START WITH NO The Negotiating Tools That the Pros Don't Want You to Know
JIM C A M P
m
CROWN BUSINESS N E W YORK
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START WITH NO The Negotiating Tools That the Pros Don't Want You to Know
JIM C A M P
m
CROWN BUSINESS N E W YORK
Copyright © 2002 by James R. Camp All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Published by Crown Business, New York, New York. Member of the Crown Publishing Group, a division of Random House, Inc. www.randomhouse.com C R O W N BUSINESS is a trademark and the Rising Sun colophon is a registered trademark of Random House, Inc. Printed in the United States of America Design by Susan Maksuta Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Camp, Jim. Start with no : the negotiating tools that the pros don't want you to know / by Jim Camp.—1st ed. 1. Negotiation in business.
I. Title.
HD58.6.C36 2002 658.4'052—dc21
2001047742
ISBN 0-609-60800-2 1 0
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First Edition
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1
To my wife, Patty
Contents
Introduction 1
W i n - W i n Will Kill Your Deal
Your Greatest Weakness in Negotiation The Dangers of Neediness
2
T h e C o l u m b o Effect The Secret of Being "Not Okay"
3
Start w i t h No How Decisions Move Negotiations Forward
4
Success C o m e s from This Foundation Develop Your Mission and Purpose
5
Stop Trying to C o n t r o l the O u t c o m e Focus on Your Behavior and Actions Instead
viii
6
Contents
W h a t Do You Say? Fuels of the Camp System: Questions
7
H o w D o You Say It? More Fuels of the Camp System
8
115
Q u i e t Your M i n d , Create a Blank Slate No Expectations, No Assumptions, No Talking
9
101
136
K n o w their "Pain," Paint T h e i r " P a i n " Work mth Your Adversary's Real Problem
159
10 T h e Real Budget and H o w to Build It The Importance of Time, Energy, Money, and Emotion
180
11 T h e Shell G a m e Be Sure You Know the Real Decision Makers
203
12 Have an Agenda and W o r k It Ride the Chaos Inherent in Negotiation 13
Present Your C a s e — I f You Insist Beware the Seductions of PowerPoint
14
215
234
Life's Greatest Lesson The Only Assurance of Long-Term Success
Conclusion
245
D a n c e with the Tiger! Thirty-three Rules to Remember
251
Contents
ix
Acknowledgments
261
Index
265
START WITH NO
Introduction Win-Win Will Kill Your Deal
•
| ow OFTEN OVER the past couple of decades have we read
I
l o r heard the phrase " w i n - w i n " ? Thousands, I guess. Enough,
I know. T h e term has b e c o m e a cliche in o u r culture, the only acceptable paradigm for personal interaction of any sort. In business, its appeal rests on the proposition that no company has the right to p l u n d e r a market j u s t because it enjoys a position of strength and d o m i n a n c e . We believe that a shared prosperity—a w i n - w i n prosperity—is the sustainable o n e . It all sounds so g o o d , w h a t stick-in-the-mud could possibly disagree that w i n - w i n is the m o d e l to use in negotiation? Well, I disagree. Based on my nearly twenty years of experience as a n e gotiation coach, I believe w i n - w i n is hopelessly misguided as a basis for good negotiating, in business or in your personal life or anywhere else. This b o o k and my system should be viewed as a
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START WITH NO
rejection of w i n - w i n and all its kind. Of the various ideas in my system that I could have chosen as my tide, I selected Start with No expressly to emphasize my profound disagreement with w i n win, which implicitly urges you to get to yes as quickly as possible, by almost any means necessary. Such negotiating is the worst possible way to get the best possible deal. In fact, it will get you killed. Maybe you w o r k for o n e of the many companies around the world that proudly display those shiny w i n - w i n trophies p r e sented to the sales t e a m by their largest customers. That's right, actual trophies, each and every one of w h i c h is testimony to a failed negotiation. Testimony to a negotiation conducted w i t h o u t discipline and w i t h o u t a system. Testimony to a negotiation c o n ducted by naive amateurs, to be perfectly blunt. I think it's great that eight-year-old girls and boys receive trophies in their baseball and soccer leagues regardless of w h e t h e r they were the c h a m pions that season. I think it's astonishing that top executives don't understand that it is precisely the w i n - w i n negotiations that are grinding their businesses into the g r o u n d . B u t this is often the case. I know, because many times I've walked right past the w i n win trophy case on my way to meet the executives w h o want to hire me as a negotiation coach because things have gotten so bad. "But so many deals have been negotiated on the basis of w i n win! So many headlines, articles, books! It must w o r k ! " My a n swer is simple: T h e fact that a given deal was negotiated and signed tells me n o t h i n g at all. W h o said this was a good deal, much less the best one? Just as the fact that the Cleveland Indians scored eight runs tells me something, b u t not e n o u g h , because the Yankees may have scored nine, so I need to k n o w the final score in these so-called w i n - w i n deals.
Win-Win Will Kill Your Deal
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And I do. I k n o w that a certain worldwide delivery c o m p a n y became an industry j u g g e r n a u t by negotiating deals w i t h h u n dreds of small vendors across America that the company then abrogated in order to obtain leverage for a better deal—better for the delivery company, that is. Were those first deals good for the vendors? Just ask them. W h a t about the second deals? Ask the vendors about these, too. I k n o w that certain clothing retailers have made a specialty of squeezing vendors into signing pie-inthe-sky deals with production targets they cannot possibly meet. W h e n they don't c o m e through, the companies enforce the letter of the law, nullify the contracts, and t h e n return in a m o n t h or so to renegotiate at the proverbial d i m e - o n - t h e - d o l l a r , b e cause they n o w have all the leverage. Were those first or second deals good for the vendors? Just ask t h e m . W h e n I became a full-time negotiating coach in the 1980s, after y e a n of m o r e informal tutoring, I didn't just say to myself, "Jim, there's always a niche for the contrarian in any field, so w h y don't you go challenge the w i n - w i n paradigm?" N o r am I a go-for-the-jugular tough guy w h o enjoys bullying people, as if this were the only alternative to w i n - w i n . T h e business world is certainly full of such individuals, and we will meet s o m e of t h e m in these pages, but I'm n o t o n e of t h e m . N o , I began to challenge w i n - w i n because I quickly learned that it's all too often win-/<we. M a k e no mistake about it: a simply terrible but supposedly w i n - w i n deal is signed every m i n u t e in this country. T h e promise is just manipulation. It's all double-talk. T h i n k about the situation this way: If a c o m p a n y with a g o o d product or service and with adequate resources goes bankrupt, w h i c h happens daily, what is likely to be more responsible for this fatality than p o o r negotiating w i t h suppliers, customers, e m p l o y ees, someone? B u t even as the n u m b e r of w i n - w i n losers grows
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and grows, the unwary are still legion. If I accomplish n o t h i n g in this b o o k beyond alerting businesspeople to the dangers of w i n win, I will have performed a valuable public service. I feel so strongly on this subject I'm n o w g o i n g to devote a couple m o r e pages to it. S o m e readers—I'm a m o n g them—tend to skim or e v e n skip b o o k i n t r o d u c t i o n s . P l e a s e d o n ' t d o s o this t i m e . I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d m y s y s t e m , y o u must u n d e r stand t h e d a n g e r s inherent in w i n - w i n .
They're Lying in Wait I am not the first professional negotiator to understand the inherent weakness of the reigning philosophy. N o t at all. Many, many corporate opportunists and shrewd negotiators in every field understand that a g u n g ho, w i n - w i n negotiator on the other side of the table is a sitting duck. In fact, o n e increasingly popular, high-level corporate strategy in negotiation c o m m o n l y k n o w n in the business world by the acronym PI C O S was developed for the sole purpose of defeating weak w i n - w i n negotiators. This an instructive story, which I'll pick up in the early 1990s, w h e n a m a n n a m e d Jose Ignacio Lopez de Arriotua was a main player in the p r o c u r e m e n t d e p a r t m e n t for General M o t o r s . (Many readers will r e m e m b e r Lopez for his subsequent highly publicized defection to Volkswagen in 1992 amid charges that he stole GM secrets. T h e federal g o v e r n m e n t has indicted h i m for industrial espionage, b u t he's fighting extradition from Spain.) Lopez and his c o h o r t at GM developed P I C O S , or Program for the Improvement and Cost Optimization of Suppliers. (I've also seen it spelled o u t as Purchased Input Cost Optimization, so take your pick.) T h e advertised idea of this "costing m e t h o d " was to
Win-Win Will Kill Your Deal
help suppliers hold down their o w n costs in the design and p r o d u c t i o n stage of the products they sold to G M . By h o l d i n g d o w n suppliers' costs, G M held d o w n suppliers' prices a n d thereby G M ' s o w n costs. So w h a t could be w r o n g w i t h helping suppliers hold d o w n their o w n costs? That's w i n - w i n , isn't it? It sure was—for G M , because w h e n the rhetoric was stripped away, "cost optimizat i o n " was a politically correct e u p h e m i s m for bludgeoning s u p pliers into submission. It was n o t h i n g m o r e or less than a diligent, sustained, extremely effective way for the giant a u t o maker to drive d o w n costs by putting the squeeze on its t h o u sands of suppliers, no matter the result to them. If a supplier w e n t belly-up or couldn't deliver u n d e r the negotiated terms, there was always a n o t h e r supplier w h o believed that it could s o m e h o w live with these prices. P I C O S and its w i n - w i n r h e t oric s o u n d e d good in theory, b u t it was and is devastating in practice for many businesses. Today, several major business schools have developed similar programs for cost optimization or "supply systems m a n a g e ment," as they are also labeled, and I imagine many others will follow suit, because GM and other large corporations have had great success with them. T h e business school that teaches the w i n - w i n mantra in a course on negotiation might also teach, right across the hall, a course in "supply system m a n a g e m e n t " that's expressly designed to destroy the w i n - w i n model! M i n d boggling. Just a couple of weeks before w r i t i n g this book I happened across an interview on o n e of N o r t h w e s t Airlines's audio channels with the C E O of a n e w c o m p a n y that develops software for "interactive electronic c o m m e r c e . " This C E O was boasting a b o u t h o w the company's p r o c u r e m e n t software helps their
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clients " d o m i n a t e their suppliers." That's the quote, and that's just the tip of the iceberg. T h e N e t will facilitate the growth of huge buying cooperatives, multiM/ion-dollar initiatives that will allow competitors to c o m b i n e their buying power in order to drive d o w n suppliers' prices and add another tool to their cost optimization arsenal: "If your terms aren't g o o d enough, we'll put it up for bid on the N e t . " I have no idea h o w this will all shake o u t in the years ahead, b u t I do k n o w it represents more leverage for the big boys.
The Invitation to Unnecessary Compromise W h a t is the poison that resides at the heart of the big lie that is w i n - w i n ? You've heard of the deadly stuff. It's called compromise. Many negotiators play the w i n - w i n game w i t h an implicit invitation to debilitating early compromise on the part of their unwary adversaries, w h o are, in turn, almost programmed into this fatal mistake by the mantra of w i n - w i n . T h o s e smooth-talking negotiators don't compromise, b u t they d e m a n d that you do. (In the case of corporate purchasing departments, I guess their c o m promise is that they're buying from you instead of from s o m e o n e else.) And all the while, they p u t the happy face on their n e g o tiations. GM acquired the deserved reputation of being a bully, so it and all the other big purchasing companies learned to be even m o r e diligent in their use of w i n - w i n rhetoric, playing on o u r old-fashioned, all-American, Dale C a r n e g i e instinct to win friends and influence people. T h e y say, "Let's team up on this, partner." T h e y play on the t i m e - h o n o r e d A m e r i c a n tradition of collective bargaining. In fact, almost every recent b o o k on negotiation—many dozens, if not hundreds, including academic texts and popular paperbacks alike—structure their wisdom and
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advice around legally mandated collective bargaining in labor r e lations (the National Labor Relations Act of 1935): negotiating in good faith, give-and-take, compromise. In collective bargaining, a negotiator can be sent to jail for failing to bargain in good faith—for rejecting w i n - w i n , in effect. It should be no surprise that many w i n - w i n gurus in this c o u n t r y w e r e e d u c a t e d and trained in this field. In and of itself, tightly regulated collective bargaining is fine. So is generic "bargaining in good faith." Of course you want to bargain and negotiate in good faith. I insist on it with my clients. B u t w h e n the tiger across the table says, " N o w , Denise, Tom, you have to consider o u r legitimate interests here. We have to have a little good faith here, a litde w i n - w i n , " what is Denise and Tom's first thought? It's probably that they have to give up s o m e thing if they need to sign this deal—and of course they do need to sign this deal, it's such a big o n e for their company. T h e y have allowed themselves to be subtly manipulated into feeling responsible for the results r e p o r t e d to his boss by their adversary. They're nice people, so they compromise in order to help their adversary b e c o m e a winner, too, t h o u g h they have no idea what makes h i m a winner. W h e n naive, e a g e r - t o - e a r n D e n i s e and T o m are negotiating with a c u n n i n g tiger w h o has also read the w i n - w i n books, they are in terrible jeopardy. Please r e m e m b e r this: T h e negotiators for many of the d o m i nant multinationals are tigers. Most if not all of the great businessmen and businesswomen are tigers. I dare you to walk into the negotiating cage with t h e m or their colleagues or a team of cost optimization negotiators while using o n e of the w i n - w i n textbooks as your bible. If you don't believe m e , please check w i t h suppliers for a certain w o r l d w i d e delivery c o m p a n y and for certain retail clothing companies. Please check with smaller
S U I T WITH N O
8
companies w h o deal daily w i t h the giants of the Brave N e w E c o n o m y o u t on the West Coast. A n d I can assure you that n e gotiators in Saudi Arabia a n d Japan d o n ' t k n o w about o u r American tradition of collective bargaining—or if they do, it's in order to take advantage of the negotiator w h o comes to their table w i t h that mind-set. Was Ho C h i M i n h playing w i n win games in those fateful negotiations over Vietnam? I don't think so. B u t R i c h a r d N i x o n and H e n r y Kissinger and their team were. T h e furthest t h o u g h t from Ho's shrewd mind was negotiating a "wise agreement," as defined in Gelling to Yes, the leading w i n w i n b o o k on the market today. A quick look at that definition will be highly instructive. It reads: "A wise agreement can be d e fined as o n e that meets the legitimate interests of each side to the extent possible, resolves conflicting interests fairly, is durable, and takes c o m m u n i t y interests into account." Sounds nice e n o u g h , but exactly w h o decides which interests are "legitimate"? In whose eyes are conflicting interests "fairly" resolved? A n d what does " t o the extent possible" mean? And what does " d u r a b l e " m e a n — t h a t the agreement lasts a m o n t h , a year, or for the ages? And which " c o m m u n i t y interests" are we talking about? T h e r e are many of t h e m , often in competition, o n e w i t h the other (schools, labor, management, the environment, city hall—just for starters). O n e m o r e time: "A wise agreement can be defined as o n e that meets the legitimate interests of each side to the extent possible, resolves conflicting interests fairly, is durable, and takes c o m m u n i t y interests into account." In a perfect world, maybe, but in this o n e I hear " T a p s " playing in the background. C o m promise is implicit—almost explicit—within this definition. Of course, o u r hypothetical negotiators Denise and T o m do have to
Win-Win Will Kill Your Dtal
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consider their adversary's "legitimate interests," o n c e they figure o u t w h a t they are, but this does not necessarily mean they need to give up a single dime. W h y in the world compromise before you're certain you have to? Sometimes you do, and that's fine, but often you don't, and that's better. T h e key point is that w i t h the w i n - w i n mind-set, you'll never know which it is. T h i n k carefully about this for a m o ment: W i n - w i n and compromise are a defeatist mind-set from the first handshake. Negotiating u n d e r the banner of w i n - w i n , you'll have no way of k n o w i n g if you've made good and necessary decisions leading up to the compromise. Maybe some readers are already thinking, " T h i s J i m C a m p approach sounds too cold-blooded for me. I like the idea of w i n w i n . I believe it makes for a better, fairer world." N o w I hear " T a p s " playing n o t quietly in the background, b u t l o u d and clear. Let me illustrate with a quick, true story. Imagine that you are o n e of a small crew of y o u n g software hotshots in Silicon Valley and a Japanese firm offered to license your state-of-the-art technology for $400,000. You n e e d some capital, and here's s o m e nice capital. You guys and gals live on practically nothing, and this m o n e y might get you over the h u m p , and these i n vestors are smart e n o u g h to think highly of your work and kind e n o u g h to go out on a limb for you. It's a good w i n - w i n deal, right? So this team thought. T h e y were tempted to accept the initial offer before they were introduced to me, and I suggested a different approach because I found o u t that this Japanese firm that had pretended for six m o n t h s that this $400,000 offer was all they could afford was actually a subterfuge g r o u p w o r k i n g on behalf of a major Japanese car manufacturer to buy American technology as cheaply as possible. Such "hit squads," as they're k n o w n , are notorious in Silicon Valley, and their equivalents o p -
START WITH NO
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erate in every field of business, large and small, and usually u n d e r the humanitarian guise of w i n - w i n . T h e final negotiated fee for that crew's technology was $8 million. W h y ? Because that's w h a t it was w o r t h . W i n - w i n would never have netted what that technology was w o r t h . Maybe some readers are also already t h i n k i n g , " B u t what about that w o r d 'adversary' you used earlier, C a m p ? I don't like that. Negotiation isn't a war." N o , it's n o t a war, and while I realize that the word "adversary" may carry confrontational c o n n o tations, I define it as "respected o p p o n e n t . " You are negotiating w i t h a respected o p p o n e n t . I employ the word "adversary" mainly to counter the mushy idea that the folks on the other side want to be your friend, and may even pretend to be your friend. Sure w i n - w i n sounds good! That's exactly w h y it's so dangerous and w h y you have to be so careful. W h e n negotiating over the fence with your neighbor about what time you should fire up the coals for the big barbecue, you might well get by w i t h w i n - w i n , but n o t against the tough, seasoned negotiators in the outside world.
Emotion-Based versus Decision-based Negotiation It's crazy o u t there. In many, many corporations, the sales force adheres to the w i n - w i n paradigm and therefore compromises at every o p p o r t u n i t y in its desperation to "get the business," while the various purchasing agents and departments are well skilled in o n e of the theories of supply systems m a n a g e m e n t that are d e signed to take advantage of w i n - w i n vendors. Do the chief e x ecutive officers understand the contradiction here, the absurdity,
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and do they understand that both the w i n - w i n and the P I C O S paradigms are self-defeating? I wonder. Here's a true story that perfectly proves my point. On o n e side of the negotiating table was a medium-sized company that sells a product vital to the high-tech world. I'll call this c o m p a n y E u p h o r i c , Inc. On the other side of the table was a division of a giant multinational that supplies a chemical vital to Euphoric's product. I'll call this supplier Worldwide, Inc. In this negotiation, Worldwide approached E u p h o r i c and requested a r e n e g o tiation of the contract for their p a t e n t e d chemical, w h i c h is petroleum based and therefore had b e c o m e m u c h m o r e e x p e n sive to produce, given a w o r l d w i d e increase in oil prices. E u phoric refused to renegotiate the contract. A deal is a deal, they said. In reply, W o r l d w i d e slowed d o w n its s h i p m e n t of the chemical, and w i t h o u t this chemical. E u p h o r i c would have to shut d o w n its line. H o w m u c h w o u l d W o r l d w i d e s request have added to E u phoric's unit cost? A b o u t fifteen cents. H o w m u c h did E u p h o r i c retail this unit for? A little over $2,000. T h o s e numbers are not typos. T h e battle was raging over a fifteen-cent increase in cost for a $2,000 product. W h a t in the world could account for such blindness? It's very simple. Worldwide, like vendors everywhere, was so used to compromising at every opportunity in the name of w i n - w i n that they were afraid to insist on the justified p r e m i u m for their patented p r o d u c t . Meanwhile, the purchasing folks at E u p h o r i c were risking tens of millions of dollars in business because they, like purchasing departments everywhere, were blindly committed to taking a d vantage of w i n - w i n adversaries at every opportunity. Both sides were in an emotional box, c o m m i t t e d to abstract theories of n e -
12
START WITH NO
gotiation, and neither side m a d e g o o d decisions. In the end, Worldwide got its p r e m i u m , because it was the best decision for b o t h companies, but the negotiation was ridiculously long and involved and expensive. This b o o k is a refutation of all such emotion-based negotiating. As an alternative, I present for your consideration rfedsum-based negotiating. In the end, I believe you'll agree w i t h me that the difference between the two is clear and that the choice between the two is easy. W h e n I was in the air force, I learned, first in the classroom and then by practice in the cockpit, decision after decision, mistake after mistake, that I could n o t directly control the actions and decisions of my adversary, b u t I could, t h r o u g h trained habits, better manage my assessment of my adversary and make certain that it was accurate. W i t h good decision-making skills, I had a chance at maintaining control of the situation and thereby achieving a beneficial o u t c o m e . Likewise, I couldn't absolutely control my e m o t i o n s — n o o n e c a n — b u t I could keep t h e m under check, I could keep t h e m from overly influencing my actions, w i t h carefully constructed behavioral habits. This is precisely h o w the surgeon or any other practitioner learns his or h e r craft: through practice, study, making good and bad decisions, correcting the bad ones, m o r e practice, m o r e study, m o r e decisions, m o r e corrections. I focused on what I could control—the m e a n s — n o t what I could n o t control—the end. T h e focus of this b o o k is teaching you h o w to do the same during negotiation, because t o o many negotiators do just the opposite. T h e y focus on what they cannot control—the e n d — w h i l e losing sight of what they can c o n t r o l — the means. I like this analogy w i t h baseball. Barry Bonds and Sammy
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Sosa c a n n o t control w h e t h e r they hit a h o m e run. After all, Bernie Williams may climb the wall and take it away, or the long fly may confront a jet stream that keeps the ball on the w a r n i n g track. A lot of things can happen in the end, so Bonds and Sosa can only focus on the means to the end: putting a pure, sweet swing on the ball. T h e y think only in t e r m s of maintaining power and leverage in the process of the swing. If they think in terms of homers, they lose power and leverage by overswinging and lunging at bad pitches. T h e analogy w i t h a business negotiation is direct, w h i c h I realized almost from the first day I thought seriously about the subject, w h e n helping a friend in California work o u t a small business deal. You cannot control the other party's actions and decisions—not direcdy—but you can control your assessment of your adversary's situation, and you can, with a great deal of w o r k and discipline, control your o w n actions and decisions, and you can keep your emotions u n d e r check. My system teaches you h o w to control what you can control in a negotiation. W h e n you do so, you can and will succeed (understanding that success sometimes means walking away w i t h a polite good-bye). My principle (and title), "Start w i t h N o , " is based on the u n derstanding that " n o " is a decision. An early "yes" is probably a trick, and " m a y b e " is just that, maybe, and gets you nowhere. B u t " n o " is a decision that gives everyone s o m e t h i n g to talk about, that helps you maintain control, as I'll explain in detail in chapter 3. A n o t h e r rule is " N o Closing." B u t this is absurd, you may think. After all, " H o w to C l o s e " is a m o r e or less mandatory section of almost every negotiation b o o k , so it has to be i m p o r tant. But I'm n o t playing games. Large deals, and even smaller ones, don't "close" in the usual sense of the term. T h e y come to-
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gether, through vision and decision, over weeks and m o n t h s and maybe years. Moreover, if closing this deal is your goal, your preoccupation, maybe even your life's dream, then you're c o n centrating on what you cannot control and forgetting about what you can control. W h e n negotiating w i t h real pros, you'll pay the price in the end for this misguided behavior. In my system, you forget about w i n n i n g and concentrate on the fundamentals of sound decision making. At first e n c o u n t e r , some p e o p l e — m a n y , to be frank—are skeptical of these and other rules I use in my work, because they seem to fly in the face of conventional business wisdom. S o m e n e w clients have even been actively resistant, but after closer consideration, certainly after one trial negotiation, the great m a j o r i t y of these m e n and w o m e n are converted, because inviting the adversary to say " n o " simply works. T h e " N o Closing" rule simply works. Concentrating on what you can actually control in a n e g o t i a t i o n — t h e means, not the end—simply works. T h e so-called contrarian suddenly becomes c o m m o n sense.
The Camp System To repeat: W i n - w i n is often win-lose because it invites unnecessary compromise, because it is emotion-based, not rfemion-based, and because it plays to the heart, n o t to the head. And one m o r e thing: W i n - w i n is n o t based on definitive principles; it's based on mush like the definition of a "wise a g r e e m e n t " I've already cited. A w i n - w i n negotiation is not controlled in a clear, step-bystep way. That's just o n e reason w i n - w i n gets slaughtered in the real business world, again and again and again. I k n o w C E O s w h o are proud of their deal making, b u t they have no discipline,
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15
no real basis for making their decisions. They're shooting from the hip u n d e r the assumption that everyone else is s h o o t i n g from the hip. B u t s o m e of their adversaries aren't. S o m e are shooting w i t h a telescopic lens a n d the unwary w i n - w i n adversary is the target. It's not a fair fight. M a n y readers will have heard Ross Perot's often-told story about the American w h o wants to b u y a camel, pulls up at a tent w i t h half a dozen camels staked in front, a n d asks the o w n e r about one particular animal. T h e b e d o u i n replies, " O h , that's my son's camel, his pet. I couldn't sell that one." T h e A m e r i c a n looks nonplussed, gets back into his R a n g e Rover, and starts to drive off. T h e b e d o u i n runs after him, shouting, "I t h o u g h t you wanted to b u y my camel!" I agree with Ross Perot: Americans don't k n o w h o w to n e g o tiate! Okay, you ask me and Perot, h o w did these C E O s get to the top if they're such i n c o m p e t e n t negotiators? Since w i n - w i n isn't a system and offers no real basis f o r j u d g i n g those w h o " u s e " it, mediocrity flourishes w i t h o u t b e i n g detected. We all k n o w there's a fair a m o u n t of mediocrity in American business, and I believe the w i n - w i n paradigm is partially responsible. So what if the negotiator settled for offering a 27 percent volume discount, while his bosses were h o p i n g he'd only have to offer 24. He tried, and it's only a 3 percent difference, and it was w i n - w i n , so break o u t the bubbly. No o n e has any idea h o w m u c h , if any, volume discount should have been offered and would have been accepted. Or change the perspective: T h e buyer was h o p i n g to get a 27 percent discount but only got 24, and under w i n - w i n w h o k n o w s h o w m u c h she could have gotten with better n e g o tiating? So break out the bubbly on the other side of the table. My b o o k introduces a system. W i t h it, y o u do k n o w h o w m u c h discount should have been offered, and you do not offer
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one dime more. W i t h my system, you focus on goals and behavior you can control and ignore results you cannot control. T h e system is pretty simple to understand, I believe, in its basics, but it does take strict discipline and a great deal of practice to e m ploy successfully, w h e t h e r you're negotiating the price of a P o k e m o n card, a n e w house, or a multimillion-dollar deal for, or with, a multinational. This discipline and practice have changed the lives of my clients—not only because they're bringing h o m e a lot m o r e m o n e y than in the past, b u t in the broader context of a life lived w i t h boss, coworkers, teammates, spouse, children, friends. No matter your walk in life, if you sat d o w n and calculated the n u m b e r of negotiations you handle in a busy week, the answer would astound you. I did this o n c e for myself and got up to o n e h u n d r e d before deciding that e n o u g h was e n o u g h . Your answer will be in the same range because, if your family is a n y thing like m i n e was s o m e years ago, w h i c h restaurant to go to w i t h the kids is o n e negotiation, which table you take is a second one, w h a t dishes they order is yet a third, and what they actually eat is yet a fourth. You get the picture. In N e w York City, which route the cabby takes from La Guardia to m i d t o w n Manhattan is a negotiation. W h a t time you meet w i t h your negotiating adversaries at the hotel may well be a negotiation. T h e list is endless, and the principles and system I introduce in this book apply to all of t h e m . T h e c o n t e n t of this b o o k is contrarian, but the structure couldn't be m o r e straightforward: fourteen chapters that introduce, o n e by o n e , the principles a n d practices of my system. T h e y progress from the more general principles that are really about preparing yourself for negotiation—neediness, being not o k a y — t o principles that are still about preparing yourself, but also take you into the realm of actual negotiations. These c h a p -
Win-Win Will Kill Your Deal
17
ters will also be n e w to you, even w h e n dealing with tried-andtrue business ideas like mission and purpose, w h i c h , in my system, is completely different from any M & P statement you've ever prepared. T h e last chapters then take us into the nitty-gritty practices we'll use to negotiate actual deals. You will learn h o w to rigorously structure the negotiating process from A to Z w i t h agendas and budgets a n d o t h e r g o o d t h i n g s — n o n e of t h e m b e i n g the usual practices of the business world.
A Bio and a Guarantee This system first began to take shape in the air force, then d u r i n g my career as a commercial pilot, and then in the business arena as I m a d e the transition to negotiating coach. I am not a consultant. I'm a coach, and there's a h u g e difference: Consultants are m u c h less hands-on than coaches, and they take no responsibility for their work. T h e r e are h u n d r e d s — m a y b e thousands—of consultants w h o include negotiations as a featured service. T h e r e are very few coaches w h o do what I do, working with my clients on every aspect of the negotiation. For the past dozen years, since I founded the N e g o t i a t o r C o a c h i n g Series in the Bay Area, and t h e n Camptraining, I have trained and coached negotiation teams here and abroad, on every continent. I h o l d N e g o t i a t o r C o a c h Symposiums every year in major venues across the continent. Harvard University, O h i o State University, and the University of San Francisco have sent participants to my lectures and symposiums. Inc. magazine has featured me in its annual G r o w i n g the C o m p a n y conference. All in all, I've introduced my ideas and my system to about fifteen thousand individuals. I've worked with about 150 c o r p o r a tions on literally thousands of negotiations. In the last decade,
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m e n and w o m e n in many different fields have used my system to negotiate transactions worth m o r e than $4 billion. I've coached individuals and teams at such companies as Motorola, Texas Instruments, Merrill Lynch, IBM, and P r u d e n tial Insurance. I also w o r k with many medium-sized and small companies. At any given time I'm w o r k i n g w i t h about thirty companies, c o n d u c t i n g seminars a n d / o r o n e - t o - o n e coaching with, on average, about 130 individuals in each company. I'm involved in about 750 negotiations a year. I also coach some individual proprietors. And t h e n there's the interactive website, Camptraining.com. I'm n o t claiming that this book will accomplish for the reader w h a t I accomplish with my workshops and hands-on and w e b site coaching, because I work with my clients for hours, days, weeks, months, years, and decades, in certain instances. I'm i n clined to give credence to the theories of learning that suggest we humans need about eight hundred hours to truly master a complex concept and the habits necessary for its application. B u t I have no doubt this b o o k alone will be a revelation to readers, just as the material in its m o r e hands-on form is a revelation to my clients. T h i n k of me as a patient, supportive, enthusiastic coach in absentia, or at a distance. Reading this b o o k will n o t necessarily prepare you for negotiating a $2 million deal w i t h H u m o n g o u s , Inc., whose negotiators may be the most tenacious of t h e m all, but if you apply the principles I introduce here and if you develop the proper habits, you will be closer to this goal than you ever imagined. Obviously, there are thousands of articles, b o o k s , college courses, and websites dealing with the art and the science of n e gotiating. Plenty of g o o d deals were signed in this world before I showed up on the scene, and plenty have b e e n accomplished by
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negotiators w h o have never heard of me. But many, many bad ones have also been signed. This is my promise to the reader: You might pull off a successful n e g o t i a t i o n — o r at least obtain a serendipitous result—without the C a m p System, but you will negotiate many m o r e g o o d deals with this system, and you will n o t get bogged d o w n or suckered into a single bad negotiation with this system. No o n e hires, or should hire, a negotiating trainer or coach based on an advertisement. Every n e w client I have is a referral from another client. In the early days of my work as a coach I offered every n e w client a written guarantee. If it were possible to publish a b o o k w i t h the same guarantee, I'd do so w i t h o u t qualms. If you work hard to understand and put to good use the principles and practices revealed in this short b o o k , you will b e c o m e an immeasurably better negotiator. That's a fact. W h e t h e r we like it or not, it really is a j u n g l e out there in the world of business, and it's crawling with predators. In my work I often use the image "dance w i t h the tiger," because the tiger is viewed or even worshiped a r o u n d the world as the ultimate predator. To dance well—to negotiate well—we must hear the music, we must feel the music, we must be tuned in to o u r p a r t n e r — o u r "adversary"—at all times, we must follow carefully established steps w i t h discipline. This b o o k provides such a discipline and such a system. This is n o t a lot of theory that was dreamed up in an ivory tower and looks pretty good on paper b u t doesn't pass the smell test. My system was developed in the real world of business and is used with tremendous success in this real world every day. I've spent a good deal of rime in the ivory tower, reading about the great decision makers, but I've never lived or w o r k e d there. This is nuts-and-bolts material that you will immediately be
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able to apply in your business negotiations as well as in all other aspects of your life. You will learn h o w to lay o u t a negotiation on paper and control it step-by-step, h o w to react effectively to anything that happens at the negotiating table, h o w never to be caught flat-footed, even h o w to walk away with a smile, if need be. You will close this b o o k feeling, "I can do this. What's more, I already have a pretty g o o d idea how to do this."
1 Your Greatest Weakness in Negotiation The Dangers ofNeediness
W
HY ARE THE tiger's eyes set in the front of the head, facing forward? Because the animal is a predator always on the
lookout for prey. W h y are o u r o w n eyes also set in the front of the head, facing forward? Because we are predators as well. W a t c h i n g children in a playground is delightful, but it is also cautionary, as every parent knows, because we see the king-ofthe-hill, one-upmanship, bullying, competitive instincts emerge at a very early age. These instincts last a lifetime, as anyone w h o has spent m u c h time in a nursing h o m e knows. T h e y accompany some of us right to the grave. This is a harsh truth with w h i c h to begin the first chapter of this b o o k , but it's a vitally necessary point. Like all predators, we humans often take advantage of the fear-racked, the distressed, the vulnerable, the needy. We're capable of wonderful altruism as
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well, but we don't find too m u c h altruism in the business and negotiation world, despite all the sweet talk of some cagey w i n w i n negotiators. In a negotiation, " d o g - e a t - d o g " may n o t do justice to the hidden ferocity. In your life as a negotiator, even in your life as a private citizen of the world, you are dealing w i t h some serious predators w h o are looking for the slightest sign of distress and neediness. It is absolutely imperative that you as a negotiator understand the i m p o r t a n c e of this point. You do N O T need this deal, b e cause to be needy is to lose control and make bad decisions. H o w vulnerable are you to predators w h e n you lose control? Very vulnerable. I'll illustrate the point w i t h the movie To Walk with Lions, starring R i c h a r d Harris and set in East Africa, n a t u rally e n o u g h , w h e r e the character played by Harris has many "friends" a m o n g the animals, including a certain lion. O n e day Harris slips and falls on a hillside—and the lion is on h i m in a flash! Harris manages to fire his gun and scare the lion away, but he doesn't shoot him, because he has always k n o w n and never forgotten that the lion is a predator, first and foremost, and will behave like a predator w h e n given the opportunity and sensing weakness. Every animal trainer k n o w s the same thing: with a predator, it's all about power. Many negotiators are the same way. M a n y win-win negotiators are the same way. W h e n I cover this subject in workshops and seminars, s o m e p e o p l e seem to think that I'm exaggerating about this neediness business. I am n o t . In fact, if I polled my clients over the past years to n a m e the o n e idea of my system that had the greatest and most immediately beneficial impact on their negotiating work, I'm pretty sure that a plurality, maybe even a significant majority, w o u l d identify this simple w a r n i n g about neediness. W i t h experience they have learned that neediness can
Your Greatest Weakness in Negotiation
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have—will have—a dramatic, always negative effect on their b e havior. You must overcome any neediness at the negotiating table.
Neediness Comes in Many Varieties Perhaps the category of negotiation in w h i c h this neediness d y namic is most powerful and dangerous is the straight retail sales negotiation, in which the golden rule of business is the implicit understanding of b o t h sides: " T h e o n e with the gold rules." In Western culture, we see ourselves as buyers, don't we? We proudly buy and c o n s u m e as m u c h as we can. T h e salesperson, on the other hand, has a problem with his or her self-image. T h e very t e r m "sales" is being replaced in many fields by "business development," because the image of the salesperson is that of the huckster on the street, almost. M o r e important, the salesperson is definitely the dependent party in the negotiation. He or she must be prepared to give, to compromise, while the buyer takes everything he or she can get. After all, the buyer can go elsewhere, in most cases, but the poor seller needs this deal. T h e selfimage of the individual in the selling role traps h i m or her in a neediness m o d e and often leads to bad deals. Tough negotiators are experts at recognizing this neediness in their adversaries, and expert in creating it as well. Negotiators with giant corporations, in particular, will heighten the expectations of their supplier adversaries, painting rosy, exaggerated scenarios for mega-orders, j o i n t ventures, global alliances, all for the purpose of building neediness on the part of their adversary for this once-in-a-lifetime, c a r e e r - m a k i n g deal. T h e n , w h e n the neediness is well established, they lower the b o o m with changes, exceptions, and a lot m o r e — d e m a n d s for concessions, all of
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them. T h r o u g h o u t this b o o k we'll see in ugly detail h o w this works. Sometimes, however, the buyer, n o t the seller, finds himself in the potentially needy position. A classic example from history is the Lewis and Clark expedition. W h e n these intrepid explorers really needed fresh horses, the Native Americans s o m e h o w k n e w this. If the local residents were negotiating to sell less valuable and necessary goods, they came to quick agreements, but w h e n they were selling vitally needed horses to the explorers, they pitched their teepees and settled in for the long haul. T h e y were instinctively tough negotiators. (The journals of Lewis and Clark are excellent reading for any negotiator, because these t w o great Americans e n c o u n t e r e d dozens of unusual negotiating situations.) Sometimes Lewis and Clark were needy, plain and simple. Sometimes they really were desperate for horses and other supplies. Today, in the twenty-first century, we're n o t needy. We're just not, b u t we nevertheless still hear people say, "I need this jacket." Or "I need this car." Or "I need to make this call." Or "I need this job." Or "I need to talk to you." Or "I need this deal." We use the word " n e e d " much too casually. T h e only things we truly need are the basics of physical survival—air, water, food, clothing, shelter—and everyone reading this b o o k already has these. We also need the basics of intellectual and emotional wellbeing—love, family, friendship, satisfying work, hobbies, faith— each reader has his or her o w n list here. But it's a short list, and it does n o t — o r should n o t — i n c l u d e the $500 jacket or the $100,000 car, because there are other jackets and cars. It should not include this particular j o b or sale or deal, because there are other jobs and sales and deals. Nevertheless, neediness is everywhere. Let me tell you the
Your Greatest Weakness in Negotiation
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most instructive experience on this subject I've had in my o w n life. T h e time is 0-dark-30 hours (military lingo for early A.M.) on a cold, damp, foggy January m o r n i n g in West Texas. This is the first m o r n i n g on the flight line for my group of fighter pilot trainees. T h e r o o m is full of y o u n g m e n , all second lieutenants, dressed in n e w green flight suits and black high-top boots, waiting for the flight c o m m a n d e r . In walks Major Dave Miller, slightly gray at the temples, the perfect specimen of a fighter pilot, a veteran of the R e d River Valley in Vietnam, site of some of the most intense aerial c o m b a t in history. " A t t e n - h u t ! " We j u m p to o u r feet and stand ramrod straight. In a deep, confident voice he c o m m a n d s "Seats!" You never saw m e n sit d o w n as quickly as this group did. Immediately he says, "Lieutenant Camp." I'm startled b u t gather my wits as best as I can, leap back up to attention, and answer, "Sir, yes sir!" Dave Miller says, "You have just taken off, you are three hundred feet above the ground and climbing. Instantly, everything goes quiet and you feel like s o m e o n e is putting on the brakes. Your airspeed is at two h u n d r e d fifty knots and slowing. You suddenly realize b o t h engines have quit. W h a t are you going to d o ? " My mind goes blank and my heart goes into orbit. It seems like forever, b u t then I hear myself say, "Well, sir, w h i c h runway am I o n ? " And believe it or not, I proceeded to debate this man, a seasoned veteran, my teacher, about h o w I should have handled that hypothetical situation. T h e correct answer to Miller's question was eject. Eject? He must be out of his mind. I'd never ejected in my life—never even considered it d u r i n g my prior training. A n d on that m o r n i n g I never considered that Miller was trying to save my life, while I was trying to show off by arguing that I could make it to a certain runway. There's another word for all that early chutzpah and ego on
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my part: neediness, plain and simple. In that " n e g o t i a t i o n " with my instructor, I needed to be a top gun, to k n o w it all, to be right. Sometimes neediness is blatant and easy to spot, as in that flying story, but m o r e often it is subde and insidious. T h e trained negotiator sees neediness of all sorts all the time, in big ways and in little ways. It is so easy to slip into such a state, often w i t h o u t even being aware of it. T h i n k about something as simple as a greering. "Hi,
I'm Frank Jones."
"Hello, Mr. Jones." Such subtle subservience puts you at an immediate disadvantage. You have c o n c e d e d that Frank Jones is top g u n in this room, and he knows it. You're ripe for the picking. So call h i m Frank instead. Consider this appeal for an appointment: "Mr. Smith, this is Bob Jones. I'm with First Advantage Venture Fund, and I want to see if I could get ten minutes on your calendar so I can show you how we can work with you in the future." R e m e m b e r , n e w companies aren't the only parties w h o can be needy. S o m e start-ups are well funded and choosy regarding any venture capitalist they may b r i n g in. T h e investors can also get into the needy m o d e , just as B o b Jones did while m o r e or less begging for this appointment. B o b should have said: "Bill, my name is Bob Jones. I'm not quite sure that we as a venture fund fit where you're going. I just don't know. What I'd like to do is meet with you so we can see where you're going and you can look at where we're going at First Advantage and see if there's a Jit. When's the best time on your calendar?"
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" N o Talking" Talking can be an overt showing of need. This is w h y " N o Talki n g " is one of my rules—an exaggeration, of course, but I make it a rule to make the point: Talking and showing need go hand in hand. O n e of my best students started o u t with an insatiable d e sire to make sure his voice was heard. This guy was bright and always wanted people to k n o w that he was as informed and on top of things as anyone in the r o o m . He needed to feel important. Okay, t h o u g h t his shrewder adversaries, we'll be happy to let you feel important as we skin you alive. This is a c o m m o n issue that hard-driving, alpha-male types have to deal w i t h daily: T h e y want to k n o w it all, or, short of that, they want to be seen to k n o w it all. T h e adrenaline kicks in, the neediness becomes a biochemical fact, then the neediness becomes a biochemical addiction. It's true. O n e of the most effective life insurance salesmen I ever saw was a m a n in a wheelchair w h o could not speak. He used a marker and a board to c o m m u n i c a t e , patiendy writing out his questions. I would not wish this man's disability on anyone, but his only means of asking questions was a terrific advantage in his profession, as he was the first to acknowledge, because it's hard to be needy w h i l e sitting in a wheelchair calmly w r i t i n g o u t questions by hand. (His most effective question, by the way: "If we lose you, w h e r e will your family live?") H o w many people do you k n o w w h o won't let you get a word in edgewise? By being overbearing, these people are actually betraying neediness. I've even heard an overbearing, needy o u t g o i n g message on an answering machine. N o r m a l is " H i , this is
. Please leave your message at the beep." Instead, this
individual greeted the caller w i t h a detailed message regarding
S T A I T WITH N O
28
her schedule for the hour, the day, the week. And I think we can imagine what kind of messages this person left on other people's answering machines: long ones! She needed to make sure you understood h o w busy she was, h o w c o m p e t e n t she must be, h o w lucky you w o u l d be if she could spare you the rime of day. B u t it's all counterproductive. It's just annoying. N o w think for a m o m e n t about "cold calls" and " w a r m calls," because they're the ultimate lesson on this subject. Just thinking about cold calls gives the average businessperson chills. It's tough, no d o u b t about it, and a lot of fine people just won't do it. Cold calling is the worst way to do business, we all k n o w that. But I say it's also a great way, because it's a great training ground, and it can be surprisingly effective because your neediness is under control. You have no great expectations, that's for sure, and your discipline is keen. You start off by saying something like: "Well, Mary, I have no idea whether what we do has any relevance for your business. I just don't know, maybe it doesn't. If not, just tell me and I'll be on my way, but if whoever handles your market research
..."
And off you g o — o r not. It doesn't matter. Your neediness is under control. A cold call is just a n o t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n — n o m o r e and no less—and by the e n d of this b o o k you'll understand h o w to handle a cold call according to the same rules and habits as you would handle any other negotiation. T h e same holds for a w a r m call: "Hey, Tom, this is Bill. Man, do I have a hot one for you. I told them all about you, what you do. They're on the tee. They're ready. All you gotta do is call and then collect. You owe me one, buddy."
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Oh yeah? Tom's blood is racing, but he might be better off w i t h a cold call than with a reference like that one. If he's n o t careful, he'll lose discipline, start thinking about the payday, get excited, b e c o m e needy. That's w h e n defeat may be snatched from the jaws of victory. Do yourself a favor: treat every w a r m call as t h o u g h it's the coldest one you ever made. W h e n emotions run h o t and heavy in negotiations, the highpitched voice is a sure sign of need. T h e rushed delivery is a n o t h e r sure sign. W h i l e needy negotiators raise their voices, negotiators u n d e r control lower their voices. So lower y o u r voice in times of inner turmoil. Slow d o w n . T h e T h i r d World bazaar offers classic lessons on neediness, as I learned myself while Christmas shopping in Saigon in 1967, holding about $100 with w h i c h to buy presents for my w h o l e family. My grandparents were very special to me, and I t h o u g h t about t h e m w h e n I found in the same shop two beautiful pieces of lacquerware a n d a small boat carved from a water buffalo h o r n . Mama-san said she wanted 1,000 piastres apiece—about $10, or $30 total. I wanted all three in the worst way, but this was way t o o m u c h money, and I said so. I was t o o y o u n g and naive to be employing any negotiating strategy, and I didn't want to be the proverbial ugly A m e r i c a n , b u t I couldn't b u y t h e m . As I started to leave, Mama-san chased after me and said she'd sell t h e m for 800 piastres each. I said no, it's still too m u c h . I shopped elsewhere, b o u g h t some nice things and some trinkets, but I still had nothing for my grandparents as I was walking past the little shop with the lacquerware and the carved boat. W h e n Mama-san saw me with the packages she grabbed me and said, " O h , you n u m b e r o n e GI, you beaucoup shop." She urged me back inside, w h e r e she offered to part with each of the three items for 500 piastres apiece, but this was still too m u c h . " N o , " I
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said. "I'll give you four h u n d r e d , that's all I have." She said, "Okay, GI, I sell you for four hundred." I wasn't needy. She was. B u t if she had been a C a m p - t r a i n e d negotiator, she'd have asked me (setting aside the language problem), " W h o are these for?" W h e n I answered she w o u l d have whistled and said, " W h y w o u l d you want to spend so much money on them? A lot of money lor grandparents." Sin* would have shown no need while building my need. She'd have laid a guilt trip on me
Money's not a factor when it comes to my
grandparents!—and I'd have paid 1,000 piastres, or darned close to it, because I really loved my grandparents.
Don't Worry About Rejection Fear of rejection is a sign of neediness—specifically, the need to be liked. It is imperative for the negotiator to understand just w h a t rejection is, and w h o can reject you a n d w h o c a n n o t . Here's the key point: Your adversaries in a negotiation cannot reject you. There's nothing you need from t h e m , so h o w can they reject you? It's impossible. T h e parent can reject the child, b e cause the child certainly needs the parent. T h e spouse can reject the spouse. T h e teacher can even reject the student in the early grades, w h e n the boy or girl truly does need this teacher. But can your adversary in a negotiation really reject you? T h e y don't have any such power. Never, never allow t h e m to believe that they d o . T h e serious negotiator understands that he or she cannot go o u t into the world spending emotional energy in the effort to be liked, to be smart, to be important. This negotiator wants to be recognized as being effective and businesslike, that's all. She spends her energy on the task of business. She has no need for
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the rest of it. B u t h o w often we fall into this particular neediness trap. In labor-management relationships, a key tactic of m a n a g e m e n t is to find union m e m b e r s w h o want a boost to the ego and can therefore be made to feel needy. Such members can be m a nipulated until they are double agents for management, in effect, passing on contrived information, telling their o w n union m e m bers, " O u r c o m m i t t e e is getting us killed. I've got buddies in m a n a g e m e n t . That's what they tell m e . T h e y might shut this plant down if we keep on like this." I speak b o t h from personal experience of many years a g o — that labor-management dispute—and from my coaching experience, as I've seen negotiating team m e m b e r s u n d e r m i n e their o w n team in a host of ways. T h e y leak valuable information, b r i n g back false information, break their team's resolve, urge u n necessary compromises—all because their neediness to be smart, to be liked, to be important, is t u r n e d against t h e m by the clever adversary. Off the top, I could n a m e a dozen well-paid m a n a g e m e n t professionals for Fortune 500 companies w h o were, in effect, w o r k i n g for their adversaries in b i g - t i m e negotiations. I k n o w because these adversaries were my clients. I can n a m e an almost-at-the-top executive w h o s e neediness for a deal to use as a stepping-stone to the chairmanship m a d e him agree to a totally unnecessary compromise. T h e eventual deal camouflaged that compromise, but that's what it was. I k n o w because the beneficiary of that ridiculous compromise was my client. A few years ago, I took on a corporate client w h o had just lost a large deal with a multinational after my n e w client had c o m promised in every way imaginable. T h e y had the best t e c h nology to start with, and on top of that they offered the best price, the best terms, the best delivery dates, the best service, the best everything. If they could compromise on any element of
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the negotiation, they did. T h e y even tossed in a free piece of very expensive e q u i p m e n t , no strings attached. But the multinational walked away from this steal of a deal. W h y ? We finally found out that their C E O was wary precisely because the c o m pany that was n o w my client had compromised too much. S o m e thing must be w r o n g , he thought, for a c o m p a n y to show so much need. T h a t cannot be a c o m p e t e n t , trustworthy company. They'll never be able to deliver. And that C E O was right. My n e w client would never have b e e n able to make good on the c o m m i t m e n t s negotiated in that deal.
