State and Civil Society: The Chinese Perspective

State and Civil Society The Chinese Perspective

7809 tp.indd 1

8/25/10 3:43 PM

Series on Developing China — Translated Research from China Series Editor: Deng Zhenglai (Fudan University, China)

Published: Vol. 1

China’s Economy: Rural Reform and Agricultural Development edited by Deng Zhenglai

Vol. 2

State and Civil Society: The Chinese Perspective edited by Deng Zhenglai

Lixi - State and Civil Society.pmd

2

12/13/2010, 7:46 PM

Volume

SERIES ON DEVELOPING CHINA Tr a n s l a t e d R e s e a r c h f r o m C h i n a

2

State and Civil Society The Chinese Perspective

Editor

Deng Zhenglai Fudan University, China

World Scientific NEW JERSEY

7809 tp.indd 2

•

LONDON

•

SINGAPORE

•

BEIJING

•

SHANGHAI

•

HONG KONG

•

TA I P E I

•

CHENNAI

8/25/10 3:43 PM

Published by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Series on Developing China — Translated Research from China – Vol. 2 STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY The Chinese Perspective Copyright © 2011 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.

For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher.

ISBN-13 978-981-4313-57-5 ISBN-10 981-4313-57-2

Typeset by Stallion Press Email: [email protected]

Printed in Singapore.

Lixi - State and Civil Society.pmd

1

12/13/2010, 7:46 PM

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Contents

Chief Editor

ix

List of Contributors

xi

Series on Developing China — Translated Research from China Editorial Committee

xv

Preface Paying Attention to Chinese Interpretations Pan Shiwei Introduction Academic Inquiries into the “Chinese Success Story” Deng Zhenglai Chapters Part I Civil Society in China: A Theoretical Reflection The Construction of the Chinese Civil Society Deng Zhenglai, Jing Yuejin “Civil Society” in Modern China Studies: Methodology and Limitations Yang Nianqun v

xvii

1

25

47

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Contents

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment Yu Keping

63

Graduated Control: Research on State-Society Relationship in Contemporary Mainland China Kang Xiaoguang, Han Heng

97

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State, Civil Ruling Elites and Commoners before and after the Reform Sun Liping Part II A Historical Research on Civil Society “State and Society” in Modern China: Research Review and Reflection Zhu Ying

121

169

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92 He Baogang

197

Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings — A Case Study of Shanghai Xu Jilin

241

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China Wang Shaoguang, He Jianyu

271

Chinese Rural Township Government: A Sequence of the Expansive Moments of the State in History Wang Mingming

311

Part III The Modern Development of Civil Society in China The Wenzhou Model of China’s Civil Society Zhou Jun, Yu Jianxing

365

vi

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Contents

Towards a Corporatist Development of Civil Society in China: Enabling State and Mutual Empowerment between State and Society Edward Gu

385

From Major Community Standard to Civil Society: A Rethinking of Traditional China and Its Modernization 405 Qin Hui Index

423

vii

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

This page intentionally left blank

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Chief Editor

Deng Zhenglai is Distinguished Professor of Fudan University and Dean of Fudan Institute of Advanced Study in Social Sciences (IAS-Fudan), Shanghai, P. R. China. He supervises PhD students in jurisprudence and political theory. He is the editor-in-chief of Fudan Journal of The Humanities and Social Sciences and China Social Sciences Quarterly. He holds honorary professorships at a number of Chinese universities. Deng’s research interests include legal philosophy, political philosophy and an interdisciplinary study in humanities and social sciences. He has published nearly 20 soleauthored books, some 20 translated books and a number of edited books. His works include: State and Society: China’s Civil Society (1997, Sichuan); Research and Reflections: Intellectual Integrity of China’s Social Sciences (1998, Liaoning); Freedom and Order: Hayek on Social Theories (1998, Jiangxi); Hayek on Legal Philosophy (2002, China University of Political Science and Law); China’s Jurisprudence: Where to Go? (2006, Commercial Press).

ix

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

This page intentionally left blank

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

List of Contributors

Deng Zhenglai, Distinguished Professor of Political Philosophy, Dean of Fudan Institute for Advanced Study in Social Sciences (IAS-Fudan) and Director of Contemporary China Research Center (CCRC) at Fudan University, Shanghai, P. R. China. His main research fields include: political philosophy, jurisprudence, social theory. Edward Gu (Gu Xin), Professor of Social Policy, School of Government, Peking University, Beijing, P. R. China. His main research fields include: social policy, health policy, labor relations, civil society and state-society relations. Han Heng, Lecturer, School of Public Administration, Zhengzhou University, P. R. China. His main research fields include: trade union and ecoenvironmental science. He Baogang, Professor and Chair in International Studies, School of International and Political Studies, University of Deakin, Australia. His main research fields include: civil society, democratization, and deliberative democracy. He Jianyu, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Government and Public Administration, the Chinese University of Hong Kong. His primary research interest is civil society. Jing Yuejin, Professor, Department of Politics, Tsinghua University, Beijing, P. R. China. His main research fields include: political theory, political sociology and political transformation in contemporary China. xi

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

List of Contributors

Kang Xiaoguang, Professor, School of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development, Director of NGO Research Institute, Renmin University of China, P. R. China. His main research fields include: poverty, state-society relations, political development and political stability. Qin Hui, Professor, Department of History, Tsinghua University, Beijing, P. R. China. His main research fields include: the economic history of traditional China, the history of peasantry, and the history of peasants’ wars. Sun Liping, Professor, Department of Sociology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, P. R. China. His primary research interest is social modernization. Wang Mingming, Professor of Anthropology, Research Institute of Sociology and Anthropology, Peking University, P. R. China and an advisor of the academic editorial board of Chinese Social Sciences Quarterly. His main research fields include: anthropology and sociology. Wang Shaoguang, Chair Professor, Department of Government and Public Administration, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and the Chief Editor of the China Review. His main research fields include: political economy, comparative politics, fiscal politics, democratization, and economic and political development in former socialist countries and East Asian countries. Xu Jilin, Professor of History, Simian Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities, East China Normal University, P. R. China. His main research fields include: social democracy, history of political thoughts and studies on the intellectual community in modern China. Yang Nianqun, Professor of History, Institute of Qing History, Renmin University of China, P. R. China. His publications include Localization of Confucianism and Dual Orientations of Intellectual Group’s Personality in Modern China, Mysticism of Buddhism: Logical Starting Point of Da Tong Shu etc. His main research fields include: history, Confucianism and localization. Yu Jianxing, Director of Institute for the Development of Civil Society (ICSD), Zhejiang University, P. R. China. His main research fields include: social policy, local governance and civil organizations. xii

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

List of Contributors

Yu Keping, Vice Chairman of Central Compilation and Translation Bureau and Director of China Center for Comparative Politics and Economics (CCCPE), Beijing, P. R. China. His main research fields include: comparative politics, political philosophy, globalization, and civil society. Zhou Jun, Lecturer, Institute for the Development of Civil Society (ICSD), Zhejiang University, P. R. China. Her main research fields include: global civil society, state and society relations. Zhu Ying, Professor, Institute of Chinese Modern History, Central China Normal University, P. R. China. His primary research interest is the socioeconomic history of modern China.

xiii

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

This page intentionally left blank

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Series on Developing China — Translated Research from China Editorial Committee

Advisors Wang Zhongwei: CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee Qin Shaode: Fudan University

Director Pan Shiwei: CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee

Deputy Directors Deng Zhenglai: Fudan University Chen Xin: Shanghai Century Publishing Company Ltd.

Editorial Committee Members Chen Jiaming: Xiamen University Chen Jiaying: Capital Normal University Chen Sihe: Fudan University Fan Gang: China Reform Foundation Fang Liufang: China University of Political Science and Law Gao Yi: Peking University Guo Qiyong: Wuhan University He Huaihong: Peking University He Qinhua: East China University of Political Science and Law xv

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Series on Developing China — Translated Research from China

Hu Jingbei: Tongji University Jiang Yihua: Fudan University Li Qiang: Tsinghua University Lin Shangli: Fudan University Liu Kang: Shanghai Jiao Tong University Liu Qingping: Fudan University Liu Shijun: CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee Ma Min: Huazhong Normal University Mao Shoulong: Renmin University of China Qin Hui: Tsinghua University Qin Yaqing: China Foreign Affairs University Sang Yucheng: Fudan University Shen Dingli: Fudan University Shen Zhihua: East China Normal University Shi Jinchuan: Zhejiang University Shi Yinhong: Renmin University of China Sun Liping: Tsinghua University Sun Zhouxing: Tongji University Tong Shijun: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Wang Hui: Tsinghua University Wang Yuechuan: Peking University Wei Sen: Fudan University Xu Jilin: East China Normal University Xu Xianming: Shandong University Xu Yong: Huazhong Normal University Xu Zhangrun: Tsinghua University Yang Nianqun: Renmin University of China Yao Yang: Peking University Yu Keping: Central Compilation and Translation Bureau Zhang Jun: Fudan University Zhang Shuguang: Academic Committee of Beijing Unirule Institute of Economics Zhang Weiying: Peking University Zhang Wenxian: Jilin University Zhang Xiaojin: Tsinghua University Zhou Guoping: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

xvi

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Preface Paying Attention to Chinese Interpretations Pan Shiwei

The name of this series, “A Developing China”, is plain and simple, but giving some thought to its implications yields three levels of meaning. The first is that China is a developing country. Over the course of the modern period, because of the constrictions imposed from the outside by imperialism and the internal corruptions of feudalism, China’s economy, politics, culture and social development all lagged behind, with the result that the country remained underdeveloped for a substantial period of time, becoming, in fact, the world’s largest developing nation. Second, China is still at its primary stage of socialism. Owing to the combination of a number of internal and external factors, China did not evolve along the traditional path of capitalism, choosing instead a non-capitalist form of development, a determination made both by its people and by history. The socialist path, however, can only be experimental in nature, and is marked by considerable uncertainty in the setting of its goals, the design of its institutions, its growth approaches and its operational mechanisms. In all of these things we can see the symptoms of a country still in the process of development. Third is the character of a still developing social science. As far as the understanding and grasp of the rules of China’s development toward modernization is concerned, Chinese social science can only deepen its awareness through a process of constant exploration and trial and error, and can only mature via repeated reflection upon and synthesis of new research. Regarding a move toward a spirit of autonomy, Chinese social science is in pursuit of a comprehensive method arising out of a gradual amalgamation of Western academic learning, Chinese cultural heritage and theoretical innovation of xvii

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Pan Shiwei

Marxism. Based upon the three considerations outlined above, using the idea of “a developing China” to describe and define contemporary China is clearly an apt and precise reading. The gathering speed of China’s development, the growing intensity of its transformation, and the ever more evident achievements of its modernization over the past 30 years have attracted a good deal of interest. Like a huge laboratory, China and its development represent a comprehensive process of transformation combining economic growth, political stability, social growth, cultural maturation, and a high level of diplomatic activity. In terms of economics, China has sustained an annual rate of GDP growth of over nine percent, with GDP having jumped to the third largest in the world, and it has grown into an important contributor of industrial products to the world’s trading system. Politically, this country with a huge population and a vast area has been able to maintain a commendable stability; there has been a firm drive toward putting democracy into action; the rule of law has been implemented with great perseverance and leadership by the Communist Party has been very effectively improved. Socially, the issue of the livelihood of the people has always been at the head of the agenda; the pursuit of social justice and equality has never been set aside and there has been great effort to confine the social costs of development to as small an area as possible; the social welfare system as they have accumulated has been continually improved, and non-governmental organizations for public welfare have flourished. Culturally, the creation and innovation of a mainstream ideology has continued apace and in an environment that is profoundly changing, people’s intellectual and spiritual worlds increasingly show an essential soundness; the provision of the products of public culture grows richer by the day, and the spread of education, literature and the arts, and science has greatly increased. In diplomacy our essential premise has been to maintain an open stance and to pursue an independent, autonomous and peaceful foreign policy; we pay careful attention to relations among the major powers, as well as to links with our neighbors, and we participate actively in all matters global; we strive to contribute as we should to making adjustments to the international political situation and toward economic globalization. All of these factors indicate that China provides a model case in development that is rare in the contemporary world, regardless of whether one considers development in its totality, its

xviii

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Preface

sustainability, or its depth. As a result, it is only natural that a developing China has attracted increasing curiosity and more favorable opinion. One consequence of China’s rapid development is that people inevitably wish to take their thoughts about this issue one step further, which brings in its wake a whole series of perplexities. Has China’s development been merely the result of a series of fortuitous circumstances, or is it comprised of historical rationality and a certain objective necessity? Has China’s development been an isolated case that cannot be emulated, or can it function as a universal reference for other developing countries? Is China’s development merely an uncomplicated duplication of the developed nations of the West, or is it a unique creation that has at once assimilated such achievements of human civilization as market economics and combined them with indigenous conditions? Has China’s development been nothing more than a series of hasty and muddled practical efforts that have nonetheless brought about significant results, or will it gradually take shape as an exemplary developmental model? Is China’s development only a single charge forward, or will it be able to build on its current momentum to achieve sustained progress over a longer duration? Is China’s development only a matter of material wealth, the pursuit of profit and economic growth, or does it embody unique Chinese views on development, social order, human well-being and the world as a whole? All such questions represent unavoidable and serious challenges to those people objectively observing Chinese development. Any accurate response to these questions cannot be based only on simple common sense, but requires the assistance and support of the humanities and the social sciences. Scholars active in such fields as economics, political science, sociology and law need to take their responsibilities seriously. We can take comfort, however, from the fact that Chinese humanists and social scientists have neither absented themselves from this great and profound transformation nor lost their way during the course of this intensely dramatic restructuring — they have kept apace with the times and of events. The work of Chinese scholars of the humanities and the social sciences over the past decades can be encapsulated within the several categories listed below. First, they have engaged in meaningful analysis of both the real world and the national situation. Whether in the face of the difficult beginning days of China’s reform and opening-up or in regard to the

xix

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Pan Shiwei

specific developmental steps or changes that followed, in order to sort out the principal contradictions of each stage or field, Chinese scholars have all paid close attention to analyzing both the contemporary international environment and the practicalities of the domestic situation. With an issueoriented approach, they illuminated the full dimensions of the bottlenecks during the course of reform such that they gained a full range of information and source materials for policy makers. Second, they have developed specialized planning of the programs and the ways and means of reform. Although the pace of intensity of the Chinese reform and opening-up proceeded according to both its own rhythm and its own program, no one can deny its wide range and comprehensiveness. From economics to politics, from culture to society, hundreds and thousands of important changes took place in succession, and the survival and success rate of all of these reforms was exceptionally high. One of the main reasons for this was the development of carefully thought out as well as highly detailed contingency plans, on which Chinese scholars expended a good deal of painful intellectual labor. Almost every anticipated program required detailed thinking and preparations because of the necessity and urgency of each item on the agenda, tasks implicit in the general goal, key specific points to work on, safeguards, and due attention to each item. It was such pre-planning that differentiated China’s reform from that which took place in the ex-USSR bloc — it was less hasty, random and careless, and more objective, precise, and generally undertaken with more equanimity. Third, they have drawn upon and introduced the experiences of the developed world. Against the background of globalization, the interaction, accommodation, and contesting of an opened China with the rest of the world have become increasingly commonplace, and Chinese scholars are the interactive link between the two. They have been the group most sensitive to global trends, to the propensities of the times, and to the most beneficial elements of these tendencies. In recent years, Chinese scholars have assiduously introduced and promoted the latest news, advanced understandings and freshest concepts from abroad, with the result that Chinese from all walks of life have benefitted greatly from the extension of their perspectives and the updating of their knowledge. Fourth, they have initiated a methodical discourse. The existence of a variety of interests in the current Chinese social structure is a demonstrable

xx

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Preface

fact; equally clear is the decisive role of the underlying socialist system in rendering a fundamental consistency of interests, such that there are not any fundamental antagonisms. The smooth implementation of the reform and opening-up of Chinese society, as well as future results, has depended upon the full expression of a variety of views and the effective coordination of a variety of interests. An ever richer public discussion, therefore, has by degrees become a vital factor in determining whether the reform and opening-up will succeed or not. Chinese scholars have played a key role in this and in the face of a wide variety of different problems associated with the developmental process, they have provided the impetus for and participated in discussions large and small. Most of these discussions took place on the scholarly level, but they were often characterized by a strong social or public quality. More often than not this discourse reflects divergent perspectives, or requests from different groups, and eventuates in a more complete conceptualization of specific aspects of the reform. The discussions have also provided numerous ideas about how to solve practical problems, opened up space for practical action and increased people’s ability to make comparisons and choices. Even more importantly, the lively atmosphere created by these discussions has enabled society as a whole to gradually achieve consensus, to gather together the public will, and to unify action. Fifth, they have assessed and taken stock of the achievements of the reform and opening-up, another key link that has been taken very seriously in the developmental process. Implementing reform in China has been, of course, particularly formidable, because modernizing this most populous nation in the world presents far more difficulties than would be the case anywhere else. Reform in China, however, also has had an exploratory quality to it, as there is absolutely no precedent that can be consulted for a country with an essentially socialist system and guiding ideology in connecting with the world economy and achieving a market economy. The Chinese experience is also characterized by its long duration, for to realize the goals of true industrialization, urbanization, commercialization, digitalization, and internationalization from a relatively low production base has to be a long and gradual process. China has had, therefore, to become proficient at taking stock and self-evaluation, diligent at repeated assessment, and bold in continuously correcting error. Chinese scholars have again and again been highly effective in this, enthusiastically encompassing a wide

xxi

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Pan Shiwei

terrain, engaging in both theoretical argument and powerful social assessment. These debates have included purely academic retrospective analysis as well as retrospective summing up of experiences carried out in cooperation with the ruling party and the government. These activities have contributed powerfully to the ripening and maturation of the policy makers and implementers of China’s reform and opening-up even as they have ensured the orderliness and accuracy of the actions that have followed on its heels. Sixth, they have enhanced and spread public rationality. China’s reform and opening-up has been of great benefit to the populace as well as being an immense series of activities in which hundreds of millions of people have participated — its characteristics include self-education and self-management. Through the experience of the reform and openingup, people have not only attained material benefits, but have also attained rich and satisfying lives, gained spiritual and political growth, as well as achieved a more civil mentality. As a consequence, Chinese intellectuals have a responsibility to disseminate knowledge of the humanities and the social sciences, enhance public rationality, create a common spiritual home, and satisfy the ever-increasing needs of the popular consciousness. At the same time, the spread of public rationality has also contributed to the ability to handle inter-personal relations, provided a basic code for interaction between individuals and society, and been of great help in the mediation of these relations as well as in resolving social antagonisms. Via the many ways through which they have paved the way for the spread and enhancement of public rationality, Chinese scholars have thus provided valuable lubrication to ease the process of a tense and pressing reform and openingup; they have constantly raised the level of harmony in a society in the process of restructuring. Seventh, they have improved the humanities and the social sciences in China. The Chinese humanities and social sciences in the modern sense got a tortuous start in the 20th century. They did not really flourish until they received a boost during the period of reform and opening-up, which provided an exceptional opportunity for their development. Mainstream Marxist ideology called forth a vitality that kept pace with the times, the resources of Chinese traditional culture were taken up and sorted through from a new perspective, and the high achievements of world civilization received

xxii

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Preface

unprecedented attention and were introduced to China. All these intellectual resources were gathered together to provide a generous foundation for the development of the humanities and the social sciences. Even more important, the rich variety of achievements of the reform and opening-up provided a plentiful assortment of source materials for the Chinese humanities and social sciences, and the advancing and ever deepening project of socialist modernization allowed them ample space for development. This enabled Chinese scholars to take the initiative to contribute to the establishment of the humanities and the social sciences even as they were taking part in practical affairs. As a result, we have been delighted to observe the ever more profound and healthy interaction between academia and society, theory and practice, with the result that Chinese-style humanities and social sciences composed of the various academic disciplines have gradually come into being. It must be stressed that the prospering of the Chinese humanities and social sciences cannot be separated from the support, understanding and importance attached to them by the Party and the government. The Party and the government earnestly hope that the Chinese humanities and social sciences will be able to play a key role in undertaking the vital tasks of bringing its people to understand the world, transmitting the ideas of civilization, creating theory, counselling the government, educating the people, and being of service to society. It must be said that at the initiation point of the reform and opening-up, based on the urgent needs of the forces of production and the building of modernization, the Chinese Party and government favored the development of modern scientific technique. Following upon the intensification of the process of modernization and after due attention to the organization of the economy, however, political, cultural, social, and environmental construction were all put on the agenda, and the Party and the government’s focus on the humanities and the social sciences became ever more profound. Because of this the important concept of “four things of equal importance”, i.e. philosophy, the social sciences and the natural sciences had the same priority, was clearly set forth. This meant that training of high-caliber philosophers and social scientists received the same weight as the training of natural scientists, that raising the national quality of philosophy and social sciences was as vital as raising the national quality of the natural sciences, and that there was to be no distinction between

xxiii

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Pan Shiwei

giving free rein to and fully utilizing the talents of philosophers and social scientists and the treatment accorded to natural scientists. In accord with this principle, the Party and government adopted a series of important measures to forward the development of the humanities and the social sciences, making them a crucial constitutive part of overall national strength, with the earnest desire that the humanities and the social sciences will begin to thrive sooner rather than later. Because of the common effort of the Party, the government and the academy, over the course of 30 years following the reform and opening-up, theoretical research has had an important influence on policy formulation and implementation. The launching of the reform program, which began with a highly significant discussion of the idea that “practice is the only criterion for testing the truth”, opened up the movement for the liberation of thought that cast off the fetters of dogmatism. On the occasion of drawing conclusions from 30 years of development, the theoretical structure of the idea of socialism with Chinese characteristics has taken shape. It is possible to say without any exaggeration that no other historical transformation that has lasted as long as 30 years has been able to preserve such a level of enthusiastic anticipation of theoretical guidance, that no other political party has been able to effectively combine organically a steadfast loyalty to its principal ideology and capacity for the innovation of mainstream theory, and that no other country has been able to remain so favorably and enthusiastically disposed to the theoretical enterprise for so long. Theory has played a vital and unmistakable role in the research into and scrutiny of the development of China’s reforms. From this perspective it is thus possible to draw the following inferences: theory has guided practical concerns, practical concerns have changed China, and China has influenced the world. The implementation of this earth-shaking reform and opening-up has, of course, fed back into influencing and changing the development of theory itself. Over the past 30 years, the development of the Chinese humanities and social sciences has followed a path not entirely like that pursued in the West. Careful scrutiny reveals three specific features of how this process has unfolded in China. First, from the developmental perspective there have been efforts of and some preliminary implementation of combining the trinity of basic Marxist principles, the general achievements of human civilization, and Chinese realities. Second, from the perspective

xxiv

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Preface

of basic content, there have been efforts of and some preliminary implementation of pushing forward a combination of the trinity of theoretical exploration, broadening the base of popular knowledge, and policy transformation. Third, from the perspective of those who participate, there has been effective advocacy of and some preliminary implementation of combining scholarly experts, leading cadres, and the general populace. Of course, during the process of merging the three entities listed above, people experienced the adjustments of moving from the unsystematic to the systematic, from lack of proficiency to proficiency, and from lacking initiative to possessing it. The upshot of these efforts has been to edge the contemporary Chinese humanities and social sciences toward a brand new point of departure. The goal of our current series is to introduce the achievements of the last 30 years of the Chinese humanities and social sciences, and their close relationship to China’s reform and opening-up, to the foreign academic and general audience. Any dispassionate review will, of course, reveal that, no matter how fast the Chinese humanities and social sciences have progressed, there are still numerous inadequacies. For example, there has yet to be adequate study of the Chinese model, more attention need to be paid to the development of academic standards, the development of the various disciplines has been uneven, there has not been enough done in regard to rendering research and analytical methods sufficiently diverse and scientific, and much more need to be done with respect to training academic talent.Among the problems, the low degree of internationalization is an especially weak link. A statistical count reveals that in the decade between 1991 and 2001, Chinese scholars of the humanities and the social sciences received 9,000 invitations to lecture abroad, with 19,000 scholars going abroad to study, and 23,000 foreign scholars invited to lecture in China. There was great progress made between 2001 and 2005, with 100,000 Chinese scholars participating in international conferences, 13,000 articles by Chinese scholars being published in foreign journals, and 2,600 cooperative ventures with foreign universities and research organizations. Clearly, then, there has been a demonstrable and stable increase in the rate of interaction between Chinese academia and the rest of the world. The imbalance in the level of “exports” and “imports” in this academic exchange is, however, still a serious problem. Taking scholarly translation

xxv

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Pan Shiwei

as an example, between 2000 and 2005 there were approximately 7,000 foreign academic works translated into Chinese, but in the same period of time there were only 800 works whose primary author was a Chinese scholar translated into foreign languages. Taking the internationally influential Social Science Citation Index (SCCI) as another example, in 2007 there were 1,962 journals listed in the SCCI published in over 40 countries, with the United States accounting for almost 60% of them and the top ten countries on the list accounting for more than 90%; there were only about ten journals concerned with Chinese social sciences. Only one of these, however, actually comes from China, China and World Economy, published by Basil Blackwell in the UK on behalf of the China Society of World Economics and the World Economy and Politics Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The inability of Chinese academic research to go far from home stands in sharp contrast to China’s ever-increasing economic and political influence and represents a serious weakness in the development of the Chinese humanities and social sciences. It is in this context that, in order to carry through the strategy of having the Chinese humanities and social sciences “walk out”, the Publicity Department of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party decided to initiate this important “Series on Developing China”. It organized an editorial committee and appointed Fudan University Distinguished Professor Deng Zhenglai, Dean of the Fudan Institute for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences to head the program. By translating outstanding academic articles on the subject of the experience of Chinese development published over the last 30 years, this program aims to introduce a comprehensive set of outstanding world-level scholarly works by Chinese scholars and thereby take steps to move the Chinese humanities and social sciences “toward the world”. The series will be marked by the following characteristics: one, it will hold firm to the principle of “standing firmly in China and moving toward the world”, but also make sure to choose themes that will be influential in the international academic sphere and conform to its demands. We believe that only works in the humanities and the social sciences with true Chinese character, style and manner will be able to really make its way into the world, and that only works with the distinct imprint of the national culture will be truly vital. With this in mind, we have chosen a number of academic

xxvi

Aug. 11, 2010

11:14

9in x 6in

b978-fm

Preface

fields that will perhaps be influential internationally as our point of entry and developed themes like “China’s Economy: Rural Reform and Agricultural Development”, “State and Civil Society: the Chinese Perspective”, “Sino-American Relations: the Chinese Perspective”, and “Globalization and Localization: the Chinese Perspective”. Second, we have organized an authoritative editorial committee, which will uphold strict academic standards and select only the most outstanding papers on relevant topics. The committee is made up of premier Chinese scholars such as Zhang Wenxian, Yu Keping, Zhang Weiying, Wang Hui, Chen Jiaying, Zhou Guoping, Xu Xianming, Ma Min, Lin Shangli, He Qinhua and Sun Liping; it thus embodies a high level of academic expertise that will ensure meticulously fair and objective choice in the works to be published. Third, we have organized a group of high quality translators and will be on guard to guarantee a high level of translation. In addition to this team of translators, we have set up a process that will have experts from each field do a preliminary translation, which will then be checked by the original author, passed on to the English editor and finally to the editor-in-chief for review. The internationalization of Chinese scholarship is a lofty goal; it is also a difficult task, but even more than that, something that will take time. What continues to encourage us to devote ourselves to the task is this firm conviction: the economic and social development — and the related academic progress — that has already taken place in China, is taking place now, and will take place in the future is essentially aligned with trends in the advance of human civilization. We have every reason to believe that by way of our careful, even and painstaking efforts we can make some small contribution toward an understanding of China’s transformation, taking stock of the Chinese experience, researching the Chinese model, spreading Chinese values, and raising the international standing of the Chinese humanities and social sciences. Of course, owing to our lack of experience, such a large-scale undertaking as this translation project will be subject to numerous oversights, even outright errors. As far as that is concerned, we can only hope that our readers all over the world will provide us with critical feedback. Shanghai July 21, 2009 xxvii

This page intentionally left blank

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Academic Inquiries into the “Chinese Success Story” Introduction to Series on Developing China Vol. 2: State and Civil Society: The Chinese Perspectives Deng Zhenglai1

1.

Introduction

Since the 1980s, the end of ideological warfare characterized by the Cold War and the Iron Curtain has enabled globalization to manifest itself in two dimensions. Firstly, the transformation to market economy in postsocialist countries accelerated global economic interdependency. Globality as encapsulated in such international organizations as the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF, together with the emergence of global issues and common crises, has an enhanced capacity to weaken national sovereignty. As Robert Reich pointed out, “[t]he transformation we are experiencing now will reshuffle politics and economy in the new age, which will render a series of traditional concepts obsolete, such as national product, technology, company, industry or economy. Within national boundaries will only be left the people that form the country… The centrifugal force of global economy has been trying to weaken the bond that traditionally holds a nation together”.2 As a matter of fact, billions of people, in almost every 1 Distinguished Professor and Dean of Institute for Advanced Study in Social Sciences, Fudan University. Areas of interests: social theory, jurisprudence and political philosophy. 2 Reich (1994, p. 1). It should be pointed out that Reich’s analysis of globalization is far from simplistic than this quote suggests at a glance. My quote of his opinion is only in its descriptive sense.

1

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Deng Zhenglai

nation the world over, have their daily life affected to a certain degree by the globalization that has been unprecedentedly omnipotent and ubiquitous. The second dimension came from the increasing popularity of globalization among academic researchers in all disciplines. A research report on global issues was published by the Club of Rome in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Meadows et al., 2000; Mesarovic and Pestel, 1987). Since then, “globalization”3 has become one of the most frequently used terms in international social science circle. As one of the new perspectives to examine contemporary issues, it contextualizes current intellectual life. As M. Waters has pointed out, “as much as postmodernism was a concept that belonged to the 1980s, globalization is a concept of the 1990s, a key concept for us to understand the transformation of human society towards the third millennium”.4 It needs to be pointed out immediately that globalization is also by definition one of the most controversial terms. “The variety of vantage points notwithstanding, globalization invariably concerns a dominant theory, in that the past two centuries that were characterized by using geographical boundaries to define social fields have fostered and encouraged imaginations, be it scientific or socio-political. Now this age has come to an end. Global capitalism carries with it a globalization of culture and politics, resulting in the breakdown of the socialization of national boundaries and the institutional principles of cultural knowledge, upon which the selfimage and world picture familiar to all were based” (Beck, 2000a, p. 14). On the other hand, globalization has become a leading topic in every social science field internationally. Any issue of significance, be it economic, political, social, legal or cultural, will be invariably related to it. Besides, its appearance in academic journals has an extensive coverage of different areas of humanities and social sciences, such as global governance, globalization of economy, cultural globalization, global common interest, global justice, global politics and globalization of law (Held et al., 2001, pp. 3–14). 3 For Giddens, “Globalization may not be a term that is especially attractive or glorifying…

However, even in the late 1980s, this term was commonly used in academia and daily life, as it was already ubiquitous by then”. He pointed out that in today’s world, “every man that seeks to understand our future should not ignore it” (Giddens, 2001, p. 2). 4 Waters (1995, p. 1). Sklair also pointed out that “even though conceptually globalization is far from perfected, as a research question and subject, it has already been indisputably consolidated in social science” (Sklair, 1993).

2

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Academic Inquiries into the “Chinese Success Story”

Obviously, for China and Chinese social science alike, globalization has presented the following issues to be answered: How should globalization be understood? Is it a process of objective inevitability, or subjective variability? Is it a fact or a discourse? For such less developed countries as China, what kind of challenges and opportunities can be identified? For Chinese social science, what does globalization entail? What does it mean for the “Chinese Success Story” that has attracted attention worldwide?

2.

Section 1: World Structure and China as the Subject: A Chinese Perspective on Globalization

How should we seek to interpret globalization, as well as the challenges and opportunities it thus entails? As far as I can see, only through clarification of the following few issues will it be possible to offer answers that are marginally close to “satisfactory”. First, how have we been dragged into globalization? How can we understand the nature of globalization? For China, what is the difference between the current age of globalization and the times preceding it? What is China’s position in the world structure in the current age of globalization? Is the discourse on globalization and its theorization sufficient to warrant solutions for the problems facing China today? In recent studies, I have used such concepts as “world structure” or “global structure” to respond to the issues brought afore by globalization. Hereby these concepts shall be briefly outlined. My thesis can be summarized in the following few themes (cf. Deng, 2006, pp. 2–23; 2009, Pt. 1): Firstly, China was included into the process of globalization through its accession to such international organizations as the WTO, which contains structural inequality that I term as “world structure”. With the advent of globalization and the opening up of China to the outside world, especially after China’s entry into such international organizations as the WTO, China is no longer geographically isolated, in which replacement she becomes a country that is deeply embedded in the world structure. For China, this was the greatest transformation since time immemorial. Before this, China as an independent sovereign power was external to world structure despite 3

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Deng Zhenglai

extensive international cooperation or conflicts — which means that China, although part of the world, used to be an outsider to the world game. The reason for me to signify world structure as a world game lies in the distinction between center and periphery that contains a domination of developed countries over developing ones. As Robert W. McChesney (2000, p. 7) pointed out, “The reason for market globalization is that the government of developed countries, especially the US, has superimposed trade agreements and treaties upon the whole world, enabling commercial magnates and the rich to easily dominate other national economies without shouldering relevant responsibilities”. For me, this domination by the developed countries over their developing counterparts is not only manifested in economy as McChesney pointed out, in that it allows peripheralization of China that has become increasingly dependent upon the West through market mechanisms and the optimal allocation of the means of production globally, but also in institutions and cultures. Institutionally, the legal rules or institutions as recognized by China in the world structure are in fact local knowledge based on Western experiences, through which the transplantation of certain values has assumed an unquestionable gesture of unipolarity and inevitability, as captured in the dominator-dominated relationship. On the other hand, culturally, the demise of ideology has engendered a high level of integration both in culture and in the development of science, where the Western countries as dominators export not only technology but also their culture and ideology, which in its turn compresses, suppresses and depresses the development of culture in developing countries, including China. Secondly, different from the previous modernization period, the Western domination over China has changed in nature, which was based on not collusion but promises. The most important element of the so-called “modernization paradigm” in the world structure that was most often neglected by Chinese scholars, lies in the Chinese intellectuals’ collusion to the dominator during this process of domination. Such collusion is manifested in the uncritical or unreflective acceptance of the Western modernization paradigm. Obviously, in order for the world structure to be effective in dominating China, the collusion from China is indispensable. By this, the domination is not structural or compulsory — the Western modernization paradigm remains external to China, in that without China’s collusion, its

4

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Academic Inquiries into the “Chinese Success Story”

dominant influence over China will cease to work, together with its ability to superimpose its rules and imaginations upon which China’s ideal picture is based. However, in the post-Cold War period, the domination of the world structure becomes effective as soon as it secures the acceptance of rules and institutions from China that has been arranged into this game. It is precisely in the light of this statement that this domination of the world structure can be concluded as structural and compulsory, which was dependent not on force, but China’s promises to abide by its rules and institutions, regardless of China’s collusion. From this it can be seen that the world structure that China joined has to a great extent a binding domination over China that is based not on collusion but promises. Thirdly, the principle of sovereign equality as vouched by international law cannot possibly rescue China, while a “China as the sovereignty” needs to be substituted by a “China as the subject”. To point out this structural inequality in the world structure is of great importance for less developed countries, as it showcases the tension between this factual inequality-based domination and the propaganda of sovereign equality as claimed by Western powers since the 16th century. The aforementioned domination has shown that the contemporary world is at the beginning of a new empire. Certainly, this new empire is dependent not upon war and blood, but information, knowledge, capital and market. More importantly, the purpose of this new empire or the dominators has not been only for extension and protection of their national interests in the world, but to propagate their values or ideal pictures that are clothed as “universally applicable” to other nations, through which to further superimpose their social or political orders. Therefore, in the current world order, apart from its justifiability to defend border integrity, national security, human rights and economic development, the so-called “sovereign equality” (or China as the sovereignty) is not only insufficient, but also limited to a great extent. China as in the world structure is not a peculiarity or departure from the Western polity, but a subject in terms of ideology, with its core on a Chinese weltanschauung and value (or a unified China perspective in the world structure). This shall pave the way for a proactive approach on the part of China to participate in restructuring the world order. In the contemporary world structure, an emphasis on substituting “China as the subject” for “China

5

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Deng Zhenglai

as the sovereignty” serves the fundamental purpose of breaking through the limits set by sovereignty, towards an inter-subject, inter-culturality and inter-civilization at the level of the world structure. This has to a greater degree suggested a legitimation or rule-making of the world structure not by a minority of sovereign powers only, but through inter-subject negotiations and interactions. Fourthly, whether from the perspective of globalization per se or from the nature of Western domination over China in the age of globalization, challenges as brought about in this process also carry with them unprecedented opportunities for China, insofar as an “ideal picture” based on Chinese perspectives can be formulated, which will then enable the transformation of a candidacy of participating in the world order into a capacity of revising these very orders. Through this, it will be possible to shape the dynamics and dimension of the development of world order according to Chinese experiences and perspectives. Globalization extends far beyond the economic globalization as vouched by economists. More importantly, it is a social transformation that is both dependent upon and transcendental to nation-state. Likewise, globalization of law is not a unification of national laws towards “non-national laws”, but a shift towards a diversification of national and non-national laws. Globalization is thus not a process of homogenization, but a coexistence of oneness and diversification, internationalization and localization, integration and fragmentation, aggregation and disaggregation. Globalization is no longer an objective inevitability, but rather a product of globalism, and an issue of counter-hegemony through different perspectives. In other words, in nature globalization is an open process that can be (re)shaped through cultural and political demands and national interests of China. Once this open notion of globalization is appreciated, the subject position of China can be assumed to restructure globalization and its orientation through the epistemological premises of “Chinese ideal picture” or “world ideal picture”. The fundamental significance for China to access the world structure lies in her gaining of candidacy to voice her own concerns over such topics as the justifiability of world structure as well as the so-called universally-applicable values, to the accompaniment of China’s promises to abide by these rules and institutions upon entry. However, a candidacy to voice concerns cannot be equated with the capacity to do so. Formal candidacy alone will not warrant a unique contribution by China 6

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Academic Inquiries into the “Chinese Success Story”

to revising the rules for the future. On the contrary, it will entail either an acceptance of these existing Western rules, or a retreat into the safe harbor to concentrate on the millennia-long Chinese civilization. This is due to the fact that there lacks such idealizations as of identity, a life of good, desirability and a suitable modus operandi of globalization. Obviously, without these idealizations our capacity to revise or participate in revising future rules of the world order shall be severely restricted. For this very reason, endeavors should be made to offer idealizations that are based on Chinese perspectives, before China is actively involved in revising the rules of world structure, as well as in influencing the dynamics and dimension of the future world order.

3.

Section 2: Counter-Hegemony and Internationalization: A Knowledge Reform for Chinese Social Science

Globalization entails challenges and opportunities for China and Chinese social science alike, which can be summarized in the following two aspects: Firstly, construction of and competition in the globalization discourse have provided ample opportunities for Chinese social science to shape the discourse in accordance with Chinese national interests and culturalpolitical demands. As previously mentioned, globalization is as much a fact as a construction of and competition in discourse, which, as far as I can see, have provided opportunities for Chinese social science that is to be shouldered with the task of seeking a globalized platform to express Chinese national interests and cultural-political demands. This judgment is based on two observations of globalization and Chinese social science: First being the interaction between globalization, globalism and the openness of globalism, while the other a Foucauldian notion of social science as “discourse”. First of all, Ulrich Beck proposed an analytical framework to encompass globality, globalism and globalization, through which it can be found that globalization as an objective inevitability was in fact a product of subjective globalism.5 Through this prism, globalism is not only genetically 5 For Beck, globalization in its broad sense is neither an objective fact, nor a subjective construct, but rather an interaction between the objective and the subjective, of which these

7

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Deng Zhenglai

based on neoliberalism, but also a reflective version to critique globalism itself. Fundamentally, globalism in its genetic sense appeared first in developed capitalist world, into which China was dragged by means of accession into such international organizations as the WTO. This globalization coexists with knowledge, privilege, resources and interests of the Western power, which were exported as the neoliberalist glorification of “objective truth”6 to non-Western countries (China included), thus instituting a subjection to the West. As Dahrendorf has pointed out, apart from technology, neoliberalism (relaxation of control, privatization and liberalization) as universally practiced since the 1980s paved the way for globalization. “New technological capacity was first realized in an atmosphere of relaxed controls… [which] permeated first in such powers as the US and the UK and later extended into other countries”.7 Therefore, globalization is not a purely objective economic process, but an international capitalist push through neoliberalist globalism, which is reinforced through globalization. In this institutional arrangement, the neoliberalist Utopian movement of crafting a pure and perfect market has been pursued with political strategies of all sorts, after its being created through a cohort of stakeholders from major financial institutions and enterprises, with senior government officials, politicians and economists who are seeking to justify their actions. However, it was from the subordinate classes in the West as well as the peoples from other societies that the tension between globalization and three levels are differentiated as globality, globalism and globalization (Beck, 2000b, as quoted in Zhang, 2000). 6 It should be pointed out that neoliberalism as in the genetic sense of globalism carries with it a necessary feature of ideology, by instituting a public notion of the “inescapable pressure of market”, through which to disable counteractions as well as discourage political intervention of maintaining status quo. It is in this sense that neoliberalism is ideologue (Habermas, 2002). It was also pointed out that “the interconnectedness of global economy was not a natural consequence but rather the product of such policies as consciously in pursuit of set targets” (Martin, 1998, p. 11). For Paul Smith, “globalization is an ideological construct, declaring a fundamentalist version of capitalism that has yet to come” (Smith, 2001, p. 96). 7 Dahrendorf (1998) as quoted in Zhang (2000). It should be noted that relaxation of controls, privatization and liberalization have become strategic tools by the Western Europe and the US and further advocated as “state ideologies” by neoliberalism (Martin, 1998, p. 150; cf. Scholte, 2003, pp. 39–41).

8

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Academic Inquiries into the “Chinese Success Story”

globalism has been escalated. On the one hand, globalization widens the gap in living standard between the great majority of the world population and the minority that have been better-off when incorporated into globalised production and financial networks. On the other hand, this gap, together with other traditional contradictions, has enabled a critical, reflective globalism to challenge globalization and globalism in its genetic sense. An ethical issue was raised: Are the rich that have consumed the majority of world resources and caused pollution en masse capable of fulfilling the aspirations of the poor in seeking development and an improvement of their living conditions (Cox, 2002, p. 20)? In other words, is this ideology and institutional arrangement capable of constructing a desirable and justifiable world order? As far as I can see, it is precisely this latter sense of globalism that provides possible theorizations for Chinese social science to shape the discourse on globalization through Chinese perspectives. Furthermore, for me, social science knowledge is fundamentally a matter of power and legitimation, which means that it is neither reflective and descriptive as claimed by positivists, nor technically regulatory, but more constructive and consolidating, in that these knowledge is capable, by means of institutionalization, of shaping, constructing and embedding into public awareness and regulatory frameworks such an “ideal picture” of social orders (Deng, 2006, pp. 266–267). Prior to this, due to the lack of critical reflection upon neoliberalism that has been lurking beneath globalization, the discourse on globalization and social order thus formulated by Chinese social scientists was essentially an idealization based on Western experiences. For this, as far as this legitimation of social science knowledge is acknowledged, with its critical power restored, it will be possible to shape a new form of global discourse based on the legitimacy of social order, national interests and cultural-political demands in China. Therefore, globalization is a game-playing process to be (re)constructed through cognizance, tradition and interests. It is to a certain extent a process of contingency, reversibility and uncertainty. For this, Chinese social scientists should not be contented with describing globalization, or uncritically accepting the dominance of neoliberalist globalism during this very process of globalization. On the contrary, it should be realized to

9

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Deng Zhenglai

that degree of sophistication that globalization is an open and changeable construct, for which an active strategy to proactively reconstruct or reshape the dynamics and dimension of globalization should be adopted by Chinese social science. Secondly, the advent of globalization has provided historical opportunities for the internationalization and a knowledge reform for Chinese social science. I firmly believe that globalization has brought ample opportunities for Chinese social science to construct a global discourse based on Chinese experiences, which informs a fundamentally critical juncture of knowledge reform for Chinese social science. By this, Chinese social science will not only be internationalized but actively engage the world in substantial discourse and dialogue. From historical perspectives, the centennial development of Chinese social science can be periodised into three stages: (1) “The introduction of Western knowledge into China”, where a modern discipline-based social science system was established by translating the theories, methodologies, disciplinary system and institutional set-up from the West; (2) “The assimilation’ of Western social science theoretical framework”, from the 1990s forward, by means of applying Western social science knowledge and methodology to Chinese issues and copying the Western paradigm on theoretical innovations, especially in the areas of economics; and (3) “The integration into the world”, i.e., adopting international academic norms, standards, disciplinary system and institutional set-up, particularly through academic standardization movement from the late 1990s. With these three stages of development, not only has the theoretical paradigm from the Western social science been introduced into China en masse, but also a comprehensive discipline-based system was set up. So was the case with the reinvigoration of the academic tradition of Chinese social sciences, which went hand in hand with “copying” the Western paradigm on theoretical innovations and assimilating with international academic standards. Undeniably the past three decades has witnessed a substantial development of Chinese social science, which has laid down a solid foundation for its further advancement. In the new millennium, with a deeper understanding of globalization and development for Chinese social science, Chinese government has grabbed this serendipitous opportunity to propose a “walk out” strategy for

10

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Academic Inquiries into the “Chinese Success Story”

Chinese social science, which may in all probability signify a new age of internationalization. During introduction, assimilation and integration, Chinese social science has replaced an autonomous judgment with a West-centric perspective, under which criterion the research findings thus obtained not only ignore China, but find it difficult to engage the world in substantial discourse and dialogue. On the other hand, the reason for economic miracle in the past three decades has been China’s courage to travel a path that is free from the confinements of Western and traditional models. By comparison, Chinese social science is still deeply entrapped within the ideological circumscription of the ex-USSR and the West, thus incapable of interpreting China’s own experiences. At many times, Chinese scholars were helping Western philosophers to wage a war against Chinese sages. However, “we” as an entity in waging the war are non-existent. Due to the lack of interests in theorizing contemporary Chinese experiences, “we” in fact are either a photocopier or gramophone of Western scholars. In other words, Chinese scholars have gravely ignored an in-depth study and theorization of China’s own issues. I can see that this new age of internationalization is far from a natural continuity of the previous three periods, but has placed higher demand on Chinese social science in establishing a “made in China” academic assessment scheme, through which to develop theories and in-depth studies of China and to engage the Western academia in substantial dialogue, by using a language understandable to the latter (Deng, 2008). For Chinese social science, at least two aspects can be internationalized: (1) Chinese perspectives on globalization, and reconstruction and understanding of world order; and (2) In-depth study of contemporary China (certainly, if humanities are considered as well, the philosophical tradition of China should equally be an aspect for internationalization). As aforementioned, reconstruction of globalization and world order is not only a historical mission, but an important field for Chinese social science to contribute to the world. If the spread of neoliberalism in the post-Cold War period and its subjection to a series of recent challenges can be regarded as unavoidable limits of Western culture in shaping globalization and world order, then the global discourse, with its historicity rooted in Chinese civilization and its contemporaneity in China’s current

11

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Deng Zhenglai

cultural-political demands, can become an important theoretical resource to shape globalization and influence its future development. On the other hand, an in-depth study of contemporary China, especially theorizing the “Chinese success story”, can be the field for Chinese social science to contribute to the world. It is well-known that the recent 30 years of development has told a remarkable “Chinese success story”, beneath which lie the “Chinese experiences” in achieving development without following the Western models. In spite of the existing problems in human rights, democracy and environment due to a single-minded developmentalist impetus, indisputably China is now a country of significance, in terms of tradition, history, civilization, population and modernization. The winding path of development was first built upon the ex-USSR model and later redirected to market economy. The market reform has brought thirty years of sustained growth, which is in itself a remarkable achievement.8 Of these experiences, there exists not only an institutional modus operandi with Chinese characteristics, but also a Chinese living wisdom that can be explained not through imported Western theories but by Chinese perspectives.

4.

Section 3: State and Civil Society as the Analytical Framework for Our Inquiries into the “Chinese Success Story”

The research on civil society in China9 started in the early 1990s, in which China Social Sciences Quarterly played a no small part.10 The general 8 Economists have already pegged their attention to decoding the economic miracle in China. Yifu Lin, for instance, suggested a “backward advantage”. For him, “for developing countries, in general capital is scarce and unaffordable, while labor abundant and cheap, which is conclusive on the mode of labor-intensive industrialization” (Lin, 2002). Hui Qin offered an explanation from the perspective of transaction cost. “The second wave of reform since 1992 has two features. On the one hand, there was no more of Pareto reformism while on the other, the transaction cost of institutional transformation has been collectively lowered through marketization, which is the main reason for the so-called miracle” (Qin, 2008). 9 Geographically, the research I am referring to here only concerns the studies conducted by scholars from mainland China. 10 China Social Sciences Quarterly has played an irreplaceable role in channeling the discussion of civil society in the early 1990s and later period. Cf. Deng and Jing 1992;

12

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Academic Inquiries into the “Chinese Success Story”

socio-economic context of this emerging field of studies can be seen from the great social and economic transformations China experienced since the reform and opening-up policy in 1978. This reform brought unprecedented changes to China in terms of social structure (where the dichotomy of rural-urban residence was replaced by a more fluid rural-urban exchange), economic forms (where planned economy gave way to market economy) and political reshuffling (where upon the demise of the Gang of Four, a new generation of leaders, led by Deng Xiaoping, came into power that opened up further and deeper democratization in China). In attempts to decode and recode these new social phenomena, Chinese scholars, although they did not use the concept of “civil society” in the 1980s, had already experimented with concepts similar to “civil society”, such as the clanstate thesis by Liang Zhiping, the Grey Market theory by Fan Gang, and a Marxian “state-society” proposition by Lu Yue (He, 1995, pp. 27–29). A distinctive discourse on civil society in mainland China, nonetheless, would have to wait until the early 1990s, where such journals as China Social Sciences Quarterly and China Social Sciences helped in no insignificant way to streamline the discussions and debates on state and civil society (Deng, 1996). Therefore, the background for this civil society research can be seen in two aspects, one being the practical aspects of China’s path to modernity, while the other was the intellectual interest in this issue. As far as China’s modernization is concerned, since the Opium War in 1840, the development of China was inescapably faced with a serious structural challenge, in that as a country that lagged behind the western powers in terms of modernization, China’s taking of this path to modernity was not a natural choice, but rather a state-led political design. In the light of this perspective, the forms of transformations that were alien to the Chinese culture and tradition were introduced to China, to which both state and society would have to respond with certain structural adjustments, so as to accommodate these new changes. Such transformations not only brought unprecedented changes to China’s economic, political and social landscapes, but also presented such unparalleled issues as legitimacy crisis, social disintegration, and widespread anomie. Between the two ends Deng 1993a, 1993b; Xia 1993; Xiao, 1993; Xie, 1993; Jiang, 1993; Zhu, 1994; Shi, 1993; Lu, 1993; Chen, 1993; He, Zengke 1993; Fang, 1993; Tong, 1993, Jing, 1993.

13

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Deng Zhenglai

of a strong state control and laissez-faire, the Chinese state and society oscillated back and forth like a pendulum, which as an issue has remained even until today. On the other hand, there emerged this intellectual interest in studying the state-society relations. The political and economic reform in China opened up new horizons for academic research, in the midst of which scholars from different backgrounds (e.g., political science, history, sociology, and cultural studies, to name just a few) were engaged in heated debates and discussions. A distinctive discourse on the issue gradually took shape, which at a later stage would have serious intellectual and policy implications. It is against this background that we set the theme of this volume as “State and Civil Society: The Chinese Perspectives”. As the second instalment in the Series on Developing China — Translated Research from China, this book aims to present to international readers such issues as of state and civil society, as well as of how our understanding of this issue can be contextualized in the Chinese perspectives. The 13 chapters selected for this volume are grouped into three sections — “theoretical reflection”, “historical research” and “modern development” respectively. Where the “theoretical reflection” section shall provide a nutshell view of academic debates and discussions on this topic, the other two sections shall look into the history of China to examine the concepts, definitions and propositions as discussed in the first section. Moreover, how this civil society discourse can help to elucidate our outstanding of its pertinence to modern China shall be elaborated in the section on “modern development”. It is more than a mere coincidence that the chapter by Deng Zhenglai and Jing Yuejin, titled “The Construction of the Chinese Civil Society”, is selected as the first one to head the “theoretical reflection” section. For one thing, this chapter not only appeared as the first of its kind on this topic in the Chinese intellectual community; nay, it also played a leading role in stimulating the intellectual discussion of civil society in mainland China. Its influence for the discourse on civil society in mainland China, so to speak, extended far beyond its temporal precedence. In this article, Deng and Jing challenge the then prevalent theses of neoauthoritarianism, “authority supremacy” or “democracy priority”. Where neoauthoritarianism celebrated the necessity of an iron-hand by the state in propagating market economy, the “authority supremacy” thesis stressed the importance

14

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Academic Inquiries into the “Chinese Success Story”

of state presence in leading the whole nation to modernity. Such authoritycentered views were challenged by the “democracy priority” thesis that emphasized the leading role to be played by a democratic polity in emancipating social and productive forces. China’s reform, in the light of this argument, should start first of all from politics. As Deng and Jing point out, whether it be neoauthoritarianism or the “democracy priority” thesis, both theories base their analyses on a top-down approach that is focused on the state role. This approach overlooks the essential dynamics of the society, which should be taken into account. Therefore, opting for a bottom-up perspective, Deng and Jing call for a construction of the Chinese civil society that will allow members of the society to conduct social and economic activities by contractual rules voluntarily and autonomously. This construction shall have to go through two phases, namely formation and maturation. Only through these two phases can it be possible to accomplish the goal of constructing a Chinese civil society. Where Deng and Jing challenge the state-centered views in the Chinese academia,Yang Nianqun, in his chapter titled “ ‘Civil Society’ in Modern China Studies: Methodology and Limitations”, explores the contextual differences in the theoretical discussions on this topic from China to the West, where the former is more focused on the changes of resources allocation, socialization and state function. The Western discourse on civil society, henceforth, is relatively more teleological in seeking to describe and explain the confrontations between civic associations and the state. By way of comparison, the Chinese discussion of civil society is not based on the presumptions of conflict or confrontations between state and society. In its stead, it stresses a positive interaction between the two in achieving mutual appreciation, stability and democratization. This positive interaction between state and society accords with the Chinese history of state and society in a state of “mutual embeddedness”, under which circumstances both “socialization of state” and “nationalization of society” could be seen. The discourse of civil society in China thereby will not be readily intelligible unless and until contextualized within the historical experiences and traditional resources of China. Following Yang Nianqun, Yu Keping’s chapter, “Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment”, seeks to clarify our conceptualizations of civil society, the third sector, institutional

15

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Deng Zhenglai

environments or civil society organizations. He then classifies civic associations in China by the differences in their administrative management and theoretical propositions. His focus none the less is on the institutional environment in China, where the coexistence of contradictory terms can be seen, such as encouragement at the macro-level and restriction at the micro-level, legislations and party policies, redundancy and deficit. These conceptual particularities in the Chinese context should be born in mind should any researcher wish to study state and civil society in China. Different from Yu Keping’s general warning of conceptual nebulae in the study of Chinese civil society, Kang Xiaoguang and Han Heng, upon the basis of their empirical examinations in “Graduated Control: Research on State-Society Relationship in Contemporary Mainland China”, propose a concept of “graduated control” which is believed to possess great theoretical potentialities. By definition, graduated control refers to the control strategies by the state on civic associations, at varying degrees by the nature and type of the public goods offered. The provision of public goods, in the light of this perspective, can be achieved in a non-governmental way, thereby enabling the state to exercise its control over the society under new economic conditions. This undoubtedly is an attempt to construct a Weberian ideal type to capture both theoretical expositions and empirical realities in China. The last chapter in this section, namely “Evolution of the Interactive Relationships among Chinese State, Civil Ruling Elites and Commoners before and after the Reform” by Sun Liping, adopts a structuralist view to study the relationships between different social entities. For him, traditional China was characterized by a three-tier social structure of the state, civil ruling elites and commoners, which was replaced by a two-tier structure of state and commoners when the Chinese Communist Party established their rule in 1949. This structure, following the introduction of market reform in 1978, was gradually and quietly substituted by a three-tier structure, a structure this time consisting of a new middle rung of civil ruling elites. This new space situated itself between the state and commoners as a medium. Sun’s structuralist conceptualization shall help us to have a clearer vision of the social structure in both traditional and modern China. Now, apparently, another horizon that is opened up by Sun’s article is the history of civic associations in China. We can read Sun’s structuralist

16

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Academic Inquiries into the “Chinese Success Story”

reconstruction of China through either a theoretical or historical perspective. It is a study that is of as many theoretical as historical implications. What follows from Sun’s chapter is a deeper understanding of China’s history, the context of which shall be used to examine the validity of the concepts thereby deployed by different scholars. This is where lies the second section — “a historical research on civil society”. Taking up the argumentation from where Sun leaves it, Zhu Ying’s chapter, “ ‘State and Society’ in Modern China: Research Review and Reflection”, discusses the opportunities and challenges of applying the “state-society” framework to analyzing China’s history. Different from critics who were hostile to these borrowed concepts of “civil society” and “state-society relations”, Zhu Ying argues in favor of using these Western concepts to analyze different historical periods in China, albeit in a cautious manner. Where it opens up new horizons, provides fresh perspectives and enriches research methodologies, this “state-society” analytical framework should nonetheless be subject to rigorous academic scrutiny — in other words, their applicability to China’s history cannot be taken for granted. Different from Zhu Ying who examines the applicability of these concepts to China’s history, He Baogang attempts to trace the very history of these concepts in their use among the Chinese intellectuals. His chapter, “The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92”, describes the process of and explains the raison d’être behind the discourse of civil society in mainland China and Taiwan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For both places, civil society carried with it ample implications, both intellectual and political. In both places, there was a shift in the ideological underpinning of the conception of civil society, namely changing from an antagonist model to a non-antagonist one. Where in mainland China, such antagonism turned into a mutual support model between state and civil society since 1992, in Taiwan, it was changed into a Habermasian version of civil society. He Jianyu examination of the concept of civil society is restricted to a short period of time in rather recent history of China. In contrast, Xu Jilin is far more ambitious in pushing the history under his study back to the imperial age. In his chapter, “Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings: A Case Study of Shanghai”, Xu argues that the Chinese notion of public sphere can be traced back to the group

17

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Deng Zhenglai

of aristocrat-intellectuals in late imperial China. Engaging Europe as the comparative example, Xu forcibly asserts that the Chinese public sphere had its inception deeply rooted in the political from the very beginning. The public space, by way of contrast, referred to newspapers, institutes and schools rather than cafes, bars or saloons as in the European case. The threat to its development did not come from capital, power or money as Habermas suggested, but rather from systemization and partisanship. The last two chapters in this section, namely “Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China” by Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu, and “Chinese Rural Township Government: A Sequence of the Expansive Moments of the State in History” by Wang Mingming, explore the history of civil society in China from different contexts. The urbanityoriented presumption guides Wang and He to focus their attention on the global context of associational revolution in China, as they argue that the mushrooming of civic associations in China in the past decades cannot be readily detached from the global boom of civil society activism. By contrast, Wang Mingming directs his attention inwards to the Chinese history in the past century since 1908. He ably demonstrates that throughout the different regimes in the 20th century (namely the Republic Period, Mao’s Era and Post-Mao Reform), there had been an extension of state power into the countryside. The institutionalization of rural township and town governments, henceforth, was a result of state penetration into the society. The vivacity of Wang and He’s global awareness as well as of Wang Mingming’s countryside-centered analyses leaves open the question of how to envision the modern development of civil society in China. Does it present nothing but a conformation to the “global” experience, or rather, in its rural– urban kaleidoscope, exhibit certain distinctive “Chinese characters” that are readily palpable and analyzable? This is where the very purpose of the third section (“modern development”) lies. The three chapters in this section follows from one to another in a differential scope of study. As Zhou Jun and Yu Jianxing picks up Wenzhou as their case study, Edward Gu argues for a corporatist model for civil society in China, while Qin Hui, both a historian and a sociologist, skilfully combines both perspectives in his examination of China, civil society and modernization. More specifically, using the positive interaction paradigm as proposed by Deng and Jing in the first section, Zhou and Yu, in their article

18

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Academic Inquiries into the “Chinese Success Story”

titled “The Wenzhou Model of China’s Civil Society”, uses the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce as the example to demonstrate how a Wenzhou model of civil society can be conceptualized and theoretically characterized. The development of this model not only derives its dynamics from market mechanisms, but also an indispensable portion of government support and buttress. It thereby testifies the mutual support model as suggested by He Baogang in his historical studies in the second section. This mutual support relation between state and society is confirmed by Edward Gu in his theoretical proposition of a “mutual empowerment” model of state-society interactions. By this model, Gu’s chapter, “Toward a Corporatist Development of Civil Society in China”, points out that the state has been instrumental in forging societal corporatism and nurturing the inception of a public sphere comprised of a wide variety of civic associations. Where Zhou andYu emphasize the local particularity in their Wenzhou model, what can be extricated from this model is also the essential element confirmed by various contributors in this volume, such asYang Nianqun, He Baogang and Edward Gu — namely mutual embeddedness between state and society. This positive interaction between state and society points to the very necessity for us to be critically aware of the underlying presumptions of antagonism, individualism and zero-sum contestation as inherent in the Western conception of civil society. This intellectual re-examination culminates in Qin Hui’s study, “From Major Community Standard to Civil Society: A Rethinking of Traditional China and Its Modernization”, which addresses the issues that concern intellectual integrity, critical faculty and cultural awareness as raised in the foregone paragraphs. As Qin argues, traditional China emphasized the integrity of major community, such as clan and big families. Different from the European stress on breaking the fetters of minor community, Chinese path to modernity shall necessarily involve an alliance between civil society and minor community in breaking the fetters of major community. Apparently, the scope of study is gradually enlarged from Zhou and Yu to Gu, and then further to Qin. Moreover, revisiting both the concepts and theoretical frameworks as discussed in the first section, this third part fuses history and contemporaneity in critically examining the modernization path of China. In short, this unique volume provides a comprehensive overview of the “state vs. civil society” discussion in China in the past three decades, which

19

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Deng Zhenglai

include the most outstanding and influential articles on the topic. It seeks to pose important questions, within the context of Chinese national conditions, particularities and histories, to the validity, applicability and viability of the state and civil society paradigm in the Western academia. The discussion of state and civil society includes not only theoretical reflections, but also historical studies and empirical examinations. All the contributors are native Chinese scholars who have experienced China’s dramatic changes by themselves. This book shall present a unique opportunity for international readers to gain the Chinese perspectives, as far as civil society, as well as its relation with the state, is concerned. In the past, research done by Chinese scholars has not been adequately represented in English due to the language barrier. This translated volume shall in no small way supplement the global discourse on state and civil society with the voices from within China. Last but not least, the discussion on state and civil society in China has been fully expanded into different disciplines, on the basis of which monographs, edited books and papers have appeared in such fields as law, sociology, economics, politics, culture and ideology. The 13 chapters thus selected, most representative as they may be, are at best only a small proportion of such discussions in mainland China. Plus, the worth of this volume not only lies in presenting the voices from within China. More importantly, through these chapters and their bibliographies, readers interested in this topic may research further readings that otherwise may be inaccessible. This collection, in short, can be the key for readers to unlock the door to a gold mine of intellectual resources on state and civil society in China.

References Beck, U. (2000a). The Desirable Growth of Democracy in Globalization. In Globalization and Politics, Beck, U. and J. Habermas (eds.). Translated by Wang, Xuedong; Chai, Fangguo. Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press. Beck, U. (2000b). What is Globalization? London: Polity. Chen, Jiaming (1993). The Hegelian Civil Society and Its Relation with Other Countries. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1993(3). Cox, R. (2002). Different Perspectives on Globalization. In The Discourse on Globalization, Wu, S. (ed.). Shanghai: DSX Joint Press.

20

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Academic Inquiries into the “Chinese Success Story” Dahrendorf, R. (1998). Globalization. In Re-Inventing Europe: A Cosmopolitan Vision, Beck, U. and E. Grande (eds.). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Deng, Zhenglai (1993a). Civil Society and State. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1993(3). Deng, Zhenglai (1993b). Study of Civil Society in Taiwan. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1993(4). Deng, Zhenglai (1996). State and Society. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1996(5). Deng, Z. (2006). China Jurisprudence: Where to Go? (zhongguo faxue xiang hechu qu). Beijing: Commercial Press. Deng, Z. (2008). Advanced Study and the Development of Chinese Social Science (27 Dec 2008). Wenhui Bao. Deng, Z. (2009). Whose Globalization? Which Jurisprudence? (shui zhi quanqiuhua? hezhong fazhexue?). Beijing: Commercial Press. Deng, Zhenglai and Jing Yuejin (1996). The Construction of the Chinese Civil Society. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1992(1). Fang, Chaohui (1993). Civil Society and Legitimacy of Capitalist Nations. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1993(3). Giddens, A. (2001). Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives. Translated by Zhou, Hongyun. Nanchang: Jiangxi People’s Publishing House. Habermas, J. (2002). Habermas on Globalism, Neoliberalism and Modernity. Translated by Shen, Hongwen. International Theoretical Frontiers (guowai lilun dongtai) 1. He, Baogang (1995). The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92. Issues & Studies, 1995 (June). He, Zengke (1993). Civil Society and Cultural Leadership. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1993(3). Held, D. and A. G. McGrew, et al. (2001). Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Translated by Yang, Xuedong. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press. Jiang, Qing (1993). Confucianism. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1993(3). Jing, Yuejin (1993). The Symposium on “Civil Society and China’s Modernization”. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1993(4). Lin, Y. (2002). Backward Advantage and Disadvantages (houfa youshi yu houfa lieshi) (8 July 2002). News Weekly (xinwen zhoukan), pp. 68–69. Lu, Pinyue (1994). China’s History and the Construction of Civil Society. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1994(3). Martin, H. P. and H. Schumann (1998). The Global Trap: Globalization and the Assault on Prosperity and Democracy. Translated by Zhang, Shipeng. Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press. McChesney, R. W. (2000). Introduction. In Neoliberalism and the Global Order. Chomsky, N. (ed.). Translated by Xu, Haiming and Ji, Haihong. Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Press. Meadows, D. H. and D. L. Meadows, et al. (2000). The Limits to Growth. Translated by Li, Tao. Beijing: Mechanical Industry Press.

21

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-intro

Deng Zhenglai Mesarovic, M. D. and E. Pestel (1987). Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome. Translated by Lin, Changyi. Beijing: China Peace Press. Qin, H. (2008). The Origin and Prospect of the Miracle of China (zhongguo qiji de xingcheng yu weilai) (21 Feb 2008). South Weekend (nanfang zhoumo). Reich, R. (1994). Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st-Century Capitalism. Translated by Xu, Dizhou. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House. Scholte, J. A. (2003). Globalization. Translated by Wang, Yanli. Changchun: Jilin People’s Press. Shi, Xuehua (1993). Modernization and Chinese Civil Society. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1993(2). Sklair, L. (1993). Several Sociological Concepts on Globalization. China Social Sciences Quarterly (HK), p. 5. Smith, P. (2001). One World: Globality and Generality. In Symptoms of Globalization. Tong, Shijun (1993). Civil Society in the Post-Marxist Perspective. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1993(4). Waters, M. (1995). Globalization. London: Routledge. Xia, Weizhong (1993). Civil Society to China: A Dream Hard to Fulfil in the Short Term. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1993(4). Xiao, Gongqin (1993). Civil Society and China’s Modernization: Three Barriers. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1993(4). Xie, Weihe (1993). The Mobility of Social Resources and Social Stratification. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1993(3). Zhang, S. (2000). What is Globalization? Europe (ouzhou), p. 1. Zhu, Ying (1994). Several Preliminary Suggestions on the Chinese Civil Society. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1993(2).

22

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

PART I Civil Society in China: A Theoretical Reflection

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

This page intentionally left blank

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

The Construction of the Chinese Civil Society1

Chapter

1

Deng Zhenglai, Jing Yuejin2

Abstract A true dilemma for Chinese modernization is that between state and society there is no robust structure that favors the development of modernization. More specifically, the society does not form an independent and autonomous structural sphere. It is a must, therefore, that “Neoconservatism”, the “authority supremacy thesis” or the “democracy priority thesis” be replaced with the “dichotomy of state and society”. In other words, the earlier “top-down” perspective needs to be replaced with a “bottom-up” one so that the Chinese civil society can be built. The Chinese civil society refers to a private area where social members conduct social and economic activities following contractual rules voluntarily and autonomously. The construction of the Chinese civil society can be divided into two phases: formation and maturation. The relationship between state and civil society is positive interaction. As a process caught in social and political reorganization, the construction of the Chinese civil society is bound to be a long-term process, where unless with the appearance of a dual structure of state-civil society, as well as their mutual positive interaction, this mission shall remain unfulfilled. Keywords: Chinese civil society; the Positive Interaction Thesis. 1 The article was originally published in the first issue of China Social Sciences Quarterly

in October 1992. The English version was translated by Professor David Kelly from the Australia National University and published in Chinese Social Sciences Year Book in 1993, and included in International Political Science Abstracts, USA. 2 Deng Zhenglai, Dean of Fudan Institute for Advanced Study in Social Sciences (IASFudan) and Director of Contemporary China Research Center (CCRC) at Fudan University, Shanghai, P. R. China. Jing Yuejin, Tsinghua University, Beijing, P. R. China.

25

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

Deng Zhenglai, Jing Yuejin

1.

Introduction

1.1. Chinese modernization has encountered a severe structural challenge ever since the Opium War. As a country where modernization lagged behind the West and driven by external forces, China had to make a certain degree of adjustment in terms of political and social structures so that the development of modernization could be conceived and pushed forward. And in this process of adjustment, one of the central problems to tackle is to reform the traditional political structure and the form of authority, in a way such that they can be legitimated on the new base of social support, and then changed into a modernization-oriented political center.

1.2. This challenge composes, to a certain extent, a dilemma with which Chinese modernization is faced. Theoretically, the successful transformation as abovementioned has to meet two basic requirements: firstly, the loss of governmental authority in previous structure should be minimized so that certain social order can be maintained and governmental access to social resources safeguarded, or in other words, social disorder resulting from political crisis should be avoided to stabilize political and social conditions that are necessary for the progress of modernization. Secondly, in order to ensure a true modernization orientation on the part of this authority, governmental authority in transition should be prevented from receding into traditional forms due to social disorder or the absence of external social monitor. Looking back into history, regrettably it can be seen that these two basic requirements composed the two opposing poles in the practice of Chinese modernization. Political changes resulted in the legitimacy crisis of political authority, which in turn caused social disintegration, wide-scale anomie and divided nations. As a reaction to and compensation for this disorder, political structure would usually return to its traditional forms, where military power and traditional symbols, either reformed or otherwise, will be deployed to tackle with the legitimacy crisis. Such deployment shall 26

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

The Construction of the Chinese Civil Society

result in the abortion of the newly launched political reform. Certainly, as can be seen in the post-1949 period, these two historical poles dangling between high political centralization and planned economy evolved into such vicious circles as “relaxation leading to disorder, disorder to recentralization while recentralization to political stagnation” as far as the matrix of central-local government relationship is concerned and the “[bureaucratic] downsizing — swelling — re-downsizing — re-swelling” with regard to institutional reforms.

1.3. Since 1978, many debates and arguments related to the path of Chinese modernization, especially those discussions about the political and economic reforms, can be deemed as theoretical attempts beseeching contemporary solutions for this historical challenge. “Neo-authoritarianism” was wary of social disorder during reform, for which reason this school by emphasizing the importance of authority insisted that a powerful political authority would be needed as a guide of modernization in the process of changing from ancient regime to modern commodity economy and democracy, so that social integration could be safeguarded, social order maintained and social and political wellbeing provided for the development of market economy. Neo-conservatism derived from this basis (which differs from neo-authoritarianism in both substance and degree) expressed more clearly that social and cultural sources to buttress this authority should be sought in traditional culture (Liu and Li, 1989). Opposing neo-authoritarianism, the “democracy priority thesis” emphasized that previous political centralization hindered the progress of Chinese modernization, for which reason the reform in China must start from politics and that unless with the progress and consolidation of democracy, China’s economic modernization would fail (Liu and Li, 1989).

1.4. However, the focus of our attention and interest is: What cognitive style shall we take to examine this dilemma of Chinese modernization in the 1990s? 27

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

Deng Zhenglai, Jing Yuejin

A resort to intellectual rigor and rationality reveals that to exit the dilemma, cognitive change will be necessary in the first place. We should not focus on the transformation of political authority, for the fundamental of this dilemma lies in the absence of a state-society configuration appropriate for the development of modernization. Specifically, a structured sphere of independence and autonomy has not taken shape yet in society. Regardless of the over-centralization of state power or the drastic loss of political authority, they are both related to the relationship between state and society (external structure), in addition to its own cause (internal structure). Therefore, when it comes to identifying the fundamental issues for modernization, the “dualism of state and society” has to replace the “authority supremacy thesis”. If Chinese modernization wants to exit the historical vicious circle and the dilemma, the problem about the relationship between state and society must be settled both theoretically and practically. This is a huge but inevitable challenge.

1.5. In order to attract theorists to this significant issue, and also to find a better practical solution to the issue of the state-society relationship, after careful deliberation and reflection on our current context and historical experiences since China’s reform and opening-up policy, we believe that it will be necessary to build a theory of the Chinese civil society. As a strategic vision of Chinese modernization, the ultimate purpose of this theory is to, from a top-down perspective, construct a robust Chinese civil society, during which process we hope to establish the dual structure of state and civil society, as well as to enable positive interactions between the two. Only by doing so can we avoid the historical repetitions and push forward Chinese economic and political reforms, eventually availing China’s modernization. The implications of building the Chinese civil society can be seen in the following few aspects: After the disintegration of planned economy, where upon the state gives up managing the economy by administrative means, civil society could actively assume the responsibility of cultivating the market and 28

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

The Construction of the Chinese Civil Society

developing commodity economy, and also nurturing a great number of independent market entities engaged in commercial activities. In other words, after the state partially abstained from social life and economy, civil society could fill in the “vacuum” on the one hand while build an economic base for its own construction on the other. When China needs to centralize power during its transition from traditional to modern society, civil society as an independent force will become the “last resort” to prevent such authority descending into tyranny. Moreover, in daily routines civil society can also keep state power in check. In the process in which the reform and opening-up will be carried further in politics, civil society can create amenable social conditions for democracy through developing market economy and cultivating a plurality of autonomous associations and organizations. The contractual rules, autonomous capability and interest structure developed within civil society shall insure and monitor social stability. On account of the depoliticization of social and economic life, the repercussion of political changes on social elements will be greatly reduced. Meanwhile, the diversification of the interest structure will also reduce the probability of social turmoil. The concrete strategies of building the Chinese civil society include adopting an approach of rational gradualism, or “two-phase development”. The first phase is formation, in which members of state and civil society should be upheld together. While the state is pushing forward a top-down reform, the change in governance should be accelerated by a proactive and gradual retreat from society and economy. Social members should take full advantage of the favorable conditions and opportunities to push forward the bottom-up building of civil society in a conscious and rational manner. Activities within this phase are concentrated in economy. The second phase is maturation, during which social members, upon self-development and self-improvement, shall gradually enter “the public sphere”,3 participate in and influence state decision-making, so as to avail positive interaction with the state.

3 See Section 2.2 of this chapter.

29

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

Deng Zhenglai, Jing Yuejin

1.6. The intellectual and theoretical appreciation of Chinese modernization so far has been focused on the top-down process. Though neo-authoritarianism and the democracy priority thesis differ in their choice of path for Chinese modernization, their cognitive styles are the same, in that they both adopt the “top-down” approach.4 Considering the historical features of Chinese society and the sui generis way of launching the Chinese modernization, such cognitive style is understandable. But it must be pointed out that if the top-down approach in researching China’s modernization is regrettable, then in today’s China where the reform and opening-up have been carried out energetically, it will not only be a regret but also a grave mistake to cling on to this top-down paradigm while overlooking the significance of the role that social actors have played in the bottom-up process of modernization. To build the Chinese civil society also requires the disenchantment of several misconceptions. One is the idea that civil society belongs to the bourgeois class in nature. Advocating civil society thus equals advocating bourgeois interests per se, or even preaching capitalism. This mistake is to simplistically equate civil society with bourgeoisie. In fact, the rise of the bourgeois class is merely a Western type of civil society. Historically, civil society as a counterpart of modernity has a universal applicability, to which China is no exception. Another misconception is that the emphasis on the independence and autonomy of civil society is to abolish the state and to advocate anarchism. This idea confuses the necessity of state interference and its reasonable limitations. On the contrary, the emphasis does not negate the role of the state. It merely attempts to demarcate the boundary of state interference. The third and last misconception is that civil society is an enemy of the state, which is derived from the cultural tradition of populace rebelling against state officials. Just as above-mentioned, civil society can keep in check the encroaching power of the state without confronting the latter. It can strike a balance in the dual structure between state and society. 4 Certain proponents of the democracy priority thesis argued that considerations should

be given to the highest level of politics in a given state. They called for constitutional amendments, parliamentarianism and multi-party politics, all as constituents of a topdown democratization. By comparison, neo-authoritarianism and neo-conservatism explicitly upheld “benevolently wise authority”, “authority with a modernization mentality”, or “modernization-oriented authority”.

30

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

The Construction of the Chinese Civil Society

All of the abovementioned misconceptions will affect the development of a robust civil society from a variety of aspects. It is in this sense that they are worthwhile of our attention.

2.

What Is the Chinese Civil Society

2.1. The formation of modern civil society in the West is closely related to the appearance of “modern state” or what is termed as “nation-state”. In the light of the complex variety of social developments across countries, civil society will have its meaning, composition, function and nature varied by such contexts as historical periods, cultural backgrounds and national differences.5 Civil society is not a natural and unchangeable entity, but a historical phenomenon. Neither is it a universally homogenous model, but a social phenomenon contextualized in local particularities. We thereby should put them into particular historical contexts for examination. On the other hand, civil societies do share certain common features, such as the base of market economy, contractual relations and the protection of civil rights and civil liberties. A full appreciation of the nature of civil society, therefore, depends on the combination of its shared features and individualities.

2.2. According to Chinese history and status quo, the Chinese civil society is both a private area where social members abide by contractual norms voluntarily and autonomously in their social and economic conducts, and a non-official public area where the masses participate in the management 5 Western scholars differ in their description of civil society. For example, scholars of the

natural law school argued that civil society is a state of civilization in contrast with a state of nature. Hegel criticized such viewpoint and pointed out the historicity of civil society. He suggested that civil society is a phase of logical consequence of social life and will be transcended by the state. Marx explored civil society on the basis of economic relationship and equated it with capitalist society. For Tocqueville, civil society is a public sphere free of state interference and a curb on state tyranny.

31

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

Deng Zhenglai, Jing Yuejin

of public affairs. Its specific connotations can be seen in the following few aspects: The Chinese civil society is made up of independent and autonomous individuals, groups, organizations and interest groups, excluding governmental staff, the ruling Party organizations, military staff and police officers who have “political identity” and a duty to execute governmental functions.6 Peasants self-sufficiently relying on lands are also excluded. In the Chinese civil society, entrepreneurs and intellectuals are the backbone, for a few reasons. Entrepreneurs are the chief force for the building, development and improvement of market economy. That they intuitively seek their own interests while equally treating others will incentivize them to advocate the spirit of contractual equality. Their deep understanding of the significance of negative freedom (exemption from the encroachment of power and the harassment of social disorder) shall drive them to stabilize social order and maintain civil society. The fact that as staple taxpayers they are resourceful both financially and materially makes them an important stakeholder group to influence state decision-making. The economic strength and status thus possessed endow them the leadership in organizing and sponsoring all forms of groups, organizations and interest groups. Chinese intellectuals generally have the awareness of modernity and knowledge on modernization. Regarding social stratification, certain intellectuals changed their roles, chose to do business and then became a backbone in the development of a robust economy. Those who were not involved in economy played irreplaceable roles in education, enlightenment and academic research. All in all, Chinese intellectuals have been the source of knowledge and energy for the progress and development of the Chinese civil society. It should be pointed out that even though Chinese peasants are still not totally detached from lands, the boom of township and village enterprises (TVEs) brought about by the reform and opening-up policy cultivated a great number of township entrepreneurs and workers who also bore the identity of peasants. Along with the development of the rural commodity economy, they would become an indispensable force in the Chinese civil society. 6 The concept of role should be clarified here. In a society, an individual can play many

different roles. When a governmental official is not carrying out duty ex officio, he or she will become a member of civil society as well.

32

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

The Construction of the Chinese Civil Society

The inner connection of the Chinese civil society is neither the traditional blood relationship nor the hierarchical administrative relationship, but contractual relationship conceived during market transactions. Let us make no mistake about it, within civil society, any party that wants to take will have to give. In other words, the obtainment of certain right is accompanied by the acknowledgement of duty thereof. The establishment of this contractual relationship is first of all an approbation of the fundamental human and property rights of every member within civil society. For one thing, prior to a contractual relation, presumably members must possess certain rights and resources of their own. Otherwise morally they will have no reason or possibility to transfer some of their rights. In addition, once established, contractual principles will have binding effects upon every member, who then within the contractual boundaries can compete for his own interests in a rational manner and enjoy full independence and autonomy in his own life. All kinds of organizations, groups and individuals that make up the Chinese civil society have independent legal personality. Their activities and internal management are both highly autonomous. The state must respect this independent autonomy and protect it by laws. Generally speaking, the state should not interfere with the operation and activity of each group or organization, but from this it cannot be concluded that they are totally independent and autonomous. When conflicts or disputes occur within civil society which cannot be settled, state interference, arbitration and mediation will become necessary.7 It is in this sense that the independence and autonomy of civil society are only matters of relativity, which can be termed as “independence without autonomy”. The independence of civil society is correlated with its maturity: the more mature a civil society is, the more independence and autonomy it will have. In the Chinese civil society, each member should not join a particular group or organization under coercion except out of their own judgment and volition. Voluntariness should be one of the important features of the Chinese civil society, which is premised on a deep appreciation of civil liberty. The importance of forming an association voluntarily is that it cultivates in people a sense of responsibility and self-management. 7As for the necessity of state interference in civil society, please refer to Section 3.4 in this

chapter.

33

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

Deng Zhenglai, Jing Yuejin

The Chinese civil society is a composition of the public and private spheres. The private sphere means an economy that is free of excessive administrative interference. Market economy is not only the place where is members of civil society spent an active life, but also the base on which civil society dwells and thrives. Without market economy there would be no civil society. The non-official public sphere refers to the variety of spaces that despite their externality to politics allow for civil society exercising influences upon state legislation and decision-making. For example, opinions and ideas can be communicated on TV, radio, newspapers, periodicals, books and other forms of media. They can also be exchanged spontaneously in saloons, seminars and meetings. Through these activities, an opinion with wide social recognition can be formed, which is called “public opinion”. It is not subject to interpretations by the state or the government. Also, it will exert certain influence on the latter.

2.3. The conceptualization and definition of the Chinese civil society are based on the dichotomy of state and civil society. Civil society and modern state are bound to be in a historical process of both separation and interdependence. In this process, the depoliticization and secularization of social and economic life is a powerful motive behind the formation of civil society. The eventual riddance of political control on the part of civil society stands for the maturity and awakening of civil society. The division of state and civil society results in the establishment of the dual structure: the institutional setting as political arrangement is to be controlled by the state, while the rest, like the private and non-official public spheres, will become civil society.

2.4. In order to fully understand the idea of the Chinese civil society, it is necessary to distinguish it from various civil social organizations in Chinese history.8 For purposes of discussion, we will preferably call it 8 Many scholars in Hong Kong and Taiwan have translated “civil society” as minjian shehui

in Chinese. Although this chapter is not intended to discuss the accuracy of this translation,

34

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

The Construction of the Chinese Civil Society

“folk society”, which mainly refers to the various forms of peasants organizations (sometimes with the involvement of gentry, merchants or officials) that were off centralized control, including organizations that were close to or remote from the government, like cooperatives that stressed mutual help, gangs, rebellious organizations and religious societies. These folk societies were not based on market economy, for which reason they did not rely on rational contractual norms to adjust interpersonal relationship. Instead, they relied on blood or sworn relationship, as well as fraternal loyalty. In addition, they did not have the independent and autonomous spirit borne of market economy. The Chinese civil society pursues a structural reform of the relationship between state and society for the purpose of marketization and democratization. By contrast, for the traditional folk society, the supportive conditions upon which it relied upon prescribed an impossible escape from tradition and history for the sake of modernization. Functionally, the biggest difference between civil society and folk society is that the former pursues positive interaction with the state on the basis of independence and autonomy, while the latter was never differentiated from the state, not even to mention a positive interaction with the latter. Therefore, the traditional folk society and civil society are two completely different historical phenomena.

3.

The Chinese Civil Society and the State

3.1. After 1949, China gradually established a highly centralized political system that fits planned economy. Unavoidably, this system resulted in the unity of state and society. Before reform, this unity featured the loss of independence on the part of society, as we can see from the following three aspects. Firstly, the state carried out collectivization by administrative means in rural areas and socialist nationalization of urban industry and trade, thereby absorbing all economic components into the framework of planned economy. This resulted in making economy dependent on politics it should be duly acknowledged that this translation is also one of the reasons for us to distinguish civil society from folk society.

35

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

Deng Zhenglai, Jing Yuejin

and thus eradicating the conditions for the growth of civil society. Secondly, with such guiding principles as “politics first”, “the political in command” and “class struggle”, and by such means as of political propaganda, study, discussion, debate, class struggles, self-criticism, reporting and organizational rectification, the state controlled social opinions ideologically and practiced a high level of political mobilization, making the state dominate all social fields and resulting in a highly politicized social life. Through institutionalization, the state absorbed individuals into the administrative framework, making individuals “an institutionalized being” while extinguishing their independent personalities. This unity of state and society robbed society not just of its natural independence, but also hindered the development of economy, deforming the state, limiting state functions and barricading the progress of democracy. Since China’s reform and opening-up in 1978, along with the partial retreat of administrative power from social life and economy, the gradual depoliticization of social life and the rapid development of commodity economy, the dichotomy between state and civil society started taking shape, and the Chinese civil society also began to emerge. Under such circumstances, the relation between the Chinese civil society and the state has already become a major issue that demands attention from theoreticians.

3.2. The issues concerning the relation between state and civil society have always been controversial theoretically. Opinions on civil society, as well as relevant theoretical models vary considerably according to opinion-holders’ temporality.9 Theoretically, of these differing ideas and opinions, roughly two major schools can be seen, namely the school of “state over society” and that of “society over state”. The former emphasizes the role of the state in structuring the society while denying the other way round. In the relation between the two, the society is believed to be attached to the state. The latter 9 John Keane did a historical study on the relation between state and civil society. By examin-

ing the various theoretical attempts to differentiate non-public spheres from public spheres, he classified five categories, namely Security State, Constitutional State, Minimum State, Universal State and Democratic State (Keane, 1988, 31).

36

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

The Construction of the Chinese Civil Society

school, on the contrary, argues that society precedes state, and that the state is a political organization built for security and interests, or in other words, merely a tool to achieve social welfare. For society, the state is a “necessary evil”. State interference, as well as the size of government, should therefore be minimized.

3.3. Along with the “revival” of civil society theories in recent years, new paradigms emerged in the discussion of the state-society relation. What is worth mentioning is the “rebellion theory” and the “harbor theory”. The “rebellion theory” simplifies the state as a political party or a government, and preferentially regards the state-society relation as hostile or even confrontational. This theory stresses the resistance of civil society against the state through mobilizing populace against officers, from which can be seen its emphasis on the entirety, consistence and homogeneity of civil society. For this school, such consistency means also “belligerence” or “rebelliousness” on the part of civil society in encountering the state. The “harbor theory” maintains that it is meaningless to try seizing or sharing governmental power. For those living under a centralized system, the best strategy is to invest their energy in economy, religion, culture and other important activities while ignoring the tyrannical state (Konrad, 1984). For this, civil society is regarded as a “harbor” in a centralized system. When people are all in the harbor, the tyrannical state will be vacated and become an empty entity. This theory stresses passive evasion when dealing with the state-society relation.

3.4. According to the history and status quo of China’s social development, we suggest a “Positive Interaction Theory (BIT)” to examine the state-society relation. The role the state plays in relation to civil society includes the following two aspects. Firstly, the state acknowledges the independence of civil society and provides it with institutionalized legal protection so that it has a legitimate active space. Secondly, the state interferes with civil society only 37

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

Deng Zhenglai, Jing Yuejin

when necessary. This interference can be divided into two levels. The first is abstract legislation, which provides universal rules for the activities of civil society, while the other level is to arbitrate or mediate interest conflicts that civil society itself cannot reconcile. It should be pointed out that civil society is neither a paradise on the earth nor a single piece. In itself there are complicated relations that involve different interests groups with varying orientations. Competition for resources and profits can be fierce and cruel. Probably there will exist marked inequality in property ownership, freedom of choice and income distribution. Moreover, civil society represents more of particular interests, and it often fails to protect universal social interests, so that there is a necessity for state interference and mediation. However, while recognizing the necessity of state interference and mediation, we have to define the rational limits of such interference with the principle that state interference and mediation should be carried out by legal and economic means rather than political mobilization. The state interferes and mediates where civil society cannot manage in accordance with contractual principles, such as macro-management and those areas that concern universal social interests. The effect of civil society on the state is also reflected in two aspects. In its passive sense, civil society can check and balance the state, in that while defending its independence and autonomy, civil society struggles for and defends its freedom from excessive state interference and encroachment. It is in this sense that civil society is the last resort that keeps authority from descending into tyranny. In its active sense, the development of civil society cultivates diversified interest groups that will seek political expression of their interests in different ways and at certain stages of development. This type of desire and activity powerfully incentivizes the process of democratization. In this sense, civil society lays a solid social foundation for democracy. On the other hand, before the establishment of democracy, civil society can influence major state decisions through various non-official channels so that democratic decision-making can be achieved.

3.5. It is obvious that the positive state-society interaction is a mutual, appropriate check-and-balance relationship. Through this interaction, both sides 38

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

The Construction of the Chinese Civil Society

can make up for each other’s deficiencies so that universal interests under state control can be balanced with particular interests in civil society in a manner appropriate for further social development. Certainly, this positive interaction proposition is merely an ideal type. In reality there exists no such pure form as described, but rather varied transformations of it. For example, the state may interfere with civil society in the name of general interest through various approaches, as can be seen in the example of the “welfare state” model popular in Western countries. On the other hand, civil society will also try various means to advance particular interests even at the sacrifice of general interests, resulting in the loss of social justice. Therefore, to approach this ideal type in a closest manner will be our purpose, since the perfection of the positive interaction between state and society shall avail social maturity and robustness.

4.

The Building of the Chinese Civil Society

4.1. In order to craft the further development of the Chinese civil society, it is necessary to explore the constituents of the Chinese civil society. These constituents include mainly state, society and external elements. Firstly, the top-down state element. Since 1978, the reform and opening-up policy made objectively significant contribution to the formation of the Chinese civil society. For example, within 30 years after the liberation in 1949, especially during the decade-long Cultural Revolution, “ultra leftism” flooded the whole nation. The great discussion of the standards of truth in 1978 launched a top-down movement of thought liberation, providing an ideological basis for the state to transfer its emphasis of work from “class struggle” into economic development, the historical transition of which provided the basis for advancing political reforms in China. Relaxation of government control over enterprises, as well as the change in governance, has to a certain extent resulted in the depoliticization of the entire social and economic life, wherefrom can be seen the partial retreat of state from social life and economy. 39

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

Deng Zhenglai, Jing Yuejin

In view of the painful lessons learnt from the Cultural Revolution, the nation started emphasizing the construction of a legal system. The legislative function of the state advanced a great deal since the reform and openingup, where a multitude of laws and regulations was made. Among them, the Administrative Procedure Law, the Civil Law, and the Enterprise Law, among others, were especially significant in regulating the state-enterprise and state-society relations. As these laws were reinforced during application, their significance for the construction of civil society also increased. Where the planned economy under excessive administrative interference that lasted for 30 years failed to uphold the nation, the state was forced to move on to commodity economy, enabling the prospering of individuals, private and township enterprises, as well as the appearing of market economy, which laid a foundation for civil society. With the development of market economy, especially the pressure to energize major and medium enterprises, the state started experimenting with shareholding ownership, which enabled the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to be freed from state controls to a certain extent. The gradual change of state functions in economy left space for the development of civil society. In order to drive reform and opening-up further, as well as to introduce technology and funds, the state not only opened up a number of port cities, but also sought to attract foreign direct investments (FDIs) with favorable policies, creating foreign-funded enterprises with various sizes, which formed an emerging and relatively independent economy. In order to ensure the economic interests of individuals and enterprises as well as to assure the FDIs, the state made various policies and laws to ensure their rights and interests. In this sense, the state defined a boundary between state and civil society by means of institutional arrangement. The “anti-rightist” movement persecuting intellectuals in the 1950s and the decade-long “Cultural Revolution” were cruel attacks on intellectuals who were independent and modernization-oriented. This caused devastation to education in China and created a fracture zone in terms of China’s intellectual recruitment. In 1977, the state resumed the system of university entrance examination and recruited large numbers of intellectuals with modern knowledge and awareness of modernization. They were the backbone of civil society, in that they provided an intellectual basis for the formation and development of civil society.

