Terror on the High Seas: From Piracy to Strategic Challenge

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Terror on the High Seas

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Terror on the High Seas From Piracy to Strategic Challenge Volume 1 Yonah Alexander and Tyler B. Richardson, editors

Forewords by James Arden Barnett, Jr., Robert J. Cox, and Ingar Skaug

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC

Copyright 2009 by Yonah Alexander and Tyler B. Richardson All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Terror on the high seas : from piracy to strategic challenge / Yonah Alexander and Tyler B. Richardson, eds. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-0-275-99750-2 (hard copy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99751-9 (ebook) 1. Piracy. 2. Maritime terrorism. 3. Piracy—United States. 4. Maritime terrorism— United States. I. Alexander, Yonah. II. Richardson, Tyler B. K5277.T47 2009 345'.0264—dc22 2009022867 13

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents

Foreword by James Arden Barnett, Jr. Foreword by Robert J. Cox

xxiii xxv

Foreword by Ingar Skaug

xxvii

Preface

xxix

Acknowledgments

xlvii

VOLUME 1 1

Maritime Terrorism: An Overview of Challenges and Responses

1

Yonah Alexander

2

A Deﬁnitional Perspective

2

Historical and Contemporary Threats

8

Responses: Unilateral and Multilateral

24

Observations and Conclusions

33

Maritime Security and Terrorism: Some Interdisciplinary Perspectives (1981) History of the High Seas: Moral Defense for a Maritime Civilization

41 41

Jeffrey St. John

The Role of Maritime Industry in Defense of ‘Free World’ Nations Admiral (Ret.) Thomas H. Moore

44

Contents

vi

International Terrorism: Unconventional Warfare

46

Yonah Alexander

Maritime Terrorism

51

Brian Jenkins

Status of ‘Free World’ Maritime Contingency Planning

56

D. N. Cassidy

Status of ‘Free World’ Maritime Contingency Planning

58

Paul Wilkinson

Status of ‘Free World’ Maritime Contingency Planning

61

RADM Wayne E. Caldwell

Offshore Terrorism: Are We Prepared?

63

Congressman Carroll Hubbard

Offshore & Maritime Pipeline Facilities

66

Paul Wilkinson

Shipping & Maritime Terminals

68

Col. (Ret., U.S. Army) Douglas G. Macnair

Maritime Security—A National Dilemma

70

Capt. (Ret., USCGR) A. Robert Matt & Robert L. Patcha (Ret., USCGR)

3

Achille Lauro Hijacking: Case Study (1985)

75

Selected Executive Statements On the Achille Lauro Hijacking Incident

75

Larry M. Speakes Principle Deputy Press Secretary October 10, 1985

Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters

77

President Ronald Reagan October 11, 1985

“On the Italian Government’s Release of Palestinian Terrorist, Abu el Abbas” Larry M. Speakes Principle Deputy Press Secretary October 13, 1985

80

Contents

vii

Selected Congressional Statements Mr. Arafat Owes the World Some Explanations

81

Congressman Charles E. Schumer October 9, 1985

The Ugly Face of Terrorism

82

Senator Mark O. Hatﬁeld October 10, 1985

Resolution Condemning the Murder of Leon Klinghoffer

84

Congressman Ted Weiss October 10, 1985

Striking Back

85

Congressman Bob McEwen October 11, 1985

Condemning Egyptian Actions in the Achille Lauro Affair

86

Congressman Harry Reid October 15, 1985

Cutting Off Aid to Egypt

87

Congressman George Darden October 16, 1985

America’s Allies Offer Scant Support of Antiterrorism Efforts

88

Congressman Eldon Rudd October 16, 1985

Victory over Terrorism

88

Congresswoman Barbara A. Mikulski October 17, 1985

The Killing of Leon Klinghoffer by International Terrorists aboard the Achille Lauro

89

Senator Robert Byrd and Senator Allen K. Simpson March 27, 1986

Commemorating Achille Lauro’s 10th Anniversary

91

Senator Alfonse M. D’Amato October 26, 1995

Court Case Ilsa and Lisa Klinghoffer v. Achille Lauro, 1991

92

Contents

viii

4

USS Cole Bombing: Case Study (2000)

107

The Investigation into the Attack on the USS Cole, May 2001 Report of the House Armed Services Committee Staff Executive Summary

107

Introduction

110

The Genesis of the HASC Investigation

110

The Department of Defense and Department of the Navy Investigations

112

The Navy Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) Report

115

U.S. Central Command and Its Area of Responsibility

116

The U.S. Policy of Engagement

118

Intelligence

121

Collection Analysis Dissemination

122 123 124

Threat Levels and Threat Conditions

126

Vulnerability Assessments

128

Force Protection

129

The Navy’s Antiterrorism/Force Protection Training Program

130

Force Protection Measures and the Rules of Engagement

131

Operational Issues

136

Appendices Appendix A: Summary of Observations and Recommendations Appendix B: List of Brieﬁngs and Interviews Appendix C: Threat Condition (THREATCON) Measures 5

Threats and United States Responses to Maritime Challenges

141 145 147

155

Border Protection and Customs

155

Federal Law Enforcement

155

Admiral James M. Loy Department of Transportation, United States Coast Guard Before the Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources December 5, 2001

Contents

ix

Port Safety

160

Douglas M. Browning Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, and Merchant Marine July 2, 2002

U.S. Customs Service’s Counterterrorism Efforts at Home and Abroad

163

Robert C. Bonner U.S. Customs Commissioner Foreign Press Center Brieﬁng, Washington DC January 14, 2003

CBP Expands Enforcement of the 24-Hour Rule

166

Customs and Border Protection, United States Department of Homeland Security May 1, 2003

Review of CBP Actions Taken to Intercept Suspected Terrorists at U.S. Ports of Entry

167

Ofﬁce of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security June 2006

Port Security

169

The Interim Final Regulations on Port Security

169

Admiral Thomas H. Collins U.S. Coast Guard Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation July 22, 2003

“President Discusses Port Security”

171

President George W. Bush Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary, The White House February 21, 2006

“Testimony of Susan J. Monteverde” Vice President American Association of Port Authorities Before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Homeland Security February 13, 2007

172

Contents

x

Container Security

176

Container Security

176

Capitan Anthony Regalbuto United States Coast Guard Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Marine Transportation March 13, 2002

Container Security Initiative: 2006–2011 Strategic Plan

178

Ofﬁce of Policy and Planning Ofﬁce of International Affairs, Container Security Initiative Division, United States Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security August 2006

United States Government Accountability Ofﬁce “Supply Chain Security”

181

To the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Investigations, and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce January 2008

Transportation Security

186

International Maritime Security

186

Michael J. Crye President, International Council of Cruise Lines Before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, and the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources December 13, 2005

6

U.S. Organizational Structure: The Role of the Executive

197

Interagency Framework

197

“Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat”

197

GAO Report May 2003

The White House

202

“National Maritime Day Proclamations”

202

President George W. Bush 2001–2007

Contents

xi

Maritime Security Policy

209

National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13 December 21, 2004

The National Strategy for Maritime Security

217

The White House September 2005

Department of Homeland Security

219

Fact Sheet, Port Security: A Comprehensive Approach

219

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary June 2003

Secure Seas, Open Ports: Keeping Our Waters Safe, Secure, and Open for Business

224

United States Department of Homeland Security June 21, 2004

DHS Announces West Coast Maritime Radiation Detection Project

231

Department of Homeland Security, Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary September 5, 2007

United States Coast Guard

232

Port and Maritime Security Strategy

232

Admiral James M. Loy United States Coast Guard Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation December 6, 2001

Coast Guard and America’s Security

236

United States Coast Guard 2002

Before the Gathering Storm Admiral Thomas H. Collins National Defense University Distinguished Lecture Program, Washington DC October 9, 2002

239

Contents

xii

A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-First-Century Seapower

249

Admiral Thad W. Allen Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security Before the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives December 13, 2007

Department of Transportation

256

Port Security: A National Planning Guide

256

United States Department of Transportation 1997

Security of U.S. Ports

268

The Honorable Norman Y. Mineta Secretary of Transportation Before House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation December 6, 2001

The Security of Our Seaports

275

William G. Schubert Maritime Administrator Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information February 26, 2002

Department of Defense

281

Hearing on the President’s FY 2005 Budget Request for the Department of Defense

281

General Richard B. Myers, USAF Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before the Committee on Armed Services May 12, 2004

A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-First Century Seapower

284

United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, and United States Coast Guard October 2007

Commanders Discuss AFRICOM and Maritime Partnership General William Ward and Admiral Henry Ulrich Commander, U.S. Africa Command and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe United States Department of Defense, Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) October 15, 2007

295

Contents

xiii

Federal Maritime Commission

302

Remarks by Harold J. Creel Chairman, Federal Maritime Commission 2nd International Gwangyang Port Forum Gwangyang, Korea April 25, 2002

Scanning the Horizon: Some Observations on the Changing Maritime Scene

304

Steven R. Blust Chairman, Federal Maritime Commission At the Plimsoll Club, New Orleans, Louisiana October 27, 2006

State Department

310

Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea

310

Maureen O’C. Walker Acting Deputy Director, Ofﬁce of Oceans Affairs U.S. Statement to the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and Law of the Sea New York, New York May 10, 2001

International Outreach and Coordination Strategy for the National Strategy for Maritime Security

313

United States Department of State November 2005

Preventing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism in the Maritime Supply Chain

319

Thomas Lehrman Director, Ofﬁce of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Maritime Security Expo New York, New York September 20, 2006

Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Ratiﬁcation of the 1994 Agreement Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention John D. Negroponte Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of State Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee September 27, 2007

325

Contents

xiv

Federal Bureau of Investigation

337

Homeland Security: Facilitating Trade and Securing Seaports

337

James F. Jarobe Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations August 5, 2002

Covering the Waterfront—A Review of Seaport Security since September 11, 2001

344

Gary M. Bald Acting Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security January 27, 2004

The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Protect the Nation’s Seaports

348

Audit Report 06–26 Ofﬁce of the Inspector General-Audit Division, United States Department of Justice March 2006

International Cooperation

357

Q&A Session

357

Admiral Thomas Fargo USN Commander, U.S. Paciﬁc Command Before the House Armed Services Committee March 31, 2004

U.S. Coast Guard International Maritime Security Strategy Vice Admiral D. Brian Peterman Commander Atlantic Area, U.S. Coast Guard 6th Regional Seapower Symposium for the Navies of the Mediterranean and Black Sea Countries Venice, Italy October 10–13, 2006

359

Contents

xv

VOLUME 2 7

U.S. Organizational Structure: The Role of the Legislature

363

Selected Congressional Research Service and Government Accountability Ofﬁce Reports

363

Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain

363

Margaret Wrightson Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues Government Accountability Ofﬁce Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation May 17, 2005

Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities

383

John F. Frittelli and Paul W. Parfomak Analysts in Transportation, Resources, Science, and Industry Division Congressional Research Service Report for Congress January 9, 2007

Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act Status and Implementation One Year Later

390

Stephen L. Caldwell Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues Government Accountability Ofﬁce Before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism October 20, 2007

Congressional Hearings

393

Seaport Security Hearing in Seattle

393

Senator Patty Murray July 1, 2002

Contents

xvi

Department of Homeland Security Law Enforcement Efforts at U.S. Ports of Entry

397

Representatives Howard Coble, North Carolina, and Robert C. Scott, Virginia Opening Statements Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security March 15, 2005

Legislation

400

Protecting America’s Ports, Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002

400

United States Department of Homeland Security, Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary July 2003

Presidential Statement on the Port Security Improvement Act of 2006

411

President George W. Bush The White House, Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary September 14, 2006

8

International Perspectives: Regional and Global Regional Perspectives Southeast Asia ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Security

417 417 417 417

Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum June 17, 2003

APEC and Maritime Security Measures

420

Ambassador Makarim Wibisono Chairman of the APEC Counterterrorism Task Force Presented to the APEC High-Level Conference on Maritime Security Manila, Philippines September 8–9, 2003

Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia ReCAAP Agreement, Tokyo, Japan November 11, 2004

425

Contents

xvii

The Batam Joint Statement of the 4th Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the Littoral States on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

433

Batam, Indonesia August 2, 2005

Factsheet on the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)

435

ReCAAP Information Sharing Center November 29, 2006

Counterterrorism in Maritime Operations

438

Philip Ruddock Attorney General, Australia Port and Maritime Security and Counterterrorism Summit 2007 Langham Hotel, Melbourne, Australia May 1, 2007

Africa Pirates Pursue American Ship

444 444

U.S. Overseas Security Advisory Council, Safety & Security Sub-Saharan Africa—Somalia December 22, 2006

Coordinated Action Urged as Piracy Threatens UN Lifeline to Somalia

445

Joint Communiqué, IMO Brieﬁng 23 International Maritime Organization July 10, 2007

Africa Command: A Historic Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement—If Done Right

448

Dr. J. Peter Pham Director, the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs James Madison University Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health August 2, 2007

Public Announcement East Africa Consular Affairs Bulletins U.S. Overseas Security Advisory Council August 31, 2007

458

Contents

xviii

South America & the Caribbean Naval Forces from Eight Countries Train to Protect Panama Canal

459 459

Press Release Embassy of the United States, Panama August 10, 2004

Argentina Becomes the First South American Country to Sign Container Security Initiative Declaration of Principles

461

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Ofﬁce of Public Affairs May 11, 2005

Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin

462

Stephen L. Caldwell Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, General Accountability Ofﬁce Government Accountability Ofﬁce Report Summary June 29, 2007

Global Multilateral Perspectives European Union (EU) EU Presidency Statement—Piracy at Sea

468 468 468

EU statement in discussion panel B: Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea, European Union at United Nations, New York City Dr. Marie Jacobsson Alternate Head of Delegation of Sweden on behalf of the European Union May 10, 2001

An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels October 10, 2007

473

Contents

xix

NATO Combating Terrorism in the Mediterranean

475 475

Vice Admiral Roberto Cesaretti Commander, NATO Operation Endeavour NATO Review, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Autumn 2005

Combating Terrorism at Sea

480

NATO Active Endeavour Brieﬁng: NATO Naval Operations, Proliferation Security Initiative, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, North Atlantic Treaty Organization June 2006

United Nations Convention on the High Seas

485 485

United Nations April 29, 1958

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Overview and Full Text

495

United Nations Ofﬁce of Legal Affairs, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea December 10, 1982

Maritime Security, ISPS Code Implementation, Costs, and Related Financing

497

UNCTAD Secretariat United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations March 14, 2007

International Maritime Organization Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts against Passengers and Crews on Board Ships

501 501

International Maritime Organization September 26, 1986

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation International Maritime Organization March 10, 1988

505

Contents

xx

Focus on IMO: Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea

511

International Maritime Organization January 2000

IMO Adopts Comprehensive Maritime Security Measures

523

Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 International Maritime Organization December 9–13, 2002

IMO 2004: Focus on Maritime Security

532

World Maritime Day 2004 Background Paper International Maritime Organization September 27, 2004

Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia

550

International Maritime Organization Resolution A.[...] (25) (Agenda item 19(a)) Adopted on November 29, 2007

9

Private-Sector Perspectives: Industry and Trade Organizations Intercargo Direction Paper

561 561

International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners January 24, 2001

Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism against Shipping, Port and Maritime Security, Guidance for the Development of Ship and Port Security Plans

567

International Association of Ports and Harbors and International Chamber of Shipping Maritime Safety Committee, 75th Session Agenda Item 17

International Maritime Organization April 12, 2002

Port and Maritime Security International Association of Ports and Harbors IAPH Policy and Guidance Paper April 23, 2002

572

Contents

xxi

BIMCO’s Vision and Objectives

578

The Baltic and International Maritime Council June 17, 2004

An Introduction to the IFSMA

579

International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations October 2004

Remarks of Christopher Koch

581

President and CEO World Shipping Council Before the Maritime Security Expo 2006 New York City September 19, 2006

Selected Bibliography

595

Index

603

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Foreword James Arden Barnett, Jr.

Piracy is the second-oldest profession on the high seas, just behind those seafarers who derive their living from the sea and from commerce over the waves. Since humans ﬁrst put to sea, piracy, maritime terrorism, and smuggling have been tools that affect what happens on the land, sometimes profoundly. Even as the methods and instruments of piracy and waterborne terrorism have changed, the motivations for piracy and inﬂicting terror in the maritime domain have remained constant over the centuries: money, public attention, or inﬂuence over governments. Recent piratical attacks and maritime terrorism have forced the caricatures of cutlass-wielding Jack Sparrows and black-bearded Edward Teaches out of the public perception and brought the realization that piracy is very much an ongoing feature of modern political, sociological, and economic life. Those events illustrate anew the truth of the Greek proverb: “Where there is a sea, there are pirates.” Without doubt, that will continue. Piracy and maritime terrorism endure because of the richness of the target vessels, cargoes, and facilities; the remoteness of the criminal acts from capable authorities in the vast ocean or secluded waterway; and often the symbolism of the vessel's ﬂag or the nationality of its passengers or crew. These factors are not likely to change. What can change is the national and international response to the modern tactics and modalities of piracy and maritime terrorism; and that response must begin with a deep understanding of the modern history of piracy and maritime terrorism; the panoply of political, industrial, and military responses; and the development of thought by outstanding policy leaders, academicians, and practitioners in combating terror at sea. Piracy evokes major national and international turmoil, action, and expenditures. Navies have come into existence due to piracy. Governments have appeared impotent in the face of maritime terrorism. Legislatures, parlia-

xxiv

Foreword

ments, and congresses have debated these events hotly, and industry and the public have clamored for solutions. National and international action must be preceded by careful analysis, with full mental rigor, of the courses of action that are best taken to battle terror on the high seas and the inland waterways. In navigation, the ﬁrst crucial step in charting where you are going is to ascertain where you are. Professor Yonah Alexander and Tyler Richardson have compiled an outstanding and comprehensive review of piracy and terrorism at sea, an essential tool for anyone desiring to understand and ﬁght this timeless, yet modern, threat to public safety, international security, and commerce. They have crafted this book to provide government leaders, policy makers, academicians, law enforcement ofﬁcials, and the maritime industry, with the body of knowledge (easily accessible) that they will need, to achieve a deep understanding of where we are in addressing terror on the high seas-the indispensable prerequisite for charting the future through pirate-infested waters. James Arden Barnett, Jr., J.D. Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired) Senior Research Fellow Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

Foreword Robert J. Cox

America's challenge, in the present and future course of her military transformation, is to achieve the right balance (as articulated by Secretary Gates) between conventional and asymmetric capabilities. By their very size and remote reaches, the near-shore coastal waters of the earth's surface create safe havens for illegal activities-activities which we have yet to develop the capabilities to address. Piracy is a singular manifestation of the global challenge of preventing larger wars. The challenges of piracy, narco-terrorism, human trafﬁcking, and a range of other illicit activities, and how the United States and her global partners address these challenges, will determine global success in the Phase Zero ﬁght. National military capabilities have always existed for the purpose of going to war when required. They have also existed for the purpose of preventing war by making it unlikely for a challenger to succeed in a kinetic ﬁght. But the world has changed. The kinetic war will always be the ﬁnal outcome to be prevented. However, the might of nations' militaries is now being challenged by non-state-sponsored terrorists and pirates, who are not threatened by the sophisticated capabilities of the world's global militaries. They sow their seeds of discontent and disaffection in disenfranchised coastal populations over many years. They are patient, because they understand that time favors their strategic goals. They are stealthy and agile, able to employ simple, effective, and cheap kinetic violence when they wish. They build friendships and local support with populations who are not able to distinguish the good guys from the bad guys. They can hide, to strike when not observed, and they can stand down the most sophisticated warship on the high seas. The United States and other global partners-both developed and developing-must shift their framework of prevention of war, from military might to partner-nation engagement. Denying safe havens in the near-shore coastal

xxvi

Foreword

arena will prevent the unchallenged use of these maritime domains by those who would deny the freedom of the seas. An asymmetric transformation, of developing the right capabilities of soft power and hard power, when required, will make the difference in the success of this global challenge. Helping nations and building partner-nation capacity will plant the seeds of success that can combat the seeds of disaffection. Like piracy centuries ago, piracy and other illicit activities today have emerged as the premier challenge to our current conventional capabilities. The modern pirate's skilled tactics, just like those of pirates centuries ago, can out-maneuver and avoid the kinetic wrath of sophisticated navies. There will always be an absolute need for conventional military power. However, the sophistication of our enemies in the irregular warfare dimension will challenge the traditional Title 10 approach to warfare-and this is currently challenging the ability of the United States to transform our military might. The sophistication of our present-day opponents in this asymmetric ﬁght must be matched by an equal sophistication of understanding and action by our present-day military leaders. Professor Yonah Alexander and Tyler Richardson have succinctly and expertly captured the essence of this challenge. Robert J. Cox, Rear Admiral USN (Ret.) General Managing Partner, Maritime Security Strategies, LLC Former Commander, Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group

Foreword Ingar Skaug

The English word “pirate” is derived from the Latin pirata and the Greek peirates, meaning “attempt”-implying a search for luck or good fortune at sea. Such an attempt was extremely dangerous, and the English word “peril” also has its roots in the same Greek and Latin words. Loosely, the root words came to mean “travelers of the sea.” Most people imagine pirates as rebellious seafarers on armed vessels, raising their “Jolly Roger” skull-and-crossbones ﬂag when preparing to hijack a vessel. This symbol has been adopted by the entertainment industry, and I do believe that most of us recall childhood memories of stories about pirates chasing buried treasures and hidden fortunes. Maritime piracy has existed as long as seafarers have used the oceans as trade routes in all parts of the world. The best-known and farthest-reaching pirates of the Middle Ages in Europe were the Vikings, warriors from the Scandinavian countries who raided wildly during this era. Today, seaborne piracy against commercial vessels remains a signiﬁcant threat, and the number of reported attacks has increased over the last years. Global centers of piracy include, among others, the waters between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the Somali coast, the Strait of Malacca, the South China Sea, and the Niger Delta. Modern pirates take advantage of unstable societies on shore and narrow waters where ships must lower their cruising speeds to allow for safe navigation and trafﬁc control. In addition, the small number of crew members onboard commercial cargo vessels makes these vessels vulnerable to pursuit and capture by pirates. It was the lack of a centralized power during the Middle Ages in Europe that allowed the Vikings to raid across the continent at that time. Today, the

xxviii

Foreword

international community still faces many problems in bringing modern pirates to justice. Gaining a greater understanding of the strategic challenges related to piracy will give us the necessary means to ﬁght the increasing number of pirate attacks around the world. Collaboration between ships owners, cargo owners, governmental bodies, and international institutions is a prerequisite in the ﬁght against terrorism and piracy. In this book, Professor Yonah Alexander and Tyler Richardson will give the reader a comprehensive understanding of the strategic challenges related to piracy, through well-documented background material and case studies. These materials cover a wide range of global, regional, and local perspectives and will provide important knowledge and a deeper understanding of the challenges we all now face on the high seas. This book will serve as an important resource to businesses, governments, and schools, to bring us closer to viable solutions and jurisdictions in the ﬁght against piracy. Ingar Skaug GCEO, Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA Norway

Preface

Terrorism—as a tool, method, process, and projection of psychological and physical violence in violation of law—is not new in history. Although such tactics and strategies employed by both nonstate and government agencies in the name of “higher” ideological, theological, and nationalistic principles to attain political, social, and economic objectives date from time immemorial, it is the twentieth century and even early twenty-ﬁrst century that are unique in the extraordinary scale of the globalization and brutalization of this mode of waging war by other means. After all, the murder of the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo by a Serbian terrorist ignited World War I. Furthermore, the powerful dictatorships of Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin, and Mao Tse-Tung practiced terrorism from “above.” These dictators utilized revolutionary intimidation and force to seize, maintain, and increase power in destroying the landlord class, the rich peasantry, the intelligentsia, and other perceived enemies in the process of establishing and expanding a new political and legal order. Although these tyrants and totalitarian regimes are gone, their modus operandi is still responsible for grave international disorder on every continent. To be sure, contemporary terrorism is another manifestation of totalitarianism. Consider the challenge of the global network of terrorism for the past four decades. More speciﬁcally, experience indicates that terrorist groups thrive on collaboration across national boundaries. Shared ideologies and commitments to radical strategies, such as professed struggles against capitalism, imperialism, racism, Zionism, and democracies, motivate groups to work together on an international scale. The informal and formal relationships among various terrorist groups and state sponsors have resulted in a national, regional, and global framework for terror. The international character of many terrorist efforts often compounds the difﬁculty of identifying the initiator or sponsor of a given terrorist act.

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Clearly, Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda is the most elaborate international terrorist network operating around the world, with dire consequences to the security interests of the United States and its friends and allies. That is, alQaeda (the Base), also known as the International Front for the Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, the Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites, and the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, operates in over 90 countries. Al-Qaeda seeks to “unite all Muslims and establish a government which follows the rule of the Caliphs,” according to bin Laden’s strategic plan. To achieve al-Qaeda’s goal, Muslim regimes, viewed as corrupted by the United States and other Western inﬂuences, must be overthrown by force. Since, in the viewpoint of bin Laden, the United States in particular supports corrupt governments such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, he declared jihad (holy war) against the “Great Satan” (the United States). Bin Laden’s disdain for the United States also stems from the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia— home to Mecca and Medina, the two holiest sites of Islam. In several fatwas (religious rulings) issued by bin Laden and his associates in the past decade, Muslims were instructed to kill Americans, including civilians, anywhere in the world where they can be found. Muslims are, then, duty-bound to prepare as much force as possible to attack the “enemies of God.” Indeed, in the post-9/11 environment, tomorrow’s terrorists will continue to utilize a broad range of conventional weapons, including explosives and missiles, as illustrated by suicide bombings worldwide. The arsenals of future terrorist operations will most likely consist of mass destruction instruments, such as biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear, and cyber terrorism. In the face of such devastating dangers, the question is not if the worst is yet to come, but when super terrorism will occur and what consequences it will have for national, regional, and global security concerns. What is also challenging to the global security system in the twenty-ﬁrst century is the expansion of violence in the maritime environment. The proliferation of piracy, insurgency, and terrorism is a stark case in point. More speciﬁcally, the tactics utilized by these actors include hijacking, arms smuggling, human trafﬁcking, drug trafﬁcking, assaulting land-based maritime facilities, shelling tankers, ﬁring rockets at port energy infrastructures, launching seaborne raids against civilian targets on land, attacking offshore oil rigs, and bombing vessels in port. Piracy most dramatically reﬂects the current serious maritime security situation: • Some 95 ships were attacked and more than 39 of them have been hijacked in 2008 off Somalia. In 2007, a total of 31 incidents were recorded, and in 2006, only 10 cases were reported. • Piracy ransoms are partially funding insurgencies in Somalia and Africa as a whole. • Some 14 ships are still detained by Somali pirates and approximately 330 crew members from 25 countries are being held hostage.

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Among the maritime incidents reported by the media in 2008, the following attacks are noteworthy: pirates seized a Spanish tuna boat off Somalia (April 20), an Iranian bulk carrier and Japanese-operated tanker were hijacked by Somali pirates (August 21), pirates grabbed a Ukrainian ship loaded with 33 Russian-made T-72 tanks and numerous weapons off Somalia (September 25), armed rebels killed a Nigerian sailor during an assault on a U.S. Chevron oil facility in Southern Nigeria (November 7), a Chinese ﬁshing boat with 24 people on board was captured off Kenya by “unidentiﬁed persons” (November 14), and separate bands of attackers seized a Thai ship with 16 crew members and an Indian vessel with a crew of 25 in the Gulf of Aden (November 18). To be sure, the record of violence in the maritime environment indicates that vessels, citizens, and interests of additional countries were targeted— namely Italy, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Georgia, Greece, Malaysia, Brunei, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Egypt, and Syria. Several other realities should also be noted. First, the demands for ransom made by the pirates are, in most cases, met in order to secure the release of crew members kidnapped. This kind of response encouraged pirates to continue carrying out attacks since they became aware that their tactics paid off. Second, although the economic impact of piracy is hard to gauge, estimates of global piracy costs range from $250 million to $16 billion a year. Third, in many countries in Southeast Asia, the frequency and ﬁscal damage of piracy is less than that of shore-based crimes. Therefore, there is a tendency to place piracy low on the list of law enforcement priorities. And fourth, what makes acts of piracy against ships difﬁcult to combat is the lack of effective law enforcement and prosecution of offenders. This makes piracy extremely attractive to criminals, promising easy money at low risk. In sum, the piracy record reveals that thousands of attacks were mounted since the 1980s in all regions of the world. For instance, the number of incidents reported to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN), between 1984 and 2002 was 2,678. Unfortunately, it is widely recognized that these ﬁgures are far below the number of actual cases. Shipowners often choose not to report such attacks because of the cost they would incur by their ships being immobilized by an inquiry. On the other hand, it is obvious that when a dramatic attack is undertaken, the incident is unavoidably widely reported by the media. The most spectacular and unprecedented incident recorded is the capture by Somali pirates of a fully laden Saudi supertanker, the Sirius Star (1,080 feet long, dead weight 318,000 tons), with a cargo of 2 million barrels of oil worth more than $100 million. This hijacking occurred off the coast of eastern Africa (some 450 nautical miles southeast of Mombasa, Kenya) outside the “security zone” in the Gulf of Aden that various military ships have been patrolling since summer 2008. The brazen attack on the biggest tanker ever hijacked, which had a

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crew of 25 people (including British, Croatian, Polish, Filipino, and Saudi nationals), began on November 16, 2008. The pirates subsequently moved the tanker close to their base at Harad, some 180 miles from Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, where they have total control of the area. Meanwhile, the Saudis vowed to retake the ship, and apparently negotiations with the ship owners for a passable ransom have begun. Regardless of the outcome of the Sirius Star case, the implications for maritime security are discouraging. For instance, a major Norwegian shipping group, Odfjell SE, already ordered its more than 90 tankers to sail around Africa rather than use the Suez Canal to avoid attacks by pirates. Clearly, piracy is not the only challenge in the maritime environment. Both insurgents and terrorists have been active in modern times. A partial list of contemporary perpetrators include the Somalia National Movement (SNM), the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), Marxist Popular Forces 25 April (FP-25), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Abu Sayyaf, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Jama’ah al-Islamiya, Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP-GC), the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Abu Nidal Organization, Hizballah, the Japanese Red Army (JRA), the Movement of 19 April (M-19), anti-Castro groups, Puerto Rican independence terrorists, and single-issue political extremists such as antiabortion and animal rights radicals. The aforementioned insurgent and terrorist groups have been involved in thousands of attacks in the post-WWII period. For instance, on October 20, 2001, LTTE suicide attackers rammed their ﬁve boats into a ship carrying fuel off the coast of Sri Lanka. This operation was carried out in retaliation for a Sri Lanka naval attack on the terrorist Sea Tiger base earlier that month. For the past decade, however, it has been widely recognized that the most serious threat to maritime security is the challenge posed by Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. One of its important military components is a maritime capability consisting of a ﬂeet ranging from an estimated 15 to 300 vessels. Al-Qaeda’s tactical methods include shipment of weapons and deployment of ships as bombs directed against naval targets, critical infrastructure, and port cities and straits. In October 2000, for instance, a spectacular al-Qaeda suicide attack by a small boat against the USS Cole in the port of Aden killed 17 American sailors. Also, in June 2002, Moroccan authorities arrested three operatives planning attacks on U.S., British, and Israeli ships in the Strait of Gibraltar. And, in October of that year, a French-ﬂagged oil tanker, the Limburg, was attacked by al-Qaeda members in the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, it has been reported that Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, identiﬁed as al-Qaeda’s maritime operations chief, who was arrested in November 2002, planned to attack U.S. ships in the Strait of Hormuz. In short, two conclusions are apparent. First, attacks on shipping allow al-Qaeda to disrupt the global economy, divert resources to protect the seas, and serve as a vehicle for

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recruiting. And second, al-Qaeda is interested not only in destroying shipping but also in using vessels to close maritime lanes and conducting seaborne mass casualty attacks. One of the most spectacular terrorist assaults recorded in the post-9/11 period took place in Mumbai between November 27, 2008, and November 29, 2008. Ten determined terrorists, reportedly members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (a Pakistani-based movement with al-Qaeda afﬁliation and dedicated to “liberating” Kashmir from India’s rule), spread terror, death, and chaos in the subcontinent’s economic and ﬁnancial capital. The city of some 14 million turned into a war zone for three days. The purpose of this attack was to cause random and selected mass casualties (both Indian and foreigners), take hostages as “human shields” for safe passage, confuse response forces, and further destabilize the region by undermining the peace process between India and Pakistan. When the bloody assaults on eight different sites in Mumbai were ended by the Indian security forces, the human cost was horriﬁc: nearly 200 people were killed, including 22 foreigners, and over 200 were injured. What is of particular tactical and strategic concern is that the terrorists hijacked a ﬁshing trawler at sea that was used to launch their land attacks. More speciﬁcally, the unfolding piracy-terrorist maritime drama began when a private Indian ﬁshing boat with ﬁve crew members sailed from the western Gujarat state in mid-November 2008. At some point afterward, the trawler was hijacked at sea by a group of attackers probably boarding a mother vessel at the Pakistan port of Karachi. Once in control of the trawler, the terrorists slit the throat of one of the crew members. Three nautical miles off Mumbai, the attackers abandoned the vessel, opened inﬂatable dinghies they were carrying, and sailed into the city coast on November 26, some 10 hours before splitting into four assault units. Apparently the terrorists’ plan was to return to Pakistan with the same abandoned trawler. In sum, one of the implications of this latest drama is that the international community must beware of possible conventional and unconventional seaborne terrorist plots in the future. In view of the foregoing dangers, it is important to underscore several security problems. For example, globally, there are some 15 million containers in circulation and approximately 120,000 merchant ships that require some sort of security protection. There is also a concern of tracking difﬁculties such as renaming, repainting, and reregistering ships. Additionally, ﬁctional corporations are formed by owners of these vessels to disguise them. On the national level, the United States is a case in point. The following are some of the security concerns: • Over 95 percent of overseas trade enters through U.S. seaports. • U.S. seaports annually account for 2 billion tons and $800 billion of domestic and international freight.

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• Each year, approximately 9 million containers enter the United States via seaports. • 5.2 percent of those that reach American ports are screened with x-ray and gamma ray devices. • 3 percent of the 6 million metal boxes that arrive in the U.S. ports are subject to search. • 26,000 miles of commercially navigable waterways service 361 U.S. ports. • The strategic military value of many ports and waterways. • Seaborne shipment of approximately 3.3 billion barrels of oil each year. • 78 million Americans are engaged in recreational boating. • 6 million cruise ship passengers travel each year from U.S. ports. • Ferry system transports 180 million passengers annually. • Waterways support 110,000 commercial ﬁshing vessels, contributing $111 billion to state economies. • 8,100 foreign vessels make 50,000 U.S. port calls each year. • Existing maritime smuggling networks can facilitate the illicit movement of people and equipment into the United States, particularly as legal points of entry are hardened.

It is not surprising that in the face of the vulnerabilities in the maritime environment, states, on both unilateral and multilateral levels, have responded to the numerous challenges in accordance with their speciﬁc concerns. Regarding the piracy threats, for instance, in 2008 alone, the following measures undertaken should be mentioned: the U.S. Navy ﬁred at Somali hijackers of a Russian ship (February 12), Somali troops stormed a Dubai vessel and arrested seven pirates (April 22), the French army freed hostages off the coast of Somalia (September 16), the UN adopted a new Somalia piracy resolution (October 7), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) dispatched ships to tackle Somali pirates (October 9), Russian and British frigates joined forces to thwart a pirate attack on a Danish cargo vessel off the coast of Somalia (November 12), and the Indian Navy ship Tabar sank a suspected mother ship used by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden (November 19). It is expected that similar and other appropriate responses will be applied in the coming months and years not only against pirates but also directed against insurgents and terrorists. The purpose of this study is to provide the academic community, policymakers, industry, the media, and the general public with a comprehensive resource on the challenges from piracy to strategic security concerns and on governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental responses to past, current, and potential threats within the maritime environment. This study that was initiated some three decades ago as a research project at Georgetown University’s Center of Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC was completed in November 2008 at the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (administered by the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies in Arlington,

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Virginia, and the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies at the International Law Institute in Washington DC). Terror on the High Seas consists of nine chapters. The ﬁrst introductory chapter, titled “Maritime Terrorism: An Overview of Challenges and Responses” and authored by Yonah Alexander, provides an analytical context, including a deﬁnitional focus on essential terms such as piracy, insurgency, and terrorism; another section details the historical record from antiquity to World War II and reports on contemporary threats from 1945 to 2008; and the ﬁnal segment covers unilateral and multilateral responses, focusing on U.S. measures as well as global and regional strategies, to confront violence in the maritime environment. The next eight chapters consist of relevant ofﬁcial and nongovernmental documents selected since the 1980s. This material sheds light on the nature of the maritime challenges as well as on response strategies crafted and implemented unilaterally and multilaterally. The following narrative describes in great detail the context of each of these chapters:

CHAPTER 2: “MARITIME SECURITY AND TERRORISM: SOME INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (1981)” Concern with maritime terrorism was dealt with as early as the 1980s at a symposium attended by international experts. The excerpts of speeches from this conference held in September 1981 in Arlington, Virginia, examine the opinions of various institutions affected by the challenges in the maritime environment. These spheres include the shipping industry, marine energy producers, the U.S. Navy and other international military forces, and the port facilities industry. The viewpoints of the participants are important because they portend the challenges the United States and her allies will face in combating maritime terrorism. The opening remarks by the author Jeffrey St. John remind us that terrorism on the high seas is not new to the world history and has indeed been employed by various governments. He ponders if the Soviet Union would support piracy or maritime terrorism and recommends that if Western governments do not do enough to protect the seas from the scourge of pirates and terrorists, then private industry should do more to protect itself. The role of private industry in combating pirates and maritime terrorists is next endorsed by Admiral Thomas H. Moore, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, who recommends that American shipbuilding should increase its capacities to build more vessels. In the next statement, Professor Yonah Alexander describes the threat maritime terrorism poses to the world economy and civilians. He prescribes four remedies, which include developing academic studies concerned speciﬁcally with analyzing acts of terrorism and active support of suppressing terrorists

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through the U.S. governmental, maritime industry, and intergovernmental levels. This is underscored by the suggestion made by Rand analyst Brian Jenkins on how a maritime terrorist attack might manifest itself in the Western world. The next two excerpts represent the attitudes of the British and Canadian governments toward maritime security and what contingency plans they have in place in case of an attack. This is followed by the assessment of contingency planning against maritime terrorism in the United States by Rear Admiral Wayne E. Caldwell of the United States Coast Guard. Following his remarks is Congressman Carroll Hubbard, who recommends that one central agency should be in charge of the maritime security rather than the interdepartmental authority given to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Coast Guard, and other agencies. The focus of the next two contributors is related to the threats against America’s maritime facilities, particularly offshore petroleum mining platforms and port facilities. British professor Paul Wilkinson warns of the lack of projection against marine oil derricks and the lack of an elite U.S. commando unit trained to retake offshore platforms in case of a terrorist seizure. Colonel Douglas Macnair of the Gulf Trading and Transportation Company agrees that more is to be done with protecting America’s maritime infrastructure and stresses the necessity of creating an efﬁcient system of communications between the U.S. government and maritime industry in reacting to acts of maritime terrorism. Finally, A. Robert Matt and Robert L. Patcha, both retired captains from the Coast Guard Reserve, discuss the clandestine support of state actors, particularly the Soviet Union, for pirates and maritime terrorists. They suggest that the best way to prevent maritime threats is to adopt “greater measures of detection, contingency planning, training, dedication of resources, and crisis management.” Although the assessments in Chapter 2 were based on a Cold War perspective and mostly concerned with the supported role of the Soviet Union in maritime terrorism, these perspectives are signiﬁcant in that while support for maritime terrorism has mostly devolved from state actors to self-sufﬁcient terrorist groups, the same threats persist today but on a more dangerous scale. Until the 1980s, maritime terrorism was relatively rare and unknown to the general public and only a handful of terrorism experts studied this phenomenon. This all changed, however, with the sensational act of terrorism on the cruise liner Achille Lauro in October 1985 as detailed in the following segment.

CHAPTER 3: “ACHILLE LAURO HIJACKING: CASE STUDY (1985)” The Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) hijacking of the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro on October 7, 1985, off the coast of Egypt was a watershed incident in maritime terrorism. What followed the hijacking was a series of dramatic events that included the murder of an American passenger, the

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interception of the ﬂeeing terrorists by the United States Air Force in midﬂight, and a diplomatic standoff between the United States and its ally, Italy. No other act of terrorism on the high seas before had both caught the public’s attention and caused a government to respond vigorously. The crisis began when members of the PLF seized the Achille Lauro and threatened to blow up the ship with all 350 passengers on board unless the Israeli government released 50 Palestinian prisoners being held within the country. The next day, the terrorists shot an American invalid, Leon Klinghoffer, before realizing that Israel would not submit to their demands. Klinghoffer’s body was thrown over the railing into the water below. The four terrorists then negotiated through Abu Abbas, the planner of the attack, and Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), with the Egyptian government. The terrorists were granted safe passage from Egypt to Tunisia onboard an Egyptian airliner. In response, President Ronald Reagan authorized U.S. warplanes to intercept the commercial jet and divert it to a NATO airbase at Sigonella, Italy. After a ﬁve-hour diplomatic standoff over sovereignty rights, the terrorists were taken into custody by Italian authorities. The importance of this event is that it demonstrates a transition in the goals of maritime terrorists. Previous high-proﬁle maritime hijackings in the 1960s, such as the attack on the Santa Maria liner, were intended to draw public attention to a particular movement and rarely resulted in acts of murder. But the hijacking of the Achille Lauro was different in that the death of a hostage occurred and speciﬁc demands (in this case, the release of 50 PLF prisoners from Israeli prisons) were made by the hijackers. This transition was later underscored with the Abdul Nidal Organization (ANO) attack on the Greek passenger ferry City of Poros in 1988 in which nine tourists died and 98 others were wounded. This chapter examines the reaction to this event by ofﬁcials from the Reagan administration and by members of Congress. The initial reaction from both branches of government protested strongly against the role of their ally, Egypt, in offering safe passage to the terrorists. This sentiment is demonstrated in interviews and statements by President Reagan, Senator Mark Hatﬁeld, and a group of congressmen including Representative Harry Reid, Senate majority leader. Congressman George Darden even went so far as to suggest cutting off all ﬁnancial aid to Egypt. Immediately following the detainment of the terrorists, including Abu Abbas, the United States submitted a request to extradite the terrorists back to the United States for trial after they had already gone through the Italian legal system. In a statement, Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speaks conveyed utter dismay at the fact that Italy allowed a known PLO terrorist mastermind to go free without penalty, especially in light of the U.S. request to extradite Abbas and bring him to justice. The other four terrorists would ultimately be convicted in Italy for the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, but they escaped American justice for the murder of Leon Klinghoffer.

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The compliance of Egypt to terrorist demands and the leniency of Italy, in terms of their handling of Abu Abbas, caused many members of Congress to question the resolve of the United States’ allies as well as the potential need for an international agreement on how to confront terrorism. This sentiment was conﬁrmed in several congressional resolutions sponsored by Senators Robert Byrd and Allen K. Simpson, and Representative Ted Weiss, respectively. A general consensus of outrage and disgust permeated the chambers of Congress with regards to the Achille Lauro affair. The family of Leon Klinghoffer eventually sued the PLO for responsibility in his death. In the last document, their lawsuit is presented in Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro. The question of whether the PLO could be lawfully sued in the United States for its part in the Achille Lauro hijacking was addressed by the courts. There were concerned arguments in defense of the PLO, dealing with the fact that its members were immune from prosecution or suit due to their position as a sovereign government because they hold observer status in the UN. They claimed that a court of justice could not rule on cases that raise foreign policy questions. This defense was based on the legal precedents established in Baker v. Carr. Their arguments were thrown out by a court of appeals, but the case was remanded back to a U.S. district court to determine whether personal jurisdiction could be asserted over the PLO by the plaintiffs. The PLO later settled with the Klinghoffer family out of court.

CHAPTER 4: “USS COLE BOMBING: CASE STUDY (2000)” The spectacular bombing of the USS Cole by al-Qaeda in October 2000 is presented in Chapter 4. The American warship, which cost $1 billion to build, was attacked by two suicide bombers, resulting in the death of 17 sailors. Dozens of others were wounded. As in the previous case study of the Achille Lauro, this event represented a dramatic change in maritime terrorism. This change concerned both tactics and intent. This was the ﬁrst suicide terrorist attack at sea that did not involve an attempt by the terrorists to bargain for a speciﬁc deal. Indeed, the attack ushered in a new stage of maritime terrorism attacks where questions of ideology and nationalism have been marginalized and the signiﬁcance of the sensational act itself has become the main intent of the terrorists. In May 2001, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) published its investigation into the USS Cole attack. This inquiry examined the U.S. Navy’s security procedures and looked into whether there was any critical error or failure that led to the success of the attack. The investigation concluded that there was not any particular lapse of judgment or organizational failure that was responsible for the attack. The HASC investigation also took into account a joint Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of the Navy’s commission report in January

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2001. It focused on ﬁve distinct areas: organizational issues within the DOD, antiterrorism and force protection measures, intelligence, logistics, and training. The HASC investigation did concur with the DOD commission’s ﬁndings but also noted that the report “did not address issues related to the reasons behind the USS Cole’s refueling stop at Aden, for example, the U.S. strategy of engagement, operational considerations, and Navy force structure realities.” The HASC investigation disagreed with the DOD commission’s support of refueling U.S. warships in Yemen as part of its policy of “engagement” with countries in the Middle East without consideration of the increased risk of acts of terrorism due to the local populace’s hostility. In consideration of this threat, HASC recommended that “a policy of engagement must be pursued cautiously in areas where the potential for terrorism is high.” The investigators also concluded that there were not any intelligence failures in regard to the attack because there was no indication of a direct threat attack against the USS Cole known in the intelligence community. However, if any indication of an attack against a warship is discovered, the ship’s commander must be notiﬁed immediately and there must be appropriate coordination between the intelligence community and the DOD in order to thwart the attack, the committee noted. This should be buttressed by updated vulnerability assessment investigations into the U.S. Navy’s ports of call. Also, the HASC commission recommended that ofﬁcers and sailors should focus more attention on sea-based attacks rather than on land-based attacks. Finally, the HASC investigation considered which operational issues contributed to the USS Cole’s vulnerability and recommended measures that should be taken to prevent similar attacks in the future. The investigation stated that allowing American warships to refuel, along with allowing sailors shore leave in ports with a hostile populace, increases risk. This can be prevented, the investigation concluded, by implementing at-sea refueling, thus negating the use of potentially hostile ports. Furthermore, any decisions to refuel in foreign ports should be made by a regional commander in chief. The DOD did reform some of its operational procedures and tactics to better prevent terrorist attacks at foreign ports in the ﬁrst half of 2001. However, the new dynamic of the September 11, 2001, attacks on U.S. soil naturally diverted focus away from threats to U.S. maritime assets overseas to the domestic sphere. Now, for the ﬁrst time, the U.S. government had to confront the challenge of maritime terrorism at home waters and in its national ports.

CHAPTER 5: “THREATS AND UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO MARITIME CHALLENGES” Prior to 2001, major acts of maritime terrorism existed only in the periphery of U.S. presence and inﬂuence. However, with the catastrophic 9/11 attacks on American soil, new fears arose within the government and general

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public about the vulnerability of the nation’s infrastructure to terrorist exploitation or attack. Of particular concern were alleged al-Qaeda designs in 2002 to smuggle a radiological dispersal device (RDD), or a dirty bomb, through an American seaport and detonate it in a densely populated area. Although such a nightmare scenario has yet to materialize, such anxieties have led the U.S. government to reexamine and reform its border, seaport, and transportation security policies. In this chapter, the testimony from leading experts in the maritime security ﬁeld and top government ofﬁcials analyzes the various terrorist challenges and illustrates the steps the United States is taking to counter the risk. At the forefront of defending American ports is the United States Coast Guard. In the ﬁrst document, Admiral James M. Loy testiﬁes before the Congressional Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources and enumerates the efforts of the Coast Guard to combat smuggling. These efforts included the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS), introduced in 2002, which provided technologically advanced detection systems along the American seaboard. Other efforts in defending America’s borders and seaports include the participation in the internationally regulated Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the implementation of the Advance Manifest Regulation, or 24-hour rule, of reporting cargo manifests before reaching ports. Although most of the port security ofﬁcials and experts contend that thorough searching of every container of imported cargo would be grossly inefﬁcient, these two programs may be enough to ensure an adequate level of security according to testimony by U.S. Customs Commissioner Robert C. Bonner and others. These port entry rules began in 2002 and 2003 and were deemed successful in a report by the Ofﬁce of the Inspector General in the Department of Homeland Security in 2006. Finally, in early 2008, the Government Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO) released a report of post-9/11 port security policies and their results. The report requires the scanning of 100 percent of all container ships importing cargos to the United States by 2012. It also stated that, despite that some problems with cooperation between the port security authority ofﬁcials, cargo scanners, home governments of the cargo ships, and ofﬁcials within the Department of Homeland Security, the programs have been successful.

CHAPTER 6: “U.S. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE: THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE” In the post-9/11 environment, the U.S. government has realized an unprecedented challenge in maritime terrorism as noted in documents from the previous chapter. At the forefront of meeting the challenge is the executive branch, which directs the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, and Transportation; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the Federal

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Maritime Commission. These agencies have advised the White House on maritime security strategy and have implemented the directives of the president. By 2007, the White House’s national maritime security policy was mostly complete and was employed throughout the various relevant departments. The ﬁrst set of documents explains the interagency maritime security strategy set out by the White House. These include the National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13, issued in 2004, as well as the National Strategy for Maritime Security prepared by the White House in 2005. These documents direct the efforts of federal, state, local, and private-sector entities in implementing surveillance, intelligence, interagency coordination, and threat prevention on both national and international levels. The cabinet-level department most responsible for maritime security is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In response to the White House’s maritime security policy, the DHS released an overview of its strategy on domestic port security. The documents from the DHS and the U.S. Coast Guard, which is under the auspices of the former, focus on strategies for protecting American harbors and borders. These policies include the post-9/11 adoption of the International Port Facility Security Code and Customs-Trade Partnerships against Terrorism (C-PAT), two programs that are utilized internationally. Other important improvements by the DHS include a mandatory 96-hour advance notice of arrival for incoming vessels, new safety procedures for handling dangerous cargos at ports facilities, offshore boardings by sea marshals, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) screening of cargos. Many of these procedures were conﬁrmed in documents from the Department of Transportation and with the passage of the 2002 Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA). Finally, another component of the White House’s National Strategy for Maritime Security is the application of U.S. power and inﬂuence on an international scale. In documents by the Department of Defense, the idea of “global maritime partnerships” with other countries is suggested. The deployment of U.S. warships in highly volatile areas, such as the Horn of Africa, to maintain control of the seas from pirates and terrorists is also noted. The emphasis of international cooperation in the maritime sphere is evident in documents from the Department of State. A particular overture to international cooperation is testimony by Deputy Secretary John D. Negroponte, who offered his support for the ratiﬁcation of the UN’s Law of the Sea Convention’s Part XI.

CHAPTER 7: “U.S. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE: THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE” In the previous chapter, the roles of various government departments under the auspices of the executive branch were examined. Although the implementation of the maritime security policy by the White House is critical

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in securing national interests against maritime terrorists, the function of Congress is equally vital. The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives play two important roles in providing maritime security. Their ﬁrst contribution is the creation and passage of landmark maritime legislation such as the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and the Port Security Improvement Act of 2006. Their second contribution has been creating a forum for the necessary oversight and hearings by experts or government ofﬁcials in order to provide the appropriate funding of the maritime security programs and strategies. In this chapter, brieﬁngs concerning threat assessments, costs, progress, and goals are presented to members of Congress. Most, if not all, of the various hearings acknowledge that maritime security is of vital importance due to the economic implications of maritime commerce and the vulnerability of U.S. seaports. These presentations provide lawmakers the proper information to act in accordance with the security needs of the country, enabling them to appropriate funding and other support that different agencies require in order to execute security programs designed for U.S. ports, coastline, and offshore assets. The ﬁrst of such reports concerning maritime security issues is that conducted by Margaret Wrightson, director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues. At this hearing, Wrightson outlines the progression of the Maritime Transportation Security Act. Even though most of the progress is positive, Wrightson analyzes areas of needed attention and improvement in implementation and planning, cooperation of the private and public sectors, and funding. Many items coincide in other reports such as the “Maritime Security: Overview of Issues” presented by John Frittelli to the Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, and Stephen L. Caldwell’s progress report of the SAFE Port Act. The recurring structures of these congressional reports include statistical and administrative overviews of progress since the passing of legislation. Another Congressional Research Service Report, conducted by Frittelli and his colleague, Paul W. Parfomak, titled “Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities,” outlines speciﬁc threats and their imminence. Frittelli and Parfomak analyze the threat level and possibilities of nuclear/radiation attacks, attacks on liquid natural gas tankers, and passenger ferry attacks. The objective of their report is to provide Congress with information on the most likely threats to the United States and how to deal with such threats. The actions taken in response to such information would in turn inﬂuence the creation of laws and the funding to combat these primary threats. Adding another perspective to the responsibility of the U.S. legislature, Senator Patty Murray of Washington describes to the Commerce Committee the signiﬁcance of port security using the Seattle/Tacoma port system as an example. Her emphasis on security, especially for a port bordering Canada with military installations in the vicinity, is an important consideration in

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maintaining maritime security. Her belief in a sound and safe maritime industry, complete with public and private cooperation, offers a personal perspective on the national issue of U.S. maritime security. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) completed a survey on the steps taken by the U.S. legislature in pursuing better maritime security policy. The DHS press release provided is a report of the current implementations, plans, and goals of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. It also outlines the affected parties of the legislation. All of the aforementioned reports and releases directly affect the policy decisions of lawmakers from the local to the federal levels of U.S. government. These threat assessments and progress reports are vital to the security of waterborne assets, as they provide lawmakers with the information to solve emerging problems as quickly as possible.

CHAPTER 8: “INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL” In the previous two chapters, documents concerning the American response to maritime terrorism from the executive and legislative branches were presented. However, the United States is not alone in developing strategies in securing the oceans from perpetrators. The need for cooperation and shared initiatives is being recognized by governments and other groups on the world stage. In this chapter, perspectives from other governments, particularly those prone to maritime terrorism and piracy, are examined. The beginning of the chapter focuses on Asian and African perspectives including, but not limited to, economics and terrorist origins. Within these speciﬁc regions, the chapter examines international cooperation on all fronts concerning maritime terrorism. The ﬁrst few documents originate from conferences of Asian regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Based upon the sheer existence of these organizations, it is clear that Asia places a high priority on the concept of cooperation to ensure the stability and security of their nations and their respective economies. The nations that comprise ASEAN contribute 80 percent of the world’s trade. With collective action, these various organizations share their capabilities in intelligence, legal proceedings, strategies, and the like to beneﬁt all in the security of their waterborne economies. Throughout the chapter, these regional coordination practices concentrate a large amount of effort on combating piracy with a lesser focus on port security. This contrasts American actions in previous chapters regarding larger efforts on port security. Australian policies toward maritime terrorism are outlined as well. Piracy in Asia poses a huge danger to the economies of that continent much as it does in Africa.

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The next section is composed of African perspectives that focus mainly on the rampant piracy off the Horn of Africa and the Somali coast. In this section, documents pertaining to African affairs include announcements from the U.S. Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), a speech addressing the House Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health about strategies that could be implemented in foreign relations with the entirety of Africa, and a UN bulletin urging cooperative action against the piracy off the coast of Somalia. OSAC’s warnings of pirate activity off the coast of Somalia coincide with the UN’s concerns. Once again, waterborne economic interests at stake included oil shipping and ﬁshing. The speech to the House Subcommittee by Dr. J. Peter Phram outlines a political and military strategy for U.S. foreign policy regarding Africa. With concerns of Chinese interests and threats to natural resources, Dr. Phram believes that the United States and Africa have common interests on the continent, not to mention that Africa had been mostly ignored in strategic plans, usually lumped into another regional command jurisdiction. Also, Dr. Phram believes that the common goals of defeating terrorism, combating poverty, and addressing the AIDS pandemic were noble goals of which America and Africa could cooperate. The next section examines maritime security issues related to the Caribbean, Europe, NATO, and the UN. A Government Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO) report pursuant to the SAFE Port Act of 2006 examines the Caribbean basin and its potential security issues. Although the report ﬁnds no evidence of a current and credible terrorist threat, it does note areas of concern. Specifically, it states that due to the high volume and value of targets found within the maritime environment, there is still a real security concern in the region. It goes on to detail the various contributions and programs run by a number of U.S. governmental agencies that work to improve maritime security. The next document is a press release from the U.S. embassy in Panama describing a multinational training exercise to facilitate effective response to threats made against the Panama Canal. The NATO documents outline their strategy in combating terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea, UN documentation on international maritime law, and a cost analysis of the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. The NATO documents provide a broad overview of the beginnings of “Operation Active Endeavour.” They also detail speciﬁc areas and highlight how it has become a comprehensive counterterrorism program highly successful at promoting stability and security throughout the Mediterranean. The ﬁrst UN document incorporated contains the original 37 Articles of the Convention on the High Seas (1958), which lays out in detail the principles of international law governing the waterways designated the “high seas.” The second is a summary and overview of key features to be found in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Finally, the section ends with a report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on the

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ﬁndings of questionnaires given to ports and governments. This questionnaire detailed levels of compliance, cost of compliance, ﬁnancing of the related costs, and overall perception of other related effects. The report was meant to assess the costs related to compliance with ISPS Code implementation using data from 2003 through 2005. The chapter ends with documents from important conferences of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). When the IMO convened for its 53rd session in September 1986, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) approved new measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews aboard ships. These safeguards were intended to assist member governments reviewing or strengthening port and onboard security. In the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation in March 1988, there were concerns about unlawful acts that threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews. Reports of crews being kidnapped and ships being hijacked, deliberately run aground, or blown up by explosives were examined. In response to the 9/11 attacks, the IMO Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea in 2002 adopted measures to comprehensively combat terrorist acts in maritime jurisdiction. Finally, the IMO continues to work against the growing threat of terrorist and piratical activities against ships and ports as evidenced in a resolution calling on world action to address the growing problem of piracy off the Somali coast.

CHAPTER 9: “PRIVATE-SECTOR PERSPECTIVES: INDUSTRY AND TRADE ORGANIZATIONS” While the preceding chapters mostly offer the viewpoints of governments and international bodies, the ﬁnal chapter addresses the perspective of private-sector industry and trade organizations in regard to maritime stability and security. Speciﬁcally, six documents are presented. The ﬁrst document is an Intercargo Direction Paper, which attempts to deﬁne the realities faced by shipowners, detail the characteristics most desired for the industry, and identify the steps that should be taken to make those ideals a reality. Among the current realities addressed are a largely unchanged industry, increased safety and environmental expectations, an unstable short-term market view, substandard ships, and the difﬁculties in attracting a qualiﬁed workforce. To meet these concerns are a number of preferred characteristics such as safety, stability, equitability, and a fair return. In discussing what can be done to achieve these characteristics, the underlying theme present is that of mutual support and collective action and determination. The second and third documents are from the International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) and the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS). They outline general guidelines to be followed in developing security plans

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applicable across ships and ports of varied layout and vulnerability. The pair of documents from the ICS and the IAPH provide loose and basic guidelines for the establishment of effective security plans. They agree on what are to be considered essential elements, namely awareness, vulnerability assessment, knowledge, cooperation, information management, and preventative measures. However, they differ in their preferred approach and in the level of detail attributed to each section. The next two documents of the chapter describe a pair of related industry organizations. Both are very clear in being nonproﬁt and apolitical. The ﬁrst is the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO). BIMCO is a leading member organization and interest group in the industry with a goal of bringing its members’ interest, goals, and solutions to governments, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations. The second document is an introduction to the International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations (IFSMA). The organization’s intent is to unite individual shipmasters and regional associations into a single international front. Its mandate is to promote and safeguard the interests of serving shipmasters as well as to uphold international standards within its membership. In the ﬁnal document, Christopher Koch, president and CEO of the World Shipping Council, offers brief observations of the maritime security policies of the United States and Europe in his remarks before the Maritime Security Expo, an annual trade conference. In regard to U.S. ship and port security, he praises the vigilance of the Coast Guard acting under the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. In regard to personnel, he makes note of the need for fair treatment of seafarers and the challenges faced by the Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration in implementing the Transport Worker Identiﬁcation Credential for U.S. shorebased maritime workers. Cargo security is the ﬁnal element he discusses. Although the basic strategy is sound, he stresses that the two most important improvements are advancements in risk assessment protocol and radiation inspection implementation. He also brieﬂy mentions the European policies and measures, citing them as comparable to their U.S. counterparts, while pointing out the main ﬂaws in the most recent draft of Commission Regulation 1250. It is hoped that this work will help academics, policymakers, the media, and the general public better understand the nature and intensity of violent threats in the maritime environment and what the international community can and must do to cope with the challenge. Yonah Alexander November 30, 2008

Acknowledgments

This study, which was initiated some three decades ago as a research project at Georgetown University’s Center of Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC, was completed November 2008. The Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (administered by the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies in Arlington, Virginia, and the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies at the International Law Institute in Washington DC) provided research and logistical support. Professor Yonah Alexander owes special gratitude to these institutions for their encouragement. In particular, he wishes to thank Michael S. Swetnam, CEO of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, and Professor Edgar H. Brenner, codirector of the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies, for their continued support of this project during the past decade. Tyler B. Richardson, a graduate of Georgetown University, has made invaluable contributions during his work as a research assistant at the InterUniversity Center for Terrorism Studies from 2002 to 2005. Without his dedication and true professionalism, this book could not have been completed. Numerous other individuals were involved in conducting research and preparing the volume for publication. They include Steven Lockﬁeld (London School of Economics), Jack Baber (Rhodes College), Jennifer Zewin (American University), William Royal (Monmouth University), Frank Stoy (Juniata College), Stephen Mathany (American University), Michael Ashley (Saint Joseph’s University), Daniel Curzon (Saint Joseph’s University), Kendall McKay (Case Western Reserve University), and Michelle Zewin (University of Nevada, Reno). They deserve appreciation for cooperation, particularly during the 2007–2008 period. Special thanks to the 2009 summer interns for their assistance in ﬁnalizing this book: Alexandra Collier, Bradley University; Dimitar Georgiev, St. Francis

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College; Esther Nai, National University of Singapore; Adam Rodriques, Yale University; Chelsea Sandler, McGill University; Selina Singh, California Polytechnic State University; Antoinette Wilson, Monterey Institute for International Studies; and David Witter, University of California-Berkeley. Mention should also be made of the support of the law interns Eric Eves, University of Miami; and Diana Simpson, Roger Williams University School of Law.

1

Maritime Terrorism: An Overview of Challenges and Responses Yonah Alexander

The spectacular attacks of September 11, 2001, have dramatically illustrated that present-day terrorists have introduced into the contemporary international system an unprecedented scale of violence in terms of threats and impact. The globalization and brutalization of subnational violence, frequently with the direct and indirect support of states, make it amply clear that we have entered a new, dangerous age of conﬂict, with serious implications for world peace and security concerns. Because terrorists have traditionally selected “soft targets” for attacks in their struggle for political, social, and economic power, the maritime environment is becoming a more inviting vulnerability than ever before. The purpose of this introductory chapter is, therefore, to provide a deﬁnitional focus on the relevant terms of “piracy,” “insurgency,” and “terrorism;” to present an overview of the threats to maritime security (both historical and contemporary); and to review national, regional, and global responses to current and potential challenges on the high seas.

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A DEFINITIONAL PERSPECTIVE The seventeenth-century political philosopher John Locke observed that “a deﬁnition [is] nothing but making another understand by words what the term deﬁned stand for.”1 Unfortunately, Locke’s truism has evaded the reality of the actual meanings of various seemingly simple political terms. Speciﬁcally regarding security concerns in the maritime environment, it is apparent that there exists a deﬁnitional and moral confusion over what constitutes “piracy,” “insurgency,” and “terrorism.” After all, every sovereign nation reserves to itself the legal authority to deﬁne these terms in the context of democratic and foreign affairs dictated by what is perceived as its own national interests. It is essential, therefore, to review the various deﬁnitions offered by both international and national bodies. Piracy The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (also known as the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas) focuses on the tactic of violence utilized by perpetrators in violation of the law committed both on the seas and in the air, outside the jurisdiction of any state. More speciﬁcally, it provides the following legal guidance: Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of deprivation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).2

United States federal law, on the other hand, in 18 U.S.C., links “piracy” and “privateering” under the same judicial framework. Because both terms are relevant to this study, it is critical to provide the speciﬁc details incorporated by this legislation: § 1651. Piracy under laws of nations Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as deﬁned by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.

Maritime Terrorism § 1652. Citizens as pirates Whoever, being a citizen of the United States, commits any murder or robbery, or any act of hostility against the United States, or against any citizen thereof, on the high seas, under color of any commission from any foreign prince, or states, or on pretense of authority from any person, is a pirate, and shall be imprisoned for life. § 1653. Aliens as pirates Whoever, being a citizen or subject of any foreign state, is found and taken on the sea making war upon the United States, or cruising against the vessels and property thereof, or of the citizens of the same, contrary to the provisions of any treaty existing between the United States and the state of which the offender is a citizen or subject, when by such treaty such acts are declared to be piracy, is a pirate, and shall be imprisoned for life. § 1654. Arming or serving on privateers Whoever, being a citizen of the United States, without the limits thereof, ﬁts out and arms, or attempts to ﬁt out and arm, or is concerned in furnishing, ﬁtting out, or arming any private vessel of war or privateer, with intent that such vessel shall be employed to cruise or commit hostilities upon the citizens of the United States or their property; or Whoever takes the command of or enters on board of any such vessel with such intent; or Whoever purchases any interest in any such vessel with a view to share in the proﬁts thereof— Shall be ﬁned under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. § 1655. Assault on commander as piracy Whoever, being a seaman, lays violent hands upon his commander to hinder and prevent his ﬁghting in defense of his vessel or the goods entrusted to him, is a pirate, and shall be imprisoned for life. § 1656. Conversion or surrender of vessel Whoever, being a captain or other ofﬁcer or mariner of a vessel upon the high seas or on any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, piratically or feloniously runs away with such vessel, or with any goods or merchandise thereof, to the value of $50 or over; or Whoever yields up such vessel voluntarily to any pirate— Shall be ﬁned under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. § 1657. Corruption of seamen and confederating with pirates Whoever attempts to corrupt any commander, master, ofﬁcer, or mariner to yield up or to run away with any vessel, or any goods, wares, or merchandise, or to turn pirate or to go over to or confederate with pirates, or in any way to trade with any pirate, knowing him to be such; or

3

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4

Whoever furnishes such pirate with any ammunition, stores, or provisions of any kind; or Whoever ﬁts out any vessel knowingly and, with a design to trade with, supply, or correspond with any pirate or robber upon the seas; or Whoever consults, combines, confederates, or corresponds with any pirate or robber upon the seas, knowing him to be guilty of any piracy or robbery; or Whoever, being a seaman, conﬁnes the master of any vessel— Shall be ﬁned under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. § 1658. Plunder of distressed vessel (a) Whoever plunders, steals, or destroys any money, goods, merchandise, or other effects from or belonging to any vessel in distress, or wrecked, lost, stranded, or cast away, upon the sea, or upon any reef, shoal, bank, or rocks of the sea, or in any other place within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, shall be ﬁned under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. (b) Whoever willfully obstructs the escape of any person endeavoring to save his life from such vessel, or the wreck thereof; or Whoever holds out or shows any false light, or extinguishes any true light, with intent to bring any vessel sailing upon the sea into danger or distress or shipwreck— Shall be imprisoned not less than ten years and may be imprisoned for life. § 1659. Attack to plunder vessel Whoever, upon the high seas or other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, by surprise or open force, maliciously attacks or sets upon any vessel belonging to another, with an intent unlawfully to plunder the same, or to despoil any owner thereof of any moneys, goods, or merchandise laden on board thereof, shall be ﬁned under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. § 1660. Receipt of pirate property Whoever, without lawful authority, receives or takes into custody any vessel, goods, or other property, feloniously taken by any robber or pirate against the laws of the United States, knowing the same to have been feloniously taken, shall be imprisoned not more than ten years. § 1661. Robbery ashore Whoever, being engaged in any piratical cruise or enterprise, or being of the crew of any piratical vessel, lands from such vessel and commits robbery on shore, is a pirate, and shall be imprisoned for life.

In light of the foregoing approaches, as well as similar global and national legal dispositions, it appears that customary international law confers upon

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states the extraordinary jurisdiction to prosecute sea pirates. That is, because piracy is traditionally regarded as an offense against the “law of nations,” each state is permitted to take action against the perpetrators—including seizing a pirate ship and prosecuting the crew—regardless of its nationality, and, if they are found guilty, to punish them accordingly. And yet, this “universality” principle does not explicitly obligate governments to exercise the jurisdiction to apprehend, prosecute, and punish pirates in the interest of the world community. Moreover, this unilateral “globalized” permission of action does not necessarily impose rules for piratical offenses perpetrated within certain territorial waters.

“Insurgency” and “Terrorism” “Piracy” is held as a class of offenses for personal gain at sea that corresponds to criminal activity on land. However, the former offenses are inherently in violation of the “laws of nations” in distinction to violation of state laws such as murder. Thus, it is necessary to understand the meaning of both “insurgency” and “terrorism” in the context of threats and responses within the maritime environment. These two terms are, by their very nature, subject to numerous differing political and legal interpretations. “Insurgency” is relevant to maritime terrorism because insurgents (sometimes called “rebels” or “revolutionaries”) have resorted to terrorist tactics in their struggle against governments they wish to replace. Insurgency is a condition of armed revolt against a recognized sovereign entity that does not reach the proportions of organizing a revolutionary government or being recognized as a military belligerent. Its targets are usually military forces or installations, and it follows the international rules of armed conﬂict. Insurgent activity seeks a basis of popular support for the goals the revolutionaries espouse. If successful, insurgents eventually conduct guerrilla military operations and organize a revolutionary regime. Insurgency, then, unlike outlawed piracy, is the ﬁrst phase of a legitimate revolution in which physical violence is used for speciﬁc political and military gains rather than for private beneﬁts. Despite this favorable status, whenever insurgents employ terrorist tactics such as maritime hijacking, they are not entitled to a legal exemption for the crime they have committed.3 In this connection it is noteworthy to mention NATO’s deﬁnition of these terms because of its global involvement in maritime security matters. According to NATO’s approach (JP1-02), “insurgency” is regarded as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conﬂict.” The related term “counterinsurgency” is deﬁned as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”

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The concept of “terrorism” presents a more complicated deﬁnitional understanding as to its universal meaning. Indeed, the international community and governments speak with a bewildering variety of voices on this subject. Consider the League of Nations Convention of 1937 that was never enacted by its member states due to contradictory political and moral views. The Convention deﬁned “terrorism” as “all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public.” 4 The United Nations, the League’s successor international organization, has also failed thus far to at least provide a global consensus on the meaning of “terrorism.” Prior to September 11, 2001, the world body initiated a wide range of deﬁnitions and statements on terrorism. For instance, a UN General Assembly, in its resolution titled “Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism” (adopted on December 9, 1994), contains a provision describing terrorism: “Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustiﬁable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.” 5 In the post-9/11 period, the United Nations continued to offer more detailed deﬁnitions on the nature of the challenge. For example, in its 2007 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the UN asserted that terrorism is an “act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conﬂict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”6 The absence of a universal deﬁnition of “terrorism” becomes even more complicated because of the proliferation of deﬁnitions on national levels. The United States is a case in point. Various deﬁnitions have been utilized by different government agencies. Before 9/11, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) cited the Code of Federal Regulations 928 (C.F.R. Section 0.85) in deﬁning terrorism as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian populations, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”7 The Department of State, in contrast, uses a statutory deﬁnition [22 U.S.C. Sec. 2656f(d)] stating that “terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence against noncombatant targets by a subnational group or clandestine agents usually to inﬂuence an audience.”8 After September 11, 2001, the legal American framework made a distinction between “international terrorism” and “domestic terrorism.” The USA Patriot Act (18 U.S.C. Sec. 2331) details the following meaning:

Maritime Terrorism

(1)

(5)

7

the term “international terrorism” means activities that— a. involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; b. appear to be intended— i. to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; ii. to inﬂuence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or iii. to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and c. occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum; the term “domestic terrorism” means activities that— a. involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; b. appear to be intended— i. to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; ii. to inﬂuence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or iii. to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and c. occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

The record indicates that the Patriot Act has raised many issues, such as civil liberties matters, that are yet to be resolved. It is not surprising, therefore, that many other countries have developed their own deﬁnitions of what constitutes terrorism. For example, Moslem countries, members of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, exclude from this act what they regard as “armed struggle for liberation and self-determination.” Yet, regardless of these conceptual and legal distinctions, what is important to consider within the context of this chapter is that the tactics of pirates, insurgents, and terrorists are not dissimilar and, therefore, the broad ranges of responses by government and intergovernmental bodies were developed with a view to cope primarily with these sorts of challenges to the maritime environment. These responses comprise global and national measures undertaken against pirates and previously mentioned “counterinsurgency” acts. Moreover, the broad spectrum of what is conceptually labeled as “combating terrorism,” “antiterrorism,” and “counterterrorism” must also be considered. The clearest deﬁnitions of these types of strategies are offered by NATO. Again, according to its legal guidance (JP1-02), the following deﬁnitions are applied:

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• Combating terrorism—“Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measure taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorists throughout the entire threat spectrum.” • Antiterrorism—“Defensive measures used to reduce vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local and military forces.” • Counterterrorism—“All offensive measures taken to neutralize terrorism before and after hostile acts are carried out. Note: Such measures include those counterforce activities justiﬁed for the defense of individuals as well as containment measures implemented by military forces or civilian organizations.”

In sum, the traditional deﬁnition of “maritime terrorism” is offered by the Council for Cooperation in the Asia Paciﬁc Working Group. The deﬁnition covers “the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or ﬁxed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas, and port towns or cities.”9 Within the context of this study, however, the resort to piracy is also considered simply because of the global security concerns on the high seas.

HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY THREATS Maritime terrorism is as old as history itself. From times of antiquity to the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century, perpetrators have deployed varied forms of violence, including hijacking, sabotage, and direct attacks on targets on the high seas, as well as on the broader maritime environment (e.g., ports, rivers, lakes). For the most part, these operations have been conducted by pirates, insurgents, and terrorists (subnational and state-sponsored). The purpose of this section is to review the nature and intensity of these threats historically and contemporarily, and assess their implications to regional and global security concerns.

The Historical Record (Antiquity to World War II) Recorded history provides numerous instances of maritime terrorism. For example, between 1000 B.C. and 67 B.C., piracy plagued the Eastern Mediterranean despite efforts by the Egyptian, Rhodesian, and, later, Roman navies. Pirate havens included Crete, Lydia and Cilicia (modern day Turkey), and the Illyrian coastline.10 Two unconnected experiences during the ﬁrst century B.C. are noteworthy. In the year 78 B.C., Julius Caesar was captured by Cilician pirates off the coast

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9

of Turkey and held for ransom. After the ransom of 50 gold talents was paid, Caesar sent out a ﬂeet to capture and punish the pirates.11 Also, in 67 B.C., Pompey the Great was appointed the commander of an extensive naval operation to suppress piracy in the Mediterranean Sea by the Roman Senate. He virtually annihilated Mediterranean piracy in the course of one summer and deported the captured pirates (Plutarch estimates 20,000 men, women, and children) inland, where they were allowed to farm.12 The Middle Ages also recorded a proliferation of maritime threats. For instance, between the 790s and 1000s, the Vikings were active in piracy and pillaging European settlements throughout the North and Baltic seas. Their maritime activity reached all the way to North Africa and Newfoundland. Viking decline was caused by greater interest in trade and establishment of centralized governments based in Scandinavia, in addition to their conversion to Christianity.13 Although piracy continued for several hundred years, it did not become a major concern in the Mediterranean Sea again until the ﬁfteenth and sixteenth centuries. Thus, between the 1450s and 1500s, the Christian reconquest of Spain and the emergence of the Islamic Ottoman Empire in the Balkans sparked religious conﬂict throughout the Mediterranean region. This religious struggle led both the Ottomans and the Spaniards (with the support of the Papacy and other Italian states) to sponsor piracy against the other’s commerce. It was during this period that the Barbary Coast (modern day Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) corsairs, such as the Barbarossa brothers Aruj and Kheired-din (“Defender of the Faith”), wreaked havoc in the shipping lanes and coastal towns, along with capturing and ransoming Christian slaves.14 One of the most intense periods of piracy occurred between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Various powerful religious and political groups and European maritime states found it expedient to employ pirates or “privateers” (armed pirate ships commissioned to cruise against the commerce or warships of an enemy) as cost-effective tools of power and inﬂuence. The following examples provide a panoramic view of the challenges during this period: • In 1522, the Knights Hospitaller were expelled from the Greek island of Rhodes by the Ottoman Sultan, Suleiman the Magniﬁcent, and eventually established their new base on the island of Malta. The Knights allowed piracy against Muslim shipping for proﬁt as well as crusading. Once the Knights used piracy against Christian ships, France and the Vatican pressured them to end their piratical activities by the mid-eighteenth century.15 • Between the 1530s and 1560s, French Huguenots from the Atlantic port of La Rochelle raided Spanish settlements and treasure ships in the Caribbean, thus starting the ﬁrst wave of Caribbean piracy. Although they remained a constant threat to the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, their activity declined due to the religious civil war underway in France.16

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• Between the 1560s and 1570s, English traders such as John Hawkins and Francis Drake attempted to trade with Spanish colonies in South America and Mexico, but were refused access to the colonial markets due to the strict Spanish policy of mercantilism. The refusal by the local authorities caused English tradesmen to blockade ports and attack ships in order to bring a proﬁt back home. These English “sea dogs” forced a breakdown of diplomatic relations between Spain and England with charges that Queen Elizabeth I condoned piracy. The Queen later knighted Sir Francis Drake for his circumnavigation of the world as well as the Spanish plunder he acquired along the way.17 • In 1586, Sir Francis Drake, with royal support, led a large English expedition of 21 warships and 2,300 soldiers and sacked the wealthy Spanish colonies of Santo Domingo and Cartagena. Both towns were ransomed for a combined 130,000 ducats. This and other political incidents induced Philip II of Spain to launch the ill-fated Spanish Armada against England two years later. In the subsequent Anglo-Spanish War (1588–1603), 100 to 200 privateering expeditions were launched from English ports every year, averaging £150,000 to £300,000 per annum in Spanish plunder.18 • In the early 1600s, the Dutch began to penetrate the Spanish Caribbean and engaged in both piracy and smuggling. Their proﬁts supported the Dutch cause for independence from Spain during the Eighty Years War (1568–1648).19 • In 1628, the Dutch Admiral Piet Heyn, commanding a ﬂeet of 31 warships, captured the entire heavily guarded Spanish Treasure Fleet off the coast of Cuba. This feat became the dream of every pirate operating in the Caribbean and yielded the largest amount of booty ever recorded in the region (12,000,000 guilders worth of gold and silver bullion).20 • Between the 1630s and 1650s, Tortuga, an island off the coast of Haiti, became the base of operations for French, English, and Dutch buccaneers who were former cattlemen expelled by the Spanish. Simultaneously, England, France, and the Netherlands took advantage of the Spanish Empire’s decline by settling other Caribbean islands such as Martinique, Curacao, and Barbados.21 • In 1655, the English captured Jamaica from the Spanish and founded Port Royal. With an underdeveloped economy and constant Spanish threat from nearby Cuba and Hispaniola, the English governors promoted piracy as a means of proﬁt and defense. Port Royal soon became the most infamous pirate haven in the Caribbean, until it was swept into the sea by a powerful earthquake in 1691.22 • In 1671, one of the most celebrated buccaneers in history, Sir Henry Morgan, sacked the wealthy Spanish colony of Panama on the Paciﬁc coast. He burned the town and tortured or murdered most of the town’s inhabitants. He plundered over £100,000 and returned to Jamaica, where he was arrested for breaking a newly signed treaty between Spain and England. He was sent to England in chains, where he was pardoned, and even knighted by King Charles II for his exploits. Ironically, he returned to Jamaica as a Lieutenant Governor, where he used his ofﬁce to suppress piracy.23 • Between the 1670s and 1689, France, England, and the Netherlands decided to discontinue the deployment of privateers for both protection and income due

Maritime Terrorism

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

11

to a growing agricultural economy. As a result, these governments stopped offering Letters of Marque and Reprisal, or legal licenses to practice piracy, and began to suppress the buccaneers.24 King William’s War (1689–1697) allowed the European governments to unleash their privateers against their enemies’ shipping and colonies in the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean. In the last year of the war, the greatest attack by ofﬁcially tolerated French buccaneers occurred at the Spanish treasure port of Cartagena. The siege by the buccaneers succeeded and they were able to plunder $15,000,000 of booty and ransom.25 In 1698, the Scottish captain William Kidd illegally captured the Indian-owned Quedah Merchant off the Malabar Coast, which yielded a cargo worth £710,000. Despite claims that Quedah Merchant was carrying French papers, he was arrested and tried in London in March 1701. In a sensational trial, he was found guilty and hanged. His body was tarred and placed in gibbet at Tilbury Point along the Thames estuary as a warning to other sailors.26 The period between the 1710s and 1720s is considered the “Golden Age of Piracy.” That is, the peace after the War of Spanish Succession (1702–1713) forced many ex-privateers to practice outright piracy against all nations. Though many pirates accepted an amnesty from the British government in 1717, thousands continued their previous employment. Pirate activity was especially strong in the Caribbean, along the North American coastline, in the Gulf of Guinea, and off Madagascar. European navies, particularly the British, actively hunted down pirates.27 In 1718, Edward Teach (also known as Blackbeard) blockaded the port of Charleston, South Carolina, and demanded ransom of one medical chest, which was subsequently delivered. He was later hunted down by the British Navy and killed in battle off the coast of North Carolina.28 Bartholomew Roberts (also known as Black Bart), one of the most successful pirates in history, was killed in 1722 during battle with the British Navy in the Gulf of Guinea. His death concluded the “Golden Age of Piracy” and commerce was thereafter generally unmolested by European pirates.29 Between 1776 and 1779, the struggling Continental Congress commissioned Letters of Marque to American privateers during the American Revolution. Among the most famous of the American privateers was the naval hero John Paul Jones, who was active in British home waters.30 Between 1793 and 1799, the French Republic, and later the Directory, actively supported the maritime supremacy of Britain. Though neutral in the conﬂict, American ships were frequently targeted by the French privateers. This caused President John Adams to establish the ﬁrst American Navy and led to an undeclared war between the United States and France. The French were eventually contained by joint Anglo-American naval actions and ceased to be a threat to American maritime trade when Napoleon Bonaparte came to power.31

The nineteenth century also reveals instances of maritime piracy, insurgency, and terrorism. Most signiﬁcant is the case of the two Barbary wars. Between 1801 and 1805, the First Barbary War between the newly created

12

Terror on the High Seas

United States Navy and the Barbary States of Tripoli, Algiers, and Tunis erupted off the coast of North Africa. The Jefferson administration reversed presidents Washington and Adams’s policy of paying extortion money to the Barbary corsairs in return for protection from piracy. An American squadron of frigates was sent to the Barbary Coast and blockaded several ports, particularly Tripoli. After several American naval and overland raids, the Dey of Algiers signed a treaty with the Americans.32 The Second Barbary War between the United States and Barbary States broke out in 1815 when the Dey of Algiers demanded tribute on American shipping after the U.S. Navy was swept from the Mediterranean by the British during the War of 1812. After brief engagements at sea, the Dey signed a new treaty with the United States. Afterwards, the Barbary corsairs were no longer a threat due to Anglo-Dutch naval intervention in the area and, later, French colonization of the Barbary Coast.33 The other important manifestations of threats during this century were the cases arising from the American Civil War (1861–1865) when the effective Union naval blockade of the Confederacy compelled the South to purchase raiders from Britain. Based out of British ports, these Confederate raiders preyed on Union merchant ships. Several examples illustrate the nature of these cases.34 In November 1862, a Yankee schooner, the Gerrity, was hijacked on a voyage between Mexico and New York by Confederate-American and Irish supporters disguised as ordinary passengers. After the takeover, the Gerrity was taken to British Honduras where its cargo of cotton was sold. While the ship was subsequently returned to its American commercial agent, the attackers escaped. Also, in December 1862, Confederate sympathizers who had taken passage aboard the Chesapeake seized the American steamer in the Atlantic Ocean. During recoaling at Sambro Harbor, a Union vessel appeared and the hijackers abandoned ship. They were never prosecuted. Similarly, in September 1864, the U.S. steamer Philo Parsons, operating on Lake Erie, was hijacked by Southern and British passengers in the Confederate service. The attackers also seized the steamer Island Ocean but failed to capture the U.S. warship Michigan and freeing Confederate prisoners on Johnson’s Island. Again, the attackers escaped punishment. To be sure, these incidents were considered a cost-effective weapon by the South, despite the controversy they generated over whether to treat hijacking at sea as piracy or traditional insurgency. Ultimately, the Confederate raiders and their collaborators were defeated, but the issue of the United Kingdom supporting the South soured Anglo-American relations throughout the 1860s and the 1870s.35 An examination of the nineteenth century also reveals other less-known cases of maritime insurgency.36 A case in point is the 1857 seizure of the Sardinian merchant steamer Cagliari by Italian insurgents. After leaving Genoa for Tunis, two dozen passengers on board produced concealed

Maritime Terrorism

13

weapons and hijacked the ship on the high seas. They seized the ﬁrearms cargo and then navigated the vessel successfully through a squadron of British war ships, ultimately reaching the island of Ponza, a fortress and prison of the Neapolitan Government. At port, the hijackers loaded boats and began an attack on the garrison, resulting in the freeing of some 300 prisoners. The attackers, reinforced by the liberated prisoners, boarded a Royal Neapolitan cutter in the harbor, plundered the ship, and sank it. Afterward, the Cagliari proceeded to the Gulf of Policastro, arrived at Sapri, and began an assault on shore. The attack failed and the insurgents were either killed or captured by civilians and Neapolitan troops. The Cagliari was then towed by Neapolitan cruisers to Naples, where it was kept as a prize of war. Another instance of maritime hijacking took place in November 1876. Cuban revolutionary passengers took over the Spanish steamer Montezuma, which navigated between Havana and Puerto Rico. When the steamer reached Nicaragua, Spanish gunboats appeared on the scene, and the hijackers set ﬁre to the Montezuma before abandoning ship. The issue of whether the attackers should be regarded as pirates or insurgents has never been determined by the countries concerned with this affair. Finally, two additional maritime-related cases are noteworthy. The ﬁrst concerned China. Between 1804 and 1810, Cheng I and his wife, Cheng I Sao, uniﬁed warring Chinese pirates into a powerful confederation of pirates. The confederation, which, at its height, numbered 400 junks and 70,000 men, plagued both European and Chinese shipping alike in the South China Sea. The confederation ﬁnally broke up into factions and Cheng I Sao (who became the confederation leader after the death of her husband in 1807) accepted an amnesty by the Chinese government.37 The second case concerns maritime security in Southeast Asia between the 1820s and 1840s. The British and Dutch conducted anti-piracy operations against Malay and Borneo pirates who had newly made the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea some of the most dangerous theaters for piracy. The joint operations, as agreed upon in the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, successfully suppressed piracy, but it was not entirely eliminated, as evidenced in modern piracy off the Strait of Malacca.38 The twentieth century clearly underscored more widespread maritime threats posed by state and non-state actors. The ﬁrst and second world wars provided the most dramatic examples. Between 1914 and 1918, both the German and British navies dispatched surface raiders (merchant ships armed to attack shipping) and submarines against each other’s vessels.39 During WWII (1939–1945), the Germans renewed their surface and submarine commerce raiding campaign against British shipping with mixed results. By 1943, most German surface raiders and submarines had been successfully swept from the North Atlantic, where they previously had a devastating effect on the British supply routes.40

14

Terror on the High Seas

Finally, it is evident that during the inter-war period, maritime attacks were also undertaken. In 1929, the Falke, while at the Polish port of Gdynia, was loaded with arms and boarded by Venezuelan revolutionaries posing as passengers. Immediately, these passengers seized the ship and headed for Venezuela to support an insurrection against the government of that country. Reaching Venezuela, the rebels landed at Cumna, but the government continued to remain in power. When the Falke took refuge in the Port of Spain, Trinidad, it was not considered a pirate vessel, and therefore was not liable to punishment. While the foregoing historical record demonstrates that piracy, insurgency, and maritime terrorism were utilized extensively, it was not until the postWorld War II era that operations within the maritime environment intensiﬁed considerably.

Contemporary Threats (Post-World War II to 2008) Since World War II, terrorists have resorted to the same traditional tactics of maritime piracy, insurgency, and terrorism that their counterparts utilized in previous centuries. They have, however, devised new forms of attack that are suited to an age of modern technologies, revolutionary political conditions, and contemporary mass media forms (particularly television). Among the new tactics are extortion, bomb threats, arms smuggling, direct attacks on maritime facilities and operations, and assaults against ships and population centers. Moreover, the actors who engage in modern maritime terrorism include not only pirates, insurgents, and governments, but also single-interest groups (e.g., antiwar activists, environmentalists, and animal rights organizations) and a wide range of ideological, ethnic, religious, and national terrorist organizations.41 Contemporary maritime piracy includes several thousand recorded incidents. For example, in 1979, pirates took over a Thai tanker after it left Bangkok and then siphoned 80,000 gallons of diesel fuel into a waiting pirate tanker. Also, in 1981, Mobil, Shell, and British Petroleum conﬁrmed that some of their oil tankers were targets of pirates in the Phillips Channel off Singapore. The seriousness of the problem is underscored by the fact that the General Council of British Shippers asked the Singapore government for assistance. The latter, in turn, appealed to Interpol (International Criminal Police Organization) for help. Other attacks at sea have been registered throughout the 1980s. Indeed, modern piracy ﬁrst came to world attention after reports of attacks in the Gulf of Thailand on the “boat people” ﬂeeing Vietnam after the war. Though Thailand took action to protect the refugees from local ﬁshermen, attacks continued elsewhere. Moreover, even ﬁshermen had been victimized. In August 1986, Indian pirates sailing motorboats in the Bay of Bengal kidnapped 22 Bangladeshi ﬁshermen.

Maritime Terrorism

15

More frequently, however, “harder” targets, such as shipping, have been selected by pirates. For instance, in 1989 alone, several incidents were recorded: A Liberian-registered petroleum gas tanker operated by a Japanese company en route to Japan from the United Arab Emirates was attacked by three pirates off the Anambas Islands of Indonesia. The pirates robbed the crew members of cash and other valuables. A Panamanian-registered freighter operated by a Japanese firm was also assaulted by four pirates off the same islands while on a voyage to Japan from Singapore. The crew was robbed of cash and valuables. In both incidents, the pirates approached the vessels in wooden high-speed boats, avoiding detection by radar. Also in 1989, the Isla Luzon, bound for Cebu Island in the Philippines with a cargo of steel, was hijacked by 18 pirates off the port city of Iligan. Three crew members were taken hostage and 27 were set adrift on a rubber raft. In South America, pirates attacked the Stolt Eagle in the harbor of Aratu, stole money and personal possessions, and injured several crew members. Escaping in a small boat, they boarded the motor container ship Asian Senator, a Liberian-registered vessel, while the ship was at Port Colon on the Caribbean side of the Panama Canal, and stole bags of coffee from Mallory Lykes at Guayaquil, Ecuador. In the 1990s, pirate attacks continued to threaten maritime security interests. For instance, the London-based International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported in 1993 that the ﬁrst nine months of the year registered the highest number of pirate activities of any period since the IMB began compiling statistics in 1991. According to this data, some 344 attacks or attempted attacks on ships at sea, at anchor, or in port were recorded worldwide, compared to 271 in 2002 and 253 in 2001. Some 25 percent of the total incidents occurred in Indonesian waters. Other prime target areas included Bangladesh, Nigeria, and the Malacca Straits between Indonesia and Malaysia.42 More recently, the IMB reported only 49 incidents in Southeast Asia during the ﬁrst nine months of 2008, down from 133 in the same period of 2004. A major reason for the reduction of piracy in this region is increasing security measures, such as maritime patrols undertaken by Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. As detailed extensively in the preface to this study, piracy in East Africa and Nigeria has grown dramatically. For example, MV Genius, a Liberian-ﬂagged oil tanker with a crew of 19 Georgian, Sri Lankan, and Syrian nationals, was hijacked on September 26, 2008, by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden near the Horn of Africa. When ransom was paid to the pirates by the Greek ship owners, the vessel and its crew were freed a month later. Currently, negotiations are being conducted over the release of the Sirius Star, a Saudi supertanker with a $100 million oil cargo and a 25-man crew of British, Croatian, Polish, Filipino, and Saudi citizens. The world’s biggest ship was seized in the perilous waters off lawless Somalia.

16

Terror on the High Seas

Contemporary maritime insurgents, who, unlike pirates, seek to achieve some political goal, usually within the framework of the laws of armed conﬂict, have been involved in several types of attacks. It has been reported that in a six-month period in 1990–91, more than 50 Thai ﬁshing trawlers were robbed or subjected to extortions by armed rebels in Burma. Thus, an umbrella organization of ethnic insurgents and dissident Burmese students demanded “protection fees” from Thai trawlers of ﬁshing in Burmese territorial waters. Approximately 800 ﬁshing vessels were affected by this demand.43 However, insurgents have not limited their activities to ﬁnancial maritime terror. For example, a combined force of Kachin Independent Army (KIA) and All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) ambushed the Inland Water Transport-owned passenger launch near Gonyin Village from the Irrawaddy River with rockets and small arms, killing six passengers and wounding 18.44 Insurgents have also been involved in maritime hijacking cases. The bestknown incident is the January 1961 Santa Maria takeover. Some 70 Portuguese and Spanish rebels, posing as passengers on the ship’s journey between Curacao and Miami and armed with hand grenades and machine guns, seized control of the Portuguese liner with 600 passengers abroad. Led by Enrique Galvao, the hijackers communicated their opposition against the Portuguese and Spanish government and their policies in the African colonies. The hijackers demanded political recognition of the “liberated” part of the national territory represented by the Santa Maria. Negotiations ended the 11-day episode when the insurgents surrendered the vessel in Brazil. Galvao and his men were forced to accept asylum in Brazil, and Portugal sentenced the rebel leader in absentia to 22 years in prison.45 In another hijacking incident, members of Somalia’s National Movement (SNM), using speed boats armed with machine guns, captured the Italian ship Kwanda and her crew of two Italians and 14 Somalis near the port of Zeila off Northern Somalia in December 1989. The Kwanda was anchored and her cargo of petroleum was discharged by the insurgents. Several weeks later, the Kwanda was brought to Djibouti after being relieved of its cargo of 350 tons of fuel oil, food reserves, tools, and other removal property. The crew was beaten and robbed of its clothing and money. This attack followed an SNM warning of all shipping agencies not to cooperate with the Mogadishu government or else face seizure of their vessels.46 Similar incidents also took place throughout the 1990s. For instance, in August 1991, 13 westerners were kidnapped by the Eritrean Liberation Front after the charted yacht allegedly entered Eritrean waters illegally. The victims included an American, six Italians, a German and ﬁve Britons. They were released in the following month.47 Clearly, a historical survey of maritime violence undertaken by pirates and insurgents is incomplete without also reviewing traditional terrorism. In this regard, the activities of single-issue groups in maritime terrorism must be considered. As its name implies, a single-issue group is an organization

Maritime Terrorism

17

formed to deal with one particular ideological subject. In maritime terrorism, the active single-issue groups include militant political activists, environmentalists, and animal rights activists.48 In 1970, the U.S. freighter Columbian Eagle, en route to Sattaship with U.S. Air Force ammunition, was hijacked to Cambodia by two armed crewmen who were protesting the U.S. war effort in Vietnam. Twenty-four crewmen were released in lifeboats, and a U.S. Coast Guard cutter followed the ship to Cambodia, where the duo requested political asylum. Subsequently, the ship was released. Other political extremists have also resorted to maritime violence. In January 1996, for example, seven Turkish nationals of Chechen origin, apparently unafﬁliated with any terrorist movement, hijacked a Russian-bound Panamanian ferry in Trabzon, Turkey. The hijackers initially threatened to kill all the Russians on board unless Chechen separatists being held in Dagestan in Russia were released. Eventually, the hijackers surrendered to the Turkish authorities and the hostages were released unharmed. Environmentalists have also engaged in maritime terrorism. A case in point is the abortive July 1978 bombing of Soviet and Japanese whale boats moored in the harbor of Talcahuano, Chile. The three American plotters acquired a two-man submarine, explosives, and sophisticated diving equipment. The funding for this operation was reportedly provided by an unnamed international environmental body. Animal rights extremists are also engaged in maritime terrorism. For instance, a group calling itself the Band of Mercy set ﬁre in June 1974 to an American vessel used to hunt seals and destroyed it completely. The animal activists warned that in the future they would use explosives unless seal hunting was abolished. In another incident, the Sea Shepherd of Conservation Society, the naval arm of Earth First! (an international environmental group consisting primarily of Americans, Canadians, and Britons), sank two of Iceland’s four whaling ships moored in Reykjavik harbor in November 1986.49 Besides single-issue political extremists, a wide range of ideological, ethnic, religious, and national groups have perpetrated maritime attacks with much more devastation and impact than those committed by single-issue groups. These groups include the Marxist Popular Forces 25 April (FP-25) in Portugal; the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka; the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Abu Sayyaf, both Moslem separatist groups in the Philippines; the Irish Republican Army (IRA); the Egyptian al-Jama’ah al-Islamiya; and bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, the international terrorist network.50 To be sure, one of the most active maritime terrorist groups operating over four decades was Fatah, a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).51 Formed in 1957, Fatah (which used cover names such as the Black September Organization, al-Asifa, Force 17, and the Hawari group) was headed by Yasir Arafat and is dedicated to the establishment of

18

Terror on the High Seas

an independent secular Palestine state. (It originally sought to recapture all of Palestine but now seems to accept a Palestine state based on a West BankGaza formulation.) In 1971, Fatah established a maritime arm and set up workshops, small shipyards, and other maritime commando facilities in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East. It has operated dinghies, small boats for night-time raids, as well as a ﬂeet of 500-ton vessels. Fatah initially recruited ﬁshermen and scuba divers but subsequently enlisted more professional terrorists trained in maritime commando operations in communist and Moslem countries. Other Palestinian groups within the PLO, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), headed by George Habash; the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), led by Ahmad Jibril; abu Abbas’ Palestine Liberation Front (PLF); and Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), have also engaged in extensive maritime terrorism independently or in collaboration with other terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism. Members of Palestinian groups have been trained in a variety of activities ranging from underwater demolition to operating one-man submarines. The spectrum of their involvement covers at least four areas of operations. The ﬁrst type of activity is the smuggling of arms. A case in point is the September 1976 inﬁltration carried out by a Palestinian terrorist squad with a mission of smuggling arms into the Gaza Strip. The squad, along with its craft, was transported from Lebanon on a foreign vessel. Squad members were lowered into the sea opposite the Israeli coastline. When they reached Tel Aviv beach, they were apprehended by Israeli security forces. The second category of tactics is direct attacks on maritime facilities and operations. As early as May 1969, members of the PFLP placed an explosive charge in the Baniyas River, a tributary of the Jordan River, heavily damaging a section of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, which is owned by Aramco, in the Golan Heights. At that time, the pipeline provided millions of dollars in royalties and transit fees to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. The ﬂow of oil through the 1,000-mile pipeline, which connects Dharan, Saudi Arabia, to Sidon, Lebanon, was blocked because of the resultant ﬁre. A PFLP spokesman claimed that his group had intended to pollute the water supplied to Israeli settlements and ﬁsheries in Hula Valley. Oil was reported to be seeping into the northern port of the Sea of Galilee, and oil slicks were seen on the Jordan River. The Israelis managed to contain the blaze. Also, in August of 1969, another squad of the PFLP threw a hand grenade into a London ofﬁce of Israel’s Zim Line, wounding an employee and damaging property. The third form of Palestinian operations involves sea-launched attacks, including bombing, on ships as well as on civilian population centers. For instance, in June 1971, PFLP terrorists assaulted the Liberian-registered oil tanker Coral Sea in the Strait of Bab el Mandeb at the entrance to the Red Sea. Three terrorists on a speedboat ﬁred ten bazooka shells at the tanker, causing

Maritime Terrorism

19

some damage but no casualties. The purpose of the attack was to deter other tankers from using the Israeli port of Eilat on the Red Sea. In another operation in September 1978, the sinking of an explosive-laden freighter Agios Demitrius (purchased from a Greek Company) by the Israeli Navy foiled a sensational Fatah terrorist scheme. The terrorists planned to sail the vessel into the port of Eilat, ﬁre 42 122-mm. rockets at the port’s tank facilities, and then ram the 600-ton boat, crammed with more than three tons of explosives, onto the crowded beach.52 The fourth tactic utilized by Palestinian groups is maritime hijacking. The most famous case is the Achille Lauro incident.53 On October 7, 1985, four armed members of the PLF, posing as passengers and armed with Kalashnikov assault riﬂes, grenades, and other weapons, hijacked the Italian cruise ship in Egyptian territorial waters near Alexandria. At the time of the hijacking, approximately 100 passengers and 350 crew members were on board. The hostages included citizens from Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany. Although the original intention of the hijackers was unclear, it has been assumed that they planned to seize the ship once it arrived at Ashdod port in Israel and carry out a suicide attack there. The Achille Lauro, however, sailed at the instructions of the hijackers in the direction of Tartus port in Syria, but was not permitted to dock there. The terrorists threatened that they would blow up the ship unless the Israeli government released 50 Palestinians held in Israeli jails. To underscore the seriousness of their demands, the attackers brutally murdered a 69-year-old disabled American, Leon Klinghoffer. He and his wheelchair were discharged overboard. Despite numerous threats, the hijackers did not kill any other passengers during the remainder of the ordeal. Realizing that Israel would not submit to their demands, the attackers then negotiated with Abu Abbas, the head of the PLF and mastermind of the hijacking; Arafat; and the Egyptian authorities to determine a satisfactory outcome to the incident. Subsequently, the terrorists, along with Abu Abbas, boarded an Egyptian airliner on a ﬂight to Tunisia. However, U.S. Navy F-14 ﬁghter jets intercepted the Egyptian plane and forced it to land at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization air base in Sigonella, Sicily. Despite the American request to transfer the terrorists to them, Italy took custody of the hijackers. Abu Abbas was allowed to leave for Yugoslavia. The four attackers were put on trial by Italy, convicted, and sentenced to 15 to 30 years in prison. Eleven other members of the PLF connected with the incident, including Abu Abbas, were sentenced in absentia. Another major attack at sea took place in July 1988, when members of the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) ﬁred at passengers and threw hand grenades that started ﬁres on The City of Poros, a day-excursion Greek ship, as it was sailing toward its port near Athens. Nine civilians from West European countries were killed and approximately 100 were wounded. On the same day, at

20

Terror on the High Seas

the ship’s pier, a bomb exploded prematurely in a parked car, killing the two occupants, who were apparently connected with The City of Poros incident. The escaping attackers of the ship and their comrades on shore were linked to Libya. The weapons used had been provided by Tripoli, and one terrorist had entered Greece using a Libyan passport.54 Also, an attack was carried out by members of the PLF in May 1990 when they attempted a seaborne raid against Tel Aviv beaches. The Israeli Navy intercepted the terrorists, killing four and capturing 12. Libya, once again, was involved in all aspects of the foiled operation, providing sophisticated equipment, navigational aids, expert planning assistance, and weapons used in the attack.55 Finally, on January 3, 2002, the Israeli Navy seized control of the ship Karine A carrying weapons in international waters on its way to the Suez Canal. The ship was intended for the Palestinian Authority for the purpose of transferring the arms it carried to its naval police near Gaza beaches. According to the Israeli Defense Forces’ spokesman on the following day, the boat cargo was loaded with weapons sold by both Iran and Hizballah. It consisted of 50 tons of advanced weaponry, including Katyusha rockets, riﬂes, mortar shells, mines and a variety of antitank missiles. Apparently, senior ﬁgures in the Palestinian Authority were involved in the smuggling operations, and authority personnel manned the Karine A. To be sure, a similar record of maritime terrorism is also evident in the activities undertaken by non-Palestinian terrorist groups throughout the world. Indeed, their involvement, by virtue of the reported cumulative number of operations, is even greater than that of Palestinian groups. In this regard there have been numerous extortion incidents and bomb threats. Many are probably not reported because the maritime industry does not wish to raise insurance rates, which might provide inspiration to other attackers. A typical incident involved a threat in August 1975 to blow up the U.S.-owned Phillips Petroleum Company gas drilling rigs in the North Sea. British Royal Navy divers checked the rigs mentioned in telephone warnings, but they found nothing. The deadlines mentioned in the calls passed without incident. The security ofﬁcials therefore considered the threat a hoax. The maritime smuggling of weapons for terrorists has also been a popular tactic.56 For example, in September 1984, the trawler Marita Ann, carrying a large arms shipment intended for the IRA, was seized by an Irish Navy Ship. Similarly, in April 1986, a barge loaded with 18,000 kilograms of explosives, and apparently shipped for the Movement of 19 April (M-19) in Colombia, was intercepted by Brazilian naval police near the port of Manaus. Attacks on maritime facilities and operations on shore and offshore, including inland waters and rivers, have also been registered. In January 1974, two Japanese terrorists belonging to the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and two

Maritime Terrorism

21

Arabs of the PFLP tried to blow up a Shell Oil Company reﬁnery in Singapore. They then seized eight hostages aboard a ferryboat and threatened to kill themselves and the hostages unless they were given safe passage to an Arab country. The terrorists tried to blow up three oil storage tanks belonging to Shell Eastern Petroleum, a Shell International company, but only succeeded in setting one on ﬁre.57 During the 1980s, there were a number of attacks off the shore of Morocco. In July 1986, the Andes, a Spanish ﬁshing boat, was set on ﬁre when it came under machine gun ﬁre, and the Titouncriak, a Soviet ﬁshing refrigerator ship, was shot at, injuring three Soviet sailors. These attacks were perpetrated by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Western Sahara (Polisario).58 Sea-launched attacks against civilian population and property have also been considerable, particularly in high-tension areas. For example, in December 1968 the Cuban government announced that it had captured ﬁve anti-Castro Cuban exiles two days after their landing at the northwestern port of Cabanas, 38 miles southwest of Havana. The report noted that the perpetrators were members of Alpha 66 and the Second Front of Escambray, which had merged their operations.59 The bombing and sinking of boats and ships in harbors and at sea has also occurred from time to time. For example, in March 1960, anti-Castro saboteurs were blamed for the sinking of a French freighter while it was unloading explosives in Havana. The explosions, which blew the ship apart, killed nearly 100 persons and injured 200.60 Another dramatic incident took place on August 27, 1979. Earl Mountbatten of Burma, cousin of Queen Elizabeth, was killed when a bomb exploded aboard his boat a mile off the coast of County Sligo in northwestern Ireland. The IRA claimed responsibility for the “execution.” The blast was caused by 50 pounds (23 kilos) of explosives set off by remote control, the IRA said. Mountbatten, 79, had refused to take any special security precautions. He had no particular connection with the sectarian conﬂict in Northern Ireland. Terrorists have also targeted naval personnel and facilities. In October 1979, two bombs exploded, one in the Chicago area at the Great Lakes Naval Training Center and another at a U.S. Coast Guard installation in Puerto Rico. Members of a Puerto Rican independence group claimed responsibility for the explosions.61 A more dramatic incident took place in December 1979 in Puerto Rico. Two sailors were killed and ten others were injured when a U.S. Navy school bus carrying 13 enlisted men and ﬁve enlisted women was ambushed by Puerto Rican terrorists. Moreover, hijacking in territorial waters and on the high seas is another tactic that has become popular over the years. For example, in February 1974, three gunmen, who identiﬁed themselves as members of a group called Moslem International Guerillas, seized a Greek freighter in the port of Karachi. They threatened to blow up the ship and kill two hostages unless the

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Greek government freed two Arab terrorists who were sentenced to death for an August 5, 1973, attack at the Athens airport. After lengthy negotiations with Pakistani authorities and three Arab ambassadors, the attackers were ﬂown out of Karachi on a special Pakistani International Airlines ﬂight to Cairo. They were subsequently ﬂown to Libya.62 Also in 1974, the Philippine subsidiary of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company paid over $10,000 to the MNLF for the release of a hijacked motorboat with 15 people on board in the waters of the southern Philippines. This group also hijacked a Japanese ship in the same area and demanded a $133,000 ransom within two days. The group threatened to kill a Philippine hostage and take reprisals against the 26 Japanese crewmen unless the Philippine navy’s ten ships left the area and allowed them safe passage to their island hideout. The owners of the vessel cabled Manila that they were willing to pay the ransom. After lengthy negotiations, the hijackers surrendered. The ship and crew returned to Japan, while the hijackers were reported to be on board a Philippine naval vessel.63 In another hijacking case in October 1979, MNLF members hijacked the Malaysian vessel Haleha Baru Adal 40 kilometers from Samporna, Malaysia. Three of the 44 passengers were killed and two were missing after the pirates stole property worth more than 8,000 Malaysian dollars from the passengers. Seventeen of the Malaysian passengers were either released voluntarily or rescued by the Philippine Armed Forces. Subsequently, the remaining hostages—a Malaysian mother and her two children—were rescued from the terrorists’ hideout in Siasi, southern Philippines, after a gun battle in which the leader of the gang and four of his followers were killed.64 Maritime hijacking was also frequent in the 1980s. In August 1981, the Iranian Liberation Forces, an anti-Khomeini movement led by General Bahran Aryana, former general in the imperial army, claimed responsibility for the seizure of Labarzin, an Iranian Patrol boat, off the coast of Spain. The terrorists tried to capture two other boats, which managed to escape. Subsequently, the 22 attackers surrendered and were then freed by the French authorities who took custody of the Iranian gunboat. In another incident that occurred off the Trincomalee coast in Sri Lanka, two 4,500-metric ton cargo ships belonging to the Maritime Union of India, a Bombay-based company, were hijacked by Tamil terrorists in July 1985.65 Noteworthy, too, are kidnapping incidents. A case in point is the abduction of a Swiss national and a Filipino woman from a small pumpboat near Santa Cruz Island in June 1986. The hostages were taken by members of the MNLF. When ransom requested by the attackers was not paid, the captives were released.66 Finally, there have also been a number of incidents in the maritime environment that cannot be proven to be acts of terrorism and for which no group has claimed responsibility. Super-tanker sinkings and destruction in mysterious circumstances exemplify these cases. One dramatic incident took place in

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December 1976. A Liberian-registered oil tanker, which ran aground on the Nantucket Shoals 27 miles off the Atlantic coast, produced what was described as one of the worst Atlantic Coast oil spills in history. The U.S. Coast Guard said that a telephone caller who identiﬁed himself as a crew member of the ship told the Coast Guard’s New York Headquarters that the tanker might have been run aground deliberately. The chief of the Coast Guard ofﬁce of merchant safety said that the information had been referred to the Liberian ofﬁce for investigation. The Coast Guard spokesman said that the Coast Guard itself was not investigating because the tanker broke up in international waters, where the U.S. government had no authority to investigate except at the request of the foreign government involved. The vessel ran aground onto the Nantucket Shoals while running from Venezuela to Salem, Massachusetts. The tanker was ten miles off-course. None of her 38 crewmen and ofﬁcers were injured.67 Similarly, in January 1980, off the coast of West Africa, a Liberian-registered tanker was lost while on a voyage from Kuwait to Italy. Investigators from Lloyd’s of London, which had insured more than 50 percent of its $600 million crude oil cargo, suspected piracy. No oil slick was found, making it unlikely that the ship had sunk with its oil still aboard. And so, many different kinds of actors have engaged in acts of maritime terrorism since the end of World War II. These include pirates, insurgents, subnational groups, and states that use the element of surprise to intimidate, injure, or kill government ofﬁcials and innocent civilians. Their tactics are varied and include threats, bombings, and hijackings. Many are trained in maritime terrorism and have had results which, at times, have attracted the world’s attention to their causes and audacity. Evidence since 2000 indicates that maritime terrorism continues despite the hopefulness of peace generated by the end of the Cold War. Sufﬁce to mention two spectacular maritime terrorist incidents. The ﬁrst occurred on October 12, 2000, when two men guided a tender boat alongside the USS Cole, a U.S. Navy Aegis Destroyer docked in the port of Aden, and detonated a large amount of explosives, blowing a hole 20 feet high and 40 feet wide in the hull of the ship. Seventeen sailors aboard the Cole were killed and 39 were injured. Al-Qaeda later claimed responsibility.68 The second maritime attack, directed against a French oil tanker, the Limburg, occurred on October 6, 2002, off the shore of Yemen, near the city of al-Mukalla. An explosion caused by a small boat spilled 90,000 barrels of oil along 45 miles of the Yemeni coastline, killing one sailor and wounding 12 others. The victims were Bulgarian and French. Although the Aden Abyah Islamic Army claimed responsibility for the attack, al-Qaeda initiated and executed the operation.69 And so it is prudent for states to examine the record of the past and present and thereby understand the many different methods that terrorists have at their disposal to strike at maritime targets. It is also wise for states to study

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the responses that have been effective in stopping or impeding the goals of terrorists in conventional matters so that they will apply those successful responses should terrorists resort to unconventional operations in the maritime environment.

RESPONSES: UNILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL Counterterrorism strategies, whether national or international, are founded on the perceptions of threats and the resulting policies and actions to cope with these threats at home and abroad. Essentially, these strategies incorporate numerous considerations, including organizational structures, intelligence, law enforcement, legal, technological, diplomatic, economic, medical, and military components. Although the responses to threats within the maritime environment are also based on these elements, the nature of the challenges on the high seas necessarily require speciﬁc conceptual and functional measures to be undertaken both unilaterally and multilaterally. This section considers selected responses to maritime threats by the United States and the global community.

United States Measures Since the early days of the Republic, speciﬁc notable measures relevant to maritime security have been undertaken by the United States. On August 4, 1790, the U.S. Congress authorized the Department of the Treasury to create a federal maritime service to enforce customs laws. The ﬂotilla of small cutters (later called the Revenue Cutter Service in 1862) was used to protect the American coastline and U.S. interests on the high seas during the Quasi-War with France (1799–1801) and thus became the ﬁrst maritime security force in the United States. Additionally, for the next 200 years, several other efforts were recorded. In 1915, the U.S. Coast Guard was ofﬁcially created with the merger of the Treasury Department’s Revenue Cutter Service and the U.S. Navy’s Life-Saving Service. Another measure was the June 15 Espionage Act of 1917 that empowered the U.S. Coast Guard to make and enforce laws to prevent damage to harbors and vessels during national security emergencies.70 In October 1940, the Dangerous Cargo Act of 1940 reinstated the port security measures from World War I, including the right to govern the movement and docking of all incoming vessels in U.S. territorial waters. It also gave the Coast Guard jurisdiction over ships with high-explosive or dangerous cargos. During the period from 1945 to September 11, 2001, several steps are noteworthy. First, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1971 (PWSA) was

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enacted. It entrusts the safety and environmental protection of U.S. ports and waterways to the U.S. Coast Guard. It also authorizes the Coast Guard to require the carriage of electronic devices necessary for participation in the Vessel Trafﬁc Service (VTS).71 Second, in the 1980s, a major naval warship building program was initiated by the Reagan administration, which included the modernization of the World War II-era Iowa-class battleships. Although the program was mostly intended to reafﬁrm American supremacy of the seas against the Soviet Navy, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman made it clear that the other objectives included a broad-spectrum deterrence against conventional, nuclear, and terrorist threats, as well as to secure the sea lanes for global communications and trade. Third, in 1984, the U.S. Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) was established. The MDZ gave the Coast Guard responsibility for command and control, coastal defense, harbor defense, port safety and security, search and rescue, salvage, surveillance, and interdictions. Finally, in 2000, the Maritime Security Council, which includes members from the shipping and port management industries, was appointed to advise the U.S. State Department’s Overseas Security Advisory Council on maritime security issues.72 In the post-9/11 world, the United States has developed numerous strategies and enacted legislative measures to cope with maritime threats at home and abroad. The following chronological review deals with selected relevant responses to the challenges: • In January 2004, the United States Customs Service, now Customs and Border Protection (CBP), announced the creation of the Container Security Initiative (CSI). The primary purpose of the CSI is to protect the global trading system and the trade lanes between CSI ports and the U.S. Under the CSI program, a team of ofﬁcers is deployed to work with host nation counterparts to target all containers that pose a potential threat. The CSI was ﬁrst implemented in the ports shipping the greatest volume of containers to the United States. Currently, customs administrations all over the world have committed to joining the CSI and are at various stages of implementation. The CSI is now operational at ports in North, Central, and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and throughout Asia.73 • On July 15, 2002, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program went into effect. The C-TPAT is a joint government-business initiative to build cooperative relationships that strengthen overall supply chain and border security. The C-TPAT recognizes that customs can provide the highest level of security only through close cooperation with the ultimate owners of the supply chain—importers, carriers, brokers, warehouse operators, and manufacturers. Through this initiative, U.S. Customs requires businesses to ensure the integrity of their security practices and communicate their security guidelines to their business partners within the supply chain.74 • The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) was signed into law on November 25, 2002. It is designed to protect the nation’s ports and

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waterways from a terrorist attack. This law is the U.S. equivalent of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) and was fully implemented on July 1, 2004. It requires vessels and port facilities to conduct vulnerability assessments and develop security plans that may include passenger, vehicle, and baggage screening procedures; security patrols; establishing restricted areas; personnel identiﬁcation procedures; assessing control measures; and/or installation of surveillance equipment. By creating a consistent security program for all our nation’s parts, the United States is better able to identify and deter threats.75 On May 31, 2003, President Bush announced the creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). This program aims to stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide, and identiﬁes interdiction as the area where greatest focus must be placed. The main tenet of the PSI is cooperation. It seeks to use existing authorities, both national and international, to defeat proliferation.76 On January 27, 2004, Rear Admiral Larry L. Hereth, United States Coast Guard Director of Port Security, testiﬁed before the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security on the Coast Guard’s progress on maritime security and anti-piracy issues. In his testimony, he commented on the Anti-Terrorism and Port Security Act of 2003 as well as Deepwater, a program that allows U.S. security ofﬁcials to board vessels before they reach port.77 On March 31, 2004, Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Commander of the U.S. Navy’s Paciﬁc Command, testiﬁed before the House Armed Services Committee and recommended the implementation of the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). The RMSI would allow U.S. warships to permanently patrol the Strait of Malacca with Indonesian, Singaporean, and Malaysian navies, as well as provide for intelligence sharing in the region.78 In December 2004, President Bush directed the Secretaries of the Department of Defense and Homeland Security to lead the federal effort to develop a comprehensive National Strategy for Maritime Security to better integrate and synchronize the existing department-level strategies and ensure their effective and efﬁcient implementation. The strategy was to be followed through the creation of eight separate supporting plans to include the: • National Plan to Achieve Domain Awareness • Global Maritime Intelligence Interrogation Plan • Interim Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan • International Outreach and Coordination Strategy • Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan • Maritime Transportation System Security Plan • Maritime Commerce Security Plan • Domestic Outreach Plan79 In explaining his National Strategy for Maritime Security, President Bush stated on December 21, 2004: It is the policy of the United States to take all necessary and appropriate actions, consistent with U.S. law, treaties and other international agreements

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to which the United States is a party, and customary international law as determined for the United States by the President, to enhance the security of and protect U.S. interests in the Maritime domain80

• On October 12, 2006, President Bush signed the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 into law. This legislation has three key elements. It ﬁrst orders a strengthening of physical security measures at U.S. ports, such as radiation detection screening of cargo containers. Second, it provides legislative authority to existing elements of the port security strategy, codifying into law the CSI and the C-TPAT, as well as providing the Domestic Nuclear Detection Ofﬁce with additional authority in the area of port security. Finally, the SAFE Port Act requires the Department of Homeland Security to establish a plan to speed up the resumption of trade in the event of a terrorist attack on our ports or waterways, in an effort to minimize the economic impact of such an event.81 • In 2007, two bills (HR4954 on Security and Accountability for Every Port Act and S2008 on GreenLane and Maritime Cargo Security Act) recognizing the need to upgrade security in the nation’s ports were considered by the U.S. Congress. This legislation provides for improvement grants in the amount of $2.4 billion during the 2007–2012 ﬁscal years.82 • In June 2008, the United States Government Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO) published a report to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the U.S. Senate entitled “Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented” (GAO-08672). This report focuses on Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 13, issued in December 2004 (as noted earlier).

Furthermore, the GAO, in August 2008, issued another relevant report to congressional requesters titled “Supply Chair Security: CBP Works with International Entities to Promote Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but Challenges Remain” (GAO-08-538). The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and part of the DHS oversee the ﬂow of goods from manufacturers to retailers that can pose a risk to terrorist exploitation. This GAO report praised CBP for working with international partners to advance American security concerns in the trade sphere. One step in this direction is establishing “mutual recognition” agreements, whereby the actions or decisions taken by the customs administration of one country are accepted by the customs administration of another country. In addition to the above-detailed measures initiated and implemented by the United States, it is noteworthy to mention American international cooperation in combating maritime terrorism. Several examples will sufﬁce. First, in late 2001 and early 2002, American and Indian navies collaborated to protect U.S. shipping in the northern end of the Strait of Malacca.83 Second, in July 2004, the United States and the Philippines co-hosted the Maritime Threats Workshop in Cebu, Philippines. The workshop focused

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on promoting interoperability and cooperation on maritime and environmental issues that foster terrorism, and identiﬁed maritime and transnational threats.84 And third, on March 15, 2007, the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam signed the Agreement on Marine Transport in Washington, D.C. In this agreement, relations concerning maritime security were normalized, and each agreed to assist the other party if ships under their national ﬂag were in distress or under attack at sea.85 Despite the foregoing policies and actions undertaken by the United States, it is important to be aware that over the years there have been instances of serious controversies with American administrations regarding “best practices” strategies to combat maritime terrorism. The Dubai Ports issue, as developed in 2006, has clearly brought to the American public the complexity of maritime security. More speciﬁcally, the controversy began when the Dubai Ports World company (owned and operated by the United Arab Emirates government) requested the U.S. government clear the regulatory hurdles in the possible acquisition of the U.S. port management leases of Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O), a British ﬁrm, in October 2005. The acquisition was cleared in December 2004 by the U.S. government despite security concerns by Coast Guard intelligence ofﬁcials. When the P&O sold its leases of 22 major U.S. ports to the Dubai Ports World in February 2006, the deal was immediately approved by the U.S. Treasury Department. The sale was then reported in the national press and, responding to public pressure over security risks, both Congressional Democrats and Republicans agreed to enact legislation to stall the acquisition. On February 22, 2006, President Bush threatened to veto any legislation that would block the sale because it would “send a terrible signal to friends and allies not to let this transaction go through.” The controversy was eventually resolved when the Dubai Ports World sold P&O’s American operations to the American International Group for an undisclosed sum.86

Global and Regional Response Strategies In the face of expanding threats in the maritime environment, it is becoming increasingly clear that multilateral response strategies are, indeed, critical. Both global and regional organizations are critical instruments in combating pirates, insurgents, terrorists, and other violent actors. This section details some of the international efforts in this ﬁeld of universal security concern. Global bodies such as the United Nations and its relevant specialized agencies have played an important role. It will sufﬁce to mention several measures crafted by those world organizations:

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• Between 1956 and 1958, the United Nations held its First Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) at Geneva, Switzerland. The four treaties that were a result of the conference included anti-piracy provisions, such as the right to seize pirates by any national navy in international waters.87 • On November 1, 1974, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) was adopted by members of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). One of the articles required mandatory codes for carrying dangerous goods and nuclear fuel.88 • On December 10, 1982, the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) created the “Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention”, which concerns the exploitation of marine resources outside national waters. Though 60 countries ratiﬁed the agreement and thus the convention went into affect in 1994, the United States Senate has yet to ratify the treaty due to free market and sovereignty concerns over Part XI. The nonratiﬁcation of the treaty does not give the U.S. Navy freer access to pursue pirates or terrorists near territorial waters.89 • On March 10, 1988, the IMO adopted the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. The purpose of the convention allows for member states to enforce appropriate actions against persons who board ships to inﬂict violence or robbery.90 • Between December 9, 2002, and December 13, 2002, the 108 signatory nations of the original 1974 SOLAS met at the London headquarters of the IMO to adopt amendments to the original convention, including a new International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). The ISPS Code contains detailed mandatory security-related requirements for governments, port authorities, and shipping companies, together with a series of guidelines about how to meet those requirements. It went into effect in July 2004.91 • Between May 28, 2003, and June 6, 2003, the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organization met to modify the text of the “Directives for Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers (MRCCS) on Acts of Violence Against Ships” to include provisions concerning alerts received from ships in response to terrorist acts and other security incidents.92

In support of the global efforts, different multilateral organizations have developed and implemented response strategies focusing on regional maritime concerns. The most recognized bodies are the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The following selected measures provide a glimpse of their contributions: • Between November 27, 1995, and November 28, 1995, representatives from EU member states and ten Mediterranean partners (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) meet in Barcelona, Spain to begin the “Mediterranean Dialogue.” Though the ultimate goal of the dialogue was to secure improved political, economic, and cultural

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relations in the Mediterranean region, it also focused on maritime security cooperation. This initiative was conﬁrmed by NATO’s North Atlantic Council the following year.93 In September 2001, in response to the 9/11 attacks, member nations activated the collective security mechanism of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949). Later that month, Operation Active Endeavor was launched, permitting NATO warships to conduct minesweeping patrols and escorts at choke points in the Mediterranean Sea (Strait of Gibraltar) and inspect suspect vessels in international waters.94 In December 2002, the Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), consisting of ships from the French, Spanish, German, British, and American navies, was deployed to begin anti-piracy and anti-Al Qaeda patrols off the Horn of Africa. The task force commanders soon met with a Djibouti government delegation that agreed to allow the warships to be based at their home waters.95 On June 29, 2004, at the Istanbul Summit, NATO members decide to elevate the Mediterranean Dialogue to a full partnership with associate countries. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) aims at promoting military-to-military cooperation, ﬁghting terrorism through information sharing and maritime cooperation, and ﬁghting illegal trafﬁcking on a bilateral level with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.96 On October 16, 2006, NATO and Israel concluded the Individual Cooperation Program (ICP) under the enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue. As a result of this agreement, Israel and NATO navies fully cooperate in Operation Active Endeavor.97 On October 9, 2007, NATO and Egypt ﬁnalized the ICP under the enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue.98

Other signiﬁcant multilateral activities are initiated in Asia within the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The sustained operations by pirates, insurgents, and terrorists in the seas of this region triggered cooperative measures during the past decade: • Between December 18, 1997, and December 20, 1997, the ﬁrst ASEAN Conference on Transnational Crime was held in Manila. In the conference, and later formalized in the Manila Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime (1998), the ASEAN member countries agreed to regional cooperation and enforcement against acts of piracy in the region, as well as other illegal activities such as human and drug trafﬁcking. Such degrees of cooperation included the harmonizing of criminal codes and bridging gaps in the member states’ legal system concerning transnational crimes at sea.99 • On November 4, 2002, the ASEAN members signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea with the People’s Republic of China. The signatories reafﬁrmed their commitment to both freedom of navigation and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in regards to the South China Sea, and pledged to assist each other in combating maritime piracy and other illegal activities.100

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• On March 2, 2003, Singaporean Defense Minister Teo Chee Hean urged his counterparts at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to move beyond dialogue and negotiations on maritime security with 14 other dialogue partners, including the United States, EU, Australia, and Russia, and begin naval exercises in the Strait of Malacca. The Singaporean proposal and similar proposals for joint action with the Western powers were later continually rejected by Singapore’s allies, Malaysia and Indonesia.101 • On June 17, 2003, the ARF published a statement on “Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Security.” The statement endorsed and conﬁrmed the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and other international maritime legal treaties. It also recommended cooperation between the ASEAN nations and the 14 dialogue members in combating maritime piracy.102 • On January 8, 2004, the ASEAN members issued a joint communiqué declaring their concern for the rise of maritime terrorism and piracy in the region (including the Strait of Malacca), during the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) in Bangkok.103 • In March 2005, the ARF representatives met in Singapore to discuss regional maritime security cooperation as prescribed in the 2003 “ARF Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security.” While Malaysia and Indonesia remained adamant in their refusal for Western patrolling of the Strait of Malacca, they agreed to using technology provided by the United States in detecting and preventing pirate attacks and other security threats. There was also a consensus among representatives that the main concern in the region had moved beyond traditional maritime piracy and armed robbery concerns to maritime terrorism and other transnational crimes.104

In connection with Asian responses to maritime threats, it is important to report on the efforts undertaken under the arrangement of the “Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia” (ReCAAP). Some of the noteworthy measures include the following: • In October 2001, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan ﬁrst proposed the establishment of ReCAAP to suppress piracy in the Strait of Malacca through multinational cooperation.105 • On November 11, 2004, ReCAAP was ﬁnalized in Tokyo, Japan. This effort became the ﬁrst regional government-to-government agreement designed to enhance multilateral cooperation on reducing the threat from and incidence of piracy and armed robbery in Asia.106 • Between August 2, 2005, and August 3, 2005, the foreign ministers of Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia met in Batam, Indonesia to discuss maritime security issues and reafﬁrm their cooperation with the International Maritime Organization’s Marine Electronic Highway (MEH). MEH created an integrated system of physical infrastructure and electronic processes and resources to improve the safety of navigation and anti-piracy efforts in the Strait of Malacca.107

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• On September 4, 2006, the ReCAAP Agreement came into effect, and has since been ratiﬁed by 16 Asian governments. The signatories of the agreement include Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam.108 • On November 29, 2006, the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center (ISC), as established under the ReCAAP Agreement, was launched in Singapore to exchange information and provide analysis concerning acts of piracy in the Strait of Malacca.109

In addition to the ASEAN and ReCAAP activities, attention should also be drawn to the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA). Its member states, namely Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand, have, since 1981, regularly conducted naval exercises in the South Asian Sea. On July 4, 2000, they met in Singapore to expand the mutual defense obligations to include additional joint naval games in the Asia Paciﬁc region with the dual purpose of strengthening the naval defenses of Malaysia and Singapore and confronting piracy and terrorism. Another broader structure called the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Paciﬁc (CSCAP) 110 has also been established to link the two regions. In April 1994, CSCAP members published Memorandum No. 1, which recommended “cooperative efforts to ensure the security of sea lanes and sea lines of communication, with the enhancement of capabilities and maritime surveillance, safety, and search-rescue operations; for example, the concept of a Regional Maritime Surveillance and Safety Regime (REMARSSAR), and the establishment of a Regional Maritime Communications Network in the South West Paciﬁc.”111 Similarly, on August 29, 1995, CSCAP published Memorandum 4, which recommended regional maritime cooperation, building an oceans governance regime for the Asia Paciﬁc region based on UNCLOS, and the promotion of a stable maritime regime in the region with the free and uninterrupted ﬂow of seaborne trade.112 Finally, the CSCAP Maritime Cooperation Working Group held a joint meeting with participants from the Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in Manila and reiterated that maritime security issues are vital to the economic and political stability of the Asian Paciﬁc region.113 The other regional effort in confronting maritime violence is the Organization for African Unity (OAU). Two undertakings are noteworthy. First, on July 14, 1999, the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism was signed in Algiers by African Union members. Article 4 of the convention speciﬁcally calls for member states to develop stronger methods in monitoring the seas for terrorist activity.114 And second, on November 26, 2007, South African, Kenyan, and Tanzanian military and diplomatic representatives held a conference on maritime security issues on board the SAS Drakensberg in

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Mombassa harbor. The conference members discussed the poor regional maritime security policy of Africa and the problems of rising pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa.115 It is also important to acknowledge the activities of nongovernmental bodies in confronting maritime threats. An example of such an organization is the International Chamber of Commerce of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). In 1981, IMB was established with the mission to act as a focal point to combat all types of maritime crime and malpractice. It eventually offered consulting services in areas concerning vessel and port security. And in 1992, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre was created in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The center “maintains a round-the-clock watch on the world’s shipping lanes, reporting on pirate attacks to local law enforcement and issuing warnings about piracy hotspots to shipping.”116

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS In light of the foregoing review of the contemporary record of maritime terrorism, as well as an examination of other published and unpublished documents on the subject, several observations can be made. First, a broad spectrum of perpetrators, capabilities, tactics, and targets is evident. Whether modern-day pirates, insurgents, or terrorists, these actors have used a variety of weapons (e.g., M-16 riﬂes, machine guns, and rocket propelled grenades), and have employed deception (e.g., planting mines) in their operations. They attacked facilities and personnel offshore and at sea. The perpetrators targeted ﬁshermen, refugees, tourists, businesspeople, and other victims on rivers, lakes, and the high seas. These attackers have threatened, robbed, bombed, ambushed, and sunk ships and other targets in the maritime environment. These operations, however, did not include any reported hijacking of nuclear material transported by sea. Yet, the attacks perpetrated thus far contain conceptual and tactical elements that might potentially threaten shipments of plutonium. Second, although maritime operations vary considerably in terms of scope and intended results, almost all of them might be generalized into several logical sequences, including analysis, planning, preparation, and execution. Once the perpetrators determine their objective and target, they obtain the information needed, analyze it, organize a suitable plan of action, make the necessary preparations in terms of recruits, training, weapons, and equipment, and set off on their mission. Conversely, in the majority of incidents, it is evident that the response record of both industry and government was rather weak. Intelligence was not available or shared between relevant agencies, security procedures and practices were poor, and crisis management plans were either nonexistent or were not implemented.