Wanting Is Fine, Needing Is N o t T h e next time you watch o n e of the predator-prey nature shows on public television or one of the wildlife channels, watch the chase scenes carefully. T h e r e are always one or two in which the lion or the cheetah is n o t successful, and each time the scenario is the same: T h e predator gets closer to the prey . . . closer . . . closer, t h e n slips back slightly—and immediately gives up. On the spot. W h e n the distance to the prey begins to widen, the hunter quits. She (the females do most of the hunting) will never waste energy on a losing cause. She saunters off, because it doesn't matter. T h e r e are other wildebeests, other gazelles. Likewise, the trained negotiator has no needs, because it just doesn't matter. T h e r e are other deals. T u r n the page on this one. Let it go. I m e n t i o n e d in the introduction one of my ironclad rules: " N o Closing." T h e context was a discussion of the dangers of w i n - w i n , and h o w w i n - w i n implicitly urges you to focus on what you cannot control—the e n d — w h i l e losing sight of what you can control—the means. N o w I'll add the point that urgent closing betrays neediness on your o w n part. You need to close.
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N o , you don't. B u t maybe your adversary does. T h e personal experience of every single reader of this b o o k reveals the dangers of the trick closing. W h e n s o m e o n e has tried to close on you t o o quickly—and s o m e o n e has, in one context or another, unless you're still a babe in arms—you instinctively reacted in the negative. N o t h i n g , but nothing, will blow a n e g o tiation faster than such a rush to j u d g m e n t . Why? You had a v i sion of neediness, w h i c h makes anyone feel uncomfortable emotionally, and w h i c h also serves as a warning to look closer at this deal. M o r e bad deals are signed and m o r e sales are lost because of neediness than because of any other single factor. If there's any need in this negotiation it has to be your adversary's, n o t yours. You will never achieve the level of success of w h i c h you're capable until you understand and live this concept. We negotiators—we h u m a n s — s h o w o u r neediness in many, many ways. To recognize your o w n varieties, all you really have to do is stop and think about what you're d o i n g and what the u n d e r lying motivation is. No o n e knows better than you w h e n your neediness is showing its true colors. W h e n you stop to consider, it's amazing h o w m u c h in o u r lives that we get so w o r k e d up over doesn't matter, not really. As a negotiator aspiring to excellence, you must, at all costs, avoid showing need. In order to avoid showing need, you must never feel it. You do not need this deal. But what happens if we simply substitute the word and the e m o t i o n " w a n t " for "need"? T h e dynamics change. W h a t picture comes to mind w h e n you read the words "I want"? I see a bright red Porsche convertible, w i t h a black top and interior. W h a t is your picture? As good n e gotiators, the word " w a n t " means something we w o r k for, strive for, plan for, but it is never confused w i t h "need." Sure I want
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this global alliance w i t h H u m o n g o u s , Inc., b u t I don't need it. I want the car, b u t I don't need it. I want the house, b u t I don't need it. It will be their loss, not mine, if any of these deals falls through. Either way, I'll sleep tonight and I'll eat tomorrow. C a m p - t r a i n e d negotiators never show need, only want. " N e e d " is death, " w a n t " is life. Believe m e , this different attitude will be instantly perceived by the folks on the other side of the table. Confidence and trust go up across the board. Control and discipline go up for you. I h o p e I haven't sounded like a broken record (or should I bring myself up to date and say CD?) in this chapter, b u t I can't say this t o o often: O v e r c o m e all need.
2 The Columbo Effect The Secret of Being "Not Okay"
R
EMEMBER THE OLD TV series Columbo? Or perhaps you watch the reruns every night. As a homicide detective in Los
Angeles, C o l u m b o w o r e the raggedy trench coat, drove the b e a t - u p old Peugeot, told h e a r t w a r m i n g stories about his wife and his d o g — a sad-looking basset h o u n d , I believe, definitely n o t a silky-sleek golden retriever—and he had the habit of forgetting to ask a key question in every interview and interrogation. H e ' d have to ring the doorbell again, apologize, and ask that final question. He always presented himself to his a d versaries as a little less c o m p e t e n t than they were, a little less perfect—or, usually, a lot less perfect. He could get people to talk to h i m because he m a d e t h e m feel superior and therefore comfortable. In the lingo m a d e famous by the b o o k I'm Okay, You're Okay, he seduced t h e m into feeling okay.
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To be okay is to feel comfortable and therefore safe. That's the simplest way to define the word as it's used in p o p psychology. From the m o m e n t of birth, all of us, as m e m b e r s of the h u m a n race, struggle to feel comfortable and safe. As babies a n d t o d dlers, we n e e d — w e d e m a n d ! — t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l love of o u r parents that is the only source of o u r well-being. As y o u n g children, o u r demands in this regard increase. We want to be recognized. We wanted to be heard. We want to be liked. We want to be right. Or should I say we need all this? I'm afraid so. And this need to feel okay follows us right through adolescence and into a d u l t h o o d as we struggle for victory, achievement, success. W h e n we're called u p o n to show ourselves, do we expose o u r weakness? Never. We expose o u r strength. M a y b e o u r strength is o u r k n o w l e d g e , or physical beauty, or c h a r m i n g personality. M a y b e we are c u n n i n g and fearless, or quick of wit. W h a t e v e r o u r strength, that is w h a t we build o n . T h a t is w h a t we show the world. This is w h a t we need to show the world. Likewise, we compare ourselves to others in order to see h o w we stack up. Are we a litde ahead or a little behind? W h e n we are w i t h people we think we are ahead of, or at least equal to, we feel comfortable. Conversation comes easily and questions seem to have no risk. We feel okay. B u t in the presence of people to w h o m we feel inferior, w h e t h e r culturally, socially, or intellectually, we feel unokay and can b e c o m e defensive, or aggressive, or resentful, or a lot of other emotions. W h e n s o m e o n e looks p e r fect while we need a haircut, h o w do we feel? Exactly. A little uneasy, a little unokay. Conversation may be difficult, questions seem full of risk, we fear we will look silly or even stupid. T u r n i n g the situation around, have you noticed h o w we h u mans tend to feel okay w h e n we see s o m e o n e not okay? We feel comfortable w h e n we see s o m e o n e w h o doesn't quite measure
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up in some way. Soap opera fans watch the shows because t h e lives of the characters in those stories are even m o r e messed up than the viewers' o w n lives. We revel in the trials and tribulations of the rich and famous because n o w the tables are t u r n e d : A lot of g o o d their fame a n d fortune has brought them! S u d denly we're m o r e okay than the m o v i e star in the $2,000-a-day rehab center. This is n o t o u r most attractive feature, perhaps, but there it is. L o n g ago the G e r m a n s gave this feeling the n a m e Schadenfreude. I don't guess anyone really argues these points about okayness. They're pretty self-evident. B u t my n e x t statement is far from self-evident. At first blush, in fact, it will sound crazy to m a n y readers (as it has to many of my clients), b u t here goes: T h e wise negotiator knows that only o n e person in a negotiation can feel okay, and that person is the adversary. S o m e n e w clients are n o t just baffled by this lesson, b u t positively antagonistic. T h e lesson is correct, however, and extraordinarily effective as a tool in a negotiation. By letting your adversary be a little m o r e okay, you start to b r i n g d o w n barriers. By allowing h i m to feel in control, you, like C o l u m b o , are actually in control. T h e detective's sad-sack behavior was calculated. His adversary doesn't k n o w this, b u t we viewers do. We also understand why he acts this way. We understand the psychology: C o l u m b o solved every crime by allowing his adversaries to feel m o r e okay. I'll cite a few parallel examples from history. R o n a l d Reagan, intentionally or unintentionally, was a master at appearing less than okay at press conferences. He would stammer around and laugh at himself before he answered a question, and t h e n his answer might n o t have b e e n m u c h of o n e at all. B u t he was effective, wasn't he, in the end? W i n s t o n Churchill was an u n p r e -
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possessing butterball, F D R a crippled m a n in a wheelchair, A b r a h a m Lincoln o n e of the less attractive m e n around, b u t these three leaders did well enough, in the end. And o n e final example: what did General N o r m a n Schwarzkopf do w h e n he o p e n e d the negotiation w i t h King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to base American troops and airplanes on Saudi soil as we moved toward war with Iraq in 1990? T h e four-star general dropped to o n e knee. ( N o t o u t of neediness, note, but o u t of unokayness. N e e d i ness is an internal state, unokayness a public presentation.) Surely you've noticed h o w every effective keynote and afterd i n n e r speaker tells a self-deprecating story in the first few minutes of his performance. His first implicit message to the a u dience: You may be paying me ten grand to stand up here, and my suit may be m o r e expensive than yours, but I'm no better than you, I ' m just folks. And this is n o t gamesmanship. This is honesty, because, in the final analysis, everyone on this planet is just folks, one of the gang—a big gang, to be sure, but just a gang. We're all in this boat together. We're all h u m a n . We've all m a d e a mistake today and we'll m a k e another o n e tomorrow, very possibly a w h o p p e r . People w h o pretend otherwise fool no o n e b u t themselves (if they really fool themselves). As negotiators, we must take the same approach. If you can emulate C o l u m b o ' s unokayness to even a small degree, in your o w n way, you will exponentially increase your negotiating success. In his profound essay " O n C o m p e n s a t i o n , " R a l p h Waldo Emerson wrote, " O u r greatest strength is o u r greatest weakness." H o w true. We tend to overplay o u r hand, so to speak, but as n e gotiators we must control this instinct while letting it blossom in o u r adversary. If he likes to show off his glibness, let h i m . If he can't resist the opportunity to play to his charm, let him. If he
The Columbo Effect
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likes to demonstrate his extraordinary grasp of the finest points of federal maritime law, let him. T h e trained negotiator is m o r e than happy to let the adversary show off in almost any way he wants to, because that adversary's greatest strength will eventually b e c o m e his greatest weakness. S o m e years back I w o r k e d w i t h a c o m p a n y I'll call N e t w o r k , Inc., that was on the brink of bankruptcy. If this company had continued to ship its product at the contracted price with its p r i mary customer, it would have g o n e o u t of business because it was losing $100,000 w i t h every machine it shipped. R e n e g o t i a tion was called for. Either that or bankruptcy. However, no o n e in the organization t h o u g h t they should reopen the negotiation. T h e y t h o u g h t this m o v e w o u l d look "unprofessional." T h e y said, "We're going to look like fools." T h e president balked as well, until I finally got his attention by asking, " H o w long do you want to continue to tape a $100,000 check to the side of each m a c h i n e ? " W h e n the president of N e t w o r k called his adversary to broach the subject, he said, in just about so many words, "You have d o n e such a great j o b negotiating, and we are so i n c o m p e tent and so weak in negotiating, that we have b e e n a p o o r s u p plier. We have put you in a terrible position, and we apologize for that. We take responsibility for o u r ineptness in negotiation." This was the truth, and it needed to be said, but it was also effective in the way of C o l u m b o . This helped to disarm the adversary. N o r was it unprofessional to make such an admission. T h a t adversary is n o w my client's biggest customer. A n o t h e r one of my corporate clients today does business in a field w i t h a lot of negotiators trained in P I C O S or o n e of the o t h e r supply systems m a n a g e m e n t methodologies. T h e s e are really tough professionals, n o t o r i o u s within the industry.
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No
They've called my negotiators names and accused t h e m of u n professional behavior, real in-your-face tactics. (Sometimes these fellows will be your best friend and w i n e and dine you, then turn on a dime and intimidate you w i t h bluster.) Do my clients get needy? Do they get defensive and then aggressive and fight back against this behavior? N o . T h e y listen calmly, they take notes, they make a concerted effort to be n o t okay, and then they ask quietly, " W h a t would you like us to d o ? "
So Effective It's Scary I am not suggesting that you appear unprofessional. I'm asking you not to be afraid of candor and honesty, n o t to be afraid of n o t being totally okay, of being less than perfect. Do you enjoy being around the perfect person? I don't. People want to deal w i t h a regular person. In a negotiation, b e i n g less okay is just showing a foible n o w and then. Struggle a little. B o r r o w a pen or paper to take notes. Search for the right words to ask questions. Letting people help you is an excellent way to help t h e m feel m o r e okay. It also says to your adversary, " W h a t you see is what you get." N e w clients think I must be kidding w h e n I even suggest they leave their briefcase or business cards at h o m e for the first m e e t ing, and maybe you just w o n ' t do it, but I'm here to tell you that this gambit or something similar can be so powerful it's scary. I once coached a w o m a n w h o sold office e q u i p m e n t to Silicon Valley start-ups. In o n e negotiation in which a $35,000 c o m m i s sion was at stake, I finally convinced h e r to drop her purse o n t o the floor. O n l y thing was, w h e n the purse hit the floor it fell open and the contents spilled everywhere. A real mess. T h e guy she was negotiating with hurried around the desk and got d o w n
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on his knees to help my client gather everything up. As she was expressing her embarrassment, he was saying, "Hey, forget it. You've got the deal." Again, some might call this gamesmanship, but I disagree. My client didn't get the deal because she dropped her purse. She got the deal because the purse episode broke through the final barrier in the negotiation, allowing decisions to flow freely. This is not trivial gamesmanship. This is honesty, the honesty of u n okayness that breaks d o w n barriers. T h e tougher the negotiation, the m o r e critical it is to u n d e r stand that if s o m e o n e in this r o o m has to be unokay, it will be you and not your adversary. W h e n your adversary feels u n okay, the barriers go up m u c h faster than you can break t h e m d o w n . But unokayness on your part breaks d o w n barriers—like magic, often. This behavior is all easier said than d o n e , I realize, because from the day we're b o r n we're fighting for o u r okayness, a n d then we're almost trained to fight for it. And of course we see pictures of the titans of industry—maybe the C E O of the very c o m p a n y we work for—dressed to the nines as they savor their power breakfasts, power lunches, power dinners, power aperitifs, and power cigars. These guys (they are mostly guys, let's face it) are okay beyond belief. Their lives are what we're supposed to want and need. And here I am suggesting that you get to the top by presenting yourself as less okay! In the context of a negotiation, yes I am. I'm not saying you show up with a stain on your shirt or blouse. Just a little s o m e thing that's less than perfect to inject a little humanity, a little vulnerability, a little unokayness. T h e truly skillful, successful n e gotiator gets his or her strokes at h o m e . (If you're fortunate, you're like former president Jerry Ford or former First Ladies
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Barbara Bush and the late Jackie O., all of w h o m were famous for their instinctive ability to make people around t h e m and p e o ple watching on television feel okay. B u t if you're like . . . well, never mind, you'll have to work a little harder. Some people just seem to have the unfortunate knack of m a k i n g others feel u n okay.) If you have any doubts about the wisdom of the advice in this chapter, it couldn't be easier to check out. T h e next time you find yourself in a situation in which your "adversary" is maybe just a litde standoffish or doubtful, try b e i n g a little less okay. Pretend your pen has r u n out of ink and ask to b o r r o w one for a m o m e n t . Or search your pocket for your notepad and c o m e up short and ask to b o r r o w a slip of paper. Or pretend your Palm Pilot has r u n o u t of power—again. A n d t h e n try to tell me you don't notice an immediate, beneficial difference in the a t m o sphere of this "negotiation."
3 Start with No How Decisions Move Negotiations Forward
W
H E N YOU BECOME excited or nervous, w h e r e in your b o d y do you feel it first? W h e r e do you get butterflies b e -
fore a speech or public performance of any kind? W h e n was the last rime you heard s o m e o n e say, " H e just doesn't have the s t o m ach for it"? Do you r e m e m b e r one important time w h e n you said to s o m e o n e , " M y gut tells me I shouldn't do this"? Yes, probably In Japan, w h e r e negotiation is revered almost as a cultural art form, it is said that we should make all of o u r decisions w i t h the stomach—ham—never with the head or with the heart. I absolutely agree that this is w h e r e decisions start. This is the way we do make decisions, w h e t h e r we like the idea or not. In a negotiation, decisions are 100 percent emotional. Yes, 100 percent. Research psychologists have proved this beyond any doubt. Sometimes we use the t e r m "negotiation science," b u t
START WITH NO
the "science" part is k n o w i n g that decisions themselves are all e m o t i o n . In a C a m p negotiation, it is always gut-check time, b e cause this is w h e r e the real negotiation is being played out. W h e n was the last time you presented some facts and figures that m a d e perfect sense in your o w n head and should have made perfect sense in your adversary's head, but he still couldn't agree with you? C o u l d n ' t even see what you were talking about? I'm sure it's happened, because facts do n o t w i n negotiations. Facts c o m e later, because they mean n o t h i n g to the stomach. Or c o n sider the s m o k i n g habit. You probably k n o w a smoker w h o claims he can quit anytime he "decides" to do so. W h e n does he quit? Sadly, in many cases, only after he has had to have q u a d r u ple bypass heart surgery—and n o t always then, unbelievably. If facts aren't able to convince most smokers to break the habit that is literally killing t h e m , it's small w o n d e r that facts do not w i n negotiations, either. T h e head is too confused, or too rigid, b u t mainly it's just o u t of the loop. T h e real decisions are being m a d e s o m e w h e r e else. O u r so-called rational m i n d kicks in only after we've m a d e the decision, in order to justify it after the fact. W h e n we watch ourselves and other people carefully, we can actually see the transition from the emotional state—the hara— to the intellectual state—the head. Every day, every hour, even every minute, u n d e r some circumstances, we flip back and forth between the emotional and the so-called rational. O u r emotions rage all over the scale before we make a decision, and t h e n we set about rationalizing it. Successful negotiation requires the c o m plete understanding and application of this dynamic of decision making. B u t wait a m i n u t e . D o n ' t these paragraphs contradict the claim in the introduction that my system is decision based, not e m o t i o n based? H o w can this be, if all negotiations are e m o -
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tional? N e g o t i a t i o n s and even decision m a k i n g do begin w i t h emotions. Emotions are rampant, they are at the root of o u r initial decisions, they are unreliable, they are even destructive, b u t these emotions do not have to be the final word. My system sees emotions for what they are and works w i t h t h e m , not against t h e m . My system teaches us h o w to progress from e m o t i o n s , which never produce deals that stick, to decisions that do produce deals that stick. Negotiations are indeed rooted in emotions, and all too often never get beyond t h e m . Your j o b as a negotiator is to see t h e m clearly and overcome t h e m w i t h precise decision making. Your j o b is even to use t h e m to your advantage with precise decision making. T h e subject of this chapter is the subtle relationship b e tween e m o t i o n and decision making, and the ways in which you can capitalize on your understanding of this relationship.
Forget "Yes " Forget "Maybe" I like to provoke n e w clients and folks in seminars and w o r k shops by stating that the best "yes" in a negotiation is by way of "no." I tried to provoke you, the reader, with Start with No as my title, but the phrase is a lot m o r e than a mere provocation. It's also the truth. T h e negotiation really does start w i t h " n o " — n o t w i t h "maybe," definitely n o t with "yes," but w i t h a firm, clear "no." In any negotiation, this is the key word I want to hear. Everything that precedes it is mere w i n d o w dressing. H o w can this be? Because " n o " is a real decision that induces the party across the table into actually thinking about w h y they've just said " n o . " T h e responsibility of making a clear decision helps the adversary focus on the real issues of the negotiation. T h e adversary has to take responsibility for " n o , " so n o w
START WITH NO
everyone has s o m e t h i n g real to talk about. In fact, as we will soon see, the m e r e invitation for the o t h e r side to say " n o " changes the dynamic of a negotiation in a very beneficial way. But the alternative a n s w e r s — " m a y b e " and "yes"—aren't real d e cisions at all. T h e y do n o t h i n g at all to stop the ebb and flow of emotions. They're just a frustrating waste of time. Let's see why. W i t h "maybe," neither party has any idea w h e r e things stand. If you say "maybe," you haven't said e n o u g h to elicit a useful response or information from the other side, because you haven't really said anything at all. You've m u d d i e d the waters, nothing more. Likewise, w h e n you hear "maybe," your emotions are all over the place. D i d he really mean "yes"? Are we almost there? Or is he just trying a last-minute ploy for concessions? Or did he really mean " N o , this offer doesn't have a chance"? Or did he actually mean " m a y b e " because he doesn't even k n o w what he wants? Well, w h o the heck has any idea? I could even suggest that " m a y b e " is m o r e of an e m o t i o n than anything else. It definitely isn't a decision. It definitely does n o t engage the negotiator's rational m i n d . It definitely doesn't give either side anything to w o r k with. I cannot emphasize this point too strongly: " M a y b e " is the kiss of death for a successful negotiation. If you can't quickly get past " m a y b e " — a n d it comes in infinite varieties, of c o u r s e — start walking, because you're wasting your time (especially w h e n dealing with the Japanese, w h o will drive the untrained negotiator crazy with " m a y b e " ) . Sometimes even " m a y b e " is too harsh sounding for the faint of heart w h o doesn't want to hurt o u r feelings and perhaps e n danger the negotiation. Sometimes the adversary is so c o n d i tioned by the "getting to yes" ethos that she starts out with "yes." But a "yes" in the beginning is no better than a "maybe." It is
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n o t a decision, n o t really, because your adversary can't really mean "yes." If she did, everyone wouldn't be here negotiating in the first place. M o r e i m p o r t a n t , w h e n o u r adversaries say "yes," we get excited, o u r adrenaline starts p u m p i n g , we start c o m p u t i n g the commission and deciding b e t w e e n the Mercedes and the B e e m e r — a n d before we k n o w it, we're . . . what? Needy. A n d the m o m e n t we're needy, we've lost control. We k n o w in o u r head that this "yes" isn't real and final, b u t the e m o t i o n in o u r heart surges nevertheless. A n d then, hours or days or weeks later, w h e n this "yes" is followed by the adversary's subde "if," "but," "however," " w h e n , " or some other dangerous qualifier, we've lost o u r focus and b e c o m e vulnerable to unnecessary compromise. T h e other side is suddenly in control. Offering an eariy "yes" is a real tiger trick. It traps us in his cage. Shrewd corporate negotiators use this trick all the time. " M a y b e " is worthless and " y e s " is dangerous, so we're left w i t h " n o , " a real decision. As I said, " n o " gets the adversary across the table into a rational m o d e . Just thinking about saying " n o " gets the adversary into the rational m o d e . Elucidation is r e quired, and n o w you have real issues to discuss. Ross Perot's n e gotiator o u t in the desert should have b e e n delighted, n o t disappointed, to hear the b e d o u i n say " n o " regarding the selected camel. Let's consider a classic situation encountered by almost every smaller c o m p a n y that negotiates w i t h multinationals. Specifically, a large multinational was negotiating with three different, m u c h smaller companies for a special project, playing the competitors against o n e another, asking for o n e concession after a n o t h e r from o n e c o m p e t i t o r after another, driving the price d o w n , d o w n , down. Finally, the company that had been the multina-
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clonals first choice;—I'll call it Bonanza, Inc.—got tired of this whipsawing and decided to either change the dynamic or drop out of the negotiation. T h e i r negotiators told the multinational that Bonanza could not and would n o t participate in any further reductions, so Bonanza probably was n o t the c o m p a n y for the project. In short. Bonanza said "no," w h i c h was an invitation for the multinational to say " n o " in return. N o w the m u c h bigger company faced a couple of tough issues. T h e y might not be able to get the best c o m p a n y for the project, and the other companies might take the same stance as Bonanza. T h e y could no longer play the three companies against one another. Because o n e company was willing to risk losing the deal rather than compromise further, the multinational's negotiators found themselves at a severe disadvantage. We can guess what happened next. T h a t c o m p a n y began to disclose information to Bonanza, the very c o m p a n y that had told t h e m " n o , " thereby giving Bonanza a great advantage. In the end, this is the c o m p a n y that got the project. That's the power of " n o . " Now, what would have happened if the multinational had been C a m p trained and said early on to Bonanza and the o t h e r t w o companies, "Feel free to say n o . Turn us d o w n at any point"? T h e negotiation would have p r o ceeded m u c h m o r e quickly. Essential issues, n o t emotional ones, would have b e e n on the table early. N e i t h e r side w o u l d have b e e n in a guessing m o d e . Everyone w o u l d have k n o w n h o w everyone else saw the negotiation. Everyone could have been working on real problems. T i m e , money, and resources would have b e e n saved. That's the key idea here: " n o " gets you past emotional issues and trivial issues to essential issues. We want decision-based n e -
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gotiation, not the emotion-based waste of time k n o w n as w i n win. I m e n t i o n e d that the use of the worthless " m a y b e " is an art form in Japan. N o w here's a " n o " story set in that esteemed country, one in w h i c h a n e w American-based client was stuck w i t h a terrible distribution deal with a Japanese giant. This deal had been negotiated by my client's w i n - w i n team years before, and it was losing millions of dollars annually. Really, it was r u n ning the business into the g r o u n d , and everyone at the board level understood that the deal had to be renegotiated now, even t h o u g h contractually it couldn't be challenged for another five losing years. However, and predictably, everyone w h o had n e g o tiated the old agreement argued that the c o m p a n y would ruin its position in Japan and never recover w h e n w o r d spread that we wanted to renegotiate. You just can't operate that way in Japan, the old crowd warned. It's impossible. B u t the president of the c o m p a n y decided that the only thing impossible was continuing w i t h the ridiculous deal signed by that i n c o m p e t e n t team of w i n - w i n negotiators. E i g h t e e n m o n t h s after the subject of renegotiation was first broached, the issue finally reached the highest level of the Japanese company, w h e r e the American team presented a n e w deal, all the while urging the Japanese to just say " n o " if they felt they had to. O u r agreement must change, my clients said, but tell us " n o " if this n e w one doesn't work for you. Just say, " W e can't do this." T h e Japanese sucked their teeth—literally—and talked a m o n g themselves for at least twenty minutes. T h e y r e cessed. My clients waited calmly. Finally, the Japanese came back and said they'd accept the proposal we gave them. Period. T h e invitation to say " n o " crystallized their thinking. It got
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their attention. If they had said " n o " in response to us, fine, we would have d u g into the details of o u r offer and negotiated from that point. As it was, the invitation to say " n o " led directly, i n exorably, to a deal. A n d w h a t about the dire prediction of a r u i n e d business relationship w i t h that Japanese distributor— ruined prospects in Japan, period? Hogwash. T h e two companies n o w have a mutually profitable—very profitable—relationship. A few h u n d r e d miles west of Japan is Korea, w h e r e the businesspeople are also k n o w n as tenacious negotiators w h o always get their way. My client in this Korean story, a player in one of the high-tech industries, was negotiating w i t h a Korean giant regarding extremely complicated and vital equipment. T h e giant was rightly convinced they n e e d e d this technology, b u t they insisted on a lot of it for free. This was a perfecdy natural demand, because, as many readers know, a lot of American c o m panies believe they have to give away technology and e q u i p m e n t in order to get a foot in the door of that society and economy. I'm n o t talking about a $200,000 piece of e q u i p m e n t , either. I'm talking about tens and hundreds of millions of dollars in factories and technology given away for free. H o w did A m e r i c a n companies get the idea that they had to do this? Because the Koreans asked for it, and we all k n o w h o w tough those Koreans are. To my knowledge, corporate America had never once said, " N o , we don't think so, we believe in a fair profit for o u r business. Feel free to say no to us in return, but we're n o t giving you a good piece of o u r business for nothing. That's n o t a g o o d practice for us and o u r investors." Now, my client's sales force in Korea was C a m p trained, and they understood that C a m p - t r a i n e d negotiators don't c o m p r o mise for the fun of it and don't give away the store simply b e cause s o m e o n e asks for the store. B u t they assured their chiefs at
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headquarters on the mainland that the C a m p System wouldn't work in Korea, because a generous sweetener is the way business works over there. We have to forget o u r training, they insisted, but the president of the c o m p a n y insisted otherwise. He didn't feel like giving anything away. He instructed his salespeople to negotiate full price for the machines. A daunting task, certainly, but the team returned to Korea and made its presentation, i n viting the Koreans at every o p p o r t u n i t y to say " n o . " Sure e n o u g h , the adversaries c a m e unglued. You can't do business like that here! T h e s e protestations w e n t on three days. Finally my clients said they w o u l d be leaving the following m o r n i n g , and very politely gave the Koreans o n e last chance to say " n o " and be d o n e with it. But the Koreans didn't do that, and the t e a m flew h o m e w i t h o u t either a firm " n o " or an order for machines. T h r e e days later the p h o n e rang at c o m p a n y headquarters. T h e Koreans placed an order w o r t h $30 million, complete with a purchase order number. T h e y paid full price, because full price is a fair price for this state-of-the-art technology, and they had k n o w n this all along. But w h y n o t try to get something for n o t h ing, they had figured—and w h o could blame t h e m , because that tactic had b e e n w o r k i n g for years and years against lackluster w i n - w i n negotiators from America. Back n o w in the States with a different scenario: A client that builds expensive machinery was just about to ship the first order to a n e w customer w h e n the customer called to say that they also needed a separate machine that w o r k e d in tandem with the main order. My client's salesman w h o was responsible for this deal wanted to consign the separate item on the spot and be a hero in the eyes of the n e w customer. B u t this item wasn't easily available, and his superiors w i t h my client decided to say n o , the e q u i p m e n t wasn't available, there was an e i g h t - w e e k delivery,
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they didn't k n o w what they could do to help. T h a t answer was transmitted on Friday night. On Saturday m o r n i n g , my client called the customer again and said that they could juggle things around and deliver the other e q u i p m e n t , but at some risk to the b o t t o m line, so could the customer help o u t here by taking t w o older machines and paying w i t h i n the m o n t h ? T h e customer accepted the n e w terms immediately. Then, on Monday, the customer called to say that they had t u r n e d up the separate e q u i p m e n t they needed, so they didn't need the favor after all. My client calmly said okay, but we did do a lot of juggling here on your behalf, we'd like you to buy the two old systems anyway. Say no if you want to, it'll be okay, no hard feelings, b u t we think the fair thing is for you to buy the two old systems. T h e customer agreed.
The Power of " N o " Saying " n o , " inviting " n o , " hearing " n o " : these are all-powerful tools for any well-trained negotiator, including a high school kid I k n e w a few years ago, an athlete applying to colleges. Like all valuable high school recruits, he had b e e n inundated with solicitation letters from programs all over the country. He had two big garbage bags full of letters he never even o p e n e d . (I guess c o m puter programs spit o u t these invitations by the thousands.) To the coaches at the schools in which he was interested, this student sent his academic transcript along w i t h a letter requesting that the recruiter please advise him if he was n o t academically qualified. T h a t was a straightforward "tell me n o " request. T h e player didn't want to waste his time with a school for w h i c h he was not qualified. Later in the negotiation (what else would you call it?), he followed up w i t h a second request for certain coaches
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to tell h i m "no." To t h e m he wrote, "Please tell me if you're n o t going to support my application through the admissions process. I'd appreciate k n o w i n g this now, because if you cannot support me, I'll move on to the other schools I'm interested in." He didn't k n o w precisely h o w m u c h sway the coach had in the admissions process, he did k n o w that the n u m b e r of studentathletes was limited, and he k n e w that the admissions c o m m i t t e e w o u l d n o t select these lucky kids w i t h o u t input from the coach. W i t h the coach's stamp of approval, his chances w o u l d rise e x ponentially. A coach's c o m m i t m e n t to supporting his application was as close to an assured acceptance as he could get. T h e easiest way to accomplish b o t h these goals—finding o u t w h e r e he stood and getting the coach on his side—was to ask the coach to say "no." H e l p e d by his requests for " n o s , " he received a b u n c h of "yeses." I relate this college recruiting story to demonstrate that many situations that we might n o t think of as " n e g o t i a t i o n s " really are, and that "just say n o " is an effective tool in every single one of them. In the discussion on neediness in chapter 1, I suggested the cold caller begin the conversation: "Well, Mary, I have no idea w h e t h e r what we do has any relevance for your business. I just don't know, maybe it doesn't. If not, just tell me and I'll be on my way, but if w h o e v e r handles your market research . . ." See h o w that statement invites the adversary to say " n o " ? Establishing this g r o u n d rule is just so critical in all negotiations. B u t w h e n was the last time any of those p h o n e companies or stockbrokers or bankers w h o call at dinnertime ever invited you to send h i m on his way? W o u l d your temptation to slam d o w n the p h o n e have b e e n slightly t e m p e r e d if he had? " N o ! " you say. "I'd slam d o w n the p h o n e anyway." And maybe you would, b u t
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I'm here to tell you that a good script that begins with a calm invitation to say no will generate about three g o o d appointments for every ten calls, w h i c h is an unbelievable percentage, as I'm sure you'll agree. I'm not just spouting off on this subject. I k n o w what I'm talking about, because in the early days of my coaching career I built my first client base with cold calls as well as w i t h referrals. I called people in insurance, real estate, advertising, stockbrokerage, and accounting, and said, "Pete, I'm n o t sure that anything I do fits with you. I don't know. So if this doesn't make any sense, just tell me and I'll get off the p h o n e . Is that fair?" If Pete invited me to p r o c e e d — a n d he usually did—I then asked, " W h o do you have in your corner, Pete, w h o can assure you that your income will increase through coaching?" In those early days I worked with insurance companies and their sales staffs, and I could guarantee that after eighteen hours of training, a group of thirty salespeople w o u l d net ninety valid a p pointments with just t w o hours of calling apiece. That's an i n credible return on investment of time, as anyone in that field knows. Eight or nine years ago, my oldest son, Jimmy, had some time after he graduated from college and before he began his training to b e c o m e an air force pilot. Almost as a lark, J i m m y went to work for a while w i t h fifty other m e n and w o m e n cold calling for Prudential Brokerages in N e w York. On the first day J i m m y said he wasn't g o i n g to use the self-defeating script he was given, but rather one of his o w n (and my) devising, o n e that included a request to "tell me no." Okay, his manager said, but you'd better produce. Well, J i m m y d i d — a b o u t three times what anyone else in that office accomplished.
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The Right to Say " N o " M a n y years ago I happened to be in H o n g K o n g after I'd just finished reading a b o o k about negotiation that included a definition of " n e g o t i a t i o n " pretty similar to the o n e from the b o o k Getting to Yes q u o t e d in my introduction. T h a t definition was also a lot of words that don't say or mean m u c h , w h e n you c o n sider t h e m closely. Frustrated, and k n o w i n g that such thinking is worthless but w i t h o u t k n o w i n g exactly why, I stopped at a bookstore in H o n g K o n g and simply looked up " n e g o t i a t i o n " in a dictionary. And there it was: "A negotiation is an agreement between two or m o r e parties, with all parries having the right to veto." These words struck me like a bolt of lightning. All these years later I r e m e m b e r the m o m e n t clearly. Eureka! A negotiation is simply an agreement between two or more parties, with all parties having the right to veto. That's w h a t it is. N o t h i n g more, n o t h i n g less, nothing fancy, n o t h i n g meaningless, n o t h i n g winwin. N o w , the right to veto is the right to say " n o , " isn't it? They're the same thing. As soon as I returned h o m e , I tried a few e x periments with the word " n o " in harmless contexts. As a hobby, I h a d also started selling water softening systems for a guy I knew. My approach was simple: " M r s . Smith, I have a little demonstration of what a water softener can do for you. Maybe it will interest you, maybe it won't. I don't know. If you'd like to look, I'd be happy to show you, and if you're interested, great, a n d if you're not, that's fine, too. I'll be on my way." W i t h i n m o n t h s I was making m o r e m o n e y selling water softening systems than I was flying jet airplanes. A big reason was my invitation to potential customers to tell me " n o . "
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Okay, this is straightforward and uncontroversial e n o u g h , I believe, w h e n we think about it, but it's a funny thing: in a n e gotiation, as we've seen, a simple " n o " can be difficult to say in response to an offer and difficult to hear as a response to this offer. I suppose this ambivalence begins for each of us in our Terrible Twos, w h e n we discover this incredible word. " N O ! " gives us, for the first time in o u r lives, a little e m p o w e r m e n t , but it also comes w i t h the downside of battles w i t h our parents, b e cause " n o " is a t w o - w a y street. We carry this experience w i t h us the rest of o u r lives. I said in chapter 1 that my a d m o n i t i o n about neediness is probably the o n e principle of my system that has the most i m mediate beneficial impact on my clients. N o w I should add that my "just say n o " principle is the one that businesspeople find the hardest to truly accept and then put into practice. W h e n they finally master the word the results are often magical, b u t for many it isn't easy to get over the h u m p . In the world of business, specifically, we are so immersed in the emotion-based atmosphere of w i n - w i n that saying " n o " just sounds too harsh. It goes c o m pletely against the w i n - w i n grain of subservience and malleability and neediness. We all want to be liked, we don't want to hurt someone's feelings, we don't want to c o m e across as too blunt or surly or arrogant or demanding, we don't want to shut the d o o r on a deal prematurely, we don't want to start a w i n - w i n negotiation on a negative note. Therefore we pull o u r punches and say " m a y b e " or even "yes" and believe that this solves everyone's problem. We haven't had to say the nasty word and our adversary hasn't had to hear it. W i n - w i n ! N o . Lose-lose, because we're stuck in o u r emotions and then get victimized by o u r emotions. As Exhibit A I n o w introduce a client from some years ago, a lawyer and expert on Japanese business and legal practices w h o
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hired me because he could never get paid what he was w o r t h . This was a m a n at the very top of his demanding field, a m a n w h o consulted with the p r i m e minister of Japan, b u t he often w o r k e d for a $100 per h o u r consulting fee in the States. Just ridiculous. He should have received $400 m i n i m u m plus e x penses, but he was a w i n - w i n negotiator, and he was always getring screwed, and he knew it, but he couldn't control himself He certainly understood in theory the power of saying " n o " and inviting the other party to say " n o , " but the idea of actually p r o ceeding in this way on his o w n behalf was too terrifying. B u t one day we were driving together from San Francisco d o w n to the Silicone Valley w h e n he got a call on his mobile p h o n e from a c o m p a n y wanting him to be an expert witness in Los Angeles for two days. On the spot, I urged him to take this opportunity to test the power of " n o " for himself. He told the caller that he'd call right back, and we quickly came up with an agenda for h i m . (Agendas will be discussed in depth in chapter 12.) My client would ask for first-class airfare, a limousine at the airport, and $500 an hour, with a m i n i m u m of t w o days—a total of $8,000 for sixteen hours, to be transferred by wire immediately. T h e r e was n o t h i n g out of line about this proposal, n o t h i n g at all. For an expert of his prominence, he was right in line. Nevertheless, he was very uncomfortable w h e n he returned the call, made his presentation, then invited t h e m to say " n o " if this was too m u c h money. He w o u l d understand, he assured the o t h e r party, no hard feelings, and he was sure they could find a n o t h e r good e x p e r t witness s o m e w h e r e on the West Coast. M a y b e he could even r e c o m m e n d one, given a little time. So, he said, just let me know. T h e caller on the other e n d said he'd have to check on this. My client h u n g up totally exhausted from his traumatic experi-
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ence. Forty-five minutes later, the o t h e r party called back, agreed to the deal, and asked for the account n u m b e r for the wire transfer. A n o t h e r client actually said to me recently, " H o w will people like my c o m p a n y if we don't cut o u r price?" In just so many words! He didn't ask, " H o w will my c o m p a n y be profitable?" or " H o w will we be seen as an effective, dynamic c o m p a n y with which to do business?" He asked, " H o w will they like m e ? " This was a n e w and untrained client, that's for sure. He never t h o u g h t in those terms again. Just imagine the predators o u t there lying in wait to take advantage of such a vulnerable adversary. Nevertheless, it's amazing h o w many negotiators want to be liked, want to save the adversary from making a tough decision. It happens every day. Here's another case in point. A few years ago, a client was dealing with a large Japanese corporation that had found itself in a tight situation that was shaping up to be very profitable to my client. A team of five negotiators was sitting in the room in Tokyo w i t h a like n u m b e r of counterparts for the Japanese company. T h e silence was deafening, as they say, and the damnedest thing happened: the burden for the adversary to make a decision became too m u c h for o n e m e m b e r of my own team, and he blurted out, t h e n and there, with no consultation with his teammates, m u c h less w i t h his bosses back h o m e , that the Japanese could have a 2 percent discount. O u t of nowhere! And this was a billion-dollar negotiation. Two percent here, 2 percent there, and pretty soon you're talking about real m o n e y down the drain—all for the sake of making the adversary feel comfortable and saving t h e m from taking responsibility for their decisions. T h e Japanese gladly accepted this offer, the meeting adjourned, all hell broke loose in the American camp, and the
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team had to return to the table the following day and take back that 2 percent discount, w h i c h they did.
Never "Save the Adversary" or "Save the Relationship" W i t h o u t question, o n e of the most dangerous mistakes you can make in a negotiation is trying to "save the adversary," as I p u t it. T h e r e can be no saving of the adversary emotionally, intellectually, financially, or on any level. N o . N o n e . Never. It's a terrible practice that does neither side any good. Neither side? That's correct, because if you do "save the adversary," you are n o w partially responsible for their decision. If some problem comes up later, w h o gets the guilt trip laid on them? W h o sets himself up for a n o t h e r compromise? I h o p e the answer is obvious. If it's not, consider this cautionary tale involving a corporation in the microchip business and one of its major cust o m e r s . Before I b e c a m e involved in their negotiations, this c o m p a n y had allowed o n e particular customer, a large m u l t i national, to cancel a w o r l d w i d e service contract. Specifically, o n e m a n in the field allowed the supply system m a n a g e m e n t guy w i t h the multinational to abrogate the agreement, because he t h o u g h t he could do better paying for maintenance a n d service on a piecemeal basis. This was a terrible mistake by my client. In the first place, the m a n in the field was negotiating with an u n qualified adversary. He should never have allowed the purchasing guy to make such a decision. T h e service agreement should have b e e n carefully looked at and renegotiated all the way up the line. But in the n a m e of friendship, my client's representative agreed to kill the agreement. He had no idea what the ramifications
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would be: w h e n e q u i p m e n t finally started to require m a i n t e nance, the parts would require a week for delivery instead of a day, and on-site service wouldn't be available 2 4 / 7 , including holidays. H o w could there be such blanket coverage?! It wasn't b e i n g paid for. Nevertheless, w h e n problems came up w i t h the piecemeal service, my client took the blame, even though it was the other company's supply system m a n a g e m e n t guy w h o had asked for this n e w a r r a n g e m e n t . Saving the adversary in the n a m e of friendship had backfired b o t h for my client, w h o ended up being the bad guy, and for the customer, w h o ended up paying m o r e for piecemeal service, w h e n they factored in downtime. "Saving the adversary" is but one example of the many b e haviors k n o w n in negotiating circles as "saving the relationship." S o m e form of saving the relationship happens hourly, all over the world, in all fields of endeavor. It's the w h o l e idea behind w i n w i n . For example, a friend w h o works for a national t o u r i n g dance c o m p a n y was negotiating with the director of an organization that intended to b r i n g the dance c o m p a n y to its venue. But this director didn't want to sign the contract for the appearance, for reasons that were never m a d e clear, and she enlisted the aid of a colleague of my friend. This colleague blurted to my friend, "I don't care if your position is logical! It's n o t a very nice way to treat a major dance presenter!" For fear of tarnishing his relationship with the adversary in the negotiation, the colleague didn't want to appear too d e manding. He didn't want to h u r t the adversary's feelings by saying " n o signed contract, no appearance by this dance company." Because of his o w n deeply ingrained desire for approval, he was unable to see the real problem in the negotiation. In effect, he
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b e c a m e n o t h i n g other than an i n - h o u s e saboteur, prepared to p u t my friend and h e r dance c o m p a n y in the position of taking a considerable financial risk in order to save the relationship w i t h the program director. B u t that colleague was right about o n e thing: T h e program director did not appreciate hearing " n o . " She could n o t accept it w h e n the b o o k i n g agent said, " N o , w e are n o t c o m i n g t o y o u r t o w n because we d o n ' t do business w i t h o u t a fully e x e c u t e d contract." In a t h i r t y - m i n u t e p h o n e m o n o l o g u e , the director said that in seventeen years of experience she had never b e e n treated like this. She accused the agent of discounting h e r e x p e rience and reputation and integrity. She saw the agent's " n o " as representing a lack of trust. She simply couldn't accept it. This reaction is quite c o m m o n , of course. In fact, in t h e early stage of a negotiation I'd say it's probably the most c o m m o n r e action. People take " n o " as personal rejection. T h e y get ugly, they " g o negative" in a big way. A n d this is w h y "saving the r e lationship" is classic w i n - w i n behavior. T h e u n s p o k e n — o r sometimes spoken—assumption b e h i n d w i n - w i n is that p e o p l e enter negotiations trying to build friendly relationships a n d want to leave w i t h that relationship intact. T h e classic w i n - w i n dilemma is this o n e : How much money do I have to leave on the table in order to maintain this relationship? B i g time c o r p o r a t e negotiators, along w i t h many others, play this game to the hilt. T h e y play up the i m p o r t a n c e of partnerships, loyalty, the l o n g t e r m — e m o t i o n - b a s e d stuff. How could you endanger such benefits by holding the line? B u t their only real c o n c e r n is the price they're paying. I've had a client say to m e , " O h , I'm g o o d friends w i t h their head of purchasing."
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"Really? That's interesting." "Yeah, his wife a n d my wife are pretty g o o d friends, t o o . T h e y play tennis." "Really? H o w long have y o u had this relationship?" "A couple of years, I guess." " H o w l o n g has he b e e n head of purchasing?" Pause. "A couple of years, I guess." W e l c o m e to m o r e supply systems m a n a g e m e n t , in w h i c h an explicit strategy is to use outings a n d j u n k e t s a n d any o t h e r means to establish friendships that can t h e n be used as unspoken leverage w h e n the adversary wants to say and should say " n o " in the negotiation. Friendships w i t h the g o o d folks on t h e o t h e r side can be fine—or they can be dangerous. It's hard e n o u g h for m a n y n e gotiators to say " n o " to adversaries they've j u s t met. H o w m u c h harder is it to say " n o " to friends?
Respect, N o t Friendship, Is W h a t You Want T h e impulse to think and act in any such save-the-relationship fashion is w r o n g h e a d e d n o t only because it's b a d negotiating, but also because the adversary across the table does not want to be a friend. C o u l d n ' t care less. Has not even thought about it. N o w , I noted earlier in this chapter that most of us h u m a n s want to be liked, don't want to h u r t feelings, don't want to be blunt or surly or arrogant. It's also true that we don't w a n t to be on the receiving e n d of such behavior. B u t this does n o t mean that we want to be everybody's good friend. For businesspeople and negotiators in any field, m u c h m o r e important than friendliness are effectiveness and respect. N o t h i n g more. Have you ever wondered h o w the jerks of the world get along? H o w some even get ahead?
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H o w a very few even get to the top? T h e s e people don't get away w i t h their boorish, offensive behavior for no g o o d reason. T h e y get away with it because they're effective in their work and b r i n g benefit to their business relationships, in one way or a n other. Every reader of this b o o k understands exacdy what I'm saying here. Every reader can think of a case in w h i c h she or he has chosen to deal w i t h an o b n o x i o u s but effective person rather than a friendly but ineffective o n e . W h a t does friendship have to do w i t h m a k i n g good business a n d negotiation decisions? N o t a thing. As will b e c o m e quite clear, I advocate and coach respectful dealings and politeness w i t h the adversary at all times. This is mandatory for my clients. B u t this practice has n o t h i n g to do w i t h saving the adversary from taking responsibility for decisions, all for the sake of friendship or for b e i n g liked or for feeling i m portant. M o s t businesspeople, if they stop to think a b o u t this question carefully, will agree that friendships in business are the product of l o n g - t e r m effective dealings. M a k i n g decisions based on a sense that the adversary seeks your friendship is misguided. T h e y w o u l d m u c h prefer your effectiveness. W h y w o u l d you want to load d o w n a business relationship with a lot of emotional baggage, including guilt, w h i c h can be the by-product of "friendship"? It doesn't work. It doesn't pay. If agreements result from effective decision making, the odds are very good that there will be a l o n g - t e r m business relationship, regardless w h e t h e r you play golf with your adversary. If agreements are the result of ineffective decision making, there w o n ' t b e — a n d should n o t b e — a l o n g - t e r m relationship, n o matter h o w many rounds you play.
