Systemic Transitions: Past, Present, and Future (Evolutionary Processes in World Politics)

Systemic Transitions

The Evolutionary Processes in World Politics series Series editor: William R. Thompson, Indiana University The Historical Evolution of World-Systems, edited by Christopher Chase-Dunn and E.N. Anderson (2005) Puzzles of the Democratic Peace: Theory, Geopolitics and the Transformation of World Politics, by Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson (2005) The Evolution of Technological Change and How It Shaped Our World, by Joachim K. Rennstich (2008) Systemic Transitions: Past, Present, and Future, edited by William R. Thompson (2009)

Systemic Transitions Past, Present, and Future Edited by William R. Thompson

SYSTEMIC TRANSITIONS

Copyright © William R. Thompson, 2009. All rights reserved. First published in 2009 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–60846–7 ISBN-10: 0–230–60846–9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Systemic transitions : past, present, and future / edited by William R. Thompson. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–230–60846–9 1. Balance of power. 2. World politics—Philosophy. I. Thompson, William R. JZ1313.S97 2008 327.1⬘12—dc22

2008024465

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: January 2009 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

CON T E N T S

List of Figures

vii

List of Tables

ix

One

Introduction: How Might We Know That a Systemic Transition Is Underway? Clues for the Twenty-First Century William R. Thompson Part 1

Two

1

Past

Relative Decline: Why Does It Induce War or Sustain Peace? Steve Chan and Brock F. Tessman

9

Three Transitions in Hegemony: A Theory Based on State Type and Technology Peter J. Hugill

31

Four

Five

Structural Preludes to Systemic Transition since 1494 William R. Thompson

55

Falling Down: An Empirical Test of Dynamic Differentials Theory 1500–1999 Michael Lee

75

Part 2 Six

Seven

Present

Searching for Changing Organizational Architecture during Global Transition: Where Is the Post–Cold War Order? Thomas J. Volgy, Keith A. Grant, and Elizabeth Fausett Whether and How Global Leadership Transitions Will Result in War: Some Long-Term Predictions from the Steps-to-War Explanation John A. Vasquez

101

131

vi

Contents

Eight

Implications of Asia’s Rise to Global Status Jacek Kugler and Ronald L. Tammen

Nine

Kantian Dynamics and Systemic Transitions: Can International Organizations Inf luence U.S.-China Conf lict? David P. Rapkin and William R. Thompson

Ten

Exploration of Connections between Energy Use and Leadership Transitions David J. LePoire

161

187

205

Part 3 Future Eleven

Twelve

The Evolutionary Trajectory of the World System toward an Age of Transition Tessaleno C. Devezas Cities in Transitions and Transformations: Exploring a Jacobsean Approach to Macro-Social Change Peter J. Taylor

Thirteen Scale Transitions and the Evolution of Global Governance since the Bronze Age Christopher Chase-Dunn, Richard Niemeyer, Alexis Alvarez, and Hiroko Inoue

223

241

261

Contributors

285

Index

287

F IGU R E S

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8

The Twin Peaks Model Balancing against Leading Land Powers in Europe Naval Capability Global-Regional Concentration, 1490s–1990s System Satisfaction of Members of the International System French and Dutch Relative Shares of Military Power, 1620–1714 French and Dutch Relative Shares of Overseas Colonies, 1600–1714 French and Austrian Shares of Great Power Population, 1600–1685 Austrian Share of Great Power Population, 1714–1740 Relative Share of German and French Economic Power, 1816–1870 Concentration of Power in the International System, 1495–2000 Concentration of Naval Power in the European System, 1495–2000 U.S. Structural Strength Index, 1950–2004 Percent of GIGOs, IRGOs, RGOs/SRGOs, for 1975, 1989, and 2004 Percent of New FIGOs by Type, 1989 and 2004 Numbers of RGOs/SRGOs by Region, 1975, 1989, and 2004 Participation (Percent of Total) in New GIGOs and IRGOs 1975–1989 and 1990–2004 Global Hierarchy Regional Hierarchies The Median Voter: Confrontation and Cooperation Hierarchy Implications under Parity Power Transition and Conf lict and Cooperation Estimated Future Relative Capabilities Estimated Future Relative Capabilities: Major Powers Relative Population Structures

61 65 66 67 78 79 80 80 81 83 91 91 108 114 114 115 118 162 163 166 167 169 172 174 177

viii 8.9 8.10 8.11 8.12 10.1 10.2 10.3 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7

Figures Growth Paths with High and Low Political Capacity A Potential Atlantic and Asian Alliance China, United States, and the Expanded European Union Middle East Region: Turkey, Iran, and Russia Energy Transitions Energy Transitions, Leadership Transitions, and Energy Intensity History as a Complex Adaptive System Types of Medium-Term Scale Change in the Largest Settlement or Polity in an Interacting Region Rise, Fall, and Upward Sweeps of Polity Size Rise, Fall, and Upward Sweeps as Revealed by Taagapera’s Estimate of the Territorial Sizes of the Largest Empires in the Central System Logged Largest City Population Sizes in the Central PMN, 3290 BCE to 1970 CE Revised Iteration Model for Empire and City Upsweeps in State-Based Systems Waves of Colonialism and Decolonization Based on Henige’s Colonial Governors (1970) Trajectory of U.S. Hegemony as Indicated by Shares of World GDP

178 181 181 182 209 212 217 263 264 265 266 269 272 273

TA BL E S

1.1 2.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 7.2 10.1 11.1 12.1 12.2

Hints for Identifying Periods of Systemic Transition Gross Domestic Product, 2001 Systemic Leadership Phases Growth Peaks in Global Lead Industries Indicators of Systemic Transition Found in Five Leadership Long Cycle Models A Multivariate Logit Examination of Global War/Systemic Transitions, 1520–2000 Assumptions in the Origins of Major War Likelihood of War Initiation by State Strength and Polarity List of Great Powers 1500– List of Major Wars, 1500– List of Wars Between Great Powers, 1500– Great Power Per Capita GDP, 1500– Factors Predicting Incidence of Great Power Wars Likelihood of Great Power War Factors Predicting Incidence of Major War Factors Predicting Defensive Coalition Formation Factors Predicting Defensive Coalitions, Pre-1816 Versus Post-1816 Factors Predicting Offensive Coalition Formation U.S., USSR/Russian, and Chinese Membership in GIGOs and IRGOs Major Power Participation in GIGO and IRGO Creation, 1990–2004 Functional Share of New FIGOs, 1975–1989 and 1990–2004 Risk of War of Various Steps-to-War Predictions of Transition Dyads Going to War Summary of the IIASA World Energy Scenarios Cascade of Modern Evolutionary Processes Moral Syndromes by Clusters of Precepts Guardian and Commercial Outcomes Creating Modern Ambiguities

3 22 57 61 64 68 77 77 86 87 87 89 92 93 93 94 95 95 117 118 119 136 142 213 224 244 257

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CH A P T E R

ON E

Introduction: How Might We Know That a Systemic Transition Is Underway? Clues for the Twenty-First Century Wi l l i a m R . Thom p s on

We are all familiar with the popular and academic analyses of the ongoing and future ascent of China. Two of the associated questions are whether and when China might succeed the United States as the lead state in the world system. These are interesting questions, albeit ones that are not likely to be answered in the most immediate future. An alternative focus examines instead periods of systemic transition—eras in which, among other things, it is conceivable that a new leader might emerge at the expense of an older system leader. Framing the question this way presumes that (1) future systemic transitions remain a possibility and (2) transitions do not occur abruptly but may require several decades to set up structural situations in which a transition might take place. Neither of these assumptions are carved in stone and both are open to question. It may be that future systemic transitions are unlikely. Or, it could be that it is not structural change as much as highly contingent precipitants that are most important to systemic regime changes.1 But, given these assumptions, one pressing question is how might we recognize a period of transition? Must we wait until we see who wins a global showdown conf lict (again, assuming some form of intensive conf lict is involved) to know belatedly that we have been in a transitional period for some time? Do system leaders attain some peak inf luence in the system after which everything is relatively transitional? Does international political behavior change in a period of transition? For instance, are new coalitions constructed? Are old ties severed? Do incumbent leaders always focus on a singular enemy as in the early-twentieth-century British case? Do new actors’ relative capability positions pass the position of the incumbent leader? In retrospect or theoretically, can we tell which types of actors should have the best chance of success in a transitional period?

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William R. Thompson

In short, we might all recognize a global war when we see one but could we recognize the slide/leap (choose the appropriate metaphor) toward such a conf lict before it becomes so obvious that no one is capable of missing it? Alternatively, is it possible that future systemic transitions will occur in the absence of global war? If so, we need to pin down the abstract nature of transitional eras on the chance that some of the earlier characteristics will continue to manifest themselves in an altered future. And, if we can generalize about the characteristics of transitional periods, can we say much about what sorts of international relations might be anticipated during this time? Finally, based on past examples, can we say anything in general about the probable outcome of a future period of systemic transition? These questions and others are addressed in very different ways by the following twelve chapters found in this volume.2 They take on what is likely to be one of the central questions in twenty-first century international relations—the ascent of China and the possible relative decline of the United States. Unlike most, if not all, studies in this genre, however, the volume is not restricted to “the China question” per se. Other types of transition may or may not occur. The fundamental nature of the international system may change instead. Centrality in the system may not be something any single state can aspire to any longer. Or, states may become increasingly irrelevant and supplanted by alternative organizations. In all cases, though, some type of systemic transition (or transformation) will have taken place. The question is which kind(s) are we likely to see in the twenty-first century and beyond? But what exactly is a systemic transition? We know that demographic transitions involve changes in fertility levels as in the case of the shift from higher levels of procreation in agrarian settings to lower levels in industrial settings. In energy transitions, primary fuel sources give way to new sources of energy, as in wood to coal to petroleum. Presidential transitions involve changes in regime with an incumbent surrendering the reigns of power to his or her successor. Transitions in economics usually mean the movement from more to less central planning of economic activities—although presumably it could work in the opposite direction and still qualify. Systemic transitions are more difficult to pin down because the systemic context is broader than fertility replacement levels, presidential regimes, or economic management policies—all of which are usually set at the national level. The problem is compounded further by the fact that transitions that can take place at the national level may also occur at the systemic level. Both demographic and energy transitions, for instance, can be manifested at the systemic level. But they are more likely to be manifested unevenly. Parts of the world system remain agrarian and cling to agrarian fertility replacement practices while other parts of the system have moved beyond industrial replacement levels and are facing significant population declines. Similarly, parts of the system are grappling with reducing their dependency on petroleum while other regions are just beginning to

Introduction

3

develop increased dependency. Still other parts of the world continue to rely on wind, wood, and human muscles. There are, nonetheless, a number of other types of transitions that can take place at the systemic level. The most common reference, and the principal one focused upon in this volume, is to fundamental changes in the power hierarchy with one lead actor giving way to a new leading state—not unlike the presidential-type transition, albeit in a less institutionalized fashion. This form of transition is complicated by disagreements about which states are in the lead. Should we focus primarily on economic leaders or military-political leaders? Should we demand that both types of lead be held simultaneously? How much of a lead counts as a “hegemonic,” “preponderant,” or “dominant” positional lead? But systemic transition could also refer to a fundamental shift in the way the system is organized politically—as in the population of states becoming less salient or politically significant—somewhat like the demographic transitions. Cities might become more important than states (see chapter twelve) or the number of states might be reduced from two hundred to one (see chapter thirteen). The creation of a single world state would resemble the type of structural transformation invoked by economies becoming more centralized in planning even though, of course, the types of economic planning engaged in by a single world state would not necessarily be centralized. There are many questions that can be raised about transitions and, at this point, it is fairly easy to say that we have more questions than answers. Nevertheless, if we focus on the most salient type of transition—at least most salient for students of international relations—the authors in this edited volume have a number of suggestions for what to look for in periods of transition at the apex of the system’s power hierarchy. Table 1.1 lists 16 transitional period characteristics that should be viewed as hypotheses that are not, in general, subject to any great degree of consensus, Table 1.1 Hints for identifying periods of systemic transition S. no. Indicators

Chapters

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, and 11 2, 3,4,5, 8, and 11 8 2 and 7 7 4 4 4 and 11 4 4 and 11 8 4 10 6 6 9

Ascending challenger(s) Declining Leader Parity Territorial disputes and war joining possibilities Threat perception and realpolitik syndrome Multiple rivalry “ripening” Global-regional dissynchronization System phase time Bipolarization Destabilizing innovation wave (K-wave) Shifts in geographical focus of greatest productivity Commercial rivalry Energy transitions Decaying world order architecture Leadership decline in international organization participation Relatively weak Kantian dynamics

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William R. Thompson

even among scholars who have looked at periods of transition intensely. The first two on the list, however, are fairly generic. One needs a declining leader and one or more ascending challengers that are moving toward positions of parity (characteristic number 3) in whatever metric is considered important (military, economic, or some combination). Whether one has to reach parity before the fireworks begin continues to be debated. Yet however central this contest for systemic leadership, they may not be the main event. They may simply be one of several, nested transitional processes underway. The “real action” may be focused on less powerful actors in transitional conf lict—as in a struggle between states that are numbers 2 and 3 in the hierarchy (or simply lower in the hierarchy). Or, there could be a large number of conf licts escalating more or less simultaneously (multiple rivalry ripening). The question is whether the most powerful actors are pulled into conf licts among less powerful actors (war joining) that may or may not be fighting over non-positional issues, such as territorial disputes that have proven to be so central to a large number of wars. Transitional conf licts, therefore, need not necessarily be a special case of warfare escalation but simply a more complex case with room for the traditional concerns for how alliances, crises, arms races, hard liners and rivalries (the realpolitik syndrome) are germane to understanding escalating conf licts. There need not be a single power hierarchy. One argument is that there are separate hierarchies for global activities that focus on long distance commerce and others for regions in which more traditional military-political powers reign supreme. That raises the possibility of several different types of transitional conf licts within and between the different hierarchies (Hugill’s transition types I, II, and III [chapter three]). There is also the contention that decline and ascent in the global and central regional hierarchies are linked such that one is likely to becoming more concentrated in power while the other is becoming less concentrated (global-regional dissynchronization). States looking for new allies and breaking free of old commitments are not uncommon. Transition periods tend to be foreshadowed by periods of coalition building (system phase time), in preparation for the possibility of large-scale conf lict. Some tendency toward bipolarization or the formation of two competing groups is also suggested by the historical record. These conf licts have clear economic foundations. Periods of transition are ushered in by radical technological breakthroughs that benefit some and put others behind in interstate competition, thereby adding an additional degree of insecurity and destabilization. New technological and productivity leaders tend to emerge. Increased commercial rivalry and access to resources between pioneering innovators and states trying hard to catch up is probable. New technology may also imply new sources of energy. The last three items in table 1.1 are less specific in terms of their timing. Declining system leaders and decaying world orders go hand in hand but it is possible that a world order could be in decay for a substantial period

Introduction

5

of time before leadership successors emerged to create new world orders. To say that a world order is in decay at time X does not tell us whether we are close to a period of transition but it does suggest that we are closer than when decay was less evident. Similarly, to argue that Kantian dynamics (democratic peace, economic interdependence, and international organizations) are relatively weak constraints on transitional conf licts tells us nothing specific about transition timing—only that some factors thought to be conducive to suppressing conf lict may be less operative currently and, in that respect, less likely to forestall systemic conf lict.3 Keep in mind, though, that no one is arguing that extensive conf lict must coincide with systemic transitions. They certainly have in the past but they need not work exactly the same way in the future.4 For that matter, there is no consensus on how probable or near term a U.S.-China transition might be. There is also the possibility, moreover, that the system will undergo fundamental transformation into something relatively novel, unprecedented, and rather difficult to predict. We do not know and cannot really know at this stage what might happen, although that does not mean that we cannot speculate about such changes—as several chapters in this volume do. The safest prediction, though, is Devezas’ (this volume) that the twenty-first century will be an age of transitions. Whether or not we experience transitions in the political hierarchy, technological and energy transitions seem highly probable. In the past such transitions have been associated with system leader transition—so we should assume some probability of significant changes in the political hierarchy are indeed likely to take place as well. The following dozen chapters are designed to discuss different dimensions of systemic transition behavior. The authors do not all agree and certainly choose to promote varying emphases and interpretations. The chapters are grouped in three clusters: past, present, and future. The labels are not entirely accurate in the sense that they are less mutually exclusive than they imply. But they are meant to convey what each chapter stresses most. The first cluster (past) looks at earlier transitions to develop and test generalizations about how systemic transitions have worked. The second cluster (present) focuses primarily on interpreting ongoing dynamics— even though much of what they have to say has also been shaped by their understanding of past behavior. The final cluster (future) is just as interested in the past and the present as the chapters in the earlier two clusters but they are also most focused on what might take place in the more distant future. Notes 1. Although this is a possibility, I, and most of the other contributors to this volume, would not rate it a strong probability. 2. The papers were originally delivered at a conference on systemic transitions held at Indiana University in 2007 and funded by the Donald A. Rogers Professorship in Political Science.

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William R. Thompson

3. The distribution of nuclear weapons is another constraint that may have stronger effects. 4. Although systemic transitions can be found in ancient history, as in the struggles between Athens and Sparta or Rome and Carthage or dynastic shifts in China from Xia to Shang to Chou, contemporary systemic transitions is a form of behavior that began to emerge only toward the end of the fifteenth century CE and took sometime to develop into the most recent manifestation in the rise of the United States to systemic leadership in 1945.

PA RT

Past

1

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CH A P T E R

T WO

Relative Decline: Why Does It Induce War or Sustain Peace? St e v e C h a n a n d B ro c k F. Te s s m a n

Introduction Changing national capabilities looms large as an explanatory variable in accounts of war and peace. Theories of imperial overstretch, power transition, and long cycles have tried to show the consequences of these changes at the unit, dyadic and systemic levels of analysis (e.g., Kennedy 1987; Modelski 1987; Organski 1958). These changes, whether ongoing or anticipated, have been invoked to account for the rise and fall of great powers, the occurrence of hegemonic war, and the acceptance of imperial retrenchment and even capitulation. Thus, for example, Britain’s accommodation of rising American power after 1895 and imperial and Nazi Germany’s aggression against Russia/the Soviet Union have been explained, respectively, by the opposing motivations to appease and to wage a preventive war against a rising competitor (Copeland 2000; Friedberg 1988; Rock 2000). More recently, some scholars have emphasized the USSR’s material decline as the chief cause for the end of the cold war on Western terms (e.g., Lebow and Risse-Kappen 1995; Wohlforth 2003). For other analysts, China’s rapid economic growth has engendered concerns about a potential conf lict with the United States if current trends augur an impending parity between the two states and even perhaps the overtaking of the latter by the former (e.g., Brown et al. 2000; Johnston and Ross 1999; Tammen et al. 2000). The episodes just alluded to—the nonviolent power transition between Britain and the U.S. and the peaceful conclusion of the cold war, in contrast to the outbreak of World Wars I and II—surely represent some of the most important events in the modern history of international relations. While explanations of each of these seminal events abound,

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we do not yet have a unifying theory that presents an integrated account for all these episodes. Such a theory will have to explain why relative decline sometimes leads to war but in other instances unfolds peacefully without inducing a contest of arms. Solving this puzzle is one of the most enduring and important challenges in international relations research. We do not pretend to offer a complete theory that fully explains these episodes, but do hope to make the more modest claim of contributing to a more satisfactory account of why states faced with the prospect or reality of downward mobility respond differently to their policy predicament. Although whether our account can be generalized to other cases will have to wait for future research, we look beyond the past and offer some tentative thoughts about China’s ongoing ascent to great-power status. Our analytic perspective is undergirded by the view that power transitions are what states make of them. This phenomenon is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for war. While the structural conditions of regional and global systems surely shape the options available to leaders, the latter do still make choices (albeit constrained ones). These choices are interactive and multilateral. That is, more is involved in determining war and peace than a dissatisfied ascending latecomer challenging a satisfied declining hegemon. Not only do both parties have a vote in their evolving relationship (although, as already mentioned, we will only focus in this paper on the declining power), but other states beyond this dyad can also have a simultaneous and significant inf luence on their relationship and the prospects for war and peace. When “positional competition” is entangled with territorial disputes in a setting of multiple, overlapping rivalries, there is a greater danger that bilateral conf licts will escalate and spread (Thompson 1995; Vasquez 1996a) Structural conditions can encourage or discourage leaders’ incentives to choose conf lict. To anticipate the following discussion, we argue that the declining states’ responses to their predicament have been shaped by considerations of geography and polarity. In a multipolar world, a major power in decline is likely to appease a more distant challenger in order to focus on threats closer to home. Preventive war is possible, though not inevitable, when such a declining state reacts to a nearby incipient threat in a multipolar system. The advent of nuclear weapons coincided with the cold war era of bipolarity. Credible nuclear deterrence has reduced the relative inf luence of geography and polarity and, by protecting the declining state from the threat of direct military assault, it has made the resort to preventive war less necessary and attractive in comparison to a recourse to reform and retrenchment. Thus, the impact of geography and polarity on how states have responded to relative decline has varied over time, and the introduction of nuclear deterrence has been largely responsible for the diminished (though still relevant) inf luence of these factors.

Relative Decline

11

Relative Decline and the Preventive Motivation At the beginning of the twentieth century, the U.S. economy had become about twice as large as the British economy, which had fallen to third place behind Germany. Soon after it had achieved a dominant status in Europe, Wilhelmine Germany faced the prospect of another power rising to challenge its status. Although starting from a low economic base, Czarist Russia was the fastest growing economy among major powers in the decade before World War I, and it was also engaged in energetic policies to expand its rail network and promote the modernization of its army. Therefore, even though Germany’s economy and military continued to grow, its relative advantage over Russia had begun to slip before 1914. Germany had apparently reached the peak of its power relative to its competitors as the first decade of the twentieth century was coming to a close. Although it was very successful in promoting its economic and military development, much of the potential available to it for the further advancement of this development appeared to have been already realized. In contrast, with three times Germany’s population and forty times its territory, Russia had a huge potential to enable it to sustain and even accelerate its growth. This growth would eventually enable Russia to overtake Germany and become the dominant power in Europe. Berlin’s predicament was further compounded by the weakness of its only ally, Austria-Hungary, which had been and was expected to continue on a course of deep and steady decline. As Paul Schroeder (2004) showed, even at the moment when Germany had seemingly reached the peak of its power, the general trend of competition among the European great powers and the race for imperial expansion pointed to an inexorable process whereby Berlin (and, especially, Vienna) would be placed in an increasingly disadvantageous position. Ken Organski and Jacek Kugler (1980) have designated Britain, Germany, and Russia as major contenders in the central system of international relations prior to 1914. The power shifts among these three leading European states have been the focus of two leading theories seeking to explain the outbreak of World War I. The power transition theory (Kugler and Lemke 1996; Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1980) argues that this conf lict stemmed from an attempt by Germany to challenge British supremacy. Berlin sought to achieve a hegemonic status in at least Europe and perhaps globally. Even though it already commanded the most powerful army on the continent, it undertook a program of naval expansion that threatened London’s control of sea lanes supplying its home market and its protection of the British isles from foreign assault. Germany’s ambitions set it in a collision course with the United Kingdom. The competitive dynamic of Anglo-German rivalry transformed an otherwise local conf lict in the Balkans into World War I. Germany was able to recover from the devastation of World War I. Two decades after the conclusion of that conf lict, its economy reached a level that one would have anticipated had the war not occurred. Organski

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and Kugler (1980) referred to the reemergence of defeated states as the Phoenix phenomenon. In the case of Germany, its economic recovery was accompanied by renewed efforts to expand armament and conscription, so that by the 1930s this country had again overtaken Britain in terms of both economic and military power. These advantages encouraged Adolf Hitler to pursue a plan of aggrandizement at the expense of his neighbors. His was a second concerted German challenge to British hegemony. Germany’s ambitions were responsible for starting a second world war within a quarter century of the first. The power transition theory account, however, poses several puzzles. If Germany had already overtaken Britain before 1914 and again prior to 1939, why did Britain not succumb to the demands of its more powerful adversary? Why did Germany have to resort to war?1 Why did it not wait so that the passage of time would further increase its relative power? Moreover, if Germany was already more powerful than Britain before both World Wars, it should have won both contests. That it lost these wars must be explained by the involvement of other great powers—ones that tipped the balance back in Britain’s favor. This explanation in turn suggests that these contests were more than just a bilateral rivalry between Germany and Britain. It introduces a further puzzle about Germany’s inability or even unwillingness to prevent other great powers from joining the British side. Of course, the recognition that Germany had already overtaken Britain on the eve of both world wars does not quite correspond with the power transition theory’s (Organski and Kugler 1980) suggestion that these conf licts were due to efforts mounted by Germany to displace Britain from its preeminent position (because Britain had already been displaced from that position). Because of these and other concerns,2 the logic of power transition theory does not seem to explain Germany’s policy choices leading up to war in 1914 and 1939. In our view, Germany’s power decline relative to Russia/the Soviet Union, and not its overtaking of Britain, was the more important factor shaping its choices. The theory of preventive war offers a different explanation of the two global conf licts (Copeland 2000; Lemke 2003; Levy 1987). Rather than seeing Germany just as an arrogant and overconfident challenger on the ascent, it depicts this state also as an insecure power whose overall position in the international system had already peaked and entered into a phase of relative decline. Britain, of course, had been overtaken by not just Germany but also the United States, which had achieved the world’s largest economy by the 1870s ( Jacobson 1984: 56).3 Germany was not gaining on the United States and was in fact losing ground to Russia/ the Soviet Union. Charles Doran (1991: 82–89) has noted in his work on power cycle theory that, accounting for relative growth trends in the broader international system, in 1914 Berlin was much more concerned about its quickly eroding advantage over Russia than it was about overtaking Britain. Far from wishing to confront the British, German leaders had hoped to recruit them as Berlin’s junior partner or at least to keep

Relative Decline

13

them neutral in a war aimed at creating Lebensraum (especially in Poland and the Ukraine) at the expense of the Slavs. German leaders preferred an earlier conf lict with Russia/the Soviet Union than a later one. In the words of German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, World War I was “in a sense . . . a preventive war . . . . [T]he war was hanging over us anyway, two years later it would have come even more dangerously and unavoidably” (quoted in Liberman 1996: 71). Similarly, before World War II Adolf Hitler saw the Soviet Union as “the greatest power factor in the whole of Europe” (Robertson [1963] quoted in Copeland 2000: 80). Just shortly before launching his invasion of Poland in August 1939, he explained that “everything I undertake is directed against the Russians; if the West is too stupid and blind to grasp this, then I shall be compelled to come to an agreement with the Russians, beat the West, and then after their defeat turn against the Soviet Union with all my forces” (Copeland 2000: 135). Significantly and in contrast to the prevailing interpretations of these global conf licts, these statements suggest the focal rivalry was between Germany and Russia/the Soviet Union,4 and not between Germany and Britain. Indeed, Hitler was exasperated that London did not see “an Anglo-German combination [made] the most natural of alliances,” (Schweller 1998: 114). World Wars I and II can therefore be interpreted as preventive wars launched by Germany against Russia/the Soviet Union, whose more rapid growth (albeit from a low base), would make a future conf lict much more disadvantageous for Germany. The logic of the preventive motivation suggests that systemic wars originate more from the desperation of a state whose growth has stalled or even begun to fall rather than from the cockiness of a surging state. These conf licts are more likely to be initiated by a declining but still stronger state than by an ascending latecomer.5 Moreover, these conf licts are not necessarily precipitated by a direct competition for supremacy between the two most powerful states in the system. Rather, as just suggested in the stylized accounts of World Wars I and II, they can originate from struggles involving the other lesser members of the great power club.6 Why would Germany want to take the risky policy of initiating two wars when it could have waited for its power to expand further? As already suggested, time was not on Germany’s side. Paul Kennedy (1984: 29) has reasoned that Berlin’s refusal to choose “peace [which must have brought Germany mastery of Europe within a few years”] was due to the fundamental misperceptions of its key leaders. According to him, these misperceptions led to unwarranted fears about the imminence of German decline as well as an exaggerated sense of threat when it came to the growth of an economically underdeveloped Russia. But were Germany’s leaders really exercising f lawed judgment? It seems more likely that they were successful in accurately detecting that, by 1914 (and again by 1939) the peak of their country’s relative power in the system had already been reached. Germany was still achieving high levels of growth in absolute terms, but even higher rates of expansion in Russia/the Soviet Union meant that Germany was

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slipping in relation to its main competitor.7 Extrapolating from the trends that were already present by 1914, Germany’s leaders were actually quite perceptive in projecting that their country’s window of opportunity was closing. From then on, Russia/the Soviet Union would be able to narrow the distance separating the two countries.8 Moreover, for both world wars, a postponement of conf lict would enable Germany’s enemies to ramp up their military programs so that Germany’s advantage would slip. Hence, as Copeland (2000) showed, Berlin was eager to start war against Russia/ the Soviet Union before it had to face a more formidable adversary. Prior to July 1914, instead of seeking to confront the United Kingdom, German leaders actually sought (as it turned out, unsuccessfully) to keep the British on the sideline. Again, in the 1930s, their efforts to recruit Britain as a potential partner and to ensure British neutrality failed. But why should the German leaders be so obsessed with Russia/the Soviet Union? In the case of Hitler, his ideological and racial hatred against the communists and Slavs certainly played a role. There was, however, also a sense that if Germany failed to grasp its window of opportunity and start a war in 1914 and again in 1939, it would have lost its chance to secure its dominant position in Europe forever. This anxiety and even a feeling of panic stemmed from realizing that an emergent Russia/the Soviet Union would sooner or later threaten Germany’s status as the premier European power. This sense of insecurity ref lected an acute concern that although Germany commanded an economic and military advantage currently, Russia/the Soviet Union had much greater potential to further develop its unrealized power to catch up with and then overtake Germany. Therefore, a belief in Germany’s current advantages (especially in its military power) and in its more limited potential to sustain these advantages into the future motivated the idea of starting a preventive war against Russia/the Soviet Union. Significantly, the preventive motivation suggests a desire to avert a future loss as opposed to a preference to secure current gain. Prospect theory lends credence to the preventive motivation. It argues that people are prone to take greater risks when they find themselves facing losses rather than gains (e.g., Kaheman and Tversky 1979, 2000; Levy 1997, 2000; McDermott 1998; Taliaferro 2001; Tessman and Chan 2004). They are also affected by the so-called endowment effect, so that they tend to overprice their own assets and underprice others’ possessions. One implication of this proposition is that officials will see their own concessions to be more valuable than their opponents’ concessions. Another implication is that a policy of retrenchment (scaling back one’s role conception in response to declining capabilities) tends to be psychologically challenging. This tendency is exacerbated if the position from which one is retrenching is unsatisfactory in itself. A declining power is even more inclined to take risks that might forestall contraction if it never achieved the prestige and inf luence it expected while at the peak of its power cycle. Wilhelm II

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often expressed frustration at Germany’s inability to achieve its rightful “place in the sun” in light of British opposition and the impending rise of Russia. When one considers Berlin’s lack of preparation for general war against either opponent, Germany’s challenges to the French in Morocco (1905 and 1911) and the Russians in the Balkans (1908 and 1912) are best understood as desperate and misguided attempts to forestall decline by first initiating and then escalating a series of crises that only succeeded in drawing its rivals closer together. Significantly, preventive war presents itself as a possible response to the onset of relative decline only when there is both the realization of a current advantage (in military power especially) promising a reasonable chance of success in launching a campaign of aggression and the fear of an inexorable long-term process producing a deterioration in one’s relative capability and position. Thus, as Copeland (2000) has emphasized, leaders are unlikely to resort to preventive war unless they believe that their country faces deep and inevitable decline. That is, they do not see any realistic policy that can arrest and reverse their decline. If officials feel that their state has the wherewithal to sustain its current advantages or at least engage in a competitive arms race and economic rivalry with a rising power, they would not want to undertake a preventive war. Robert Powell’s (1999) work suggests another important factor inf luencing whether the preventive motivation is likely to arise. According to the rationalist perspective, countries go to war because they believe that they can improve their current situation. Therefore, they do not resort to arms unless they expect a conf lict to bring them gains. This remark in turn suggests that if the current distribution of benefits received by states from the international system accords with the current distribution of power among them, there is no incentive for them to fight a war. Fighting a war would not be rational because this undertaking cannot improve one’s benefit share even though it will involve definite costs. Thus, according to Powell (1999: 199), “if the distribution of benefits mirrors the distribution of power, no state can credibly threaten to use force to change the status quo and the risk of war is smallest. If, however, there is a sufficiently large disparity between the distribution of power and benefits, the status quo may be threatened regardless of what the underlying distribution of power is.” This discussion implies that if a declining state anticipates that the benefits accorded to it will be more than what its relative power would entitle it in a future international order dominated by another state currently in the process of overtaking it, this state will not be inclined to wage a preventive war. Conversely, if this declining state expects to be treated poorly in the future so that it will likely be allocated less benefits than its relative power warrants, then starting a preventive war now makes more sense (Chan 2008, 2004). These propositions indicate that when faced with the prospect of being replaced by the United States as the world’s hegemon, Britain would not be energized to fight a preventive

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war if it expected to receive an “overallocation” of benefits under a future U.S.-dominated order. However, Germany had serious misgivings about its prospective treatment in a system under Russian/Soviet control. The preventive motivation would apply only when one expects to suffer a disappointing underallocation of benefits in the hands of a rival; that is, only if one expects the rules of a future international order would be rigged significantly to one’s disadvantage. Accommodation and Retrenchment The account just offered is incomplete, because a declining state can choose from several options (Lebow and Mueller 1995). It can lash out, or procrastinate, or withdraw to isolation and decrepitude, or seek accommodation with its rivals (e.g., Elliott 1963; Gibbons 1910; Moulder 1979; Treisman 2004). Thus, the experience of relative decline is in itself indeterminate of a state’s policy response to this challenge. In contrast to Germany’s reaction, why did Britain choose a policy of appeasing the rising United States? Some analysts (e.g., Schweller 1992) have argued that when one democratic state is being overtaken by another democratic state, this power transition is not nearly as threatening to peace as when at least one of the states concerned is authoritarian. A rising democratic state is not likely to harbor ambitions to revise the international status quo, and is therefore not likely to be perceived as a source of threat by the other democratic state being overtaken. This argument is sometimes augmented by the proposition that cultural affinity and institutional networking tend to also reduce mutual threat perception, thereby making a power transition between Britain and the United States a peaceful process (e.g., Kupchan 2001; Reuveny and Thompson 1997). It seems a stretch, however, to characterize Britain and the United States as democracies during the late 1800s. After all, neither of them permitted universal adult suffrage. Moreover, prior to 1895 these countries were bitter, even hostile, rivals in Asia Pacific and the Western Hemisphere (Vasquez 1996b: 35–36; see also Rock 2000, 1989: Chapter 5; and Thompson 1999). Democratic institutions and cultural affinity evidently did not prevent this rivalry from happening in the first place, and are therefore unpersuasive as an explanation for its termination. “The most difficult position to defend is the extreme argument that democratization was primarily responsible for the decline in Anglo-American conf lict” (Thompson 1999: 213). This argument also suffers from the fact that Britain was ready to fight republican France in the Fashoda crisis, and supported authoritarian Russia in its showdown with Austria-Hungary. Because both Russia and Austria-Hungary had authoritarian regimes, London’s discrepant policies toward them could not be explained by these countries’ regime type.

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In view of its relative decline, Britain’s decision can be better understood as a choice to withdraw its forces from the more distant outposts of its empire in order to redeploy them closer to home. The withdrawal of the British f leet from the Western Hemisphere just hastened and confirmed the seemingly inevitable ascendance of the United States as a regional hegemon. In the Far East, an alliance with Japan again helped Britain to carry out its retrenchment policy. That London chose to pursue these conciliatory policies in the Western Hemisphere and Asia Pacific can be largely explained by geography rather than culture.9 It sought appeasement and accommodation in these regions so that it could concentrate on more nearby threats. Germany’s naval expansion and Russia’s encroachments in Afghanistan presented more immediate security concerns to London (Friedberg 1988).10 In dealing with U.S. demands in the Western Hemisphere, such as those relating to the Venezuelan Boundary Crisis, the dispute about Alaska’s borders with Canada, and the building of an isthmian canal in Panama, Britain offered unilateral concessions without insisting reciprocity from the United States. Bradford Perkins was quoted saying that “in hard diplomatic coin, the Americans took but they did not give” (Rock 2000: 41). Geography mattered in another sense. Britain’s position as an island nation gave it a measure of security, especially given its naval superiority. The socalled stopping power of water (an important factor in John Mearsheimer’s formulation of offensive realism [2001]) reduced the ability of continental powers to apply pressure against Britain and, at the same time, enabled Britain to play the enviable role of an offshore balancer. This geographic reality accounts for an important difference in the situation faced by Britain and Germany. Being situated in the middle of Europe, Germany did not have the luxury of withdrawing to an island redoubt. Moreover, being a latecomer in the game of imperialism, Germany did not have large overseas colonies to supply markets and raw materials for its manufactured goods and to provide land to settle its surplus population. Retrenchment in terms of withdrawing from imperial outposts did not present itself as an option. Nor was appeasement and accommodation in more distant and expendable areas a viable alternative in order to acquire friends and allies because, unlike Britain, Germany did not have these resources to pursue engagement and cooptation. Rather than facing the problem of imperial overstretch whereby its resources are scattered in different parts of the world, Germany’s leaders saw their country being hemmed in and denied the necessary resources to grow (Choucri and North 1975; Copeland 2000). How does this account fit with the more recent story of Soviet decline and retrenchment? The Soviet economy suffered stagnation and setback from the mid 1970s on, and all economic indicators pointed to an exacerbation of the situation throughout the 1980s. Indeed, it appeared that Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempts at reform actually compounded the problems and set the economy into a tailspin by the late 1980s (Brooks and Wohlforth 2003, 2000/2001; Schweller and Wohlforth 2000; Wohlforth

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1994/1995). Even at its height, the size of the Soviet economy was barely about half that of the United States. With the onset of steady and sharp decline, it became increasingly difficult to sustain, not to mention further increase, military expenditures that were already consuming about 40% of the budget and 15–20% of the gross domestic product (Brooks and Wohlforth 2000/2001: 22–23). In light of these grim facts, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed: “our goal is to prevent the next round of the arms race. If we do not accomplish it, the threat to us will only grow. We will be pulled into another round of the arms race that is beyond our capabilities, and we will lose it, because we are already at the limit of our capabilities. Moreover, we can expect that Japan and the FRG [West Germany] could very soon join the American potential . . . . If the new round begins, the pressure on our economy will be unbelievable” (Brooks and Wolhforth 2000/2001: 29). One approach to alleviate this severe strain was to withdraw from Eastern Europe where Soviet support for its client states had been a huge and steady drain on scarce resources.11 Significantly, that the Soviet Union controlled this sphere of inf luence made its dismantlement both necessary and possible as a part of the retrenchment program. That is, like Britain but unlike Germany, imperial withdrawal was an available even though unpalatable option. This option would have been harder to accept were it not for Moscow’s possession of a second-strike nuclear capability. Kenneth Waltz (1993) has emphasized the importance of nuclear weapons as a source of reassuring a state’s security. The usefulness of Eastern European states as a security buffer declined because of Moscow’s nuclear deterrent. The advent of the nuclear age therefore helped to surmount geographic considerations that, as mentioned above, differentiated British and German reactions to relative decline in an earlier era.12 The Soviet Union came to a policy of retrenchment belatedly, having held off this option until long after the onset of its decline (and Soviet leaders could have played for time still further). As such, their policy resulted from a protracted process not unlike that of trial and error that Britain underwent before reaching a policy of appeasing the United States, conciliating with France and Russia, allying with Japan, and confronting Germany prior to 1914 (Thompson 1999: 215). The Soviet Union made huge and unrequited concessions, which brought an end to the cold war on Western terms. On issues ranging from military downsizing, to the dismantlement of communist regimes in client states, to the reunification of Germany, and finally the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself, Moscow basically capitulated. The depth and unilateral nature of these concessions present a sharp contrast to the other cases of relative decline. These concessions were compelled by an important structural factor. Unlike Britain and Germany for which relative decline occurred during a period of multipolarity, the Soviet Union faced a bipolar world that did not allow the options of “hiding” and “buck-passing (Christensen and Snyder 1990 and Schroeder 1994).” It was standing alone against all the other major states.

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There was no place to hide and no alternative target to divert pressure. Gorbarchev’s statement quoted earlier is informative because it points to a concern that the Soviet Union was competing against a Western coalition of advanced states rather than the United States alone. Three factors interacted to explain Moscow’s response to relative decline. The prior existence of a Soviet empire made retrenchment a necessary step whereas Russia’s possession of nuclear deterrence made this step more acceptable. The bipolar structure of the cold war world, however, forced the Soviet Union to make larger unilateral concessions than it would have, had Soviet decline occurred in a multipolar world. Significantly, the devastating destructiveness of a nuclear war and the bipolar alignment of the cold war era also made the option of lashing out against another major power in a desperate effort to forestall decline exceedingly costly.13 In contrast to the Soviet predicament, Britain had much greater freedom to maneuver in a multipolar world on the eve of World War I and again World War II. Indeed, German leaders had tried but failed to keep Britain on the sideline in 1914. Britain’s decision to throw its support to the Franco-Russian alliance was far from certain until rather late in the game. In the case of World War II, actual military hostilities were delayed months after the formal declaration of war. In short, bipolarity forced Soviet concessions whereas multipolarity limited British liabilities even though both suffered from relative decline. In a multipolar world, one’s relative decline does not automatically mean relative gain for one’s adversary. Some analysts argue that multiple options were available to Moscow and that it did not have to resort to large concessions without any firm expectation of reciprocation (e.g., Evangelista 1993).14 One of the more intriguing options not adopted was supposedly the “China road”—that is, the introduction of economic liberalization without political reform. The feasibility of pursuing this option, however, is highly questionable. Unlike the Soviet Union, China did not have an overseas empire that requires a huge amount of resources to sustain. Beijing’s military spending, consuming about 3.4% of the gross national product in 1989, was much lower than Moscow’s defense burden (which captured 15%–20% of the Soviet economic output). Moreover, China was located in the world’s most (economically) dynamic region with neighboring states and overseas compatriots offering ready access to markets, capital and managerial skills. Neither the “China road” nor temporization offered a way out for Gorbachev in view of the precipitous and apparently irreversible decline of Soviet economy. The decline of the Soviet Union was not recognized by the outside world until well after it had reached an advanced stage. One reason is that our indicators of national power have not kept up with the times. These indicators emphasize demographic and territorial size, steel production, energy consumption, and the number of military personnel. While useful for gauging national power in the world of 1914 and even 1939,

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their relevance to contemporary international relations has diminished. In today’s world, a nation’s command of information technology and scientific knowledge is more important than the size of its smokestack industry and conscripted infantry.15 The standard, but increasingly obsolescent indicators of national power, therefore concealed the seriousness of the Soviet decline and, at the same time, underestimated significantly America’s true strength and vitality given its commanding lead in the invention and application of cutting-edge technologies (Reuveny and Thompson 2004). There is another common oversight accounting for our collective failure to realize the depth and seriousness of the Soviet decline. We concern ourselves with the quantity of physical assets possessed by states without always asking about the relationship of these stocks to national objectives. That is, we often neglect to ask whether there are enough resources to fund a state’s undertakings abroad and its domestic consumption and investment. Moscow’s problems offered a classic example of imperial overstretch warned by Paul Kennedy (1987). The Soviet Union’s heavy burden for pursuing its foreign missions and agenda depleted resources that were necessary to sustain domestic productivity, leading eventually to a sharp economic contraction and a significant loss in global competitiveness. Accordingly, an exclusive concern for power shifts (whether dyadically or multilaterally) overlooks the importance of national self-image about a state’s proper role and entitlement in the interstate system. When a declining state fails to trim its ambitions, aligning its goals with the available resources, it is vulnerable to overextension. Charles Doran (2003: 30) argued that the structural changes resulting from relative power shifts cause interstate strains not so much due to the upward and downward mobility of states, but rather because of the shock experienced by officials when they suddenly realize the projected security environment and role designation for their state have come under severe pressure for radical change. The goals, assumptions, and self-images that used to guide one’s foreign policy can no longer be sustained in the future.16 An incongruity between declining capabilities and outdated role conception (or demand for status recognition) is the major source for interstate tension. This observation in turn begs the question why Moscow was able to revise its role conception in such a way that the cold war ended peacefully. The overtaking of Russia, at least in economic output, by Japan, Germany, and China occurred without provoking a war scare. In addition to asking why Mikhail Gorbachev finally took the step to reverse his predecessors’ policies, one would want to inquire why his predecessors procrastinated.17 After all, the signs of economic and political decay had been visible for some time. Thus, unfavorable power shifts can go on for extended periods before leaders decide to engage in reform. Still, the experience of contemporary Russia tells us that states are capable of undertaking peaceful and constructive actions in response to decline.

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Implications for China’s Ascent What does this discussion suggest for China’s recent and apparently ongoing ascent in the interstate system? Traditional measures of power (e.g., large total and urban population, armed forces personnel, steel production, energy consumption) have naturally favored and, indeed, exaggerated China’s relative standing. China’s relative status would look very different if one uses other measures, such as human capital and technological capacity, to index national power in the contemporary era. Such data from the more recent years show that the United States continues to hold a commanding lead over China. There remains an enormous distance separating the two countries. For instance, the average number of personal computers and Internet access was 33 times and 12 times, respectively, higher in the United States than China in 2001–2002.18 A state that is able to develop and command the newest technologies will continue to maintain a strong economy as evidenced by the several growth spurts that Britain had mounted during roughly 1680–1850. A vibrant economy, sustained by a capacity to mount successive waves of new leading sectors, in turn provides the wherewithal for a strong military (Rapkin and Thompson 2003). We are therefore reminded about the need to update and adapt indicators of national power without inflicting serious damage to the continuity and comparability of historical time series. Measures emphasizing bulk size and physical assets—such as population, territory, and armed forces—become less informative about relative national standing (Rosecrance 1986). Naturally, size is not irrelevant when considering national power. Perhaps, as suggested by Organski and Kugler (1980), relative economic productivity as suggested by gross domestic product offers the most parsimonious and revealing indicator for gauging national power (even though this statistic does not go very far back in history and even though conversion to purchasing power parity raises all sorts of analytic problems). Table 2.1 presents data for the world’s leading economies, both before and after adjustment for purchasing power parity. It shows that at the start of the twenty-first century, the U.S. economy was by far the largest in the world. It was in 2001 twice as large as Japan’s gross domestic product and five times that of Germany’s. Before adjustment for price differences, the U.S. economy was nearly nine times bigger than China’s. Even after conversion to purchasing power parity, it was twice as big. It is therefore difficult to make a case for an impending power transition in SinoAmerican relations. If one stresses quality rather than quantity in assessing national power or competitiveness, the available evidence points strongly to the persistence of U.S. hegemony. It was not so long ago that some scholars raised serious concerns about the U.S. suffering a relative decline, concerns that others thought were exaggerated (Calleo 1988; Nye 1990; Oye et al. 1979; Rosecrance 1976; Russett 1985; Strange 1987).

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Gross domestic product, 2001

Country United States Japan Germany United Kingdom France China Italy Canada Spain Mexico Brazil India Republic of Korea Netherlands Australia Switzerland Argentina Russia Belgium Sweden

Billions of Current U.S. Dollars 9,781 4,523 1,940 1,477 1,381 1,131 1,124 682 588 550 529 477 448 390 386 277 260 253 245 226

Billions in Purchasing-Power Parity (PPP) Dollars 9,781 3,246 2,078 1,431 1,425 5,027 1,422 825 816 820 1,219 2,913 713 439 478 224 412 995 269 212

Source: Data were derived from World Bank’s World Development Indicators at accessed on February 22, 2004.

Moreover, our earlier discussion suggests that the United States is favored by several advantages even if the other major states (including China) manage to close the gap separating them from the leader in some areas. Although Washington’s extensive overseas commitments impose a burden on available resources, these same resources can in principle be redirected to domestic programs if a decision is made to reduce imperial overstretch. Geography favors the United States even more than Britain, giving it greater protection from foreign challenges and enabling it to play the role of an offshore balancer. In addition to being a global superpower, the United States has been the only country to have successfully established a regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and, unlike Britain,19 does not face any challenger in its own backyard. These geographic factors are reinforced by a powerful nuclear deterrent, which provides even more of a guarantee for security against conventional military threats. Finally, to the extent that an erosion of U.S. leadership is far more likely to be followed by a multipolar rather than bipolar world, Washington will enjoy a much more extensive menu of options for coalition politics than the stark constraints confronting Moscow in the late 1980s. These considerations do not guarantee a persistence of U.S. hegemony, but suggest that the United States will have an easier time if retrenchment is sought. Rather than focusing on bilateral Sino-American relations, our arguments imply that the danger posed by power shifts pertains more to the competitive dynamics in Asia. This danger is less likely to stem from a

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growing China than a China whose growth trajectory has stalled and even reversed.20 Contemporary Asia resembles much more the multipolar world of Europe a century ago than the U.S. domination of the Western Hemisphere. It is a much more “congested” neighborhood with several current and possible future economic powerhouses—Japan, India, Korea, Indonesia, and Russia in addition to China. World Wars I and II started not so much because of the competition between the two most powerful states (the United States and Germany). They stemmed rather from the regional rivalries among the lower-ranked great powers. The preventive war launched by Germany on both occasions was motivated by a concern that its relative power had already peaked. The cause behind this reversal of Germany’s growth trajectory was Russia’s ascendance. This history draws one’s attention to the contemporary situation whereby China’s rise has adversely affected Japan’s growth trajectory and, concomitantly, the implications of India’s ascent in turn affecting China’s trajectory. In this light, a preoccupation with the power shifts between the United States and China may be misplaced, and there should be more effort directed at understanding the dynamics characterizing the relations among the major Asian states. Multiple intersecting rivalries involving either status or territory (such as that involving China’s sovereignty claim over Taiwan) can engulf states in conf licts that they would rather not be caught in (Thompson 2003, 1995). Three other implications follow from our analysis. First, U.S. bargaining leverage is enhanced to the extent that regional multipolarity prevails in Asia. A corollary of this proposition is that a policy to “contain” or block one or the other major Asian power has a polarizing effect and is therefore counterproductive. Second, none of the Asian states has a traditional empire to pull back from although Japan has established a dense network of interlocking investment and production abroad. China and India have also become increasingly integrated into global commerce. Whether this development implies more intense economic competition and, if so, how this competition can in turn amplify power shifts and exacerbate security concerns is a matter that deserves much more careful study. The continental size of China and India suggests at least the feasibility in principle of relying on domestic demand as an engine of growth. In contrast, as in the case of imperial Britain, this option is not available to Japan. The latter country has not thus far entertained the option of going nuclear. Some have already commented that Japan’s decision to eschew nuclear weapons represents an anomaly that cannot last for long (Waltz 1993). A third and final implication from this analysis suggests that a nuclear Japan and, for that matter, a nuclear China and India augur for a more stable region. Nuclear deterrence provides the necessary security insurance for states experiencing sharp decline. It makes retrenchment a more acceptable option and aggressive war a less attractive option. As a thinking experiment, try to imagine whether in the absence of a strong nuclear deterrent force, the Soviet Union would be as accommodating

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as its policies had been in contributing to the end of the cold war. As another counterfactual to probe the other side of the ledger, one may ponder whether Japan would have been more, or less, inclined to pursue its war of conquest against China in the 1920s and 1930s if the latter had nuclear weapons. Relative decline is less threatening to systemic stability when nuclear deterrence makes a retreat from empire a realistic policy alternative. Conclusion States experiencing relative decline make choices. Their options, however, are framed by structural constraints and opportunities. The menu for choices (Russett et al. 2004) is more extensive in a multipolar setting and more limited in a bipolar world. Hiding, shirking, external balancing, and even band-wagoning and withdrawal to isolation are possible options in a multipolar world. In contrast, a bipolar world affords only more stark choices between a continuation of failed policies (with the concomitant prospect of almost certain further setback), a sharp break from the past to overhaul both domestic and foreign agendas, or perhaps even launching a preventive war. By definition, bipolarity engenders a zero-sum contest, whereas relative decline in a multipolar context may be less alarming for those experiencing this fate because one’s enemies would not be necessarily advantaged (the relative gains may instead be accrued by one’s friends). At the same time, because the incentives for buck-passing are greater in a multipolar system, a potential aggressor may be more tempted to launch a preventive war in the hope that it can defeat its adversary (or adversaries) without having to face an overwhelming coalition of opposing states. This proposition should be subjected to further empirical scrutiny to determine its validity. Jeffrey Taliaferro (2001: 177) offered an opposite expectation. He argued that multipolarity is less likely to tempt a declining power into war because the number of powerful rivals is higher, and thus the potential for a strong balancing coalition is greater than it is in a bipolar system, where there is only a single rival of significance. Dale Copeland (2000) suggested yet another possibility that disagrees with the one we have advanced here. He hypothesized that unless a state possesses a preponderance of power in a multipolar world, it would be reluctant to wage a preventive war because it would have to face the possibility of a superior coalition consisting of several opponents that may be individually weaker in a bilateral contest with this state. Conversely, in a bipolar world, he argued that a state with approximately the same power as its opponent, and perhaps one with even an inferior capability, would be inclined to wage a preventive war because it would not have to be concerned about the possibility of third-party intervention affecting the outcome of the bilateral contest.

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In face of relative decline, strategic withdrawal is a feasible option if a state actually has an overseas empire from which to retreat for the sake of conserving resources and focusing on more pressing problems at home or closer to home. Physical distance and insularity offer some reassurance that imperial retrenchment promises consolidation in a more defendable position rather than precipitating even further decline and more acute vulnerability. In the contemporary era, nuclear deterrence alleviates this security concern. Although geography still matters, its relative importance has declined. Thus, the significance of sympathetic or neutral states in East and Central Europe as a buffer for the Soviet Union had diminished by the time Gorbachev was faced with the option of strategic withdrawal. In general, states in relative decline are more inclined to choose retrenchment rather than preventive war if geography and/or nuclear deterrence offer them a safety margin. Britain had a geographic advantage, the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, and the United States has both. Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany had neither, and it also did not have imperial possessions from which to retrench. Prior to both World Wars I and II, Germany was seeking to expand rather than to retrench.21 In this important respect, the power transition theory offers a critical insight. Having reached their peak power earlier, predominant states would have acquired imperial possessions that they can shed when faced with relative decline. Latecomers like Germany do not have this space (both in the physical and policy sense) to downsize, and are therefore more disposed to pursue expansion rather than contraction in response to decline. A state may be gaining on another state but falling behind a third state. Therefore, it is more useful to assess positional changes among the great powers in a multilateral rather than bilateral context. A larger state’s growth trajectory can be bent and even reversed by modest gains on the part of a much smaller state. Following the implication of prospect theory and the analysis of preventive war, a contest of arms is more likely to be initiated by declining rather than rising states. Moreover, World Wars I and II did not at least initially involve a bilateral confrontation between the two most powerful states (i.e., the United States and Germany) competing for global hegemony, but rather originated from a struggle for prestige and survival among the lesser regional powers. These points lead us to offer as our conclusion an unorthodox speculation. The argument that a rising China threatens international security seems misplaced. Just as its growth had set off relative decline on the part of the United States and Japan, China may soon face the same fate due to the current and prospective gains made by India and perhaps Indonesia. That China’s relative growth will be constrained and even reversed will have less to do with Sino-American or Sino-Japanese rivalry, and will be more a result of the ascendance of other states that begin their economic takeoff even later. The dynamic of several major states in regional politics simultaneously undergoing relative decline (China, the United States, Russia, Japan, and Korea) recreates a situation reminiscent of Europe at the turn of the twentieth century. According

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to the logic presented in this analysis, international stability will be more threatened when China enters a phase of slower or even negative growth. Its large population and geographic position resemble Germany’s situation. A critical difference between these two states, however, is the advent of nuclear weapons, which reassures defensive security while rendering offensive aggression prohibitively costly. Current U.S. policy to develop and deploy missile-defense systems has understandably been a source of serious concern for China and Russia. Notes 1. As James Fearon (1994, 1995, 1997) has stressed, wars are inefficient and, therefore, the potential belligerents should have an incentive to settle if they could have foreseen the outcome of their conf lict. Fearon pointed to private information, misrepresentation, indivisible payoff, and unreliable commitment as critical barriers standing in the way of reaching a settlement to avoid war. 2. See, e.g., Vasquez (1993: Chapter 3). 3. Indeed, as Richard Rosecrance (2001: 294–295) noted, “by 1913, the U.S. economy equaled Britain’s and Germany’s combined.” 4. Edward Ingram (2001: 233) remarked “[i]n fact both conf licts were fought between Germany and Russia; closed down in the west until Russia lost the first and won the second.” 5. In addition to the two world wars, Copeland (2000) studied other epic contests (such as the wars between Sparta and Athens, Rome and Carthage, and the Thirty Years’ War) and concluded that the preventive motivation on the part of the stronger but declining power was responsible for their outbreak. 6. See John Vasquez’s discussion of the contagion effect in this volume (chapter 6), and also Doran (2003) on power shifts and competitive dynamic that characterize “secondary” dyads involving states such as China and India today. 7. See Doran (1991: 65–78) for a discussion of how rapid growth in the less powerful countries (such as Russia in the early twentieth century) can lead to a significant deterioration in the relative power share enjoyed by the leading countries (such as imperial Germany). 8. In reality, while clearly on a course of accelerated growth, the Russian/Soviet upward trajectory was punctuated by short periods of sharp decline, most notably as a result of its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, the Bolshevik Revolution and the ensuing civil war, and to a certain extent, Stalin’s purges of the mid-1930s. Nonetheless, the Russians/Soviets enjoyed strong and relatively consistent capability growth from 1896 to about 1970. 9. Culture would carry little analytic weight in accounting for the British-Japanese partnership in the Far East. 10. London cared about Afghanistan because it cared about India, the crown jewel of its colonial empire. 11. See Rasler and Thompson (1994: especially 155) for a discussion on whether and how overseas commitments (or overcommitments) affected Britain’s relative decline and, more recently, the Soviet Union’s disintegration. 12. Assuming a second-strike capability for both the declining and ascending states, the likelihood of a large-scale preventive war occurring during the nuclear age is quite low. In short, the expected utility of a preventive war approaches zero (and, indeed, becomes even negative) for all sides, including the declining power. From about the late 1950s on, the strategy of mutual assured destruction virtually guaranteed that war between the United States and the Soviet Union would not be appealing to either side, regardless of the changes in their relative power. 13. Some may argue that because the Soviet Union was never stronger than the United States, a preventive war by Moscow was unlikely. This argument is problematic on two accounts. First, weaker states have been known to initiate hostilities against stronger ones (Paul 1994). Second, although weaker than the United States, the Soviet Union was stronger (at least militarily) than the other major states. Significantly, the option of launching a preventive war was not that unthinkable at a time when China had not developed a nuclear retaliatory force and when it

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14.

15.

16.

17.

18. 19.

20.

21.

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had not aligned itself with the West to oppose the Soviet Union. Moscow reportedly contacted the Nixon administration about a possible preventive strike against Chinese nuclear facilities at Lop Nor. Edward Luttwak (1983: 40) discussed the possibility that Soviet weakness would abet a more aggressive foreign policy. Other scholars have noted that, while unable to reverse their relative decline vis-à-vis the United States by launching a general war, the Soviets attempted to extract concessions by initiating high-risk confrontations such as the Berlin Crises in 1948 and 1961, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Of course, we know in hindsight that these attempts failed. By the time Gorbachev came to power, the extent of Soviet decline was such that even attempting to obtain concessions from the United States via a strategy of crisis initiation seemed far-fetched (Snyder and Diesing 1977). Whether material conditions constrained Soviet choices to such a degree that a retreat from empire was the only feasible policy seen by both “new” and “old” thinkers among Moscow’s leaders, and whether Gorbachev’s and his close advisors’ “new thinking” played an independent and critical role in this retreat were discussed in the exchange between English (2002) and Brooks and Wohlforth (2002). For two recent discussions on the changing nature of power, see Tellis et al. (2000) and Sweeney (no date). Both analyses underscored the need to include soft power to supplement traditional measures of hard power. For two recent studies on the changing power relationship between the United States and China, see Rapkin and Thompson (2003) and Chan (2005). Prospect theory can build upon these ideas. Jack Levy (1997, 2000) pointed out that adjusting expectations (especially downward) is difficult for leaders because of the human tendency toward a “reference-point bias.” Any adjustment from the perceived status quo entails costs and benefits. Evidence from the literature on prospect theory suggests that in such a situation, the costs of adjustment are exaggerated and the benefits are downplayed. Thus, leaders typically engage in risky strategies (such as preventive war) in order to avoid making any downward adjustments to their country’s role in the system. Furthermore, after committing material and human resources, they are likely to stay with these risky strategies even if they are failing in a last-ditched attempt to recoup their sunk costs. Some would answer this question by pointing to the importance of new ideas and Gorbachev’s personality (e.g., English 2003). Others emphasizing more the constraints of material conditions would argue that the objective situation confronting Gorbachev was much more serious than that faced by his predecessors. The United Nations’ Millennium Indicators at accessed on February 21, 2004. Britain did not simultaneously enjoy global and regional supremacy. See Rasler and Thompson (1994) for a discussion on how the dynamics of global power deconcentration and regional power concentration can produce a lethal combination for war. A growing country should be content to allow the ongoing trend to continue in furthering its upward mobility. It should be wary of any action that can disrupt or dampen the favorable momentum. This proposition disagrees with the standard interpretation offered by the power transition theory, which sees a rising challenger as the likely source of international instability. By the time Germany and Japan joined the game of imperialism, much of the world had already been colonized. Unlike in the experience of the U.S. westward expansion and Russia’s eastward and southern aggrandizement, Germany faced a much stronger opposition from its neighbors in carrying out its Drang Nach Osten.

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Brown, Michael E., Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds. (2000) The Rise of China. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Calleo, David (1988) Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance. New York: Basic Books. Chan, Steve (2004) “Exploring Some Puzzles in Power Transition Theory: Implications for SinoAmerican Relations.” Security Studies 13 (3): 1–39. ——— (2005) “Is There a Power Transition between the U.S. and China? The Different Faces of Power.” Asian Survey 65 (5): 687–701. ——— (2008) China, the U.S., and the Power Transition Theory: A Critique. London: Routledge. Choucri, Nazli and Robert C. North (1975) Domestic Growth and International Violence. San Francisco, CA: Freeman. Christensen, Thomas J. and Jack Snyder (1990) “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity.” International Organization 44 (2): 137–168. Copeland, Dale C. (2000) The Origins of Major War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Doran, Charles F. (1991) Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at the Century’s End. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——— (2003) “Economics, Philosophy of History, and the ‘Single Dynamic’ of the Power Cycle Theory: Expectations, Competition, and Statecraft.” International Political Science Review 24 (1): 13–49. Elliott, John H. (1963) Imperial Spain, 1469–1716. New York: St. Martin’s. English, Robert D. (2002) “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War’s End: A Reply to Brooks and Wohlforth.” International Security 26 (4): 70–92. ——— (2003) “The Road(s) Not Taken: Causality and Contingency in Analysis of the Cold War’s End,” in William C. Wohlforth, ed., Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 243–272. Evangelista, Matthew (1993) “Internal and External Constraints on Grand Strategy: The Soviet Case,” in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993, 154–178. Fearon, James D. (1994) “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” American Political Science Review 88 (3): 577–592. ——— (1995) “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49 (3): 379–414. ——— (1997) “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1): 68–90. Friedberg, Aaron L. (1988) The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gibbon, Edward (1910) The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. New York: Dutton. Ingram, Edward (2001) “Hegemony, Global Reach, and World Power: Great Britain’s Long Cycle,” in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 223–251. Jacobson, Harold K. (1984) Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System. New York: Knopf. Johnston, Alastair Iain and Robert S. Ross, eds. (1999) Engaging China: The Management of An Emerging Power. London: Routledge. Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1979) “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica 47 (2): 263–291. ———, eds. (2000) Choices, Values, and Frames. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kennedy, Paul (1984) “The First World War and the International Power System.” International Security 9 (1): 7–40. ——— (1987) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House. Kugler, Jacek and Douglas Lemke, eds. (1996) Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Kupchan, Charles A. (2001) “Benign States and Peaceful Transition,” in Charles A. Kupchan, Emanuel Adler, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Yuen Foong Khong, eds., Power in Transition: The Political Change of International Order. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 18–33.

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Lebow, Richard Ned and John Mueller (1995) “Correspondence.” International Security 20 (2): 185–186. Lebow, Richard Ned and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds. (1995) International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press. Lemke, Douglas (2003) “Investigating the Preventive Motive for War.” International Interactions 29: 273–292. Levy, Jack S. (1987) “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War.” World Politics 39 (1): 82–107. ——— (1997) “Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations.” International Studies Quarterly 41 (1): 87–112. ——— (2000) “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conf lict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory,” in Manus Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies II. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 193–221. Liberman, Peter (1996) Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Luttwak, Edward (1983) The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union. New York: St. Martin’s. McDermott, Rose (1998) Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. Modelski, George (1987) Long Cycles in World Politics. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Moulder, Frances V. (1979) Japan, China and the Modern World Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Nye, Joseph S. (1990) Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books. Organski, A.F.K.(1958) World Politics. New York: Knopf. Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler (1980) The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Oye, Kenneth, Donald Rothchild and Robert Lieber, eds. (1979) Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World. New York: Longman. Paul, T.V. (1994) Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiations by Weaker Powers. New York: Cambridge University Press. Powell, Robert (1999) In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rapkin, David and William R. Thompson (2003) “Power Transition, Challenge and the (Re) Emergence of China.” International Interactions 29: 315–342. Rasler, Karen A. and William R. Thompson (1994) The Great Powers and Global Struggle, 1490– 1990. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. Reuveny, Rafael and William R. Thompson (1997) “The Timing of Protectionism.” Review of International Political Economy 4 (1): 179–213. ——— (2004) Growth, Trade, and Systemic Leadership. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Robertson, Esmonde M. (1963) Hitler’s Pre-war Policy and Military Plans, 1933–1939. London: Longmans. Rock, Stephen R. (1989) Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. ——— (2000) Appeasement in International Politics. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. Rosecrance, Richard, ed. (1976) America as an Ordinary Country. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ——— (1986) The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World. New York: Basic Books. ——— (2001) “Postscript: When Did Britain Decline?” in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 293–300. Russett, Bruce M. (1985) “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: Or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead.” International Organization 39 (2): 207–232. Russett, Bruce M., Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella (2004) World Politics: The Menu for Choice. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson.

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Schroeder, Paul W. (1994) “Historical Reality versus Neo-Realist Theory.” International Security 19 (1): 108–148. ——— (2004) “Embedded Counterfactuals and World War I as an Unavoidable War,” in Paul W. Schroeder, ed., Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 157–191. Schweller, Randall L. (1992) “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?” World Politics 44 (2): 235–269. ——— (1998) Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest. New York: Columbia University Press. Schweller, Randall L. and William C. Wohlforth (2000) “Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War.” Security Studies 9 (3): 60–107. Snyder, Glenn H. and Paul Diesing (1977) Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Strange, Susan (1987) “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony.” International Organization 41 (4): 551–574. Sweeney, Kevin (no date) “The Changing Face of National Capability.” Mimeo, Ohio State University. Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. (2001) “Realism, Power Shifts, and Major War.” Security Studies 10 (4): 145—178. Tammen, Ronald L., Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Allan C. Stam III, Mark Abdollahian, Carole Alsharabati, Brian Efird, and A.F.K. Organski (2000) Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century. New York: Chatham House. Tellis, Ashley J., Janise Bially, Christopher Layne, and Melissa McPherson (2000) Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Tessman, Brock F. and Steve Chan (2004) “Power Cycles, Risk Propensity, and Great-Power Deterrence.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (2): 131–153. Thompson, William R. (1995) “Principal Rivalries.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39 (2): 195–223. ——— (1999) “The Evolution of a Great Power Rivalry: The Anglo-American Case.” in William R. Thompson, ed., Great Power Rivalries. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 201–221. ——— (2003) “A Streetcar Named Sarajevo: Catalysts, Multiple Causation Chains, and Rivalry Structures.” International Studies Quarterly 47 (3): 453–474. Treisman, Daniel (2004) “Rational Appeasement.” International Organization 58 (2): 344–373. Vasquez, John (1993) The War Puzzle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——— (1996a) “Distinguishing Rivals That Go to War from Those That Do Not.” International Studies Quarterly 40 (4): 531–558. ——— (1996b) “When Are Power Transitions Dangerous? An Appraisal and Reformulation of Power Transition Theory,” in Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 35–56. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1993) “The Emerging Structure of International Politics.” International Security 18 (2): 44–79. Wohlforth, Willliam C. (1994/1995) “Realism and the End of the Cold War.” International Security 19 (3): 91–129. ———, ed. (2003) Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

CH A P T E R

T H R E E

Transitions in Hegemony: A Theory Based on State Type and Technology P e t e r J. Hugi l l

Introduction A critical question for world-system theory is what level of predictability there is for hegemonic transitions in the world system. I argue here, on the basis of historical experience, that a proper theory of hegemonic transitions needs to account for several types of transition. At heart, the types of polities competing shape the transition through their internal struggle to control the levers of state power in the states they occupy. The two dominant state types that result from these struggles are trading states and territorial states. In the past 500 years or so of the operation of the modern world system it is noticeable that all of the major trading states have been, or have been trending toward, capitalist forms of economic and social organization. The territorial states have tended to be, or have been trending toward, more statist forms of economic and social organization. At its simplest, two state types give us three basic types of transition: Type I between a trading and a territorial state; Type II between two trading states; and Type III between two territorial states. In reality most transitions are more complex than this. At each transition there is a dominant power, the declining hegemon, and one or more challenger powers. Each state type, trading or territorial, and each subtype, hegemon or challenger, also tends to have a preferred economic strategy. In all types of transitions a complex set of boundary conditions operates to shape the struggles. Three types of struggle are most important: economic; politico-military; and geopolitical. Each type of struggle creates its own suite of strategies, all of which are mediated by available technology. Some, but not all these struggles, eventuate in war. This chapter lays out the basics of the model and then applies it to the four transitions that we have so far experienced in the world system: Portugal

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to Holland; Holland to Britain I; Britain I to Britain II; and Britain II to America (Modelski 1978). Of the five hegemonies thus far all have been trading states. The first three, those of Portugal, Holland, and Britain I, operated in a commercial, Eotechnic form of world economy, trending toward capitalism (Mumford 1934; Hugill 1993). The last two operated in a fully capitalist, industrial world economy, but under very different technological systems with very different energy sources. Britain II’s hegemony was based on the first industrial revolution and was transitional from an organic world economy to one based on hydrocarbons, in this case coal. America’s hegemony has been based on the second industrial revolution and has been increasingly embedded in a world economy based on organic chemistry that has been heavily dependent on hydrocarbons, mainly oil and natural gas. Polities and States Within any given state in any given period, multiple polities usually coexist. Some of these polities support a trading state strategy, some a territorial one, but all struggle for control over the levers of state power. Very few states are ever dominated by a single polity, and rarely for any length of time. At the end of World War I, in his attempt to analyze the origins of that war in accord with his pioneering theory that there is a “geographical pivot of history” in the Heartland or Pivot region of Eurasia (Mackinder 1904), the British geographer Halford Mackinder brief ly described German war aims as split between two polities, although he did not define them as such: the Hamburg merchants attempting to expand into the Atlantic trades in competition with British and French interests; and the Prussian Junkers striving for territorial expansion east and south (Mackinder 1919: 154; Hugill 2005). Such territorial expansion is central to Mackinder’s pivot theory, but late in his life Mackinder reworked his theory to account for the success of the maritime trading states (Mackinder 1943). More recently the American historian Edward Whiting Fox has codified this internal struggle between competing polities at considerable length in what has become known as the “Two Frances thesis” (Fox 1971). In each case the competing polities diluted state power sufficiently to lose a major war (the Napoleonic Wars and World War I) against a more focused opponent or set of opponents (Britain and its allies). As Mackinder put it with regard to Wilhelmine Germany, Berlin committed a fundamental mistake [in 1914]; she fought on two fronts without fully making up her mind on which front she meant to win. Berlin had not decided between her political objectives: Hamburg and overseas dominion or Bagdad [sic] and the Heartland and therefore her strategical aim was uncertain. (Mackinder 1919: 154)

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Economic Strategies Once in control of the levers of state power, different polities use different economic strategies to achieve their goals. Hegemonic trading states prefer Free Trade; weaker trading states prefer mercantilist forms of Protection; territorial states prefer absolute Protection in the form of autarky. Since trading states generate their income by the profits from trade, access to trade routes becomes central to their economic interests. Hegemons are so powerful that they argue that all states should have open access to all trade routes. Such Free Trade policies actually favor hegemons, since they are (by definition) the most efficient traders. Challenger trading states prefer mercantilist forms of Protection, seeking to carve out a niche in which they are able to keep the hegemonic trading state at arm’s length by reducing in some way their ability to profit from trade with the challenger. Such niches are usually geographically defined spaces and, in the past, sometimes took the form of Empires. Hegemonic trading states have usually accepted or at least ignored some form of mercantilism among their challengers. Territorial states approach Protection very differently, preferring to control their territory and its contents as absolutely as possible. If they consider that they control enough territory to have all the resources they need and thus have no need for trade, they can move to autarky. Struggles I define three major types of potential struggle here: economic; geopolitical; and politico-military. I avoid the term war since it implies that all forms of struggle may move to a military solution. Economic struggles, especially between trading states, often stop well short of war, although they may be intense. Geopolitical and politico-military struggles do, however, frequently result in military action. Various theorists of war have argued for various types of war, such as “wars of hegemonic transition” and “decline wars,” when the hegemon is struggling to deal with decline (for an excellent summary see Modelski and Thompson 1996: 13–62). Geopolitical and politico-military struggles seem the most critical, since they can produce intense fighting and serious loss of human life. They tend to be associated with two types of war. The first is major war, which is usually a war of hegemonic transition, in which at least the declining hegemon and its principal challenger fight, although self-interest, alliance structures and the like usually result in many other states being dragged in. The second war type is the war of proxy, in which at least the hegemonic power and one challenger induce others to fight in their stead. All these forms of struggle are heavily mediated by the technology available to or believed available to the various actors. For example, a perceived edge in one arena of struggle may increase or reduce willingness to fight. A huge advantage may persuade a state either to fight because victory will

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be easy or that no other state will dare attack it. The most contested arena of struggle in this regard is usually the politico-military one. Economic Struggles At the most crucial one level all struggles are de facto economic. Without the economic ability to support military activity in the field no state can hope to win a military action. As Charles Tilly notes, trading polities prefer to focus on the sorts of power projection needed for weak control at a distance: control of their global trade routes and critical trading nodes via navies, and indirect control through alliances. Territorial polities prefer direct control of large territories close to home via occupation and armies (Tilly 1989). These different preferences cause perhaps the most crucial difference in the way trading and territorial states conduct themselves in Type I economic struggles, the way economic surplus is invested. Trading states, in part because of their inherent tendency toward capitalist forms of economic and social organization, tend to make steady investments over long periods of time in durable, high technology military goods and the skilled human capital needed to operate them. As Modelski and Thompson first argued (1988), for maritime trading states this has historically meant large, sophisticated, powerful navies. They further argued that a useful definition of hegemony was a state’s possession of the most powerful navy, and that each period of hegemony since the rise of Portugal in the late 1400s has been marked by precisely such. Changes in technology have, however, caused strategic air power to become increasingly important for force projection over long distances (Hugill 2005). Navies and air forces cannot be built overnight, and as technology changes the goods themselves must be constantly updated or replaced and their personnel reskilled. Such forces fit well with capitalist trading states on three levels. First, capital goods are well understood as important in capitalist economies, and expensive investment in such goods is not shied away from if the prospect of long-range returns, such as military security, can be reasonably projected. Second, high investment in capital goods usually requires high levels of investment in human capital to maximize the output of the capital goods. Third, given that trading states make much of their income from selling goods that are “new” compared to the goods of their competitors, the habit of constant technological innovation in the arena of economic struggle (Hugill 2003) is a particularly useful habit to transfer to the arena of politico-military struggle. As McNeill has noted, the habit of ceaseless military innovation has marked out European and, to some extent, world history for the past five hundred years (McNeill 1988). Trading states usually win or lose major wars with the “f leet in being” when war breaks out, whether this be entirely naval or, more recently, a mix of naval and air power, since innovation and reinvestment in new capital goods takes many years.