40

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

The Construction of the Chinese Civil Society

Secondly, the bottom-up social elements. This refers to innovative activities launched or implemented voluntarily by social members of the state. This was a vigorous social force in the process of Chinese modernization. For example, driven by the desire to reduce poverty, peasants in Fengyang County, Anhui Province took spontaneous actions to break the stagnant collectivization and initiated the household contract responsibility system, taking the first step of rural economic reform. The popularization of the household contract responsibility system nationwide gradually freed peasants from administrative directives, thereby availing freedom, autonomy and profits. The self-employed and private enterprises in Wenzhou City, Zhejiang Province suffered severe strikes during the “ultra leftism” period but were never exterminated. Instead, they prospered after the reform and openingup in 1978. Their acquisition of legitimacy triggered the mushrooming of private enterprises and self-employed associate ventures in other cities and towns in the whole nation. In the process of thought liberation, a great number of civil associations sprang up, especially intellectual groups engaged in the study of local culture. Since then, independent associations of other categories started to emerge. During the disintegration of the old system, certain original constituents started transferring to new positions. A lot of governmental staff quit their “iron bowls” for freelance jobs that could sustain their lives. The range of enterprises that were taken, as well as the sheer number of this group, was very impressive, and they created an increasingly large amount of social wealth. More importantly, the occupational change from within the system to without, termed as “cross-system flow of population”, brought about changes in mentality, ideologies and conducts. Such values as independence, competition, mutual help, risk, credit and compromise took root, and the recognition of individual independence increased day by day. Thirdly, the outer-inner external elements. This refers to the important influence the international society had on China since the reform and opening-up. After China’s reform and opening-up, a large amount of FDIs flowed into China and engendered a great number of foreign-funded enterprises. Apart from their non-politicization, these foreign funds accelerated the

41

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

Deng Zhenglai, Jing Yuejin

process of the depoliticization of enterprises they joined or permeated, thereby forming a group of independent enterprise legal persons that were free of administrative interference. In order to merge into the international society and achieve corresponding international recognition, the state started to emphasize a conformation to international standards. These standards and codes during international interactions could be easily internalized, or in other words, transplanted unto domestic soil. The protection of intellectual property rights and the concern for ecosystem were important examples. It is predictable that with the deepening of reform, this influence will be further strengthened. The list of the abovementioned three major constituents is far from exhaustive, but it demonstrates sufficiently that with the state gradually retiring from social life and economy, the boom of market economy, the establishment of contractual relation and the growth of civil society forces, the Chinese civil society has already started to take shape. Through the making of laws and policies, the dichotomy of state and society is gradually taking shape as well.

4.2. Under such circumstance, how to change the “forming” civil society into an “automating” one, or in other words, to move from passive formation to proactive constructing, is a significant and difficult historical mission for us.

4.3. In order to ensure the smooth development of the Chinese civil society, when we are proactively constructing the Chinese civil society, two extremities should be avoided. First, before civil society reaches maturity, it should operate according to contractual principles and becomes a stable force in maintaining social order, and before civil society gains independence from the state and then overcomes its own dependence and reliance on the former due to the fact that its economic liberation preceded democracy, civil society should avoid over-participation in politics. Secondly, the construction of civil society should not be modeled after the traditional folk 42

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

The Construction of the Chinese Civil Society

society paradigm, which can easily lead to a return to the single-minded “civil rebellion against government” approach, thus barricading the positive interaction between state and society, as well as hindering the progress of democratization.

4.4. For this reason, we advocate the “two-phase development” for the construction of the Chinese civil society.

4.5. The major task in the first phase of constructing the Chinese civil society is to build the preliminary form of civil society and formulate the dual structure between state and civil society. This target can be achieved economically with the management mechanism as the main method. For example, various kinds of economic organizations through acquiring independent legal person status are thus freed from administrative or consanguine relations. Through the growth of market, contractual relations can be cultivated and established. Commodity economy can help to foster independent and autonomous personality as well as cultivating objective economic interest structure and behavioral norms. Certainly, the building of civil society can also be achieved through voluntary groups and associations and other autonomous organizations. The significance of cultivating a national awareness of civil society to the building of the Chinese civil society can never be over-emphasized. Without conscious and concerted efforts on the part of social members, the construction of the Chinese civil society will be unimaginable. The major problems to be solved in this phase are to acquire the free space off state control and the premise of independence and autonomy. If these two problems are not solved, the dual structure between the Chinese civil society and state can never be achieved and attempts to mediate such relations through regulations will fail. It should be pointed out that the acquisition of independent autonomy and freedom is especially important for the construction of the Chinese civil society, as the formation of the Chinese civil society differs fundamentally from the rise of Western civil society. The former is driven by the state, not 43

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

Deng Zhenglai, Jing Yuejin

individuals. For instance, the appearance and development of independent enterprises relied on state policies for a certain period, thus manifesting dependence on the state. The Western civil society, by comparison, was driven by private capitals rather than by the state, and it naturally was more independent and autonomous.

4.6. The major task in the second phase of constructing the Chinese civil society is to improve civil society on the basis of the achievements in the first phase, and to exert positive influence on state decision-making through various channels, which means active participation in politics. This is the expansion of the Chinese civil society from private to public spheres, which indicates that in addition to obtaining an independent identity, it also acquires a participant identity, which will help to avail a positive interaction between state and society. Apparently, if civil society only plays the role of negative check-andbalance without positive participation in politics, such civil society will be incomplete functionally, and the positive interaction based on dichotomy will not be achieved. Therefore, the civil society that China needs to build should have not only economic freedom, but also rights to participate in state decision-making. Seen from another perspective, one of the ultimate targets of Chinese modernization is to achieve political democratization which will be unrealistic without civil society as its cornerstone and without the participation of multiple interest groups as one of its structural arrangements. In other words, only when the public are willing to unite themselves by voluntary groups and exert influences on public life through various channels can democracy emerge. It is in this sense that we regard civil society as a precondition of democracy.

4.7. The crucial issue here is the mechanism through which civil society can take advantage of its participation right and exert influence on state decisions. This is of essential importance for a country where democratization is not yet institutionalized. In terms of politics, public participation relies on legally recognized rights, such as the rights to know, freedom of speech, 44

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

The Construction of the Chinese Civil Society

and freedom of association. But the establishment of these rights does not solve the problem of equal entry into political processes. Therefore, in order to make sure different interest groups can equally carry their particular interests into the political processes and then effectively influence state decisions, a set of institutional procedures and regulations has to be set up to protect the above-mentioned rights. Henceforth, apart from active participation on the part of civil society in the second phase, the cultivation and establishment of such systemic procedure and regulations should be made one of the primary tasks.

4.8. It should be emphasized that the two phases are not neatly separated from each other. Instead, they are connected organically to each other and follow overlapping paths of gradual development with varying emphases. We do not assert that civil society plays the participation roles only when reaching the second phase. Actually it might appear in the first phase, depending on whether civil society has acquired an identity independent of the state, whether it has become a self-stabilizing entity, and also whether civil society has legitimately acquired the control of non-official public sphere.

5.

Conclusion

The building of the Chinese civil society will be a long-term process, from the formation of the dichotomy of state-society to the positive interaction between state and society. Our suggestion of constructing the Chinese civil society is to encourage the whole nation to consciously participate in the construction, creating conditions and bases for positive interaction between civil society and state, so as to reduce blind fervor, temperamental convulsions and irrationality. It is also an arduous process for the construction of China’s civil society. The difficulty comes from the following two aspects. First, China has a long history of despotism and power centralization, where the development of independent societies had always been confined or even smothered by the imperial unity and centralization. More importantly, because the state lacked modernity, certain independent forces that emerged failed to form 45

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch01

Deng Zhenglai, Jing Yuejin

civil society in a modern sense. Modern China did not leave us a rich heritage. The weakness of the bourgeois class and the fall of the gentry class seemed to foretell a difficult delivery of civil society in modern China. After 1949, the establishment of highly centralized political system extremized the imbalanced state-society relation. Understandably it can be difficult to build civil society in a nation with such historical backgrounds. Secondly, it is not easy to define the boundary between state and civil society in practice. The history of other countries shows that the boundary varied with time and by nations. Correspondingly, it is easy to propose an ideal type theoretically, but in practice there is no model to follow. For the interaction between state and society and their respective roles vary considerably from one country to another. Therefore, it is not easy to find an appropriate standard for defining the rationality of state interference or advocating the autonomy of civil society. Thirdly, when advocating the building of civil society, more attention might be unconsciously paid to its rationality, strengths and functions while the potential problems are overlooked. As stated in Section 3.4 in this chapter, there exist various kinds of conflicts in civil society, which elicits the necessity of state interference. It is also worth pointing out that such conflicts and contradictions will lead to the collapse of civil society if they are not dealt with properly. The purpose of pointing out that it is a long-term and difficult enterprise to build the Chinese civil society is to encourage further endeavors and cautious deliberations. Chinese modernization needs concerted efforts of the nation and active participation of the people. Only in the multiple interactions of top-down, bottom-up, inner-outer and outer-inner constituents can Chinese modernization exit the dilemma and the vicious circle, so as to mobilize sufficient social resources for modernization. Here lies the purpose of this chapter.

References Keane, John (1988). Democracy and Civil Society. London: Verso. Konard, George (1984). Anti-Politics. London: Harcourt. Liu, J. and L. Li (eds.) (1989). Neo-Authoritarianism. Beijing: Beijing Economy Institute Press.

46

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch02

“Civil Society” in Modern China Studies: Methodology and Limitations

Chapter

2

Yang Nianqun1

Abstract This article tries to examine the use of two terms, namely “public space” and “civil society” by Chinese scholars. Through analyzing the different contexts, be it cultural, historical or political, between China and the West, this article cautions against unreflective use of the two terms. Moreover, the background of “civil society” research in China differs from that of the West, for which reason it is necessary to bear these differences when applying these terms. Keywords: Civil society; public space; democracy priority theory.

1.

Introduction

The academic circle of Western Sinology generally applied the concepts of “civil society” and “public sphere” as tools to analyze modern Chinese society. Presumably this was influenced by two main factors. The first was the change of theoretical discourse after the global socialist crisis in 1989. Western scholars focused their discourse on the antagonistic interaction between state and society. Taking Trade Union Solidarno´sc´ (Poland) as an individual case, these scholars believed that the demise of Eastern Europe communist regimes was attributed primarily to the formation of “civil society” and its final rise as a social force capable of contending with state 1Yang Nianqun, Institute of Qing History, Renmin University of China, Beijing, P. R. China.

47

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch02

Yang Nianqun

authority. All studies on this aspect were implicitly contextualized in ideological clashes, which is not within the scope of discussion herein. The second factor was specific to modern China studies. Influenced by Jürgen Habermas the German sociologist, certain scholars focused their studies on the politicization process of elites and commoners in the late Qing Dynasty and early Republican Period, which indicated that the academic discourse in the Western Sinology community was going through another profound transformation. At the end of the 1970s, the American Sinology circle experienced a change from such binary model as the “Western Challenge — China’s Response Paradigm” and “tradition-modernity” to “sinocentrism” and started to focus on reevaluating the realignment and regrouping of local elements during the development of modern Chinese history. Nevertheless, they failed to develop a reliable model alternative to the previous theories, as well as to describe the “internal dynamics” of Chinese local conditions. Even “sinocentrism” as proposed systematically in Paul A. Cohen (1974), only constructed a simplistic “coastal-inland” framework to evidence the “internal dynamics”. Meanwhile, it was widely acknowledged that a more normative sociological theory — the “civil society” thesis became seemingly a tool more feasible and powerful to study such issues as the changing concepts of social space and the relation between elites and commoners. This thesis is of particular significance to deepening the cognitive clarity of “sinocentrism”. However, before the late 1980s, most Western historians were only influenced by the secondhand introductory materials about Jürgen Habermas’s thesis on “civil society”. The concept of “civil society” formally came into the studies of modern Chinese history in the Englishspeaking academia after Tomas Burger translated Jürgen Habermas’s masterpiece — “Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit” into English in 1989. In the American Sinology circle, the first monograph using the “civil society” theory to research on modern China was Chinese Elites and Political Change: Zhejiang in the Early Twentieth Century, written by R. Keith Schoppa. In Schoppa’s opinion, in the 1900s the infiltration of local elites into state power was reflected in their wide participation in public affairs. Along with this process, there was a popularization trend which transferred official duties to private organs. R. Keith Schoppa used “political development” to summarize this transference. The so-called “political

48

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch02

“Civil Society” in Modern China Studies: Methodology and Limitations

development” arose in a social system which was constrained by certain form of combination between individuals, teams, systems and local political units. The level of development could be summed up as its interdependence and complicated relations among constituents of the system. To put it simply, the process of political development was one of upgrading political structure from its embryonic stage to a complicated combination one, evolving into different institutionalized structures based on initial consanguinity, family status and the relationship between clients and brokers. Most important of all, in the first decade of the 20th century, political development did not have a high level of consistency in space and time. It did not originate from the same resources across provincial or regional boundaries or within the same province or region. This heterogeneous characteristic could be effectively analyzed only by dividing a province into “ecological areas” based on economic patterns, as the development of different elite groups indicated the discrepancies between local and provincial politics (Schoppa, 1982, p. 6). Based on the criteria of population density, regional location, and prosperity of postal service and property system, R. Keith Schoppa divided Zhejiang Province into four areas which were differentiated from “center” to “periphery”. The center covered the most developed areas, while other areas were cumulatively divided by a descending order from primary to secondary areas. This hierarchy had tremendous impact on elite mobility and political development (Schoppa, 1982, p. 28). Regional politics revealed that private affairs were gradually taken into public responsibilities. The center areas in the late Qing Dynasty had strong integrating effects on the development of political organizations. Evidence suggested that it was possible to explain the goal and significance of autonomous organizations and interest groups in the new context of politics, society and economy, which could be termed as the emergence of “public sphere” (Schoppa, 1982, p. 187). In the study of regional politics, R. Keith Schoppa was the first to have used the “civil society” theory to review the role that the pattern and direction of intellectual mobility played in chartering political changes in the late Qing Dynasty. This was particularly the case with the change in the intellectuals’ role and the interactive relations among grassroots organizations in the “state-society” binary framework. Despite a “localized” perspective, he incorporated the variable of “political development” into regional political

49

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch02

Yang Nianqun

network of “center-periphery” and dedicated a whole chapter to analyzing the radiating effects of center. Based on his conclusion that peripheral intellectual elites would self-consciously return to their hometown to engage in local modernization, the “center-periphery” dichotomy had essentially become a geographical indicator of the “radicalist-conservative” confrontation. Thus, it is seemingly possible to find traits of the “tradition-modernity” model in his analysis. After R. Keith Schoppa, the concept of “civil society” was gradually introduced as an interpretative instrument in the studies on modern Chinese history. This was to a large extent reflected in two aspects. First of all, the American Sinology circle put more emphasis on finding comparably analogous “political terms”. For instance, highlighting the frequency of such terms as “gong lun (public opinion)” and “gong wu (public affairs)”, it was believed that the meaning of the Chinese character “gong ( )” was comparable to the Western term “public”.2 This implied that there evolved a local autonomous tradition that was actually corroding state power. With the use and change of concepts like “public”, “state-owned” and “private”, these elites started to compete for their own ascendancy in legal and judicial areas. Both official and non-official elites were invariably seeking political legitimacy. Such historical terms as “public”, “official” and “private” were defined with legitimacy implications in the new era, thus becoming new parameters for addressing social and political issues (Rowe, 1990). Secondly, certain scholars more often than not identified the scope of “public sphere” through power transfer from state to society. In fact, since Philip Kuhn et al. initiated their studies on “localism”, the research on society’s penetration into state power in the late Qing Dynasty had been started and later systemized by Mary Backus Rankin (1993) and William T. Rowe (1990, 1993). Mary Backus Rankin categorized the political vocabulary of the late Qing Dynasty into three groups, namely “official”, “public” and “private”, with “public” as a medium between “state” and “private”. There was a spatial extension of the “public”, according to the following criteria: Flourishing of autonomous organizations and property rights, changes in 2 William T. Rowe indicated that America and Britain also had substantial discrepancies

on the meaning of “public”. For instance, in Britain, “public school” is used for private educational system off governmental control, while in America, “public” is more consistent to connote governmental behavior, which is different from Britain (Rowe, 1993).

50

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch02

“Civil Society” in Modern China Studies: Methodology and Limitations

communication with free expression of public opinions, and legal protection of rights, systems and actions with structural limitations on state power. Certain general assumptions also played crucial roles. For instance, it was assumed that there existed conflicts of interest between government and individuals, which gave rise to such belief in limiting state, power (Rankin, 1993, p. 159). Mary Backus Rankin concluded that the Donglin Party and the Fushe Society, active in the late Qing Dynasty and early 17th century, had the sign of “public sphere”, which was quite similar to the rise of its Western counterpart. In the Qing Dynasty, there were three factors indicating that “public sphere” had become a force confronting the state power. Firstly, due to the weakening of state power and the collapse of the punitive taxation-oriented Lijia (Tithing) Household Registration System in the late Ming Dynasty, local elites regained power in managing local affairs, thus had their local position enhanced. Secondly, the improvement of literacy rate provided more employment channels. Thirdly, the gentry-merchant elites came into being (Rankin, 1993). William T. Rowe intended to demystify the so-called “Weberian Myth” by analyzing the urban structure of modern Hankou. He concluded that the urban structure of Hankou, like water conservancy facilities and street maintenance, reflected the divisions between state, the public and the private. The function of the “public” had substituted the effect of the “private”. The “Weberian Myth” is a feature model about Chinese urban development proposed in Weber’s well-known monograph, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism. The key point of this work was to define Chinese and Western cities in terms of political and economic functions. By highlighting the differences between Chinese urban areas and rural areas, the model overlooked the importance of market centers at the sub-county level as well as the potential difference in social conditions between counties, provinces and empires. Weber also believed that Chinese urban areas had been in a dormant state since the Song Dynasty and until the invasion by the West in the 19th century, thus overlooking the internal dynamics of the Chinese social structure. The later Chinese historians mainly amended Weber’s conclusion in three aspects, emphasizing the primary role of economic factors than that of politics (Rowe, 1984, pp. 7–8). In William T. Rowe’s view, Jürgen Habermas established the discourse of “civil society” mainly from a historical point of view. William T. Rowe

51

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch02

Yang Nianqun

admitted that the existence of “public sphere” is a historical and unchangeable phenomenon, based on which he was convinced that China had started a “second commercial revolution” in the late Ming Dynasty and early Qing dynasty (Rowe, 1993). Secondly, William T. Rowe avoided taking the “civil society” study as an ideological instrument, but focused on the so-called “de facto public sphere” (Dirlik, 1993). As William T. Rowe pointed out, history evidenced that critical space was enabled owing to Hankou’s prosperous long-distance trade, large-scale trading firms, fiscal system and organized commercial network, continuous local urbanization and development of urban culture (including teahouses similar to Western European bar and café), rapid expansion of the printing industry and the rise of secular pop culture. As the urban service system and social welfare had improved significantly in Hankou in the 19th century, William T. Rowe believed “public sphere” as a social category can certainly be applied to summarize these phenomena. For one thing, to a certain extent this was a direct consequence of the piecemeal withdrawal of state power under social demands. In the face of new social demands and the complicity of a metropolis, the society might respond more flexibly than the government. Primarily official administration could play at best a secondary role when encountering the emergent societal activism (Rowe, 1989). William T. Rowe made optimistic estimate on grassroots autonomy in his study on Hankou, which aroused great controversy. For instance, he thought the changes in the composition of the Hankou population and mixed inhabitation of both natives and non-natives were the foundation for autonomy. However, Frederic Wakeman, Jr. had the opposite opinion, in that the conclusion that Hankou was representative of Chinese endogenous urban autonomy and community identification was indefensible. For one thing, Hankou’s commercial guilds were most of the time controlled by nonnatives. For instance, one of Hankou’s biggest commercial guilds actually was established by non-natives with support from Shanghai compradors. Taking another example, the management of the salt industry’s profit was not under the control of an autonomous and independent merchant community. According to Frederic Wakeman, Jr., the so-called autonomy of “Hankou merchants” was actually a product of state monopoly and a “broker of bureaucratic merchant”. Therefore, it can present certain difficulties

52

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch02

“Civil Society” in Modern China Studies: Methodology and Limitations

in how to distinguish commercial bureaus within official administration from autonomous grassroots commercial organizations (Wakeman, 1993). Critics on the “civil society” theory suggested that conventional neighborhood or community activities could not be regarded as similar to “modern communitarianism”. Personnel and activity funds provided by trading firms could evidence as new and unconventional autonomous activities. Different from Mary Backus Rankin and William T. Rowe who focused on looking for similarities between the political vocabulary inside modern Chinese structure and its Western counterpart, Philip Huang believed the binary “state-society” as an ideal concept that was abstracted from the early experiences of modern West is not suitable for China. Jürgen Habermas also admitted that the “public sphere of Buergertum” is a very abstract theoretical model. Philip Huang suggested that we could use a tripartite analysis to examine the society of the late Qing Dynasty (Huang, 1993). Firstly, the relation between state and society should be understood from the changes in both aspects. Thus, Philip Huang tried to build a value-neutral category — “the third realm” to describe the possibility of an existing Buergertum. This category had unique characteristics different from state and social spheres and operated on its own accord. Metaphorically, it resembled the child–parent relation. With emphasis on parental guidance, the importance of the child’s own growth might be neglected. The assumption of “the third realm” was actually derived from Philip Huang’s study on Chinese law. He divided the judicial system of the Qing Dynasty into three parts: a formal legal system consisting of statute laws and official courts, an informal legal regime including unwritten laws based on consanguinity and community arbitration, and the third realm which fell in between the above two systems. The personnel of administrative organizations were positioned between state and community, thus influencing both sides. The third realm was increasingly institutionalized, part of which turned into bureaucratization and was incorporated into modern statecraft, while other parts were absorbed into socialization. All these polarizations could be deemed as symbols for the emergence of modern society. In summary, to use “civil society” in the studies on modern China featured state’s derivative rights from traditions and their limitations. Based on the aforementioned perspectives, the discussions, materials and the

53

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch02

Yang Nianqun

“state-society” interactive framework differ essentially from the “public sphere” thesis as proposed by Jürgen Habermas. Probably this dissimilarity to the Habermasian theory can be an alternative approach to interpreting the particular case of Chinese history. Next, we will analyze and evaluate these perspectives briefly.

2.

Limitations of the “Civil Society” Concept as the Basis for Academic Discourse

As discussed above, it has been noticed that although the introduction of “civil society” and “public sphere” has pro forma significance, their interpretation nevertheless departed from the original thesis of Jürgen Habermas. According to Philip Huang, the two Habermasian concepts — “civil society” and “public sphere” were proposed on the premise of a dichotomy between state and society, which as merely a summarization of modern Western experiences were not able to explain Chinese historical conditions. Huang’s perspective was quite refreshing. Therefore, in this context, the Habermasian approach is seemingly not valid to examine the Chinese history. However, while Huang proposed an alternative theory of the third realm between state and society, he was apparently modeling after the Habermasian “public sphere”. These conflicts are closely related to different understandings of the Chinese society. In the course of Chinese history, the relationship between “state” and “society” maintained a delicate balance. The grassroots xiang-li organizational structure in social sphere in Chinese history has its record dated back to the pre-Qin periods. For instance, there were vivid descriptions about xiang-li organizations in the chapter on Situ (Judge), a kind of Diguan (Local Officials) in The Chou Rituals, as well as in the chapter on politics in Guanzi. But the structure of grassroots society did not mature till the Tang and Song Dynasties. After xiang-li organizations were established, they gained independence from the “state”. Although the state could intervene with social life by administrative means, local gentries took charge of essential functions and formed an operational space different from state organizations. This can be misleading to the extent that autonomous space in Chinese history was believed to have existed that approximates such Western concepts as “public sphere” 54

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch02

“Civil Society” in Modern China Studies: Methodology and Limitations

or “the third realm”. In fact, in China, “state” and “society” did not have concrete boundaries but instead have substantial connections. For instance, the state controlled gentry’s mobility through imperial civil examinations, which presents a monitoring network involving high-ranking officials and low-level gentry. The fact that local gentry’s identity and educational background would have to conform to these official standards largely weakened their independence, not to mention a distinct “public sphere”. Even in the late Qing Dynasty, when the identity of the “gentry” class was demised by a rising gentry-merchant class, it was still difficult to measure to which extent the traditional “society” had changed. The “civil society” theorists used many examples to prove that public sphere existed in China, such as night-watchers, fire brigade, and charity organizations. However, the majority of these were at best a transformation or extension of grassroots organizations in the old “society”. In Jürgen Habermas’s definition, “public sphere” has two characteristics: It is a place to express public opinion and the expression is conducted freely. However, the formation of public sphere was often corroded by two processes, namely the state’s penetration into social sphere and the authority’s socialization plan (Huang, 1993). Under such circumstances, “public sphere” would experience a structural transformation possible in two ways, namely “socialization of state” and “nationalization of society”, both of which tended to blur the boundaries between state and society. Without such boundaries, a “public sphere of Buergertum” would not be possible (Huang, 1993). As for Chinese history, the penetration of state into society was limited due to territorial varsity and cultural resistance. After the Southern Song Dynasty, the control of grassroots society gradually turned indirect, where a greater reliance was placed upon such bodies as clan, local rule and regulations applicable for the inhabitants in a given territory. As Gu Yanwu concluded in Daily Records, it was partly due to the draconian laws in Legalism. Therefore, the “socialization plan of state authority” should occupy a central role in imperial governance. Huang noticed that the activities of gentry and merchant elites were concentrated in local and rural areas, while not at the state level and in urban areas. This varied from the Habermas’s thesis that the “public sphere” of Buergertum was centralized at the state level and in urban areas. Generally, although sinologists understood

55

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch02

Yang Nianqun

the independent character of township administrations in the Chinese society, they were often mistaken in regarding the following organizations as characteristic of pre-modern civil society, including trade guilds, townsmen associations, clans, community groups, god-worship societies (Bai Shen Hui), scholars’ societies (Xi Zi Hui), charity organizations and secret societies. These organizations were regarded as institutions independent of state control. As a matter of fact, they could be part of the “socialization plan of state authority”. In examining these organizations, the question we should ask is: beneath “public sphere”, had the private sphere expanded? How independent was the private sphere? These are important hallmarks to identify the modernity of grassroots organizations. There was a strong sense of collective identity in China. Scholars, if overlooking the assumption of individualism and private property, could be mistaken in applying such concepts as “public sphere”. Another issue that needs to be clarified is the integrating role played by the state in the development of “public sphere” during the late Qing Dynasty. This issue itself seems like a paradox. For one thing, the early modern European-style democracy in the West was developed under high-level social integration and statecraft. By comparison, modern China lacked an effective administrative framework for the development of public sphere on the one hand, while on the other, it squeezed social resources through state power. Under such circumstances, the state could confine the expansion of political freedom. Prasenjit Duara described the influence of “statecraft” and “democratization” on rural administrative organizations from the late Qing Dynasty to the Republican Period. He demonstrated that the “symbolic traditional value” of various organizations could be retained, such as the ritual activities by the Society of Baiquanzha (Baiquan Zhahui), which remained an effective means to unify local communities (Duara, 1994, p. 5). As Chinese statecraft was implemented successively from the late Qing Dynasty to the early Republican Period, the state could easily coordinate with social organizations by modeling after Western regulations and institutions. For instance, by the late Qing Dynasty a plethora of “corporations” appeared with non-traditional administrative characteristics. These corporations, such as educational, lawyers’ and bankers’ organizations, operated as affiliates to the state. The state controlled them in the same manner as it controlled local elites. Active scholars in introducing the “civil

56

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch02

“Civil Society” in Modern China Studies: Methodology and Limitations

society” concept (e.g., Mary Backus Rankin) has already noticed that state monitor, other than open public discussions, was the core feature of civil society in the late Qing Dynasty. The relationship between officials and elites in handling local public affairs were not confrontational but interactive. The elites did not try to monitor state power (Rankin, 1993, p. 159). Although in time of rising “localism”, certain gentry called themselves as administrators of xiang (township) or li (community), it did not suggest that they accepted the overall state ideology. Apparently, traditional identification had changed. For instance, Zeng Guofan was also a marshall. His official title nonetheless was still shilang (minister). From this, it can be seen that local symbols could not be readily detached from statecraft efforts. Apart from the separation between state and society, there had been mutual coordination between them toward the goal of democratization, which should not be overlooked in examining the complexity of the Chinese history. The final question we should consider is whether the external similarity between organizational functions and political descriptions really indicates convergence of cultures. As analyzed previously, the power transfer from state to social elites may not necessarily indicate that the society had an essential nature of “public sphere” similar to the West. The Chinese-style “public sphere” kept a close relation with the state. As a Japanese scholar had summarized, “in traditional China, civil society existed neither as a dependent entity dominated by state power alone nor as a self-improving space independent of the state. We may regard civil society and state power as a mutually-connected continuum” (Yuzo, 1994). This concentric structure entailed that the boundary between state and society may have little significance. If we temporarily set functional operation aside and review the issue from a cultural perspective, we will find demarcation tension between “public sphere” and “private sphere”. On the one hand, the concept of “only [selfishly] private, no public” was popular among the Chinese intellectuals in the late Qing Dynasty. Among others, Yan Fu, Liang Qichao and Chen Duxiu did fiercely criticize the “selfishness” in Chinese personality and tried to redefine the relation between group and individual so as to enable a new mentality for the Chinese people. On the other hand, as modern theorists have noticed, the lack of “individualism” and respect for private rights

57

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch02

Yang Nianqun

posed an age-old problem to achieve an integrated Chinese personality. The Chinese concept of man being an integral part of nature could help to eliminate tension and discrepancy in terms of theoretical interpretation, which should be the key to our understanding of whether “public sphere” existed in China. Some sociologists have pointed out that the concepts of “private” and “public” had been interpreted with such great ambiguity in modern times due to the elusiveness in the connotations of “private” and “public”. Thus, the scope of “private” and “public” might be distorted under particular conditions. Take the understanding of “one’s private ends” for example. Although for Chinese the “private” is emphasized at times, they do not simply defend individualistic privacy. Instead, this notion of “private sphere” will have to be understood in the context of family, clan and neighborhood. In other words, the “private sphere” needs to be contextualized in a collective identity. The “private” is seldom construed in individualistic sense. To a great extent, the “private” has the character of the “public”. As Fei Xiaotong commented in his “differential mode of association”, “the difference between the public and private is only relative” (King, 1994). This “public” is connected with “clan” and “official affairs”. In this view, Ambrose King believed that if the “private” and the “public” were only relative to each other, it would be difficult to establish the “boundary” between them (King, 1994). Therefore, the confrontation and integration of the “private” and the “public” is an age-old proposition, as certain concepts such as “public affairs” and “public business” were reinvigorated to examine China. These concepts, despite their frequent appearance in daily life, were at best the reproduction of “public sphere”, which did not incorporate an element of Western individualism. It differed fundamentally from the Western “public sphere” which stresses protection and respect for individual privacy. Jürgen Habermas particularly used a chapter to explore “the relationship between the autonomy of public sphere and that of private sphere” in his recent work — On the Internal Relation between the Rule of Law and Democracy. As he suggested, “Law cannot exist without private autonomy of legal person. As a result, given the lack of protection for basic rights of citizens, there is no way to institutionalize certain conditions, under which the populace as citizens can exercise their public autonomy. Thus, private

58

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch02

“Civil Society” in Modern China Studies: Methodology and Limitations

and public autonomy serve as a premise for each other” (Habermas, 1994). What Jürgen Habermas stressed was the private autonomy under the condition of “public sphere”, whereas the Chinese traditional “public sphere” took the “private” autonomy as a premise. The Chinese history at large did not lack the concept of “public”. There were many examples of local autonomy both in urban and rural areas. Nevertheless, superficial resemblance cannot blind us to the facts of distinctive cultural patterns and notions. In China, “public sphere” had penetrated into “private sphere”. China’s ontological view of nature can be the background for us to understand the “public-private” distinction. For instance, such differences as between imperial power and civil rights, as well as those between father and son in a family are all included in the notion of “public sphere”. As Mizoguchi Yuzo commented, from Japanese private-public point of view, the “father–son relation” was a private issue and was separated from government, state and society in the public sphere. Henceforth, it could not be regarded as “public”. Obviously, under the Confucian influence to eradicate privacy and individualism, the “public” could subjugate all the “private” traits in traditional China. It made individualistic autonomous rights unable to fit in with the Chinese conception of “public sphere”. But in Japan, although the demarcation between “public sphere” and “private sphere” was feudalistic, there was a possibility for private space to expand.

3.

Conclusion and Projection

Applying the concepts of “civil society” and “public sphere” to modern China studies is an experiment to interpret the development of Chinese history according to the Western empirical framework. It is too early to make an overall evaluation, as further studies need to be carried out. However, those scholars who have applied the “civil society” theory to studying Chinese issues have realized that the key to in-depth study lies in a deeper consciousness of the differences between Chinese and Western contexts. As Richard Madsen maintained, the Western context of “civil society” is rationalitic. It was used to legitimate and institutionalize political orders. China and other Asian countries should look for an “Asian-style” public 59

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch02

Yang Nianqun

sphere. Habermas suggested that café played a critical role in the British public sphere of Buergertum in the 18th century, which nonetheless cannot be used to examine the role of Chinese teahouses (Madsen, 1993). American social philosopher Criag Calhoun believed that it is important to clearly distinguish the two concepts — “public sphere” and “civil society”, which are interconnected but not equivalent to each other (Liang, 1994, pp. 424–427). Fortunately, many researchers have started to apply the concepts cautiously. One is to avoid overemphasizing the inherent differences of Chinese history in the Western discourse. For instance, William Theodore de Bary even attempted to unearth the liberalist traditions in Chinese history. The other is to avoid taking longitudinal concerns due to the constraint of political discourse, thus making the study a product of ideological “teleology”. Studies on Chinese history are at the crossroads. For one thing, institutional analyses were applied, from the concept of “civil society” to local structure. On the other hand, efforts have been made to avoid overgeneralizations from the studies on Chinese history. Therefore, the conclusions can be paradoxical as far as the differences between Chinese and Western “individualism”, “civil law”, “property rights”, and “public management” are concerned. For instance, “individualism”, social contract and natural rights as well as the stability of “private sphere”, were the essential conditions for the birth of a “civil society”. Without these features, how is it possible to prove that the autonomous organizations in the late Qing Dynasty and early Republican Period were not a revival of traditional forms but in essence resembled the Western “public sphere”? The background of “civil society” study in Chinese mainland differs from that in the West. The former has more practical concerns. They do not seek to describe the balancing and confrontations of social associations and civil organizations against state power for “teleological” purposes like their Western counterparts. Neither do they attempt to avoid abstract philosophical discussions and a due concern of political contexts. They strive to establish a theory about the unique development of modern China with reference to the practical problems China met since its reform. The study of Chinese “civil society” focuses on the changes of resource allocation, socialization, and state functions during the reform and establishment of market economy since 1992. It thus makes an in-depth analysis and critique

60

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch02

“Civil Society” in Modern China Studies: Methodology and Limitations

of “neo-authoritarianism” and the “democracy priority theory” at the end of the 1980s (Deng, 1993). According to the Chinese “civil society” theory, the relation between “state” and “society” is not as intensively confrontational as its Western counterpart, but presents a positive interaction which can only be achieved by dual achievement of political democratization and political stabilization. The change from authoritarianism into democracy is contingent upon the joint establishment of and social consensus on a political system by associations, groups and organizations (Deng, 1993). This consensus entails neither taking the reestablishment of new authority as a necessity nor using an extreme method of violent confrontation to expand “public sphere”. Rather, it is intended to find a possibility for a positive interaction between state power and social organizations. Theoretically, the Chinese civil society study stresses positive interactions between “state” and “society”, which is comparatively compliant with the historical conditions that “state” and “society” were in a state of mutual embeddedness. Under the historical backgrounds of “socialization of state” and “nationalization of society”, the birth of “public sphere” in modern China was difficult to have the character to confront the state. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Chinese “civil society” theory still needs to find justifications and resources from specific historical examples. The objective of such studies should be extended far beyond the confines of theoretical discourse, but also with strong practical concerns.

References Cohen, Paul A (1974). Between Tradition and Modernity; Wang T’ao and Reform in Late Ch’ing China. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Deng, Zhenglai (1993). Study on Civil Society in Taiwan. Chinese Social Sciences Quarterly, November. Dirlik, Arif (1993). Civil Society/Public Sphere in Modern China; As Critical Concepts Versus Heralds of Bourgeois Modernity. Chinese Social Sciences Quarterly, March. Duara, Prasenjit (1994). Culture, Power and State — Rural Area in Northern China from 1900 to 1942, translated by Fuming Wang. Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Press. Habermas, Jürgen (1994). On the Internal Relation between the Rule of Law and Democracy. Chinese Social Sciences Quarterly, Autumn. Huang, Philip CC (1993). Public Sphere/Civil Society in China? The Third Realm Between State and Society. Modern China, 19(2).

61

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch02

Yang Nianqun King, Ambrose (1994). Chinese Notions about “Public” and “Private”. Chinese Social Sciences Quarterly, 2. Liang,Yuansheng (1994). End of Historiography and the Final Chinahand — Recent Modern Chinese History Studies from Perspective of Modern American Thought. The Scholar, 5, 424–427. Madsen, Richard (1993). The Public Sphere, Civil Society and Moral Community; A Research Agenda for Contemporary China Studies. Modern China, 19(2). Rankin, Mary Backus (1993). Some Observations on a Chinese Public Sphere. Modern China, 19(2). Rowe, William T (1989). Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City. 1796–1895. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Rowe, William T (1990). The Public Sphere in Modern China. Modern China, 16(3). Rowe, William T (1993). The Problem of Civil Society in Late Imperial China”. Modern China, 19(2). Schoppa, R Keith (1982). Chinese Elites and Political Change; Zhejiang Province in the Early Twentieth Century. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Wakeman, Frederic, Jr. (1993). The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate: Western Reflections on Chinese Political Culture. Modern China, 19(2). Yuzo, Mizoguchi (1994). Contrast between Chinese and Japanese Notions of “PublicPrivate”. Twenty-First Century, 2.

62

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment1

Chapter

3

Yu Keping2

Abstract The article provides a clarification and definition of such concepts as civil society, the third sector, institutional environment, civil society organizations (CSOs or minjian zuzhi), non-government organizations (NGOs), non-profit organizations (NPOs), intermediate organizations (zhongjie zuzhi), social associations or mass groups (qunzhong tuanti), etc. And then the author offers suggestions in the classification of civil organizations in China in terms of academic research and administrative management. The author put his focus upon analysis of the main characteristics of the current institutional environment of Chinese civil society.As the author points out, the institutional environment of civil society in contemporary China is characterized by the coexistence of encouragement at the macro-level and restriction at the micro-level; registration at different levels and dual management; dual management and multiple management; government regulations and Party policies; institutional redundancy and institutional deficiencies; and the co-existence of actual space and institutional space. Keywords: China’s civil society; civil organizations; institutional environment. 1 This is the final report on the project “The Institutional Environment of China’s Civil

Society” ( ) prepared by Yu Keping under the auspices of the United Nations Development Program and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. The main members of the research team areYu Keping, He Zengke, Xu Xiuli, Jia Xijin, Zhou Hongyun, Wang Yongbing, and Yan Jian. The author is grateful to them for their contribution to the report. 2Yu Keping, China Center for Comparative Politics & Economics (CCCPE), Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Beijing, P. R. China.

63

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping

1.

Introduction

This chapter is organized in the following way: Section 2 begins by explaining several key concepts pertaining to civil society and its institutional environment as well as the general environment of China’s civil society. Section 3 mainly focuses on the classification of civil society in China from both the perspectives of scholarly research and administrative management. Section 4 analyzes the prominent characteristics of the current institutional environment of civil society in China. Section 5 summarizes the general characteristics of civil society in China and makes some predictions about its further development.

2.

Concepts and General Observations

Although civil society was very lively in Modern China (1840–1919), the Chinese government and academic world view it as a new phenomenon. China’s civil society is still in the formative stage and quite immature, and its basic characteristics and functions have not yet been fully developed. Similarly, there are numerous ambiguities in the understanding of China’s civil society, manifested most dramatically in the lack of consensus on how some key categories and concepts are to be interpreted. Disagreements are natural, but if key concepts are too ambiguous, deep discussion will be difficult and, more important, the formulation of reasonable policies and regulations will be hindered. Therefore, before discussing the overall institutional environment of China’s civil society, it is necessary to state clearly how key concepts are to be interpreted.

2.1.

Civil society

The English term “civil society” is translated into Chinese by three different terms: shimin shehui ( ), gongmin shehui ( ) and minjian shehui ( ). Although the uses of these terms overlap, their meanings are not completely identical; there are subtle differences among them. The term shimin shehui is the one most widely used and is the standard

64

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment

translation for “civil society”. Its origin lies in Chinese translations of the classical texts of Marxism. However, in its traditional usage, it has a negative connotation to some degree, and in fact many people equate it with the term “bourgeois society”. Moreover, it is easy to misinterpret it to mean “urban residents”. The earliest use of minjian shehui to translate “civil society” was by scholars in Taiwan. This usage was embraced by mainland historians and widely adopted in research on non-governmental organizations in Modern China. It has a neutral connotation, but many government officials and scholars feel it conveys the sense of being marginalized. The term gongmin shehui was adopted as a translation for “civil society” after the beginning of reform and opening up. It has a positive connotation and emphasizes the political science aspect of the term, i.e., both citizens’ participation in public affairs and citizens’ restraints on state power. More and more young scholars prefer this term. We define civil society as being comprised of all civil organizations and civil relations that are outside the state, the government system, the market and the commercial system. It is a civil public sphere outside the spheres of government and the market economy. It is constituted of all kinds of civil organizations not affiliated with the government or businesses, including organizations for safeguarding citizens’ rights, all kinds of trade associations, public interest organizations, community organizations, interest groups, collegial groups, mutual assistance organizations, recreational groups, voluntary organizations and associations spontaneously created by citizens. Therefore, we can view them as the third sector intermediary between the government and enterprises.

2.2.

Civil organizations

Civil society is a public sphere that is relatively independent from the political state. It is constituted of all kinds of civil organizations. However, the current understanding of civil organizations in China’s academic world is even more confused than the understanding of civil society. Both scholarly articles and government documents use a variety of names for civil society organizations (CSOs), such as non-governmental organization (NGO), non-profit organization (NPO), civil organization, civil group,

65

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping

intermediary organization, mass association, people’s association, social association, the third sector organization and voluntary organization. There are no substantive differences between the organizations denoted by these various names. However, based on a strict interpretation of their meaning, these concepts should be distinguishable because they stress different aspects of civil society. The term “NGO” is a widely-used concept in nowadays China. Its strength is that it emphasizes the unofficial nature of civil society organizations and indicates that they are not part of the system of government organizations and are therefore clearly different from government organizations. But in the Chinese context, this concept can engender two opposite ambiguities. The first is to suggest that only important and formally constituted civil organizations fall within the category of civil society because the earliest use of the term in China was to apply to international NGOs recognized in the UN Charter. International NGOs have standing and have been formally approved by governments, so a large number of informal organizations in society would probably not be counted as NGOs in many people’s eyes. The second ambiguity is to suggest that the non-governmental nature of NGOs means that they are completely unrelated to the government or even opposed to the government. But what is intriguing about Chinese NGOs is the fact that most of them all have intimate relations with the government, and many of them can be called governmental non-government organizations (GONGOs). The term “non-profit organization” highlights the difference between civil society organizations (CSOs) and market organizations such as enterprises and corporations, but they blur the fact that for civil society organizations to survive and fulfill their mission they need to charge for the services they provide and engage in for-profit activities. CSOs should be free of the profit motive theoretically, but many civil organizations do not get necessary financial assistance from governments or corporations, so they are forced to generate income from their activities in order to survive and develop. The services they provide are not free in China. Thus it is very difficult to determine which kind of activities is “non-profit”. Therefore, using non-profit as the standard to define CSOs will raise new problems, such as how to define the “non-profit”. “Intermediary organization” is one of the most widely used terms in China, and it is preferred by government administrative agencies because 66

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment

the term is used frequently in administrative regulations. The term makes it clear from the start that civil society organizations have an intermediary position between the government and enterprises. However, this term glosses over other important features of such organizations, especially their non-profit nature. In actuality, most organizations with an intermediary nature are for-profit bodies, and they are much more closely associated with market society than civil society. As China’s market economy develops, the service industry is booming. Many of the organizations in service industry, although were viewed as “intermediary organizations” by the government administrative agencies, are not at all parts of civil society, such as law offices, accounting offices, marriage affairs agencies, public notary offices, human resources centers, real estate assessment offices, quality and technical oversight bodies, household services agencies, business advisory bodies and commercial agent bodies. They are all intermediary organizations, but they operate purely for profit. The terms “mass organization” or “people’s organization” are specific political terms in China’s current system. Such organizations are directly led by the Communist Party of China and include trade unions, the Communist Youth League, women’s federations as well as a small number of specialized organizations such as the China Disabled Persons’ Federation, the China Federation of Writers and Artists, and the China Association for Science and Technology. The salient feature of these organizations is that they have a strong political and administrative flavor. They have national and local bodies paralleled to government administrative divisions; and their leading bodies parallel those of government bodies; their quota of staff was officially assigned by the government; and they perform certain administrative functions as well. In terms of their functions and nature, these organizations actually are more like government organizations than non-governmental organizations. The terms “mass organization” and “people’s organization” are sometimes used in a general sense to pertain to all non-governmental social organizations, but the notion about their functions as well as connections with the governments has already been deeply implanted in people’s minds. In addition, in the current discourse of Chinese politics, the terms “the masses” and “the people” are commonly used in a political sense that signifies the recognition of a majority of citizens by the Party or the government. Obviously, this connotation makes it difficult for these terms to embrace the full significance of civil society organizations. 67

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping

The limitations of the terms of “third sector organization” and “volunteer organization” are relatively clear. The first is a technical term introduced from aboard only in recent years. A lot of people cannot understand the term because they do not know what the third sector is. In the economic sphere, it is easy to confuse it with the tertiary sector in service industries. The term “volunteer organization” emphasizes the voluntary nature of civil society organizations, but voluntary participation is not an exclusive characteristic of “volunteer organization”: many political party organizations stress that their members’ participation in them is also “voluntary”. Obviously, using these terms to denote “civil society organizations” is not altogether satisfactory. CSOs are also frequently called “social associations”, “citizens’ groups”, “citizens’ organizations” and “civil organizations”. These terms relatively clearly indicate the civil nature of CSOs, which distinguishes them from government agencies and commercial organizations. Relatively speaking, their connotation is relatively clear and precise. The term “social association” emphasizes the social nature of civil society organizations. The terms “citizens’ group” and “citizens’ organization” emphasize the political nature of civil society organizations because the term “citizen” is a political concept defined by a country’s constitution. The term “civil organization” (minjian zuzhi, ) emphasizes the societal basis of civil society organizations, and its connotation can be extended to encapsulate the important content of all the above-discussed terms, so it is a relatively satisfactory concept to denote CSOs. Therefore we propose that when discussing CSOs, the term “civil organization” be used wherever possible to avoid the unnecessary disputes and confusions caused by the use of different terms discussed above. Then, what are the bodies that this chapter calls “civil organizations”? Civil organizations, which are the main elements of civil society, are nonprofit groups that are constituted of citizen volunteers who seek the common interests. They have four prominent characteristics. First, they are unofficial; that is, they take a civil form and they do not represent the position of the government or the state. Second, they are non-profit; that is, they do not take making a profit as the main purpose of their existence; instead, they usually take providing public benefits and services as their main purpose. Third, they are relatively independent; that is, they have their own organizational

68

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment

and management mechanisms and independent sources of funding, and are relatively independent from the government politically, administratively and financially. Fourth, they are voluntary. Those who participate in specific civil society organizations do so entirely based on their own free will. These characteristics of CSOs clearly make them different from government bodies and business groups. In addition, they are non-political and nonreligious; that is, they do not take obtaining political power as an important objective and do not engage in religious activities. Therefore, political and religious organizations cannot be classified as civil organizations.3

2.3. The institutional environment An institution is a series of regulations or norms that influence human activities. Douglas C. North, an important representative of New Institutionalism, says, “Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” (North, 1991, p. 97, pp. 201–202) Institutional regulations are ready-made norms of behavior that are relatively stable and long lasting. The behavioral regulations that constitute institutions include both written and unwritten norms. They include statutory regulations that authoritative bodies endorse and enforce as well as so-called implicit regulations, which are informal rules that have not been promulgated by any authoritative body yet implicitly restrict people’s actions. A political institution is a series of regulations that restricts people’s political activities, in other words, it is the rule of conduct that structure human political life. In general, a political institution is established by the state and embodies the basic interests and value orientation of the political authorities who use it to control the political activities of the citizens. Therefore, a political institution is more fundamental, restrictive and coercive than other institutions, and when in conflict with other social systems, the other institutions usually give way to it. 3 Scholars are of different opinions on whether political parties and religious organizations

should count as civil organizations. On the basis of conditions in China, we adopt the definition of civil organizations given by Laster M. Salamon and others and do not count them as civil organizations. See Salamon (1994).

69

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping

To establish civil associations and activities of civil associations are commonly thought of as typical political activities, so they must be structured by relevant state institutions. We call all formal and informal rules the state uses to regulate or control the activities of civil organizations the institutional environment of civil society. This environment has five aspects: (1) Constitution, which provides the fundamental legal framework and legitimacy for civil society; (2) Ordinary laws, that is, the comprehensive and special laws concerning civil organizations; (3) Administrative regulations, decrees and rules with which the central and local governments regulate civil organizations; (4) Party policy regulations, i.e., policies, principles, rules and measures of political parties in power concerning civil organizations; and (5) Informal institutions that are all kinds of implicit regulations diffused throughout society and the government that influence the activities and functions of civil organizations, including the attitude of party and government leaders at all levels toward civil organizations. Since civil society exists in specific institutional environment, the latter must exert direct or indirect influence on the development of civil society. As the principal component of civil society, the civil organizations are structured by all kinds of formal or informal regulations, which in turn mold the shape and characteristics of civil society and its role in social and political life as well. By differentiating and analyzing the influences on civil society into a number of institutional factors, we can discover the overall impact China’s current institutional environment has on its civil society. We can identify the following important factors of the institutional environment: Determinants of the nature and orientation of civil organizations; rules for establishing and registering them; classifications of civil organizations and measures for supervising them; supervision, control and guidance of them; financial policies for them, including subsidy, taxation and auditing policies; ways and means to intervene in their affairs; measures to support them; policies to encourage them; restrictions on and penalties against them, including licensing, qualifications, franchising and revocation; and the Party’s leadership of them.

3.

Classification of Civil Organizations

Clearly defining the nature and position of civil organizations is a basic requirement to the relevant laws and regulations and it is also a prerequisite 70

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment

for formulating corresponding policies, but the relevant laws and regulations currently in effect lag far behind to clearly define the nature and position of civil organizations in China. In party or government documents as well as the relevant laws and regulations, social associations are generally viewed as bridges or links between the Party or government and the citizens. While underscoring the societal, voluntary and non-profit aspects of civil organizations, does not mention that they have nothing to do with the government. Perhaps this arises from misinterpreting “non-governmental” as “having no relationship with government” or as “being entirely independent of government and not subject to governmental guidance”. In fact, what “non-governmental” means here is that they are not part of the Party or government systems and are relatively independent of Party and government organs, and it is absolutely absurd to equate “non-governmental” with “no relations whatever with the government”. Civil organizations can also be established by the government and receive government guidance or funding. The “Regulations Concerning the Registration and Supervision of Social Associations” determines the nature and position of civil organizations as follows: “What these regulations call social associations are non-profit social organizations whose members are Chinese citizens who join them voluntarily, whose purpose is to carry out the common will of their members, and whose activities fall within the scope of their charters”. The “Interim Regulations Concerning the Registration and Supervision of Privately-Run Non-enterprise Entities” defines the position of privately-run non-enterprise entities as follows: “What these regulations call privatelyrun non-enterprise entities are social organizations that undertake non-profit social service activities without government funding support, which are set up by enterprise-operated institutions, social associations, other social forces and individual citizens”. The “Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Foundations” defines foundations as follows: “What these regulations call foundations are non-profit legal persons constituted in accordance with the provisions of these regulations who use property donated by natural persons, legal persons or other organizations to carry out public welfare undertakings”. These definitions and those of other related laws have some inherent shortcomings. First, their definition of the position of civil organizations is vague. Some scholars argue that according to the above regulations, the difference

71

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping

between social associations and privately-run non-enterprise entities is that the former are organizations established by their members for their mutual benefit while the latter are organizations which aim at providing public goods and is not based on membership. This analysis obviously blurs their distinctions because some kinds of civil organizations are both mutually beneficial social associations and public goods associations as well, such as China Charity and the Red Cross of China. Also, many industry associations are classed as social associations, but they are not voluntarily formed by citizens, instead they are established by the government to exert specific functions. The above definitions also make it difficult to properly differentiate privately-run non-enterprise entities from foundations. Many privately-run non-enterprise entities are also “non-profit legal persons” that use “property donated by natural persons, legal persons or other organizations” to carry out public goods activities. In addition, according to the stipulation of relevant laws, citizen self-governing organizations on the grassroots levels, such as Villager Committees and Residential Committees, are non-governmental organizations, but they are not included in the above classification. Second, the specifications of civil organizations are mutually contradictory on numerous points. According to the above definitions, trade unions, the Communist Youth League and Women’s Federations are all viewed as social associations, but the Civil Servants Law clearly states that cadres in these three kinds of associations fall within the state civil servant supervision system. According to the above regulations, social associations should be citizens’ voluntary organizations; they should not be bureaucratic like government bodies, and their leaders should not have administrative grades. However, Party and government policies also specify that many social associations and their leaders, such as the China Science and Technology Association, the Chinese Writers Association, the China Law Society and the Chinese Public Administration Society, receive the treatment accorded administrative grades. Third, the specifications make it difficult to classify civil organizations. According to the current supervision laws and regulations, civil organizations are divided into social associations, privately-run non-enterprise entities and foundations. However, there are some kinds of civil organizations that do not fall into any of these categories as well as overlapping exist among these categories. For example, in reality, a large number of civil

72

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment

organizations have never registered with Civil Affairs departments, instead they have registered with Departments of Industry and Commerce as enterprise organizations. According to the law, all organizations that registered with departments of industry and commerce are not civil organizations but enterprise organizations. Another example is citizens’ self-governing organizations, such as Villager Committees and Residential Committees. They are widespread and playing a very important role in society, yet they are difficult to classify on the basis of the above criteria. In China, there is no unified ways of classifying civil organizations. Three different ways coexist in classifying civil organizations in China: The official classifications used by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the classifications used by the United Nations or foreign research bodies and the various classification schemes proposed by Chinese scholars. The Ministry of Civil Affairs, which is the official authorities responsible for civil organizations, classifies the civil organizations under its jurisdiction into three types. The first type is comprised of social associations, i.e., “non-profit social organizations voluntarily organized by Chinese citizens to achieve the common objectives of their members by engaging in activities in accordance with their charters”. The second type is comprised of so-called “Civilian-Run Non-enterprise Units”, i.e., “social organizations without governmental funding organized by enterprises, institutions, social associations, other social forces and individual citizens for the purpose of engaging in not-for-profit social service activities”. The third type is comprised of foundations dedicated to the public good, i.e., “non-profit legal persons that use funds contributed by natural or legal persons or other organizations to carry out undertakings for the public good”.4 The Ministry of Civil Affairs also classifies the numerous social associations into four types. The first type consists of academic groups, such as associations in the various natural and social sciences and in interdisciplinary fields. 4 Quoted from State Council publications: Shehui Tuanti Dengji Guanli Tiaoli

(“Regulations Concerning the Registration and Supervision of Social Associations”); Minban Fei Qiye Danwei Dengji Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli (“Interim Regulations Concerning the Registration and Supervision of Run Non-business Bodies”); and Jijinhui Guanli Tiaoli (“Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Foundations”). See the document library of the official website of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China: http://www.mca.gov.cn/wjylzx.

73

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping

The second type consists of trade organizations (hangyexing tuanti), whose members are enterprises in the same field. The third type consists of professional organizations, whose members have similar skills and special funds and are engaged in the same work. The fourth type consists of federations (such as trade unions) which are associations of groups or people (Wu, 1996, p. 6). Some scholars point out that the way government regulatory agencies categorize social organizations is easy to implement, but it is overly simple and not conducive to thorough analysis. They advocate using international standards until a comprehensive and mature standard for classifying Chinese social organizations is developed. One choice would be to use the United Nations’ International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), which divides NPOs into three major categories and fifteen sub-categories. The category of education has primary education, secondary education, higher education and adult and other education as sub-categories; the category for health and social work has human health activities, veterinary activities and social work activities as sub-categories; and the category of other community, social and personal service activities has sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities; activities of membership organizations; recreational, cultural and sporting activities; and other service activities as sub-categories. Another choice would be to use the classification standards of research institutes in Western countries. The School of Public Policy and Management of Tsinghua University basically uses International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations (ICNPO) developed at the Johns Hopkins University Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project. It divides China’s civil organizations into 12 major categories and 27 subcategories. The major categories are: Culture and recreation; education and research; health; social services; environment; development and housing; law, advocacy and politics, philanthropic intermediaries and volunteerism promotion; international; religion; business and professional associations; and not elsewhere classified (Deng, 2001, pp. 5–6). In recent years, as research on civil organizations has deepened, Chinese scholars have developed a number of classification schemes. For example, classifying social associations on the basis of their statutory purpose into organizations that mutually benefit their members, operational organizations and organizations whose members work for the public good;

74

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment

classifying them based on the kind of relation they have to the government into organizations that are government or privately run or have aspects of both; classifying them based on their form of management into organizations that are professionally or non-professionally managed and those for which management responsibility is not clear; classifying them based on whether they have members or not; classifying them based on whether their organizational structure is tight like a pyramid or loose like a net; and classifying them based on whether they serve the public good or the mutual benefit of their members. In order to unify the classification of civil organizations, some scholars classify them based on both the subject and functions of civil organizations, and therefore divide all of China’s nationwide social associations into 17 functional categories. (Wang Ming, 2001, p. 17; Wang Ying, 1993, p. 70; CPC Research Group on Hangzhou’s Civil Organizations, 2003; Wan, 2004; Wang Ying and Sun Bingyao, 2002, pp. 4–5). There are many kinds of civil organizations, and they all have their own distinctive characteristics. People can classify them on the basis of various characteristics and the choice of these characteristics will generate different criteria of classification. For example, on the basis of their legal status, civil organizations can be classified as legal or illegal; from the nature of their objectives, they can be classified as dedicated to the public good or not; from the nature of their activities, they can be classified as professional or general organizations; from the scope of their activities, they can be classified as national or local organizations; and from sources of their operating expenses, they can be classified as being subsidized by government funds or social contributions or as self-supporting. Therefore, it is not surprising that there are numerous typologies and methods for classifying them. However, classification itself is not the main objective; our aim is to better understand or supervise the various kinds of civil organizations. Research and supervision of civil organizations are closely connected, but they are distinct and have important differences, including differences in the typology they use. Accordingly, we propose methods of classification for academic research and government respectively. First, from the perspective of academic research, civil organizations can no doubt be classified by various criteria, such as their status, function or locality, but what should be most important are their basic characteristics. Based on the important characteristics of existing civil organizations, they

75

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping

can be divided into the following types: (1) Trade organizations, i.e., trade, professional and management associations, such as the associations associated with the various industries; (2) Charitable organizations, whose main functions are to provide disaster relief and aid the poor, such as the Red Cross, charities, disabled persons’ federations, and the Soong Ching Ling Foundation; (3) Academic groups, organizations of scholars in the same field, such as the Chinese Physical Society, Chinese Chemical Society, Chinese Association of Political Science and Chinese Atheistic Research Society; (4) Political groups, i.e., all kinds of citizens’ organizations that safeguard the political rights of citizens, such as trade unions, the Communist Youth League, women’s federations, villagers’ committees, residential committees, and other kinds of organizations devoted to safeguarding citizen’s rights; (5) Community organizations, which are engaged in neighborhood supervision and service, such as homeowners’ committees, community welfare centers, community retirees’ associations, community legal assistance centers and neighborhood public security committees; (6) Social service organizations, i.e., civil organizations that provide social welfare services and public welfare services, such as public welfare organizations engaged in environmental protection and in culture, education, sports and health activities; (7) Citizens’ mutual assistance organizations, i.e., organizations voluntarily entered into by citizens to protect their interests, such as urban and rural mutual assistance associations, relief centers, rural agricultural associations and rural cooperative organizations; (8) Common interest organizations, citizens’ organizations based upon common good, leisure interests and career, such as sports clubs, countrymen associations, alumni associations, poetry groups and so on; (9) Non-profit consulting service organizations, including most privately operated non-commercial bodies. Secondly, looking at the classification of civil organizations from the perspective of government supervision, there are at least three criteria that should be considered: Their legal status, their incentive orientation, and the nature of their activities. The first two criteria concern civil organizations’ institutional treatment in such areas as taxation, registration and supervision, and the third concerns the suitability of supervision. Based on this line of thought, we believe that civil organizations should be classified in the following three ways. First, on the basis of their legal status, civil organizations can be divided into legal person groups and non-legal-person groups. Legal

76

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment

person groups have independent existence as legal persons and as such they have more rights and responsibilities than groups that do not. They should be subject to stricter approval, registration and supervision, and they should receive greater government support in such areas as finance and taxation. Second, on the basis of their purpose, civil organizations can be divided into public welfare groups and non-public-welfare groups. The main purpose of public welfare groups is to increase the common good of society, and the government should give more support and financial assistance to such groups. Third, on the basis of supervision requirements, civil organizations can be classified as follows: (1) Mass organizations, i.e., mass groups unique to China’s political situation and directly under the leadership of the CPC, such as trade unions, the Communist Youth League, women’s federations, writers’ associations, science and technology associations, literary federations and disabled persons’ federations; (2) Self-governing groups, i.e., self-governing citizens’political organizations, such as Villagers’Committees and Residential Committees; (3) Business and professional groups, i.e., all kinds of organizations and associations in a particular industry or profession, including organizations having regulatory functions and selfpolicing organizations, such as the China National Council of Light Industry and China Consumers’ Association; (4) Academic groups, i.e., all kinds of associations in the fields of natural and social sciences and interdisciplinary studies; (5) Community groups, i.e., organizations of community residents that provide community supervision and services; (6) Social associations, i.e., all other kinds of social organizations besides the above; (7) Public welfare and charities foundations, i.e., organizations that finance public welfare and charities undertakings.

4.

Characteristics of the Institutional Environment of China’s Civil Society

As I mentioned above, the institutional environment constraining and regulating the growth of China’s civil society is constituted mainly of the following five elements: The Constitution, ordinary laws, administrative statutes, Party policies and other informal regulations. These five elements

77

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping

mutually complement each other and form a relatively complete network that decisively influences the growth of China’s civil society. A comprehensive analysis of the formal and informal institutional environment constraining China’s civil society reveals the following general characteristics.

4.1.

Macro encouragement and micro restrictions

Overall, since reform and opening up, China’s macro institutional environment has been beneficial to the growth of civil society. This is a basic reason why China’s civil society has been able to spring up in such a short time. First, the Constitution and the CPC’s principal policies basically take a positive attitude toward civil organizations. This lays a legal foundation for the existence of China’s civil society. The Constitution promulgated in 1982 confirmed the freedom of association as one of the basic rights of Chinese citizens. Since reform and opening up, a whole series of important principles and policies formulated by the CPC, such as promoting the socialist market economy, carrying out rural and urban structural reform, promoting villagers’ self-governance and other kinds of grassroots level democracy, establishing “socialist rule of law” and political civilization, encouraging the separation of Party and government and the separation of government and business, and raising the Party’s governing capacity, have objectively created legal and institutional space for the development of civil organizations. In addition, economic restructuring focused on the “rural land contract responsibility system” (lianchan chengbao zerenzhi) and establishing the market economy created realistic conditions for fostering civil organizations. After the 1980s, China began to institute market-oriented economic restructuring. It gradually abandoned the former planned economy in favor of the socialist market economy, and it changed the original unitary system of ownership by collectives and the state to a diverse system of state, collective and private ownership by single owners, partnerships and foreign owners. These changes greatly expanded productive forces, raised people’s standard of living and are the deep economic roots of the vigorous development of civil organizations. Further, since the 1980s, numerous important changes occurred in China’s political system that directly or indirectly facilitated the development of civil society. For example, the government continually paid greater attention to the legal system and the 78

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment

rule of law, and citizens’ freedom of assembly began to take on substantive meaning. The government delegated many of its powers. It delegated operational, decision-making and human resources powers to enterprises, and it delegated most of its economic powers to society. It also gradually relaxed supervision over citizens, and there was an unprecedented increase in citizens’ freedom of action. Finally, the government began to transform its functions. In most areas of production, business, civil affairs, culture, arts and academics the government no longer exercised direct supervision functions and transferred these functions to civil organizations such as nongovernmental industry associations, professional associations and volunteer groups (Yu, 2002, pp. 196–198). It can be said that China’s macro institutional environment is generally encouraging to civil society, but its micro institutional environment is generally restrictive. First, the basic orientation of laws and regulations of government departments that directly affect civil organizations is to control and restrict those organizations. For example, most of the laws and regulations promulgated individually or in conjunction with other departments by civil affairs departments from the central to local levels are supervisory in nature, and very few of them have encouraging clauses. Second, the supervision of civil organizations by government regulatory departments focuses on issues of entry, and they erect obstacles to the establishment and registration of civil organizations. For example, there are strict regulations concerning the names, structure, location, staff size, spending, charter and the Regulatory Bodies (zhuguan bumen) of civil organizations. Third, civil organizations are subject to duplicate supervision. The law stipulates that all civil organizations must submit not only to the oversight of government civil affairs departments but also to the leadership of agencies responsible for their area of professional activities, and that these agencies generally have the primary responsibility for supervision. Fourth, the spending, scope and content of civil organizations’ activities is strictly limited. For example, laws and regulations concerning supervision stipulate that civil organizations can operate only within designated localities and only engage in the activities approved when they register; otherwise their activities are considered illegal. Fifth, the government exercises macro control over civil organizations similar to its macro control of the economy. When civil organizations expand quickly in a short period of time or an

79

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping

unusual domestic political development occurs, the CPC Central Committee, the State Council and various government departments issue documents or policies requiring civil organizations be investigated and put in order. For example, in 1984, 1989, 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2004, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council issued several important documents to exert macro control on the development of civil organizations.

4.2.

Hierarchical registration and dual supervision

Until now, China has not yet passed a formal law concerning civil organizations, and at present the “Regulations Concerning the Registration and Supervision of Social Associations” and the “Regulations Concerning the Supervision of Civilian Run Non-Enterprise Units” are the most important laws concerning social associations. These two regulations establish the basic framework for government supervision of civil organizations, namely the model of hierarchical registration and dual supervision. The basic content to this kind of supervisory system is that all civil organizations must simultaneously accept dual leadership from the Registering Department (i.e., the civil affairs department at their corresponding level) and the Regulatory Bodies (i.e., the government department responsible for their realm of activities). The Registering Department is responsible for approving and registering civil organizations and the Regulatory Body is responsible for routine supervision. “Hierarchical registration” ( fenji dengji) means at and above the county level, civil affairs departments of the people’s government are responsible for approval, registration, annual inspections, modification, dissolution and oversight of civil organizations at their respective level. According to this system, civil organizations that operate nationwide are approved and registered by the Ministry of Civil Affairs; organizations that operate locally are approved by local government civil affairs departments at all levels from the county level up. Civil organizations that operate across administrative boundaries are approved the civil affairs departments of the next higher level of government. Specifically, As the statutory bodies for approving and registering civil organizations, civil affairs departments (i.e., the Registering Department) at all levels have some common responsibilities as follows: to examine and approve civil organizations that have been 80

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment

approved by the Regulatory Bodies; to carry out statutory procedures of registration, annual inspection, modification and dissolution for civil organizations in their locality that have received approval; to formulate supervisory principles, policies, regulations and oversight procedures for social associations and civilian run non-enterprise units; to take responsibility for the registration and annual inspection of domestic civil organizations (including civilian run non-enterprise units and social associations of Hong Kong and Taiwan people in Chinese mainland), social associations of foreigners in China, and agencies of international social associations in China; to guide the activities of civil organizations, study and propose plans for the development of civil organizations, standards for membership dues and measures for financial management; oversee the activities of civil organizations and investigate civil organizations’ illegal activities and illegal organizations that have not registered yet operate under the guise of social associations (State Council, 1998). The Regulations stipulate that the Regulatory Bodies (zhuguan bumen), who are responsible for routine supervision of civil organizations, are the relevant departments affiliated with the State Council and the relevant departments of the local people’s governments from the county level up, as well as organizations empowered by the State Council and local people’s governments. Based on the present “dual supervision system” of civil organizations, the main functions of the Regulatory Bodies are: To approve and appoint the main leaders, including president, vice president, members of the executive council and secretary-general of the civil organizations under their supervision; approve their major activities; oversee their daily work; provide professional guidance for their activities; and audit their finances. In addition to the hierarchical approval and registration, the hierarchical principles also apply to Regulatory Bodies. In other words, For different administrative divisions and administrative levels of civil organizations, the corresponding Regulatory Bodies will be different. As far as a specific civil organization is concerned, the administrative level of its Regulatory Body principally is accordance with the administrative level of its Registering Department. For example, the Regulatory Body for national civil organizations must be a ministry or commission at the central level, while the civil organizations that operate within a province must look for a provincial-level Party or government body as their Regulatory

81

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping

Bodies. Therefore, in today’s China, the “dual supervision system” and the “hierarchical registration system” of civil organizations are mutually complementary.

4.3.

Dual supervision and multiple supervision

The system of dual supervision leads inevitably to multiple supervision. The provision of “dual supervision” requires every civil organization must accept dual leadership from a Registering Department (i.e., the civil affairs department at their corresponding level) and a Regulatory Body (i.e., the government department responsible for their realm of activities). The Regulations provides only general rules. Party and government bodies at and above the county level as well as those bodies appointed by governments at and above the county level may all become functioning Regulatory Bodies for civil organizations. An inevitable consequence is therefore the proliferation of the Regulatory Bodies. Evidences show that all kinds of functional departments of the Party and government frequently become the Regulatory Bodies of civil organizations under their jurisdiction. For example, the organization departments of Party committees at all levels are generally the Regulatory Bodies of Party Research Societies at the same level; the United Front Departments (tongzhan bu) are the Regulatory Bodies for United Front Research Societies at the same level; government cultural offices and bureaus are the Regulatory Bodies for all kinds of unofficial cultural groups; sports bureaus or sports commissions are the Regulatory Bodies for all kinds of unofficial sports groups; and science and technology commissions, offices and bureaus are the Regulatory Bodies for all kinds of mass science and technology groups. Not only do functional departments of the Party and government become “mothers-in-law” to all kinds of civil organizations within the scope of their authority, but in fact for various reasons many civil organizations have to look everywhere for an appropriate “mother-in-law” (i.e., the Regulatory Bodies) while many “mothers-in-law” have little relationship with the fields in which the civil organizations they supervise operate. For example, a government cultural bureau might become the Regulatory Body of a people’s fitness association while a government sports committee might become the Regulatory Body of a people’s arts association, and a government science commission might become the Regulatory Body of 82

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment

a training center while an education commission might become the Regulatory Body of a civil science and technology service center. Civil organizations with relatively abundant resources, especially some well-funded industry supervisions organizations, not only have to accept leadership from their Regulatory Bodies, but also have to accept direct or indirect leadership from other important and powerful Party and government bodies, so there will be several “mothers-in-law” supervising them at the same time.

4.4.

Government laws and regulations and Party policies

Government laws and regulations and Party policies are mutually complementary, and both are authoritative standards for the supervision of civil organizations, and together they constitute the basic institutional environment of China’s civil society. This is an important characteristic of the institutional environment of China’s civil society. Every Party leading body and government organ of power from the central to the local levels, all have responsibilities for supervising civil organizations. Party committees and governments at every level have the duty to strengthen their leadership on civil organizations. The basic purpose of government supervision is to improve and strengthen the Party’s leadership on civil organizations. Government regulation concerning civil organizations relies principally on state law or administrative regulations, and Party regulation concerning civil organizations mainly takes the form of Party policies. These policies could be the formal documents, directives, notices, regulations, measures, opinions, rules, standards and decisions of the CPC Central Committee and local Party committees at every level; they also could take the form of informal instructions, directives, speeches and writings of Party leaders at every level. Party policies concerning the supervision of civil organizations are similar to government laws and regulations in that they also constitute a system. Vertically, Party committees from the CPC Central Committee to local committees all have a series of policy documents concerning the regulation and supervision of civil organizations, and horizontally, Party committee departments, such as the general offices, organization departments, publicity departments and united front departments, all have the power to formulate supervisory policies within the scope of their responsibilities. 83

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping

In recent years, these leading Party committee departments have issued a stream of policy documents in the spirit of the CPC Central Committee’s documents, and such policy documents have provided important guidelines for the supervision of civil organizations. Government laws and regulations and Party policies together constitute the basic institutional environment of China’s civil society. They have different emphases and complement each other. In general, the main function of government laws and regulations concerns carrying out ordinary approval, registration and oversight, and the main role of Party policies concerns carrying out macro control, particularly to make decisions of principle at important moments to encourage, guide or constrain civil organizations. As pointed out above, in light of the importance of rural economic mutual assistance organizations in raising the rural standard of living, the CPC Central Committee announced a number of policies to encourage and support such organizations in a series of documents in recent years, while in light of the indiscriminate and uncontrolled development of social associations and, the CPC Central Committee or its general office issued documents in 1984, 1989, 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2004 to control and regulate the development of civil organizations. (See Legal Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee General Office et al., 1997 and 2001; Shandong Province Bureau for Supervising Civil Organizations, 2005) The coexistence of government laws and regulations and Party policies concerning the supervision of civil organizations to a certain extent reflects the unique relationship in the current Chinese political situation between the Party and the government, between law and policy, and between the rule of leaders and the rule of law. On the one hand, establishing the rule of law in China is an objective of the CPC which have been both written into CPC’s Constitution and the Chinese Constitution as a goal of China’s political development. Party organizations and leaders at all levels must operate within the scope of the Constitution and the law. The rule of leaders is gradually being supplanted by the rule of law, and Party policies are gradually giving way to laws and they are becoming supervisory tools subordinate to the law in the country’s political life. China still has a long way to go to achieve the objective of rule of law. The rule of leaders still plays a very important role in the social and political life in the country, and policy plays a more important role than law in many circumstances.

84

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment

4.5.

Institutional redundancy and institutional deficiencies

The coexistence of institutional redundancy and institutional deficiencies is a mark of the institutional environment of China’s civil society. On the one hand, many regulations concerning civil organizations are redundant, overlapping or trifling. For example, the regulations concerning the supervision of many civil organizations include not only the State Council’s “Regulations Concerning the Registration and Supervision of Social Associations” and the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ rules and regulations for implementation, but also supervisory rules promulgated jointly by the Ministry of Civil Affairs and other ministries and commissions or independently by such ministries and commissions. Some local governments also formulate numerous implementation measures for supervising civil organizations. Not only do provincial-level governments or regulatory bodies have their own provisions as well as rules and regulations for implementation, but regional, municipal and county governments also have their own measures and official opinions. Not only do Registration Departments and Regulatory Bodies formulate numerous laws, regulations and rules, but Party committees and governments at all levels also occasionally issue important regulative documents and policy measures as circumstances require. There are too many such rules and regulations, and they create an institutional redundancy in the process of supervising civil society. Institutional redundancy is primarily manifested in overlapping functions of the Registration Departments (i.e., the civil affairs regulatory bodies in government) and the Regulatory Bodies in the supervision of the same civil organization. The Regulations currently in effect stipulate that the Registration Departments have three oversight responsibilities: (1) To be responsible for registering the formation, modification and dissolution of social associations and civilian run non-enterprise units; (2) To carry out annual inspections of social associations, civilian run non-enterprise units, foundations, and representative bodies of foreign foundations; and (3) To investigate allegations of violations of the Regulations by social associations and civilian run non-enterprise units as well as to administer administrative penalties for such violations. The Regulatory Bodies have five responsibilities: (1) To be responsible for approving the establishment,

85

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping

modification and dissolution of social associations and civilian run nonenterprise units before these matters are registered; (2) To oversee and guide social associations and civilian run non-enterprise units to observe the state’s Constitution, laws, regulations and policies and to engage in activities in accordance with their charters; (3) To make a preliminary investigation of the social associations and civilian run non-enterprise units before their annual inspections; (4) To assist the Registration Departments and other relevant agencies in investigating illegal activities of social associations and civilian run non-enterprise units; and (5) To guide, along with other agencies, social associations and civilian run non-enterprise units in their liquidation. It is easy to see that the above listed functions overlapping. This is not only a great waste of institutional and government resources; in addition, institutional redundancy does not necessarily make government guidance of civil organizations more effective; rather, it generally weakens it. The original intention in setting up the system was to make it doubly safe by duplicating approval and responsibility, but in practice overlapping and duplicate responsibilities readily lead to both agencies shirking their responsibilities, leaving gaps in oversight. In addition, the oversight tasks and responsibilities of the Regulatory Bodies are invariably greater than those of the Registration Departments, but they do not receive any payment for their efforts, so they lack motivations to carry out their oversight function. Yet once they receive supervision fees paid by the civil organizations they oversee, they usually let the organizations do whatever they please. The Registration Departments readily ignore routine oversight duties of civil organizations because these duties are the primary functions of the Regulatory Bodies. In the end, the duplicate supervision system degenerates into a mere formality (He, 2005). On the other hand, apart from institutional redundancy, there exist lots of vacuums in the supervision of civil organizations, which are manifested mainly in the following three ways. First, there is no comprehensive law for the supervision of civil organizations. At present, supervision of civil organizations rests mainly on several regulations of the State Council, which are regulations, not formal state laws. There are only a few formal laws that touch on the supervision of civil organizations, such as the Trade Union Law, most of which are special laws. China still does not have a

86

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment

mother law for supervising civil organizations. Second, there is a lack of directed and operational regulations. For example, there are no regulations directed specifically at various categories of civil organizations, such as industry associations, professional groups, academic groups, federations of social associations, and volunteer work. Third, many existing regulations are already relatively unsuitable to the present circumstances. Some scholars believe that a considerable portion of regulations concerning civil organizations are “too complex, opaque and difficult to understand” and that their “technical details are crude, their content is general and vague, and they are difficult to implement” (Zhu, 2004, pp. 204–225). The institutional deficiencies invariably result in leaving many civil organizations at a loss as to what to do, and it’s true even to those advocated by the central government. For example, in recent years, the central authorities have especially encouraged farmers’ occupational and cooperative organizations, but in many places throughout the country, they have encountered institutional difficulties. Because their legal position is not clear, their development is constrained by a series of environmental factors of a legal, institutional and taxation nature. Whether they are actually enterprise legal persons, social association legal persons or cooperative legal persons is not given clear legal specification. For example, the farmers’ professional cooperative organizations in Wenling, Zhejiang Province, registered as stock cooperative enterprises, which are enterprise legal persons; therefore, the tax agencies and financial institutions must treat them as stock cooperative enterprises for the purposes of assessing taxes and making loans. However, at the same time, the 19th article of the “Regulations of Zhejiang Province Concerning Farmers’ Professional Cooperative Organizations” also stipulates that the sale by cooperatives of agricultural goods produced by members of the cooperatives should be treated the same as goods produced and sold by households. Primary-level agricultural goods produced and sold by farmers are not subject to tax, but if the goods are turned over to a cooperative for sale, then they are subject to tax. Another problem is the difficulty in getting financing. Farmers’ cooperative organizations register with administrations for industry and commerce as legal persons, but banks do not recognize their status as legal persons and do not grant them loans. They can only get loans in the names of their individual

87

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping

members, who must pledge their property collateral. This is without a doubt not beneficial for expanding the scale of rural professional cooperative organizations (Yan, 2005).

4.6.

Actual space and institutional space

The institutional space of civil organizations is much smaller than their actual space. This is an important characteristic of China’s institutional environment. Institutional space is here interpreted as the space allotted to civil organizations by China’s regulatory laws and regulations, and actual space is interpreted as the actual space civil organizations have. A typical example of how civil society’s actual space exceeds its institutional space is the fact that the number of actually existing civil organizations greatly exceeds the number formally registered with government departments. The Chinese government published data in March 2005 on the number of civil organizations registered with the Registration Departments. There were 149,000 social associations, 132,000 civilian run non-enterprise units, and 994 foundations — a total of 282,000 — registered with civil affairs agencies at the four levels of government. However, in addition, scholars estimate that there is a large number of NGOs that have not registered in accordance with government requirements, including Non-profit Organizations registered with administrations for industry and commerce, primarylevel urban community organizations, village community public welfare or mutual assistance organizations, farmers’ cooperative organizations, foreign financial aid organizations and project organizations in China as well as foreign chambers of commerce and industry associations in China. It is impossible to determine their exact number because there are no reliable statistics, but a conservative estimate puts the number between 2 and 2.7 million (Wang Ming, 2005b). The National Conference on Developing Village Occupational Economic Associations held by the Ministry of Civil Affairs revealed that at the end of 2004 there were already 100,000 village occupational economic associations throughout the country, but only about 10,000 of them had registered with civil affairs departments at various levels, which is only one-tenth of the total (He, 2005). A research study done by Tsinghua University shows that in addition to legally registered civil organizations, China presently has at least the following ten kinds of “extra-legal” 88

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment

civil organizations: (1) Non-Profit Organizations registered with administrations for industry and commerce, (2) Primary-level urban community organizations, (3) Social associations affiliated with various kinds of bodies, (4) Village community development organizations, (5) Farmers’ cooperative organizations, (6) Village community public welfare or mutual assistance organizations, (7) Foreign financial aid organizations in China, (8) Foreign project organizations in China, (9) Foreign chambers of commerce and industry associations in China, and (10) Religious groups (Wang Ming, 2005a). There is a very interesting phenomenon that the institutional space within China’s civil society varies considerably depending on variations in the standard for having legal standing. Relatively speaking, the institutional space of civil organizations which were set up strictly in accordance with the three Regulations is the smallest. In China, there also exists such a kind of civil organizations, who are not required to register with civil affairs agencies, but they are viewed as “legal” by the governments. Such civil organizations have more institutional space. Such civil organizations can basically be divided into two kinds. One kind is civil organizations that the CPC Central Committee, the State Council or the Ministry of Civil Affairs clearly specified “unnecessary to register”. For example, the “Ministry of Civil Affairs’ Notice Concerning Issues Pertaining to the Exemption from Registration for Some Social Associations” clearly states that the following three kinds of social associations are exempt from registration: (1) People’s organizations that belong to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); (2) Social associations identified by regulatory agencies of the State Council and approved by the State Council as organizations “unnecessary to register;” and (3) Groups that are established by institutions, agencies and enterprises and operate within them. The other kind is civil organizations of all kinds established with the encouragement of Party committees and governments at all levels under the instructions of higher-level committees and governments or to meet work needs, such as the widespread and numerous farmer cooperative organizations. There are no formal regulations stipulating that organizations like these are exempt from approval and registration, but because they are established at the urging of the Party and government, they are always considered to be legal even though they have not been approved and registered by a civil affairs

89

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping

department. A survey of civil organizations in one city revealed that the municipal civil affairs department had formally registered 163 civil organizations, but the civil affairs department had records of more than 1,200 civil organizations that had not undergone formal approval and registration. The latter number is seven times more than the former. A spokesman for that municipal civil affairs department added that there were even more civil organizations that the civil affairs department had no records of (Yan, 2005).

5.

Conclusion

Despite the multitude of differing views on China’s civil society, there is at least a consensus on the following points among officials and scholars, i.e., China’s civil society is rapidly growing along with the development of the market economy and political democracy and it is playing an ever more important role in the political, economic and social life of the country. However, China’s civil society must solve many problems and overcome a lot of difficulties, the most pressing of which arise from its institutional environment. This has already been verified by some field surveys. The Peking University Social Groups Research Center once did a massive investigation using questionnaires of civil organizations in Zhejiang Province and Beijing over the course of two years. The response rates for various answers to the question “What factors are most detrimental to the development of civil organizations?” were: (1) They lack funds and/or operating site (Beijing 38.7%, Zhejiang 40.8%); (2) The supervisory system is too strict or chaotic and there are too many restrictions (Beijing 33.4%, Zhejiang 22.7%); (3) Their position and legal status is not sufficiently clear and relevant laws are inadequate (Beijing 22.8%, Zhejiang 20.5%); (4) The government does not attach sufficient importance to them (Beijing 22.0%, Zhejiang 19.9%, Heilongjiang 23.8%) (Li Jingpeng). A nationwide sample survey of social associations by Tsinghua University NGO Research Center in 2000 revealed that the main problems currently facing civil organizations are: Lack of funds, sites to hold activities and operating equipment, insufficient government support, lack of personnel, lack of information exchanges and training opportunities, inadequate laws and regulations, inadequately 90

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment

standardized internal supervision and excessive government interference (Wang Shaoguang, 2004, p. 73). The general characteristics of institutional environment as well as the institutional difficulties China’s civil society facing is an indicator of the overall development of China’s civil society. In other words, it is an institutional expression of the overall development of China’s civil society. In China, modern civil society actually first appeared in late Qing Dynasty. The development of China’s civil society is extremely arduous which was disrupted frequently. The changes in the economic and political environment resulted from “reform and opening up” set off a rapid expansion in civil organizations beginning in the 1980s. By 1989, there were 1,600 national mass organizations and more than 200,000 local ones. According to the most recent statistics, there were a total of 147,937 social associations of all kinds, 131,322 civilian run non-enterprise units and 714 foundations in China on March 31, 2005.5 There is no official data on the number of civil organizations below the county level at this time. Someone estimates there are more than 3 million civil organizations in China. Some scholars have noted that at the end of 2003, China had 142,000 registered social associations, 124,000 registered civilian run non-enterprise units, 40,000 unregistered social associations, and 250,000 unregistered civilian run non-enterprise units. At that time, there were also estimated to be 5,378,424 primary-level organizations of the eight major types of mass organizations (including trade unions, the Communist Youth League, and women’s federations, students’ federations, peasants’ associations, literary federations, friendship associations, and associations of industry and commerce); 1,338,220 quasi-governmental, primary-level social associations, such as disabled persons’ federations, family planning associations, and art and literature federations; and 758,700 grassroots organizations, such as students’ groups, community recreational groups, homeowners’ committees and Internet groups. Thus, the total number of social associations is estimated to be 8,031,344 (He, 2005). The growth of the market economy and democracy has brought with it the gradual rise of China’s civil society, which has an ever-increasing influence on China’s social and political life. Civil organizations, as the subjects 5 “Civil Government Statistical Data for the First Quarter of 2005”, Ministry of Civil Affairs

website: http://www.mca.gov.cn/mztj/yuebao0503.html.

91

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping

of civil society, must be non-governmental, non-profit and independent, and membership in them must be voluntary. The existence and development of such civil organizations in Chinese society after reform and opening up is an important difference from the preceding period. However, civil organizations in China are very different from those in the West. Compared with Western countries, China’s civil society has the following characteristics (Yu, 2002, pp. 216–220). First, China’s civil society is a typical case of a civil society led by the government, and it obviously has both official and unofficial aspects. Most of China’s civil organizations were established by the governments and are led by the governments, especially for the most influential civil organizations that are legally registered, such as industry organizations, professional organizations, academic associations and interest groups.Although the CPC and the Chinese government have tried to increase the independence of civil organizations and have repeatedly issued documents stating that leaders with positions in Party and government departments may not hold leading positions in civil organizations and civilian run non-enterprise units, government dominance of civil organizations has always been a prominent feature of China’s civil society. Second, China’s civil organizations are in the process of being formed and have a transitional nature. Compared with their counterparts in Western countries, China’s civil organizations are still very immature, and their natures of “independent”, “voluntary” and “non-governmental” have not yet fully extended. Most of China’s civil organizations began to develop after the mid-1980s and it is just a period of less than 20 years. They are in a process of changes and growth, and neither their structure nor functions have taken set form. For example, the latest government regulations require all civil organizations to separate themselves from the government, yet the governments control the important activities of civil organizations through the Regulatory Bodies. This kind of transitional nature of civil organizations is just one aspect of similar changes taking place throughout the whole of Chinese society, and it is the specific manifestation in civil organizations of these more general social changes. Third, in accord with the above stated characteristics, China’s civil organizations have not been yet normalized. Although the Ministry of Civil Affairs promulgated revised supervision regulations in an attempt to

92

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment

standardize civil organizations in 1998, this standardization process still has a long way to go. In terms of organizational characteristics, China presently has at least the following kinds of civil organizations: (1) Social associations with high administrative degree, such as trade unions, the Communist Youth League and women’s federations. In reality they have no substantive differences from administrative agencies; (2) Social organizations with significant administrative functions, such as all kinds of industry supervision associations, associations of industry and commerce and consumers’ organizations. They have a certain staff allocations and enjoy a certain rank while shoulder some administrative management functions; (3) Academic associations, which have become essentially unofficial, such as scientific and research associations. The vast majority of them do not have fulltime staffs, and their principal leaders are elected by the association itself (although needed to be approved by the Regulatory bodies). Apart from several exceptions, most of such associations do not enjoy administrative rank; (4) Civilian run non-enterprise units. They constitute a very unique kind of civil organization. They do not have administrative rank and perform few administrative functions. Except research and exchanges, they also provide specialized services to the whole society. Fourth, the development of China’s civil organizations is very uneven at present, and they are different on the social, political and economic influence as well as social positions. As for rural and residential civil organizations in grassroots, those with the greatest influences and prestige are villagers’ committees, neighborhood committees, and some other community organizations, for example, retirees’ associations. Organizations which were very influential in the past, such as CommunistYouth League branches, women’s conferences and militia battalions, have lost much of their influences. At the central and provincial levels, the influence of industry associations, management associations, charitable organizations, professional organizations and civilian run non-enterprise units is in general growing. The main reasons for the disparity lie in the facts that they are different in institutional resources, cultural basis, economic strength as well as the prestige of their leaders. We can summarize our conclusions concerning the institutional environment of China’s civil society as follows. In our opinion, since the reform and opening up and the accompanying development of the market economy

93

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping

and democracy, all kinds of civil organizations have emerged in great numbers and a relatively independent civil society is now rapidly emerging in China whose influence on the political and economic life of society is deepening by the day. The rise of China’s civil society is an important manifestation of China’s overall social progress. It not only helps promote Chinese democracy, but also helps promote the healthy development of the market economy. The birth and development of a relatively independent civil society in China directly benefits from improvements in the institutional environment. Since the mid-1980s, China has carried out important reforms of the political system, such as revising the Constitution, separating the Party from the government and the government from business, transforming government functions and placing the country under the rule of law. It has also brought forth a series of laws, regulations and policies to encourage and standardize civil organizations and transformed its attitude toward civil society. All these are institutional factors that facilitate the rapid development of civil society. After more than 20 years of development, China’s civil society has reached a new stage in which many aspects of China’s present institutional environment are no longer conducive to its further growth, and some institutional factors have already become a bottleneck restricting its growth, making it necessary to undertake reforms. Reform should be based on a thorough understanding of the development laws of civil society. It should further transform our understanding of civil society, correctly define civil society and classify civil organizations rationally. It should revise and improve laws, regulations and policies concerning civil organizations as soon as possible. It should energetically support, enthusiastically assist, correctly guide and rationally standardize the approval, registration, regulation, spending and taxation of civil organizations. It should create an institutional environment conducive to the healthy growth of civil society. It should prevent civil organizations from becoming adversaries of the government and promote cooperation between civil organizations and the government, so that they work together towards a society with democratic governance and highly harmony.