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The Next Decision T h e fear of hurting people's feelings, of n o t being liked, of d a m aging a l o n g - t e r m relationship—these are all reasons we're afraid to say " n o . " A n o t h e r is that we're afraid to make a wrong decision. " N o " is a pretty strong answer—a pretty strong decision— and w h a t if it's the w r o n g one? People are terrified at the prospect, a n d this fear of the w r o n g decision is one of the most debilitating emotions of all, b u r r o w i n g deep beneath all aspects of decision making. Inexperienced or w r o n g h e a d e d negotiators believe that " n o " locks t h e m into a w r o n g decision and that " m a y b e " protects t h e m from this w r o n g decision. We are paralyzed by d o u b t from all sides: "Why take this deal?" "The whole thing sounds too good." "Maybe I can win even more." "Why are they making this so easy?" "What do they know that I don't know?" "This can't be right." "How can I get out of this?" I or any businessperson could e x p a n d this list for pages. There's no d o u b t that the average negotiator is beset by doubt. T h e fear of making a w r o n g decision relates to all our fears of failing, w h i c h are deeply ingrained in most of us. In school we were afraid of giving a w r o n g answer because we'd look stupid and be laughed at by the other kids. In the business world, the w r o n g answer—the w r o n g decision—can have far worse ramifications. So we live in fear of that w r o n g decision, and that fear
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binds us. Unnecessary fear of a bad decision is a major stumbling block to g o o d decisions. H o w do you get rid of the fear of being wrong? I'll answer this question w i t h another o n e : W h a t really happens w h e n we make a bad decision? We m a k e another decision, and t h e n a n other, a n d then another, and then another. A negotiation is a s e ries of decisions. W h e n — n o t if, b u t w h e n — y o u m a k e a bad decision, y o u simply follow it w i t h a better one. Understanding this simple lesson will liberate you as a negotiator. Or as a flight instructor told my son d u r i n g his training as a military pilot, "Lieutenant C a m p , you sure make some bad decisions in this airplane, but don't worry. As l o n g as you at least do make decisions, we can fix the bad ones." Take responsibility for the bad decision, learn from it, e m brace the failure, and soldier on w i t h o u t fear because you are only o n e decision away from getting back on track. B u t this attitude and approach take discipline and a lot of self-confidence, because being right is very important to most of us. It is a p o w erful need, and like all needs, it must be overcome. In a negotiation w i t h o n e of my clients, the adversary—a pretty big c o m p a n y with a famous set of initials—insisted on a 28 percent discount for the particular high-tech product in q u e s tion. Even though this discounted price was barely breakeven for my client, the negotiator agreed to the demand. ( W h e n his boss found out, he called me w i t h every intention of showing me the d o o r — a s he should have, except that I, too, had not been c o n sulted about that giveaway.) T h a t 28 percent giveback was a bad decision, a terrible decision, a killer decision. B u t it was not the end of the world. T h e following week my client went back to the adversary, r e o p e n e d the negotiations, and told t h e m he
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couldn't deliver at that price: "Sorry, b u t that agreement was a terrible mistake." In the end, the adversary agreed to forego most of that discount. B u t wait a m i n u t e , wasn't the adversary therefore guilty of saving my client by renegotiating the agreed-to discount? I don't k n o w ; I wasn't privy to their internal considerations. T h e y may have b e e n saving us, or they may have m a d e a careful business decision. I rather suspect the latter, because I'm talking about a careful company, but I can't prove it. Okay, but what if the c o m pany had said, " T o u g h . You negotiated the 28 percent discount, and we want it"? My client would have pulled the old negotiating team o u t of the picture, p u t in a n e w one, and the n e w team w o u l d have said, "Sorry, mea maxima culpa, we screwed up, but the machine is n o t c o m i n g at that deeply discounted price. Let's go from here." And what would have happened then? We would have negotiated. B u t all t o o often, companies saddled w i t h bad w i n - w i n contracts don't even consider renegotiation. Bad form, they say—and this is assuming they even understand that it is a bad contract, and they may not until the wolves are at the door. I've seen this many times. H e r e are t w o classic cases from recent business annals about reversing terrible decisions. S o m e years ago C o c a - C o l a decided they n e e d e d to change their formula, and they came on the m a r ket w i t h the " n e w C o k e . " A bad decision, a terrible decision, a killer decision, an unbelievably embarrassing decision. B u t it was not the end of the world. T h e c o m p a n y simply reversed the d e cision. ( O r was that first decision actually an unbelievably clever marketing ploy? I've heard that theory, w h i c h holds that the company merely pretended to replace C o k e Classic w i t h N e w C o k e in order to remind us h o w much we love the Real T h i n g .
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Either way—blunder or ploy—things worked out well, because sales soared, along w i t h the company's capitalization, w h i c h has gone from $9- billion to s o m e t h i n g closer to $100 billion since 1985.) T h e n we have a n o t h e r giant, Microsoft, w h i c h was dead w r o n g for years in its dismissive attitude toward the Internet. W h e n Bill Gates realized his error, he t u r n e d his giant c o m p a n y of fifteen thousand employees on a dime. W i t h i n ninety days, every division of Microsoft re-envisioned its purpose in terms of the N e t . Whatever your feelings about Gates, you have to a c k n o w l e d g e that this was an incredible demonstration of business leadership. He wasn't going to persevere in a bad decision (or a nondecision, actually). He did an about-face, and n o b o d y thinks the less of h i m for it.
O n e Last Time Embrace " n o " at every opportunity in a negotiation. D o n ' t fear the word, invite it. You do not take it as a personal rejection b e cause you are n o t needy. You understand that every " n o " is reversible. T h e m o m e n t you really internalize this principle of the C a m p System, you will be a m u c h better negotiator. T h e m o m e n t you quit w o r r y i n g about w h e t h e r you will h u r t someone's feelings, the m o m e n t you quit trying to save your adversary, you will be a m u c h better negotiator. T h e m o m e n t you understand the honesty and the power of " n o " you will have taken a long stride away from emotion-based negotiating and toward d e c i sion-based negotiating. If you cannot accept " n o , " you will b u r n too many bridges and have no way back into too many negotiations. N o t h i n g — absolutely nothing—is m o r e important to a successful negotiation
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than for you to make as clear as posssible from the very b e g i n ning that " n o " is a perfectly acceptable response at this negotiating table. You must make clear that you do n o t take " n o " as a personal rejection, but as an honest decision that can be discussed and perhaps reversed. You must make clear that a blunt " n o " is preferable to "maybe," w h i c h tells you n o t h i n g at all, and also preferable to "yes," a total nonstarter. You must challenge the niceties of the emotion-based w i n - w i n system that a c c o m plish nothing, at best, or set you up for a sucker, more likely. This can be difficult to do w h e n dealing with c o m m i t t e d w i n - w i n adversaries, but w h e n you are able to do so, you'll be amazed h o w this right to say and hear " n o " clears the air at the negotiating table. If your adversary is a shrewd, highly trained expert, they'll consider you w i t h a great deal m o r e respect. If your adversary is a naive w i n - w i n n e r , they will feel much m o r e safe. T h e y can give you an honest " n o , " you'll accept it gratefully, and they k n o w you'll react in the same way in the future. Feeling safe saying " n o , " they also feel safe hearing "no." Barriers go d o w n , trust goes up, everyone feels m o r e comfortable, everyone becomes m o r e forthright, we're all adults here, the a t m o sphere of honesty is welcome. In the long run, " n o " is really the safest answer. It does not tear down business relationships. It builds them. You want w i n win? Saying and inviting and hearing " n o " are the real w i n - w i n .
4 Success Comes from This Foundation Develop Your Mission and Purpose
E F F E C T I V E N E G O T I A T I O N is effective decision making, plain b a n d simple, and the foundation of effective decision making is a valid mission and purpose to guide it. This is bedrock in my system. H o w can you stay on track d u r i n g a long negotiation or endeavor of any kind w i t h o u t a clear mission a n d purpose? There's no o t h e r way. But if you do develop and adhere to a valid mission and purpose, h o w can you go off the track? It's i m possible. If you have a valid mission and purpose, and the result of your negotiation fulfills this mission and purpose, it's a g o o d and w o r t h w h i l e negotiation. Now, that's pretty simple. It doesn't sound all that profound, but the principle works like magic. It's an airtight guide for effective decision making. R e m e m b e r from the previous chapter that list of doubts that
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disrupt effective decision making? H e r e it is again (and it could have been a lot longer): "Why take this deal?" "The whole thing sounds too good." "Maybe I can win even more." "Why are they making this so easy?" "What do they know that I don't know?" "This can't be right." "How can I get out of this?" Forget all this stuff! If your negotiation serves a valid mission and purpose, y o u don't have to w o r r y a b o u t w h e t h e r y o u get every last dollar or concession o u t of the deal, or w h e t h e r y o u gave e n o u g h dollars and concessions. You don't w o r r y about the l o n g - t e r m relationship. You are n o t responsible for the o t h e r party's decisions. You d o n ' t care w h e t h e r this contract is w i n w i n , win-lose, lose-win, or lose-lose. Such scorekeeping is suddenly seen for w h a t it is: arbitrary, empty, meaningless. You don't have to w o r r y about it anymore, and this freedom will liberate you in a negotiation, believe m e . I teach and I preach that mission and p u r p o s e is the very essence of success. It must b e c o m e as automatic as breathing. You must develop the habit of referring to it on matters great and small, because it gives y o u crystal-clear guidance in all cases. T h e ultimate example of the effectiveness of the mission and purpose to guide decisions in the most difficult and critical circumstances i m a g i n a b l e — s o difficult a n d critical that they're unimaginable, really, to my m i n d — w a s President Lincoln's single-minded focus on saving the U n i o n . T h a t was his mission a n d purpose in his negotiation with his constituency and his other negotiation with the Confederacy: save the U n i o n . At any cost.
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Lincoln had decided that the dream of a N o r t h American c o n t i n e n t that could avoid t h e p r e c e d e n t offered by the E u r o p e a n states—war after war after w a r — w o u l d be so jeopardized should the U n i o n break apart that he was willing to make any personal sacrifice (which he did, in the end, and n o t to his surprise), and he was willing to ask any sacrifice of his people, including this Civil War, in the service of that mission and purpose. As the general of the U n i o n troops in the Civil War, Ulysses S. Grant adhered w i t h o u t hesitation to Lincoln's mission a n d p u r pose of saving the U n i o n by any means necessary, including h o r rible losses on the battlefield. Grant sacrificed his troops before the Confederate barricades at Vicksburg a n d Spotsylvania and C o l d H a r b o r a n d Petersburg because he understood that his sup e r i o r n u m b e r s and e q u i p m e n t w o u l d w i n the war of attrition in the end. But as a
president,
Grant was a failure, taking bad ad-
vice, m a k i n g b a d decisions, dealing w i t h a host of unsavory characters, mainly because he didn't k n o w w h y he was president and w h a t h e h o p e d t o accomplish d u r i n g Reconstruction. H e didn't have a clear mission and purpose. W h a t great decision, w h a t great achievement, was a c c o m plished w i t h o u t the valid M & P ? Certainly there have b e e n accidental discoveries in technology, b u t again, I ask you, w h a t great political or scientific or social or philanthropic deed, or w h a t w o r k of art, was pulled off w i t h o u t the focus, control, and resolution provided by a clear mission and purpose? I don't believe y o u can n a m e o n e . A n o t h e r favorite illustration I use in my workshops is the example of T h o m a s Alva Edison, w h o could have settled for putting up o n e streedight as a demonstration of his technology, or w h o could have wired the world's first electric toaster, b u t he h e w e d to his mission and p u r p o s e — a d o p t i n g electrical energy for the everyday use of m a n k i n d — a n d invested
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an astronomical a m o u n t of his o w n m o n e y in order to light up an entire block in N e w York City. W h a t a great story. W h a t a great vision. W h a t a great mission and purpose. H o w m a n y decisions will m a k e things t o u g h e r today t h a n they w e r e yesterday b u t benefit y o u dramatically in the l o n g term? I often use the example of the hypothetical inventor w h o can invest his life savings either in a marketing campaign for his p r o d u c t or in a complicated, expensive p a t e n t application on w h i c h there w o n ' t be a decision for three to five years. W i t h o u t a valid mission and purpose he m i g h t go astray, think short t e r m , and go to the market w i t h o u t a patent. B u t w h a t happens if the product does take off and he hasn't protected the invention? He has lost in b o t h the short and the l o n g terms. W i t h a valid m i s sion and purpose he wouldn't make that mistake. H e ' d file for that patent. Another, m o r e practical story involves a storyteller and artist w i t h a successful business in the Midwest. This client lived in a small t o w n and had the opportunity to b e c o m e involved w i t h all sorts of businesses, some directly related to his native talents and aspirations, some pretty far-fetched in that regard. He had a c quired a c o p y shop, a p r i n t shop, and an I n t e r n e t service provider, to n a m e just a few of his enterprises. Clearly, he is a very b r i g h t guy w i t h a lot of energy, and if an o p p o r t u n i t y seemed pretty g o o d , he dived right in. After a few years, his b e came the classic situation of overreaching. He had failed to stick to his knitting, as G r a n d m o m used to say. This happens a lot, of course. S o m e o n e starts o u t selling ice cream cones, t h e n starts m a k i n g the ice cream, t h e n buys his o w n cows—and t h e n figures he m i g h t as well o p e n a b u t c h e r shop as well! First things first, I said to my n e w client, a n d he g o t to
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w o r k on his mission and p u r p o s e , and this is w h a t he d e t e r mined: My mission and purpose is to help people see, discover, and decide to experience this world as a world of imagination and possibility and healing. We do this by sharing our stories and the model of our company, in a way that is sustainable now and into the future our children will inherit. O n c e he p u t this valid mission a n d purpose in place, my client could see clearly w h i c h of his subsidiary companies made sense. O n c e he had this clear vision, the decisions about what to keep a n d w h a t to divest were easy e n o u g h . For years n o w he has d o n e very well for himself and for m a n y others by a d h e r i n g to the spirit of this statement in all his businesses and negotiations. T h r o u g h o u t these pages you will see h o w negotiators a n d companies w h o have a valid mission and purpose in place, o n e w h i c h clearly expresses their l o n g - t e r m aim and c o n t i n u i n g responsibility, are able to handle any c o n t i n g e n c y that may c o m e up in t h e daily give-and-take of their businesses. T h e i r decision-making abilities are tenfold m o r e powerful than those of negotiators operating on a w i n g and a prayer. Supply system m a n a g e m e n t adversaries will fire in your direction a veritable fusillade of promises, threats, requests, deadlines, quibbles, position papers, and other stuff. Mission a n d purpose will serve as your very o w n missile defense shield to deal w i t h these tactics. Example: At the request of o n e of the biggest chipmakers in the world, my client provided a complete, in-depth, across-theboard proposal for selling about $50 million worth of the boxes that carry the silicon chips along the production line in the factory. (I should explain that these are n o t just any boxes. They're
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n o t corrugated paper, that's for sure, but high-tech in the e x treme. T h e y can cost almost $3,000 apiece.) Four other c o m p a nies in the world make these boxes; all had prepared proposals for the giant chipmaker. A great deal of negotiation had b e e n r e quired in order for my client to understand exactly what the cust o m e r required, b u t after receiving this comprehensive, carefully negotiated proposal, the supply system m a n a g e m e n t team at the chipmaker tried to break out the pieces of the proposal and n e gotiate t h e m separately. W h y ? To induce compromise, of course. My client declined to do this. Its mission and purpose was to provide the highest level of technology for the 300 mm arena, as it's k n o w n , while minimizing to the extent possible the risk of failure for the chipmaker. W i t h this M & P in place, and given the fact that the elements of their proposal had been crafted to w o r k in tandem to minimize the risk of failure for the chipmaker, my client simply couldn't agree to break their proposal into pieces, because this w o u l d have u n d e r m i n e d their M&P. Of course, the supply system m a n a g e m e n t people w i t h the chipmaker weren't thinking in these terms. T h e y saw their j o b as saving m o n e y upfront. So the crux of the negotiation revolved around getting the real decision makers at the chipmaker (the challenge of finding the real decision makers is the subject of chapter 11) to focus on the risk involved in using an inferior box, w h i c h was huge, because the failure of a single o n e at just the right place and just the right time in the production line can cost millions of dollars. In the end, that chipmaker saw the light, awarded the contract to my client, and paid full price. Mission and purpose is just as important for negotiations in o u r private lives as in o u r businesses and careers. I'm thinking of another client, the proud and happy father of a premature baby
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girl b o r n with a defective heart valve—a condition, the parents were told, that many premature babies are b o r n with. Sometimes this valve can be induced to close w i t h drugs, but if not, surgery is required. In the case of my client's baby, the drugs failed. T h e doctors wanted to move her to another hospital for the required surgery, the hospital w h e r e the best pediatric thoracic surgeons practiced. T h e parents—my client and his wife—saw no reason for this move. T h e hospital their daughter was in had a state-ofthe-art neonatal unit. In addition, there was an operating theater attached to the neonatal unit. T h e y feared that transferring their daughter to another hospital was t o o m u c h of a risk to take. B u t my client, a veteran businessman and negotiator, also k n e w he was too emotional to talk to the doctors and to argue his feelings effectively. This was a negotiation, pure and simple, and my client develo p e d the specific mission and p u r p o s e of getting the head of the neonatal unit to see and decide that he was risking the baby's life by transferring h e r to a n o t h e r hospital. Having this idea in place guided what the parents said to the doctor and h o w they said it. It helped t h e m keep their emotions in check, and this in t u r n prevented the doctors from l u m p i n g them—understandably enough, perhaps—into the category of emotionally overwrought parents w h o don't have to be taken seriously. T h e mission and purpose did its j o b in guiding the interview with the doctors, alt h o u g h the eventual decision was a surprise. We'll see exacdy how, and why, in chapter 9. W h a t happens if you don't have a valid mission and purpose in place? I've learned that a surefire way to get everyone's attention is to answer that question this way: If you're not w o r k i n g on b e half of your o w n mission and purpose, you're w o r k i n g on behalf of s o m e o n e else's. T h a t gives everyone pause. N o w , it's fine to
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w o r k on behalf of s o m e o n e else if y o u understand that y o u are d o i n g s o — i f y o u freely embrace a n d take their mission a n d p u r pose as y o u r o w n or build your o w n to support theirs—but it is a terrible waste to w o r k on behalf of s o m e o n e else's mission and purpose w i t h o u t realizing it. B u t if you don't have o n e , haven't even t h o u g h t about the subject, that's w h a t is happening. People w h o are u n h a p p y a n d frustrated in their w o r k either have invalid mission and p u r p o s e s — " I want to make a million dollars before I ' m t w e n t y - o n e " — o r they don't have o n e and are serving s o m e o n e else's, and s o m e part of t h e m understands this at some deep level. I k n o w a n d have w o r k e d w i t h quite a few freelancers and sole proprietors a n d o w n e r s of very small businesses w h o feel that their mission a n d p u r p o s e is self-evident. This was a mistake for my client in the Midwest, a n d it's a mistake for anyone in his p o sition. T h e mission and purpose is n o t self-evident. If y o u w o r k for yourself and do n o t have o n e in place, you are w o r k i n g at a great disadvantage. You're j u s t as vulnerable to w o r k i n g a n d n e gotiating on behalf on an invalid mission a n d purpose as is an employee at a giant, faceless multinational c o r p o r a t i o n . You must begin to develop o n e immediately. N o w let's see h o w to do this.
M o n e y and Power Are N o t Valid I want to make a million dollars before I'm twenty-one. I want to make 10 million dollars this year. I want to leave a legacy of 100 million dollars. I want to become president and CEO of this company. I want to be the most powerful politician in the state. XYZ is committed to increasing sales this year by 25 percent.
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T h e s e are some popular mission and purpose statements, if not stated quite so bluntly. This is h o w a lot of people and e m ployees construe their life's and their company's work. Already, at this early point in the book, I imagine readers k n o w the negative opinion I h o l d about all such statements, but the essential p r o b lem is not that these are narrow, shortsighted goals. T h e essential problem is that they are I-centered. T h e y are set in the world of the individual building the mission and purpose. This is w h y they are 100 percent invalid and worthless for any person, business, or negotiation. I have n o t h i n g against m o n e y and p o w e r properly acquired and used, but they must be the result, not the essence, of a valid mission and purpose. History and experience should tell each and every o n e of us, time and time again, that having wealth a n d / o r power as the aim in life will destroy any individual (and many o t h e r people, in some instances). T h e cliche is worth repeating o n e m o r e time: M o n e y for money's sake does corrupt; power for power's sake does c o r r u p t . Will businesspeople w h o s e mission and purpose is to "make a killing" grow and thrive in the long run with such a narrow, self-serving mission and purpose? It is no m o r e possible for t h e m than it was for Hitler or Ferdinand Marcos or Joseph Stalin. O n e of the great American business tragedies of the 1980s was the death of Eastern Airlines. T i m e has shown that Eastern didn't die. It was killed by its leadership and some j u n k - b o n d guys. I'm sure these m e n could have presented a mission and purpose for public consumption that addressed jobs and lower ticket prices for the consumer and safety in the air, but the real M & P seemed to have been to strip the airline of its assets, leaving only bills and debt for the creditors. Perhaps the best case in point from more recent business an-
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nals is that of Q u a k e r Oats and Snapple. T h e giant corporation b o u g h t the drink c o m p a n y for about $1.7 billion in 1994, b e lieving that there would be a g o o d fit b e t w e e n Snapple and their Gatorade brand. B u t Snapple had a completely different kind of distribution plan than Q u a k e r Oats used for Gatorade, and the company's plan to force Snapple's distributors and buyers into conforming to the Gatorade m o d e l were resisted and eventually failed. A few years after Snapple was b o u g h t for the $1.7 billion, it was sold by Q u a k e r Oats for about $300 million. T h e acquiring company, TriArc, k n e w w h a t it was doing, rebuilt the brand, and sold it for $1.6 billion to C a d b u r y S c h w e p p e s — a n d they didn't even n e e d that, since they were on the road show for their I P O w h e n that offer came in. W h e n I read about such acquisition debacles, of w h i c h there are many every year, I automatically analyze the deal in terms of valid versus invalid mission and purpose. On the surface, b r i n g ing Snapple and Gatorade u n d e r the same umbrella m a d e sense, b u t the valid mission and purpose isn't just on the surface, and it doesn't suppose that the c o m p a n y that sells o n e popular drink can necessarily sell a n o t h e r o n e . W h a t about the predatory negotiators I have w a r n e d about w h o sound like the k i n d of people w h o w o u l d have "make a killing" as their mission a n d purpose? Well, m a y b e it is their M&P, b u t n o t necessarily. T h e i r predatory negotiating is a means; they're simply taking advantage of weak w i n - w i n n e g o tiators. T h e y m i g h t have a perfectly valid mission and purpose. In any event, I don't blame the predatory negotiators. I blame the weak w i n - w i n negotiators w h o feed them. A n o t h e r problem w i t h concentrating on m o n e y and p o w e r as a mission and p u r p o s e is that you're scorekeeping, a n d scorekeeping means you're t h i n k i n g a b o u t results over w h i c h y o u
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have no real control. To repeat, you're thinking about breaking par for the first time (or bogey, m o r e likely), n o t about the r e quirements of this crucial shot on seventeen. You're t h i n k i n g about the n e w Beemer, n o t about the discipline and hard w o r k you'll n e e d in the negotiation that, if it's successful, will ultimately pay for that shiny n e w car. And o n e final point here, j u s t to set the record straight. T h e great coach Vince Lombardi of the Green Bay Packers did say, for commercial purposes, " W i n ning isn't everything, it is the only thing," b u t w h e n I heard h i m address the football t e a m at O h i o State d u r i n g spring practice in 1965, I believe, he p u t the point somewhat differently: " W i n ning isn't everything, b u t the will to prepare to w i n is everything." I trust the distinction b e t w e e n the t w o statements is clear. I also believe that the second statement must have reflected Lombardi's true feelings, because a great coach of any sport or any endeavor at all k n o w s that the first attitude guarantees failure, s o o n e r or later, because w i n n i n g is b e y o n d o u r control, while preparation is 100 percent u n d e r o u r control. A n d w h a t is the cornerstone of preparation? Mission and purpose.
Your M & P Is Set in Your Adversary's W o r l d M a k e that a valid mission and purpose. W h a t is a valid M & P ? First a n d foremost, it must be set in the adversary's world. For a politician and leader, it must be set in the world of his or h e r constituents. For a businessperson, it must be set in the world of the customer. For a negotiator, it must be set in the world of t h e t e a m sitting across the table. Setting the mission and purpose in the constituents' or the customer's or the adversary's world allows all of t h e m to see clearly the features and benefits that y o u and your product or service have to offer t h e m . For the negotia-
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tor, setting the mission and purpose statement in the adversary's world is a fundamental way in w h i c h you see your adversary's world clearly and w i t h o u t false assumptions, and get the adversary to see and act w i t h the same clarity. My mission and purpose is to help people see, discover, and decide to experience this world as a world of imagination and possibility and healing. We do this by sharing our stories and the model of our company, in a way that is sustainable now and into the future our children will inherit. W h e n you read the artist's mission a n d purpose a few pages back, perhaps y o u noticed s o m e t h i n g different about it b u t didn't stop at the time to pin d o w n this difference. Now's the time. Please take a m i n u t e or two to study the statement and a b sorb the fact that it's fundamentally, irrevocably set in the world of his customer. It has n o t h i n g whatsoever to do with buying m o r e businesses or making m o r e money, and n o t because he's playing games w i t h words. He isn't. R e c e n t l y this client told m e , "Mission and purpose is what I stand for in the world—above all, w h a t I want to accomplish and h o w I want to accomplish it. If it came to the hour of my death, I could say wholeheartedly that this is something that I am willing to live for." Recall my client w h o was a b o u t to m e e t w i t h the doctors c o n c e r n i n g his baby girl. His mission and purpose was to get the head of the neonatal unit to see and decide that he was risking the baby's life by transferring her to a n o t h e r hospital. It was set in the world of the doctors. In a valid mission and purpose, o u r world must be secondary. You might understandably ask why, if it's my mission and purpose, do I want to focus on s o m e o n e else? Because unless you live alone on a desert island, your mission and purpose is to focus on someone else. T h a t " s o m e o n e else" is
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your lifeblood, w h e t h e r you're a politician, a doctor, a patient, a businessperson, or a negotiator. D o n ' t ever forget this. As a n e gotiator, you don't go anywhere w i t h o u t your adversary, by definition. We all k n o w the phrase that is n o w de rigueur in retail sales: " T h e customer comes first." I'd like to k n o w the retail c o m p a n y that has thrived over a l o n g p e r i o d of time w i t h any other m o d u s operandi. This is the reason I w o n d e r about the l o n g t e r m prospects for companies that take advantage of b o o m s and let their customer service slide. T h e airlines c o m e to mind, j u d g ing by the n u m b e r of complaints p o u r i n g in to the FAA. O t h e r companies that have theoretically m o d e r n i z e d their customer service w i t h those automated p h o n e programs that serve mainly to enrage us with their endless loops may be in for a surprise w h e n things cool off. T h e r e will be some winners and losers, and I k n o w w h o m I'm betting o n . O v e r the long haul, you p u t profits in the bank by putting the customer first, and there's a direct analogy w i t h negotiation: We greatly enhance o u r o p p o r t u n i t y for a successful deal by putting the adversary first in o u r mission and purpose. You make your killing—or just a solid profit—only by entering heart and soul into your adversary's world, business, needs, requirements, hopes, fears, and plans. Your mission and purpose is to allow her or him to see and decide that you build and service the best machine for the task at a competitive price. It is not to sell ten t h o u sand machines this fiscal year. By providing the best machine, you may sell the ten thousand, but focusing on t h e m is putting the profit before the performance, your world before your adversary's. It won't work. Recall n o w the company on the brink of bankruptcy because it was losing $100,000 with every shipment. C u t t i n g costs was
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n o t an issue here; costs were n o t the problem. T h e problem was that the c o m p a n y had b e e n taken to the cleaners in the negotiation w i t h its primary customer. It had allowed the price to be driven to below-cost levels. Let's examine s o m e possible M & P s for a c o m p a n y in this dire situation. "Renegotiate this contract." Well, this c o m p a n y certainly did want to renegotiate the big contract. "Become profitable again." M a n a g e m e n t , employees, and shareholders certainly did want it to b e c o m e profitable again. B u t those approaches would never w o r k , because they did n o t address the world of the other c o m p a n y w i t h w h i c h it had the fateful contract, a n d w h i c h was u n d e r no obligation to renegotiate the contract. Instead of those t w o self-centered statements, the c o m p a n y developed the following customer-centered m i s sion a n d purpose for the u p c o m i n g renegotiation: To help [the other company's] management at the very highest level see our company as a new and revitalized organization that is going to change its effectiveness to the benefit not only of their company but also to that of the whole industry by becoming a more effective and competent supplier to that industry. And they were able to accomplish this mission. R e m e m b e r o u r high school athlete deciding a m o n g colleges in chapter 3? His mission and purpose was n o t "get into a good program so I'll be recruited by the pros and sign for five million." He wasn't g o i n g to be a pro, and he k n e w it. N o r was his M & P " t o get into a top academic school so I can make lots of m o n e y after I graduate." N o r was it " t o get as far away as possible from h o m e . " T h e last t w o m i g h t have b e e n considerations, b u t all w o u l d have b e e n invalid missions and purposes because all were set in his world. His valid mission and purpose was to provide the
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coaches w i t h an individual w h o would p u t forth the effort r e quired for c o m p l e t e t e a m success. Likewise, the mission a n d purpose of the b o o k i n g agent for the dance c o m p a n y in the n e gotiation w i t h the program director was n o t to secure another w e e k of t o u r i n g for the c o m p a n y and increase its earnings. It was n o t to secure a commission for the b o o k i n g agent and i n crease h e r earnings. It was to get this director to see a n d decide that presenting this particular dance c o m p a n y w o u l d b r i n g cultural richness to h e r organization's audiences and c o m m u n i t y , and to help the program director fulfill h e r organization's o w n mission a n d purpose. As an interviewee for a j o b , y o u r mission and p u r p o s e might be to help the employer see a n d decide that you are a person of great character and integrity that the employer's c o m p a n y must have in order to take its business to a n e w level. As a Realtor it might be to help the seller see and decide that it is in her best l o n g - t e r m interest that she accept this offer that she is able to secure from you today. As a commercial plumber, it might be to help contractors see and decide that you b r i n g great benefit to their projects by providing professional workmanship, using the highest-quality supplies and materials available, and guaranteeing o n - t i m e completion. As a travel agent, it might be to help travelers see and decide that your k n o w l e d g e and experience in the field and attention to detail would enhance every aspect of their travel. A n d w h a t a b o u t J i m C a m p , b o o k author? M y mission a n d purpose is to provide the o p p o r t u n i t y for people to elevate their level of success, accomplishing this by means of clear, concise w r i t i n g that presents in a systematic way the keys to decisionbased negotiating. W h e n I asked s o m e of my clients about the w i s d o m of this project, a c o u p l e w o n d e r e d aloud w h e t h e r I
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could do the j o b sufficiently in a single b o o k . Confronted by this doubt, I returned to my mission and purpose and t h o u g h t about the key word, w h i c h is "opportunity." My purpose here isn't to elevate your success regardless, but simply to provide you with the opportunity to do so. A huge difference, obviously, and I have no d o u b t at all that this b o o k does provide that opportunity, and so I am w r i t i n g it. In 1999, Major League Baseball umpires must have thought their mission and p u r p o s e was to show the lords of baseball that they couldn't get along w i t h o u t the umpires. Bad t h i n k ing. T h e y were blinded by their incorrect assessment, and some of t h e m paid w i t h their jobs. T h e i r mission and purpose should have been to get the players, the fans, and the lords of the game to see and decide that the umpires provide the highest level of expertise in calling balls and strikes and plays at the bases while remaining invisible on the field. S o m e t h i n g like this: "Invisible" is important, I think, because I've played a lot of baseball, and used to u m p i r e Pony League games, and I k n o w h o w easy it is for the u m p to slip into a power trip. A mission and purpose i n cluding invisibility w o u l d well serve the umpires and referees in all sports. W i t h such an M&P, w h y would you go on strike, which is, by definition, a high-visibility act? W h a t would have happened if the umpires had said instead that they w o u l d never go o u t on strike, because that would damage the game all of us love, but that they would w o r k hard to alert the players and the fans of their situation, that they w o u l d hire a public relations firm to that end? I think the negotiation might have turned out differendy. Of course, I ' m shooting from the hip here. I wasn't privy to the details of that episode, a n d I don't k n o w for sure h o w I
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w o u l d have coached either the umpires or the owners, had they b e e n my clients, b u t I do k n o w that the umpires, surely, and maybe also the owners were flailing around w i t h o u t a valid mission and purpose. T h e y were n o t alone. Invalid mission and purposes are at the heart of many labor disputes, almost by definition. By now, the phrase "see and d e c i d e " in most of the mission and purpose statements presented above must be obvious. W h y this phrase? Often, you want to create a vision in the other party that will move t h e m to take action. Mission and purpose drives vision for all parties, and vision drives effective decision making for all parties. It's as simple as that. In short, you may want your adversaries to see and decide. From what perspective will they see and decide? From the perspective of their o w n world, of course. Therefore your mission and purpose must be set in their o w n w o r l d — t h e key criterion for a valid M&P. T h e r e are other criteria as well. All good mission and purpose statements are concise. If we can state o u r mission and purpose simply and concisely, we can create the vision we want. If we get too complicated, too convoluted, we cloud the vision. Even if such statements are valid, they make creating a vision difficult. T h e mission and purpose must always be written. W h a t h a p pens w h e n y o u g o through the process o f w r i t i n g a n y t h i n g down? I can't tell you, technically, but I do k n o w that putting a t h o u g h t in w r i t i n g makes it stronger a n d reinforces c o m m i t ment. O u r mind is an amazing thing, b u t it can lose focus. I m portant matters are written d o w n for a reason, and it's n o t to create busywork. So pick up your pen or sit down at the keyboard. This is the day and age of teamwork in business, and the team must have its o w n mission and purpose that is in complete sup-
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p o r t of the overall mission and purpose of the institution. Everybody has to be on the same page, and happily so. W i t h a team, the mission and purpose has to be negotiated—and in a n e gotiation, all parties have the right to say no, of course. You may also have realized by n o w that an individual or a c o m p a n y may have more than one mission a n d purpose. T h e c o m p a n y renegotiating the contract on w h i c h it was losing $100,000 on every machine delivered developed a specific mission and purpose for the renegotiation. You or your c o m p a n y may well have many M&Ps, because you have o n e for almost every major task y o u undertake, and for many seemingly m i n o r tasks as well. You have the overall mission a n d purpose for your business or enterprise. You have a seco n d mission and purpose for your negotiation w i t h a specific adversary. Within that negotiation you have yet other layers of mission and purpose, each of which guides the decision m a k i n g at that p o i n t . In complicated, high-stakes negotiations, my clients may have a w r i t t e n mission a n d purpose for almost every p h o n e call to anyone on the other side. No kidding. A n d each, of course, is set in the world of the adversary. A n d o n e m o r e thing about mission and purpose, w h i c h may at first blush sound completely contradictory to every previous point in this chapter. Your mission and purpose can a n d perhaps should change. If you're a plumber, the skills and attributes y o u b r i n g to your w o r k may n o t change, so your mission and p u r pose might not, either. B u t it might if, say, the emphasis of your business switched from residential to commercial. We can easily see h o w the situation of an individual w i t h a less clearly focused business, like real estate, might change. In any event, if the features and benefits that y o u b r i n g to the table do change, you will have a different vision of what can be accomplished, and your
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mission and purpose should change accordingly. Earlier in this chapter I referred to Ulysses S. Grant's victory as a Civil War g e n eral but failure as a president. A n o t h e r way to look at that career is that Grant had the mission and purpose for the Civil War but was unable to develop o n e for his R e c o n s t r u c t i o n presidency. O n e could analyze George Bush's reelection defeat in 1992 as a failure to convince the electorate that he had a n e w mission and purpose for a p o s t - G u l f War America. In 2000, Al Gore lost the election in large part, I believe, because he, like many vice presidents w h o r u n for the presidency, wasn't quite able to develop and sell his o w n M&P, o n e i n d e p e n d e n t from Bill Clinton's. T h i n k about h o w the Internet has changed the products and services that p h o n e companies offer their customers, that catalog companies offer their customers, or that advertising companies offer their customers. I've already m e n t i o n e d h o w Bill Gates finally saw the light regarding the Internet and changed M i c r o soft's mission and purpose in three m o n t h s . T h e Internet has or should have changed the mission a n d purpose of most of the businesses in this economy. In the e n d , w h o will be i m m u n e t o it?
A Valid M & P Will Never Let You D o w n In his excellent book Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, and Practices, Peter D r u c k e r dedicates many pages to the issue of u n d e r standing w h a t it is y o u really d o — y o u r mission and purpose. He writes, " Y o u r business is never apparent. It requires i n - d e p t h questioning that gives you a process that provides constant refocusing of w h a t you do." You must continuously analyze a n d ask yourself: W h a t is my business? W h a t is my mission? W h a t is my purpose? As y o u set a valid mission and purpose in place, y o u
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will discover that the picture of w h a t you are trying to a c c o m plish becomes crystal clear and you eliminate all confusion. As a negotiator, once you have a mission and purpose you can control your emotions, you can make effective decisions. If every decision you m a k e — e v e n o n e that doesn't t u r n out well—is in the service of a sound mission and purpose, you cannot go w r o n g , n o t in the long run. H o w many ways can I say it? Mission and purpose can be the most powerful single card you hold in your hand.
5 Stop Trying to Control the Outcome Focus on Your Behavior and Actions Instead
S
OME YEARS AGO, I was u n w i n d i n g with one of my best and most successful students at the time, a salesman, and he told
me the following story: "You know, Jim, I have a prospect in my area that I called on for more than two years. Around 8:30 in the morning on the first Monday of each month I'd stop by and see him—a really nice guy, but I thought he would never buy from me. He always seemed unable to focus on the issues. To tell the truth, it was frustrating, and I only called on him because he was so close to where I lived. It was convenient. He was part of my monthly plan. One week I was on my way home one afternoon, with a little time to spare. I decided to stop by and see this man. And he was a different guy! He was focused, he acknowledged he had some problems we could fix, and he gave me my
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first order right then. I was shocked. After we finished the paperwork I had to ask him, 'Why today?' What had brought him to buy from me on that day? He said, 'Well, I'm diabetic and it takes me a couple hours in the morning to get my blood sugar under control. I have trouble getting started until about ten in the morning. Come to think of it, I don't think I ever place an order until the afternoon, probably out of habit. I appreciate your continuing to come and see me.' "
O u c h . Two years! In chapter 8 we'll look at the mistake my client made that caused this negotiation to take that long in the first place, b u t the point for o u r discussion n o w is that not o n e of those visits was wasted time, and this would have been true even if he hadn't eventually signed the deal. O u r subject n o w is goals. Just as w i t h mission and purpose, I believe in these tools but call for a very different approach from the usual one. My clients do not set sales targets, quotas, n u m bers, percentages. Never. Instead, they set goals they can control. So, what can we control? If you're able to answer this question and really internalize that answer, you're way ahead of most people, including many "professional" negotiators. W h e n I ask this question in workshops a n d seminars, only a few people will answer, "Ourselves." This is the correct answer, but only partially. C a n we manage o u r heart rate, for example? I've read that certain m o n k s of a high caliber can do so, b u t most of us cannot. C a n we control o u r anger following an insult? N o t really, not the e m o t i o n itself. T i m e ? C a n we control time? Well, we can't alter the fact that there are only t w e n t y - f o u r h o u r s a day to w o r k with, and some of these will be "lost" to sleep, b u t we can c o n trol what we do d u r i n g o u r waking hours and h o w we do it. By this progression we arrive at the real answer to w h a t we can c o n -
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trol about ourselves: behavior and activity, or as I sometimes p u t it, an action or effort to an end. Your anger following an insult is n o t under your control, but your behavior is. You decide w h e t h e r to strike back in some way or to t u r n the other cheek. In your life, in your negotiations, you develop habits of behavior, good and bad, and you have a c tivities that y o u p u r s u e that help or hinder you. E v e r y t h i n g else—everything, including all results—we might as well think of as acts of God. If my clients goal had b e e n " t o sell his p r o d u c t " to his diabetic customer, he would have given up. But that would never have b e e n his goal, because the actual sale was an end over w h i c h he had no control, and no o n e in his right mind w o u l d set a goal over w h i c h he had no control. Or would he? Of course he would! It happens all the time in the business world, and in o u r private lives as well. I'd even say that most companies, professionals, and individuals set perform a n c e goals that are really results, over w h i c h they have no c o n trol and w h i c h they fail to m e e t time after time after time. I have spent years in front of thousands of negotiators in straight sales, m e n and w o m e n w h o may earn $750,000 a year in commissions, students in college preparing for their first real j o b , top executives of Fortune 500 companies. I have coached the negotiations of some of the most successful service and academic institutions in the world. Invariably, no matter the background, all of these good people want the same thing: results! But w h e n I ask t h e m to identify the behaviors and activities required of their n e g o tiation or sales teams, they don't know. T h e y can't do it. All they k n o w is that on every sales team there is—and has to be, by definition—the top seller or the top negotiator, no matter the
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market condition, no matter the difficulty of the negotiation. W h y can't everyone deliver results like that?! Well, many m o r e of us can, but only if we understand the difference b e t w e e n a goal and a result, b e t w e e n what we can and cannot control.
Control W h a t You Can Control, Forget the Rest W h a t goals did y o u set prior to sitting d o w n w i t h this b o o k and thinking at greater length about the art and science of negotiation? You probably didn't set any. That's fine. Most p e o p l e wouldn't; no o n e said you had to. B u t I suggest that now you think about your goal for this undertaking. If I were a beginner in the study of decision-based negotiation (as opposed to e m o t i o n - and compromise-based negotiation), my initial goals would be to focus at all times on my mission and purpose, to control my neediness and never demonstrate neediness, to always allow my adversary to be okay, to have no fear of saying or hearing " n o " — t h e subjects of the preceding chapters. R i g h t there you have four very straightforward, obtainable, valid goals that, if carefully followed, would make you an excellent negotiator, relative to the field. B u t the real point I want to get across here is the distinction between a goal and a result (or objective, as it's c o m m o n l y labeled). Goals you can control, objectives you cannot. By following your behavioral goals, you get to your o b jectives. O n e last time: instead of trying to break par (or bogey, m o r e likely), a result we cannot control, we concentrate on putting a good swing on the ball, an action we can control. T h e distinction is crystal clear, surely, but it never ceases to amaze me that the same folks in my workshops w h o n o d their heads in agree-
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merit w i t h the golf analogy t u r n right around and a n n o u n c e that their goal in this negotiation is to sign the deal and collect the money. So I ask you again, is this signing and collecting something that you can actually manage and control? You can attempt to influence s o m e o n e else's decision, to help t h e m see, but can you manage the final decision itself? N o t if this is a genuine negotiation in which both parties have the right to say "no." You cannot forge the adversary's signature. Or think about it this way: After you've led the horse to the water, can you make it drink? T h e old adage says no, and the old adage is right. As you work through these lessons and apply t h e m to your business and your life, you'll develop a keen awareness of exacdy what you can and cannot control, and therefore what is and is n o t a valid goal. W h a t you can control is behavior and activity, what y o u cannot control is the result of this behavior and activity. T h i n k behavior, forget result. Should s o m e o n e e x h o r t you, " G o get ' e m , gang! Make s o m e t h i n g happen! Stir the pot! Go for the jugular! Close, close, close!" y o u should ignore this yelling and screaming. If y o u think this individual is w o r t h the effort, you should point out w h y these are n o t valid goals. And if you don't think this individual is w o r t h the effort but you're stuck w i t h h i m or her as a manager or colleague, you should think seriously about a n e w venue for your labors, because at this o n e you'll be wasting time, effort, and money. Even if some kind of quantitative goal is achieved, it is still an invalid, dangerous goal. Say you're a salesperson and you've "got your n u m b e r " for the w e e k , and it's only Wednesday. You might be t e m p t e d to think, Man, I'm great. I'll relax the rest of the week. It's my reward. See the problem? Worse, what if you don't have
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your n u m b e r toward the end of the week? You tend to work harder, not smarter, all in the service of what's n o t valid anyway. You end up w o r k i n g on the w r o n g problem or with the w r o n g activities and habits and dig a deeper hole. And if you're into the w i n - w i n thing, y o u very likely end up m a k i n g a classic w i n - w i n mistake: the unnecessary compromise in the course of chasing an invalid goal. That's a killer. In my negotiation c o a c h i n g e x p e r i e n c e — a n d it's pretty broad, ranging over many different fields of business—I have seen that the failure to set manageable goals is as c o m m o n a mistake as any other. People get confused because they don't have a step-by-step plan. T h e y casually talk about goals and results, or objectives, b u t they don't really k n o w h o w to distinguish b e t w e e n t h e m . F o r o n e thing, they d o n ' t have a mission and p u r p o s e to guide t h e m . T h e y thereby p u t themselves on an emotional roller coaster, and this is a fatal error, as we shall see time and again in these pages. Disappointment, excitement, d e spair, h o p e — t h e y experience the w h o l e range of emotions, and all because they're reacting to events over which they don't have control and ignoring those over which they do have control. By following your valid goals you obtain your objective. By obtaining your objective you further your mission and purpose. At all times you set goals and objectives that are as valid as the mission and purpose they serve. It sounds simple, and it is simple to state and to understand, but it takes discipline and practice to actually live and negotiate in this way. You could think of my system—and this book—as nothing more or less than a means to identify activities and behaviors that we can control during a n e gotiation.
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The Negotiation Never Ends W h e n does a negotiation really end? C o n v e n t i o n a l w i s d o m holds that it ends w h e n the deal is p u t to bed, w h e n the paper is signed, before the ink has even dried. B u t if this were true, we w o u l d never e n c o u n t e r buyer's remorse, w o u l d we? We wouldn't need lawyers (or as many lawyers). Customers wouldn't change suppliers, suppliers w o u l d n ' t decide they d o n ' t want anything to do with that customer again. In the real world, the negotiation does n o t e n d w h e n the paper is signed. Tough n e g o tiators for the multinationals—supply systems m a n a g e m e n t types—operate under the assumption that contracts are easily b r o ken, that this is just part of business, and that their corporations have m o r e legal staying p o w e r than the smaller businesses they're dealing with. Take just a m i n u t e to think back on some of your most critical negotiations, either in your business or private life. D i d they really end, or did they keep going? S o m e of t h e m kept going, I k n o w that. N o w , h o w did you react? If your goal had b e e n " t o sign the deal," you were upset, and then you were in trouble, b e cause you didn't k n o w w h a t to do next. B u t if your goal all along had b e e n behavior and activity over which you had c o n trol, you had no problem at all. T h e first negotiation was n o w followed by a second negotiation. Back to work! Big deal.
Beware Unworthy Goals Setting unmanageable goals, those that are beyond your control, is o n e c o m m o n mistake. Wasting time and energy on manageable b u t insufficient or u n w o r t h y goals is another. To make my point here, I draw a distinction b e t w e e n what I call payside and
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nonpayside activities. I apologize for the jargon and the m e r c e nary tone, but the distinction is important, and I haven't figured o u t a better way to describe it. Payside activity is everything d i recdy related to the negotiation, from setting valid appointments and meetings to making the final presentation. Nonpayside activity is stuff you have to do that isn't directly on the track of the negotiation. Filling out expense forms, for example, and other sorts of bureaucratic paperwork are the lowest form of n o n p a y side activity. In any event, I think you get the picture. For the salesperson, getting appointments with truly qualified prospects is a payside activity, while getting appointments w i t h individuals or companies merely for the sake of fulfilling some mandatory quota is not a payside activity. You do have to spend time and energy on nonpayside activities in order to get to payside, but, obviously, you want to keep the nonpayside to the m i n i m u m . A downfall of s o m e gladhanding negotiators is to w i n e and dine potential customers, stop by their offices to shoot the breeze, play golf, send gifts, and so on-—all nonpayside activities—while never making the move to get d o w n to serious negotiating. This is pretty c o m m o n , actually, in the corporate world, as well as in the m o r e o n e - o n - o n e professions, such as straight sales. These folks either don't k n o w the difference b e t w e e n payside and nonpayside, or, m o r e likely, they do k n o w the difference very well and are kidding t h e m selves and using all this nonpayside wining and dining to avoid what they k n o w will be a difficult negotiation. W i t h nonpayside activity, there's no immediate gain, but neither is there i m m e d i ate risk, a n d this is tempting to us. Payside activity does have potential reward, but it also holds risk, and it's hard work. This can thwart us—but we must n o t let
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it. On the day that I w r i t e these words, I have a m e e t i n g that could, in the future, lead to a serious $20 million n e g o t i a tion. I ' m g o i n g gladly, but I don't kid myself; it's nonpayside activity, and I'd set it aside in a m o m e n t for a payside activity on a negotiation w o r t h only $1 million. O n e of the characteristics of really successful negotiators is h o w swiftly and efficiently they shift from nonpayside activity to payside activity. T h e r e is great risk in believing, as per conventional wisdom, that certain activity is payside, w h e n actually it's not. I'm t h i n k ing specifically of begging for an a p p o i n t m e n t — a n extremely c o m m o n error in all fields of business, as I've m e n t i o n e d . I have seen salespeople almost ruined by this kind of nonpayside dreaming. A w o r t h w h i l e a p p o i n t m e n t w i t h a potential supplier or cust o m e r is definitely payside activity. An a p p o i n t m e n t rustled up o u t of the p h o n e b o o k to m e e t some kind of quota is definitely nonpayside and a horrible instance of self-deception. This a p p o i n t m e n t will fail, and so will the next o n e like it, and pretty soon, no matter h o w strong you are, your self-image will suffer and you'll really be in trouble. I m e n t i o n e d in chapter 1 the salutary discipline imposed by cold calling, and this is true, b u t it is nonpayside activity. Be sure y o u understand this. Be sure you don't cold-call or do the equivalent if you have a legitimate payside activity waiting. W h e n we have the habit of setting as a goal only activity that we can accomplish and that is genuinely productive, we've taken the first step to getting some real work done. R a t h e r than succeeding or not succeeding almost by accident in the service of some goal that's really beyond o u r control, we've taken the first step to taking responsibility for o u r actions and to e n d w h a t is, really, self-deception (and probably c o m p a n y w i d e d e c e p t i o n ) .
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This may sound harsh, b u t it's the truth. It's t o o easy to sell or n o t sell fifty widgets this week, or to sign or fail to sign the c o n tract w i t h your supplier. It's m u c h m o r e difficult to behave and act at all times in a disciplined, systematic way. B u t this is w h a t you must do in order to achieve w h a t you're capable of.