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Territorial states depend much more on armies for power projection. Historically these have often been built extremely quickly, sometimes even after a military struggle has begun. Such military forces have traditionally required much less in the way of capital goods or human capital than navies or air forces, and have depended far less on technological innovation. Recent technological shifts have somewhat changed this, reducing the importance of infantry and making mobility via tanks and tactical air forces much more important. Geopolitical Struggles In the geopolitical realm two forms of struggle have tended to predominate, both over control of territory, the first for the geostrategic advantages control of that territory can confer, the second for the resources that territory can produce. Trading states have, in general, involved themselves very little in the first form of struggle, although they have sought to prevent territorial states acquiring such advantages. In general, territorial struggles for geostrategic advantages tend to be between geographically adjacent territorial states. Struggles for critically needed resources may range over the entire planet, have economic as well as geopolitical components, and be pursued as much by trading as territorial states. Trading states have, however, usually sought direct control over territory only where they have not felt assured of access to needed f lows of resources. Given the origins of the modern world system in largely temperate western Europe from the 1500s on such struggles tended to emphasize access to the tropical and sub-tropical resources that could not be produced there. To begin with they were primarily over food for humans in the form of New World sugar. After about 1750 such struggles switched to being about cotton, the fiber that drove the first industrial revolution and shaped the increasingly globalized world economy that first emerged in Britain in the late 1700s (Hugill 1988a, 1988b, 1993, forthcoming). Subsidiary contestation has occurred over other commodities and over soft and hard drugs (caffeine rich coffee, tea, and cacao, and opium for pain relief ). Recently the struggle for resources has shifted to hydrocarbons. Territorial struggles over geopolitical control of territory for its agricultural output were alleviated somewhat during the European expansions by the formation of empires to bring distant territories unequivocally under the political control of metropolitan cores. Trading states often preferred informal empires: for example, the British financed the output and transportation of cotton from the cotton South of America after 1815, ensuring access to the crucial agricultural resources needed for British textile industrialization long after the area broke free of formal British political control. The term informal empire, however, lends a geopolitical tinge to what trading states regard as a simple competition for resources based on pure economics. As the organic world economy has receded into

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history and been replaced by an economy based on organic chemistry and energy, geopolitical struggles in the world system have, perforce, changed character. As described by Wallerstein in his landmark The Modern World-System (1974), the world economy that developed in the late 1400s was an organic world economy in which all food and virtually all fibers and fuels were grown using agricultural systems with only organic inputs (human and animal labor and waste) (Hugill 1993: 6). In Technics and Civilization (1934), Lewis Mumford described this as an Eotechnic system. From the late 1700s on the increasingly massive substitution of fossil hydrocarbon resources for organic ones created a very different world economy, one dependent upon increasingly massive inputs of fossil fuels as a substitute for human and animal labor and waste. This, Mumford’s Paleotechnic, described the technical structure of the First Industrial Revolution, roughly from the late 1700s to the late 1800s. As we segued in the late 1800s into Mumford’s Neotechnic and the Second Industrial Revolution, fossil fuel hydrocarbon resources themselves became, thanks to the developing science and technology of organic chemistry first in Imperial Germany because of its lack of tropical and subtropical colonies, raw materials for industry and replacements for older, organic raw materials. A prime example is in textiles: other than for aesthetic reasons, organic silk can be replaced by nylon produced by organic chemistry; cotton, linen, and wool by polyesters (Hugill forthcoming). The transformation of those hydrocarbon resources into raw materials has been achieved through massive shifts in science and technology which themselves have come about through massive and innovatory shifts in economic, political, and social organization (Hugill 1993; Hugill and Bachman 2005). The transformation of the focus in the world economy from organics to organic chemistry transformed geopolitical struggles at the technological level, de-emphasizing concerns over the organic output of territory and large sources of cheap labor and emphasizing the resources for organic chemistry, namely hydrocarbons and highly skilled labor. Politico-Military Struggles Politico-military struggles were simple at the onset of the modern world system some 500 years ago. Trading and territorial states practiced different geostrategies with different approaches to political alliances. Military technologies were fairly stable. For about the last one hundred years, however, such struggles have assumed greater and greater importance, exacerbated by accelerating technological change. From the late 1400s to roughly 1900 navies allowed the states that commissioned them increasing power projection around the oceans, littorals, and even river systems of the world, the last via steam-powered gunboats from roughly 1820 on (Hugill 1993). But such power projection was not world encompassing: ships could not project force inland beyond the range of their guns. Mackinder believed

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that the evolution of much more effective means of overland transport in the form of the railroad negated the historical geographic advantage of the maritime trading states and that the global balance of power would tip back to territorial states. He noted that, until the “Columbian epoch,” the world island of Eurasia was dominated by horse-using steppe polities. Sea power allowed far more effective power at a distance, allowing the maritime states that emerged in Europe in the late 1400s to dominate the world’s littorals (Mackinder 1904). In the last one hundred years air power, especially in the modern form of smart bombs and GPS guided cruise missiles, has substantially changed the equation, allowing effective control of the nodes and f lows of interest to trading states at considerable distances inland. Recent wars in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and the Arabian Gulf have clearly indicated that air power can be highly effective if no demands are made on it to control territory. Boundary Struggles and Transition Wars Periods of hegemonic transition are usually accompanied by major wars. I argue here that major wars are not a necessary condition of transitions and that transition wars are a function of the nature and complexity of the boundary struggles at a particular transition. Since multipolarity is the norm at transitions, transition wars are, however, usually complex and deadly. Since the late 1500s there have been four hegemonic transitions between the states indicated: the states in italics and brackets were major actors in the transition wars in question. The states underlined were the principal territorial state challengers in that transition: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Portugal-Spain [Britain] Holland Holland [France] Britain I Britain I [France/Prussia/Russia] Britain II Britain II [France/Germany/Japan/Russia-USSR] America.

Type I transition wars involve at least one territorial state and one trading state and are more likely to be fought over economic and military-political boundary problems, though resource geopolitics may intrude. Transitions (1), (3), and (4) were predominately Type I transitions. Type II transitions are between competing trading states and involve primarily economic contestation: this may include access to but not political control of resources. Only transition (2) has been predominately of this type. No Type III transitions have actually occurred although in transitions (3) and (4) territorial states fought each other in a classic Type III war. Type III wars are predominately geopolitical wars for direct control of territory for its geostrategic advantages and its resources. For example, in transition (3) Napoleonic France fought both Prussia and Imperial Russia, and in transition (4) Nazi Germany fought the Soviet Union. Now that all states are able to project substantial

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politico-military force well beyond their territorial boundaries, geopolitical competition for access to resource flows, notably of hydrocarbons, if not for control of the territory that contains them, is likely to become more significant. Transition (1): Portugal-Spain to Holland, a Confused Type I Example Portugal reconstituted under the joint kingdom of Spain and Portugal was challenged for its trading routes by both Holland and Britain in the late 1500s. There is dissent among world system scholars as to whether Portugal was ever hegemonic, with Wallerstein (1974, 1984) arguing no and Modelski (1978) arguing yes. From the perspective of state type, however, Portugal was the formative trading state for the modern world system since it emerged in a Europe where the bulk goods trades were beginning to predominate in value over the older trades in prestige goods, with very substantial consequences for the nature of the state itself. This trade in bulk goods originated in the Baltic economy in the Hanseatic period, helped usher in the modern world system during the long Sixteenth Century (Wallerstein 1974), and fundamentally altered the political nature of the states that pursued it. Rulers of the emergent trading states shifted from being tribute takers to taxing trade. Rulers of tribute states generated wealth by monopolizing certain prestige goods trades or simply by occasionally preempting such trades, since the goods themselves were usually of high intrinsic value, low in bulk, easily stored, and highly portable. Monopolizing or preempting trade in the dominant trade goods of the Baltic economy, wood, wool, or wheat, would have made rulers into merchants, thus losing their claim to social exclusivity. Taxing such bulk goods trades was a viable alternative, but in return for the taxes rulers had to both obtain some consent from the merchants involved to their being taxed and deliver certain services, usually beginning with such elements as port infrastructure and ending with naval protection for merchant ships ( Jones 1981). Modelski and Thompson (1996) argue for periods of economic hegemony based on leading sector analysis before the emergence of Portugal, specifically for Sung China and the Italian city-states. Despite Sung China’s maritime expansion China classically suffered from multiple polities struggling to control the state. Sung China’s maritime expansion was also less about trade than tribute and prestige goods. In the early 1400s China abandoned its maritime expansion and became a fully territorial state. The Italian city-states were certainly trading states, but they suffered several fatal f laws when pressed militarily. Much of their trade was in prestige goods, and they placed little value on the bulk goods they needed, of which food and lumber predominated, the latter for both fuel and construction. As city-states they were small in area and easily

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defended, especially by sea, but they were vulnerable to disruption in their food and timber supplies by naval challengers in a way that the new states emerging in northern Europe were not. The rise of Turkish naval power in the eastern Mediterranean was one major factor in the decline of Venice, the other being the pioneering of trade routes around Africa by the new states of northern Europe, which compressed the eight premodern circuits of trade between China and Europe into one (Abu-Lughod 1989). The monopoly of the Italian city-states on prestige trade goods from the east entering Europe was ended. The rising states of northern Europe controlled enough land area around their capitals to provide ample food and lumber resources to fight longer wars against competent naval opponents: Portugal was the first of these. Portugal had problems, however. It was heavily committed to eastern expansion around and across the Eurasian landmass into the eight circuits of trade controlled largely by Islam. The costs of such expansion were high, and Portugal was a small country with a limited agricultural base and a limited population available to man its f leet and its increasing number of foreign possessions. In addition, a new world economy was emerging as the Americas were opened up by better European ships and navigational technologies, one becoming global in nature and no longer limited to the Eurasian landmass. The Americas were easier to exploit than Eurasia. Their population turned out to be disastrously vulnerable to Eurasian and Africa diseases (Wolf 1982), and could be replaced using slaves from subSaharan Africa, a region also opened to European exploitation after 1431 (Hugill 1993). As Portugal expanded east Spain expanded west. Spain’s domestic resource base and population were larger and they expanded against much slighter opposition. Portugal-Spain, now known as the Iberian Union, was a predominately territorial state in which Portuguese trading interests were heavily subordinated to Spanish territorial ones. Portugal entered a dynastic crisis in 1578 and was annexed by Phillip II of Spain, one of several claimants to the Portuguese throne, in 1580. Portugal regained independence in 1640. Spain’s fundamental failure brought on by its territorial nature is evident both at home in its inability to efficiently provision its capital, Madrid, and in its fatal attempts to hang on to its overseas possessions at all costs. Spain’s rise had resulted in opposition from both Britain and Holland, the latter formally claimed by Spain as the Spanish Netherlands, but increasingly resistant as Calvinism took hold. Spain attempted to bring both Britain and Holland under control with the Armada, losing the naval struggle to Britain at Gravelines (1588) and therefore unable to land troops to support the Inquisition against Dutch Calvinism in the crucial early phases of the Eighty Years War between Holland and Spain (1579–1648). Despite the long drawn out nature of the war, the issue was effectively decided by the naval failure of the Spanish with the loss of the Armada. Holland possessed several advantages. Its continued control of access to the wheat region of north Germany and Poland via the

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Baltic plus its highly efficient domestic agriculture made it able to feed its population. Portugal was subjugated to Spain in the Iberian Union, allowing Holland to take increasing control of Portuguese trade routes to Asia after 1580. Finally, the Dutch pioneered mass construction of standardized ships that were sold “off the lot” and the significant innovation in financial risk management of merchants owning shares in ships rather than whole ships (Wallerstein 1980; Hugill 1993; Taylor 1996). These factors ensured the achievement of a financial edge that cemented Dutch hegemonic victory. Transition (2): Holland to Britain I, a Simple Type II Example The Holland to Britain I transition of the mid- to late-1600s is the only clear example thus far of an almost purely Type II economic struggle between two trading states. By the mid-1600s many Dutch had settled in Britain to drain the eastern counties, both states had similar decentralized systems of investment and finance, both made numerous innovations in banking and financial risk management, and Britain increasingly embraced the sort of radical Protestantism pioneered in Holland by the followers of Calvin. At the level of economic struggle the Dutch policy of mare liberum, free seas, made Holland the committed free trader and Britain, the “weak challenger,” adopted mercantilism under the guise of the Navigation Acts, the first of which was passed in 1651 and was the root cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652–1654). The First AngloDutch War was an entirely naval war, and the second and third were heavily naval. At the politico-military level both states were extremely innovative in naval warfare, the British pioneering highly maneuverable “razed” ships and the Dutch being the first to fight their ships in what became the classic “line of battle” formation. Holland and Britain had a substantial sea boundary that made territorial aggression almost impossible given the technologies of the period, so no real geopolitical struggle could develop. A secondary geopolitical struggle over territory developed in their North American colonies. Although the Dutch won the second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–1667) they simply withdrew from North America in 1665, effectively ceding it to Britain: New Amsterdam became New York and major struggles over territory ended. The Dutch reoccupied New York in the Third Dutch War (1672–1674) but ceded it permanently in 1674. Britain, with a much weaker merchant f leet, well-established interests in North America, and little interest in Asia at the time, had no interests in attacking Dutch possessions in Eurasia. The two polities established effectively separate spheres of trade and thus of geopolitical interest. The Third Dutch War was part of the larger Franco-Dutch War (1672– 1678), the British entering in 1672 because of a secret treaty between

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the British and French crowns but switching allegiances. This dragged Britain into the Wars of Louis XIV (1667–1714), fought to expand the boundaries of the French territorial state and expand its power. After 1678 Holland and Britain increasingly united under a Protestant banner against France. Their monarchies effectively merged in 1688 when William of Orange deposed James II and ascended the British throne to rule jointly with his wife Mary, the Protestant daughter of Catholic James II. The Dutch and British economies effectively merged when the Dutch moved their capital supplies overwhelmingly to London after 1688. Britain then achieved global financial dominance by embracing a global gold standard (Bernstein 2000). The series of wars that closed out the Wars of Louis XIV, and in which Britain’s Duke of Marlborough played a central role, were a Type I war fought by British and their allies to resist the expansion of the French territorial state, but they were not a transition war per se, the transition being over by 1688. Competition for territory in the Indian subcontinent between the British East India Company and the Dutch Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) could have been an issue, but the Dutch focus was Indonesia, not India, which it effectively left to Britain. After 1688 the Dutch and the British fought together as a trading state against a predominately territorial state, France. Their economies were merged, Britain had clearly fully embraced Protestantism, and they had the same common enemy in India as they had in Europe, Catholic France. Transition (3): Britain Succeeds Itself, despite a Type I Challenge from France By the late 1700s, after a near century long struggle, Britain and France were competing culturally, economically, and geopolitically worldwide. Despite a series of military victories that extended from the later Wars of Louis XIV to the French and Indian War (1756–1763) the British lost a war with France over the American colonies between 1776 and 1783. In many ways this was a “decline” war, but it was contemporary with a much larger decline struggle that was economic in nature and that resulted in a clear British victory. In the mid-1700s Britain began to restructure its economy from a commercial to an industrial economy with cotton textile manufacturing rising to preeminence in the First Industrial Revolution of the period 1771 (the first use of Arkwright’s “water frame” to spin cotton) to 1811 (the first use of mechanized weaving). Britain also restructured its fiscal policies under Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger, first to retire the substantial National Debt created during the American Revolutionary War, then to pay for the Napoleonic Wars with the first introduction of an income tax. France tried to restructure both its economy and its fiscal policies in the same period but failed at both. The state encouraged cotton textile

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industrialization, but would-be entrepreneurs built their mills near Paris to stay close to state patronage. The Paris Basin is not a region suited to water power. British cotton mills were built well away from London by capitalist entrepreneurs in rugged regions in the north and west of the country with huge amounts of water power (Hugill forthcoming). French financing of the American Revolution (Stinchcombe 1969), in company with lavish spending by the monarchy and an archaic tax system, led to serious fiscal problems. Louis XVI was forced by his minister of finance to attempt to solve these by calling the Estates General in 1789. His inability to control the Estates General, which had not been called since 1614, turned out to be fatal. His and his ancestors’ obsession with creating a powerful territorial state under strong central control foundered, although Fox notes that the Revolution itself clearly had a trading state component in the activities of the Girondins, the power base of which was in the maritime trading cities along the Atlantic coast (Fox 1971). Britain and France then fought a major transition war between 1792 and 1815. This was a clear case of a Type I transition war and, on its surface, a clear economic and military struggle between a trading and a predominately territorial state. The main changes were in the economic struggle, where Britain innovated and France did not. Military technology remained fairly constant throughout the transition war, with neither side having any clear technological advantage. However, underlying the main struggle was a secondary Type III geopolitical struggle involving three territorial states, France, Russia, and Prussia. Napoleon’s “continental system” can be construed as a form of economic struggle: it sought a level of autarky for Napoleonic Europe by imposing high tariffs on imports from Britain. No geopolitical theorist explained Napoleon’s advance on Prussia and Russia at the time as a search to control the heartland, but had Napoleon achieved the conquest of Russia he would theoretically have achieved the advantages later postulated to come from such control over a geostrategic area and its resources that was described by Mackinder in 1904. He had smashed Prussian power at Jena in 1806 and forced Prussia to cede some half of its territory to France. But Napoleon failed in Russia. Russia’s ability to retreat past Moscow and let the winter take its toll on French troops demonstrated clearly in French casualty statistics the geostrategic advantages of controlling the heartland. With the Grande Armée almost destroyed in the retreat from Moscow Prussia was able to recover, rejoining the war against Napoleon in 1813. Prussian troops under Blucher supported Wellington’s crucial victory at Waterloo in 1815 to finally end the French challenge. Transition (4): Britain to America, a Complex, Long Drawn Out Example with Type I, II, and III Components The long-drawn-out, complex, and confused transition between Britain and America involved all transition types in a multi-phase struggle. Phase

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one of transition (4) was a Type II economic struggle between Britain and America that began in 1861 when America, the challenger trading state, embraced an essentially mercantilist form of Protection. Protection allowed a large domestic market to develop free of cheap British imports, especially for the leading sector product of the period, cotton textiles. As American production of cotton textiles boomed in increasingly technologically innovative and efficient mills, especially after 1870, America wrested supremacy in the organic global economy from a Britain increasingly fearful of the security of its cotton supply. Yet Britain never retaliated militarily or economically. Despite strongly held beliefs in the cotton South that Britain would enter the Civil War to protect its cotton supply, Britain did not. In the late 1800s ever more efficient American mills bought ever larger amounts of American cotton on the world market at the same time as Britain moved ever closer politically to America. The American internal struggle for control of the levers of state power is of interest. Although America was initially founded as a trading state the internal expansion of the 1800s pushed it toward becoming a more territorial state. By the Civil War two clear polities had emerged, but not divided so much along territorial/trading state lines as along the lines of competing trading states, one seeing itself as a challenger state demanding Protection, one willing to continue as a trading partner of Britain under Free Trade. Article I, Section VIII, of the Confederate Constitution specifically eschews Protection: “no bounties shall be granted from the treasury, nor shall any duties, or taxes, or importation from foreign nations be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry.” After the Civil War the Republican Party drifted increasingly toward territorial state policies, especially in the party’s tendency to isolationism, even autarky. The leadership of the party was divided, and there were clearly internationalist exceptions, such as Teddy Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover, just as there were isolationist impulses in the Democratic Party. However, in both parts of the transition war, World Wars One and Two, the Democratic Party controlled the levers of state power and pursued clearly trading state geostrategies. Britain’s increasing rapprochement with America in the late 1800s came from rising fears of Imperial Germany, which sparked phase 2 of transition (4). These fears arose from two sources, economic and military, both of which were heavily affected by new technologies. In the economic sphere, Germany invented a new, more efficient form of world economy in which research based companies such as Bayer and others increasingly substituted the products of organic chemistry for those of tropical and sub-tropical colonies: indoxyl for indigo dyestuff, aspirin for opium, saccharin for sugar (Hugill 1993). At home, the Haber-Bosch process allowed massive output of ammonia thus large amounts synthetic fertilizer that radically increased the efficiency of domestic agriculture (Smil 2001, 2005). By World War I Britain was massively dependent on food imports, thus easy prey to the U-boat blockade. The Haber-Bosch process also allowed massive output of the explosives Germany needed to wage World War I. Although some

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knowledge of this radically new German approach to the world economy diffused to America and Britain before World War I broke out, it was not clear until 1915 how great the German accomplishment was, forcing her competitors into a feverish and difficult race to copy the German innovations. It took until well into the 1930s to start to draw equal (Hugill and Bachman 2005). The other, and initially far more important, source of Britain’s rising concern was the German military build-up based on the increasing strength and efficiency of the German economy, combined with a growing German militarism. Phase two of transition (4) began in the late 1800s as a Type I politico-military struggle between Britain and Germany. What historians conventionally refer to as World War I was thus phase three of transition (4), in part a hot war version of the Type I phase two struggle, but also a Type III struggle between Britain, France, and Russia on one side and Germany on the other. In phase four of transition (4), conventionally World War II, Britain reverted to a Type I struggle, substituting strategic airpower for naval power. America also fought a predominately Type I struggle in phase four, again with air power. Germany and Japan, unable to choose between their trading and territorial polities, were both caught in bloody and vicious Type III wars in Russia and China respectively. Maintaining a large and expensive battlef leet to protect Britain’s global interests and fight a Type I war was central to British geostrategy from the Dutch Wars of the mid-1600s. Increasing German naval bellicosity, starting with the First Samoa Crisis of 1888–1889, and the decision to build a challenger battlef leet with the First German Naval Appropriations Act of 1898 caused Britain to end its policy of “splendid isolation,” seek new security partners, outbuild the new German Navy, and develop a qualitative edge to its battlef leet. For a trading state the better battlef leet commissioned by Fisher and Churchill from 1904 on made perfect sense, as did the Royal Navy’s embracing of increasingly radical military technologies: dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers, submersibles, airships, attack airplanes, strategic bombing airplanes, armored cars, tanks, and, by the end of the phase three of transition (4) in 1918, aircraft carriers. As transition (4) entered phase three in 1914 the British made a political decision to embrace an essentially territorial state geostrategy in addition to its traditional trading state naval geostrategy, sending a huge army to die in droves in Flanders from 1915 on. Such a decision is understandable only at the level of the geopolitics and military technologies of the period. Two members of Asquith’s cabinet at the time, Lord Haldane, Minister of War from 1905 to 1912 and Lord Chancellor from 1912 to 1915, and Sir Edward Grey, foreign secretary from 1905 to 1916, had been members of the Co-efficients, an Edwardian London “think tank,” another member of which had been the British geopolitician, Halford Mackinder. Mackinder argued persuasively before the Royal Geographical Society in 1904 that if any one power came to dominate the central European “heartland” they would be able to use the resources of the Eurasian landmass to build

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the world’s dominant f leet free from any interference by the likes of the Royal Navy, and that, as a consequence, “the empire of the world would be in sight” (Mackinder 1904). Britain thus allowed itself to be dragged into a Type III struggle that would beggar it, fighting Germany alongside France. The real victor in phase three of transition (4) was therefore America, which avoided long-term involvement in the Type III struggle that marked phase three and made substantial profits selling arms, ammunition, and other war materiel to the British and French. By 1918 Germany seemed defeated. In the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty America refused to accept hegemony, accepted naval parity with Britain, and even allowed Japan, a power it had manifestly distrusted for decades because of ongoing conf licts in Hawaii, California, and the Philippines, to become officially the world’s third greatest naval power. The Washington Naval Treaty persuaded Japan that it too could embrace global ambitions. At the appalling cost of some 35% of its GNP it therefore built a battlef leet to challenge America in the Pacific. Meinig puts it in a classically geopolitical formulation, especially true of a Japan that had not embraced the new world economy of organic chemistry: Germany and Japan represent extreme cases of “domestic pathologies” that unleashed “extraordinarily aggressive states.” Both were late industrializing nations seeking greater control over a large resource area. (Meinig 2004: 339) However domestic the origins of German and Japanese aggression it was exacerbated by the ongoing American domestic struggle over control of the levers of state power. The return of the Republican Party to power in 1920 returned a largely territorial polity that emphasized almost autarkic levels of Protection when Free Trade should have taken over, isolationism when globalization was called for, and “hemispheric defense” instead of hegemony. The consequences of this series of American failures were, of course, disastrous. What had been a relatively open global economy under the liberalism of the mid to late 1800s began to compartmentalize. This increasing compartmentalization was heightened by the international economic depression that struck in 1929, from which too many states saw isolating their economy as the way out. Even before the Depression “Socialism in One Country” had isolated the economy of the Soviet Union from that of the trading states. The disastrous Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 isolated the economy of America even more than previous Protectionist policies. Under the leadership of Hitler the German economy withdrew into total autarky. To protect its own economy, albeit with the goal of returning the global economy to free trade, Britain reverted to a form of mercantilism at the Imperial Economic Conference held in Ottawa in 1932. In America this was Protection for geopolitical reasons, not to deal with the economic boundary struggle of a trading state vying for market share, which had been most of the history of American Protection. The

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American failure to assume hegemony in the period 1919–1922, when it was clearly within reach, encouraged not only Japan but also the return to global ambitions of a Germany that never believed itself defeated in World War I, a belief confirmed by the brilliant, if vicious, oratory of Adolf Hitler. As he reached power, Hitler came to believe that new politicomilitary conditions such as tactical air power and mechanized warfare had the potential to transform geopolitical and politico-military struggles in Germany’s favor. Geopolitics played an increasingly formalized role in both phases three and four of transition (4). Britain recognized as early as 1904 through the writings of Mackinder that, if Germany came to control the Eurasian landmass, it would create a geopolitical boundary problem that could not be resolved by the politico-military solution then available. British naval power could reach, as Mackinder noted in 1919, no more than the range of its biggest guns, some twenty-five miles inland. In Germany after World War I the German geopolitician, Karl Haushofer focused on Germany’s need for a naval security partner to counter British and American naval strength, and turned naturally to Japan where he had spent time as a military advisor before World War I. After World War I Britain came to see strategic airpower as the logical politico-military alternative to sea power because it allowed power projection much further inland without committing vast armies. As aviation technology developed in the 1930s all the major air powers (United States, Great Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union) saw the possibility of long-range strategic bombers using four or more engines and procured prototypes. Such technology was difficult and expensive, fraught with excessive claims for its effectiveness and numerous missteps (Boyne 2003). The Soviet Union and Germany both developed long-range, four-engine strategic bombers, then abandoned them. In the Soviet Union the very advanced Tupolev ANT-6 was proposed as early as 1926. By 1932 160 were in service and 820 were built in total, but it was obsolete and out of service by 1941. In 1934 the Soviet Union commissioned its only other strategic bomber, Tupolev’s ANT-42, the prototype of which was accepted in 1936: only 93 were built and it saw very limited service in World War II. That same year, the Tupolev design bureau turned its attention to the very effective tactical bomber, the ANT-40 or SB-2, of which nearly 7,000 would be built (Duffy and Kandalov 1996: 42, 80, 84, 220, 222). In its “Ural bomber” program Germany built two dedicated strategic bombers before World War II from 1935 designs, both designed to reach the Ural Mountains from bases in Germany. Both were abandoned for tactical bombers upon the death of Generalleutnant Walther Wever, the Luftwaffe’s main proponent of strategic bombing, in an air accident in 1936. Dornier turned from the Do-19 to the Do-17; Junkers from the Ju 89 to the Ju 88. Heinkel persisted with a third strategic bomber, the He-177, based on a 1936 proposal for a replacement for the “Ural Bombers.” The He-177 entered limited service in 1942, but never

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performed satisfactorily. As the war progressed and the value of strategic bombing became clear, Germany produced many designs and a few prototypes, all much too late (Green 1970: 113, 127, 336, 448, 483). Britain and America persisted with large strategic bombers. Hitler’s reestablishment of the Luftwaffe panicked Britain into procuring three twin-engine strategic bombers under Air Ministry specification B.3/34, the third bomber specification issued in 1934. The ArmstrongWhitworth Whitley, Vickers Wellington, and Handley-Page Hampden were all designed to reach anywhere in Germany from bases in Britain, albeit with light bomb loads. Specification B.12/36 resulted in a larger, four-engine bomber, the Short Stirling, roughly equivalent to the “Ural bombers” and the American Boeing B-17. These prototypes from 1934 to 1936 matured in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The most outstanding four-engine strategic bomber of World War II, the Avro Lancaster, was also procured in 1936, but underwent a different line of development, originating as a large torpedo attack aircraft and morphing from the big, twin-engine, unsuccessful Avro Manchester to the four-engine Lancaster when it became evident that the Stirling was failing to meet its performance requirements (Mason 1994: 263–349). America at first saw little need for geopolitics. Secure, as America then thought, behind two oceans, and operating an increasingly protected national economy, the American territorial polity of the 1920s and early 1930s saw no obvious boundary problem with Germany and pursued a policy of hemispheric defense (Meinig 2004). Between the end of World War I and 1933 America built only fourteen bomber designs to Britain’s thirty-one. But as the trading polity came to control the levers of state power in America after 1934 it began to follow Britain’s lead, investing increasingly heavily in strategic air power. Between 1934 and 1941 America procured thirteen strategic bomber designs and built six, of which three saw service. Britain procured ten designs and built nine, of which eight saw service. In America such huge bombers as the unsuccessful prototypes of the 5,000-mile range Boeing XB-15, the request for which was issued in April 1934, and the similar Douglas XB-19, procured in February 1935 and known as the “Hemisphere Defender,” were sold to the public as isolationist tools of hemispheric defense. The highly successful B-17 “Flying Fortress” was Boeing’s response to an August 1934 requirement and was intended to extend the walls of “fortress America” well out to sea. Such bombers were easily converted into tools of strategic offense (Jones 1980: 36, 45, 54). Even as president, former secretary of the navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt failed to build America’s navy up to the tonnage limits set in the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. On the other hand, his administration began the heavy investment in strategic air power that would pay off in the phase four war in the form of many prototypes and three highly successful strategic bombers: Boeing’s B-17 and B-29, and Consolidated’s B-24 (Jones 1980: 45, 71, 97). The most extreme example of such geostrategic thinking, was the Air Corps request in spring 1941 (based on what it

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had learned from the XB-15 and XB-19 programs) for a bomber capable of carrying 4,000 pounds of bombs 12,000 miles (Wegg 1990: 93), revised in late fall to 10,000 pounds for 10,000 miles. The resulting Northrop B-35 and Convair B-36 would have bombed Germany or Japan from America (Jones 1980: 121–128; Knaack 1988: 4–7). Finally, and perhaps most importantly in phase four of transition (4), Germany entered into a suicidal Type III war with the Soviet Union for geostrategic control of what geopoliticians such as Mackinder and Haushofer had argued were vital regions. In phase three of transition (4) Germany had beaten Russia starting at the Battle of Tannenberg (1914), forcing the Russians to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1917 after the collapse of their army. The Germans clearly expected a similar outcome in 1941, though they now had much clearer geostrategic objectives: not only political control of the Heartland but also access to its crucial energy resources. In phase four, however, Germany lost disastrously to a Soviet state that was much more effective at generating Russian nationalism than its predecessor, and that had invested even more heavily than Nazi Germany in the new military technologies suited to a territorial state. The lack of strategic bombers was not fatal to a Soviet Union that could use the Red Army’s tanks and tactical air power, in both of which it excelled, to role back the Nazis on a single, common, territorial front. The Germans were stuck in a two-front war that, to the West, was well suited to strategic airpower. Future Transitions In the series of struggles that marked transition (4) only America operated predominately as a trading state throughout, thus essentially ensuring both political victory and the much more crucial economic victory that came from avoiding massive destruction of its human and economic resources. Only after transition (4) was over did it become it clear that America would have to deal with traditional geopolitical boundary problems. The failure of hemispheric defense as a policy required a more global approach to American security and a permanent American politico-military as well as economic presence outside America. This resulted in containment theory, the decision to maintain an American power base in Europe, and the confrontation with the Soviet Union in Germany that led to the Berlin Airlift (Meinig 2004). Such boundary problems were now politico-military as well as traditional geopolitical ones, involving complex alliances as well as new military technologies such as air power, space power, and nuclear weapons. Through containment theory America came to see itself as having classical geopolitical boundary problems with the Soviet Union, elaborating containment into the domino theory in an attempt to more fully understand the geopolitical issues involved. These geopolitical theories led America into the misadventure of the Vietnam War, a transition war to some. Although defeat in

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that war was worrisome it was really a side event in the much more serious component of the transition war, the cold war, victory in which came about almost entirely through vastly better long-run American economic performance than that of the Soviet Union (Gates 2006). In the world economy since the Vietnam War there have been three major players: America, the Soviet Union, and the European Union (EU). Initially only the Soviet Union seemed to be a potential challenger to America, but its economy turned out to be spectacularly weak and its military power collapsed with its loss of the Afghan War and its inability to control Chechnya. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the only economy strong enough to challenge America is the EU. We pay little attention to this because the EU was, in general, our ally during the largely ideological cold war and has generally remained such in the civilizational wars that have followed. The EU’s economy is larger than the American, if currently about 35% lower in per capita PPP, and its scientific and technological base is pretty much identical. In transition (4) Britain was challenged by two powers that stood to it rather as the EU currently stands to America. Both America and Imperial Germany had larger economies by the late 1800s than Britain, but lower per capita PPP. Financially the development of the Euro threatens to create a second world reserve currency, thus American financial primacy. Neoconservatives, who tend to be more concerned with military than economic and cultural power, have dismissed the EU as the first postmodern power (Kagan 2003) although neoliberal realists accept that the EU is a potential great power that may well emerge as did Germany in the late 1800s (Kupchan 2003). Although no territorial geopolitical boundary problems exist or are likely to exist between the EU and America, the potential for conf lict exists in the boundary conditions of tariff protection. This is, however, reduced by the relatively open nature of the American economy as well as by substantial American ownership of the European economy. Unlike the typical British overseas investment of the late 1800s this is not portfolio investment so much as direct ownership of companies. British investors bought, for example, American railroad stock, but they did not own and control the New York Central Railroad in the way that American investors currently control a company such as Ford of Europe. The EU currently looks much like Holland at the time of the Holland/ Britain transition, willing to cede a further period of hegemony to America in return for a privileged position as the principal recipient of American culture and investment, open access to the American market, and an open exchange of American science and technology. Some components of the EU, such as Britain and Germany, have been more willing than others to accept such a position than others, such as France. At the cultural level both Britain and Germany have strong ties to America because the “first effective settlement” of America was from those regions of Europe (Zelinsky 1973).

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Britain accepted its loss of hegemony to America in part because Britain was always a trading state, its “Empire” was as much an economic as a political construct, and competition among trading states for markets and resources is normative. By 1904 it was clear to at least that part of the British elite represented by Mackinder and the Edwardian “think tank” he was part of, the Co-efficients (Blouet 1987), that the advantages that had accrued to Britain from the 1500s on were being lost in the rapidly changing economic, geopolitical, and politico-military climate of the 1900s, much of which was the result of the rapid technological change of the Second Industrial Revolution (Mackinder 1904). America also began to emerge as a fundamentally different sort of hegemon, f lirting brief ly with the traditional political approaches to great power status in the Spanish-American War period, then backing away. Although Britain’s history was dominated by its trading state polity, it was not fully able to avoid political imperialism in the late 1800s, however much the imperial protectionist wing of the Tory Party dressed up such imperialism as protection of British markets in the face of American and German competition. America chose to develop instead a new form of hegemony based on the “cheap mass products, the dazzling technology, and the alluring mass culture” that was first clearly on display at the Great Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893 (Rosenberg 1982: 6). America’s full shift back to trading state status in the 1930s eased Britain’s loss and it was clear as America assumed de facto hegemony after 1945 that “the United States had no territorial ambitions, that its strategy was not aimed at dominating Europe, that the very idea of such a military alliance [as NATO] was controversial within the United States” (Meinig 2004: 357). The American “Empire” that came into existence in 1945 was thus an economic and cultural construct much more than a geopolitical or politico-military one, a tradition that owed much to British hegemony. Germany’s trading polity had always been strong, and it had always had strong settlement links to America. The first wave of German settlement in America, from roughly 1720 to 1775, came almost entirely from the Protestant German states along the seaward end of the Rhine that traditionally looked out into the Atlantic basin. The second and third waves of German settlement in America, in the 1840s and 1870s, also drew disproportionately from the western German states: migrants from Prussia, whose Junker elite dominated the German territorial polity, were almost absent (Zelinsky 1973; Jordan 1980). Following unification in 1871 the German territorial polity came to control the levers of the new German state and to believe that hegemony could only be achieved by geopolitical and politico-military means, with disastrous consequences. Germany’s military defeat in both German Wars of the 1900s, really one long transition war, has convinced it that it can no longer seek hegemony in any geopolitical or politico-military sense. The partition of 1945 helped, since West Germany was fundamentally the area controlled by the

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historic trading polity, and from 1945 on Germany has clearly embraced the trading component of its history (Hugill 2005). The current German discourse on Germany’s role in international relations is also dominated by that history and describes Germany as a “civilian power” (Maull 1990). Although there are disagreements between America and the EU, they are little more than disagreements over how to manage a hugely complex global economy, in which energy and environmental issues loom increasingly large if productivity and living standards are to stay high. Geopolitical and politico-military disagreements are minimal, despite the recent tensions over how to manage the growth of Islamism with which, in any case, the EU has geopolitical boundary problems and concerns over immigration. Many American strategists, especially in the military, see geopolitical and politico-military boundary problems emerging with a China in which the trading polity is struggling for control over the remnants of the previous, Maoist territorial polity. Without being too dismissive of the Chinese question in the long run, despite its very large economy China at present has very real and serious problems in PPP per capita, very substantial regional wealth disparities between the coastal cities and the interior, and lacks the technological capacity needed to mount an economic let alone a politico-military challenge. The leading sector of the Chinese economy only recently switched to cheap electronic goods from cotton textiles. In historical analogy, any challenge China might pose to America looks like that posed by Imperial Japan at the turn from the nineteenth century into the twentieth. Despite rapid economic growth after the Meiji Restoration, especially in cotton textiles, Japan was always very substantially behind Britain, America, and Germany in per capita PPP. Imperial Japan’s only route to challenge America in the 1920s and 30s was to build a powerful battlef leet and use it to destroy the American f leet in a Mahanian style climactic battle, meanwhile seeking resources close to home: Manchuria for its energy resources and China for its cotton. China could elect a politico-military challenge of the Japanese sort, but it would only come at substantial cost to the economic challenge it seems much more seriously embarked upon and that trading states accept as normal. It currently shows no signs of the sort of military adventuring Japan had clearly embarked upon by the time of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). In the First Gulf War (1991) it also became apparent that politico-military solutions through alliances and GPS guided smart weaponry were also extremely effective at limiting certain types of boundary struggles and controlling critical nodes and f lows of resources, oil being of predominant concern. The current ground war in Iraq (2003–?) is clearly aberrant since it has not played to America’s politico-military strengths: alliances were eschewed and occupation has replaced control of nodes and f lows. The American Air Force argues with some justice that it has

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fought a continuous air war over Iraq from 1991 to the present, such being precisely a trading state’s way of war. However, in the longer run development of the current world-economy, and despite the central importance of the technologically mediated politico-military struggle to transition (4), economic boundary problems are becoming more serious for hegemonic polities than politico-military ones. The events surrounding the rise of Protection in America and Germany in the late 1800s are evidence of the beginnings of this. The return to a globalized economy in 1944 at Bretton Woods and the emergence of the dollar as the global reserve currency marked an apparent victory for America in the Type II, phase one economic struggle of transition (4), just as the collapse of Germany in 1945 marked American and British victory in the Type I, phase two politico-military struggle and Soviet victory in their Type III struggle. Even so, Britain by no means abandoned its economic struggle with America, continuing it in its attempts to sell both commercial and military aviation technology after World War II (Engel 2007). America’s shift to Free Trade after close to 75 years of Protection returned the economic struggle to the fore, although for a while it was masked by the overarching geopolitical and politico-military struggles that seemed to characterize the cold war. Just as transition (4) began with the Type I struggle between Britain and America when America adopted Protection in 1862, transition (5) can be said to have begun with a Type I struggle between America and the new EU, formed in 1993. As befits the challenger trading state, the EU operates as a more protected economy within the American neoliberal world economy. The adoption of the Euro as a common currency for member states in 2002 has resulted in a major challenge to American financial hegemony, in much the way that the British pound was challenged by the dollar and the mark. In the history of economic struggles between trading states, as exemplified by the Type I transition (2) between Holland and Britain and the Type I component of transition (4) between Britain and America, such activity is normal. Problems have arisen when territorial states such as France, Germany, or Russia see a path to hegemony in Type II struggles, and embark on geopolitical and politico-military struggles. Two things will ensure transition (5) is a Type I transition: one is that no territorial state intrudes itself; the other is that politicomilitary systems have evolved to the point where struggles can be contained through the system of alliances or, when needed, through military struggles conducted in the way trading states prefer, to control f lows and nodes, not to occupy territory. References Abu-Lughod, Janet L. (1989) Before European Hegemony: The World-System A.D. 1250–1350. New York: Oxford University Press. Bernstein, Peter L. (2000) The Power of Gold. The History of an Obsession. New York: Wiley.

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Blouet, Brian W. (1987) Halford Mackinder: A Biography. College Station: Texas A&M University Press. Boyne, Walter J. (2003) The Influence of Air Power upon History. Gretna, LA: Pelican. Duffy, Paul, and Andrei Kandalov (1996) Tupolev: The Man and His Aircraft. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers. Engel, Jeffrey A. (2007) Cold War at 30,000 Feet: The Anglo-American Fight for Aviation Supremacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Fox, Edward Whiting (1971) History in Geographic Perspective: The Other France. New York: W.W. Norton. Gates, Robert (2006) “Presentation to Bush School Faculty and Students, Texas A&M University, on Likely Impact of Iraq Study Group.” Green, William (1970) Warplanes of the Third Reich. New York: Galahad. Hugill, Peter J. (1988a) “The Macro-Landscape of the Wallersteinian World-Economy,” in Richard L. Nostrand and Sam Hilliard, eds., Geoscience and Man, Vol. 25, The American South. Baton Rouge: Department of Geography, Louisiana State University, 77–84. ——— (1988b) “Structural Changes in the Core Regions of the World-Economy, 1830–1945.” Journal of Historical Geography 14: 111–27. ——— (1993) World Trade since 1431. Geography, Technology, and Capitalism. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. ——— (2003) “Technology, Its Innovation and Diffusion as the Motor of Capitalism.” Comparative Technology Transfer and Society 1: 89–113. ——— (2005) “Trading States, Territorial States, and Technology: Mackinder’s Unexplored Contribution to the Discourse on State Types,” in Brian W. Blouet, ed., Global Geostrategy: Mackinder and the Defence of the West. London: Frank Cass, 108–125. ——— (forthcoming). Cotton in the World-Economy: Geopolitics and Globalization since 1771. Hugill, Peter J. and Veit Bachman (2005) “The Route to the Techno-Industrial World-Economy and the Transfer of German Organic Chemistry to America before, during, and Immediately after World War One.” Comparative Technology Transfer and Society 3: 159–186. Jones, Eric L. (1981) The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia. New York: Cambridge University Press. Jones, Lloyd S. (1980) U.S. Bombers 1928 to 1980s, 3rd edition. Fallbrook, CA: Aero Publishers. Jordan, Terry G. (1980) Immigration to Texas. Boston, MA: American Press. Kagan, Robert (2003) Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order. New York: Knopf. Knaack, Marcelle S. (1988) Encyclopedia of U.S. Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems. Vol. 2, Post–World War II Bombers 1945–1973. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History. Kupchan, Charles A. (2003) The End of the American Era. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century. New York: Knopf. Mackinder, Halford J. (1904) “The Geographical Pivot of History.” The Geographical Journal 23: 421–444. ——— (1919) Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction. New York: Henry Holt. ——— (1943) “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace.” Foreign Affairs 21: 595–605. Mason, Francis K. (1994) The British Bomber since 1914. London: Putnam. Maull, Hans (1990) “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers.” Foreign Affairs 69: 91–106. McNeill, William H. (1988) The Pursuit of Power. Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Meinig, Donald W. (2004) The Shaping of America, Vol. 4., Global America, 1914–2000. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Modelski, George (1978) “The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 20: 214–35. Modelski, George and William R. Thompson (1988) Seapower in Global Politics, 1494–1993. Seattle: University of Washington Press. ——— (1996) Leading Sectors and World Powers. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Mumford, Lewis (1934) Technics and Civilization. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

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Rosenberg, Emily S. (1982) Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945. New York: Hill & Wang. Smil, Vaclav (2001) Enriching the Earth: Fritz Haber, Carl Bosch, and the Transformation of World Food Production. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ——— (2005) Creating the Twentieth Century: Technological Innovations of 1867–1914 and Their Lasting Impact. New York: Oxford University Press. Stinchcombe, William C. (1969) The American Revolution and the French Alliance. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Taylor, Peter J. (1996) The Way the Modern World Works: World Hegemony to World Impasse. New York: Wiley. Tilly, Charles (1989) “The Geography of European Statemaking and Capitalism since 1500,” in Eugene Genovese and Leonard Hochberg, eds., Geographic Perspectives in History. New York: Blackwell 158–181. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974) The Modern World-System. Vol. 1, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic. ——— (1980) The Modern World-System. Vol. 2, Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600–1750. New York: Academic. ——— (1984) The Politics of the World-Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 37–46. Wegg, John (1990) General Dynamics Aircraft and Their Predecessors. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. Wolf, Eric R. (1982) Europe and the People without History. Berkeley: University of California Press. Zelinsky, Wilbur (1973) The Cultural Geography of the United States. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

CH A P T E R

FOU R

Structural Preludes to Systemic Transition since 1494 Wi l l i a m R . Thom p s on

If it were not for the current U.S. preoccupation with its Iraqi problems, the question of systemic leadership decline and the possibilities of a transition to a new system leader would loom much larger than they have to date in this century. Yet, if forced to choose between Middle Eastern turmoil and the potential for systemic transition as the central question of twenty-first century international relations, one would have to side with the longer term implications of systemic transition. For the past 500 years, systemic transition has been about intermittent but relatively infrequent shifts in the distribution of global power. Minor, incremental shifts take place all of the time. More rare are the momentous shifts that change the identity of the leading power in the global system. Of course, what is changed is more than just a matter of which state sits at the head of the elite table. Systemic leadership is about changes in the sources of technological innovation—the main impetus of long-term economic growth. Technological innovation literally changes the world in which we live in radical ways. It also has profound implications for the pioneers of radical innovation who reap the monopoly rents of creating new technological frontiers and, as well, the responsibilities and burdens that come with systemic centrality. In 500 years, only four states (Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States) have occupied this apex position. Even this statement is contested. The global system, focused on the management of long-distance transactions and related policy problems, did not spring full blown into our collective consciousness, or elsewhere, in 1494, 1648, or 1945. It began to emerge in 1494 as large west European states began to fight over control of the remains of what had been the Italian subsystem— itself a product in part of earlier profits and problems associated with long distance transactions in the 500 years preceding 1494. But once the system began to emerge, it can be said to have slowly begun to acquire structural

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shape and patterns of behavior. Throughout this structural evolution, some significant actors increasingly specialized in global politics and economics while others retained more traditional orientations toward regional issues. Other actors moved back and forth unable to commit to primarily global or local agendas. Partly as a consequence of the emergent nature of the phenomenon and partly due to the multiple patterns of behavior of the most important powers, we disagree about which actors have been most prominent and when.1 Observers are most readily inclined to accept the reality of a shift from Britain to the United States around 1945 as the leader of the global system. More controversial are the ideas that similar, earlier shifts took place with a more industrialized Britain succeeding a more commercial Britain in 1815, Britain succeeding the United Provinces of the Netherlands in 1714, and the Dutch supplanting the Portuguese in 1609. This sequence, nonetheless, is critical to leadership long cycle theory’s interpretation of international relations history. If we are to understand what leads or precedes systemic transition, it follows that we need to look for patterns that can be generalized across the several transitions that have occurred in the past. There is no guarantee that past patterns will persist into the future—and that is something that we need to keep in mind—but given the uncertainties of the future, one viable strategy is to look to the past for regularities that just might give us some clues about the future. Leadership long cycle theory possesses at least five different models developed to help explain structural change in the global system.2 The leadership long cycle phase model establishes a schedule of generational shifts in changing structures and behavior. Each long cycle is divided into four phases that can be looked at from several different vantage points.3 In this examination, the world power–delegitimation-deconcentration– global war sequence will be emphasized. A second model, global-regional dissynchronization, argues that the dynamics of global and regional tendencies toward concentration and de-concentration are not coincidentally out of synch with one another. De-concentration at the global level encourages concentration in the system’s most central region which, in turn, increases the probability of reconcentration at the global level. Model three examines something called the “twin peaks” phenomenon. System leaders experience two distinct waves of innovation. The first peak establishes the foundation for economic and political leadership by placing the pioneering innovators at the world economy’s technological frontier. While this periodic updating of economic practices is critical to long-term economic growth, it is destabilizing and contributes to the outbreak of global war in which contenders for systemic leadership determine in a rather primitive way which candidate’s qualifications are superior. Just why the first peak is so destabilizing is the subject of the fourth model. There are several reasons including the tendency for the main competitors to pursue similar commercial, industrial, and export sectors

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more or less simultaneously. To the extent that the new sectors demand raw materials and energy resources, these same main competitors will also be attempting to lock up the same sources. Then, too, development latecomers often perceive that they must fight their way into closed markets. They also tend to rely on centralized strategies of catch up that earlier develops view as highly predatory and threatening behavior. The fifth model looks at the ways in which conf lict tends to spiral upwards nonlinearly in global war situations. Multiple rivalries among major powers seemingly escalate abruptly and simultaneously producing an expansion of conf lict that goes beyond what decision-makers thought might transpire. While our ability to decipher how rivalries escalate is still underway, the fourth model specifies several processes—serial clashes, bipolarization, and central power transitions—that work toward making rivalries more dangerous. While each model has a somewhat different slant, the emphases overlap explicitly and implicitly. Eight factors that provide hints of systemic transition can be extracted. Some of them cannot be measured very easily at this time. Others are linked and do not lead to fully independent indicators. But the eight can be distilled into several measurable predictors of systemic transition. The extent to which they are successful predictors can be tested on the last 500 year record through logistic regression. The outcome is several successful indicators with statistical substantiation that can give us some warning about the likelihood of systemic transition. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these indicators for ongoing discussions about the prospects for a Chinese challenge in the twenty-first century. Five Models (1) The Leadership Long Cycle Phase Model Table 4.1 summarizes the past 500 years or so of systemic leadership phasing (Modelski 1987). What is most important for our immediate purposes is that each phase is characterized by distinctive behavior. New system leaders emerge in periods of global war by leading the victorious coalition. The phase immediately following the global war is the best window of opportunity for establishing new rules and institutions for global politics. This window for Table 4.1

Systemic leadership phases

Global System Leader

Global War

Delegitimation

Deconcentration/ Coalition-Building

Global War

Portugal Netherlands Britain I Britain II United States

1516–1540 1609–1640 1714–1740 1815–1850 1945–1973

1540–1560 1640–1660 1740–1763 1850–1873 1973–2000

1560–1580 1660–1688 1763–1792 1873–1914 2000–2030

1580–1609 1688–1714 1792–1815 1914–1945 2030–

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optimal leadership is then followed by a period of delegitimation in which opponents of the system leader challenge the leadership and its status quo (but falling short of global warfare). Immediately prior to the renewed outset of global war is an interim period of further leadership relative decline (deconcentration) and negotiations among elite actors to see who will align with whom (coalition building) if there an intensive conf lict over power and inf luence in the global system (global war). The utility of the phase model is that it provides us with a quick historical summary of past systemic transitions and some hints about the behavior to anticipate prior to transition. Transitions have taken place at the end of the global war phase and the beginning of the world power phase (1516, 1609, 1714, 1815, and 1945). They are preceded by periods of intensive warfare of generation length (1494–1516, 1580–1609, 1688–1714, 1792–1815, and 1914–1945). These global war bouts, in turn, are preceded by periods of bargaining among major powers as they feel out potential allies. Moreover, the two to three phases preceding the global war period are characterized by the relative decline of the system leader. One would expect that the peak system leader position in terms of relative military capabilities would be found towards the beginning of the world power phase and the nadir should be located near the end of the de-concentration phase. In sum, we are told to look for periods of intensive war, coalition building, rising opposition to the status quo, and the relative decline of the system leader as preludes to system transition. We also have a predicted timing sequence: rising opposition to the legitimacy of the system leader, coalition building, global war with de-concentration trending roughly downwards across the three phases preceding global war. (2) The Regional-Global Dissynchronization Model The second model, regional-global dissynchronization (Thompson 1992; Rasler and Thompson 1994, 2001), starts from the co-opted Dehioan premise (Dehio 1962) that aspiring regional hegemons in Europe were thwarted by counterweights that were able to win by introducing extraregional resources into the balancing contest. One authoritarian counterweight supplied landpower from the east. The other entered from a western position based on its seapower and commercial mediation focused on Europe-Asia-America. Operating simultaneously, the two counterweights were able to defeat a sequence of hegemonic attempts by forcing states attempting to take over the region to fight on two fronts and usually without much access to extra-regional resources. A 1494 French bid for Italy was stopped primarily by Spain. France and the Ottoman Empire combined to block a sixteenth century Habsburg hegemonic effort. A true western counterweight emerged later in the sixteenth century in the form of Dutch-English resistance to Philip II and Spanish ambitions. The same western counterweight was mobilized to help defeat Louis XIV in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth

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centuries. By the end of the eighteenth century, Britain alone served as the western counterweight to the regional threat posed by the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Against the German challenges of World War I and II, Britain and the United States co-operated in the west while the earlier Austrian role in the east had been taken over by Russia. This brief summary of nearly five hundred years of European international relations is fairly familiar ground. What Dehio contributed was an appreciation for the pattern of regional-global structural change. At the regional level, peaks in concentrated land power alternated with troughs in regional concentration. New regional aspirants tended to emerge during the regional trough periods. It was during these same low regional concentration periods that western counterweight strength was greatest. Thus, the principal dynamic was one of alternating relative strength. The leading land power in the region tended to be strong when the western sea power was relatively weak and vice versa. Moreover, the two states pursued dramatically different agendas. The leading land power utilized absolute royal powers and large armies/ bureaucracies to expand its territorial control in the home region. The leading sea power sought to evade territorial control by specializing in monopolizing markets at home and abroad. Yet success for the leading land power implied a direct and indirect threat to the leading sea power. Regional hegemony either led to the occupation of the reigning or former sea power and/or created a very strong base for a subsequent challenge for extra-regional colonies and markets. Western sea powers, therefore, never lacked structural incentives to coordinate the suppression of regional hegemonic aspirations. Western sea power specialized in maritime containment of regional supremacy. Such a strategy could limit the expansion of a regional hegemon beyond the confines of the region but it would not suffice to defeat the hegemon on land. Someone needed to supply substantial land power for that purpose. A coalition combining the requisite naval and army capabilities could then squeeze the aspiring hegemon into overextending itself fighting on eastern and western fronts at the same time and, ultimately, unsuccessfully. Dehio thought this process had ended in 1945 as the last would-be continental unifier was defeated. Since extra-regional resource bases kept expanding and the European regional resource base was relatively fixed, Dehio also thought that this process of attempted unification-suppression of the attempt had gradually weakened the ability of European states to make bids for regional hegemony. The process therefore could not persist forever. At some point, no further bids would be feasible and at that juncture the European region would lose its autonomy to the greater strengths of the former counterweights. Dehio may have been right to interpret the European experience as a relatively unique coming together of geopolitical and historical factors. If so, it may not provide us with much predictive leverage for future

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transitions. Still, the key argument is that declining global powers are likely to be threatened by ascending regional powers. Accordingly, maritime/commercial powers will seek to build coalitions to contain and defeat leading land powers before they become genuinely global threats. In the process, sea-power capabilities are renewed and some land power capability is exhausted. There is no reason why this syndrome of dissynchronized global and regional structures might not play itself out somewhere other than Europe. There are other regions and other states that might aspire to become the leading land power in their home region. There are also regions that are adjacent to oceans that might encourage or facilitate the emergence of sea power counterweights to land-based takeover bids. East Asia, the other end of the Eurasian land mass, comes readily to mind. That this region has not yet duplicated the west Eurasian experience does not rule out the possibility that similar behavior could not re-emerge at some point in the future. The second model directs our attention to situations involving declining leading sea powers that are threatened by ascending or leading land powers focused primarily on regional territorial control. It is not a matter of the presence or absence of one or the other factor but their interaction that is most critical. Whether a second counterweight is present or potentially recruitable is more a question of who wins and loses regional wars than it is a concern for anticipating systemic transitions. (3) The Twin Peaks Model The third model (Modelski and Thompson 1996) focuses on technological change and its relationship to the onset and consequences of global warfare. Technological change looms large in the leadership long cycle research program. Long-term growth is predicated on intermittent spurts in radical technological innovation. Radical innovation is neither constant nor random. Nor is it widespread geographically. Most radical innovation is pioneered by the system’s lead economy. Each lead economy is associated with at least one paired set of spurts (hence the “twin peaks” depicted in figure 4.1). The first spurt peaks in the phase immediately prior to global war and contributes to the outbreak of war by destabilizing relative positions and the status quo in the world economy. The initial spurt also ends up helping to pay for the costs of coordinating the anti-hegemonic coalition during the consequent global war. Emerging at the end of the global war at the head of a victorious coalition, the lead economy experiences a second spurt of technological innovation in the world power phase—or the phase immediately after the global war. The second spurt may draw upon innovations in the first spurt, either improving on them or taking advantage of the lead bestowed on the pioneering economy. The innovations of the second spurt are also likely to have been accelerated or facilitated by participation in the global war.

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Global War

First K-wave Peak

Figure 4.1

Second K-wave Peak

The Twin Peaks model

Table 4.2

Growth peaks in global lead industries

Global Lead Industry Indicators Portugal Guinea Gold Indian Pepper Netherlands Baltic Trade Asian Trade Britain I Tobacco, Sugar, Indian Textiles Tobacco, Sugar, Tea, Indian Textiles Britain II Cotton Consumption, Pig Iron Production Railroad Track Laid United States Steel, Sulphuric Acid, Electricity Production Motor Vehicle Production, Aerospace Sales, and Semiconductor Production

Predicted High Growth

Observed Growth Peak

1460–1492 1516–1540

1480s 1510s

1560–1580 1609–1640

1560s 1630s

1660–1680 1714–1740

1670s 1710s

1763–1792 1815–1850

1780s 1830s

1873–1914 1945–1973

1870s/1900s 1950s

Source: Based on Modelski and Thompson (1996: 111).

For instance, radar, jet airplanes, and the computer were products of the World War II. Would they have been developed without a World War II? Without a doubt but their development would perhaps have proceeded much more slowly. Being on the winning side of the global war certainly helps as well. Table 4.2 outlines the indicators of leading sectors and the anticipated and observed timing of their peaks. The expectation that lead economies enjoy two spurts of innovation seems well validated. For our immediate purposes, though, the implication is that we should look for the initial innovation spike as a precursor to the outbreak of global war and subsequent systemic transition.

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William R. Thompson (4) A Commercial Rivalry Model

The commercial rivalry model serves to elaborate some dimensions of the problems encountered in the first innovation peak.4 A core problem is that the introduction of new commerce and industry pits pioneers and late comers against one another. The primary competitors in the world economy are not content to engage in comparative divisions of labor. Instead, they focus on the same commodities and products roughly at the same time. The lead enjoyed by the pioneer is emulated as others attempt to catch up. Since the commercial and industrial foci are similar, the competition extends to the control of sources of raw materials and energy for which demand is increasing. Pioneers and late comers must also compete to build and defend transportation infrastructures for access to raw materials and markets. Desired production scales lead inevitably to exports, more economic competition, and quite possibly surplus capacity. Within this spiral of increased economic competition, the nature of the strategies pursued can also aggravate tensions. Late comers tend to practice protectionism and other perceived unfair practices against the lead of the pioneer. Depressions make these types of practices both more attractive to the people who execute them and more predatory to the perceived victims. Late comers may also feel that the best markets are already staked out by the early leaders and require coercion to break into pioneer preserves. The pursuit of catch up strategies make democratization less likely just as more centralized economic strategies (industrial policies, cooperative banks, and subsidies in particular) are apt to be viewed as more unfair competition. Of course, all of these frictions ref lect increased economic interdependence but the constraining effects of shared interests can be overwhelmed by the intensification of competition. (5) A Nonlinear War Expansion Model Another recently developed model, one on nonlinear war expansion (Thompson 2003), argues that World War I was due at least in part to multiple interstate rivalries that were “ripe” for escalation. Without going over that particular story (that is, the World War I story), the most pertinent question is whether it is possible to generalize about the circumstances that increase the probability that rivalry ripeness is translated into nonlinear war escalation. Three conditions were advanced in the 2003 model. The first concerned serial conf licts within rivalry relationships. An increasing number of rivalries experiencing multiple clashes could be one index of increasing ripeness because successive clashes increase the probability of rivals going to war. The degree to which antagonists are bound together or “coupled” is another indicator of increasing probability for expanded conf lict. Thus, the extent to which rivals are bipolarized into two mutually exclusive camps should be suggestive for conf lict escalation. Allies are not only

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closely linked to allies in a bipolarized situation, the sheer simplicity of the conf lict pattern means that enemies are also closely coupled even if their only shared attributes are mistrust and conf lict. Power transitions suggest a third type of conducive factor. An actor being overtaken is apprehensive about future losses. The actor doing the overtaking may be overly confident of its imminent success. As they approximate capability parity, the probability of one or the other type of actor initiating conf lict with the other antagonist increases. The more central these power transitions are, moreover, the more likely the resulting conf lict will lead to nonlinear conf lict expansion. Examples of more central power transitions would encompass global-regional ones (as in model 2) and ones involving central regional leaderships. The fifth model, thus, recommends that we look at the frequency of serial clashes within rivalries, the extent to which rivals are bipolarized, and whether multiple power transitions, especially more central ones, are ongoing. The alternative would be to look at rivalry “ripeness” more directly but we have yet to develop a handle on how that might best be measured. Instead, the fifth model advocates looking at situations that might be expected to make rivalries more ripe for bloodshed. Integrating the Five Models Somewhat Table 4.3 lists 11 indicators linked to the five models. Little data that cover several centuries currently exists for two of the eight. Serial rivalry clashes are usually measured in terms of crises or militarized interstate disputes— neither of which have series extending back before 1816. Rising opposition to the status quo also has yet to be operationalized for several centuries.5 The absence of readily available data, of course, does not mean that we need to abandon these indicators permanently. But they cannot be applied to the systemic transition question right away. The global war indicator is problematic for systemic transitions. From a leadership long cycle perspective, the relationship is perfect. Between 1494 and 1945, systemic transitions did not occur without a long period of intensive combat between and among major powers. By definition, global wars did not occur during this time period without a consequent systemic transition. While global war is therefore a quite efficient predictor of systemic transition, it does not really aid our search for empirical clues to an incipient transition. If one must follow the other (no global war, no systemic transition), it would be tautological to employ global war as a predictor of systemic transition.6 An alternative approach, however, is to use global war as a proxy for systemic transition. Since we have no convenient way to capture systemic transition numerically without using some of the same data that are useful for prediction purposes, adopting global war as our dependent variable is most attractive. The twin peak model’s emphasis on the first of two innovation spurts shares some of the awkwardness associated with global war. As

64 Table 4.3

William R. Thompson Indicators of systemic transition found in five leadership long cycle models

Model 1 Phases ●

Relative decline of system leader

●

Rising opposition to status quo Coalition-building Intensive war

● ●

●

—

Model 2 Dissynchronization

Model 3 Twin Peaks

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

First of two Innovation spurts or peaks

—

—

Pioneers and late comers compete in same sectors and need same raw materials and energy resources Late comers employ more centralized strategies to catch up and break into closed markets

—

Interaction of global and regional concentration ●

—

—

Model 4 Model 5 Commercial Rivalry Nonlinear War

●

—

—

— ●

●

—

—

—

—

● ●

Multiple serial clashes Bipolarization Central power transitions

demonstrated in table 4.2, the relationship between the first of a pair of growth spikes and global war is perfect. Global war, by definition, has always followed the first of two technological waves. That is good to know but it does not aid our quest for constructing a set of probabilistic indicators. There is certainly no need to throw out a very strong indicator but we need to set it aside for the moment. Similarly, capturing the tendency for increased competition in similar sectors, raw materials, and energy sources is difficult to do in a single indicator. It is a more complex problem for which evidence has been advanced elsewhere (Sen 1984; Bunker and Ciccantell 2005; Thompson 2006). There has also been extremely little variance in the more centralized strategies of development late comers. Thus, these two indicators do not lend themselves to convenient operationalization either.

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Coalition building and bipolarization overlap to some extent. Major powers searching for allies need not end up in two mutually exclusive camps but the development of bipolarization probably requires some involvement in coalition building. To tap these indicators, we need to examine major power alliance behavior patterns. Increases in the frequency of alliance formation and dissolution presumably would signify a commitment to coalition building beyond the norm. Similarly, we can measure the extent to which major powers are situated in mutually exclusive alliance clusters. The data on 500 years of major power alliance making are still being improved but an interim measure that manages to capture some aspects of both coalition building and bipolarization is a balancing index developed originally for other purposes. The index measures the extent to which major powers are allied against the leading land power of the European region (see Levy and Thompson 2005). In any specific time period there is one state that possesses the largest army in the region (the indicator for leading land power). The question is to what extent do other major powers ally against this power. Presumably, the more states allied against the leading land power, the greater is the perceived threat of regional expansion and hegemony. Since the number of major powers in existence varies, this index, plotted in figure 4.2, is measured as a proportion of the number of existing major powers other than the leading land power. One liability of this index, however, is that it is tied very closely to the history of European international relations. For postdicting past transitional behavior this Eurocentricity is not much of a handicap but its generalization into the future may warrant further consideration. 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2

14

6 14 0s 9 15 0s 2 15 0s 5 15 0s 8 16 0s 1 16 0s 4 16 0s 7 17 0s 0 17 0s 3 17 0s 6 17 0s 9 18 0s 2 18 0s 5 18 0s 8 19 0s 1 19 0s 4 19 0s 70 s

0

balancing Figure 4.2

Linear (balancing)

Balancing against leading land powers in Europe

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William R. Thompson

The last three indicators also overlap. The relative decline of the global system leader conventionally is measured in terms of the relative capability position of that state. For the global system, which places a premium on reaching across great distances, capability is best measured in terms of global reach or naval capability.7 The f luctuations in the share of naval capabilities controlled by the leading global power are plotted in figure 4.3. Given the numerous changes in naval technology across the past five centuries, this index is based on an indicator system that attempts to evolve with changes in maritime capabilities. The emphasis is placed largely on the number of ships but the actual count begins with armed warships in the sixteenth century and moves through a schedule of shipsof-the-line that are subject to an escalatory trend in the minimal number of guns carried to qualify as able to survive in the first line of combat. In the nineteenth century, wooden sailing ships were replaced by first iron sided ships that eventually became battleships that were also subject to increasingly lethality in terms of their fire power.8 Battleships then gave way to heavy aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, both of the attack and ballistic missile variety.9 As shown in figure 4.3 system leaders tend to emerge from periods of global warfare with their highest shares in naval power. Subsequent decades tend to be characterized by relatively declining positions of variable pace. The “interaction” of global and regional capability concentration might be interpreted in several ways but we have had some success earlier with an index that subtracts the relative size of the region’s leading army from the relative size of the global system’s leading navy. As this 1.2

1

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

1491 1505 1519 1533 1547 1561 1575 1589 1603 1617 1631 1645 1659 1673 1687 1701 1715 1729 1743 1757 1771 1785 1799 1813 1827 1841 1855 1869 1883 1897 1911 1925 1939 1953 1967 1981 1995

0

Figure 4.3

Naval capability

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0.6

0.4

0.2

0

–0.2

–0.4

–0.6 global-regional Figure 4.4

Global-regional concentration, 1490s–1990s

index takes on increasingly smaller or negative numbers, either regional concentration is increasingly faster than global concentration or global de-concentration is progressing faster than regional de-concentration. Larger, positive numbers for this index, enumerated in figure 4.4, suggest that global concentration is outpacing regional concentration. While this index is not a direct translation of all possible power transition situations, it does attempt to measure the extent to which regional leaders are catching up to or surpassing the capability positions of global leaders—which has been portrayed as one of, if not the, central power transition dynamic to watch for. Thus, we have two indicators: f luctuations in relative sea power and the index that combines proportional information on global sea power and regional army power. Declining sea power positions and diminishing gaps between global and regional military positions should be harbingers of an impending global war confrontation. Five somewhat different models have been reduced to a set of three possible indicators of global war-systemic transition. All three indicators represent behavior that create structures thought to be conducive to systemic transition. One focuses on alliance behavior while the other two are oriented toward capability expansion and decay at sea and on land. Table 4.4 summarizes the outcome for 48 decades of major power military buildup and conf lict.10 Each of the three indicators contribute something to the explanatory outcome. Not surprisingly, balancing against the threat posed by the leading land power makes global war more likely. While the

68

William R. Thompson Table 4.4 A multivariate logit examination of global war/ systemic transitions, 1520–2000 Variable

Coefficient

Constant

1.627 (1.869) Balancing 5.605** (2.455) Naval Capability 213.681** (4.63) Global-Regional Concentration 27.364* (4.068) LR Chi square (3) 5 27.65** N548 Pseudo R2 5 0.493

Notes: * Denotes statistical significance at the 0.10 level or better. ** Denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level or better.

balance of power is revered as a traditional mechanism for preserving the peace, it is fairly well known that its main f law is that balancing usually makes physical conf lict more rather than less likely. That is, balancing has been most useful for resisting and eventually overpowering would-be regional hegemons in Europe. The decline of the incumbent global leader makes global war more probable. So does a diminishing gap between global and regional military positions. This outcome may sound as if the same variable, naval concentration, is being counted twice. Yet the correlation between the decline of global sea power and the gap between global sea and regional land power positions remains fairly moderate (r 5 0.482). On the other hand, if one examines regional military concentration by itself, the coefficient is statistically insignificant and incorrectly signed. Thus, knowing something about the decline of the global leader and how this plays out vis-à-vis continental aspirations improve our understanding of movements toward systemic transition. The three variables account for nearly 50% of the variation over the past five centuries. If there was a reasonable way to introduce the first peak of technological change as a fourth variable and the frictions between technological pioneers and latecomers, we might anticipate an even stronger explanatory outcome. But part of the problem is that only some innovation peaks cause trouble. Other peaks, such as the second part of the twin peaks phenomenon introduce statistical noise in this particular respect. Frictions, moreover, are notoriously difficult to pin down quantitatively. Conclusions We have some respectable predictive capability concerning the advent of systemic transitions in the past. A checklist of nearly a dozen things to look for can be advanced, some of which have fairly solid empirical grounding

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presented here. Perhaps that means we can put more confidence in at least the postdictive value of the indicators that made it into the logistic regression equation. Yet all of the eleven indicators are based on some sort of empirical evidence from past iterations: ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Relative decline of the global system leader Rising opposition to the status quo Coalition building Interaction of global and regional concentration First of two innovation spurts or peaks Competitive frictions between technological pioneers and latecomers More authoritarian catch up strategies Multiple serial clashes Bipolarization Central power transitions Intensive global warfare

Can we use this information in the twenty-first century? To borrow a phrase beloved of economists: it depends. As long as we stick to generalities, there are basically only so many alternative futures. One is that any propensities toward systemic transition will play itself out pretty much as it did in the past 500 years. On the one hand, we know or have good reason to expect that western Europe is unlikely to generate another military challenger. That might suggest that the traditional (eg, 1494–1945) fusing of regional and global politics on occasion need not work the same way as in the past. But it is not inconceivable that East Asia or Eurasia could spawn a formidable challenger later in the twenty-first century.11 Were that to occur, it is hard to imagine regional land power concentration not increasing even as global capability concentration decayed. Thus, there is a decent possibility that regional-global dissynchronization could continue into the future despite a substantial change in venue. It seems highly likely that we have already experienced at least one East Asian iteration of regional land power concentration increasing as global concentration declined in the 1930s. If we look, we may find even earlier iterations. It seems implausible that the decay of the system leader’s capabilities or increasing balancing activity are apt to become obsolete considerations in the twenty-first century—assuming, at least, no fundamental changes in the way the system operates. It is not difficult, for example, to see ongoing attempts at containing China in motion. Some things and strategies do not seem to go out of fashion. A second scenario is that many processes in international relations may continue as before but no aggressive challenger may emerge. The costs of major power warfare have increased exponentially. The benefits of engaging in peaceful economic development and trade have also expanded. In this respect, the cost-benefit calculus of global warfare may have been

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altered forever.12 The current Chinese “charm offensive” certainly seems to ref lect this estimation. As one Chinese policy maker has written: The . . . strategy is to transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge, . . . China will not follow the path of Germany leading up to World War I or those of Germany And Japan leading up to World War II, when these countries violently plundered resources and pursued hegemony. Neither will China follow the path of the great powers vying for global domination during the Cold War. Instead, China will transcend ideological differences to strive for peace, development, and cooperation with all countries of the world. (Zheng 2005: 22) Perhaps the Chinese ascent path will in fact be different. It is interesting to observe, however, that the above paragraph (or the article in which it was embedded) did not specify just how a transcendental strategy would be forged—only that such a path would be pursued, explicitly eschewing traditional great power competitions ala the late nineteenth century, hegemonic resource pillaging strategies of the mid-twentieth century, or a late-twentieth-century cold war competition over relative inf luence. At the same time as China stresses peace and cooperation, its economy expands quickly in size (Maddison 1998), its military spending expands on land and at sea, and it makes a point of demonstrating an ability to destroy satellites in outer space. All of these activities tend to contribute to regional power concentration and may facilitate further global power de-concentration.13 These same activities also tend to be interpreted as threatening by the incumbent system leader. Yet faced with weaknesses in many spheres, it makes perfect sense for a potential challenger to avoid confrontations while working on reducing the weaknesses. The question is whether future Chinese decision makers will feel equally inclined toward cooperative gestures when their material base and technological competitiveness has been improved substantially. There is also the problem that becoming the leading actor in the world system is quite a prize—perhaps unlike any other goal in the history of world politics. It might be perceived to be so valuable that the costs and benefits of major power warfare could be overridden in the eyes of decision-makers operating in stressful crises. This last point applies to both would-be challengers and incumbent system leaders. Whether we like it or not, there is probably at least one last hurdle to overcome before transcendental paths towards peace and cooperation might become fully plausible. That hurdle is the twenty-first century’s question of China’s re-emergence as not just a great power but one of the most powerful states in the system. Should it become quite clearly the most powerful and technologically innovative state in the system, some type of systemic transition, with or without global war, seems probable—all other things being equal.14

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Yet all other things may not be equal. The United States could very well duplicate the British feat of experiencing two sets of “twin peaks,” in which case one might still have an intensive conf lict of some sort over global leadership but not necessarily as much of a radical transition as would be implied by a more Sino-centric outcome. From an evolutionary perspective, it would not be too surprising and certainly welcome if the next challenge simply sputters out. If so, we should be in the beginning part of a first innovation peak. It is of course conceivable that technological innovation will no longer be monopolized by one lead economy at a time as it has in the recent past.15 Were the advent of new waves of technological innovation to be more widely distributed, it is equally possible that the attendant economic changes and their politico-military implications might be less destabilizing. No clear evidence, however, is available that would support such an evolutionary shift in the concentration of innovation. As long as this technological concentration and uneven diffusion process remains a central feature of modern economic growth, both the probabilities of further systemic transitions and the attendant political tensions and conf licts between pioneers and later developers seem strong. Notes 1. One way to look at these disagreements over the extent or existence of leadership is to imagine scholars of the American presidency insisting that all U.S. presidents that “count” must have exhibited precisely the same powers wielded by the current U.S. president. But the point is that U.S. presidential capabilities and powers have evolved over time too. It makes little sense, therefore, to require all earlier presidents to have exhibited the same political powers of the contemporary era. 2. There are other models. For a sixth model that is focused on which challengers, assuming multiple threats of succession, declining system leaders are most likely to select as the primary enemy, see Thompson (1997) and Rapkin and Thompson (2003). 3. The timing of the four phases do not change but it is possible to look at the phases in the context of the ascent of a future system leader prior to global war or its peak inf luence and relative decline after a phase of global war. 4. This model is discussed in more detail and in the context of the global warfare of the past 500 years in Thompson (2006). The model represents a synthesis of three earlier models advanced in Kennedy (1980), Sen (1984), and Bunker and Ciccantell (2007). Note that many of the problems are likely to be more acutely manifested in circumstances involving “doubled” twin peaks—that is, when one state enjoys two sets of twin peaks. The gap between the lead economy and latecomers is likely to be all the greater. 5. One approach to this type of variable is suggested by work on measuring status quo dissatisfaction within the power transition research program. See, for instance, Tammen et al. (2000). 6. This tautology applies only to past global systemic transitions (e.g., 1494–1945). One can make a case for earlier systemic transitions in regional and/or a pre-global world system. One can also speculate on how systemic transitions might come about in the future without global warfare. 7. There is no question that naval capabilities have been augmented by aerospace capabilities from the twentieth century on. One of the more interesting discussions of this process is Hugill (2005). Yet the question remains one of whether the capability trajectory would look all that different if both types of capability were integrated into a single indicator. This is an empirical question that awaits resolution. 8. In this period, some of the technological chaos is smoothed by relying also on naval expenditures as another indicator of relative position.