References CPC Research Group on Hangzhou’s Civil Organizations ( ) (2003). “Jiaqiang Minjian Zuzhi Zhong Dang De Jianshe Gongzuo

94

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment Sikao” (Considerations on Strengthening Party Building Work in Civil Organizations). In Zuzhi Renshi Guanli Yanjiu (Research on Human Resource Management in Organizations), No. 3. Deng, Guosheng (2001). Fei Yingli Zuzhi Pinggu (Evaluation of Non-profit Organizations). Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe (Literature in Social Sciences Press). He, Zengke (1997, 2001) “Analysis of Factors Affecting the Institutional Environment of China’s Civil Society (a research report on this project), 2005 Legal Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee General Office, Legal Affairs Office of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the General Office of the Organization Department of the Central Committee, eds., Zhonguo Gongchandang Dangnei Fagui Xuanbian (Selected Laws and Regulations of the Chinese Communist Party). Beijing: Law Press. Li, Jingpeng. Comprehensive General Analytic Report on a Survey of Beijing and Zhejiang Province. Working paper, not yet published. North, Douglass C. (1991). Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1) 97–112. Salamon, Laster M. (1994). The Emerging Sector. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Shandong Province Bureau for Supervising Civil Organizations (eds.) (2005). Minjian Zuzhi Guanli Wenjian Ziliao Huibian (Collected Documents and Data Concerning the Supervision of Civil Organizations). Shandong University Press. State Council (1998). Shehui Tuanti Dengji Guanli Tiaoli (Regulations Concerning the Registration and Supervision of Social Associations), October. Wan, Jianghong and Zhang Cui’e (2004). “Jin Shinian Woguo Minjian Zuzhi Yanjiu Zongshu” (Review of Research on China’s Social Organizations During the Past TenYears). Jianghan Luntan (Jianghan Forum), No. 8. Wang, Ming et al., Zhongguo Shetuan Gaige (Reform of China’s Social Associations). Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe (Literature in Social Sciences Press). Wang, Ming (2005). Introduction. In Qinghua NGOYanjiu Congshu NGO (Series of Tsinghua University NGO Research Studies). Beijing: Tsinghua University Press. Wang, Ming (2005). “Speech at the 17th Annual International Philanthropy Fellows in Philanthropy and Social Justice International Conference. Unpublished, July 11. Wang, Shaoguang and Wang Ming (2004). “Cujin Woguo Minjian Fei Yingli Zuzhi Fazhan De Zhengce Jianyi” (Policy Suggestions for Promoting the Development of China’s NPOs). In Wang Ming, ed.,

95

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch03

Yu Keping Zhongguo Fei Zhengfu Gonggong Bumen (China’s Nongovernmental Public Sector). Beijing: Tsinghua University Press. Wang,Ying et al. (1993). Shehui Zhongjian Ceng (The Intermediate Level of Society), Beijing: Zhongguo Fazhan Chubanshe (China Development Press). Wang, Ying and Sun Bingyao (2002). Survey of the Development of China’s Civil Organizations. in Yu (2002). Wu, Zhongze (ed.) (1996). Shetuan Guanli Gongzuo (Managing Social Associations). Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe (China Social Press). Yan, Jian (2005). Survey of Rural Civil Organizations in Wenling, Zhejiang Province. A research report on this project, July. Yu, Keping (2002). Zhongguo Gongmin Shehui De Xingqi Yu Zhili De Bianqian (The Rise of China’s Civil Society and the Transformation of Its Governance). Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe (Literature in Social Sciences Press). Zhu, Xiaoming (2004). “Zhongguo Minjian Zuzhi Shengcun Fazhan De Falü HuanjingYanjiu” (A Study of the Legal Environment of the Existence and Development of Civil Organizations). Zhejiang Shehui Kexue (Zhejiang Social Sciences), No. 3.

96

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Graduated Control: Research on State-Society Relationship in Contemporary Mainland China1

Chapter

4

Kang Xiaoguang, Han Heng2

Abstract The authors have conducted a series of positive researches on the topic of state-society relationship in contemporary Mainland China. Through an examination of the actual state control over a great many organizations, this paper proposes the concept of a “system of graduated controls”. Based on this system, the government, out of consideration for their benefits, takes different control strategies on different social organizations according to the social organization’s capability and the public goods they offer. In other words, it is a new system where the government implements an overall control on the society and offer public goods by means of a non-governmental method in a new economic environment. Through comparing with other state-society relationships, this paper points out that the graduated control system is a new “ideal type” for state-society relationship. Keywords: Graduated control; state-society relationship; social organization; NGO.

1.

Raise the Issue

The reform and opening up policy raised by Deng Xiaoping brought wide, profound and rapid change in Mainland China, stirring academia’s 1 This research was sponsored by Ford Foundation. 2 Kang Xiaoguang, School of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development Renmin Uni-

versity of China, P. R. China. Han Heng, School of Public Administration, Zhengzhou University, P. R. China.

97

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Kang Xiaoguang, Han Heng

enthusiasm on re-discussing the development direction and strategies of China. In the 1980s, the theoretical paradigm occupying dominant position was the modernization theory. Within such paradigm, “neoauthoritarianism” and “democratic priority” became two famous theories with competitive relations (Liu and Li, 1989). However, this situation had been broken up at the end of the 1980s. After that, the research on state-society relationship received more and more attention from academia with the economic reform advancement and increasingly highlighted social problems. The advocators of a new paradigm no longer fixed their eyes only on the “superstructure,” but the “base” instead with a close attention to social domain other than state. In the past research on state-society relationship, “civil society” trended the analytical frame earlier. It is Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard that introduced the theory of civil society into China, and he explained the political events at the end of 1980s with the theory of “civil society resists against the State” (Gu, 1994).3 Gordon White pointed out the appearance of civil society in China upon the inspection to the grass-roots associations in Xiaoshan, Zhejiang Province, and he thought such situation was developing to become a civil society (White, 1993). Later, under a concept of civil society in a sociologic sense, White and other researchers analyzed the changes in social organizations resulting from the economic reform and pointed out that the development of Chinese primary organizations presented systematical features of civil society (White et al., 1996, p. 208). Considering there is no social organizations independent from state in China, some scholars adjusted civil society concept from Western society followed by proposing the new ones such as “semi-civil society” (He, 1997), “state-led civil society” (Frolic, 1997) and then analyzed actual situation in contemporary China based on these concepts. Since the concept of civil society underlines the social domains independent from the state which did not exist in the contemporary mainland China, a number of researchers throw away such concept and turned to the corporatism frame to analyze the state-society relationship within the frame of corporatism. Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger indicated that the state-society relationship in China currently was in a “corporatism model” 3Anthony Saich also points out that the early documentary concerning contemporary China

and civil society focuses on the conflicts between state and society (Saich, 2001, p. 206).

98

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Graduated Control

based on their research on labor unions and business associations (Chan, 1993; Unger and Chan, 1995; Unger, 1996). Tony Saich also used the concept of corporatism to analyze the state-society relationship during the reform (Saich, 2001, pp. 207–210), and Dai Muzhen even applied the concept of local corporatism to her interpretation of local economic growth and the role of local government during reform (Oi, 1992). As both concepts originated from the West, so the effectiveness of their application in China was doubted by some scholars.4 Meanwhile, a few scholars intended to create new analytical conceptions based on the experience of China. For instance, Wang Ying and some other scholars established the “theory of social middle-class group” after an inspection on the grass roots associations in Xiaoshan, Zhejiang Province (Wang et al., 1993; Wang, 1994). Why there are so many different models concerning state-society relationship against the reality in China? The answer is that the country is too large and complicated such that any theory model may find its supporting data as long as its advocators make effort to seek and dare to ignore the contrary facts. Generally speaking, the research on state-society relationship in Mainland China still stays in local observation stage. Researchers concerned with political events think China has entered an era of “civil society resists the State”; researchers of new types of organizations think the civil society is emerging in China; researchers focusing on mass organizations think China falls into the category of “corporatism”; however, researchers caring about “duality of government and the people” of associations consider a “social middle-class group” is being established in Chinese society. In terms of such situation, Bao Duanjia and Alexer Shevchenko have described it vividly as “proliferation of labels” or “the blind man trying to size up the elephant” (Baum and Shevchenko, 1999, pp. 333–334, p. 346). This chapter tries to go beyond such stage of the studies of state-society relationship and intends to conduct a comprehensive observation on the whole “elephant” based on past researches, then raises a new analysis framework from the data of field investigation.

4 The doubt about civil society, see: Wakeman (1993); Huang (1993); Dean (1997); Cham-

berlain (1998, p. 68); Saich (2000, p. 139); Howell (2004, pp. 163–164). The doubt about corporatism, see White et al. (1996, pp. 211–215); Saich (2001, p. 209); Foster (2002, pp. 62–63); Howell (2004, pp. 162–163).

99

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Kang Xiaoguang, Han Heng

2.

Research Hypothesis and Programme

Upon current studies on state-society relationship, a common feature existing in methodology is the taking of the management method of the government performed on social organizations as the entry point. To a large extent, the difference in the conclusions of different researchers is subjected to the different types of organizations they have studied. In terms of “local observation”, their conclusions are right. But the deficiency exists in their conclusions is “over-generalization”, i.e., concluding the whole features based on local observation. This has offered us a “hint”: On the whole, the management methods of government are “plural” rather than “unitary”. In other words, the government has different methods for different social organizations. We name this “plural management strategy” as “graduated control” and conclude the basic features of state-society relationship in contemporary Mainland China with such method. For authoritative government, social organization has “double properties”: On one hand, it is a challenge for it represents one of the most powerful carriers of collective behavior; on the other hand, it is an auxiliary power as well for social organizations offer public goods, which belongs to part of the governmental obligations. In addition, the abilities of different organizations for dealing with the authorities are different, also the provision of various goods. Therefore, a government pursuing self-interest maximization must carry out respective management on those organizations according to their power and the public goods they offer.5 But obviously, this is only a “subjective wish” of the government, of which the realization requires proper government ability. However, the Chinese government is equipped with such ability. The reform in China began with the holism. The government occupied the absolutely leading position in the power distribution pattern between state and society during the initial stage. But the reform did not change the situation fundamentally, and itself was government dominant reformation. Such power distribution pattern before reform 5 “Government” is not an abstract concept. The government in real life is composed of a group of live people. In general, they are the “rational economic man” pursuing the selfinterest maximization. The character of “rational economic man” appeared in behavior way of government has decided that all the behaviors of the government serve the realization of the interest maximization of the government or the ruling class.

100

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Graduated Control

and leading position during reform enable the government to promote the reform at its own will, and the progressive process of the reform has left enough time for it to adjust strategies. Therefore the government gradually set up “the system of graduated control” that may perform various control strategies on different social organizations according to its self-interest. We may draw two ratiocinations from the “theories” above. Suppose the ultimate interest of the government is the monopoly on political power while the most powerful challenge on it comes from the collective behavior of the public, the government shall choose the control method according to social organizations’ abilities for launching such collective behavior firstly. Thus the first ratiocination floats onto the surface: Facing social organizations with different power of challenging or ability for launching collective behavior, the government shall select different control method; since the government also assumes the function of providing public goods in which its stability is likely to be threatened for a poor performance of this duty, the government will also choose control strategies based on the properties of public goods the organization will offer. Then the second ratiocination comes up: The government takes different control actions on social organizations in line with the properties of the goods they offer. In order to verify the hypothesis (ratiocinations) above, we select eight types of social organizations for typical investigation (see Table 1); they are labor union, trade association, chamber of commerce, urban neighborhood committee, religious organization, GONGO, grass-roots NGO, informal organization and political opposition organization.6 Their abilities for launching collective behaviors are different as well as in the offered public goods. Labor union is a labor organization; trade association and chamber of commerce are interest groups of entrepreneurs. All of these functional organizations have strong abilities for launching collective action. Political opposition organization is more powerful than others in challenging the government while religious organization may create a different system concerning value. The geopolitical community organization offers crucial public goods to residents and a carrier of their collective action as well. In general, GONGO for public benefit, grassroots NGO and hobby group 6 The sample of political opposition organization is Falun Gong, the relevant data are sorted

according to the Kang Xiaoguang’s investigation on Falun Gong during 1998–2000 (Kang, 2000).

101

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Kang Xiaoguang, Han Heng Table 1. General category

Subdivision

Functional Labor Union Organization

Trade Association, Chamber of Commerce Urban NeighCommunityborhood based Committee Organization

Investigation Samples List.

Designation SG federation of trade union SG ironworks labor union SK corporate labor union SD corporate labor union YY chamber of commerce ZB trade association WS investment association SY community neighborhood committee XX community neighborhood committee YC Christian church BD Christian church

Religious Christian Organization Three-Self Patriotic Movement NGO GONGO FP foundation Grassroots NGO XY education Institute FZ briefing

Remark State-owned corporation State-owned corporation Joint venture

Shenzhen

Foreign company

Shenzhen

Beijing Beijing

Beijing Shenzhen Shenzhen “Compound” neighborhood committee Ordinary neighborhood committee Urban church Rural church

Beijing

Beijing

Henan Henan

Beijing Local organization Beijing Overseas organization Organization in a unit

Informal Hobby RD painting and Organization Organization calligraphy research institute SY waist drum team Organization in a unit QN hobby Organization in a organization park

102

Location

Beijing Beijing

Beijing Beijing

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Graduated Control

without official organization form will not compose a remarkable threat to the authorities. However, for the government, the GONGO and grassroots NGO are more important than any informal organization in terms of providing public goods. We use five variables to describe the management methods of the government in controlling social organizations: (A) The government’s attitude towards the establishment of social organization. Does the government permit their existence? If it does, has the government offered a positive support or put a strict limitation on the registration issue? During the process of the establishment, does the government take care of everything or represents non- intervention? (B) The setup method of the government department concerning social organization’s activities management. If the government allows the existence of social organization, is there any government department or institution appointed by the government conducting management on their business activities. If there is a government department responsible for managing, is it functional department designated by the government or a part time one with no clear function found by social organizations? (C) The governmental control over the management structure. How do those social organizations make their crucial decisions? Is the decision formulated by the order of the upper management department or made independently by the organization itself? Or make through negotiation of both parties? The so-called “crucial decision” refers to the decision on important activities or personnel matters. (D) The government control over the needed resources of social organizations. The “resource” includes funds and human resource. In terms of funds control, we mainly investigate on the government control over funds source. Does the government carry out intervention through clear laws and regulations or administrative methods, or does it not step in? In the aspect of human resource, what we study is, to what extent the staff, welfare in social organization are controlled by the government. (E) The government control over the daily routine in social organization. The investigation mainly involves whether the daily routine in this social organization has been intervened by government department. The daily routines are required by competent department or decided by the organization? If it decides on its own, is the decision required to be reported to the competent department before or after the implementation? Next, we will examine the hypothesis above with the data of typical investigation. 103

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Kang Xiaoguang, Han Heng

3.

Corresponding Analysis: Description of Graduated Control System

According to the data from typical investigation, we can figure out the actual state of each control variable. For instance, control variable A has six different status: a1 — The organization is established in a top-down way; a2 — The establishment of the organization is encouraged by the government; a3 — The organization is established in a bottom-up way within the management system set by the government; a4 — The organization is established in a bottom-up way without governmental intervention; a5 — The organization is prohibited from registering as corporation, but the government tacitly consents to the social organizations existing as legal entity; a6 — The organization is prohibited from establishing, and the government bans the existing organization. See Table 2. Using the code in Table 2, we are able to re-state the government control over these 18 social organizations (see Table 3). We carry out a plural corresponding analysis with the application of “alternating least squares and optimal scaling analysis method” and draw a result that there is an obviously corresponding relation between the control method of the government and the type of the social organization, mainly divided into five categories. Such corresponding relation is reflected in Table 4. In the first corresponding pattern, the social organizations are labor unions and community neighborhood committees, which both are established in a bottom-up way by the government. Among the four investigated labor unions, 2 (SG federation of trade union and SG labor union of ironworks) were set up in 1949 by the government; the other 2 (SK corporate labor union and SD corporate labor union) were established after the reform and opening policy as required by the government. Similarly, the community neighborhood committees were also set up in this way. The precursor of community neighborhood committee is the resident committees or family committees set by the government in the city, and its evolution is still under the direct control of the government.7 7 For instance, XX community neighborhood committee is consolidated by the previ-

ous 2 committees while SY community neighborhood committee is set up after the a few previous family committee consolidated into one. Later, it evolved into the current

104

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Graduated Control Table 2. Index System in the Investigation on Government Control over Social Organization. Control variable

Status of control variable

A: The government attitude towards the establishment of social organization

a1 : The organization is established in a top-down way; a2 : The establishment of the organization is encouraged by the government; a3 : The organization is established in a bottom-up way and shall be included in the management system set by the government; a4 : The organization is established in a bottom-up way without governmental intervention; a5 : The organization is prohibited from registering as corporation aggregate, but the government tacitly consents to the social organizations existing as legal entity; a6 : The organization is prohibited from establishing, and the government bans the existing organization.

B: The setup method of the government department concerning the management social organizations’ activities

b1 : The government appoints a certain department in charge of the management; b2 : The government and social organization determine a business management unit after negotiation; b3 : No business management unit; the government manages social organization as corporation; b4 : The management of social organizations’ activities is conducted by the unit to which the organization belongs; the government does not conduct direct intervention; b5 : Business activity is developed by the organization itself.

C: The government control over the governance structure

C1 : Crucial decision making

C2 : The appointment of the person in charge

C11 : Crucial decisions are made by the competent department; C12 : Crucial decisions are proposed by the organization and require the approval from the competent department; C13 : Crucial decisions are made by the organization. C21 : The person in charge is appointed by the competent department; (Continued)

105

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Kang Xiaoguang, Han Heng Table 2.

(Continued) C22 : The person in charge is appointed by the unit to which the organization belongs; C23 : The person in charge is determined by the organization and government after negotiation; C24 : The person in charge is determined by the organization.

D: Resource Control

D1 : Funds control

d11 : The government specifies the funds source of the organization through laws and regulations; d12 : The government restricts the funds collection through administrative methods; d13 : The government supports the funds collection through administrative methods; d14 : The government does not intervene with the funds, but the organization needs to report the source to the competent department; d15 : The funds come from the unit to which the organization belongs without direct government management; d16 : The funds are arranged by the organization. d21 : The arrangement concerning D2 : Human resource control: staff, salary human resource is decided by the standard competent department; d22 : The arrangement concerning human resource is decided by the unit to which the organization belongs; d23 : The arrangement concerning human resource is decided by the organization, but it needs to report to the competent department; (Continued)

106

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Graduated Control Table 2.

E: Control over daily routines

(Continued)

d24 : The arrangement concerning human resource is decided by the organization. e1 : The daily routines are the tasks assigned by the competent department; e2 : The daily routines are supported by the unit to which the organization belongs; e3 : The content of daily routines are decided by the organization but needs approval from the competent department before implementation; e4 : The daily routines are decided by the organization, but it needs to report to the competent department after implementation; e5 : The daily routines are conducted by the organization.

The government not only decides the establishment of the social organization of this type, but also sets the specialized management department for them;8 the crucial decisions are made by the competent department and the implementation followed top-down way. The people in charge is appointed by the unit to which the organization belongs or the competent department. The investigation indicates that important leading comrades in community neighborhood committee. All of these are completed upon the command from upper government. 8 The investigation indicates, most business activities in labor union are arranged by the system of each federation of trade union while the federation of trade union above the county level actually has been included into the governmental frame, for the “Trade Union Law” specifies: “The welfare of the retired personnel or veteran cadres in the federation of trade union above the county level is the same as that of the personnel in state organs” (the 48th article). The major activities of neighborhood committee are mostly organized by subdistrict office. The “Urban Residents Committees Organization Law” has also made clear specification: “The people’s government or its agencies in cities without districts, or district under city administration guide, support and help the work of neighborhood committee. Neighborhood committee assists the people’s government or its agencies in cities without districts, or district under city administration with their works” (the 2nd article). In other words, the government has appointed the federation of trade union at all levels, urban grassroots government and its agencies to manage respectively the business of labor unions and community organizations.

107

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Kang Xiaoguang, Han Heng Table 3.

Detailed Control Information of the Government over Social Organization. C

D

Control method The type of the organization

A

B

C1

C2

D1

D2

E

SG federation of trade union SG ironworks labor union SK corporate labor union SD corporate labor union SY community neighborhood committee XX community neighborhood committee YY chamber of commerce ZB trade association WS investment association YC district Christian church BD township Christian church FP foundation XY education institute FZ briefing RD painting and calligraphy research institute SY waist drum team QN hobby organization Falun Gong

a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a2 a2 a2 a3 a3 a2 a5 a5 a4 a4 a4 a6

b1 b1 b1 b1 b1 b1 b2 b2 b2 b1 b1 b2 b3 b3 b4 b4 b5 b1

C11 C11 C11 C11 C11 C11 C12 C12 C12 C12 C12 C12 C13 C13 C13 C13 C13 C13

C22 C22 C22 C22 C22 C21 C22 C23 C23 C23 C23 C21 C24 C24 C24 C24 C24 C24

d11 d11 d11 d11 d11 d11 d14 d14 d14 d12 d12 d13 d16 d16 d15 d15 d16 d12

d22 d22 d22 d22 d22 d21 d22 d23 d23 d23 d23 d23 d24 d24 d24 d24 d24 d24

e1 e1 e2 e2 e1 e1 e4 e4 e4 e3 e3 e4 e5 e5 e5 e5 e5 e5

labor union are appointed by the Party branch of its corporation.9 Speaking of community neighborhood committee, though electoral system has been promoted in the grass-roots community in recent years, the election 9 In SG the federation of trade union, the chairman of labor union is held concurrently by the Party committee member of the Standing committee in the head company of SG; the person in charge of each department is elected under an appointment system of Party committee; the chairman of labor union of subordinate factories and mines (including the labor union of SG ironworks) are also assumed by the deputy secretary of the Party committee at same level or the Party committee member of the Standing committee. In the labor union of SK corporation, the chairman of labor union is held concurrently by the deputy secretary of the Party committee, who is also the chairman of the board of supervisors and administrative director; the chairman of each branch union is appointed through the negotiation between labor union and department managers and “must have the consent of department manager”. Sometimes department managers will even take the job as the chairman of labor union.

108

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Graduated Control Table 4. Method.

Corresponding Relationship between Type of Organization and Control

Control method of the government over social organizations Corresponding pattern

Type of organization

I

Labor union; Community neighborhood committee Associations, chamber of commerce; GONGOs Grassroots NGOs; Informal hobby organization Church groups Political opposition groups

II

III

IV V

A

B

C

D

C1

C2

D1

D2

E

a1

b1

C11

C21 C22

d11 d11

d21 d22

e1 e2

a2

b2

C12

C21 C22 C23

d13 d14

d22 d23

e4

a5 a4

b3 b4 b5 b1 b1

C13

C24

d15 d16

d24

e5

C12 C13

C23 C24

d12 d12

d23 d24

e3 e5

a3 a6

is still under the total control of the government. Some elections are a mere formality.10 10 For instance, before the election of XX community neighborhood committee takes place,

in order to control the votes, the personnel in the subdistrict office has conducted wide propaganda, holding meetings with resident representatives and intentionally increasing the interaction between the representatives and the “favorite” candidate of the subdistrict office to “let the residents know more”. SY community neighborhood committee also held its election, but it was “a mere formality”. For example, the election in 2003 was as follows: First the leader of SY (the unit to which the committee is attached) delivered an address, expressing the recognition on the past achievement of the committee and explaining that SY neighborhood committee was converted from family committee, which was rather different from the current neighborhood committee in society. He encouraged the representatives to vote for the previous members of the committee. After that, the leader of the subdistrict office gave a speech, the content of which was similar to that of the SY leader, calling everyone to continue supporting the committee work. Finally the list of candidates was given to resident representatives, and the candidates were exactly the previous members. But there was a “blank” on the vote. If the representative was not satisfied with those candidates,

109

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Kang Xiaoguang, Han Heng

Concerning source of the organization funds, the “Trade Union Law” and the “Urban Residents Committees Organization Law” have made clear stipulations. For instance, the “Urban Residents Committees Organization Law” stipulates that “neighborhood committee’s working funds and its source, as well as the scope, standards and sources of the members’ living allowance,” are regulated and allocated by the government; “the office space of neighborhood committee is planned and offered by local government” (the 17th article); “the working funds, living allowances, and office space for family committee are offered by its unit” (the 19th article). Of course, the staff structure and welfare of the grass-roots labor union are decided by the corporation to which it belongs. In terms of daily routine, the daily routine of the labor union in state-owned enterprise depends on the upper union system.11 The activities of labor union in joint ventures or private enterprises are supported by their enterprises,12 while the activities of community neighborhood committee comply with the order of higher governmental department.13 he could write down his favorite person. Thus, the election result was that the candidates were the same with the last term. Then the neighborhood committee organized the formal election following a single-candidate election. The director, committee members were all pre-appointed. The residents selected the committee personnel through the single-candidate election. 11 By contrasting the activities of SG federation of trade union in 2002 and that of Beijing federation of trade union, we can discover that the former are either conducted as required by the municipal federation of trade union (or municipal Party committee, local government), or carried out for participating in the activities uniformly organized by Beijing federation of trade union; some are frequently “emphasized” or “arranged” by the municipal federation of trade union. 12 We once investigated a foreign company without labor union — CL Group, though it has not established a labor union, all the activities in SK corporate labor union can be found in CL Group, and those activities are performed well. Therefore, we can see that the existence of the labor union in joint venture is not a big issue for workers. In some better enterprises, some activities are carried out even without a labor union, such as recreational and sports activities, skill contest, or propaganda. The ultimate goal of these activities is to stimulate the activity of workers and increase the sense of belonging and cohesion rather than for the interest of the workers, though these activities have satisfied the need for recreation of the workers objectively. 13 When we interviewed in XX community neighborhood committee, the interviewees kept complaining that the subdistrict office had assigned too much tasks and members had to attend meetings frequently: “We are afraid of meeting followed by tasks”. When the director attends the meeting every Tuesday, there are always numerous people in charge there assigning numerous tasks: “Works line up in queue”, they speak simply, but the job assigned

110

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Graduated Control

Under the government control above, labor union and community committee have actually become the “quasi-governmental organizations” implementing government’s specific policies. To a large extent, they almost totally depend on government organs without autonomy.14 In the second corresponding pattern, the types of social organizations are association, chamber of commerce, and GONGO. Government encourages the establishment of the organizations of these types. In 1989, the “Interim Provisions for the Administration of Foreign Chambers of Commerce in China” was published to attract foreign businessmen to invest in China; in 1999, the government published “Some Proposals of Speeding up Cultivating and Developing the Business Association (For Trial Implementation)” to help and support associations to develop. The Proposals pointed out: “the business associations (including industrial and commercial association, chamber of commerce and other intermediary organizations in society) are an important part of socialist market economy. Cultivating and developing the business associations are major tasks of promoting the reform in government institutions and deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises”. Obviously, the government supports the development of the associations positively.15 Not only has the establishment of associations, chambers of commerce received the financial support from the government, but also the establishment of GONGOs.16 to me means several days’ work”. A member of the committee must receive guidance from several sections of the subdistrict office: “One person deals with several upper sections”. 14 Grassroots labor union and compound-based neighborhood committee are not only supported by the government, but also by the unit where they exist, for the personnel appointment, funds source, and human resources of these organizations highly depend on the unit to which they belong. Therefore grassroots labor union and compound-based neighborhood committee have double dependence. 15YY chamber of commerce itself is a product of the separation of enterprise from administration and the transformation of government functions; ZB trade association and WS investment association are set up jointly by the government and enterprises. 16 The establishment of FP Foundation is directly initiated by the government. It maintains a close relationship with the government during its development. According to what an official has said: “The members in the Party Central Committee and the State Council always pay attention to the works in the foundation and support its development. There are clear instructions for no matter the candidate appointment, or the solution of problems emerging in the developing process, including audit”. See “The Address of State Councilor Chen Junsheng in the Third Conference for FP Foundation Council Members”, September 9, 1996.

111

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Kang Xiaoguang, Han Heng

In the setting of the management department, the government did not appoint a certain department to control the business activities of the organizations; instead, the competent department is the outcome through the negotiation between social organizations and the relevant government institutions. The organizations of this type have autonomy with different degree in making crucial decisions and appointing the person in charge.17 In the aspect of resources, these organizations are supported rather than restricted by the government,18 and they have freedom in deciding the recruitment and staff welfare. The daily routines are not intervened, either, but the organizations need to report to the competent department. In the third corresponding pattern, the type of social organizations is grassroots NGO and various informal organizations. Compared with the organizations above, the government did not pay much attention to grassroots NGO and hobby organizations.19 Grassroots NGOs are always registered as corporations, so the government has to treat them as industrial and commercial units.20 Compared with GONGO, they have more autonomy 17Among the four investigated organizations, ZB trade association and WS investment asso-

ciation have more autonomy in terms of management structure. YY chamber of commerce to a large extent complies with the “unit of the president (huizhang danwei)” in personnel appointment while the person in charge of FP Foundation is nominated by the government. 18 FP Foundation has received a lot of “preferences” during its development. For instance, during the period from1992 to1993, The People’s Bank of China,Agricultural Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China have respectively offered RMB20 million discount loans to this organization with the approval from relevant government department. 19 The less intervention is relative, and it does not mean the government has no control over these organizations. What the government carries out is a “bottom line” control, in which the bottom line refers to the governmental authority and social stability. Some scholars also have noticed such bottom line (Howell, 2004, p. 159). 20According to the current “Regulations Governing the Registration on Registration Administration of Association”, social associations are prohibited from registering in the civil administration department without the approval of the competent unit. But in fact, the organizations qualified as competent units are unwilling to assume the management responsibility. As a result, many social organizations fail to find a competent unit to register as public organization and have to register as corporation. For instance, XX institute of education has negotiated one after the other with the State Education Commission, All-China Women’s Federation, Song Chingling Foundation, China Children and Teenager’s Fund, Child Development Center, China Disabled Persons’ Federation, Beijing Disabled Persons’ Federation and other institutions, but drew no successful fruit. Finally it has to register as legal entity.

112

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Graduated Control

for bearing no restrictions from the competent department.21 For those informal organizations, the government neither requires them to register in civil administration department, nor conducts a direct control over them. Its attitude on such organizations is either to mandate the unit to which the organization belongs to govern (indirect control),22 or laisser-faire. It can be easily seen that the government implement a weak control over this type of organizations compared with above organizations. In the fourth corresponding pattern, the type of social organizations is religious organization. The government has put limits on its establishment. The newly-founded Christian church must have the approval from government and shall be included into the “three-self” patriotic movement system which is recognized by the government. For the activities of churches, the government has built the state administration of the religious affairs for managing relevant affairs. In terms of management structure, the significant events in the church must be approved by the relevant department, and the people in charge are appointed by the government and also maintain good relationship with the government. Some of them are even be added into the CPPCCC. The government has issued strict regulations on the resource obtained in the church, especially on receiving overseas donation. But the church can make independent decisions on human resource issues such as the size of staff, salary, etc, however, all these must be filed on record in the relevant 21 By now, the government basically manages those social organizations as corporations

rather than public organizations. However, what activities have these organizations practically preformed are corporation activities and played corporation role, so that resulted in the loophole in the governmental management on such organizations. 22 The “transfer of the management right” is reflected in two aspects: First, the informal organization needs to be registered inside the unit; second, the unit supports the activities of the organization. This transfer does not only happen to the internal hobby organizations of units, but also of community. During the interview with XX community neighborhood committee, the member in charge of recreational and sports activities told us, the subdistrict office once delivered the methods of “enhancing the management of civil organizations in the community”, which requires the committee to make statistics on the basic situation of those organizations. The information includes the name, gender, age, address, phone number of the members in the organizations, whether they have retired, as well as the basic situation of the person in charge, etc. Here we can see, though the government did not conduct direct control over informal organizations, but it makes an indirect control through community neighborhood committee or unit.

113

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Kang Xiaoguang, Han Heng

government departments; basically, the daily routines are carried out by the church independently, but the time, location, content, and some other issues must be approved in advance. In the fifth corresponding pattern, the type of social organizations is political opposition organization, which is prohibited by the government. Those secretly established will be banned immediately once discovered. The state security department is in charge of the control over such organizations. They have high autonomy in terms of decision on the aspects such as crucial policies, appointment, resource obtaining, and daily routines. Compared with the control over other types of organizations, the government has adopted a unique and strict strategy towards political organizations. The analysis above indicates that the government uses different strategies towards social organizations with different power of challenge. For instance, for labor union and community neighborhood committee (with greater potential for challenge), the government treats them as “quasigovernmental organizations”; for religious organizations (with greater potential for challenge), the tactic of the government is to limit their growth; for associations, chambers of commerce, and GONGOs (with less potential for challenge), the government encourages their development; for grassroots NGOs and informal organizations (with less potential for challenge), the government does not conduct intervention; for political opposition organizations (challenging the government publicly), the government firmly prohibits and bans their existence. With these premises, the government intends to implement different control strategies according to the public goods provided by social organizations. For instance, the government encourages and supports the social organizations such as associations, chambers of commerce, and GONGOs because they offer the public goods which are exactly what the government badly needed. For those which do not provide necessities, the government will limit their development or takes a laissez-faire policy.23 That means, it is true that the government conducts different control strategies towards the social organizations in line 23 If a social organization has great potential for challenge while the public goods it provided

do not comply with the governmental urgent needs, the government will take limitation measures on it . If its potential is weak and it provides the public goods which the government does not need, then the government will take laisser-faire policy on it.

114

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Graduated Control

with their power of challenge and the public goods they provide. Therefore, these facts serve our hypothesis concluded through empirical data.

4.

The State-Society Relationship as an Ideal Type

The analysis on the empirical data indicates that during the process of reform and opening, with the political control loosening and the economy becoming market-oriented, there comes the plural interest demands in the social field and a great number of social organization thus emerged. Facing numerous new social organizations, the original mode in which the state governs society dissolved gradually. Instead, a new control system — graduated control system replaces the old one. In this new relationship between the state and society, “the state controls society” represented its basic feature. However, the control is not rigid for the government has varied controls according to different situation, some are strict, and some are moderate or takes laisser-faire policy. In the new system, the control strategy and its intensity are decided by the interest demand of the government and the power for challenge and social function of the controlled object. In fact, it is a new system that enables the government to establish an overall control over society with a nongovernmental method in a new economic environment. “Graduated control system” not only precisely describes the fundamental characters of the state-society relationship in contemporary Mainland China, but also establishes a new “ideal type” of such relationship.24 We can clarify the characteristics of this “new type” through the comparison with other types of state-society relationships. Here, we use, “civil society pattern”, “corporatism pattern”, “civil-society-resist-state pattern”, and “holism pattern” as the references. Though there is still controversy over the definition of civil society, it is generally accepted that civil society is the society, economy, and ethics order beyond the government control (Deng, 1992, p. 126). Civil society emphasizes freedom of association, plural competition of social organizations, and social domain beyond government control. Society plays a 24 The “ideal type” is used here based on the sense of Max Weber.

115

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Kang Xiaoguang, Han Heng

dominant role in the power distribution between state and society. However, compared with above condition, the right of association will be limited to some extent under the system of graduated control and it varies in different groups. Social organizations are not completely established based on voluntary association, neither are they totally independent from the country. Different organizations have different relationships with the government.25 The graduated control system is corresponding to authoritarianism government, in which the state gains a leading position in the power distribution of state and society. Compared with graduated control system, the corporatism pattern brings more freedom to association and more autonomy to social organizations. Different from civil society, corporatism underlines the communication and cooperation between state and society rather than the social domain independent from the country. It emphasizes the monopoly of functional organizations rather than plural competition. These monopolistic social organizations negotiate with the state on behalf of its members on one hand; on the other hand, they must promise to the government that they will implement public policies on members as an exchange (Deng, 1992, pp. 173–176). Under the graduated control, not all interest departments have a monopolistic social organization, and even there is, such organizations may not be recognized by its members,26 for under the system of graduated control, people’s right in this aspect is limited and most monopolistic organizations are not established at people’s will. Furthermore, corporatism pattern is more adaptable than graduated control system, which can live in harmony with liberal democratic government, authoritarian government, and even with totalitarian one. The pattern of civil society resisting the government concludes the relationship between state and society during the transition of socialist countries in Eastern Europe. It is corresponding to the crumbling totalitarian government. In such relationship, though the right of association 25 Thus, some advocators of civil society have to adjust this concept when analyzing China

and propose the concepts such as “quasi-civil society”, “state-led civil society”, etc. Moreover they think the civil society in China is still in the “nascent”, ”embryonic”, and ”emerging” stage (Dickson, 2003, p. 18). 26 Foster once indicated that in today’s China, corporatism is merely an external form rather than basic essence because most monopolistic organizations fail to represent the interest of their members, but the interest of the government (Foster, 2002, pp. 62–63).

116

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Graduated Control

is restricted in law, such restriction is actually invalid in real life. Social organizations have greater autonomy and resist against the government in public while the government control falls short of its wishes. However, under the graduated control system, the limitation on association right and the intervention on society are effective. Social organizations generally will not fight against the government because they have a clear awareness of “bottom line”.27 The civil-society-resist-state pattern is corresponding to the “crumbling” government form under a general system while graduated control system is able to conduct “self-adjustment”. Under the system of graduated control, the government still takes the dominant position in the power distribution, controlling the public fields and all resources for collective behavior. But it is obviously different from the previous general system. Under the system of graduated control, the government no longer carries out an overall intervention and allows limited freedom of association so that leads to the springing up of social organizations and the opening of economic field and private field. In terms of providing public goods, the government will not take care of everything anymore; instead, it takes advantage of social organizations to provide some public goods, though these organizations only plays a “supplementary” role. Through the comparison in Table 5, we can conclude that the graduated control system differs from the general system pattern before the reform period, the civil-society-resists-state pattern in Eastern Europe, as well as the corporatism pattern and civil society pattern from Western countries. It is a totally new pattern for the relationship between society and state. Graduated control system formed in Mainland China in the 1990s. After a market-oriented reform of over 20 years, market economy has replaced the planned economy becoming the leading mode of resource allocation. General system is also replaced by authoritarianism. The government no longer conducts overall control over economic activities, and does not intervene with the personal and family life of citizens; however, it still governs the “political” and “public” fields. Graduated control system is actually the basic strategy and organization system of government control. 27 For all the organizations we have investigated do not conduct any activity which is opposed

to the government except political opposition organizations. All the investigated objectives are equipped with strong “bottom line” awareness and applied strict self-discipline on their activities.

117

The government does not intervene

Right of association

Citizens have full right of association in law Completely autonomous

Autonomy

Mode of providing public goods Formulation and implementation of political decision

Corresponding form of government

General system

Graduated control system

The government does not intervene with society but interpose functional organizations through legislation Citizens have full right of association in law

The government intervenes with the public filed invalidly

The government conducts The government an overall intervention intervenes with public with society, including field economic, public and private field

Right of association is limited in law, but is not actually

Association is prohibited

Completely autonomous

Completely autonomous

Completely not autonomous

Cooperation between state and society

State and society go their own way

State provides all the public goods

Society plays the Influencing the dominant role; formulation and administration implementation of cooperates with political decision functional through non-system organizations conflicts Society plays the Society plays the State and society match dominant role dominant role; the each other in strength government influence or meet as equals is greater than that in the civil society pattern Liberal democracy Liberal democracy or Crumbling stage of authoritarianism general system

State plays the dominant role; society has no right of speech

Right of association is limited, but different groups have different right Different organizations have different autonomous State plays the dominant role; society plays a “supplementary” role State plays the dominant role; but society has space to express opinion

State plays a absolute dominant role

State plays the dominant role

General system

General system with “self-adjustment”

b978-ch04

Power distribution between state and society

Cooperation between state and society Society plays the dominant role; the council is the center

Civil society resists state

9in x 6in

Scope of government intervention on society

Corporatism

7:29

Civil society

Aug. 11, 2010

Ideal type Comparative content

Comparison between Patterns of State-Society Relationship.

Kang Xiaoguang, Han Heng

118

Table 5.

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Graduated Control

Under this system, the state allows the citizens to enjoy limited freedom of association and the existence of the social organizations of a certain type, but the government will not permit them to be independent from the country, let alone to challenge its authority. Meanwhile, the government takes advantage of the social organizations’ abilities of providing pubic goods consciously, enabling them to play a “supplementary” role. The experience of Mainland China since 1978 has proved that the government controls the progress of social systemization effectively through graduated control system. Certainly, the period of more than 20 years are not long enough for us to predict the consequence after further social systemization. Neither can we foresee whether the graduated control system counts as a transitional arrangement, or an ultimate system with everlasting life. Maybe, only time can give the answer.

References Baum, Richard and Alexei Shevchenko (1999). The “Slate of the Slate”. In Merle Goldman and Roderich Macfarquhar (eds.) The Paradox of China’s Post-Mao Reforms. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press. Chan, Anita (1993). Revolution or Corporation? Workers and Trade Unions in Post-Mao China. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 29. Chamberlain, Heath B. (1998). Civil Society with Chinese Characteristics? The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 39. Deng Zhenglai (ed.) (1992). Blackwell Encyclopedia of Politics. Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press. Dickson, Bruce J. (2003). Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs and Prospects for Political Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dean, Kenneth (1997). Ritual and Spare: Civil Society or Popular Religion? In Timothy Brook and B. Michael Frolic (eds.), Civil Society in China. New York: M. E. Sharp. Wakeman, Frederic Jr. (1993), The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate: Western Reflections on Chinese Political Culture. Modern China, 19(2). Foster, Kenneth W. (2002). Embedded within Stale Agencies: Business Associations in YanTai. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 47. Frolic, B. Michael (1997). Stale-Led Civil Society. In Timothy Brook and Michael Frolic (eds.), Civil Society in China. New York: M. E. Sharp. Gu, Xin (1994). Is There Civil Society and Public Space in Contemporary China? — Remarks on the Expositions of Western Scholars. Journal of Contemporary China, 4. He, Baogang (1997). The Democratic Implications of Civil Society in China. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

119

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch04

Kang Xiaoguang, Han Heng Howell, Jude (2004). New Direction in Civil Society: Organizations around Marginalized Interests. In Jude Howell (ed.), Governance in China. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Huang, Philip C. C. (1993). “Public Sphere”/“Civil Society” in China? The Third Realm between State and Society. Modern China, 19(2). Kang, Xiaoguang (2000). Perspective on Falun Gong Event. Hong Kong: Ming Bao Publishers. Liu, Jun and Li Lin (eds.) (1989). New-authoritarianism — Debate over the Guiding Principles of Reform Theory. Beijing: Beijing Institute of Economics Press. Oi, Jean C. (1992). Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China. World Politics, 45(10). Saich, Tony (2000). Negotiating the Slate: The Development of Social Organizations in China. China Quarterly (March). Saich, Tony (2001). Governance and Politics of China. New York: Palgrave. Unger, Jonthan (1996). “Bridges”: Private Business, the Chinese Government and the Rise of New Associations. The China Quarterly, 147. Unger, Jonthan and Anita Chan (1995). China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 33. Wang,Ying (1994). The Social Intermediate Layer in China: Social Development and Reconstruction of Organization System. China Social Science Quarterly, 6. Wang,Ying, Zhe Xiaoye, and Sun Bingyao (1993).The Social Intermediate Layer — Reform and China’s Social Organizations. Beijing: China Development Press. White, Gordon (1993). Prospects for Civil Society in China: A Case Study of Xiaoshan City. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 29. White, Gordon, Jude Howell and Xiaoyuan Shang (1996). In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China. New York: Oxford University Press.

120

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State, Civil Ruling Elites and Commoners before and after the Reform1

Chapter

5

Sun Liping2

Abstract The state, civil ruling elites and commoners are three basic structural elements of society. The relatively stable and interactive relationships among them are one of the basic frameworks of societal structure. As an important aspect of structural social changes, the evolution of this interactive relationship tends to exert wide and far-reaching influences on social life. Traditional China formed a three-tier social structure of state, civil ruling elites and commoners; but after Song Dynasty, the three-tier structure experienced a major change on the part of the mainstay of civil ruling elites, which had been the middle tier, the gentry-landlord group replaced the aristocrat-landlord group. Ever since the end of Qing Dynasty, China has been in want of a force that can reshape the basic institutional framework of society lacking inner stability. The result of this need is the formation of a total crisis represented by the integration of crisis. In the rivalry to solve the total crisis between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Kuomintang, the former triumphed and secured the state power in the mainland and built a total society to respond to the total crisis. Before the reform and opening up, Chinese society formed a two-tier structure of state-commoners, and the state monopolized the distribution of most resources; after the reform, with the formation of “free-flowing resources” and “free activity space”, China has started forming a new middle tier 1 This chapter is a reference paper for the “Symposium on Social Strata in Chinese Society” in December, 1993 in Hong Kong. Many of the opinions herein benefited greatly from Liqun Liu, Xiaoming Shi, Hansheng Wang, Yuan Sheng and Guoliang Xiao, to whom I would like to express my gratitude. 2 Sun Liping, Department of Sociology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, P. R. China.

121

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping and reshaping the three-tier structure: the state, civil ruling elites and commoners. Keywords: State; civil ruling elites; commoners; civil society.

1.

Introduction

This chapter is aimed at applying the three-tier analytical framework of “state–civil ruling elites–commoners” to exploring the trajectory of social structural development before and after the reform and opening up in China.

2. State, civil ruling elites and commoners are three basic components of any social structure. The relatively stable interactive relationship among them constitutes a framework of the basic social structure. The evolution of this interactive relationship serves as a key barometer of social structural transformation and exerts a profound influence on social life. Brief definitions of state, civil ruling elites and commoners herein are entailed to provide a reliable foundation for the following analyses. The concept of state here does not refer to nation-state generally but state-institutions specifically. Certainly, state is an institution to exercise power but not in general terms. Rather, power is related to sovereignty, namely the power of an ultimate and supreme arbitrator. Traditional state theories tended to stress the “representativeness” of state, namely to regard state as a representative of some groups and their alliances that share common interests. In brief, state is a representative of the ruling class. Therefore, the decision of a state is but an expression of the ruling class. In recent years, however, some important researches indicate that state is obviously characterized by autonomy. Michael Mann’s study of Britain indicates that state has its own interests (Mann, 1980, 1986, pp. 165–208). In this new theoretical framework, the property of state must be emphasized: state as an entity has its independent interests and its aims different from that of a social group; state can be an autonomous actor; state both conflicts and coincides with the ruling class in terms of interests. The conflict between them will prevail especially when a social crisis takes place 122

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

threatening both parties, the root of which lies in that usually they have to draw on the same resources. Civil ruling elites are a special category of social elites. Being civilian (independent of state institutions) and ruling are two basic features of civil ruling elites. Being civilian distinguishes them from the ruling elites inside state. In other words, civil ruling elites do not belong to state ruling elites. State ruling elites are “state”, not “civil”.3 “Ruling” here means far more than political ruling. Leadership, management, coordination, arbitration, integration, and organization are all elements included in “ruling”. In short, anyone who exercises the foregoing functions in public sphere can be deemed as one of civil ruling elites. But the resources civil ruling elites exploit in performing their functions are not administrative power endowed by state, but unofficial influences including those derived from wealth, prestige, ability and knowledge. As far as position is concerned, civil ruling elites lie in between state and commoners. As such, they usually serve as the bridge between them. Independent of state as they are, civil ruling elites are the essential social force that defines basic institutional framework; in the social life of commoners, civil ruling elites are an important social force that integrates society and restores its capabilities of self-organization and self-regulation. Commoners are a component at the lowest tier of the three-tier structure as well as the common source of resources for the other two tiers. In most cases, commoners maintain a direct interactive relationship with civil ruling elites, but an indirect one with state. When both upper tiers weaken, commoners will play a prominent role. The interactive relationship of the three tiers can be illustrated as follows:

State Direct Civil Ruling Elites

Indirect

Commoners

3 The civil ruling elites referred to here should not be identified with the ruling elites proposed

by V. Pareto.

123

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

The three-tier social structure in traditional Chinese society resulted from the establishment of the system of empire (symbolized by the reunification during Qin Dynasty). Social power experienced a major division when the feudal system changed into the system of empire. The aristocrats’ total power that integrated ruling, governing and unofficial influences was divided into relatively separate ones. In the system after the division, the emperor had the ruling power, the professional bureaucracy took the governing power, and the aristocratic landlords exerted unofficial influence. The three-tier structure was thus reshaped:

State

Civil Ruling Elites

Emperor, bureaucracy

Aristocratic landlords

Commoners Peasants

However, the traditional three-tier structure experienced a major change around Song Dynasty. As the main body of civil ruling elites, aristocratic landlords were replaced by gentry-landlords. On account of the damages incurred by a series of wars since the late Eastern Han Dynasty, feudal inheritance system started falling apart, and the aristocratic landlords before Tang Dynasty continually went down. With the development of keju system (Imperial Civil Examination System), gentry-landlords emerged and gradually took the place of aristocratic landlords. Hence, the social structure was renewed:

State

Civil Ruling Elites

Commoners

124

Emperor, bureaucracy

Gentry-landlords

Peasants

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

When aristocrats-landlords were replaced by gentry-landlords, important changes followed in structure, system and social life: Civil ruling elites found themselves more attached to the state and the imperial power while professional bureaucracy became more reliant on the imperial power. Subsequent to that were the reinforcement and expansion of the imperial power, the weakening of the dividing powers, the strengthening of the basis for reunification, the establishment of an elastic relationship between civil ruling elites and commoners, the establishment of an effective media between state and commoners, the growth of social fluidity and elasticity, and the systematic integration of political center and ideological center (Sun, 1992a). In late Qing, gentry-landlords suffered severe losses due to the erosion of the development of a commodity economy, the development of neoteric industry and trade, the communication of Western culture, the creation of modern schools, especially the eventual abolishment of keju system. Now this group, which featured remarkable homogeneity and interior integration, started falling apart in four directions: Some became industrialists and merchants, some neoteric intellectuals, some modern militaries, still some who stayed in villages and became local landlords or local gentry.4 This actually means that an essential component of the three-tier structure was separated and disintegrated. Neoteric Industrialists and Merchants

Gentry-landlords

Neoteric Intellectuals

Modern

Local Gentry

The collapse and disintegration of civil ruling elites directly resulted in the end of the system of empire (or monarchy) while its far-reaching influence lasted even longer: The media betwixt state and society lost efficacy; grassroots society had difficulty in integration; political disintegration was usually accompanied by social disintegration; lower ruling started to emerge; 4 For discussions of evil local squires, refer to Kuhn (1975).

125

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

revolutions and rebellions became frequent; radicalism rose as the mainstream ideology; liberalism and conservatism were kept at a disadvantage. More importantly, for nearly a century after this, China had lacked a driving force to reshape the basic social institutional framework and required the inherent basis for social stability. Then everything just ended up in total crisis. In the competition of solving this total crisis, Communist Party of China (CPC) triumphed over Kuomintang (KMT) and captured the political power in the Mainland. Based on the victory, CPC restored a total society that responded to total crisis.5

3. After 1949, the total society system was established in China on the basis of the total control and monopoly of social resources. The takeover of control of resources by confiscating bureaucratic capital was underway before the founding of People’s Republic of China (PRC). By the end of 1949, up to 2,858 bureaucratic enterprises were confiscated with about 1.29 million workers involved. Bureaucratic capital at that time accounted for roughly 66% of national industrial capital. Estimated according to the original value of the fixed assets, the confiscated capital reached RMB15 billion approximately. By the end of 1956, socialist alteration of national capital was nearly completed when 112,000 private enterprises hiring 1.2 million workers were transformed into state-private joint ventures. 400,000 private enterprises engaged in joint operation with the state, another 1.44 million individual businesses grouped up, 48,000 individual businesses integrated into joint enterprises of the state and the private. Through land reform, collectivization and communalization, the state realized its control of land and other agricultural elements. In 1953, the state exercised the monopoly of the purchase and supply of food and edible oil, while for secondary agricultural and sideline products like live pigs and fresh eggs, purchase was exercised by state quotas (CCE Editorial 5 “Total crisis” and “total society” are two concepts proposed first by American scholars,

such as Tsou et al. (1968); Tsou (1989).

126

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

Board, 1987; ERCC Editorial Board, 1984; ERI-CASS, 1978). As a result, the state established an urban employment system of uniform arrangement and appointment, a household registration system based on the separation between urban and rural areas, and a higher education system entailing the state-unified admission and employment. In this way, it had overwhelming power to control and allocate some rare resources, including not just materials of all kinds and money, but also power, prestige, opportunity, etc. Any individual member of society must get corresponding resources from the state to sustain life. All of the members of society were divided into two major categories according to their respective relationships with the resources monopolized by the state. Redistributors came first. They included mostly government officials and professional workers of the Party paid directly by state finance. They were the actual distributors of social resources. The second category included direct producers or resource recipients. They were positioned differently in the total system and therefore differed in their ways and quantities of obtaining necessities. Despite these differences, they are the same in terms of the object of resource distribution. Take urban or suburban residents, workers of a collective ownership enterprise or state-owned enterprise, regular or non-regular workers for example, Each pair differed in terms of status in the total system because they had no equal access to job opportunities, medical treatment, housing plan, habitation, supply of staple and nonstaple food, income, etc. Some rural residents were even denied any of these opportunities. They were all the targets of redistribution irrespective of status. Even those who enjoyed the most welfare and privileges, workers in a collective ownership enterprise, for example, did not own these resources. As illustrated above, a total society with such a unique system of resource monopoly and distribution can format social structure. In a market economy where rare resources are owned by multiple owners, a great share of rare resources is distributed among civilians. A complicated structure was thus formed: landlords, significant or insignificant capital owners of complete or incomplete ownership, owners of knowledge and skills, owners of labor, etc. And there were important nuances among these groups. Under this circumstance, the middle stratum, namely civil ruling elites, came into being. In a total society, the state owns not just the great share of current

127

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

resources, but has access to new resources with its compulsory power. The state would destroy any potential competitor of rare resources by political or administrative forces. A typical example is the clan power in suburban areas. China has an age-old engrained tradition of clan power (Fried, 1956). Even if urban ethnic capital and the social influence of squires in villages are destroyed, clan power still exists in villages and plays some roles at one time or another. To some extent, clan power is the only force that could compete for suburban influence against state power institutions. And exactly for this reason, “clan” had always been a target of impact in all political movements that involved suburban areas. Clan power had been completely defeated during the Cultural Revolution even though some clan powers were still playing important roles. Since the greatest share of rare resources were in the control of the state and there was no civilian power that can compete for them, the Chinese society at that time had only two structural elements left: state and commoners. In this case, the former three-tier structure was reduced to two tiers as shown in the following diagram:

The State

Commoners

Controllers and distributors of rare resources, including Party cadres and government officials

Direct producers, recipients of resource distribution, including workers, peasants and non-governmental “cadres”

This two-tier social structure comprising state and commoners seems very particular in the history of human society. It differs from the structures of previous Chinese society, modern Western society and even the former Soviet Union. Maurice Meisner applied the notion — “Universality of Thermidor Rebel” proposed by Klan Brandon to the comparative analysis of China and Soviet Union after the revolution. He found that soon after the victory of the revolution, the fervor for revolution faded quickly. In an attempt to establish the order of social life, the process of normalization began and a new system that differed slightly from the old one 128

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

was established. On the contrary, after the victory of Chinese revolution, “unlike the usual ‘post-victory’ social history pattern”, “probably the most outstanding historical feature after 1949 is that the Communists made great efforts to turn around the general trend that revolution dies after victory, prevent the ‘institutionalization of bureaucracy’ that results in the loss of revolutionary drive, and protect the vitality of revolutionary targets and revolutionary ideals so as to become a fountain of vitality of real social activities” (Meisner, 1990, pp. 74–77). China and the Soviet Union differed greatly in social structure. After October Revolution, the Soviet Union gave rise to a group of new social elites quick enough and to some degree actualized elite ruling. Although the elites did not control essential rare resources, their social status and income were much higher than ordinary people. In China, however, after the victory of revolution, everything was aimed to eliminate elites, from the criticism of “expert leading a factory”, “professor running a university” to the re-education of the intellectuals by workers and peasants; from breaking “bourgeoisie legal rights” to the criticism of “reactionary bourgeois academic authorities”, etc. Equalitarianism of income was a mirror image of the social reality. In order to illustrate the features of an overall society, we need to further discuss the interactive relationship between the state and commoners in this two-tier structure. I. Direct contact and communication between with state and commoners result in the interactive relationship between the state and commoners. As mentioned above, the interaction of state and commoners in a three-tier structure are mostly bridged by elites. Only in occasions of taxes, lawsuits and neoteric democratic politics can commoners interact with state directly. As for daily work and life, the two are seldom in contact with each other. However, in the total society of two-tier structure, state and commoners often interact face to face. A member of this society was born in a state-owned hospital, attended a state-owned kindergarten, primary school, middle school and university, eventually worked in a state-owned enterprise or office, enjoyed the state welfare before retirement and received the state pension after retirement. He lived in a house built by the state, ate food of all kinds supplied by the state and died in a state-owned crematory and funeral parlor. As ordinary he was, a commoner had to deal with the 129

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

state all his lifetime. However, it is in this frequent interaction that direct conflict between state and commoners can be found. Since an individual mostly depends on the state for sustenance, he ascribes what he has to the state and blames the state for what he suffers as well. Even his opinion or idea about his workplace or superior has a bearing on the state. This indicates that the absence of civil ruling elites will greatly increase the possibility of direct conflicts between the state and commoners. Besides, though the commoners and state interact frequently, they lack real channels of communication. This fact is the cause of slow responses of the state to the demands of commoners in a society of two-tier structure. In this structure, due to the lack of elites and other related conditions, the collection, clarification and expression of the opinions of the commoners became really hard. Even if some demands were expressed in mass protests, they were apparently not manageable for being too far from the decisionmakers. This can help us see why constructive factors are few in all civil disobediences even though the impact of the movement is strong. II. The state carries out participatory mobilization of commoners. In the two-tier society, the relationship between the state and commoners is expressed as direct total control and participatory mobilization. One of the outstanding features of a total society is its extremely powerful mobilization. It can mobilize all the state resources to achieve a certain national aim by a rigorous nationwide organizational system. This mobilization system serves as an effective means to the realization of industrialization and a response to the highly separated situation of resources within Chinese society before 1949. The late Qing witnessed the decline of the state and the radical separation of social resources that were increasingly controlled by the gentry, warlords and other local despots. As these local despots got stronger, they became forces that prevented the central government from concentrating resources. Above all, the invasion of foreign powers in neoteric history, slow-paced industrialization and highly frequent social unrest were all related to the extreme dispersion of social resources. High degree of mobilization became the top priority of the new state in order to deal with the general crisis stemming from the combination of political dissolution and social disintegration and to realize the aim

130

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

of enriching the state and reinforcing the military force. But just as Bernstein pointed out, the same mobilization assumes different forms in China and the Soviet Union. According to Bernstein, the social mobilization in Soviet Union can be called command mobilization while China’s can be called participatory mobilization (Bernstein, 1970). A typical example is agricultural collectivization. In the Soviet Union, agricultural collectivization was realized through compulsory means by urban work teams; though large numbers of work teams were sent to villages, their major task was not to twist the peasants’ arms but to propagate and persuade them out of the current irrational land possession and management and into collective prosperity by putting all lands together. The whole process was accompanied by “the visit to the poor and the miserable” and the “recollection of past hardship and the reflection on current happiness” conducted by the teams. The purpose was to foster the peasants’ class awareness and improve their political consciousness. The result was the initiative participation into the collectivization movement on the part of the peasants. This special way of mobilization determined a special phenomenon in Chinese society: despite the frequent political movement which took place for specific and special reasons, the consideration of social mobilization always loomed in the background. On the one hand, the great capability of social mobilization promoted the process of China’s industrialization, especially at the early stage. On the other hand, this capability had a great potential danger partly because the decision-making authority was centralized at the highest level of power system and partly because the decisionmaking process was free from supervision and constraint. This may cause serious negative results. Among others, the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) and Cultural Revolution were two typical examples. III. Administrative social integration replaces consanguine and contractual social integration and total control of commoners. The fact that the state’s total control and monopoly of rare resources and the resulting total social system profoundly transformed the pattern of social integration in China. Generally speaking, social integration is realized at two levels: Political integration at the first level of state and social integration at the second local level. The former is aimed to ensure

131

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

the sovereignty of a nation-state, exercise administrative control and management and establish and maintain social order by means of administration and law; the latter works at the level of community through civil and non-political means to maintain basic social order so that roles, organizations and systems of different functions can set up cooperative relationships. In traditional Chinese society, one of the outstanding features of integration mechanism is that social integration is relatively stronger than political integration; social integration at the level of community is realized through local suburban elites since consanguine and geographical relationship plays an important role in local community. Therefore, this model of social integration can be called the ascribed integration. These two forms of integration lack organizational connection in between. The two-tier integration mechanism is interconnected on the basis of the private relationship between local elites and officials, thus partially replacing the integration of organizational form by value integration. For one thing, this model of integration provides a foundation for the flexibility and stability of the entire society, enabling it to last for over two millennia. For another thing, the model also causes disastrous weaknesses in this social system, namely the level of integration is low. One of the results is that the state cannot respond powerfully as a whole to foreign invasions. What hurt and haunted Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) was this “state of disunity” as a corollary of this integration mechanism. When they find no systematized approach to the center of politics, local elites usually become a dominant regional power against the state, as is often seen in neoteric history. After the establishment of PRC in 1949, therefore, the crackdown on the gentry, landlords, clans, civil religions and secret societies had become a must for the state to penetrate suburban society. In the meantime, the overall monopoly of rare resources and the reduction of some structural elements in society made it impossible to form any new civil elites. Since it was impossible and checked by the state, social integration through local elites was replaced by a model of administrative social integration. One of the striking features of integration model in China after 1949 was the very powerful political integration; even integration at the

132

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

level of community was realized through administrative means. By the middle 1950s, this model of replacing social integration with political integration was basically put into shape. A stereotype in suburban area was the people’s commune (originally called agricultural producers’ cooperative); in urban area, however, an institution was placed at the center and supported by a system of residents’ committee (est. in 1954). Both of them were total organizations that integrated a lot of functions withl political and administrative powers at the core. To be specific, the organizational system of the Party, the administrative system, and the public societies of workers, youths and women were three important forces in this integration mechanism. One of the advantages of this integration mechanism was that it removed the tension between social and political integrations, uniting them and subjugating social integration at local level to political integration at state level. In this model, the power of the state penetrates the grassroots social life with unprecedented width and depth. But the effectiveness of this integration model was achieved at the expense of the independence and autonomy of society. Due to its high rigidity, the model must keep suppressing social differentiation. The people’s communes and urban units were not just a fundamental mechanism of social integration, but also an important means for the state to exercise social control. The latter had a total organizational form as the only channel through which people gained access to rare resources monopolized by the state. Without the channel, people would lose the opportunity for the necessary and basic living conditions. Units controlled the living conditions of individuals. Political attitudes, initiatives at work, childbirth, relationship between husband and wife, and even leisure life were all directly controlled by the units (actually by proxy of state). IV. Commoners had an organized dependency on the state. Such an “organized dependency” is a reflection of the relationship between commoners and state, Walder thought that before the reform in China, dean of a workshop and chief of a factory as representatives of state had powerful, all-embracing dominance and control in social, economic and political fields. Workers were dependent on their units in terms of social and economic life, on the administrative level in

133

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

terms of political life, and on his boss in terms of personal being (Walder, 1983, 1987a). A careful analysis can help us conclude that the aforementioned “the necessary and basic living conditions” from the units included much more than job opportunities, materials and social welfare, to name but a few. As a matter of fact, the role, identity and social status were assigned, to a great extent, by units. The identity of an individual hinged greatly upon the unit one belonged to, the nature of that unit and one’s position in it. Interestingly, in the total society before the reform, China had not instituted the universal ID Card System. Two documents that actually helped to identify an individual included work certificate and letter of introduction issued by the unit involved (for suburban areas without work certificates, the ID documents were merely introduction letters issued by a people’s commune or production brigade). Anything that happened outside of the unit and involved the identification of an individual must be proved with work certificate and unit’s letter of introduction. Even today, 15 years after the reform, an individual must be certified “single” before handling marriage formalities and getting married. To give birth to a child after marriage, “birth quota” must be obtained from the unit beforehand. In a total system, it was almost impossible to transfer from one unit to another and therefore individuals were forced to rely on the unit, outside of which individuals would lose both the political channel of resource distribution and their own role and social identity. To ensure the social members’ dependency on and loyalty to the unit (accordingly the state), any private interests would be labeled “unjustifiable” ideologically. The slogans “My factory, my home” in the 1950s and “Clampdown on the idea of personal gains” in the 1960s had one thing in common: independent interests should be kept in check. Under this system, any individual who attempted to acquire resources from outside of the unit should be rigorously prevented or even severely punished. For instance, “work off work” (similar to the present-day moonlighting) was frequently an object of criticism. V. Vertical relationship outweighed horizontal relationship. Relationship or “guanxi” in Chinese played decisive roles in social life. Upon analysis we can find that individual attachment to the unit was actually

134

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

a dual attachment. A person was attached first to the unit and then to its leaders. The first attachment required loyalty, which was usually judged firstly by political loyalty, like “active participation in political movements” and “taking the right side” and “upholding the leadership of the Party” and secondly by working hard and making more contributions to the unit and eventually to the state. The second attachment, however, was not judged by this “politics-performance” principle. Instead, “feelings-interests” overruled all. In a unit, the fluidity of both the leader and the led was rather low, meaning this leading-led relation is very stable. This vertical relationship did not change and plus that fact that the institution was in control of the distribution of resources needed by individuals, who, therefore, had to pay serious attention to his relationship with the leader. Apple-polishing and even bribery became common phenomena unavoidably. Objectively speaking, under such circumstances, this relationship was not a short-term economic relationship to pursue equal or greater payback of the cost in a short period of time because awards were generally cancelled and salaries were generally fixed, without, or with very little, chances of change. Therefore, what the led expect in this relationship was some kind of an uncertain payback over a long period of time, e.g., some priorities in the housing distribution and promotions, some favors from the leaders when in trouble, etc. The more common mentality was that they were afraid of being “deliberately obstructed” by the leaders, like assigning heavier work to the individuals. In a total society, such a relationship or “guanxi” existed not just inside but also outside the units. Differences remained, however. If the relationship inside of an institution tended to be vertical, then the one outside of it tended to be more horizontal. “Guanxi” outside of the unit all serve as important links, including relatives, friends, townsmen, former colleagues, old comrades-in-arms, former subordinates, and former classmates. In the rigid system of total society, “guanxi” is a very important social resource; actually it was “guanxi” that gave a certain degree of flexibility to the rigid system. For instance, before the reform, married couples were often separated geographically. According to official rules within the system, it was rather difficult to transfer spouses across cities or regions. Nevertheless,

135

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

thanks to “guanxi”, many people secured advantages through influence, broke the official regulations of the state, and were reunited by means of job transfer. But generally speaking, before the reform the vertical relationship far outweighed horizontal relationship in the total society because considering the “cost-reward”, people would prefer clientelism, which means to establish a special protective relationship with the leader, to protecting and struggling for personal interests by means of collective action at the same (horizontal) level (Walder, 1987b). “Compared with vertical relationship, therefore, horizontal relationship has been underdeveloped. Inside a unit, one can see that one leader is often isolated from another but closely related to some of the advanced workers like masters and slaves. It is the same with the relationship between units. We may deem this status as minimal integration within the highly organized state” (Lu, 1991). VI. Hierarchical society and “majority phenomenon”. The total society of China before the reform was a hierarchical society instead of a class society. The latter can be formed on the basis of multi-dimensional ownership of rare resources in the society. When the state monopolizes the majority of resources, there would be no way for classes to emerge. What is formed under this circumstance is but hierarchy or status. There were actually four major systems of identity before the reform in China. The first was the series of political identity. The two ends of this series are theoretical proletariat and bourgeoisie. For the actual situation in China, these two ends covered many mixed components. When the bourgeois class disappeared, the concept “bourgeoisie” actually included any person that was “grudging against socialism”, even some of the underdogs in power struggles. The second was the series of urban-suburban identity. The Chinese household registration system based on the division of urban and suburban areas was initiated in 1951 and instituted in 1958. After the “Three-Year Disaster” (1959–1961), this division of the urban and the suburban became stricter, dividing residents into two totally different social identities. The third was the series of “cadres” and “workers”. In most societies, occupation does not make any hierarchical identity for it is changeable. But in China before the reform, the identities of “cadres”

136

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

and “workers” were rather fixed and it was hardly possible for a worker to be promoted to a cadre. Consequently, “to substitute worker for cadre” did become a common phenomenon then. According to the third identity system, all urban occupations were actually classified into two major categories: one for “cadres” and the other for “workers”. The fourth was the identity series of ownership. After the state completed the socialist transformation of capitalist commerce and industry nationwide in 1956, the distinction of ownership identity lied mainly in ownership by the whole people and collective ownership. Workers of either ownership had their identities that were not easily changeable. The system identity originated from the complicated interactive relationship between the severe shortage of rare resources, the overall monopoly of rare resources and the ability to manage and distribute rare resources on the part of redistributors. When resources were sparse and monopoly severe, the recipients of distribution had to be divided into different hierarchies to decide the priority order of distribution. Meanwhile, the distribution of rare resources nationwide required immense amounts of work, let alone the limitations of organization, human resources and technologies of state. In other words, the workload far exceeded the ability of state. Therefore, dividing different social members into different hierarchies and identities so that they could obtain from different channels and in a fixed manner their fair share of resources undoubtedly reduced the complexity of the distribution of resources on the part of the state, at the cost of rigidity of social structure and severe control of social fluidity, of course. What merits attention, however, is that the obvious distinction caused by the system of identity and hierarchy did not fundamentally change the overall situation that commoners were the objects of resource distribution. In a total society, therefore, though social members are divided by geography and identity, a thought-provoking phenomenon that is named by some scholars as “majority” phenomenon. “The nation-socialist system reduces the limitations on collective actions by causing the ‘majority phenomenon’. The ‘majority’ is made up of people who share similar behavioral patterns and needs which break up the borderline of organization and social groups”

137

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

(Zhou, 1993). One of the important reasons lies in the similarity between individuals, groups and state. Not only did the state place all social members, with the exception of state officials, in a position that directly accepted its resource distribution, but also created for them a generally similar social, economic and political environment in which each social member basically experienced the same life. It was this common feature and similarity that gave social members a similar behavioral pattern, which was inclined to cause an unstructured and purposeless collective action. Given the powerful control by state, this common behavioral feature could greatly facilitate the state mobilization for political campaigns and motivate commoners to be involved “unusually actively”. Given the loosening control by state, this behavioral similarity could prompt civil resistance movements to scale up easily and quickly. VII. Populism and instinctive repulsion for elites. Populist ideology is an essential tool that legalizes the two-tier hierarchy of “statecommoners”. It emphasizes the vital and even singular role commoners play in history and reality. “The People, only the People, are the engine of the world”, “The People are true heroes and heroines”, “Smart are the lower and stupid the higher”. These are all basic beliefs of this ideology in which the formation of elites, or any signs of it, is kept under severe control even though social hierarchy is obvious and some institutional structures are maintaining and reinforcing this hierarchy. This ideology was enabled to culminate in the Cultural Revolution. Intellectuals were involved in physical labor to be reeducated by farmers and workers; scholarly and technical titles were cancelled; trainees of workers, farmers and soldiers became managers and reformers; propaganda teams of workers, military forces and the poor set up in superstructure institutions; workers took direct part in management; ordinary workers, farmers and soldiers were promoted to cadres and leaders. These were all efforts of populist pursuits. Considering that most civil rulers in Chinese history were educated to some degree, this purposeful defense of intellectuals was no mystery at all. Equalitarianism of income and “big pot for all” (egalitarian practice of everybody eating from the same big pot) are merely

138

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

concrete images of this populist mentality. They had two crystal-clear targets. Firstly, the income gap should be narrowed between officials (regarded as “administrative cadres” in the Mainland, especially administrative leaders) and ordinary workers. But to safeguard the interests of the officials when narrowing this income gap, their privileges in the distribution of resources, houses for example, kept growing. Secondly, the income gap should be narrowed between intellectuals, especially high-ranking intellectuals, and workers. The salary standards made with the help of the Soviet Union experts were reduced continuously until they were lower than those of the workers. This is so-called “Reversal of Brain and Body” (i.e., the income of mental workers falling short of that of manual workers). Populism also gives rise to a sub-consciousness that defies authorities. One of the examples is that the “legalization” of countering the directions of managers in a unit or institution. Interesting enough, under the influence of a total system and populist ideology, an extremely contradictory dual personality is formed, viz. “authority– anti-authority” personality. As mentioned above, in the vertical protective relationship in a total society, individuals are greatly attached to leaders. In this relationship, the protected registers a very powerful character of authority. Meanwhile, the protected would also defy and rebel against any authority that cannot affect his interests negatively and should be followed in principle. If he is protected by the superior of his boss, then he would fearlessly challenge his boss. Therefore, though authority personality was universal in the total society before the reform, it failed to establish a boss-worker relationship conducive to work. VIII. One-way communication system. In the two-tier hierarchy of total society, top-down and bottom-up communication channels are not exactly symmetrical. The former channel is stable and effective, while the latter is of very low degree of systematization. There are three channels essential to top-down communication. The first is public opinion tools (mass media). In a total society, newspapers, books, journals, broadcasts TVs and other media are controlled with no exception by the Party and the state. The sole use of these tools is to communicate the decision and ideas of the state and Party and all

139

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

means are used to ensure that they be communicated to the mass in a “happy and rejoicing manner” with deep “penetration”. The power of media is to be seen in its synchronization and repetition. Reception of information is basically a need of man. When there is no other source of information, official information from mass media becomes the only choice of commoners. Besides, the information is communicated with a super-high frequency of repetition. The second is official documents. The delivery of documents from all levels of leadership in a total society before the reform was an important part of political life. The difference between document delivery and mass media is that after the delivery the commoners should be “organized to study and discuss” the contents and stipulate measures to carry out the documents for the documents themselves were compulsory orders. The third is work teams. In the total society before the reform, work teams were often assigned to tasks, often demanding ones. This way of communication was even more compulsory since a work team similar to “Inspector General” represented the upper leadership. It not just assisted the local organization in finishing a job, but could remove and replace local leadership. At least the advice of the work team was decisive. Behind these three channels of communication is a rigours organizational system which guarantees the effective and accurate reception and execution of orders from the upper leadership. On the contrary, comparable channels do not exist in bottomup communication. Theoretically, there are channels like the People’s Congress and organizations of workers, youth and women, hierarchical reporting and direct appealing to higher authorities, etc, but these channels did not play a remarkable role then. What worked better was non-institutionalized “mass-line work methods” including individual interviews, advice inquiries, etc. These forms later developed into what was called “four freedoms”, viz. the freedoms of airing views, of expressing ideas, of pasting big-character posters, and of holding debates. But even when these “four freedoms” were commonly practiced, the bottom-up communication did not exist as an expression of public wills and interests but as a positive response to superior decisions.

140

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

To sum up, in the state-commoners hierarchy of total society, the state and commoners entered a rather unique type of interactive relationship, which caused all kinds of particular social phenomena.

4. During the reform of economic system, a series of changes took place in the ownership and distribution of rare resources. This in turn resulted in the fundamental changes in social structure: a new intermediate class was rising very fast and a new interactive relationship was established between state, civil ruling elites and commoners.

4.1.

Formation of “free-flowing resources” and “free activity space” and advent of a new intermediate class

Whatever the changes are, the most significant are always the apparent. The most indicative one in the structural changes during the reform and opening up was the changed importance of “official positions”. Another fact was that urban areas, especially the collective ownership were reformed still at a low pace and “official positions” meant a lot to an individual or a family, though not as significant as before. Some incredible phenomena occurred after the reform. Most typically, individuals who were not “expelled from official position” took the initiative of leaving the space and ways that linked them to resources under the control of state. This was not a universal phenomenon. Rather, it was highly symbolic and kept deteriorating. More universal than quitting “official positions” is “suspension of salary and keeping the position as a backup”. Many people made this choice before this policy was carried out. There were so many that various complementary stipulations had to be made to restrict this practice. Keeping positions while suspending salary provided access to resources under the control of state, but they had to suffer certain losses as well. Comparatively speaking, “Being fired” was even more commonly seen in individual enterprises, private companies and foreign-funded enterprises. It is worth special attention that being fired does not loom as seriously as being expelled from official positions.

141

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

Behind the superficial changes aforementioned were fundamental changes that took place during the process of the reform and opening up in Chinese social structure. Along with the weakening state monopoly of resources and of social activity space, society was becoming an independent and parallel source of resources and opportunities, which assumed the form of market exchange. How, then, society became a fountain of resources and opportunities that was independent of and parallel to the state? What were the contributing factors? The answer is the “free-flowing resources” released and “free activity space” provided by structural reform. Now we will take a closer look at the process. First of all, we will check out the formation of “free-flowing resources”. Just as mentioned above, before the reform the state monopolized the greatest share of resources in Chinese society. It was really difficult and even impossible for individuals to access these resources from channels outside of state. But one of the targets and results of structural reform was to decrease the range and strength of state control over resources. Part of resources got out of state monopoly to become “free flow resources” in society or market. Theoretically speaking, the ownership of these resources in market can be transferred and therefore not monopolized by some kind of administrative power. The process started in suburban areas. The practice of production responsibility system and the disintegration of pubic community did not change the nature of land ownership, but two important things were given to peasants: the relatively independent management right of the land and the distribution right of his own labor. Two relatively independent rights became two most basic and essential “free-flowing resources” after the reform (though land could not be exchanged freely in market). The choice of planting methods and crops, the choice of agriculture or industry of other career, or simply working in urban areas was all based on these two “free-flowing resources”. From the current perspective, it was only natural that peasants had these two “free-flowing resources”. From a historical viewpoint, however, this was the greatest beginning of the reform of Chinese economic system and even its social structure. It meant that the weakest link of state monopoly was broken, and “free-flowing resources” flowed out of the system of state monopoly. Many historical changes in the history of suburban China and even in urban economy have something to do

142

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

with this. In cities, the “free-flowing resources” appeared first because part of production materials got out of the control of state. This was especially true after the implementation of dual system; a great share of production materials became independent of state control and entered the market. On account of the fact that individual and private enterprises became the object of bank loans, state monopoly of cash started loosening. Immense influx of foreign capitals was another source of “free-flowing resources”. The increase of financial independence and the private reserves of enterprises (including foreign exchange retention) reinforced the multi-dimension of resource ownership. Subsequent to this was the emergence of groups like individual, private and joint ventures and other non-state-owned commercial and industrial enterprises. The appearance of these enterprises plus the reform of the employment system of state-owned enterprises caused another kind of “free-flowing resources”, namely contractual job opportunities. Related statistics indicate that by the end of 1989, private enterprises in urban and rural areas provided 19.41 million job opportunities, township enterprises 47.20 million, industries at village level and below 33.80 million, village construction team 7.68 million, foreign ventures 0.37 million and joint industries 0.91 million respectively (Chinese StatisticalYearbook, 1990). Next is a review of the expansion of “free activity space”. The formation and expansion of “free activity space” is informed of the same significance as the release of “free-flowing resources”. The formation and expansion of this “free activity space” is both a result of structural reform and the adjustment of governmental policies. And exactly for this reason, people would usually define this “free activity space” as “within the space of governmental approval”. “Free activity space” is the concrete place where people use “free-flowing resources”, without which “free flow” will be pointless. Take the Chinese rural development in the past 10-old years for example. If there was just the release of “free-flowing resources”, there would not be present-day development as a result of the combination of the two. In retrospection, after a decade of economic structural reform and a series of policy adjustments, four major “free spaces” have been formed for peasants who were used to collective agricultural production only. The first is in crop production, as a result of structural reform and policy adjustment,

143

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

production agriculture thence developed into commercial agriculture; the second is the lift of restrictions on peasants doing businesses, especially long-distance transportation for profit. This “free activity space” is the major playground of sidelines that focus on commerce. The activity of fares makes this “free activity space” grow continually. The third “free activity space” includes enterprises in towns approved, supported and cultivated by state policies, including private enterprises. Industrialization of suburban areas in China thus began. The fourth “free activity space” is formed among peasants working in urban areas. State policies began permitting peasants to work in cities in areas like construction, commerce and other services, and some state-owned enterprises were also allowed to hire temporarily peasants under contracts, and other ownerships hiring peasants were also permitted. And the two “free-flowing resources”, namely autonomy of land and labor, played significant roles in the foregoing four major “free activity spaces”, without which what a farmer obtained from the two “free-flowing resources” would be nothing but leisure and recreation. Urban areas experienced the same process of formation and expansion of “free activity space”, but at a much slower pace. One of the major reasons is that the state control of urban areas used to be much tighter and the “free activity space” in urban areas was much more complicated. Nonetheless, “free activity space” in urban areas developed greatly in the last 15 years. First, at the beginning of the reform, the state policy of “opening up job opportunities” permitted individuals to conduct retail and catering businesses, which developed into wholesale later. That was attributed to all kinds of disadvantages in the system of commodity flow and the fact that intellectuals sent to villages were coming back into cities, causing great pressure on employment. A large “free activity space” was thus formed in commodity flow system. Then, beginning from between 1984 and 1985, the state started advocating the development of tertiary industry. A “free activity space” was thus created for tertiary industry requires little on technology, fund and managerial experiences and therefore fits individual operation better. Around the same time, high-tech industry started developing in China. The government made a variety of special policies for the development of high-tech industry, including allowing privatized enterprises to engage in high-tech industries. A third “free activity space” was thus formed on the basis of high-tech industry. And compared with

144

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

the other two, this “free activity space” was established at a undoubtedly much higher echelon. Taking “foreign-funded enterprises”, “special zones” and other elements into consideration, we can see that in the 15 years of the reform, urban “free activity space” not only budded, but also started to bloom. In the spring of 1992, the second wave of reform started rising and urban “free activity space” began heading to larger areas (Sun, 1993). “Free-flowing resources” and “free activity space” indicate that resource monopoly in China before reform has experienced profound changes, though essential resources are still in state control up till now. Some resources flowed into civil areas and formed a fountain of resources and opportunities in parallel with that of the state. In the meantime, a relatively independent social power based on “free-flowing resources” and “free activity space” is taking shape, and later became the prototype of contemporary civil ruling elites in China. The following elements in these social powers merit special attention: (1) Owners of private enterprises. According to a report in China Information on March 10th 1993, there were 130,000 registered private enterprises in China, hiring 2.318 million people with a high growth rate (28.8% in 1992). If “red hats” (private enterprises in the name of public enterprises) were included in the statistics, the numbers could be much greater. (2) Substantial self-employed entrepreneurs. By the end of 1991, there were 14.168 million self-employed entrepreneurs in China, hiring 22.58 million people; by the end of 1992, the numbers reached 15.339 million and 24.677 million respectively. Some of these self-employed entrepreneurs were operating on a remarkable scale. (3) Managers of township enterprises. Thus far, China had over 20 million township enterprises.6 Suppose each enterprise has two managers. The number of people they hire amounts to 40 to 50 million. (4) Chinese managers in “foreign-funded” enterprises. Despite their striking officialdom, they differed greatly from other government officials due to the features of their jobs. (5) Managers of joint-stock enterprises without competent authorities. Since 1991, the reform of joint-stock system accelerated and a series of joint-stock enterprises occurred without any relevant authorities.And most of them were economically powerful. (6) Increasingly 6 Refer to the following two newspapers, Newspaper of Chinese Industry and Commerce,

July 22, 1992; China Information, March 10, 1993.

145

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

independent intellectuals. In the total society before the reform, intellectuals were very reliant on the state, both spiritually and materialistically. But under the conditions of market reform, great changes took place, and their access to resources through non-official channels became easier. Hence, their independence improved. (7) Others. Since market reform was still in process and the line of structural division was not clear enough, some structural elements without clear identity occurred accordingly, like individual brokers on a relatively larger scale of operation, and who occupied “official positions”; operators of “underground economy”; and even managers of some strongly autonomous state-owned or collective enterprises who were increasingly unidentifiable as governmental officials but clearly identifiable as civil ruling elites.

4.2.

Evolving structural elements under the conditions of partial reform

The influence of the reform of economic system does not just register as the appearance of civil ruling elites, which changes the two-tier social structure “state-commoners” into three-tier structure “state-civil ruling elites-commoners”, which is in the process of formation now. Besides, each structural element is influenced as well.

4.2.1. State In the course of reforming economic systems, one of the outstanding changes that occurred on the part of state was that its ability to withdraw resources was in decline. Evidence indicated that the share of financial income in GDP kept decreasing. In 1978, the rate was 27.2%. The figure in 1985 became 25.3% after debts were deducted. By 1989, the share further decreased to 18.7%. Compared with 1978, the share of financial income in GDP decreased approximately by half. According to the analysis of Mr. Liu Liqun, financial difficulty has exerted great influences on governmental behaviors. First, “the shortage of administrative expenses caused a full-scale decline of governmental functions”. “On account of severe insufficiency of administrative expenses, salary of governmental officials was obviously lower than employees in enterprises or other departments during the past 146

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

decade. As a consequence, governmental officials became inactive at work, the quality of personnel and work decreased evidently, and personnel started out seeking a second income; and the combination with the dual system caused the pervasion of evils like embezzlement, bribery and corruption. Governments turned to enterprises, departments and individuals for sponsorship, thus depriving themselves of justice and weakening the authority of their mandates”. Second, “severe insufficiency of investment in land management and infrastructure construction within the budget” resulted in “the continuous expansion of water loss and soil erosion, continual disasters of rivers, completed mileage of railroad decreasing year by year, and paucity of urban telephone resources”. “What is supposed to be done by the government is distributed among enterprises and other departments because of financial challenges confronted by the government. State operations changed into those of separate departments”. “Many users had to build ‘small and complete’ infrastructure systems by themselves, which, at no less cost, are of low social and economic efficiency because of its scale”. Third, the cause of social and cultural welfare was on the wane. “Expenses on education, science, culture, health, relief and consolation and other social cultural welfare currently account for less than 4% of GNP; government functions in these aspects are hard to realize on account of insufficient fund. Elementary education is changed into compulsory education, but with the insufficient state finance, the change is empty talk in suburban areas. Unregulated charges in urban schools become simply disastrous. Expenses for basic scientific researches are insufficient, and thousands of units have to adapt to make money, causing a major slip of quality nationwide … current financial status cannot even afford disaster relief, which for thousands of years has been a function of the government. A good example is that half of disaster relief fund for East China is sourced from donations at home and abroad” (Liu, 1993). The cause of this situation involves the change of relationship between the central and local governments, and between the governments and enterprises in the reform over the last fifteen years. Before the reform, both local governments and enterprises were merely parts of the state as a great machine. But both started becoming economic entities of independent interests during the reform. Many powers that used to be in the hands

147

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

of the central government are now devolved on local governments, many of which are kept back by local governments as bargaining chips against the central government, especially with the growth of local economic strength. In the early period of the reform, many powers were decentralized to the local governments by the central government willingly, but now, local governments became more proactive in the distribution of powers and interests, and the central government more passive. In addition to financial reasons, the power of governments (especially the central government) declined due to the across-the-board lowering of awareness of work and sense of duty on the part of governmental officials. In the total society before the reform, sense of duty among governmental officials was high because of the exposure to revolutionary ideals and atmosphere, effective stimulating system that encouraged active work and political faithfulness in exchange for rewards, tight organizational system, and powerful control. Plus, there were hardly any strong temptations from the outside world. But the reform diluted ideology and revolutionary fervor, and external stimulus increased and opportunities were many, impacting the former compensation system which exchanged rewards for active work and political loyalty. When the old sense of duty was gone and the new one had yet to come, along with the loosening of organizational control, it became pretty commonplace to work without proper sense of responsibility. Meanwhile, since changes took place in Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China, quite a number of officials lost sight of a relatively further future and were more inclined to short-term actions. This was evidenced by official corruption. And the coexistence of the redistribution system and market system served as the hotbed for corruption to grow. On this we will elaborate later. Briefly speaking, the state is now in sort of a decline. But while we are analyzing this decline, two processes should be distinguished properly. The first process is normal structural division. In the total society before the reform, the state not only monopolized the greatest share of rare resources, but also penetrated directly into every corner of social life, forming an omnipresent and omnipotent rule. Structural division between state and society began during the reform. The state power retired from some areas so that social activities in these areas can be conducted relatively independently (Sun, 1992b). On the surface, state power weakened in these fields, but this

148

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

was only normal structural division process other than the decline of state power. The second one, however, is true decline, namely where state power should be active but not active now. For example, the state could neither macro-administrate social economic life nor safeguard the public properties represented by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Hence, substaintial stateowned assets were lost in vain. Besides, It failed to promote the development of public cause according to social needs and worse still tried to seek certain special interests for some social forces. This process of declination would surely exert great influences on the interactive relationship between state, civil ruling elites and commoners.

4.2.2. Civil ruling elites A dominant view about the formation of civil ruling elites is that middle class in China could never rise fast for two reasons. First, China never had a basis for the formation of middle class. Second, privatization could not be realized quickly in China. Based on the collective ownership of production materials, a middle class of certain scale could never be formed. But people of this view failed to foresee an extremely important fact that had occurred in recent years, namely the quick drainage and/or division of state-owned capitals. The formation of civil ruling elites, however, is based on this process to a great extent. As such, the birth of civil ruling elites is closely associated with the appearance of “free-flowing resources” and “free activity space”. But due to the existence of the dual structure of urban and suburban division, this “free-flowing resources” and “free activity space” played distinctively different roles in the formative process of the urban and suburban areas, which provided different conditions for the formation of civil ruling elites. The development of private enterprises and self-employed businesses in China can be divided into two important periods. The first started from the beginning of the reform till around 1986, during which private enterprises and individual operations boomed and ceased or even declined for a very brief period of time. The second period started from 1992, when Deng Xiaoping, the Chairman of China then, inspected South China and made important speeches about the reform. It has been under way to date. This is the

149

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

second golden age for the development of private enterprises and individual businesses.7 The township enterprises followed a similar pattern of development. The development of township enterprises, private enterprises and individual enterprises in suburban areas was closely related to the disintegration of the contracted household responsibility system and the people’s commune system. The disintegration not only freed peasants of certain personal fetters, but made the former production teams and their cadres “redundant” to much extent. However, we have not collected sufficient systematic and complete data concerning the relationship between the political power and growth of civil economic force during this period. According to investigations made by Mr. Dai Jianzhong into Gongxian County, Henan Province, among 517 owners of private enterprises, only 28 used to be cadres in villages, merely 5% of the total; but 449 used to be peasants, accounting for 87% (Dai, 1991). But the data indicated only one county, and the cadres identified in the investigations seemed not to include cadres of production teams in the past. Victor Nee categorized them more specifically while he examined the case of Fujian Province. He divided suburban enterprises into three categories according to the cadre background of the enterprises, viz. cadre entrepreneurs, ex-cadre entrepreneurs and non-cadre entrepreneur. In the sample of their investigations, cadre entrepreneurs was 9.6%, excadre entrepreneurs and non-cadre entrepreneurs were 13.7%, and the rest, which was 76.8%, had no cadre background at all. And it was this 76.8% that formed “the majority of suburban economy elites” (Nee, 1991). These may indicate wide participation into suburban economic structure reform and industrialization on the part of ordinary peasants, but if “cadre background” is identified as “power background” and therefore presume that power has little influence over the formation of suburban economic elites, we would certainly underestimate the role power plays in this process. Two factors shall be considered here. First, the effect of power does not always unfold through the cadre background of the entrepreneurs; relatives, friends, hometown folks, military buddies, and even whatever money can buy can be used to establish direct or indirect relationship with the owner of the power. Second, in circumstances where a dual system existed and where overall 7 Mr. Li Qiang divided it into five stages. See Li (1993).

150

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

plan of resource distribution was dominant, it is no wonder that township enterprises, private enterprises and individual enterprises in suburban areas purchased power to access the state-monopolized raw materials and market channels as well. If these two factors were considered, we could conclude that power played a major role in the early formation of suburban economic elites.8 The situation was slightly different in cities. In the early period of the development of urban individual and private economy, people engaged in the trade are mainly unemployed youth (a large part of them are youthful intellectuals who returned from rural education), retirees and other unemployed people in society. Thse people seemed to have even less power background. If they had strong power background, the young intellectuals who returned from rural education would not be unemployed. Instead, they would be in administrative institutions or collective enterprises of privileges. It was the same case with other unemployed people in society. The case was more complicated with the retirees, many among which retired in advance so that their children could succeed their careers for they all have decent power background; and some of the retired cadres could not bring themselves to individual enterprises for their identity of aristocracy was vulnerable to social discrimination under those circumstances. Based on this, we can conclude that in the early development of private and individual enterprises in urban areas, even the employed did not have very strong power background. But there is a problem in cities. The state monopoly of rare resources and social space was far more rigorously implemented in urban areas than in rural areas. Individual and private enterprises had to deal with the possessor of state power directly when they wanted to apply for a license, use some land, water and electricity, or when they were in operation, paying taxes or the change or expansion of their business scope. On account of the natural rarity of resources and the rarity made by officials, private and individual enterprises with no power background found it harder to operate, and this was why the exchange of cash for power plays an 8According to the estimation of cadres in Pingtang County, Guizhou Province who are familiar with the situation there, over 50% of collective property (especially cash) are divided up by cadres of minor and major production teams. See Jiang (1993). It is estimated that total collective property in suburban areas then is about RMB1,400 billion, see Wang (1991). And the role this divided property plays in the early accumulation of capitals remains unclear.