A Daily Track Helps You Monitor Your Work O n e of the most challenging skills to learn must be flying the ultrasophisticated military j e t fighters. T h e training is rigorous, to say t h e least. T h i s is a completely n e w e n v i r o n m e n t for a y o u n g m a n o r w o m a n just o u t o f college. T h e oxygen mask and parachute alone are restrictive e n o u g h to m a k e you w a n t to vomit. Sitting in a cockpit so small and w i t h straps so tight you can barely m o v e is also stifling. Flying at speeds of seven h u n d r e d miles p e r h o u r requires quick, effective decision making, to say the least again. T h e r e is no d o u b t that death can be instantaneous if the w r o n g decisions are made, so it is a gross understatement to say the y o u n g pilot faces a t r e m e n d o u s challenge. So h o w does the military, in twelve short m o n t h s , t u r n this college graduate into a superb pilot? H o w does this pilot build the a c tivity and behavior habits necessary to fulfill the goals? Well, w h e n this y o u n g m a n or w o m a n checks into pilot training, o n e of the first items issued is the daily training folder. T h a t record is carried at all times and reviewed by the instructor (coach) and the flight leader. It will be reviewed t w o or three times a day, with constant emphasis on reward for success a n d f o cused hard work on the failures. U n d e r the circumstances, g o o d habits are formed very quickly. T h e training folder will be a lasting d o c u m e n t that will grow as the y o u n g pilot's career grows.
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W h e n the career is over, that training folder will b e c o m e a historical d o c u m e n t a n d part of this pilot's p e r m a n e n t military record. N o w I ' m going t o scare s o m e o f y o u w i t h the answer t o t h e following question: H o w do you, as a student of negotiation, t u r n newly learned activity and behavior into habit? You, too, should keep a daily record and use it to identify strengths a n d weaknesses. T h o u g h this is n o t a b o o k about psychology, my system does ask the negotiator to study h u m a n nature, and it requires that the serious negotiator do so. You must understand and engage the adversary as a psychological being—an approach i m plicit t h r o u g h o u t the previous discussion—and y o u must engage yourself in the same way. This daily habit of analyzing perform a n c e and correcting it is critical to success. It's s o m e t h i n g that m a n y of us do at least some of the time—sometimes explicidy— and in my hands-on w o r k as teacher and coach, I ask my s t u dents to make a c o m m i t m e n t to daily, active self-examination and assessment, to m o n i t o r their behavior and emotions as they affect the negotiating process. R e m e m b e r V i n c e Lombardi: " W i n n i n g isn't everything, b u t t h e will to prepare to w i n is everything." For m a n y people, this "daily track," as I call it, is a rigorous task. B u t I also k n o w that keeping such a daily track w o u l d be as valuable in y o u r negotiating w o r k as anything else you m i g h t do. T h e critical assessment of daily actions and decision m a k ing pinpoints weaknesses, works w i t h strengths, and develops self-esteem. This discipline makes y o u really stop to think h o w you're spending your time, h o w you're absorbing this material, h o w you're d o i n g as a negotiator. As I've m e n t i o n e d in the i n troduction, some theories of learning suggest that we n e e d eight
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h u n d r e d hours of practice to learn something n e w and complex. Maybe that's high for some tasks, I don't know, but I do k n o w that we need lots of practice. T h e daily track helps us get it. I urge you to make the c o m m i t m e n t , and in the conclusion of this b o o k I'll explain h o w to set up your o w n daily track for establishing goals y o u can control, and t h e n m o n i t o r i n g h o w well you've d o n e .
6 What Do You Say? Fuels of the Camp System: Questions
H
ow DO WE stop kidding ourselves, even lying to ourselves in negotiations? H o w do we preclude or correct misunder-
standings? H o w do we identify the real issues a n d problems? H o w do we stop adversaries from hedging, fudging, and o u t right lying to us? H o w do we make deals that stick? H o w do we answer truthfully w i t h o u t destroying the feelings of s o m e o n e else? We use the specific goals of behavior and action—goals we can control—that I call the "fuels of the system." These are the behavioral habits that allow us to peel the onion of the adversary's business situation and negotiating position a n d find o u t what's really going on over there. T h e single most important fuel that you have, the most i m portant behavioral goal and habit you can develop, is your ability to ask questions. T h e other fuels, w h i c h I introduce in the fol-
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lowing chapter, support o u r questions. Perhaps this seems like kind of a small, maybe even quirky, subject for a chapter. In the first place, it's a short chapter, and in the second place it may be quirky, and it's certainly overlooked in every other b o o k on n e gotiating I've ever seen, b u t the unwillingness or inability to ask g o o d questions is a serious weakness in the field. T h e y deserve their o w n chapter, believe me. If you master the art of questioning, your work as a negotiator will benefit enormously. For many of us, the problem w i t h questions is that we have b e e n trained in o u r respective educational settings to be the smartest person in the r o o m . H o w do we accomplish this? By answering questions, of course. Very few of us are trained to ask t h e m , and even those w h o s e professional work depends on this skill—I'm thinking of doctors and lawyers n o w — o f t e n don't do a very good j o b of it. D o c t o r s can be so constrained by time and bureaucratic formulas, and so dependent on laboratory tests, that they forfeit o n e of their key diagnostic tools—asking g o o d questions. I've had firsthand experience w i t h this kind of medicine. I've also had the equivalent experience with lawyers, and I don't mean just in the c o u r t r o o m , w h e r e the exchanges are tightly controlled by rules, b u t even in depositions, w h e r e the parties can take m o r e liberties. T h e d o c t o r is trying to understand h e r patient's case, the lawyer is trying to find o u t as m u c h as she can about the testifier's k n o w l e d g e of the case, and the negotiator must try to see and understand her adversary's world. In any negotiation, w h e r e do we want to spend as m u c h time as possible? In the adversary's world. If this wasn't your answer, that's okay, but it's the o n e I'll be looking for by the time we finish this book. Your mission and purpose is set in your adversary's world. Starting with M & P and going from there, you want to inhabit the adversary's world, b e -
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cause that is the world about w h i c h you need information, and that is the perspective from w h i c h the adversary makes decisions. He doesn't make decisions from your perspective, does he? Of course n o t . He makes t h e m from his o w n perspective. O b v i ously. H o w do you find o u t about this perspective? H o w do you inhabit his world? By asking questions. As I've already discussed, o u r decisions are, initially, 100 p e r cent emotional. After we've m a d e o u r emotion-based decision, we need time to get the clear picture, the clear vision w i t h w h i c h to rationally j u d g e that decision. Questions are the means by w h i c h the negotiator helps the adversary do this. T h e adversary's answers to o u r questions build the vision that he needs to make decisions. No vision, no real decision: this is a rule of human nature. T h e most pliable w i n - w i n folks w o n ' t buy a t e n - c e n t trinket w i t h o u t s o m e kind of vision of themselves or their children playing with this trinket. R i g h t ? If you have any d o u b t about this point, please take a m o m e n t to think about it. It's some v i sion in o u r mind's eye that leads us to buy this house, to plant this flower, to negotiate this deal. All of us make decisions based on the vision we have of the issue at hand. No vision, no decision. It's vital that you understand this point. As a negotiator, questions are the fuels we use to lead the a d versary to a vision that will serve as a catalyst for a decision. As much as possible, we want the negotiation to stay in o u r adversary's world. Questions do serve the further purpose of helping us control o u r o w n neediness and to be u n o k a y — a n d this is a valuable purpose, I h o p e we all agree—but the vital purpose of questions is to allow us to mOve around in the adversary's world and see what they see and then lead t h e m to a clear vision and decision as well.
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T h e P o w e r o f Correct Q u e s t i o n s Asking questions is a science and an art. T h e science is in h o w y o u intellectually c o n s t r u c t a question. T h e art is f o u n d in h o w y o u ask it: your t o n e of voice, your creative choice of words, y o u r behavior and remarks before asking your question. So n o w we're g o i n g to get pretty technical, a n d we have to, b e cause technique is everything here. First, the "science." In the construction of o u r questions, we can start w i t h a verb or w i t h an interrogative. T h e verb-led question is just that, a question that begins w i t h a verb. "Is this something you should do?" "Can you do this?" "Will you do this?" "Do you need this?" "Do you have Jive minutes to see me?" H o w many responses can such questions bring? Off the top, the majority of my n e w clients a n d w o r k s h o p students say two. I wish it were so, b u t the correct answer is three. "Yes." "No." "Maybe." I h o p e y o u r e m e m b e r the discussion of these three choices in chapter 3, "Start w i t h N o , " and why, for a negotiator's purposes, " m a y b e " tells you n o t h i n g at all and "yes" is even worse. O n l y " n o " tells y o u s o m e t h i n g real, gives you s o m e t h i n g to go on w i t h your next question. W i t h only o n e w o r t h w h i l e answer o u t of the three, it follows that verb-led questions are often a waste of time. Therefore there are only t w o reasons to ask such a q u e s -
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tion: if y o u already k n o w the answer (law students are taught j u s t this rule), or if you're near the very e n d of the negotiation a n d y o u have to really b o r e in. T h e answer to the verb-led question usually does n o t give you w o r t h w h i l e information. That's o n e problem. A n o t h e r problem is that s u c h a question can often seem to the adversary as if you're driving for a "yes." " C a n y o u do this?" is a perfect e x a m ple. This question seems to the adversary to be calculated to take away the right to answer " n o . " It seems subtly manipulative, a n d usually it is subtly manipulative. Most people don't really want to say " n o " in the first place, as we've discussed, so if your question makes it even harder for t h e m to do so, you have created an u n comfortable, defensive adversary, a n d this does you no g o o d at all. Questions are so, so subde. C o n s i d e r the difference b e t w e e n the following choices: "Is this what you really want?" "Isn't this what you really want?" B o t h are verb led, and therefore dubious, b u t the inclusion of the w o r d " n o t " makes the second question a really terrible o n e , because o f the insinuated " r u s h t o close." R e m e m b e r , " N o Closing." S o o n e r or later in the negotiation, the attempt will backfire. "Can you say yes to this?" This is another terrible verb-led question. Never frame a question that seems to the adversary to be taking away the right to say " n o . " "Is there any reason you wouldn't say yes to this?"
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Even worse, if that's possible. Never frame a question that a p pears to your adversary as an attempt to trick. Everyone reading this b o o k w o u l d flinch w h e n hearing that question, and yet they do hear that question, or the equivalent, all too often from i n e x perienced negotiators. This point must be clear: Framing any question is very tricky and very important. You can blow a solid o n e - h o u r presentation in less than o n e m i n u t e w i t h an ill-chosen, one-sentence q u e s tion such as "Is there any reason y o u wouldn't say yes to this?" But it happens every second of the day, somewhere, because the ill-trained negotiator has b e e n led to believe that he's supposed to ask such a question in order to push things along quickly. B u t what if I were to ask this question: "What would you like me to do?" Well, this simple question is of a different sort altogether. This question spawns some interesting dynamics. Mainly, it is a very comforting question to hear. It demonstrates that you, the n e g o tiator w h o has asked this question, has no needs at the table. You have o p e n e d an area for negotiation and shown no fear. You are m a k i n g no assumptions. T h e adversary feels okay, because you are at her service. You are certainly n o t closing, attempting to confuse, or any of that negative stuff. H e a r i n g this question, the adversary on the other side of the table has no reason to fear you. Just as important, this o p e n - e n d e d question does n o t have a quick answer. It cannot be answered w i t h yes, n o , or maybe. T h e necessarily m o r e extended answer will have—well, may h a v e — s o m e information, or some e m o t i o n , or s o m e telltale waffling, or some insight. It should have something you can w o r k with, b e cause, as we know, people have a weakness for talking.
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W h o has control in a conversation, the guy listening or the guy talking? T h e listener, of course. If y o u want to maintain m a x i m u m control a n d leverage—and y o u do, o f c o u r s e — l e t your adversary do the talking. W i t h a question such as " W h a t w o u l d you like me to d o ? " y o u invite the adversary to indulge this weakness. Moreover, h e r answer allows you to enter h e r world a n d her vision. Likewise, w h e n I ask, " H o w are y o u ? " w h o s e world am I e n tering? W h o s e world am I entering w h e n I ask, " N o w w h y did y o u invite me to this m e e t i n g ? " W h o s e w o r l d w h e n I ask, "What's the biggest challenge your c o m p a n y faces?" Have y o u noticed the m a i n difference b e t w e e n these g o o d questions a n d any of the previous bad questions? T h e g o o d ones are led by an interrogative, n o t by a verb. " W h o , " "what," " w h e n , " " w h e r e , " "why," "how," and " w h i c h " : T h e s e are t h e famous i n terrogatives we all learned about in elementary school, I guess. T h e y begin the safe, effective questions in a negotiation. T h e y will m o v e the negotiation forward w i t h o u t the pitfalls of verb-led questions. You have to be diligent and careful w i t h all questions—with every word you u t t e r — b u t the verb-led q u e s tions are almost all d o w n s i d e , w h i l e these interrogative-led questions are a key means of discovery. T h e y elicit details. T h e y ensure thoroughness. T h e y help the adversary, as well as us, see what hasn't b e e n seen a n d understood before. I'm sure y o u didn't register—there's no reason y o u should have—that
the
first sentence
of my i n t r o d u c t i o n was
an
interrogative-led question: How often over the past couple of decades have we read or heard the phrase "win-win"? My strategy was simple. In o r d e r to o p e n your m i n d to my contrarian approach, I t h o u g h t I n e e d e d to challenge immediately, r i g h t in t h e first
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paragraph, the reigning paradigm in negotiation, which is w i n w i n . But in order to do this I had to create in your mind a vision of its omnipresence in o u r culture. W h a t better way to do this than with a question led by an interrogative?
It's Hard to Go Wrong with Interrogative-Led Questions Many readers have probably participated in role-playing games in w o r k s h o p s . T h e y ' r e pretty m u c h a staple in the business world, and they really can be useful, so let's try o n e now. Close your eyes. Relax. Let your muscles go limp. You are allowed to be anywhere you w o u l d like to be. You may be w i t h anyone you choose, doing anything you would like to do. Okay, let's play. Where are you? Whom are you with? What are you doing? Maybe you're s o m e w h e r e in the tropics with a beach in the foreground, or maybe you're skiing d o w n a m o u n t a i n w i t h a chalet and a h o t toddy in the background. In any case, your ability to envision the scene will have a direct effect on your ability to help others gain a clear picture of what you would like t h e m to see. This was your picture, your world that I was finding o u t about through the use of interrogatives. In just this way the interrogative-led question in a negotiation helps you to turn on your adversary's picture tube. T h e interrogative-led question helps you help the adversary to t u r n on their o w n vision and to paint clear pictures, so that b o t h sides have the same picture. It gives you the power to see what they see, and you need to. Otherwise, there will be no progress in this negotiation. H e r e is a set of verb-led questions juxtaposed with an equivalent interrogative-led question on the same subject. In every case, which is the better question?
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"h this the biggest issue we face?" versus "What is the biggest issue we face?" "Is this proposal tight enough for you?" versus "How can I tighten this proposal?" "Can we work on delivery dates tomorrow?" versus "When can we work on delivery dates?" or "How important are delivery dates?" "Do you think we should bring Mary into the loop now?" versus "Where does Mary Jit in?" or "When should we bring Mary into the loop?" "Is there anything else you need?" versus "What else do you need?" "Do you like what you see?" versus "What are your thoughts?" "Is it too expensive?" versus "What price would you pay?" "Does it Jit into your needs?" versus "How do you see it? or "Where would you use it?" This rule about interrogative-led questions is n o t rocket science. Negotiators have b e e n taught for decades to ask o p e n ended questions, and interrogative-led questions are simply o n e type of o p e n - e n d e d questions. I emphasize the interrogative-led idea rather than the o p e n - e n d e d idea because I've found that the former rule is easier to understand and to follow in the heat of a negotiation. Interrogative-led questions can be closed, of c o u r s e — " W h a t time is it?" is an example—but, generally speaking, the negotiator w h o frames interrogative-led questions is on the right track. You m i g h t be thinking. Well, okay, but this discussion is too simple and stagy, it doesn't sound very real world to me; does it really apply in the world of big-time negotiating? This is a fair question. S o m e of my examples have been a little stagy, for the sake of
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simplicity and clarity. B u t n o w let me list in order the sequence of questions asked in a p h o n e call by a client working for a large corporation. His adversary w o r k e d for an even larger corporation. This was one of hundreds of such conversations—in p e r son, on the p h o n e , and by e - m a i l — d u r i n g the course of a l o n g negotiation. T h e subject here is intentionally unclear, b u t for o u r purposes the subject doesn't matter. H e r e are the questions: "Why did your previous boss want you to get with me?" "Why were we added?" "Who was your old boss?" "How did that affect us?" "Where are we at in the process?" "What
happened?"
"Where will you be?" "Like what?" "How can I help you succeed?" "Who will pull all these factions together within [unnamed corporation]?" "How should I work with [unnamed]?" "How should I proceed?" "What are [unnamed company's] plans at the facility in [unnamed American city]?" "What are the plans for the [unnamed project]?" "What influence does [unnamed project] have in all this?" "How should I proceed?" "Why are you asking?" "Who are they?" I don't claim that I picked this conversation completely at r a n d o m , b u t I assure you that it's quite typical. My clients really do live a n d d i e — m o s t l y live, mostly t h r i v e — b y asking
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interrogative-led questions. O n e client was recently b r o u g h t into a negotiation w i t h a large multinational to be the competitive vendor for a primary vendor. We understood that this was the d y n a m i c and accepted it, a n d we also k n e w that the p r i m a r y v e n d o r w o u l d have a powerful constituency within the multinational's o w n middle m a n a g e m e n t , because some such liaison is almost a given. Such a situation must be addressed up front by any negotiator. We therefore framed the following question to ask at the highest possible level ( C E O to senior vice president, specifically): "How do we keep o u r efforts from b e i n g sabotaged b y s o m e o n e w i t h i n y o u r c o m p a n y w h o ' s responsible for t h e competitor's success?" In this instance, the answer was the senior vice president's instruction to the in-house spear carrier for the p r i m a r y v e n d o r to be certain that my client's efforts c a m e to fruition. T h e man's annual b o n u s n o w depended on it. T h i n k back a little bit m o r e about mission and purpose. R e m e m b e r the "features and benefits" to your adversary that we want to be part of o u r mission and purpose? Such features and benefits can also be a part of your questions. T h e words that d e scribe a feature or a benefit can be placed in the question to help the adversary see a problem. Say o u r rough-and-ready mission a n d purpose for this negotiation is " T o have H u m o n g o u s , Inc., see and decide that having o u r technology will m e e t all their needs n o w and in the future." O n e good interrogative-led q u e s tion to fit into an early discussion might be "How can you stay competitive w i t h o u t this technology?" N o t i c e the vital difference between that question and "Can you stay competitive w i t h o u t this t e c h n o l o g y ? " T h e p o i n t of b o t h questions is to lead the adversary to see that they cannot stay competitive otherwise, b u t t h e question led by the verb " c a n " sounds faintly accusatory a n d m i g h t p u t the adversary
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on t h e defensive, w h i l e t h e question led by the interrogative " h o w " is softer, less threatening, a n d m o r e inviting of a straightforward, w o r t h w h i l e answer. O n c e again, the advantage goes to the interrogative-led question. Let's return to the story in chapter 2 about N e t w o r k , Inc., the c o m p a n y that n e e d e d to renegotiate the contract for its m a chines, because each one was being sold at a loss. Say o u r m i s sion a n d p u r p o s e for this negotiation is " T o help [the o t h e r company's] m a n a g e m e n t at the very highest level see o u r c o m pany as a n e w a n d revitalized organization that is g o i n g to change its effectiveness . . ." O n e g o o d interrogative-led q u e s tion to fit into an early discussion might be " H o w will you m e a sure us from this p o i n t forward?" Let's return to the infamous negotiation involving the baseball umpires, w h i c h we talked about in chapter 4. Say their mission and purpose is, as I've already suggested, " t o get the players, the fans, a n d the lords of the game to see and decide that the u m pires provide the highest level of expertise in calling balls and strikes a n d plays at the bases while remaining invisible on the field." O n e good interrogative-led question to fit into an early discussion m i g h t be " H o w long does it take to develop a great u m p i r e ? " A n o t h e r might be " H o w many bad calls does it take to really h u r t a baseball g a m e ? " I u r g e you to play these hypothetical games, because the power of the simple interrogative-led question is just amazing. I've had clients for w h o m this understanding was a eureka m o m e n t that t u r n e d a r o u n d their w h o l e careers as negotiators. T h e i r appreciation of the difference b e t w e e n these disarming questions and all others seemed to loosen t h e m up in a fundam e n t a l way. T h e i r o w n neediness c a m e u n d e r control. T h e y n o w u n d e r s t o o d that a successful negotiation really does take
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place in the adversary's world, n o t in their o w n . T h e y suddenly understood the necessity of creating vision in the adversary. N o vision, n o decision? O f course. A n d n o w I add, n o interrogative-led questions, no vision, no decision.
Keep It Simple Keep your questions short. Anytime a question has m o r e than, say, n i n e or ten words y o u risk complication. You may think that a lengthy c o m p o u n d question sounds impressive, b u t you're n o t in the business of sounding impressive, remember. Such a q u e s tion serves only to kill vision and confuse your adversary. R e m e m b e r w h e n I said that if o u r o w n mission and purpose is t o o cloudy, we make it difficult for o u r adversary to make a decision? T h e same thing goes w i t h questions. A n o t h e r key is to ask one question at a time. Simple question by simple question, answer by answer, you will help y o u r adversary build his o w n picture of the issue. B u t often we don't do this. A negotiation is a very emotional arena, of course, and we get i m patient and load o n e question on top of another, asking five or six in a row, barely pausing to take a breath, m u c h less letting the adversary answer. Instead, you must take each question slow and easy and listen to each answer, because that answer is the clue for framing the next question. "When is your ideal delivery date?" "How critical is this November date for you?" "I'm not sure I understand. Why is November so important?" "Oh, when did that problem on the production line show up?"
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Interesting news! A n d it happens all the time, because mixed in w i t h everything else in the answers to good questions will be some spilled beans. (I discuss this p h e n o m e n o n at length in chapter 8.) T h e r e seems to be a h u m a n impulse to help people answer o u r questions. We start off w i t h a g o o d interrogative-led question but then answer it for the adversary, or at the least throw o u t possible answers. I ask, " W h a t is the biggest challenge you face?" and before you have a chance to answer I add, "Is it the national e c o n o m y or your local labor problems?" O n e mistake on top of another: We answered the question for o u r adversary and in d o i n g so o u r interrogative-led question t u r n e d into a verb-led question. All we accomplish with this intervention is to impede the process by w h i c h the adversary creates a vision for himself and for us regarding his company's greatest challenge. I've m e n t i o n e d the clients f o r w h o m their sudden u n d e r standing of the power of interrogative-led questions was a e u reka m o m e n t . For m a n y others, the art of asking questions has b e c o m e a standing challenge. T h e y really get into it. T h e y understand that asking great questions is an art, a science, and a necessary skill for succeeding at the highest level.
7 How Do You Say It? More Fuels of the Camp System
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SKING G O O D Q U E S T I O N S is the highest octane fuel we have.
T h e y are a key behavioral goal. Of the five other behavioral
goals that I call the fuels of the system, four work in direct s u p p o r t of o u r questions. T h e y help us control what we say. T h e y help us use our words to o u r advantage. I call these four fuels nurturing, reversing, connecting, and 3 + . T h e fifth fuel, u n r e lated to questions, is the strip line. T h e r e are some quirky names in that list, but that's okay. M u c h of the behavior they require is contrarian to conventional w i n - w i n wisdom. It is this contrarian and unexpected behavior that allows us to transcend the average and gives us a great advantage.
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Nurturing We all k n o w w h a t the w o r d means. " N u r t u r i n g " means to feed emotionally, to provide moral training, to foster the m i n d w i t h good and understanding and appreciative thoughts. W h o brings good n u r t u r i n g thoughts and m e m o r i e s to your mind? M a y b e it was your g r a n d m o t h e r w h o always had a k i n d word, or y o u r m o m or dad w h e n she or he tucked y o u in at night, or others w h o p u t y o u at ease by the way in w h i c h they talked to you. Maybe it was a w a r m , soft conversation, or a conversation that was heavy w i t h respect. W h a t you had to say was important to this individual, and she or he wanted to listen. Just to be listened to can b r i n g good thoughts to mind. In a negotiation, n u r t u r i n g will keep the negotiation g o i n g through thick and thin. Your ability to n u r t u r e will be the key to b r i n g i n g the negotiation back to the table after a b r e a k d o w n . Your ability to n u r t u r e your adversary, to p u t h i m or h e r at ease, is the key to assuring her that you are listening and that you value w h a t she has to say. N u r t u r i n g is also j u s t another way to allow your adversary to feel okay. N u r t u r i n g should be part of your b o d y language. W h e n you're seated, refrain from a sudden forward m o v e m e n t . Lean back. Relax your neck, face, and hands. If you're standing, lean against the wall, lower your posture. No o n e is going to deal effectively w i t h y o u if you're towering over t h e m . This is c o m m o n sense, and even an average negotiator w o u l d pretty m u c h adhere to this principle. B u t a lot of average negotiators give o u t the w r o n g signals in less obvious ways. T h e y lean forward and j e r k their arms and smack the table. T h e truly comfortable, trained negotiator takes it easy. W h e n in doubt, slow your cadence of
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speech, lower your voice. As the old saying goes, laughter often is the best m e d i c i n e , especially laughter directed at ourselves. Laughter is a way to n u r t u r e everyone in the r o o m — i n c l u d i n g ourselves. N o w , n o n e of this is contrarian at all. Granted, y o u w o n ' t find a section about n u r t u r i n g in most negotiation books, b u t that's just because those authors are trying to impress y o u w i t h their arcane academic theories a n d charts and graphs. T h e y wouldn't disagree w i t h me on this point; they just incorrectly b e lieve it's n o t hotshot material. T h e way you phrase questions and statements can be either n u r t u r i n g or almost the opposite. Let's revisit some of the questions from the discussion so far a n d find the n u r t u r i n g in t h e m . "Hey, how's it going?" This is n u r t u r i n g . "That's a g o o d question." This is n u r t u r i n g . "Boy, you l o o k g r i m . " N o t quite so n u r t u r i n g unless you're teasing a g o o d friend. " T h a t question does n o t h i n g for me." N o t quite so n u r t u r i n g . Even m o r e important than w h a t you say for n u r t u r i n g p u r poses is how y o u say it. T h i n k of the sentence "Is this w h a t you really w a n t ? " T h e s e six words can cut either way. If I say t h e m abruptly a n d abrasively, they're the opposite of n u r t u r i n g . B u t if I ask the question quietly a n d w i t h concern, even t h o u g h it's a verb-led question, it's very n u r t u r i n g . I see n o t h i n g w r o n g w i t h taking a m i n u t e right n o w to p u t this b o o k d o w n and ask that question aloud in a n u m b e r of ways, including "IS T H I S W H A T Y O U R E A L L Y W A N T ? ! " and, softly, "Is this w h a t y o u really w a n t ? " You'll immediately see the differences on the n u r t u r i n g scale. Delivery is everything. We all k n o w this, b u t t o o often we forget it. Please don't misunderstand me. I'm n o t into touchy-feely n e gotiations. N u r t u r i n g must n o t be confused w i t h b e i n g easy and
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soft. N u r t u r i n g does n o t signal arbitrary compromise. It does n o t mean "saving the adversary" from a tough decision. N u r t u r ing is simply a psychological m o v e that allows just a little stress to be released at the right m o m e n t . O n e of the toughest m e n of the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y was Sir W i n s t o n Churchill, b u t if you study his writings and listen to recordings of his speeches you will discover b o t h his bulldog toughness and his n u r t u r i n g moves. If you listen to his speeches on tape, you will hear his naturally n u r t u r i n g voice. Likewise, Joe Lieberman, vice presidential candidate for the D e m o c r a t i c Party in 2 0 0 0 , b e c a m e k n o w n for his naturally n u r t u r i n g voice and d e m e a n o r . He could say almost anything and get away with it. T h i n k of a psychologist trying to pry o u t your deepest, darkest secrets. Is she going to do so with a harsh, challenging voice, or with a calm, gentle voice? N u r t u r i n g requires the delicate touch. N u r t u r i n g may be just the one right word, or facial expression, or gesture. H o w you nurture will require great practice, insight, and reflection. W h e n the going gets tough in a negotiation, your biggest challenge will be your ability to nurture your adversary in spite of everything else going on. I should p u t that in boldface capital letters—but I won't, because that wouldn't be very nurturing, would it?
Reversing This is a behavior that you must h o n e to perfection for successful negotiations. T h e reverse is the behavioral tactic that answers a question w i t h a question, the answer to which will do you some good. W h e n your adversary asks you a question, you do have to say something, but n o t in the way in which you were trained in school.
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"How are you?" "Great. How are y o u ? " That's a reverse, isn't it? A n d effective. B u t m o r e often than not, for a variety of reasons, untrained negotiators aren't alert for the opportunity to answer questions by asking questions. M a y b e they're too busy talking up themselves and divulging information. Many times they assume that they already k n o w the a n swer. Or they don't understand t h e difference between verb-led and interrogative-led questions, and they're tired of hearing " n o " in response to incorrect verb-led questions. M e a n w h i l e , the trained negotiator looks for every opportunity to answer a question with a question. Vital point: T h e reverse should be preceded by a short nurturing statement, because you don't want to sound like a district attorney during cross-examination. W i t h o u t the n u r t u r i n g tidbit, the reverse will do you little good, b u t if you have any d o u b t that the nurturing reverse works, try it the next time you're talking w i t h someone at the proverbial watercooler. We h u m a n b e ings are seduced by it every time. "Jim, what will this option do for me?" "That's a good question, Dick. Before we get into that, what's the biggest challenge you're facing in this area?" N u r t u r e , reverse: "That was certainly well thought out. By the way, what are your cost constraints?" "We definitely have to talk about that, but before we go there ..." "Interesting. Really interesting. How soon will you be up against a deadline here?" "That's something I hadn't thought of. When could you deliver?"
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"Hmmm. What am I missing here? What else can you tell me about that?" My son Brian n o w plays college football for a major program. He was n o t the high school recruit I m e n t i o n e d in chapter 3, but w h e n Brian was being recruited a couple of years ago, he was asked by the dean of students with arguably the most prestigious and respected football program in the country, " W h a t do y o u think would be the most challenging part of playing football for this school?" Brian's answer was rather long, b u t it was a great reverse: " G e e , that's a great question. I'd like to toss it back at you because I've got so many things going through my mind. I'd like your help in understanding h o w you really see it, because you've got so m u c h experience in this. W h a t are the things I should really be aware o f ? " Most potential recruits w h o came through this dean's office were making a required stop and could n o t have cared less about anything the m a n had to say. But this C a m p - t r a i n e d recruit—my s o n — h a d let the dean k n o w that he wasn't a cocky, self-aggrandizing kid w h o thought he had all the answers. (There are a lot of these kids around, you know, and quite a few such adults as well.) T h e recruit also allowed the dean to be the most okay person in the room—always a plus. T h e dean was delighted to have a kid w h o actually seemed to r e spect his opinion, and he was a great source of insight into the way the campus worked and the unusual pressures on football players, since it is such a high-profile program. W h e n we drove through the gates at the end of the visit, Brian said, "I don't want to go to school in a museum." On a n o t h e r campus, Brian was interviewing w i t h the highly respected football coach. (I apologize for using two such e x a m ples in a row, but b o t h speak to the subject of reversing, and the
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fact that each was carried o u t by an eighteen-year-old high school student demonstrates that the behavioral goal of reversing is readily available to all of us.) This coach was talking to Brian about his size, which is large, and then he asked Brian h o w flexible he was. Brian quickly reversed and said, " I n my high school, we w o r k pretty hard w i t h weights, C o a c h . H o w m u c h emphasis do you p u t on weight lifting in your program?" T h e coach told my son that he didn't really believe in a lot of weight training for quarterbacks, Brian's position at the time. T h e coach was c o n cerned that the size and strength of today's quarterbacks was l i m iting their flexibility. My son hadn't studied the physiology of exercise, but he knew that the coach's concern was g r o u n d e d in exercise theories of twenty years ago and almost falls into the category of myth today. In the last three or four years, hasn't T i g e r W o o d s totally destroyed o l d - t i m e myths about h o w strength exercises are bad for the "flexibility sports"? A n d look at the baseball players, even the pitchers. So there is no r o o m in m o d e r n athletics for that coach's o u t m o d e d and incorrect t h i n k ing, and my son's simple reverse gave him all the information he needed about that program. T h e coach's answer was o n e of the reasons Brian didn't go to that particular school. In any negotiation, the reverse assures that you're dealing w i t h an important question for you, thereby allowing you to gather m o r e insight and information. Your j o b is to get information from the adversary by asking questions, n o t to provide information by answering questions. Reversing is n o t h i n g m o r e than the lawyer's standard t e c h n i q u e of clarification. Questions and r e versing help us get into the world of the adversary. T h e y are the way we create vision. W i t h o u t reversing and asking questions, we'll get nowhere. Sometimes you may feel you absolutely have to give some kind
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of answer. In this case, give a no-risk answer. If your adversary asks your opinion about a given matter, what she's really after is your agreement. D o n ' t give it to her. "Well, Mary, I know how you feel and I really respect your opinion, but to tell you the truth, I haven't had time to solidify my opinion. You may be right. I'm sort of going both ways. But your opinion is always in the back of my mind." You haven't given up any information, and you have ever so subtly made your adversary think you're supporting her position w i t h o u t actually d o i n g so. "How much does it cost?" "A lot." "How long have you guys been working on this?" "It seems like forever!" You're satisfying the necessity of answering, but the information you're giving is, for all intents and purposes, n o t w o r t h m u c h . Most of the time, however, your adversary will n o t recognize this, will accept the answer, and will be o p e n to a good question from you.
Connecting As I've said in several contexts, we have a tendency to want to save o u r adversary, to be liked. This instinct can impel us into these three c o m m o n negotiating errors, w h i c h I have derived from what every attorney tells his client before a deposition or testimony: never answer an unasked question; don't interpret a statement as a question; and never reply to random statements.
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"I don't like what I see, Jim." W h e n we hear this, many of us will feel an urge to reply in s o m e way, to try to set things right. "Well, Damon, this isn't written in concrete." N o ! T h e best way to deal w i t h t h e leading unasked question or t h e provocative remark is to use it as a basis for prying o u t m o r e information. H o w ? By employing w h a t I call a connector. To respond is average negotiating behavior; to connect is contrarian negotiating behavior, and m u c h m o r e effective. T h i n k a b o u t t h e psychiatrist, w h o s e j o b is to help t h e client understand his problems a n d t h e n deal w i t h t h e m . Here's o n e possible e x change: "Doctor, you're not helping me." "I think I am helping you." "No, you're not helping me at all." "Of course I'm helping you." "If you're helping me so much, then why do Ifeel so bad?" "Well, you feel bad because you're not committed." "I am committed, you're just not a very good shrink." T h e patient is correct. This is n o t a g o o d shrink. N o w let's see h o w t h e n u r t u r i n g c o n n e c t o r m i g h t have improved t h e e x change. "Doctor, you're not helping me at all." "Help me understand." "Well, I just don't feel as though I am making any progress." "Annnnnd?"
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"I'm having trouble doing the exercises you told me to do." "I see. What's the most difficult problem you are having with the exercises?" T h a t little word "and," w h e n asked as a question, is an excellent connector. "I don't like what I see, Jim." "Aannnnnnnnd?" [This is drawn out, a c c o m p a n i e d by a shrug. T h e adversary n o w has to fill in the picture for Jim.] "I can't get too excited about this until I see your competition." Fine. You've learned something. In effect, the connection is another type of reverse. Your a d versary's floating remark, gauged to get some kind of reaction from you, is turned around w i t h the intent of getting some kind of useful information from him. "Wow. This is pretty much out of nowhere." "Which means . . . ?" [Accompanied by a shrug.] "This isn't going to happen unless you lose a zero." Fine again. You've learned something. Profound, silent concern on your part can also serve as a c o n nector. People don't like silence. It's the void that o u r nature a b hors. Your adversary will rush to fill in the blank. "Wow. This is pretty much out of nowhere." Silence. "This isn't going to happen unless you can deliver next month." N o w you're really getting somewhere. T h e connector, like the reverse, has helped get us to the real issue.
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"I don't like your attitude." "How can I help you?" "Yourprice is too high." This is real progress. Your attitude was never the problem. Again, these little dialogues are on the stagy side, I admit, but they're not all that stagy. In somewhat e x t e n d e d form, they h a p p e n every day. T h e trained negotiator practices every day.
3+ T h e fuel "3 + " (pronounced "three plus") is simple and i m p o r tant. W h a t is it? N o t h i n g m o r e than the ability to remain w i t h a question until it is answered at least three times, or to repeat a statement at least three times. This is n o t an original idea. A n y o n e who's ever taken a speech class knows the old rule: Tell t h e m what you're going to tell t h e m , tell t h e m , tell t h e m what you told t h e m . O n e , two, three times. I first heard the equivalent rule many, many years ago from a salesman friend and quickly learned that this was good advice. I've added the " + " because I've found that three times often isn't e n o u g h . So I coach 3+ times. T h e m o r e critical the negotiation, the m o r e times over a longer p e r i o d of time you may need to reiterate the a g r e e d u p o n point. In practice, it's difficult to overdo the 3 + . Almost impossible. In the conference call that started the N e t w o r k , Inc., r e n e g o tiation regarding the contract that was losing $100,000 per m a chine shipped, the president of N e t w o r k actually informed his adversaries that he would repeat what he had to say about the p r o b l e m three times, because it was so serious he w a n t e d to
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make sure it was clear and understood by each and every one of them. I don't usually coach that you literally a n n o u n c e that you will use 3 + , but it was appropriate to do so in this negotiation. Of course you must nurture or reverse with 3 +. You have to make certain that the agreement you're hearing from the adversary on this particular is truly agreement. As always, you're e x tremely suspicious of "yes." Most of all, you cannot sound needy to nail down this point of agreement. T h e 3+ technique cannot seem to the adversary like pressure in any way; it cannot be pressure in any way. W h e n you use 3 +, you always have to leave the option for the adversary to change his m i n d . You are not rushing to close three times. Just the opposite, of course: You're asking for " n o " three times. That's the way to think about it. H o w many times have you tried to make a decision and had thoughts like this r u n through your mind? "I'm going to do it." "No, I'm not." "Yeah, I think I am." "I hate it. I'm not going to do it." W h e t h e r w e use 3 + o r 2 0 + , w e always give the adversaries the opportunity to go through this process in their o w n minds. T h e 3+ technique goes hand in hand w i t h "never close." T h e w h o l e point of 3+ is to give the adversary multiple o p p o r t u n i ties to look at their decision—to verify it, to justify it, or to change it. We give the adversary every chance to think through the situation, look at it from different perspectives, and see for themselves h o w their thinking changes. T h e adversary doesn't always see what they should see, and using the 3+ technique helps t h e m get a good picture. No vision, no decision.
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The Strip Line I introduce the strip line, the last of the fuels of the system, w i t h the analogy of the p e n d u l u m swinging back and forth, back and forth, back and forth. That's what a negotiation can be like. Initially, the p e n d u l u m is stationary. E m o t i o n s are calm, neither positive n o r negative. T h e n s o m e t h i n g happens, s o m e o n e says something, and this force pushes the p e n d u l u m into the negative, say. T h e n some factor halts the m o v e m e n t into the negative and pulls the p e n d u l u m all the way past neutral and toward the positive. All these back-and-forth emotional swings can be catastrophic to the negotiation, especially if they're big and dramatic. T h e task of the good negotiator is to keep the p e n d u l u m as close as possible to a calm, stationary m o d e . T h e big negative swings don't do anyone any good in the long run, and neither do the big positive swings. Let's take a straight sales situation, although the picture works just as well for any negotiation of any kind. If you, the salesperson, allow the potential customer to swing too hard into the positive m o d e , w h a t happens w h e n the inevitable second thoughts and doubts set in? T h e p e n d u l u m that was high in the positive m o d e swings d o w n w i t h so m u c h m o m e n t u m it carries all the way t h r o u g h neutral a n d into the hard negative m o d e . N o w w h a t do you do? This may be a position from w h i c h you never recover. Of course, the eternal optimist says, well, the n e x t change of e m o t i o n will carry it from deep in the negative back to high in the positive. Okay, fine. B u t t h e n what? You see? T h e s e big swings are a vicious cycle, so to speak, and they're almost impossible to control. B u t you must maintain control. So what's the solution? It's simple (in t h e o r y ) : Avoid b o t h the strongly negative and the strongly positive by staying in the calm
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neutral range, which is w h e r e we find the deals that stick. This is totally contrarian negotiating. You mean we don't want the adversary to get all excited about this deal? N o , we don't, because the e x citement won't last; those inevitable second thoughts will c o m e along sooner or later. H o w do we stay in the neutral range and keep all the e m o tions u n d e r control d u r i n g a negotiation? We use the strip line, a reference to a technique in bonefishing (and other types of fishing as well) in w h i c h you feed line to the fish w h e n it first takes the bait, rather than set the hook. This is the only way to catch bonefish, which take off at incredible speeds the m o m e n t they're hooked. W i t h bonefish, setting the h o o k immediately just rips it right o u t . By stripping line, y o u avoid p u t t i n g on t o o m u c h pressure. Likewise in a negotiation: by stripping line you take the pressure off the adversary. It is an extremely effective tool, and it's a lot of fun for me to see the initial doubt about the strip line on the part of my clients turn into enthusiastic endorsement, as they see h o w effective it is. Sometimes they get so excited I have to use strip line to draw t h e m back a little! It's not a panacea, just a darned good tool. N o w that I've introduced this idea of releasing pressure, you can see that 3+ is also a way to release pressure. So is giving the adversary the right to say " n o . " So is allowing the adversary to be okay. So is " N o Closing." W h e n used effectively, the strip line, like those other behavioral goals, will allow your adversary the opportunity to validate information and decisions that have gone before.
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The Negative Strip Line T h e strip line comes in different types to be used in different situations. T h e first type I'll examine is the negative strip line, w h i c h I'll illustrate first w i t h the movie Legal Eagles, in w h i c h that great actor R o b e r t Redford plays an experienced assistant district attorney w h o has just b e e n fired for complicated reasons. For other complicated reasons, Redford joins Debra Winger, a small-time defense attorney, in her advocacy on behalf of the Daryl H a n n a h character, a beautiful y o u n g w o m a n accused of killing her lover. This is a dream case for the scandal sheets and way over Winger's inexperienced head. T h e prosecution has a m u r d e r weapon, a motive, and an eyewitness w h o puts the d e fendant at the scene. It's apparent from the reaction to the prosecution's o p e n i n g statement that the j u r y and the press have already found Redford's n e w client guilty. This is an o p e n - a n d - s h u t case. Picture a packed c o u r t r o o m and a circuslike atmosphere as the district attorney finishes his powerful introduction. H o w should Redford proceed? H o w could he possibly shift the p e n d u l u m even a little away from the powerfully negative and toward the neutral? He begins his o p e n ing remarks in a normal fashion: "Ladies and gentlemen, Chelsea D e a r d o n did n o t kill Victor Taft. T h e prosecution has suggested a possible motive, b u t one based entirely on hearsay, conjecture, and circumstantial evidence, evidence that on the surface w o u l d appear to have some substance, but u p o n closer examination will prove to have no relevance whatsoever to this case." Okay, a d e cent start, b u t the camera tells us that Redford's remarks are falling on deaf ears in the j u r y box. He knows this as well, of course. And here comes the hard, negative strip line. Redford stops suddenly, looks into the jury's eyes, tilts his head in that
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w i n n i n g way of his, and says, "You're n o t b u y i n g this, are you? You're n o t listening to a word I'm saying. Really. R i g h t ? " P r e g nant pause. "Guess what? I don't blame you. After listening to the prosecution's evidence, even I'm convinced my client m u r dered Victor Taft. After all, if I'd walked into the r o o m and found Victor Taft dead on the floor and Chelsea Deardon's fingerprints all over the weapon that killed him, there isn't much in the world that wouldn't convince me she was guilty. Look, let's just save ourselves a lot of time here. . . . W h o thinks Chelsea D e a r d o n is guilty?" W h e n Redford asks for a show of hands on this question, the prosecution objects. T h e j u d g e grumbles. Redford continues, " C o m e o n . I've got my hand raised. I b e lieve that my client murdered Victor Taft in cold blood. W h o agrees with me? C o m e o n ! " M o r e objections, m o r e grumbles. "Let's save the state of N e w York a lot of rime and m o n e y and move directly to sentencing." Redford has g o n e so negative even his cocounsel, w h o didn't k n o w what was c o m i n g , is having her doubts. T h e defendant is beside herself. W i t h the c o u r t r o o m n o w in chaos, the j u d g e calling for order, reporters racing for the p h o n e s , Redford finds himself near the j u r y box, w h e r e o n e respectable-looking, middle-aged w o m a n (played by the actress Liz Sheridan, w h o later in h e r career played J e r r y Seinfeld's m o t h e r on his TV series, by the way) asks softly, "Isn't she e n t i d e d to a fair trial?" Redford replies instantly, " O h , let's give her a fair trial and then convict her." By n o w the j u d g e has had e n o u g h , disqualifies the jury, and threatens Redford with contempt. Redford begs the judge's i n dulgence. He says he's perfectly happy with this j u r y and has faith in t h e m , even t h o u g h they believe his client is guilty. T h e
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prosecutor expresses his satisfaction with this jury, and the j u d g e relents. Brilliant negotiating by Redford. W i t h the emotional p e n d u l u m set solidly in the negative area in the beginning, he used his hard, negative strip line—"You're n o t buying this, are y o u ? " — t o insinuate himself right into the heart of that negative e m o t i o n . W h a t was he trying to accomplish? Stabilization, that's all. He w a n t e d to wake up the j u r y to their bias a n d plant a second thought. By j o i n i n g their decision of " n o , " he had enticed t h e m into shifting into the intellectual m o d e , if only for a m o m e n t . R e m e m b e r that the value of the word " n o " is that it is, unlike "maybe," a real decision, and as a decision it has to be intellectually validated by the adversary—by the jury, in this particular n e gotiation. Redford has their full attention now. T h e y were still negative, but at least they were thinking. T h e n he said, "You're n o t listening to a word I'm saying." T h a t was another hard strip line that n u d g e d the e m o t i o n a l p e n d u l u m j u s t a little m o r e toward neutral. T h e n came "Guess what? I don't blame y o u ! " — another hard strip line. H o w many negative strip lines are required in a given negotiation is always a j u d g m e n t call, b u t a good rule of t h u m b is to c o n t i n u e until y o u see, or feel, evidence of significant m o v e m e n t by that p e n d u l u m . W h e n Redford finally feels it with this jury, he subtly introduces the presumption of innocence: " S o we all think she's guilty. N o w what do we do? It's a dilemma, isn't it? It's an especially difficult p r o b l e m because we've developed a legal concept in this country to protect ourselves, to protect o u r rights. It's called the presumption of innocence." A n d you k n o w that Darryl H a n n a h is soon found i n n o c e n t — or, rather, the case against her is dismissed w h e n the actual m u r -
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derer is discovered. Legal Eagles is definitely not a great movie, b u t that was a great negative strip line by R o b e r t Redford. Hats off. N o w , a real-life story: I recently switched cell p h o n e c o m p a nies because the spotty coverage I was experiencing was intolerable. I travel a lot and require as close to nationwide coverage as 1 can get, but the last straw w i t h this c o m p a n y was the day I couldn't get through to San Francisco as I was driving up from San Jose. And it wasn't my p h o n e unit, because 1 had invested in a h i g h - e n d p h o n e . W h e n I got h o m e I called the c o m p a n y to stop my service and gave the guy the reason I was switching to a competitor. W h a t do you think he said? H e r e are his exact words: " W h a t do you mean? I was just in San Francisco and didn't have any problems. We have great coverage." I don't k n o w about your reaction to this statement, b u t in my b o o k this guy was calling me a liar. T h i n k of the other mistakes he made as well. He took away my right to say " n o , " he didn't allow me to feel okay, he didn't ask good questions to get a little m o r e information, and he didn't strip line. (He did use an interrogative-led question, which just proves that you still have to use your head a n d your c o m m o n sense w h e n following the rule to ask interrogative-led questions. His wasn't a n u r t u r i n g question, to say the least.) I was so strongly negative on this o u t fit, this guy could have offered me the world and I would have said no thank you, but w h a t if he had used a strip line and said: "I'd probably switch companies too, if that happened to me. B u t before you do that, w h y don't you let me give you a free upgrade and check o u t o u r coverage for ten days?" His negative strip line w o u l d have neutralized my harshly
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negative emotional state. W h o knows, he might have h o o k e d me for at least another ten days, and he might have saved the situation. T h e r e is no better tool around than the hard negative strip line to neutralize a negative p e n d u l u m swing and get the situation into the neutral range. Try it sometime. Find a g o o d o p p o r t u n i t y to say, "Wow, this is bad. I d o n ' t k n o w if we can ever recover from this." Q u i t e likely, your a d versary will then help you recover. It's so m u c h fun w h e n this happens.
The Positive Strip Line N o w , the positive strip line is just that: a way to bring the adversary back toward a m o r e neutral position from a position that's too positive—yes, too positive. T h e well-trained car salesman puts a slight damper on his customer's excitement over the black car by saying, "Black is a powerful color for a sports car, but it sure shows the dirt. It'll take work." This brings the positive a d versary closer to neutral and at the same time urges h i m to validate his o w n enthusiasm for the color black—his vision of the color black. He replies, "Yeah, but if I buy this car, keeping it clean will be a pleasure." Workshop students have said to me at this stage of my spiel, "You must be kidding." Hardly. In all honesty, I could n o t n a m e o n e instance in w h i c h a positive strip line ever backfired. It just never backfires. To believe that it m i g h t is to misunderstand h u m a n nature and your purpose as a negotiator. T h e lightest possible strip line is used to bring the adversary back toward neutral almost as the icing on the cake. It controls any neediness of your o w n , reinforces the adversary's right to say
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"no," lets the adversary be okay, and gets you deals that stick. B e lieving that the positive strip is dangerous reveals that you're stuck in a "rush to close" m o d e . R e m e m b e r , everything hinges on your adversary's vision. You want to do everything you can to build that vision. T h e positive strip line does just that, as you will learn the m i n u t e you p u t this fuel into practice. "Before you sign this deal, are you sure this is something you really want to do?" "Yes, I've thought about it a great deal and it makes perfect sense." Or: "That's great, Joan. I appreciate your interest, but we still have a lot of challenges to work on."