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9. Ballistic submarines are indexed in terms of their missile lethality and accuracy. See Modelski and Thompson (1988) for details on the index construction. 10. The empirical analysis begins in the 1520s (and runs through the 1990s) since there is an absence of data prior to the outbreak of global war in 1494 that continued to 1516. 11. Here the question is whether the ending of the long-time centrality of Western Europe implies the absence of a central region in the future or the substitution of other regions. One possibility is that East Asia might supplant Western Europe creating a reversed mirror effect for the Dehioan geopolitical tendencies of Eastern and Western balancers for interior hegemons. Or, it could be that the new central region will be Eurasia writ large. One can interpret the cold war reaction to the Soviet threat of expansion as a continuation of a Eurocentric script or a new pan-Eurasian development. Since the cold war was contested throughout Eurasia, rather than simply in Europe, the evidence leans toward a more pan-Eurasian possibility. If so, this development would conform with the long-term British-Russian rivalry that also was waged on a pan-Eurasian scale. Should China become the twenty-first century’s principal challenger, however, much of the pan-Eurasian contest will have a strong East Asian focus. 12. See the arguments developed by Rosecrance (1986) and Rasler and Thompson (2005). 13. Despite some alarms to the contrary (O’Rourke 2007; Kennedy 2007), Chinese naval development has had more success in the conventional arena than in terms of nuclear submarines or aircraft carriers, still the hallmarks of maritime global reach. The applicability of such a generalization need not persist long into the future. 14. Hence, the question is not how big the challenger becomes when but who arrives at the next technological frontier first, how concentrated global and regional systems become, and what sort of alliances are constructed to contain threatening challengers or to evade containment. 15. This “recent past” extends back continuously to Sung China or over a millennium according to Modelski and Thompson (1996).

References Bunker, Stephen G. and Paul S. Ciccantell (2007) Globalization and the Race for Resources. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Dehio, Ludwig (1962) The Precarious Balance. New York: Vintage. Hugill, Peter J. (2005) “Trading States, Territorial States, and Technology: Mackinder’s Contribution to the Discourse on States and Politics,” in Brian W. Blouet, ed., Global Geostrategy: Mackinder and the Defence of the West. London: Frank Cass, 107–124. Kennedy, Paul (1980) The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914. London: George Allen and Unwin. ——— (2007) “The Rise and Fall of Navies.” International Herald Tribune (April 5). Levy, Jack and William R. Thompson (2005a) “Balancing and War.” Paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, HI, March. ——— (2005b) “Hegemonic Threats and Great Power Balancing in Europe, 1495–1999.” Security Studies 16: 1–33. Maddison, Angus (1998) Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run. Paris: OECD. Modelski, George (1987) Long Cycles in World Politics. London: Macmillan. Modelski, George and William R. Thompson (1988) Sea Power and Global Politics, 1494–1993. London: Macmillan. ——— (1996) Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Economics and Politics. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. O’Rourke, Ronald (2007) China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities— Background and Issues for Congress. CRS Report for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Rapkin, David and William R. Thompson (2003) “Power Transition, Challenge, and the (Re) emergence of China.” International Interactions 29: 317–342. Rasler, Karen and William R. Thompson (1994) The Great Powers and Global Struggle, 1490–1990. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

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——— (2001) “Malign Autocracies and Major Power Warfare: Evil, Tragedy and International Relations Theory.” Security Studies 10: 46–79. ——— (2005) Puzzles of the Democratic Peace: Theory, Geopolitics and the Transformation of World Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Rosecrance, Richard (1986) The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World. New York: Basic Books. Sen, Gautam (1984) The Military Origins of Industrialization and International Trade Rivalry. London: Pinter. Tammen, Ronald L., Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Allan Stam III, Carole Alsharabati, Mark A. Abdollahian, Brian Efird, and A.F.K. Organski (2000) Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century. New York: Chatham House. Thompson, William R. (1992) “Long Cycles and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transitions.” World Politics 43: 127–152. ——— (1997) “The Evolution of Political-Commercial Challenges in the Active Zone.” Review of International Political Economy 4: 285–317. ——— (2000) The Emergence of the Global Political Economy. London: University College London Press/Routledge. ——— (2003) “A Streetcar Named Sarajevo: Catalysts, Multiple Causation Chains, and Rivalry Structures.” International Studies Quarterly 47: 453–474. ——— (2006) “Commercial Rivalry and Global War.” Paper delivered to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, August. Zheng Bijan (2005) “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status.” Foreign Affairs 84: 18–24.

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CH A P T E R

F I V E

Falling Down: An Empirical Test of Dynamic Differentials Theory 1500–1999 M ic h a e l L e e

With the power and inf luence of China and India rapidly rising as America’s star fades, a discussion of systemic transition is warranted. Scholars of international relations must address whether impending transitions will be peaceful, conf lictual or even nonexistent (Rennstich 2004). The historical result has varied little—most systemic transitions have ended in warfare. Nonetheless, it is worth investigating why transitions have often led to war, as this may elucidate what the future holds in store, and even how that future might be addressed. Dale Copeland (2000) in The Origins of Major War offers an answer to just such a question. Synthesizing classical realism, neo-realism and hegemonic stability theory, he argues that the likelihood of major power war is determined by the interaction between military power differentials and the long-term prospects of a great power. In short, declining power fear the future and risk hegemonic wars to avoid a slow death by stagnation. At the same time, he (Copeland 2000: 11–35) accepts the precept that polarity is also important—with multipolar international systems more likely to produce systemic war, because counter-hegemonic alliances are more prone to collective action problems in this setting. Dynamic differential theory, if proven valid, offers stark implications: systemic transitions lead to preventive wars. While Copeland has developed a mechanism able to explain some cases, dynamic differentials theory is not a general theory of war. Three principle problems arise: first it is hard to square Copeland’s universal claims with a historical reality that is ever changing. Second, Copeland’s theory requires an unrealistic assumption that there are no “rents” to hegemony, or that states care naught of their “role” within the international system.1 Finally, multipolarity alone cannot explain the patterns of coalition formation necessary for the escalation of conf licts into major wars. Specific

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conditions make war escalation more likely: territorial concerns drive offensive coalitions, while naval powers have historically played a key role in holding together counter-hegemonic coalitions.2 This chapter will proceed first by establishing Copeland’s theory, drawing out his main hypothesis: that major wars are most likely to occur when a great power faces relative decline against a state with a weaker military, controlling for the collective action problems that may be presented by multipolarity in the international system. Next, I will explore the two main problems with dynamic differentials: the question of why rising powers initiate wars, and why balancing is a more complex act than Copeland suggests. Finally, I will test Copeland’s theory against the reality of great power wars in the European system (and world system after 1940) 1495–2000 in a large-N dyadic logistic regression. Dynamic Differential Theory Dynamic differential theory begins with the proposition that states in decline “fear the future” (Copeland 2000: 1–3). Even if the intentions of rising challengers seem outwardly benign, the declining state faces uncertainty: once stronger, the challenger will be able to invade or extract concessions with relative impunity. Driven by security concerns, rational leaders are inclined to initiate crises with the hope of reversing decline and salvaging their position (36–37). These crises contain the risk of escalation, but also the prospect of easy gains if other powers involved in the crisis make concessions. Whether or not such an approach will be taken depends also upon how inevitable and how deep decline is presumed to be—ref lecting the difference in the economic potential of the two powers in crisis. Thus, the likelihood of war and crisis can be predicted by the interaction between military differentials, and the future expectation of military differentials (i.e., economic growth). Where decline cannot be averted, Copeland argues that states will be more likely to choose risky options that may lead to war. Copeland (2000: 40) summarizes the assumptions underlying these mechanisms, largely drawn from the traditional assumptions of realist international relations theory, as shown in table 5.1. While the above assumptions form the basis of his theory, he adds that each can be relaxed somewhat. However, the only explicit prospective violations Copeland suggests are the impacts of nuclear weapons and democratic peace theory. In addition it is unclear as to whether Copeland is discussing regional systems (such as the European system) or the international system as a whole (although it is possible to infer the former until 1945, given his exclusion of the United States and Japan from a discussion of the World War II). Copeland then establishes polarity as an intervening variable. In a multipolar world, the rise of a single power over the rest is difficult to

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Table 5.1 Assumptions in the origins of major war Unit-Level Assumptions 1. Rationality 2. Ends 3. Direction of ends 4. Nature of actor 5. Risk tolerance 6. Cost tolerance

High security seeking self-interested unitary (state) Neutral Neutral

Systemic-Level Assumptions 1. Certainty of other's present intent 2. Certainty of other's future intent 3. Certainty regarding past/present power levels 4. Offense-defense balance 5. Geographic position of states 6. Tech. costs of war

largely uncertain fully uncertain largely certain Neutral equidistant moderate

Source: Copeland (2000: 10).

Table 5.2

Bipolar Multipolar

Likelihood of war initiation by state strength and polarity Declining Strong State

Rising Strong State

Parity

High High

Moderate Low

High Loderate

Source: Copeland (2000: 18–19).

stop. While states fear the prospect of domination by the rising state, each would rather free-ride by letting others shoulder the costs in blood and treasure of stopping the rise of the ascendant state. Should another state rise from the pack at a later date, the likelihood of war between the leader and challenger will rise, tempered by the prospects of a balancing coalition emerging against whichever state initiates a war. If a rising power reaches near-parity with the leading state, the likelihood of war will decrease because the costs of war would be high, and the chances of victory poor for either side. Bipolarity, on the other hand, presents a more war-prone situation. Because the leading state alone has the ability and incentive to contain the rising state, they are likely to attack as soon as their relative decline becomes apparent—and are still likely to do so when the leader and challenger are in a state of parity. This relationship has been summarized in table 5.2. Copeland’s theory can be summarized as a set of related hypotheses about war. He identifies three “independent variables” that will contribute to war: initial differentials of relative military power, depth of decline, and the inevitability of further decline. Relatively powerful countries are more likely to initiate war, as are declining countries, and those with little prospect of outpacing a challenger. However, the effect of decline will depend upon the polarity of the international system—collective action problems will make war unlikely when the international system

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is multipolar, and more likely when the international system is bipolar or unipolar. Copeland’s basic hypotheses are summarized below: H1: The likelihood of major power war is increased when a great power is both in a state of relative economic decline, and military preponderance over other states. H2: Multipolarity decreases the likelihood of major war, ceteris paribus. Rising States and War Initiation In The Origins of Major War, Copeland (2000: 3) poses an argument as to why rising states are unlikely to initiate conf licts: “rising states should want to avoid war while they are still rising, since by waiting they can fight later with more power.” However, he misses an important set of incentives: the desire for increased role or rents accruing to a power by its status. While it would seem that rents are a poor fit for Copeland’s assumption that concerns over security primarily drive the actions of states, this is not the case. Consider that control over the institutional settings of the international system is hardly irrelevant to security. For instance, the Congress of Vienna was aimed at maintaining an institutional setting favored by the victors of the Napoleonic wars, benefitting the autocratic great powers of Eastern Europe far more than France.3 International institutions tend to be sticky, ref lecting the preferences of the victors of the last war, while limiting the ability of rising powers to exert inf luence (Ikenberry 2001: 61–69). Power transition theory presents a view of the international system as comprised of a hierarchy of states, with proportionally greater rents accorded to those

Dominant Power

Great Powers

Middle Powers

Small Powers

Dissatisfied Figure 5.1

Satisfied

System satisfaction of members of the international system

Source: Kugler and Tammen (chapter 8).

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0

.1

.2

.3

.4

at the top, as in figure 5.1. If dominance comes with rents, then rising powers may have an incentive to initiate wars, because military power does not necessarily translate into a greater role (Doran and Parson 1980). Great powers do not surrender institutional powers easily, even if another has surpassed their military strength. This is not necessarily a miscalculation either (Kim 1996: 94–96), as it stems from the belief that allies will come to their aid (if, e.g., the status quo benefits multiple powers). Declining power war initiation of major war is far from a constant in the range of cases one might draw from the European system since 1495. The France of Louis XIV presents a good case of rising state war—in contrast to the religious wars of the first half of the seventeenth century, France enjoyed stability, demographic growth and more colonies. Despite this sharp upward trajectory, France invaded Holland in 1672, a declining power faced with stagnant demographic growth and waning domination of overseas trade (see figures 5.2–5.3). Casting the War of the League of Augsburg as a French reaction to a rising Austria (as Copeland does) is simply not borne out by the historical reality. Following the end of internal strife in the first half of the seventeenth century, the French remained relatively stable. Austria, on the other hand, had seen relative decline through the course of the century—with the Austrian share of population (a good indicator of the largely agricultural wealth of pre-industrial states) down by a third from the beginning of the century (see figure 5.4). The War of Austrian Succession offers another textbook case of rising states initiating wars. Once again, Austria in the eighteenth century was not a rising challenger to Prussian sovereignty. Indeed, quite the opposite (Hassal 2001: 65–87), despite gains in the treaty of Utrecht, the Austrian

1600

1650 year United Provinces

Figure 5.2

1700

France

French and Dutch relative shares of military power, 1620–1714

Source: Rasler and Thompson (1994) and Modelski and Thompson (1988).

Michael Lee

0

.05

.1

.15

80

1600

1650

1700

1750

Year Netherlands Figure 5.3

France

French and Dutch relative shares of overseas colonies, 1600–1714

.1

.15

.2

.25

.3

Source: Rasler and Thompson (2005).

1600

1620

1640

1660

1680

year France Figure 5.4

Austria

French and Austrian shares of great power population, 1600–1685

Source: McEvedy and Jones (1978).

empire had lost a number of Italian territories and faced the rising specter of a rising Russia to the east (see figure 5.5). Furthermore, the ascension of Maria Theresa as empress of Austria was controversial both internally and externally (Browning 1995: 37–45), as the risk of rival claimants increased (e.g., it gave Frederick the Great a pretext for annexing Silesia). The likelihood of a Prussian attack was increased by Austrian decline, rather than diminished—with Prussia capitalizing on Austrian weakness

81

.2 .15 .1

popshareb

.25

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1690

1700

1710

1720

1730

1740

year Figure 5.5

Austrian share of great power population, 1714–1740

Source: McEvedy and Jones (1978).

in the face of the succession question. The initiation of opportunistic wars by weak rising powers may take place even without being driven by positional concerns. Smaller great powers have great reason to fear for their security, but if they can become larger great powers, their security is surely aided in the long run. That is not to say preventive war never happens, however, it has no monopoly as a cause of major war. Preventive Wars and Balancing Copeland’s mechanism for the expansion of wars is the weakest part of his argument, and yet a necessary element for his theory to be one of major wars. Major wars, by Copeland’s own definition must include all great powers in the system. While this requirement can be relaxed, the mechanism by which wars expand is just as important as the motives that drive war initiation (Copeland 2000: 3–4). Without a viable explanation for why a conf lict might come to include the entire international system, dynamic differentials are simply a theory of war, not major war. Measured as a predictor of all wars, not merely major ones, preventive motives are clearly an exception, not a rule. Copeland (2000: 23–24) argues that since all states have a stake in survival, defensive coalitions will form against aggressive bids for hegemony. At the same time, there is some tension between the desire to sit on the sidelines, maximizing relative power, and the desire to prevent the domination of the international system by a single power. On top of this, while major wars often feature counter-hegemonic coalitions, offensive coalitions are hardly rarities, either (Schroeder 1994). Austria, for instance, won the support of France and Russia for its planned offensive against Prussia in the Seven Years’ War and Germany the support of Italy and Japan in the World War II. Schweller (2006) contests the conventional argument

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that offensive alliances are especially difficult to form; pointing out that such an approach ignores the gains from conquest, which can be divided between coalition members. The motivations behind balancing and band-wagoning are often distinct—while security drives the latter, profit inspires the former. In addition, Copeland’s “fear of the future” may be shared by a number of states; each with a common interest in halting the rise of a particular state (The Pact of Steel between Germany, Japan and Italy, forged to oppose Soviet expansion, may fit the bill in this instance). Copeland’s insistence that states initiating preventive war be stronger than those they are attacking can also be mitigated by band-wagoning (e.g., a weak Austria, cobbled together a much stronger coalition with France and Russia in the Seven Years’ War). Moreover, because offensive alliances are often necessary for a plausible bid for hegemony, one ought to question the degree to which multipolarity is a predictor of major war. After all, if multipolarity increases the problems of collective action problems for defensive alliances, it does so for offensive ones as well. Additional questions that further confound the theory involve whether a “balance of power” mechanism functions consistently. Levy has argued that the balance of power is a specifically European artifact, and one that operates selectively at any rate. Levy and Thompson (2007) point out that the powers that historically played the role of “balancers” (the Dutch and British in particular) were naval powers. Interestingly, the rise of Holland, Britain and the United States to domination of global commerce and industry did not foster a balancing response by other powers. Hence, the operation of the balance of power requires some qualification (Levy and Thompson 2007). This study will posit that there are particular reasons why naval powers tend to play the role of balancers most effectively. Dominion over the seas requires the sinews of a strong financial system, which can also support mercenaries and subsidies to other powers (Modelski and Thompson 1988). Financial strength, being more fungible than military power, enables the formation of noncontiguous alliances that would otherwise be difficult to put together (Hart 1976). Leading naval powers tend to expand their power by colonization, industrialization and trade—avenues that do not require territorial acquisition. The pursuit of those objectives does, however, require a divided European continent (Otte 2003; Snyder 1984). Should a single power gain continental hegemony, the naval power would face a profound threat to its basic territorial integrity, as did the Portuguese, Dutch and British from the Spanish, French and Germans, respectively. In keeping with general theories of collective action, coordination is more likely, as capability is more centralized (Olson 1965: 53–66). While multiple actors can provide a public good (such as security against bids for hegemony), it is more likely that each will pass the buck, hoping that others will subsidize a defensive coalition (Schelling 1978). Schweller explores a different problem in Unanswered Threats, in his focus on the sources of under-balancing. Even if circumstances compel

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states to act against a hegemonic bid by another state, it is possible that they will miscalculate matters (indeed this may offer a distinct causal path to war in itself ). Schweller (2006: 46–68) suggests that domestic politics often act as a constraint, preventing the operation of balancing mechanisms, and throwing an additional wrench into Copeland’s argument. The increasing prevalence of democracy might suggest yet another factor that might change how states balance. At any rate it is difficult to construct theories of warfare that will work in all time and space, if the mechanism that causes wars to expand changes over time. Even if one accepts Copeland’s premise regarding the effects of multipolarity, another tension is revealed. If multipolarity encourages aggressive behavior because of collective action problems and sideline sitting within potential defensive alliances, then it may also prevent a major war from happening in the first place. After all, sideline sitting implies that key actors are not participating in the war, or are mobilizing less than their full strength, which begs the question: what do you do if you start World War III and nobody shows? The question may be asked whether the sidelining scenario has occurred before within the international system. Reasonable contenders abound—but the Franco-Prussian war offers a good example. France during the period offers a strong case of relative decline: demographically, the French population was growing much more slowly than either that of Britain or Germany/Prussia, while France could not keep pace with the industrialization of either power (See figure 5.6). Moreover, the ongoing unification of Germany suggested a long-term threat for France. When the question of the Spanish succession became open, and a Hohenzollern was eligible for the Spanish throne, the French demanded renunciation of such claims by the Prussian ruler (Halperin 1973). While the Ems dispatch aroused tempers on both the Prussian and

.05

.1

.15

.2

Equally weighted index of COW economic variables 1816–1870

1820

1830

1840

1850

1860

year Figure 5.6

Relative share of German and French economic power, 1816–1870

Source: Singer (1987).

1870

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French side, it was the French that initiated war against the Prussians in a mechanism similar to that described by Copeland (a declining power attacked a rising one before things got worse). The ensuing war, however, engaged no external parties (except some German states bound by a defensive pact with Prussia) against France or Prussia. The question of whether a war became a major war was determined largely by third parties, which opted to be spectators. A question of the opposite sort may also post another problem. Even when many great powers involve themselves in a conf lict, a highly asymmetric balance of forces may result in a onesided conf lict requiring less than full mobilization. For instance, although the War of the Quadruple Alliance included most of the European great powers, none except beleaguered Spain came close to full mobilization. Thus balancing is not enough on its own, the right amount of balancing is necessary to cause a major war. Summing Up Dynamic differential theory cannot systematically predict the initiation of wars, major or otherwise. It is not that preventive wars never occur, however, they are rare enough to make a poor explanation for all major wars. Rather, rising states will conf lict with declining states when the two are near parity because it is at this point that conf lict over control of key issue areas is most likely. Rising powers will demand greater accommodations, while the declining power will be less than obliging. This prediction is most similar with that of the power transition theory of Organski and Kugler (1980: 13–64). Ha1: The likelihood of war between two states is increased when both are at parity, but growing at unequal rates. This is likely to lead to major war when the capacity of the system to balance against a bid for hegemony is weak and the incentive to band-wagon is strong. The concentration of naval power, as argued above, provides the best historical predictor that defensive coalitions will form. On the other hand, contiguity should offer the best predictor of offensive coalitions. Territorial powers, driven by profit motives, have historically engaged in band-wagoning. Because the payoff for joining such coalitions is typically territorial gain, states will tend to band-wagon against contiguous states, since the addition of newly conquered territory can be facilitated more easily. Ha2: Balancing against bids for hegemony will be strongest when naval power is most concentrated within the international system. Ha3: Band-wagoning will be most common when states within a dyad have the opportunity to band-wagon against a contiguous state.

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A Test In order to demonstrate the predictive power of the revisions stated above, a test of each is necessary. In contrast to Copeland’s case study approach, a large-N cross-sectional logistic time series analysis with clustered standard errors of the data is more appropriate to the task at hand. Copeland’s model leaves out the analysis of large periods of peace, some of which also feature declining, but preponderant states. If relative decline often fails to lead to declarations of war—even if the theory holds for all cases of major wars—then it provides a poor means for explaining conf lict. At any rate, Copeland’s case analysis employs Mill’s method of agreement—a relatively weak test (Van Evera 1997: 57–58). Even if one accepts all of Copeland’s evidence, he does not demonstrate variation on either his independent or dependent variable, making it difficult gauge how these variables operate. Indeed, the process of decline is often under way because change is one of the few constants in international relations (one power’s relative rise is another’s decline). Typically the strongest powers in the system are the winners of the last major war—with postwar settlements forming a high water mark for their power over time. Thus relative decline is close to a constant, and one that tends to apply to militarily strong powers in particular, because of the costs of maintaining military leadership (Cappelen et al. 1984). Thus, a statistical approach is useful because it can include the modern era in its entirety, held to a relatively “tough” standard of confirmation. There are two principle objections to taking this approach, both of which appear in The Origins of Major War. The first is that Copeland’s (2000: 27–34) theory is driven by individual actors, and their perceptions—both of which are difficult to model. While this may be true, a policymaker’s knowledge about the growth of other states approximates reality as Copeland’s model assumes. If uncertainty is too strong then it is unlikely that any predictive model is possible at all. Because of uncertainty, this represents a hard test of Copeland’s theory, which is hardly a bad thing. Second, it can be objected that quantitative methods test only correlation and not causality (George and Bennett 2005: 21–22). This criticism is valid, and complete vindication or rejection of the theory may require additional case study analysis. Outright rejection is not the natural order of things within political science, rather, it is more productive to find the bounds within which Copeland’s causal mechanism is useful in explaining conf licts. Scope and Membership In keeping with Copeland’s universal claims, this study will cover the period from 1500–2000, covering as much of history as possible (data shortages make earlier inquiries difficult). Because of the changing nature of warfare, these periods will be broken in two—one pre-1816 and one

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List of great powers 1500–

State France England/ Great Britain Spain Austria The Netherlands Sweden Russia Prussia/Germany United States Italy China

Duration 1500– 1500– 1500–1799 1500–1918 1615–1714 1625–1719 1725– 1740–1944/1965– 1900– 1865–1944 1960–

Source: Adapted from Levy (1983: 48). From the period 1519 to 1556 Spain and Austria are considered collectively as the United Hapsburgs in order to ref lect the unification of those kingdoms under Charles V.

post 1816. All great powers will be arranged in dyads over five-year intervals in a pooled cross-section. Prior to 1940 only European dyads will be considered, ref lecting Copeland’s (2000: 30) focus on the European regional system, and the “equidistant” assumption. Thereafter, this assumption will be relaxed. The list of great powers will be taken from Levy’s (1983:48) list in War in the Modern Great Power System—although the exclusion powers outside the regional system means that the Ottoman Empire and Japan will not be included, while the United States will only enter the analysis in the midst of the World War II.4 Thus the great powers included are listed below in table 5.3. Dependent Variable: Major War The dependent variable under investigation in this study is “major war” along the same definition given by Copeland (2000: 3): Major wars are wars that are characterized by three attributes: all the great powers in a system are involved; the wars are all-out conf licts fought at the highest level of intensity; and they contain the strong possibility that one or more of the contending great powers could be eliminated as sovereign states. Within The Origins of Major War Copeland (2000: 79–145, 209–234) lists both world wars, the Napoleonic Wars, the Seven Years’ War, the wars of Louis XIV, the Italian wars of Charles V and the Thirty Year’s War as major wars. Based on his criteria the exclusion of the War of Austrian Succession does not make sense. Table 5.4 compares the performance of each conf lict based on Copeland’s criteria.

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As shown above, the War of Austrian Succession is a strong contender: it featured more casualties than the Italian Wars, and involved greater mobilization than the Seven Year’s War. Moreover it included every great power in the system, and led to the rise of Prussia as a great power— changing the system. Because the theory is dyadic, coding becomes more difficult. While it is usually clear which state initiated a war (although offensive coalitions Table 5.4

List of major wars, 1500– Great Powers

Italian Wars of Charles V Thirty Years’ War (post-1625) Wars of Louis XIV (1688–1713) War of Austrian Succession Seven Years’ War Napoleonic/Revolutionary Wars World War I World War II

All All All All All All All All

Mobilization Battle Deaths 263% 290% 266% 38% 37% 84% 437% 933%

178,000 1,465,000 1,991,000 359,000 992,000 2,532,000 7,734,300 12,948,300

Source: Mobilization—Rasler and Thompson (1994); Battle Deaths—Levy (1983: 68–71).

Table 5.5

List of wars between great powers, 1500–

War

Period

Second Milanese War Neapolitan War War of the Holy League Siege of Boulogne Arundel's Rebellion Scottish War First Huguenot War War of the Armada War of the Three Henries Second Franco-Spanish War First Anglo-Dutch Naval War Northern Wars English-Spanish War Second Anglo-Dutch Naval War Devolutionary War Franco-Dutch War

1515 1501–1504 1511–1514 1544–1546 1549–1550 1559–1560 1562–1564 1585–1604 1589–1598 1648–1659 1652–1655 1654–1660 1656–1659 1665–1667 1667–1668 1672–1676

Franco-Spanish War Great Northern War War of the Quadruple Alliance

1683–1684 1700–1721 1718–1720

Anglo-Spanish War War of Polish Succession War of Jenkin's Ear War of Bavarian Succession American Revolution Crimean War Austro-Prussian War Franco-Prussian War Korean War

1726–1729 1733–1738 1739–1748 1778–1779 1778–1784 1853–1856 1866 1870–1871 1950–1953

Source: Levy (1983: 68–71).

Great Powers Involved France vs. Austria, Spain France vs. Spain France vs. England, Spain, Austria France vs. England France vs. England France vs. England France vs. England Spain vs. England France vs. England, Spain France vs. Spain Holland vs. England Holland vs. England, Sweden Spain vs. England France, England vs. Holland France vs. Spain France, England vs. Holland, Spain, Austria France vs. Spain Russia vs. Sweden Spain vs. France, United Kingdom and Austria Spain vs. United Kingdom France, Spain vs. Russia, Austria Spain vs. United Kingdom Prussia vs. Austria France, Spain vs. United Kingdom France, United Kingdom vs. Russia Austria vs. Prussia, Italy France vs. Prussia France, United Kingdom, United States vs. China

Severity 3,000 18,000 18,000 8,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 48,000 16,000 108,000 26,000 22,000 15,000 37,000 4,000 342,000 5,000 64,000 25,000 15,000 88,000 N/A 300 34,000 217,000 34,000 180,000 954,960

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abound), it is less clear who the primary target of that war is. Four versions of the dependent variable will thus be coded. First, we will test the broader hypothesis that declining states are more likely to initiate wars—coding as a 1 all declarations of war between great powers. These wars include both the major wars listed above, and a second set of smaller wars listed below in table 5.5, taken from Levy’s list of great power wars. Second, the more specific hypothesis that declining powers are more likely to initiate wars that result in major wars will be tested. Only those dyads declaring war within the context of a major war will be coded as a 1. If Copeland’s hypothesis is correct, multipolarity should account for nonentry by third parties, and dynamic differentials for war entry. Finally, even if the initiation of wars is not predicted by dynamic differential theory, it may be the case that Copeland’s independent variable is a good predictor of the kind of balancing coalitions that will lead to wars. Perhaps declining powers will band-wagon or balance against rising challengers, given that a war is under way. To test this proposition for defensive balancing, all dyads in which one member joining a defensive coalition aimed at stopping the other member of the dyad (or its allies) from attaining hegemony were coded as a 1.5 In addition, a fourth variable was employed, with all dyads in which one member joined an offensive coalition attacking the other coded as a 1. Independent Variables Dynamic differential theory is not predicated on the importance of any single variable, but rather focuses on an interaction between military preponderance and relative economic decline. As such it is necessary to capture both the ratio of power between dyad members, as well as their relative economic growth (Copeland 2000: 5–6). During the pre-1816 period, military power was captured by an equally weighted average of each power’s proportion of the number of troops (Rasler and Thompson 1994) and warships (Modelski and Thompson, 1988). The latter measure is a good proxy for financial strength, which often proved decisive. The successful record of powers such as the Dutch Republic and the United Kingdom demonstrates the efficacy of this measure. For the post 1816 period, an equally weighted average of the proportion of total troops size, military spending (Singer 1987) and naval power was employed. Admittedly, the measure is imperfect and equal weighting contestable— however, this approach is common in such analyses and no clear alternative has been put forth (see Kim 1992). The asymmetry of military power within a dyad was captured by taking the logged ratio of the relative power of the smaller power to that of the larger power.6

Milratio 5 In (smaller power/larger power)

Falling Down Table 5.6

Austria France Germany Netherlands Sweden Britain Spain Russia

89

Great power per capita GDP, 1500– 1500

1600

1700

1820

707 727 688 761 695 714 661 499

837 841 791 1,381 824 974 853 552

993 910 910 2,130 977 1,250 853 610

1,218 1,135 1,077 1,838 1,198 1,706 1,008 688

Source: Maddison (2007).

Relative economic growth was captured by comparing population growth in the pre-1816 period, based on McEvedy and Jones (1978) data. Population growth will largely capture both increases in territory, and the agricultural wealth of states during the period—giving a good estimate of potential economic power in the face of a war. Per capita GDP varied little during the period, as demonstrated in table 5.6. For the modern period, measures of industrialization are easier to come by, and so an equally weighted index of population, urban population, energy consumption and pig iron/steel production was employed.7 While these measures are robust for the periods covered, new measures of economic modernization would be more effective for future analyses, for instance advanced states now seek to reduce energy consumption in the face of global warming, and increasingly import steel from the developing world. Differences in economic growth within a dyad was captured by taking the logged ratio of the relative growth of the smaller power to that of the larger power. Econgrow 5 (weaker military t/weaker milirary t21)/ (stronger military t/stronger military t21) The dynamic differential was measured as the interaction between both military preponderance, milratio and the depth of economic decline, econgrow. Since milratio varies from 0 (parity) to ∞ (inequality) an econgrow from 2∞ (the larger power is growing much faster) to ∞ (the smaller power is growing much faster), dydiff (unequal militaries, and faster growth for the smaller power, which Copeland hypothesizes will result in a greater propensity for war) to ∞. Because lnMilratio varies from 0 (parity) to 2∞ and econgrow from 0 to ∞, Dydiff2 will range from 0 to 2∞. When dydiff is highly negative, it ref lects that the state with the stronger military is growing relatively slowly, while at the same time the dyad is far from military parity (and, according to Copeland, likely to engage in warfare). Dydiff 5 econgrow * milratio

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In addition to decline, the concentration of power is an important variable for Copeland’s theory. Rather than use dummy variables to indicate polarity, taking the concentration of military power during each time period is a more objective and instructive approach. As Edward Mansfield (1994) argues in Power, Trade and War concentration indices capture both the number of poles, and the dispersion of power among them. Counting poles gives no indication of the gap between different powers, such that one supposedly multipolar system may look very unlike another. Concentration was captured by first taking the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index of military power (using the same indicators as above) in each given year as follows: HH 5 (x1*x1)1(x2*x2)1 ...1(xn*xn) On its own, the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index works well in microeconomics as an indicator of the concentration of market power, however, it performs poorly when there is a high propensity for changes in the number of actors (Mansfield 1994: 159). In accordance with this, a modified concentration index will be employed that is more sensitive to the impact of changes in the number of actors: ⎛ ⎛ 1 ⎞⎞ ⎜ HH ⫺ ⎜ ⎟ ⎟ ⎝N⎠ ⎟ concentration 5 ⎜ ⎜ ⎛1⎞ ⎟ ⎜⎜ 1 ⫺ ⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎟ ⎝N⎠ ⎠ ⎝ Concentration varies from a high of .64 at the end of the sixteenth century (following Spanish absorption of Portugal) to low points during the War of Austrian Succession and the World War I. The concentration of power through history is graphed in figure 5.7. In addition, naval concentration was employed, to test whether the concentration of naval power impacted the emergence of defensive coalitions. Naval concentration was calculated in the same fashion as overall concentration, using data from Thompson and Modelski’s Seapower in Global Politics. Concentration excluded states not considered great powers in the above list, such that Japan, Portugal and the United States (until its entry into the World War II) do not factor into the calculation. This ref lects this paper’s European territorial focus pre-1940, rather than Thompson and Modelski’s focus on the evolution of the global system. Naval concentration over time is displayed in figure 5.8.

91

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con .4

.6

.8

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1600

1700

1800

1900

2000

year Figure 5.7

Concentration of power in the international system, 1495–2000

.8 .6 .4 .2

navalconcentration

1

Source: Rasler and Thompson (1994); Singer (1987); and Modelski and Thompson (1988).

1500

1600

1700

1800

1900

2000

year Figure 5.8

Concentration of naval power in the European system, 1495–2000

Source: Modelski and Thompson (1988).

Contiguity Copeland argues that there are a number of circumstances that make the prospect of a rising challenger less palatable to states. A strong neighbor surely represents a dismal prospect, if, as Copeland assumes, states are largely uncertain the future intentions of others (Maoz and Russett 1993). Throughout the period, 393 dyad-periods were classified as contiguous. Short-distance maritime borders were included as well as land borders, meaning that the Netherlands and Britain were considered contiguous.

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This ref lects the historical importance of British fears that France would capture “the low countries” and invade Britain (Lynn 1999). In addition, all of the noncontiguous parts (e.g., the Spanish Netherlands) of the Austrian, Spanish and Prussian states were considered for the purpose of contiguity. According to dynamic differentials theory (Copeland 2000: 39), contiguity should increase the likelihood of war, out of a fear of strong neighbors invading in the future. The Times Atlas of World History (Barraclough and Stone 1994) was used to determine contiguity. Results Observing the results of the logistic regression of all great power wars on the variables discussed above, yields no evidence of a systematic preventive. Not only is the interactive relationships not statistically significant, differential growth rates and asymmetries in military strategies also fail to make a dyad more prone to conf lict. Contiguity offers a fairly consistent positive correlations with war and there is a weakly significant relationship between multipolarity and war (corroborating the reverse of H2). The failure of that relationship to hold in the pre-1816 period, however, casts doubt on the robustness of the finding. It is, however, of more instructive use to turn to a first differences table, which captures some of the more complex interactions at play (table 5.8) Contiguity played an important role in the probability of war, raising the likelihood of war by 7.1% to 11.9%. Concentration was similarly important, with multipolarity leading to a greater likelihood of war. The role played by the interaction effect of military power and economic growth, however, did not vindicate Copeland’s theory. Preponderance led to a Table 5.7

Factors predicting incidence of great power wars All wars coeff.

Dydiff Milratio 0.01 Ecogrow 0.142 Contiguity 0.286*** Concentration 21.35** Constant 21.219*** Wald Prob > chi2 pseudo R2 N

All wars

S. E.

coeff.

pre-1816 S. E.

coeff.

23.381*** 1.128 25.143*** 0.222 3.508*** 1.162 5.368*** 0.222 21.988*** 0.761 23.65*** 0.109 0.29*** 0.108 0.436*** 0.575 21.35** 0.579 21.548** 0.334 0.942 0.791 2.727** 13.75 0.01 0.02 1044.00

22.48 0.00 0.03 1044

Notes: * 10% level. ** 5% level. *** 1% level. SE: Standard errors reporter above were clustered by dyad.

S. E.

post-1816 coeff.

1.872 23.159* 1.902 3.115* 1.379 21.726 0.141 2.036 0.66 2829 1.394 0.263 19.60 0.00 0.04 636.00

S. E. 1.633 1.68 1.097 0.225 1.073 1.108 6.76 0.24 0.03 391.00

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93

Likelihood of great power war Probability of War (%) Contiguous Dyads Low

Milratio Ecogrow Concentration

Medium

9.0 11.3 16.7

11.8 11.8 11.8

Noncontiguous Dyads

High

Low

Medium

12.8 12.4 5.9

5.0 6.3 9.5

6.6 6.6 6.6

High 7.2 6.9 3.2

Note: “Low” refers to the tenth percentile value for a variable, “medium” to the fiftieth, and “high” to the ninetieth. Parity Average

Declining Challenger

11.8 6.6

13.4 7.5

Contiguous Noncontiguous

Table 5.9

12.2 6.8

6 3.3

13.1 7.4

Factors predicting incidence of major war Major War initiation Coeff.

Dydiff — Milratio 2.025*** Ecogrow 0.978** Contiguity 1.133 Concentration 6.665** Constant 26.443*** Wald Prob > chi2 pseudo R2 N

Preponderance Rising Declining Rising Challenger Challenger Challenger

20.61 0.00 0.113 1056

Major War Initiation

S. E.

Coeff.

— 0.655 0.445 0.756 2.794 0.745

20.233 2.03*** 0.866** 1.133 6.675** 26.444***

— — — —

22.09 0.0001 0.113 1056

S. E.

pre-1816 Coeff.

0.956 8.113** 0.652 2.633*** 0.394 5.78** 0.756 1.72* 2.791 7.69*** 0.742 26.818*** — — — —

18.67 0.002 0.17 655.00

post-1816

S. E.

Coeff.

S. E.

3.983 1.007 2.741 1.045 2.91 0.722

20.624 1.278*** 0.575 0.23 4.171 25.774***

1.244 0.319 0.573 1.325 6.856 1.691

— — — —

33.37 0.00 0.044 401.00

— — — —

Notes: * 10% level. ** 5% level. *** 1% level.

greater likelihood of war only when the leading challenger was in decline, while parity most often led to war only when the challenger was on the rise lending some credibility to HA2. Declining, but preponderant powers were less likely than average to initiate wars, casting doubts on Copeland’s hypothesis. If preventive war is the exception, rather than the norm, then it is less likely that preventive wars will snowball into major wars. It is also possible that preventive wars often generate the balancing coalitions that enable major wars. Thus, a second set of tests was performed to gauge whether declining states are more likely to initiate major wars (see table 5.9).

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In this instance, support was found for the fear of decline as a cause of war, but not for the interaction Copeland hypothesizes. In fact, the opposite was found in the pre-1816 period – dyads at parity, in which a challenger was growing more rapidly, were not likely to go to war. High concentrations of power did predict a greater likelihood of war, in keeping with H2, however, this relationships was not robust across time. Finally, dyadic parity predicted war through all periods in a firm rebuff to Copeland’s theory. The lack of historical consistency for most variables demonstrated the difficulty in constructing a theory that will work across all time and space. Even if major wars are not initiated by declining powers, states sometimes enter existing wars, and turning minor conf licts into major ones. A possible saving grace for dynamic differentials theory is that it can predict defensive coalitions against the aggressor (or possibly alongside the aggressor), given an existing war.If so, then it may be possible to salvage Copeland somewhat (although a better explanation of why this might occur is necessary). The results of this test are shown in table 5.10. Looking at table 5.10, dynamic differentials are a poor predictor of defensive balancing. The most important factor is concentration. When power is less concentrated (multipolarity), defensive coalitions are more likely, contrary to Copeland’s assertion that multipolarity causes collective action problems. The most salient variable overall was the concentration of naval power within the system, in support of the hypothesis Ha2. Defensive balancing was most likely when naval capability was concentrated within a single state, rather than when many states had such capabilities. Turning to the historical subdivision of the data, however, some inconsistency is revealed. In the pre-1816 period high concentrations of Table 5.10

Factors predicting defensive coalition formation Model 1 Coeff.

Dydiff Milratio Ecogrow Contiguity Concentration Navalcon Constant Wald Prob > chi2 pseudo R2 N Notes: * 10% level. ** 5% level. *** 1% level.

20.082 20.155 0.035 20.257 25.169** — 21.536*** — — — —

Model 2 S.E.

Coeff.

0.697 — 0.191 20.155 0.578 0.094 0.297 20.256 2.043 25.166** — — 0.577 21.537*** 10.41 0.065 0.022 633

— — — —

Model 3 S.E.

Coeff.

— 0.192 0.4 0.297 2.045 — 0.577

— 20.11 0.008 20.285 25.997*** 3.554** 22.916***

10.43 0.034 0.022 633

— — — —

S.E. — 0.197 0.418 0.302 2.124 1.798 0.77 12.23 0.032 0.038 633

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naval power and multipolarity in overall power are the best predictors that defensive balancing will take place. In keeping with the arguments of Levy and Thompson (2005) regarding the historically specific nature of the balance of power, this relationship does not hold for the modern period. By contrast, in the modern period unequal dyads tended to engage in balancing, rather than dyads in parity (see table 5.11). Furthermore, turning to bandwagoning behavior, the best predictors were different once again as shown in table 5.12. Contiguity was the best predictor that states would join in an offensive coalition against the other Table 5.11 Factors predicting defensive coalitions, pre-1816 versus Post-1816 Pre-1816 Coeff Dydiff Milratio Ecogrow Contiguity Concentration Navalcon Constant Wald Prob > chi2 pseudo R2 N

Post-1816

S.E.

1.404 20.035 21.032 20.133 27.806** 5.392* 23.31** — — — —

2.091 0.316 1.591 0.412 2.281 2.855 1.235 32.39 0.000 0.071 527

Coeff

S.E.

–1.078 1.315 0.428 20.553 1.022 20.059 0.713 20.992 2.899 3.734 2.335 21.492 0.769 22.686** — 19.7 — 0.003 — 0.057 — 106

Notes: * 10% level. ** 1% level.

Table 5.12

Factors predicting offensive coalition formation Model 1 Coeff.

Dydiff 1.794* Milratio 20.171 Ecogrow 1.308** Contiguity 0.644** Concentration 21.625* Navalcon 20.973 Constant 21.424** Wald Prob > chi2 pseudo R2 N Notes: * 10% level. ** 5% level. *** 1% level.

— — — —

S.E. 0.929 0.295 0.641 0.29 1.809 1.681 0.684 16.75 0.01 0.028 633

Model 2 Coeff. — 20.046 20.625 0.625** 23.43 20.989 21.406 — — — —

Pre-1816

S.E.

Coeff.

— 4.116 0.283 20.223 0.401 2.321 0.288 0.751** 1.817 23.571** 1.67 — 0.681 21.917*** 15.43 0.009 0.026 633

— — — —

S.E.

Post-1816 Coeff.

3.77 0.617 0.31 0.496 1.938 0.712 0.345 20.047 1.544 23.796 — — 0.524 21.061 19.44 0.002 0.036 527

— — — —

S.E. .883 0.987 0.683 0.732 7.374 — 1.236 8.84 0.1154 0.021 106

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member of the dyad, confirming hypothesis Ha3. In addition some weak evidence was found for the role of differential growth rates, with rising challengers more likely to join offensive coaltions—perhaps ref lecting dissatisfaction with a status quo imposed by declining powers. However, this relationship was not consistent across time, holding only in the pre1816 period. In addition some weak and temporally inconsistent evidence suggests that multipolarity is conducive to bandwagoning.. As before, the pre-1816 period was consistent with the overall trend, while the post-1816 period was not. The strength of the aggressor state or coalition was the best predictor of offensive balancing in this instance, suggesting that states tend to “join the winning team” when its victory seems likely. Conclusion and Implications of Findings Preventive motives lead states to wars in some instances, but it is far from the cause of war, major or otherwise. The quest for a universal cause of war may be misguided in a field as prone to change as international relations. Differential growth rates interacting with military preponderance form a plausible pathway to war that can adequately explain some cases of major war. However, that tendency is insufficiently systematic to form statistically significant relationships. Indeed, declining states are less likely than average to initiate and participate in wars. On the other hand, the stakes of this research question are sufficiently high that it is valuable to have a causal mechanism, even if that mechanism only describes a minority of the cases. If conf licts such as the two World Wars are in that minority, then it is valuable, even if generalizations from those events must be taken with more than a grain of salt. The weakness of dynamic differentials theory is its underdeveloped theory of balancing. Collective action problems and buck-passing happen, but in some cases preclude rather than cause the onset of major war. Looking at wars that failed to escalate into major conf licts has the advantage of capturing those dynamics. The long cycle approach emphasis on naval power helped explain defensive balancing coalitions, while contiguity performed better at predicting membership in offensive coalitions. However, temporal distinctions were revealed regarding the effectiveness of either model to anticipate balancing/band-wagoning behavior. Thus, it may be of greater use to study how balancing behavior has evolved over time, and whether it is likely to take place in the post-1816 period, parity with the states being balanced against was significant. in future conf licts. For instance, updating existing data on naval power to include air power will offer a more accurate picture of whether force projection capabilities will relevant to balancing in the twenty-first century. Finally, to the question of transitions, it is clear that great powers are not indifferent to being overtaken by others. However, they rarely go to war while still militarily preponderant. Thinking about prospective

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transitions in the future, conf lict surrounding the incorporation of a stronger China or India into the country club of superpowers offers a strong set of candidates for systemic war. Should a conf lict arise between any modern-day great powers, it is unclear how and whether balancing is likely to take place (although a preponderance of force projection capabilities has formed the bulwark for defensive coalitions in the past). Indeed, the past fifty years suggests that balancing is relatively rare—Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian disputes have taken place without escalation in the past. Nonetheless, should the stakes of dyadic competition between any of those states come to involve mastery of Asia or global hegemony; the risk of major war will surely be heightened. Notes 1. See Doran and Parsons (1980) and Lemke and Kugler (1996). 2. On territoriality see Bremer (1992 ) and Vasquez (1993: 123–153); on naval power and balancing, see Levy and Thompson (2005, 2007). 3. See Ikenberry (2001: 80–117). 4. Because one of the independent variables involves changes, data unavailability means that dyads will enter the analysis one period later than in Levy’s list. 5. Admittedly, it is not possible to capture the problem of invisible balancing, which suggests a possible criticism of this approach. 6. The negative ratio is taken to make the interpretation comparable to the logged ratio, and thus, less confusing. The residuals resulting from a regression of a variable, X on Y are the same as those resulting from a regression of X times a constant, c, on the same Y. 7. The use of different measures for different time periods is a ref lection of changing quantities of relevance over time. While the sources may vary, the quantities being investigated do not— relative power is still relative power. However, this is likely to introduce heteroskedasticity into the model, necessitating the use of robust standard errors.

References Barraclough, G. and N. Stone (1994) The Times Atlas of World History. London: Times Books. Bremer, Stuart (1992) “Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36: 309–341. Browning, Reed (1995) The War of Austrian Succession. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Cappelen, A., N.P. Gleditsch, and O. Bjerkholt (1984) “Military Spending and Economic Growth in OECD Countries.” Journal of Peace Research 21: 361–373. Copeland, Dale (2000) The Origins of Major War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Doran, Charles and Wes Parsons (1980) “War and the Cycle of Relative Power.” American Political Science Review 74: 947–965. George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Halperin, S. William (1973) “The Origins of the Franco-Prussian War Revisited: Bismarck and the Hohenzollern Candidature for the Spanish Throne.” Journal of Modern History 45: 83–91. Hart, Jeffrey (1976) “Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations.” International Organization 30: 289–305. Hassal, Arthur (2001) The Balance of Power 1715–1789. Boston, MA: Adamant Media. Ikenberry, John (2001) After Victory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kim, Woosang. (1992) “Power Transition and Great Power War from Westphalia to Waterloo.” World Politics 45: 153–172.

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Kim, Woosang. (1996) “Power Parity, Alliance and War from 1648 to 1975,” in Douglas Lemke and Jacek Kugler, eds., Parity and War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 93–107. Lemke, Douglas and Jacek Kugler (1996) “The Evolution of the Power Transition Perspective,” in Douglas Lemke and Jacek Kugler, eds., Parity and War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 3–35. Levy, Jack (1983) War in the Modern Great Power System, 1494–1975. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. Levy, Jack and William Thompson (2005) “Hegemonic Threats and Great Power Balancing in Europe.” Security Studies 14: 1–33. ——— (2007) “Land Powers, Sea Powers and the Evolution of the Balance of Power.” Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, May 5, 2008. Lynn, John (1999) The Wars of Louis XIV. New York: Longman. Maddison, Angus (2007) “World Population, GDP, and GDP Per Capita, 1–2003 AD.” http:// www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical Statistics/horizontal-file 03–2007.xls. Mansfield, Edward (1994) Power, Trade and War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett (1993) “Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace.” American Political Science Review 87: 624–638. McEvedy, Colin and Richard Jones (1978) Atlas of World Population History. Middlesex, UK: Penguin. Modelski, George and William R. Thompson (1988) Sea Power in Global Politics. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Olson, Mancur (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler (1980) The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press Otte, T.G. (2003) “Almost a Law of Nature? Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Office and Balance of Power in Europe, 1905–1912,” in Erik Goldstein and B.J.C. McKercher, eds., Power and Stability: British Foreign Policy, 1865–1965. London: Routledge, 77–118. Rasler, Karen and William R. Thompson (1994) The Great Powers and Global Struggle, 1490–1990. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. ——— (2005) “War, Trade and Mediation of Systemic Leadership.” Journal of Peace Research 42: 251–269. Rennstich, Joachim K. (2004) “The Phoenix-Cycle: Global Leadership Transition in a Long-Wave Perspective,” in Thomas E. Reifer, ed., Hegemony, Globalization and Antisystemic Movements. Boulder, CO: Paradigm. Schelling, Thomas (1978) Micromotives and Macrobehavior. Toronto: George Macleod. Schroeder, Paul (1994) “Historical Reality versus Neo-Realist Theory.” International Security 19: 108–148. Schweller, Randall (1994) “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” International Organization 19: 72–107. ——— (2006) Unanswered Threats. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Singer, J. David (1987) “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Data Set on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985.” International Interactions 14: 115–132. Snyder, Jack (1984) “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics.” World Politics 36: 461–495. Van Evera, Stephen (1997) Guide to Methods for Student of Political Science. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Vasquez, John (1993) The War Puzzle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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CH A P T E R

SI X

Searching for Changing Organizational Architecture during Global Transition: Where Is the Post–Cold War Order? Thom a s J. Vol g y, K e i t h A . G r a n t, a n d E l i z a b e t h Fau s e t t

As the cold war concluded, President George H.W. Bush proclaimed the end of the old world order, and signaled twice that America would lead in creating a new one: We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment . . . Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective—a new world order—can emerge: a new era—freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South can prosper and live in harmony . . . Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we’ve known.1 [And a year later] Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the real prospect of a new world order.2 These pronouncements may have been more rhetoric than an indication of strong policy preferences for constructing a new world order, or they may have constituted an initial response to changing circumstances but faded as domestic policy agendas supplanted foreign policy ones (Nye 1992). It is just as likely, however, that the president of the strongest state to emerge out of the cold war was signaling publicly and committing his foreign policy apparatus to the creation of a new international order that would be substantially different from the one just concluded. It certainly would not have been precedent setting if these words indicated a determination by the United States to lead the global community in constructing a new architecture of relations in international politics. That is precisely

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what the United States and its allies did following World War II, and it was clearly the intent of Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War I. Long cycle theorists (e.g., Modelski 1990; Modelski and Thompson 1988), hegemonic stability theorists (e.g., Gilpin 1981; Keohane 1984) and power transition theorists (Organski and Kugler 1980; Tammen et al. 2000) all address various facets of how a global state, holding predominant capabilities in the aftermath of system transformation, seeks to create a new world order consistent with its own policy objectives. It is reasonable to assume that after major system transformation, the leading global state in the international system would seek to construct institutions, rules, and norms that are consistent with its policy objectives and is able to fashion not only new answers to unresolved issues from one era to the next, but as well for those that are unique to the new era, and by doing so stabilize the newly emerging status quo. Yet, nearly two decades later, despite overwhelming capabilities (e.g., Krauthammer 1990/1991 Wilkinson 1999) and the articulated desire for new architecture on the part of the United States, the nature of the new world order remains uncertain. Equally uncertain is whether or not the “victor” is shaping or resisting the institutional contours of an emerging order. While U.S. engineered multilateral mechanisms of cooperation, such as the G7/8, GATT/WTO or NATO have been modified and continue as important structures, several major efforts to create new institutions have found American policy makers obstructing attempts at multilateral cooperation (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court) rather than leading or assisting in their creation. In this context, we explore two research questions: first, can we identify the emergence of a U.S.-led, new world order in international politics? Second, can we explain why such a new world order has or has not developed, given the articulated intentions of American policy makers (and the fears of other foreign policy makers worried by U.S. dominance) to forge a new order? We narrow the inquiry to one aspect of world order: the creation and maintenance of formal multilateral institutions of cooperation and coordination between states. We recognize that the concept of “order” encompasses a much broader set of mechanisms than the one addressed here, including norms, rules, treaties, regimes, and informal and ad-hoc collaborative arrangements between states (and non-state actors).3 Nevertheless, we focus on the creation of formal intergovernmental organizations for several reasons. First, numerous scholars have noted significant spurts in the creation of new, multilateral institutions following system transformation, and particularly after major power wars (e.g., Russett et al. 1998; Vasquez 1993; Wallace and Singer 1970). A simple frequency count of existing intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) yields a 78% increase in IGOs in a 15-year period following the end of World War II, and even a net increase of 18% in IGOs4 within 15 years following the end of World War I, in spite of

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Woodrow Wilson’s failure to implement his vision of a new world order. Thus, substantial change to and growth in the constellation of formal organizations operating in international politics appears to be one important attribute of changing world order conditions, and one significant—albeit not the only—indicator of an emerging alternative to previous arrangements to deal with a potentially anarchic world of global affairs. Second, IGOs appear to matter, both to scholars and policy makers. The constellation of IGOs has generated substantial scholarship in the field of international relations and the literature has particularly grown both in volume and sophistication (Martin and Simmons 1998; Gartzke et al. 2005). Likewise, the past century has witnessed an unprecedented growth in IGOs and state involvement in them. Although the development of modern IGOs can be traced back to the beginning of the nineteenth century ( Jacobson et al. 1986), their growth has been markedly spectacular over the last hundred years (Shanks et al. 1996). Particularly after the end of World War II, and accelerating across the remainder of the twentieth century, international politics witnessed the creation of a “web of interdependence” (Haas 1970): a growing network (e.g., Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006; Ingram et al. 2005) of intergovernmental organizations that number in the hundreds and constitute for us the global intergovernmental architecture5 of international politics. Third, we assume that viewing world order through IGOs is important since formal IGOs—as viable organizational entities—create additional dynamics and impacts not associated with more informal or unstructured collaborative arrangements such as treaties or norms unaccompanied by an organizational context. When states agree to abide by a common set of rules and regulations governing their interactions (within an organizational structure), predictability between states is enhanced further. The creation of bureaucratic structures affords increased continuity of attention to problems and issues within the mandate of the organization and holds the potential for increasing efficient interactions. To the extent that the organization enjoys some autonomy, it can inf luence the foreign and domestic policies of its members and as well nonmember states, creating what Barnett and Duvall (2005) identify as an institutional conception of power.6 It should not be surprising then that major powers would expend considerable resources to create IGOs that embed their policy preferences, including surrendering some autonomy for doing so, and that weaker states join them to limit the autonomy of major powers (e.g., Ikenberry 2001). These reasons lead us to focus on changes to the architecture of intergovernmental organizations in the international system in order to address the extent to which the post–cold war order has changed, and to seek an answer to the pattern we are likely to find. We proceed through the following steps: we offer an explanation for why there isn’t likely to be a U.S.-led new architectural construction in the post–cold war world of international politics; we define and elaborate the concept of formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs)7 and delineate the process used

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to develop an appropriate database of FIGOs; we sketch out criteria for ascertaining the existence of a U.S.-led new world order and—using the database—map the contours of the post–cold war architecture; finally, we assess the evidence from this mapping in the context of the explanation we have offered. Explaining a Non-occurrence: Why Is There No U.S.-led New World Order? The conditions for new order formation—and the creation of new organizations to reorganize multilateral collaborative and cooperative arrangements in international politics—at the cold war’s end are consistent with the type of dramatic environmental change and system transforming disturbances proposed by scholars who use a punctuated equilibrium model (Baumgartner and Jones 1993 Diehl and Goertz 2000; Goertz 2003) of institutional change. Why would such institutional change not occur in post–cold war international politics if the predominant state in the system articulates strong preferences for creating one? We suggest four alternative explanations and resulting predictions for why a new world order would not occur after cold war’s end. The first addresses the nature of the “transformation,” arguing that it wasn’t comparable to previous transformations resulting in fundamental systemic change. The second argues that irrespective of the salience of the end of the cold war, the “constitutionalist” nature of the old order holds sufficient benefits so that new constellations need not be developed. A third explanation suggests that while a new order may be needed eventually, the lack of an explicit stimulus to create one in the first post–cold war decade continues to make the contours of a new order hazy. Finally, a fourth explanation—and the one we propose—is that the United States, as the preeminent state in post–cold war era, lacks the structural strength during this particular transformation to fashion a new world order consistent with its policy orientations. The no fundamental disturbance explanation: One plausible explanation for the absence of a new world order centers on the notion that that the post–cold war era is not comparable to previous transformations. The cold war ended relatively peacefully while in other periods great power wars destroyed existing architecture—or made it irrelevant—and the wars themselves produced clear winners and losers, and forced realignments and new approaches to conducting global affairs. We believe that this view of the end of East-West hostilities greatly underestimates the extent to which its end impacted international politics. The conf lict—for nearly a half century—dominated global affairs. While no direct physical hostilities broke out between the two superpowers, they stood more than once on the threshold of thermonuclear war and “the fighting never stopped” (Brogan 1990), albeit through proxy wars. At the end, the Soviet

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Union disintegrated, more than a dozen new states were formed, and all domestic political systems collapsed in east and southeast Europe. An entire East-West dimension of international politics disappeared, transforming as well relations between North and South and across security and economic issues. Nevertheless, if this explanation is valid, then we should expect the following: (1) continuation of the cold war trend of small death rates in IGOs accompanied by continued net monotonic growth of IGOs, with little change to their composition; and (2) increased integration of states into the constellation of cooperative arrangements operating during the cold war (and especially those states that operated outside of Western organizations). The fundamental disturbance but continued organizational viability explanation: A second explanation for the absence of new order is suggested by a liberal institutionalist perspective. This perspective argues that regardless of how fundamentally transforming an event the cold war’s end was, unlike other transformations, it did not destroy existing architecture (except for IGO architecture in post-Soviet space), and that architecture was functioning quite well in providing cooperative and collaborative mechanisms to members. Since existing organizations may be working relatively well, strong policy preferences for new world order construction are mitigated by this unique condition regarding the previous institutional order. For example, Ikenberry (2001) argues that after World War II the United States created a “constitutional” order by developing a web of organizations through which it surrendered some autonomy and allowed some institutional checks on its power in return for a buyoff on its policy direction. By joining in this web, other states were assured that the United States would not “exit” from the system, while they would have the opportunity to shape the outcomes of decisions made through these institutions. American power would be partially checked, while the United States would benefit from an organizational infrastructure that was consistent with its policy orientations.8 This view of the cold war order questions the extent to which American policy makers hold strong preferences for new world order construction or may decide that their preferences for a new world order are not worth pursuing, opting instead for incremental changes to existing institutional mechanisms. If this explanation is valid, then we should expect: (1) the constellation of cooperative/ collaborative arrangements continues to follow previous patterns without significant changes, although there may be some incremental changes to existing institutions; and (2) an acceleration of participation in ongoing institutions by those states that had stayed out of these organizations during the cold war. The fundamental disturbance but no major threat/stimulus explanation: A third explanation would suggest that while the cold war’s end may have had a profound effect on international politics, it was not accompanied early on by the type of threat that would motivate policy makers in states with sufficient capabilities to seek to restructure world order. While

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leading policy makers would express preferences for new world order construction and argue about what arrangements are best to fashion (e.g., multipolarity), the “winners” (and the strongest of states) after the cold war’s end would not seek new arrangements without a sufficiently strong stimulus or threat to motivate them to pay the costs for engaging in such efforts. Plausibly for the United States, that stimulus on September 11, 2001, but not prior. If this explanation is valid, then we would expect again: no major changes to the patterns of IGO formation and development after the cold war until after 9/11.9 The insufficient strength to create new order explanation: Our explanation suggests that the end of the cold war constitutes a major systemic disturbance, consistent with calls for a new world order, and historically consistent with previous disturbances that led to surges in new intergovernmental organizational formations. Our quarrel instead is with the notion that such institutional reconstructions occur automatically when systemic transformations warrant them. We contend that structural approaches to global stability and world order underestimate conditions that may negate efforts by great powers—or discourage them—from establishing new institutions when international politics undergo dramatic changes.10 We assume that at a minimum three conditions are required for a global leader to engage in fundamental transformation of global institutions. First, a global leader must have strong policy preferences (Moravcsik 1997; Bueno de Mesquita 2003) for new order construction if it is to commit substantial resources to the effort. Second, it needs the creativity to be able to assemble new institutions that ref lect changing circumstances (e.g., Modelski 1990). Third, it needs sufficient strength with which to create both architecture and to entice or coerce other actors to join and participate (Strange 1989). Without strong preferences, creativity,11 and strength, new world order formation is highly unlikely and there is no reason to assume that that these three conditions will automatically coincide with the onset of a new era. Their presence is very much an empirical question. The explanation we offer overlaps with the continued organizational viability explanation to the extent that both question the intensity of U.S. policy preferences for a new order, albeit for different reasons. We argue that after the cold war, neither the United States, nor any other major power is able to meet the necessary condition of holding sufficient strength with which to rearrange substantially the web of global institutions. Insufficient strength in turn can either make strong policy preferences meaningless, or, lead policy makers to alter their preferences if they cannot generate sufficient strength with which to accomplish them.12 There are two types of strength necessary for architectural construction and its maintenance: relational strength and structural strength. Relational strength refers to the relative capability of a great power vis-à-vis potential challengers to its leadership (Wilkinson 1999; Volgy and Imwalle 2000). It is the type of strength that may be required to deter, or to defeat the military of another state. It is strength assessed by viewing capabilities in

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the context of other major and minor powers and such strength can be measured as the aggregate share of great power economic and military capabilities (Spiezio 1990 Volgy and Imwalle 2000). It is in this sense that the United States possesses “unipolar” strength in the post–cold war era. Relational strength, however, is only part of the equation, important for maintaining the order that is created. It is structural strength that has been posited as the type of capability needed to construct order (e.g., Krasner 1978; Strange 1989; Volgy and Bailin 2003). Structural strength refers to the type of strength needed to create broad sets of norms, rules, and organizations governing global affairs at least in political, military, and economic spheres. Of the two, structural strength is a more complex attribute, required to address potential resistance from not only other states but also from a broad variety of international non-state actors salient for an assortment of issue areas, and requiring the global leader to address an increasingly complex international system. In addition, structural strength is a function not only of substantial domestic capabilities13 applied to foreign policies, but as well the degree to which the state can create and sustain a certain level of autonomy for itself in international affairs.14 Whether we consider relational or structural strength, the United States is the strongest of states in the post–cold war era, the one most capable of creating a new web of architecture, and its policy makers have articulated the intention to do so. American relational strength is certainly sufficient for global leadership, both in the aggregate and on the basis of relative economic and military measures. Although it demonstrated a significant drop during the 1970–1985 period, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, U.S. relational strength shows to be at its highest since the 1950s, and exceeds in the aggregate 50% of all major power strength (Volgy et al. 2004).15 It is in this sense that the post–cold war order has been characterized as unipolar. Yet, for a number of reasons U.S. structural strength, along with those of other major powers, has declined dramatically over time and may be insufficient to effectuate a new world order. For a variety of methodological reasons, comparing structural strength across major powers over time is exceedingly difficult. Instead, the measure we use allows comparison for each major power to itself over time, with a specific base year as the starting point. For the United States, that base year is 1950.16 For each major power, starting with its base year, we calculate all the resources the state spends annually (in constant local currencies) for all aspects of foreign relations (e.g., defense, foreign aid, foreign policy infrastructure, etc.). Then an index is constructed, by first reducing the value of resources spent by a measure of a state’s autonomy (as the percentage of GNP accounted for by its trade subtracted from the state’s resources), and then dividing the remaining value by the international system’s complexity (measured very conservatively as the number of state actors in the international system). The resulting index (see figure 6.1) allows us to compare f luctuations in a

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450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50

19 5 19 0 5 19 2 5 19 4 5 19 6 5 19 8 60 19 6 19 2 64 19 6 19 6 68 19 7 19 0 7 19 2 7 19 4 7 19 6 7 19 8 80 19 8 19 2 8 19 4 8 19 6 8 19 8 9 19 0 9 19 2 9 19 4 9 19 6 9 20 8 0 20 0 02 20 04

0

Figure 6.1 U.S. structural strength index, 1950–2004 Source: Volgy and Bailin (2003).

state’s structural strength over time, assuming a historically useful initial benchmark for comparison.17 On the basis of this empirical approach, the structural strength of all major powers (the United States, Soviet Union/Russia, China, Japan, France, Germany, United Kingdom) shows substantial decline over time, and including the post–cold war era. Perhaps most precipitous is that of the United States. As figure 6.1 illustrates, even with major commitments to increasing resources since 9/11, the U.S. structural strength index in 200418 is some 40% lower than it was in the 1960s, and during the “new world order” construction phase, even lower through the 1990s. In the context of sufficient relational but insufficient structural strength, it is plausible that U.S. policy makers would hold preferences for a new world order yet find it a task too arduous. The unipolarity of relational strength offers the hope of unlimited ability. It is predictive of an easy defeat of an Iraqi army (in 1991 or 2003) or of successful deterrence of military engagements with Chinese or Russian counterparts. It is the structural strength, however, needed not to defeat Saddam Hussein but to restructure the map of the Middle East (or global affairs) that appears to be in short supply. In the context of sufficient relational but insufficient structural strength, we should expect a mixed American strategy of unilateral and bilateral approaches (consistent with relational strength) over a substantial reconstruction of the web of IGOs.19 Likewise, as other states clash with American leadership in the post–cold war environment (and perhaps recognize the structural weakening of the United States), we should expect three consequences related to reduced U.S. structural strength. First, states previously resistant to participation

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in architecture created or inf luenced by the United States should be now integrating and participating in those structures, fearing less American control over collective outcomes. Second, resistance to U.S. leadership should be partially manifested in attempts to create multilateral structures that are not necessarily supported by the leading global state. However, we have noted that the structural strength of all major states has declined (Volgy and Bailin 2003), making such architectural creation—if not futile—then likely to be only of very limited success and mostly at the regional and interregional level, rather than in a global context.20 The arguments about declining U.S. structural strength are suggestive of three predictions regarding the shape of post–cold war organizational development: 1. The post–cold war web of multilateral cooperative organizations should demonstrate a substantial increase in the “death” of IGOs, ref lecting changing circumstances brought about by transformations in the international system. Yet the diminution of existing organizational arrangements will not be accompanied by a substantial growth in the size of organizational architecture, either at the global level or in regions of substantial interest (e.g., Asia, Middle East) to the United States compared to previous eras of systemic transition; 2. We expect significantly increased participation in ongoing architecture by all states and including those states that have expressed substantial policy disagreement with U.S. global leadership; 3. 3a. We expect more organizational creation by states dissatisfied with U.S. global leadership than by the United States; although 3b. We expect these efforts to be less successful than U.S. efforts. Further, given the differential between the structural strength of the United States and other states, we expect architectural creation by other major and minor powers to be occurring primarily at the regional and interregional levels but not at the global level. These predictions should not be equated with the absence of a new world order in the sense that—from an organizational perspective—nothing important has changed since 1989. Instead, and taken together, they suggest that in the context of the tumultuous changes accompanying the end of the cold war and the professed commitment by U.S. policy makers to create a new world order, a new, U.S.-led order has not emerged. Instead, we should find changes that are either incremental—albeit significant— departures from the status quo (e.g., the change from GATT to the WTO; expansion of NATO membership) and far less costly than the creation of new sets of institutions, and/or changes that come as a result of growing contestation against U.S. leadership, both in existing organizational structures and through the creation of new structures at the regional and interregional levels.