151

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

important role from the very beginning. They had to attach themselves to officials with access to resources. It is generally accepted that most successful individual enterprises and private enterprises had established a rather stable relationship of “patronage” with officials. Recent years have witnessed remarkable changes in the situation. One of the outstanding phenomena was that “cadres go into business”, meaning that these cadres were also engaged in the operation of enterprises in one way or another. There were three types. The first was the “cadresturned entrepreneurs proper” for they actually quit their official posts to run individual, private or “red-hat” enterprises, or they would contract state or collective enterprises. The second type was labeled “cadres-turned entrepreneurs within the system” for they created “the tertiary industry” within the power institutions; some even contract the enterprise and pay only some management fee. The third is “invisible cadres-turned entrepreneurs”. These people kept their posts and power but they engage themselves in the exchange of power for cash. The infamous “official speculations” fall into these three different types. Sure enough, there were some “new entrepreneurs” with no cadre background themselves, though some of their relatives had, or they simply established a partnership by other means. The rise and success of many “new entrepreneurs” were closely associated with the drainage of state-owned assets. In other words, they carved up the state assets. This carve-up of state assets was carried out through not just corruption, bribery and embezzlement, but also through “price differences, exchange rate differences, profit differences and tax differences” and so forth. According to the analysis of Heli Hu, the price difference under state control was about RMB130 billion, profit difference was about RMB20 billion and exchange rate difference was about RMB50 billion in 1987, and the sum of these differences reached over RMB200 billion. In 1988, price difference was over RMB150 billion, profit difference is about RMB113.881 billion, and exchange rate difference is over RMB93.043 billion, and the sum is over RMB356.9 billion, accounting for about 30% of GDP in 1988 (Hu, 1989a, 1989b). Needless to say, these differences did not fall into private wallets as a whole, but a great share did. In the 1990s, along with the lifting of more and more commodity price control and the “market adjustment” in foreign currency entering Chinese market, the differences of these two parts will decrease slightly, but the “profit difference” remains

152

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

the same and increased significantly due to the expansion of the sum of loans. In addition to “profit difference”, two items are worth attention. The first is the drainage of tax avenues. It is estimated that tax drainage in 1992 was about RMB100 billion,10 including evasion of taxes and unreasonable tax deductions. The second is “land price difference”. In the real estate boom last year, in Hainan Province alone, there were above 1,000 people who profited over RMB10 million. Thus, we can postulate that the land price difference in 1992 was no lower than RMB100 billion. The value of state land is drained away quickly in the heat of real estate, during which process power played a major role. Land given out with the consent of the power costs merely a very small percentage of the market price, leaving a large space for those “economic elites” who simply became nouveaux riches overnight due to their access to power.11 This close relationship between civil economic elites and power directly influenced the features of these economic elites. First, their acquisition of huge fortune was closely related to the process of reform. In this sense, they are advocates because they benefited, and in the meantime, they wished marketization drive could be pushed forward quickly out of their concern for their own development. Second, considerable elites have experience in officialdom and their acquisition of wealth had a lot to do with governmental power, thus they are very reliant on governmental power, even if they are already developing on a great scale and at high speed. But we cannot exaggerate this attachment of economic elites. And sometimes they were in rather active position in the exchange of cash and power, which differed from the early period of the reform. Third, their economic activity was obviously characterized by short-sightedness and speculativeness. Part of their income was unlawful, entailing the “money laundering”. Meanwhile, due to the absence of a systematized protection of private properties and their hesitation about the judgment of future political trend, a great share of capitals were not spent in long-term investments, but rather in get-rich-quick speculations like hoarding real estates, speculating in stocks and/or foreign currencies, etc. As for non-speculative economic activities, 10 Refer to the newspaper, Guangming Daily, 1st edition, Oct. 11, 1993. 11 By the end of 1992, total value of state capitals is RMB1,930 billion, see Lookout, 47th

issue, 1993; if the value of real estate and resources are taken into calculation, the total will be at least above RMB10,000 billion.

153

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

they would rather engage in short-term commercial investments than in long-term ones like manufacturing industries. Another group of people among civil ruling elites were the so-called “intellectual elites”. They had two features in the beginning of the reform. One is that they were gaining more independence than before. Between the late 1970s and early 1980s, their voice started to be heard. The other is their passion for the reform. Although they had different attitudes toward the reform, they advocated the reform most decidedly as a whole. Upon closer analysis of their advocacy, we can find that two factors played important roles: the academic freedom that may ensue the reform, and the belief that reform alone is the way out for China. Put differently, their advocacy of the reform was not based on their judgment of personal material gains to a great extent. Meanwhile, they did not have a clear estimation of the cruelty of market reform and possible negative influences on the intellectuals. A dozen of years into the reform, they suddenly woke up to the fact that they were getting poorer, some are even in absolute impoverishment. With the advancement of marketization, “mammon worship” was spread overwhelmingly, and the old worship of intellectuals became valueless overnight. They were even condemned or criticized severely when everyone went into business. “The most useless of all are the intellectuals” became a popular expression at that time. In the early 1990s, their attitude started assuming very subtle changes toward the reform: their passion for it diminished. A typical example is the cold shoulders the intellectuals had toward Deng Xiaoping’s speech when he was inspecting the south of China. In contrast with this cold-shouldering was their heated lash of corruption. When some economic elites were defending “carve-up of state assets” as “a path of privatization for China”, the intellectuals clearly registered anger. Economic elites stressed the positive effects of the “carve-up of state assets” on GDP, while intellectuals focused on its side effects like social injustice and intensification of social contradictions. In some sense, current intellectuals are forming a rather contradictory attitude toward reform. On the one hand, they insisted that only reform can help China find a way out, and even the “non-nationalization” trend that features the carve-up of state assets is a possible way out; on the other hand, the price they paid in reform, their repulsion of corruption and their reflection on the negative influences of corruption necessitated their conservative attitudes toward reform. Knowing

154

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

that “corruption is not a natural result of reform” or “reform has no necessary connections with corruption” will not change their attitude. Given the tradition of appealing for commoners on the part of intellectuals in Chinese history, it is possible that intellectuals were more inclined to populism.

4.2.3. Commoners With the progress of marketization and the change of resource ownership and distribution, great changes take place on the part of the commoners as well. In the previous analysis of China as a total society, we kept away from an important structural element, i.e., “aristocracy of public ownership” (or urban aristocracy). Although there was not a civil ruling elite group in the Chinese mainland at that time, an “aristocracy of public ownership” did exist. The group can be subdivided into four subgroups according to real conditions. The first one is cadres (who live on the payroll of the state in the state, excluding those in production teams and brigades in suburban areas; and the administrative cadres fall into the category of state rather than that of civil ruling elites as far as structure is concerned), this subgroup enjoys the greatest advantage of accessing resources controlled by the state and the fullest special interests and even privileges; another is workers in a public-owned institution, who, though enjoy less social status and privileges than the first one, are also covered by many state welfare and special interests. The third subgroup included workers in institutions of collective ownership who are again divided into is the so-called “major communities” who enjoyed about the same welfare coverage and privileges as the second subgroup, with only more restrictions on their change of career, and “minor communities” who enjoyed even less. The fourth subgroup included neither cadres nor workers in state-owned or collectively-owned enterprises, nor urban residents or “non-agro” population in suburban areas, but they share one common feature: They enjoy the state quota of “commercial food”, edible oil and other complementary food also supplied in quota (which were very important at that time), and partial allowance granted by the state. But the reform gradually ate way the special interests and privileges of “aristocracy of public ownership” after the middle 1980s. Reform of systems like housing and public medical care on the expense of state greatly weakened these privileges. The sharp contrast between retirement fee that growed so 155

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

slowly and the inflation that reached two digits made the retirement fee normally with a stable yield farther from enough. The reform of employment system in state-owned enterprises made the privileges and advantages enjoyed in the past by the employed incomparable with today. The release of price control of grain and oil prices, and the entrance of secondary food products into market sweep clean special interests in the respect. In this sense, “aristocracy of public ownership” is the group that sacrificed the most for the reform. It is only natural that they feel “relatively deprived” when they see the income of other groups keep growing and living conditions keep getting better. Correspondingly, there arose the quick social differentiation. This tendency could be identified very clearly among whatever groups, including cadres, workers and peasants. The differentiation was evident among workers in different ownerships, the income of workers in “foreign-funded” enterprises on average had already exceeded that of the workers in other enterprises. Therefore, though without or with only a little welfare offered, people are still attracted to these joint enterprises. By contrast, considerable workers in collective enterprises were paid lowly, and also due to poor economic efficiency in their enterprises, their supposed welfare in many cases is in want of guarantee. The income gap between the same group of workers who were in state-owned and collective enterprises also kept growing because their respective enterprise had different degree of access to resources under state control, and also because the difference between their respective progress of system reform, which would result in the difference of economic efficiency. The ones at the top were workers whose enterprises had the best economic benefits, and the ones whose enterprises had insufficient workload or could operate at all were placed at the bottom for they had nothing to live upon but the bottom salary paid by their enterprises. In terms of individual division, workers who had part-time jobs differed greatly in income from those who had not. In the meantime, the division also revealed itself in certain labels we put to workers of different ranks, e.g., white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, and the status difference indicated by such labels as permanent workers, contract workers, and temporary workers. The differentiation among peasants was also clearly identifiable. The author will not go into details since there have been already many research results. It is especially noteworthy that a unique “marginalized” group is formed with the loosening of the dual structure of urban-rural system and the increase of 156

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

mobility between urban and rural societies. The “marginalized” here refer mainly to peasants who were employed or who were operating certain businesses in cities. The number of this group was close to seventy or eighty million, if their relatives were included. Specifically, the “marginalized” commoners accounted for roughly 10% of rural population. They lived in cities, laboring or doing businesses, but they were not “urban”, and therefore unacceptable by their residential communities in cities. Undoubtedly, the changes of this group make an important factor in the observation of societal changes in China. Generally speaking, a quick and large-scale differentiation was rising among Chinese population. Hence, it will directly reduce the homogeneity of commoners, increasing their heterogeneity, which undermined the “majority” phenomenon. As expounded above, this phenomenon indicates groups of people in a total society who were separated by institutions, geography, ownership and even the urban-rural dichotomy shared similar behavioral patterns and similar requests. Consequently, the “majority” phenomenon would be replaced with diversified requests and utterly different behavioral patterns. Another focal point at the level of commoners is that “utilities” imposed a heavier direct burden on the commoners. That is because its influence on the analysis of the interactive relationship between state, civil ruling elites and commoners can by no means be underrated. In the total society before the reform, on account of the monopoly of the vast majority of rare resources, “utilities” in society were run basically by the state. Apart from this, the commoners were occasionally needed when “legion combat” became necessary. Throughout the reform, since the power to withdraw resources had declined and many lessons should be learned for “makeups”, state finance appeared to be impotent in terms of the maintenance and initiation of “utilities”. The burden of education, traffic and the preserve of cultural heritage, etc were all transferred to the shoulders of the masses. Finally, their meager income tended to run out plus all kinds of “charges” levied by local corrupt officials.

4.3. Transitional interactive relationship between state, civil ruling elites and commoners Theoretically speaking, three pairs of relationships can be formed among state, civil ruling elites and commoners. In a number of societal forms, two 157

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

of the three pairs are direct, namely the state and civil ruling elites, the civil ruling elites and commoners. The relationship between the commoners and state is mostly indirect. Under current Chinese situation, due to the extension of some old systems in partial reform, and also due to the fact that civil ruling elites are still not playing their normal roles in social life, the state and commoners maintains a direct relationship to a great degree. Then we will explore the current status of the interactive relationship between state, civil ruling elites and commoners as well as the process of this relationship adjustment based on the individual analysis of three structural elements discussed in the previous parts of this chapter.

4.3.1. Relationship between state and civil ruling elites Judging from the origin of the civil ruling elites, quite a few of them came from the center of the original system. This was especially true of the upper civil ruling elites. For example, some of them used to be cadres, even leaders, in the old system. Their experiences with the government, brief or long, gave them natural intimacy with governmental institutions. Especially those who had very long experiences: They were very familiar with the way of doing things particular to the officials, the mentality, and even the language, with which they strongly identified themselves. Still some other people, though not cadres by themselves, were born in a family of cadres and the exposure also familiarized them with the language, logic and tactics to a degree no worse than the cadres did. These civil ruling elites have an almost natural relationship with the state. Among civil ruling elites, especially among economic elites, there are some people who are not cadres themselves, nor do they have a cadre background, but they made contact of the central system in the past. They could be party members, or soldiers or veterans who are engaged in a new career. Regarding personal backgrounds, the civil ruling elites have a lot to do with the state. Upon further analysis, it is not difficult to see that not only are the two closely related, but also have strong consistency in terms of interests. The formation of civil ruling elites, especially economic elites, is a direct result of the reform and opening-up policy made and executed directly by the state. Therefore, in terms of the reform and opening up, economic elites share the same interests with the state. The interests lie not just between the two entities, but also between individuals in either entity. We can conclude from the previous analysis that 158

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

the rise of civil economic elites greatly depends on the exchange of power and cash, which determines the relationship between certain individuals in civil economic elites and some governmental officials. Therefore, sufficient attention has to be paid to their relationship and common interests when analyzing the relationship between state and civil ruling elites. But this is merely one aspect of the issue. Seeing from another respect, there are realistic factors that can intensify the relationship between state and civil ruling elites. First, as mentioned above, the drainage and division of state assets served as important conditions for the rise of civil ruling elites. But the drainage of state assets was a direct loss of state interests. Under current circumstances, the authority of state is still built on the monopoly of resources, and the drainage of state assets has this effect of draining its authority. By contrasting the situation after the late 1980s, especially after early 1990s with that of the middle 1980s, we can find that the state power in the execution of economic and social policies is declining. “Orders are not executed, and prohibitions broken” is a pretty ordinary phenomenon. This is especially true of the central government. On account of the lack of legal means and the decline of administrative power, the central government’s control over local governments and civil social forces are not comparable with old times. A series of measures are adopted by the Central Government since this summer to protect state assets, including the “shaking-up” of the operation of real estates and financial and economic order, the reinforcement of tax-related work, the reform of the management system of state-owned enterprises and the clampdown on corruptions, etc. These measures contradict the interests of civil economic elites, especially those who emerged upon the division of state assets. The state, the central government in particular, encounters not just the contradiction against civil ruling elites, but also two very thorny issues inside of itself. The first is how to regulate the conduct of officials so that they will cease to be the “private peddlers” of state assets; the second is how to find a practical path of “nonnationalization” outside of “the power-based carve-up of state assets” so as to turn around the situation of state enterprises encumbering economic development. It has to be pointed out here that in all of the previous analyses we have deemed “the state” as a whole, which is undoubtedly an oversimplification. In fact, within different parts of “the state”, or within different groups

159

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

of officials, there are differences or even a varying degree of opposition when it comes to values orientation and/or interests. What is worth special attention in our analysis is the relationship between the central and local governments. In the total society before the reform, local governments were no independent economic entities; the conflict of interest between the two was usually latent even if they disagreed with each other. After over ten years since the reform, local governments have developed into independent economic entities, and the conflict started revealing itself. On account of the interest conflict, its relationship with civil ruling elites also differs ostentatiously. The relationship between civil ruling elites and local governments is obviously closer. The preferential policies made by local governments out of local protectionist motives undoubtedly will promote the growth of local economy and therefore collide with the interest of civil economic elites. The development of local economy not indicates just the “political competence” of local governments and the officials there, but also increases local financial revenue. Therefore, local governments and civil ruling elites naturally take the same side when opposing the central government’s policies that are not beneficial to local economy. It can therefore be stated that the interweaving of common interests and conflicts as well as the differences in terms of relationships between civil ruling elites and different parts of the state together put the relationship between state and civil ruling elites in a very subtle condition. From the perspective of development, the relationship will continue to change along with the growth of economic strength of civil ruling elites and the ripening of conditions for independent development. But interesting enough, although the interaction of the two is frequent or even intimate, the communication between them does not have a systematized channel, and dialogue between them happens through personal relationship. This situation has something to do with the following two factors. First, civil ruling elites as a group are not well organized. Although there are many new intermediate organizations like associations and academies in academic fields, many of them are created by the official and therefore are hard to become the media of communication between the government and civil ruling elites. Second, it is only rare that civil ruling elites participating in central political areas, even if they participate, they will act on behalf of themselves individually. Due to the extreme sensitivity of this issue, civil ruling elites are usually very

160

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

cautious when competing for political engagement. Therefore, although more and more civil ruling elites are becoming members of National People’s Congress (NPC) or Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the communication channel between state and civil ruling elites has not been established yet. This situation forms a striking contrast with the intimate relationship in the form of personal relationship between the two parties (the relationship sometimes can even be father and son, for example, when the father is a governmental official and the son a member of civil ruling elites). The absence of systematized communication channel is the cause of dividing lines between groups. And if judged by orthodox ideology, civil ruling elites make a dissenting power. Intellectuals are registering more and more frequently attitudes toward major issues concerning Chinese social development, which vary from the government. They differ even in discourses, and one can imagine how hard it would be for both parties to communicate with and understand each other. In a sense, there is suspicion or even mutual fear between state and civil ruling elites. The extreme way of solving the political unrest around the summer and autumn in 1989 can be understood in this context. It is expected that the establishment of a systematized channel of communication and dialogue will be put on agenda as civil ruling elites achieve further development of independence. One of the specific forms is the demand of “elite democracy” by civil ruling elites, which is also one of the preconditions of carefree long-term investment by civil ruling elites.

4.3.2. Relationship between civil ruling elites and commoners If there is some kind of tension in the relationship between state and civil ruling elites, the same tension exists in the relationship between civil ruling elites and commoners, or may even be more obvious. Populist ideology formed in the total society has made two far-reaching impressions. The first is the equalitarianism of income distribution in which privileges caused by powers can be tolerated but the significant difference of income caused by non-power elements cannot be tolerated. The second is the “host awareness” at the socio-political level. Though the “awareness of ownership” then was false and horizontal attachment was universal, this “awareness” did create 161

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

a psychological tendency that resisted or even repelled any authority with the exception of state. It can be concluded therefore that populist ideology is an important element in the making of the tense relationship between civil ruling elites and commoners. Surely, the more realistic element is the denial of civil ruling elites in a moral sense. A rather consistent condemnation of civil economic elites is that they are “wealthy but pitiless”. The condemnation is based not just on the traditional idea that “no merchants are not crooked”, but also on the conduct of civil economic elites. In the process of Chinese civil economic development, deception, tax cheat and evasion, fake and defective products have been prevalent, which has adversely damaged the image of civil economic elites. More importantly, as aforementioned, the rise of civil economic elites benefited a lot from the trade of money and power and the carve-up of state assets. This is a more realistic element that intensifies the relationship between commoners and economic elites. And some of the irrational conduct on the part of some civil economic elites, like conspicuous consumption, wealth showing-off, extravagance, dissoluteness, and bare contempt and humiliation of the poor all undoubtedly fuel the flame of this already tense relationship. Intellectual elites are in a more intricate relationship with commoners. One of the Chinese traditions is to respect intellectuals. But continuous humiliation of the intellectuals over the last forty years and some inappropriate behaviors on the part of some intellectuals in political movements changed this tradition in two distinctively different aspects. Money as a standard of measurement has attracted increasing attention in recent years; intellectuals thus appeared to be increasingly “uselss” and incompetent. If the commoners form an aversion to a great number of economic elites, they must show contempt for intellectuals. And exactly for this reason, when the government criticized the intellectuals through mass media in recent political movements, quite a number of commoners responded positively. Nevertheless, intellectual elites are inclined to the commoners due to their decrease of economic and social positions. This is the above-mentioned trend of “intellectuals developing toward populism”.

4.3.3. Relationship between state and commoners If peasants are beneficiaries of the reform at the very outset, urban residents benefit from during the reform while paying a price for peasants have almost 162

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

nothing before the reform, exactly as Marx put it: “nothing to lose but fetters and chains”. Urban residents, however, are different because before the reform they enjoyed many aspects of privileges, which are exactly what the reform takes away. The reform of housing and pricing policies impacted the benefits enjoyed by urban residents in housing and staple and non-staple food supplies. The reform of employment undermined the significant of the long-cherished “iron rice bowl” (a secure job). The reform of public medical care system and pension system diminished the sense of security that had lasted for over forty years. It could be said that continuous progress of urban reform reinforces to a certain extent the reserved opinions of the urban residents toward the reform. And exactly for this reason, the state has been very cautious about any reform that involves the interests of urban residents and would delay once and again measures of reform related. After the summer of 1989, about RMB100–200 billion were appropriated from the peasants as “peace and union loans” granted to pacify urban residents. But if the reform is to solve some basic problems in Chinese society, the reform related to urban interests has to be pushed forward. These reforms are actually advancing in recent years. What responses these reform will encounter among urban residents greatly depends on the ability of the government to maintain a relatively rapid growth when reforming the economic systems. To be objective, the reason that urban residents can keep a “reserved and tolerant” attitude toward reforms that concern their interests is mainly that while paying the price of welfare privileges they obtained substantial financial benefits. Two big problems exist between state and peasants, however. The first is the comparative interests of peasants. Since last year, issues concerning agriculture and peasants have been drawing official and social attention. The reason is the continuous decline of the comparative interests of peasants in recent years. But the issue of peasants’ comparative interests is very different from that of before the reform. In the planned economic system before the reform, the comparative interests of the peasants are represented as: the state presses down the price of agro products while lifting the price of industrial products, using administrative power, forming the “scissors difference” (price gap) between agricultural and industrial products. This was an important means of accumulating capital for industrialization. But today, not only the prices of the majority of agricultural products are open to market adjustment, but also close to prices in the world 163

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping

market. But there remains a great income gap between rural and urban residents (the ratio was 1:2.4 before reform, 1:2.33 now).12 Why? We can call this “cook dilemma”, meaning that rural population and labor force take too large a percentage. Suppose a man hired three cooks. The average income of the three cooks (given no other incomes) will never exceed 1/3 of the employer’s income. This situation is a result of the fact that China’s urbanization is falling far behind industrialization. Looking back at the past 40 years, we can find that urban-rural population rate stayed 2:8 or 3:7. Existence of great rural population proportion is an important condition for the existence of “ruling flexibility”. The disastrous situation caused by “Great Leap Forward Movement” ended quickly. Then the Cultural Revolution lasted for 10 years and the government was able to pacify urban residents after 1989. These are all based on the existence of a huge “suburban area” or “peasants”. The control of urbanization, especially the control of metropolitan development has always been a consistent governmental policy. But the approach to improving the comparative interests for peasants is only to encourage “secondary trade” or “leaving the soil without leaving homeland”. “Township enterprise” is actually a form of “collective secondary trade”. And more are individual operators of “secondary trade”, which, though solved the issue of comparative interests in a certain period of time, benefited very few peasants who focused on agriculture. And besides, due to the limitations of other factors, agriculture cannot achieve largescale development, and the promotion of comparative interests becomes a beautiful bubble. The effective solution to “cook dilemma” will therefore have fundamental effects on the relationship between state and peasants. The second is that there is hardly any media of communication between state and peasants. Since the disintegration of people’s communes, the state has actually been confronted with the direct presence of hundreds of millions of peasants. Due to the decline of peasants’ comparative interests, and the burden transferred to the shoulders of peasants and due to the corruption of local officials (including non-official officials at the village level), the burden on the shoulders of peasants weigh increasingly heavily. But peasants do not have their own intermediate organizations like Peasants’ Association, nor do they have a medium through which they 12 Refer to the newspaper, Guangming Daily, Oct. 11th, 2009, Version 1.

164

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Evolution of Interactive Relationships among Chinese State

express and actualize their interests, peasants as individuals cannot deal with the state. Two features of rebellious behaviors on the part of peasants are thus formed. The first is delay. For example, some peasants would passively resist by deserting their land if the profit of planting is low or even the cost exceeds the production. A careful analysis of this process reveals that peasants will decide not to farm next year the moment they realize that the yield this year is not worth the investment. But this intention will not be published anywhere through any media and the officials will not even notice it until no one is farming next spring. But due to low efficiency of the governmental institutions, feedback of information takes too much time and the central government will not realize the seriousness of the issue until related statistics are reported after summer. The second is the “leaping quality” of their forms of resistance. Due to the fact that they do not have a way to express their interest appeals and that they are intimidated by local officials, peasants will simply “take it” as long as they can. But when it becomes unbearable beyond limit, the resistance will erupt in a violent manner. A typical example is that peasants in Renshou County, Sichuan Province and some other places refused to pay levies and taxes. In summary, the sustainable development of China is significantly contingent upon the evolution of the interactive relationships among the three structural elements: state, civil ruling elites, and commoners.

References Bernstein, Thomas (1970). Leadership and Mobilization in the Collectivization of Agriculture in China and Russia: A Comparison. Ph.D. diss., Department of Political Science, Columbia University. CCE Editorial Board (1987). Contemporary Chinese Economy. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. Dai, Jianzhong (1991). Investigation of the Current Status of Private Enterprises in Henan Province. Sociology and Social Sciences, 1991(5). ERCC Editorial Board (1984). Economic Reform of Contemporary China. Beijing: China Social Science Press. ERI-CASS (Economy Research Institute) (1978). The Socialist Alteration of Capitalist Industry and Commerce in China. Beijing: the People’s Press. Fried, Morton H. (1956). Fabric of Chinese Society. NY: Atlantic Press.

165

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch05

Sun Liping Hu, Heli (1989a). Three Issues in Clean Administration. Comparison of Economic and Social Systems, 1989(2). Hu, Heli (1989b). Estimation of China’s Part of Fund in 1988. Comparison of Economic and Social Systems, 1989(5). Jiang, Ruqun (1993). Market, Government and Social Changes. PhD dissertation, Sociology Department, Beijing University. Kuhn, Philip A. (1975). Local Self-Government under the Republic. In Frederic Wakeman, Jr. and Carolyn Grant (eds.), Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China. Berkeley: University of California Press. Li, Qiang (1993). Contemporary Chinese Social Strata and Flow. Beijing: China Economy Press. Liu, Liqun (1993). Dilemma of Chinese Finance and the Way Out. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1993(2). Lu, Dequan (1991). “Contact”: An Exchange Form in Contemporary Chinese Society. Sociology and Social Investigation, 5. Mann, Michael (1980). State and Society: 1130–1815; An Analysis of English State Finances. In Maurice Zeitlin (ed.), Political Power and Social Theory. Greenwick, CT: JAI Press. Mann, Michale (1986). The Sources of Social Power, Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press. Meisner, Maurice (1990). Mao’s China and After, translated byYuling Li. Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Press. Nee, Victor (1991). Social Inequality in Reforming State Socialism: Between Redistribution and Markets in China. American Sociological Review, 56, 267–282. Sun, Liping (1992a). Rise and Fall of Aristocrats and Squires in Traditional Chinese Society and Their Influence on Social Structure, Tianjin Social Sciences. 4, 58–64. Sun, Liping (1992b). Structural Division of the State and Society. China Social Sciences Quarterly, 1992(1). Sun, Liping (1993). Free-Flowing Resources and “Free Activity Space”. Exploration, 1993(1). Tsou, Tang. Ho Ping-ti (eds) (1968). China in Crisis. University of Chicago Press. Tsou, Tang (1989). Chinese 20th Century Politics and Occidental Politics. Thinker, 1. Walder, Andrew G. (1983). Organized Dependency and Culture of Authority in Chinese Industry. Journal of Asian Studies, XLIII(1). Walder, Andrew G. (1987a). Communist Neotraditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry. Berkeley: University of California Press. Walder, Andrew G. (1987b). Communist Social Structure and Worker’s Politics in China. In V. Falkenheim (ed.), Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan. Wang, Xiaoyi (1991). Social Integration. Suburban Economy and Society, 1991(3). Zhou, Xueguang (1993). Unorganized Interests and Collective Actions in Communist China. American Sociological Review, 58, 54–73.

166

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

PART II A Historical Research on Civil Society

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

This page intentionally left blank

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

“State and Society” in Modern China: Research Review and Reflection1

Chapter

6

Zhu Ying2

Abstract As a new framework for theoretical analysis formed under the influence of civil society theory, “State and society” has been widely applied to monographic studies of modern Chinese history over the last decade. It has provided a new horizon for the research of modern Chinese history and strengthened some weak links in past researches. By opening up new fields for researchers, it contributes positively to the growth of modern Chinese history research toward depth and width. But the application of this framework needs to be further improved, and empirical researches into more related special subjects in modern Chinese history from the perspective of “state and society” also needs to be further enhanced. Keywords: State and society; civil society; research review.

1.

Introduction

For over a decade, researches into “state and society” of modern China or researches into “civil state and society”, and researches into certain special subjects using “state and society” as theoretical framework seem to become 1 This paper is an interim result of one of the major projects approved by the Key Research Base of Humanities and Social Sciences of the Ministry of Education: “A Study of Freelance Guilds in Republic of China period based on Doctors, Lawyers, and Accountants” (05JJD770115). 2 Zhu Ying, Institute of Chinese Modern History, Central China Normal University, P. R. China.

169

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

Zhu Ying

an increasingly “attractive” topic in researches of modern Chinese history, and related results of researches continuously come out. This reveals not just a new trend in the study of modern Chinese history, but forecasts an extension and expansion of related research tools and subjects. It has a promising future, in other words. In order to further promote the research of “state and society”, it is necessary to review and analyze some past researches, and to reflect on the direction of the trend and offer some advice.3 It should be made clear here that this chapter does not intend to list and review research results related to modern Chinese “state and society” but attempts to describe, roughly, the trend of development as a whole.

2.

From Theoretical Discussions to the Development of Monographic Studies

The so-called “state and society” is a new theoretical framework that emerged in China along with the introduction of ideas concerning Western civil society and public sphere. It can also be regarded as a framework for theoretical analysis. In early 1990s, Western academia had heated discussions about Chinese civil society. Meanwhile a few domestic scholars started paying attention to the subject and introduced Western theory about civil society into China. Also they formed some initial ideas about constructing civil society in modern China. Civil society is both a model of theoretical interpretation and a historical experience that originate from the West. The primary problem faced by this theory in its introduction to China lies in its applicability in China. The scholars understand the theory differently probably because of the historical cause for the formation of the theory and the sophistication of its content. Furthermore, it gets complicated because users of the theory often interpret it according to their own needs. For instance, “they may quote John Locke’s view that society precedes state and state is subject to its promises to society; resort to Montesquieu or Tocqueville who inherited ideas from the former and proposed separation of power and checks 3As far as the author of this chapter knows, articles related to this issue include: Zhang

(1998); Xu et al. (2002); Deng, J. (2004); Min (2005); Deng, Z. (1994).

170

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

“State and Society” in Modern China

and balances (i.e., society is defined by the political society, but a powerful monarchy as the political society should be subject to the rule of law that should be defended by an independent “intermediary” according to the separation of powers); adopt the ideas of Hegel who blended Locke and Montesquieu (i.e., civil society in its individuality is independent of state, but not morally self-sufficient and therefore requires relief from state the representation of universal interests); quote Marx whose reversal of Hegel informed his argument of superstructure (including state and ideology) being determined by base (civil society), and also another idea that mainly draws on Hegel and revises Marx’s “Civil Society–State” framework and proposes a crucial sub-proposition, namely the “civil society vs. state” thesis, within superstructure that is external to the “base-superstructure” thesis or turn to the Habermasian neo-Marxism that draws on non-Marxism but offers a democratic interpretation of civil society. The list could go on and on” (Deng, 1999, pp. 1–2). Sure enough, it is nothing odd that people would debate about the civil society theory. First, it originates from the West; second, different interpretations are unavoidable after its introduction into China. A new theory would have to encounter some debates at its embryonic stage even if it is native. However, the problem is that if we keep debating at a theoretical level without applying it to empirical researches and analysis of special subjects, the theory is totally pointless. Some scholars recognized this danger and made some rewarding attempts in later researches. Another point of contention is whether the theory is applicable to China. The issue exists not just in Chinese academic circle. Even among Western sinologists, there are two oppose views. Some are negative for they think that at the end of Qing Dynasty and the beginning of the Republic of China, China had already had many cases that resembled Western civil society or public sphere and that played potential roles in the modernization of China. For example, the activities of genteel elites in the late Qing Dynasty, club politics in the Republic of China, protests and strikes of workers and students after the May 4th Movement, etc. Some other scholars analyzed some business organizations and public institutions that are free of governmental control, like the Sacred Granary, Pu ji tang (Hospices for the aged and people in need), Poundling Home, Benevolence etc. They concluded that these organizations and institutions were increasingly

171

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

Zhu Ying

non-bureaucratic and increasingly influential in local communities. Eventually they grew into places where governmental policies were criticized. The foregoing researches and results are mainly achieved by American scholars. Among others, R. Keith Schoppa conducted a research into elites in Zhejiang Province as early as the beginning of the 20th century; William T. Rowe researched business organizations and merchant groups of Hankou in the late 19th century; Mary Backus Rankin studied the relationship between aristocratic intellectuals in Zhejiang Province and political changes; David Strand examined the relationship between citizens in Beijing and politics in 1920s. But quite a few Western scholars, including famous scholars like Frederic Wakeman and Philip Kuhn who are well versed in the study of modern Chinese history, believe that Chinese development has features totally different from Western world and civil society or public sphere that resembles the West do not exist at all. Analysis of modern Chinese history based on Western theories about civil society and public sphere is therefore quite inappropriate and actually very dangerous for the results might be misguiding at its best. Domestic scholars argue about the same topic and hold the same two contrary opinions along with some other related ideas. Representative scholars who hold different views include Deng Zhenglai, Xiao Gongqin, Yang Nianqun and Xu Jilin. As for Zhang Zhidong and Min Jie, their critical reviews have been so thoroughly introduced that more repetition would be totally unnecessary. Comparatively speaking, scholars who favor application of civil society from a new perspective to a new discussion of modern Chinese history seem to outnumber those who do not favor it. The former maintain that as long as they are not simply imitating western scholars by debating whether China has civil society or public sphere in theory, but conducting in-depth empirical researches in the critical light of the theory, then the theory will be beneficial to the development of the study of modern Chinese history. Just as Mr. Zhang (Kaiyuan) pointed out: “Western scholar discussion of ‘civil society’ and ‘public sphere’ can liberate us from fixed empty framework like ‘clue’, ‘stage’, ‘climax’ and ‘event’ so that we can focus our attention on the complicated historical process of how China developed from medieval period into modern society, how the carrier of modernization sprouted, evolved and its space and style of activities, etc”

172

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

“State and Society” in Modern China

(Zhang, 1995, p. 2). Considering the subsequent development and practice, the opinion is very reasonable. The author started paying attention to the theory of civil society in early 1990s, with little participation in debating the theory itself though. Instead, the author tried to apply the theoretical framework, “state and society”, to the study of modern Chinese chambers of commerce. The author did this out of two considerations. First, the study at that time was still limited to general discussion of the property, characteristics and function of chambers of commerce, put another way, the study of chambers of commerce was merely for the sake of study. Even though good progress has been made in the study of modern commerce chambers, the horizon of study is still relatively narrow and breakthrough is still possible. Second, Western scholars, including Chinese scholars, cared less about empirical evidence, especially about chambers of commerce as newly emergent social groups comprising active and burgeoning merchants and industrialists, when they argued about whether modern China had similar civil society and public sphere and whether the theory is applicable in China. This is not good enough to demonstrate the theoretical possibility of the theory of civil society. Based on these two considerations and after several years’ pursuit, the author published a monograph, nearly 500,000 characters, entitled State and society in Change: Historical Perspective into Modern Chinese Chambers of Commerce (Central China Normal University Press, Sep, 1997). Judged over ten years from publication, the book appears immature and imperfect with insufficient discussions and certain disadvantages. Nevertheless, it received some attention in the field of history since it made an early attempt to propose the theoretical framework of State and society, and did try to put in some empirical researches for support. In 1995, Ma Min published a monograph entitled Between Business and Bureau: Modern Businessmen in Drastic Social Change. The book analyzed modern businessmen between the Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China and offered a unique perspective into issues in the public sphere. Some scholars think that these two monographs and a paper entitled “Development of Public Sphere in Late Qing Dynasty in the Upper Stream of Yangtze River” published in Historical Research (Issue 1, 1996) by Wang Di “symbolize the official beginning of (domestic) researches into modern Chinese civil

173

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

Zhu Ying

society”, “through empirical investigations into modern commerce chambers, mapped the existence and function of modern civil society. Their researches go beyond general patterns of research into the features and functions of chambers of commerce and find in this very familiar social group some elements that resemble those at the dawn of European capitalism. Their researches won academic recognition not only in the field of history, but also in Chinese contemporary sociology. When sociologists are looking for used-to-be civil society in Chinese history, they usually cite chambers of commerce” (Min, 2005, p. 43). In the meantime, some scholars honored the author and Ma Min as “representatives” of the school of “Chambers of Commerce” and the school of “Empirical Research” (Zhang, 1998, p. 297). To be honest, I do not think I have contributed anything in the research of modern Chinese civil society, let alone making any contributions to the discussion of the theory of civil society. I just proposed “state and society” as a new theoretical framework relatively earlier in the light of the theory of civil society so as to broaden the horizons of researches into chambers of commerce and make some fruitful attempts to discuss some specific issues in modern Chinese history under the framework of “state and society”. The effort is not entirely successful, but laid certain groundwork for later researches. What makes me proud, as a matter of fact, is the effect my book has achieved in pushing theoretical argumentation about civil society to the development of empirical researches into dedicated subjects. For after the publication of my book, the theoretical framework of “society and state” or “state and society” is often employed, fruitfully, by contemporary history researchers to investigate and analyze many specific issues in modern history. The study of civil society therefore changed in a general manner from theoretical discussion to specific researches. This is a contribution to the development of the study of modern Chinese history. Just as Mr. Zhang Kaiyuan said: “Given its importance the relationship between state (government) and society has been inappropriately neglected . . . For a long time, we have regarded state merely as a tool of executing policies and overlooked an abundance of contents in the relationship” (Zhang, 1995, preface; Zhu, 1997, pp. 3–4). Reviewing the development of historical researches about “state and society” in modern China over the past decade, we can find a number of

174

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

“State and Society” in Modern China

implications. If we hold a critical view without pure imitation or fashionfollowing or simple-minded rejection and adapt them according to real Chinese situations in an appropriate manner, theories introduced from the West can provide us with a new perspective into modern Chinese history and present us some new knowledge. Besides, though it is necessary for us to clarify and analyze Western theories, we should also pay attention to the proper application of the theory to real situations. The latter may be more important for we cannot be content with empty talk. An important link in empirical research is that theories cannot be used as models with a grain of salt. Just imagine what will happen if we modeled ourselves upon Western theories. We borrowed from Western theory of civil society and concluded our own “state and society” theory. And with the theory we find that there is another pattern of interactive relationship and influence in modern China, which is different from the “society vs. state” relationship emphasized by Western civil society theory. Thus, careful attention has been paid to the differences between China and the West. Only in this way can Western theories benefit and promote the development of modern history research. Theoretically speaking, the author of this paper thinks that perhaps it is more fitting to use the theory of “society and state” or “state and society” than using “civil society” or “public sphere”. For as mentioned above, the theory of civil society is too complicated and has too many voices to be clarified, and it is from the West. If a Western theory is applied to real Chinese situations, however hard it may try to adapt to reality, the fruits it yields will unavoidably be labeled “imports”, or even worse, be criticized as being value-oriented or lacking subjectivity and creativity. Besides, Western scholars would strictly distinguish “civil society” and “public sphere” when doing either theoretical interpretation or empirical research. Many Chinese scholars happen to do exactly the opposite, unfortunately, and therefore incite some unnecessary debating. On the one hand, the framework of “society and state” or “state and society” can be used to avoid the suspicion of imitating passively western theories of civil society or public sphere. On the other hand, the content and scope will be enlarged accordingly. Be it “civil society” or “public sphere”, both can be included in our theory. We rarely examine modern China in the framework of “state and society”, using it now will indeed be helpful to gain some new sights. As a matter of fact, the application of a new theory is to provide for us new fields

175

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

Zhu Ying

and new perspectives, and this is exactly what “state and society” theory does in the research of modern Chinese history.

3.

Empirical Dedicated Subject Research in the Theoretical Framework of “State and Society”

Within the field of historic study, when my book, State and society in Change, was published in 1997, researches of modern Chinese history from the perspective of “state and society” were very few. Within less than 10 years after the publication of my book, however, related research results just boomed and many other fields in modern China were also included. Even the study of ancient Chinese history started trying the theory out. This is undoubtedly a favorable trend in the development of historical research.4 As mentioned earlier, “state and society” is a theoretical framework covering a wide range of fields. It is a theoretical tool with broad usage. If our discussion is confined to a narrow field and subject, we cannot fully understand the development of modern Chinese state and society and the interactive relationship between them. On account of the fact that early empirical subject research results are mainly based on chambers of commerce, this fault becomes particularly obvious. Some scholars once pointed out: “Seen in modern Chinese history, chambers of commerce are indeed the most representative organization of civil society. The “chambers of commerce school” held to this perspective first in their researches under the influence of their academic background. The school proposed some creative and new ideas, and their contribution can by no means be denied. Modern Chinese civil society is a large complicated social system, while chambers of commerce are merely a link in the chain. Excessive focus on the research of these two subjects may result in partial and one-sided academic findings like the illusion that “chambers of commerce equal civil society”. Consequently, modern Chinese chambers of commerce tend to equal or mix with civil society. Therefore, we cannot overlook researches of other links in civil society in addition to the researches into chambers of commerce. 4About the application of “state and society” in the study of ancient Chinese history, this

chapter recommends Mou (2006).

176

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

“State and Society” in Modern China

“Commerce-chamber-centralism” in the research of modern Chinese civil society should be avoided (Zhang, 1998, p. 304). As other scholars pointed out, this is not the fault of scholars who studied chambers of commerce, since every scholar is entitled only to speak about what he knows best. It is unreasonable to ask the researchers on chambers of commerce to go beyond their field to prove the existence of civil society. But, “to form a complete idea of modern Chinese civil society takes the efforts of considerable scholars in their respective area of expertise” (Min, 2005, p. 43). Indeed, be it the study of modern Chinese civil society or public sphere, or the study of “state and society”, restricting scholarly attention within commerce chambers and business organizations are far from being sufficient. In fact, in middle 1990s when modern historic field based its study of modern Chinese “state and society” on chambers of commerce, some scholars had already initiated empirical researches into broader fields. For example, Wang Di conducted an in-depth discussion of the public sphere in the upper stream of theYangtze River. By comparing Chengdu and Hankou, two cities situated in the middle part of the Yangtze River, he illustrated that even within China the development of public sphere varied from area to area. In other words, “state and society” has a different interactive relationship. He thinks that the development of public sphere in the late Qing Dynasty in the upper stream of Yangtze River is mainly embodied by the evolution of traditional fields and the birth of new fields. The former was represented by the advent of public schools and chambers of commerce, while the latter by the birth of public associations and other social economic organizations. The expansion of public sphere in Hankou at the end of the 19th century mainly resulted from of the dynamo within society and positive contributions made by local elites. The role of the government is not so obvious here and now. But the development of public sphere in Chengdu at the same time was mainly driven by the government, subordinated by local gentry. Even state and society conflict here, but the interaction between them, namely the governmental role, was very obvious (Wang, 1996). Ma Min’s research was not directed solely toward chambers of commerce either. Through examination of modern Chinese genteel businessmen, he explicated the transformation of “civilian society” between the late Qing Dynasty and the early period of Republic of China. He concluded that genteel merchants as newly rising class replaced traditional gentry as the

177

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

Zhu Ying

most active group in local society, bringing traditional public sphere to some systematized evolution. They came into the command of the construction of civil government, jurisdiction of commercial business, local autonomy and the management of commerce and trade, education, health and other public society-beneficial matters in varying degrees through setting up all types of new associations and still some other means. They established an “opposition network of municipal power”. In this process of development, state and society were not engaged in tense conflicts or even in opposition. Instead, they were both interdependent and contradictory with interdependence overriding contradiction (Ma, 1995, pp. 281–292). Above all, more direct or indirect empirical researches into modern Chinese state and society development began asserting themselves between the late 20th century and early 21st century, and covered a broader range of areas. Multiple expansion of local society and its influences on various aspects are issues that attract much academic attention. Recently, Wang Di published the Chinese version of his English book entitled Street Culture in Chengdu: Public Space, Urban Commoners, and Local Politics, 1870–1930 (Stanford University Press, 2003) in China. This book is quite popular among Euro-American sinologists. It studies “public space” and “public life”. To quote from Wang Di’s Chinese Preface: “If the public sphere of Jurgen Habermas mainly discusses a social and political space, then what I want to examine in this book is substantial “material space”, namely the public space visible and tangible in citizens’ daily life, what people, especially people of lower social ranks, do in their daily life and how their daily life is connected with local politics in such a space. Though this does not discuss directly ‘public sphere’, it still has to explain how ‘material’ space changes into social and political space” (Wang, 2006, p. 5). Centering upon the idea, the book places great stress on examining and answering a series of questions including: What functions does public place have in urban daily life? What is the relationship between urban people and urban public space? Who is the primary occupant of urban public space? How ordinary people use public space? To what an extent can the state and local elites control streets and community? How mass culture and public space change in social-pattern transitions? What is the nature of the relationship between urban commoners, local elites

178

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

“State and Society” in Modern China

and state power in public space? How mass culture interacts with local politics? Jie Qiu explored issues of Temple Conference in Guangzhou in late Qing Dynasty. This is a specific case study of modern state and society (relationship). It offered a valuable referential case for the study of regional modern Chinese “civil society”. Temple Conference refers to the assembly of a block of residents in the temple of the same block to handle affairs within the block. In late Qing Dynasty, Temple Conference succeeded in tackling public affairs in respective blocks in Guangzhou, including fire, theft, social security, house alteration, marriage, family disturbance, civil and criminal cases, conflicts of between locals and government as well as other emergencies. It is actually a form of autonomy with genteel merchants playing dominant roles. The government acknowledged the existence of this block autonomy, maintained order, collected taxes, and publicized official intentions through the autonomy. “The government admits not just temple conference decisions about block affairs, but also sentences of civil and criminal cases. Though this power is not assigned by law but by tradition, both civilians and government recognize it as reasonable and lawful.” What is worth attention is that Temple Conference in Guangzhou is not a result of Western influences. Instead, it has its own origin and tradition. This indicates that tradition has a major influence in the process of Guangzhou’s modernization (Qiu, 2003). He Yuefu thinks that there are four types of unofficial social organizations of significance to the urban social control of Guangzhou, namely block organization, chambers of commerce gentry associations as well as charity and commonweal groups. These unofficial groups played a major part in the changes of Guangzhou locality; they are indispensable in the management of local public affairs and local autonomy (He, 1998). Both Qiu Jie and He Yuefu pointed out that between late Qing and early Republic of China, though civil society developed a lot, conclusive evidence to its modern civil society features are still in want. Guo Qin studied the case of Changsha and explored the regional qualities and developmental features in modern Chinese civil society. He suggested that between late Qing and early Republic of China, the formation and growth of civil society in Changsha were deeply influenced by regional politics, political elements and the features of inland cities and that the radical and the conservative coexisted, and the newly rising class was

179

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

Zhu Ying

relatively weak and to a great extent restricted by historical tradition (Guo, 2005). Between late Qing and early Republic of China, civil communities were established in places like Suzhou by local gentry and merchants. It mirrors the modern development of Chinese civil society, and therefore attracts great attention from researchers. Yet the earliest research into civil community in Suzhou is from the perspective of political history. The bourgeoisie nature of civil community and its effect and influence in the Revolution of 1911 were explored, but not from the “society and state” perspective (Zhang andYe, 1982). Soon afterwards, with increasing interest in the study of civil society, some scholars began examining civil community in new theoretical framework. The book, Between Bureau and Business: Modern Genteel Businessmen in Drastic Social Changes, written by Ma Min explored Suzhou civil community from this perspective and explicated that civil community is a type of grassroots self-governing organizations based on blocks in charge of public affairs like hygiene, road and security. This is of great significance to the promotion of changes in urban public sphere and the nature of civil society in late Qing (Ma, 1995, pp. 276–278). Some scholars even further probed into civil community from the “state and society” perspective. Tu Xuehua made clear that Suzhou civil community is not just a grassroots urban autonomy but a civil group of identifiable features of civil society (Tu, 1993). Li Ming proposed that the establishment of Suzhou civil community completed the integration of streets and blocks in Suzhou. Restricted by the state, civil community was not able to grow into “independent society” as such, but its autonomous purview and power were still expanding, and the ideology of community members kept updating by embodying implications of modernity (Li, 2003). The formation and development of various forms of public space in civilian society are another important field that attracts academic interests. For example, Wang Di conducted a thorough investigation into teahouses in Chengdu at the beginning of the 20th century and yielded very impressive fruits. He thinks that Chengdu teahouses at the beginning of the 20th century are civil “world of freedom”. They are both places of entertainment and stages for people of different hierarchies, including elites and commons. Teahouse at this time has already had multiple functions. It is a public space for civilians to have fun, to talk business, to socialize and to politicalize.

180

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

“State and Society” in Modern China

More often than not, it is even a center for social life and local politics (Wang, 2001). Liu Fengyun also completed a comprehensive study of teahouses in Qing Dynasty and concluded that teahouse as a publicized social center plays important roles in urban social life. Since teahouse has some features of street culture, it is often integrated with the culture of people of lower social status, and their culture fully represents entertainment and relaxation and therefore becomes an epitome of the big world (Liu, 2002). Zhu Xiaotian explored modern teahouses in towns south of the Yangtze River and explicated the leisure culture there and the concrete operation process of suburban society and the related features are also reflected. Teahouses in towns are joints of towns and villages, focuses of community politics and hotspot of leisure (Zhu, 1997). Xiong Yuezhi dedicated his researches to the opening of private gardens and the space for public activities in Shanghai between late Qing Dynasty and early Republic of China. He analyzed the reason and process of the opening of private gardens like Zhang’s Garden, Xu’s Garden, Yu Garden and West Garden, and illustrated that these open private gardens are the corollary of the combination of western and Chinese public spaces, and a result of the fusion of the two cultures. They had very important influences on the expansion of civil public activity space (Xiong, 1998). Besides, Xiong Yuezhi conducted a pecial research into the largest hub for public activities — Zhang’s Garden and illustrated that the garden is a public place that integrates the functions of garden, teahouse, restaurant, story-telling spot, theater, conference hall, photo studio, exhibition hall, stadium and carnie. But the most striking feature of Zhang’s Garden lies in the fact that it is a major place for people of all classes to gather and to make speeches. There is always a party whenever a major event occurs, like border crisis, school movement, local autonomy and celebrations. The party features openness, publicity and tolerance. The formation of public space like Zhang’s Garden made due and noteworthy contributions to the integration of immigrant Shanghai, the birth of Shanghai people’s collective consciousness and even the development of democratic revolution. It is a very unique public space in modern China’s civilian society (Xiong, 1996). Li Deying conducted a comprehensive examination of urban public space and the development of urban social life based on examples of urban

181

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

Zhu Ying

parks in modern history. With a case study of parks of Chengdu in the Republic of China period, he concluded that parks have already been a haunt to all social classes, including the rich or poor, officials or commons, dignitaries or beggars. Parks cater to people of different hierarchies where the rich and the powerful and civilians can have fun and entertain themselves, laborers can rest to recover their strength, beggars can live and beg, and hookers can pimp for business. Besides, both civil groups and the government used parks to hold parties, making parks an epitome of social, economic and cultural conflicts (Li, 2000, 2003). Dai Haibin discussed the first park in modern sense in Beijing, Central Park, which developed from a royal forbidden park to a public space and how this is related to social development of Beijing in early period of the Republic of China. He suggested that Central Park as a new type of public space accepted a large amount of the content of modern urban life, especially those of the new and the old, the Western and the Chinese, the state and the society. These things were all fully exhibited in this space, and the political ideas of the civilians were also expressed here. The space also embodies the constriction of the area of the privileged and the expansion as well as limitation of modern urban public space. But this space does not fully reflect the binary opposition of state and society. The state often uses this space to re-establish new lawful order, which was well received by society (Dai, 2005). Chen Yunqian studied Sun Yat-sen Park (i.e., Zhongshan Park) in the same period of time and illustrated that the park is followed as an example across the nation, creating a unique space of park and social activity. Sun Yat-sen Park is not just a place for fun, but a carrier of state power and ideology. In the meantime, it is re-established as a space for civil activities, especially during the Anti-Japanese War when it is a symbolic space of nationalism. Kuomintang took advantage of the special space of Sun Yat-sen Park and established the collective memory of Dr. Sun Yat-sen (Chen, 2006). Apart from parks, modern museums and cinemas also start entering the vision of researchers as a special public space. Zhigang Yang thinks that a museum changed the privilege of appreciation of antiques into a common right by exhibiting national, imperial and private collections to society. And the people can feel something of democracy and public awareness (Zhang, 1999). Li Wei conducted dedicated research into Shanghai Cinema and the

182

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

“State and Society” in Modern China

development of urban public space in late Qing Dynasty and Republican Period and he proved that after the advent as a brand-new invention cinemas were closely related to urban life and exerted great influences on urban social life (Li, 2004). In recent years, researchers have shown increasing concern for the development of space for public opinions. Regarding this subject, the author of this paper conducted a preliminary discussion of journals published by chambers of commerce between late Qing and early Republic of China ten years ago and concluded that the publication of these journals not just provided the merchants and industrialists with the unprecedented independent tool of expressing public opinion and thus increasing their influences, but could be regarded as an example of the new development of civil society (Zhu, 1996). In recent years, Liu Zenghe published several papers discussing the development of public opinion in late Qing Dynasty and its influences on the formation of public space. He emphasized that the space of public opinion is the core and essential component of public sphere. After examining a variety of journals in late Qing, he proposed that these journals were relatively independent of and objective toward politics and close to civilians. They fall into the category of public media. Not only was independent public opinion space thus formed, but also the basis of civil society was expanded. In another paper he studied the relationship between media and the continuous expansion of modern public space from the perspectives of “mass media” and “assistant media”, illustrating that the expansion of public sphere in modern time was reliant on the growth of media. Besides, he suggested that if the autonomy of chambers of commerce and local gentry embodied the benevolent interaction between state and society, then public space as represented by civil media indicates the “opposition” of state and society, and its erosion of feudal national culture and ideology is dominant (Liu, 1999, 2000). Xu Jilin based his research on Shanghai and discussed the native tradition and forms of public sphere in China, and explicated that the emergence of numerous journals, academies, and schools in the 1898 Reform had already formed spaces for public association and public opinion. For some hard evidence, public opinion was formed by independent and rational public through expressing public criticism in newspapers, magazines, academies and schools. Public sphere thus formed is not a mere imitation of European model. Instead, it has its own

183

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

Zhu Ying

individuality (Xu, 2003). With a focus on the Shangdong Issue discussed in Paris Peace Conference (1919), Ying Junhao explored the interaction between the foreign affairs of that time and public opinions and illustrated that the development of public opinion turned around the situation that foreign policy used to stimulate public opinions in the May 4th Period: public opinion is exerting influences on foreign affairs. Hence, “diplomacy → public opinion” was transformed into “public opinion → diplomacy” (Ying, 2001, pp. 257–258). “Researches of modern political history under the framework of “state and society” yielded many new fruits in recent years. The study of local autonomy and the reform of political system in late Qing is particularly fruitful, and there are many insightful ones. Among others, Ma Xiaoquan published an outstanding book: State and Society: Local Autonomy and Political Reform in Late Qing. Mr. Zhang (Kaiyuan) pointed out in the preface of the book that “(this book) made systematic and in-depth research into local autonomy in late Qing from the angle of socio-political structure (i.e., the relationship of state and society) and early political modernization in China (i.e., political development), absorbing latest research results and using research methods from subjects in politics, sociology and other subjects” (Zhang, 1995, preface; Ma, 2001, p. 2). Qingsong Zhou analyzed the origin of local autonomy in late Qing from the development of public sphere, using Shanghai as an example. He suggested that the birth of public sphere in Shanghai, which is of special background, and the growth of social forces, enabled Shanghai to take the initiative in local autonomy and become a role model nationwide to be followed under the guidance of Qing government later (Zhou, 1998). Liu Chunrong researched the relationship between civil society and constitutional government, and found that the relationship changed in an unprecedented manner in late Qing. Social independence increased, traditional monarchy changed to constitutional monarchy, but weak civil society and debilitating state did not have benevolent interaction in terms of politics. This is why constitutional reform failed (Liu, 2000). Besides, Chang Shuhong analyzed the changes of social integration in local society in late Qing and early Republican Period (Chang, 2003); Ma Xiangyuan et al. conducted preliminary discussions concerning the evolution of state and society and its influences on the process and ending of 1911 Revolution (Ma et al., 2004). 184

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

“State and Society” in Modern China

Scholars laid the same stress on the researches into modern social groups within the framework of “state and society”. By exploring the changes to landlords between late Qing and early Republican Period, Hong Pu concluded that the migration of landlords from villages to towns and cities since late Qing was a rather ordinary historical phenomenon. The change of living environment had influence on their daily life in terms of the specific social activities and relations as well as the sphere of social activities. These influences were embodied in the diminishing individuality and the increasing individual power on the part of south China landlords (Hong, 2002). Discussions of modern freelancers and their groups is a new field opened up in recent years. Chinese-American scholar, Dr. Xu Xiaoqun, entitled his doctoral dissertation “State and Society: the Rise of Occupational Groups in Shanghai from 1927 to 1937”, based on which he published the book Professionals and the Republic of China, 1912 to 1937. This book boasts the first monograph dedicated to the study of freelancer groups in modern historiography. The book thoroughly investigated the rise and growth of lawyers, doctors and journalists and their multiple complicated relationships with the state, with Shanghai before the Anti-Japanese War as background. The book concludes that modern freelancers have a lot to do with state power and based on the conclusion he proposed the idea of “symbiotic dynamics” between occupational groups and state power in the Republican Period (Xu, 2001). The book, Print and Politics: Times and Cultural Evolution in Late Qing (Stanford University Press, 1996), by Ji Jiazhen started from the famous newspaper, Shi Bao (Time) and examined the relationships between journalists, people of lower classes and the government in Shanghai, as well as the relationship between Chinese and Western culture. Although theoretical framework employed in the book is “intermediate zone”, it actually refers to the middle zone between state and society, the governing and the governed; it is therefore closely related to the theoretical framework of “state and society” (Wang, 2003). Scholars like Wei Wenxiang, Lin Meili and Sun Huiming also conducted thorough investigations into the guild of lawyers and accountants in the period of the Republic of China.5 5 For detailed information in this respect, see Yin (2006).

185

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

Zhu Ying

Furthermore, the book State, Society and the Under-privileged: Social Relief in Republican Period (1927–1949) (Tianjin People’s Press, 2003) by Cai Qinyu explored comprehensively issues concerning social relief from the perspective of the multiple interactive relationship of the state, society and the under-privileged in Republican Period, and analyzed respective influences of state and society on the execution of relief (Wu, 2003). There are also new accomplishments achieved from the perspective of state and society in the study of legal history. One of the representative works is Conventional Law in Qing Dynasty: State and Society (China University of Politics and Law Press, 2003) by Liang Zhiping. The book has a high reputation among the academic communities at home and abroad. Some scholars remarked that “it is one of the typical works on the legal and social history. Many legal and sociological theories are used to explore the conventional law and constitutional law in traditional Chinese society; and with the theoretical framework, the book attempts to explore the relationship between state and society in China” (Zhao and Deng, 2001, p. 170). In addition to the foregoing monographic researches, Guo Jianming also studied the subject from the viewpoint of modern literary public sphere and discussed the features of modern China’s civil society (Guo, 2004). Amidst the development of the historical study of Ming and Qing society in the past decade, many scholars have applied the framework of “state and society” to the creative researches of various subjects. Among other scholars, Zhao Shiyu, Chen Chunsheng, Zheng Zhenman and Liu Zhiwei have made due contributions with their representative and prospective research results.6

4.

Applicability of “State and Society” Framework Redefined and Reconsidered

Though some scholars were constantly skeptic of and in some cases radically critical of the application of “civil society” and “state and society” theory to the research of modern Chinese history, the introduction and application of these theories, as mentioned above, clearly have some positive 6 For detailed information in this respect, see Deng (2004).

186

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

“State and Society” in Modern China

effects upon the development of the study of modern Chinese history. In summary, these positive effects include at least the following aspects: Firstly, a new horizon is provided for comprehensive and in-depth study of modern Chinese history. To be honest, we did have some faults in our past study of history. For example, our theories were sparse, our horizon was narrow and our approaches were not diverse enough. These faults exist not just in the study of modern Chinese history but also in other branches of historical study. As a consequence, the discussion of some important issues is often confined to a single level. The failure to analyze from multiple levels actually restricts the development of researches. Appropriate application of new theoretical framework is conducive to the expansion of horizon and vision and the development of researches of modern history. For instance, the past two decades have witnessed the fast development of the study of chambers of commerce into a hot field in historical study of modern China, which owes a lot to the continuous innovation of research methods on the part of researchers. In brief, the initial study of the chambers of commerce history was confined to traditional political framework, focusing on the nature of chambers of commerce and their attitudes and actions toward revolution while overlooking their economic and social functions. The ensuing introduction of frameworks like “tradition and modernity”, “modernized theory”, “state and society”, and “social network” deepens the study of the history of chambers of commerce and, to a great extent, promotes the development of modern history of city, economy, society, modernization, etc. as well as the development of the entire field of modern Chinese history (Ma, 2003). This indicates that along with the application and expansion of new theories come academically creative results and developments which should be acknowledged. Secondly, some of the old weak links have been reinforced and many new fields of research have been opened up. True use of theoretical framework is to cause researchers to form new awareness of issues or to explore old issues from new perspectives by providing new horizons. Zhao Shiyu and Deng Qingping once pointed out that “using state and society theory as an analytical discourse of the study of social history gives a relatively unified theoretical guide, more in-depth issue awareness and wider and macro research horizon to the separate and loose subjects of social study at ground level so that attention be paid to the interactive relationship between state

187

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

Zhu Ying

and society. This is a breaking point in understanding traditional China in a new and more profound way, which had been neglected, and an important step for China’s study of social history toward the entire history of China as well” (Zhao and Deng, 2001, p. 170). Similar positive effects, of course, are not just embodied in the study of social history, but also embodied in other research fields. Besides, “state and society” theory widens academic horizon, making scholars explore many new fields that had been overlooked, and achieved many valuable results, like teahouses, parks and museums mentioned above. Besides, the analysis of civil temple conference, the discussion of civil journals, public opinion and its influences, the rise of freelancers as a social group and its interactive relationship with state, etc are all new research fields opened up in the last decade inspired by the theoretical framework of “state and society”. This has reinforced the weak links in, and also promoted the study of modern Chinese history. Thirdly, researches of some old subjects are enriched. Research results have been accomplished for many issues in modern history, which does not mean that it is unnecessary to study them further. Exploration based on these results, if innovation of theory, methods and excavation of historic materials are found wanting, researches may be unavoidably repetitious and pointless as a result. There are so many totally stagnant historic research papers now. Except for “scientific research results” churned out by people who want nothing but a career, accumulation of academic progress has nothing to offer, and substantial human, financial and social resources are therefore wasted. Using “state and society” theory to help researchers study some old issues with new issue awareness and new perspectives can avoid these phenomena to a great extent. For example, despite many research resulting from the “May 4th Movement”, study of the topic will still impress people from the new perspective of how public opinion influences state diplomacy and some new insights into the movement will be gained. Research results of the legal history are just numberless, but studying it from the interactive relationship between conventional law and constitutional law certainly will bring something new. Analysis of local autonomy in late Qing, Constitution Movement, 1911 Revolution in the light of “state and society” has similar effects. Though not all these researches have achieved high academic standards, a few of which even lack in-depth and persuasive results, they are not poor repetition of past researches and may serve as references for future

188

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

“State and Society” in Modern China

researches. It is expected that remarkable academic results will come from such accumulation over time. One point needs to be clarified here. Even though some outstanding results have been achieved in the last decade by using “state and society” theoretical framework to study modern Chinese history, some scholars kept questioning it, especially the application of the theory of civil society, which is closely connected to this framework. To a great extent, “state and society” grows out of the soil of civil society, and therefore it is necessary to respond to their criticisms. Since earlier debates have been discussed above, now I will attempt to review some of the new opinions in recent years. One of the criticisms asserts that “some domestic scholars not only take Western theory of civil society as an effective tool for the analysis of Chinese society in late Qing, and apparently with some value orientation. Consciously or unconsciously, they take the historical experience of Western civil society and its ideas as something universal. They either try to find similarities between Chinese and Western history by modeling on Western civil society or criticize the Chinese phenomena inconsistent with the code of Western civil society. They anticipate that China would have a ‘civil society’ opposite to the state and thus realize its political modernization” (Cui, 2005). Criticisms like this strike me not only as an absolute denial of the positive significance of applying the theory of civil society to the study of the history of late Qing, but also a lifting of the “harm” to the level of politics. Objectively speaking, this criticism does not coincide with the truth exactly. First, according to related results the author of this paper had read, extremely few researchers of modern history exhibited this kind of favor except for a few non-historic researchers who are studying modern Chinese issues. On the contrary, many modern history researchers paid meticulous attention to the reality of China and tried to avoid identifying similarities between Chinese and Western history based merely on the model of Western civil society. Even some Western scholars clearly stated that they are opposed to using the ideas of civil society as a tool of value-orientation and ideology, and they also emphasized that the theory should be defined as a historical description (Yang, 1995, p. 31). Second, when studying Chinese society in late Qing in the framework of Western civil society theory, domestic researchers did not retort

189

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

Zhu Ying

right after the emergence of phenomena in Chinese history that differ from Western civil society. Instead, they went to great lengths to prove that these phenomena are reasonable and necessary as features of China. They further pointed out, the faults of these phenomena appropriately. This is an objective and scientific attitude toward academic research, instead of expecting a “civil society” opposite to the state in China. In fact, current researches in the field of history are generally discussions of historical issues, not specific plans about the future of China. Critics also hold that because the main subject explored by civil society theory is “the public sphere of the middle-class”, and modern China was based on agriculture and therefore the middle-class had been underdeveloped in modern history. In late Qing, though “citizens” or “capitalists” uttered their voices and were heard within a certain range, they were concentrated in some big cities. As a corollary, civil society theory cannot reflect the complicated relationship between state and society in Chinese countryside. In recent years, researches about state and society are mostly focused on urban public sphere and elites, which has a lot to do with the influence of civil society theory. It should be clarified here that current researches, be the theory of civil society or the theoretical framework of state and society, are indeed based on major cities. But this is normal for cities are obviously more significant than countryside in terms of development and evolution even if seen from different aspects like public space or public opinion. Hence, cities should be studied first. If significant urban changes are neglected while suburban ones are preferred, we are in the danger of reversing the major and the minor. Besides, though majority researches focused on cities, suburban areas are by no means totally forgotten. Actually some of the scholars made great efforts in the area and achieved a lot (e.g., Zhu, 1997; Wang and Chang 2000; Liu, 1997; Chen, 1996; Ke and Liu, 2000; Tang, 1995). These works are representative works that directly or indirectly study suburban development and its relationship with the state from different perspectives. Actually, the application of “state and society” as a framework does not entail an exclusive focus on urban public space and elites. In recent years, many important results have been achieved in the researches into the interactive relationship between state and society on the basis of countryside.

190

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

“State and Society” in Modern China

Judging from current results, both civil society theory or “state and society” framework have some unavoidable imperfections. Deng Jingli once summed up different opinions and put forward many noteworthy questions including: The definition of “state” and “society”; the division of rights; the binary or ternary interpretation model; the “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches; the internal and external perspective; the interior analysis of “state” and “society” and their relationship; the analysis of system and strategic action; the limits of nation-state analysis unit; the subject borderline; and the standard of historiography (Deng, 2004). The author of this paper suggests that the foregoing issues should be carefully considered and evaluated in order to make the theoretical framework for the analysis of “state and society” more proper and applicable to the study of modern Chinese history. In particular, the definition of “society” and “state” is worth special attention because under the special historical circumstances, the borderline between them is not really clear sometimes. They are blended with each other just like one and this keeps researchers from separating “society” and “state” simple in a dichotomous approach. If two concepts were separated, it would be hard to understand the interactive relationship and effect of them. Philip C.C. Huang proposed “the third sphere” (Huang, 2003, p. 260) (“the third realm”) as a playground for state and society. This also merits our special attention when researching specific subjects. Besides, although related empirical researches developed fast and covered many fields, there are still some weak links or even blind points that demand more researches. After reviewing and concluding the research results within the past decade, Min Jie proposed that empirical research should be strengthened, at least in three aspects: Social hierarchy, social group and social movement (Min, 2005, p. 48). The three aspects are also closely related to each other as a whole. This proposal is really insightful, but it focuses just on the situation in late Qing, and therefore the specified class only refers to the most active merchants at the time. If we examine the period of the Republic of China, we will find the there are more rising classes worth our analysis in the framework of “state and society”. Many of them are weak links or even blind spots of research. For example, there were many emergent groups of freelancers including

191

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

Zhu Ying

lawyers, teachers, reporters, journalists, artists, doctors, engineers, auditors, architects, etc. Domestic researchers just started looking into them; some even have not noticed them yet. Not only does the research need to be strengthened, but also there will be more spacious field to explore. And this is the same with the study of social groups. Great emphasis is laid on it since public group serves as an important symbol of the formation of civil society and public sphere as well as the embodiment of the development of civilian society. But current researches into it are limited by a narrow horizon, with the exception of chambers of commerce and education associations. If there already appeared various new social groups, then they must have thrived by the Republican period. The social groups mentioned above had their respective entities. Most of them have not attracted much academic attention except for lawyers’guilds and accountants’guilds and other guilds that are researched. Efforts should be stepped up in special studies of such subjects as well. In conclusion, remarkable results have been achieved in the study of modern Chinese history in the analytical framework of “state and society”. However, we will make more academic accomplishments in the future if we can consolidate relevant theories and improve the scope and efforts regarding the related empirical researches of special subjects.

References Chang, Shuhong (2003). Changes of the Integration of Local Society in late Qing and Early Republican Period. Journal of Historical Science, 2003(4). Chen, Chunsheng (1996). Sanshan King’s Worship and Cantonese Moving to Taiwan in Qing: Focusing on the Relation between Countryside and the State, Geographical Society and Traditional China. Xi’an: Shaanxi People’s Press. Chen, Yunqian (2006). Space Regroup and Sun Yat-sen Worship — A Research of Sun Yat-sen Parks in the Republican Period. Historical Review, 2006(1). Cui, Zhihai (2005). Theory of Civil Society and Study of Late Qing. Xinhua Digest, 2005(4). Dai, Haibin (2005). Central Park and Beijing Society in Early Republican Period. Beijing Social Sciences, 2005(2). Deng, Jingli (2004). Application of “State and Society” Framework in Chinese History. Journal of Historical Science, 2004(12). Deng, Zhenglai (1994). A Survey of the Study of China’s Development in Relation to the Study of Chinese Civil Society. Chinese Social Sciences Quarterly (H.K.), 1994(8).

192

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

“State and Society” in Modern China Deng, Zhenglai (1999). State and Civil Society. In Deng, Zhenglai and J. C. Alexander (eds.), State and Civil Society: A Path for a Social Theory. Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press. Guo, Jianming. Literary Public Sphere: A Rudiment of Modern Chinese Civil Society. Journal of Jiangxi Normal University, 2004(5). Guo, Qin (2005). On the Regional Features and Historical Trajectory of Modern Civil Society: A Case Study of Changsha in Late Qing and Early Republican Period. Hunan Social Sciences, 2005(5). Ke, Dawei, and Liu Zhiwei (2000). Clan and State Identification of Local Society: Ideological Basis of Clan Development in South China during Ming and Qing. Historical Research, 2000(3). He, Yuefu (1998). Social Groups in Guangzhou and Their Modern Changes in Late Qing. Modern Chinese History Studies, 1998(2). Hong, Pu (2002). Village, Town, City: Change of Activity Space of Daily Life of South China Landlords in Late Qing and Republican Period. Papers on Chinese History and Geography, 2002(4). Huang, Philip C.C. (2003). Discussion of Paradigm of Chinese Research. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press. Li, Deying (2000). Urban Public Space and Urban Social Life: In Modern City Parks. Urban History Research, Vol. 10, Tianjin: Tianjin Social Science Academy Press. Li, Deying (2003). Social Conflicts in Parks: A Case Study of Urban Parks in Chengdu. Historical Review, 2003(1). Li, Ming (2003). The Evolution of Civil Community in Suzhou and its Modern Significance. Historical Review, 2003(1). Li, Wei (2004). Modern Shanghai Cinema and Urban Public Space (1908–1937). Archives and History, 2004(3). Liu, Chunrong (2000). “Civil Society” and Constitutional Politics: Another Political Reform in Late Qing. Chinese Social Sciences Quarterly (H.K.), 32. Liu, Fengyun (2002). Teahouses in Qing and Their Space of Socialization. Journal of Renmin University of China, 2002(2). Liu, Zenghe (1999). On the Expansion of Public Opinion in Late Qing: Examination Based on Mass Media. Jianghai Academic Journal, 1999(2). Liu, Zenghe (2000). Media Form and the Expansion of Public Sphere in Late Qing. Modern Chinese History Studies, 2000(2). Liu, Zhiwei (1997). Between State and Society: A Study of the Lijia Tax and Military Service System in Guangdong during Ming and Qing. Guangzhou: Sun Yat-sen University Press. Ma, Min (1995). Between Business and Bureau: Modern Merchants in Drastic Social Changes. Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Press. Ma, Min (2003). Historical Research of Chambers of Commerce and New Historiography — A Paradigm Change. Journal of Central China Normal University, 2003(5).

193

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

Zhu Ying Ma, Xiangyuan, Wang Qinyu, and Su Chenxia (2004). Political Interpretation of the Relationship between State and Society in 1911 Revolution. Journal of Pingdingshan Normal College, 2004(6). Ma, Xiaoquan (2001). State and Society: Local Autonomy and Constitutional Reform in Late Qing. Kaifeng: Henan University Press. Min, Jie (2005). Review of Modern Civil Society Study in China for the Last Decade. Historical Review, 2005(1). Mou, Fasong (2006). Where is the “Society” of traditional China: Substitution for Preface to Historical Changes of Han and Tang Dynasty in the Perspective of State and Society. Historical Review, 2006(1). Qiu, Jie (2003). Temple Conference in Guangzhou in Late Qing. Modern Chinese History Studies, 2003(2). Tang, Lixing (1995). Social Changes and the Fangs in Huizhou, in relation to Geographical Society and Traditional China. Historical Research, 1995(1). Tu, Xuehua (1995). On the Nature of Suzhou Civil Community. Jianghai Academic Journal, 1995(3). Wang, Di (1996). The Development of Public Sphere in the Upper Stream of Yangtze River in Late Qing. Historical Research, 1996(1). Wang, Di (2001). Teahouse and Chinese Urban Social Life in Early 20th Century: A Case Study of Chengdu. Historical Research, 2001(5). Wang, Di (2006). Self Account of the Chinese Version, see Street Culture in Chengdu: Public Space, Urban Commoners, and Local Politics, 1870–1930. Beijing: Renmin University of China Press. Wang, Min (2003). “Middle Zone”: Shanghai Journalists in Late Qing and the Constitutional Movement. Academic Monthly, 2003(11). Wang, Xianming and Chang Shuhong (2000). Historical Evolution of Baojia System and the Suburban Power Structure: Changes of State and Society Relation in Suburban Social Control. Journal of Historical Science, 2000(5). Wu, Keda (2003). Care for Reality: Reading of State, Society and the Underprivileged: Social Relief in Republican Period (1927–1949). Oriental Forum, 2003(3). Xiong, Yuezhi (1996). Zhang’s Garden: A Public Space in Late Qing in Shanghai. Archives and History, 1996(6). Xiong, Yuezhi (1998). The Opening of Private Gardens and the Expansion of Public Space in Shanghai in Late Qing. Academic Monthly, 1998(8). Xu, Jilin (2003). Modern China’s Public Sphere: Form, Function and Self-Interpretation: A Case Study of Shanghai. Historical Review, 2003(2). Xu, Songru, Pan Tong, and Xu Ning (2002). A Survey of Theories about and Researches into the Interrelationship between the State, the Public and the Local. Journal of Shanghai Normal University, 2002(6). Xu, Xiaoqun (2001). Chinese Profession and the Republican State: The Rise of Professional Associations in Shanghai, 1912–1937. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

194

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

“State and Society” in Modern China Yang, Nianqun (1995).A Chinese Case in “Civil Society” Study: Review of Two Monographs on Hankou. Chinese Book Review (H.K), 1995(5). Yang, Zhigang (1999). Museum and the Expansion of Public Awareness in Modern China. Fudan Unversity Journal, 1999(3). Yin, Qian (2006). Review of Researches of Freelance Groups in Modern Chinese History. Manuscript. Ying, Junhao (2001). Public Opinion and Northern Government’s Diplomacy: A Research of Shandong Issues in 1919 Paris Conference of Peace. Taipei: History Department of Cheng-chi University. Zhang, Kaiyuan and Ye Wanzhong (1982). Suzhou Civil Community and 1919 Revolution, Series of 1919 Revolution History, Vol. 4. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Zhang, Zhidong (1998). Domestic Researches of Issues about Modern China’s Civil Society: Current Situation and Some Thoughts. Modern Chinese History Studies, 1998(2). Zhao, Shiyu and Deng Qingping (2001). Review and Reflection about the Study of Social History in the 20th Century. Historical Research, 2001(6). Zhou, Qingsong (1998). The Origin of Public Sphere and Local Autonomy. Archives and History, 1998(1). Zhu, Xiaotian (1997). Modern Teahouses in South China and the Operation of Suburban Society. Sociological Studies, 1997(5). Zhu, Ying (1996). Civil Opinions: Influence and Effect of Commerce Chamber Journals in Late Qing and Early Republican Period. Oriental, 1996(2). Zhu, Ying (1997). State and society in Transition: Historical Perspective into Modern Chinese Chambers of Commerce. Wuhan: Central China Normal University Press.

195

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch06

This page intentionally left blank

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–921

Chapter

7

He Baogang2

Abstract The idea of civil society has been the source of contested debates, and has been a dominant discourse in recent Chinese political and ideological life since the late 1980s both in mainland China and Taiwan. The paper describes and explains the emergence and transformation of the ideas of civil society. It analyzes political innovations associated with, 1 The author feels much indebted to Professor Gordon White and other conference participants for their useful comments; to Dr. David Kelly for permitting me to use some of his translation of the article by Deng Zhenglai and Jing Yuejin; to Hang Chih [Chen Chunghsin], Chou Yang-sun, Liang Heng, and Liu Qingfeng for providing me some materials. The paper was written in the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex University in late 1992 and was presented at the conference on “The Future of East Asian Socialism: Eastern Europe or the Four Little Dragons”, Australian National University, January 13–15, 1993. It was published in Issues and Studies, Vol. 31, No. 6 (1995): pp. 24–64. A later discussion on the impact of Chinese semi-civil society, see He Baogang, The Democratic Implications of Civil Society in China (Basingstoke, London: MacMillan & NY: St. Martin Press, 1997). I have also applied the idea of civil society to address the national identity or boundary question, see He Baogang, “The Roles of Civil Society in Defining the Boundary of a Political Community: the Case of South Korea and Taiwan”, Asian Studies Review, Vol. 23, no. 1 (March 1999): pp. 27–48; and “Transnational Civil Society and the National Identity Question in East Asia”, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Vol. 10, No. 2 (May 2004): pp. 227–246. Also I have studied the international dimension of civil society. See He Baogang and H. Murphy, “Global Social Justice at the WTO: The Role of International Non-Governmental Organisations in Constructing Global Social Contracts”, International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 4 (2007): pp. 707–727. 2 He Baogang, Professor, Chair in International Studies, School of International and Political Studies, University of Deakin, Australia.

197

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang and democratic implications of, the conceptual changes of civil society both in mainland China and Taiwan. These conceptual changes can be identified as a shift from the idea of the totalitarian society to the liberal idea of civil society before June 4, 1989, to the antagonist model of civil society as a democratic strategy among some intellectuals overseas after 1989, and then to the mutual support model between the state and civil society since 1992 in mainland China. These changes also involve a shift from the antagonist model of civil society, which was popular in 1986–87, to the Habermasian version of civil society on Taiwan. The discourse on civil society in both Taiwan and mainland China seems to support, confirm and reinforce the key element of the liberal idea of civil society, that is, the necessity of the normative distinction of the state from civil society. It also demonstrates that it is dangerous to believe that all the problems, and all the solutions lie within the body of civil society; the idea of civil society alone cannot offer a solution to all the problems. We need to turn for help from the democratic ideas of constitutionalism, citizenship, and the rule of law; above all, civil society itself has to be democratized. Keywords: Civil society; discourse, the state and society relations, democratization, conceptual changes.

1.

Introduction

Since a growing body of literature in English has already substantially studied the institutions of emergent civil society,3 this chapter undertakes 3 For example, Li Oufan, “The Student’s Perspective: The Road of Chinese Democrati-

zation”, Jiushi niandai (The Nineties) (Hong Kong), August 1989, pp. 64–67; Clemens Stubbe Ostergaard, “Citizens, Groups, and a Nascent Civil Society in China: Towards an Understanding of the 1989 Student Demonstrations”, China Information (Leiden) 4, no. 2 (Autumn 1989): pp. 28–41; Andrew J. Nathan, “Chinese Democracy in 1989: Continuity and Change”, Problems of Communism 38, no. 5 (September-October 1989): pp. 16–29; Jonathan Unger, “Introduction” to The Pro-Democracy Protest in China: Reports from the Provinces (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1991); Thomas B. Gold, “The Party and Civil Society in China”, Zhishifenzi (The Chinese Intellectual) (New York), Fall 1989, pp. 9–14; Thomas B. Gold, “Autonomy Versus Authoritarianism”, in The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen, ed. George Hicks (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 196–211; David Strand, “Protest in Beijing: Civil Society and Public Sphere in China”, Problems of Communism 34, no. 3 (May-June 1990): pp. 1–19; Craig Calhoun, “Tiananmen, Television and the Public Sphere: Internationalization of Culture and the Beijing Spring of 1989”,

198

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

a comparative study of the political dimension of the ideas of civil society both in mainland China and Taiwan. This study of Chinese theories of civil society will help us to understand conceptual changes, political innovations, and political roles of the discourse on civil society in contemporary China. Here, I assume that Chinese intellectual ideas of civil society might be decisive in shaping political and social life and in altering the nature and workings of existing institutions if they are connected to structural forces.4 The chapter focuses on profound and radical conceptual transformation of the idea of civil society in 1986–92 both in mainland China and Taiwan. It has three tasks. The first is to describe and explain the emergence and transformation of the ideas of civil society as employed by writers for different political purposes. The second task is to provide an analysis of changes in the concepts of civil society and an analysis of political innovations associated with these conceptual changes. Finally, the third task is to outline the basic problems associated with the Gramscian version of civil society and the conceptual alternatives suggested by scholars from both mainland China and Taiwan. To achieve the above goals, the chapter adopts a comparative approach and what Terence Ball and James Farr have called a conceptual historical approach.5 To study the political discourse on civil society, I have selected the following variables: The ways in which the notions of civil society are employed, the concrete political problems which the ideas of civil society address, the political motivations of those who use the term “civil society”, the Chinese translations of that Western term, and the concrete political conditions under which the concepts of civil society are employed. Public Culture 2, no. 1 (Fall 1989): pp. 54–71; and Gordon White, “Prospects for Civil Society in China: A Case Study of Xiaoshan City”, Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 29 (January 1993): pp. 63–88. 4 There are signs that the ideas have transformed the behavior of writers such as Wang Juntao, Rong Jian [Lu Yue], Nanfang Shuo, and Hang Chih in the way that they want to be free and independent scholars rather than official ones. However, the paper does not answer the question of how the political discourse on civil society helps to transform people, making them as political agents and citizens and to change political institutions. The issue could not satisfactorily be answered unless some empirical work is done. 5 Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell Hanson, eds., Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Terence Ball, Transforming Political Discourse: Political Theory and Critical Conceptual History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

199

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang

I have gone through major journals and publications in both mainland China and Taiwan. I have selected Zhishifenzi (The Chinese Intellectual), Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century), Zhongguo luntan (China Tribune), and Zhongguo shehui kexue jikan (Chinese Social Sciences Quarterly) (Hong Kong), which has been leading journals in debating over the issue of civil society.6 My selection of the above journals is justifiable in terms of their great volume of works on civil society, but they, nonetheless, constitute a limited representation of all available materials. Also, I give less emphasis to the arguments against the use of civil society7 as those for it in mainland China. The chapter is organized an follows: Section 2 outlines the development of the discourse on civil society before and after June 4, 1989 in mainland China. Section 3 introduces major debates on civil society in Taiwan. Section 4 undertakes a comparative analysis of the discourse on civil society, and brings out the political importance of conceptual changes, and the conceptual importance of political change in both mainland China and Taiwan. We may expect a similar discourse on civil society emerging from the different societies of mainland China and Taiwan, albeit there are significant differences in translating the term “civil society” and in theorizing civil society.

2.

The Discourse on Civil Society in Mainland China before June 4, 1989

Between 1987 and 1989, enormous difficulties were experienced in undertaking economic reforms. One source of resistance against reforms 6 There have been other writers and articles discussing civil society which I have not dis-

cussed here. Also, there are a few Chinese books specifically dealing with the issue of civil society. For example, Chou Yang-sun, “Social Movements and the Party-State in Taiwan: Emerging Civil Society and the Evolving State Corporatist Structures” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1988); Chang Mao-kuei, Shehui yundong yu zhengzhi zhuanhua (Social movements and political transition) (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1989); Hang Chih [Chen Chung-hsin], Maixiang hou-Meilidao de minjian shehui (Toward post-Formosa civil society), 2 vols. (Taipei: Tangshan chubanshe, 1990); Zhang Xueguang, ed., Dangdai Zhongguo de guojia yu shehui guanxi (The relations between the state and society in contemporary China) (Princeton, N.J.: Center for Modern China, 1993). 7 For example, see GanYang, “A Critique of the Concept of Civil Society”, Zhongguo luntan (China Tribune) (Taipei), no. 374 (November 1991): pp. 66–73.

200

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

came from the orthodox ideology. The reforms required theorists to rethink practical problems and to go beyond the Marxist framework. At the same time, the intellectual atmosphere was relatively free due to the soft line of the then leadership. In short, it was an era which demanded new thinking. The idea of civil society arose in this period in order to meet this social need. In Eastern Europe, the following various models have been delineated for the emancipation of civil society: a “new evolutionism” (Adam Michnik); “the power of the powerless” (Vaclav Havel); the formation of a “parallel polis” (Vaclav Benda); the development of a “second society” (ElemÇr Hankiss).8 In mainland China, there have been at least four approaches, albeit overlapping, to formulate the idea of civil society and to rediscover its value since the early 1980s, particularly between 1987 and 1989. The conceptual formulation and transformation was achieved through the following processes and mechanisms: The discovery of the value of civil society; the exposure of the negative consequences of “mass society”; and the criticism of the ostensible incoherences of the dominant official ideology. 1. The reconstructed Marxist approach: Rong Jian,9 Tong Xin, and Yan Qiang10 saw the nature of the reforms as a transformation from a statecentered system to a society-centered system, or in Marx’s terms, from a political to an administrative function of the state. Referencing Marx’s model of the Paris Commune, they argued that the state should give power back to society, which should have final control over state affairs. Separately, Shen Yue showed that Marx’s distinction between “bourgeois” and “civil” society was obliterated in the process of translation, 8 Oleg G. Rumiantsev, “From Confrontation to Social Contract”, Eastern European Politics and Societies 5, no. 1 (Winter 1991): p. 117. 9 Rong Jian [Lu Yue], “The Weakening Tendency of the State’s Political and Economic Functions: From the Point of Relationship between the State and Society”, Zhengzhixue yanjiu (Studies in Political Science) (Beijing), no. 2 (1987): pp. 19–25. Rong Jian was a Ph.D. candidate in the People’s University of China when he wrote the article. He took active part in the Beijing Association of Intellectuals in 1989, and was dismissed from the membership of the Party. After 1989, he was an editor of Tequ shibao in Hainan, and now is a millionaire engaging in property business. 10 Tong Xin and Yan Qiang, “A Leap from State-Centered System to Society-Centered System: More on the Revolutionary Nature of Socialist Reform”, in Lilun zongheng (Theories in length and breadth), ed. Shen Yizhi (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 1988), pp. 146–157.

201

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang

resulting in a general suppression of the second, more evaluatively neutral of these senses.11 Shen Yue’s efforts represented a Chinese Marxist rediscovery of the value of the citizen and civil society in mainland China. 2. The civil discourse approach: Since 1978, Chinese intellectuals such as Jin Guantao, Yan Jiaqi, and Fang Lizhi have established what might be called a new “civil discourse” in mainland China. This signifies an arena in which, despite the existence of an ideological authority, politics and social norms are treated not as givens but as objects of inquiry, dispute, and even rejection.12 New theoretical models of science and knowledge deriving from Western figures like Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and others were catalysts in this intellectual transition. Also, a parallel discourse on “culture” emerged as an arena in which positions could be taken in apparent independence from political constraint. 3. The citizenship approach: Liu Zhiguang and Wang Suli criticized the idea of revolution in mainland China, which is based on the notion of the masses rather than that of citizens. “Masses”, in Liu and Wang’s view, are implicitly subordinate to “cadres” in the social order. The term “masses” carries the sense of a traditional dependency on the state, and does not suggest equal rights as does the libertarian notion of citizen.13 They argued explicitly that the notion of civil society relates to the idea of equal rights, and that the citizen has natural rights independent of the state. They advocated that Chinese people should have a strong consciousness of citizenship, and cited Rousseau to define a citizen as being the free and autonomous individual who makes or shares in the making of the law he or she obeys. Wang Juntao, a major intellectual

11 Shen Yue, “An Examination of Bargerliche Gesellschaft”, Zhexue yanjiu (Philosophical

Research) (Beijing), no. 1 (1990): pp. 44–51. Shen Yue also published an article entitled “Bourgeois Right Should Be Translated as Civil Right”, Tianjin shehui kexue (Tianjin Social Sciences), no. 4 (1986). 12 For the conception of the civil discourse, see Thomas F. Glick, Einstein in Spain: Relativity and the Recovery of Science (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. xi. 13 Liu Zhiguang and Wang Suli, “Moving from ‘Mass Society’ to ‘Civil Society’”, Zhengzhixue yanjiu, no. 5 (1988): pp. 1–5.

202

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

figure in the events of 1989, also emphasized the constitutive role of human rights in his work, On Citizenship.14 4. The neo-authoritarian approach: New authoritarianism may be interpreted as a strong version of the embourgeoisement program, which offers an “express train to modernization” by instituting private property and promoting a flourishing middle class. It emphasizes private property and the protection of economic freedoms by a strong state. This corresponds closely with the economic definition of civil society by economic liberalism in the West. New authoritarianism, however, sets limits on the political dimension of civil society, and allows merely the development of the economic dimension of civil society under the control of new authoritarian government. Democracy would be for the elite only until the authoritarian state felt the time was right to extend it.15 Furthermore, Wu Jiaxiang, an earlier advocate of neoauthoritarianism, argued against what he called “status society” where political status determines income and social benefits. He used the term “profession society” (zhiye shehui) to suggest the direction in which China should go. By “profession society”, Wu means an equal society where distribution of income is based on merit and contribution, and where the individual is liberated from suppression and political power is limited.16 The above review demonstrates that Chinese discussions of civil society tie closely to other ideas or neighboring concepts, such as individualism, rights, private property, market, and citizenship. Thus, a single concept of 14 Wang’s book is cited by Shao Qun, “An Independent Kingdom under the Nose of the Chinese Communist Party”, Zhongguo zhi chun (China Spring) (New York), no. 1 (January 1990): pp. 10–13. See also Min Qi, Zhongguo zhengzhi wenhua: Minzhu zhengzhi nanchan de shehui xinli yinsu (China’s political culture: Sociopsychological factors in the travail of democratic politics) (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1989). This book is dedicated to Wang among others. 15 For further discussion and references, see David Kelly, “Chinese Marxism since Tiananmen: between Evaporation and Dismemberment”, in China in the Nineties: Crisis Management and Beyond, ed. David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 19–34. 16 Wu Jiaxiang, “From Status Society to Profession Society”, Shijie jingji daobao (World Economic Herald) (Shanghai), November 28, 1988, p. 14.

203

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang Table 1.

Discussion of Civil Society and Neighboring Concepts in Economics, 1988–89.

Name

Career

Shen Yue

Department of Economics, Beijing Normal University

Fan Gang

Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Department of Economics, Wuhan University

Zeng Qixian

Zhang Zhanxin, Zhang Wenzhong and Li Fei∗

Title

Main points

“Explorations of Marx’s Theory of the Citizen Economy”a “A Theory of Grey Market”b

Civil economy is not capitalism; China needs to establish civil economic institutions

“Person in Economic Analysis”c

“On the Standard Citizen”d

A justification for “Grey Market” which is similar to Hankiss’ “Second Market” A justification for rational choice theory and an advocacy of methodological individualism Three principles for market: the protection of private property, freedom of contract, and self-responsibility. Taking citizen rights seriously as a starting point

∗ Zhang Zhanxin, a staff in the Research Office of the Beijing Municipal Government; Zhang

Wenzhong in the State Council’s Research Center for Economic, Technological, and Social Development; Li Fei in the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Bureau for Translation of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin’s Works. Sources: a Jingji yanjiu (Economic Research) (Beijing), no. 2 (1988): pp. 19–26. b Ibid., no. 8: pp. 3–11. c Ibid., no. 5 (1989): pp. 3–10. d Ibid., no. 7: pp. 45–52.

civil society can hardly be traced without reference, however briefly, to other concepts. We are, therefore, required to look for the essence of the concept of civil society in the overall structure of the Chinese intellectual theoretical writings within a multidisciplinary framework (see Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4). These tables show that the idea of civil society figures out in Chinese theoretical constellations. To summarize, while Liu Zhiguang and Wang Suli used gongmin shehui in 1988 and Shen Yue shimin shehui in 1986 and 1990, other writers 204

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92 Table 2.

Discussion of Civil Society and Neighboring Concepts in Philosophy, 1987–89.