Nirvana R i g h t about n o w you may be thinking, Wait a minute, Camp, in this chapter and the preceding one on the fuels of the Camp system, you've been introducing ways to obtain as m u c h information from the adversary as possible while divulging as little information as possible. What happens when you run into an adversary who also knows the Jim Camp system? I wish it were so! Such a negotiation w o u l d p r o c e e d at a splendid pace. B o t h sides w o u l d be w o r k i n g from valid mission and purpose statements and w i t h valid goals. B o t h parties would p u t their cards on the table at an early stage of the negotiation. B o t h sides w o u l d be quick to say " n o " and t h e n to explain why. We w o u l d n ' t have to engage in reversing and c o n n e c t i n g in
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order to p r y o u t information and answers. We wouldn't need strip line in order to keep everyone's emotions on an even keel. T h e fuels of the system are means to elicit information and to keep the negotiation moving smoothly. W i t h two C a m p - t r a i n e d negotiators as adversaries, this s m o o t h exchange is almost a given.
8 Quiet Your Mind, Create a Blank Slate No Expectations, No Assumptions, No Talking
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N MY SYSTEM, "blank slate" is a verb. As negotiators, we actively blank slate in order to create a blank slate in o u r o w n
minds, w h i c h t h e n sits ready and waiting to receive any n e w i n f o r m a t i o n , n e w attitudes, n e w emotions, o r n e w anything that o u r adversary wittingly or unwittingly beams o u r way. It is t h r o u g h blank slating that we learn what's really g o i n g on in this negotiation—what's really holding things up, w h a t the adversary really needs. Blank slate is a key behavioral goal that y o u will have to p r a c tice over and over and over. For successful negotiations, it must b e c o m e a habit. A n d in order to blank slate you're probably g o i n g to have to give up s o m e habits that you may think are beneficial b u t are hurting you in m o r e ways than you can i m a g -
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ine. I've already p o i n t e d o u t s o m e of the dangers of neediness. A n o t h e r danger of neediness of any kind is that it interferes w i t h blank slating. So does the fear of hearing " n o " and the fear of failing. Obviously the tendency of s o m e of us to " k n o w it all" interferes w i t h blank slating, because if we k n o w it all, w h y b o t h e r to listen? All of these negative behavioral activities that we've already discussed have to go o u t the w i n d o w in the interests of blank slating. B u t o n c e we do get the hang of blank slate, we b e c o m e so focused and intense that we almost feel we're stepping o u t of o u r bodies, going to a corner of the r o o m , and watching o u r selves negotiate w i t h the adversary. It's an exhilarating feeling. Your ability to blank slate is directly related to your ability to rid yourself of expectations and assumptions, t w o v e r y b a d words in my system of negotiation. Real taboos. By nature, we humans are chock-full of expectations and assumptions. As a n e gotiator, you must learn to recognize t h e m and set t h e m aside. T h e y have less than zero value to you as a serious negotiator.
Your Positive Expectations Are Killers H o w many times have you heard o n e of these statements from your adversary: "It looks good." "That's exactly what we need." "No question this is superior." "Let's get together and wrap this up." "Boy, you're just in time. Do we need you!" "Do you think you can deliver five thousand by next month?"
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"Well, this isn't set in concrete." "You folks are right on target." "This is in the groove—Jits right in with where we're trying logo." W i t h all such remarks—and they are infinite in their variety; any businessperson w i t h much experience could rattle dozens off the top of the h e a d — y o u r adversary is building your positive e x pectations to close the deal. If you b u y into these statements, he'll move right in and take the advantage. "It looks good." W h e n the novice on the other side of the table hears such a statement, he starts mentally c o u n t i n g c o u p and then gets whipsawed by the n e x t statement, "What's going to be your discounted price?" T h e novice provides some n u m ber and there he is, locked in for the rest of the negotiation u n less he's really good, and he's n o t really g o o d or he wouldn't have talked price at such an early stage of the negotiation, before he knew anything at all. Happens all the time. In a recent negotiation I coached, the other team said they needed o u r best price on thirty-three thousand units. Everyone at the table k n e w that the going price for this expensive widget was s o m e w h e r e around $1,000 per. T h e adversary told my client that although they had other suppliers for this item, they really wanted to give us the w h o l e order so that they could get the best price. W h a t happens w h e n a negotiator is given the scent of such an order? If we're not careful, the first thing that pops into o u r mind is the n u m b e r $33,000,000. Even w i t h a volume discount thrown in, even for a large multinational, this counts as real money. As n e w business, it would be a t r i u m p h for any n e gotiator. If we're n o t careful, the blank slate has just been wiped away by this positive expectation. A n d that's exactly w h a t the other team was trying to do in this case—build our expectations.
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N o w say we are suckered in by o u r excitement and i m m e d i ately give t h e m o u r best discounted price for the 33,000 units, expecting t h e m to j u m p on this number, sign the contract this afternoon, and open the champagne tonight. And say they don't j u m p — a n d they won't, because the champagne can wait and they've played this game a million times. Instead, they c o m e back and a n n o u n c e that they've decided to spread the purchase of these units a m o n g several vendors after all. Moreover, they've miscalculated their inventory. Turns o u t they only need 10,000 n e w units, n o t 33,000, and they want us to supply only 3,000 of these at the same incredibly g o o d unit price we just agreed to for an order ten times as large. And by the way, they hint broadly, they're going to be very disappointed if we don't give t h e m that price, if we say "no." N o w what d o w e do?! N o w w h a t are o u r emotions? N o w what good did all those positive expectations do us? If there is one classic maneuver played by large multinationals and shrewd dealers in all fields to take advantage of anxious adversaries, this is the o n e . Build positive expectations with pie-in-the-sky n u m bers, then start in w i t h the ifs, ands, and buts. A specific case in point regarding expectations dates from a few years back, w h e n I coached a small, $8 million c o m p a n y in its negotiation with a very large Irish firm. My team of four n e gotiators traveled to Ireland for a m e e t i n g — a S20.000 total e x pense probably, n o t inconsiderable for this small company. W h e n they arrived, the Irish folks were suddenly unavailable. Pure gamesmanship? Perhaps. In any event, many negotiators would have let the prospect of this m e e t i n g drive up their positive expectations and, confronted w i t h this disappointment, have started t h i n k i n g in t e r m s of, "Well, we're here, and we don't want to waste this trip." T h e n w h o knows what decisions they
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would have made. But my team had blank slated, they had not flown over w i t h high expectations, and so had no qualms about saying, in effect, "Hey, it doesn't matter." T h e y t u r n e d right around and flew h o m e the following day. A few days later they calmly w r o t e a letter expressing their understanding that e m e r gencies do happen, setting forth a n e w agenda, and inviting the Irish team to fly over here for the next meeting. W h i c h they did. But positive expectations are so positive. T h e y feel so good. W h o doesn't want to be hopeful? I had o n e client w h o had an especially hard time ridding himself of positive expectations. For one thing, he had played tennis in high school and college and every coach he had along the way extolled the virtues of a positive attitude. "Positive attitude" sounds great, but to me it's just another, m o r e seductive way of saying "positive expectations." For the negotiator, even a positive attitude is dangerous. Yes, it's true. It can devolve quickly into neediness, into positive e x p e c tations. W h e n I teach blank slate, I m e a n blank slate. A n d it's hard.
Your Negative Expectations Are Also Killers W h a t about negative expectations? W h a t a b o u t the string of double bogeys or double faults, or the series of lost deals? W h a t happens to the emotional state of individuals stuck in these ruts? If they're n o t very careful they b e c o m e rattled and emotional. Very likely, initial positive expectations n o w give way to negative expectations which can have a terribly debilitating effect. T h e dreaded S w o r d — s l u m p — c o m e s to mind. Surely negative e x pectations play some role w h e n we go into a s l u m p — a n d n e g o tiators, certainly those in direct sales, do have slumps.
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In negotiations, your adversary may try to d r a w you into positive expectations, as we have seen, or they may try to draw you into negative expectations before things even get started. Consider this deal: A large contractor wants to buy a piece of e q u i p m e n t that usually sells for $1.7 million. Since they s o m e times subcontract the w o r k w i t h a c o m p a n y that buys large numbers of these machines, they k n o w that the discounted price for large orders is $1.3 million per unit. N o w they want the same discounted price for their purchase of just o n e unit, and they stipulate this at the very b e g i n n i n g of negotiations. T h e u n trained negotiator will hear this stipulation and immediately have a negative expectation of either no deal at all or a deal so heavily discounted that it might as well be no deal at all. T h e trained negotiator, meanwhile, has no thoughts either way about the final price for the machine. T h e trained negotiator recognizes those early numbers for w h a t they are: early n u m b e r s of no real significance. T h e trained negotiator knows that there's n o t h ing in his mission and purpose about busting the rate sheet just because this c o m p a n y wants h i m to, and he says, " G e e , we're sorry, we just can't sell the o n e m a c h i n e to anyone, even you folks, w i t h w h o m we'd love to do business, for $ 1 . 3 million. Maybe you could try to b u y a used machine from your friends with the other company, or get t h e m to order an extra machine in their next order, and t h e n you could buy it from them. T h a t might take some time, b u t wouldn't that work for y o u ? " This negotiator has blank slated and nurtured, and n o w waits for the reply. Perhaps the most pervasive, straightforward example of negative expectations is w h e n you're dealing w i t h someone, or w i t h an entire company, that has always been difficult to w o r k with, badgered y o u to death, m o r e trouble than they were w o r t h . This
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is what you feel after every negotiation with these adversaries. Well, maybe they are m o r e trouble than they're w o r t h , and if they are you make that decision and cut your losses. But you do so calmly and rationally, not because these people are a pain in the ass. T o m o r r o w they may not be a pain in the ass, for whatever reason. R e m e m b e r from chapter 5 my client in San Francisco w h o paid a visit to the diabetic guy once a m o n t h for two years? He had every reason to develop negative expectations. If the visit hadn't b e e n so convenient and easy, he probably w o u l d have said good-bye for good. B u t keeping in touch was no trouble, and he didn't succumb to negative expectations, and eventually he c o n cluded that negotiation to everyone's satisfaction. However, my client's grade could be marked d o w n for failing to find o u t e x acdy w h y this guy acted like he did in the m o r n i n g . If he had blank slated, he could have saved some time off those two years of waiting. N e i t h e r positive n o r negative expectations have a place in my system. You blank slate and you negotiate, that's all. W h e n you have a mission and purpose in place, w h e n you have behavioral goals in place, w h e n you've established your plan to solve the real problem, w h e n you have laserlike focus—when you have all this going for you, w h y would you want to climb on any kind of emotional roller coaster of expectations? O n c e you really start using my system, you are so dedicated to goals over w h i c h you have control, so oblivious to anything over w h i c h you don't have control, and so free of neediness that expectations shouldn't even enter into the equation. B u t of course they do anyway. Expectations are everywhere. In this regard, they're like emotions. In fact, they are emotions. You cannot banish t h e m once and for all, b u t you can see t h e m
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for what they are and take appropriate measures. W h e n things seem to be going your way in a negotiation, it's easy to get e x cited and tempting to let your emotions take over. W h e n you feel this happening, call a time-out, take a b a t h r o o m break, or suggest a break for coffee or for lunch, or step back in s o m e other way. O h , c o m e o n , I've had students say. Blank slating can't be that big a deal. T h e y sense the discipline required, and this scares t h e m a little. It should. Discipline is difficult. But w i t h o u t discipline, you will never be a great negotiator. You will leave m o n e y on the table time after time.
Assume Nothing N o w what about assumptions, the other chief obstacle to effective blank slating? They're just as dangerous as positive and negative expectations, and just as c o m m o n , because most of us c o m e to believe that we're pretty good at reading other people, at u n derstanding what they're really feeling and thinking. N e g o t i a tors, in particular, tend to pride themselves on their people skills. A thousand times I've heard s o m e o n e say: "I know what they'll do if we make that offer." "This is the way they operate." "If you raise the price, they'll want a volume discount." "I'm pretty sure she makes the decisions over there." "There's no way they'll make an offer today." T h e r e are just a million assumptions o u t there, lying in wait to ambush us. I learned my first lesson on the subject growing up in western Pennsylvania, w h e r e h u n t i n g was a way of life for a boy. W h e n I got my first s h o t g u n — a .410 b o u g h t by Cousin Earl
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from the Sears catalog—I t u r n e d it over carefully in my hands. I can still vividly picture the scene. Many readers probably have the same m e m o r y . And I r e m e m b e r my father's first words to m e : " C h e c k and see if it's loaded. N e v e r assume a g u n is n o t loaded. Always check for yourself." We're all vulnerable to assumptions, despite the fact that we can all identify ones that have b e e n flat-out w r o n g . In Kosovo, N A T O t h o u g h t Slobodan Milosevic would cave in after a few high-altitude b o m b i n g sorties against isolated army barracks, w h i l e Milosevic t h o u g h t that N A T O politics would limit the alliance to these same few high-altitude b o m b i n g sorties against isolated a r m y barracks. T h e results of these assumptions— delusions might be the better w o r d in this c o n t e x t — w e r e tragic. In the V i e t n a m War, o u r leaders assumed that if we stopped b o m b i n g during the Christmas holidays, H o C h i M i n h would draw back as well. This incorrect assumption cost about three thousand lives in o n e week. Back at the t u r n of the century, village blacksmiths w h o were married to the horse and buggy assumed that they were in a lot of trouble, b u t other blacksmiths saw n o t h i n g b u t o p p o r t u n i t y from the newfangled a u t o m o b i l e s — o p p o r t u n i t y in the form of service stations a n d repair bills. T h e y were able and willing to see things new, to see things as they n o w were, to blank slate and thereby to seize o p p o r t u nity. In 1982, air traffic controllers assumed that President Reagan wouldn't have the guts to lock t h e m out. O u c h . T h e baseball umpires, as m e n t i o n e d in chapter 4, assumed that the often
i n c o m p e t e n t major-league bureaucracy w o u l d n ' t have
the guts to accept their resignations. O u c h . In chapter 3, I m e n tioned Bill Gates's brilliant decision to acknowledge that he and Microsoft had been w r o n g to ignore the Internet. B u t w h a t had happened there in the first place? A failure to blank slate, plain
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and simple. C o m i n g from a software background, Bill Gates and his minions had failed to see that the N e t could be bigger than the PC operating system, perhaps even make it obsolete e v e n t u ally. Close call. Bill. Maybe the favorite of all my stories a m o n g the folks w h o take o n e of my workshops concerns o n e Samuel Langley, w h o k n e w everything about the steam engine back at the turn of the t w e n tieth century. He k n e w that steam was the ultimate power source for the foreseeable future. He just knew it. Therefore he tried to power an airplane w i t h a steam engine. Langley was laughably w r o n g , in retrospect, but he went on to b e c o m e a critical invent o r in the world of aviation. H o w ? By d o i n g a lot of things we've talked about in previous chapters. He was able to hear the world say " n o " to h i m in the form of failed experiments; he was able to embrace failure; he was able to set activity goals he could manage, n o t ends he could not control—such as p o w e r i n g an airplane with a steam engine; and he was able to blank slate and start all over. W h e n the solution to powered flight proved to be the gasoline engine, not the steam engine, Langley embraced the n e w knowledge. If he had continued along the dead-end road that was his steam engine, he would never have contributed to aviation, and Langley Air Force Base in Virginia would n o w be n a m e d for someone else. And n o w a final story that is also well received in my w o r k shops, but w i t h o u t pleasure. In the 1960s, experts w h o k n e w everything about rockets and missiles were absolutely positive that aerial combat in the future would only be fought from a great distance. Close-in dogfighting was ancient history. Airplanes w o u l d fly at supersonic speeds, radar w o u l d see the enemy, missiles would be launched from many miles away, and battles w o u l d be w o n and lost by pilots w h o never saw the
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enemy planes. T h e engineers and experts were so certain this was correct that they built the first fighter aircraft in the history of aerial c o m b a t that was n o t equiped w i t h a machine g u n or rapid firing c a n n o n . T h a t was the F-4 P h a n t o m . Guess what. O v e r N o r t h V i e t n a m , the lighter Soviet M i G s got in close w h e r e the A m e r i c a n missiles w e r e n ' t effective and sometimes shot d o w n the bigger, less maneuverable, and gunless F-4. T h e horrible mistaken assumption surfaced quickly, and the vision of the solution was all too clear. But it took nine months to retroa r m the F-4s w i t h a simple gun. T h e so-called experts just didn't k n o w what they didn't know. T h e y were incapable of blank slating. A tragic mistake for many of America's finest y o u n g men. Back to business. H o w many times have you m a d e the steam e n g i n e mistake and failed to correct y o u r error? H o w many times have you g o n e into a m e e t i n g for o n e reason, only to find out that you were there for a completely different reason? H o w many times have you looked at the way s o m e o n e was dressed a n d m a d e an assumption, g o o d or bad, that y o u later discovered was completely wrong? W h e n was the last time you made an assumption based on the car s o m e o n e was driving? We're talking C o l u m b o here, of course: You never want to make the mistake that his suspects make, underestimating h i m . A n y o n e with m u c h experience in business can recall w h e n they didn't even bother calling on a potential client or supplier or customer because they assumed this deal would never work out, only to learn later that it might well have worked out. We've all d o n e t h a t — e x c e p t , perhaps, Stanley Marcus, w h o preached to his sales force to treat every customer as if he or she were a millionaire, because he or she might indeed be a millionaire, certainly so in oil-rich Texas. Actually, assumptions are perhaps even m o r e dangerous than
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expectations, because they're so subtle and insidious. If I say the word "retirement," what do I mean? If I say, "I'll pay you two dollars," what would you think? If I say, " I ' m too busy to do this," what do you do? Every day such statements are made, and every day we make assumptions w h e n we hear them. " R e t i r e m e n t " ? T h e word can mean a million things. You don't k n o w what / mean until you ask questions (interrogative-led questions such as " W h y do you want to retire?"). If you accepted my $2 w i t h o u t question, you made an assumption that I wouldn't pay m o r e than $2, and I never said I wouldn't. If you believed me w h e n I said I was too busy, you assumed that I was telling the truth, and you assumed you k n e w what I meant by the word. But what does "busy" mean to me? C o u l d we have different definitions? Of course we could. You have to find o u t . N o w let's play another w o r k s h o p game. Close your eyes and picture a horse. Okay, what color is the horse? Is it light or dark? Shiny or dull? H o w big is the horse? H o w tall? H o w w i d e is he across the back? O o p s ! D i d y o u recognize w h e n I m a d e my first assumption? Sure you did if y o u pictured a mare and I said "he." Because I pictured " h e " w h e n I posed the situation, I assumed you did as well. That's w h e n I blew the blank slate. In a real n e gotiation that mistake could put me in a losing position. If you were in the horse business and were looking for a filly and I was picturing a gelding, we're n o t off to a good start. I needed to see your picture of the horse, not my picture. Forget my picture. It doesn't matter at all. But all too often we make this very mistake. Any o n e of us could sit d o w n in the evening for ten minutes and make a list of the assumptions we made that day. Assumptions are like expectations in that we can't get rid of them, but as good negotiators we can beware of them. We can also plant assumptions—and if the opposing parties let
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you, w h y not? Say you're asked h o w m u c h your widget costs. "It's expensive," you say. Well, this w o r d means very different things to a millionaire and to a m a n m a k i n g $30,000, a n d — here's the i m p o r t a n t k i c k e r — e a c h immediately assumes that you mean what he means, and you may well find him preparing to pay a price m u c h higher than yours. In fact, p e o p l e — n e g o t i a t o r s — m a k e offers higher than you ever d r e a m e d they would because of such false assumptions on their part. "When can this be done?" "Soon." Well, " s o o n " can mean anything. W h e n you're told "soon," you have to find out. Ask a question. W h e n you say "soon," y o u can take advantage of the fact that your adversaries don't find out. O u r assumptions always work against us. T h e i r assumptions can work for us.
Do Your Research Research can rid us of many assumptions and help us blank slate, but we don't have the habit of d o i n g research. Instead, we allow ourselves to be led by assumptions. T h e lack of information makes it easy to assume and almost impossible to blank slate. N o t k n o w i n g about something, you have the urge to fill in the blanks with the first t h i n g that pops into your m i n d . You w i n g it, so to speak. But n o t the Japanese. Before they go into any negotiation they do i n - d e p t h research, sending o u t teams to study and gather facts a b o u t the companies and the markets involved. B u t we Americans often skip this vital step. I am constantly amazed at h o w many negotiations are conducted w i t h o u t even the most
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basic research: g o i n g to the Web, to the business papers a n d magazines, to the financial statements and year-end reports in order to study the adversary and find out its financial position, its strengths a n d weaknesses in the marketplace, its major profit (or loss) centers. A client in Silicon Valley m e n t i o n e d the other day that he is constantly amazed at h o w his negotiating team outprepares teams from Fortune 100 c o m p a n i e s — F o r t u n e 100, n o t 5 0 0 — t h e biggest and therefore, presumably, a m o n g the best companies we have to offer. On the other hand, the supply systems m a n a g e m e n t teams from aggressive multinationals will have d o n e copious research. You can pretty m u c h assume that they k n o w every competitor for your product or service and the financial condition of those competitors, their strengths a n d weaknesses, their negotiating strategy, their negotiating success, the decision-making hierarchy, and personal details about the key decision makers—education, college, awards, family, pets, golf handicap, and so on. It follows that y o u must have the same information a b o u t your adversary and your competitors, doesn't it? T h e r e is just no excuse in fading to learn all you can about everything relating to your field of business in general and this negotiation in particular, b u t if you enter a negotiation w i t h a w i n - w i n frame of m i n d , are y o u g o i n g to feel the necessity all that strongly? I d o u b t it. We n o w have even less excuse for failing to do research than we used to. Twenty years ago, the library was a few blocks away W h a t a chore! Today, the Web is right in front of us, on o u r desks. Use it. T h a t said, the l o w - t e c h newspaper remains an i n valuable resource. D i d you k n o w that the N o r t h Vietnamese used a network of Americans to gather "harmless" news releases on local y o u n g m e n during the Vietnam War? T h e y stockpiled
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this information in case s o m e of these m e n became their p r i s o n ers of war. A n d some of t h e m did. A n d s o m e of t h e m were b r o ken w i t h the help of this information about family and h o m e . A horrible example of the p o w e r of applied research. A m u c h m o r e pleasant example is provided by C o a c h W o o d y Hayes of O h i o State, w h o m I had the privilege of k n o w i n g in the 1960s a n d 1970s. C o a c h Hayes was o n e of the greatest football coaches w h o ever lived, b u t that's secondary. He was also o n e of the greatest individuals of his era. He had an e n o r m o u s impact on my life, as he had on the lives of thousands of others. He had an e n o r m o u s impact on my ideas for negotiation. C o a c h Hayes was an indefatigable reader of newspapers. Today he w o u l d be a master of the W e b universe, w i t h o u t a d o u b t . He used his research to impress, persuade, educate, and demonstrate that b e i n g a great coach required m o r e than j u s t w i n n i n g football games. At the hundred-year c o m m e m o r a t i o n of the death o f R a l p h Waldo E m e r s o n , H a r v a r d University chose C o a c h Hayes—yes, W o o d y Hayes, college football c o a c h — t o be t h e keynote speaker, at w h i c h time he used his vast stores of research to compare the lessons of Emerson to o u r m o d e r n - d a y p r o b lems. He received a standing ovation. N o w let's recall that negotiation from earlier in this chapter, the o n e in w h i c h the adversary wants the same volume discount for t h r e e t h o u s a n d widgets that o u r c o m p a n y usually gives for m u c h larger orders. M e n t i o n i n g the n u m b e r t h i r t y - t h r e e thousand early in the negotiation was intended to drive up my client's positive expectations, a n d against many negotiators this time-tested trick might have w o r k e d . B u t my team had d o n e its research. It k n e w that the multinational's total w o r l d w i d e c a pacity for these widgets was only twenty-two thousand units. T h e nerve! T h o s e negotiators never intended to procure thirty-three
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thousand widgets. T h e y were only interested in driving up e x pectations a n d thereby extracting a price they could t h e n use for leverage. T h a n k s to research, thanks to blank slating, this gambit didn't w o r k w i t h m y clients. T h e y k n e w there wasn't g o i n g t o b e an order for thirty-three thousand units, so they hadn't gotten excited. T h e y said instead, " N o , sorry, we can't help y o u w i t h those three thousand widgets at such a steep discount."
It Couldn't Be Simpler Research is indispensable, b u t the best single, easy-to-use, foolp r o o f tool we have at o u r disposal to blank slate is the simplest o n e imaginable: taking great notes. By its very nature, if we stop to t h i n k about the process, n o t e taking removes us from o u r world and keeps us in o u r adversary's world. T h e simple act of picking up the pen or pencil moves us in that direction. N o t e taking reinforces listening skills. As we take o u r notes, o u r c o n centration is automatically focused on w h a t is b e i n g said. In seminars, meetings, a n d negotiations, I can quickly tell w h i c h ones are the most successful people a r o u n d the table. T h e y are effectively silencing their o w n thoughts and learning as m u c h as they can about their adversary's world. T h e y are the ones listening closely and taking notes. T h e y are blank slating and gathering the pieces of the puzzle. (It's important to n o t e that they are n o t solving the puzzle. T h a t c o m e s later, w i t h analysis, w i t h b u r n i n g the m i d n i g h t oil.) T h e y k n o w that what is realty said a n d w h a t we actually hear d u r i n g a negotiation is far m o r e important than w h a t we allow ourselves to think while others talk. In order to blank slate effectively, the little voice in o u r o w n heads must be silent. If we take notes, we have to be listening. We all think we're
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good listeners, b u t w h e n was the last time you focused on your listening skills just for practice? You must listen to every word just as closely as a trial lawyer listens to every word of testimony w i t h o u t letting the mind w a n d e r off, w i t h o u t thinking about what you want to say next, w i t h o u t interrupting, w i t h o u t a n swering your o w n questions. I'm n o t m u c h of a Freudian, but Freud did preach to his pupils that they must adopt the same a p proach w i t h their patients: First just listen w i t h the most o p e n possible mind. D o n ' t j u d g e . T h a t comes later. As we take o u r notes, o u r e m o t i o n s are m o r e easily c o n trolled. O u r nerves relax, o u r stomach quiets d o w n , we c o m fortably settle i n t o the negotiating session. We d o n ' t show excitement or disappointment. As we take notes, we are also allowing the adversary to be m o r e okay, by making her feel m o r e important because we are taking notes on what she has to say. And then, on the plain practical side, notes are o u r d o c u m e n t a tion of what was said—and also what was d o n e or gestured, b e cause great n o t e takers make note of nonverbal behavior and moods. H o w many times have you found yourself unable to r e m e m ber a point? You might have gotten the gist of it b u t can't r e m e m b e r specifics. You're left w i t h some holes in the conversation, perhaps even a general vagueness. Worse yet, w h e n was the last time you found yourself w o n d e r i n g w h o you just talked to, because you hadn't written d o w n someone's name? Was it Sue or Sally? J i m or John? Most people can scribble d o w n a few notes here and there in a conversation, but taking great notes takes lots of practice. T h e next meeting you go to, pull o u t your legal pad instead of your business card. N e x t time the p h o n e rings, pick up your p e n , really listen, and take notes—even if it's your m o t h e r on the line.
Quiet Your Mind, Create a Blank Slate
(That m i g h t be the ultimate challenge—trying to blank slate w i t h a close m e m b e r of your family!) If we take notes, we're listening, which is good, and we're n o t talking, w h i c h is equally good. No talking! This is o n e of my cardinal rules—and an exaggeration, as I admitted earlier. I don't m e a n that you can't utter a w o r d , but I do mean that in a n e g o tiation most of us should talk a lot less than we do, in the interest of controlling neediness, in the interest of blank slating. W h e n we are spare w i t h o u r words, we are able to ask m u c h m o r e focused questions, w h i c h keep us on track and give us clearer pictures. If you can't keep from talking, y o u won't be able to blank slate. N o t talking is hard. We're trained through education to k n o w all the answers and to blurt t h e m o u t at the first opportunity. We have b e e n rewarded time a n d time again for k n o w i n g the correct answer. O u r life has revolved around o u r intelligence. We go to great pains to let people k n o w w h a t we know. B u t the danger here is easily illustrated. We've all b e e n to social functions w h e r e s o m e o n e seems to k n o w it all, and he makes the ridiculous assumption that people enjoy hearing h i m unload his vast stores of k n o w l e d g e . B u t w h a t really happens w h e n you find yourself trapped in that situation w i t h that guy? For o n e thing, you may feel unokay and get a little defensive and resentful and t u r n h i m off entirely. H o w seriously do you take him? H o w m u c h do you r e m e m b e r of what he said? Talk about a bad assumption: His assumption that you'll be impressed by all his talking literally takes h i m o u t of the game. (Here's a n o t h e r assumption, on my part this t i m e : T h i s b l o w h a r d / g a s b a g / k n o w - i t - a l l will be a man. Funny about that.)
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Spilling the Beans So, no talking, or less talking. As a negotiator, if you can't c o n trol the m o t o r m o u t h you're eventually g o i n g to say something you'll regret for the duration of that negotiation. C o m m u n i c a tion by e-mail is often preferred to a p h o n e call, especially for a beginning negotiator, because it reduces e m o t i o n . It also reduces the possibility of spilling your beans in the lobby. That's the phrase I use for the mistaken revelation of information: "spilling the beans." W h e n it happens the next time, just make sure it's from the other side, not from you. If y o u conduct many negotiations you will be the happy recipient of spilled beans. That's b e cause m a n y p e o p l e knowingly spill beans as they fight for the feeling of self-importance. Kind of pitiful, b u t true. People also spill beans in the very mistaken belief that this will help advance their o w n position or agenda, like in The Godfather, Part II, w h e n poor, weak Fredo spills to H y m e n R o t h (by way of J o h n n y Olla) details about Michael Corleone's position in the negotiation, all because Olla assured Fredo there'd be something in it for h i m if the negotiations were successfully concluded. Beans get spilled all over the place, that's the truth, and your j o b is to gather up all those beans and p u t t h e m to g o o d use. As it happens, I have s o m e t h i n g of a pet peeve regarding spilled beans in a very specific situation: putting forth a full financial package for a highest-level corporate officer before getting a c o m m i t m e n t from the candidate to accept or reject that package. Often, officers looking for a n e w colleague feel they have to offer the package before asking for the c o m m i t m e n t . T h e y feel the package drives the negotiation. B u t what happens is that the candidate takes the spilled beans—the financial package offer—back to his current employer and uses it for leverage.
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H a p p e n s all the time. I urge a different approach. I urge my clients to say to the candidate, "We're going to c o m m i t to a financial package that will be at the top of the industry, b u t we're n o t going to reveal it until we have your c o m m i t m e n t to take it or reject it. We don't want this package to be used to start a bidding w a r w i t h your c u r r e n t company." T h i s is a fair a p proach, b u t companies are afraid they'll lose the candidate, so they spill the beans, and t h e n they lose the candidate because they spilled the beans w h e n he uses the package for leverage and r e ups w i t h his current company. Often people blatandy tell you they are about to spill vital beans. "I shouldn't really say this, since I work for Intrepid, but I agree with your company's reaction. Our side has made some really dramatic statements, but this is all about negotiation. We pay penalties when we are late and we expect our suppliers to share part of that if they are late for us. We don't really plan to sue you into the ground if you are late, but we have to start the agreement somewhere." "Richard would not want to hear me talking to you, but we are looking for you to have some cash in the game—does not have to be ten percent—we pulled that number out of the air. What's the first rule in negotiating? Always ask for more than what you are willing to take. So we did. But it does not have to be ten percent. I don't know what is has to be. Could be software, spares, service, a credit toward other products, I don't know. We just want to make sure you are committed to executing." "Tom would probably kill me for saying this . . . but the truth is that he loves your product. The technology will solve all of our needs today. Period. That is a fact."
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In the dance company negotiation I've followed off and on since chapter 3, o n e of the p r o g r a m director's t h i r t y - m i n u t e m o n o l o g u e s w i t h the b o o k i n g agent divulged that o n e of the agent's colleagues had advised the director that her organization was n o t the only o n e that had n o t signed a contract. W h a t a situation: T h e director was spilling beans about spilled beans. (And the information about the original beans was w r o n g , to boot.) I have to admit that I'd be very surprised—flabbergasted—if any client of m i n e c o m m i t t e d the same error. It's just so foolish. B u t Lord knows they have ample opportunity. I have m e n t i o n e d the cozy relationships that many corporate negotiators try to establish w i t h their adversaries, for the sake of establishing a subtle neediness on the adversary's part. A n o t h e r purpose of these "close" relationships is the opportunity they pose for collecting spilled beans. "Say, Joe, is that pricing structure you guys just proposed for real?" Or maybe it's s o m e remark that's just a little leading—"Boy, Joe, that's a bear of a position you guys took last w e e k " — i n the h o p e that you, by way of friendship, might slip and reply, "Well, you k n o w h o w the game is played, Pete." We've seen h o w negotiators use hints of huge purchases, future global alliances, and the like to set up naive w i n - w i n n e g o tiators with neediness and false expectations, but another point of these promises is to get you to spill your beans about internal cost-profit structures. This is basic cost optimization strategy: Hey, we're partners. Let us help you hold your costs d o w n . It's tough to let go of expectations, not to assume, to listen i n stead of talking, to take copious notes all the time, to be certain
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n o t to spill beans. But with training and practice, blank slate can b e c o m e a behavioral goal and discipline for anyone. There's definitely no excuse for the careful negotiator's spilling the beans. W i t h dedication and practice, you can make sure that your slate is erasable and easily adjusted. You will develop the habit of c o n stantly reviewing the status of the negotiation. W h e n your picture changes, you'll change w i t h it. But even if you're good at blank slating, have no expectations and no assumptions, listen well, take great notes, refrain from excessive talking, and don't spill b e a n s — e v e n if you're the perfect blank slater, the world outside the negotiation can still intrude on your ability to blank slate. If you're overly tired, it's difficult to focus. If you're dealing w i t h the remains of the night before, blank slating is difficult. If there's a crisis in your h o m e , blank slating can be impossible. If you feel you cannot blank slate for any reason, you have only o n e option: cancel the negotiating session. This is h o w important the blank slate is.
Play a Mind Game W h e n you were a small child, did you ever see a p o n y in the clouds, or perhaps the face of a clown? W h e n you read Robin Hood, did you literally see Friar Tuck fall in the river? D i d you see yourself shoot the arrow that w o n the archery contest? It's this ability to envision that we had as children that we must n o w cultivate as negotiators. W h e n we blank slate we can truly see, as if for the first time. T h r o u g h my work with hundreds of students and in hundreds of actual negotiations over the last many years, I have learned that the ability to envision varies with individuals. I also k n o w that the ability to envision is directly linked
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to the level of success we can achieve. T h e greater the ability to envision, the greater the potential for success. If you can't see it, you'll never be able to do it. Everyone can see better than they do now. T h e r e are many simple exercises that help us do so. Consider the word sky. Say it to yourself, close your eyes, see the sky you want to see. All of us have a favorite sky. Pick another word for a p h e n o m e n o n in the natural world. See that p h e n o m e n o n . T u r n it around in your mind's eye. W h e n you get the c h a n c e — b u t sometime s o o n — g o to the movies w i t h o u t leaving your favorite chair: Find a quiet place and relax, close your eyes, and r u n a movie in your mind of some pleasant time in your life (a sporting event, a date, a fun time in school or at work). Before a negotiation, see that n e g o tiation unfolding in your mind. Picture yourself asking the questions, taking the notes, and negotiating w i t h perfect behavior. See yourself relaxed w i t h no expectations, no n e e d , and no fear—a perfectly blank slate. It works, even for a hard-nosed corporate negotiator.
9 Know Their "Pain," Paint Their "Pain" Work with Your Adversary's Real Problem
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O U R ADVERSARY IN any negotiation must have vision b e fore they can ever take action. I've said it before, I'll say it
again: n o vision, n o action. N o vision, n o decision. N o vision, no deals that stick. This is H u m a n N a t u r e 101, and it's the s u b text, to o n e extent or another, of m u c h of the preceding m a t e rial. B u t what, exactly, do we need a vision of? Pain. This is what brings every adversary in every negotiation to the table. I realize it's a harsh word, maybe even offensive to s o m e w h o perhaps feel it makes negotiation and business into a blood sport. I appreciate this c o n c e r n , b u t all too often negotiations do b e c o m e extremely e m o t i o n a l and can require extremely t o u g h decisions. I use pain only as a technical term. It has n o t h ing to do w i t h actual physical pain (although it could certainly lead to that, in the form of headaches and upset stomachs). In
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my system, pain is whatever the negotiator sees as the current orfuture problem. People make decisions in order to alleviate and take away this current or future p r o b l e m — t h i s pain. Put in these terms, what else would any negotiation concern? I want to start digging into this subject w i t h a brief history lesson. In my work w i t h clients, I've found that these lessons are a great way to make a couple of points. First, many critical m o ments in history are really negotiations, if we consider carefully, and we can learn lessons from t h e m that apply to o u r m o r e m u n dane endeavors. Second, setting a n e w principle in a context of great historical importance helps to emphasize the importance of the principle. It gets people's attention. O n e story from history that gets people's a t t e n d o n is the story of Winston Churchill's brilliant success in getting the attention of the worldwide public in the first days of World War II. On May 13, 1940, after Churchill had b e c o m e British prime minister following the resignation of Neville C h a m b e r l a i n , w h o s e n a m e has since b e c o m e synonymous w i t h appeasement, the n e w leader of the British polity appeared before the H o u s e of C o m m o n s and was asked for a succinct statement of his wartime policy. His answer: "It is to wage war, by sea, land, and air, w i t h all o u r might and with all the strength that G o d can give us: to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue of h u m a n crime. T h a t is o u r policy." To w h o m was Churchill directing that remark? W i t h w h o m was he negotiating? N o t with Hitler. To hell with Hitler, literally. N o , the n e w prime minister was negotiating with the c o n stituencies of his potential allies in the democratic West. T h e free world had been and still was, at that time, little prepared for the massive G e r m a n industrial and military might that steamrolled Europe. Chamberlain was convinced there was no hope
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against H i t l e r s war machine, and he had therefore compromised the British Empire in his efforts to avoid a war he did not think he could w i n . So it was no surprise that Churchill inherited a constituency that saw no hope. He did have h o p e , however, and passion, and genius, and his problem was h o w to persuade his people and their ostensible allies on the other side (our side) of the Atlantic. His solution was expressed on J u n e 14, 1940, w h e n he spoke again on the subject of the day: Even though large tracts of Europe and many old and famous States have fallen or may fall into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi rule, we shall not flag orfail. We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight on with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God's good time, the new world, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old. I don't k n o w about you, but I get chills thinking about the passion b e h i n d Churchill's righteous campaign against Hitler. His words in this speech are the perfect way to introduce the subject of pain in a negotiation. W i t h a towering passion and 179 perfectly chosen words, Churchill wanted to paint a picture for his vast audience of the pain of living u n d e r — b o w i n g d o w n before—abominable tyranny. He also wanted to paint a second picture, that of fighting against this abomination with, if neces-
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sary, the life of the last good m a n and w o m a n on earth. His adversary was the constituency of the Western democracies, and they were never going to make the decision to go to war w i t h o u t a clear vision of the intolerable pain that would follow from Nazi rule. Just recently a friend told me about a speech he had heard by H u g h L. M c C o l l Jr., chairman and C E O of Bank of America, before the E c o n o m i c C l u b i n Chicago. M c C o l l h a d b e e n i n b a n k i n g f o r t y - o n e years, starting w i t h a small o n e in N o r t h Carolina, building what is n o w Bank of America. A m e m b e r of the audience asked h o w M c C o l l had successfully negotiated over o n e h u n d r e d mergers and acquisitions, and he answered, "I really try to get inside their head before I ever get in the r o o m with t h e m . " Exactly! And w h a t was M c C o l l looking for inside the adversary's head? T h e pain, to use my nomenclature. As a negotiator you can and will make a lot of mistakes, of course, b u t your clear vision of your adversary's pain will see you through thick and thin. As I stated earlier, adhering to your mission and purpose will keep you from going seriously astray in a negative direction. N o w you have a tool for keeping you oriented in a positive direction: your vision of your adversary's pain. W i t h b o t h mission and purpose and pain you're in great shape, b u t w i t h o u t b o t h you're w a n d e r i n g in the desert. O n e day quite a few years ago my son J i m and I were tooling along on an errand for my wife, Patty, in Dublin, O h i o , w h e r e we lived (and a suburb of Columbus), w h e n we passed the local exotic car dealership just as one of those transport trucks was unloading s o m e n e w Porsches. O n e of these beauties was flaming red, with a black convertible top. Light rain had moistened the top and beaded on the body. N o w the sun was out, and that car was glistening. "Jimbo," I exclaimed, "look at that. Porsche
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doesn't make a convertible. T h e y only build T-tops and coupes. W h e r e did this convertible c o m e from? I'll bet s o m e o n e had it built by special order. T h e r e couldn't be another o n e like it in O h i o , m u c h less here in Dublin." I ended up buying that car. W h y ? T h e picture I had of myself as the only guy in O h i o with this magnificent Porsche, cruising d o w n the road in that m a c h i n e on a sunny day w i t h the top d o w n and w i t h heads t u r n e d wherever I went. My pain was my ego trip, my vanity. I ached for this car. Okay, no h a r m in falling into the position of needing a car. Silly, maybe, but not all that harmful. But in a negotiation, pain is big-time serious. This is w h y I use that harsh word, to emphasize the seriousness of the concept. In every negotiation, " p a i n " is what brings the negotiator to the table in the first place. It is, in effect, the soft u n d e r belly in his negotiating position, the most vulnerable point. Your pain in a negotiation can be your need to p u t this particular m a c h i n e on y o u r factory floor a n d n o t o n e of the competitive products. B u t maybe you don't k n o w that you need this particular machine; m a y b e all y o u understand is that y o u need a pretty g o o d machine. My primary j o b in this negotiation is to create vision of your real pain, that this is the only machine for your purposes, that this technology is the future of this i n dustry, and that w i t h o u t it your efficiency and your business plan will suffer. Meanwhile, my o w n pain in this negotiation is that my c o m p a n y has committed 60 percent of its resources to the development of this machine, and we want to establish it as the n e w industry standard. O u r adversaries, if they're on top of things, will make sure that we k n o w that they k n o w that we've bet the farm on this machine. T h e y will have found this o u t through research, of course. O t h e r scenarios: Your pain can be your desire to hire this par-
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ticular person, w h o is head and shoulders above any other candidate you've interviewed; or, on the other side, it can be your d e sire as the applicant to get this particular j o b because the salary is twice what you're making now. Or the pain can be your desire as an editor to buy a particular manuscript from an author because it's the best "airport novel" you've read in years, or it can be your b u r n i n g desire to sell this airport novel for major money, because you've g o n e through your life's meager savings while writing it for the past two years. It can be your desire to sell this Porsche today, n o t tomorrow, or it can be your desire to be the only big shot in O h i o driving this model. It can be a dance company's need to b o o k this gig because they need the revenue and it fills o u t the schedule, or it can be the need of the performing arts theater to fill in the blank on their o w n schedule. It can be the football player's b u r n i n g desire to play for a top program, or it can be the desire of the coach of the top program to get this particular kid for his team. And in his negotiation with his people, W i n s t o n Churchill had his o w n pain as well: his picture of what failure meant, n o t to him personally, but to Western Europe and beyond. (In the political and moral realm, you could almost define leadership as the effective painting of the pain shared by leader and people. T h i n k of Lincoln: He had to share with his c o n stituents his o w n picture of the pain that w o u l d follow if the U n i o n were allowed t o disintegrate. O f course, W i n s t o n Churchill and Abraham Lincoln were two of the greatest m e n w h o ever lived. Each u n d e r s t o o d in his hara, his gut, that all meaningful actions and decisions begin w i t h a vision. W i t h o u t the vision each painted w i t h his incomparable words, there w o u l d have b e e n no decisive action by the people. We m o r e
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limited individuals could do worse than learn from Lincoln and Churchill.) In a really efficient negotiation, both parties will w o r k to clarify the vision of the pain of the adversary. In any event, you must never enter a negotiation in which you haven't seen your adversary's pain. Never. In fact, if your mission and purpose is set in the world of the adversary—and it is, of c o u r s e — t h e n the features a n d benefits of what you offer in this negotiation will necessarily be addressed to the pain in the adversary's world. T h a t said, you must never forget to blank slate and make certain that there's no hidden pain that you haven't discovered and that is subverting the entire deal. In m a n y cases, the pain will be pretty straightforward and the issues pretty clear. B u t sometimes you really have to dig. T h e purchase of life insurance comes to mind. I can think of a simple reason s o m e o n e might give the salesman setting up an a p p o i n t m e n t — " W e l l . I guess my wife and kids just need some life insurance"—but I can see that hidden behind this general e m o t i o n could be a host of particular circumstances, and it would be the particular circumstance, n o t the general e m o t i o n , that generates the deal in the end.
You M a y Have to Really Hunt for the Pain In most cases in which you have an intractable problem in a n e gotiation, either you have failed to help your adversary u n d e r stand his pain, or you have failed to have a clear vision of the pain, or the real pain is actively hidden. In big corporate negotiations, imagine the different people and their private agendas in w h i c h the real pain would be care-
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fully camouflaged. Divisions within a large corporation will even hide their pain from other divisions within the same corporation— c o m m o n bureaucratic b e h a v i o r — m u c h less from negotiators for other companies. Negotiators definitely don't hang the pain o u t for just anyone to look at. Well, occasionally they do, but probably they d o n ' t , and great professional negotiators never will. People—negotiators—have to feel safe in order to reveal their pain and, perhaps, even to see it clearly themselves. T h e y definitely will n o t expose their pain if they think the adversary will try to take advantage of them. W h o would? So your challenge as a negotiator is to discover and paint for your adversary the clearest possible picture of their pain while always nurturing. According to family tradition, my great-grandfather used to say about o n e of the mules on his farm, " T o get his a t t e n tion you have to hit h i m between the eyes with a two-by-four. W h e n you have his attention, he can see w h a t he o u g h t to do." B u t this doesn't w o r k w i t h us humans. We can be just as lacking in vision as mules, b u t we will not usually respond to the t w o by-four. You want your h u m a n adversaries to see the pain, b u t y o u do n o t want to hit t h e m b e t w e e n the eyes w i t h it. You soften the blow, so to speak, with nurturing. A classic example of h o w a clear vision of a hidden pain, r e vealed by nurturing, drives the decision-making process involved a client w h o was trying to acquire a m u c h smaller c o m p a n y w h o s e founder had recently died. However, the asking price per share for the c o m p a n y in play was three times the true market value of the stock. T h e price was so inflated that it m a d e no sense. My client simply couldn't understand w h y the adversary w o u l d take such a risk w i t h such a high asking price. Obviously, my client didn't have a clue w h e n it came to the adversary's real pain.
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As it t u r n e d out, the w i d o w of the founder of that c o m p a n y belonged to the same club as o n e of my client's board m e m b e r s , whose wife often played cards with the widow. O n e day at the club, the board member's wife chatted up the w i d o w and asked her h o w she was able to face dealing with all the details involving her late husband's company. T h e board member's wife asked this interrogative-led question (How . . . ?) in such a n u r t u r i n g way that the w i d o w spilled h e r beans. She revealed that the sale of her late husband's c o m p a n y represented, in her m i n d , the end of her husband's legacy, and she felt he would be forgotten. H e r husband had been an inventor, and she was desperately t r y ing to find a way to immortalize him, especially for her many grandchildren and great-grandchildren. T h e board member's wife was able to set up a meeting b e tween the w i d o w and my client. T h e mission and purpose of that meeting for my client? To get the w o m a n to see and d e scribe what was most important to her and her family in this a c quisition. My client explained to h e r that the t w o companies were so far apart in price that the difference could never be overc o m e . He asked her what he could do. "How can I help you?" he asked. For a second time, the w i d o w spilled the beans and told my client about her fear of her husband's legacy disappearing. My client asked h e r if she had ever t h o u g h t of erecting a m e m o r i a l on the grounds of his c o m p a n y to recognize a n d h o n o r his achievements. She was absolutely flabbergasted. My client added that if he m a d e this acquisition, his c o m p a n y w o u l d be pleased to establish and pay for the m e m o r i a l . She could choose the artist and the material and design this memorial in any way that she wanted. She accepted this offer almost on the spot, and within six m o n t h s the acquisition was completed. My client had finally learned the real pain at the heart of the negoti-
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ation, and then had helped the w o m a n see this pain in her o w n mind and proposed a way for her to alleviate it. T u r n on the discovery channel, I like to say. Paint the pain. W h e n you finally get to the right person in a negotiation, they will often spill the beans and reveal their real pain so that you can fix it. T h a t target c o m p a n y had valued itself at something a p proaching $100 million. Ridiculous, as we knew, but my client's board of directors eventually authorized $50 million for the p u r chase. In the end they paid less than $25 million.