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There exist three systematic, empirical mappings of the global organizational architecture. The first ( Jacobson et al. 1986; Shanks et al. 1996) identifies continuity and change in the population of IGOs from 1982 to immediately after the end of the cold war; the second (Cupitt et al. 1996) enumerates mortality rates for IGOs over time. In addition, the COW IGO effort (Wallace and Singer 1970; Pevehouse et al. 2003) identifies “traditional” IGOs and reports annual data on their existence through the year 2000. We differ from these efforts in two critical ways—conceptually and therefore empirically—in the enumeration of the number and types of intergovernmental organizations. We define the web of pertinent IGOs as those that are formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs). FIGOs differ from the more generic IGO classification: they are entities created with sufficient organizational structure and autonomy to provide formal, ongoing, multilateral processes of decision making between states, along with the capacity to execute the collective will of their members (states). This definition highlights both the process of interactions within IGOs and the possibility of collective outcomes from them, even though collective outcomes are contested among realist conceptions of international politics.21 Furthermore, formal, ongoing processes of interaction within an organization and collective action require ongoing administration and organization. The two primary functions of formal organizations are a stable organizational structure and some amount of autonomy in a defined sphere (Abbott and Snidal 1998: 5). Stability of organizational structure and autonomy are critical as well for institutional conceptions of power (Barnett and Duvall 2005), both for assessing global governance and hegemony. Our definition of intergovernmental organizations is consistent with our theoretical concerns over state strength and the ability to create a new architecture at the end of the cold war. We assume that creating IGOs with little bureaucratic organization and very limited autonomy is less useful in stabilizing a new world order than a network of organizations that are significantly organized and autonomous. In addition, it may be far easier to construct organizations that have neither of these characteristics than ones that do. By including in our analysis IGOs that are easy to assemble but produce little autonomous capability or organization, we would distort responses to research queries regarding the importance of great power strength in formal institutional construction. In addition, we wish to uncover whether or not states participate in these organizations for reasons similar to, or different from factors correlated with their participation during the cold war. We assume that joining organizations that lack bureaucratic organization and offer little capacity to execute the collective will of members requires much less from states in terms of the costs of joining such organizations. Therefore, including state

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membership in such organizations may distort our understanding of the conditions under which states may invest resources in joining IGOs, by confusing participation in minimalist organizations with the willingness of state policy makers to potentially surrender some of their sovereignty as a trade off for their participation in more autonomous organizations. For these reasons, our conceptual approach to defining FIGOs constitutes a theoretical subset 22 of the concept inherent in the COW IGO database. However, in order to map the web of institutions in the post–cold war era and to systematically compare it to its predecessor, we need data that are consistent with our definition of FIGOs, and provide equidistant and sufficiently long time periods to assess changes from one era to another. Since previous empirical efforts did not satisfy one or both of these requirements, we constructed a new database,23 mapping the existence of FIGOs at three equal intervals of time: 1975, 1989, and 2004, and we traced birth and death rates of individual FIGOs (and state membership in them) across these time periods. The 15-year span for the post–cold war era allows sufficient time to gauge potential changes after the end of the East-West conf lict, and corresponds to the latest available data on IGOs. The 1975–89 period provides two snapshots of the web of organizations—during the cold war and at its very end—as points of comparison with the present web of FIGOs.24 We classify all FIGOs as belonging to one of four types. Global intergovernmental organizations (GIGOs) are open to all states in the global system without geographic restrictions, or are restricted only by their focus on an activity or purpose irrelevant to some states (e.g., all states can become members that import or export wine). Interregional governmental organizations (IRGOs) are restricted in membership to states geographically, culturally or ethnically (e.g., Latin states, Francophone states, Arab states), or politically (e.g., former colonies), across two or more (but not all) regions. Regional intergovernmental organizations (RGOs) are open to all members of a single region.25 Sub-regional intergovernmental organizations (SRGOs) are restricted by geography, or other criteria (e.g., African states with large Muslim populations) to members within a region. Furthermore, we classify each FIGO on a variety of characteristics,26 including whether or not it is a functional FIGO;27 its primary purpose; its founding date and (when relevant) year of death; and whether or not it contains major power membership (United States, China, Soviet Union/Russia, Japan, and one or more of the major states in the European Union [EU]: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom). Criteria for Assessing the Creation of a U.S.-led World Order What would constitute the institutional dimension of a U.S.-based new order in the post–cold war era? A simple enumeration of institutional

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longevity—using birth and dates rates of FIGOs—does not provide sufficient indication of order transformation: IGOs are born and they die fairly frequently (Shanks et al. 1996; Cupitt et al. 1996). To assess whether or not there is a new world order, we need to establish a different set of benchmarks, consistent with the non-incremental notion associated with a significantly different order implied in the pronouncements of policy makers. Earlier in the modern era the end of one order yielded a substantial, non-incremental increase in the web of IGOs (Wallace and Singer 1970), as the victors moved to create substantial numbers of formal organizations designed to institutionalize cooperation and to stabilize the new status quo. Consistent with the predictions we made earlier, we suggest four empirically observable, non-incremental indicators that would ref lect the creation of a U.S.-led, new order that is substantially different from its predecessor. These indicators can be used as well to assess whether or not other changes may be occurring consistent with our structural strength arguments. Specifically, a significantly different web of U.S.led organizations should be noted following system transformation when, compared to its predecessor, the web changes through: ●

●

●

●

significant death rates for older global FIGOs and cold war based regional and interregional FIGOs; a substantial net increase in the overall numbers of FIGOs and especially including a substantial net increase in the creation of new global FIGOs; a substantial change in the mix between different types of FIGOs (global versus interregional versus regional FIGOs); significant new institutional formation of regional FIGOs where the dominant global power manifests substantial interest (for the United States, this includes Asia, and the Middle East).

Ideally, all four conditions should be evidenced in order to conclude that a U.S.-led institutional transformation has occurred. In addition, we suggest a fifth condition, this one consistent with our prediction regarding greater contestation against U.S. global leadership preferences in an era of declining U.S. structural strength: ●

a significant increase of state membership in regional, interregional and global FIGO networks along with the creation of organizations by dissatisfied states at rates matching or greater than those involving the United States.28

Below we look at evidence through simple frequency tabulations of aggregated and disaggregated elements of the web of intergovernmental organizations along with a network analysis of membership patterns.

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Describing the Web of Post–Cold War Architecture The database we constructed contains 265 “live” FIGOs in 2004. As expected, we find little evidence to support a claim of a new, U.S.-led institutional dimension to the post–cold war order. First, there does not appear to be either a substantial increase in the overall web, nor in the constellation of global FIGOs, and while there is a high “death rate” in the post–cold war era it appears to be overwhelmingly unrelated to cold war based organizations. Previous mappings (Shanks et al. 1996) indicate that IGOs of all kinds vary in terms of their longevity. We expected that evidence of a new institutional order would be manifested in both a high death rate of organizations associated with the previous order and an even higher birth rate for new FIGOs, consistent with the net increases in IGO births following previous system-wide transformations. In line with this expectation, the FIGO death rate between 1989 and 2004 is substantial at approximately 25%, and represents a death rate four times greater than the death rate observed between 1975 and 1989. Yet, a closer look at the data indicates that these death rates do not appear to be of the type that would be indicative of U.S.-led transformations in the global FIGO architecture. Virtually 70% of the death rate is accounted for by regional and sub-regional organizations, with the subSaharan African region accounting for nearly 60% of total regional FIGO deaths. Thus, the observed high death rate does not appear to be directly related to the cold war’s end but rather to an outcome consistent with African states experimenting liberally with alternative organizational arrangements (e.g., Powers 2004). Nor has the death rate been accompanied by unusually high birth rates following the end of the cold war. A decade and a half into the new world order the web of organizations is virtually identical in size to the web at the end of the cold war (265 versus 268), reversing the net growth of substantial (over 26% increase in FIGOs between 1975 and 1989) FIGO development prior to the end of the Cold War. As noted above, this finding is contrary to previous transformations in the twentieth century: a 78% net increase in the web of IGOs within 15 years after 1945, and even an 18% increase after 1919. Nor can this outcome be directly attributed to the collapse of USSR-based traditional organizations after 1989 since these were too few to account for a significant share of organizational deaths.29 Furthermore, there appears to be no significant net increase in the number of global FIGOs from the previous period (figure 6.2). In 2004, roughly 26% of the web is global in scope, accounting for a smaller proportion of FIGOs than in 1975 (30%) and barely smaller than in 1989 (27%). Growth in global FIGOs over the 15 year period since the end of the cold war is smaller than their growth over the last 15 years prior to

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the cold war’s end (figure 6.3), unlike the creation of interregional and regional organizations. If there is an anomaly in figure 6.2 then it appears to be the interregional web: its pattern is a ref lection of a relatively low death rate and a birth rate that substantially outpaces interregional FIGO creation prior to 1989. Consistent with previous mapping exercises (e.g., Shanks et al. 1996), the dominant organizational mode is regional (47%). Most deaths and births occurred among regional and sub-regional organizations after 1989, as they 60

Percent of Total

50 40 30 20 10 0

1975

1989

2004

Years Percent GIGOs

Percent IRGOS

Percent RGOs/SRGOs

Figure 6.2 Percent of GIGOs, IRGOs, RGOs/SRGOs, for 1975, 1989, and 2004

Percent new by type of FIGO

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 New GIGOs

New IRGOs

New RGOs/SRGOs

Type of FIGO 1989

2004

Figure 6.3 Percent of new FIGOs by type, 1989 and 2004

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Number of RGOs/SRGOs

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1975

1989

2004

Year Africa

Asia

Caribbean

Europe

Latin America

Middle East

Figure 6.4 Numbers of RGOs/SRGOs by region, 1975, 1989, and 2004

did prior to the end of the cold war. Despite processes of globalization, much of the web of FIGOs appears to be non-global in character. In this manner, the post–cold war web is not substantially different from its predecessor. The distribution of region-based FIGOs ref lects as well great variation in the size of organizational webs across these regions (figure 6.4).30 The two smallest sets of webs are exhibited in the Caribbean and in Asia, with Latin America and the Middle East demonstrating a somewhat thicker web of organizations, and Africa and Europe exhibiting the largest constellation of FIGOs. Four of the six regions demonstrate little net change across the periods. Pertinent to our predictions, note the absence of any net growth in Asia where U.S. policy makers have worked during and after the cold war to obstruct the creation of region-based organizations (e.g., Rapkin 2001) and opted instead for bilateral relationships through which they can exercise more inf luence. Nor are there substantial increases in formal cooperative arrangements in the Middle East (exhibiting a modest downturn by 2004), an arena of strong interest to the United States. Latin America indicates modest regional growth in FIGOs, but most of those are related to the MERCUSOR and Andean states, locked into growing conf lict with U.S. policy preferences. It is primarily the sub-Saharan African region that demonstrates a dramatic surge followed by a substantial decline across the three time periods.31 What Type of New World Order? While there appear to be a number of significant differences between the post–cold war web of FIGOs and its cold war counterpart, with one exception, there does not appear to be much evidence from this mapping that

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a U.S. driven new world order is emerging. The overall web of FIGOs is slightly smaller than at the end of the cold war, reversing a pattern of dramatic increases in organizational formation both during the previous era and historically in the aftermath of twentieth century system transformations. Rather than showing substantial net growth and change, global FIGOs in 2004 are fewer than they were in 1989. While death rates of organizations born during the cold war increased dramatically after 1989, most of those are associated with regional, non-system transformation factors: experimentation with organizational form in Africa and consolidation of integrationist FIGOs in the EU. At the same time, in regions of substantial interest to the United States, regional and subregional FIGOs either did not increase their numbers (Asia), or, exhibited a net decline (Middle East). The only finding across the two webs that may signal a significant change is noted across the relative proliferation of interregional FIGOs since 1989. This change, however, cannot be attributed to the leading global power forging a new institutional dimension of cooperation in the post–cold war era. For example, Russian membership in these new organizations is nearly twice that of the United States (43% versus 25%). Of course we are not asserting that institutional changes in post–cold war international politics have been unimportant: NATO enlargement, deepening integration in the EU, the shift from GATT to the WTO, the emergence of NAFTA. Most of these, however, are incremental in character, and fail the test of a substantially different formal, institutional world order. Other changes (e.g., the substantial increase in interregional FIGOs) may be less incremental, but are also less likely to be a function of U.S. leadership in creating new multilateral arrangements and more likely resistance by states dissatisfied with U.S. post–cold war leadership as American structural strength diminishes. Nor is continuity of architecture a ref lection of widespread post–cold war satisfaction with cold war architecture. For example, most of the Bretton Woods constellation of organizations remain intact (with the exception of the shift toward the WTO) despite persistent criticism not only from Russian, Chinese, and third world sources, but even from the core (e.g., Japan’s collaboration with China to provide an alternative to the IMF; growing domestic political questioning of the IMF and the World Bank in the United States, France, and the United Kingdom). Is it diminished (or overstated) preference for a new order or limited structural strength that results in the absence of a fundamentally new set of U.S.-led organizations since 1989? We suspect that both conditions are likely, and suggest some evidence that may underscore the intersection of these explanations. We focus on Russia and China as two dissatisfied powers likely to challenge U.S. leadership and engage in new architecture construction. They are of course not the only states that exhibiting dissatisfaction with American “unipolarity.”32 Clearly, the statements of French and third world policy makers appear to be similar. However, France is well integrated into the

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“constitutional” web while third world states often lack the resources to create significant global architecture (albeit this may not be the case for sub-regional or regional architecture). Therefore we focus on Russian and Chinese efforts and compare them to U.S. involvement in new architecture, focusing primarily on the creation of new global and interregional FIGOs. Both the organizational viability and the diminished structural strength explanations predict that (1) there will be no major U.S.-led institutional formation; and (2) that formerly dissatisfied powers would move to integrate into existing architectural arrangements at rates higher than during the cold war period.33 We have elaborated above on the evidence regarding the first prediction and found some support for the absence of a new U.S. based institutional order. Table 6.1 begins to address the second prediction: dissatisfied powers integrate into ongoing architectural arrangements after the end of the cold war faster than prior to 1989. While U.S. participation is basically unchanged, Russia and China substantially increase their participation in cold war–based GIGOs and IRGOs in the post–cold war era. In fact so do most states outside of Europe, including those dissatisfied with U.S. global leadership (see the network graphs at http://www. u.arizona.edu/~volgy/research.html). Apart from the overlap in these explanations, the different causal mechanisms at the center of the two explanations lead to contrasting predictions about the nature of post–cold war institutional arrangements. One difference pertains to which states are likely to drive the emergence of new institutions, since neither approach assumes the total absence of any new organizational development. The organizational viability explanation implies that, while there will be little in the way of new architectural creation, when it does occur it will be driven by the United States and will be ref lected in U.S. participation in new institutional arrangements. Alternatively, the structural strength approach suggests that it is the diminution in U.S. structural strength that makes the creation of new institutions by the victor problematic. Diminished structural strength raises another possibility: dissatisfied states may attempt to engage in institutional formation in resistance to U.S. leadership. Is there evidence at the aggregate level of such resistance (along with integration) on the part of dissatisfied states? Figure 6.5 compares U.S. Table 6.1 U.S., USSR/Russian, and Chinese membership in GIGOs and IRGOs* Country United States Soviet Union/Russia China N

Years 1989

2004

56% 35% 32% 131

54% 50% 43% 140

Notes: * Included are IGOs created prior to 1990. ** Difference of means test.

Difference

Probability**

22% 15% 11% —

0.788 0.029 0.086 —

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Volgy, Grant, and Fausett 40 30 20 10 0 U.S. member

Russia/China member but not US

1975–1989

1990–2004

Figure 6.5 Participation (percent of total) in new GIGOs and IRGOs 1975–1989 and 1990–2004

Table 6.2

Major power participation in GIGO and IRGO creation, 1990–2004 Participation in Existing Architecture

United States Russia and/or China

0.519 (0.044) 0.534 (0.044)

Participation in New Architecture

Difference

Probability*

0.229 (0.083) 0.710 (0.083)

–0.229 (0.099) 0.175 (0.099)

0.01 0.04

Note: * One-tailed difference of means test.

participation with Soviet/Russian and Chinese participation—when the United States is not a member—in new global and interregional FIGOs created within the two time periods. The period 1975–1989 represents a baseline: it is a period when the initial cold war web was expanding, although often in an incremental fashion, and ref lective of a rich constellation of “constitutional” institutions created early in the cold war, but within the context of already declining U.S. structural strength. As figure 6.5 indicates, the United States was involved with nearly one third of global and interregional FIGOs created during the last 15 years of the cold war. Soviet and Chinese participation occurred at a rate roughly one half that of the United States in these new FIGOs when the United States was not a member. This picture changes substantially after the end of the cold war. While the United States participates in new institutions at roughly the same rate as before, Russian and Chinese involvement in new FIGOs when the United States is not represented is now equal to the percentage of new institutions that carry U.S. involvement. This outcome is consistent with our predictions regarding the decline of U.S. structural strength and the willingness of dissatisfied states to participate in institutional contexts where the United States is not engaged. Another way of assessing these differences is to test whether or not the patterns observed during the cold war predict well to the post–cold war

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period. Here we focus on the extent to which participation in institutions during the cold war period predicts to participation in new architecture in the post–cold war period. As table 6.2 illustrates, and consistent with our predictions, there is a significant decline in American participation (p = 0.05) and a significant increase in Russian and Chinese participation (p = 0.06) in both existing institutions and new institutions in which the United States is not a member. This divergence in behavior is suggestive of efforts by China and/or Russia to create and participate in new transcontinental ties and organizations, and/or the inability or unwillingness of the United States to deter the formation of these arrangements. It is plausible that states participate in new institutions where the United States is not a member, not to challenge U.S. leadership, but because as they integrate into the existing order they need the technological, and regulatory assistance offered by emerging new organizations. In the second half of the cold war period, a majority of new institutions created were in fact functional ones. If the new global and interregional FIGOs in the post–cold war era are meant to broadly challenge U.S. global leadership, then we should find that these new organizations reverse the pattern of being primarily functional organizations. As table 6.3 indicates, there is a significant difference in the type of organization created across the two time periods and the majority of new post–cold war FIGOs are other than functional organizations. Finally, if structural strength matters, then we should find evidence of it through the death rates of these institutions. Although the structural strength of all major powers is in decline, it is also the case that the United States has significantly more structural strength than Russia and China. It follows that the survival rate of all new institutions should be lower in the post–cold war era than previously, and for those new institutions in which the United States is an active participant, survival should be higher than for those in which the United States is not participating. This is clearly the case. The survival rate for new global and interregional FIGOs in the 1975–1989 period was roughly 96%; the survival rate of these new institutions decreased to 86% in the 1990–2004 period. Furthermore, none of the new global and interregional FIGOs created after the cold war and joined by the United States died by 2004. However, nine of these post–cold war Table 6.3 Functional share of new FIGOs, 1975–1989 and 1990–2004 Period 1975–1989 1990–2004 Total

Type of Organization Broad

Functional

N

33% 56%

67% 44%

69 68 137

Notes: Pearso n’s chi2 = 7.0500 p = 0.008. Likelihood-ratio chi2 = 7.1131 p = 0.008.

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FIGOs—created without U.S. participation—were dead by 2004, even when they included participation from Russia, China, and/or major EU states. We can offer one more type of evidence that may be consistent with declining American structural strength and its consequent inability or unwillingness to restructure the organizational architecture of the post– cold war order. Part of the criticism leveled at U.S. policy makers and especially since 9/11 is their propensity to pursue unilateral and ad hoc bilateral arrangements in lieu of utilizing the multilateral organizations available in international affairs. If American relational strength is high and structural strength is diminishing, then it would be to the advantage of U.S. policy makers to diminish their involvement in an architecture they cannot fashion. Is there evidence that American involvement in the global web of FIGOs is diminishing? We lack data on how often policy makers may initiate activities through FIGOs, but an indirect measure is the extent of their membership in the architecture as a necessary condition for such activity. We use network analysis (see appendix 8.1) to probe changes in the depth of U.S. involvement in the web of FIGOs. Specifically, network analysis allows us to calculate the centrality of any given state in the network; the most central are those states that are most connected in the network. Centrality can be addressed at least two different ways. Degree centrality represents the percentage of other actors in the network to which each particular actor is directly connected. Eigenvector centrality is a second measure that places much more emphasis on the global rather than the local, and identifies those most linked on the dominant structural dimension of the network. Figure 6.4 illustrates eigenvector centrality values for the United States across the three time periods, and compares these values with other major powers. It is the more nuanced eigenvector values that should be more relevant for our considerations: is the United States maintaining its centrality on the dominant structural dimension of the FIGO web? The evidence seems to point to diminishing centrality. Consistent with its declining structural strength its eigenvector score is slightly smaller in 1989 than it was in 1975, but is 16% lower in 2004 compared to the end of the cold war.34 Network analysis seems to indicate the U.S. participation in the FIGO web is less central than during the cold war. Conclusions Our mapping of the web of FIGOs in the post–cold war era indicates to us no substantial creation of an institutional new world order, along lines that would be consistent with the stated preferences of U.S. policy makers. In many significant ways, however, the institutional architecture has changed: death rates of regional FIGOs have increased substantially

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compared to the past; interregional FIGOs have dramatically increased, demonstrating substantially more cooperative arrangements across regions; the web of FIGOs has failed to continue its upward trajectory and may now be shrinking; there appears to be substantially more organizational formation involving those states that may not be satisfied with American global leadership; and in fact the United States appears to be less central to the web than it was 15 or 30 years ago. In terms of the creation of new institutional arrangements, we find some limited evidence consistent with the notion that the decline in U.S. structural strength is associated with its inability or unwillingness to forge a new institutional order. Consistent with its diminished structural strength, there is both greater activity in ongoing organization and in newly created organizations by both major dissatisfied states (Russia and China) and by other states dissatisfied with U.S. foreign policies. In fact, there are nearly as many new global and interregional FIGOs in the post– Cold War web where all three major powers are absent, indicating perhaps that resistance to U.S. global leadership may be more widespread than when viewed only through the participation patterns of major powers. Nor should such a conclusion come as a surprise to observers of post– cold war international politics. American policy makers have used bilateral and unilateral approaches at least as often as multilateral ones,35 and have spent a considerable amount of effort to veto attempts at multilateral arrangements by others: the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the International Landmine Ban Treaty, The Programme of Action on Illicit Trade in Small and Light Arms, and the new protocol to verify compliance on the Biological Weapons Convention readily come to mind. This record of “veto” on multilateral arrangements implies that U.S. structural or relational strength may be sufficient to deter certain institutional outcomes, including in regions and sub-regions where the United States may not be a participant in formal organizations. Clearly, American policy makers have worked to insure that regional institutional arrangements did not arise in Asia, and the paucity of organizations in that region attests to the possible veto power contained by U.S. relational strength (e.g., Rapkin 2001). Attempts by China and Japan to create a regional counterweight to the IMF for Asia in the 1990s failed in large part due to such pressure. Our quantitative exercise has not paralleled a qualitative exercise to help determine the “salience” of post–cold war institutions created by the United States versus other parties. Such a next step may be beneficial for future research. Clearly, NAFTA is one such new organization of high salience; so is the transition from the GATT to the WTO.36 Together, they are ref lective of instances of U.S. determination to expand and improve cold war architecture. Yet, an interregional organization such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), jointly sponsored by China and Russia to contain U.S. strategic involvement in Central Asia following 9/11 and the second war in Iraq was not arrested, and has

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been inf luential in reducing the prospect of long-term American security presence in the former Soviet republics. Moreover, SCO f lirtation with Iran and Turkey indicate that this type of cooperative arrangement holds possibilities beyond former Soviet and communist space, and we consider the SCO to be a highly salient addition to the constellation of interregional FIGOs. Another area of future research should focus on the effects of increasing integration (and its attendant difficulties) in the EU and the impact the European experience has had on the FIGO architecture. While the degree centrality scores for France, Germany, and the UK have increased somewhat from 1989 to 2004, all of their eigenvector scores have declined, suggesting that the major EU powers (and perhaps indirectly the EU itself ) have become less central in the global web as they have focused more on the internal dimensions of the integrationist process. Note for example that at the aggregate level, the involvement of EU powers in creating post–cold war FIGOs outside of their own region has been no more successful than that of Russia or China. Likewise, over two decades of publicly articulated policy preferences from the EU for creating a Mediterranean region has led to virtually no successful FIGO creation in the area that could formalize cooperative relations between European and North African/ Middle Eastern states (Sabic and Bojinovic 2006). The EU’s failure in the Mediterranean suggests another important avenue of research needing to be pursued: mapping out the web of emanations that exist along with traditional FIGOs. We suspect that birth and death rates among these organizations will help uncover where the constellation of FIGOs have been further supplemented by emanations and perhaps made stronger than they now appear. We suspect otherwise, yet, we should not dismiss this plausibility without further exploration. We note as well that we have been unable to separate definitively declining structural strength from the lack of will needed by American policy makers to create new webs of architecture. That of course is part of the argument regarding American “unilateralism” and the use of ad-hoc “coalitions of the willing,” but it is also part of the story regarding how much U.S. policy makers may believe that the Cold War based “constitutional order” is sufficient for post–cold war realities. We suspect that it isn’t the lack of will: the inability of the United States to create the global norms it preferred with regard to an environmental (the Kyoto Protocol), or a human rights regime (International Criminal Court) are but two examples where U.S. structural strength may be insufficient to create institutions that embed strong American policy preferences. We do not have enough data points after the end of the cold war to be able to show significant differences across different American administrations, although our evidence suggests that despite the enormous differences in foreign policy personnel and style, none of the three administrations demonstrated strong determination to construct new architecture.

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APPENDIX 8.1: A Note on Steps Utilizing Network Analysis Network analysis provides an analytic tool set uniquely designed to answer questions of systemic structure and organization. A network consists of “a finite set or sets of actors and the relation or relations defined on them” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 20). Thus, a network consists of a known group of actors and at least one set of relations linking certain actors to other actors. Structure is an emergent property, representative of the organization of that system defined through the linkages between actors. The relational ties linking nodes can take on an infinite number of types, though can typically be described by phrases such as “is friends with,” “likes,” “knows the name of,” or “works with.” In this study, actors are the set of states that are embedded within an affiliation network. An affiliation network is a special type of two-mode network, consisting of a single set of actors (here, states) and a series of events or voluntary organizations in which those actors participate (Ibid.). Membership in an organization is therefore the relational tie connecting actors. Membership is nondirectional since all ties in the same unit are reciprocated; two states relate to each other through their common memberships as opposed to an individual selection process where states identify their friends, enemies, and so forth. A network can be represented either as a graph or as a matrix. We use both representations. Graphing the network allows for the visual inspection of trends within the network (see the graphs at http: www.u.arizona. edu/~volgy/research.html). Often, visual inspection illuminates clustering of actors into similar groups, showing not only dense areas of connectivity but “bridging ties” connecting otherwise disjointed areas of the network. Treating the network as a matrix allows for a variety of mathematical calculations summarizing the general trends of the network as well as the positions of each node embedded within the network. Network data in matrix form generally takes the form of a square matrix, with the same set of actors as both the row and column identifiers. A zero between state A and state B indicates the lack of a network tie, while a non-zero value indicates a relational tie between those two actors. From this representation of the network, it is possible to identify actor level characteristics such as network centrality, which is a representation of how connected each particular node is to other actors within the network, thus making it more visible to other actors within the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). We rely primarily on visual inspection of network graphs in addition to an analysis of network centrality.37 Centrality is a measure of how connected each node in the network is to other actors in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Hanneman and Riddle 2005). This is not meant to be a measure of (material) power. Instead, centrality is more a measure of involvement within the network—the most central are the ones who are connected to the most others (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 169–174). Two

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types of centrality are used in this study. First is degree centrality. Degree centrality represents, on average, how connected a particular node is to other nodes in the network, normalized by system size. A second, more nuanced version of centrality is eigenvector centrality. This form of centrality emphasizes the overall structure of the network, first using factor analysis to identify the dominant structure of the network, and then to evaluate each actor’s centrality relative to that dominant structure. Eigenvector centrality takes into consideration not only how many ties each node has within the network, but also the relative importance of those to which each node is connected. Using an eigenvector centrality measure, a node that is highly connected, but to peripheral actors, will be seen as less important than one equally connected to more central actors within the network8.38 Global and regional powers should be more central relative to less ‘important’ members of the system, especially when looking at the eigenvector measure. Increases in degree centrality, without corresponding increases in eigenvector centrality would suggest a state is gaining inf luence regionally, but not globally. Moreover, changes in centrality over time allow us to observe the emergence of potential challengers, or the decline of certain powers. In constructing networks of states connected through FIGOs, we begin with describing each state’s membership in each organization. This data takes the form or a rectangular matrix, where each state is represented by a row, and each organization is represented by a column. A zero value in each cell represents that a given state is not a member of that organization, while a one indicates that the state has joined that organization. Associate members and observers are coded as nonmembers. This affiliation matrix, representing each state’s individual membership in each organization, is then multiplied by its transpose, to create a state-by-state square matrix, where cell values represent the total number of organizations those states are both members. Nearly every state in the international system is a member of the United Nations and certain other organizations. This suggests that almost every state is directly linked to every other state in the system. Moreover, this network is so dense as to make visual inspection of it very difficult. To solve this problem, we use the densities of each level of the network (global, interregional, and regional), at each time point, to create a network of highly connected states. We define a highly connected dyad to be one connected at two standard deviations above mean densities for that organizational level (i.e., regional, interregional, global) at each respective time period. Statistically, this eliminates all but the most dense relations, and represents connections between the most integrated actors in the system. This process is repeated for each level of organizational structure at each time point, creating a total of nine networks. More importantly, networks at each time point consist of the same set of actors, and may be analyzed separately or jointly, as overlapping levels of the same structure. This allows for the visual presentation of these nine networks using only three network graphs, representing the

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three time periods analyzed in this study While this technique is used to create the network graphs, network measurements (such as centrality) are taken using the full, more dense network. Notes The authors would like to thank Stuart Rodgers and Joanna Detamore for their work and assistance on the FIGO project and SBSRI for its generous grant of assistance. 1. President George H.W. Bush, address to the Joint Session of Congress, September 11, 1990. 2. President George H.W. Bush, address to the Joint Session of Congress, March 6, 1991. 3. We focus on regional and global architecture in terms of formal IGOs, as opposed to international regimes or legal arrangements without formal organizations. There is obviously much overlap (Keohane and Murphy 1992), and ample literature (e.g., Hasenclever et al. 1997) on both regimes and legal arrangements, and their linkages to the construction and performance of formal institutions (e.g., McCall Smith 2000). 4. Authors’ calculations, utilizing COW IGO database, version 2.1, http://cow2.la.psu.edu. Last accessed April 15, 2007. 5. By architecture we refer to the constellation of formal organizations, not in a hierarchical sense (e.g., the architecture of a high rise building) but in the more general sense of a “structural blueprint” that maps out the population of formal, cooperative arrangements. 6. We are not implying however that IGOs and state membership in them necessarily results in positive effects on states or international politics; for negative effects, see Barnett and Finnemore (1999) and Gruber (2000). 7. FIGOs refer to our concept of formal intergovernmental organizations (as developed further on in the chapter); IGOs refer to the more generic classification used in the literature to identify intergovernmental organizations in general. 8. This of course is not the only way in which strong policy preferences for world order construction may be mitigated. They can as well by growing domestic political opposition, pitting preferences for reelection against policy preferences (Bueno de Mesquita 2003, Skidmore 2005). 9. Since our time frame ends in 2004, we cannot fully estimate how much new architectural construction occurs through U.S. initiatives after 2001; this would require a longer timeframe through at least 2011. However, our preliminary evidence indicates no such movements from the United States between 2002 and 2007. That timeframe, while insufficient for gauging fully whether or not 9/11 was such a stimulus to U.S. policy makers, should nevertheless provide some data about initial momentum for architectural reconstruction. Yet, we see no such evidence (for a similar view, see Beeson 2006). 10. For an interesting exception, focusing on domestic political conf licts over foreign policy strategies, see Hugill’s chapter in this volume (chapter 3). 11. The concept of creativity would appear to be salient, yet with few exceptions (e.g., Modelski 1990) is rarely addressed except in historical accounts of system transformation. 12. It is also plausible that policy makers may overestimate the extent of structural strength at their disposal and move forward with architectural construction, although we would predict that this strategy will fail. One possible example would be U.S. efforts to create a region of democracies in the Middle East. 13. Elsewhere (Volgy and Bailin 2003) we have mapped out the domestic strength dimension of major power structural strength. Due to space limitations, we do not address this aspect here. However, level of domestic strength may underscore the intersection between will and external strength: if the will exists to create new order, it may have a significant impact on the external strength that policy makers can generate for foreign policy objectives, and thus, these conditions may not be mutually exclusive. However, neither can policy makers manufacture capabilities for foreign policy objectives out of thin air; they are limited by the extent of overall domestic capabilities (and domestic commitments) at their disposal. Fortunately for the United States, its domestic strength is quite extensive and can be more extensively utilized for external purposes. In fact, the occasional increases in structural strength noted further on (see

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18.

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figure 6.1) are manifestations of U.S. policy makers converting domestic resources for foreign policy activities when the “will” to do so existed. For an elaboration of the concept, its operationalization and validation of both the measure of relational strength and the index of structural strength, see Volgy and Imwalle (2000) and Volgy and Bailin (2003: Chapter 3). We use shares of major power economic and military capabilities as measures of relational strength rather than the COW capabilities measures since we view the aggregate of those measures as mixing indicators of both strength and potential strength. For a validation of our measures, see endnote 17. We know of no theory that specifies exactly how much structural strength may be needed to create a new constellation of cooperative and collaborative architecture. Therefore, we have opted for another approach: we use the 1950s as a baseline for the United States, knowing that during the early years of the cold war it was able to fashion such architecture and likely had sufficient structural strength. We can then compare its structural strength in the post–cold war era with that baseline. Clearly, many arguments can be raised against our measure of structural strength, including the conceptual and empirical dynamics of the autonomy component and the very conservative indicator of system complexity. In a previous effort (Volgy and Imwalle 2000), we argued for the empirical validity of the structural strength index by seeking to ascertain whether or not the relational and structural measures correlated well with relational and structural dynamics in international relations. The two different measures corresponded to our predictions, giving us some confidence in their validity. In fact, the upward trend in structural strength during the 2003–2004 period is somewhat misleading since it represents a huge outlay of defense spending for the Iraqi war, and therefore resources that are simultaneously produced and spent in that conf lict. What those mix of strategies is likely to be may depend much on the nature of competing political forces and their victories in U.S. presidential elections. Neocons in the second Bush administration pressed for unilateralist approaches to policy concerns (e.g., the second war in Iraq); the first Bush administration pursued more of a combination of approaches, including a multilaterally sanctioned force response to Iraq over Kuwait. The Clinton administration used a variety of combinations ranging from unilateral use of force (Somalia), abstention (Rwanda), and multilateral approaches (e.g., the response to Serbia). Yet, all of these varying options involved the primacy of relational strength, even with dramatically different personnel and policy objectives across the three administrations, and consistent with our argument regarding the common thread of diminution in U.S. structural strength for fashioning new architecture. This argument assumes that opposition to U.S. global leadership comes from individual states rather than large coalitions of states acting together (e.g., a common EU foreign and defense policy). Likewise, it assumes that the United States has not been able to forge a large enough coalition (e.g., the G8) with a common architectural agenda to aggregate individual state resources for the construction of new global architecture. While the collective will part of an IGO is not its only value (a routinized forum where state leaders interact on a regular basis may yield unique benefits for cooperation), e.g., Bearce and Omori (2005), it is an important one, allowing for outcomes that may not be achievable by members outside of the organization. Although a theoretical subset, it is not an empirical subset since we created (see further on within the chapter) our own database of FIGOs that overlaps with but does not duplicate COW IGO. Space considerations do not allow us here to elaborate on the eleven criteria used to operationalize the concept of FIGOs, the process used in the construction of the database, and the comparison with previous efforts to identify systematically the existence of IGOs. These issues are discussed at length in Volgy et al. (2008). It would be very useful to enumerate as well the range of FIGOs created between 1950 and 1975. However, our methodology, especially using web pages in conjunction with the more recent methods of observation used by the Yearbook of International Organizations to verify whether or not IGOs meet FIGO criteria, are not available for those organizations that have been dead for over two decades. There is an enormous amount of controversy over how to identify “regions” in international relations (e.g., see Lemke 2002; Buzan and Waever 2004). We make no claim to resolving this

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27. 28. 29.

30. 31.

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controversy. For analytic purposes, we have created instead a generic classification scheme that is based on a combination of geography, and broad political affiliation. Accordingly, our regions consist of: Europe, Asia, Middle East (including states with dominant Arab or Islamic populations directly adjoining the Middle East, such as Saharan Africa, Afghanistan, and Turkey); Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America (including Central America), and the Caribbean. Organizations exclusive to North America (two) and Oceana (two) are for accounting purposes coded as “other” region. Israel is excluded from the Middle East; Turkey is included in the Middle East, but not in Europe. The database is still undergoing additional coding. When completed, it will be able to differentiate FIGOs on a number of additional characteristics, ref lecting the growing literature on institutional design (e.g., McCall Smith 2000; Bearce and Omori 2005). We code each organization as functional if it is primarily engaged in narrow, technical, or regulatory tasks related to a single issue. Otherwise, we classify it as being broad in scope. Although as we had noted earlier, we do not expect such creation to be as successful as ones in which the U.S. participates. The number of traditional organizations created by the Soviet Union for its allies was very small; those numbers are significantly larger when we include emanations, but here we are focusing only on traditional organizations. Only 2.78% of those that failed can be directly attributed to the collapse of FIGOs constructed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. For some crucial differences across political regions, see Lemke (2002) and Buzan and Waever (2004). The European FIGO constellation shrinks as well, although not as much as the Sub-Saharan network, and for an obviously different reason: there is FIGO consolidation within the unique EU integrationist process. For public statements on the part of foreign policy makers (even prior to the invasion of Iraq) regarding dissatisfaction with U.S. global leadership, see Gordon (1997) and Eckholm (1999) for Russia and China; for European resistance to U.S. unipolarity, see Erlanger (1997), Sanger (1997). This is so since the benefit accruing from participation by dissatisfied states may allow them to further diffuse American strength inside the institutional setting. Likewise, the limited structural strength on the part of dissatisfied powers seeking to contest the United States with a broad array of alternative institutions leads to the same conclusion. While its degree centrality score does not diminish in tandem with its eigenvector score, it demonstrates as well a decline in 2004 compared to 1989. Leeds and Mattes (2005), in an analysis of alliance treaties, indicate that while most alliances are typically bilateral in nature, the proportion of bilateral alliances since 1989—compared to multilateral ones—far exceeds the norm. The transition from GATT to the WTO was designed around a series of continuous rule amendments, or “rounds” that would broaden the global trade regime. The latest round— bogged down now for nearly a decade—seems to indicate that this incremental approach for designing WTO rules is not working as well as expected. All network calculations were completed using the Ucinet 6.130 software package (Borgatti et al. 2002). For a more detailed discussion of eigenvector centrality, as well as an example of its use in international relations, see (Maoz, et al. 2007).

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Whether and How Global Leadership Transitions Will Result in War: Some Long-Term Predictions from the Steps-to-War Explanation Joh n A . Va squ e z

This analysis is an exercise in predicting the future likelihood of war breaking out during major transitions that might occur in the global political system. A useful theory of the causes of war should be able to predict the conditions under which war is highly likely or unlikely. It should also be able to identify the factors that put pairs of states or systems at risk for war. The two major transition theories that are the focus of this book—power transition and long cycle theory—both specify certain shifts in capability and in global leadership as conditions that increase the likelihood of war. The theory employed in this analysis does not see either of those conditions as the primary factors bringing about war. Instead, it sees wars as arising mainly out of certain kinds of issues and how they are handled. It examines how war grows out of the foreign policy behavior and interactions of states. This steps-to-war approach seeks to identify the steps states take that increase the probability of war and explain why they take them. The steps-to-war explanation is used to predict deductively whether certain transitions are at risk of war and how that war might come about. Over the last decade there has been considerable research on the steps to war. This research in combination with the theory permit not only a general set of predictions that can be used to identify the broad conditions that increase the likelihood of war, but also permit predictions about the likelihood that specific dyads will fight. For instance, there has been wide speculation about the so-called coming transition between China and the United States. The steps-to-war explanation does not have much to say about whether such a transition will occur, but it can examine details

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about that dyad and predict on the basis of those details the likelihood that such a transition will involve a war. It can also go further and predict the path to war such a transition is likely to follow, if it is vulnerable to war. Predictions of this sort are powerful policy tools. They are also psychologically powerful tests for assessing the empirical accuracy and scientific utility of a theory. While policy is a major concern of this book, one of the analytical purposes of this chapter is to lay out a set of predictions from the steps-to-war explanation about the likelihood of future war that can then be used to test the adequacy of the explanation. It does this by specifying events that should occur under certain conditions. In other words, predictions derived from the theory will indicate that in the future, anywhere from 50 to 100 years from now that if a dyadic power transition occurs between two specific states, then depending on their characteristics there will be a low or high probability of war. Such a set of predictions will be made for the major transitions that have been discussed in the literature. Once these transitions come about, it will be possible to see if the predictions are fulfilled. The set of the predictions constitute a “real time” test of the explanation. If the predicted events do not occur, that would constitute evidence against the explanation. If the events do occur, then that is evidence that is not only consistent with the explanation, but also indicates the power of the theoretical approach to predict the future. Tests like this are common in meteorology, but fairly rare in the social sciences outside of economics. They do occur in political science, but in very narrow circumstances, such as predicting who will win an election based on surveys conducted fairly close to the election. In this analysis, we are talking about making predictions based on events that are much further down the road. The chapter begins with a brief outline of the steps-to-war explanation and some of the components that can be used to make predictions. It then examines the problem that is to be analyzed; namely, whether transitions will have wars. Next, the predictions will be presented. Lastly, the policy implications will be outlined with an eye as to how war could be avoided. The Steps-to-War Explanation The steps-to-war explanation was initially presented in Vasquez (1987) in an article that tried to derive through an inductive process, a coherent explanation of the Correlates of War project’s statistical findings. This inchoate explanation was then expanded and elaborated in Vasquez (1993), which closes with 76 testable propositions. Since then there have been numerous statistical tests of aspects of the explanation (e.g., Senese 1996; Hensel 1996, 2000; Vasquez 1996b; Vasquez and Henehan 2001; Sample 2000; Gibler 2000; Colaresi and Thompson 2005; Senese and

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Vasquez 2008), as well as some case studies (Vasquez 1996a; Cashman and Robinson 2007). Given this literature only an outline of the main relevant tenets of the explanation will be presented here. The steps-to-war explanation presents a nonrealist explanation of the onset of war. It is based on an issue politics paradigm perspective. Within this paradigm, politics is seen, fundamentally, as the raising and resolving of issues (see Mansbach and Vasquez 1981). War from this perspective grows out of the kinds of issues over which states contend and the relationships that evolve between states. War and violence occur because of grievances and not just power. War rarely occurs in the absence of a grievance; without grievance there would be little violence. Power is not unimportant, but it is seen as a means to an end, and not as an end in itself. In contrast, the theories of the realist paradigm see war as intrinsic to the struggle for power, which is fundamental to politics. War is simply a natural effect of that struggle. It is the struggle for power and not specific issues that bring about war. Specific grievances are simply a cover for the underlying questions of power and position, in and of themselves they have no causal force. The steps-to-war explanation specifies both underlying and proximate causes of war. It sees war as a social institution within world politics that permits states to make binding (and often authoritative) political decisions in the absence of government. The purpose of war is to resolve an issue that one has not been able to resolve short of war, but only some issues are worth the cost of war. Conventional wisdom assumes that in principle any salient issue might be worth the cost of war, since wars appear to be fought over a variety of issues. The steps-to-war explanation does not make this assumption. Although no one category of issues is a necessary condition of war, it maintains that certain types of issues are inherently more war prone. Of all the issues that can give rise to the use of force, territorial issues are seen as the most prone to war. In part, this is because human territoriality makes us organize social life (and in the early stages of human history, economic life) around territorial units. In the modern global political system, the boundaries of these territorial units are marked by the use of aggressive displays, not unlike what other mammals do to mark their territory. These aggressive displays often turn to war, so that with the exception of very natural boundaries between existing nationstates, such as deserts, mountains, and oceans, most neighbors have established at least part of their boundaries through warfare. Territorial claims are an underlying cause of war in that they provide a source of conf lict (disagreement) that is not easily negotiated and for which war provides a unilateral solution. This territorial explanation of war, however, should not be confused with the biological deterministic explanations of Ardrey (1966) or even the less deterministic explanation of Shaw and Wong (1989). Humans should be seen as soft wired not hard wired, and territoriality is a proclivity and not a drive or an instinct (see Vasquez 1993: 39–140). In addition,

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it is not that territory always leads to war or that it leads to war directly. Rather territory can be seen as satisfying certain needs, which once satisfied no longer actively guide behavior. Similarly, territory does not give rise directly to war, but sets off a train of events that result in war. One of the optimistic theoretical expectations of the territorial explanation of war is that because territorial issues are so war prone, once they are solved an entire set of reasons for why states fight is removed from the political agenda. Among neighbors, this can have a profound effect on relations. It implies that once boundaries are mutually accepted as satisfactory, long periods of peace can reign even if other salient issues arise. This is a testable difference between the territorial explanation of war and realism, which sees war as inherent in the struggle for power and always beneath the surface. In this sense, territorial disputes are an underlying cause of war in that if they are resolved, the probability of peace increases immensely. Territorial issues and disagreements, however, do not make war inevitable; that is why territoriality is not seen as hard wired. It all depends on how the issue is handled. The ways in which states handle issues and interact with each other are the proximate causes of war. The explanation assumes that war is a cultural invention (see Mead 1940) that leaders resort to in order to handle certain situations (with characteristics x, y, and z). Realist thinking going back in the West to at least to Thucydides is seen as constituting a global diplomatic culture (see Johnston1996) to which diplomats, leaders, and their publics resort for guidance on how to handle situations that pose security threats. When security issues arise that threaten a state, realist culture and folklore tells leaders that they should increase their power to meet the threat. There are two ways to do this—make alliances and increase military strength. Such strategies often lead to a security dilemma, because one’s opponent—following the same advice (since it shares the same diplomatic culture)—does the same thing. This leads to counter-alliances and under some conditions arms races. Instead of decreasing insecurity, such policies increase insecurity. Simultaneously, realism suggests that states need to resort to the threat or use of force and other realpolitik tactics (such a demonstrating resolve) to make their preferred issue position prevail in a salient dispute. This leads to a series of crises and militarized confrontations that lead to a perception of rivalry. As crises repeat, they tend to escalate and re-enforce attitudes of hostility, threat perception, and insecurity. They increase the number and inf luence of hard liners in each side, which in turn increases the likelihood that crises will escalate over time and decrease the willingness to compromise. Eventually, one crisis comes along that escalates to war (see Vasquez 1993: Chapters 5–6; Senese and Vasquez 2008: Chapter 1, for further detail). Each of theses policies and actions taken by states can be seen as following a realist strategy in that each action is tied to the other. If one action fails, this does not encourage a different approach, but the taking of the next

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logical step within the strategy. Leaders are reluctant to abandon a strategy mid-stream, but follow out all its components before seeing it as failing. In this way, realist diplomatic advice leads decision makers down a particular road. The problem with realist advice is that each of these actions instead of preventing war (by peace through strength) actually increases the probability of war. Each of the policies and actions are, in fact, a series of steps to war along the realist road to war. This provides a brief overview of the causal logic of the steps-to-war explanation. It uses realism as a description of why states take the actions they do and then it relies on cognitive and other psychological explanations to discern and explain the impacts of those actions. The logic of the steps-to-war explanation has been used to derive certain theoretical expectations and propositions about why war occurs. The five most basic are 1. Territorial issues handled through the threat or use of force are more apt to escalate to war than other types of issues. 2. The making of outside alliances, especially to handle territorial disputes, often leads to counter-alliances, and the presence of either one side or both sides having outside alliances increases the probability of war. 3. As crises occur between states, a sense of rivalry emerges, which in turn increases the probability of war. 4. Resorting to military buildups often leads to arms races, which increase the probability of war. 5. The use of power politics practices (alliance making, crisis initiation, and military buildups) to handle any issue increases the probability of war; territorial issues are particularly prone to war when handled in this manner. As each practice is adopted, this can be seen as a step to war, each of which progressively increases the probability of war. These five major propositions outline the basic conditions that increase the probability of war. A crisis or militarized interstate dispute (MID) that occurs that has one or more of the above characteristics can be seen as being at risk for war. The more steps to war a militarized interstate dispute embodies (e.g., it is a territorial dispute, both sides have outside alliances, there is an ongoing rivalry, and an arms race) the higher the risk for war. Table 7.1 list some of the major risk factors with some hypothetical probabilities of war, based on general trends in the 1816–1945 period to illustrate how the risk for war can be expected to increase. Each of these predictions is based on the absence of one side having nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons can be expected to lower the probabilities for all out total wars, but not eliminate the possibility of limited war, especially conventional wars.1 This table can be an aid in making predictions about the future likelihood of war between two states. All one would need to do is see where an existing dyad and its militarized interstate disputes fit into the table according to the risk factors listed on the left. Thus, a dyad whose MIDs were not over

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Table 7.1 Risk of war of various steps-to-war Factors Promoting War Territorial Disputes, Outside Alliance,* rivalry, 15 disputes, arms race Territorial Disputes, Outside Alliance,* rivalry, 15 disputes Territorial Disputes, Outside Alliance,* rivalry, 6 disputes Territorial Disputes and Outside Alliance* Territorial Dispute Policy Dispute

Risk Level for War (Illustrative Probability) 0.90 0.65 0.55 0.45 0.15 0.09

Note: * No Ally has nuclear weapons. Source: Derived from Senese and Vasquez (forthcoming: Chapter 8, Table 8.2).

territory and did not engage in power politics practices would have the lowest probability of war, that is, it would be highly unlikely that it would have a war. Those that had all the characteristics at the top of the table would be at very serious risk for war. While the above five propositions and the risk factors in table 7.1 specify when war would occur, it does not specify the path by which war would come about. In particular, it assumes a direct path to war between the two parties, and it ignores diffusion effects that might make states join an ongoing war. The steps-to-war explanation recognizes that the factors that make states go to war are different from the factors that might make them join a war (see also Bremer and Cusack 1995). For this reason the steps-to-war explanation outlines two different paths to war (see Vasquez 1996b). The first path to war involves a direct war between two parties that typically begins with a territorial dispute being handled through a series of power politics practices as outlined in table 7.1. It is a typical path to war followed by neighbors, many of whom are minor states. It is the path by which most nation-state boundaries have been established in modern history going back to at least 1495. It is also the path by which most contiguous rivals have gone to war. The second path to war is more complicated. It looks at multilateral or complex wars and finds that some states come to war against each other primarily by joining an ongoing war. In some instances without this prior war spreading these states would never have fought each other. For example, it is unlikely the Britain in 1914 would have ever fought Austria-Hungary, except by joining a war. The second path to war then involves primarily a path to war whereby one side intervenes in an ongoing war. Explaining why such a war occurs involves more than just looking at the factors in table 7.1, it also involves looking at the factors that promote intervention, which include diffusion and contagion effects. Two things are theoretically interesting about the second path to war. First is that it is frequently the path to war taken by noncontiguous major state rivals (see the interesting findings in Rasler and Thompson (2000), as well as those in Vasquez 1996b). Second, it is the path taken by major states whose main issue of contention is a nonterritorial issue.2 What this

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means is that just because two states do not have territorial issues does not mean that they will not fight wars. They often become embroiled in wars through diffusion. Elsewhere, I (Vasquez 1993: Chapter 7) specify three factors that encourage wars to spread and outside parties to join or be dragged into wars: alliances with one of the belligerents, contiguity, and rivalry with one of the belligerents. Because war can also be caused by diffusion, table 7.1 underestimates the likelihood of war of the lowest rank—nonterritorial disputes. Since major states are one class of actors often likely to intervene in an ongoing war, the table underestimates their probability of war. In fairness to the table, however, it does state that for the risk of war to be low, the nonterritorial issues must not be handled in a power politics fashion, and major state rivals frequently resort to power politics so this always puts them above that low rank. A combination of the steps-to-war logic (in table 7.1), along with an understanding of the two paths to war, makes it possible to analyze not only whether war will occur, but also how it might come about. There are three basic patterns that can be predicted and into which future transitions can be classified: 1. The transition dyad has no territorial disputes and does not engage in power politics. This pattern has an extremely low probability of war. 2. The transition dyad is engaged in a major territorial rivalry (regardless of whether there is also a rivalry over position) in which power politics is frequently employed. This pattern has the highest probability of going to war. 3. The transition dyad is engaged in rivalry over position and power politics are used in this contention. A war involving one of them and a third state over territory occurs. The other partner in the transition has the option of joining that war. This pattern has a high probability that the other partner will be drawn into the local war if certain diffusion or contagion factors are present, thereby making a war occur within the transition dyad. The probability of war is lower than pattern 2 above, but higher than pattern 4 below. 4. The transition dyad is engaged in a rivalry over position and power politics are used in this contention. A war involving one of them and third state over territory occurs. However, the other party in the transition dyad has no ties to the third state. Intervention into this war by the other party is unlikely and hence war within the transition dyad is not high. Specifically the probability of war is lower than # 2 or #3, but higher than #1. With these analytical tools in hand, it is now possible to attempt to make predictions about the likelihood of war during future transitions. Before doing so, it is necessary to specify the transition contexts in which the steps-to-war propositions will be applied.

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The normal procedure in testing a theory is to derive propositions and then see if their retrodictions about the past are supported by the evidence. In this procedure one has numerous cases that presumably follow a pattern that either conforms to or deviates from the pattern outlined by the proposition. In the situation here, the proposed test is not based on numerous observations, but a prediction about the future likelihood of war in a single case or cluster of cases. The case is a possible transition from the current global political system where the United States is the strongest state, and presumed global leader, to one where this will no longer be the case and a new state will emerge as the strongest state and presumed leader. The basic assumption about a future transition is that the United States is bound to be replaced at some point, because no state has dominated the system forever. Even Rome, whose empire lasted for several hundred years, eventually fell. When the replacement of the United States might occur, if at all, is a hotly debated subject. Some predicted the decline of the United States with the Arab oil embargo, and several important books in the 1980s spoke of decline and the passing of U.S. hegemony (Kennedy 1987; Keohane 1984; cf Russett 1985), only to see the United States emerge more powerful and vibrate than ever in the twenty-first century. Most recently, there has been speculation that the United States will be (and in some ways has already been) surpassed by China economically (see Tammen et al. 2000; Kugler 2006). Others challenge the notion that China is likely to surpass the United States in the near future, and in fact may never do so (Chan 2007). The predictions of this analysis are contingent on what sort of transition occurs. The analysis, itself, does not make predictions on transitions, but only on what the likelihood of war is within a given transition. It therefore begins with certain plausible scenarios, based on what others say, about possible transitions that are likely. The steps-to-war explanation is not a general theory of international politics and therefore, does not, itself, have anything to say about whether transitions are likely. Rather it is an explanation about certain conditions increasing the probability of war. If a transition embodies or brings about these conditions, then war is likely. If a transitions does not embody these conditions, then war may still come, but for other reasons. Because the steps to war are not a necessary and sufficient condition of war, war may also come about for other reasons. To apply the steps-to-war explanation, it is necessary to specify the nature of a future transition. International relations theory discusses at least three possible transitions—dyadic, multiple, and systemic/dyadic. The first and most common type is a dyadic power transition as outlined in general theoretical terms by Organski (1958) and Organski and Kugler (1980) (see also Lemke 2002).3 Any theoretical tradition that spans several decades and more than one theorist, as does power transition, is

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apt to have variations in certain details. One such variation in power transition is whether the power transition is a sufficient or necessary condition of war (see Vasquez 1996c). Another is how much emphasis to put on variables other than power, especially “satisfaction,” in identifying transitions likely to result in war. In the earliest version, Organski (1958) placed great emphasis on power and not too much on satisfaction, although it was a key ancillary variable. Later in Organski and Kugler (1980) satisfaction was not measured but played an important role in explaining why the Anglo-American power transition did not go to war, but the Anglo-German one did. Of late, satisfaction has loomed as the crucial variable in determining whether China will pass in peace (Tammen et al., 2000). One might derive two variants of power transition theory in terms of making predictions (or retrodictions) about transitions. The simple variant would look first at power, defined as GNP, with a transition involving the number 2 state catching up to and leap-frogging the number 1 state in the system. Such a transition would be expected to be associated with a war, all other factors being equal.4 The complicated variant employs the concept of satisfaction, which is part of the original theory, to identify the key transition that leads to war, even if this does not involve a completed transition between the #1 and the #2, but only a rapid approach. The early examples of power transition and war center on World War I and World War II with Germany passing Britain in both cases. However, this transition only occurs (between #1 and #2) in Organski and Kugler (1980) because they leave out the United States until 1945. This sidesteps the U.S. transition over Britain and a host of issues regarding who is # 1 and #2 among Britain, Germany, and the United States. A similar problem is occurring today with the focus on the United States and China without considering the EU. So, in terms of dyadic transitions the key conceptual questions are which dyadic transition is crucial, and must it always be between #1 and #2, and, if not, what is the basis for ignoring certain transitions. In the complex variant, satisfaction is the intervening variable, however, there is always a risk that without precise measurement one could always attribute an absence of war to satisfaction. If this is not to be a facile ad hoc explanation, analysts must demonstrate that the two sides are, in fact, satisfied—such a demonstration is not obvious in the Anglo-American transition (see Vasquez 1993: 103–104). In addition, from a realist perspective greater power, especially hegemonic power, must always be seen as inherently threatening, and therefore should be “balanced” (see Morgenthau 1960: 167). Doran’s (1989, 1991; see also Doran and Parsons 1980) power cycle makes several improvements over conventional power transition. One important advance is the incorporation of perceptions, which provides a more detailed description of the causal process by which power transitions lead to hostility, insecurity, and war. A second is an identification

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of inf lection points based on expectations of where one should be, where one is going, and where one is. The inf lection points provide a more precise mathematical determination of the power cycle and when war is likely. These can lead to more accurate predictions, especially for the U.S.-China case. From a dyadic pure power transition perceptive, the coming key transition is between the United States and China.5 Nevertheless, the United States and Europe is quite relevant. The EU already has a greater population than the United States and a larger GNP. Kupchan (2002) is the major thinker who takes this case seriously as a future rivalry. Conventional power transition theorists tend to ignore it, mostly because the EU is not a unitary state. More importantly, war is not predicted by them because both the EU and United States are seen as satisfied. Just about everybody ignores the China—EU axis. The interesting theoretical point is that this triad involves multiple transitions, not unlike the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century between Britain, the United States, and Germany. The second type of transition involves precisely these kinds of multiple transitions. The presence of multiple transitions in and of itself could be seen as destabilizing for the system as a whole, just as multiple rivalries, which are often linked, are seen as bringing about large wars, such as World War I (Thompson 2003; Valeriano 2003). Multiple power transitions or power transitions within a multipolar system are also important theoretically because they raise the complication of coalition making as a way of stemming decline or building offensive allies to topple a leader. Such considerations and their implications are not given sufficient attention in power transition theory, despite the advocacy of alliance making within realist thinking as a way of augmenting capability. The major factor that needs to be taken into consideration is whether and how a power transition can be prevented (or accelerated) by the formation of a tight alliance. Would not an alliance between the #1 and #3 that had more power (economic and/or military) than a passing #2, obviate the transition? Likewise, should not an alliance (or expected alignment) between a satisfied #1 and #2 prevent any war initiation by a rising and dissatisfied #3? Such questions are not often asked, let alone taken seriously by analysts. Yet, these questions seem particularly relevant to the situation prior to World War I where the allied coalition in the West was vastly superior to anything Germany was able to put together in 1914. Did not this coalition, which was in place by 1907, constitute a stopping or reversal of the Anglo-German power transition?6 These questions are also relevant to the future, because that transition appears likely to take place in a multipolar context. Looking at multiple power transitions requires, at some level, a more systemic perspective. In this regard, long cycle theory has an advantage, because it consciously compares all major states. Long cycle theory (Modelski and Thompson 1989) argues that over time a de-concentration

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of systemic power can be expected and with it the probability of war should rise. One of the most important insights of long cycle theory is that changing structural characteristics can increase or decrease the likelihood of war. This can have a profound impact on the success of certain foreign policies—like nuclear deterrence—that are aimed at preventing war. Modelski and Morgan (1985) argued that one of the reasons that nuclear war did not occur during the cold war was that the system had not reached a point on the long cycle where war would be expected. In this sense, nuclear deterrence was working in a very favorable environment. As the long cycle evolves toward a more de-concentration of power, war will become much more difficult to avoid. In analyzing future transitions, one should pay attention to whether structural factors do in fact play this kind of role and whether concentration of power is the crucial variable. The third possible transition involves combinations of a systemic shift coupled with a dyadic power transition (typically in a region). Geller (1992) in a test of long cycle theory in which he finds no relationship between increasing or decreasing concentration of power and the frequency of war from 1820 to 1976, does find an important relationship between systemic de-concentration of power and dyadic power transitions. He finds that a dyadic power transition is more apt to result in war when the long cycle is at its de-concentration phase. Thompson (1992) also argues that power transitions occurring during a systemic de-concentration are going to be more dangerous, and he provides a more long-term historical analysis to support this claim. Of particular importance is that various regional power transitions might be going on simultaneously thus making for both horizontal and deep vertical instability. Each of these perspectives provide a way of identifying what a future transition might look like given various scenarios regarding what might actually occur. In the twenty-first century, the following actors are relevant to any analysis trying to identify likely transitions: the United States—as the leading state, a united and more integrated EU, China, a revitalized Russia, and India. To this one might add Japan, if it should become a major rising economic power. In addition, there are a host of regional states—such as Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Nigeria, some counties of the Arab bloc that could increase in strength, as well as states that have or might get nuclear weapons, such as Israel, Pakistan, and Iran. Likewise, a break-up of the EU would require looking at Germany, Britain, France, and Italy as potential powers both within and outside their region. All these “facts” must be taken into account with regard to transitions, especially of the third type, which takes account of regional power transitions. At the global level, the following sets of dyads are likely to be key for conventional power transition theory: (1) EU–United States; (2) China–United States, China-EU, China-Russia; (3) India-China, India-Russia, India–United States, India-EU. Other regional pairings and rivalries, as well as nuclear states add to the complexity. The analytical

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problem at hand consists of two parts: (a) which of these dyads is likely to go to war and (b) does the presence of multiple transitions introduce so much complexity and uncertainty that a global war is more likely? Predictions Given the above outline of future transitions, what would the steps-to-war explanation say about the likelihood of a war and how would its predictions differ from those of power transition and long cycle theory? The steps-towar explanation differs from power transition and long cycle theory in that power is not the paradigmatic assumption. Power plays a role, but it is more at the margins. It shapes the kind of war that might be fought and the timing of war and not the onset of war (see Vasquez 1993: 119). In the steps-to-war perspective, power is a means to an end and not the end itself. What brings about war, conf lict, and rivalries are issues, and power itself is not treated as an issue in the explanation. Grievance and how it is handled is the key for determining whether a transition will be peaceful or end up in war. Territorial issues that are handled in a power politics manner are the most war prone issues. Looking at this factor, the transition dyads can be divided into those that have territorial disputes at their heart and those that do not. Those that have territorial disputes are apt to end up in rivalry, recurring disputes, the making of alliances, and even arms races. Each of these factors makes the relationship between two states more hostile, and increases threat perception and insecurity. In doing so, they increase the likelihood of war. In terms of the explanation, power shifts (at the dyadic or systemic level) and the prospect of a power transition aggravate these perceptions (but are not their initial source). The major role they are apt to play is that they could increase fear in one side that would impact decision making, but it is the territorial dispute and the process by which it has been handled (i.e., the previous steps to war that have been taken) that takes decisions makers down the road to war. Table 7.2 categorizes the dyads into least and most likely at risk for war during a transition. From table 7.2 it can be seen that the dyad that is least likely to go to war even though there might be a dyadic power transitions would be the EU–United States. Here there are no territorial disputes, or any major disagreements that would raise the grievance threshold close Table 7.2

Predictions of transition dyads going to war Risk for War (Lowest to Highest)

Transition Dyads

Not at Risk for War

Some Risk for War Vulnerable to Second High Risk for War Path to War

EU-U.S.

India-China China-Russia

China-U.S. China-EU India-U.S. India-EU

None

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to war. Nor is the dyad characterized by power politics interactions. For a simple dyadic power transition hypothesis, any EU–U.S. transition is problematic, much like the Anglo-American transitions, in that power, in and of itself fails to bring about a conf lictive struggle for position that would culminate in rivalry and war. This is even truer for any realist analysis of the problem along the lines of Morgenthau (classical realism) or Mearsheimer (offensive realism). It would also be true for a more realist variant of long cycle theory in which the EU poses as a new potential global leader within a de-concentrating long cycle. In each of these explanations, fundamental power shifts—regardless of their underlying cause (whether they be demographic and economic) as in power transition or a function of economic innovation (and related military innovation) as in long cycle theory—should give rise to fundamental grievances shaped around a struggle for position. In the steps-to-war explanation, such grievance is not automatic but centered on whether there are territorial claims. Power transition would discount the war potential of an EU-U.S. transition by relying on the satisfaction variable to explain away the absence of conf lict. Making this move, however, makes satisfaction a more important causal variable than power. Power transition theory will still need to deal with how other dyadic transitions involving #3 and #4 states, namely China and India, might affect politics, if the EU and United States are the main dyad encompassing the challenger and the leading state. Given its logic, a “cross-level” variant of long cycle theory is apt to stick with a prediction that an EU transition over the United States in the context of systemic de-concentration of power (a la Thompson [1992] and Geller [1992]) is apt to be war prone. This seems unlikely now, but long cycle theory would see this as more likely as de-concentration sets in. For the steps-to-war explanation no such war scenario is plausible, given the lack of grievances. Would a fundamental shift bring about grievances? Wallensteen (1981: 183) provides some evidence that a dyadic power transition between major states increases the likelihood of militarized confrontations.7 Nevertheless, given the absence of any major territorial disputes between the United States and any EU state since colonial times, and the absence of any enduring rivalry since 1945, there is nothing to indicate that a power transition or systemic de-concentration would give rise to territorial disputes. Therefore, war through this path is not likely. Is there another path through which war might occur? There would be if some nonterritorial dispute were handled in a power politics fashion. Again this seems unlikely given the history of the dyad and the recent history since 1945 of the United States and individual European states. It also seems unlikely since democratic states tend to settle militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) nonviolently (see Dixon 1993; Dixon and Senese 2002; Raymond 1994). Of course, this tendency as well as the pattern that democracies do not fight each other is partly a function of the absence of territorial disputes (Mitchell and Prins 1999; Gibler 2007). In

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addition, the United States and EU are enmeshed in a variety of shared inter-governmental organizations, which research shows reduces the likelihood of conf lict (Russett et al. 1998). The steps-to-war explanation places great emphasis on the global institutional context in terms of reducing the probability of war of all issues, particularly the less war prone issues, like nonterritorial issues (Vasquez 1993: Chapter 8; Henehan and Vasquez 2006). Shared IGOs play an important role in handling existing issues between the EU (as a whole and individual members) and the United States in a fashion that keeps things from getting too far out of hand. This is especially true of economic disagreements, which can become quite strident at times and lead to rather harsh economic actions. In principle, such harsh actions could play into the hands of hard liners on each side and poison attitudes and relations. The rules of the WTO manages this sort of conf lict effectively.8 The dyads that are most prone to war are those that have territorial disputes, and the more severe those disputes (i.e., the extent to which they have given rise to a sense of rivalry over territorial issues and the various steps to war have been taken) the greater the likelihood that a transition might be marked by war. The dyads that have a history of territorial disputes are China-Russia and India-China (see table 7.2). Anything that increased the salience of these territorial disputes would increase the likelihood that additional steps to war might be taken. Such vulnerability would be present regardless of any transition.9 Could a transition make it more likely that such issues would come to the forefront or intertwine with a struggle for position? If the two were linked, that means an increased chance of war, since the theory predicts an increased likelihood of war when any issue is linked with territory (see Vasquez 1993:150). For instance, speaking counter-factually, if there had been a power transition between 1871 and 1914, whereby France overtook Germany, then the presence of the Alasce-Lorraine dispute would have been brought to the fore, since now France had more of a chance to win a war with Germany without outside aid. Power transitions that are not linked with territorial claims are not going to be as war prone as those that are. In the absence of any previous territorial claims, it is unlikely that such territorial issues would arise.10 Another and non-obvious way in which a dyadic power transition could bring territorial disputes to the forefront is that the power transition might be associated with one side or both sides no longer having to worry about disputes with third parties. Huth (1996: Chapter 5) finds that territorial disputes that occur in the context of other ongoing disputes with other parties (i.e., those outside the dyad) are less likely to go to war and sometimes more likely to be settled. To the extent that an increase in power of one side eliminates disputes with third parties, then the dyad is free to pursue any existing territorial dispute they might have more vigorously. To a certain extent this phenomenon is illustrated by Britain’s settling a number of rivalries and their underlying issues prior to World

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War I. These would include relations with the United States, France, Russia, and even Japan, leaving Britain “free” to focus its attention on Germany, although even here Britain tried to settle some issues (e.g., the Baghdad railway). In the transition cases at hand, the territorial disputes between the former Soviet regime and China have a long history. Two factors seem to have kept this territorial rivalry within bounds (even though it was ongoing in the context of a rivalry for position within the communist world and the third world). The first is that third parties were a concern, especially the United States, but also India. Second, the dispute was primarily over boundary issues, which are less salient than claims over large tracts of homeland territory—the Chinese also have such claims, but have not pushed them. If they were, that would heighten the risk of war. Given the fact, that any dyadic transition between China and Russia (which some have already seen as taking place) will be in the context of multiple transitions, the first factor (outside third party disputes and rivals) is unlikely to change. The presence of these outside disputes will continue to mute the salience of the territorial rivalry between China and Russia. Similarly, the fact that this is a boundary dispute and that the Chinese have not pushed their larger claims puts this issue at a lower salience. Nevertheless, the presence of territorial disputes gives this dyad at least one risk factor for war. In the end, boundary disputes are apt to result in limited wars and not the kind of global wars that power transition and long cycle theory predict, although such disputes can play an important role in bringing rivals into a larger war (through the second path to war, see below). Similarly, the India-China dyad has a risk of war because of its outstanding boundary dispute. The same kinds of considerations that mute the China-Russia boundary dispute seem also to be at play here, and to a certain extent even more so because the location of the dispute makes it less prone to extensive fighting. Unlike the China-Russia territorial dispute, however, the India-China boundary dispute has a greater potential danger if any India-China rivalry should become more tightly linked with the India-Pakistan rivalry by the Chinese becoming more supportive of the Pakistanis in their dispute with India over Kashmir. Such a linkage could bring territory to the fore in the India-China transition. Hard liners in one or both sides might then link territorial concerns with a struggle for position, which would make the latter more prone to war. Such a linkage might also expand or at least heighten demands over the boundary. A power transition might also encourage hard liners to settle old scores as well as make declining states (e.g., Pakistan) more desperate to do something before the power shift makes change impossible. For all these reasons, the India-China transition has more potential to go to war at some point than the China-Russia transition, depending on whether some or all of these factors come to the fore. It also has an additional risk factor, which is that both sides would be major state rivals that are contiguous.

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The India-Russia dyad unlike the above two would be less at risk of war during any dyadic power transition for two simple reasons. First, there is no outstanding territorial dispute, nor is one likely to arise. Second, the history of positive relations and alliance reduces the likelihood of hostility and any rivalry emerging. In addition, to these, neither state is apt to side with the principal rival of the other. All these factors make war unlikely even in the face of a power transition that would damage Russia’s pride and self-image. It along with a potential EU-U.S. transition shows that grievance not power transition is the key.11 The third set of possible transitions listed in table 7.2 are in many ways the most interesting and complicated. These include the dyadic pairings of the rising states—China with the United States and the EU, and India with the same. These are placed in an in-between category between the least and most at risk for war during any power transition or systemic de-concentration of a long cycle. Certain factors make it likely that there would be no war between the dyads; among these the absence of direct territorial disputes is central. None of these states have territorial claims on the other. In that sense, the grievance level is well below that typical of war. However, there are other factors at play here that need to be included—contiguity and war diffusion, each of these make for a potentially less optimistic picture, albeit more optimistic than power transition or long cycle theory. Nevertheless, in the end, these transition dyads have a higher probability of going to war than India-China or China-Russia, as can be seen in table 7.2. So far the analysis has been confined to direct dyadic war between parties without looking at war joining or factors that might drag states into an ongoing war or make for a multilateral complex war. Global wars and world wars are of the latter type. The steps-to-war explanation posits different paths to war. One path is that which has been discussed. This is a path that is typical of contiguous rivals. A second path is typical of noncontiguous rivals especially those whose rivalry is not centered on territorial disputes (see Vasquez 1996b; cf Rasler and Thompson 2000). Noncontiguous major state rivals do in fact fight each other even in the absence of territorial disputes. Realists see these fights as hegemonic wars that determine position. For this reason both World War I and World War II are seen as wars between Germany and Britain for hegemony. The steps-to-war explanation takes a different perspective. Historically, it does not see the world wars as coming out of a struggle between Germany and Britain, which is not to deny that there was no rivalry between them. Rather it sees this rivalry as dragging the states, through alliances, into a local war, which starts because of territorial disputes between the local belligerents. In World War I, this involved territorial disputes between Serbia (as well as Serbian non-state actors) and Austria-Hungary, and in World War II it involved territorial disputes between the Third Reich and Poland (and later Russia). Noncontiguous (and contiguous) major state rivals are dragged into such wars, and because

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of that, these wars become global wars or world wars. The latter wars, however, do not start out that way. In fact, it may be possible to avoid such global wars if intervention in the local territorial wars can be avoided. To a certain extent a global war between the United States and the Soviet Union was avoided in this way. Thus, rather than seeing World War I as a titanic struggle for hegemony or the result of a power transition (or even some de-concentration phase of a long cycle), this perspective sees it as a war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia that could not be managed and expanded through the alliance structure and contiguity. Indeed, Germany did not want Britain to intervene and when that seemed likely the Kaiser and Edward Grey tried to stop the war unsuccessfully with the halt in Belgrade plan. This view of history eschews sweeping long-term power shifts as fundamental factors bringing about war, but sees war, as coming about because of very specific steps to war that are taken, and world wars as coming about because of diffusion and contagion factors that are at play. In terms of predictions about future transitions between the four noncontiguous major states the crucial prediction for determining the accuracy of the steps-to-war explanation is not so much whether a war comes about, but how it comes about, if it does. Any war between the United States and China or the EU-China is not going to come about in order to settle who is the global leader, but will come about through some local territorial war in which one or both sides are brought in. If such a war settles who is the global leader, this will be a side effect, an unintended consequence, much like the United States becoming the clear economic global leader after World War I and the clear political global leader after World War II. Global succession, as even Modelski and Thompson (1989: 46–47) accept, often goes not to the one of the two main rivals fighting for position in the global war but to a third party, albeit this third party may pursue predominance once the war starts.12 Any war between the United States and China is most apt to occur by the United States getting dragged into a territorial dispute that China has with a third party. What are the prospects for this? One simply needs to look at China’s present and potential territorial disputes and then see whether the United States is allied to a state that is in a severe conf lict with China. An examination of how many steps to war are present between China and this party is an indicator of the likelihood of war. The presence of various diffusion factors would then provide a measure of the risk of the war spreading (a list of these is presented in Vasquez 1993: Chapter 7). It is not that noncontiguous rivals are free of the risk of war, but that that risk is greatly accentuated by the presence of this second path to war. It is probably not an accident that both world wars began with local wars over territorial disputes. At any rate, blocking this path is one of the few specific actions states in transition can take to reduce their risk of war. The most obvious case that fits this risky scenario is the Taiwan dispute. This is a territorial dispute of high salience to both China and Taiwan.