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Third, despite the numerous cases that have been recorded, no complete and comprehensive data on maritime terrorism are available. The reason for this reality stems from the fact that many incidents are often disguised, underreported, or not revealed for economic reasons (e.g., raising insurance costs) and security considerations (e.g., minimizing future attacks). And fourth, considering the fact that some of the incidents have been spectacular (e.g., the hijacking of the Achille Lauro and the bombing of the USS Cole and the Limburg), the cumulative impact is rather serious. Maritime terrorism affects not only business, but also national and international security issues. To be sure, as a result of an expanding vulnerability of the maritime environment to terrorist attacks, there has been a steadily growing concern that the perpetrators might raise the ante under certain conditions. It has been suggested, for example, that should effective government and intergovernmental responses deny terrorists their sought-after publicity, they are likely to change tactics, increase their audacity, and escalate their symbolic-oriented acts through major, spectacular operations. Consider a threatened or actual detonation of a natural gas or petroleum tanker in a major harbor or on the high seas. A terrorist-initiated attack on maritime transportation of hazardous chemicals, pesticides, or petroleum products—including liquid natural gas—is no less signiﬁcant. Moreover, any major type of nuclear maritime event, such as the hijacking of a nuclear submarine by terrorist units, might force a government to submit to the demands of the perpetrators and make extreme concessions simply because there will be no viable alternatives to resolve the incident satisfactorily. In conclusion, it is apparent that despite the various security measures undertaken by government and industry, including legislation, structures, policies, and procedures, maritime terrorism is alive and well. From a terrorist’s point of view, it is becoming increasingly attractive and cost effective. The maritime environment is opening up new vulnerabilities to determined and dedicated terrorists and their supporters. Perpetrators operating today are better organized, more professional, and better equipped for operations at sea than their predecessors several decades ago. Potential maritime targets are also expanding because of an increase in commercial and leisure activity at sea. What is of particular concern is that current and future actors, operating independently or with support of state sponsors, will target not only cruise ships but also intensify their attacks on cargo vessels, such as large crude oil tankers or liqueﬁed natural gas carriers. Moreover, the hijacking or even sabotage of ships transporting plutonium should be seriously considered as a terrorist option. Although we have not experienced a terrorist nuclear incident at sea, prudence dictates that ignoring the likelihood that such an event would be dangerous, with serious consequences for the future development of civilian nuclear programs. Tragically, with the emerging post-9/11 world now

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under pressure from political, economic, and social adversaries, and with the expanding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it appears that the terrorist phenomenon will not be reduced, let alone eliminated, in the foreseeable future. This reality forces us to ponder maritime security requirements with extraordinary concern. After all, as the Greek thinker Themistocles who observed some 25 centuries ago, “He who commands the sea commands everything.”

Notes 1. Quote cited in Webster’s International Dictionary of the English Language (Springﬁeld, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Comp, 1900), p. 382. 2. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part7.htm and U.N. Doc. Alconf.62/122art. 101, reprinted in 21 I.L.M 1261 (1982). 3. See, for example, V. K. Anand, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: A Study of Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publishers, 1981); Max G. Manwaring, “Toward an Understanding of Insurgent Warfare,” Military Review, vol. 68, no. 1 (1988), pp. 28–35; and Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare (London: Routledge, 1990). 4. http://terrorism.about.com/od/whatisterroris1/ss/DeﬁneTerrorism_2.htm. 5. http://www.undemocracy.com/A-RES-49-60/page_4/rect_103,807_894,899. 6. http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2007/2007fc568/2007fc568.html. 7. See, for example, FBI, “Terrorism in the United States” (1993), p. 28. See also www.geocities.com/CapitalHill/2468/def.html ; www.cqpress.com/context/articles/ cqr_terror_def.html ; and www.armscontrolcenter.org/terrorism/ 101/deﬁnitions.html. 8. See, for instance, U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 1994” (1995), p. vi. 9. http://www.maritimeterrorism.com/deﬁnitions/. 10. http://www.thewayofthepirates.com/history-of-piracy/ancient-piracy.php 11. Life of Julius Caesar, IV, Suetonius, The Lives of the Caesars. http://www .gutenberg.org/ﬁles/6386/6386.txt 12. Life of Pompey, XXIV–XXX. Plutarch, Parallel Lives. http://www .gutenberg.org/ﬁles/14140/14140-h/14140-h#LIFE_OF)POMPEIUS 13. Davies, Norman. Europe: A History. Pimlico: London, 1977. pp. 293, 309. 14. Cordingly, David. Pirates: Terror on the High Seas – from the Caribbean to the South China. Atlanta, Turner Publishing, Inc. 1996. pp. 78–80. 15. Ibid., pp. 91, 97–98. 16. Ibid., pp. 19–21, 25. 17. Ibid., pp. 26–30. 18. Ibid., pp. 31–33. 19. Ibid., pp. 34–35. 20. Ibid., p. 35. See also Encyclopedia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/ eb/article-9040341/Piet-Heyn 21. Cordingly, op. cit., pp. 38–40. 22. Ibid., pp. 49–50.

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23. http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/pages/history/story0038.htm 24. Cordingly, op. cit. p. 56. 25. http://famousamericans.net/jeanbernardlouisedesjeanpointis/ 26. Ibid., pp. 158–160. 27. Cordingly, op. cit., pp. 102–103. 28. Ibid., pp. 112–115. 29. Ibid., p. 122. 30. Ibid., p. 174. 31. Ibid., pp. 176–177. 32. http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl940.cfm 33. Ibid. 34. See W. M. Robinson, The Confederate Privateers. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1928. 35. Cordingly, op. cit., pp. 185–187. 36. S. F. Menefee, “Terrorism at Sea: The Historical Development of an International Legal Response” in E. Ellen, Violence at Sea (Paris: 1987). 37. Cordingly, op. cit., pp. 222–235. 38. Ibid., pp. 189–211. 39. http://www.ahoy.tk-jk.net/MaraudersWWI/Wolf.html 40. B. H. Liddell Hart. The History of the Second World War. Old Saybrook, Connecticut, 1970. Konecky & Konecky. pp. 374–391. 41. For general literature and chronologies on terrorism incidents, see, for example, Yonah Alexander, ed., Terrorism: An International Resource Tile 1970–89 Bibliography (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Press, 1991). See also Edward F. Mickolus, The Literature of Terrorism: A Selectively Annotated Bibliography (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980), and Edward F. Mickolus et al., International Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, Vol. I: 1984–87 (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University, 1984 and 1989). 42. Aljazeera.net, October 30, 2003. 43. The Nation (Bangkok), February 11, 1991. 44. Rangoon Domestic Service, January 25, 1991. 45. See, for example, L. C. Green, “The Santa Maria: Rebels or Pirates,” 37 British Yearbook of International Law (1961), 496. 46. Attacks against merchant shipping as reported to the U.S. Government, Reference No. 90-0002 (unclassiﬁed). 47. Media reports and such as press indexes. 48. Micklous, op. cit. For a case study of single-issue political extremism, see, for instance, Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, new ed. (New York: Random House, 1990). 49. Cited by Stefan H. Leader, “The Militant Animal Rights Movement: An Assessment” (an unpublished paper, July 1989), p. 13, and Micklous et al., op. cit. 50. For exhaustive sources, see for example, Peter Janke, Guerilla and Terrorist Organizations: A World Directory and Bibliography (New York: Macmillan, 1983): Terrorist Group Proﬁle (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1989); Yonah Alexander, Middle East Terrorism: Selected Group Proﬁles (Washington DC: JINSA, 1994); and Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute of the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Rand Corporation, “RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database,” 2003. 51. See, for instance, Yonah Alexander and Joshua Sinai, Terrorism: The PLO Connection (New York: Crane, Russak, 1989), and Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Secular Groups:

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Proﬁles of Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2003). 52. Brian Michael Jenkins, “Subnational Conﬂict in the Mediterranean Region,” March 1983, http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2005/P6858.pdf 53. See, for example, Gregory V. Gooding, “Fighting Terrorism in the 1980’s: The Interception of the Achille Lauro Hijackers,” Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 12 (1987), pp. 158–179, and Dean C. Alexander, “Maritime Terrorism and Legal Responses,” Transportation Law Journal, Vol. XIX, no. 2 (1991), pp. 453–493. 54. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998 (Washington DC: March 1989), p. 27. 55. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990 (Washington DC: April 1991), pp. 26–27. 56. Micklous, op. cit. 57. IDF Spokesman (January, 1974). 58. Micklous, op. cit. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid. 62. IDF Spokesman (February, 1974). 63. Micklous, op. cit. 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid. 68. www.washingtonpost.com/ac3/ContentServer?mode- world/issues/terrordata +pagename=world/terror2003. 69. “RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database,” March 12, 2003. 70. “Primary Documents: U.S. Espionage Act 15 June 1917.” First World War.com May 5, 2002. Accessed on December 18, 2007. http://www.ﬁrstworldwar.com/ source/espionageact.htm 71. “Ports and Waterways Safety System.” The United States Coast Guard. Accessed on December 18, 2007. http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/mwv/vts/PAWSS.htm 72. “MSC Background Information.” Maritime Security Council. 2003. Accessed on December 18, 2007. http://www.maritimesecurity.org/background_info.htm 73. “CSI: Container Security Initiative Fact Sheet.” United States Customs and Broader Protection. October 2, 2007. Accessed on December 18, 2007. http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/international_activities/ csi/csi_fact_sheet.ctt/csi_fact_sheet.doc 74. Securing the Global Supply Chain Customs: Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) Strategic Plan. U.S. Customs and Border Protection. November 2004. Accessed on December 20, 2007. http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/linkhandler/ cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/ctpat_strategicplan.ctt/ctpat_ strategicplan.pdf 75. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, United States Coast Guard. Accessed on December 18, 2007. http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factﬁl/Factcards/ MTSA2002.htm 76. The Proliferation Security Initiative, United States Department of State. Accessed on December 18, 2007. http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/proliferation/

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77. “Guard Statement of Rear Admiral Larry L. Hereth on the Anti-Terrorism & Port Security Act of 2003 before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, & Homeland Security.” Department of Homeland Security. January 27, 2004. http://kyl.senate.gov/ legis_center/subdocs/012704_hereth.pdf 78. Testimony of Admiral Thomas B. Fargo before the House Armed Services Committee. United States Navy Paciﬁc Command. March 31, 2004. Accessed on November 15, 2007. http://wwww.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2004/040331house armedsvcscomm.shtml 79. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, The White House, September 20, 2005. Accessed on December 17, 2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/maritimesecurity.html#annex 80. Ibid. 81. “President Bush Signs SAFE Port Act.” White House Press Releases. October 13, 2006. Accessed on December 17, 2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2006/10/20061013-2.html 82. Reported in Homeland Security Funding Week, No. 06-12 (March 28, 2006), p. 5. 83. “Piracy and Maritime Policy in Southeast Asia: Dire Straits.” Eds. Adam Ward & James L. Hackett. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Comments Vol. 10 Issue 6. July 2004. Accessed on November 14, 2007. http://www.southchina sea.org/docs/Piracy%20and%20Maritime%20Terror%20in%20Southeast%20Asia,%20 ISS.pdf 84. CDR Robert Wholschlegel, LTC Curtis W. Turner, and Dr. Kent Butts. “Maritime Threats Workshop (United States Army Paciﬁc’s: Defense Environmental and International Cooperation [DEIC] Workshop).” Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College Issue Paper. October 2004 Vol. 09-04. Accessed on December 10, 2007. http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/publications/IP09-04.pdf 85. Agreement on Maritime Transport Between the Government of the United States of America and The Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration. 2007. Accessed on January 10, 2008. http://ww.marad.dot.gov/International/07/Vietnam_Eng.pdf 86. Weisman Jonathan. “Port Deal To Have Broader Review.” The Washington Post. February 27, 2006; Page A01. Accessed on December 17, 2007. http://www.washington post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/26/AR2006022600737.html and “Dubai Ports World Sells U.S. Assets.” The Wall Street Journal Online. December 12, 2006. Accessed on December 17, 2007. http://online.wsi.com/article/SB116584567567746444 .html 87. Articles concerning the Law of the Sea. United Nations. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II. 1956. Accessed on December 20, 2007. http://untratey .un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/8_1_8_2_1956.pdf 88. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. International Maritime Organization. 2002. http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?topic_id=257&doc_id=647 89. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention. United Nations. 2001. Accessed on December 20, 2007. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx .htm 90. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. International Maritime Organization. 2007. Accessed on December 20, 2007. http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id= 259&doc_id=686

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91. International Maritime Organization: http://www.imo.org/Safety/main frame.asp? topic _id=583&doc_id=2689 92. Measure to Enhance Maritime Security: Directives for Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers (MRCCS) on Acts of Violence Against Ships, International Maritime Organization, MSC/Circ.1073, June 10, 2003 http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. International Maritime Organization. 2007. Accessed on December 20, 2007 http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=259&doc_id=68 93. “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Barcelona Process.” EU External Relations. 2007. Accessed on December 21, 2007. http://ec.europa.ed/external_relations/ euromed/index.htm 94. Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, Italian Navy. “NATO Contribution to Maritime Security.” NATO. November 13, 2006. http://www.afsouth.nato.into/ transcripts/2003/TS_02_03.htm 95. Cox, Steve, USMC. “Horn of Africa Group Meets with Regional Leaders.” U.S. Department of Defense. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle .aspx?id=42352 96. “NATO elevates Mediterranean Dialogue to a genuine partnership, launches Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.” NATO April 21, 2005. Accessed on December 21, 2007. http://www.nato.into/docu/update/2004/06-june/e0629d.htm 97. “NATO/Israel Cooperation in the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue.” NATO Press Release. December 6, 2006. Accessed on December 21, 2007. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-123e.htm 98. “NATO and Egypt conclude Individual Cooperation Programme.” NATO Press Release. October 10, 2007. Accessed on December 21, 2007. http://www.nato.int/ docu/pr/2007/p07-106e.html 99. ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime Manila, 20 December 1997. ASEAN. 2005. Accessed on January 8, 2008. http://www.aseansec. org/5640.htm & Manila Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime (1998). ASEAN. 2005. Accessed on January 8, 2008. http://www.aseansec.org/5634.htm 100. Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. ASEAN. 2007. Accessed on January 8, 2008. http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm 101. Singapore Proposes Maritime Security Exercises for Asian Security Forum. ASEAN. March 2, 2003. Accessed on January 8, 2008. http://www.aseansec.org/afp/100.htm 102. ARF Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Security. ASEAN. June 17, 2003. Accessed on January 8, 2008. http://www.aseansec.org/14837.htm 103. Joint Communique of the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) Bangkok, 8 January 2004. ASEAN. 2005. Accessed on January 8, 2008. http:// www.aseansec.org/15649.htm 104. ARF CBM on Regional Cooperation in Maritime Security 2–4 March 2005, Singapore: Co-China’s Report. ASEAN Regional Forum. March 2005. Accessed on January 8, 2007. www.aseanregionalforum.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=BIypn%2FghhhM%3D &tabid=66&mid=403 105. “Info on ReCAAP.” International Quality & Productivity Center. 2006. Accessed on November 9, 2007. http://www.iqpc.com/cgi-bin/templates/document .html? topic=228&event=11243&document=82392 106. The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre. Accessed on December 10, 2007. http://www.recaap.org/index_home.html

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107. The Batam Joint Statement of the Fourth Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the Littoral States on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, August 1–2, 2005. http:// app.mfa.gov.sg/internet/press/view_press.asp?post_id=1406 108. The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre. Accessed on December 10, 2007. http://www.recaap.org/index_home.html 109. Ibid. 110. Khoo How San. “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: If It Ain’t Broke . . .” Ministry of Defense, Singapore. December 2000. Accessed on January 8, 2008. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2000/Vol26_4/7.htm Media Release: Five Power Defence Meeting. Australian Department of Defence. July 4, 2000. Accessed on January 8, 2008. http://www.defence.gov.au/minister/Mooretpl .cfm?CurrentId=192 & “5 Power Defense Pact Targets Terrorism, Sea Piracy.” Asian Political News. July 10, 2000. Accessed on January 8, 2008. http://ﬁndarticles .com/p/articles/mi_ m0WDQ/is_2000_July_10/ai_63275598/pg_1 111. CSCAP Memorandum No. 1: The Security of the Asia Paciﬁc Region. CSCAP. April 1994. Accessed on December 21, 2007. http://www.cscap.org/documents/cscap %20memo%201.doc 112. CSCAP Memorandum No. 4: Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation. CSCAP. April 1998. Accessed on http://aus-cscap.ann.edu.au/memo4.html 113. Joint Statement of the Maritime Cooperation Working Group of the Council for Security Cooperation in The Asia Paciﬁc (CSCAP) and Participants from the Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation Council (PECC). CSCAP. September 7, 2003. Accessed on December 21, 2007. http://www.cscap.org/documents/ WGMC%2013Report.doc 114. OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols, Charters. Accessed on January 10, 2008. http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Algiers_convention%20on%20Terrorism .pdf 115. Conference on Maritime Security Issues on the East Coast of Africa. Institute for Security Studies. November 20, 2007. Accessed on January 10, 2008. http://www.iss.co.za/ dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/OPENING%20REMARKS.PDF? link_id=&slink_id=5383&link_type=&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3 116. “International Maritime Bureau: Overview.” International Commercial Crime Services, International Chamber of Commerce. 2008. Accessed on January 9, 2008. http:// www.icc-ccs.org/imb/overview.php

2

Maritime Security and Terrorism: Some Interdisciplinary Perspectives (1981)*

HISTORY OF THE HIGH SEAS: MORAL DEFENSE FOR A MARITIME CIVILIZATION Jeffrey St. John News Commentator Mutual Broadcasting System

One hundred and eighty years ago, Thomas Jefferson had been third president of an infant American republic only two months when he was faced with his ﬁrst crisis in foreign policy. On May 14, 1801, the Pasha of Tripoli declared war on the United States. American and European maritime states operating in the Mediterranean had been paying tribute to the piratical Barbary states of North Africa to prevent their commercial shipping from being plundered. The Pasha of Tripoli had demanded an increase in the amount of tribute paid by the *This chapter includes selected remarks presented at an International Symposium on Maritime Security & Terrorism held on September 21–23, 1981, in Arlington, Virginia. The event was organized by A. Robert Matt, President, IISS Associates, in cooperation with several universities and government agencies. The entire conference proceeding is out of print.

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United States. Jefferson refused and thus became the ﬁrst president in U.S. history to say no to international blackmail when the pasha demanded an increase in that tribute. To back up his refusal, Jefferson ordered a United States naval blockade of the pasha’s ports. The subsequent U.S. victory, in what was called the Tripolitianian War of 1804 and 1805, ended the practice forever of paying tribute to the pasha, although the United States continued to make payments to other Barbary states of North Africa until 1816, when the practice was ended for good in the aftermath of the War of 1812 with Great Britain. This forgotten episode in the early history of America and the high seas has several uncanny parallels to our own time. Jefferson’s ﬁrst foreign policy test dealt with a despot in Tripoli, and President Reagan’s ﬁrst policy test also concerns a despot in Tripoli, which is, of course, the modern capital of Libya, ruled by Muammar Al-Quaddaﬁ. Libya’s bankrolling of terrorism worldwide is an ideologically reﬁned substitute for piracy as practiced by the Pasha of Tripoli. Maritime terrorism is a potential future menace, because of the current relationship between Libya and the Soviets, who have already helped terrorists achieve their ideological objectives on land. In the 1980s, the Soviets will increasingly use their naval power in their ongoing resource war. Waterborne commercial transports that carry vital oils and ores to the West have concluded with the Libyans another massive arms deal in exchange for the Soviet’s use of Libyan ports for the Soviet’s Mediterranean ﬂeet. It places the Soviets in a strategically strong position to expand their ongoing resource war against the western world. Their efforts to deny western industrial societies access to vital oil and ore are being carried on in ﬁve critical areas of the globe: the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, the tip of South Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America. Soviet naval power has safe anchorage to dominate the Caribbean, where sixty percent of Middle East and Persian Gulf oil ultimately ﬁnds its way for reﬁning or transshipment to the United States. Given the nature of the Soviet submarines and trawlers operating in the oceans of the world, would it be difﬁcult to mount a campaign of maritime terrorism? The Reuters News Service reported on September 10, 1981, that in the last ﬁve months Mobil, Shell, and British Petroleum have conﬁrmed that some of their oil tankers have been targets of pirates in the Phillips Channel off Singapore. The nearby Malacca Strait has for generations been the focal point for piracy against coastal shipping. British shippers consider the problem serious enough to ask the Singapore government for help, which, in turn, has appealed to the international police organization, Interpol. The September 18, 1981 edition of the Christian Science Monitor reported much the same information with one critical addition: While the pirates currently operating in the Phillips Channel have obviously limited aspirations—money, transistor radios, and watches—and have thus far indulged in little physical violence, there is obvious danger of escalation if the

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pickings are good enough. The fact that it is clearly possible to raid cargo vessels with impunity in this part of Southeast Asia must raise the specter of a more sinister development—the hijacking of an oil tanker by an organization with political, rather than commercial, motivations.

Ever since the establishment of the Soviet regime in Russia, it has been standard operating procedure for the Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries to use criminal elements for political purposes. Historically, we should remember that between the sixteenth and late eighteenth centuries, European powers employed pirates or privateers as instruments of national policy. British and Dutch privateers preyed on Spanish gold and silver treasure ships. The speciﬁc purpose of this form of naval warfare was to weaken Imperial Spain as a global power and so enfeeble her economically that she would ﬁnd it impossible to maintain her status as a superpower. Would the Soviets sponsor such a form of naval warfare? The revival of piracy as a form of naval warfare would be an inexpensive way to extend its war against the West to the seas and Western maritime nations. Piracy has been practiced by Ancient Greece, Rome, and Carthage. The Vikings and the Moors had practiced this black art on the high seas. European maritime states found it expedient to employ privateers as an instrument of national policy. Jefferson was the ﬁrst head of a Western maritime nation willing to lay down a ﬁrm and consistent policy to deal with the maritime menace. Congress—on March 3, 1819—passed a law “denying any person or persons whatsoever” found in the United States and convicted of piracy the legitimacy of claiming that such an act was committed in the name of a political cause or revolution. In 1820, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the law when it was challenged by ﬁfty men convicted and sentenced to death for piracy. With the exception of the use of privateers in the U.S. Civil War, the crime of piracy became almost nonexistent. It was the general agreement of the maritime nations that the practice was an international menace that must be dealt with harshly that accounts for the almost total disappearance of piracy in the nineteenth century. After World War II, some governments of the globe accepted the idea that terrorist tactics for political goals were in some cases permissible, and we began to witness the growth, or reemergence, of terrorism on a global scale. By skillful propaganda, direct and indirect, worldwide communications have conferred on terrorism a moral mystique and romanticism that it does not deserve. Land-based multinational corporations in the last decade and a half have refused to deal with the initial incubation of terrorism. Will maritime nations and enterprises of the world make the same mistake? I ask this because of the initial reaction of so many in the oceans industries to the idea of even holding this symposium to discuss the potential menace of maritime terrorism. Such an attitude is not only intellectual negligence, it is stupidity of the ﬁrst order. Historical and ideological evidence and experience alone make it necessary to face the problem and prepare for it.

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In the nineteen years left in this century, the oceans of the world may well become the ﬁnal and crucial arena of global conﬂict between competing economic systems. How the world perceives the free system that is now under siege will be largely shaped by communications, or by a black legend and a war of words. If the maritime enterprises and nations cannot explain and defend the values that make that system possible and communicate why freedom of the seas and commerce is preferable to global dictatorship, they will ultimately lose the more important battle for the minds of millions everywhere on earth. If they refuse to ﬁght the war of words now being waged, then any physical war, which is a constant companion of the war of words, will be lost. The economic jugular vein of the Western World is the sea lanes between the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic, and the Caribbean. The economic system that makes this miracle possible is under violent siege on land on every continent and faces the clear prospect that the siege will eventually be extended to the seas. The men and women who make that private economic system possible have been stiff-necked and stupid in not seeing that the system must be defended with the mind as well as with might, with moral and political principles and not pious platitudes. Perhaps it’s time for the private sector to cease waiting for government to defend it from its enemies. Perhaps it’s time the private sector ﬁnd some intellectual leathernecks to defend the system before it’s too late.

THE ROLE OF MARITIME INDUSTRY IN DEFENSE OF “FREE WORLD” NATIONS Admiral (Ret.) Thomas H. Moore Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Sea power includes the Navy, Coast Guard, shipbuilding industry, shipping industry, and handling-equipment. We are a maritime nation and without access to the sea, this country not only cannot survive militarily and industrially, but neither can it survive economically. Gentlemen, your business and your performance are taken for granted. As a consequence, we have let our capabilities drift down to an unacceptable position. It’s an attribution war. The whole problem in ﬁghting a major war against the maritime industry is to sink ships faster than the other side can build them. In World War II we were sinking German submarines faster than they were building them and building ships faster than they could sink them. That is the kind of war you always have at sea, whether it be conducted by terrorists with an attack here and an attack there or spread all over the world. It’s not the Battle of Jutland. It’s not the Battle of Midway where they fought

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essentially to an obvious outcome. That is not the nature of the threat to the maritime industry. During World War II, the shipbuilding facilities of Germany and Japan were absolutely demolished. Today, we ﬁnd ourselves with very obsolete equipment and shipyards, whereas both the Germans and Japanese have very modern yards. For that reason they have captured the commercial shipbuilding contest. We have to put the maritime industry and sea power at the level that it must be, if we are to continue to defend our country. We have a big problem in just the shipbuilding capacity required to do this. Recently we made a study of the number of bases that are available to American Navy ships and aircraft worldwide. Before the Vietnam War, it was over 100. Today, it’s about 32. When I was chief of naval operations we had 900 ships. Today, we have less than 500. The Soviets have well over 200 submarines, which were the ﬁrst kinds of ships they began to build. In my view, World War III has already started. What concerns me is the answer to the question: “Can we acquire the resources and transport them to the United States and then distribute them after they have completed processing?” Just last week I was in Japan, where we had extended discussions with many people on the overall subject of the total vulnerability of Japan. They have to import 100 percent of their petroleum, 95 percent overall of their energy, and a large part of their food. The whole world has taken for granted the fact that we are always going to have free marine transport that won’t be interfered with by outside agents. Raw materials must be transported by ship. The maritime industry is vital. The products that might be used to provide a better way of life for those in various countries, and in the so-called developing countries, can only be distributed by ship. What are we going to do about it? I testiﬁed to Congress, suggesting that we set up in the executive branch some kind of cabinet position or directive to cover this whole problem of sea power. I would like to see someone in the executive branch of government have the responsibility to look at this problem, as Bob Matt has brought it before you, in the broadest context of sea power—shipbuilding capacity, our navy, (the kind of navy we need), the Coast Guard, and the handling facilities. Mr. St. John was quite right when he pointed out the historical import of the maritime gateways: the Malacca Straits, Suez Canal, Strait of Gibraltar, Panama Canal, around the cape of Africa, and Indonesian Islands. All are choke points that the Soviets are gradually moving into in order to be in a position to inﬂuence or take action by proxy or otherwise. Bearing in mind that we cannot survive without use of the sea because we are a maritime nation, I think it is high time that the entire country get behind it. Let me wind up by saying that we’ve got a real tough problem, and that’s why I am happy to see this meeting being held.

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Terror on the High Seas

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE Yonah Alexander Professor & Director, The Institute for Studies in International Terrorism State University of New York

On the night of November 29, 1981, two months before the 34th anniversary of the United Nations (UN) resolution on Palestine, several maritime terrorist squads, calling themselves the “Secret Army for the Liberation of Palestine” (SALP) seized two Liberian-registered loaded supertankers of 300,000 tons each. One ship was captured in the Persian Gulf, where 60 percent of all oil traded internationally ﬂows. The second was seized in the Strait of Malacca, through which consumers in southeast Asia and Japan receive their supplies. The SALP communicated a message to major news agencies at the UN in which they threatened to blow up these vessels if their demands were not met within 48 hours. Their demands were two: One, that Israel recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, and second, that the UN General Assembly revoke its November 29, 1947 petition resolution and recommend the establishment of a secular democratic state in Palestine in which Muslims, Christians, and Jews will live in peace side by side. The actual sinking of those tankers would not prevent the passage of other vessels through the Strait of Hormuz or the Strait of Malacca. More serious would be the effect on the environment from the oil spill. The psychological impact of such an event would trigger skyrocketing increases in insurance fees for the vessels through the straits. This commercial response by the oil companies and the insurance brokers, rather than any reduced physical capability, would result in a signiﬁcant slowdown in oil ﬂowing to Europe, Southeast Asia, and Japan. The crippling state that such action would inﬂict is nevertheless devastating. This over-simpliﬁed scenario illustrates the complex nature of contemporary terrorism and raises the question whether industrial democratic societies are equipped in terms of funding, personnel, organization structures, and realistic policies to cope with threats directed against vital maritime choke points. The answer to this question is probably no. According to various studies and reports, neither industry nor government has developed adequate contingency plans to reduce the adverse effects of a petroleum shortage. My remarks will deal brieﬂy with some of the aspects of modern terrorism, focusing on the vulnerability of the maritime environment in general and what we can and should do about this problem. Terrorism is an expedient tactical and strategic tool of politics in the struggle for power within and among nations. From time immemorial, established regimes, as well as opposition groups and forces, functioning under varying degrees of stress, have intentionally utilized instruments of psychological and physical force, including

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intimidation, coercion, repression, and ultimately the destruction of human life and property for the purpose of attaining various goals, real or imaginary, broad and narrow. During the past two decades, pragmatic and symbolic terrorist acts undertaken by terrorist groups throughout the world for the purpose of producing pressures on governments and peoples to concede to the demands of the perpetrators have victimized, maimed, and killed thousands of innocent civilians. Considerable damage has also been inﬂicted on nonhuman targets. The terrorist groups ideologically committed to the destruction of the capitalistic system and those in need of funding, or both, have selected as their primary targets the personnel, facilities, and operations of the international business community. About 40–45 percent of the total number of terrorist incidents are business-connected. As commerce, industry, transportation, and communications become more complex, they will become more susceptible to unpredictable and highly technological schemes of men determined to use terrorism. More ideological and political violence can be anticipated in the 1980s. Terrorism poses many threats to contemporary society and is likely to have a very serious impact on the quality of life and on an orderly, civilized existence. The most signiﬁcant dangers are those related to the safety and welfare of each and every one of us; to the stability of the state system, to economic development, and lastly the expansion and perhaps even the survival of democracy. While the United States has been relatively free of terrorism, it is likely to become more of a target in the future for several reasons: First, the terrorist may be looking for new and more important areas of operation so as to make a greater impact. Due to the low level of terrorist activity here, and the fact that the United States is currently faced with more immediate problems of inﬂation, high interest rates, unemployment, and environmental questions as well as international issues, such as neutron bomb development, the Middle East, and Central America, the United States is largely unprepared to deal with terrorism. The American people’s conﬁdence in both the legislative and executive branches of the government to resolve these pressing problems is presently low. To counter terrorism, governments must strengthen intelligence. Police organizations should be allowed to increase wiretaps, hire informers, and inﬁltrate various organizations suspected of terrorism. In the past few years Congressional action has been moving away from, rather than strengthening, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In my judgment, conditions are emerging that could lead to many explosive forms of illegal terrorist activity by individuals, groups, or class interests, especially in response to future crises such as a deep recession, or a serious military challenge abroad, possibly from the more expansionist Soviet Union. If any of these occur, terrorists could provide unprecedented challenges to the U.S. social, political, and economic system.

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The deliberate use of terrorism as a technique of disrupting the fabric of civilized order in open societies is one of the most menacing facts of international life today. As a form of low-intensity attack below the threshold of what is clearly perceived as a regular, organized military aggression, terrorism is seldom recognized as a form of warfare and is rarely met with effective counter-measures in democratic nations. It is the destabilizing element that beneﬁts militants by putting tolerance, moderation, and political pluralism in peril. Unless Americans become more conscious of the broad strategic dangers reﬂected in the deliberate international use of terror as an instrument of policy and become more skillful in deterring or countering terrorism, regardless of who the agents of violence and the sponsors may be, the 1980s will be catastrophic for worldwide interests of the United States and its friends and allies abroad. Despite national and international efforts to control the dangers of terrorism, the level of non-state violence as we know it remains high. There are many reasons and diverse conditions but they include at least 10 factors: (1) Disagreement about who is the terrorist; (2) the lack of understanding as to the root causes of terrorism; (3) the role of the media; (4) the politicization of religion; (5) double standards of morality in the world; (6) the loss of resolve by democratic nations to take appropriate action; (7) weak punishment of governments that harbor terrorists; (8) violation of international law by various states; (9) the existence of an international network of terrorism; (10) most importantly, the support of terrorism by some states. The last contributing factor to terrorism as it affects maritime interests should be brieﬂy considered. It is clear that ideological and political violence is, to paraphrase Clausewitz, a continuation of war by other means for the purpose of compelling an adversary to submit to speciﬁc or general demands. Terrorism is escalating into the struggle for power. Small groups, with direct or indirect state support, are able to conduct political warfare at the national level, and ultimately could alter the balance of power equation on an international scale. The thinking of the communist states, as exempliﬁed by the Soviet Union, in the words of Admiral Gorshkov, is: “The disruption of the ocean lines of communication, the special arteries that feed the economic potential of the aggressor imperialist countries, has continued to be one of the ﬂeet’s missions.” The linkage of the Soviets in carrying out this dictum is unproven. However, there has been a continuing Soviet support, direct and indirect, of what Moscow calls, “national liberation movements.” A case in point is the Soviet support of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). There is organized training of thousands of PLO members in the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries. Soviet weapons ﬂowing to the PLO have established naval units, whose objective was to import the necessary know-how for the purpose of terrorist inﬁltration and smuggling of arms into Israel from the sea. These terrorist units are equipped with a very wide variety of

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material. Most of their equipment comes from the Arab states, and therefore originates from the Soviet Union. Some of it is acquired on the world market. Their equipment includes speedboats, a large number of rubber dinghies, surfboards and even a number of air mattresses. Their naval material contains approximately 500–600 mother ships, diving equipment, and sea mines. Inﬁltrators from the sea are armed with standard ground forces weapons. There have been cases in which terrorist vessels are equipped with antitank weapons. Terrorists have attempted to launch rockets at the Israeli coast from vessels. The terrorist attempts to inﬁltrate Israeli shores are basically by two principal routes: the direct route from their bases to the Israeli coastline; and the indirect route, disembarking from Lebanon, or in other Arab countries, on cargo vessels sent on the open seas and continuing their voyage to the Israeli shore. The Israeli Navy’s response against the maritime terrorist is made at two levels: (1) defensive and (2) offensive. Defensive includes: sea and air patrols, radar network, other sophisticated means, and infantry patrols along the coastline. The major portion of these activities [is] conducted on the open seas, where the Israeli Navy makes an attempt to locate and destroy the terrorist squads coming from the sea. On the offensive activities, there are two major components; (a) attrition and disruption, principally from shelling the terrorist bases from the sea, and (b) raids carried out by navy personnel on terrorist objectives situated on the shore. This is the Israeli experience. What about worldwide experience? What has been the history and what are the future implications for the maritime environment? The maritime industry, including the merchant marine and shipbuilding industries as well as the navy, [has] been, to some extent, exposed to terrorist attacks. On the basis of various data and information, we have seen a total of 100 maritime incidents, both in the United States and abroad. These incidents, which are both successful and unsuccessful, would include the following: (1) threats; (2) smuggling of arms to terrorists; (3) plots to bomb shipyards; (4) attacks directed at maritime ofﬁces on shore; (5) attacks on fuel storage facilities, at ports, islands, etc.; (6) attacks directed at Navy personnel and facilities on shore; (7) political mutiny at sea; (8) attacks at sea, including hijacking, sea-launched attack against civilian population and property; (9) sinking of merchant marine ships; and (10) supertanker sinkings in mysterious circumstances. What is the outlook for the next eighteen months to two or three years? What are the trends? What are the patterns? What are the consequences? It is very difﬁcult to predict. It is safe to assume, as Brian Jenkins states: “Terrorism is now an established mode of conﬂict.” The major reason for the continuation of terrorism and low-level intensity warfare is the fact that many of the root causes of ideological and political violence will remain unsolved. New causes will emerge in the coming months and years.

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What about the tactics? I think we are going to see two approaches: (1) continuity and (2) change in target selection. In regard to continuity, I think we can expect to see a continued rise in bombings, assassination, kidnapping, facility attack, and also some attempts at dramatic targets, such as greater use of weapons against aircraft, or attack on nuclear power stations, even attacks on parliaments. I would say that change in target selection could well be related to the maritime environment. We have more than 3,000 offshore oil platforms in operation in the United States. The numbers of these types of facilities are expected to increase substantially in the 1980s. Offshore targets are susceptible to attack from the surface, underwater, and the air. A well-placed explosive or a guided missile could seriously damage or destroy an offshore rig facility. The relative ease with which such an operation could be carried out makes offshore facilities especially inviting targets. A determined and dedicated group could also capture a facility and hold the crew hostage or threaten to blow up the rig and cause a major oil spill unless its demands are met. American oil executives are somehow reluctant to confront the problem, fearing that discussion of the problem would invite attacks. I think Americans and U.S. property abroad will continue to be major targets. We are going to see a continuation of activity in Latin America, particularly in Central America, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. What conclusions can we draw? I believe that four conclusions emerge: (1) The problem of expanding terrorism is serious and not well understood. The implications, both domestic and international, have scarcely been explored. Answers to the terrorist problem are elusive and need much greater serious attention. (2) Terrorism on the oceans has to date not been a signiﬁcant problem. (3) The oceans contain many economic assets that are within the capabilities of the terrorists to attack because their economic and symbolic value are potential targets. Some of the maritime-related ideological and political violence could possibly threaten the important vital interests of the United States as well as other domestic industrialized nations. (4) Maritime terrorism cannot always be prevented, but it can always be defeated. Governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations have a role to play in combating maritime terrorism. What can be done? What should be done? I suggest responses on four levels. (1)

The academic level. We are only beginning, in the academic community worldwide, to develop studies related to the problem of terrorism and unconventional warfare affecting maritime interests in the 1980s. I have a number of colleagues here who are going to discuss this problem. The vulnerabilities and preparedness of the navy, merchant marine, and shipbuilding industries of the United States are the major focus of this proposed project. The maritime interests of the industrial democracies in support of national security will also be considered.

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(3)

(4)

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Some of the issues to be considered by this project are the following: (a) The vulnerabilities of shipping and marine terminals, offshore oil and pipeline facilities, and ships at sea; (b) the status of the free-world maritime industry contingency planning; and (c) the role of maritime nations in the security of the free world. The U.S. government level. A primary problem is the location of jurisdictional responsibility over terrorist acts. Preventive planning is inadequate. There are ambiguities regarding jurisdictions among several U.S. enforcement agencies. The maritime industry. Unless the maritime industry will take the lead in developing some capabilities, I think all of us are going to remain hostages for a long time. As one example, the maritime industry could develop comprehensive gaming simulation and exercise programs. Acts of terrorism are extremely complex and difﬁcult to manage. Resolving them requires swift and wise decisions and coordination with many authorities. Bad decisions can be enormously costly in life and material. Many executives are still prime targets for terrorists. Training of top executives and midlevel management through simulation and gaming can prevent terrorism or substantially reduce its threats. The intergovernmental level. I suggest we look seriously at this option. Democratic nations should encourage strong sanctions to enforce international law in this ﬁeld. They should explore the possibilities of establishing a multinational naval force to respond to certain types of maritime terrorism, such as hijacking on the high seas.

MARITIME TERRORISM Brian Jenkins Program Director, Security & Sub-National Conﬂict, The Rand Corporation, 1981

Let me begin by reviewing some of the recent things we’ve seen in terrorism. August 30, [1980,] Palestinian terrorists attacked a Jewish synagogue in Vienna. August 31, a bomb was detonated at the U.S. Air Force headquarters in Ramstein, Germany. August 31, ﬁve bombs detonated in Lima, Peru, at the U.S. Embassy, the residence of the U.S. Ambassador and three American companies. August 31, a bomb destroyed a Middle East Airlines 727 jet in Beirut. September 1, there were attacks on cars in the U.S. residence area in Wiesbaden, Germany. September 2, the International Communication Agency’s ofﬁces in Lesothal. September 4, [the] French Ambassador was assassinated in Beirut. September 4, six bombs defused in the Soviet mission in New York. September 5, [a] Nigerian mission in New York. September 16, the attempted assassination of the commander [of the] U.S. Army in Europe. September 16, more bombs defused in Europe. There were 27 incidents of terrorism in August of this year. Terrorism in the world has become so commonplace that we can

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label what has occurred in the last few weeks as normal. To be sure, I compared 1981 to 1980, and 1980 was a bad year. There were more incidents of international terrorism in 1980 than in any previous year. More terrorist attacks were aimed at people rather than property than in any previous year. More terrorist incidents with fatalities occurred in 1980 than in any previous year, both in number and as a percentage of the total number of incidents. Americans continued to be the favorite targets of terrorists. American citizens or facilities [were] considered in more than one-third of all international terrorist incidents. The events of 1980 simply capped a decade of growing terrorism. These events of the last few years have demonstrated repeatedly that by employing terrorist tactics, small groups with a limited capacity for violence can achieve disproportionate effects in the world. They compel governments and corporations to divert resources, money, manpower, the attention of senior ofﬁcials, vastly out of proportion with the magnitude of the threat they pose. This afternoon I would like to review what we have seen and what we might look for in the area of terrorism in the maritime environment. The kind of terrorism we see taking place today is qualitatively different from the kind of terrorism that took place in the nineteenth century or at the beginning of the twentieth century. This has relevance to the maritime environment. Many of these qualitative changes have come about as a result of progress creating new capabilities, new vulnerabilities in our society. First, there is increased mobility, worldwide mobility provided by modern jet air travel, which permits the terrorist to carry his struggle to any part of the world. There is no such thing today as a local conﬂict in the world. Attacks made on one continent may be made because of struggles on another continent. It’s that kind of internationalization that is part of the qualitatively different terrorism today. Second are the developments in mass communications, particularly in the news media, radio, television, and communications satellites, the kinds of things that make it possible for terrorists to reach audiences of global proportions to provide them with instantaneous access to hundreds of millions of people. Much of terrorism is aimed at obtaining publicity for the terrorist cause. Enormous publicity can be obtained with almost instantaneous access to audiences of 100 million or more. Third is the increasing availability of sophisticated weapons and explosives in our society. I’m talking about increased availability of such things as plastic explosives, of miniaturized detonating devices and rocket-propelled grenades. Some groups have obtained surface-to-air guided missiles. The availability of weapons has increased the small groups’ capacity for violence. Fourth are the increased vulnerabilities of our modern, industrialized society. Other vulnerabilities that cause concern include: nuclear energy systems, electrical power grids, gas lines, offshore rigs, and liqueﬁed natural gas

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facilities and tankers. All of these are vulnerabilities, and in many cases the terrorists have already identiﬁed them. The mobility, the access to the media, the increased weaponry, and the increased vulnerabilities go together to explain more than simply the political conditions that have given rise to this modern form of international terrorism. Terrorism has increased in volume in the last decade. It is not only increasing in volume, it is also increasing in severity and lethality. At the beginning of the last decade, only 4 percent of the international terrorist incidents involved two or more fatalities. By 1980, that ﬁgure had ascended to 10 percent, or more than doubled. This year it looks as if it is climbing again. Terrorism affects the world unequally. A handful of countries experience a disproportionate share of the world volume of terrorism. In fact, ten countries account for nearly half of the incidents of international terrorism, about twenty account for nearly three quarters. The countries that do not have the high rates of international terrorism are the countries of the modern, industrialized West; countries with the highest per-capita GNPs, highest literacy rates, highest rates of industrialization, highest rates of urban population, and largest university populations. Terrorism appears to be an attribute of modern, highly industrialized, relatively afﬂuent, non-totalitarian societies. Terrorists are at a critical juncture right now. They’re at a threshold. They have achieved all that they can expect to achieve using the tactics that have been used to date: kidnapping, hijacking, bombings, and assassinations. They now face the problems of diminishing returns, diminishing returns in two senses. (1) Governments are increasingly resistant to meeting the demands of terrorists making threats, holding hostages, or other kinds of demands. Governments have also demonstrated their increased willingness to use force whenever that is possible to resolve a terrorist incident. (2) The news value of terrorist incidents has been diminishing as such events have become commonplace. This poses a problem to the terrorists. There is some evidence they’re beginning to perceive this. The pressure is on them to alter their targets or tactics, or possibly escalate. An era where they’re possibly ﬁnding new tactics and targets raises the question about whether they will enter the maritime environment as a means of regaining some of the novelty and coercive power they had in the 1970s. Growing terrorism worldwide has provoked increasing concerns that terrorism may go to sea, striking targets in the maritime environment. In fact, they already have. A quick look at recent history shows more than 70 signiﬁcant incidents in the last two decades, 60 in the last 10 years. Terrorists have attacked 47 ships. They hijacked 8 ships. They sank (or totally destroyed) 11 sea-going vessels. Anti-Castro Cuban exile groups were responsible for 19 attacks, mainly bombings. Various Palestinian groups were involved in 8 of these incidents. Other groups include the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Moslem separatists in the southern Philippines, right-wing

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Christian extremists in Lebanon, Portuguese dissidents, Angolan rebels, and the Maltese National Front. Those charged with the security of maritime assets face a broad spectrum of adversaries. Besides guerrillas and terrorists, modern-day pirates, ordinary criminals, fanatic environmentalists, mutinous crews, hostile workers, and foreign agents have carried out attacks. The spectrum of actions is equally broad: ships hijacked, destroyed by mines and bombs, attacks with bazookas, [ships] sunk under mysterious circumstances, cargos removed, crews taken hostage, extortion plots against ocean-liners and offshore platforms, raids on port facilities, attempts to board oil rigs, sabotage at shipyards and terminal facilities, even a plot to steal a nuclear submarine. Some examples: March 1960—Anti-Castro saboteurs were blamed for the sinking of a French freighter unloading explosives in Havana. The explosions, which blew the ship apart, killed nearly 100 persons and injured 200. January 1961—Seventy men armed with machine guns and hand grenades seized control of a Portuguese liner with 600 passengers on board. Opponents of the Portuguese government, they demand political recognition of “this” liberated part of the national territory. Negotiations ended the episode 11 days later. 1968—At some point during its journey, Israeli agents reportedly took control of a freighter carrying 200 tons of uranium ore and removed its cargo. The empty ship eventually reappeared in Istanbul. March 1973—A Greek charter ship carrying 250 tourists bound for Haifa sank in Beirut following an explosion. There were no casualties. Black September claimed credit for the incident. February 1974— Three gunmen seized control of a Greek freighter in the port of Karachi. They threatened to blow up the ship and kill their hostages unless the Greek government freed two imprisoned Arab terrorists. Greece agreed to commute the sentences of the two and the ship hijackers were ﬂown to Libya. June 1974—A group of animal lovers calling themselves the “Band of Mercy” set ﬁre to a vessel used to hunt seals. They warned that in future attacks they would use explosives unless seal hunting was abolished. The vessel was totally destroyed. September 1978—The sinking by the Israeli Navy of an explosive-laden freighter foiled a sensational Al Fatah terrorist plot. The terrorists planned to sail the vessel into the Sinai port of Eilat, ﬁring 42 122-mm rockets at the port’s tank farm and then ramming the 600-ton boat, crammed with more than three tons of explosives, onto the crowded beach. July 1979—Pirates took over a Thai tanker after it left Bangkok, then siphoned 80,000 gallons of diesel fuel into a waiting pirate tanker.

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January 1980—The port of Sacramento was closed for three days after receiving a bomb threat against a Soviet vessel and a warning that the harbor was mined. July 1981—Environmentalists attempted to board an oil rig 177 miles off the coast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts, to protest offshore drilling.

It is certain that the ﬁgures given here do not reﬂect the total number of incidents. Bomb threats are common. Threats of a more serious nature are not revealed for reasons of not wanting to raise insurance rates or provide inspiration to others. Extortion is a notoriously under-reported crime. Sabotage by hostile employees is often disguised. Chronologies are incomplete. Statistics are lacking. Exchange of information is limited. Will we see more of this kind of activity in the maritime environment in the future? Probably. For one thing, partly as a result of offshore oil production, there are many more targets. Our chronology shows that terrorist incidents in the maritime environment reﬂect the general level of terrorist activity, and that is clearly increasing. Low-level conﬂicts continue. We also see an increasing number of extraordinary, large-scale extortion events that will ﬁnd lucrative targets in the maritime environment. Only about one-ﬁfth of the thirty terrorist groups that account for a vast proportion of international terrorism have operated in the maritime environment. Which groups are these? Cuban, Palestinian, and the IRA alone account for two-thirds of all terrorist attacks we’ve been able to record in the maritime environment. These groups are quite special. The Cuban groups were trained by the U.S. Navy in navigation and underwater demolitions. Earlier they had been armed and equipped by the Central Intelligence Agency. Until 1968 the U.S. government supported a guerrilla navy that operated against Cuban ports and Soviet shipping in the Caribbean. The ﬂeet comprised small, fast boats armed with 57mm recoilless riﬂes and machine guns. They were responsible for a number of attacks on Soviet shipping. Sometimes they also made mistakes at night and on one occasion sank a Spanish freighter. The Palestinian groups are large, well-ﬁnanced, have access to explosives, and are well trained in bomb making. The Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine has reportedly received underwater demolitions training in the Eastern Block countries, and they certainly have access to shipping in the Mediterranean. The IRA is also comparatively large, experienced, well-ﬁnanced, skilled at making bombs, and some have also had military training. Other groups that have carried out attacks in the maritime environment include groups active in Western Africa and the Southern Philippines. Both the coast of West Africa and the Southern Philippines have been traditional areas of piracy going back several centuries. The groups most likely to operate in the maritime environment in the future are those with specialized explosives and naval skills, and those that emerged from geographic regions where maritime skills are prevalent.

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STATUS OF “FREE WORLD” MARITIME CONTINGENCY PLANNING D.N. Cassidy Director General, National Harbours Board Police Ottawa, Canada

In recent years Canada and the United States have been holding regular bilateral consultations on terrorism at the state level, and it is the policy of both countries to work together to counter any threat from international terrorists, including acts of maritime terrorism in our inland, coastal, and offshore waters. It is the policy of my country to ensure that antiterrorist contingency plans are in place and that countermeasures are coordinated among the respective organizations and agencies within Canada in both the public and private sectors, and with our counterparts in the United States. In respect to maritime terrorism, we want to know the authorities on both sides of the United States/Canada international border responsible for responding to any threats of maritime terrorism and to ensure our respective contingency plans are coordinated, and no gaps exist in such plans. I have been designated within the marine Transportation Administration, Transport Canada, to coordinate response mechanisms and counterterrorist measures in relation to the St. Lawrence Seaway, inland, coastal, and offshore waters, and the roles of the Canadian Coast Guard, the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, and the National Harbours Board. Canada is a large country that borders three oceans: the Atlantic, Paciﬁc, and Arctic. It also has the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes, stretching some 2,400 miles inland from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the head of Lake Superior. Some 36,000 vessels call annually at National Harbours Board ports in Canada. A high percentage are foreign ﬂag vessels. There were some 1,900 foreign ﬂag vessels and 3,000 Canadian or U.S. vessels that used the St. Lawrence Seaway system in 1980. In addition, in Canada’s territorial and offshore waters in the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans, a great deal of offshore oil exploration has produced a number of sites or possible sites for oil rigs. An assessment of the threat against maritime facilities by international terrorists conﬁrmed that a serious security problem existed in reinforcing the need for contingency planning in order to cope with a terrorist attack or sabotage against maritime facilities in port areas, vessels, and offshore oil rigs. [Although] the present assessment of the threat of terrorist activity against Canadian maritime facilities, vessels, and offshore oil rigs may well be comparatively low, the possibility of such an attack does exist. Our examination of the problem has indicated the need for more communications, coordination, the development and implementation of contingency planning, implementation of the lead agency and support agency roles, more government/industry coordination, cross-training of land and sea forces to counter terrorism, and exercises to test contingency plans.

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Because of Canada’s federation, there are areas of overlapping jurisdictions between federal and provincial “team” approach based on consultative arrangements for decision-making in respect to police and other actions to bring an act of maritime terrorism under control. It is necessary to develop cooperative contingency plans in order to cope and properly deal with a terrorist attack or sabotage of vessels or harbors. In terms of developing and implementing contingency plans, a few of the major elements to be considered are jurisdiction, strategic and tactical response, and crisis management. First, jurisdiction. In Canada we would treat an act of terrorism as a crime, and there would be great reliance on the criminal code for offences in respect to maritime terrorism. The administration of justice and enforcement of the criminal code are the responsibility of the provincial governments. The police force having jurisdiction in Canada has the responsibility to bring a terrorist incident under control within Canada’s inland waters and territorial sea. The low-water mark is the limit where provincial boundaries extend, and the police forces of the province responsible have responsibility to enforce the criminal code. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) reporting to the federal government has responsibility for enforcement of the criminal code and other federal statutes on the territorial sea. In the national harbours, my own police force has the responsibility for the enforcement of the criminal code. Another aspect of importance in contingency planning is the availability of strategic weapons and tactical response. The RCMP, the Ontario Provincial Police, the Quebec Police Force, and a number of municipal police forces have strategic weapons and tactical response teams. These teams are pretty much land-based, and some adaptation would have to take place in order to respond to an incident of maritime terrorism. The management of the crisis is another aspect of the contingency planning process. In dealing with an emergency arising from a terrorist act, it is fundamentally the responsibility of the police having jurisdiction assisted by provincial authorities if need be, and depending upon the need and/or circumstances, assisted by the federal government who would have the responsibility of bringing the incident under control. In the federal context, when a government department’s emergency functions are seen to be dominant in meeting an emergency, that department normally is the lead agency responsible for coordinating the activities and utilization of all federal resources that may be required to assist in resolving the crisis. The lead agency’s role is to ensure that federal government policy is upheld by ascertaining that each area of activity required to assist in resolving the situation is being attended to by appropriate federal departments and agencies, each of which, acting in accordance with its emergency (contingency) response plans, contributes specialized expertise, services, and/or equipment.

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The basic system calling for the lead agency role and responsibility is to ensure coordination and control of federal resources, making it possible for the minister responsible to be in position to (a) report to the parliament; (b) consult his colleagues; and (c) coordinate the federal aspects of public affairs. The functions of the lead agency are to: (a) nominate a federal coordinator for the emergency (b) initiate measures to counter the state emergency and restore the situation to normal, requesting extra departmental assistance as required (c) establish a coordination centre (d) coordinate federal aspects of public affairs (e) ensure liaison/consultation with provincial and/or other governmental authorities, with consultation with foreign governments being handled through the federal Department of External Affairs

All federal departments and agencies holding resources or providing services that have potential use during an emergency are support departments, and arrangements for cooperation between lead and support departments are worked out during the planning phase to ensure that a coordinated response will be swift and effective. We have been holding meetings with the major police forces in respect to their role and responsibilities. In addition, an ofﬁcial delegation will shortly visit oil facilities in the North Sea to examine security measures in place, and it will be holding meetings with military services in the United Kingdom, Holland, and Norway regarding military response arrangements. In Canada we are tackling the job of contingency planning to deal with antiterrorist measures in the maritime environment through a federal interdepartmental steering committee comprised of representation from all the federal departments and agencies of government, and a working group with composition being representative of all interested government agencies and police forces. In addition, we are holding meetings with the chief security ofﬁcers of the principal oil companies. All parties essential to the operation of the contingency plan dealing with antiterrorist measures will be included in the plan, whether from the public or the private sector.

STATUS OF “FREE WORLD” MARITIME CONTINGENCY PLANNING Paul Wilkinson Professor of International Relations University of Aberdeen, U.K.

A rather important black liquid was discovered in surprisingly large quantities in the North Sea. Its value to the British economy is evident when you

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look at these ﬁgures. We have 24 ﬁelds producing a revenue of 12 billion pounds, 12 percent of the GNP. Eighty thousand jobs depend on the oil and gas industry. The major boom has been in the vicinity of Aberdeen. It has now become the Houston of the Western European oil industry. In the light of that very valuable investment in the oil industry, the British have had to develop means of protecting this extremely complex set of offshore resources with all their onshore accoutrements. One of the major problems is the size of the areas of oil exploration. It is as distant from the northeast corner of the British oilﬁelds to Aberdeen as it is from Aberdeen to Cork—about three hours jet ﬂying time. The climate is a disincentive to anybody going out to the rigs, let alone a terrorist. They experience 100-foot waves, and 100 mile-per-hour gales are quite frequent. The actual problem of servicing this vast area with surveillance, with security protection, has been a particular headache for the British police, government, and the Ministry of Defense, all of whom are involved. The basic philosophy of the British method of handling a terrorist incident is that the government carries the overall responsibility. The primary response lies with the civil power. The civil power works well through the home secretary, who is a member of the cabinet. The police chief constable for the region, which in the case of the oil ﬁelds of Aberdeen is the chief constable of Grampian, is the chief policeman in charge. He takes total responsibility for the police response. He has immediate recourse to the central government’s advice, information, and brieﬁng from the cabinet ofﬁce brieﬁng room. He may request military aid and probably will have to if there is a terrorist incident. The civil police don’t have the resources of an assault team suitable for a maritime assault. It won’t have the aviation facilities, etc. for a major terrorist incident. But he has a well-established system now for calling upon help. Military power is immediately involved if there is a terrorist incident. The Royal Navy is immediately informed. They set about planning for any potential use of Royal Marine Assault Force, HMS Commachio, the Royal Naval Frigates, or Islands-class ships, which are available in the area speciﬁcally for the defense of oil installations. If it’s an onshore thing, the police have to handle it from start to ﬁnish, and would not normally expect to call in the military unless there was a really serious emergency that required a military assault team. That might be SAS, the Army specialist unit, which was used in the Iranian Embassy siege. Provided the cabinet ofﬁce brieﬁng room gives authority for the use of the military resource, the civil control remains in charge overall. Once the military group has been committed, [and has] carried out [its] function, the on-scene authority immediately reverts back to the civil power. The miscreants and any kind of consequences of the operation will be dealt with by the chief constable and his advisors. This system of response has been tried over a whole series of bomb hoaxes, bomb threats, and actual attempts to plant bombs [at] onshore and offshore

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installations. This system requires a tremendous amount of liaison between the various departments. By centralizing the command, control, and communications, the chief constable, in his incident room in Grampian police headquarters, can call upon the leaders of each of the government’s departments and get immediate information or advice. Assume it’s a foreign terrorist group involved. Then the Foreign Ofﬁce representative is in fact emplaced in the cabinet ofﬁce brieﬁng room system that is plugged into the Grampian incident center, with secure lines and secure telex. Every single group represented in this system has its own totally secure communications system. [...] This is vitally important, because the company has to be kept fully in the picture throughout as to what is happening with the military headquarters, the specialized assault force, and the intelligence services. The Crown Ofﬁce is the prosecutor’s department in Scotland. They would always be involved advising the chief constable of the legal matters of jurisdiction, prosecution, and so on. The Scottish Home and Health Dept. is important in case there is any need for special medical or welfare facilities. The media are built in, because it has been found that unless you have a proper system for handling the media, they will create “merry Hell” with your crisis management and your contingency planning in the future. We long ago built in this system that the media are given proper press brieﬁngs. After the event they may be given more information if they’ve been cooperative and helpful to the conduct of the operation. This communication system is vitally important. This system, through being exercised very frequently, can be improved upon to iron out all the snags where overlaps of authority appear to be snarling things up. Another absolutely fundamental lesson we have learned from [exercises] is that if the company employees are not told after the event has been resolved one way or the other what went on, there is a danger that rumors will be caught onto by the press. This will lead to dangerous speculations, and sometimes exaggerated accounts of threats. It makes much better sense to brief the media after the event about what happened to give them the full facts. We did learn one very important lesson from a recent bomb threat. The fellows living on the accommodation level of the oil production platform were not told that there was a device discovered on the derrick below them. When they discovered that afterwards, there was all hell let loose. The union demanded… that things be changed completely or they wouldn’t go and work on this particular installation again. Some wanted the company to be publicly exposed for its irresponsible action. The police have since decided they will actually inform the company that it is their duty to inform the employees on the platform. The brieﬁng for the companies is extremely thorough. A brieﬁng booklet produced by Grampian police is distributed to all the companies operating in the area. It gives instructions to the companies on how they should respond. For example, if a

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threat call is received by the company, insure that all particulars are immediately informed to the police. Notify the installation, commence search procedures, [and] notify the police information room, who have instructions as to the action to take thereafter. Arrange for senior management liaison at the Grampian headquarters. The company is actually represented in the incident management. They actually participate, but obviously as the civil police have responsibility for maintaining the law, they would normally defer to the chief constable’s decision about the seriousness of the threat, the need for evacuation procedures, and so on. The companies themselves have built up a lot of expertise in this. Their security people have a very sophisticated idea of what is needed. There are not many cases of direct collision of view between the chief constable and the company. It’s more a question of handling the press and handling employees. Difﬁculties occur in those areas because it’s very often a communication rather than a high strategy problem. As regards strategy, it’s quite clear the chief constable with all the resources he’s got from central government plugged in, is in a better position than the individual company to know what is available, what can be done, and what needs to be done on the installation.

STATUS OF “FREE WORLD” MARITIME CONTINGENCY PLANNING RADM Wayne E. Caldwell United States Coast Guard

I’d like to discuss the Coast Guard, how it’s organized, and where it gets its authority. The Coast Guard is one of the ﬁve armed forces of the United States: the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard. Each of the ﬁrst four are under the Department of Defense (DOD). The uniqueness of the Coast Guard is that it is under the Department of Transportation. That has advantages and disadvantages. For the purpose of this meeting it is advantageous. The Posse Comitaus Act restricts the utilization of the DOD forces in dealing with domestic law. However, the Coast Guard is not under DOD. Fourteen U.S.C. 2 states the “U.S. Coast Guard shall enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable federal laws upon the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Fourteen U.S.C. 88 says: “The Coast Guard may render aid to persons and protect and save property at any time and at any place at which Coast Guard facilities and personnel are available and can be effectively utilized.” A third section from 14 U.S.C. 89 reads: “the Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction for the

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prevention, detection, and suppression of the laws of the United States rendering a person liable to arrest has been committed, such persons shall be arrested.” From 18 U.S.C. 7, the federal criminal code: “The high seas and other waters within the Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state,” (that extends out to the three-mile limit, the states have certain authorities). In some instances we preempt the state’s authority. Gen. Giuffrida said the Coast Guard was the logical federal agency to coordinate responses to terrorism in the marine areas within the United States. I share that opinion. These laws basically indicate there are no legal barriers to be hurtled for that to be done. There is a problem. Our maritime arena is extremely vulnerable to acts of terrorism. One of the ﬁrst introductions I had to this business was by Bob Matt and Doug Macnair. I asked them, “Why don’t we do something about it?” Then they gave me the punch line: “Because we have had relatively few recorded incidents, it is considered to be low threat.” A by-word for me is, the risks of high vulnerability are so great that to be unprepared is intolerable. We have many of the mechanisms capable of providing capabilities in preventing and responding to terrorism. The preparedness is the uniting of those things into a working cadre. That’s what we’re missing. Remember, back in the early 1970s the Coast Guard preached to deaf ears about the threat to the marine environment from pollution by spillage of oil and hazardous substances from ships. The Argo Merchant was the ﬁrst of a series of oil spillage and marine accidents in and around the waters of the United States. We preached and said, “Some day, the law of averages… it’s going to happen.” It never happened, so the threat wasn’t there. Like a busy intersection on a busy highway, the vulnerability for serious accidents is there by virtue of their own existence. “How many people have to be killed before we put trafﬁc controls on a dangerous intersection?” We’re at that crossroad today. Out of the Argo Merchant spill came the Port and Tanker Safety Act. Out of that came one of the best federal documents I have ever seen: the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan. It has proved itself, over and over again, as one of the best systems in the world. Incorporated in this system for each area, each port has a regional plan with a contingency as to who has what resources, who is to be contacted, how you get ahold of them, every conceivable thing you can think of that will enable a rapid response to any type of spill. What is the difference between that type of contingency planning and something similar for marine terrorism? I think the Coast Guard is the agency to do it. Our captains of the port have unique training. Everything they do, practically every day, is training in crisis management. The captain is the crisis manager with his feet in the oil, on-scene, and deeply involved. I’m not saying they’re experts in handling maritime terrorism. I’m saying that they could handle the basic groundwork.

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What is needed are people who have the know-how, the academic knowledge, and the background, meeting together to identify resources. For example: the local police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and anyone who has any capability that can be utilized for the myriad number of scenarios that can be envisioned. We don’t have that kind of coordination in America. The resources are here, but they’re not put together. The Coast Guard has always fought for the principle; the best thing to do is prevent it. If you can prevent it, you don’t have to respond to it. I heard Dr. Alexander say something about ostriches. I had the same thing in my talk. I’m proud of the people who are here. Bob Matt and Doug Macnair know, there are a lot of people they asked to come. They wouldn’t because they are so vulnerable. They desired not to expose their vulnerability. That’s a sad state of affairs and if that’s not the deﬁnition of an ostrich, I don’t know what it is. The thing we have to do is coordinate, cooperate, and communicate. With Gen. Giuffrida’s comments today, the impact that he has and is putting into the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), I think we may get this thing off top dead center. You have my support.

OFFSHORE TERRORISM: ARE WE PREPARED? Congressman Carroll Hubbard Chairman Subcommittee on Panama Canal/Outer Continental (House Committee on Merchant Marine & Fisheries)

It is a distinct pleasure to address this distinguished assembly of domestic and foreign experts in the ﬁeld of maritime security and terrorism. The Subcommittee on Panama Canal and the Outer Continental Shelf, which I chair, is a subcommittee of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. The subcommittee has oversight jurisdiction over the security and operation of the Panama Canal and legislative jurisdiction concerning the implementation of the Panama Canal treaties. It also maintains oversight jurisdiction over the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and legislative jurisdiction with respect to any amendments thereto. Both my subcommittee and the full committee, under the leadership of the Honorable Walter B. Jones of North Carolina, are dedicated to the enhancement and protection of the nation’s maritime assets, including the development of a strong and prosperous merchant marine; the smooth operation of the Panama Canal; a secure system of ports and waterways; and the sage and proper development of our offshore resources, including oil, gas, and other minerals. I would like to commend the International Security Information Services Associates Incorporated (ISIS), and particularly Mr. A. Robert Matt, the president of ISIS, who is also our symposium moderator. ISIS is to be commended

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for organizing this conference for the purpose of examining the status of worldwide maritime transportation and asset protection programs with respect to the real threat of international terrorism. I realize that there is a decided hesitancy on the part of the industry and government ofﬁcials in general to discuss these issues in public forums out of a concern for giving potential terrorists and criminals any ideas for targets and plots. However, I submit to you that the issue is not going to evaporate; that the trend of international terrorism in the world is on the rise; and that a responsible examination of such threat and the means to counteract it is both warranted and prudent. The reality of this threat was underscored by the statement of principles set forth by the Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism, which, among other things, found that: Terrorism is a serious and growing threat to all peoples living under the rule of law; it is no longer a national problem, but a global one; it cannot be contained, let alone eliminated, except by concerted international action; and the case for such action is overwhelming and urgent.

A June 1981 report compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency, entitled: “Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980,” provides some noteworthy statistics on the incidence and trends in international terrorism. • From 1980, more casualties occurred as a result of international terrorism than in any year since the beginning of the statistical analysis on the subject in 1968. • From 1968 through 1980, there were 6,714 documented incidents of international terrorism. • The year 1980 saw the second highest number of terrorist incidents committed at 760. • Terrorists continued the pattern of attacking targets symbolizing Western power in industrialized nations. • Americans remained the primary targets of international terrorism, with at least 38 percent of all incidents between 1968 and 1980 involving U.S. citizens and property. • Of the total attacks against U.S. citizens or property, over 28 percent were against diplomatic ofﬁcials or property, and nearly 32 percent were against business facilities or executives.

Because it is clear that U.S. citizens and property will continue to be primary targets for international terrorism, as was dramatically underscored by the Iranian hostage crisis, it is incumbent upon both government and industry to upgrade our preparedness to counteract such attacks through enhanced security procedures, contingency planning, training, and mock exercises. The terrorists of the 1980s are far better trained, equipped, and sophisticated than ever before.

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An essential fact that you must keep in mind is that this nation’s maritime assets are highly vulnerable to the full gambit of terrorist crimes, including kidnapping and murder, bombing, extortion, hijacking, piracy, and sabotage. Attractive targets could include such facilities as deepwater ports; offshore oil production platforms and pipelines; petroleum, liqueﬁed natural gas and liqueﬁed petroleum gas tankers; the Panama Canal and other important waterways; offshore nuclear facilities; and deep seabed mining operations—just to name a few. Indeed, congressional testimony has indicated that transnational terrorists are receiving training in covert maritime assault tactics. The ease with which anti-Khomeini forces recently commandeered an Iranian gunboat is but one example that dictates a close look at our own maritime security precautions. Hopefully, we will not wait for a tragic and catastrophic incident off our shores, or in our coastal zone, to occur before improving our capabilities to prevent, deter, and respond to maritime terrorism. In this respect, the often used adage, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,” comes to mind. This nation must take a “proactive” versus a “reactive” stance toward maritime security and terrorism. The uncertainty of an event taking place, such as the seizure of a U.S. port-bound liqueﬁed natural gas tanker, or the takeover of a large offshore production platform with the threat of destruction, casualties, and widespread pollution does not eliminate the need for prudent contingency planning for such an eventuality. It is clear why the federal government and industry do not wish to highlight the issue of maritime security and terrorism, and the vulnerability of our offshore assets. However, the apparent perception on the part of the federal government that a low threat level exists in this area is highly questionable. With respect to the security of our offshore energy operations, we should take a cue from the United Kingdom and other countries engaged in oil and gas operations in the North Sea that devote substantial resources toward the protection of their maritime assets. Certainly, industry must shoulder the primary burden for the protection of its facilities and personnel. However, law enforcement authorities at all levels of government must be coordinated and ready to step in when necessary. On the federal level, coordination must be effected among a multitude of agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Federal Maritime Administration. In April 1979, an effort to provide a coordinated response to counteract terrorist activities in the marine environment led to the development of a memorandum of understanding between the U.S. Coast Guard, which is the principal maritime law enforcement agency of the federal government, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is responsible for counteracting domestic terrorist activities. Certainly, this memorandum is a step in the right direction. In addition, under a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the U.S.

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Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are nearing the completion of a joint study on terrorism in the marine environment, which should indicate how federal resources should be allocated to address the problem. These efforts notwithstanding, a single federal agency must be designated to lead all antiterrorist actions in the maritime area. The president should make this designation, and I know that he would receive the cooperation of our committee in the Congress in taking this action. The protection of our maritime assets, including offshore hydrocarbon resources, is essential to our economic growth as we strive to achieve energy self-sufﬁciency. In addition, the enhancement of maritime security should prove to be a very positive contribution to national mobilization efforts in times of war. As chairman of the subcommittee with oversight and legislative jurisdiction over the Outer Continental Shelf and the Panama Canal, I will examine, with extreme interest, the recommendations developed by this symposium with respect to maritime security, and counteracting international terrorism. I can assure you that this member of Congress is concerned about maritime terrorist possibilities, and I urge you to continue your good work here and to maintain communication with my ofﬁce regarding this most serious matter of national security. Thank you very much for your invitation for me to speak here this evening.

OFFSHORE & MARITIME PIPELINE FACILITIES Paul Wilkinson Professor of International Relations Aberdeen University, U.K.

We tried to solve offshore and marine pipeline facility security. We only surveyed the ﬁeld and came up with some major points we felt were worth stressing. We agreed that we supported whole-heartedly the tough line put forward by the United States, the British government, and the government of West Germany. We support the effort to get a hard line of ﬁrmness in standing up to terrorist blackmail established over a wider area of countries. It was generally recognized we need to get the collaboration of governments, to involve government more closely to get awareness of the needs of a high-risk industry operating in many of the highest-risk areas of the world. We need to get governments working on the problems of helping to protect our valuable offshore assets in high-risk areas by diplomatic means, by the improvement of alliance arrangements, and by military assistance arrangements. Industry cannot do these things alone; it has to educate government to the special problems of this enterprise. Weaknesses were found in the American response and system for dealing with maritime security.

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Prevention is far better than cure. There are all sorts of ways by which the design of offshore installations, by better planning in the constructions stage, can get a greater degree of security. You have to plan the particular response. There’s much more room for the sharing of information among the offshore operators about the suitability of various new sensor systems. New things like microwave systems have all kinds of difﬁculties, which might interfere with the operational viability of an installation because of interfering with shipping and various other hazards. Seagulls present a major problem to introducing these new technologies. As a protected species, they have created a major hazard in planning the technology of protection. We need to improve our use of all the technologies of protection and damage containment policies. We then looked at the human factor of industrial response, the screening procedures for employees on offshore installations. In the United States there are quite serious problems in screening in these areas. This calls for liaison between companies at the highest level, the governments, and law enforcement agencies. Top employees concerned with security aspects of the companies should be cleared in the same way government employees in sensitive areas are cleared to deal with sensitive information. Give them access to the kinds of intelligence that are primarily gathered by the public sector, which are so vital to the security of the offshore industry. We looked at access control. The determined attacker is not worried about any technologies of access control and will overcome any of the obstacles put in his way. However, access control is a help. It reduces the risk. Improved technologies of access control are another area we recommend being explored by the companies. The area perhaps most controversial in the American context is the management of an incident or a crisis when it occurs. You must have an integrated crisis management setup, involving a clear chain of command, communications, and control. You have to have very clearly laid down guidelines, jurisdiction, authority, and the appropriate forces or resources that have to be made available to the lead agencies given responsibilities in these major areas. In the United States, there is a major defect in this crisis management area. There is no clear lead agency for the offshore crisis. This needs to be sorted out. The ambiguity could be catastrophic. It was the overwhelming judgment of our seminar it could be the U.S. Coast Guard that is given this role in maritime terrorism in the United States. Make sure this body has the right kind of resources, manpower, necessary ships, and equipment to tackle this role. It would be the recommendation of our seminar that if the logical legal position of the Coast Guard is recognized as the lead agency in countering maritime terrorism, that it be given, therefore, the resources necessary to carry out this task. We realized that terrorist incidents are a major threat to the offshore industry, and we also looked at the problems of disaster caused by, for example, collisions in a fairly narrow seaway with oil installations, the possibilities of

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sabotage by an employee, of an attack in a conventional war situation, and the growth of a conﬂict that started perhaps as terrorism or guerrilla war, developing into a major conﬂict. The industry has to have a much wider spectrum, particularly internationally, of responses to deal with a whole range of threats against it. We looked at the military option, special forces for the particular task of hostage rescue, of recovering control of an offshore installation, and specialized training for this particular job. You need to create and train special forces for this with a particular mission. Most of the countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance are in fact busy doing this. I understand the United States has already designated such units. It was agreed that we should call upon the other armed services to assist, as they have a valuable role. The Air Force in terms of air surveillance, and naval facilities for communication centers. The U.S. Coast Guard, cooperating perhaps with the forces of the U.S. Navy in home waters, could be valuable in extending that kind of defense of these valuable assets. There was no dissent from the conclusion that more assistance and better liaison between the companies, governments, and armed services were necessary. That, I think, sir, sums up our conclusions.

SHIPPING & MARITIME TERMINALS Col. (Ret., U.S. Army) Douglas G. Macnair Director, Security Affairs Gulf Trading and Transportation Co.

We discussed communications, and reached an accord that communications need to be examined and improved wherever possible. We discussed how we might better enhance communications, particularly in the rapprochement between government and industry and by separate conversation recognized that the Federal Emergency Management Agency does have such a capability and, at the proper time, could exercise it. The group recognized that any maritime security needs must be divided into a preventive and reactive response. It was the unanimous conclusion of the group that preventive aspects of any security program must come from within. Industry must bear the principal responsibility for securing itself in terms of reasonable, prudent, and preventive aspects. Counterterrorist programs are dependent on the prompt and efﬁcient ﬂow of information, not only from the federal government to industry but from industry to the federal government. Without that ﬂow of information, security is not capable of being accomplished other than in a titular fashion. Our group recommended, without objection, that the outcomes of this conferences be stated in the form

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of resolution. I make that recommendation. I do so, advising the group that the exact wording of a resolution is indeed sensitive. We did resolve that an effective security program at any level depends ﬁrst and foremost on the prompt and expeditious ﬂow of information. In the event of maritime security, the information must ﬂow, not only from industry to government, but from government to industry. It is recommended that immediate action be taken on the part of the federal government and with the full support of the industry, to accomplish the establishment of a federal mechanism enhancing and insuring the ﬂow of information imperative to maritime security both in U.S. waters and abroad. We recognize that certain actions may be necessitated, such as security clearances for designated representatives of the industry. Maritime guidelines for security are nonexistent within U.S. waters. It was resolved that voluntary guidelines governing marine security applicable to terminals, offshore facilities, critical ports and harbors, and vessels were necessary and should be accomplished as expeditiously as possible. Industry itself should bear the responsibility of developing in joint session and subsequently promulgating voluntary guidelines for presentation to those segments of industry involved in the transportation of ocean-borne goods, materials, and/or resources. A reactive security program is in fact necessary. We came to quick agreement that regulatory authority, statute, and law already exist empowering the U.S. Coast Guard with the authority necessary. Jurisdiction is a problem in certain areas. Goods, materials, and manpower to erect an effective reactive program sub-element already exist within some agencies of the federal or state government. But bringing these resources together effectively and rapidly to assure an efﬁcient response is in fact nonexistent. We recognize that one of the best documents currently in existence today is the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. It was resolved that the need for a national contingency plan was imperative and that the U.S. Coast Guard, already empowered with the statute necessary, could be in fact designated the lead agency for developing a national contingency plan insuring a prompt, effective response to a terrorist incident in U.S. waters or waters of the international sea within the scope and sphere of operations of the Coast Guard. It is recommended that prompt action be taken on the part of the federal government, and in coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to so designate a lead agency, and that industry participate by whole-hearted coordination, cooperation, and contribution to the meaningful promulgation of such a national contingency plan. I believe our group accomplished a lot. I would personally like to thank them for their contributions, dialogue, and very succinct comments this morning. Thank you very much.

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MARITIME SECURITY—A NATIONAL DILEMMA Capt. (Ret., USCGR) A. Robert Matt & Robert L. Patcha (Ret., USCGR)

Commander Merle McBain, USN (Ret.), asked in the January 1980 issue of Seapower magazine, “Will Terrorism Go to Sea?” Many feared it would; some say it has, and is ﬂourishing. In the same month the article was printed, the Russian motor vessel, Nicolay Karamzin, moored in the upper reaches of the Sacramento River channel, was threatened. A group calling themselves the Patriotic Scuba Divers of America contacted a Sacramento radio station to say the channel had been mined and the vessel was to be blown up. The channel was shut down for the better part of 3 1⁄2 days while Navy, Coast Guard, and Army resources swept it and tried to make a factual determination as to whether the vessel had bombs planted aboard. This unconventional method of intimidation, to say nothing of the amount of dollars expended through the deployment of resources and commercial income lost while the channel was closed, is becoming a reality of life in the maritime community. The petroleum industry is not emphasizing physical security and neither industry nor government has developed contingency plans for reducing adverse affects of petroleum shortages should key pipeline facilities be damaged, causing serious disruptions. (U.S. Comptroller’s report to Congress, August 1979). U.S. oil and gas rigs off the coast of California and in the Gulf of Mexico are very vulnerable to terrorist attacks according to security experts who say this country is not adequately protecting its oil and natural gas network. Other countries such as Britain and Norway have invested in antiterrorist training and security devices. “But,” said a Newsweek spokesman, “American oil executives are afraid to confront the problem, fearing mere mention of security would invite attacks.” (AP) The highly unsatisfactory state of affairs involving the disappearance of many ships, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean, has highlighted the fact that most merchant ships sail around the world with virtually no protection from hijackers. It is understandable that shipping companies would not wish to advertise the fact that their ships carry no form of defense against forcible take-over, and the same could go for oil rig operators. But the likelihood of such an incident must now be very much greater if one considers how often in the recent past buildings, trains, and aircraft have been assaulted. (Lloyds List March 5, 1980). Acts of piracy have occurred recently off the coast of West Africa, Florida, and even New York. Besides being a continuing bane in the Far East, a primary target today is oil, in terms of relative values [it] is at least equivalent to the Spanish gold doubloons of yore. In January 1980 off the coast of West Africa, a Liberianregistered tanker was ‘lost’ while on a voyage from Kuwait to Italy. Investigators from Lloyd’s of London, which had insured more than 50% of its $600 million crude oil cargo, suspect piracy. No oil slick was found, making it unlikely that the ship had sunk with its oil still aboard. (Christian Science Monitor—February, 1980)

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THE SOVIET CONNECTION International terrorism is not easily traced, but is as much a part of the world scene today as gunboat diplomacy used to be. It is hardly a new technique. Never has terrorism been more pervasive and likely to strike in any part of the world as it has been over the past decade. In recent months, President Reagan and Secretary of State Haig have charged Moscow with supporting terrorism on a huge scale. Maritime incidents are among the kinds of acts of international terrorism that Secretary of State Haig claims the Russians bear responsibility for, or at last for providing the guns and training of personnel who pull the triggers. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports last year’s Soviet budget allocated $200 million for this purpose. The Kremlin staunchly defends the policy as part of its ﬁght against Imperialism. It has been reported that under such a guise, more than 1,000 Palestinians have been trained in the Soviet Union. Libya, with a desert population of only 2 million, maintains one of the most elaborately equipped military machines in Africa or the Middle East. According to the Institute for the Study of Conﬂict in London, Colonel Qaddaﬁ supplies weapons for the Irish Republican Army, the Baader-Meinhof Gang in West Germany, the Japanese Red Army, and insurgents in the Phillippines, Turkey, Yemen, and Chile. These organizations have been linked to numerous maritime incidents of terrorism. The money Qaddaﬁ gets from oil allows him to buy weapons from the Soviet Union. Reagan ofﬁcials maintain that the Soviets are using the export of terror as an instrument of their foreign policy and must be ﬁnally challenged on it. If true, what implication does it make for the execution of Soviet naval missions?

OUR VITAL SEALANES ARE THREATENED BY UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE The former commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, has in the past stated, “The disruption of the ocean lines of communication, the special arteries that feed the military, and economic potential of the aggressor Imperialist countries, has continued to be one of the ﬂeet’s missions.” Whether there is linkage in any, none, or just a few of Soviet interests in carrying out the dictum of Admiral Gorshkov is not known for certain. It is certain there has been a slow but steady increase in maritime incidents involving bomb threats, sabotage, and mysterious sinking. For the year 1979, Lloyd’s investigated the sinking of ﬁve supertankers and dozens of other vessels. They estimate that, worldwide, 100 cargo ships were

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supposedly sunk in 1979, accounting for losses in excess of $250 million. On the surface it may seem that these losses, the highest ever in maritime annals, were for the purposes of illicit gain. The question that has to be raised is whether the money was subsequently ﬁltered to a criminal cartel or found its way back into the support of worldwide terrorism.

THREAT NOT DOCUMENTED BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE Arnaud de Borchgrave, the former chief foreign correspondent for Newsweek magazine, developed an extraordinary rapport with members of the European intelligence services. When asked if these people were surprised by President Reagan’s charge that the Soviets are involved in global terrorism, he stated that one chief said he was only surprised by our own surprise. Mr. de Borchgrave claims at least two of the intelligence chiefs he knows in Europe keep up-to-date charts on all the secret meetings that they’ve managed to detect between various international terrorist groups and the Soviet Secret Service, the KGB, or the GRU, which is Soviet military intelligence or their proxy services. If the Europeans have known about all of this since 1974, as Mr. de Borchgrave claims, why has it taken until 1980–1981 for the American intelligence services to be equally conﬁdent of the relationships? Mr. de Borchgrave says the delay can be blamed on the fact our intelligence people are not given anything except raw information. The European services do not pass on their sources of information because they are afraid that under the Freedom of Information Act or in the process of the activities of congressional oversight committees, these things will leak out. He noted that Alexander Haig, who made these charges recently, has been in touch with all these European service chiefs while he was NATO’s Supreme Commander. He had access to all sorts of information that the CIA did not.

CURRENT STATUS OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES A substantial portion of the intelligence community’s estimates are based on the analysis of databases of terrorist/extortion incident reports. American maritime industry intelligence sources hardly ever share information with the federal intelligence community for the same reasons North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intelligence chiefs do not. There is a growing evidence that incident information in the maritime industry is closely held and seldom reported. Last April the Washington Post reported that prior annual CIA reports on terrorism never listed more than 188 attacks in a year throughout the world. The 1980 report claims 760 international incidents. Did the new administration’s

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determination to make international terrorism the major focus of U.S. foreign policy lead to the apparent wave of CIA “statistical revisionism?” Not just the 1980 ﬁgures underwent statistical surgery. According to various sources, the new public CIA report will show there were 5,954 terrorist attacks during the period 1968–1979. For the same period, last year’s report showed 3,336 terrorist attacks. This 2,618 increase is remarkable, not only by its size, but its demonstration of how sensitive the statistics used in threat assessments are to political deﬁnitions. A Federal Bureau of Investigation spokesman claimed the Bureau has many big problems. Countering terrorism in the United States is among its lowest priorities, reportedly number 17 on at least one list. His view is not shared throughout Washington. Amidst conservative politicians pointing to this new unconventional warfare’s threat to national security, the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism has opened hearings on the Soviet connection. Its chairman, Sen. Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.), will no doubt, as a retired navy admiral, have more than a passive interest in the maritime aspects of the total problem.

THREAT ASSESSMENTS OBSOLETE Historically, determining the size of our military forces, hardware capability requirements, and funding needed to match our enemy’s sustainability have been based on intelligence estimates, which become threat assessments. But, as here previously reviewed, serious questions arise concerning the degree of conﬁdence to be placed in this methodology when it comes to the unconventional warfare of terrorism. For example, just as there is doubt about the statistics of international terrorism, it is really questionable how many maritime terrorist incidents have occurred in the last decade. Insurance carriers, owners, [and] corporate interests are all loath to expose the number of mysterious incidents that have occurred. All that has been documented are some 30 maritime terrorist incidents worldwide in the past ten years. With the lack of intelligence to determine exactly what our potential enemies are doing, it is difﬁcult, if not impossible, to set preparedness contingency plans and force levels to counteract them. Several NATO nations are currently using risk assessments and risk proﬁles of assets to determine what needs to be done to protect their maritime assets and respond in the event an incident occurs. They are further interested in damage limitation, mitigation of effects of interruption, and measures for restoration of supply. They are in what may be identiﬁed as a proactive mode. We, in the United States, continue to live in the archaic world of reactive modes, waiting for statistics we may never receive, to tell us we have a problem.

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RISK PROFILES—A MUST Analyzing internal and external backup systems that affect vulnerability, threat, and criticality of assets to produce a risk assessment will identify that the risk we take by being unprepared in the maritime community is unacceptable. Greater measures of prevention, detection, contingency planning, training, dedication of resources, and crisis management exercising are imperative to protect our critical maritime assets. Maritime industries should take the lead in developing risk assessments on the assets they individually control. Collectively, through their national industry associations, they can then urge government to pay more than just “lip service” to the problem. We must be fully prepared to protect these vitally important national maritime assets from peril in the Unconventional Warfare waged in “peace” or in declared hostilities. We can no longer afford the luxury of being reactive. It’s time we shifted into a proactive mode.

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Achille Lauro Hijacking: Case Study (1985)

SELECTED EXECUTIVE STATEMENTS ON THE ACHILLE LAURO HIJACKING INCIDENT Larry M. Speakes Principal Deputy Press Secretary October 10, 1985*

At the president’s direction, U.S. military forces intercepted an aircraft over international airspace that was transporting the Achille Lauro terrorists. The aircraft was diverted to the airbase at Sigonella, Italy. In cooperation with the government of Italy, the terrorists were then taken into Italian custody for appropriate legal proceedings. Earlier today, upon learning that the terrorists would be ﬂown from Egypt to their freedom, the president directed that U.S. forces intercept the aircraft and escort it to a location where the terrorists could be apprehended by * “Statement by Larry M. Speakes, Principal Deputy Press Secretary on the Achille Lauro Hijacking Incident; October 10, 1985.” The Public Papers of President Ronald V. Reagan. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/ 1985/101085f.htm (accessed 10 February 2009).

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those with appropriate jurisdiction. U.S. F-14 aircraft, ﬂying from the carrier Saratoga, detected the aircraft in international airspace and intercepted it. They instructed it to follow them and escorted it to the military airbase at Sigonella, Italy. This operation was conducted without ﬁring a shot. The aircraft landed with Italian consent and was surrounded by American and Italian troops. The terrorists aboard were taken into custody by Italian authorities. The Egyptian aircraft, with its crew and other personnel on board, is returning to Egypt. We have been assured by the government of Italy that the terrorists will be subject to full due process of law. For our part, we intend to pursue prompt extradition to the United States of those involved in the crime. This action afﬁrms our determination to see that terrorists are apprehended, prosecuted, and punished. This episode also reﬂects our close cooperation with an exemplary ally and close friend—Italy—in combating international terrorism. The American government and people are grateful to Prime Minister Craxi, his government, and the Italian people for their help. We are also grateful to the government of Tunisia for its refusal to permit the aircraft transporting the terrorists to land in Tunis. Finally, we must at this point note our gratitude to the government of Egypt for its efforts to end this dangerous crisis without additional loss of life. We strongly disagreed with the government of Egypt, however, on disposition of the terrorists. From the onset, the United States government made clear to all the governments involved our ﬁrm opposition to negotiations with the terrorists or concessions to them. We also made clear our expectation that the terrorists would be brought to justice. We were, therefore, deeply distressed to learn that those responsible for the death of Leon Klinghoffer might be permitted to go free. We said yesterday that we were determined to see justice done and that we would use every appropriate means to that end. The decision on ending the hijacking was an independent one by the government of Egypt. When we were consulted, we advised strongly against any arrangements that would permit the terrorists to escape justice. Since the time the terrorists were taken off the ship, we have continued intensive contacts with the government of Egypt to pursue that point. The United States wants to emphasize the fundamental and durable interests that the United States and Egypt share, interests that transcend this difﬁcult incident. These have been trying times for both our governments. We will do all we can to ensure that the basic U.S.-Egyptian relationship—in which both our countries have taken so much pride for so long—remains unaffected. In closing, the president wants to emphasize once again that the international scourge of terrorism can only be stamped out if each member of the community of civilized nations meets its responsibility squarely—passing up no opportunity to apprehend, prosecute, and punish terrorists wherever they may be found. We cannot tolerate terrorism in any form. We will continue to take every appropriate measure available to us to deal with these dastardly deeds. There can be no asylum for terrorism or terrorists. Note: Larry M. Speakes read the statement to reporters at 11:15 p.m. in the Brieﬁng Room at the White House.

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REMARKS AND A QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION WITH REPORTERS President Ronald Reagan October 11, 1985*

Events of the past 24 hours reinforce the determination of all of those who share the privileges of freedom and liberty to join together in countering the scourge of international terrorism. All civilized peoples welcome the apprehension of the terrorists responsible for the seizure of Achille Lauro and the brutal murder of Leon Klinghoffer. The pursuit of justice is well served by this cooperative effort to ensure that these terrorists are prosecuted and punished for their crimes. I want to point out the crucial role played by the Italian government in bringing this operation to a successful and peaceful conclusion. Throughout, Prime Minister Craxi has been courageous in his insistence that those apprehended shall be subject to full due process of law. I also want to note my gratitude that the government of Egypt was able to end the crisis without additional loss of life, although I disagreed with their disposition of the terrorists. And, additionally, I wish to praise President Bourguiba’s forthright decision to refuse the entry of the fugitives. Most of all, I am proud to be the Commander in Chief of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who deployed, supported, and played the crucial role in the delivery of these terrorists to Italian authorities. They and the men and women of our foreign service and intelligence community performed ﬂawlessly in this most difﬁcult and delicate operation. They have my gratitude and, I’m sure, the gratitude of all of their countrymen. These young Americans sent a message to terrorists everywhere. The message: You can run, but you can’t hide. Q: The president:

Q:

*

Mr. President, does your action last night increase the danger for other Americans being held hostage in the Middle East? I don’t believe so. I don’t think that there’s any increase that could be made. I think that Americans are, as well as many other people from other countries—as was evidenced in the passenger list of that ship—targets of continued terrorism. Mr. President, we were told you’d answer a few questions. If I might ask one. The Egyptians are apparently holding onto the Achille Lauro, the ship that the hijacking took place on. What do you know about that? Is there any tie to the fact that Italy is now holding the Egyptian plane, and what are you going to do to try to get that ship released? There are apparently still Americans on it.

“President Ronald Reagan’s Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters; October 11, 1985.” The Public Papers of President Ronald V. Reagan. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1985/101185a.htm (accessed 10 February 2009).

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Terror on the High Seas The president: I really don’t know whether that is being held there for anything other than just simply it is berthed there at this time. I don’t know whether the other passengers who were away from Port Said—they are waiting for them to come aboard or anything—whatever might be true of that. I just don’t know. Q: Mr. President, can you tell us about your attitude now toward Egypt, and can you tell us whether we intercepted this plane without any help from Egyptian authorities, either the top ofﬁcials of the government or lower down, or whether in fact they did give us some sort of help? The president: Knowing that we could not risk a leak of any plans of this kind— this plan was ours, and the decision was made yesterday afternoon on Air Force One coming back from Chicago. Q: You’re telling us, sir, if I may follow up, you’re telling us that Egypt then didn’t know we were going to do it and didn’t sanction it in any way? The president: And nor did the Italians know we were going to do it, as far as I’m aware. Q: Mr. President, you say the decision was made on Air Force One. Can you tell all of us exactly what you did on this yesterday? What went through your mind, what decisions exactly you made, and what it was like for you yesterday? The president: Well, I can’t answer exactly on some of those things, on the decisions that were made. The operation, as it was carried out, was the operation that I ordered and approved of. But the reason I don’t want to answer any more speciﬁcally on things of that kind is because terrorism and ﬁghting terrorism is an ongoing thing, and again, as we’ve said before, I don’t want to make public decisions that we’ve made as to what we would or would not do in events of that kind, because I think it’s for the terrorists to wonder what we’re going to do. Q: But was it difﬁcult for you or easy for you? Can you give us some sense of your own state of mind? The president: I don’t know whether a decision like that can ever be called easy, but I had complete faith in our forces, and the opportunity was there, and I believed that the mission was possible, and I didn’t think there was any way that I could not approve a mission of that kind with what was at stake. Q: Mr. President, what kind of message do you think this sends regarding your resolve? You’ve been criticized in the past for not taking action against terrorists. How does this ﬁt the proﬁle of what you think is possible, feasible, and what kind of message for the future?

Achille Lauro Hijacking The president: Well, our problem in the past has not been a lack of will. Our problem has been in terrorist attacks that have taken place in the past. First of all, in a number of them, such as the terrible tragedy with the marines, the perpetrators of the act went up with the bomb. They were suicides, so, there wasn’t—you couldn’t—you were faced with, well, who were their collaborators, who were behind them, how do you retaliate—they’re gone. And the other thing is in a number of incidents where to retaliate would simply be an act of violence without any knowledge that you were striking the perpetrators of the deed and you might be attacking many innocent people. This has been our great problem with terrorism. But here was a clear-cut case in which we could lay our hands on the terrorists. Q: Well, because you know that these were the criminals and because you knew there were not innocent people around, were you prepared to ﬁre? Were you prepared to shoot that plane down? The president: This, again, is one of those questions, Andrea [Andrea Mitchell, NBC News], that I’m not going to answer. That’s for them to go to bed every night wondering. Q: Mr. President, on extradition, will you press to extradite the terrorists to the United States if the Italians do give them what you consider to be justice, knowing that there is no capital punishment in Italy? The president: Well, we think this is the proper thing to do because—I’m not a lawyer, and I don’t intend to get into too many legal areas where I might be caught short—but they could be tried in both countries, and in this country they would be tried for murder, where in Italy they will probably be tried on the basis of piracy because of the taking-over of the Italian vessel. So, this is why we have put in a request for extradition. Q: Well, do you want two trials, or would you be satisﬁed if the Italians give them, say, a long prison sentence? The president: That remains to be decided as to how far we go or how far we pursue this. What we want is justice done. Q: Does that mean death? The president: What? Q: Does that mean death to the hijackers? The president: Well, I’m just going to say justice done. Q: Mr. President, there were reports that there was disagreement between yourself and Prime Minister Craxi about the disposition of these terrorists—how they’d be tried, where they’d be tried. Is there any truth to that?

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The president: No. We had a phone call last night. He told me what his situation was with regard to them, and I told him what ours was. And I told him that we would introduce an extradition request. He told me what their legal process was with regard to that, that it wasn’t something that he could just give an opinion on himself, any more than I could if the situation was reversed. And, no, we had full cooperation. But now, I think the few are ﬁnished. I know there are many hands, and I’m going to turn them all over to Bud McFarlane.

ON THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT’S RELEASE OF PALESTINIAN TERRORIST, ABU EL ABBAS Larry M. Speakes Principal Deputy Press Secretary October 13, 1985*

The U.S. government ﬁnds it incomprehensible that Italian authorities permitted Abdul Abbas to leave Italy despite a U.S. government request to the Italian government for his arrest and detention. Abbas is one of the two Palestinians who accompanied the four Achille Lauro hijackers on the plane that was intercepted after leaving Egypt Thursday night. A U.S. Federal judge Friday issued a warrant for Abbas’ arrest, charging him with violation of 18 U.S.C. 1203, hostage taking, as well as piracy and conspiracy to commit both offenses. The Italian government was notiﬁed, and the U.S. requested Italy to arrest Abbas, provisionally pending transmission of a formal request for extradition. Abbas, also known as Abu Khaled, is one of the most notorious Palestinian terrorists and has been involved in savage attacks on civilians. Evidence at hand strongly suggests that Abbas was criminally implicated in the hijacking of the Achille Lauro; indeed, that he planned and controlled the operation. The Italian government has informed us, however, that its judicial authorities did not consider this evidence legally strong enough to support provisional

*

“On the Italian Government’s Release of Palestinian Terrorist, Abu el Abbas,” Statement by Larry M. Speakes. “Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on the Italian Government’s Release of Palestinian Terrorist Abu el Abbas; October 11, 1985.” The Public Papers of President Ronald V. Reagan. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. http://www.reagan.utexas. edu/resource/speeches/1985/101185a.htm (accessed 10 February 2009).

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arrest of Abbas while awaiting a formal U.S. request for his extradition. The U.S. government is astonished at this breach of any reasonable standard of due process and is deeply disappointed.

SELECTED CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENTS MR. ARAFAT OWES THE WORLD SOME EXPLANATIONS Congressman Charles E. Schumer October 9, 1985*

Congressional Record—House Wednesday, October 9, 1985 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 131 Cong Rec H 8518

Mr. Schumer asked and was given permission to address the House for one minute and to revise and extend his remarks. Mr. Schumer: Mr. Speaker, Americans in the world are overjoyed at the reports that the hostages aboard the Achille Lauro have been released unharmed. But the incident raises many questions that must be answered. Indeed, it seems that there is something ﬁshy in the Mediterranean this morning. How did Yasser Arafat negotiate so quickly with the same terrorists he was yesterday calling his most dire enemies? When the terrorists stated, as they released the hostages, that they were releasing them because world opinion had come out so quickly about the Israeli raid and the bombing of Tunis, they ignore the fact that the mission was planned weeks before that bombing and world opinion had actually congealed days before the terrorists started their action. It seems indeed, Mr. Arafat, there is certainly more, or should I say less, than meets the eye. Your already miniscule credibility in the world is on the verge of disappearing. Mr. Arafat, you owe the world, the hostages, and their families some explanations.

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Vol. 131 No. 133; Continuation of Senate Proceedings of October 8, 1985, Issue No. 132; and Proceedings of October 9, 1985, Issue No. 133.

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THE UGLY FACE OF TERRORISM Senator Mark O. Hatﬁeld October 10, 1985*

Congressional Record—Senate Thursday, October 10, 1985; (Legislative day of Monday, September 30, 1985) 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 131 Cong Rec S 13046

Mr. Hatﬁeld: Mr. President, today I would like to address several recent events in the Middle East. While my colleagues and I have been primarily focused on domestic issues, the ugly face of terrorism has shown itself abroad and threatened to scuttle U.S. efforts at achieving a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conﬂict. The hijacking of the Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, and the killing of an American citizen aboard the ship is a testament to the lengths those who are against freedom will go to impose their will by force. Just as abhorrent was the Israeli raid in Tunisia. The killing of 61 Palestinians along with 12 Tunisians with American-made F-16’s should never be condoned by the American people or their elected leaders. Unfortunately, these actions seem to represent a growing movement in this world that is marked by increasing violence rather than a move toward peaceful means of resolving differences. In this barbaric display of brutality substituted for negotiation, both sides of the Arab-Israeli conﬂict have been more than adequately represented in the arena of terrorism. While this makes the U.S. role more difﬁcult, it should not deter us from distinguishing right from wrong. We must be consistent in opposing those who promulgate violent acts in the name of peace and justice. A case in point is the Israeli raid in Tunis. During this session we have authorized and appropriated billions for Israel in security assistance funding. Throughout this time no one has come forward and argued that Israel stands for anything other than U.S. interests in the Middle East. According to the U.S. Senate, Israel is a bastion of freedom and a staunch ally of Western values in the Mideast region. If this is the case, we must analyze what these values are. Do we stand for peace, or do we stand for the brutal killing of 61 Palestinians on Tunisian soil, a country that has been a faithful ally of ours? In a region where pro-United States, moderate Arab countries are awfully hard to come by, is it really in our interest to have Israel, in their quest for revenge, also inadvertently kill 12 Tunisians who were mostly policemen?

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Mr. President, these innocent Tunisians hardly constitute a military target. I believe we must be consistent in our condemnation of terrorism, and, if that means straining our relations with Israel or any other ally, so be it. In our use of American power and diplomacy, we must stand up for what is right rather than blindly supporting those that purport to represent our interests. The use of terrorism has many deplorable facets, but to me, the use of innocent civilians for extortion to further political goals is utterly abhorrent. In the world today, the leading authority when it comes to this tactic is the PLO and its various factions. How can Yasser Arafat and his cronies believe for a second that they are a legitimate body when they repeatedly resort to the use of terrorism? This week’s hijacking of the Italian cruise ship with citizens of the United States, West Germany, Britain, and Italy aboard not only is an act of aggression toward those respective governments, but a slap in the face of the Palestinian cause. Mr. President, I am not sure who plans terrorist activities such as this one, but whoever they are, they have a strange way of furthering their cause. How can they possibly pretend to promote the view that the Palestinians have been wronged and deserve better than what they have? Certainly, killing an American and holding over 400 hostages are poor ways to do it. Maybe I should send my press secretary, Rick Rolf, to them. I am sure he could come up with better ways to highlight their cause than the use of violence and extortion. There is only one possible response to this behavior—disgust and animosity. And this is what I have to offer anyone who claims to promote peace through violence. Both the Israeli raid and the Palestinian ship hijacking bring to mind an interesting question—what do these acts accomplish in the long-term? Mr. President, I have a pretty good idea as to what they do not accomplish, and that is peace in the Middle East. These actions were taken, as most terrorist acts are, to achieve short-term goals. The Israelis sought immediate retribution for the murder of three of their citizens in Greece, and the Palestinians sought the release of 50 of their brethren held prisoner in Israel. What these groups failed to realize was what their acts would do to the longterm goal of peace in the Middle East. It has been apparent that the conﬂict can only be resolved through a negotiated solution. By carrying out a military raid on a moderate Arab country, Israel has seriously undermined not only the atmosphere for negotiations, but American credibility as a mediator to the Palestinian question. By seizing the Achille Lauro and committing other terrorist acts, the Palestinian Liberation Front has jeopardized any possibility of having the PLO being recognized as legitimate in the eyes of the international community. Mr. President, it has been said that there will continue to be violence for political ends so long as there are unsatisﬁed political grievances in the world. I reject this proposition as defeatist and ignorant of the possibilities of peaceful conﬂict resolution. It is important that the United States attempt to help the cause of peace in the Middle East. But, in doing so, it must maintain

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vigorous and consistent opposition to acts of terrorism—wherever they spring from. The chance for peace is too important to be undermined by mindless acts of violence.

RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE MURDER OF LEON KLINGHOFFER Congressman Ted Weiss October 10, 1985*

Congressional Record—Extension of Remarks Thursday, October 10, 1985 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 131 Cong Rec E 4589

Mr. Weiss: Mr. Speaker, Leon Klinghoffer, a disabled, 69-year-old American citizen, was murdered this week by the terrorists who hijacked the cruise ship Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean. The perpetrators of this cowardly and barbaric act must not be allowed to go unpunished. Indications are that the murderers of Leon Klinghoffer were given safe passage out of Egypt and placed in the custody of the PLO. It is clearly within the power of Yasser Arafat, the PLO, the Egyptian government, and the other governments of the region to ﬁnd, prosecute, and punish these terrorists and to do it quickly. Beyond that, out of this tragedy there must grow a ﬁnal resolve by the nations of the world that hijacking and hostage-taking will no longer be tolerated. In Leon Klinghoffer’s memory we must insist on it. I am, therefore, introducing the following concurrent resolution, which does three things: It condemns the hijacking of the Achille Lauro and the cowardly and brutal murder of Leon Klinghoffer; It calls on the governments, organizations, and people of the region to do whatever is necessary to ensure that the individuals who murdered Leon Klinghoffer are found, prosecuted, and punished; and It states the sense of the congress that the president should immediately convene an international meeting to resolve this urgent issue once and for all. Following is the text of the resolution: H. Con. Res. Concurrent Resolution condemning the hijacking of the ACHILLE LAURO and the murder of Leon Klinghoffer *

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Whereas, on October 7, 1985, terrorists hijacked the civilian passenger ship ACHILLE LAURO with 400 people aboard, during a Mediterranean cruise; Whereas it has been determined that the hijackers murdered Leon Klinghoffer, a 69-year-old citizen of the United States who was confined to a wheelchair; Whereas the United States government has expressed its outrage at this “brutal killing of an innocent American” and has called for the prosecution of the individuals responsible for the killing; Whereas hijacking and the taking of hostages at sea, in the air, and on land has become a problem of massive international dimensions: Now, therefore, be it RESOLVED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (THE SENATE CONCURRING), That — (1) the Congress condemns the hijacking of the ACHILLE LAURO and the cowardly and brutal murder of Leon Klinghoffer; (2) the Congress calls on all governments, organizations, and people of the Mediterranean region to take all necessary measures to ensure that the individuals who murdered Leon Klinghoffer are found, prosecuted, and punished; and (3) it is the sense of the Congress that the President should immediately convene an international meeting to determine the steps that must be taken to rid the world once and for all of hijacking and the taking of hostages.

STRIKING BACK Congressman Bob McEwen October 11, 1985*

Congressional Record—Extension of Remarks Friday, October 11, 1985 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 131 Cong Rec E 4616

Mr. McEwen: Mr. Speaker, terrorism is the umbrella term for the most heinous and despicable crimes imaginable. For its victims, it is a chilling and frightening experience whose scar remains long after the incident itself. The descriptions yesterday and this morning of those aboard the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro are a terrifying account of a ship of fear. One woman reported going into her cabin after hearing shots and remaining cowering under her bed for 62 hours. Another said, “One minute they would try to be kind, the next minute they would do the cruelest things.” *

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These Palestinian thugs displayed their terrorist power with total disregard for human feelings and life. They ﬁred their weapons intermittently; released pins from grenades held near huddled hostages; beat and threatened crew and passengers; and ﬁnally, in the ultimate act of horror and contempt for human life, murdered an elderly and disabled American—Leon Klinghoffer—throwing him and his wheelchair into the Mediterrean. Well, this morning, Mr. Speaker, we struck back. The long arm of American justice reached out and grabbed these murderous thugs so that they may be subject to swift retribution. Let this serve as a reminder to those around the globe thinking of similar acts. They had better think twice. The freedom-loving people of the world have had enough.

CONDEMNING EGYPTIAN ACTIONS IN THE ACHILLE LAURO AFFAIR Congressman Harry Reid October 15, 1985*

Congressional Record—House Tuesday, October 15, 1985 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 131 Cong Rec H 8775

Mr. Reid asked and was given permission to address the House for one minute and to revise and extend his remarks. Mr. Reid: Mr. Speaker, over the past several years, Egypt and the United States have built an extremely deep and important friendship—one not susceptible to easy dissolution. Egypt is the only Arab country to have directly negotiated a peace agreement with Israel, and the Congress has not forgotten this courageous act. Nonetheless, I have been greatly disappointed by Egypt’s conduct in the recent Achille Lauro affair. International terrorism is a scourge all nations must unite against to guarantee a measure of civility in international affairs. Those who attacked the Achille Lauro, whom the PLO admits came from their own ranks, claimed their actions were justiﬁed by a political cause. I am sorry. People who kill an innocent, aged cripple deserve nothing except their due punishment in a court of law. It is therefore incomprehensible how Egypt could have negotiated safe conduct for Leon Klinghoffer’s four murderers.

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The Egyptian government asserts it did not know the terrorists had killed Mr. Klinghoffer. This does not excuse Egypt’s conduct, especially when we consider how the Egyptians gave the United States government false information regarding the status of the terrorist’s whereabouts. President Mubarak of Egypt understands the insidious threat that international terrorism poses to everyone. His very predecessor, Anwar Sadat, was gunned down by Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. This makes Mubarak’s actions in the Achille Lauro incident all the more difﬁcult to accept. The Egyptian–United States friendship is still important, still strong. The Achille Lauro affair must not alter this relationship. Egypt must understand, however, that capitulation to terrorist will serve neither our purposes nor theirs.

CUTTING OFF AID TO EGYPT Congressman George Darden October 16, 1985*

Congressional Record—House Wednesday, October 16, 1985 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 131 Cong Rec H 8780

Mr. Darden asked and was given permission to address the House for one minute and to revise and extend his remarks. Mr. Darden: Mr. Speaker, Egypt’s freeing of the hijackers of the Achille Lauro—who killed an American passenger—and its condemnation of our entirely justiﬁable operation to bring those outlaws to justice, should prompt reassessment of our aid program to Cairo. When Anwar Sadat made peace with Israel under the Camp David accords, the United States swiftly rewarded Egypt. Economic and military aid was only $21 million in 1974—today it totals almost $2.5 billion. Now, President Mubarak, after giving misleading statements about the location of these hijackers, insinuates that our interception of the criminals, whom he allowed to escape, is an act of piracy. And he has the gall to demand an apology from us. We supported President Sadat for an act of peace by greatly increasing assistance to Egypt. President Mubarak’s tolerance of terrorism warrants an inverse response—a cutoff of that aid.

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AMERICA’S ALLIES OFFER SCANT SUPPORT OF ANTITERRORISM EFFORTS Congressman Eldon Rudd October 16, 1985* Congressional Record—House Wednesday, October 16, 1985 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 131 Cong Rec H 8782

Mr. Rudd asked and was given permission to address the House for one minute and to revise and extend his remarks. Mr. Rudd: Mr. Speaker, as the Achille Lauro drama continues to unfold, we are basking in the glory of ﬁnally having done something against terrorists. But unfortunately, relations with some of our allies have hit rock bottom over this incident. President Mubarak of Egypt lied to the press and personally lied to the American government. Italy allowed a known terrorist and murderer [to] quietly leave their country after United States warrants had been issued for his arrest. These actions are a damning indictment of the commitment of our allies to support us and stand ﬁrm in the face of terrorism. It also questions the very substance of our relationships with these nations and the continued wisdom of pouring billions of U.S. aid dollars from American taxpayers into foreign coffers. Mr. Speaker, one daring intercept does not an antiterrorist policy make. Clearly these events have shown us that a coordinated, formal policy of combating terrorism must be formulated and ratiﬁed by the United States and its allies. We must learn to work together and depend on each other to lick this international menace.

VICTORY OVER TERRORISM Congresswoman Barbara A. Mikulski October 17, 1985** Congressional Record—Extension of Remarks Thursday, October 17, 1985 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 131 Cong Rec E 4693

Ms. Mikulski: Mr. Speaker, a brutal act of terrorism has taken another innocent American life. Mr. Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly man; an innocent

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man, known for his friendly smile and good-natured spirit, was murdered in cold blood last week by terrorists aboard the cruise ship Achille Lauro. The fact that Mr. Klinghoffer was conﬁned to a wheelchair only dramatizes the cowardly nature of the terrorists who committed this terrible crime. The whole world was shocked to learn that these terrorists made a deal with Egypt to get away. While Egyptian President Mubarak provided the terrorists with a plane ﬂight out of Egypt, the United States planned to act swiftly. Every American can be proud of President Ronald Reagan’s resolve to bring these terrorists to justice. Our military forces showed courage and determination in carrying out a very difﬁcult mission to intercept the plane carrying the terrorists. Our country stands tall because of our commitment to ensure that terrorists will not go unpunished. The United States owes no one an apology for its action. There is nothing shameful in protecting the rights of the innocent civilians in the world. Let terrorists be on notice. Although others may be frightened by terrorist threats, the United States has the will and determination to stand up to terrorism. We must ensure that Leon Klinghoffer did not die in vain. His murder has demonstrated to the world the true nature of terrorists. They are cowards who strike at the helpless and punish the innocent. Their tactics are intimidation, disguised by cheap slogans justifying their thirst for violence. Let the message be clear. The United States will never rest in its efforts to ﬁght terrorism in all of its forms. The recent action by the U.S. military is a true symbol of victory over terrorism. This symbol will remain clear and strong. THE KILLING OF LEON KLINGHOFFER BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS ABOARD THE ACHILLE LAURO Senator Robert Byrd and Senator Allan K. Simpson March 27, 1986*

Congressional Record—Senate Thursday, March 27, 1986; (Legislative day of Tuesday, March 18, 1986) 99th Cong. 2nd Sess. 132 Cong Rec S 3764

The Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 222) concerning the cruel and inhuman killing of Leon Klinghoffer by international terrorists aboard the cruise ship Achille Lauro, because he did not submit to the demands of these terrorists, which had been reported from the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, with an amendment.

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The amendment was agreed to. The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed. The amendment to the preamble was agreed to. The preamble, as amended, was agreed to. The title was amended so as to read: Joint resolution concerning the cruel and inhuman killing of Leon Klinghoffer and Robert Stethem by international terrorists because they did not submit to the demands of these terrorists. The joint resolution, as amended, and the preamble, as amended, are as follows: S. J. RES. 222 Whereas the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro and TWA ﬂight 847 were peaceful journeys in the Eastern Mediterranean; Whereas the Achille Lauro and TWA ﬂight 847 were seized by terrorists for the purpose of frightening and threatening the passengers, their relatives, and law-abiding citizens everywhere, and for the purpose of drawing attention to the terrorists’ goals; Whereas the terrorists were armed and dangerous and attempted to force the passengers and crew of the Achille Lauro and TWA ﬂight 847 into submission to further their purposes of terror, anarchy, hate, and death; Whereas the terrorists of the Achille Lauro have been charged under United States law with hostage-taking, piracy, and conspiracy to commit both; Whereas the United States Department of State has offered rewards for the apprehension of Robert Stethem’s murderers; Whereas Leon Klinghoffer, a sixty-nine-year-old, dearly-beloved American who was crippled and conﬁned to a wheelchair, and Robert Stethem, a young Navy diver, did not submit to the demands of the terrorists; Whereas the terrorists brutally killed Leon Klinghoffer by shooting him several times and throwing his body overboard because he resisted their demands; and Whereas terrorists brutally beat Robert Stethem to death and left him on the Beirut Airport tarmac: Now, therefore, be it RESOLVED BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED, That the President is authorized to present, on behalf of the Congress, posthumously to Leon Klinghoffer and to Robert Stethem a Congressional Gold Medal each to show Congress’ admiration for the bravery of Leon Klinghoffer, a handicapped senior citizen, and Robert Stethem, a young Navy diver, who, during the kidnappings by terrorists, did not submit to terrorist demands to further the objectives of terrorism, and who gave their lives as a result of this resistance. Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury is directed to strike and issue the gold medals authorized by the ﬁrst section of this joint resolution in accor-

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dance with the national medals provisions of section 5111 of title 31, United States Code. Sec. 3. The President is authorized to present the gold medals authorized by this joint resolution on behalf of the Congress separately, to the daughters of Leon Klinghoffer and the parents of Robert Stethem. Sec. 4. There are authorized to be appropriated $18,500 to carry out this joint resolution.

Mr. Simpson: Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution was passed. Mr. Byrd: I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

COMMEMORATING ACHILLE LAURO’S 10TH ANNIVERSARY Senator Alfonse M. D’Amato October 26, 1995*

Congressional Record—Senate Thursday, October 26, 1995 104th Congress 1st Session 141 Cong Rec S 15976

Mr. D’Amato: Mr. President, I rise to urge you to stand with me against the blight of terrorism that is growing throughout the world. We need legislation to toughen our antiterrorism laws in response to the growth of this scourge. During the tenth anniversary of the hijacking of the Achille Lauro and the killing of one of its passengers, Leon Klinghoffer, I ask you to take the time to support my request for such legislation before the United States bears the brunt of another terrorist act. Americans are the focus for many terrorist acts overseas. Now, we are becoming targets at home. Americans are increasingly exposed to the deadly realities of terrorism. Ten years ago Leon Klinghoffer was singled out by terrorists for execution and summarily dumped over the side of the cruise ship. The mastermind behind this act, Abdul Abbas, continues to elude international authorities to this day. We need to be able to run these criminal masterminds to ground wherever they hide. In 1993, terrorists bombed the World Trade Center, murdering six innocent people and injuring over 1,000 more. We were lucky the structure withstood the blast and did not collapse. We could have faced thousands of murdered

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people. We need to be able to block the actions and designs of international terrorists. Earlier this year, Oklahoma City was targeted by domestic terrorists. This time, Americans were graphically confronted with the specter of hundreds of mangled bodies. Our children were viciously mauled by the passions of an unstable youth and his accomplices. We need to be able to thwart the evil ambitions of such internal fringe groups. Just weeks ago, ten Islamic extremists were found guilty of conspiring to carry out a campaign of terrorism and assassination against New York City landmarks and ofﬁcials. These incidents highlight the growing threat of terrorism and the need for improved United States’ antiterrorism measures. Final passage of comprehensive antiterrorist legislation will represent a concrete step toward extinguishing the threat of terrorism by increasing the difﬁculty and cost in perpetrating heinous acts such as these. We have seen terrorism become a way of life for many other nations. We cannot allow this complacency to occur in the United States. If anyone such as Abdul Abbas or his conspirators can be discovered in our country, perhaps other destructive attacks may be averted. Mr. President, on this, the tenth anniversary of the tragedy, the threat of terrorism is undiminished. It is our responsibility to act collectively to thwart forces pursuing these acts and to block the ﬁnanciers condoning international terrorist activity. We need action and we need it now. Our people cannot continue to endure the depredations of these extremist murderers. Thank you, Mr. President.

COURT CASE ILSA AND LISA KLINGHOFFER V. ACHILLE LAURO* United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Ilsa Klinghoffer and Lisa Klinghoffer Arbitter, as Co-Executrixes of the Estates of Leon and Marilyn Klinghoffer, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria; Commissario of the Flotto Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria; Chandris (Italy) Inc.; Port of Genoa, Italy; Club ABC Tours, Inc.; Crown Travel Service, Inc., doing business as Rona

*

Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d 44, 1991 A.M.C. 2751, 19 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1277 (1991).

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Travel, and/or Club ABC Tours, Defendants-Appellees. Sophie Chasser and Anna Schneider, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Achille Lauro Lines, The Lauro Lines Flotto Achille, Chandris Cruise Lines and ABC Tours Travel Club, Defendants-Appellees. Viola Meskin, Seymour Meskin, Sylvia Sherman, Paul Weltman and Evelyn Weltman, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Achille Lauro Lines, The Lauro Lines Flotto Achille, Chandris Cruise Lines and ABC Tours Travel Club, Defendants-Appellees. Donald Saire and Anna G. Saire, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione M/N Achille Lauro S.N.C. Commissario S.N.C., Commissario of the Flotto Achille Lauro in Amministrazione and Chandris, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. Frank R. Hodes and Mildred Hodes, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Palestinian Liberation Organization, an Unincorporated Association, John Doe, President, PLO and Richard Roe, Treasurer, PLO, Defendants-Appellants. Donald Saire and Anna G. Saire, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Palestinian Liberation Organization, an Unincorporated Association, John Doe as President and Richard Roe as Treasurer of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Defendants-Appellants. No. 1371, Docket 90-9060. Argued March 27, 1991. Decided June 21, 1991.

Suits were brought against the Palestine Liberation Organization arising from the seizure of an Italian passenger liner and the killing of a passenger thereon. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 739 F.Supp. 854, Louis L. Stanton, J., denied the PLO’s motion to dismiss, and the PLO appealed. The Court of Appeals, Oakes, Chief Judge, held that: (1) Palestine Liberation Organization was not a “state” for purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and was not immune from suit in United States as result of its status as Permanent Observer at United Nations; furthermore, fact that United States had not extended its formal diplomatic recognition did not deprive it of capacity to be sued; (2) political question doctrine did not bar claims against Palestine Liberation Organization relating to seizure of Italian passenger liner and killing of a passenger thereon; and (3) only those activities not conducted in furtherance of Palestine Liberation Organization’s status as Permanent Observer at United Nations could properly be considered as a basis for jurisdiction under New York long-arm statute. Vacated and remanded with instructions.

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If Italian law was applicable to claims asserted against Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) arising from seizure of Italian passenger liner and killing of passenger thereon, no federal right would be involved and New York law would apply with respect to method of bringing suit against unincorporated association; however, if United States maritime law governed, naming PLO by its common name would be sufﬁcient, and service could then be made on PLO’s “managing or general agent.” Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 4(d)(3), 17(b), 28 U.S.C.A. Ramsey Clark, New York City (Lawrence W. Schilling, of counsel), for defendantsappellants Palestine Liberation Organization, John Doe and Richard Roe. Jay D. Fischer, New York City (Stephen Obus, Juliet M. Sarkessian, Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendelsohn, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellees Klinghoffer Arbitter and Hodes. Rodney E. Gould, Framingham, Mass. (Rubin, Hay & Gould, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellees Club ABC Tours, Inc.; Crown Travel Service, Inc. and/or Club ABC Tours and Rona Travel; and ABC Tours Travel Club. Daniel J. Dougherty, New York City (Todd L. Platek, Kirlin, Campbell & Keating, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellees Chandris (Italy) Inc.; Port of Genoa, Italy; Chandris Cruise Lines; and Chandris, Inc. Arthur M. Luxemberg, Law Ofﬁce of Perry Weitz, New York City, of counsel, for plaintiffs-appellees Chasser, Meskin, Schneider, Sherman and Weltman. William Larson Jr., Newman, Schlau, Fitch & Burns, New York City, of counsel, for plaintiffs-appellees Saire. Raymond A. Connell, Connell Losquadro & Zerbo, New York City, of counsel, for plaintiffs-appellees S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria; Commissario of the Flotta Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria; Achille Lauro Lines; Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione M/N Achille Lauro S.N.C.; The Lauro Lines Flotta Achille; Commissario Lauro S.N.C.; and Lauro Lines s.r.l. Steven M. Freeman, Tamar Sadeh Ellison, Justin J. Finger, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, Ruth L. Lansner, Anti-Defamation League, of counsel, for amicus curiae AntiDefamation League.

Before OAKES, Chief Judge, TIMBERS and KEARSE, Circuit Judges.

OAKES, CHIEF JUDGE: The Palestine Liberation Organization (the “PLO”) appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Louis L. Stanton, Judge, reported at 739 F.Supp. 854, denying its motion to dismiss various complaints brought against it in connection with the October 1985 seizure of the Italian passenger liner Achille Lauro and the killing of pas-

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senger Leon Klinghoffer. The district court rejected the PLO’s claims that it is immune from suit in United States courts, that the complaints against it raise non-justiciable political questions, that service of process on its Permanent Observer to the United Nations (the “UN”) was insufﬁcient under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that personal jurisdiction could not be asserted over it in the state of New York. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the district court that the PLO is not immune from suit and that this case does not present a non-justiciable political question. However, because we conclude that the remaining questions cannot be resolved on the record before us, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand the case for further ﬁndings.

BACKGROUND 1. The PLO and its Activities in New York The PLO, which is headquartered in Tunis, Tunisia, describes itself as the internationally recognized representative of a sovereign people who are seeking to exercise their rights to self-determination, national independence, and territorial integrity. The PLO is the internationally recognized embodiment of the nationhood and sovereignty of the Palestinian people while they await the restoration of their rights through the establishment of a [comprehensive], just, and lasting peace in the Middle East. 739 F.Supp. at 857 (quoting afﬁdavit of Ramsey Clark). On November 15, 1988, the Palestine National Council issued a Declaration of Statehood, proclaiming the existence of the State of Palestine and vesting the powers of the provisional government in the executive committee of the PLO. The United States does not give diplomatic recognition to Palestine, although several other nations do. Since 1974, the PLO, through its representative Zuhdi Labib Terzi, has participated at the UN as a Permanent Observer. To support its activities at the UN, the PLO purchased a building in Manhattan, which it uses as its UN Mission (the “Mission”). Mr. Terzi and his family reside at the Mission, and eight other employees work there as well. From time to time, other high-ranking ofﬁcers of the PLO, including its Chairman, Yasser Arafat, use the Mission. In addition to owning a building, the PLO owns an automobile and maintains a bank account in New York, and has a telephone listing in the NYNEX white pages. From time to time, the PLO has engaged in various fundraising and propaganda efforts in New York and elsewhere. In 1987, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act (the “ATA”), 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201–5203 (1988), which makes it unlawful “to receive anything of value except informational material from the PLO” or “to expend funds from the

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PLO” if the purpose is to further the PLO’s interests. Id. § 5202(1)–(2). The ATA also forbids the establishment or maintenance of “an ofﬁce, headquarters, premises, or other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of the United States at the behest or direction of, or with funds provided by the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups, any successor to any of those, or any agents thereof.” Id. § 5202(3). The ATA does not apply, however, to the PLO’s Mission in New York. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F.Supp. 1456, 1464–71 (S.D.N.Y.1988).

2. The Achille Lauro Hijacking On October 7, 1985, four persons seized the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. During the course of the incident, the hijackers murdered an elderly Jewish-American passenger, Leon Klinghoffer, by throwing him and the wheelchair in which he was conﬁned overboard. Shortly after the incident, the hijackers surrendered in Egypt. They were then extradited to Italy, where they were charged and convicted of crimes related to the seizure. At this point, it remains unclear what role, if any, the PLO played in the events described above. According to some reports, the seizure was undertaken at the behest of Abdul Abbas, who is reportedly a member of the PLO. The PLO, however, denies any responsibility for the hijacking, and maintains that its involvement in the affair was limited to helping to secure the surrender of the hijackers and to ensure the safety of the ship and its passengers. On November 27, 1985, Marilyn Klinghoffer1 and the estate of Leon Klinghoffer ﬁled suit in the Southern District of New York against the owner of the Achille Lauro, the charterer of the vessel, two travel agencies, and various other defendants. Other passengers who were aboard the Achille Lauro during the hijacking also commenced actions in the Southern District against the ship’s owner and charterer, as well as against the travel agencies. The defendants in these actions then impleaded the PLO, seeking indemniﬁcation or contribution, as well as compensatory and punitive damages for tortious interference with their businesses. On October 7, 1988, two other passengers on the Achille Lauro brought separate actions in the Southern District against the PLO directly. On April 27, 1987, the PLO moved to dismiss the third-party complaints against it. This motion was later extended to encompass the two direct suits as well. In an opinion and order dated June 7, 1990, the court denied the PLO’s motion. The PLO then moved for reargument, as well as for certiﬁcation of the case for interlocutory appeal. The court denied the PLO’s motion for reargument, but granted the motion for certiﬁcation. Thereafter, in an opinion dated December 7, 1990, we granted the PLO’s petition for permission to appeal, see 921 F.2d 21, and this appeal followed.