And Don't Forget to Nurture I have a n u m b e r of clients in the digital world, w h e r e change comes so fast a c o m p a n y can find itself behind the eight ball almost overnight. (If it can happen to Microsoft, it can happen to anyone.) If you're convinced that a potential customer has taken a potentially fatal fork in the road, and you k n o w that you have the means to help t h e m correct that mistake, h o w in the world do you go about painting this terrible pain? H o w do you tell a c o m p a n y that has invested tens of millions of dollars that they've got to t u r n their supertanker on a d i m e , and quickly. You certainly can't say, "Folks, you've just wasted $30 million and several years' w o r k by twenty good people. That's the bad news. T h e good news is that o u r technology can bail you out." T h a t won't get you anywhere. You can't challenge all the time and m o n e y that the c o m p a n y has invested in a misguided direction w i t h o u t n u r t u r i n g . W i t h o u t careful n u r t u r i n g , the vision your adversaries will have is that they're i n c o m p e t e n t losers and that their heads will soon be rolling. O n l y with the most careful n u r t u r i n g and with the most careful painting of the pain will they see and accept the merits of the correct vision, and see and decide that
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g o i n g in another direction is the only way for l o n g - t e r m success. So you say: "Now, I ask you to be patient with me here, but I've got a real problem. Maybe I'm out of my mind. I need you to tell me if I am. Just say so. And everything I say is going to sound self-serving, I understand that, but with your permission, I'd like to tell you what I see, and together let's see if it makes sense." But you don't describe your vision at all. Instead, you ask a series of interrogative-led questions to build their vision. T h e first question is " W h a t direction is this w h o l e industry n o w g o i n g in the area of wireless widgets?" You have nurtured, you have given the adversary permission to say no, and you will use the 3 + technique. This is h o w you start building for your adversary his vision of his o w n pain, w h i c h in this case he isn't hiding a n d doesn't even know. By the way, the " h e " here is not some h y p o thetical adversary. This was an actual m e e t i n g b e t w e e n the president of one of my clients and the president of a major corporation heading for serious trouble. W h e n you begin any n e w negotiation or find yourself losing control of an o n g o i n g negotiation, you return t o — w h a t ? Your mission and purpose. And w h e r e is your mission and purpose set? In your adversary's world. And what is e m b e d d e d d e e p within your adversary's world? T h e i r pain. W h e n in d o u b t , r e turn to the pain. And always nurture, because w i t h o u t it, the pain may simply be too m u c h . "Gee, that's a bad break. How long will your car be in the shop?" "That's terrible. How long will your company pay for the temporary apartment?" "This is great technology. You must really have invested a lot in it."
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"Sure we have a lot of competitors, so you're in good shape in that regard. Now when do you need to get your line back up and running?" T h e clearer your adversary's vision of his pain, the easier the decision-making process. This may sound like one of the m o r e counterintuitive aspects of my system of negotiation, but think about it this way: If your doctor doesn't paint for you a crystalclear picture of your case—your pain—will she ever be able to "sell" you this medicine or this outpatient procedure, m u c h less this t h r e e - h o u r operation? S o m e h o w I rather doubt it. I think about this psychological issue every time I see a n o t h e r advertisement in the antismoking campaign. H o w long have we been funding these programs n o w ? H o w effective they have been, especially the ones aimed at kids? Even granting that they've helped a little, and I think this would be hard to prove, clearly they're n o t really effective. W h y not? T h e y have n o t b e e n able to successfully paint a vision of the pains of s m o k i n g — t h e hacking c o u g h , the odors, the cost, the public disapproval (in some circles), and the possibility of cancer—clearly e n o u g h to offset the pleasures and, of course, the addiction.
Painting Pain is N o t Creating Pain I h o p e it's understood that I'm not talking about creating pain in your adversary. Many times I've heard s o m e o n e say, "Boy, did I put them in pain." That's ridiculous. You help create the vision, but you don't create the pain itself at all. T h e pain is just there. T h e d o c t o r doesn't create your pain; she helps you see your case clearly. T h e retail salesperson isn't starting from scratch. My son J i m
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and I didn't wander o n t o the parking lot of the Porsche dealership by accident. I wanted that Cabriolet badly. No salesman in the world was going to be able to convince me that I had an aching need I didn't really have. Likewise, no one wanders into an electronics store intent on b u y i n g a n e w refrigerator. T h e salesperson always has s o m e t h i n g to work with. And it wasn't as if Churchill had n o t h i n g to work with in his negotiation with his constituents. Western Europe and the United States did need to gear up for the war with Hitler. T h e British certainly k n e w the dangers posed by Hitler. T h e y just needed their vision and the solution painted with passion. (Americans were a little slower on the uptake, but that was natural. We were far away and justifiably sick of European wars, but we, too, could finally be stirred to action by the c o m b i n e d efforts of Churchill and Roosevelt to paint w i t h passion b o t h the vision and the solution.) So, please, forget any idea you may have about creating pain for your adversary. That's amateur hour. W h a t you help to create is their vision of their very real pain. T h e difference is huge, and you shouldn't read further until you're convinced I'm right about this. As a negotiator, you want the adversary to see and understand his pain calmly and rationally, just as you have long ago seen and understood your o w n pain, calmly and rationally. (For example, am I w r o n g in presuming that you're reading this b o o k because you have some kind of modest pain in the area of negotiation?) If you seem to be mired in an intractable problem in a negotiation, it's not because you haven't been able to create some pain. As I said earlier, you either don't have a clear vision of your adversary's pain, or you haven't been able to paint the picture clearly for your adversary—or the adversary doesn't even see their o w n pain! " O h , c o m e on," you may blurt. But it's true. Sometimes the
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adversary just doesn't get it. " B u t wouldn't this be g o o d ? " n e w clients have asked. "If I figure o u t their pain and they d o n ' t , doesn't this put me o n e up? Doesn't it allow me to sneak up on t h e m ? " N o , this is poppycock. It's n o t real world. If the c o m pany on the other side of the table doesn't understand that they need your machine and no other machine, what's their incentive in the negotiation? If the real estate agent doesn't understand that this lunar-powered house in the middle of the lake is so quirky very few people will be interested, w h e r e s the incentive to c o m e d o w n from the ridiculous asking price? You think a n y o n e is going to make a deal w i t h o u t a very clear vision of why they need to make this deal? Please. T h e i r ignorance of their pain only puts everybody o n e down. If they don't k n o w their o w n pain, they'll never make the deal. Two competitors were trying to sell an apparently comparable piece of e q u i p m e n t to a third company. O n e ' s price was $2.9 million, the other's was $2.1 million. T h e r e was only one difference in the machines, w h i c h no o n e k n e w about at the b e g i n riing of the negotiations: T h e more expensive machine could be configured so that it would provide m u c h longer service than the inexpensive machine. This longer service life was m u c h m o r e valuable than the $800,000 difference in the cost, b u t — unbelievably, perhaps-—the buyer had failed to understand this basic point. W h e n we were able to get the purchaser to see V clearly their future pain if they purchased the less-expensive m a chine, to see that this had b e c o m e a situation of pay me n o w or pay me later, they eagerly purchased the m o r e expensive m a chine. Another, m o r e detailed story that vividly demonstrates the power of painting the real pain is the second installment of the N e t w o r k , Inc., saga. You may recall from the first installment,
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related in chapter 2, that the c o m p a n y had gotten itself into a serious b i n d thanks to terrible negotiating that had p r o d u c e d contracts under w h i c h it was losing $100,000 on every machine shipped to its primary customer. B u t they had kept shipping for fear of losing this account and going o u t of business. Of course, losing m o n e y on every m a c h i n e w o u l d also p u t t h e m o u t of business, just m o r e slowly. This situation played o u t d u r i n g a d o w n t u r n in the industry some years ago. Up against the wall at last, the N e t w o r k board was prepared to shut down if one m o r e machine was shipped at this losing price. T h e president was instructed to renegotiate or cancel the deal w i t h a major European conglomerate. T h e negotiators on the other side were real tigers. T h e i r e n tire strategy for every negotiation was to play the w i n - w i n game, bludgeon their w i n - w i n adversaries, and drive d o w n every price from their many suppliers. A n d they were successful in d o i n g so. T h e y had certainly succeeded against N e t w o r k . Several m e m bers of the N e t w o r k team were completely cowed by these n e gotiators, w h o , they were convinced, would get angry and walk away if N e t w o r k tried to change its losing situation into a profitable one by renegotiating. In fact, these folks lost their jobs b e cause they refused to go along with the n e w negotiating system I was coaching. But the president was ready to try anything. We were short of time, so I worked intensely with the president, and he controlled his team accordingly. T h e y had been introduced to my methods, but that was about all. T h e y weren't really trained, b u t we forged ahead, because we had no choice. Seven days before N e t w o r k was supposed to ship the first m a chine in a large order signed eight m o n t h s earlier, we set up a conference call a m o n g thirteen negotiators in six countries. My client, N e t w o r k ' s president, o p e n e d w i t h minimal pleasantries
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because this was an ultraserious p h o n e call. N o t h i n g could be allowed to distract from that. His statement was short, concise, and direct: "Our problem is that we want to be your supplier of the future. We want to be the provider of technology that takes you into the twenty-first century, but we must alert you that we cannot ship the machines currently under order to you, because we are losing $100,000 per machine. We are in a desperate situation. We simply cannot ship the machines." T h e president closed his remarks by apologizing for putting the other c o m p a n y in this position, which as a professional businessm a n he would never do if it weren't a matter of his company's survival. If N e t w o r k didn't survive, there wouldn't be any m a chines to ship at any price. It's important to see that he did n o t explicidy paint the adversary's pain, b u t he didn't have to. By describing the desperate situation, by saying " N o , we cannot deliver these machines at this price," he made it easy for the adversary to discover and feel his o w n current and future pain should he say " n o " in return. Often there is no m o r e effective way to paint the adversary's pain than by asking t h e m to tell you "no." W h e n your adversary carefully considers exacdy what this " n o " entails, their pain becomes very clear indeed, and good things can happen for you. In this negotiation, the adversary had its very low price for the machines, but n o w there were consequences. First, they wouldn't get the e q u i p m e n t — a n d they did need these machines, which were state of the art, the very best. Second, they were in danger of driving this technically superior supplier out of business. T h i r d , if they succeeded in d o i n g this, they w o u l d lose
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their effective "dual vendor strategy" in negotiations. Given that there were only two suppliers of this vital equipment, the loss of o n e w o u l d mean they'd have no leverage w i t h the r e m a i n i n g supplier. T h e y ' d put themselves at the mercy of the other s u p plier, in fact, w h o s e machine was technically inferior to boot. Then w h e r e w o u l d their vaunted cost optimization strategies leave them? I'm sure the adversary's negotiators understood all this in a flash after the statement from the N e t w o r k president.
You Cannot Tell Anyone Anything R a t h e r than set o u t on the sometimes long, hard road of painting vision and pain, many negotiators make the fatal mistake of thinking they can convince s o m e o n e to make the rational decision to do something, to buy something, to see something the same way they see it. T h e y offer up reasons, facts, figures, and charm that they are sure would make any rational person see things the way they see t h e m . In fact, most negotiators think of the gift of gab as o n e of their greatest assets. B u t what's the problem w i t h trying to convince s o m e o n e to see the same thing you see? You k n o w the answer to this question, but let's go ahead and spell it out. To begin with, you're asking your adversary to c o m e into your world and to see your world. And w h e r e do we want to spend o u r time in a negotiation? In the adversary's world. Second, if we're busy giving reasons to o u r adversary, we're too busy talking; we're totally in o u r world and impeding o u r ability to blank slate. Finally, and most important of all, we're forgetting that decisions are made not with o u r head but with o u r heart and guts, first of all. R e m e m b e r , negotiations are 100 percent emotional until a decision is made.
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You cannot tell anyone anything. T h i n k about this and be sure you agree w i t h m e . You can only help people see for themselves. To test this thesis, a clever client o n c e devised a clever experiment. He was m a k i n g a presentation to a financial analyst, and he did it t w i c e , in effect—once in the standard didactic way, and then a second time in w h i c h he asked questions of the analyst. In the first presentation, the analyst sat quietly and took a few notes, b u t the second time around he filled page after page with notes as he engaged w i t h the interrogatives from my client. Since that day, that particular client has understood completely the power of asking questions as a way of painting the vision, the pain, so the adversary in a negotiation sees it for his o w n . In trying to convince s o m e o n e to buy this product or service or to sign this deal, in trying to reason with someone, we are setting ourselves up to fail. Instead, we have to use o u r fuels of the system—asking questions, nurturing, connecting, reversing, and m o r e — i n order to paint the picture of their pain. D u r i n g the conference call I m e n t i o n e d earlier, the o n e involving the president of N e t w o r k , Inc., he asked the adversary, "How do you think this problem can be solved?" An interrogative-led question, of course. In the end, the other c o m p a n y offered to pay N e t w o r k an additional $200,000 p e r m a c h i n e : $100,000 to reach breakeven, $100,000 for profit. Moreover, they proposed to g r a n t — n o t loan, b u t simply g i v e — N e t w o r k several million dollars in order to ensure its financial stability. S o u n d t o o g o o d to be true? Maybe, but it is true. Apparently the N e t w o r k president's presentation had given the adversary a clear picture of current and future pain if they didn't get those machines! B u t my client didn't accept this offer immediately. After four m o r e meetings, they secured additional orders for
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more machines. B o t t o m line: N e t w o r k had an immediate t u r n around on the b o t t o m line of tens of millions of dollars and then secured $100 million in n e w orders. T h e switch from the old sales team to the n e w o n e took about a year and a half. T h e n e w team of seven people p r o d u c e d — a n d is still p r o d u c i n g — a b o u t three times the dollar v o l u m e generated by the old team of thirty people. W h a t better example could we find of the rule that the value of any n e g o t i a t i o n — t h e price that will be paid in any negotiation—is directly related to the clarity of the vision of pain? W h a t better example of the rule that the greater the pain, the higher the price the adversary will pay to have it m a d e better or taken away? (Now, h o w could the w i n - w i n paradigm have worked for beleaguered N e t w o r k ? It couldn't have. H o w in the world could the same lame negotiating style that had gotten t h e m into this bind have gotten t h e m o u t of it? Impossible.) Sometimes, o n e simple question can create a vision of the pain and quickly drive a decision. Recall the negotiation between my client and the doctors at the hospital regarding w h e t h e r his baby girl w o u l d be transferred to the other hospital for surgery. My client t h o u g h t this transfer was t o o risky. He and his wife wanted the doctors from the other hospital to perform the o p eration in the hospital w h e r e their baby already was. My client asked only one question of the head of the neonatal unit: How much risk are you willing to take with my child's life? After the father asked his interrogative-led question, the d o c t o r considered his answer carefully. T h e question about the baby's pain was designed to make the doctor think about his o w n pain: How much risk am I willing to take to transfer this baby? To his great credit, the doctor did n o t shoot from the hip, know-it-all
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style. And t h o u g h he knew nothing about my system of negotiating, he did understand that he had so far failed to paint a clear picture of my client's o w n pain in this situation. T h e d o c t o r replied calmly that yes, there was risk in transferring the baby, and yes, there was an operating theater at this hospital, and yes, they could request the specialists from the other hospital to c o m e over here. But, he continued, the real risk for my client's d a u g h ter was n o t what happened during the operation, but p o s t - o p complications. If the baby was moved to the other hospital, she would have the best care available to her within seconds should an emergency arise after the operation. If she remained in her current hospital, the best care was p h o n e calls, beepers, pagers, and urgent car trips away. N o w the pain on b o t h sides was very clear. My client i m m e diately changed his mind and okayed the transfer to the other hospital. T h e operation was successful, and the baby is n o w a perfecdy healthy toddler.
Painting the Pain Is an Art "Your greatest strength is your greatest weakness." I quote these words from E m e r s o n for the second time, because truer words were never w r i t t e n . For a negotiator, they're pure gold. T h e naturally glib negotiator talks too m u c h . T h e brilliant negotiator tries to overpower his adversary w i t h intelligence. T h e friendly, compassionate negotiator tries to "save" his adversary. T h e aggressive negotiator tries to browbeat his adversary. T h e list of scenarios goes on and on and o n , and the painting of pain is o n e area in which the serious negotiator must be particularly careful not to get carried away w i t h his or her particular strength and skill. You want to avoid that emotional p e n d u l u m I w r o t e about
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in the section on strip lines in chapter 7. You want to avoid the too positive and the too negative. T h e vision has to be clear, but so does the solution you offer. You must not frighten or anger the adversary, you can't appear to be lording it over your adversary, you must nurture at all times. Painting the pain is o n e of the real arts of negotiation. You must wield the brush w i t h the touch of an O l d Master.
10 The Real Budget and How to Build It The Importance of Time, Energy, Money, and Emotion
K
I D S PLAYING BASEBALL are great—a t e x t b o o k in h u m a n psychology. W h a t happens w h e n youngsters hit a g r o u n d
ball? First, they r u n toward first base. ( O r sometimes they head for third base, b u t let's assume they do run in the right direction.) W h a t else is happening? Often, they look over at the coach for approval, then watch the ball, then look as the shortstop catches the ball, t h e n watch the throw. T h e trained Little Leaguers would duck their heads a n d r u n full speed to first base, concentrating on the base. This is the proper behavioral goal, b u t kids usually don't do this. By watching the action in the field, they r u n m o r e slowly a n d greatly increase the c h a n c e that the ball will b e a t t h e m to the bag. And often the runner's fear of making an o u t takes over. T h e kid slows d o w n or even quits r u n n i n g and looks at the coach again, thinking the throw will be in time, forgetting
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that the first baseman may drop t h e ball—quite possible—or be pulled off the bag by a high or wide t h r o w — v e r y possible. In short, t h e h i t t e r s behavior and activity are n o t disciplined and p r o p e r habits have n o t b e e n developed. T h a t r u n to first base is n o t "valid." Kids are kids. T h e y say and do t h e darnedest things. What's really amazing is that we adults exhibit the same failing. W h e n I was a youngster my w h o l e family enjoyed watching an old game s h o w called Beat the Clock, w i t h B o b Collyer as t h e host. He was t h e Regis Philbin of that era, I guess. T h e idea of t h e s h o w was that contestants ran a r o u n d t h e studio trying to beat t h e clock in t h e accomplishment of some ridiculous task. For some strange reason, I got to t h i n k i n g a b o u t Beat the Clock years later, and I realized that we, t h e audience, focused on t h e clock, while we should have been w a t c h i n g the contestants' activity and b e h a v ior. Worse, the contestants were always l o o k i n g up to see h o w m u c h t i m e they h a d remaining. B u t this shouldn't have m a t tered. T h e y were w o r k i n g as fast as they could, weren't they? If they beat t h e clock, they b e a t it; if they didn't, they didn't. Watching the clock only slowed t h e m d o w n and m a d e it m o r e likely that they would n o t beat t h e clock. B o t t o m line: usually it wasn't t h e clock that beat t h e m . T h e y beat themselves w i t h w h a t I call invalid behavior. I've seen such self-defeating b e h a v i o r on t h e o t h e r side of t h e table so m a n y times it's ridiculous. N i n e times o u t of t e n — n i n e t y - n i n e o u t o f o n e h u n d r e d , I ' m t e m p t e d t o say— unsuccessful negotiators have beat themselves. It has b e e n said that my entire system is set up as a guide to behavior, and I d o n ' t quarrel w i t h this assessment. T h e fuels of t h e system are certainly guides to behavior—specific, c o n c r e t e dos and do nots, r i g h t d o w n t o c h o o s i n g w h i c h w o r d s y o u should use w h e n asking
START WITH No
questions. And being unokay, not needing, blank slating, painting pain—these are all principles of valid behavior. T h e subject of this c h a p t e r — b u d g e t — i s a n o t h e r principle directed at the same purpose. As w i t h pain, " b u d g e t " in my system is almost a technical term. It is m u c h m o r e than your normal budget, m u c h m o r e than an itemization of projected costs, because the real price to be paid in the negotiation goes way beyond dollars and cents. Budget in the C a m p System breaks down into three budgets that help us a c c o u n t for and control this real p r i c e in t i m e - a n d energy, money, and emotional investment. (I unite time a n d e n ergy because it's hard to spend one w i t h o u t spending the other as well.) T h e overall budget is a comprehensive, powerful tool, a n other means by w h i c h we can retain control in the negotiation by making certain that o u r investments are working for us, n o t against us. O n l y the m o n e y budget is numerical. T h e other two employ a different kind of assessment, but o n e that we can keep up with quite accurately. My r o u g h - a n d - r e a d y formula for calculating the overall budget for a negotiation gives " t i m e " a value of x, " e n e r g y " 2x, " m o n e y " 3x, and " e m o t i o n " Ax. Obviously, these are n o t empirically based numbers. They're a way to drive h o m e the point of relative importance. If you are spending only time and energy in a negotiation, you have a budget of \x X 2x, for a total budget of 2x. If you start throwing real m o n e y around, your budget is 2x X 3x, or 6x. T h e real budget has tripled over the b u d g e t for t i m e - a n d - e n e r g y alone. W h a t happens if your emotions enter the negotiation and the equation in a powerful way? Multiply that 6x by Ax. You're up to 2Ax, a large relative n u m b e r that serves mainly to demonstrate h o w important the budget for e m o t i o n is, h o w dangerous emotional investment is.
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To repeat, budget is the way you keep on top of the real price to be paid in the negotiation, w h i c h goes way beyond dollars and cents. B o t h sides in a negotiation have a budget for each of the three categories, and your j o b is to make certain that you k n o w b o t h yours and your adversary's. Budget is a warning, in effect, to take careful account of factors that are usually overlooked in a negotiation and to realize their importance. A n d it's a way to help you use these factors to your advantage in a n e g o tiation. Needless to say, we want to keep o u r o w n budgets as low as possible while reaping the benefit of the adversary's higher budgets. At all times, the real price we are prepared to pay is regulated by effective decision making based on o u r mission and purpose and on o u r vision of the negotiation. T h e danger is that we b e c o m e overinvested in a negotiation and o u r decision m a k i n g goes o u t of whack. We start thinking in such terms as Well, we've already invested so much in this deal, we have to get something out of it. That's the classic logic that yields bad deals. It's the kind of logic that seduces us into egregiously violating o u r mission and purpose. I don't k n o w of a better example of what can happen w h e n we let o u r sense of a m a x ' e d - o u t budget affect o u r e n forcement of mission and purpose than NASA's decisions prior to the Challenger tragedy. T h e agency k n e w about the O - r i n g problem, b u t its budget for the space shuttle project was already so high that it compromised its values, its mission and purpose, and its people. T h e Challenger disaster was a h u m a n tragedy. You'll be dealing with situations of less import, thank goodness, b u t bad decision making from budgets g o n e awry is what we want to avoid by k n o w i n g and setting budgets in the first place.
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The Time-and-Energy Budget W h e n was the last time s o m e o n e asked, "May I have a few m i n utes of your t i m e ? " and you granted this person the time? This was basic courtesy, but by d o i n g so you unwittingly placed little or no value on those minutes, correct? And if e n o u g h such u n solicited, unwanted, time-eating episodes pile up in the day— answering e-mail may c o m e to mind for many of us; it does for m e — a considerable a m o u n t of time is d o w n the drain by day's end. Professional negotiators must carefully consider the value of o u r time, but usually this calculation just doesn't enter o u r minds. "By signing this application, all you are doing is making an application, and once it's been approved you can decide if you want the policy. Of course this doesn't mean you are committed, it only means you are making application." "Okay,
fine."
"I'll call to tell you when your doctor's appointment is scheduled for your physical. It won't take long, you 'II be in and out of there in no time." "Well, I'm going to be pretty busy for the next few weeks. Call me, and we'll see if we can work it out." A n d the chase is on for this life insurance salesman. H o w many calls will it take to get the adversary to the doctor? H o w much work goes into application preparation and underwriting? T h e salesman must think about this. To the untrained negotiator, time is a virtually free c o m m o d i t y given away right and left, so he ends up spending his commission, in effect, in t i m e - a n d energy.
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Do we really have m u c h " t i m e to spare"? N o . Warren Buffer* may have all the money in the world, but he doesn't have any m o r e time than you and I do. And believe me, Warren Buffett understands this. I d o n ' t imagine he hands o u t a p p o i n t m e n t s right and left. In any negotiation, the calculation of time must enter o u r minds, because the time at o u r disposal and at o u r adversary's disposal is so fleeting and so finite. M a y b e we don't like to focus on the limited hours of the day because we don't like to focus on the limited days of o u r lives. Maybe that's it, I don't know, b u t I do k n o w that as negotiators we must train ourselves to care about the hours of the day. We must understand that time can be used against us in many ways, especially as a way to increase the real price of a negotiation and eventually b r i n g about a possible compromise. All of a sudden we're saying to ourselves, "I've got too m u c h time in this. I can't t u r n away now." For the crafty negotiator, increasing the adversary's time b u d get is the oldest game in the b o o k : making y o u wait an hour, flooding you w i t h e-mails and faxes, asking y o u to drive two hours or fly eight hours, canceling at the last m i n u t e — o r arguing for nine m o n t h s about the shape of the negotiating table, w h i c h is what Ho Chi Minh's team did in the 1974 Paris peace negotiations, driving up N i x o n and Kissinger's time b u d g e t . T h e N o r t h Vietnamese had all the time in the world for this negotiation—after all, they'd already been fighting France or us for a generation—and they k n e w that N i x o n and Kissinger did not. Such budget-building ploys are transparent. O t h e r s are not. T h e use of time against you can start w i t h something as c o m m o n as your trying to get an a p p o i n t m e n t .
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"Just give me ten minutes and let me show you what I've got, Sara." "Okay,
when?"
You've got the appointment! Your company has been trying for years to o p e n the golden door, and you've finally succeeded. But then your adversary is a no-show. You're stood u p — n o explanation, no p h o n e call, no insincere apology. T h e untrained negotiator n o w crashes, t h i n k i n g that valuable time has b e e n wasted. But what if Sara keeps the appointment? Look h o w she can still use time against you: "Okay, show me w h a t you've got. B u t remember, I have to leave soon." T h e untrained negotiator gets excited and starts talking and spills every feature and benefit of his position, thinking, I'm really getting my money's worth out of these ten minutes! N o , he's not. T h e adversary is getting her money's w o r t h o u t of these ten minutes, because she's finding o u t everything she wants to know. M e a n w h i l e , the untrained negotiator isn't finding o u t anything. He's violating every rule in my system. He's o u t of c o n t r o l — n o t asking good questions, n o t blank slating, not living in the adversary's world. And he is trying to close this deal today. He is chasing time, as I like to p u t it. "Just a little more time and they'll buy!" N o t h i n g could be further from the truth. N e v e r chase time. For the m a n or w o m a n in straight sales, conventional w i s d o m tells you just to get o u t there and make proposals, get in front of people and spill your guts, then ask t h e m to buy. In effect, play a numbers game. M a k e up for self-defeating behavior with raw numbers. A h u n d r e d lines in the water must be better than five. Okay, you may catch a few small fry this way, if you have the e n -
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ergy and the self-image to withstand the p o u n d i n g ( r e c o m m e n d e d viewing: Death of a Salesman, the Lee J. C o b b performance), b u t you will never c o m e close to your full potential. W h y throw up a three-pointer w i t h t w o defenders hanging all over you? W h y throw a long pass into t w o - m a n coverage d o w n field? W h y swing at pitches that aren't in the strike zone? W h y try to carry the lake at 220 yards? W h y drive to an a p p o i n t m e n t an h o u r away w i t h o u t k n o w i n g your chances for valid negotiation are good? In the discussion about w a r m calls versus cold calls in chapter 1, w h e n I was w a r n i n g about the danger of the former and the surprising benefit of the latter, I was dealing w i t h t e l e p h o n e calls. Never drive around t o w n on cold calls. T h e great negotiator in any field won't walk next door, much less get in h e r car or on the airplane, w i t h o u t a clear picture of the negotiation c o m ing u p — a clear picture of the adversary's pain and a firm k n o w l edge that the adversary has the budgets in t i m e - a n d - e n e r g y , money, and e m o t i o n to pay—negotiate—to have this pain taken away. This is the only valid a p p o i n t m e n t for the m a n or w o m a n in straight sales, and the rule applies just as stringently to c o r p o rate and all other negotiators, no matter what the field. It also applies to advertising. T h e following paragraph on that subject may seem like a digression, but I think not. I think it drives h o m e the point about valid a p p o i n t m e n t s — o f any s o r t — very well. Every m o r n i n g , all of us wake up to advertising: in the newspaper, surfing the Web, on television, in the mail, on the radio, on the billboards, on the magazine jackets in the airplane, on the ticket jackets for the airline, on paper coffee cups. Advertising is literally e v e r y w h e r e . It is certainly o n e of o u r greatest commercial strengths in the U n i t e d States. B u t h o w should you use advertising to do business? I once had a student
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w h o had o n e h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d c o u p o n s delivered t o h o m e s each m o n t h , costing a nickel a c o u p o n , $60,000 per year. He earned from $225,000 to $360,000, gross revenue, from those c o u p o n s . T h e n an advertising rep presented him with a c a m paign to cut his advertising budget in half, using the newspaper instead of coupons. W h e n my student asked my advice I asked a question of my own—several of them, in fact (and interrogative-led, naturally, since I was trying to build his vision). " W h a t is the circulation of the local paper?" I asked. He didn't know, b u t soon found o u t it was sixty-eight thousand. " W h o are you selling to?" "Jim, that's easy. W o r k i n g families w h o o w n their o w n homes." " H o w many w o r k i n g families get the newspaper each day at home?" He didn't know, but even if every subscriber to the n e w s paper was a working-class h o m e o w n e r , the total was sixty-eight thousand, considerably fewer than the o n e h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d coupons he p u t in circulation. " W h e n you are at work, do you b u y from newspaper advertising?" "Well, c o m e to think of it, no, I don't." " W h a t do you think you should d o ? " " M a y b e I need to do m o r e research, and maybe I had better n o t cut o u t the c o u p o n campaign." I r e c o m m e n d David Ogilvy's b o o k Ogilvy on Advertising. It's all there. T h e principles of advertising as a sales prospecting tool are simple, and they pertain to many of the negotiations we're discussing in this b o o k as well. No matter h o w good an appoint-
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m e n t or meeting looks or sounds at first blush, it must meet the criteria of validity. If it doesn't offer the prospect of p r o d u c i n g results you can measure, it has to go. Let me just repeat what I said earlier: T h e great negotiator in any field must n o t lift a finger w i t h o u t a clear picture of the negotiation c o m i n g u p — a clear picture of the adversary's pain and a firm knowledge that the adversary has the budgets in time-and-energy, money, and e m o t i o n to pay—negotiate—to have this pain taken away. You will be able to uncover budget easily w h e n you c o m e to u n d e r stand, from trial and error, the risk to the negotiation if budget isn't solidly understood and in the open. This doesn't m e a n that your adversary will necessarily tell you straight o u t about their budgets (although he might, unthinkingly). Mainly, you'll learn to discover budget as your adversary shares his vision of his pain. T h e higher the pain, the higher the budget. People will pay a m u c h higher price than you would ever ask. "Bill, what would you budget to solve this problem?" "John, I'm not sure what it takes in dollars and cents, but with your help we will build the necessary budget." I'm n o t saying that every a p p o i n t m e n t or meeting must pan o u t or make progress or it becomes, in retrospect, invalid. N o t at all. You have no control over that ultimate result. I've already r e lated the story of my clients w h o flew to Ireland and were stood up. T h a t was nevertheless a perfectly valid meeting within the o n g o i n g negotiation. Being stood up is annoying, b u t it h a p pens, and it's n o t the end of the world. It becomes a problem only if you crash emotionally and thereby concede leverage in the negotiation to your adversary. As I've m e n t i o n e d , my stoodup clients got back on the next flight h o m e from Ireland and, a
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couple of days later, w r o t e a calm letter suggesting a m e e t i n g over here the next time. And they got it. W h e n stood up by anyone, the trained negotiator should calmly sit back and figure out w h e t h e r he'd like to try again or just fade away. He should, in short, consult his budget for t i m e and-energy. This is not a specific n u m b e r of hours, in all likelih o o d , although it could be. It is a sense, an assessment, a judgment based on experience. It is, most of all, an awareness that your time-and-energy is not free. T h e negotiator needs to r e m e m b e r that the adversary's budget is going up right along w i t h his own. Patience, my friend, always patience. That's the watchword. W h e n s o m e o n e tries to drive time up on you, regardless of how, patience will be your sword. And w i t h a solid mission and p u r pose in place, he or she w o n ' t be able to drive up time. By definition, your mission and purpose is a l o n g - t e r m aim, a c o n tinuing task and responsibility. Therefore, time actually becomes your ally; it is there to work for you, n o t to run o u t on you. Budgeting time is a matter of disciplining ourselves, of m a i n taining patience, of following o u r mission and p u r p o s e w i t h dedication and skill. If these are handled well, the t i m e - o n - t h e calendar question takes care of itself. T i m e can be wasted in a o n e - h o u r negotiation. It can be utilized to the fullest in a one-year negotiation. T i m e spent tells us n o t h i n g either way about time well spent. W h e n people try to drive up your budget by putting deadlines in place, even if it's only a t e n - m i n u t e time limit for a p r e sentation, w i t h patience and a mission and p u r p o s e , y o u can eagerly embrace such a deadline and craft your presentation accordingly. Every m i n u t e of your time in a negotiation is a m i n u t e of their time as well. Two can play that game.
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"Bill, what day are you looking at on your calendar?" "Well, John, this is a real problem. Could you make it today?" "Bill, I can't get there until tomorrow. What time would be best for you?" If you are using time well, you are always building your a d versary's b u d g e t . You can build it w i t h canceled meetings of your o w n , with " u r g e n t " p h o n e calls that you don't return i m mediately, by n o t leaving detailed messages that might save the adversary time b u t cost you t i m e — o r even by p u t t i n g y o u r adversary on hold for fifteen seconds. I'm t h i n k i n g of o n e particular episode w h e n I m e n t i o n that last scenario. In a sixm o n t h - l o n g negotiation, a client received a call from the adversary, w h o wanted to review a letter my client had sent him. Even t h o u g h the letter was on my client's desk, staring h i m in the face, he told the adversary he'd have to put h i m on hold and go look for the letter. O n l y fifteen seconds, but if you're w o r r i e d about an issue, fifteen seconds is long e n o u g h for all kinds of thoughts to race through your mind. Meanwhile, those brief seconds gave my client time to collect and calm himself for the discussion to follow. My client was also making a subtle statement that he was not needy here, that he didn't even have the letter in front of him. Is building the adversary's b u d g e t j u s t silly gamesmanship? N o t at all. It's a valuable way to get your opponent's attention, to push their vision of their pain. Adversaries dally, play games of their o w n , and in many other ways simply aren't serious. These folks need your help in order to push forward to serious decision making. O n e way you do this is by building their budgets, which then focus the attention marvelously. Ho C h i M i n h just kept
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building and building and building the Americans' time budget in Vietnam until we finally figured o u t that the war was never going away. T h i n k about it: building o u r time budget was the best way the N o r t h Vietnamese had to get us to see the ultimate pain of o u r position, which was that this war was never going away. N o , building budgets definitely is not gamesmanship. It's i n t e gral to painting the pain for the adversary and getting the adversary to get a clear vision as quickly as possible. In a phrase, time intensifies pain. As the investment of time m o u n t s higher and higher, so does the psychological pressure. M a n y negotiators allow themselves to get the sense that they're under a deadline, beyond w h i c h they've "wasted their time." My clients love to hear from the other side, "Okay, let's cut to the chase," because this may mean that the time-and-energy budget for the adversary is reaching its allotted total, and that they are seeing the pain very, very clearly, and they're finally just about willing and able to make an effective decision. For your o w n part, make certain that you do have "all the time in the w o r l d " — a n d if you don't, be ready to walk away. R e m e m b e r , you only want this deal, you do n o t need this deal. They may n o w need this deal. Crucial difference. (As I've said, in a negotiation b e t w e e n two C a m p - S y s t e m adversaries, there's little need for b u d g e t - b u i l d i n g tactics, because b o t h parties are trained to move quickly to the essential issues, the essential v i sion, the essential pain, the essential decisions.) All time is energy, of course, but in tough negotiations there may be energy spent beyond time. T h e work of negotiating is draining, and we really don't have any energy to waste. We want it to be there for us w h e n we can use it the most. Never u n d e r -
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estimate the energy that's g o i n g to be required to do a deal. Keeping o u r needs in check and completing the activity and b e havioral goals we set will help us conserve o u r o w n energy and waste theirs. Invalid, pointless a p p o i n t m e n t s and meetings? A waste of energy. Accepting " m a y b e " for an answer? A waste of energy. Accepting "yes" for an answer? A waste of energy. Asking questions that don't do you any good? A waste of energy. Failing to blank slate, making assumptions instead of d o i n g valid research? A waste of energy. Needing something? A terrible waste of energy. O n the o t h e r hand, the old adage " P e n n y - w i s e , p o u n d foolish" is right on. We do want to spend energy in preparation and research, but the shocking reality is that many people w o n ' t or don't prepare for negotiations. T h e y won't spend the time or the energy required. This isn't conserving energy, this is laziness, w h i c h inevitably wastes energy at a later stage of the negotiation. As I've said, my clients are often shocked by the p o o r preparation of some Fortune 100 companies. My system can be described as n o t h i n g m o r e or less than a way to behave in negotiations, b u t it can also be looked at as a way to save energy. If o u r energy is wasted, it is of o u r o w n doing. We cannot blame the adversary, because we are in control of o u r o w n behavior. Most well-trained adversaries will try to use energy against you, w h e t h e r they w o u l d p u t their actions in these terms or not. But if you're stood up, for example, exactly h o w m u c h energy over and above the time that's wasted is u n d e r your control? And you can respond in kind, of course. Build their energy budget. Increase the preparation required by the adversary to complete the deal ("This just doesn't make sense to us. C a n you redo it?"). Tactically w i t h h o l d decision makers from
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the negotiation ("We've talked this over and decided that your team needs to go to N e w York to show this to Mr. Smith"). Always be guided by your mission and purpose. Be aware of" personal health a n d stamina. K n o w your e n durance limits. D o n ' t get caught short of energy with j e t lag. Regular physical exercise is important. D o n ' t allow yourself to be locked away during negotiations. Take breaks and walks to keep the energy up and the head clear. Alcohol can steal your energy; beware of social gatherings c o m b i n e d with business. H o w many times have you read about a big labor conflict that was finally resolved at four in the morning? That's because w h e n we get tired, we b e c o m e impatient and m o r e vulnerable. After days, weeks, maybe m o n t h s of negotiations, all sides finally d e cide to stay with it until they have a deal, each trying to wear d o w n the other side. T h e physically stronger, m o r e energetic side gets the best of the deal. A n y marathon negotiation turns into a contest of endurance, plain and simple. You must k n o w your o w n endurance and n o t hesitate to call a time-out, w h e t h e r you're in an h o u r - l o n g meeting or a r o u n d - t h e - c l o c k negotiation.
The M o n e y Budget " P u t your m o n e y w h e r e y o u r m o u t h is." It always seems to c o m e down to money, doesn't it? Or as some wise person once said, " W h e n they say it's n o t about money, it's about money." O n c e you and your adversary start spending real m o n e y d u r i n g the negotiation and get serious about exchanging m u c h m o r e w h e n the deal is signed, the value of any negotiation goes up dramatically. R e m e m b e r , time is \x, energy 2x, and m o n e y 3x, roughly and relatively speaking.
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T h e value of anything goes up w h e n m o n e y is involved. W h o is m o r e likely to attend and get the most o u t of seminars or classes, the student w h o w o r k s from m i d n i g h t to four in the m o r n i n g to pay her fees, or the student on the athletic scholarship, w i t h free tutors and five years to finish at no cost at all? W h o ' s m o r e likely to work at the n e w negotiation system, the student w h o pays his way because he's genuinely interested and ambitious, or the employee sent by h e r boss? I k n o w that answer, and so d o you. W i t h i n the context of a negotiation, m o n e y is a surprisingly slippery commodity. Any given s u m means different things to different people. On the most obvious level, an u n e x p e c t e d $1,000 expense affects the clerk earning $20,000 far differently than it affects the executive earning $120,000, and it registers differently w i t h each of t h e m . Less obviously, perhaps, a c o n sumer may n o t be able to see value if the price of a given p r o d uct is too low in his frame of reference. On the other hand, he will search for value if the price is d e e m e d high. A classic case is Callaway's Big Bertha golf club. Ely Callaway intentionally jacked up the price of this club w h e n he first introduced it years ago, setting it far above the industry standard and far above what he needed to make a g o o d profit. As a marketing man, he u n d e r stood that at a lower price, the Big Bertha would have been just another golf club, and the well-heeled target market wouldn't have b e e n able to see the value. B u t the $400 driver (initially; even m o r e n o w ) caught the attention of golfers, w h o t h e n searched for value—and found it, as any golfer w h o has tried the club will attest. T h e Big Bertha changed the industry. Just as w i t h time-and-energy, you want m o n e y to work for you and against your adversary. You will try to drive up your a d versary's budget by making the negotiation literally expensive,
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and your adversary will try to do the same, because everyone k n o w s that a m o n e y squeeze is often followed by compromise if the untrained negotiator loses sight of his mission and purpose. You have to k n o w your actual dollars-and-cents budget for this negotiation, and you have to have a sense for their dollars-andsense budget and a sense of h o w they stand financially. W h a t is your adversary's frame of reference? What's real m o n e y to them? If you are constrained by m o n e y and your adversary is not, watch o u t . I guess the most obvious example of this situation is a lawsuit between a lawyer representing a single client against a large corporation. Legal proceedings are not, technically speaking, negotiations, since they're regulated by legal factors that don't affect true negotiations, but my point stands: T h e corporation is in a position to drive up the i n d e p e n d e n t lawyer's dollarsand-cents b u d g e t past the point of e n d u r a n c e , whereas the lawyer does not have this capability. It's n o t a fair fight, in this regard. (I say this w i t h o u t taking a position on the controversial subject of torts litigation.) Therefore some consumer-products companies have a policy of refusing to settle lawsuits. They'll spend $100,000 in legal fees instead of settling for $20,000, figuring that this a n n o u n c e d policy keeps the suits to a m i n i m u m and saves m o n e y in the long r u n . I'll bet they're right. In any event, if you're a lawyer you'd want to k n o w about this policy beforehand, wouldn't you? Do your research. If you're negotiating w i t h a big multinational, w o u l d n ' t you w a n t to k n o w that they have the habit of driving up m o n e y budgets by insisting on meetings all over the country, and often the world? This tactic of driving up the dollars-and-cents budget of their smaller suppliers is basic strategy for the purchasing departments of the big multinationals. It works to perfection against w i n -
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win, of course, b u t the supplier who's using the C a m p System doesn't lie to himself about the situation. He just sees it clearly, sets the m o n e y budget, and is prepared to lose every dollar of it. In this way, the supplier protects himself from needing a n d from compromise as the crunch approaches. T h e professional negotiator engages in an o n g o i n g assessment of the m o n e y budget at all times. If you don't have e n o u g h cash reserves for the long haul, your negotiation is, for all intents and purposes, over w i t h before it even gets going. So don't even get going. Seek your deals elsewhere. T h e four C a m p clients w h o flew to Ireland for a meeting, w h e r e they were promptly stood up, "lost" $20,000, but the m o n e y was in their budget and they had no expectations. H o w ' s this for trying to drive up the budget? My client was ready to ship t w o systems to their biggest customer, a giant multinational. T h e s e were special-order systems—state-of-theart work w o r t h several million dollars apiece—with hard P.O.'s, and w h e n the customer's truck backed up to the loading dock my client was ready to roll o u t the machines. Imagine their surprise w h e n the truck driver a n n o u n c e d that he had specific orders not to pick up the two main systems. He had been a u t h o rized to pick up only a n o t h e r subsidiary c o m p o n e n t . That's hardball for you. T h e multinational was hoping to get a literally last-minute discount. B u t two can play that game. On the telep h o n e , then a n d there, with the truck driver waiting, officers w i t h my client took an aggressive stand, reminding high officers with the multinational that this was a confirmed deal based on a l o n g negotiation, and stating clearly that they needed a "ship in place" letter. This is a legal d o c u m e n t that gives o n e party the right, for accounting purposes, to move an asset off the books of
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o n e c o m p a n y and o n t o the books of another. My client got that ship in place letter, because they were entitled to it. S o m e years back, I was introduced to a y o u n g m a n n a m e d Craig L e h m k u h l . Craig had just left the building industry as a contractor in order to j o i n the real estate industry as a c o m m e r cial broker. He had a family, and, like many y o u n g family m e n , he had very little money. B u t he was c o m m i t t e d to training in negotiation. Craig was scraping the b o t t o m to pay for his training and, as he told me later, "I wasn't about to waste my m o n e y by n o t applying the system." My newest client got his big break three m o n t h s into o u r w o r k w h e n h e had the o p p o r t u n i t y t o earn a substantial six-figure commission. D u r i n g o u r coaching sessions and system studies, Craig had never missed a beat. He learned by leaps and bounds, but it was n o t until the last negotiation session with his adversary in this deal that he learned just w h a t the value of m o n e y means to a negotiation: everything. In the bitter end, m o n e y is the toughest business decision. I'll let Craig tell his o w n story: "I had spent a lot of time working on this deal, including a trip to the lender in Southern California. That was valuable, but the airfare alone was more than I could afford. All in all, I was reaching my budget, and my emotions seemed out of control. This was the biggest deal of my life. If I pulled this off, I would make more than I made in all my working life. But in Southern California the closing agent informed me I was $50,000 short. Try as I might, I had no way of throwing this sum of money into the pot. I saw my commission going right down the toilet. I didn't think we had a chance of doing the deal. I couldn't see the seller putting in any more money. "I had a problem. Actually, I had two problems. First, I didn't understand the price of this negotiation to the seller, and second, I
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couldn 't see him writing a $50,000 check. So with my heart jammed into my throat I returned to the seller and told him, in my most notokay way, that two major problems had killed the deal. First, the deal was $50,000 short. Second, I didn't have the heart to ask him to throw in more money. His $200,000 contribution had moved the deal this Jar, and I couldn't ask him to throw in an extra $50,000, could I? What happened next was amazing. It happened so quickly. He simply asked me if another $50,000 would really close the deal? I was so emotional I didn't even realize he had asked the question. I just said yes. He didn't blink an eye, just opened his desk, took out a large checkbook, and handed the check to me with a smile and said he was very happy. He had been prepared to write a much larger check! He explained that his losses could have been much greater. He'd invested so much in this negotiation, he just wasn't going to lose this deal. I was shocked. It hit me like a ton of bricks. The money he had already spent made the negotiation so valuable he couldn't let it go away."
You must k n o w your o w n budget for m o n e y and, as Craig learned, you must k n o w your adversary's budget as well. Q u i t e a few years ago, o n e of my very best students was c o n ducting what was shaping up as the largest negotiation in the history of his company. At that time, the largest negotiated deal to date had been $1.2 million. This deal might c o m e in at s o m e thing over $9 million. It would be difficult, but the company's decision makers d e t e r m i n e d that there were adequate resources to take on such a large project and the negotiation it would e n tail. Given the green light, this y o u n g man b u r n e d the midnight oil structuring his mission and purpose, his goals and objectives. Picture yourself in his situation. You struggle and lose sleep. Your life becomes m o r e intense. Your c o m m i t m e n t to the p r o j -
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ect grows, and soon the boss is putting the fate of the c o m p a n y in your hands: "We're c o u n t i n g on you, you're the guy, you're the m a n , the only o n e w h o can pull this off." As the energy and time escalate in this negotiation, problems arise. Colleagues are getting in the way. If y o u are successful in closing the deal, they'll be u n d e r a great deal of additional pressure to perform in their j o b s . T h e y say they want you to w i n , but they are also afraid you will. You need their support, and they pledge to be there, b u t the w o r k you ask of t h e m comes in late or poorly d o n e or n o t at all. N o w you're afraid to let anyone else get involved. You're b e g i n n i n g to feel very alone. Your o w n budget for t i m e - a n d - e n e r g y is getting high. B u t y o u must c o n t i n u e . Even u n d e r all these pressures, the energy y o u have already spent is also the energy driving you forward. You do a great j o b negotiating—eighty different mini-agendas in all (the subject of chapter 12), well over a dozen solid presentations to various teams of adversaries, a firm and w e l c o m e " n o " heard at least ten times. You can smell victory. You are prepared to make what you hope will be the final presentation—and then the boss says he's awfully proud of you, but he has decided to take over the n e g o tiation himself. T h e m a n in the corner office is stepping in, and you won't be needed any longer. Unbelievable, but w h a t can you do? W h a t do you feel? Relief? N o t a chance: You're a player. Disappointment? Worse: You're mad as hell. You've set the w h o l e thing up, and n o w he'll probably lose the deal. He's not a trained negotiator. Predictably, the u n t r a i n e d boss's presentation is a j o k e and a disaster. He doesn't k n o w the system established by his n e g o t i a t o r — y o u — a n d he ignores the one briefing he gets from you. His presentation of features and benefits is beside the point
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and of no interest to the other side. He makes everyone on the adversary's board who's sitting in on the presentation feel unokay. And guess what happens? He is called the day after the presentation and told that the adversary has no interest in his company's providing the required services. It's over. W h a t did my client do now, in real life? He kept negotiating. He didn't quit. He didn't yell. Q u i t e simply, he controlled his emotions and stayed in the system. T h e adversary may have b e e n disgusted w i t h his boss, but the deal wasn't dead. He k n e w this, because he k n e w that while he had spent a great deal of time and energy and money, the total price was still within the budget. Just as important, he k n e w that the budget for his adversary was also very high by this time. He k n e w their pain intimately. He m a d e the calls, he wrote the letters to bring everyone back to the table—and he soon closed the deal. And w h o tried to take all the credit in the end? W h o else? T h e moral of this story: If you k n o w the price and manage your time and energy and m o n e y and stay within budget a n d serve your mission and purpose, you're okay regardless of w h a t the boss does.