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The dispute has recurred. It has produced a rivalry, and China has engaged in a military buildup, in part, as a way of dealing with the dispute. Taiwan has long been aligned with the United States as a way meeting the threat from the mainland (and although U.S. commitment to Taiwan is considerably weaker since the United States formally recognized the People’s Republic, it is still in force). During the cold war there was an intense rivalry between the United States and China, and important displays of military force. Continued or future insistence on the part of Taiwan for independence or a unilateral move by either side could put the United States in a difficult position. Whether war would occur would depend on whether the United States would live up to its commitment to defend Taiwan and join a war or put itself in a position (e.g., moving the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits) where it has to be attacked. Vasquez (1993: Chapter 7) outlines six factors that increase the likelihood that any dyadic war would spread. The three initial factors that encourage an intervention into a war are: alliance, contiguity, and rivalry. The first and third factors would be most relevant to any war with China. Even though at present it appears that the United States would not want to fight such a war, and even though the United States avoided such a war at the height of the cold war, that does not mean that such a war would be avoided in the future, even if there is no power transition. One must remember that China and the United States did fight in Korea in what could be considered an inadvertent war between the two (see Whiting 1991: 122), especially since Truman had previously decided not to fight the communists to save Chiang Kai-shek, and Truman did not want a war with China over Korea. While Taiwan is the most salient territorial issue now, it is not the only one. China’s policy in Tibet and other parts of the mainland could also give rise to similar sorts of territorial claims where non-state actors may make demands that the United States might support out of concerns for human rights or spreading democracy. For a number of years there have been bumper stickers in the United States saying, “Free Tibet.” This might be a noble sentiment, consistent with the dominant nationalist norm, but such claims will raise very serious territorial disputes with China. Because the EU is not likely to ally with any state that has a territorial dispute with China, it is less at risk of a war with China than the United States. If war does come, it would be apt to come from two paths. The first would be if the EU took on the territorial claims of another actor, like that of Tibetan nationalists. The second is that its alliance with the United States might bring it into a war that the United States had with China. The India–U.S. and India-EU transitions are less likely to go to war than China’s transitions with these two actors.13 There are several reasons for this. First, of course, is the absence of any territorial disputes. The main territorial dispute that might bring in the United States would be its support of Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute. Additional reasons for the United States favoring Pakistan, for example, its position on terrorism, might also

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make India more hostile to the United States. Similarly, EU support for Pakistan, following the lead of Britain could cause similar concerns. In general, however, such a scenario is unlikely to materialize. The United States is likely to move closer to India in the long run, especially if India has a rivalry with China (see Carter 2006: 42; Mohan 2006: 29–30). Similarly, the EU is apt to be more sympathetic to India over China because of the colonial ties to Britain. In addition, India is the world’s largest democracy and one of the healthiest in the former “third world.” All of these factors make it difficult for a perception of rivalry to emerge between India and the West even in the presence of disagreements. Policy Implications The policy implications of the steps-to-war explanation are more precise and detailed than that of power transition. The steps-to-war explanation is basically an attempt to explain war in terms of the foreign policy goals and behavior directed toward other states. It looks at the issues that divide states and what they do to each other in light of each state’s domestic political environment and the global institutional context. Because it attributes significant causal force to foreign policy choice, it provides more opportunities for manipulation, than power transition or long cycle theory, which see long-term secular trends that are difficult (but not impossible) to change as the key causal factor related to war. The clearest way to discuss policy implications is to look at the two paths to war—that between neighbors and that between noncontiguous rivals. Since the latter is more relevant to the China-U.S. transition, which has received the most media and scholarly attention, it will be discussed first. The Second Path to War—War by Diffusion Drawing in Noncontiguous Rivals One of the interesting patterns of war between noncontiguous rivals since 1816 is that they tend not to fight a direct war with each other, but come to war by supporting a third party. This pattern has not always held prior to 1816 and whether it will be sustained remains to be seen; nevertheless, it is clear that states enter war through two distinct paths either by fighting each other directly as the originators of the war or being brought into an ongoing war as joiners. The causal factors that make states join an ongoing war may be different from those that bring about the onset of war in the first place, a point Bremer and Cusack (1995) emphasize. One of the key differences, of course, is that states may join a war because of diffusion effects and contagion. As mentioned above, it is unlikely that there would be a direct war between the United States and China primarily because the absence of a

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territorial dispute between them keeps the grievance level low. The same is true of the EU and China. Historically, the great distance between the United States and China also reduces the likelihood of a war, primarily because it reduces the number of issues over which they can contend, while it increases the cost of a war due to the loss-of-strength gradient (Boulding 1962). Technological advances, particularly in missile technology and potentially space warfare, have shrunk this distance considerably.14 The crucial variable is the territorial factor, with noncontiguity making it less likely that a territorial dispute would arise. This is particularly the case in a postcolonial era. If war were to occur between the United States and China, it is most likely to occur through the second path to war; namely, by the United States intervening in a war between China and some other actor over a territorial dispute. The Taiwan issue and other similar types of issues (e.g., Tibet) have already been identified as a potential source or trigger for such a war. The policy implications here are obvious—avoid getting entangled in such conf licts by avoiding alliances with such actors. The price of course is that may give China a free hand. The alternative is to embolden weak actors to be less compromising than their position (of power) warrants. The price of the alternative is to become entrapped in someone else’s war by making their territorial dispute one’s own. Decision makers at the time will need to make the assessment of whether it is worth the cost, but the steps-to-war explanation points out the path by which a war is likely to occur and how that path can be blocked. What is not apt to occur is that there would be a direct provocation between the two major states over position that would lead to war without the presence of some third party. No direct provocation is apt to occur that is sufficiently high to bring about a straightforward war for leadership. The grievance level of that sort of issue is usually not sufficiently high—in part, because the issue itself is not pressing and does not have to be resolved now, and in part, because it is not clear that a war would resolve the issue and if it did that it would be worth the costs, right now. Psychologically, there is a bias in favor of putting off a decision that will bring high costs if there is no reason to making the decision now. One of the main reasons direct wars over position are avoided, then, is that both sides are prudent and without a clear provocation there is insufficient domestic support for such an action, even within nondemocratic regimes. The third party war raises the provocation threshold and makes the issue pressing. Action is required now or something will be lost. This situation can garner domestic support. In this sense, major states that join an ongoing war are dragged into it. With regard to China and any transition, war is most apt to be avoided by avoiding these entanglements. What entanglements do is make it easier for those who would like to fight a war for position to do so. The case is made easier because long-term potential threats are not as pressing as shortterm immediate threats, especially those involving territorial disputes.

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Even though this policy implication is derived from the steps-to-war explanation, that does not mean that it is inconsistent with classical realism, which already provides a way of avoiding such wars—it is called spheres of inf luence. Can There Be a Direct War over Position? The simple answer to this question is, yes; the more complicated answer is, that this is not likely, especially in a multipolar world. To see if purely positional issues (not linked to territorial disputes) can ever give rise to war among noncontiguous major state rivals, one must remember how and why nonterritorial issues give rise to war. Nonterritorial issues give rise to war when parties handle them through the use of power politics. The probability of war goes up when disputants take steps such as making outside alliances, engaging in repeated confrontations that either encourage and/or stem out of a sense of rivalry, and engaging in military buildups that lead to arms races. Senese and Vasquez (2005, 2008: Chapter 6) show that while such steps do not increase the probability of war as much as they do when taken with territorial disputes, they still can push the probability of war to very high levels. For instance, in the 1816–1945 period handling territorial disputes by taking additional steps to war increases the probability of war from 0.20 to 0.58 (when outside alliances and rivalry are present) to 0.92 (when arms races are also present). For nonterritorial issues the respective probabilities are 0.11, 0.40, 0.85.15 Still, this probability of war is most apt to be actualized by the second path to war. Can a Transition Be Peacefully Negotiated? This subject raises the related question of whether any potential war can be negotiated away. According to the rationalist bargaining theory of war, no war, in principle should be fought if the net benefit of winning is less than the net benefit of a bargain reached between the disputants to avoid the war (see Fearon 1995). To analyze the possibility of a bargain one must have some idea of the benefits of being a global leader. The main benefit of global leadership is that it may permit the construction of a global political structure that will maintain or enhance the power and preferences of the global leader. Here the role of the global institutional context in world politics comes to the fore. Power does not occur in a vacuum; it can be augmented or tamed by the existing global institutional context. An important implication of the steps-to-war explanation is that one way to avoid a war over a dyadic transition is to create a bargain implicitly or explicitly between the rising state and current leader that creates a global institutional context that benefits both. The

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power of the new leader is tamed by enmeshing it in a set of international institutions. In order for the new leader to accept this bargain, however, the global institutional context must tame the new leader not try to keep it in second place. The new arrangement must benefit both. What such a set of institutions and its underlying structure might look like would need to be determined at the time. At present, however, it seems that the system would remain one of sovereign nation-states and capitalist at its core. From this base, several other political structures are possible. It could be free trade and globalizing or it could be a classic spheres of inf luence structure. Evolutionary and/or liberal theory might suggest the former and classical realism the latter. Concerts of power and other issue-specific regimes would be a third alternative. What is also important to keep in mind is that, according to the steps-to-war explanation, constructing some sort of global institutional structure reduces the likelihood of war at any time regardless of whether a transition is present or systemic de-concentration occurring. It reduces war, because it provides a way of making binding political decisions in the absence of government. Since war is also a way of making binding political decisions, global institutions provide a functional equivalent of war. It provides a form of governance without government—something between world government, on the one hand, and war, on the other. Most of the implications from this perspective are not that different from what could be derived from the Modelski’s (1978) conceptual framework that posits a global political system and a global leader. Where it differs is when one asks the question: Does the prospect of a power transition or cyclical power de-concentration make it more difficult for a global institutional structure to operate? According to these two power theories it does by definition. The steps-to-war explanation is more hesitant in giving an affirmative answer to this question. On the one hand, it recognizes that such foundational or “constitutional” questions can be potentially quite disruptive. On the other hand, how well such questions can be dealt with before a war is an open empirical question, because most global political structures have been created after a global war as Gilpin (1981) and Modelski (1978) (see also Modelski and Thompson 1989) point out. Whether a given global structure can politically adapt to the challenge of a power shift depends in part on the nature of the global political system in place. Global political systems (or peace systems) can vary in their ability to prevent war (Vasquez 1993: Chapter 8 and Doran 1971). Some, like the Concert of Europe, work better than others, for example, the Versailles system. To date all peace systems have decayed, but their rate of decay has varied. They have decayed in part because new fundamental critical issues arise that they cannot handle. Doran (1971) can be used to derive certain functions that peace systems must satisfy in order to prevent a future global war. The most important are the ability to deal with new issues that might arise since the peace system was created and the ability to accommodate new powerful actors. The theory is that power shifts may

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raise new issues or produce a new actor that needs to be accommodated, but whether war will occur depends very much on the issues raised and the ability of the peace system to give a governing role to the new actor. It is not so much the power transition, but these two intervening variables that determine the likelihood that a peace system will survive and avoid a global war. The steps-to-war explanation also provides the additional insight that it is important, not only to have institutions and mechanisms for making decisions, but also to keep certain issues off the agenda, namely, salient territorial issues.16 When territorial issues do arise, it is important to have a set of international norms, laws, and institutions for their settlement. Such considerations lead to a discussion of the policy implications of the first path to war, since territorial issues are most likely to arise between neighbors. The first path to war stipulates that among neighbors war is most apt to arise over territorial disputes. The steps-to-war explanation, as expressed in the territorial explanation of war, says that most boundaries are established through aggressive displays, which often involve war. It goes on to say, however, that once these borders are accepted by both sides as legitimate, peaceful relations between neighbors can reign for very long periods even if other salient nonterritorial issues arise. There is a growing body of evidence that supports the relationship between territorial disputes and war and some evidence on the relationship between settled borders and peaceful relations (see Vasquez and Valeriano [2008] for a review). These theoretical expectations imply that transitions involving contiguous major state rivals would have their probability for a direct war reduced, if their territorial disputes are resolved and removed from the agenda. If that is not feasible, then it would be well to try to keep the territorial issues de-linked from the positional issue. The worse scenario from a steps-to-war perspective is to link the two and then handle each with a resort to power politics. Such a scenario is most likely when the global institutional context is weak or seen as rigged to favor the status quo, as the Versailles–League of Nations–Washington Conference system was seen by Germany, Italy, and Japan. All of the above policy implications of the first path to war are relevant evidence on India-China and China-Russia given their contiguity and their territorial disputes. To a lesser extent they might apply to the Spratley Islands dispute between China and Japan. The likelihood of war in these cases is also a function of the nature of the territorial dispute. In other words, some territorial disputes are more prone to war than others. Territorial disputes that involve economic resources that can, in principle, be divided and provide prospects of joint economic reward are more apt to be settled. Boundary disputes are easier to settle than territorial disputes involving ethnic claims, which are often the most war prone (for evidence on all of the above see Huth 1996: Chapters 5–6). It is somewhat heartening that India and China have made

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some moves to resolve their territorial boundary dispute (see Mohan 2006: 21–22), although it remains to be seen whether that effort will pay off. Realist Strategies for Dealing with Transitions These policy implications are generally more optimistic than what is suggested by power transition whose logic can imply preventive war as an option, although mainstream theorists (Organski and Kugler [1980]) are not wont to recommend such an option.17 While this is not the only strategy that can be derived, it is one that those more imbued with the realist efficacy of power politics consider (see Mearsheimer 2001: 372– 377, 2005). Basically, this realist strategy argues that the leading state or hegemon should use its considerable political power to prevent its own economic decline and to inhibit or stunt the economic rise of the challenger. Some in China fear that the United States is or will do this ( Jisi 2005: 47, see also Mahbubani 2005). A variation on this strategy is for the leading state to use its privileged diplomatic position to marshal a preponderant coalition against the rising state and isolate it. To a certain extent Britain at least started on this quest to alleviate its “weary titan” status at the very end of the nineteenth century. From a realist point of view, if either of the above exercises in diplomatic and economic power fails, then one could fight a preventive war. Each of these strategies has had problems. The first (inhibit the economic power of the challenger) and last (preventive war) may simply not work. To the extent that Organski and Kugler (1980), Modelski and Thompson (1996), and Thompson (1988) are correct in seeing political power growing out of economic power, the market forces may simply be too great to stem the tide in the long run. Attempts to stunt market forces may only generate hostility and rivalry making the kind of bargain that would make each side better off and avoid a war, unlikely to occur. In terms of preventive war, Organski and Kugler (1980) show that for global wars there is a phoenix factor at work, whereby the defeated challenger is likely to be at its prewar economic strength 15–20 years later. In addition, a major state preventive war in the nuclear era is less of an option. Such failings suggest to power transition theorists and others that perhaps market forces should be permitted to work their will without a resort to war, especially if the war is going to be very costly. In the end, the kinds of policy implications suggested by the steps-to-war explanation in terms of making a bargain about the global political system could converge with the implications less realist transition theorists (who focused on avoiding war) would derive. The second strategy of marshalling a preponderant diplomatic coalition seems feasible on paper. It also seems to be a likely scenario for the United States and EU to follow vis-à-vis China (Lake 2006). It is not clear if such a strategy (either in its hard-line form by trying to isolate completely the

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challenger or in its more conciliatory form by trying to accommodate it) can avoid war. Assuming that Britain actually followed aspects of this strategy, which is a big assumption, it is not clear it worked.18 In the end, Britain did go to war in 1914 and again in 1939. Part of the problem may have been with Britain’s implementation of the strategy in that it was unwilling in 1914 to give Germany its rightful place in the sun and when it was (in the 1930s), it was too late. Such a strategy is most apt to work, if it incorporates the insights of the steps-to-war explanation outlined above. In the end, however, this strategy still is plagued by zero-sum thinking, and is not likely to be as fruitful as the policy suggestions derived from the steps-to-war explanation. Conclusion Several conclusions can be made from this analysis. First, the steps-to-war explanation can make specific falsifiable predictions about the type of transitions that are apt to be association with a major war in the future. It is able to identify the conditions under which war is likely and the kind of war that will occur, if it occurs. Second, the analysis suggests that transitions need not end in war and that certain steps can be taken to avoid war. Third, the transition least likely to go to war is that which has neither territorial disputes nor resorts to power politics. The EU-U.S. transition conforms to this pattern and therefore is unlikely to go to war. Fourth, the transition most likely to have a war is one where there are outstanding territorial disputes and they are handled through the use of power politics. The India-China and China-Russia transition come closest to this pattern. However, the territorial disputes involved in these dyads are primary boundary disputes, which are less war prone, than large-scale claims to homeland territory that have an ethnic dimension to them. So, while these transitions have some risk of war, they are not at the highest risk that they could be. In fact, a fifth important conclusion is that of the likely transitions that are apt to occur in the next 50–100 years, the analysis finds no transition at the highest risk of war. Sixth, a non-obvious pattern that poses the greatest risk for war during a twenty-first century transition is where noncontiguous major state rivals who do not have any territorial disputes come to war by intervening in a ongoing war over a territorial dispute between one member of the transition dyad and a third party. This is the pattern by which both World War I and World War II came about. The war involving the transition dyad is produced by diffusion effects. The transition dyad most vulnerable to this kind of war is China–United States followed by China-EU. Of all the possible wars that could occur this is both the most likely and the most dangerous. Seventh, such war could be avoided by the United States and the EU avoiding ties, especially a defense alliance, with actors that have serious territorial disputes with China. Likewise, China could avoid such wars by

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trying to settle such disputes with contiguous actors without a resort to power politics. This analysis has made it clear that the steps-to-war explanation can make predictions about the future that provide important and sometimes non-obvious policy guidance based on explicit theoretical propositions that have passed some empirical tests. At the same time, the predictions provided in this analysis constitute a rigorous test of the steps-to-war explanation based on events that have not yet occurred. If the steps-towar is able to provide an accurate prediction of the future, both in terms of whether and how war might occur for specific dyads, it will be given great credence. Notes 1. The 1999 Kargil War between Pakistan and India shows that nuclear weapons will not, in the presence of a serious territorial dispute and rivalry, deter a conventional war. 2. An analysis of the MID data show that these are often over policy. The policy code in the MID data however is quite broad so this is not very informative other than the issue is non-territorial. A preliminary classification of war based on policy MIDs shows that these typically involve over imperialist and colonial questions, see Vasquez and Valeriano (2004). Rasler and Thompson (2000) would suggest that these major states frequently involve a rivalry over position. This question is a fruitful area for further research. 3. Gilpin’s (1981) theory of hegemonic war has several similarities to Organski’s power transition theory; however, since the latter was published first, Gilpin’s analysis will not be treated here in any detail. For a review of the power transition research program, see Kugler and Lemke (1996); DiCicco and Levy (1999). 4. In some version war may come before the actual transition occurs, especially if there is a rapid approach (see Wayman 1996; see also Sample 1998). 5. In addition to Tammen et al. (2000), see the September/August 2005 issue of Foreign Affairs, especially Bijian (2005), see also Levy (2006). 6. German leaders, of course, thought as late as July 1914 that they could break the Triple Entente; for instance, see Bethmann Hollweg’s question to Grey whether Britain would remain neutral if Germany took no homeland territory from France and restored Belgium after the war (Harris 2003: 282). It is also the case that Britain sent mixed signals, as the suggestion by Grey that Britain would remain neutral if Germany did not attack France (see Harris 2003: 383–384). “Stopping” coalitions of this sort, therefore, do not always produce the anticipated “deterrent” effect because the opponent questions the ally’s reliability or resolve. Conversely, when the ally does seem to be reliable this increases threat perception and hostility within the target (e.g., Germany), which increases the probability of war rather than result in a “deterrent” effect. My thanks to William Thompson for reminding me of some of these theoretical points. 7. Using a 10 year window and a very early version of the Militarized Interstate Dispute data, he finds that 91% of major state dyads that experience a power transition have militarized confrontations (compared to a base of 85%). Note however that only 27% of these dyads experience a war (compared to a base of 55%). 8. The settlement procedures of the WTO also give leaders an “out” with domestic constituencies in that they force a leader to hand over such issues to the IGO rather than pursue them unilaterally through hard-line policies. On leaders’ use of third parties to divert blame for not doing more on an issue, see Simmons (1999). 9. Russia-Japan and China-Japan have outstanding territorial disputes that would be prone to similar processes. Likewise, the extension of the EU to the Russian border and the inclusion of the Baltic states, especially Estonia, that have territorial disagreement with Russia puts the EU (and NATO) in a position where they assume the territorial disagreements of these small states while simultaneously emboldening them.

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10. Even Hitler’s goal of Lebensraum in the Ukraine was preceded by the precedent of German demands and acquisition of the Ukraine in the Brest-Litovsk treaty. Hitler’s goals here can be seen as similar to his revising the Versailles settlement in Western and Central Europe. 11. Of course, with India-Russia there are two other differences—unlike the EU–United States dyad there is no cultural similarity between the ruling elites, and the type of government is different (assuming Russia does not become more democratic). 12. The United States in World War II is a good example of the latter. It is not really seeking global leadership in 1939, and FDR cannot get domestic support for a war against Germany until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Once in the war, however, the United States seeks and assumes the leadership role against Germany and its allies. 13. On the rise of India and U.S. perceptions see the July/August 2006 issue of Foreign Affairs. For an excellent historical and political analysis of India’s search for major power status see Nayar and Paul (2003). 14. Still distance is important. One factor that has reduced the likelihood of a Chinese attempt to conquer Taiwan by force is its distance coupled with the relative weakness of its navy (see Glosny 2004 and O’Hanlon 2000). 15. These particular findings do not always separate joiners from originators. For a discussion of this question, see Senese and Vasquez (2005: 622, note 49). 16. It is also likely that a successful peace system must produce a global political economy that benefits the strongest states in the system. A global political economy, especially one based on a liberal trading order, that reduces wealth is apt to lead actors to put territorial issues on the agenda (see Rosecrance 1986). 17. On how the logic of power transition can suggest preventive war, see Levy (2008). 18. An alternative interpretation is that this was one of several potential strategies entertained and that a different option was for Britain to try to reach an accommodation with all its potential rivals, Germany included. The latter was certainly true at the turn of the century when Joseph Chamberlain made several overtures to Germany from 1898 to 1901 without success (Harris 2003: 268–269). By 1914, Anglo-German relations were improving on several fronts, and it is not inconceivable that Britain could have reached some accommodation with Germany. In retrospect the war makes the system of ententes appear as a more linear anti-German grand strategy than it actually was. On the general question of Britain as a “weary titan,” see Friedberg (1988).

References Ardrey, Robert (1966) The Territorial Imperative. New York: Atheneum. Bijian, Zheng (2005) “China’s “Peaceful Rise” to Great Power Status.” Foreign Affairs 84 (5): 18–24. Boulding, Kenneth (1962) Conflict and Defense: A General Theory. New York: Harper and Row. Bremer, Stuart A. and Thomas R. Cusack, eds. (1995) The Process of War: Advancing the Scientific Study of War. Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach. Carter, Ashton B. (2006) “America’s New Strategic Partner?” Foreign Affairs 85 (4): 33–44. Cashman, Greg and Leonard C. Robinson (2007) An Introduction to the Causes of War: Patterns of Interstate Conflict from World War I to Iraq. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Chan, Steve (2007) China, the U.S. and the Power Transition Theory: A Critique. New York: Routledge. Colaresi, Michael P. and William R. Thompson (2005) “Alliances, Arms Buildups and Recurrent Conf lict: Testing a Steps-to-War Model.” Journal of Politics 67 (May): 345–364. DiCicco, Jonathan M. and Jack S. Levy (1999) “Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43 (6): 675–704. Dixon, W.J. (1993) “Democracy and the Management of International Conf lict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37: 42–68. Dixon, W.J., and P.D. Senese (2002) “Democracy, Disputes, and Negotiated Settlements.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46: 547–571.

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Doran, Charles F. (1971) The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. ——— (1989) “Systemic Disequilibrium, Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (September): 371–401. ——— (1991) Systems in Crisis: New Imperative of High Politics at Century’s End. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Doran, Charles F. and Wes Parsons (1980) “War and the Cycle of Relative Power.” American Political Science Review 74: 947–65. Fearon, James D. (1995) “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49 (3): 379–414. Friedberg, Aaron (1988) The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Geller, Daniel S. (1992) “Capability Concentration, Power Transition, and War.” International Interactions 17 (3): 269–284. Gibler, Douglas M. (2000) “Alliances: Why Some Cause War and Why Others Cause Peace,” in John Vasquez, ed., What Do We Know about War? Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 145–164. ——— (2007) “Bordering on Peace: Democracy, Territorial Issues, and Conf lict.” International Studies Quarterly 51 (September): 509–532 Gilpin, Robert (1981) War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Glosny, Michael A. (2004) “Strangulations from the Sea: A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan.” International Security 28 (4): 125–160. Harris, J. Paul (2003) “Great Britain,” in Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, eds., The Origins of World War I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 266–299. Henehan, Marie T. and John A. Vasquez (2006) “The Changing Probability of War, 1816–1992,” in Raimo Vayrynen, ed., The Waning of Major War. London: Routledge, 280–299. Hensel, Paul R. (1996) “Charting a Course to Conf lict: Territorial Issues and Interstate Conf lict, 816–992.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 15 (1): 43–73. ——— (2000) “Territory: Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conf lict,” in John A. Vasquez, ed., What Do We Know about War? Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 57–84. Huth, Paul K. (1996) Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Jisi, Wang (2005) “China’s Search for Stability with America.” Foreign Affairs 84 (5): 39–49. Johnston, Alistair I. (1996) “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security. New York: Columbia University Press, 216–268. Kennedy, Paul (1987) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House. Keohane, Robert O. (1984) After Hegemony. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kugler, Jacek (2006) “The Asian Ascent: Opportunity for Peace or Precondition for War?” International Studies Perspectives 7 (1): 36–42. Kugler, Jacek and Douglas Lemke, eds. (1996) Parity and War: A Critical Reevaluation of the War Ledger. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Kupchan, Charles A. (2002) The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century. New York: Knopf. Lake, David A. (2006) “American Hegemony and the Future of East-West Relations.” International Studies Perspectives 7 (1): 23–30. Lemke, Douglas (2002) Regions of War and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levy, Jack S. (2006) “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China.” Revision of a paper written for the conference on The Rise of China: Theory and Practice, Peking University, January (May revision). ——— (2008) “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China,” in Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., China Rising: Theoretical and Policy Perspectives. Ithaca, New York, NY: Cornell University Press, 11–33. Mahbubani, Kishorne (2005) “Understanding China.” Foreign Affairs 84 (5): 49–60. Mansbach, Richard W. and John A. Vasquez (1981) In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

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Mead, Margaret (1940) “Warfare Is Only an Invention—Not a Biological Necessity.” Asia 40 (8): 402–405. Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton. ——— (2005) “Clash of Titans” (an exchange with Zbigniew Brzezinski). Foreign Policy 146 ( January/February): 46–49. Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Brandon Prins (1999) “Beyond Territorial Contiguity: Issues at Stake in Democratic Militarized Interstate Disputes.” International Studies Quarterly 43: 169–183. Modelski, George (1978) “The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 20 (April): 214–235. Modelski, George and Patrick M. Morgan (1985) “Understanding Global War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 29: 391–417. Modelski, George and William R. Thompson (1989) “Long Cycles and Global War,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies. Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 23–54. ——— (1996) Leading Sectors and World Power: The Coevolution of Global Economics and Politics. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Mohan, C. Raja (2006) “India and the Balance of Power.” Foreign Affairs 85 (4): 17–32 Morgenthau, Hans J. (1960) Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 3rd edition. New York: Knopf. Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003) India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. O’Hanlon, Michael (2000) “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan.” International Security 25 (2): 51–86. Organski, A.F.K. (1958) World Politics. New York: Knopf. Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler (1980) The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rasler, Karen and William R. Thompson (2000) “Explaining Rivalry Escalation to War: Space, Position, and Contiguity in the Major Power Subsystem.” International Studies Quarterly 44: 503–530. Raymond, Gregory A. (1994) “Democracies, Disputes, and Third Party Intermediaries.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38 (1): 24–42. Rosecrance, Richard N. (1986) The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World. New York: Basic Books. Russett, Bruce M. (1985) “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: Or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead.” International Organization 39 (2): 207–232. Russett, Bruce M., John R. Oneal, and David R. Davis (1998) “The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod For Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes.” International Organization 52 (3): 441–467. Sample, Susan G. (1998) “Military Buildups, War, and Realpolitik: A Multivariate Model.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42: 156–175. ——— (2000) “Military Buildups: Arming and War,” in John Vasquez, ed., What Do We Know about War? Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 165–195. Senese, Paul D. (1996) “Geographic Proximity and Issue Salience: Their Effects on the Escalation of Militarized Interstate Conf lict.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 15: 133–161. Senese, Paul D. and John Vasquez (2008) The Steps to War: An Empirical Study. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Shaw R. Paul and Yuwa Wong (1989) Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism, and Patriotism. Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman. Simmons, Beth A. (1999) “See You in ‘Court’? The Appeal to Quasi-Judicial Legal Processes in the Settlement of Territorial Disputes,” in Paul F. Diehl, ed., A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict. Nashville, TE: Vanderbilt University Press, 205–237. Tammen, Ronald L, Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Allan Stam III, Carole Alsharabati, Mark A. Abdollahian, Brian Efird, and A.F.K. Organski (2000) Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century. New York: Chatham House. Thompson, William R. (1988) On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. ——— (1992) “Dehio, Long Cycles and the Geohistorical Contexts of Structural Transition.” World Politics 45 (October): 127–152.

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Thompson, William R. (2003) “A Streetcar Named Sarajevo: Catalysts, Multiple Causation Chains, and Rivalry Structures.” International Studies Quarterly 47 (September): 453–474. Valeriano, Brandon. (2003) The Steps to Rivalry: Power Politics and Rivalry Formation, Doctoral Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, August 2003. Vasquez, John A. (1987) “The Steps to War: Toward a Scientific Explanation of Correlates of War Findings.” World Politics 40:108–145. ——— (1993) The War Puzzle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——— (1996a) “The Causes of the Second World War in Europe: A New Scientific Explanation.” International Political Science Review 17 (April): 161–178 ——— (1996b) “Distinguishing Rivals That Go to War from Those That Do Not: A Quantitative Comparative Case Study of the Two Paths to War.” International Studies Quarterly 40 (December): 531–558 ——— (1996c) “When Are Power Transitions Dangerous? The Contribution of the Power Transition Thesis to International Relations Theory,” in Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: A Critical Reevaluation of the War Ledger. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 35–56 Vasquez, John A. and Brandon Valeriano (2004) “A Classification of Interstate War.” Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 20. ——— (2008) “Territory as a Source of Conf lict and a Road to Peace.” In Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, eds., The Handbook on Conflict Resolution. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 193–209. Wallensteen, Peter (1981) “Incompatibility, Confrontation, and War: Four Models and Three Historical Systems, 1816–1976.” Journal of Peace Research 18: 57–90. Wayman, Frank Whelon (1996) “Power Shifts and the Onset of War,” in Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 145–162. Whiting, Alan S. (1991) “The U.S.-China War in Korea,” in Alexander L. George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 103–125.

CH A P T E R

EIGH T

Implications of Asia’s Rise to Global Status Jac e k Kug l e r a n d Rona l d L . Ta m m e n

Background A fundamental and unprecedented transition is underway. For the first time in the past 500 years, the center of world politics is shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific. This transition is a consequence of the rise of productivity among the largest societies in the developing word relative to that of today’s developed leaders. These patterns are reinforced in unexpected ways by fertility and migration trends. As this continental shift takes place, the established norms of the international system will be challenged. The uncharacteristic pattern of this transition is that rich, productive societies will be surpassed by poorer, less productive nations at the individual level. In the past, fundamental transitions of this magnitude have been associated with severe conf lict. Will history repeat itself? What can be done? This chapter lays out some of the major anticipated events, provides a formal structure that accounts for potential conf lict and cooperation centering on the rising Asian nations, and assesses the long-term implications of these new interactions. Let us first review the main global trends and indicate their likely consequences for world politics. Hierarchy and Power in World Politics We conceptualize world politics as a hierarchical system (Tammen et al. 2000). We believe that all nations implicitly recognize this hierarchy and the implications of the relative distribution of power therein.

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Dominant Power

Great Powers

Middle Powers

Small Powers

Dissatisfied Figure 8.1

Satisfied

Global hierarchy

Figure 8.1 indicates that a dominant nation resides at the top of any global or regional hierarchy. The term dominant has a special meaning. This nation is not a hegemon, but rather the recognized pre-eminent, most powerful regional or global leader. Unlike a hegemon that could act unilaterally, a dominant nation maintains its position by assembling and managing a coalition of nations with similar preferences that are satisfied with the rules that structure international interactions. For the most part, the dominant nation creates and defends the status quo. In recent history, Britain following the Napoleonic period, and the United States following World War II were the global dominant nations. In South America during the last century, Brazil has been the dominant nation. More variation is found in Asia and Africa (Lemke 2002). Great powers populate the second tier in this hierarchy. Each of these nations has a significant, but not overwhelming, proportion of the power in the international system. Current great powers include China, the EU taken in total, Russia, and potentially India. Most, but not all, great powers are satisfied with the creation and management of rules by the dominant nation. For example, the EU and Japan are generally committed to sustaining the United States established status quo. Yet, among the great powers there exist nations that are not fully integrated into the dominant power’s regime. China, India, or Russia fall in this category. On the one hand, when dissatisfied nations rapidly develop power, they may challenge for leadership of world politics, as Germany did twice in the past century. On the other hand, satisfied powers find effective accommodations that allow the new dominant power to take leadership while preserving existing rules. This transfer took place when the United States overtook Britain. Beneath the great powers are the middle powers. These include states of the size of Germany, Japan, France, Italy, South Africa, Indonesia, or Brazil. Each possesses substantial resources. Middle powers can make

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Global Hierarchy US Regional Hierarchies

India Mexico Guatemala Honduras

Figure 8.2

Pakistan Bangladesh

Regional hierarchies

serious demands that cannot be dismissed, but they do not have the capabilities to challenge the dominant power for control of the global hierarchy. Further down the power hierarchy reside the small powers. Though large in number, they have few resources and very limited power. Nations, such as Uruguay, Costa Rica, or Fuji pose no direct threat to the region dominant nation’s leadership of the dominant nation in the global hierarchy. Figure 8.2 shows that embedded within the global hierarchy are a number of regional hierarchies, each with its own set of dominant, great, and lesser powers.1 Interactions within regional hierarchies are severely affected by the global hierarchy. Regional hierarchies are inf luenced by the global hierarchy, but cannot, in turn, fundamentally affect outcomes in the global system. Simply put, nations lower in the global and regional hierarchies are far more constrained than nations in the top of such hierarchies. Lemke (2002), on the one hand, indicates that isolated regional hierarchies, like Latin America, operate under similar rules to those in the global hierarchy. On the other hand, interdependent hierarchies, like the Middle East, are directly affected by the interests of the global dominant and great powers. When taking any action in its own region, Guatemala and Honduras must consider their interactions with Mexico and also calculate effects on the United States. In all cases, the dominant power in the regional hierarchy is subordinate to the inf luences of the dominant power in the global hierarchy. We further postulate that wars diffuse downward from global to regional hierarchies but seldom diffuse in the opposite direction. The exception is like in World War II when a transition among dissatisfied members of the global hierarchy is ongoing allowing the invasion of Poland to triggers initiation. In general, the global dominant power and its main great power

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challengers can directly exert power anywhere in the globe, while most regional powers can only do so within their own region. Thus, limited wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iran do not escalate to global proportions. This unidirectional diffusion of conf lict has empirical support. For example, World Wars I and II involved all the great powers and diffused to include almost every regional hierarchy. The contending powers delivered troops to distant areas of conf lict from Africa to Asia. By contrast, the far more numerous conf licts within regional hierarchies seldom spill outside the region. Even when military troops from a dominant or challenging global power are deployed diffusion has been minimal. Two examples include the United States in Korea, Afghanistan, and Iraq; and the Soviet Union in Hungary, Afghanistan, or Czechoslovakia. The global power’s troops frequently determine the outcome of regional hierarchy wars (as in Korea or Hungary) but even under such circumstances regional conf lict seldom escalates. Such patterns are in sharp contrast to conf licts that involve global contenders directly. When the global and dominant powers wage war (as they did in World War I and II) conf lict escalates and usually diffuses to most regions connected to contenders in the global hierarchy. For this reason it is unwise to confound global wars with limited regional wars. The characteristics and preconditions associated with World War I or II are not the same as those associated with the succession of wars in Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan; and they certainly differ from the elements that characterize terrorist activities like 9/11. Rather than assert this point we will provide a formal structure to explain these differences and use this framework to analyze relations among the aff luent and less aff luent societies both at the global and regional levels. The September 11 attacks confounded the usual boundaries of conf lict initiation. Al-Qaeda (an informal supranational group) directly attacked the dominant nation. U.S. leaders defined this terrorist attack on the United States as the equivalent of a major war among great powers, not a limited conf lict emerging from the unstable Middle East hierarchy. The terrorist “axis” was incorrectly compared to the challenge posed by the Nazi Axis powers during World War II. Despite the 3,000 civilian casualties and major suffering inf licted on U.S. citizens, the 9/11 terrorist activity involved a very small number of determined individuals. Such actors do not, and cannot not, challenge the structure of world politics. The outcome of the al Qaeda versus U.S. and its allies—now waged in Afghanistan, Iraq, and perhaps elsewhere in the future—will not resolve global structural differences. They simply increase the level of uncertainty in global politics. The global transition of power between the United States, Western Europe, and the two potential Asian challengers, China and India, is the at center stage in the global hierarchy and independent of any regional shifts motivated by terrorist activity. This chapter focuses on the global hierarchy. The transitions anticipated are expected to produce consequential, lasting and fundamental

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transformations in world politics. Associated with these transitions are possible long-term challenges to the current structure of world politics. Micro Foundations Why should parity increase competition and provide the necessary conditions for serious conf lict? In world politics the traditional argument is precisely the opposite. Balance of power proponents argue that international politics is an anarchic system where contenders will avoid conf lict when faced with the high costs of war. Thus, the closer two opponents are to a balance of power, the less likely is conf lict to emerge (Morgenthau 1960; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). This balance of power logic was transformed into a nuclear doctrine in the 1950s. The concept of Mutual Assured Destruction, adopting the equality insures peace concept, argued that nuclear nations can deter opponents because they have a credible capacity to impose unacceptable damage in retaliation for a nuclear imitation (Brodie 1959). We argue the exact opposite, that equality establishes a key component of conf lict. Black (1958) proposes a very elegant formal demonstration of the parity principle in a competitive electoral context. Black’s median voter theorem has universal application to any competitive environment. Competitive political elections are contests where voters choose among alternatives, with a majority winning the prize. When distributions of voters are approximately equal, electoral contests are strenuously contested. The reason is that either side can win by marginally increasing its support among voters. While in any election each side attempts to maximize support, in close elections where the two sides are even, small differences mean the difference between victory and defeat. Conf licts are more likely and serious when norms are weak, and more restrained when norms are clear.2 Such intuitions transfer directly into global conf lict. The median voter theorem provides an explanation of why power transitions in the international context are associated with severe conf licts. Figure 8.3 shows alternate, extreme conditions that emerge under parity between two alliances that support alternate views of the international system. To achieve victory, assuming a normal distribution of voters, parties must move to the middle. In Condition 1 both rush to the median even though their “true” preferences are very distinct. The electoral competition determines winners who then maximize original preferences. The bipolarity in Condition 1 ref lects that parties have serious difference in norms leading to severe conf lict. In world politics this is the condition that preceded both World Wars I and II. The British led coalition held quite different perceptions of international norms than those led by Germany. In World War II the confrontation between Nazi-Fascism and Democratic principles was a most extreme example of divergent views

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100

Median

0 Condition 1: Bipolarity at Parity with Divergent Norms-Potential Conflict POSITION 100

Median

0 Condition 2: Bipolarity and Converging Norms-Negotiated Accomodatioon Figure 8.3

The median voter: Confrontation and cooperation

about the future. Perhaps less extreme but still divergent perceptions are present in the Middle East region today. Such perceptions preceded the brutal Iran-Iraq War and may set in motion a conf lict between Iran and Turkey in the future (Arbetman and Kugler 1989; Yesilada et al. 2006). Condition 2 ref lects competition among parties that do not differ fundamentally on policy issues. While the electoral competition can still be intense, as both sides are relatively equal, a negotiated solution is found after the contest is over since preferences do not differ. These are characteristics of primary contests where intense rivalry disappears immediately after the election. In world politics, the overtaking of Britain by the United States in the 1870s is a good illustration. That overtaking preserved peace as both sides attempted to preserve equivalent outcomes. The United States became the global leader but did not wish to fundamentally alter the rules of the game established by Britain. Under such circumstances, legal means can be used to settle emerging disputes. Role of Hierarchy Hierarchy also plays a critical role in determining the likelihood of cooperation. We argue that participants generally acknowledge the presence of an international hierarchy (see figures 8.1 and 8.4). The combination of the dominant and satisfied major powers defines the level of challenge.

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Symmetric Hierarchy I

Distribution of Resources

Actor i

Actor j

Actor k

No Rules: Conflict & Imposition to Resolve Disputes

Distribution of Preferences

Symmetric Hierarchy II Actor i Distribution of Resources

Actor j

Satisfied: Rules & Institutions used to Resolve Disputes

Actor k

Distribution of Preferences Figure 8.4

Hierarchy implications under parity

Lemke’s (2002) insight allows us to account both for relations among great powers and for interactions in regional hierarchies. Proximity, economic and security alliances, religion, ethnicity, and culture can be used to define regions. Lemke refers to the complexity of these relationships as the politically relevant neighborhood. Varying degrees of hierarchical asymmetry may be characterized by participants who are dissatisfied or satisfied with the status quo. Let us examine the extreme conditions in two simple hierarchies: Hierarchy I shows the hierarchical distribution when equal sized units hold diverse preferences. Hierarchy II shows the distribution of the same equal units that now hold similar preferences. In hierarchy I actors cannot reach agreement on rules, institutions, or governing bodies because they are driven by different preferences. Any competition over scarce resources is based on power relations. There is a high degree of uncertainty about future compliance. This is the world Morgenthau (1960), Waltz (1979), and Mearsheimer (2001) among others perceived as the norm in world politics. They argue that each actor that vies for power and control acts independently and is deterred only by the costs of defeat. Conf lict is avoided when there is a balance of power because at that point costs are maximized. Thus it is the cost of war rather than the structure of preferences that avert conf lict. In contrast the condition described in hierarchy II suggests an absence of dissent based on common preferences. Actors now agree on the status quo. Organski (1958) suggested this was the condition that characterized Europe after 1948. The difference between Europe before and after World

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War II was not captured by dramatic changes in power distributions within that regional hierarchy. Instead it was captured by fundamental shifts in norms and rules. Faced with devastation, European nations chose to adopt similar preferences leading to the evolution of cooperation. Over time such common preferences were institutionalized and led to the creation of the EU. The fundamental point is that regardless of power distributions, when actors hold similar preferences, cooperation emerges. Common rules allow the creation of institutions and procedures for the distribution of scarce resources. Thus, in satisfied hierarchies members do not wage war; they choose cooperation to distribute resources. Use of “hard” power shifts to “soft” power as the constraining rule of law becomes stronger and participants resolve differences within an agreed upon framework. The nature of such interaction changes as the characteristics of the hierarchical distribution become more complex. We argue, based on empirical work thus far that, asymmetric hierarchies populated by satisfied and dissatisfied nations are the rule in world politics. In highly asymmetric hierarchies, the dominant nation designs and then imposes the set of rules that define the status quo consistent with its preferences. This is the hegemonic world described by Organski (1958), Gilpin (1981), and Keohane (1984). Overwhelming “hegemonic” power asymmetry can be used to impose the status quo. But this is a very rare condition found in recent memory only for a short time following World War II. Lemke (2002) has shown that overwhelming regional asymmetry was present in South America after Brazil emerged as the overwhelming power. This ‘hegemonic’ condition led to cooperation. In the global hierarchy for most of the last four centuries, dominant powers assembled effective coalitions to support the status quo. Most frequently, a dominant actor preserves stability by gaining support for the status quo from the major powers in the regional hierarchy. Model Combining power, preferences for the status quo and symmetry and asymmetry derived from the structure of coalitions, it is possible to summarize the effects discussed thus far in figure 8.5. Figure 8.53 approximates the dynamics of power in world politics. Note that the area of conf lict (dark gray) is always bounded by areas of cooperation (light gray). This is consistent with empirical results showing that parity and overtaking is the necessary, but not sufficient condition, for total conf lict. Under parity conditions 50% of the time major war is waged (Organski and Kugler 1980). Adding dissatisfaction to the mixture increases prediction to almost 90% (Werner and Kugler 1996). Fortunately, total war among major powers is rare—but it is waged under very unusual yet predictable systemic conditions.

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STRUCTURAL CHANGE

War Severity of Conflict Parity-World War I & II

Increasing

Franco-Prussian War

Al Qaeda

Attack

Neutrality Intensity of Cooperation SQ CHANGE Increasing

USA overtakes Britain

Dissatisfied Satisfaction

Integration satisfied

Defender Preponderant

Parity

Challenger Preponderant

Relative Power

Figure 8.5

Power transition and conf lict and cooperation

Source: Efird, Kugler, and Genna (2002).

This logic rejects the notion that the international system is autarkic because satisfaction among contenders frequently leads to collaboration. Whether one uses parity and satisfaction as a predictor of conf lict or the combination of hierarchies, clearly parity and the status quo are powerful tools for anticipating the emergence of serious conf lict (Efird et al. 2003). Returning to figure 8.5, the intensity of conf lict (dark gray) and peace (light gray) regions will vary with the distribution of power within global and regional hierarchies. World War I and II are the archetypical examples of total war that produced massive casualties and restructured world politics. At the regional level, the war between Iran and Iraq 1980–1988 had similar characteristics, despite ending in a draw. When we speak of international transforming wars, we refer to total war. The size of participants by itself does not indicate that a war is total. The Austro-Hungarian-Prussian conf lict and the Franco Prussian war of 1870, for example, were both serious but limited conf licts waged for regional control. These were limited wars because each side was limited in its capacity to escalate substantially—as was documented during the Napoleonic Wars.4 Some limited wars have much in common with total wars, but parties act differently when they are relatively satisfied. Under such conditions they will not exercise all resources to change the outcome.

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Parity is the precondition for total war at the global and regional level, but it is not the only condition for conf lict. Under asymmetry, figure 8.5 shows that very dissatisfied groups like Al-Qaeda may initiate conf lict despite their relative weakness. Such wars produce limited consequences for one side, but can be as protracted as total conf licts when they do not engage fully at least one of the contending populations. Total war endangers the core populations of each nation, causes major casualties on both sides, generally exceed the costs of previous conf licts, and frequently leads to the occupation or partition of the loser’s core territory. Finally, despite overwhelming odds, asymmetric limited wars are waged by the weak and very dissatisfied against the powerful. If they persist, the smaller nation endures massive population and property losses which approach the costs suffered during total war. The powerful contender endures limited consequences. Vietnam is the archetypical exemplar. This conf lict is unusual only because the smaller nation emerged victorious. The costs of victory for Vietnam were steep. Casualties among Vietnam’s population are staggering when compared to those endured by the United States forces. Likewise, the Afghan-Russian War 1979–1989, or the Gulf Wars waged by the United States and Iraq in the late 1990s and the still ongoing conf lict started in 2001 show similar patterns. In victory or defeat the smaller nation endures massive casualties compared to those of the more powerful opponent. In summary, power is the ability of a nation to impose its preferences on another nation or set of nations. Preponderant powers set the norms of world politics. Consequently, nations that share common norms exercise “soft power” and choose negotiations over confrontations. When views of an acceptable status quo diverge sharply, the more powerful nations impose their preferences on those that are weaker. Conf lict in world politics is generated, therefore, not merely because a given power distribution prevails, but from the competition among nations to establish and impose norms they find acceptable. Peace is the prevalent form in world politics. Nations pursue goals and choose war only when the payoffs are high. For this reason dissatisfied nations at parity can engage in severe and devastating conf licts while, asymmetry even in the presence of dissatisfaction results in limited conf licts (Tammen 2006). Finally, parity will produce peace when nations agree on the norms governing the international system. The fundamental point is that structural distributions do not determine whether a nation is involved in war or preserves peace, decision makers do. Decisions by leaders make a difference. Note on the left side of figure 8.5, that actors can make policy choices that bring them closer or farther away from each other, prompting or averting conf lict. On the positive side, this analysis suggests that in almost all circumstances policy makers can make choices that lead to alternate outcomes. Of course, decision makers like Adolph Hitler may be bent on conf lict and use the same structures to accelerate rather than reduce the potential for war. Structural models forecast the preconditions for peaceful or conf lictual outcomes,

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but only analysis of decision makers can determine which choices will ultimately be made.5 The perspective presented in figure 8.5 also shows that policy makers can alter the level of satisfaction of any dyad (left side arrow). Altering status quo perceptions also affects the structure of coalitions (fourth dimension not shown), depressing or enhancing the prospects for war represented by the size of the conf lict (dark gray) preconditions, or that of the peace (light gray) regions. In real life change moves both ways. The rather slow relative gains in productivity by developing nations (See figure 8.6 below) increases their relative power and concurrently provide conditions to enhance commitments to hierarchies that support or oppose existing rules. Mexico is a good example of growth with a strengthening commitment to international norms, while North Korea illustrates a society that has declined in relative productivity and isolated itself from the international community. Mexico, therefore, moved into the peaceful (dark gray) area while North Korea f lirts with moving further into the conf lict (light gray) area. By utilizing assessments of structural conditions, important signs of impending conf lict can be identified. With early warning comes the possibility of decision making that will avoid conf lict. The structural conditions that constrain war and peace in world politics are driven by non-linear interaction between capability, satisfaction and hierarchy. Let us now turn to applications. The Next Global Transitions In modern times, nations have dominated the international system because they held a technological lead over potential opponents. Britain overtook France and Spain because it industrialized first. Industrial leadership first generated and then sustained Pax Britanica. Following the pattern of Britain, technological advances among the other great developed nations also led to the major challenges for global leadership. As its technological prowess expanded, Germany twice challenged Britain’s leadership. Following World War II, the United States established technological leadership over Britain and sustained that advantage over the Soviet Union during the cold war—leading to Pax Americana. Technological advancement also leads to accelerated growth among developed societies and distances them from developing nations. Western dominance was established and assured by such transformations, but this pattern is changing. Asian nations, after several centuries, are once more challenging for dominance in world politics. Because of their overwhelming demographic size and potential, Asian societies are overtaking the West using a technological base that is less well developed than that of the current leaders. Taking advantage of rapid transfers of education, and technology, Asian and other developing nations are expected to maintain very high relative productivity growth rates (Solow 1956; Feng et al.

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2000). For the first time in this century, relatively unproductive societies are likely to become larger than their more productive brethren. An overtaking by a technologically less advanced society has not taken place in recent memory, but it is not unprecedented. The Mongols in the twelfth century executed the last global pre-industrial transition. Because of their superior military tactics, the Mongols created the largest land empire in recorded history. In addition to conquering China, the Middle East, Russia and much of India, the Mongols invaded Eastern Europe and could have dominated the rest of that continent. Their sheer military superiority provided an advantage in war. But, the Mongols were not technologically superior to China, India, countries in the Middle East, or most of the European nations they partly conquered. Even with such deficiencies, had the Mongols solved and institutionalized their political succession process they may have prompted an industrial revolution in Asia. Immediately following Mongol control, from 1405 to 1424, China became the leading global industrial and maritime society. Technological transfers placed them at the verge of an industrial revolution. But it was not to be. China’s emperors made the choice to look inward.6 This decision produced technological stagnation and industrial decline. Consequently, this then created the conditions for the West to lead the industrial revolution and produce the economic engine that accelerated growth much faster than in any other region. This economic power generated military dominance. Control over the international system fell into the hands of the relatively small European population. History may have been quite different had the Mongols solved the problem of political succession, or had China continued to look outward. Today China and India and a number of developing societies are looking outward. They are adopting modern economic principles that encourage growth. If these trends persist, major changes are in the horizon. 100 80

GDP Percent

BRIC 60 40 G6 20 0 1990

2000

2010

2020

2030 Year

Figure 8.6

Estimated future relative capabilities

Source: Wilson and Purushothaman (2003).

2040

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2060

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Figure 8.6 displays a global overview of the changes induced by the emergence of large developing societies: Brazil, Russia, India and China are the “BRIC” developing nations that, along with Indonesia (not included here), have the largest populations and therefore a substantial overall GDP potential. As the productivity of populations in India and China increases, those nations can challenge for leadership in world politics. Remaining BRIC nations likely will become regional leaders and support that transition. In contrast, the G6 nations, the United States, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Italy, dominated world politics for the last century. The transformation anticipated in figure 8.6 is epic. For the first time in modern history, the less developed societies will out produce the technologically advanced nations. From a power transition perspective, these conditions are potentially unstable. As developing nations seek technological parity and redress of perceived past grievances, their support for the status quo may be in question and at parity the potential for a major conf lict will increase. A fundamental question is whether the anticipated overtaking will be peaceful or confrontational. More importantly, what can be done to maintain the peace? Before we analyze these implications it is reasonable to ask, why now? Ironically, we believe that the anticipated transitions are the result of policies adopted by the G6 nations. The rise of the BRIC’s and other successful developing nations was prompted by the adoption of competitive western economic principles and in part by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States—the dominant power since 1945—advocated: open economy, free movement of capital, free trade and democratic principles. Following the collapse of the USSR, the BRIC nations and many other developing societies shifted from a centralized approach to open economies and competitive practices. These changes produced the sustained growth detailed in figure 8.6. Note that the growth rates are very different from those in the past. Figure 8.7 shows that after 1945, China, Russia, and India, the largest among the BRIC developing societies, chose to pursue economic strategies that limited competition and rewarded employment not productivity. The vast disparities in individual income resulting from these economic choices generated massive disparity between the developed and developing world. This historical anomaly is now starting to be addressed as the global distribution of income reverts to preindustrialization patterns (Maddison 2003). In the long term we anticipate that economic convergence, long anticipated by macro economists, will result in a world where populations will determine the overall output. Figure 8.7 centers on the largest nations and unions that can challenge each other for dominance of world politics. In Asia these are India and China. Japan a major power even today, is expected be too small to mount a future challenge as its population will decline to less than 100 million by 2050. In the Americas only the United States should continue to be a

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GDP Percent

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China

30

India

20

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10

EU

0 1930

1945

1960

1975

1990

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2020

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2050

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Estimated future relative capabilities: Major powers

major contender. Brazil, like Japan, will be simply too small within this time horizon, but may emerge as a contender by the century’s end. On the one hand, no individual European nation is likely to be a major contender by 2050. On the other hand, the current EU and/or the expanded EU that includes Turkey led by an amalgamation of Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom is expected to be a major contender. What is unambiguously clear is that China and then India will become the largest global economies by mid century. The consequences of such transitions are of some concern. Based on the formal empirical material reported above, when parity is achieved and the norms and rules of international politics are challenged, war is likely. (Tammen et al. 2000; Kugler and Lemke 1996; Organski and Kugler 1980). A remarkable event is waiting in the wings. While the large population base of China and India will generate GDPs larger than any in the world, individual productivity will remain low. The average citizen in those countries will be far less aff luent than those in the G6 or Japan. This gap is important because as China and India become the new giants in world politics, they may advance preferences inconsistent with those advocated by the liberal democracies that have dominated international norms since 1945.7 Based on power transition theory, we contend that the forthcoming transitions need to be carefully considered and managed. Otherwise conditions for conf lict will emerge that may have devastating consequences in the nuclear era. Dynamics of World Politics Power dynamics that indicate future capabilities and the structure of hierarchies provide the rough background to understanding changes in world

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politics. In a cross-sectional context, preferences indicate the options that stakeholders face at any given time. A number of distinct indicators have been created to approximate the central concept of power. Arbetman and Kugler (1989) show that alternate indicators provide compatible views with differences emerging as comparisons move from developed to developing societies. Yet the future is very difficult to anticipate. Widely used major components of power include: population as a long-term estimator; productivity as a middle-range estimator; and, military capability, as a short-term estimator. In this section we compare the perspectives gained from using these alternate perspectives in the expectation that the sum of the parts will provide more effective short and longer term approximations of the power potential of societies.8 Population Population is the base measure of inf luence. A number of perspectives can be taken to represent the population that can be utilized by governments to inf luence other societies. Students of democratic politics focus on an electorate composed of citizens sufficiently motivated to participate in elections. Any such electorate does not include all members of a society—rather it identifies that portion of the population that directly participates in politics. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) show that in traditional monarchies that the selectorate is limited to aristocratic members who can directly inf luence key decisions. Authoritarian and one party regimes frequently allow elections, but again political choices are affected by members of the single party in power. The degree of cohesion will vary across societies such as South Africa under Apartheid, China since 1948, Mexico before 2000. The central point is that a restricted selectorate and not the population at large govern many societies. In electoral competitive democracies the selectorate is drawn from the population above a given age limit. In some democracies only registered voters can exercise their choice (United States) while in others (Argentina) voting is compulsory requiring participation of all citizens above a given age. Participation restricts the selection of leaders and the very young, along with previously incarcerated individuals, are excluded. This selectorate is still biased but approximates the population as a whole. Democratic systems assume that one person one vote is an effective means to represent the preferences of populations. This principle is challenged in some societies that restrict the selectorate by gender, position, income or religion. Democratic selectorates are important from a global perspective because all the large, high performing G6 societies in figure 8.1 are secular liberal democracies including the two world leaders, the United Kingdom and the United States. Recent democratic peace arguments suggest that if similar democratic institutions emerge in other societies, than peaceful international interactions will follow. Political leaders in Western societies have readily

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adopted this principle. The Iraq War has been justified (perhaps belatedly) because it extends democracy. Democracy in Iraq, we are told, may jump start that process in the rest of the Middle East. Such an argument could be tested if it were possible to effectively estimate, and more importantly, forecast the selectorate size and disposition in each population. Given our knowledge of such changes it is unwise to base empirical forecast on highly variable elements. Consider, if China adopts a two party system in the next decade or so, then a massive transformation in the size of the selectorate will take place. But will this transformation bring stability? In Bolivia and Venezuela dramatic expansions of the selectorate took place, but such changes did not secure the relative stability that Latin America has enjoyed under Brazil’s dominance. In our opinion linking an enlargement of the selectorate with an expansion of democratic principles is a first step towards the creation of consistent norms across societies. It is the latter that secures peace and not the size of the selectorate. From an economic perspective, the size of the active population is another logical candidate to reflect potential power (Organski 1958; Organski et al. 1984). The active population in a society provides the resources and subsidizes the dependent population that is either too young or too old age to be involved in the economic enterprise. The overlap between the potential democratic selectorate and the active population is substantial.9 The operational advantage of active populations is that they can be forecasted far more accurately than the size of the selectorate. What is lost however is the political component that electoral participation would add to these measures. Population Dynamics Elaborating on the early insights by Thompson, Notestein (1945) uncovered that stable populations, where birth is balanced with deaths, are found in the very poor and very affluent populations. In between these two extremes, demographic transitions generate population expansions that enlarge the size of existing populations. Extremely affluent societies face declining populations because fertility drops below replacement rates (Organski et al. 1984). Analysis using political capacity shows that government policy contributes to fertility declines regardless of income. As opportunity increases and improvements in safety allow for more effective predictability, fertility declines. Thus, the counterintuitive result is that relatively poor populations expand rapidly generating the potential for inf luence in world politics that only materializes after these populations achieve stable and sustained growth. Under such conditions, the gap between the relatively poor and rich narrows leading to power transitions among societies. (Organski et al. 1984; Kugler and Swaminathan 2006). This reinforces our argument that in the long term precondition for power is population size. Figure 8.8 shows the consequences of anticipated population shifts among the five largest powers and their likely evolution in the next half century.

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60

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40 China 30 20 US

10

EU 0 1950

1975

2000

2025

2050

2075

Year Figure 8.8

Relative population structures

Note: Size of nation circles represents the birth rate per 1,000. Source: Maddison, 2003.

Figure 8.8 shows the consequence of contractions and expansions in world populations. By their sheer size, Asian nations will dominate world politics. Consider the most populous nations in turn. China’s population expansion was encouraged in the early stages of Mao’s regime. Then the expansion of political control led unexpectedly to a rapid reduction in population. This pattern was later institutionalized with the policy of “one child” per family that preserved and expanded the earlier drop in fertility. China’s population expansion was reduced and a stable, if aging, population is emerging. This created important consequences for growth. Because of the inertia generated by previous fast expansions, a large proportion of China’s population is young. Policy restriction to one child per family allowed families to invest in higher levels of education. India’s pattern is quite different. After several failed attempts, India instituted effective population planning on a regional basis. While in some provinces fertility declines occurred, the overall population expansion continued unabated (Kugler and Swaminathan 2006). Again because of inertia, India’s population is expected to continue to grow well into the end of this century surpassing China’s. Among the BRIC nations, Russia alone is expected to continue its substantial drop in population. Part of this decline in fertility is due to the collapse of the Soviet Union that reduced health care facilities but other factors are at work. The effects on growth are unclear. Populations of the G6 are expected to maintain or loose populations. Consistent with expectations, fertility in advanced societies will decline particularly if migration is prevented. Migration accounts for the anticipated increase in the U.S. population from 300 to 400 million by 2050.10

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On the one hand, the result of these divergent paths is a developing gap between Asian populations and those elsewhere. India and China have over one billion citizens each and due to population inertia their relative size will continue to grow into the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the EU and Japan will shrink, and so will the United States if in-migration is reduced. Such changes have important consequences which will be ref lected in the global discussions over rules and norms. National Output In the 1700s King suggested that the Gross National Product (GNP) of a nation could be used to approximate the likely outcome of total confrontations. He constructed a crude measure to estimate the capabilities of France and Britain and successfully anticipated the French decline. His logic was direct. Two components are critical to power: population and productivity. The government has the ability to extract resources from its population and allocate it to any desired activity. Under stress, governments may allocate the lion’s share to the military. During peace, national allocations would be directed more heavily toward health, energy, education, or any other activity deemed important by the government. To analyze long-term trends in world politics it is very useful to evaluate the fundamental changes in GDP that indirectly also assess variations in the population structures that ultimately determine the status of nations. To understand GDP growth we must understand the reasons for such changes. Solow (1956) was among the first to propose and show that GNP per capital t+1 Balanced Growth

45˚ High Political Capacity

Low Political Capacity

Transitional Dynamics

Poverty Trap

0 Figure 8.9

h*

h**

Growth paths with high and low political capacity

GNP per capita t

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technology was the motor of growth. His exogenous growth arguments anticipated full convergence among societies provided free trade, movement of capital, and labor were allowed. These results were refined by Lucas (1988) using endogenous growth arguments. He proposed partial rather than full convergence because of the differential allocation of resources to human capital. More recently political considerations were added to this analysis. Figure 8.8 shows the implications of the Politics of Fertility and Economic Development (POFED) model proposed by Feng et al. (2000, 2004). This model synthesizes the key relationships between demographic, economic and political factors that contribute to growth. As shown in figure 8.9 growth patterns are non-linear. Societies fall into the poverty trap at very low levels of political capacity and economic productivity per capita. In such societies population growth exceeds per capita income growth. These societies may still experience a growth in aggregate GNP, but their populations become poorer and poorer. Many African nations today, including oil-rich Nigeria, fall in this category. Adding political factors to economic structures improves empirical fits and provides a plausible story about the expansion of economic capabilities. Only partly consistent with Solow’s expectations, and consistent with Lucas insights, the POFED model anticipates partial convergence. Such patterns suggest that productivity across societies will get closer, but a gap may remain for indefinite periods based on the political and demographic characteristics of societies. This argument is consistent with that of most growth scholars who seemingly agree that existing massive differences in individual productivity across societies will be reduced but not eliminated with time. In the long term the critical question is whether the remaining differences will be substantial or minor. If the differences are substantial then “developed” societies can continue to lead with relatively small populations and GDP will be the base indicator of capabilities. If the gap closes and differences are minor, population rather than GDP will be the future indicator of power. Figure 8.9 shows why the G6 nations in figure 8.1 dominate the much larger BRIC developing societies. For portions of the last two centuries most of the BRIC nations were caught in the poverty trap: birth rate outstripped economic growth in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union; in India during the later part of past century, and, in China in the early 1960s (Maddison 2003). When political capacity improves, developing nations escape the poverty trap and face periods of very high growth per capita. All the BRIC nations are in this phase. Brazil, China, and India are experiencing rapid growth patterns. Russia has just starting on an upward path after a long slump. When political capacity is sustained, rapid growth may be self-sustaining leading to lower, but balanced growth. These patterns are found in developed societies that despite yearly variation maintain relatively slow, but steady growth patterns (for details see Feng et al. 2000, 2004).

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From a power perspective the central implication is that relatively poor societies have the potential to grow rapidly if (and this is a very big if ) they solve the political problems preventing their societies from attaining sustained growth. In sum, growth is unexpectedly uneven across societies. In part this is due to the creation of nation-states that impede the free f low of individuals and commerce that in the long term would both equalize and optimize growth. In part this is due to the very different political constraints imposed on citizens across political systems. It is difficult, however, to attribute such differences to intrinsic variations among individuals, for the genetic composition is so similar that given equal opportunity one would expect equal results. Global Implications This perspective has important implications for the future of world politics. Changes in the relative power dimension we are now witnessing suggest that the United States and European dominance of world politics will be challenged by China and/or India by mid century. We want to assess the consequences of alternate choices made by political elites during the next half century. What are the possible structural characteristics that could emerge? What are their anticipated consequences? Can they be altered? Alliances Consider first the implications of potential alliances modifications along traditional lines. In this section we chose to rely on the work of colleagues who have advanced reasonable propositions rather than present results derived from our models directly. These results are most important because they were obtained independent of the arguments made about the dynamics of population and their impact on total output. The Atlantic Alliance On the one hand Western developed world could expand the concept of the European Union into the Atlantic Alliance taunted in the 1960s. On the other hand the Asian giants China and India could create a community of developing nations to counter this expansion. Considering only the largest players at the global level the impact would look as shown in figure 8.10. The two Asian giants would dominate the international system even if the developed societies were joined together. Such patterns are unprecedented.

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100

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40

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A potential atlantic and asian alliance

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0.00 1990

2000

2010

EU

2020

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Figure 8.11

China, United States, and the Expanded European Union

Source: Adapted from Yesilada, Efird, and Noordijk (2006).

Consider next the competition among the top three global powers (figure 8.11). The ranking in world politics will be altered at the top; otherwise it should remain the same during the next half century. Figure 8.11 adapted from Yesilada and Efird (2006) anticipates that even if EU expansion results in the inclusion of Turkey and Russia, this Union will remain third

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among the top global powers. China will become the dominant economic and military power followed, by some distance, by the United States. Hierarchies Regional implications are equally important. Note that in the next few decades the Middle East will face at least three overtakings with the potential to generate instability (see figure 8.12). The capabilities of Turkey, Iran, and Russia will converge in the middle of this century generating additional fuel to that unstable environment. If we take our overtaking insights seriously and believe these nations will remain relatively dissatisfied with the rules and norms of the international system, than the potential for serious regional conf lict is at hand. Yesilada et al. (2006) show that one way in which this process could be alleviated is if Turkey and/or Russia were added to the EU. This would create a strongly dominated hierarchy controlled by nations satisfied with the status quo. Were the EU to accept Turkey or Russia or both into its fold, the conditions for conf lict in the Middle East would be reduced significantly as well as the severity of any conf lict. Similar scenarios can be generated for all hierarchies in world politics.

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Turkey

0 1990

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Figure 8.12

Middle East region: Turkey, Iran, and Russia

Source: Yesilada, Efird, and Noordijk (2006).

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Implications We argue that policy can affect the long-term stability of the international system at the global or regional level. At the global level, policy makers will need to consider how to “buy-in” emerging nations into the existing status quo. While to most observers this is not news, the path to a stable global environment requires early attention to these long-term trends. On the one end of the spectrum, one response to the Asian challenge could be the formation of new blocs of countries. For example, converting NAFTA into an EU-type structure would preserve parity with China up to about 2060. It would also have regional benefits as it diffuses the increasing political dissatisfaction among NAFTA members and other countries in Latin America. At the other end of the spectrum, should India and China reach an accord on economic or military integration or political affiliation, this would create a permanent dominant dyad at the global level. China and India would hold over half of the resources available to the major powers, a position of superiority that no other coalition could challenge. This would be structurally similar to the relationship between the United States and the rest of the world community at the end of World War II and for a decade or two afterwards. We find the China-India bloc concept unlikely for a variety of cultural and historical reasons yet it represents the most extreme form of a highly preponderant international system. Restructuring the old Atlantic Alliance would tilt the balance temporarily in favor of the Western community—but again that condition would revert to Asia over time. Not even a revitalized Atlantic Union can match the tide of GDP growth in Asia. It is possible to envision a partnership between the United States, the EU, and some combination of countries from the list of Japan, India, China, and Russia. For example, in the case of a rising China hostile to the status quo, a “super bloc” of the United States, EU, Japan, and India would be a powerful counterweight to demands to rewrite international rules and norms instituted since World War II. A more utopian concept would envision a period of great power and peace where the United States, EU, Japan, India, and China shared common preferences. Against that backdrop, no challenger could be successful. The implications of this analysis are obvious. Because of its overwhelming population advantage, Asia will become the center of global politics by mid century or a little later and short of a major war, for the foreseeable future. The developing world will play a much larger role in the evolution of world politics as the resources of the aff luent societies begin to be matched by those of the developing ones. Stability can only be achieved if the rising powers in Asia support the global status quo. This is not a picture of despair or unbridled optimism because we understand that policy decisions will affect all of these outcomes. The

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challenges and even the pathway seem clear. We only hope that decision makers understand what is at risk. Notes 1. Douglas Lemke and Suzanne Werner (1996), Lemke (2002), and Tammen et al. (2000), provide a detailed discussion of multiple hierarchies. 2. Recent elections in the United States or Serbia support Black’s insight. In the United States where electoral norms are well institutionalized—The Gore-Bush 2000 contest was ended by a decision of the Supreme Court. Both parties accepted the rule of law and prepared to compete another day. When norms are unclear—as was the case of Serbia—the contest escalated to war. Recall that following the electoral decision in favor of Milosevic, no Supreme Court could make a binding decision. A crisis with potential for conf lict ensued and determined the ultimate winner. Power Transition suggests that the severity of a crisis rises in direct proportion to the difference between the two sides. 3. The formal equation used to generate this structure is as follows: CC = RP – S (RP3) + H s + H r CC =Conf lict to Cooperation S= Status Quo RP = Relative Power Hs = Global Hierarchy Hr = Regional Hierarchy Structural changes along the RP axis are relatively slow. Changes along the SQ axis are relatively fast driven by elite preferences. Changes along the H global or regional hierarchies respond to rare alliance shifts connecting structural and preference alternations. 4. The fundamental implication of power transition is that peace is preserved by power asymmetry. Very infrequently, regional challengers can muster enough resources to manage a regional overtaking and generate conf licts within their own sub hierarchy. At no time however, could the USSR amass enough resources to challenge the dominant United States and its coalition. Overtaking is a necessary but not sufficient condition for total war that among major powers is referred to as a world war. It produces unprecedented and massive population and physical losses for the nations vying for control of international politics (Kugler and Organski 1980, Tammen et al. 2000). At the regional level similar events take place (Lemke 2002). When regional powers were left alone as was the case between Iran and Iraq, devastating confrontations ensue. The Iran-Iraq War produced casualties far in excess of any in the region thus far. That war was waged under parity conditions as Iran and Iraq fought for control over regional affairs (Arbetman and Kugler 1997). The civil war now raging in Iraq, despite foreign presence, is hard to quantify as an international conf lict. Mayor powers seldom chose to involve themselves directly in regional conf lict unless they are reasonably sure it will not escalate into global war. Regional limited or total wars do not pose a direct challenge to the stability of the international system itself—unless there is an overtaking led by the dissatisfied challenger underway. This was the situation when the Austro-Hungary and Serbian conf lict escalated into World War I. 5. Filson and Werner (2004) show that even when battles are waged preferences regarding the status quo change, agendas are altered and new collations are re-created. 6. Ghingis Khan conquered China breaching the great wall, but it was Kublai Khan 1279–1368 who built a large navy that although still limited to coastal activities was capable of challenging close neighbors, like Japan. In 1368 Hong Wu became the first Ming Emperor after defeating the last Mongol Emperor Toghon Temur. Zhu Yunwen become the second Ming Emperor in 1398 after Hong Wu’s death. Following a coup in 1402, Zhu Di become third Ming Emperor and in 1404 reestablished China’s capital in Beijing. The height of China’s maritime voyages takes place after a large blue navy is built under Admiral Zheng He. In the next 20 years China’s navy explores Australia, all of South Asia, rounds the Cape of Hope and may have reached South America. By existing standards Chinese f leets were enormous, numbering over 100 ships and carrying thousand of sailors. In 1424 Zhu Gaozhi ascended the throne. He issued an edict

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canceling all voyages and ordered the f leets back to port. This began a long period of self imposed isolation. The Middle East, e.g., has similar patterns to those found in the global hierarchy before 1939 and anticipated at mid century. Given the levels of tension in that region the prospects for stability are dimming. Alternate indicators of capabilities based on six indicators that include total population, urban population, iron and steel production, fuel consumption, military personnel and military expenditures developed by the Correlates of War Project are widely used. These aggregates are similar to overall GNP and cannot be formally extended into the future (Singer and Diehl 1990). Differences emerge because of age. A democratic selectorate increases with longevity while active populations are constrained by age and to some degree the health of populations. Navaneetham’s (2002) shows a “Window of Opportunity” of 20–30 years generated by demographic transitions that is most advantageous to accelerate economic growth. Beyond this point, the dependent population rises because of aging while the young population shrinks reducing the potentially active population. Japan is a classic example of a rapidly shrinking and aging population where the driving force is prosperity. In the short term, extension of the working lifespan from the traditional 65 to 70 or beyond can minimize the effects of aging. In the long term, however, unless fertility rises or in-migration increases developed societies will continue to shrink while the relatively underdeveloped will continue to grow.

References Arbetman, Marina and Jacek Kugler (1997) Political Capacity and Economic Behavior. Boulder, CO: Westview Press ——— (1989) “Choosing among Measures of Power: A Review of the Empirical Record,” in Richard J. Ward and Michael D. Stoll, eds, Power in World Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Black, Duncan M. (1958) The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brodie, Bernard (1959) Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce et al. (2003) The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Efird, Brian, Jacek Kugler, and Gaspare Genna (2003) “From War to Integration: A Generalized Power Transition Dynamic.” International Interactions 29 (4): 293–313. Feng, Yi, Jacek Kugler, and Paul Zak (2000) “The Politics of Fertility and Economic Growth.” International Studies Quarterly 44: 667–693. ——— (2004) “Path to Prosperity: A Political Model of Freedom, Demographic Change and Economic Development.” Mimeo. Filson, Darren and Suzanne Werner (2004) “Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes.” American Journal of Political Science 48 (2): 296–313. Gilpin, Robert (1981) War and Change in World Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kugler, Jacek and Douglas Lemke, Eds. (1996) Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Kugler, Tadeusz and Siddharth Swaminathan (2006) “The Politics of Population.” International Studies Review 8: 581–596. Lemke, Douglas (2002) Regions of War and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lemke, Douglas and Suzanne Werner (1996) “Power Parity, Commitment to Change, and War.” International Studies Quarterly 40: 235–260. Lucas, Robert E. Jr. (1988) “On the Mechanics of Economic Development.” Journal of Monetary Economics 22: 1–42. Maddison, Angus (2003) The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris: OECD. Mearsheimer, John (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton. Morgenthau, Hans (1960) Politics among Nations. New York: Knopf.