Name

Career

Lu Yue Institute of (Rong Jian) Marxism-Leninism, People’s University of China (PUC)

Xin Xiangyang

Department of International Politics, PUC

Bao Zonghao and Yao Jianjian

Department of Politics and Education, Shanghai Normal University Department of Economics, Beijing Normal University

Shen Yue

Title

Main points

“The Weakening Tendency of the State’s Political and Economic Functions: From the Point of Relationship Between State and Society”a “On the Identification of State and Society from the View of the Relationship Between the Two”b “Commodity Economy and the Evolution of the Concept of Human Rights”c “An Examination of ‘Bargerliche Gesellschaft’”d

“Weak state” is a result of reform; the state should be weaker; and society should control the state

A critique of Lu Yue; the state should be stronger

Commodity economy creates and demands the idea of human rights Three ways in which “Bargerliche Gesellschaft” was used by Marx; rediscovery of the value of civil society in China

Sources: a Zhexue yanjiu (Philosophical Research) (Beijing), no. 2 (1987): pp. 19–25. b Ibid., no. 1 (1988): pp. 3–9. c Ibid., no. 5 (1989): pp. 19–25, 26–27. d Ibid., no. 1 (1990): pp. 44–51. As Shen’s article was published in early 1990, it still can be counted in this table.

such as Wu Jiaxiang, Fan Gang, and Rong Jian did not use such terms to discuss civil society, but employed other terms such as “profession society”, “grey market”, and “a centered-society”. These terms — “profession society”, “grey market” and “a centered-society” — do not directly discuss the very idea of civil society. But they reflect Chinese intellectual rethinking of the negative aspects of the Maoist totalitarian society, and express basic ingredients of the liberal notion of civil society, such as individual rights, individual autonomy, voluntary associations, public sphere, and free 205

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang Table 3. Discussion of Civil Society and Neighboring Concepts in Political Science, 1988–89. Name

Career

Liu Zhiguang

Zhuozhou Oil Evening University, Hebei

Jia Ting and Wan Kaicheng

(unknown)

Wan Bin

Department of History, Beijing Normal University

Liang Zhiping

Department of Law, PUC

Title

Main points

“Moving from ‘Mass A rejection of Society’ to ‘Civil totalitarian society; Society’”a an advocacy of civil society “The Rise and An empirical study of Development of the formation, basic Private features, and Entrepreneur tendency of private Stratum in China”b entrepreneurs in rural areas “A New Perspective An investigation of on Social Contract why and how to Theory”c apply social contract theory in China “Family and the A study of the reasons State: Rethinking why China did not Traditional have civil society Chinese Legal rather than a mixture Culture”d of family and the state

Sources: a Zhengzhixue yanjiu (Studies in Political Science) (Beijing), no. 5 (1988): pp. 1–5. b Ibid., pp. 6–18. c Ibid., no. 1 (1989): pp. 42–49. d Ibid., no. 2: pp. 1–10.

enterprise.17 This was also true of the writers Shen Yue, Liu Zhiguang, and Wang Suli who used the works of Marx and Rousseau respectively. Importantly, civil society as a political goal was set up; that is, a civil society independent of the state was envisioned in which the power of the state would be limited. Drawing on the above facts, I claim that a liberal notion of civil society, being defined as individual rights, individual autonomy, voluntary associations, public sphere, and free enterprise, dominated the discussions of 1987–89; and that there was a conceptual shift from the idea of the totalitarian society to the liberal idea of civil society. 17 The liberal concept of civil society, in my mind, is a kind of John Locke’s idea of civil

society. See Zbigniew Rau, “Some Thoughts on Civil Society in Eastern Europe and the Lockean Contractarian Approach”, Political Studies, 35 (1987): pp. 573–592.

206

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92 Table 4.

Discourse on Civil Society in Multidisciplines.

Disciplines

The issue discussed

Philosophy

Political Science

Economics

Table 5.

Separation between the state and society; society is source for legitimation of the state and should control the state; the consciousness of citizen’s rights; and the value of civil society To establish civil society as a political goal; to make a social contract is a way to regulate the relationship between the state and civil society; and cultural reasons why the state and society infused together in China The value of the civil economy, institutions, and second market; justifications for individualist methodology and citizen’s rights

Articles on Civil Society After June 4, 1989. Journal Zhishifenzi

Total articlesb Number of articles on civil societyc Proportion of total articles

Ershiyi shiji

1989a

1990

1991

1992

1990

1991

1992

12 2

58 0

54 3

47 1

32 0

90 8

80 1

16.7%

0%

5.6%

2.1%

0%

8.89%

1.3%

Notes: a The mainland issue of 1989 is excluded. b Comments, dialogue, editorials, and reviews are excluded. cArticles which mention the term “civil society”, but have no substantial content are also excluded.

2.1. The overseas discourse on civil society after 1989 Following June 4, 1989, discussion of civil society in mainland China fell nearly silent.Yet, Chinese journals overseas have been continuing to discuss the issue of civil society (see Tables 5, 6 and 7). Ershiyi shiji was designed by editors such as Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng to advance Chinese cultural reconstruction; one topic addressed

207

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang Table 6. Name

Discussion of Civil Society in Erhshiyi shiji.

Career

Zhu Ying

Wuhan Huazhong Normal university Ambrose Y. C. Chinese King university of Hong Kong (CUHK) Independent Hang Chih scholar (Chen Chung-hsin) Wang Tunghai Chen-huan University Hsia Chu-jiu

NTU

Shih Yuan-kan CUHK

Wang Yale Chao-kuang University

Tang Zhencheng

Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences

Title

Main points

“Merchants and Civil The rise of merchants and Society in the Late their associations, the effect Qing”a of these on social and political lives “Weber and Modern There was lack of civil society State-Building in in Chinese tradition, the China”b importance of civil society

“Taiwan Facing Up How to establish institutional to Its Historic compromise and a liberal Challenge”d civil society “The Emergent Civil A study of weak and fragile Society and Its civil society in Taiwan Limitation”e “Is the Taiwan City a A critique of the urban policy which resulted in Taiwan Civil Society?”f cities without citizens “Civil Society vs. the Civil society links to State Policy of modernity, principles of Encouraging civil society, and the Agriculture and problems with Chinese Restraining modernization Commerce”g “Some Reflections A conceptual clarification and on Civil Society”h review of civil society, a call for cautious use of the term “civil society” “Civil Consciousness The rise of civil and Shanghai consciousness, local Society”i self-government, and political participation in Shanghai in modern China

Sources: a Erhshiyi shiji (Twenty-first Century) (Hong Kong), no. 3 (1991): pp. 37– 44. b Ibid., pp. 56–72. c Ibid., no. 5: pp. 36–40. d Ibid., pp. 41–53. e Ibid., no. 5 (1990): pp. 57–67. f Ibid., no. 5 (1991): pp. 73–85. g Ibid., no. 6: pp. 105–120. h Ibid., no. 8: pp. 102–114. i Ibid., no. 11 (1992): pp. 11–23.

208

Aug. 11, 2010

Name

Career

Discussion of Civil Society in Zhishifenzi . Title

Thomas B. Gold Center for Chinese Studies, “The Party and Civil Society in University of California, Berkeley China”a Jacek Kuroñ A key adviser to Solidarity “Polish Civil Society”b

Main Points

Visiting Fellow, Princeton University “Misleading Concept of ‘Clan Society’ and the Reconstruction of Civil Society in China”d (Unknown) “Civil Society and Totalitarian State”e Emerging civil society has been challenging the Chinese totalitarian state Currently Assistant Professor at “The Effects of Economic Reforms on The power of the state is weakening, social Colby College, Maine the Changing Relations Between the autonomy is increasing, but there is no State and Society in China”f civil society in China Scholar from mainland China “The Third Way of the Chinese Social associations should share power at Political Reform: Share Power with local level, which should be encouraged People”g by the state

Zhao Suisheng

Zhao Jialin

209

Sources: a Zhishifenzi (The Chinese Intellectual) (New York), (Fall 1989): pp. 9–14. English translation of the article published in Journal of Democracy 1, no. 1 (1990): pp. 18–31. b Ibid., pp. 22–23. English translation of the article published in Journal of Democracy 1, no. 1 (1990): pp. 72–74. c Ibid., (Spring 1991): pp. 8–15. d Ibid., (Summer 1991): pp. 23–30. e Ibid., pp. 38–44. f Ibid., (Winter 1992): pp. 21–26. g Ibid., Summer 1992, pp. 3–7.

b978-ch07

Chen Kuide

9in x 6in

Visiting Prof., Harvard University Research Fellow, Australian National University Ph.D. student

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

To apply the concept of civil society in explaining Chinese history since 1949 Through civil society a totalitarian system can be overthrown The growth of civil society is a long-term trend in China; the 1989 democracy movement can be seen in terms of conflict between the state and an emerging civil society A critique of a mode of collective society; three ways to reestablish civil society

Su Shaozhi Barrett L. McCormick Xiao Xiaoming

Xu Xianglin

“The 1989 Democracy Movement: A Review of the Prospects for Civil Society in China”c

7:29

Table 7.

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang

therein is the issue of civil society. This is well expressed by Yu Yingshih, a leading historian in Chinese intellectual circles, who states that the reconstruction of civil society will be the most important issue in the next century in China.18 Both Ambrose Y. C. King and Shih Yuan-kang point out that the basic problem associated with Chinese modernization is the issue of how to deal with civil society. Also, while Zhu Ying identifies the existence of civil society and its close relationship to commerce, Tang Zhenchang investigates the emergent idea of citizenship (no taxation without representation) in Shanghai in the early part of this century. Most articles on civil society focus on the cultural dimension of civil society concerning cultural values, consciousness, and historical traditions.19 This may be due to the moderate editorial policy of Ershiyi shiji. Contrarily, Zhishifenzi20 focuses on the political dimension of civil society: How to establish a political civil society against the backdrop of a Chinese totalitarian system. The following three issues are major concerns of this journal: 1. Is there a civil society in China? Su Shaozhi, Barret McCormick, and Xiao Xiaoming21 argue that ten years of economic reform have begun to erode the rigid controls that the state violently imposed on society during the initial phase of Stalinism. They further argue that whether civil society is defined as an autonomous organization, entrepreneurial activity, or autonomous public discourse, there is clear evidence of the beginnings of civil society in contemporary China.22 In line with the above argument, 18 See Yu Ying-shih, “Picking Up the Pieces for a New Start”, Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-first

Century) (Hong Kong), no. 2 (1990): pp. 5–7. Tu Wei-ming calls for overseas Chinese to do their best to establish “a civil society”. See Jiushi niandai, February 1990, pp. 56–57. 19 Four articles on civil society by Taiwanese scholars did provide the political dimension of civil society, which will be discussed in the next section. 20 The journal was established on October 5, 1984 and edited by Chinese but published abroad. It once managed to publish one issue in early 1989 in mainland China. Currently, 7,000 copies go into mainland China, 3,000 abroad. 21 Su Shaozhi, Barret McCormick, and Xiao Xiaoming have briefly discussed the discourse on civil society in mainland China. See “The 1989 Democratic Movement: A Review of the Prospects for Civil Society in China”, Zhishifenzi (Spring 1991): pp. 8–15. English version of this article was enlarged and published in Pacific Affairs 65, no. 2 (Summer 1992): pp. 182–201. 22 Ibid.

210

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

Xu Xianglin describes how economic reforms and political liberalization policies facilitated and created civil society. He also warns that it is too early and would even be a historical mistake to put this newborn civil society in a struggle against the current political regime.23 On the other hand, Zhao Suisheng argues that there have been great changes in the relationship between the state and society in that the state’s power has decreased while social consciousness and space have increased in the past decade. However, according to Zhao, these changes do not imply that there is a civil society in mainland China. He asserts that at the moment there is no civil society in mainland China in the sense that Chinese society has no ability to combine all social forces to make itself a powerful counterbalance against the state.24 Chen Kuide also argues that only when social associations and organizations at grassroots level, operating according to international rules, permeate the whole nation of China, can a civil society be brought about.25 2. The debate over the value of civil society: Peng Wenyi argues that the economic success in East Asia was attributable to what he calls “clan society” (shizu shehui) rather than civil society. By “clan society” Peng means a traditional Chinese society where collectivism, collective identity, respect for old people, and emphasis on harmony are the major means to resolve social conflicts, and where individualism, individual rights, trade unions, and legal regulation do not play major roles.26 Chen Kuide rejects Peng’s idea with the following two arguments: (1) Theoretically, Peng misunderstands the notion of civil society held by Chinese intellectuals. Peng’s idea of civil society focuses on cultural values, ideology, and social behavior, whereas Chinese intellectuals understand civil society as a social space independent of political power. (2) Practically, Peng’s idea is misleading in the 23 Xu Xianglin, “Civil Society and Totalitarian State”, Zhishifenzi, (Summer 1991):

pp. 38–44. 24 Zhao Suisheng, “The Effects of Economic Reforms on the Changing Relations Between

the State and Society”, ibid. (Winter 1992): pp. 21–26. 25 Chen Kuide, “The Misleading Concept of ‘Clan Society’ and the Reconstruction of Civil Society in China”, ibid. (Summer 1991): p. 30. 26 See Peng Wenyi, “Clan Society and Civil Society”, originally published in Jiushi niandai, and cited by Chen, in “The Misleading Concept”, p. 23.

211

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang

sense that there is no such “clan society” and the economic success in EastAsia was due to two basic institutional factors: The protection of private property and free contracts. More importantly, according to Chen, what the “clan society” favors is exactly a totalitarian system in China because there is no distinction between “clan” and totalitarian society. 3. How to establish civil society in China? Chen Kuide suggests three measures for reconstructing civil society in China: (1) To further weaken the central power of the totalitarian system and to gradually strengthen the autonomy of provincial economic and political powers; this is what Wu Jialong27 calls “a strategy of weakening central government and strengthening provincial governments”; (2) to develop the stabilizing forces of economic organizations at grassroots level; and (3) to establish an alternative political force from below.28 Zhao Suisheng feels that China lacks a strong middle class. He, therefore, suggests that Chinese intellectuals should play the role of the middle class on the road to the construction of civil society in China.29 To summarize, June 4, 1989 was a dividing line. After that, the overseas discussion of civil society did not need a Marxist coat. The major issue was not whether China needed a liberal model of civil society, but how to establish civil society and how to employ civil society as a strategy to push further democratization.30 Significantly, civil society appeared as an explicit political goal, clear in its own right. The autonomous organizations and Chinese intellectuals overseas validated each other, linking up in a self-referring civil society in the strong sense (B type) as used by 27 Wu Jialong, “How to Craft China: More on the Transition from Autocracy to Democracy”,

Minzhu Zhongguo (Democratic China) (Paris), no. 4 (October 1990): pp. 27–28. 28 Chen, “The Misleading Concept”, pp. 23–30. 29 Zhao, “The Effects of Economic Reforms”, pp. 25–26. 30Yu Dahai, currently president of the Chinese Alliance for Democracy, puts his hope in civil

society. See Zhongguo zhichun, no. 9 (September 1992): p. 3. Liang Heng outlines democratic strategies which include strengthening civil society. See Liang Heng, “Strategies for Change in China”, Journal of Democracy 2, no. 3 (Summer 1991): pp. 89–93. Su Xiaokang accepts civil society as a democratic strategy, but doubts its power in democratization. See Su Xiaokang, “The Vapid Life of Civil Society”, Minzhu Zhongguo, no. 8 (1992): pp. 1–3.

212

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

Timothy Garton Ash.31 This may be a solid foundation for a transition from the half-baked pseudo-political reforms, which were being carried out by the party-state apparatus, to a conscious alternative: The construction of independence movements.

2.2. The revival of the discourse on civil society after 1992 Zhongguo shehui kexue jikan, a new journal, was established in Hong Kong by Deng Zhenglai, editor-in-chief, from mainland China in late 1992. A number of articles published by the journal have discussed the notion of civil society from the aspects of intellectual origin, conceptual clarification, reform, and Confucianism.32 Among these, an article by Deng Zhenglai, a freelance writer, and JingYuejin, an associate professor at the People’s University of China, is particularly worthy of reading and reviewing. They call for elimination of some conceptual misunderstandings about the notion of civil society. One error, according to Deng and Jing, is to hold that stressing the independence and autonomy of civil society is to deny the role of the state. This reflects confusion about the necessity of state intervention and its rational boundary. To suggest the independence and autonomy of civil society is not to deny the necessity of state intervention, but rather to attempt to draw a boundary from the state. Another error, in Deng and Jing’s view, is to hold that civil society is antagonistic or resistant to the state; this idea arises from the “people vs. officialdom” mentality of China’s traditional culture. Civil society does indeed function to prevent the excessive augmentation 31 For Ash, civil society describes two different things: (1) the entire range of social asso-

ciations, ties, and activities independent of the state, from glee clubs to Charter 77, from samizdat to breviaries, and from private farmers to homosexuals; and (2) more narrowly, and more politically, the products of that strategy of “social self-organization” that was, broadly speaking, adopted by the democratic opposition in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in the mid- to late-1970s. For them, the reestablishment of “civil society” was both an end in itself and a means to political change, including change in the nature of the state. See Timothy Garton Ash, The Uses of Adversity (London: Granta Books, 1989), p. 246. 32 Deng Zhenglai and Jing Yuejin, “Constructing Chinese Civil Society”, Zhongguo shehui kexue jikan (Chinese Social Sciences Quarterly) (Hong Kong), no. 1 (November 1992): pp. 58–68; Sun Liping, “The Structural Differentiation of the State from Society”, ibid., pp. 69–76; Deng Zhenglai, “Civil Society and the State”, ibid., no. 3 (May 1993): pp. 60– 71; Jiang Qing, “Confucian Culture: The Rich Source for Constructing Chinese Type of Civil Society”, ibid., pp. 170–75.

213

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang

of state power. However, its aim in doing so is not to resist the state, but to preserve a necessary balance within the dualistic structure of the state and civil society. Deng and Jing support a “theory of benign interaction” between civil society and the state. Under such a scenario, the state’s role with regard to civil society has two aspects: First, the state recognizes the independence of the latter and provides institutional legal guarantees for it, giving it a legitimate field of action; next, the state carries out necessary interference and regulation over civil society. This, for Deng and Jing, is because civil society is no heaven on earth, nor is it an iron bar. It contains within itself complicated relationships of different interests and value orientations; competition for resources and over interests is intense and cruel; the distribution of income, property rights, and the free space of individual choice, etc., may also be extremely unequal. Thus, the state’s intervention is required, but there are rational limits to the intervention and regulation of the state. For example, the state’s intervention and regulation is carried out not through political techniques, but rather through legal and economic ones. Deng and Jing also advocate the self-limiting strategy of civil society. They assert, To guarantee the unimpeded development of Chinese civil society, we think two extreme tendencies should be avoided when we think about its construction: first, is the tendency toward inordinately participating in politics while civil society is yet to mature to the point of operating on its own according to the contractual regulations so as to become a force for a stable social order, and while civil society has not yet, having become properly independent of the state, gone further to overcome the subservience and dependency which characterizes it due to the precedence of the economy over democracy. Next, avoid applying Chinese traditional views of folk society (minjian shehui) as a guide to the construction of Chinese civil society, as this easily causes this construction to return in the impetuous overheated emotion to the single track of “people vs. the officials”, blocking the formation of benign interaction between the state and civil society and thus slowing progress toward democracy.33

This line of thinking of Deng and Jing is exactly the same as the idea of self-limiting civil society described by Zbigniew Rau, a Polish political scientist who said long ago that there is a need for political calculations in 33 Deng and Jing, “Constructing Chinese Civil Society”, p. 66.

214

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

order to avoid activities which could cause the state to institute repression and so jeopardize the extent of the independence which civil society has already achieved.34 The concrete strategy of constructing Chinese civil society is, Deng and Jing suggest, to adopt a rational, gradual two-step approach, or twophase development. The first is the formative phase, during which the state and members of civil society act together. While the state instigates further reforms from the top, it speeds up changes in government functions, actively and gradually ceding social and economic domains in which it ought not to interfere, and members of society fully utilize the beneficial conditions and opportunities of reform consciously, rationally to promote the building of civil society from the bottom up. Activity in this phase is mainly concentrated and expressed in the economic domain. The second is the maturation phase, during which members of society, while continuing to develop and perfect themselves. Gradually enter the “public sphere”,35 participate in and influence state policies, and set up positive interactive relationships with the state. In short, scholars such as Deng Zhenglai and Jing Yuejin who still live in mainland China have a different emphasis and have learned the lesson from the 1989 student demonstrations that the advocacy of the antagonism between the state and civil society would do harm to China. Thus, Deng and Jing have rejected the antagonist model of civil society and suggested a model of civil society which emphasizes the compatibly mutual supportive relationship between the state and civil society.

3.

The Discourse on Civil Society in Taiwan

3.1. The first debate over civil society in 1986–87 36 In the second half of 1986, Taiwan undertook an initial move toward democratization. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was established on 34 See note 15 above. 35 Deng and Jing, “Constructing Chinese Civil Society”, p. 66. 36 This section uses the materials from Tsai Chi-ta, “A History of the Idea of Civil Soci-

ety: An Investigation of the Discussions of Anti-Hegemony”, Zhongguo luntan, no. 336 (September 25, 1989): pp. 23–29; and Ho Fang, “From Civil Society to Populism”, Dangdai (Contemporary) (Taipei), no. 47 (1990): pp. 39–52.

215

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang

September 28, 1986. It was against this new backdrop that Nanfang Shuo initially opened a discussion of civil society. In line with the opposition party, Nanfang applied the Gramscian model of civil society, which refers, in Nanfang’s understanding, to (1) political opposition movements or parties; (2) any social movements independent of the control of state; and (3) the private sector or entrepreneurs. All these are in the struggle against the hegemony of the state. Nanfang’s use of the Gramscian concept of the civil society rubric has come in for heavy criticism. One charge is that Nanfang misunderstands Gramsci.37 However, the matter is not whether Nanfang correctly understands Gramsci, but his political use of the Gramscian model. There, according to Ho Fang, were three practical purposes. First, the idea of civil society was employed to wage a “Taiwanese war of opposition” against the Kuomintang’s (KMT’s) hegemony. Second, the idea of civil society was used to underpin a political strategy which attempted to unify all the social forces against the KMT. It was also a device intended to divert attention away from the sensible issue of the independence of Taiwan from mainland China. Compared with the moderate nature of the strategy adopted in Eastern Europe in the late 1970s, Nanfang’s civil society as a strategy was very radical in the way it attempted to overthrow the KMT’s hegemony. In the East European strategy, civil society was envisaged as a sphere of autonomous, ostensibly nonpolitical, social activity which did not seek to challenge the state’s control over the main levers of power and, indeed, obtained its status through a tacit social contract with the authorities of the ruling party-state.38 Third, the idea of civil society was used to argue for a privatization policy against state capitalism. Nanfang, in a radical way, promoted the “auctioning of the Republic of China”.39 37 Sun Shan-hao, “Minjian Shehui and Wenming Shehui: Taiwanese Theory of Civil Society

Misunderstands Gramsci”, Zhongguo luntan, no. 336 (September 25, 1989): pp. 30–33; Li Hsiao-ti, “Revisit Civil Society: From Hegel to Gramsci”, ibid., no. 340 (November 25, 1989): pp. 73–80. 38 R. F. Miller, ed., Development of Civil Society in the Communist Countries (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), Introduction, pp. 5–6. 39 Nanfang Shuo, “Auction the Republic of China”, Qianjin (Forward), no. 7 (1986); Nanfang Shuo, “New Social Movement inTaiwan”, Zhongguo luntan, no. 269 (December 10, 1986): pp. 36–40; Jiang Xun, “A Defense of Civil Society”, Nanfang (The South), no. 10 (1988): p. 36; Mu Yu, “From Civil Philosophy to a Theory of Civil Society”, ibid.,

216

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

The first reaction to Nanfang did not come from the KMT, rather from the left-wing Marxist intellectuals. They argued against Nanfang’s misuse of civil society in Taiwan for the following reasons: (1) It is misleading to reduce the social contradictions to the conflict between the state and people; (2) Nanfang’s idea that the state and civil society should be separate and that different social classes should find their own representatives in the existing system is a “liquidationist” view, which does not aim to control the state; and (3) Nanfang’s privatization policy does not favor the poor, rather that it provides lip service for the bourgeois class. In short, Nanfang’s idea of civil society remains in the bourgeois framework of thinking.40

3.2. The second debate in 1989 In 1989, Zhongguo luntan organized a seminar on how we see civil society in Taiwan. Then the KMT had already lifted martial law and restrictions on newspapers. Also a total of 18 social movements emerged to demand more autonomy from the state. However, some of the social as well as opposition movements involved violent demonstrations. This discredited the idealized notion of civil society, which assumes that once civil society is established, a harmonious and democratic society would occur. In reality, civil society had become the realm of potentially and actually disruptive conflicts among competing interests and behavioral traditions. The question thus was how to prevent the negative actions of civil society, and to establish a healthy civil society. If the task assigned to civil society by Nanfang Shuo had been to overthrow the KMT’s rule in 1986, the task assigned to civil society in 1989 was substantially different: Its role was to be constitutive and preservative of the fragile democracy, given that the KMT was willingly promoting democracy. Against this background, the Gramscian model of civil society was challenged by different writers in various aspects. The central issue focused on whether the strategy of the deliberate use of confrontation between the state and civil society is valid in political and social life. For the articles dealing with the above issues, see Table 8. no. 10; Lu Kuang, “The Rise of Civil Consciousness”, Zhongguo luntan, no. 302 (April 25, 1988): p. 30, all cited in Tsai, “A History of the Idea of Civil Society”, and Ho, “From Civil Society to Populism”. 40 See Tsai, “A History of the Idea of Civil Society”, pp. 26–27.

217

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang Table 8. Name Chou Yang-sun (Tsou Chin)

Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao

Huang His-ju

Tsai Chi-ta

Sun Shan-hao

Shih Ssu-hung

Discussion of Civil Society in Zhongguo luntan.

Career NTU

Title

“The Autonomy of the State and Theory of Civil Society: Reflections on Theory and Experience”a “The Anti-Control Institute of Feature of Civil Ethnology, Society: To Define Academia the Nature of Social Sinica Movements”b “Political Freedom and Economic Justice: To Define a Historical Role of Social Movements”c “The Autonomy of the Ph.D. student, State and Civil Purdue Society: Introducing University Relative Theories and Studies”d Graduate student, “A History of the idea of Civil Society: An Fu Jen Catholic Investigation of the University Discussions of Anti-Hegemony”e “Minjian Shehui and Ph.D. student, Wenming Shehui: Free University, Taiwanese Theory of Berlin Civil Society Misunderstands Gramsci”f Free-lance writer Populism: Beyond the State vs. Civil society”g

Main points The state should maintain autonomy against the control of the bourgeois class over civil society

The nature of social movements is against the hegemony of the state

The aim of the autonomy of social movements should be seen as a search for political freedom and economic justice A review of theories of the state and society

A review of the development of the discourse in civil society in Taiwan

A charge that Nanfang Shuo misunderstands Gramsci

An introduction of neo-Marxist theory of the state and civil society; to replace the Gramsci model with populism (Continued)

218

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92 Table 8. Name

Career

Hsu Chin-yu Graduate student, NTU

Li Hsiao-ti

Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica

(Continued) Title

Main points

“The Residents movement and Populism: A Challenge to the Framework of the State vs. Civil Society”h “Revisit Civil Society: From Hegel to Gramsci”i

To interpret the residents movement as a new effort to establish a genuinely healthy civil society

A clarification of the concepts of civil society by Hegel and Gramsci; and a critique of Gramsci

Sources: a Zhongguo luntan (China Tribune) (Taipei), no. 316 (November 25, 1988): pp. 34– 37. b Ibid., no. 331 (July 10, 1989): pp. 60–64. c Ibid., no. 332 (July 25, 1989): pp. 65–70. d Ibid., no. 331 (July 10, 1989): pp. 72–80. e Ibid., no. 336 (September 25, 1989): pp. 23– 29. f Ibid., pp. 30–33. g Ibid., pp. 34–42. h Ibid., pp. 43–47. i Ibid., no. 340 (November 25, 1989): pp. 73–80.

Below I summarize the various challenges in the three categories: Theoretical, practical, and strategic problems associated with the Gramscian notion of civil society in Taiwan. Theoretical problems: Let us first look at the discourse on civil society in Eastern Europe. Civil society first was used as an anti-politics strategy. The Solidarity movement was interpreted as a struggle of society against the state.41 When the members of Solidarity came to power in 1989, a new problem arose: Those who were the members of civil society now became officers of the state. This led to the disappearance of the demarcation between the state and civil society. As Piccone put it: Upon taking power, civil society ideologists quickly adjusted to corporatist politics dictated by the communist power structure (in Poland). Then, after it became obvious that there were no Soviet tanks propping up the various local communist regimes, they rediscovered the virtues of politics-as-usual, while attempting, like the careless sorcerer’s apprentice, to control the demonic forces they have unwittingly released. The major 41Andrew Arato, “Civil Society Against the State”, Telos 47 (Spring 1981): pp. 23–24.

219

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang

components of the long-projected reconstitution of an autonomous civil society, the working classes, are now increasingly joining forces with the remnants of the old bureaucratic apparatus to contain the detrimental consequences of these economic reforms necessary for dismantling the system of central planning.42 This problem also occurred in Taiwan in 1989. When some members of the DPP came to power at the local governmental level, some writers such as Ho Fang started to question the validity of Nanfang Shuo’s concept of civil society: What so-called civil society became a part of the state’s apparatus?43 The demarcation between the state and so-called civil society disappeared. Chang Mao-kuei points out that Nanfang Shuo’s idea of civil society presupposes a unified and simplified view of the state and society; that is, the state is regarded by Nanfang as one thing so that there is no distinction between the state’s apparatus and its policies.44 Ka Wei-po further argues, framing complex relationships as a simple confrontation between the state and civil society results in ignoring concrete, differentiated relationships and the interests of the particular disadvantaged groups. The contradiction between the farmers who want to prohibit U.S. fruit imports and the consumers who demand cheaper fruit is dissolved in the abstract notion of civil society. Among the new social movements, some, such as the program for privatization of state enterprises, demand that the state not interfere in the market economy. Some demand that the state should use its political power to redistribute social welfare. The idea that the state power has to be limited is misleading in that it blurs distinctions among different social movements and domination relationships (e.g., class, sex, and ethnicity).45

42 Paul Piccone, “Paradoxes of Perestroika”, ibid., 84 (Summer 1990): p. 15. Also see Jean

L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). 43 For this charge, see Ho, “From Civil Society to Populism”, pp. 39–52. 44 Chang, Shehui yundong yu zhengzhi zhuanhua. 45 See the proceedings of the workshop on “How to Look at Civil Society”, Zhongguo luntan, no. 336 (September 25, 1989): pp. 7–22. The symposium was chaired by Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, and attended by Wang Chen-huan of Tunghai University; Ka Wei-po, a freelance writer; and Nanfang Shuo, editor-in-chief of Xin xinwen (The Journalist).

220

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

Again, as Wang Chen-huan argues, the application of the Western notion blurs distinctions between Taiwanese and Western modes of civil society. In the West, social movements demand more free space and more autonomy of civil society, and further limitation on the state’s power. In contrast, Taiwanese social movements demand more commercialization; for example, the fishermen want compensation, and workers high emolument.46 Practical problems: The major problem is that the violent tendency of some political and social movements threatened the transformation from a neo-authoritarian state to democracy. Chou Yang-sun, professor of political science at National Taiwan University, argues that if the authority of the KMT continuously declines, the autonomy of the state will further lessen and the influence of the capitalists in the state will advance. As a result, the confrontation between capitalist and populist sectors (i.e., working class, local residents, farmers, and consumers) will become much more serious.47 The essence of Chou’s argument is that intentional conceptual innovations for democracy by Nanfang Shuo’s group often yield unintentional consequences which lead to the destruction of democracy in Taiwan. Chou’s argument raises the questions of internal tensions within civil society, and of whether bourgeois society will be dominant over the state and civil society in the near future.48 The solution suggested by Chou is that the state should maintain and strengthen its autonomy and neutrality. There is also a need for some kind of balance between the state and civil society. Strategic problems: Ka Wei-po argues that the theoretical antagonism between the state and civil society may produce a dangerously one-sided strategy in practice. Disadvantaged groups and other strategies may be 46 Ibid., and Wang Chen-huan, “The Emergent Civil Society and Its Limitation”, Ershiyi

shiji, no. 5 (1990): pp. 57–67. 47 Chou, “Social Movements and the Party-State in Taiwan”, p. 270; and Chou Yang-sun

(the pen name was Tsou Chin), “The Autonomy of the State and Theory of Civil Society: Reflections on Theory and Experience”, Zhongguo luntan, no. 316 (November 25, 1988): pp. 34–37. 48 Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao disagrees with Chou’s conceptualization of the “bourgeois society” and argues that the analysis of social movements should go beyond the class analysis. See Hsiao, “The Anti-Control Feature of Civil Society: To Define the Nature of Social Movements”, Zhongguo luntan, no. 331 (July 10, 1989): p. 64.

221

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang

overlooked. Even worse, in the name of so-called collective interests of all social movements against the hegemony of the KMT, disadvantaged groups such as women and labor were asked by Nanfang Shuo to sacrifice their interests.49 Thus Ka Wei-po suggests, we need a new theoretical framework to analyze the strategy for disadvantaged groups. Furthermore, Nanfang’s strategy was politicized. Any social movement, according to Nanfang, has to connect with the political movement. Thus, this politicized strategy, as Hsu Chin-yu argues, undermines the autonomy of the social movement and overstresses the importance of the role of polity.50 The weakness of the anti-state strategy in the thesis of the polarity of the state and civil society also ignores that regulation by the state is significant both in the West and East. It also does not provide a solid intellectual foundation for liberal policy. It cannot precisely meet the task that a democratic movement should progress from more or less radical slogans and requirements to the formulation of the foundations of a liberal policy. In short, all the criticisms challenge the validity of the Gramscian concept of civil society being applied in Taiwan. And the theoretical, practical, and strategic problems require resolution, as Ka Wei-po and Wang Chenhuan suggest, by the elimination of the antithesis of the state-civil society scheme. Just as the Gramscian project was obsolete, once the objective of the transfer of “hegemony” was no longer the establishment of proletarian class’ rule, the Gramscian idea of civil society was useless in Taiwan after the lifting of martial law, because various confrontational relations and the operation of power exist within civil society.

3.2.1. Nanfang Shuo’s defense Nanfang Shuo justifies on anti-state strategy in the following arguments: (1) The supremacy of the state over civil society has been a major source of difficulty for democracy; thus the state first needs to be dismantled; (2) The state has penetrated into all aspects of society in Taiwan; any social movement, therefore, by nature, is against the supremacy and penetration 49 See note 45 above. 50 Hsu Chin-yu, “The Residents Movement and Populism: A Challenge to the Framework

of the State vs. Civil Society”, Zhongguo luntan, no. 336 (September 25, 1989): pp. 43–47.

222

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

of the power of the state.51 In this sense, Nanfang claims that most social movements are indeed anti-state movements; (3) Just as Gramsci’s creative use of the notion of civil society satisfied the social need in his time, the Gramscian concept fits well into the reality of Taiwan’s situation in the sense that it provides a powerful strategy against the KMT’s rule. As to the question of the internal tension within civil society, Nanfang argues, first, that internal tensions within civil society are less serious than tensions between civil society and the state. Second, in Nanfang’s view, the tension between the farmers and consumers concerning U.S. fruit imports can be resolved by his intellectual reinterpretation; that is, because the KMT adopted an erroneous policy, it caused problems both for farmers and consumers.52 Nanfang Shuo further asserts that intellectuals should maintain and control power over this kind of interpretation; the skillful use of this power can mobilize the masses and unify all social forces. For Nanfang, this is an important issue of how to create the hegemony of civil society. Though Nanfang explains his use of the Gramscian model, his explanation does not justify it, because he fails to answer the theoretical and strategic challenges to the Gramscian model of civil society. He underestimates the tensions within civil society; he, therefore, provides no solution to these tensions except his suggestion of the wise use of the intellectual interpretation, which in fact is problematic. He lacks a conceptual innovation to react to the political changes in recent years in Taiwan.

3.3. The reconstruction of conceptions of civil society A reconstruction of the ideas of civil society has been under way since 1989. Some writers first reviewed fully the history of the ideas of civil society in the West.53 Other writers took the following steps to resolve the problems associated with the Gramscian model of civil society in Taiwan. 51 See note 45 above. Also, Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao supports this view. As Hsiao observes,

the common target of all the social movements has been the state. 52 Ibid. 53 Huang Hsi-ju, “The Autonomy of the State and Civil Society: Introducing Relative The-

ories and Studies”, Zhongguo luntan, no. 331 (July 10, 1989): pp. 72–80. She suggests a middle road to combine different approaches at the end of the article.

223

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang

1. To narrow the extension of the concept of civil society: In defense of the relevance of the concept of civil society in Taiwan, Hsinhuang Michael Hsiao has usefully described the following emerging social movements as constituents of a “demanding civil society”: Consumers, conservationists, women, Taiwanese aborigines, students, laborers, farmers, teacher’s rights, political victims’ human rights, mainlanders home-visiting, Taiwanese home-visiting, anti-nuclear power, other ethnic minority rights, anti-pollutionists, the new testament church, the handicapped and disadvantaged welfare groups, and veterans welfare protesters.54 Here, Hsiao’s use of civil society refers to social movements, and excludes the political opposition movement and party. This may overcome the theoretical problem caused by Nanfang’s broad understanding of civil society; that is, the disappearance of the demarcation between the state and civil society if the opposition party comes to power. In the same line of thinking, other writers55 use the terms such as “new” and “weak” to describe social movements in order to separate them from the opposition movement. “New” in the sense that they do not seek to seize political power as the DPP does; “weak” in the sense that the influence of these new social movements is much weaker than that of the DPP. 2. To stick to the principle of autonomization: Nanfang Shuo insists on the autonomy of political and social movements in the struggle against the hegemony of the KMT. However, he plays down the autonomy of some social movements within civil society. For example, in Nanfang’s view, women and labor movements are less important than political democratization and, therefore, should give way to the political democratization movement. New social movements, as Shih Ssu-hung claims, are not subject to transcendental principles such as “democracy”. To seek autonomization

54 See Hsiao, “TheAnti-Control Feature of Civil Society”, pp. 60–64, and “Political Freedom

and Economic Justice: To Define a Historical Role of Social Movements”, Zhongguo luntan, no. 332 (July 25, 1989): pp. 65–69. 55 See note 50 above.

224

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

is the goal of new social movements; in other words, group rights themselves are a political task.56 3. To adopt a depoliticized strategy: Hsiao observes that most of the emergent social movements have taken a depoliticized stance by avoiding any obvious connection with the political opposition party.57 Hang Chih (Chen Chung-hsin) shouts out: “Don’t let ‘politicization’ destroy an embryonic civil society”. Hang Chih and Shih Ssu-hung interpret the residents movement as a genuine civil movement demanding a right to housing and a self-governing arrangement of housing by citizens themselves. 4. The Habermasian “public sphere”: Hang Chih feels that the DPP has no ability to play a significant role in leading social movements.58 He also realizes the danger of a so-called “idea bank”, which is an effort to establish ideological hegemony by the rich, precisely, by the bourgeois class. Hang is concerned with how to establish a healthy and liberal civil society and prevent violent and self-destructive actions from civil society.59 He expresses these concerns in his question as to when Taiwan will have a mature social movement. He argues that a plural society does not imply a public society. Rather, Taiwan’s plural society is a commercial one, which now is destroying the public sphere.60 Hang Chih finds that the Habermasian type of civil society is relevant to the needs and aspirations of the Taiwanese. Habermas sees the public sphere as the realm of society, lying outside institutionalized politics. What makes it “civil” is the fact that it is the locus where citizens may freely organize themselves into smaller or larger groups and associations at various levels in order to apply pressure to the formal building 56 Shih Ssu-hung, “Populism: Beyond the State vs. Civil Society”, Zhongguo luntan, no. 336

(September 25, 1989): pp. 34–42. Also see Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, trans. Winston Moore and Paul Cammack (London: Verso Press, 1985). 57 Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao, “Emerging Social Movements and the Rise of a Demanding Civil Society in Taiwan”, Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 24 (July 1990): pp. 163–180. 58 Hang, Maixiang hou-Meilidao de minjian shehui 2:43. 59 Ibid., 101–107, 120. 60 Ibid., 1: pp. 133–141.

225

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang

of state authority.61 To apply Habermas’ idea in Taiwan, Hang is concerned about how to make newspapers into a public forum and how to overcome the tendency of the commercialization of newspapers. The solution suggested by Hang is a combination of the traditional intellectual’s moral concern and modern democratic institutions such as public debate and a referendum system.62 As to the concrete issue of whether Taipei should be allowed to build a big gymnasium, Hang suggests, we should first have public debates, then have a referendum to decide it.

4.

A Comparative Study

Although Taiwan is now in the process of the consolidation of democracy while mainland China is still under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the writers from both the mainland and Taiwan seem to share a few common assumptions in their thinking on civil society as well as to have different emphases and translations.63

4.1.

Conceptual dimension of political innovations

Most writings on civil society are a kind of political theorizing, or precisely the political activity of searching for a normative theory of democracy and the state. Among writers such as Rong Jian, Liu Zhiguang, and Wang Suli from mainland China, Nanfang Shuo and Hang Chih from Taiwan, and Ambrose Y. C. King and Shih Yuan-kang from Hong Kong, there is a common view concerning the new civil institutions necessary for a stable, prosperous, and democratic China. For them, to talk about civil society is to seek a just society, to enquire a new political theory of the state, and to articulate a normative project for liberalization and democratization, although they have different opinions about how to liberalize and democratize. 61 See Craig Calhorn, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,

1992). 62 Hang, Maixiang hou-Meilidao de minjian shehui 2: 59–64. 63 Tsai Shih-ping highlights differences. See Tsai Shih-ping, “Plural Society vs. Totalitar-

ian Society: A Comparison Between ‘Civil Society’ on both Sides of the Taiwan Strait”, Zhongguo luntan, no. 362 (November 1990): pp. 65–68.

226

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

Rediscovering of the value of civil society: Most writers such as Rong Jian, Jin Guantao, Ambrose Y. C. King, Hang Chih, Hu Fu, and Nanfang Shuo share a common view that there is a strong state and weak society in mainland China and Taiwan. Insofar as the relationship between the state and society is concerned, there is a marked continuity between traditional and Maoist and Chiang Kai-shek’s states in the sense that the state has an all-encompassing jurisdictional claim over society. While the communist hegemony over mainland China radically reinforced the age-old tradition of unitary, noncompetitive politics, and created a highly centralized, highly dependent society,64 the KMT controlled and penetrated all aspects of society through its political society up to the mid-1980s. There, however, is difference. The Chinese Communist system attempted to establish a deliberate connection between the state and civil society for ending the sorts of invidious and inhuman conflicts which Marx had seen as characteristic of capitalist societies. On the ground that the abolition of civil society would remove the divisions and conflicts which bedevil capitalist societies, the CCP suppressed and destroyed civil society in the 1950s. This move has led to the extension and aggrandizement of the power of the state. Contrarily, in Taiwan, under the Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People, the private sector was protected and encouraged by the state. Thus, the economic dimension of civil society has remained, while the political dimension of civil society had been suppressed until late 1989. The lessons learned by these writers are similar. The writers both in mainland China and Taiwan share the fundamental assumption that the state and civil society should be two different things, with a certain distance maintained between them (this influences their translations as discussed later). In Rong Jian’s writing, it is the distance between the state and society that brings back the issue of popular sovereignty. It is civil society that constitutes the source for the legitimacy of the government. A similar view 64 See Ezra F. Vogel’s description of the “political conquest of society”, in Canton under

Communism 1949–1968 (NewYork: Har-Row, 1969), pp. 350–356; Tang Tsou’s description of totalitarianism, in The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. xxii, 54; and Prasenjit Duara’s description of penetration of all levels of society by the state, in Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900–1942 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 188.

227

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang

can be also found in the writings of Nanfang Shuo. For most writers, the distinction between the state and civil society provides a useful perspective on economic and political reform. This separation of the state from civil society is the most important step in the revival of civil society, and is a prerequisite to the establishment of genuine political freedoms and economic prosperity. For some writers, civil society is seen as a new kind of utopia, a utopia that includes a range of complementary forms of democracy and a complex set of civil, social, and political rights. For them, Chinese civil society will essentially dictate a new dimension of Chinese political development, and it will provide ample resources for generating democratic forces.65 There have been nevertheless tensions, or sometimes a trade-off relationship between individual liberty and associations. One central issue therefore is how to unify a pluralist society given the inescapable tensions between individual liberty and associations, as well as between unity and plurality. Here, Chinese scholars stress different facets of the above problem. Some, such as Hang Chih, advocate a moral aspect of civil society; some, such as Deng Zhenglai and Jing Yuejin, emphasize legal aspects of civil society, which should be bound by a legal order or set of shared rules; some, such as Chou Yang-sun, Deng Zhenglai, and Jing Yuejin, accentuate the idea of self-limiting civil society. Civil society and theories of democracy: As mentioned, for Chinese intellectuals to talk about civil society is to search for a normative theory of democracy and the state, and to articulate a normative project for liberalization and democratization. For most liberal intellectuals, a society independent of the state should be developed so that the power of the state would be limited. They believe, under civil society, the dispersion of economic power means that political, economic, and legal powers cannot be monopolized, and that checks and safeguards against the abuse of power are operable. Thus a liberal model of civil society is formulated as being associations for individual pursuit of their liberties, interests, and happiness and as being one mechanism to limit the power of the state. Thus a liberal idea of democracy, or a limited government, is assumed. As Deng and Jing 65 This begs the question. See the analysis of dual roles of civil society in democratization.

He Baogang, “Dual Roles of Semi-Civil Society in Chinese Democracy”, Australian Journal of political Science 29, no. 1 (1994): pp. 154–171.

228

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

state clearly, civil society has the capability to constrain the state and to fight for and defend freedom, to maintain its independence and autonomy, and to exempt itself from abnormal intervention and infringement by the state. It is in this sense that civil society is seen as the last bastion for protecting freedom and preventing the reversion of authority to totalitarianism.66 The above ideas also entail a pluralist theory of democracy. A highly articulated civil society with cross-cutting cleavages, overlapping group memberships, and social mobility is the presupposition for a stable democratic polity, a guarantee against permanent domination by any one group. As Deng Zhenglai and Jing Yuejin argue, the development of civil society nurtures a plurality of interest groups, which, reaching a certain stage in their growth up in the economic and other sectors, will in a variety of ways demand to express their interests in the political domain; these aspirations and activities are a powerful impetus toward the creation of democracy. In this sense, then, civil society lays down a solid social basis for democracy.67 The idea of civil society also implies a participatory theory of democracy. For some Chinese intellectuals, without active participation on the part of citizens in civil associations and politically relevant organizations, there will be no way to maintain the democratic character of the political culture or of social and political institutions. But other Chinese intellectuals favor an elitist theory of democracy and see the overpoliticized civil society as a threat to Chinese democratization, as discussed later. Civil society and strategies for democratization: The state-civil society distinction is also a key to understanding the democratic strategy both in mainland China and Taiwan. This understanding may be described as an attempt to translate the theoretical distinction into a practical program. Those whose political position is in line with opposition party or movement tend to regard civil society as independent of the state, and hold an antagonistic view of the relationship between civil society and the state. As seen above, Nanfang Shuo from Taiwan, Yu Dahai, Liang Heng, and Su Xiaokang from mainland China all emphasized this element and advocated an anti-state strategy. Civil society thus is seen as a new strategy for democracy; that is, to promote the power of civil society and 66 Deng and Jing, “Constructing Chinese Civil Society”, p. 64. 67 Ibid.

229

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang Table 9.

The Two Models of Civil Society and Their Democratic Strategies.

Authors Nanfang Shuo, Yu Dahai, Liang Heng, Su Xiaoking

Chou Yan-sun, Deng Zhenglai, Jing Yuejin

Models The Gramscian model of civil society (the antagonism between the state and civil society) The Kantian model of mutual independence between civil society and the state

Political strategy An anti-state strategy, overpoliticized mobilization

Self-limited strategy, appropriate politicized mobilization

Attitude toward the state The state and laws are seen as sources of injustice and should be destructed The role of the state is neutral in protecting rights and mediating conflicts of interests

combine all forces from civil society in a struggle against the hegemony of the state. Furthermore, the notion of civil society also provides a way to change the traditional behavior of Chinese intellectuals; that is, to be free and independent scholars rather than serve the state after educational training. But Chou Yang-sun from Taiwan, and Deng Zhenglai and Jing Yuejin from mainland China advocate the self-limiting strategy of civil society and emphasize the mutual support relationship between the state and civil society. Thus the above two competing models of civil society suggest different strategies for democratization (see Table 9).

4.2.

Political dimension of conceptual changes

The belief that the concept of civil society is worthy of dispute and revision is more often a political than a philosophical matter. Why have writers such as Nanfang Shuo and Chen Kuide tended to emphasize and magnify confrontation rather than interaction and mutual support? The simple answer is that the thesis of the polarity of the state and society is nothing more than a typical expression of the antipathy toward politics and the state, with the aim of destruction of the state by those who have suffered under both the 230

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

CCP’s and KMT’s regimes. On the other hand, those, such as Chou Yangsun, tend to stress interdependence between the two. Civil society could not function without the state, and the latter could not realize its potential completeness and universality without a properly constituted and functioning civil society. Between 1986 and 1989, Marxist doctrine was used politically in different ways in mainland China and Taiwan. In Shen Yue’s writing, the Marxist text was used authoritatively to justify market and private sectors in mainland China. This tactic evolved due to the ideological constraints on capitalism on the mainland. Contrarily, there was no such official Marxist doctrine in Taiwan. However, Marxism was employed by a group of leftist intellectuals to criticize capitalism, privatization, and commercial society in Taiwan. Between 1989 and 1992, the writers from mainland China focused on whether civil society existed and how to establish it in China; whereas in Taiwan, the writers focused on how to establish a healthy civil society and how to avoid negative, self-destructive actions from civil society.68 Furthermore, in the writings of Su Xiaokang and Chen Kuide, the middle or bourgeois class is identical with civil society,69 while a concept of civil society that is properly differentiated from the economy and middle class, is formulated by Chou Yang-sun and others70 in Taiwan. Also, most mainland writers overseas still use the Gramscian notion of civil society to call for an alliance of all social forces in a struggle against the CCP. By contrast, Taiwan is undertaking a conceptual change from the Gramscian to the Habermasian conception of civil society. Similarly, the mainland Chinese intellectuals 68 While James Cotton shows insufficient evidence for the emergence of civil society, casting

doubt about the application of the East European model of civil society in North Korea, Ahn discusses how to empower civil society but avoid entrapping society into either a “class state” or “Balkanized state” in South Korea. See James Cotton, “Civil Society in the Political Transition of North Korea: The Limitation of the East European Model”, Korea and World Affairs 16, no. 2 (Summer 1992): pp. 319–337; Ahn Chung-Si, “Economic Development and Democratization in South Korea: An Examination on Economic Change and Empowerment of Civil Society”, ibid. 15, no. 4 (Winter 1991): pp. 740–754. 69 For example, Su Xiaokang’s group thinks that the intellectual stratum can gain autonomy by allying itself with the emerging management professionals, small entrepreneurs, and the media in the road to civil society. 70 See Kuan Hung-chih, “Are Urban Social Movements the Middle Class Movement?” Zhongguo luntan, no. 341 (December 10, 1989): pp. 36–38.

231

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang

have also undertaken this kind of conceptual change. This is evident in Deng Zhenglai and Jing Yuejin’s writing on the rejection of the Gramscian model of civil society and on advocacy of a mutual support model of civil society and the state.

4.3.

Linguistic analysis

Since the concept of civil society is a linguistic construct, a linguistic analysis of the Chinese translations is necessary. First, the Western term “society” can be translated into Chinese terms “shetuan” and “tuanti”, which refer to concrete social organizations and are something like empirical categories open to testing. Why has “society” been translated into “shehui” without exception both in mainland China and Taiwan? In Chinese language, “shehui”, a generalized term and a theoretical category, contrasts with the term “guojia” (state). As mentioned above, civil society is seen as a way to separate the state and society. Thus, the above meaning of “shehui ” expresses this need, whereas “shetuan” and “tuanti” cannot because social organizations to which these terms refer may be part of state machinery. Second, why was “civil society” translated as “minjian shehui” in Taiwan, but as “shimin shehui” and “gongmin shehui” in mainland China? “Minjian”, usually translated as “popular” ( or “folk”, as in “folk song”), refers to any field and social movement opposite to, and independent of, the state. It includes the peasantry and their struggle. There were two purposes for Nanfang Shuo translating the term “civil society” into “minjian shehui”. First, “minjian shehui” highlights the antithesis of society and the state in the traditional language framework of “cadre vs. mass” (ganbu vs. qunzhong, or guan vs. min). Second, the extension of minjian shehui is the broadest. Here the more general term “minjian” is more politically useful because it expresses well Nanfang’s desire to set up a strategy to unify all the social forces. The above explanation can be further supported by the translation of Chen Kuide from the mainland who thinks that the term “minjian” is better than “gongmin” to translate the concept of civil society. For Chen, the idea of civil society involves a democratic strategy; Nanfang’s translation, therefore, fits this need. As mentioned above, Nanfang Shuo’s idea of civil society was criticized in 1989. So was his translation. Sun Shan-hao suggested that civil 232

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

society should be translated as “wenming shehui” (civilized society) in 1989. This translation plays up the meaning of civility against violence. The underlying motivation of Sun was that civil society should avoid violent actions. Also, Hsia Chu-chiu from Taiwan used “shimin” rather than “minjian” in his discussion of civil society in Taiwan in 1991. His major concern is the urban problems in Taiwan, thus “minjian”, which literally encompasses peasantry, is inappropriate for his purpose. “Civil society” was translated by ShenYue in 1986 as “shimin shehui” in mainland China. Shimin shehui, the original Chinese rendition, is usually taken to exclude the peasantry. Shimin generally refers to the population in the city. It may refer narrowly to business people, as “shi” means market. The term “shimin” fits well Shen Yue’s political motivation: he attempts to justify the policy of privatization and the market. Thus Shen argues, “Bargerliche Gesellschaft” in the past has been translated into “bourgeois society” in all Chinese translation works of Marx and Engels. As a result, Marx’s distinction between “bourgeois” and “civil society” was obliterated by Chinese translation practices. It should be, as Shen suggests, correctly understood as civil society.71 In 1988, the translation of the term was revised by Liu Zhiguang and Wang Suli to “gongmin shehui”. They criticize the Chinese term “qunzhong” (masses) which historically refers to the manual laboring class and presupposes a hierarchical society. For them, the modern term “guomin” (nation-people) also carries the meaning that people depend on the state. For them, gongmin (citizen) is a good term to express and highlight individual and equal rights. The Chinese word “gong ” has always been seen most simply as the opposite of “private” (wusi). It also refers to collective goods which are the sum total of the harmonized self-interest of all members of the community; it is “public” in the nongovernmental sense. Thus, “gongmin” is a very adequate term for Liu and Wang to translate Rousseau’s idea of civil society.72 The above analysis of the political use of the Chinese language does not imply that the Chinese language mirrors the independently existing 71 Shen, “An Examination of ‘Bargerliche Gesellschaft’”, pp. 44–51. 72 “Gong” also refers to the business, property, and personnel of the imperial-bureaucratic

state; it is “public” in the governmental sense. “Gongmin” also emphasizes the duty to collective goods and law. That is why Chen Kuide does not like the translation of gongmin shehui.

233

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang

political world. Rather, the Chinese language is instead partly constitutive of it in the way that the Chinese language has imposed limits on what the writers discussed. The linguistically imposed limits are invisible to the writers. Any single Chinese term has a very limited power to express the various connotations of the ideas of civil society. In each Chinese expression, some connotations are overstressed, some lost, and some distorted in the process of the translation. In Nanfang’s “minjian shehui” for civil society, the meaning of the antithesis of the state to society is played up, whereas the meaning of civility is lost. Also, the meaning of entrepreneur and market is stressed, but the meaning of autonomy is lost in the term “shimin shehui”. Even worse, the meaning of duty to the state and even public in the governmental sense is infused in the term “gongmin shehui”. Another linguistically imposed limit is that although some writers, such as Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao,73 attempt to use an empirical category for the translation of the concept of civil society, they have to follow the common translation of “minjian shehui” or “shehui”. Once “shehui”, a theoretical category, is employed, it is liable to escape empirical testing. The similar and different translations of the Western term “civil society” by scholars from Taiwan and mainland China are shown in Tables 10 and 11. Yet without exception, all are “imported products”. Although Chen Kuide and Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao acknowledge some Chinese writers who have influenced them, these writers were originally influenced by “foreign” ideas. We may identify a slight difference between the writers from Table 10.

The Translations of “Civil Society” in Taiwan.

Translators

Chinese terms

Emphasis

Nanfang Shuo

Minjian shehui

Sun Shan-hao Hsia Chu-jiu

Wenming shehui Shimin shehui

Any field and social movement opposite to, and independent of, the state The civility against violence The exclusion of the peasantry and a focus on the urban problems

73 This evidences that Hsiao’s notion of social movements is empirically constituted. See

Hsiao, “Emerging Social Movements”.

234

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92 Table 11.

The Translations of “Civil Society” in Mainland China.

Translators

Chinese terms

Emphasis

Shen Yue Liu Zhiguang

Shimin shehui Gongmin shehui

Chen Kuide

Minjian shehui

The population in city, and business relations The stress on individual and equal rights, the opposition to “private” An anti-state strategy for democratization

the mainland and Taiwan in terms of theoretical sources. In mainland China, the major sources came from the classical Western writers such as Locke, Rousseau, and Marx before June 4, 1989; after that from East European writers such as Vaclav Havel and Jacek Kuron. In Taiwan, the major sources came from Gramsci, Jacek Kuron, and Adam Michnik before the lifting of martial law; after that, Taiwanese writers seemed to want to catch up with any new ideas occurring in the West, such as those of Habermas, Foucault, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Alfred Stepan, and Philippe Schmitter (see Table 12). Some writers simply adopted whatever conception they wanted to for their own political purposes in terms of its role in political debates. Contrarily, purely academic study of the idea of civil society played a less political role than political use of the concept of civil society. There was a trade-off between the practical effects of the application and the correct understanding and use of the original ideas. If Nanfang correctly understands Gramsci, and applies his ideas without distorting the original meaning, he probably cannot use Gramsci in Taiwan. On the other hand, writers such as Sun Shanhao, Li Hsiao-ti, Huang Hsi-ju, and Wang Chao-kuang have reviewed fully the ideas of civil society expressed by Locke, Hegel, Marx, and Gramsci, but their writings have played a less political role than Nanfang Shuo’s.74 It seems that the enterprise of applying Western thought in China implies “necessary distortion” of the original meanings of the Western ideas. However, the dominant influence of foreign ideas does not imply that the Chinese Confucian tradition plays no role, but rather an indirect part at a deeper level. Most writers from mainland China and Taiwan have idealized 74 See notes 35 and 51 above, and Wang Chao-kuang, “Some Reflections on Civil Society”,

Ershiyi shiji, no. 8 (1991): pp. 102–114.

235

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang Table 12. Who are influenced?

Who Influenced Chinese Writers?a

Who impose the influences?

Liu Zhiguang and Wang Suli

Locke Rousseau

Shen Yue

Marx

Barret L. McCormick, Su Shaozhi, and Xiao Xiaoming Chen Kuide

Vaclav Havel

Nanfang Shuo

Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao

Shih Ssu-hung

Hang Chih (Chen Chung-hsin) Chou Yang-sun

What is influenced? The idea of civil society

Zhengzhixue yanjiu, no. 5 (1988): pp. 1–5. Jingji yanjiu, no. 2 The idea of civil (1988): pp. 19–26; economy and of civil Zhexue yanjiu, society no. 1 (1990): pp. 44–51. Civil society as a Zhishifenzi, (Spring democratic strategy 1991): pp. 8–15.

Yu Ying-shih, Tu The importance of civil Wei-ming society in China Antithesis of the state Gramsci Adam and civil society as Michnik Jacek political strategy Kuroñ, Li Oufan Nanfang Shuo, Mu The term “civil Yu, Jiang Xun society” and its explanation of social movement Foucault, Laclau, A critique of and Mouffe beyond the antithesis of the state and civil society Habermas Public sphere Alfred Stepan and Philippe Schmitter

Sources

Differentiated version of civil society; the ideas of corporatism and pluralism

Ibid., (Summer 1991): pp. 23–30. Zhongguo luntan, no. 336 (September 25, 1989): p. 11. Ibid., no. 331 (July 10, 1989): pp. 60–64. Ibid., no. 336 (September 25, 1989): pp. 34–42. Two volumes of his bookb His Ph.D. diss.c

a The criterion for the selection of writers in this table is based on their acknowledgments

for those who have influenced them in their writings on civil society. b Hang Chih [Chen Chung-hsin], Maixiang hou-Meilidao de minjian shehui (Toward post-

Formosa civil society), 2 vols. (Taipei: Tangshan chubanshe, 1990). c Chou Yang-sun, “Social Movements and the Party-state in Taiwan: Emerging Civil society and the Evolving State Corporatist Structures” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1988).

236

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

and even moralized the idea of civil society. Even when violent and confrontational development within civil society destroyed the idealized notion of civil society, Hang Chih soon changed his objective to one of idealism. Since then, the idea of the public sphere has played a fundamental role in his reconstruction of a new utopia. Further, Hang Chih has also criticized the commercial trend as immoral. He regards the public sphere as a moral area full of meaningful ethics. Here Hang ignores the Montesquieuan argument that commerce encourages people to think of themselves and their materials, and makes them tolerant and hardworking. Both Hang Chih from Taiwan and Zhao Suisheng from the mainland emphasize the important role of intellectuals in establishing a healthy civil society. Nanfang Shuo stresses that intellectuals should wisely use the power of the explanation. Both believe that it is the intellectuals’ duty to define and elaborate moral norms and ideologies for a just society. This can be seen as a revised version of the Confucian Daotou. The Confucian tradition has also directly influenced some Chinese writers. For example, Peng Wenyi’s conception of “clan society” and his argument against the idea of civil society is based, or drawn, on the Confucian tradition. Also, Jiang Qing argues clearly that there are enormous problems and internal tensions associated with the Western type of civil society, and the solution to these problems and tensions might be found in Confucianist emphasis on collectivism and harmony.75 These ideas, however, are either criticized or ignored by a majority of Chinese intellectuals.

5.

Conclusion

The idea of civil society has been the source of contested debates, and has been a dominant discourse in recent Chinese political and ideological life since the late 1980s. This paper records some conceptual changes. In mainland China, a shift occurred from the idea of the totalitarian society to the liberal idea of civil society before June 4, 1989, and to the antagonist model of civil society as a democratic strategy among some intellectuals 75 Jiang, “Confucian Culture”.

237

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

He Baogang

overseas, and to the mutual support model between the state and civil society among some intellectuals on the mainland since 1992. In Taiwan, the antagonist model of civil society was popular in 1986–87, but was criticized and declining in 1989. Subsequently, there was a shift from the antagonist model of civil society to the Habermasian version of civil society. Habermas’ idea of public sphere seemed to provide the normative foundation of a theory of civil society for Taiwanese scholars such as Hang Chih. The paper discusses political dimensions of these conceptual changes: How the ideas of civil society were politically conceptualized and constituted in different contexts for different purposes. These conceptual changes were not a simple reflection of political change, but rather one striking outcome of the problem-solving processes of political actors as they tried to understand and change the world around them. In mainland China, the liberal idea of civil society was formulated by a number of writers who used the liberal notion of civil society to set up a boundary, with which the power of the state did not interfere before June 4, 1989. This model of civil society became a clear political objective demanded by students and intellectuals; and the anti-state attitude was so dominant that compromise was not made by the students in the 1989 pro-democracy movement. After the June 4th events of 1989 the antagonist model of civil society was accepted as a democratic strategy by a number of the writers whose political position was in line with the opposition movement overseas. Contrarily, some intellectuals who live in mainland China favor the idea that the state and a healthy civil society are mutually interdependent. This is ironic because the idea of civil society opposing the state is often dominant in the initial stage of the democratic transition. So far mainland China has not passed the initial stage of the transition toward democracy, but somehow the idea of civil society opposing the state is now rejected by some intellectuals within mainland China. Though ironic, it nevertheless may do good for China because the mutual support model between the state and civil society advocated by Deng and Jing may promote a smooth transition to democracy if this view is accepted and shared by most intellectuals and Chinese society. In Taiwan, during the initial stage of the transition toward democracy, the antagonist model of civil society was dominant and advocated by Nanfang Shuo’s group, which attempted to unify all forces against the

238

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

The Ideas of Civil Society in Mainland China and Taiwan, 1986–92

KMT’s hegemony. Nevertheless, this model of civil society faced theoretical, practical, and strategic problems and gradually lost its centrality. Thus in the stage of consolidating democracy, writers in Taiwan have been searching for a Habermasian version of civil society or the Kantain model of civil society, a kind of healthy civil society supportive of democracy. The discourse on civil society in both Taiwan and mainland China seems to support, confirm and reinforce the key element of the Western liberal idea of civil society — the necessity of the normative distinction of the state from civil society. It also demonstrates that it is dangerous to believe that all the problems, and all the solutions lie within the body of civil society; the idea of civil society alone cannot offer a solution to all the problems. We need to turn for help from the democratic ideas of constitutionalism, citizenship, and the rule of law; above all, civil society itself has to be democratized.

239

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch07

This page intentionally left blank

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings — A Case Study of Shanghai

Chapter

8

Xu Jilin1

Abstract Neoteric Chinese public sphere differs from European public sphere which is based on the civil society and membership of bourgeois individuals in that its formation has basically nothing to do with civil society but much to do with political themes like nation-state construction and social reforms. Chinese public sphere, therefore, is centered upon aristocratic intellectuals from the very beginning. It skips the transitional stage of literary public sphere in Europe and starts directly from political contents to its formation, and scenes within the public space are not cafés, bars or saloons but newspapers, institutes and schools. As far as style is concerned, it lacks literary elegance but features poignancy of political essays. What threatens the development of Chinese public sphere is not the soft infiltration of late capitalist power and money as analyzed by Habermas, but the systematization and legitimacy that are unattainable within the social system as well as the commonality that finds itself hard to maintain its independence and nonpartisanship on account of the increasingly strong influences of partisan struggles. Keywords: Public sphere; ideal type; civil society.

1.

Introduction

For nearly a decade, the Public Sphere Theory proposed by Jurgrn Habermas, together with the Civil Society Theory, has been applied to the study 1 Xu Jilin, Simian Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities, East China Normal Univer-

sity, P. R. China.

241

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Xu Jilin

of Chinese society since the Ming and Qing Dynasty by foreign academic world, especially by American scholars who are committed to the study of China. The application proved to be both fruitful and controversial, however. Although the focal point of the controversy is at the level of experiences, there is a noteworthy underlying theoretical question: The theory of Habermas is derived abstractly from the history of Europe; it is both an experiential ideal type and a Utopian model of liberation that resorts to the criticism of reality. Can an analytical framework like this be applied crossculturally to China? In other words, is public sphere merely a particular experience of Europe in modern historical process or, possibly, a universal model applicable to diverse cultures? Though this issue was involved in related contentions, both sides failed to achieve sufficient understanding of the awareness of problems (wenti yishi) viz. the political legitimacy, behind Habermas’s theory of public sphere. As a result, they cannot adopt this perspective to examine the historical possibilities arising from Chinese public sphere. Therefore, there is room for further study concerning this issue. This is especially true in China’s academic circles where necessary analysis and review are required of the two concepts, namely civil society and public sphere and the study of Chinese public sphere as an independent research subject is intermingled with discussions about civil society, except for a few papers. Consequently, the study of Chinese public sphere by now is far from sufficient, which calls for responses based on China’s experiences.2 Based on the study of the historical evolution of Chinese political legitimacy, the purpose of this chapter is an analysis of neoteric Chinese public sphere, its local nativity, historic forms and consensus function with Shanghai as a case in question, and to discuss the universality and particularity in neoteric Chinese public sphere by comparison and contrast with Habermas’s ideas of public sphere.

2 For researches of civil society, please refer to Deng (1997); Zhang (1998). As for related papers quoted from a variety of journals, I will not list them due to the restriction of length. Besides, there are some empirical researches about neoteric China’s public sphere (Wang, 1996; Zhou, 1998; Fang, 2001).

242

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings

2.

Local Tradition of Chinese Public Sphere

Public sphere theory proposed by Habermas is what can be properly described as a Weberian ideal type, which derived within the historical backdrop of 18th century Europe, mainly France, Britain and Germany. Habermas analyzed the clubs, cafés, salons, magazines and newspapers that emerged among the bourgeois class in the 18th century. These “spheres” were space for many to discuss public issues and associate with each other freely, and constituted the basis of the legitimacy of political authority. Whether public power is legitimate and whether it represents popular wills depends on whether they are supported by public opinions formed through free debating.3 Habermas proposed the concept of public sphere in his general theoretical framework on the basis of the following the awareness of problems. What changes will take place in the legitimacy basis of political authority when political modernity unfolds itself in the process of history? In a traditional society, the right of politics stems from the good of moral value system. The will of the God replaced the good of cities in Christian Medieval Period and became the source of the legitimacy of political order. But modern society is profane, namely an era of “post-God”. Legitimacy of public power comes from public consensus alone. Nevertheless, Habermas identified two different processes of modern politics. One is democratic election that centers on the election of political representatives and political leaders, which is not adequate to constitute the “general will” as the basis of legitimate authority. The birth of “general will” does not happen inside of, but outside of, political election, namely in the public sphere. It is realized by free people, by public discussion and social criticism. Public sphere differs from general political voting as much as it differs from civil society which focuses on market. Public sphere lies just between the two. It is “a public area with the assembly of individuals” and it supervises political power through social consensus and social criticism (Habermas,

3 For general information about the public sphere theory, refer to Habermas (1999).

243

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Xu Jilin

1999). This political legitimacy based on public consensus is exactly where the value and significance of public sphere lies. Habermas himself is very cautious about the issues concerning the cross-cultural application of public sphere theory.4 Even so, the theory is still widely employed in international academic circles to analyze many non-European histories in the past years, including the changes of contemporary Eastern Europe and neoteric history of China. This fact indicates that public sphere theory has evolved from an analytical tool of particularities into an ideal type with universal interpretative power in the same way as other concepts: Civil society, capitalism, socialism, idealism, industrialization, etc. Abstracted from the European history, this theory has become a universal interpretative framework relating to issues of modernity. Why? This is because the ideal type initiated by Max Weber is an intellectual analytical method. Though it is derived out of particular experiences, it can transcend the context of culture and history because it is highly abstract. It can effectively prove some common, universal elements and qualities across the history of different contexts. Take public sphere for example. Although its experiential basis is confined to the history of Europe in the 18th century, it can be a universal analytical concept because it involves the universal cross-cultural issue of foregoing modern political legitimacy. The most crucial point in public sphere is public communications and public opinions independent of political structure. They are critical of political power and meanwhile the basis of political legitimacy. As long as a structure like this appears in the entire social system, we can conclude that it is a public sphere regardless of its cultural or historical background. As a highly abstract ideal type, public sphere theory can “cross” cultures, but cannot “transcend” culture. When we conduct normative arguments upon it, we can put concrete experiential facts into brackets temporarily. Once the theory is applied to specific areas, China for example, the validity of the concept has to be buttressed by experiential facts, and the same public sphere fact should be examined by historical cross-cultural comparison and contrast to see how its particularity is revealed. 4 Habermas commented in the first edition of The Structural Transformation of the Public

Sphere that the concept of public sphere should not be isolated from medieval European civil society and its unique history, nor should it be used as ideal type to apply to any similar historical context. See Habermas (1999, p. 1)

244

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings

Now let us take up the study of the social and notional premises in Chinese public sphere by tracing the development of Chinese history. According to Habermas’s theory, public sphere is a concept related to political legitimacy. Studying of public sphere should start from the historical evolution of the construction of legitimacy. In this connection, ancient China took a constructive approach different from the West. Even though there were no Christian God-like personified gods in Chinese history, there was a “Heaven” in the same exterior form of transcendence, namely “Heaven of Will” in a metaphysical sense. This “fate” or “Will of Heaven” as mystic and unfathomable as the sky, represents everything in the universe and the most superior will of real society, and constitutes the fountain of the legitimacy of political power. Emperors of each and every dynasty entitle themselves as “the Son of Heaven”, proclaiming that they are ruling on behalf of the “Heaven”. Since the legitimacy of an emperor stems from the authorization of heaven, not from himself or his family, nor was it a tradition, then the relationship between the emperor and heaven is not self-evident and therefore needs to be proved in terms of legitimacy. Who can prove this? And how? Just as the legitimacy of medieval European kings was proven by the Pope, the legitimacy of Chinese emperors was proven by intellectuals who know and interpret “the Will of Heaven”. As for how, Confucius offered a system of political philosophy that focuses on the importance of the people. The gist of Confucian political philosophy is as follows: Legitimacy of political power depends on the approval or disapproval from people. The one approved by people can be “the Son of Heaven”. Political legitimacy of ancient China, under the influence of Confucianism, is both transcendent, for it claims “the Will of Heaven”, and earthly, for it emphasizes on the approval from people. The transcendent “Will of Heaven” needs to be proven by the “favor of people”, but people are always silent. Thus, whether an emperor can represent the “Will of Heaven” or “favor of people” depends on the intellectuals or specifically the public opinions formed by aristocratic intellectuals. Aristocratic intellectuals in each dynasty tried to build their own center of public opinion inside and outside of the imperial system. Taixue (Imperial Academy) in Eastern Han Dynasty and donglin shuyuan (Donglin Academy), another educatory facility in late Ming Dynasty, are good examples of the tradition of political criticism established by Chinese aristocratic intellectuals.

245

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Xu Jilin

Though these scholar-bureaucrats communicated with each other in an organized manner through taixue, shuyuan and huiguan (institute, another form of academic facility), it was not possible for them to form a public sphere in ancient China as it is today. Public sphere as a means of public communications and public opinions to political legitimacy cannot be established independently. It should be coordinated with the modern system1 of representative democracy on the one hand; it entails preset notions of popular sovereignty on the other hand. Unlike medieval Europe when the Pope bestowed legitimacy on the king in the name of the God, aristocratic intellectuals in ancient China were not prestigious enough to crown an emperor. Their criticism had but some moderate influence on the emperor, and their criticism was not guarded systematically, nor could they form powerful organizations or systems to curb the power of the emperor. As a result, they cannot form a binary system of divine and imperial power like that of medieval Europe. On the other hand, Confucian political philosophy covers both Menciusian democratic tradition and the “heaven and human telepathy” tradition proposed by Dong Zhongshu as far as ideological origins are concerned. Though both exert certain limitations on the imperial power, the relationship between the emperor and aristocratic intellectuals is never systematically stable because the imperial power stems from binary origins, namely the “Will of Heaven” and the “favor of people”. Only when the emperor is at a disadvantage will he not be able to ignore the influence of aristocratic intellectuals who may take “the favor of the people” to their advantage. Therefore, though Confucian democracy has public opinion as the connotation of power legitimacy, the connotation retains the ultimate value of the “Will of Heaven” for it is not supported by popular sovereignty, and as a result, a modern democratic notion and a modern system of public sphere were never developed. Even so, Confucian democratic ideas played an important role in the formation of neoteric Chinese public sphere, and the former provided the latter with an indispensable value of “traditional legitimacy”. This is because the earliest advocates of public sphere in China were the reformers in Qing Dynasty, who “reformed current system by referring to ancient values”. While they were discussing and establishing public sphere, they quoted profusely from the critical traditions of aristocratic intellectuals, including Mencius’s democratic ideas, Taixue in Eastern 246

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings

Han Dynasty, shuyuan in Song and Ming Dynasty, and Donglin Party in late Ming Dynasty. Among others, the thoughts of Huang Zongxi, who greatly inspired the reformers in late Qing Dynasty, are particularly worth mentioning. Just as many researchers have noticed, the late Ming Dynasty is a very important period of time in the sprouting and growth of neoteric Chinese thoughts. It is safe to say this period opens a new chapter in neoteric Chinese history of thoughts. Gu Yanwu, Wang Chuanshan and Huang Zongxi proposed, respectively, ideas similar to modern democracy using ancient methods. Huang Zongxi is particularly important in that he was the first to propose that “school” should be re-interpreted and re-constructed when he was thinking about how to keep imperial power in check. What is called “school” in the past is usually regarded as a place to cultivate elites, but the protest tradition left behind by taixue in Eastern Han Dynasty and shuyuan in Ming Dynasty makes Huang Zongxi think it is necessary to redefine “school” so that it can be a space of public opinions, which can help keep imperial power in check. He said: “School is a place to educate elites, but ancient saints and kings meant more for a school. The significance of school is not complete if the governing methods of the people are not derived from school”. Mencius proposed that the legitimacy of imperial power originates from “the favor of people”, but he did not specify on how “the favor of people” can be systematized to keep imperial power in check. Huang Zongxi, however, for the first time in the history of Chinese thoughts, proposed that “the favor of people”, viz. public opinions, should be systematized by means of “school”, which is a public sphere of aristocratic intellectuals. He further made it clear that the public opinion of “school” is the only source of political legitimacy: “What the emperor deems right may not be right, wrong not wrong, then he will not dare to impose right or wrong on school”. To Huang Zongxi, the criteria of right or wrong rest not with the emperor, but with public opinions formed in “school”, and His Majesty as the Son of Heaven should follow public opinions. This is an amazing contribution. It is amazing because the idea about public opinions had been very romantic instead of realistic until Huang Zongxi projected a concrete social institution. To curb imperial power with public opinions is not exactly unprecedented in traditional Chinese political system, e.g., the expostulator of the emperor and the supervisor of other officials. Be it the former or the latter, 247

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Xu Jilin

however, they are part of the bureaucratic system subject to the control of the imperial power. They are not independent. The “school” designated by Huang Zongxi, however, is an agency of public opinions independent of imperial power and bureaucrats. The leader and members of the school are not arranged by the royal court, but by democratic election on the part of aristocratic intellectuals. The “school” is civilian, but it has a systematic limitation on central power. The emperor must lead the entire cabinet to the “school” every month, sit down in a disciple-like manner, and listen to the lecture of the “school” principal. The principal should be a prestigious Confucian scholar, equivalent to the prime minister in position. If anything goes wrong with politics, they can air their criticism in front of the emperor and the prime minister.5 In addition, many scholars used to believe that the “school” proposed by Huang Zongxi resembles a modern parliament. Nevertheless, the foregoing introduction suggests that it is more of a modern public sphere. The “school” does not have the political right to vote for or impeach bureaucrats like modern parliament, but it has the function to discuss political matters and provide political legitimacy in public sphere. It is well-grounded to say that Huang Zongxi was the first thinker to propose the idea of public sphere in Chinese history of thoughts. He had remarkable and far-reaching influence on the establishment of public sphere on the part of Reformists in late Qing Dynasty. Liang Qichao, then a young man, was greatly inspired after reading the abovementioned ideas of Huang Zongxi said that his political movement later was directly influenced in a most profound manner by Huang Zongxi (Liang, 1996, p. 56). Public sphere in neoteric China is not merely something imported; it has its historical roots in China. Both the populism proposed by Mencius and the “school” tradition proposed by Huang Zongxi have a unique influence on the formation of the concept and pattern of public sphere as distinguished from its European counterpart. Besides, judging from the origin of ideological history, it is not accidental that Shanghai became the center of Chinese public sphere by the end of the 19th century, it was influenced by the intellectual spirits in south China as represented by Huang Zongxi and Gu Yanwu. Aristocratic intellectuals began to look downward from Song and Ming Dynasty when they 5 The foregoing ideas about Huang Zongxi are all excerpted from “the School Chapter” in

Mingyi Daifang Lu.

248

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings

began setting up “shuyuan” (academy), among others. They did so to raise a spirit and to form public opinions so that they can build a powerful tradition outside of the royal court. These regionalized historical tradition and civilian atmosphere made silent and salient contribution to the reform of Shanghai in the late Qing Dynasty and, as a result, they made Shanghai the center of public sphere in neoteric China.

3.

Formation of Public Sphere in Shanghai

The public sphere in neoteric China appeared somewhere between the failure of Sino-Japanese War (September 1894 to April 1895) and the political reform 1898. Stimulated by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, aristocratic intellectuals woke up from their past dreams about China being the greatest nation in the world. They started participating in the discussion of current politics as well as in the reform. Newspapers, schools and academies sprang up overnight, forming a basic space for public association and public opinion. There were three areas at that time that had the most active reforming activities: Beijing, Shanghai and Hunan. Newspapers, academies and schools were also the most developed in these areas. Nonetheless, why public sphere in neoteric China was centered in Shanghai, not Beijing or Changsha? The emergence of public sphere is attributed to two very important conditions. First, space for public association should be developed in private areas. Literate reading public should grow as books, magazines and newspapers came into daily life. Then these readers can form an open and critical public sphere based on the reading and exchange of ideas. Second, although political issues are discussed in public sphere, but the public sphere should not be politicalized. It should establish space for public discussion outside of political power. In other words, it should be independent of the power system (Habermas, 1999, ch. 1–3). With a review from this angle, we can find that Beijing and Changsha have one of the two conditions respectively, but only Shanghai has both conditions. Take a look at Beijing first. The prelude of the Reformist Movement, namely Gongche Shangshu (the petition of students assembling for the imperial examination), opened its curtain in Beijing. Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao started Qiangxue Hui (Self-Strengthening Study 249

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Xu Jilin

Society) dedicated to enlightening the slumbering state, and the magazine entitled News of China and World. And before all of these, there were new schools like Jingshi Tongwen Guan (the Imperial Foreign Language Institute), which is the predecessor of Beijing University. However, Beijing is Beijing, conservative, highly political and unprepared for a citizen society. Any cause of reform is unavoidable involved with political system. The clash of ideologies thus may ensue. The creation of schools, publication of newspapers and establishment of academies, therefore, mean nothing but double pains and half gains. Though both were created by the reformers, the Guang Fangyan Guan (Shanghai Foreign Language Institute) in Shanghai achieved a lot, but great adversity was met by Jingshi Tongwen Guan (Xiong, 1999, pp. 268–272). Members of the earliest reformist organization, Qiangxue Hui, included high-ranking government officials. It was not independent of the government. Half of it is political and another half civilian. It got involved in the clash of interest within the court soon and therefore failed in Beijing, let along to develop. Then take a look at Changsha. New policies in Hunan Province were once very influential after 1895 with the support of Chen Baozhen, the incumbent governor. And being far from the capital, aristocratic intellectuals gathered there. Times School, Journal of Hunan Province, and other forms of public communication were all successful enough to pass for the center of neoteric Chinese public sphere. However, Changsha was hindered by some disadvantages: It is located at the center of China, flow of information there was quite slow and less open. Its understanding of the outside world is therefore impeded and therefore it is not easy for Changsha to achieve national influence. The influence of the Reformist Movement was usually maintained by local officials at certain times. Reformists were mostly from outside Hunan Province, while the natives were not so open-minded then. Once local officials were transferred or resigned, the public sphere would collapse without the political support. Compared with Beijing and Changsha, Shanghai boasted all the advantages in terms of establishment of public sphere. It prided itself on time, location, talents, among others. Shanghai used to be a relatively small place of little significance in traditional political territory. After being opened as a port in 1842, due to the particularity of offering concessions to aggressors and the convergence of the United States and some European states, Shanghai sprang up as one of the most important cities, second only to Beijing, within merely half a century. The power structure in neoteric 250

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings

Shanghai was strange and complicated. A subtle balance was struck among the western states, the central government and local officials. Nobody alone could have a monopoly on Shanghai and therefore the city gained the greatest freedom outside of the political system then in China. New enterprises established by westerners and the commercial atmosphere nursed by the Westernization Movement together endow Shanghai unique advantages concerning the establishment of public sphere. It broke many records in China as early as late 19th century. Shanghai had the largest quantity of newspapers and magazines from home and abroad; Chinese newspaper of the largest circulation: Shenbao (Shanghai Journal), and News; Western book press of the longest history: Guangxuehui and the translation house built by South China Manufacture Bureau; Chinese press of the largest scale and influence: the Commercial Press; the largest number of new schools: Guang Fangyan Guan, Gezhi Shuyuan (Shanghai Polytechnic Institution), etc. In addition, there were also postal services, telegrams, telephones, modern print technology, public libraries, theaters, cinemas, public parks and gardens all taking the lead in China. These amenities had paved the incomparable way for the growth of public communications and public opinions of modern aristocratic intellectuals. Then, what is the relationship between the formation of public sphere in Shanghai and the development of industry and commerce as well as the construction of civil society in Shanghai? In most cases, people would identify civil society with public sphere. Indeed, the formation of public sphere in Europe was closely related to the development of civil society. The fact is that civil society involves private affairs related to market transactions. In effect, it is a market society where the participants are bourgeois citizens. That is another story for public sphere that involves public affairs regarding social and political life. Those active in public sphere are people keen on public welfare and political participation. With the development of market economy, bourgeois citizens felt a stronger urge to intervene in public affairs. So, they appeared in cafe, salon, newspapers and other public spaces to discuss public affairs and form public opinions that can keep public power in check. Hence, a systematized public sphere (Habermas, 1999, pp. 14–25). However, the appearance of public sphere in neoteric Shanghai is not propeled by market society, nor does it have anything to do with the bourgeois class. Public sphere and civil society are almost parallel 251

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Xu Jilin

processes; the former is even earlier than the latter. The chamber of commerce as an important indicator of systematized civil society did not appear until 1902, namely Shanghai Commerce of Chamber. The establishment of commerce chambers on a larger scale, however, was not real until Concise Regulations of Commerce Chamber came out in 1903. Political media as an important sign of public sphere embraced its first climax between 1895 and 1898. This is because as part of the social reform, the formation of public sphere in China has little bearing on the civil interests of bourgeoisie but has much on domestic and foreign crisis experienced by late Qing Dynasty. The participants of Chinese public sphere, unlike their European counterparts who experienced an identity transformation from citizens to public bourgeoisie, were aristocratic intellectuals who from the very beginning were dedicated to pushing it forward. Public sphere in neoteric China has its special origin. It is special because its formation, compared with civil society, is relatively independent. The study of public sphere in neoteric Shanghai, therefore, should begin from the assembling of modern aristocratic intellectuals, not civil society. Shanghai is the intersection of China and the West as well as the center of the Westernization Movement. Any aristocratic intellectual who favored the reform, like Feng Guifen, Wang Tao, Zheng Guanying, Zhang Huanlun, etc, lived in Shanghai once. From mid-19th century on, Shanghai had been a place for modern aristocratic intellectuals who always obtained the latest news about the world. These modern aristocratic intellectuals, despite their traditional titles, ceased to repeat traditional path to political power. Instead, they chose a different path of life: Work as a comprador, run a newspaper, open a school or translate foreign books, etc. They, along with the magazines, newspapers, western books and reading public educated in schools, served as the backbone of public sphere in Shanghai. Though many basic conditions were prepared gradually in Shanghai for public sphere before middle 1890s, we cannot conclude that these conditions are public sphere itself. By nature, public sphere is independent of systematized political power and remains public and critical. Some newspapers and schools before middle 1890s were critical, like the discussion of some political issues by Gezhi Shuyuan, but they were neither public nor oriented toward the public directly. Besides, as commanders, reforming

252

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings

aristocratic intellectuals were part of the system, therefore they lacked true civilian identity. Two thinkers had made meritorious contributions to the formation of public sphere in Shanghai. The first is Zheng Guanying. Among early reform thinkers, many would lay great emphasis on democracy and parliament, but it was probably Zheng Guanying alone who truly understood the importance of public sphere, especially newspaper, and mentioned it in the same breath as parliament. In the famous Expostulation in Prosperity, he dedicated a whole chapter to the discussion of the function of “newspaper”. He suggested that for free communication of information between the emperor and people, “nothing is better than the popularization of newspapers” except for parliament (Zheng, 1998, “On Newspaper”). Zheng Guanying realized very clearly that “Newspapers and parliament will make public opinions a force to keep in check the imperial power” (quoted in Hu, 1987, p. 47). In addition, he set great store by the use of schools and considered the establishment of schools and parliament one of the important means for the emperor and people to communicate (Zheng, 1998, preface). Zheng Guanying could be the only personage then who stressed the significance of newspaper and school and took them as the basis of “public opinions”. Another important figure is Liang Qichao. Although he was among the intellectuals of Gongche Shangshu Movement, but gradually he was walking out of the shadow of his teacher, Kang Youwei, and started to be seen and heard when he took the duty of chief editor of Current Affairs Newspaper in Shanghai where he became famous. Although both Kang and Liang assumed leadership in the movement, they differed from each other in their purposes and directions of reform. Kang Youwei showed concern for government and politics by devoting himself to a reform within the system: parliament, constitutional monarchy, etc. By contrast, Liang Qichao was inclined to the public and clung to the tenet of public sphere with such venues as newspaper, schools, and academies. Many articles he published in Current Affairs Newspaper discussed, in a moving manner, and proved that “newspaper is good for state affairs”, that “newspapers are like eyes and ears of the people”. In the meantime, he also pointed out that “if we want China to be strong, we should have more talents; to have more talents, we must open schools and academies to educate them”. (Liang, 1996 Vol. 66,

253

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Xu Jilin

p. 28). With his mighty pen of strong emotions, he proposed not just a set of Chinese notions of public sphere, but also provided successful experiences of the practice of establishing public opinion in China by his own doings. It is worth mentioning here that Zheng Guanying and Liang Qichao formed their ideas about public sphere in Shanghai. This cannot be accidental, and the atmosphere in Shanghai of that day probably had some direct influence on them. Current Affairs Newspaper is important not just to Liang Qichao, but also an important emblem to Shanghai. Its inception in 1896 indicates the formation of “a relatively small but critical public sphere”.6 There are three reasons to regard Current Affairs Newspaper as the starting point of Shanghai’s public sphere. First, the paper is not just a paper; it has a reform organization behind it: Qiangxue Hui (Self-Strengthening Study Society). According to Kang and Liang, the nature of the Society consisted in “two functions, school and political party, in one” (Liang, 1996, Vol. 1, p. 38). Newspapers, clubs and schools were about to be major forms of neoteric Chinese public sphere. The Current Affairs Newspaper on Sima Road became a gathering place for the reformers. Centering upon newspaper, plus the cooperation of schools and churches, neoteric Chinese public sphere began to take shape. Second, creators of the paper, Kang, Liang and Wang (Kangnian Wang) were related to current political system in many nuanced aspects, but their basic ways of behavior had been moved from the royal court to the civilians, educating the masses with public opinions and pressing for reform from the royal court. They started assuming their own critical character. Third, the paper was created in Shanghai, but its influence was present across China. Thus, Liang stated: “In a few months, the circulation reached over ten thousand. This is unprecedented in the history of Chinese newspaper. Most nationals were reading it as if they were drinking from rushing fountains” (Liang, 1996, Vol. 1, p. 477). This indicates that Current Affairs Newspaper has already had an open and wide influence on society, just like public opinions. Since the publication of Current Affairs Newspaper, Shanghai has always been leading national public opinions with its large number of books and magazines. Anyone who wishes to be heard by the whole state 6 This is quoted by Habermas to describe Germany at the end of 18th century. See Habermas

(1999, p. 3).

254

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings

must control the public opinion in Shanghai. Ge Gongzhen quoted from a book entitled Talk about Shanghai in “The History of Chinese Newspapers” that “Newspapers in China are led by Shanghai. Even if today, Shanghai newspapers are still the most influential. Beijing regards newspapers in Shanghai as South Papers, while Guangdong, Hong Kong and Southeast Asia call them Hu Papers. Anything that is not published in papers in Shanghai cannot be regarded as authentic. This is what Shanghai newspapers took pride in” (Ge, 1964, p. 349). Neoteric Shanghai as the center of China’s public opinions and public sphere thus came into absolute authority ever since.

4.