The Emotion Budget T h e thrill of victory! T h e agony of defeat! I'll bet you recognize those words almost immediately, because they have b e c o m e cliches in o u r culture, thanks to ABC's Wide World of Sports. I still r e m e m b e r the ski j u m p e r w h o s e goggles fly off as he crashes over the side of the ski j u m p and the American hockey team celebrating their unbelievable victory over the Soviet squad, back in 1980 w h e n the U n i t e d States and the U S S R were bitter adversaries. And w h e n it comes to my son's college football
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games, I k n o w all about thrill and agony. For sports fans, these extreme emotions are fine. They're mandatory for the fun. For negotiators, they're dangerous. I'll stick by my original calculus: time is lx, energy is 2x, m o n e y 3x, and e m o t i o n 4x. E m o t i o n s have an extremely high value in any negotiation. T h e value of the negotiation increases by many multiples w h e n emotional pain or excitement is i n vested. T h e reason m o n e y is the toughest business decision is that m o n e y issues are also emotional issues for most of us. I guess there are people w h o don't care about money, b u t will you find t h e m in the business world? T h e excitement of w i n n i n g and the pain of losing, of failing, are the two key emotions for b o t h you and your adversary, and sophisticated corporate negotiating teams are trained to drive up your e m o t i o n a l b u d g e t — a s well as the other t w o budgets, of c o u r s e — w i t h promises, threats, ridiculous requests and deadlines, sudden exclamations that the deal has g o n e south, and the like. B u t you must control your needs, your positive and negative expectations, your fears, your ego, your responses, and your d e cisions. You must n o t expect to manage the actual wins or losses, because y o u can't do this. You can only manage the means to the end: stay within your system, manage your activity, manage your behavior. This is all the a r m o r you need. At the same time, you build needs, expectations, fears, a n d egos in the adversary in order to increase the value of the negotiation for h i m . K n o w your budget. Control your budget. K n o w their budget. Build their budget. These rules apply for time-and-energy, for money, for emotions. W h e n you master t h e m , you really can't fail.
11 The Shell Game Be Sure You Know the Real Decision Makers
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HO'S CALLING THE shots? W h o are the real decision m a k ers within the adversary's bureaucracy? This might seem,
at first glance, to be a fairly m u n d a n e issue, but it's not. It is a critically important issue in any negotiation, even t h o u g h you can read b o o k after b o o k on the subject and never find a single a c k n o w l e d g m e n t that the question of who's calling the shots d e m a n d s i m m e d i a t e attention. H o w can you create vision a n d paint the pain effectively w i t h o u t k n o w i n g w h o the decision makers for the adversary really are? You can't, so the decisionm a k i n g process within your adversary's organization must be discovered and understood at the very beginning of the negotiation, or as soon thereafter as possible. If you don't accomplish this, you drive up your t i m e - a n d - e n e r g y budget, maybe your m o n e y budget, and, if you're n o t careful, your e m o t i o n budget.
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As a rule, the bigger the organization the more complex and confusing the decision-making process can be. W h e n you're dealing with a big multinational, as some of my clients do, solving the shell game can be as frustrating as any aspect of the n e gotiation. In fact, you will encounter adversaries w h o play the shell game for just this p u r p o s e — t o drive up your budget. N o w the decision making is here, n o w it's there, n o w it's elsewhere. W h e n was the last time you heard, "Just show me and I'll take it to the board"? O r , " I f I like it, I'll r e c o m m e n d it, and they always stamp my recommendations. It's just a formality. Just p u t your bid together based on the specs and I'll do the rest." But it seldom works o u t this way, does it? W h e n you stop to think about it, the situation couldn't be this easy. T h i n k of the n u m b e r of times you as an individual were, in theory, the sole decision maker regarding a problem, but in the e n d asked the opinion and approval of s o m e o n e else. We do this all the time. In my o w n family, the loyal dog seems to call the shots m u c h of the time. It is no different for o u r adversaries. M a n y times, the adversary does n o t even k n o w its own decision process as it directly c o n cerns your negotiation. You will have to help t h e m figure it out. S o m e experts specialize in analyzing h o w decision m a k i n g differs culturally around the world. In the U n i t e d States we supposedly have a vertical process, while in Japan it's horizontal. I believe that most decision-making structures have b o t h elements, and many surprising twists and turns as well. In my seminars I sometimes tell the story about the attempted change in the daily training regimen of a major college athletic department. It turned o u t that this change affected the schedule of the janitorial staff. In fact, the janitorial staff wielded something of a veto over aspects of the schedule. At the least, they had to be brought into the loop. So you never know. But you must know.
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I'll never forget the episode in w h i c h I learned the painful facts of life on this subject. This was back in the 1970s, w h e n I recruited on the West Coast for the O h i o State football team. I was w o r k i n g for W o o d y Hayes, and I cannot tell you h o w proud I was to do so. We were interested in a wonderful y o u n g man and r u n n i n g back n a m e d Freeman M c N e i l , w h o played high school ball in Los Angeles. All the big football colleges were recruiting Freeman, and I was on this recruit 2 4 / 7 , as we didn't say t h e n b u t m i g h t say today. I talked w i t h everyone imaginable: principal, teachers, coaches, family, everyone. Freeman's coach told me that the final decision would be made by Freeman and his family, w i t h the coach's input. So far, so good. W h e n I m e t Freeman himself, he said he was very interested in O h i o State, and he told me his decision would be based on his assessment of the school and C o a c h Hayes. Even better, because W o o d y Hayes was as impressive a man as I ever met. Everyone felt this way. This is a l o n g story, so I'll cut some corners and j u m p to the w e e k e n d w h e n W o o d y flew to California to meet Freeman. Everything went very well. I was so excited by that evening all I could see was Freeman scoring for O h i o State against U S C in the Rose Bowl. T h e n Freeman's m o t h e r introduced us to her son's girlfriend, w h o told W o o d y and me that she and Freeman had been g o i n g steady two years. C o a c h Hayes immediately asked her w h e r e she was g o i n g to college. She replied, "Why, U C L A . " In his most polite and n u r t u r i n g t o n e the old m a n asked, " W h a t will you study?" Again she answered with a radiant smile of perfect teeth, " T h e a t e r and drama." T h e evening c a m e to a t r i u m p h a n t e n d with my believing that Freeman M c N e i l was going to be the next Heisman Trophy w i n n e r for the O h i o State Buckeyes. I was slow. C o a c h Hayes wasn't. As we walked to the car he said to m e , "Jim, you did a
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hell of a j o b w i t h Freeman. You have put us in a great position here in California. B u t Freeman is going to U C L A . He would be better off w i t h us, b u t he will decide on U C L A . " I was flabbergasted. H o w did W o o d y k n o w for sure? In response he asked m e , "Jim, w o u l d y o u leave h o m e to play for the Buckeyes?" Sure! "But w o u l d you leave your movie-star girlfriend alone at U C L A to play for the Buckeyes?" That's w h e n I saw the light. I asked W o o d y w h e n he had seen it, and he said, " N o t undl she said U C L A and theater. That's H o l l y w o o d , and that is hard to t u r n d o w n . F r e e m a n is b e i n g recruited by H o l l y w o o d and movie stars. He is a fine y o u n g m a n , but the most important part of his decision process is his girlfriend. Even he doesn't realize it. He thinks he is making the decision along w i t h his m o m and dad. He is, but his girl carries the most weight. She'll convince him to go to U C L A , and he'll never see it. If she wanted m e d i cine, law, business, education, we could c o m p e t e , but she is so d a m n e d pretty and she wants Hollywood." I had n o t only failed to find all the decision makers, I had failed to find the main one. In the end, Freeman M c N e i l did go to U C L A , w h e r e he had a very good, if n o t Heisman Trophy, career. T h e n he was an All-Pro w i t h the N e w York Jets and may someday be in the Professional Football Hall of Fame in C a n t o n , Ohio. T h a t failure to find the decision maker was o n e mistake I never repeated d u r i n g my days recruiting for C o a c h Hayes, b u t I have seen it c o m m i t t e d u m p t e e n times in business negotiations—by the adversary, n o t by the good guys. Recall the negotiation I described in chapter 9 b e t w e e n my client and the company it was trying to acquire, the one we finally resolved by building the m o n u m e n t to the founder, the widow's husband. W i t h such an inflated price on the table and the negotiations
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going n o w h e r e , I repeatedly asked the chief negotiator, " W h a t the heck is driving this price?" He just didn't have a clue, and he's a really bright guy. He was convinced that the board of d i rectors made the decisions, but I did my j o b as coach and went d o w n with him the list of possible decision makers. Lawyers? N o . Accountants? N o . Heirs? H m m m m . H e hadn't t h o u g h t about such potentially important shareholders. W h o holds the largest block of stock and has most of the influence? He didn't know, but he'd find out. You k n o w the rest of the story. W h y do negotiators often fail to find the real decision process? W h y do many want to just get a decision, any decision, and get the heck out? O n e reason, I believe: T h e y fear that they don't have the right behaviors to negotiate with the real decision makers. W i t h my system, however, you do have those behaviors. In this intensely personal, emotionally fraught discovery of w h o really makes the decisions, your skills with nurturing, reversing, and 3 + will be key. W i t h your mission and purpose in place, and using all your behavioral goals, and no matter h o w elaborate the decision-making process, you can handle it. You simply negotiate each piece of the puzzle until you have the information you need. It's just that simple (if arduous). H o w do you find o u t the truth? T h e same way you find o u t the t r u t h on any issue in a negotiation: You ask those interrogative-led questions. "Of course you make the decisions. But who else might you want to talk with?" "Who might be of service in making this decision?" "Who should we invite to support your decision?" "Who'd be sorry or upset if we left them out?" "How will this decision be reached?"
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"When will it be reached?" "What criteria and paperwork must be in place for it to be reached?" You need these answers. Eliminate all the wild cards you can think of. Continually ask yourself who's missing? W h o ' s not in my loop w h o should be? A n d be ready for unearthing multiple decision makers, and be able and willing to negotiate w i t h each and every o n e of them.
You'll Have to Deal with Blockers In many, many instances, the biggest problem you'll encounter in this discovery process is s o m e o n e on your adversary's team telling you, assuring you, promising you, guaranteeing you, that he is the decision maker w h e n he's not. W h y does this happen so often? Q u i t e simply, this is yet another example of h o w we h u mans fight to be okay, and it's n o t okay to say, "I have to run everything past my branch manager." It's no exaggeration to state that the decision-making process in an organization is driven by people's need to feel okay. W h e n we walk into a reception area, what is the receptionist fighting for? T h e feeling of being okay. It's h u m a n nature! W h o wants to feel powerless? O u r big businesses are divided into level after level after level: upper managem e n t , middle m a n a g e m e n t , business development, engineering, legal, h u m a n resources—it's endless. We work in these big corporate environments, and often we feel like we're about to be swallowed up. We k n o w we are replaceable, because we've seen the company plow ahead even if the C E O drops dead, b u t we want to mean something in this bigger scheme of things. We want to make a beneficial difference. We want to feel okay. And a key
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way we can do this is to insinuate ourselves into the decisionmaking process. I call these sweet folks w h o want to play some kind of role "blockers." Beware of them. O n c e you have determined w h o the real decision makers are, it's often hard to get to t h e m b e cause of the blockers standing in the way. If you can't go around or over the blockers, you'll never get your deal. R e m e m b e r my excellent student Craig Lehmkuhl from chapter 10, the guy w h o learned the anxious way that b o t h sides in a negotiation have a budget. His adversary's was so high the m a n gladly w r o t e the check for 550,000. In the early days of Craig's work w i t h me, his biggest problem was getting past the receptionists. This is the situation with lots of people in sales—and elsewhere. T h e blocker could be the receptionist w h o screens the calls, or the executive assistant, or the comanager, or, worst of all, the person you have incorrectly decided is the decision maker. Do the blockers think of themselves as blockers? Sometimes yes, because they are under explicit instructions to block, but often no. T h e y just k n o w what makes t h e m feel okay. T h e y are by nature defensive and believe that their j o b description is to obstruct forward progress, to create obstacles, and ultimately to b r i n g about your defeat. T h e y may have other reasons for blocking as well. T h e i r jobs might be on the line. T h e y may be jealous, because y o u seem to be the decision maker for your company, while they obviously are n o t for their o w n ; you're going to get a lot of credit or commissions or some kind of r e ward for this deal, while they're not. In short, what's in it for the blocker? M a y b e not m u c h . Great leaders surround themselves w i t h great blockers w h o love the game. You can count on this. Prepare for the person in a negotiation w h o loves the game. You could decide that the
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tangle of negative attitudes with a blocker may need to be put on the agenda with this person as "baggage." (I'm j u m p i n g the gun here and will explain this idea further in the next chapter.) But always show the blocker respect, even as you are circumventing her carefully guarded territory. I have followed the travails of N e t w o r k , Inc., the company that was in deep water with a terribly negotiated contract that they realized they simply couldn't h o n o r . It w o u l d have put t h e m o u t of business, so a n e w team of negotiators was called i n — a l o n g w i t h me. O n e of the first things we learned was that no one with N e t w o r k k n e w w h o the real decision makers were on the other side. W h e n they found out, they had never heard of a single one of these individuals. N o w that's pretty amazing. As the n e w team nosed around and asked questions t h r o u g h o u t the other company, the same three or four names kept p o p p i n g up as candidates to be the real decision maker, but one other n a m e was m e n t i o n e d by everyone except those in this individual's division. This guy turned o u t to be w h e r e the buck stopped, and in his o w n division everyone blocked for him. T h e first t e a m of negotiators didn't k n o w about h i m or a n y o n e else of i m p o r t a n c e . T h e y had b e e n negotiating w i t h blockers, plain and simple. T h e y had been dealing w i t h the p u r chasing office, and the purchasing office should never be in a negotiation. T h e y handle the paperwork and n o t the decisions. E v e r y o n e k n o w s this. T h e m o r e p o w e r the old team gave to purchasing, the less effective they became. O n c e the n e w team came in, purchasing was for all intents and purposes o u t of the loop. T h e second g r o u p of blockers that had to be dealt with by the n e w team were the technical evaluators of the machine in question. T h e head of this evaluation g r o u p had b e e n displaced
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within his o w n company, as colleagues had been p r o m o t e d all around h i m . He was standing still and didn't have a lot of positive feelings about w h e r e things stood. He was very defensive about every decision he had made in the past in the area in question, and he was doing everything he could to defend his decisions. Basic h u m a n nature. As it turned out, o n e of those decisions was responsible for almost S I 0 0 million w o r t h of equipment sitting idly at his company. So he had a lot to defend, and the N e t w o r k deal would make that equipment entirely o b solete. Everyone else in the department was n o w begging for the N e t w o r k equipment, while the blocker was working as hard as he could to influence the decision makers otherwise. W h e n this individual got wind of the fact that the n e w team from N e t w o r k had finally found out w h o the real decision makers were, he immediately tried to sabotage any meeting between the parties, and the obstruction c o n t i n u e d apace for the duration of that negotiation.
It N e v e r Hurts to Start at t h e T o p You can get around your basic blocker in several ways. A surefire way is simply to start at the top. W h a t happens if you start at the top? T h e top boots you d o w n the ladder to the blocker, but this is fine because, presumably, you've b e e n introduced into the blocker's territory with a stamp of approval. T h e blocker knows it's okay to talk to you, and the blocker knows that you k n o w that he is indeed a blocker. Start at the top and you will be in a position to report to the top. You have a hall pass to the corner office upstairs. Blockers will therefore treat you w i t h respect. If the C E O had time to talk to you, the blocker has time to talk to you. Or he had better find the time.
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But all is not lost if you can't start at the top. You can still deal with the blocker from below. Ring! Ring! "Hello, this is the office of the president of the United States. Tammy speaking." "Tammy, my name is BUI Jones and I need your help. What are the criteria I must meet to have an audience with the president? Tammy, who would have the ear of the president on matters of supercomputers capable of putting billions of dollars into the Treasury without any additional taxes?" "Well, I recommend you speak with the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Mr. Smith." "Tammy, do you know his most competent assistant I might talk to?" "Why yes, she's a classmate of mine, Betty. Would you like me to transfer you to her number?" "I'd appreciate that. Would you be so kind as to tell her why I am calling? It's very difficult to call out of the blue, as you know." "Yes, I'll be glad to do that. Let's see if we can reach her." A fantasy, yes, but this approach will get you s o m e w h e r e . D o n ' t just get around the blocker, but also get a useful introduction from the blocker. This is m u c h easier to do w h e n you u n d e r stand w h a t the blocker is really doing, which is trying to feel okay. Have a little sympathy. Engage in a little nurturing. "Bill, I'd like to make a deal with you. I'd like to go over our proposal with you. If what I present to you is not acceptable and you know it won't fly, just tell me no, it won't fly, and I'll go away. Fair? Fair. That will be our deal. If you like what I propose and feel it is what the committee is looking for, all I ask is that you allow me to represent myself to the committee. Fair?"
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W h a t have we done? We have protected o u r proposal and also protected Bill's okayness. If Bill accepts this proposal, he will fight for it, or at least strongly support your program to the c o m mittee. This approach usually works. If it doesn't, if Bill never allows anyone else to take a proposal to the committee, if he doesn't feel comfortable with you and is afraid the c o m m i t t e e won't either, and will then blame h i m , you go to your second choice. "Bill, I understand that under no circumstances will anyone but you talk to the committee. All I ask is if you don't like what I show you, just tell me no and I'll get out of your hair. But if you like our proposal and wish to recommend it to the committee, all I ask is that you let me coach you on my proposal and what you might say. Allow me to wait out in the hall, just in case there are any questions the committee wants answered. Tliat way you are protected with adequate information in case something unexpected comes up. Fair? That will be our deal." W h a t if Bill won't accept this agenda? Go to your third choice for an agenda. "Bill, I understand that no one is to be present during the committee meeting, even in the hall. All I ask is that you allow me to coach you on what to say, and if any question arises, allow me to wait in your office. You can call me there and I can provide you any information you need. Of course, if you don't like my proposal today, it's okay, you won't hurt my feelings. Just tell me no and I'll go away. We'll take a shot at working with you next time around." If Bill still balks—unlikely, but possible—consult your timeand-energy budget, because this situation doesn't look promising. H o w m u c h have you put into this negotiation? Are you
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fighting too hard? Are you needy? Should you simply walk away, no hard feelings? Whatever your decision, it will be a g o o d one, because you have retained control of the negotiation. You have preserved the blocker's okayness. He's comfortable. You've given him every o p p o r t u n i t y to say "no." You haven't tried to close h i m . You've given h i m every opportunity to create vision. A n d , finally, if you give up on Bill as a lost cause, you can always move in any other direction you like within the organization. T h e talented negotiator moves freely within the decision process. T h e talented negotiator enjoys solving the shell game.
12 Have an Agenda and Work It Ride the Chaos Inherent in Negotiation
M
Y SYSTEM is designed to help us control the chaos in a negotiation—and sometimes " c h a o s " is not too strong a
word. Things get complicated quickly, and you can find yourself being pushed and pulled by your adversaries in many different directions. H o w many times have you found yourself w o n d e r ing,
What just happened? What went wrong? What should I have
done differently? What should I do now? Who should I be talking to and what should I say? B o t t o m line: You're confused, you're flailing around, your budgets are o u t of control, and effective decision m a k i n g is in jeopardy. Negotiating in this scattered, aimless way is a good way to get your brains kicked in on a daily basis, and that ain't fun. This chapter introduces that part of my system that will tell you what w e n t w r o n g , what to do next, h o w to keep your negotiation on track, h o w to continue making effec-
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tive decisions, h o w to keep your brains intact. T h e subject is agendas. In all fields, the most successful people deal w i t h the most difficult problems directly. Negotiation is no different. Your ability to identify the greatest problems and then to b r i n g t h e m into the negotiation h e a d - o n by way of an agenda will exponentially i m prove your record. Agendas also help us to maintain emotional control. T h e y are o u r first line of defense in this regard, o u r surefire means of staying on track. I cannot overemphasize their value. T h e preparation of the agenda is a terrific exercise in and of itself, as well as a test of your ability to see the negotiation clearly and to assign priorities. In a corporation w i t h negotiating teams, valid agendas are absolutely crucial for keeping everyone on the team on the same page and talking with o n e voice, so to speak, in their various encounters with various adversaries. If five team members using the same agenda return w i t h five drastically different answers from their counterpoints, they're well advised to stop and take a hard look at the discrepancies. Are the members of the other t e a m n o t on the same page, or are they playing games? You need to know. For your part, if your team is having trouble crafting explicit agendas, you're also having trouble with mission and purpose, or w i t h goals, or w i t h blank slating, or with painting the pain, or with budgets, or with all of these. As w i t h mission a n d purpose and budgets, o u r Camp-System agendas are different from those used by most negotiators and businesspeople. T h e typical business agenda lists topics to be discussed, often in no particular order. Even if there is an order, we k n o w what happens all too often: T h e anticipated order is m o r e or less discarded and a free-for-all ensues. Like many other business meetings, this o n e ends up as a frustrating waste of time and
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energy. O u r agendas must do better. T h e y must provide a clear path through the negotiation thicket. Every negotiating session—even a telephone call or an e-mail, n o matter h o w short, even o n e m i n u t e o r o n e p a r a g r a p h — requires an agenda. M a y b e this sounds radical at first, but it's really n o t . Every call and e-mail has some kind of p u r p o s e , doesn't it? I h o p e so. So what's the purpose? T h e agenda makes it clear. In fact, what can guide the day-to-day nuts and bolts of the negotiation other than agendas? You don't have to be a c o n trol freak to enjoy the control offered by agendas that really work.
Every Agenda M u s t Be Negotiated "Joe, isn't this the greatest thing you've ever seen? Don't you need this right away? This is for you, Joe!" Forget it. An adversary can never be asked to do something if a valid agenda was n o t negotiated. "Bill, I said I would look at it, and I have. I never said I would act." In my system, there are no hidden agendas. W h a t w o u l d be the point of one? You h o p e to get a deal that sticks in the end by springing surprises? H o p e again. T h e only agenda that is valid for purposes of negotiation—the only agenda that will produce results—is the o n e that has b e e n negotiated with an adversary. Take a m o m e n t and be certain that you understand the implications of this rule: T h e only agenda that is valid for purposes of negotiation is the one that has b e e n negotiated with the adversary. T h e m o r e effective you are in negotiating the agenda, the m o r e comfortable the adversary organization will be in allowing
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you into the inner sanctum. Your c o m p e t e n c e will be appreciated and embraced. Let's try again w i t h Joe. "Joe, I'm not sure this information has any value to you, and if it doesn't just say so and we'll go no further. Fair? Okay. Then that's our agreement. If it doesn't apply we'll go no further. If it does apply, we'll move forward, okay?" W i t h this agenda in place Bill isn't g o i n g to feel blindsided or p u s h e d to close. You've given h i m every right to say " n o . " You've reiterated your point three times ( 3 + ) . Your o w n e m o tions are u n d e r control. That's some agenda! Before making his opening statement in the conference call in the N e t w o r k , Inc., negotiation we've b e e n following, the presid e n t of N e t w o r k said, "If you have any questions, please direct t h e m to me. I will be the only one responding to any questions, unless I defer t h e m to someone else. Is that okay with everyo n e ? " He was negotiating what I call a mini-agenda. You may have a major agenda and several mini-agendas, some of w h i c h you resort to only if a problem comes up outside the scope of the major agenda. A mini-agenda can be almost anything, a n d it must be everything it needs to be. No detail is too minor. "May I ask you a difficult question without your getting mad at me? You're sure lean ask you a tough question? You won't get mad?" That's a n o t h e r mini-agenda (and a n o t h e r 3 + ). W i t h that mini-agenda in place, you can ask the question w i t h o u t fear, but asking that question o u t of the blue might have been e n o u g h to send your adversary packing. Agendas a n d mini-agendas n o t only make you comfortable, they make your adversary comfort-
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able. By keeping your adversary comfortable, you maintain c o n trol and leverage.
What the Agenda Can Contain A valid agenda or mini-agenda has five basic categories: 1. Problems 2 . O u r baggage 3. T h e i r baggage 4. W h a t we want 5. W h a t happens n e x t A n y given agenda can include issues in some or all of the categories, but every issue you need to negotiate—every single o n e — w i l l fit into o n e of these five categories. Let's consider each in detail. Problems W h a t are "problems"? We all k n o w the answer, in the general sense, and I'm talking in the general sense here. A problem is a n y t h i n g you see as a p r o b l e m . Anything! T h e y can even be imagined, n o t real. H o w can an imagined problem be valid? If it's imagined by either party, it's in the air, and if it's in the air it has to be dealt with. So if your adversary feels she has a problem even t h o u g h you don't think it's a problem, you must see it as one. C a n I be specific? Sure. Your company used to have a reputation for p o o r service. T h a t issue has been solved, as any of your current customers know. B u t this negotiation is with an adversary w h o remembers the bad old days, w h o w r o t e you off (perhaps
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justifiably), and has just n o w b e e n enticed to take another look. T h a t negative m e m o r y is definitely a p r o b l e m . Put it on the a g e n d a — t h e very first agenda.
Or your big c o m p a n y used
to have the reputation w i t h suppliers of b e i n g such a mean and nasty negotiator that topflight suppliers were driven away. They'd been b u r n e d once too often. N o w you've had to change (a fanciful scenario, I admit), b u t many of these suppliers don't k n o w that. You have to put your reputation on an agenda. Let's say you sell the most expensive automobile in the world. N o w , you don't make assumptions—you never make assumptions, because you never k n o w — b u t y o u do understand that m o n e y can be a real problem for many people w h o would love to o w n this car, and you do lay this question on the table for u p front consideration. It may be the first item on your agenda for the first negotiation. "Bill, I'm in the business of putting people in the finest motorcar in the world. Before we go any further, are you able to spend or finance $200,000 to buy a Rolls-Royce? It's a lot of money, we all know that. . . . Interesting. You could write a check for $200,000 if you choose to do so today? That's great. What bank would you draw the check on? . . . Oh, I see, you'd b o r r o w the money from the bank before you write the check. . . . Oh, you'd borrow the money from any bank that will loan it to you? Interesting." You've n u r t u r e d , you've reversed, you've c o n n e c t e d , a n d you've found o u t w h e r e things stand. G o o d work. Of course, this scenario is extreme, but extremes provide us w i t h clear pictures. Problems can be of a general nature—your company's history of p o o r service, the question of m o n e y — o r they can be specific.
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Recall the negotiation w i t h Craig, the commercial real estate agent w h o needed the additional $50,000 to close the deal. T h e m i n u t e this became a problem it went on an agenda. If he had hidden this problem he m o r e than likely w o u l d have lost the deal. Here's a small sample of problems on agendas I've coached: • We don't understand Mr. Smith's vision of his business. • A thick glass wall exists between the two companies. We see each other but remain at a distance. This may be preventing us from gaining access to their best technology and preventing t h e m from gaining access to o u r best technology. •
O u r c o m p a n y doesn't k n o w w h e r e the adversary is g o i n g w i t h its n e w program, and therefore o u r preparation is i m paired.
•
O u r c o m p a n y doesn't k n o w w h a t C o m p a n y X truly requires. It would be reckless for o u r c o m p a n y to respond to their r e quest for proposal at this time.
•
Mr. Jones wouldn't c o m e to the demonstration.
•
O u r c o m p a n y is focused on w o r k i n g on real opportunities w i t h customers w h o see value in o u r technology. We don't generally put on demonstrations for every customer w h o r e quests o n e .
• We're getting conflicting directions from different d e p a r t ments of their company. • T h e building we want to buy is improperly zoned.
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• T h e building we want to sell is improperly zoned. •
We'll probably need the seller to help with financing, maybe carry a second mortgage.
• Your product is terrific, b u t it has always been too expensive for us. We have this negative attitude going in. • Your company has the reputation of picking only the " l o w hanging fruit," a n d we are a p r e m i u m service. Obviously, any list of potential problems is literally infinite. Every negotiation is different, every negotiation will have a different set of problems that crop up, but you will find that many problems relate to the major categories of my system: W h o are their decision makers? What's their pain? What's their budget? In the N e t w o r k , Inc., case, the n e w team brought in to take over for the i n c o m p e t e n t old team had to start almost from scratch with all of the problems in that negotiation. T h e y had to do a lot of blank slating and ask a lot of questions. All too often, we negotiators try not to recognize o u r p r o b lems, or if we do recognize t h e m , we're t h e n t e m p t e d to sweep t h e m under the carpet and h o p e they go away. If the problems seem i n s u r m o u n t a b l e , we give up. In short, we are often the real problem underlying all of o u r problems, because we do n o t deal w i t h t h e m h e a d - o n . But if we do deal w i t h o u r problems head-on, we appear as effective people to the adversary. This is comforting for the adversary and for us. B a g g a g e — O u r s and Theirs Baggage is o u r collected life experiences and observations— some old, some new, some wise, some foolish—that we carry
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around all the time. We may have w o r k e d o u r way through a lot of personal baggage, but other kinds can pop up in any negotiation. H o w many people do you think are burdened by baggage related to gender, age, religion, education, appearance, attitudes, financial status, experience, or seniority? Whatever baggage you think will be a problem in the negotiation needs to be dealt w i t h up front. S o m e n e w clients are surprised to learn that such issues properly belong on the agenda. T h e y think of an agenda as dealing only with the big issues of the final deal per se: unit price, delivery dates, and the like. " P r o b l e m s " they can see, after t h i n k ing about it, but "baggage"? My answer: Agendas and mini-agendas lay o u t everything that will significandy affect reaching that deal. Baggage is certainly in that category. By b r i n g i n g up baggage, aren't we m a k i n g assumptions, and aren't we supposed to avoid assumptions? Shrewd questions. Baggage is the o n e and only area in which you can make an ass u m p t i o n regarding your adversary, based on your e x p e r i e n c e with other adversaries and h o w they've perceived you. You have to have a personal history with the issue; baggage is an educated guess. B u t if you do have any such assumptions, you should b r i n g t h e m up. This may be difficult for you to do, b u t you should be m o r e afraid of the baggage that is neither recognized n o r negotiated in the beginning. Your adversary will not resent your question about baggage. H e wasn't b o r n yesterday. H e ' l l k n o w w h e r e you're c o m i n g from. He'll respect you for asking. Or maybe the baggage you lay on the table does kill the deal t h e n and there. Maybe your adversary just won't take seriously anyone who's relatively i n e x perienced. (It happens.) So what's the loss if you lay your i n e x p e r i e n c e on the table and the adversary walks away? You
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weren't going to get anywhere anyway. You've kept your t i m e and-energy budget extremely low. B u t if your adversary does n o t walk off, you have gained some respect for your forthrightness and competence, and you have negotiated a track on which to r u n w i t h o u t being blindsided. "George, I'm new in this business. If my inexperience is going to be a problem in this deal, let's talk about it now." "Yes, now's a good time. John, the only problem I have with your being new is that if we come up against something you can't handle with confidence, I want your assurance that you'll call in someone to help. Someone who really knows how to handle that problem. If that's okay with you, I'm comfortable." "That'sfine with me. Are you sure it's okay with you?" "Yes, John. It's okay with me." "All right, that will be our deal. If I can't handle something with complete confidence, I'll call my boss to help.
That's our deal.
Agreed?" "Agreed." [ N o t e the 3 + , of course. George agreed three times. Sometimes an agenda item simply clears the air.] "Folks, I'm a lawyer. This a problem?" [Laughter ensues, which represents progress, but you push ahead w i t h 3 + .] "Seriously. We lawyers don't rank too high in the polls these days. You sure it's not a problem?" [Everyone shakes his or her head in the negative, so you make the point for the third time.] "No? Great. Everyone loves the fact that I'm a lawyer!" [More laughter.] N o w you're a swell fellow and there's no need to kill all the lawyers after all. But if you hadn't b r o u g h t up the question y o u might expect to hear, days or weeks d o w n the line, something like this:
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"Well, Bill, since this contract is so important, I'll get back to you after I've looked this over and talked with some people." Your adversary's unstated feeling might be: "I wouldn't trust a lawyer with the time of day. I think I'll check with the competition. I'll check with my lawyer." Or in a different situation your adversary might reply, "I like what you've shown me, Betty. Call me back in a few weeks and I'll let you k n o w my decision." His unstated feeling: " W i d g e t s are a man's business. W h a t can you k n o w about t h e m ? " If Betty has r u n into such biases in the past, she must get the question o u t in the o p e n immediately by saying, "John, I'm o n e of the few w o m e n in the widget industry. I k n o w of o n e other. We're rare in this field, let's face it. Frankly, I've encountered resentment from some guys for this reason alone, that I'm a w o m a n . W h a t problems do you see here?" And then proceed w i t h the 3 +, no matter what John's answer is. Perhaps he won't be honest, but the fact that the question is n o w on the table might give h i m second thoughts about letting any bias affect his decisions. M o r e baggage I've seen in my day: • Your chief negotiator used to w o r k for us and had a distinctly negative experience. •
O u r chief negotiator used to w o r k for you and had a distinctly negative experience.
•
O u r main competitor has b e e n your supplier for twelve years.
• We've been remiss in n o t calling on you for three years.
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Your manufacturing is biased against us and doesn't want to expand o u r role within your company.
• We have been consistendy late in delivery of systems. •
You just don't believe we can do any better than o u r c o m p e t i tors.
• You believe o u r company is too expensive. • You believe o u r company is too small for you to depend o n . • You d o n ' t like o u r dual pricing policy and are c o n c e r n e d about overseas support. •
We c o m e dangerously close to needing some orders b o o k e d in the short term. T h e line b e t w e e n problems and baggage is a thin one, obvi-
ously, and n o t a critical one. Baggage discarded by all c o n c e r n e d is not a problem. Baggage that isn't discarded remains a problem. Just be sure that every p r o b l e m and every piece of baggage is placed on an agenda. Use your imagination, use your experience, use your c o m m o n sense. W h e n in d o u b t , err on the side of including a candidate problem or baggage on the agenda. Wants In addition to problems and baggage, we have "wants" as legitimate issues for an agenda. Wants can be m u c h m o r e complicated than either of the o t h e r categories. C o n s i d e r this quick e x change. "John, I have an idea for your business that could increase its value dramatically."
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"Good, Bill. Let's see it." "Great, John. I'll lay it out right here on the desk." Ten minutes later: "I like what I see, Bill. Let me study it for a week or two, then get back to me." "Sure, John. I'll talk to you in a few weeks." Far-fetched, you say? Stand in my shoes as a coach for a few days. I see this often in n e w clients. W h a t did Bill want in this negotiation? From that conversation, we don't k n o w exactly. W h a t was the o u t c o m e ? Unfortunately, this we do k n o w : Poor Bill has spilled his beans and is n o w completely at the mercy of his adversary. In fact, I k n o w of a similar situation in w h i c h the noncommittal adversary took the n e w idea to a third party and slipped himself into the deal as broker of record. Insult and i n jury! Of all the issues in the negotiation that should be placed on an agenda but often are not, wants are supreme. In this regard, they are o u r greatest cause of failure. Often negotiators don't k n o w w h a t they w a n t — n o t really—not step by step by step by step d o w n the l o n g and w i n d i n g road. T h e y just want a signed deal, that's all. T h e y don't have a clue about what they want at every step of the decision-making process along the way. They're thinking about ends, which are o u t of their control, n o t about means, w h i c h we control w i t h agendas. W i t h o u t a clear understanding and picture of what we want at every point in the negotiation, we can't p u t it on an agenda. A n d if we can't put it on an agenda, we have no right to ask for it. And if we can't ask for it, we p u t ourselves completely at the mercy of the adversary. So if we want to stay in control to the
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extent possible—and we d o — w h a t we want must be part of every agenda. (Want, n o t need. We don't need anything, of course.) Granted, it's often difficult to figure out what we want, but figuring this out will make you " r i c h " in agenda. You can make all the negotiating mistakes in the world, b u t if you get a handle on what you want, and get these wants placed on an agenda n e gotiated w i t h the adversary, you've got a chance. H o w could i n c o m p e t e n t Bill's negotiation w i t h J o h n have been structured to keep Bill in control? First, Bill has to ask h i m self what he wants at this earliest stage of the negotiation. W h a t he w a n t s — o r should want—is to protect his ideas. T h e following would have been a productive approach:
"John, if I had an idea for your business that could increase its value dramatically over the next five years, who would be involved in the decision process?" "Bill, I make all those decisions." "Of course you do, but who would give you good advice in financial areas?" "Well, Bill, I'm the guy, but I would want my attorney and tax man to look at it." "I see. John, who else would you get involved?" "No one else, that would be the group." "John, here is what I'd like you to do. I have an idea drawn up. I'd like to show it to you. If you like it, can you and I show it to your attorney and accountant together? Of course, if you don't like it, we'll drop it. Fair?" "Sounds fair to me." "Okay John, our deal is that if you like my idea, we'll go together to see the attorney and the tax man. Please sign this 'broker of record'
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to protect my ideas. This says that others can't take my ideas and use them without my being paid. John, are you comfortable with protecting my work?" "Sure, I have no problem. If you do the work, you get paid." "Are you sure you're okay with this, John?" "I have no problem with it, Bill. It's only fair. Let me sign it." Bill, by asking a few questions of himself and c o m i n g up w i t h what he wanted right then, was able to negotiate an agenda over which he could have some control. Of course, this doesn't mean he will get the deal. He still has difficult negotiations ahead. But at least he has a chance to get things off on the right foot. K n o w i n g what we want o u t of each stage of the negotiation— what we want on each agenda—helps us make sure that o u r mission and purpose is clear. It guarantees that o u r goals are clear. It makes us think clearly h o w to p r o c e e d — A , B, C, D, E, and all the way to Z and a deal that sticks. But w h a t if J o h n won't sign the proposed agreement? Well, find o u t now.
If we k n o w
from
the b e g i n n i n g w h a t we
want, there is no need to compromise and no danger of being sucker p u n c h e d later. If you can't figure o u t what you want at a given point in the negotiation, figure o u t what else is missing. Is your mission and purpose in place? If you haven't prepared for the negotiation session, h o w aware can you be of what you want from that session? N o t very. But if you k n o w exactly what you want, h o w are you perceived by the adversary? Effective. If you k n o w exactly what you want and it's valid, h o w early do you compromise? You don't compromise early. Take a look at these "wants," most from assorted actual n e g o tiations, a few generic:
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• We want to share o u r vision of o u r business and h o w the n e gotiation should proceed. • We want o u r c o m p a n y to be seen by your company as c o m mitted to your success. • We want your feedback on o u r suggestion about changing the rate scale. • We want a m e e t i n g to discuss the latest changes in your p r o posal. • We want your full support of o u r programs. • We want an objective comparison of o u r service vis-a-vis o u r competitors' service. • We want you to understand that this field is changing rapidly, and we want you to see w h e r e your decision on pricing could be taking you in the future. • We want a clear, complete picture from you of exactly what you need from us at this stage. •
We want an introduction with the president, the o n e and only decision maker in the company.
•
We want a demonstration of your product.
• We want you to assure us that your inventory and production line can meet the requirements of this enhanced schedule. •
We want the termite report.
•
We want your financial statement.
•
We want your resume.
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• We want the first draft of the contract. • We want m o r e time to reply to your R F P (Request for P r o posal). • We want a definite date by which y o u will respond to o u r RFP. T h e list could be infinite. For just a single complicated actual negotiation, it could be pages l o n g . A great exercise is to sit d o w n and think about a "typical" negotiation in your field—if there is such a t h i n g — a n d d r a w up a list of wants along the way. T h e really complete list will be pretty long. Now, I want to take a closer look at the list above, because these wants are n o t quite sharp e n o u g h . T h i n k about this question: W h a t does every want entail from the adversary? A decision, of course. This is almost by definition, because any progress depends on decisions. Therefore, I'd like you to consider each want in the negotiation in terms of the decision required of the adversary in order to fulfill it. And of course the decision may always be " n o . " You allow every opportunity for your adversary to say " n o . " And of course you are wary of any "yes" and e x tremely wary of any "maybe." So we could revise that list in this way: • We want you to reject or accept o u r vision of o u r business and h o w the negotiation should proceed. • We want to k n o w w h e t h e r you do or do not see o u r company as c o m m i t t e d to your success. • We want you to reject or accept our proposed change in the rate scale.
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• We want you to reject or accept a meeting to discuss the latest changes in your proposal. • We want to k n o w w h e t h e r you do or do not fully support o u r programs. • We want you to either submit or refuse to submit the termite report. • We want you to either refuse or grant us m o r e time to reply to your RFP. This is a good exercise to help you understand that every want does indeed require decisions by the adversary. By framing your wants in terms of those decisions, you discipline yourself to live in the world of the adversary—a t h e m e of my entire system, of course. In most negotiations, at some point one of your wants will be s o m e n u m b e r s — p r i c e s , quantities—but always r e m e m b e r that numbers are limitations. Avoid t h e m until the time is right. (A very recent example: After quoting a $185 unit cost in a p r e C a m p negotiation w i t h a large customer, a client just received $290 in the C a m p era. This can happen m u c h m o r e often than you realize.) As the buyer, you do not want to k n o w the seller's prices in the first meeting unless this is an extremely simple negotiation. As the seller, you do not want to k n o w h o w m u c h the customer says he wants to pay in the first meeting. Wants proceed in lockstep w i t h the other principles of my system. Your first wants will concern the big picture: your adversary's baggage, perhaps, and certainly his vision a n d pain and needs and budgets.
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W h a t H a p p e n s Next T h e last agenda item is " w h a t happens next." H o w many times have you been in a negotiation and assumed that w h e n the other party said "Call us b a c k " they really meant it, but w h e n you did call they were busy and couldn't talk? H o w often is a brush-off like "I'll talk to you in a few w e e k s " accepted by a neophyte n e gotiator w h o gets sucked into small talk, gets uncomfortable, leaves the subject, makes assumptions, doesn't conclude business? It happens all the time, because we get lost in the e m o t i o n of the final m o m e n t s of a meeting or p h o n e call. B u t you must learn very quickly to take care of business by carefully negotiating what happens next. As with finding the decision maker, this may seem like an inn o c u o u s item for an agenda, but, believe me, it's not. It protects us against unwarranted assumptions (not that you have assumptions of any kind, other than baggage). It's a leg up on the next agenda. It's simply mandatory. A n d , of course, w h a t happens next must be negotiated with the adversary, and it must be verified three times.
Enough Said T h e logic is simple: By crafting agendas, you find o u t w h e r e you stand. By putting these agendas into action, you improve this standing.
13 Present Your Case—If You Insist Beware the Seductions of PowerPoint
• N MANY FIELDS of business, and therefore in many negotiaI tions, the presentation is the formal act of showing off the product or service, stating features and benefits and prices, and requesting a formal response: This is my widget, this is what it will do, this is why it's so much better than any other widget on the market, this is how much it costs, how many do you want to buy right now? This show-and-tell often follows the R F R and on this subject I am probably as contrarian as I can get. To the chagrin of some of my o w n clients, frankly, I say that the presentation is that part of basic negotiating t h e o r y — w i n - w i n and otherwise—that the old school may feel has tremendous value but in fact has very little, if any. I've seen many m o r e times w h e n the presentation was positively harmful to the presenter's standing in the negotiation, or even fatal. I say instead that the greatest presentation you will
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ever give is the o n e your adversary never sees. I'd like to repeat that statement: T h e greatest presentation you will ever give is the one your adversary never sees. In
o p e n i n g my
defense
of this position
I
pose
these
interrogative-led questions: W h e n was the last time you h o p e d that the salesperson/agent/whoever w o u l d just be quiet for five minutes and let you discover the offer for yourself? H o w many times have you walked into a store and a salesperson immediately attached himself to you like a limpet? Plenty, I imagine. Most of us would rather be left alone to look around for ourselves, and then to find help and ask questions w h e n we're ready to. Now, h o w many times have you listened to formal business presentations and b e e n moved to take action on the spot? Never, I ' m betting. It's a silly formality, at best, or m o r e likely an insidious ploy to get the adversary to spill h e r beans to no purpose. If you've worked through your system and implanted vision and painted your adversary's pain effectively, you have made a w i n n i n g presentation. O n e of my best clients was initially as skeptical of my system as anyone w h o has ever worked w i t h me. I don't even u n d e r stand w h y he decided to stay on board, because the system seemed so contrarian as to be s o m e h o w "countercultural" for h i m , a n d he is n o t a counterculture kind of guy. B u t he has c o m e to excel in his negotiations. He's in commercial real estate, w h e r e requests for R F P s are pretty m u c h standard—except with him. It doesn't matter if he's dealing with—negotiating w i t h — a city zoning board or a Japanese conglomerate. If he creates a clear picture of pain, with vision to follow, he does n o t need to make any formal presentation. This man is a good negotiator, but he is n o t a magician. If the system can work for h i m , it can w o r k for anyone in real estate.
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A major tenet of my system is that you want the negotiation to take place—where? In the world of your adversary. To this e n d you ask interrogative-led questions, and your adversary's a n swers create vision for h i m or her. You don't tell anyone anything, remember. T h e y have to see it for themselves. B u t h o w do most presentations work? T h e y try to tell the adversary not just anything b u t everything, and then h o p e against h o p e that the adversary goes along with what's been said. But the presentation, by definition, puts the adversary into the intellectual m o d e . W h e n the adversary is in the intellectual m o d e , he raises objections, doesn't he? T h i n k about this from your o w n experience. W h e n s o m e o n e presents to you, your instinct is to h u n t for o b jections, quibbles, and mistakes, and you always find them. T h e classic presentation serves only to create objections, so you end up answering questions rather than asking t h e m . W h e n I frame the issue with presentations this way in w o r k shops, I see a lot of b o b b i n g heads in the audience. T h e y k n o w I'm o n t o s o m e t h i n g here. If you have w o r k e d effectively to paint the pain, a presentation is simply a waste of time and energy. If you have not painted the pain, the presentation is no substitute for your failure to do so, and it won't do you any good now. W h a t are you going to present? H o w do you k n o w that the points of your presentation have any interest to the adversary? You don't, because you don't k n o w their pain. So anyone w h o wants to "present" to me is telling me that they haven't painted the pain. He doesn't k n o w what the pain is. If he did, he wouldn't be presenting blindly, throwing m u d at the wall and h o p i n g that some of it sticks. F u r t h e r m o r e , a presentation shows neediness, doesn't it? Can't it often seem to the adversary to be a rush to close? Can't it c o m e across as taking away the right to say " n o ? " Indeed it can
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2J7
and does. Or you want to present because this negotiation is going n o w h e r e , and the presentation is your last hope. Or maybe the adversary has insisted u p o n the presentation, as a ploy. So you do your thing and lay out all your beans and show ' e m h o w great you are and accomplish what, really? D o n ' t take my word for it. T h i n k honestly about your o w n experience and I'll bet you agree that otherwise effective negotiations have survived formal presentations, but they have never needed them. "We need a presentation on your business." "Well, I don't have any idea how to do that. I really don't. If I had an idea w h e r e you stand, what you need, what you're interested in, then I'd be happy to address your concerns. That's what I'm here for. What's driving you to ask me for a presentation? I mean, w h y do you want my widget? You've been dealing with USA Widgets for seven years. You must have the best price in the world from them by now. H o w could we ever compete with USA Widgets? W h y are you now interested in Widgets International?" "But you called us." "Yes, and I'm glad I did. I was interested in how it's going with USA Widgets. There must be some reason w h y you invited me to this meeting. You must have some interest in something about Widgets International. I just need an idea what it is." That's not an entirely fanciful exchange. That's an effective way to deal with R F P s , an effective way to get the ball rolling, even if you have to do a litde something official looking toward the e n d of the negotiation. O n e client o n c e struck a deal worth a couple of h u n d r e d million dollars with a multinational by getting the adversary to make the presentation. After ten or so m o n t h s of serious work by my client in finding the decision makers—always a challenge with a
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multinational—painting the pain, and building budgets, the adversary finally asked us for o u r presentation of h o w m u c h of o u r product they should buy at what unit cost, and so on. We suggested that it m a d e a lot m o r e sense for t h e m to give us their thoughts and give us a good idea w h e r e they were going and what they were trying to do, and then we could respond w i t h ideas tailored to their requirements. That's a g o o d idea, they said.