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Navaneetham, K . (2002) “Age Structure Transition and Economic Growth:: Evidence from South East Asia.” Working Paper 337, CDS Kerala, India. Notestein, Frank (1945) “Population, The Long View,” in T.W. Schultz, ed., Food for the World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Organski, A. F. K. (1958) World Politics. New York: Knopf. Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler (1980) The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Organski A. F. K., Jacek Kugler, Timothy Johnson, and Youssef Cohen (1984) Births Deaths, and Taxes: The Demographic and Political Transitions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Singer, David and Paul Diehl (1990) Measuring the Correlates of War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Solow, Robert M. (1956) “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 34: 65–94. Tammen, Ronald L. (2006) “The Impact of Asia on World Politics: China and India Options for the United States.” International Studies Review 8: 563–580. Tammen, Ronald L., Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Allan Stam III, Mark Abdollahian, Carole Alsharabati, Brian Efird, and A.F.K. Organski (2000) Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century. New York: Chatham House. Waltz, Kenneth (1979) Theory of International Politics. Boston, MA: Addison Wesley. Werner, Suzanne and Jacek Kugler (1996) “Power Transitions and Military Buildups: Resolving the Relationship between Arms Buildups and War,” in Douglas Lemke and Jacek Kugler, eds., Parity and War: A Critical Reevaluation of the War Ledger. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Wilson, Dominic and Roopa Purushothaman (2003) “Dreaming with the BRICs: The Path to 2050.” Global Economics Paper 99 (Goldman Sachs). Yesilada, Birol, Brian Efird, and Peter Noordijk (2006) “Competition among Giants: A Look at How Future Enlargement of the European Union Could Affect Global Power Transition.” International Studies Review 8,4, 607–623.

CH A P T E R

N I N E

Kantian Dynamics and Systemic Transitions: Can International Organizations Influence U.S.-China Conflict? Dav i d P. R a p k i n a n d Wi l l i a m R . Thom p s on

Systemic transitions refer to a specific kind of potentially conf lictual situation. The importance of transition conf licts stems from the location of the main contestants at the apex of the global power hierarchy and their strong implications for global order. Ascending states seek their place in the sun and may be willing to resort to force to attain it. Descending states hope to maintain their privileged status despite positional decline, and likewise may be willing to employ violent means to hold on to it. Historically, such systemic transitions have seldom been negotiated peacefully. One simple way to categorize factors thought to be associated with conf lict is to dichotomize them into two clusters, those that encourage conf lict escalation and those that discourage it.1 Examples of the former include processes such as rivalry, arms races, resource competition, serial crises, and misperception. Among the latter, the most prominent include the Kantian trinity of conf lict-suppressing factors—joint democracy (the democratic peace), economic interdependence, and international governmental organizations (IGOs). This chapter focuses on what has to date been the empirically weakest link among the Kantian processes—the hypothesized pacifying effects of IGOs.2 Throughout the principal concern is with the effectiveness of this approach in accounting for whether systemic transitions are accompanied by violence, both generically and in the context of a possible twenty-first century transition involving the ascendancy of China. The chapter first brief ly describes the posited interrelationships among the Kantian variables, and then turns to different aspects of the relationship between IGOs and peace: purported causal mechanisms that link the two; review of the quantitative literature

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addressing these links, and; reasons to discount the causal potency of the IGO peace connection. The Main Kantian Arguments: A Sketch The current exemplar of Kantian-inspired research is without a doubt Russett and Oneal (2001), who provide a most convenient focus for our critique. Their basic model appears quite simple. They draw a triangle with each point representing one leg of the Kantian tripod: democratic regimes, economic interdependence and IGOs. A fourth variable, peace, is embedded within the triangle. Reciprocal arrows connect each set of adjacent points. Thus, democracies strengthen the effects of IGOs and vice versa. Democracies and economic interdependence share a two-way inf luence relationship, as do economic interdependence and IGOs. The main thrust of Kantian theory, however, is that each of the three Kantian variables brings about higher levels of peace. These relationships are reciprocal, so that peace contributes to the f lourishing of democracy, the deepening of interdependence, and the formation of IGOs. Finally, reinforcing the notion that all “good things go together,” the whole ensemble of Kantian variables combines to create virtuous spirals of higher levels of cooperation. It is the case that democracies tend not to fight other democracies. They also conduct, in general, less coercive and conf lictual foreign policies than do autocracies. Since they do not have much to fear from other democracies, democracies are more apt to trade with one another, thereby generating more economic interdependence that, in turn, raises the costs of using force against a trading partner. Severed relations will mean a decrease in imports and exports, investment, jobs, and corporate profits. People with stakes in these types of activities can be expected to lobby against harming relations with significant trading partners. Democracies also are more likely than autocracies to initiate, join, and support IGOs, some of which will encourage democratization in still-autocratic states or in those trying to expand participation in their political systems. Expanding economic interdependence also increases the need for institutions that help to monitor, coordinate, and regulate commercial activities. All such institutions need not take the form of IGOs, but to the extent that they do the organizations should be expected to facilitate higher levels of economic interdependence. Some of the more visible IGOs have ameliorated international conf lict through peacekeeping or peace-making operations. They can also provide an alternative arena for negotiations between disputants. If democracies are at peace with other democracies, the odds of these states remaining democratic are improved by environments in which conf lict is minimized. Downward spirals are also possible. The more states become involved in international conf lict, the more likely they are to expand their

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commitments of scarce resources to military capabilities and to limit public involvement in foreign policy. Conf lict increases economic uncertainty and risk, and therefore discourages trade and investment. IGOs are also unlikely to thrive in highly conf lictual settings. Conf lict among organizational members, on the contrary, is likely to paralyze the organizations into inactivity. The main effects of these variables interacting in virtuous spirals should be less conf lict and more cooperation. As the multivariate dynamic gains in strength, the beneficial effects should become increasingly strong and mutually reinforcing. A tightening web is strung that will work toward suppressing and containing conf lict as it arises. These dynamics cumulate and ultimately should lead to the emergence of a Kantian world order that is expected to feature much less militarized conf lict than its Westphalian predecessor. Can IGOs contribute to realization of this Kantian order? We readily acknowledge that IGOs can be useful in mediating some types of conf lict. But it is difficult to see how any existing international institution—or perhaps even an extensive network of institutions—could be expected to avert transition conf lict, a rare type of conf lict that by definition involves the most powerful states in the international system. IGOs and Peace The previous section brief ly summarized liberal expectations about how the trinity of Kantian variables operate collectively to constrain conf lict. We now turn to consideration of more specific questions concerning IGOs’ conf lict-dampening effects, in general and in the particular contexts posed by systemic transitions. The liberal prescription is for established system leaders to engage ascending challengers and to accommodate their expanding regional or global interests in hopes of socializing them peacefully into the existing order. System leaders characterized by democratic regimes are expected to be more accommodating. Ascending states that are democratic are also thought to be more likely to internalize prevailing norms and thus also more susceptible to socialization. Such engagement (or binding or accommodation) strategies are contrasted with the containment (or balancing or confrontational) strategies typically associated with realism.3 Another form of engagement involves international institutions, specifically IGOs, that is, institutions whose members are territorial states. Since IGOs are thought to function as “an organizing process of conf lict management at the supranational level” (Kim 1994: 405), engagement via IGO membership is expected to dampen conf lict. But does participation in IGOs actually reduce the risk of militarized conf lict? Has Inis Claude’s (cited in Singer and Wallace 1970: 521) claim that, “[i]n the realm of organizations, the essential criterion of legitimacy is relevance to the prevention of war,” been corroborated? Or do many (most?) IGOs

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lack both legitimacy and relevance to war prevention? Before reviewing the empirical evidence that bears on these questions, we first examine the various causal mechanisms that have been adduced to account for the expectation that IGOs are likely to exert pacifying effects. Causal Mechanisms: How and Why IGOs Are Expected to Have Pacifying Effects Several literatures can be brought to bear on the question of whether and how IGOs are likely to affect the prospects for U.S.-China transition conf lict. One relevant line of research involves tracking whether and how an ascending China is being engaged (or contained) in IGOs and other locations, and the extent to which it has internalized (and complied with) IGOs’ prevailing principles and norms of behavior. Another is concerned with historical patterns in how and with what strategies established powers have responded to challengers (Schweller 1999; Kupchan et al. 2001). Yet another is the growing literature focusing on quantitative tests of IGOs’ impact on conf lict and cooperation Several problems arise in attempting to summarize and pull together these diverse strands. One is that while generalizations of IGO effects may be derived in some fashion from the empirical record of all states, small and large, weak and powerful, there is little reason to think they are relevant to the specific circumstances of system leaders and ascending challengers during transitions at the top of the global hierarchy. A second problem, as will be demonstrated in the balance of this section, is an overabundance of causal mechanisms claimed to bring about the anticipated effects on cooperation and/or conf lict. Another difficulty is the inconsistency of dependent variables. Some researchers test whether membership and participation in IGOs prevent, reduce or ameliorate conf lict; others expect IGO membership to facilitate compliance with rules and norms,4 or; to encourage cooperative behavior, and; still others posit two or more of these salutary effects. Russett and Oneal (2001: 158), for example, are clearly interested in the conf lict-suppression question, asking “whether dense networks of . . . IGOs also reduce the incidence of militarized disputes.” Russett and Oneal (2001: 163–166) go further to identify as many as six different “functions” performed by IGOs that can serve to promote peaceful relations among states:5 1. 2. 3. 4.

use of coercion to maintain or restore peace mediating, adjudicating, or arbitrating disputes conveying information and reducing transaction costs altering states’ conception of their interests in the direction of being more inclusive and longer-term, and linking issues so as to promote trade-offs and side payments that can help to reach cooperative agreements

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5. encouraging formation of, and socialization to, shared norms that, in turn, create common interests and facilitate cooperation 6. generating narratives of mutual identification Most of these functions are explicitly about facilitating cooperation, but two bear directly on conf lict prevention or management (numbers 1. and 2.). The first of these presupposes IGOs, “acting in a quasi-supranational capacity to enforce established agreements by military action,” a capacity that Russett and Oneal (2001: 162) acknowledge “most international organizations [are] rarely able to exercise.” Also note that while all six are plausible in application to most IGO members, it strains the imagination to envision circumstances in which any IGO would attempt to coerce China or the United States to maintain or restore peace (number 1.). Aside from both being permanent, veto-equipped members of the UN Security Council, the council was never intended or empowered to intervene in such situations. As Hurd (2003: 205) points out, “[t]he power that the council wields over the strong comes not from its ability to block their military adventures . . . but rather . . . by raising the costs of unilateral action.” Nor is it likely that (as in number 2. above) China or the United States would agree to be bound by the results of IGO arbitration of a security dispute (though some sort of mediation is conceivable). Johnston and Evans (1999) are interested in how engagement strategies have affected the frequency of China’s participation in multilateral security organizations, the quality of that participation, and if its participation spills over into Chinese behavior outside those IGOs. Toward those ends, they stipulate five “causal processes that might link participation with these different levels of outcomes” (1999: 237): 1. China is compelled to develop the organizational and bureaucratic expertise to handle the complexity of IGO issues, thus creating an “emergent constituency” of experts that has an interest in continued participation. 2. These experts develop linkages with state and non-state experts in other countries through which f low information, ideas, and interests. 3. Participation helps China develop a reputation for credibility, trustworthiness, and cooperation. 4. Participation exposes China to “backpatting” and opprobrium in response to its positive and negative behaviors, respectively. 5. Participation in IGOs leads to constraints on action. All five of these causal mechanisms involve cooperation in security IGOs, but only number 5., “constraints on action,” might describe direct suppression of conf lict. It can be plausibly hypothesized, however, that the greater the cooperation (of the sort represented by numbers 1.– 4.) the lower the probability of conf lict (transition or otherwise). Researchers should be

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explicit about whether they are invoking this indirect causal mechanism and/or more direct variants. Even allowing for the possibility that generic cooperation can indirectly suppress conf lict even if it is not intended first and foremost for that purpose, it is necessary to be clear about exactly which kinds of cooperation are being invoked. Is cooperation under the auspices of economic, environmental, human rights or security IGOs equally likely to dampen conf lict?6 Or is there significant variation among these? And, if any type of cooperation will do, how much is necessary to produce pacifying effects? We should also avoid creating or leaving the impression that cooperation and conf lict simply occupy opposite ends of the same dependent variable scale.7 Taking into account how IGO-sponsored cooperation in non-security as well as security issue areas might help to suppress conf lict certainly complicates the IGO leg of the Kantian tripod. Consider in this context the array of goals and mechanisms that Pearson (1999b: 211) offers to explain how economic IGOs promote cooperation. First, five “sub-goals” fit within an overall engagement strategy intended to cope with China as a rising power: 1. “to transform a country’s preferences by erecting a set of positive incentives and building a domestic constituency for further integration into the global economy” 2. serve as an acknowledgment that it is legitimate for a rising world power to have “a place at the table.” 3. provide information on a country’s economic regime to the multilateral institutions. 4. facilitate access by the global economic institution and its members to the market opportunities offered by the rising power. 5. enmesh a country in the regime so that it is costly for the country either to breach its norms or to defect from the regime, thereby limiting its ability to disrupt the system. Pearson (1999b: 212–213) then adds another four “mechanisms” by which IGOs gain inf luence over members through “entanglement” with the latter’s domestic political processes: 1. 2. 3. 4.

domestic policy makers learn new ideas; these ideas are as used to provide leverage in domestic politics; IGOs gain a foothold in a country’s bureaucracy; IGO’s establish positive and negative incentives for compliance.

How then to summarize this assortment of hypothesized causal mechanisms?8 Those commonalities that can be found across this profusion of categories, connections, and incentives to join IGOs are almost all concerned with how IGOs facilitate cooperation: Pearson’s “goals” and “mechanisms”

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overlap substantially with Johnston and Evans’ “causal processes”—despite the difference in issue areas (trade and security, respectively)—and with several of Russett and Oneal’s more generic “functions” that address IGO cooperation. Among the authors and categories examined, only Russett and Oneal (2001) offer hypotheses that directly link IGOs to conf lict prevention, management, or termination. The argument that IGOs exert pacifying effects can be salvaged, in a manner consistent with Kantian reasoning, by postulating that webs of IGO cooperation serve to reduce the likelihood of conf lict among member states. Expectations that shared IGO memberships might dampen or prevent conf lict associated with a U.S.-China transition must rest on this indirect kind of causal mechanism, as the probability that direct mechanisms such as IGO coercion will be operative verge on zero. There are other challenges to drawing sound inferences about how the IGO-conf lict linkage operates. As argued persuasively by Chan (2005), one obstacle to modeling the pacifying inf luence of IGOs is the likely presence of “selection effects.” We must allow for the possibility that some states join IGOs because of a “generic disposition” to comply with international norms. Put differently, those states that are more inclined to settle disputes by peaceful means are also more likely to join (i.e., self-select) IGOs. To the extent that this statement is valid, IGO membership is no longer simply an independent variable hypothesized to reduce the propensity to use militarized means. Instead, IGO membership is determined endogenously via reverse causation by underlying conf lict propensities. Much the same argument can be made regarding “common interests”: “Presumably, states join the same IGOs . . . because they have a common stake in matters falling within these organizations’ jurisdiction. It seems . . . obvious, that states with such common interests are less likely to have militarized disputes with each other” (Chan 2005: 240). IGOs may still have value-added effects, that is subsequent and independent pacifying effects that are not simply manifestations of pre-existing generic predispositions and common interests. For example, drawing on the earlier discussion, IGOs might produce pacifying effects by providing a forum for negotiation or deliberation or by socializing members to adopt peaceful norms. The research design task is to devise tests that enable estimates of subsequent and independent effects to be sorted out from selection effects, as well as separate estimates of direct and indirect effects. Assessing the Empirical Literature Whether the IGO portion of the liberal tripod is regarded as conceptually messy or theoretically persuasive is ultimately less important than its empirical effectiveness. Do measures of IGO membership perform in a manner consistent with the expectations of pacific effects generated by the Kantian research program? The results, considered as a whole, are at best mixed, perhaps even more so than those concerning the pacifying

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effects of economic interdependence.9 We cannot explore all the permutations here, but suffice it to say the findings are less than robust across different time periods, samples, conceptualizations of both dependent and independent variables, operational definitions, and methods of testing.10 In some cases, the findings provide support for the Kantian argument (Russett et al. 1988; Russett and Oneal 2001; Oneal et al. 2003). In others, however, the results are mixed, weak and insignificant, or, in some cases, contrary to hypothesized expectations (Singer and Wallace 1970; Jacobson et al. 1986; Domke 1988; Oneal and Russett 1999; Bennett and Stam 2000; Boehmer et al. 2004; Chan 2005; Ward et al. 2007). In sum, theory and research on the connection between IGOs and mitigation of conf lict has not yet yielded robust, unequivocal results. At this early juncture—early in this line of research and early in the putative U.S.-China transition process—the quantitative literature is not yet sufficiently refined to instruct how IGOs might help to ensure a peaceful, or at least minimally conf lictual, transition. More recent research has yielded some qualified positive results by further specifying the IGO variable. For example, Boehmer et al. (2004) report that more institutionalized IGOs reduce the risks of militarized disputes. And Pevehouse and Russett (2006) find that IGOs whose membership is most “densely democratic” are more successful in reducing conf lict. These results suggest that empirical progress may hinge on further differentiating among IGOs to discover which among them positively inf luence on conf lict reduction and which do not (see endnote 6). The lists of possible causal mechanisms reviewed above provide a number of clues as to how the IGO variable might be further refined. Should We Discount the Connection between IGOs and Conflict Reduction? This section first reviews some general theoretical reasons to be skeptical about the pacifying effects of IGOs, and then turns to more China-specific ones. Overall, we view international organizations as especially aff licted by problems of limited inf luence and the decay of institutional orders. Organizational Mortality and Decay Problems Russett and Oneal (2001: 160) also acknowledge that IGOs do not live forever. The implication is that organizations tend to possess finite institutional life cycles. Yet there is more at stake than simply a few marginal organizations that come and go. Cupitt et al. (1996/2001: 399) confirm that IGOs are not immortal. Along with Wallace and Singer (1970), they find that in an examination of nearly 1000 organizations created since 1865, there is a pronounced tendency for new IGOs to emerge in the aftermath of intense major power warfare and to die “before or during eras of global conf lict.” Some 30% of the organizations created between

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1865 and 1990, moreover, have disappeared. Nor does it take more than a century for this much organizational death to occur. Shanks et al. (1996) find that 32% of the IGOs functioning in 1981 were no longer operating in 1992.11 International organizations not only do not live forever; they also do not come and go randomly. They are strongly linked with periods of regional and global crisis. Presumably, institutions that have lost their functional purpose or supporters die off at a higher rate in highly conf lictual periods. New institutions are created by the victors of global wars as part of their postwar order-building activities. IGOs help institutionalize the new status quo and are expected to act as agents in sustaining the new order. But most discussions of Kantian dynamics proceed as if the evolution of the main variables is somehow self-organizing. Virtuous circles of democratization, economic interdependence, and IGOs, once initiated, spiral upward without human agency. Yet human agency is rather critical to the interaction among democratization, economic interdependence, and IGOs. It is victors in global wars that are most likely to create new global-scale organizations. Waves of technological change—that not coincidentally tend to be pioneered in the lead economy, that is, that of the principal victor—foster increased economic interdependence, at least among more developed states. Early technological pioneers also found it easier to democratize than did latecomers (Kurth 1979). These same technological pioneers worked to promote systemic norms favoring democracy over other forms of political organization (i.e., aristocracy, fascism, communism) and were forced to fight intensive wars to defend themselves against autocracies attempting to catch up with the technological leaders (Porter 1994). While the track record of democratic system leaders is less than perfect in regards to the types of political regimes they accept as clients, there is at least intermittent encouragement of greater democratization by system leaders, their closest allies, and the international organizations that they have created.12 Thus, democratization, economic interdependence, and international organizations do not emerge spontaneously. Nor are they subject to immaculate conception. They emerge within a politico-economic context in which elite states create structures to preserve their transactions and hierarchical status. As such, they are linked to the ascendancy and decline of those elite actors. The stronger the ascendancy, the more clout and funding the new organizations are likely to possess. The more precipitous the decline of the global elite power structure, the less clout and funding the now older IGOs are likely to possess. IGOs not only do not live forever, they are also likely to have trajectories that resemble life cycles. Even when organizations do not die, they can still fade from political relevance as they become less well suited to the changing environment in which they are expected to operate. Non-relevancy translates into institutional impotence. One of the ironies of arguments advocating the Kantian

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dynamic’s effectiveness is that they currently depend in part on IGOs that emerged in the aftermath of the last global war. Whether they will be around or sufficiently powerful to help head off a future global war is less than a sure thing. Relative Gains A central tenet in the realist worldview is the predominance of relative gains (Grieco 1988; Mearsheimer 1994/1995). States are said to be disinclined to cede sovereignty to IGOs or to commit to cooperative endeavors under IGO auspices because of their overriding concern—even if cooperation promises absolute gains—that rivals will benefit more from these arrangements. Competitors that reap relative gains eventually can translate them into material advantage over those undergoing relative loss; the latter’s relative power is diminished, vulnerability to coercion increased, and security jeopardized. This stark logic, exacerbated by fears that others will cheat, applies with full force to cooperation on security issues since, as Lipson (1984) points out, the potential “perils of defection” from security agreements (war, survival) are so much greater than defection from economic agreements (trade deficits, unemployment). That is not to say, however, that economic cooperation escapes the relative gains calculus, since economic gains are fungible and can be and are converted into military advantage. How then might relative gains concerns affect systemic transitions? It is plausible that, contrary to relative gains expectations, both declining system leader and rising challenger would have incentives to deepen their strategic reliance on IGOs. The rising power might emphasize its intentions to support the status quo by deepening its commitment to IGOs, in the process also reducing the likelihood that the declining (but still dangerous) system leader would opt to launch a preventive war. At the same time, a system leader that recognized the inevitability of its relative decline might choose to try to strengthen IGO norms and institutional mechanisms so as to bind and constrain the challenger. As a general matter, we think the emphasis on relative gains is overdone. As the scenarios in the preceding paragraph suggest, relative gains concerns do not preclude cooperation nor make conf lict certain, though they can make them, respectively, less or more probable. That said, the phenomenon of primary interest—periods of transition at the apex of the global system—seem to us to be inescapably about relative gains, about “catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind.”13 Accordingly, at least in application to the problem at hand, relative gains considerations should not be either embraced or dismissed too quickly. Disjunctions between Institutions and Power Distributions Another line of realist reasoning sees IGOs and their norms, rules and procedures as merely derivative of the distribution of power across states

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(Mearsheimer 1994/1995). Without independent capacities, IGOs lack agency and are of marginal importance in the mitigation of conf lict. It follows that if changes in power distributions are not matched by corresponding adjustments in the allocation of authority and inf luence in IGOs, that is, when IGOs are no longer ref lective of state power, they are doomed to ineffectiveness and irrelevance. Thus Glennon (2003: 33) attributes the inability of the UN Security Council to block the U.S. invasion of Iraq (or, depending on one’s perspective, the inability of the U.S. to gain Council approval of the invasion) to shifts in the post–cold war period toward a unipolar distribution of power that is incongruent with the ref lective-of-post–World War II distribution of authority in the UN Security Council: “The upshot was a Security Council that ref lected the real world’s power structure with the accuracy of a fun-house mirror—and performed accordingly.” Put differently, we should not expect IGOs to prevent, manage, or resolve adequately conf licts associated with systemic transitions since such transitions mark the very moment that IGOs are least effective.14 For the same reasons, we should also expect IGOs to be generally declining in inf luence or effectiveness as or if a transition period looms. To the extent that periods of transition and uncertainty increase the probability of “outlaws,” “rogue,” or “pariah” states—because systemic hierarchy is being loosened as the relative power of the formerly lead states declines—we might also expect international organizations to have the least effects on these states engaged in behavior perceived to be unacceptable. The historical record is that it is the pariahs that are most likely to leave IGOs (Shanks et al. 1996). There is, however, one caveat to this type of speculation that nevertheless also works against the Kantian expectations. It is well known IGOs membership is most dense in Western Europe and North America (see, e.g., chapter six) and, for a variety of reasons, least dense in Asia.15 The constraints of organizational density—that is, where international engagement is greatest—should be most effective, therefore, precisely where future transition threats are least likely to emerge, and vice-versa. Another qualification is that, to the extent IGOs tend to be regional in scope and that future transition problems are likely to be inter-regional in character, the Kantian argument rests on only a fraction of the international organizations that might be relevant. Disjunction between IGO Problem-Solving Capacities and the Range of Functional Problems That Now Need to Be Addressed At the time that the UN, IMF (International Monetary Fund), World Bank, GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs), and other IGOs were created, their charge, in the aggregate, was to create a global political economy that would avoid a recurrence of the 1930s depression and of global war. Since environmental damage, secure access to energy

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supplies, and global pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, among other functional problems, were not yet manifest, problem-solving IGOs to address them were not constructed. Now that these problems are manifest, neither the creation of robust new institutions nor the adaptation of existing ones has been forthcoming in sufficient supply.16 The Bretton Woods institutions provide interesting cases in point as they have repeatedly adapted their roles and missions to changes in their operating environment: from facilitating postwar reconstruction to helping newly-independent developing countries, to assisting in the transition of former communist countries to poverty reduction among the least developed countries. The IMF was able to reinvent itself after it lost its exchange-rate management role with the demise of the fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s. Following its controversial and widely criticized role in dealing with the East Asian financial crisis, however, the IMF is having great difficulty adapting its role to a world economy in which private capital f lows are vastly greater than public f lows, financial f lows dwarf the value of trade f lows, and most crises in need of bail-outs involve the capital account rather than the current account. An increasing number of emergent market economies and developing countries are paying off IMF loans early, forgoing access to IMF resources altogether, and relying instead on private capital markets. With the number of its borrowers, the amounts it is owed, and its income from interest payments dwindling, the IMF is said to be experiencing a credibility crisis, a legitimacy crisis, a financial crisis, even an existential crisis. If existing IGOs are unable or unwilling to adjust their functional capacities to solve new problems, and if states are unable or unwilling to create new IGOs empowered to do so, then IGOs are hardly likely candidates to ameliorate transitional conf licts. China-Specific Factors General problems aside, is there something about its past behavior or innate characteristics that lead us to be circumspect about claims that China’s participation in IGOs will result in either more cooperation and/ or less conf lict over the course of the looming transition? Oksenberg and Economy (1999: 25) identify eight “deeply ingrained strategies and tactics” that guide Chinese behavior in the eight case studies in Economy and Oksenberg (1999): 1. “retaining f lexibility . . . and avoiding enduring commitments and entangling alignments.” 2. “free riding and seeking inf luence without shouldering responsibility, acquiescing to [IGO] policies that manifestly serve China’s interest while expressing reservations about the policies. Then extracting side-payments for acquiescing . . .” 3. “. . . making compliance with [China’s] objectives the litmus test of whether the interlocutor wants ‘good’ or ‘friendly’ relations with

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China, and placing the burden of maintaining ‘good’ relations on the other side.” “Mobilizing support for China’s position among developing countries.” “Taking advantage of the ambiguities in the norms of international regimes.” “Adopting an aggrieved posture, capturing the moral high ground, and placing the interlocutor—whether a country, a regional organization or an international regime—on the defensive, claiming it owes China special consideration because of past injustices.” “Maintaining secrecy and opacity.” “Entering into agreements knowing China lacks the institutions to implement them . . . as part of an effort to entice the international regime to assist the nation in acquiring the necessary institutional capacity.”

These behaviors toward and in IGOs hardly represent a warm embrace, but there is no reason to think that any of them are uniquely Chinese; many seem common, especially among sovereignty-conscious developing countries. The combination and frequency with which these tactics and strategies are deployed may be more distinctively Chinese, but none suggest that Chinese participation in either conf lict resolution or meaningful cooperation under IGO auspices is impossible, or even improbable. The case study literature so far supports this conclusion. For example, Lawrence’s (2006: 2) analysis of the early phases of China’s participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO), “concludes that China’s trade policies are broadly supportive of a rules based multilateral trading order and its behavior at the WTO is that of a status quo power rather than one seeking major systemic changes.” On the basis of his survey of China’s participation in a number of economic and security IGOs, Lampton (2001: 4) concluded that, “Beijing’s post-cold war record has been mixed but on the whole encouraging inasmuch as the trend has been toward greater multilateral participation, more frequent compliance, and a closer fit between the institutional structures and personnel of the world community and China’s domestic apparatus.” Kent’s (2007: 4) case studies of security, economic, environmental and human rights IGOs lead to a similar conclusion: “In general, China complies with the rules of international organizations and treaties and its compliance has usually improved over time.”17 While sharing this literature’s cautious optimism, we also must concede that there is also little to suggest that China is uniquely or especially susceptible to successful engagement via IGOs.18 To sum up, the third leg of the Kantian tripod advances the general hypothesis that international institutions serve to reduce conf lict and/or promote cooperation. The number of causal mechanisms that are claimed to link IGOs to these outcomes are numerous. The hypothesis, which dovetails with engagement strategies for coping with ascending powers,

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enjoys quite limited, mixed empirical corroboration. Moreover, there are several reasons to discount the prospects that IGOs will dampen conf lict, especially the distinctive category of conf licts associated with systemic transitions. Conclusions It may be that the Kantian dynamics will prove to be just the panacea the world system needs to avoid a transitional conf lict in the twenty-first century. But there are also good reasons for healthy skepticism. The constraining effects of the Kantian dynamics may be less strong than is needed should a transition showdown loom in the future. In turn, this weaker effect may be due to the emergent nature of the Kantian dynamics. They constitute relatively novel phenomena from a long run perspective. International organizations, especially, have not been on the world scene even as long as democracies have. We cannot expect them to operate with full effectiveness in their early stages of development. Just how long it may take for the Kantian processes to achieve full strength may vary from one leg of the tripod to another. Ultimately, the democratic peace, whatever its origins, is precarious as long as there are strong autocracies that do not behave in accordance with joint democracy expectations (Gat 2007). It may also be that democratization will ultimately prove to have been a red herring. Some parts of the world definitely appear to be moving toward greater pacificity. Whether it is due to Kantian dynamics or other types of dynamics remains to be determined. Economic interdependence, on the other hand, can increase almost without limitation and still lead to more conf lict, rather than less, if we are right about its negative connotations for competition among the most powerful adversaries. The significance of IGOs, among the three legs of the Kantian tripod, may be the easiest to downplay in significance. The organizations we possess currently are probably not up to the task of managing transitional conf lict. The ones we need—that collectively would comprise an organizational field that renders the traditional state fitness trial-by-strength obsolete—are apt to be a while longer in coming. In the interim, we are faced with some prospects for transitional dynamics that will gain momentum later in the twenty-first century. It would certainly be advantageous if the Kantian dynamics were in place and operating at full strength when they are most needed. Yet it may be that even if they are operating at full strength, something that we judge to be most unlikely, the dynamics will still not suffice to head off an intensive transition conf lict between a challenger and declining incumbent system leader. A great deal is at stake in acquiring and defending systemic leadership. The costs of losing leadership are quite significant. So, too, are the benefits associated with attaining some degree of control over the world’s political economy. That is one major reason why states

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have continued to fight over this prize, one that is unlike anything else at stake in interstate relationships. With very strong factors promoting conf lict, the constraints will need to be equally strong, if not greater. Whether the Kantian dynamics (and other conceivable constraints such as the problems associated with employing nuclear weapons) will be up to the task, of course, remains to be seen. Our suspicion is that the contribution of international organizations to constraining transitional conf licts in particular (at least in the first half of the twenty-first century) will be slight or marginal. Nor is it a sure thing that the “democratic peace” or the net effects of economic interdependence can pick up the slack. They all share at least one common denominator. Kantian dynamics work best within the set of countries least likely to challenge the status quo. The applicability of Kantian dynamics to authoritarian challengers that may choose to manipulate ties of economic interdependence and to withdraw from or ignore relatively weak IGOs is highly debatable. The question will probably become one not so much of whether the Kantian dynamics can constrain conf lict, but whether their constraining effects will prove adequate in a highly charged setting in which powerful forces are pulling in other directions. Even Russett and Oneal (2001) seem to have some misgivings on this score. Notes Many thanks to Steve Chan and Tom Volgy for their insightful and constructive comments on an earlier version of this chapter. 1. See Russett (2003) for one recent approach to this dichotomous categorization. 2. Elsewhere, we have examined the democratic peace (Rasler and Thompson 2005) and economic interdependence (Rapkin and Thompson 2006). 3. For a useful survey of these and other strategies for coping with rising powers, see Schweller (1999: 7–18). As Schweller points out, these strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive, i.e., states can undertake mixed strategies. It is also necessary to distinguish between bilateral engagement strategies and those pursued via IGOs, though in practice they are likely to jointly pursued. See also Mastanduno (2003) for economic engagement strategies. 4. See Kent (2007) for a useful general overview of the compliance literature, for the distinction between compliance and the broader concept of cooperation, and for an assessment for China’s record of compliance with IGOs rules and norms. 5. Pevehouse and Russett (2006) suggest three mechanisms which link IGOs comprised mainly of democratic states to peaceful outcomes. Renewed emphasis is given to mediation/dispute settlement and socialization (numbers 2. and 5. within the chapter) and another mechanism is added: IGOs make more credible the commitments of members. 6. Powers (2004, 2006) reports very interesting relationships among African countries: military alliance commitments that have been incorporated into the design of regional economic institutions serve to reduce conf lict propensities among member states. 7. Some IGOs may aim at both promotion of cooperation and suppression of conf licts; others at one or the other. Other potentially relevant distinctions among IGOs—that we cannot pursue further here—turn on the degree to which they are institutionalized (Boehmer et al. 2004); whether they address security issues or economic issues (Lipson 1984), both, or other kinds of issues; whether their membership is universal or regional, and: whether members’ domestic regimes are densely democratic (Pevehouse and Russett 2006). 8. Systematically collapsing this plethora of causal mechanisms, processes, and functions into a smaller number of semantic clusters is a task for another occasion, but we do offer the following

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12.

13. 14.

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rough-and-ready categorization: (1) use of force, coercion; (2) arbitration, mediation, provision of “good offices,” arena for negotiation; (3) convey information, reduce transaction costs; (4) learning, internalization of norms, socialization, preference change; (5) reputation, image, status; and (6) entanglement, constraints on action. We think it useful, especially for purposes of empirical testing, to distinguish between those causal mechanisms that inf luence conf lict immediately (e.g., in the same year or with a one-year lag) and those—such as socialization, learning, or internalization of norms—that unfold over longer periods of time. For recent reviews of the empirical literature, see Boehmer et al. (2004), Pevehouse and Russett (2006), and Chan (2005). For discussions of the issues that arise in conceptualizing and measuring IGOs, see Wallace and Singer (1970); Singer and Wallace (1970); Pevehouse et al. (2004), and; chapter six (this volume). At the same time, the primary source of growth in IGOs since World War I has been “emendations,” which entail existing IGOs creating more specific auxiliary organizations rather than states creating new organizations in the traditional fashion. These factors come together most clearly in the cases of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and EU encouragement of democratic forces in order to satisfy minimal prerequisites for organizational membership. See Abramovitz’ (1986) article by this title, though he was not referring to systemic transitions per se. Contrary to widespread popular and scholarly perceptions, Drezner (2007: 42) argues that, “the Bush administration has tried to reshape international organizations to make them more accommodating to rising powers.” To the extent Drezner is correct about the engagement efforts of the Bush administration in IGOs, and to the extent that subsequent administrations follow a similar course in the decades to come, the case for realist skepticism expressed in this section would lose force. On the other hand, there is likely to be something of a gap between attempts to reform/reshape international organizations and actually attaining the desired outcome. Whatever the case about Bush Administration efforts on behalf of rising powers, it seems clear that U.S. attempts to make the UN more accommodating to U.S. interests have not been especially successful. Nor should one find that surprising given the changes that have taken place since the UN’s founding. In post–World War II Europe, the United States and its allies formed NATO, a classic multilateral defense pact that endures to this day amidst numerous other IGOs. In East Asia, in contrast, a pattern based on bilateral alliances with the United States emerged and can still be discerned. The legacy of this “hub-and-spokes” pattern is a low density of regional IGOs, especially security-oriented ones. Forman and Segaar (2006) make a persuasive case that, owing in large part to the ineffectiveness of existing IGOs, there has been a proliferation of ad hoc, informal and hybrid forms to address problems in need of multilateral solutions inter alia. These include alia, alternative intergovernmental arrangements and multistakeholder arrangements involving nongovernmental organizations and transnational corporations as well as traditional IGOs. See also Pearson (1999a and 1999b) on economic IGOs; Johnston and Evans (1999) and Swaine and Johnston (1999) on multilateral security IGOs; and the other selections in Economy and Oksenberg (1999). The obvious comparison is with Germany’s fairly enthusiastic participation in international institutions after World War II as an acceptable approach to developing an active foreign policy in a world that was anything but eager to see German foreign policy revived.

References Abramovitz, Moses (1986) “Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind.” Journal of Economic History 46 (1, March): 385–406. Bennett, D. Scott and Alan C. Stam (2000) “Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads: When Decisions Matter.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (5, October): 653–685. Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom (2004) Do International Organizations Promote Peace?” World Politics 57 (1, October): 1–38.

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Chan, Steve (2005) “Discerning the Causal Relationships between Great Powers’ Membership in Intergovernmental Organizations and Their Initiation of Militarized Disputes.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 22 (3, Fall): 239–56. Cupitt, Richard, Rodney Whitlock, and Lynn Richards Whitlock (1996/2001) “The (Im)mortality of International Governmental Organizations,” in Paul F. Diehl, ed., The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 44–61. Domke, William (1988) War and the Changing Global System. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Drezner, Daniel W. (2007) “The New New World Order.” Foreign Affairs 86 (2, March/ April): 34–46. Economy, Elizabeth and Michel Oksenberg, eds. (1999) China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Forman, Shepherd, and Derk Segaar (2006) “New Coalitions for Global Governance: The Changing Dynamics of Multilateralism.” Global Governance 12 (2, April–June): 205–225. Gat, Azar (2007) “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers.” Foreign Affairs 86 (4, July/ August): 59–69. Glennon, Michael J. (2003) “Why the Security Council Failed.” Foreign Affairs 82 (3, May/ June): 16–35. Grieco, Joseph M. (1988) “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.” International Organization 42 (3, Summer): 485–507. Hurd, Ian (2003) “Too Legit to Quit.” Foreign Affairs 82 (4, July/August): 204–205. Jacobson, Harold K., William M. Reisinger, and Todd Mathers (1986) “National Entanglements in International Governmental Organizations.” American Political Science Review 80 (1, March): 141–159. Johnston, Alastair I. and Paul Evans (1999) “China’s Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power. New York: Routledge, 235–272. Kent, Ann (2007) Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Kim, Samuel S. (1994) “China’s International Organizational Behavior,” in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 401–434. Kupchan, Charles A., Emanuel Adler, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Yuen Foong Khong (2001) Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. Kurth, James (1979) “The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle: Industrial History and Political Outcomes.” International Organization 79: 1–34. Lampton, David M. (2001) Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lawrence, Robert Z. (2006) “China and the Multilateral Trading System.” Harvard University, Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP06–045 (October). http://Ksghome.harvard. edu/~RLawrence/Lawrence%20China%20and%20the%20Multilateral%20Trading%20 System.pdf. Last accessed August 25, 2008. Lipson, Charles (1984) “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs.” World Politics 37 (1, October): 1–23. Mastanduno, Michael (2003) “The Strategy of Economic Engagement: Theory and Practice,” in Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, eds., Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 175–186. Mearsheimer, John J. (1994/1995) “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19, 3 (Winter): 5–49. Oksenberg, Michel and Elizabeth Economy (1999) “Introduction: China Joins the World,” in Economy, Elizabeth and Michel Oksenberg, eds. (1999) China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Oneal, John R. and Bruce Russett (1999) “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992.” World Politics 52, 1: 1–37.

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Oneal, John R., Bruce Russett, and Michael Berbaum (2003) “Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992.” International Studies Quarterly 47, 3 (September): 371–93. Pearson, Margaret M. (1999a) (1999a) “China’s Integration into the International Trade and Investment Regime,” in Elizabeth Economy and Michael Oksenberg, eds., China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. ——— (1999b) “The Major Multilateral Economic Institutions Engage China,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power. New York: Routledge, 207–234. Pevehouse, Jon and Bruce Russett (2006) “Democratic International Governmental Organizations Promote Peace.” International Organization 60 (4, Fall): 969–1000. Pevehouse, Jon, Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke (2004) “The Correlates of War 2 International Governmental Organizations Data Version 2.0.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 21 (2, Summer): 101–119. Powers, Kathy L. (2004) Regional Trade Agreements as Military Alliances. International Interactions 30 (4): 37–95. ——— (2006) “Dispute Initiation and Alliance Obligations in Regional Economic Institutions.” Journal of Peace Research 43 (4): 453–471. Rapkin, David P and William R. Thompson (2006) “Will Economic Interdependence Encourage China and India’s Peaceful Ascent?,” in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., Trade, Interdependence, and Security. Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asia Research, 333–363. Rasler, Karen and William R. Thompson (2005) Puzzles of the Democratic Peace. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Russett, Bruce (2003) “Violence and Disease: Trade as Suppressor to Conf lict When Suppressors Matter,” in Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, eds., Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Russett, Bruce and John Oneal (2001) Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: W.W. Norton. Russett, Bruce, John Oneal, and David R. Davis (1998) “The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 195–85.” International Organization 52 (3, Summer): 441–467. Schweller, Randall L. (1999) “Managing the Rise of Great Powers; History and Theory,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power. New York: Routledge, 1–31. Shanks, Cheryl, Harold K. Jacobson, and Jeffrey H. Kaplan (1996) “Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International Governmental Organizations, 1981–1992.” International Organization 50: 593–627. Singer, J. David and Michael Wallace (1970) “Intergovernmental Organization and the Preservation of Peace, 1816–1964.” International Organization 24 (3, Summer): 520–547. Swaine, Michael D. and Iain Johnston (1999) “China and Arms Control Institutions,” in Elizabeth Economy and Michael Oksenberg, eds., China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Wallace, Michael and J. David Singer (1970) “Inter-governmental Organization and the Preservation of Peace, 1816–1965: Some Bivariate Relationships.” International Organization 24 (2): 520–547. Ward, Michael D., Randolph M. Siverson, and Xun Cao (2007) “Disputes, Democracies, and Dependencies: A Reexamination of the Democratic Peace.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (3, July): 583–601.

CH A P T E R

T E N

Exploration of Connections between Energy Use and Leadership Transitions Dav i d J. L e Poi r e

Introduction To gain a perspective on potential leadership transitions, past and current trends can be explored for potential patterns. There are many possible approaches to take in exploring patterns, such as the scope of the time period and the level of detail of possible explanatory factors. A standard approach is to start with the formation of modern state systems during the European age of exploration and scientific discovery in the sixteenth century (Kennedy 1987; Modelski 1987). However, hypotheses to study this leadership transition period might arise from considering extensions of patterns observed over earlier and much longer durations. For example, the rate of population growth over human history indicates a strong relationship to technological factors (Kremer 1993). This paper first reviews these approaches, which explore the possibility of longer trends that seem to be continuing throughout biological (natural), human, and technological evolution. These quantitative and qualitative hypotheses are then synthesized into the hypothesis that historical transitions may ref lect the emergent phenomena (e.g., bifurcations and logistic growth) of an underlying complex adaptive system. To explore the suggestion that energy f low through the system is the driving parameter of this complex system, this paper analyzes estimates of historical energy use over the recent (500-year period) transitions in leadership. The relationship between the progression of energy use and complexity of civilization is then further explored by investigating associated technologies and social organization. Possible implications of the continuation of these trends in leadership, technology, and energy transitions are then discussed.

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Historical analyses suggest that the adoption of new technologies is accompanied by an increase in energy use and subsequent social transformations. These analyses include the early identification of energy’s role in societies by White (1959), the role of energy in the historical transformation and collapse of previous civilizations by Tainter (1988), the recent contributions to this issue in the extended logistic complexity curve of Modis (2002), and the connection between extended evolution and energy of Chaisson (2001 and 2004). Further hypotheses of an extended theory of evolution have been proposed by Gardner (2003). White (1959) was one of the first to make the connection between energy and cultural change. He identified the leverage that technology could provide to sustain more complex societies. This work was incorporated into the analysis of the collapse of complex agricultural societies by Tainter (1988), who identified the marginal return on investment of resources, such as energy, as societies grow larger and more complex. He suggested that many agricultural societies collapsed by overextending their reach into nonsustainable systems. The impact of environmental degradation has been an important factor in the development and decline of civilizations (Ponting 1991; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Tainter 1996; Diamond 2005). Most of these analyses focused on agricultural societies because of their simplicity relative to industrialized societies. Chaisson (2001, 2004) recently connected the energy f low (i.e., the free energy density f low) to possible bifurcation points throughout the history of the universe, from galaxy formation to present society. However, Chaisson’s focus was on the connection of the early development of galaxies, stars, and planets to the period of time since the big bang. Therefore, the graphs of the progression of energy f low over time display the recent accelerating rates. This connection between increased energy f low and historical transitions were also suggested by Prigogine (2000) and Spier (2002). Modis (2002) approached the cosmic evolution in a slightly different manner by relating complexity to the sequence of generally agreed upon important events. This definition of complexity was inversely proportional to the period of time between subsequent events. This treatment emphasized the recent events, which is similar to using a time scale based on time before present (not time since beginning). An important aspect of this study was the comparison of the data to two possible mathematical trends—an exponential curve, which would lead to a singularity given how Modis defined complexity, and a logistic curve, which would ref lect a learning or adaptive element throughout the history of the universe. However, Modis did not specifically discuss the role of energy f low in relation to the increase in complexity.

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Complex Adaptive System Theory Each of these previous studies contributes to an interpretation that societies exhibit learning (of social organization, technologies, and energy use). In complexity theory, such systems are called complex adaptive systems. These types of systems are found in a variety of fields and display a range of common emergent phenomena, such as bifurcations or transitions, from one form to another as some important factor increases past critical levels. Studies of physical systems far from thermal equilibrium suggest that the energy f low is important in the development to more complex systems (Gleick 1988; Fox 1988). Chaos and adaptation have been investigated in many natural developing systems such as biological evolution (Kauffman 1991), ecosystems (Schulze 1995), and social systems (Perry 1995). A simple example of a complex system that exhibits bifurcations can be observed in a pan of heated oil. When the temperature difference between the top and bottom is great enough the oil rolls (Benard cells), forming hexagonal patterns. When the heat below the pan is increased, the energy f lowing through the oil also increases. At critical heat f low levels, the cells exhibit a new f low pattern, doubling the number of rolls to complete a cycle. In such dissipative systems, as explored by Nobel Prize-winning chemist Ilya Prigogine (2000), order can spontaneously form only when the system is maintained far from equilibrium, as measured by the usable energy that f lows through a system. In these systems, as the energy f low or other ordering parameter is increased, the system transitions discretely into higher order forms. The sequence of critical energy f lows is related to the Feigenbaum number (about 4.7). Although Chaisson identifies the energy f low as an important factor in complexity development, he does not detail the relationship between the quantitative and qualitative expectations of a complex adaptive system. Therefore, while he presents a number of energy density f lows among a mix of natural, human, and technological periods, he does not develop the possible connection between the free energy density, the Feigenbaum number, and the bifurcations (or transitions) in complexity. Contrasting Interpretations While it is possible that historical trends might help understand the possible near-future scenarios, there are often multiple contrasting interpretations of historical data. For example, the trends in technology development have led to two very different interpretations of long-range patterns. As opposed to the nested logistic trends (based on a learning and adaptive society that Modis suggests), Ray Kurzweil (2001) has interpreted the progression of computing technology to suggest that technology continues to develop at an accelerating pace. Although these simplistic models differ in

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just one basic assumption about the learning process, the predictions from the models are radically different: the societal learning model suggests a logistic trend, that is, technological development continues, although at eventually slowing rates, in contrast to the Kurzweil model, which suggests an accelerating rate of technological development toward a relatively near-term “technological singularity” (Kurzweil 2005). A fundamental difference in these two models is the claim by Kurzweil that information growth is unique compared to all the other technological trends, which seem to show logistic developments, such as the efficiency of steam engines, the discovery of stable elements (Marchetti 1986), and possibly fundamental physics (LePoire 2005). Each of these logistic patterns shows an “S-shaped” or “bandwagon” growth trend that starts out slow as new information is discovered; speeds up as the information is shared, and then slows down again as the diffusion of the information has reached its limits. Historic Energy Transitions It may be that technology and leadership transitions are indications of a complex learning system. If this is the case, then it may be possible to identify a few of the emergent behaviors of complex adaptive systems—behaviors which might be displayed through an examination of historical trends. If a system learns or adapts, a factor or parameter that is crucial to the maintenance of the complexity might increase (e.g., energy f low). When this factor (or ordering parameter) reaches certain levels, the system bifurcates, that is, it transitions from one stable form into two discretely possible different forms. Thus, the stages in a civilization’s development may demonstrate discrete changes when the energy f low increases by a geometric factor. Further, the adaptive learning system might develop through a sequential, nested logistic growth pattern—that is, the duration of the separate logistic growth stages might display recursive behavior, (i.e., the stages may be long at first, then speed up, and eventually slow down). Now, with this hypothesis concerning a relationship between energy f low/use and leadership transition(s), we will first examine the transitions in energy and use during the limited time period of the past approximately 500 years and covering the leadership transitions among modern Western nations. There are two parts to examining the energy patterns. One is to consider the source of fuel for energy conversion. Another factor is the relative intensity of energy use (e.g., energy use per person). The complex adaptive system model suggests that when the energy f low increases by a factor of about five (i.e., approximately the Feigenbaum number), the system bifurcates or transitions—possibly moving to a new energy source, a new leader, and/or a new set of technologies to support the more complex organization. Concerning the first part of examining energy patterns, research has found that primary energy sources exhibited regular long-term logistic substitution trends from the mid-nineteenth century through the third

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quarter of the twentieth century (Marchetti 1977). (Details of these transitions can be found in a number of studies, e.g., Smil 1994 and Bunker et al., 2005.) This analysis, based on an extension of the Fisher-Pry substitution model, accounted for the observed historical shifts in primary energy use from sources of biofuels such as wood and peat (Van der Woude 2003)., coal, oil, natural gas, and nuclear power. In the mid 1980s, the substitution dynamics were replaced by a relatively constant contribution from oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear power, and hydropower. However, a major factor in energy use dynamics in this recent period was the substitution of conservation and efficiency for actual fuel use (Devezas et al. 2007). The energy efficiency is measured as the ratio of economic activity to the rate of energy use (energy intensity). To incorporate this data into the logistic analysis, a method for estimating the fraction of energy saved by the increased efficiency was used. With this interpretation, energy efficiency fits within the substitution model. The logistic substitution results are compared with recent energy projections, trends in decarbonization, Kondratieff waves, and other efficiency measures. While the specific future mix of renewables and nuclear energy sources is uncertain, the more general logistic dynamics pattern of the energy system seems to be continuing as it has for about the last 150 years (figure 10.1). The transitions seem to correlate with transitions in leadership. The British led the Industrial Revolution first by using wood and then by switching to coal, which was used as a substitute energy source as forests were depleted. The coal mines spurred on the positive feedback cycle of technology development by driving the production of iron, engines, and further coal use. The British period of world leadership saw the expanse of railroads and deployment of English capital throughout its empire, which 10 Wood

Coal

FFF Efficiency

FI(1-F)

1 Nuclear/ Renewables 0.1

0.01 1850

1900

1950

2000

2050

Year Figure 10.1

Energy transitions

Notes: Energy trends resulting from logistic substitution fits the historical and near-term projections after accounting for energy efficiency as measured by energy intensity for the world. The near term (up to 2020) can be understood as substitution for approximately a 2% increase in efficiency as measured by the energy intensity with a corresponding 2% decrease in fossil fuel components after accounting for energy efficiency.

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was powered primarily by coal. However, the leadership transitioned to the United States during the first half of the twentieth century, which was powered by oil first developed in Pennsylvania but later by large deposits discovered in Texas and elsewhere. When the U.S. domestic supply of oil became insufficient to supply the continued growth, it depended on the large reservoirs found in other locations, including the Middle East. The energy crises of the 1970s—first in 1973 during the OPEC oil embargo and later in the decade as our relationship with Iran deteriorated—led to price increases, which in turn encouraged investments in energy efficiency. This wave of energy efficiency is seen to be only partially complete, with its peak projected to occur somewhere around 2025 (figure 10.1). The developed countries seem to be leading in this effort, motivated by the reduced importance of energy prices in determining economic activity. Historical Energy Flows How have energy f lows changed in the past? Since the hunting-gathering stage, human societies have undergone transitions toward more complex forms (e.g., from agricultural villages, to civilized states, to trading networks, to industrialization, to the current evolution of a services- and knowledge-based economy). Human beings have used various sources to derive energy to support various levels of societies. These energy sources include our own muscle and that of animals, as well as wood, wind, water, coal, oil, and nuclear power. The increase in energy usage over this period is illuminating: a human’s intake of 2,500 calories per day corresponds or averages to about 100 watts (W) (i.e., about as much energy as a large incandescent light bulb uses). The average current per capita rate of energy use in the United States stands at 15 kilowatts (kW) of energy (including commercial, industrial, and residential use), or about 150 times a person’s food energy intake/use per day. This measure corresponds to about 3.5 factors of Feigenbaum’s number and suggests there might be three or more transitions, or bifurcations, where the energy f low increases by a factor of about five (assuming that the ordering parameter is inversely related to the energy f low). Additional transitions might be the result of a concentration of energy use by parts of a civilization. For example, the agricultural transition from hunting/gathering occurred over a long period but saw the concentration of effort (as measured by time spent on food production). Also, the development of civilizations then organized rural work efforts to support urban development and classes. The details of specific developments or energy sources and uses have been studied (Smil 1994), however, to test the relationship between leadership and an aggregate measure such as energy consumption it is necessary to estimate the energy use quantitatively for various leading societies in human history. After the Roman Empire suffered a slow disintegration, an often recognized end came when the Goths sacked Rome in 410 AD. Much

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of the organization and culture of the Roman Empire survived in the eastern half, which became the Byzantine Empire. The western part was in supposed decline during the early Middle Ages, although some researchers have come to reconsider how “dark” and unproductive these times really were (Gimpel 1976). Freed from depending on slave labor, the western part was more motivated to explore mechanical and energy extraction to help reduce their physical efforts, leading the West to utilize water, wind, and wood along with mechanical machines. Artifacts such as cathedrals, ships, and castles attest to their ability to apply these technologies and energies in creative ways. This activity led to a shortage of wood in Western Europe (especially in England and the Netherlands) after the recovery from the Black Plague, which created the need to import vast amounts of wood and timber from further North and East as was traded by the Hanseatic traders (Bernstein 2004). An estimate of wood use in the middle of the Northern Renaissance (in 1670) is 4 cubic meters (m3) per person. Water, wind, and animal-derived power were also utilized. The sum of the usage conversion rates of these energy sources suggests that there could have been approximately 500 W of energy consumed per person in the late Renaissance, or about a factor of five times greater than the 100W consumption rate of one person. The energy use per person then increased again as fossil fuels became extensively used (Kulcinski 2004). The use of coal enabled the industrial revolution. By 1860, energy use in the United States was up to about 3.5kW per capita. Over the course of the twentieth century, oil and natural gas, along with nuclear power and hydroelectricity, were added to use. The oil crises in the 1970s prompted a more efficient use of energy resources, with the result that the productivity of energy resources increased by about a factor of 1.6 (Devezas et al. 2007). This increase in raw energy resources use and combined with more efficient use led to an increase of a factor of about five in energy use per person in the United States (figure 10.2). While patterns in per capita energy use are illuminating, perhaps the transitions do not follow the leadership transitions of nation-states but some larger framework suggested by Modis. In examining the long time it took for the Middle Ages to replace human power (relied upon in Roman times) with wood, wind, and animal power to coal, it is seen that leadership transitions passed through medieval states, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the first British phase. Perhaps this era of commerce and trade, before the Industrial Revolution, would better characterize this period of energy transition from natural renewables to coal. The transition might have been started by the Vikings or Venetians in the south, and then led by the Hanseatic League and the Venetians, Dutch, English, and Americans. In the middle of this period, the Dutch used an estimated 500 W of energy per person. In the Industrial Revolution, the sequence of industrial stages seems to be the application to agriculture in England starting in 1726, followed by textile industrialization, steel,

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David J. Lepoire Energy Source Transitions Wood

Coal

Oil

Efficiency

?

Leadership Transitions British 1

British 2

Knowledge-Based

Technology Transitions Industrial Revolution Agriculture Cotton/Textile

USA

IBM

MS Google

Railroad/Steel Mass Production

Energy Intensity

1700 Figure 10.2

1800

1900

2000

2100

Energy transitions, leadership transitions, and energy intensity

Notes: Temporal relationship of the energy fuel source, energy intensity, and leadership. It is seen that the energy fuel source and leadership exhibit pulses. The ratio of the energy intensity (energy per person in the leading nation) between pulses is about four.

and mass production. The dominant energy source in the middle of this period was coal, whose intensity of use in 1890 was about 20% more than the levels used in 1860. The current period might be called the information age, where the predominant types of energy used are the f luid fossil fuels (FFFs) of oil and natural gas. The estimate of the per capita energy use of FFFs in the United States is currently the same as the level of use in 1980, if the efficiency factor is not accounted for. Discussion We have investigated the energy transition, leadership transitions, and energy use intensity patterns of the past 500 years. But what do these patterns tell us about the near future? It appears that the energy transition pattern in the developed countries is moving through a phase of being dependent on more efficient energy use (figure 10.1). But a large transition to nonfossil fuels must eventually occur. What technologies might support this transition? What learning has to occur to avoid environmental collapse? What might be the next phase of an increase in energy use intensity, leading to another transition? What countries or organizations might lead or be most involved in this transition? While these are large questions that are not treated here, this paper can provide some limited insights on the basis of the results presented here.

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While the efficiency component is expected to rise in the near term, the eventual decline of the efficiency component is expected, which will be the result of the subsequent substitution of a new energy contributor. In the previous graph, this next energy component was identified as renewables/nuclear. While there is less certainty surrounding the beginning of a new logistic growth, the identification of the actual energy source is fraught with many unknowns. The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) constructed a set of possible scenarios (Nakicenovic 1998), summarized in table 10.1. The assumptions that would lead to a prediction of renewables/nuclear are similar to the IIASA Scenario C (1) The relative use of coal and oil/natural gas will remain quite constant (prediction from the logistic analysis), and (2) renewables/ nuclear will substitute for them with strong growth after 2020. However, some of IIASA’s other scenarios could result when starting with slightly different assumptions, for example, development of nontraditional fossil fuels, such as tar sands, oil shale, or methane hydrates. Various predictions about the reemergence of nuclear power have been suggested, but even the most aggressive of these scenarios would not generate the historical logistic growth rates seen in previous substitutions (Devezas 2007). While there are proposals to encourage energy supply to developing nations, for example, current discussions over global participation in nuclear energy, a single leader is unlikely to arise. Many new technologies are being developed that are expected to transform society. These technologies include information technologies and their integration in nanotechnology, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science. These technologies are often viewed as a group as their science and applications converge (Roco and Bainbridge 2002). The many uses of the technologies include uses for improved medical care and, more controversially, human enhancements such as extended life, improved mental capabilities, and genetic engineering. One goal is Table 10.1

Summary of the IIASA world energy scenarios

Cases:

Case A

Case B

Case C

Short Name

High Growth

Muddling Through

Ecologically Driven

Major assumptions

Fast economic growth and technological development

Slower development due to trade and environmental issues

Sub-scenarios

Three sub-scenarios: (1) Continued availability of oil and gas, (2) Benefits of coal use and global warming (3) Technologically driven efficiencies in nuclear and renewable resources. (Similar to Case C)

—

Need to change based on environmental consequences, e.g., green taxes Two subscenarios: (1) Nuclear phaseout and (2) Development of both nuclear and renewables

Source: Nakicenovic et al. (1998).

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to explore the ethical issues and options as early as possible to facilitate beneficial applications while minimizing risks. This aim is made difficult by the large uncertainties in the technologies, social responses, and external events. The use of new technologies in this context could be viewed as a historical continuation of technology use to enable human potential (e.g., writing, printing, telecommunications, and computer interaction). Environmental and health risks from potential energy production and use are difficult to assess because of uncertainties in technological solutions, societal reaction, and scientific understanding of their impacts (Glenn and Gordon 2004; Elliott 2003). There are at least two long-term, global energy-related environmental issues that need to be resolved. The first is the question of the fossil fuel “waste” of carbon dioxide and its contribution and impact on global warming, and the second is the question of nuclear energy waste, nonproliferation, and its impact on the environment. There are basic scientific uncertainties, political uncertainties, and technological uncertainties concerning reversibility and the impacts of engineering solutions. The consistent comparison of these impacts and risks is difficult, and the approaches are being debated (e.g., Arrow et al. 1996). However, recent trends (i.e., since the 1970s) suggest that economic factors are leading to a more efficient use of energy, although there are many other opportunities for further conservation (Ausubel 2004; Lovins and Lovins 2004; Podobnik 2006). There are many other global issues besides energy accessibility, but energy may be the key for addressing other issues concerning water, pollution, and illness (Smalley 2003). Leaders might over commit to an existing energy source and therefore find it more difficult to make a transition using new technologies and sources. Ausubel (2004) looked at a series of technology transitions and found that the early adopters tend to over commit, while later adopters can learn to use the technologies more efficiently. A comparative review of the energy transitions among countries might address this question. The logistic substitution process suggests that the relative costs of the energy sources changes with time, but this includes both the fuel and committed infrastructure costs. However, the underlying reasons of the historical transitions seem to be mixed: Britain transitioned from wood to coal as the wood supply dwindled, while transportation needs, not diminishing coal reserves, was a factor in the transition to oil. It was suggested in the introduction that energy, information, and communication might be coupled. The identified stages in energy use and development may have corresponded to new ways of capturing and communicating information to maintain new social structures at the higher energy f low. For example, the rise of civilization was accompanied by the development of writing, centralization, and specialization. The development and growth of machines, markets, capital, and trade during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance were related to information communicated through various pricing of labor, land resources, and capital markets. The industrial age blossomed through refinement and

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new combinations of existing technologies, which were facilitated by communication—initially through printed media and then telecommunications. The current period relies not only on the electronic movement of information but its enhancement through increased levels of data collection, organization, processing, and inference. Returning to consider the relationship between leadership and energy use, could the large growth in China lead to a new phase of energy use? While it is possible, it does not seem likely in either the energy use per capita measure or the development of a new energy source. Currently in China, the citizens use about one-tenth the energy of citizens in the United States and generate about one-third of the economic output per energy unit as compared to citizens in the United States. While China has large hydropower and nuclear energy plans, the predominant energy source in China is coal, which currently supplies about 73% of energy demand and is expected to provide about 40–50% by 2050. However, China and other “Asian tiger” countries such as South Korea invest a large percentage of their countries’ GDP in research, including new applications of nanotechnologies, and they also have a large pool of former citizens who have trained in the United States. The United States, in turn, has received quite a bit of benefit from foreign students, who have supplied about 50% of the total number of all graduate students in engineering and science in the United States. This percentage, however, has been decreasing recently as greater restriction and barriers have been applied to attract students (Task Force 2005). But if not China, with its world-leading population of 1.3 billion, who or what else might take the lead? Another popular concept being discussed is that the world is “f lattening”: through the application of communications and transport, effective distances are virtually shrinking. The networked economy allows finance, science, and other knowledge-based work to be performed and integrated in a virtual network across the globe. Thus, it may be that the next leadership phase or transition will not arise from any one country but by countries participating in various collections of networks of organizations. Robert Paehlke (2004) sees the transition toward a global economy as testing the limits of the current nation-state system and democratic governments. The dilemma that nation-state democracies face is that economic markets are globalizing although the necessary infrastructure is not in place to balance the social and environmental needs. Since a world government would be difficult to support, Paehlke suggests using international trade agreements to include provisions for environmental and equity issues. An example of using trade to diffuse environmental concerns is the European Union’s e-waste law, which was implemented in 2005 and by which international manufacturers, such as from China or the United States, must abide in order to market their products in Europe. This f lattening scenario seems to indicate an early phase of a new pulse of environmental activity that has exhibited three logistical periods throughout the twentieth century (LePoire 2006).

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This f lattening scenario also would be consistent with the energy f low increase, since bringing the rest of the world to the United States’ energy use level would take a factor of about five, since the United States consumes 25% of the energy used worldwide and has 5% of the world’s population. This scenario would also be consistent if the rate of technological change is slowing down. The ability of a leader to maintain its lead depends on generating new ideas faster than the ideas can diffuse (or spread) throughout a culture (or network, etc.). If the diffusion rate speeds up or the innovation rate slows down, then leadership becomes more dispersed. This pattern would fit with the Modis interpretation of innovation pattern. Some have argued that the era of nation-state dominance is ending, as posited in Van Creveld’s (1996) “The Fate of the State”: The State, which during the three and a half centuries since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) has been the most important and the most characteristic of all modern institutions, appears to be declining or dying. In many places, existing states are either combining into larger communities or falling apart; in many places, organizations that are not states are challenging them by means fair or foul. On the international level, we seem to be moving . . . towards . . . more complex political structures. . . . These developments are likely to lead to upheavals as profound as those that took humanity out of the middle ages and into the modern world. Whether the direction of change is desirable, as some hope, or undesirable, as others fear, remains to be seen.” If trade and technology will dominate the world and lead to new methods for communicating, then we should see some trends in the information technology (IT) fields. If we look at the companies that have dominated the field over the course of development of the information technology boom, we see a pattern—where IBM led the field for about 35 years, to be passed by the software company, Microsoft, for about 15 years, which is now being chased by a service company, Google. These companies, Microsoft, Google, and IBM, had the fourth-, twenty-fifth-, and twenty-sixth-largest market capitalization as of March 2007. It will be interesting to see how long Google can maintain leadership. If the trend in the shortening time of dominance continues, Google only has a couple of more years. If the inf lection point (mid point) has been reached in the IT learning curve, then a length similar to Microsoft’s reign of 15 years might be expected. Another wave of ubiquitous computing technologies is expected that combines wireless, global positioning system (GPS), cell phone technology, radio frequency identification (RFID), remote monitors, augmented reality, and smart devices (Lyytinen et al. 2004). If the system of human development through energy use and technology development follows patterns of adaptive complex systems, then future development might continue towards the accelerating rates towards more

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Knowledge-Based (1950–?) Industrialization (1720–1950) Complexity Level

Commerce (700–1720) Civilization (3,000 BCE–400)

Energy Intensity (and Time) Figure 10.3

History as a complex adaptive system

Notes: Speculative possible interpretation of history exhibiting patterns of a complex adaptive system with the ordering parameter related to the energy intensity. The bifurcation reversal as shown (adapted from Stone 1993) might be consistent with the overarching logistic model suggested by Modis. The ratio of the energy intensity (energy per person in the leading nation) between the historical bifurcations is about four, close to the Feigenbaum universal constant of development of complex systems.

chaotic states as suggested by Kurzweil (2001), or reverse the bifurcations in an overarching logistic framework suggested by Modis (2002). Bifurcation reverse has been studied in ecological complex systems (Stone 1993). A speculative possible interpretation is shown in figure 10.3 with the transitions from commerce, industrial, and knowledge-based societies are superimposed on the development of a system undergoing bifurcations as an ordering parameter, such as energy use per capita, increases. This reversal would coincide with a slowing down of technological change. Much change would still occur, although not at an ever accelerating pace. This might be similar to a transition to a sustainable society, where growth is not the highest priority. Conclusions Previous studies have suggested that technology, energy use/f low, and societal changes are coupled, perhaps in a long-term learning pattern. The use of new technologies in energy production is important to understanding leadership transitions, since it has been argued that a major factor in transforming societies to more complex forms is the ability to increase the intensity of energy use. To gain a wider perspective, the historic role

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of energy, technological, and leadership development is reviewed within a possible logistic growth and transition framework. In general, complex adaptive systems show bifurcations or transitions when the energy f low through the system increases by a factor of about five. While these patterns might occur over a longer time period, this study focused on the last 500 years and the near future. The energy source and intensity as measured by the energy consumption per person in a leading society were estimated. These major changes in energy source from wood to coal to oil and natural gas, and the simultaneous increase by a factor of about 150 from the 100W equivalent to human food caloric intake in this sequence. These transitions occur concurrently with both the transitions of international leadership of nation-states in the West, that is, from the Dutch, to the British, to the United States, and also the transition in technological leadership in trading, industrialization, and information processing. The current and near-future struggle to supply expanding energy demands to a global economy will also likely utilize new technologies, such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science for new energy sources, conversion, storage, and transmission. While the United States currently maintains its lead in high technology development, other countries, such as China, are indicating their interest in these technologies by their internal research-and-development investments. However, the energy source patterns and intensity trends in China do not indicate a transition of the type observed in the historical record. The intensity of energy use seems to be correlated better with the development of more complex structures, e.g. agricultural, industrial, and knowledge-based. The ability to use these new structures then might develop into the ability to lead. It seems like a current problem is to develop a system to supply energy to support a global economy that does not render great environmental problems or large inequities- the two other dimensions of Paehlke’s (2004) democracy’s dilemma. The possibility of a larger systemic transition from the nation-state system has been postulated. These studies indicate more complex patterns and networks arising among organizations across spatial scales of larger and smaller institutions. This transition is partly facilitated by information technology, which allows the easier communication of ideas, finances, and skills. The development in this field seems to be dominated by a transition among international corporations, which is currently headquartered in the United States. This systemic transition might continue as computing capabilities increasingly are embedded and networked to facilitate human actions. Note Work supported by the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract No. DE-AC02–06CH11357.

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References Arrow, K.J., W.R. Cline, K.-G. Maler, M. Munasinghe, R. Squitieri, and J.E. Stiglitz (1996) “Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, and Economic Efficiency,” in James P. Ruse, Hoesung Lee, and Erik F. Haites, eds., Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 125–144. Ausubel, J.H. (2004) “Will the Rest of the World Live Like America?” Technology in Society 26 (2/3): 343–360. Bernstein, W.J. (2004) The Birth of Plenty: How the Prosperity of the Modern World was Created. New York: McGraw-Hill. Bunker, Stephen G. and Paul S. Ciccantell (2005) Globalization and the Race for Resources,. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press. Chaisson, E.J. (2001) Cosmic Evolution: The Rise of Complexity in Nature. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ——— (2004) “Complexity: An Energetics Agenda; Energy as the Motor of Evolution.” Complexity, 9 (3): 14–21. . Chase-Dunn, C.K. and T.D. Hall (1997) “Ecological Degradation and the Evolution of WorldSystems.” Journal of World-Systems Research 3 (3, Fall): 403–431. Devezas, T., D. LePoire, J.C.O. Matias, and A.M.P. Silva (forthcoming) “Energy Scenarios: Towards a New Energy Paradigm.” Futures. Diamond, J. (2005) Collapse. London: Penguin Books. Elliott, D. (2003) Energy, Society and Environment. London: Routledge. Fox, R.F. (1988) Energy and Evolution of Life. San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman. Gardner, J. (2003) Biocosm: The New Scientific Theory of Evolution: Intelligent Life Is the Architect of the Universe. Makawao, HI: Inner Ocean. Gimpel, J. (1976) The Medieval Machine: The Industrial Revolution of the Middle Ages. New York: Henry Holt. Gleick, J. (1988) Chaos: Making a New Science. New York: Penguin. Glenn, J. and T.J. Gordon (2004) “Future Science and Technology Management Policy Issues—2025 Global Scenarios.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 71: 913–940. Kauffman, S.A. (1991) “Antichaos and Adaptation.” Scientific American 265 (2): 78–84. Kennedy, P. (1987) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House. Kremer, M. (1993) “Population Growth and Technological Change: One Million B.C. to 1990.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (3, August): 681–716. Kulcinski, G.L. (2004) Resource Limitations on Earth—Energy. University of Wisconsin Fusion Technology Institute. Available at http://fti.neep.wisc.edu/neep533/SPRING2004/lecture3. pdf. Last accessed August 14, 2008. Kurzweil, R. (2001) The Law of Accelerating Returns, March. Available at http://www.kurzweilai. net/articles/art0134.html. . Last accessed August 14, 2008. ——— (2005) The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology. New York: Viking. LePoire, D.J. (2005) “Application of Logistic Analysis to the History of Physics.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 72 (4): 471–479. ——– (2006) “Logistic Analysis of Recent Environmental Interest.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 73: 153–167. Lovins, A.B. and L.H. Lovins (2004) “A New Age of Resource Productivity,” in R. Olson and D. Rejeski, eds., Environmentalism and the Technologies of Tomorrow. Washington, DC: Island Press, 29–37. Lyytinen, K. U. Varshney, M.S. Ackerman, G. Davis, M. Arital, D. Roby et. al. (2004) “Surfing the Next Wave: Design and Implementation Challenges of Ubiquitous Computing Environments.” Communications of the Association for Information Systems 13: 697–716. Available at http://www.ist. psu.edu/faculty_pages/sawyer/papers/lytinnen_et_al_cais_2004.pdf. Marchetti, C. (1977) “Primary Energy Substitution Models: On the Interaction between Energy and Society.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 10: 345–356. ——— (1986) “Fifty-Year Pulsation in Human Affairs: Analysis of Some Physical Indicators.” Futures 18 (3): 376–388.