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DISCUSSION 1. Immunity from Suit The PLO ﬁrst argues that it is a sovereign state and therefore immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the “FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (1988). As support for this argument, it relies on its “political and governmental character and structure, its commitment to and practice of its own statehood, and its unlisted and indeterminable membership.” Brief for Appellant at 7. However, this Court has limited the deﬁnition of “state” to “‘entit[ies] that ha[ve] a deﬁned territory and a permanent population, [that are] under the control of [their] own government, and that engage[s] in, or ha[ve] the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.’” National Petrochemical Co. v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir.1988) (quoting Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 201 (1987)), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081, 109 S.Ct. 1535, 103 L.Ed.2d 840 (1989). It is quite clear that the PLO meets none of those requirements. First, the PLO has no deﬁned territory. To be sure, the PLO’s November 15, 1988, Declaration of Statehood “contemplates” that the state’s territory will consist of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. The fact that the PLO hopes to have a deﬁned territory at some future date, however, does not establish that it has a deﬁned territory now. Indeed, the Declaration’s assertion that “[t]he State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be” underscores the PLO’s current lack of a territorial structure. In addition, because the PLO does not have a deﬁned territory, it cannot have a permanent population. The PLO is also unable to demonstrate that the State of Palestine is under the control of its own government. After all, without a deﬁned territory, what, we ask, could the PLO possibly control? Moreover, even accepting the PLO’s contention that the State of Palestine incorporates the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, these areas are all under the control of the State of Israel, not the PLO. Finally, despite the fact that some countries have “recognized” the PLO, the PLO does not have the capacity to enter into genuine formal relations with other nations. This is true primarily because without a deﬁned territory under uniﬁed governmental control, the PLO lacks the ability [to] actually implement the obligations that normally accompany formal participation in the international community. See Note, The International Legal Implications of the November 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Statehood, 25 Stan.J.Int’l L. 681, 696 (1989). Contrary to the PLO’s assertions, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003, 105 S.Ct. 1354, 84 L.Ed.2d 377 (1985), does not establish that the PLO is a sovereign nation entitled to immunity under the FSIA. In Tel-Oren, the D.C. Circuit afﬁrmed the dismissal on

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jurisdictional grounds of a suit brought by Israeli citizens against persons allegedly responsible for an armed attack on a civilian bus in Israel.2 Although each of the three judges in Tel-Oren agreed that the suit should be dismissed, they did so in three separate opinions, each with its own distinct reasoning. The PLO suggests that at least two of these opinions support the theory that the PLO is a state entitled to sovereign immunity. Nothing could be further from the truth. Judge Edwards, in his opinion, wrote that “the PLO is not a recognized member of the community of nations,” id. at 791, Judge Bork noted that the PLO “apparent[ly] lack[ed] . . . international law status as a state,” id. at 805, and Judge Robb concluded simply that the PLO “ought to remain an organization ‘of whose existence we know nothing . . .,’” id. at 824 (quoting United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 149, 5 L.Ed. 55 (1820)). How the PLO reads these statements to support its claim to statehood we do not see. The PLO also maintains that it is immune from suit as a result of its status as a Permanent Observer at the UN. It relies for this argument on the Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States of America Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations (the “Headquarters Agreement”), reprinted at 22 U.S.C.A. § 287 Note. By its terms, however, the Headquarters Agreement extends immunity only to representatives of members of the UN, not to observers such as the PLO. See id. § 15. We see no reason to extend the immunities provided by the Headquarters Agreement beyond those explicitly stated. Finally, the PLO claims that because the United States has not extended its formal diplomatic recognition, it lacks the capacity to be sued in United States courts. This claim is without merit. While unrecognized regimes are generally precluded from appearing as plaintiffs in an ofﬁcial capacity without the Executive Branch’s consent, see Banco Nacional v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410–11, 84 S.Ct. 923, 931, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964); National Petrochemical Co., 860 F.2d at 554–55, there is no bar to suit where an unrecognized regime is brought into court as a defendant. Cf. United States v. Lumumba, 741 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.1984) (contempt proceeding against attorney claiming to be representative of the “Republic of New Afrika,” an unrecognized nation), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 855, 107 S.Ct. 192, 93 L.Ed.2d 125 (1986). Accordingly, the fact that the United States has not recognized the PLO does not provide a basis for immunity.

2. Political Question The PLO next argues that this case constitutes a non-justiciable political question because it “raises foreign policy questions and political questions in a volatile context lacking satisfactory criteria for judicial determination.” Brief for Appellant at 27. This claim, it appears, rests on the concededly correct observation that the PLO is a political organization that engenders strong feelings of

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both support and opposition, and that any decision the district court enters will surely exacerbate the controversy surrounding the PLO’s activities. However, the doctrine “is one of ‘political questions,’ not one of ‘political cases.’” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). The fact that the issues before us arise in a politically charged context does not convert what is essentially an ordinary tort suit into a non-justiciable political question. In Baker, the Court wrote that: [p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

Id. Although no one factor is dispositive, Justice Brennan, the author of Baker, has suggested that the ﬁrst question—whether there is a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department”—is of particular importance. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1006, 100 S.Ct. 533, 538, 62 L.Ed.2d 428 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Properly understood, the political-question doctrine restrains courts from reviewing an exercise of foreign policy judgment by the coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been ‘constitutional[ly] commit[ted].’”). Here, we are faced with an ordinary tort suit, alleging that the defendants breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiffs or their decedents. The department to whom this issue has been “constitutionally committed” is none other than our own—the Judiciary. This factor alone, then, strongly suggests that the political question doctrine does not apply. All of the other factors identiﬁed in Baker, moreover, also militate against applying the political question doctrine here. First, because the common law of tort provides clear and well-settled rules on which the district court can easily rely, this case does not require the court to render a decision in the absence of “judicially discoverable and manageable standards.” Second, because the PLO has maintained throughout this litigation that the hijacking was an act of piracy, rather than a terrorist act, a ﬁnding for or against the PLO does not depend on a prior political assessment about the value of terrorism, and thus no “initial policy decision of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion” need be made.3 Third, given the fact that both the Executive and Legislative Branches have expressly endorsed the concept of suing terrorist organizations in federal court, see Letter from Abraham D. Sofaer, United States Department of State, Ofﬁce of the Legal Adviser, to Justice Carmen B.

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Ciparick, (Sept. 4, 1986); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2333(a) (West Supp.1990) (providing a civil remedy in federal court for United States nationals injured by acts of international terrorism), resolution of this matter will not exhibit “a lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.” Fourth, this case does not require us to display “unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,” because no prior political decisions are questioned—or even implicated—by the matter before us. Finally, because this lawsuit is consistent with both the Executive and Legislative Branch’s attitude toward terrorists, resolution of this case does not have the potential for “embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.” Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the political question doctrine does not bar the claims presented here.

3. Personal Jurisdiction The PLO next contends that its contacts with New York are insufﬁcient to support an assertion of personal jurisdiction over it in the Southern District of New York.4 For the reasons set forth below, we believe this claim cannot be resolved on the record before us, and we therefore remand to the district court for further ﬁndings of fact. Based on the principles discussed by Judge Leisure in Andros Compania Maritima S.A. v. Intertanker Ltd., 714 F.Supp. 669, 673–74 (S.D.N.Y.1989), as well as the natural implications of our opinion in Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir.1963) (en banc), the law of the forum state—here, New York—governs the issue of personal jurisdiction in admiralty cases. Under the New York long-arm statute, the only plausible basis for jurisdiction over the PLO is section 301 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”), which provides for general jurisdiction over defendant corporations that are “doing business” in New York.5 See Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 N.Y.2d 305, 310–11, 449 N.Y.S.2d 456, 458, 434 N.E.2d 692, 694 (1982). The New York Court of Appeals has not yet decided whether the “doing business” rule applies to unincorporated associations. However, because “the form of organization by which a defendant does business is irrelevant to any policy governing acquisition of jurisdiction,” 1 J. Weinstein, H. Korn & A. Miller, New York Civil Practice, ¶ 301.15, at 3–31, we see no reason to distinguish between corporate and non-corporate organizations in this regard. Cf. Forgash v. Paley, 659 F.Supp. 728, 730 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (Weinfeld, J.) (applying the “doing business” test to non-corporate, individual defendants). Accordingly, if the PLO meets the doing business standard, jurisdiction under section 301 would be appropriate.6 An organization is “doing business” under section 301 when it is engaged in “such a continuous and systematic course” of activity that it can be deemed to be “present” in the state of New York. Laufer, 55 N.Y.2d at 310–11,

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449 N.Y.S.2d at 458, 434 N.E.2d at 694 (citations omitted). Whether this test is met depends on the aggregate of the organization’s activities; the key question is whether “the quality and nature” of the defendant’s contacts with New York “make it reasonable and just according to ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ that it be required to defend the action” in New York. 55 N.Y.2d at 311, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 458, 434 N.E.2d at 694 (citations omitted). Here, the PLO has a number of contacts with the state of New York. It owns a building in Manhattan, which it uses as an ofﬁce and residence for its employees, and it owns an automobile, maintains a bank account, and has a telephone listing in New York as well. In terms of its activities, it participates actively at the United Nations headquarters in Manhattan as a Permanent Observer, and its representatives have at times engaged in speaking tours and fundraising activities throughout the State. The question, then, is whether these activities amount to “doing business” within the meaning of section 301. The district court concluded that all of the above activities, when viewed as a whole, indicate that the PLO is engaged in business in New York State. See 739 F.Supp. at 863. This analysis, however, fails to distinguish those activities the PLO conducts as an observer at the UN from those activities it conducts for other purposes. In our view, only those activities not conducted in furtherance of the PLO’s observer status may properly be considered as a basis of jurisdiction. We reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, were the PLO not a Permanent Observer at the UN, it would not be entitled to enter New York at all. See United States v. PLO, 695 F.Supp. 1456, 1471 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (ﬁnding that, pursuant to the ATA, the PLO is prohibited from engaging in any activities in this country other than the maintenance of a mission to the UN). It is allowed to come to New York only because the Headquarters Agreement effectively removes control over the UN Headquarters and related areas from the jurisdiction of the United States. In other words, the PLO’s participation in the UN is dependent on the legal ﬁction that the UN Headquarters is not really United States territory at all, but is rather neutral ground over which the United States has ceded control. For a federal court then to turn around and conclude that the PLO has been doing business in New York as a result of its UN activities would, we believe, be rather duplicitous. Second, and more importantly, basing jurisdiction on the PLO’s participation in UN-related activities would put an undue burden on the ability of foreign organizations to participate in the UN’s affairs. In an analogous context, courts have held that jurisdiction in the District of Columbia may not be grounded on a non-resident’s “getting information from or giving information to the government, or getting the government’s permission to do something.” Investment Co. Inst. v. United States, 550 F.Supp. 1213, 1216–17 (D.D.C.1982). Although this “government contacts” rule is based in part on

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the constitutional right “to petition the Government for redress of grievances,” see Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 786–87 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210, 104 S.Ct. 2399, 81 L.Ed.2d 355 (1984)— a right not implicated here—it also appears to be based on non-constitutional policy considerations, such as the Judiciary’s reluctance to interfere with the smooth functioning of other governmental entities.7 As appellees conceded at oral argument, these same concerns militate against basing jurisdiction over the PLO on its UN-related activities. Accordingly, we conclude that jurisdiction may be asserted over the PLO only if its non-UN related activities rise to the level of doing business under section 301. With regard to the PLO’s non-UN activities, Judge Stanton noted that “[e]very month or two, Mr. Terzi speaks in public and to the media in New York in support of the PLO’s cause,” 739 F.Supp. at 863, and appellees have pointed to a number of other proselytizing and fundraising activities the PLO has undertaken. Taken together, we believe these activities would sufﬁce to meet the doing business standard. However, the evidence in the record concerning the PLO’s non-UN activities is limited to deposition testimony taken before the end of 1987,8 when Congress passed the ATA. In light of the ATA, it is quite possible that the PLO was forced to cease its non-UN activities in New York some time after 1987. Thus, because personal jurisdiction depends on the defendant’s contacts with the forum state at the time the lawsuit was ﬁled, see 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1051, at 160–62 (1987), personal jurisdiction over the PLO may be lacking with respect to those complaints that were ﬁled after 1987.9 Accordingly, on remand, the court should determine whether the PLO’s non-UN-related contacts with New York provided a sufﬁcient basis for jurisdiction at the time each of the complaints was ﬁled. In conducting this analysis, it should pay careful attention to those complaints ﬁled after 1987, and determine whether the PLO continued in its fundraising and proselytizing activities after the ATA was passed.

4. Service of Process Even if the court concludes on remand that personal jurisdiction may be asserted over the PLO with respect to some or all of the complaints, the question remains as to whether service of process on the PLO’s Permanent Observer to the UN was sufﬁcient. For the reasons set forth below, we believe further ﬁndings are required before the district court can resolve this question conclusively. Although its arguments on this point are somewhat muddled, it appears that the PLO’s service of process argument essentially breaks down to two distinct claims. The ﬁrst claim is that the law of the forum state determines the procedure for suing an unincorporated association such as the PLO, and that,

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because New York law provides that unincorporated associations can be sued only by naming (and accordingly serving) the president or treasurer personally, service on the PLO’s Permanent Observer was insufﬁcient.10 See N.Y.Gen.Ass’ns Law § 13 (McKinney Supp.1991). The second claim is that even if New York law does not apply, and suing the PLO in its common name is sufﬁcient, service of process on the Permanent Observer was deﬁcient under federal standards. Our ﬁrst task is to determine whether New York law is controlling on this issue, or whether a federal standard is to govern. Under Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the law of the forum state determines the manner in which an unincorporated association must be sued, except where the complaint alleges violations of “substantive right[s] existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States,” in which case federal law governs. Thus, if the claims asserted here are non-federal causes of action, the complaints would have to comport with the law of New York, which, as noted above, would require naming and serving the PLO’s president or treasurer. See N.Y.Gen.Ass’ns Law § 13. If they are federal claims, however, naming the PLO in its common name and delivering service of process to its managing or general agent would sufﬁce. See Oyler v. National Guard Ass’n, 743 F.2d 545, 550 (7th Cir.1984). At the outset, then, we must determine whether the complaints raise federal or non-federal law claims. The district court concluded that the claims in this case are federal, because “federal maritime law applies.” See 739 F.Supp. at 865-66. However, the court did not engage in a choice of law analysis, and itself noted that, “at this point[,] it is not clear which [jurisdiction’s] law will apply.” Id. at 866. As such, although it stated that federal maritime law applies, what it probably meant to say was that the case was brought under the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts. An assertion of admiralty jurisdiction, however, does not mean that the underlying claims raise “substantive right[s] existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States” within the meaning of Rule 17(b). Cf. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 368, 79 S.Ct. 468, 478, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959) (holding that maritime cases not involving federal statutes do not arise under the laws of the United States for purposes of federal question jurisdiction). Rather, under Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 S.Ct. 921, 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1953), another nation’s contacts with a particular event may be so great as to warrant the application of the law of that nation, even if jurisdiction has properly been asserted in federal court on the basis of admiralty. See Bilyk v. Vessel Nair, 754 F.2d 1541, 1543–45 (9th Cir.1985) (applying Lauritzen). Indeed, the district court was fully aware that, under Lauritzen, Italian law might ultimately be found to apply on the facts of this case. See 739 F.Supp. at 866. However, it concluded that “[i]f . . . foreign law applies, it will be because federal law requires its use,” id., and that, as a result, the complaints would remain federal for purposes of Rule 17(b). This analysis, we believe, confuses federal choice of foreign law with federal incorporation of state and foreign law

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rules. In the latter situation, a federal court that has the power to create a federal rule of decision may choose to exercise that power by incorporating legal principles derived from state or foreign law. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 1458, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979); Barkanic v. General Admin. of Civil Aviation, 923 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir.1991). When state or foreign law is used in this sense, it becomes a federal rule for all practical purposes; for example, it is binding on state courts under the Supremacy Clause. See Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv.L.Rev. 881, 963–64 (1986). By contrast, where a federal court concludes that another jurisdiction has the greatest interest in regulating a particular situation, it applies that law outright—indeed, it may be constitutionally prohibited from applying another jurisdiction’s law to the case. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 310–13, 101 S.Ct. 633, 638–40, 66 L.Ed.2d 521 (1981) (concluding that courts may not apply the law of jurisdictions that lack signiﬁcant contacts with the case); P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin & D. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 798–99 (3d ed. 1988) (noting that Hague applies to federal courts). Under these circumstances, the foreign rule does not simply give content to what is essentially a federal substantive right, but rather applies of its own force. Thus, it does not assume the status of federal law. Accordingly, if the district court concludes that Lauritzen requires it to apply Italian law to this case, no federal right would be involved, and Rule 17(b) would require the application of New York law with respect to the method of bringing suit against an unincorporated association. Thus, because New York law mandates serving the PLO’s president or treasurer, service of process on the Permanent Observer would be inadequate, and the complaints would have to be dismissed.11 If, however, the court determines that United States maritime law governs, naming the PLO in its common name would be sufﬁcient, and service could then be made on the PLO’s “managing or general agent.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(3). Under those circumstances, the only issue would be whether the PLO’s Permanent Observer to the UN constitutes a managing or general agent within the meaning of Rule 4(d)(3). In our view, the evidence in the record indicates that the Permanent Observer’s functions in New York are comparable to those of a general agent. Accordingly, in the event the district court concludes that United States law governs, a dismissal on service of process grounds would be unwarranted. Vacated and remanded, with instructions to determine whether personal jurisdiction can be asserted over the PLO with respect to some or all of the complaints at issue here, and, if so, whether service of process on the PLO’s Permanent Observer to the UN was sufﬁcient.

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Notes 1. After Marilyn Klinghoffer’s death, Ilsa Klinghoffer and Lisa Klinghoffer Arbitter, as co-executors of both Marilyn and Leon’s estates, were substituted for Marilyn Klinghoffer as plaintiffs. 2. Because the incident in Tel-Oren did not occur on the high seas, as did the hijacking here, admiralty was not an available basis of jurisdiction. Thus, the court had to decide whether the incident presented a federal question, or, in the alternative, whether jurisdiction could be asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, which provides for jurisdiction over civil actions “by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 3. For this reason, the opinions of Judges Bork and Robb in Tel-Oren, supra, which suggested that judgments about the role of terrorism in international struggles are best entrusted to the Executive Branch, see 726 F.2d at 805 (Bork, J.); id. at 825–26 (Robb, J.), are inapplicable here. In any event, given the Executive Branch’s repeated condemnations of international terrorism, we believe that any initial policy decision that might conceivably be required has already been made. 4. At the outset, we disagree with appellee Chandris that the PLO waived its right to contest personal jurisdiction by participating in discovery in these proceedings. First, we have no way of knowing whether Chandris is correct that the PLO participated in the depositions of plaintiffs Seymour and Viola Meskin on August 5 and 6, 1987, as Chandris has not included any documentary support for this claim—such as, for example, a deposition transcript—in the appellate record. In any event, even if the PLO did participate in those hearings, it did so before any complaints were ﬁled against it. Thus, no assertion of jurisdiction had yet been made over it, and there was accordingly no jurisdictional defense that it could have waived. 5. Appellee Chandris suggests an alternative basis for jurisdiction—namely, that the PLO consented to jurisdiction in this case by participating in an unrelated lawsuit in state court. A party’s consent to jurisdiction in one case, however, extends to that case alone. It in no way opens that party up to other lawsuits in the same jurisdiction in which consent was given, where the party does not consent and no other jurisdictional basis is available. 6. In addressing this question ourselves, we reject appellee Chandris’s claim that the decision in United States v. PLO, 695 F.Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y.1988), resolved the question whether the PLO meets the doing business standard of section 301. In United States v. PLO, the statute at issue created a federal, rather than a state, jurisdictional standard. See id. at 1461. Because the jurisdictional bases of New York law are more limited than those allowed under federal standards, see CPLR § 302, McLaughlin Practice Commentary, the fact that jurisdiction may have been appropriate under federal law does not establish that jurisdiction is now appropriate under CPLR § 301. 7. The use of jurisdictional immunities to further non-constitutional policy goals is not limited to the context of government lobbying. See, e.g., Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S.Ct. 44, 61 L.Ed. 192 (1916) (holding that service of process may not be executed on a non-resident who comes into the jurisdiction to participate in litigation as a plaintiff, defendant, or witness); Shapiro & Son Curtain Corp. v. Glass, 348 F.2d 460 (2d Cir.) (exempting witnesses who appear in judicial proceedings from service of process), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 942, 86 S.Ct. 397, 15 L.Ed.2d 351 (1965).

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8. The only indication in the record that the PLO has engaged in fundraising and propaganda activities comes from the depositions of Mr. Terzi, taken on March 31, 1986, and Hasan Abdul-Rahman, taken on October 6, 1987. 9. This conclusion is not affected by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 111 S.Ct. 858, 112 L.Ed.2d 951 (1991) (per curiam), which held that diversity jurisdiction, once established, is not defeated by the addition of a non-diverse party to the action. In Freeport, the Court concluded that the addition of a non-diverse party to the original complaint does not destroy diversity, on the theory that, “if jurisdiction exists at the time an action is commenced, such jurisdiction may not be divested by subsequent events.” 111 S.Ct. at 860. This holding is inapplicable to the present case for two reasons. First, it relates only to the question of subject matter jurisdiction, and says nothing about the question of personal jurisdiction with which the present controversy is concerned. Second, the thirdparty complaints and the two direct suits ﬁled against the PLO were not simply additions to the original complaint, as was the amendment to the complaint in Freeport, but were new actions entirely. As such, defects in personal jurisdiction as to those new complaints cannot be overcome by the fact that personal jurisdiction over the PLO may have existed at the time the ﬁrst complaint was ﬁled. 10. We state that the PLO’s arguments are muddled because, at times, it appears that its claim is simply that the parties failed to comply with New York’s requirement of naming the President and Treasurer, rather than the requirement of serving the President and Treasurer personally. To the extent the claim is, in fact, that the requirement of naming the President and Treasurer was not met, however, it is undermined by the complaints’ reference to “John Doe as President and Richard Roe as Treasurer.” 11. Such a dismissal, of course, would be without prejudice. See 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1353, at 285–86 (1990).

4

USS Cole Bombing: Case Study (2000)

THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ATTACK ON THE USS COLE May 2001

Report of the House Armed Services Committee Staff

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The October 12, 2000, attack on the USS Cole was the latest in a series of terrorist attacks against U.S. interests and the U.S. military presence in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. In December 1992, two bomb blasts occurred at hotels in Aden, Yemen, where U.S. military forces were staying en route to deployment in Somalia. These bombings resulted in the withdrawal from Aden of U.S. personnel. In November 1995, a bomb exploded at a joint military training facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 5 American military personnel. In June 1996, a truck bomb at the Khobar Towers compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killed 19 U.S. service personnel. The Riyadh and Dhahran attacks were generally considered to be directed at the U.S. military

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presence in Saudi Arabia, as part of a broader effort to force the United States to withdraw from the Middle East. The bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salem, Tanzania, in August 1998, although not speciﬁcally directed against the U.S. military presence, were believed to be part of the same campaign against U.S. interests in the region. The attack on the USS Cole occurred during a brief stop for refueling in the port of Aden, Yemen. The bomb blast ripped through the side of the ship, creating a 40 × 45 foot hole, killing 17 U.S. sailors and injuring dozens more. It was the most serious attack against U.S. military personnel since the 1996 Khobar Towers attack. Although signiﬁcant security enhancements and force protection measures were implemented after the Khobar Towers incident, those measures proved inappropriate to deal with the kind of attack that took place against the USS Cole. A combination of factors contributed to the USS Cole tragedy. These included the desire for engagement with Yemen, operational requirements, force structure limitations, intelligence shortfalls with respect to the terrorist threat, a confusing threat level reporting system, a failure to react appropriately to changes in the geopolitical environment in the region, inadequate training and security measures, ambiguity in the determination of hostile intent under the rules of engagement, insufﬁcient attention to force protection measures by the ship’s commanding ofﬁcer, and split responsibilities for supporting Navy logistical and intelligence requirements. There was no “single point failure” that was responsible for the tragedy, nor is it possible to conclude with any degree of conﬁdence that all required force protection measures, if implemented, would have prevented the attack from occurring. At the strategic level, the U.S. policy of engagement—highlighted in various national security guidance documents and reﬂected in U.S. Central Command’s (USCENTCOM’s) theater engagement plan—was the primary motivating factor behind the desire of the United States to increase its involvement with Yemen, including an increase in port visits to Aden and brief stops for ship refueling. At the tactical level, the decision to conduct refueling activities in Yemen was based on operational considerations. The engagement with Yemen was initiated with a clear understanding that Yemen was a sanctuary for terrorists. Although the 1992 bombings in Aden led to the withdrawal of U.S. personnel, and subsequent threats to U.S. deminers resulted in an interruption of the U.S. humanitarian demining program, the attack on the USS Cole was completely unexpected. Intelligence reporting regarding speciﬁc threats to U.S. interests in Yemen was scarce and sometimes contradictory. Consequently, the decision to conduct port visits in Aden was made on the basis of incomplete and inconclusive information, and resulted in higher risk than was generally perceived. Compounding this was a general mindset that tended to discount the likelihood of a terrorist attack against a U.S. warship. In part, this was due to the

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fact that previous port visits had occurred without incident and that there was no concrete evidence suggesting terrorists were planning such an attack. In addition, operations in the region were conducted under peacetime rules of engagement and without an adequate appreciation of the “war” that terrorists had declared on the United States. Therefore, there was a widely held view that the USS Cole was not at particular risk. This ignored previous terrorist incidents and changes in the geopolitical situation in the Middle East that should have led to a real-time reappraisal of the desirability of port visits and a more critical assessment of admittedly sketchy intelligence about possible terrorist actions in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). It is signiﬁcant that the focus of the U.S. military’s antiterrorism/force protection program has been on land-based, not waterborne, threats. The general assumption regarding terrorist attacks against U.S. military assets is that they will be perpetrated on land, not at sea. Many of the Navy’s force protection measures have been designed to prevent terrorist attacks on U.S. naval vessels while docked in port, including measures to ensure pierside security. The Navy’s force protection training program has focused on pierside threats, with little emphasis on defense against waterborne threats. Waterborne terrorist threats proved to be the Achilles’ heel of the Navy’s counterterrorism program. No one in the chain of command appears to have recognized that additional security measures were necessary to protect against waterborne terrorist threats. A waterborne suicide attack had not been considered likely. With respect to the establishment of threat levels in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, a bureaucratic change in threat level reporting resulted in a degree of confusion over whether the threat in Yemen had ofﬁcially decreased when it had not. The confusion was exacerbated by the fact that USCENTCOM did not concur with the changed threat reporting methodology and did not implement it. This raises issues with respect to the process by which threat levels are established. Although the USS Cole remained at THREATCON Bravo, not all 62 force protection measures required under this threat condition were implemented. Among the measures not implemented were a requirement to coordinate security measures for the USS Cole’s visit with the local Yemeni husbanding agent and a requirement to keep unauthorized boats away from the ship. However, the failure to implement all measures does not, in itself, constitute a “smoking gun,” and it can never be known whether their implementation would have been sufﬁcient to prevent the tragedy. Reductions in force structure have left the Navy with signiﬁcantly diminished assets. The reduction in the number of oilers, combatants, and weapons available may have led to operational decisions that contributed to the USS Cole’s vulnerability Finally, split responsibilities between USCENTCOM, the Navy, DOD, and the Department of State led to confusion that could have been avoided had

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the coordination processes functioned effectively. Contracting issues in support of Navy port visits and refueling stops are handled by the Navy. However, operational decisions regarding refueling are USCENTCOM’s responsibility. Moreover, the establishment of threat levels, as noted above, requires greater coordination between DOD and USCENTCOM. The threat levels set by the U.S. embassy in Yemen were based on different criteria and were not communicated to the USS Cole. And the existence of multiple force protection standards—one baseline set by the Navy, the other by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and augmented as necessary by USCENTCOM—is a recipe for confusion, and a single standard should be established. In short, while there was no “single-point failure” that led to the attack on the USS Cole, numerous factors combined in ways that left the ship and its crew vulnerable.

INTRODUCTION On October 12, 2000, at approximately 11:35 AM local time, a small boat laden with explosives detonated alongside the USS Cole (DDG 67) in Aden harbor, Yemen. Seventeen sailors died in the explosion and dozens more were wounded. The explosion ripped a 40 × 45 foot hole in the ship. Preliminary press reports indicated that the small boat carried more than 500 pounds of explosives and that the two individuals on board the boat sought to maximize damage to the USS Cole by using a “shaped charge” that concentrated the blast in a relatively narrow area. The USS Cole—an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer with Aegis-equipped guided missiles—had arrived in Aden several hours earlier for refueling en route to joining a carrier battle group in the Persian Gulf. The ship moored at a fueling “dolphin” located in the harbor some distance from the port area, and had completed the process of taking on fuel when the small boat approached it and pulled up alongside. Press reports indicated that the two men on board the boat stood and saluted just prior to the explosion. The attack on the USS Cole again demonstrates that the threat of international terrorism directed against the United States, its military personnel, citizens, and interests, remains serious. This attack was the deadliest against the U.S. military since the June 1996 terrorist attack that killed 19 service personnel at the Khobar Towers compound in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. It was also the ﬁrst against a sophisticated Navy ship.

THE GENESIS OF THE HASC INVESTIGATION In 1996, a House National Security Committee staff investigation concluded that intelligence shortfalls, coupled with operational and organizational

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shortcomings, contributed to the unpreparedness of the military for the Khobar Towers attack. Since that attack, the United States has instituted additional security precautions to protect against terrorism. Unfortunately, they were insufﬁcient to prevent the deadly attack on the USS Cole. As part of the U.S. government’s investigation of the USS Cole incident, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is conducting a criminal investigation of the attack. U.S. FBI agents remain in Yemen, working with Yemeni ofﬁcials to uncover the identity of those responsible for planning and executing the attack on the USS Cole. Numerous press reports suggest that those responsible have links to Osama bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi expatriate who is thought to be the mastermind behind the terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Bin Laden is also thought to have been responsible for the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers. In addition to the FBI investigation, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen appointed retired Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., former Commander in Chief of U.S. Joint Forces Command, and retired General William Crouch, former Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, to conduct a broad review of lessons learned from the attack, including a review of Department of Defense (DOD) policies and procedures regarding force protection, rules of engagement, logistical support, intelligence, and counterintelligence. This report was completed and the ﬁndings and recommendations released publicly on January 9, 2001. The Department of the Navy has also conducted a Judge Advocate General Manual investigation to determine whether the commander and crew of the USS Cole exercised the appropriate security precautions prior to its refueling stop. A redacted version of this report was released on January 19, 2001. [The] committee staff has seen and been briefed on both reports and has reviewed [its] conclusions. This latest attack on the U.S. armed forces has again raised questions regarding the military’s preparedness to prevent terrorism directed against U.S. forces overseas. The USS Cole’s refueling in Yemen, a country that the Department of State described in its most recent annual report on global terrorism as a “safe haven for terrorists,” has raised questions about the U.S. policy of “engagement” in the region, the sufﬁciency of U.S. intelligence on the terrorist threat, and the adequacy of security procedures designed to protect Navy vessels, especially during single-ship transits. With these questions in mind, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) tasked committee staff to conduct a preliminary investigation into the attack on the USS Cole. As part of its oversight responsibility, the HASC received a series of brieﬁngs after the incident from the Department of Defense and Department of the Navy. On October 18, 2000, the HASC Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism received a classiﬁed brieﬁng from the intelligence community on the attack. This was followed on October 25, 2000, with an open hearing conducted by the full committee to receive testimony from Department of Defense and Department of State ofﬁcials. The open session was followed by

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a closed executive session, during which the committee also heard from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Committee staff held numerous meetings with Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, and intelligence community ofﬁcials to gain a better understanding of the USS Cole tragedy. HASC staff received numerous briefings in Washington and requested numerous documents related to the intelligence aspects of the incident. HASC staff also worked closely with staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, who provided important contributions to the understanding of the role of intelligence and the intelligence process as it related to events surrounding the attack on the USS Cole. On November 15, 2000, committee staff traveled to the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic, in Norfolk, Virginia, to assess the training program and force protection guidance established for crews aboard Arleigh Burke-class ships. From December 4-8, 2000, committee staff traveled to Manama, Bahrain, to discuss the attack with Navy ofﬁcials at U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT), headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. Staff received numerous brieﬁngs at USNAVCENT regarding policy, operations, intelligence, logistics, and force protection issues. On December 18, 2000, committee staff visited USCENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida. A complete listing of briefers and individuals interviewed during the course of this investigation appears as Appendix B of this report.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY INVESTIGATIONS On January 9, 2001, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen released the ﬁndings of the investigation into the USS Cole attack headed by Admiral Gehman and General Crouch. The report of the USS Cole Commission concluded that, although signiﬁcant improvements had been made since the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in protecting U.S. installations from terrorist attack, the attack on the USS Cole “demonstrated a seam in the fabric of efforts to protect our forces, namely in-transit forces.” The report contained 30 unclassiﬁed ﬁndings and 44 speciﬁc recommendations for improvements to DOD policies and procedures in order to enhance the ability to protect U.S. military forces in transit. The USS Cole Commission was tasked with responsibility for reviewing the attack in light of DOD policies and procedures in order to assess the lessons learned. In an October 24, 2000, memo from Secretary Cohen to Admiral Gehman and General Crouch, the commission was directed to “address those matters that you consider pertinent associated with port visits, refueling stops, and related military activities in the USCENTCOM AOR (area of responsibility), including, for example, force protection measures, rules of engagement, procedures for and other matters associated with logistic support, and intelligence and counterintelligence efforts.”

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The commission report focused on ﬁve distinct areas: organizational issues within DOD; antiterrorism and force protection measures; intelligence; logistics; and training. Signiﬁcantly, the report did not address issues related to the reasons behind the USS Cole’s refueling stop at Aden; for example, the U.S. strategy of engagement, operational considerations, and Navy force structure realities. These issues are addressed in the HASC staff report. The commission conducted its work taking the existing national security strategy of engagement as a given. In commenting on the release of the commissions report at a Pentagon news conference on January 9, 2001, Admiral Gehman stated, Our review was conducted in the context of the national security strategy. . . . The national security strategy includes the pillar the United States will be engaged actively around the world (sic.). We took that as an assumption. Our review was intended to determine how you do it more safely, not to question it. . . . [W]e did not review the policy of engagement with Aden. It wasn’t in our charter.

General Crouch noted, Even though . . . the [USS] Cole was the catalyst for our review, the approach we took was not to ﬁnd out what went wrong in the case of the [USS] Cole, but how can we do engagement activities more safely in the future.

The commission’s support of the engagement strategy was explicitly noted by Admiral Gehman, who stated, “The only thing I can say is that the premise of our report reﬂects our views that the national strategy of engaging in these regions around the world is a good one. It’s in the U.S. best interests. . . .” General Crouch noted, “What we are committed to is the continuation of that strategy of engagement and balancing it . . . with risk mitigation to protect our troops.” Another area left unaddressed by the USS Cole Commission is the issue of Navy force structure. The USS Cole was in Aden because of operational requirements that made its transit to the region necessary. Those operational requirements were inﬂuenced by the Navy’s force structure and the assets the Navy can devote to contingency operations in the region. The commission concluded, “The current level of Combat Logistics Force oilers is sufﬁcient to support the refueling and logistics requirements of the national strategy.” However, it did not address the issue of using oilers to support single-ship transits, nor did it examine the adequacy of overall Navy force levels to execute the engagement strategy at an acceptable level of risk. These issues played a factor in the USS Cole’s presence in Aden harbor on October 12, 2000. With respect to organizational issues, the commission concluded that “unity of effort” among the various entities within DOD with responsibilities for combating terrorism is essential. Accordingly, the commission recommended that the Secretary of Defense designate an Assistant Secretary of

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Defense (ASD) to oversee DOD’s combating terrorism efforts. In fact, this recommendation was a Congressional initiative and previously codiﬁed in section 901 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106–398). That section requires the secretary to designate an assistant secretary “to provide overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation and use of resources for the activities of the Department of Defense for combating terrorism….” The commission also called for “greater coordination of engagement activities across U.S. government agencies.” However, the commission did not review the basic premise, assumptions, or implementation of U.S. engagement strategy. The commission recommended a variety of actions to improve the antiterrorism and force protection capabilities of transiting units. These included manning and funding enhancements. The report concludes that Component Commanders must be provided with adequate resources to temporarily augment security for in-transit units. Moreover, the commission noted the existence of conﬂicting threat levels and recommended that the geographic Commander in Chief (CINC) have “sole authority” for establishing threat levels within his AOR. The commission also called for improvements to the threat condition (THREATCON) system, a series of increasingly robust force protection measures linked to the probability of terrorist attack. Importantly, the commission considered the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be “adequate” and recommended no changes to them. However, the commission did acknowledge that the SROE “do not provide speciﬁc guidelines or indicators for the determination of hostile intent of a terrorist threat.” The HASC staff report concludes that, in the case of the USS Cole, there was ambiguity in the determination of hostile intent under the rules of engagement and that this ambiguity was a contributing factor in the attack. Finally, the commission noted that “we must get out of the purely defensive mode by proactively applying AT/FP [antiterrorism/force protection] techniques and assets to detect and deter terrorists,” and called for establishment of an “operational risk management” model to assist in AT/FP planning and execution. Among the commission’s key recommendations with respect to intelligence is that intelligence production and analysis must be reprioritized to decrease emphasis on traditional Cold War missions and increase emphasis on post-Cold War missions, such as combating terrorism. This recommendation presumes that the existing level of intelligence collection on some traditional Cold War targets is no longer necessary, a presumption that is certainly debatable. At the January 9, 2001, Pentagon news conference, Admiral Gehman stated that although DOD and the intelligence community have shifted resources “away from Cold War missions and toward the antiterrorist mission,” that shift has occurred “only at the margins.” He noted that “that shift should continue.” While additional intelligence efforts directed toward

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the combating terrorism mission are admittedly important, they should not necessarily come at the expense of other intelligence priorities or requirements. The commission also addressed, in accordance with its charter, counterintelligence requirements, and offered suggestions for improving threat and vulnerability assessments. The commission highlighted existing vulnerabilities in the logistics requirement process with respect to in-transit forces, and recommended that the Component Commanders be included in the logistics planning and contract award process. In addition, the commission recommended that the logistics support process be modiﬁed in ways that incorporate security and force protection considerations. A number of these recommendations parallel the ﬁndings and recommendations contained in the HASC staff report. Finally, the commission noted speciﬁc AT/FP training deﬁciencies and recommended that such training be accomplished “with a degree of rigor that equates to the unit’s primary mission areas.” In sum, many of the commission’s recommendations are focused on improving the ability of Component Commanders to exercise appropriate force protection measures. The commission’s report describes the Component Commanders as “the fulcrum of a balance with the beneﬁts of engagement on one side and the associated risks/costs on the other side.” While there is clearly a balance to be struck between the strategy of engagement and the assumption of risk, the commission did not address the issue of what a proper balance should be.

THE NAVY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL MANUAL (JAGMAN) REPORT As part of the ofﬁcial inquiry into the USS Cole tragedy, the Navy conducted its own investigation, focusing on a review of the force protection measures implemented and not implemented by the commanding ofﬁcer of the USS Cole, and whether the commanding ofﬁcer and crew were negligent or deﬁcient in the execution of their duties. The Navy’s Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) investigation was conducted by an ofﬁcer at USNAVCENT. Formal written endorsements of the ﬁndings were submitted by Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore, Jr., Commander in Chief of USNAVCENT and the Navy’s Fifth Fleet; Admiral Robert J. Natter, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet; and Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations. On January 19, 2001, the JAGMAN report was ofﬁcially released, containing the ﬁndings of fact, opinions, and recommendations of the investigating ofﬁcer, along with the written endorsements of Admiral Moore, Admiral Natter, and Admiral Clark. The endorsements to the report contain background information and the Navy’s perspective on the USS Cole’s port visit, [as well as] threat levels and threat conditions, Navy training program deﬁciencies, and organizational issues.

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Among the JAGMAN report’s ﬁndings were that the commanding ofﬁcer of the USS Cole failed to implement roughly half of the force protection measures required during his refueling stop in Aden. The implementation of these measures, according to the report, “may have prevented the suicide boat attack or mitigated its consequences.” Despite this ﬁnding, the senior Navy ofﬁcials endorsing the report recommended that no disciplinary action be taken against the commanding ofﬁcer, Commander Kirk S. Lippold. In his endorsement to the report, Admiral Moore disagreed with the conclusion of the investigating ofﬁcer on this point and noted his view that “had USS Cole implemented the THREATCON Bravo force protection measures appropriately, the ship would not have prevented the attack.” Admiral Natter concurred in this assessment, noting that implementation of those additional measures would have been “inadequate” to prevent the attack. Admiral Clark also concluded that “these measures, even if fully implemented, would not have thwarted a well-planned, determined attack of this nature.” Nevertheless, it is impossible to prove a negative and to know whether actions not taken would or would not have been sufﬁcient to prevent the consequences that resulted. On January 9, 2001, after reviewing the USS Cole Commission report, former Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, to review the ﬁndings of the USS Cole Commission and the JAGMAN investigation, and to provide his advice concerning implementation of the USS Cole Commission’s recommendations, “and any additional actions the Department should now take.” He also directed General Shelton to assess “operational and administrative matters associated with this incident, including issues of accountability, as well as any other matter you deem appropriate.” At a news conference on January 19, 2001, Secretary Cohen announced his and General Shelton’s concurrence with the JAGMAN report’s recommendation that no disciplinary action be taken against the USS Cole’s commanding ofﬁcer. He indicated that responsibility for the USS Cole tragedy lies with the entire military chain of command, from the Secretary of Defense on down, because the chain of command did not sufﬁciently question the procedures for protecting U.S. military forces in transit. In a January 19, 2001 memorandum, Secretary Cohen stated that [although] force protection enhancements have focused on land-based installations, “all of us who had responsibility for force protection of USS Cole . . . did not do enough to anticipate possible new threats.”

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND ITS AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY US. Central Command (USCENTCOM) is one of four geographic commands and encompasses 25 countries in the Middle East, central and southwest Asia, and parts of Africa. This region is one of the most volatile and

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dangerous in the world. The Commander in Chief of USCENTCOM (CINCCENT) is the Department of Defense’s primary liaison and representative to the countries in the region. USCENTCOM is the only geographic command with its headquarters located outside the command’s area of responsibility (AOR). CINCCENT is not a force provider—he has no standing military forces under his command. Rather, he receives forces from the various other commands in order to execute the missions he is given. USNAVCENT is the Navy component command and is one of ﬁve peacetime component commands within USCENTCOM. Throughout the course of the HASC staff investigation, USCENTCOM ofﬁcials emphasized the importance of their mission, which includes promoting regional stability; maintaining access to regional resources and markets; supporting a lasting Middle East peace; and countering terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The three major strategic chokepoints in the region are the Suez Canal, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Bab el Mandeb. The Bab el Mandeb lies at the southern end of the Red Sea. Yemen is situated at the northern end of this waterway, with Djibouti to the south. Through these narrow chokepoints ﬂows nearly 80 percent of the world’s petroleum resources. The Navy’s main responsibility in the region is to keep those chokepoints open. The dangerous nature of operations in USCENTCOM is typiﬁed by the fact that the “normal” threat condition for most countries within the AOR is generally higher than in other commands. However, military operations within USCENTCOM take place on a routine basis using peacetime rules of engagement and operating procedures. Port visits, brief stops for fuel, and military exercises are conducted as part of the normal peacetime engagement strategy for the region. This peacetime posture belies the fact that USCENTCOM is conducting combat or near-combat operations on a daily basis within the AOR. For example, OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH requires armed U.S. aircraft to enforce the Iraqi “no-ﬂy zone” south of the 33rd parallel in the face of active Iraqi air defense systems. The Navy conducts maritime interdiction operations against ships in the Persian Gulf suspected of smuggling in violation of the UN-imposed economic sanctions regime against Iraq. In addition, there have been a series of high visibility terrorist attacks in the region, including the attacks against the joint military facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 1995, the Khobar Towers compound in 1996, and the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salem, Tanzania, in 1998. Despite these ongoing high-risk operations, ofﬁcials at USCENTCOM indicated that, prior to the attack on the USS Cole, engagement in the various countries in the region was viewed as the top priority. Since the attack, the priority within USCENTCOM has changed to force protection. This change came about, according to USCENTCOM ofﬁcials, because of the realization that terrorists are “at war” with the United States. Up until the time of the USS Cole

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attack, ofﬁcials did not view the situation in the region in this light, and continued to conduct operations with primarily a peacetime mindset. This peacetime mindset may have contributed to an overall atmosphere within USCENTCOM that colored commanders’ judgments and allowed units to maintain an overall security posture that was inappropriate to the actual threat in the region. Had the commander of the USS Cole felt that he was entering an actual “combat zone,” he may have been more diligent in implementing the required force protection measures when entering Aden harbor. The realization that the United States is now “at war” with terrorists should signal commanders and units in the USCENTOM AOR that they should approach all operations in the region as if they were combat operations. As such, they could be attacked any time, any place, and should take appropriate force protection actions. This “combat” mindset is critical to presenting a credible deterrent posture toward any would-be terrorist in the future.

THE U.S. POLICY OF ENGAGEMENT For the past eight years, U.S. national security policy has emphasized a strategy of “engagement.” Engagement can take many forms, but at its root lies the forging of closer ties between the United States and other countries, in furtherance of U.S. national security objectives. As articulated in the most recent White House national security strategy document, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century,” dated January 5, 2000, “Our strategy is founded on continued U.S. engagement and leadership abroad.” The 1997 National Military Strategy, prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, notes that “Our global engagement makes the world safer for our Nation, our citizens, our interests, and our values.” In a preface to the report, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili, noted, “The military has an important role in engagement—helping to shape the international environment in appropriate ways to bring about a more peaceful and stable world.” Often, the U.S. military is the tool for implementing the strategy of engagement. The U.S. military is respected around the world for its capabilities, professionalism, and adherence to the highest principles. The Navy bears a major share of engagement responsibilities in the region because of its continuous forward-based presence, which is often non-permanent and less intrusive than other types of military deployments. Engagement with Yemen was seen as an important priority because of Yemen’s strategic location astride the Bal el Mandeb. Until 1990, Yemen was divided into North and South Yemen. South Yemen was a Marxist state. A bloody but relatively short civil war between both Yemeni states was fought in 1994. Despite the end of the civil war, Yemen remained unstable and a harbor for terrorists. As Admiral Moore described it, former USCENTCOM

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Commander in Chief, Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni, saw an opportunity to try to prevent Yemen “from becoming another Afghanistan.” Defense ties between the United States and Yemen expanded after 1997. In accordance with U.S. engagement strategy, the regional CINC developed a Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) that outlined the speciﬁcs for engagement with countries within the USCENTCOM AOR, including Yemen. The TEP is a classiﬁed document that is prepared, reviewed, and amended on a cyclical basis during the course of each year. The last TEP prepared prior to the attack on the USS Cole—TEP 1250-01—was dated April 1, 1999, and covered a sevenyear period from 2001-2007. The document was not solely a product of USCENTCOM. All national agencies had the ability to review the particulars of the TEP and to recommend changes or modiﬁcations to the engagement plans it outlined. According to USCENTCOM ofﬁcials, no agency articulated any objections with respect to the TEP section dealing with Yemen. In an unclassiﬁed entry in the TEP, General Zinni stated, “We need to broaden our relationships with nations in our AOR through expanded engagement activities….” He noted that a number of states in the USCENTCOM AOR “face both transnational dangers and internal threats to stability. Chief among these is anti-government terrorism, fostered by various Islamic extremist groups.” Yemen, he noted, faced “internal problems between the national government and the tribes,” exacerbated by the country’s “extreme economic disadvantage.” USCENTCOM’s August 2000 classiﬁed country campaign plan for Yemen identiﬁed the speciﬁc rationale for engagement with Yemen, and addressed the security environment in the country. One of the unclassiﬁed assumptions in this document was that “Yemen will remain stable and be able to provide security for USG/DOD [United States Government/ Department of Defense] personnel conducting engagement activities.” General Zinni requested the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT) and the Navy’s Fifth Fleet, Vice Admiral Charles N. Moore, Jr., to help formulate speciﬁc recommendations for the Navy’s support for engagement with Yemen. Admiral Moore suggested three speciﬁc options: conducting military-to-military exercises with Yemen, assisting in the development of Yemen’s coast guard capabilities, and conducting brief port visits in Aden. General Zinni accepted these recommendations and added a fourth: assisting Yemen in the clearance of land mines left over from the country’s civil war. In this regard, the Navy conducted a “train-the-trainer” program to assist Yemen in the demining effort. The U.S. Navy strongly supported the engagement policy with Yemen and continues to do so even after the attack on the USS Cole. Admiral Moore stated that, in general, the Gulf countries view the U.S. naval presence in the region as a matter of “prestige,” and that they do not want the United States to disengage from the region. The Gulf states view Iran as the primary threat to their security, and see the United States as providing a necessary deterrent to Iranian aggression.

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In practice, USNAVCENT conducts 50 exercises annually in 13 Gulf states for engagement purposes. According to Admiral Moore, the Navy had “no discomfort” going to Yemen. In accordance with the speciﬁc engagement plans accepted by General Zinni, some joint U.S.-Yemeni training exercises had been conducted. U.S. deminers were also assisting Yemen in clearing the country of land mines left over from the civil war. In addition, planning was being done to help develop Yemen’s coast guard capabilities. And, by the time of the attack on the USS Cole, at least 27 U.S. Navy ships had already conducted brief stops for fuel in Aden harbor. The original decision to refuel Navy ships at Aden was viewed by the Navy in the context of the operational beneﬁts it would provide. Yemen not only was situated adjacent to the Bab el Mandeb, but also was roughly half the steaming distance between the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf. The refueling situation at other ports in the USCENTCOM AOR was becoming increasingly difﬁcult. For example, Djibouti was becoming increasingly tenuous as a refueling stop because of escalating instability. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 19, 2000, General Zinni stated, “We had been in Djibouti and refueling. We were interested in terminating that contract, because at that time, Djibouti, the threat conditions were far worse. The port was extremely busy, many small boats, the conditions ashore and in the government were not satisfactory.” In addition, the quality of the fuel being provided in Djibouti was questionable, the fuel pumping rate was inadequate compared to other ports, fuel storage capacity was less, and storage costs were higher than in Aden, and refueling took place pierside. In addition to operational considerations that made Yemen look like an attractive refueling option, the desire for engagement with Yemen provided the Navy with a strategic rationale for increasing the number of planned refueling stops there as part of the overall engagement strategy developed by the USCENTCOM Commander in Chief. In short, the decision to go to Yemen accomplished multiple objectives, both strategic and operational. From the Navy’s perspective, the decision to refuel in Yemen was logical and appropriate. In fact, the Navy continues to support the engagement strategy with respect to Yemen and considers Aden to be the best refueling port option in the AOR. This is one reason why the Navy expects to return to Aden in the future. In the wake of the attack on the USS Cole, the Navy sees a return to Yemen as both a matter of sound operational policy and a matter of political necessity driven by the requirement not to withdraw in the face of terrorist attacks. Both Admiral Moore and the current USCENTCOM Commander in Chief, General Tommy R. Franks, stated their belief that the attack on the USS Cole was an “act of war” designed to force U.S. disengagement from the region. According to General Franks, “Terrorists have declared war on us. We shouldn’t back away. I will never recommend disengagement.” The decision to refuel in Aden harbor was made with full knowledge of the fact that Yemen was home to a variety of terrorist groups, some with

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anti-American agendas. Yemen is also the ancestral home of Osama bin Laden, the Saudi expatriate and suspected mastermind behind the attacks on U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia and the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The Department of State, in its report, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999, concluded that Yemen remained “a safe haven for terrorist groups.” With this background, the deterioration in the political and security environment with respect to Israel and the Palestinians in the summer of 2000 should have provided early warning that U.S. interests in the region might be placed at greater risk because of a perceived U.S. bias toward Israel. As a result of this change in the geopolitical situation, a more careful and deliberate review of the CINC’s TEP and U.S. engagement plans with Yemen should have taken place. Unfortunately, this did not occur.

Key Observations: U.S. national security strategy called for engagement with Yemen. USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT implemented this strategy through port visits and brief refueling stops, among other initiatives. Yemen was seen as “win-win”—it solved an operational need and met U.S. engagement policy guidance at the same time. However, the desire for engagement with Yemen outpaced an understanding of the terrorist threat in that country, increasing the risk to U.S. military personnel. The requirement for engagement with Yemen led to an increase in the number of U.S. Navy ships refueling there. Changing geopolitical conditions in the AOR should have led to a more critical reassessment of U.S. vulnerabilities and engagement plans for Yemen, but they did not.

Recommendations: A policy of engagement must be pursued cautiously in areas where the potential for terrorism is high. The balance between the desire for engagement and the assumption of risk must be recalibrated to place increasing emphasis on force protection requirements. Implementation of the TEP should be reviewed and adjusted in accordance with changing geopolitical factors in the AOR.

INTELLIGENCE Accurate intelligence information on terrorist plans and activities has historically been difﬁcult to obtain. Even the small amount of intelligence that referenced Yemen speciﬁcally was occasionally contradictory. Generally,

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“strategic” intelligence—containing information about threats and preparations for possible attacks on U.S. interests or personnel—can be useful in providing early warning of terrorist actions. However, because terrorist groups tend to be small, close knit, very security conscious, and difﬁcult to penetrate, “tactical” intelligence—that intelligence containing specific information regarding the target, method, timing, and location of an attack—is generally more difﬁcult to obtain, if not nearly impossible. Further, it is generally agreed that there are insufﬁcient resources, particularly in terms of human intelligence assets, to properly counter the difﬁcult terrorist threat.

Collection Since the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers compound in Saudi Arabia, intelligence collection efforts have improved signiﬁcantly. A sizable amount of intelligence information, much of it nonspeciﬁc, is collected, processed, and disseminated daily by the various national intelligence agencies. While there is always a risk that source information gathered through a variety of means may be deliberately or unintentionally erroneous, much of the intelligence product is sufﬁciently accurate and timely to be “actionable.” As the USCENTCOM AOR is one of the most volatile and dangerous regions of the world where U.S. military forces operate, accurate and timely intelligence is essential to ensure the safety of U.S. military personnel conducting their missions. Ofﬁcials at USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT noted that a number of planned terrorist attacks in their AOR were thwarted as a result of accurate and timely intelligence. Both General Franks and Admiral Moore praised the work of the national intelligence agencies with respect to their efforts in providing critical intelligence that allowed successful preventive defensive actions to be taken. The national intelligence community—including the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency—has helped the United States to score notable, but largely unheralded, counterterrorism successes. Unfortunately, despite signiﬁcant efforts, failures to provide tactical warning may occur, as intelligence efforts will rarely result in absolute knowledge of terrorist activities. General Franks noted that intelligence must be “actionable” to be effective. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 19, 2000, General Zinni stated that “Aden never had a speciﬁc terrorist threat. All the other ports that have been mentioned here, that we should have considered as options, have had speciﬁc terrorist threats, and we’ve had to emergency sortie out of them.” However, recent press reports indicate that information on a possible terrorist threat to U.S. Navy ships in Aden was conveyed by the FBI to the Department of Defense in August 1998.

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Much of the U.S. intelligence collection effort is dedicated to signals intelligence (SIGINT), the exploitation of communications. Over the years, modern technology has made communications more difﬁcult to intercept and exploit. Encryption software, devices, and other technologies have become readily available on the open market and have complicated the task of gathering accurate intelligence regarding the terrorist threat. Moreover, terrorists have become more sophisticated in their use of these technologies and more cautious in their communications. In addition to SIGINT, human intelligence (HUMINT) often provides a valuable source of information. Published reports suggest that planning to attack a U.S. Navy warship in Aden may have begun as early as 1997—three years before the attack on the USS Cole was actually carried out. In addition, a previous failed attempt to attack a U.S. Navy vessel remained undiscovered. In retrospect, it is clear that USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT operated with respect to Yemen on the basis of engagement and operational factors without complete and accurate threat information. Moreover, recent press reports indicate that the FBI had access in 1998 to information about a possible terrorist attack against a U.S. Navy vessel in Yemen and that this information was disseminated to several DOD organizations. Nevertheless, engagement activities with Yemen increased, and a bunkering contract to provide for the refueling of U.S. Navy ships was concluded in December 1998.

Analysis It is common knowledge that the intelligence community circulates a large number of intelligence messages daily regarding terrorist threats. This intelligence trafﬁc must be sorted, prioritized, analyzed, and disseminated in a timely manner. At the level of a ship commander, it is impossible to wade through the sheer quantity of raw intelligence reports. Therefore, intelligence analysts must accurately separate the critical from the uncritical and the reliable from the unreliable. This is a key role of intelligence analysis. Source reliability is a key factor in the determination of how seriously to take an intelligence report of a possible terrorist threat. Analysts often disagree on how much credibility to lend to a given source, and this can result in points of dispute between analytical agencies. Nevertheless, these disputes may result in healthy, competitive analysis. In addition, the credibility of threats may also be linked to seemingly unrelated external factors, such as geopolitical developments in the region. In the summer of 2000, the Middle East peace process began to falter. AntiIsraeli and anti-American sentiment among many Arabs in the region increased. In this period of increased regional tension, it was reasonable to expect a higher probability of attacks on U.S. interests in the region. Prudence suggests that intelligence normally considered to be relatively benign with

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respect to threats against U.S. interests should have been viewed by the operational consumers with greater seriousness and urgency than was the case. Both USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT ofﬁcials indicated that more analysis of raw information is needed. Admiral Moore also noted a need for more timely analysis. He indicated that the USS Cole had all the relevant intelligence information, but was not knowledgeable of conﬂicting assessments with respect to source material. In a January 18, 2001 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig noted, “While more than a dozen people participated over eighteen months in a plot against naval ships in Aden, focused intelligence resources in that port amounted to less than a man year, contributing to poor insight about the actual threat.” As a result, he concluded that the commanding ofﬁcer of the USS Cole “did not have full situational awareness.” In his endorsement to the JAGMAN report, Admiral Moore conceded simply, “we did not believe an attack in Yemen would occur.” Committee staff also reviewed the analysis produced by DIA analyst Kie Fallis, who resigned from DIA after the attack on the USS Cole. According to press reports, Mr. Fallis’ analysis suggested that the terrorist threat should have been taken more seriously than it was. Speciﬁc comments on the Fallis analysis are contained in the classiﬁed annex to this report.

Dissemination Overall, the dissemination of threat intelligence reporting was extensive. A low threshold for the dissemination of intelligence information was established, and all intelligence reporting was disseminated appropriately and in a timely manner. Message trafﬁc was relayed as expected. However, some highly classiﬁed message trafﬁc could not be relayed directly to the USS Cole because the ship did not have the equipment to receive sensitive compartmented information, which is not an unusual conﬁguration for a U.S. destroyer on a normal deployment. In addition, selective message trafﬁc from Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, including analyses of intelligence data, was transmitted to the USS Cole before the ship transited the Suez Canal and entered the USCENTCOM AOR. USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT ofﬁcials indicated that the USS Cole had access to all relevant intelligence information. Unfortunately, the massive quantity of nonspeciﬁc intelligence information that was broadly disseminated contributed to an under-appreciation of the seriousness of the terrorist threat. USCENTCOM ofﬁcials in Tampa, Florida, and USNAVCENT ofﬁcials in Manama, Bahrain, indicated they had no concern that the signiﬁcant quantity of raw intelligence reporting being disseminated would lead to “information overload.” However, they acknowledged that a high volume of general intelligence information could have a “numbing effect” on personnel. The low threshold for dissemination of

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intelligence may lead to a blizzard of information that causes some to be dismissed inappropriately. This is not to suggest that the intelligence community should raise its threshold for reporting terrorism information. There is likely no possible set of conditions for establishing a rigid reporting threshold for this type of information, and the intelligence community should, absent such, continue reporting as it has. USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT ofﬁcials indicated that, even with the beneﬁt of 20/20 hindsight, they would have made the same call to refuel the USS Cole in Aden, given the same intelligence information at the time. The determination to refuel in Aden was a policy decision, made with the known lack of speciﬁc information on terrorist cell activities in Yemen. Unfortunately, in this instance, the intelligence community produced no timely tactical warning of the attack. Because an examination of the speciﬁc intelligence information available to USCENTCOM, the U.S. Navy, and the USS Cole, as well as a description of how the intelligence process worked in this instance, necessarily involves a discussion of classiﬁed information, it is not included in this unclassiﬁed report. However, a full discussion of intelligence factors relevant to the attack on the USS Cole appears in the classiﬁed annex to this report.

Key Observations: There was clearly a shortage of intelligence information with respect to the speciﬁc attack on the USS Cole. In spite of the fact that the intelligence community had known of general and ambiguous planning activities for an unspeciﬁed action or actions for some time, the lack of speciﬁc information led to a failure to provide “tactical” warning to the USS Cole. Likewise, there was no speciﬁc information to suggest that the intelligence community could have provided tactical warning to other U.S. Navy ships in Aden. Further, there was no intelligence information about a previous failed attempt to attack a U.S. Navy vessel in the Aden port. There is sufﬁcient evidence to believe that additional HUMINT collection personnel would enable broader coverage of the USCENTCOM AOR and provide an increased antiterrorism collection effort. The intelligence dissemination system worked well, as the threshold for reporting was low. However, the sheer volume of nonspeciﬁc intelligence placed a premium on accurate analysis.

Recommendations: Policy determinations that place U.S. military personnel in harm’s way must not be made without a full understanding that there may be an absence of speciﬁc intelligence to support them. Additional intelligence collection

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personnel and analysts with the proper training are needed to sort through the voluminous supply of raw intelligence and make accurate judgments regarding the credibility of the data. The process for resolving competing analyses within and between intelligence agencies should be strengthened by encouraging alternative analyses. Improved qualitative analysis is also required. A better process is required for ensuring that useful, operationally oriented intelligence is available to ship commanders. The intelligence staffs of the regional commands must be more proactive in pushing the national intelligence community to provide better intelligence support and analysis in areas where existing intelligence collection and analysis is deﬁcient. This should include the operational elements informing the national intelligence community about the fact and timing of deployments so that focused intelligence collection can be undertaken. Intelligence assessments should also be viewed in the context of broader geopolitical developments within the AOR. Greater coordination between Department of Defense ofﬁcials in Washington and theater commanders in USCENTCOM is necessary.

THREAT LEVELS AND THREAT CONDITIONS The system of threat level reporting is designed to provide a simple barometer of terrorist threats to U.S. interests in other countries. The threat levels in various countries are continuously assessed and reassessed based on existing intelligence information. In accordance with Department of Defense Directive 2000.12 on “DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program,” country threat levels are established by DIA and promulgated by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conﬂict (ASD/ SOLIC). The Directive also stipulates that the establishment of country threat levels is supposed to be coordinated with the regional commanders-in-chief in their respective areas of responsibility. Unfortunately, part of the general and prevalent complacency about the threat to U.S. interests in Yemen was the result of confusion brought about by the introduction of a new threat level reporting methodology on October 1, 2000. The change in the threat level reporting methodology was intended to clarify understanding of the threats facing the United States globally. According to a September 29, 2000 DIA report on the new methodology, “Customers of the new methodology should receive a clearer picture of the terrorist threat in a particular country.” In the case of the USS Cole incident, this change may have had the opposite effect. Prior to October 1, 2000, the threat level reporting system classiﬁed countries according to ﬁve categories: Negligible, Low, Medium, High, and Critical. After October 1, 2000, the methodology was streamlined to reﬂect only four categories: Low, Moderate, Signiﬁcant, and High. Under the old methodology, the threat level in Yemen was classiﬁed as “High.” However,

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under the new methodology, the threat level was classiﬁed as “Signiﬁcant,” with “High” representing the highest level of threat. Admiral Moore stated that the commander of the USS Cole may have misinterpreted this revision as signifying a decrease in the threat level in Yemen. This was also a conclusion of the USS Cole Commission, headed by General Crouch and Admiral Gehman. USCENTCOM never concurred with the change in reporting methodology and did not adopt it because of concerns over possible confusion that might result. Although it appears likely that this concern was realized in the case of the USS Cole, ofﬁcials at USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT pointed out that the commander of the USS Cole maintained threat condition (THREATCON) Bravo. At the time of the USS Cole’s visit to Aden, the U.S. embassy in Sana’a, the Yemeni capital, was at a higher threat level than USNAVCENT. This elevated threat level was the result of factors that USCENTCOM ofﬁcials suggested were not relevant to the Navy’s operations in Yemen, for example, the prevalence of street crime and rioting. Because the USS Cole’s visit was a brief stop for fuel and not a port visit involving crew liberty, USCENTCOM ofﬁcials discounted the relevance of the embassy’s higher threat level. The USS Cole was unaware of the different threat level in effect at the U.S. embassy. They were also unaware of the fact that the embassy was closed for security reasons from October 5–8, 2000. Had they been made aware, it is possible that this information might have factored into the USS Cole’s force protection plan. Threat conditions, or THREATCONs, are a measure of the force protection requirements that must be implemented in response to the threat level in a given country. THREATCON Normal reﬂects a routine security posture. THREATCONs increase from Alpha to Delta as the threat of terrorism becomes more pronounced. (The specific unclassified THREATCON measures are included at Appendix C of this report.) Normally, USCENTCOM operates under THREATCON Bravo, a higher threat condition than generally found in other regions of the world where the United States has military forces. Yemen was under THREATCON Charlie until May 2000, when it reverted to THREATCON Bravo. The THREATCON Charlie status was initiated as the result of a threat to U.S. deminers in Yemen, who were removed from the country in response. It was not instituted as a result of any threat against a U.S. naval vessel. By May 2000, USNAVCENT and USCENTCOM determined that there was insufﬁcient intelligence to justify remaining at THREATCON Charlie in Yemen. U.S. naval vessels that had previously made brief stops for refueling in Aden had reported no security problems and at least one after-action report received by USNAVCENT recommended a loosening of security measures for subsequent refueling stops. The reduction in the threat condition from Charlie to Bravo was coordinated with the U.S. embassy in Sana’a and supported by the in-country U.S. Defense Representative at the embassy.

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THREATCON Charlie involves security measures that require increased vigilance and additional personnel standing watch, which can place difﬁcult strains on a crew. It is also usually limited to short periods of time. Since the attack on the USS Cole, all ports in the USCENTCOM AOR have remained at THREATCON Charlie, and will likely remain there for some time to come. However, ofﬁcials at USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT acknowledged that maintaining THREATCON Charlie for too long can lead to a mindset that it is normal, and people can become “numb” to threats. After May 2000, THREATCON Bravo was considered to be the appropriate threat condition for Yemen. Unfortunately, critical waterborne threat security measures that must be implemented under THREATCON Charlie are not required under THREATCON Bravo. Key Observation: Confusion with respect to threat levels could have contributed to a false sense of security and complacency by the commanding ofﬁcer of the USS Cole. Recommendations: Standardization of the system of threat level reporting is essential to avoid confusion regarding the nature and magnitude of the terrorist threat. The sufﬁciency of THREATCON measures to accomplish their intended objectives should be reviewed and revalidated periodically. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS After the bombing of the Khobar Towers compound in 1996, revised antiterrorist security measures were instituted. However, the focus of these enhancements was on hardening land-based installations against terrorist attack. It is conceivable that these improvements played an indirect role in the terrorists’ choice of a U.S. navy vessel as a target. Among the security enhancements instituted after the Khobar Towers bombing was the conduct of vulnerability assessments of U.S. military installations and facilities abroad. After the decision was made to support engagement with Yemen, four vulnerability assessments were conducted in Aden. Two were conducted by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and one by the Coast Guard. The NCIS vulnerability assessments focused on ground-based threats to U.S. deminers in Yemen. They did not consider waterborne threats to U.S. Navy ships. In May 1998, USCENTCOM conducted a vulnerability assessment of the Aden port. This was the only vulnerability assessment of Aden conducted by USCENTCOM, and it occurred more than two years prior to the attack on the USS Cole.

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An unclassiﬁed entry in the USCENTCOM Commander in Chief’s Theater Engagement Plan 1250-01 stated, “USCENTCOM has an active force protection program responsible for vulnerability assessments and site surveys. The assessments will be used as part of the overall theater assessment process and will assist in determining the appropriate level of force protection required for forces conducting engagement activities.” Regrettably, USCENTCOM did not believe it was necessary to conduct additional vulnerability assessments, even though the threat level and threat conditions in Yemen changed. The lack of NCIS personnel assigned in Aden may also have exposed a vulnerability. While there is no way to know whether NCIS personnel on the ground watching the port might have precluded the attack, an NCIS presence would have allowed for a more knowledgeable assessment regarding port security.

Key Observations: Formal vulnerability assessments focused primarily on land-based threats in Yemen. Only one vulnerability assessment of the Aden port was conducted, but that was more than two years prior to the USS Cole attack.

Recommendation: Formal vulnerability assessments should be conducted at regular intervals, and when threat levels within the AOR change.

FORCE PROTECTION USNAVCENT, with headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, prides itself on having the best force protection program in the world. In fact, in April 2000, USNAVCENT was awarded top honors by the Department of Defense for having the “best force protection program anywhere.” Admiral Moore noted that USNAVCENT headquarters enjoys “the best security money can buy.” Yet, again, these measures are primarily oriented toward defending against shore-based attacks. Unfortunately, even the best force protection measures in place at the time did not protect the USS Cole. Extensive training is conducted to familiarize military personnel with force protection measures and procedures. However, there is always concern that additional force protection measures—usually adopted after an unexpected vulnerability is exploited—compromise the military’s ability to execute its missions and leave the armed services “looking backward” rather than “looking forward.”

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This concern was voiced repeatedly at USCENTCOM headquarters and at USNAVCENT. Admiral Moore was particularly strong in expressing his view that the reaction to the attack on the USS Cole in terms of additional force protection measures will leave the United States better defended against a threat that is unlikely to be repeated. The terrorists have successfully attacked a U.S. Navy ship, he noted, arguing that they are planning their next type of attack while the United States military spends time bolstering its defenses against the last type of attack. Force protection, as practiced, is an inherently defensive activity. Both Admiral Moore and General Franks commented that the war against terrorism cannot be won if the United States only plays defense. Implicit in their comments was a recognition that the United States cannot defend against every type of attack, in every place, at every time, and that some offensive activity on the part of the United States is necessary if terrorism is to be defeated. Also implicit in their remarks was an apparent belief that by only playing defense, the U.S. military is being placed in an untenable situation, and that incidents like the attack on the USS Cole are inevitable unless the United States adopts a more aggressive approach toward counterterrorism. Nevertheless, risk is an inherent element in U.S. force deployments. Whether U.S. military deployments are justiﬁed on the basis of a strategy of engagement or a requirement for power projection, risk must be managed effectively and reduced to a minimum wherever possible. Consequently, force protection measures must be thorough and adequate.

The Navy’s Antiterrorism/Force Protection Training Program In general, the U.S. Navy’s antiterrorism and force protection (AT/FP) program is focused almost exclusively on shore-based, rather than waterborne, threats. Until now, terrorist threats to ships were considered to emanate from shore, such as truck bombs on the pier when a ship is docked in port. In the case of the USS Cole, waterborne threats proved to be the Achilles’ heel of the Navy’s counterterrorism program. The Navy’s AT/FP training program is run by U.S. Joint Forces Command. USCENTCOM does not inject itself into the training program. However, USCENTCOM has certain knowledge and experience regarding threats that would make its inputs valuable to U.S. Joint Forces Command in structuring the AT/FP training program. There is no indication anyone in the chain of command suggested a change in the training program to improve capabilities against waterborne terrorist threats. There are few opportunities for formal force protection training to hone the skills of the commissioned ofﬁcer (collateral duty assigned to one of the junior ofﬁcers aboard ship) or the enlisted intelligence specialist responsible for advising the ship commander of the threat. In the case of the USS Cole and

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similar Aegis-class ships, these two personnel, along with the ship’s executive ofﬁcer, are principally responsible for the training of shipboard personnel and, if necessary, implementation of the ship protection plan. They are also responsible for assisting the commander in conducting the required real-time assessment of the speciﬁc threats against his ship. There is no Navy-wide standard core curriculum for force protection unique to Navy vessels. This fact reﬂects the primacy of the domain of the East and West-coast Navy commanders-in-chief. The Force Protection Ofﬁcer course, which lasts ﬁve days, addresses the development of ship protection plans. However, the training focuses on shore installation protection and does not teach perimeter security (pier, water, or air), or the skills needed to execute the ship protection plans. An additional training program for shipboard security personnel (the Shipboard Security Engagement Tactics Course) trains them to locate and neutralize intruders, protect vital ship areas, and recover hostages. It does not address threat analysis, external threats, or perimeter security. Law of the Sea training is also part of the pre-deployment training that each ship undergoes, with written certiﬁcation that the training was conducted. Training of ship personnel with respect to the use of deadly force is also considered an essential part of the ship protection measures. The ofﬁcial U.S. Navy policy in this regard is that members of the ship’s self-defense force (SSDF) and all armed watch standers should receive pre-deployment and on-deployment refresher briefs, as well as tailored scenario training relative to the use of deadly force. The Navy traditionally leaves weapons release authority to the commanding ofﬁcer, or it may be delegated to another senior ofﬁcer. However, even if the watch sentries on board the USS Cole had recognized a threat from the small boat that approached the ship, they may not have been able to engage it without ﬁrst obtaining authorization from the commander or another ofﬁcer.

Force Protection Measures and the Rules of Engagement The Navy operates under multiple force protection standards: the Navy has developed its own baseline force protection standards and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have developed another set of more stringent measures. Navy operations are inconsistent in the force protection standards used. For example, the Navy’s Sixth Fleet operates under the Navy baseline force protection measures, while the Fifth Fleet operates under the JCS measures. The USS Cole was transitioning from the Sixth Fleet to the Fifth Fleet and operating under the JCS guidelines. According to DOD Directive 2000.12 on antiterrorism and force protection, the USCENTCOM Commander in Chief has the responsibility to “assess and review the AT/FP programs of all CINC-assigned military forces and/or activities in the AOR.” USNAVCENT conducted a review of force protection

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programs in the summer of 2000. USCENTCOM indicated that the CINC review progress is an ongoing one, with programs reviewed on an annual basis. It is not a formal review process, and is conducted by “exception,” meaning that the force protection procedures remain unchanged unless an issue is raised that requires reexamination. While in port, or during a refueling stop, U.S. Navy ships require various services, for example, trash removal. These services are generally provided by a local “husbanding agent.” The contracting procedures for selecting a husbanding agent primarily emphasize cost considerations. Security is not an element in selecting a husbanding agent. Background checks are not required in the contracting process and are generally not requested by the United States. This raises signiﬁcant issues with respect to security and force protection for U.S. Navy ships during port visits. Admiral Moore expressed frustration at the fact that he has no role in the selection of husbanding agents, as this is strictly a Navy contracting activity. Nevertheless, he suggested that allowing USNAVCENT to select the husbanding agent, based on host country considerations that would not necessarily be part of the evaluation process, would make the host country a “partner” in providing protection to U.S. Navy ships. Under THREATCON Bravo, 62 speciﬁc force protection measures are required to be implemented by the commanders of U.S. Navy ships (see Appendix C). Each successive threat condition requires implementation of all force protection measures under lower threat conditions and imposes additional measures to be adopted. In accordance with the Navy’s standard operating procedure, the commanding ofﬁcer of the USS Cole ﬁled a force protection plan with USNAVCENT prior to transiting the Suez Canal, indicating that he would implement all 62 THREATCON Bravo measures during the brief stop for refueling at Aden. Despite this assurance, the USS Cole did not implement a number of force protection measures that might have had a bearing on the ability of the attackers to conduct the attack. The Navy Judge Advocate General Manual (QAGMAN) investigation found that roughly half of the 62 THREATCON Bravo measures were not implemented by the USS Cole. For example, THREATCON Bravo requires that the ship commander coordinate security arrangements for the ship’s visit with the local husbanding agent. The commander of the USS Cole did not do so. In addition, THREATCON Bravo measures require that small unauthorized boats be kept away from the ship. However, no waterborne security measures were required, and none were implemented. Despite this signiﬁcant security lapse, neither General Franks nor Admiral Moore suggested that the implementation of all 62 force protection measures would have prevented the attack. It is conceivable, though unprovable, that some of the measures not implemented could have either prevented the attack or mitigated its consequences. The operations order issued by USNAVCENT establishing threat condition procedures for ships in the USCENTCOM AOR indicated that the ship

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commander “must maintain ﬂexibility” in determining the appropriate force protection measures. Nevertheless, that ﬂexibility does not allow for failing to implement speciﬁc THREATCON measures that the ship commander agrees to take in the force protection plan ﬁled and approved by USNAVCENT. As Admiral Moore noted, ship commanders, in exercising ﬂexibility, will generally take the minimum force protection measures stipulated by the existing threat condition and add to them. However, this does not appear to have been the case with the USS Cole. According to USNAVCENT’s operations order, implementation of appropriate THREATCON measures serves two purposes: “First, the crew is alerted, additional watches are created, and there is greater security. Second, these measures display the ship’s resolve to prepare for and counter the terrorist threat. These actions will convey to anyone observing the ship’s activities that the ship is prepared, the ship is an undesirable target, and the terrorist(s) should look elsewhere for a vulnerable target.” A July 21, 2000, message from the commander of the George Washington Battle Group disseminating force protection guidance to ships in the Fifth Fleet AOR noted: “The potential for our ships and personnel to become targets for terrorist groups signiﬁcantly increases while in port/ashore in the gulf. No port should be considered completely safe. To help prevent terrorist attacks against personnel, ships, and aircraft, commanders must make force protection a top priority and an integral part of the planning process.” USNAVCENT’s operations order explicitly acknowledged the possibility of waterborne attack, even under THREATCON Alpha. Speciﬁcally, Measure 18 noted, “Water taxis, ferries, bum boats, and other harbor craft require special concern because they can serve as an ideal platform for terrorists.” In light of this, Measure 18 stated, “Unauthorized craft should be kept away from the ship.” THREATCON Bravo required the USS Cole to “implement measures to keep unauthorized craft away from the ship” and to “coordinate with host nation/local port authority, husbanding agent as necessary, and request their assistance in controlling unauthorized craft.” The JAGMAN investigation found that the USS Cole “waived” 19 speciﬁc force protection measures and “failed to accomplish” 12 others. THREATCON Bravo did not require the establishment of a small boat exclusion zone around the ship, nor did it mandate the presence of “picket boats” around the ship to provide a cordon that could be used to keep unauthorized boats away from the ship. It did require the commander to make “random” picket boat patrols in the immediate vicinity of the ship only “if the situation warrants.” Unfortunately, picket boats were not used in this instance, and could not have been used once the ship was tied up, because the position of the USS Cole against the fueling dolphin placed the picket boats up above the dolphin. Therefore, they could not be lowered into the water. However, they could have been launched prior to mooring. In reality,

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USNAVCENT considered the location of the fueling dolphin away from the Aden pier to be a force protection beneﬁt that would reduce the risk of terrorist attack. USNAVCENT guidance on the use of force explicitly noted that a ship commander has “the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in self defense.” However, the USNAVCENT rules of engagement (ROE) were also clear that “commanding ofﬁcers...should avoid actions that may be interpreted as provocative or inimical by host country authorities.” Moreover, the ROE noted that “‘warning shots’ are inherently dangerous, and will not be used.” The USNAVCENT rules of engagement allowed the use of deadly force to defend against hostile acts or hostile intent. Unfortunately, because the small boat did not maneuver in a threatening manner and demonstrated no clear hostile intent against the ship, the presumption was that it was involved in support activities for the refueling stop and, therefore, not a threat to the USS Cole. The determination of what constitutes hostile intent is ambiguous in certain circumstances, and the USNAVCENT ROE do not provide clarifying guidance. The “Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces,” prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, does deﬁne “hostile intent.” However, that deﬁnition does not cover the speciﬁc situation in which the USS Cole found itself. Because the commander of the USS Cole stated his intention to implement all 62 force protection measures, USCENTCOM presumed the ship was sufﬁciently equipped to implement them. None of the previous U.S. Navy ships stopping at Aden for refueling indicated that they lacked the resources to implement required threat condition force protection measures. In addition, some ships requested and received approval for deviations to the required THREATCON measures. Under customary international law, the host nation assumes responsibility for the security of visiting naval vessels. Nevertheless, the United States has never relied solely on host nations to provide security for U.S. ships, and the force protection guidelines have been developed to allow a commanding ofﬁcer to take whatever actions are necessary to defend his ship or crew. The commanding ofﬁcer of the USS Cole did not request assistance from Yemeni ofﬁcials in providing security for the ship while it was in Aden. Some of the force protection measures the USS Cole was supposed to implement required host country coordination. In his endorsement to the JAGMAN report, Admiral Clark noted that permission to implement certain measures, such as the use of force, must be obtained from the host country, and that “[t]here was no special authority for visiting U.S. ships to Aden to use such force.” According to USCENTCOM, only 45 of the 62 THREATCON Bravo measures could be implemented without host nation coordination. Although USNAVCENT believes that the Yemeni government was aware, in a general sense, that the USS Cole’s commanding ofﬁcer would take whatever

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action was necessary to protect his ship and crew, the Yemeni government was unaware of the speciﬁc force protection guidance developed for various threat conditions. Until the attack on the USS Cole, security at the Aden harbor was considered to be sufﬁcient. The Aden port had also been used by ships of other nations without incident. Not a single U.S. Navy ship complained about lax security at Aden during the previous 24 ship visits beginning in February 1999 that took place under the December 1998 bunkering contract. In fact, at least one after-action report ﬁled by the commanding ofﬁcer of a U.S. Navy ship that had stopped to refuel in Aden recommended a relaxation of the THREATCON Charlie security measures that were in effect at the time.

Key Observations: The antiterrorism/force protection program of the U.S. Navy trains sailors primarily to deal with terrorist threats emanating from land. There is little focus in the training program on waterborne threats. Although the host nation is responsible for port security under customary international law during the visit of foreign vessels, the U.S. Navy has never relied exclusively on host country security procedures. The commanding ofﬁcer of the USS Cole indicated his intention to implement all 62 force protection measures required under THREATCON Bravo. However, he failed to do this. In addition, there was ambiguity in the determination of hostile intent under the rules of engagement. The lack of any security problems during previous U.S. Navy ship visits to Aden may have resulted in a sense of complacency regarding the threat that might face the USS Cole. Moreover, there are different force protection standards used by various Navy commands. Other security shortfalls have been identiﬁed with respect to U.S. Navy host country contracting activities. The selection of husbanding agents is performed by a contracting agency outside the purview of the CINC’s component commanders.

Recommendations: In the wake of the USS Cole attack, the threat of waterborne attack must receive more attention as part of the Navy’s AT/FP training program. A baseline assessment of port security in the USCENTCOM AOR should be conducted. There should be a single force protection standard for all U.S. Navy ships, and it should be the more stringent standard developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, augmented, as appropriate, by the geographic CINCs. Additional force protection measures are required for port visits and brief stops for fuel, and should include measures that provide for adequate ship standoff distances and the inspection of small boats. The regional

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commanders-in-chief must enlist the support of host countries in providing security for U.S. Navy vessels while in foreign ports, where appropriate. Necessary agreements with host countries regarding rules of engagement and the implementation of required THREATCON measures must be worked out in advance of any port visit or refueling stop. The rules of engagement should be reviewed with the objective of clarifying procedures and addressing the issue of hostile intent. Additional security measures are required with respect to contracting for local port services. Component commanders should also be involved in the contracting process.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES After the attack on the USS Cole, the questions raised most often with USNAVCENT were “Why Aden? What were we doing there?” Admiral Moore stated that he was “ﬂabbergasted” by such questions, noting that the engagement plan regarding Yemen was fully coordinated and approved by superiors. He forcefully articulated his view that refueling in Aden made good sense from an operational perspective. In April 1997, the U.S. resumed port visits to Aden after a suspension of several decades. Three visits occurred prior to the negotiation of a bunkering contract in December 1998. As explained in an unclassiﬁed entry in a September 8, 1999 NCIS classiﬁed threat assessment, “In 1999, Aden became the site for the primary U.S. Navy bunkering contract in the Horn of Africa, replacing Djibouti. Ships visiting Aden will now be able to refuel at one of two fueling ‘dolphins’ located near the mouth of the harbor. The dolphins will allow U.S. naval vessels to enter Aden and refuel without having to go pierside.” Under current U.S. Navy guidelines, the USS Cole was required to refuel when its fuel stocks were depleted to a certain level. Exceptions to this general rule must be authorized. The reasoning behind this requirement is to ensure that Navy vessels are able to fulﬁll operational requirements on short notice. In the case of the USS Cole, the ship was transiting from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf. At that time, events in the Gulf raised concerns that Iraq was mobilizing forces for a possible military action. The USS Cole was en route to the Gulf in order to participate in any possible U.S. contingency action that might be required in response to Iraqi actions. Reductions in force structure over the years have left the Navy with signiﬁcantly diminished assets. Most single-ship transits are required by operational demands that cannot be satisﬁed with the existing number of assets. A key reason the USS Cole was conducting a single-ship transit from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf was because it provided capabilities the Navy needed for contingency planning in the region, and there were no other Navy assets available at the time that could be positioned in as timely a

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manner. Unfortunately, the reduction in force structure, coupled with an increase in the operational demands on the service, has left the Navy facing serious strains in its ability to execute its required missions. In addition, single-ship transits expose ships to greater vulnerability than when they travel as part of a carrier battle group. This was a key conclusion of the USS Cole Commission report, which noted that “in-transit units… are particularly reliant upon non-organic support (dispersed throughout the organization) to combat terrorism.” The USS Cole was steaming at a transit speed of approximately 25 knots in order to arrive on station in time to meet potential operational objectives. The USS Cole’s fuel reserves had been signiﬁcantly reduced when it reached Yemen. USNAVCENT considered Yemen a “perfect place” to refuel because of its location roughly halfway between the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf. In addition, Aden had existing infrastructure to support refueling operations. Unfortunately, the perceived operational desirability of refueling in Aden may have contributed to an inadequate consideration of appropriate force protection and security measures. From an operational standpoint, refueling at sea has signiﬁcant advantages over refueling in port. For example, environmental considerations are less onerous at sea. Fuel spillage creates less of an environmental problem at sea than it does in port. To avoid possible spillage, ships are refueled in port only to approximately 85 percent of fuel capacity. At sea, the refueling capacity is closer to 95 percent. Refueling is also faster at sea than in port. Finally, time and training advantages make at-sea refueling a preferable option to in-port refueling. The U.S. Navy lacks sufﬁcient assets to make at-sea refueling a credible option in all circumstances. The number of oilers and other combatants in the active inventory has decreased in recent years. Therefore, sending a tanker to meet a single ship was considered “inefﬁcient.” Nevertheless, the Navy’s operational preference is to refuel at sea. The reduction in the number of oilers, combatants, and weapons available for theater use may have led to operational decisions that contributed to the USS Cole’s vulnerability. The USS Cole was transiting as a single ship to join the Fifth Fleet and provide a weapons platform capability needed to support possible contingency operations. In the past, when the Navy ﬂeet was significantly larger, such single-ship transfers were unnecessary. Moreover, the replenishment of Navy ships was mostly accomplished at sea, as they traveled in battle groups. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Persian Gulf War led to a decline in Navy force structure. This, coupled with USCENTCOM’s need to maintain certain force level requirements in the AOR, resulted in an increase in the number of single-ship transits. The availability of additional oilers may have made it possible to position assets in the area to accommodate all refueling requirements in the USCENTCOM AOR. With current assets

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and the existing demands, it is impractical to consistently provide oiler support for replenishment of single-ship operations. The relative beneﬁts of refueling in port are limited to support of the engagement strategy, providing shore leave for the crew, and conducting maintenance operations. However, few actual port visits in Aden involving crew liberty were authorized. Brief stops for fuel do not constitute port visits because they do not provide for crew liberty. In fact, USNAVCENT supported liberty visits in Aden. In at least one instance, the U.S. Ambassador in Yemen did not. Consequently, most stops in Aden were brief refueling stops only. Therefore, there was no particular crew beneﬁt to refueling in Yemen, other than to “show the ﬂag” as part of the broader U.S. engagement strategy. While refueling in Aden solved an operational problem for the Navy, it was a problem that could have been addressed by other means.

Key Observations: It is generally preferable to conduct refueling operations at sea rather than in foreign ports for a variety of operational reasons. However, the Navy has insufﬁcient at-sea refueling assets to support single-ship transits on a regular basis. Moreover, the need for single-ship transits has increased as a result of the decline in Navy force structure and the need to maintain certain force level requirements in the USCENTCOM AOR.

Recommendations: The U.S. Navy should reassess the desirability and practicality of port visits and refueling stops in regions where high threat levels exist. Alternative procedures for refueling Navy ships at sea should be developed. Crew liberty should not be an option in high threat areas, particularly those in the USCENTCOM AOR. Increases to the Navy’s force structure are necessary to limit the requirement for single-ship transits. USCENTCOM is the only geographic, or regional, command with its headquarters located in the continental United States and not in its own area of responsibility. In addition, all of USCENTCOM’s component commands are based in the United States, with the exception of USNAVCENT. This has implications for the conduct of operations in the USCENTCOM AOR. In the case of the attack on the USS Cole, USCENTCOM’s distance from the theater of operations probably was not a signiﬁcant factor with respect to the ability of the attackers to carry out the attack or the ability of the United States to prevent it. USNAVCENT, with headquarters in Bahrain, is USCENTCOM’s “operational functionary” in the AOR. While acknowledging beneﬁts and liabilities to having the USCENTCOM headquartered in Tampa, General Franks

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indicated that the normal chain of command would still apply regardless of the physical location of USCENTCOM headquarters. Although USCENTCOM contends that there is no split command or confusion as to who is in charge of operational and security considerations within the AOR, USCENTCOM, the Department of the Navy, and various other Department of Defense components have different responsibilities in support of Navy requirements and operations in the region. For example, refueling arrangements with host countries are made by USCENTCOM through the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC), but the Department of the Navy, through the Navy Regional Contracting Center (NRCC), makes contracting arrangements with local husbanding agents, based on standard contracting procedures that emphasize cost and value considerations and ignore security issues. The NRCC coordinates with USNAVCENT, but the USNAVCENT commander has no role in the process of selecting a husbanding agent. Appropriate threat levels for each country are determined by the Defense Intelligence Agency and promulgated by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conﬂict (ASD/SOLIC). However, USCENTCOM also sets its own threat levels in the AOR that occasionally differ from those established by DIA and ASD(SOLIC). In the case of the USS Cole, a decision by ASD(SOLIC) to modify the threat level reporting system at the beginning of October 2000 was not agreed to by USCENTCOM, which continued to operate under the former reporting system. This apparently resulted in confusion in the mind of the commanding ofﬁcer on the USS Cole with respect to the level of threat in Yemen. These are issues that need to be addressed. The location of USCENTCOM headquarters in the United States results in a “tyranny of distance” that affects USCENTCOM’s ability to communicate effectively in a timely manner with its component commands. There is an eight hour time difference between the east coast of the United States and Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. Although the daily dialogue between headquarters staff and component commanders would be easier if headquarters were located in the AOR, it is unlikely that, in the case of the USS Cole incident, additional information would have been passed that would have prevented the attack. USCENTCOM headquarters has appropriate ties to the U.S. national intelligence community. Representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Air Force Ofﬁce of Special Investigations, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service are on the staff at USCENTCOM headquarters. This arrangement provides for a relatively seamless ﬂow of information. In the aftermath of the Khobar Towers attack in 1996, DOD Directive 2000.12, “DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program,” was promulgated. This Directive establishes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as “the principal advisor and focal point to the Secretary of Defense” for all DOD antiterrorism and force protection issues. It also deﬁnes the responsibilities of the military departments, commanders of the Combatant

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Commands (CINCs), and Defense Agencies for DOD activities in their respective organizations. DOD Directive 2000.12 prescribes a policy that specifies that the geographic CINCs force protection policies take precedence over all force protection policies or programs of any DOD component deployed in that command’s AOR and not under the security responsibility of the Department of State. It states that “the CINC or a designated representative (for example, a component commander or joint Task Force commander) shall delineate the force protection measures for all DOD personnel not under the responsibility of the Department of State.” The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for reviewing Service doctrine and CINC, Service, and Defense Agency standards, and is tasked with reviewing, coordinating, and overseeing the AT/FP training for all DOD personnel. In addition, the CJCS must “assess the implementation of threat conditions (THREATCONs) for uniform implementation and dissemination. The geographic CINCs exercise tactical control (for force protection) over “all DOD personnel assigned to, temporarily assigned to, transiting through, or training in the CINC’s AOR.” This provision authorizes the CINC “to change, modify, prescribe, and enforce force protection measures for covered forces.” The CINCs also serve as “the DOD point of contact with hostnation ofﬁcials on matters involving AT/FP policies and measures.” In addition, no system was evident for review of the adequacy or relevancy of the prescribed force protection measures.

Key Observations: USCENTCOM operations are impacted by its headquarters’ physical location outside the AOR. The “tyranny of distance” has an effect on the ability to communicate effectively between headquarters and the component commands. However, it does not appear that this was a factor in the USS Cole attack. In addition, no system was evident for review of the adequacy or relevance of the prescribed force protection measures.

Recommendations: The operational impact of basing USCENTCOM headquarters in the continental United States instead of in the AOR should be reviewed. Responsibilities for support of U.S. Navy visits to foreign ports, including for refueling stops, should be centralized, with the regional commander in chief having overall responsibility for coordination of support activities. The execution of DOD responsibilities under force protection directive 2000.12 should be evaluated, along with procedures for evaluating the adequacy of force protection measures.

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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The U.S. Policy of Engagement Key Observations: U.S. national security strategy called for engagement with Yemen. USCENTCOM and USNAVCENT implemented this strategy through port visits and brief refueling stops, among other initiatives. Yemen was seen as “win-win”—it solved an operational need and met U.S. engagement policy guidance at the same time. However, the desire for engagement with Yemen outpaced an understanding of the terrorist threat in that country, increasing the risk to U.S. military personnel. The requirement for engagement with Yemen led to an increase in the number of U.S. Navy ships refueling there. Changing geopolitical conditions in the AOR should have led to a more critical reassessment of U.S. vulnerabilities and engagement plans for Yemen, but they did not.

Recommendations: A policy of engagement must be pursued cautiously in areas where the potential for terrorism is high. The balance between the desire for engagement and the assumption of risk must be recalibrated to place increasing emphasis on force protection requirements. Implementation of the TEP should be reviewed and adjusted in accordance with changing geopolitical factors in the AOR.

Intelligence Key Observations: There was clearly a shortage of intelligence information with respect to the speciﬁc attack on the USS Cole. In spite of the fact that the intelligence community had known of general and ambiguous planning activities for an unspeciﬁed action or actions for some time, the lack of speciﬁc information led to a failure to provide “tactical” warning to the USS Cole. Likewise, there was no speciﬁc information to suggest that the intelligence community could have provided tactical warning to other U.S. Navy ships in Aden. Further, there was no intelligence information about a previous failed attempt to attack a U.S. Navy vessel in the Aden port. There is sufﬁcient evidence to believe that additional HUMINT collection personnel would enable broader coverage of the USCENTCOM AOR and provide an increased antiterrorism

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collection effort. The intelligence dissemination system worked well, as the threshold for reporting was low. However, the sheer volume of nonspeciﬁc intelligence placed a premium on accurate analysis.

Recommendations: Policy determinations that place U.S. military personnel in harm’s way must not be made without a full understanding that there may be an absence of speciﬁc intelligence to support them. Additional intelligence collection personnel and analysts with the proper training are needed to sort through the voluminous supply of raw intelligence and make accurate judgments regarding the credibility of the data. The process for resolving competing analyses within and between intelligence agencies should be strengthened by encouraging alternative analyses. Improved qualitative analysis is also required. A better process is required for ensuring that useful, operationally oriented intelligence is available to ship commanders. The intelligence staffs of the regional commands must be more proactive in pushing the national intelligence community to provide better intelligence support and analysis in areas where existing intelligence collection and analysis is deﬁcient. This should include the operational elements informing the national intelligence community about the fact and timing of deployments so that focused intelligence collection can be undertaken. Intelligence assessments should also be in the context of broader geopolitical developments within the AOR. Greater coordination between Department of Defense ofﬁcials in Washington and theater commanders in USCENTCOM is necessary.

Threat Levels and Threat Conditions Key Observation: Confusion with respect to threat levels could have contributed to a false sense of security and complacency by the commanding ofﬁcer of the USS Cole.

Recommendations: Standardization of the system of threat level reporting is essential to avoid confusion regarding the nature and magnitude of the terrorist threat. The sufﬁciency of THREATCON measures to accomplish their intended objectives should be reviewed and revalidated periodically.

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Vulnerability Assessments Key Observations: Formal vulnerability assessments focused primarily on land-based threats in Yemen. Only one vulnerability assessment of the Aden port was conducted, but that was more than two years prior to the USS Cole attack.

Recommendation: Formal vulnerability assessments should be conducted at regular intervals, and when threat levels within the AOR change.

Force Protection Key Observations: The antiterrorism/force protection program of the U.S. Navy trains sailors primarily to deal with terrorist threats emanating from land. There is little focus in the training program on waterborne threats. Although the host nation is responsible for port security under customary international law during the visit of foreign vessels, the U.S. Navy has never relied exclusively on host country security procedures. The commanding ofﬁcer of the USS Cole indicated his intention to implement all 62 force protection measures required under THREATCON Bravo. However, he failed to do this. In addition, there was ambiguity in the determination of hostile intent under the rules of engagement. The lack of any security problems during previous U.S. Navy ship visits to Aden may have resulted in a sense of complacency regarding the threat that might face the USS Cole. Moreover, there are different force protection standards used by various Navy commands. Other security shortfalls have been identiﬁed with respect to U.S. Navy host country contracting activities. The selection of husbanding agents is performed by a contracting agency outside the purview of the CINC’s component commanders.

Recommendations: In the wake of the USS Cole attack, the threat of waterborne attack must receive more attention as part of the Navy’s AT/FP training program. A baseline assessment of port security in the USCENTCOM AOR should be conducted. There should be a single force protection standard for all U.S. Navy ships, and it should be the more stringent standard developed by the Joint

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Chiefs of Staff, augmented, as appropriate, by the geographic CINCs. Additional force protection measures are required for port visits and brief stops for fuel, and should include measures that provide for adequate ship standoff distances and the inspection of small boats. The regional commanders in chief must enlist the support of host countries in providing security for U.S. Navy vessels while in foreign ports, where appropriate. Necessary agreements with host countries regarding rules of engagement and the implementation of required THREATCON measures must be worked out in advance of any port visit or refueling stop. The rules of engagement should be reviewed with the objective of clarifying procedures and addressing the issue of hostile intent. Additional security measures are required with respect to contracting for local port services. Component commanders should also be involved in the contracting process.

Operational Issues Key Observations: It is generally preferable to conduct refueling operations at sea rather than in foreign ports for a variety of operational reasons. However, the Navy has insufﬁcient at-sea refueling assets to support single-ship transits on a regular basis. Moreover, the need for single-ship transits has increased as a result of the decline in Navy force structure and the need to maintain certain force level requirements in the USCENTCOM AOR.

Recommendations: The U.S. Navy should reassess the desirability and practicality of port visits and refueling stops in regions where high threat levels exist. Alternative procedures for refueling Navy ships at sea should be developed. Crew liberty should not be an option in high threat areas, particularly those in the USCENTCOM AOR. Increases to the Navy’s force structure are necessary to limit the requirement for single-ship transits.

Organizational Issues Key Observations: USCENTCOM operations are impacted by its headquarters’ physical location outside the AOR. The “tyranny of distance” has an effect on the ability to communicate effectively between headquarters and the component

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commands. However, it does not appear that this was a factor in the USS Cole attack. In addition, no system was evident for review of the adequacy or relevancy of the prescribed force protection measures. Recommendations: The operational impact of basing USCENTCOM headquarters in the continental United States instead of in the AOR should be reviewed. Responsibilities for support of U.S. Navy visits to foreign ports, including for refueling stops, should be centralized, with the regional commander in chief having overall responsibility for coordination of support activities. The execution of DOD responsibilities under force protection directive 2000.12 should be evaluated, along with procedures for evaluating the adequacy of force protection measures. APPENDIX B: LIST OF BRIEFINGS AND INTERVIEWS Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic Norfolk, Virginia November 15, 2000

Commander Frank Pandolfe, Commanding Ofﬁcer, USS Mitcliner (sister ship to Cole) Captain Trif Rigas, Atlantic Fleet, Force Protection (N34) Captain Jim Landay, Director, DDG-51 In Service Engineering Rear Admiral Lindell Rutherford, Atlantic Fleet, Operations/Strategy/Policy/ Training (N3/5/7) Captain Ralph Richard, Atlantic Fleet, Operations/Strategy/Policy/Training (N3/5/7) Captain Gerrald Becker, Atlantic Fleet, Current Ops Captain Ned Herbert, Executive Ofﬁcer, Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic Mr. Al Johnson, Director of Curriculum, Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (U.S. Fifth Fleet Headquarters) Manama, Bahrain December 4–8, 2000

Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore, Jr., Commander, USNAVCENT/US Fifth Fleet Captain Van Mauney, Chief of Staff

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Captain Kurt Tidd, Assistant Chief of Staff, Directorate of Naval Operations (N-3) Commander Samuel Cox, Assistant Chief of Staff, Directorate of Naval Intelligence (N-2) Captain Julius Gostel, Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, Directorate of Naval Operations (Logistics) (N-4) Captain Richard Kikla, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy, Directorate of Naval Operations (Policy) (N-5) Captain Greg Steele, Commanding Ofﬁcer, Naval Support Activity Bahrain Colonel Gary Supnick, Force Marine Ofﬁcer/Force Protection Ofﬁcer Commander Carlton Cramer, Special Assistant, Judge Advocate General Special Agent James Lindner, OIC, Naval Criminal Investigative Service Lieutenant Colonel Scott Deacon, Joint Intelligence Support Element Colonel Larry Grundhauser, Directorate of Intelligence (J-2), Joint Task ForceSouthwest Asia

U.S. Central Command Headquarters, Tampa, Florida December 18, 2000

General Tommy R. Franks, USA, Commander in Chief, USCENTCOM Lieutenant General Michael P. DeLong, USMC, Deputy Commander in Chief, USCENTCOM Major Scott Berrier, Directorate of Intelligence (J-2) Lieutenant Colonel Bud Rasmussen, Policy Division, Directorate of Plans and Policy Captain Jack Dorsett, Commander, Joint Intelligence Center Colonel Joseph Schott, Joint Security Directorate Lieutenant Colonel John Sarver, Directorate of Logistics and Security Assistance Captain Shelly Young, Staff Judge Advocate

Otliers Present: Rear Admiral Jay A. Campbell, USN, Director of Plans and Policy (CCJ5) Major General Dennis K. Jackson, USA, Director of Logistics and Security Assistance (CCJ4/7) Colonel Stanley G. Silverman, CCDJ2 Colonel Dario Compain, CCDJS Colonel Richard R. Perez, CCDJ6 Rear Admiral George E. Mayer, USN, Deputy Director of Operations (CCDJ3) Colonel James W. Danley, CCDJ1 Colonel Brian P. Hoey, USAF, Director of Public Affairs (CCPA)

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Washington, D.C. Brieﬁngs October 2000–January 2001

Captain Tony Kouthron, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, Chief of Targeting Mr. Ron Brunson, Head, Anti-Terrorism Alert Center, Naval Criminal Investigative Service Mr. Richard E. Sunday, Ofﬁce of Congressional Affairs, National Security Agency Ms. Mary Jo Coyner, National Security Agency Mr. Kie C. Fallis, Former Analyst, Defense Intelligence Agency Admiral J. Cutler Dawsen, Chief, Ofﬁce of Legislative Affairs, Department of the Navy

APPENDIX C: THREAT CONDITION (THREATCON) MEASURES Tab B to Appendix I of Annex M Moo Qeord 9sq1 Shipboard Threatcon Measures Shipboard Terrorist THREATCON Measures: The measures outlined below are for use aboard U.S. Naval vessels (combatant and non-combatant) in the CENTCOM/NAVCENT area of responsibility (AOR) and serve two purposes. First; the crew is alerted, additional watches are created, and there is greater security. Second, these measures display the ship’s resolve to prepare for and counter the terrorist threat. These actions will convey to anyone observing the ship’s activities that the ship is prepared, the ship is an undesirable target, and the terrorists should look elsewhere for a vulnerable target. The measures outlined below do not account for local conditions and regulations, or current threat intelligence; the ship’s command must maintain ﬂexibility. As threat conditions change, the ship’s crew must be prepared [to] take actions to counter the threat. When necessary, additional measures must be taken immediately. The simple solution to THREATCON CHARLIE or DELTA is to get under way, but this option may not always be available. Speciﬁc non-combatant shipboard THREATCON Measures are identiﬁed as: Measure Number (MSC). A.

THREATCON ALPHA: This condition is declared when a general threat of possible terrorist activity is directed toward installations, vessels, and personnel, the nature and event of which are unpredictable, and where circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON Bravo measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain selected measures from THREATCON BRAVO as a result of intelligence

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received or as a deterrent—the measures in this threat condition must be capable of being maintained indeﬁnitely. (1) Measure 1. Brief crew on time for speciﬁc threat, the security/force protection plan, and security precautions to be taken while ashore. Ensure all hands are knowledgeable of various THREATCON requirements and that they understand their role in implementation of measures. Remind all personnel to be suspicious and inquisitive of strangers, be alert for abandoned parcels or suitcases and for unattended vehicles in the vicinity, report unusual activities to the OOD. (2) Measure 2. Muster and brief sea personnel on the threat and rules of engagement. (3) Measure 3. Reveal security plans and keep them available. Retain key personnel who may be needed to implement security measures on call. (4) Measure 4. Secure and periodically inspect spaces not in use. (5) Measure 5. Consistent with local rules, regulations, and status of forces agreement, post qualiﬁed armed fantail sentry and forecastle sentry. Riﬂes are the preferred weapon. (6) Measure 6. Consistent with local rules, regulations, and sofa, post qualiﬁed, armed pier sentry and pier entrance sentry. (7) Measure 7. Ensure sentries, roving patrols, response force, and the quarterdeck watch have the ability to communicate. If practical, all guards will be equipped with at least two systems of communication (e.g., two-way radio, telephone, whistle, or signal light). (8) Measure 8. If available, issue night vision devices to selected posted security personnel. (9) Measure 9. Review pier and shipboard access control procedures. (10) Measure 10. Coordinate pier and ﬂeet landing security with collocated forces and local authorities. Identify anticipated needs for mutual support (security personnel, boats, and equipment), and deﬁne methods of activation and communication. (11) Measure 11. Tighten shipboard and pier access control procedures. Positively identify all personnel entering pier and ﬂeet landing area—no exceptions. (12) Measure: 12. Consistent with local rules, regulations, and sofa, establish unloading zone(s) on the pier away from the ship. (13) Measure 13. Deploy barriers to keep vehicles away from the ship. Barriers may be ship’s vehicles, equipment, port-provided barrier systems, marine containers, or items available locally. Consistent with local conditions, 400 ft standoff from the ship is preferred. (14) Measure 14. Post signs in local language(s) to explain visiting and loitering restrictions. (15) Measure 15. Inspect all vehicles entering pier and check for unauthorized personnel, weapons, and/or explosives.

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(16) Measure 16. Inspect all personnel, hand-carried items, [and] packages before allowing them on board. Where available, use baggage scanners and walk-through or hand-held metal detectors to screen packages and personnel prior to boarding the ship. (17) Measure 17. Direct departing and arriving liberty boats to make a security tour around the ship and give special attention to the waterline and hull. Boats must be identiﬁable night and day to ship’s personnel. (18) Measure 18. Water taxis, ferries, bum boats, and other harbor craft require special concern because they can serve as an ideal platform for terrorists. Unauthorized craft should be kept away from the ship; authorized craft should be carefully controlled, surveilled, and covered. Inspect authorized watercraft daily. (19) Measure 19. Identify and inspect workboats. (20) Measure 20. Secure ships not in use. (21) Measure 21. Regulate shipboard lighting to best meet the threat environment. Lighting should include illumination of the waterline. (22) Measure 22. Rig hosepipe covers and rat guards on all lines, cable, and hoses. Consider using an anchor collar. (23) Measure 23. Raise accommodation ladders, stern gates, jacob ladders, etc., when not in use. Clear ship of all unnecessary stages, camels, barges, oil donuts, and lines. (24) Measure 24. Conduct security drills, [including] bomb threat and [boarder-repelling] exercises. (25) Measure 25. Review individual actions in THREATCON Bravo for possible implementation. B.

THREATCON Bravo: This condition is declared when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardships, without affecting operational capability, and without aggravating relations with local authorities. (1) Measure 26. Maintain appropriate THREATCON Alpha measures. (2) Measure 27. Review liberty policy in light of the threat, and revise it as necessary to maintain the safety and security of the ship and crew. (3) Measure 28. Conduct divisional quarters at foul weather parade to determine the status of on-board personnel and to disseminate information. (4) Measure 29. Ensure that an up-to-date list of bilingual personnel for the area of operations is readily available. Ensure the warning tape in the pilot house and/or quarterdeck that warns small craft to remain clear is in both the local language and English. (5) Measure 30. Remind personnel to lock their parked vehicles and to carefully check them before entering.

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(6) Measure 31. Designate and brief picket boat crews. Prepare boats and place crews on 15-minute alert. If the situation warrants, make random picket boat patrols in the immediate vicinity of the ship with the motor whaleboat or gig. Boat crews will be armed with m16 riﬂes, one m60 with 200 rounds of ammunition, and 10 concussion grenades. Measure 31 (MSC). Implement measures to keep unauthorized craft away from ship. Coordinate with husbanding agent and port authority, as necessary. (7) Measure 32. Consistent with local rules, regulations, and sofa, establish armed brow watch on pier to check identiﬁcation and inspect baggage before personnel board ship. (8) Measure 33. Restrict vehicle access to the pier. Discontinue parking on the pier consistent with local rules, regulations, and/or the status of forces agreement, establish unloading zone(s) and move all containers as far away from the ship as possible (400 feet stand-off distance preferred). (9) Measure 34. Man signal bridge or pilot house and ensure ﬂares are available to ward off approaching craft. (10) Measure 35. After working hours, place armed sentries on a superstructure level from which they- can best cover areas about the ship. (11) Measure 36. Arm all members of the quarterdeck watch and SAT. In the absence of a SAT, arm two members of the SDF. (12) Measure 37. Provide shotgun and ammunition to quarterdeck. If the situation warrants, place sentry with shotgun inside the superstructure at a site from which the quarterdeck can be covered. (13) Measure 38. Issue arms to selected qualiﬁed ofﬁcers to include Command Duty Ofﬁcer (CDO) and Assistant Command Duty Ofﬁcer (ACDO). (14) Measure 39. Implement measures to keep unauthorized craft away from the ship. Authorized craft should be carefully controlled. Coordinate with host nation/local port authority, husbanding agent as necessary, and request their assistance in controlling unauthorized craft. (15) Measure 40. If not already abated, arm sounding and security patrol. (16) Measure 41. Muster and brief ammunition bearers or messengers. (17) Measure 42. Implement procedures for expedient issue of ﬁrearms and ammunition from small arms locker (SAL). Ensure a set of SAL keys are readily available and in the possession of an ofﬁcer designated for this duty by the commanding ofﬁcer. (18) Measure 43. Load additional small arms magazines to ensure adequate supply for security personnel and response forces.

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(19) Measure 44. Inform local authorities of actions taken as the THREATCON increases. (20) Measure 45. Test internal communications, communications with local authorities, and communications with other U.S. naval ships in port. (21) Measure 46. Instruct watches to conduct frequent random searches under piers, with emphasis on potential hiding places, pier pilings, and ﬂoating debris. (22) Measure 47. Conduct searches of the ship’s hull and boats at intermittent intervals and immediately before it puts to sea. (23) Measure 48. Move cars and objects such as crates and trash containers as far from the ship as possible. (24) Measure 49. Hoist boats aboard when not in use. (25) Measure 50. Consider terminating all public visits. (26) Measure 51. Set materiel condition YOKE, main deck, and below. Measure 51 (MSC). Secure all watertight doors and hatches main deck and below. (27) Measure 52. After working hours, reduce entry points to the ship’s interior by securing selected entrances from the inside. (28) Measure 53. Duty department heads ensure all spaces not in regular use are secured and inspected periodically. (29) Measure 54. If two brows are rigged, remove one of them. Use only one gangway to access the ship. (30) Measure 55. Maintain capability to get under way on short notice or as speciﬁed by SOP. Consider possible relocation sites (different pier, anchorage, etc.). Rig brow and accommodation ladder for immediate raising or removal. (31) Measure 56. Ensure .50-caliber mount assemblies are in place with ammunition in ready service lockers (.50-caliber machine guns will be maintained in the armory, preﬁre checks completed, and ready for use). (32) Measure 57. Prepare ﬁre hoses. Brief designated personnel on procedures for repelling boarders, small boats, and ultralight aircraft. (33) Measure 58. Obstruct possible helicopter landing areas in such a manner as to prevent hostile helicopters from landing. (34) Measure 59. Review riot and crowd control procedures, asylumseeker procedures, and bomb threat procedures. (35) Measure 60. Monitor local communications (e.g. ship-to-ship, tv, radio, police scanners). (36) Measure 61. Implement additional security measures for high-risk personnel as appropriate. (37) Measure 62. Inform local authorities of actions being taken as THREATCON increases. (38) Measure 63. Review individual actions in THREATCON Charlie for possible implementation.

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C.

THREATCON Charlie: This condition is declared when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action against installations [. . .] or personnel is imminent. Implementation of this THREATCON [for] more than a short period will probably create hardship and will affect the peacetime activities of the ship and its personnel. (1) Measure 64. Maintain appropriate measures for THREATCONS Alpha and Bravo. (2) Measure 65. Cancel liberty. Execute emergency recall. (3) Measure 66. Be prepared to get under way on one hour’s notice or less. If conditions warrant, request permission to sortie. (4) Measure 67. Muster and arm SAT, BAF, and reserve force (RF). Position SAT and BAD at designated location(s). Deploy RF to protect command structure and augment posted security agents. Measure 67 (MSC). Consider requesting armed security augmentation force from ﬂeet CINC. (5) Measure 68. Place armed sentries on a superstructure level from which they can best provide 360 degree coverage about the ship. (6) Measure 69. Establish .50- or .30-caliber machinegun positions. (7) Measure 70. If available, deploy STINGER surface-to-air missiles in accordance with established rules of engagement. (8) Measure 71. Energize radar and establish watch. (9) Measure 72. Energize radar and/or sonar, rotate screws and cycle rudder(s) at frequent and irregular intervals, as needed to assist in deterring, detecting, or thwarting an attack. Man passive sonar capable of detecting boats, swimmers, or underwater vehicles. Position any non-sonar-equipped ships within the acoustic envelope of sonar-equipped ships. (10) Measure 73. Man one or more repair lockers. Establish communications with an extra watch in DC central. (11) Measure 74. Deploy picket boat. Boats should be identiﬁable night and day from 71BE ship (e.g., by lights or ﬂags). (12) Measure 75. Coordinate with host nation, local port authority, or husbanding agent to establish small boat exclusion zone. (13) Measure 76. If feasible, deploy a helicopter as an observation or gun platform. The helicopter should be identiﬁable night and day from the ship. (14) Measure 77. If a threat of swimmer attack exists, activate an antiswimmer watch. (15) Measure 78. Consider issuing weapons to selected ofﬁcers and chief petty ofﬁcers in the duty section (i.e., the commanding ofﬁcer, executive ofﬁcer, department heads). (16) Measure 79. If available, issue concussion grenades to topside rovers, forecastle and fantail sentries, and bridge watch.

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(17) Measure 80. Erect barriers and obstacles as required to control trafﬁc ﬂow. (18) Measure 81. Strictly enforce entry control procedures and searches—no exceptions. (19) Measure 82. Enforce boat exclusion zone. (20) Measure 83. Minimize all off-ship administrative trips. (21) Measure 84. Discontinue contract work. Measure 84 (MSC). Consider securing all access doors and hatches, main deck and below. (22) Measure 85. Set materiel condition ZEBRA, second deck and below. (23) Measure 86. Secure from the inside all unguarded entry points to the interior of the ship. (24) Measure 87. Rotate screws and cycle rudder(s) at frequent and irregular intervals. (25) Measure 88. Rig additional ﬁre hoses. Charge the ﬁre hoses when manned just prior to actual use. (26) Measure 89. Review individual actions in THREATCON Delta for implementation. D.

THREATCON Delta: This condition is declared when a terrorist attack has occurred in the immediate area, or intelligence has been received that indicates a terrorist action against a speciﬁc location or person is likely. Normally, this THREATCON is declared as a localized warning. (1) Measure 90. Maintain appropriate THREATCONS Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie measures. (2) Measure 91. Permit only necessary personnel topside. (3) Measure 92. Prepare to get under way and, if possible, cancel port visit and depart. (4) Measure 93. Post sentries with M60 machine gun(s) to cover possible helicopter landing areas. (5) Measure 94. Arm selected personnel of the SDF. (6) Measure 95. Deploy M79 grenade launchers to cover approaches to ship. Measure 95 (MSC). Employ all necessary weaponry to defend against attack.

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5

Threats and United States Responses to Maritime Challenges

BORDER PROTECTION AND CUSTOMS FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT Admiral James M. Loy Department of Transportation, United States Coast Guard Before the Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources December 5, 2001*

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the Coast Guard’s role in federal law enforcement and service, including the wide implications for the Homeland Security mission.

*

http://www.uscg.mil/history/Loy/Loy_Statement_051201.html

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THE COAST GUARD’S ROLE As a multi-mission maritime and uniformed service, the Coast Guard is an integral part of America’s maritime security. We array our ships, planes, and people against multiple, asymmetric national security threats including drug smuggling, alien migration, economic predation of our ﬁsh stocks, and terrorism. Drug interdiction is a national security priority. Drugs have a pervasive and corrosive impact on society. They contributed to violent crime, disease, and nearly 17,000 deaths in 1998. In addition, the illicit proﬁts ﬁnance terrorist organizations, and this linkage must be interrupted. The Coast Guard is the designated lead agency for in-transit zone maritime drug interdiction, and shares lead agency responsibility for arrival zone maritime and air interdiction with the Customs Service. Prior to September 11 we took this responsibility very seriously, and we remain committed to this mission with its now wider implications. The Coast Guard supports the balanced approach of the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) and we work closely with our interagency partners, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), customs, and the FBI to meet NDCS objectives. Goal Four of the NDCS requires us to shield America’s frontiers from illegal drugs and sets out clear performance measures. We have achieved signiﬁcant results in supporting the objectives of Goal Four, including three consecutive years of record cocaine seizures. However, given our current homeland security priorities, we will continue to be challenged in meeting our drug interdiction goals. The transit zone is a 6 million square mile area roughly equivalent to the size of the continental United States, and includes the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Eastern Paciﬁc. Our operations rely on our interagency partners as well as foreign military and law enforcement counterparts. Likewise, our role in migrant interdiction is as important as ever. In FY 2001 the Coast Guard interdicted almost 4,000 people trying to illegally enter the United States. That was a typical year for us. To meet America’s expectation for a secure border we must continue to maintain our vigilance and be capable of detecting and interdicting illegal migrants. Our presence is needed to deter migrants from attempting an illegal and risky voyage. The Coast Guard is also the only agency capable of “at-sea” enforcement of ﬁsheries regulations. Our efforts in this area are critical to effective management of the $25 billion U.S. commercial ﬁshing industry to ensure our ﬁsh stocks are not depleted. Furthermore, while inspecting a vessel’s catch and gear to ensure compliance with ﬁsheries’ management regulations, we also have the opportunity to verify crewmember status and identity, as well as enforce safety regulations for this extremely dangerous occupation. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, the Coast Guard immediately responded along every coast in the nation; increasing Coast Guard presence to protect our ports and maritime transportation infrastructure. Clearly,

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the port safety and security mission now stands as Mission 1, right alongside search and rescue, and over the last month, our primary focus has remained maritime homeland security. The Coast Guard’s increased role in port security responsibilities required redeployment of cutter and aircraft resources among all our law enforcement missions to meet surge operations resulting from September 11. Our multi-mission culture and resilient resources enabled us to make the rapid transition from normal operations to a heightened homeland security posture. This ﬂexibility is our greatest strength, but it comes at the expense of other missions. We are now adjusting to a sustainable presence in all mission areas. This “new normalcy” will be closely monitored while we work with the administration to deﬁne the appropriate alignment with national priorities and the resources required to fulﬁll all Coast Guard missions effectively.

CURRENT THREAT AND EFFORT Protecting our maritime transportation system and critical infrastructure from terrorist activities remains our highest priority threat. But our other threats have not disappeared. According to the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement, in calendar year 2000 an estimated 645 metric tons of cocaine left source countries en route to the United States, of which 606 metric tons were transported via noncommercial conveyances. Of that total, 568 metric tons traveled via noncommercial maritime means for at least part of their journey. As indicated by these statistics, the vast majority of illicit cocaine travels by sea, presenting constant challenges and demands for Coast Guard interdiction efforts. With the advent of the recent terrorist attacks, it is still too early to predict with any conﬁdence or speciﬁcity the actual number of events and amount of drugs that will transit to the United States. Currently, the primary threat vectors for cocaine are nearly evenly distributed between the Eastern Paciﬁc Ocean and the Caribbean Basin. The go-fast boat continues to be the smuggler’s vehicle of choice, although ﬁshing vessels have reappeared as smuggling conveyances, especially in the Eastern Paciﬁc. These go-fast vessels are not only quick and maneuverable, but they are small and difﬁcult to detect. Our 15–25 knot cutters are no match for 35–45 knot gofasts. That is why we must continue to develop and employ endgame initiatives such as Operation NEW FRONTIER, which utilizes armed helicopters and Over-the-Horizon cutter boats to stop drug smugglers. These assets have clearly demonstrated they will improve our interdiction successes and will be fully deployed this year. Our long-standing relationships with many Caribbean countries are extremely important to the sustained success of supply reduction efforts. We are actively engaged in improving and increasing these relationships, and

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currently beneﬁt from 22 bilateral agreements with Caribbean and Latin American nations that improve our effectiveness in the counter-drug mission. Recently, Costa Rica has been especially cooperative, entering into a landmark International Maritime Interdiction Support Agreement with the U.S., which greatly enhances logistics support for U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy vessels engaged in counter-drug operations. In addition to deploying aboard U.S. Navy ships, Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) deploy aboard British and Dutch naval ships involved in counter-drug operations. This provides increased law enforcement endgame capability in the transit zone. In March, we signed a similar agreement for LEDETs to embark on Belgian naval ships operating in the Caribbean. This is indicative of our strong counter-drug partnerships with European maritime powers. Our Caribbean Support Tender has realized great success in conducting its mission. This U.S. Coast Guard cutter operates out of Miami, with an international crew, and visits Caribbean nations to conduct law enforcement training, security assistance, and international engagement in support of the NDCS and the U.S. Southern Command. The threat posed by illegal immigration is subject to many economic and political pressures, and as such is difﬁcult to forecast. While these external forces are beyond our ability to completely control, we do hope to inﬂuence migrant behavior through deterrence. By maintaining our presence and ability to effectively interdict illegal migrants, we hope to discourage people from taking that risky voyage in the ﬁrst place. Presently we expect illegal migrant activity to remain steady. Our oceans represent a source of signiﬁcant renewable wealth and a rich supply of seafood for the American public. This wealth, however, is ﬁnite. A recent United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization report on the status of world ﬁsheries estimated there is a sustainable 80 million metric ton catch available worldwide, yet in 1997 over 90 million tons were harvested. Furthermore, demand for ﬁsh protein in 2010 is predicted to reach 115 million tons. The Coast Guard’s ﬁsheries law enforcement mission is integral to maintaining a balance between conservation and commerce to ensure these resources may be enjoyed indeﬁnitely. The Coast Guard’s ﬁsheries enforcement strategy is built upon three strategic foundations; a strong national constituency base, effective use of resources to include leveraging technology, and support for national and regional goals.

RESULTS The results of all of these strategies before September 11 are mixed. In FY 2001, the Coast Guard set a noncommercial maritime seizure record of over 138,000 pounds (nearly 63 metric tons) of cocaine, including the largest single maritime cocaine seizure on record. This marks the third

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successive year of record cocaine seizures. We also seized over 34,000 pounds of marijuana. These results are attributed to the continued maturation of the interagency cooperation process, improved sharing of information and intelligence, enhanced cooperation of the international community, and effective deployment of Coast Guard LEDETs. However, more needs to be done. Despite record-setting seizure amounts, the Coast Guard’s drug seizure rate, deﬁned as the Coast Guard’s overall seizure total measured as a percentage of total ﬂow, fell in FY 2000 due to the increase in the estimated ﬂow of cocaine through the transit zone. Final seizure and cocaine shipment data for FY 2000 show a seizure rate of approximately 10.6 percent. Despite a strong effort and extensive interagency and international cooperation, we were unable to meet our 13 percent seizure rate target in 2000. While the shortfall may be attributed to data methodology and collection limitations and challenges, the Coast Guard remains concerned with this downward turn. Our efforts in ﬁsheries enforcement have witnessed a tremendous increase in national and international concern for our living marine resources and, at the same time, a tremendous demand for these resources. An excellent example is the demise of the New England groundﬁsh ﬁshery. Through our enforcement efforts, we have turned the corner on New England groundﬁsh. Biologists report that what was once a dwindling and endangered ﬁsh stock is now rebounding and will soon be a viable resource again.

FUTURE EFFORTS The challenge of meeting our law enforcement goals prior to September 11 was already considerable. Our response to the horrible events of that day and the effort we expended in increasing our maritime security temporarily put our law enforcement goals on hold. We have already returned many of our assets to law enforcement missions such as drug interdiction and ﬁsheries enforcement. We have also made a great effort to ﬁnd a sustainable and effective balance among all of our missions. We will continue to increase our effectiveness with interagency and international cooperation; and will work with the administration and Congress to identify the correct level and the required resources. One of the greatest challenges facing the Coast Guard today is that our Deepwater assets (cutters and aircraft) are maintenance-intensive and technologically obsolete. To correct this problem, the Coast Guard has begun recapitalizing and modernizing its assets, including sensors and communications equipment for our aging Deepwater cutters, aircraft, and command centers. This effort is being addressed in the President’s FY 2002 budget through our Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) acquisition project. The IDS project is vital to our counter-drug efforts and our war against terrorism. We

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are ready to award a contract in FY 2002 to begin this major recapitalization effort, which will ensure a robust Coast Guard well into the twenty-ﬁrst century. Mr. Chairman, we are proud of our record as contributors to national security. The Coast Guard remains fully committed to protecting the nation against all of the threats facing us today and in the future. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

PORT SAFETY Douglas M. Browning Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, and Merchant Marine July 2, 2002*

Senator Wyden, Senator Smith, thank you for your invitation to testify before this subcommittee today. Since September 11, Commissioner Bonner’s top priority for the Customs Service has been responding to the terrorist threat at our seaports, land borders, and airports. His highest priority is doing everything we reasonably and responsibly can to keep terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. Through our Customs Inspectors, Canine Enforcement Ofﬁcers, and Special Agents we are doing just that: protecting and defending our country against the terrorist threat at all our ports of entry, including our seaports. Since September 11, customs has been at a Level 1 alert across the country—at all border entry points, including our seaports. Level 1 requires sustained, intensive antiterrorist questioning, and includes increased inspections of travelers and goods at every port of entry. Because there is a continued threat that international terrorists will attack again, we remain at Level 1 alert to this day and will be at Level 1 for the foreseeable future. To help ensure that customs develops a coordinated, integrated counterterrorism strategy for border and seaport security, Commissioner Bonner established a new Ofﬁce of Anti-Terrorism. In an operational context and to support our customs ofﬁcers in the ﬁeld, we have also established the Ofﬁce of Border Security. The mission of that ofﬁce is to develop more sophisticated antiterrorism targeting techniques for passengers and cargo in each border

*

http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/107s/92325.txt

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environment, and provide a single point of contact for events taking place in our ﬁeld. In approaching our primary priority to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from transiting our borders, customs employs a “Defense in Depth” strategy; a layered approach for targeting and screening that essentially expands our perimeter of security to the point of origin. If terrorists were to succeed in concealing a weapon of mass destruction, even a crude nuclear device, among the tens of thousands of containers that enter U.S. ports every day, the devastation would be horrible to contemplate. And the impact on our global economy would be severe. As the primary agency for cargo security, U.S. Customs should know everything there is to know about a container headed for this country before it leaves a foreign port, such as Rotterdam or Singapore, for an American port. Customs wants that container pre-screened there, not here. A critical component of customs overall “Defense in Depth” strategy is the implementation of the Container Security Initiative. The Container Security Initiative engages the ports that send the highest volumes of container trafﬁc into the United States as well as governments in these locations, in a way that will facilitate detection of potential problems at their earliest possible opportunity. The core elements of the Container Security Initiatives are the following: • First, we must establish international security criteria for identifying high-risk cargo containers that potentially pose a risk of containing terrorists or terrorist weapons. • Second, we must maximize the use of detection technology to pre-screen highrisk containers. Much of this technology already exists and is currently being used by the U.S. Customs Service. This technology will not only be used for inspection of U.S. Customs targeted cargo but also for cargo identiﬁed by other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Food and Drug Administration, and the Department of Agriculture. • Third, we must develop and broadly deploy “smart” boxes—smart and secure containers with electronic seals and sensors that will indicate to customs and to the private importers or carriers if particular containers have been tampered with, particularly after they have been pre-screened.

The vast majority of world trade—about 90 percent—moves in containers, much of it carried on oceangoing container ships. Nearly half of all incoming trade to the United States by value—about 46 percent—arrives by ship, and most of that is in containers. In FY 2001, approximately 34,000 containers entered through the North Paciﬁc CMC (Service Ports of Portland and Anchorage). The effective use of technology depends largely on good targeting, for which we require advance information. Since September 11, Customs has

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refocused resources and technology to increase the number and the type of cargo exams it performs. However, to some the overall number of examinations may still seem surprisingly low in proportion to the vast amount of trade we process. Yet it is important to note that the cargo customs selects for intensive inspection is not chosen randomly. It is the result of a careful screening process, one that uses information culled from a vast database on shipping and trading activities known as the Automated Manifest System. Using targeting systems that operate within AMS, we are able to sort through the cargo manifests provided to customs by shippers and carriers, and choose those shipments that appear unusual, suspect, or high-risk. It is a system that has served us well, but one that can and must serve us better in light of September 11. Currently the submission of advanced shipping manifests to customs is voluntary. We cannot rest our Nation’s homeland security on the inconsistent submission of advance information that is often incomplete and sometimes inaccurate. Timely, accurate, and complete information is vital to homeland security, and we should mandate it is provided in advance. Current legislation such as S.1214 take us a major step closer to where we ultimately need to be, particularly for the Container Security Initiative—and that is to have full information on incoming cargo before it even leaves the foreign port. This information is needed for all imports and in-bond shipments. The Customs Service is also seeking the inclusion of a six-digit harmonized tariff code in the manifest for in-bond shipments. The six-digit classiﬁcation universally describes the goods to all governments that subscribe to the harmonized system. Customs has had success in targeting in our entry system, using this level of detail. This level provides the speciﬁcity necessary to allow for ﬁner targeting, which could translate into fewer examinations—a sort of reverse targeting to eliminate unnecessary and timely inspections. With less detailed information, however, the need to examine for potential threats increases, particularly as those shipments move inbond. As part of our immediate response to September 11, customs promptly sought, and the Congress promptly enacted, legislation that made the submission of data on incoming passengers to customs’ Advance Passenger Information System mandatory for all airlines. That law was passed last November as part of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. Initially, the commissioner ordered all international airlines ﬂying into the U.S. from abroad to submit advance passenger information to customs, or face 100 percent inspection of people and goods departing their ﬂights. This enabled customs to better secure advance passenger information on all incoming international ﬂights before the new law took effect. As you can glean from this list, technology and information are essential to a successful container security strategy and to our counterterrorist mission in

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general. And to put it simply, the more technology and information we have, and the earlier in the supply chain we have them, the better. Customs has a long history and working relationship with the trade community. Another customs-developed initiative is the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or “C-TPAT”. C-TPAT builds on past, successful security models between customs and the trade that were designed to prevent legitimate commercial shipments from being used to smuggle illegal drugs. Customs also looks forward to the completion of the Automated Commercial Environment, or ACE, which as you know is an extremely important project for the Customs Service. ACE, our new and comprehensive automation system, offers major advances in both the collection and sorting of border transaction data. The terrorists have already exploited one key component of our transportation system: commercial aviation. It is not at all unthinkable that they will seek to target others, including maritime trade. We believe our seaports and the system of global trade they support are vulnerable, and we believe that the U.S. and the Customs Service must act now to address this threat. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify here today.