If You Insist If, for whatever reason I oppose, you make a formal presentation, at least do it well. First, be certain that you are presenting to the real decision makers. If you make a formal presentation to the unqualified, you're spilling your beans all over the universe. Second, you must have an agenda negotiated in advance of the big day. T h e adversary must know, Here we go, the formal presentation. T h e adversary must k n o w what the presentation will c o n tain, and what it will n o t contain. T h e adversary must k n o w that it is finally "yes" or " n o " time. " M a y b e " is not allowed as an answer following the presentation. M a k e sure this agreement is n e gotiated on an agenda. If it's not, w h a t will y o u do w h e n you hear the dreaded "maybe"? Finally—and I h o p e by this point in the b o o k this statement almost goes w i t h o u t saying—always p r e sent in the world of the adversary. Granted, you're telling t h e m things rather than letting t h e m see, by the nature of the presentation, but at least tell t h e m things about the issues that are d r i v ing the negotiation. Present only the information that addresses your adversary's concern, the information that addresses the adversary's p a i n — o r w h a t you k n o w about it, which is probably n o t m u c h , or you wouldn't be presenting in the first place. Resist the temptation to throw in the kitchen sink. If the only
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pain is the tire's m a x i m u m carrying capacity, forget about h o w w i d e your tires are. If you're trying to sell a house that has a beautiful lawn but the buyer hasn't expressed any interest in a beautiful lawn, stifle the temptation to deliver a long spiel on the subject. Let the grass speak for itself. You can always b r i n g it up later, if the occasion arises. ("Addition by subtraction": this old sports adage about making your t e a m better by getting rid of a certain player is also true for presentations.) Present in the order of i m p o r t a n c e : " M r . Smith, since your most i m p o r t a n t c o n c e r n is horsepower, let's look at the engine first. T h e n we'll check out the h e a d r o o m for the driver's seat, since you're rather tall and I k n o w that's also important to you." N o w recall from chapter 3 the football recruit w h o used my system. He never made the formal presentation of an application to the school he finally chose—and that chose h i m — b u t he did provide a demonstration—a videotape—and the key point about his demonstration pertains to presentations. Most recruits make the mistake of submitting film that is in their o w n world: clips of their spectacular runs, spectacular catches, t o u c h d o w n s . B u t is this what the coach really wants to see? If it's not, if the coach's pain is elsewhere, the recruit has n o t presented to that pain. T h e way to find o u t is to ask the question this recruit asked of every coach: " H o w do you evaluate a player?" Isn't this question just c o m m o n sense? Yes. But is it c o m m o n l y asked? N o . O u r recruit found o u t that the answer varied from coach to coach and often seemed very limited. O n e coach was mainly interested in vertical j u m p i n g ability, another in speed, a n o t h e r in strength work (specifically, the bench press). O n e coach w o u l d n o t recruit a d e fensive back under six feet tall, and another w o u l d not recruit any players under six feet tall. In any event, no coach said or i m plied. Send me dips of your greatest plays. So our recruit tailored his
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videotape to the answers provided by each coach. He presented in the world of each specific coach, n o t his o w n world. He showed t h e m what he had decided they wanted to see, n o t what he t h o u g h t they should want to see, or what he wanted to see of himself. T h a t approach took a lot of discipline and a lot of work. In short, if you insist on making formal presentations, or if a hidebound or stealthy adversary insists that y o u make one, do it well. Stay within the system. It's perfectly okay to pull out all the stops with overheads, art, graphics, multimedia, and everything else that PowerPoint and the other software programs offer, but n o n e of this works if you're relying on the glitz by itself to carry the day. It won't. If your high-tech presentation isn't addressed to your adversary's vision and pain, you're wasting your gigabytes. (And if you've negotiated well up to this point, you've wasted t h e m anyway.)
The Next Negotiation W h a t is p r e p - e n d step? It's the reminder that your work in this negotiating session isn't over until you've either prepared the bridge to the next o n e by means of " w h a t happens n e x t " on the agenda, or until you have prepared a means of exiting the n e g o tiation for g o o d — e n d i n g it by fading away into the night. P r e p end step works hand in hand w i t h " w h a t happens n e x t " to ensure that the negotiation is organized and to the point. In the N e t w o r k , Inc., negotiation we've looked at several times, the president outlined the problem and told the adversary what he w a n t e d — f o r the o t h e r c o m p a n y to propose a s o l u t i o n — a n d then he said, " A n d w h e n you have offered a solution, we will be happy to sit w i t h you face-to-face. W i t h twenty-four-hours' n o -
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rice, my team will meet you anywhere in the world. Just call me back and tell me where." That's p r e p - e n d step. That's advising the adversary of the bridge to the next negotiation. Two days after the conference call, the adversary requested an immediate m e e t i n g in Germany. As we know, good things happened in the end. N o w I switch to the negotiation I introduced in chapter 3 b e tween the c o m p a n y I call Bonanza, Inc., and the big multinational, the o n e in which Bonanza got tired of being whipsawed in competition with two other companies for a big project. B o nanza had about fifteen m e n and w o m e n working on this deal w i t h their various counterparts with the multinational. I'd say that all in all, we had about five h u n d r e d negotiating sessions of one sort or another, including e-mailed mini-negotiations. This was just a really complicated situation. Plotted on paper, all the negotiations within the negotiation w o u l d look like a tangled spider's web. In fact, however, all these bits and pieces of the n e gotiation fit together logically, thanks to agendas and diligent p r e p - e n d stepping every step of the way. N o t a single e-mail or p h o n e call was concluded w i t h o u t setting the stage for the next e-mail or p h o n e call. T h e end result was that Bonanza n o w has a special relationship w i t h the multinational. (With many multinationals, such alliances are often meaningless, or even dangerous. This o n e isn't.) N o t only is your work not over after this negotiating session, it's not over after this entire negotiation is signed, sealed, and d e livered. T h e signed contract is just a n o t h e r decision. Isn't this right? Contracts are broken all the time, for starters. M o r e i m portant, most contracts entail future obligations from both parties, almost by definition. A g r e e m e n t s have b e e n m a d e to do
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something. S o m e good or service has to be delivered, exchanged, or bartered by o n e party or another, or by both. S o m e t h i n g has to w o r k right. S o m e t h i n g is guaranteed. So d r i n k the c h a m pagne, by all means, but don't then drop your guard. Be ready for m o r e negotiations. As history has demonstrated all too often over the past millennia, keeping the peace is m u c h m o r e i m p o r tant and usually m u c h m o r e difficult t h a n signing the peace treaty. That's what p r e p - e n d step is all about. P r e p - e n d step is also about h o w to end the negotiation short of agreement. It happens in straight sales, it happens in proposed multibillion-dollar c o r p o r a t e mergers. You have a b u d g e t for the negotiation, y o u have your mission and purpose, and this deal just isn't going to happen. This finally becomes clear. You decide the rime has c o m e to retire. W h e n this happens, I r e c o m m e n d the calm, quiet " T h a n k s but no thanks, maybe next time." To my m i n d , this fadeaway is far m o r e effective than b u r n i n g bridges. I hate to see clients b u r n their bridges, no matter h o w ill-served they feel. For one thing, it betrays neediness on their part. T h e y wouldn't feel the temptation to b u r n bridges if they didn't have too m u c h invested emotionally. For another, w h o k n o w s what will happen in the future? C o m p l e t e changes of heart or m i n d are n o t u n k n o w n , after all. I just can't see any advantage to b u r n e d bridges except s o m e kind of s h o r t - t e r m selfvalidation, and that kind of neediness is n o t good enough, n o t in my system. O n e final story about the value of p r e p - e n d step, a fairly long b u t instructive o n e . O n e of my early students, Eric, was a college d r o p o u t w o r k i n g , like his father, in the life insurance business—a real crucible for negotiation skills. O n e of Eric's first sales calls was w i t h an elderly lady living in a retirement center. He found the lady's pain—she had one-third of a million
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dollars sitting in the b a n k — h e l p e d her see this pain—she could do a w h o l e lot better—had a budget, understood her decisionmaking process, and established an agenda with w h i c h he would try to help the lady fix h e r pain. W h e n Eric's sales m a n a g e r found o u t the size of the negotiation, he became excited, sales manager fashion, and insisted that he go along to help Eric close the deal. Eric immediately negotiated a separate deal w i t h the sales manager: He could c o m e along, but only if he kept his m o u t h shut. He knew n o t h i n g about Eric's system of negotiation. He could blow it. T h e negotiation o p e n e d as p l a n n e d and w e n t extremely well w i t h o u r nineteen-year-old negotiator and his sixty-sevenyear-old adversary. She decided to give Eric three checks for $100,000 each. At this point, Eric did exactly w h a t p r e p - e n d step, " N e v e r Close," the 3+ technique, and n u r t u r i n g call for: He slid the three checks back across the table to his prospective client and asked her, "Are you sure this is what you want to do? I don't want you to do this unless you are sure this is something y o u want to do." He gave the client every opportunity in the world to say no. Almost predictably, the conventional sales m a n ager started to interrupt, b u t Eric kicked him u n d e r the table. N o w I'll let Eric pick up the story as he related it later to m e : "Jim, I was comfortable, but I thought my sales manager was going to have a heart attack. He had no concept of what I was doing. He didn't see that I was preparing for the next negotiation. Of course I wanted to help my client, but I also wanted to get my referral system in high gear, and if this wasn't handled properly, I would receive no referrals from this lady. As the meeting closed, I spoke privately with her. She whispered that when I came back with the other documents I needed to deliver, I shouldn't bring the other fellow' with me.
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She didn't know why, but she didn't trust him. Two days later, she called to tell me she had been talking with her friends at the retirement community, and they would like to invite me over to discuss how I might help them like I helped her. Jim, I am convinced prepend step was the key to gaining eleven new clients." I am convinced Eric was right.
14 Life's Greatest Lesson The Only Assurance of Long-Term Success
I
N A N Y ROLE in life, including negotiation, there is a direct correlation between o u r self-image and our performance. We
consistently perform to the level of o u r self-image. O u r world was built by m e n and w o m e n of high self-esteem. In negotiation, it is absolutely required if y o u are to succeed. It is selfesteem that gives you the confidence to face d o w n debilitating neediness, to swallow false pride, to make tough decisions, to act in the many challenging ways I've discussed t h r o u g h o u t these pages. This last chapter in my b o o k is as important as any of them. Is it clear that there's no contradiction between having high self-esteem and allowing your adversary to be okay? Self-esteem is your internal appraisal of yourself as an individual, and n o t h i n g can affect it. Okayness is your public presentation of yourself.
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T h e difference is huge, obviously. Your o w n high self-esteem is exacdy w h a t allows you to allow your adversary to have all the okayness in the negotiation. Self-esteem keeps you in the fight w h e n y o u face o v e r w h e l m ing odds. W i t h it, no situation can keep you from seeing yourself as a strong person, a capable person, a deserving person, a s u c cessful person. H i g h self-image gives us the strength to endure high levels of success. It confirms your desire to fulfill your capabilities. It demands that y o u be paid full measure for work r e n dered. It is your high self-image that w o n ' t allow y o u to sleep if y o u don't do the right thing. On the other hand, those of us with low self-image will n o t pay the price of victory. We will quit. Bill Gates did n o t take on the federal g o v e r n m e n t while b u r d e n e d with l o w self-esteem. In fact, I challenge anyone to find examples of greatness in any field produced by individuals with low self-esteem. T h i n k of the child w h o is called clumsy by the critical parent, told he has " t w o left feet." W h a t success w o u l d you expect of this child in the roll of athlete? N o t m u c h . H o w many children have you k n o w n w h o wouldn't even try an activity o u t of fear of embarrassment? H o w many children are called " d u m b " at a y o u n g age? H o w m a n y embrace " d u m b " as a self-image a n d prove it true? H o w many times have you heard s o m e o n e say, "I j u s t can't see myself d o i n g that"? B u t w h a t if they say, " I ' m going to do everything I can to do that"? W h i c h person has the self-image that will give h i m or h e r a c h a n c e to m a k e their dream c o m e true? But I am n o t a fatalist. I do n o t believe o u r destinies are set in stone by age three or even thirty. Certainly, early successes and failures play a role in the development of self-esteem, b u t anyone—anyone—can achieve, maintain, a n d deserve a m u c h
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higher self-image if he or she is c o m m i t t e d to the task. A n d this observation brings me to the main point of this chapter, paying forward, w h i c h I introduce w i t h a final story a b o u t coach Woody Hayes. In 1975, O h i o State played a great Michigan team coached by Bo Schembechler. It was a typical W o o d y versus Bo matchup, b o t h teams undefeated and rated a m o n g the top three teams in the nation. This was a c h a m p i o n s h i p prizefight w i t h t w o t o u g h heavyweights trying to k n o c k each other out. T h r o u g h the first three and a half quarters, it was a close game. T h e n , late in the fourth quarter, O h i o State Ail-American R a y Griffin intercepted a Michigan pass and returned it to the three yard line. W h a t a k n o c k o u t blow! Buckeye fans w e n t nuts, of course, n o t only in A n n Arbor, w h e r e the game was played, but around the world. O n c e again O h i o State was on the way to the R o s e Bowl. W h e n the team returned to C o l u m b u s from A n n Arbor, it was m e t at the airport by some twenty thousand fans. To signify the victory and the u p c o m i n g appearance in Pasadena, a g r o u p of these fans gave a dozen red roses to each of the w o m e n w h o had traveled with the team in any capacity. T h e n C o a c h Hayes did a strange thing. He immediately confiscated all the roses and put t h e m in his El C a m i n o truck. No one understood w h a t he was doing, n o r was he telling. In fact, he never did say w h a t he did with the flowers. O n l y later did I learn that he had driven, with only five hours of sleep the night before, from hospital to hospital in C o l u m b u s , presenting a rose to every terminally ill patient he could find, until the flowers ran out. C o a c h Hayes was putting into practice the lesson learned e x plicidy from Emerson and taught implicitly by the great religions of the world, the lesson he had taught his players at O h i o State
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and everyone else he dealt w i t h all over the c o u n t r y : In this world, you must "pay forward" because you can't really pay o t h ers back, n o t sufTiciendy. W i t h those roses distributed in the hospital on the day after the great victory, C o a c h Hayes was paying forward. (Pay It Forward was the title of a film in 2000, w h i c h c o m b i n e d this idea w i t h that of a chain letter.) Do y o u r e m e m b e r the feelings you had as a child w h e n you received presents? You were thrilled. But, as thrilled as you might have been to receive, do you r e m e m b e r w h e n you went o u t and e a r n e d your very o w n m o n e y and t o o k those hardearned dollars and b o u g h t s o m e o n e you loved a present? H o w good did it feel w h e n that person became excited? I once gave my devoted g r a n d m o t h e r an oil painting of a seascape. She was so overwhelmed, she cried. It was the most thrilling day of my life. W h y do the wealthy give their m o n e y away? T h e y can't take it w i t h t h e m , it's true, and they want to avoid taxes, and many don't want to bestow too much on their children (smart thinking), b u t they also do it to feel better about themselves. T h e very wealthy can have self-image problems like everyone else. Philanthropy is paying forward. T i t h i n g to a house of worship is paying forward. So is patriotic sacrifice. So is sleeping in h o s pitals w i t h the w o u n d e d , as President Lincoln did. Q u e e n Isabella I of Spain was paying forward w h e n she w r o t e a check to C o l u m b u s to go explore the u n k n o w n , over five h u n d r e d years ago. An old m a n in Iowa, the o w n e r of a large grain elevator, was paying forward w h e n he told a y o u n g m a n working in a gas station that he would pay for his college tuition if he promised to work hard. This was during the Great Depression. W i t h o u t this assistance, the y o u n g m a n would have stayed at that gas station, in all likelihood. W i t h this aid, R o y M. K o t t m a n went to Iowa State, eventually became dean of agriculture at the O h i o State
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University, and played a major role in the development of hybrid corns that increased yields fourfold and helped to feed the world. There's nothing n e w in these paragraphs. T h e context may be unusual, but I am speaking of age-old wisdom. Achievement r e quires self-esteem, and to build self-esteem you only need to start paying forward, to pay forward m o r e effectively, at every opportunity, w i t h your family and friends, in the workplace, in your community, in your house of worship, everywhere. A n d t h e n you should pay forward some m o r e . You will reap the benefit in every aspect of your life, including most definitely the negotiating table. T h r o u g h o u t this b o o k I've discussed attitudes and behaviors and activities vital for negotiation success. Paying forward is as i m p o r t a n t as any of t h e m . It is the most dramatic way to see yourself as a g o o d person, a successful person, a c o n t r i b u t o r to society. It is the most dramatic way to be this individual. Paying forward is the secret for creating self-esteem, no matter what your age or circumstances. Anyone can pay forward. T h e r e are absolutely no excuses on this one. You can even pay forward in the bare-knuckles world of business. In illustration, I want to tell o n e final story. This story goes back to the mid-1950s, w h e n the queen of England decided to p u t up for sale the land she o w n e d in the Lake Muskoka region of O n t a r i o , Canada. This land had never been o w n e d by any w h i t e m a n before the queen. It had been taken from the original Canadians by treaty. My dad bid for a lot, sight unseen, on Go H o m e Lake, and to his family's delight, his bid was accepted. In o u r first visit to o u r n e w holding, my father m e t an old trapper and h u n t e r on the lake n a m e d J o e Bolier. Joe was starting to build s u m m e r cabins for n e w people on the lake—people like us. He had a small crew of w o r k m e n from the local area, and he was
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o p e n i n g a small trading post. D a d and J o e negotiated for o u r n e w cabin, and a deal was struck w i t h a handshake. N o t h i n g was p u t i n writing. T h e cabin would b e ready w h e n w e r e t u r n e d next summer. R i g h t on schedule, we showed up w i t h e n o u g h old furniture and o t h e r stuff to make the n e w cottage o u r s u m m e r h o m e . J o e stopped by to say hello and to be sure D a d was happy w i t h his work. D a d was happy, and he said so. T h e n he looked J o e in the eye and asked if he was happy w i t h the deal. J o e said, "Well, Larry, I didn't do well here. I lost money. I underestimated the cost to carry all the l u m b e r up over the cliffs." D a d didn't blink an eye and asked, "Joe, w o u l d another $800 cover your loss a n d give you a fair profit?" T h e m a n was startled. H e hadn't m e t m a n y landowners like my father, b u t this was the right thing to do on Dad's part, a n d as a businessman he k n e w it was. Honestly, I think D a d , as an American, was a little uncomfortable in Canada. He w a n t e d to feel good about his presence in the country. He was protecting his high self-image by d o i n g the right thing. He was paying line for line, deed for deed. D a d was paying forward for a lifetime of service from Joe. We didn't have to w o r r y about snow on the roof, that's for sure. J o e stayed in business on Go H o m e Lake and helped many other people w i t h the small profit he earned from my father. My father did n o t need the self-satisfaction of getting every last dollar o u t of every last negotiation. He w a n t e d fair value. If he k n e w he was getting such value, he was happy to pay full price. I ' m the same way. Paying full price, w h e n justified, e m powers me to ask full price, w h e n justified. In this world we do usually get w h a t we pay for, remember. We also perform to the level of o u r self-image.
Conclusion Dance with the Tiger! Thirty-three Rules to Remember
W
E'RE ALL PROFESSIONAL negotiators, aren't we? Most of us don't think of ourselves this way, but we're all trying to
make agreements every day. We're negotiating. S o m e of us do so haphazardly, maybe even lackadaisically, while some of us realize that since we're always negotiating, the m o r e skillfully we do so, the better off we'll be. Presumably the readers of this b o o k are in this latter category; you w a n t to be better negotiators. You understand that there are levels of qualification, just as there are with any skill. T h e purpose of this b o o k has b e e n to provide you w i t h the most basic, minimal qualification in a system that can profoundly c h a n g e y o u r life in negotiation. N o w you take it from here. I w r o t e in the introduction that my system is pretty easy to understand in its basics b u t requires discipline and patience and
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practice. I'll stand by that statement here in the conclusion, b u t I do realize that learning doesn't c o m e automatically—not at all— and that many readers will have difficulty i m p l e m e n t i n g s o m e of the m o r e counterintuitive principles of my system—"just say no," for example. I k n o w this about the readers because I k n o w it about my clients. N e w ones always require a considerable adj u s t m e n t period. M a n y have b e e n negotiating cream puffs their entire business lives—always w o r r i e d w h e t h e r they're being sufficiently w i n - w i n - i s h — a n d n o w I'm asking t h e m to go o u t and tell s o m e o n e " n o " ! T h e adjustment takes time. As I've said, eight h u n d r e d hours, according to o n e study I give credence to. So how, exactly, should y o u go a b o u t settling in w i t h the C a m p System? First, a n d as I've suggested from time to time in the b o o k , I r e c o m m e n d you try o u t the most straightforward, discrete principles and rules of the system. At the e n d of this conclusion I'll list t h i r t y - t h r e e succinct rules—a nice, catchy n u m b e r — t h a t serve well as a s u m m a r y of the system, as catalysts, as jogs to the m e m o r y . T h e rules are n o t listed in any particular order, because everything w i t h i n my system connects w i t h everything else, so every rule works in conjunction w i t h every o t h e r rule. Before you read this b o o k , most of t h e m , such as " N o Closing," would have made no sense whatsoever. By this point they definitely should make at least s o m e sense. W h e n y o u read " N o Closing," y o u k n o w I ' m talking a b o u t neediness o n your o w n part, w h i c h you want to control, and about anxiety on your adversary's part about feeling pressured, w h i c h you want to avoid. Likewise, y o u k n o w that " N o Talking" also refers to neediness on your o w n part, to the necessity to blank slate, and also as a reminder that asking questions and listening is preferable to answering questions and talking. " T h e clearer the picture of
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pain, the easier the decision-making process" reminds us that we cannot tell anyone anything, b u t can only help t h e m see for themselves the pain that has b r o u g h t t h e m to the table. Every day or week, perhaps, j o t d o w n as many of these rules as you feel comfortable handling, review t h e m in the m o r n i n g , t h e n try t h e m o u t d u r i n g the day, off and on, here and there. Find a fairly risk-free situation in w h i c h you can say " n o , " and be sure to toss in some n u r t u r i n g a n d an interrogative-led question as well: "Amanda, I can't do that. I j u s t can't, b u t I sure w a n t to w o r k w i t h you. H o w can we find an alternative solution?" In a situation in which you feel a little conflict brewing, simply ask, " W h a t w o u l d you like me to do, Jonathan? I ' m at your service." Try the C o l u m b o effect in an i n n o c u o u s situation and be a little unokay: run o u t of ink, r u n o u t of battery power, w h a t ever. W h e n you find yourself talking too m u c h , try the simplest r e verse there is, c o m b i n e d w i t h an interrogative-led question: " B u t e n o u g h from m e , Pete. H o w do y o u see all this falling into place?" T h e following day or the following week, j o t d o w n a different set of rules, and the following week, yet another set. M i x t h e m up, because they all w o r k together. At this " t e s t - d r i v e " stage, you're n o t trying to p u t these activities in a broad context, n e c essarily. All you're trying to do is convince yourself that they work. T w o goals will be achieved: You'll b e c o m e comfortable with t h e m , and you'll see that they do w o r k . You'll have a lot m o r e hits than misses. W h y ? You will be i m p l e m e n t i n g valid goals—behavior a n d activity over w h i c h you can exercise control. Watching o u t for neediness, asking g o o d questions, b e i n g unokay, saying and r e -
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questing " n o , " blank slating: T h e s e are all valid behavioral goals. In chapter 5, I m e n t i o n e d the daily track that my clients maintain as a way to m o n i t o r their behavior and emotions as they affect the negotiating process. T h a t critical assessment of behavioral goals helps us pinpoint o u r weaknesses, w o r k w i t h o u r strengths, and develop self-esteem. It helps us assess h o w we're spending o u r time, h o w we're absorbing the material, h o w we're doing as a negotiator. I urge you to set up your o w n daily track, a sheet on which you ask yourself h o w often and h o w well you have controlled your neediness, been unokay, said " n o " and asked for " n o , " nurtured, reversed, used the 3+ technique, c o n nected, asked interrogative-led questions, taken great notes, accepted a bad decision and corrected it with your next one, and contained your emotions. I realize it's easy for me to make this request, and it's even easy for y o u to plan to do s o m e t h i n g like this, but in today's hectic world it's difficult to actually do so. I'm u n d e r no illusions here, and as a coach in absentia I don't enjoy any powers of oversight, m u c h less enforcement, but the exercise will pay dividends for everyone w h o gives it a try.
N o w You're Ready to Give the Camp System a Simple Try So, in the first stage you get comfortable w i t h basic principles, basic goals, basic behaviors and activities. And you are always paying forward, of course, building self-esteem. H o w long do you devote to this stage? I have no idea. However long it takes for you to b e c o m e comfortable e n o u g h to proceed to the second stage. You move from the test drive to the shakedown cruise, if I can mix the metaphor. You're ready to i m p l e m e n t the system in one specific negotiation. I'd choose a pretty straightforward one,
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a situation that you feel comfortable w i t h already, maybe n o t the most i m p o r t a n t o n e in the shop right now. I'd say to myself, "Okay, here we go w i t h the C a m p System. Let's just see w h a t happens." You're n o t expecting a mistake-free performance; y o u r n e e d i ness is u n d e r control. I suggest b e g i n n i n g this first test negotiation w i t h a five-step process. First, y o u make certain you have a good, strong mission and purpose that's set in the world of your adversary, o n e that is d e signed to let the adversary see a n d decide that the benefits a n d features of your product or service or whatever are w h a t they wish to acquire. (See chapter 4.) Second, you m a k e sure that y o u k n o w t h e adversary's real p a i n — t h e real reason they're negotiating. You ask questions, you create vision. (See chapter 9.) T h i r d , you assess all the budgets involved—time-and-energy, money, and emotional investment—for b o t h y o u and y o u r a d versary. You never forget about these budgets, you m o n i t o r t h e m at all times, and you see h o w they seem to be influencing the d e cisions on b o t h sides. (See chapter 10.) F o u r t h , you make certain you're dealing w i t h the real d e c i sion makers. (See chapter 11.) Fifth, y o u don't make a p h o n e call, you don't w r i t e an e-mail, w i t h o u t w r i t i n g d o w n an agenda for that p h o n e call or e-mail. (See chapter 12.) Of course, I label these activities "first" through "fifth," b u t you m i g h t be dealing with o n e or m o r e at the same time. A n d as you're setting up the basic path for the negotiation, you're always r e m i n d i n g yourself about the behavior goals y o u practiced in stage o n e . You blank slate, ask the g o o d questions, a n d so o n . It's all part of the same package.
2S6
S U I T WITH N O
Periodically, you sit back and take stock, n o t just with a daily track of your behavior goals, but of this negotiation specifically. You take it slow and easy. You expect to feel uncomfortable w h e n saying no. You may be so used to "taking meetings" d u r ing a negotiation that you struggle to figure out exacdy what the agenda is for this meeting. But you also c o m e to appreciate that yes, by focusing on things you can control at every stage, such as agenda, the negotiation does move forward—maybe quickly, maybe slowly, b u t forward. Or maybe it doesn't. M a y b e it's going nowhere. If so, you have the tools to figure o u t why. Is your M & P valid after all? Do you really understand your adversary's pain? Do they? Slowly you acquire a sense of h o w the pieces of the puzzle can c o m e together. T h a t negotiation wraps up, one way or the other. You think about h o w things went, t h e n you pick another negotiation to do Camp-style, and you start again. First you crawl, then you walk, and then . . . you dance. This is w h e n it really gets fun. H o w long before y o u feel completely comfortable on the dance floor? W i t h o u t training, I don't think you'll ever feel completely comfortable. T h e study and practice of negotiation is e x traordinarily complicated, as you know. Every negotiation is different, and every h u m a n being is a handful, so to speak. Full and c o m p l e t e implementation of the system in this b o o k r e quires a great deal of discipline, as I've stated time and again, and it's difficult to maintain such discipline in any endeavor w h e n working alone. This is one reason w h y almost no top athletes train alone. So h o w long before you're relatively comfortable? T h a t may also be asking too m u c h w i t h o u t training. H o w l o n g before you feel a lot more comfortable than you may feel right now? You
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could reach that level within a couple of m o n t h s — i f you're a genius at this. It could be six months, it could be longer. It d e pends on h o w hard you work and your native talent. All I k n o w is this: Every day you'll b e c o m e m o r e adept with the system and m o r e confident that it works a n d m o r e knowledgeable a b o u t h o w and w h y it works. Every day you'll be a better negotiator than y o u were yesterday, and one day, for the first time in your business life, you'll start to achieve at a level approaching your p o t e n tial. I guarantee it.
The Thirty-three Rules • Every negotiation is an agreement between two or m o r e parties w i t h all parties having the right to v e t o — t h e right to say "no." •
Your j o b is not to be liked. It is to be respected and effective.
• Results are not valid goals. •
M o n e y has n o t h i n g to do with a valid mission and purpose.
•
Never, ever, spill your beans in the l o b b y — o r anywhere else.
•
N e v e r enter a n e g o t i a t i o n — n e v e r make a p h o n e call— w i t h o u t a valid agenda.
• T h e only valid goals are those you can control: behavior and activity. •
Mission and purpose must be set in the adversary's world; o u r world must be secondary.
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Spend m a x i m u m time on payside activity and m i n i m u m time on nonpayside activity.
• You do not need it. You only want it. • No saving. You cannot save the adversary. •
O n l y o n e person in a negotiation can feel okay. T h a t person is the adversary.
• All action—all decision—begins with vision. W i t h o u t vision, there is no action. •
Always show respect to the blocker.
• All agreements must be clarified p o i n t by point and sealed three times (using 3 + ) . • T h e clearer the picture of pain, t h e easier the decisionmaking process. • T h e value of the negotiation increases by multiples as time, energy, money, and e m o t i o n are spent. •
No talking.
•
Let the adversary save face at all times.
• T h e greatest presentation you will ever give is the o n e your adversary will never see. •
A negotiation is only over w h e n we want it to be over.
•
" N o " is g o o d , "yes" is bad, " m a y b e " is worse.
• Absolutely no closing. • D a n c e w i t h the tiger.
Dance with the Tiger!
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O u r greatest strength is o u r greatest weakness (Emerson).
•
Paint the pain.
•
Mission and purpose drive everything.
•
Decisions are 100 percent emotional.
•
Interrogative-led questions drive vision.
•
Nurture.
•
No assumptions. No expectations. O n l y blank slate.
• W h o are the decision makers? Do you k n o w all of them? •
Pay forward.
2S9
Acknowledgments
To b r i n g a book to the world requires m o r e than just knowledge of, and experience with, the subject—in this case, negotiation. W i t h o u t the confidence, vision, and talents of my partners, B o b Jordan and Patty and M i k e Bryan, this book would n o t be in your hands. I also wish to thank J o h n T h o r n t o n , especially, and J o e Spieler of the Spieler Literary Agency, w h o helped shape this project and place it with C r o w n Business, and R u t h Mills and then J o h n Mahaney, w h o inherited the project and b r o u g h t it to fruition w i t h intelligence and energy. Successful coaches must have talented players to work with. 1 have b e e n extremely fortunate in this regard, and to these m e n and w o m e n I express my sincerest gratitude. For obvious reasons I will n o t n a m e you, but your success is a joy to me every day, and your faith and trust will never be forgotten.
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A successful coach also requires a foundation of principles and truths learned from great coaches, teachers, mentors, associates, and respected opponents. First a m o n g these have been my father, Lawrence R. Camp, and my grandfather Richard Barlow. I will be forever grateful for their guidance and leadership.
Coaches Irving P. Olmstead
Woody Hayes
Dick Eaton
Duffy Daughtery
Col. L. A. Bienvenu
Fred Taylor
Maj. Dave Miller
John Mummey
Eldon Miller
Salvatore Ruvolo
Tom Hawkins
George Chaump
N o r m McElheney
Dan O'Brien
George O'Leary
Billy O'Brien
Dave O'Brien
Hugh Hindtnan
Earl Bruce
Jim Anderson
Floyd Stahl
Alex Gibbs
Casey Fredricks
Bill Conley
Terry Forbes
Joe Delamiellure
Glen Mason
Jim Haney
Carl Fanarro
Eric Tudor
The Staff of the USAF Survival School, Fairchild AFB, Washington
Teachers Bob Barnettson
Prof. Bob Bartells
Prof. Julian Gresser
Prof. William Hubbard
Prof. Roy Lewicki
John Hendrix
Cal Lowery
D o n McComas
Dick Stratford
Ernie Reese
Ed Calhoun
William H. Crawford III
Acknowledgments
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Mentors Prof. Arthur Cullman
David Sandler
Stan McCloy
James Barlow
Wade Stanley
Arthur Jones
Jack Havens
Bob Kanuth
Sonny Spriggs
Ross Bartschy Sr.
Chalmers Wylie
R a n Burson
Art DelNero
James R h o d e s
Robert Prescott
Bill Dever
D o n Biller
George Casrignola
John Easton
T i m McRitchie
Michael Burke
Associates Phil Kabealo
Bob Jordan
Dick Glenn
Gerry Betterman
Valerie Kosorek
Jack Cowan
Peggy Hunter
Gretchen Shipley
Ross Bartschy Jr.
Dick Butkus
Brian Kelley
R. J. and Lynn
John Barlow
Michael Tobin
Matthew DeLamater
Most important, my thanks to my family for their unwavering support and strength: my wife, Patty; my son J i m and his family—his wife, Cynthia, my grandson, James, and my g r a n d daughter, Jordan; my son Scott and his wife, Meredith; my sons Todd and Brian; and my daughter, Kristina.
Index
adversaries: assessment of, 12—13 Camp system known to, 134-35, 192 definition of, 10 tuning in to, 19 advertising, budgets and, 187-88 agendas, 17, 57, 215-33, 238, 240-41, 255-57 budgets and, 200, 2 1 5 - 1 6 , 222, 224, 232 contents of, 219-33 decision makers and, 210, 213, 2 1 5 - 1 6 , 222, 225, 2 2 7 - 2 8 , 230-33 negotiation of, 2 1 7 - 1 9
on what happens next, 219, 233, 240 assumptions, 259 agendas and, 220, 223, 233 blank slating and, 137, 143-48, 153, 156-57 baggage, 219, 222-26, 232-33 Bank of America, 162 bargaining in good faith, 7 Beat the Clock, 181 behavior and actions, 85, 123, 128, 207, 217, 235, 2 5 3 - 5 8 and blank slating, 136-37, 142, 152, 157-58 and budgets, 180-82, 186, 193, 202
266
behavior and actions (continued) control of, 8 9 - 1 0 1 , 115, 257 and pain, 164, 166 and reversing, 118, 121 blank slating, 136-58, 182, 252, 254-55, 259 agendas and, 216, 222 assumptions and, 137, 143—48, 153, 156-57 budgets and, 186, 193 expectations and, 137-43, 147, 1 5 0 - 5 1 , 156-58 note taking and, 151-53, 156-58 pain and, 165, 175 research and, 148-51 spilling the beans and, 154-57 vision and, 146, 153, 157-58 blockers, 2 0 8 - 1 4 , 258 Bolier.Joe, 2 4 9 - 5 0 Bonds, Barry, 12-13 budgets, budgeting, 17, 180-204 agendas and, 200, 2 1 5 - 1 6 , 222, 224, 232 decision making and, 183-84, 191-94, 198-200, 202-4, 214 definition of, 182-83 of emotions, 182-83, 187, 189, 2 0 1 - 3 , 255, 258 of money, 182-83, 187, 189, 194-203, 209, 255, 258 prep-end stepping and, 242—43 presentations and, 238 time-and-energy, 181-95, 2 0 0 - 2 0 3 , 213, 224, 255, 258 Buffett, Warren, 185 Bush, George, 87
Index
Cadbury Schweppes, 78 Callaway's Big Bertha golf club, 195 Camp, Brian, 1 2 0 - 2 1 , 2 0 1 - 2 Camp, Jim, Jr., 54, 162-63, 170-71 Camp, Larry, 250 Camp system, 14—18 adjusting to, 2 5 2 - 5 7 implementation of, 2 5 4 - 5 7 list of rules of, 2 5 2 - 5 3 , 257-59 Challenger disaster, 183 Chamberlain, Neville, 160-61 Churchill, Sir Winston, 3 7 - 3 8 , 118, 160-62, 164-65, 171 Civil War, 7 1 , 8 7 Coca-Cola, 66-67 cold calls, 53-54, 97, 187 neediness and, 2 8 - 2 9 , 53 collective bargaining, 6 - 8 Columbo effect, 35, 3 7 - 3 9 , 146, 253 compromise, 74, 92, 94, 1 6 1 , 229 budgets and, 196-97 neediness in, 23, 3 1 - 3 2 no and, 4 7 - 4 8 , 50, 59 unnecessary, 6 - 1 0 , 14 win-win negotiating and, 6—11, 14 connecting, 115, 122-25, 134-35, 176, 220, 254 contracts, 2 4 1 - 4 2 control, 16, 32, 2 5 2 - 5 7 agendas and, 215-19, 2 2 7 - 2 9 of behavior and actions, 8 9 - 1 0 1 , 115, 257 blank slating and, 142, 145, 153-54
Index
budgets and, 182, 186, 193, 198, 2 0 1 - 2 and daily tracks in monitoring work, 9 8 - 1 0 0 , 254, 256 decision making and, 12-14, 9 1 - 9 3 , 9 8 - 9 9 , 214 and M & P s , 7 1 , 79, 88, 9 2 , 9 4 neediness and, 22, 2 8 - 2 9 , 34, 92, 112, 152 no and, 47, 57, 92 not okay and, 3 7 - 3 8 pain and, 169, 173 questioning and, 107, 112 strip lines and, 128, 133-34 unworthy goals and, 9 5 - 9 8 of what can be controlled, 92-94 convincing, 175-78 cost optimization, 4 - 7 , 11, 39, 156, 175 decisions, decision making, decision makers, 22, 4 1 , 4 3 - 7 5 , 126, 202-16, 245, 253-55, 2 5 8 - 5 9 agendas and, 210, 213, 2 1 5 - 1 6 , 222, 225, 227-28, 2 3 0 - 3 3 blank slating and, 139-40, 142-43, 149 blockers and, 2 0 8 - 1 4 budgets and, 183-84, 191-94, 198-200, 2 0 2 - 4 , 214 control and, 12-14, 9 1 - 9 3 , 9 8 - 9 9 , 214 fear of, 6 4 - 6 6 , 70 and M & P s , 6 9 - 7 5 , 8 1 , 8 3 - 8 6 , 88, 111-13, 207 negotiation based on, 10-14, 4 8 - 4 9 , 83, 92
267
next, 64-67 no and, 13, 4 3 - 6 8 , 2 1 3 - 1 4 pain and, 159-60, 162, 164, 166, 1 6 8 - 7 1 , 1 7 5 , 1 7 7 - 7 8 , 203 prep-end stepping and, 2 4 1 - 4 3 presentations and, 235, 2 3 7 - 3 8 , 240 questioning and, 103, 111-13, 2 0 7 - 8 , 210, 2 1 2 - 1 3 respect and, 6 2 - 6 3 , 68 saving the adversary and, 5 9 - 6 0 , 6 2 - 6 3 , 67, 118 saving the relationship and, 6 0 - 6 2 , 64 and starting at the top, 2 1 1 - 1 4 strip lines and, 128, 130-31 w i n - w i n negotiating and, 9—15 discipline, 14-16, 19, 65, 79, 232, 240, 2 5 1 - 5 2 , 256 blank slating and, 143, 157 budgets and, 181, 185, 190 control and, 94, 9 7 - 9 9 neediness and, 2 8 - 2 9 , 34 Drucker, Peter, 87 Eastern Airlines, 77 Edison, Thomas Alva, 7 1 - 7 2 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 38, 150, 178, 2 4 7 - 4 8 , 259 emotions, 36, 9 0 - 9 2 , 94, 99, 116, 198-203, 242, 248, 2 5 4 - 5 5 , 258-59 agendas and, 216, 218, 233 blank slating and, 136, 139-40, 142-43, 152, 154 budgeting of, 182-83, 186-87, 189, 2 0 1 - 3 , 255, 258 decision making and, 103, 207
268
emotions (continued) and M & P s , 75, 88 neediness and, 29—30, 33 negotiation based on, 10-14, 49, 92 no and, 4 3 - 4 9 , 56, 59, 6 3 - 6 4 , 67 pain and, 159, 165, 175, 178-79 questioning and, 103, 113 strip lines and, 127-28, 131-33 expectations, 259 blank slating and, 137-43, 147, 1 5 0 - 5 1 , 156-58 negative, 140-43, 202 positive, 137-43, 1 5 0 - 5 1 , 2 0 2 Gates, Bill, 6 7 , 87, 144-45, 246 General Motors ( G M ) , 4 - 6 Getting to Yes, 8, 55 goals, 1 2 - 1 3 , 16, 18, 32, 121, 128, 207, 216, 253-55 blank slating and, 142, 145, 157 budgets and, 180, 199 control over, 8 9 - 1 0 1 , 115, 142, 145, 257 unworthy, 9 5 - 9 8 Godfather, Part II, The, 154 Gore, Al, 87 Grant, Ulysses S., 7 1 , 8 7 Hayes, Woody, 150, 205-6, 2 4 7 ^ 8 Hitler, Adolf, 1 6 0 - 6 1 , 171 Ho C h i M i n h , 8, 144, 185, 191-92 Kissinger, Henry, 8, 185 Kosovo, war in, 144 Kottman, Roy M . , 2 4 8 - 4 9
Index
labor-management relations, 7, 3 1 , 194 Langley, Samuel, 145 Legal Eagles, 1 2 9 - 3 2 legitimate interests, 8 - 9 Lehmkuhl, Craig, 198-99, 209, 221 Lewis and Clark expedition, 24 Lincoln, Abraham, 38, 7 0 - 7 1 , 164-65, 248 listening skills, 151-53, 156-57, 252 Lombardi, Vince, 79, 99 Lopez de Arriotua, Jose Ignacio, 4 M c C o l l , H u g h L., Jr., 162 M c N e i l , Freeman, 2 0 5 - 6 Major League Baseball umpires, 8 4 - 8 5 , 112, 144 Management (Drucker), 87 maybe, 1 3 1 , 193, 2 3 1 , 238, 258 no and, 4 5 - 5 3 , 56, 68 questioning and, 104, 106 Microsoft, 67, 87, 144-45, 168 mission and purposes (M&Ps), 17, 6 9 - 8 8 , 90, 242, 2 5 5 - 5 7 , 259 in adversary's world, 7 9 - 8 7 , 102-3, 111, 165, 169, 257 and agendas, 216, 229 of author, 83-84 and blank slating, 141—42 and budgets, 183, 190, 194, 196, 198, 201 changes in, 86-87 and control, 7 1 , 79, 88, 92, 94 and decision making, 69—75, 8 1 , 8 3 - 8 6 , 8 8 , 1 1 1 - 1 3 , 207 invalid, 7 6 - 7 9 , 82, 85 and pain, 162, 165, 167, 169
Index
in private life, 74—75 and questioning, 102-3, 111-13 reliability of, 8 7 - 8 8 written, 8 5 - 8 6 money, 93, 2 5 7 - 5 8 agendas and, 2 2 0 - 2 1 , 232 budgeting of, 182-83, 187, 189, 194-203, 209, 255, 258 and M & P s , 7 6 - 7 9 , 8 1 - 8 3 N A S A , 183 need, neediness, 16, 21-34, 125, 182, 242, 245, 252-55 agendas and, 217, 226, 2 2 8 - 3 0 , 232 blank slating and, 136-37, 140, 142, 147, 153, 156, 158 budgets and, 191-93, 197, 202 control and, 22, 2 8 - 2 9 , 34, 9 2 , 112, 152 decision makers and, 22, 213-14 in flying story, 2 5 - 2 6 no and, 47, 53, 56, 65, 67 No Talking rule and, 2 7 - 3 0 not okay and, 36, 38, 4 0 - 4 1 pain and, 163, 171-72 presentations and, 2 3 6 - 3 7 questioning and, 106, 112 rejection worries and, 3 0 - 3 2 strip lines and, 133-34 varieties of, 2 3 - 2 6 wanting vs., 32-34, 258 negotiation, negotiations, negotiating: in busy week, 16 chaos in, 215-17 definitions of, 55, 65, 257
269
as endless, 95 errors in, 122 failures in, 2—3, 14 incompetence in, 15 N i x o n , Richard, 8, 185 no, 126, 200, 2 5 2 - 5 4 , 2 5 7 - 5 8 agendas and, 57, 218, 231 blank slating and, 137, 139, 145 control and, 47, 57, 92 decision making and, 13, 4 3 - 6 8 , 213-14 maybe and, 4 5 - 5 3 , 56, 68 pain and, 169, 174 power of, 48, 52-54, 57, 67 presentations and, 236—38 questioning and, 104-6 right to say, 13-14, 5 5 - 5 9 saving the relationship and, 6 0 - 6 2 , 64 strip lines and, 128, 131-32, 134 yes and, 4 5 - 5 3 , 55-56, 68 No Closing rule, 13-14, 32, 105-6, 126, 128, 243, 252, 258 nonpayside activities, 9 6 - 9 7 , 258 No Talking rule, 252, 258 blank slating and, 153-57 neediness and, 27-30 note taking, 151-53, 156-58, 176, 254 not okay, 16, 3 5 - 4 2 , 182, 199, 2 0 1 , 2 5 3 - 5 4 , 258 nurturing, 115-19, 126, 132, 141, 220, 243, 253-54, 259 decision makers and, 205, 207, 212 pain and, 166-70, 176, 179
270
Ohio State University, 150, 205-6, 247-49 " O n Compensation" (Emerson), 38 pain, 159-79, 253, 255 agendas and, 216, 222, 232 budgets and, 182, 187, 189, 191-92, 2 0 1 - 2 convincing and, 175-78 creation of, 170—75 decision making and, 159—60, 162, 164, 166, 1 6 8 - 7 1 , 175, 177-78, 203 hunting for, 165-68 nurturing and, 166-70, 176, 179 painting picture of, 161—62, 164, 166, 168, 170-76, 178-79, 182, 192, 203, 216, 2 3 5 - 3 6 , 238, 258-59 prep-end stepping and, 242—43 presentations and, 235-36, 238-40 paying forward, 2 4 7 - 5 0 , 254, 259 payside activities, 9 5 - 9 7 , 258 Perot, Ross, 15, 47 power, 7 6 - 7 9 , 104-8 predatory negotiators, 19, 2 1 - 2 2 , 32, 58, 78 preparation, 16, 79, 99, 209, 221 budgets and, 193, 200 prep-end stepping, 2 4 0 - 4 4 presentations, 2 3 4 - 4 0 , 258 by adversaries, 2 3 7 - 3 8 agendas and, 2 2 1 , 2 3 0 , 2 3 8 if you insist, 2 3 8 - 4 0 problems, 2 1 9 - 2 6 , 229 Program for the Improvement and
Cost Optimization of Suppliers (PICOS), 4 - 5 , 11, 39 Quaker Oats, 78 questions, questioning, 101-15, 117-25, 243, 252-55 agendas and, 218, 220, 2 2 3 - 2 5 , 2 2 8 - 2 9 , 231 blank slating and, 138, 141, 147-^8, 153, 158 budgets and, 182, 186, 188-89, 191, 193, 199 connecting and, 122-25 decision making and, 103, 111-13, 2 0 7 - 8 , 210, 2 1 2 - 1 3 interrogative-led, 106-14, 119-22, 124-25, 132, 147-48, 167, 169-70, 172, 176-77, 188-89, 191, 2 0 7 - 8 , 235-36, 239, 2 5 3 - 5 4 , 259 open-ended, 106-7, 109 pain and, 167, 169-70, 172, 175-77 power of correct, 104—8 presentations and, 235-37, 239-40 reversing and, 118-22 simplicity in, 113-14 strip lines and, 130-32, 134 verb-led, 1 0 4 - 9 , 111-12, 114, 117, 119 Reagan, Ronald, 37, 144 research, 1 4 8 - 5 1 , 188, 193, 196 respect, friendship vs., 62-63 reversing, 115, 118-22, 124, 126, 134-35, 176, 207, 220, 254
271
Index
saving the adversary, 5 9 - 6 0 , 6 2 - 6 3 , 6 7 , 1 1 8 , 178, 258 saving the relationship, 6 0 - 6 2 , 64 Schwarzkopf, Norman, 38 self-esteem, 23, 245-50, 254 Snapple, 78 Sosa, Sammy, 13 spilling the beans, 186, 227, 257 blank slating and, 154-57 pain and, 167-68 presentations and, 235, 2 3 7 - 3 8 strip lines, 115, 127-35, 179 supply systems management, 39, 95, 149 decision making and, 5 9 - 6 0 , 62 and M & P s , 7 3 - 7 4 win-win negotiating and, 4 - 6 , 10 Third World bazaars, 2 9 - 3 0 3 + , 115, 125-26, 128, 169, 207, 243, 254, 258 agendas and, 218, 2 2 4 - 2 5 , 233 To Walk with Lions, 22 TriArc, 78 Vietnam War, 8, 25, 144, 146, 149-50, 185, 192 vision, 121, 126, 255 agendas and, 2 2 1 , 2 3 0 - 3 2 blank slating and, 146, 153, 157-58 budgets and, 183, 187, 189, 191-92 decision makers and, 203, 214
and M & P s , 8 5 - 8 7 pain and, 159, 162-66, 168-72, 175-77, 179 presentations and, 235—36, 240 questioning and, 103, 1 0 7 - 8 , 113-14 strip lines and, 133-34 wants, wanting, 4 1 , 46 agendas and, 219, 2 2 6 - 3 2 needing vs., 32-34, 258 warm calls, 2 8 - 2 9 , 187 Wide World of Sports, 2 0 1 w i n - w i n negotiating, 1-20, 22, 70, 78, 1 1 5 , 2 3 4 , 252 blank slating and, 149, 156 budgets and, 196-97 control and, 32, 94 dangers of, 3-15, 32 no and, 49, 5 1 , 5 5 - 5 7 , 66, 68 pain and, 173, 177 questioning and, 103, 107-8 saving the relationship and, 60-61 supply systems management and, 4 - 6 , 10 unnecessary compromise and, 6 - 1 0 , 14 as win-lose, 3, 14 wise agreements, 8, 14 World War I I , 160-62, 164, 171 yes, 8, 126, 193, 2 3 1 , 238, 258 no and, 4 5 - 5 3 , 55-56, 68 questioning and, 104-6
About the Author
J i m C a m p is a negotiation coach and the founder of C o a c h 2 1 0 0 , Inc., w h i c h offers o n e - o n - o n e coaching to senior managers at corporations as well as group coaching for client teams. He holds annual N e g o t i a t o r C o a c h Symposiums and has trained and coached negotiation teams in the U n i t e d States and throughout the world, on every continent. He has coached people through thousands of negotiations at more than 150 corporations, including Motorola, Texas Instruments, Merrill Lynch, IBM, and Prudential Insurance, as well as many smaller companies in a wide range of industries, including telecommunications, real estate, i n vestment banking, healthcare, i m p o r t / e x p o r t , automotive dealers and manufacturers, scientific research labs, and various governmental agencies. Jim has also lectured at various graduate business schools in the United States and has been a featured speaker at Inc. magazines G r o w i n g the C o m p a n y conferences. He is based in Vero Beach, Florida; visit his website: www.Camptraining.com.