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Modelski, G. (1987) Long Cycles in World Politics. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Modis, T. (2002) “Forecasting the Growth of Complexity and Change.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 69: 377–404. Nakicenovic, N., A. Grübler, and A. McDonald (1998) Global Energy Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Paehlke, R.C. (2004) Democracy’s Dilemma: Environment, Social Equity, and the Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Perry, D.A. (1995) “Self-Organizing Systems across Scales.” TREE (Trends in Ecology and Evolution) 10 (6, June): 241–244. Podobnik, Bruce (2006) Global Energy Shifts. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Ponting, C. (1991) A Green History of the World. London: Penguin Books. Prigogine, I. (2000) “The Networked Society.” Journal of World-Systems Research 6 (3): 892–898. Roco, M.C., and W.S. Bainbridge, eds. (2002) Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation. Available at http://www.wtec.org/ ConvergingTechnologies/. Last accessed August 14, 2008. Schulze, E.-D. (1995) “Flux Control at the Ecosystem Level,” TREE(Trends in Ecology and Evolution) 10 (1): 40–43. Smalley, R. (2003) “Our Energy Challenge.” Paper presented at Energy & Nanotechnology Conference, Rice University, Houston, TX, May 3. Available at http://smalley.rice.edu/ emplibrary/Rice%20EnergyNanotech%20May%203%202003.pdf. Last accessed August 14, 2008. Smil, V. (1994) Energy in World History. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Spier, Fred (2004) “How Big History Works: Energy Flows and the Rise and Demise of Complexity.” Paper presented at Self-Organization and Big History Symposium, September, Belgorad, Russia. Also Available at: http://www.iis.uva.nl/i2o/object.cfm/objectid=80D375F2-A64A44C8-B06F6ACA839A4120/download=true. Last accessed August 14, 2008. Stone, L. (1993) “Period-Doubling Reversals and Chaos in Simple Ecological Models.” Nature, 365: 617–620. Tainter, J.A. (1988) The Collapse of Complex Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ——— (1996) “Complexity, Problem Solving, and Sustainable Societies,” in R. Constanza, ed., Getting Down to Earth. Washington, DC: Island Press. Available at http://dieoff.org/page134. htm, accessed July 2006. Task Force on the Future of American Innovation (2005) The Knowledge Economy: Is theUnited States Losing Its Competitive Edge? February 16. Available at http://www.futureofinnovation.org/PDF/ Benchmarks.pdf. Last accessed August 14, 2008. Van Creveld, M. (1996) “The Fate of the State.” Parameters (spring). Available at http://www.d-n-i. net/creveld/the_fate_of_the_state.htm. Last accessed August 14, 2008. Van der Woude, A. (2003) “Sources of Energy in the Dutch Golden Age,” in S. Cavaciocchi, ed., Economia e Energia secc. XIII–XVIII. Firenze: Le Monnier: 445–468. Available at: http://www. neha.nl/publications/2003/2003–04woude.pdf. Last accessed August 14, 2008. White, L. (1959) The Evolution of Culture. New York: McGraw Hill.

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CH A P T E R

E L E V E N

The Evolutionary Trajectory of the World System toward an Age of Transition Te s s a l e no C . D e v e z a s

There are many reasons to make a war, but there is only one reason why not to make it: the Reason Devezas-Modelski’s Fractal Evolution of the World System Devezas and Modelski (2003) have shown that world system evolution consists in a cascade of multilevel, nested, and self-similar (fractal), Darwinian-like processes ranging in time from one to 250 generations, exhibiting power law behavior, which is also known as self-organized criticality. The conception is that of a cascade of differentiated non-linear processes transporting the world system through a series of transitions. An outline of this conception is presented in table 11.1 below. It includes both the fairly familiar, shorter-range ones, such as Kondratieff waves (K-waves) and long cycles of world leadership, and also the less familiar, longer range millennial sequences that, even while of millennial scope, steadily shape our social experience. The modern world system is marked by the emergence of a global level of interactions—a level that might be best described as oceanic in character, and planetary in range, in distinction to the mostly regional scope of pre-modern systems (though we keep in mind, of course, the silk roads across Eurasia). That global level of interactions—whose agent-based processes are accounted for in column 4—is gradually devolving a set of institutions (e.g., free trade, international organizations, democratic movements, global media) whose evolution is recorded in processes named

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Tessaleno C. Devezas

Table 11.1 1. Number of generations (g)

Cascade of modern evolutionary processes 2. Process 3. Carrier period (years)

1

30

2 4 8

60 120 250

16 32

500 1000

64 128

2000 4000

256

8000

4. Global-agentbased

Processes 5. GlobalInstitutional

6. Worldspecies-wide

Generational Turnover K - wave Long cycle Democratization Global economy Opinion-making Global politics Global community Global system

World economy Active zone World socialization World system

Source: Devezas and Modelski (2003).

in column 5 (the basic distinction here is between four differentiated levels of organization: global, regional, national, and local). The world system processes of column 6 are, by contrast, species-wide, and in that manner, envelop, and summarize, the social evolution of the world population. The first three columns of table 11.1 concern generations, and the process of generational turnover. Generational turnover may be measured by the time it takes for one generation to replace itself biologically. This generational process links biology with social evolution, and it is important too for sizing up the status of social evolutionary developments [see Modelski (1998) and Devezas and Corredine (2001)]. This basic pulse or beat of generations lies at the basis of the entire array of evolutionary processes shown in table 11.1. Generations (g) are the basic metric of all evolutionary processes and that is why the period of these processes is reckoned (in column 1) in terms of generations. Column 2 expresses the extension in years of the different processes considering a mean duration of 30 years for the generational turnover; these numbers for g ≥ 8 were rounded for the sake of simplicity. The generational process therefore appears in column 3 as the carrier wave of the entire cascade. We know that it is in itself a basic learning process, and it carries the information for all the other evolutionary learning processes. We observe that the periods of all the other processes shown in that cascade are multiples of that unit of “generation.” In column 4 of table 11.1 we encounter an array of four global agent-based evolutionary processes. These are the event-sequences that we find at the grassroots level of great social movements. We might call them the micro-processes of the world picture, the micro-foundations of macro-processes at the population level. They help us understand how seemingly abstract evolutionary developments actually happen: because they ref lect and embody the ideas and interests of innovative agents

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in places “where the action is,” and that is why we call these processes agent-based. What are the actions, programs, and strategies of which agents that account for large-scale and long-term phenomena described as technological breakthroughs, city or nation-building, historical eras, or rise of world religions? For the modern era they concern agents that execute innovative programs, or policies that come to be increasingly global in scope. In alliance with other agents, their activities lead to the selection of some of these agents and activities and increasing their market share and/or dominance, and their diffusion in the relevant segment of the world system. Starting with the best known, we take note of Kondratieff waves, or K-waves (period of 60 years) that account for the rise of leading sectors in the global economy, such as autos and electricity in the onset of the 20 the century, electronics in the middle and the information industries later in that same century. For K-waves the agents are innovators and entrepreneurs (such as Henry Ford, or Bill Gates, together with their competitors) who lead usually newly founded firms and help diffuse their products often first in one national market, and then throughout the global economy. These are evolutionary processes because they involve mutation (innovation), cooperation (alliances), selection (by the market), and inheritance (the birth of new firms, and changes in the global economy). For a detailed analysis of K-waves and their causal relationship with the generational turnover see Devezas and Corredine (2001). Moving along to global political system, we observe the long cycle as the learning process of the rise of world powers to a position of global leadership (period of 120 years). This is a constitutive process of world politics (tracking what is known as “power transitions”) that, via the institution of global leadership, shaped modern world politics from the fifteenth century onward by helping to resolve impending global problems. Portugal and the Dutch Republic were, successively, the early trial runs of this new form of political organization. Shortly before the seventeenth century it was Britain that stepped onto the world stage. About 1940 the United States stepped into Britain’s role, and clinched it by its success in leading the victorious coalition of World War II, and playing a key role in the organization of the peace that followed. Here again we have an evolutionary process at work: innovation by certain nation-states and their leaders (creating a new role of global leadership, to defeat designs of continental domination), cooperation (in fashioning coalitions), selection (in past global wars), and inheritance (new political orders). For the process of democratization at the global level (period of 250 years), viewed as the world-wide spread of democracy, the agents are charismatic and popular leaders, social and political activists, parties, social movements, and their programs and broader ideologies, together with their opponents, non-democratic regimes, and vested interests. The contemporary growth of democracy, forming as world process around an Anglo-American nucleus might be dated from the second half of the nineteenth century,

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and it still has a way to go. The set of social practices and decision-rules that goes by that name goes of course back at least to classical Greece, but it is only in the modern era that its rules and practices are recalled (i.e., in the Renaissance), sustained by the practice of parliaments, contested by absolutist regimes, but gaining by close association with the world powers. It is an evolutionary process because it carries forward a strategic social innovation (democratic society of equals under law) as a substitute for autocratic or totalitarian regimes; involves associative and cooperative activities (such as parties), competes for selection on national and global levels (e.g., in electoral campaigns), and diffuses world-wide by virtue of superior performance, mainly regarding the freedom of movement for innovators in all spheres of human activities—indeed the driving force behind the whole evolutionary process. We have not place enough in this chapter to discuss in detail the main characteristics and features of each of these processes in the cascade. For details of this discussion and some empirical evidence of their functioning see Modelski (2000), Devezas and Modelski (2003), Devezas et al. (2005), and Devezas and Modelski (2006). Let us proceed with a short resume of the columns 5 and 6 of table 11.1. Global institutional processes (shown in column 5) might be thought of as intermediary between agent-based, and species-wide processes. They last longer than those of agents, but shorter than population-based movements. It is as though they represent the institutions that monitor the progress of agents, and program their developments. One period of global institutional change in the global economy (some 250 years) might also be expressed as comprising four K-waves that nest within it. The current period of that process might be called that of the “Information Economy” that took off with the telephone and electric power (after 1850), moved to radio and electronics (after 1914) and, since 1975, has attained the decisive stage of the computer and the internet, already poised for worldwide diffusion (in turn, four phases of the global economy process might be thought of as nesting in one period of the world economy process. Let us now turn to global politics. We have just noted that, between about 1430 and 1850, the modern system experienced four long cycles: Portuguese, Dutch, British I and British II. We propose that this four-cycle sequence makes-up one four-phased period of the global political system. Analytically speaking, each of these long cycles constitute one phase of a learning process whose product (an evolutionary adaptation) is a set of global institutions of which the central one is global leadership—as manifested in its mature form in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—that came to compose the core of world political organization, but should also be regarded (in a long perspective) as transitional forms of international management. From this perspective, the two British cycles were the third and fourth phases of the global institutional learning process.

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That is, we postulate, for the modern world system only—because in the ancient and classical systems we find no global-level, world-wide arrangements—the operation of an array of global-institutional processes (in an ordered hierarchy), that is operating for the global economy, the global political system, the global community (on a democratic foundation), and the global system. We now come to the sixth and last column of table 11.1, where once again we find an array of four processes, the processes of the world system (species-wide). These are, in order of increasing temporal reach, the world economy process (period of 1,000 years) that builds structures of planetary production and exchange; the active zone process (period of 2,000 years), that tracks the movement of the world system’s active zone (the locus of systemic innovation), world socialization (period of 4,000 years) that builds the humans’ capacity for cooperation, and the world system process that envelops all of them (or within which the other three nest). Quite broadly speaking these four processes might be described, respectively as economic, political, social, and cultural. We observe, too, that the order in which they are listed is a determined one (in one direction, that of control), the cultural precedes the social, and the social precedes the political, and the economic. The world system process (postulated period of some 8,000 years) might be thought of as the envelope of a cascade of species-shaping (or world population-shaping) processes. In the first place, it expresses the fact that the human species is programmed to proceed on a four-phased evolutionary journey, passing sequentially through the stages of a macro-learning process. The four phases of world system development constitute in fact the major eras of world history: generally known as ancient, classical, and modern (and presumptively, shall we say, post-modern). In the second place, it “sits’ atop an array of three other differentiated and specialized, social processes through which social evolution is in fact implemented. The Power of Prediction—World Species-wide Processes For the purpose of this paper, which aims primarily to look ahead to what may happen during the unfolding of the present century and the transition to the next, it will be sufficient to look closely only to some of the processes in the cascade, namely the first three agent-based processes (K-wave, Long cycle, and Democratization) and the shorter (world economy) and the longer (world system) of the world species-wide processes. Let us begin with the longer processes (species-wide). Regarding prediction it is worth pointing out that the present approach (the postulated cascade of world system processes) might make it possible to predict major trends and turning points, including their f lavor (the formal-logical aspect) but not the substance or the nature of the events involved, for ever bounded to the fortuitousness, contingency and uncertainties underlying

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the innovative process. As demonstrated in Devezas andModelski (2003) the general equation for the logistic curves underlying the different evolutionary processes can be written:

f ⫽ 1⫹ e

1 ⫺g␦ (t⫺t 0 )

where f expresses the normalized fraction of the process corresponding to a given g (carried out then by a given group of g generations, and expressed as the power law g = 2n, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . ), d represents the basic diffusion-learning rate (roughly 0.16 per generation), t is the time in years, and t0 is a constant to adjust the time axis corresponding to the year when f = 0.5. For a world system process we would have n = 8 (g ~ 256), t0 ~1000 AD, and the resulting logistic curve as shown in figure 9 in Devezas and Modelski (2003). This logistic curve portrays the fact that, in its macroorganization, the world system has already passed through two major phases (the ancient and the classical), and is now well into the third, the modern era. This process, started some 5,000 years ago and coextensive with what is conventionally understood as “world history,” is currently reaching its 80% level of completion. The overall picture is that of a four-phased millennial learning process: the first phase (ancient era) might be thought of as the phase of putting in place its learning infrastructure (writing, calendars, cities); the second phase (classical) as one of community-building by world religions; and the third (modern) as that of selecting the collective organization of the world system, to be consolidated in the fourth phase (presumptively a “postmodern” phase). Following this picture we may say that (time-wide) humanity is now through a decisive stretch of the human experience, one that will or will not consolidate the modalities of its socio-political arrangements on a worldwide scale. On the other hand, our analysis suggests that the process of emergence may already be 80% complete, and could “soon” be moving into a phase of consolidation. That would imply the “good news” that the fundamentals of world system construction are now in place, and that a drastic or revolutionary reconstruction of the broad outlines of the contemporary world order is not really to be expected. In the mathematics of logistic curves, the second and third phases together consist in the “takeover” time of the entire growing process (time to go from f=0, 1 to f=0, 9, corresponding roughly to 50% of the entire growth time span), and the part containing all their essential and significant points (turning points). Following the modeling discussed in Devezas and Corredine (2002), the fourth phase is one of growing entropy production and depletion of the available information, with the system looking for new information, ready for a new beginning. The succeeding growth process usually overlaps and we get a time of instability

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and chaotic oscillations (due to the growing entropy production of the new process). In other words, it might be said that at the beginning of the next century a «new» world system process (again a 8,000-year process) of a very different nature, still unforeseeable by the actual state of knowledge, will blossom amid chaotic f luctuations, whose symptoms we can already perceive in present days as “limits” of the planetary carrying capacity (climate change, resource availability, primary energy system, social inequalities, capital accumulation, etc.). Resuming, if the timetable of the present analysis is correct, the transition to a New Era is approaching and the signals of the new start up will be in clearly action during the next century. Regarding the world economy process Modelski and Thompson (1996) have exhaustively analyzed as the “modern” world system starting with a new order of the world economy some thousand years ago, with the inception of the market economy in Sung China at about 930 AD, evolving gradually through the formation of a national market, the entrenchment of a fiscal/administration framework, and leading to the expansion of maritime trade by the southern Sung. It has been a 1,000-year long process, which encompasses nine long cycles of world leadership (we turn back to the long cycles in the next section), during which the locus and nature of leading innovations has changed dramatically. What is important to observe is that, being a process that started some thousand years ago and that has a period of also thousand years, it is naturally reaching (or has reached) its ceiling and pointing also to a transition toward a new order of the world economy. Fukuyama (1992) has already pointed out that the continuing globalization of the world capitalist system, and, more, recently, the apparent triumph of global liberalism following the collapse or restructuring of most socialist states, have led a number of scholars to claim that a fundamentally new era has begun in which economic rather than military competition will become the solely basis of geopolitics. Wallerstein (2000) uses two different time frames to analyze what is going on in the sphere of world economy: one going from 1945 to today, and other from circa 1450 to today. For both cases he presents evidence of secular trends that are reaching critical points. The period 1450 to today marks the life cycle of the capitalist world economy, which had his period of genesis, its period of normal development and now has entered into its period of terminal crisis. The period of 1945, initiated with the Yalta agreement, in contrast, marks the complete unfolding of a Kondratieff wave (K-wave for short). This period started with the division of the world between two world superpowers (a bi-hegemonic period during the upswing phase of the K-wave), soon followed during the downswing phase by the solely hegemonic power of the United States after the implosion of Soviet Union. Wallerstein traces then a detailed analysis of the key features developed since at least the 1970s (coinciding with the peak of the

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K-wave): the declining hegemonic power of the United States caused by a chain of events after the loss of the Vietnam War and the summing up of at least three secular trends of the capitalist system that are approaching their asymptotes: the real wage level as a percentage of costs of production, cost of material inputs and very high levels of taxation. It is also important to stress, as we did in the first section of this chapter, that the period from 1000 AD to 2000 AD encompasses four phases of the global economy process and might be thought of as nesting in one period of the world economy process, a point to be analyzed more closely in the next section. All these considerations form altogether a disturbing picture about a future scenario and we need to reduce the zoom of our analysis focusing on the shorter processes (agent-based) presented in table 11.1, namely the K-waves, the long cycles, and democratization. The Power of Prediction—Agent-based Processes In many ways, the present K-wave, nowadays leveling off and exhibiting many signals of a new start up, is the easiest of the time frames to analyze, since it resembles all previous K-waves, which have been much studied (for a extensive review and models of working see Devezas and Corredine (2001, 2002). Among the theorists of the world-system model of cycles and trends there is a reasonable consensus that we are witnessing a transition from the fourth K-wave (fourth using the Schumpeterian reckoning, or the eighteenth using Modelski and Thompson’s reckoning) to the fifth (or nineteenth) K-wave, which has probably started since 2003 at least. It was during the upswing phase of this last K-wave that the United States reached his highest point in the world leadership, disputing first the hegemonic power with the Soviet Union during at least four decades, and then exercising it alone since the 1990s. The United States emerged from World War II as the only major industrial power whose industries were intact, and whose territories had not been damaged by wartime destruction. U.S. industries had been perfecting their performance and efficiency for over a century. This long-term economic development was also the outcome of the U.S. world leadership in economic affairs during the third (seventeenth) K-wave, started about the 1890s as the consequence of a big cluster of technological base innovations introduced by U.S. innovators between 1870 and 1890 (electricity, chemicals, steel, telephone, etc.). This long period of economic development was leveraged by another big cluster of technological innovations that surfaced during the depression period and wartime (between 1920 and 1945; autos, airplanes, electronics, nuclear energy, rockets, etc.) that sparked another boom of world economic development leaded by the United States in the forthcoming years, reaching a maximum point (peak of the fourth K-wave) around the 1970s.

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This repeated leadership in the global economy gave the United States a productivity edge that was enormous and made it easy for U.S. products (and the U.S. way of life) to dominate the world market. Furthermore, it made possible the largest expansion of both value and real production in the history of the capitalist world economy, creating simultaneously great wealth and great social strain in the world social realm. We can then posit the question: what is coming with the already started fifth or nineteenth K-wave? Which are the leading sectors? Which country will lead it economically? The answer to the first two questions was recently analyzed in depth by Devezas et al. (2005) and we can feel all of it in the technological environment, or “tecnosphere” (Devezas and Corredine 2001) we are now living in: the new economy based on personal and advanced computing, on the worldwide IT communications system, on bio-related technologies, on new advanced material systems (intelligent- and nanomaterials), all this leaded by the ubiquitous Internet, which is already firmly embedded in our everyday life and marching stiff ly toward the consolidation phase during the upswing phase of the present K-wave. It is relatively easy to observe that all base innovations related to the abovementioned technologies and the so-called new economy were born during the downswing (depression) phase of the previous K-wave, or in other words, mostly between 1973 and 2003. Devezas et al. (2005) have empirically delineated it for the case of the internet and related innovations bandwagon. But the most striking aspect to stand out regarding all these technologies, with special emphasis on the Internet and its technologies’ bandwagon, is the fact that they are mostly U.S.-born technologies, still led mainly by U.S.-based enterprises, now spread all over the world. Silicon Valley still is the most creative and fecund technological plantation in the world. This fact gives the United States an enormous technological advantage with relation to other possible candidates to lead the fifth (nineteenth) K-wave, in despite of the contrary views of some authors [see for instance Chase-Dunn and Podobnik (1999) and Ayres (2006)], that insist in a slowdown and/or even stalling of the U.S. innovative capacities after 1970. Then simply extrapolating the trend of the present K-wave we can infer (and respond to the third question above) that it will continue its upswing mode till a ceiling between 2025–2030, led by the United States, but being challenged by a given set of emerging economies, such as China, India, European Union, Russia, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, to mention only a few. Now let’s jump to the second process in the column of agent-based processes presented in table 11.1, namely the long cycles of world leadership. In the first section of this work we defined the long cycle as a constitutive process of world politics (tracking what is known as “power transitions”) that,

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via the institution of global leadership, shaped modern world politics from the fifteenth century onward, and stated that Portugal and the Dutch Republic were, successively, the early trial runs of this new form of political organization. But, as demonstrated by Modelski-Thompson (1996), and already discussed in the previous section, it is possible to backcast a succession of world leaders and leading sectors forging a new order of the world economy since the inception of the market economy in Sung China by 930 AD. In the succession of nine long cycles and respective world leaders since the tenth century (Modelski and Thompson’s 1996 Tables 8.3, 8.5, and 9.4) and following the power-law cascade already explained in the first section, each long cycle has a mean duration of ~120 years and within each are embedded two K-waves of 60-year. Considering that each K-wave is carried out by two successive generations, this implies that a long cycle is carried out by four successive generations, following very closely the generation-learning model advanced by Devezas and Corredine (2001) and Rennstich’s (2008) generation perspective of the globalization process (the Buddenbrook cycle). Modelski and Thompson’s succession of world powers was grounded in systematic data analysis. Very recently Devezas and Modelski (2006 and 2007) have analyzed deeply the Portuguese case, and have demonstrated mathematically (using logistic curves calculated with quantitative data) that the Portuguese leadership indeed embraced four generations carrying through two long waves, with each long wave corresponding to a given leading sector (Guinea Gold for K9 and Indian spices for K10) and have shown in detail how each of these long waves was backed by a given set of technical, scientific and geopolitical innovations. During the evolutionary path of the world economy process there have been, almost in a regular mode, several shifts in the locus and/or nature of the innovations. The overall picture suggests strongly that the process is reaching (or has reached) its ceiling, and in this way it is possible to foresee two important transitions: 1. the United States is reaching the end of its world leadership corresponding to the LC 9 till the end of the 1980s disputing it with the USSR and after this in a “solo fashion”; the “macrodecision” phase that will define the new world leader for the LC10 should happen about 2030, for a final entrenching in the “execution phase” in 2050 (dates following the Modelski and Thompson (1996) schema, Table 9.4); 2. the process of the world economy itself is approaching a transition phase to a new economic order of a completely new nature ( post-Globalization?) that should be very well defined by the middle of the next century. Finally, let’s consider the third process in the cascade of agent-based process, namely the democratization process. An index of the growth of democracy is

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the proportion of the world’s population living, in their several countries, under a democratic regime; let’s call it “the fraction democratic” ( f ). A rise (or fall) in that fraction can be used to chart the rate of spread of democracy in the world system. This collective learning process, whereby humans learn better to cooperate within and across national societies, is forwarded by democratic social and political movements competing against absolutist, authoritarian, and otherwise undemocratic institutions and ideologies. A systematic re-test of this process done by Modelski and Perry (2002) shows it to vindicate the predictions of an innovation-diffusion model whose characteristic time (raising the fraction democratic in the world from 10% to 90%) might be expected to last from the 1880s to 2100s (more exactly 228 years). Again we have another process in the cascade pointing to a completion level by the end of the present century. Exploratory Scenarios Scenarios, and indeed all future research methods, can be either exploratory or normative, that is, they can produce images of expected futures or desired futures. Exploratory forecasts portray futures that seem plausible, given the initial conditions (today), actions of the key players, exogenous developments, chance, and the internal dynamics of the system concerned. They give possible answers to the question: “What do you think the future might be?” Normative forecasts describe the hoped-for future and can be produced with either qualitative or quantitative methods. Although the utopian and science fiction literature fits here, the methods can be quite systematic. They respond to the question: “What kind of future would you like to see?” The latter, normative scenarios, belong to the sphere of decision makers’ activities, be it in the political or business realm. For the purpose of discussions in this seminar, we should remain with the former, that is, we will try the construction of some exploratory scenarios, based on: 1. the hypothesis that the evolutionary dynamics of the world system is that of a cascade of differentiated non-linear learning processes transporting the world system through a series of transitions and exhibiting power law behavior (self-organized criticality and a fractal distribution); 2. the objective and subjective aspects related to the unfolding of the present world system scenario and its evolutionary path toward the near future (half-century). Objective Aspects The objective aspects of a scenario construction are those related with quantitative and/or qualitative information that can be inferred from

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past events and current trends and simply extrapolated using forecasting mathematical tools as, for instance, the logistic curves. Based on the already analyzed points of the first two sections there are at least 10 objective conclusions than can help us in the construction of probable exploratory scenarios. They are 1. We have recently gone through the trough between the fourth (eighteenth) and the fifth (nineteenth) K-waves and are just starting the upswing phase of the fifth (nineteenth) K-wave. Considering its mean duration of about a half-century implies that it will be completed between 2050–2060 and should reach the peak about the year 2030. 2. Then we have ahead some three decades of world-wide economic growth, during which the recent cluster of basic innovations (IT, telecommunications, bio-sciences, genetics, nanotechnologies, advanced computing, etc.) will be consolidated, the new «technosphere» will entrench and saturate after 2030; 3. As already pointed out before, more than 90% of these technologies were born in the United States and are under control of American enterprises (with ramifications all over the world). Silicon Valley is in the United States and still there is nothing in the world comparable with this giant technology fecundity park. 4. The United States steered the leading sectors of the two last K-waves and, as a consequence, assured their hegemonic leadership during the still running long cycle (LC 9), which started about 1910 and should extend until 2020–2030, when it will be established if they continue or not as hegemonic leader during the next long cycle (LC 10), or if a new world power will emerge. 5. During their first hegemonic cycle (LC 9) the United States along with the third (seventeenth) K-wave disputed the world leadership with Great Britain and Germany. The former was taken over by a much stronger (and not destroyed) economy and the latter was eliminated from the dispute by losing the war. Along with the fourth (eighteenth) K-wave the United States disputed the hegemony with the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union fragmented by implosion during the downswing and innovative phase of the last K-wave, and left the United States as the lone hegemonic power from 1990 onwards. Presently the United States is the unquestionable world leader in all levels: commercial, industrial and military, and regarding this last aspect there is not nowadays any country, even among the emergent powers, capable of a frontal warfare challenge. 6. Then the United States’s long hegemonic cycle should endure until the next period of “macrodecision” (selection) about 2020–2030, a critical period that coincides with the peak of the current K-wave. If the pattern of the long cycles is to be maintained (considering that the United States already leads the actual K-wave, and that one long cycle

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embraces two K-waves), it is expected that the United States might also lead the following (sixth/twentieth) K-wave, as well as the next (tenth) long cycle, in a similar vein as its predecessor, Great Britain, that also led in two succeeding long cycles (LC 7 and LC 8). 7. We are presently reaching the 80% level of completion of the world system formation, which is moving well into a phase of consolidation. After 2200 a superposition with a new starter will take place,, for the time being just an unknown world system process, which probably will carry within it a new form of living on Earth (Global brain . . . , Global governance . . . , Singularity, . . . ). 8. Two other co-evolutionary processes in the cascade are reaching the saturation or completion level (90%) about our times—the world economy and democratization. Resuming, the time around 2030 appears as a very critical point, when we will have the coincidence of the peak of the current K-wave with the time of “macrodecision” marking the transition for a possible new world power. Moreover, the overall picture of five processes of the cascade, including that of the world system itself, reaching the completion between 2100–2200, signals that the stage is being set to a new world order, a true Age of Transition. Subjective Aspects It is clear that the set of objective aspects outlined in the previous section is not sufficient to draw probable realistic exploratory scenarios for the near future, say for the next 50 years, when we will cross the critical decade 2020–2030. Anticipating the future calls for more than extrapolating trends or curves, it demands also identifying other driving forces (socioeconomic, political, environmental, and technological) presently in action, as well as to take into account the possibility of chance events. The reason for the unpredictability in the so-called soft sciences has been attributed to the pervasiveness of contingency, usually defined as those unpredictable but always possible occurrences. Contingency, the reason for the ifs in all spoken languages, gives the social realm that lacework of historical filigree, those wonderful or tragical details that could easily been otherwise, but were not. Without contingency life would be extremely boring. My view is that the main if to be considered in the construction of exploratory scenarios for the near future regards the possibility of occurrence of warfare between core countries disputing the transition to the new long cycle of world leadership, a period that, as we have already pointed out, is coincident with the peak of the current K-wave. We know well that historically the peaks of K-waves are critical times that function as attractors for peak wars of some severity (Goldstein 1988, 2006 and Modelski and Thompson 1996).

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In order to envision some probable hypothesis we have to identify and consider in any forecast the main factors that are presently inf luencing today’s decisions and affecting the unfolding of the world order (socioeconomic and geopolitical). These factors are: the environmental degradation (that includes energy usage), the war on terrorism, the globalization, and the emergence of new (economic) world powers. These factors are in some way interrelated and an in depth discussion of each one could fill an entire book. For the sake of brevity and the lack of time and space in this short communication I will present in the following section a set of three probable scenarios based on previous and recent research results of this author—Devezas et al. (on energy scenarios, 2008), Devezas and Santos (on terrorism, 2006), Devezas and Rodrigues (on all four factors, 2007). Set of Scenarios U.S. Leadership Renewal Supposing that the future development of the above factors will not affect strongly the pattern of the long cycle and considering that chance events will not disturb the already designed path of the United States toward the maintenance of their commercial, military and technological leadership, there is a strong probability of a renewed U.S. world leadership, as the United Kingdom did after the Vienna Conference (1815) and Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo. The United Kingdom assured in this way a second mandate one century after its first entrenchment as world power, following after the Treaties of Utrecht (1713) and Rastadt (1714). The United States emerged as a world power at the beginning of the twentieth century entering by the door opened by the strategic dilemma that began to debilitate the incumbent power (United Kingdom) at this time and helping to win two successive world wars. After the Yalta Conference (1945) the United States formalized their leadership (“execution phase”), and consolidated their ‘a solo’ position after the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall (1989). It is important to stress that, despite what might be considered as strategic mistakes during the three last decades (since the Vietnam War), the United States has not yet been confronted with a very serious strategic dilemma of the same magnitude as that confronting the United Kingdom during the turbulent years of 1910–1930. To be confirmed the global consolidation of market economies based on democratic regimes and the advantage of United States as a consequence of the already existing technical and scientific leadership, the stage might be set for a second mandate of the United States as undisputable world power during LC 10. There are some ingredients supporting this scenario: a probable fragmentation of the Islamic world and the strategic weakening of this region

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of the planet if alternative energies win momentum surpassing oil as primary energy source (Devezas et al. 2008); a Russia-European alliance will be weakened by aging and declining populations; the posture of strategic dependence in the face of United States of several European political leaders, even accepting the formation of a common U.S.-EU market; and finally, the ascension of China as world power will be threatened by the fundamental contradictions between the needs of a free-market economy and the communist party’s monopoly on power, to which we can add a still poor technological and scientific innovations pull. Such a scenario does not discard the probability of warfare of minor or medium scale (but not between core countries), but that will not affect significantly the world system evolutionary path until at least 2070. International Organizations and Multipolarity Limit the World Power There is a real possibility that the multilateral experiment that emerged after World War II will not continue to follow the path of the League of Nations, but will be shaken free of its current malaise and, reshaped and strengthened, will find new ways to withstand instabilities and reduce international conf lict. A renewed United Nations and even NATO might consolidate their positions as leading actors, becoming international institutions of soft power control, in contrast to the until now practiced and failed hard power control. Such scenario does not discard the possibility of the United States assuming a renewed mandate as world power leader, but in this case in a mitigated mood and multipolar frame, negotiating and disputing the leadership with other emergent powers or alliances, postponing the systemic transition to a new world power to the end of the present century (LC 11). A change in direction of the American international strategy with a new Democratic ruling could pave the way to this alternative scenario. Some signal favoring this scenario is the attitude of some emerging powers (China, India, Brazil, Russia, . . . ) that do not refuse the role of ‘number two’ or ‘followers’, in a typical attitude of patient expectation. Risk of a Peak War and Power Vacuum The third and worrisome hypothesis, pointed out inter alia by Berry (2006), is that the external opposition to the U.S. international politics, however weakened, might be sufficiently aggressive, and the costs of global leadership (and of policy of the world) sufficiently burdensome as inf lationary growth resumes, that domestic critics will force the United States to disengage and turn inward. In this scenario the world will enter a dangerous power vacuum at the very time that rogue states are busy securing nuclear and biological weaponry, setting the stage for a new K-wave peak conf lict of terrific consequences. This would configure a chaotic and anarchic scenario, perhaps already equationed in some war rooms around the planet, waiting for the final clash

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between the incumbent power (and allies) and some rogue states, which would tire significantly both sides. From the outcome of this scenario, and if it were possible for the current system to survive the holocaust, could emerge the new candidates to the world power leadership of the next long cycle (LC 10). Conclusion Our analysis suggests that we are approaching a transition to a new period of the K-Wave, as well as a phase of the Long Cycle that might bring within it a change of the leading power in the world scenario. The overlapping of the critical points of these processes should happen between 2030–2050, when the peak of the next K-wave and its subsequent downturn coincides with the macrodecision phase of the Long Cycle (LC 10). Shifting world leadership may ref lect an eastward trajectory, as suggested by some scholars. But a closer analysis using different and longer time frames, corresponding for instance to the longer cycles of democracy, the world economy, and the whole world system process, suggests that the approaching transition might hold within a much broader set of changes, corresponding to the entrenching of a new era, a true Age of Transition. The present paper uses five different time frames corresponding to the last millennium and some empirical evidence as well as history-based facts and arguments to support this hypothesis. Moreover, based on objective extrapolations of the evolutionary dynamics of the world system and on subjective considerations about the world wide geopolitical order, three probable future explorative scenarios for the time about 2030–2050 are presented and discussed. From these scenarios the United States appears with two chances in three to repeat their mandate as world power for the next Long Cycle (LC 10), postponing then a transition eastwards to a more distant Long Cycle (LC 11) by the end of this century (or beginning of the next), when a very Age of Transition might be entrenching. References Ayres, R.U. (2006) “Did the Fifth K-Wave Begin in 1990–1992? Has It Been Aborted by Globalization?” in T.C. DEVEZAS, ed., Kondratieff Waves, Warfare and World Security. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 57–71. Berry, B.J.L. (2006) “Recurrent Instabilities in K-Wave Macrohistory,” in T.C. Devezas, ed., Kondratieff Waves, Warfare and World Security. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 22–39. Chase-Dunn, C. and B. Podobnik (1999) “The Next War: World-System Cycles and Trends,” in V. Bornschier and C. Chase-Dunn, eds., The Future of Global Conflict. London: Sage. Devezas, T. and G. Modelski (2003) “Power Law Behavior and World System Evolution: A Millennial Learning Process.” Technological Forecasting & Social Change 70: 819–859. ——— (2006) “The Portuguese as System-Builders in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries: A Case Study on the Role of Technology in the Evolution of the World System.” Globalizations 3: 503–519.

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——— (2008) “The Portuguese as System-Builders: Technological Innovation in Early Globalization,” in G. Modelski, T. Devezas, and W.R. Thompson, eds., Globalization as Evolutionary Process: Modeling Global Change. London: Routledge, 30–57. Devezas, T. and H. Santos (2006) “The Emergence of Modern Terrorism,” in T.C. Devezas, ed., Kondratieff Waves, Warfare and World Security. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 245–249. Devezas, T. and J. Corredine (2001) “The Biological Determinants of Long Wave Behavior in Socioeconomic Growth and Development.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 68: 1–57. ——— (2002) “The Nonlinear Dynamics of Technoeconomic Systems: An Informational Interpretation.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 69: 317–357. Devezas, T. and J.N. Rodrigues (2007) Pioneers of Globalization – Why the Portuguese Surprised the World. Lisbon: Centro-Atlantico. Devezas, T., H. Linstone, and H. Santos (2005) “The Growth Dynamics of the Internet and the Long Wave Theory.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 72: 913–935. Devezas, T., D. Lepoire, J.C. Matias, and A.M. Pereira Da Silva (2008) “Energy Scenarios: Toward a New Energy Paradigm.” Futures 40: 1–16. Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press. Goldstein, J. (1988) Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ——— (2006) “The Predictive Power of Long Wave Theory, 1989–2004,” in T.C. Devezas, ed., Kondratieff Waves, Warfare and World Security. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 137–144. Modelski, G. (1998) “Generations and Global Change.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 59: 39–45. ——— (2000) “World System Evolution,” in R. Denemark, J. Friedman, B. Gills. and G. Modelski, eds., World System History: The Social Science of Long-Term Change. London: Routledge, 24–53. Modelski, G. and G. Perry (2002) “Democratization in Long Perspective Revisited.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 69: 359–376. Modelski, G. and W. Thompson (1996) Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Economics and Politics. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Rennstich. J. (2008) “Is Globalization Self-Organizing?,” in G. Modelski, T. Devezas, and W. Thompson, eds., Globalization as Evolutionary Process: Modeling Global Change. London: Routledge, 87–107. Wallerstein, I. (2000) “Globalization or the Age of Transition? A Long-Term View of the Trajectory of the World System.” International Sociology 15: 251–267.

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CH A P T E R

T W E LV E

Cities in Transitions and Transformations: Exploring a Jacobsean Approach to Macro-Social Change P e t e r J. Tay l or

Introduction: The Times They Are A-changing We are, it seems, condemned to live in interesting times. The key word that has emerged to describe our contemporary condition is globalization. A highly contested concept, its spatial meaning is quite explicit—an upscaling of social practices—but its temporal meaning is less clear. There are three feasible candidates that emerge from studies of macro-social change. First, globalization represents the latest harnessing of new technological innovations by capital to generate the next Kontratieff cycle; it could be phase VA in the conventional timing starting with the Industrial Revolution. Second, globalization represents a power transition marking the beginning of the hegemonic succession to the USA; it could be to a presage to new economic powerhouse, possibly China, as world hegemon. Third, globalization represents the initial indications of demise of the modern world-system; it could be heralding a new social logic, a materialist postmodern. These three change possibilities are not exclusive because processes associated with each one of them may be occurring simultaneously today. But the important point is that they rank in terms of degree of macro-social change and therefore implications for the near and medium-term future (the twenty first century) are profoundly different. We cannot know which set of processes will be dominating future social practices and therefore we have to look towards intelligent conjecture to make sense of globalization. Inevitably this means drawing on ideas and concepts that derive meaning from the past and present but not in the form of “lessons of history”; we

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must respect the autonomy of the future—it has yet to be made. In this paper I explore ideas from Jane Jacobs to develop a conjecture that argues for the most profound change: demise of the modern world-system. To invoke Jane Jacobs is to bring cities to centre stage in understanding macro-social change. Thus I propose a city-centric approach but one that does not diminish the role of states. This is contrary to most formal social knowledge, which employs a state-centric approach that does diminish the role of cities (Taylor 1996). This is quite overt in state-centric social science and national histories but similar embedded statism can be found, albeit more covertly, in various world-systems analyses. My more balanced city-centered approach leads to concern for city/state relations in macrosocial change. The argument proceeds in four parts. In the first section I outline my Jacobsean approach to understanding social change. Second I relate these ideas to social transitions and transformations and provide a new interpretation of world-systems. I treat world-empires as the historical norm as the social structure of humanity and identify two steps (transformations) to this condition and two steps from it. The rise of the modern world-system is interpreted as being the first of the two steps from world-empire; globalization is interpreted as the beginning of the second step. The remainder of the paper elucidates with these pairs of steps, hoping that stepping up to world-empire structure might inform stepping down from it. Jacobsean Understanding of Macro-Social Change I introduce some new social science concepts as tools for both unthinking and rethinking macro-social change. These ideas derive from Jane Jacobs’ work on cities (1969, 1984) and moral syndromes (1992), with an addition from Manuel Castells’ (1996) theory of social space construction. My emphasis is on understanding, which I equate with identifying generic concepts; being trans-historical they can inform transitions and transformations. I argue that it is through variations in relations between generic concepts, in particular city/state relations, that we may derive new insights into contemporary globalization. Understanding Cities: City-ness and Town-ness According to Jacobs (1969) a city is not a large town. Its fundamental difference is its complexity, ref lected in material terms as very diversified divisions of labor. This economic complexity is the result of growth spurts generated by import replacement: every time erstwhile imports from other cities are produced locally, extra work categories are added to the division of labour. Thus cities grow, not just by increasing existing production (old work), but through fresh production (new work). This means that cities always come in groups; these are organized as networks. It is through these horizontal links that cities negotiate the ups and downs of economic

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cycles. Thus Jacobs’ model of economic expansion is through the “little movements” within cities (replacement and innovation) operating in the “big wheels” of commerce (networks and interdependence). It is only through dynamic cities in networks that economic life expands. The process described above may be termed city-ness. This contrasts with town-ness, which is the process of servicing an urban hinterland. Town-ness is essentially a local process. It is modelled as central place theory, defined as a pattern of boundaries within an urban hierarchy (multiple, increasingly large, dependent areas). But as Jacobs has pointed out, no city ever grew by just servicing its hinterland, however large. Thus town-ness implies no expansion of economic life. However, urban settlements combine these two processes in their reproduction: city-ness and town-ness are processes and therefore they can exist simultaneously in the same place. This means that to understand any city requires two models; for vertical inter-urban relations there is central place theory as town-ness, and for horizontal inter-urban relations a “central f low theory” is required as city-ness (Taylor 2006, 2007a). The latter theory is about interlocking networks of cities linked together by economic practices. My argument is that these two theories/processes are generic to urban settlements; they exist from the creation of urbanization and they exist today under conditions of globalization. Understanding Work: Moral Syndromes Extending her consideration beyond cities to societies as a whole, Jacobs (1992) defines work as making a living. She contends that there are only two ways of making a living: taking/guarding/stewarding and trading/making/ servicing. This basic division of labor can be found in all human societies and the latter—trading—is unique to humans. Her key point is that the two ways of making a living are based upon two different, contrary, ethical logics or moral syndromes which she terms guardian and commercial. The guardian and commercial moral syndromes are sets of precepts that are necessary for the medium/long term reproduction of their respective ways of making a living. The two key contrarian precepts are “be loyal” at the heart of guardian work, and “be honest” crucial to commercial work. But they are not interchangeable: loyalty in a market situation is dangerous leading to bad deals and economic bankruptcy; honesty in a battle situation is dangerous leading to being outmaneuvered and military defeat. Jacobs’ complete sets of precepts constituting the two syndromes are given in table 12.1. They can be categorized as “bourgeois traits” and “heroic virtues” but the former should never be limited to “Western” or “modern” behavior. Jacobs (1992: 28) argues that commercial precepts are found . . . wherever commercial life is viable, East or West. They apply to Islamic innkeepers, Buddhist batik makers, Hindu brass craftsmen, or Shinto brake manufacturers, just as they do to Christian, Jewish or atheist auto mechanics . . .

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Moral syndromes by clusters of precepts

COMMERCIAL SYNDROME Clusters

Precepts

GUARDIAN SYNDROME Clusters

“Key virtue” Be honest “Key virtue” Other basic cluster Shun force Come to Other basic voluntary agreements cluster

Operating cluster

Progress cluster

Capital cluster

Life cluster

Collaborate with strangers and aliens Compete Respect contracts Use initiative and enterprise Be open to novelty Be efficient Promote comfort Dissent for the sake of the task Invest for productive purposes Be industrious Be thrifty Be optimistic

Action cluster

Precepts Be loyal Shun trading Exert prowess Adhere to tradition Be obedient and disciplined Respect hierarchy Take vengeance Deceive for the sake of the task

Lifestyle cluster Make rich use of leisure Be ostentatious Dispense largesse Be exclusive Show fortitude Life cluster Be fatalistic Treasure honor

Source: Taylor (2007b) derived from Jacobs (1992).

I have organized the precepts into functional sub-sets to emphasize their differences. Ultimately they lead to two opposing mindsets. Guardians play zero-sum games in a fatalistic worldview; for instance, battles produce just winners and losers. In contrast, commerce is a win-win situation in an optimistic world-view; for instance, in a market (without coercion) both seller and buyer are satisfied with the deal or else it would not go ahead. Jacobs (1992) does not claim to have invented these concepts; rather she has uncovered them from documents and texts purporting to guide behaviors or to describe ethical violations of expected behaviors. She argues that these syndromes have been developed and honed over millennia by people making a living in these two ways. They are, of course, normative and therefore violated in the real world: if the violation reaches a certain level, then making a living will become impossible and work will collapse and disappear. Too much disloyalty undermines an army; too much dishonesty undermines a market. I argue (Taylor 2007a) that guardian and commercial work as practiced by through these moral syndromes are essential generic categories that will be expressed in different social forms across time and space.

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Understanding Social Spaces: Spaces of Places and Spaces of Flows Space is not a platform on which social practices take place. A basic materialist approach to space treats it as socially constructed by social practices. In this argument social space is produced by work. It is made through carrying out social practices (making a living) and the resulting space itself impinges on subsequent social practices. Following Castells (1996), socially constructed spaces come in two basic forms: spaces of places and spaces of f lows. Spaces of places are constructed by territorial practices, the making, designing and defending of territories. Spaces of f lows are constructed by movement practices, the making of paths, chains, networks and circuits. These two types of spaces always exist together. As social constructions their limiting cases (an inert mosaic world, a totally f luid world) do not exist. Thus their salience is to be found in their relations over time and space; for instance, for Castells (1996) industrial modernity was dominated by spaces of places but new spaces of f lows are beginning to dominate contemporary society which he calls network society. Although Castells devised his theory of social space to contrast old industrial society with new informational society, I contend that Castells’ spaces of places and spaces of f lows are generic concepts applicable to all human societies. Synthesis: Cities in Space Three understandings through identifying generic concepts have been presented separately for pedagogic reasons but they are closely associated, entwined in macro-social change. The moral syndromes guide practices to create two different forms of space: for the guardian syndrome spaces of places are predominant; for the commercial syndrome spaces of f lows are overriding. It follows that each way of making a living is embedded in a contrary space; one that is predisposed by the practice of making a living and which, in turn, is necessary for making that living. Cities and states are a critical expression of these conceptual associations. Guardian agents are essentially territorial in their behaviors; they fight over, lose or gain, control and organize territories. They create the world as a space of places. Guardian practices can take several forms depending upon how political power is distributed: states are compound centralizations of political power. The guardian side of the primal division of labor is itself divided into numerous political, military, policing, legal, administrative/bureaucratic, religious, planning, and other ways of making a guardian living. The resulting state apparatus is the means through which states aspire to be supreme authorities in their territories (be they city-states, empire-states, or modern nation-states). Their political means of control is to simplify the complex societies they confront; however sophisticated their apparatus, guardian work classifies and codifies to keep

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order, or at least the semblance of order. Central place theory has been popular with modern guardians, urban and regional planners, because its simple depiction of boundaries and hierarchies in space economies mirrors the states themselves. Commercial agents are essentially networked in their behaviors; they connect with each other to trade, make deals, and produce commodities. They create the world as a space of f lows. Cities are nodes where commercial practices are strongly concentrated; the commercial side of the primordial division of labor is divided further into a much more complex pattern of work than for the guardian side. In this case complexity represents economic opportunity. As noted above, economic complexity is the hallmark of a city. Cities are the most complex inventions of humanity: this is true of contemporary world/global cities, but is also the case for all cities in their own eras, right back to the first cities. Central f low theory tries to make sense of the space of f lows “blizzard” that is the real economic world. Transitions and Transformations: Two Steps Up, Two Steps Down My emphasis on generic concepts might be expected to produce a historical frame that favored continuity over discontinuity in macro-social change. This is not the case because I focus upon a particular relation between generic concepts thereby identifying discontinuities. City/State Relations One important feature of the previous understandings is the lack of exclusivity in the pairings: city-ness and town-ness coexist in urban settlements, spaces of places need spaces of f lows and vice versa, and all societies require both guardian and commercial work. All are implicated in city/state relations. I focus on the latter relation because, while it is a perennial issue in the stories of all societies, and it is specifically crucial for understanding contemporary globalization. The latter is commonly characterised as both leading to the demise or erosion of states while also being a new “age of cities.” I will treat city/state relations as the dominant way in which commercial/guardian relations are played out. This is largely about the degree of autonomy of cities/commercial elites have with respect to states/guardian elites. This autonomy varies greatly over time and space; I will use it as a critical delimiter of world-system type. Discontinuities in Macro-Social Change Social change is endemic to all social practice; from institutions to societies reproduction takes place through ordinary change. But there is

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also extraordinary change, change of such an unusual magnitude that it makes a difference to how a society operates. Extraordinary change phases define the periods and eras through which history is demarcated and organized. Extraordinary change comes in two forms. There is change that occurs within a world-system, which I will call a transition. This is typically a change of guardians, represented by alterations in the power constellations in a system. The sequence of changing Chinese imperial dynasties might qualify here. There is also a more fundamental “break” in which the social logic of the system is changed to a different social matrix, which I will call transformations. The classic example is the change from feudalism to capitalism in Europe (ironically usually referred to as a transition). Extraordinary change can occur through two different spurs: internal and external. In the latter case, systems are incorporated into another system. The modern world-system expanded extensively in this manner to become global in about 1900. The other change is from processes forming and creating new social structures within an existing system. Both incorporation (external) and primal (internal) change are important elements of macro-social change. In what follows I focus on primal-transformation as the critical or fundamental extraordinary change. The other three extraordinary changes (primal-transition, incorporation-transformation and incorporationtransition) all occur as consequences of primal transformation. Primal Transformations In the remainder of this paper I present a new historiography based upon primal transformations. It is new because I base the eras on a novel criterion: city/state relations. I start in the middle with what Wallerstein (1979) calls world-empires. From a modern perspective these are traditional social structures in which religious-political leaders dominate. The domination is both ideological (religion) and material (control of land and its product). A key feature is the separation of guardian and economic elites. The latter and their practices are viewed as inherently inferior, all the time verging on the criminal. However, although at the bottom of the ideological hierarchy, in many world-empires vibrant cities exist made prosperous by the practices of commercial elites. Thus in the material hierarchy commercial elites can sometimes rival guardians; they are referred to as “merchant princes.” But they can never overcome their lowly social status except by buying into the landed aristocracy and thereby forsaking their commercial origins. World-empires remain guardian structures with commercial practice subordinate; the relationship between city and state is inherently unequal. Most of the historical record of humanity is of world-empires. Therefore in this argument I will treat them as the norm: world-empires are the

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human condition historically. As I will explain and hopefully justify below, I will take a very unorthodox view of transformations as follows: 1. Starting point. Hunter-gatherer-trading groups without either cities or states. These are not Wallerstein’s (1979) mini-systems; I follow Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) here in seeing continuous patternings of these groups linked by reciprocal exchanges. 2. Step 1 to world-empire norm between 8,000 and 10, 000 BP. World-economies emerging from the early trading networks. The transition is the invention of city networks. Chiefdom guardian processes will be dominated by the new economic power of commercial elites. 3. Step 2 to world-empire norm in the sixth millennium BP. City-states emerging from city networks. As more successful cities try and augment their power politically, security requires new governance apparatus. The transition is the invention of the city-state. Guardians begin to dominate commercial elites. 4. The norm has been reached: a history of world empires until challenged by modernity. 5. Step 1 from world-empire norm in the “long sixteenth century.” The modern world-system emerges in the long sixteenth century. World-empire transforms into world-economy in which power is more balanced between economic and political elites. The transition is the invention of the modern (territorial/mercantile/nation-) state. The separation of guardian and commercial practices breaks down to become political economy. 6. Step 2 from world-empire norm in the twenty first century. Globalization provides a glimpse of a world where economic elites are back on top. The transition invention is the world city network. Guardians will be necessary for global governance but commercial practices in cities will dominate states. But this is all speculation from what is only the first decade of the century. Note that this sequence is derived from middle-east/Europe experience (“central civilization” in Wilkinson’s (1987) schema) because of primal transformation away from world-empires only occurs in this region. However the steps to world-empire should traceable in other world regions. The Conventional Story and Its Discontents The temporal sequence above is totally contrary to the conventional way of conceptualizing the “rise of civilization.” Before describing my new ordering I outline the conventional story to emphasize the paradigm shift I am promoting in this paper. Only in this way can my Jacobsean alternative be fully appreciated in its contrarian claims.

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The Conventional Story Two works dominate this story telling: Gordon Childe’s (1943) What Happened in History and Lewis Mumford’s (1961) The City in History; the longevity and importance of their ideas is shown by the fact they have found a place in the most recent city reader (LeGates and Stout 2000). It is the Marxist scholar Childe who invented the phrase “urban revolution” to describe the city development in early Mesopotamia. However, I will tell the story through more recent publications of Bairoch (1988) and Chase-Dunn (1992) who come from different theoretical backgrounds but share this paradigm. There are four basic elements to the conventional argument. Agriculture Revolution before Urban Revolution The Neolithic revolution creating agriculture enables higher human population densities and therefore is a necessary precursor of city development according to Bairoch (1988: 13). He recognises that relatively large settlements have been found in Neolithic sites ( Jericho and Çatal Hüyük), which he treats as “preurban towns” (9–10); they remain villages because they have no complex division of labour. “International trade” (i.e., intercultural) is also recognized between “non-urbanised regions” (21) but this does not feature in the evolutional process. For Chase-Dunn (1992: 54) these agricultural societies create “world-systems without cities”: kin-based systems that are also classless and stateless. There is a socially constructed space constituted by settlement patterns (villages) within a world-system and interactions (Prestige and basic goods) between system territories (55). In this rural world, class formation precedes the origins of cities and states in the form of hierarchical chiefdom polities. City-States in the Urban Revolution Bairoch (1988: 21–22) emphasises scale and density changes to identity “true cities” in bronze ago Mesopotamia from c5000 BP. This urban revolution occurred in this “most fertile” region in “areas where agriculture was particularly well established” (26). The cities are city-states, defined as urban centres ruling over a relatively large rural hinterland as an “integral economic unit” with the administration decisive in external trade (ibid.). Thus Mesopotamia initially consisted of a set of independent states each centred on a major city. Chase-Dunn (1992: 58) describes this “pristine state” emergence as an “interstate system composed of city-states.” This was a world of autonomous city-states of shifting alliances creating a balance of power mechanism. The state emerged as a “new technology of control” in this more complex world-system (59). He rehearses the debate about whether the cities thrived through exploiting their hinterlands or through exploiting peripheral places in an unequal exchange mechanism (60–61).

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Empire Formation For Baroich (1988: 26) the rise of Babylon represents a “new kind of culture” with a population of about 250,000 and conquered hinterland area to match: it was “practically a ‘city-empire’ ” (27). This is the beginning of a world of great empires in the Middle East from Persia and Egypt to Alexander and Rome. Chase-Dunn (1992: 61) identifies Sargon of Akkad, conqueror of Mesopotamia, as the first empire-builder. The products are the world-empires that Wallerstein (1979) identifies as world-systems based upon a redistributive-tributary mode of production, although Chase-Dunn notes that they often had interactions with areas beyond their political control (62). Intercity Trading Systems Baroich (1988: 29) treats the Phoenician city-states as “the first commercial towns”: “the first major instance of commercial cities taking their place in a geographical setting far wider than that provided by their immediate hinterlands” (33). As well as trade (high value e.g., jewellery), they also became production centers (e.g., shipbuilding), and which came together in their famous purple dye production for cloth exports [31]). They planted colonies around the Mediterranean many of which grew to become important cities in their right (e.g., Carthage). Chase-Dunn (1992: 62) argues that Phoenician cities were “capitalist city-states”: as active agents of commodification “they ought to be designated as the first capitalist states” (63). From the interstices between empires they expanded economic networks across the Mediterranean as merchant capitalists buying cheap and selling dear, and also engaged in production capital (64). Although the two authors use different terminology we can see that they are effectively telling the same story: how the ancient world became an ensemble of agricultural settlements, city-states, empires and trading networks. Two types of state and two types of city are identified and each pair appear in sequence: city-state then empire; cities based on local hinterlands followed by others enmeshed in wider networks. The former pair take precedence in the story. But is this, as Childe’s (1943) book title would have it, “What Happened in History?” I seriously doubt it. This is a paradigm long overdue its revolution. Against Convention The conventional story is supported by a century of scholarship based upon reams of archaeological evidence. The result is consensus on cities and states being invented together some 5,000 years ago. There are three ways in which this has been disputed with respect to cities.

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Deductive Argument A first reason for doubting Mesopotamian city primacy can be found in ceramics. According to Reader (2005: 15) “Pottery is the key,” sophisticated pots are city products for city needs. Ceramic containers are necessary for large-scale sedentary life and are therefore ubiquitous in city excavations. Among this multifarious mass of evidence Reader emphasises one simple finding: in the earliest layers of Mesopotamia’s “first city,” Eridu, a wide range of sophisticated pottery products are found. Because there is no sequence from early crude pots upwards (Leick 2002: 10), the resident potters of this city must have started with a well-developed knowledge of ceramic production. If they did not invent complex pottery then such ceramics must have developed in cities pre-dating Eridu. Since Eridu is Mesopotamia’s earliest known city it follows that the origin of cities (and high quality ceramics) can be placed before and outside Childe’s Mesopotamian urban revolution. Induction Argument Any “first” or “origin” position is empirically vulnerable to a black swan finding. Therefore whatever the weight of empirical evidence upon which the conventional story rests, archaeological evidence is never complete, therefore discovery of black swans—cities before Mesopotamian civilization—are always a possibility. Çatal Hüyük in Anatolia, with an estimated population varying between 6,000 and 10,000 about 8,000 years ago, is a classic black swan. To conform to the conventional story Çatal Hüyük has to be interpreted as nothing more than a “large village,” and indeed, its “rural credentials” are claimed by results from the current excavation of the site (Balter 1998, 1999). However the leader of the original excavations, Mellaart (1964, 1965), claimed city status and both Jacobs (1969) and Soja (2000) affirm this from an urban theoretical position—see below. As well as the size of the settlement, they point to a complex division of labour that is a sure sign of urban development: over fifty different types of work are found in Çatal Hüyük’s leading Jacobs (1969: 32) to conclude that “it was a city of crafts, of artists, manufacturers and merchants” within “a network . . . nearly two thousand miles wide from east to west” (22). But again, current archaeological work claims this does not represent economic specialization because there are no workshops dedicated to one task (Balter 1998, 1999). This is always the problem with the inductive approach; evidence can be interpreted in contrary ways. Theory is required to sort out the differences. Theoretical Argument The key claim Çatal Hüyük was a rural settlement is countered by Jacobs’ import replacement theory of economic expansion, which will be illustrated in Step 1 below. Here I will focus on two other elements of the theoretical framework presented previously.

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First, remember cities do not exist singularly, they depend on each other, they exist in packs ( Jacobs 1969). Thus what we are looking for is the development of networks of cities not a putative “mother city” out of which urbanization diffuses to other settlements. And this is exactly what Soja (2000, 28–9) finds: “a broad T-shaped region . . . linked together in a trading network of cities.” Of course, this region has no historical name; Soja lists 15 cities (including Çatal Hüyük) in the “No Name Region” consisting of the Levant, the upper reaches of the Euphrates and Tigris, and the Anatolian plain in the “prehistoric world” of about 8,000 to 10,000 years ago. No Name Region may well be the first city-coordinated world-system. Second, returning to Mesopotamia, the bundling together of city and state as inherent properties of civilization belies the fact that they are the product of separate and distinctive processes, commercial and guardian. Whereas these two processes are required in all human conditions, there is no reason for their respective expressions through cities and states to coincide. In the No Name Region there will be governance practices carried out by guardians but there is no suggestion of a state with concentration of guardian powers (which is why it has no name). But there is evidence of concentrated commercial practices in a network—the reason why Çatal Hüyük is so important and controversial. The conventional story is, in Rudgley’s (1998: 209) terms, an “ideological wall . . . placed at 5,000 years ago.” It is certainly a very high wall but it needs climbing. Two Steps to World-Empire: The Jacobsean Story The Jacobsean story is a simpler one of just two primal transformations, first to a world-economy through invention of city networks, and second to world-empire through invention of city-states. Step 1: City Networks in No Name Region Bands of hunters and gathers traded widely with some specialization of trading groups interlocking other groups of peoples (Curtin 1984; Sahlins 2004). The question is how did such specialization convert into a concentration of commercial practice that we call cities? This is where Jacobs’ theory of import replacement comes into play. Trade initially emanates from different resource endowments. Different places provide different hunting and gathering products and surpluses may be exchanged. Some bands had access to geological resources, like f lint and obsidian, which they could trade. Other bands, the traders, would have location as their key resource, a place of between-ness where they could facilitate exchange (Sahlin 2004: 282–285). It is the latter that may transmute into cities as concentrations of commerce.

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Trading of itself does not create economic expansion; it just circulates goods. Expansion occurs when the people in a trading settlement start replacing some of the goods they import by their own production. At the very beginning Jacobs hypothesizes that the first import replacement will be traders producing their own food. In the process they invent agriculture. Agriculture is new work carried on through the city in the making of that city. This is Jacobs’ (1969: 36) controversial “cities first, rural development later” thesis. Like any economic expansion, the “agricultural revolution” is a product of the city. Hence the recent finding that work in Çatal Hüyük is very “rural” is wide of the mark as a means of reducing it to “large village” status: in this theory of the city, rural work begins as city work. In this city theory, Jacobs (1969) argues that cities are the locales for economic expansion because of their high population densities. This is a unique context enabling massively increased inter-personal and intergroup contacts, the requirement to stimulate replacements and innovations to produce new work. Agriculture is just one such new work: the idea that this economic transformation could have occurred before the enabling context of cities she dismisses as conventional “dogma” (6, 41–48; the conventional emphasis on prior food surpluses to create cities is a curious supply-orientated economics so beloved of orthodox Marxists). Rather, it is the high density of humanity in cities that has invented agriculture to meet its own growing food needs. But this invention is not alone, import replacements and innovations come in clusters, both spatially and temporally, between cities in networks: for Çatal Hüyük, other cities in the No Name Region would have been essential. Note that it is city-ness that comes first, town-ness can only begin once rural production for cities has been created. Thus unlike, say, Mumford’s (1961) idea that villages coalesce to form the first cities/towns in Mesopotamia; here the sequence would be city-village-town. The argument is that as city food demand increased, a newly created hinterland for food would get larger and at some point some food producers would have to move permanently into the larger hinterland. This would initially create villages; further hinterland expansion would require some local servicing of villages thus leading to the creation of “country towns” as a central place process. Outcome: A Rudimentary World-Economy The outcome is a lightly urbanized world in which the non-local is organized through city networks by commercial elites and guardian functions remain at local pre-state levels of chiefdoms. This defines a rudimentary world-economy. Conversion to a world-empire is beyond the guardian practices at local chiefdom level. This transformation is not a matter of “progress,” a natural progression to a bigger and better society. The facts point in the opposite

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direction: the transformation from hunter-gather-traders is regressive. Using data on work time inputs for hunter-gather-traders compared to later agricultural populations, Sahlin (2004) has famously described the former as the “first aff luent society”: their few needs were satisfied by little work. Not surprisingly, therefore the transformation involved declining health among the general population (Rudgley 1998: 7–8). Regression requires coercion; this means a strengthening of guardian practices. Enter the state. Step 2: City-States in Mesopotamia Soja (2000) defines my step 1 as the first urban revolution, to be followed by the Mesopotamian as second urban revolution in contradiction to the conventional story. He argues (51) that the second urban revolution is a matter of size and new needs for organization (irrigation works) leading to innovations in governmentality. The result is a competitive mosaic of city-states that lead to “the urban invention of the imperial state” (59). Thus defence becomes a critical necessity leading to city walls, something absent from Çatal Hüyük. Evidence from the latter shows little military activity. This does not mean a lack of guardian work in early city networks, but rather that the process had not become centralized into a stateform. Herein lies the origin status claim of Mesopotamia: the invention of the state (as city-state) constituted as new concentration of guardian practices. It is the product of these city-states with their numerous urban political/cultural innovations that has led to its designation as cradle of civilization. But this identification of the “first civilization” treats cities and states as societal “twins” that appear historically at the same time (e.g., Tilly (1990: 2) treats them as “a couple” with a love-hate relationship). But this is because such arguments are based upon a singular “rise of civilization” process; our recognition of two prime processes (commercial and guardian) allows for cities to precede states by millennia. Outcome: A World of World-Empires So the coming of the state is a second primal transformation. A citystate is a state and therefore guardian practices, including monopolies of violence, dominate commercial practices. The resulting world of world-empires, humanity’s “normal traditional condition,” still includes both guardian and commercial practices but, as noted previously, the former’s predilection for hierarchy relegates the latter socially, commonly to the social basement. This can be understood as a necessary feature in moral syndrome analysis. In terms of the moral syndromes, the world empire form of social organization is an example of what Jacobs (1992: 158–178) calls “syndrome-friendly inventions.” Since the two syndromes are contrary in their prescriptions for behavior and practice they can contaminate

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each other and cause a breakdown of work; in other words a failure of social reproduction. Successful social organization, therefore relies on syndrome-friendly inventions: the fact that world-empires in various forms survived for millennia across the world shows that the social separation of guardian and commercial practice to be such a winning formula. Hierarchies demeaning commerce—the limiting case is caste society—need not be so negative for commerce since it can provide for a deal of commercial autonomy. This is why world-empires, although dominated by territorial guardians, nevertheless included successful commercial practice that created many great trading cities, and not all in the interstices between political powers. Two Steps from World-Empire: The Rise and Demise of the Modern World-System In this final section I describe two steps away from the world of world-empires. This covers the ground of Wallerstein’s (1979) historical project as described in his seminal paper “The rise and future demise of the world capitalist system.” Thus what follows is part following and part reinterpreting this as a modern Jacobsean story. Step 1: Modern (Territorial (Mercantile, Nation-) States in Europe and Beyond According to Wallerstein (1979) the modern world-system came into being in the long sixteenth century (c. 1450–1650). The new world-system involved another round of guardian centralization but unlike with world-empires, the centralization occurred in multiple territories. This “inter-state system,” consolidated at Westphalia in 1648, is an important element of the modern world-systems survival: it provided space for commercial practices. The new states were “mercantile states” that developed explicit policies to promote commercial practices in their territories. But because there were multiple states, the interstices for commercial expansion were everywhere: city networks overlapped multiple states so that leading commercial elites had a built-in spatial autonomy. In moral syndrome analysis this can be interpreted as follows. The traditional “syndrome-friendly,” guardian/commercial relation of separation can be referred to as a modus vivendi. Modernities are constructed in opposition to such traditional practices. One hallmark of any modernity is that it challenges old status hierarchies: the modus vivendi is replaced by a modus operandi in which both guardian and commercial work are respected (Taylor 2007b). This is expressed in the modern state, a polity that is distinguished by its combining traditional responsibility for guardian work with new responsibilities for commercial work. Thus the primal transformation to a modern world-system is the invention of a new “syndrome

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friendly” relation between guardian and commercial work. This modus operandi is generally termed political economy. In Wallerstein’s account of the rise of the modern world-system, cities are relatively neglected but this is compensated by Braudel’s (1984) analysis of early modern political economy. In his argument, Genoa “silent rule” (with Castile) is followed by the rise of Amsterdam and the United Provinces. There is a debate about the nature of this later success story. Sometimes interpreted as “Amsterdam city-state,” Braudel has it as both the last dominant city as well as the “halfway house” between prior city and later state economic pre-eminence. My position is that the United Provinces are most certainly not a city-state; they are more like a “state of cities” or “merchant state” but perhaps this concern for labelling the polity a state is the problem. An alternative argument is that the Dutch created a unique political economy entity, a new guardian/commercial relation (Taylor 2005). First, merchants in cities dominated the polity and used it to further their commercial work—it has been called the most capitalist of states. But the commercial elite did not take over the fundamental guardian role of protection. There was a sort of public-private initiative whereby when the political situation became dangerous the Orange family were brought in to act as stadtholder. The stadtholder was not sovereign, he was a “governor,” previously governing on behalf of the Hapsburgs, now allowed to govern the merchants for their specific protection. This very confused and confusing political structure is simplified today by referring to it as the “Dutch Republic” but this is a later imposed labeling. What we have is a multi-nodal city region wherein commercial elites have their own territory to protect and who bring in local guardians when muscle is needed. It can be interpreted as a syndrome-friendly invention, moving towards the modern modus operandi through guardian and commercial work being organized within a single territorial framework. The guardian-commercial relationship varied with the security situation in the seventeenth century culminating with the stadtholders overseeing the Dutch economic decline after the debacle of 1672 and through the eighteenth century. By this time the idea of a territorial modus operandi became established as mercantilism—the upscaling of traditional city commercial policies to the territorial state level. This territorialism survived Adam Smith’s critique of mercantilism and was ultimately consolidated by the “nation-state”—what Jacobs (1984) calls “the myth of the national economy.” Thus the Dutch did not produce the first “modern state” but they did create the materialist context out of which modernity has prospered. Outcome: The Two Sides of Modernity in a Political Economy The transition to this new world-system is from a traditional political world dominated by guardians to a political economy world; an upgrading

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of commercial work relative to guardian work that enabled a capitalist world-economy to be created and reproduced. The political economy modus operandi of the modern world-system has embedded an ambiguity at the heart of modernity. This centers on guardians in their states seeing complexity as a problem, something to be tamed through planning; and commercial work in cities viewing complexity as opportunity, something to make money out of. Thus there is a widely recognized “dual ambiguity” (Taylor 1999: 15) inherent to the concept of modernity. For instance, social change in the modern world has been viewed in two totally different ways: state modernization models portrayed simple stages of ordered conversion from traditional to modern society (Lerner et al. 1968); in contrast Berman (1988: 15) famously described modernity as innately complex, “a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal.” Thus, according to Lash and Friedman (1992: 2) there are two “faces” of modernity; these have taken a variety of guises as listed in table 12.2. The paired opposites in table 12.2 are witness to how Jacobs’ moral syndromes are entwined in the modern world-system. And each face of modernity has its own space. States are clearly producers and outcomes of modernity as order: planning in its many guises removes complexities to create uncomplicated planned spaces. Cities on the other hand are implicated in chaos; they are locales that thrive on complexity consequent upon myriad functions. Thus while the world of the state is a simple space of places, a mosaic of approximately sovereign territorial containers; the world of the city is a multifarious space of f lows, a veritable blizzard of innumerable networks, circuits and chains. From the “Dutch Republic” onward, the modern world-system has operated through a political economy modus operandi that creates many examples of both syndrome-friendly inventions and their opposite, destructive monstrous hybrids. The most important were the hegemonic inventions and their hybridic challenges. The Dutch syndrome-friendly invention that led to systemic mercantile modernity reproduction, superseded by the British syndrome-friendly invention that led to systemic industrial modernity reproduction, in turn superseded by the third hegemonic invention, American consumer modernity whose systematic consumer modernity reproduction has elided into Table 12.2 Guardian and commercial outcomes creating modern ambiguities Modernity through Guardian Work

Modernity through Commercial Work

Source

order discipline regulation orderliness security reason and order

chaos liberty emancipation ambivalence danger f low, f lux, and change

Bauman (1991: 15) Wagner (1994: xi) De Sousa Santos (1995: 2) Smart (1999: 6) Giddens (1990: 7) Ogborn (1998: 5)

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contemporary globalization. Although these hegemonies are identified above by their state location, in fact as political economy products cities are equally implicated in world hegemonies: this is what makes them different from political transitions in world-empires. In modern political economy transitions cities play a central role. In each hegemony economic supremacy was created in just one region of the state’s territory: Holland in the “Dutch Republic,” the industrial North in Britain, and the North East/Midwest “manufacturing belt” in the USA. Their own states pursued space of f lows policies outside their territories—freedom to sail, freedom to trade and freedom to produce system-wide respectively—to support their clusters of vibrant dynamic cities. In contrast, their systemic oppositions each favored territorialist autarchies aiming to bring guardians back into control: the Hapsburg’s counter-Reformation, Napoleon’s continental system, Germany’s lebensraum and national socialism, and latterly, the Soviet Union’s communist state planning. It is the defeat of the these regressive guardian attempts to recreate a world-empire that has enabled step two to be reached: contemporary globalization. Step 2: Globalization beyond Modernity In the spirit of this exploratory paper—“the times they are a-changing”—and while recognizing that globalization exhibits many of the ambiguities of modernity, I am going to accept the premise that it represents the beginning of a new era. This position is not a simple scale-based—“upscaling to a new global era”—but derives from the contemporary changing nature of space. Following Castells (1996) the modern space of places is being superseded by a new space of f lows in a network or informational society. And this is associated with the rise of global/globalizing/world cities in a new world city network (Taylor 2004). The latter replaces “national urban hierarchies” that contained cities within “national economies”: with globalization, cities appear to have burst out of their state containers. New social space construction portends new world-system. In moral syndrome analysis, transformation to a new world-system means changing the balance between guardian and commercial work, in other words undermining the political economy modus operandi. At its simplest this can change in two directions: either a reversal to guardian dominance or an enhancement of the power of commercial work. I will begin by discussing each possibility through its limiting case in turn, starting with the latter. Much of the globalization discourse is about the decline or even demise of the state due to the economic onslaught of financial markets and transnational corporations. Thus much debate centers on the role of states in global society. Even without going as far as the “end of the state”/“borderless world” rhetoric, in this scenario there is no doubt that the new space of f lows is fundamentally impinging on the powers of states, the main locales of guardians. Thus it can be argued that our

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political economy world is transmuting into an economic world in which world markets prevail, a new “purer” form of capitalist world-economy. Possibly only previously glimpsed in the seventeenth century Dutch polity, this would be a confederation of cities at a world-systems scale in which corporations held sway (Petrella’s (1995) dystopia). To the degree that global governance is weak relative to global commercial work, the process of contemporary economic globalization can be deemed a “monstrous hybrid” (an unbalance guardian/commercial relation), not reproducible over the medium term since weakened guardians will not be able to constrain environment-destroying economic growth. From a political/IR perspective globalization looks very different with the “global” represented by the practices of a lone superpower and resistances thereto. This presages a more political world, a geopolitics with related corporate geoeconomic monopolies replacing world markets. In this scenario states remain as the key players in wars over reducing global resources such as oil and water. This is a sort of “Middle East shatter belt” writ large to become system-wide. Guardians are back in the seats of power and boundaries return as critical lines in the carve-up of the world into monopoly resource zones. This is an alternative monstrous hybrid in which commercial work will not be able to sustain the permanent war. But neither of these two scenarios is realistic; each downgrades its contrary syndrome too far. Jacobs always insists that both are necessary for human social reproduction; in the two scenarios the emphasis is on the rapacious side of each way of making a living, producing either a cruel and irresponsible capitalist world-economy or a vicious and reckless geopolitical world. However, the political stewardship process in guardian work and the economic expansion process in commercial work are contrary positives that define sustainable development. Beyond the easy rhetoric on the latter, this is the syndrome-friendly invention that has to be invented from the disaster of contemporary globalization. This is a step 2 worth making: a primal transformation to sustainable development as an alternative political economy world of cities and states. References Bairoch, P. (1989) Cities and Economic Development: From the Dawn of History to the Present. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Balter, M. (1998) “Why Settle Down? The Mystery of Communities.” Science 282 (5393): 1442–1445. ——— (1999) “A Long Season Puts Çatalhöyük in Context.” Science 286 (5441): 890–891. Bauman, Z. (1991) Modernity and Ambivalence. Cambridge: Polity Press. Berman M. (1988) All That Is Solid melts into Air. New York: Penguin. Braudel, F. (1984) Perspective of the World. London: Collins. Castells, M. (1996) The Rise of Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell. Chase-Dunn, C. (1992) “The Changing Role of Cities in World-Systems,” in V. Bornschier and P. Lengyer, eds., Waves, Formations and Values in World-Systems. New York: Transactions, 51–87.