U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE’S COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AT HOME AND ABROAD Robert C. Bonner U.S. Customs Commissioner Foreign Press Center Brieﬁng, Washington DC January 14, 2003*

INTRODUCTION Although we are 16 months removed from the terrorist attacks of September 11, the threat of international terrorism is every bit as real and immediate and dangerous as it was then, if not more so. And we must remember that the threat from terrorism is a multinational threat—it is a threat that knows no boundaries. The terrorist attacks in Bali, in Kenya, off the coast of Yemen, and elsewhere across the globe, remind us that the terrorist threat is one we must all confront. It is a long-term threat. It is critical that we maintain the sense of urgency and action that galvanized the United States and the world against terrorism after 9/11. *

http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/16640.htm

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At the United States Customs Service, combating terrorism is our number one priority. It has been our highest priority since 9/11. And we are doing everything we reasonably and responsibly can, both here in the United States and abroad, to protect our nation and the global trading system from the terrorist threat. And as we do this, we are also making sure that legitimate trade and travel continues without undue or costly delays.

ADVANCE MANIFEST REGULATION One of our efforts is the Advance Manifest Regulation, or so-called “24-hour rule,” which requires that shippers and ocean carriers provide U.S. Customs with manifest information for oceangoing containerized cargo 24 hours in advance of “lading”—that means 24 hours before it is loaded on board a vessel for shipment to the U.S. The rule enables us to analyze the information and identify, and eliminate potential terrorist threats before the vessel sails, not after it arrives. U.S. Customs has been talking about the 24-hour rule for many months. We issued the proposed 24-hour rule in early August of last year, and that was followed by a 45-day comment period on the rule. We considered the comments and, after making some modiﬁcations, issued the ﬁnal regulation on October 31, 2002. We delayed implementation for 90 days—3 months, including a 60-day penalty-free period. This grace period expires on February 1, in about two weeks. Although some still may desire more time, I believe we have provided sufﬁcient time for the change of business practices needed to comply with the 24-hour rule. As I have said before, this is an issue of national security, and customs intends to take compliance seriously. We applaud the efforts of those shippers and carriers that have taken the rule and implementation period seriously— and many, many have—but we caution those that have not. On February 2, the U.S. Customs Service will begin enforcing the 24-hour rule. Data that is incomplete or late will not be tolerated from carriers or shippers. When I say incomplete data, I include the description of the cargo. Vague, non-descriptions, such as “freight of all kinds” (commonly abbreviated “FAK”) or blank descriptions are no longer acceptable on February 2 and thereafter. Where there is no description, or where Customs was not provided with data 24 hours before loading, U.S. Customs will begin denying permits to unload on February 2. We will indicate to carriers our intent to deny permits to unload, and we will expect the cooperation of carriers to deny loading at the foreign port to those who do not comply with the rule. In addition to denying unloading permits, customs will also use its authority to impose penalties to secure rapid compliance. The U.S. Customs Service’s actions on February 2 will be the ﬁrst step in a process of ratcheting up denials of unloading permits to ensure compliance

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over the course of a few weeks. I am optimistic that compliance with the 24-hour rule will be achieved quickly.

CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE The 24-hour rule applies to shipments of cargo containers from all ports outside the United States to ports of the United States; however, implementation of the rule helps to ensure the success of the Container Security Initiative, or CSI, currently being implemented, or about to be implemented, at many ports around the world. CSI is the U.S. Customs Service’s program to prevent containerized shipping—the primary system of global trade—from being exploited by terrorists. With CSI, U.S. Customs has entered into partnerships with other governments to identify “high-risk” cargo containers and pre-screen those containers for terrorist weapons at the port of departure instead of the port of arrival. Getting the manifest information on the containers in advance of their loading is essential to this process, because it provides the risk-targeting data needed to identify high-risk containers. Just one year ago, CSI was merely an idea for safeguarding the global trading system and the global economy. CSI has [now] become a reality. Ten countries—representing 17 of the top 20 ports that ship to the United States—have agreed to and are implementing CSI. The most recent country to sign a declaration to implement CSI is Spain, which signed last week. Other countries participating in CSI with the U.S. are, in Europe, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the U.K. And in Asia, they include Singapore, Japan, and China. Soon, we will be expanding CSI beyond the top 20 ports. Other nations and other ports are eager to [be], and I expect soon will be, joining the CSI program, because they recognize, as we do, that CSI is a critical tool for safeguarding the global economy against the terrorist threat, as well as better safeguarding their seaports and ours against terrorist exploitation. The early success of CSI is the result of outstanding cooperative efforts between countries, on a bilateral basis. Multinational organizations such as the World Customs Organization and the G-8 [Group of Eight industrialized nations] have also endorsed the principles of CSI. This kind of cooperation in addressing the terrorist threat is imperative for success in the global campaign against terrorism. The terrorist threat impacts all of us, and the world community must work together to conquer it.

CONCLUSION In conclusion, let me just say we are making progress, but we must not let down our guard. We must continue to do more. And I can tell you that I [am],

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and all the men and women of the U.S. Customs Service are, continuing to do more—we are more determined than ever in our mission—not only to protect our borders, but to protect the movement of global trade.

CBP EXPANDS ENFORCEMENT OF THE 24-HOUR RULE Customs and Border Protection, United States Department of Homeland Security May 1, 2003*

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Commissioner Robert C. Bonner today announced that CBP will begin the next phase of enforcement for the 24-hour rule. The 24-hour rule requires an advance cargo declaration from sea carriers and became effective on December 2, 2002. CBP uses the cargo information to identify and eliminate potential terrorist threats before a vessel sails from a foreign port to U.S. seaports, rather than after a vessel and its cargo arrives in the United States. The expanded enforcement actions include: 1.

2. 3.

4.

On May 4, 2003, CBP will issue “Do Not Load” messages for containerized cargo that has an invalid or incomplete cargo description. Initially, enforcement efforts focused only on signiﬁcant violations of the cargo description requirements of the 24-hour rule. For example, the use of such vague cargo descriptions as “freight-all-kinds,” “said-to-contain,” or “general merchandise” was not tolerated. On May 4, 2003, CBP will issue monetary penalties for late submission of cargo declarations. On May 15, 2003, CBP will issue “Do Not Load” messages for clear violations of the consignee name and address requirement. For example, consignee ﬁelds left blank, or the use of “To Order” and “To Order of Shipper” without corresponding information in the consignee ﬁeld and notify party ﬁeld, or consignee name with no address, incomplete address, or invalid address are not acceptable. On May 15, 2003, CBP will issue monetary penalties for Foreign Remaining on Board (FROB) cargo that has an invalid cargo description, and has been loaded onboard the vessel without providing CBP a 24-hour time frame for targeting.

Carriers may be assessed a $5,000 penalty for ﬁrst violation and $10,000 for any subsequent violation attributable to the master. Non-vessel operating

*

http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2003/05/sec-030502-usia01.htm

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common carriers (NVOCCs) may be assessed liquidated damages in the amount of $5,000. Every subsequent violation will also be $5,000. “The global supply chain and the seaports of the United States are more secure from terrorist threat since the inception of the 24-hour rule, but there is still more work to do,” said Commissioner Bonner. “We are taking the next step in our compliance strategy to see that all of the rule’s requirements are complied with. Our goal is to achieve full compliance quickly and efﬁciently while still maintaining a high rate of trade compliance.” On February 2, 2003, enforcement of the rule began. This initial phase focused on signiﬁcant violations of the cargo description requirement. Vague cargo terms such as “freight of all kinds,” “said to contain,” “consolidated cargo,” “general merchandise,” and “various retail merchandise” were not accepted. Containerized cargo with this type of description was issued a “Do Not Load” message while still in the foreign port. If cargo was loaded without prior approval by CPB, the container was denied permit to unlade at all U.S. ports. CBP reviewed more than 2.4 million bills of lading for the period between February 2 to April 29, 2003. About 260 containers with inadequate cargo descriptions were denied loading for violation of the 24-hour rule. Most of these violations were resolved in time for the shipment to make its original voyage. CBP expects to see the same type of strong compliance by the trade under the second phase of enforcement.

REVIEW OF CBP ACTIONS TAKEN TO INTERCEPT SUSPECTED TERRORISTS AT U.S. PORTS OF ENTRY Ofﬁce of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security June 2006*

INTRODUCTION We reviewed the procedures employed by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to prevent known and suspected terrorists from entering the United States through the country’s 324 air, land, and sea Ports of Entry (POE). In February 2004, the CBP Ofﬁce of Anti-Terrorism issued guidance to standardize the targeting and screening of known and suspected terrorists attempting to enter the United States. This is a summary of a longer and more detailed report that has been provided to program managers and Congress. Law enforcement *

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sensitive information has been removed from this version at the request of program managers.

RESULTS IN BRIEF CBP has improved information-sharing capabilities within the organization to smooth the ﬂow of arriving passengers and increase the effectiveness of limited resources at POEs. Earlier, ofﬁcers at POEs possessed limited information to help them resolve the identities of individuals mistakenly matched to the terrorist watch list, but a current initiative aims to provide supervisors at POEs with much more information to help them positively identify and clear individuals with names similar to those in the terrorist database. CBP procedures are highly prescriptive and withhold from supervisors the authority to make timely and informed decisions regarding the admissibility of individuals who they could quickly conﬁrm are not the suspected terrorist. As CBP has stepped up its efforts to intercept known and suspected terrorists at ports of entry, traditional missions such as narcotics interdiction and identiﬁcation of fraudulent immigration documentation have been adversely affected. Recent data indicates a signiﬁcant decrease over the past few years in the interception of narcotics and the identiﬁcation of fraudulent immigration documents, especially at airports. When a watchlisted or targeted1 individual is encountered at a POE, CBP generates several reports summarizing the incident. Each of these reports provides a different level of detail, and is distributed to a different readership. It is unclear, however, how details of the encounter and the information obtained from the suspected terrorist are disseminated for analysis. This inconsistent reporting is preventing DHS from developing independent intelligence assessments and may be preventing important information from inclusion in national strategic intelligence analyses. During an encounter with a watchlisted individual, CBP ofﬁcers at the POE often need to discuss sensitive details about the individual with law enforcement agencies and CBP personnel in headquarters ofﬁces. Some case details are classiﬁed. Because some CBP ofﬁcers at POEs have not been granted the necessary security clearance, they are unable to review important information about a watchlisted individual and may not be able to participate with law enforcement agencies in interviews of certain individuals. To improve the effectiveness of CBP personnel in their mission to prevent known and suspected terrorists from entering the United States, we are recommending that CBP: expand a biometric information collection program to include volunteers who would not normally provide this information when entering the United States; authorize POE supervisors limited discretion to make more timely admissibility determinations; review POE stafﬁng models to ensure the current workforce is able to perform the entire range of CBP

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missions; establish a policy for more consistent reporting to intelligence agencies the details gathered during secondary interviews; and ensure all counterterrorism personnel at POEs are granted an appropriate security clearance.

PORT SECURITY THE INTERIM FINAL REGULATIONS ON PORT SECURITY Admiral Thomas H. Collins U.S. Coast Guard Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation July 22, 2003*

Good Morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee. It is my pleasure to return and discuss the Coast Guard’s progress in implementing the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), one of the most signiﬁcant pieces of legislation to impact the Coast Guard in the last decade. As promised, the Coast Guard published a suite of regulations on July 1, 2003, to implement the requirements of the MTSA. These regulations form an essential element of our national strategy to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States, to reduce our vulnerability to terrorism, and to minimize the damage and permit quick recovery from any attacks that might occur. The six separate but complementary rules will implement the core security elements of the MTSA as well as newly adopted international security standards. And while the foundation of our effort is based on the MTSA, it is critically important to recognize the value of having these rules integrated with the international maritime security regime established through the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Speciﬁcally, I speak of the adoption at IMO of maritime security-related amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and an International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. This approach helps minimize the potential for a proliferation of national, unilateral security requirements that could impair global maritime commerce, while at the same time ensuring that meaningful security measures are implemented, not just in the U.S., but also on a global scale. The result of this dedicated, multilateral effort is a team of over 100 international partners committed to worldwide maritime security.

*

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The six security rules issued on July 1, 2003, are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

General Provision of National Maritime Security Area Maritime Security Vessel Security Facility Security Outer Continental Shelf Facility Security Vessel Carriage Requirements for the Automatic Identiﬁcation System

The rules were developed in coordination with our partners in DHS (Department of Homeland Security), speciﬁcally the Transportation Security Administration, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, and the Maritime Administration. They are the product of a very collaborative effort that began in January of this year when the Coast Guard held seven public meetings with our regulatory partners. These meetings were a critical part of the process and combined with the excellent public input we received to the docket, helped us address the security challenges of an industry with tremendous diversity. The rules will require certain sectors of the maritime industry to take signiﬁcant measures to increase the security of vessels, shoreside facilities, and offshore facilities under U.S. jurisdiction. The regulations also require the installation of automatic identiﬁcation systems on board certain vessels engaged in international trade, as well as certain vessels that transit through vessel trafﬁc systems in the United States. Among other requirements, the regulations compel regulated vessels and facilities to conduct security assessments, to develop detailed security plans to address vulnerabilities revealed by those assessments, and to establish security measures commensurate with the level and degree of risk within the marine transportation system. The regulations contain requirements for the designation and competency of security personnel, including standards for training, drills, and exercises. The regulations further designate Coast Guard Captains of the Port as local Federal Maritime Security Coordinators. In this role they are delegated authority to conduct area security assessments and develop area security plans for their respective areas of responsibility. This “family of plans” approach establishes a layered system of protection that involves all maritime stakeholders, and will be consistent with the National Transportation System Security Plan being developed by the Transportation Security Administration in coordination with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate. The Coast Guard, as the lead maritime homeland security agency, has also begun developing a national maritime security strategy to be incorporated within the National Transportation Security Plan. We estimate that the regulations will affect as many as 10,000 vessels, 5,000 facilities, 361 ports, and 40 offshore facilities. The cost to industry of imple-

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mentation is estimated to be $7 billion over the next 10 years. [Although] we clearly understand that the cost of these security regulations to the maritime industry is not insigniﬁcant, a terrorist incident against our marine transportation system would have a serious and long-lasting negative impact on global shipping, international trade, and the world economy. Our ports and waterways also have signiﬁcant strategic military value. These factors make our marine transportation system a high-priority target, and that is what these rules are designed to do. Failure is not an option.

PRESIDENT DISCUSSES PORT SECURITY President George W. Bush Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary, The White House February 21, 2006*

And I also want to address another issue I just talked to the press about on Air Force One, and that is this issue of a company out of the UAE purchasing the right to manage some ports in the United States from a British company. First of all, this is a private transaction. But it—according to law, the government is required to make sure this transaction does not, in any way, jeopardize the security of the country. And so people responsible in our government have reviewed this transaction. The transaction should go forward, in my judgment. If there was any chance that this transaction would jeopardize the security of the United States, it would not go forward. The company has been cooperative with the United States government. The company will not manage port security. The security of our ports will be—continue to be managed by the Coast Guard and customs. The company is from a country that has been cooperative in the war on terror, been an ally in the war on terror. The company operates ports in different countries around the world, ports from which cargo has been sent to the United States on a regular basis. I think it sends a terrible signal to friends around the world that it’s okay for a company from one country to manage the port, but [that] a country that plays by the rules and has got a good track record from another part of the world can’t manage the port. And so, look, I can understand why some in Congress have raised questions about whether or not our country will be less secure as a result of this transaction. But they need to know that our government has looked at this issue and looked at it carefully. Again, I repeat, if there was any question as to whether or not this country would be less safe as a result of the transaction, it

*

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060221-2.html

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wouldn’t go forward. But I also want to repeat something again, and that is, this is a company that has played by the rules, that has been cooperative with the United States, a country that’s an ally in the war on terror, and it would send a terrible signal to friends and allies not to let this transaction go through.

TESTIMONY OF SUSAN J. MONTEVERDE Vice President American Association of Port Authorities Before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Homeland Security February 13, 2007*

I am Susan Monteverde, Vice President of Government Relations for the American Association of Port Authorities. I am here today representing 85 of the leading public port authorities in the United States, all of which are members of the American Association of Port Authorities, or AAPA. Outside the U.S., our trade association also represents more than 75 member ports in Canada, the Caribbean, and Latin America, for a total of more than 160 port authority members, together with more than 300 individuals, businesses, and related organizations that support the port industry. In addition to serving as an advocate on issues related to seaport development and port operations, AAPA works to inform the public, media, and policymakers about the essential role ports play within the global transportation system. My testimony today will focus on protecting maritime port facilities from terrorism. I will discuss two federal programs that are critical to port facilities’ ability to harden their security—the Port Security Grant Program [PGSP] and the Transportation Worker Identiﬁcation Credential, or TWIC. Since our nation was founded, ports have played a crucial role in America’s economic vitality and the quality of life we enjoy. Safe, efﬁcient, and accessible seaports help American farmers and U.S. commodities compete internationally and improve our standard of living by tapping into the goods, jobs, and services that global trade brings. Ports propel our nation’s economy through the millions of people they employ, cruise passengers they board, the billions of dollars in business investments they make and encourage others to make, and by the approximately $2 trillion worth of goods that pass through them each year. And let’s not forget the importance of our commercial ports to our national defense. Commercial ports now handle virtually all of the equipment and substantial amounts of needed supplies that are shipped overseas in support of our armed forces. In short, our military depends on efﬁcient, accessible public ports to defend this nation. *

http://aapa.ﬁles.cms-plus.com/PDFs/dhsappr%5Ftestimony2%2D13%2D07.pdf

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The U.S. has always relied heavily on international trade—both imports and exports—and that continues today, with international trade accounting for more than one-fourth of our gross domestic product. Today, however, port authorities are facing some big challenges in balancing funding for security with meeting the expansion needs of the future. By 2020, industry analysts predict overall cargo volumes through America’s ports will be twice as much as they were in 2000, while containerized cargo volumes will grow even faster. At the same time, the number of cruise ship passengers at U.S. ports, which was more than 9 million last year, will likely more than double to 20 million by the year 2020. In response, seaports across the country are expanding to meet the increased demand for their services, spending $2.1 billion per year in capital expenditures for infrastructure, equipment, software, and dredging. [Although] America’s ports must be able to accommodate today’s newer, larger ships so we can remain competitive as a trading nation, the ports must also remain safe and secure in the face of terrorist threats. One of the key things impacting the ability of ports to keep up with their growing trade volumes is the high cost of hardening their facilities against terrorism. When the nation’s ports have to divert their limited resources to pay for security measures, it can impact their ability to make the necessary investments to handle the rising volume of trade. Port security is a shared responsibility, with the federal government taking the lead. Much progress has been made since September 11 in protecting our seaport facilities, and we must continue our focus in this area. The federal government has implemented a number of cargo security programs, but only the Port Security Grant program, administered through the Department of Homeland Security, is focused on port facility security. This program was set up in 2002 to help protect marine facilities from terrorist attacks. From its inception, the Port Security Grant program has been dramatically underfunded. Only 20 percent of the requests for security enhancements at our nation’s ports have received funding. This underfunding has left ports with the difﬁcult choice of either delaying security improvements or paying the lopsided balance themselves, which, in some cases, requires shifting funds from other needed infrastructure improvement projects. Ports already spend millions of dollars on security in areas that are not paid for by grants. For example, additional security personnel, [along with] operation and maintenance of security systems have placed a large new ﬁnancial burden on ports. They also now pay for 25–50 percent of the cost of infrastructure received through the Port Security Grant program. The Transportation Worker Identiﬁcation Credential, or TWIC, requirements will place an even larger ﬁnancial burden on ports. The TWIC program, currently being implemented, will provide federal background checks

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and an identity card to all workers and individuals who seek unescorted access to port facilities. AAPA is very supportive of this program and believes it will be another important tool in hardening port facility security. But it will be costly. Your subcommittee can help in two ways: 1) by providing strong funding for the Port Security Grant program and 2) providing stafﬁng and funding for TSA and [the] Coast Guard to test and provide oversight for the implementation of the TWIC program. In an attachment to this testimony, you will ﬁnd numerous examples of the types of security projects U.S. ports would like to undertake—many of which will have to delay security projects or shift funds away from infrastructure improvement projects to pay for security enhancements, if adequate funds are not provided through the Port Security Grant program. Let me highlight a few that are in states with members on this subcommittee. Chairman Price’s state of North Carolina is an excellent example. The North Carolina State Ports Authority has two ports—Morehead City and Wilmington—with a third under development. Although not a large port, they estimate their security needs are currently $4.24 million, including funds to improve access control and surveillance, communications, waterside and perimeter security, and TWIC compliance. While some of these needs can be delayed, others, such as TWIC compliance, would have to be paid for even if port security funds are not available. This subcommittee also includes ﬁve members from the state of Texas. In Texas, where AAPA has nine public port members, the Port Security Grant program is also critical to their ability to enhance security. Some of these ports, such as Beaumont and Corpus Christi, are strategic military ports— others like Galveston are large cruise ports, and the largest port, Houston, handles much of the petroleum imports and exports in the U.S. and is expanding its container operations. The needs are huge. The Port Security Grant program is critical to their enhancement of security. The lack of sufﬁcient funds has meant delays in worthy security enhancing projects. And then there is California, with three members of the subcommittee. The ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach combined comprise the largest port complex in the nation, handling over 40 percent of the nation’s cargo by value. Much of the projected growth in containerized cargo will be handled by these two ports. Other ports in California include the growing container port of Oakland, the Port of San Diego, and several other smaller niche ports. All are faced by challenges in paying for security during a time of trade growth. The Port of Long Beach has received about $32 million in federal grant funds for security enhancements and has spent over $19 million of its own money. And then there is the costly TWIC implementation on the horizon. For Long Beach, the TWIC implementation estimate is $10 million, and for its sister port, Los Angeles, the TWIC estimate for full implementation of TWIC readers is $12 million. There are many other security priorities the port has identiﬁed that will compete with the TWIC funding.

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Last week we learned what the administration’s proposed FY 2008 budget for the Department of Homeland Security is for the Port Security Grant program. In this budget request, the administration recommends that $210 million be appropriated for the Port Security Grant program. While this is the largest amount the administration has ever recommended as a line item for this program, it is the same amount that Congress appropriated in FY 2007. At the same time the administration is asking for an overall 8 percent increase in DHS’s FY 2008 budget, it is recommending that spending remain ﬂat for port facility security. We ﬁnd this troublesome, especially in light of new security mandates being implemented. When the Maritime Transportation Security Act was enacted ﬁve years ago, the Coast Guard estimated that port facilities would have to spend $5.4 billion over a 10-year period to comply with the new regulations. In the ﬁrst six rounds of the grant program, only $876 million has been made available out of the more than $4.3 billion identiﬁed as eligible port security expenses. For FY 2006, Congress upped the ante 20 percent and appropriated $210 million for port security grants. [Although] we are appreciative of increases in past Port Security Grant program appropriations, we believe an even stronger federal partnership is necessary to help our public ports balance the pressure of competing priorities, such as infrastructure development, environmental initiatives, access improvements, and promoting economic growth. Both the administration and Congress acknowledged this fact in approving the SAFE Port Act legislation, which authorizes $400 million per year for port facility grants. This law was signed by the president only four short months ago. We applaud the congressional leaders and the president who supported and enabled this bill. [Although] the SAFE Port Act provides the authorizing legislation to support a $400 million appropriations level for the Port Security Grant program, that level of funding has yet to be realized. It’s now time for Port Security Grant appropriations to rise to the full authorization amount of $400 million provided in the SAFE Port legislation. The next few years will be especially challenging for the grant program, as the new requirements and program expansions go into effect. The program was expanded signiﬁcantly this year to cover training and exercises. The exercise budget formerly was in TSA. A second pressure will be implementation of the TWIC reader requirements. By providing a strong level of appropriations, Congress can make sure that the ﬁnancial toll of this new TWIC reader mandate is lessened. The Coast Guard’s original estimate, which we believe is low, was around $300 million just for TWIC readers. More funding is needed to meet this new mandate. We also ask that the Appropriations Committee revise its language related to risk-based funding in regard to the TWIC readers. All facilities will have to get readers, although higher risk facilities will need to implement this

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requirement sooner. TWIC money should be made available to all public port facilities and not mostly focused on the high risk facilities, because all must comply. Otherwise this TWIC equipment becomes an unfunded mandate for smaller facilities, many of which have the least amount of ﬁnancial capital to invest in these security requirements. Another stress on this program has been the ability to get funds out quickly. For FY 2008 this program will move to FEMA, as required by recently passed legislation. This program has been moved four times since its inception in 2002, and each move has resulted in an initial lack of grant staff to manage the grants, and a slowdown in the release of the funds. Last year, the Appropriations Committee solved part of this problem by outlining a timetable for the grants. This was very successful and we hope you will continue this next year. It resulted in the grants being opened in January rather than in July. We also hope there will be a quick transfer of personnel to FEMA. The Port Security Grant program is essential to port facilities’ ability to harden security. This program is the lifeblood of facility security enhancements at ports. We have made progress and with your support and growing levels of appropriations, we can continue to meet the goal of securing port facilities while expanding them to meet the trade demands of tomorrow. AAPA supports a funding level of $400 million as called for in the SAFE Port Act. With new TWIC mandates and expansion of the program, these funds will be well used. On behalf of the American Association of Port Authorities and its member U.S. ports, I thank you for your attention to this important issue.

CONTAINER SECURITY CONTAINER SECURITY Capitan Anthony Regalbuto United States Coast Guard Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Marine Transportation March 13, 2002*

As the Director of Port Security for the Office of Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Transportation and Coast Guard’s container security strategy following the attacks of September 11. *

http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/pasttest/02test/Regalbuto1.htm

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If terrorists found a way to use the U.S. aviation industry against our country, they are potentially capable of exploiting vulnerabilities in our marine transportation system as well. As a nation that depends so heavily on the oceans and sea lanes as avenues of prosperity, we must protect our ports, waterways, intermodal connectors, and vessels. The Marine Transportation System of the United States handles more than 2 billion tons of freight, 3 billion tons of oil, and 6 million containers, transports more than 134 million passengers by ferry, and entertains more than 7 million cruise ship passengers each year. Although much attention was rightfully focused on aviation following the September 11 attacks, the Department of Transportation took decisive steps to address the issue of security in all the surface modes of transportation as well. In addition to the U.S. Coast Guard’s quick response to guard the security of American ports and waterways, Secretary Mineta established the National Infrastructure Security Committee (NISC). Through several direct action groups, the NISC was tasked with evaluating transportation infrastructure vulnerabilities, security protocols and processes and recommending changes to improve security. From the direct action group process, other groups have been formed to tackle very speciﬁc security issues. Among these is the Container Working Group—established through the NISC in December. The Container Working Group is tasked with providing recommendations to improve the secure movement of the six million marine containers that enter our nation’s ports and the eleven million trucks and rail containers that cross the Mexican and Canadian borders into America each year. The Container Working group is co-chaired with the U.S. Customs Service and includes representatives from the Departments of Defense, Energy, Commerce, Justice, Agriculture, Health and Human Services (FDA), and others. The group has oversight from the Ofﬁce of Homeland Security. On the front lines of container security is the U.S. Customs Service as well as other federal agencies, and the Container Working Group is studying technologies and business practices that will enable customs and others to prevent high-risk containers from entering the United States or to ensure that they are properly inspected before they pose a threat to the United States. Although the Customs Service utilizes a thoughtful, risk-based selection method, preventing a container from being used as a weapon requires a more complex strategy, enhancing the nonintrusive inspection technology and information used for selection. We are very supportive of the new Customs Container Security Initiative because it builds upon previous work with our international trading partners to improve container security throughout the world’s global supply chain. Likewise, the Department of Transportation, through the new Transportation Security Administration (TSA), will be making every effort to ensure the security of cargo—including containerized cargo—as it moves throughout

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America’s intermodal transportation system. With its congressional mandated deadlines, TSA has been focusing primarily on aviation-related security issues. However, in the months ahead, the new organization will be devoting substantial attention to maritime and surface transportation related security. Equally important in improving port security has been our partnering efforts with the international community. At a recent International Maritime Organization assembly and intersessional working group meetings, the Coast Guard, as the lead agency for the U.S. delegation, introduced numerous security measures for consideration, including vessel, facility, and offshore platform security plans, early implementation of automatic identiﬁcation system transponders for certain international ships, and designation of and training for ship, company, and facility security ofﬁcers. The U.S. government also introduced some preliminary container security measures for consideration with the promise to provide more detailed papers for the Maritime Safety Committee meeting in May 2002 based upon the recommendations of the interagency container working group and Customs’ Container Initiative.

CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE: 2006–2011 STRATEGIC PLAN Ofﬁce of Policy and Planning; Ofﬁce of International Affairs, Container Security Initiative Division, United States Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security August 2006*

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The CBP CSI Strategic Plan relies on a multi-layered approach consisting of three goals and associated objectives and strategies. This section summarizes the essential features of the CSI plan designed to address elements of the terrorist threat involving the global maritime trade community. CSI Strategic Goal 1 — Secure U.S. Borders Secure U.S. borders against terrorists and terrorist weapons by evaluating all containers bound for the United States for terrorist risk before lading at CSI ports. Objective 1.1: Enhance the process for identifying high-risk cargo by receiving and making full use of advance trade data.

* http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/csi_ strategic_plan.ctt/csi_strategic_plan.pdf

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Objective 1.2: Improve the process of screening and examining containers by developing and fully utilizing state-of-the-art technology. Objective 1.3: Promote parity through increased examinations of high-risk containers prior to entering the United States. CSI Strategic Goal 2 — Build a Robust CSI Cargo Security System Build a robust CSI cargo security system that will withstand a terrorist incident and ensure a continuous ﬂow of trade, or promptly resume trade through CSI ports, should a terrorist event occur. Objective 2.1: Advance security of all world nations by promoting an international framework of standards covering data elements, host country examinations, risk management, and detection technology. Objective 2.2: Enhance cargo security and trade facilitation by strategically identifying the optimal trade lanes and ports for inclusion into CSI. Objective 2.3: Expedite the movement of low-risk shipments through the global supply chain. Objective 2.4: Continue to work with other agencies on maritime contingency and recovery plans and efforts. CSI Strategic Goal 3 — Protect and Facilitate Trade Protect and facilitate the movement of legitimate trade by maintaining effectively operating CSI ports, working with host nations to inspect all containers identiﬁed as posing a potential terrorist risk and providing beneﬁts and incentives to international governments and organizations, as well as to our trading partners. Objective 3.1: Increase the effectiveness of CSI by negotiating with host countries to review and request examination of all high-risk shipments identiﬁed by CBP through the Automated Targeting System (ATS). Objective 3.2: Ensure effective coordination with host countries by conducting periodic risk evaluations of ports to assess the level of stafﬁng and other resource needs. Objective 3.3: Encourage interagency cooperation by developing a capacity to collect and share information and trade data gathered from CSI ports. Objective 3.4: Present CSI standards and promote greater participation by international governments, international organizations, trade communities, and other organizations engaged in maritime security. Objective 3.5: Improve CSI operations by evaluating the feasibility of regionalizing management of CSI teams.

INTRODUCTION The priority mission of CBP is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. This extraordinarily important mission means improving security not only at physical borders and ports of entry but

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also globally, in collaboration with other countries and the international trade community. CBP must do this important work while continuing to perform our traditional missions. These include apprehending individuals attempting to enter the United States illegally, stemming the ﬂow of illegal drugs and other contraband, protecting our agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests and diseases, protecting American businesses from theft of their intellectual property rights, regulating and facilitating international trade, collecting import duties, and enforcing U.S. trade laws. In FY 2005, CBP processed 20 million sea, truck, and rail containers entering the United States in 29 million trade entries, collected $31.4 billion in import duties, seized 2 million pounds of illegal drugs, and processed 431 million passengers and pedestrians. CBP must perform this security and border-related work while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel that is so important to our nation’s economy. In other words, we have “twin goals”—building more secure and more efficient borders. The border authority of CBP is unsurpassed in defense of national interests because examinations of cargo or persons do not require search warrants, probable cause, or particularized suspicion. In order to allow for the movement of legitimate travel and trade, CBP uses all resources at its disposal to target travelers and cargo that pose a risk for terrorism and to facilitate the ﬂow of legitimate trade. CSI is one important resource to accomplish this mission. CSI helps to secure an indispensable link in the chain of global trade: maritime containerized shipping. Since CSI was unveiled in January 2002, it has become a part of our government’s strategy to secure the nation from the potential terrorist threat using maritime cargo containers. To implement the CSI program, CBP deploys multi-disciplined teams to selected foreign seaports of countries that have bilaterally agreed to implement the CSI program. CSI ofﬁcials partner with foreign governments to identify cargo containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism and inspect those containers at the foreign ports before they are shipped to the United States. Through use of advanced technology, sharing of trade data, and expanded collaboration, CSI ofﬁcials work to enhance maritime security. CSI initially became operational in the top twenty largest-volume ports that export to the United States. CBP now intends to expand CSI to other ports, based on strategic importance related to terrorist threats. This Strategic Plan outlines this intention and other goals and objectives that CSI plans to accomplish to both protect and facilitate global maritime trade.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT ON “SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY” To the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Investigations, and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce January 2008*

Oceangoing cargo containers play a vital role in the movement of cargo between global trading partners. In FY 2007, more than 10 million oceangoing cargo containers arrived at U.S. seaports—meaning roughly 28,000 oceangoing containers arrived each day that year. The terrorist attacks of 2001 heightened concerns about the ability of both the federal government and companies participating in international maritime commerce to identify and prevent weapons of mass destruction from being smuggled inside cargo containers bound for the United States. Balancing security concerns with the need to facilitate the free ﬂow of commerce remains an ongoing challenge for the public and private sectors alike. In the federal government, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is charged with managing, securing, and controlling the nation’s border and in its capacity as the frontline border security agency, plays a lead role in facing maritime threats. CBP launched the Container Security Initiative (CSI) in January 2002, which through partnerships with its foreign counterparts, is designed to help protect global trade lanes by targeting and examining container cargo that poses a threat as early as possible in the global supply chain. As part of the program, foreign governments allow CBP ofﬁcers to be stationed at foreign seaports. These ofﬁcers use intelligence and automated risk-assessment information to target shipments to identify those at risk of containing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other terrorist contraband. CBP and host government ofﬁcials share the role of assessing the risk of U.S.-bound container cargo leaving the seaports of countries participating in CSI. CBP ofﬁcers at the CSI seaports are responsible for targeting high-risk cargo shipped in containers and other tasks, whereas host government customs ofﬁcials examine the high-risk cargo—when requested by CBP—by scanning containers using various types of non-intrusive inspection equipment, such as large-scale X-ray machines, or by physically searching the container’s contents before it travels to the United States. As part of its strategic plan, CBP is partnering with international trade and security groups to develop supply chain security standards that can be implemented by the world community. By engaging international organizations, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08187.pdf

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CBP is contributing to the development of global security standards. Recent legislative actions intended to further enhance maritime security also updated requirements that affect CSI. In October 2006, Congress passed and the president signed legislation—the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act)2—establishing a statutory framework for CSI, which previously had been an agency initiative not speciﬁcally required by law. The act imposed various mandates, such as requiring CBP to take risk factors including cargo volume into account when designating seaports as CSI participants. In August 2007, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) was enacted, which requires, among other things, 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound cargo containers by foreign seaports by 2012, with possible extensions for some ports—replacing a similar provision in the SAFE Port Act that did not have a deadline.3 We have previously reported on CSI’s progress in meeting its strategic goals and objectives. Our July 2003 and April 2005 reports on CSI acknowledged the program’s important role in helping to enhance homeland security, but we also recommended actions to enhance the strategic planning for the program, such as better deﬁning its goals, objectives, and performance measures. In addition, we recommended actions to strengthen the program’s management and operations, such as conducting human capital planning (which affects CBP stafﬁng levels at seaports) and establishing minimum technical capability requirements for equipment used to examine high-risk containers.4 Recognizing the importance of the CSI program, you asked us to conduct another review. For this report, we assessed the following issues: • How has CBP contributed to strategic planning for supply chain security efforts and the CSI program in particular, and what progress has been made in achieving CSI performance goals? • How has CBP strengthened CSI operations in response to our 2005 review, and what challenges, if any, remain? • How does CBP evaluate CSI seaport operations and assess program performance overall, and how has this process changed over time?

To address these objectives, we met with CBP ofﬁcials who have program responsibilities for CSI, and reviewed available program data and documentation. Speciﬁcally, to review CBP’s strategic planning initiatives, we reviewed national-level strategic planning documents and those created for DHS, CBP, and CSI. To determine CBP’s progress in achieving its CSI program goals, we reviewed CBP’s statistical data on container cargo and CSI program activities. To learn about how CBP has strengthened its operations, we reviewed our previous assessments of the CSI program, and examined CBP’s efforts to implement our three prior recommendations. To

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assess CBP’s progress, we met with CBP ofﬁcials at the U.S. National Targeting Center-Cargo (NTCC) in Virginia and three domestic seaports in different geographical locations representing varying volumes of container trafﬁc.5 We also visited six CSI seaports located overseas that were selected based on several factors, including geographic and strategic signiﬁcance, volume of container trafﬁc, and when CSI operations began at the seaport. The results from our visits to seaports provided examples of CBP and host government operations but cannot be generalized beyond the seaports visited because we did not use statistical sampling techniques in selecting the seaports. To determine what progress CBP has made in strengthening its tools for monitoring and measuring the progress of the CSI program, we reviewed the performance measures presented in the CSI strategic plan against criteria developed by the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, and GAO. We also reviewed a no-representative sample of CSI team evaluations. While these documents provided examples about program evaluation methods and CSI program operations, and generally corroborated our seaport site-visit observations, our ﬁndings cannot be generalized to the program as a whole. We conducted this performance audit from May 2006 through January 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufﬁcient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our ﬁndings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our ﬁndings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is contained in appendix I.

RESULTS IN BRIEF CBP contributed to a new strategic planning document to guide efforts to secure the international supply chain, updated the CSI strategic plan, and reported achieving key CSI goals by increasing both the number of CSI locations and the proportion of total U.S.-bound containers passing through CSI seaports. By supporting the development of the Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security that DHS was required to produce in accordance with the SAFE Port Act, and by revising and enhancing the strategic plan for CSI, as we had previously recommended, CBP has contributed to overall strategic planning efforts related to supply-chain security. The supply chain security strategy, issued in July 2007, delineates the supply chain security roles, responsibilities, and authorities of federal, state, local, and private sector entities, and describes how CBP’s portfolio of initiatives to address supply chain security, including CSI, is coordinated throughout the supply chain. As to achieving CSI performance goals, in FY

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2007, CBP reached its targets of operating CSI in 58 foreign seaports and having 86 percent of all U.S.-bound containers passing through CSI seaports—where, according to CBP, there is an opportunity for the high-risk cargo to be examined at foreign seaports before reaching the United States. These results represent a continued increase in both of these measures of CSI performance since CSI’s inception in 2002. Also, CBP reported increases in the number of high-risk cargo containers examined by host governments at CSI seaports. To strengthen CSI operations over the last 2 years, CBP has sought to address human capital challenges and enhance relationships with host governments participating in CSI, but operational challenges remain. Our 2005 CSI report noted that CBP had not achieved its goal of targeting all U.S.bound containers passing through CSI seaports for high-risk cargo before they depart for the United States because, in part, the agency had not been able to place enough staff at some CSI seaports. CBP has subsequently taken steps to implement related recommendations, including increasing overall stafﬁng levels just above the 203 positions called for in its stafﬁng allocation model by, among other things, adding 125 permanent staff to CSI seaports and 15 staff to the NTCC, resulting in a parallel increase in the volume of container cargo that is targeted. Nevertheless, CBP continues to rely, in part, on a temporary workforce at CSI seaports and the NTCC; has yet to determine how to optimize its stafﬁng resources even as the CSI program expands; and reports difﬁculties in identifying sufﬁcient numbers of qualiﬁed individuals to hire for the program. In addition, ﬁndings from our CSI port site visits and our review of select CSI evaluations conducted by CBP suggest that relationships with host governments have improved over time, leading to increased information sharing between governments and a bolstering of host government customs and port security practices, among other things. However, we also found that levels of collaboration between U.S. and host government ofﬁcials varied across CSI seaports, and we identiﬁed hurdles to cooperation between CSI teams and their counterparts in the host government, such as host country legal restrictions that CBP ofﬁcials said prevent CSI teams from observing examinations. CBP also continues to face logistical difﬁculties inherent in a seaport environment, often outside of its control, such as highrisk container cargo that is infeasible to access for examination. CBP has enhanced how it collects data about CSI operations by strengthening its approach to on-site evaluations of teams of CBP officers at CSI seaports and has refined certain program-wide performance measures, but weaknesses remain in CBP’s evaluation and performance measurement efforts. Also, CBP lacks a process for systematically gathering information on the equipment, people, and processes used by host governments to examine U.S.-bound cargo containers identified as high-risk. Specifically, CBP has recently improved its process for conducting evalua-

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tions at CSI seaports by, among other things, testing the proficiency of the CBP officers who must identify high-risk cargo, and by introducing an electronic tool that enables CBP evaluation teams to systematically record their evaluative data. However, evaluators do not always use the data collection tools as intended, which makes it difficult for CBP to ensure that evaluations are consistently carried out or that evaluative data are reliable for management decisions. Also evaluators do not always follow up on recommendations made in previous evaluation reports—so CBP cannot ensure that previously identified problems have been addressed. Also, CBP has not set minimum technical capability criteria for equipment used at CSI seaports, as we recommended in April 2005 and as required under the SAFE Port Act for CSI and the 9/11 Act for future 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound containers. Without such criteria and systematically collected information on equipment, people, and processes involved in each host government’s cargo, CBP does not have a sound basis for determining the reliability of the examination systems used at CSI seaports, which is of particular importance because only a small fraction of U.S.-bound high-risk containers are reexamined upon arrival in the United States. With respect to assessing CSI performance overall, over the past 2 years, CBP has revised its performance measurement system to provide decision makers with more accurate indicators of the program’s progress—by setting some specific performance targets and modifying some existing measures—and to reflect CSI’s continuing maturation. However, we identified limitations with the CSI performance measures, such as the omission of measures for a key core CSI function, the lack of annual performance targets, and misleading or confusing methods for calculating several performance measures. These limitations may potentially make it difficult for CBP and DHS managers and Congress to appropriately provide program oversight. We are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of CBP to take actions to help ensure that the agency has the information necessary to ensure that CSI is operating efﬁciently and effectively. Speciﬁcally, we are recommending that CBP (1) strengthen its process for evaluating CSI teams at overseas ports by maintaining evaluation data, ensuring evaluation teams follow procedures, and monitoring the completions of recommendations from previous evaluations; (2) improve, in collaboration with host government ofﬁcials, the information gathered about the host governments’ examination systems to determine their reliability and whether mitigating actions or incentives are necessary to provide the desired level of security; and (3) enhance CSI performance measurement processes to better assess CSI performance overall. We provided a draft of this report to the Department of State and DHS for their review and comment. The Department of State did not provide written

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comments but provided technical comments, which have been incorporated into the report as appropriate. DHS provided written comments— incorporating comments from CBP—on December 20, 2007, which are presented in Appendix II. In its written comments, DHS and CBP concurred with our recommendation on strengthening its process for evaluating CSI teams at overseas locations. CBP partially concurred with our recommendation to improve information gathered about host government examination systems. CBP agreed on the importance of an accepted examination process and noted it continues to take steps to address improvements in the information gathered about host governments’ examination systems at CSI ports by working directly with host government counterparts through the World Customs Organization, and providing capacity building training and technical assistance. [Although] CBP does engage in capacity building with some CSI host governments, it does not systematically collect or assess information on the people, processes, or technology used by these host governments to examine high-risk U.S.-bound containers, and thus has limited assurance that CSI host government examination systems can detect and identify WMDs. Finally, CBP partially concurred with our recommendation to enhance CSI performance measures to better assess CSI performance overall. CBP stated that it believes its current measures address core program functions of targeting and collaboration with host governments to mitigate or substantiate the risk of a maritime container destined for the United States. We disagree. As discussed in this report, a core element of the CSI program, speciﬁcally the extent to which U.S.-bound containers carrying high-risk cargo are examined at CSI seaports, is not addressed through CBP’s performance measures.

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY Michael J. Crye President, International Council of Cruise Lines Before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, and the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources December 13, 2005*

Good morning, Chairmen and members of the committee. My name is Michael Crye; I am the President of the International Council of Cruise Lines. Thank you for the opportunity to present testimony on behalf of the cruise industry. *

http://www.iccl.org/pressroom/crye_testimony_12-13-05.pdf

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The ICCL is the cruise industry trade association representing 15 leading cruise lines and approximately 100 companies providing goods and services to the member lines. Our members carry approximately 90 percent of the passengers in the North American vacation market. The mission of the ICCL is to participate in the regulatory and policy development process and promote all measures that foster a safe, secure, and healthy cruise ship environment. The ICCL advocates industry positions, actively monitors international shipping policy, and helps to formulate, review, and update best industry practices for and among its membership on a wide variety of issues. The trade association regularly attends meetings as a nongovernmental consultative organization to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and also represents its membership at the International Labor Organization. ICCL vessels operate around the globe and call at more than 800 ports worldwide. Today, I am testifying about our security practices and jurisdictional protocols, and how many people have cruised safely over the past few years; however, there have been a few passengers that have regrettably had other experiences. My testimony cannot lessen their pain, no matter how rare the incidents are that we talk of today. It doesn’t make them any less relevant or serious. We recognize that and send our sympathies and condolences to those passengers and their families. Over the past 20 years, the cruise industry has grown at a rate of approximately 8 percent per year while continuing to be rated as one of the highest vacation options with outstanding guest approval ratings. The industry also has an enviable record when it comes to safety and security. In 1995, the U.S. Coast Guard published the Report of the Cruise Ship Safety Review Task Force and issued the following opinion: “Passenger Vessels operating from US ports are among the safest modes of transportation available.” I know of no reason for this opinion to have changed in the past ten years. For many years, cruise lines have had on-board security plans and procedures in place. These plans were tested by the events of 9/11. That day, by any measure, was a landmark event for the United States as well as the international community. On the afternoon of 9/11, the ICCL convened a conference call of our membership and, by acclimation, our members raised shipboard and terminal security practices to the highest level that was identiﬁed under the existing security plans on ﬁle with the U.S. Coast Guard. These practices, which form the base line for what is in place today, include x-raying or examining every person, piece of luggage, and all supplies loaded on board the vessels. All passengers are screened prior to boarding and properly identiﬁed with appropriate reservations and traveling documents. Each crewmember, under longstanding practice for vessels operating from U.S. ports, holds a U.S. seafarers visa and has thus undergone a U.S. State Department background check prior to visa issuance and serving on the vessels. Because of

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these proactive measures, ICCL members achieved the highest security level on the morning of Sept. 12, 2001, an achievement that many other modes of transportation continue to struggle with today. In addition, beginning on Sept. 12, 2001, the ICCL began a series of daily conference calls with U.S. security agencies that lasted for approximately the next 90 days. In the aftermath of 9/11, Congress passed landmark legislation, the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), and concurrently, the United States led the way to a new international agreement called the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which was ﬁnalized at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as part of the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea in 2002. MTSA and the ISPS Code became effective throughout the world on July 1, 2004. Under both U.S. law as well as the ISPS Code, cruise ship security plans and practices were utilized as the blueprint for the development of those that are applicable throughout maritime industry today. These security requirements include: Comprehensive ship and terminal security assessments, extensive ship and terminal security plans that are approved by relevant authorities, designation of qualiﬁed company, ship, and terminal security ofﬁcers, mandatory security drills and exercises, Ship Security Alert Systems, periodic audits with subsequent updating of security plans as indicated, and requirements for improved communication and coordination between ship and terminal operators. In the United States and other countries, requirements have been enacted so that ships must provide speciﬁc pre-arrival or pre-departure information to appropriate authorities. That information includes the name, date of birth, address, citizenship, passport or traveling document number, and other data for each and every person on board. This information, normally provided 96 hours before arrival in port and prior to departure for any cruise ship whose voyage is originating in the United States, is screened by authorities to identify persons who should not be sailing or are wanted for some crime. The ICCL is proud to have played an important role in the development of the world standard for security practices. These practices have been proven to be effective for our member operators and demonstrate that in the event of a security incident, there is an established plan that can be rapidly implemented. Each and every crewmember on board and in the management chain knows what his or her responsibilities are and has the training to accomplish his/her assigned responsibilities. These are the goals of any effective security plan, and we have very mature programs in this regard. There has been much debate over the idea that ships that are not ﬂagged in the United States must rely, at least to some degree, on foreign governments to provide protection for U.S. citizens. However, various nations, such as the United States, can and regularly do assert jurisdiction over ICCL vessels under international law based upon a number of well-established factors.

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Congress can enact criminal laws that apply extraterritorially if any of the ﬁve criteria below are met: • First there is “territorial” jurisdiction. If a ship enters or an act occurs within the territory of a particular country, then that country’s laws apply. This is true for any international traveler. Legally, a ship is also considered to be part of the territory of the ﬂag state where it is registered, and thus the ﬂag state’s laws also apply on board that ship, in addition to the laws of the country where the ship is physically located. • Second, under the “national” theory, the country where any alleged criminal perpetrator resides has jurisdiction over a matter involving the perpetrator’s conduct. • Third, the nation with custody of any alleged perpetrator for certain types of crimes can claim jurisdiction under the “universality” principle. Piracy, for example, has been identiﬁed as such a criminal act and every country has jurisdiction to take enforcement action against persons in that country’s territory for acts of piracy that occur on the high seas. • Fourth, under the “passive personality” doctrine, the nation where the victim resides can exercise jurisdiction over the matter, regardless of where it occurs. • And ﬁfth, any country whose national interests are affected by an incident can assert “protective” jurisdiction.

From the above discussion one can identify events that could occur for which a number of different countries could have jurisdiction and authority to take enforcement action. The United States can and does assert jurisdiction based on the residence and location of the victim or perpetrator, the site of the incident, the nature of the act in question, or our own national interest in the matter, regardless of any other factors, such as the ship’s registration or itinerary. For example: consider a criminal act perpetrated against a U.S. citizen occurring on a Bahamian ﬂagged ship in the territorial waters of Spain. All three countries may have jurisdiction to apply their laws, to investigate, and to take criminal action. It becomes a matter of diplomatic negotiation as to which country takes the lead in applying its laws and which country follows. Congress has recognized these well-established principles, and has passed several laws that reinforce the notion that the United States may enforce its laws on board ships wherever they operate in the world when U.S. citizens or interests are involved. Crimes Committed Within the Special Maritime Jurisdiction of the United States (arson 18 USC 81, assault 18 USC 113, maiming 18 USC 114, murder 18 USC 1111, homicide 18 USC 1112, kidnapping 18 USC 1201, sexual assault, rape 18 USC 2241, and robbery and burglary 18 USC 2111) The “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” has been expanded to include any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation when the offense is committed by or against a national of the United States (see 18 U.S.C. § 7(7)). Among the offenses within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States are the crimes of murder,

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manslaughter, maiming, kidnapping, rape, assault, and robbery. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 7(1) there is also jurisdiction over such offenses when they are committed on the high seas or any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States that is out of the jurisdiction of any particular state. See USAM 9-20.000 et seq. (Maritime, Territorial, and Indian Jurisdiction). In addition, 14 USC 89 provides the U.S. Coast Guard with very broad authority to enforce the laws of the United States on the high seas. Sec. 89 Law enforcement (a) The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the United States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty ofﬁcers may at any time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the ship’s documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance. When from such inquiries, examination, inspection, or search it appears that a breach of the laws of the United States rendering a person liable to arrest is being, or has been committed, by any person, such person shall be arrested or, if escaping to shore, shall be immediately pursued and arrested on shore, or other lawful and appropriate action shall be taken; or, if it shall appear that a breach of the laws of the United States has been committed so as to render such vessel, or the merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of, or brought into the United States by, such vessel, liable to forfeiture, or so as to render such vessel liable to a ﬁne or penalty and if necessary to secure such ﬁne or penalty, such vessel or such merchandise, or both, shall be seized. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency in enforcing the 18 USC provisions outlined above. In recognition of this fact, in 1999 our membership issued the following public statement implementing a policy of “zero tolerance for crime”: “This policy establishes a single industry standard that requires allegations of onboard crime be reported to the appropriate law enforcement authorities which, for vessels calling on U.S. ports, or crime involving U.S. citizens, would include the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Our companies, and our industry as a whole, have zero tolerance for crimes committed on our vessels. If crimes do occur, the appropriate law enforcement authorities will be called in to investigate and prosecute to the fullest extent of the law. We will continue to cooperate with the authorities to ensure that perpetrators of crime are brought to justice.” Our commitment in this regard extends equally to law enforcement authorities in other nations, and I therefore draw your attention to international agreements regarding law enforcement between different nations. For example, the Commonwealth of the Bahamas is a ﬂag state where many ICCL

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member ships are registered. As a commonwealth, the Bahamas has extensive ties to the United Kingdom, including coordination of law enforcement and national defense. Most Bahamian laws are derived from UK laws, their courts are very similarly constituted, and the Bahamas maintains a number of bilateral and multilateral law enforcement agreements with the United States. In addition, the Bahamas is signatory to a number of mutual defense treaties involving the Americas, as are most of our Caribbean neighbors. The membership of ICCL has an excellent cooperative relationship with the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP), where we are establishing and enhancing systems for ensuring a comprehensive database exists for vetting those persons wishing to work or do business with the cruise industry. These efforts merely supplement our close working relationship with the FBI and local law enforcement authorities in the ports we serve throughout the United States. To summarize, the cruise industry is one of the most highly regulated industries in the world today. U.S. law protects American passengers on board cruise ships. The United States is signatory to a number of maritime bilateral and multilateral agreements with other countries that allow for investigation and prosecution of crimes against Americans. The U.S. Coast Guard has jurisdiction over all ships entering U.S. ports, regardless of ﬂag. The FBI, by virtue of federal statutes and long-standing legal precedent, has jurisdiction to investigate allegations of serious crimes on ships. This power speciﬁcally extends to incidents in international waters involving Americans. The FBI routinely exercises this authority throughout the shipping industry. By contrast, victims of crime occurring ashore in foreign countries not in connection with a cruise rarely have recourse to the FBI or its extensive national and international resources. Through this discussion, I trust I have answered your inquiry regarding what international and national laws pertain to security of Americans on board ships traveling outside of territorial waters. Next, I would like to give an overview of cruise ship security that will address the subcommittee’s remaining questions. Ships are mobile. They travel from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, crossing state and national boundaries. Therefore, as outlined, a variety of governmental entities exercise law enforcement authority over each ship based upon where it is located. As mentioned above, alleged criminal acts involving U.S. citizens are reported to the appropriate law enforcement agencies, which may include the FBI. Other incidents affecting security are reported to the ﬂag state, in addition to any reporting requirements applicable in the United States, such as Coast Guard incident reports. Available information indicates that incidents on board ships are extremely low compared to similar incidents reported ashore, undoubtedly due to the nature of a cruise ship environment where passengers and crew are screened and access is strictly limited.

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NATIONAL STATISTICS: Missing Persons Ashore • More than 2,000 people are reported missing in the United States every day (FBI). • On average, there are over 100,000 missing persons listed in the National Crime Information System (NCIC). • Therefore, in the United States, one person out of every 2800 goes missing every year.

Cruise • More than 10 million people went on cruise vacations in 2004. • From reports, it can be estimated that 13 persons (passengers) have gone missing off ICCL member cruise ships in the past two years. • Therefore in these two years, less than 1 person per 1 million passengers went missing.

Crime • 1 in every 1,000 people is raped or sexually assaulted each year according to the Bureau of Justice (BJS) • Cruise ships: 1 alleged sexual assault per 100,000 passengers (based on statistics produced in a court case) • According to the FBI, there were 1.4 million offenses of violent crime (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault) in 2004. • National Rate: 465.5 violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants • Approximately 50 cruise ship crimes against U.S. citizens are reported to the FBI each year (FBI) • Cruise ships: 1 crime per 200,000 cruise passengers

[Although] incidents of crime on board cruise ships are rare, we are not dismissive, nor do we shirk our responsibility as an industry to acknowledge and address such matters. For those individuals who are missing loved ones, the ICCL and our membership extend our deepest sympathies and assure them that our membership takes all such allegations and conﬁrmed incidents very seriously, reports them to the proper authorities, and fully cooperates in any investigation. A cruise ship is comparable to a secure building with a 24-hour security guard. Because vessels operate in a controlled environment, access to the ship

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can be strictly enforced. Crime is extremely rare on board cruise vessels, as shown by our previous discussion and in comparison to similar incidents reported ashore. Nevertheless, it is important for all travelers to be observant of one’s possessions and in control of one’s faculties at all times. Cruise passengers are reminded of this, as they are in any hotel, by safety information, daily bulletins, port visit brieﬁngs, and the provision of a room safe or safety deposit box. If there are any particular dangers that warrant the implementation of higher security levels on the ship, the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) requires that passengers be given a brieﬁng to ensure awareness. All ships operated by ICCL lines maintain strict security protocols, with concomitant training, in compliance with a number of national and international mandates. These are set forth in more detail below. • Each ship has a designated security ofﬁcer and a team of security personnel whose sole responsibility is safety and security. • Ship security personnel are typically former military or law enforcement from around the world and are trained speciﬁcally in respect to maritime security as set forth in the ISPS Code and MTSA regulations. • Extensive security plans were in effect and approved by the U.S. Coast Guard from 1996–2004. In 2004, these plans were updated in accordance with ISPS Code requirements. • These plans enable the ship to increase its security measures at a moment’s notice. Ship security personnel are trained in the basic principles of crime scene preservation. Customarily, the scene will be secured awaiting release by the appropriate law enforcement authority.

On a regular basis as well as upon request, the ICCL facilitates the exchange of information between a cruise line and the appropriate law enforcement organizations. Additionally, the ICCL assists in the dissemination of information between ICCL member lines when a security incident is of industry interest. Facilitation is provided by means of e-mails, conference calls, and more often through meetings of the ICCL security committee. In the case of a piracy incident, cruise ships are ﬁtted with Ship Security Alert Systems to immediately notify a competent authority of the attack. The security teams on board are well trained in methods of repelling pirates; however, it is industry policy to not discuss operational security matters in public forums. The ICCL’s role in such an incident is to facilitate the exchange of information between government agencies and the cruise line involved. The ICCL will also ensure that all our other member lines are aware of the incident and can take proactive measures for any ships they may have in the vicinity. The ICCL security committee is comprised of corporate security ofﬁcers from each cruise line. Many of these corporate security ofﬁcers have backgrounds in law enforcement, the military, or the FBI. Committee meetings have taken place approximately every 60 days since 1996, and include various

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government enforcement and intelligence agencies to share port and ship law enforcement and criminal information as well as federal intelligence assessments and terrorism information. Agencies involved on either a temporary or permanent basis include: • • • • • • • • • •

United States Coast Guard Department of Transportation S-60 Ofﬁce of Naval Intelligence Department of State United States Customs and Border Protection Federal Bureau of Investigation Department of Defense Central Intelligence Agency Department of Homeland Security Transportation Security Administration

For the purpose of these meetings and sharing classiﬁed intelligence and threat assessments, several members of ICCL and the ICCL Security Committee have obtained secret security clearances. In these meetings, items such as best practices, methods of information sharing, threat analysis, and coordination are routinely discussed with the speciﬁc intent of increased security and safety. The success and value of these information-sharing meetings can be gauged by the fact the principals from both industry and the government have continued these meetings for the past nine years despite no requirement to do so. With regard to training, most of the training provided to company or shipboard personnel is a function of individual company security requirements as mandated by MTSA and/or the ISPS Code. However, the ICCL may facilitate these efforts, as exempliﬁed by a recent international conference, the ISPS Implementation Workshop, which was jointly hosted with the Florida-Caribbean Cruise Association and the American Association of Port Authorities. This conference focused on the new requirements of the ISPS Code and was attended by 100 representatives from cruise lines, government ofﬁcials, and countries representing the greater Caribbean Basin, Mexico, and South America. The ICCL has, upon invitation from our member lines, participated in several company security training sessions. Additionally, ICCL and ICCL member cruise lines have participated in numerous regional IMO-sponsored training sessions and security exercises conducted by the United States Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security. As mentioned earlier, ICCL executives fully participated in the drafting and development of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code at the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which implemented port and vessel security procedures worldwide. Members of the ICCL staff regularly participate in federal committees or working groups such as the Data Management Improvement Act Task Force, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Airport

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and Seaport Inspections User Fee Advisory Committee, and the Department of State Shipping Coordinating Committee. In addition, a senior member of the ICCL staff is currently serving on the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee, which provides advice to the Department of Homeland Security regarding matters of national maritime security strategy and policy, international cooperation on security issues and actions required to meet current and future security threats. To conclude, cruising continues to be one of the safest modes of transportation available today. Our highest priority is the safety and security of our passengers, crew, and vessels, and our safety record is a testament, as over 90 million people have safely sailed on cruise ships over the past 20 years. We will continue to work with law enforcement agencies around the world to make sure we have the latest intelligence and security measures in place. [Although] it is impossible for an outsider to feel the pain of families who are missing their loved ones, what we can do as an industry is to do our best to minimize the chances of crime of any sort on our ships, and if it happens, to do our best to ensure those crimes are properly investigated and prosecuted.

Notes

1. A watchlisted person is a passenger whose name or other biographic data matches or is very close to that of a person listed in the Terrorist Screening Center’s database of approximately 200,000 names of known or suspected terrorists. A targeted person is a non-watchlisted person who has been selected to be given additional scrutiny at the port of entry only for this particular trip. Such selection would be based on a variety of expert screening activities. 2. Pub. L. No. 109–347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006). 3. Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1701(a) 121 Stat. 266, 489-90 (2007) (amending 6 U.S.C. § 982(b)). Also, see GAO, Maritime Security: Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later. GAO-08-126T. (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007), mainly pages 31 to 35, and 44 to 48 for more detail on the requirements included in the SAFE Port and 9/11 Acts that affect the CSI program. 4. GAO, Container Security: A Flexible Stafﬁng Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts, GAO-05-557 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005), and GAO, Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors, GAO-03-770 (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2003). 5. At the time of our engagement, we met with ofﬁcials from the NTC. The NTC was established in response to the need for proactive targeting aimed to prevent acts of terror and to seize, deter, and disrupt terrorists and/or implements of terror. The NTC originally combined both passenger and cargo targeting in one facility. It was later divided into the National Targeting Center-Cargo (NTCC) and the National Targeting Center-Passenger (NTCP). By convention, we will use NTCC in our references because its mission is to support CBP cargo targeting operations.

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U.S. Organizational Structure: The Role of the Executive

INTERAGENCY FRAMEWORK COMBATING TERRORISM: INTERAGENCY FRAMEWORK AND AGENCY PROGRAMS TO ADDRESS THE OVERSEAS THREAT GAO Report May 2003*

The National Security Council and its Director for Combating Terrorism develop and manage the interagency framework for combating terrorism overseas. This framework consists of presidential directives, national strategies, and related guidance. For example, the National Security Council coordinated the overall National Security Strategy of the United States of America, and the Director for Combating Terrorism coordinated the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. There are other national-level strategies related to combating terrorism. Examples of these include the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass *

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03165.pdf

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Destruction. The various strategies were developed for speciﬁc and separate purposes. There is a general hierarchy among these overlapping strategies. Another key element in the interagency framework for combating terrorism overseas is the speciﬁc roles played by federal organizations and agencies. Some play a coordinating role, others serve a lead role in speciﬁc areas, and many others have support roles for speciﬁc activities. Some individual agencies have positions designated within them to lead their agencies’ terrorismrelated programs. In addition, individual agencies have their own strategic plans or develop interagency plans and related guidance for speciﬁc functions. For example, the Department of Justice’s Strategic Plan for FY 2001–2006 and the Department of State’s 2002 Annual Performance Plan provide departmentspeciﬁc plans and goals related to terrorism. The interagency framework also consists of coordinating mechanisms and groups to implement the functions and activities among all the federal agencies involved. In Washington DC, the National Security Council plays a major coordinating role by sponsoring a policy coordinating committee called the Counterterrorism Security Group that has several subordinate working groups on such topics as interagency exercises and assistance to other countries. At U.S. embassies there are interagency teams that meet to coordinate bilateral efforts to combat terrorism. Similarly, regional military commands have interagency coordination groups that coordinate military operations with nonmilitary tools to combat terrorism. Gathering and analyzing intelligence outside of the United States are the major activities to detect and prevent terrorist activities overseas, and generally are led by the Central Intelligence Agency. Under the overall leadership of that agency, U.S. intelligence agencies gather information on terrorist organizations, monitor terrorist threats, and share information with other nations. The Departments of State, Justice, and Defense collect and analyze intelligence through surveillance programs and liaisons with foreign police. These intelligence activities support other preventative efforts, such as protecting U.S. facilities and Americans overseas, and visa and border controls. Protecting U.S. facilities and Americans overseas is a major part of preventing terrorism and is generally led by the Department of State. To protect U.S. facilities and personnel abroad, [The Department of] State has programs that include facility security, local guard forces, armored vehicles for embassy personnel, and Marine guards to protect sensitive information. The Department of Defense has separate programs to protect its military forces against terrorist attacks. For American citizens traveling and living abroad, the State Department issues public travel warnings and public announcements, and operates warning systems to convey terrorist-related information. [The Department of] State also uses overseas advisory councils—voluntary partnerships between [the Department of] State and U.S. businesses—to exchange threat information with private companies. Improving the image of the United States to support U.S. foreign policy is another activity to prevent terrorism. For example, in an attempt to reduce

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possible negative perceptions of the United States and foster greater understanding of U.S. policy in key international audiences, State conducts public diplomacy through various media. Similarly, the Broadcasting Board of Governors conducts international broadcasts to worldwide audiences to help support U.S. strategic interests. Keeping terrorists and their materials out of the United States also helps to prevent terrorism. The State Department has a role in preventing terrorists from entering the United States through its visa programs and related efforts to screen out terrorists. Agencies that have recently transferred from various departments to the Department of Homeland Security also have a role in keeping terrorists and their contraband out of the United States. These include the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Border Patrol, the former U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard, which monitor the border at and between ports of entry. Improving other countries’ capabilities is another part of preventing terrorism, and is generally led by the Department of State. The department has overall leadership of bilateral relations, including programs to assist foreign nations. Such programs consist of training, equipment, and other assistance to improve foreign police and military capabilities. While the State Department has the overall lead, many of these assistance programs are implemented in conjunction with the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, Energy, and the Treasury. One example is the Antiterrorism Assistance Program, which is managed by State, but the training might be delivered by other agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the U.S. Secret Service. These assistance efforts not only help to prevent terrorist attacks, they can improve the capabilities of other countries to disrupt and destroy terrorists and to respond to terrorist incidents. Diplomacy and cooperation with other countries, led by the Department of State, enables that department and other federal agencies to undertake a number of efforts to combat terrorism. State manages bilateral and multilateral relationships to leverage opportunities for cooperation among traditional and emerging allies. At the bilateral level, State helps orchestrate other nations’ support and assistance for U.S. law enforcement activities, ﬁnancial operations, and military actions against terrorists. At the multilateral level, State leads U.S. efforts in the United Nations and in other international forums to combat terrorism. For example, State has introduced and coordinated the passage of several related United Nations Security Council Resolutions to combat terrorism. Law enforcement efforts are also a key activity to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, and generally are led by the Department of Justice and its Federal Bureau of Investigation. These include efforts, in conjunction with other nations, to investigate terrorist incidents, make arrests, arrange for the return of suspects to the United States, and prosecute alleged terrorists. In such investigations, the Departments of State and the Treasury,

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[along with] other law enforcement agencies, support the Department of Justice. Taking action against the ﬁnancial structure of terrorist organizations also plays a key role in disrupting and destroying the organizations and preventing future attacks. Numerous components of the Departments of State, the Treasury, Homeland Security, Justice, and other agencies participate in efforts to combat terrorist ﬁnancing. Activities include blocking or freezing assets of designated individuals and organizations linked to terrorism and conducting investigations aimed at identifying, tracing, and freezing assets tied to terrorist organizations. Military operations are important in disrupting and destroying terrorist organizations and generally are led by the Department of Defense with support at the multilateral level provided by the Department of State. Operations in Afghanistan bluntly illustrate the devastating nature of military efforts to attack terrorist organizations. Many of the military operations are conducted or coordinated with foreign militaries. Another means of disrupting and destroying terrorists is to strike secretly at terrorists through covert action, approved by the President and led by the Central Intelligence Agency. The federal government takes many advance preparations in anticipation of a terrorist attack. For example, each diplomatic post has an Emergency Action Committee and Emergency Action Plan. The committees are required to exercise these plans periodically. To improve the government-wide responses to a terrorist incident, a number of federal agencies participate in an interagency exercise program. Federal efforts to respond to terrorist incidents are organized along a lead agency concept. The State Department is the lead agency for responding to the crisis and managing the consequences of a terrorist incident overseas. In this role, State is responsible for marshaling all federal assets necessary to respond. The U.S. ambassador would be the on-scene coordinator for the U.S. response in the foreign nation, as was done, for example, after the U.S. embassy bombing in Nairobi, Kenya. The State Department, with the concurrence of the National Security Council, can lead a rapidly deployable interagency advisory group called the Foreign Emergency Support Team. As part of the response to an incident, the Department of Justice, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, would lead U.S. law enforcement investigations in conjunction with local police in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist incident overseas. Other federal law enforcement agencies—such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security—have expertise to assist in investigations at the scene of an overseas attack. Depending on the nature of the threat or incident, other federal agencies may be called upon to support State in managing the consequences of a

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terrorist attack. For example, the Department of State may request that the Department of Defense provide military support as part of the U.S. government’s efforts to assist in mitigating the consequences of a terrorist incident overseas. The Department of State also may request U.S. military support for the evacuation of embassy staff and other Americans, should that be necessary in the aftermath of a terrorist incident. Many of State Department’s efforts for managing the consequences of a terrorist attack have focused on incidents involving weapons of mass destruction—those involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials. Several federal agencies could assist the State Department in responding to such an incident. For example, the Department of Energy has a Nuclear Emergency Search Team to provide technical expertise in resolving a nuclear or radiological terrorist incident. After a terrorist incident overseas, the Departments of State and Defense generally conduct reviews of the incident, which identify actions to prevent or mitigate future attacks. Examples of these include State’s Accountability Review Boards for the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa, and Defense’s Task Force on the 1996 bombing of the al-Khobar Towers military housing facility in Saudi Arabia. GAO provided a draft of the report to several federal agencies in March 2003 for their review and comment. Such agencies included the Executive Ofﬁce of the President (including the National Security Council, the Ofﬁce of Homeland Security, and the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget); the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The Department of Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments generally agreed with the accuracy of the report and they are reproduced in appendixes VIII and IX, respectively. In addition, these agencies provided technical comments, and we made revisions, as appropriate. We also received technical comments from the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget; the Departments of Justice and State; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the U.S. Secret Service; and the Bureau for Immigration and Customs Enforcement. We made changes, as appropriate, based upon these written and oral technical comments. Our draft report reﬂected efforts to combat terrorism overseas just prior to the transfer of certain agencies and functions to the new Department of Homeland Security in March, 2003. Therefore, many of the technical comments concerned the creation of the new department and the transfer of these agencies and functions from other departments into the Department of Homeland Security. The Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Transportation, and the Treasury, and the CIA had no comments on a draft of this report.

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THE WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL MARITIME DAY PROCLAMATIONS President George W. Bush 2001–2007*

NATIONAL MARITIME DAY PROCLAMATION, MAY 22, 2001 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A Proclamation: Throughout our history, America’s economic prosperity has been closely tied to its maritime geography. From indigenous peoples navigating our majestic rivers to colonists settling along the New World’s eastern shores, natives and immigrants alike have relied on the sea and our bountiful inland waterways for commerce and security. In colonial days and in the nineteenth century, America’s maritime industries facilitated the exchange of goods and the migration of pioneers. During World War II, some 6,000 American seafarers and more than 700 U.S. merchant ships fell to enemy action, many in the infamous Run to Murmansk. No branch of our Armed Forces, save the Marine Corps, suffered a higher casualty rate. Today, our Merchant Marine continues this proud tradition. As recently as the Persian Gulf War and during humanitarian and military operations since, a unique partnership of government, industry, and labor has continued its vital maritime service to our nation. Many civilian merchant mariners crew the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force, which is observing its twenty-ﬁfth anniversary. Today, the U.S. maritime ﬂeet has decreased in the number of vessels in the international trades, but it transports goods more efﬁciently and economically than ever before. These U.S. ships deliver a billion tons of imports and exports each year in our foreign trade and another billion tons of waterborne domestic trade. Many merchant seafarers are trained at outstanding institutions such as the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, New York, the six state maritime academies, and several union and industry training facilities. To help ensure continued competitiveness, we must tailor our maritime policy to the challenges of the twenty-ﬁrst century. America’s marine transportation system will help determine our long-term economic health and improve our ability to respond quickly and effectively in crisis. *

President George W. Bush, National Maritime Day Proclamations, 2001–2007. Source: http://www.usmm.org/md/maritdaygwb.html

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Within the next two decades, cargo will double. Accordingly, my administration is working with government agencies, the maritime industry, shippers, labor unions, and environmental groups to ensure that our waterways continue to serve as a sound transportation option in the face of ever-growing congestion on highways and rail lines. In recognition of the importance of the U.S. Merchant Marine, the Congress, by joint resolution approved on May 20, 1933, has designated May 22 of each year as “National Maritime Day” and has authorized and requested that the president issue an annual proclamation calling for its appropriate observance. NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim May 22, 2001, as National Maritime Day. I call upon the people of the United States to celebrate this observance and to display the ﬂag of the United States at their homes and in their communities. I also request that all ships sailing under the American ﬂag dress ship on that day. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this eighteenth day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand one, and of the independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twenty-ﬁfth.

NATIONAL MARITIME DAY PROCLAMATION, MAY 22, 2002 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A Proclamation: Our commercial maritime tradition dates back to the founding of our nation, and it continues to play an important role today, moving passengers and freight, protecting our freedom, and linking our citizens to the world. Merchant mariners have served America with distinction throughout our history, but especially at critical moments. Before World War II, they made dangerous and difﬁcult voyages carrying vital supplies to Europe. During that war, more than 700 United States merchant ships were lost to attack, and more than 6,000 merchant mariners lost their lives. Merchant mariners played a vital role in the Korean Conﬂict, especially in the rescue of 14,000 Korean civilians by the SS Meredith Victory. During the Vietnam War, ships crewed by civilian seamen carried 95 percent of the supplies used by our Armed Forces. Many of these ships sailed into combat zones under fire. In fact, the SS Mayaguez incident involved the capture of mariners from the American merchant ship SS Mayaguez. More recently, during the Persian Gulf War, merchant mariners were vital to the largest sealift operation since D-Day.

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And after the tragic attacks of September 11, professional merchant mariners and midshipmen from the United States Merchant Marine Academy transported personnel and equipment, and moved food and supplies to lower Manhattan. Their efforts enhanced rescue operations and helped save many lives. Today, the men and women of the United States Merchant Marine and thousands of other workers in our nation’s maritime industry continue to make immeasurable contributions to our economic strength and our ongoing efforts to build a more peaceful world. We must ensure our maritime system can meet the challenges of the twenty-ﬁrst century. As cargo volume is expected to double within the next 20 years, a viable maritime network will help our country compete in our global economy. Accordingly, my administration is working with government agencies, the shipping industry, labor, and environmental groups to ensure that our waterways remain a sound transportation option that complements our overland transportation network. In recognition of the importance of the U.S. Merchant Marine, the Congress, by joint resolution approved on May 20, 1933, as amended, has designated May 22 of each year as “National Maritime Day,” and has authorized and requested that the president issue an annual proclamation calling for its appropriate observance. NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim May 22, 2002, as National Maritime Day. I call upon the people of the United States to celebrate this observance and to display the ﬂag of the United States at their homes and in their communities. I also request that all ships sailing under the American ﬂag dress ship on that day. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-ﬁrst day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand two, and of the independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twenty-sixth.

NATIONAL MARITIME DAY PROCLAMATION, MAY 22, 2003 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A Proclamation: Today, as in the past, America depends on our maritime services to help ensure our security, promote our prosperity, and advance the universal hope of freedom. We honor the service and proud history of our merchant mariners and also recognize their important contributions in strengthening our economy. For generations, merchant marines and commercial sailors have assisted in the defense of our nation. Most recently, more than 5,000 merchant mariners

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supported Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom by serving aboard 157 ships moving essential supplies to our troops. As they continue to support our troops in the ongoing War on Terror, their mission continues to be dangerous and difﬁcult, and remains vital to our efforts to defend the peace. We also remember the vital role the Merchant Marine has played in past conﬂicts. More than 6,000 merchant mariners lost their lives during World War II, and more than 700 U.S. merchant ships were lost. Even before the United States declared war, merchant mariners were making perilous runs to Europe with desperately needed supplies. President Franklin Roosevelt, the ﬁrst president to issue a proclamation honoring merchant mariners, wrote of their role during wartime: “They have delivered the goods when and where needed in every theater of operations and across every ocean in the biggest, the most difﬁcult and dangerous transportation job ever undertaken.” We are grateful for the contributions and sacriﬁces of America’s merchant mariners before and after World War II, in Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and around the world today. In addition to their efforts to support our troops, merchant marines play a vital role in moving the goods that we produce around the United States and throughout the world. Their work provides jobs and economic beneﬁts to our country, and strengthens our economy. By operating as the eyes and ears of America at sea, they also help protect our homeland. In recognition of the importance of the U.S. Merchant Marine, the Congress, by joint resolution approved on May 20, 1933, as amended, has designated May 22 of each year as “National Maritime Day,” and has authorized and requested that the president issue an annual proclamation calling for its appropriate observance. NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim May 22, 2003, as National Maritime Day. I call upon the people of the United States to celebrate this observance and to display the ﬂag of the United States at their homes and in their communities. I also request that all ships sailing under the American ﬂag dress ship on that day. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-ﬁrst day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand three, and of the independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twenty-seventh.

NATIONAL MARITIME DAY PROCLAMATION 2004 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A Proclamation: National Maritime Day provides an opportunity to recognize the men and women of the United States Merchant Marine and their contributions to our national security and economic strength.

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Since they ﬁrst offered their ships and services to assist the Continental Navy in our struggle for independence, to their distinguished service in World War II, merchant mariners have courageously sacriﬁced to protect our country and defend our freedoms. In 1936, America recognized the contributions of these patriots and established the U.S. Merchant Marine “as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency.” Today, merchant mariners are delivering essential supplies and equipment to our troops in Iraq and bravely serving the cause of liberty. They continue to play an important role in our nation’s efforts to advance democracy, peace, and freedom around the world, and we are grateful for their dedication. Merchant mariners also contribute signiﬁcantly to the U.S. maritime transportation system. More than 95 percent of non-North American trade enters our country through our seaports. These ports handle more than $740 billion and 2 billion tons of domestic and international freight each year. Those in the maritime industry, including merchant mariners, enhance waterborne commerce and help promote America’s economic growth. Today, we honor the courage, determination, and service of our nation’s merchant mariners and remember the many who have given their lives in defense of our country. Their work reﬂects the patriotism and devotion to duty that make America great. In recognition of the importance of the U.S. Merchant Marine, the Congress, by joint resolution approved on May 20, 1933, as amended, has designated May 22 of each year as “National Maritime Day,” and has authorized and requested that the president issue an annual proclamation calling for its appropriate observance. NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim May 22, 2004, as National Maritime Day. I call upon the people of the United States to celebrate this observance and to display the ﬂag of the United States at their homes and in their communities. I also request that all ships sailing under the American ﬂag dress ship on that day. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-ﬁrst day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand four, and of the independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twenty-eighth.

NATIONAL MARITIME DAY PROCLAMATION 2005 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A Proclamation: America’s merchant mariners make our nation more secure and our economy stronger. Throughout our history, they have promoted commerce and protected our freedom. On National Maritime Day, we honor the dedicated service of the United States Merchant Marine.

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Each year, the men and women of the U.S. maritime transportation system move more than 2 billion tons of cargo along our waterways and across the open seas. Many of the raw materials Americans purchase are transported by merchant vessels, and merchant mariners ship agricultural products and ﬁnished goods in and out of the United States every day. Merchant mariners have also served in every conﬂict in our nation’s history. The U.S. Merchant Marine helps provide our nation’s armed forces with crucial supplies and equipment. These brave men and women demonstrate courage, love of country, and devotion to duty, and we especially honor those who have made the ultimate sacriﬁce in defense of our nation. The United States is safer and the world is more peaceful because of the work of our merchant mariners, and we are grateful for their service. In recognition of the importance of the U.S. Merchant Marine, the Congress, by joint resolution approved on May 20, 1933, as amended, has designated May 22 of each year as “National Maritime Day,” and has authorized and requested that the president issue an annual proclamation calling for its appropriate observance. NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim May 22, 2005, as National Maritime Day. I call upon the people of the United States to celebrate this observance and to display the ﬂag of the United States at their homes and in their communities. I also request that all ships sailing under the American ﬂag dress ship on that day. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this nineteenth day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand ﬁve, and of the independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twenty-ninth.

NATIONAL MARITIME DAY PROCLAMATION 2006 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A Proclamation: The United States Merchant Marine plays an important role in ensuring our national security and strengthening our economy. As we celebrate National Maritime Day and the 70th anniversary of the Merchant Marine Act, we pay tribute to merchant mariners and their faithful service to our nation. Since 1775, merchant mariners have bravely served our country, and in 1936, the Merchant Marine Act ofﬁcially established their role in our military as a wartime naval auxiliary. During World War II, merchant mariners were critical to the delivery of troops and supplies overseas, and they helped keep vital ocean supply lines operating. President Franklin D. Roosevelt praised these brave merchant mariners for persevering “despite the perils of the submarine, the dive bomber, and the surface raider.” Today’s merchant mariners follow those who courageously served before them as they continue to

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provide crucial support for our nation’s service men and women. America is grateful for their commitment to excellence and devotion to duty. In addition to helping defend our country, merchant mariners facilitate commerce by importing and exporting goods throughout the world. They work with our nation’s transportation industry to share their valuable skills and experience in ship maintenance, navigation, and cargo transportation. This past year, the good work and compassion of merchant mariners also played an important role in hurricane relief efforts. Ships brought urgently needed supplies to the devastated areas, provided assistance for oil spill cleanup, generated electricity, and provided meals and lodging for recovery workers and evacuees. In recognition of the importance of the U.S. Merchant Marine, the Congress, by joint resolution approved on May 20, 1933, as amended, has designated May 22 of each year as “National Maritime Day,” and has authorized and requested that the president issue an annual proclamation calling for its appropriate observance. NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim May 22, 2006, as National Maritime Day. I call upon all the people of the United States to mark this observance by honoring the service of merchant mariners and by displaying the ﬂag of the United States at their homes and in their communities. I also request that all ships sailing under the American ﬂag dress ship on that day. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this nineteenth day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand six, and of the independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirtieth.

NATIONAL MARITIME DAY PROCLAMATION, 2007 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A Proclamation: America has a proud maritime history, and the United States Merchant Marine has played a vital role in helping meet our country’s economic and national security needs. On National Maritime Day, we honor merchant mariners for their dedication to promoting commerce and protecting our freedom. During times of peace, the U.S. Merchant Marine helps ensure our economic security by keeping the oceans open to trade. Ships operated by merchant mariners transport goods across our nation’s waterways and on the high seas around the world to connect American businesses and consumers with valuable foreign markets and commodities. The skill and expertise of merchant mariners facilitates trade and helps to strengthen our economy. In times of war, the Merchant Marine is the lifeline of our troops overseas. By carrying critical supplies, equipment, and personnel, merchant mariners

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provide essential support to our armed forces and help advance the cause of freedom. Today, merchant mariners are supporting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their devotion to duty is a tribute to the generations of men and women who have served our nation with courage and determination in every conﬂict in America’s history. On this day, and throughout the year, America is grateful for their service. In recognition of the importance of the U.S. Merchant Marine, the Congress, by joint resolution approved on May 20, 1933, as amended, has designated May 22 of each year as “National Maritime Day,” and has authorized and requested that the president issue an annual proclamation calling for its appropriate observance. NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim May 22, 2007, as National Maritime Day. I call upon the people of the United States to mark this observance by honoring the service of merchant mariners and by displaying the ﬂag of the United States at their homes and in their communities. I also request that all ships sailing under the American ﬂag dress ship on that day. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this eighteenth day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand seven, and of the independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirty-ﬁrst.

MARITIME SECURITY POLICY National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13 December 21, 2004*

Memorandum for the Vice President The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Attorney General The Secretary of the Interior The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Transportation The Secretary of Energy The Secretary of Homeland Security Chief of Staff to the President Director, Ofﬁce of Management and Budget The United States Trade Representative Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

*

http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd41.pdf

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Counsel to the President Assistant to the President for Homeland Security Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality Director of Central Intelligence Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant of the Coast Guard Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director, National Counterterrorism Center

SUBJECT: Maritime Security Policy This directive establishes U.S. policy, guidelines, and implementation actions to enhance U.S. national security and homeland security by protecting U.S. maritime interests. It directs the coordination of United States government maritime security programs and initiatives to achieve a comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving appropriate federal, state, local, and private sector entities. This directive also establishes a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate interagency maritime security policy efforts. As speciﬁed herein, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, in cooperation with appropriate federal departments and agencies, will jointly coordinate the implementation of the policy set forth in Section II of this directive.

I. BACKGROUND For the purposes of this directive, “maritime domain” means all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances. Due to its complex nature and immense size, the maritime domain is particularly susceptible to exploitation and disruption by individuals, organizations, and states. The maritime domain facilitates a unique freedom of movement and ﬂow of goods while allowing people, cargo, and conveyances to transit with anonymity not generally available by movement over land or by air. Individuals and organizations hostile to the United States have demonstrated a continuing desire to exploit such vulnerabilities. The United States must deploy the full range of its operational assets and capabilities to prevent the maritime domain from being used by terrorists, criminals, and hostile states to commit acts of terrorism and criminal or other unlawful or hostile acts against the United States, its people, economy, property, territory, allies, and friends, while recognizing that maritime security policies are most effective when the strategic importance of international trade, economic cooperation, and the free ﬂow of commerce are considered appropriately.

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II. POLICY The security of the maritime domain is a global issue. The United States, in cooperation with our allies and friends around the world and our state, local, and private sector partners, will work to ensure that lawful private and public activities in the maritime domain are protected against attack and criminal and otherwise unlawful or hostile exploitation. These efforts are critical to global economic stability and growth, and are vital to the interests of the United States. It is the policy of the United States to take all necessary and appropriate actions, consistent with U.S. law, treaties, and other international agreements to which the United States is a party, and customary international law as determined for the United States by the president, to enhance the security of and protect U.S. interests in the maritime domain, including the following: • Preventing terrorist attacks, criminal acts, or hostile acts in, or the unlawful exploitation of, the maritime domain, and reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain to such acts and exploitation; • Enhancing U.S. national security and homeland security by protecting U.S. population centers, critical infrastructure, borders, harbors, ports, and coastal approaches in the maritime domain; • Expediting recovery and response from attacks within the maritime domain; • Maximizing awareness of security issues in the maritime domain in order to support U.S. forces and improve United States government actions in response to identiﬁed threats; • Enhancing international relationships and promoting the integration of U.S. allies and international and private sector partners into an improved global maritime security framework to advance common security interests in the maritime domain; and • Ensuring seamless, coordinated implementation of authorities and responsibilities relating to the security of the maritime domain by and among federal departments and agencies.

These actions must be undertaken in a manner that facilitates global commerce and preserves the freedom of the seas for legitimate military and commercial navigation and other legitimate activities, as well as civil liberties and the rights guaranteed under the Constitution. III. POLICY COORDINATION The Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee (MSPCC) is hereby established, consistent with NSPD-1 and HSPD-1. The MSPCC, in consultation with the relevant regional and functional policy coordinating committees of the federal government, and without exercising operational oversight, shall act as the primary forum for interagency coordination of the implementation of

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this directive. As part of that effort, the MSPCC shall review existing interagency practices, coordination, and execution of U.S. policies and strategies relating to maritime security, and shall recommend speciﬁc improvements to all of them as warranted. The MSPCC shall provide analysis of new U.S. policies, strategies, and initiatives relating to maritime security for consideration by the Deputies and Principals Committees of the NSC and the HSC, and subsequently by the NSC and the HSC, and shall ensure ongoing coordination and implementation of such policies, strategies, and initiatives. The reviews, plans, and recommendations required by this directive (as set forth in Sections IV and V below) shall be completed by the departments and agencies designated herein in coordination with the MSPCC, and shall then be prepared for consideration by and submitted to the Deputies and Principals Committees of the NSC and the HSC, and subsequently to the NSC and the HSC. The MSPCC shall be co-chaired by an NSC staff representative selected by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and an HSC representative selected by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, and shall include the following ofﬁcers or their designated representatives: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

The Vice President The Secretary of State The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Defense The Attorney General The Secretary of the Interior The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Transportation The Secretary of Energy The Secretary of Homeland Security Director, Ofﬁce of Management and Budget The United States Trade Representative Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality Director of Central Intelligence Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director, National Counterterrorism Center

The co-chairs of the MSPCC may invite representatives of other departments and agencies to attend MSPCC meetings as they deem appropriate. IV. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION National Strategy for Maritime Security: A coordinated and integrated government-wide effort to enhance the security of the maritime domain requires an overarching strategy. The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland

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Security shall jointly lead a collaborative interagency effort to draft a recommended National Strategy for Maritime Security, which shall be submitted for my consideration within 180 days after the effective date of this directive. Such a strategy must present an overarching plan to implement this directive and address all of the components of the maritime domain, including domestic, international, public, and private components. It shall further incorporate a global, cross-discipline approach to the maritime domain centered on a layered, defense-in-depth framework that may be adjusted based on the threat level. The strategy shall build on current efforts and those initiated by this directive, as well as complement existing strategies, tools, and resources. All relevant federal departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security in this effort and provide all appropriate assistance.

V. POLICY ACTIONS In concert with the development of a National Strategy for Maritime Security, the following actions shall be taken: Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA): Maritime domain awareness is the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. It is critical that the United States develop an enhanced capability to identify threats to the maritime domain as early and as distant from our shores as possible by integrating intelligence, surveillance, observation, and navigation systems into a common operating picture accessible throughout the United States government. The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security have established a Maritime Domain Awareness Senior Steering Group (MDASSG). The MDASSG is co-chaired by representatives of the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, and includes representatives from departments and agencies that will participate in the MSPCC. The MDASSG shall coordinate national efforts to achieve maximum maritime domain awareness. No later than 180 days after the effective date of this directive, the MDASSG will develop and submit to me, through the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, a national plan to improve maritime domain awareness, which shall include near-term and long-term objectives, required program and resource implications, and any recommendations for organizational or policy changes. Global Maritime Intelligence Integration: A robust and coordinated intelligence effort serves as the foundation for effective security efforts in the maritime domain. In support of this effort, I direct the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, with the support of the Director of Central Intelligence, and in coordination with the Director of the National Counterterrorism

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Center (NCTC) and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to use existing intelligence capabilities to integrate all available intelligence on a global basis regarding the location, identity, and operational capabilities and intentions of potential threats to U.S. interests in the maritime domain. The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, with the support of the Director of Central Intelligence, and in coordination with the Director of the NCTC, the Director of the FBI, and other appropriate departments and agencies, shall submit to me for approval, through the Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and Homeland Security, a plan for global maritime intelligence integration within 180 days after the effective date of this directive. The plan shall include appropriate interagency participation to ensure effective government-wide sharing of information and data critical to intelligence production. Domestic Outreach: A successful strategy to implement this directive must include coordination with State and local authorities and consultation with appropriate private sector persons and entities. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Attorney General and the Secretaries of the Treasury, Interior, Commerce, and Transportation, shall lead the development of a comprehensive engagement plan that ensures that the interests of state and local governments, and the private sector are considered in the federal government’s implementation of this directive. The plan shall be completed within 180 days after the effective date of this directive and shall take effect upon approval by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Coordination of International Efforts and International Outreach: Ensuring the security of the maritime domain must be a global effort, in which United States government efforts are developed and furthered with the support of other governments and international organizations, resulting in lasting international cooperation. The Secretary of State shall lead the coordination of United States government initiatives in the implementation of this directive with regard to activities with foreign governments and international organizations. All federal departments and agencies shall coordinate with the Department of State on policies, programs, and initiatives relating to the implementation of this directive that could affect the conduct of foreign policy. In addition, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, Transportation, and Homeland Security, and the U.S. Trade Representative, and in consultation with appropriate private sector persons and entities, shall develop, within 180 days after the effective date of this directive, a comprehensive plan to solicit international support for an improved global maritime security framework. Such plan shall take effect upon approval by the Secretary of State. Maritime Threat Response: The Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Commerce, and Transportation, shall develop a comprehensive National Maritime Security Response Plan to ensure seamless United

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States government response to maritime threats against the United States. This plan, when approved by me, shall supplement the National Response Plan required by HSPD-5 and complement the critical infrastructure protection plans required by HSPD-7 and the domestic all-hazards preparedness goals and structures required by HSPD-8. The plan, at a minimum, shall reﬂect lead agency roles and responsibilities, including recommendations regarding changes to existing policy, including those reﬂected in PDD-39 and PDD-62, in the following areas: 1) maritime security response and counterterrorism operations; 2) maritime interception operations; 3) prevention and detection of, and response to, the mining of U.S. ports; 4) detection, interdiction, and disposition of targeted cargo, people, and vessels; and 5) attacks on vessels with U.S. citizens aboard or that affect U.S. interests anywhere in the world. The plan also shall: 1) include recommended protocols that establish clear coordination relationships governing protection and defense of the United States against threats to its interests in the maritime domain; and 2) provide recommendations concerning the designation of an interagency planning and command-and-control entity to ensure unity of command for national execution of maritime security policy. An interim plan shall be submitted no later than 180 days after the effective date of this directive, through the Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and Homeland Security, and shall be ﬁnalized after completion of the National Strategy for Maritime Security. Maritime Infrastructure Recovery: Rapid recovery from an attack or similar disruption in the maritime domain is critical to the economic well-being of our nation. A credible capability for rapid recovery will not only minimize an incident’s economic impact but also serve as a deterrent. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with other appropriate ofﬁcials, including the Secretaries of Defense, State, the Treasury, the Interior, Commerce, and Transportation, and in consultation with key industry stakeholders, shall be responsible for the development of recommended minimum federal standards, where appropriate, for maritime recovery operations, and shall develop comprehensive national maritime infrastructure recovery standards and a plan, complementary to the national preparedness goals and standards required by HSPD-8. Such standards and plan shall be completed no later than 180 days after the effective date of this directive, shall focus on the restoration of physical assets and transportation systems, and shall take effect when approved by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The standards and plan also shall describe a maritime infrastructure recovery exercise program consistent with the National Exercise Program administered by the Department of Homeland Security. The program shall address coordination with State, local, and private sector partners, and cooperation with foreign governments and international entities as appropriate. Maritime Transportation System Security: The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce,

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and Transportation, and the U.S. Trade Representative, and in consultation with appropriate industry representatives, shall develop recommendations for improvements to the national and international regulatory framework with respect to licensing, carriage, communications, safety equipment, and other critical systems for all private vessels, including commercial vessels, operating in the maritime domain. The recommendations shall be submitted to me through the Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and Homeland Security, no later than 180 days after the effective date of this directive. Maritime Commerce Security: To implement this directive effectively and to enhance economic growth, the United States must promote global supply chain security practices to reduce the risk of terrorists or criminals acting against the United States from within the maritime domain. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense, State, the Treasury, Commerce, Transportation, and Energy, and the U.S. Trade Representative, shall lead a collaborative interagency effort, in consultation with appropriate industry representatives, to develop a comprehensive international maritime supply chain security plan no later than 180 days after the effective date of this directive. The plan shall deﬁne supply-chain security requirements, include recommendations to further secure commercial operations from point of origin to point of destination, build on available resources, and provide a recommended framework of roles, responsibilities, and implementation actions. The plan shall deﬁne measurable national “end state” supply chain security goals and develop contingency plans to continue the ﬂow of commerce in the event of an incident necessitating total or partial closure of U.S. borders to maritime commerce. The plan shall take effect upon approval by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

VI. GENERAL This directive does not alter existing authorities or responsibilities of the department and agency heads, including their authorities, to carry out operational activities or to provide or receive information. This directive is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch and is not intended to, and does not; create any right or beneﬁt enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, entities, ofﬁcers, employees, or agents, or any other person. Nothing in this directive impairs or otherwise affects the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Department of Defense, including the chain of command for military forces from the President and Commander-in-Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the commander of military forces, or military command and control procedures. The Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and Homeland Security and the Chairman of the Council on Environmental

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Quality shall coordinate as appropriate the work of the MSPCC under this directive and the work of the Committee on Ocean Policy under the executive order of December 17, 2004.

THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY The White House September 2005*

INTRODUCTION The safety and economic security of the United States depends upon the secure use of the world’s oceans. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government has reviewed and strengthened all of its strategies to combat the evolving threat in the War on Terrorism. Various departments have each carried out maritime security strategies that have provided an effective layer of security since 2001. In December 2004, the President directed the Secretaries of the Department of Defense and Homeland Security to lead the federal effort to develop a comprehensive National Strategy for Maritime Security, to better integrate and synchronize the existing department-level strategies and ensure their effective and efﬁcient implementation. Maritime security is best achieved by blending public and private maritime security activities on a global scale into an integrated effort that addresses all maritime threats. The new National Strategy for Maritime Security aligns all federal government maritime security programs and initiatives into a comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving appropriate federal, state, local, and private sector entities. In addition to this strategy, the departments have developed eight supporting plans to address the speciﬁc threats and challenges of the maritime environment. [Although] the plans address different aspects of maritime security, they are mutually linked and reinforce each other. The supporting plans include: • • • • • • • •

*

National Plan to Achieve Domain Awareness Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan Interim Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan International Outreach and Coordination Strategy Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan Maritime Transportation System Security Plan Maritime Commerce Security Plan Domestic Outreach Plan

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Development of these plans was guided by the security principles outlined in this National Strategy for Maritime Security. These plans will be updated on a periodic basis in response to changes in the maritime threat, the world environment, and national security policies. Together, the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its eight supporting plans present a comprehensive national effort to promote global economic stability and protect legitimate activities while preventing hostile or illegal acts within the maritime domain [. . .]

CONCLUSION This national strategy presents a vision for the achievement of maritime security for the people and interests of the United States while respecting the information privacy and other legal rights of Americans. Moreover, it underscores our commitment to strengthening our international partnerships and advancing economic well-being around the globe by facilitating commerce and abiding by the principles of freedom of the seas. As a vision for the future, it certainly faces some serious challenges. The sheer magnitude of the maritime domain complicates the arduous and complex task of maintaining maritime security. The United States confronts a diverse set of adversaries fully prepared to exploit this vast milieu for nefarious purposes. The seas serve as the medium for a variety of transnational threats that honor no national frontier and that seek to imperil the peace and prosperity of the world. Many of these threats mingle with legitimate commerce, either to provide concealment for carrying out hostile acts, or to make available weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to nations and non-state actors of concern. In this ambiguous security environment, responding to these unpredictable and transnational threats requires teamwork to prevent attacks, protect people and infrastructure, minimize damage, and expedite recovery. It necessitates the integration and alignment of all maritime security programs and initiatives into a far-reaching and uniﬁed national effort involving the federal, state, local, and private sectors. Since September 11, 2001, federal departments and agencies have risen uncompromisingly to the challenge of maritime security. But even an enhanced national effort is not sufﬁcient. The challenges that remain ahead for the United States, the adversaries we confront, and the environment in which we operate compel us to strengthen our ties with allies and friends and to seek new partnerships with others. Therefore, international cooperation is critical to ensuring that lawful private and public activities in the maritime domain are protected from attack and hostile or unlawful exploitation. Such collaboration is fundamental to worldwide economic stability and growth, and it is vital to the interests of the United States. It is only through such an integrated approach among all maritime

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partners—governmental and nongovernmental, public and private—that we can improve the security of the maritime domain. Thus, effective implementation of this national strategy requires greater cooperation, not less. It requires deeper trust and conﬁdence, not less. It requires a concerted application of collective capabilities to: increase our awareness of all activities and events in the maritime domain; enhance maritime security frameworks domestically and internationally; deploy a layered security based on law enforcement authorities, private sector partners’ competencies, and military might; pursue transformational research and development to move to the next level of information fusion and analysis and WMD detection technologies for qualitative improvements in threat detection; and lastly, improve our response posture should an incident occur. With this national strategy, the course has been set, but rhetoric is no substitute for action, and action is no substitute for success.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FACT SHEET, PORT SECURITY: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary June 2003*

AN OVERVIEW OF OUR STRATEGY • Enhancing our Nation’s Security: With 95 percent of our nation’s international cargo carried by ship, port security is critical to ensuring our nation’s homeland and economic security. • Shielding our Maritime Borders and Ports: DHS is implementing an integrated and collaborative process among international, federal, state, local and private partners to protect our ports and maritime infrastructure by gaining the greatest intelligence about the people, cargo, and vessels operating in our waters and ports. • Managing the Threats: Port security threats vary and could come from different avenues, including the crew of a ship, the vessel, or the cargo itself. Threats are not limited to container ships. Cruise ships, tankers, bulk cargo ships, ferry boats, small pleasure craft, port facilities, and vital coastal infrastructure are all entities potentially at risk. • Coordinating our Response: Protecting ports, both in the United States and abroad, demands a comprehensive layered defense approach incorporating regulations, inspections, information sharing, vigilance, technology, and presence. By enhancing security at each of these layers the Department of Homeland Security is now able to screen and board high-risk vessels. *

http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2003/06/sec-030613-usia01.htm

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• Providing Leadership: Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush directed that port security measures be enhanced and a comprehensive layered strategy be put into place to protect and secure the vessels, the cargo, and the port facility itself from possible attack.

NEW INITIATIVES AND FUNDING Enhancing Container Security—The Container Security Initiative (CSI): The Container Security Initiative is an existing Department of Homeland Security program that incorporates side-by-side teamwork with foreign port authorities. It is designed to identify, target, and search high-risk cargo. The program has been expanded to strategic locations beyond the initial 20 major ports to include areas of the Middle East, such as Dubai, as well as Turkey and Malaysia. The top 20 ports account for 68 percent of all cargo containers arriving at U.S. seaports. Governments representing 19 of these ports have agreed to implement CSI during the ﬁrst phase, including an agreement with the government of Thailand for the Port of Laem Chabang that was signed by Secretary Ridge and Thailand’s Foreign Minister on June 11, 2003. Phase 2 of CSI will enable the Department to extend port security protection from 68 percent of container trafﬁc to more than 80 percent—casting the safety net of CSI far and wide. Supporting DHS Agencies with Resources: The Department of Homeland Security has provided over $1 billion to fund port security needs this year alone. Supplemental DHS funds in FY 2003 went to: U.S. Coast Guard $628 million—Increased port security and War on Terrorism Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) $170 million—More personnel at maritime entry points, U.S.-VISIT system development Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) $90 million—Port radiation detection and monitoring $35 million—Container Security Initiative (CSI) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) $170 million—Port Security Grants $58 million—Operation Safe Commerce Targeting Grants to Key Ports: The Department of Homeland Security has provided signiﬁcant investments in infrastructure security protective measures, security enhancements, training, exercises, equipment, planning, and information sharing. Grants were provided as follows: $170 million—TSA port security grants $75 million—Ofﬁce for Domestic Preparedness for port security grants $58 million—TSA for funding of security projects in Operation Safe Commerce

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IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY The Vessel: Cargo, Crew, and Ship International Ship and Port Facility Security Code: Through United States leadership at the UN’s International Maritime Organization, the majority of countries have now adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code—the ﬁrst multilateral ship and port security standard ever created. With implementation scheduled for 2004, the code requires all nations to submit port facility and ship security plans. Result: Port security responsibility is now the shared responsibility of all nations and shipping authorities. Container Security Initiative: Nineteen of the world’s largest ports work side-by-side with the Department of Homeland Security to identify, target, and search high-risk cargo. The Container Security Initiative is fully functional in 40 percent of these high-volume ports, with increased implementation daily. Result: Potential suspect containers are targeted and identiﬁed before being loaded onto vessels. 24-Hour Advanced Manifest Rule: Every ship bound for the United States must now provide a detailed cargo list 24 hours before loading. Failure to meet the 24-hour Advanced Manifest Rule results in a “do not load” message and other penalties. Result: We have greater awareness of what is being loaded onto ships bound for the United States. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT): Thousands of commercial importers have taken steps to secure their entire supply chain. Under the C-TPAT plan, participating private industry providing veriﬁable security information will receive preferential treatment during the shipping process. Result: Security enhancements put in place by private sector shippers allows DHS to devote more of our resources to suspect activities. 96-Hour Advance Notiﬁcation of Arrival: The United States requires all ships to provide 96-hour advance notice of arrival with detailed crew, passenger, cargo, and voyage history. Information is collected and disseminated to agencies by DHS’s new National Vessel Movement Center. Advance notice gives security and boarding teams additional time to determine suspect ships and take action before the ship ever reaches our shores. Result: We now know far in advance more information about what is coming to our shores and can take early action to stop suspect vessels. Mariner Documents: We have increased security screening measures for documents held by over 100,000 U.S. merchant mariners. Result: We have carefully screened our mariners, revoked documents if necessary, and, in concert with unions and shipping authorities, have ensured that our ships are operated by professional mariners. Offshore Strategic Boardings: We position key assets to conduct strategic and random boardings of merchant ships miles off our coasts. Result: Ships

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with suspect indicators are not immune from our vigilance and inspections, even hundreds of miles from the U.S. coastline. High Interest Vessels: Certain vessels are closely watched based on their ﬂag state, historical information about the ship, and intelligence. Information on these ships is shared among federal, state, and local authorities, and a coordinated plan for allowing these ships into port is developed. Result: Working together we are able to quickly assimilate information and develop and implement a protective plan to guard against high interest vessels. Integrated Deepwater System: To eliminate potential threats before they reach our shores, the Coast Guard will replace its aging cutters, aircraft, and offshore command and control system with a $17 billion Integrated Deepwater System, its biggest acquisition in history. Result: Coast Guard forces will have superior capability to be aware of maritime threats and deploy forces when needed.

The Port: Protecting the Port 2002 Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA): The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 is designed to protect the nation’s ports and waterways from a terrorist attack, and to equip the country to respond in the event of such an attack. We have taken action on many of the provisions of this legislation since it was signed in November, and this summer we will take another step forward with the publication of the maritime security regulations. This landmark legislation requires port security committees, security plans for privately owned port facilities, and vessel security plans among its many measures. Result: The MTSA signiﬁcantly strengthens and standardizes security measures of our domestic port security team of federal, state, local, and private authorities. Port Security Committees: Federal, state, local, and private authorities in major ports work together as a team to maintain and enhance security. This type of teamwork enables us to rapidly respond to both general and speciﬁc threats. Increased communication, teamwork and coordination is a great example of the public and private sectors working together to secure our homeland. Result: The leadership team, the responders, and the organizations are in-place and working together to ensure security in our ports. Sea Marshals: An innovative program that places armed Coast Guard teams on ships to ensure they both arrive safely and depart our ports safely. Result: Sea marshals are a deterrent, a protector, and an immediate response force to assure that ships will not be used as weapons against our infrastructure and citizens. Maritime Safety and Security Teams: We created four specially trained maritime safety and security teams, or MSSTs, to protect and shield our most important economic and strategic ports. These Coast Guard teams

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operate high speed boats and are trained in special security and boat tactics. We are training two more teams now, and the president has proposed six more MSSTs in the FY 2004 budget. Result: The nation now has dedicated and highly trained forces whose mission is to protect our domestic ports. They can be moved around the nation with little notice to protect areas of speciﬁc need. Armed Helicopters: We deployed armed helicopters trained in special use of force tactics to key port areas around the nation to be ready to respond to potential terrorist activity. Result: Our port security forces can now effectively counter security threats with well-coordinated tactics from the sea, the shore, and the air.

The Port Facility: Security at the Facility and Infrastructure Operation Safe Commerce: Seven million containers are imported to the United States annually. “Safe Commerce” is a pilot program that will analyze current technology to uncover security gaps at all points in the commerce supply chain, and test solutions to plug these gaps at the ports of SeattleTacoma, Los Angeles-Long Beach, and the New York-New Jersey Port Authority. Result: Technology is allowing us to guarantee the security and integrity of cargo as it moves through the ports. MTSA: MTSA’s emphasis on advance security measures and plans deters threats and provides a strong framework for response and recovery in the event of an attack. Result: The security of our ports improves every day due to the diligence of the men and women who work there. U.S. Automated Targeting System (ATS): Powerful computers analyze years of shipping data to determine if a container poses a potential risk. Result: Sophisticated analysis of cargo information sorts high-risk cargo from low-risk cargo. Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Screening: Sophisticated radiation detection portals screen for even slight traces of radiation, and specially trained dogs are utilized to spot suspicious chemicals in incoming cargo. Result: Radiation screening is available for designated containers, while not interrupting the free ﬂow of commerce. Port Vulnerability Assessments: Every aspect of port security is being thoroughly analyzed and assessed by special teams to ascertain the strengths and weaknesses of the system. This information will give us a clear picture of ports where increased security measures or funding is needed. Result: We must know where our strengths and weaknesses are, assign resources, and increase security if necessary. Preliminary assessments have been completed at 47 port areas. Dangerous Cargo Handling: Many of our vital industries depend on cargoes that must be carefully handled. Port facility inspectors have plans in place to

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ensure that these cargoes are kept secure and handled safely. Result: Vital commodities continue to ﬂow efﬁciently and reliably to keep our economy healthy.

SECURE SEAS, OPEN PORTS: KEEPING OUR WATERS SAFE, SECURE, AND OPEN FOR BUSINESS United States Department of Homeland Security June 21, 2004*

INTRODUCTION Today Homeland Security Secretary Ridge announced the implementation of new security measures across the country designed to build upon the layers of security that are already in place at the nation’s ports. The new measures, required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act, add additional security protections to every port in the United States. Port and vessel protection continues to remain one of the Department of Homeland Security’s highest priorities. The oceans and ports of the world are vital to the economic livelihood of the United States and countries throughout the world. Consider: • Over 95 percent of the nation’s overseas cargo moves through our ports. • There are 76 million recreational boaters in the United States and they spent over $30.3 billion on boats and accessories in 2003. • Worldwide, 5.8 billion tons of goods were traded by sea in 2001. This accounts for over 80 percent of world trade by volume. • Over 318 billion gallons of petroleum products are shipped in vessels on U.S. waterways in a year. • Cruise ships calling at U.S. ports carry over 6 million passengers per year.

NEW SECURITY MEASURES In addition to the international requirements of the International Ship and Port Security Code, the United States has required vessels and port facilities around the country to take additional security measures by July 1, as part of the domestic Maritime Transportation Security Act, which establishes a new, robust baseline of security for our nation’s ports. Ports around the country are now on target to meet the July 1 deadline to implement additional port security measures. Security Assessments and Plans: Port facilities and vessels across the nation were required to submit a security assessment and a security plan to *

http://www.piersystem.com/posted/586/DHSPortSecurityFactSheet_062104.41841.pdf

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the United States Coast Guard, now part of the Department of Homeland Security. The submitted security assessments identiﬁed the aspects of each port facility and vessel that were deemed security vulnerabilities. The accompanying security plan outlined speciﬁc measures that would be taken by each port to address those vulnerabilities. Some 9500 vessels and 3500 facilities submitted both a security assessment and a security plan earlier this year. In addition, the Coast Guard examined the vulnerabilities of the port complexes as a whole and, working in conjunction with the local stakeholders, developed security plans that detail how the combined resources of an area will be used to deter, prevent and respond to terror threats. The Coast Guard analyzed each plan to ensure that it sufﬁciently and consistently addressed the security needs of the individual facility, port, and vessel. Implementation: The Coast Guard is overseeing the ongoing implementation of these security measures across the country. Each plan is different and uniquely tailored to the individual port, facility, and vessel. Some of the speciﬁc security measures currently being implemented include increased identiﬁcation checks on crew members and visitors to the ports; additional canine detection teams; expanded baggage and passenger screening efforts; strategically placed perimeter fencing equipped with newly installed surveillance cameras; targeted restricted access to sensitive areas of the port; x-ray machines on all large cruise ships; additional employee training procedures; increased security patrols; and implementation of a robust certiﬁcation program to ensure foreign ﬂagged vessels docking in U.S. ports have met the international security requirements, which the United States originally proposed to the international community in November 2001. Continued Improvement: The U.S Coast Guard will conduct assessments of the nation’s ports to determine which vulnerabilities still exist and where. These assessments consist of teams of analysts who craft possible terrorist plots against speciﬁc targets and then analyze how such targets would fare under those circumstances. Additional training and port security related exercises will also be part of ongoing port security effort. The U.S. Coast Guard has also implemented a veriﬁcation program to ensure that all ports and vessels maintain their security measures.

AN OVERVIEW OF OUR STRATEGY Layers of Security Systems: By taking a layered approach to security, the DHS has utilized the expertise of its bureaus—the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection—the private sector and state and local authorities, to create a system of different security measures that ensure there are protective measures in place from one end of a sea-based journey to the other. The layered security measures are designed to protect the three phases of the journey: overseas, in transit, and on U.S. shores.

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Joint Effort: Securing our ports and waterways is a team effort—everyone, from local governments and private citizens to the international community play an important role in ensuring that our waterways remain open for business. The U.S. government does not have the resources to secure the ports and waterways alone. DHS must coordinate its efforts with the nation’s trading partners, enlist the expertise of maritime industry and local government agencies, and use the eyes and ears of our citizens, who are the true regional experts, to notice when something is amiss. The goal is to ﬁnd the appropriate balance between security and freedom—between inspecting every container and keeping trade moving—that is the measure of success.

IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY Overseas 24-Hour Advanced Manifest Rule: Awareness. All sea carriers with the exception of bulk carriers and approved break bulk cargo are required to provide proper cargo descriptions and valid consignee addresses 24 hours before cargo is loaded at the foreign port for shipment to the United States through the Sea Automated Manifest System. Failure to meet the 24-hour Advanced Manifest Rule results in a “do not load” message and other penalties. Through this program, administered by DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the department has greater awareness of what is being loaded onto ships bound for the United States, and the advance information enables DHS to evaluate the terrorist risk from sea containers. Container Security Initiative (CSI): Awareness & Prevention. Under the CSI program, the screening of containers that pose a risk for terrorism is accomplished by teams of CBP ofﬁcials deployed to work in concert with their host nation counterparts. Nineteen of the top 20 ports have agreed to join CSI and are at various stages of implementation. These 20 ports account for approximately 66 percent of sea containers shipped to the United States. CSI operational seaports include: Rotterdam, LeHavre, Bremerhaven, Hamburg, Antwerp, Singapore, Yokohama, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Göteborg, Felixstowe, Genoa, La Spezia, Busan, Durban, Vancouver, Montreal, Halifax, and Port Klang. Through CSI, potential suspect containers are targeted and identiﬁed before being loaded onto vessels. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT): Awareness and Prevention. Through C-TPAT, thousands of importers, carriers, brokers, forwarders, ports and terminals, and foreign manufacturers have taken the necessary steps to secure their supply chains. Under the C-TPAT initiative, business participants providing veriﬁable security information are eligible for special beneﬁts. The security enhancements put in place by C-TPAT participants allow DHS to devote more resources to high-risk shipments.

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International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code: Awareness & Prevention. By July 1, 2004, countries around the world will have implemented the ﬁrst multilateral ship and port security standard ever created. The ISPS Code requires vessels and port facilities to conduct security assessments, develop security plans, and hire security ofﬁcers. By establishing a standard for security, the world has increased its ability to prevent maritime related attacks by making ports around the world more aware of unusual or suspicious activity. International Port Security Program: Awareness & Prevention. Under this effort, the U.S. Coast Guard and the host nations will work jointly to evaluate the countries’ overall compliance with the ISPS Code. The Coast Guard will use the information gained from these visits to improve the United State’s own security practices and to determine if additional security precautions will be required for vessels arriving in the United States from other countries. Operation Safe Commerce (OSC): Awareness & Prevention. This pilot program analyzes security in the commercial supply chain and tests solutions to close security gaps. The technologies tested through the program will enhance maritime cargo security, protect the global supply chain, and facilitate the ﬂow of commerce. DHS has awarded $58 million in grants to the private sector since its inception, and will award another $17 million this summer to private sector companies. In Transit Smart Box Initiative: Prevention. One core element of CSI is using smarter, “tamper-evident” containers that will better secure containerized shipping. Designed to be “tamper-evident,” the Smart Box couples an internationally approved mechanical seal afﬁxed to an alternate location on the container door with an electronic container security device designed to deter and detect tampering of the container door. If someone attempts to open the cargo door after it has been sealed, the Smart Box device on the door would reﬂect that there had been an attempted intrusion into the container. Together with the results of technology testing, Operation Safe Commerce, DHS will have valuable information to assist in developing performance standards for container security. Ship Security Alert System: Response. Like a silent alarm in a bank, a SSAS allows a vessel operator to send a covert alert to shore for incidents involving acts of violence, (such as piracy or terrorism), indicating the security of the ship is under threat or has been compromised. The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code requires new passenger and cargo ships of at least 500 gross tons to install this equipment by July 1, 2004. Existing passenger vessels and cargo vessels must have the equipment installed prior to the ﬁrst radio survey after July 1, 2004, or by July 1, 2006. Other types of vessels may carry and use SSAS voluntarily.

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Automated Targeting System (ATS): Awareness. CBP’s ATS serves as the premier tool for performing transactional risk assessments and evaluating potential national security risks posed by cargo and passengers arriving by sea, air, truck, and rail. Using pre-arrival information and input from the intelligence community, this rules-based system identiﬁes high-risk targets before they arrive in the United States. 96-Hour Advance Notice of Arrival: Awareness & Prevention. Ships must notify the Coast Guard 96 hours before arriving in a U.S. port and provide detailed information on the crew, passenger, cargo, and voyage history. This information is analyzed using databases and intelligence information, including reviewing previous security problems with the vessel or illegal activity on the part of the crew. Part of this analysis will also account for the security environment in previous ports of call. By obtaining this information well in advance of a vessel’s arrival, the U.S. Coast Guard is able to make determinations about which vessels require additional attention, including security precautions such as an at-sea boarding or armed escort during transit to and from port.

In U.S. Waters & On U.S. Shores National Targeting Center (NTC): Prevention & Response. The priority mission of CBP’s NTC is to provide tactical targeting and analytical research support for CBP antiterrorism efforts. Experts in passenger and cargo targeting at the NTC operate around the clock using tools like the Automated Targeting System (ATS) to identify tactical targets and support intradepartmental and interagency antiterrorist operations. The NTC also supports operations in the ﬁeld, including the Container Security Initiative (CSI) personnel stationed at critical foreign ports throughout the world. Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers: Prevention. Located in Norfolk, VA, and Alameda, CA, these units compile and synthesize intelligence products from the federal, state, and local level dealing with maritime security. These intelligence products are then disseminated to homeland security professionals across the country responsible for securing our ports and waterways. High-Interest Vessel Boardings: Prevention. Before they are allowed to enter port, all vessels are screened for the security risk they pose to the United States based on information about the vessel’s cargo, size, voyage, security history, and any intelligence information. Those identiﬁed as higher risk are targeted for offshore boardings to ensure potential security issues are addressed prior to entry into port. In addition, the Coast Guard randomly selects vessels for security boardings to ensure an element of unpredictability, and thus deterrence. Specially trained Coast Guard teams board the boats through traditional water-based methods or via fast roping from helicopters.

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Operation Port Shield: Prevention. Operation Port Shield focuses on the implementation and enforcement of the new security measures implemented under the international requirements or MTSA between June 15 and December 31, 2004. Under this veriﬁcation program, the Coast Guard will be boarding every vessel, at sea or at the dock, on its ﬁrst visit to a U.S. port on or after July 1 to ensure that the vessel is compliant with U.S. security standards. These program ofﬁcers will also visit foreign countries to evaluate antiterrorism measures in place at ports abroad. Automatic Identiﬁcation System: Awareness. AIS is a type of vessel-tracking equipment that automatically sends detailed ship information to other ships and shore-based agencies, allowing for comprehensive, virtually instantaneous vessel tracking and monitoring, increasing security and safety in our shipping channels. Currently, most vessels required to use this technology are large vessels on international voyages. The Coast Guard is exploring possible ways to expand these requirements to other vessels and other U.S. waters. Area Maritime Security Committees: Awareness, Prevention & Response. The Coast Guard has established committees in all the nation’s ports to coordinate the activities of all port stakeholders, including other federal, local, and state agencies, industry, and the boating public. These groups are tasked with collaborating on plans to secure their ports so the resources of an area can be best used to deter, prevent, and respond to terror threats. Port Security Assessment Program: Awareness. This program is aimed at increasing the information and best practices available to port ofﬁcials across the country to help them make decisions about how to reduce the vulnerability of their ports. The Coast Guard is in the process of closely examining the key infrastructure in the nation’s 55 most economically and strategically important ports for potential vulnerabilities. Those assessments will be completed by the end of the year. In addition to these assessments, the Coast Guard is creating a system to display key port information in an electronic, geospatially referenced format to serve as a database that can be easily searched for national, regional, and local information. Port Security Grants: Awareness, Prevention & Response. The Port Security Grant Program provides federal resources for projects to enhance facility and operational security for critical national seaports. Funds assist ports in analyzing vulnerabilities and then closing gaps in security through physical enhancements like access control gates, fencing, lighting, and advanced communication and surveillance systems. The program also funds the implementation of security strategies to prevent and respond to terror threats. Over the past three years, $516 million in grants have been allocated and another $50 million are currently pending review. Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology (NII): Prevention. Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technologies allows U.S. Customs and Border Protection to screen a larger portion of the stream of commercial trafﬁc in

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less time, while facilitating legitimate trade. CBP ofﬁcers use large-scale gamma ray and x-ray imaging systems to safely and efﬁciently screen conveyances for contraband, including weapons of mass destruction. These units can scan the interior of a full-size 40-foot container in under a minute. Inspectors also use personal radiation detectors to scan for signs of radioactive materials, as well as special high-tech tools such as density meters and ﬁberoptic scopes to peer inside suspicious containers. Finally, if necessary, containers are opened and unloaded for a more intensive manual inspection. Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs): Prevention & Response. MSSTs are a Coast Guard rapid-response force assigned to vital ports and capable of nationwide deployment via air, ground, or sea transportation to meet emerging threats. MSSTs were created in direct response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. They have unique capabilities, including explosive-detection dogs, personnel trained to conduct fast-roping deployments from a helicopter to a hostile vessel, and antiterrorism/force protection small boat handling training. Eight teams are currently in operation and ﬁve more are scheduled to be commissioned by early 2005. Guarding In-Between the Ports: Prevention. Coast Guard, CBP Border Patrol, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Air and Marine Operations units are responsible for patrolling and securing our nation’s borders between the ports of entry. During FY 2004 to date, DHS personnel have apprehended more than 770,000 illegal aliens on land and over 9,000 at sea. By adding additional personnel, equipment, and technology, the Department of Homeland Security has been able to broaden the areas of coverage. Through strong enforcement operations and the stateof-the-art technology at the borders, the department has enhanced its operational effectiveness on the frontline. Operation Drydock: Awareness & Prevention. This Coast Guard and FBI investigation into national security threats and document fraud associated with U.S. merchant mariner credentials revealed nine individuals linked to terrorist groups who were holding maritime credentials. Merchant mariner credentials are often used as an identiﬁcation document that allows mariners to come and go from the ship while it is docked in a foreign port. This investigation, enhancements to the criminal background check process for applicants, and increased security features on the cards themselves, has increased the U.S. Government’s ability to monitor crews of the U.S. merchant ﬂeet. Transportation Workers Identity Card (TWIC): Awareness & Prevention. The goal of the TWIC program is to develop a secure uniform credential to prevent potential terrorist threats from entering sensitive areas of our transportation system. When implemented, the TWIC program will ensure that credentials contain a biometric identiﬁer to positively authenticate identities of TWIC holders. By having one universally recognized credential, workers avoid paying for redundant cards and background investigations to enter secure areas at multiple facilities. The prototype phase will be conducted at

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35 facilities in six states, including the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, California, and the fourteen major port facilities in the state of Florida. The prototype is funded with $50 million included in Homeland Security’s Transportation Security Administration (TSA) budget, and up to 200,000 port workers are expected to participate. America’s Waterways Watch: Awareness. The goal of America’s Waterway Watch is to help prevent acts of terrorism and other illegal activity that jeopardizes maritime homeland security by having members of the maritime and recreational boating industries, as well as the boating public, recognize and report to appropriate authorities suspicious activity that may be an indicator of potential terrorism. Any observations of suspicious or unusual activity could be extremely valuable to our national security and may provide clues to help uncover patterns of possible terrorist activity. Reports can be made to the Coast Guard, local law enforcement, or by calling 1-877-24-WATCH.

DHS ANNOUNCES WEST COAST MARITIME RADIATION DETECTION PROJECT Department of Homeland Security, Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary September 5, 2007*

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Ofﬁce (DNDO) announced today the West Coast Maritime pilot program that will provide maritime radiation detection capabilities for state and local authorities in Washington’s Puget Sound and California’s San Diego areas. The three-year pilot program involves the development of a radiation detection architecture that reduces the risk of radiological and nuclear threats that could be illegally transported on recreational or small commercial vessels. The pilot will be conducted in close coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection. “The West Coast Maritime pilot program addresses a potential threat pathway in the maritime domain,” said DNDO Director Vayl S. Oxford. “This project reﬂects the priority that the department has placed on balancing risk against all potential threats.” DNDO anticipates investing roughly $10 million in the pilot program. The Puget Sound region and San Diego, with DNDO assistance, will leverage existing federal grant funding to support small vessel radiation detection programs and the procurement of recommended equipment. DNDO expects to deploy nonintrusive passive detection sensors, such as human-portable radiation detection equipment, mobile sensors, and

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http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1189012515699.shtm

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ﬁxed-position detectors. The goal of the program is to evaluate the efﬁcacy and begin to facilitate the use of radiation detection equipment by local authorities and maritime partners as part of their routine operations in the maritime environment. A small vessel is deﬁned as any watercraft that is generally less than 300 gross tons. Small vessels include commercial ﬁshing vessels, recreational boats and yachts, towing vessels, uninspected passenger vessels, or any other small commercial vessels involved in foreign or U.S. voyages. The deﬁnition distinguishes small vessels from large commercial vessels and yachts, generally 300 gross tons and over, which are subject to security regulations already put in place under the authority of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. The West Coast Maritime pilot program is underway at Puget Sound, with initial assessment activities beginning in July, and will start soon in San Diego. DNDO will be working with maritime partners and local authorities in both areas to assess the geographic conﬁgurations of the ports to maximize detection and interdiction opportunities. Additional analyses for local partners will include a baseline survey of the existing radiological and nuclear detection architecture, a gap and risk assessment, and associated recommended actions to be developed in conjunction with maritime stakeholders. Maritime stakeholders will also receive guidance from DNDO on operational protocols, training, and exercises that support small vessel radiation detection capabilities.

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD PORT AND MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY Admiral James M. Loy United States Coast Guard Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation December 6, 2001*

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee. As Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss port security and the Coast Guard’s security strategy before and after the tragic events of September 11. *

http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/history/Loy/Loy_Statement_061201.html

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As a multi-mission, maritime, military service within the Department of Transportation, the Coast Guard is a leader in America’s maritime security, and will take a leadership role in coordinating a multi-agency, private sector and international effort to prevent terrorism. We are uniquely positioned because of our broad civil authorities as a law enforcement agency, our military character, and our ability to surge operations quickly to meet new threats to our nation. The Coast Guard’s homeland security efforts prior to September 11 were directed toward executing and enhancing maritime safety and security, environmental protection, and homeland defense in addition to our other normal peacetime missions. Coast Guard Captains of the Port in strategic U.S. ports chaired Port Readiness Committees and led operations to protect major force deployments under national defense contingency plans. The Coast Guard worked closely with the Department of the Navy to address domestic force protection for naval assets. We were also positioning ourselves to be prepared for the future by developing a methodology to conduct initial domestic port vulnerability assessments to identify critical infrastructure and high-risk activities in our ports, to target our limited resources against the greatest threats. We encouraged the formation of additional local port security committees to help in the security planning in ports, and actively promoted the concept of maritime domain awareness in cooperation with members of the National Security Council. Additionally, we have been working on the establishment of domestic active-duty Maritime Safety and Security Teams that will possess specialized law enforcement and force protection capabilities to meet emerging port security requirements in normal and heightened threat conditions. When the events of September 11, 2001 occurred, we found ourselves under attack by an enemy lacking a face and a conscience directed not at a government or military, but against innocent people who simply cherished and protected American freedom. The reality of the assault immediately impacted many U.S. Coast Guard men and women at units deployed throughout the service. Yet, despite the obvious presence of the unseen enemy, the Coast Guard engaged in a massive response effort to protect our ports and marine transportation infrastructure. We also immediately escalated our force protection condition to protect our own people and facilities. In consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, I immediately ordered my operational commanders to control all of our nation’s major ports. Since the attack, over 55 cutters, 42 aircraft, and hundreds of small boats have been underway aggressively patrolling domestic ports and coastlines. Diverted from other essential missions, these assets helped in our attempts to achieve maritime domain awareness in ports and coastal regions, and provided an offshore security presence to control shipping in the approaches to several strategic ports. In addition, highly trained Port Security Units, staffed predominately by Coast Guard reservists, were deployed

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to four critical domestic ports to augment security forces. Currently, over 2200 Selected Coast Guard reservists are augmenting regular forces to assist with the considerable increase in operational tempo associated with the demands of protecting critical port infrastructure, enforcing security zones, providing marshals on high-interest vessels, and performing security inspections. We identiﬁed high-interest vessels and prioritized critical infrastructure so that our limited resources could be applied in an efﬁcient manner. Crew and passenger lists were obtained along with Advanced Notice of Vessel Arrival information for commercial vessels arriving from foreign ports, so that we could screen them to identify potential terrorists attempting to enter the country. We issued an emergency temporary regulation changing the advance notice requirement from 24 to 96 hours, to give analysts more time to complete their work. The unique nature of the Coast Guard as an agile emergency response-oriented organization allowed us to immediately increase our security posture, using existing active duty, reserve, civilian, and auxiliary personnel; and existing shore units, ships, boats, and aircraft. However, this posture is not sustainable, nor is it an efﬁcient and effective use of resources. Our people are working long hours, other important missions are being curtailed, and over 25 percent of our total reserve population are on active duty. I am working with my operational commanders to determine ways to sustain this high tempo of operations and the administration to obtain the resources required to support an enhanced level of port security and safety. Our challenge for the future is to determine what the new normalcy represents in terms of mission requirements and the associated operational activity, while also ensuring that the Coast Guard is able to provide forces to meet its military service responsibilities for supporting the war against terrorism, both at home and abroad. This is an immense challenge because our Exclusive Economic Zone encompasses 95,000 miles of open shoreline, 361 ports, and nearly 3.5 million square miles of ocean. A key consideration is the U.S. marine transportation system. This system of ports, waterways, intermodal connections, vessels, and vehicles moves 95 percent of the nation’s oversea trade and 90 percent of our war ﬁghting materials during a major military contingency. Maritime industries contribute $742 billion annually to the U.S. GDP. Over 7,500 foreign ﬂag vessels make more than 51,000 port calls bringing some 200,000 foreign mariners to U.S. ports yearly. The cruise ship industry carries more than 6.5 million Americans annually on passenger vessels. Six million loaded containers, 156 million tons of hazardous material, and nearly one billion tons of petroleum products enter our ports each year. The vulnerability of the marine transportation system makes it an attractive target to terrorists for both mass disruption and mass destruction. The security environment must allow for the differentiation between the movements of lawful and unlawful activities without unreasonably

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disrupting the free ﬂow of commerce or movement of war-ﬁghting materials to overseas theaters. The United States Coast Guard will continue to maintain the viability and integrity of the marine transportation system (MTS). However, the intermodal aspect of the MTS requires the department and its agencies with a stake in MTS to take a uniﬁed approach in addressing the expansive security requirements nationwide. The importance of a cooperative DOT effort can not be overstated and has become a focal point for all transportation security since the attacks of September 11. Through this interagency collaboration and extensive partnering with public, private, domestic, and international entities, tremendous steps have been taken to address the strategic gaps between the current and desired level of protection for our nation’s ports and waterways. Increased vigilance in the ports includes continued engagement with the private sector, which has the primary responsibility for security and safety at their waterfront facilities and vessels, to present a uniﬁed and coordinated security posture. Equally important are partnering efforts with the international community. At the recent International Maritime Organization meeting, the Coast Guard proposed the development of concrete actions that will enhance maritime security worldwide, thus extending our vision outward and intercepting threats before they reach our homeland. [Although] effective homeland security is built upon the principles of awareness, prevention, response, and consequence management, the primary objectives are awareness and prevention. Awareness helps focus resources and provides efﬁciency to prevention. Prevention places a premium on awareness, detecting, identifying, and tracking threats to our homeland security. However, once terrorists or the means of terrorism are on the move toward or within the United States, the nation must have the means to detect and intercept them before they reach our borders and our transportation system. While there are no guarantees, there is good reason to believe that we can improve our national ability to detect potential threats in or to transportation through effective use of information that is, to a great extent, already available. Thus armed, border control agencies will be better able to intercept unwanted terrorists before reaching the United States. This idea of exploiting available information to separate the good from the bad, and then stop the bad is the heart of the Coast Guard-developed maritime domain awareness concept and overall Maritime Homeland Security Strategy. The goals of the Coast Guard’s Maritime Homeland Security Strategy will be to: • Instill public conﬁdence in the security of the ports, waterways, and maritime borders. • Build maritime domain awareness.