The Original Structure and Evolution of Public Sphere in Neoteric China

Habermas once analyzed that European bourgeoisie public sphere is preceded by literary public sphere. Through discussion of art and literature, the critics gradually turned to political issues and formed political public sphere (Habermas, 1999, pp. 55–60). The description does not fit China anyway. As mentioned above, the establishment of public sphere in neoteric China is directly connected with China’s survival and reform; those aristocratic intellectuals were organized not through the analysis of literature but political issues. The theme discussed was not public aesthetic issues but the establishment and reform of national structure and traditional system. Chinese public sphere exhibits apparent politics-oriented nature at the outset. On the other hand, European public sphere grew out of literary public sphere including salons and cafes that played important roles. There educated aristocrats and bourgeoisie associated and communicated. But salons and cafes are exotics in China and did not win favor among Chinese literary circles even in the most westernized city — Shanghai until the 1920s and 1930s. They had little to do with the daily life of Chinese people and even Chinese intellectuals. Therefore, they failed to be part of public communications. Then, what is the basic structure of neoteric Chinese public sphere? We have good reasons to say that, as far as its prototype is concerned, it consisted 255

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Xu Jilin

of schools, newspapers and academies. And in some extreme cases, they even formed a relationship of “trinity”. In addition, it is supplemented by assemblies and telegraphs. Through these special structures, modern aristocratic intellectuals gathered together in new socializing relationship and formed critical public opinions for the purpose of saving the state. Now, this chapter will present some analyses with Shanghai as a case. First is school. Among various forms of public sphere in China, school is the oldest one. According to modern educational philosophy, school is merely a place for imparting knowledge and skills. However, based on the ancient philosophies of education, especially the academic traditions in the Song and Ming Dynasty, school is also responsible for the cultivation and guidance of social customs. This kind of responsibility is highly indicative of public criticism. It was on this basis that the idea of Huang Zongxi, who claimed that school be the judge of values, was brought out. In middle 19th century, several new schools were founded in Shanghai also under the influence of Chinese historical traditions, though they served the enterprise of the Westernization Movement and trained modern professionals. The prime example is Gezhi Shuyuan (Shanghai Polytechnic Institution), a new-style school created by Chinese and Western sponsors together. The school was aimed at cultivating talents of science and technology fit for the cause of reform. Scientific education is its most outstanding feature. Even it be so, Wang Tao, John Fryer and others in charge of the institution succeeded the age-old tradition of education and emphasized the moralization of students. Interestingly, since 1886 the institution had been conducting quarterly tests. Questions were asked by reform officials or famous aristocratic intellectuals, and students could answer freely. Besides scientific questions, there were major ones related to political reform, national prosperity, law configuration, etc: How can China prosper in contemporary world? What are the advantages and disadvantages of installing railroads in China? What are the approaches to evaluating a reformer selected according to the Great Constitution of China? What are your comments on Parliament? What are the differences, strengths and weakness of Chinese and Western legal systems? Judging from extant test papers, students came up with free answers. Every quarterly test seemed like a school-wide debate of public issues (Xiong, 1999, Vol. 3, pp. 176–180). Similar debates and

256

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings

discussions became commoner in all new schools after middle 90s. School became a key bastion of public sphere in late Qing Dynasty. At the center of public sphere lie newspapers and academies. Shanghai is the most influential center in this respect. According to statistics by Zhang Yufa, between the shut-down of Qiangxue Academy and the political coup in 1898, there appeared 62 influential academies nationwide, 15 of which were located in Shanghai. It accounted for about one quarter of the total and was ranked the first in China. Some of them are to be remembered, like Agro Academy, Anti-Feet-binding Association, AntiSmoking Association, Mengxue Public Academy, Academy of Translation and Mathematics, Academy of Industry, Association of Asia, etc. (Zhang, 1971, pp. 199–206). On the other hand, between 1896–1898, dozens of newspapers appeared and followed the example of Current Affairs Newspaper by putting political essays at their core.At the headings of these papers were printed “Remark of This Paper”, publishing its own ideas about social reform and public affairs. Never have people talked about state affairs on such a large scale before. Above all, it indicated that Shanghai’s public sphere had been truly established in the Reformist Movement in the 1890s. More importantly, in late 19th century and early 20th century, newspapers, academies and schools were the basic elements of public sphere in China. They tended to form a kind of “trinity” relationship: Behind a newspaper is an academy, behind one school is another school. Take Current Affairs Newspaper for example. The academy behind it is Qiangxue Academy. According to the design of Kang and Liang, the academy is “school and politics in one”. By the beginning of the 20th century, another typical “trinity” public sphere emerged in Shanghai, namely Su Newspaper, China Education Press and Patriots’ Academy. Newspaper, academy and school combined into one “trinity” relationship. Over time Qing government was irritated by Su Newspaper so much that it wanted to eradicate the newspaper partly because it was afraid of the paper’s influence on public opinions. More importantly, the paper with independent organizations and personnel had developed into a threatening power outside of the governing system under the special environment of Shanghai. As a consequence, the Su Newspaper Case occurred, and shocked China and the world at large.

257

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Xu Jilin

Newspaper, academy and school are three major forms of Shanghai’s public sphere. Another two forms also merit our attention. One is assembly. From the late 19th century to the early 20th century, by taking advantage of the free foreign quarters in Shanghai, political assembly had become a rather popular method to express public opinions. Zhang’s Garden was known as the most famous assembly place in Shanghai. Located in the prime section of public concessions, it was the center of public opinions as well as a scenic spot. It may have Hyde Park as a counterpart (Xiong, 1999, Vol. 3, pp. 284–296). These assemblies and speeches were open, public and critical, above all typical of public sphere undoubtedly. Another form of public sphere is telegraph. Telegraph here means that people from all social classes sign in unison to air opinions about major political events and to claim sides. Then the signed opinions will be sent to telegraph offices or news press before it is relayed to further areas. This can produce an influence nationwide and a pressure on the government. It is pretty characteristic of Chinese expression of public opinions. Shanghai had become the center of public sphere since late Qing Dynasty and considerable important telegraphs were sent from Shanghai to the rest of China. Telegraph and assembly are connected inside. After assembling in Zhang’s Garden, a telegraph will usually be passed and be sent home and abroad. The earliest telegraph in this sense is the one launched by Yuan Shan in 1900, which was against the dethronement of Guangxu the emperor. After the political coup in 1898, Empress Dowager Cixi plotted to dethrone Guangxu the emperor and replace him with another. When the news was spread, it caused quite a stir among the civilians in Shanghai. Chief of Telegraph Office united intellectuals, aristocrats, merchants and civilians through Yuan Shan, altogether 1,231 people, to sign in unison and sent the telegraph to Beijing to voice their disapproval of the dethronement. They also assembled and decided that if Cixi dared to put her will through, they would propose unions of commerce and industry across the country to strike. When the telegraph came out, the whole nation was taken aback followed by supportive responses from all foreign envoys. Cixi was forced to cancel the plan at last. The success of anti-dethroning indicates that the public sphere centered in Shanghai has already been very influential in the complicated political framework of late Qing Dynasty. Since then, till the end of 1920s, whenever major historical events like May 4th Movement,

258

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings

Yuan Shikai’s enthronement, etc took place, telegraphs of this type were often launched by Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce and Jiangsu Education Association and many other civilian groups to claim political sides. These telegraphs used to be the wind vane of public opinions. Public sphere participants in China are mostly educated intellectuals. From 1898 to 1921, according to Zhang Hao, is a “period of transformation” of knowledge, culture and society (Zhang, 1999). Correspondingly, intellectuals during this period experienced an identity transformation, too. Habermas once mentioned that as far as the identity of participants is concerned, European public sphere underwent a change from aristocratic representatives to bourgeoisie representatives (Habermas, 1999, pp. 5–32). In comparison, Chinese public sphere of new aristocratic intellectuals changed to that of modern intellectuals. During the 1898 reform period or so, major activists in public sphere were new aristocratic intellectuals who had traditional titles and a certain degree of modern knowledge. We can find this feature from the name list of Qiangxue Hui members (Zhang, 1971, pp. 179–188). Before and after the abolishment of the Imperial Civil Examination System in 1905, the situation started changing gradually. For example, major members of China Education Association were either titled new aristocratic intellectuals or youthful educated talents. And the latter started to increase in number (Xiong, 1999, Vol. 3, pp. 296–297). Development of public sphere means not just the change of public opinions, but also symbolizes the change of association pattern of participants. Traditionally in China, aristocratic intellectuals had a code of association, practically a hierarchical relationship built on teacher-student relations and ranks. But in public sphere, the traditional hierarchy was dissolved and a sense of equality among elites came into being and graduated into a completely modern self-understanding, namely all people are but citizens. If this is not so clear in Qiangxue Hui, then it is clear enough in China Education Association. New aristocratic intellectuals with titles like Cai Yuanpei, titleless sinologists like Zhang Taiyan, and young intellectuals like Zou Rong, gathered together to discuss state affairs and criticize current political policies. New patterns of association were thus established on the basis of new space and equality of identity. Public association like this was fully established during the May 4th Period in 1919. Take NewYouth magazine for example. Its associates were all intellectuals from home or abroad.

259

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Xu Jilin

The traditional hierarchical relationships were gone and reason-based equal relations were set up regardless of their identity. As basic structures of public sphere, newspapers, academies and schools were not a long-term feature of Chinese public sphere, but a shortlived one, existent during the end of Qing Dynasty. After the establishment of the Republic of China, the situation changed dramatically. Academies and schools were no longer a fixed part of public sphere. Academies (or clubs) were either professionalized or politicalized. The chaotic and public feature in late Qing Dynasty was gone. Above all, schools after the Republic of China gradually modeled themselves on modern system in professionalization as well as specialization and became independent of politics on the whole. Therefore, mostly newspapers and magazines continued to play a public part in public sphere after the Republic of China was founded. When analyzing the structural transformation of public sphere in Europe, Habermas pointed out that public sphere as a part of lifeworld (German: Lebenswelt) was tempered by the system world, manipulated by money and power and gradually lost its publicity, and therefore no longer served as the bedrock of the legitimacy of public power (Habermas, 1999, 170–282). In neoteric China, however, main factors that affect the growth of public sphere is that it cannot be systematized and it is gradually politicalized. Though public opinion has formed with Shanghai as its center at the end of the 19th century, but it remains unprotected and unacknowledged by state system. After the inception of Republic of China, though it was stipulated that the people have the freedom of speech, publishing, assembly and other rights, it was but stipulations. The truth was that public opinions were often tempered with by the government, and sometimes even persecuted. The difference was that when the government exerted strong control, public sphere became rather fragile, and vice versa. On the other hand, neoteric bourgeois class in China had been weak, and its interference in public sphere was very limited. Besides governmental power, another interference of public sphere was from deteriorating factionalism. Because of conflicting and increasingly clashing political powers in neoteric China, public sphere was also seriously infiltrated with opposing parties’ interests. Many magazines and newspapers had very clear political drives and therefore lost the justice, objectivity and publicity that are endowed in public opinion. Free space of public sphere was already limited, this factionalism just made the future of Chinese public sphere dimmer. 260

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings

Affected by government and partisans, Chinese public sphere as represented by Shanghai developed unevenly. Generally speaking, there were three stages: The first stage lasted roughly from the mid-1890s to the late 1920s. Late Qing Dynasty was weak, and the subsequent Northern Government was weak too. Furthermore, factionalism just sprouted and had yet to penetrate public sphere fully, allowing public sphere a space to develop, especially during May 4th Movement when Chinese public opinion was most powerful, and the divided Northern Government could not control the entire situation and each party needed to use the power of public opinions, so Shanghai Journal, News, Oriental Magazine and other media were able to play certain roles of importance. The second stage spanned from the late 1920s to the mid-1940s. Kuomintang gradually took control of national public opinion, crashing severely public sphere. Although newspaper as an industry of journalism developed a lot, like Shanghai Journal in Shanghai and Ta Kung Pao in Tianjin, etc., space for public opinions were not thus enlarged, but narrowed down. Public opinions were twisted to a great extent and they had to find expressions in sarcasms, games, humors and other twisted forms of expression. “Free Talk” of Shanghai Journal is an example. When the AntiJapanese War broke out, the space like this was gone, too. On the other hand, the structure of political parties was fully established and started infiltrating public sphere and in a sense injured public opinion. The third stage lasted from the latter half of 1943 to the year of 1949. Kuomintang during this period apparently ended political tutelage and pretended to return power to the people, thus relieving the control of public opinion temporarily. Plus political parties of all sides were at a interim and subtle balance, so public sphere as symbolized by public discussion and criticism of politics made a great progress before and after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War. Public opinions represented by Observation and Ta Kung Pao exhibited a certain level of courage and evident publicity. But as civil war intensifies, governmental control of public opinions was tightened again. And the intensity of political conflicts was mirrored in public sphere. So much so that voice of justice and objectivity was simply drowned. The change from bloom to death proves that neoteric Chinese public sphere suffered irreversible injuries for the want of systematized safeguard and the intensity of factionalism. 261

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Xu Jilin

5.

Self-Understanding of Public Opinion

Public sphere defines itself as public opinion. It refers to the critical activity conducted by the public who are capable of judging reasonably. According to Habermas, subjects engaged in public opinions in public areas are different from subjects active in political area. They are not parties brought into being by the combination of interests; they are the public as an individual. Individuals who possess different values start from their understanding of public interests to discuss and debate about public affairs before forming public opinions on the basis of public association and criticism (Li, 1996). Then, how did participants of neoteric Chinese public sphere understand themselves? I will research this question through comparison with the thought of Habermas and through the definitions of key words like “the public”, “public opinion”, “public interest”, and “publicity”. The earliest definition of “the public” in Europe is that “readers, audiences who act as the receivers, consumers and critics of art and literature”, then the definition broadens to include people who discuss and criticize political and public affairs in public sphere (Habermas, 1999, ch. 1, 2, 4). But Chinese public sphere does not have literature as a predecessor like Europe, and its appearance is directly connected with the establishment of a nation. So the definition of “the public” in China is a civil concept related to the state. As Liang Qichao pointed out, the so-called nationals indicated “a country is owned collectively by people living in it”, and “to decide on the affairs of a state and to set up its legal system with its people”, “this is what we call the nationals” (Habermas, 1999, pp. 33–36). Liang Qichao was aware of the significance of nationals denoting wide participation in public affairs. Nationals so defined are close to the connotation of the public. However, unlike European public sphere, Chinese public sphere lacks wide support from the civil class. So, the public sphere in neoteric China is not really public, but much narrower since it is the public sphere of some scholar-bureaucrats or intellectuals. When they are discussing public opinions, what they exhibit is more an awareness of elites, not that of the public. Liang Qichao wrote a short essay entitled “The Mother and the Servant of Public Opinion” in which he discussed the relation between elites and public opinion. To him, public opinion is but ordinary opinion. 262

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings

It is not necessarily where public interests lie in. But heroes and elites can always find what ordinaries cannot find and lead public opinions (Liang, 1996, Vol. 1, p. 309) What Liang Qichao succeeds here is the elite tradition of Wang Yangming, which emphasizes on the education of the civilians and the improvement of customs. The difference is that Wang Yangming believed in moral inspirations, but Liang Qichao found a more powerful way of transforming society: To lead public opinion. Neoteric Chinese field of thinking resembles neoteric German thinking whose civil society is also less developed. Kant stated that enlightenment means the courage to use one’s own reason. In his opinion the onus is on the scholars, especially philosophers to achieve enlightenment. When dealing with a government, the philosopher’s mission is to guide and supervise the government, but when he faces the public, he should guide them to use their reason (Kant, 1997, pp. 22–26). Chinese intellectuals recognize both layers of their missions. Qichao Liang published To My Peers in 1902, declaring the two duties of newspapers are “to supervise the government, and to guide domestic public opinions” (Liang, 1999, Vol. 2, p. 969). This idea of elites became almost a part of Chinese intellectual’s sub-consciousness. Even modern intellectuals are influenced with the same effect. In 1947, Chen Hengzhe wrote from U.S. to Chu Anping, chief editor of Observation, and discussed with him how liberalists should play their part in politics. He emphasized that “a steady and pure public opinion should be made so that men of justice can be supported morally by the public” (Chen, 1954). The elite awareness is self-evident. This indicates that neoteric intellectuals, despite their notional citizen awareness or public awareness, still kept to elitism when dealing with public opinion. They regarded themselves as some kind of a prophet who bears certain moral obligation. They believed that if they worked hard enough they can lead public opinion and change social customs. Second, it is about the criticism of public opinion. According to Habermas, public opinion refers to “critical activity conducted by the public who are capable of judging reasonably” (Habermas, 1999, p. 108) The core feature of public opinion is its criticality. It necessitates a transformation for Chinese intellectuals to realize this. Generally speaking, before the end of the 19th century, both reformers and revolutionists stayed in traditional framework of democracy. They restricted the

263

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Xu Jilin

function of newspaper as tools for the communication between the emperor and commons. The criticality was very weak. From the early 20th century onwards, participants of Chinese public sphere made some progress in the understanding of public opinion. They broke the framework of democracy and related the function of public opinion to civil rights, and assumed, as a result, clear criticality. In this respect, Liang Qichao was the most far-sighted thinker of the time. Among the tides of civil rights at the beginning of 20th century, reform or revolution at the level of political system was emphasized by a lot of people for they believed that democratization of political system could save China. But Mr. Liang found an issue more important than political reform: How could public opinion be remade so that it can provide basis for the legitimacy as well as supervision of political power? Why did an elected government need supervision by public opinion? Liang maintained that this was attributed to the partly evil human nature. The government is trusted and authorized by the people to govern. Even a saint or a philosopher can be corrupt in this case. Though legislation and jurisdiction may come independently to keep people in check, and the opposition of parties may help, the strength is still weak. They need to be backed up by public opinion. Freedom of speech and publication is the safeguard of all other freedoms. A newspaper uses these two freedoms to supervise the government. For Liang Qichao, newspaper, as an independent function of public opinion, “is not subject to the government but an equal to the government”. Besides, the position of newspapers should be higher than that of the government, for the government is entrusted by the people. In other words, the government is employed by the people. The newspaper represents public opinion, so it should treat government the way a father or elder brother treats his son or younger brother in the capacity of a guide and a critic (Liang, 1996, Vol. 2, p. 969). This was the idea of Liang Qichao in 1902. By 1910, he had clearer understanding of public opinion. He further pointed out that “all politics must rely on the support of public opinions” for public opinion represents, and is an open expression of, the opinion of the majority. True constitutional democratic politics lies in the respect for independent opinion of every individual and in enabling them to express their opinions aboveboard. To him, “public opinion is the greatest power of the world and no one can

264

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings

drive it”. What is called constitutional democratic politics is the politics of public opinion (Liang, 1996, Vol. 4, p. 2287, p. 2211) Understanding of these functions of public opinion on the part of Mr. Liang is rather close to the critical notions of modern public sphere. His thoughts were succeeded by the circles of China’s public opinion and later made a common sense of civil public opinion. Third, on the representation of public interests. According to Habermas and other contemporary republican thinkers, public opinion should represent public interests and public will, which is not merely a sum of personal will or personal gain but common interests that transcend the limitations of individual interests formed through public discussion and debate.7 Interesting enough is that public opinion representing public interests is a common ground agreed upon by participants of neoteric Chinese public sphere. In as early as 1901, Mr. Liang suggested that newspaper as a representative of public opinion must have a noble purpose. Its purpose should neither be making profits nor flattering the powerful. Above all else, the newspaper should be aimed at “serving the interests of the majority” (Liang, 1996, Vol. 1, p. 475). Ge Gongzhen, a renowned journalist and expert in neoteric Chinese journalism history, stated clearly in his famous work The History of China’s Newspapers that “democratic politics is based on public opinion, which is based on the public will of civilians in general. Newspaper is to represent the public will of the civilians in general to form public opinion” (Ge, 1964, p. 362). But, everyone is selfish. How can public opinion be made a representative of common interests instead of the sum of personal opinions? To Western republican thinkers, when an individual voices an opinion, he is not speaking from his own interests. Instead, he starts from his personal belief or conscience and thinks about what is public interest. Then, conscience changes into public opinion and therefore possible common ground can be found between different beliefs to form public will (Habermas, 1999, p. 108). In this respect, Mr. Liang and republican thinkers have something in common. In order to make sure public opinion can represent the common interests of the civilians, he made a lot of requirements for personal 7About common interest and common sense, refer to Xu (2002).

265

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Xu Jilin

opinions, and he put special emphasis on “sincerity” and “justice”. An individual should think about issues not based on personal gains or losses of an individual, but on the interests of the state: “Each utters his opinions based on his own conscience” (Liang, 1996, Vol. 4, p. 2211). These requirements to a certain degree become moral standards of neoteric Chinese journalists. What then, is public opinion? How can separate personal opinions and public wills combine to fit public interests? Liang Qichao and Ge Gongzhen did not elaborate in this regard. But the monograph Famous Essays in Journalism compiled by Huang Tianpeng and published in 1930 includes an essay entitled “Public Opinions”, penname of whose author was “Yile”. In this essay, the author researched these questions thoroughly. He is unidentifiable now, but his understanding of public opinions seems to coincide with the ideas of Habermas. The author pointed out: “Public will is the will of a majority of unorganized people”, which is the same as what Habermas emphasized repeatedly: the main part of public sphere should not be a party or a faction, but free and unorganized public who represent personal will. By analyzing the formation of public opinion, the author noticed that public opinion has to be first and foremost an open opinion, which should go through repeated discussion and debate in a public space before it goes open. This also bears a striking similarity to the association reason proposed by Habermas (Huang, 1930). From these analyses, we can see the notional depth neoteric Chinese public sphere reached. Fourth, about non-factionalism and publicity. Modern democratic politics is party politics. Different parties represent different interest groups. A voter enters the political process as if he enters a market, and chooses his own political representatives. However, this will be different in public sphere. As a space for free discussion, public sphere does not need and should reject factionalism lest public association and interaction be twisted by factionalism. Non-factionalized public opinion is of true publicity. Neoteric participants of public sphere knew pretty well about the nonfactionalization and publicity of public opinions. Liang Qichao instituted a very good tradition in this respect. Although he was a revolutionist with a tendency of factionalization, he tried in earnest to maintain the publicity of newspapers when working on public opinion, like the way he worked in Shi Wu Bao (The Chinese Progress), Qing Yi Bao (Open Criticism Newspaper),

266

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings

Xin Min Cong Bao (Xinmin Serial Newspaper), etc. In 1901, he wished that Open Criticism Newspaper could rise from the newspaper of a party to a state newspaper, namely he wished the paper can take “common interests” as its purpose, not “the interests of a single party” (Liang, 1996, Vol. 4, p. 2211). In 1910, when discussing rules public will have to follow, he emphasized the principle of “justice”. He asserted that: “if one holds factional ideology, and grudges against anything from outside the faction; or if one thinks he is protecting the country and therefore fights against any policies of the government without any discrimination or without thinking about the cause and effect, then he is either fishing for fame or pursuing personal pleasure. These are all bad examples”. To some degree, newspapers were not so much factionalized at the end of the Qing Dynasty. However, subsequent to the establishment of the Republican of China and the intensification of partisan struggles, newspapers and magazines, especially political magazines and newspapers, got involved in the struggles. As a result, the publicity of public opinion is also threatened. Within such context, there were a group of people who held fast to the publicity of public sphere and strived to transcend realistic politics and to avoid being reduced to be a tool of partisan struggles. Huang Yuansheng, a famous newspaper journalist, inherited the tradition of “justice”. He emphasized repeatedly that the magazine Yong Yan (Trite Remarks) he edited was “a platform for free public debate”, and that “the freedom of speech should be maintained, while personal or partisan affairs should never get involved” (Huang, 1984, p. 38). But Huang Yuansheng was not independent economically; therefore he was once trapped in politics and was made to confess. What Huang Yuansheng could not achieve was achieved by the tycoon of newspaper, Shi Liangcai. The principles of Shi Liangcai in running a newspaper include economic independence, partisan transcendence, and the creation of independent-minded public opinion. Under his management, Shanghai Journal developed into the most influential newspaper in China and maintained the tenet of being an independent and just civil newspaper (Hu, 1987, pp. 269–270). Another newspaper that enjoyed the same reputation as Shanghai Journal is Ta Kung Pao. The creator of the latter defined his principles as follows: “never hold partisanship, never sacrifice justice, never pursue personal gains, never follow suit”. To be specific, the newspaper was managed by

267

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Xu Jilin

“uttering opinions from pure civilian perspectives”, “being willing to open to the whole state as the spokesman of the public”, “neither selling speeches nor accepting political-oriented donation and declining political investment or share holding” (Ta Kung Pao, 1926). After the middle 1930s, Ta Kung Po replaced Shanghai Journal as the first newspaper of civilian public opinions. And the newspaper won an honorary medal of the Journalism College of Missouri, U.S.A. This honor owed much to its management principles. In the latter half of the 1940s, Kuomintang government tightened its control over public opinions and political conflicts became irreconcilable. As a consequence, the room for public sphere became increasingly small. Even at this time, Observation edited by Chu Anping and Ta Kung Pao edited by Wang Yunsheng still adhered to their principles of representing the public. In the first issue of Observation, Chu Anping published an essay entitled “Our Interest and Attitude”, in which he declared: “at a time when the country is at risk and morality is gone, we are in urgent need of just, trustworthy and serious speeches” (Chu, 1946). He stated that the newspaper is never a place for political conflicts but an independent newspaper for the publication of political essays. It will openly criticize every aspect of society, including the government. Just because of the objectivity and rationality set up by Observation, its circulation rose to over one hundred thousand within merely two years. It held great sway over readers in the 1940s. Though these publications were forbidden one by one later, but the public spirit embodied in such advocates as Liang Qichao and Chu Anping left a glorious and immortal chapter in the history of journalism. Now, it is time for us to make a simple conclusion of this study. First of all, the theory of public sphere by Habermas can be totally applied cross-culturally to interpret phenomena that appeared in neoteric China like public sphere and public opinion. In the light of notions and practices of public sphere in neoteric China, they share the most universal features of public sphere: Public opinions are formed by the independent and reasonable public in a public space. Secondly, China’s experience is not a repetition or imitation of the Europe’s. Rather, it has its own features. Chinese public sphere is not merely an imported ideal or structure; instead, it has its roots in its native land: Confucian democracy, critical tradition of ancient aristocratic intellectuals,

268

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Public Sphere in Neoteric China: Forms, Functions and Self-Understandings

etc. These traditional elements played key roles in the earliest formation and legitimacy of public sphere in late Qing Dynasty. Thirdly, unlike European public sphere based on a civil society and individuals of the bourgeois class, public sphere in neoteric China was mainly involved with the establishment of the nation-state (republic) and other political themes like social reforms, and had little bearing on civil society. Chinese public sphere, therefore, originated from aristocratic intellectuals and educated people as centers, skipping the transitional stage Europe had and beginning directly with political contents as major stuff. The scene of public space was not cafe, bar or salon, but newspaper, academy and school. It lacked the elegance of a literary style, but featured the forcefulness and poignancy of political discussions and comments. Fourthly, what threatens the development of Chinese public sphere is not the soft penetration of capitalist power and money according to the analysis of Habermas, but the fact that it cannot obtain a systematized safety and legitimacy within current social structure. Besides, it is influenced by partisan struggles and therefore cannot maintain its independence and nonpartisanship in publicity (or openness). Lastly, Shanghai boasted a series of special advantages: Geographical and cultural traditions of scholar-bureaucrats in the south of the Yangtze River; special political space provided by foreign quarters; the role model of Western culture and system; the new knowledge resources; and the diversified talent pool. All of these combined to distinguish Shanghai as the center of public sphere in neoteric China indisputably. The destiny of Chinese public sphere is closely related to vicissitudes in Shanghai whose neoteric history testifies to the rise and fall of Chinese public sphere.

References Chen, Hengzhe (1954). Observation, 12(3), May 17th, 1954. Chu, Anping (1946). Our Interest and Attitude. Observation. Vol. 1, September 1, 1946. Deng, Zhenglai (1997). State and Society: Study of Chinese Civil Society. Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Press. Fang, Ping (2001). Civilian Newspaper and Magazine in Late Qing Dynasty and the Pattern of Public Opinion Expression. 21st Century, 2001(2).

269

Aug. 11, 2010

12:33

9in x 6in

b978-ch08

Xu Jilin Ge, Gongzhen (1964). History of Chinese Journalism. HK: Taiping Press. Habermas, J. (1999). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, translated by Weidong Cao. Shanghai: Xuelin Press. Hu, Taichun (1987). China’s Neoteric History of News Ideology. Taiyuan: Shanxi People’s Press. Huang, Tianpeng (1930). Essays of News Terms. Shanghai: Shanghai United Bookstore. Huang, Yuansheng (1984). Yuansheng Last Words (yuansheng yizhu). Beijing: Commercial Press. Kant, I. (1997). Answer to the question: What is Enlightenment Campain?, Historic Critic Corpus, translated by Zhaowu He. Beijing: Business Affair Press. Li, Oufan (1996). Create “Criticism Space” — from ‘Shen-Talk Free’. Taipei: Maitian Press. Liang, Qichao (1999). Complete Collection of Liang Qichao. Beijing: Beijing Press. Ta Kung Pao, (1926). Interests of Our Group, September 1, 1926. Wang, Di (1996). Public Sphere Development in Late Qing Dynasty in the Upper Stream of Yangtze River. Historical Research, 1996(1). Xiong, Yuezhi (1999). General History of Shanghai. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press. Xu, Jilin (2002). Public Idea and Common Ideal, Tianya, 2002.3. Zhang, Hao (1999). Age of Pattern Change in Chinese Neoteric History of Ideology. 21st Century, 1999(4). Zhang, Jing (ed.) (1998). State and Society. Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Press. Zhang, Yufa (1971). Constitutional Groups in Late Qing. Taipei: Neoteric History Institute. Zheng, Guanying (1998). Expostulation in Prosperity (Shengshi weiyan). Changsha: Zhongzhou Ancient Document Press. Zhou Songqing (1998). Public Sphere and the Origin of Shanghai Autonomy. Archives and Histories, 1998(1).

270

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China

Chapter

9

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu1

Abstract In recent years, we have observed a striking upsurge of organized voluntary activity and the creation of private, nonprofit or non-governmental organizations around the world. This study explores to what extent China is part of the global associational revolution. It aims at charting the size, scope and structure of the associational world in China, in a way that not only yields solid and objective information about China, but also makes it possible to undertake cross-society comparisons later. Keywords: Association; civil society; social capital.

1.

Introduction

In recent years, political and scholarly interest in associational life has increased noticeably, because “a striking upsurge is under way around the global in organized voluntary activity and the creation of private, nonprofit or non-governmental organizations” (Salamon, 1994). However, little is known about associational life in China, the world’s most populous country with an estimated population of 1.25 billion. If we are indeed in the midst 1 Wang Shaoguang, Department of Government and Public Administration, the Chinese

University of Hong Kong. He Jianyu, Department of Government and Public Administration, the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

271

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu

of a “global associational revolution” as Salamon (1994) proclaims, it is quite important and timely to ask whether China is part of the revolution. Some outside commentators often assume that associational life is repressed and therefore insignificant under the communist rule (Mathews, 1997). In fact, the situation in China does not appear to be very different from the above-mentioned worldwide trend. After 30 years of omnipresent government control, the Chinese state began in the late 1970s to step back from its effort to program totally all of social life. As the economy and society become more pluralistic and as the people enjoy more freedom than ever before, it is only natural for Chinese to pursue a more active associational life. Now a significant number and wide range of associations are in operation in the country. The problem is that, except few aggregated numbers, we know very little about this aspect of modern Chinese society. For this reason, improving the base of knowledge about Chinese associational life in a systematic fashion is a matter of great academic interest. The purpose of this study is to do just that, contributing to our understanding of associational landscapes in China.

2.

Rationale

Since the early 1990s, the expanding social space between the individual and the state has attracted growing interest from China specialists. The focus of the field has been on so-called “civic associations”. Some studies examine specific types of membership organizations, such as trade unions (Chan, 1993; Perry, 1994), business and professional associations (Pearson, 1994; Unger and Chan, 1995; Unger, 1996), student associations (Wasserstrom and Liu, 1994), leisure groups (Wang, 1994; Chen, 1994), or foundations (Zhang, 1995b). Others focus on associations located in certain towns and cities (White, 1993; Wang, Sun and Zhe, 1993; Shue, 1994; White, Howell and Shang, 1996; Chan, 1999). Still others deal with civil associations in general (Whiting, 1991; Zhang, 1992; Whyte, 1992; National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, 1994; Howell, 1994; Zhang, 1995a; Frolic, 1997; Pei, 1998; Chan and Qiu, 1998). Those studies are often informative and insightful. Together, they provide a broad yet diverse picture about associational life in contemporary China. 272

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China

Rich as it is, however, with few recent exceptions (Ding, 1999; Wang, 2000; Young, 2000), the literature suffers from three drawbacks. (1) Approach: The central theoretical concern of the literature has been whether the growth of civic associations is indicative of the emergence of “civil society” in China. Some specialists conclude that elements of civil society are already present in such associations, and that civil society may emerge more fully in the future (Whyte, 1992; White, 1993). Others disagree. In their view, those associations can best be explained as examples of corporatism (Chan, 1993; Pearson, 1994; Unger and Chan, 1995; Unger, 1996). Still others point out that there may be “a possible continuum” of associational experiences stretching from those completely dominated by the state at one extreme to those relatively autonomous at the other (Shue, 1994). The civil society approach focuses its attention almost exclusively on trying to ascertain whether associations represent the emergence of a civil society that can challenge the party-state. While it is important to study the extent to which associations are autonomous from the party-state, approaching China with a strictly “civil society” lens may run the risk of treating the reality in a Procrustean manner. No wonder that many studies end up with a disappointing conclusion that there is little resemblance between Chinese and Western experiences. Perry (1994) is right that a simple state-society dichotomy is of little help in explaining associational life in China. To study the space lying between the state and the market, we should not force the world to fit our concepts. Rather, we should adjust our concepts to fit the real world. (2) Coverage: Perhaps due to the influence of the civil society approach, much of the research has focused on civic associations, especially on what have come to be known as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), not on associations in general. The concept of NGO, while quite useful for some purposes, embraces a very limited range of associations. It excludes most associations that exist in today’s China. Moreover, NGO often functions as an ideological screen used to differentiate “good” associations from “bad” ones along lines that are often not entirely clear (Salamon and Anheier, 1997a). Thus, studies on NGOs may at best supplement, but certainly cannot substitute, studies on associations. 273

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu

(3) Data: Most studies are case studies in nature, covering either certain types of associations or associations in certain local communities. As Pei (1998) comments, they may have enabled us to examine individual “trees”, but overlooked the “forest”. Moreover, most of the previous researches have been either published before the mid-1990s (Whiting, 1991; Whyte, 1992; Zhang, 1992; Chan, 1993; Howell, 1994; National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, 1994; Wang, Sun and Zhe, 1993; White, 1993; Chen, 1994; Pearson, 1994; Perry, 1994; Shue, 1994; Wang, 1994; Wasserstrom and Liu, 1994; Unger and Chan, 1995; Zhang, 1995a, 1995b) or based upon data collected before the mid-1990s (Unger, 1996; White, Howell and Shang, 1996; Frolic, 1997; Pei, 1998). As snapshots of particular times and places, they are of course valuable. But China is a country where “the situation changes so fast that updates are needed almost before the ink is dry” (Young, 2000, p. 5). It is necessary to provide up-to-date information on the rapidly changing associational landscapes in China. This chapter intends to provide a quantitative assessment of the density and diversity of associational life in China. Informed by another prevailing concept in social sciences in the last decade or so — “social capital”, the key question here is not whether associations are autonomous from state control, but to what extent people are associated with one another in some structured forms. The concept of “social capital” refers to “resources embedded in social networks accessed and used by actors for action” (Lin, 2001, p. 25). Associational activity is a cornerstone of the theory of social capital. Various associations, formal or informal, constitute durable networks of interpersonal relationships that provide their members with such capital. For this reason, the degree of associational life can be used as a surrogate measure of social capital (Bourdieu, 1986: pp. 248; Coleman, 1990, pp. 302–304; Putnam, 1993, pp. 173–176). Social capital is not only individual goods but also collective goods (Lin, 2001, p. 26). In addition to enabling individuals to gain access to information, favors, status, wealth, power, reputation, and the like, it may also contribute to the creation and maintenance of democracy, albeit indirectly. Through fostering the exchange of information, the norms of reciprocity, and interpersonal trust, for instance, social capital may help facilitate spontaneous cooperation, thus “overcoming dilemmas of collective action and 274

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China

the self-defeating opportunism that they spawn” (Putnam, 1993, p. 167). Thus, a society with a relatively high level of social capital stock does not have to rely as heavily on the use of force by the state to induce cooperation as those with lower levels of social capital stock (Ibid., pp. 163–185). Perhaps equally important, as a particular form of social capital, membership in associations may instill habits of compromise and tolerance, and cultivate organizational and communications skills, which in turn may increase people’s motivation and capacity to take part in politics and sense of political efficacy and competence (Verba et al., 1995). Because associations may breed a democratic ethic among their members, they are often viewed as the school for democratic citizenship. Whereas the civil society approach emphasizes associations’ “external” effects on the wide polity (e.g., providing a counterweight to the state), the social capital approach focuses on their “internal” effects on individual members’ ways of thinking and behaviors (Putnam, 1993, pp. 89–90). Both types of effects may be necessary for the emergence, consolidation, effectiveness and stability of democratic government, but the conditions for them to occur are quite different. External effects are unlikely to happen unless associations are somewhat political and relatively autonomous from state control. However, internal effects do not require that manifest purpose of the association be political. That is why Tocqueville praises various kinds of associations, “religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large and very minute” as virtuous organizations (De Tocqueville, 1969, pp. 513–514). In fact, as Tocqueville insists, civil associations are more crucial than political associations to a democratic society. “If the inhabitants of democratic countries had neither the right nor the taste for uniting for political objects, their independence would run great risks, but they could keep both their wealth and their knowledge for a long time”, Tocqueville argues. “But if they did not learn some habits of acting together in the affairs of daily life, civilization itself would be in peril” (Ibid., p. 514). Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995, p. 3) echo, “Both the motivation and the capacity to take part in politics have their roots in the fundamental nonpolitical institutions”. Putnam (1993, p. 90) put it more vividly, “Taking part in a choral society or a bird-watching club can teach self-discipline and an appreciation for the joys of successful collaboration”. There are many more studies demonstrating that participation in nonpolitical

275

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu

organizations can stimulate political involvement and interest (Erickson and Nosanchuck, 1990; Olsen, 1972; Rogers, Barb and Bultena, 1975). Similarly, it can be argued that, for associations to generate social capital or some of the above-mentioned “internal” effects, they do not have to be formal, voluntary or fully autonomous from state control. According to Bourdieu (1986, p. 248), social capital is rooted in “a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition — or in other words, to membership in a group”. As long as an association forms such a network, the ensuing dense interpersonal relationships would constitute a valuable asset that may benefit its own members as well as the society at large, whether the association is formal voluntary non-governmental organization or not. Studies in the United States and the United Kingdom, for instance, have found that social networks, both formal and informal, reduced crime (Putnam and Goss, 2002, p. 6). Offe and Fuchs (2002, p. 242) observe among informal groups in Germany, “This informality does not preclude a strong preparedness on the part of those attached to provide help and to share resources with other (recognized) members”. Likewise, a study of involuntary organizations in England questions the current emphasis on voluntary organizations when examining social capital. The formal institutions active within England’s smaller communities in the 14th–17th centuries were found to have generated considerable social capital (including both internal and external returns), regardless of whether participation in them was obligatory or voluntary. The emphasis upon the voluntary nature of organizations by political scientists in their study of social capital therefore is deemed unnecessary (McIntosh, 2001). For similar reasons, it may also be premature to exclude the possibility that associations incorporated or co-opted by the state can produce useful social returns just as effectively as can groups that are independent from the state. Foster (2001, p. 94) is right when he points out, “Associations do not invariably seek autonomy from the state. Viewing associations as fundamentally ‘civic’ in nature, embodying a societal interest in freedom from state domination, obscures the more basic fact that associations are organizations created to accomplish particular goals”. In sum, the analytic framework that undergirds the civil society approach is unduly restrictive. Consequently, many interesting and important parts of the associational universe are dismissed as unworthy of attention. In contrast, the social capital approach is more inclusive, allowing 276

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China

Makeup

Nature Voluntary Organizations under the Jurisdiction of the Formal Ministry of Civil Affairs Grassroots Groups Informal Virtual Groups

Figure 1.

Involuntary Quasi-governmental Organizations [Traditional Kinship]

A Typology of Associations.

the fullest possible array of associations to be included in our study of China’s associational universe. The article attempts to map out the whole picture of associational life in China, top-down or bottom-up, voluntary or involuntary, and formal or informal. Association here is broadly defined as social space in which individuals are tied to each other through formal and informal group membership. Measuring the density and diversity of associational life may appear to be a modest objective, but in fact, it is a Herculean task. The study of associations in China has long been handicapped by absence of a central source of information on the subject. As in most other countries, the Chinese government rarely gathers statistical data on associations, and even if some of its agencies do, they often collect information only in their respective jurisdictions. Thus, even at the most basic level of quantification, information is abysmally inadequate and fragmented. Since no single information source on associations is available, we have made great efforts in assembling data from a large assortment of sources. The picture emerged from the data presented below make unambiguously evident that a veritable associational revolution is indeed underway in China, which may well prove to be as momentous a feature of the contemporary China as the rise of a market economy. For the sake of convenience, we build a simple typology of associative forms of social life based upon the combination of two dimensions: Nature can be voluntary or involuntary, and makeup can be formal or informal (Fig. 1).

3.

The Benchmark

In order to demonstrate that the above-mentioned “associational revolution” is real, not illusory, we need to place the recent development in a 277

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu

historical perspective. A brief history of associations in China therefore is presented here. In traditional China, primary associations of family and kinship were abundant, membership in most of which were non-voluntary. Qiangxue Society, a reformist group founded by KangYouwei in Beijing in September 1895, was thought to be the first modern secondary or civic association in the country. This group existed for barely five months before the Qing government outlawed it in January 1896. Ironically, the ban of Qiangxue Society spurred even greater interest in starting reform-oriented learned societies among the literati. The following two years witnessed the first wave of association formation in the modern history of China, with 63 such groups established in the period (Zhang, 1971a, pp. 126–130). In the first decade of the 20th century, voluntary groups began to proliferate. A study identifies 733 membership associations that came into being between 1899 and 1909, including 85 reformist groups, 65 revolutionary, 265 commercial, 103 educational, 65 academic, 50 diplomatic, 17 cultural, and 83 others (Zhang, 1971b, pp. 90–148). Of course, the number of associations at any particular moment during these years were much smaller than 733, because early groups tended to be fragile or short-lived. In 1911, the Qing dynasty was overthrown and replaced by the Republic of China, the first republic inAsia. The political change catalyzed another wave of associational development. Within a year or so, nearly 700 political organizations emerged across the country (Zhang, 1975, p. 33; Wang, 1984, p. 541). Soon after, business associations began to burgeon. While only 57 chambers of commerce were identified in 1912 (Zhu, 1991, p. 55), the number jumped to 1,242 in 1915 (EB, 1975, p. 117). After the death of Yuan Shikai in 1916, the subsequent political chaos and tangled warfare between regional warlords temporarily hampered associational activity. However, following the May 4th Movement of 1919, China saw the beginning of yet another upsurge of associational building. Hundreds of youth groups, learned societies, literary clubs, mutual aid co-ops, and so on sprang up in major cities, especially among university students and professors, between 1920 and 1923 (Wang and Li, 1994, p. 358, p. 372). In order to mobilize political support against their common enemies — warlords and local bullies, both the Nationalist Party (KMT) and the newly established Communist Party made painstaking effort to set up trade unions

278

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China

and peasants’ associations in the mid-1920s. Around the time when the two parties split in 1927, there were about 700 trade unions with over two million members (Liu, 1998, p. 343) and 22,000 peasants’ associations with 9,153,093 members (DIPPKU, 1985, p. 170). Afterward, the two parties separately controlled their own workers’ and peasants’ organizations. There is no record on the communist side, but the Nanjing government claimed to have 33,000 grassroots peasants’ associations with 34,681,000 members in 1938 (TSHDHC, 1994, p. 86, p. 497). From 1937 to 1945, China was at war with Japan. Large parts of China’ territory fell under Japanese occupation. The KMT government then moved its capital to an inland city, Chongqing. In 1942, it stipulated “Organic Law of People’s Groups during the War Time”, which required associations to register with the government. A total 17,250 organizations did in the same year. Two years later in 1944, the number reached 26,126. Of course, organizations existing in areas under Japanese control were excluded (Liu, 1998, pp. 423–424). No one knew the real number for the whole country. Japanese surrendered in 1945, but soon after China fell into a 3.5-year long civil war, during which the government lost track of the number of operating associations. The war ended in 1949 with a victory of the Communist forces. The KMT forces fled to Taiwan. In the early years of the People’s Republic, the national governments did not seem to have kept record of the total number of associations in the whole country, but some local governments did. As Table 1 indicates, in four provinces (Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong and Liaoning) and three metropolizes (Shanghai, Tianjin and Nanjing) for which information was available, no general pattern was discernible during the period. In some places, the number of associations plunged substantially from the previous peak (Jiangxi and Guangdong); in others, the decline was quite minor (Shanghai and Tianjin); and yet in the rest, the number swelled (Fujian, Liaoning and Nanjing). After 1956, there was no longer any single government ministry that took the sole responsibility for the administration of associational affairs. Instead, all party/state agencies (including Ministry of Culture, State Sports Commission, State Science and Technology Commission, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and, above all, the Party’s Department of Propaganda) were involved, with each in charge of certain types of

279

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu Founding Year of Associations 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 1904 1911 1917 1925 1931 1938 1945 1951 1957 1963 1970 1976 1982 1988 1994

Figure 2.

Founding Year of Associations.

Source : Our databank.

organizations. No centralized registration was required. This situation did not change until 1989–1990 (Ma and Liu, 1993, pp. 10–11). Thus, systematic statistics on associations was simply non-existent for more than 30 years. To the best of our knowledge, there were about 100 nation-level associations and 6,000 local associations in 1965 (Wu and Chen, 1996, pp. 4–7). After China embarked on reforms, Chinese associations underwent a postreform renaissance in the 1980s. Based on a dataset that contains information from 16,379 existing associations, Fig. 2 plots the frequencies of their respective founding years. Clearly, never before had China seen such a high level of association building. When the Ministry of Civil Affairs assumed the duty of overseeing associational affairs in 1989, it estimated that there were altogether 1,600 nation-level organizations and 200,000 local ones. In the nine places included in Table 1, the number of registered associations in 1989–1990 all surpassed the previous record year.

4.

Organizations under the Jurisdiction of MCA

Registered groups refer to those that have registered with the Minister of Civil Affairs (MCA) and its subsidiaries throughout the country. Those 280

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China Table 1.

Registered Associations in Selected Places, 1912–1990.

Jiangxi Fujian Gansu Guandong Liaoing Shanghai Tianjin Nanjing Shaoing 1912 1928 1934 1935 1936 1937 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1951 1952 1953 1954 1956 1981 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990

100 142 1123 1142 15 2403 2988 2225 97 3273 4536

4385

1572 2087 2479 2740

1416 4090

212 388 27

5143 2794 504

1320 1336

492 350

904

377

485

9231

379 278 1116

1210 1474 590 633 2256 7000 10000 8172

13200 11403

4299 4290

80 4803

Sources: Jiangxi Minzheng Zhi [Records of Jiangxi Civil Affairs] (Huangshan Publishing House, 1993); Fujian Shengzhi-Minzheng Zhi [Fujian Records — Civil Affairs] (Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 1997); Gansu Shengzhi-Minzheng Zhi [Gansu Records — Civil Affairs] (Lanzhou: Gansu Peoples’ Publishing House, 1994); Guangdong ShengzhiMinzheng Zhi [Guangdong Records — Civil Affairs] (Guangzhou: Guangdong Peoples’ Publishing House, 1993); Liaoning Sheng Minzheng Zhi [Records of Liaoning Civil Affairs] (Liaoning Peoples’Publishing House, 1996); Shanghai Minzheng Zhi [Records of Shanghai Civil Affairs] (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Science Publishing House, 2000); Ma and Liu (1993); Tianjin Tongzhi-Minzheng Zhi [All Records of Tianjin — Civil Affairs] (Tianjin Academy of Social Science Publishing House, 2001); Nanjing Minzheng Zhi [Records of Nanjing Civil Affairs] (Shenzhen: Haitian Publishing House; 1994); Jiangsu Shengzhi-Minzheng Zhi [Jiangsu Records — Civil Affairs] (Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 2002); Shaoxing Minzheng Zhi [Records of Shaoxing Civil Affairs] (Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, 1998).

281

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu

fall into two broad categories: “social organizations” and “private nonenterprise units”.

4.1.

Social organizations

In 1989, the State Council promulgated the Regulation on the Registration and Administration of Associations, which entrusted the MCA as the sole authority of registration. With some exceptions, all civic associations were required to register with the MCA and its local bureaus. To do so, an association had to find a party/state agency that was willing to be its official sponsor first. Otherwise, it would have to dissolve itself. The system of dual regulations was designed for the party-state to control the development of the registered associations. In the highly electric political environment after the Tiananmen, thousands of associations failed to obtain appropriate sponsorship. Consequently, the total number of registered associations dropped from around 200,000 in 1989 to barely 110,000 in 1991. As Fig. 3 shows, associational activism quickly resumed in the first half of 1990s. By 1996, the number of registered associations reached 186,666, a level only slightly lower than the peak of 1989. However, the rapid growth of associations was seen by the government as a serious 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000 0 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Registered Associations

Figure 3. Registered Associations: 1991–2003. Source : Ministry of Civil Affairs, Zhongguo Minzheng Tongji Nianjian [Statistical Yearbook of Civil Affairs] (Beijing: China Statistical Press, various years). 2003’s data is from the official website of Bureau of NPO Administration: http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn.

282

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China

challenge to its ability to manage associational affairs. In particular, the emergence of such semi-religious organizations as Falun Gong greatly worried the government. With hierarchical structure and top-to-bottom control, such organizations could pose a threat to the regime. In 1999, such concern turned into a reality when more than 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners surrounded Zhongnanhai, the compound in central Beijing housing the core government and CCP leaders and their families. To remove potential time bombs, the government became stricter in conducting annual inspections over associations. Those failing the inspections were forced to shut down. In 1998, the State Council amended the Regulation on the Registration and Administration of Associations, which increased the threshold of the initial funds and required sponsoring agencies to take full responsibility for the conducts of related associations. Those measures resulted in another slump of the number of registered associations between 1996 and 2001. Afterward, the falling trend was reversed. By the end of 2003, China had 142,000 registered associations i. What kinds of associations were most vulnerable to the abovementioned policy changes? The government seems to have favored some types of associations over others. Officially, MCA divides associations into five large categories: Academic associations (xueshu), trade associations (hangye), professional associations (zhuanye), federations (lianhe), and foundations (jijinhui). Data from the MCA Statistical Yearbook shows that the government tends to be more supportive to the first two categories, which together accounted for nearly 60% of the total number of registered associations in 2002 (Fig. 4). From the very beginning of the reform era, the role of science and technology in modernization has been emphasized. Many academic associations that had been disbanded during the Cultural Revolution resumed their activities after 1978. The number of academic associations has not fluctuated as much as other types of associations when the state intervened. At the end of 2002, in the area of natural science and technology alone, there were 3,776 academic associations at the national and provincial level, with a membership of 7.9 million (Table 2). Trade association is a product of marketization and denationalization. The pre-reform system of planned economy left no space for trade associations to function. As government agencies increasingly withdrew

283

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu Foundation 1.0% Mixed 13.0%

Learned Society 28.5%

Foreign 0.0%

Profession al 28.2%

Guild 29.4%

Figure 4. Social Organizations by Type, 2002. Source : Zhongguo Minzheng Tongji Nianjian (2003).

from micromanagement of state-owned enterprises and more and more non-state enterprises came into being, the state realized that trade associations could play such important roles as facilitating information exchange and conducting self-regulation among their member firms. For this reason, the government has gone out of its way to promote the development of trade associations in the recent years. In 2000, for instance, nearly 40% of the newly registered associations were trade associations. The ratio increased to 45% in the following year. In this sense, the current distributional pattern of registered associations reveals the preference order of the state with regards to different types of associations. Moreover, Fig. 5 suggests that the administrative level matters: The lower the level, the more vulnerable. After 1994, the numbers of nationlevel and province-level, and prefecture-level associations have fluctuated but within narrow ranges. County-level associations, however, were more likely to suffer from restrictive policy environment.

4.2.

Private non-enterprise units

Private non-enterprise units are providers of social services whose purposes are not to maximize profits. Examples include private schools, day care 284

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China Table 2.

Academic Associations in Natural Science and Technology: 1987–2002. Organizations by level

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Membership by level

Total

Nation

Province

Prefecture

Nation

Province

Prefecture

— — — — — — — — — 13359 13092 — — 12111 12023

146 146 151 155 159 163 160 164 165 165 165 165 163 168 167 167

2885 2828 3013 3257 3198 3107 3160 3124 3538 3055 3006 2950 3535 3470 3648 3609

— — — — — — — — — 10149 9921 — — 8473 8208 —

1718780 2012312 2238956 2305991 2943469 3235631 — — 2734589 4157297 4174262 — — 4570400 4490000 3940000

2396037 — — 3384177 3655743 3592950 — — 2858868 4071087 4219741 — — 4551200 3710000 3960000

— — — — — — — — 4859651 4703818 — —

Source : Ministry of Science & Technology, Zhongguo Keji Tongji Nianjian [Statistical Yearbook of Science & Technology] (Beijing: China Statistical Press, various years).

centers, facilities for the physically and mentally challenged, retirement homes, and so on. Most of such entities used to be owned by the state or collectives. Now they became privatized in one way or another. In addition, an increasing number of such entities were recently established to meet new demands resulted from China’s rapid socioeconomic transition. They tended to be privately-owned from the outset. Whatever their origins were, those organizations did not begin their registration with MCA until 1999. In the last five years, the number of registered organizations increased by more than 20 folds. By the end of 2003, there were altogether 124,000 “private non-enterprise units” (Fig. 6).

4.3. What are excluded? Studies on China’s civil society often focus on “social organizations” and “private non-enterprise units”, assuming that they cover the entire 285

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

0

National

Provincial

Prefectual

County

Figure 5. Social Organizations by Administrative Levels. Source : Zhongguo Minzheng Tongji Nianjian (various years). 200000 180000 160000 140000 120000 100000 80000 60000 40000 20000 0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Figure 6. Private Non-Enterprise Units. Source : Zhongguo Minzheng Tongji Nianjian (various years). 2003’s data is from the official website of Bureau of NPO Administration: http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn.

associational landscapes in China (Young and Woo, 2000). In fact, organizations registered with MCA only occupy a small corner of the vast landscape. Most associations in China are actually not registered with MAC. First of all, there are organizations that should register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs but fail to do so. Figure 5 shows that more than 40,000 county-level social organizations vanished on MCA’s record between 1996 and 2000. That they were no longer registered with MCA did not mean that they no longer existed. Some of them might have disbanded themselves or 286

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China

merged into other organizations, but most might have chosen either to register as commercial entities instead or simply continue their operation without registration at all. As a matter of fact, many of high-profile environment groups in China have never registered with MCA. Because the thresholds for registration are quite high, many newly formed organizations might also not be able to register even if they are willing to do so.2 We have reasons to estimate that the number of social organizations that operate without official registration could be as many as 30,000–50,000 in the nation. As for private non-enterprise units, MAC itself estimated that there might in fact be 200,000–300,000 of them currently operating in the country but failing to register (Zhao, 2003). In addition to the registered and unregistered social organizations and private non-enterprise units, there is huge number of associations that are not required to register with MCA by law. Those include local chapters of the eight categories of “mass organizations” that are the membership of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress and of 25 “social organizations” that are exempt from registrations with MCA by the State Council (e.g., the China Writers Association or the All-China Journalism Association). Moreover, grassroots associations below the county level, especially those operating within enterprises, government agencies, schools, urban neighborhoods, rural townships and villages, etc. do not have to register with MCA either. The next two sections turn to examining these vast areas of China’s associational landscapes.

5.

Quasi-Governmental Organizations

Established by the Communist Party before or after 1949 and covering the party’s key constituencies (workers, youth, women, scientists and engineers, businesspersons, overseas Chinese, literary and art circles, and so on), mass organizations have been important institutional pillars of China’s political system. They are designed as two-way transmission belts between 2A former official from Shanghai municipal bureau of civil affairs told us that, after retire-

ment, she worked for a non-governmental organization, but her organization was forced to operate without registration, because the requirement of initial funds for social organizations was set too high.

287

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu

the party/state and the masses of people. They are expected to carry out the directives of the party/state and pass them down to the masses on the one hand, and collect the will, opinion and interests of the masses and carry them back to the policy-making of the party/state on the other. Even before the reform era, “there has been variation over time in the degree of political integration demanded of mass organizations. During periods of political mobilization, mass organizations were highly politicized. During periods of consolidations, they became relatively independent of political demands and more responsive to the expressed needs and interests of their members” (Fisher, 1974, pp. 11–12). Reforms in the last quarter of century have further weakened their political roles and strengthened their functional roles. All mass organizations are umbrella organizations, each of which has thousands of branches and subsidiaries and millions of members throughout the country. Table 3 presents a breakdown of information about eight mass organizations. Space limit does not allow us to elaborate how we arrive at those numbers. What follows is the discussion of a couple of cases, which is meant to illustrate how we assemble data from a myriad of sources for such exercises.

5.1.

All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) 3

Trade unions are supposed to protect the rights and interests of workers, but at the same time, they are used by the party/state to pacify workers or mobilize workers for achieving certain political goals. The dual nature has often led unions to conflict with the party-state.4 Due to the massive denationalization of the Chinese economy in recent years, unions are in a process of searching for their new identities. While it is uncertain about whether they will eventually become true representatives of workers’ interests, no one can deny their potentiality of serving as a powerful counter force against management. Recent restructuring of trade unions seems to hint that such change is highly probable. As Fig. 7 reveals, the numbers of grassroots trade unions and their membership reached their peaks in the early 1990s. Afterward, both began to fall. This was so because at that time trade unions operated mainly in the 3All China Federation of Trade Unions’ website, http://www.acftu.org. 4 For a detailed description of the conflicts between All-China Federation of Trade Unions

and the party-state, see Harper (1969) and Zhang (2003).

288

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China Table 3.

Mass Organizations and Their Grassroots Groups.

Eight mass organizations

Grassroots groups

Trade Unions Youth League Branches Women’s Associations Science & Technology Associations Rural Special Associations AST WST Returned Overseas Chinese Federation of Industry & Commerce Self-Employed Association∗ Taiwanese Associations Youth Federation Sub-total

1,713,000 2,720,000 684,000 50,000 115,658 10,674 25,611 11,000 18,481 30,000 — — 5,378,424

Notes: ∗WSTs are sponsored by trade unions. For convenience, they are included under the category of science and technology. The Administrative Bureau of Industry and Commerce sponsor associations of self-employed and private businesspersons. However, their functions are similar to Federation of Industry & Commerce. 2.00

250

1.80 1.60

200

1.40 1.20

150

1.00 100

0.80 0.60

50

0.40 0.20 2004 2006 2008

1998 2000 2002

1992 1994 1996

1986 1988 1990

1980 1982 1984

0.00 1952 1962

0

Membership (Million) #Grassroots Organizations (Million)

Figure 7. Trade Unions in China: 1952–2002. Source : ACFTU, Zhongguo Gonghui Tongji Nianjian [The Statistical Yearbook of Trade Unions in China] (Beijing: China Statistical Press, various years) and Zhongguo Gonghui Nianjian [Yearbook of Trade Unions in China] (Beijing: ACFTU Press, various years).

289

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu

state-owned sector, which was experiencing a painful decline in much of the 1990s. The year of 1999 appeared to be a turning point. In the subsequent three years, the number of grassroots unions more than tripled and their membership increased by 50%. Both changes were the results of the expansion of unions into the private sector. Interestingly, although the number of grassroots trade unions expanded rapidly after 1999, the number of the full-time staff working for them was still shrinking, an indication that the party/state’s control over unions was relaxing. At the end of 2002, there were all together 1,712,528 grassroots trade unions in China with a total membership of 133,977,709.

5.2.

Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) 5

Chinese Communist Youth League is defined as the vanguard of the youth. To serve as an “assistant and reserve” for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the main function of CCYL is to recruit and educate outstanding young men and women. In the 1990s, the CCYL became less attractive to the young people. After the middle 1990s, though the membership was still growing, the number of grassroots branches declined (see Table 4), a change that might also be related to the shrinkage of the state sector of the economy. In the new century, the CCYL began to establish branches in the private sector, which helped to increase its grassroots branches, but only slightly. At the end of 2002, there are 2.57 millions of branches with a total membership nearly 70 millions.

5.3.

China Association for Science and Technology (CAST) 6

China Association for Science and Technology is an umbrella mass organization of scientists and engineers. In addition to directly managing near 200 nation-level scientific societies, CAST has around 2,600 local branches at provincial, municipal and county levels, which in turn oversee 42,000 scientific societies at the corresponding levels. More important, below the county level, there exist three vast networks of grassroots associations for science 5 Chinese Communist Youth League’s website: http://www.ccyl.org.cn. 6 China Association for Science and Technology’s website: http://www.cflac.org.cn.

290

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China Table 4.

Development of Youth League.

Year

Membership (million)

# of staff

# of branches (million)

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

48.54 / 47.74 46.95 46.60 51.82 56.37 60.07 56.00 / 55.35 56.48 56.80 58.00 61.80 63.76 65.56 68.54 68.71 68.03 / / 69.86

150200 161600 168034 184716 200820 220511 229692 225308 208027 209188 220571 235235 227546 210593 215612 213891 214960 213695 208876 186971 / / 183000

212.7 / 227.3 226.5 227.8 239.5 247.7 249 256.9 / 260.8 258.1 / 263.9 264.8 274.7 271.2 276.6 264.2 254.9 / / 272

Source : http://80years.ccyl.org.cn/80year/tdjs/index.htm.

and technology, namely, rural special technique associations (RSTA), associations for science and technology in enterprises (AST) and the workers’ technical associations (WTA). RSTAs emerged after the introduction of household responsibility system in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They were technical and economic cooperative organizations of the farmers who happened to plant the same crops or engage in similar activities. RSTAs have expanded quickly, especially after CAST set up a subsidiary — China Rural Special Technique Association (CRSTA) to direct RSTAs in 1995. It is reported that 5.8 millions of farmers joined 115,658 RSTAs by the end of 2001 (Fig. 8). 291

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu

Figure 8. Rural Special Technique Associations. Source : http://www.china-njx.com/xiehuifenbutu.htm.

Also at the end of 2001, there were 10,674 ASTs operating in enterprises. While ASTs are composed of engineers and technicians, WTAs are organizations of workers. WTA was first founded by some model workers in Shenyang in 1961.7 From then on, the government has made efforts to 7 For administrative purpose, WTAs are under the jurisdiction of the All China Federation

of Trade Unions.

292

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China Table 5.

1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 2002

Grassroots Workers’ Technical Associations.

Grassroots WTA #

Membership

Full-time staff

59750 60154 61298 70000∗ 47091 33940 38000∗ 25611

3642203 4008042 4339543 4340000 3278354 3258082 3260000 2288960

39049 48099 56426 — 118203 65627 — —

Note: ∗ Those figures include the WTAs at the levels of province and prefecture. Source : Zhongguo Gonghui Tongji Nianjian and Zhongguo Gonghui Nianjian (various years).

promote their development, aiming at increasing the participation of workers in technical innovation, cooperation, competition and transfer. Table 5 presents statistics on WTAs for the last decade or so. Apparently, WTAs have contracted since the mid-1990s, which no doubt is a consequence of the denationalization of the Chinese economy. Private enterprises do not seem to have much interest in WTAs at all.

5.4.

All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce

Established in 1953, the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) was an organization representing the interests of industrial and commercial business. Approved by the State Council, now the ACFIC is also known as the China General Chamber of Commerce (CGCC). The adoption of a “new face” is a sign that the organization intends to downplay its “united front” role and shift its emphasis more toward economic and nonstate activities. By the end of 2002, the ACFIC system had a membership of about 1.64 million, comprising enterprises, institutions, and individuals. Members were pre-dominantly small and medium-size enterprises as well as individually owned ventures (getihu). The system has an extensive network of local chambers of commerce throughout the country, including 3,059 local chapters at the county level and above, of which 358 local chapters are located in major cities throughout the country, covering 95% of 293

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu

the nation’s administrative regions. Below the county level, there are some 18,481 chapters at the township and community level, 461 of which were founded during 2001. The relationships among the chambers at various levels are informal and quite loose. The national ACFIC may provide guidance to the provincial and local chambers and the provincial chambers may also provide guidance to their respective local chambers, but the national and provincial chambers do not have formal authority to issue orders to the local chambers (ADB, 2003, p. 44). In addition to the ACFIC, private businesspersons may also join either local getihu associations or private enterprise associations. Supervised by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and its local branches, the two organizations have their own networks throughout the country at every administrative level, which are separated from, and compete in supplying certain services to members with, the ACFIC system. Although both appear to have top-down structure, each local association is actually independent and is administered by its respective local government. There is also considerable variation in the name, structure, size and activities of different associations depending upon the local conditions and the attitudes of local governments. Since two organizations generally overlap the ACFIC system, it is conservative to estimate that they together have at least 30,000 groups below the county level (ADB, 2003, p. 46).

5.5.

Other quasi-governmental organizations

On top of the eight major mass organizations, there are other governmentsponsored organizations, each of which has its own nation-wide network. Examples include the China Family Planning Association (CFPA)8 and the consumers’ associations.9 Established in 1980, CFPA has since penetrated nearly all provinces, municipalities and counties, and a large portion of urban neighborhoods and rural communities. Those organizations have served as an effective instrument for the government to carry out its birth control policy, especially in the countryside. Besides, they have also been active in the fields of health education and community development. CFPA reportedly has about 1.02 million local branches and 83 million members. 8 China Family Planning Association’s website: http://www.chinafpa.org.cn. 9 China Consumers’ Association’s website: http://www.cca.org.cn.

294

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China 3500 3138 3085

3000 2500

2425

2000 1500 1100

1000 500 1

4

238

1983 1984

1986

1992

1998 1999

Figure 9. Consumers’ Associations at the County Level and Above. Source : http://www.cca.org.cn/aboutus/6-gzcj1.htm.

Table 6. Other Quasi-Government Associations and Its Grassroots Groups. Other quasi-government associations Family Planning Associations Consumers’ Associations Associations of Disabled Volunteers’ Associations Associations of Literature & Arts Sports Associations Sub-total

Grassroots groups 1,020,000 156,000 40,000 24,000 45,000 53,220 1,338,220

The mission of the China Consumers’ Association is to protect consumer rights and to probe and intermediate consumers’complains according to the Law on Consumer Rights Protection. After its foundation in the early 1980s, the organization has expanded rapidly. Its local branches now penetrate all corners of the country. As Fig. 9 shows, by 1999, there were already 3,138 chapters at the county level and above. It is reported that consumers’ associations at lower levels amounted to 156,000. Table 6 sums up the number of grassroots groups affiliated with six quasi-governmental associations. Together, the 14 organizations included 295

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu

in Tables 5 and 6 encompass some 6.7 million grassroots organizations. The main function of those organizations is to involve people from specific segments of the society in activities in specific areas and make sure that such activities would not spin out of state control. Due to their close connections with the government, they may be more susceptible to state interference than other organizations and the membership within some (not all) of them may not even be entirely voluntary. Nevertheless, as they play important roles in the economic, social, political, and cultural lives for millions of Chinese, any study of associational life in China would be incomplete if they were to be excluded.

6.

Grassroots and Virtual Organizations

According to China’s “Regulation on the Registration and Administration of Associations”, groups operating within government agencies, institutions, enterprises, schools, urban neighborhoods, and rural communities are considered “internal” organizations and not required to register with MCA. MCA and its local bureaus do not even bother to collect information about associations below the county level. For this reason, grassroots associations have largely been ignored by the literature on China’s civil society, although they have played an active and increasingly more important role in Chinese associational life. Examples include book discussion clubs, choral societies, hiking clubs, amateur sports clubs, literary circles, religious groups, hobby groups, elderly associations, friendship groups, students’ associations, disease support groups, and the like. A report on grassroots associations in Shanghai, for instance, found that there were 4,658 reading groups in 92 work units surveyed in August 1999, including 1,061 groups on social science, 1,600 on science and technology, 648 on economics and management, 644 on culture and arts, and 705 on hobbies (Yin, 2001, p. 244). Most of grassroots associations are locally based, significantly autonomous and volunteer-run. They provide their members with information, stimulation, opportunities for self-expression, social support, fellowship, and mutual aid, and thus have many kinds of significant “internal impact” on their members. In each work units or community, the number of such grassroots groups may be small, but cumulatively, their total number 296

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China Table 7.

Grassroots Groups.

Grassroots groups

Number

College Student Groups High School Student Groups Community-based Recreational Groups Philately Other Hobby Groups Senior Citizens’ Schools Tne Elderly Associations Home-owners’ Associations Religious Groups Friendship Groups BBS and Virtual Associations Sub-total

20,700 95,000 50,000 41,000 130,000 17,000 70,000 15,000 170,000 50,000 100,000 758,700

must be gigantic. It is impossible to ascertain the exact number without a nation-wide survey. Table 7 presents our conservative estimates about the numbers of 11 types of grassroots groups. Three types are discussed below.

6.1.

Students’ associations at college campuses

There are 1,472 universities and colleges in China by the end of 2003. We randomly selected 108 for our investigation. After sampling, we browsed the websites of these schools to look for information on students’ associations in each of them. All of these schools provide their lists of students’ groups active on their campuses and some offer detailed information on each of them. These lists may or may not be exhaustive. In any event, we identify altogether 1,519 students’ groups among the 108 universities. In other words, each university on average has 14.06.10 Some universities seem to have more vibrant associational life than others do. The number of students’ groups on each campus ranges from 100 at Harbin Polytechnic University to just one at Xinjiang University. Table 8 shows that the 10A survey conducted in Shanghai largely confirms this estimate. There were 712 associa-

tions in 56 universities in Shanghai in 2000. The average was about 12. The distribution of these associations was also similar with our online survey with 57% of groups active in the areas of literary and arts and sports (SDSYL, 2001).

297

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu Table 8. Types of Students’ Associations at 108 Universities. Types

Number

Percentage

Literary & Arts Sports & Health Science & Technology Social Science Voluntary Service Study Groups Others Total

647 253 183 157 146 100 33 1519

42.6 16.6 12 10.3 9.6 6.6 2.2 100

Source : Our own databank.

distribution of different types of students association in our sample. Apparently, literary and arts groups are most attractive to college students. Using the average derived from our sample, we estimate that there are at least 20,700 (14.06 × 1,472) students’ associations on university campuses in China. The same method is also used to estimate the number of students’ groups at high schools.

6.2.

Community-based groups

China has 5,576 urban residential communities and 20,601 townships (State Statistical Bureau, 2003, p. 3). How many community-based recreational groups are there? No one knows. Nevertheless, any tourist to Chinese cities would immediately spot signs of lively recreational activities in group form. Of course, more group activities are not observable to outsiders. Take Ruijin Community in Shanghai as an example. An area of 1.98 square kilometers with the population of 93,000, the community had 465 grassroots associations of 41 types, which involved the participation of more than 6,000 residents (see Table 9). All these groups were founded after 1990. Retirees were among the most active participants. Most of group leaders were either the members of the Residential Committee (46%) or retirees (46%). Moreover, most of the groups were initiated by the Residential Committee, and only a handful of sports clubs were started by individual residents (Yin, 2001). 298

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China Table 9. Types Self-Service

Grassroots Associations in the Ruijin Community, Shanghai. No. 1 2 3 4

5 6

7 8

9 Learning and Propaganda

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Caring and Mutual Help

18 19 20

Name (including activities) Volunteers’ Associations and Groups Voluntary Patrol Groups Legal Consulting Service Groups Health Consulting Groups (Consist of Retired Doctors) Sanitation Monitoring Groups Medical Service Groups (Including Human Milk Feeding Supporting Groups) Psychological Counseling Groups Voluntary Groups for Helping Families with Subsistence Difficulties Groups for Scientific Baby-fostering Senior Citizens’ Schools Newspaper Reading Groups for the Elders Current Affairs Discussion Groups Citizenship Schools Propaganda Groups Young Pioneers Radio Groups Young People’s Propaganda Groups Popular Science Groups Comprehensive Caring Groups for the Weakens Army Man’s Family-caring Groups Elders-caring Groups

Group No.

Membership

12

128

30 12

5295 65

5

30

9 5

133 77

3

17

6

30

2

11

4 3

51 37

2

29

2 2 5 3

45 31 52 35

12

164

4

27

4

29

1

29

Source : Yin (2001, pp. 246–247).

299

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu

This case is by no means representative of the overall situation in China. Most of the country’s urban and rural communities may not be as vivacious as the Ruijin Community is. Nevertheless, even if we assume that each urban community has five groups and each rural community has only one, the number of community-based groups in the country would reach around 50,000.

6.3.

Associations in cyberspace

What we have discussed heretofore are all associations in real space. Since the mid-1990s, personal computers have penetrated workplaces and homes in urban China. Meanwhile, the growth of Internet has been equally astounding, with the number of Internet users doubling every 12 months or so (see Fig. 10). According to the “Thirteenth Semiannual Survey Reports on the Internet in China” released by the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC, http://www.cnnic. net.cn/html/Dir/2004/02/03/2114.htm), the number of Internet users reached 79.5 million by January 2004. The Internet provides a platform for individuals — through email, chat rooms, news groups and clubs — to form formal and informal groups “for the purpose of exchanges, including resource transactions and relations reinforcement” (Lin, 2001, p. 212) regardless of their physical location. How does the Internet affect Chinese 450 384

400

338

350

298

300

253

250

210 162

200 150 100 500.62 1.1752.1 4

59.1 68 45.8 33.7 26.5 22.5 8.9 16.9

111 94 103 79.5 87

123

137

10 /

1/ 4/ 97 1 10 /98 /1 /9 4/ 8 1 10 /99 /1 / 4/ 99 1/ 10 00 /1 /0 4/ 0 1 10 /01 /1 /0 4/ 1 1 10 /02 /1 /0 4/ 2 1/ 10 03 /1 /0 4/ 3 1 10 /04 /1 / 4/ 04 1 10 /05 /1 /0 4/ 5 1/ 10 06 /1 / 4/ 06 1 10 /07 /1 /0 4/ 7 1/ 10 08 /1 /0 4/ 8 1/ 10 09 /1 /0 9

0

Figure 10. Internet Users in China: 1997–2003 (million). Source : CNNIC, Zhongguo Hulian Wangluo Fazhan Zhuangkuang Tongji Baogao [Semiannual Reports on the Development of Internet in China]. http://www.cnnic.net.cn/index/0E/00/11/index.htm.

300

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China

associational life? Does it promote the growth of “virtual” associations? This subsection tries to answer these questions by focusing on one particular form of virtual com-munity — the Bulletin Board System. Interaction between members is both the main cause and function of association. The Bulletin Board System (BBS) on the Internet is a virtual forum that provides a general community structure around which users can gather and interact. Any individual who frequents a virtual forum or BBS can be considered a member of that community, simply by their attendance. The BBS community consists of a variety of boards, each of which focuses on a specific topic, like current affairs, history, reading, literature, arts, techniques, hobbies, mutual help, and volunteering. Some eminent BBS forums have large numbers of loyal members. For example, set up by People Daily’s Net in May 1999, Qiangguo Luntan (Strengthening China Forum, http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/start) is one of the most renowned political forums, with 290,000 membership IDs. On average, about 12,000 pieces of messages are posted everyday. The highest number of simultaneous online members amounts to 50,000. Also set up in 1999, Tianya Virtual Club (http://www.tianyaclub.com) has now more than 1 million registered IDs. SMTH BBS (http://www.smth.org), the earliest in China, is one of most famous university-based BBS. With more than 150,000 member IDs, it always has more than 10,000 members spontaneously online. According to the estimation of its managers, the real membership should be no less than 100,000. SMTH offers over 300 boards, covering almost every area of university life. Calculated from CNNIC’s 13th surveys, Fig. 11 traces the growth of Chinese BBS users in the last few years. By January 2004, as many as 15 million Chinese were regular BBS users. How many BBS forums are there in China? There is no systematic statistics available, but it is possible to come up with a rough estimate. There were altogether 595,550 websites in the country by the end of 2003. They could be divided into seven broad categories: Websites of enterprises, commercial website, personal websites, websites of education and research institutions, other business websites, government websites, and websites of nonprofit organizations. In its 13th survey, CNNIC reported that 19.2% of 422,245 websites of enterprises provided BBS forums, which meant 81,071 BBS on this type of websites alone. The BBS forums on enterprises

301

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 2010 2010

0

Figure 11. BBS Users, 1999–2004 (million). Source : Zhongguo Hulian Wangluo Fazhan Zhuangkuang Tongji Baogao.

websites were mostly oriented toward their customers or staff, and related to its products or services. Most of them have little influence in the public. Among 48,835 commercial websites, 9.1% of them set up the 4,444 BBS forums.11 Many BBS forums provided by commercial websites have enormous influence on internet users. Examples include SINA.com, SOHU.com and Xilu.com. Xilu.com is a professional provider of virtual communities, where some 520,000 forums have registered with more than 10 million member IDs. At any moment, more than 10,000 persons visit those forums. As for 19,058 government websites, 35.6% of them provided 6,785 BBS forums. Although there is no data on the education and research institutions’ BBS in the CNNIC survey, we know that 160 college BBS forums have registered at http://www.cn-bbs.org by 2003, each of which provides on average 17 bulletin boards. On average, each college BBS has 13,730 member IDs. Finally, there are 38,711 personal websites, many of which also set up BBS forums, even though we have no way to establish the exact number of personal BBS forums. Adding the estimates together, we are confident to conclude that there are no less than 100,000 BBS forums in China, probably many more. Each bulletin board functions as a virtual community. To what extent is a virtual community different from a traditional association? Two types of 11 The number of this type of BBSes do not seem to be very stable. CNNIC’s 2002 survey

identified 8,470 BBS forums provided by commercial websites.

302

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China

activities are worth noting. First, opposed to the open forum, close forums have emerged recently. These forums have clear goals and orientations. Their memberships do not open to the public and reference from the existing member is always the prerequisite to join the forum. Rights and obligations are always clearly declared and must be obeyed. The close forum is very much like an association. Dogn Club (http://www.dogn.net), a close forum oriented to the serious-minded communication, is a good example. It is open for browsing, but the membership is under strict control. The club establishes a 5-person membership committee to screen applications. One veto from any committee member will deny an application. Now it has only 386 member ID and 12 boards. League for BBS Masters is another example. Founded in September 2001, it is a confidential forum aiming at building a virtual association for the communication of BBS masters. The precondition for its membership is that the applicant has to be a master of large-sized BBS. Internal referee is required for anyone who intends to apply for membership. Second, virtual associational life can be transformed from the cyberspace into formal or informal associations in the real world. Get-togethers of net-mates are now quite common for the BBS users. Some members of a tourist BBS may travel together; sports lovers may play balls every weekend; and reading groups may meet to debate on some issues. Guantian Teahouse, a board in Tianya Club (http://www.tianyaclub.com), is virtual tea bar for those who are interested in political debate and attracts many prominent scholars and writers from both liberal and new left camps. Despite their conflicting ideological orientations, net-mates of the BBS organized lectures at different cities from time to time. As Table 10 shows, during the summer in 2003, 14 gathering were held by the net-mates of Guantian in nine cities. Constitutionalism, citizenship, and democratizations were hot topics in the gathering. No doubt, the Internet has greatly expanded the social space for Chinese associational life.

7.

Summary

This chapter provides a quantitative assessment of the density and diversity of associational life in China. Table 11 summarizes our findings presented 303

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu Table 10.

Recent Gatherings of Guantian Teahouse Board in Tianya Club.

Date

City

2003-6-28 Hangzhou, Zhejiang 2003-6-29 Hangzhou, Zhejiang 2003-7-11 Beijing 2003-7-13 Guangzhou, Guangdong 2003-7-19 Guangzhou, Guangdong 2003-7-26 Xi’an, Shaanxi 2003-7-26 Beijing

2003-8-2 2003-8-6

Chengdu, Sichuan Wenzhou, Zhejing

2003-8-9 Wuhan, Hubei 2003-8-10 Beijing 2003-8-26 Shanghai 2003-8-27 Ji’nan, Shandong

2003-9-3

Xi’an, Shaanxi

Topics

# of participants

Lecture on the Economic Sociological Explanation of China’s Reform Environmental Protecting Hiking Dinner Talk on Constitutionalism Around 20 persons Lecture on News Reform Climbing

20 persons

Internet, Citizenship and Democratization Lecture on Rule by Law, Given by Dr. Yu Jianrong, a Famous Scholar in the Field of Rural Politics Constitutional Reform Confucianism and Culture and Development of Wenzhou

7 persons About 50 persons

Lecture Given by Dr. Liu 80 persons Junning, a Political Scientist Chinese Culture and Democracy, About 20 persons Internet and Public Opinion About 30 persons Huang Jing’s Case (A Well-known Dating Rape Case of the Year) History, Democratization, Labor

in the preceding sections. Clearly, if our attention were to be focused on what Chinese called “social organizations” or worse yet on those social organizations that are financially, functionally, and politically autonomous from the state, we would miss large parts of China’s associational landscapes. The findings about the number of operating associations run parallel with those about the participation rate of associational life. The 1990 304

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China Table 11. The Total Estimated Number of Associations in China. Category

Number

Registered Social Organizations Registered Private Non-enterprise Units Unregistered Social Organizations Unregistered Private Non-enterprise Units Eight Mass Organizations Other Quasi-Government Associations Grassroots Groups Total

142,000 124,000 40,000 250,000 5,378,424 1,338,220 758,700 8,031,344

Table 12. Active Membership in any Organizations Except Political Party. # of associations that interviewee participated 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total

Frequency

Percent

1810 468 149 57 13 2 1 2500

72.4 18.7 6.0 2.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 100

Source : World Value Survey (1990).

World Value Survey, for instance, found that 27.6% of Chinese had active membership in one or more associations (Table 12). Commissioned by UNDP, our own 2001 survey confirmed the results of the World Value Survey (Table 13). Therefore, it is hardly an exaggeration for us to conclude, “Yes, China is indeed part of the global association revolution”. Of course, the organizations listed in Table 11 differ greatly from one another in their origins, natures, internal structures, sources of financing, membership profiles, relationships with the state, and so on, even though they all help form durable networks of more or less institutionalized relationships among their members. Therefore, mapping out the landscapes is 305

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu Table 13. Have You Participated in Associational Activities. Answer

Frequency

Percent

Yes No Total

422 1345 1767

23.9 76.1 100

Source : Our own databank.

at best the first step to study the associational revolution in China. Many more questions need to be scrutinized before we can fully grasp the significance of the revolution. What factors have contributed to China’s recent associational revolution? Why has the associational space in China been populated more by certain types of organizations than others? How are different types of association organized internally? What kinds of people are most likely to join associations? Are all associations alike with respect to both the amount and the sort of social capital “produced”? Are memberships of a particular associational sector are more likely to score highly on certain dimensions of social capital than on others? To what extent is the social capital generated by these organizations of benefit not only to their own members but also to the society as a whole? What kinds of social capital are different categories of associations likely to produce, bonding or bridging? What types of associations are more capable of fostering cooperation, civic engagement, tolerance, trust, and the norms of reciprocity? Does participation in nonpolitical or involuntary organizations help stimulate political involvement and interest? Is associational life really the school for democratic citizenship? How conducive is associational life to the formation of civic and democratic virtues? Do association members tend to act as better citizens than non-members do? Those questions will guide our future research.

References ADB (2003). The Development of Private Enterprise in the People’s Republic of China. Manila: Asian Development Bank.

306

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China Bourdieu, Pierre (1986). The Forms of Capital. In J. G. Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Chan, Anita (1993). Revolution or Corporatism? Workers and Trade Unions in Post-Mao China. Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 29. Chan, Kin-man (1999), Intermediate Organizations and Civil Society: The Case of Guangzhou. In Chong Chor Lau and Geng Xiao (eds.), China Review 1999. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Chan, Kin-man and Qiu Haixiong (1999). Shetuan, Shehui Ziben Yu Zhengjing Fazhang [Social Organizations, Social Capital and Politico-economic Development]. Shehuixue Yanjiu, No. 4. __________ (1998). Small Government, Big Society: Social Organizations and Civil Society in China. China Area Studies Series, No. 8. Chen, Nancy N. (1994). Urban Spaces and Experiences of Qigong. In Deborah S. Davis, Richard Kraus, Barry Naughton and Elizabeth J. Perry (eds.), Urban Spaces in Contemporary China: The Potential for Autonomy and Community in Post-Mao China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coleman, James S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dept. of International Politics of Peking University (DIPPKU). (1985) Zhongguo Jinxiandai Shi Tongji Ziliao Xuanbian [Selective of Statistics in Modern and Contemporary History of China]. Zhengzhou: Henan Peoples’ Publishing House. De Tocqueville, Alexis (1969). Democracy in America. Lawrence, Garden City, NY: Anchor Book. Ding, Yuanzhu (ed.) (1999). Zhiyuan Jingshen Zai Zhongguo [Volunteerism in China]. Beijing: UNDP. Editing Board (EB) (1975). Minguo Banian Zhongguo Nianjian [China Yearbook in 1917]. Taipei: Tianyi Publishing House. Erickson, B. and T. A. Nosanchuck (1990). How an Apolitical Association Politicizes. Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 27, No. 2. Fisher, Allon (1974). Associational Life in the People’s Republic of China. In David Horton Smith (ed.), Voluntary Action Research: 1974 — The Nature of Voluntary Action around the World. Toronto & London: Lexington Books. Foster, Kenneth W (2001), Associations in the Embrace of an Authoritarian State: State Domination of Society? Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 35, No. 4. Frolic, B. Michael (1997). State-Led Civil Society. In Timothy Brook and B. Michael Frolic (eds.), Civil Society in China. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe. Harper, Paul (1969). The Party and the Unions in Communist China. The China Quarterly, No. 37. Howell, Jude (1994). Striking a New Balance: New Social Organizations in Post-Mao China. Capital and Class, Iss. 54. Huang, Philip C. C. (1993). Pubic Sphere/Civil Society in China? Modern China, Vol. 19, No. 2.

307

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu Lin, Nan (2001). Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action. New York: Cambridge University Press. Liu, Jianqing (1998). Zhonghua Wenhua Tongzhi-Shetuan Zhi [All Records of Chinese Culture- Associations]. Shanghai: Shanghai Peoples’ Publishing House. Ma, Yili and Liu Hanbang (1993). Shanghai Shehui Tuanti Gailan [A General Introduction to Social Organizations in Shanghai]. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House. Mathews, Jessica T. (1997). Power Shift. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1. McIntosh, Marjorie K. (2001). The Diversity of Social Capital in English Communities, 1300–1640 (with a Glance at Modern Nigeria). In Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), Patterns of Social Capital: Stability and Change in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (1994). The Rise of Non-Governmental Organizations in China: Implications for Americans, Report #8. Offe, Claus and Susanne Fuchs (2002). Decline of Social Capital: The German Case. In Robert D. Putnam (ed.), Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Olsen, M. (1972). Social Participation and Voting Turnout. American Sociological Review, Vol. 37, No. 3. Pearson, Margaret M. (1994). The Janus Face of Business Associations in China: Socialist Corporatism in Foreign Enterprises. Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 31. Pei, Minxin (1998). Chinese Intermediate Associations: An Empirical Analysis. Modern China, Vol. 24, No. 3. Perry, Elizabeth J. (1994). Labor’s Battle for Political Space: The Role of Worker Associations in Contemporary China. In Deborah S. Davis, Richard Kraus, Barry Naughton, and Elizabeth J. Perry (eds.), Urban Spaces in Contemporary China: The Potential for Autonomy and Community in Post-Mao China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Putnam, Robert D. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Putnam, Robert D. and Kristin A. Goss (2002). Introduction. In Robert D. Putnam (ed.), Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rogers, D., K. Barb and G. Bultena (1975). Voluntary Association Membership and Political Participation: An Exploration of the Mobilization Hypothesis. Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 3. Saich, Tony (2000). Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China. China Quarterly, No. 161. Salamon, Lester M. (1994). The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4. Salamon, Lester M. and Helmut K. Anheier (1997a). The Third World’s Third Sector in Comparative Perspective. A Working Paper of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project. __________ (1997b). Defining the Nonprofit Sector: A Cross-National Analysis. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

308

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Training Ground for Democracy: Associational Life in China School Department of Shanghai Youth League (SDSYL) (2001). Shanghai Xuesheng Shetuan de Xianzhuang Fenxi yu Yanjiu [Analysis and Research on Current Situation of Students’ Associations in Shanghai]. Thoughts, Theory, and Education, Vol. 11. Shue, Viviene (1994). State Power and Social Organization in China. In Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue (eds.), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. State Statistical Bureau (2003). China Statistical Yearbook. Beijing: China Statistical Press. The Second Historical Dossier House of China (TSHDHC) (1994). Zhongguo Minguo Shi Dang’an Ziliao Huibian [Collection of the Dossiers of the Republic of China]. Nanjing: Jiangsu Ancient Books Publishing House. Unger, Jonathan (1996). Bridges: Private Business, the Chinese Government and the Rise of New Associations. China Quarterly, No. 147. Unger, Jonathan and Anita Chan (1995). China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model. Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 33. Verba, Sidney, Key Lehman Schlozman and Henry E. Brady (1995). Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wang, Ming (ed.) (2000). Zhongguo NGO Yanjiu [Research on Chinese NGOs]. Beijing: UNCRD Research Report Series No. 38. Wang, Shaoguang (2000). Money and Autonomy: Dilemma Faced by the Nonprofit Sector. An unpublished manuscript. Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong. __________ (1999). DuoyuanYu Tongyi [Pluralism and Unity: A International, Comparative Study of the Third Sector]. Hang-zhou: Zhejiang People’s Publisher. __________ (1994). The Politics of Private Time: Changing Leisure Patterns in Urban China. In Deborah S. Davis, Richard Kraus, Barry Naughton and Elizabeth J. Perry (eds.), Urban Spaces in Contemporary China: The Potential for Autonomy and Community in Post-Mao China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wang, Shigang and Li Xiusong (1994). Zhongguo Shetuan Shi [Associational History in China]. Hefei: Anhui Peoples’ Publishing House. Wang, Shuhuai (1984). Zhongguo Xiandaihua de Quyu Yanjiu: Jiangsu [Regional Analysis on China’s Modernization: Jiangsu Province]. Taipei: Modern History Institution of Academia Sinica. Wang, Ying, Sun Bingyao and Zhe Xiaoye (1993). Shehui Zhongjianceng [Intermediate Sphere in Society: Reforms and Chinese Social Organizations]. Beijing: China Development Press. Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N and Liu Xinyong (1994). Student Associations and Mass Movements. In Deborah S. Davis, Richard Kraus, Barry Naughton and Elizabeth J. Perry (eds.), Urban Spaces in Contemporary China: The Potential for Autonomy and Community in Post-Mao China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. White, Gordon (1993). Prospects for Civil Society in China: A Case Study of Xiaoshan City. Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 29. White, Gordon, Howell Jude and Shang Xiaoyuan (1996). In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

309

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch09

Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu Whiting, Susan H. (1991). The Politics of NGO Development in China. Voluntas, Vol. 2, No. 2. Whyte, Martin King (1992). Urban China: A Civil Society in the Making?. In Arthur L. Rosenbaum (ed.), State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform. Boulder: Westview. Wu, Zhongze and Chen Jinluo (1996). Shetuan Guanli Gongzuo [Administration of Social Organizations]. Beijing: China Society Publishing House. Yin, Jizuo (ed.) (2001). 2001 Nian Shanghai Shehui Baogao Shu [Report on Shanghai Society: 2001]. Shanghai: Shanghai Social Science Publishing House. Young, Nick and Anthony Woo (2000). An Introduction to the Nonprofit Sector in China. Kent: Charities Aid Foundation. Zhang, Junhai (1992). The Voluntary Sector in the People’s Republic of China: An Overview and New Challenges. In Kathleen D. McCarthy, Virginia A. Hodgkinson and Russy D. Sumariwalla (eds.), The Nonprofit Sector in the Global Community: Voices from Many Nations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. Zhang, Ye (1995a). Chinese NGOs: A Survey Report. In Tadashi Yamamoto (ed.), Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community: Nongovernmental Underpinnings of Emerging Asia Pacific Regional Community. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange. __________ (1995b). Foundations in China: A Survey Report. In Tadashi Yamamoto (ed.) Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community: Nongovernmental Underpinnings of Emerging Asia Pacific Regional Community. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange. Zhang, Yufa (1975). Qingji de Geming Tuanti [Revolutional Association in Qing Dynasty]. Taipei: Modern History Institution of Academia Sinica. __________ (1971a) Qingji de Lixian Tuanti [Constitutional Association in Qing Dynasty]. Taipei: Modern History Institution of Academia Sinica. __________ (1971b). Minguo Chunian de Zhengdang [Political Parties in the Early Years of the Republic of China]. Taipei: Modern History Institution of Academia Sinica. Zhang, Yunmei (2003). Lishun yu Chongtu: Zhongguo Gonghui yu Dang-Guojia Guanxi. [Harmonization and Conflicts: Relationship between Trade Unions and Party-State in China]. Twenty-one Century, No. 18. http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c. Zhao, Yong (2003). Minban Fei Qiye Danwei Shuliang Fenxi. [Analysis on the amount of Private Non-enterprises Units]. Online Paper: http://www.mca.gov.cn/artical/ content/WGJ_TJFX/20031229122655.htm. Zhu, Ying (1911). Xinhai Geming Shiqi Xinshi Shangren Shetuan Yanjiu [Research on New Businessmen during the Period of the Revolution of 1911]. Beijing: Remin University of China.

310

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government: A Sequence of the Expansive Moments of the State in History

Chapter

10

Wang Mingming1

Abstract This is a chapter in historical sociology. It particularly focuses on the extension of rural townships since 1908. Specifically, it examines different attempts under different regimes in 20th century China to enhance the sphere of influence of the state in the countryside. However, it has a broad historical scope, covering the lengthy history of local administration and grassroots power. By means of a comparative historical study, the author finds that the marching of state power into the countryside has been phenomenal in the age of nation-state. The author thus argues that the institutionalization of rural township and town governments in post-reform China neither arises from rural industrialization nor “liberalization of market”, but as a consequence of the intensified accumulation of “authoritative resources” by the state. Keywords: Rural township; nation-state; authoritative resources.

1.