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Chase-Dunn, C. and Hall, T. D. (1997) Rise and Demise: Comparing World-Systems. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Childe, G. (1942) What Happened in History. London: Penguin Curtin, P.D. (1984) Cross-cultural Trade in World History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press De Souza Santos, B. (1995) Toward a New Common Sense. New York: Routledge. Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Jacobs, J. (1969) The Economy of Cities. New York: Random House. ——— (1984) Cities and the Wealth of Nations. New York: Random House. ——— (1992) Systems of Survival. New York: Random House. Lash, S. and J. Friedman (1992) Modernity and Identity. Oxford: Blackwell. LeGates, R.T. and F. Stout, eds. (2000) The City Reader, 2nd edition. London: Routledge. Leick, G. (2002) Mesopotamia: The Invention of the City. London: Penguin Mellaart, J. (1964) “A Neolithic City in Turkey.” Scientific American (April): 94–104. ——— (1965) “Çatal Hüyük a Neolithic City in Anatolia.” Proceedings of the British Academy 51: 201–213. Mumford, L. (1961) The City in History. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Ogborn, N. (1998) Spaces of Modernity. New York: Guilford. Petrella, R. (1995) “A Global Agora vs. Gated City Regions.” New Perspectives (Winter): 21–22. Reader, J. (2005) Cities. London: Vintage. Rudgley, R. (1998) Lost Civilizations of the Stone Age. London: Century. Sahlins, M. (2004) Stone Age Economics. London: Routledge. Smart, B. (1999) Facing Modernity. London: Sage. Soja, E. (2000) Postmetropolis. Oxford: Blackwell. Taylor. P. J. (1996) “Embedded Statism and the Social Sciences: Opening up to New Spaces.” Environment and Planning A 28(11): 1917–1928. ——— (1999) Modernities: A Geohistorical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press. ——— (2004) World City Network: An Urban Global Analysis. London: Routledge. ——— (2005) “Dutch Hegemony and Contemporary Globalization,” in J. Friedman and C. Chase-Dunn, eds., Hegemonic Declines. Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 117–134. ——— (2006) “Cities within Spaces of Flows: Theses for a Materialist Understanding of the External Relations of Cities,” in P. J. Taylor, B. Derudder, P. Saey, and F. Witlox, eds., Cities in Globalization. London: Routledge, 287–297. ——— (2007a) “Cities, Networks, and Development: Towards a Central Flow Theory.” GaWC Research Bulletin No. 267 (www/lboro.ac.uk/gawc). Last accessed September 1, 2008. ——— (2007b) “Problematizing City/State Relations: Towards a Geohistorical Understanding of Contemporary Globalization.” Transactions, Institute of British Geographers NS32: 133–150. Tilly, C. (1990) Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990. Oxford: Blackwell. Wagner, P. (1994) A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline. London: Routledge. Wallerstein, I. (1979) The Capitalist World-Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wilkinson, D. (1993) “Civilizations, Cores, World Economies, and Oikumenes,” in A G. Frank and B. Gills, eds., The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? London: Routledge, 221–246.

CH A P T E R

T H I RT E E N

Scale Transitions and the Evolution of Global Governance since the Bronze Age C h r i s t op h e r C h a s e - D u n n, R ic h a r d Ni e m e y e r , A l e x i s A lva r e z, a n d H i roko I nou e

All systems of interacting polities oscillate between relatively greater and lesser centralization as relatively large polities rise and fall. This is true of systems of chiefdoms, states, empires, and the modern system of the rise and fall of hegemonic core states. The literature on modern power transitions needs to be considered in an anthropological temporal and spatial framework of comparison in order to explain both the rise and fall of transitions and the long-term evolutionary trends of complexity and hierarchy-formation. In the long-term trend polities have increased in population and territorial size since the Stone Age, and the total number of polities on earth has decreased as the average polity has gotten larger. These trends have been somewhat masked in recent centuries because the processes of decolonization and the emergence of nation-states out of older tributary empires have increased the number of smaller polities. But the general trend toward larger polities can be seen in the transition from smaller to larger hegemonic core states (from the Dutch, to the British to the United States), and in the emergence of international political organizations and an expanded and active global civil society that participates in contemporary world politics. This chapter reports early results from a project that is assembling and analyzing data on the population sizes of cities and the territorial sizes of empires and is constructing causal models that explain changes in the scale of human settlements and polities and potential future world state formation.1 We empirically identify “upward sweeps,” when the scale of cities and states dramatically increased. We review and synthesize

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explanations of chiefdom-formation, state-formation, empire-formation and the rise and fall of modern hegemonic core states in order to produce formal explanatory models. And we study the emergent characteristics that distinguish these different scales in order to comprehend how the processes have qualitatively evolved, and in order to consider what kinds of qualitative transformation might occur in the future. Our approach avoids the unscientific pitfalls of progressivist, functionalist, inevitabalist and teleological presumptions that have plagued many earlier approaches to sociocultural evolution.2 We do not identify complexity and hierarchy with progress, but neither do we assume that they are the opposites of progress. Cycles, Upward Sweeps, Collapses, and Ceilings Our project compares relative small regional systems with larger continental and global systems, thus we must abstract from scale in order to examine changes in the structural patterns of small, medium and large human interaction networks. That said, we are also interested in medium term change in the scale of polities and settlements as well as very long-term trends. The long-term trends of scale expansion are ultimately caused by the concatenation of medium term changes, especially the upward sweeps that are the main focus of this analysis. When an interacting set of polities or settlements is the unit of analysis nearly all systems oscillate in what we may term a normal cycle of rise and fall—the largest city or polity reaches a peak and then declines and then this or another city or polity returns to the peak again. We call this a normal cycle of rise and fall. It roughly approximates a sine wave, although few cycles that involve the behavior of groups of humans actually display the perfect regularity of amplitude and period found in the pure sine wave. In figure 13.1 the cycle of rise and fall is half way down the figure and is labeled “normal rise and fall.” The notion of hegemonic or power cycle transitions as employed in discussions of the modern interstate system usually does not address the issue of different kinds of scale change, but many have observed that hegemons or system leaders have tended to get larger with each transition in the modern system. At the top of figure 13.1 is a depiction of an upward sweep in which the size of the largest entity (state or city) increases by a factor of 2. Such a sweep may be relatively rapid or may be slow, and Rein Taagepera (1978b) contends the speed of the rise is often related to the sustainability of the upsweep, at least in the case of empires. Taagepera notices that empires that rise more slowly tend to last longer than those that rise abruptly. When an upward scale change is sustained and a new level of scale becomes the norm we call this an upward sweep. When it is temporary and returns to the old lower norm we call it a “surge” (see the second line from the top in figure 13.1). We also distinguish between three types of decline, a “normal” decline which is part of the normal rise and fall

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Slow = 2 Fast = 3

Surge = 1

Normal Rise and Fall = 0

Short-term Collapse = –1

Collapse = –2 Figure 13.1 Types of medium-term scale change in the largest settlement or polity in an interacting region

cycle, a short-term collapse in which a decline goes significantly below what had been established as the normal trough, and a sustained collapse in which the new lower scale becomes the norm for some extended period of time. Jared Diamond (2005) has examined the complex causes of a large collection of collapses, though he does not rely on quantitative indicators of collapse and he often focuses on particular societies or settlements that collapsed while ignoring neighboring societies or settlements that rose. If intersocietal interaction networks (world-systems) had been his unit of comparison instead of single societies some of the cases he studied have been shown to be instances of normal rise and fall cycles rather than instances of system-wide collapse. A genuine collapse is when all the societies in a region go down and stay down for a long period. Our project is assembling an inventory of all the instances of the types of scale change of city population sizes and the territorial sizes of states and empires for the regions and state-system networks for which we have quantitative data. We will use this inventory to identify instances of each type of change, and will use these as cases for testing our models. Figure 13.2 is a stylized depiction of the rise and fall of large polities and occasional upward sweeps that portrays, not the history of a single world region, but rather the general evolution of what has happened over the past 12,000 years as many small polities (bands, tribes, and chiefdoms) have been consolidated into a much smaller number of larger polities (states, empires, and a possible future world state). George Modelski’s (2003) recent study of the growth of cities over the past 5,000 years points to a phenomenon also noticed and theorized by

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Large Hegemons without Formal Colonies

Hegemons with Colonial Empires States

Small

Global State Formation

Core-wide Empires

Chiefdoms Time Figure 13.2

Rise, fall, and upward sweeps of polity size

Roland Fletcher (1995)—cities grow and decline in size, but occasionally a single new city will attain a size that is much larger than any earlier city, and then other cities catch up with that new scale, but do not much exceed it. It is as if cities reach a size ceiling that it is not possible to exceed until new conditions are met that allow for that ceiling to be breached. This notion of size ceiling will also be useful for studying changes in the sizes of polities. Figure 13.3 plots Rein Taagepera’s (1978a, 1978b, 1979, 1997) estimates of the territorial sizes of the largest and second largest empires in the “Central System”3 for the purpose of identifying empire upsweeps. We know that an early upsweeps occurred in the Uruk expansion out of Southern Mesopotamia (Algaze 1993) and the Old Kingdom in Egypt but we do not have quantitative estimates of territorial sizes of polities before these upsweeps. After several centuries of competing city-states in Mesopotamia the Akkadian Empire emerged as the first core-wide empire.4 Taagepera estimates its territorial size and so it appears in f igure 13.3. After the fall of the Akkadian Empire there was a millennium of no comparably large states until Egypt managed to attain a size as large as that of the Akkadian Empire (around 0.8 square megameters). That was the ceiling until the rise of the Neo-Assyrians to a size twice as large, which was then quickly superseded by much larger empires—Achaemenid Persia and the Hellenic Empires. They reached a new ceiling that was as large as Rome and Parthia at their height several centuries hence. The metric used in figure 13.3 is square megameters of territorial size, and so we can readily see when upsweeps or collapses are quantitatively much larger than normal rises and falls. But using such a real metric also makes it very hard to see what is happening in the Bronze Age because the long-term

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265 British

35

Square Megameters

30 Mongol 25 20

Umayyads and Abbassids

15 Neo-Assyrian,

10

Persian, Hellenic Rome 5 akkadian –3 2 –3 00 0 –2 10 8 –2 20 6 –2 30 4 –2 40 2 –2 50 0 –1 60 8 –1 70 6 –1 80 4 –1 90 3 –1 00 11 –9 0 2 –7 0 3 –5 0 4 –3 0 5 –1 0 60 30 22 0 41 0 60 0 79 0 98 0 11 7 13 0 6 15 0 6 17 0 5 19 0 40

0 Year Largest Empire

Second Largest Empire

Figure 13.3 Rise, fall, and upward sweeps as revealed by taagapera’s estimate of the territorial sizes of the largest empires in the central system

upward trend in empire sizes dwarfs the early changes. One way to solve this problem is to log the values, as we do in figure 13.4 below. But that disturbs the metric and makes it harder to judge whether an increase is an upsweep or a regular rise. Another approach that does not disturb the natural metric is to examine subperiods separately or to leave out the most recent phase of very large empires and cities. A new upward sweep was made by the Islamic caliphates, but then there was a trough followed by the Eurasian-wide, but brief, Mongol conquest, and then another trough that was transcended by the emergence of the modern colonial empires of the European states, with the largest of these being the British Empire of the nineteenth century. So there have been five major measurable polity upward sweeps in the Central System that we may label 1. Akkadian-Egyptian, 2. West Asian-Mediterranean, 3. Islamic, 4. Mongol, and 5. Modern. Urban Upward Sweeps Figure 13.4 depicts the logged population sizes of the largest cities in the Central PMN over the past five millennia.5 The first two city size upsweeps corresponds with the Uruk expansion in early Bronze Age Mesopotamia. Then there was another upsweep in the Bronze Age with the rise of Babylon and Nineveh, another one in the Iron Age—the rise of Alexandria and Rome, a fall-back and then the rise of Islamic Baghdad. The huge size of Baghdad in the tenth century did not really constitute

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a new ceiling in the evolution of city sizes because it was not replicated for 1000 years. Thus we should call this a surge rather than an upsweep (as indicated in figure 13.1). So there have been five main upward sweeps that led to new plateaus of city growth in the Central System: the original heartland of cities in Mesopotamia and Egypt, the rise of Alexandria and Rome in the Iron Age, then a decline followed by the Baghdad surge, and then the well-known rapid upsweep of modern large cities in East Asia, Europe, and North America. After the 1950s a new ceiling of around 20 millions is reach by the largest urban agglomerations. Megacities in Brazil, Mexico and China caught up with the largest core cities in this period, causing the global size distribution of cities to f latten in the second half of the twentieth century (Chase-Dunn et al. 2006) Theories of Rise, Fall, and Upward Sweeps There are many theories about why systems of interacting polities experience cycles of rise and fall. A thorough overview of the anthropological literature on “cycling”—the rise and fall of large chiefdoms—is presented in David G. Anderson’s (1995) The Savannah River Chiefdoms. Chase-Dunn (2005) presents an overview of earlier theories and a new theoretical synthesis based on Peter Turchin’s (2003) model of the dynamics of agrarian state growth and decline, network theory, a population pressure iteration model and explanations of the rise and fall of modern hegemons. This approach is

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further modified below to reincorporate the operation of trade networks. Explaining the upsweeps requires adding a discussion of emergent properties and the increasing geographical scale of interaction networks to the theories of rise and fall. Explaining collapses requires taking account of environmental fragility and resilience, cultural and technological f lexibility and other factors examined by Jared Diamond (2005) Explaining Upsweeps Earlier work on socio-cultural evolution has produced a synthesized “iteration model” of the processes by which hierarchies and new technologies have emerged in regional world-systems since the Paleolithic (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: Chapter 6). The iteration model assumes a system of societies that are interacting with one another in ways that are important for the reproduction and transformation of social structures and institutions. This comparative world-systems theory uses interaction networks rather than spatially homogenous characteristics to bound regional systems. Bulk goods exchanges are an important network in all systems, and so are alliances and conf licts among polities (the so-called political/ military network—PMN). Some systems are also importantly linked by the long-distance exchanges of prestige goods. While Chase-Dunn and Hall used trade networks to spatially bound world-systems, they left trade out of the iteration model that explains why world-systems evolve. More recent works by McNeill and McNeill (2003) and Christian (2004) have stressed the importance of trade and communications networks in the processes of human socio-cultural evolution. Both of these recent works employ a network node theory of innovation and collective learning that is similar to the human ecology approach developed earlier by Amos Hawley (1971). Innovations are said to be unusually likely to occur at transportation and communications nodes where information from many different sources can be easily combined and recombined. One advantage of using world-systems as the explicit unit of analysis and of examining the possibility that world-systems may be organized by core/ periphery structures is that it allows us to see that there are important and repeated exceptions to the network node theory of innovation. It is often societies out on the edge of a system rather than at the center that either innovate or that successfully implement new strategies and technologies of power, production and trade. Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997: Chapter 5) synthesize earlier formulations into a theory of semiperipheral development in which a few of the societies that are in between the core and the periphery of a system are the ones that are most likely to come forth with strategies and behaviors that produce evolutionary transformations and upward mobility. This phenomenon takes various forms in different kinds of systems: semiperipheral marcher chiefdoms, semiperipheral marcher states, semiperipheral capitalist city states, the semiperipheral position of

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Europe in the larger Afroeurasian world-system, modern semiperipheral nations that rise to hegemony, and contemporary semiperipheral societies that engage in and support novel and potentially transformative economic and political activities. The network node theory does not well account for the spatially uneven nature of evolutionary change. The cutting edge of evolution moves. Old centers are often transcended by societies out on the edge that are able to rewire network nodes in a way that expands the spatial scale of networks. There are several possible processes that might account for the phenomenon of semiperipheral development. Randall Collins (1999) has argued that the phenomenon of marcher states conquering other states to make larger empires is due to the marcher state advantage. Being out on the edge of a core region of competing states allows more maneuverability because it is not necessary to defend the rear. This geopolitical advantage allows military resources to be concentrated on vulnerable neighbors. Peter Turchin (2005) argues that the relevant process is one in which group solidarity is enhanced by being on a “metaethnic frontier” in which the clash of contending cultures produces strong cohesion and cooperation within a frontier society, allowing it to perform great feats. Carroll Quigley (1961) distilled a somewhat similar theory from the works of Arnold Toynbee. But Toynbee also suggested another way in which semiperipheral regions might be motivated to take risks with new ideas, technologies and strategies. Semiperipheral societies are often located in ecologically marginal regions that have poor soil and little water or other disadvantages. Patrick Kirch relies on this idea of ecological marginality in his depiction of the process by which semiperipheral marcher chiefs are most often the conquerors that create island-wide paramount chiefdoms in the Pacific (Kirch 1984). It is quite possible that all these features combine to produce what Alexander Gershenkron (1962) called “the advantages of backwardness” that allow some semiperipheral societies to transform and to dominate regional world-systems. Iteration Revised For the purposes of explaining upward sweeps we have reformulated the iteration model to focus on state-based systems by adding trade, marcher states, capitalist city-states, cities and empires (see figure 13.5). The top and right side of the revised iteration model is only slightly modified. Here we have the basic ideas from Marvin Harris and Robert Carneiro as reformulated by Allen Johnson and Timothy Earle (1987) regarding population growth, intensification, environmental degradation, population pressure, emigration, circumscription and conf lict, which then lowers or reverses population growth. This is a general model of population

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ecology and the Malthusian demographic regulator that works for humans as well as for other animal populations. Human world-systems that are unable to invent institutions that protect natural resources, to regulate population growth or to evolve larger polities, hierarchies and/or new technologies of production get stuck in the “nasty right side” of the iteration model (e.g., see Patrick Kirch’s [1991] study of the Marquesas). Systems that increase population and that fail to sustain their natural resources, especially those that occupy marginal or fragile environments, may collapse back to a lower level of complexity and hierarchy (Diamond 2004). All human world-systems tend eventually to return to the nasty right side, at least so far, because the scale of resource use, ecological degradation and population growth tends eventually to exceed existing institutional capacities. In state-based systems periods of intensified conf lict within and between societies lower the resistance to empire formation. A semiperipheral marcher state can “roll up the system” under such circumstances. Thus did the Neo-Assyrians, the Achaemenid Persians, Alexander, the Romans, the Islamic Caliphates and the Aztecs produce the core-wide empires that constitute the great upward sweeps of state size in the age of state-based systems. During the Bronze and Iron Age expansions of the tributary empires a new niche emerged for states that specialized in the carrying trade among the empires and adjacent regions. These semiperipheral capitalist city states were usually “thalassocratic” entities that used naval power to protect sea-going trade (e.g., the Phoenician city-states, Venice, Genoa, Malacca), but Assur on the Tigris, the “Old Assyrian city-state and its colonies,” was

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a land-based example of this phenomenon that relied mainly upon donkey caravans for transportation (Larsen 1976). The semiperipheral capitalist city-states did not typically conquer other states to construct large empires, but their trading and production activities promoted regional commerce and the emergence of markets within and between the tributary states. The expansion of trading and communication networks facilitated the growth of empires and vice versa. The emergence of agriculture, mining and manufacturing production of surpluses for trade gave conquerors an incentive to expand state control into distant areas. And the apparatus of the empire was itself often a boon to trade. The specialized trading states promoted the production of trade surpluses, bringing peoples into commerce over wide regions, and thus they helped to create the conditions for the emergence of larger empires. Capitalist City-States and Ports of Trade Sabloff and Rathje (1975) contend that the same settlement can oscillate back and forth between being a “port of trade” (neutral territory that is used for administered trade between different competing states and empires—see Polanyi et al. 1957) and a “trading port” (an autonomous and sovereign polity that actively pursues policies that facilitate profitable trade). This latter corresponds to what Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) mean by a semiperipheral capitalist city-state. Sabloff and Rathje also contend that a trading port is more likely to emerge during a period in which other states within the same region are weak, whereas a port of trade is more likely during a period in which there are large strong states. The archaeological investigation of Cozumel carried out by Sabloff and Rathje was designed to try to test the hypothesis that Cozumel had been a trading state with a cosmopolitan and tolerant elite during the so-called Decadent period of the Mayan state system just before the arrival of the Spanish in the sixteenth century. If Sabloff and Rathje are right, trading ports (semiperipheral capitalist city-states) may more likely to be autonomous and to prosper during the fall part of the cycle of rise and fall when tributary states and empires are relatively weak. Several analysts have contended that world-systems oscillate between periods in which they are more integrated by horizontal networks of exchange versus periods in which corporate and hierarchical organization is more predominant (Ekholm and Friedman 1982; Blanton et al. 1996; White et al. 2006). Arrighi (1994, 2006) contends that modern “systemic cycles of accumulation” display a somewhat similar alternation, with the Genoese-Portuguese network-based cycle followed by a more corporate Dutch organized cycle and that by a more network-based British cycle and then a more corporate U.S. cycle. These oscillations may be composed by the alternative successes and failures of tributary marcher states and capitalist city-states, but in the long run it was the capitalist city-states

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that transformed the state-based systems into the global capitalist system of today. The long-term trend toward commercialization and the integration of large regions into networks of market exchange may have made greater gains during periods in which tributary states were relatively weak. But Arrighi contends that the deepening of commodity production made gains under both network and corporate forms of hegemony. So what does this have to do with upward sweeps of empires and upward sweeps of city sizes? Regarding upward sweeps of empires, if semiperipheral capitalist city states were major agents of the spread of commodified exchange and the expansion and intensification of trade, then upward sweeps in which larger states emerged to encompass regions that had already been unified by trade should have occurred after a period in which semiperipheral capitalist city-states had been f lourishing. Regarding upward sweeps of city sizes, these should have followed upward sweeps of empire sizes because it was empires that created the largest cities as their capitals. The settlements of semiperipheral capitalist city-states were typically smaller than the capital cities of empires. It was not until the rise of London that a capitalist city became the largest city in a world-system. The question of the timing of upward sweeps to new levels is entirely germane to the problem of modeling global state formation. So also is the issue of how unusually large states have been formed in the past. Upward sweeps have mainly been instances of a semiperipheral marcher state conquering and unifying adjacent older core states and nearby peripheral areas. Conquest of adjacent territories has been the main mechanism of large-scale political integration in the past. But the pattern of hegemonic rise and fall in the modern world-system has been different. The most powerful states, the hegemons (the Dutch, the British, and the United States), have fought semiperipheral challengers (e.g., Napoleonic France and Germany) to prevent the emergence of core-wide empires. We contend that this is because the hegemons are the most capitalist states in the system, the ones for whom economic success is most closely tied to the ability to make superprofits on the technological rents that return from new lead technologies. Only during hegemonic decline have the modern capitalist hegemons shown a tendency toward “imperial overreach” in which their military power is employed in a last ditch effort to prop up a declining economic hegemony.6 These efforts have not been successful, and a new hegemon only emerges after a period of hegemonic rivalry and world war. This is a primitive method of choosing “global leadership” that we can no longer afford to employ because of the existence of weapons of mass destruction. This is analogous to the succession problem within states. The further construction and strengthening of institutions that can peacefully resolve the struggle for hegemony is of the first importance for our very survival as a species. The approach that we propose is to model the main causes of state formation and upward sweeps taking into account the ways in which the

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basic processes have been altered by the emergence of new institutions. We elaborate and improve upon the recent work of Robert Bates Graber (2004). Graber develops both an ahistorical and an historical population pressure model of political integration. His ahistorical model is a very simplified version of the iteration model that includes population growth rates and the number of independent polities. Graber’s historical model takes account of the emergence of the League of Nations and the United Nations. But we add the rise and fall cycle, the emergence of markets and capitalism, and the growth of other international political organizations and nongovernmental organizations to our model of the evolution of global governance. The main political structure of global governance in the modern world-system has been, and remains, the international system of states as theorized and constituted in the Peace of Westphalia. This international system of competing and allying national states was extended to the periphery of the modern world-system in two large waves of decolonization of the colonial empires of core powers. The modern system already differed from earlier imperial systems in that its core remained multicentric rather than being occasionally conquered and turned into a corewide empire. Instead, empires became organized as distant peripheral colonies rather than as conquered adjacent territories. Earlier instances of this type of colonial empire were produced by thallasocratic states, mainly semiperipheral capitalist city-states that specialized in trade (e.g., Carthage, Venice, etc.). In the modern system this form of colonial empire became the norm, and the European core states rose to global hegemony by conquering and colonizing the Americas, Asia and Africa in a series of expansions (see figure 13.6). The international system of sovereign states was extended to the colonized periphery in two large waves of decolonization (see figure 13.6). After a long-term trend in which the number of independent states on Earth had been decreasing, that number rose again

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with decolonization and the core states decreased in size when they lost their colonial empires. Extension of the State System to the Periphery The decolonization waves were part of the formation of a truly global polity of states. The system of European core states, each with its own colonial empire in Asia, Africa, and the Americas, became reorganized as a global system of sovereign states. Most of the former colonies remained in the non-core and new forms of neocolonialism emerged to allow the core states to continue to exploit the non-core states. But one of the early decolonized regions, “the first new nation,” rose to core status and then to become the largest hegemon the modern world-system has yet seen—the United States of America. The doctrine of the national self-determination, long a principle of the European state system, was extended in theory to the periphery, but new forms of economic imperialism continued to reproduce the core/periphery hierarchy. Our historical model adds marketization, decolonization, new lead technologies, the rise and fall of hegemons, and the rise of international political organizations to the population pressure model in order to forecast future trajectories of global state formation. Because we are sensitive to the cyclical nature of many processes, we can easily consider how downward plunges and possible collapses might affect the probable trajectories of global state formation. We also take into account the structural differences between recent and earlier periods. For example, the period of British hegemonic decline moved Shares of World GDP, 1820–1998 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15

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rather quickly toward conf lictive hegemonic rivalry because economic competitors such as Germany were able to develop powerful military capabilities. The U.S. hegemony has been different in that the United States ended up as the single superpower after the decline of the Soviet Union. Some economic challengers (Japan and Germany) cannot easily play the military card because they are stuck with the consequences of having lost the last World War. This, and the immense size of the U.S. economy, will probably slow the process of hegemonic decline down relative to the speed of the British decline (see figure 13.7 and Chase-Dunn et al. 2005). Our modeling of the global future also considers changes in labor relations, urban-rural relations, the nature of emergent city regions, and the shrinking of the global reserve army of labor (Silver 2003). The Trajectory of Global Governance and Political Globalization Global governance usually refers to the nature of power institutions in the modern world-system, especially in the last century. But when we compare the modern system to earlier systems it is obvious that they all have institutional arrangements that shape their intersocietal interactions. So there has been global governance all along. It has not emerged. But it has changed its nature. The modern world-system was originally constituted as a multilayered medieval set of nested networks (Sassen 2005). Out of this emerged the European interstate system in which states allied and fought with one another for territory, control of trade routes, and other resources. As Europe became hegemonic over the rest of the world this system became the predominant form of global governance. The basic logic is the anarchy of nations and geopolitics, but this anarchy had a cultural backdrop that the English school of international relations calls international society (Buzan and Little 2000). In earlier millennia Christendom and the other world religions proclaimed and elaborated an ethic that differentiated the world into civilized, barbarian and savage peoples. Cannibalism, ritual human sacrifice and polygyny were banned. A degree of individualism and humanism emerged in the context of the European enlightenment, and the rules of this civilized culture were applied in geopolitical alliances and conf licts. Wars with other civilized peoples were somewhat different than wars with barbarians or savages. Thus did a moral order come to stand behind the anarchy of nations, a moral order that condoned less ethical forms of coercion when dealing with the peoples of the non-core. The interstate system that emerged in Europe soon adopted institutions that had previously been elaborated in relations among the Italian city-states during the Renaissance. Diplomatic immunity and rules of engagement came to regulate warfare within the core. These rules were made explicit in the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The balance of power among states was reinforced by the notion of “general war,” which prescribed that all states

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should band together against any “rogue state” that aggressively attacked another. Theorists of the international system often portray this as a great discovery that distinguished the European interstate system from others, especially those more hierarchical interstate systems known to exist in South Asia and East Asia. But similar institutions are known to have existed in much earlier interstate systems (e.g., the system of Sumerian city-states in the early Bronze Age). The European balance of power system coincided with the emergence of Dutch hegemony in the seventeenth century, and indeed it was the Dutch state, arguably the first capitalist nation-state, that played a pivotal power-balancing role in that century. The growing importance of the accumulation of profits shifted the logic of state power increasingly away from tribute and taxation without dispensing with these entirely. Indeed, some states continued to pursue the tributary logic, but they were consistently beaten in competition with newly emerging capitalist states in the core. Thus did the logic of adjacent tributary empires become increasingly supplanted by a new imperial logic that sought the control of trade routes and access to valuable raw materials and labor that could contribute to the profitable production of commodities. The emergence of colonial empires corresponded with the reproduction of a multicentric core in which several European states allied with and fought each other. This system came to be taken for granted by international relations theorists as the natural mode of global governance. Despite that earlier systems had repeatedly seen the emergence of “universal states” such as the Roman Empire, the notion of a global state is now unthinkable because many international relations theorists define states as only existing in relationship to each other. This is part of the strong institutionalization of the modern interstate system—an historically constructed structure that has come to be seen as natural. The oscillation of earlier systems morphed into the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers in the modern system. A series of hegemons emerged from the semiperiphery—the Dutch, the British, and the United States. This cycle (or sequence) has itself evolved, with the hegemons becoming increasingly larger with respect to the size of the whole system, and with the institutional nature of states and finance capital getting reorganized in each “systemic cycle of accumulation” (Arrighi 1994). Tributary empires survived into the nineteenth century, but they were increasingly supplanted by nation-states. And the colonial empires of the European states brought the whole Earth into a single relatively homogenous global polity for the first time. The surrounding and partial penetration of Qing China in the nineteenth century brought this last semi-independent center into the fold of the now-predominant Europe-centered system of states. The evolution that occurred with the rise and fall of the hegemonic core powers needs to be seen as a sequence of forms of world order that evolved to solve the political, economic and technical problems of successively more global waves of capitalist accumulation. The expansion of global production involved accessing raw materials to feed the new

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industries, and food to feed the expanding populations (Bunker and Ciccantell 2004). As in any hierarchy, coercion is a very inefficient means of domination, and so the hegemons sought legitimacy by proclaiming leadership in advancing civilization and democracy. But the terms of these claims were also employed by those below who sought to protect themselves from exploitation and domination. And so the evolution of hegemony was produced by elite groups competing with one another to stay on top or to rise in a context of successive powerful challenges from below. World orders were contested and reconstructed in a series of world revolutions that began with the Protestant Reformation (Arrighi et al. 1989; Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000). The idea of world revolution is a broad notion that encompasses all kinds of resistance to hierarchy regardless of whether or not it is coordinated. Years that symbolize the major world revolutions after the Protestant Reformation are 1789, 1848, 1917, 1968, and 1989. Arguably another one is brewing now. Political Globalization and Global Party Formation The nineteenth century saw the beginning of what we shall call political globalization—the emergence and growth of an overlayer of regional and increasingly global formal organizational structures on top of the interstate system. We conceptualize political globalization analogously to our understanding of economic globalization—the relative strength and density of larger versus smaller interaction networks and organizational structures (Chase-Dunn et al. 2000). The most obvious indication of political globalization is the evolution of the uneven and halting upward trend in the transitions from the Concert of Europe to the League of Nations and the United Nations. The waves of international political integration began after the Napoleonic Wars early in the nineteenth century. Britain and the Austro-Hungarian Empire organized the “Concert of Europe” that was intended to prevent future French revolutions and Napoleonic adventures. After World War I the League of Nations emerged as a weak proto-state designed to provide collective security by preventing future “Great Wars.” The failure of the United States to take up the mantle of British hegemony during the Age of Extremes, and the weakness of the League (which the United States never joined) led to another round of unbelievably destructive world war. After World War II a somewhat stronger proto-world-state, the United Nations Organization, emerged and the United States stepped firmly into the role of hegemon. The trend toward political globalization can also be seen in the emergence of the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and the more recent restructuring of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the heightened visibility of other international fora (the Trilateral Commission, the Group of Seven [Eight].

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Some of the proponents of a recent stage of global capitalism contend that strong transnational capitalist firms and there political operatives working within national states have combined with existing international organizations to constitute an emerging transnational capitalist state (e.g., Robinson 2004). This version of the global state formation hypothesis claims that a rather integrated transnational capitalist class has emerged since the 1970s, and that this global class uses both international organizations and existing national state apparatuses as coordinated instruments of its rule. A related perspective holds that the United States has so completely dominated the other core powers since World War II that it constitutes a world empire (Gowan 2006). These approaches probably overstate the degree of integration of class governance on a global scale. The current reality is that both the old system of nationally competing capitalist classes and a very high degree of global integration now exist and these contend with one another to an extent that is much greater than in the past. An internationally integrated global capitalist class was also in formation in the second half of the nineteenth century, but this did not prevent the world polity from descending into the violent interimperial rivalry of the two twentieth-century World Wars (Barr et al. 2006). The degree of integration of both elites and masses is undoubtedly greater in the current round of globalization, but will it be strongly integrated enough to allow for readjustments without descent into a repetition of the Age of Extremes? That is the question. In addition to the formation of regional and global international organizations, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also saw the emergence of transnational social movements and the enlargement of what has come to be known as global civil society. These have also altered the form of global governance by providing expanded arenas in which individuals and organizations participate directly in world politics rather than through the mediating shell of national states. Specialized international and transnational non-governmental organizations (e.g., the International Postal Union) exploded in the middle of the nineteenth century (Murphy 1994; Mattelart 2000). Abolitionism, feminism and the labor movement became increasingly transnational in nature. Earlier local movements had also had a transnational aspect because sailors, pirates, slaves and indentured servants carried ideas and sentiments back and forth across the Atlantic (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000) but the large global consequences of these movements occurred when many mainly local developments (e.g., slave revolts) occurred synchronously. The Black Jacobins of the Haitian revolution, by depriving Napoleonic France of important sources of food and wealth, played a role in the rise of British hegemony (Santiago-Valles 2005). These kinds of effects of resistance from below became stronger in the middle decades of the nineteenth century—the years around the world revolution of 1848. This is usually thought of in terms of developments in Europe, but millenarian and revolutionary ideas traveled to the New World to play a role in the

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“burned over district” in upstate New York, where several important new Christian sects and utopian communes emerged. And in China the huge Taiping peasant and landless rebellion was fomented by a charismatic leader who became convince that he was Jesus Christ’s younger brother after reading some pamphlets supplied by a millenarian Baptist preacher from Tennessee. Non-elites were becoming transnational activists. Elites had long been involved in international and transnational activism as statesmen, churchmen, businessmen and scientists. The decreasing costs of longdistance communications and transportation were now allowing some non-elites to play a more important and direct role in world politics. These developments ramped up during the “Age of Extremes” (Hobsbawm 1994), the first half of the twentieth century. Internationalism in the labor movement had emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century. Global political parties were becoming active in world politics, especially during and after the world revolution of 1917. The Communist International (Comintern) convened large conferences of representatives from all over the globe in Moscow in the early years of the 1920s. The history and evolution of global party formation is treated in several recent works on this topic that are considering current developments at the World Social Forum (Chase-Dunn and Reese 2007; Sehm-Patomaki and Ulvilla 2007; Patomaki and Teivainen 2006). Global party formation is playing a role in deepening the participation of non-elite actors in world politics, expanding the size and relevance of global civil society, and activating demands for more democratic forms of global governance. These processes could eventually lead to more political globalization and further global state formation. The Comintern was abolished in 1943, though the Soviet Union continued to pose as the protagonist of the world working class until its demise in 1989. In 1938 Trotskyists organized the Fourth International to replace the Comintern, which they saw as having been captured by Stalinism. The Fourth International suffered from a series of sectarian splits and the huge communist-led rebellions that emerged during and after World War II were led by either pro-Soviet or Maoist organizations that held the Fourth International to be illegitimate. The Bandung Conference in 1954 was an important forum in which the leaders of the emerging nations explicated Third World interests. But the heady days of transnational social movements were overshadowed by the Cold War and the hegemonic Keynesian national development project. It was only after the attack on the developmental state model by Reaganism-Thatcherism and the demise of the Soviet Union that a new wave of transnational activists began to form into a global justice movement. Ulrich Beck’s (2005) effort to rethink the nature of power in a globalized world makes the claim that the power of global capitalist corporations is based mainly on the threat of the withdrawal of capital investment, and thus it does not need to be legitimated. Beck further argues that the transnational capitalist class does not need to form political parties, because

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its power is translegal and does not need legitimation. While this may be true to some extent, it is still the case that one may discern an evolution of political ideology that is promulgated by the lords of capital and the states that represent them. The Keynesian national development project that was the hegemonic ideology of the West from World War II to the 1970s was replaced by neoliberalism, a rather different set of claims and policies. William Carroll (2006a, 2006b) traces the history liberalism and neoliberalism as it emerges from the eighteenth century, takes hiding in monastery-like think-tanks during the heyday of Keynesianism, and then reemerges as Reaganism-Thatcherism in the 1970s and 1980s. The further evolution can be seen in the rise of the neoconservatives in the 1990s, and concerns for dealing with those pockets of poverty that seem impervious to market magic in the writings of such neoliberals as Jeffrey Sachs (2005). Stephen Gill’s (2000) suggestive discussion of “the post-modern prince”—a Left global political party emerging out of the global justice movement, also proposes an analysis of corporate media, think-tanks, and institutions such as the World Economic Forum as participants in a process of global political contestation. Necessary or not, the transnational capitalist class and its organic intellectuals engage in efforts to legitimate its own power, and this can be seen to interact with popular forces. Thus did the advertised concerns of the World Economic Forum shifted considerably after the rise of the World Social Forum. It is likely that the United States will be “the last of the hegemons” (Taylor 1986). New economic challengers are emerging, but the role of political hegemon played by a single national state is likely to be played within a much stronger context of multilateral global governance. Some see the Peoples’ Republic of China as a potential future hegemon. There is little doubt that the PRC will play an important economic and political role in future global governance despite its daunting environmental problems and extreme dependence on the bubble economy of the U.S. dollar. The European Union process itself only creates a larger core state that can contend with the United States, and as such it does not change the logic of the interstate system and global governance by hegemony. But the example of the emergence of a multinational state apparatus out of a process of peaceful politics, rather than as a result of conquest, holds important lessons, both positive and negative, for the larger process of global state formation. It shows it can be done. The revised iteration model presented above both explains upsweeps of the past and it continues to be relevant for understanding the present and the future. The multiple local and regional and largely disconnected human interaction networks have become strongly linked into a single global system. The treadmill of population growth has been stopped in the core countries, and it appears to be slowing in the non-core. The global human population is predicted to peak and to stabilize in the decades surrounding 2075 at somewhere between eight and twelve billion. Thus population pressure will be a major challenge in the decades

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of the twenty-first century. The exit option is mainly blocked off and a condition of global circumscription exists. Malthusian corrections are not a thing of the past, as illustrated by continuing warfare and genocide. Famine has been brought under control, but future shortages of clean water, good soil, non-renewable energy sources, and food might bring that old horseman back. Huge global inequalities complicate the collective action problem. First world people have come to feel entitled, and non-core people want to have their own cars, large houses and electronic geegaws. The ideas of human rights and democracy are still contested, but they have become so widely accepted that existing institutions of global governance are illegitimate even by their own standards. The demand for global democracy and human rights can only be met by reforming or replacing the existing institutions of global governance with institutions that have some plausible claim to represent the will and interests of the majority of the world’s people. That means global state formation, although most of the contemporary protagonists of global democracy do not like to say it that way. Many contemporary observers of globalization point to the devolutionary trends in state powers in the last few decades as large political bureaucracies have deregulated and have passed responsibilities to smaller political entities. Saskia Sassen (2006) sees the return of a nest and multilayered political world similar in some respects to that of medieval Europe in which national states have become reconfigured to serve global functions for capital and for citizens. Peter Taylor (2004) and Peter Hugill (1999) see a world of global cities and city regions largely replacing the system of sovereign nation states. The discourse of modern world state formation has existed since the Round Table, and has been recently retooled for a larger audience by carriers of the world federalist tradition (Tetalman and Belitsos 2005; Cook 2006). William R. Robinson (2004) sees the emergence of a transnational world state, mainly under the control of transnational capitalists. Alex Wendt (2003) portrays the emergence of a world state as inevitable, while attempting to rehabilitate teleological explanation. George Monbiot (2003) proposes new economic and political institutions that address the problems of global inequality. And Joseph E. Schwartzberg (2003) has constructed thoughtful proposals for how to make the United Nations more representative of the world’s peoples. There is nothing inevitable about global state formation, especially within the next several decades. But the continuing decline of U.S. hegemony and the issue of hegemonic transition puts the problem in the middle of the table of world politics. A democratic and legitimate United States of the Earth will be needed to deal with the social, political, economic, and environmental problems that our species has produced for itself. The question is whether that upward sweep will occur soon and relatively painlessly or after a long period of Malthusian correction similar to what happened in the first half of the twentieth century.

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Notes 1. Our National Science Foundation proposal is at http://irows.ucr.edu/research/citemp/globstat/ globstatprop.htm. Last accessed August 15, 2008. 2. We use the term evolution despite its tawdry history. We are talking about sociocultural evolution, not biological evolution, and we are well aware that teleology and progress need to be washed out of the concept of evolution before it can be scientifically useful (Sanderson 1990, 2006). 3. The idea of the Central System is derived from David Wilkinson’s (1987) definition of “Central Civilization.” It spatially bounds a system in terms of a set of allying and fighting states, and the Central System (or Political-Military Network) is the one that emerged in Mesopotamia with the birth of cities and states, then merged with the Egyptian system around 1500 BC and subsequently engulfed the rest of the Earth. Because it is an expanding system its spatial boundaries change over time. That is the unit of analysis used in figures 13.3 and 13.4, but we also study constant regions (see endnote 6). 4. There were a few instances in which new core-wide empires were formed by internal revolt (e.g., the Akkadian Empire, the Mamluk Empire) or conquest by peripheral marchers (e.g., the Mongol Empire), but by far the majority of new empires were the work of semiperipheral marcher conquests. 5. See endnote 3 for a definition of the Central System. We study city and empire scale changes in both PMNs and constant regions. The constant regions for which we have quantitative estimates are: West Asia/Mediterranean, East Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia. We are also making an effort to develop quantitative estimates of city populations and polity territorial sizes in Mesoamerica and the Andes. 6. This unilateral policy of might-makes-right has been characterized as “imperial over-reach” by Paul Kennedy (1988) and as the “imperial detour” by George Modelski (2005). These scholars of hegemony and geopolitics see a repeated pattern in which a formerly powerful hegemon that has lost its economic preeminence tries to substitute unilaterally exercised military supremacy in place of its former ability to gain compliance based on economic comparative advantage and political legitimacy. The result is to mobilize significant resistance and counter-hegemony on the part of those who feel that power is being exercised illegitimately.

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CON T R I BU TOR S

Alvarez, Alexis, is a graduate student in the Department of Sociology, University of California, Riverside. Chan, Steve, is Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado. Chase-Dunn, Christopher, is Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Research on World-Systems at the University of California, Riverside. Devezas, Tessaleno C., is an Associate Professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Head of the Technological Forecasting and Innovation Theory Working Group at the Universidade da Beira Interior, Colvilha, Portugal. Fausett, Elizabeth, is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science, University of Arizona. Grant, Keith A., is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science, University of Arizona. Hugill, Peter J., is a Professor in the Department of Geography and Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. Inoue, Hiroko, is a graduate student in the Department of Sociology, University of California, Riverside. Kugler, Jacek, is Elisabeth Helm Rosecrans Professor of International Relations and Political Economy in the Department of Politics and Policy, Claremont Graduate University. Lee, Michael, is an Associate Instructor in the Department of Political Science, Indiana University. LePoire, David J., is an Environmental Systems Analyst in the Radiological Health Risk Section of the Environmental Science Division, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois. Niemeyer, Richard, is a graduate student in the Department of Sociology, University of California, Riverside.

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Rapkin, David P., is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska Tammen, Ronald L., is Director of the Mark O. Hatfield School of Government, Portland State University. Taylor, Peter J., is Professor of Geography and Co-director of the Globalization and World Cities network at Loughborough University, United Kingdom. Tessman, Brock F., is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International Affairs, University of Georgia. Thompson, William R., is Rogers Professor of Political Science, Indiana University. Vasquez, John A., is Thomas B. Mackie Scholar in International Relations in the Department of Political Science, University of Illinois, Urbana. Volgy, Thomas J., is Professor of Political Science, University of Arizona and Executive Director, International Studies Association.

I N DE X

Abbott, Kenneth, 110 Abramovitz, Moses, 202 (ft. 13) Abu-Lughod, Janet L., 39 active population, 176 active zone process, 227 Afghan-Russian War (1979–89), 49, 170 Age of Extremes, 276–78 Age of Transition, 235 agrarian state growth and decline model, 261 agricultural revolution, 249 air power and territorial control, 37 Algaze, Guillermo, 269 al-Qaeda, 164 Alsace-Lorraine dispute, 144 American Revolution, 42 American Revolutionary War, 41 Anderson, David G., 266 Anglo-Dutch wars, 40 Anglo-German transition, 11–12, 17, 44–45, 139–40 Anglo-U.S. transition, 15–17, 139, 166 Arbetman, Marina, 166, 175, 184 (ft. 4) architecture of international politics, 103 Ardrey, Robert, 133 Arkwright, Richard, 41 Arrighi, Giovanni, 270, 275–76 Arrow, Kenneth J., 214 artificial intelligence, 213 Atlantic Alliance, 180, 183 Austrian Succession War, 79, 87 Ausubel, J.H., 214 autarkic economy strategy and territorial states, 33 Ayres, Robert U., 231 Bachman, Veit, 36, 44 Bailin, Alison, 107, 109, 125 (ft. 3), 126 (ft. 14) Bainbridge, W.S., 213 Bairoch, Paul, 249–50 balance of power, 82 balancing, 65, 68 Balter, M., 251

Bandung Conference, 278 bandwagon growth, 208 Barnett, Michael W., 103, 110, 125 (ft. 6) Barr, Kenneth, 277 Barraclough, G., 92 Bayer, 43 Bearce, David H., 126 (ft. 21), 127 (ft. 26) Beck, Ulrich, 278 Belitsos, Byron, 280 Bennett, Andrew, 85 Bennett, D. Scott, 194 Berlin crises (1948, 1961), 27 (ft. 13) Berlin Wall fall, 236 Berman, M., 257 Bernstein, Peter L., 41 Bernstein, W.J., 211 Berry, B.J.L., 237 Bethmann Holweg, Theobald von, 13, 156 (ft. 6) bifurcation, 205, 208 bifurcation reverse, 217 Bijian, Zheng, 156 (ft. 5) Biological Weapons Convention, 121 biotechnology, 213 bipolarization, 65 Black, Duncan M., 165, 184 (ft. 20) Black Jacobins, 277 Black Plague, 211 Black swan finding, 251 Blanton, Richard, 270 Blouet, Brian W., 50 Blucher, Gebhard Lebrecht von, 42 Boehmer, Charles, 194, 201 (ft. 7), 202 (ft. 9) Bolshevik Revolution, 26 (ft. 8) Bonaparte, Napoleon, 42, 258 Borgatti, Stephen P., 127 (ft. 37) Boswell, Terry, 276 Braudel, F., 256 Bremer, Stuart, 97 (ft. 2), 136, 149 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (1917), 48 Bretton Woods institutions, 52, 116, 198, 276 BRIC, 173

288

Index

Britain American transition, 42–48 Dutch transition, 40 first industrial revolution, 32 Twin peaks, 71 Brooks, Stephen G., 17, 18, 27 (ft. 14) Brown, Michael E., 9 buck-passing, 18 Buddenbrook cycle, 232 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, 106, 125 (ft. 8) bulk goods, 267 Bunker, Stephen G., 64, 209, 276 Bush, George, 126 (ft. 19), 184 (ft. 2), 202 (ft. 14) Bush, George H.W., 101, 125 (ft. 1, ft. 2) Buzan, Barry, 126 (ft. 25), 127 (ft. 30), 274 Calleo, David, 21 Cappelen, A., 85 Carneiro, Robert, 268 Carroll, William K., 279 Carter, Ashton B., 149 Cashman, Greg, 133 Castells, Manuel, 242, 245, 258 Catal Huyuk, 249, 251–54 Central Civilization, 248, 281 (ft. 3) central f low theory, 243 central system, 264, 281 (ft. 3, ft. 5) Chaisson, E.J., 206–207 challenger dynamics, 164 Chamberlain, Joseph, 157 (ft. 18) Chan, Steve, 14–15, 27 (ft. 15), 138, 193–94, 201, 202 (ft. 9) Chase-Dunn, Christopher, 231, 248–50, 266–67, 270, 274, 276, 278, 286 Chiang Kai-shek, 148 Childe, G., 249–51 China charm offensive, 70 energy use, 215 U.S. transition, 21–24, 140, 147–51 China road, 19 Choucri, Nazli, 17 Christensen, Thomas J., 18 Christian, David, 267 Churchill, Winston, 44 Ciccantell, Paul S., 69, 71 (ft. 4), 276 Claude, Inis, 189 Clinton, William, 126 (ft. 19) coalition building, 65 Co-efficients, 44, 50 cognitive science, 213 Colaresi, Michael P., 132 Collins, Randall, 268 command practices, 246 commercial moral syndrome, 243–48 commercial rivalry model, 62

Communist International, 278 complex adaptive systems, 207 Concert of Europe, 152, 276 containment theory, 48 Cook, J.A., 280 Copeland, Dale C., 9, 12, 14–15, 17, 24, 75–78, 81–85, 88, 90, 92–94 Copeland, Miles, 85 Corredine, J., 224–25, 228, 230–32 Correlates of War capability measures, 126 (ft. 15), 185 (ft. 8) IGO effort, 110 Steps-to-War, 132 Cozumel, 270 Cuban Missile Crisis, 27 (ft. 13) Cupitt, Richard, 110, 112, 194 Curtin, P.D., 252 Cusack, Thomas R., 136, 149 decline overextension, 20 war, 41 decolonization waves, 273 degree centrality, 120, 124 Dehio, Ludwig, 58–59 democracy and overtaking, 16 democratization, 225, 232–33 demographic transition, 2 window of opportunity, 185 (ft. 10) Devezas, Tessaleno, 209, 211, 213, 223–25, 228, 230–32, 236–37 Diamond, Jared, 206, 263, 267, 269 DiCicco, Jonathan M., 156 (ft. 3) Diehl, Paul F., 185 (ft. 8) Dixon, William J., 143 dominant nation, 162 Domke, William, 194 Doran, Charles F., 12, 20, 26 (ft. 7), 79, 97 (ft. 1), 139, 152 Drang Nach Osten, 27 (ft. 21) Drezner, Daniel W., 202 (ft. 14) Duffy, Paul, 6 Duvall, Raymond, 103, 110 dyadic transitions and war risk, 142 dynamic differentials theory, 75–78, 84, 88, 96 Earle, Timothy, 268 East Asian financial crisis, 198 Eckholm, Erik, 127 (ft. 32) ecological marginality, 268 economic convergence, 173 economic transitions, 2 Economy, Elizabeth, 198, 202 (ft. 17) Efird, Brian, 69, 181–82 eigenvector centrality, 120, 124 Eighty Years War (1579–1648), 39

Index Ekholm, Kasja, 270 Elliott, John H., 16, 214 empire formation, 250 energy f low, 206 endowment effect, 14 energy scenarios, 213 energy transitions, 2 engagement strategies, 191, 202 (ft. 14) Engel, Jeffrey A., 52 English, Robert D., 27 (ft. 14, ft. 17) English school of international relations, 274 eotechnic system, 36 Eridu, 251 Erlanger, Steven, 127 (ft. 32) European Union e-waste law, 215 FIGOs, 122 potential as challenger, 49 power transitions, 140 United States transition, 52 Evangelista, Matthew, 19 Evans, Paul, 191, 193, 202 (ft. 17) Faust, Katherine K., 123 Fearon, James, 26 (ft. 1) Feigenbaum number, 257 Feng, Yi, 171, 179 Figo definition, 110 IGO, 126 (ft. 22) Filson, Darren, 184 (ft. 5) Finnemore, Martha, 125 (ft. 6) Fisher, Jackie, 44 f lattening world, 215 Fletcher, Roland, 264 f luid fossil fuels (FFFs), 212 Ford, Henry, 225 Forman, Shepherd, 202 (ft. 16) fossil fuel waste, 214 Fourth International, 278 Fox, Edward W., 32, 42 Fox, R.F., 207 Franco-Dutch War (1672–78), 40–41 Franco-Prussian War, 83, 169 Frederick the Great, 80 French and Indian War (1756–63), 41 Friedberg, Aaron L., 9, 17, 157 (ft. 18) Friedman, J., 257, 270 Fukuyama, F., 229 G6-7-8, 102, 173, 276 Gardner, J., 206 Gartzke, Eric, 103 Gat, Azar, 200 Gates, Bill, 225–26 Gates, Robert, 49

289

GATT-WTO, 102, 109, 121, 127 (ft. 36), 166, 276 Geller, Daniel S., 141, 143 general war, 274 generational turnover, 224 generation learning model, 232 Genna, Gaspare, 169 geographical pivot of history, 32 George, Alexander, 85 Germany airpower, 46–47 first Naval Appropriations Act (1898), 44 Gershenkron, Alexander, 268 Ghingis Khan, 184 (ft. 6) Gibbon, Edward, 16 Gibler, Douglas M., 132, 143 GIGOs (global governmental organizations), 111 Gill, Stephen, 279 Gilpin, Robert, 102, 152, 156 (ft. 3), 168 Gimpel, J., 211 Girondins, 42 Gleick, J., 207 Glenn, J., 214 Glennon, Michael J., 194 global governance, 274 global hierarchy, 162 global institutional learning process, 226 globalization, 258–59 global leadership as side effect, 147 global party formation, 278 global-regional concentration, 66–67 global-regional dissynchronization model, 56 global war, 58 Glosny, Michael A., 157 (ft. 14) Goldstein, Joshua, 235 Google, 216 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 18–20, 25, 27 (ft. 14, ft. 17) Gordon, Michael, 127 (ft. 32) Gordon, T.J., 214 Gore, Albert, 184 (ft. 2) Gowan, Peter, 277 Graber, Robert B., 272 Great Columbian Exposition, Chicago (1893), 50 Green, William, 47 Grey, Edward, 44, 147, 156 (ft. 6) Grieco, Joseph M., 196 Gruber, Lloyd, 125 (ft. 6) guardian moral governance, 243–45 guardian practices, 245 Gulf Wars asymmetric limited wars, 170 second war, 51, 121, 176, 197 Haas, Ernst B., 103 Haber-Busch process, 43–44 Hafner-Burton, Emilie, 103

290

Index

Haldane, Richard, 44 Hall, Thomas D., 206, 248, 267, 270 Hanneman, Robert, 123 Harris, J. Paul, 156 (ft. 6), 157 (ft. 18) Harris, Marvin, 268 Hart, Jeffrey, 82 Hasenclever, Andreas, 125 (ft. 3) Hassal, Arthur, 79 Haushofer, Karl, 46, 48 Hawley, Amos, 267 hegemonic stability, 102 hegemonic war theory, 156 (ft. 2) hegemon series, 275 Henehan, Marie, 132, 144 Hensel, Paul R., 132 hiding option, 18 Hirschmann-Herfindahl index, 90 Hitler, Adolf, 12–14, 45–46, 157 (ft. 10) HIV/AIDs, 198 Hobsbawm, Eric J., 278 Hong Wu, 184 (ft. 6) Hoover, Herbert, 43 hub-and-spokes pattern, 202 (ft. 15) Hugill, Peter, 4, 32, 34–36, 39–40, 42–44, 51, 125 (ft. 10), 280 Hurd, Ian, 191 Hussein, Saddam, 108 Huth, Paul K., 144, 153 Iberian Union, 39–40 IBM (International Business Machines), 216 IGOs definition, 125 (ft. 7) effects, 190–91 issue handling, 144 Ikenberry, John, 78, 97 (ft. 3), 103, 105 imperial detour, 281 (ft. 6) Imperial Economic Conference (1932), 45 imperial overstretch, 17, 271, 281 (ft. 6) import replacement theory, 252 Imwalle, Lawrence E., 106–107, 126 (ft. 14, ft. 17) industrial Revolutions, 36, 41, 50, 209, 211 Ingram, Edward, 26 (ft. 4), 103 institutional life cycles, 194 intercity trading systems, 250 International Criminal Court, 102, 121–22 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), 213 International Landmine Ban Treaty, 121 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 198, 276 International Postal Union, 277 Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), 166, 169, 184 (ft. 4) IRGOs (interregional governmental organizations), 111 iteration model, 268–70

Jacobs, Jane, 242–44, 251–54, 256–57 Jacobson, Harold K., 12, 103, 110, 194 James II, 41 Japan as challenger, 51 Jena, 42 Jericho, 249 Jisi, Wang, 154 Johnson, Allen, 268 Johnston, Alastair I., 9, 134, 191, 193, 202 (ft. 12) Jones, Eric L., 38, 47–48 Jones, Lloyd S., 80–81 Jones, Richard, 89 Jordan, Terry G., 50 Kagan, Robert, 49 Kahneman, Daniel, 14 Kandalov, Andrei, 46 Kantian trinity, 187–89 Kargil War (1999), 156 (ft. 1) Kashmir dispute, 148 Kauffman, S.A., 207 Kennedy, Paul, 9, 13, 20, 71 (ft. 4), 138, 205, 281 (ft. 6) Kent, Ann, 199, 201 (ft. 4) Keohane, Robert, 102, 125 (ft. 3), 138, 168 Keynesianism, 279 Kim, Samuel S., 189 Kim, Woosang, 79, 88 King, Gregory, 178 Kirch, Patrick V., 268–69 Knaack, Marcelle S., 48 Kondratieff waves (k-waves), 223, 225, 230 Krasner, Stephen D., 107 Krauthammer, Charles, 102 Kremer, M., 205 Kublai Khan, 184 (ft. 6) Kugler, Jacek, 11–12, 21, 78, 84, 97 (ft. 1), 102, 138–39, 154, 156 (ft. 3), 166, 168–69, 175–77, 184 (ft. 4) Kulcinski, G.L., 211 Kupchan, Charles A., 16, 49, 140, 190 Kurth, James, 195 Kurzweil, R., 207–208, 217 Kyoto Protocol, 102, 121–22 Lake, David A., 154 Lash, S., 257 Lawrence, Robert Z., 199 lead economy, 195 leadership long cycle phase model, 56–58 leadership transition and energy f low, 208 League of Augsburg, War of, 79 League of Nations, 237, 276 Lebow, Richard Ned, 9 Leeds, Brett Ashley, 127 (ft. 35) LeGates, R.T., 249

Index Leick, G., 251 Lemke, Douglas, 11–12, 97 (ft. 1), 126 (ft. 25), 127 (ft. 30), 138, 156 (ft. 3), 162–63, 167–68, 174, 184 (ft. 1, ft. 4) LePoire, D.J., 208, 215 Lerner, Daniel, 257 Levy, Jack S., 12, 14, 27 (ft. 16), 65, 82, 86–88, 95, 97 (ft. 2, ft. 4), 156 (ft. 3, ft. 5), 157 (ft. 17) Linebaugh. Peter, 277 Lipson, Charles, 196, 201 (ft. 7) Little, Richard, 274 logistic curves general equation, 228 logistic growth, 205 long cycles, 102, 225–26, 231–32 long cycles of world leadership, 131, 140–41, 223 Lovins, A.B., 214 Lovins, L.H., 214 Lucas, Robert E., Jr., 179 Luttwak, Edward, 27 (ft. 13) Lynn, John, 92 Lyytinen, K., 216 Mackinder, Halford, 32, 37, 42, 44–45, 48, 50 macrodecision, 234–35 Maddison, Angus, 70, 89, 179 Mahbubani, Kishorne, 154 major wars, 33, 81 Malthusian demographic regulator, 269 Mansbach, Richard W., 133 Mansfield, Edward, 90 Maoz, Zeev, 91, 127 (ft. 38) marcher state advantage, 268–69 Marchetti, C., 208–209 Maria Theresa, 80 Marlborough, Duke of ( John Churchill), 41 Martin, Lisa, 103 Mary, 41 Mason, Francis K., 47 Mastanduno, Michael, 201 (ft. 3) Mattelart, Armand, 277 Mattes, Michaela, 127 (ft. 35) Maull, Hans, 51 McCall Smith, James, 125 (ft. 3), 127 (ft. 26) McDermott, Rose, 14 McEvedy, Colin, 80–81, 89 McNeill, John, 267 McNeill, William H., 34, 267 Mead, Margaret, 134 Mearsheimer, John, 17, 143, 154, 165, 167, 196–97 median voter theorem, 165–66 Meiji Restoration, 51 Meinig, Donald W., 45, 47 Mellaart, J., 251 MERCUSOR, 115 Mesopotamian city primacy, 251

291

metaethnic frontier, 268 Microsoft, 216 Middle East shatter belt, 259 Millennial learning process (four-phased), 228 Millennium indicators, 27 (ft. 18) Mill’s method of agreement, 85 Milosevic, Slobodan, 184 (ft. 2) Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, 143 Modelski, George, 9, 32–34, 38, 57, 61, 72 (ft. 7), 85, 88, 90–91, 102, 106, 140–41, 147, 152, 154, 205, 223–24, 226, 228–30, 232–33, 235, 263, 266, 281 (ft. 6) Modis, T., 206, 211, 217 Mohan, C. Raja, 149, 154 Monbiot, George, 280 Mongol-China transition, 172 Montgomery, Alexander H., 103 moral syndromes, 243–45, 257 Moravcsik, Andrew, 206 Morgan, Patrick N., 141 Morgenthau, Hans J., 139, 143, 167 Moulder, Frances V., 16 Mueller, John, 16 multiple power transitions, 140 multiple rivalry model, 57 Mumford, Lewis, 32, 36, 249, 253 Murphy, Craig N., 125 (ft. 3), 277 Mutual Assured Destruction, 165 myth of the national economy, 256 NAFTA, 121, 183 Nakicenovic, N., 213 nanotechnology, 213 Napoleonic Wars, 41 nation-state dominance ending, 216 NATO, 50, 102, 109, 237 naval capabilities, 66 Navaneetham, K., 185 (ft. 10) Nayar, Baldev Raj, 157 (ft. 13) Nazi Axis, 164 neotechnic system, 36 network centrality, 123 network node theory, 268 Nixon, Richard, 27 (ft. 13) No Name Region, 252–53 nonlinear war expansion model, 62–63 nonoccurrence of world order, 104–106 Noordijk, Peter, 181–82 normative scenarios, 233 North, Robert C., 17 Notestein, Frank, 176 nuclear deterrence and long cycle, 141 Nye, Joseph S., 21, 101 Offensive realism, 17 O’Hanlon, Michael, 157 (ft. 14)

292

Index

Oksenberg, Michael, 198, 202 (ft. 17) Olson, Mancur, 82 Omori, Sawa, 126 (ft. 21), 127 (ft. 26) Oneal, John, 188, 190–91, 193–94, 201 organizational architecture, 125 (ft. 5) Organski, A.F.K., 9, 12, 21, 71, 84, 102, 138–39, 154, 156 (ft. 3), 167–68, 174, 176, 184 (ft. 4) O’Rourke, Ronald, 72 (ft. 13) Otte, T.G., 82 Oye, Kenneth, 21 Pact of Steel, 82 Paehlke, R.C., 215, 218 paleotechnic system, 36 pariah states, 197 Paris Basin, 212 parity and conf lict, 165 Parsons, Wes, 97 (ft. 1), 139 Patomaki, Heikki, 278 Paul, T.V., 26 (ft. 13), 157 (ft. 13) Pax Americana, 171 Pax Britanica, 171 peace system decay, 152 peak war risk scenario, 237–38 Pearson, Margaret M., 192, 202 (ft. 17) perils of defection, 196 Perry, D.A., 207, 233 Petrella, R., 259 Pevehouse, Jon, 110, 194, 201 (ft. 2, ft. 5), 202 (ft. 9, ft. 10) Phillip II, 39, 58 Phoenician cities, 250 Phoenix phenomenon, 12 Pitt, William (the younger), 41 Podobnik, Bruce, 214, 231 Polanyi, Karl, 270 polarity and relative decline, 10 political globalization, 276 political/military network (PMNs), 267, 281 (ft. 3, ft. 5) Politics of Fertility and Economic Development (POFED) model, 179 Ponting, C., 206 population pressure models, 266, 272 Porter, Bruce D., 195 port of trade, 270 positional competition, 10, 151 Powell, Robert, 15 power cycle, 12, 139–40 Powers, Kathy L., 201 (ft. 6) power transition, 11, 102, 131, 154–55 preventive war, 154, 157 research program, 156 (ft. 3) presidential transitions, 2 preventive war, 12–15, 26–27 (ft. 13), 81

Prigogine, I., 206–207 primal transformations, 247 Prins, Brandon, 143 pristine state, 249 Programme of Action on Illicit Trade in Small and Light Arms, 121 prospect theory, 14, 27 (ft. 16) Protestant Reformation, 276 punctuated equilibrium model, 104 Purushothaman, Roopa, 172 Quadruple Alliance, War of the, 84 Quigley, Carroll, 268 Rapkin, David P., 21, 27 (ft. 15), 71 (ft. 2) Rasler, Karen, 26 (ft. 11), 27 (ft. 19), 58, 72 (ft. 12), 80, 87–88, 97, 136, 146, 156 (ft. 2), 201 (ft. 2) Rastadt, Treaty of, 236 Raymond, Gregory A., 143 Reader, J., 251 Reaganism-Thatcherism, 279 Rediker, Marcus, 277 Reese, Ellen, 278 regional-global dissynchronization model, 58–60 regional hierarchies, 163 relational strength, 106–107 relative gains, 196 Rennstich, Joachim K., 75, 232 Reuveny, Rafael, 16, 120 RGOs (regional intergovernmental organizations), 111 Riddle, Mark, 123 Risse-Kappen, Thomas, 9 rivalry ripeness, 63 Robertson, Esmonde M., 13 Robinson, William R., 133, 277, 280 Rock, Stephen R., 9, 16–17 Roco, M.C., 213 Rodrigues, J.N., 236 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 47, 157 (ft. 12) Roosevelt, Theodore, 43 Rosecrance, Richard N., 21, 26 (ft. 3), 72 (ft. 12), 157 (ft. 16) Rosenberg, Emily S., 50 Ross, Robert S., 9 Round Table, 280 Rudgley, R., 252 Russett, Bruce M., 21, 91, 102, 138, 144, 188, 190–91, 193–94, 201, 201 (ft. 1, ft. 5, ft. 7), 202 (ft. 9) Russo-German transition, 11–14 Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), 26 (ft. 8), 51 Sabloff, Jeremy, 270 Sachs, Jeffrey, 279

Index Sahlins, M., 252, 254 Sample, Susan G., 132, 156 (ft. 4) Sanderson, Stephen K., 281 (ft. 2) Sanger, David E., 127 (ft. 32) Santos, H., 236 Sargon of Akkad, 250 Sassen, Saskia, 274, 280 satisfaction, 139 war, 170 Schelling, Thomas, 82 Schroeder, Paul, 11, 18, 81 Schulze, E.D., 207 Schwartzberg, Joseph E., 280 Schweller, Randall, 13, 16–17, 81, 83, 190, 201 (ft. 3) Segaar, Derek, 202 (ft. 16) Sehm-Patomaki, Katarina, 278 selection effects, 193 selectorate, 175 self-organized criticality, 223 semiperipheral development theory, 267–68 Sen, Gautam, 64, 71 (ft. 4) Senese, Paul D., 132, 134, 143, 151, 157 (ft. 15) Seven Years’ War, 82 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 121–22 Shanks, Cheryl, 103, 110, 112–14, 195, 197 Shaw, R. Paul, 133 shift in center of world politics, 161 Silicon Valley, 231 Silver, Beverly, 274 Simmons, Beth A., 103, 156 (ft. 8) Singer, J. David, 91, 102, 110, 112, 185 (ft. 8), 189, 194, 202 (ft. 10) Six Weeks War, 169 Skidmore, David, 125 (ft. 8) Smalley, R., 214 Smil, Vaclav, 209–210 Smith, Adam, 256 Smoot-Hawley tariff (1930), 45 Snidal, Duncan, 110 Snyder, Glenn H., 27 (ft. 13) Snyder, Jack, 18, 82 socially constructed space theory, 242, 245 societal learning model, 208 sociocultural evolution, 281 (ft. 2) Soja, E., 251–52, 254 Solow, Robert M., 171, 178–79 Soviet Union air power, 46 Chechnya, 47 decline, 17–19 Spanish-American War, 50 Spier, Fred, 206 Spiezio, Kim E., 107

293

SRGOs (Sub-regional intergovernmental organizations), 111 S-shaped growth, 208 Stam, Alan C., 194 Steps-to-war explanation, 131–38 power, 142 transition, 138 World Wars I and II, 146–47 Stinchcombe, William C., 42 Stone, L., 217 Stone, N., 92 Stout, F., 249 Strange, Susan, 21, 106–107 strategic dilemma, 236 strategic withdrawal, 25 structural strength, 107 index, 107–108 Swaine, Michael D., 202 (ft. 17) Swaminathan, Siddharth, 176–77 syndrome friendly inventions, 254–55 systemic cycles of accumulation, 270 systemic transition, 1–3 Taagepera, Rein, 264 Tainter, J.A., 206 Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., 14, 24 Tammen, Ronald L., 9, 71 (ft. 5), 78, 102, 138–39, 156 (ft. 5), 170, 174, 184 (ft. 1, ft. 4) Tannenberg, Battle of (1914), 48 Taylor, Peter J., 40, 161, 242–44, 255–58, 279–80 technological singularity, 208 technosphere, 231 Teivainen, Teivo, 278 territory geopolitical struggles, 35 military power, 35 Portugal-Spain, 39 war risk, 134, 142–45, 153–54 Tessman, Brock F., 14 Tetalman, Jerry, 280 thalassocracies, 269 Thompson, Warren S., 176 Thompson, William R., 10, 16, 18, 20–21, 23, 26 (ft. 11), 27 (ft. 15, ft. 19), 33–34, 38, 58, 60–62, 64–65, 71 (ft. 2, ft. 4), 72 (ft. 9, ft. 12, ft. 15), 80, 82, 87–88, 90, 95, 97, 97 (ft. 2), 102, 132, 136, 140–41, 143, 146–47, 152, 154, 156 (ft. 2, ft. 6), 201 (ft. 2), 229–30, 232, 235 Tilly, Charles, 34, 254 Toghon Temur, 184 (ft. 6) town-ness, 243 Toynbee, Arnold, 268 trading port, 270

294

Index

trading states cotton, 35 drugs, 35 hegemony and free trade, 33 hydrocarbons, 35 informal empire, 35 Italian city states, 38 military power, 34 protectionist economic strategies, 33 sugar, 35 Sung China, 38 Treisman, Daniel, 16 Trilateral commission, 276 Truman, Harry S., 148 Turchin, Peter, 266, 268 Tversky, Amos, 14 Twin Peaks model, 56, 60–61, 68, 71 (ft. 4) two Frances thesis, 32 type I transition (trading-territorial states), 31 economic struggles, 34 war, 37 type II transition (trading states), 31 type III transition (territorial states), 31 transition wars, 37 Ulvilla, Marco, 278 under-balancing, 82 unidirectional diffusion of conf lict, 163–64 United Nations, 237, 276, 280 United States airpower, 47 leadership and energy f low, 210 leadership renewal scenario, 236–37 leading sectors, 231–32 second industrial revolution, 32 structural strength, 108–109 Ural bomber program, 46 urban upward sweeps, 261–63, 265–66 urban revolution, 249, 254 Utrecht, Treaty of, 236 Valeriano, Brandon, 140, 153, 156 (ft. 2) Van Creveld, M., 216 Van der Woude, A., 209 Van Evera, Stephen, 85 Vasquez, John A., 10, 16, 26 (ft. 2, ft. 6), 97 (ft. 2), 102, 132–34, 136–37, 139, 142, 144, 146–48, 151, 152–53, 156, 157 (ft. 15) Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), 41 Versailles-League of Nations-Washington Conference system, 152–53 Vienna Conference, 236 Vietnam War, 48, 170, 230, 236 Volgy, Thomas, 106–107, 109, 125 (ft. 13), 126 (ft. 14, ft. 17), 201

Waever, Ole, 126 (ft. 25), 127 (ft. 30) Wallace, Michael, 102, 110, 112, 189, 194, 202 (ft. 10) Wallensteen, Peter, 143 Wallerstein, Immanuel, 36, 38, 40, 229, 247–48, 250, 255–56 Waltz, Kenneth N., 18, 23, 165, 167 Ward, Michael D., 194 War of proxy, 33 Wars of Louis XIV (1667–1714), 41 Washington Naval Treaty (1922), 45 Wasserman, Stanley, 123 Waterloo, 42, 236 Wayman, Frank W., 156 (ft. 4) weary titan, 157 (ft. 18) Wegg, John, 48 Wellington, Duke of (Arthur Wellesley), 42 Wendt, Alex, 280 Werner, Suzanne, 168, 184 (ft. 1, ft. 5) Westphalia, Peace of, 272, 274 Wever, Walther, 46 White, L., 206, 270 Whiting, Alan S., 148 Wilhelm II, 14, 147 Wilkinson, David, 102, 106, 248, 281 (ft. 3) William of Orange, 41 Wilson, Dominic, 172 Wilson, Woodrow, 102–103 Wohlforth, William C., 9, 17–18, 27 (ft. 14) Wolf, Eric R., 39 Wong, Yuwa, 133 World Bank, 276 World Economic Forum, 279 world-empire norm, 248 world federalists’ tradition, 280 world power limited scenario, 237 world revolution, 276 World Social Forum, 29, 27 world socialization, 227 world state formation, 280 world-system transition, 247 World Wars I and II as total wars, 169 WTO, 144, 156 (ft. 8) Chinese participation, 199 Yalta Conference, 229, 236 Yesilada, Birol, 166, 181–82 Zelinsky, Wilbur, 49, 50 Zheng, Bijan, 70 Zheng He, 184 (ft. 6) Zhu Di, 184 (ft. 6) Zhu Gaozhi, 184 (ft. 6) Zhu Yunwen, 184 (ft. 6)