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• • • •

Ensure capability to interdict threats. Ensure positive/controlled movement of high-interest vessels. Protection of critical infrastructure. Increase presence for both deterrence and response capability.

In summary, the Coast Guard mounted a signiﬁcant and rapid response to this severe and unexpected threat. Notably, maritime trade, which is critical to this country’s economic strength, continues to move through ports with minimal interruption. It is no surprise that sustaining mobility will come at a higher cost to all of us. But the reality is that we live in a country that prides itself on the openness of its democracy, so we remain at risk to attacks of terrorism. It is incumbent upon our government to minimize this risk. With your support, the Coast Guard shall meet this challenge and ensure that our nation’s marine transportation system remains the very best in the world. COAST GUARD AND AMERICA’S SECURITY United States Coast Guard 2002*

The Coast Guard has been performing the mission of homeland security since its inception more than 200 years ago. Since 1790 it has adapted its operations to meet the needs of the nation. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, we once again made changes, refocused our efforts, and developed new tools and policies to protect the American people. We already had many of the skills, authorities, systems, and response plans, and brave, dedicated men and women to immediately raise the level of security. As America’s premier multimission, military, maritime agency, homeland security and search and rescue are, and have been, our top priorities. Continued performance of all our missions—from security and SAR, to anti-drug and illegal migrant patrols, to ﬁsheries enforcement and aids to navigation—keeps our men and women and our organization active, alert, and always ready while providing much-needed services and security to the American people. We appreciate the public’s support, understanding, and assistance as the Coast Guard works to keep the nation’s ports and waterways safe and secure. Since September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard has: • Created Maritime Safety and Security Team (MSSTs)—federal maritime SWAT teams—highly trained, strategically located, and specially equipped to *

Originally available from http://www.uscg.mil/news/homeland_security/homeland_ security.htm; most recently accessed at http://www.trackpads.com/forum/coast-guard/ 356580-americas-homeland-security.html

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provide an extra layer of security to key ports, waterways, and facilities. First four deployed this year: Seattle; Los Angeles, Houston/Galveston, and Chesapeake, VA. Six more planned. Established Special Missions Training Center at Camp Lejeune, N.C. to train new MSSTs and other CG commands in port security. Boarded and inspected over 10,000 ships to search for threats and conﬁrm the identity of those aboard. Developed special “Sea Marshal” boarding procedures where Coast Guard law enforcement ofﬁcers remain on board certain ships as they enter and leave ports to ensure they stay safely on course. Escorted cruise ships in and out of port and enforced 100-yard “no sail” security zones around them. Established a new, centralized National Vessel Movement Center and required foreign ships to provide a 96-hour advance notice of arrival, plus more information about the ship, cargo, and all people on board—information that is shared with other intelligence and law enforcement agencies to detect threats. Established and enforced Naval Protection Zones around all naval vessels. Penalties include forfeiture of vessel, 6 years in prison, and $250,000 ﬁne. Enforced over 100 security zones around sensitive maritime areas and facilities. Used the pollution and hazardous materials expertise of the Coast Guard’s National Strike (NSF) to prepare for and respond to bioterrorism response and weapons of mass destruction. NSF Atlantic, Paciﬁc, and Gulf Strike teams assisted with WTC response, cleanup of Anthrax attacks in Florida and Washington, and were part of joint agency teams on standby at Superbowl Olympic Games. Worked to “push our borders out” to detect threats before they reach our shores. Strengthened our relationships with federal, state, local and international agencies to share information and coordinate security operation. Launched a nationwide Port Security Assessment program to review and improve security in 55 key ports and waterways. Partnered with mariners and boaters to help keep waterways safe and secure by asking them to be more careful about their own activities on the water, and to be more aware of and report unusual and suspicious activity. Maintained the highest level of alert and continued the largest port security effort since WWII. Submitted wide range of U.S. security-related proposals to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to improve security of ships and cargo worldwide, leading U.S. initiative to make global transportation system more secure. Launched the ﬁrst phase of a long-term $17-billion program to build the next generation of Coast Guard ships and aircraft, communications and logistics systems, and began some immediate system upgrades that will enable the Coast Guard to perform their essential maritime safety and security missions.

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Years in the planning and known as the “Deepwater” program because of its focus on larger ships and planes capable of operating far offshore, the contract will strengthen the front line of the Coast Guard’s layered homeland security strategy. • Begun procuring 46 new port security boats around country to enhance patrol and response capabilities of most vital ports. • Coast Guard Captains of the Port (COTPs) have joined Department of Justice Antiterrorism Task Forces. • Coast Guard continues to exercise operational control of 13 U.S. Navy special operations command patrol boats for homeland security duties, with Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments and U.S. Navy crews aboard.

In addition to homeland security duties, the Coast Guard has continued performing its wide range of emergency response, regulatory, and public safety duties. Since September 11, Coast Guard men and women have: • • • • • • •

Responded to over 31,500 search and rescue cases; Saved over 3,200 lives; Assisted over 39,000 people in distress; Seized 111,903 pounds of cocaine, 37,024 pounds of marijuana; Interdicted over 3,500 illegal migrants; Responded to 4,000 oil and chemical spills; Conducted approximately 11,000 Port State Control (PSC) boardings of foreign-ﬂagged vessels (annual average); • Certiﬁed the qualiﬁcations of merchant ship ofﬁcers and crew and issued 36,473 merchant mariner licenses; 30,678 merchant mariner documents, and 26,443 mariner training certiﬁcates (STCW); • Conducted 6,500 marine safety accident investigations; • Increased safety patrols by the civilian volunteer Coast Guard Auxiliary.

The coastline is our longest border and we will remain vigilant. (95,000-mile coast includes Great Lakes and inland waterways.) Approximately 10,000 vessels enter the U.S. each year and make approximately 68,000 port calls. Coast Guard remains at a heightened state of alert at over 361 major ports. Coast Guard Investigative Service Special Agents continue to serve as Air Marshals in support of the DOT and FAA. (They are the only military personnel allowed to participate in the Air Marshal program). Over 2,700 reservists were recalled to active duty. Port Security Units remain on duty in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, providing security to JTF 160 at the U.S. naval base. 95 percent of our annual commerce comes by ships through our ports. Maritime industries contribute $742 billion per year to U.S. Gross National Product.

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BEFORE THE GATHERING STORM Admiral Thomas H. Collins National Defense University Distinguished Lecture Program, Washington DC October 9, 2002*

AMENITIES Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It is a real pleasure to be here with you today, and an honor to be invited as a guest speaker in the Distinguished Lecture Program. Someone once praised Abraham Lincoln as a “distinguished orator.” I can really appreciate the humility of his reply to such high praise. He said, “I am not a very sentimental man; and the best sentiment I can think of is, that if you collect the signatures of all persons who are no less distinguished than I, you will have a very undistinguishing mass of names.” A very humble reply, I’m sure you’ll agree. Though he was perhaps our greatest president, what really distinguished Mr. Lincoln as a man was his sincere humility. We should all be so distinguished! Though he could not be here today, I’d like to thank the distinguished VADM Paul Gaffney for inviting me to speak with you this morning. And I’d like to thank Ambassador Raphel for hosting my visit with you. Many thanks also to the senior leadership of the schools represented here today for the hard work they do to prepare our nation’s future military leaders for the challenging years ahead.

INTRODUCTION Last Thursday, Hurricane Lili slammed into the southwestern coast of Louisiana. Lili was classiﬁed by the National Hurricane Center as a Category Two storm. The night before, as it seemed to be gathering strength from the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico, the storm’s strength was estimated as Category Four—a deadly fury of wind and water. Storms at sea are measured in strength on a scale relative to others that have come and gone. But when they come ashore, storms are often measured in human lives. Thankfully, Lili’s strength waned as it came ashore. And nobody...nobody was killed. That’s amazing! Clearly, Lili caused some severe damage to the towns and cities along the coast. And the communities that were in its path will be cleaning up and recovering for quite a while. But the storm’s strength, in terms of the cost of human lives, was very small, indeed. That wasn’t the case back in 1957, however, when Hurricane Audrey came ashore in the same place. Audrey’s massive power devastated New Iberia with a storm surge that

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http://www.uscg.mil/history/collins/2002-10-09%20NDU%20Short3.doc

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swept inland 25 miles. Four hundred people died in that storm. What was the difference? Forty-ﬁve years ago, the people of New Iberia had very little warning of the impending disaster. In contrast, last week, nearly 500,000 people were evacuated well in advance of Lili’s potentially deadly arrival. They escaped due to preemptive early warnings by vigilant national, state, and local ofﬁcials. There is a lesson there, folks. I’ll get back to that thought in just a moment. Of course, as you might imagine, the Coast Guard provided rescue and assistance services before and after both storms. America’s lifesavers were there to rescue the victims, and to prevent any additional harm wherever possible. That’s the image most Americans have of the Coast Guard. America’s lifesavers. It’s an image that we cherish as an organization. But it’s not a complete image. In fact, it is far from complete. There’s much more to our service than meets the eye. The events of the past year have proven that beyond any doubt. The value of the Coast Guard extends well beyond saving lives and responding to disasters. Though we will remain always ready to do that important work, the Coast Guard also provides valuable security to our homeland. We have been doing that since 1790, when Alexander Hamilton ﬁrst formed what he called “a system of cutters” to patrol the coast of the United States to protect the fragile economic security of the new republic. I’d like to spend my time this morning speaking with you about that central role—a role that I believe will prove vital to our nation’s future.

THE ARRIVAL OF A DIFFERENT STORM Like a storm without a forecast, the future arrived suddenly, violently, and without warning on a clear day in September of last year. Previously, we had seen the storm clouds building toward us over the horizon, but nobody thought they would arrive so soon, or with such devastating fury. We were hit full force in New York, Washington, and the countryside of Pennsylvania. That changed everything with regard to the security of our nation. In the past, our view of national security has been projected mainly abroad, rather than within our own borders. However, after the recent attacks on our own cities, we now have good cause to be more concerned about the threats right under our own noses, as well. Today, we suffer under the constant threat of terrorism as a means of coercion or retaliation, as much of the world already has. That will likely continue for some time in the future. As a nation that depends so heavily on the oceans and sea-lanes as avenues of our prosperity, we know that whatever action we take against further acts of terrorism must protect our ports and waterways, and the ships that use them. They are just as vital to our commerce with the world as airlines and trade centers, and even more vulnerable. Terrorism, however, is only one of many modern threats that confront us. Migrant and drug smuggling, for example, compound the threat of terrorism, because they contribute to the illicit movement of people, money,

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and weapons across borders. These threats have been with us for many years. They have continued to grow in severity each year, and will likely continue into the future. Proﬁts from these non-nation-state sponsored threats are well documented as signiﬁcant funding engines for international terrorism. Common to each of these threats is the potential for an attack against the United States by a state or non-state actor who is either unwilling or unable to confront us directly. All of these threats bring the problem of national security much closer to home. Clearly, however, we must never forget that our prosperity also depends in large part on the security of our national interests abroad. A coherent national security strategy to meet the challenges of the future must address threats beyond our borders that could easily become threats within our borders. I would urge you, as you study and think about our nation’s security, to think in terms of homeland security as an element of a broader national security strategy. The two are intimately linked. My thesis for you today is simply this: the Coast Guard—with its multiple missions, maritime expertise, military discipline, and the civil law enforcement authority it brings to the table—is a vital instrument of such a national security strategy. The Coast Guard retains at its core the vital link between national security and homeland security that is the key to an effective strategy… and I believe that in its own way, it has become the harbinger of the future. Let me explain what I mean by examining how the Coast Guard is working to meet the emerging challenges of a changing world and what we have come to call the “new normalcy,” both at home and abroad. But ﬁrst, I’d like to examine more carefully what those challenges are.

HOMELAND SECURITY AS AN ELEMENT OF A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY Last month, President Bush announced a new national security strategy, one based on a doctrine of preempting the new threats to our national security, rather than relying exclusively on the Cold War-era doctrines of containment and deterrence. The doctrine of preemption has been hailed as unprecedented in modern world affairs. While not really a new notion, what makes it unprecedented is that preemption has now been made a central tenet to our nation’s policy of military intervention. The strategy says, in part: “Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past.” The president is absolutely right. What is true abroad is also true here at home. We can no longer afford to rely on a reactive posture to prevent future terrorist attacks on our homeland. We must act ﬁrst to prevent harm to our people. The president also recently unveiled the National Homeland Security Strategy, which outlines plans to accomplish three broad objectives: to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; to reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism;

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and to minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. It is a sound strategy that depends primarily on preventing future attacks—or preempting them, if you will—by sharing information, securing our borders, protecting vital infrastructure, partnering with others at home and abroad, and preparing to respond quickly if necessary. That sounds a lot like bracing for a coming storm, doesn’t it? That’s why it makes so much sense.

THE NEW DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY The president’s Homeland Security strategy addresses required capabilities and points to the way ahead. It also points clearly to the need for changes in the way our government is organized to work. With his proposal to create a single Department of Homeland Security, the President has taken a sensible step to ensure that we have the ability to implement the maritime security strategy. It is a vital part of the strategy. From my perspective, it is a necessary change, whose time has come. I believe that the proposed organization will bring unity of effort and unity of command to our efforts to strengthen homeland security, with clear lines of authority to get the job done. That’s the main reason I believe that the Coast Guard is a necessary component of the proposed department. Though the Coast Guard is one of our nation’s ﬁve armed services, we are the only armed service that has full statutory authority to enforce United States law. Whereas national security is concerned mainly with military power, homeland security is necessarily centered on civil authority—the power to enforce the law. We need to coordinate the efforts of individual agencies holding that authority to work together in unity, and to meet our combined need for information. These concerns will be most effectively addressed by the creation of this new department. We have already begun in earnest to work with other agencies to reduce the number of competing or repetitive requirements among us. But we can do more if we are all under the same roof. You will recall President Lincoln’s famous admonition: “A house divided against itself cannot stand.” This wasn’t just rhetoric from a distinguished orator. When he used the word “house,” he wasn’t talking about a wood and plaster building. He was talking about human institutions. In Lincoln’s language, a family was known as a house. Likewise, a nation is a house. The same is true of its government. We need the strength of unity where it counts, and we need to get our house in order.

THE MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY Threats to our security at home are growing, and they will continue to grow in this new century. Separately and collectively they pose dangers to our sovereignty, our economy, our environment, and our safety. All of them have

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a distinct maritime dimension. Sustained prosperity at home clearly depends upon our accommodating the global trade that is predicted to double or triple in the next 20 years. Most of that trade will take place through our seaports. So, government needs to be attentive to ﬁnding ways to minimize the disruptions and delays caused by federal inspections and other requirements in our seaports. More stuff has to move through faster—so ports need to become more open. Ensuring maritime security suggests a requirement to tighten down on activity in the ports, however. Government has an obligation to keep illegal immigrants, drugs, weapons, and other contraband from entering and leaving through those same ports whose throughput we want to maximize in the interests of prosperity. We need a maritime security strategy that will enable us to provide security while preserving our prosperity. The Coast Guard has been at the center of effort to deﬁne a maritime security strategy that supports the president’s broader homeland security strategy. There are seven principal elements of that strategy. Let me share them quickly with you.

THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGY First, we must implement a layered defense of the maritime domain. We are designing a full range of concentric maritime security measures, starting overseas and extending to the shores of the United States. The goal is to have the effect of pushing our borders out as far as possible, so we can intercept potential threats long before they arrive on the docks. Second, we will work to maintain an increased level of security operations directed against terrorism. Our maritime operations must reﬂect the changes brought by the events of last fall by increasing the level of effort against terrorism, without degrading our readiness in other missions. Third, we will strengthen the security of our ports and reduce their vulnerability. Fourth, we must create a more comprehensive awareness of threats and activities in the maritime domain. This is really the centerpiece of our strategy. Prior to September 11, our awareness of potential threats to our nation was relatively low. Our preparations regarding serious threats to our homeland were focused mainly on ﬁrst-response capability and consequence management. Obviously, that wasn’t enough. We must be more aware—not only to prepare for last year’s threat, but next year’s as well. Fifth, we plan to further expand the core competencies and recapitalize vital assets of the Coast Guard. We will recapitalize our Deepwater forces, continue to deploy Maritime Safety and Security Teams, and expand our Sea Marshal program. These improvements will take several years to achieve, but we are committed to obtaining the needed resources to get the job done. Sixth, we must prepare our forces to transition easily between homeland security and homeland defense operations. If all else fails, we must be ready

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to conduct joint military operations to defend our homeland. As one of America’s ﬁve armed forces, the Coast Guard will stand ready to execute the orders of combatant commanders, extending from the Commander-in-Chief. Finally, we have set out to organize and sustain a lasting partnership between the public and private sectors, both at home and abroad. This seven-part maritime border security strategy incorporates the core competencies of the Coast Guard into multi-agency, multinational, and layered operations to push our maritime borders outward—into and beyond the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. It will help to ensure that we can strengthen our maritime security, while allowing the freedom of commerce that is so vital to our economic security.

THE COAST GUARD’S UNIQUE QUALITIES AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY Now that we have carefully examined the challenges before us, let’s turn to examine how the Coast Guard is suited to meet those challenges. We are a maritime nation. We’ve already discussed how porous our maritime borders can be, especially in comparison to our land and air borders. Ninety-ﬁve percent of our trade is shipped by maritime means. Threats can pose as legitimate trading vessels very easily among such a large volume. Somebody has to engage these vessels one at a time, up close and personal. Somebody has to distinguish the suspicious from the obviously innocent. To separate the guilty from the merely suspicious, somebody has to get alongside and put a boarding team aboard, even if the suspect vessels resist or won’t stop. Somebody has to size up each case and dispose of it based on the complex humanitarian, diplomatic, military, geopolitical, environmental, and legal issues at stake. Somebody has to coordinate proposed enforcement actions with other government departments, ﬂag states, law enforcement agencies, and everybody else who has a legitimate interest in the matter. It must all be done according to the rule of law. For more than 212 years, that somebody has been the United States Coast Guard. The Coast Guard offers scalable command and control frameworks suitable for preventing or responding to nearly any military or civil domestic emergency. Our Captains of the Port have broad and strong legal authority to secure and manage any situation that arises in our ports or on our waterways. This authority gives them the legal basis for ordering or approving just about any movement of shipping within the port. And our Port Security Units give enforcement teeth to that legal authority. To that foundation, we offer experience in disaster relief and pollution response—experience that has made us the most proﬁcient agency anywhere in conducting emergency operations through the Incident Command Structure. Our Incident Command Structure, which has been adopted by FEMA, is the most effective way of coordinating inter-agency responses to domestic emergencies. And if one of those emergencies should require DOD involvement, our status as one of the nation’s ﬁve armed services

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links us to the others in a joint warfare environment. The sum of these elements—legal authority, coastal assets, command structure for military and civilian agencies, command and control systems—offers a bridge between the various players who have to get involved within the civilian interagency community and the Department of Defense. You’ve seen the effectiveness of the combination of those elements continuously throughout the past year.

COAST GUARD CONTRIBUTIONS TO A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY ABROAD Events of the past year have focused our attention clearly on the security of our homeland. It is important to note, however, that Coast Guard contributions to a national security strategy extend well beyond the reach of our own borders. We have been considering the maritime security threats to our homeland. These are symptoms of worldwide instability. Add to that inventory the nuclear capabilities and tensions between India and Pakistan, the eagerness of rogue states like Iraq to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and the willingness of other states like Iran and North Korea to export medium-range missile technology, and the uncertain disposal of the former Soviet Union’s arsenal. In this unstable world, international engagement must be used as a primary tool in our national security toolbox, and a number of combatant commanders have recognized the Coast Guard’s utility as a unique instrument of our security. The idea at work behind the Coast Guard’s contribution to international engagement is that if we can help other nations establish the competence to exercise their sovereignty in the maritime environment, they will help increase stability in their regions. Several of the security threats we’ve discussed do not arise from hostile nations, but from uncontrolled criminal enterprises. Thus, every nation that develops the will and the means to impose the rule of law over its territorial sea will make our own security challenges a little easier to manage. The Coast Guard has an active program aimed at helping other countries develop maritime organizations modeled on the U.S. Coast Guard. Through equipment transfers, training visits, joint exercises, bilateral agreements, and opportunities to train at our service schools, we are helping friendly countries to become positive forces for peace and stability. This is particularly apparent in the Caribbean region, but we have programs all over the world, including the Baltic States and Africa.

A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH DoD We do the important work of international engagement in close cooperation with the Department of Defense. But that’s not the only area where such a relationship exists with DoD. As you may know, in times of war, we have

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been transferred temporarily to the Department of Defense as part of the Navy. But even in peacetime, we maintain very close ties. Interaction takes place daily at many levels. And now that homeland security has come to the forefront of our national priorities, that interaction has increased at an astonishing pace, especially with the stand-up of Northern Command. For example, you may be interested to know that General Eberhardt, the Commander of NORTHCOM, has recently named a Coast Guard ﬂag ofﬁcer to become his Deputy J-3. We now have eight ofﬁcers billeted on staff there. We continue to give our utmost attention to many areas of common concern. Just last month, I received from Secretary Rumsfeld a memorandum for secretaries of the military departments. The subject of the memo was “Legislative Priorities for Fiscal Year 2004.” He listed ten major priorities to consider as we seek to strengthen our capabilities through additional legislative authority. As I read the memo, I was struck by how similar our priorities really are. Many of those listed are the same as the priorities and initiatives that have come from deliberations of our own Leadership Council. We share priorities such as transforming the military culture to reward innovation and risk-taking … improving our approaches to human resource management … developing new concepts of global engagement … more clearly deﬁning our roles in homeland security … and improving interagency integration and processes to reduce response times and increase surge capabilities.

SUPPORTING THE COMPONENT COMMANDERS In our daily interactions with DoD, we provide direct support of Component Commanders’ strategies and operations. The Coast Guard has statutory authority to assist the department in the performance of any activity for which the Coast Guard is especially qualiﬁed. A Memorandum of Agreement is active between the DOD and DOT that speciﬁcally calls on the Coast Guard to participate in Component Commanders’ engagement strategies. We deploy major cutters to the Baltic, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, the Black Sea, and other spots throughout the globe in response to the Component Commanders’ requests for support of their engagement plans. Last year, the CG Cutter Sherman deployed to the Persian Gulf in support of maritime intercept operations to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq. Her unique contributions among the naval task force were widely praised. We can often gain access to nations and ports where a more overt U.S. military presence would not be welcome. There are still a lot of places in this world where the arrival of gray-hulled American ships would either not be permitted or would create anxiety and resentment. Many of these same places welcome Coast Guard cutters with open arms. We are an armed service of the United States; but our legal authority as a law enforcement and regulatory agency, combined with our international reputation as a humanitarian service, creates

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unique engagement opportunities. In a wider sense, the ability of various Component Commanders to capitalize on the Coast Guard’s status as a model maritime service for emerging naval services has proven valuable, from Albania to Haiti. We have developed a model maritime service code that sets forth the legal authorities that must be in place for a maritime service to be effective. These peacetime missions offer Component Commanders and ambassadors extensive contacts and inroads to national bureaucracies. How often do the other U.S Armed Services communicate with the Russian and Cuban Border Guards? We do it every day. We also contribute to joint operations. Desert Shield/Desert Storm revealed valuable Coast Guard contributions to port security and logistics ﬂow. In theater, Coast Guard Port Security Units, consisting mostly of Coast Guard reserve personnel, set up Harbor Defense Commands where materiel was being delivered. Stateside, we balanced the urgency of loading and moving MARAD and Sealift Command ships against the necessity of maintaining an orderly ﬂow of routine commerce. The Coast Guard provided crucial support at both ends of the logistics pipeline. After Desert Storm, our boarding and inspection expertise have remained in place in theater to enforce the UN embargo. Sometimes, Component Commanders use our engagement advantage and our operational capabilities simultaneously. For example, the acceptability of a more benign Coast Guard presence is one of the reasons that Coast Guard vessels were chosen as the lead U.S. ships entering Port Au Prince, Haiti, in Operation Uphold Democracy. Without a Coast Guard cutter at the head of the line, the operation would have looked a lot like a hostile invasion, and been received as such. In fact, if you recall, just one week earlier, the USS Harlan County withdrew from her berth in Port-Au-Prince to an anchorage about a mile away, to avoid the violence mounting against the U.S. military presence there. However, having a Coast Guard cutter at the head of the line alleviated anxiety among the Haitian populace, who were well accustomed to Coast Guard port calls. This action gave the operational commander the immediate capability to control the port, mark the channel, and set up the Harbor Defense Command.

COMPLEMENTING THE U.S. NAVY (NATIONAL FLEET) We are actively engaged in complementing the U.S. Navy in other ways, too. Many of you may have heard of the statutory provision for the Coast Guard to operate under the Navy during times of war. But the interdepartmental transfer hasn’t happened since World War II, and our complementary support of the Navy is not limited to wartime. Joint Vision 2020 predicts a less stable era in the coming decades in which much of our maritime security activity will be concentrated at the low end of the spectrum of conﬂict. In this environment, the Coast Guard and Navy will have to deploy forces with

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greater ﬂexibility, adaptability, affordability, and inter-operability. Accordingly, the Navy and the Coast Guard are planning their future acquisitions in light of a concept we call the National Fleet. Under this concept, both services will maintain their distinctive heritages, capabilities, and identities; but we will make sure that our strengths are complementary. Of course, the Navy will maintain its highly capable multi-mission surface combatants designed for the full spectrum of naval operations, from Peacetime Engagement through Major Theater War. The Coast Guard will provide relatively smaller national security cutters, designed for peacetime and crisis-response Coast Guard missions, but capable of meeting the requirement for general-purpose, shallow-draft warships. Our nation doesn’t need another Navy. But it can’t do without a Coast Guard. “National Fleet” isn’t an inventory of who will procure which assets. It is a process for closer cooperation to synchronize planning, training, and procurement to provide the highest level of maritime capabilities for the nation’s investment. It is a way for both services to support national security objectives and our stewardship responsibilities. It is a way to ensure interoperability and to avoid redundancy.

CONCLUSION Ladies and gentlemen, we have had adequate warnings of another approaching storm, but it is not a threat of nature. This one is man-made. We have yet to feel the full strength of the gathering storm that threatened us last year. We don’t know exactly where it may strike—if it does. But we must continue to prepare, and we must remain vigilant and ready. Failure is not an option. The Coast Guard is doing what we can to be ready. I hope you now have a much better idea of what we can do to help our nation get ready. Not just ready to respond, but ready to act ﬁrst—to preempt the threats wherever possible. Our vital role in national security is to be an instrument of our government to conduct international engagement, to support the Component Commanders in theater, and to complement the Navy. We have been doing so for many years. Our central role in homeland security is to lead the effort to prevent any harm presented by the preeminent threats against our borders. These two roles are closely linked by our function as a maritime, multi-mission, military service. Maritime security is common to both. Some people—private citizens, members of Congress, and even a few in the Coast Guard itself— consider maritime security as an adjunct mission . . . another new task added to a growing burden of tasks for the Coast Guard. It is no burden. It is our sworn duty. And if it is new, then it is news to me. We have been active in the security of our homeland for the past 212 years. We plan to continue doing so as long as the ﬂag of our nation remains the standard of freedom around the world. Thank you. Semper Paratus.

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A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SEAPOWER Admiral Thad W. Allen Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security Before the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives December 13, 2007*

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is my pleasure to be here today to testify on the tri-service document, “A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-First Century Seapower”. Thank you for the invitation to speak to the U.S. Coast Guard’s role with the U. S. Navy and U. S. Marine Corps in defending our nation at sea and securing the marine transportation system. I want to begin by recognizing the leadership of Admiral Roughead and General Conway in developing an integrated strategy for our nation’s sea services. We share a vision for seapower that will strengthen our national defense and economic security. It is a common vision about how to move our nation forward into an uncertain future; into an era of persistent conﬂict and of irregular conﬂict; into an era where the next challenge may be something disruptive and unanticipated. To succeed in such an environment we need ﬂexibility, agility, and adaptability—all characteristics that are embedded in this strategy. We also need a strategy that integrates the three services’ unique capabilities into a single vision. The Coast Guard is a multi-mission, military and maritime service, responsible for the safety, security and stewardship of our nation’s ports, waterways, maritime borders, and international maritime interests. Its wide civil maritime authorities empower the Coast Guard with the unique competencies that it brings to its defense role, deﬁned in statute (14 USC 1 and 2, and 10 USC 101). We traditionally provide capabilities and resources in mission areas that support naval operations, such as maritime interception operations; domestic and expeditionary port operations/security and defense; theater security cooperation; military environmental response operations; and coastal seacontrol operations. Increasingly, however, we contribute our law enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and civil governance competencies in defense operations. These essential military tasks may be performed by the Coast Guard as an element of joint and combined forces in peacetime, crisis, and war. The Coast Guard participates with the other military services and combatant commanders in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) deliberation and crisis-planning processes. Coast Guard forces are apportioned to combatant

* http://www.uscg.mil/comdt/testimony/docs/Statement.Cooperative%20Strategy.Dec%2 02007.pdf

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commander operation plans and are regular participants in joint and combined military operations. About two years ago, the Coast Guard testiﬁed before our authorizers in the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure regarding the newly released National Strategy for Maritime Security. That testimony highlighted the Coast Guard’s extensive Title 14 responsibilities in securing our ports, waterways, and the maritime domain. My testimony today on “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” highlights how the Coast Guard integrates its Title 10 responsibilities with the Navy and Marine Corps in a wide spectrum of military operations. For me, this “closes the circle” in describing the Coast Guard’s unique contributions to the security and defense of our nation, and highlights the value of integrated, synchronized operations among the three services. The Coast Guard subscribes completely to “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”. It reinforces the time-honored military and humanitarian missions that we have carried out for the nation since 1790, and it reﬂects the global reach and inﬂuence of our maritime services. The strategy emphasizes the need to integrate, synchronize, and act with our coalition and international partners not only to win wars, but as Admiral Roughead said, to prevent wars too.

NATIONAL DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD The Coast Guard’s contributions to the combatant commanders include cutters, aircraft, patrol boats, Maritime Safety and Security (MSST), Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET), Port Security Units (PSU), and other specialized capabilities. These assets deliver essential maritime surveillance, security, and response capabilities, particularly where hostile intent is not immediately discernable or is intermingled with civil maritime operations. The Coast Guard deploys assets to support DoD operations and theater security cooperation requirements. With more than 40 of the world’s 70 naval forces structured and focused on performing Coast Guard-type functions, combatant commanders continue to seek Coast Guard capabilities to support their theater security cooperation initiatives that are intended to improve the governance and security. Working with combatant commanders, the Coast Guard allocates forces to the highest priority requests. The Coast Guard’s 2007 defense activities illustrate the various contributions it makes to the six key military capabilities highlighted in the maritime strategy. Forward Presence: Coast Guard cutters and other forces provided specialized and important theater security cooperation operations supporting national security and defense strategies. Multinational exercises included annual Coast Guard cutter deployments with the U.S. Navy to the Caribbean,

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South America, and Central America. In 2007, a major cutter deployed for U.S. European Command to conduct security operations and combined training exercises with numerous countries in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. Also, a high-endurance cutter deployed for U.S. Central Command to conduct maritime security operations, including piracy suppression operations off Somalia, the Horn of Africa, and the Gulf of Aden. Deterrence: The Coast Guard’s principal contributions were close to home in deterring transnational, unconventional threats—principally drug smuggling—that test our national sovereignty and border integrity, as well as weaken regional political stability and order at sea. Coast Guard, Navy, U.S. law enforcement, and Allied military and law enforcement cooperation though Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF) South and West showcased the strength of integrated military and law enforcement operations, and were integral to enabling the Coast Guard to remove on average 319,945 pounds of cocaine from the transit zone each year between 2004 and 2007. These were the four highest years for maritime cocaine removals ever, culminating with a record breaking removal of over 355,000 pounds of cocaine in 2007. Highly successful Coast Guard airborne use of force operations have also been extended from the Atlantic to Paciﬁc Coast, where continued operation of Coast Guard crews on Navy helicopters in 2007 have brought an effective new joint-service capability to securing our borders. This ever-tighter integration of our naval services in hemispheric maritime security operations creates a stronger deterrent effect against a range of unconventional, irregular threats to our nation. The Coast Guard also supports the Navy’s essential strategic deterrence capability through its Maritime Force Protection Units (MFPU), commissioned in 2007 [to] enforce Naval Vessel Protective Zones (NVPZ) for the Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) ﬂeet. Sea Control: In 2007, the Coast Guard continued to support national interests in the Arabian Gulf. Working alongside Navy and allied naval units, six patrol boats, two LEDETs and associated logistics and command and control elements supported the naval component commander’s ability to prosecute the War on Terrorism at sea and continued the protection of the vital offshore Iraqi oil infrastructure. The Coast Guard also continued port security deployments to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in support of DoD operations. Detachments from PSUs were used to fulﬁll this commitment. Power Projection: In support of the Global War on Terrorism, the Coast Guard protected and escorted Navy high-value units in 2007, including 75 Military Sealift Command ship arrivals and departures at 20 U.S. seaports of embarkation/debarkation, moving over 6 million square feet of military cargo. About one half of the over 800 Coast Guard men and women supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) in 2008 will be conducting domestic and expeditionary port operations/security and defense activities. The Coast Guard plays a specialized and essential role in supporting the military sealift that underpins power projection.

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Maritime Security: The President’s Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan provides for the coordinated U.S. government response to threats against the United States and its interests in the maritime domain by establishing roles and responsibilities enabling rapid and decisive response. The Coast Guard, as the nation’s leading maritime law enforcement agency, fulﬁlls DHS’s role as one of the lead MOTR agencies in the maritime domain. With its experience working both law enforcement and military operations, the Coast Guard brings broad authorities as well as planning and execution skills to operations requiring interagency coordination through the MOTR process in support of both homeland defense and homeland security missions. The operations can include the deployment of integrated and adaptive capabilities (including use of force) required to locate, identify, intercept, apprehend, exploit, and, when necessary, defeat maritime threats. The Coast Guard continues to play an important supporting role to DoD within the interagency MOTR process used in countering piracy and suppression of unlawful acts at sea. Humanitarian Assistance /Disaster Relief (HA/DR): With long-standing domestic authority and experience in organizing and responding to maritime and civil disasters, the Coast Guard brings highly practiced skills to the expanded core naval service mission of HA/DR. This is second nature to us, as illustrated when tropical storm Noel struck the Dominican Republic last month. The Coast Guard rapidly deployed three helicopters, coordinating rescue and aid operations with U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) while using ﬁxed-wing air reconnaissance and the Coast Guard Cutter Tampa in Dominican Republic waters to serve as a command and control platform during the response. This joint forces effort saved over 50 lives, transported critical medical teams, and distributed vital food and water rations to victims in distress. The changing nature of the threats and challenges facing the nation and our combatant commanders has not only shaped the Coast Guard’s role in traditional naval warfare mission areas but has also introduced new demands for specialized skill sets that the Coast Guard is uniquely suited to ﬁll. New and emerging mission areas that support combatant commanders include: Rotary Wing Air Intercept (RWAI): Responsibility for National Air Defense (AD) operations rests with U.S. Northern Commands, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Coast Guard RWAI forces seamlessly integrate into the NORAD air defense command and control structure, allowing unity of command and enhancement of the layered defense and law enforcement response. In 2007, the Coast Guard is providing RWAI capability for several different AD missions, including: • • • •

National Special Security Events (NSSE) Special Events Level 1–5 NASA Space Shuttle Launches National Capital Region (NCR)

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Coast Guard aircraft provided low/slow air intercept of aircraft in the National Capital Region under NORAD. In 2007, we responded to over 50 incidents in the prosecution of this mission. The Coast Guard is participating in planning and exercises with U.S. Northern Command to further hone this capability, including the development of an air-to-maritime concept. Combatant commanders’ support operations for the War on Terror are conducted when regional combatant commanders request speciﬁc capabilities be added to deployed forces to expand capability. The Coast Guard provides forces with special capabilities and competencies often useful to DoD overseas, especially in Phase 0 “shaping” operations, including training host nation military and government forces to build capacity for maritime governance, security, and basic civil administration. The Coast Guard provides training assistance to 60 nations with mobile training teams worldwide. For example, Coast Guard support has been instrumental in ensuring the success of the Search and Rescue Training Center (SAR-TC) in Malta. The SARTC graduated three classes last year, which included students from Nigeria, Cape Verde, Tunisia, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, and nations of the European Community. The ability to ﬁeld Coast Guard capabilities in areas where DoD forces lack civil authorities, expertise, and access can give combatant commanders the beneﬁt of relationships the Coast Guard has built with the civil ministries (e.g., Ministers of Interior) of many foreign countries.

IMPLEMENTATION PRIORITIES FOR THE U.S. COAST GUARD The maritime strategy captures the challenges facing our nation and our sea services in a globalized maritime world. For the Coast Guard to serve its role in national defense operations, four implementation priorities bear highlighting. Cutter and aircraft ﬂeet recapitalization through the Deepwater acquisition program is my highest priority. Unless we are able to continue delivering the program’s much-needed assets, our ability to secure the nation’s maritime borders, save lives, ensure national security, and protect natural resources will be severely limited. The Deepwater acquisition program fully aligns with the National Fleet Policy, and by design implements the essential service interoperability called for in this strategy. The National Security Cutter was designed from the keel-up to integrate with the Navy in C4ISR, weapons systems, and operational capability. Our new HC-144A CASA aircraft will also provide interoperability with DoD and other partners. There are huge returns from the Deepwater program to our homeland security and national defense readiness, as well as operational and economic efﬁciencies. For example, in March 2007, we opened our new C4ISR systems training facility at the Coast Guard Training Center in Petaluma, California. This

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facility is equipped with state-of-the-art simulators, and radar and electronics equipment to train Coast Guard crews assigned to new Deepwater cutters, and has also been used to train U.S. Navy personnel on common C4ISR systems. Building and sustaining a talented, adaptable workforce is essential to the Coast Guard’s success in implementing this strategy. The modernization of our ﬂeet of cutters and aircraft, coupled with the progression of technology in the maritime industry, are creating new training and education demands for Coast Guard men and women. It is especially important for our Coast Guard professionals to remain competent and technologically current in their maritime safety, environment, stewardship, maritime security, and Title 10 roles. In fact, it is these civil competencies and authorities that are often the most valuable contribution a small Coast Guard presence can add to the combatant commanders’ spectrum of operations. Deployable Operations Group: The Coast Guard’s response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita demonstrated its ability to respond quickly and effectively to one of the most costly and damaging natural disasters in American history. However, the Coast Guard also saw it could improve its response by building adaptive force packages to meet operational requirements and achieve greater interoperability with partner agencies and DoD. Because of this experience, the Coast Guard has consolidated and integrated its deployable forces under the Deployable Operations Group (DOG), which achieved initial operating capability (IOC) in July 2007. Deployable Specialized Forces (DSF) in the DOG force structure include Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST), the Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT), Tactical Law Enforcement Teams (TACLET), Port Security Units (PSU), National Strike Force (NSF) Strike Teams, and the National Strike Force Coordination Center (NSFCC). An additional force in the DSF community is the Coast Guard personnel assigned to the Navy’s Coastal Warfare (NCW) Squadrons. The DOG structure promises not only to greatly improve Coast Guard response to domestic disasters and incidents of national signiﬁcance, but also to more tightly integrate training and doctrine with our Navy and Marine Corps partners and bring highly effective maritime service force packages to the combatant commanders. High-Latitude Operational Capacity: The Coast Guard Cutter Healy, one of our two operational icebreakers, returned in October 2007 from a science mission off the North Slope of Alaska, an effort to determine the extent of the United States continental shelf. This was a very topical deployment given receding ice, growing maritime activity in the Arctic, and related challenges presented to the United States government. The Arctic contains 2,500-plus miles of U.S. shoreline and perhaps 25 percent of the world’s energy reserves. The changing national security and sovereignty implications in the Arctic are noted in the strategy, and are emerging challenges for the Coast Guard and the nation. Maritime Domain Awareness: Three weeks ago I returned from London, where I led the U.S. delegation to the International Maritime Organization.

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High on our agenda were long-range tracking initiatives that complement shorter-range transponder systems, such as the safety-related Automated Identiﬁcation Systems (AIS) used on commercial vessels around the world. The Coast Guard is a global leader in advancing systems that make maritime commerce safe and more transparent, allowing peaceful forces around the world to have a higher degree of certainty about legitimate shipping on known routes. With the additional information that will become available through the global Long Range Identiﬁcation and Tracking (LRIT) system, we will be able to target anomalies and disrupt threats as far from our shore as possible. The Navy is an enthusiastic and close partner in building maritime domain awareness to protect our nation and provide security on seas around the world. We have a Navy ﬂag ofﬁcer working with an integrated staff at Coast Guard Headquarters, and the Navy is a true leader in the effort to better share information among navies and the coast guards of the world, particularly in the European theater. Maritime domain awareness—our ability to understand what’s out there, and what a potential threat is—requires the joint-service team effort highlighted in the strategy, and we are putting it into action.

A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL MARITIME ENGAGEMENT Cooperative engagement of navies and coast guards throughout the world is the organizing principle of the new maritime strategy. This is a natural extension of the globalized nature of maritime activity, the common interest of peaceful nations in good order at sea, and the strategic advantage of defense in depth. I admire Admiral Roughead and General Conway, as well as Joint Service Chief Chairman Admiral Mullen, for having the strategic vision to expand our thinking about the relationships among maritime forces globally, and their common purpose to safeguard the maritime domain. The Coast Guard has a unique role in this strategic concept because the service is both an armed force of the United States and a federal law enforcement agency. This dual character allows it to operate in many roles and venues. In dealing with coastal nations around the world, the Coast Guard necessarily moves beyond the traditional military-to-military relationships with the defense ministries. In other nations, many coast guards work under the Ministry of the Interior (MOI)—some under public safety and others under transport—not under Ministries of Defense (MOD). Our ability to interact with those various ministries and departments in pursuit of shared civil maritime authorities and roles allows us to expand the concepts that are contained in the maritime strategy across broader elements of international governments. To this end, we play an important role globally in managing seams between MODs and MOIs. Moving forward, the full range of interagency

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power must be brought to bear to deal with the challenges we face in today’s world. The security provided by the Navy and Marine Corps is the essential foundation upon which our maritime nation relies for its prosperity and way of life. But, to prevent wars and to ensure peace, we must also be able to help create and sustain the elements of a civil society and order around the world. That too is the vision of this strategy. What the Coast Guard “brings to the peace” is integration and synchronization capability to deal with civil departments and ministries of coastal nations around the world regarding search and rescue, oil and hazmat spill response, illegal migration, counter-drug operations, piracy, and polar operations. In closing, the Coast Guard will continue to be a strong partner to the Navy and the Marine Corps. We will stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our shipmates to ensure the security and prosperity of our nation, and our maritime interests around the world. I am committed to implementation and execution of this strategy, because it’s the best thing for the Coast Guard, it’s the best thing for the sea services of the United States, and it’s the best thing for the security of this country and our partners around the world. I look forward to your questions.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PORT SECURITY: A NATIONAL PLANNING GUIDE United States Department of Transportation 1997*

Worldwide, maritime cargoes and vessels are increasingly targeted by organized criminal conspiracies or individuals involved in alien smuggling, cargo theft, drug smuggling, and terrorism. Exploiting weaknesses in port security is central to these crimes. The associated costs reduce the competitiveness of those affected, including the ports. So long as threats to trade exist, port security will remain as essential to port operations as cargo and good labor relations.

MARITIME SECURITY TODAY Traditional views of port security responsibilities must be expanded. A complex transnational set of security issues threaten the maritime industry and the movement of cargo in international trade. Those threats include terrorism, piracy, smuggling of stowaways and drugs, cargo theft and fraud, bribery, and extortion. Sea robbery provides an excellent example of the *

http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nmc/security/portplan.htm

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complexity of port security issues. The nature of sea robbery necessitates that port security controls include both the waterside and the land-side access of ports. However, jurisdictional authority discrepancies, a lack of ﬁnancial resources, and equipment problems are frustrating the attempts by some countries to address this issue. Enacting requisite port security measures and coordination, cooperation, and communication with government and maritime industry components is necessary. Solutions require multinational participation from governments and the international commercial maritime industry. The international trade community and constituents of the world economy in general must also become partners in this responsibility. The Cost: In addition to direct ﬁnancial losses due to maritime crime, the total cost includes an impact on productivity, possible loss of life, rehiring, retraining, and time spent with police, attorneys, claim adjustors, and the news media. Real costs also include increased insurance costs, liability exposure, and the loss of trade as well as the loss of goodwill and reputation. Responding To the Threat: Port security is an essential part of the safe, secure, and competitive operation of the maritime transportation system. It promotes the development of commerce and is an essential element in maritime trade competitiveness, which cannot be achieved merely by modernizing port infrastructure and increasing operating productivity. Port security can surface as a signiﬁcant issue in trade negotiations, and government and industry courses of action should be coordinated to facilitate effective solutions. Port authorities should develop the means for exchanging current information on port security issues and for the dissemination of intelligence to the commercial industry. Through this approach, the security programs of individual ports can be enlarged into a national alliance of many port security programs working cooperatively with all elements of the maritime industry. Industry/Government Partnership: Cooperation of industry and government is necessary to address the complex issue of maritime security. To achieve cooperation, the security departments of seaports must develop partnerships with law enforcement and the transportation industry’s shippers, carriers, and insurers. Proﬁtable port business and trade relationships are dependent upon the security of the trade corridors through which a port’s business is conducted. The scope of port security, therefore, extends beyond the physical facilities of the port to include the other ports, shippers, intermodal transportation carriers, insurers, etc., moving cargo and passengers through an interdependent trade network. Through cooperative partnerships, an economy of effort can be achieved while actually increasing the degree of security provided to all aspects of the maritime transportation system. Planning For Port Security: Port security must be included in the national transportation planning framework that establishes priorities for allocation of

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resources for governmental and private funding of infrastructure investments. Security operations should be considered in the earliest planning and design phases for the construction and restoration of port infrastructure, in order to achieve an operational environment designed to limit opportunities for criminal exploitation. Association of Port Security Directors: The establishment of an association of port security directors in trading regions is recommended. Each association would serve as a forum for facilitating periodic analyses, discussion, recommendations, and mutual assistance. The association would be self-managed and conducted in a fashion common to such organizations, with a documented charter, a board of directors, and ofﬁcers rotated by election. The association would work toward the common beneﬁt of its member ports, and confer with other such associations on an inter-regional basis.

FUNDAMENTALS OF PORT SECURITY Port Security Goals and Principles: The goal of port security is to establish an environment in which trade may be conducted with reasonably high assurance of being unencumbered by criminal activity and without becoming a conduit for such activity. A port security department should strive to constrict the opportunities for criminal exploitation of the maritime transportation system, its providers, and users. In developing a security program, the emphasis should be placed on deterring, preventing, detecting, and reducing the losses attributed to criminal activities. In order to do so, port security operations must be proactive rather than merely reactive. This requires intelligence and investigative coordination with law enforcement agencies and the security departments of the maritime industry companies utilizing a port’s facilities. Port security must also be capable of assessing threats to the port, and responding appropriately to those threats. Therefore, the port security department must be proactive in its thinking rather than reactive. Port security must employ all forms of intelligence information, promote awareness within the port community, conduct training, practice preparedness, and exercise security plans. The goal should be to identify processes and procedures that can be implemented while adapting to a changing environment. Port Management and Security Planning: Port security must become a planning priority in port operations, commanding the attention and resources of senior port management. While responsibility and accountability for port security goals and principles rest with the director of the port, the manager of the port security department, and the ofﬁcers of the port security force, all persons within the port community must undertake a commitment to its implementation and success. The port’s mercantile operations of moving cargo and passengers are especially sensitive to the effectiveness of security operations.

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Port operations and security at a marine terminal involve extensive and detailed planning considerations that must be coordinated with the port’s security program. There must be a level of consistency between a port’s operational policies and procedures, and its security program. Effective port security is achieved by integrating port planning and operations functions with port security. In this way, the port’s business and security goals are developed through a planning process involving mutual perception of requirements. It is through this planning and coordination that the successful implementation of a port’s security plan and the operational objectives are achieved. Port Security Planning Cycle: Essential to port security planning is the ability to document and measure evidence of security threats, vulnerabilities, loss control, and the success of security measures implemented. This necessitates a system for monitoring implementation results and evaluations as a continuing process for improving a port’s security effectiveness. The identiﬁcation of these measures is critical to a port security service gaining budgetary and organizational support. A security planning cycle is both strategic and tactical in nature, making it a dynamic process subject to adjustment as operational circumstances demand. The element of change necessitates that the security planning cycle be a continuous process. It requires intelligence information inputs to analyze security threat conditions, as well as an assessment of vulnerabilities and an evaluation of the suitability of security countermeasures being implemented. Security Survey and Risk Assessment: Ultimately, the port security planning process must develop and implement measures to reduce port vulnerabilities. Unless there is recognition of potential vulnerabilities, appropriate countermeasures cannot be developed. Port security management must be capable of ascertaining the nature and magnitude of all foreseeable security threats to the port’s operations. Consequently, a comprehensive security survey is the ﬁrst task in the process of establishing an effective port security regime. The security survey should be comprehensive in order to enable a complete and accurate analysis of the port’s vulnerabilities. In addition to identifying the current and potential vulnerabilities to which the port’s operations are exposed, it should be compiled in a manner that makes it possible to measure the frequency and severity of exploitation of those vulnerabilities. Analysis of the information compiled in the survey will assist in the selection of various security measures to best counter potential losses and to monitor the effectiveness of countermeasures. Port Security Plan: All port authorities should establish and implement a comprehensive port security plan and associated policies and procedures. Further, the plan should be exercised by the port on a regular basis. In developing the plan for implementing port security operations, the following criteria should be considered: (a) the port’s vulnerability to potential threats; (b) the effect of security measures on the port’s efﬁciency and operations;

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(c) practical limitations imposed by physical characteristics of port infrastructure; (d) availability of funds; (e) alternative measures available; and (f) evaluation of all available security capabilities, internal and external. Where applicable, the elements of a port security plan should be carried out in coordination with such entities as the nation’s coast guard, customs service, port authority, local law enforcement authorities, harbor master, marine terminal operators, etc. Documentation for these activities should be part of the port security plan, and should be integrated and consistent with the other portions of the plan pertaining to standards.

PORT SECURITY OPERATIONS Implementation of the Port Security Plan: One of the keys to successful implementation of any port security program is support of senior management. Another key is the commitment of port personnel. Port personnel will generally be more interested in the successful implementation of a security plan if senior management has authorized and supports its development. A third key is integration of security into the port’s overall management, planning, and operations. The operations of ports worldwide are similar; however, each has its own unique activities and trade circumstances. These differences affect not only the vulnerabilities of a port, but the countermeasures that should be implemented. It is essential that port management and staff be directly and thoroughly familiar with the port’s facilities, operations, and plans. Accomplishing this requires a cooperative working relationship between security personnel and personnel responsible for the port’s general management and operations.

PORT SECURITY MEASURES AND PROCEDURES The tactical responsibilities of port security apply to the vessels, cargoes, passengers, and the installations of the port facility itself, such as buildings, equipment, and trade information. The measures and procedures employed, therefore, must be adequate to counter the threat within the context of the physical port facility and its operational environment. The essential components of port security measures and procedures should be structured to include land-side operations and marine patrols in the harbors, anchorages, and waterways of ports to: (a) control access to the port, its installations, and vessels; (b) control access to cargo or passengers while in the port; [and] (c) prevent sabotage to vessels calling at the port, to port facility installations, and to the port’s business and trade information systems.

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Physical Access Control: The importance of controlling the physical access to the port facility, its installations, and cargo is paramount. Once physical access has been achieved by criminals, cargo can be stolen or subjected to various forms of exploitation. In addition to exploiting cargo, other illicit activities can occur within the port. These activities may include smuggling of weapons, drugs, currency, contraband goods, and stowaways, or even the placement of an explosive device within a containerized shipment. Further, breaches in security that allow criminals electronic access to cargo documentation makes criminal exploitation easier, particularly with the collusion of seemingly legitimate companies fronting for criminal enterprises. Port security operations may necessitate the ability to take up positions at all entry points, open storage areas and warehouses throughout the port, and inspect the identiﬁcation papers of arriving workers. It may also include being capable of controlling the movements of trucks transporting cargo through the port, and searching containers, warehouses, and ships in port as well as in the anchorage awaiting a berth. Information Security: Port security must be prepared to counter not only threats posed by physical access to a port, but also access to information. Unauthorized access to information used by a port in the conduct of its business can be exploited just as effectively as access to the port itself. Access to information, such as the contents of containers, is a growing problem in the area of maritime security. Port security programs must address methods and procedures for ensuring information security. Port Security Training: Lack of training is one of the most common deﬁciencies in any security organization. A marine terminal may increase its liability exposure not only for failing to implement reasonable security measures, but for failing to properly train its personnel in effective security measures. Becoming effective in implementing port security measures and procedures requires competent training. Training of the port security force and supervision of daily security operations are two of the most important responsibilities of port security management. Training should include programs to train the trainer. This action creates a force-multiplier effect that will in turn produce more security-trained port ofﬁcials. Port security departments should seek the establishment of regional port security training centers with cooperation of national and international organizations, where port ofﬁcials, law enforcement, and customs personnel can receive training. Personnel: The true base of any security program will be the personnel selected to institute that program. Port organizations must make those efforts necessary to ensure that the port’s security personnel are a competent and professional force. While many of the items mentioned earlier in this section will assist in the development of competencies within personnel, ports must also consider the level of professionalism that they desire of their security personnel. This will include such items as making a determination on whether

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security personnel should be sworn law enforcement ofﬁcers and conducting background checks on personnel before hiring. Port management must also make the security personnel aware of their importance to the successful operations of the port. Threats and Issues Facing Port Security: Internationally, port cities and their surrounding areas are experiencing dramatic increases in various forms of maritime crime, such as the theft and in-transit hijacking of entire containers and trailers, and the smuggling of drugs and migrants. Maritime crime is being committed by highly organized and sophisticated criminal groups with the ability to exploit the international commercial shipping trades. Port security departments must be prepared to counter the various international security threats. The characteristics of several of those security threats and issues are described below. Maritime Terrorism: Port security must have an antiterrorist component to contend with the possibility of a terrorist attack directed against port facilities and vessels within a port’s jurisdiction or the territorial waters of the state. As is true with other port security programs, any antiterrorist planning or implementation will necessitate extensive coordination with governmental authorities at the national and possibly international levels. At a minimum, an essential function for port security is the dissemination of warning information to alert users of the port to the threat of terrorist activities. Such advisories elevate awareness regarding terrorist threats and focus the attention of the maritime industry on increasing its own security posture during the period of warning. Information of potential terrorist activity will most likely originate from national or international governmental authorities in law enforcement or intelligence agencies. Port security should be involved in the response system at least to the extent necessary to alert and protect the community of port users. Port security should be active in working cooperatively with ocean, truck, and rail carriers, and other port users to establish antiterrorist response capabilities in advance of the need. Port security services should include assisting with the review of vulnerabilities pertaining to shipboard and terminal security plans and contingency response procedures for both freight and passenger trades. Dissemination of warning information to the maritime industry by the U.S. Government, for example, is effected through the coordination of its organizations. They are the U.S. Government’s Department of State, Maritime Administration, Coast Guard, Ofﬁce of Naval Intelligence, Secretary of Transportation’s Ofﬁce of Intelligence and Security, and Defense Mapping Agency. Sea Robbery: Sea robbery is a term used to describe attacks upon commercial vessels in ports and territorial waters. Such attacks are, according to international law, not true acts of piracy but rather armed robberies. They are criminal assaults on vessels and vessel crews, just as may occur to truck drivers

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within a port area. Such attacks pose a serious threat to trade. The methods of these attacks have varied from direct force using heavy weapons to subterfuge in which the criminals have identiﬁed themselves on VHF radio as the national coast guard. These maritime criminals are inclined to operate in waters where government presence is weak, often lacking in both technical resources and the political will to deal effectively with such attacks. International law permits any warship or government vessel to repress an attack in international waters. In a state’s territorial waters, such attacks constitute an act of armed robbery and must be dealt with under the laws of the relevant coastal state. These laws seldom, if ever, permit a vessel or warship from another country to intervene. The most effective countermeasure strategy is to prevent criminals’ initial access to ports and vessels, and to demonstrate a consistent ability to respond rapidly and effectively to notiﬁcation of such a security breach. Cargo Theft: Cargo theft has become a growing problem in many countries and the transnational character of cargo theft is becoming increasingly evident. Investigations have linked criminals involved in cargo theft with transnational drug trafﬁcking and money laundering activities. Cargo theft can become so severe a problem in a country as to constitute a serious threat to the ﬂow of commerce. In the United States, for example, cargo theft losses are estimated to exceed $10 billion, with the value of a single cargo theft averaging about $500,000. To effectively counter cargo theft and truck hijacking, port security personnel must be thoroughly familiar with the port’s physical facilities and the operations of its terminals. They should also be aware of the details of cargo-handling operations scheduled for the day, including berths, ships, and times. Further, there is a need to be closely familiar with the names of trucking companies, warehouse operators, and drivers doing business with the port, in addition to their practices and reputations. Hijackers acting with apparent information about the cargo manifests suggests that collusion is occurring at the intermodal freight interchange points. Another element needed to combat this threat is a comprehensive database of cargo loss compiled through a formal system of reporting and analysis. This is an essential analytic tool for reducing theft-related losses in the maritime industry. These databases are needed in each country in order to develop a comprehensive assessment of the problem. The lack of such a database has been an obstacle to effective cooperative action by the industry, local law enforcement, and government agencies. Stowaways and Alien Smuggling: Stowaways jeopardize the integrity of international maritime commerce. The risk for ports and ocean carriers is being elevated by the increased use of containers in organized criminal conspiracies to smuggle transnational migrants. Adding to that risk is the migration of millions of people worldwide, impelled by various motivations. The volume of migrants is increasing the percentage of those likely to become

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ocean stowaways to escape their situation. Stowaways result in service disruption and revenue losses for vessel operators, which typically are held legally responsible for repatriation. Port security must be capable of preventing stowaways through physical access controls at terminal facilities in port areas and at vessels, at warehouses, and at cargo storage areas. The methods of operation employed to smuggle stowaways aboard ships are strikingly similar in ports worldwide. However, sophisticated smuggling efforts are placing stowaways in containers during the freight-forwarding phase, before delivery to the marine terminal, thereby increasing the challenge to port security. Complicity of corrupt port and vessel personnel enabling stowaways access is a crucial issue with which port security must contend. Stowaways are gaining access to ships disguised among, and aided by, crews of legitimate port workers. Stowaways may board vessels as part of stevedoring crews or with others who have port and vessel access. Adding to the difﬁculty of identiﬁcation, stowaways may carry fraudulent documents, such as passports and visas. Drug Smuggling: Ports are vulnerable to being used by sophisticated smuggling schemes which rely on concealment of narcotics in shipments of commercial containerized maritime trade. Smugglers are utilizing front companies or exploiting legitimate shippers in the process. A port must accept responsibility for ensuring or taking the steps necessary to prevent its facilities from being used by drug smugglers. Included in this responsibility are physical security measures such as access controls, lighting, and patrols of the port. There must also be a coordinated effort with those shipping companies using the port’s facilities. This may include agreements to either have the ship operators conduct a vessel search for drugs or a cooperative search of the vessel by the ship’s crew and port security personnel. Additionally, contacts should be made with various enforcement authorities to obtain assistance and intelligence that can be used in helping them curtail drug smuggling operations from a port’s facilities. The growing volume of containerized maritime trade also provides opportunities for smuggling illicit drugs and the precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of drugs such as cocaine and heroin. Concealment of illicit shipments manifested as legitimate commercial cargoes, and the diversion of legal chemicals following legitimate transactions by unscrupulous shippers is a serious problem. Port security should include controls on precursor chemicals shipped through the port and be able to implement methods and procedures for investigating the theft or diversion of precursor and essential chemicals. Availability of auditable documentation of chemicals and their producing companies throughout their shipping cycle within the port is of crucial importance. Currency Smuggling: It is important for port security to contribute to countering currency smuggling by coordinating its efforts with the responsible law

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enforcement agencies. Currency smuggling is an integral component in the money laundering process and the accumulation of illegitimate wealth. Organized crime uses that ﬁnancial power to corrupt ofﬁcials, inﬁltrate legitimate business through legal purchases and criminal means, and create monopolies. According to the U.S. Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the increasing concentrations of wealth among organized criminal groups is a concern to legitimate commerce, government, and the integrity of the political process in several parts of the world. Illicit funds and corrupt ofﬁcials represent a continuing threat to democracy worldwide. Smuggling currency out of the country in export cargo is facilitated by the freight container itself, which offers considerable opportunities for smuggling bulk currency concealed in legitimate shipments. To illustrate, $18 million of U.S. currency in $20-denominations consists of 900,000 bills, weighing 2,000 pounds and amounting to approximately 40 cubic feet in volume (one measurement ton). The interior space of a standard twenty-foot freight container measures 1,100 cubic feet, which can accommodate 27.5 measurement tons. The practical cooperation of the maritime industry is essential to deterring the opportunities for exploitation of the foreign commercial trade sector by currency smugglers and money launderers.

FUTURE CHALLENGES Technology and Innovation: All port administrations should identify the requirements for technological equipment necessary to improve security and control access to their port. They must also develop innovative solutions to transport security problems as the criminal element may use new technologies in their criminal efforts. An example may be the development of a satellite communications infrastructure that would be shared with port security systems for the purpose of tracking and securing cargo in transit or at rest. This same technology could be used by criminals to send false signals as to the security of the container, or possibly to redirect the cargo. It is evident that the increasing use of electronic data interchange in the shipping cycle presents information security challenges to port security departments, and to the entire maritime transportation industry. Intelligence Databases: In November 1994, the United Nations World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime drafted conclusions and recommendations for international cooperation. It was regarded as essential that law enforcement agencies be equipped with software for databases to be used for tactical and strategic intelligence. Electronic Data Interchange (EDI): EDI is increasingly used in modern marine terminals. It enables shipping transactions to be conducted entirely from a computer terminal linked to a data network. Transactions include booking freight, tracking shipments, billing customers, and clearing customs.

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A modern marine terminal container operation is dependent upon a central computer database to track arrivals and departures between the vessel and the port gate, and throughout the container storage and handling areas. At each transaction in the cycle, speciﬁc details identifying each container are entered into or generated by the computer database, electronically and in hard copy. The information includes the container’s current location and ultimate destination. Also extracted during that process is information from the ocean bill of lading, which is available on the export load’s dock receipt. The ocean bill of lading contains a description of the cargo (e.g., “…packages said to contain...”), and serves as a collection document enabling a foreign buyer to receive a shipment from the carrier by simply showing proof of identity. EDI is, therefore, a potentially rich source of shipping information to cargo thieves and other criminals and must be adequately protected. Satellite Tracking of Cargo: The integration of data communications and satellite technologies shows considerable promise in the near future for tracking containers, trailers, and chassis. The port security application of this technology is toward combating, for example, hijacking and theft of intermodal containerized cargoes while at sea or during inland transit. Other security applications, other than those related to cargo theft, are also feasible. Although the responsibility for in-transit tracking of cargo rests primarily with the transporters of the cargo on behalf of its owners, future business arrangements and insurance requirements may necessitate a larger service involvement by port security beyond the physical facility. Security personnel should at least be familiar with the technology, understand its application, and be knowledgeable of the trades in which it is used, what companies employ the technology, and what governmental authorities are involved in its application. The technology could also serve as an accurate and reliable electronic bonding system for the movement of international containerized cargo through customs inspection. In that capacity, customs at the point of export would certify the integrity of the container’s seal until it was uneventfully received by customs at the point of import. One result would be expediting cargo handling at ports of entry by reducing container processing time clearing customs. Privatization: Seaport privatization plans, which may grant long-term concessions to nongovernmental organizations to operate ports, have increased productivity, in some cases. Ship turnaround and cargo-handling times have been reduced. New competition created among private terminal operators has led to decreased port fees and increased supply and quality of service. A port’s security, however, is not necessarily improved as a natural consequence of privatization. It is important that a strong port security program be maintained. In some cases, port privatization has included a relaxation of controls and fewer cargo inspections. These acts have made it easier to smuggle illicit cargoes from those ports concealed in legitimate commercial shipments.

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Port Congestion: Port security must be prepared to deal with the maritime crime problems resulting from cargo congestion in ports. In many countries, rapid growth and surges in containerized maritime trade are resulting in severe congestion in marine terminals. Consequently, this is causing inefﬁciencies in the processing and control of containers, accompanied by expedited customs inspections. Ironically, a common government response to port congestion is to relax customs inspections in an attempt to expeditiously clear backlogged cargo. These circumstances create additional opportunities for unauthorized access to idle or misplaced cargo and inspire cursory examinations of shipping documentation. These conditions are providing smugglers with substantial opportunities at relatively low risk. International Cooperation: A more vigorous international approach is needed to curtail maritime criminal activities. For example, criminal penalties for smuggling aliens are often weak, and smuggling is not considered a crime in many countries. The U.S. Department of State has stressed the importance of multilateral cooperation among governments. Building networks of diplomacy and law enforcement are necessary in order to alleviate such problems as alien smuggling, characterized as not only an immigration problem but also a national security problem. In addition to working in the international arena to solve port security problems, there is a need to adhere to the conclusions and recommendations of the international organizations capable of providing conscientious assistance to the maritime industry. The Group of Seven Nations/P-8 Senior Experts Group on Transnational Organized Crime conducted a review of existing international agreements, arrangements, and practices to counter transnational organized crime. Their report identiﬁed gaps, and made recommendations to ﬁll such gaps. General conclusions included that: (a) all states should sustain their participation in international organizations to promote cooperation against transnational organized crime, including the United Nations, Interpol (International Criminal Police Organization), and the World Customs Organization; (b) all states must work closely to share information and expertise; and (c) all states should increase their operational cooperation among police forces, customs, immigration, and other relevant agencies.

Conclusion: The increasingly complex nature and international scope of the maritime security issues which threaten the industry requires a wide range of participation and response from all levels of government and the maritime industry. [Although] some ports are comparatively unencumbered by crime, many others are besieged by a wide range of serious problems that threaten the safe and efﬁcient conduct of trade in those ports. The lack of a secure trade corridor can hamper the economic growth of that port and possibly the country itself.

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A viable maritime security program is good business. Losses from cargo thefts are estimated to be in the billions of dollars in the United States alone. While the implementation of a security program will entail the expenditure of funds, that expenditure can be more than offset by the savings security can provide. The cost to a port of losing a shipping company’s business because of inadequate port security must be considered. We must begin to think beyond the short-term cost and look at the long term beneﬁts, such as increased cargo operations, which lead to increased port revenues. The potential to reduce local crime is enhanced as more of the surrounding populace ﬁnds employment and beneﬁts from legitimate businesses. We must begin to look beyond the simple view that a lack of security affects only the ship and the terminal it calls upon. A much bigger economic interdependency exists within the entire transportation network. Ports must be committed to developing effective maritime security programs based on the recognition of ports as intermodal interchange hubs of commerce, critical to international trade.

SECURITY OF U.S. PORTS The Honorable Norman Y. Mineta Secretary of Transportation Before House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation December 6, 2001*

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss our nation’s maritime security strategy, and ways to strengthen maritime and port security in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. As many have observed, our nation has entered a new era of security awareness, and nowhere is that felt more strongly than in the ﬁeld of transportation. This is a challenge that confronts us in all transportation modes— from aviation to railways, highways, pipelines, and waterways. At the Department of Transportation [DOT], we are working aggressively to build the security foundation we will need in this new era. We are working with our partners in state and local law enforcement, other government agencies, industry and labor, and with the leadership and members of the Congress. Thanks to your help, we are making great strides in addressing our most critical transportation security challenges. However, much work remains to be done—particularly in the security of our coastal waters, our inland waterways, our port facilities, and their

*http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/12/mil-011206-usia10.htm

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intermodal connectors. While the most pressing security challenges have been met with existing authorities, we now must work to build a new network of protections—one that transforms what has been a rapid response into a sustained effort that recognizes heightened security as a part of normal operations. In addition, marine security depends on the users of the system, shippers and operators, and affects the trade corridors they use. This work is of critical importance. Approximately 95 percent of our nation’s international trade moves by water. During a major military deployment, 90 percent of our military materials move through our nation’s seaports. Preserving those assets and protecting the safety of the men and women who use them and the communities near them has been, and continues to be, one of the administration’s top priorities. To accomplish this priority, a new partnership must be formed. A partnership between the commercial maritime industry and government must take advantage of existing commercial security systems, information systems, and technological innovations. The department and the Coast Guard have been well equipped with existing statutory authority to develop the immediate maritime security response our nation has required. A number of critical steps have been taken since September 11: The Coast Guard has refocused resources to protect high-consequence targets in the marine environment, including critical bridges, port facilities, and other infrastructure. • The department has issued emergency regulations requiring 96-hour advance notices of arrival for ships arriving in U.S. ports, and we expect to make that regulation permanent by the summer of 2003. • The Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, working with the Ofﬁce of Naval Intelligence, has been tracking inbound high-interest vessels and providing intelligence to operational commanders and interested agencies. • The Coast Guard has deployed personnel as Sea Marshals to ensure positive control of vessels containing critical cargoes and [those] in sensitive areas. • The Maritime Administration has been meeting with members of the maritime industry to examine and address security issues and make recommendations regarding legislation and policy changes. • The Maritime Administration has heightened security at its Ready Reserve Force ﬂeet sites and outport locations, as well as activated one ship to assist in Operation Enduring Freedom. • The Maritime Administration and the General Services Administration have been working with other maritime agencies on ways to utilize “smart card” technology throughout the maritime and related industries in order to accurately identify employees working in security-sensitive areas. The cards that they have developed will use biometric identiﬁcation such as: facial, ﬁngerprint, or iris. • The St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation has been working closely with its Canadian counterpart to heighten security on the St. Lawrence River and ensure the protection of ocean access to our Great Lakes ports.

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These steps have formed the core of our near-term response to the new maritime and port security environment, and have been based on current authority and existing resources. However, I am glad to have the opportunity today to discuss the longer-term steps we hope to take as we build a new operational baseline for maritime and port security in America. I know that Admiral Loy will be able to expand on the efforts I will be describing today, and all of us at DOT are looking forward to working with the leadership and members of the House and the Senate in successfully building the new standard the nation requires. As you know, Mr. Chairman, shortly after September 11, I established two Rapid Response Teams to examine issues speciﬁcally relating to aviation security. Many of their recommendations have become part of the recently passed Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001. In addition, I directed the creation of a National Infrastructure Security Committee (or NISC) as an internal working group at the Department of Transportation. The NISC’s charge is to focus on intermodal security issues, to ensure coordination of the department’s security work across all the modes, and to develop responses to meet the challenges of the new security environment. Within the NISC, Direct Action Groups have been created to look at each of the modes of transportation, to meet with experts from business, labor, and other stakeholders, and to make recommendations for action on legislative, regulatory, and diplomatic initiatives. The Maritime Direct Action Group was formed in anticipation of your September 24 letter to me and, over the last two months, the M-DAG has been meeting with maritime industry stakeholders and examining pending legislative proposals. Much of that work is reﬂected in the departmental views on S. 1214, “the Port, Maritime, and Rail Security Act of 2001,” introduced by Senator Hollings of South Carolina. We believe that many of the elements laid out in S. 1214 can be critically important tools in crafting a new paradigm in maritime and port security, and look forward to continuing to work with the leadership and members of both bodies on this vital issue. There are some key principles that we believe should underlie our national efforts to build a new baseline of operations for maritime security: • Our approach must be comprehensive, reaching both security at port facilities and in the marine environment. It must reach the security of physical assets and the security of maritime and port personnel and passengers. • Due to the widely diverse nature of the maritime system across the country, and the widely divergent nature of operations among ports, local planning and coordination with local and state authorities will be crucial. • Like any transportation network, the maritime transportation system is in a constant state of growth and change. The system we create must therefore be one that is capable of evolving over time, and where the expectation of that evolution is clearly established.

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• And ﬁnally, the system must fully recognize the intermodal nature of marine transportation. Cargo that is unloaded from a ship today in a seaport will move quickly to other modes of transportation. There is no better example than the cargo container—a phenomenon that has been successful precisely because it is fundamentally intermodal—a cargo container arriving at a U.S. seaport today can be virtually anywhere in the heartland of America via truck and/or rail tomorrow. Accordingly, maritime security measures must be fully integrated with security measures being implemented in other modes of transportation.

The pieces of this puzzle that could be quickly implemented have been implemented under the department’s existing authority. However, some longer-term tools for security planning and coordination will require new authorities. And, with the maritime transportation system playing such a critical role in our nation’s international trade, some responses to our new security challenges cannot be adopted unilaterally, but will only work if implemented in an international effort with our trading partners and the International Maritime Organization.

INTEGRATED PLANNING Although it may not be readily apparent to those outside the maritime community, a focus exclusively on security at ports alone will not be enough. Security enhancements and improved security coordination at port facilities will be crucial, but the comprehensive approach we need must look beyond ports and port facilities, and embrace the entire marine transportation system. Most Americans, when asked about port security, will no doubt immediately think of large seaports through which more than 6 million containers enter the country each year. However, our security planning cannot afford to ignore smaller ports, ports of all sizes handling bulk cargoes, or the security of our coastal waters and inland waterways. Security measures at these locations must be integrated and coordinated in order to close identiﬁed gaps and prevent new gaps from opening, and the department must have enforcement authority to ensure compliance with the security plans that result from this process. The ﬁrst step in this security planning process must be an inventory of existing security systems and current plans for security enhancements at the nation’s waterfront facilities and onboard passenger and cargo vessels. We propose to coordinate the collection of that information through the Coast Guard’s Captains of the Port. The jurisdictions of the Captains of the Port reach across the nation. The men and women who serve in that role have wellestablished relationships with the maritime stakeholders within their jurisdictions and a deep familiarity with the operations and activities in their geographic areas of responsibility.

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Simultaneously, a National Maritime Security Advisory Committee would be established at the Department of Transportation to advise me, the new Under Secretary for Transportation Security, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard on guidelines to be used by regional Coast Guard commanders and local Coast Guard Captains of the Port in building maritime security plans within their jurisdictions. Finally, based on reviews of local security plans and risk assessments conducted at ports of national and strategic signiﬁcance, I will identify maritime facilities for which full-scale vulnerability assessments are required. Local planning and coordination [will be] based on the proposed statutory requirements, the department will issue regulatory guidance for the development of local port security plans. However, how those guidelines play out from port to port will depend on the nature of the local facilities and the cargos that are handled through a given port. Given the diversity of port design and operations across the country, a strong component for local planning and coordination will be required. To facilitate that process, local port security committees chaired by the Captain of the Port should be established. These local committees would include representation from local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, port authorities where those authorities exist, terminal owners and operators, organized labor, and other stakeholders. The local committees would apply the national guidelines to their own local conditions, identifying areas of port operations that must be considered secure, and access to which will be limited to individuals who pass background checks. Local committees would also be responsible for ensuring that security plans for multiple facilities at a port interface properly with one another, coordinating land-side, security planning, with waterside security operations. Local port security committee members will, of necessity, have access to sensitive information during the course of their work, and security clearances will be required for members. In addition, we are proposing local committees play a role in any program for federal grant assistance for security upgrades at port facilities. We believe that eligibility for any such grants should be contingent on the local committee’s certiﬁcation that the project to be funded is necessary for compliance with the local port security plan. Finally, it is the role of the local committees to designate speciﬁc secure areas in ports as part of the local port security plan.

EVOLVING PLANS TO MATCH EVOLVING CONDITIONS Each of the planning elements I have described—security inventories and the development of local security plans under guidance from the department, the work of the National Maritime Security Committee, and the support

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provided by local port security committees—has the goal of building a system that continually reviews and reﬁnes its security protocols. Security inventories will take a ﬁrst look at existing systems, and local plans will be developed from that starting point. Input from the ﬁeld will be reviewed by the National Maritime Security Committee, and further national reﬁnements made. We strongly agree that local plans must be reviewed at least annually, and that security exercises should take place in the jurisdictions of all local committees at least once every three years. The results of these reviews and exercises will likewise be reviewed nationally as inputs for the next round of reﬁnements to the national maritime security plan.

RECOGNIZING MARITIME TRANSPORTATION’S INTERMODAL FOUNDATION As I mentioned, maritime transportation is an inherently intermodal process. Passengers travel via air to embark on cruise ships. Ferry passengers access surface transportation modes in traveling to and from water transit facilities. And cargo moves from ships and barges to trucks, rail, and pipeline and vice versa throughout the transportation system. It is especially in this area of container cargo that much attention has been rightfully focused. Containerization has been a boon to international trade since its development in the 1950s. The ease of movement afforded by the ability of a container to be unloaded from a ship and quickly attached to a truck or rail car has made the container one of the most useful elements in the cargo transportation system. It has been estimated that more than 6 million containers enter the country via U.S. ports each year, representing more than 11 million twenty-foot container equivalent units (TEUs) of cargo. The overwhelming majority of container cargo is arriving in the U.S. as imported goods. The U.S. Customs Service has the lead in setting standards for the information that is to be provided by shippers in order to receive customs clearance and for conducting inspections of incoming cargo. We are requesting that customs be given enhanced authority to specify the nature of cargo information they may require for clearing shipments or allowing their in-bond transportation beyond the port of arrival. DOT will continue to support customs and our colleagues at the Department of the Treasury in carrying out that work, and we will continue to explore opportunities to make the cargo transportation system both more secure and more efﬁcient. To aid that goal, we are proposing that Secretary O’Neill, Secretary Evans, and I establish a joint task force to work with the transportation industry to develop performance standards for the tracking of shipments, containers, and contents. Such systems could serve the dual purposes of aiding the work of

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customs in clearing and processing cargo shipments and of aiding shippers and carriers in efforts to more closely monitor their own cargo movements, and to limit cargo theft and tampering. In addition, we are proposing that Treasury and DOT work with the National Institutes of Standards and Technology at the Department of Commerce, and with the transportation industry, to develop enhanced performance standards for seals on cargo traveling in-bond, and for locks to better secure containers during transport.

NEW STATUTORY AUTHORITIES The department and the Coast Guard have broad authority within the area of maritime transportation to set security and safety standards and to enforce them. However, we are seeking new and enhanced authority to broaden safety and security operations, and to improve maritime security enforcement. We are proposing that the Secretary of Transportation be given expanded authority to conduct security assessments of foreign ports where necessary. The department will also work with international organizations for the adoption of international standards for port security, similar to international airport standards promulgated by the International Civil Aviation Organization. • In order to facilitate the Coast Guard’s ability to monitor and manage arriving vessel trafﬁc, we are proposing to extend the jurisdiction of the Magnusson Act from three miles to 12. • We are proposing that new Maritime Safety and Security Teams be established for rapid deployment to enhance port security operations in areas of heightened threat. • We are proposing new criminal penalties, similar to those in place for aviation, for acts against vessels and maritime facilities. We also propose a new penalty for use of a dangerous weapon on all passenger vessels, similar to the penalty recently enacted in the USA Patriot Act for offenses involving a ferry or mass transit system. • We propose to extend our authority to license and regulate deepwater oil ports to include natural gas facilities. • We also propose criminal penalties for acts of maritime terrorism, such as placing destructive devices or harmful substances into our waters.

Mr. Chairman, as I indicated earlier, our response to the new maritime and port security threat environment can never reach the point of being “ﬁnished.” The transportation networks that make up the marine transportation system are constantly evolving. The security threats and safety challenges we face in marine transportation are constantly evolving. Our response to those challenges must be constantly evolving, as well. The proposals I have described

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will establish the foundation we need to build on the progress already made, and build a process for that kind of continual reﬁnement. Our partnership with the leadership and members of the Congress has always been a critical part of our work; it will be an even more vital part of our efforts to build the kind of secure, efﬁcient, and safe marine transportation system the American people deserve. I look forward to working with all of you to reach that goal. Thank you very much.

THE SECURITY OF OUR SEAPORTS William G. Schubert Maritime Administrator Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information February 26, 2002*

Good Afternoon, Madam Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I am Captain William G. Schubert, Maritime Administrator. I am pleased to be here today to address the important issue of seaport security on behalf of the Department of Transportation. The Department of Transportation (DOT) has always sought to maintain secure transportation within every mode. We continue to do so with a greater sense of urgency and with more focus through the newly created Transportation Security Administration. My own agency, the Maritime Administration (MARAD), has always played a critical role in port security. One of our duties is to provide port security guidance to the commercial ports in the United States, and to coordinate government and commercial port stakeholders in their security efforts. MARAD Co-Chaired the Presidential Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports, and, as Chair of the National Port Readiness Network, plays a lead role with the military in assuring port security and protection of critical infrastructure during mobilization. We have developed an Inter-American Port Security Training Program in which nearly 300 port personnel have been trained in the Western Hemisphere, and the Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point provides security training to industry. We have also been working with the port community to advance uses of technology that have positive security benefits both within the port and through its landside intermodal connections. I welcome the opportunity to continue our efforts to improve port security.

*

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/02/mil-020227-usia05.htm

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Today, I would like to address several recent developments led by Secretary Mineta in the area of port security in which DOT has been actively involved—grants for the improvement of port infrastructure, cargo and container security, credentialing for transportation workers, and the availability of maritime insurance against terrorism-related losses. Admiral Venuto will then brief the committee on speciﬁc Coast Guard initiatives to secure our ports and protect shipping.

GRANT PROGRAM FOR IMPROVEMENT OF PORT INFRASTRUCTURE As you know, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY 2002 (Act) appropriated $93.3 million to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to award competitive grants to critical national seaports to ﬁnance the cost of enhancing facility and operational security. Such grants are to be awarded based on the need for security assessments and enhancements as determined by the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, the Administrator of the Maritime Administration, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard (USCG). Discussions among TSA, MARAD, and the USCG resulted in agreement that MARAD and the USCG would work cooperatively, on behalf of TSA, to administer the emergency seaport security funding contained in the Act. MARAD and the USCG have met, and we expect ﬁnal approval of our implementation plan very quickly. MARAD and USCG will act as “agents” of TSA for the distribution of grants from the $93.3 million appropriation. The ﬁnal grant approval body will be a board consisting of the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, myself as Administrator of the Maritime Administration, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, or our representatives. Determination of grant awards will be based on consideration of the most urgent needs from a homeland security perspective. It is anticipated that initial awards will commence in June 2002. We are moving very quickly to put this money to work. We intend to use a small amount of this money to fund “proof of concept projects”; we will focus on critical seaports. Preference will also be given to ports that have already begun port security enhancement through some demonstrated action.

CARGO AND CONTAINER SECURITY An analysis of our transportation system in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, clearly laid bare the susceptibility of container shipments as a delivery system for an enemy’s weapons, with over 12 million TEU’s [container units]/year arriving at our shores. Prior to September 11, from a

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DOT perspective, our primary concern was the efﬁcient movement of these containers through the transportation system. The advent of just-in-time business processes and the use of the transportation system as a rolling inventory tied the transportation system even more integrally into the economic vitality of this country. In order to address the security issues surrounding the movement of marine cargo containers through the international, intermodal transportation system, an interagency Container Working Group was established in December 2001. The effort is co-chaired by the Departments of Transportation and Treasury (U.S. Customs). The Container Working Group’s activities are focused in four subgroups: Information Technology, Security Technologies, Business Practices, and International Affairs. Just this month, the Working Group provided recommendations to the Ofﬁce of Homeland Security on ensuring the security of cargo container transportation. Recommendations addressed improving the coordination of government and business efforts as they relate to container security; enhancing data collection; improving the physical security of containers; initiating activities on the international front; and considering all possible uses of advanced technologies to improve the proﬁling of containers and to increase the physical security of containers. Even with our best efforts, our current transportation system is groaning under capacity constraints, and congestion in many ports is increasing. To further complicate matters, container trafﬁc, even with the current economic slowdown, is predicted to double in the next twenty years. Improving efﬁciency is one of the key ways to help solve these capacity and congestion problems. Yet efﬁciency improvements must now be looked at through a security lens. Our transportation system will need to operate both efﬁciently and securely. These twin goals of efﬁciency and security need to be addressed simultaneously. We are working jointly with U.S. Customs, exporters, importers, carriers, and governments to establish business and security practices that will push the nation’s virtual borders outward to the point of loading of the containers. Security must be established before the vessel carrying the container or cargo begins its international travel. Technology and information are also essential to container security. For that reason, we strongly support the accelerated implementation of the U.S. Customs ACE and Integrated Trade Data System (ITDS) to bring it online as quickly as possible.

CREDENTIALING FOR TRANSPORTATION WORKERS Security background checks and credentialing of all who move or have access to cargoes has never been more important. This includes everyone from facilities and conveyances to the destination warehouse. Thus, the

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department established an interagency “Credentialing Direct Action Group” (CDAG), co-chaired by MARAD, to examine the feasibility and process for conducting background checks and issuing an identiﬁcation card for all transportation workers and other persons who require access to secure areas of transportation facilities. The primary goal of the CDAG is to fashion a nationwide transportation worker identity solution that veriﬁes the identity of transportation workers, validates their background information, assists transportation facilities in managing their security risks, and accounts for personnel access to transportation facilities and activities of authorized personnel. The CDAG is primarily concerned with private-sector transportation workers, and has held numerous meetings that have included many representatives from the transportation industry and transportation labor. Such outreach efforts are necessary. They are experts in transportation, and we have found they are anxious to contribute their knowledge to solving the difﬁcult issues surrounding personnel identiﬁcation. We are building industry buy-in at the front end to ensure the success of this effort. The most difﬁcult issue is to deﬁne the appropriate levels of security for the broad spectrum of transportation facilities and operations, and how these should be applied. There have also been some concerns regarding the anticipated background check process. Various models are being investigated by several groups to try and improve responsiveness, lower cost, and improve consistency over present practices for credentialing. We also face the privacy issues presented by the collection and maintenance of databases containing personal information. The CDAG has already developed a functional requirements document, which identiﬁes the principal attributes that a credentialing system must have to achieve the interoperability necessary to reach across the transportation industries. This document has been shared with many of the major transportation industry associations. They have begun to provide their comments. Under a maritime cooperative program called the Ship Operations Cooperative Program (SOCP) that is administered by the Maritime Administration, industry, in partnership with multiple government agencies, is currently working to evaluate and test a Mariner Administrative Smart Card credentialing system to reduce fraud, track mariner training, facilitate shipboard sign on/sign off, and enhance shipboard security. The Smart Card Administrative Project started in October of 2000 and is a 50/50 cost sharing initiative between the 43-member SOCP and the Maritime Administration. As a result of the September 11, 2001 events, added emphases within the project are being placed on the potential of smart card applications for addressing security concerns. Members of the cooperative, including MARAD and USCG, are engaged internationally with the International Maritime Organization, International Labor Organization, International

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Transport Workers’ Federation and others to discuss security and credentialing issues. In addition, SOCP is coordinating with DOT entities that are currently working maritime security issues to ensure the project is in line with currently discussed directions. SOCP is working closely within DOT, and with other agencies, including the General Services Administration, to ensure interoperability through standardization. This project has the potential for demonstrating the effectiveness of smart card technology to improve efﬁciency, reduce fraud, and increase security in the maritime industry.

INSURANCE AGAINST TERRORISM-RELATED LOSSES The Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (Act), authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to ensure the availability of adequate insurance for vessels engaged in the waterborne commerce of the United States. This authority, delegated to MARAD, provides coverage for vessels, their cargoes, crews, and third-party liabilities against war risks, including acts of terrorism, if commercial insurance is not available on reasonable terms and conditions. The insurance may be made available to both U.S. and foreign ﬂag vessels. There are two basic forms of war risk insurance. Section 1202 of the Act addresses commercial vessels in commercial trade, while Section 1205 pertains to vessels that are under charter or in the employ of the Department of Defense. Recently, President Bush authorized DOT to provide war risk insurance under Section 1202. The insurance is available for areas currently excluded in commercial war risk trading warranties: the Persian or Arabian Gulf and adjacent waters, Israel, Lebanon, Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea, Yemen, Pakistan, Oman, Syria, and Egypt. Authority under Section 1205 for the Middle East has remained in effect since it was authorized by thenPresident Bush in August 1990. Since February 20, 2002, MARAD has written Section 1205 insurance on ﬁve vessels in the employ of the Military Sealift Command. Although the combined losses arising out of the attacks of September 11 are estimated in the tens of billions of dollars, we are seeing an excellent response all across the insurance industry in responding to the coverage of these losses. While the losses are of catastrophic proportions, the industry is ﬁnancially sound, and most property/casualty insurers are highly reinsured with major reinsurers with excellent reserves. The insurance industry has taken a major hit as a result of [the] September 11 events, and what we are seeing is a major restructuring of terrorism risks. Many primary property/casualty insurance coverages, which would include port infrastructure, had reinsurance renewals on January 1 of this year, and it appears that most reinsurers have excluded terrorism risks from their renewal coverage. A few major primary insurers are offering to write terrorism risks

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on ﬁxed property, but with very limited cover (up to $50 million on some risks) at very, very high premiums. As a result of this, we have been advised by a number of insurance brokers and underwriters that upon insurance renewal, many companies and properties are underinsured or uninsured for terrorism risks. The situation is somewhat better with regard to vessel insurance, where terrorism risks are generally covered under the war-risk policy. Terrorism coverage is still available for vessels and cargoes, but the cost has increased signiﬁcantly. For example, war-risk underwriters issued cancellation notices on war risk policies on all vessels worldwide on September 19, (which they were permitted to do under their seven-day cancellation clauses). They reinstated these policies on September 26 with increases of annual premium of 200 to 300 percent on most ﬂeets, except for cruise vessels, which we understand faced a 1,000 percent increase in annual premiums. In addition, warrisk underwriters published new excluded zones, extending from Egypt to Pakistan, where vessels and cargoes may not enter without paying thousands or even hundreds of thousands of dollars of additional premium. Marine warrisk/terrorism insurance is still available from the commercial market, although at much higher premium rates and with much more limited coverage on the liability side since September 11. The Protection and Indemnity Clubs, a mutual arrangement of ship owners that provide vessel liability coverage, now limit coverage for terrorism risk as of February 20 to $200 million per vessel—an amount far lower than previously. Vessels and cargoes are still moving worldwide, but the cost is higher and the terms more limited. In addition, we understand that one of the mutual clubs that provides insurance for terminals, stevedores, port authorities, and transport and logistics companies for handling equipment and property was able to reinstate terrorism cover as of February 1, but it is not clear on what terms or cost. In summary, insurance covering risks of terrorism is still in a state of ﬂux, and we expect this to continue for some time to come.

CONCLUSION The Department of Transportation does not need to be convinced that port security is a good idea. We have recognized it as a critical component of our maritime industry and our national security for many years. Nevertheless, achieving appropriate levels of security in our seaports and seeking to educate our international partners as to the need and beneﬁts of seaport security is no small undertaking. DOT is aggressively pursuing all aspects of transportation security in all modes utilizing our own resources and tapping the best minds in the industry and labor. I would be happy to answer any questions you or the other committee members may have.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEARING ON THE PRESIDENT’S FY 2005 BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE General Richard B. Myers, USAF Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before the Committee on Armed Services May 12, 2004*

Operations in the Horn of Africa remain an essential part of the [War on Terrorism] (WOT). The Joint Task Force Horn of Africa at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, is conducting counterterrorist and civil affairs operations in Eastern Africa. Although these operations have impacted al-Qaeda’s inﬂuence in the region, a continued military presence is essential to stop the movement of transnational terrorists and demonstrate to the region our resolve to wage the WOT in Africa. In support of OEF – Philippines, U.S. Paciﬁc Command (PACOM) used congressionally approved funds this past year to continue counterterrorism training for the armed forces of the Philippines. A small contingent of U.S. military personnel remains in the southern Philippines managing these efforts and other humanitarian assistance projects.

OTHER OVERSEAS OPERATIONS U.S. European Command (EUCOM), in accordance with SECDEF guidance, has developed a concept for the reduction of U.S. forces supporting U.S. Stability Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. USEUCOM is closely monitoring the stability of the Province of Kosovo, given recent violence, to determine required U.S. force levels to support the U.S. Kosovo Force. Any force reductions will be done in concert with the North Atlantic Council’s Periodic Mission Review recommendation for the Balkans. When EUCOM concludes the Georgia Train and Equip Program in May 2004, they will meet their objective of improving Georgia’s ability to confront transnational terrorism operating within Georgia. Training is being provided for two staffs, four battalions, and one mechanized/armor company team. To build on this success and momentum, EUCOM is reviewing a possible follow-up Georgia Capabilities Enhancement Program to sustain and improve the Georgian military’s newly acquired capabilities, and demonstrate a continued U.S. commitment to the Georgian Armed Forces’ development. *

http://www.cellexchange.com/News/Articles/JPEN/JPEN_003.pdf

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Maritime Interdiction Operations took on a new global focus last year, beyond the historical CENTCOM and EUCOM missions, when the President approved Expanded Maritime Interception Operations to interdict terrorists and their resources globally. Expanded Maritime Interception Operations are now signiﬁcant mission areas for every deployed battle group, especially along maritime transit lanes and choke points. Results from these maritime operations, such as in the Mediterranean Sea, have produced lower insurance premiums in the shipping industry, considerably less illegal immigration in countries such as Spain, Italy, and Greece, and a reduction in crime at sea. Maritime Interdiction Operations are a truly international effort. German and Spanish-led multinational naval forces patrol the CENTCOM area of responsibility, and this past year coalition naval forces have been responsible for boarding over thirty ships within EUCOM’s area of responsibility. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) continues to support counternarcotics trafﬁcking and counterterrorism efforts in the Caribbean and Central and South America. They are assisting the Colombian military in its ﬁght against designated terrorist organizations by providing military advice, training, and equipment, with an emphasis on the pursuit of narcoterrorist leadership, counter-narcotics tactics, and security for major infrastructure, such as the Cano Limon pipeline. SOUTHCOM supported the formation of the Colombian Army Special Operations Command, and is continuing its efforts to train the Commando Battalion, and a Ranger-type unit. Training was successfully completed for the ﬁrst Colombian Commando Battalion, and training has begun for the second battalion. The Colombian military has been very successful over the past year in their ﬁght against narco-terrorism. The Tri-Border Area between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay is another focal point for drug and arms trafﬁcking, money laundering, document fraud, and Islamic terrorist-supported activities in South America. U.S.-sponsored multilateral exercises are promoting security, improving effective border control, and denying safe havens to Hizballah, Hamas, and other Middle Eastern terrorists, restricting their ability to operate. SOUTHCOM is also providing nearly 2,000 military personnel to manage detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. We operate in close coordination with several U.S. agencies. We are constantly reviewing the status of each detainee, and to date have transferred 128 of the detainees who were determined to be of no intelligence or law enforcement value, or no threat to the U.S. or its interests, back to their countries of origin for release. Eighteen detainees have been transferred back to their country of origin, under an agreement for continued detention by that country. More await similar agreements to allow for transfer or continued detention. A number of detainees have been assessed as high-intelligence and/or law-enforcement value, or pose a signiﬁcant threat to U.S. interests. These detainees will

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remain for further exploitation. Other cases are being considered for referral to the Military Commission, although no one has been referred to date. Information gleaned from detainees, many of whom continue to make threats against Americans, has already helped prevent further terrorist attacks against the U.S. and our allies. Furthermore, continued detention of those who pose a threat to U.S. interests prevents those enemy combatants from returning to the battleﬁeld. SOUTHCOM is also conducting security and stability operations in Haiti following the departure of President Aristide, with a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) of nearly 4,000 personnel. The presence of the MIF has improved the security and humanitarian situation in Haiti. The MIF is composed of approximately 2,000 U.S. military personnel with the remainder from Canada, Chile, and France. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1542, adopted unanimously on April 30, SOUTHCOM and the Multinational Force will transition the current Haiti operation to a new United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti on or about June 1, 2004. The United Nations has authorized a force of 6,700 troops and 1,600 police. In accordance with the Uniﬁed Command Plan 2002 Change 2, on January 1, 2004, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) reported signiﬁcant progress in all of their new mission areas: global strike; missile defense; DOD information operations; and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. Further, they are on schedule to achieve full operational capability in each of the newly assigned mission areas this year. SECDEF has already approved the Information Operations Roadmap, which has 57 wide-ranging recommendations that aid Combatant Commanders in planning and executing fully integrated information operations. As we become more reliant upon information to conduct operations, the defense of our network is paramount. This requires properly trained people, common operating standards, and a well-stocked arsenal of information assurance tools. We are working diligently to centralize network operations and defense, and to formalize information sharing policy, guidance, and procedures. These steps, along with our cryptographic modernization plan, will safeguard our vital information. We are formalizing the role of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in the War on Terrorism. In the near future, we will be recommending a change to the Uniﬁed Command Plan, assigning SOCOM speciﬁc responsibility to coordinate DOD actions against terrorist networks. In March, SOCOM’s trans-regional psychological operations program was approved to unify existing programs, streamline approval authorities, and synchronize psychological operations across regional boundaries in support of the War on Terrorism. These changes will provide SOCOM and all of DOD improved focus in our global effort to combat terrorism.

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A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SEAPOWER United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, and United States Coast Guard October 2007*

Seapower represents a historical ﬁrst. Never before have the maritime forces of the United States—the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—come together to create a uniﬁed maritime strategy. This strategy stresses an approach that integrates seapower with other elements of national power, as well as those of our friends and allies. It describes how seapower will be applied around the world to protect our way of life, as we join with other like-minded nations to protect and sustain the global, inter-connected system through which we prosper. Our commitment to protecting the homeland and winning our nation’s wars is matched by a corresponding commitment to preventing war. Our citizens were involved in development of this strategy through a series of public forums known as the “Conversations with the Country.” Three themes dominated these discussions: our people want us to remain strong; they want us to protect them and our homeland, and they want us to work with partners around the world to prevent war. These themes, coupled with rigorous academic research, analysis and debate, led to a comprehensive strategy designed to meet the expectations and needs of the American people. “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” binds our services more closely together than they have ever been before to advance the prosperity and security of our nation. The demands of an uncertain world and the enduring interests of the American people require nothing less. James T. Conway General U.S. Marine Corps Commandant of the Marine Corps Gary Roughead Admiral, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations Thad W. Allen Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant of the Coast Guard

INTRODUCTION The security, prosperity, and vital interests of the United States are increasingly coupled to those of other nations. Our nation’s interests are best served by fostering a peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks *

http://www.defenselink.mil/Blog_ﬁles/MaritimeStrategy.pdf

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of trade, ﬁnance, information, law, people, and governance. We prosper because of this system of exchange among nations, yet recognize it is vulnerable to a range of disruptions that can produce cascading and harmful effects far from their sources. Major power war, regional conﬂict, terrorism, lawlessness and natural disasters—all have the potential to threaten U.S. national security and world prosperity. The oceans connect the nations of the world, even those countries that are landlocked. Because the maritime domain—the world’s oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, littorals, and the airspace above them— supports 90% of the world’s trade, it carries the lifeblood of a global system that links every country on earth. Covering three-quarters of the planet, the oceans make neighbors of people around the world. They enable us to help friends in need and to confront and defeat aggression far from our shores. Today, the United States and its partners ﬁnd themselves competing for global inﬂuence in an era in which they are unlikely to be fully at war or fully at peace. Our challenge is to apply seapower in a manner that protects U.S. vital interests even as it promotes greater collective security, stability, and trust. While defending our homeland and defeating adversaries in war remain the indisputable ends of seapower, it must be applied more broadly if it is to serve the national interest. We believe that preventing wars is as important as winning wars. There is a tension, however, between the requirements for continued peacetime engagement and maintaining proﬁciency in the critical skills necessary to ﬁghting and winning in combat. Maritime forces must contribute to winning wars decisively while enhancing our ability to prevent war, win the long struggle against terrorist networks, positively inﬂuence events, and ease the impact of disasters. As it has always been, these critical tasks will be carried out by our people—the key to success in any military strategy. Accordingly, we will provide our people—our Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen—with the training, education and tools necessary to promote peace and prevail in conﬂict. Guided by the objectives articulated in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy and the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard will act across the full range of military operations to secure the United States from direct attack; secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action; strengthen existing and emerging alliances and partnerships and establish favorable security conditions. Additionally, maritime forces will be employed to build conﬁdence and trust among nations through collective security efforts that focus on common threats and mutual interests in an open, multi-polar world. To do so will require an unprecedented level of integration among our maritime forces and enhanced cooperation with the other instruments of national power, as well as the capabilities of our international partners. Seapower will be a unifying force for building a better tomorrow.

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CHALLENGES OF A NEW ERA The world economy is tightly interconnected. Over the past four decades, total seaborne trade has more than quadrupled: 90 percent of world trade and two-thirds of its petroleum are transported by sea. The sea-lanes and supporting shore infrastructure are the lifelines of the modern global economy, visible and vulnerable symbols of the modern distribution system. Because the maritime domain—the world’s oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, littorals, and the airspace above them—supports 90 percent of the world’s trade, it carries the lifeblood of a global system that links every country on earth that relies on free transit through increasingly urbanized littoral regions. Expansion of the global system has increased the prosperity of many nations. Yet their continued growth may create increasing competition for resources and capital with other economic powers, transnational corporations, and international organizations. Heightened popular expectations and increased competition for resources, coupled with scarcity, may encourage nations to exert wider claims of sovereignty over greater expanses of ocean, waterways, and natural resources—potentially resulting in conﬂict. Technology is rapidly expanding marine activities such as energy development, resource extraction, and other commercial activity in and under the oceans. Climate change is gradually opening up the waters of the Arctic, not only to new resource development, but also to new shipping routes that may reshape the global transport system. While these developments offer opportunities for growth, they are potential sources of competition and conﬂict for access and natural resources. Globalization is also shaping human migration patterns, health, education, culture, and the conduct of conﬂict. Conﬂicts are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and execution, and non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways. Weak or corrupt governments, growing dissatisfaction among the disenfranchised, religious extremism, ethnic nationalism, and changing demographics—often spurred on by the uneven and sometimes unwelcome advances of globalization—exacerbate tensions and are contributors to conﬂict. Concurrently, a rising number of transnational actors and rogue states, emboldened and enabled with unprecedented access to the global stage, can cause systemic disruptions in an effort to increase their power and inﬂuence. Their actions, often designed to purposely incite conﬂict between other parties, will complicate attempts to defuse and allay regional conﬂict. Proliferation of weapons technology and information has increased the capacity of nation-states and transnational actors to challenge maritime access, evade accountability for attacks, and manipulate public perception. Asymmetric use of technology will pose a range of threats to the United States

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and its partners. Even more worrisome, the appetite for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is growing among nations and non-state antagonists. At the same time, attacks on legal, ﬁnancial, and cyber systems can be equally, if not more disruptive than kinetic weapons. The vast majority of the world’s population lives within a few hundred miles of the oceans. Social instability in increasingly crowded cities, many of which exist in already unstable parts of the world, has the potential to create signiﬁcant disruptions. The effects of climate change may also amplify human suffering through catastrophic storms, loss of arable lands, and coastal ﬂooding, [and] could lead to loss of life, involuntary migration, social instability, and regional crises. Mass communications will highlight the drama of human suffering, and disadvantaged populations will be ever more painfully aware and less tolerant of their conditions. Extremist ideologies will become increasingly attractive to those in despair and bereft of opportunity. Criminal elements will also exploit this social instability. These conditions combine to create an uncertain future and cause us to think anew about how we view seapower. No one nation has the resources required to provide safety and security throughout the entire maritime domain. Increasingly, governments, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and the private sector will form partnerships of common interest to counter these emerging threats.

MARITIME STRATEGIC CONCEPT This strategy reafﬁrms the use of seapower to inﬂuence actions and activities at sea and ashore. The expeditionary character and versatility of maritime forces provide the U.S. the asymmetric advantage of enlarging or contracting its military footprint in areas where access is denied or limited. Permanent or prolonged basing of our military forces overseas often has unintended economic, social or political repercussions. The sea is a vast, maneuver space, where the presence of maritime forces can be adjusted as conditions dictate to enable ﬂexible approaches to escalation, de-escalation, and deterrence of conﬂicts. The speed, ﬂexibility, agility, and scalability of maritime forces provide joint or combined force commanders a range of options for responding to crises. Additionally, integrated maritime operations, either within formal alliance structures (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or more informal arrangements (such as the Global Maritime Partnership initiative), send powerful messages to would-be aggressors that we will act with others to ensure collective security and prosperity. United States seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world. As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others,

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U.S. maritime forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, ﬁnance, information, law, people, and governance. We will employ the global reach, persistent presence, and operational ﬂexibility inherent in U.S. seapower to accomplish six key tasks, or strategic imperatives. Where tensions are high or where we wish to demonstrate to our friends and allies our commitment to security and stability, U.S. maritime forces will be characterized by regionally concentrated, forwarddeployed task forces with the combat power to limit regional conﬂict, deter major-power war, and should deterrence fail, win our nation’s wars as part of a joint or combined campaign. In addition, persistent, mission-tailored maritime forces will be globally distributed in order to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding set of international partners, and prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises. Regionally Concentrated, Credible Combat Power: Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Paciﬁc and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and allies of our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors. This combat power can be selectively and rapidly repositioned to meet contingencies that may arise elsewhere. These forces will be sized and postured to fulﬁll the following strategic imperatives: Limit Regional Conﬂict with Forward-Deployed, Decisive Maritime Power: Today regional conﬂict has ramiﬁcations far beyond the area of conﬂict. Humanitarian crises, violence spreading across borders, pandemics, and the interruption of vital resources are all possible when regional crises erupt. [Although] this strategy advocates a wide dispersal of networked maritime forces, we cannot be everywhere, and we cannot act to mitigate all regional conﬂict. Where conﬂict threatens the global system and our national interests, maritime forces will be ready to respond alongside other elements of national and multinational power, to give political leaders a range of options for deterrence, escalation, and de-escalation. Maritime forces that are persistently present and combat-ready provide the nation’s primary forcible entry option in an era of declining access, even as they provide the means for this nation to respond quickly to other crises. Whether over the horizon or powerfully arrayed in plain sight, maritime forces can deter the ambitions of regional aggressors, assure friends and allies, gain and maintain access, and protect our citizens while working to sustain the global order. Critical to this notion is the maintenance of a powerful ﬂeet—ships, aircraft, Marine forces, and shore-based ﬂeet activities—capable of selectively controlling the seas, projecting power ashore, and protecting friendly forces and civilian populations from attack.

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Deter Major-Power War: No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major-power war. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provides the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces. Win our Nation’s Wars: In times of war, our ability to impose local sea control, overcome challenges to access, force entry, and project and sustain power ashore makes our maritime forces an indispensable element of the joint or combined force. This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it provides joint and combined force commanders with freedom of maneuver. Reinforced by a robust sealift capability that can concentrate and sustain forces, sea control and power projection enable extended campaigns ashore. Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces: The Sea Services will establish a persistent global presence using distributed forces that are organized by mission and comprised of integrated Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard capabilities. This global distribution must extend beyond traditional deployment areas and reﬂect missions ranging from humanitarian operations to an increased emphasis on counterterrorism and irregular warfare. Our maritime forces will be tailored to meet the unique and evolving requirements particular to each geographic region, often in conjunction with special operations forces and other interagency partners. In particular, this strategy recognizes the rising importance and need for increased peacetime activities in Africa and the Western Hemisphere. Contribute to Homeland Defense in Depth: Maritime forces will defend the homeland by identifying and neutralizing threats as far from our shores as possible. From fostering critical relationships overseas, to screening ships bound for our ports, or rapidly responding to any threats approaching our coastline, our homeland defense effort will integrate across the maritime services, the joint force, the interagency community, our international partners, and the private sector to provide the highest level of security possible. When directed, maritime forces will promptly support civil authorities in the event of an attack or natural disaster on our shores. Foster and Sustain Cooperative Relationships with more International Partners: Expanded cooperative relationships with other nations will contribute to the security and stability of the maritime domain for the beneﬁt of all. Although our forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, trust and cooperation cannot be surged. They must be built over time so that the

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strategic interests of the participants are continuously considered, while mutual understanding and respect are promoted. A key to fostering such relationships is development of sufﬁcient cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise among our Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen to nurture effective interaction with diverse international partners. Building and reinvigorating these relationships through Theater Security Cooperation requires an increased focus on capacity-building, humanitarian assistance, regional frameworks for improving maritime governance, and cooperation in enforcing the rule of law in the maritime domain. Additionally, the Sea Services must become adept at forging international partnerships in coordination with the other U.S. services and government departments. To this end, the Global Maritime Partnerships initiative seeks a cooperative approach to maritime security, promoting the rule of law by countering piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafﬁcking, and other illicit activities. Prevent or Contain Local Disruptions Before They Impact the Global System: Maritime forces will work with others to ensure an adequate level of security and awareness in the maritime domain. In doing so, transnational threats—terrorists and extremists; proliferators of weapons of mass destruction; pirates; trafﬁckers in persons, drugs, and conventional weapons; and other criminals—will be constrained. By being there, forward-deployed and engaged in mutually beneﬁcial relationships with regional and global partners, maritime forces will promote frameworks that enhance security. When natural or manmade disasters strike, our maritime forces can provide humanitarian assistance and relief, joining with interagency and nongovernmental partners. By participating routinely and predictably in cooperative activities, maritime forces will be postured to support other joint or combined forces to mitigate and localize disruptions. Implementing the Strategy: To successfully implement this strategy, the Sea Services must collectively expand the core capabilities of U.S. seapower to achieve a blend of peacetime engagement and major combat operations capabilities. Expanded Core Capabilities: Although the Sea Services conduct many missions, the following six capabilities comprise the core of U.S. maritime power and reﬂect an increase in emphasis on those activities that prevent war and build partnerships. Forward Presence: Maritime forces will be forward deployed, especially in an era of diverse threats to the homeland. Operating forward enables familiarity with the environment, as well as the personalities and behavior patterns of regional actors. Mindful of the sovereignty of other nations, this inﬂuence and understanding contributes to effective responses in the event of crisis. Should peacetime operations transition to war, maritime forces will have already developed the environmental and operational understanding and experience to quickly engage in combat operations. Forward presence also

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allows us to combat terrorism as far from our shores as possible. Where and when applicable, forward deployed maritime forces will isolate, capture, or destroy terrorists, their infrastructure, resources, and sanctuaries, preferably in conjunction with coalition partners. Deterrence: Preventing war is preferable to ﬁghting wars. Deterring aggression must be viewed in global, regional, and transnational terms via conventional, unconventional, and nuclear means. Effective Theater: Security cooperation activities are a form of extended deterrence, creating security and removing conditions for conﬂict. Maritime ballistic missile defense will enhance deterrence by providing an umbrella of protection to forward-deployed forces, friends, and allies, while contributing to the larger architecture planned for defense of the United States. Our advantage in space—upon which much of our ability to operate in a networked, dispersed fashion depends—must be protected and extended. We will use forward-based and forward-deployed forces, space-based assets, sea-based strategic deterrence, and other initiatives to deter those who wish us harm. Sea Control: The ability to operate freely at sea is one of the most important enablers of joint and interagency operations, and sea control requires capabilities in all aspects of the maritime domain, including space and cyberspace. There are many challenges to our ability to exercise sea control, perhaps none as signiﬁcant as the growing number of nations operating submarines, both advanced diesel-electric and nuclear propelled. We will continue to hone the tactics, training, and technologies needed to neutralize this threat. We will not permit conditions under which our maritime forces would be impeded from freedom of maneuver and freedom of access, nor will we permit an adversary to disrupt the global supply chain by attempting to block vital sea-lines of communication and commerce. We will be able to impose local sea control wherever necessary, ideally in concert with friends and allies, but by ourselves if we must. As a declaratory strategy, this document challenges the sea services to evolve an expanded range of integrated capabilities to achieve enduring national strategic objectives. Power Projection: Our ability to overcome challenges to access and to project and sustain power ashore is the basis of our combat credibility. Our advantages will be sustained through properly sized forces, innovative technologies, understanding of adversary capabilities, adaptive joint planning processes, and the proﬁciency and ingenuity of our Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen. We will maintain a robust strategic sealift capability to rapidly concentrate and sustain forces, and to enable joint and/or combined campaigns. This capability relies on the maintenance of a strong U.S. commercial maritime transportation industry and its critical intermodal assets. Maritime Security: The creation and maintenance of security at sea is essential to mitigating threats short of war, including piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafﬁcking, and other illicit activities. Countering

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these irregular and transnational threats protects our homeland, enhances global stability, and secures freedom of navigation for the beneﬁt of all nations. Our maritime forces enforce domestic and international law at sea through established protocols, such as the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan (MOTR). We also join navies and coast guards around the world to police the global commons and suppress common threats. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response: Building on relationships forged in times of calm, we will continue to mitigate human suffering as the vanguard of interagency and multinational efforts, both in a deliberate, proactive fashion, and in response to crises. Human suffering moves us to act, and the expeditionary character of maritime forces uniquely positions them to provide assistance. Our ability to conduct rapid and sustained noncombatant evacuation operations is critical to relieving the plight of our citizens and others when their safety is in jeopardy. Implementation Priorities: Implementation of this strategy will require that the Sea Services demonstrate ﬂexibility, adaptability, and unity of effort in evolving to meet the enduring and emerging challenges and opportunities ahead. Speciﬁc initiatives in support of this strategy must be vetted and tested over time, through experimentation, wargaming, and continued operational experience, with periodic oversight and uniﬁed guidance provided by the senior leaders of the Sea Services. While many initiatives must come to fruition to enable this strategy, three areas will receive priority attention: Improve Integration and Interoperability: The combatant commanders’ increased demand for mission-tailored force packages requires a more integrated approach to how maritime forces are employed. Marines will continue to be employed as air-ground task forces operating from amphibious ships to conduct a variety of missions, such as power projection, but they will also be employed as detachments aboard a wider variety of ships and cutters for maritime security missions. Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen, teamed in various combinations of security forces, mobile training teams, construction battalions, health services, law enforcement, and civil affairs units to conduct security cooperation and humanitarian assistance missions, illustrate adaptive force packaging. Homeland defense is the most obvious example of the requirement for greater integration. It is not sufﬁcient to speak of homeland defense in terms of splitting the responsibilities and authorities between the Navy and the Coast Guard along some undeﬁned geographic boundary. Rather, the Sea Services must—and will—work as one wherever they operate in order to defend the United States. Consistent with the National Fleet Policy, Coast Guard forces must be able to operate as part of a joint task force thousands of miles from our shores, and naval forces must be able to respond to operational tasking close to home when necessary to secure our nation and support civil authorities. Integration and interoperability are key to success in these activities, particularly where diverse forces of varying capability and mission must

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work together seamlessly in support of defense, security, and humanitarian operations. Expanded cooperation with the maritime forces of other nations requires more interoperability with multinational partners possessing varying levels of technology. The Global Maritime Partnership initiative will serve as a catalyst for increased international interoperability in support of cooperative maritime security. Achieving the requisite level of integration and interoperability will demand a high degree of coordination among service headquarters staffs to fulﬁll their responsibilities of providing, training, and equipping forces. Furthermore, Navy and Marine Corps component commanders and Coast Guard functional commanders will play a central role in determining how maritime forces are organized, deployed, and employed. This role involves identiﬁcation of combatant commander requirements and articulation of how their respective service capabilities can be integrated in innovative ways to meet those requirements. Close coordination among, if not outright integration of, maritime components may be required to do this effectively. At all echelons of command, we must enhance our ability to conduct integrated planning, execution, and assessment. Enhance Awareness: To be effective, there must be a signiﬁcantly increased commitment to advance maritime domain awareness (MDA) and expanded intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability and capacity. New partnerships with the world’s maritime commercial interests and the maritime forces of participating nations will reduce the dangerous anonymity of seaborne transport of people and cargoes. Great strides have already been taken in that direction, and the National Strategy for Maritime Security has mandated an even higher level of interagency cooperation in pursuit of effective MDA. Maritime forces will contribute to enhance information sharing, underpinning and energizing our capability to neutralize threats to our nation as far from our shores as possible. Critical to realizing the beneﬁts of increased awareness is our ability to protect information from compromise through robust information-assurance measures. Such measures will increase international partner conﬁdence that information provided will be shared only with those entities for which it is intended. Adversaries are unlikely to attempt conventional force-on-force conﬂict and, to the extent that maritime forces could be openly challenged, their plans will almost certainly rely on asymmetric attack and surprise, achieved through stealth, deception, or ambiguity. Our ISR capabilities must include innovative ways to penetrate the designs of adversaries and discern their capabilities and vulnerabilities while supporting the full range of military operations. We must remove the possibility of an adversary gaining the initiative over forward-deployed forces and ensure we provide decision makers with the information they need to deter aggression and consider escalatory measures in advance of such gambits.

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Prepare Our People: Given the distributed nature of the forces executing this strategy, we must properly prepare Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen for the challenges and opportunities ahead. We are creating a dispersed force under decentralized authority in a world of rapid information exchange. Maritime forces will normally operate in a less concentrated manner than they do today, and junior leaders will be entrusted with a higher level of responsibility and authority for carrying out important aspects of strategically important missions. Junior personnel will be required to interact with a far greater variety of U.S. and multinational partners and indigenous populations than their predecessors. Professional development and unit training must be reﬁned accordingly. Operations as an integrated team require improved mutual understanding of respective service or agency capabilities and cultures, which can be achieved through expanded interagency teaming of students and instructors throughout training, education, and staff assignments. Similarly, if we are to successfully partner with the international community, we must improve regional and cultural expertise through expanded training, education, and exchange initiatives. Signiﬁcantly, this strategy requires new ways of thinking—about both empowering individual commanders and understanding the net effects of dispersed operations. Such operations require a broadly shared responsibility among: the on-scene commander responsible for ensuring actions are in accordance with the commander’s intent; the higher commander responsible for providing intent and guidance to subordinates; the parent service of dispersed forces responsible for ensuring that units are trained, equipped, and culturally prepared for the missions they will undertake; and ﬁnally, the regional commanders responsible for determining appropriate force levels and readiness postures.

CONCLUSION This strategy is derived from a thorough assessment of the nation’s security requirements. It does not presume conﬂict but instead acknowledges the historical fact that peace does not preserve itself. Looking across the wide maritime domain, it calls for a broad portfolio of core capabilities to support our vital interests, realized by well-trained, highly motivated, and ably-led people. The strategy focuses on opportunities, not threats; on optimism, not fear; and on conﬁdence, not doubt. It recognizes the challenges imposed by the uncertain conditions in a time of rapid change and makes the case for the necessity of U.S. seapower in the twenty-ﬁrst century. As a declaratory strategy, this document challenges the Sea Services to evolve an expanded range of integrated capabilities to achieve enduring national strategic objectives. Further experimentation, operational experience, and analysis are necessary,

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as is sea service commitment to building upon the ideas that this document puts forward. However, the Sea Services cannot do this alone. The diverse elements of the greater maritime community must be inspired and supported as they invest to secure peace and prosperity across the maritime domain. The Sea Services commit to continuing the process of collaborative strategy implementation in the years ahead. United States seapower is a force for good, protecting this nation’s vital interests even as it joins with others to promote security and prosperity across the globe. Seapower will be a unifying force for building a better tomorrow.

COMMANDERS DISCUSS AFRICOM AND MARITIME PARTNERSHIP General William Ward and Admiral Henry Ulrich, Commander, U.S. Africa Command, and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, United States Department of Defense, Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) October 15, 2007*

Bryan Whitman: (deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Public Affairs)

General Ward:

*

Good morning and welcome. It’s my privilege to introduce two briefers today: General William “Kip” Ward, who is the commanding general of U.S. Africa Command, and Admiral Harry Ulrich, who is the commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe. They’re here today to talk to you about the African Partnership Station Initiative, which is to promote maritime security and safety. They both have some opening statements that they’d like to make, and then they’re prepared to take your questions. So with that, let me turn it over to the two of them. Thank you for being here today. First, let me thank you for coming this morning to listen to Admiral Ulrich and I talk about the African Partnership Station. And I think it provides a good example of what the newly established U.S. Africa Command is about as it relates to helping out partner nations on the continent of Africa build their capacity to better govern their spaces, to have more effects in providing for the security of their people, as well as doing the things that are important in assuring the development of the continent in ways that promote increased globalization of their economies, as well as the development of their societies for the betterment of their people. As was pointed out recently, the stafﬁng of U.S. Africa Command—and as you know, the creation of the command designed to cause the work that’s currently being done on the

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continent, by three separate combatant commands (U.S. Central Command, U.S. Paciﬁc Command, and U.S. European Command)—had to be consolidated into one uniﬁed structure— that is, U.S. Africa Command. As we work over the course of the coming weeks and months to stand up the command, we’re focused on building the team that will cause value-added to be brought to the various programs that we do on the continent. We’re working to cause the work that we in fact do currently to be reinforced by creating a greater synergy of the entirety of the work being done. And in that regard, the command is very uniquely envisioned to be an interagency model organization; a matrixed organization, so that functionalities that make a difference in getting things done are included; an interagency construct, also ensuring that we, as best we can, understand the work that’s being done by humanitarian organizations, other partners that do work on the continent, and importantly, where private enterprise is involved, also understanding those efforts and their intent. Again, we want to bring value-added to the work that we currently do so that we achieve effects in working with our African partners to do, as they said, cause Africans to be in a better position to take care of themselves. And by being of an assistance of—to them in this endeavor, we think that we have the best chance of doing work today that helps bring stability so that we are not in a position of having to do things 10, 20 years from now that are problematic for the continent and as well for our global society. The program that Admiral Ulrich will talk to, the African Partnership Station, is a wonderful example of the sorts of things that AFRICOM will do throughout the continent, again, in conjunction with its partners on the continent, its international friends, but more importantly those things that Africans have come forward and said, “We would like you to help us increase our capacity to provide stability within our borders and within the region, and on a continent as we can.” And those things that are within our means to do, we will look forward to working with the African nations and providing them with that type of an assist. So with that, I’ll turn it over to Admiral Ulrich to provide you more detail on our African Partnership Station Initiative. Henry. Admiral Ulrich: Thank you, Kip, for that introduction. We advertised that we were to talk today about African Partnership, that we could operate off the West Coast of Africa in the coming months to provide and build capacity for maritime safety and security; I think it’s important that we start with, what is maritime safety and security?

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It’s kind of a new term that has come up in the last ﬁve to six years. It was generated by a sense that although we’ve been doing maritime safety and security for decades and generations, and indeed hundreds of years, we’ve kind of pulled it all together and looked at it in a different fashion. And it was driven by, of course, the terrorist attacks that have taken our transportation infrastructure and have turned that around against us, whether it be airplanes, trains, subways, buses, trucks, cars. It’s just a matter of time before they use our maritime infrastructure against us as well. So we took a long, hard look at this starting about, as I said, four or ﬁve years ago, and we’ve kind of brought this into a disciplined fashion. It was driven by Operation Active Endeavor, which is a NATO operation, the only Article 5 NATO operation that has ever been conducted, and is still being conducted. And we kind of took about—a hard look at that after about two years of operation and checked its effectiveness. Now, it turns out that I, in my NATO hat, I’m in charge of air safety and security for the southern part of Europe and indeed also responsible for maritime safety and security. And when I looked at the contrast there, it was striking. I knew where every aircraft was ﬂying over Europe in three dimensions to about 50 feet, real time. I knew where it was, where it was going, where it came from, and what it was carrying. We were tracking 7,000 of these airplanes every single day. And at the same time, in the maritime domain I could only look you in the eye and say that we were tracking less than a hundred ships or even knew where the hundred ships were, and clearly there were a lot more out there. So we looked at how we did it in the air—you know, with little, tiny airplanes moving very, very fast in three dimensions— and why we couldn’t do it in the maritime domain with really, really fat ships that move very slow in normally two dimensions? And so we’ve changed our whole way of looking at this, and we’ve had some great success in this whole new discipline of maritime safety and security. And what we found was that it took different partners, what I call different places and different faces, to put this all together. And in fact, right about that time, they came—the United States came out with a new document called the Strategy for Maritime Safety. And I’m going to read some of the words from it, because it’s just—and it’s in your packet—just so striking. That says why we need maritime safety and security—it says that we need to protect against ocean-related terrorists; hostile, criminal, and dangerous acts; that we need to do this with international cooperation, seek new partnerships, and so forth

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Terror on the High Seas and so on. It’s a great document. I really highly recommend you read it. And then the maritime component of the national military strategy says we ought to foster trust and conﬁdence, we ought to expand our maritime relationships. And then the United States Navy came out and said we need to build one force. We need partnership amongst joint interagency international organizations and NGOs. And at the same time that was going on, the—our African friends, the nations that have started getting together in several symposium and other different fora—and they issued what is also in your package, called the Benin communique, this time last year, where we said: We, the ministers attending the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Safety and Security Conference, agree to commit to address the following elements of maritime governance—partnership, maritime domain awareness—and agree to continue engagement with international maritime partners to improve our maritime safety and security. So that’s the background. Maritime safety and security is the common theme here. We did a lot of experiments, as I said, up in the Mediterranean. We had our African friends on the West Coast ask for some help in developing their maritime safety and security. And so we in the last year did a lot of exploration and meetings and discussions on how we might do this. And we’ve sent some ships and airplanes down there to work with our folks there and our new partners there to try to understand where they were in their development and how we might help them. And so we came to the conclusion that the way to do this is to use a delivery vehicle. We use a ship—go ﬁgure—as we talk about maritime safety and security. We went out to a lot of our European partners that had an interest off the West Coast of Africa. Six of them agreed—six different nations agreed that this was important and they would like to work with us. We reached out to the other agencies and departments here, and our own government, the State Department, USAID, NOAA, Coast Guard, Homeland Security, all wanted to work with us on this. And then we reached out to NGOs that had an interest in the maritime domain. And so we brought that together, and the ship leaves—sails from Norfolk tomorrow. We’ll go to Spain to pick up all these riders, and then we’ll travel a circuit down off the West Coast of Africa with training teams that will work as a group. So we’ve, if you would, convened a center of excellence. And we have a center of mass now on this ship that can help these nations seek what they want, which is maritime safety and

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security, so that they can continue to develop ashore in all the activities that we support, other nations support. And so that’s kind of the long and short of what maritime safety and security is, why we’re going to the West Coast of Africa, and why we decided to use a ship, called an Africa Partnership Station, to work this problem. So subject to your questions, that’s what I have on this. And again you have a package with some of the details. Do we have any questions? Yes. [Off mike] Tell us more about this particular program. Could you give us an idea of the scope of what’s already being done, compared to before? Like in the last several years, you’ve increased your presence off of Africa from 5 ship days to 50 or whatever it is. You know, what’s the presence now, and what are you doing— Well, we pretty much have a continuous presence, deﬁned as either a ship off the West Coast of Africa or some maritime patrol aircraft off the West Coast of Africa or training teams that are downrange in some of the West Coast. And we’re there 360 days a year now. It was. Before we went down there to what I call an episodic fashion, we would travel, you know, a one-time swing every year or two years, do some fort visits, which were more or less friendship visits, and didn’t have the added dimension of focusing on training and capacity building. [Cross talk.] Yeah, my question had— Yeah, we have numbers, and if you—we’ll get you some statistics on that. [Off mike] . . . training, mapping, dredging . . . what are the . . . All of the above. We do all that, quite frankly. It depends on the country. The way we approach this is we go to the—our country team, the ambassador, who in turn works with the right ministers in whatever country this is—and we kind of talk to them about where they are in maritime safety and security, what they need. And we break maritime safety and security down into four elements: Maritime domain awareness—can you see what’s out there; maritime professionals—do you have the people to support your maritime industry and safety and security; do you have the infrastructure; and ﬁnally, do you have the ability to intervene where intervention would be necessary? And we kind of work in those lanes with the country and then put together a training and development program. [Off mike] . . . needs are varied. Is there a way to say overall what the effect of this great increase in presence has been?