Introduction

With regard to the evolution of the organizational forms of Chinese township governments, existing arguments are developed basically from two totally different perspectives. One plays down the historical depth of systems, tending to consider the township governments as a product of the policy of “separating government administration from local management”, of “market economy”, and of the state’s “delegating power to lower levels”. 1 Wang Mingming, Research Institute of Sociology and Anthropology, Peking University,

P. R. China.

311

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

These have been implemented by the central government in rural areas since 1980s as a new type of rural economy regulation and control system characterized by the difference from commune system from 1958 to the first half of 1970s (such as Gu, 1993, pp. 171–178; Zhu, 1997, pp. 421–428; Zhang and Xu, 1995, pp. 825–833). The scholars who hold the other opinion tend to look for the predecessor of township governments in ancient Chinese history, analogizing this kind of governmental organization form to xiangli system (rural area and community system) and baojia system (community-based collective administrative system) (e.g., Skinner, 1964, p. 65; Dutton, 1998; Li and Qiu, 1994; Cong, 1995, pp. 3–48; Hsiao, 1960). In exploring the evolution of Chinese township governments, I am inclined to juxtapose the above two perspectives. In my view, they just refer to certain different moments of the history of the same system. Undeniably, grassroots administrative organizations at township level did exist in the long history of imperial China. However, as an important part of the state’s political power in the grassroots, the normalization of local township government occurred later. Of course, when connecting township governments with the short-term history of the reforms, many have neglected the close relation between the normalization of the administrative system and the modern state development process in wider historical background. Similarly, it is likely that many neglect the nature of township governments: These are the state’s local political agents. Excessive emphasis has been placed on the connection between township governments and the “central government’s devolution of power to local governments”. From the view of shorter-term history, the recent development of township governments is just a reform of communized locational society — a reformist economic re-enlivening of administrative organization. Nevertheless, from the perspective of a longer-term institutional history, we may find the normalization of township governments in the recent decades has been historically consistent with the extension of state power into the grassroots since the 20th century. In 1988, just one year after rural election was implemented, an American scholar Vivienne Shue pointed out that, the reform since 1980s did not result in the withdrawal of state power and social control system in expansive rural China. Rather, it facilitated the extension of state power in rural society (Shue, 1988). From the viewpoint of institution, the normalization

312

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

of township government is a corollary of township development since the economic reform. It seems township governments are just economic management organizations that have evolved “naturally” from new rural economic system. From a certain point of view, this conception reflects some social reality, as the normalization of township governments mostly refers to demutualization of administrative organizations. However, the rapid organization expansion of township governments in rural China in recent years mirrors more the intensive enhancement of state power and social control in the countryside. Investigations of the system and power of township government should not be separated from historical view of the relation between state and local society (Shue, 1988; Duara, 1988; Wang, 1997a). Meanwhile, as the local administrative system in contemporary rural China is a part of a modern nation’s long-term self-enhancing process, we can understand the current operation mechanism and its future development tendency of this system only by contrasting the realization methods of historical and modern state-society relation. In view of this, this essay makes an investigation into the accumulative process of township administration from the macro historical perspective of state-society relation, and then accordingly makes a further investigation into tortuous building process of township political authority during self-enhancement process of modern China in the 20th century. I hope that the argument to be presented can explain the historical background and specific process of township governments’ development, and that it can become a comparative history of state-society relation.

2.

State and Society: A Historical Explanatory Framework

A township is a local administrative unit under the county level. The origin of such a unit seems to be quite ancient: It can be traced back to the xiangting system in the Qin and Han Dynasty. Nonetheless, as generally acknowledged by the academic circle, governmental organizations under the county level in ancient China were extremely lax and informal. Before the Song Dynasty, most of the numerous local administrative divisions were just “illustrations”, they performed little function and had little accordingly 313

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

fixed institution (Weber, 1951; Chu, 1962). Although the blueprint of baojia system masterminded by neo-Confucian Cheng Hao and reformer Wang Anshi in the Song Dynasty had developed clear maps of arrangements, it did not exert much effect until the Ming Dynasty. Local administrative system had been very mature in the Ming and Qing Dynasty, but it continued to heavily depend on informal local authoritative group and there were great differences among different locations. More formal governmental institutions under county level were established after end of the Qing Dynasty, especially after the Republic of China revolution of 1911. The local administration before this time was just an expedient design between state and local gentry. Why did such a change occur in the political control unit under county level after the 20th century? Shue briefly mentioned in her argument: With the founding of a modern state, state power extended into the grassroots society (Shue, 1988, pp. 120–121). Shue derives her argument from a theoretical review. Shue refers to a constructionist theory of the modern nation. Although this is a good guideline of historical study, it requires an investigation into the history of local administrative system. In my opinion, townships and alike local administration systems are neither the interest that the state allocates to locality and nor the result of productive resources accumulation of local autonomy, but “authoritative resources”. They are occupied and used by the state to stretch the influence scope of itself and to control the country outside the city (Giddens, 1985). As Gidden has argued, authoritative resources have different accumulation methods in different social types, but the modern state (or what called “the nation-state”) monopolized the resources to an unprecedented extent. I will especially argue hereinafter that, development of township government is consistent with the self-enhancement of the modern Chinese state — its centralization of authoritative resources. It is necessary to consider state-society relationship as a framework applicable to the analysis of the history of township governments. Given many arguments on state-society relationship, herein I mainly critically utilize Giddens’ historical sociology. The book The Nation-State and Violence published in 1985 most strikingly features historical sociology among all Giddens’ works. With the evolution process of global society as its core narrative line, it was

314

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

intended to establish a general model of social transformation and clarify the concept of the nation-state formation. In the “Introduction” to this book, Giddens clearly stated that, the disputes among major social theories since the 19th century were mainly attributed to the fact that theorists held different views on the issue of dynamics for modern social transformation. Nevertheless, if we see the nature of the issue, we may recognize the difference is not as tremendous as we presume. Karl Marx, Max Weber and Émile Durkheim studied the formation of the modern society from varied perspectives, including productivity and relation of production, rationalization and social division of labor etc, but all of them believed capitalism, as interpreted differently, was the only solution to establishing the modern society. The transformation of modern society is not only related to productivity improvement (Marx), rationalization of human (Weber) and development of social labor division (Durkheim), but more importantly, related to the change of state form. We need to distinguish “modern society” from “traditional society”, because the nation-state is a remarkable manifestation of in-depth fusion of state and society. The reasons for in-depth fusion of state and society include the change of productivity and relation of production as well as the development of other three strengths: Surveillance in the method of information storage and administrative networking, nationalization in the method of military violence and industrialism of human behaviors. Modern society is in contrast with traditional society, because modern society has prosperous material production, widespread information and administrative surveillance, state-monopolized military violence and industrialism infiltrated into each social field. Giddens divided the history of state formation into three phases: Traditional state, absolutist state, and nation-state. In traditional state phase (city-state, feudal state, descent state, centralized bureaucratic empire), class differentiation is obvious and is manifested in the distinction between the urban and the rural (upper class lives in cities and lower class in countryside). The difference between urban and rural areas not only shows the class differentiation but also indicates the coverage limitation of traditional state’s administrative power. In any form of traditional state, governmental control for society is limited within cities. Meanwhile, state symbolic system keeps far distance from religion and “folk customs” of commoners,

315

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

which weakens its surveillance. The difference between urban area and rural area as well as the undeveloped surveillance prove traditional state is not a “power container”. In other words, the relation between state and society is comparatively lax and the state only has “boundaries” but not “borders” and has not monopoly right for military force (plenty of military forces are controlled by warlords and folk strengths). In regulation respect for behaviors, many regulations are just valid for noble estate but have no constraint force for ordinary people at all. The intermediary phase between traditional state and modern state is absolutist state. In Europe, absolutist state appeared between the 16th century and 17th century. It was primarily embodied in the split of largescale empire gradually into separate states. First, the “natural boundaries” between states is defined as “borders”. Then, the concept of “sovereignty” emerges, the charismatic King becomes sacred and divided agent and symbol of state sovereignty and the laws become national regulations to directly define relation between individuals and state as well as the sanction system. Meanwhile, the development of military technology provides conditions for violence expansion. The administrative management tool inside the army is highly developed and provides referential system for social order control. The growth of navy force prepares an indispensable requisite for globalization. The development of absolutist builds foundation for the modern nation-state. It provides the hallmarks of territory and sovereignty for the nation-state. However, the modern nation-state appeared later, was driven by the pursuit of administrative power and citizenship which produced as the foundation of the modern state the growth of allocative resources and authoritative resources. The “allocative resources” mean material resources and the “authoritative resources” mean the sources of administrative power. Giddens believes that the two resources are inseparable and interrelated with the mechanism of “industrialization”. Industrialization not only results in the growth of material resources but also produced another kind of “industrialism”, that of an administrative power and individual behavioral orientations as well as the development of authoritative resources. Furthermore, commercialization establishes laws as national standards, taxation as the method of the state to control industry, labors as subject to “work location”, and the state as a member of world system. In addition, the development

316

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

of media, transportation, posts and telecommunications etc makes the state easier to infiltrate into the society and thus strengthen its surveillance. As Giddens claimed, The Nation-State and Violence was aimed at drawing the outline of world history. The historical process it describes is a process whereby feudalist and hierarchical states (“traditional state”) transformed to highly unified, sovereign and national states. This description does not imply the objective process of society’s evolution. Giddens argues in many of his works that any social science study is a part of the reflexivity of the modern society. When writing his own book, Giddens concerned himself about world history and about the core concept of social science — “society”. “Society” is a word used to indicate space with sovereignty and territorial border. Its meaning gives us an impression that it has not historical relativity, which seems the sovereignty and border are always there. The Nation-State and Violence tells us a “story” that the concept of “society” in social science just resulted from a fragment of European experience of the state — “nation-state” as a power container, but did not exist since ancient times. The formation of modern “society” is not a growth history of good time, but is closely connected with four “institutional clusters”, which are high surveillance, capitalistic enterprise, industrial production and violence centralization. These four clusters can not be reduced mutually. According to Giddens’ argument, however, we can notice that the control of rights and violence continually increases its binding force to people with the growth of modernity. In essence, this binding force is exactly the system of nationstate. It rose in European border disputes in modern history, but has become a global system in the 20th century (especially after World War II). Nationalism that is familiar by Giddens has proven amply that the modern age is a historical phase when nationalistic ideology spreads widely (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983). Nationalism, as a particular ideology, derives from ancient hometown consciousness. It became the dominant concept in Europe around the 18th century, and then continually spread to other regions in the world. Giddens utilizes sufficient argument to clarify the concept that the nation-state is the social formation of modernity. He points out that the nation-state is a established process of a modern system other than just a process of ideology. For Europe, the origin of this system is self-evident. Nevertheless, the nation-state development beyond Europe

317

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

obviously depends more on nationalistic ideology perhaps because the system communication mostly relies on media propaganda or that ideology creation is easier than system establishment. The most important cause is that nationalistic ideology brings a tremendous political allure. Nationstate is a power container. This container contains weapons monopolized by the state, but it is covered with advertisement, i.e., nationalistic ideology which propagates modernized citizenship and publicizes that the nationstate’s high surveillance, capitalistic enterprise, industrialized production and centralized violence are modernization itself and necessities for people. This advertisement has such great political allure that almost all societies who strive for state modernization following Europe have to “purchase” the products advertised. What Giddens has discussed is the modernized social formation of Europe and its globalization process. I herein focuses on the relationship between Chinese state-society relation and grassroots political power. Apparently, it is difficult to address Chinese issues by utilizing European theory. Regarding the applicability of his theory, Giddens himself also emphasized two points: First, his social theory is based on the history and current situation of European society; secondly, social theory is meaningless without being utilized in empirical study. Undoubtedly, as a social theory rooted in Europe, Giddens’ theory has great explanatory implications for European societies and is widely utilized in empirical study. Here comes a question, “Is his theory applicable for Chinese society study?” Giddens mentioned China occasionally in The Nation-State and Violence. He referred to the Chinese empire when elaborating on traditional state, but most of his cases applied to discussing modern nation-state were derived from Europe and tended to exclude all non-Western states. Does it mean China is not a modern nation-state? As admitted by Giddens, his model of state-society relation history is just an “ideal type” established for theoretical explanation. It may have local variations while being practiced in different societies or nations. However, if we have been aware of European specificities of this model, we can say that it still has certain explanatory implications for the historical inquiry of social change in China. Firstly, we must admit that the “modernization” concept in Chinese politics is to ideologically legitimate the new nation-state’s

318

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

totalitarian surveillance of society and community. It serves the establishment of new power structure. Secondly, we must admit that modernism forces or persuades people to considers tradition as “enemy of modernization” or a cultural model that will be inevitably substituted by modernity, which only proves the legitimacy of this ideal type. Finally, we must admit that the view that tradition and modernity are mutually opposite just reflects the so-called concept that peasants and citizens are mutually opposite. The state system of traditional China always has certain characteristics of absolutist state and enforces information and personal surveillance and strict criminal law which seem to match modern European autarchies. However, this “absolutism” was always not complete, as the king and centralized authority of the Chinese empire were always concerned about combining with “gentry power” which represented private and local interests beyond the reach of the state (Fei, 1953, pp. 17–32). In fact, the Chinese state did not enter into absolutist state phase even until the end of the Qing dynasty (Shue, 1988, pp. 95–103). This observation makes us difficult to utilize Giddens’ explanatory framework directly. However, if we avoid purifying the characteristics of the state and impose such purified features on history, if we focus on a relational pattern of history, on the changing relations between state and society (especially city-countryside relation), we can produce a better perspective of state formation. Briefly speaking, it is a process from statesociety separation (urban-rural segmentation) to completely state-society integration. In The Nation-State and Violence, Giddens does not make systematic associations for the change history of rural community and state formation. But his investigation into the evolutionary process of state power from traditional state, absolutist state and modern nation-state can be reformulated into a series of position changes experienced by local community as the major social unit. We may say that the growth history of nation-state is a process that people inside the community continually “liberated” from locality to directly face influence and constraint of state’s national regulation, administrative surveillance, industrial management and ideology. If we call it traditional state before the Tang Dynasty, call it absolutist state after the Song Dynasty (especially the Ming and Qing Dynasties) and call it (growing-up) modern nation-state since the Republic of China (ROC), we also can say the change process of the Chinese community started from class differentiation of urban and rural areas, went through “sovereignty”

319

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

and community “nationalization” process jointly resulted by internal and external power (absolutist state and Western world system) and then came into the state’s fully surveillance for community. Since Weber, the entire academia admits China was a traditional state before the Tang Dynasty. From 2000 BC to 900 AD, China went through a creation and improvement process of bureaucracy-descent empire. Giddens calls this kind of social formation as “class-divided society”, which refers to the tremendous social and cultural differentiations between upper class and middle-lower class (may be specifically embodied in the differentiation between urban and rural areas) as well as the widespread power localization and military decentralization. After the Song Dynasty, the Chinese empire went through a series of significant changes on state-society relation. Different from Europe, these changes did not feature absolute sovereignty like European monarchies, but mainly featured the transformation of military forces, central-local relations and symbolic systems. According to historians’ study, one of the major differences between dynasties after the Song Dynasty and dynasties before the Tang Dynasty is “centralization of military power” of the former. Even till Tang Dynasty, the Chinese empire still implemented “junfu” system (i.e., military government rule) and “juzhong yuqing” system (i.e., control of military power to override political power). However, in Song dynasty, “imperial centralization of military power” and “the principle of the civil superiority over the military” emerged. Then, the administrative system for controlling local society was greatly developed and the Imperial Civil Examination System established in the Tang Dynasty became culturally dominant to connect “urban area” with “rural area”. Meanwhile, the social connections and ritual activities (like clan organizations and clan hall cults) that could only be practiced by royal estate originally were “civilianized” as well (Chen, 1991; Zheng, 1992). Chinese social formation during both traditional phase and absolutist phase developed independently. But, the establishment of the Chinese modern state could not be done without “globalization”. In other words, it was established in the frequent interaction with “foreign countries”. To establish a strong “state-nation” was an ideal shared by Chinese intellectual–political elites who accepted positively or passively the European modern political philosophy. Although this dream has not been realized so far, the pursuit for it has run through the entire Chinese history of the 20th century.

320

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

The establishment of nation-state (in the case of China, “state-nation”) also depends on four “institutional clusters”, which are surveillance, capitalistic enterprise, industrial production and violence centralization. In Europe, the establishment of the four institutional clusters was not always realized through the process of “subjectively planned modernization”. By contrast, in China of the 20th century, they were all established under the name of “modernity”, which made people forget the content under the slogan. In fact, if we contrast the Chinese governmental system of the 20th century with the governmental system before the 20th century, we will see the surveillance was mainly presented in the form of policing, taxation, personnel files, units etc and reached an unprecedented width of coverage and depth of infiltration into society. Regarding the pursuit for “development”, “economic growth” etc, even the political elites advocating “politics first” also paid their attention to it. Various movements were staged to reduce and eliminate warlords and military riots since “Northern Expedition” only to create a stable system for state monopoly of instruments of violence. These conditions also promoted the change of state-society relation, enabling the strength of “state-nation” to improve gradually throughout the 20th century. Hereinafter, I will utilize the foregoing conceptualized framework to write a genealogy of the development and transformation of township governments. One noteworthy point is that the review of township governments under such a historical comparative framework of state-society relationship and nation-state theory will make us fully realize that if we explain the change of Chinese grassroots political authority only from the view of “economic reform”, we will neglect the close relationship between the modernization process and the ever-growing state power of social control.

3.

Local Control and Grassroots Political Power before the 10th Century

For a long time, those who study ancient China had an impressionistic conclusion that China was a grand unified country since ancient times, thus its control of society (and market) has already achieved the height of totalitarianism for a long time as well (Wittfogel, 1938). Since Skinner proposed the regional theory about Chinese social structure and historical 321

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

development, the academic circle started to have a new understanding of social diversity and autonomous condition of rural economy in traditional China (Skinner, 1964, p. 5; 1977). In a publication called Unity and Split, a historical geographer, Jianxiong Ge, concludes: If we deem the widest territory in Chinese history as benchmark, it shall take 81 years to achieve unification. If we consider the approximate recovery of previous dynasty’s territory and maintenance of peace and stability in central plains of China as benchmark, it shall take 950 years. In the 950 years, strictly speaking, there were many years that cannot be deemed as unified, like the middle period of Eastern Han dynasty, the late reign of Chongzhen Emperor of Ming dynasty, etc. If we calculate from 221 BC when the first Emperor of the Qin Dynasty (Qin Shi Huang in Chinese) unified China to 1911 when the Qing Dynasty ended, the unity time based on the first criterion is 4% of the entire time, and the unity time based on the second criterion is 45% of the entire time. If we calculate from the Western Zhou Dynasty when there were comparatively exact chronological records (841 BC), the former one is 3% of the entire time and the latter one is 35% of the entire time (Ge, 1994, pp. 78–79).

Those who give a conclusion for modern enlightenment of Chinese history may immediately associate with reconsideration about Chinese politics. But in my opinion, the above “surprising” characterization just indicates the essential feature of traditional Empire. The traditional state and modern nation-state obviously differ in that the former does not have explicit territory border and is not a “power container” to monopolize military tools. This is also the reason why this type of state is always between “unity and split” and why this type of state creates “unified” situation but still cannot avoid power decentralization. Also worthy of note is that, due to above reasons, and also due to the social sustainability of traditional state depends on social-cultural distance building between royal estate and ordinary people, the state control of and infiltration into social groups and geographic space beyond (or “under”) city are basically in quite lax status. Therefore, there might be local administrative units at township level but just in name. The three dynasties of Xia, Shang and Zhou were unified ostensibly, but both the regions directly under the King’s jurisdiction (neifu, internal

322

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

administration) and the vassal states within the Empire (waifu, external administration) had their own dominating entities respectively. As Wang Fuzi remarked, “lords of the vassal states rule their territory and subjects respectively”, and the lords were “emperor’s royal officials in name” but actually “dominators in their vassal states” (Wang 1975, p. 514). The relation between central government and local authorities was maintained by lax union between royal court and lords. The decentralization in the method of vassal states was quite common. The local lords had their own troops and laws within their vassal states and were able to reallocate his land based on their own interest. The regions directly under the King’s moral, civil and juristic regulation and vassal states varied in local administrative systems as well. The King set up “six towns” (liu xiang in Chinese) within 100 li around capital and set up “six suburbs” (liu sui in Chinese) beyond the 100 li. “Town” lies approximately between village and township in terms of level. Both towns and suburbs adopted military organizations to set community management and service units designed with military, educational and supervisory functions. The local administrative system utilized by lords varied for different vassal states and historical periods, but the substance was basically same. From the perspective of ideal design, the grassroots political power had been established in the three dynasties of antiquity. But, the relation between royal court and lords was variable, so the local administrative system became temporary in nature and often served military affairs among difference local authorities. Despite certain social control function, it was not local administrative system in strict sense. In the Spring and Autumn Warring States period, this kind of system was in much closer connection with military organizations. After Qin Shi Huang unified the seven vassal states, unprecedented central authority appeared in the history and the (feudal) vassal state system of Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties was firmly abolished. The system of prefectures and counties created by Shang Yang in the Warring States period was implemented. The local official positions were taken by professional bureaucrats. The governments at prefecture level were divided into three departments, which were administration (led by official position called as “shou”), military affairs (led by official position called as “wei”) and supervision (led by official position called as “jian yu shi”), all of which were

323

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

allocated by the central government. The Qin Dynasty with only 12-year reign is similar to European absolutist countries in many respects. Its wellknown policy of “uniform way of writing and uniform width of roads” shows the attempt to reinforce the regime. However, the rural social control of the Qin Dynasty was realized through direct suppression and enslavement. Under the strict system of prefectures and counties, we will find it lacks of Xiang level administration with complete administrative function. At the end of the Qin Dynasty, “xiangting system” appeared as a geographic space distance unit in rural area. It might have a certain administrative function which was not put into practice (Yang, 1937, p. 9). In the Western and Eastern Han Dynasties, the relation between central and local governments tended to recover the vassal state system of ancient dynasty. The conferred lords enjoyed autonomy of local administration and taxation and had own troops and law system, which were quite similar to the Zhou Dynasty. Meanwhile, the system of prefectures and counties was strictly implemented. Consistent with Qin dynasty, the central government designated local administrative officials to manage local government, military affairs and supervision. The parallel implementation of vassal state system and prefectures and counties system presented tremendous conflict with each other, so the relation between central and local always varied. At the beginning of Western Han Dynasty, the strength of vassal states were very strong, which heavily limited the professional development of prefecture and county administration. Then, in order to solve “self-strengthening” problem of vassal states, central government adopted the strategy of “mutual constraint between internal and external” to limit vassal states’ power. Under such unstable central-local relation, the local administrative system under county level existed, but there was no concrete regulatory system for it. During the Western Han Dynasty and the Three-Kingdom period, xiangting (town and neighborhood) system was continued to be used and be more organized in written documents. In this period, there were wu (five households), shi (ten households), ting (ten li), and xiang (ten neighborhoods) units under xiang level so as to facilitate local management. However, the problem is whether these organizational units were under direct control of central government. Along with the variation of relation between central government and vassal states/prefecture/county, rural grassroots organization under xiangting level varied accordingly.

324

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

Till the Wei, Jin, and Southern and Northern Dynasties, this problem got aggravated. In Wei, Jin, and Southern and Northern Dynasties, China split into many regional regimes and these regimes conflicted with each other. According to historian’s study, no matter the short unified Western Jin Dynasty or regional regimes like Three-Kingdom period, Eastern Jin Dynasty, Southern and Northern Dynasties etc, sometime the relation between uncrowned “central” and “local” showed strong decentralization. Under this circumstance, regional regimes strengthened themselves and attempted own expansion, so they implemented strong control for population and social economy in their juristical territory. During this period, local administrative system consisted of three levels, which were province, prefecture and county. It was also a strict governmental system ostensibly, but, in fact, the local officials always monopolized the autonomous control right of local military affairs, politics, economy, society. Under county level, the Western Jin Dynasty set a “li system”, which resembled xiangting system in the Qin Dynasty. The grassroots organizations during regime splitting period had different titles but the essences were approximately same. However, as same as all decentralization age in Chinese history, the local administrative units under county level in the Wei, Jin, and Southern and Northern Dynasties were just in name and either was changed into “military” or “militia” organization by local separatist regime so as to serve for years of wars and frontier defense. During the Sui, Tang and Song Dynasties, the relation of unity and split appeared in a new cycle. After Qin, Han and Western Jin Dynasties, the Sui Dynasty reunified the north and south. If implemented thoroughly centralism and eliminated the strength of decentralization. After establishment of the Tang Dynasty, its founder, taking the Sui Dynasty as reference, reinforced the monarchy centralism and weakened local separatist regimes. But, after the “An Lushan rebellion” (755 AD), the imperial power passed to the local military governors and there was splitting situation for a time. For local administration, both Sui and Tang Dynasties implemented “provincecounty system” but eliminate prefecture, trying to improve central government’s direct control for local places. The two dynasties also eliminated private power of scholar-official families and set up systems for household registration, taxation, corvee and military service. For the administration

325

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

system under county level, the Sui Dynasty set up li (100 families) and xiang (five li) system in 589 AD. The Tang Dynasty continually adopted this system and set up two levels of administrative units under li, which were lin and bao. “Lixiang system” in the Sui and Tang Dynasties was mainly different from previous systems by strengthening its functions of taxation, agricultural affair and household registration and weakening its military function. With appearance of separatist regimes built by the local military governors, the “province-county system” was in crisis. The provinces and counties nominally abided by central government, but were actually controlled by local military regimes. The taxation, agriculture, household registration functions of “lixiang system” in rural area were utilized by local regimes and served for military conflicts among local regimes or between local regime and central government. This problem became much more serious in the Five Dynasties and Ten States period. Although an organization named “Tuan” was used to enhance management for rural area during the reign of Emperor Xiande of the Zhou Dynasty (958 AD), its implementation did not have a long-term assurance. From the Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties to Five Dynasties and Ten States period, although the state unified and split, the central-local relation frequently varied and there were plenty of local administrative systems and governmental organizations in different titles, we may still find the following characteristics of grassroots administrative organization in summarization: after the Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties, the rulers of both royal court and local regimes noticed the importance of population and social economic resources in rural areas, so they set up social control units under county level, trying to monopolize labor, physical and financial resources in this wide geographic space and stabilize political order under state and local regimes. However, in a quite long historical period, there was no sole and stable state apparatus that monopolized military force. As the ever existed unified states were always possible to face a split, all of them focused on political stability. As demanded by war and other expenditures, economy was concerned and encouraged at sometimes, but in most times, industrial organization of production was forbidden. This resulted in the Chinese rural area standing still in military-type organization status for a long time. In addition, China started its effort in unifying transportation and communication method in the Qin Dynasty, but, in order to keep the ruler’s monopoly

326

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

of symbolic imperial system and other privileges as well as local powers’ authority, small-scale rural communities were usually not entitled to use these methods. And most of courier stations, roads, canals and writings were only used for internal military, financial and governmental personnel arrangement of royal court and local regime. The above elements resulted in the state during that period to not have sufficient allocative and authoritative resources to build a unified “power container” and also resulted in the surveillance of grassroots society to be under quite lax status. Unsurprisingly, township level administrative unit during this period is definitely not local administrative organization in strict sense. No matter xiangting system or the later “xiangting system”, there were no normal or even temporary offices. They were like governmental organization in name, but “yamen (government offices)” is absolutely not a suitable title for them. Naturally, the various “official positions” allocated for these local and social units could only be informal. There were “xiang san lao ( )” in the Han Dynasty, “wu zhang ( )” and “shi zhang ( )” etc in the Wei, Jin, and Southern and Northern Dynasties and “xiangzheng (township sheriff)” in the Sui and Tang Dynasties, but all of them were not “township chief” or “town chief” in modern sense, as these personnel did not enjoy governmental finance subsidy but usually just local powers like “local ruffians”, who kept complicated, dynamic relationship with local economic, military and intellectual elites. Sometimes they served for the latter’s interests or resisted the latter to protect the interests of local villagers (Weber, 1951, pp. 63–78).

4.

The Historical Accumulation of Local Administrative and Authoritative Resources from Song to Qing Dynasty

State-society relationship in the Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties is consistent with the previous dynasties in many respects. In nature, the successive dynasties in late Chinese Empire are still of “traditional state”. The Liao and Jin between the Northern Song and Southern Song Dynasties as well as the Yuan and the Qing Dynasties were particularly similar to “traditional state”. But to be more clear about historical transformation in 327

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

the larger scope, we herein should single out the dynasties after the Song dynasty as the age of “absolutism”. Regarding absolutist state, Giddens considers absolute combination of monarchy and territory sovereignty for its precondition. Although the regimes were always unified and split in Chinese history, the titular “sovereignty” concept seemed to have existed for a long time. The problem is the extent of its actual existence. According to Giddens, the existence of substantial significance of a monarch’s commander and state sovereignty representativeness is determined by whether the instruments of violence are “monopolized” by the state and monarch. From this point of view, the dynasties after the Song Dynasty do differ from all the previous dynasties. During early Song Dynasty, it lectured from the “local military governors have great power which results a situation of weak monarch and strong officials” of its previous dynasty. Different from the ruler of the previous dynasty who preferred expanding territory, the Song Dynasty turned its political concern to the strategy of “internal pacification” and “focus on internal and belittle external”. On the one hand, the policy was similar with initial territory definition of European Absolutist state; on the other hand, as it placed more emphasis on direct state control of troops, the military power under local control was taken back to be controlled directly by the emperor and central government. The system that the emperor and central government directly monopolized military power in the Song Dynasty was partially adopted by the imperial and military-oriented Yuan Dynasty. It set up strong provincial system, which was an administration-centered governmental system. The province official designated by central government directly managed finance, troops and transportation in the province. When mobilizing troops, the province was directly restricted by the central government. The garrison dispatching and troops mustering were directly arranged and undertaken by royal court. When necessary, the emperor would grant his princes the right of “chief commander in war” to restrain the elites in troops. In many respects, the Ming Dynasty had more features of absolutist state than any dynasties earlier than it. The Ming Dynasty abolished zaixiang (prime minister) system and centralized all power in the emperor. In respect of local administration, Ming Dynasty carried out “three Secretaries, one Supervisor” system which strengthened the state control of local administration. In military

328

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

respect, Ming dynasty adopted “yasuo (secret service and station) system” and “town garrison system”, which reinforced the concept of “border” and the military maintenance of the border. In addition, the Ming Dynasty also created powerful social surveillance system like “jian cha (supervision)” and “chang ya (spy organization)” etc. The Qing Dynasty was a unified dynasty which was founded by the royal estate of the Man nation after conquering the entire China. Meanwhile, the Qing Dynasty was in the transitional period from empire to modern state. Under such circumstance, it was important to enhance military control and further defined the border. At the beginning period after Nurhaci founded the Qing Dynasty, the Manchu Eight Banners were controlled by the banner masters respectively. Nurhaci enervated the strength of the banner troops by changing the banner color. When Emperor Shunzhi took over the veins of government, he further reclaimed the banner troops under central government’s control. Till the reign of Emperor Xianfeng, through a series of reform, the Eight Banner troops had transformed from banner-master control to state own and empire direct control, eliminating the decentralization by members of royal clan. With the state monopolization of instruments of military violence, the dynasties after Song also had comparatively clear concept of border. The Liao, Jin, Yuan and Qing Dynasties during this period relatively had imperial characteristic to externally expand their “frontier”, but the “internal pacification” slogan in orthodox ideology and policy by Song dynasty did have far-reaching influence for the self-definition of its successive dynasties. When Giddens argues the absolutist state formation, he emphasizes the importance of the border definition and the diplomatic-recognized relation between state and state. His observation indicates that the biggest difference between absolutist state and traditional empire is the former has realized its existing territory range but the latter thinks all the world belongs to itself. In other words, compared with the latter, the former has been able to enter into reflexively monitored state systems (Giddens, 1985, pp. 255–267). It seems such a concept had appeared in China in the Song Dynasty. However, the European absolutist states formed separated state situation along with decay of empire, but China did not experience such history. Traditionally, European civilization in the “Middle Ages” is an integration of “Latin, classic tradition and Christianity”. This view is actually a fairy tale. The ruling center of Roman Empire was in Mediterranean

329

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

area, which occupied large areas of Asia and Africa but the British Isles, Scandinavian Peninsula and Germany were not in its domain. Latin in the Middle Ages was just an established and lasting cultural element in some regions on Continental European. The Papalism and the Holy Roman Empire had never completely and practically resorted to Latin. Byzantine Empire was primary a central area with solid power, but it became an edge zone of those later “European” regions, Giddens pointed out. Absolutism changed everything. Of course, it did not result in a new and unified Europe. Contrarily, due to differentiation among the states and the scars of war, Europe was divided and split up again. But, despite all this, Europe was still a political order having clear connections with the sequent nation-state system. The principalities under feudal state system were all over the Continental Europe, but most of them were just small principalities. Whether it was peace or war, the primary relation among them were internal relations within ruling classes. Generally, the ruling classes at that time as various class-divided societies kept tremendous distance from cultural and practice activities of their subjects. Under absolutist system, most subjects lived in the same way as before, but the state had started having “pyramid” characteristics. The internal consolidation method of the state was specifically utilized for reinforcing its territory. Moreover, till absolutist period, the border of European countries started to change. In feudal Europe, boundary was frontier. The scramble for boundaries always existed. And the definition of border was ambiguous. There was diplomacy at that time, but was traditional form of diplomacy. In other words, so-called “diplomacy” was aimed to provide commodities and rewards to bribe other groups or compel those nominally affiliated groups to dedicate tributes. Although there were some constructive diplomatic cases in the feudal age, most of diplomacies were actually developed after the 16th century. This proves that absolutism prevailed but the formation of new system still depended on mutual acknowledgement of states about legitimate autonomous territory of each other (Giddens, 1985, pp. 84–85). Different from Europe, the establishment of state position and border in China did not experience the process of internal empire differentiation and wars, as its self-orientation was mostly dependent on conflicts with “foreign states” beyond the Chinese Empire, such as Song Dynasty vs. northern military nation,Yuan Dynasty vs. Middle Asia and Eastern Europe,

330

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

Ming Dynasty vs. Japanese pirates, and Qing Dynasty vs. Japanese pirates and colonialist countries. All of these dynasties enhanced the concept of “territory” due to its practical experience and imagination of foreign force. We may even analogize this view back to the Chinese Empire before Song Dynasty (Ge, 1994, pp. 83–94). The nationalization of military power and territory settlement in the Song,Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties probably did not matter to the growth of European-type “international relationship” but more to the “internal pacification” inside the Chinese Empire. Certainly, as Giddens says, the internal pacification of a state gets mature till nation-state age. However, China seems to have gradually accumulated historical heritage of this respect since the Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties. The basic way of state’s internal pacification is to accumulate authoritative resources, i.e., to establish social surveillance method through development of transportation and communication media as well the storage of social information and to set up space location of social surveillance through experiential regionalization of administration, economy and people (Giddens, 1985, pp. 172–191). Additionally, the popularization of state symbolic system was an important method for behavior surveillance, which seemed to be an ideological premise for initial development of internal pacification in the Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties. Before the Song Dynasty, symbol-religious system and behavioral value system in China had defined differentiation, like refined-popular, official-civil, good-evil, domestic-exotic. As all traditional states (Giddens, 1985, pp. 34–40), the primary political function of these differentiations is to maintain social-class differentiation of “central-frontier”, “city-countryside”, “upper class-lower class” and also the symbolic and political authority of ruling class. This cultural view of “upper class different from lower class” has strong continuity. It still had deep social influence till late Qing Dynasty or even a long historical time after Qing Dynasty (Yang, 1961). In history, the strict hierarchical regulations for ritual of emperor, bureaucrats, gentry and farm were evidences for this differentiation. Till the Song Dynasty, the situation changed to some degree. The appearance of Neo-Confucianism brought an unintended consequence, i.e., the civilianization of upper political value and ethical concept system. This school of ethical ideology focused on close combination of the “knowledge

331

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

(or knowing)” of upper culture (especially Confucianism) and “practice (or doing)” of all people inside the empire, making all subjects of empire abide by same idealistic behavior way. According to social historians’ studies, the consequence of neo-Confucianism growth is ceremonies of ancient upper society (like rituals for ancient ancestors), privilege of social communication and succession, as well as civilianized and localized system (Ebrey, 1991). Meanwhile, it provided an ideological premise for standardization of people’s practices and administrative control. However, it is worthy to emphasize that the ideological change had bearing on the widespread development of heterodoxy economical and cultural powers at that time which threatened the state’s stabilization. What we need to pay particular attention to is the formation of Chinese macroeconomic regions and central places of urban market towns and accordingly integration crisis of centralism state after the Song Dynasty. G. William Skinner’s analysis of Chinese economic space and social structure (Skinner, 1964, p. 65; 1977, 1985) reveals that since the dynasties after Song, the decentralization situation of local military governors have been gradually eliminated, but in economic, social and cultural fields, the relatively autonomous regional space system got mature gradually. In different macroregions, the social economic development period was in obvious regional autonomy. The great development of market towns in rural area provided regional network for product circulation in countryside and provided local stage for social and ritual activities between villages and between clan organizations. Meanwhile, the civil association irrelevant to government also largely developed around economic central places. In specific historical period, these associations assembled in economic central places were even able to organize anti-government activities in the name of religious congregation or tax-resistance, threatening central government. It is not difficult to find that the development of social control system in the Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties also had close relation with the conflict between regional autonomous social economic development and state integration. Under such circumstances, the grassroots powers in the Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties gained great momentum in two “lines”. One is “military township” construction around state territory border where maintenance by instruments of military violence was required; the other is the establishment of local administration and internal pacification system

332

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

around rural areas, markets and cities. In many places, the two lines developed simultaneously. And in most places, local military towns and administrative grassroots organizations were always substituted mutually. “Town” referred to the frontier junctures and the garrison residential places in province and prefecture at the earliest time, which was totally different from “market” in industrial and commercial sense. “Town” was probably derived from the Tang Dynasty. Its original meaning is “military town”. The development of “town” mainly occurred in the Song Dynasty and was probably related with the garrison system at that time. In the Ming Dynasty, “military station” system and “town garrison system” were implemented successively, which further developed garrison function of town. Till the Qing Dynasty, the official literature (such as Records of the Great Unity of the Qing) still put the records about “town” in the category of “pass”. It is clear that “town” meant military “station” for a long time (Cong, 1995, pp. 119–120). In the Song Dynasty, this system was implemented all over China, but was adapted accordingly in different areas. After the Yuan Dynasty, with development of local economic regions, in northern China closer to the imperial capital, the original “town” changed into “market town” gradually. However, in frontier area, the military town in the Tang, Song and Ming Dynasties and the military station in the Ming Dynasty kept their military defense function for a longer time. Some of them changed into smuggling market town till late Qing dynasty under the impact of Western colonial commerce. The local administration construction around original villages, markets and cities has existed in history before the Song Dynasty. After Song, with the growth of regional economic system, the court also enhanced its social economic control. In strict sense, the formation foundation of such administrative location is space structure of social economy. In this connection, Skinner’s analysis is quite worthy of reference. When analyzing the regional structure of Chinese economy, Skinner takes three main steps: Firstly, to analyze the hierarchy of Chinese central places; secondly, to divide Chinese social space structure into regions and inspect the structure of internal economic center inside the regions; finally, to argue how the factors besides economic geography to constrain economic space. “Hierarchy of central places” refers to hierarchical situation in local market or specifically the ordered relationship among Chinese rural villages, market

333

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

towns and large-scale market towns. In any region of the Chinese rural area, farmers produce and consume some types of articles, like agricultural product (includes grains, edible oil, cotton) and handicraft products (including tableware, containers, metal tools, clothes, yarn, sacrificial vessels, and fabrics). We can put forward a series of questions related to regional structure: (1) How did the peasants depend on commercial activities (or what proportion of consumables did rural households purchase from market?); (2) How were the product purchased from the producers, how were they processed, packaged, and distributed to consumers? (3) In one region, what proportion of consumables was produced internally and what proportion of consumables was imported from other regions? In simple subsistence economy, each rural household is self-sufficient, so it does not need a market transaction system. But any economy slightly more complicated than simple subsistence economy needs two market mechanisms. First, there must be a market mechanism providing channels for obtaining products from the producers as well as the processing and packaging for products. In addition, there must another market mechanism to ensure that finished products can be sold or distributed to consumers. The former market mechanism is a product-oriented market system, which represents the upward process from product to business in order to convert the product into processed and packaged finished products; the later is a consumer-oriented market system, which provides downward channel from distributors to consumers. Generally, vegetables and similar products will not be transported far away. Farmers will sell these products in nearby local markets. Cotton, tea and other products are sold in local markets as a priority. But, the products collected from local market will be further transported to upper business sectors and sent back to local markets or transported to metropolis for sale. In other words, there is a cyclic channel among villages, market towns and cities. In Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China (Skinner, 1964, p. 65), Skinner makes a systematical analysis of the role of market in rural social structure. In his view, all central places of traditional China could be arranged in hierarchical order according to the definition of economic function. The ideal status of market hierarchy is, the higher place contains the lower place in a comparatively large system and provides the latter with products and services unavailable in the latter place. Village itself does not

334

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

have market facilities and commodity available for trading. They are served by nearby standard market town, obtaining tools, foodstuffs (if necessary), fruits and vegetables. Standard market town is a rural trade market that meets the business demand of rural households, a place for peasants to sell what they have produced but will not consume, and a center for peasants to purchase what they have not produced but need to consume. It is the lowest level in the market hierarchy above farmers and villages. Above standard market towns are a series of economic units at higher level, including intermediate market towns, central market towns, local cities and regional cities. Intermediate market towns serve as standard market towns, providing luxuries for gentry, landlords and officials. Teahouses and social occasions in intermediate market towns provide a place of activities for gentry and landlords. The higher level it is, the more goods and service are provided. Therefore, there are three major criteria for hierarchy definition: (1) Availability of goods and services; (2) Market behavior of people in the area; (3) Itinerant mode of merchants and peddlers. Skinner believes the trading system integrates city, market town and village in a region, and enables roads and transportation to connect different locations. In Cities and Hierarchies of Local Systems (1974 (1978)), Skinner modifies his location hierarchy system by further dividing it into standard market towns, intermediate market towns, central market towns, local cities, greater cities, regional cities, regional metropolises, central metropolis. The location of each level is defined based on its unique economic function. These unique economic functions refer to: Goods categories, the position in market transportation networks, postal services, market dates and financial services. It should be noted that, location hierarchy is not an abstract space layout, but is closely related to transportation layout. Meanwhile, transportation cost is a determinant for economy. Specifically speaking, the formation of market town must take the minimization of transportation cost into consideration. The direct consequence of this consideration is the higher level locations are always surrounded by a number of lower level locations. When analyzing the relation among villages, market towns and cities, Skinner adopts the “central places theory” of Christalle and Losch. “Central places theory” proposes to utilize a simple economic system concept to analyze and abstractly describe location hierarchy in economic geography. Its

335

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

theoretical establishment mainly takes the consideration about transportation cost, demand intensity and goods category as basis. Skinner defines “demand intensity” as “including consumable demand areas that enable product vendors to obtain normal profits; he also defines “goods category” as “a limited area that buyer is not willing to purchase goods beyond it”. The formation of demand intensity depends on the purchasing power in a region. In other words, if the region is poor with a small population, it will have a smaller demand for goods; if the region is rich with high population density, it will have a greater demand for goods. On the basis of these assumptions, Skinner deduces the general space organization of these central locations. Provided that villages and market towns were located in a flat plain with balanced resources and no mountains, no matter the goods are transported to any direction, the cost will be relatively same and the demand intensities of the locations across the entire plain are consistent. Thus, the distribution of villages and market towns will present a unique space pattern. The suitable arrangement for central places is: Generally, there are six markets around a market town and the villages locate around a market town in hexagonal pattern. Skinner believes, Chinese rural society space layout typically provides evidence for dual-ring structure; generally speaking, in Chinese rural area, the inner ring around market town includes six villages and the outer ring includes 12 villages. In other words, the coverage of a market town is 18 villages. In addition, the standard market town around intermediate market town and intermediate market towns around higher level market town are also in hexagonal layout. From the view of Idealistic status, this location layout brings one consequence, i.e., the space of Chinese rural area includes a number of hexagons composed by places and these hexagons are connected as a hierarchical network, creating differentiation between higher locations and lower locations and facilitating the higher locations (cities and developed market towns) to serve the market demand of lower locations. This market space model is imagined based on plain, same demand intensity, same transportation cost and infinity space, which is not the reality. In order to utilize this model in real Chinese rural area, Skinner modifies the assumption for the model establishment with realistic altitude. He divides China into macro-regions which consist of central places and border places, and thus introduce variables like nature of border, demand differentiation,

336

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

population density differentiation, transportation efficiency differentiation etc. Especially, the differentiation of transportation cost has great effects on the modification of idealistic type of market town layout. In traditional China, some places near transportation network of rivers, canals and seas were convenient for goods transportation and took much less cost than those inland places blocked by mountains, so the market town layout varied accordingly. However, according to Skinner’s study on six regions of China, the central places theory approximately complies with Chinese practical situation. Although many places presented in unique space layout due to geographic factors, dual-ring hexagonal layout of market towns were fairly common. Skinner further argues, on space structure of the Chinese Empire, “we may distinguish two kinds of hierarchical system, one is a regional system set and adjusted by imperial bureaucrats for regional administration; the other is a regional system derived from economic trading. Both systems are in nature of central places system, but have close relation with territorial system. The former regional system reflects bureaucratic structure of “official China”, which is administrative world of “yamen” and officials. The latter regional system reflects “natural” structure of Chinese society which is a market trade system dominated by retired officials, non-official gentry and rich merchants and a world of informal politics and concealed subculture. We should notice at the very beginning that administrative capital is just a byproduct of economic central places (Skinner 1978 (1974), pp. 1–78). This view may not be suitable for the development of Chinese local administrative system before Song Dynasty (Wang, 1997b), but it basically reflects the development process of local administrative system after Song Dynasty and is comparatively compliant with the development of local administrative location under county level (especially the township hereinafter mentioned). As we know, in the dynasties after Song, the development of social control system under county level was firstly started in the 2nd year of Xi Ning period (1069 AD). The Wang Anshi Reform referred to many respects, including politics, military, society and economy etc. Of which, bao jia system was a quite important part of it. According to baojia system (the Tithing System), “da bao” consisted of ten families and “du bao” consisted of 500 families. Basically, “bao (security)” was a local protective organization for

337

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

public security and paramilitary (militia). Both bao and jia had unfixed leadership position. In several years after baojia system, Southern Song dynasty invented “xiangyue” (town schooling) system. Strictly speaking, it was an administrative system but a “non-governmental organization” founded by local gentries to voluntarily help government maintain local ethical code and social order. Its effort was to promote “admonishment and correction for faults, provision for etiquettes and customs, mutual aid when trials and tribulations” in folk community through local rules and regulation. The two mutually collaborated systems were in concord with the political and ethical view of neo-Confucianism, so they were highly valued by Zhu Xi et al. after the Southern Song Dynasty. They were impacted at late Song Dynasty, however. Till Ming and Qing Dynasties, the two systems had become civilianized systems. The “xiang” in “xiangyue” system is approximately same as the conventional unit title “xiang” used since Qin and Han Dynasties, which is like the level of big village or township nowadays. In the following dynasties, although the title of rural grassroots management unit was changed for several times, the nature of Song’s baojia system and xiangyue system was substantively carried on. Both the Jin and Yuan Dynasties continued to use xiang system and set “she” (consisted of 50 families) under town level. The xiang system in the two dynasties combined the main functions of baojia system and xiangyue system. In the Yuan Dynasty, some places (especially the places need garrison) changed “xiang” into “du” and “she” into “tuan” so as to enhance the military function of grassroots organization. But in most of Yuan period, the “xiang she” system that was similar with baojia system and xiangyue system broke down the ethnic-divided situation in theYuan Empire and became main tool for controlling folk society. The rural grassroots organization of the Ming Dynasty carried on Song’s system further more. It strictly implemented militarized baojia system in the unstable places, enhancing the household registration and joint defense training in these places. In ordinary places, it adopted she system of Yuan Dynasty, encouraging local regulations, local schools and social system. Till Qing Dynasty, baojia system was changed as chun jia system. Jia consisted of ten families and zong jia consisted of 100 Jias. Chun jia system basically had same functions as baojia system and she system. The grassroots local administrative system on chapter was so

338

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

standardized that Dutton concludes China have surveillance system since ancient time (Dutton, 1988). He believes baojia system of ancient China is as comprehensive as Western modern person surveillance system described by French Sociological theorist, Michel Foucault. I also believe that, after the Song Dynasty, Chinese empire’s control for local society had achieved a “unprecedented” extent. Especially, the urban and rural area information control and development of chang wei (secret service agencies) in the Ming and Qing Dynasties exactly reflected the high centralization tendency of authoritative resources in this period. However, we must be aware that, if nation-state does be established, the surveillance and internal pacification in true sense is impossible to realize. Hence, it is not difficult to see that the grassroots social control system in the Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties just partially implemented the ideal model. In other words, since Weber, the analysis on grassroots society of traditional China in historical sociology field is still applicable for the dynasties of late Chinese empire. Firstly, the grassroots social control system was implemented intermittently and decayed together with dynasty decline. Secondly, the social control unit under county level was not government in strict sense and its “leader” was not bureaucrat (official) in strict sense, so the government’s control for grassroots society depended on local gentries or powerful men. These people’s interest was not totally the same as royal court or even had the characteristic of “localism”, thus they might not server political integration interest of royal court (Han and Fei, 1988; Shue, 1988, pp. 95– 103). Thirdly, due to above reasons, grassroots social control unit was often reconstructed as carrier of local identity by social group in different regions and combined with folk associations and non-official ritual (such as temple fairs) organizations; and either, it was often absorbed into regional economic and political framework, making it beyond control of royal court and becoming a centrifugal power (Wang, 1995). Finally, in order to maintain the authority of centralization, the dynasties after Song still kept social hierarchy and class differentiation between city and countryside of traditional state age (Chu, 1981, pp. 197–219). It made royal court be willing to admit the locality of the local society and keep its cultural differentiation from imperial symbolic system, thus provided large existence space for non-official systems and those behavior modes different from the standard behavior modes regulated by the bajia system etc.

339

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

5.

Township Governments and Modernity in Late 19th Century and First Half of 20th Century

In the 19th century, the political situation of Chinese urban and rural areas changed greatly. In the previous time, the differentiation between urban area and rural area was comparatively stable. The residents in cities enjoyed high privilege and also took more strict personal surveillance. And, people lived under city level, although could not avoid the constraints of orthodox ideology and royal court’s social control system, enjoyed more social and economic autonomy. After the middle 19th century, this situation was impacted by the newly rising urban centers promoted by foreign colonialism countries (Fei, 1953, pp. 91–107) and partially decomposed. Meanwhile, during the confrontation with colonial strength, the ruler of Qing Dynasty also gradually realized the “world” passed down from ancient time was just one of the many states in the world. With initiatively help of colonialism countries, late Qing Dynasty established self-organized custom system and frontier defense system and tried to cultivate a set of modern military officers abided by royal court (state) with reference of Western experience. Till the end of 19th century, driven by the slogan of “xinzheng (New Deal)” reform, the Qing Dynasty referenced Western European monarchism to define “sovereignty” and partially executed internal pacification in the state. Under the propaganda of “state enrichment and self-strengthening”, in the name of rural “self-autonomy”, the late Qing Dynasty enhanced its control for people of lower level. Particularly in 1901 when Yuan Shikai undertook governor of Zhili, he developed “new learning” and encouraged “police system”. In May of 1902, he tried to establish modern police system in Baoding, set up “police headquarters” and found “police schools”. Soon afterwards, Yuan Shikai proposed Qing court to substitute the old baojia system with new police system. He criticized the baojia system for its “lacking protective function but making trouble” and implemented new police system in northern urban area, which was under his jurisdiction. In 1904, police system was implemented in rural area. In rich area, it allocated one policeman for every 50 families; in poor are, it allocated one policeman for every 100 families. All the policemen ware identical uniform and weapon and accepted formal training. Police system started from district division 340

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

and counted family number per village. The policeman was recommended by village and the necessary fund was self-raised by village as well. Police system of the Northern Warlords was the early form of Chinese modern policing system. It firstly executed modern-type internal pacification in Chinese rural area. However, the police system at that time did not execute all over the state. Although it was implemented widely in Northern China, it was often impractical in local places due to some officials’ insistence on the former baojia system and also due to policeman expenditures of village level and district level were funded by local finance. In 1908, the Qing Dynasty issued “Imperial Constitutions Outline” (Xu, 1992, pp. 10–11) nationwide. At the same time, it issued “Local Autonomy Regulations on Cities, Towns and Townships”. It regulated that: Places where fu, ting, zhou and county Governments located were called as cities; market towns, villages, tun, ji etc had over 50,000 populations were called as towns; any market town, village, hamlet, marketplace etc had with a population less than 50,000 were called as xiang (town).Autonomous scope of city, township and xiang mainly included education, health, road, agricultural, industrial and commercial affairs, charity, public interest and autonomy fund. As for organ of local autonomy, all cities and towns set council and court of directors. All xiangs set council and xiang-level director. Council member was elected from city, town and xiang internally. All the males at 25 years old or above, holding Chinese nationality, living in the city, town and xiang for three years or above and paying two yuan or above of formal tax or local-interest tax had the right to elect and be elected. The basic amount of council members for city and town is 20. One member would be added for every additional population of 5,000 people. The maximum amount is 60 members. The amount of council member at xiang level was determined upon population. For xiang with population less than 2,500 people, there would be six members; for xiang with population over 2,500 people, the member amount would increase in proportion. The maximum council member amount is 18. The council member was honorary position and its service term was two years, having no salary. Half of the members were reelected every year. Council held a meeting per season. The meeting lasted 15 days and was able to extend (less than 10 days) when necessary. The functional power of council was to determine initiation and abolition affairs, autonomous regulations, autonomous fund,

341

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

election dispute, punishment for autonomous staff member, complaint and arbitration among towns and townships etc. The court of directors for city and town had 1 chief director, 1–3 directors and 4–12 honorary directors, who were elected from electorates of local city and town and submitted to local officials for approval. Their service term was two years. Their functional power was to implement the matters decided by council, contacting local government, and organize council election and arrange council meeting. The local autonomous organ at xiang level was simpler, which only had one xiang director and one xiang assistant. They were elected from electorates of local xiang by xiang council and submitted to local official for approval. Their service time and functional power were similar to city and town court of directors (Cong, 1995, p. 46; Xu, 1992, pp. 414–421). Three years later, the Qing Dynasty came to an end. But the local autonomous system of town and township was carried on by ROC for a longer term.Although local autonomous system was stopped byYuan Shikai in 1914, the bureaucratic town, township and city still substantially existed in most places of China. In some provinces, they established their own grassroots administrative system (such as the district-village system in Shanxi, city-village system in Yunnan, city-town system in Zhejiang), although in different titles, their substances were approximately same as the city, town and township system. After the founding of the Nanjing-based ROC, the setting of organization under county level always varied, but the basic content still carried on city, town and xiang system of the late Qing Dynasty. In September of 1929, “County Organization Law” regulated there were four levels under county, which were qu (district), cun (village), li (community), jian (block) and lin (neighborhood). In July of 1930, the “County Organization Law” was revised. In 1934, the Central Political Committee of the Kuomintang (KMT) issued “Improvement Principle of Local Autonomy”, regulating a two-level system for counties, i.e., county was set up as one level and town (township, village) was the other level. District can be set when special places, but it was exceptional case. This regulation changed the previous five-level system (county-qu-xiang (town)-jian-lin) into two-level system (county-xiang). Nevertheless, as the local autonomy condition of many places did not suit for new county-xiang system, the ministry of interior issued “Explanation about Improvement Principle of Local Autonomy” soon, declaring the reform of two-level system was not hurry to implement. In winter of 1935, the fifth congress of KMT admitted 342

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

that the 12-year local autonomy failed and the local autonomy was actually “local bully autonomy”, i.e., largely controlled by local despots. However, the “County Organization Outline” was issued in September of 1939 to regulate the implementation of “new county system” and re-regulate the organ under county level. For county occupied wide land, district was set up to administer 15 to 30 xiang (towns). Under ordinary counties xiang (towns) and townships would be set directly. “New county system” also regulated that, district was detached organ of county government to supervise xiang /town. Only towns/townships were sole administrative organizations under county. This regulation has formally and completely devolved Chinese grassroots administration from “county” to original autonomous units of “towns/townships” (Xu, 1992, pp. 414–421; Wei, 1996). The issuing time of “new county system” was during the war of resistance against Japan. Its implementation range was limited. But, the content of this system completely showed the downward transferring of modern Chinese grassroots political power. District was set between “county” and “town (township)”. And there were formal district headquarters, district police station, district health center, district occupation training class as well as formally appointed official positions like district leader, center director etc. It defined grassroots organization of district level as a administrative unit having local management functions of finance, civil administration, education, construction, punishment, health etc. “New county system” and “Town (Township) Organization Rules” issued in 1941 clearly regulated that town/township level organization substituted the baojia system as grassroots administrative power. One town (township) consisted of 6–15 baos, setting xiang affair committee and xiang administration office, four sections of civil administration, police, economy and culture, militia, xiang (town) chief with “three in one” power of politics, military and education. xiang (town) also set public opinion organ, called as “Town (Township) Public Opinion Representative Committee”. Each bao elected two representatives to take part in this committee. The tasks of Town (Township) and public opinion organ including: Improve organization, establish and check household registration, finance management, regulate land price, found school, promote cooperation, manage policing, “four rights” training, improve health, manage manufacturing and production, construct transportation facilities and, perform benevolence etc (Ruan, 1978). 343

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

From the end of 19th century to 1940s, Chinese local administration changed several times, but its main development route was to move down the grassroots political powers from county-level to town/township level. In principle, we can define this development route as gradual maturity progress of modern local administrative system. However, due to Chinese military and political unrest and unstable state integration in the first half of 20th century, the local administration during this period had great regional differentiation in practice. At the beginning after ROC founded, it strived for using new administrative system to substitute the old baojia system, but, in some places controlled by local strength, the baojia system was protected and sometimes had the tendency to change as affiliated unit to local military leader (Zhu, 1994; Wei, 1996). From late 1920s to middle 1930s, in order to “eliminate communism”, Chiang Kai-shek implemented the paramilitary baojia system in Southeastern China, Eastern China, Southwestern China and Northwestern China and reinforced local pacification, utilizing ancient “Lian Zuo” system to strictly control local society and make these regions fall into cage status. During the war of resistance against Japan (1937–1945), ROC also implemented the baojia system in some places. This reinforced paramilitary local control measure was based on the consideration about historical particularity (like to pacify internal unrest, to resist foreign enemy) ostensibly, but, in fact, it just particularly showed the great concern for the internal pacification of a state trying to convert itself into a “power container”. In 1939, Hsiao-Tung Fei had already critically described the local administrative system in ROC period in his Peasant Life in China. He pointed out the setup of this system took “planned social change” as an excuse, but it was actually the stretch of social control (Fei, 1939, pp. 106– 109). Even from today’s view, this conclusion of Hsiao-Tung Fei still makes sense. The institution of modern local administrative system is a major part of social change, but it is definitely not a social evolution developed by society itself. It is closely related with the effort to establish modernity of state power. The growth of the modern world system (Wallerstein, 1974) brought the current world a “modern age”. No matter Western capitalistic nationstate or non-western new nation-state, all of them built their power foundation under the paragon of “establishment of modern age”. They commonly

344

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

called the process and method to enter into this age as “modernization”. However, for what “modernization” is, they gave quite different answers. In the past, we naturally connected “modernization” with “industrialization”, “rationalization” and “capitalization”. It seemed “modernization” was just a highly oriented transformation of economy or economic concept. But, the development of thoughts since this year proves, “modernization” is not simply an economic process but a complicate process of power operation. I have mentioned Giddens’ nation-state theory hereinbefore. This theory actually points out that the consequence of “modernization” is the establishment of so-called “modernity”, but “modernity” definitely features more than capitalization, industrialization and rationalization. “Modernization” is a process that allocative resources and authoritative resources highly grow in society at the same time. The so-called “allocative resources” refer to productive and consumable resources in the society and the so-called “authoritative resources” are the resources of administrative power system and social control system. The process of a society striving for “modernity” is the process that allocative resources and authoritative resources are highly extended and expanded in the society. In the West, with large-scale development of industries, “industrialism” was a means of social control, whose expansion resulting in close surveillance of people. In order to achieve this surveillance, plenty of information and industrial resources were utilized in policing and personnel system. Meanwhile, in order to achieve internal social control, the international world achieved a “border agreement”, defining people in society as “citizen” within the sovereign scope of a certain state. On the one hand, it gave these citizens within state boundary “human rights” and sufficient rights to participate politics; on the other hand, it changed these citizens to the subjects abiding by administrative surveillance and nation responsibility through imperceptible and ideological influence. For the respect of politics and economy, state administrative entity monopolized military power (or instruments of violence) to strictly keep potential violence under state control and make revolution impossible. This made modern society quite different from any previous society form. The cultural consequence of modernity is the generation of a new historicity, which considers the development of history and humanity as linear evolution based on subjective assumption (Giddens, 1990; Duara, 1996).

345

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

Ideally speaking, the “consequences” of modernity have the following features: 1. From the viewpoint of individual and culture, one of the modernity consequences is that individuals are directly put into nationalized social reproduction. To become a modern nation-state, the society mainly depends on its entire industrialization. But, during the process that traditional society changes into nation-state, the relation between individual and culture also plays an important role. The characteristic of traditional society is social distance between community life and state system. The reason why traditional state is able to reproduce and sustain by itself is the face-to-face education in community. Face-to-face cultural education provides an important method for social culture to sustain. In modern nation-state age, national culture is no longer able to exist. All nationalists emphasize the establishment of national public education so as to build a nationalized social reproduction system by substituting community cultural education with common knowledge education (Gellner, 1983). 2. From the viewpoint of social organization, one of the modernity consequences is that the administrative space system and citizenship society substitute the community interpersonal relationship. Related to the above feature, the society pursuing modernity often significantly focuses on the establishment of social order, but the social order is no longer take family, kinship, geographic relation and friendship at the core. Giddens indicates that a major feature of modern society is the generation of “risk culture”. The so-called “risk culture” refers to people’s uncertainty about future. In modern society, people trust diverse service systems provided by modern society so as to face various uncertainties including insurance, welfare, hospital and lawyer. When people got into trouble in the past society, they could ask favor from clan and neighbors in the community. But when modernity develops to a certain extent, people mostly turn to professional organizations for support (Giddens, 1990). The change of modern trust system does not contradict with the change of social relationship, i.e., the enhancement of social control of people at workplace. The theorists on modernization often mention 346

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

that, “modernity” is the rising of bureaucracy. In fact, by considering the Western modernization experience, the substance of “bureaucracy” is recombination of social structure. In modern society, the time and space of people’s activities are deeply limited by the social system of the location where they locate. Their interpersonal communication has already been off the multi-orientated communication in traditional society but into single-oriented communication related to administrative system. On the one hand, this enables them to exceed the space of “family”; on the other hand, this forces them to enter into another hierarchical relationship and behavioral pattern. 3. From the viewpoint of economy, one of modernity’s consequences is that the global economic system and commodity exchange substitute the reciprocal and redistributive exchange. In traditional society, economic system is integrated with societyculture system. the economic activity usually presents particular social relation and people’s perspective for this relation. In society with highly developed modernity, society is divided into state, market and charity organization. Sufficiently modernized nation-state does not implement resources reallocation function. The processing and consumption mostly depends on self-adjustment of market. As Wolf comments, in capitalistic production mode, the popular ideology assumes, all participants in market are equal in front of political and economic differentiation between capitalists and workers (Wolf, 1982, pp. 389–390). Part of taxes collected from market is used for paying state expenditures, another part is used for labor reproduction, and a small part is passed to charity organizations for social relief. The generous welfare system of charity organization is similar to reciprocal exchange in existence sense, but the social relation thus established is quite different from ethical-economic relation of traditional society. It is systemized folk reallocation of market profits (Paci, 1989). Plenty of allocative resources are used for profitable market exchange. It results in the growth of market’s self-reproduction and expansion capability as well as common reorganization of “money symbolizes power”. The situation of world economic system can be approximately divided into “hard currency” of developed country and “soft currency” of undeveloped country. The former enjoys highly

347

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

creditworthiness and can be exchanged in most cases. The value of the latter often intensively fluctuates and can be exchanged only in special cases. Actually, the two currencies symbolize the hierarchy of world system. In general, highly modernized states possess hard currency. The global infiltration by world economic system may be reviewed in the formation of international trade organizations and large global auto markets monopolized by developed capitalist countries, or McDonald’s impact on global fast-food culture. The “survival of the fittest” principle for goods is reflected in quality competition as well as “modernity” of goods itself. 4. From the viewpoint of politics and jurisdiction, one of the modernity consequences is that nation-state sovereignty and official laws put the power system and relation coordination principle as “marginal” “nonofficial system”. “Democracy” and “rule of law” are the slogans of all nation-states. Highly modernized states have highly developed “democracy” and “rule of law”. The pursuit of “democracy” and “rule of law” actually renounces many early European political systems and non-Western political systems. It dedicates to establish a transpersonal order that is formal and irrelevant to social relations. Its realization will bring out an important consequence, i.e., gradual decomposition of ethical order and customary law and establishment of official power organization and official court system. Furthermore, though “democracy” is established in different forms, it serves the generation of nation-state’s identical order and the citizens’ participation in nation-state’s politics; and the establishment of “rule of law” serves nation-state’s monopolized discretion about “justice”. 5. From the viewpoint of symbolic and religious rituals, one of the modernity consequences is that nationalism prevails in diverse rituals and symbolic systems. According to some scholars, modernity means the replacement of “secular culture” by “divine culture”. Put it the other way, the growth of modernity is the disappearance of “irrational belief”. In fact, one major feature of modernity is to include new symbolic systems and beliefs. The symbol and belief believe the existence of “unified past”. And the unified past” is in order to indicate the existence of “unified present”

348

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

(i.e., nation-state). It quite differs from diverse believes in traditional society. In traditional society, symbol-ritual system interprets the “past” diversely. Thus, when anthropologists make field investigation, the local people often give different answer to same symbol and issue. The characteristics of modernity is nation-state gives an identical “official explanation” for “past”, making history an “distantiating” process away from human creativity (Duara, 1996). Many modern “secular life” is actually the same as traditional rituals. For instance, sociologists find, the sports in Western society often have ritual characteristics and the sports enthusiasts often treat the sports competition as an activity presenting historical spirit of a state. The sports are respected and presented with symbolic significance. In many developed countries, popular culture also has nationalistic characteristic. The media serves information communication for practical life ostensibly, but actually have remarkable effect on creation and duplication of national common topics. Many people think only primitive people use “totem” to symbolize ethnic tribe and “totem” is a kind of belief. In fact, nation-state also needs symbols like national anthem, national emblem, national ensign etc. We may say these symbols are “modern totem”. Of course, with the maturity of nationalism, these symbols related to nation-state will become an “orthodox symbolic system” gradually and override the “unorthodox symbolic system” (Anderson, 1983). I have suggested in a case study on a Southern Fujian village that the effort to establish modernity had been started since the end of 19th century and early 20th century and the effort had infiltrated into the development process of Chinese history. Old-style private school substituted by public school is a part of new citizenship reproduction. In the ROC period, plenty of specialized agencies established successively were a part of modern professional bureaucracy. The increase of business management department and new taxation department showed prosperous development of new national economy. The movement to topple old idols and improve customs clearly showed nation-state was changing people into citizens (Wang, 1997a). Town/township governments were an important part of the building of Chinese modern government system in ROC period. Meanwhile, it was also an important method for establishing modernity. In the introduction to “new system” hereinbefore, we are aware that town/township, 349

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

was strictly organized as a grassroots political power. It consisted of town affair committee and town administration office and then was divided into sections, including civil administration, police, economy and culture, militia. The task of these organs was to implement: Administrative control (mechanism improvement, household registration establishment and check), economic regulation (financial management, land price control, transportation facilities construction), cultural reconstruction (school setup), social improvement (promote cooperation), political control (policing administration, “four rights” training), advocate new citizenship (health improvement, benevolence practice). These tasks (or functions) are compliant with main contents of modernity. Therefore, the establishment of town/township governments should be considered as a primary approach to “regulatory social changes” in modern Chinese history. It is worthy to note that from the Beijing-based ROC period to Nanjing-based ROC period, Chinese military power had developed with striking regional features. The maintenance of national boundaries were infiltrated by foreign colonization and attacked by invasion and the militarization of internal party politics made the establishment of internal pacification stay in partial realization status for long. Therefore, the establishment of nation-state faced many problems at that time. Meanwhile, the establishment of modernity system also met many troubles. Due to the characteristics of semi-colonial and semi-feudal society during that period, the nation-state and its integration of society, economy and culture were in an embryonic phase and had to make concession to the old social system. As a result, the efficiency of town/township governments’ administrative control was largely limited. In fact, the economy and culture in many local places were still controlled by non-governmental organizations and power blocs, which created a “comprehensive” power and cultural network of semi-official and semi-civil nature (Duara, 1988, pp. 218–226).

6.

Enhancement of Township Governments Since 1949

When elaborating upon the relation between Chinese state power and rural society, Shue concludes that since 1949 the state control of rural areas experienced a transformation from “honeycomb” system in Mao Zedong 350

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

period to the situation that business network and governmental organization directly infiltrated into the countryside. In Mao Zedong period, peasants were fixed in local society. The state depended on local officials to localize central policies. Local officials then played a role similar to “gentry” in Chinese empire period. Thus, the rural areas were basically not open to top-down governmental control. By contrast, a series of economic opendoor policies and administrative reform regulations were released during the reform and opening up and incorporated peasants into the control of the integration-oriented business network and the continually reinforced local administrative systems. The local rural communities gradually opened up under top-down social control. And it enabled China to achieve the unprecedented extension of state power (Shue, 1988, pp. 123–154). During the investigation into the development history of Chinese township governments, I find Shue’s insight basically complies with local administration development status from 1958 till now. In the Introduction herein, I have mentioned that Shue’s macro-analysis of Chinese statesociety relation was quite worthy of elaboration. But, it must be noted that, Shue focuses her argument on the contrast between “Mao and Deng periods”, so the longer history of local administration establishment under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is neglected. The scholars greatly concerned about this unique historical period can notice that, since its founding, CPC adopted “mobilizing” mode and “managing” mode alternatively for social control. Thing being true, we can conclude that since 1949 the development history of Chinese power has been presented in an “upward spiral” type but not in a simple evolution process from “Mao” to “Deng”. From the perspective of general development tendency, CPC was in periphery position of the official state before 1949. In order to overthrow the existing regime in periphery position, it adopted social mobilization mode that was bale to directly contact the society. However, even in this phase, the alternation between the “mobilizing” mode and “managing” mode existed as well and the two modes were often adopted together in most places. During the first revolutionary civil war, CPC first mobilized peasants to establish people’s regime by peasants’ associations. As mass organizations, peasants’ associations were “revolutionary” in character and had the main function of substituting old authority with new authority temporarily. It was

351

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

quite imperfect in structure.After Guangzhou Uprising in 1927, CPC gradually proposed the plan of “establishment of Soviet Regime” and made clear definitions in “Resolution on Organization of Soviet Regime” in July of 1928. From 1931 to 1933, CPC implement Soviet Regime according to this “Resolution” and the subsequent “Organization Laws and Regulations on Administration Division”. Meanwhile, CPC issued the four-level system, i.e., province, county, district and town; and primarily carried out local election and administration management system. The mobilizing mode turned to managing mode. However, in October of 1934, Red Army was forced into the Long March. The southern base area was lost and the administrative system of Soviet regime was abolished. From October of 1935 when the Red Army arrived in Northern Shaanxi to August of 1945 when the war of resistance against Japan, CPC’s regime establishment changed from Soviet regime into anti-Japanese national united front regime. It also mobilized peasants to establish people’s regime at first. But with the outbreak of Anti-Japanese War, the object of mobilizing was extended to all classes of the society in order to establish anti-Japanese national united front regime. After 1939, with the expansion of anti-Japanese base area, CPC implemented stricter grassroots administrative organization system and widely absorbed communists and personnel beyond CPC to participate in local administrative affairs. We find that during this period CPC carried out the comparatively complete managing mode in local (especially rural) society. During the same period, district and town governmental agencies were largely enhanced due to the implementation of policies like “triangular organization system”, “reduction of rent and interest”, “payment of rent and interest”, “streamlining of the military and administrative structure”, “production improvement”, “supporting the army and cherishing the people” etc. After the victory of Anti-Japanese War, the foreign war was turned into domestic war again. During this process, CPC achieved great victories nationwide and controlled much wider regions. In order to consolidate the regime in liberated areas and absorb peasants to participate in People’s Liberation War, CPC widely adopted the mobilizing mode in newly liberated areas and implemented rural land reform in liberated areas where the regime was more stabilized. It divided class-based social groups in local society and enhanced the “dictatorship” capacity of people’s regime.

352

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

After 1949, the building of Chinese rural grassroots administrative organization went through three evolving phases, which were (1) 1949– 1958, (2) 1958–1982 and (3) 1982 till now. From the view of overall character, phase (1) was development of “managing” control mode — governmental organization; phase (2) was “mobilizing” mode — social movement; phase (3) was the recovery and further enhancement of the managing mode of phase (1). Phase (1) showed apparent character of downward transferring of state power. In October 1st of 1949, the People’s Republic of China founded. Then, land reform and building of grassroots administrative organization gradually started all over China. Peasants association and militia were established. In some areas, three-level people’s representatives’ conference consisted of county level, district level and town level was implemented. Thousands of town-level organizations were reconstructed preliminarily. In December of 1950, Government Administration Council issued “General Rules for People’s Governmental Agencies at Town (Administrative Village) Level”. It regulated the scale and functions of Xiang people’s government. It carried on the administrative division of ROC period. In the respect of functions, it emphasized grassroots administrative character of Xiang-level governmental organization. In January of 1954, in order to enhance organization building of town governments, Department of the Interior issued anther regulation, requiring town governments to set formal affiliated work committee (one work committee consisted of 5–9 people) so as to manage production cooperation, culture, education, health, security, people’s armed force, civil administration, finance, provisions, mediation etc. In September of 1955, the measure to extend the jurisdiction of town governments was put into practice. Although the amount of towns decreased accordingly, the personnel structure, scale and functions of town-level governments were all on the rise. The managing capability of town governments had been well developed. The fundamental characteristic of phase (2) was the well-known people’s commune system. The people’s communes were formally established nationwide since February of 1958 and abolished in 1983.As the “grassroots units”, they comprised workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and merchants. The jurisdiction was 4–5 times larger than that in 1954. Specifically, a people’s commune implemented unified leadership, three-level administrative system, fiscal responsibility system, unified accounting, “balance

353

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

turned over to higher level”. It also enjoyed autonomy in management of provisions, finance, business and banking. Shue describes people’s communes as “cells” or “honeycombs”, because she takes into account the economic and organizational particularities of the people’s communes. The communes had the advantages of locally closed productive factors, identical organization, simple approach for objective realization etc. In addition, it implemented ambiguous property right system of “production brigadebased three-level ownership”. In terms of allocation and communication, it adopted the policy of “unified planning, allocation and marketing by the state”. Regarding the powers of officials, it had the tendency of “rule of man”. These particularities entailed that communes had the tremendous bottom-up function of political integration ostensibly, but the nature of “government and commune in one” brought it great closeness and blocked the top-down and external-internal stretch of state power. From 1966 to 1976, conflicts (even armed fights) occurred between local factions. The locality of power use plunged communes into the long-term situation without clear regulations (Whyte, 1974), characteristic of local decentralization in Chinese Empire (Siu, 1984; Shue, 1988, pp. 31–72; Liu, 1994, pp. 28– 30). In their study into Chinese social fabric in commune period, Chu and Hsu (1983) argue that the diverse “information communication method” like conferences and movements then gave rise to a situation of unprecedented political integration. On the surface, this view accords with the fact. But in fact, the ostensible integration created by “information communication method” covered the cellular independence of communes in essence. The commune system started to reform from 1979 in some areas and was totally abolished between October of 1983 and the spring of 1985 when the town reconstruction project was completed. The reform conducted step by step during these years was called “separation of governments and communes” and “town reconstruction project”, which was organized and implemented in three development phases: (1) Pilot performance of “separation of governments and communes” in 213 communes from 1979 to 1982; (2) nationwide experiment of “separation of governments and communes” and “town reconstruction project” from 1982 to 1983; (3) nationwide completion of town reconstruction project from 1983 to 1985. Through the town reconstruction project, the communes were changed in the manner of “one commune as one town”, “large district with small towns”, or “large district

354

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

with medium-sized towns” etc. The amount of administrative personnel was regionally regulated upon the scale of town. In 1985, there were 83,182 organic townships nationwide. Then, the amount of towns decreased in order to reduce governmental burden and realize township development plan in some areas. Till 1988, the amount had decreased to 45,195. Till 1991, the amount fell down to 43,660. Till 1992, the amount was cut down to 34,115. Meanwhile, since the recovery of organic towns in 1984, the amount of towns increases together with the acceleration of small town construction. In 1991, there were 11,882 organic townships. Till the end of 1992, there were 14,539 organic townships (in addition, there were about 37,000 towns having the potential to be organic townships) (Zhu, 1997, p. 412; or refer to the argument of Ma, 1990, 1993). Although the amount of towns and townships varied from area to area, the political power structure was basically the same. The authorities of towns and townships mainly include the following types: (1) Town (township) party committee assumed the political leadership of local government. There was one secretary and some deputy secretaries (usually 2–4 people, town chief or township chief taking the concurrent position of deputy secretary). For larger towns (townships), there would be a secretary of discipline inspection. The office of town (township) party committee assumed the leadership for People’s Armed Force, Communist Youth League and Women’s Federation. (2) Town (township) people’s congress — local organ of state power was established by direct election and had no permanent organ. There was one chairperson, some deputy chairpersons (usually 1–2 people) and one secretary. (3) Town (Town) people’s government — a grassroots official administrative organ and the executive organ of people’s congress at the same level had one town (township) chief, some deputy town (township) chief (usually 4–5 people). The former was the local administrative leadership. The latter took charge of agriculture, technology, town (township) enterprises, culture, education, and finance respectively. It had office and was affiliated with secretaries and assistants; (4) Besides the above organs, in recent years “enterprise committees” were set up in some areas to manage town (township) enterprises and implement the policy of “substituting government with enterprise”. It 355

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

was even called “four major leaderships” together with the first three government agencies. A town (township) government was led by its superior organ, which was mostly embodied in the foregoing three organs. County party committee was the central political organ for leading town (township), taking charge of inspection, training and recommendation for the principal of town (township). County people’s congress standing committee assumed occasional leadership of town (township) people’s congress. County people’s government took full responsibility for supervising the personnel and work of town (township) government. It can be found that, the leadership relation between county and town (township) was through government departments. The leadership of county people’s government for the works of town (township) government was mainly driven by the working bodies which were dispatched by government departments. During this process, the top-down “line-to-line” leadership connection between departments of county government and town (township) government was built naturally and county government also established a dynamic relation with the “modules” of town (township). The “line and module” relation was primarily embodied in “seven offices and eight stations”, i.e., seven “offices” (industrial and commercial administrative office, tax office, public security and police office, judicial office, fiscal office, land administration office, foods office, post office, business office of agricultural bank, credit association, statistics office etc) and eight “stations” (broadcasting station, agricultural electricity station, agricultural machinery station, agricultural technology/science station, forest and fruit tree station, irrigation station, seed station, culture station, veterinarian station, agricultural economy station etc), under the “dual leadership” of county and town (township). “Offices” were governmental organs and “stations” administrative institutions. “Seven offices and eight stations” were organs nominally under the “dual leadership” of county and town (township), but so far, most of them were organs dispatched by county and entered into complicated power relations with town (township). According to relevant regulations, towns (townships) and villages (administrative villages) were grassroots political powers and local autonomous organization respectively. In fact, there was leadership relation between them as well. In some places, town (township) party and governmental organs implement “district” management system. It designated 356

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

personnel at town (township) level to administer villages within its jurisdiction and had significant influence on personnel arrangement of villagelevel party and government leadership. In addition, party and governmental organs at village level were enhanced to a great extent. They were undergoing the organizational evolution from “autonomous organizations” to “semi-administrative, semi-mass” organizations. Since 1982, the town (township) party and government organization system was implemented nationwide. It had three major differences from the local administrative system in the commune period. First, it changed the “party and government integration” system in commune period to “party and government coordination” system. Second, it changed “integration of government and commune” to “separation of between government and commune” and “separation between government and enterprise”; confirmed the relation between county and town (township) as complicated “line-module” relation (Liu, 1994, pp. 36–41). The purpose of “separation between party and government” was to enhance work efficiency of government, but it actually resulted in the increasing number of town (township) party and governmental officials. The “separation between government and commune” and “separation between government and enterprise” were mostly aimed at promoting the initiative of production and enterprise departments, but it also opened local society and economy to the outside world. It is gratifying that the appearance of “line-module” relation promoted complicated leadership relation in town (township) party and government organs. Furthermore, the “line-module” relation eliminated the characteristic of cellularization left by commune period and evolved this level of organization into a power relation with free two-way communication. These three changes brought out an unprecedented increase of organs at town (township) level and thus a large number of relatively professional administrative officials. These officials differed from the ancient gentry who were not listed in “official position” system. They were identified according to governmental administrative “position grade” criterion (such as county chief-head of department, town chief-section chief, etc). Once identified, these identifications were quite settled. The operations of town (township) governments showed unique historical and regional features in different areas. But, in general, they were enhanced nationwide. Although we can admit the town (township)

357

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

government system partially belonged to the creation after 1983, there was no denying that it was an important part of a remoter modern nationstate construction. In fact, with the enhancement of town (township) government, local society also developed the modernized power operations for administrative control, economic regulation and cultural reconstruction etc sufficiently. The possibility of “planned social changes” was increased accordingly.

7.

Conclusion

I have hereinbefore studied the evolutionary process of Chinese town (township) government from the “remote” perspective of a long relational history of state-society. Due to the limitation of length, the chapter cannot include the details relevant to “remote” historical observation. However, after defining the objective of this chapter with social typology of traditional state, absolutist state and nation-state, we can find the close relation between town (township) governments and state form. In fact, about this, Shue has already pointed out the economic reform did not surely result in social autonomy through her contrastive study of state’s infiltration into Chinese rural areas before 1979 and after 1979. Hereby I further argue that the extension of state power had a longer history than “reform” itself. And this kind of extension was mainly embodied in the normalization of governmental organization under county level since this century. It is noteworthy that the main argument of this chapter is: Before the end of Qing Dynasty, there were no official town (township) level governmental organs under county level and below. In the 20th century, with the establishment of nation-state, of governmental organs at this level were “invented”. This argument emphasizes the close relation between state’s accumulation of authoritative resources and modernity. It does imply the reconsideration of Chinese state development path. However, it definitely does not mean the nation-state can fully control rural society. The nationstate development in China in this century eliminated certain features of “local autonomy” of rural society which were observed by Weber (Weber, 1951) and created a new power organ in those original “autonomous” rural areas. But this power organ is not omnipotent. Firstly, limited by state 358

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government

fiscal capability, town (township) governments might have a “peripheral” tendency at some particular times and places (Wang, 1997), looking for the partially dependable resources in local economic and social organizations. This was possible to enhance the original autonomous organizations and challenged the authority of state power. Secondly, due to the limitation of state power at certain times and places, the space beyond town (township) might return to market town status of traditional (absolutist) state period (Fan, 1990; Wang, 1993). As such, the local society may combine with autonomous market town so as to contest with state power in some sense. Thirdly, although local officials of towns (townships) have had national administrative and salary grade since 1983 and thus got used to bureaucratization, they did not become “civil servants” in a modern sense. These officials were still in the middle position between state and local society as the gentry in traditional society. In order to accumulate personal identification asset (Esherick and Rankin, 1990), they would still possibly serve non-state power (such as relationship network, clan and regional economic and religious associations in local society). Finally, since the 20th century, the state always strategically emphasized the importance of grassroots political powers on the one hand and, the implementation of “local autonomy” (now called “villager autonomy”) on the other. Meanwhile, it did not allow free social flow of the population. This limited the power of town (township) government. Thus, the identical state policy was not able to be implemented completely and the countryside reconstruction could not be in a part of modern state. In conclusion, as stated above, the town (township) of China in the 20th century was more like a place where state power, market town power and local social power intermingled and contested and the extension of Chinese state power was just one cross-section of the grand narrative. There is no absolutely pure nation-states in the world. In Chinese society where the historical heritage was continually carried on by political elites for protecting their power’s long-peace, nation-state may function to maintain the power’s own presence, whose reality is always partial. Therefore, what I have attempted in this chapter is researching nation-state as an ideal type of social studies without taking it as Chinese social reality. However, by utilizing this analytical concept to explain the history of town (township) governments, we find “the other side” often neglected by

359

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming

historical sociologists, i.e., the close relationship between state “power container” and modernity. It reveals that towns (townships) as organizations of state power are embracing an increasingly “official future”.

References Anderson, Benedict (1983). The Imagined Community. London: Verso. Chen, Baoliang (1996). Chinese “She” and “Hui”. Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Press. Chen, Zhiping (1991). Fujian Lineage Society and Culture in Recent 500 Years. Shanghai: SDX Joint Publishing Company. Chu, Godwin and Francis Hsu (eds.) (1983). China’s New Social Fabric. London: Kegan Paul International. Chu, Tung-Tsu (1962). Local Government in China under the Ching. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Chu, Tung-Tsu (1981). Law and Society in Traditional China. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Cong, Hanxiang (ed.) (1995). Modern Rural Areas in Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, and Henan. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. Duara, Prasenjit (1988). Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900–1942. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Duara, Prasenjit (1996). Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Dutton, Michael (1988). “Policing the Chinese Household”. Economy and Society, 17(2). Esherick, Joseph and Mary Rankin (eds.) (1990). Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance. Berkeley: California University Press. Fan, Shuzhi (1990). Research on Jiangnan Townships in Ming and Qing Dynasties. Shanghai: Fudan University Press. Fei, Hsiao-Tung (1939). Peasant Life in China. London: Routledge and Kepan Paul International. Fei, Hsiao-Tung (1953). China’s Gentry. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Freedman, Maurice (1958). Lineage Organization in Southeastern China. New York: Athlone. Ge, Jianxiong (1994). Unity and Split. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company. Giddens, Anthony (1985). The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity. Giddens, Anthony (1990a). The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity. Giddens, Anthony (1990b). Modernity and Self-Identity. Cambridge: Polity. Gu, Shengzu (1993). Theory and Practice about Non-agricultural Transformation and Urbanization. Wuhan: Wuhan University Press.

360

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Chinese Rural Township Government Han, Wu and Fei Hsiao-Tung (1988). Imperial Power and Gentry Power. Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Press. Hsiao, Kung-Chuan (1960). Rural China: Imperial Control in the 19th Century. Washington: Washington University Press. Li, Shoujing, and Qiu Qin (eds.) (1994). Study of Chinese Rural Grassroots Social Organization System. Beijng: Chinese Agriculture Press. Li, Zhi’an (1996). Study on the Relation between Central and Local in Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, Qing Dynasties. Tianjin: Nankai University Press. Liu, Zhenwei (1994). Peasants and Rural Organization Construction. Guiyang: Guizhou People’s Press. Ma, Rong (1990). Development of Small Towns and Modernization of China. Social Sciences in China, 1990(4). Ma, Rong (1993). County town — Jian-zhi town differentials and migrantion to towns in China. Korean Journal of Population and Development, 22(1), 89–117. Paci, Massuni (1989). Long Waves in the Development of Welfare Systems. In C. Maier (ed.), Changing Boundaries of the Political. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ruan, Yicheng (1978). Local Autonomy and New County System. Taipei: Taiwan Linking Publishing Company. Shue, Vivienne (1988). The Reach of the State: Stretches of the Chinese Body Politic. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Skinner, William G. (1964–65). Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China (2 parts). Journal of Asian Studies, 24(3). Skinner, William G. (1974). Cities Hierarchies of Local Systems. In A. Wolf (ed.). Studies of Chinese Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974). The Modern World System. New York: Academic Press. Wang, Di (1993). Stepping Out of the Closed World — A Study of Society along Upper Reaches of the Yangtze River (1644–1911). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Wang, Fuzhi (1975). Writings on Reading History as a Mirror. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. Wang, Mingming (1995). Place, Administration and Territorial Cults in Late Imperial China. Late Imperial China, 16(1). Wang, Mingming (1997a). The Evolution of A Community. Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Press. Wang, Mingming (1997b). A Theoretical Criticism of the Market and Social Structure. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company. Wang, Shaoguang (1997). System Roots of Competence Decline of Chinese Government. Strategy and Management, 1997(4). Weber, Max (1951). The Religion of China. New York: The Free Press. Wei, Hongyun (ed.) (1996). Investigation and Study into Rural Society in Eastern Hebei during 1930s and 1940s. Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Press. Whyte, Martin (1974). Small Groups and Political Ritual in China. Berkeley: California University Press.

361

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch10

Wang Mingming Wolf, Eric (1982). Europe and the People without History. Berkeley: California University Press. Xu, Mao (1992). Political System History of Republic of China. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press. Xu, Yong (1992). Unbalanced Chinese Politics. Beijing: China Radio & Television Publishing House. Yang, Ching-Kun (1961). Religion in Chinese Society. Berkeley: California University Press. Yang, Kaidao (1937). Chinese Rural Bylaw System. Jinan: Shandong Training Bureau for Rural Services. Zheng, Zhenman (1992). Fujian Lineage Organization and Societal Transformation in Ming and Qing Dynasties. Changsha: Hunan Education Press. Zhang, Hou’an and Xu Yong (eds.) (1995). Political Stability and Development in Chinese Rural Areas. Wuhan: Wuhan Press. Zhu, Dexin (1994). A Study of Baojia System in Henan and Eastern Hebei during 1930s and 1940s. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. Zhu, Guanglei (1997). Evolution of Contemporary Chinese Government. Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Press.

362

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

PART III The Modern Development of Civil Society in China

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

This page intentionally left blank

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

The Wenzhou Model of China’s Civil Society

Chapter

11

Zhou Jun and Yu Jianxing1

Abstract Chinese scholars are cautious of the framework of modernity. Their efforts to reflect on and transcend the Western paradigm of civil society are manifest in the proposal of the “Positive Interaction Theory”, which, however, is too idealistic to interpret the reality. Moreover, theories based on case studies such as “Corporatism”, “Classification and Control”, “Autonomy and Embeddedment” also have limitations. At the same time, the development of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce indicates that a Wenzhou Model of China’s civil society has emerged, which is characterized by spontaneous growth based on local tradition and private economy, rapid development with local government support, the combination of both autonomy and dependency, and cooperative and interactive relationships with the local governments. A special case as it might be, the Wenzhou Model of China’s civil society still contains some generalizable elements, which can shed light on current researches, so as to derive a new analytical framework. Keywords: China’s civil society; the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce; the Wenzhou Model; theory paradigm; case study.

1.

Introduction

In response to the mushrooming of global associations in the 1970s and the 1980s, civil organizations grew explosively in China since the “reform 1 Zhou Jun, Institute for the Development of Civil Society (ICSD), Zhejiang University, P. R.

China. Yu Jianxing, ICSD, Zhejiang University, P. R. China.

365

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

Zhou Jun and Yu Jianxing

and opening-up” policy that was adopted in 1978, which brought about a far-reaching transformation of the relationship between state and society. Unlike the Western civil society with bottom-up development, Chinese civil society is constructed in a top-down process. Such a difference in construction pattern weakens the explanatory power of the Western paradigm in Chinese social context. What is more, even though Chinese society generally develops within the constitutional system, there exist a large number of civil organizations which either emerge outside the system, or as a mixture of the two. Therefore, the explanatory power of the analytical frameworks based on case studies is limited, and far from universal. The Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce in Zhejiang Province has developed rapidly in the current institutional context, albeit not in a “top-down” manner. Certain chambers of commerce in Wenzhou were created spontaneously by entrepreneurs. Several were set up with the help of governments, while only a few were established by governments alone. The establishment of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce differs from the industrial associations in other regions and other types of associations, thus making it difficult to interpret through using current civil society theories. Based on a review of the theories about Chinese civil society, this chapter describes and interprets the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce in an attempt to enrich the present debate on Chinese civil society.

2.