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Terror on the High Seas We do. We have measures of effectiveness that we’re working. We can also show those with you; it’s not in your package. And we have a special team that looks at that to make sure that what we’re trying to create is in fact being created. So we’re checking ourselves to make sure the activities that we generate are useful. Yeah, and my question is about the cooperation of the African countries. Can you say all the 53 countries are cooperating now with the African Command; who is cooperating, who is not? And I would like to know from you, what’s the status of the joint task force in Djibouti—still under the Central Command responsibility or now is the—this command is cooperating with the African Command? Let me—you’ll recall in my opening statement, I talked to the fact that the things that we do in Africa, be they maritimerelated or other aspects, are done based on the dialogue that we have with our country teams there as well as what the nations, the African nations, so that the work that we do is work that, one, the African nations have come forward and asked for our assistance, and two, work that the country team, led by the ambassador, says are efforts that contribute to our overall policy effectiveness as well. Where those lines meet, we then within our means move forward to take the actions that we can in support of that. Is it all 53 nations? No. It depends upon our relationships, our policy directions, et cetera, et cetera. Currently the JTF Horn of Africa, currently as a part of the CENTCOM’s area of responsibility, is still there. As the stand-up of Africa Command progresses along, these activities that currently go on on the continent will be taken over by the Africa Command structure as capability to assume those responsibilities is in fact presented. And so, currently the JTF Horn of Africa is still within the Central Command’s area of responsibility, and we would look to transition those activities over the course of the coming months as the Africa Command stands up and [is] capable of assuming those command and control responsibilities. Just to follow up, as we know, the French government has a military presence in the west side of Africa, like in Ivory Coast or Senegal. Do you have any cooperation—are you cooperating with the French government regarding their presence? Anything you can say about this? We do work with the French. We are aware of where the French have their activity. We consult with the French. The French work with us, not just in the west, also in the central part of Africa. And the intent of the command is to, in fact, work with our international friends as well, so that the work that we do is supportive of those efforts and, quite frankly, are efforts that the receiving African state and nation is able to accept in a way that causes them to have an improved capacity

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as well. But we do consult with the French, as well as other international friends who work on the continent. General, why do you think there’s been opposition in Africa to the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command? I don’t know if I would call it opposition. I think there would be—what we have is lack of clarity of purpose for the command. And I think the thing that we have now is an opportunity to present the work of the command, indeed not to embark upon a course that’s different than what we do today, but to cause there to be greater understanding that what we do today is no different from what we are currently doing on the continent. I mean, we are operating there today—U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, and to a degree the Paciﬁc Command. And those activities that we’re conducting will be done in a more cohesive way, a better coordinated fashion in conjunction with our partners such that the effects, as the admiral pointed out, that we can achieve can be more in tune to, one, the desires of our African partners as well as our own results that we would look to see from the work that we do on the continent. Yes. Admiral, regarding the USS Fort McHenry’s upcoming deployment, can you give us a better idea of what the sailors and personnel aboard will be doing and how that will advance AFRICOM’s overall goals? Well, we had sort of a—ﬁrst of all, there’s the—the crew of the USS Fort McHenry, and then what we’re going to do is embark [between] 80–100 additional folks onto the Fort McHenry. Those 80–100 additional folks will be civilians and military, U.S. and other European and African nations’ military folks that are put together with NGOs and other agencies of the U.S. government to form training teams that will work to improve those four pillars I described—maritime domain awareness, maritime professionals, maritime infrastructure, and maritime enforcement—to work with different countries to create a system of systems that they would have, and knowledge, skills, and abilities that they would have to patrol and maintain their own economic—Exclusive Economic Zones in the sense of maritime safety and security. Well, can you give some examples of concrete missions they’ll be doing—for example, teaching African nations how to avoid—how to stop illegal ﬁshing . . . Yes, yes, exactly right. So we have—NOAA will be part of it; we have an NGO that will be part of it that will be teaching these folks and instructing these folks on best practices used throughout the world to stop illegal, unregulated ﬁshing, which, as you probably know, is a billion-dollar industry off the West Coast of Africa. So we’re talking signiﬁcant, signiﬁcant economic impact there.

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FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION REMARKS BY HAROLD J. CREEL Chairman, Federal Maritime Commission at the 2nd International Gwangyang Port Forum Gwangyang, Korea April 25, 2002*

The events of September 11 also quickly catapulted the issue of maritime security to the forefront. President Bush acted quickly to establish the Ofﬁce of Homeland Security to address the domestic security issues. That ofﬁce, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Customs Service acted quickly as well to build a coalition of federal agencies responsible for maritime transportation to develop a new framework for security. The goal from the beginning has been to ﬁnd a way to secure our country’s ports and waterways without halting the ﬂow of commerce. [Although] much of the effort has, obviously, focused on the shipments entering the U.S., the United States is also working to ensure the safety of shipments initiated in our country. Scenarios abound for how a shipping container might be used in a terrorist attack. In one instance, for example, a suspected al-Qaeda member actually used a container as a passenger vessel. We can assume that terrorists have used containers to transport arms and other supplies. We can only imagine what would happen if a container was used to transport weapons of mass destruction. But what is clear is that commerce by sea would be gravely impaired if such weapons entered the U.S. in a container. The U.S. Commissioner of Customs has proposed a container security initiative that would pre-screen containers before shipment, identify high-risk containers, use technology to pre-screen high-risk containers, and require the use of “smart and secure” containers. He proposes concentrating ﬁrst on the “mega-ports” of the world, including Hong Kong, Singapore, Rotterdam, Bremerhaven, Tokyo, Genoa, and yes, Pusan, to begin to build, in his words, “a new international security standard for sea containers.” His concept is to push the border outward to ensure that cargo is secure from the point of origin, and to have complete information about incoming vessels long before they enter port. Crucial to the United States effort to secure our ports will be the accurate and timely ﬂow of information. Instead of clamping shut our borders, the fast transfer of manifest information by carriers to the port of entry in advance of the arrival of a vessel will mean that risks can be quickly identiﬁed and targeted without delaying transit of containers, which pose little or no risk. I

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ﬁrmly believe that increased transparency from the point of stufﬁng to the point of loading to the point of ofﬂoading is the best way to go about keeping our ports open, efﬁcient, and secure. Needless to say, if our efforts are to be successful, the United States will need to rely on the support and cooperation of foreign governments and ocean carriers. The United States Congress is now taking steps to turn these initiatives into funded mandates. First, Congress has made available over $93 million in grant funding to ports for improving security. Second, the U.S. Senate passed port security legislation in December that would provide additional resources for the Coast Guard, Customs, and the Maritime Administration. That legislation would also create a Port Security Task Force, and require that new regulations be developed to protect the public from maritime threats. It would also provide funding for maritime security training. Similar legislation has been introduced in the House of Representatives, but not yet passed, that would require the Coast Guard to conduct port vulnerability assessments for U.S. ports and to approve vessel and facility antiterrorism plans. The House legislation would require the Coast Guard to establish antiterrorism teams to protect vessels, ports, facilities, and cargo. In addition, it calls for the Coast Guard to assess antiterrorism measures at foreign ports from which vessels depart to the United States. The Coast Guard would have the authority to deny entry or prescribe conditions of entry for vessels coming from any foreign port that do not maintain effective security measures. Cargo identiﬁcation and screening systems would be developed. Carriers would be required to provide passenger and crew manifest information for incoming vessels. And all vessels would be required to provide 96 hours notice prior to entering the 12-mile territorial sea of the United States. Again, this legislation has not yet become law. We shall see what the ﬁnal product looks like as it makes its way through our legislative process. What does the FMC have to contribute to the maritime security effort? We have been involved from the outset. It is the responsibility of the FMC to license ocean transportation intermediaries, otherwise known as ocean freight forwarders and non-vessel operating common carriers. As part of the licensing process we investigate the applicant’s character. We intend to assist in the homeland defense effort by coordinating information we collect with information held by other agencies on suspect individuals and entities. Hopefully, the end product will be a database that is effective in screening any cargo that presents a threat to our security. The FMC has been involved from the beginning, helping the agencies with primary responsibility for maritime security to develop this new security framework. We are prepared to use all of our existing authorities to address this serious threat and to take on any new responsibilities with which we may be tasked.

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SCANNING THE HORIZON: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE CHANGING MARITIME SCENE Steven R. Blust Chairman, Federal Maritime Commission At the Plimsoll Club, New Orleans, Louisiana October 27, 2006*

Ladies and gentlemen, it is an honor to be invited to address the members of the World Trade Center, and a great pleasure to be back in New Orleans. In recognition of the fact that today is Teddy Roosevelt’s birthday, I thought it might be appropriate to preface my remarks with an observation about that great outdoorsman and former president. It would have seemed strange and highly unlikely if, at the turn of the century, someone had predicted that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy who had advocated war with Spain in 1898, and then organized and helped lead the First U.S. Volunteer Cavalry in that war, would in just a few years become the ﬁrst American Nobel Peace Prize laureate. But the dynamics of history are rarely linear and often unpredictable. And that famous “roughrider,” and author of the classic advice to “Speak softly and carry a big stick,” was in 1906 honored with the Peace Prize for helping negotiate a peace treaty between Russia and Japan that ended the RussoJapanese War in Manchuria and Korea. Because history so often presents such surprises, anyone who undertakes to offer predictions has good reason to do so with humility. So I will limit my comments today to a few subjects that I think I can address with some conﬁdence. But, mindful of Teddy Roosevelt’s achievements, I shall predict softly and carry a few caveats. My crow’s nest in Washington is a 10th-ﬂoor ofﬁce a few blocks northwest of the Capitol Building, so whenever I scan the horizon, the legislative branch of our national government ﬁgures prominently in my view. And that, I believe, is a good thing, because Congress plays, has played, and will play a major role in the transportation topics I’ll be commenting on today. And, as chairman of an independent federal agency, I am also much in contact with representatives of the U.S. executive departments involved with transportation, international trade, and maritime security. Beyond the various government ofﬁcials I’ve had the pleasure to work with, I also have frequent—and often intellectually valuable—contact with representatives of the various industries that offer, use, or provide services to international liner shipping. Access to all these perspectives—legislative, executive, and private sector—play a part in helping me and my fellow FMC commissioners perform

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the job Congress assigned to us: promoting fairness and efﬁciency in U.S. ocean commerce. Those diverse perspectives also play an important part in shaping my awareness of what may lie ahead on the metaphorical horizon. Because today’s comments are to deal with “the changing maritime scene,” it would not be unreasonable if you came expecting to hear statistics on the exploding growth of America’s international trade, pronouncements on proposed expansion of the Panama Canal, opinions on the likely consequences of the ever expanding size of new liner vessels, insights on the long-term impact the Dubai Ports episode, or similar well-known and much discussed topics. But instead, I’d like to focus on a couple of less publicized, but nevertheless very important, items. Two particular topics of growing importance seem to me to be worth highlighting. And a third one, concerning the international regulation of liner shipping—which has been getting press attention in Europe lately—may also merit a brief mention. The ﬁrst topic is maritime security—security plans, procedures, and actions pertaining to vessels, to the cargo that moves on those vessels, to the ports at which that cargo is loaded and unloaded, and to our national economy as a whole, which increasingly depends on the free and efﬁcient ﬂow of international trade. The second topic—less well publicized, but well deserving of greater public attention—is the question of future funding for landside freight infrastructure. And although the phrase, “future funding for freight infrastructure” may be strongly alliterative, it’s neither poetic to the ear, nor much in the public eye. Nevertheless, it’s an issue that everyone involved with or even interested in ocean shipping and logistics understands is of critical and immediate importance. Closely associated with ocean freight infrastructure issues, especially in our major port cities, is the growing concern with the various environmental impacts of shipping. These topics overlap, of course. Rapid trade growth presents heightened security challenges and puts ever greater pressure on inland infrastructure— the expansion of which can have local and even regional environmental effects. So, even though I may discuss them separately, it’s useful to remember that these topics are linked in ways that are sometimes direct and obvious, sometimes indirect and obscure.

MARITIME SECURITY In the months and years following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government, the nation’s public ports, U.S. importers and exporters, and the companies providing international shipping services have been working together to identify and address vulnerabilities related to America’s maritime

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trade. And that cooperative effort quickly expanded to include our major trading partners. In particular, America and its international partners have developed a container security initiative for ports—an initiative to establish pre-loading container inspection procedures and protocols. That initiative has been expanded to include some 44 foreign ports from which (collectively) more that 75 percent of our nation’s containerized imports (by volume) are loaded. With considerable international cooperation and strong public-private support domestically, the basic framework for America’s maritime security efforts is, by now, well established. The Coast Guard, for example, oversees security planning and its implementation at U.S. ports and on vessels in the U.S. trade. Other elements of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) are responsible for cargo security and personnel security, including the program to develop, test, and put in place a Transport Worker Identiﬁcation Credential known as TWIC. Even to describe our existing maritime security programs, plans, and procedures, to say nothing of discussing the details, is a speech in itself—and a long one. So I will limit my remarks to a few words about one aspect of cargo security that I think is likely to be of pressing importance in the next year or two: the need to obtain more accurate, more detailed, and (most important) more relevant cargo shipment data if DHS is to improve its risk-assessment and targeting system for containerized cargo. Currently, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the arm of DHS that operates its risk-assessment and targeting program, makes use of data provided by ocean carriers to help them determine which containers are most likely to pose a security risk—including the importation of chemical, biological, or nuclear devices—and thus require further investigation. Ideally that “further investigation” would be carried out at a foreign port before any highrisk container was loaded on a vessel bound for America. Obviously, the more relevant and accurate the data used in the initial security screening, the more likely that the high-risk containers will be timely identiﬁed. Better data allows better analysis, and leads to superior risk assessment and targeting. But cargo risk assessment is a complex and data-intensive business. And it has become increasingly clear that, to improve the data used in the analysis, it will be necessary to go to the best available source. In most cases that means to the shippers, and in particular, U.S. importers. These shippers own the cargo in question and are responsible, directly or indirectly, for the selection of the overseas suppliers that produce the cargo, the cargo consolidators that pack it and make transportation arrangements, and land and ocean transportation providers. Realizing the importance of improving its cargo risk-assessment system, DHS is reportedly engaged in an initiative—sometimes called the “10 plus 2” approach—to acquire better data. The initiative would, if fully adopted,

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require the U.S. importer of record to supply Customs and Border Protection with 10 key pieces of data about the import cargo 24 hours before that cargo is loaded on a U.S.-bound vessel. It would also require the ocean carrier to provide 2 additional pieces of necessary information. But an initial, pre-loading cargo risk assessment is not the only value of better, more relevant shipment data. As citizens of New Orleans, where Hurricane Katrina so recently produced a particularly painful object lesson in how important it is to be able to recover quickly from a disaster, you can readily appreciate that the data provided for the pre-shipping cargo risk assessment could well have an important second use. In the event that one or more containers were used in a terrorist attack, a rapid review of the relevant shipment data could be critical for making a post-event evaluation of what happened, and for determining what other cargos to allow into U.S. ports in the aftermath. In short, data collected for both pre-shipping risk assessment and postevent recovery planning is vital to protecting our nation, while at the same time assuring the free ﬂow of America’s international ocean commerce. And so, two rather straightforward implications follow: First, that the collection of relevant shipment data, its appropriate use, and its secure maintenance is going to put an increasing—but necessary—burden on U.S. importers to timely collect and provide the key data. Second, ocean transportation intermediaries, the ﬁrms that consolidate and take responsibility for a signiﬁcant amount of America’s import cargo, are going to ﬁnd themselves under increasing scrutiny as part of this dataimprovement initiative. It’s going to become a national security concern, not just a regulatory legal concern, that we can identify who these intermediaries are, what cargo they’re taking responsibility for, and what their legal status is. So, in scanning this one small (but critical) section of the maritime security horizon, I feel conﬁdent in saying that in the not-very-distant future, ocean transportation intermediaries—and the shippers that use them, and the ocean carriers who contract to carry cargo with them—will ﬁnd it essential to be certain that intermediary licensing and bonding requirements have been fully complied with.

INLAND FREIGHT INFRASTRUCTURE Beyond assuring that our nation’s imports and exports are safe and secure, there is still the issue of being able to get them to and from the vessels on which they cross the seas. Just last month, President Bush appointed a new Secretary of Transportation, Mary E. Peters. Secretary Peters brings to her new job over 20 years of experience with difﬁcult transportation challenges, including, in particular, those related to America’s highway system. She now commands nearly

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60,000 employees, a budget of almost $62 million dollars, and a mission to help maintain and improve the safety, reliability, and efﬁciency of America’s transportation system. That’s a very tall order. In the next month or two, Secretary Peters will probably have the opportunity to review a transportation planning document entitled “A National Strategy for the United States Marine Transportation System,” which is currently in draft form undergoing ﬁnal revisions and polishing at the staff level. That document will include a description of the major trends and challenges that our marine transportation system faces—aging infrastructure, productivity constraints, lack of coordinated planning, threats to safety, security and environmental quality, and—perhaps most important—a lack of public awareness of the importance of the maritime transportation system and of the impending crisis we face in maintaining and expanding the system to meet expected future trade growth. Because political commitment to ﬁnding and funding solutions so often depends on a public awareness of the nature and extent of the problem to be addressed, I believe it’s important that transportation and international trade experts read the National Strategy for the U.S. Maritime Transportation System when the ﬁnal version is released. And I’d further urge you to bring it to the attention of your local, state, and national political leaders. In a similar vein, we at the Federal Maritime Commission have noticed new types of agreements—nontraditional in focus and innovative in approach—being ﬁled with our agency. These new-style agreements among terminal operators and between neighboring ports are designed to allow and encourage cooperation on projects to reduce trafﬁc congestion, advance environmental clean-up measures, and investigate ways to fund freight infrastructure improvements. So far these new-style agreements have tended to focus on Southern California, with some interesting innovative agreements covering a broader range of port areas that deal with organizing and running chassis pools. But as these new agreements—aimed, as I said, at increasing transportation efﬁciency, combating congestion, enhancing the local environment, and improving port-related infrastructure—take off, I expect them to offer a model to other regions facing similar problems. So, when I see our national strategic planners looking at the maritime transportation system in terms of public-private partnerships, and in my own backyard see the innovative approaches being taken by public port authorities and private sector entities, I conclude that looking to the private sector, rather than just the legislative branch, for planning and investment in maritime transportation, is likely to prove an important new direction in the years ahead. A major challenge lies ahead, I’m afraid, in translating the broad and somewhat abstract national maritime transportation strategy into speciﬁc, concrete projects with adequate funding. So, I’m hoping our new DOT Secretary will take a central role in helping assure that happens. And I hope Congress and the other executive departments will give Secretary Peters the support she needs and deserves.

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THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE Finally, let me offer a few brief observations about my own regulatory realm, international liner shipping. As you may know, the European Union (“EU”) recently voted to radically revise the legal treatment of liner shipping in the European trades. Two years from now, in October 2008, the EU will end what they call the “bloc exemption” for liner shipping companies to collectively set and discuss rates. What the precise dimensions of carrier collective activity will be at that point is still under discussion—and open for public comment. The European Commission’s Directorate for Competition (their equivalent, roughly speaking, of our Department of Justice Antitrust Division) has promised to offer “guidelines” sometime in 2008. Because the EU has always approached the regulation of liner shipping in its own distinct way—more legalistic and confrontational than our more pragmatic and consensus-based approach—the decision to remove the existing exemption from standard competition policy was not unexpected. And, as a result, the existence of two distinct regulatory regimes for international liner shipping can be expected after October 2008. So, for the moment, it appears that we may soon see—in the European trades—the beginning of an interesting experiment in the economics of liner shipping. It appears likely that Europe and the U.S. will both maintain a limited antitrust exemption for operational agreements among carriers; the U.S. will continue to provide a similar exemption for public port authorities and marine terminal operators; but the Europeans will no longer allow immunity for collective trade-lane agreements with authority to discuss rates. It isn’t yet clear what such ocean carriers might yet be allowed to discuss—and I suppose it won’t be until the promised guidelines are issued. In the U.S. and throughout the rest of the world—including, most notably, our major Asian trading partners—rate discussion agreements likely will remain. In 1998, Congress—following detailed negotiations among U.S. shippers, port authorities, maritime labor and ocean carriers—passed the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (“OSRA”), which further limited the immunity granted to ocean carriers, and introduced provisions that essentially eliminated conference contracts in favor of conﬁdential contracts offered by individual lines. The previous problem of delay and bureaucracy associated with the conference contracting process disappeared as well. So, by enacting OSRA, Congress in effect modernized the antitrust provisions of the Shipping Act, introducing efﬁciency-enhancing regulatory reforms, especially in the areas of contract negotiation and carrier pricing. It also introduced new elements of regulatory ﬂexibility that allows and permits the Commission to introduce further pro-competitive reforms as warranted. And, OSRA’s successful implementation reduced tensions between shippers and carriers and helped foster an environment supportive of their cooperation in the areas I mentioned earlier—maritime security and the promotion of a modern and efﬁcient maritime transportation system.

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It is going to be interesting to see what happens in the European liner trades in 2009 and 2010. But (and if this is a biased perspective, it’s a bias informed by long and diverse experience), it seems to me that OSRA is working well, Congress’s goals are being met, and our major Asian trade partners—including China, Japan and Singapore—support U.S. style expert agency regulation over the soon-to-be-tested European approach. So, I believe that for the foreseeable future the likely course, and frankly the more prudent one, will be to keep OSRA and use its built-in reform process as needed. Let me conclude these remarks by reiterating how pleased I am to have been invited back to New Orleans, and thanking you for your kind attention.

STATE DEPARTMENT PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA Maureen O’C. Walker Acting Deputy Director, Ofﬁce of Oceans Affairs U.S. Statement to the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and Law of the Sea New York, New York May 10, 2001*

Thank you, Co-Chairs, for the opportunity to address the Informal Consultative Process on piracy and armed robbery at sea. We believe that governments acting regionally and through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) are to be commended for the scope and the breadth of the activity undertaken to combat violence against mariners and shipping. Mr. Co-Chairs, in addition to the IMO activities, the International Maritime Bureau, as well as regional organizations and individual countries, are working to implement the spirit of these IMO instruments and other arrangements. In an effort to be of assistance we have prepared a background paper on many of these efforts. That paper, which includes a number of helpful websites, is located in the back of the room. There appears to be a strong commitment to address piracy. This is evident in the activity within IMO and the range of actions enumerated in the Secretary-General’s report. The UNGA LOS Resolution has called for these actions. Despite these best efforts, Mr. Co-Chairs, the problem persists and may be getting worse. Much more must be done at the national, regional, and global levels in order to suppress this modern threat to international peace and security, as described by the panel. In this connection we believe that it is imperative that *

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governments consider taking the actions identiﬁed in paragraphs 209–223 of the Secretary-General’s report (A/56/58). In our view there are three ways that this can be undertaken. First, national governments should consider establishing inter-ministerial bodies to draw up action plans for preventing such attacks, as well as plans for steps to be taken in the event of an attack. Second, surveillance efforts should be augmented. Third, port security should be enhanced through better training in law enforcement and the ability to identify phantom ships. On the matter of deﬁnitions, not all of these attacks on the high seas or in an EEZ can be classiﬁed as traditional acts of piracy, over which all states may exercise jurisdiction. When they occur in port or at anchorage they are more likely proscribed and should be punishable by local criminal law. When the acts endanger the safety of navigation and occur on board foreign ﬂag ships while underway in the territorial sea, international straits, or international waters, these acts are frequently neither proscribed nor punishable by the criminal law of the coastal state. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, with its Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome March 10, 1988, was adopted under the IMO’s auspices. These instruments can ﬁll many of the jurisdictional gaps highlighted when the acts endanger the safety of international navigation and occur on board national or foreign ﬂag ships while underway in the territorial sea, international straits, or international waters. The Convention requires states parties to criminalize such acts under national law and to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of their perpetrators. While the Convention has been in force since March 1, 1992, many states in whose waters these acts are occurring are not yet a party. We join the urgent call of others for affected states to adhere to the Rome Convention and its protocol, and to implement its provisions. (See Paragraphs 217–222 of the Secretary-General’s report). The ICP should endorse the UNGA’s call for states that have not done so to consider adhering to the Rome Convention and its protocol and to implement its provisions. The elements of legislation necessary to implement the Rome Convention’s obligations should be identiﬁed. This is the approach that was taken for the 1988 Vienna Drug Convention. While we recognize the impending urgency of the calls for action, the U.S. also acknowledges that developing countries cannot deal with this on their own. Paragraph 223 of the Secretary-General’s report addresses technical assistance. Bilateral and multilateral assistance must begin to address these needs. We believe that this process, which is designed to facilitate coordination and cooperation among UN agencies to promote peaceful uses of the seas, can play a role in alerting donor agencies to this issue and raise awareness in the developing world that such requests should be given a priority by them. UNDP and other agencies must begin to

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appreciate the fact that developing countries need support in addressing two issues: enhancing enforcement capability, and implementation of port security measures. Donor institutions should be encouraged to engage in a dialogue with developing countries to assess the needs identiﬁed to address piracy and report their ﬁndings to the Secretary-General. Capacity can be increased in the developing world to suppress piracy and armed robbery at sea through increased force protection and enhancement of local maritime law enforcement efforts. An increased presence in these locations by cooperating navies and maritime law enforcement vessels may be needed to supplement these efforts. In that connection, serious consideration should be given by states sharing borders in areas threatened by piracy to establish bilateral/regional cooperation arrangements, as suggested in paragraph 214 of the Secretary-General’s report. As piracy and armed robbery at sea are just one aspect of international crime, including transnational organized crime, coordination with the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) could enhance regional training efforts. The FBI has expanded its cooperative programs with the police of up to 44 nations. This includes an important training component. In the past ﬁve years more than 3,000 international trainees were trained by the FBI in the U.S., and nearly 15,000 were trained in other countries. We have requested that the FBI and U.S. Coast Guard provide representatives to serve on our delegation, and they have graciously complied. Gary Swinkey and Eric Runnels are fully conversant about those training programs. Delegations interested in pursuing questions on training opportunities are encouraged to take advantage of their presence. The combined efforts of the Department of State and U.S. federal law enforcement agencies led to the establishment in 1995 of the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary, and more recently another facility in Bangkok, Thailand. In addition, preparations for the opening of another branch of the Academy in Botswana are underway. Consideration should be given to utilizing the Academy to provide specialized training on such issues as organized crime and the investigative process. In that connection we commend Scotland Yard for taking the lead in developing the IMO’s Draft Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. More attention should be paid to vessel tracking in terms of current technology. Home port veriﬁcation should also be studied. Article 110 of the Law of the Sea Convention provides a basis for boarding vessels ﬂying questionable ﬂags. Consideration should be given to increasing the onus on Flag States to make sure they do not register stolen vessels. There are a number of ways to improve port security so that ofﬁcials can prevent acts of armed robbery against ships at anchor or in port, identify stolen vessels, and assist in the apprehension of the criminals. The experience of Brazil is instructive and we commend the Brazilian authorities on their success. We would note the following: Port personnel need training, from the Captain of the Port, to the dock workers. The most comprehensive training for Captains of the Port is at the

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World Maritime University, Malmo, Sweden. The two-year course offered at this institution is world-renowned. The U.S. Agency for International Development has advised that it can fund requests for attendance at this University by developing countries if the request is identiﬁed as a priority. The Coast Guard is available to teach and instruct law enforcement tactics and port security measures and enhancements to member nations. This can serve to reduce and mitigate the piracy threat. Member nations may send their personnel to the United States for training, or the Coast Guard can send international training detachments to member nations. Information on other training opportunities should be identiﬁed and made available to developing countries. We know that efforts are being made to do this, and in particular we commend the constructive efforts of the government of Japan. Ports often have to deal with the phantom ship phenomenon. We understand that the IMO is expected to consider at its MSC June 2001 meeting a proposal from Hong Kong, China, that the IMO Ship Identiﬁcation Number be visibly welded on the stern of all vessels required to possess an IMO number. This could be of considerable help to port authorities. Finally, Mr. Co-Chairs, we want to draw attention to the fact that we have prepared an additional background paper on the issue of vandalism to scientiﬁc equipment that we alluded to earlier in the week. It is in the back of the room.

INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND COORDINATION STRATEGY FOR THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY United States Department of State November 2005*

INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND COORDINATION STRATEGY TO ENHANCE MARITIME SECURITY I. Introduction The maritime domain encompasses trade routes, communication links, and natural resources vital to the global economy and the well-being of people in the United States and around the world. In today’s globalized world, events beyond our borders have an undeniable impact on United States’ interests. Attacks on ships, ports, or maritime transportation infrastructure by terrorists, rogue nations, or transnational criminal organizations can, within a frighteningly short time, produce terrible destruction and signiﬁcantly dis*

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rupt the ﬂow of international trade, upon which we all depend. No one nation can single-handedly secure every ocean and every waterway around the world. Because the oceans play an indispensable role in the safety, security, and economic stability of the international community, all nations have a vital interest in ensuring that the maritime domain remains secure and open for the free and legitimate use of all. Public and private entities must work in concert to succeed. Accordingly, in order to enhance global maritime security, the Department of State will leverage its diplomatic resources and inﬂuence, while coordinating closely with other components of the United States government, to promote and enhance close cooperation among sovereign nations, international and regional organizations, and the maritime private sector, including manufacturers, shippers, ship owners, seafarers, dockside workers, truckers, retailers, and recreational boaters.

II. Strategic Environment: The United States— A Maritime Nation in a Globalized World Covering 70 percent of the Earth’s surface, the world’s oceans and waterways offer all nation states a network of enormous importance to their security and prosperity. These sea-roads have been a primary driver in the globalization of commercial interests, allowing all nations to participate in the ever-expanding global marketplace. This maritime transportation system is vast, serving more than 100,000 ocean-going ships, as well as tens of millions of workboats, ﬁshing vessels and recreational vessels. Every nation, including the United States, depends on an efﬁcient and open maritime transportation system of waterways, ports, and intermodal connections to carry people and cargo to, from, and along its shores. More than 40 percent of the world’s merchant ﬂeet enters United States harbors in any one year. Approximately 30,000 containers enter United States ports every day, and nearly 95 percent of all international commerce enters the United States through the nation’s 361 public and private ports. Over 80 percent of the world’s trade travels by water. The Maritime domain plays a critical role in the U.S. and global economies. The United States now faces myriad nontraditional, asymmetric, and unpredictable threats from state and non-state actors, as well as from terrorist and transnational criminal organizations. Globalization has vastly increased the range and potential effects of such threats. Appendix A summarizes the major threats to the maritime domain. With more than 98,000 miles of shoreline and 3.5 million square miles of water within our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the United States is particularly susceptible to attack from the maritime domain. The maritime domain presents a broad array of potential targets—such as piers, power or chemical plants, reﬁneries, passenger terminals, military bases, bridges, locks, dams, and nearby

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facilities—that ﬁt terrorists’ objectives of inﬂicting mass casualties, major economic disruption, and signiﬁcant psychological distress. While the oceans’ role as highways and facilitators of commerce grows, waterways have increasingly become both targets and conveyances for hostile, dangerous, and illicit activities. The openness that makes the maritime domain so important to international commerce also represents a great vulnerability. The vastness of the oceans, as well as the great length of shorelines, provides both concealment and numerous access points to land. Capitalizing on the relative ease and anonymity of movement by ship through the maritime domain, terrorists, criminal organizations, and rogue nations may smuggle or attempt to smuggle weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms, narcotics, and human beings. Where possible, they may use legitimate maritime business as fronts for these activities. Because twothirds of the world’s people live within 240 miles of a seacoast, large numbers of people are potentially subject to threats from these groups that exploit the maritime domain. An attack on a strategic point in the maritime domain, such as the Panama Canal, the locks of the St. Lawrence Seaway, or the Suez Canal, could devastate people and economies worldwide. The disruption of cross-border cargo deliveries to the United States following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the closure of West Coast ports during a major labor dispute in 2002, underscore the vital role that international trade and transport play in the United States and world economy. It has been estimated that the West Coast port shutdown cost the United States economy billions of dollars. The Brookings Institute has estimated that a weapon of mass destruction or effect hidden in a container or in the mail could cause damage and disruption costing the United States economy as much as one trillion dollars. The United States is not alone in recognizing the vital importance of securing the maritime domain. Other nations have also begun to focus on the importance of maritime security. An effective global maritime security framework that harmonizes free trade and maritime security will uphold sovereignty, strengthen economies, enhance international partnerships, and secure the maritime domain from terrorism and other unlawful or hostile acts.

III. Strategic Goals To safeguard the maritime domain, the United States must forge cooperative partnerships and alliances with other nations, as well as with public and private stakeholders in the international community. We cannot and should not attempt to patrol every coastline, inspect every ship, screen every passenger, or peer into every container crossing the world’s oceans. To foster stronger partnerships within the international community, the United States

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must have a coordinated and consistent approach to building international support and cooperation to reinforce global maritime security. We will propose ideas, and encourage others to do the same. We will speak frankly. We will also listen carefully. We will work together. Security must be a team effort. Consistent with National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13, this strategy establishes the following strategic goals: • A coordinated policy for United States government maritime security activities with foreign governments, international and regional organizations, and the private sector. • Enhanced outreach to foreign governments, international and regional organizations, private sector partners, and the public abroad to solicit support for improved global maritime security.

The United States recognizes the inherent right of every nation, including our own, to defend itself, to protect its legitimate national interests, and to prevent unlawful exploitation of the maritime domain. The United States will foster cooperation within the international community through diplomacy and mutual assistance. The United States will also, when necessary, take all appropriate actions, consistent with U.S. and international law, to defend ourselves, our allies, and our national interests around the world.

IV. Strategic Intent The National Strategy for Maritime Security, along with its associated eight national plans, represents a multilayered approach and includes increased maritime domain awareness as well as enhanced prevention, protection, and recovery capabilities. We will continue to strengthen our ability to detect and deter illicit activities in the maritime domain, to defend ourselves and our allies, and to recover from or to assist others in recovering from any terrorist or hostile act against U.S. interests or the interests of our allies or key trading partners. We will do so by enlisting the cooperation and support of our allies and partners, both public and private, throughout the world. The United States’ approach to ensuring the security and safety of the maritime domain, including maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels—like the maritime sector itself—is broad, taking advantage of all aspects of United States inﬂuence, including diplomatic, military, law enforcement, and regulatory efforts. We will promote global maritime security based on the rule of law, enforced by sovereign states, and supported by international and regional organizations, as well as the private sector. The goal is to protect international trade, economic cooperation, and

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legitimate maritime activities of all kinds. To achieve this goal, we will cooperate and collaborate with other governments, international and regional organizations, international business, and all those who work on, depend on, or use the maritime domain.

V. Strategic Execution and Objectives The Department of State, in close coordination with other Departments and Agencies in the United States government with responsibilities and authorities for security of the maritime domain, will lead active international outreach and engagement to enhance global maritime security. These efforts will be aligned with domestic outreach efforts and activities to ensure the development of consistent messages and materials. Comprehensive security of the maritime domain must be approached in partnership not only with foreign governments and international organizations, but also with the international business community, which relies upon security and efﬁciency in the movement of vessels, people, and goods. The United States will continue to explore new avenues and opportunities for outreach and cooperation, both domestically and internationally, as well as support and expand upon the work that has already begun in this critical area of our national security efforts. The United States will seek early dialogue with international partners when developing maritime security policy initiatives, and will maintain regular contact to discuss implementation and ensure effectiveness. The goal is mutually supportive policies, focused on keeping maritime systems secure and recognizing that a variety of approaches, based on different physical circumstances as well as different political, legal, and economic institutions, may foster security of the maritime domain. We will work continuously in the United States and abroad to identify best practices and to communicate them to others, reﬂecting the priorities of the United States and our partners. Foreign governments and industry ofﬁcials will be provided clear and consistent United States government positions on programs and initiatives related to maritime security, as coordinated through the Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee. Appendix B lists ongoing United States government maritime security initiatives. This annex will be updated regularly to reﬂect the latest United States maritime security policies and initiatives. Appendix C lists international, regional, and industry organizations that support efforts to enhance maritime security in the international community and with which the United States will continue to work closely in advancing global maritime security. In order to achieve the strategic goals of this International Outreach and Coordination Strategy, the Department of State (through the Ofﬁce of Transportation Policy in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs and the

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Ofﬁce of Oceans Affairs in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientiﬁc Affairs), in close coordination with all U.S. government components with equities in securing the maritime domain, will pursue the following strategic objectives: • Establish uniﬁed, consistent U.S. positions on maritime security programs and initiatives for U.S. bilateral and multilateral exchanges. • Emphasize the importance of maritime security as a key priority in U.S. international policy. • Ensure the full integration of international law in the advancement of global maritime security at international meetings and exchanges. • Optimize the use of meetings and other exchanges with countries, international and regional organizations, and private sector groups to advance maritime security. • Build partnerships with other countries and the maritime community to identify and reach out to regional and international organizations in order to advance global maritime security. • Coordinate U.S. and international technical assistance to promote effective maritime security in developing nations and critical regions. • Coordinate a uniﬁed message on maritime security for public diplomacy. • Provide U.S missions abroad with guidance to enable them to build support for U.S. maritime security initiatives with host governments, key private-sector partners, and the general public abroad.

VI. Conclusion The security of the maritime domain is a global issue. The United States is committed to working closely with our allies and partners around the world to ensure that lawful private and public activities in the maritime domain are protected against attack and criminal or otherwise unlawful or hostile exploitation. Our allies and trading partners recognize the importance the United States places on maritime security, and we will work closely with them to develop effective international maritime security programs. The United States will continue to expand our working partnerships with all who share the goal of a secure and prosperous international trading community. Many departments and agencies of the United States government share the challenge of engaging our allies and partners, as well as working with appropriate international and regional organizations and private sector groups in order to secure United States maritime interests around the globe. The Department of State will coordinate with and support other departments and agencies in developing and communicating to foreign partners a uniﬁed and consistent message regarding global maritime security and United States maritime security programs and initiatives.

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PREVENTING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) TERRORISM IN THE MARITIME SUPPLY CHAIN Thomas Lehrman Director, Ofﬁce of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Remarks at Maritime Security Expo New York, New York September 20, 2006*

INTRODUCTION Five years after 9/11, who among us cannot remember where he or she was on that day? We harbor no illusions that those who attacked us ﬁve years ago cease to threaten us now. We have been assured by the same terrorists who planned the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that they will use nuclear and biological weapons against us, should they ﬁnd a way to acquire them. We also know that the enemy we face adapts to our defenses; while aircraft may have served as the preferred weapon of choice ﬁve years ago, tomorrow they may seek to slip a weapon of mass destruction into a container ship headed for one of our ports and then onto the streets of our cities. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear—in the hands of a terrorist pose the single gravest threat to international peace and security today. The United States government is determined to work with its foreign partners, both in government and in the private sector, to strengthen our national and collective defenses against this preeminent threat.

OUR STRATEGIC APPROACH SINCE 9/11 Since 9/11, the United States has taken a strategic and comprehensive approach to combating WMD terrorism and protecting the maritime domain from these and other twenty-ﬁrst century threats. Let me brieﬂy summarize the elements of the various strategies that touch on these areas. In 2002, the President announced the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, which established a comprehensive approach for preventing the world’s most dangerous weapons from falling into the hands of the world’s most dangerous actors. Our National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction establishes the following three pillars: • Robust counter-proliferation • Policies and capabilities • Strengthened nonproliferation measures *

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WMD CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT PREPAREDNESS To integrate these pillars effectively, the strategy also called for strengthened intelligence capabilities, research and development, targeted strategies against proliferants, and enhanced international cooperation. It also emphasized the importance of bringing to bear all three pillars—counter-proliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management—against the WMD terrorist threat. In 2005, the president announced the National Strategy for Maritime Security, which outlined a strategic approach to protecting the maritime domain, including from the threats of both WMD and terrorism. This strategy set forth four strategic objectives: • • • •

Prevent terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts Protect maritime-related population centers and critical infrastructure Minimize damage and expedite recovery Safeguard the oceans and their resources

The National Strategy for Maritime Security speciﬁcally identiﬁes the important connection with the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and outlines a vision for bringing together federal government maritime security programs and initiatives into a comprehensive approach involving all appropriate federal, state, local, and private sector entities. Equally important, it contains a strategy for cooperating and coordinating our efforts with key allies worldwide. Most recently, the President signed a new National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, which identiﬁes the central importance of combating WMD terrorism by integrating our counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation tools to confront and defeat the nexus of WMD and terrorist actors. This new strategy emphasizes the following six areas as critical elements in a comprehensive approach to combating the WMD terrorist threat: • Determining terrorists’ intentions, capabilities, and plans to develop or acquire WMD • Denying terrorists access to the materials, expertise, and other enabling capabilities required to develop WMD • Deterring terrorists from employing WMD • Detecting and disrupting terrorists’ attempted movement of WMD-related materials, weapons, and personnel • Preventing and responding to a WMD-related terrorist attack • Deﬁning the nature and source of a terrorist-employed WMD device

The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the National Strategy for Maritime Security, and the National Strategy to Combat

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Terrorism demonstrate the comprehensive approach the president has outlined to ensure that our government harness all elements of national power and that the United States works closely with allies and partners to protect and defend the maritime domain from today’s most serious national and international security threats.

TURNING STRATEGY INTO CAPABILITIES The United States government has not rested on strategy alone; it has taken numerous proactive steps to implement these new strategies, establishing new initiatives, programs, and partnerships to protect the global maritime supply chain from the threat of WMD terrorism. Let me cite just a few examples of the various initiatives the Department of State is working to advance. The Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has taken a leadership role in protecting the global maritime supply chain through the Container Security Initiative (CSI), a program that places U.S. ofﬁcers overseas to detect and inspect high-risk containers in ports abroad. CBP has steadily expanded this program and has also established the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), a public-private partnership that strengthens supply chain security practices among private sector actors. The Department of Energy has established the Megaports Initiative to install radiation detection equipment at foreign seaports to enhance host governments’ capabilities to detect, deter, and interdict illicit trafﬁcking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. The Megaports Initiative also works in close partnership with CBP to strengthen our ability to detect nuclear and radiological threats in global container trafﬁc. And, more recently, the Department of Homeland Security’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Ofﬁce (DNDO), established in 2005 by National Security Presidential Directive, was charged with developing an effective global nuclear and radiological detection architecture to protect the homeland, an effort that offers an excellent opportunity to strengthen our partnerships with our friends and allies abroad. U.S. efforts to strengthen maritime supply chain security have extended beyond port security and radiation detection. In 2003, the President launched the Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI, to strengthen our capabilities to interdict shipments by land, air, and sea of WMD, related materials, and their delivery systems. The PSI now includes more than 75 nations, and PSI participants have helped stop more than 30 high-risk shipments, including centrifuge parts bound for Libya’s nuclear program. That interdiction, in cooperation with the UK, Germany, and Italy helped lead Libya to make its historic decision to abandon its chemical and nuclear weapons programs, and helped unravel and

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dismantle the A.Q. Khan network. The State Department has worked closely with a variety of federal agencies to advance the PSI. The Department of Defense has played an active leadership role in hosting and coordinating PSI Operational Experts Group exercises and developing new concepts of operation for interdicting WMD, including in the maritime domain. Financial enforcement has also played a critical role in protecting the maritime supply chain from WMD and terrorist threats. The Department of State is working closely with the Treasury Department to deter, detect, and disrupt the ﬁnancial ﬂows that underpin trade in WMD and can aid and abet terrorist and organized crime activities in the maritime supply chain. In support of these strategies, the United States has worked with a wide range of international partners, in both the government and private sectors, to block the assets of entities engaged in illicit activities and highlight the risks they pose to the integrity of our international ﬁnancial system upon which our global supply chain relies.

REDUCING WMD TERRORISM RISK THROUGH A LAYERED DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH Defending the United States and our international partners from a covert nuclear or biological attack by terrorists presents many operational and technical challenges. Because we cannot afford to fail in this mission, we must embrace a strategic approach capable of reducing this risk to its absolute minimum. We also know that no matter how effective, no single capability can provide a fail-safe protection from a WMD terrorist attack. To reduce our collective risk from WMD terrorism, we must develop with our partners a layered defense-in-depth. A layered defense, or defense-indepth, is a strategic concept employed in a diverse range of security-related ﬁelds, from missile defense to cybersecurity. Its central premise, especially applicable to combating WMD terrorism, is that no single layer or capability can provide us with sufﬁcient protection against a determined and adaptable terrorist adversary. However, a terrorist or a terrorist facilitator who has to overcome multiple defenses in the course of his attack plan is more likely to be detected or deterred or to fail during the attempt. An effective layered defense should focus not merely on preventing terrorists from linking up with those facilitators that would provide them with WMD and related enabling capabilities; it should also take active defensive measures to detect and disrupt existing linkages between terrorists and those that might facilitate a WMD attack. Working with our international partners will be essential to deploy and sustain a layered defense-in-depth against WMD terrorism, because terrorist plots and conspiracies have often involved multiple jurisdictions, with the terrorist attackers, weapons designers, transport agents, ﬁnanciers, and other facilitators all operating in different countries.

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THE GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT NUCLEAR TERRORISM: SECURING THE MARITIME SUPPLY CHAIN FROM NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS To confront the growing risk of nuclear terrorism, President Bush and President Putin announced together on July 15 of this year the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, a new effort whose purpose is to bring together a growing network of like-minded partner nations to accelerate the development of partnership capacity to combat this threat in a determined and systematic fashion. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism takes a strategic and comprehensive approach to combating all aspects of the nuclear terrorism challenge, from strengthening physical protection of nuclear material, to detecting and disrupting its movement by or to terrorists, to consequence management in the aftermath of a dirty bomb or nuclear attack. The ﬁrst meeting of initial partner nations participating in this new initiative will take place this October, and both Presidents Bush and Putin have called for outreach to industry and the public to secure full implementation of the initiative’s objectives. As the Global Initiative develops, we look forward to working more closely with many of you here today to strengthen our national and global capabilities to combat the most serious security threat we face today: a nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist.

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: AN EMERGING GLOBAL BEST PRACTICE In a post-Cold War era, as Secretary Rice has articulated, the gravest threats we face increasingly result not only from nation-states, but also from the activities of non-state actors; terrorist, criminal, or groups otherwise engaged in destabilizing, transnational illicit activity. Our terrorist adversaries seek not only to kill innocent civilians, but they have also targeted our economic infrastructure with the goal of reducing our capacity and will to continue the ﬁght. Because over 90 percent of global trade in goods is transported in containers through the maritime supply chain, ports and related infrastructure are an inviting target. We also know illicit non-state WMD trafﬁckers, such as A.Q. Khan, have used the maritime supply chain to transport WMD materials and delivery systems, and the PSI is an important initiative that our government has taken to confront this threat. Continuously strengthening our capabilities to confront and defeat terrorists and non-state actors operating in the seams of the global maritime supply chain and outside the rule of law will demand new and adaptive public-private partnerships. The partnerships must be capable of detecting illicit and terrorist activity at an earlier stage of development, and enable governments to

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accelerate the appropriate enforcement response. As the work of many agencies has already shown, many public-private partnerships are already in place and have worked well. We must strengthen and extend these partnerships in new directions to deter, detect, and take conﬁdent and effective action against terrorists and non-state actors involved in the WMD trade. The private ﬁrms that own, operate, and insure ports and the shipping and logistics providers that work with them recognize that promoting best security practices across the global supply chain not only protects our national security, it protects their individual corporate reputations, enhances their bottom lines, and promotes our collective economic security. Public-private partnerships have in a short period of time become a new “best practice,” beneﬁting both government and industry, and we invite private sector entities to consider new ways in which such partnerships can protect the maritime supply chain, and more broadly the global supply chain, from emerging twenty-ﬁrst century threats.

DEPLOYING EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES TO REDUCE WMD TERRORISM RISK Reducing WMD terrorism risk in the maritime supply chain depends on more than just partnerships, strategic clarity, and bigger security budgets. It requires the research and development of new technologies, the application of those new technologies into tested systems, and the incorporation of those systems into innovative concepts of operation that interoperate seamlessly with the security capabilities of our trading partners abroad. So let me commend the many contractors, engineers, and suppliers here today who are working hard to translate security innovations in ﬁelds such as enterprise risk management, WMD detection systems, biometric identity veriﬁcation tools, GPS location technology, RFID technologies, and wireless networking into holistic systems that governments and port operators can use on a daily basis to increase our situational awareness, reduce security risk, and keep our citizens safe from even the most adaptive adversaries we might face. Let me also take a moment to emphasize the importance of researching, developing, and deploying technologies and systems that can facilitate the real-time sharing of information among and between international partners. If 9/11 taught us only one lesson, it was that connecting the dots among and between those involved in a terrorist plot requires agencies across our federal, state, and local governments to share information more rapidly and to enable conﬁdent action before terrorists can achieve their goals. As the recent terrorist attempt in the UK showed, averting the next attack against the United States or against one of our allies may well depend on our ability to share information in real-time, not only within our own government but also with our foreign partners, either in government or in the private sector. Securing the maritime supply chain in the twenty-ﬁrst century will also depend to a large degree on our ability to identify threats and share that information rap-

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idly with those domestic and foreign partners in a position to respond most effectively.

MEETING THE SECURITY CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION We marvel today at the communications and transportation innovations of the last ten years, as well as the international legal and regulatory frameworks that have enabled what we commonly refer to as “globalization.” We recognize that the maritime supply chain forms just one element of an increasingly seamless intermodal and global supply chain. This global supply chain reaches well beyond the maritime domain and interconnects with land, air, cyber, and financial domains, weaving its way, often unnoticed, through our international, national, state, provincial, and local jurisdictions. As this increasingly global and interdependent supply chain has come into form, governments have often played catch-up to ensure that terrorists, WMD trafﬁckers, and others engaged in transnational illicit activity are denied access to this precious global resource on which our national and economic security increasingly depends. As we reﬂect on this challenge, let us remember that this resource will not secure itself; it will require energy and innovation to develop the transformational partnerships between governments and with the private sector to ensure that market-based incentives are aligned, best practices are rewarded, and protective measures are in place to deny bad actors access to both a target and a safe haven they have shown a clear intent to exploit. This conference, in this great city, is surely the place to build on and sustain this all-important work.

ACCESSION TO THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND RATIFICATION OF THE 1994 AGREEMENT AMENDING PART XI OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION [Senate Treaty Document 103–39]

John D. Negroponte Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of State Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee September 27, 2007*

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“the convention”) and the 1994 Agreement *

http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2007/NegroponteTestimony070927.pdf

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relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 10, 1982 (“the 1994 agreement”). At my conﬁrmation hearing earlier this year, I reminded the committee that the Senate conﬁrmed me twenty years ago as Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientiﬁc Affairs. Shortly thereafter, under the ﬁrst President Bush, we began to work on revising the deep seabed mining section of the convention to address the ﬂaws President Reagan had correctly identiﬁed so that we could join the convention. That effort succeeded, resulting in the 1994 agreement overhauling the deep seabed mining regime, as I will explain in greater detail. Since my ﬁrst involvement with the Law of the Sea Convention, I have had the privilege to serve the United States in other assignments that have only strengthened my support for this treaty. As Ambassador to the United Nations, I learned that other countries look to the United States for leadership on oceans issues such as maritime security—a role that is lessened without U.S. accession to the convention. As Ambassador to Iraq, I saw ﬁrst-hand the importance of navigational freedoms for deploying and sustaining our forces in combat zones, and how the convention serves as a foundation for our partnerships in the Proliferation Security Initiative. Most recently, as Director of National Intelligence, I was reminded how the convention strengthens our ability to carry out intelligence activities that other countries might seek to restrain. Mr. Chairman, these experiences compel me to endorse—most enthusiastically and emphatically—the president’s urgent request that the Senate approve the convention, as modiﬁed by the 1994 Agreement. As the president said in his May 15 statement, joining will serve the national security interests of the United States, secure U.S. sovereign rights over extensive marine areas, promote U.S. interests in the environmental health of the oceans, and give the United States a seat at the table when the rights essential to our interests are debated and interpreted. HISTORY From the earliest days of its history, the United States has relied on the bounty and the opportunity of the seas for sustenance, for trade and economic development, for defense, for communication, and for interaction with the rest of the world. Today, as the world’s strongest maritime power and a leader in global maritime trade and commerce, the United States has a compelling national interest in a stable international legal regime for the oceans. We have consistently sought balance between the interests of countries in controlling activities off their coasts and the interests of all countries in protecting freedom of navigation. The United States joined a group of law of the sea treaties in 1958, by which it is still bound. But those treaties left open some important issues. For example, they did not set forth the maximum breadth of the terri-

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torial sea, an issue of critical importance to U.S. freedom of navigation, and they did not set forth a procedure for providing legal certainty regarding the continental shelf. We therefore continued to pursue completion of a single, integrated law of the sea treaty that would attract near universal acceptance; the U.S. delegation played a very prominent role in the negotiating session that began under the Nixon administration and culminated in the 1982 convention. The resulting treaty was a victory for U.S. navigational, economic, and other interests, except for one important issue—deep seabed mining. Due to ﬂaws in the deep seabed mining chapter—Part XI of the convention—President Reagan decided not to sign the 1982 convention. However, the other aspects of the treaty were so favorable that President Reagan, in his Ocean Policy Statement in 1983, announced that the United States accepted, and would act in accordance with, the convention’s balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans—everything but deep seabed mining. He instructed the government to abide by, or as the case may be, to enjoy the rights accorded by the other provisions, and to encourage other countries to do likewise. As I mentioned earlier, the ﬁrst Bush administration agreed to participate in negotiations that modiﬁed Part XI in a legally binding manner, overcoming each of the objections that President Reagan had identiﬁed. The United States signed that agreement in 1994. The convention came into force that same year, and has since been joined by industrialized countries that shared the U.S. objections to the initial deep seabed mining chapter. There are now 155 parties to the convention, including almost all of our traditional allies. This administration expressed its strong support for the convention in testimony before this committee in the fall of 2003. Thereafter we worked closely with the committee to develop a proposed Resolution of Advice and Consent, which we continue to support, that addressed a number of issues, including those relating to U.S. military interests. Since then, our conviction has only grown: we must join the Law of the Sea Convention, and join it now, to take full advantage of the many beneﬁts it offers the United States and to avoid the increasing costs of being a non-party.

JOINING IS A WIN-WIN Joining is a win-win proposition. We will not have to change U.S. laws or practices or give up rights, and we will beneﬁt in a variety of ways. The United States already acts in accordance with the convention for a number of reasons: • First, as noted, we are party to a group of 1958 treaties that contain many of the same provisions as the convention. • Second, the United States heavily inﬂuenced the content of the 1982 convention, based on U.S. law, policy, and practice.

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• Finally, the treaty has been the cornerstone of U.S. oceans policy since 1983, when President Reagan instructed the executive branch to act in accordance with the convention’s provisions with the exception of deep seabed mining.

Thus, we are in the advantageous position in the case of this treaty that U.S. adherence to its terms is already time-tested and works well. At the same time, the United States would gain substantial beneﬁts from joining the convention. These can be summarized in terms of security, sovereignty, and sustainability.

SECURITY As the world’s foremost maritime power, our security interests are intrinsically linked to freedom of navigation. We have more to gain from legal certainty and public order in the world’s oceans than any other country. Our forces are deployed throughout the world, and we are engaged in combat operations in Central and Southwest Asia. The U.S. Armed Forces rely on the navigational rights and freedoms reﬂected in the convention for worldwide access to get to the ﬁght, sustain our forces during the ﬁght, and return home safely, without permission from other countries. In this regard, the convention secures the rights we need for U.S. military ships and the commercial ships that support our forces to meet national security requirements in four ways: • By limiting coastal states’ territorial seas—within which they exercise the most sovereignty—to 12 nautical miles • By affording our military and commercial vessels and aircraft necessary passage rights through other countries’ territorial seas and archipelagoes, as well as through straits used for international navigation (such as the critical right of submarines to transit submerged through such straits) • By setting forth maximum navigational rights and freedoms for our vessels and aircraft in the Exclusive Economic Zones of other countries and in the high seas • By afﬁrming the authority of U.S. warships and government ships to board stateless vessels on the high seas, which is a critically important element of maritime security operations, counter-narcotic operations, and anti-proliferation efforts, including the Proliferation Security Initiative

The United States has had a certain amount of success in promoting these provisions internationally as reﬂective of customary international law, as well as in enforcing them through operational challenges. However, these tools alone are not adequate to ensure the continued vitality of these rights. Customary law is not universally accepted and, in any event, changes over

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time—in this case, potentially to the detriment of our interests. There are increasing pressures from coastal states around the world to evolve the law of the sea in ways that would unacceptably alter the balance of interests struck in the convention. Operational challenges are inherently risky and resourceintensive. Joining the convention would put the navigational rights reﬂected in the convention on the ﬁrmest legal footing. We would have treaty rights rather than have to rely solely upon the acceptance of customary international law rights by other states or upon the threat or use of force. Securing these treaty rights and obtaining a seat at the table in treaty-based institutions would provide a safeguard against changes in state practice that could cause customary law to drift in an unfavorable direction. Moreover, joining would promote the willingness of other countries to cooperate with us on initiatives of great security importance, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.

SOVEREIGNTY Joining the convention would advance U.S. economic and resource interests. Recent Russian expeditions to the Arctic have focused attention on the resource-related beneﬁts of being a party to the convention. Because so much is at stake in vast areas of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, I will explain in some detail the convention’s provisions that govern these areas and why being a party would put the United States in a far better position in terms of maximizing its sovereign rights. The convention recognizes the sovereign rights of a coastal state over its continental shelf, which extends out to 200 nautical miles—and beyond, if it meets speciﬁc criteria. These rights include sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the continental shelf and exploiting its natural resources, including oil, gas, and other energy resources. U.S. interests are well served not only by the Convention’s detailed deﬁnition of the shelf (in contrast to the 1958 convention’s vague standard), but also by its procedures for gaining certainty regarding the shelf’s outer limits. Parties enjoy access to the expert body, whose technical recommendations provide the needed international recognition and legal certainty to the establishment of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Following such procedures, Russia made the ﬁrst submission (in 2001) to that expert body, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The commission found that Russia needed to collect additional data to substantiate its submission. Russia has announced that the data it collected this year support the claim that its continental shelf extends as far as the North Pole. Setting aside its recent ﬂag planting, which has only symbolic value, Russia’s continuing data collection in the Arctic reﬂects its commitment to maximizing its sovereign rights under the convention over energy resources in that region.

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Currently, as a non-party, the United States is not in a position to maximize its sovereign rights in the Arctic or elsewhere. We do not have access to the commission’s procedures for according international recognition and legal certainty to our extended shelf. And we have not been able to nominate an expert for election to the commission. Thus, there is no U.S. commissioner to review the detailed data submitted by other countries on their shelves. Norway has also made a submission to support its extended continental shelf in the Arctic, and Canada and Denmark are conducting surveys there to collect data for their submissions. The Commission has already made recommendations on submissions by Brazil and Ireland, and is considering several other submissions. Many more are expected in the coming months. The United States has one of the largest continental shelves in the world; in the Arctic, for example, our shelf could run as far as 600 miles from the coastline. However, as noted, we have no access to the commission, whose recommendations would facilitate the full exercise of our sovereign rights— whether we use them to explore and exploit natural resources, prevent other countries from doing so, or otherwise. In the absence of the international recognition and legal certainty that the convention provides, U.S. companies are unlikely to secure the necessary ﬁnancing and insurance to exploit energy resources on the extended shelf, and we will be less able to keep other countries from exploiting them. Joining the convention provides other economic beneﬁts: it also gives coastal states the right to claim an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) out to 200 nautical miles. That gives the United States, with its extensive coastline, the largest EEZ of any country in the world. In this vast area, we have sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing living and nonliving natural resources.

SUSTAINABILITY The convention also supports U.S. interests in the health of the world’s oceans and the living resources they contain. It addresses marine pollution from a variety of sources, including ocean dumping and operational discharges from vessels. The framework appropriately balances the interests of the coastal state in protection of the marine environment and its natural resources with the navigational rights and freedoms of all states. This framework, among other things, supports vital economic activities off the coast of the United States. Further, the United States has stringent laws regulating protection of the marine environment, and we would be in a stronger position as a party to the convention as we encourage other countries to follow suit. The convention also promotes the conservation of various marine resources. Indeed, U.S. ocean resource-related industries strongly support U.S. accession to the convention. U.S. ﬁshermen, for example, want their government to be in

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the strongest possible position to encourage other governments to hold their ﬁshermen to the same standards we are already following under the convention and under the Fish Stocks Agreement, which elaborates the convention’s provisions on straddling ﬁsh stocks and highly migratory ﬁsh stocks. Joining the convention provides other important beneﬁts that straddle the security, sovereignty, and sustainability categories. For example, its provisions protect laying and maintaining the ﬁber optic cables through which the modern world communicates, for both military and commercial purposes; for that reason, the U.S. telecommunications industry is a strong supporter of the convention.

WE NEED TO JOIN NOW Some may ask why, after the convention has been in force for thirteen years, there is an urgent need to join. There are compelling reasons why we need to accede to the convention now. Although the ﬁrst several years of the convention’s life were fairly quiet, its provisions are now being actively applied, interpreted, and developed. The convention’s institutions are up and running, and we—the country with the most to gain and lose on law of the sea issues—are sitting on the sidelines. For example, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (which is the technical body charged with addressing the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles) has received nine submissions and has made recommendations on two of them, without the participation of a U.S. commissioner. Recommendations made in that body could well create precedents, positive and negative, on the future outer limit of the U.S. shelf. We need to be on the inside to protect our interests. Moreover, in fora outside the convention, the provisions of the convention are also being actively applied. Our position as a non-party puts us in a far weaker position to advance U.S. interests than should be the case for our country. We also need to join now to lock in, as a matter of treaty law, the very favorable provisions we achieved in negotiating the convention. It would be risky to assume that we can preserve ad inﬁnitum the situation upon which the United States currently relies. As noted, there is increasing pressure from coastal states to augment their authority in a manner that would alter the balance of interests struck in the convention. We should secure these favorable treaty rights while we have the chance.

DEEP SEABED MINING One part of the convention deserves special attention, because, in its original version, it kept the United States and other industrialized countries from joining. Part XI of the convention, now modiﬁed by the 1994 Implementing Agreement, establishes a system for facilitating potential mining activities on

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the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction—speciﬁcally, the deep seabed beyond the continental shelf of any nation. The convention, as modiﬁed, meets our goal of guaranteed access by U.S. industry to deep seabed minerals under reasonable terms and conditions. Speciﬁcally, the convention sets forth the process by which mining ﬁrms can apply for and obtain access and exclusive legal rights to deep seabed mineral resources. The International Seabed Authority is responsible for overseeing such mining; it includes an assembly, open to all parties, and a 36member council. The authority’s role is limited to administering deep seabed mining of mineral resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction; it has no other authority over uses of the oceans or over other resources in the oceans. The council is the primary decision-making body, with responsibility for giving practical effect to the requirement for nondiscriminatory access to deep seabed minerals and for adopting rules for exploration and development. The 1994 agreement, which contains legally binding changes to the 1982 convention, fundamentally overhauls the deep seabed mining provisions in a way that satisﬁes each of the objections of the United States, as stated by President Reagan, and of other industrialized countries. President Reagan considered that those provisions would: deter future development of deep seabed mining; establish a decision-making process that would not give the United States a role that reﬂected or protected its interests; allow amendments to enter into force without the approval of the United States; provide for mandatory transfer of technology; allow national liberation movements to share in the beneﬁts of deep seabed mining; and not assure access of future qualiﬁed miners. The 1994 agreement overcomes these objections and ensures that the administration of deep seabed mining is based on free-market principles. Speciﬁcally, the agreement • Deletes the objectionable provisions on mandatory technology transfer • Ensures that market-oriented approaches are taken to the management of deep seabed minerals (e.g., by eliminating production controls), replacing the original Part XI’s centralized economic planning approach • Scales back the deep seabed mining institutions and links their activation and operation to actual development of interest in deep seabed mining • Guarantees the United States a permanent seat on the council, where substantive decisions are made by consensus—the effect of which is that any decision that would result in a substantive obligation on the United States or that would have ﬁnancial or budgetary implications would require U.S. consent • Ensures that the United States would need to approve the adoption of any amendment to the Part XI provisions and any distribution of deep seabed mining revenues accumulated under the convention • Recognizes the seabed mine claims established on the basis of the exploration already conducted by U.S. companies and provides assured equality of access for any future qualiﬁed U.S. miners

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The deep seabed is an area that the United States has never claimed and has consistently recognized as being beyond the sovereignty and jurisdiction of any nation. As reﬂected in U.S. law (the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980), it has long viewed deep seabed mining as an activity appropriate for international administration. The United States asked for changes to the 1982 convention’s deep seabed mining provisions and got them. As George P. Shultz, Secretary of State to President Reagan, said recently in a letter to Senator Lugar: “The treaty has been changed in such a way with respect to the deep seabeds that it is now acceptable, in my judgment. Under these circumstances, and given the many desirable aspects of the treaty on other grounds, I believe it is time to proceed with ratiﬁcation.”

WHY STAY OUT? Given all the valuable beneﬁts of joining and the substantial costs of not joining, is there a persuasive argument why the United States should remain a non-party? I do not think there is one. Certain arguments distort the risks of joining and/or paint an unrealistic picture of our situation as a non-party. In this regard, opponents do not offer viable alternatives to the convention. Some say we should rely on the 1958 conventions; however, those are less favorable in many respects, such as navigational rights, the outer limits of the continental shelf, and authority to conduct boardings on the high seas. Some say we should continue to rely on customary law; however, as noted, customary law is not universally accepted, evolves based on state practice, and does not provide access to the convention’s procedural mechanisms, such as the continental shelf commission. Finally, some say we should rely on the threat or use of force; however, it is implausible and unwise to think that the United States can rely on military power alone to enforce its rights, particularly economic rights. Certain arguments against U.S. accession are simply inaccurate. And other arguments are outdated, in the sense that they may have been true before the deep seabed mining provisions were ﬁxed and thus are no longer true. I would like to address some of these “myths” surrounding the convention: Myth: Reality:

Joining the convention would surrender U.S. sovereignty. On the contrary. Some have called the convention a “U.S. land grab.” It expands U.S. sovereignty and sovereign rights over extensive maritime territory and natural resources off its coast, as described earlier in my testimony. It is rare that a treaty actually increases the area over which a country exercises sovereign rights, but this treaty does. The convention does not harm U.S. sovereignty in any respect. As sought by the United States, the dispute resolution mechanisms provide appropriate ﬂexibility in terms of both

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Terror on the High Seas the forum and the exclusion of sensitive subject matter. The deep seabed mining provisions do not apply to any areas in which the United States has sovereignty or sovereign rights; further, these rules will facilitate mining activities by U.S. companies. And the navigational provisions afﬁrm the freedoms that are important to the worldwide mobility of U.S. military and commercial vessels. The convention is a “UN” treaty and therefore does not serve our interests. The convention is not the United Nations—it was merely negotiated there, as are many agreements, and negotiated by states, not by UN bureaucrats. Further, just because a treaty was drawn up at the UN does not mean it does not serve our interests. For example, the United States beneﬁts from UN treaties such as the Convention Against Corruption and the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. The Law of the Sea Convention is another such treaty that serves U.S. interests. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) has the power to regulate seven-tenths of the Earth’s surface. The convention addresses seven-tenths of the earth’s surface; the ISA does not. First, the ISA does not address activities in the water column, such as navigation. Second, the ISA has nothing to do with the ocean ﬂoor that is subject to the sovereignty or sovereign rights of any country, including that of the United States. Third, the ISA only addresses deep seabed mining. Thus, its role is limited to mining activities in areas of the ocean ﬂoor beyond national jurisdiction. It has no other role and no general authority over the uses of the oceans, including freedom of navigation and overﬂight. The convention gives the UN its ﬁrst opportunity to levy taxes. Although the convention was negotiated under UN auspices, it is separate from the UN, and its institutions are not UN bodies. Further, there are no taxes of any kind on individuals, corporations, or others. Concerning oil/gas production within 200 nautical miles of shore, the United States gets exclusive sovereign rights to seabed resources within the largest such area in the world. There are no ﬁnance-related requirements in the EEZ. Concerning oil/gas production beyond 200 nautical miles of shore, the United States is one of a group of countries potentially entitled to extensive continental shelf beyond its EEZ. Countries that beneﬁt from an extended continental shelf have no requirements for the ﬁrst ﬁve years of production at a site; in the sixth year of production, they are to make payments equal to 1% of production, increasing by 1% a year until capped at 7% in the twelfth year of production. If the United States were to pay royalties, it would be because U.S. oil and gas companies are engaged in successful production beyond 200 nautical miles. But if the United States does not become a party, U.S. companies will likely not be willing or able to engage in oil/gas activities in such areas, as I explained earlier.

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Concerning mineral activities in the deep seabed, which is beyond U.S. jurisdiction, an interested company would pay an application fee for the administrative expenses of processing the application. Any amount that did not get used for processing the application would be returned to the applicant. The convention does not set forth any loyalty requirements for production; the United States would need to agree to establish any such requirements. In no event would any payments go to the UN, but rather would be distributed to countries in accordance with a formula to which the United States would have to agree. The convention would permit an international tribunal to secondguess the U.S. Navy. No international tribunal would have jurisdiction over the U.S. Navy. U.S. military activities, including those of the U.S. Navy, would not be subject to any form of dispute resolution. The convention expressly permits a party to exclude from dispute settlement those disputes that concern “military activities.” The United States will have the exclusive right to determine what constitutes a military activity. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea could order the release of a vessel apprehended by the U.S. military. The tribunal has no jurisdiction to order release in such a case. Its authority to address the prompt release of vessels applies only to two types of cases: ﬁshing, and protection of the marine environment. Further, even if its mandate did extend further—which it does not— the United States will be taking advantage of the optional exclusion of military activities from dispute settlement. As such, in no event would the tribunal have any authority to direct the release of a vessel apprehended by the U.S. military. The convention was drafted before—and without regard to—the War on Terror and what the United States must do to wage it successfully. The convention enhances, rather than undermines, our ability to wage the War on Terror. Maximum maritime naval and air mobility is essential for our military forces to operate effectively. The convention provides the necessary stability and framework for our forces, weapons, and materiel to get to the ﬁght without hindrance. It is essential that key sea and air lanes remain open as a matter of international legal right and not be contingent upon approval from nations along those routes. The senior U.S. military leadership—the Joint Chiefs of Staff—have recently confirmed the continuing importance of U.S. accession to the convention in a letter to the committee. The convention would prohibit or impair U.S. intelligence and submarine activities. The convention does not prohibit or impair intelligence or submarine activities. Joining the convention would not affect the conduct of intelligence activities in any way. This issue was the subject of extensive hearings in 2004 before the Senate Select Committee on

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Terror on the High Seas Intelligence. Witnesses from Defense, CIA, and State all conﬁrmed that U.S. intelligence and submarine activities are not adversely affected by the convention. We follow the navigational provisions of the convention today and are not adversely affected; similarly, we would not be adversely affected by joining. The United States can rely on use or threat of force to protect its navigational interests fully. The United States has utilized diplomatic and operational challenges to resist the excessive maritime claims of other countries that interfere with U.S. navigational rights. But these operations entail a certain degree of risk, as well as resources. Being a party to the convention would signiﬁcantly enhance our efforts to roll back these claims by, among other things, putting the United States in a stronger position to assert our rights. Joining the convention would hurt U.S. maritime interdiction efforts under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Joining the convention would not affect applicable maritime law or policy regarding the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction. PSI speciﬁcally requires participating countries to act consistently with international law, which includes the law reﬂected in the convention. Almost all PSI partners are parties to the convention. Further, joining the convention is likely to strengthen PSI by attracting new cooperative partners. President Reagan thought the treaty was irremediably defective. As explained above, President Reagan identiﬁed only certain deep seabed mining provisions of the convention as ﬂawed. His 1983 Ocean Policy Statement demonstrates that he embraced the nondeep-seabed provisions and established them as ofﬁcial U.S. policy. The 1994 agreement overcomes each of the objections to the deep seabed mining provisions identiﬁed by President Reagan. As President Reagan’s Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, noted in his recent letter to Senator Lugar, “It surprises me to learn that opponents of the treaty are invoking President Reagan’s name, arguing that he would have opposed ratiﬁcation despite having succeeded on the deep sea-bed issue. During his administration, with full clearance and support from President Reagan, we made it very clear that we would support ratiﬁcation if our position on the seabed issue were accepted.” The convention provides for mandatory technology transfer. Mandatory technology transfer was eliminated by the 1994 agreement that modiﬁed the original convention. The United States could and should renegotiate a new law of the sea agreement, conﬁned to the provisions on navigational freedoms. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that this were a desirable outcome, other countries would have no reason or incentive to enter into such a negotiation. The convention is widely accepted, having been joined by over 150 parties, including all other major

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maritime powers and most other industrialized nations. Those parties are generally satisﬁed with the entirety of the treaty and would be unwilling to sacriﬁce other provisions of the convention, such as beneﬁts associated with Exclusive Economic Zones and sovereign rights over the resources they contain, as well as continental shelves out to 200 nautical miles, and in some cases far beyond. And parties that would like to impose 20 new constraints on our navigational freedoms certainly would not accept the 1982 version of those freedoms.

CONCLUSION Mr. Chairman, I am conﬁdent that the committee will agree that U.S. accession to the convention is the best way to secure navigational and economic rights related to the law of the sea. I hope I have convinced the committee that arguments against joining the convention are completely unfounded, that there are not viable alternatives to joining, and that we cannot just go out and negotiate another treaty, much less one that is more favorable. And we certainly cannot have much inﬂuence over development of the law of the sea in the twenty-ﬁrst century from outside the convention. The safest, most secure, and most cost-effective way to lock in these significant beneﬁts to our ocean-related interests is to join the convention. President Bush, Secretary Rice, and I urge the committee—once again—to give its swift approval for U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention and ratiﬁcation of the 1994 agreement, and we urge the Senate to give its advice and consent before the end of this session of Congress.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION HOMELAND SECURITY: FACILITATING TRADE AND SECURING SEAPORTS James F. Jarobe Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations August 5, 2002*

Good afternoon, Chairman Shays and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you to discuss seaport security. Ever-present in everyone’s mind are the threats of terrorist violence *

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against U.S. interests “anywhere in the world” that have been issued by international terrorist Osama bin Laden, his organization al-Qaeda, and sympathetic groups. The FBI and other components of the U.S. intelligence community, as well as foreign intelligence services, are currently tracking a large volume of threats emanating from these sources. The al-Qaeda network continually reﬁnes its operational capabilities by experimenting with variations on suicide bombing techniques to inﬂict mass casualties, including vehicle bombings against embassies, maritime attacks against naval vessels, and hijacking of commercial airliners. These attacks and capabilities illustrate the range of threats posed by extremists afﬁliated with international terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda. Intelligence bulletins have been issued in relation to the potential of a broad range of attack scenarios including acts involving weapons of mass destruction, plots to attack bridges, ﬁnancial institutions, and fuel reﬁneries, plots to use small aircraft for suicide attacks, and possible interest in crop-dusting capabilities, commercial drivers licenses with hazardous material endorsements, and an offensive SCUBA diver capability. Domestic extremist groups continue to pose a threat. In fact, domestic terrorists have committed the majority of terrorist attacks in the United States. Between 1980 and 2000, the FBI recorded 335 incidents or suspected incidents of terrorism in this country. Of these, 247 were attributed to domestic terrorists, while 88 were determined to be international in nature. The domestic terrorist threat is divided into three general categories—left-wing, right-wing, and special interest (or single issue). Right-wing terrorism activity in Central Florida is diffuse and uncoordinated, thanks in part to the arrest of Donald Beauregard, the leader of the Southeastern States Alliance, by the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. Beauregard was involved in a conspiracy to commit acts of terror that included raids of National Guard Armories for the purpose of stealing weapons to further use in attempts to disable energy facilities, communication centers, and law enforcement ofﬁces. Environmental extremists and anarchists could pose a threat to port security. Further, terrorists have an increasingly sophisticated array of weapons and capabilities available to them. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—explosive, chemical, biological, or radiological in nature—represent a real-world threat to ports. Information regarding these types of weapons is disseminated through such means as the World Wide Web. The Tampa Division of the FBI encompasses eighteen central Florida counties from the Gulf of Mexico to the Atlantic coast. Central Florida is a focal point for travelers and tourists within the State of Florida, offering a complete range of transportation systems including major seaports. Central Florida encompasses several theme parks and beaches along Florida’s central coast, on both the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Because Walt Disney World in Orlando is the number-one tourist destination in the country, it impacts the total population of the entire region. Additionally, there were more than 40 million vis-

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itors in Orange County in 2000, and more than 15.7 million in the Tampa Bay area. The Tampa Bay area is a secondary focal point for travelers within the State of Florida, offering a wide variety of tourist attractions and numerous large-capacity venues hosting international, professional, and collegiate sporting events. In addition, the associated supporting transportation systems have their own set of particular security concerns. There are six commercial international airports within Central Florida, located in Melbourne, Orlando, Tampa, St. Petersburg, Sarasota, and Fort Myers. There is one non-international commercial airport in Naples. There are six major railway stations located in Orlando, Tampa, St. Petersburg, Sarasota, Fort Myers, and Naples. The numerous rail lines traversing Central Florida predominantly carry freight versus passengers. The four seaports include the facilities at Tampa, Manatee, and Saint Petersburg on the Gulf, and Port Canaveral on the Atlantic seaboard. The Port of Tampa is the largest seaport in Florida and the tenth largest in the nation. The consequence of the varied transportation networks within Florida is high volume truck, rail, and maritime trafﬁc, an increased mobility of transient population, the ﬂow of international commodities, and a parallel increase in being susceptible to criminal enterprise. The Port of Tampa is centrally located in downtown Tampa within 10 miles of MacDill Air Force Base. The Port of Tampa is the busiest port in Florida in terms of raw tonnage and stores approximately 50 percent of the extremely hazardous chemicals in the State of Florida. Of major signiﬁcance is that the Port of Tampa is noncontiguous property, encompassing more than 2,500 acres of land. Generally, the port represents an appealing target of opportunity for would-be terrorists. The port is immense, accessible from land, sea, and air. The port is adjacent to a large population of civilians and vital regional and national infrastructure, including power facilities, water facilities, and Headquarters of United States Central Command and United States Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base. The port contains such hazards as liquid propane gas, anhydrous ammonia, and chloride. Central Florida also has some of the richest phosphate deposits in the world. The western counties are dependent on this phosphate-based industry. Fifty percent of Florida’s hazardous materials are stored within Hillsborough County and 25 percent within Polk County. Major storage of extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) and other chemicals are located in this industrialized area and are vulnerable to accidental, malicious, and acts-of-nature releases. In 1993, the United States EPA conducted chemical audits of the three anhydrous ammonia terminals located on Tampa Bay—CF Industries, located on Hooker’s Point, Farmland Hydro, L.P., and IMC-Agrico, both located on Port Sutton Road on Port Sutton Channel. The audit revealed that the three terminals represent nearly 92.5 percent of Hillsborough County’s total amount of anhydrous ammonia (NH3) inventories.

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Individually, each of the three ammonia terminals pose a risk to the surrounding community, and the effect of three facilities, in close proximity with such massive quantities, poses an even greater risk. A 1998 survey showed that these three facilities had outstanding safety records. Safety standards have undergone continual improvement with each passing year. In addition, many hazardous materials shipments originate in the Port of Tampa and move through Hillsborough County and beyond. A large volume of hazardous material travels through the area via railroads, highways, waterways, and pipelines on a daily basis. In particular, ammonia is transported by tank truck, rail car, and pipeline to fertilizer plants in Polk County. Chlorine is primarily transported by tank trucks and barges to waste water treatment plants. Residents throughout the county are vulnerable to the release, intentional or accidental, of transported hazardous materials. South Florida, in particular, is ideally located to serve as the U.S. gateway to and from the Americas. The nearness of the U.S. Gulf Coast to Latin America makes it an obvious entry point for maritime trafﬁc. Most of the cargo headed to ports in the Gulf originates from source and transit nations in Latin America, especially Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia. In addition, an extensive network of rail and truck lines allows for fast and efﬁcient delivery of all types of goods, both legitimate and illegitimate, to markets throughout the U.S. and Canada. The coast of the Gulf of Mexico has hundreds of miles of relatively open shoreline that separate the major ports—Houston, Texas; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Tampa, Florida. While these major ports have a major presence of law enforcement and security, the open shoreline and smaller ports leave the Florida coast open to a variety of criminal activity. The high volume of maritime trafﬁc in the large ports, both commercial and noncommercial, provides ample cover for the movement of illicit goods. Eleven of the top ﬁfteen ports in trade volume in the United States and six of the top ten ports in volume of foreign trade are located on the Gulf of Mexico. It is a concern that terrorist organizations could take advantage of wellestablished, well-known criminal patterns to further their own objectives, such as concealment of money laundering operations, transport and distribution of explosives and/or hazardous materials, or illegal entry into the United States. Speciﬁcally, bulk and containerized cargo freighters, ﬁshing vessels, recreational boats and tugs, and cruise ships, all of which operate from Florida coasts, each provide unique potential for exploitation by terrorists as well as other criminal organizations. Large bulk and containerized cargo pose a smuggling risk in the major ports of the Eastern and Gulf coasts. Most container trafﬁc along the Gulf Coast consists of perishable goods like fruits and vegetables. Although Tampa and Port Manatee’s container trafﬁc is considerably less than the ports of Houston, New Orleans, and Gulfport, Mississippi, Tampa is ranked ﬁfth

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among Gulf ports receiving signiﬁcant quantities of non-liquid bulk imports. Non-liquid bulk imports into the Port of Tampa are led by shipments of sand and gravel from Mexico, Canada, and the Bahamas; sulfur from Mexico and Chile; and cement and concrete from Colombia, Venezuela, and Europe. The ﬁshing industry represents a major presence along Florida’s coastline. Fishing vessels at the numerous ﬁshing ports of all sizes constitute a secondary risk in the region. The Gulf of Mexico is home to one of the largest ﬁshing ﬂeets in the United States. Moreover, the region contains ﬁve of the top ten U.S. ﬁshing ports in terms of total catch. More than 18,000 commercially documented ﬁshing vessels operate from numerous bayous, inlets, rivers, and bays along the Gulf Coast. Many of these vessels travel back and forth throughout the Gulf between ﬁshing ports, large and small, following the seasonal migrations of ﬁsh as permitted by ﬁshing regulations. The transient nature of the industry and the abundance of vessels provide ample occasion for boats engaged in smuggling activity to blend in, either transporting drugs (or explosives) directly from overseas or participating in transfers offshore. Recreational boating and tugs and barges operating near the border are additional risks. Although there are over 750,000 private vessels registered in the state of Florida, these small private vessels generally receive less law enforcement attention. The numerous recreational vessels and sailboats travel freely along the southern Gulf Coast of Florida. Foreign tugs usually transfer barges to local tugs, giving the impression that a barge entering a Gulf port is local. The primary home of the cruise ship industry in the United States is South Florida. Port Canaveral is among the nation’s top ﬁve cruise ports in terms of revenue and on the Gulf Coast. Vessels depart from Port Canaveral and the Port of Tampa for destinations throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America. To address the concerns expressed above, the law enforcement community, together with private industry and multi-disciplinary agencies such as ﬁre/rescue, HAZMAT operations, and Florida Emergency Management, has made concerted efforts in educating, training, practicing, and preparing for contingency scenarios. Through combined actions of a host of agencies, preventive measures have been carefully considered and implemented. Not the least of these has been the development of several antiterrorism task forces and speciﬁcally focused working groups and intelligence exchange forums. Participants in the working groups have been carefully selected by each represented agency for their subject matter knowledge and experience and jurisdictional roles. The Tampa FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force is not a recent development but was formed in the mid-1990s. Over the past several years, they have developed an aggressive outreach program comprised of four distinctive components of the terrorism preparedness program. It is important to note that the

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FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and Special Agent/WMD coordinators in the Tampa Division are experienced and knowledgeable focal points for all terrorism and WMD investigative matters. In addition to contingency plan development, the program includes training seminars, tabletop and ﬁeld exercises, and threat assessments. From January 1999 through September 2000, Tampa Division has provided terrorism training for many ﬁrst responders from all safety and law enforcement disciplines. Agents have conducted approximately sixty WMD and terrorism presentations and participated in seventeen tabletop and full-ﬁeld exercises. Furthermore, threat assessments have been researched and prepared for twelve special counterterrorism-preparedness events, such as the NHL Hockey All-Star Game at the Tampa Ice Palace (near the Port); Super Bowl XXXV, including the Gasparilla Pirates Parade/Super Bowl Sunday pre-game events along Bayshore Boulevard; the USS Lassen ship commissioning ceremony; and U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command change of command ceremonies at the Marriott Waterside. Speciﬁcally, in June 1999, the State of Florida Division of Emergency Management hosted a statewide WMD Terrorism Summit through a grant from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at which FBI special agents gave presentations on the threat potential to Central Florida. The purpose of this summit was to solicit input from ﬁrst responders prior to drafting a statewide terrorism response strategy. This forum was an excellent opportunity to connect with federal agency counterparts on both crisis management and consequence management. Since attending the summit, FBI special agents have assisted in writing and reviewing WMD Incident Response Plans for numerous agencies and large capacity entertainment complexes, ensuring consistent response and coordination with the FBIHQ WMD Incident Contingency Plan. Furthermore, the FBI special agent/WMD coordinators have made speciﬁc efforts to establish productive liaison with the emergency management community at the state and county level by visiting county Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) and including the directors of each in working groups and training programs. Florida EOCs are proactive in planning for response to incidents of the use of WMD by preparing annexes to their frequently implemented hurricane response plans. Of particular note in the exercise arena, in March 2000, the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force coordinated a major seventeen-agency countywide ﬁeld exercise involving a terrorist takeover of an anhydrous ammonia industrial facility at the Port of Tampa. This scenario was chosen to incorporate a response from sea and air assets as well as traditional law enforcement and ﬁre rescue/emergency teams. The exercise was preceded by a one-day seminar for mid-level crisis managers and supervisors. Evaluations of the exercise were incorporated in later threat assessments, contingency plans, and grant requests.

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Law enforcement personnel from throughout the greater Tampa Bay area participate in several formal terrorism working groups that address both domestic and international terrorism matters and WMD response issues. The FBI regularly participates in the State of Florida Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF), the Central Florida Statewide Terrorism Intelligence Networking Group (STING), the Florida Intelligence Unit (FIU), the Tampa Bay Area Intelligence Unit (TBAIU), the MacDill Air Force Base Counter Intelligence/Counter Terrorism Working Group, the Tampa Bay Harbor Safety Committee, the Tampa Bay Metropolitan Medical Response System Steering Committee, and the Port Security Working Group. These forums are composed of a broad spectrum of law enforcement investigators and intelligence analysts, military intelligence and command personnel, and also include professionals from the security departments of major private enterprises such as electric power companies, railways, and industry representatives when appropriate. The joint approach to intelligence sharing, investigation, and crisis management has served Central Florida extremely well. Thanks to recent efforts undertaken by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, FBI intelligence analysts now have access to a statewide terrorism database called THREATNET. The establishment of this database will be key to coordinating pertinent elements of pending investigations, for example patterns of activity, vehicle tags, subject names and aliases, as well as common meeting areas. The Tampa Bay Port Security Working Group, led by the U.S. Coast Guard, was established in April 2000 as a result of the Interagency Commission on Crime in U.S. Seaports, and has ﬁve subcommittees that report on a bimonthly basis. The FBI regularly participates in the Port Security Working Group meetings and heads the Terrorism Subcommittee. The FBI’s role in these committees is to provide threat analyses and to disseminate intelligence that affects safe operation of the port facilities. Somewhat unique to this forum is the integration of private industry and ﬁre/hazmat chiefs of both City of Tampa and Hillsborough County as members of the FBI JTTF. Input provided by the emergency management and ﬁre/safety sectors of our community is essential to successful preparedness. The FBI has encouraged state, county, and local response community leaders to conduct an appropriate needs and vulnerability self-assessment to determine which federal domestic training courses and programs would be of value. The State of Florida conducted a statewide vulnerability assessment of seaports. Although this assessment was funded by the State Ofﬁce of Drug Control and primarily focused on drug countermeasures, it also assessed port access, credentialing, and security. Issues raised through this assessment are being addressed through the Port Security Working Group. The interagency cooperation is evident in the daily coordination between management staff, investigators, and intelligence personnel of each agency on issues where we have common interests.

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COVERING THE WATERFRONT—A REVIEW OF SEAPORT SECURITY SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 Gary M. Bald Acting Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security January 27, 2004*

Good morning, Chairman Kyl, Senator Feinstein, and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me here today to speak to you on the topic of seaport security and the FBI’s partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard, and local port authorities. Recognizing the profound new threat that the events of September 11 represented to national security, the president directed the FBI to make prevention of terrorist attacks its number one priority. This is in keeping with the president’s strategy to defeat, deny, diminish, and defend against terrorism. Failure is simply not an option. In President Bush’s address at FBI Headquarters, he reemphasized to all FBI employees that “the FBI has no greater priority than preventing terrorist acts against America.” Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the FBI has embraced this challenge and transformed itself to address the current threat facing this country. As part of a major reorganization, the FBI restructured its approach to counterterrorism to enhance analysis and information-sharing. Improved analysis and operational capabilities, combined with increased cooperation and integration have enhanced the FBI’s ability to investigate and prevent acts of terrorism. This is especially true as we address the complex issue of security in our nation’s many seaports.

COMPLEXITIES AND VULNERABILITIES OF PORTS The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA 2002), signed on November 25, 2002, by President Bush, is a landmark piece of legislation that is designed to protect the nation’s ports and waterways from a terrorist attack. The MTSA 2002 signiﬁcantly strengthens and standardizes the security measures of our domestic port security team of federal, state, local and private authorities. The MTSA 2002 requires the establishment of maritime security committees and security plans for facilities and vessels that may be involved in a transportation security incident, among its many measures. Port security committees had already been informally established around the *http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/2004_h/040127-bald.htm

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country after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the new regulations ofﬁcially established Area Maritime Security Committees that address the complex and diverse security needs of each of the nation’s 361 ports. Area Maritime Security Committees are made up of other federal, state, and local agencies, industry and others, to assess the speciﬁc vulnerabilities in each port and develop plans for security requirements within the port areas. The FBI is a full participant in these committees. In addition, the International Maritime Organization now requires all ships and port facilities to have security plans, making a new worldwide standard. The port system of the United States is the most extensive and complex port system in the world and, as such, it is a national asset. [Although] no two ports in the United States are exactly alike, many have shared characteristics such as being close to major metropolitan areas, containing fuel farms, and having major roadways running into and out of the port area. Ports not only affect the state in which they are located but also impact neighboring states that depend on the ports for foreign trade. The United States’ economy depends on the free ﬂow of goods through these waterways, but with the free ﬂow of goods comes the inherent risk of terrorist attacks. Ports, because of their accessibility to both water and land, together with the chemical and natural resource storage facilities that are often located within close proximity, are inherently vulnerable. Ports have historically been vulnerable to a variety of smuggling ventures, from the drug trade and alien smuggling to cargo thefts and weapons smuggling. The terrorist organizations we now face have learned from these traditional smuggling operations and are looking for any holes in the port security system to exploit. Access into and around United States port facilities is difﬁcult to secure without closing access to legitimate business and recreational port trafﬁc.

MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL APPROACH TO THE SECURITY OF SEAPORTS [Although] the federal government has jurisdiction over navigable waters, as well as the interstate commerce and foreign trade at our nation’s ports, local port authorities are the primary regulators of the ports’ day-to-day operations. Legislation passed since the tragedy of September 11, 2001, has signiﬁcantly increased the security requirements at port facilities. The Department of Homeland Security, through the United States Coast Guard, has overall federal responsibility for seaport security. The Department of Homeland Security is currently working to screen more shipping containers both entering and exiting the United States and assisting state and local authorities in implementing security plans for their ports. The Federal Bureau of Investigation works in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security toward a coordinated response to the security concerns of the port authorities, primarily through participation in the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), which is located

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in the Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) at FBI Headquarters. In addition to the NJTTF, the FBI has assigned Supervisory Special Agents, fulltime, to the Department of Homeland Security to assure a timely and effective response to any crisis that may arise. Also, the FBI continues to manage Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) in each of our ﬁfty-six ﬁeld ofﬁces throughout the United States. Within these JTTFs, critical security information is exchanged on a daily basis, as representatives of the participating federal agencies work sideby-side with their counterparts in the local law enforcement community to ensure that seaports and other national assets are safely guarded. One signiﬁcant challenge is the limited amount of funding and resources available to the state and local agencies, including the port authorities, to address the many issues involved in securing our ports from terrorist attacks. We have attempted to address this challenge by pooling our resources. Prior to my current position, I served as the head of the FBI’s Baltimore Field Ofﬁce, and I can personally attest to the importance of these interagency partnerships. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the Baltimore ofﬁce established a maritime team to provide proactive and reactive maritime responses in support of the counterterrorism program and the JTTF. The primary goal was to enhance the ability to respond either overtly or covertly to maritime incidents, special events, and other events that affected law enforcement. After 9/11, the Baltimore ofﬁce joined a partnership that existed between the USCG and the City of Baltimore. This partnership was subsequently named the Maryland Maritime Security Group (MMSG), and has grown in both other agency participation (for example, the U.S. Navy, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Maryland State Police, Department of Natural Resources, Transportation Authority Police, Maryland Emergency Management Agency, Baltimore City Police and Fire Departments, local area county police departments, the Maryland Port Authority, Maryland Pilot Association, and the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant) and to include a state-wide focus. The MMSG is co-chaired by the USCG and the FBI, and the members meet often to identify and share resources, exchange intelligence, and jointly develop and implement maritime strategies to combat terrorism. Every FBI ofﬁce that has a seaport in its territory participates, through the JTTFs, in similar information-sharing initiatives and counterterrorism/security working groups. Currently these types of maritime working groups have been formed in Los Angeles, Tampa, Boston, Baltimore, Houston, New York, and Miami, to name just a few. The Tampa Division of the FBI has been a participant in the Tampa Bay Port Security Working Group, led by the United States Coast Guard, since it was established in April 2000. The FBI regularly participates in the Port Security Working Group meetings and heads the Terrorism Subcommittee. The FBI’s role in these committees is to provide threat analysis and to disseminate intelligence that affects safe operation of the port facilities. Somewhat unique to this forum is the

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integration of private industry and ﬁre/hazmat chiefs of both the City of Tampa and Hillsborough County as members of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. The Miami Division of the FBI has been actively participating in the Area Maritime Security Committee and holds a seat on the Executive Steering Committee. This committee is a United States Coast Guard initiative, which brings together members of the law enforcement community with executives of the various maritime industries. One of the pilot projects being worked on by the Miami Joint Terrorism Task Force is the “Manning Agency Screening Initiative”, which provides limited database checks on the agencies providing the staff members to cruise lines operating globally. At present the “manning agencies” providing the staff for the various cruise lines are not screened by any United States law enforcement agency and are merely licensed to do business in their respective countries. In Los Angeles, the Area Maritime Security (AMS) Committee is scheduled to begin on February 6, 2004. This new committee is being established in response to the MTSA 2002 and will continue the positive and aggressive steps taken over the last two and a half years by all prior committees. The AMS committee will be chaired by the Captain of the Port with the close involvement and leadership of the FBI JTTF Supervisor. It will be composed of approximately twelve voting members, each carrying a responsibility as chair of one of the twelve subcommittees. The AMS committee, patterned around the widely accepted and existing Uniﬁed Command and Incident Command Systems (ICS), will meet to proactively address port security needs and concerns. The AMS will incorporate voices from private industry, labor, law enforcement, intelligence, emergency, medical, and ﬁre assets. The AMS will subsume existing committees now operating within the port community to include: Port Security Committee (PSC) (began in June 2001), Mayor’s Task Force on Terrorism (began October 2001), Port Readiness Committee (used for military ofﬂoads and outloads), Marine Transportation System (MTS), Harbor Safety Committee (Los Angeles/Long Beach), and Harbor Safety Committee (Port Hueneme). Beginning with the founding of the Port Security Committee in June 2001, the FBI has been a main player in these committees and has ﬁlled a leadership role among the many agencies that make up the port community of Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach. In addition to the Area Maritime Security Committees, “Operation Drydock,” which was formally begun in January 2003, is a United States Coast Guard initiative being pursued in cooperation with the FBI’s NJTTF to identify, classify, prioritize, and appropriately respond to national security concerns. As part of this effort, “Operation Drydock” is conducting a comprehensive review of more than 200,000 United States merchant mariners. To date, eleven individuals possessing United States Coast Guard issued merchant mariner documents have been identiﬁed as having a nexus to terrorism matters. All of these merchant mariners have been placed on the “No Fly” and “Watchlist” maintained at the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). An additional 700 mariners have been identiﬁed as having issues related to

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law enforcement and maritime concerns. There are approximately 15,000 records left to be examined in this project. On a related front, the FBI, working together with members of the cruise industry, has established a protocol for domestic cruise lines to electronically send all passenger and crew manifests to the Terrorist Screening Center six hours prior to departure. The Terrorist Screening Center enables the cruise line manifests to be run against a single terrorism database, instead of the numerous lists housed within a variety of government agencies. The FBI is also working toward establishing a permanent Maritime Liaison Agent (MLA) in each of its ofﬁces with signiﬁcant port activity. The MLA position would streamline the ﬂow of information coming from and going to the various ports around the country, with one consistent point of contact identiﬁed.

CONCLUSION The institution of new security regulations and the cooperative approach to port security between the United States Coast Guard and the Joint Terrorism Task Forces have greatly enhanced maritime security in the United States. While port security may never be guaranteed, due to the sheer size of the facilities and the areas they cover, the FBI and our partner agencies are striving to provide the most secure port facilities in the world. The FBI continues to pursue an aggressive, proactive response to meet the challenges of terrorism. We remain committed to identifying and disrupting terrorist activities, particularly within the United States port system. I want to emphasize to you, this issue has the full attention of Director Mueller and the FBI. I appreciate the interest of the committee in this matter, and I look forward to working with you in the future. Thank you for the invitation to speak to you today; I am prepared to answer your questions.

THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE NATION’S SEAPORTS Audit Report 06-26 Ofﬁce of the Inspector General-Audit Division, United States Department of Justice March 2006*

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The nation’s seaports and related maritime activities are widely recognized as being vulnerable to acts of terrorism. The consequences of a maritime-based *

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terrorist attack are potentially devastating to both the economy and to public safety. The United States has more than 360 seaports, and 95 percent of overseas trade ﬂows through these ports or inland waterways. Further, seaports are often located near major population centers and hazardous fuel or chemical storage facilities that may provide attractive terrorist targets. According to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), the risk of maritime terrorism is equal to or greater than the risk of terrorism involving civilian aviation. Although the United States has placed much attention on better securing civilian aviation since 2001, seaports remain largely at risk. The protection of U.S. seaports is a shared responsibility among the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The Coast Guard has primary responsibility for the physical protection of the nation’s seaports, and it has law enforcement authority in the maritime domain. CBP enforces import and export laws and regulations and bears primary responsibility for cargo inspections at seaports. The FBI, as the lead federal agency for preventing and investigating terrorism, has an overarching role in helping to secure the nation’s seaports. The FBI’s responsibilities are part intelligence and part law enforcement, including assessing the threat of maritime-based terrorism; gathering, analyzing, and sharing information on maritime threats; and maintaining well-prepared tactical capabilities to prevent or respond to maritime-based terrorism. Unless incident command and other coordination issues are resolved in advance and response scenarios are exercised, the overlapping nature of the FBI’s and the Coast Guard’s responsibilities in the maritime domain may result in confusion and interagency conﬂict with the FBI in the event of a maritime incident. CBP’s more discrete responsibilities do not present as much likelihood for conﬂict. A 1979 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the FBI and the Coast Guard acknowledges their overlapping jurisdiction and the need for cooperation and coordination in the maritime domain. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 increased the Coast Guard’s responsibility in maritime terrorism prevention and response. In addition, the National Strategy for Maritime Security, developed by an interagency committee and issued in September 2005, attempts to align federal government maritime security programs into a comprehensive national effort involving federal, state, local, and private sector entities. Eight plans support the National Strategy for Maritime Security. One of the plans is the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan, which was issued in October 2005. The MOTR describes the U.S. government’s plan to respond to terrorist threats in the maritime domain, including the roles of various federal agencies, protocols for lead and supporting agencies, and the need for additional planning. The MOTR assigned the DHS, implemented through the Coast Guard, lead agency responsibility for interdicting maritime

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threats where it operates, and assigned the Department of Justice (DOJ), through the FBI, lead agency responsibility for investigating maritime threats and incidents. However, both the FBI and the Coast Guard have jurisdiction to interdict maritime threats, and the MOTR did not resolve potential conﬂict between the two agencies in incident command and response. The DOJ Ofﬁce of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this audit to examine the FBI’s seaport security efforts. We reviewed the FBI’s roles and responsibilities for preventing and responding to terrorist attacks in the maritime domain and the extent and effectiveness of the FBI’s interagency coordination and cooperation. To accomplish these overall objectives, we examined the FBI’s: (1) initiatives to prevent maritime terrorism, including coordination with the Coast Guard and other agencies; (2) capability to respond to maritime incidents; and (3) efforts to assess the maritime terrorism threat. Our audit found that over the past three years the FBI has taken steps to enhance its capability to identify, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks in the maritime domain, including seaports. Among the positive steps the FBI has taken to enhance seaport and maritime security are: • creating Maritime Liaison Agents (MLA) at FBI ﬁeld ofﬁces and assigning these agents responsibility for coordinating with the FBI’s maritime partners, including the Coast Guard and CBP; • establishing a Maritime Security Program at FBI headquarters to oversee the MLAs and centralize the FBI’s maritime efforts; • improving the FBI’s ability to respond to a maritime terrorism threat or incident, including creating enhanced maritime Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams located in the ﬁeld ofﬁces closest to the Coast Guard’s counterterrorism response teams; • providing maritime-related intelligence to other intelligence and law enforcement agencies; and • establishing a database, the Guardian Threat Tracking System, to collect information on terrorist threats and suspicious incidents at seaports and elsewhere, and manage follow-up action on these threats and incidents.

However, we believe the FBI needs to take additional steps to improve its capability to deal with the threat of maritime terrorism by: • resolving potential incident command, coordination, and response issues that could arise from confusion about the respective roles of the FBI and the Coast Guard; • improving the collection and dissemination of lessons learned and best practices from maritime counterterrorism exercises; • allocating FBI resources according to the threat and risk of maritime terrorism relative to other threats against other critical infrastructures such as aviation;

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• ensuring that all FBI ﬁeld ofﬁces use the Guardian database to enter and maintain data on threats and suspicious incidents at seaports and elsewhere; and • improving maritime-related intelligence gathering and dissemination.

MARITIME INITIATIVES The FBI established its MLA program in 2004 as a result of a joint FBI and Coast Guard investigation into the threat posed by divers and combat swimmers. MLAs are assigned to most of the FBI’s ﬁfty-six ﬁeld ofﬁces and are the most visible and active FBI resource dedicated to preventing maritime terrorism. There are 73 MLAs, about two-thirds of whom are FBI agents and one-third are other agency personnel assigned to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces. MLAs are primarily responsible for coordinating with other entities who share responsibility for security at the nation’s ports, thereby facilitating the sharing of information on threats and security measures. According to FBI Counterterrorism Division (CTD) managers, MLAs should be maritime experts with the knowledge and relationships to signiﬁcantly assist the FBI in resolving any terrorist threat or event that may occur at local seaports. However, we found that the FBI does not always assign MLAs according to the threat and risk of a terrorist attack on a given seaport. An analysis performed by the DHS for its Port Security Grant program suggests that 24 FBI ﬁeld ofﬁces are responsible for helping protect over 80 percent of the seaports facing the greatest risk of a terrorist attack. But because the FBI assigns MLAs without assessing the threat and risk of terrorists attacking or using a particular seaport for an attack, MLAs are not necessarily assigned to the most critical ports. Instead, we found that FBI ﬁeld ofﬁces with multiple vital ports may have only one MLA, while other FBI ﬁeld ofﬁces with only minor maritime activity may have multiple MLAs. For example, one FBI ﬁeld ofﬁce has six signiﬁcant ports in its territory but only one MLA. In contrast, another FBI ﬁeld ofﬁce has no strategic ports in its area but ﬁve MLAs. Furthermore, the FBI does not track the amount of time MLAs or other agents or analysts spend on maritime terrorism. Such tracking would help the FBI determine where its maritime activity is occurring, how much time is being spent on speciﬁc activities such as interagency training or coordination with Coast Guardsponsored Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC), and where additional resources should be deployed. In July 2005, during the course of our audit, the CTD created a Maritime Security Program, which now has responsibility for the MLA program. The Maritime Security Program is intended to be the focal point for the FBI’s maritime efforts, including carrying out the FBI’s responsibilities under the National Strategy for Maritime Security and the strategy’s eight implementing

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plans. Because the Maritime Security Program is a recent initiative, we could not fully assess its impact. It has, however, already changed the MLA program by asking all ﬁeld ofﬁces with MLAs to name an FBI special agent as the ﬁeld ofﬁce’s lead MLA. In addition, the Maritime Security Program plans to visit 30 percent of the nation’s major transportation hubs, metropolitan areas with both a major seaport and major airport. The purpose of the visits is to learn about the vulnerabilities of seaports, the activities of the MLAs, how to improve guidance to the MLAs, and how to better focus the Maritime Security Program. We view this as an indication that the FBI is beginning to consider the threat and risk of maritime terrorism in conducting its Maritime Security Program. The Maritime Security Program has also announced thirteen objectives for FY 2006, many of which we believe will be beneﬁcial and help focus the FBI’s efforts at preventing maritime terrorism. However, we are concerned that these objectives are not described in a way that will allow the program to assess progress toward meeting its goals. In addition, the objectives do not include critical needs such as maritime threat assessments and the identiﬁcation of informants who can provide information on maritime threats.

MARITIME RESPONSE CAPABILITIES The response to terrorist threats or incidents in the maritime domain presents unique challenges to the FBI and other responders. The FBI has several tactical assault options for maritime situations and also the capability to deal with maritime-based weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through • Field ofﬁce SWAT teams, including fourteen teams with some additional maritime training • The Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), which has specialized training and equipment, and is able to assault and take control of a ship whether it is docked or underway • The Hazardous Devices Response Unit, with capabilities to deal with terrorist attacks using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons—including a WMD aboard a ship

The Coast Guard has signiﬁcant responsibilities for enforcing laws in the maritime domain, a role that received an added counterterrorism component with the passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act in 2002. This act required the Coast Guard to create Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST) capable of rapidly responding to threats of maritime terrorism. The Coast Guard has 13 MSSTs nation-wide. At the same time, the FBI created enhanced maritime SWAT teams to enable it to work better with the Coast Guard’s MSSTs. Nearly all of the FBI’s teams are located in the FBI ﬁeld ofﬁce closest to an MSST.

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OVERLAPPING RESPONSIBILITIES Ofﬁcials at the FBI and the Coast Guard agreed that the Maritime Transportation Security Act created overlapping responsibilities between the agencies. This overlap has the potential to confuse the respective responses of the FBI and the Coast Guard to a maritime-based terrorism incident. For example, the FBI ofﬁcials with whom we spoke were unsure of MSST capabilities and were concerned that these Coast Guard tactical teams might duplicate the FBI’s HRT and SWAT teams. Based on our discussions with FBI personnel, we believe the HRT has unique capabilities to board, assault, and take control of a ship, whether it is docked or underway. Prior to the release of the Maritime Operational Threat Response plan, ofﬁcials from both the FBI and the Coast Guard agreed that the MOTR should resolve jurisdictional issues. However, the MOTR issued in October 2005 is an interim plan, which FBI ofﬁcials say does not clearly delineate the respective roles of the Coast Guard and the FBI. In our opinion, a lack of jurisdictional clarity in the MOTR could hinder the ability of the FBI and the Coast Guard to coordinate an effective response to a terrorist threat or incident in the maritime domain. Speciﬁcally, we are concerned about how confusion over authorities will affect the two agencies’ ability to establish a clear and effective incident command structure. [Although] a ﬁnal MOTR plan may resolve the problem of overlapping roles, we believe the FBI should propose an MOU to the Coast Guard and conduct joint exercises with the Coast Guard to resolve any coordination or incident command issues. Compared to the FBI-Coast Guard relationship, the relationship between the FBI and CBP is better deﬁned, given the more distinctive roles of each agency. The FBI, for example, does not have a direct role in cargo inspection. Consequently, the coordination required between the two agencies centers on intelligence sharing and notiﬁcation in the event of a threat or incident.

LESSON LEARNED Exercises, whether operational or incident command exercises, can provide valuable lessons and identify best practices for improving future response capabilities. FBI policy requires the preparation and dissemination of afteraction reports following exercises and major operations. However, the FBI was unable to provide after-action reports for most maritime exercises, and we concluded that reports were not prepared for all exercises. During FYs 2002–2005, the FBI prepared reports for six of nineteen maritime-related exercises or incidents. Most of these six involved interagency exercises with the Coast Guard and other elements of the DHS, such as CBP. We reviewed the FBI’s afteraction reports and found that most raised concerns about interagency incident response in the following areas: communication, adequacy or coordination of resources, command and control coordination, and jurisdiction or authority. According to an acting unit chief in the FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group,

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the FBI has not systematically reviewed these after-action reports to identify and disseminate the lessons learned from these exercises. Due to the critical need for the FBI to resolve any jurisdictional, communications, or incident command and response issues, we believe the FBI should prepare after-action reports and take action on the lessons learned from all interagency and FBI maritime terrorism exercises.

SCOPE OF THE MARITIME THREAT The FBI faces a difﬁcult challenge in trying to cover all likely terrorist tactics and targets, given the many types of infrastructure in the United States and the huge number of potential targets. Although the FBI has conducted general terrorist threat assessments, it has neither conducted nor reviewed a threat assessment that indicates where seaports and the maritime domain rank among the tactics and likely targets of terrorists. Assessing the maritime threat would be useful not only to deﬁne the nature, likelihood, and severity of the threat compared to other threats, but also to allow FBI managers and others to make informed decisions about resource allocation. In reviewing the FBI’s maritime-related intelligence reports over the four years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we found that the FBI tended to focus on just two potential tactics: attacks by scuba divers or combat swimmers and inﬁltration of the United States by various maritime methods. We are concerned that the FBI may not be devoting its intelligence resources to assessing high-risk maritime areas. For example, although terrorists have indicated a strong desire to use a WMD, and vessels can be used to transport a WMD for detonation in a port or elsewhere, none of the FBI’s intelligence reports assessed the threat and risk of terrorists smuggling a WMD in a shipping container aboard a cargo ship. The FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence establishes requirements for meeting the FBI’s intelligence needs but does not follow up to ensure that the FBI’s operational divisions and ﬁeld ofﬁces are working to address these requirements concerning maritime or other threats. Therefore, intelligence questions about terrorists’ maritime intentions and plans may go unanswered. Further, the FBI does not correlate its list of intelligence requirements with its intelligence reports. This lack of linkage hampers the FBI from readily identifying those intelligence reports that answer intelligence questions about maritime terrorism. Consequently, the FBI might have intelligence about maritime terrorism that is not easily located within the intelligence reports. However, we found that the Directorate of Intelligence is aware of these shortcomings and has several initiatives ongoing to ensure that the FBI addresses its intelligencegathering requirements in the maritime domain and other areas. The FBI has not collected complete data on the number of suspicious activities or terrorist threats involving seaports. However, using a database

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called the Guardian Threat Tracking System (Guardian), the FBI appears to be making signiﬁcant progress in identifying, tracking, and internally sharing information on maritime and other terrorist threats and suspicious incidents. However, Guardian cannot be easily searched to identify trends in maritime-related suspicious activities or threats, and the FBI has not ensured that FBI ofﬁces comply with directives concerning the use of Guardian and the need to document the resolution of all incidents entered in Guardian. The number of Guardian entries varies greatly by ﬁeld ofﬁce, with two ﬁeld ofﬁces accounting for 21 percent of the entries made by ﬁeld ofﬁces. Also, as of August 2005, Guardian contained about 6,000 entries that showed no outcome of any follow-up or investigation. According to FBI ofﬁcials, a new version of Guardian, scheduled to be deployed in March 2006, will enhance the FBI’s ability to search the database for maritime-related incidents. But the success of Guardian and the FBI’s ability to identify trends in suspicious incidents, including maritime-related incidents, is highly dependent on ﬁeld agents using the system as required. Through our review of the FBI’s maritime-related intelligence reports, we identiﬁed useful initiatives at the FBI’s Chicago, Newark, and Seattle ﬁeld ofﬁces. Chicago and Newark issue intelligence bulletins discussing maritimerelated incidents to other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. A Seattle intelligence assessment used a weighted ranking system to evaluate whether a given maritime-related suspicious incident was indicative of preoperational planning for a terrorist attack. We believe that the FBI should consider making greater use of these initiatives.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The FBI faces a difﬁcult task in protecting the nation from all potential terrorist targets and methods, and seaports are just one type of critical infrastructure that requires protection. Yet due to the vulnerability of seaports and maritime activities to a terrorist attack, the FBI has a responsibility to not only provide the resources needed to ensure an adequate response capability and intelligence gathering and sharing, but also to contribute to an effective, coordinated government response to any maritime-related terrorist threat. The FBI recognizes the general threat of maritime-based terrorism due to the inherent vulnerability of seaports, and it has established a Maritime Security Program, assigned MLAs to many FBI ﬁeld ofﬁces to coordinate with other agencies involved in securing the nation’s seaports (although the FBI should ensure that MLAs are assigned to the higher-risk locations), participated in Coast Guard-sponsored AMSCs, and trained and equipped tactical assault forces and hazardous materials experts that can operate in the maritime domain. To ensure an effective federal government response to maritime ter-

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rorism, the overlapping responsibilities, jurisdictions, and capabilities of the FBI and the Coast Guard need to be sorted out before an incident occurs and not during an incident. Unfortunately, the MTSA and the MOTR plan have not eliminated the potential for interagency conﬂict and confusion in the event of a terrorist incident at a seaport or elsewhere in the maritime domain. The shared responsibility among the FBI, Coast Guard, and to a lesser extent CBP, to ensure the safety of U.S. seaports requires the FBI to update the 1979 MOU or otherwise come to agreement with the Coast Guard on each agency’s respective roles and authorities. Once such agreement is reached on incident command and related issues, the FBI should emphasize leading or participating in more interagency maritime-related exercises involving likely terrorism scenarios. Such exercises are important to identify and resolve any problems or misunderstandings over jurisdiction, incident command, communications, tactical operations, or other matters that might impede the swift and effective resolution of a maritime terrorist incident. In addition, the FBI should ensure that it gleans lessons learned and best practices from all interagency maritime-related exercises to help resolve any disputes, confusion, or communications problems and improve its response capabilities. The FBI has not speciﬁcally assessed the threat and risk of terrorism at U.S. seaports, although it is addressing aspects of seaport security in its intelligence gathering and reporting activities. However, in addition to assessing the threat and risk of maritime-based terrorism, the FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence should better track how the FBI’s ﬁeld ofﬁces are addressing the FBI’s intelligence collection requirements pertaining to seaport security. The FBI is in the process of enhancing the search capabilities of its Guardian threatmonitoring database used to identify and track threats and suspicious activities, including those at seaports. However, the FBI needs to ensure that the database is more universally applied throughout FBI ﬁeld ofﬁces and that the entries receive prompt follow-up or investigation. In our report, we make eighteen recommendations to the FBI to help enhance the FBI’s contributions to the security of U.S. seaports. Among our recommendations are that the FBI • Resolve potential role and incident command conﬂicts in the event of a maritime terrorist incident through joint exercises and, if necessary, a revised and broadened MOU with the Coast Guard • Ensure that the Maritime Security Program has measurable objectives • Assign MLAs based on an assessment of the threat and risk of a terrorist attack to critical seaports • Prepare after-action reports after all maritime-related exercises and use the reports to identify and disseminate lessons learned and best practices • Assess the threat and risk of maritime terrorism compared to other terrorist threats • Focus intelligence reporting to more comprehensively address potential maritime-related terrorist targets and methods

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• Monitor the progress of operating divisions and ﬁeld ofﬁces in answering intelligence-collection requirements pertaining to seaports and maritime terrorism

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION Q&A SESSION Admiral Thomas Fargo USN Commander, U.S. Paciﬁc Command Before the House Armed Services Committee March 31, 2004*

Representative Larsen: I was here. I had to step out for a meeting. I’m sure that was the case. Admiral Fargo, in your testimony you talked about your maritime security initiative and how it’s part of the PSI. I think I gathered that—Proliferation Security Initiative. Could you update us on how that cooperation is working? Could you just give us a feeling of operationally how it’s working, what hasn’t worked and how we can improve it? Admiral Fargo: Congressman, I’d be happy to. We have proposed what’s called the Regional Maritime Security Initiative, which I believe will help operationalize the policy that’s been set forth in PSI. Fundamentally we don’t have as clear a view of the sea space, the maritime space, as we do the airspace today. An aircraft takes off today—we know where it’s going, who’s on board, and we know its status pretty much throughout its trip. We can’t say that about the sea space right now. And we certainly know that an awful lot of the transnational threat and transnational crime is communicated through the sea space. And by that I mean terrorism and the trafﬁcking in drugs and humans and piracy, and so on. So our proposal is that we need to put together an architecture, if you will, that allows us to share information and share intelligence that puts standing operating procedures in place with the countries of the region, such that we can take effective action against this illicit activity. There’s very large, widespread support for this initiative. I just came back from Singapore and had a very solid conversation with the “Sings,” and they’re going to help us with *

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Rep. Larsen:

Adm. Fargo:

Rep. Larsen: Adm. Fargo:

Terror on the High Seas this. My instinct, it probably ought to start at the Straits of Malacca and work its way out, because the Straits of Malacca are fundamental to the movement of all of the energy through the region. So this is a pretty large and complex undertaking, but I think it’s particularly important for our future. We need to know who’s moving through the sea space. We need to know the status of those ships. We need participation from the vast majority of them so that we can single out and cue on those that aren’t within the law. A couple of questions on that. Although this is—the PSI is a relatively new initiative from the administration, certainly it seems to be an important one to help us with proliferation threats. However, how new is it for you, and do you need new resources to speciﬁcally do it? Second, a lot of the countries that are part of the PSI are not in this region. Australia is, but, you know, Spain and Portugal and the UK, and so on. So what kind of cooperation do you expect from—you mentioned Singapore, but other countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, any other country that we can point to as a partner in the War on Terrorism? Well, I certainly expect expanding cooperation on PSI. You know, most recently India has indicated to us that they’d like to be part of PSI. Singapore has recently joined. And certainly with respect to the Regional Maritime Security Initiative, I expect a very broad range of support. All of the countries in the region are concerned about the transnational threat. As I mentioned, it’s terrorism and proliferation, but even the trafﬁcking in humans is a concern. So we need to gain control of the sea space. I think you’ll ﬁnd that all of the countries in the region have an equity here and a means to make a contribution, however modest. Do you feel you’re adequately resourced to implement this? Well, I think we’re going to have to do—we’re going to have to rely on some old capabilities that we’ve used in the past in the war on drugs—our ability to conduct detection and monitoring; our ability, as we have enforced previous embargoes, to do maritime interdiction operations. These are skill sets that apply also with this particular requirement. But I think we’re also going to have to take a look at how we transform our capability to deal with it. You know, we’re looking at things like high-speed vessels, putting Special Operations Forces on high-speed vessels, putting,

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Rep. Larsen:

Adm. Fargo:

Rep. Larsen:

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potentially, Marines on high-speed vessels so that we can use boats that might be incorporated with these vessels to conduct effective interdiction in, once again, these sea lines of communications where terrorists are known to move about and transmit throughout the region. Just quickly, one last question, something different. [Are] any decisions made or thoughts given to repositioning existing aircraft carriers into—from the West Coast, or the East Coast for that matter, into the Paciﬁc? Well, I think as we’ve stated pretty clearly, we’re taking a look at the global integrated force posture and footprint, and certainly this will be one of the key issues that we look at as part of this total review. You know, the importance of Asia and the Paciﬁc I think is well understood and has been stated clearly by the president. It’s very important to the future. Forty-four percent of the gross domestic product of the world right now is just in Northeast Asia alone, when you take a look at the United States and China and Japan and the Republic of Korea. And that’s only going to grow. So the importance of the Paciﬁc and East Asia is going to be tremendously important in the security of our country. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. COAST GUARD INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY Vice Admiral D. Brian Peterman Commander Atlantic Area, U.S. Coast Guard 6th Regional Seapower Symposium for the Navies of the Mediterranean and Black Sea Countries Venice, Italy, October 10–13, 2006*

Good morning. Thank you for inviting me here to participate in the Italian Navy’s 6th Regional Seapower Symposium. I also extend warm greetings to all the Chiefs of Navies here today. It is an honor to be invited to speak to a distinguished group of international military and industry leaders. Today we are here to discuss the quest for trans-regional dimension. In the United States Coast Guard, we consider this the outer layers of a layered

*

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defense. It is our maritime security mantra, not to be confused with national defense operations. Everyone in this room would agree it is better to stop a threat, terrorist or environmental in nature, as far from our shores as possible. To do this we must rely on our international friends and partners—we must rely on you to help us reach this goal. Similarly, we want to help you with your maritime security needs in a similar fashion. The United States Coast Guard’s maritime security strategy is based on partnerships and interoperability with our international, federal, state, local, and industry partners. This recognizes the fact that no one agency or country can provide the type of protection needed for global maritime security. The famous fableist Aesop stated “in union there is strength.” That is the theme of my talk today—international partnership to assure maritime security. The United States Coast Guard has the strongest alliances with our international partners [of] any agency in the federal government, outside of our Department of State. We developed international relations in the search and rescue program, built upon them as lead federal agency to the International Maritime Organization, and solidiﬁed them in International Ship and Port Facility Security Code interactions. We are proud that we can work closely with many countries of the world to ensure the safety and security of people, property, and waterways. That is our mission, and we strive to be the best that we can be. For over ﬁfty years, the Coast Guard has led the United States effort with the International Maritime Organization to establish worldwide minimum safety and security standards for maritime transportation. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, focused international attention on strengthening maritime security. The International Maritime Organization subsequently implemented the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code to establish minimum security standards for signatory nation port facilities and ships. This international regime is improving security at ports of departure, pushing the security border out for each of us. In the United States, Congress enacted the Maritime Transportation Security Act to signiﬁcantly strengthen the security of United States ports and to ensure compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. The regulation requires completion of security assessments, development of security plans, and implementation of security measures and procedures to reduce the risk and mitigate the exposure of United States ports and waterways to terrorist activity. The International Maritime Organization’s International Ship and Port Facility Security Code is the basis of the United States Coast Guard’s International Port Security Program. This Coast Guard program encourages bilateral or multilateral discussions with nations around the world in an effort to exchange information and share best practices that align implementation and enforcement requirements for the International Ship and Port Facility Secu-

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rity Code and other international maritime security standards. The Coast Guard’s International Port Security Program has worked closely with the European Union to establish a strong relationship to further improve practices in both our ports. On September 23, my International Port Security Liaison Ofﬁcers completed a visit to Morocco and came back with great information to share. That same date, a South African delegation completed a trip to the ports of Savannah, Georgia; Tampa, Florida; and New York/New Jersey along with visits to Coast Guard Headquarters and the National Vessel Movement Center in Washington DC. This week a Mexican delegation is visiting the United States ports of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and Houston, Texas to see how we perform port security at facilities. Next week, my liaison ofﬁcers will be visiting Bulgaria. This open communication is an extremely effective tool for international cooperation and maritime security. The Coast Guard is working with our Department of State to negotiate bilateral agreements under the President’s Proliferation Security Initiative, a framework of international cooperation to stop the spread or proliferation of weapons of mass destructions and its precursors. We have completed agreements with Panama, Marshall Islands, Liberia, and Croatia, with more agreements expected in the near future. The United States Coast Guard sponsored a highly successful Proliferation Security Initiative exercise in the summer of 2004 in which we worked with Italy, France, Great Britain, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and many other countries to stop a weapon of mass destruction in transit from the Mediterranean to the United States. There is an active international Proliferation Security Initiative exercise schedule, as well as regional exercises, in which the United States Coast Guard continues to participate. It is an outstanding means to improve international cooperation and interoperability to combat terrorism. In another initiative through our Department of State, the Coast Guard is working with the International Maritime Organization for the adoption of crucial amendments to the 1988 Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Maritime Navigation (the Rome Convention) to enable better cooperation between nations to stop maritime terrorism. The amendments will establish a foundation for bilateral agreements between the United States and international partners. One key component of such bilateral agreements is more expeditious consent of the ﬂag state for the United States to board and examine foreign vessels in international waters that may pose a risk to our homeland. With thousands of square miles of Atlantic Ocean, there is a concern about sea approaches, which are difﬁcult to monitor. The Mediterranean and Black Sea communities are concerned with approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar, while the United States Coast Guard is concerned with approaches to our Atlantic seaboard and Gulf of Mexico. The United States mandates a 96-hour Advanced Notice of Arrival, which has been a key component of maritime

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domain awareness. The reporting requirements include information on vessels, crew, passengers, and any dangerous cargoes. Interagency partners within the United States analyze and share that information to improve security screening of arriving vessels, the people aboard, and what they carry. Our Captains of the Port and other agencies use that information and risk analysis to determine what ofﬁcial action, if any, will be conducted on an arriving vessel. The International Maritime Organization recently adopted a long-range identiﬁcation and tracking regulation that will allow coastal nations to have information about ships navigating off their coasts for security and search and rescue purposes, while maintaining the right of ﬂag states to protect information about their ships. This is another large step toward maritime domain awareness for all signatory nations. The United States Coast Guard continuously engages in exercises, both large and small, with our Canadian, Mexican, and Caribbean neighbors. These exercises deﬁne concept of operations for future actual events, improve communications, and allow North American neighbors to work alongside each other in a uniﬁed defense of our continent. I stated in the beginning that the United States Coast Guard maritime security strategy is a cooperative effort between international, federal, state, local, and industrial partners. In the international arena, we strive to improve our ability to protect our mutual ports in our efforts through the International Maritime Organization, exercises with international allies, and sharing best practices. Henry Ford stated, “Coming together is a beginning. Keeping together is progress. Working together is success.” We are successful. I look forward to our future cooperative efforts, which will ensure future success. The United States Coast Guard is proud to be your partner in international maritime security. Thank you again for inviting me to speak at this important occasion. Semper Paratus!

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Terror on the High Seas From Piracy to Strategic Challenge Volume 2 Yonah Alexander and Tyler B. Richardson, editors

Forewords by James Arden Barnett, Jr., Robert J. Cox, and Ingar Skaug

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC

Copyright 2009 by Yonah Alexander and Tyler B. Richardson All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Terror on the high seas : from piracy to strategic challenge / Yonah Alexander and Tyler B. Richardson, eds. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-0-275-99750-2 (hard copy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99751-9 (ebook) 1. Piracy. 2. Maritime terrorism. 3. Piracy—United States. 4. Maritime terrorism— United States. I. Alexander, Yonah. II. Richardson, Tyler B. K5277.T47 2009 345'.0264—dc22 2009022867 13

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents

Foreword by James Arden Barnett, Jr. Foreword by Robert J. Cox

xxiii xxv

Foreword by Ingar Skaug

xxvii

Preface

xxix

Acknowledgments

xlvii

VOLUME 1 1

Maritime Terrorism: An Overview of Challenges and Responses

1

Yonah Alexander

2

A Deﬁnitional Perspective

2

Historical and Contemporary Threats

8

Responses: Unilateral and Multilateral

24

Observations and Conclusions

33

Maritime Security and Terrorism: Some Interdisciplinary Perspectives (1981) History of the High Seas: Moral Defense for a Maritime Civilization

41 41

Jeffrey St. John

The Role of Maritime Industry in Defense of ‘Free World’ Nations Admiral (Ret.) Thomas H. Moore

44

Contents

vi

International Terrorism: Unconventional Warfare

46

Yonah Alexander

Maritime Terrorism

51

Brian Jenkins

Status of ‘Free World’ Maritime Contingency Planning

56

D. N. Cassidy

Status of ‘Free World’ Maritime Contingency Planning

58

Paul Wilkinson

Status of ‘Free World’ Maritime Contingency Planning

61

RADM Wayne E. Caldwell

Offshore Terrorism: Are We Prepared?