Argumentations on the Chinese Civil Society

Since its introduction into China, the concept of civil society has been examined within the Chinese context. In 1991, GanYang put forward that “a positive interaction relationship should be set up between state and society in China” (Gan, 2000, p. 28). Deng Zhenglai and Jing Yuejing presented the “positive interaction theory” explicitly in the seminal paper “Build the Chinese Civil Society”, which opened up the discussion of Chinese civil society, and they argued that it was necessary for state to intervene in society, albeit in a limited manner (Deng and Jing, 2002). The “positive interaction theory” indicates that Chinese scholars want to transcend the dichotomy between statism and liberalism, pursuing “a third road” for the development of civil society in China. This approach is 366

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

The Wenzhou Model of China’s Civil Society

an academic effort derived from both a general theory of civil society and China’s realistic situations. The research of civil society in China started relatively late, when the shortcomings of liberal civil society theory had surfaced in East Europe, Russia and authoritarian countries in East Asia, which made scholars more reflective. Simultaneously, the society was under the control of an omnipotent government for a long time, for which there existed no group of intellectuals, Catholic associations, autonomous trade unions, or traditional Democratic Party in China at that time (Walkman, 1993, pp. 108–138). It was impossible to explain the relationship between state and society with the then popular paradigms. Advocated and promoted by such scholars as Gan Yang and Deng Zhenglai, the “positive interaction theory” became a dominant paradigm in China. Its idea was further expanded in the concept of “socialist civil society” (Yu, K, 2003, pp. 194–197). Afterwards, certain researchers were interested in the theory of “state in society” which held that state and society were both dynamic, with structures, purposes, supporters and rules transformed during interaction and mutually augmented (Yu, J, 2003). This theory can be regarded as a rephrased or an extended version of the positive interaction theory. Both the two theories are too idealistic to offer a sufficient account for the Chinese reality. The civil society theory of the famous conservative thinker John Gray was even more popular in China, for despite China’s rapid economic development, political reform lagged behind and the society was opened up in a limited manner. The theory regarded economic liberty and personal liberty as two characters of civil society. Accordingly, civil society had at least two prototypes: A liberal civil society and an autarchic one. It would be more appropriate to build an autarchic civil society for less developed countries, where the constitutions thus set up did more to limit than to advance democracy (Gray, 1993). But Gray’s theory soon lost its popularity. Great political changes can be seen in both the sphere of politics and society since 1978, albeit in a slow manner (Kang, 2000). Under such circumstances, obviously it was not sufficient to value Chinese reforms solely from the economic perspective. At this time, the paradigm of a tripartite civil society became increasingly popular, and for Chinese scholars, the primary purpose of studies on civil society was to explore the meanings of democracy. More importantly, the future of socialism should not be a political autarchy. 367

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

Zhou Jun and Yu Jianxing

In the late 1990s, Habermas’ civil society theory became popular. An increasing number of scholars left the market economy paradigm in explaining the emergence of the Chinese civil society, and switched their attention to the concept of “public sphere”. However, there was no genuine public discussion space in China, and the public sphere in the 1990s was even smaller than in the 1980s. Therefore, the debates in the public sphere cooled down gradually. On the other hand, civil organizations in China grew rapidly and started to play an increasingly important role in public management. As a result, the studies on civil organizations became a focal issue in civil society researches. As for the significance of the development of China’s civil organizations on civil society, Taylor’s opinions were widely cited. It was assumed that a civil society had already come into being in China.2 However, as Gu Xin pointed out, “almost all the scholars who assert that they have witnessed the birth or revival of civil society in China use the concept of “civil society” in the loosest manner, which means a social sphere off state control. This definition is much broader than Taylor’s narrowest concept which regards civil society as an existence of liberal civil associations beyond state control”. By this, “Taylor’s narrowest definition has nothing to do with our discussion, as by this definition, civil society may exist everywhere except in Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Then, the concept of “civil society” which is broader than that of Taylor’s may have little explanatory power” (Gu, 1994). Certainly, the concept provided by Taylor combines Lockean non-political thoughts with Montesquieu’s emphasis upon the functions of political organizations, both of which were absent in China. This debate lasted until the end of the 20th century, and as a response, Deng Zhenglai suggested that case study on state-society relations in the process of modernization might be a plausible means to solve the dilemma. It was necessary to create a concept of civil society and to formulate an analytical theory model suitable for China (Deng, 1996). With concerted 2 Taylor argued that civil society had three meanings. First, the minimum meaning: Civil

society would exist as long as there were free associations not subject to state power. Second, the strict meaning: Only when the whole community was able to construct and coordinate itself through those free associations not subject to the state, could a civil society exist. Third, an alternative or complementary to the second meaning: When those associations influenced and determined the direction of national policy quite effectively, a civil society emerged (Taylor, 1999, p. 7).

368

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

The Wenzhou Model of China’s Civil Society

efforts, case studies on civil society were carried out and yielded certain interpretations, among which were the theories of “state corporatism”, “autonomy and embeddedment” and “classification and control”. The corporatist school maintained that though the Chinese civil society has gained some autonomy, it is still under state control. Anita Chen argued in her articles that, like other social associations, the trade unions in China operated under the “authoritative or statism corporative system”. She called attention to the fact that certain civil organizations sprang up from grassroots communities, acting in the latter’s interests. Henceforth, this corporative model might advance towards a social corporatism (Chen, 1993; Unger and Chen, 2001; Deng, 1996). Kang Xiaogang argued that corporatism might be suitable for China (Kang, 1999, p. 195). Gu Xin and Wang Xu suggested that at least in the sphere of professional associations, China had completed the transformation from “state corporatism” to “societal corporatism” (Gu and Wang, 2005, pp. 155–175). State corporatism reveals some features of the state-society relationship, but its assumption of the separation between state and society does not fit the reality in China (Yu, J, 2003; Gu and Wang, 2005). It neglects that civil society can grow on its own and exert influence on the state. In rethinking corporatism, Kang Xiaoguang proposed the theory of “classification and control”, and Wang Xinxian introduced the theory of “autonomy and embeddedment”, both of which were attempts at offering new explanations for state-society relations in China. According to the theory of “classification and control”, the strategies state uses to control different social organizations are based on two variables — an organization’s capability to challenge the government and its ability to provide public goods (Kang, 2005). This theory explains why guilds, which aim to provide economic assistance and coordination, may gain more support from the state than organizations with political ambitions, such as the trade unions, which are tightly controlled by the state. Later, Wang Xinxian divided Chinese social organizations into four categories in accordance with Kang’s theory. The first refers to those high-capability and high-challenge organizations, which were directly absorbed by the state into the administrative systems. The second is high-capability and lowchallenge organizations, which are encouraged and supervised by the state. The third is low-capability and high-challenge organizations, which are

369

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

Zhou Jun and Yu Jianxing

forbidden and will be banned once discovered. The fourth is low-capability and low-challenge organizations, which are permitted by the state and the control from governments is relatively weak. The theory explains the variations among different organizations’ development. Nevertheless, unfortunately, it fails to explain why there exists evident developmental difference within the same type of organization.As a paradigm of Chinese civil society, “classification and control” theory is still limited to certain extent. The theory of “autonomy and embeddedment” assumes that China’s civil society “on the one hand, makes effort to embed itself in the government and international NGOs resources network, while on the other hand, must maintain its autonomy, which reflects the two opposite opinions in the research of state and society relationship — autonomy and embeddedment” (Wang, 2006, pp. 38–45). This theory intends to conciliate corporatism and pluralism. However, civil society is both autonomous and embedded, for which reason this theory provides no new interpretation. In fact, advocators of this theory turned to the concepts of the “strategy of classification and control” and “bureaucratic competition” to examine China’s state-society relations. As can be seen from the above analyses, the paradigm of Western civil society is not suitable for China due to historical differences, while the domestic theories based on case studies are incapable of providing a common paradigm due to the narrowness of the cases selected. This does not suggest that both Western theories and domestic case studies have no significance. Instead, we should combine these two approaches. Our study on the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce is an attempt of this kind.

3.

The Development of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce and its Relations with Governments

Industry associations have developed most rapidly among civil associations in China since 1978. Until the end of 2006, there were 192,000 social organizations, including 59,783 industry organizations. Among industry

370

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

The Wenzhou Model of China’s Civil Society

associations, the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce3 in Zhejiang Province is the most noticeable, for it is established mostly on the basis of market needs and industrial development with more autonomy than other industry associations. It has been claimed that the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce is a “true civil chamber”. The history of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce can be traced back to the early 20th century. After the foundation of the PRC, they experienced a period of reconstruction and collapse. The modern chambers began just after the “reform and opening-up”. From 1979 to 1980, the Wenzhou Association of Industry and Commerce restarted to recruit members, and since 1988, it restarted to establish industry associations. In 1992, after Deng Xiaoping’s remarks during the Southern Tour, the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce entered into a dynamic stage of development. Most of the existing chambers of commerce were established in this period. In 1997, the pilot plan of industry associations in four cities (Wenzhou, Shenzhen, Shanghai and Xiamen) boosted the development of industry associations in Wenzhou largely. In 1995, the first off-site chamber of commerce was set up in Kunming. Within a few years, off-site chambers of commerce had been set up in all the major cities in China. The Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce began to spring up all over the country. In 2001, the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce played an important role in dealing with anti-dumping lawsuits of glasses, lighters and pens and began to gain international fame. After more than 20 years’development, a network including industry associations, chambers of commerce, off-site trade associations and general chambers of commerce 3 The Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce in this chapter includes chambers of commerce in

strict definition, industry associations, off-site industry associations and general chambers of commerce at different levels. The chambers of commerce and industry associations are registered in the Civil Affairs Bureau of Wenzhou, and supervised by different government departments. Industry associations in commercial and industrial areas are supervised by the municipal Economic and Trade Commission, and the others are supervised by departments (such as the Trade and Industry Bureau, the Construction Bureau, the Science and Technology Bureau and the Agriculture Bureau, etc) or authorized organizations (such as the Association of Social Sciences). Chambers of commerce in industrial and commercial areas are supervised by the United Front Work Organization — the Wenzhou Federation of Industry and Commerce. A few of the industry associations are supervised by certain departments of CCP.

371

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

Zhou Jun and Yu Jianxing

at different levels has been formed. By the end of February 2008, Wenzhou had more than 500 industry associations, among which 135 were municipal, and 156 off-site. On the basis of longitudinal research (Yu, 2004, 2006), in January and February of 2007, we did a questionnaire survey on 32 of the 48 associations under the supervision of the Economic and Trade Commission, and 27 out of the 29 chambers administered by the Federation of Industry and Commerce.4 Based on the data, with reference to a few aspects of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce, such as the choice of supervisors, office facilities, leadership, income sources and autonomy, we will try to describe the development of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce and its relationship with the government. The Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce as an umbrella organization for associated members was formed in three ways. Firstly, some members were founded by the request of governments and authorized by the government sectors to manage industrial affairs, such as the Wenzhou City Foods Association. This category has a small number of industry associations. The second category is linked with relevant government departments or industry companies, mainly targeting market coordination, such as the Wenzhou Packaging Technology Association. Thirdly, some members were founded spontaneously and voluntarily in accordance with the “Regulations for Registration and Management of Social Organizations”, such as the Wenzhou Lamps Chamber of Commerce, the Wenzhou Costume Chamber of Commerce and the Wenzhou Smoking Sets Association. Such associations are the majority. Therefore, the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce was not primarily formed in a top-down manner, but an outcome of autonomous industry management with the development of economy. Interestingly, the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce still tends to choose government departments rather than the Federation of Industry and Commerce as its supervising organizations, with the former at a rate of 64.9%. In the aspect of office resources, 72.9% of the chambers of commerce lease their offices, 13.6% use offices provided by the chairman’s company, and 6.8% work in offices provided by supervisors. The Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce is no longer directly dependent on governments in a direct form. 4 Please refer to more data of this survey (Yu, J, 2007).

372

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

The Wenzhou Model of China’s Civil Society

As far as the leadership composition is concerned, the current chairmen from industry enterprises account for the vast majority up to 89.9%, and only one chairman is a government official. The secretaries-general are mainly government retirees, accounting for 44.8%, followed by those from the industry enterprises, accounting for 25.9%, with the proportions from civil service sectors and public business units at 3.4% and 6.9% respectively. 76.3% of the incumbent presidents are recommended by the industry and elected by the industry associations’ general assembly, and the proportion of secretaries-general elected democratically ex officio is 53.4%. Plainly, it can be seen that the major leaders of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce are elected in accordance with the organizational charters, and there is little intervention from government. With regard to revenue, according to the statistics of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce in 2003, the important income sources are membership fees, sponsorship, funds from enterprises, government subsidies, project funds from governments and operating income. Obviously, government fund is not the main source of income for most of the chambers. By this, the finance of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce is relatively independent. In the case of autonomy, with regard to decision-making, 56 among the 59 associations surveyed made their own strategic decisions and activity plans through formal decision-making institutions such as the council or the plenary meeting. According to the evaluation of government intervention with the chambers of commerce, none of the associations in this survey regarded government as over-intervening. Where 3.7% of the respondents chose “usual intervene”, choices on “no intervention in general” and “no intervention at all” accounted for 44.4% and 9.3% respectively. By contrast, up to 55.9% of the chambers of commerce hoped that governments could provide support for their actions, and up to 32.2% expressed strong demands for government support. All in all, though the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce is bound by current contexts of macroeconomic policy and management system and to a certain extent dependent on government, it is relatively autonomous. In order to explain these features, Gu Xin proposed three key elements, namely, the ownership structure, financial resources and the regulatory regime to measure the state-society relations (Gu and Wang, 2005, pp. 155–175). In this case, except that the regulatory system is universal 373

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

Zhou Jun and Yu Jianxing

across the country, the organizational structure of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce is not “top-down”, and their financial resources do not depend on the government. Therefore, the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce can be incorporated neither into the framework of state corporatism nor societal corporatism. Accordingly, the theory of “classification and control” cannot explain why the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce is uniquely dynamic, and why its development has been better than that of other industry associations in Shanghai, Guangzhou or Xiamen, the three of which are also pilot cities for industry associations’ development chosen by the State Economic and Trade Commission in 1997. Undoubtedly, we need to interpret the development of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce with a new theory.

4.

Experience and Significance of the Development of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce

There have been a number of studies on industry associations that are focused on the Wenzhou Model. For example, the theories of “functional position”, “transaction costs”, “institutional analysis” and “selfgovernance”, have discussed the origin and development of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce as well as its relations with the state from different points of view. Yu Hui and his colleagues assumed that in the absence of a public order, a kind of private order provided by industry associations could compensate for both government and market failures (Yu, H, 2002). It was also believed that from the perspective of transaction costs, industry association played a unique role in reducing costs and improving efficiency of resource allocation. Since chambers also involved transaction costs, governments and chambers should work together to achieve a reasonable labor division (Qin and Chen, 2002; Wang and Liu, 2007). Chen Shengyong took the Wenzhou Costume Chamber of Commerce as an example and re-interpreted the emergence of civil chambers of commerce in China from the perspective of institutional analysis. In his view, the rise and development of chambers of commerce not only depended on their own growth, but also on the support from governments (Chen and Ma, 2004). It was also argued from the perspective of self-governance that Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce was 374

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

The Wenzhou Model of China’s Civil Society

an outcome of autonomous co-ordination to common problems and to gain common interests. It did not depend on external agencies, although in many non-institutional areas, chambers of commerce would seek governments’ support and protection actively (Wang, 2003). Some scholars examined the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce through the “Wenzhou Model”. On May 12, 1985, the reporter Sang Jinquan from Liberation Daily first proposed the concept of the Wenzhou Model in a report. Since then, the concept became popular. The Wenzhou Model means a regional economic and social development model which helps to advance industrialization and urbanization by means of privatization and market-oriented institutional change (Shi, 2004). Undoubtedly, the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce is an integral part of the Wenzhou Model. But the existing studies on the Wenzhou Model are more concerned with the role of private economy in the economic structural reform, than with the role of non-governmental forces in the transformation of social institutions. As an exception, Kristen Parris in 1993 published a paper which attached much importance to the functions of chambers of commerce, and she suggested that private entrepreneurs were organized spontaneously to support socialist statism during the process of allying with the government departments and their officials (Parris, 1993). In 1999, Zhao Wei did a preliminary study on how economic development affected local governments’ actions and local democracy in Wenzhou from the perspective of “Daobistyle democracy” (daobi shi minzhu) (Zhao, 1999). In 2000, Li Junhui compared social autonomy in Wenzhou with that in Shunde, Guangdong Province and she pointed out that from either an economic or social perspective, the Wenzhou Model meant the possibility to take an autonomous road quite different from the national institutional system (Li, 2000). In 2001, Feng Xingyuan suggested that further development of the Wenzhou Model might lead to the establishment of a civil society (Feng, 2001). To sum up, there have been a great many discussions on the Wenzhou Model, but studies on the significance of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce during Wenzhou’s social transition are still relatively insufficient. However, these discussions have provided an important theoretical context for us to interpret the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce. On the basis of these discussions, we summarize the following aspects of the development and significance of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce.

375

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

Zhou Jun and Yu Jianxing

First, the development of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce is a combination of both universality and locality. As the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce is in the same national context as other civil organizations, the feature of locality becomes critical, which is prominently reflected in the Wenzhou entrepreneurship, autonomy, commercialism and local governments’ initiatives. Entrepreneurship and autonomy are the key social foundations for the development of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce. In Chinese history, strict state control strangled societal autonomy. As Wenzhou was far away from the political center in Beijing and the control from central government was weak, the two major social networks of clans and religions were relatively well-developed. They had played an important role in fostering social cohesion and capital, providing specific public products and participating in local governance. Social organizations had ample space in this tradition. The entrepreneurship fostered in the history laid a solid foundation for local adventurism and commercialism. In this cultural background, the Wenzhou entrepreneurs were not only able to break through the boundaries of familism, but also able to break through the boundaries of institutions and to use rational institution arrangements for industrial organizational innovation (Xu, 1988, p. 14). The unique history of Wenzhou has not only established the social foundation for the development of civil organizations, but also created the economic model in which private economy dominates, and this has been the economic base of the development of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce. There is a close connection between tradition, economy and social development. After 30 years’ reform and opening-up, market economy in Wenzhou has become mature. In 2006, the city’s GDP and gross industrial production value reached 184.338 billion yuan and 413.612 billion yuan respectively, and the city’s private economy accounted for more than 80% of the gross product. The well-developed private economy is a necessary condition to create and develop the chambers of commerce, for it enables them to avoid the problem of fund shortage that other associations are generally facing, and lays the economic foundation of autonomy. Moreover, the rapid development of private economy continues to drive the chambers to represent industry interests, to standardize market and strengthen the communication

376

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

The Wenzhou Model of China’s Civil Society

and exchange between multiple parties. Just as our survey has shown, the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce is a product of market and industrial development. The development of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce can be better understood in light of the behavior of local governments. The Wenzhou government acquiesced in the development of chambers and even tried to encourage and support them. Local government played an important role in buttressing the chambers. This is not only reflected in its efforts to make amenable laws and policies for chambers of commerce, but also in flexible interpretation and application of policies, as well as specific measures adopted to encourage industry associations. For instance, in 1993, the Wenzhou government issued a document of “Official Reply on the Lighters Industry Management in Lucheng District”, endowing the Smoking Sets Association four actual management rights: Preliminary inspection right for business registration, product quality supervision and inspection right, price negotiation right of and new product protection right. This was undoubtedly a step ahead of the change in policies by the central government. In 1999, the Wenzhou government promulgated the “Regulations on the Wenzhou Industry Association” which defined clearly the 16 functions of industry associations. In 2004, Wenzhou took the lead in authorizing the security supervision right to industry associations. In 2005, Wenzhou confirmed the functions of industry associations to investigate anti-dumping and counter-subsidy lawsuits. The clarification of the basic functions of industry associations determines the space and manner of association activities. In terms of policy interpretation and application, due to the policy of “one district, one association” and “one industry, one association”, the Wenzhou Cosmetics Industry Association could not be registered, but the government acquiesced in it, and the same case also happened in the leather shoe industry. The measures the Wenzhou government adopted to promote the chambers were also very common. For example, since 2002, the Wenzhou Economic and Trade Commission has allocated 75 million yuan every year to fund 25 industry associations of excellence to encourage their further development. Obviously, local governments in Wenzhou did not respond passively to the pressures from higher level governments. They were innovative. It

377

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

Zhou Jun and Yu Jianxing

was once pointed out that the ambiguities in China’s laws and policies allowed the local officials to interpret and implement them in a favorable way (Rowen, 2007). When macro-policy remained stable, local governments in Wenzhou tried to create conditions for local development. When the macro environment improved, they made more efforts. In this context, the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce was able to develop rapidly. To a certain extent, local governments’ innovation has been a catalyst for the development of Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce. Secondly, an interdependent relationship has emerged between the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce and local governments, which might help to formulate an interactive mechanism. With the incentives of government innovations and the autonomous development of chambers of commerce, the transformation of state-society relations is in progress. Certain commentators interpreted the relationship between the chamber of commerce and local government as unilateral dependency, in that the chamber relies on the government and not the other way around. In fact, the government as a “rational being” is always necessary to formulate and implement policies to maximize their own interests, and the Wenzhou government is no exception. The aforementioned theories of “transaction costs” and “institutional analysis” reveal this from different perspectives. In the formation and development of the Wenzhou Model, local government and micro-economic entities share the potential institutional earnings, which is why local governments could break out the shackles of orthodox ideology and avoid the pressure from high-level governments. The emergence of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce also reflects the win-win outcome. The rapid growth of private economy not only directly increases the financial revenue but also brings about certain problems such as market disorder, as well as the limitations of family businesses and SMEs. Industry associations could implement self-discipline, rights protection, assessment and price negotiation. This can greatly help with market stability and economic development. Therefore, it became a rational choice for local governments in Wenzhou to develop chambers of commerce. Thus, the government had to depend on the chambers of commerce to a certain extent. In other words, in the process of decentralization and empowerment, interdependence gradually took shape between local governments and chambers of commerce.

378

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

The Wenzhou Model of China’s Civil Society

Meanwhile, with a continuous development, the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce not only plays an irreplaceable role in local governance, but also plays an important role internationally to support and protect Chinese enterprises and to enhance their international competitiveness abroad. The functions of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce to boost local economy and to enhance regional economic competitiveness at home and abroad help governments to acquire and enhance legitimacy and financial revenue, which undoubtedly bolsters the government’s motivation to further support the former. There emerges not only a positive relationship between local governments in Wenzhou and the development of chambers of commerce, but also a long-term interactive mechanism such as information exchange and supervision. A noteworthy point here is the appropriate way the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce interacts with local governments. An increasing number of chambers realize that their functions depend on both the empowerment of enterprises and the transformation of government functions. It is important for them to improve organizational capabilities, so as to unite more enterprises, while seeking rights protection from governments. In our investigation, the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce attaches much importance to improving their abilities of governance. Most chambers have formal charters, membership meetings, council meetings and chairman and office rules. There is also a stricter requirement on staff development. More importantly, the evaluation on the functions of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce from members is positive in that the Chamber is conceived to be increasingly competent in carrying out its functions. The improvement of governance will undoubtedly enhance the negotiation capabilities of chambers and advance the transition of state-society relations. In a word, the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce gains more autonomy and capabilities to negotiate with government during the process of development. In Wenzhou City, the interactive relations between governments and civil organizations have emerged, and a kind of new state-society relations is under way. This not only indicates the possibility of China’s civil society, but also shows that China’s civil society is not necessarily built in a “top-down” manner, but evolving from bottom-up, or the combination of the two paths. What is more, it reinvigorates the explanatory power of existing paradigms of the Chinese civil society to a certain extent. The Chinese

379

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

Zhou Jun and Yu Jianxing

(Wenzhou) civil society does not represent an early or embryonic stage of their Western prototype, where there is no clear differentiation and separation between state and civil society, and the check and balance between the two bodies do not exist or are not obvious; similarly, the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce is also different from other social organizations such as trade unions and professional associations. Since their growth and development paths are different, they cannot be accounted for by existing theoretical paradigms.

5.

Concluding Remarks

An examination of the development path and experience reveal several core features of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce. Firstly, it grew spontaneously on the basis of private economy and civil tradition, and developed rapidly with local government’s support. Secondly, it does not challenge governments and is difficult to play a role in keeping political power in check. Thirdly, it has relative independence and autonomy, and relies heavily on politics. Fourthly, it can affect governments’ behavior, participate in public governance and has formed a stable cooperative interaction with governments. To borrow the concept of the Wenzhou Model, we can call the development of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce as the Wenzhou Model of Chinese civil society. The concept of the Wenzhou Model of China’s civil society has several implications. Firstly, the Wenzhou Model is a unique phenomenon in the development of civil society and might be not duplicable. For example, the local historical and cultural traditions in Wenzhou cannot be transplanted. But this does not mean that civil society can only develop in Wenzhou. There are two core factors affecting the growth of civil society, one being the improvement of institutional arrangement, while the other the autonomy of society. The growth of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce shows, on the one hand, the institutional improvement in China. On the other hand, as proactive agents, social organizations not only develop essential autonomy through institutional innovation, but also thrive for prosperity through negotiations with governments. In this sense, the development of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce confirms the conditions needed for 380

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

The Wenzhou Model of China’s Civil Society

the development of civil society in China and implies that the future of civil society lies in the following factors. Firstly, governments must change attitude towards civil society, and greatly improve the institutional setting for civil society. Local governments should take initiatives according to local particularities. Secondly, civil organizations should strive for autonomy, independence and participation in public governance, so as to gain more legitimacy through better performance. The Wenzhou Model of China’s civil society has the implications that the experiences of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce may be helpful to the paradigm shift in researches on China’s civil society. The growth of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce demonstrates that civil organizations can be beneficial for governance through participation in public affairs. In turn governments have a higher level of trust in civil organizations, and thus transfer to the latter more public management functions. In terms of the cooperative relations, the improvement of public administrative performance will not only help with the development of civil organizations, but also help governments to gain greater legitimacy. Therefore, in considering the development of civil society in China, a sharp distinction between the top-down and bottom-up approaches may be unnecessary in describing the developmental path of civil society. It is possible to explore new ways to promote cooperation between governments and civil organizations. Thus, “civil society participating in state” might become a new analytical paradigm.5

References Chen, Anita (1993). Revolution or Corporatism? Workers and Trade Union in Post-Mao China. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 29. Chen, Shengyong and Ma Bin (2004). The Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce: An Institutional Analysis of Self-Governance — A Case of the Wenzhou Costume Association. Management World, 12. Deng, Zhenglai (1996). State and Civil Society: Retrospect on the Research of China’s Civil Society. Chinese Social Sciences Quarterly, 2.

5 Please refer to the new analytical framework (Yu and Zhou, 2008).

381

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

Zhou Jun and Yu Jianxing Deng, Zhenglai and Jing Yuejin (2002). Constructing China’s Civil Society. In Deng, Zhenglai and Jing Yuejin (eds.), Research on Civil Society Theories. Beijing: China University of Politics and Law Press. Feng, Xingyuan (2001). Marketization: An Evolution Approach of the Local Model. Chinese Rural Watch, 1. Gan, Yang (1998). Criticism on the Concept of “Civil Society”. In Zhang, Jing (ed.), State and Society. Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Publishing House. Gu, Xin (1994). Is There A Civil Society and Public Sphere in Modern China? Review on the Related Research of Western Scholars. Contemporary China, 4. Gu, Xin and Wang Xu (2005). From Statism to Corporatism: The Evolving Relations between State and Associations in the Process of Marketing Reform. Research of Sociology, 2, pp. 155–175. Gray, John (1993). Post Literalism: Studies in Political Thought. London: Rutledge. Kang, Xiaoguang (1999). Power Shift: Changes on the Power Pattern during the Period of Transformation. Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Press. Kang, Xiaoguang (2000). Power Shift. Chinese Social Sciences Quarterly, 2. Kang, Xiaoguang, (2005). Classify and Control: Research on the State-Society Relations in Contemporary Mainland. Research of Sociology, 6. Li, Junhui (2000). The Origin of the Self-Governance Spirit: Difference between the SelfGovernance of Wenzhou with That of Shunde. Economy Information. Dec. 8, 2000. Parris, Kristen (1993). Local Initiative and Reforms: The Wenzhou Model of Development. China Quarterly, 134. Qin, Shili and Chen Chen (2002). The Chamber of Commerce: From the Angle of Transaction Costs. Shanghai Economy Research, 4. Rowen, Henry S. (2007). When Will the Chinese People Be Free? Journal of Democracy, 18(3). Shi, Jinchuan (2004). Institutional Changes and Economical Development: A Research on the Wenzhou Model. Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press. Taylor, J. (1999). The Models of Civil Society. In Deng, Zhenglai and Jeffrey Alexander (eds.), State and Civil Society. Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press. Unger, J. and Chen Anita (2001). China, Corporatism and East Asian Model? Strategy and Management, 1. Walkman, J. R. (1993). The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate. Modern China, 19(2), pp. 108-138. Wang, Jinjun (2003). Self-governance, Institution Arrangement and Governments’Function: A Research on the Wenzhou Industry Associations in Industrial and Commercial Areas. MA thesis of Zhejiang University, March 2003. Wang, Miao and Liu Qin (2007). Development of Fishery Associations: From the Angle of Transaction Costs. Chinese Fishery Economy, 2. Wang, Xinxian (2006). The Contending Research of China’s Social Organization: “StateSociety” Approach. Taipei: Weber Culture International Publishing Corporation.

382

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

The Wenzhou Model of China’s Civil Society Xu, Lingyi (1988). Development Trend of the Wenzhou Experimental District. Shanghai: Shanghai Social Sciences Press. Yu, Hui (2002). The Industry Association and Its Development in China. Beijing: Economy Management Press. Yu, Keping (2003). Socialist Civil Society: A New Research Topic. In Yu, Keping (ed.), Quantity Increased Democracy And Good Governance. Beijing: Social Science Documentation Press, pp. 194–197. Yu, Jianxing (2003). Emergence of China’s Civil Organization and Transition of StateSociety Relations. Humanity Journal, 4. Yu, Jianxing (2004). Between Governments and Enterprises: A Research on the Wenzhou Chamber Of Commerce. Zhejiang People’s Press. Yu, Jianxing (2006). The Chamber of Commerce and Local Governments: A Research in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province. Beijing: Economy Sciences Press. Yu, Jianxing (2007). Performance and Development of the Chamber Of Commerce: A Research in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province. Academic Journal of Public Administration, 4. Yu, Jianxing and Zhou Jun (2008). Civil Society Participating in Public Governance. 21st Century (Hong Kong), 4. Zhao, Wei (1999). Wenzhou Power. Economy Information, Dec. 26, 1999.

383

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch11

This page intentionally left blank

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Towards a Corporatist Development of Civil Society in China: Enabling State and Mutual Empowerment between State and Society

Chapter

12

Edward Gu1

Abstract The past two decades witnessed the emergence of numerous new associations and increasing independence of non-government organizations. Associations grow even faster in fields like education and academia, business administration, culture and entertainment as well as other professional sectors. The regulations on the social space are explicitly characterized by state corporatism which highlights the control by the state and emphasizes hard restrictions on the uniqueness, representativeness and monopoly of associations. The key to promoting the development of civil society is to break out of the situation of “zero-sum game” between the state and society and to replace it with a new approach of “mutual empowerment” between them. The state would play an enabling role in achieving societal corporatism and facilitating the development of civil organizations in the public sphere. This may effectively strengthen the capability of the state to drive the growth of civil society. Keywords: State corporatism; societal corporatism; civil society; associations.

1.

Introduction

The advancement of market transition has brought about significant changes to the relationship between the state and society. Totalism features state 1 Edward Gu (Gu Xin), School of Government, Peking University, Beijing, P. R. China.

385

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Edward Gu

supervision or pervasion all over the society, or even that the society doesn’t exist at all, the times of which has passed once and for all.2 Independent social space has continuously expanded, leading to more diversified and complicated relationship between state and society. In the expanded social space, the most active, vital and noteworthy would be the space of civic associations or the so-called “civil society”. It is not plain sailing for the civil society in China. For a long time, affected by some one-dimensional thinking, people tend to put civil society at the opposite side to the state. It seems that the state and civil society have formed a “zero-sum game” relationship; when the state is strong, civil society must be weak and vice versa. Such thinking dominated the international academic community in the early 1990s as well. Influenced by this way of thinking, Chinese advocators of civil society, just like those advocating the market economy in China, are overwhelmingly concerned with “state withdrawal”. The state, as the supervisor of civil society, has also not understood the positive influence of the growth of civic associations. Instead, it holds a highly preventive attitude towards them and takes administrative measures to control and even unnecessarily restrict the development of an associational space. To some extent, although the state has perceived that civic associations in the civil society play a positive part in the governance of social welfare, poverty alleviation, public health, environmental protection, business administration affairs and the organization of academic and cultural activities, the negative influence of the foregoing one-dimensional thinking has not been eliminated yet. In reality, it has been proved that the mindset of “zero-sum game” between state and society is very harmful, because practices based on such thinking in many countries and regions have caused chaos and instability. 2 For the most sophisticated discussions of the totalitarian features of the Mao regime, see

Tsou (1986); Schwartz (1968). For the discussion on the state’s monopolistic control as one of the characteristic features of totalitarianism, see Friedrich et al. (1969). In his latest work, Tsou (1994) uses the term “totalism”. Moreover, some scholars object to the use of the terms “totalitarianism” to describe the politics in China before the reform, because they believe that total state control over the society is impossible and that there was room for social activities even in China before the reform. See Walder (1986); Shue (1988). This paper is not intended to probe into this debate. In fact, as far as we consider such concepts as ideal types, there is no doubt that these concepts are applicable, because the ideal type, as analytical tool, is not completely consistent with the reality.

386

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Towards a Corporatist Development of Civil Society in China

However, “zero-sum game” is not the only way of thinking and action. As a matter of fact, since the mid 1990s, the international academia has been highlighting mutual empowerment between state and society and publicprivate partnership for the sake of building a new pattern under which the state has strong administrative power and social organizations are full of energy and vitality.3 In the course of mutual empowerment between a strong state and a strong civil society, it will be necessary for the state to withdraw from some social areas and is not able to implement state control or state regulation. Meanwhile, the complete withdrawal of the state from civil society is also not beneficial as well. It is desirable that state actors understand this new concept of “mutual empowerment” and play an enabling role in facilitating the development of civil society in China. The concept of “the enabling state” other than the concept of “state withdrawal” is more practical in China where the state is stronger than society. In fact, a large number of civic associations were originally part of the state in China. They seceded from the state system. Though having more autonomy, they are still very dependent on the state. Due to the monopoly of some associations in their respective fields, the relationship between civil society and the state bears very strong characteristics of state corporatism. Civil society in China, due to its dependence on the tradition of statism, would be developing with obvious characteristics of corporatism rather than pluralism. The social partnership prevailing and highlighted among European states can provide strong support for our thinking of the enabling role of the state in facilitating the mutual empowerment between state and society. This chapter first provides a conceptual framework for the development of civil society, and then it briefly outlines the development of civil society in China towards corporatism. In the remaining part, this chapter discusses the mutual empowerment between state and society in the development of civil society in China towards corporatism, as well as the enabling role of the state in this course. 3 There is a large pool of English literature on mutual empowerment between state and society, as well as public-private partnership. For a comprehensive review, please see Wang (1999). The idea on mutual empowerment between state and society provided in this chapter is deeply influenced by Wang Xu’s work and the author’s daily exchange of thoughts with Wang Xu.

387

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Edward Gu

2.

Development of Civil Society towards Corporatism

Different political theories may have different definitions for the concept of civil society. The most popular one would be liberal pluralism according to which civil society is defined as a vital and plural social base for democracy. Based on this theory, the major function of civil society is to restrict political power with society.4 The civil society concept in liberal pluralism may be traced to Alexis de Tocqueville, a French thinker, who in his book entitled Democracy in America emphasized the importance of a special type of society to democracy. In such a society, power and social functions decentralize and are executed by independent civic associations, social groups and community organizations. According to Tocqueville, the system of separation of administrative, legislative and judicial power underlying the American democracy is absolutely necessary. However, this system is not sufficient enough to sustain the normal operation of the American liberal democracy. A plural society composed of various independent civic associations may constitute “societal checks and balances” over power. In this system, the power includes not only the power possessed by the state but also the power possessed by the majority. John Keane, a British political philosopher advocating civil society, gave a concrete description of the society mentioned by Tocqueville, namely “an independent eye of the society” that exercises surveillance over the state.5 It is the major proposition of a liberal and plural society to limit the scope of state actions, to protect society from arbitrary intervention by the state and to create an independent and self-regulated social space. Apparently this concept of civil society has resulted in the context of “civil society versus the state” or even “civil society against the state”. It seems that the two parties have a natural zero-sum relationship. We may say that this concept dominated some related researches in the early 1990s. As for the circle of China scholars, numerous articles have been published in international journals discussing whether or not civil society has emerged in 4 For details of this thoughts, see Gu (1995). 5 Keane (1988, p. 51). Tocqueville did not use the phrase “civil society” in his book Democ-

racy in America.

388

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Towards a Corporatist Development of Civil Society in China

China. The optimistic people always consider the looser control by the state to be some kind of “elements or germ of civil society”, with the attempt to explore its political and social implications in the long run. However, this theory of “germ of civil society” was challenged in the mid 1990s. Antagonists noted that determinism in the theory of “germ of civil society” contained a methodological mistake, and that the expansion of social space in China might not necessarily lead to a liberal, plural civil society. They presented a large quantity of examples (in fact these examples could be found everywhere) to prove complexity of the relationship between state and society. They believed that the so-called independent associations were only independent-association-to-be and that the Chinese society was still heavily dependent on the state.6 Some scholars are not willing to use the term “civil society”. Instead, they prefer “corporatism” to “civil society”. Other scholars even simply adopt the dichotomy of “civil society vs. corporatism” to describe the revolution of the relationship between state and the society in contemporary China.7 However, it is theoretically faulty to view corporatism as the opposite of civil society. In the existing literature, the term “corporatism” is used to describe a certain type of the relationship between state and society — often referred to by corporatists as “intermediation” (Williamson, 1989, p. 6). According to Philippe C. Schmitter, corporatism is an “institutional arrangement for linking the associationally organized interests of civil society with the decisional structures of the state” (Williamson, 1989, p. 9), while pluralism as another.8 That is to say that corporatism is simply a form of the relationship between civil society and the state, and this is different from the relationship between social organizations and the state captured in the theories of pluralism. The characteristic features of the corporatist state-society relationship include: (1) The number of social organizations is limited; (2) only one social organization is recognized or licensed by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within a social category; 6As for the debate by foreign scholars on whether there is civil society in China, the author

of this chapter wrote an article which provided the details. See Gu (1993/4). 7 There are many works using this argument, including Chan (1993); Parris (1995/6); Unger (1996); White et al. (1996); Brook and Frolic (1997). 8 For the purpose of this chapter, there is no need to deal with the corporatist-pluralist debate in details and to consider the possibility of corporate pluralism. See Harrison (1980); Cohen and Pavoncello (1987); Heisler (1979).

389

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Edward Gu

(3) social organizations are hierarchically ordered; (4) membership of social organizations are normally compulsory; and (5) the state exercises formal or informal control over some internal affairs (e.g., leadership selections) of social organizations (Schmitter, 1974, p. 86, pp. 93–94) Therefore, in places where the corporatism prevails: (1) There is a strong state which is not completely capable of doing all things; (2) social groups are organized on non-competitive basis and therefore are subject to state restriction to some extent; and (3) associations representing interest groups cannot be totally independent from the state and they are not part of the state either (Wiarda, 1997). Corporatism may have some sub-categories. As regards our concern over the relationship between the state involvement and independence of associations, “societal corporatism” and “state corporatism” have been widely known as two discrete concepts. Many scholars in China usually misunderstand that these two types of corporatism have different characteristics. For instance, in terms of number of associations, there are more associations in societal corporatism and less in state corporatism; the former has heavy competition among associations while the latter has slight competition among its associations; etc (Zhang, 1998, pp. 28–29). However, by examining Table 1, we may find many similarities between the two types of corporatism. The truth is that they have different ways and processes to gain such similarities. The development and growth of the civil society features path dependence. In the Chinese context of highly-developed statism, it is very hard to imagine that civil society would move directly towards pluralism in China. The biggest defect of the researches on the topic in the early 1990s was that the development of civil society towards pluralism was considered as the sole path. But now we may find another way of developing civil society, i.e., the transition from state corporatism to societal corporatism. In a country carrying the legacy of revolutionary totalism, civil society would certainly be restricted at the early phase when statism still dominates the relationship between state and society. Civic associations, on the one hand, are highly dependent on the state, and on the other, they are heavily restricted by the state. Then there will be high probability that civil society carries the characteristics of state corporatism. As for whether or not the relationship between civil society and the state in the mode of societal corporatism

390

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Towards a Corporatist Development of Civil Society in China Table 1.

Differences between Societal Corporatism and State Corporatism.

Characteristics Limited number or uniqueness

Mandatory involvement

Non-competitive

Societal corporatism

State corporatism

Formed naturally through “political cartel” among associations or through competition Achieved through societal pressure, labor contract, provision of basic services, power of issuance of certification or license Achieved through oligarch trend within associations and agreements among associations Achieved through bureaucratic expansion and strengthening within associations

Achieved through restrictions applied by government

Based on agreement on procedures and goals between upper and lower levels

Based on the state’s mandatory regulation

Achieved through government regulations

Achieved through continuous state intervention, arbitration or even stifling

Achieved through centralization or administrative affiliation process clearly defined by the state Separation of Achieved through voluntary Achieved through industrial or functions agreement professional categories defined by the state State acknowledge- Based on bottom-to-top political Association formation depends ment needs on the consideration by the state Representative Formed through bottom-to-top Dependent on the consent of monopoly hard work even authorization of the state Hierarchical organizational structure

Control over selection and interest presentation

Source: Schmitter (1974, pp. 103–104).

would be achieved, or if we may say, whether or not state corporatism would be changed to societal corporatism, it is hard to tell, and this would require interactions of different factors, especially the deepening of state transformation.

391

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Edward Gu

3.

Road to State Corporatism: Development of Civil Society in China

Before the reform and opening up, the relationship between state and society in China showed the characteristics of totalism and statism. In fact, a real society did not exist then, when the associational space was composed of state-founded mass associations and considerable scientific and technological associations. These organizations can be considered as part of the state, either theoretically or practically. They are funded by the state. Moreover, these organizations and their leaders all have administrative grades. As a matter of fact, they are all public units, which are also called “public institutions” (shiye danwei ) which belong to public-sector organizations. Since 1978, significant changes have occurred to the associational space in China. The structure of the associational space is becoming increasingly diversified, with the advent of plenty of social groups, including professional associations, business organizations, industrial associations, academic organizations, public-interest organizations, sports and entertainment organizations and public affairs organizations (e.g., environmental protection organizations). According to Pei Minxin, throughout 1980s, the number of state-level social groups increased sevenfold at an average annual growth rate of 48%; and the number of local social groups increased even faster (Pei, 1998, pp. 291–294). This explosive growth had basically disappeared since October 1989 when the government promulgated the “Regulations on Registration and Management of Social Organizations”. Since 1991, official statistics on social organizations have been released. Looking at Fig. 1, we may find that except between 1991 and 1992,9 the number of social organizations increased very slowly for many years and started the negative growth from 1990 through 2002. The Law Yearbook of China provides statistics on deregistration and declined registration of social organizations between 1991 and 1997 (see Table 2). These data showed that the increase of social organizations slowed down since 1992, due to negative growth of applications for registration. 9 In fact, the soaring number of registration of social groups between 1991 and 1992 was,

to a great extent, attributable to the registration of social groups already existed before.

392

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Towards a Corporatist Development of Civil Society in China 20

40 18.7

18.1

33.5

18

Registered Social Organizations (10000)

18.1

17.4 16.8

16.6

13.7

14 12

Annual Growth Rate(%)

30

15.5

16

13.1

13.3

12.9

20

11.6

10

10

8.4 3.9

8

3.4

3.7

3.1

0

-1.5

-2.7

-4.4

6

-10

-8.3

4 -20

-17.5

2 0

-30 1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Figure 1. Expansion of Associational Space. Source : Law Yearbook of China, 1990–1998. Civil Administration Yearbook of China, 2003. Table 2. Data on Deregistration, Registration Applications and Unapproved Applications for Registration (1991–1997). Deregistration Year

Qty.

1991 9,974 1992 7,654 1993 11,331 1994 8,298 1995 6,472 1996 6,757 1997 13,995

Applications for registration Unapproved applications

Percentage (%)*

Qty.

AGR (%)

Qty.

Percentage (%)**

7.9% 4.7% 6.3% 4.6% 3.5% 3.5% 7.2%

118,691 62,891 29,773 18,826 N/A 13,976 N/A

— −47.0% −52.7% −36.8% N/A N/A N/A

28,722 8,039 3,815 3,591 N/A 2804 N/A

24.2% 12.3% 12.8% 19.1% N/A N/A N/A

Note: ∗ Percentage = Qty. of deregistration/registered qty. + deregistered qty. ×100. ∗∗ Percentage = Qty. of unapproved applications/total applications ×100. Source: Law Yearbook of China, 1990–1998.

In terms of structure, associational space expanded very fast in the 1980s and in the early 1990s, mainly attributable to the high-speed increase of business management associations, professional associations and social and academic associations. On the contrary, the growth of charity organizations, foundation, social welfare or public-interest organizations were not well developed (Pei, 1998). This situation seemed to be unchanged since 393

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Edward Gu Associations of Professionals, 10.6%

Culture and Entertainment, 16.9%

Employee Organizations, 3.3% Religious, International and Other Associations, 2.3% Business Associations, Management Associations, 21.4%,

Law, Politics and Facilitation, 3.5%

Educational and Academic Associations, 24.9%

Economic and Social Development, Housing and Employment, 5.8%

Healthcare and Environmental Protection, 3.3% Social Service, Charity, Social Welfare Facilitation, 8.0%

Figure 2. Fields for Associations in China. Source : Data on associations in Beijing, Zhejiang and Heilongjiang collected by Chinese Association Research Center of Peking University.

the mid 1990s. According to the data collected from two provinces and one municipality by Peking University from 2000 to 2003, Fig. 2 shows the fields where associations carry out activities. Among others, educational and academic associations and business management associations took the largest percentage, followed by culture and entertainment associations and professional associations, and the percentage for social welfare and public interest associations was still not large. Throughout the 1980s, though the number of associations soared, there were no formal state regulations. As early as in 1950, the State Council promulgated the “Interim Measures for Registration of Associations” and developed its “Detailed Implementation Rules” in 1951. However, after the Cultural Revolution, these measures and rules no longer took effect. In fact, a large number of associations that emerged in the 1980s were not registered according to the decree promulgated in the 1950s. And newly established associations could not find the competent authority for registration in compliance with “The Interim Measures for Registration of Associations”. Hence, these associations were organized from bottom-up, or some were separated from existing public-sector organizations.And they affiliated with different public organizations, especially with administrative organs, public

394

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Towards a Corporatist Development of Civil Society in China

units or existing mass associations.10 The establishment of such affiliation relationship was dependent on the existence of highly individualized social capital referred to as social connections of the initiators with leaders of the organizations with which these associations affiliated. Generally speaking, newly established associations could not get fund from the government. Therefore they had to raise fund through different channels, of which the paramount one would be providing services for generating revenues. Some associations might finance by publishing and marketing books. A large number of associations and self-organized associations took measures against the state in order to push for the establishment of related regulatory frameworks by the state. From September 1988 to June 1989, the State Council successively promulgated “The Regulations on Foundation Administration” and “The Interim Regulations for Administration of Foreign Chambers of Commerce in China”. In October 1989, the State Council promulgated “The Regulations on Registration and Management of Social Organizations”, indicating the formal establishment of China’s regulatory system over civic associations. In October 1998, the State Council revised the “Regulations on Registration and Management of Social Organizations” and promulgated the “Interim Regulations on Registration of Private Nonenterprise Units”, which provided a legal framework for the establishment of non-profit organizations. In March 2004, the new “Regulation on Foundation Administration” was promulgated. The regulatory framework for associations in China is typical of corporatism. Due to the limitation on length, this paper is aimed at comparing some related provisions of “The Regulations on Registration and Management of Social Organizations” promulgated in 1998 with the characteristics of corporatism. Table 3 shows that the four characteristics of corporatism mentioned above are reflected in the regulatory framework for Chinese associations except for the “hierarchical” characteristic. With respect to the “hierarchical” feature, China still carries certain noticeable hallmarks of corporatism. In a typical corporative state, many associations representing interest are usually organized on a hierarchical basis, and their state-level associations are the so-called “peak organizations”, which play extremely 10 The author ever did some case studies on the fact where some intellectual associations

pursued affiliation, see Gu (1998, pp. 271–301).

395

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Edward Gu Table 3. Corporatism Characteristics Reflected in Regulatory Framework for Associations in China.

Corporatism characteristics

Related provisions in “Regulations on Registration and Management of Social Organizations” promulgated in 1998

1. Limited number or even uniqueness Article 13: New applications shall not be approved if associations share the same or of associations in any social field or similar business scope within the same category — non-competitive administrative area. 2. Association formed on the Article 19: Associations shall not be allowed to hierarchical basis establish local branches. 3. Established by the state or with Article 2: Associations may be formed by citizens monopoly on a voluntary basis; Article 9: Applications for establishing associations shall be reviewed and approved by their competent business administrations. 4. The state controls associations Article 27 and 28: Associations are subject to dual supervision from their registration authorities and competent business administrations. Source: The document — “1998 Regulations on Registration and Management of Social Organizations” is available at the website of Ministry of Civil Affairs.

important roles in interest presentation and policy-making processes. In China, associations include national associations and local associations. As for associations of the same type, there is no hierarchical affiliation between national associations and local ones. National associations are not allowed to establish local branches in order to avoid competition with local associations. On the other hand, local associations are not allowed to join national associations as collective members. However, many leaders from local associations have some room in the steering body of national associations. Associations carry out activities of interest articulation at their respective levels, but national associations, to some extent, play roles of peak organizations due to the overlapping leadership between national associations and local ones. Moreover, the regulatory system over civic associations in China reflects strong characteristics of state corporatism. In fact, the Regulations promulgated in 1989 and 1998 all enabled the legitimization of 396

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Towards a Corporatist Development of Civil Society in China

the affiliation relationship by applying provisions of so-called “business management body”. The provisions empowered business management bodies to control civic associations. According to the differences between state corporatism and societal corporatism listed in Table 1, we may find that the state (registration authorities and business management bodies) exerts great control over associations in terms of number limitation, non-competitiveness, separation of functions and representative monopoly. Also, in practice, the state plays a very important role in establishing associations. The foresaid statistics from Peking University showed that among 2,807 associations that responded, 1,385 associations were formed upon the decision-making of public organizations with which they are affiliated, accounting for 49.3% of the total of associations; and 898 were established on a bottom-up basis, a percentage of 32.0%. There are 487 associations who did not respond, up to 17.3%. We have reasons to believe that those associations not responding were influenced by both the decision of organizations and their autonomy during the formation processes. Moreover, 37 (1.3%) associations responded but with irrelevant answers. As a result, we see that half of the associations were established by the state, and they were actually semi-governmental organizations. The situation where governmental and semi-governmental associations dominated the associational space in China seemed to have changed slightly after a decade of social reforms but without any substantial influence over the structure of such space. With the field study of Xiaoshan City of Zhejiang Province in 1990, Ying Wang et al. found that governmental and semi-governmental associations accounted for about 69% of the total number of associations (Wang et al., 1993, p. 54).

4.

Moving towards Societal Corporatism? Mutual Empowerment between State and Society and Enabling Role of the State

Evidence shows that the relationship between state and society in China always changes within the framework of corporatism. The framework is characteristic of state corporatism due to the predominant control of state over society. 397

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Edward Gu

From a comparative perspective, the opening of associational space in China will lead to corporatism other than pluralism, which is consistent with the political traditions of East Asia. In fact, in many East Asian countries, the basic form of the state-society relationship is corporatism where the state was stronger than society and non-governmental organizations were established actually by government. Furthermore, the major form of corporatism in East Asia was state corporatism until changes surfaced after the mid 1990s. For instance, Japan, South Korea and Thailand witnessed the transition from state corporatism to societal corporatism, and civil society gained great momentum during this transition.11 The transition of corporatist state-society relationship in East Asia would have far-reaching implications against the backdrop of mutual empowerment between state and society emphasized by development studies and comparative politics. For a long time, the international academic circles have been involved in discussions on whether the state or society is the main facilitator of socioeconomic development. The prevailing theory is the so-called “society-centered” approach, which incorporates neo-liberalism emphasizing market forces. However, with the rise of East Asia, the “state-centered” approach had emerged since the 1980s. Scholars supporting this theory believed that fast social and economic growth in East Asia was attributable to state autonomy. In other words, the driving force of the growth was neither society nor the market but rather the state bureaucracy which was not restricted by any social group or short-term market forces. The civil servants working for such a state bureaucracy would be able to make and implement proactive policies to meet the long-term needs of the state. This is the core proposition of the concept of the “developmental state”.12 Accordingly, many scholars hold that the underdevelopment of the third world was caused by weak states, namely the lack of developmental states, while the weakness of state had the roots in strong societies which broke down the state control utterly. Generally, it seems that there are only two types of state-society 11 For major literature, see Laothamatas (1992); Serrano (1994); Yamamoto (1995); Camil-

leri (2002); Schak and Hudson (2003). 12 There is no systematic comments on “developmental state” in Chinese publications, while

in English there are many researches. For the most systematic album, see Woo-Cumings (1999).

398

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Towards a Corporatist Development of Civil Society in China

relationship: Strong state vs. weak society and weak state vs. strong society.13 The “zero-sum game” relationship between state and society can tally with people’s empirical experience. Innumerable examples have indicated the operation of the market and enterprises was distorted by government interventions or arbitrary instructions. These examples can also be found in the society where sometimes governmental interventions can damage the development-friendly societal networks. However, we are making a big mistake if we jump into a conclusion based on these examples concerning the “zero-sum game” relationship between state and society. In the real world, there are a large number of examples supporting the fact that the state and civil society can interact well with each other and jointly create a win-win situation. Therefore, the academic community started to make another turn since the mid 1990s. Joel S. Migdal from University of Washington, a leading advocator of the state-society zero-sum game theory, revised his viewpoint in 1994 and proposed a “state-in-society” approach, emphasizing the mutual empowerment between state and society (Migdal et al., 1994; Migdal, 2001). Peter Evans from UC Berkeley introduced the concept of “embedded autonomy” in 1995 and argued that it was not sufficient enough for the state to maintain autonomy over the special interests of civil society in order to drive social and economic development and that the state must maintain close connections with society so as to enable its will to penetrate through the entire society (Evans, 1995). Furthermore, Evans introduced another concept called “state-society synergy” in 1997, emphasizing that empowerment to the society would not necessarily weaken the state’s power of governing the society. Under some circumstances, civil society composed of numerous burgeoning social groups or civil organizations can constitute the social infrastructure different from the physical infrastructure for socioeconomic development. The development of social infrastructure can effectively connect the needs of society to state power and can provide more effective institutional capability for the state so as to help the state to determine its goals and facilitate the achievement of such goals (Evans, 1997; Wang, 1999, p. 234). 13 For the most classic comment on the “zero and gambling” relationship between the state

and the society, see Migdal (1988).

399

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Edward Gu

When the fields of comparative politics and development studies were committed to correcting the bias towards the state-society zero-sum relationship, Lester M. Salamon, who was studying civil society and the third sector, strongly criticized the ideological bias for opposing civil society to the state. Basing on the findings of comparative researches on non-profit organizations in more than 20 countries, Salamon and other scholars found that the partnership between the state and the third sector was dominant. In fact, civil organizations were mainly funded by the state, while the state was relying on civil organizations to provide various services for the society (Salamon et al., 2002). Salamon introduced the idea of “voluntary failure” and consolidated it with the conventional “government/market failure” theory in order to theoretically explain the partnership between the state and the third sector (Salamon, 1995). The concept of mutual empowerment between civil society and the state indicates that the state must play a more active role in facilitating the development of civil society, especially in terms of the expansion of associational space and the emergence of non-profit organizations. The approach of “state withdrawal” highlighted by neo-liberalism is undoubtedly reasonable to some extent; however, it is too passive. And in the context where there is strong tradition of statism, the “state withdrawal” approach is not so practical. As for a more positive role of the state, we may get inspirations from the concept of “the enabling state” in social policy research. Since the 1980s, Western welfare states had experienced a significant transition to the so-called path of “public-private mix of welfare provisions”. In this regard, researchers of social policies carried out a great number of empirical studies and generated various theoretical conclusions. Among them, the concept of “the enabling state” was about government function transformation during this transition process. This concept is apparently parallel with Salamon’s comment on the partnership between the state and non-profit organizations. The concept of “the enabling state” was introduced in the late 1980s by Neil Gilbert, professor in social policy from UC Berkeley. Thereafter, he continuously discussed this concept in his books in details. According to this new concept and practice, the function of the state was not to directly provide social welfare services for the public, nor would it completely withdraw. The most important characteristic of an enabling state is that the state funds social service providers which operate as market

400

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Towards a Corporatist Development of Civil Society in China

players including for-profit organizations and mostly various non-profit organizations (Gilbert and Gilbert, 1989; Gilbert, 2002). The enabling state, on the one hand, dramatically facilitated the capability building of civil organizations; on the other hand, it directed the development of such civil organization with its strong financial capacity. All the new concepts discussed above indicate that the development of associational space and civil society in China hinges on a paradigm change. Looking at Fig. 2, we may find that there is huge room for social groups and other civil organizations in fields like social and economic growth, social service provision, charity, healthcare, environmental protection and the construction of the legal system. In fact, in such fields the state is carrying on the traditional practices adopted in the time of planned economy. It directly provides services or implements administrative governance by establishing public service providers which to some extent cannot efficiently serve the public or respond quickly enough to public needs due to their own characteristics. At present, civil organizations started to emerge in these fields, but the supervision system of state corporatism, especially those regulations regarding affiliation and representation monopoly of civil organizations restrict the development of civil organizations to a great extent, which in turn weaken the state’s capability of effectively facilitating social development. It is not difficult for us to find that in these fields, emerging civil organizations (including associations seceding from the state) are committed to providing services for society other than rivaling the state. Therefore, the government is holding a highly preventive attitude is not conducive to the state. We have reasons to expect the mutual empowerment between state and society will appear in these fields; and the establishment of partnership between the state and society relies on the enabling role of the state in facilitating the transition of the state-society relationship towards societal corporatism.

References Brook, Timothy and B. Michael Frolic (eds.) (1997). Civil Society in China. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe. Camilleri, Joseph A. (2002). States, Markets and Civil Society in Asia Pacific. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

401

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Edward Gu Chan, Anita (1993). Revolution or Corporatism? Workers and Trade Unions in Post-Mao China. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 29, 31–61. Cohen, Youssef and Franco Pavoncello (1987). Corporatism and Pluralism: A Critique of Schimitter’s Typology. British Journal of Political Science, 17, Pt. 1, 117–122. Evans, Peter (ed.) (1997). State-society Synergy: Government and Social Capital in Development. Berkeley: Institute of International and Area Studies. Evans, Peter (1995). Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Friedrich, Carl J., Michael Curtis and Benjamin R. Barber (1969). Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views. New York: Praeger. Gilbert, Neil and Barbara Gilbert (1989). The Enabling State. New York: Oxford University Press. Gilbert, Neil (2002). Transformation of the Welfare State: The Silent Surrender of Public Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. Gu, Xin (1993/4). A Civil Society and Public Sphere in Post-Mao China. China Information, 8(3), 38–52. Gu, Xin (1995). Restricting Power with Society: Tocqueville’s Theory and Civil Society. In Liu, Junning and Wang Yan (eds.), Public Forum: Market Logic and State Concept. Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore, 148–167. Gu, Xin (1998). Plural Institutionalism and the Emergence of Intellectual Public Spaces in Contemporary China. Journal of Contemporary China, 7(18). Harrison, Reginald J. (1980). Pluralism and Corporatism. London: George Allen & Unwin. Heisler, Martin (1979). Corporate Pluralism Revisited: Where is the Theory? Scandinavian Political Studies, 2, Pt 3, 278–298. Keane, John (1988). Democracy and Civil Society. London: Verso. Laothamatas, Anek (1992). Business Associations and the New Politics Economy of Thailand: From Bureaucratic Polity to Liberal Corporatism. Boulder: Westview. Migdal, Joel S. (2001). State in Society. New York: Cambridge University Press. Migdal, Joel S., Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds.) (1994). State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World. New York: Cambridge University Press. Migdal, Joel S. (1988). Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Parris, Kristen (1995/6). Private Entrepreneurs as Citizens: From Leninism to Corporatism. China Information, 5(3/4), 1–28. Pei, Minxin (1998). Chinese Civic Association: An Empirical Analysis. Modern China, 24(3). Salamon, Lester M. (1995). Partners in Public Service: Government-Nonprofit Relations in Modern Welfare State. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Salamon, Lester M. et al. (2002). Global Civil Society: Vision on Non-profit Sector, translated by Xijin Jia and Yu Wei. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press.

402

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

Towards a Corporatist Development of Civil Society in China Schak, David C. and Wayne Hudson (2003). Civil Society in Asia. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. Schmitter, Philippe C. (1974). Still a Century of Corporatism. In Pike, Fredrick B. and Thomas Stritch (eds.), The New Corporatism. Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press. Schwartz, Benjamin I. (1968). Communism and China: Ideology in Flux. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Serrano, Isagani R. (1994). Civil Society in the Asia-Pacific Region. Washington, D. C.: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. Shue, Vivienne (1988). The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politics. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Tsou, Tang (1986). The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press. Tsou, Tang (1994). Politics in China in Twentieth Century. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Unger, Jonathan (1996). “Bridges”: Private Business, the Chinese Government and the Rise of New Associations. The China Quarterly, 147, 795–819. Walder, Andrew G. (1986). Communist Neo-traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry. Berkeley, Los Angeles: The University of California Press. Wang, Xu (1999). Mutual Empowerment of State and Society: Its Nature, Conditions, Mechanism, and Limits. Comparative Politics, 31(2), 231–249. Wang, Ying, Xiaoye Zhe, and Bingyao Sun (1993). Middle Class in the Society: Reform and Associations in China. Beijing: China Development Press. White, Gordon, Jude Howell, and Xiaoyuan Shang (1996). In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wiarda, Howard J. (1997). Corporatism and Comparative Politics. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe. Williamson, Peter J. (1989). Corporatism in Perspective. London: Sage. Woo-Cumings, Meredith (ed.) (1999). The Developmental State. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Yamamoto, Tadashi (ed.) (1995). Emerging Civil Society in the Asia-Pacific Community. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Zhang, Jing (1998). Corporatism. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press.

403

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch12

This page intentionally left blank

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

From Major Community Standard to Civil Society: A Rethinking of Traditional China and Its Modernization

Chapter

13

Qin Hui1

Abstract People had been led into believing that Western culture stresses the individuality but Chinese or Eastern or Asian cultures focus on the whole. The misunderstanding stems from the negligence of the following four historical phenomena. First, Chinese and Western cultures differed greatly when they started exchanges in 19th century. Second, since the 19th century, neoteric intellectual movements came into being during the contact of the two cultures and therefore features like the liberation of individuality as well as the safeguarding, implementing and upholding of civil rights are self-evident. Third, neoteric Chinese received ideas mainly from the Western culture, which embodies principles that are proposed to liberate individuality and uphold justice for individual rights in the process of Western social modernization. Fourth, it is influenced by Western sinologists whose attention is confined to the Southeast coastal area with the most developed clan system in China. As far as the nature of traditional society is concerned, both cultures highlight community rather than individuality. The difference lies in the fact that China focuses on major community but medieval Europe emphasized minor community. Therefore, unlike Western modernization aimed at breaking the fetters of minor community, Chinese modernization needs an alliance of the civil (the public) with minor community to shake off the shackles of major community. Keywords: Community standard; civil society; modernization. 1 Qin Hui, Department of History, Tsinghua University, Beijing, P. R. China.

405

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

Qin Hui

Modernization should be common sense to us now. It involves two crucial issues: One is about a developed market economy, and the other is about democratic politics. The two issues have one thing in common, viz. a humanistic society that has shifted its focus from traditional society to humanistic society with respect for the individual rights and values of citizens. Humanism actually refers to human individuality, and human rights actually mean individual rights of a citizen. Only in this sense can we interpret the infringement or vindication of human rights. If human rights refer to the rights of all people as an inseparable whole, like the rights of a nation or a state, then it would be impossible to define infringement of human rights. Human rights, or humanism, therefore, are all based on the respect for individual human rights, and for the free development of individuality. This should be a common sense to all developing human civilizations, without exception for cultures and isms whatsoever. Karl Marx once said that the further we look back at history, the less freedom a man engaged in production can have and the more he is subject to a larger whole. In Marxist society, man is not an indepdendent individual, but rather one subordinate to a narrowly-defined community, a corollary and property of the community, and therefore a property of proprietor who fathered the community. Only in our citizen society can individuality be a means to our ends. According to Marx, social history develops from the stage featuring human reliance (on community) to the ideal stage of free growth of individuality. There is a famous line in The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau: “Citizens care about individual freedom, while subjects care about overall harmony”. It is widely acknowledged that Rousseau tends to criticize the liberalistic interpretation of individual rights, for he has many comments on human rights which, if taken too far, will threaten personal freedom. Even Rousseau would use individual rights as an important benchmark in the division of citizen and subject, not even to mention the liberalists who have many classic sayings about human individuality. I quote from Marx and Rousseau here because from a literalistic perspective both were very reserved about individual rights and individuality. But they would take the respect for individual rights and individuality as a basically essential index of modernization when they are discussing modern society and

406

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

From Major Community Standard to Civil Society

citizen society. This has laid the foundation for the development of both market economy and democratic politics. We have acquired a mindset over long-term discussion of this issue, namely we tend to discuss individuality-centricity and non-individualitycentricity as a cultural hallmark. It is time we reflected on this viewpoint now. For a long time people kept saying that the Western culture focuses on individuality, Chinese or oriental or Asian culture emphasizes the whole. But this “whole” is defined differently. Some say it is based on family, others say it is based on the clan system. In a nutshell, some think the emphasis on individuality or on the whole is a feature of different cultures. I think this thinking is reasonable, and I will offer four reasons later in this thesis. But I think this thinking is not right as far as facts are concerned, because it is hard to pinpoint Western cultural values as humanistic in the earlier periods of Western history, the Medieval Period for example. Emphasis on individuality is a feature of modernization rather than one of a culture, not to mention one feature of Western culture. However, the latter statement did emerge in modern times especially since China and the West started exchanges. This is the basis for our thinking, upon which we will discuss two questions: First, if we do not start from the comparison and contrast of oriental and occidental emphasis on individuality, then what are the features of the development of different nations? Second, how can we find, from different models of societies, a path of modernization that is of our respective features or that is of a common basis? I would like to bring this question to your attention first: “Why do a lot of people assume Western culture emphasizes individuality but Chinese or oriental culture focuses on the whole?” I think this is easy to understand. Actually we found that when studying one’s own culture, especially the culture of one’s own nation in modern times, a lot of people would treat the emphasis on the whole as the cultural feature unanimously. When it comes to the recent history, however, four reasons can support my claim of such misunderstanding. First, back in the 19th century when China started communication with Western civilization, the two civilizations differed greatly in development status. The West at that time has already become a modern society with emphasis on individuality, while China remained a traditional

407

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

Qin Hui

society. It appeared to Western people of that time, therefore, that family and clan are traditions peculiar to China, and naturally a lot of sinologists and researchers of Chinese issues focused their attention on these traditions. Given some earlier period other than the 19th century, e.g., the Medieval Period, they would have found some consanguine communities and other non-consanguine communities like villages, trade unions, parishes, fiefs, etc had no less influence in the West than their counterparts had in the East. Second, since the 19th century, China acquired a new intellectual tendency during the contact and exchange with the West, which is characterized by the liberation of individuality as well as the safeguarding, implementing and upholding of the individual rights of citizens. This is especially evident in the branch of the movement, which represents the most radical one in “May Fourth” New Culture Movement and which develops into Marxism later. We all know that those who became Marxists later had been the most radical advocates of individuality liberation. They proposed the abolishment of clan, of family, of marriage and some even proposed the abolishment of government. They struggled fiercely from both intellectual and actual aspects against community or any behavior that restricts individual rights by means of personal dependency. China had a remarkable feature then, labeled by Li Zehou as “nation’s survival overrides enlightenment”. I do not think so, however, because survival and enlightenment were not in conflict but in harmony. If enlightenment can be understood as individuality liberation, then the most active devotees of the survival of the nation also featured the greatest dedication to individuality liberation. But if survival did not override enlightenment, then it would twist enlightenment. In other words, survival turns the revolutionary tide of enlightenment and individuality liberation more toward minor communities than toward major communities. Individuality liberation and guarantee of personal rights emphasized by these people were more against the restrictions of minor communities especially family and clan, rather than those of the country, or the whole. The “May Fourth” Movement fought mainly against restrictions like arranged marriage, patriarchal system, clan and husband authorities. They proposed these as a way out for individual to break the restrictions of the whole. But they were not just against family. For example, people in the late Qing Dynasty and “May Fourth” Movement criticized Chinese

408

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

From Major Community Standard to Civil Society

feudal imperial authority as severely as they did to clan authority. But upon close analysis you will find the two criticisms differ greatly in nature. The difference lies in the fact that since “May Fourth” Movement, people are not merely trying to shake off the shackles from some authority in a family or clan, but also trying to overcome obstacles of the whole. For example, they fight against arranged marriage neither because it is an intolerable expression of patriarchal will, nor because it is a tolerable embodiment of clan will. Chinese are keen on escaping control from family and clan, but it is not the case when it comes to fighting against the tyranny of the government. When fighting against the imperial authority, they tend to emphasize that they are opposing the tyranny of family, of the clan, as if the tyranny over people is too good to oppose. Their individuality liberation therefore does not have the features of liberation at the level of state and nation. The features only exhibit at the level of minor communities. To sum up, individuality liberation at the time of “May Fourth” Movement was merely against minor communities instead of major ones. They combated fiercely the familism and clanism embedded in Chinese tradition. The phenomenon is not hard to understand. China had been in a national crisis between the late 19th century and the early 20th century. People grieved over the weakness of the country and all aspired for a strong country. This aspiration simply clouded people’s awareness of restrictions imposed by a major community, causing later an inexplicable phenomenon: It was out of the most radical branch (radical here means the radical liberation of individuality) after “May Fourth” Movement that a system, which oppressed individuality even more awfully than traditional society, emerged. There are two explanations in this connection. One is made by many Westernization advocates in the 1980s, who agree that the countertraditional campaign at that time was not thorough enough. On the contrary, others think the biggest issue of the era is that the radicals were too radical; they brought revolution followed by democracy which further suppressed individuality. I think whether it is radical or not is measured by nothing but tradition, and then, what exactly is tradition? The third reason is that Chinese people in contemporary history accepted ideas mainly from the West, which are principles proposed to liberate their individuality and to serve their personal power justice in the process of Western modernization. Traditional Western society and traditional

409

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

Qin Hui

Chinese society differ most fundamentally in that Western society indeed emphasizes minor communities. In the medieval times, the Western system of government was not very advanced. It is generally agreed that Western nations and countries are born out of the process of modernization. They remained at an age that focused on the whole, but this whole comprised various minor communities as defined in the book Community and Society. The book omitted the modifier “minor”, for Westerners identify community as minor community. Minor communities consist of fiefs, villages, trade unions, parishes and even consanguine communities. Modern researches have proved that if clan system is not as ordinary in the medieval period as we generally suppose, then it is more ordinary when compared with that of oriental societies and Chinese society. We may consider it a feature of West medieval society rather than one of Chinese society. In order to remove the restrictions of minor communities, “the alliance of the crown and the citizen” had been in existence from the very beginning. Along with the progress of Western modernization, nationalism and democratism become two coexistent values. This is especially true in the interval of two world wars, when Western nationalism, the right wing — Fascism and the left wing — Bolshevism, reached the peak. When the isms were introduced to China, it became all the more difficult for Chinese to achieve justified reflections on the emphasis on a major community. For the fourth reason, I talked about this in a conference in Hainan early this year and a scholar added that American sinologists or West sinologists have a lot of insightful ideas in this regard. He thought that West sinologists had reached this conclusion due to, firstly, their perspective of observation. Many sinologists, including the most famous scholars in the study of Chinese clan system, concentrate on clans in Fujian and Guangdong Provinces, especially clans in Xinjie. These clans are all located along the Southeast coast, which is indeed the most developed area of China in terms of clan system. But their study of the inland area by analogy is inclined to bring problems rather than insights. It is true that there are many phenomena and the so-called native resources along the Southeast coast, but to what an extent they can represent Chinese tradition is quite problematic. Because of the limitation of angles, these are all that they can get. On the other hand, West sinologists play a self-evident role: They identify the differences between China and the West, not the similarities. It is only natural

410

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

From Major Community Standard to Civil Society

that they focus on differences rather than similarities. This focus on differences entails that they should depict to the West a rather exotic East, and this tendency is one of the reasons they pay so much academic attention to Chinese clan system. The four reasons seem to have given rise to one final conclusion: The West emphasizes individuality, while China highlights the clan system. As such, I am afraid that the only difference is the attitude toward traditions since the “May Fourth” Movement. Take traditional clan system for example. Some people hold a severe criticism, and the Confucian culture that represents this tradition is regarded as junk. Many radical Westernization advocates agree with this idea. Some cultural conservatives, however, identify themselves with the tradition. But be it criticism or identification, it is merely a judgment made on the basis of particular values. But when it comes to judgment on the basis of facts, they do not seem to differ. Even today, in the face of the revival of minor communities along the Southeast coast of China, we can hear nothing but these two discourses. Though they do not agree with each other, they tend to see clan system as a tradition of China. However, I want to question this today. I do not deny the fact that there were organizations or consciousness concerning geographical and consanguine minor communities in ancient China. We have agreed that there are many minor communities along the Southeast coast, and relatively less in the inland area; there were many clans before 1949, and less after. Recently someone published an article claiming that these are all wrong since clan system also exists in North China. The clan tradition did not disappear completely even after 1949. I think this claim is right in its absolute sense, but we are talking about its relative sense. When we treat it as a feature of traditional Chinese society, surely we will have a frame of reference, i.e., other civilizations. Theories mentioned above are widely accepted and considered by the majority as self-evident truth. Hence, many postulations are made on the basis of these theories. Here is a case in point. A few years ago there was a movie entitled Shangangye the Defendant. It caused quite a sensation in the intellectual world. As far as I know, circles of sociology, anthropology and laws were all engaged in the discussion of this movie. The movie was shot in a quite remote and solitary village. The villagers there had absolutely no idea about laws. All that they knew was traditional order of their clan.

411

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

Qin Hui

Shanganye, the most respectable old man in the village, presided over the community autonomously with a traditional clan system. Unfortunately, one day his governance conflicted with laws from the outside world, and the state from outside the community intervened and put him in prison. Thus, traditional moral autonomy suffered damage. It is not my intention to offend or defend moral autonomy here, for it is an issue of value judgment. I just want to point out that many people who live in cities in China share the same understanding as Westerners. We “naturally” take it as a tradition when we see something wonderful and different from modern society in the Southeast coast, and we, by analogy, project the pattern to the inland or to the remote area, thinking the more primitive a place is, the more it fits the tradition. So, gangye in that movie is not set in the central part of China or along the coast, but in the inland, in a remote and isolated village. The truth, however, is exactly opposite if you examine the history and status quo of villages. Gens or clans we see exist in many places in China, though with varying quantities. If we merely look at the degree of development, the nearer it is from us, the more developed it is. By “nearer” I mean the period after the Song and Yuan Dynasties. The Song and Yuan Dynasties were not as developed as the Ming and Qing Dynasties, and the Ming Dynasty was not as developed as the Qing Dynasty. Even within the Qing Dynasty there were differences: Early Qing period was not as developed as late Qing period. Geographically speaking, Chinese clan organizations, clan ethics and clan autonomy were the most developed along Southeast coast, and along the valley of the Yangtze River, where development and outward contact frequency are second only to the coast area. But along the valley of the Yellow River, especially the central plains and central Shanxi plain, there is hardly any such tradition in existence even though they are regarded as the cradle of Chinese civilization and the epitome of ancient Chinese civilization. My statements above were based on quantitative data. It is hard to measure the development degree of a clan in an abstract manner, but the development degree of a clan’s public property can be so measured. In a clan, be it the family tree, clan shrine, clan cemetery or even village rules or clan agreements, they all have to be based on economy, as represented by the public property of clan temple. We already know that at least between the

412

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

From Major Community Standard to Civil Society

late 19th century and the early 20th century, Southeast coast clans have the most developed clan temple public property, especially in the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong Province, the counties of Guangzhou to be exact. In most of the counties, public property of clan temple accounted for over 50% of total arable land, and even over 80% in some counties, like Shunde, Fanyu and Xinhui, and other clan temple’s public property ranged from 30% to 50%. Many places are simply clans. During the land reform in 1950, many local cadres did not know what to do with them because there was no private-owned land. Ratio of clan public property in Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces were also very high. In the 1920s, clan public property of Yongkang in Zhejiang accounted for a percentage of 42%, Yiwu, 34%, and some communities in Pujiang and Shangyu the percentage is over 80%, not even to mention what would happen in Fujian Province, especially in habitations where Hakka people gathered. In the two great lake areas by the Yangtze River, the most developed area in the two provinces happened to be where clan public property were the most developed, like counties in Changsha, Hunan Province, and counties in Hanyang, Hubei Province. Clan public property in the 1920s accounted for about 15% to 20% of the place, and the percentage in cities around them could be lower. In North China Plain, clans along the Yellow River valley hardly owned any public property. At the beginning of the 1930s, the similar findings were presented in the investigation reports of scholars Liang Shuming and Li Jinghan, who were both known as the advocates of countryside construction and conducted investigations in North China. Li Jinghan focused on certain counties and found that the area of arable land was over 60,000 mu (1 mu equals 666.67 m2 ), but clan public property was only over 0.5% (200 mu) of the land, a percentage too low to be considered. In other words, the whole of North China did not have clan public property as such at all. This naturally poses a question: What is the family as a minor community? Is it a primitive tradition that grew in an enclosed environment or something else that grew out of stimulations of other elements? And what role did it play in the development of Chinese society? The story in the foregoing movie happened probably in an underdeveloped area, but it was by no means typical. The line of a ballad in the Ming Dynasty that goes “the emperor is faraway because mountains are too high, and the number

413

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

Qin Hui

of people is small but there are many officials” indicates that where people are far from mainstream civilization they are not necessarily all clan members. Instead, there are even more officials, therefore the autonomous system of minor communities is even less developed, and people there are under stricter control of laws. What does this phenomenon indicate? First, we have to elaborate on our understanding of tradition. In my opinion, it is questionable to treat Confucian classics as Chinese tradition, for the thing that holds sway over Chinese people, be they elites or commons, rulers or people, and their way of thinking and doing follows not Confucianism but other isms. Legalism, for example, has greater influence over the formation of Chinese culture. China began its united autocratic history from the Warring States Period and the Qin Dynasty and lasted till the Qing Dynasty without any major changes, and the system had settled down since that time. But the classics experienced changes: Since the reign of Emperor Wu of Han Dynasty, Confucianism came to be dominant in Chinese classics. But the change did not cause a major social reform. The system of the Han Dynasty can be concluded with one sentence: Han Dynasty succeeded the system of Qin Dynasty. Qu Tongzu proposed the theory that “Han succeeded the law system of Qin Dynasty”. The Han Dynasty succeeded not just the political system of the Qin Dynasty, but also the law code of Legalism in the Qin Dynasty. And these remained the same even after Emperor Wu of Han Dynasty declared the dominance of Confucianism, and it was so until the Eastern Han Dynasty. After the period of Wei and Jin, Chinese law system began to be confucianized, and li or rites — one of the key Confucian concepts became fused with the law system. Legalism and the entire legalism thought represent a tradition of centralized autocracy by major community, which is the most decidedly opponent of the clan system. The core of its thoughts is to make sure the autocracy can penetrate the autonomous shell of all major and minor communities and reach out to every agricultural household. Chinese society formed on this basis keeps a regular record of all the people. It is a society in which the central government keeps strict and direct control of every agricultural household. This idea will conflict with a currently popular idea. Many people favor the argument that before 1949, the power of the central government

414

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

From Major Community Standard to Civil Society

only reached the county level. Administrative units under that level were autonomous villages and their autonomous interests were represented by the landed gentry who practiced autonomy according to their clan system. Generally, this is true in contrast with the situation after 1949. But if we take it as a cultural feature and thus compare it with that of other nations, I am afraid it may not be able to hold water. From the Warring States Period, Qin and Han Dynasty through Eastern Han Dynasty, China succeeded not just the political system, but also the legal system of Qin Dynasty. They both feature Legalism principles. Legalism theories postulated that human nature is evil, and therefore legalists held no dreams about the tender love and care of the clan system. Han Fei put it like this: “Since the relationships between husband and wife, father and son are not trustworthy, what else can we trust?” Based on this tenet, if the emperor wants to unify the country, he has to establish a set of systems according to which all resources should be centralized and utilized under the command of the autocratic country. And this principle will surely break through the bondage of all autonomous minor communities. Therefore, the design of a legalism system is directly opposite to the clan system, and it was aimed to break down major clans. For example, one of the laws at that time stipulated that if a man who has two sons does not split up his property between his sons, his taxes should be doubled. Legal system in Qin Dynasty encourages “reporting a criminal relative” and forbids “tolerance”. The system again tears apart the consciousness of minor communities to the most insignificant parts by dividing up the property of a minor community. Law of Qin: Questions and Answers excavated in Shuihudi of Yunmeng County recorded these rules: “If a husband is guilty and the wife reports him first”, their property “shall not be confiscated”; “if a wife is guilty and the husband reports her first”, the property of the wife “including well and field shall be transferred to the husband”. Judging from these legal principles, laws defining financial relationships impress us as very modern, for the subject of property defined in it was nearly individual. If a concubine (servant) steals the property of the master’s parents, then it will not be charged with stealing the property of the master, and some issues like a son stealing from a father, or a father stealing from a son, or a stepfather stealing from a stepson were all discussed in Law of Qin Dynasty. A set of principles like this is to embody the ideal that

415

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

Qin Hui

an official is an individual. An official is more a personality than a job. The concept of being “an official” was very broad during Qin and Han Dynasty, many literature extended the concept to levels of wuren, lizhang and fulao, each of which was a unit of legal person at that time. After Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty declared the dominance of Confucianism, Legalism was gradually replaced and hence exerted great influences on social life, ideology and pattern of behavior, and the influences culminated during the period of Wei and Jin. There were indeed many clans in Wei and Jin society. From Eastern Han Dynasty on, many clans began to rise, and Wei and Jin witnessed the advent of many powerful clans. And the political system and principles of selecting officials graduated into panmoralism and ethic centrality. The officials selection system in Wei and Jin Period chose officials in the name of moral principles like “xiaolian” (filial piety and moral probity), “xianliang fangzheng” (wisdom, goodness and uprightness), “zixiaoyoudao” (adherence to the rules of filial piety). These principles were based on the theory that human nature is good. We regard this period of time as a Confucian period for Confucian principles penetrated every corner of society and human ideology. But it was during this period of time when the unified autocratic centralized country started disintegrating. China established a unified autocratic country from the Sui and Tang Dynasties to the Song and Yuan Dynasties. According to my analysis, the re-construction served as a process of “Confucianism becoming superficial and Legalism essential”. Considerable Legalist ideas were restored at the level of classic culture so that China, or rather the entire Chinese culture after the Song and Yuan Dynasties, was dominated by Legalist culture instead of Confucian culture. The overall political and economic system and the resultant human behavior patterns were more Legalist than Confucian. For instance, Chinese judgment of human nature is, factually, that human nature is born evil. Thus, Chinese, elites and commons alike, are supposed to have the most sophisticated tactics of self-protection and self-defense. The prevalent judgment of man in daily life builds not on Confucian proposition that human is good in nature, but the one derived from poems people learnt by heart in childhood. Examples include: “You can paint a dragon or a tiger with ease, but you cannot paint its bones; you can know somebody by the name or the face, but you cannot know what he holds in heart”; “Speak

416

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

From Major Community Standard to Civil Society

your mind with reservations, but never pour out your heart fully”; “Bear no evil intentions, but never quit self-protection”, etc. In contrast with this tradition of China, medieval West is a quite typical time of minor communities. The minor communities in question generally refer to non-consanguine communities mainly under the fief system that relies on the loyalty between lords and subjects and the village system that relies on geographical bondage. As a matter of fact, even when we leave these two points out, and even when we discuss true consanguine community consciousness, we will find that they are deeply rooted in precontemporary Europe.As we mentioned earlier, under the infusion of Legalist consciousness in the Qin and Han Dynasties, the whole society evinced many self-evident non-clan-system features. But in medieval Europe, consanguine communities were very common. The leading scholar of Annales School in Europe stated that there was no other relationship except consanguine relations. Researches of modern family population history rectified a claim about traditional European big family system by concluding that there were actually not so many big families. Despite the rectification, they still outnumbered Chinese households of five members. Considering other forms of communities, the former far outnumbered the latter. Widespread prosperity of minor communities in the West caused some phenomena seemingly intricate from Chinese perspective. For example, it is hard for Chinese to understand what the English Enclosure Movement is. Compared with the German marck and East Russian mir, medieval English village communities were not developed. Before the Enclosure Movement, however, village communities were very influential. Although land could be transacted and leased, land ownership was confined to the village. After the development of market economy, land was let out to outsiders at high prices, and the original tenants were driven off. This is called the Enclosure Movement. To Chinese people, this is nothing serious. Selling land to villagers from other villages is very common, much less leasing land. Land transactions between village communities emerged in the Han Dynasty, and they were more usual after the Song and Yuan Dynasties. But in England where the consciousness of village community is not so strong, it is truly amazing that selling or renting land should cause so many problems. Likewise, Chinese people also cannot understand how a community can exert so

417

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

Qin Hui

strong an influence over man, and why Russian farmers in the 19th century should pay 26% taxes to village community while they pay national taxes to the government and land rent to landlords. Trade unions, parishes and lands owned by lords in medieval Europe were very exclusive, and they had very strong autonomous bondage within themselves. Traditional medieval European society was practically a society that emphasized on minor community, and the tradition is not limited within the medieval period. Rome is included, actually. We now agree that Western traditions originated from Rome, and if we compare Rome with its contemporary Chinese society, viz., the Qin and Han Dynasties, we will find that the rule “if a man who has two sons does not split up his property between his sons, his taxes shall be doubled” forms a very contrastive counterpart with Rome’s patriarchal clan. Rome’s acknowledgment of patriarchy is much more severe than Chinese laws. The dominator of any power is the patriarchal clan, and the parents of the clan can treat clan members in the way a slave-owner treats slaves. Therefore, as far as the nature of traditional society is concerned, be it Chinese or Western society, they all tend to emphasize community rather than individuality. If we have to identify some features of the two societies, the feature of Chinese society is that major communities were highlighted and minor ones rather underdeveloped. Real growth of minor communities in contemporary history takes place in areas with stronger outside influences, developed commodity economy, and relatively higher level of overall social economy, like the Southeast coast and the Yangtze valley. On the contrary, medieval Europe featured a society that emphasized minor communities in real sense. The last question I want to elaborate on is how such a society evolved into a modern society that emphasizes individuality. As I mentioned in the beginning, modern society focuses on individuality, and the progress of modernization is the process of the growth of individual rights and individuality. However, before individuality rights and individuality hold sway, it is impossible for them to dismiss all the communities. Then choose the lesser of two harmful elements. Usually we go for the less harmful one. We do this by allying with some communities to get rid of the most harmful one. To Western world, this is the initial stage of modernization. It seems to me that “the union of the crown and the citizen” at the late medieval period was an alliance between individual rights and major communities 418

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

From Major Community Standard to Civil Society

so that obstacles imposed by minor communities could be dismantled by the power of major communities, i.e., removing the obstacles of village community, clan, fief, parish, trade union and other minor communities. Then, the royal power will be challenged when citizen power grows to a certain extent. Hence, revolutions in England and France arose for the removal of royal obstacles and the transformation of traditional dynasties into modern citizen states. The reason to ally with the royal power is that in traditional Western society, major communities had been underdeveloped and its obstacles on individuals were less crucial, but the obstacles imposed by minor communities prevailed. There is an opposite case with China. In my view, traditional Chinese society emphasizes major community, and restrictions on individual power and individuality are mainly from major community. This not only throttles the development space of individual power and individuality, but also depresses the autonomous space of minor communities. Chinese village community, clan organization and many other civilian organizations therefore have less space to develop than their counterparts in Europe in pre-contemporary conditions. Therefore, in the process of China’s modernization, an alliance of the people (citizens) with minor communities is probably necessary to get rid of major communities. Then we can understand why all kinds of traditional civilian organizations are more developed in borderland areas and in economically developed area. Similarly, we can understand why all kinds of minor communities come up during the reform and in areas where commodity economy is most developed. Likewise, this can help us understand another phenomenon that appeared in China after 1949. As we all know, Soviet Union and China both collectivized land during the socialist period. Stalin thought Russian farmers had had a tradition of village community (viz. rural commune) and practiced the policy of collective-owned land when Soviet Union collectivized land in 1929. So, the land collectivization in Soviet Union was carried out very quickly. However, that resulted in farmers’ vehement resistance and protest. In 1930 alone, 700,000 farmers got involved in the riots of anti-collectivization by killing livestock. Over 60% of major livestock were lost. In 1950, when China was planning to carry out collectivization, consultants from Soviet Union thought that Chinese farmers have a tradition of small private ownership longer than West European farmers, so it would 419

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

Qin Hui

possibly fail. But Chinese farmers did not evince very strong will of resistance. It is safe to say that Chinese farmers do have passivity in resisting major communities, and Chinese farmers at this time are indeed easier to be involved in collectivization than Russian village community members. This poses a major issue to the study of China after 1949, which is called “the Myth of the Commune”. Actually the phenomena in the process of communalization can offer us some insights. In the advanced community period of Chinese collectivization, there were such phenomenon as horse or bull slaughter by farmers, but soon enough they were stopped. From then on, no farmer dared to slaughter any livestock due to the national ban. Even during the three years of difficulty (1959–1961), the loss of livestock was much less than that of population. But farmers were not absolutely obedient during the community period, but riots did occur where clan public property had the greatest share of public property before 1949. And the reason for Russian farmers’ strong resistance to collectivization was also rooted in village community. Village community is a type of traditional minor community. It has very strong cohesive force as well as powerful autonomous bondage and function. On the one hand, it hinders the development of clan individuality and the development of capitalist commodity economy; on the other hand, it enables Russian farmers to resist effectively the autocracy of major community. The difficulty of Russian collectivization arose not from the absence of communes, but from their very presence. Chinese farmers, however, can smoothly transfer from seemingly “yixiao ersi” (small cooperatives and the privatized cultivation of private and public land) to “yida ergong” (large communes and the collectivization of land ownership and cultivation) for the apparent absence of the bondage of minor communities. It seems that China had so-called “quasi-modernization” elements a long time ago, in addition to a system of private-owned land, a system of free land renting and a system of civil official selection as represented by the keju system (an imperial civil examination system). Free market transaction had emerged long before, especially after Shang Yang decided to reform the legal system of the Qin Dynasty. Shang Yang’s reform was not aimed at establishing a system of private-own land but an autocracy. The land system in the Qin Dynasty is typical of the practice that the central government allocates land among its people. But regarding clan community — a

420

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

From Major Community Standard to Civil Society

form of minor community, private-owned land was encouraged. It highly atomized the society and disintegrated most thoroughly the bondages of minor communities. However, behind the disintegration of minor communities is not the growth of citizen’s individuality or individual rights, but the aggrandizement of major community. Conversely, there is such a possibility in the China’s modernization drive: The development of minor community bondage does not contradict the development of citizen’s individuality and individual rights; that is true at least within a certain period of time when citizens ally with minor communities.

421

Aug. 11, 2010

7:29

9in x 6in

b978-ch13

This page intentionally left blank

Aug. 11, 2010 b978-index

11:14

9in x 6in

Index

graduated control, 97, 100, 101, 104, 115–119

association, 275–278, 282, 283, 287, 290, 291, 294, 295, 298, 305, 306, 385–397, 401 authoritative resources, 311, 314, 316, 327, 331, 339, 345, 358

ideal type, 242–244 institutional environment, 63, 64, 69, 70, 77–79, 83–85, 88, 90, 91, 93, 94

case study, 368 China’s civil society, 63, 64, 77, 78, 83–85, 89–94, 365, 370, 379–381 Chinese civil society, 25, 28–36, 39, 42–46 civil organizations, 63, 65, 66, 68–94 civil ruling elites, 121–125, 127, 130, 141, 145, 146, 149, 154, 155, 157–162, 165 civil society, 47–57, 59–61, 169–177, 179–181, 183, 184, 186, 189–192, 197–239, 241–244, 251, 252, 263, 269, 273, 275, 276, 285, 296, 385–390, 392, 398–401, 405 commoners, 121–123, 125, 128–131, 133, 137, 138, 140, 141, 146, 149, 155, 157, 158, 161, 162, 165 community standard, 405 conceptual changes, 198–200, 230–232, 237, 238

modernization, 405–407, 409, 410, 418–421 nation-state, 311, 314–319, 321, 322, 330, 331, 339, 344–350, 358, 359 NGO, 101–103, 109, 112, 114 public space, 47 public sphere, 241–262, 264–269 research review, 169 rural township, 311 social capital, 274–276, 306 social organization, 97, 98, 100, 101, 103–105, 107–109, 111–117, 119 societal corporatism, 385, 390, 391, 397, 398, 401 state, 121–123, 125–139, 141–149, 151–165 state and society, 169, 170, 173–180, 182–192

democracy priority theory, 61 democratization, 198, 212, 215, 224, 226, 228–231, 235 discourse, 197–200, 202, 207, 210, 213, 215, 218, 219, 237, 239

423

Aug. 11, 2010 b978-index

11:14

9in x 6in

Index state corporatism, 385, 387, 390–392, 396–398, 401 state-society relationship, 97–100, 115, 118 the Positive Interaction Thesis, 37

424

the state and society relations, 200, 201, 205, 207, 209, 211, 215, 227 the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce, 365, 366, 370–381 the Wenzhou Model, 365, 374, 375, 378, 380, 381