63

Congressman Carroll Hubbard

Offshore & Maritime Pipeline Facilities

66

Paul Wilkinson

Shipping & Maritime Terminals

68

Col. (Ret., U.S. Army) Douglas G. Macnair

Maritime Security—A National Dilemma

70

Capt. (Ret., USCGR) A. Robert Matt & Robert L. Patcha (Ret., USCGR)

3

Achille Lauro Hijacking: Case Study (1985)

75

Selected Executive Statements On the Achille Lauro Hijacking Incident

75

Larry M. Speakes Principle Deputy Press Secretary October 10, 1985

Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters

77

President Ronald Reagan October 11, 1985

“On the Italian Government’s Release of Palestinian Terrorist, Abu el Abbas” Larry M. Speakes Principle Deputy Press Secretary October 13, 1985

80

Contents

vii

Selected Congressional Statements Mr. Arafat Owes the World Some Explanations

81

Congressman Charles E. Schumer October 9, 1985

The Ugly Face of Terrorism

82

Senator Mark O. Hatﬁeld October 10, 1985

Resolution Condemning the Murder of Leon Klinghoffer

84

Congressman Ted Weiss October 10, 1985

Striking Back

85

Congressman Bob McEwen October 11, 1985

Condemning Egyptian Actions in the Achille Lauro Affair

86

Congressman Harry Reid October 15, 1985

Cutting Off Aid to Egypt

87

Congressman George Darden October 16, 1985

America’s Allies Offer Scant Support of Antiterrorism Efforts

88

Congressman Eldon Rudd October 16, 1985

Victory over Terrorism

88

Congresswoman Barbara A. Mikulski October 17, 1985

The Killing of Leon Klinghoffer by International Terrorists aboard the Achille Lauro

89

Senator Robert Byrd and Senator Allen K. Simpson March 27, 1986

Commemorating Achille Lauro’s 10th Anniversary

91

Senator Alfonse M. D’Amato October 26, 1995

Court Case Ilsa and Lisa Klinghoffer v. Achille Lauro, 1991

92

Contents

viii

4

USS Cole Bombing: Case Study (2000)

107

The Investigation into the Attack on the USS Cole, May 2001 Report of the House Armed Services Committee Staff Executive Summary

107

Introduction

110

The Genesis of the HASC Investigation

110

The Department of Defense and Department of the Navy Investigations

112

The Navy Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) Report

115

U.S. Central Command and Its Area of Responsibility

116

The U.S. Policy of Engagement

118

Intelligence

121

Collection Analysis Dissemination

122 123 124

Threat Levels and Threat Conditions

126

Vulnerability Assessments

128

Force Protection

129

The Navy’s Antiterrorism/Force Protection Training Program

130

Force Protection Measures and the Rules of Engagement

131

Operational Issues

136

Appendices Appendix A: Summary of Observations and Recommendations Appendix B: List of Brieﬁngs and Interviews Appendix C: Threat Condition (THREATCON) Measures 5

Threats and United States Responses to Maritime Challenges

141 145 147

155

Border Protection and Customs

155

Federal Law Enforcement

155

Admiral James M. Loy Department of Transportation, United States Coast Guard Before the Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources December 5, 2001

Contents

ix

Port Safety

160

Douglas M. Browning Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, and Merchant Marine July 2, 2002

U.S. Customs Service’s Counterterrorism Efforts at Home and Abroad

163

Robert C. Bonner U.S. Customs Commissioner Foreign Press Center Brieﬁng, Washington DC January 14, 2003

CBP Expands Enforcement of the 24-Hour Rule

166

Customs and Border Protection, United States Department of Homeland Security May 1, 2003

Review of CBP Actions Taken to Intercept Suspected Terrorists at U.S. Ports of Entry

167

Ofﬁce of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security June 2006

Port Security

169

The Interim Final Regulations on Port Security

169

Admiral Thomas H. Collins U.S. Coast Guard Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation July 22, 2003

“President Discusses Port Security”

171

President George W. Bush Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary, The White House February 21, 2006

“Testimony of Susan J. Monteverde” Vice President American Association of Port Authorities Before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Homeland Security February 13, 2007

172

Contents

x

Container Security

176

Container Security

176

Capitan Anthony Regalbuto United States Coast Guard Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Marine Transportation March 13, 2002

Container Security Initiative: 2006–2011 Strategic Plan

178

Ofﬁce of Policy and Planning Ofﬁce of International Affairs, Container Security Initiative Division, United States Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security August 2006

United States Government Accountability Ofﬁce “Supply Chain Security”

181

To the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Investigations, and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce January 2008

Transportation Security

186

International Maritime Security

186

Michael J. Crye President, International Council of Cruise Lines Before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, and the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources December 13, 2005

6

U.S. Organizational Structure: The Role of the Executive

197

Interagency Framework

197

“Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat”

197

GAO Report May 2003

The White House

202

“National Maritime Day Proclamations”

202

President George W. Bush 2001–2007

Contents

xi

Maritime Security Policy

209

National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13 December 21, 2004

The National Strategy for Maritime Security

217

The White House September 2005

Department of Homeland Security

219

Fact Sheet, Port Security: A Comprehensive Approach

219

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary June 2003

Secure Seas, Open Ports: Keeping Our Waters Safe, Secure, and Open for Business

224

United States Department of Homeland Security June 21, 2004

DHS Announces West Coast Maritime Radiation Detection Project

231

Department of Homeland Security, Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary September 5, 2007

United States Coast Guard

232

Port and Maritime Security Strategy

232

Admiral James M. Loy United States Coast Guard Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation December 6, 2001

Coast Guard and America’s Security

236

United States Coast Guard 2002

Before the Gathering Storm Admiral Thomas H. Collins National Defense University Distinguished Lecture Program, Washington DC October 9, 2002

239

Contents

xii

A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-First-Century Seapower

249

Admiral Thad W. Allen Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security Before the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives December 13, 2007

Department of Transportation

256

Port Security: A National Planning Guide

256

United States Department of Transportation 1997

Security of U.S. Ports

268

The Honorable Norman Y. Mineta Secretary of Transportation Before House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation December 6, 2001

The Security of Our Seaports

275

William G. Schubert Maritime Administrator Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information February 26, 2002

Department of Defense

281

Hearing on the President’s FY 2005 Budget Request for the Department of Defense

281

General Richard B. Myers, USAF Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before the Committee on Armed Services May 12, 2004

A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-First Century Seapower

284

United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, and United States Coast Guard October 2007

Commanders Discuss AFRICOM and Maritime Partnership General William Ward and Admiral Henry Ulrich Commander, U.S. Africa Command and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe United States Department of Defense, Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) October 15, 2007

295

Contents

xiii

Federal Maritime Commission

302

Remarks by Harold J. Creel Chairman, Federal Maritime Commission 2nd International Gwangyang Port Forum Gwangyang, Korea April 25, 2002

Scanning the Horizon: Some Observations on the Changing Maritime Scene

304

Steven R. Blust Chairman, Federal Maritime Commission At the Plimsoll Club, New Orleans, Louisiana October 27, 2006

State Department

310

Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea

310

Maureen O’C. Walker Acting Deputy Director, Ofﬁce of Oceans Affairs U.S. Statement to the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and Law of the Sea New York, New York May 10, 2001

International Outreach and Coordination Strategy for the National Strategy for Maritime Security

313

United States Department of State November 2005

Preventing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism in the Maritime Supply Chain

319

Thomas Lehrman Director, Ofﬁce of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Maritime Security Expo New York, New York September 20, 2006

Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Ratiﬁcation of the 1994 Agreement Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention John D. Negroponte Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of State Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee September 27, 2007

325

Contents

xiv

Federal Bureau of Investigation

337

Homeland Security: Facilitating Trade and Securing Seaports

337

James F. Jarobe Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations August 5, 2002

Covering the Waterfront—A Review of Seaport Security since September 11, 2001

344

Gary M. Bald Acting Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security January 27, 2004

The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Protect the Nation’s Seaports

348

Audit Report 06–26 Ofﬁce of the Inspector General-Audit Division, United States Department of Justice March 2006

International Cooperation

357

Q&A Session

357

Admiral Thomas Fargo USN Commander, U.S. Paciﬁc Command Before the House Armed Services Committee March 31, 2004

U.S. Coast Guard International Maritime Security Strategy Vice Admiral D. Brian Peterman Commander Atlantic Area, U.S. Coast Guard 6th Regional Seapower Symposium for the Navies of the Mediterranean and Black Sea Countries Venice, Italy October 10–13, 2006

359

Contents

xv

VOLUME 2 7

U.S. Organizational Structure: The Role of the Legislature

363

Selected Congressional Research Service and Government Accountability Ofﬁce Reports

363

Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain

363

Margaret Wrightson Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues Government Accountability Ofﬁce Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation May 17, 2005

Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities

383

John F. Frittelli and Paul W. Parfomak Analysts in Transportation, Resources, Science, and Industry Division Congressional Research Service Report for Congress January 9, 2007

Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act Status and Implementation One Year Later

390

Stephen L. Caldwell Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues Government Accountability Ofﬁce Before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism October 20, 2007

Congressional Hearings

393

Seaport Security Hearing in Seattle

393

Senator Patty Murray July 1, 2002

Contents

xvi

Department of Homeland Security Law Enforcement Efforts at U.S. Ports of Entry

397

Representatives Howard Coble, North Carolina, and Robert C. Scott, Virginia Opening Statements Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security March 15, 2005

Legislation

400

Protecting America’s Ports, Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002

400

United States Department of Homeland Security, Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary July 2003

Presidential Statement on the Port Security Improvement Act of 2006

411

President George W. Bush The White House, Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary September 14, 2006

8

International Perspectives: Regional and Global Regional Perspectives Southeast Asia ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Security

417 417 417 417

Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum June 17, 2003

APEC and Maritime Security Measures

420

Ambassador Makarim Wibisono Chairman of the APEC Counterterrorism Task Force Presented to the APEC High-Level Conference on Maritime Security Manila, Philippines September 8–9, 2003

Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia ReCAAP Agreement, Tokyo, Japan November 11, 2004

425

Contents

xvii

The Batam Joint Statement of the 4th Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the Littoral States on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore

433

Batam, Indonesia August 2, 2005

Factsheet on the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)

435

ReCAAP Information Sharing Center November 29, 2006

Counterterrorism in Maritime Operations

438

Philip Ruddock Attorney General, Australia Port and Maritime Security and Counterterrorism Summit 2007 Langham Hotel, Melbourne, Australia May 1, 2007

Africa Pirates Pursue American Ship

444 444

U.S. Overseas Security Advisory Council, Safety & Security Sub-Saharan Africa—Somalia December 22, 2006

Coordinated Action Urged as Piracy Threatens UN Lifeline to Somalia

445

Joint Communiqué, IMO Brieﬁng 23 International Maritime Organization July 10, 2007

Africa Command: A Historic Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement—If Done Right

448

Dr. J. Peter Pham Director, the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs James Madison University Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health August 2, 2007

Public Announcement East Africa Consular Affairs Bulletins U.S. Overseas Security Advisory Council August 31, 2007

458

Contents

xviii

South America & the Caribbean Naval Forces from Eight Countries Train to Protect Panama Canal

459 459

Press Release Embassy of the United States, Panama August 10, 2004

Argentina Becomes the First South American Country to Sign Container Security Initiative Declaration of Principles

461

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Ofﬁce of Public Affairs May 11, 2005

Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin

462

Stephen L. Caldwell Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, General Accountability Ofﬁce Government Accountability Ofﬁce Report Summary June 29, 2007

Global Multilateral Perspectives European Union (EU) EU Presidency Statement—Piracy at Sea

468 468 468

EU statement in discussion panel B: Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea, European Union at United Nations, New York City Dr. Marie Jacobsson Alternate Head of Delegation of Sweden on behalf of the European Union May 10, 2001

An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels October 10, 2007

473

Contents

xix

NATO Combating Terrorism in the Mediterranean

475 475

Vice Admiral Roberto Cesaretti Commander, NATO Operation Endeavour NATO Review, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Autumn 2005

Combating Terrorism at Sea

480

NATO Active Endeavour Brieﬁng: NATO Naval Operations, Proliferation Security Initiative, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, North Atlantic Treaty Organization June 2006

United Nations Convention on the High Seas

485 485

United Nations April 29, 1958

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Overview and Full Text

495

United Nations Ofﬁce of Legal Affairs, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea December 10, 1982

Maritime Security, ISPS Code Implementation, Costs, and Related Financing

497

UNCTAD Secretariat United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations March 14, 2007

International Maritime Organization Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts against Passengers and Crews on Board Ships

501 501

International Maritime Organization September 26, 1986

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation International Maritime Organization March 10, 1988

505

Contents

xx

Focus on IMO: Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea

511

International Maritime Organization January 2000

IMO Adopts Comprehensive Maritime Security Measures

523

Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 International Maritime Organization December 9–13, 2002

IMO 2004: Focus on Maritime Security

532

World Maritime Day 2004 Background Paper International Maritime Organization September 27, 2004

Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia

550

International Maritime Organization Resolution A.[...] (25) (Agenda item 19(a)) Adopted on November 29, 2007

9

Private-Sector Perspectives: Industry and Trade Organizations Intercargo Direction Paper

561 561

International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners January 24, 2001

Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism against Shipping, Port and Maritime Security, Guidance for the Development of Ship and Port Security Plans

567

International Association of Ports and Harbors and International Chamber of Shipping Maritime Safety Committee, 75th Session Agenda Item 17

International Maritime Organization April 12, 2002

Port and Maritime Security International Association of Ports and Harbors IAPH Policy and Guidance Paper April 23, 2002

572

Contents

xxi

BIMCO’s Vision and Objectives

578

The Baltic and International Maritime Council June 17, 2004

An Introduction to the IFSMA

579

International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations October 2004

Remarks of Christopher Koch

581

President and CEO World Shipping Council Before the Maritime Security Expo 2006 New York City September 19, 2006

Selected Bibliography

595

Index

603

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7

U.S. Organizational Structure: The Role of the Legislature

SELECTED CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORTS MARITIME SECURITY: PROGRESS MADE IN IMPLEMENTING MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT, BUT CONCERNS REMAIN Margaret Wrightson Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues Government Accountability Ofﬁce Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation May 17, 2005*

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the nation’s efforts to improve seaport security. More than 3 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, seaport security continues to be a major concern for the nation. For *

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05448t.pdf

364

Terror on the High Seas

example, many seaport areas are inherently vulnerable, given their size, easy accessibility by water and land, large numbers of potential targets, and proximity to urban areas. Also, the large cargo volumes passing through seaports, such as containers destined for further shipment by other modes of transportation such as rail or truck, also represent a potential conduit for terrorists to smuggle weapons of mass destruction or other dangerous materials into the United States. The potential consequences of the risks created by these vulnerabilities are signiﬁcant as the nation’s economy relies on an expeditious ﬂow of goods through seaports. A successful attack on a seaport could result in a dramatic slowdown in the supply system, with consequences in the billions of dollars. Much has been set in motion to address these risks in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Both Congress and the administration have been active, through legislation, presidential directives, and international agreements, in enhancing seaport security. Key agencies, such as the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), have been reorganized under the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and tasked with numerous responsibilities designed to strengthen seaport security. Many of these tasks were required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA).1 My testimony today draws primarily on the work we have done in responding to congressional requests for information and analysis about the nation’s homeland security efforts [...] We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, and the scope and methodology for this work can be found in the respective products. Over the course of completing this work, we have made a number of recommendations for speciﬁc agencies [...] While this body of work does not cover every program or action that has been taken, it does encompass a wide range of these actions. My testimony will (1) provide an overview of the types of actions taken by the federal government and other stakeholders to address seaport security, (2) describe the main challenges encountered in taking these actions, and (3) describe what tools and approaches may be useful in charting a course for future actions to enhance security.

IN SUMMARY Seaports are vulnerable on many fronts and the actions taken to secure them can be divided into three main categories: reducing vulnerabilities of speciﬁc targets within seaports, making the cargo ﬂowing through these seaport gateways more secure, and developing what is called “maritime domain awareness”—a sufﬁciently informed view of maritime activities by stakeholders involved in security to quickly identify and respond to emer-

U.S. Organizational Structure

365

gencies, unusual patterns or events, and matters of particular interest. Within each category, several actions have been taken or are under way. For example, assessments of potential targets have been completed at 55 of the nation’s most economically and militarily strategic seaports, and more than 9,000 vessels and over 3,000 facilities have developed security plans and have been reviewed by the Coast Guard. Customs inspectors have been placed at some overseas seaports and partnerships struck up with some private sector stakeholders to help ensure that the cargo and containers arriving at U.S. seaports are free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or a radiological “dirty bomb.” New assets are budgeted and are coming on line, including new Coast Guard boats and cutters and communication systems. Finally, new information-sharing networks and command structures have been created to allow more coordinated responses and increase awareness of activities going on in the maritime domain. Some of these efforts have been completed and others are ongoing; overall, the amount of effort has been considerable. The efforts we have reviewed over the past three years, many of which were quickly implemented to address pressing security needs, have encountered challenges that could signiﬁcantly affect their success. Some of these challenges are likely to be resolved with time, but some reﬂect greater difﬁculty and therefore merit more attention. The more complex challenges take three main forms: • Program design and implementation: Some agencies have failed to design programs and planning components, such as human capital plans and performance measures, that are necessary to successfully implement their programs and ensure they are effective. For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) started implementation of two key container supply chain security initiatives before taking adequate steps to develop plans and strategies to effectively manage critical aspects of the programs such as human capital and achievement of program objectives. • Coordinating security efforts with stakeholders: Many private sector companies and governmental agencies are involved in seaport security efforts, and in some cases progress has been hampered because of difﬁculties in communication and coordination between parties. For example, deadlines in the development of an identiﬁcation card for transportation workers have been missed due in part to a lack of communication and coordination between TSA and DHS. • Funding security improvements: Economic constraints, such as declining revenues and increased security costs, make it difﬁcult to provide and sustain the funding necessary to continue implementing security measures and activities by maritime stakeholders including the federal government. Consequently, many stakeholders rely heavily on the federal government for assistance, and requests for federal grant funding far outstrip the funding amounts available.

366

Terror on the High Seas

For example, although more than $560 million in grants has been awarded to seaport stakeholders since 2002 under federal grant programs for implementation of security measures and activities, this amount has met only a fraction of the amount requested by these stakeholders.

As actions to enhance homeland security continue, and as it becomes clearer that the price of these actions will be measured in the billions of dollars, it is likely that increasing attention will turn to assessing the progress made in securing seaports and determine where future actions and funds should be allocated to further enhance security. Although there is widespread agreement that actions taken so far have led to a heightened awareness of the need for security and an enhanced ability to identify and respond to many security threats, assessing the degree of progress in making the nation more secure is difﬁcult. Thus far, seaport security actions—and homeland security activities in general—lack performance measures to deﬁne what these activities are intended to achieve and measure progress toward these goals. As Congress and the nation continue to evaluate how much security is enough, more attention on deﬁning these goals and measures will likely be needed by stakeholders. Doing so is all the more important because, as groups such as the 9/11 Commission have pointed out, no amount of money can totally insulate seaports from attack by a well-funded and determined enemy. These realities suggest that the future focus in applying resources and efforts also needs to incorporate an approach to identify and manage risk—that is, on assessing critical infrastructure, determining what is most at risk, and applying sound measures designed to make cost-effective use of resources and funding.

BACKGROUND The vast U.S. maritime system contains more than 300 seaports and 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals. These seaports dot not only our seacoasts but also major lakes and rivers [...] Much of the nation’s commercial maritime activities, however, are concentrated in about a dozen major seaports, such as Los Angeles–Long Beach, New York–New Jersey, and Houston. The nation’s seaports are economic engines and a key part of the national defense system. More than 95 percent of the nation’s non–North American foreign trade (and 100 percent of certain commodities, such as foreign oil) arrives by ship. Cargo containers, approximately 7 million of which entered the country in 2002, are central to an efﬁcient transportation network because they can be quickly shifted from ships to trains and trucks and back again. Because of these efﬁciencies, the U.S. and world economies have become increasingly reliant on cargo containers to transport their goods. With regard to national security, the Departments of Defense and Transportation have

U.S. Organizational Structure

367

designated 17 U.S. seaports as strategic because they are necessary for use in the event of a major military deployment. Thirteen of them are commercial seaports. [Although] the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, did not involve seaports, they called attention to ways in which seaports represent an attractive and vulnerable terrorist target. Various studies have pointed out that signiﬁcant disruptions could result from a seaport-related attack. For example, the Brookings Institution has estimated that costs associated with U.S. seaport closures resulting from a detonated weapon of mass destruction could amount to $1 trillion. The ﬁrm of Booz, Allen, and Hamilton studied the potential cost of discovering an undetonated weapon of mass destruction at a U.S. seaport and placed the cost of a 12-day closure of seaports at approximately $58 billion. An actual closure of seaports along the West Coast occurred for 10 days in 2002 due to a labor dispute. According to one estimate, the cost of this closure to the national economy for the ﬁrst 5 days was estimated at $4.7 billion and increased exponentially after that.2 Similarly, if one or more of the 17 strategic U.S. seaports (or the ships carrying military supplies) were successfully attacked, not only could massive civilian casualties be sustained and critical infrastructure lost, but the military could also lose precious cargo and time and be forced to rely heavily on already burdened airlift capabilities.

MANY ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN OR ARE UNDER WAY TO ADDRESS SEAPORT SECURITY Since September 11, 2001, a number of actions have been taken or are under way to address seaport security by a diverse mix of agencies and seaport stakeholders. Federal agencies, such as the Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and TSA, have been tasked with responsibilities and functions intended to make seaports more secure, such as monitoring vessel trafﬁc or inspecting cargo and containers, and procuring new assets such as aircraft and cutters to conduct patrols and respond to threats. In addition to these federal agencies, seaport stakeholders in the private sector and at the state and local levels of government have taken actions to enhance the security of seaports, such as conducting security assessments of infrastructure and vessels operated within the seaports and developing security plans to protect against a terrorist attack. The actions taken by these agencies and stakeholders are primarily aimed at three types of protections: (1) identifying and reducing vulnerabilities of the facilities, infrastructure, and vessels operating in seaports, (2) securing the cargo and commerce ﬂowing through seaports, and (3) developing greater maritime domain awareness through enhanced intelligence, information-sharing capabilities, and assets and technologies.

368

Terror on the High Seas

Identifying and Reducing the Vulnerabilities of Facilities, Infrastructure, and Vessels Seaports facilitate the freedom of movement and ﬂow of goods, and in doing so they allow people, cargo, and vessels to transit with relative anonymity. While seaports contain terminals and other facilities where goods bound for import or export are unloaded and loaded, or where people board and disembark cruise ships or ferries, seaports also often contain other infrastructure critical to the nation’s economy and defense, such as military installations, chemical factories, power plants, and reﬁneries. The combination of assets, access, and anonymity makes for potentially attractive targets. The facilities and vessels in seaports can be vulnerable on many fronts. For example, facilities where containers are transferred between ships and railroad cars or trucks must be able to screen vehicles entering the facility and routinely check cargo for evidence of tampering. Chemical factories and other installations where hazardous materials are present must be able to control access to areas containing dangerous goods or hazardous substances. Vessels, ranging from oil tankers and freighters to tugboats and passenger ferries, must be able to restrict access to certain areas on board the vessel, such as the bridge or other control stations critical to the vessel’s operation. Given the wide range of potential targets, an effective security response includes identifying targets, assessing risks to them, and taking steps to reduce or mitigate these risks. An essential step in this process is to conduct a security or vulnerability assessment. This assessment, which is needed both for the seaport as a whole and for individual vessels and facilities, identiﬁes vulnerabilities in physical structures, personnel protection systems, processes, and other areas that may lead to a security breach. For example, this assessment might reveal weaknesses in an organization’s security systems or unprotected access points such as a facility’s perimeter not being sufﬁciently lighted or gates not being secured or monitored after hours. After the vulnerabilities are identiﬁed, measures can be then be identiﬁed that will reduce or mitigate the vulnerabilities when installed or implemented. Most actions to identify and reduce the vulnerabilities within seaports were speciﬁcally required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA). Passage of MTSA was a major step in establishing a security framework for America’s seaports. This security framework includes assessment of risks, access controls over personnel and facilities, and development and implementation of security plans, among other activities. [...] 3 The amount of effort involved in carrying out these actions and implementing these programs has been considerable. For example, after following an aggressive time frame to develop regulations to implement the requirements of MTSA, the Coast Guard reviewed and approved the security plans of the over 3,000 facilities and more than 9,000 vessels that were required to

U.S. Organizational Structure

369

identify their vulnerabilities and take action to reduce them. Six months after July 1, 2004, the date by which the security plans were to be implemented, the Coast Guard reported that it completed on-site inspections of all facilities and thousands of vessels to ensure the plans were being implemented as approved. In addition to its work on the security plans and inspections, the Coast Guard completed security assessments of the nation’s 55 most economically and militarily strategic seaports.

Securing the Cargo Flowing through Seaports [Although] the facilities, vessels, and infrastructure within seaports have vulnerabilities to terrorist attack, the cargoes transiting through seaports also have vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit. Containers are of particular concern because they can be ﬁlled overseas at so many different locations and are transported through complex logistics networks before reaching U.S. seaports. From the time the container is loaded for shipping to the time the container arrives at a seaport, the containers must go through several steps that involve many different participants and many points of transfer. Each of these steps in the supply chain presents its own vulnerabilities that terrorists could take advantage of to place a WMD into a container for shipment to the United States. A report prepared by the National Defense University’s Center for Technology and National Security Policy stated that a container is ideally suited to deliver a WMD or a radiological “dirty bomb.” While there have been no known incidents yet of containers being used to transport WMDs, criminals have exploited containers for other illegal purposes, such as smuggling weapons, people, and illicit substances. Such activities demonstrate the vulnerability of the freight transportation industry and suggest opportunities for further exploitation of containers by criminals, including terrorist groups. In general, the actions taken thus far are aimed at identifying, tracking, and scrutinizing the container cargo shipments moving into the country. Most of these actions are being done by CBP, the DHS agency responsible for protecting the nation’s borders and ofﬁcial ports of entry. CBP uses a layered approach that attempts to focus resources on potentially risky cargo containers while allowing other cargo containers to proceed without disrupting commerce. [...] Several of these actions involve a strategy of moving primary reliance for security away from control systems at U.S. seaports of entry and toward improved controls at points of origin and along the way.4 The table also shows Operation Safe Commerce, initiated by the private sector and now administered by DHS’s Ofﬁce of Domestic Preparedness, which employs a similar strategy. This action, in pilot-project form that was initially funded by $58 million appropriated by Congress, is intended to help

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strengthen the security of cargo as it moves along the international supply chain in containers.5 In late 2004, the second of two initial phases of the project was concluded. This phase involved identifying the security vulnerabilities of 19 separate supply chains and trying out technologies, such as container seals or sensors, and their integration with governmental policies, logistic processes and procedures that could mitigate those vulnerabilities. The project has received additional funding of $17 million that has been targeted to conduct a third phase in which the best technologies and practices identiﬁed in the ﬁrst two phases will be further tested on a high number of containers for their effectiveness and tamper resistance on three separate supply chains. A report on the best practices identiﬁed in the ﬁrst two phases is expected to be issued in June 2005, and completion of the third phase is expected by October 2006. The other actions taken to enhance the security of cargo and commerce have been substantial. In 2002, CBP quickly rolled out the CSI and C-TPAT programs [...] and enlisted the participation of several countries and companies. By April 2005, CSI was operational at 35 seaports, located in 18 countries. Similarly, C-TPAT membership grew from about 1,700 companies in January 2003 to over 9,000 companies in March 2005. Given the urgency to take steps to protect against terrorism after the September 11, 2001, attacks, some of the actions were taken using an “implement and amend” approach. That is, CBP had to immediately implement the activity with the knowledge it may need to modify the approach later. For example, in August 2002, CBP modiﬁed the already developed Automatic Targeting System with new terrorism-related criteria.

DEVELOPING GREATER MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS The third main area of activity to enhance seaport security—maritime domain awareness—is the understanding by stakeholders involved in maritime security of anything associated with the global maritime environment that could adversely affect the security, safety, economy or environment of the United States. This awareness is essential to identify and respond to any unusual patterns or anomalies that could portend a possible terrorist attack. To be effective, maritime domain awareness must be comprehensive and include information on vessels, seaport infrastructures and facilities, shipping lanes and transit corridors, waterways, and anchorages, among other things. It must also identify threats as soon as possible and far enough away from U.S. seaports to eliminate or mitigate the threat. By effectively identifying potential threats, this awareness can be used as a force multiplier to position resources where they are needed most to respond, instead of spreading out limited resources to address all threats, no matter how unlikely they are to

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occur. In addition, when shared, this awareness has the potential to facilitate the coordination of efforts of local, state, federal, and even international stakeholders in responding to potential threats. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard took steps such as increasing the number of security patrols conducted within seaports and waterways that helped contribute to increased maritime domain awareness. Although maritime homeland security duties are not new to the Coast Guard, the number of hours the Coast Guard used resources (such as ships, boats, or aircraft) to carry out seaport, waterway, and coastal security activities during ﬁscal year 2003 increased by 1,220 percent from their pre–September 11, 2001, level. Relative to the rest of the Coast Guard’s responsibilities, this represented an increase from 4 percent of the Coast Guard’s total annual resource hours being used for seaport, waterway, and coastal security activities before September 11, 2001, to 34 percent by September 30, 2003. These activities provide an important input to maritime domain awareness as it places Coast Guard personnel out in the seaports where they can observe, report, and respond to suspect activities or vessels. In addition, these patrols provide the Coast Guard with a visible presence out in the seaport that may deter a potential terrorist attack from being carried out. As the lead federal agency responsible for protecting the U.S. maritime domain, the Coast Guard has spearheaded an interagency approach for establishing maritime domain awareness. Within this approach are several activities and actions intended to collect information and intelligence, analyze the information and intelligence, and disseminate the analyzed information and intelligence to appropriate federal, state, local, or private seaport stakeholders. Some of these actions were required under MTSA, such as the establishment of an Automatic Identiﬁcation System to track vessels, as well as creation of area maritime security committees of local seaport stakeholders who identify and address risks within their seaport. In addition to these actions, the Department of Defense and DHS formed a Maritime Domain Awareness Senior Steering Group in 2004 to coordinate national efforts to improve maritime domain awareness. Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, issued in December 2004, this steering group is required to develop a national plan for maritime domain awareness by June 2005. According to the head of the Coast Guard’s maritime domain awareness program, a draft of this plan is being reviewed before it is submitted to the president. [...] Although many of the activities to develop maritime domain awareness are still under way, some progress has already been made. One activity in this area that we have recently looked at concerns the process of information sharing between federal and nonfederal seaport stakeholders participating on area maritime security committees.6 The Coast Guard organized 43 of these committees, covering the nation’s 361 seaports. While a primary purpose of

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the committees is to develop a seaport-wide security plan for their respective seaports, the committees also provide links for communicating threats and security information to seaport stakeholders—links that generally did not exist prior to the creation of the committees. The types of information shared among committee members with security clearances included assessments of vulnerabilities at speciﬁc seaport locations, information about potential threats or suspicious activities, and strategies to use in protecting key infrastructure. Our review found that the committees improved information sharing among seaport security stakeholders, including the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information shared. Another aspect of improving maritime domain awareness involves having the assets to communicate and conduct patrols, and in this regard, the Coast Guard has budgeted for and is in the process of receiving substantial new resources. In 1996, the Coast Guard initiated a major recapitalization effort—known as the Integrated Deepwater System—to replace and modernize the agency’s aging and deteriorating ﬂeet of aircraft and vessel assets. The focus of the program is not just on new ships and aircraft, but also on newer, more capable assets, with improved and integrated command, control, communications and computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. Although the program was started before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard plans to leverage these capabilities of the 20-year, $17 billion program to enhance its maritime domain awareness and seaport security operations such as patrols and response.

CHALLENGES FOR IMPROVING MARITIME SECURITY TAKE THREE MAIN FORMS Propelled by a strong sense of urgency to secure the seaports, federal agencies, such as the Coast Guard, CBP, and TSA, accomplished a considerable amount in a short time. At the same time, these actions have also shown the strains that often occur when difﬁcult tasks must be done quickly. We have not examined every action that has been started or enhanced regarding maritime security, but our work to date has covered a number of them. It is not surprising that we have found, besides the progress made, a number of missteps, false starts, and inefﬁciencies. These represent challenges to overcome. Although some of these challenges will be resolved with time, analysis, and oversight, there are other challenges that bear even more careful watching, because they may prove to be considerably more difﬁcult to overcome. I would like to highlight three of those challenges, providing examples from our recent work. These three challenges involve (1) design and implementing programs, (2) coordinating between different agencies and stakeholder interests, and (3) determining how to pay for these efforts.

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Challenges in Program Design and Implementation I will discuss today two illustrative examples related to challenges in program design and implementation that we have identiﬁed from our work. These include the (1) lack of planning and performance measures for program design and (2) lack of experienced personnel for program implementation.

Lack of Planning and Performance Measures for Program Design One effect of having to design programs quickly is that they may lack such elements as strategic plans and performance measures needed to set program goals and monitor performance. The lack of such tools can create problems that need to be resolved as the program unfolds. For example, we have reviewed CBP’s actions to establish a system meant to reliably identify potentially risky cargo containers. Our work has shown that a need exists for additional efforts in several homeland security activities, including securing cargo, in order to help ensure the effectiveness of the approach.7 As we noted in a July 2003 report, the former U.S. Customs Service, part of which is now CBP initiated the Container Security Initiative (CSI) in January 2002 in response to security vulnerabilities created by ocean container trade and the concern that terrorists could exploit these vulnerabilities to transport or detonate WMDs in the United States.8 During the ﬁrst year, program ofﬁcials quickly designed and rolled out the initiative, modifying operations over time. The service achieved strong initial participation among the countries that it sought to enroll in the initiative, reaching agreement with 15 governments to place U.S. personnel at 24 seaports, and placing teams in ﬁve of these seaports. However, CBP had not taken adequate steps to incorporate human capital planning, develop performance measures, and plan strategically—factors essential to the program’s long-term success and accountability. We noted, for example, that: • More than 1 year into the implementation of the initiative, CBP had not developed a systematic human capital plan to recruit, train, and assign the more than 120 program staff that would be needed for long-term assignments in a wide range of foreign seaports, some of which could require language capabilities and diplomatic skills. • CBP lacked performance measures for the initiative that demonstrated program achievements and established accountability. For example, the service lacked measures that assessed the impact of collocating U.S. and foreign customs ofﬁcials in foreign seaports to determine which containers should be targeted for inspection. • CBP’s focus on short-term operational planning in order to quickly implement the program impeded its ability to systematically carry out strategic planning.

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We noted that the service did not have a strategic plan for the initiative that describes how it intends to achieve program goals and objectives. As a result, CBP lacked elements of strategic planning that would improve the management of the program and allow CBP to establish accountability for planned expenditures.

As also reported in July 2003, another program that did not take adequate steps to incorporate the human capital planning and performance measures necessary for the program’s long-term success and accountability is CBP’s Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program. Initiated in November 2001, C-TPAT is an initiative that attempts to improve the security of the international supply chain. It is a cooperative program between CBP and members of the international trade community in which private companies agree to improve the security of their supply chains in return for a reduced likelihood that their containers will be inspected. During the ﬁrst year, more than 1,700 companies agreed to participate in the program, and most received the key beneﬁt—a reduced likelihood of inspections for WMDs. However, we noted similar kinds of problems to those in the CSI program. For example, we found that: • Even as it rolled out new program elements, CBP lacked a human capital plan for increasing the number of C-TPAT staff from 10 to more than 160. • CBP had not developed performance measures for C-TPAT that would establish accountability and measure program achievements. For example, CBP had no performance measure to assess the impact of C-TPAT on improving supply chain security practices, possibly resulting in beneﬁts being granted to undeserving companies. • CBP lacked strategic planning in rolling out C-TPAT, failing to communicate how it planned to implement critical program elements designed to verify that companies have security measures in place and follow through with recommended changes.

We are currently reviewing both the CSI and CTPAT programs and will soon be issuing reports to update our earlier evaluation of these programs.

Lack of Experienced Personnel for Program Implementation One major challenge in program implementation is the lack of experienced personnel, which is to be expected given the rapid increase in newly hired personnel since September 11, 2001. Agencies such as the Coast Guard expect to see large increases in the number of staff over the next few years to help meet new and expanded responsibilities. Consequently, they also face a challenge in absorbing this increase and training them to be fully productive. We

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pointed out early on that this would be a challenge for the Coast Guard,9 and subsequent work has shown this to be the case. For example, after a Coast Guard internal review found that readiness of its multimission stations—the shore-based units whose responsibilities include ﬁnding and rescuing mariners in danger—had been in decline for an extended period, the Coast Guard began efforts to improve the readiness of the stations. This effort was complicated by the new homeland security responsibilities the stations assumed after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In a recent review of stafﬁng and readiness at these multimission stations,10 we found that the Coast Guard was still in the process of deﬁning new standards for security activities and had yet to translate the impact of security-related mission responsibilities into speciﬁc station readiness requirements, such as stafﬁng standards. Consequently, even though station stafﬁng had increased 25 percent since 2001, the Coast Guard was unable to align stafﬁng resources with mission activities, which resulted in a signiﬁcant number of positions not being ﬁlled with qualiﬁed personnel and station personnel working signiﬁcantly longer hours than are allowed under the Coast Guard’s work standards. We also identiﬁed personnel or human capital challenges such as lack of experienced personnel related to the Coast Guard’s program to oversee implementation of MTSA-required security plans by owners and operators of maritime facilities and vessels. These security plans are performance-based, meaning the Coast Guard has speciﬁed the outcomes it is seeking to achieve and has given seaport stakeholders responsibility for identifying and delivering the measures needed to achieve these outcomes. While this approach provides ﬂexibility to owners and operators in designing and implementing their plans, it also places a premium on the skills and experience of inspectors to identify deﬁciencies and recommend corrective action. Because the Coast Guard had to review and assess for compliance more than 12,000 security plans for facilities and vessels, it had to rely heavily on reservists, which varied greatly in the level of their skills and experience in this area. For example, some reservists had graduate degrees in security management while others had no formal security training or experience. In June 2004, we recommended that the Coast Guard carefully evaluate its efforts during the initial surge period for inspections.11 The Coast Guard has adjusted its inspection program to make its compliance assessments more relevant and useful, but it has not yet determined the overall effectiveness of its compliance actions.

Challenges in Coordinating Actions Coordinating massive new homeland security actions has been an acknowledged challenge since the events of September 11, 2001, and seaport

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security has been no exception. On the federal side alone, we have for several years designated implementing and transforming the new DHS as a high-risk area.12 Since the agency’s inception in March 2003, DHS leadership has provided a foundation to maintain critical operations while undergoing transformation, and the agency has begun to put systems in place to operate more effectively and efﬁciently as an agency. In managing its transformation, however, DHS still faces such issues as forming effective partnerships with other governmental and private-sector entities. We have made numerous recommendations related to information sharing, particularly as it relates to fulﬁlling federal critical infrastructure protection responsibilities.13 For example, we have reported on the practices of organizations that successfully share sensitive or time-critical information, including establishing trust relationships, developing information-sharing standards and protocols, establishing secure communications mechanisms, and disseminating sensitive information appropriately. Federal agencies such as DHS and the Coast Guard have concurred with our recommendations that they develop appropriate strategies to address the many potential barriers to information sharing. However, as of January 2005, many federal efforts to do this remain in the planning or early implementation stages especially in the area of homeland security information sharing, including establishing clear goals, objectives, and expectations for the many participants in informationsharing efforts; and consolidating, standardizing, and enhancing federal structures, policies, and capabilities for the analysis and dissemination of information. In this regard, the issue of information-sharing across agency and stakeholder lines has emerged as a signiﬁcant enough challenge that we have also designated it as a high-risk area. Here are three examples that illustrate the kinds of problems and challenges that remain related to seaport security.

Obtaining Security Clearances Although coordination of information-sharing at the seaport level appears to have improved, seaports are experiencing challenges with regards to nonfederal ofﬁcials obtaining security clearances. For some time, state and local seaport and law enforcement personnel have reported problems in obtaining federally generated intelligence information about their jurisdictions because they did not have a federal security clearance. However, as of February 2005—over 4 months after the Coast Guard had developed a list of over 350 nonfederal area maritime security committee participants as having a need for a security clearance—only 28 had submitted the necessary paperwork for the background check. Local Coast Guard ofﬁcials told us they did not clearly understand their responsibility for communicating with state and local ofﬁcials about the process for obtaining a security clearance. After we

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expressed our concerns to Coast Guard ofﬁcials in headquarters in February 2005, ofﬁcials took action and drafted guidelines clarifying the role that local Coast Guard ofﬁcials play in the program.

Sharing Information about Security Exercises In a January 2005 report,14 we reported that improvement in the coordination of state, local, and federal entities during seaport exercises was needed. While it was still too early to determine how well entities will function in coordinating an effective response to a seaport-related threat or incident, we identiﬁed four operational issues that needed to be addressed in order to promote more effective coordination. We found that more than half of the seaport exercises and after-action reports we examined raised communication issues, including problems with information sharing among ﬁrst responders and across agency lines. We also found that over half of the exercises raised concerns with communication and the resources available, including inadequate facilities or equipment, differing response procedures, and the need for additional training in joint agency response. To a lesser extent, we found concerns with participants’ ability to coordinate effectively and know who had the proper authority to raise security levels, board vessels, or detain passengers.

Developing a Transportation Worker Identiﬁcation Credential Beyond information-sharing, a host of challenges remain in coordinating across agency lines and in resolving issues that cut across a wide range of stakeholder perspectives. In this regard, there is perhaps no better example in our recent work than the delayed attempts to develop a major component of the security framework envisioned under MTSA—an identiﬁcation card for maritime workers. The transportation worker identification credential (TWIC) was initially envisioned by TSA before it became part of DHS to be a universally recognized identiﬁcation card accepted across all modes of the national transportation system, including airports, seaports, and railroad terminals, using biological metrics, such as ﬁngerprints, to ensure individuals with such an identiﬁcation card had undergone an assessment verifying that they do not pose a terrorism security risk. TSA initially projected that it would test a prototype of such a card system in 2003 and issue the ﬁrst of the cards in August 2004. After TSA became part of DHS, testing of the prototype was delayed because of the difﬁculty in obtaining a response from DHS policy ofﬁcials who also subsequently directed the agency to reexamine additional options for issuing the identiﬁcation card. In addition to coordinating within DHS, TSA has had to coordinate with over 800 national level transportationrelated stakeholders. Several stakeholders at seaports and seaport facilities

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told us that, while TSA solicited their input on some issues, TSA did not respond to their input or involve them in making decisions regarding eligibility requirements for the card.15 In particular, some stakeholders said they had not been included in discussions about which felony convictions should disqualify a worker from receiving a card, even though they had expected and requested that DHS and TSA involve them in these decisions. Obtaining stakeholder involvement is important because achieving program goals hinges on the federal government’s ability to form effective partnerships among many public and private stakeholders. If such partnerships are not in place—and equally important, if they do not work effectively—TSA may not be able to test and deliver a program that performs as expected. Until TSA and DHS ofﬁcials agree on a comprehensive project plan to guide the remainder of the project and work together to set and complete deadlines, and TSA can effectively manage its stakeholders’ interests, it may not be able to successfully develop, test, and implement the card program. We issued a report on TWIC in December 200416 and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs has asked us to review the program again.

Challenges in Providing Funding for Seaport Security Actions and Initiatives Our reviews indicate that funding is a pressing challenge to putting effective seaport security measures in place and sustaining these measures over time. This is the view of many transportation security experts, industry representatives, and federal, state, and local government ofﬁcials with whom we have spoken. While some security improvements are inexpensive, most require substantial and continuous funding. For example, a preliminary Coast Guard estimate placed the cost of implementing the International Maritime Organization security code and the security provisions in MTSA at approximately $1.5 billion for the ﬁrst year and $7.3 billion over the succeeding decade. This estimate should be viewed more as a rough indicator than a precise measure of costs, but it does show that the cost is likely to be substantial.17 At the federal level, more than $560 million in grants has been made available to seaports, localities, and other stakeholders since 2002 under the Port Security Grant Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative. The purpose of these programs was to reduce the vulnerability of seaports to potential terrorist attacks by enhancing facility and operation security. The programs funded several projects, including security assessments; physical enhancements, such as gates and fences; surveillance equipment, such as cameras; and the acquisition of security equipment, such as patrol vessels or vehicles. Awardees have included seaport authorities, local governments, vessel operators, and private companies with facilities in seaport areas. Interest in receiving port security grants has been strong, and [...] applicant requests have far exceeded available funds. We are currently examining the Port Secu-

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rity Grant Program at the request of several Members of Congress, and we are focusing this review on the risk management practices used in comparing and prioritizing applications. Our work is under way, and we expect to issue our report later this year.18 Where the money will come from for all of the funding needs is unclear. In our 2002 statement on national preparedness,19 we highlighted the need to examine the sustainability of increased funding not only for seaport security, but for homeland security efforts in general. The current economic environment makes this a difﬁcult time for private industry and state and local governments to make security investments and sustain increased security costs. According to industry representatives and experts we contacted, most of the transportation industry operates on a very thin proﬁt margin, making it difﬁcult to pay for additional security measures. Budgetary and revenue constraints, coupled with increasing demands on resources, makes it more critical that federal programs be designed carefully to match the priorities and needs of all partners—federal, state, local, and private—and provide the greatest results for the expenditure. Setting Performance Goals and Measures and Assessing Risk Are Important Next Steps: The ﬁnal purpose of my testimony today is to offer observations, based on the work we have done to date, about important next steps for decision makers in charting a course for future actions. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, evoked with stunning clarity the face and intent of enemies very different from those the nation has faced before—terrorists such as al-Qaeda, willing and able to attack us in our territory using tactics designed to take advantage of our relatively open society and individual freedoms. The amount of activity in response has been considerable, and although there have been no serious incidents in the United States in the interim, the threat of terrorism will likely persist well into the twenty-ﬁrst century. Thus, it is important to continue to make progress in our efforts. Beyond addressing the kinds of challenges discussed above, however, two other matters stand out. One involves developing a better understanding of how much progress has actually been made to secure our seaports; the other involves developing a better strategy to manage risk and prioritize what areas need further progress and how resources can be best allocated. LACK OF GOALS AND MEASURES MAKES DETERMINING PROGRESS DIFFICULT Although there is widespread agreement that actions taken so far have led to a heightened awareness of the need for security and an enhanced ability to identify and respond to many security threats, it is difﬁcult to translate these actions into a clear sense of how far we have progressed in making seaports

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more secure. One reason is that seaport security efforts, like homeland security efforts in general, lack measurable goals, as well as performance measures to measure progress toward those goals. As others such as the Gilmore Commission have stated, a continuing problem for homeland security has been the lack of clear strategic guidance about the deﬁnition and objectives of preparedness.20 For example, the Coast Guard has a set of performance indicators for each of its nonsecurity missions. It regularly reports on how well it is doing in rescuing mariners at sea, interdicting foreign ﬁshing boats attempting to ﬁsh the in U.S. exclusive economic zone, or maintaining aids to navigation on the nation’s waterways. However, although it has been more than 3 years since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Coast Guard is still in the process of developing a performance indicator for its seaport security activities that can be used to indicate what progress has been made to secure seaports. Completion of this indicator and careful tracking of it over the long term is essential to help ensure that taxpayer dollars are being spent wisely to make seaports more secure. Similarly, as discussed earlier in describing the actions taken to secure the cargo transiting through seaports in containers, performance measures are needed to determine the progress such actions are making to reduce vulnerabilities of the international supply chain. A challenge exists in measuring progress in this area, because seaport security, like many aspects of homeland security, relies upon the coordinated actions of many stakeholders and, in many cases, upon “layers” of defenses. In this regard, we have pointed out that systems and service standards— which focus on the performance, design, and overall management of processes and activities—hold great potential to improve coordination across such dimensions and enhance measurement of continued preparedness.21 While such standards are already being used in many parts of the private sector, creation of performance and results measures for national security in general, and seaport security in particular, remains a work in progress.

RISK MANAGEMENT IS AN ESSENTIAL TOOL FOR FOCUSING EFFORTS EFFECTIVELY Even with clear goals and effective performance measures, it seems improbable that all risk can be eliminated, or that any security framework can successfully anticipate and thwart every type of potential terrorist threat that highly motivated, well skilled, and adequately funded terrorist groups could think up. This is not to suggest that security efforts do not matter—they clearly do. However, it is important to keep in mind that total security cannot be bought no matter how much is spent on it. We cannot afford to protect everything against all threats—choices must be made about security priorities.

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Thus, great care needs to be taken to assign available resources to address the greatest risks, along with selecting those strategies that make the most efﬁcient and effective use of resources. One approach to help ensure that resources are assigned and appropriate strategies are selected to address the greatest risks is through risk management—that is, deﬁning and reducing risk. A risk management approach is a systematic process for analyzing threats and vulnerabilities, together with the criticality (that is, the relative importance) of the assets involved. This process consists of a series of analytical and managerial steps, basically sequential, that can be used to assess vulnerabilities, determine the criticality (that is, the relative importance) of the assets being considered, determine the threats to the assets, and assess alternatives for reducing the risks. Once these are assessed and identiﬁed, actions to improve security and reduce the risks can be chosen from the alternatives for implementation. To be effective, however, this process must be repeated when threats or conditions change to incorporate any new information to adjust and revise the assessments and actions. Some elements of risk management have been incorporated into seaport security activities. For example, to meet the requirements of MTSA, security plans for seaports, facilities, and vessels have been developed based on assessments that identify their vulnerabilities. In addition, the Coast Guard is using the Port Security Risk Assessment Tool, which is designed to prioritize risk according to a combination of possible threat, consequence, and vulnerability. Under this approach, seaport infrastructure that is determined to be both a critical asset and a likely and vulnerable target would be a high priority for security enhancements or funding. By comparison, infrastructure that is vulnerable to attack but not as critical or infrastructure that is very critical but already well protected would be lower in priority. In a homeland security setting, possible uses of data produced from risk management efforts include informing decisions on where the federal government might spend billions of dollars within and between federal departments, as well as informing decisions on grants awarded to state and local governments. As the nation moves ahead with seaport security efforts, there are plans to incorporate risk management as part of the nation’s larger homeland security strategy. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, issued in December 2003, charged DHS with integrating the use of risk management into homeland security activities. The directive called on the Department to develop policies, guidelines, criteria, and metrics for this effort. To meet this requirement, the Coast Guard has taken steps to use risk management in prioritizing the protection of key infrastructure within and between seaports. We are currently in the process of assessing the progress the Coast Guard has made in these efforts. In addition, we are reviewing the extent to which a risk management approach is being used by other DHS agencies, such as the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, to evaluate the relative risk faced by key infrastructure within seaports and across broad

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sectors of national activity, such as seaports and aviation, to help ensure funding and resources are allocated to where they are needed most. Our work is still under way and not far enough along to discuss at this time. It is likely, however, that attention to risk management will be a key part of the ongoing dialogue about the nation’s homeland security actions in general, and its seaport security actions in particular.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS Managing the risks associated with securing our nation’s seaports involves a careful balance between the beneﬁts of added security and the potential economic impacts of security enhancements. While there is broad support for greater security, the national economy is heavily dependent on keeping goods, trucks, trains, and people ﬂowing quickly through seaports, and bringing commerce to a crawl in order to be completely safe carries its own serious economic consequences. Striking the right balance between increased security and protecting economic vitality is an important and difﬁcult task. Considering this, three things stand out as important from the work we have conducted: • Seaports are not retreating as a homeland security issue. They are an attractive terrorist target and are likely to remain so, because by their nature they represent a vulnerability that is always open to potential exploitation. • Seaport security has lived up to its billing as an area in which security measures can be difﬁcult to implement. The range of activity in seaport areas can be extremely wide, as can the range of stakeholders and the fragmentation of responsibility among them. Many of the problems we have identiﬁed with individual programs and efforts can likely be overcome with time and effort, but success is not assured. We are already seeing some efforts, such as the TWIC identiﬁcation card, becoming deeply mired in problems. These activities will thus continue to demand close attention. • The national dialogue on this issue is likely to focus increasingly in trying to determine what we are getting for our efforts and where we should invest the dollars we have. Therefore, it is critical that federal programs be designed carefully to try to match the priorities and needs of all partners—federal, state, local, and private—and use performance measures to effectively allocate funds and resources. On this point, there is work to do, because agencies such as the Coast Guard currently lack a systematic approach for explaining the relationship between the expenditure of resources and performance results in seaport security, limiting its ability to critically examine its resource needs and prioritize program efforts. Providing answers also requires an ability to carefully assess what the key vulnerabilities are and what should be done to protect them. Only by doing this will we have reasonable assurance that we are doing the best job with the dollars we have.

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Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other members of the committee may have.

MARITIME SECURITY: POTENTIAL TERRORIST ATTACKS AND PROTECTION PRIORITIES John F. Frittelli and Paul W. Parfomak Analysts in Transportation, Resources, Science, and Industry Division Congressional Research Service Report for Congress January 9, 2007*

. . . LIKELIHOOD OF U.S. MARITIME TERRORIST ATTACKS Clear perspectives on the likelihood of speciﬁc types of maritime terrorist attacks are essential for prioritizing the nation’s maritime antiterrorism activities. Especially when security policies seek to concentrate resources against a relatively limited number of terrorism scenarios, as appears to be the case for DHS port security grants, the responsible agencies must be conﬁdent that these scenarios are credible and do, indeed, pose the greatest threat to the United States. In practice, however, there has been considerable public debate about the likelihood of scenarios frequently identiﬁed as having high priority by federal policy makers. As a 2006 RAND study of maritime security concluded “many perceptions of maritime terrorism risks do not align with the reality of threats and vulnerabilities.”22 The following section discusses perceptions and uncertainties pertaining to three prominent maritime attack scenarios, including nuclear or “dirty” bombs smuggled in shipping containers, liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG) tanker attacks, and attacks on passenger ferries.

THE “BOMB IN A BOX” SCENARIO Type of Bomb The Bush administration’s National Strategy for Maritime Security states that “WMD issues are of the greatest concern since the maritime domain is the likely venue by which WMD will be brought into the United States.”23 One arms control expert believes that, under current maritime security practices,

*

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33787.pdf

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the likelihood of such an attack within the decade “is more likely than not.”24 According to a press report, the operations and emergency management director for the Port of Los Angeles has stated that the probability of a nuclear attack at his port is “not low,” and that measures to prevent such an attack are the port’s top priority.25 Although much attention is paid to the threat of nuclear terrorism, there are divergent opinions about the likelihood of a terrorist group such as al-Qaeda constructing or otherwise obtaining a workable nuclear weapon.26 Expert estimates of the probability of terrorists obtaining a nuclear device have ranged from 50 percent to less than 1 percent.27 Among other challenges to obtaining such a device, experts believe it unlikely that countries with nuclear weapons or materials would knowingly supply them to a terrorist group.28 It also may be technically difﬁcult to successfully detonate such a nuclear device. North Korea experienced technical failures in conducting its 2006 nuclear weapons test, and this test took place under highly controlled conditions.29 Attempting to detonate a nuclear device in a maritime terror attack could pose even greater operational challenges. Consistent with these perspectives, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff has stated, “I don’t think that in the near term there’s a signiﬁcant likelihood of a traditional nuclear device being detonated” in the United States.30 Other experts concede that evaluating the likelihood of nuclear terrorism is inherently uncertain, but that such potential attacks warrant attention even if they are unlikely. The probability of a terrorist attack with an actual nuclear weapon cannot be reliably estimated, and it is surely lower than the probability of virtually any other type of terrorist attack. But the devastation from such an attack would be so overwhelming that, based on expected damages—the probability multiplied by the consequences—this threat must be considered one of the greatest dangers America faces . . .31 Terrorist attacks on U.S. ports with radiological dispersion devices (“dirty” bombs) is also considered among the gravest maritime terrorism scenarios.32 A 2003 simulation of a series of such attacks concluded that they “could cripple global trade and have a devastating impact on the nation’s economy.”33 Many terrorism analysts view such a dirty bomb attack as relatively likely. In a 2005 survey, for example, nuclear nonproliferation experts expressed their beliefs (on average) that there was a 25 percent chance of a dirty bomb attack in the United States by 2010 and a 40 percent chance of such an attack by 2015.34 Studies suggest that the materials required to make a dirty bomb may be widely available and poorly controlled internationally.35 According to some press reports, U.S. and British intelligence agencies have reportedly concluded that al-Qaeda has succeeded in making such a bomb.36 Port operators have testiﬁed before Congress that they believe “it is just a question of time” before terrorists with dirty bombs successfully attack a U.S. port.37 Although many experts consider attacks with dirty bombs among the most likely maritime terrorism scenarios, other experts dispute this conclusion. Scientists have long questioned whether terrorists could actually build a dirty

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bomb with catastrophic potential since handling the necessary radioactive materials could cause severe burns and would likely expose the builders to lethal doses of radiation.38 Building and transporting such a bomb safely and to avoid detection would likely require so much shielding that it would be “nearly impossible” to move.39 Weaker dirty bombs made from less radioactive (and more common) materials would be easier to build and deploy, but would have a much smaller physical impact and would likely cause few human casualties. Consequently, some analysts argue that terrorists will forego dirty bombs, restricting themselves to the use of more conventional explosives.40 In support of this argument, analysts point to the fact that there have been no U.S. dirty bomb attacks, notwithstanding the supposed ease of perpetrating such attacks.41 They also note that the 2005 U.S. indictment of alleged “dirty bomber” Jose Padilla, in fact, contained no evidence of, or references to, a dirty bomb plot.42 Faced with contradictory perspectives on the likelihood of a dirty bomb attack scenario at a U.S. port, analysts and policy makers draw qualiﬁed conclusions about such an attack. If a “weak” dirty bomb attack is more likely than a “strong” one, but a weak attack will have limited effects, it is unclear whether such an attack would meet terrorist objectives. On the other hand, the effects on the general public of any dirty bomb attack, even a weak one, may be great enough to motivate potential attackers. As one analyst has stated, notwithstanding the challenges to dirty bombers, “the chances of a dirty bomb being deployed by al-Qaeda cannot be discounted . . . Given the exponential psychological and economic effects of such a weapon, the beneﬁts of deploying one may far outweigh the costs and difﬁculties entailed in its construction.”43

Method of Delivery The potential smuggling and detonation of a nuclear or dirty bomb device in a shipping container at a U.S. port is one of the threats most speciﬁcally and frequently mentioned by legislators in the context of maritime security.44 Shipping containers may be particularly vulnerable to terrorist inﬁltration compared to other types of cargo for three reasons. First, shipping containers are relatively large. They come in standard sizes from 20 to 53 feet long, although the most common are 40 feet or longer—about the size of a truck semitrailer. Second, the containers on any given ship are packed at the factories or warehouses of many different companies that can be dispersed far and wide from the loading port, making it impossible for government authorities to ensure that only legitimate cargo has been packed. Third, the containers are typically trucked to the port of loading, during which the integrity of the shipments rests entirely on the trustworthiness or due diligence of the truck drivers. A maritime security expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, who is a former commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, outlines a scenario that most concerns him:

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Let me share with you the terrorist scenario that most keeps me awake at night . . . A container of athletic footwear for a name-brand company is loaded at a manufacturing plant in Surabaya, Indonesia. The container doors are shut and a mechanical seal is put into the door pad-eyes. These designer sneakers are destined for retail stores in malls across America. The container and seal numbers are recorded at the factory. A local truck driver, sympathetic to al-Qaeda, picks up the container. On the way to the port, he turns into an alleyway and backs up the truck at a nondescript warehouse where a small team of operatives pry loose one of the door hinges to open the container so that they can gain access to the shipment. Some of the sneakers are removed and in their place, the operatives load a dirty bomb wrapped in lead shielding, and they then refasten the door.

Other analysts assert that if terrorists were to attempt a nuclear or dirty bomb attack in a U.S. port, they would be unlikely to do so using a shipping container because it would put the device beyond a terrorist group’s control. These analysts question whether the container shipping system offers the routing or scheduling precision required by terrorists to position the bomb in the right place at the right time. Other observers assert that some types of noncontainerized cargo could also be used for smuggling a bomb.45 The manager of port security at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey states that their biggest concern is roll-on/roll-off cargo (ships that carry automobiles, trucks, and other vehicles).46 Noncontainerized cargo is more plentiful. By tonnage, containers carry only 11 percent of U.S. overseas waterborne trade47 and container ships account for about one in every three U.S. port calls.48 Other types of cargo also face less security screening.49 Relatively lowvalue cargo might be targeted if terrorists perceive it receives less attention from U.S. Coast Guard and customs ofﬁcials. For instance, a federal ofﬁcial familiar with New York harbor, pointing to a scrap metal terminal in Jersey City, stated the following to a reporter: “If I wanted to bring an atomic bomb into the port, I’d do it through that scrap operation.”50 The Government Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO) investigated the potential for maritime terrorists to use weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in 2005. In its report, the GAO states that an extensive body of work on this subject by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and academic, think tank, and business organizations concluded that while the likelihood of such use of containers is considered low, the movement of oceangoing containerized cargo is vulnerable to some form of terrorist action. Such action, including attempts to smuggle either fully assembled weapons of mass destruction or their individual components, could lead to widespread death and damage.51 Liqueﬁed Natural Gas (LNG) Tanker Attacks Potential terrorist attacks on LNG tankers in U.S. waters have been a key concern of policy makers in ports with LNG facilities because such attacks could cause catastrophic ﬁres in port and nearby populated areas. The Coast Guard’s FY2006 budget speciﬁcally requested funding for “additional boat crews and screening personnel at key LNG hubs.”52 To date, no LNG tanker or land-based LNG facility in the world has

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been attacked by terrorists. However, similar natural gas and oil assets have been favored terror targets internationally. The attack on the Limburg, although an oil tanker, is often cited as an indication of LNG tanker vulnerability. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) speciﬁcally included LNG tankers among a list of potential terrorist targets in a security alert late in 2003.53 The DHS also reported that “in early 2001 there was some suspicion of possible associations between stowaways on Algerian ﬂagged LNG tankers arriving in Boston and persons connected with the so-called ‘Millennium Plot’” to bomb targets in the United States. While these suspicions could not be proved, DHS stated that “the risks associated with LNG shipments are real, and they can never be entirely eliminated.”54 A 2004 report by Sandia National Laboratories concluded that potential terrorist attacks on LNG tankers could be considered “credible and possible.”55 The Sandia report identiﬁed LNG tankers as vulnerable to ramming, preplaced explosives, insider takeover, hijacking, or external terrorist actions (such as a Limburg-type, missile, or airplane attack).56 Former Bush administration counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke has asserted that terrorists have both the desire and capability to attack LNG shipping with the intention of harming the general population.57 Although they acknowledge the security information put forth by federal agencies, many experts believe that concern about threats to LNG tankers is overstated.58 In 2003, the head of one university research consortium remarked, for example, “from all the information we have . . . we don’t see LNG as likely or credible terrorist targets.”59 Industry representatives argue that deliberately causing an LNG catastrophe to injure people might be possible in theory, but would be extremely difﬁcult to accomplish. Likewise, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and other experts believe that LNG facilities are relatively secure compared to other hazardous chemical infrastructures which receives less public attention. In a December 2004 report, the FERC stated that for a new LNG terminal proposal . . . the perceived threat of a terrorist attack may be considered as highly probable to the local population. However, at the national level, potential terrorist targets are plentiful . . . Many of these pose a similar or greater hazard to that of LNG.60 The FERC also remarked, however, that “unlike accidental causes, historical experience provides little guidance in estimating the probability of a terrorist attack on an LNG vessel or onshore storage facility.”61 Former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey has stated his belief that a terrorist attack on an LNG tanker in U.S. waters would be unlikely because its potential impacts would not be great enough compared to other potential targets.62 LNG terminal operators, which have conducted proprietary assessments of potential terrorist attacks against LNG tankers, have expressed similar views.63 In a September 2006 evaluation of a proposed LNG terminal in Long Island Sound, the USCG states that “there are currently no speciﬁc, credible threats against” the proposed LNG facility or tankers serving the facility.64 The evaluation also notes, however, that the threat environment is dynamic and that some threats may be unknown.65

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PASSENGER FERRY ATTACKS Congressional policy makers frequently cite passenger ferries as a key maritime security concern. For example, in 2005, one Member of Congress stated that “there is a serious security gap in our ferry systems and we need to ensure that passengers on our nation’s waterways are protected.”66 A RAND study in 2006 argued that attacks on passenger ferries in the United States might be highly attractive to terrorists because such attacks are easy to execute, may kill many people, would likely draw signiﬁcant media attention, and could demonstrate a terrorist group’s salience and vibrancy.67 One U.S. Coast Guard risk analyst reportedly has stated that “in terms of the probability of something happening, the likelihood of it succeeding and the consequences of it occurring, ferries come out at the very high end.”68 Such attacks have occurred overseas. As noted earlier in this report, terrorists linked to alQaeda attacked and sank the Philippine vessel Superferry 14 in 2004. In a 2006 report, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) identiﬁed a ferry bombing as among the most likely types of maritime terror attacks.69 The DOJ report reached this conclusion based largely on the number of suspicious incidents reported at marine facilities in the Seattle area and at other U.S. ports. However, ofﬁcials in the Seattle ofﬁce of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reportedly suggested at the time that the DOJ’s high ranking of the passenger ferry threat might be due to more aggressive reporting of suspicious incidents in that region than elsewhere in the country.70 Seattle FBI ofﬁcials also reportedly stated that they had never been able to tie a speciﬁc suspicious incident to a terrorist group or terrorist plan.71 Thus, while there appears to be a logical case why ferries may be a key type of terrorist target, questions remain about actual terrorist activities related to ferries.

OVERALL LIKELIHOOD OF MARITIME TERRORISM The prior discussion illustrates the uncertainty surrounding some of the maritime terrorism scenarios of greatest concern to U.S. maritime security ofﬁcials. Questions about the likelihood of these speciﬁc, high priority scenarios beg the larger question of how likely is any maritime terrorism attack against the United States. Some experts suggest that some such attack, in one form or another, is almost inevitable. For example, one senior U.S. military ofﬁcer has reportedly asserted that “it’s just a matter of time until the terrorists try to use a . . . maritime attack against us.”72 Security analysts also point to known terrorist plots to attack U.S. maritime targets, such as those passing the Straits of Gibraltar, as evidence that global terrorist groups continue to plan maritime terrorism activities. Information from captured al-Qaeda member Abd al Rahman al Nashiri reportedly included plans for attacks on a wide range of Western maritime targets, including military vessels, oil tankers, and cruise

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ships.73 Other analysts believe future maritime attacks against the United States are relatively unlikely, especially in U.S. waters. Notwithstanding speciﬁc acts of terrorism in the past, such as the Cole bombing, they note that fewer than 1 percent of all global terrorist attacks since 1997 have involved maritime targets.74 Furthermore, international terrorists have attacked no maritime targets in U.S. territory since the antiCastro attacks in 1976 despite their demonstrated ability to do so overseas.75 Analysts also argue that U.S. ports and waterways are increasingly wellprotected against terrorists due to the ongoing security activities of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), provisions of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107–295), protections added using DHS port security grants, and other U.S. maritime security measures.76 Classiﬁcation issues may also inﬂuence differing perceptions of maritime terrorism risk since piracy unrelated to terrorism is common in Southeast Asia and may be conﬂated with terrorism in maritime security statistics.77 A key consideration in assessing the general likelihood of a maritime attack against the United States is the inherent operational difﬁculty in mounting such attacks, especially compared to land attacks which may alternatively satisfy terrorist objectives. One U.S. naval analyst has identiﬁed a number of speciﬁc challenges for terrorists in the maritime environment: • Maritime targets are relatively more scarce than land targets; • Surveillance at sea offers less cover and concealment than surveillance on land; • Tides, currents, wind, sea state, visibility, and proximity to land must all be factored into a maritime terror operation; • Maritime terror operations may require skills that are not quickly or easily acquired such as special training in navigation, coastal piloting, and ship handling; • Testing weapons and practicing attack techniques, hallmarks of al-Qaeda’s typically meticulous preparation, are harder and more difﬁcult to conceal at sea than on land; • The generally singular nature of maritime targets, the low probability of damage and casualties secondary to the intended target, and the problems associated with ﬁlming attacks at sea for terrorist publicity may also reduce the desirability of maritime targets.78

Given these challenges, it remains an open question how likely maritime attacks against the United States may be. In terms of the scenario framework in this report, although a successful attack on U.S. maritime targets would likely satisfy certain objectives of known international perpetrators such as alQaeda, tactical uncertainties and security deterrents may lead terrorist planners to turn their attention elsewhere. It bears repeating, however, that maritime terror attacks against the U.S. have occurred and there is evidence they have been planned for the future, despite the operational challenges. The

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same naval analyst cited above calls for continued vigilance: Rather than develop a false sense of security based on the belief that inherent difﬁculties will limit maritime terrorism . . . caution is warranted in light of al-Qaeda’s adaptability, ingenuity, tenacity, and audacity.79 Successful development and application of maritime tactics, techniques, and procedures has already occurred within the terrorist community. It appears, therefore, that while maritime terrorist attacks against the United States may be more difﬁcult to execute and, consequently, less likely to occur than other types of attacks, they remain a signiﬁcant possibility and warrant continued policy attention. The key challenge in determining the overall likelihood of a terrorist attack on a U.S. port is reducing uncertainty about speciﬁc types of attacks and potential attackers. Because historical terrorist activity is not necessarily a reliable predictor of future activity, scenarios derived from attacks like that on the USS Cole may not help prepare for actual future attacks. Furthermore, information about the ongoing motivations, capabilities, and plans of terrorist groups is limited and typically not in the public domain. Terrorist intelligence gathered by U.S. and foreign agencies may reduce this uncertainty, but is unlikely to eliminate it. Faced with this uncertainty, decision makers are to some extent forced to rely upon their own best judgment to reach conclusions about the likelihood of maritime terrorist attacks . . . MARITIME SECURITY: THE SAFE PORT ACT STATUS AND IMPLEMENTATION ONE YEAR LATER Stephen L. Caldwell Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues Government Accountability Ofﬁce Before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism October 20, 2007*

Federal agencies have improved overall port security efforts by establishing committees to share information with local port stakeholders, taking steps to establish interagency operations centers to monitor port activities, conducting operations such as harbor patrols and vessel escorts, writing port-level plans to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, testing such plans through exercises, and assessing the security at foreign ports. However, these agencies face resource constraints and other challenges trying to meet the SAFE Port Act’s requirements to expand these activities. For example, the Coast Guard faces budget constraints in trying to expand its current command centers and include other agencies at the centers. *

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08126t.pdf

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Similarly, private facilities and federal agencies have taken action to improve security at about 3,000 individual facilities by writing facilityspeciﬁc security plans, inspecting facilities to determine compliance with their plans, and developing special identiﬁcation cards for workers to help prevent terrorists from getting access to secure areas. Federal agencies face challenges trying to meet the act’s requirements to expand the scope or speed the implementation of such activities. For example, the Transportation Security Administration missed the act’s deadline to implement the identiﬁcation card program at 10 selected ports because of delays in testing equipment and procedures. Federal programs related to the security of cargo containers have also improved as agencies are enhancing systems to identify high-risk cargo, expanding partnerships with other countries to screen containers before they depart for the United States, and working with international organizations to develop a global framework for container security. Federal agencies face challenges implementing container security aspects of the SAFE Port Act and other legislation. For example, Customs and Border Protection must test and implement a new program to scan 100 percent of all incoming containers overseas—a departure from its existing risk-based programs. Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss port and cargo security functions related to provisions of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act).80 The nation’s 361 seaports are the gateway for more than 80 percent of our foreign trade. Worldwide, some 30 large ports, spread across North America, Asia, and Europe constitute the world’s primary, interdependent trading web. Much of this trade—particularly high-value cargo— enters and leaves in cargo containers. In our post-9/11 environment, however, the potential security weaknesses presented by these economic gateways have become apparent. Sprawling, easily accessible by water and land, often close to urban areas, and containing facilities that represent opportunities for inﬂicting signiﬁcant damage as well as for causing economic mayhem, ports present potential terrorist targets. Further, they are potential conduits for weapons prepared elsewhere and concealed in cargo designed to move quickly to many locations beyond the ports themselves. Since the 9/11 attacks, Congress has established a new port security framework—much of which was set in place by the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA).81 Enacted in November 2002, MTSA was designed, in part, to help protect the nation’s ports and waterways from terrorist attacks by requiring a wide range of security improvements. Among the major requirements included in MTSA were (1) conducting vulnerability assessments for port facilities and vessels; (2) developing security plans to mitigate identified risks for the national maritime system, ports, port facilities, and vessels; (3) developing the Transportation Worker Identiﬁcation Credential (TWIC), a biometric identiﬁcation card to help restrict access to secure areas to only

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authorized personnel; and (4) establishing of a process to assess foreign ports, from which vessels depart on voyages to the United States. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—itself a creation of the new security environment brought on by the 9/11 attacks—administers much of this framework, which also attempts to balance security priorities with the need to facilitate legitimate trade. The SAFE Port Act, which was enacted in October 2006, is one of the latest additions to this port security framework. The act made a number of adjustments to programs within this framework, creating additional programs or lines of effort and altering others. The SAFE Port Act created and codiﬁed new programs and initiatives, and amended some of the original provisions of MTSA. The SAFE Port Act included provisions that (1) codiﬁed the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), two programs administered by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to help reduce threats associated with cargo shipped in containers, as well as established the Domestic Nuclear Detection Ofﬁce (DNDO), which is responsible for conducting research, development, testing, and evaluation of radiation detection equipment; (2) required interagency operational centers where agencies organize to ﬁt the security needs of the port area at selected ports; (3) set an implementation schedule and fee restrictions for TWIC; (4) required that all containers entering high-volume U.S. ports be scanned for radiation sources by December 31, 2007; and (5) required additional data be made available to CBP for targeting cargo containers for inspection.82 This statement summarizes our recently completed and ongoing work. Over the past several years, we have examined and reported on many of the programs in this new port security framework. This statement is designed both to provide an overview of what we have earlier reported about these programs and to describe, with the preliminary information available, what DHS is doing as a result of the SAFE Port Act requirements and the challenges the agency faces in doing so. [...] This statement is organized into three key areas, as follows: • Programs related to overall port security, such as those for coordinating among stakeholders, conducting security operations, developing security plans, and conducting exercises to test security procedures • Programs related speciﬁcally to security at individual facilities, such as examining security measures and ensuring that only properly cleared individuals have access to port areas • Programs related speciﬁcally to cargo container security, such as screening containers at ports both here and abroad and forming partnerships with the private sector

This statement is based primarily on a body of work we completed in response to congressional requests and mandates for analysis of maritime, port, and cargo security efforts of the federal government.83 In some cases, we provide preliminary observations from our ongoing work. Thus, the timeli-

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ness of the data that were the basis for our prior reporting varies depending on when our products were issued, and the preliminary observations are subject to change as we complete our work. We conducted all of our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. To perform both our completed and ongoing work, we visited several domestic and overseas ports; reviewed agency program documents, port security plans and postexercise reports, and other documents; and interviewed ofﬁcials from the federal, state, local, private, and international sectors. The ofﬁcials were from a wide variety of port stakeholders to include Coast Guard, CBP, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), port authorities, terminal operators, vessel operators, foreign governments, and international organizations. While this body of work does not cover all the provisions of the SAFE Port Act, it does cover a wide range of these provisions [...]. We provided a draft of the information in this testimony to DHS. DHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS SEAPORT SECURITY HEARING IN SEATTLE Senator Patty Murray July 1, 2002*

(Seattle, WA)—Today U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) spoke at a Commerce Committee ﬁeld hearing in Seattle on port security. Her opening remarks follow: This is one of several hearings being held in port communities around the nation. These hearings will help us in the Senate respond to the new security challenges facing our ports in the wake of September 11. Our solutions to these challenges must be comprehensive. But they must also be ﬂexible enough to reﬂect the unique elements of each port—including those here in the Paciﬁc Northwest. No survey of our nation’s port systems would be complete without a look at Washington State. We provide a unique perspective on challenges and solutions. To help us do that, we’ve assembled representatives from the domestic port community, government, foreign seaports, technology companies, and organized labor to share their ideas on improving security. It’s going to take all of us working together to implement good solutions so I want to thank all of the witnesses for being here today.

*

http://murray.senate.gov/news.cfm?id=189093

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I want to extend a special welcome to one of our witnesses, Mr. Robert Yap, the executive vice president of the PSA Corporation, which handles the Port of Singapore and others international ports. He is accompanied today by Mr. Vincent Lim, Deputy President of PSA. Welcome, Mr. Lim. Their perspective from a foreign port will help us understand how various proposals would affect our ability to trade with other countries. As we improve our security, we don’t want to penalize the foreign shippers who use our ports, or we’ll pay the price in lost jobs and commerce. Mr. Chairman, as you know, Washington State is in a unique position to help shape our nation’s seaport security work. Washington is the most trade dependant state in the nation, and our seaports are the lifeblood of our economy. The ports of Tacoma and Seattle together form the third-largest load center for containerized cargo in the United States—1.8 million containers pass through this region each year. That cargo generates billions of dollars of goods each day and supports tens of thousands of good-paying, family-wage jobs. The Puget Sound also has marine security challenges that other regions do not. • We share a land and sea border with Canada. • We have several important defense installations that share our waterfront. • And we have the largest passenger ferry system in the country.

In the Northwest, we must balance all of these security needs with the continuing need to keep cargo moving efﬁciently. I want to outline the challenge before us, talk about the steps we’ve taken so far, and ﬁnally lay out some principles for a national solution.

THE CHALLENGE For decades, we’ve built our port infrastructure and procedures around economic efﬁciency, and we’ve done a good job. Many of the folks in this room have helped make our port system efﬁcient and that’s helped our economy and our community. But since September 11, we now need to add a new element to the equation—security. We’ve got to realign our port system around efﬁciency and security. We’re really starting from scratch. There are few standards for handling or inspecting foreign cargo as it enters our ports. Often, we don’t know where a container has come from or what’s inside. There are also many players involved in moving goods to and from our ports including buyers, sellers, banks, inland carriers, foreign seaports, carriers, governments, and consolidators. The wide range of participants in itself adds to the security challenge.

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Because we’re starting from scratch and involving so many players, our response must be prompt and it must be comprehensive. We can’t wait 10 years for one group or agency to develop a plan. I hope today’s hearing will help us meet these new challenges together. Whatever we do, we must be mindful that it does not slow down the progress we have made in expanding the productivity and efﬁciency of our ports. The United States receives some $750 billion worth of cargo at 360 seaports every year. That’s roughly one-ﬁfth the U.S. economy. We don’t want to gamble with such an important part of our economy.

PROGRESS SO FAR In Congress, we’ve been working on seaport security for several months, and I want to so brieﬂy summarize what we’ve accomplished. First, the Puget Sound will get its own Marine Safety and Security Team because of funding I secured in last year’s Defense Supplemental Appropriations Bill. We will receive one of the ﬁrst of four teams in the nation trained to operate fast response boats that can intercept ships carrying suspicious cargo well before they reach the port or even the coast. I’m pleased to report that the commissioning ceremony is this Wednesday. I also included $93.3 million in the Defense bill for port security grants. This money will help ports pay for security assessments, enhance facilities and operations, and create better security partnerships. These grants were released on June 17. They provide $5.7 million for seaports and maritime security activities in Washington State including $653,000 to assist security efforts on the Columbia River. In addition, I’ve used my position as chairman of the Senate Transportation Subcommittee to review our government’s security efforts. I’ve held hearings to examine the proposed budgets for the Coast Guard and for the new Transportation Security Agency. In May, I held a hearing on cargo security in Washington DC. In April, I held an Appropriations Subcommittee ﬁeld hearing on this topic in this very chamber. I also attended a set of full Senate Appropriations Committee hearings on homeland security where seaport security was discussed. Because we’ve had an overwhelming number of applications for the original funding, I included an additional $200 million in this year’s Senate Supplemental Appropriations bill for seaport security grants. I also included $28 million for an initiative called “Operation Safe Commerce” in the Supplemental. This is an initiative at the nation’s three largest container ports—which includes the Ports of Seattle/Tacoma—to test and deploy a program that applies a system-wide approach to seaport security. The initiative calls for all stakeholders to develop international standards from the

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point of origin to the ﬁnal destination. These standards would provide advanced information about cargo and ways to monitor the cargo during transit. The Supplemental includes $59 million for the U.S. Customs Service Container Security Initiative, which has similar goals to “Operation Safe Commerce.” Finally, let’s not forget that this Committee passed the Port and Maritime Security Act in December of last year. That legislation would • • • •

Improve cooperation among all the stakeholders Force ports to evaluate their security needs Better secure port facilities Require information about cargo shipments be evaluated before they’re granted entry into a U.S. port • Improve reporting of cargo and crew • Authorize grants to ports to help comply with these new mandates

That bill is now in conference with the House.

PRINCIPLES After looking at the challenge and our work so far, I’d like to close by laying out a few principles for policy solutions. First, our solution must involve all the stakeholders in the shipment of goods, both private and public, foreign and domestic. By developing a plan together, we can establish the trust and cooperation we’ll need to carry it out. The nature of container trafﬁc makes it difﬁcult to secure the trade route. Foreign manufactures, ports of origin, shippers, destination port authorities, and organized labor are all critical elements in the shipping chain. They are our best allies to securing the trade lanes. Without cooperation among all of these players, any system we create will be vulnerable. Second, we must create international standards, where none exist today. Those standards must do two things. They must provide reliable information on cargo to everyone in the supply chain. That way ofﬁcials at home and abroad can identify suspicious cargo and quickly determine if it poses a security risk. These standards must also ensure good communication between all the players in the system. Third, the costs of these improvements must be shared so that no single entity in the system is burdened with ensuring the security of the system as a whole. Because most of the players are private businesses—concerned with the bottom line—our approach should provide economic incentives to encourage everyone to work within the system. It must include a way for safe, reliable players to have better access to our markets and to remain active even if an incident should occur. A complete shutdown in the cargo container business could have a severe impact on our economy—a much larger impact than the one we saw when the aviation

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industry was grounded immediately after September 11. I think most of the private entities who are involved in transshipment of commercial goods would pay a premium for such an incentive. Fourth, our new system should not disadvantage American ports in this highly competitive environment. So as I see it, port security plans need to involve all stakeholders, must create international standards for information and communication, must spread the costs around, and must not disadvantage American ports. I recognize that’s a tall order, but working together I think we can meet those principles. One thing that would help would be more interest and support from the current administration. Customs, the INS, and the Coast Guard are all doing a great job of trying to address the vulnerability of our seaport, but this initiative needs more support from the very top. So far, the Transportation Security Administration has only doled out responsibilities. It hasn’t yet developed the comprehensive approach that is needed to properly secure our trade routes. In fact, the additional $200 million in the pending Supplemental for seaport security grants, and the money in the Supplemental for “Operation Safe Commerce” and for the Customs’ “Container Security Initiative” are not supported by the president. The president has said he will veto any appropriations bill that is above what he requested. So I hope we’ll have a more cooperative approach from the White House and the TSA to help us and our ports make these needed improvements. It’s clear we have some very critical issues to discuss today. So I again thank all of the witnesses and everyone here today. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS AT U.S. PORTS OF ENTRY Representatives Howard Coble, North Carolina, and Robert C. Scott, Virginia Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security March 15, 2005*

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:02 P.M., in Room 2141, Rayburn House Ofﬁce Building, Hon. Howard Coble (Chair of the Subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Coble: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. The Subcommittee will come to order. Today, the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, convenes a very important

* http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/109h/20016.pdf

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oversight hearing of the Department of Homeland Security to examine the security of the nation’s seaports and the cargo entering these ports. I have long contended that protecting our nation’s seaports is a vital aspect of the overall war on terror. Press reports have indicated there’s a lack of cargo inspections taking place at our ports of entry. This Subcommittee is concerned about these reports and looks forward to hearing the Department’s response to these accounts and the plans to assure adequate inspections to protect our ports and the cargo entering the United States are taking place. Today’s hearing will focus on the efforts of three vital entities charged with protecting our nation’s seaports from hostile threats. First, we will hear from the two primary agencies within the Department of Homeland Security charged with protecting our ports—that is, the United States Coast Guard and the United States Customs and Border Protection. The United States Coast Guard is the nation’s leading maritime law enforcement agency and has broad multifaceted jurisdictional authority. As part of Operation Noble Eagle, the Coast Guard is at a heightened state of alert, protecting more than 361 ports and 95,000 miles of coastline, which is America’s longest border. The Coast Guard utilizes both Maritime Safety and Security Teams as well as Port Security Units to protect our seaports. Maritime Safety and Security Teams were created in direct response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and are a part of the Department of Homeland Security’s layered strategy directed at protecting our seaports and waterways. MSSTs provide waterborne and a modest level of shoreside antiterrorism force protection for strategic shipping, high-interest vessels, and critical infrastructure. MSSTs are a quick response force capable of rapid nationwide deployment via air, ground, or sea transportation in response to changing threat conditions and evolving maritime homeland security mission requirements. The Coast Guard Port Security Units, the PSUs, are Coast Guard units staffed primarily with selected Reservists. They provide waterborne and limited land-based protection for shipping and critical port facilities, both within the continental United States and in other theaters. We will also hear from Customs and Border Protection. The CBP antiterrorism mission is not limited to the physical examination of cargo when it arrives in United States ports. The CBP, or the Customs and Border Protection, is also using intelligence from a number of sources to identify high-risk shipments in order to concentrate its inspection resources on them. For example, under bilateral agreements as part of the Container Security Initiative, CBP inspectors work in nearly 20 foreign ports to help ensure the security of U.S.bound cargo before it disembarks. Additionally, in November of 2001, the CBP established the National Targeting Center to serve as the national clearinghouse for targeting imported cargo for inspection. Among other tasks, the NTC interacts with law enforcement and the intelligence community to disseminate intelligence alerts to the ports. NTC, furthermore assists, in conducting research on incoming cargo,

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attempts to improve the targeting of cargo, and manages a National Targeting Training Program for CBP targeters. Next, we will hear testimony from a local port authority, the Virginia Port Authority. The VPA has led the nation in radiological testing at its seaports and has successfully employed radiological monitoring equipment since December of 2002. In just this past year, in cooperation with Customs and Border Protection, VPA deployed some of its equipment to national security events, including the presidential inauguration. Finally, we will hear testimony from a representative from the International Cargo Security Council. The International Cargo Security Council is a professional association of cargo transportation and security professionals from the entire spectrum of cargo security. One of ICSC’s goals is to improve cargo transportation security through voluntary Government/industry efforts. In order to further this effort, ICSC is a leading proponent of encouraging industry to partake in CBP’s Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. C-TPAT is a joint Government/business partnership where companies agree to improve the security in their supply chain in return for fast-lane border crossings and other important incentives. It is important to recognize that cargo and port security require the multilayered approach in order to deter and detect all vulnerabilities and hostile cargo. I am pleased that we have this representation here before us today and I look forward to their testimony, and I apologize to all of you. I normally don’t give an opening statement this lengthy, but I think the subject matter at hand requires some detail. And prior to introducing our distinguished witnesses, I am pleased to recognize the distinguished gentleman from Virginia, the ranking member of this subcommittee, Mr. Bobby Scott. Mr. Scott: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m pleased to join you in this hearing on law enforcement efforts at our ports. The development of the Department of Homeland Security in the wake of the 9/11 tragedies brought about a shift of several law enforcement agencies from one Department to another with changes and reorganizations of their responsibilities in some cases. There has been a signiﬁcant change in responsibilities of the federal law enforcement entities to communicate, coordinate, and cooperate with state and local law enforcement entities. As a result, some confusion exists in the public and Congress and among the various federal and state agencies as to where the oversight responsibilities for these operations reside. I am of the opinion that we should seek to clarify any such confusion by ﬁrst asserting our jurisdiction over all federal law enforcement entities and then working with those entities to insist their coordination and cooperation with each other and with state and local law enforcement entities. So I’m pleased to join you in this ﬁrst of a series of hearings that we’ll be conducting in this regard and commend you for your foresight and leadership in this matter. I’m particularly pleased to have Jeff Keever, the deputy director of our Virginia Port Authority, as one of our witnesses today. Our ports are a vital part of the

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nation’s economy, handling over 2 billion tons of freight each year, and the Port of Virginia is the seventh-largest U.S. port in terms of general tonnage handled annually and the second largest on the East Coast. Operating alongside the nation’s largest naval base, assisting missions of the Defense Logistics Agency and the U.S. Transportation Command, security has always been a big job for the Port of Virginia. Secure, smooth, and efﬁcient operations not only are critical to the deployment of our troops around the globe but also are why the port has maintained a robust annual growth rate of more than 9 percent over the past few years. As part of its focus on security, the Port of Virginia checks 100 percent of the containers leaving the port for radiation detection and monitoring equipment before they leave the port on trucks. And as a result of its successful cooperation with the U.S. Customs agencies, there has not been a theft at the port for about 8 years. That’s quite a record in security when you consider that estimates of thefts from other ports across the U.S. range as high as $30 billion annually. Yet despite the fact that our ports have risen to the challenges, their ability to continue to meet them in a world of changing threats and circumstances will depend in large measure on our assistance and support. I’m concerned, Mr. Chairman, that we have not been as diligent in supporting our seaports as we have with our airports and our other border crossings. It appears that we have left much of the responsibility to the ports themselves compared to what we have done to assist our airport and border crossing operations. I expect that we’ll hear about details of what we can do from our witnesses, so I look forward to their testimony and to working with you, Mr. Chairman, in clarifying our oversight responsibilities for the various law enforcement entities and strengthening our ports so that they can do their vital job in securing and sufﬁciently moving cargo and people. Again, I appreciate your leadership in this manner.

LEGISLATION PROTECTING AMERICA’S PORTS, MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT OF 2002 United States Department of Homeland Security, Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary July 2003*

Contents I. Press Release: Maritime Security Regulations II. Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 III. Fact Sheet: Summarized Regulations *http://users.mo-net.com/district8wr/public/MTSA_Port_Presskit.pdf

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I. PRESS RELEASE: MARITIME SECURITY REGULATIONS U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE July 1, 2003 Department of Homeland Security issues maritime security regulations Rules mandate security improvements in the nation’s seaports WASHINGTON DC—The U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced the publication of security regulations today requiring sectors of the maritime industry to implement measures designed to protect America’s ports and waterways from a terrorist attack.

“With 95 percent of our nation’s international cargo carried by ship, port security is critical to ensuring our Nation’s homeland and economic security,” Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge said. “The port security measures we are putting in place, both here at home and abroad, are about expanding our capabilities—strengthening a vitally important system with additional layers of defense. “This effort is part of a broad international effort to increase global shipping security and one of many steps we are taking to better protect our ports and the ships traveling in our waters.” The result of intense international and domestic efforts that began in November 2001, these regulations signiﬁcantly strengthen the security of our ports by requiring preventive security measures and plans to deter threats and provide a framework for response in the event of an attack. The regulations build on a comprehensive port security strategy and range of enhancements directed by the president following September 11, 2001, and implement signiﬁcant portions of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA). By requiring completion of security assessments, development of security plans, and implementation of security measures and procedures, these regulations will reduce the risk and mitigate the exposure of our ports and waterways to terrorist activity. Developed using risk-based methodology, the security regulations focus on those sectors of maritime industry that have a higher risk of involvement in a transportation security incident, including various tank vessels, barges, large passenger vessels, cargo vessels, towing vessels, offshore oil and gas platforms, and port facilities that handle certain kinds of dangerous cargo or service the vessels listed above. An estimated 10,000 vessels, 5,000 facilities, and 40 outer continental shelf facilities will be directly affected. The regulations require security measures that have three scalable security levels. Depending on security needs, measures may include passenger, vehicle and baggage screening procedures; security patrols; establishing restricted areas; personnel identiﬁcation procedures; access control measures; and/or installation of surveillance equipment.

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To promote innovation and ﬂexibility, the Department of Homeland Security is also encouraging the private sector to develop acceptable alternatives to accommodate speciﬁc security measures. Alternatives that afford a level of security equal to the original regulation may be presented by individual industry entities. The regulations published today amend other sections of the Code of Federal Regulations to implement Automatic Identiﬁcation System (AIS) requirements for certain vessels, as required by MTSA. AIS is a system of equipment and technologies that automatically sends detailed ship information to other ships and shore-based agencies. Installing AIS equipment on certain vessels traveling in our waters will allow comprehensive, virtually instantaneous vessel tracking and monitoring, increasing security and safety in our shipping channels, and our awareness of maritime activity. The regulations were developed through interagency teamwork within the Department of Homeland Security (the Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection) and with the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration. The interim ﬁnal rules are effective as of July 1, 2003. They will be replaced by ﬁnal rules by October 25, 2003. The Coast Guard is accepting written comments on the regulations for 30-days, and will hold a public meeting to discuss all of the maritime security interim ﬁnal rules and the AIS interim rule on July 23, 2003, in Washington DC at the Grand Hyatt Hotel on 1000 H Street NW. The regulations and details on submitting comments are published in a series of Federal Register notices that include a request for comment on the further implementation of the AIS, as required by MTSA. The Federal Register Docket can be viewed online at http://dms.dot.gov. The docket numbers are as follows. General USCG-2003-14792 Ports USCG-2003-14733 Vessels USCG-2003-14749 Facilities USCG-2003-14732 Outer continental shelf facilities USCG-2003-14745 AIS USCG-2003-14757 AIS request for comments USCG-2003-14878

II. FACT SHEET: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT OF 2002 U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary July 2003—Fact Sheet

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Implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), signed on November 25, 2002, by President Bush, is a landmark piece of legislation that is designed to protect the nation’s ports and waterways from a terrorist attack. While the publication of new regulations on July 1 marks a signiﬁcant milestone in the implementation of MTSA, the Department of Homeland Security has been taking major steps to implement the entire act. Below are the major components of the MTSA and the actions we have undertaken. Threat and Security Assessments Port Threat and Vulnerability Assessments Preliminary assessments have been completed and we are now conducting comprehensive assessments at 55 critical ports that will provide local threat proﬁles and evaluate all aspects of security surrounding each port. Vessel and Facility Vulnerability Assessments Security plans are required on over 10,000 vessels and 5,000 facilities in the new regulations. The regulations require the individual vessel owner to conduct a self-assessment and develop a security plan. The Transportation Security Administration, in conjunction with the Coast Guard and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate, is developing an assessment tool that may be used by ports, vessels, and facilities that are required to conduct these self-assessments. Foreign Port Assessments Shipping is a global system. The security of the ports in other nations is important to the security of our ports. We will deploy veriﬁcation and audit teams to ensure that 2,500 foreign ports have effective security programs. Security Plans and Advisory Committees National Maritime Security Plan and Advisory Committee Another element of our layered maritime security strategy is the National Maritime Transportation Security Plan, an interagency initiative to build an

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overarching national strategy for protecting America’s ports. The National Maritime Security Advisory Committee will advise the Secretary on this national strategy.

Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans and Committees Adding yet another layer to our security strategy are Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans that will detail the response and preventative security policies. In addition, port security committees have already been informally established around the country and the new regulations establish Area Maritime Security Committees that will address the complex and diverse security needs of each of our 361 ports. In addition, the International Maritime Organization now requires all ships and port facilities to have security plans—making this a worldwide standard.

Vessel and Facility Security Plans The new regulations require the owners and/or operators of over 10,000 vessels and 5,000 facilities to develop and implement security plans that may include passenger, vehicle and baggage screening procedures; security patrols; establishing restricted areas; personnel identification procedures; access control measures; and/or installation of surveillance equipment.

Security Incident Response Plans The Coast Guard and other agencies have long had a suite of contingency and response plans for domestic incidents and terrorist activities. In addition, the new regulations require that key portions of industry address how they would respond to an incident in security plans that they must develop and submit to the Coast Guard for approval. Finally, we are coordinating security plans with other plans that already exist for other emergencies, such as oil spills and natural disasters.

Other Initiatives and Programs Transportation Security Cards The Transportation Security Administration is working on developing the Transportation Worker Identiﬁcation Credential (TWIC). Over time, the TWIC will be used as a credential for transportation workers from all

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modes who have undergone, and passed, required background checks. TWIC will introduce a common credential, one that positively ties the person to the credential to the background check, which can be used in conjunction with access control to critical components of the nation’s transportation infrastructure.

Maritime Safety and Security Teams Maritime Safety and Security Teams are a Coast Guard rapid response force capable of nationwide deployment via air, ground, or sea transportation to meet emerging threats and were created in direct response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Maritime Safety and Security Teams are already deployed to Seattle; Chesapeake, Virginia; Los Angeles/Long Beach; and Houston/ Galveston. More teams will be deployed by the end of this year to St. Mary’s, Georgia, and the Port of New York/New Jersey. President Bush has included funds for six additional teams in his ﬁscal year 2004 budget request to Congress.

Grants We made available $170 million in port security grants in June 2003 to 387 ports and facilities. Later this year we will make available an additional $105 million. This is on top of $92 million awarded by the Transportation Security Administration in 2002. In addition, the Ofﬁce for Domestic Preparedness awarded another $75 million to 13 critical national seaports.

Maritime Intelligence Using a variety of current and future operations, including the National Maritime Intelligence Center, and local and regional intelligence centers, we are focusing on gathering, analyzing and disseminating information. The president’s ﬁscal year 2004 budget request to Congress includes $34 million to increase our intelligence capabilities.

Automatic Identiﬁcation Systems Automatic Identiﬁcation Systems (AIS) immediately sends detailed ship information to other ships and shore-based agencies. The installation of AIS on certain vessels traveling in our waters, as required by the new regulations, will allow comprehensive, virtually instantaneous vessel tracking and monitoring, increasing safety and security in our shipping channels. This is also an international initiative.

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Secure Systems of Transportation Programs such as Operation Safe Commerce, which is led by TSA and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and CBP’s Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism will help identify ways to better secure cargo containers and add additional layers of security throughout the entire sea transportation system.

International Seafarer Identiﬁcation Recently adopted international agreements provide for a program to improve the security of seafarers documents through the use of a biometric indicator, enhanced tamper resistant features, and the establishment of national databases, all of which will create uniform and veriﬁable credentials for the mariners around the world.

Extension of Seaward Jurisdiction MTSA extended certain Coast Guard authorities out to 12 nautical miles from the U.S. coast. This measure is part of our strategy to push our borders out—to gain information about what is coming in and deal with it as far away from our shores as possible and have the authority to exercise protective actions and measures.

Deepwater Ports This provision added natural gas facilities to the Coast Guard’s previous authority to regulate other kinds of deepwater ports. We expect to receive two to three applications per year. These facilities will allow for the unloading of natural gas offshore, and will help increase our ability to import natural gas.

Sea Marshals Since shortly after September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard has been placing armed personnel on key vessels as they transit in and out of port to keep those vessels from being used by terrorists as weapons. Sea marshals ensure positive control, 24 hours a day, seven days a week of over 21,000 vessels arrivals, departures and interport transits in the 55 most critical ports. The president has included funding for 53 sea marshals in his ﬁscal year 2004 budget request to Congress.

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Maritime Security Professional Training The publication of these regulations is the beginning of the work begun by the Maritime Administration at the Department of Transportation, in cooperation with the Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration, to establish standards for training. We are continuing the cooperative effort of these agencies and the international community to fully leverage existing security training expertise. III. FACT SHEET: SUMMARIZED REGULATIONS U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary July 2003—Summarized Regulations New Maritime Security Regulations Making Our Waters Safer The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), the new security amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS), and its complementary International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) strengthen and add additional protective layers of defense to our nation’s port security. • MTSA: Designed to protect the nation’s ports and waterways from a terrorist attack. Landmark legislation that requires area maritime security committees, security plans for facilities and vessels that may be involved in a transportation security incident • ISPS: First multilateral ship and port security standard ever created. Implementation scheduled for 2004; requires all nations to develop port and ship security plans.

Regulations specify requirements for: • Security assessments, development of security plans, implementation of measures to address access control, security monitoring, and physical, passenger, personnel, baggage and cargo security. • Annual exercises and/or drills • Designation of security personnel for each vessel or facility • Installation of Automatic Identiﬁcation System (AIS), equipment that automatically sends detailed ship information to other ships and shore-based agencies

Who the Regulations Will Apply To The regulations focus on those entities that may be involved in a transportation security incident, including various tank vessels, barges, large passenger

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vessels, cargo vessels, towing vessels, offshore oil and gas platforms, and port facilities that handle certain kinds of dangerous cargo or service the vessels listed above. When July 1, 2003: Temporary Interim Rules published; effective date of regulations July 23, 2003: Public meeting in Washington DC July 31, 2003: Deadline for submission of written comments October 2003: Projected publication of Final Rule November 2003: Effective date of Final Rules (30 days from publication) Dec. 31, 2003: Deadline for submission of security plans July 1, 2004: International and domestic deadline for implementation of MTSA regulations & ISPS requirements

Where Ports of all sizes throughout the country and the world. Regulatory Highlights The new MTSA security regulations cover vessels and facilities operating on or adjacent to waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and are split into six separate parts. Following a general section that discusses general requirements and deﬁnitions, each of the sections focuses on a speciﬁc segment of the marine industry: ports, vessels, facilities, and outer continental shelf facilities. A ﬁnal regulation addresses the installation of Automatic Identiﬁcation Systems (AIS). These regulations are part of the new Subchapter H of Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), except for AIS, which amends several sections of the CFR. The regulations have common elements, including the following: Security Ofﬁcers and Training for All Personnel Requires the designation of an individual who will be responsible for the vessel or facility security program, outlines the qualiﬁcations for security ofﬁcers, and requires all personnel to have training so that they are ready and able to implement the security plan. Security Assessments and Plans Requires owners and operators to assess the vulnerabilities, and develop plans that may include passenger, vehicle and baggage screening proce-

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dures; security patrols; establishing restricted areas; personnel identiﬁcation procedures; access control measures; and/or installation of surveillance equipment.

General—Parts 101 & 102 Alternative Security Programs/Equivalencies Provides ﬂexibility and encourages innovation by allowing industry to submit, for Coast Guard approval, alternative security programs that provide an equal level of security as required in the regulations. Maritime Security Directives • Gives the Coast Guard the authority to issue supplemental directives that require the implementation of speciﬁc security measures within the context of security plans, allowing the government to communicate sensitive security information to industry • Increased threat = increased security • Establishes three levels of security, which align with an international system, and correspond to the Homeland Security Advisory System. These levels allow industry to increase and decrease security measures based on threat conditions, providing reasonable and effective security.

Communication of Maritime Security Information Requires the Coast Guard to communicate information on threats to the appropriate members of maritime industry and other authorities in the port.

Ports—Part 103 Federal Maritime Security Coordinators Designates the Coast Guard Captains of the Port as Federal Maritime Security Coordinators, giving them the authority to oversee and direct the necessary activities of increasing security of our ports.

Area Maritime Security Committees (AMS) Establishes Area Maritime Security Committees, made up of members of other federal, state and local agencies, industry and others, to assess the speciﬁc

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vulnerabilities in each of our 361 ports and develop plans for very complex and diverse security requirements within the port areas.

Risk Assessments and Security Plans Requires the AMS Committees to conduct risk assessments, building on preliminary assessments already conducted in 47 key ports, which examine the threats, consequences, and vulnerabilities of the port. Details the elements of Area Maritime Security Plans, including requiring an annual exercise.

Vessels—Part 104 Examples of vessels most directly impacted by the new regulations: • Small cruise ship traveling from Chicago to Montreal • SOLAS-certiﬁed cargo ship carrying grain traveling from Jacksonville to New York • Container vessel carrying cargo from New Orleans to San Juan • Container vessel carrying cargo from Hong Kong to Los Angeles • Barge carrying auto part containers traveling from Seattle to Vancouver • Cruise ship on a Caribbean voyage • Dinner boat on the Chesapeake Bay carrying more than 150 people • Gaming boat on the Mississippi • Ferries operating in Puget Sound, Washington • Barge carrying home heating oil on the Hudson River • Tanker carrying liqueﬁed natural gas • Supply vessel heading to an offshore oil rig • Towing vessel pushing an oil barge on the Mississippi River

Facilities—Part 105 Examples of maritime facilities most directly impacted by the new regulations: • Facility that handles dangerous cargo, including oil, chemicals, and explosives • Facility that services vessels that carry more than 150 passengers • Facility that receives vessels on international voyages, including vessels solely navigating the Great Lakes.

Outer Continental Shelf Facilities—Part 106 Examples of offshore oil & gas platforms most directly impacted by the new regulations:

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• Oil rig that produces more than 100,000 barrels of oil per day • Platform that produces more than 200 million cubic feet of natural gas per day • Platform that is consistently manned by more than 150 people

Automatic Identiﬁcation Systems The regulations require the installation of Automatic Identiﬁcation System (AIS) on certain vessels. AIS equipment is a system that automatically sends detailed ship information to other ships and shore-based agencies. Installing AIS equipment on certain vessels traveling in our waters will allow comprehensive, virtually instantaneous vessel tracking and monitoring, increasing security and safety in our shipping channels. Examples of vessels required to install an Automatic Identiﬁcation System: • Ships on an international voyage • Large passenger vessels • Other commercial vessels operating in a Vessel Trafﬁc System

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE PORT SECURITY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2006 President George W. Bush The White House, Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary September 14, 2006*

Today, the Senate passed legislation to strengthen my administration’s efforts to secure our ports and detect dangers before they reach America’s shores. By furthering our coordination with responsible countries throughout the world, the Port Security Improvement Act of 2006 will help secure the global supply chain and help ensure the smooth ﬂow of commerce into and out of the United States. I am pleased this bill codiﬁes several administration efforts that have already substantially improved security at our ports, including the Container Security Initiative, which identiﬁes and inspects cargo at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United States, and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, which helps our international trading partners secure their supply chains before shipping goods into our country. I look forward to the House and Senate resolving their differences in Conference and sending this legislation to me for my signature.

*

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060914-9.html

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Notes 1. Pub. L. No. 107–295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002). 2. Zeigert, Amy, et al. “Port Security: Improving Emergency Response Capabilities at the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach.” California Policy Options 2005. University of California Los Angeles, School of Public Affairs (Los Angeles, Calif. 2005). 3. None of the listings in this testimony is meant to be exhaustive of all the efforts under way. The Coast Guard has a range of activities under way for reducing seaport vulnerabilities that extends beyond the actions shown here. Such activities include, among others the use of armed boarding ofﬁcers, formerly known as sea marshals, who board high-interest vessels arriving or departing U.S. seaports and stand guard in critical areas of the vessels; the establishment of Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST) to provide antiterrorism protection for strategic shipping, high-interest vessels, and critical infrastructure; and the underwater port security system, which uses trained divers and robotic cameras to check ship hulls and piers and an underwater intruder detection system. We have not evaluated the effectiveness of these activities. 4. Another program to help secure the overseas supply chain process is the Coast Guard’s International Port Security Program. In response to being required under MTSA to assess antiterrorism measures maintained at foreign seaports, the Coast Guard established this program in April 2004 to protect the global shipping industry by helping foreign nations evaluate security measures in their seaports. Through bilateral or multilateral discussions, the Coast Guard and the host nations review the implementation of security measures against established security standards, such as the International Maritime Organization’s ISPS Code. To conduct the program, the Coast Guard has assigned ofﬁcials to three regions (Asia-Paciﬁc, Europe/Africa/Middle East, and Central/South America) to facilitate the discussions. In addition, a Coast Guard team has been established to conduct country/port visits, discuss security measures implemented, and develop best practices between countries. Each year the Coast Guard seeks to visit approximately 45 countries that conduct maritime trade with the United States. 5. The nation’s three largest container port regions (Los Angeles/Long Beach, New York/New Jersey, and Seattle/Tacoma) are involved in the Operation Safe Commerce pilot project. 6. GAO, Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention, GAO-05-394 (Washington DC: April 15, 2005). 7. GAO, Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors, GAO-03-770 (Washington DC: July 2003); and GAO, Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection, GAO-04-557T (Washington DC: March 2004). In addition, we have additional work under way regarding the Container Security Initiative program and expect to issue our report in May. 8. GAO, Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors, GAO-03-770 (Washington, D.C: July 2003). 9. GAO, Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Coast Guard as It Transitions to the New Department, GAO-03-467T (Washington DC: February 2003). 10. GAO, Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and Management Concerns Remain, GAO-05-161 (Washington DC: Jan. 31, 2005).

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11. GAO, Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security, GAO-04-838 (Washington DC: June 30, 2004). 12. GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington DC: Jan. 2005). 13. GAO, Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management Issues, GAO-03-1165T (Washington DC: Sept. 17, 2003); and Homeland Security: Information-Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management Issues, GAO-03-715T (Washington DC: May 8, 2003). 14. GAO, Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention, GAO-05-170 (Washington DC: January 2005). 15. Of the facilities testing TSA’s prototype, we visited ports and facilities in the Delaware River Region, including Wilmington Port Authority, the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange, and the South Jersey Port. We also visited ports and facilities on the West Coast, including those in the Port of Seattle, Port of Los Angeles, and Port of Long Beach as well as ports and facilities in Florida, including Port Everglades and the Port of Jacksonville. 16. GAO, Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime Worker Identiﬁcation Card Program, GAO-05-106 (Washington DC: December 2004). 17. GAO, Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security, GAO-04-838 (Washington DC: June 2004). 18. DHS has proposed consolidating homeland grant programs into a single program. Known as the Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program (TIPP), the program would lump together grant funding for transit, port security and other critical infrastructure, and eliminate speciﬁc grant programs for port, rail, truck, intercity bus, and nongovernmental organizations security. In its ﬁscal year 2006 budget request, the administration proposed $600 million for TIPP, a $260-million increase in overall funding from ﬁscal year 2005 for the speciﬁc transportation security grant programs. In ﬁscal year 2005, funding for port, rail, truck, intercity bus, and nongovernmental organizations security totaled $340 million. 19. GAO, National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO-02-621T (Washington DC: April 2002). 20. The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, V. Forging America’s New Normalcy (Arlington, VA: Dec. 15, 2003). 21. GAO, Homeland Security: Observations on the National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-1075T (Washington DC: Sept. 22, 2004). 22. Greenberg, Michael D., Chalk, Pete, Willis, Henry H., Khilko, Ivan. and Ortiz, David S.; Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability. RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy. 2006. p. xxi. 23. Executive Ofﬁce of the President. The National Strategy for Maritime Security. September 20, 2005. p. 4. 24 Allison, Graham. Remarks on “CNN Presents: Nuclear Terror.” CNN Presents. Broadcast transcript. Sept. 12, 2004. [http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/ 0409/12/cp.00.html]. 25. Gorman, Siobhan and Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr. “Early Warning.” The National Journal. June 11, 2005. 26. For further analysis on this topic, see CRS Report RS21293, Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response, by Jonathan Medalia.

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27. Hegland, Corine, and Webb, Greg. “The Threat,” National Journal. April 15, 2005. [http://nationaljournal.com/members/news/2005/04/0415nj1.htm]; Senator Richard G. Lugar. “The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses.” June 2005. p. 6. [http://lugar.senate.gov/reports/NPSurvey.pdf]. 28 Bunn, Matthew and Weir, Anthony. Securing the Bomb 2006. John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University. Commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative. July 2006. p. 29. 29. Collins, Graham P. “Kim’s Big Fizzle: The Physics Behind A Nuclear Dud.” Scientiﬁc American. Jan. 2007. 30. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff at George Mason University. Fairfax, VA. April 26, 2006. 31. de Rugy, Veronique. “Is Port Security Spending Making Us Safer?” American Enterprise Institute. Working Paper #115. Sept. 7, 2005. p. 8. 32. For further information on dirty bombs, see CRS Report RS21528, Terrorist ‘Dirty Bombs’: A Brief Primer, by Jonathan Medalia. 33. Ibid. Booz Allen Hamilton. 2003. p. 1. 34. Senator Richard G. Lugar. “The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses.” June 2005. p. 6. [http://lugar.senate.gov/reports/NPSurvey.pdf]. 35. Government Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO). Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening. GAO-03-638. May 16, 2003. p. 65. 36. Mayer, Josh. “Al Qaeda Feared to Have Dirty Bombs.” Los Angeles Times. Feb. 8, 2003. p. 1. 37. Gilbert, Gary. Senior V.P., Hutchison Port Holdings. Statement before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Permanent Investigations Subcommittee. March 30, 2006. 38. Singer, S. Fred., Hoover Institution, Stanford Univ. “Nuclear Terrorism: Facts and Fantasies.” Washington Times. (Commentary). April 5, 2002. 39. “Dirty Bomb” Fact Sheet. Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. Oct. 2006. [http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20769/dirty_bomb_ facts.pdf]. 40. Burgess, Mark. “Pascal’s New Wager: The Dirty Bomb Threat Heightens.” Center for Defense Information. Washington. Feb. 4, 2003. [http://www.cdi.org/ terrorism/dirty-bomb.cfm]. 41. Sterngold, James. “Assessing the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism” San Francisco Chronicle. April 18, 2004.; Dotinga, Randy. “After the Beep, Exit the Premises.” Wired News. May 6, 2004. [http://www.wired.com/news/technology/1,63328-0.html]. 42. Taylor, Guy. “Padilla Case Mum on ‘Dirty Bomb’.” Washington Times. Nov. 24, 2005. p. A03. 43. Burgess, Mark. Feb. 4, 2003. 44. See, for example, Hon. Edward J. Markey. “Rep. Markey Urges Scanning for Nuclear Devices in Container Ships Before They Arrive at U.S. Ports.” Press release. Sept. 28, 2006; Ofﬁce of Senator Patty Murray. “Cargo Security: Floor Remarks by Senator Patty Murray Introducing the GreenLane Bill for Senate Consideration.” Press release. Sept. 7, 2006. 45. For an analysis of smuggling a nuclear weapon in an oil tanker, see CRS Report RS21997, Port and Maritime Security: Potential for Terrorist Nuclear Attack Using Oil Tankers, by Jonathan Medalia.

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46. Ibid. 47. U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). An Assessment of the U.S. Marine Transportation System. Report to Congress. Sept. 1999. 48. U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD). Vessel Calls at U.S. and World Ports 2005. April 2006. p. 1. 49. Stables, Eleanor. “For Better Cargo Security, Government Needs to Think ‘Outside the Box,’ Experts Say.” CQ Homeland Security. Oct. 1, 2006. 50. Finnegan, William. “Watching the Waterfront.” The New Yorker. June 19, 2006. p. 63. 51. Government Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO). Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny With Limited Assurance of Improved Security. GAO-05-404. March, 2005. p. 7. 52. Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS). Budget-in-Brief, Fiscal Year 2006. [https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Budget_BIB-FY2006.pdf]. 53. Ofﬁce of Congressman Edward J. Markey. Personal communication with staff. Jan. 5, 2004. 54. Turner, Pamela J., Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Letter to U.S. Representative Edward Markey. April 15, 2004. p. 1. 55. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large Liqueﬁed Natural Gas (LNG) Spill Over Water. SAND2004-6258. Albuquerque, NM. Dec. 2004. pp. 49–50. 56. SNL. Dec. 2004. pp. 61–62. 57. Clarke, Richard A., et al. LNG Facilities in Urban Areas. Good Harbor Consulting, LLC. Prepared for the Rhode Island Ofﬁce of Attorney General. GHC-RI-0505A. May 2005. 58. McLaughlin, J. “LNG is Nowhere Near as Dangerous as People Are Making it Out to Be.” Lloyd’s List. Feb. 8, 2005. p5. 59. Behr, Peter. “Higher Gas Price Sets Stage for LNG.” Washington Post. July 5, 2003. p. D10. 60. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Vista del Sol LNG Terminal Project, Draft Environmental Impact Statement. FERC/EIS-0176D. Dec. 2004. p. 4–162. 61. FERC. FERC/EIS-0176D. Dec. 2004. p4–162. Notwithstanding this assertion, in its subsequent draft review of the Long Beach LNG terminal proposal, the FERC states that “the historical probability of a successful terrorist event would be less than seven chances in a million per year . . .” See FERC. Oct. 7, 2005. p. ES-14. 62. Woolsey, James. Remarks before the National Commission on Energy LNG Forum, Washington DC, June 21, 2006. 63. Grant, Richard, President, Distrigas. Testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Energy hearing on “The Future of Liqueﬁed Natural Gas: Siting and Safety.” Feb. 15, 2005. 64. U.S. Coast Guard. U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port Long Island Sound Waterways Suitability Report for the Proposed Broadwater Liqueﬁed Natural Gas Facility. Sept. 21, 2006. p. 146. 65. Ibid. 66. Congressman Frank Pallone, Jr. “Pallone Calls for Increased Funding for Ferry Security.” Press release. July 15, 2005. 67. Greenberg, M.D. et al. 2006. p. 95. 68. Lipton, Eric. “Trying to Keep the Nation’s Ferries Safe from Terrorists.” New York Times. March 19, 2005.

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69. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Ofﬁce of the Inspector General. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Protect the Nation’s Seaports. Audit Report 06-26. March 2006. p. 52. 70. Shukovsky, Paul and Barber, Mike. “Ferries a Top Terror Target, FBI Cautions.” Seattle Post-Intelligencer. April 21, 2006. p. A1. 71. Ibid. 72. Gen. Ralph Eberhart, U.S. Northern Command, as quoted in “Militants Eyeing Seaborne Attack, U.S. General Says.” Reuters. Aug. 25, 2004. 73. Köknar, Ali M. “Maritime Terrorism: a New Challenge for NATO.” Energy Security. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS). Jan. 24, 2005. 74. National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). Terrorist incident reports. July 20, 2006. [http://www.tkb.org/IncidentTargetModule.jsp]. 75. MIPT. July 20, 2006. 76. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL31733, Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress, by John F. Frittelli. 77. Valencia, Mark J. and Young, Adam J. “Conﬂation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility.” Contemporary Southeast Asia. Vol. 25. No. 2. Aug. 2003. pp. 269–283. 78. Captain James Pelkofski, U.S. Navy. “Before the Storm: al Qaeda’s Coming Maritime Campaign.” Proceedings. U.S. Naval Institute. Vol. 132. No. 12. Dec. 2005. [http://www.usni.org/proceedings/Articles05/Pro12Pelkofski.html]. 79. Ibid. 80. Pub. L. No. 109–347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006). 81. Pub. L. No. 109–347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006). 82. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 amended a SAFE Port Act provision on scanning all United States-bound containers at foreign ports. See Pub. L. No. 110–53, §1701(a), 121 Stat. 266, 489–90. This amendment is discussed later in this testimony. 83. A list of related GAO products may be found at the end of this testimony.

8

International Perspectives: Regional and Global

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES Southeast Asia ARF STATEMENT ON COOPERATION AGAINST PIRACY AND OTHER THREATS TO SECURITY Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum June 17, 2003*

The chairman of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), on behalf of the participating states and organization, issues the following statement: 1.

*

Recognizing that: a. Piracy and armed robbery against ships and the potential for terrorist attacks on vulnerable sea shipping threaten the growth of the AsiaPaciﬁc region and disrupt the stability of global commerce, particularly as these have become tools of transnational organized crime;

http://www.aseansec.org/14837.htm

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b. ARF countries represent approximately 80 percent of the world’s GDP and trade, and even more of maritime or container shipping trade; c. Maritime security is an indispensable and fundamental condition for the welfare and economic security of the ARF region. Ensuring this security is in the direct interest of all countries, and in particular the ARF countries; d. Most maritime armed robberies in the Asia-Paciﬁc region tend to occur in the coastal and archipelagic waters. Trends over the last few years indicate that piracy and armed robbery against ships continue to threaten to be a signiﬁcant problem in the Asia-Paciﬁc region; e. To deal with this increasingly violent international crime, it is necessary to step up broad-based regional cooperative efforts to combat transnational organized crime, including through cooperation and coordination among all institutions concerned, such as naval units, coastal patrol and law enforcement agencies, shipping companies, crews, and port authorities; f. Such efforts must be based on relevant international law, including the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention; g. It is important that there be national and regional cooperation to ensure that maritime criminals and pirates do not evade prosecution; h. Effective responses to maritime crime require regional maritime security strategies and multilateral cooperation in their implementation; i. National, regional, and international efforts to combat terrorism also enhance the ability to combat transnational organized crime and armed robberies against ships. The Participants of ARF endeavor to achieve effective implementation of the relevant international instruments and recommendations/guidelines for the suppression of piracy and armed robbery against ships, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988) and its Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf; and the International Maritime Organization’s recommendations and guidelines for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships at sea; the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1974), particularly the new Chapter XI-2 and the International Ship and Port Facilities Security (ISPS Code); and to enhance their coordination and cooperation to that end. The members of ARF express their commitment to become parties to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 and its Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelves as soon as possible, if they have not yet done so. The ARF Participants will work together to protect ships engaged in international voyages by: a. Enhancing cooperation on ﬁghting piracy and armed robbery in the region between ARF participants’ shipping and organizations such as the

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International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Piracy Reporting Center of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB); b. Early implementation of the comprehensive amendment to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, and the new ISPS Code adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security in December 2002; as called for in Conference Resolution 6. c. Afﬁrming their responsibilities to prosecute, in accordance with relevant domestic laws, perpetrators of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. d. Endorsing the development by the International Maritime Organization of the following instruments and recommendations/guidance for use in preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships: • Recommendations to governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships, MSC/Circ. 622/Rev. I, June 16, 1999; • Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, MSC/Circ. 623/Rev. 3, May 29, 2002; Directives for Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers (MRCCs), MSC/Circ. 967, June 6, 2000; • Interim Procedures for MRCCs on Receipt of Distress Alerts, MSC/Circ. 959, June 20, 2000; • Resolution A. 922 (22)—Code of Practice for the investigation of the crimes of piracy and armed robberies against ships; • Resolution A. 923 (22)—“Phantom” ships and registration process; and • Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 and its Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf. The ARF participants commit to undertake the following actions: a. Encourage bilateral and multilateral maritime cooperation among ARF members to combat piracy, including at the present increased personnel contact among personnel, information exchanges and antipiracy exercises on the basis of respecting territorial integrity, sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction and in accordance with the principles of voluntary participation and agreement in line with the respective applicable international conventions. b. Encourage ARF consideration and future discussion of new IMB proposals (10/23/02) on prescribed trafﬁc lanes for large supertankers with coastguard or naval escort whenever and wherever possible on the high sea upon the consent of all ARF countries concerned. If considered feasible, forward to IMO for adoption as appropriate. c. Provide, where and when possible, technical assistance and capacitybuilding infrastructure to countries that need help in developing necessary laws, extending training, and where and when possible, providing equipment.

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d. Enhance ARF participants’ ability to share information domestically and internationally as a vital component in the ﬁght against maritime piracy and armed robberies. e. Institute regional ARF cooperation and training in antipiracy and security. Cooperate with the world maritime university (under the IMO) as regards education and training of personal engaged in antipiracy and security. f. Encourage greater ARF member states’ transport industries and shipping community to report incidents to the relevant coastal states and to ships’ ﬂag administration for follow up action by the proper authorities as prescribed in MSC/Circ. 623. In addition to the IMO, ships may also report to secondary reporting centers such as the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Center in Kuala Lumpur. g. Encourage the ARF Chair to explore with the ASEAN Secretariat or an ARF participant whether it would be willing to coordinate logging of requests for assistance by ARF participants in implementing the provisions of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 and its Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf and other relevant instruments. h. Review progress on efforts to combat maritime piracy and armed robberies against ships at the 11th ARF Ministerial meeting in 2004, and share their experiences with member states of the IMO. i. Endorse the ongoing efforts to establish a legal framework for regional cooperation to combat piracy and armed robberies against ships. j. Welcome the discussion in the IMO on various issues relating to the delivery of criminals who have committed crimes on a ship on the high sea or on the exclusive economic zone to the authorities of port state by the master of the ship, and hope to reach a conclusion as soon as possible (IMO document “LEG 85/10”). k. Nothing in this statement, nor any act or activity carried out in pursuant to this statement, should prejudice the position of ARF countries with regard to any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over territory.

APEC AND MARITIME SECURITY MEASURES Ambassador Makarim Wibisono Chairman of the APEC Counterterrorism Task Force Presented to the APEC High-Level Conference on Maritime Security Manila, Philippines September 8–9, 2003

International terrorism has made the world a far more dangerous place than when the Asia Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) was born in 1989. And

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the need to secure our region’s economy and trade from terrorism has become an important and major focus of the APEC agenda. At the meeting of APEC leaders in Shanghai in 2001, counterterrorism efforts were placed ﬁrmly on the APEC agenda. The simple reason for this is that terrorism is one of the most destructive threats to the APEC goals of free trade and investment in the Asia-Paciﬁc region. Terrorism not only destroys lives and property, but undermines market conﬁdence, inﬂates the cost of trade and reduces market activity. At the same time, more stringent security measures have the potential to increase the cost of trading goods and services, and slow the movement of passengers across borders. Therefore, failure to act would have severe repercussions and puts APEC’s economies at risk. Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has developed new measures relating to the security of ships and port facilities. In December 2002, the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security adopted new provisions for the 1974 International Convention of Safety of Life at Sea. The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) provides us measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism that threaten the security of passengers and crews and the safety of ships. Implementing new counterterrorism measures will require a substantial investment in new infrastructure. In the case of shipping, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) calculates that the cost to implement the IMO package of security measures contained in the Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS) Convention and the ISPS Code to be over US$2 billion. The APEC economies believe that these costs should be viewed as an investment that will reduce the risk premiums and ensure continued economic growth. APEC’s comprehensive strategy to protect our region from terrorism was unveiled by APEC leaders in Los Cabos, Mexico, last October when they issued their statement on ﬁghting terrorism and promoting growth. APEC’s counterterrorism strategy includes the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) Initiative; preventing the ﬂow of funds to terrorists; protecting critical infrastructure; and working in partnership with the private sector to implement these measures. APEC represents about 60 percent of the world’s GDP and half of its trade. Most of the world’s largest seaports and busiest airports are located in APEC economies. The threat of terrorism not only reduces trade ﬂow, but if terrorists were to successfully cause a shutdown of major ports, this would severely affect the economies of the region. To protect our trade, APEC leaders have committed their economies to implement the Standard Terminal Arrival Route (STAR) Initiative to strengthen security against terrorist threats while simultaneously boosting trade efﬁciency. The program involves protecting cargo, ships, aviation, and people crossing borders.

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APEC recognizes that considerable investment will be needed to fully implement the system. However, by reducing the economic costs of terrorism while facilitating the more efﬁcient movement of goods and people across borders, such an investment is expected to result in signiﬁcant economic returns. APEC economies are also working to protect cargo by implementing a Container Security Regime. This initiative ensures the in-transit integrity of containers and provides electronic information on a container’s contents to customs, port, and shipping ofﬁcials as early as possible in the supply chain. By the year 2005, the APEC economies have also agreed to implement common standards for an electronic customs reporting system developed by the World Customs Organization (WCO), which will provide the data necessary to target high-risk shipments for inspection and facilitate trade. APEC is pursuing a number of programs, including training, to simplify and harmonize customs procedures so as to improve the accuracy, certainty, uniformity, and transparency of customs procedures. APEC is also helping to build the systemic risk management capacity necessary to allow customs administrations to target resources where they are most needed. The main way that the STAR Initiative is anticipated to protect ships engaged in international voyages is through the promotion of ship and port security plans by July 2004. This will be followed by the installation of automatic identiﬁcation systems on certain ships by December 2004. The ﬁght against pirates in the region is also being enhanced with increased cooperation between APEC fora and organizations such as the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Center. It is also developing standards for detection equipment and other security technology. The Accreditation of Seafarer Manning Agencies in the APEC Region Project aims to develop a system for accrediting manning agents who provide employees to maritime companies in the Asia-Paciﬁc region. The Transport Working Group is also undertaking projects to assess the beneﬁts of new technologies as they relate to the transportation industry. The working group agreed to a Pathﬁnder Initiative on the Global Navigational Satellite Systems. This will signiﬁcantly enhance the safety of international shipping. Another project involves applying track and trace technologies to the logistics chain. These measures not only improve the visibility, quality, and reliability of delivery of products to export markets but also enhance the security of the supply chain. The use of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) will also enhance the end-to-end supply chain security and increase the efﬁciency of trade. These systems involve the use of smart container technologies such as electronic cargo seals and sensors, increased efﬁciency in inspecting seals and the use of electronic cargo manifests. Some of the other components of APEC’s comprehensive counterterrorism strategy are measures to deny terrorists access to the world’s ﬁnancial system,

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while at the same time, using the money trail to locate and apprehend terrorists. Last October, APEC leaders agreed to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism no later than October 2003, and to implement, as soon as possible, the measures called for in UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1390. These measures include the blocking of terrorist assets and making the ﬁnancing of terrorism a criminal offense, promoting better monitoring of alternative remittance systems and to enhance information sharing and law enforcement activities. Given the importance of cyber security to international trade, APEC leaders are also committed to protect the Internet from cyber criminals. By the end of this year, APEC members will endeavor to enact a comprehensive set of laws relating to cyber security and cyber crime. These will be consistent with the provisions of international legal instruments, such as the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/63 (2000) and the Convention on Cyber-crime (2001). APEC has also undertaken a number of projects to protect the stable supply of energy required for economic growth in our region. One of these projects was a sea-lane disruption simulation exercise conducted by the Asia Paciﬁc Energy Research Center last April. This exercise highlighted the inadequacy of navigational aids in the straits of Sunda and Lombok in the event that a shipping incident blocked the Strait of Malacca. Work is also underway to create a real-time, emergency information-sharing network. The Energy Working Group will conduct a half-day workshop on oil supply emergency response arrangements to assist member economies to develop and implement energy emergency preparedness plans. To facilitate the exchange of information between APEC member economies, in February 2003, APEC senior ofﬁcials endorsed the completion of the Counter-Terrorism Action Plans (CTAP) by all member economies. The CTAP lists speciﬁc objectives and expected outputs by each economy to secure cargo, protect people in transit, secure ships engaged in international voyages, secure international aviation, halt the ﬁnancing of terrorism, enhance cyber security, secure energy supplies, and protect the health of our communities. Relevant APEC fora, including the Transport Working Group, are now looking at the CTAP to determine speciﬁc regional gaps in counterterrorism capacity relevant to their ﬁelds. It is proposed that next year, the completed CTAP and data provided by the APEC fora will form the basis of a rigorous qualitative cross-analysis by Asia-Paciﬁc security experts. This analysis would seek to identify linkages between the various CTAP objectives and regional needs to promote effective regional and multidisciplinary/ multiagency approaches to shared challenges.

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To oversee the implementation of these Action Plans, this February, APEC Senior Ofﬁcials established a Counter-Terrorism Task Force. The aim of this high-level group is to coordinate the ﬁght against terrorism; facilitate cooperation between APEC working groups and committees on counterterrorism issues; and coordinate regional and bilateral capacity building and technical assistance programs, including consultations with international ﬁnancial institutions. APEC recognizes that terrorists know no boundaries, and that members must work with other regional and international bodies to protect our maritime environment from terrorism. One of the key roles of the CounterTerrorism Task Force is to cooperate with other international organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the World Customs Organization (WCO), and the International Civil Aviation Organization. Building the Asia Paciﬁc into a region that is more secure and more efﬁcient is a signiﬁcant undertaking. To achieve this goal will require enhanced cooperation, new procedures, and the greater use of advanced technology. Capacity building, in particular the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of governments, is essential to the success of protecting the economy of the Asia Paciﬁc. APEC’s programs to secure efﬁcient trade start with the identiﬁcation of capacity building needs. These needs will be coordinated internally within APEC and with other international organizations to match each target economy’s unique situation. APEC members also consider that a partnership between the public and the private sectors is essential in the ﬁght against terrorism. Private sector representatives, therefore, should be encouraged to work in partnership with APEC economies to implement necessary measures to secure trade. The member economies are investing great efforts in undertaking reforms to protect our growing prosperity, and where possible, to use these reforms not only to protect, but also to enhance trade efficiency. As we have discovered through the APEC process, investment in security can result in significant economic efficiency gains, not only by reducing the economic costs of terrorism, but also by facilitating the movement of goods and people. The APEC Counter-Terrorism Action Plan, APEC Counter-Terrorism Task Force, the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) Initiative and numerous programs that support these efforts are at the heart of our efforts to promote trade, to expand business opportunities and to create jobs in our region. Further initiatives are being developed to build on the progress achieved to date and to ensure that the region’s maritime environment is protected. However, the goal set by APEC leaders of ensuring secure trade in the Asia Paciﬁc will be realized only if we work closely together.

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REGIONAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT ON COMBATING PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS IN ASIA ReCAAP Agreement, Tokyo, Japan November 11, 2004*

The Contracting Parties to this Agreement, Concerned about the increasing number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia, Mindful of the complex nature of the problem of piracy and armed robbery against ships, Recognizing the importance of safety of ships, including their crew, exercising the right of navigation provided for in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 10, 1982, hereinafter referred to as “the UNCLOS,” Reafﬁrming the duty of States to cooperate in the prevention and suppression of piracy under the UNCLOS, Recalling “Tokyo Appeal” of March 2000, “Asia Anti-Piracy Challenges 2000” of April 2000 and “Tokyo Model Action Plan” of April 2000, Noting the relevant resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the relevant resolutions and recommendations adopted by the International Maritime Organization, Conscious of the importance of international cooperation as well as the urgent need for greater regional cooperation and coordination of all States affected within Asia, to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships effectively, Convinced that information sharing and capacity building among the Contracting Parties will signiﬁcantly contribute towards the prevention and suppression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia, Afﬁrming that, to ensure greater effectiveness of this Agreement, it is indispensable for each Contracting Party to strengthen its measures aimed at preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships, Determined to promote further regional cooperation and to enhance the effectiveness of such cooperation,

Have agreed as follows: PART I: INTRODUCTION Article 1: Deﬁnitions 1.

For the purposes of this Agreement, “piracy” means any of the following acts: (a) any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

*http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaiyo/pdfs/kyotei_s.pdf

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2.

(i) on the high seas, against another ship, or against persons or property on board such ship; (ii) against a ship, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b). For the purposes of this Agreement, “armed robbery against ships” means any of the following acts: (a) any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends and directed against a ship, or against persons or property on board such ship, in a place within a Contracting Party’s jurisdiction over such offenses; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with knowledge of facts making it a ship for armed robbery against ships; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

Article 2: General Provisions 1.

2.

3. 4.

5.

6.

The Contracting Parties shall, in accordance with their respective national laws and regulations and subject to their available resources or capabilities, implement this Agreement, including preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships, to the fullest extent possible. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations of any Contracting Party under the international agreements to which that Contracting Party is party, including the UNCLOS, and the relevant rules of international law. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for noncommercial purposes. Nothing in this Agreement, nor any act or activity carried out under this Agreement shall prejudice the position of any Contracting Party with regard to any dispute concerning territorial sovereignty or any issues related to the law of the sea. Nothing in this Agreement entitles a Contracting Party to undertake in the territory of another Contracting Party the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other Contracting Party by its national law. In applying paragraph 1 of Article 1, each Contracting Party shall give due regard to the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS without prejudice to the rights of the third Parties.

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Article 3: General Obligations 1.

2.

Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with its national laws and regulations and applicable rules of international law, make every effort to take effective measures in respect of the following: (a) to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships; (b) to arrest pirates or persons who have committed armed robbery against ships; (c) to seize ships or aircraft used for committing piracy or armed robbery against ships, to seize ships taken by and under the control of pirates or persons who have committed armed robbery against ships, and to seize the property on board such ships; and (d) to rescue victim ships and victims of piracy or armed robbery against ships. Nothing in this Article shall prevent each Contracting Party from taking additional measures in respect of subparagraphs (a) to (d) above in its land territory.

PART II: INFORMATION SHARING CENTER Article 4: Composition 1.

2. 3. 4.

5.

6. 7.

8.

9.

An Information Sharing Center, hereinafter referred to as “the Center,” is hereby established to promote close cooperation among the Contracting Parties in preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships. The Center shall be located in Singapore. The Center shall be composed of the Governing Council and the Secretariat. The Governing Council shall be composed of one representative from each Contracting Party. The Governing Council shall meet at least once every year in Singapore, unless otherwise decided by the Governing Council. The Governing Council shall make policies concerning all the matters of the Center and shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its Chairperson. The Governing Council shall take its decisions by consensus. The Secretariat shall be headed by the Executive Director who shall be assisted by the staff. The Executive Director shall be chosen by the Governing Council. The Executive Director shall be responsible for the administrative, operational and ﬁnancial matters of the Center in accordance with the policies as determined by the Governing Council and the provisions of this Agreement, and for such other matters as determined by the Governing Council. The Executive Director shall represent the Center. The Executive Director shall, with the approval of the Governing Council, make rules and regulations of the Secretariat.

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Article 5: Headquarters Agreement 1.

2.

3.

The Center, as an international organization whose members are the Contracting Parties to this Agreement, shall enjoy such legal capacity, privileges and immunities in the Host State of the Center as are necessary for the fulﬁllment of its functions. The Executive Director and the staff of the Secretariat shall be accorded, in the Host State, such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulﬁllment of their functions. The Center shall enter into an agreement with the Host State on matters including those speciﬁed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.

Article 6: Financing 1.

2. 3.

The expenses of the Center, as provided for in the budget decided by the Governing Council, shall be provided by the following sources: (a) Host State ﬁnancing and support; (b) Voluntary contributions from the Contracting Parties; (c) Voluntary contributions from international organizations and other entities, in accordance with relevant criteria adopted by the Governing Council; and (d) Any other voluntary contributions as may be agreed upon by the Governing Council. Financial matters of the Center shall be governed by a Financial Regulation to be adopted by the Governing Council. There shall be an annual audit of the accounts of the Center by an independent auditor appointed by the Governing Council. The audit report shall be submitted to the Governing Council and shall be made public, in accordance with the Financial Regulation.

Article 7: Functions The functions of the Center shall be: (a) to manage and maintain the expeditious ﬂow of information relating to incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships among the Contracting Parties; (b) to collect, collate and analyze the information transmitted by the Contracting Parties concerning piracy and armed robbery against ships, including other relevant information, if any, relating to individuals and transnational organized criminal groups committing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships; (c) to prepare statistics and reports on the basis of the information gathered and analyzed under subparagraph (b), and to disseminate them to the Contracting Parties;

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(d) to provide an appropriate alert, whenever possible, to the Contracting Parties if there is a reasonable ground to believe that a threat of incidents of piracy or armed robbery against ships is imminent; (e) to circulate requests referred to in Article 10 and relevant information on the measures taken referred to in Article 11 among the Contracting Parties; (f) to prepare nonclassiﬁed statistics and reports based on information gathered and analyzed under subparagraph (b) and to disseminate them to the shipping community and the International Maritime Organization; and (g) to perform such other functions as may be agreed upon by the Governing Council with a view to preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships.

Article 8: Operation 1. 2.

3.

The daily operation of the Center shall be undertaken by the Secretariat. In carrying out its functions, the Center shall respect the conﬁdentiality of information provided by any Contracting Party, and shall not release or disseminate such information unless the consent of that Contracting Party is given in advance. The Center shall be operated in an effective and transparent manner, in accordance with the policies made by the Governing Council, and shall avoid duplication of existing activities between the Contracting Parties.

PART III: COOPERATION THROUGH THE INFORMATION SHARING CENTER Article 9: Information Sharing 1.

2. 3.

4.

Each Contracting Party shall designate a focal point responsible for its communication with the Center, and shall declare its designation of such focal point at the time of its signature or its deposit of an instrument of notiﬁcation provided for in Article 18. Each Contracting Party shall, upon the request of the Center, respect the conﬁdentiality of information transmitted from the Center. Each Contracting Party shall ensure the smooth and effective communication between its designated focal point, and other competent national authorities including rescue coordination centers, as well as relevant nongovernmental organizations. Each Contracting Party shall make every effort to require its ships, ship owners, or ship operators to promptly notify relevant national authorities including focal points, and the Center when appropriate, of incidents of piracy or armed robbery against ships.

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5.

6.

Any Contracting Party which has received or obtained information about an imminent threat of, or an incident of, piracy or armed robbery against ships shall promptly notify relevant information to the Center through its designated focal point. In the event that a Contracting Party receives an alert from the Center as to an imminent threat of piracy or armed robbery against ships pursuant to subparagraph (d) of Article 7, that Contracting Party shall promptly disseminate the alert to ships within the area of such an imminent threat.

Article 10: Request for Cooperation 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

A Contracting Party may request any other Contracting Party, through the Center or directly, to cooperate in detecting any of the following persons, ships, or aircraft: (a) pirates; (b) persons who have committed armed robbery against ships; (c) ships or aircraft used for committing piracy or armed robbery against ships, and ships taken by and under the control of pirates or persons who have committed armed robbery against ships; or (d) victim ships and victims of piracy or armed robbery against ships. A Contracting Party may request any other Contracting Party, through the Center or directly, to take appropriate measures, including arrest or seizure, against any of the persons or ships mentioned in subparagraph (a), (b), or (c) of paragraph 1 of this Article, within the limits permitted by its national laws and regulations and applicable rules of international law. A Contracting Party may also request any other Contracting Party, through the Center or directly, to take effective measures to rescue the victim ships and the victims of piracy or armed robbery against ships. The Contracting Party which has made a direct request for cooperation pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article shall promptly notify the Center of such request. Any request by a Contracting Party for cooperation involving extradition or mutual legal assistance in criminal matters shall be made directly to any other Contracting Party.

Article 11: Cooperation by the Requested Contracting Party 1.

2.

A Contracting Party, which has received a request pursuant to Article 10, shall, subject to paragraph 1 of Article 2, make every effort to take effective and practical measures for implementing such request. A Contracting Party, which has received a request pursuant to Article 10, may seek additional information from the requesting Contracting Party for the implementation of such request.

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A Contracting Party, which has taken measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, shall promptly notify the Center of the relevant information on the measures taken.

PART IV: COOPERATION Article 12: Extradition A Contracting Party shall, subject to its national laws and regulations, endeavor to extradite pirates or persons who have committed armed robbery against ships, and who are present in its territory, to the other Contracting Party which has jurisdiction over them, at the request of that Contracting Party. Article 13: Mutual Legal Assistance A Contracting Party shall, subject to its national laws and regulations, endeavor to render mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, including the submission of evidence related to piracy and armed robbery against ships, at the request of another Contracting Party. Article 14: Capacity Building 1.

2. 3.

For the purpose of enhancing the capacity of the Contracting Parties to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships, each Contracting Party shall endeavor to cooperate to the fullest possible extent with other Contracting Parties which request cooperation or assistance. The Center shall endeavor to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in providing capacity building assistance. Such capacity building cooperation may include technical assistance such as educational and training programs to share experiences and best practices.

Article 15: Cooperative Arrangements Cooperative arrangements such as joint exercises or other forms of cooperation, as appropriate, may be agreed upon among the Contracting Parties concerned. Article 16: Protection Measures for Ships Each Contracting Party shall encourage ships, ship owners, or ship operators, where appropriate, to take protective measures against piracy and armed robbery against ships, taking into account the relevant international

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standards and practices, in particular, recommendations adopted by the International Maritime Organization. PART V: FINAL PROVISIONS Article 17: Settlement of Disputes Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, including those relating to liability for any loss or damage caused by the request made under paragraph 2 of Article 10 or any measure taken under paragraph 1 of Article 11, shall be settled amicably by the Contracting Parties concerned through negotiations in accordance with applicable rules of international law. Article 18: Signature and Entry into Force 1.

2. 3.

4. 5.

This Agreement shall be open for signature at the depositary referred to in paragraph 2 below by the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, the Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. The Government of Singapore is the depositary of this Agreement. This Agreement shall enter into force 90 days after the date on which the tenth instrument of notiﬁcation by a State listed in paragraph 1, indicating the completion of its domestic requirements, is submitted to the depositary. Subsequently it shall enter into force in respect of any other State listed in paragraph 1 above 30 days after its deposit of an instrument of notiﬁcation to the depositary. The depositary shall notify all the States listed in paragraph 1 of the entry into force of this Agreement pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article. After this Agreement has entered into force, it shall be open for accession by any state not listed in paragraph 1. Any State desiring to accede to this Agreement may so notify the depositary, which shall promptly circulate the receipt of such notiﬁcation to all other Contracting Parties. In the absence of a written objection by a Contracting Party within 90 days of the receipt of such notiﬁcation by the depositary, that State may deposit an instrument of accession with the depositary, and become a party to this Agreement 60 days after such deposit of instrument of accession.

Article 19: Amendment 1.

Any Contracting Party may propose an amendment to this Agreement, any time after the Agreement enters into force. Such amendment shall be adopted with the consent of all Contracting Parties.

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Any amendment shall enter into force 90 days after the acceptance by all Contracting Parties. The instruments of acceptance shall be deposited with the depositary, which shall promptly notify all other Contracting Parties of the deposit of such instruments.

Article 20: Withdrawal 1. 2. 3. 4.

Any Contracting Party may withdraw from this Agreement at any time after the date of its entry into force. The withdrawal shall be notiﬁed by an instrument of withdrawal to the depositary. The withdrawal shall take effect 180 days after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the depositary. The depositary shall promptly notify all other Contracting Parties of any withdrawal.

Article 21: Authentic Text This Agreement shall be authentic in the English language.

Article 22: Registration This Agreement shall be registered by the depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

THE BATAM JOINT STATEMENT OF THE 4TH TRIPARTITE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE LITTORAL STATES ON THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE Batam, Indonesia August 2, 2005*

1. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, H.E. Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, Hon. Dato’ Seri Syed Hamid Albar, and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore, H.E. George Yeo, met in Batam, on August 1–2, 2005, to discuss matters pertaining to the safety of

*

http://app.mfa.gov.sg/internet/press/view_press.asp?post_id=1406

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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

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navigation, environmental protection and maritime security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The Foreign Ministers of Malaysia and Singapore appreciated the initiative of the Foreign Minister of Indonesia for convening this timely Meeting in view of the current challenges faced by the littoral States and user States of the Straits. The Ministers noted the series of Tripartite Ministerial Meetings of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as well as Meetings at the technical level held annually within the context of the Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG) on safety of navigation and Revolving Fund Committee (RFC) in dealing with issues of environmental protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The Ministers reafﬁrmed the sovereignty and sovereign rights of the Littoral States over the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, deﬁned under UNCLOS 1982 as straits used for international navigation. As such, the primary responsibility over the safety of navigation, environmental protection, and maritime security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore lies with the Littoral States. The Ministers emphasized that whatever measures undertaken in the Straits should be in accordance with international law including UNCLOS 1982. In this regard they acknowledged the interest of user States and relevant international agencies and the role they could play in respect of the Straits. The Ministers recognized the importance of the Tripartite Ministerial Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in providing the overall framework for cooperation. They agreed that the Ministers and the Senior Ofﬁcials should meet on a more regular basis to address relevant issues in a timely manner. Such meetings may include, if necessary, representatives of other relevant agencies of the respective Littoral States. The Ministers recognized the importance of engaging the states bordering the funnels leading to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and the major users of the Straits. In this regard, the Ministers supported continuing discussion on the overall subject of maritime security in the Southeast Asian region within the framework of ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The Ministers acknowledged the good work carried out by the Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG) on Safety of Navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. They also recognized the efforts of the Revolving Fund Committee (RFC) in dealing with issues of environmental protection in the Straits. In this regard, the Ministers welcomed the convening of the 30th TTEG on Safety of Navigation Meeting scheduled to be held in Penang, Malaysia, in September 2005. The Ministers encouraged cooperation between Littoral States and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to put in place the Pilot Project of Marine Electronic Highway (MEH) as a step forward for the enhancement of the safety of navigation and environmental protection in the Straits. The Ministers also took note of the forthcoming establishment of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center in Singapore. In this regard the Ministers of Indonesia and Malaysia indicated their respective countries’ preparedness to cooperate with the Center. The Ministers supported the convening of the Chiefs of Defence Forces of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand Informal Meeting (CDF-MIST

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12.

13.

14.

15.

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Informal Meeting) in Kuala Lumpur on August 1–2, 2005, and encouraged them to further strengthen their cooperation. The Ministers acknowledged that the littoral States should address the issue of maritime security comprehensively which includes trans-boundary crimes such as piracy, armed robbery and terrorism. The Ministers also recognized the need to address the issue of trafﬁcking in persons and smuggling of people, weapons, and other trans-boundary crimes through appropriate mechanisms. The Ministers agreed to establish a TTEG on Maritime Security to complement the works of the existing TTEG on Safety of Navigation and the Revolving Fund Committee. Bearing in mind the responsibility and burden of littoral States and the interests of user States in maintaining the safety of navigation, environmental protection and maritime security, the Ministers welcomed the assistance of the user States, relevant international agencies, and the shipping community in the areas of capacity building, training and technology transfer, and other forms of assistance in accordance with UNCLOS 1982. In this regard they also welcomed closer collaboration between littoral States and the international community. The Ministers expressed regret at Lloyds’ categorization of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as a high-risk zone for piracy and terrorism without consulting and taking into account the existing efforts of the littoral States to deal with the problems of safety of navigation and maritime security. The Ministers urged the Committee to review its risk assessment accordingly. The Ministers welcomed the forthcoming “Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection” in collaboration with the International Maritime Organization to be held on September 7–8, 2005, in Jakarta, Indonesia.

FACTSHEET ON THE REGIONAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT ON COMBATING PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS IN ASIA (RECAAP) ReCAAP Information Sharing Center November 29, 2006*

What is ReCAAP? 1. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is the ﬁrst regional government-togovernment agreement to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in Asia. 2. Proposed by the then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in October 2001, the ReCAAP initiative aims to enhance multilateral cooperation *

http://app.mot.gov.sg/data/ReCAAP%20factsheet%20_Nov06_%20%5BFINAL%5Das%2 0of%20281106.pdf

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amongst 16 regional countries, namely the ASEAN 10 plus Japan, China, Republic of Korea, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh to combat sea piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region. After three years of negotiations, the ReCAAP Agreement was finalized in November 2004 in Tokyo. Singapore is the depositary of the ReCAAP Agreement, which was open for signature on February 28, 2005. 3. The ReCAAP Agreement entered into force on September 4, 2006. To date, fourteen (14) countries have signed and ratiﬁed the ReCAAP Agreement, namely, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. Malaysia and Indonesia have also indicated their preparedness to cooperate with the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC). This commitment was ﬁrst made in August 2005 at the 4th Tripartite Ministerial Meeting of the Littoral States of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore held in Batam, and was most recently reiterated at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore held in Kuala Lumpur in September 2006. Singapore looks forward to the signature and ratiﬁcation by the remaining ReCAAP countries in due course. 4. The signiﬁcance of the ReCAAP Agreement has been recognized by regional and international organizations. For example, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Intersessional Support Group Meeting on Conﬁdence Building and Preventive Diplomacy held on October 18–19, 2005, noted the importance of agreements such as ReCAAP in enhancing maritime security in the region. The September 2005 IMO Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore held in Jakarta noted the importance of ReCAAP in addressing piracy and armed robbery against ships, and the entry into force of ReCAAP on September 4, 2006. The launch of the ISC in Singapore in November was subsequently welcomed at the September 2006 IMO Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore held in Kuala Lumpur. The Plenary of the 60th session of the United Nations General Assembly also adopted Resolution 60/30 of November 29, 2005, on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, which welcomed “the progress in regional cooperation” through the ReCAAP Agreement and urged States to “give urgent attention to adopting, concluding and implementing cooperation agreements at the regional level in high risk areas.”

What does ReCAAP consist of? 5. The ReCAAP Agreement sets out obligations undertaken by member countries to effect measures to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships. It also lays out a framework for cooperation among member countries, based on three main pillars of information sharing, capacity building, and operational cooperation, with information sharing as the main pillar. Sharing of piracy and armed robbery information can help improve operational cooperation when responding to incidents as well as enable the development of more effective prevention measures. 6. As a platform for cooperation, the ReCAAP countries will establish an Information Sharing Centre (ISC). The ISC was ofﬁcially launched on November

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29, 2006, in Singapore by Mr. Raymond Lim, Minister for Transport and Second Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Headquarters Agreement, which establishes the ReCAAP ISC as an independent, international body, was signed by Minister Lim (representing the government of Singapore), and Mr. Yoshiaki Ito, the Executive Director of the ReCAAP ISC. 7. The ISC is an international organization and includes representatives from ReCAAP member countries. This is the ﬁrst time that regional governments have institutionalized their cooperation in combating piracy and armed robbery against ships in the form of a permanent body with full-time staff. Singapore will be the host of the ISC. 8. The ISC will undertake the following activities: • facilitate communications, information exchange and operational cooperation between the participating governments to improve incident response by member countries; • collate and prepare statistics and analysis of the piracy and sea robbery situation in the Asia region, and • support capacity building efforts. 9. Through the above activities, the ReCAAP ISC will help to improve the national response and capability of member countries to prevent and suppress piracy and sea robbery in the region. Through its periodic reports made available to the public, the ISC will contribute to the pool of information which shipowners and shipmasters access to help them take preventive measures against piracy and armed robbery attacks in regional waters.

SINGAPORE—HOST OF THE INFORMATION SHARING CENTRE (ISC) 10. As an independent international organization, the ISC will have its own premises situated in the NOL Building along Alexandra Road. ST Electronics has also been appointed to develop the Information Network (IFN) System to support the communication ﬂow and exchange between ISC and the ReCAAP member countries. Details of the IFN system can be found in Annex A. 11. A training workshop was recently held on October 2–4, 2006, to conduct training on the IFN for the Focal Points (e.g., national coast guard, maritime authority), which were designated by each individual ReCAAP member country as the points of contact for the ISC. This was followed by the PreGoverning Council Preparatory Meeting on October 5–6, 2006, which was held to ﬁnalize preparations for the ﬁrst Governing Council Meeting on November 28–30, 2006. The Governing Council comprises one representative from each ReCAAP Contracting Party, and oversees policies guiding the work of the ReCAAP ISC. The Governing Council representative for the Republic of Singapore is the Chief Executive of the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, BG (NS) Tay Lim Heng. 12. The expenses of the ISC will be funded largely by voluntary contributions from the ReCAAP member countries. As the host, Singapore has generously

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contributed towards the operations of the ISC. For example, Singapore has borne the entire startup costs of the ISC, including the development of the IFN and provision of suitable premises to house the ISC. The start-up costs of the ISC are estimated to be about S$2.2 million. 13. In addition, Singapore will be contributing towards the annual running costs of the ISC, such as the rental, maintenance and utility charges. Singapore will also be bearing the salaries of the staff of the ISC who are Singapore citizens or permanent residents. Singapore’s annual contribution to the ISC is estimated to be about S$1.5 million.

The IFN System is a 24-hour, secure, Web-based information system that supports the ISC in the collection, organization, analysis, and sharing of piracy and armed robbery information among ReCAAP member countries. It links up the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) in Singapore with the designated Focal Points of ReCAAP member countries to enable the dissemination and exchange of information. These Focal Points (e.g., national coast guard, maritime authority) are designated by each individual ReCAAP member country as the points of contact for the ISC. When a piracy or sea robbery incident occurs, the victim reports to the closest Focal Point, which would respond to the incident as well as submit an incident report to the ISC through the IFN. The ISC would be able to communicate with this Focal Point and other Focal Points via the IFN, as well as disseminate alerts to other Focal Points. The shipping community can gain access to information on incidents through the ISC Web site. COUNTERTERRORISM IN MARITIME OPERATIONS Philip Ruddock Attorney General, Australia Port and Maritime Security and Counterterrorism Summit 2007, Langham Hotel, Melbourne, Australia May 1, 2007*

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Firstly, may I acknowledge the traditional owners of the land we meet on—and pay my respects to their elders, both past and present.

* http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/MinisterRuddockHome.nsf/Page/Speeches_2007_ Speeches_1_May_2007_-_Speech_-_Port_and_Maritime_Security_and_Counter -Terrorism_Summit_2007

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OTHER ACKNOWLEDGMENTS • Commodore Lee Cordner, AM, Summit Chair and Principal Research Fellow at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security • Mr. Hartmut Hesse, Senior Deputy Director Operational Safety and Human Element Subdivision, International Maritime Organisation • Rear Admiral Geoff Smith, Chief Executive Ofﬁcer, Sydney Ferries Corporation • Ms. Elizabeth Kelly, Executive Director, AusCheck • Mr. Andrew Tongue, Deputy Secretary, Department of Transport & Regional Services • Distinguished guests, including those from overseas. • Ladies and Gentlemen

INTRODUCTION 1. When people think of maritime terrorism they are likely to picture speedboats packed with explosives and driven into the sides of ships. We all remember when suicide bombers drove a boat into the USS Cole in 2000, killing seventeen sailors. Another shocking target is ordinary commuter vessels carrying people to work or on family visits. One such vessel was SuperFerry 14, which was set alight in the Philippines after a planted device exploded on February 27, 2004. One hundred and sixteen people died in that terrorist attack. 2. Or people might remember the many cases of high-powered weapons smuggled around the world in ordinary containers looking like legitimate shipping. 3. These are the high-proﬁle cases of maritime terrorism that ﬁx in people’s minds. 4. But protecting our vital maritime infrastructure and resources from terrorism means focusing on the whole environment, not just the sea or ships or ports. It means examining a range of policies and issues which may be less enthralling than incidents on the high seas. 5. We must look at every possible vulnerability at the local, national, and international level. Then we must develop solutions to those weaknesses and negotiate their implementation. Our national security depends on the government ensuring that terrorists face a multitude of barriers to give our country and our interests the best possible protection. 6. However, the government cannot do this alone. 7. As the Australian Strategic Policy Institute found in a 2005 analysis, there is a risk of a terrorist attack on Australia’s maritime interests. 8. Thankfully, terrorists have been less attracted to maritime assets than to some others. But this is no reason for complacency. 9. An attack on a maritime target in Australia would have serious consequences—for individuals, for business, and the entire economy as a whole.

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10. The maritime sector is vast, complex and in a constant state of change. It encompasses assets on the high seas, in ports and on land. That means there are three different environments in which to consider a variety of necessary protective measures. 11. It is difﬁcult, but it is a challenge the government has met and will continue to meet. Our seaports and maritime infrastructure are key components of our national economy, and we must protect them to safeguard our nation and our prosperity.

AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ACTION 12. Since September 11, 2001, the Australian government has taken signiﬁcant steps to increase our national security. 13. We have put in place a wide range of measures—both at the national and industry-speciﬁc level—to help keep your industry safe. They are also aimed at keeping the economic beneﬁts ﬂowing to the wider community. 14. We have spent over $8.3 billion on more than 200 individual national security related measures to improve our safety. These measures are part of a comprehensive, multilayered response which has seen every aspect of our national security assessed and improved.

MARITIME SECURITY REGIME 15. The Australian government has put in place a robust and world-class maritime security regime to help safeguard our maritime transport system and offshore facilities. 16. My colleague the Honorable Mark Vaile, Minister for Transport and Regional Services, yesterday discussed some of these industry-speciﬁc measures in detail. 17. You have heard from a number of agencies within my portfolio including the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the Australian Crime Commission, and the Australian Customs Service. These agencies are working to protect the maritime industry. 18. In addition, my Department is leading some of the key activities that are integral to counter terrorism and other criminal activity in the maritime industry, such as background checking initiatives.

AUSCHECK 19. In recent years we have introduced a range of measures at airports—and more recently at port facilities—designed to control access. One of the most important security tasks has focused on background checking.

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20. As you will all know, the Maritime Security Identiﬁcation Card was introduced on January 1. It provides proof that the holder has an operational need to be in a maritime security zone. It also proves the holder has no relevant criminal record or adverse security assessment. 21. As I foreshadowed at this conference last year, the government has established the Australian Background Checking Service—known as AusCheck. 22. AusCheck’s work will contribute to improving the security of one of the largest maritime domains in the world. 23. Australians depend on that security for about $188 billion of seaborne trade every year. Document Veriﬁcation Service 24. To further strengthen our security framework, we are also establishing a national Document Veriﬁcation Service. The Service will be managed by my Department. It will form a central component of our National Identity Security Strategy. 25. The Service will allow authorized government agencies to check key identity documents online and in real-time. It will check whether the document being presented and the information recorded by the agency are an exact match. Importantly, there will be a cross-check function to detect stolen or fraudulent documents. 26. Organized crime and terrorist groups both seek to exploit the use of false and stolen identities. The Report of the 9/11 Commission in the United States says travel documents are as important as weapons to terrorists. Identity fraud has suddenly become a much bigger problem for us all. 27. The proliferation of false identity documents makes it very hard for background checking systems to work effectively. 28. The new Document Veriﬁcation Service will make it extremely difﬁcult for people to present false identiﬁcation. As a result, industry can be conﬁdent of even greater surety in background checking. And all Australians will be better protected from criminals using their identities for illegal purposes.

BIG PICTURE INITIATIVES 29. The Maritime Security Identiﬁcation Card Scheme and the Document Veriﬁcation Service are just two examples of how the government is working to protect Australia’s maritime industry. Effective counterterrorism arrangements in this industry are also dependent on a strong foundation. That foundation is provided by the wider security framework within Australia and the region. 30. The Australian government’s response to terrorism operates at three levels— the international, the national and the local. 31. It is a response which builds on the success of our existing structures and administrative arrangements. 32. It is through a series of complementary measures that the maritime industry and the broader Australian interest are best protected.

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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 33. Internationally, we are working with other countries to target terrorists. We do this directly through military operations—including in Afghanistan and Iraq—multilaterally through international forums, and on a bilateral basis. 34. We are working with other countries and international institutions to track down terrorists, deny them bases of operation, and prevent them planning, ﬁnancing, and launching attacks. We have improved intelligence gathering and sharing, implemented tighter passport and border controls, and increased protection of offshore facilities. As I told you last year, I signed two protocols to an international convention—the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention—in 2005. The protocols strengthen the original Convention to provide an appropriate response to the increasing risks posed to maritime navigation by international terrorism. 35. As of February, 18 states had signed the two 2005 protocols. One will come into effect once 12 states have ratiﬁed it. The other will come into effect with three ratiﬁcations and the entry into force of the ﬁrst protocol. Australia has begun the process of ratifying the protocols, and I have encouraged other States to do the same. 36. As well, we are improving anti–money laundering and money-tracing measures to locate and freeze terrorists’ funds.

NATIONAL LEVEL 37. At the national level, the Commonwealth, together with the states and territories, has established a nationwide, cooperative counterterrorism framework. 38. We have national laws dealing speciﬁcally with terrorist offenses. We have strengthened the powers of our security authorities to detain and question people who may have information about terrorist activities. We have also given our law enforcement agencies the power to detain people to prevent an imminent terrorist attack. 39. We have developed new institutional arrangements to ﬁght terrorism. But in focusing on the protection of people, we have not neglected the risk to our economy.

BUSINESS COMMUNITY CONSULTATION/CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 40. Australian businesses are the government’s key partners in Australia’s national counterterrorism strategy. 41. This is particularly true of businesses involved in critical sectors. These include vital services like transport, telecommunications, energy utilities and

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the banking and ﬁnance industries. These services are critical to the running of other businesses and the economy as a whole—and, because of their importance to the nation, could be an attractive target for terrorists. The Commonwealth, in partnership with the states and territories, has cataloged our critical infrastructure and identiﬁed those at greatest risk. Very few of them are owned by government. In fact, in some areas, up to 90 percent of them are owned or operated on a commercial basis. And it is these businesses that are primarily responsible for protecting the assets. The Australian government actively engages the private sector to develop long-term approaches that both protect Australia’s economic interests and leverage business expertise and capabilities to help to counter terrorism. We have put in place a range of consultative bodies and forums. We have established the Trusted Information Sharing Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection as a forum in which the owners and operators of critical infrastructure work together to share information on security issues. There are currently nine industry sector advisory groups covering the range of Australia’s critical infrastructure, including a group that focuses on transport matters. We have also established a high-level Business-Government Advisory Group on National Security. This group gives business leaders the opportunity to raise security issues at the highest levels with myself and other senior ministers. It also helps clarify the way business and government can continue to work together to effectively ensure our nation’s security. The Australian government believes that the best results for national security will be achieved through cooperation.

BUSINESS PROTECTION STRATEGIES 48. In government, we are doing everything we can to get the legislative protections right. We are also giving industry whatever information and practical assistance we can. But ultimately, because you are the people who know and understand your business, the security of your business is in your hands. 49. You are the ones who must make sure the correct security measures are in place. 50. Implementing security measures is really nothing more than good business planning. It means employing risk management strategies, fostering a security culture and putting good business continuity plans in place. These are hardly radical management theories. They simply represent the basics of good business practice.

ROLE OF BUSINESS LEADERS 51.

Finally, risk management and other security measures will not work without the vision and drive of business leaders. You set the tone for your organizations.

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Good security is not an end in itself. It is good business and, although it is a cost, it indirectly leads to proﬁt.

CONCLUSION 52. Australia faces a very real threat from terrorists—and it is a threat that is unlikely to change any time soon. 53. In government, we are constantly reviewing our laws and our policies to ensure that we are doing everything we can to keep Australia safe. 54. However, I must again stress that terrorism cannot be countered by governments alone. We need the help of all Australians—including those of you in the maritime industry. We need you to look at your own industry and business, assess the risks, and take what measures you can to safeguard your operations. Together, we can keep Australians safe and maintain our economic prosperity.

Africa PIRATES PURSUE AMERICAN SHIP U.S. Overseas Security Advisory Council, Safety & Security, Sub-Saharan Africa—Somalia December 22, 2006*

An OSAC constituent contributed to the following report: An American-owned ship was pursued by suspected pirates on December 19 in the Indian Ocean. The ship was 120 miles off the coast of Somalia when another vessel approached them, claiming to be in distress. The distress message came at approximately 5:30 P.M., from a distance of 5 miles off the starboard bow. The crew began tracking the signal of the allegedly distressed vessel but did not change course. The American ship caught sight of the other vessel within 5 minutes. Due to the frequency of pirate attacks in the waters of Somalia, the vessel’s relative high speed and interceptive course, the distress claims of the vessel became suspect. From the American ship, the vessel looked to be in sound condition; there appeared to be a group of men on deck. These factors caused the American ship’s captain to put the bridge watch on notice and order the house to be locked down. The course was altered as well; the American ship

*

https://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cfm?contentID=60901

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headed farther out to sea, as the suspect vessel was small and pirate vessels often are unable to pursue after reaching a certain distance from their home port, due to fuel concerns. By 6:00 P.M., the American ship began to pull away from the suspect vessel, and within 15 minutes there was a distance between them of approximately two miles. The suspect vessel appeared to have slowed, but continued in pursuit of the American ship. The American ship again headed further away from the Somali shoreline, heading east at maximum speed. The suspect vessel then faded from sight. Throughout the entire period, the suspect vessel had been calling for the American ship to stop and come to their position. According to the Americans, the radio calls sounded as though they were using more than one radio, and that there was more than one caller. This incident is signiﬁcant because it marks only the second time in over six months that a western ship has reported suspecting itself as the target of pirates off the coast of Somalia. Through approximately May 2006, the Somali waters were generally considered the second-worst in the world for piracy, after Indonesia’s Malacca Straits. The U.S. government has issued successive warnings for ships plying the Indian Ocean, with the most recent warning recommending vessels stay 200 nautical miles from the coast. However, the Islamic Courts Union announced in late spring that piracy would not be tolerated, as it was un-Islamic and punishable under Shari’a Law. Since that time, suspected acts of reported piracy appear to have diminished in frequency.

COORDINATED ACTION URGED AS PIRACY THREATENS UN LIFELINE TO SOMALIA Joint Communiqué, IMO Brieﬁng 23, International Maritime Organization July 10, 2007*

The heads of two United Nations agencies today made a joint call for concerted and coordinated international action to address the threat of piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia, amid growing concern about the perils it poses for commercial shipping, ﬁshing and other vessels and the delivery of humanitarian assistance needed by hundreds of thousands of Somali men, women and children. The secretary-general of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, and the Executive Director of the UN World Food *

International Maritime Organization (IMO), www.imo.org.

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Programme (WFP), Josette Sheeran, warned that the actions of pirates operating in the waters off Somalia threaten the sea-lanes in the region and could endanger the fragile supply line for food assistance to Somalis whose lives have been shattered by more than 15 years of civil conﬂict, political instability and recurring natural disasters. Last month, the IMO Council, meeting in London, shared the concerns expressed by Secretary-General Mitropoulos and agreed with his proposals for further action to engage the international community in addressing the continuing incidence of acts of piracy and armed robbery in the region and, in particular, against ships carrying humanitarian aid to Somalia. The IMO Council accordingly authorized Mr. Mitropoulos to request United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to bring the piracy situation off Somalia, once again, to the attention of the UN Security Council, so that, in turn, the Security Council requests the Transitional Federal government of Somalia to take appropriate action. Such action could include giving consent to ships—as deﬁned in Article 107 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—to enter the country’s territorial waters when engaging in operations against pirates or suspected pirates and armed robbers endangering the safety of life at sea. Delivering supplies to Somalia, both commercial goods and humanitarian aid, has been a logistical and security challenge ever since the collapse of the last national government in 1991. Roadblocks controlled by militia groups across the country have hampered deliveries by road. Transportation by sea should, in principle, be both cheaper and safer, but a recent increase in the frequency of attacks by pirates appears to have led to higher shipping costs and a dramatic reduction in the use of cargo vessels, particularly those employed in moving food assistance to Somalia from ports in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa. “Close to 80 percent of WFP’s assistance to Somalia is shipped by sea but, because of piracy, we have seen the availability of ships willing to carry food to the country cut by half,” said WFP Executive Director Sheeran. “Pirates may have a romantic image on the silver screen these days, but the picture might not be quite so pretty from the point of view of someone stuck in a camp for internally displaced people in Somalia, dependent on food assistance for survival. Much more has to be done to address this problem of piracy and, at WFP, we are much encouraged by the actions that IMO has taken recently for that purpose.” So far this year there have been 15 attacks on vessels in or near Somali waters, which carry some of the highest risks of piracy in the world. Two of these attacks involved WFP-contracted ships, and in one of these two incidents, a security guard was killed. WFP aims to provide food assistance to 1 million people in Somalia this year, at a time when the country is once again plagued by brutal civil conﬂict. Forecast crop failures in the south and central parts of the country, already hit by alarming levels of malnutrition, are raising fears of food shortages and ris-

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ing prices, both of which could be ameliorated by securing an uninterrupted supply line. “The continuing incidence of acts of piracy and armed robbery in these waters is of great concern,” IMO Secretary-General Mitropoulos said. “In conjunction with other multifaceted initiatives recently taken by IMO to address the issue effectively, this latest high-level approach to the Security Council, through Mr. Ban, will, I believe, help considerably in alleviating the situation, especially if support and assistance to ships is enhanced; and if administrations and the shipping industry implement effectively the guidance that IMO has issued and the notices promulgated regularly by naval operations’ centers.” A new request from the UN Security Council would be in line with its Presidential Statement of March 15, 2006, issued after the matter had ﬁrst been brought to its attention following adoption of resolution A.979(24) by the IMO Assembly. The 2006 Presidential Statement encouraged UN member states with naval vessels and military aircraft operating in international waters and airspace adjacent to the coast of Somalia, to be vigilant for any incident of piracy therein and to take appropriate action to protect merchant shipping (in particular ships being used to transport humanitarian aid) against any such act, in line with relevant international law. Subsequently, there had been a much-welcomed reduction in acts of piracy and armed robbery off Somalia, due, to a large extent, to the support provided by naval assets in the region, as a consequence of the well-established liaison by IMO and WFP with relevant naval operations’ centers. However, as a result of the renewed rise in attacks on ships in recent months, IMO has lately taken a number of steps, including intensifying its existing coordination mechanism with WFP and the navies operating in the western Indian Ocean region, with a view to ensuring that the tracking of and, where necessary, the provision of assistance to merchant shipping is maintained and further strengthened. IMO has also recently issued a Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) circular (MSC.1/Circ.1233) warning maritime interests of what continues to be a worrying situation off Somalia and inviting governments and organizations concerned to implement effectively the guidance to administrations, industry, and crew issued previously by IMO. Additionally, in the context of the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, IMO has requested the inclusion, within this year’s related General Assembly resolution, of a renewed call for all concerned to continue their co operation in combating acts of piracy and armed robbery and in ensuring the early release of ships and persons held hostage as a consequence of such acts. “We would like to see a more coordinated and robust approach to dealing with the problem of piracy, from the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, from neighboring countries that have inﬂuence, and from the African Union,” said Sheeran. “WFP is grateful for the continuing presence in

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the seas off Somalia of naval forces from several nations. They have been helpful on occasion in the past and they offer a potential deterrence to pirates. But we need to explore how these resources can be brought more heavily into play to protect shipping and, thereby, the delivery by sea of life-saving humanitarian assistance.”

AFRICA COMMAND: A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR ENHANCED ENGAGEMENT—IF DONE RIGHT Dr. J. Peter Pham Director, the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs, James Madison University Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health August 2, 2007*

I am honored by the invitation to appear today before the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health and am grateful for the opportunity to add my voice to those of my distinguished colleagues on a subject which I have studied, written about, and advocated on behalf of, for a number of years: a United States Department of Defense regional uniﬁed combatant command for Africa that offers the potential for sustained engagement of a region where America has very real strategic interests.

SETTING THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW ENGAGEMENT I beg the Subcommittee’s indulgence to observe that we as a nation have indeed all come a very long way in recent years in our perceptions of Africa—some of us perhaps more than others. With the anniversary on March 6 of this year of the independence of Ghana, we also mark the ﬁftieth anniversary of the beginning of the wave of national sovereignty that swept across sub-Saharan Africa in the wake of the Second World War. At that time, however, no part of the region was included in any U.S. military command’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) except for several North African countries which ﬁve years earlier had been tacked onto the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). The rest of the continent was left unaccounted for the rest of the decade until 1960 when, following then-Vice President Richard Nixon’s extensive tour of the continent, President Dwight D. Eisenhower put the then Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) in charge of

*

http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/pha080207.htm

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security planning for sub-Saharan Africa just as he had previously created the Africa Bureau within the State Department to coordinate diplomatic initiatives. Two years later, President John F. Kennedy transferred subSaharan Africa into the Strike Command (STRICOM) AOR. From that time until the present, responsibility for defense planning affecting the continent has shifted a number of times as administrations came and went and geopolitical perceptions evolved over the course of the Cold War and its aftermath. Just three years ago, when writing on the subject of a possible regional command for Africa, I was still being counseled by one editor to make sure that I couched the whole proposal as a hypothetical in the conditional tense.1 And going back a little farther to 2000, I can recall that a number of Africa’s friends—some of whom are in this room today—were quite disappointed when a certain Republican presidential candidate responded negatively to a question from PBS’s Jim Lehrer about whether Africa ﬁt into his deﬁnition of the strategic interests of the United States: “At some point in time the president’s got to clearly deﬁne what the national strategic interests are, and while Africa may be important, it doesn’t ﬁt into the national strategic interests, as far as I can see them.”2 Yet almost seven years to the day later, on February 6, 2007, President George W. Bush announced the establishment of a U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), directing the Department of Defense to stand it up by October 2008 and entrusting the new structure with the mission to “enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa” by strengthening bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with African states and creating new opportunities to bolster their capabilities.3 I rehearse this history in order to lend some perspective to just how extraordinary the decision to set up AFRICOM as America’s sixth regional command really is. As former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Princeton N. Lyman, who previously served as U.S. ambassador to South Africa and to Nigeria, has observed, the apparent strategic neglect of Africa nonetheless sadly reﬂects “what [has] in fact been the approach of both Democratic and Republican administrations for decades.”4 Historically, with the exception of Cold War period when concerns about Soviet attempts to secure a foothold on the continent drove U.S. policy, America generally perceived Africa as secondary to its foreign policy and other strategic objectives. Thus, more often than not, American perspectives on Africa were framed almost exclusively in terms of preoccupation over the humanitarian consequences of poverty, war, and natural disaster. Alas, as noble as these moral impulses have been, they lacked the “staying power” needed to sustain a long-term commitment. Rightfully, many of our African friends viewed us as well-meaning but unreliable.

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I would argue, however, that three factors have providentially come together which cumulatively have the potential to signiﬁcantly alter the course of the relationship between the United States and the African continent as a whole as well as with its individual sovereign states. First, in the wake of 9/11, analysts and policymakers have shifted to a more strategic view of Africa in terms of U.S. national interests. Second, independent of our interests and actions, Africans themselves have increasingly expressed the desire and, more importantly, demonstrated the political will, to tackle the continent’s myriad challenges of disease, poverty, ethnic tension, religious extremism, bad governance, lack of security, etc., although they still need outside assistance. Third, we have come to recognize a commonality between our strategic interests and the interests of Africans in enhanced security, stability, and development.

RECOGNIZING OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS Broadly conceived, there are three major areas in which Africa’s signiﬁcance for America—or at least the public recognition thereof—has been ampliﬁed in recent years. The ﬁrst is Africa’s role in the “Global War on Terror” and the potential of the poorly governed spaces of the continent to provide facilitating environments, recruits, and eventual targets for Islamist terrorists who threaten Western interests in general and those of the United States in particular—and, in some regions like the Horn of Africa and Sahel, this has already become reality. The second important consideration is Africa’s abundant natural resources, particularly those in its burgeoning energy sector. The third area of interest remains the humanitarian concern for the devastating toll which conflict, poverty, and disease, especially HIV/AIDS, continue to exact in Africa.

Concerns about Terrorism There is no denying that U.S. security policy, both currently and for the foreseeable future will be heavily inﬂuenced by the “Global War on Terrorism,” the “Long War,” or whatever the designation du jour for the ﬁght against the threat of transnational Islamist terrorism happens to be. The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America rightly acknowledged that “weak states . . . can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”5 With the possible exception of the Greater Middle East, nowhere is this analysis truer than Africa where, as the document went on

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to acknowledge, regional conﬂicts arising from a variety of causes, including poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, and ethnic and religious tensions all “lead to the same ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists.”6 While the terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda on the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, in 1998, and on an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, and, simultaneously, on an Israeli commercial airliner in 2002 have underscored the deadly reality of the terrorist threat in Africa, perhaps the most eloquent reminder of the particular vulnerability of the continent to terrorism comes from the terrorists themselves. In June 2006, a new online magazine for actual and aspiring global jihadis and their supporters, Sada al-Jihad (“Echo of Jihad”), which took the place of Sawt al-Jihad (“Voice of Jihad”) as the publication of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia after Saudi authorities ﬁnally came around to shutting down the presses of latter, featured an article by one Abu Azzam al-Ansari entitled “Al-Qaeda is Moving to Africa.”7 Abu Azzam was remarkably frank: There is no doubt that al-Qaeda and the holy warriors appreciate the signiﬁcance of the African regions for the military campaigns against the Crusaders. Many people sense that this continent has not yet found its proper and expected role and the next stages of the conﬂict will see Africa as the battleﬁeld. With a rather commendable analytical rigor surprisingly free from ideological rancor, Abu Azzam then proceeded to enumerate and evaluate what he perceived to be signiﬁcant advantages to al-Qaeda shifting terrorist operations to Africa, including: the fact that jihadi doctrines have already been spread within the Muslim communities of many African countries; the political and military weakness of African governments; the wide availability of weapons; the geographical position of Africa vis-à-vis international trade routes; the proximity to old conﬂicts against “Jews and Crusaders” in the Middle East as well as new ones like Darfur, where the author almost gleefully welcomed the possibility of Western intervention; the poverty of Africa which “will enable the holy warriors to provide some ﬁnance and welfare, thus, posting there some of their inﬂuential operatives”; the technical and scientiﬁc skills that potential African recruits would bring to the jihadi cause; the presence of large Muslim communities, including ones already embroiled conﬂict with Christians or adherents of traditional African religions; the links to Europe through North Africa “which facilitates the move from there to carry out attacks”; and the fact that Africa has a wealth of natural resources, including hydrocarbons and other raw materials, which are “very useful for the holy warriors in the intermediate and long term.” Abu Azzam concluded his assessment on an ominous note: In general, this continent has an immense signiﬁcance. Whoever looks at Africa can see that it does not enjoy the interest, efforts, and activity it

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deserves in the war against the Crusaders. This is a continent with many potential advantages and exploiting this potential will greatly advance the jihad. It will promote achieving the expected targets of Jihad. Africa is a fertile soil for the advance of jihad and the jihadi cause. It would be a mistake to dismiss Abu Azzam’s analysis as devoid of operational effect. Shortly before the publication of the article, an Islamist movement whose leaders included a number of ﬁgures linked to al-Qaeda, the Islamic Courts Union, seized control of the sometime Somali capital of Mogadishu and subsequently overran most of the former state which—with the exception of the northern Republic of Somaliland where the inhabitants have tried to reassert the sovereignty they possessed before joining Somalia in a disastrous union and have, by and large, succeeded8—has been without an effective government since 1991.9 Although forceful intervention by neighboring Ethiopia in late December 2006 dislodged the Islamists, Somalia’s internationally recognized but utterly ineffective “Transitional Federal Government” has yet to assert itself in the face of a growing insurgency which has adopted the same nonconventional tactics that foreign jihadis and Sunni Arab insurgents have used to great effect in Iraq.10 Considerable evidence has emerged of links between the Somali Islamists and fugitive al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, not least of which was the capture and subsequent transfer last June to the U.S. detention facility at Guantánamo Bay of Abdullahi Sudi Arale, who was apparently dispatched from Pakistan to Somalia in September 2006 and who, according to a Pentagon statement, “played a signiﬁcant role in the reemergence” of the militants after their initial rout.11 Another al-Qaeda “franchise” has sought to reignite conﬂict in Algeria and spread it to the Sahel, the critical boundary region where sub-Saharan Africa meets North Africa and where vast empty spaces and highly permeable borders are readily exploitable by local and international militants alike both as a base for recruitment and training and as a conduit for the movement of personnel and materiel. Last year members of the Algerian Islamist terrorist group Salaﬁst Group for Preaching and Combat (usually known by its French acronym GSPC) formally pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and alQaeda and began identifying themselves in communiqués as “Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb.” The link to al-Qaeda was conﬁrmed by bin Laden’s deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri who, in the “commemorative video” the terrorist network issued on the ﬁfth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, declared: “Our mujahid Sheikh and the Lion of Islam, Osama bin Laden, . . . has instructed me to give the good news to Muslims in general and my mujahidin brothers everywhere that the Salaﬁst Group for Preaching and Combat has joined al-Qaeda organization.”12 The Egyptian terrorist hailed the “blessed union” between the GSPC and al-Qaeda, pledging that it would “be a source of chagrin, frustration and sadness for the apostates [of the regime in Algeria], the treacherous sons of [former colonial power] France,” and urging the group to become “a bone in the throat of the American and French cru-

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saders” in the region and beyond. Last April, al-Qaeda’s new afﬁliate claimed credit for a pair of bomb blasts—one close to the prime minister’s ofﬁce, the other near a police station—that rocked Algiers, killing two dozen people and wounding more than a hundred, shattering the calm that the Algerian capital had enjoyed since the conclusion of the civil war of the 1990s which claimed at least 150,000 lives.13 Perhaps most menacing over the long term, however, is an increasingly apparent willingness on the part of transnational Islamist terror networks to not only exploit the grievances which might be nursed by some African Muslim communities, but also to reach out to non-Muslim militants to make common cause against their mutual enemies. Although there is no shortage of violent non-Muslim groups in sub-Saharan Africa, the region has long been plagued by a number of indigenous Islamist groups like the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia, and the Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU).14 More recently, evidence has emerged that outside forces have been providing these groups with strategic guidance, tactical assistance, and operational planning. For example, the ONLF has been battling successive Ethiopian governments for years with the goal of splitting the ethnic Somali region from the country. However, it was only within the last year that the group acquired from somewhere the wherewithal to mount the most spectacular attack within Ethiopia since the fall of the Derg dictatorship in 1991.15 In addition to shelter, recruits, and opportunities to terrorists, terrorist groups have also proﬁted from the weak governance capacities of African states not only to raise money by soliciting sympathizers, but also to trade in gemstones and other natural resources either as a means to launder and make money as al-Qaeda did with Sierra Leonean “conﬂict diamonds” through the good ofﬁces of then–Liberian president Charles Taylor. Former Washington Post correspondent Douglas Farah, for example, has reported on how alQaeda procured somewhere between $30 million and $50 million worth of diamonds through this channel in the month before the September 11 attacks, while I have documented how Hezbollah has used the extensive Lebanese Shı-’a communities in places like Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea to make money in an illicit market estimated by the United Nations to worth between $170 million and $370 million.16

Energy and Maritime Security In his 2006 State of the Union address, President Bush called for the United States to “replace more than 75 percent of our oil imports from the Middle East by 2025” and to “make our dependence on Middle Eastern oil a thing of the past.”17 According to the Department of Energy’s Energy

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Information Administration, America has already advanced signiﬁcantly in its effort to wean itself from dependency on hydrocarbons originating in the volatile Persian Gulf, thanks in large measure to the abundant energy resources of Africa. This past March, Nigeria edged past Saudi Arabia to become America’s third largest supplier, delivering 41,717,000 barrels of oil that month compared to the desert kingdom’s 38,557,000. When one adds Angola’s 22,542,000 barrels to the former ﬁgure, the two African states alone now supply more of America’s energy needs than Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates combined.18 This milestone is all the more remarkable when one considers that the campaign of bombings and kidnappings carried out over the course of the last two years by the relatively small Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), a militant group ﬁghting the Nigerian government over the oil-rich Delta region’s underdevelopment, environmental degradation, and political marginalization, has had the cumulative effect of cutting Nigeria’s total oil production by almost one-third.19 This natural wealth makes Africa an inviting target for the attentions of the People’s Republic of China, whose dynamic economy, averaging 9 percent growth per annum over the last two decades, has an almost insatiable thirst for oil as well as a need for other natural resources to sustain it. China is currently importing approximately 2.6 million barrels of crude per day, about half of its consumption; more than 765,000 of those barrels—roughly a third of its imports—come from African sources, especially Sudan, Angola, and Congo (Brazzaville). Is it any wonder, then, that apart from the Central Eurasian region on its own northwestern frontier, perhaps no other foreign region rivals Africa as the object of Beijing’s sustained strategic interest in recent years? Last year the Chinese regime published the ﬁrst ever ofﬁcial white paper elaborating the bases of its policy toward Africa. This year, ahead of his 12-day, eight-nation tour of Africa—the third such journey since he took ofﬁce in 2003—Chinese President Hu Jintao announced a 3-year, $3 billion program in preferential loans and expanded aid for Africa. These funds come on top of the $3 billion in loans and $2 billion in export credits that Hu announced in October 2006 at the opening of the historic Beijing summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which brought nearly ﬁfty African heads of state and ministers to the Chinese capital. Intentionally or not, many analysts expect that Africa—especially the states along its oil-rich western coastline—will increasingly becoming a theatre for strategic competition between the United States and its only real near-peer competitor on the global stage, China, as both countries seek to expand their inﬂuence and secure access to resources.20 In connection with this, an additional security worry is China’s increasing arms exports to Africa, especially as weapons are ﬂowing to despotic regimes and fueling simmering conﬂicts even as they diminish further what little leverage Western governments and

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international organization—to say nothing of African ones—have with recalcitrant regimes.21 Yet for all its global importance as well as strategic signiﬁcance for U.S. national interests, Africa’s waters—especially the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Aden and other waters off Somalia, and the “Swahili Coast” of East Africa— seen comparatively few resources poured into maritime security, a deﬁcit which only worsens when one considers the scale of the area in question and the magnitude of the challenges faced. Depending on how one chooses to deﬁne the Gulf of Guinea region, the nearly 3,500 miles of coastline running in an arc from West Africa to Angola, for example, are highly susceptible to piracy, criminal enterprises, and poaching—in addition to the security challenge presented by the oil production facilities, both onshore and offshore, and the transport of the natural resources thus derived.22 The International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report covering the ﬁrst quarter of 2007, for instance, noted that while the number of reported attacks declined signiﬁcantly compared to just one year before, the ﬁgure for incidents off the coast of Nigeria doubled.23 At the same time, the Gulf of Guinea’s oil-producing states have long been a plagued by “illegal bunkering,” the tapping of pipelines for oil which is eventually loaded on to tankers which sell the crude to reﬁneries elsewhere at a considerable proﬁt. This highly organized and far-reaching activity—at one point, two Nigerian admirals were court-martialed for their involvement in one infamous 2004 incident involving the disappearance of a tanker with 11,000 barrels of oil—has grown increasingly deadly as energy prices surge upward and the criminal syndicates involved have acquired ever more sophisticated arms. There is also an increasing drug trade through the subregion: Nigeria is the transshipment point for approximately one-third of the heroin seized by authorities in the United States and more than half of the cocaine seized by South African ofﬁcials, while European law enforcement ofﬁcials report that poorly scrutinized West Africa has become the major conduit for drugs shipped to their countries by Latin American cartels.24 In addition to their vast hydrocarbon reserves, the waters of the Gulf of Guinea contain some of the richest ﬁsheries in the world. Yet, according to a 2005 report commissioned by the British Department for International Development (DFID) and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), illegal, unreported, or unlicensed (IUU) ﬁshing—often by large foreign commercial trawlers—cost countries in the Gulf of Guinea more than $375 million annually. In addition to the obvious economic impact of the loss of the value of the catches to the countries affected, IUU ﬁshing also carries indirect costs in terms of losses to industries upstream and downstream from ﬁshing itself—to say nothing of damage to the ecosystem.25

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In response to these challenges, the United States 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security declared that: assisting regional partners to maintain the maritime sovereignty of their territorial seas and internal waters is a longstanding objective of the United States and contributes directly to the partners’ economic development as well as their ability to combat unlawful or hostile exploitation by a variety of threats. For example, as a result of our active discussions with African partners, the United States is now appropriating funding for the implementation of border and coastal security initiatives along the lines of the former Africa Coastal Security (ACS) Program. Preventing unlawful or hostile exploitation of the maritime domain requires that nations collectively improve their capability to monitor activity throughout the domain, establish responsive decision-making architectures, enhance maritime interdiction capacity, develop effective policing protocols, and build intergovernmental cooperation. The United States, in cooperation with its allies, will lead an international effort to improve monitoring and enforcement capabilities through enhanced cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and global level.26 [. . .]*

FINDING COMMON GROUND WITH AFRICANS AND WITH OURSELVES Given what I outlined earlier, it is not surprising that the most recent iteration of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, a document which identiﬁed the international counterterrorism effort as the country’s top national security priority, afﬁrmed that “Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Administration.”27 However, the 2006 National Security Strategy also, quite appropriately in my judgment, went out of its way to state that “our security depends on partnering with Africans.” I have already noted the signiﬁcant achievements of the current administration with regard to assistance toward Africa, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the union of position of director of U.S. Foreign Assistance with that of administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in the person with the rank of deputy secretary of state. These initiatives build upon the foundation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), originally signed in the previous administration, which has created some signiﬁcant openings for some African countries.

* The following sections of the original work have been omitted from this compilation, because we believe that they were not relevant to the purposes of this book: the subsection titled “Humanitarian Challenges” (under the section “Recognizing our Strategic Interests”) and the section titled “Acknowledging Increased African Leadership.”

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However, given the looming nature of the terrorist threat as well as the newly recognized geostrategic importance of Africa, it is not surprising that the U.S. military has also taken the lead in America’s new engagement across the continent. To date, the largest commitment has been the Combined Joint Task ForceHorn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), a unit created by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in late 2002 and based since May 2003 at a former French Foreign Legion outpost in Djibouti, Camp Lemonier. The approximately 1,500 personnel from each branch of the U.S. military, American civilian employees, and coalition forces, who make up CJTF-HOA have as their mission “detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region” of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan (as well as Yemen across the Gulf of Aden).28 CJTF-HOA pursues its objective of enhancing the long-term stability of its area of responsibility (AOR) by a combination of civil-military operations and supporting international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, including advisors who have assisted the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The task force also undertakes more traditional military-to-military training and other collaborative efforts, including some which certainly enabled Ethiopian forces to launch their offensive against the Somali Islamists last year. In certain exceptional circumstances when actionable intelligence was available, the physical proximity of CJTF-HOA to the front lines has enabled the United States to quickly and directly engage against high-value terrorist targets, as was the case last January when an Air Force AC-130 gunship launched a strike against what was described as “principal al-Qaeda leadership” in southern Somalia29 or in June when the guided-missile destroyer USS Chafee shelled an al-Qaeda cell in the northern part of the country, killing six foreign terrorists. At the same time CENTCOM was developing its Djibouti-based task force, the State Department launched a similar multilateral program, the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), a modest effort to provide border security and other counterterrorism assistance to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger using personnel from U.S. Army Special Forces attached to the Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). As a follow-up to PSI, the State Department–funded Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) was launched in 2005 with support from the Department of Defense’s Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara (OEF-TS). TSCTI added Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia to the original four PSI countries. In addition to the Pentagon-led efforts, the Sahel countries have also received support from State Department programs—especially the AntiTerrorism Assistance (ATA) program and the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)—and other U.S. government agencies, including USAID and the Department of the Treasury. These efforts in the Sahelian subregion have already borne fruit. For example, Amari Saïﬁ, a former Algerian army ofﬁcer-turned-GSPC leader better

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known by his nom de guerre Abderrazak al-Para (“the paratrooper”) who was responsible for the daring 2003 kidnapping of 32 European tourists (they were ransomed for $6 million), was himself captured after an unprecedented chase involving personnel from seven countries who pursued him across the open deserts of Mali, Niger, and Chad (the hunt was directed by U.S. Navy P-3C Orion long range surveillance aircraft); Saïﬁ now serves a life sentence in far-less-open conﬁnes of an Algerian prison.30 Although the United States has historically deployed naval forces to Africa only to rescue stranded expatriates—Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry’s Cape Verde–based transatlantic slave trade–interdicting Africa Squadron in the 1840s being a notable exception—EUCOM’s naval component, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR), has taken the lead in maritime engagement in the Gulf of Guinea. In late 2005, the dock landing ship USS Gunston Hall and the catamaran HSV-2 Swift conducted 5 weeks of joint drills with forces from several West African nations, including Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal. In early 2006, the submarine tender USS Emory S. Land deployed to the region with some 1,400 sailors and Marines to boost maritime security and strengthen partnerships, calling on ports from Senegal to Angola. And last November, the Department of State and the Department of Defense cosponsored a ministerial-level conference in Cotonou, Benin, on “Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea” which included representatives from eleven Gulf of Guinea countries as well as delegates from the United States, Europe, Senegal, South Africa, the African Union, and regional and international organizations. This fall the USS Fort McHenry will be in the Gulf of Guinea on an extended 6-month deployment as part of a multinational maritime-securityand-safety initiative that partners with West African countries to train teams from 11 African countries along to gulf, helping them to build their security capabilities, especially maritime domain awareness. NAVEUR’s commander, Admiral Henry G. “Harry” Ulrich III, has described the Fort McHenry’s mission, which he characterized as within “the spirit of AFRICOM and the initial operating capacity of AFRICOM,” as “the tipping point for us [which will] move this whole initiative of maritime safety and security ahead.”31 [. . .] PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT East Africa Consular Affairs Bulletins, U.S. Overseas Security Advisory Council August 31, 2007*

This Public Announcement is being reissued to remind Americans of the continuing potential for terrorist actions against U.S. citizens in East Africa, *

https://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cfm?contentID=72989

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particularly along the East African coast, to alert Americans to continuing sporadic violence in Somalia, and to note a number of incidents of maritime piracy near the horn of Africa and the southern Red Sea. This supersedes the Public Announcement of January 4, 2007, and expires on February 29, 2008. A number of al-Qaida operatives and other extremists are believed to be operating in and around East Africa. As a result of the recent conﬂict and continuing tension in Somalia, some of these individuals have sought to relocate elsewhere in the region, and others may seek to do so. Americans considering travel to the region and those already there should review their plans carefully, remain vigilant with regard to their personal security, and exercise caution. Terrorist actions may include suicide operations, bombings, kidnappings, or targeting maritime vessels. Terrorists do not distinguish between ofﬁcial and civilian targets. Increased security at ofﬁcial U.S. facilities has led terrorists to seek softer targets such as hotels, beach resorts, prominent public places, and landmarks. In particular, terrorists may target civil aviation and seaports. Americans in remote areas or border regions where military or police authority is limited or nonexistent could also become targets. Americans considering seaborne travel near the Horn of Africa or in the southern Red Sea should exercise extreme caution, as there have been several incidents of armed attacks, robberies, and kidnappings for ransom at sea by pirates during the past several years. Merchant vessels continue to be hijacked in Somali territorial waters, while others have been hijacked as far as 200 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia in international waters. The U.S. government maritime authorities advise mariners to avoid the port of Mogadishu, and to remain at least 200 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia. In addition, when transiting around the Horn of Africa or in the Red Sea, it is strongly recommended that vessels travel in convoys, and maintain good communications contact at all times . . .

South America & the Caribbean NAVAL FORCES FROM EIGHT COUNTRIES TRAIN TO PROTECT PANAMA CANAL Press Release, Embassy of the United States, Panama August 10, 2004*

Naval forces from eight countries begin this week PANAMAX 2004, a maritime exercise in which the multinational forces plan and coordinate a coalition response to a security threat against the Panama Canal. *

http://panama.usembassy.gov/panama/Panamax.html

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PANAMAX is conducted under the direction of Commander U.S. Naval Forces Southern command and involves personnel, aircraft and ships from Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Panama, Peru, and the United States and observers from Ecuador. The participants organized into Task Force 138 will conduct the weeklong exercise, which includes operations on the high seas, coast, and land. “The great interest of the nations in the region to participate and expand this exercise is a clear indication of the importance that they place in Panama Canal and its security,” said Rear Adm. Vinson E. Smith, Commander Task Force 138, the multinational naval force of the Americas. “Likewise, Panamanian government agencies and services are involved in the exercise ready to assume their role in the exercise scenario.” On its second year, PANAMAX has also increased its complexity. This year ’s scenario includes multiple seaborne threats approaching the Panama Canal from the Caribbean Sea and the Eastern Paciﬁc. To respond to these threats, the multinational task force is tasked to detect, monitor, and interdict suspicious vessels and to hand them over to the Panamanian National Maritime Service as the ships approach the country’s territorial waters. “The complex no-notice scenario and the multinational involvement make this realistic exercise very challenging. We will be planning and responding exactly like we would in an actual crisis,” said Commodore Dave Costa, Commander Destroyer Squadron (CDS) Six, in charge of the forces operating in the Caribbean Sea, which include the guided missile frigate USS Crommelin (FFG 37) and the Colombian ship ARC Almirante Padilla. The forces operating in the Paciﬁc will be led by Chilean Captain Francisco Alvayay and include USS John L. Hall (FFG 32), the Peruvian ships BAP Mariategui and BAP Herrera, the Chilean ships BACH Zenteno and BACH Macalbi, and the U.S. Coast Guard cutter USCG Legare. In addition, the Panamanian National Maritime Service and National Air Service will lead the coastal, and land and air operations coordinating efforts with Panamanian National Security Council, the National Police, and the Panama Canal Authority among others. The exercise scenario was designed by expert naval planners from the participating nations in an effort to develop combined responses in the defense of hemispheric security. The exercise supports two objectives: ﬁrst ensure freedom of navigation and, second, increase interoperability among nations with critical interest in the Panama Canal. The Panama Canal is perhaps the most crucial piece of infrastructure in the ﬂow of goods and commerce in the Western Hemisphere. Hundreds of ships transit the canal every year carrying more than 235 million tons of exports and imports, which sustain the economies of all the nations in the region.

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ARGENTINA BECOMES THE FIRST SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRY TO SIGN CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Ofﬁce of Public Affairs May 11, 2005*

Washington, D.C.—U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) announced that Argentina is the ﬁrst South American country to participate in the Container Security Initiative (CSI). By signing the declaration of principles on May 9, 2005, U.S. Ambassador to Argentina Lino Gutierrez and Dr. Alberto R. Abad, Federal Administrator of National Revenue of the Argentine Republic, enable all cargo destined for the United States through the port of Buenos Aires to be targeted and prescreened for terrorists and terrorist weapons. On hand to support the signing was Ambassador Cresencio (Cris) Arcos, Director, International Affairs, from the Department of Homeland Security, and Dr. Ricardo Echegarray, Director General of Argentine Customs. “The port of Buenos Aires is one of the leading ports in South America. I applaud the government of Argentina for assuming a leadership role in the Container Security Initiative,” said CBP Commissioner Robert C. Bonner. “CSI strengthens our ability to prevent terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States. By working closely with our host nations, CBP ofﬁcers are able to identify containers bound for U.S. seaports that pose a potential threat for terrorism. I am particularly pleased to expand the CSI security blanket to South America.” Buenos Aires, Argentina, is located at the river Rio de la Plata and by open sea. The expansion of CSI to Buenos Aires will provide a strategic advantage for targeting containers transshipped through the port. “Argentina’s commitment to the Container Security Initiative today is a praiseworthy act of regional leadership,” Ambassador Arcos said. “It will invigorate ocean-bound commerce worldwide and bolster efforts to keep the Hemisphere secure.” CSI is the only multinational program in place in the world today that is protecting global trade lanes from being exploited and disrupted by international terrorists. By collaborating with foreign customs administrations, CBP is working towards a safer, more secure world trading system. Under CSI, CBP has entered into bilateral partnerships with other

* http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/2005_press_releases/ 052005/05112005.xml

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administrations to identify high-risk cargo containers and to prescreen them before they are loaded on vessels destined for the United States. Today, 22 administrations have committed to joining CSI and are at various stages of implementation. On average, every day about 25,000 seagoing containers are ofﬂoaded at America’s seaports. Commissioner Bonner, conﬁrmed by Congress shortly after 9/11, made maritime cargo security one of his top priorities. The Container Security Initiative was launched in January 2002. CSI has been accepted globally as a bold and revolutionary initiative to secure maritime cargo shipments against the terrorist threat. The 36 operational ports in Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and North America include Halifax, Montreal, and Vancouver, Canada; Rotterdam, The Netherlands; Le Havre and Marseille, France; Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany; Antwerp and Zeebrugge, Belgium; Singapore; Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kobe, Japan; Hong Kong; Göteborg, Sweden; Felixstowe, Liverpool, Southampton, Thamesport, and Tilbury, United Kingdom; Genoa, La Spezia, Naples, Gioia Tauro and Livorno, Italy; Busan, Korea; Durban, South Africa; Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia; Piraeus, Greece; Algeciras, Spain; Laem Chabang, Thailand; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; and Shanghai, China. CSI will continue to expand to strategic locations around the world. The World Customs Organization (WCO), the European Union (EU), and the G8 support CSI expansion and have adopted resolutions implementing CSI security measures introduced at ports throughout the world.

INFORMATION ON PORT SECURITY IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN Steven Caldwell Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, General Accountability Ofﬁce Government Accountability Ofﬁce Report Summary June 29, 2007*

Referred to as our “third border,” the Caribbean Basin has signiﬁcant maritime links with the United States.32 Given these links and the region’s proximity, the United States is particularly interested in ensuring that the ports in the Caribbean Basin—through which goods bound for this country’s ports and cruise ships carrying its citizens must travel—are secure. Section 233 (c) of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act)33 requires GAO to report on various security-related

*

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07804r.pdf

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aspects of Caribbean Basin ports. Our speciﬁc objectives were to identify and describe the • threats and security concerns in the Caribbean Basin related to port security, • actions that foreign governments and local stakeholders have taken in the Caribbean Basin to implement international port security requirements and the challenges that remain, • activities reported to be under way by U.S. government agencies to enhance port security in the Caribbean Basin, and • potential economic impacts of port security and terrorist attacks in the Caribbean Basin.

To determine the threats and security concerns in the Caribbean Basin related to port security, we interviewed ofﬁcials from federal agencies, international organizations and associations, and various stakeholders (such as facility operators and government ofﬁcials of Caribbean countries) involved in port security in the region. To determine the actions taken by Caribbean Basin countries to implement international port security requirements and the challenges they face, we visited several Caribbean nations and reviewed information provided by agencies and organizations working in the region. To determine the activities under way by U.S. government agencies to enhance port security in the Caribbean Basin, we met with agency ofﬁcials and reviewed pertinent documents. Finally, to identify the potential economic impacts of port security in the Caribbean Basin, we met with ofﬁcials from the countries we visited, as well as from U.S. agencies and international organizations, and reviewed various analyses by a government agency and nongovernmental researchers. Because the mandate gave us a limited time frame within which to complete our work, this report is descriptive in nature and does not provide a detailed analysis of the actions taken or efforts made regarding port security in the Caribbean Basin. Enclosure II describes our scope and methodology in more detail. Between March 29 and April 13, 2007, we briefed your ofﬁces on the results of our work to address these objectives. This report summarizes the information provided during those discussions and provides the detailed handouts in enclosure I. Additional information received from the agencies since the briefings were presented is contained in the body and agency comments section of this document. We conducted our work from October 2006 through June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

SUMMARY Although intelligence sources report that no speciﬁc, credible terrorist threats to maritime security exist in the Caribbean Basin, the ofﬁcials we spoke to indicated that there are a number of security concerns that could

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affect port security in the region. Caribbean ports contain a variety of facilities such as cargo facilities, cruise ship terminals, and facilities that handle petroleum products and liquefied natural gas. Additionally, several Caribbean ports are among the top cruise ship destinations in the world. Given the volume and value of this maritime trade, the facilities and infrastructure of the maritime transportation system may be attractive targets for a terrorist attack. Our prior work on maritime security issues has revealed that the three most likely modes of attack in the port environment are a suicide attack using an explosive-laden vehicle or vessel, a standoff attack using small arms or rockets, and the traditional armed assault. Beyond the types of facilities and modes of attack to be considered, ofﬁcials we spoke to identiﬁed a number of overarching security concerns that relate to the Caribbean Basin as a whole. Among these concerns are (1) the level of corruption that exists in some Caribbean nations to undermine the rule of law in these countries, (2) organized gang activity occurring in proximity to or within port facilities, and (3) the geographic proximity of many Caribbean countries, which has made them transit countries for cocaine and heroin destined for U.S. markets. Other security concerns in the Caribbean Basin mentioned by U.S. agency ofﬁcials include stowaways, illegal migration, and the growing inﬂuence of Islamic radical groups and other foreign terrorist organizations. Foreign governments and local stakeholders in the Caribbean Basin have taken a number of steps to implement the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, although challenges for further progress remain.34 The U.S. Coast Guard has visited a number of Caribbean Basin countries to observe the security and antiterrorism measures put in place at their ports to determine the degree to which the ISPS Code has been implemented. Final reports from these visits have been issued for 14 of the 29 Caribbean Nations included in this report. Most of the countries were found to have “substantially implemented the ISPS Code.” Even so, the Coast Guard also found that facilities within some countries needed to make improvements or take additional measures. According to a Coast Guard ofﬁcial, although the Coast Guard cannot require the facilities to make improvements to respond to Coast Guard’s ﬁndings, improvements have been made in order to avoid potential difﬁculties in conducting trade with the United States. We also visited ﬁve countries in the region and found that security measures were generally in place, although there were areas of concern, such as maintaining access controls, conducting security plan exercises, and maintaining security records.35 Our discussions with facility operators as well as government ofﬁcials and a regional association during these visits revealed that challenges exist, such as obtaining additional training for their security personnel and funding for the further enhancement of port security measures in the region. Several U.S. agencies reported being involved in activities in the Caribbean Basin that could help enhance port security in the region. Through its embassies, the Department of State serves as the lead coordinator of the

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activities of other U.S. federal agencies in the Caribbean nations. The State Department has also been involved through the Organization of American States to coordinate and fund projects to improve maritime security. The Coast Guard is involved in the region through its International Port Security Program to assess the effectiveness of antiterrorism measures in place in other countries. The Coast Guard monitors the implementation of ISPS Code requirements in these countries and provides them with best practices to help them improve port security. The Coast Guard also has a Port State Control (PSC) program in which ofﬁcials board and inspect foreign vessels arriving at U.S. ports to ensure that the vessels are complying with security standards. To address a potential mass migration event from a Caribbean nation such as Haiti or Cuba, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has developed a plan that involves dozens of federal, state, and local agencies. Customs and Border Protection, another DHS component, has provided training assistance to a number of Caribbean nations and is also operating its Container Security Initiative in the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Jamaica. Under this initiative, Customs and Border Protection staff are placed at foreign seaports to screen containers for weapons of mass destruction. Related to the security of containers in the ports, the Department of Energy (DOE) also has efforts under way in the Caribbean Basin related to its Megaports Initiative, which provides equipment to scan containers for nuclear and radiological materials. This initiative is currently operational in the Bahamas and is expected to eventually operate in other countries as well. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), already active throughout the Caribbean because of its role in administering assistance programs, also has directly contributed funds toward a project to help Haiti comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code. The Department of Defense (DOD), through its Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), is active in the Caribbean through its Enduring Friendship program, which seeks to achieve regional security cooperation and build maritime security capabilities. Finally, there are several interagency efforts under way in the region to help secure cargo and counter illicit trafﬁcking, migration, and narco-terrorism operations. For example, one effort involves coordinating the efforts of Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the U.S. Attorney’s Ofﬁce to target illegal migration and narco-trafﬁcking near Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Although the potential economic impact of port security (or lack thereof) in the Caribbean Basin is difﬁcult to determine, our review of analyses performed by a government agency and nongovernmental researchers identiﬁed a number of factors that could inﬂuence the economic impact of port security and a terrorist attack in the maritime domain. These factors include (1) the target of the attack, (2) the tactics employed and objectives of the attack, (3) the amount of destruction caused by the attack, and (4) the ability to recover from the disruption or loss of facilities resulting from the attack. As part of an effective risk

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management approach—a framework that can aid in determining which vulnerabilities should be addressed in ways within available resources—government ofﬁcials and port stakeholders must determine which security measures to implement by considering their beneﬁts and costs with these factors in mind. To address the risk posed by vessels seeking entry into the United States from foreign ports that do not maintain effective antiterrorism measures as determined through the country visits completed under the International Port Security Program, the U.S. Coast Guard is authorized to take certain actions such as boarding vessels or conducting inspections of vessels. These actions can result, for example, in costs to shippers and others because of time lost while the vessel is boarded or being inspected. From July 10, 2006, when the Coast Guard began data measurements of its activities with these vessels, to April 2007, only two vessels have been subjected to a boarding offshore by Coast Guard ofﬁcials prior to gaining entry to a U.S. port solely because they arrived from a Caribbean Basin port facility deemed by the Coast Guard as not maintaining effective antiterrorism measures. To determine the potential costs of such boardings, we talked with a variety of maritime stakeholders in the region, such as facility operators and a shipping association, who indicated that such boardings have not been a signiﬁcant source of delay or ﬁnancial loss for their businesses. Thus the economic impact on the maritime industry—of actions taken to date by the Coast Guard in response to security problems at Caribbean Ports—appears to be insigniﬁcant.

AGENCY COMMENTS We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security and its component agencies (the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement), the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development for their review and comment. We received technical comments from the Department of Defense and the Coast Guard, which we incorporated where appropriate. The Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Agency for International Development provided formal written comments, which are presented in enclosures III and IV. These comments and the supplemental comments provided by the Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Department of State are discussed below. The Department of Energy did not provide comments on the report. In its comments, the Department of Homeland Security suggested that additional information be included on other Customs and Border Protection programs and initiatives under way in the region. CBP ofﬁcials subsequently provided the following information on two of these programs:

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• The Caribbean Corridor Initiative: Established in April 2005, this is a multiagency initiative that targets drug trafﬁcking in the Eastern and Central Caribbean areas. The mission of this operation is to identify, disrupt, and dismantle South American drug trafﬁcking organizations that utilize the maritime domain to smuggle narcotics into and throughout the Caribbean. The agencies that are part of this initiative include Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Coast Guard Investigative Services (USCIS), and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Puerto Rico. Under this initiative, CBP has provided training to countries in the region on the use of cargo scanning technologies and identifying fraudulent documents. • The Secure Freight Initiative: Formally initiated in December 2006, this initiative will fuse commercial data from the supply chain, information on the vessel and crew, information about cargo movement and integrity, and an integrated foreign and domestic radiography and radiation detection scan to create an enhanced risk assessment for the maritime domain.

Coast Guard ofﬁcials commented that the individuals involved in the recent JFK International Airport terrorist plot were from Trinidad and Guyana and are believed to have been in contact with that the radical Islamic group Jamaat al Muslimeen, which has been active in Trinidad. Related to the security of domestic U.S. ports, waterways and coastal areas, Coast Guard ofﬁcials also noted that operational activities conducted by the Coast Guard and its federal, state, and local partners are guided by a Coast Guard operations order called Operation Neptune Shield, which contains a classiﬁed set of requirements establishing the Coast Guard’s homeland security activity levels with performance minimums that escalate as the maritime security (MARSEC) level increases. Operational activities covered by this order include patrols to provide deterrence and response, boardings of vessels, escorts of selected vessels during transits, deployment of antiterrorism and counterterrorism assets, and enforcement of security zones among other things. ICE ofﬁcials commented that the Caribbean Basin region continues to remain as a major center for drug trafﬁcking, money laundering, and potential major staging area for terrorist operations. They stated that commercial vessels departing from Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic pose a direct threat to U.S. law enforcement assets assigned to the detection and monitoring of narcotics trafﬁc and national security as well. ICE ofﬁcials also stated that steps have been taken to monitor and detect highrisk shipments and containers coming from the region. In addition to these security concerns, ICE ofﬁcials noted that the United States depends greatly on critical energy infrastructure located in the region and that any destabilization of this infrastructure could negatively affect the U.S. economy. The Department of State stated in its comments that the threat by an explosive-laden vehicle to a cruise ship port facility or directly to a cruise ship

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should be a matter of great concern to U.S. government authorities and that U.S. citizens can be particularly vulnerable in this area. According to the State Department, such an attack can cause loss of life to American cruise line passengers and considerable economic impact on American cruise line and tourist industries in the United States. In addition, the State Department stated that compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code does not necessarily mean that a port is secure from a terrorist attack. The State Department noted that it and its contractors have witnessed open gates, poor screening of vehicles, and inadequate physical protections at ports with cruise line activity. The State Department stated that these deﬁciencies, coupled with poorly trained security personnel, can make cruise line terminals and cruise ships vulnerable to attack. According to the State Department, poor training of port security personnel is also an overarching security concern. The U.S. Agency for International Development expressed agreement with the contents of this report. We are sending copies of this report to the secretaries of the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and State, as well as the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. Additionally, this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov [. . .]

GLOBAL MULTILATERAL PERSPECTIVES European Union (EU) EU PRESIDENCY STATEMENT—PIRACY AT SEA Dr. Marie Jacobsson Alternate Head of Delegation of Sweden on behalf of the European Union EU Statement in Discussion Panel B: Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea, European Union at United Nations New York City May 10, 2001*

Mr. Co-Chairman, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia and the associated countries Cyprus and Malta align themselves with this statement.

*

http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_233_en.htm

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“Acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships represent a serious threat to the lives of seafarers, the safety of navigation, the marine environment, and the security of coastal states. They also impact negatively on the entire maritime transport industry, leading, for example, to increases in insurance rates and even the suspension of trade.” The quotation comes from the unedited text of the UN report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, to be considered at the 56th session of the General Assembly. It describes in two sentences why piracy and armed robbery against ships constitute a problem. Statistics from the International Maritime Organisation shows that the number of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships that occurred in 2000, as reported to the Organisation, was 471. That is an increase of 162 (52 percent) over the ﬁgure for 1999. Piracy and armed robbery against ships simply makes our common maritime area for transport—the seas—an unsafe area to use. They bring about and encourage lawlessness. They either threaten to undermine coastal states’ authority in the coastal state’s own territory, or they threaten to undermine an effective global management of a global common. They make the environment in which the crews work unsafe. They are often a threat to the environment. They are simply a destabilizing factor that needs to be combated! Piracy is a crime under international law. Other acts, such as unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation, including armed robbery against ships, are prohibited in recent treaties. Piracy and armed robbery against ships are very often also crimes under national law. The international community as a whole has an interest in preventing and in combating such crimes. Although it is possible to assume that the ﬂag state, the coastal state, the port state and the state of which the pirates or criminals are nationals, have a particular responsibility to combat piracy and armed robbery, preventing and combating piracy has been an obligation of all states for centuries. Article 100 of UNCLOS clearly reiterates that all states have a duty to cooperate for the repression of piracy. Ships of all states enjoy the right of innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea-lanes passage in areas under the sovereignty of a coastal state. It is clear that armed robbery against ships seriously threatens these fundamental rights. It is, and it should remain, the prerogative of the coastal state to exercise control over its territory. The coastal states have a special responsibility to ﬁght criminal acts in their territory. It is therefore extremely important that the coastal states concerned are encouraged to take this problem seriously, especially considering that most attacks occur within their sea territory, i.e. including internal waters and ports. However, this requires knowledge and resources. Mr. Co-Chairman, There is a proliferation of regional and global governmental and nongovernmental organizations that at various levels deal with the issue of

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piracy and armed robbery against ships, for example the International Maritime Organisation, (IMO), INTERPOL, the International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC-IMB), the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), the International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI), the International Group of P & I Clubs (IGP & I), and numbers of others. The International Maritime Organisation plays a vital role and the organization should remain a focal point when it comes to combating piracy. The organization has addressed the problem since 1983, when it was ‘reintroduced’ on the international agenda. Since then, a number of committees of the IMO have taken measures to address the problem—for example, the Maritime Safety Committee, the Legal Committee, and the Marine Environment Protection Committee. The Maritime Safety Committee has approved for circulation a Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, pending its adoption by the IMO Assembly in November 2001. The IMO Subcommittee on Flag State Implementation has recently prepared a resolution in order to prevent registration of so-called phantom ships that will be presented for adoption at the IMO Assembly in November 2001. The series of regional workshops initiated by the IMO in October 1998 in Singapore and concluded in Mumbai, India, in March 2000 have already produced positive results. Let me just mention one example, namely the problem of underreporting. Since the IMO stressed the need for all incidents to be reported, there has been an increase in reports. This, in turn, helps us to get a clearer picture of the problem. Impressive regional efforts have been made in order to combat piracy. The initiatives taken by Japan, India, and Malaysia—for example, within the JapanASEAN Summit and other meetings—are commendable, as is the initiative to hold combined antipiracy exercises with other countries in the region. States have now decided to bring up the matter in the oceans consultative process. The EU member states recognize the importance of the fact that the matter is brought up within the context of this process and welcome the inclusion on the agenda of piracy and armed robbery against ships. It is logical to discuss the matter in this context, not least since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides for the rights and duties of all states in respect of acts of piracy. There is a need for all UN agencies and international bodies to coordinate responses to the threat of piracy and armed robbery against ships. The matter is of concern to the IMO, the World Bank, to UNEP, to international police agencies—just to mention a few. Mr. Co-Chairman, It is important that states become parties to the relevant international treaties in this ﬁeld, namely the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; 1988 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of

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Maritime Navigation and its Protocol on Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf; and the UN Convention on Combating Organised Crime. Unfortunately, this is not enough. States should also be encouraged to enact and enforce national legislation for effective implementation and enforcement of these conventions. Perhaps all states ought to review their national legislation and practice to see if they fully reﬂect the rights and duties embedded in these conventions. It is, furthermore, important that the coastal states concerned make an increased effort to prevent and combat piracy and armed robbery. This should be done both by addressing the question of preventive measures to be taken in ports and by handling of reports from ships that are being attacked or have been attacked. In doing so they may seek guidance in the guidelines developed by both IMO and nongovernmental organizations. It is also essential that those ﬂag states whose ships are sailing in waters affected by crimes at sea, and who are the targets of piracy attacks or armed robbery, make an increased effort to advise their ships on how to take precautions against these attacks. Guidance in these matters may also be found in the guidelines developed by IMO. But this is still not enough. Piracy is an international crime that by deﬁnition can only be committed outside of the territory of a state. Sometimes piratical acts are better described as internationally organized crime. This is particularly true in cases, which involve “phantom ships.” It is also an indication of the fact that a crime must not be treated in isolation. It is therefore of the utmost importance that cooperation between states and relevant international bodies is encouraged. We need a global management regime, and we need to make sure that measures taken by individual states are consistently enforced within the framework of international law. The World Bank and regional bodies and states should support these measures. The IMO should be recognized as the international organization that has the primary mandate to globally deal with the problem of piracy. At the same time, regional initiatives and activities, such as the discussion in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) should be strongly encouraged. Experience has also shown that the coastal states concerned may beneﬁt from entering into regional cooperation. Speciﬁc areas for cooperation could include capacity building in law enforcement and legislation, development of standard reporting procedures, development of both global and regional information bases and cooperation between coast guards. Cooperation and the building of networks can also be achieved through other measures. A number of reports have shown that law enforcement ofﬁcials and policy-makers from affected areas need education, and need to exchange information on experience. There is one institution that seems apt to provide a forum for such measures namely, the United Nations’ World Maritime University, which is a university, established under the auspices of the IMO.

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At present, the World Maritime University gives lectures on piracy in some of its courses. However, the WMU could do something on a wider scale, perhaps a weeklong seminar, to which representatives from, for example, other UN bodies such as IMO could be invited to give presentations. An alternative might be to develop and deliver education on piracy matters as a “Professional Development Course (PDC)” and invite all maritime administrations around the world to participate. The courses could also include training of investigators of piracy and armed robbery against vessels. Such a course could also serve as an international contact point for representatives from those different regions in the world that are most affected by piracy. The EU member states suggest that the WMU should be asked whether it would be possible for the WMU to serve as a focal educational point and to commence a more organized education on the issue of piracy and armed robbery against ships. Mr. Co-Chairman, Let me also take the opportunity to say a few words about the work of the Comité Maritime International. In February 2001, the Assembly of the Comité Maritime International adopted a resolution (at the XXXVII International Conference of the CMI) encouraging the Executive Council to transmit the so-called Model National Law to the Secretary-General of the IMO with a request for endorsement by the IMO Assembly. It is, of course, to be welcomed that piracy and armed robbery against ships is now gaining more and more attention. The work by the CMI should be honored. Piracy is a truly global problem and it cuts across all sectors of society—from political to commercial, from state actors to individuals. At the same time there is a risk, given the number of fora in which piracy and armed robbery against ships is discussed, that the problem is dealt with in disparate ways and not in a particularly organized and consistent manner. The attempts to deﬁne criminal acts against ships not included in the deﬁnition of piracy in UNCLOS represent one example that needs to be discussed. The EU member states believe that the only viable way to prevent and to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea goes through cooperation and capacity building. Moreover, the private sector should be even further associated, as appropriate, to the efforts developed by the international community. Such cooperation should include capacity building in law enforcement, legislation, development of both regional and global information bases, regional exchanges on law enforcement and coast guard training. The EU would like to express its concern over the current underreporting of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. It is important that all incidents are reported. In this context we note that there has been an increase in reporting and that it is welcome (although the incidents themselves are not). The IMO should be a focal point when receiving reports. The recording and initial examination of reports should be made by the IMO, because the IMO is an intergov-

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ernmental organization with international credibility also within the private sector. Furthermore, it is essential that all states support the initiatives taken by the IMO to prevent and combat piracy and armed robbery against ships, thereby maintaining focus on this very serious problem. The WMU should be asked to bear responsibility for the development of international education and training. Piracy and armed robbery against ships can constitute an environmental hazard. It is therefore important that regional emergency plans be developed. The IMO and other organizations strongly discourage the carrying and use of ﬁrearms on board merchant vessels, and the EU supports this point of view. However, when the vessels do not carry ﬁrearms on board, the states must take their responsibility to patrol areas in which incidents are most likely to occur, and to act against the criminals. This is indeed a costly business and the lack of capacity and funds to tackle it needs to be examined and discussed, as does the matter of what could be done to build up capacity. There are also other issues that need to be discussed, such as the need for maritime areas to be properly charted, how far an obligation for a ship to carry an Automatic Identiﬁcation System (AIS) can curb criminality, and if smoother exchange control restrictions would be of help. The EU member states are willing and prepared to commence a discussion on what measures could be taken. We look forward to a strong statement in the report of this meeting to UNGA on the importance of preventing and combating piracy, suggesting measures and decisions that could be reviewed at future meetings of the oceans consultative process and by the General Assembly. Piracy and armed robbery against ships are matters for the international community as a whole. Thank you, Mr. Co-Chairman. AN INTEGRATED MARITIME POLICY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels October 10, 2007*

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The seas are Europe’s lifeblood. Europe’s maritime spaces and its coasts are central to its wellbeing and prosperity—they are Europe’s trade routes, climate regulator, sources of food, energy and resources, and a favored site for *

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/com2007_0575en01.pdf

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its citizens’ residence and recreation. Our interactions with the sea are more intense, more varied, and create more value for Europe than ever before. Yet the strain is showing. We are at a crossroads in our relationship with the oceans. On the one hand technology and know-how allow us to extract ever more value from the sea, and more and more people ﬂow to Europe’s coasts to beneﬁt from that value. On the other hand, the cumulated effect of all this activity is leading to conﬂicts of use and to the deterioration of the marine environment that everything else depends on. Europe must respond to this challenge; in a context of rapid globalization and climate change the urgency is great. The European Commission has recognized this, and launched a comprehensive consultation and analysis of how Europe relates to the sea.36 It has triggered a massive response from stakeholders that reveals clearly the enormous potential of the seas and the scale of the challenge if we are to realize that potential sustainably. It has also provided a wealth of ideas as to how Europe can rise to meet this challenge. Building on this valuable input the Commission proposes an Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union, based on the clear recognition that all matters relating to Europe’s oceans and seas are interlinked, and that searelated policies must develop in a joined-up way if we are to reap the desired results. This integrated, intersectoral approach was strongly endorsed by all stakeholders. Applying it will require reinforced cooperation and effective coordination of all sea-related policies at the different decision-making levels. An Integrated Maritime Policy will enhance Europe’s capacity to face the challenges of globalization and competitiveness, climate change, degradation of the marine environment, maritime safety and security, and energy security and sustainability. It must be based on excellence in marine research, technology, and innovation and will be anchored in the Lisbon agenda for jobs and growth and the Gothenburg agenda for sustainability. An EU Integrated Maritime Policy will: • Change the way we make policy and take decisions—at every level compartmentalized policy development and decision-making are no longer adequate. Interactions must be understood and taken into account; common tools developed; synergies identiﬁed and exploited; and conﬂicts avoided or resolved. • Develop and deliver a program of work—action under the different sectoral policies must develop in a coherent policy framework. The Action Plan accompanying this communication gives a clear idea of the variety and magnitude of the work ahead. The following projects are of particular importance: • A European Maritime Transport Space without barriers • A European Strategy for Marine Research

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National integrated maritime policies to be developed by member states A European network for maritime surveillance A road map toward maritime spatial planning by member states A strategy to mitigate the effects of climate change on coastal regions Reduction of CO2 emissions and pollution by shipping Elimination of pirate ﬁshing and destructive high seas bottom trawling An European network of maritime clusters A review of EU labor law exemptions for the shipping and ﬁshing sectors

This Communication lays the foundation for the governance framework and cross-sectoral tools necessary for an EU Integrated Maritime Policy and sets out the main actions that the Commission will pursue during the course of this mandate. These actions will be guided by the principles of subsidiarity and competitiveness, the ecosystem approach, and stakeholder participation.

NATO COMBATING TERRORISM IN THE MEDITERRANEAN Vice Admiral Roberto Cesaretti Commander, NATO Operation Endeavour NATO Review, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Autumn 2005*

In the course of the past four years, NATO’s ﬁrst Article-5, collective-defense operation has evolved from a small-scale deployment providing a modest military presence in an important stretch of sea into a comprehensive, continuously adapting counterterrorism operation throughout the Mediterranean. In the process, the Alliance has contributed to maintaining peace, stability and security in a strategic region, obtained invaluable experience of maritime interdiction operations and developed increasingly effective intelligencegathering and information-sharing procedures relevant to the wider struggle against international terrorism. NATO’s Standing Naval Force Mediterranean deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean on October 6, 2001, a day before the launch of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban and al-Qaida from Afghanistan. This measure, taken at the request of the United States following the September 11 terrorist attacks and NATO’s invocation of Article 5 a

*

http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/art4.html

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day later, aimed to provide a deterrent presence and surveillance in strategic international waters at a key moment. In the intervening years, the operation, subsequently named Active Endeavour, has become increasingly sophisticated as the Alliance has reﬁned its counterterrorism role and integrated lessons learned in the course of the operation. In this way, Active Endeavour’s mandate has been regularly reviewed and its mission and force composition adjusted to create an effective counter to terrorism throughout the Mediterranean. In February 2003, the operation was expanded to include escorting merchant shipping from Allied states through the Straits of Gibraltar. This was a precautionary measure taken on the basis of intelligence indicating that ships passing through this extremely narrow passage were potential terrorist targets. The escorts were subsequently suspended in May 2004 as a result of a decline in the number of requests but may be reactivated at any time. In April 2003, NATO extended Active Endeavour’s scope to include compliant boarding operations, that is, boarding with the consent of the ships’ masters and ﬂag states in accordance with international law. Then in March 2004, NATO expanded Active Endeavour’s area of operations to include the entire Mediterranean. As of September 15, 2005, some 69,000 ships had been “hailed” and 95 boarded. In addition, 488 noncombatant escorts had been conducted through the Straits of Gibraltar.

NEW OPERATIONAL PATTERN In October 2004, NATO put in place a new operational pattern. Since then, the focus has been on gathering and processing information and intelligence so as to target speciﬁc vessels of interest. In this way, it is now possible to deploy surface forces as reaction units to conduct speciﬁc tasks such as tracking and boarding of vessels. The new operational pattern maintains a proactive posture. Moreover, resources may be supplemented in periodic surge operations. At these times, augmentation forces, such as one of the Standing Maritime Groups of the NATO Response Force, join Task Force Endeavour to provide an enhanced presence and more intensive surveillance capability. Speciﬁcally, Active Endeavour is now involved in the four following areas. It is helping deter and disrupt any action supporting terrorism at or from sea; controlling “choke” points, that is the most important passages and harbors of the Mediterranean, by deploying mine-hunters from one of the Standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures Groups to carry out preparatory route surveys; providing escorts for designated vessels through the Straits of Gibraltar when necessary; and enhancing the ongoing Mediterranean Dialogue program and other NATO programs to promote bilateral and multilateral relations.

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At all times, NATO units dedicated to Active Endeavour are patrolling the Mediterranean basin, collecting information and assessing the situation in their vicinity. They provide the visible presence and potential reaction forces that may respond rapidly if required. Allied Forces Maritime Component Command HQ Naples (CC-MAR Naples) controls the operation through the Maritime Operations Centre, which works around the clock. This Operations Centre, which has close ties and exchanges information with national agencies of several NATO countries, is located close to the NATO Maritime Intelligence Coordination Centre. Another important source of information is the experimental Joint Information and Analysis Centre (JIAC). This is structured as a fusion center to collect all available information and effectively collate, analyze, and then disseminate data as actionable intelligence to the appropriate command. It is located in NATO’s Joint Force Command Naples and monitors the whole area of functional responsibility. Together, these agencies provide the information and analysis that allow me as commander of Active Endeavour to direct limited resources as efﬁciently as possible. Sheer physical presence goes a long way to maintaining security at sea. The Mediterranean is patrolled by frigates and corvettes speciﬁcally dedicated to Active Endeavour by Allies on a voluntary basis. They are supported by the Alliance’s two maritime high-readiness forces, if and when needed. In addition to these surface units, submarines provide complementary surveillance by providing discreet monitoring of speciﬁc areas to detect suspicious behavior. Maritime patrol aircraft also provide wide area coverage across large areas, using a variety of sensors to detect and classify vessels and other objects of interest. Active Endeavour relies heavily on the logistic support of Mediterranean Allies, using two logistic bases—Souda in Greece and Aksaz in Turkey—and other Allied ports in the Mediterranean basin.

OPERATION IN PRACTICE Every day, merchant ships sailing through the Mediterranean are “hailed,” that is, contacted and questioned, by patrolling NATO naval units and aircraft. They are asked to identify themselves and their activity. This information is then reported to both CC-MAR Naples and the NATO Shipping Centre in Northwood, England. If anything appears unusual or suspicious, teams of between 15 and 20 specially trained personnel may board the vessel to inspect documentation and cargo. If there is credible intelligence or strong evidence of any terrorist-related activity, Task Force Endeavour is ready to deploy to the area and take any necessary actions as authorized by the North Atlantic Council. Vessel inspections are conducted with the consent of both the ﬂag state and the ship’s captain. The results are then evaluated by CC-MAR Naples. If

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irregularities are discovered, not necessarily related to terrorism, this information will be relayed to the appropriate law-enforcement agency in the vessel’s next port of call, provided there is an established protocol with the country involved to do so. The suspect vessel will then be shadowed until action is taken by a responsible agency, or it enters a country’s territorial waters on the way to a port. If a vessel refuses to be boarded, NATO will take all necessary steps to ensure that it is inspected as soon as it enters any NATO country’s territorial waters. CC-MAR Naples works closely with Allied national authorities and directly with the NATO naval forces operating in the Mediterranean. An example illustrates the potential beneﬁts of such cooperation. In June 2003, a southern-region country reported that a vessel was operating in a suspicious manner. CC-MAR Naples disseminated this information to a wider audience to increase general awareness and in preparation for any subsequent action on the part of NATO or national authorities. Subsequently, an Ally’s Coast Guard was able to use the information when it spotted the same vessel operating within its territorial waters and the national authorities decided to investigate more thoroughly. Having a force ready at sea gives NATO the opportunity to react to a broad range of situations and emergencies, in addition to combating terrorism. This includes humanitarian, search-and-rescue and disaster-relief operations. Indeed, in this way, NATO ships and helicopters rescued 84 civilians on a stricken oil rig in high winds and heavy seas in December 2001. And in January 2002, NATO ships and helicopters provided life-saving support to 254 passengers of a sinking ship in the Eastern Mediterranean off Crete. Helicopters evacuated the passengers and the ship’s hull was repaired at sea before being towed into port. At the June 2004 NATO Summit in Istanbul, the Alliance decided to enhance Active Endeavour by inviting the participation of NATO Partners, including Mediterranean Dialogue countries. All offers of support, including those by other interested countries, are now being considered on a case-bycase basis. Offers of contributory support by Russia and Ukraine, for example, were made in 2004, and expert teams on both sides are currently working to integrate Russian and Ukrainian forces into the operation in 2006. Three Mediterranean Dialogue countries (Algeria, Israel, and Morocco) and three Partner countries (Croatia, Georgia, and Sweden) have also indicated a desire to participate in the operation. The extent of the contribution will be tailored according to the speciﬁcs of the country concerned and optimized on the basis of the offers received and the needs of the operation.

IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE SHARING NATO is also developing an experimental networking system to enable all Mediterranean countries to exchange information about the merchant ship-

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ping in the basin more effectively. Once approved and implemented, our understanding of the extent of illegal activities and therefore our ability to control them will be improved. The resulting picture of the merchant shipping trafﬁc in the Mediterranean should assist law-enforcement agencies, as well as NATO forces in international waters, to act decisively against these problems. In the same context, NATO is looking forward to including more national contributions from non-NATO, Mediterranean-rim countries. Such contributions, in addition to increasing Active Endeavour’s effectiveness throughout the area of responsibility by enhancing cooperation and information sharing, will reduce the need for more dedicated assets. Over the years, Active Endeavour has increasingly become an information and intelligence-based operation through the sharing of data gathered at sea by Allies and Mediterranean-rim countries. The level of information sharing achieved to date provides a sound foundation upon which to build in the future. The aim is to develop a much more effective information collection and analysis system and to change the character of the operation from one that is intelligence-supported to one that is intelligence-driven. The main tool for this concept will be the JIAC, with the aim of promoting a common information collection and reporting strategy, providing analysis and warning, and advising on deployment of assets. Its establishment is meant to encourage the widest sharing of information and ensure that the JIAC output is passed in a timely manner to the countries or agencies most likely to be able to make use of it. The JIAC should help energize efforts of both NATO and individual Allies to provide usable information that contributes to the struggle against the destabilizing factors of terrorism, organized crime, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region. The experience that NATO has acquired in Active Endeavour and other maritime interdiction operations has given the Alliance unparalleled expertise in this ﬁeld. This expertise is relevant to wider international efforts to combat terrorism and, in particular, the proliferation and smuggling of weapons of mass destruction. As a result, countries involved in the Proliferation Security Initiative, a U.S.-led partnership aiming to help halt ﬂows of dangerous technologies to and from states and nonstate actors of concern, are currently seeking to learn the lessons of NATO’s maritime operations. Active Endeavour has proved to be an effective tool in countering terrorism at and from the sea in the Mediterranean. With continuing cooperation from both military and civilian agencies in all Mediterranean countries, the day will come when NATO is only required to provide the coordination for a more holistic approach to countering terrorism, and more generally illegal activity in the area. When effective links are established and appropriate agreements put in place whereby national authorities can react upon suspicious indicators, Active Endeavour should evolve into a more routine activity involving both NATO Allies and Partners.

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COMBATING TERRORISM AT SEA NATO Active Endeavour Brieﬁng: NATO Naval Operations, Proliferation Security Initiative, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, North Atlantic Treaty Organization June 2006*

NATO ships are patrolling throughout the Mediterranean monitoring shipping to help detect, deter, defend, and protect against terrorist activity. This operation, called Active Endeavour, has evolved out of NATO’s immediate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States of September 11, 2001. In the intervening years, the operation has developed increasingly effective intelligence-gathering and information-sharing procedures relevant to the wider struggle against international terrorism. “Active Endeavour has proved to be an effective tool in countering terrorism at and from the sea in the Mediterranean,” says Vice Admiral Roberto Cesaretti, Commander of Active Endeavour. The operation has also helped NATO gain valuable experience of maritime interdiction operations and more broadly contributed to maintaining peace, stability, and security in a strategic region. NATO initially deployed its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean on October 6, 2001, in a demonstration of Alliance resolve and solidarity. That was a day before the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S.-led campaign to oust al-Qaida and the Taliban from Afghanistan. The deployment was one of eight measures taken by NATO to support the United States in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, following the invocation of Article 5, NATO’s collective-defense provision, for the ﬁrst time in the Alliance’s history. Its aim was to provide a deterrent presence and surveillance in strategic international waters at a key moment. The deployment, which was formally named Operation Active Endeavour on October 26, 2001, is commanded by Allied Forces Maritime Component Command HQ Naples (CC-MAR Naples) through the Maritime Operations Centre and represented a milestone for the Alliance. Together with the dispatch of Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft to the United States, it was the ﬁrst time that NATO assets had been deployed in support of an Article 5 operation. Keeping the Mediterranean’s busy trade routes open and safe is critical to NATO’s security. In terms of energy alone, some 65 percent of the oil and natural gas consumed in Western Europe pass through the Mediterranean each year, with major pipelines connecting Libya to Italy and Morocco to Spain. For this reason, NATO ships are systematically carrying out preparatory route surveys in “choke” points as well as in important passages and harbors throughout the Mediterranean.

*

http://www.nato.int/docu/brieﬁng/terrorism_at_sea2006/terrorism_at_sea2006-e.pdf

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EXPANDING THE MISSION In March 2003, Active Endeavour was expanded to include providing escorts through the Straits of Gibraltar to merchant ships from Allied states that requested them. This extension of the mission was designed to help prevent terrorist attacks such as those off Yemen on the USS Cole in October 2000 and on the French oil tanker Limburg two years later. This was a precautionary measure taken on the basis of intelligence indicating that ships passing through this extremely narrow passage were potential terrorist targets. Some 3,000 commercial shipments pass through the Straits every day. In May 2004 the escorts were suspended as a result of a declining number of requests. They may, however, be reactivated at any time. In April 2003, NATO further expanded the mission and began boarding suspect ships. These boardings take place with the compliance of the ships’ captains and ﬂag states, in accordance with international law. In practice, merchant ships are hailed by patrolling NATO naval units and asked to identify themselves and their activity. This information is then reported to both CC-MAR Naples and the NATO Shipping Centre in Northwood, England. If irregularities are discovered, not necessarily related to terrorism, this information is relayed to the appropriate law-enforcement agency in the vessel’s next port of call. The suspect vessel will then be shadowed until action is taken by a responsible agency, or until it enters a country’s territorial waters on the way to a port. In March 2004, as a result of the success of Active Endeavour in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO extended its remit to the entire Mediterranean.

NEW OPERATIONAL PATTERN In October 2004, NATO put in place a new operational pattern. Since then, the focus has been on gathering and processing information and intelligence so as to target speciﬁc vessels of interest. In this way, it is now possible to deploy surface forces as reaction units to conduct speciﬁc tasks such as tracking and boarding of vessels. Augmentation forces, such as one of the Alliance’s Standing Maritime Groups, may join the operation to provide an enhanced presence and more intensive surveillance capability. Active Endeavour has over the years increasingly become an information and intelligence-based operation through the sharing of data gathered at sea by Allies and Mediterranean-rim countries. The level of information sharing achieved to date provides a sound foundation upon which to build in the future. According to Vice Admiral Cesaretti: “The aim is to develop a much more effective information collection and analysis system and to change the character of the operation from one that is intelligence-supported to one that is intelligence-driven.”

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NATO is also developing an experimental networking system to enable all Mediterranean countries to exchange information about merchant shipping in the basin more effectively. The resulting picture of the merchant shipping trafﬁc in the Mediterranean should assist law-enforcement agencies, as well as NATO forces in international waters, to act against these problems. PARTICIPATION OF NATO PARTNERS At NATO’s Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the Alliance decided to enhance Active Endeavour including through the support of NATO Partner nations and Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The Mediterranean Dialogue Programme, which was set up in 1995, seeks to contribute to regional security and stability and to achieve better mutual understanding between NATO and its Mediterranean Partners. All offers of support, including those by other interested countries, will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Following offers of support by Russia and Ukraine, agreements concerning their support to the operation were ﬁnalized in 2004. Expert NATO teams have been working with staff from both countries to prepare for the beginning of their operational contributions later in 2006 or early 2007. Negotiations are also under way with three Mediterranean Dialogue countries—Algeria, Israel and Morocco—and two Partner countries—Georgia and Albania—which indicated a desire to support the operation. In the words of Jaap de Hoop Scheffer: “NATO is the place where common responses are being developed to the challenges posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction and failed states and the place where common decisions are converted into common action.” BENEFITS Although the mandate of Active Endeavour is focused on deterring and detecting terrorist-related activities, the operation has had a visible effect on security and stability in the Mediterranean that is beneﬁcial to trade and economic activity, as well as emergencies. As of July 13, 2006, some 81,000 ships had been “hailed” and 102 boarded. In addition, 488 noncombatant escorts had been conducted through the Straits of Gibraltar. In June 2003, a southernregion country reported that a vessel was operating in a suspicious manner. CC-MAR Naples disseminated this information to a wider audience to increase general awareness and in preparation for any subsequent action on the part of NATO or national authorities. Subsequently, an Ally’s Coast Guard was able to use the information when it spotted the same vessel operating within its territorial waters and the national authorities decided to investigate more thoroughly.

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NATO ships and helicopters have also intervened on several occasions to rescue civilians on stricken oilrigs and sinking ships. This includes helping 84 workers to evacuate an oilrig in high winds and heavy seas in December 2001 and winching women and children off a sinking ship carrying some 250 refugees in January 2002 and helping to repair the damaged hull. The experience that NATO has accrued in Active Endeavour and other maritime interdiction operations has given the Alliance unparalleled expertise in this ﬁeld. This expertise is relevant to wider international efforts to combat terrorism and, in particular, the proliferation and smuggling of weapons of mass destruction. Although many characteristics of Active Endeavour are essentially the same as those of earlier NATO maritime missions in terms of the equipment used and activities involved, the nature of the threat is new and has required the adoption of innovative approaches. The Alliance’s two maritime high-readiness frigate forces—Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG 2, formerly STANAVFORMED) and Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG 1, formerly STANAVFORLANT)—rotate on a three-monthly basis in the Mediterranean in support of Active Endeavour. These forces include ships from many NATO nations that are also deployed on a rotational basis. Allies also contribute additional forces on a voluntary basis and Active Endeavour relies heavily on the logistic support of Allies in the Mediterranean. In addition, submarines provide complementary surveillance by providing discreet monitoring of speciﬁc areas to detect suspicious behavior. Maritime patrol aircraft also provide wide area coverage across large areas, using a variety of sensors to detect and classify vessels and other objects. Spanish maritime forces play a particularly important role in escorting ships through the Straits of Gibraltar. Regular reports on the conduct of Operation Active Endeavour are provided to the UN Security Council.

NATO NAVAL OPERATIONS Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has acquired much experience and practical expertise in naval operations, whether carried out in support of individual Allies or coalitions of Allies or under the NATO banner. The longest-duration NATO maritime missions took place during the wars of Yugoslav dissolution. Between 1992 and 1996, the Alliance helped enforce both an arms embargo against the whole of the former Yugoslavia and economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, both of which were imposed by the UN Security Council. This operation, which also involved forces from the Western European Union, was originally called Maritime Monitor and then renamed Sharp Guard as the mission was expanded from surveillance to include boarding and searching of vessels. Given the many similarities with Active Endeavour, the experience gained during these years has proved extremely useful to the current operation.

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PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. Launched by U.S. president George W. Bush in May 2003, it is a global partnership of countries seeking to halt the ﬂow of dangerous technologies to and from states and nonstate actors engaged in or supporting WMD proliferation programs. Participating countries agreed a Statement of Interdiction Principles in September 2003. These commit them to undertaking effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, in a number of speciﬁc areas: interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials to and from states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern, adopting streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning suspected proliferation activity; protecting the conﬁdential character of classiﬁed information provided by other states as part of this initiative; dedicating appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities and maximizing coordination among participants in interdiction efforts; reviewing and working to strengthen relevant national legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives and working to strengthen relevant international laws and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments; and taking speciﬁc actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international law. At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the Alliance underscored its strong support for the aims of the Proliferation Security Initiative and its Statement of Interdiction Principles, and called on partners and other countries to join in supporting and implementing the objectives of the Initiative. NATO’s experience of patrolling the Mediterranean to detect and deter terrorism in Active Endeavour is highly relevant in this context.

EARLY MEASURES TO COMBAT TERRORISM Having invoked Article 5 in response to the terrorist attacks against the United States of September 11, 2001, the Allies agreed on October 4, 2001— at the request of the United States—to take eight initial measures to implement it. Speciﬁcally, they agreed to enhance intelligence sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in the appropriate NATO bodies, related to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it; to provide individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other states which are or may be subject to

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increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism; and to take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory. The Allies also agreed to “backﬁll” selected Allied assets required to support operations against terrorism; to provide blanket overﬂight clearances for U.S. and other Allied aircraft for military ﬂights related to operations against terrorism; and to provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airﬁelds on the territory of NATO nations for operations against terrorism. In addition, the Allies agreed to deploy part of NATO’s Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean and AWACS planes to the United States to support operations against terrorism.

United Nations CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS United Nations April 29, 1958*

The States Parties to this Convention, DESIRING to codify the rules of international law relating to the high seas, RECOGNIZING that the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held at Geneva from February 24 to April 27, 1958, adopted the following provisions as generally declaratory of established principles of international law, Have agreed as follows: ARTICLE 1 The term “high seas” means all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State. ARTICLE 2 The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and noncoastal States: (1) (2) *

Freedom of navigation; Freedom of ﬁshing;

http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf

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(3) (4)

Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; Freedom to ﬂy over the high seas.

These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.

ARTICLE 3 1.

2.

In order to enjoy the freedom of the seas on equal terms with coastal States, States having no seacoast should have free access to the sea. To this end States situated between the sea and a State having no seacoast shall by common agreement with the latter, and in conformity with existing international conventions, accord: (a) To the State having no seacoast, on a basis of reciprocity, free transit through their territory; and (b) To ships ﬂying the ﬂag of that State treatment equal to that accorded to their own ships, or to the ships of any other States, as regards access to seaports and the use of such ports. States situated between the sea and a State having no seacoast shall settle, by mutual agreement with the latter, and taking into account the rights of the coastal State or State of transit and the special conditions of the State having no seacoast, all matters relating to freedom of transit and equal treatment in ports, in case such States are not already parties to existing international conventions.

ARTICLE 4 Every State, whether coastal or not, has the right to sail ships under its ﬂag on the high seas.

ARTICLE 5 1.

2.

Each State shall ﬁx the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to ﬂy its ﬂag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose ﬂag they are entitled to ﬂy. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical, and social matters over ships ﬂying its ﬂag. Each State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to ﬂy its ﬂag documents to that effect.

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ARTICLE 6 1.

2.

Ships shall sail under the ﬂag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. A ship may not change its ﬂag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or change of registry. A ship which sails under the ﬂags of two or more States, using them according to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any other State and may be assimilated to a ship without nationality.

ARTICLE 7 The provisions of the preceding articles do not prejudice the question of ships employed on the ofﬁcial service of an intergovernmental organization ﬂying the ﬂag of the organization.

ARTICLE 8 1. 2.

Warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the ﬂag State. For the purposes of these articles, the term “warship” means a ship belonging to the naval forces of a State and bearing the external marks distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an ofﬁcer duly commissioned by the government and whose name appears in the Navy List, and manned by a crew who are under regular naval discipline.

ARTICLE 9 Ships owned or operated by a State and used only on government noncommercial service shall, on the high seas, have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the ﬂag State.

ARTICLE 10 1. Every State shall take such measures for ships under its ﬂag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard inter alia to: (a) The use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the prevention of collisions;

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2.

(b) The manning of ships and labor conditions for crews taking into account the applicable international labor instruments; (c) The construction, equipment, and seaworthiness of ships. In taking such measures each State is required to conform to generally accepted international standards and to take any steps which may be necessary to ensure their observance.

ARTICLE 11 1.

2.

3.

In the event of a collision or of any other incident of navigation concerning a ship on the high seas involving the penal or disciplinary responsibility of the master or of any other person in the service of the ship, no penal or disciplinary proceedings may be instituted against such persons except before the judicial or administrative authorities either of the ﬂag State or of the State of which such person is a national. In disciplinary matters, the State which has issued a master’s certiﬁcate or a certiﬁcate of competence or license shall alone be competent, after due legal process, to pronounce the withdrawal of such certiﬁcates, even if the holder is not a national of the State which issued them. No arrest or detention of the ship, even as a measure of investigation, shall be ordered by any authorities other than those of the ﬂag State.

ARTICLE 12 1.

2.

Every State shall require the master of a ship sailing under its ﬂag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew, or the passengers, (a) To render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) To proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him; (c) After a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, her crew and her passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship of the name of his own ship, her port of registry and the nearest port at which she will call. Every coastal State shall promote the establishment and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and where circumstances so require by way of mutual regional arrangements cooperate with neighboring States for this purpose.

ARTICLE 13 Every State shall adopt effective measures to prevent and punish the transport of slaves in ships authorized to ﬂy its ﬂag and to prevent the unlawful use of its ﬂag for that purpose. Any slave taking refuge on board any ship, whatever its ﬂag, shall ipso facto be free.

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ARTICLE 14 All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.

ARTICLE 15 Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (1)

(2) (3)

Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph 1 or subparagraph 2 of this article.

ARTICLE 16 The acts of piracy, as deﬁned in article 15, committed by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a private ship.

ARTICLE 17 A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 15. The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control of the persons guilty of that act.

ARTICLE 18 A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of nationality is determined by the law of the State from which such nationality was derived.

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ARTICLE 19 On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.

ARTICLE 20 Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been effected without adequate grounds, the State making the seizure shall be liable to the State the nationality of which is possessed by the ship or aircraft for any loss or damage caused by the seizure.

ARTICLE 21 A seizure on account of piracy may only be carried out by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft on government service authorized to that effect.

ARTICLE 22 1.

2.

3.

Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship which encounters a foreign merchant ship on the high seas is not justified in boarding her unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting: (a) That the ship is engaged in piracy; or (b) That the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or (c) That though ﬂying a foreign ﬂag or refusing to show its ﬂag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship. In the cases provided for in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) above, the warship may proceed to verify the ship’s right to ﬂy its ﬂag. To this end, it may send a boat under the command of an ofﬁcer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which must be carried out with all possible consideration. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been sustained.

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ARTICLE 23 1.

2. 3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities of the coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that State. Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the internal waters or the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing State, and may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted. It is not necessary that, at the time when the foreign ship within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone receives the order to stop, the ship giving the order should likewise be within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone. If the foreign ship is within a contiguous zone, as deﬁned in article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the pursuit may be undertaken only if there has been a violation of the rights for the protection of which the zone was established. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own country or of a third State. Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship has satisﬁed itself by such practicable means as may be available that the ship pursued or one of its boats or other craft working as a team and using the ship pursued as a mother ship are within the limits of the territorial sea, or as the case may be within the contiguous zone. The pursuit may be commenced only after a visual or auditory signal to stop has been given at a distance that enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship. The right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft on government service specially authorized to that effect. Where hot pursuit is effected by an aircraft: (a) The provisions of paragraph 1 to 3 of this article shall apply mutatis mutandis; (b) The aircraft giving the order to stop must itself actively pursue the ship until a ship or aircraft of the coastal State, summoned by the aircraft, arrives to take over the pursuit, unless the aircraft is itself able to arrest the ship. It does not sufﬁce to justify an arrest on the high seas that the ship was merely sighted by the aircraft as an offender or suspected offender, if it was not both ordered to stop and pursued by the aircraft itself or other aircraft or ships that continue the pursuit without interruption. The release of a ship arrested within the jurisdiction of a State and escorted to a port of that State for the purposes of an enquiry before the competent authorities may not be claimed solely on the ground that the ship, in the course of its voyage, was escorted across a portion of the high seas, if the circumstances rendered this necessary. Where a ship has been stopped or arrested on the high seas in circumstances that do not justify the exercise of the right of hot pursuit, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been thereby sustained.

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ARTICLE 24 Every State shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines or resulting from the exploitation and exploration of the seabed and its subsoil, taking account of existing treaty provisions on the subject.

ARTICLE 25 1.

2.

Every State shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas from the dumping of radioactive waste, taking into account any standards and regulations that may be formulated by the competent international organizations. All States shall cooperate with the competent international organizations in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of the seas or airspace above resulting from any activities with radioactive materials or other harmful agents.

ARTICLE 26 1. 2.

3.

All States shall be entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of the high seas. Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources, the coastal State may not impede the laying or maintenance of such cables or pipelines. When laying such cables or pipelines the State in question shall pay due regard to cables or pipelines already in position on the seabed. In particular, possibilities of repairing existing cables or pipelines shall not be prejudiced.

ARTICLE 27 Every State shall take the necessary legislative measures to provide that the breaking or injury by a ship ﬂying its ﬂag or by a person subject to its jurisdiction of a submarine cable beneath the high seas done willfully or through culpable negligence, in such a manner as to be liable to interrupt or obstruct telegraphic or telephonic communications, and similarly the breaking or injury of a submarine pipeline or high-voltage power cable, shall be a punishable offense. This provision shall not apply to any break or injury caused by persons who acted merely with the legitimate object of saving their lives or their ships, after having taken all necessary precautions to avoid such break or injury.

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ARTICLE 28 Every State shall take the necessary legislative measures to provide that, if persons subject to its jurisdiction who are the owners of a cable or pipeline beneath the high seas, in laying or repairing that cable or pipeline, cause a break in or injury to another cable or pipeline, they shall bear the cost of the repairs.

ARTICLE 29 Every State shall take the necessary legislative measures to ensure that the owners of ships who can prove that they have sacriﬁced an anchor, a net or any other ﬁshing gear, in order to avoid injuring a submarine cable or pipeline, shall be indemniﬁed by the owner of the cable or pipeline, provided that the owner of the ship has taken all reasonable precautionary measures beforehand.

ARTICLE 30 The provisions of this Convention shall not affect conventions or other international agreements already in force, as between States Parties to them.

ARTICLE 31 This Convention shall, until October 31, 1958, be open for signature by all States Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies, and by any other State invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a Party to the Convention.

ARTICLE 32 This Convention is subject to ratiﬁcation. The instruments of ratiﬁcation shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 33 This Convention shall be open for accession by any States belonging to any of the categories mentioned in article 31. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

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ARTICLE 34 1.

2.

This Convention shall come into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the 22nd instrument of ratiﬁcation or accession with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the 22nd instrument of ratiﬁcation or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day after deposit by such State of its instrument of ratiﬁcation or accession.

ARTICLE 35 1.

2.

After the expiration of a period of 5 years from the date on which this Convention shall enter into force, a request for the revision of this Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notiﬁcation in writing addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.

ARTICLE 36 The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States Members of the United Nations and the other States referred to in article 31: (a) Of signatures to this Convention and of the deposit of instruments of ratiﬁcation or accession, in accordance with articles 31, 32 and 33; (b) Of the date on which this Convention will come into force, in accordance with article 34; (c) Of requests for revision in accordance with article 35.

ARTICLE 37 The original of this Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certiﬁed copies thereof to all States referred to in article 31. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized thereto by their respective governments, have signed this Convention. DONE at Geneva, this 29th day of April, 1958.

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UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OVERVIEW AND FULL TEXT United Nations, Ofﬁce of Legal Affairs, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea December 10, 1982*

AN OVERVIEW The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea lays down a comprehensive regime of law and order in the world’s oceans and seas establishing rules governing all uses of the oceans and their resources. It enshrines the notion that all problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be addressed as a whole. The Convention was opened for signature on December 10, 1982, in Montego Bay, Jamaica. This marked the culmination of more than 14 years of work involving participation by more than 150 countries representing all regions of the world, all legal and political systems, and the spectrum of socioeconomic development. At the time of its adoption, the Convention embodied in one instrument traditional rules for the uses of the oceans and at the same time introduced new legal concepts and regimes and addressed new concerns. The Convention also provided the framework for further development of speciﬁc areas of the law of the sea. The Convention entered into force in accordance with its article 308 on November 16, 1994, 12 months after the date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratiﬁcation or accession. Today, it is the globally recognized regime dealing with all matters relating to the law of the sea. The Convention (full text) comprises 320 articles and nine annexes, governing all aspects of ocean space, such as delimitation, environmental control, marine scientiﬁc research, economic and commercial activities, transfer of technology, and the settlement of disputes relating to ocean matters. Some of the key features of the Convention are the following: • Coastal States exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea which they have the right to establish its breadth up to a limit not to exceed 12 nautical miles; foreign vessels are allowed “innocent passage” through those waters; • Ships and aircraft of all countries are allowed “transit passage” through straits used for international navigation; States bordering the straits can regulate navigational and other aspects of passage;

*

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention. htm

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• Archipelagic States, made up of a group or groups of closely related islands and interconnecting waters, have sovereignty over a sea area enclosed by straight lines drawn between the outermost points of the islands; all other States enjoy the right of archipelagic passage through such designated sea-lanes; • Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection; • All other States have freedom of navigation and overﬂight in the EEZ, as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; • Landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States have the right to participate on an equitable basis in exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the EEZs of coastal States of the same region or subregion; highly migratory species of ﬁsh and marine mammals are accorded special protection; • Coastal States have sovereign rights over the continental shelf (the national area of the seabed) for exploring and exploiting it; the shelf can extend at least 200 nautical miles from the shore, and more under speciﬁed circumstances; • Coastal States share with the international community part of the revenue derived from exploiting resources from any part of their shelf beyond 200 miles; • The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf shall make recommendations to States on the shelf’s outer boundaries when it extends beyond 200 miles; • All States enjoy the traditional freedoms of navigation, overﬂight, scientiﬁc research, and ﬁshing on the high seas; they are obliged to adopt, or cooperate with other States in adopting measures to manage and conserve living resources; • The limits of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of islands are determined in accordance with rules applicable to land territory, but rocks which could not sustain human habitation or economic life of their own would have no economic zone or continental shelf; • States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas are expected to cooperate in managing living resources, environmental and research policies, and activities; • Landlocked States have the right of access to and from the sea and enjoy freedom of transit through the territory of transit States; • States are bound to prevent and control marine pollution and are liable for damage caused by violation of their international obligations to combat such pollution; • All marine scientiﬁc research in the EEZ and on the continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal State, but in most cases they are obliged to grant consent to other States when the research is to be conducted for peaceful purposes and fulﬁls speciﬁed criteria; • States are bound to promote the development and transfer of marine technology “on fair and reasonable terms and conditions,” with proper regard for all legitimate interests;

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• States Parties are obliged to settle by peaceful means their disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention; • Disputes can be submitted to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established under the Convention, to the International Court of Justice, or to arbitration. Conciliation is also available and, in certain circumstances, submission to it would be compulsory. The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over deep seabed mining disputes.

MARITIME SECURITY, ISPS CODE IMPLEMENTATION, COSTS, AND RELATED FINANCING UNCTAD Secretariat United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations March 14, 2007*

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On July 1, 2004, the 2002 amendments to the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the new International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), entered into force and became mandatory for all SOLAS member states. The SOLAS amendments and the ISPS Code (hereinafter the ISPS Code) impose wide-ranging obligations on governments, shipping companies, and port facilities. Implementing these obligations entails costs and potential economic implications. Against this background, UNCTAD conducted a global study based on a set of questionnaires designed to obtain ﬁrst hand information from all affected parties. The main objective was to establish the range and order of magnitude of the ISPS Code–related expenditures made from 2003 through 2005 and to gain insight into the ﬁnancing mechanisms adopted or envisaged. In addition the study sought to clarify matters relating to the implementation process, level of compliance and other less easily quantiﬁable impacts. Due to limited responses received from the shipping sector the report presents responses received from ports and governments only.

A. Ports’ Questionnaire A total of 55 completed questionnaires were received from respondent ports spread over all regions, the majority of which were in developed countries.

*

http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/sdtetlb20071_en.pdf

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Together respondent ports that provided information on cargo throughput handle about 16 percent of the global port cargo throughput (tonne), based on 2004 world seaborne trade ﬁgures, and approximately 24 percent of the global container port throughput (TEU).37

Implementation, Supplementary Measures, and Level of Compliance Full compliance seems to have been achieved with no major difﬁculties. The mandatory requirements in Part A of the ISPS Code are largely fulﬁlled on the basis of the guidance contained in Part B of the Code. In many cases additional measures, either government- or industry-driven, have been adopted.

Cost of Compliance Reported initial cost ﬁgures for respondent ports range between a low of US$3,000 and a high of US$35,500,000, while reported annual costs range between US$1,000 and US$19,000,000. Unit costs and averages have been assessed on the basis of a number of parameters. These include respondent ports’ annual revenues, cargo throughput (tonnes and TEUs), ship calls, and number of ISPS port facilities. The unit cost analysis revealed the presence of important cost differentials between respondent ports, especially between larger and smaller ports. In other words, relative costs appear to be substantially higher for smaller respondent ports. As to the manner in which costs are distributed among various cost headings, responses received suggest that, on average, expenditures on equipment absorb the largest share of the initial costs followed by expenditures on infrastructure and to a lesser extent other cost headings. With respect to the annual costs, on average, personnel and staff time represent, by far, the largest share of the ISPS Code–related costs. Other cost headings take up a smaller share of the annual costs. Global initial and annual costs were also estimated on the basis of data on costs provided, as well as reported cargo throughput (tonnes and TEUs) and number of ISPS port facilities. The share of relevant respondent ports of world seaborne trade measured in tonnes is estimated to about 13 percent, while their share of global container port throughput and total number of declared ISPS port facilities is estimated to approximately 16 percent and 6 percent, respectively.38 Bearing in mind the limitations that may characterize such calculations, the estimated global port-related costs of the ISPS Code range between approximately US$1.1 billion and US$2.3 billion initially and approximately US$0.4 billion and US$0.9 billion annually thereafter. These costs are equivalent to increases in international maritime freight payments of

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about 1 percent with respect to the initial expenditure and 0.5 percent with respect to the annual expenditure.39

Financing the ISPS Code–Related Costs A number of respondent ports have implemented or plan to implement cost-recovery schemes. Where applicable, ports seem to favor levying security charges on several port users, but particularly cargo and containerized trafﬁc. In general, less than full recovery of both initial and annual costs is expected. As to security charges applied, responses received did not shed much light on the criteria used for setting the basis and the levels of the charges. The survey also revealed that some ports had received public funding and assistance. Where applicable, assistance included governmental grants and cost-sharing agreements, mainly for respondent ports located in developed regions. Respondent ports in developing countries appear to have beneﬁted mainly from technical assistance and capacity building provided by international organizations.

Ports’ Perception of Other Effects Ports seem to have accepted the ISPS Code objectives as legitimate and reported an overall positive impression of the new security regime, especially in terms of increasing awareness, streamlining processes, standardizing risk assessment, and improving business practices. Respondent ports that emphasized the negative impact associated with the Code appeared particularly concerned about operational interferences, as well as cost implications and related funding requirements. In this respect, some respondent ports have called for assistance. As to the Code’s impact on various port performance measures, such as efﬁciency, use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and throughput growth, respondent ports’ perceptions appeared rather positive. Some respondent ports, however, reported experiencing increased delays and few noted a decrease in competitiveness, while many said the ISPS Code had no impact at all.

B. Governments’ Questionnaire A total of 45 responses were received from governments located in countries representing about 24 percent of the United Nations membership. Responses received span all regions with the exception of North America and Oceania.

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Implementation Process and Compliance All respondent governments are Contracting States to the SOLAS Convention and most have delegated certain security duties to Recognized Security Organizations (RSOs). Most respondent governments reported that they had relied on dedicated legislative and regulatory instruments to ensure national implementation of the Code, including the monitoring of initial and subsequent compliance. With few exceptions, including in relation to resource limitations, governments reported that compliance with the ISPS Code by their respective national ports and shipping sectors had been achieved with no major difﬁculties. Compliance with the mandatory provisions of Part A of the Code has mainly been achieved on the basis of the guidance provided in Part B of the Code. The majority of respondent governments indicated that additional measures affecting their respective national ports and the shipping sectors had been adopted to supplement the ISPS Code requirements.

Implementation and Compliance Costs Reported initial cost ﬁgures range between US$13,500 and US$50 million per respondent government, while annual costs range between US$1,500 and US$27 million. This provides an indication of the range of ISPS Code–related expenditures on the part of governments. However, the limitations that characterize data on costs obtained require that these be considered as broadly indicative only.

Financing Governments’ ISPS Code–Related Costs There are various approaches and degrees of external support to SOLAS contracting governments, because not all respondent governments have beneﬁted or expect to beneﬁt from assistance. Assistance received by governments took mainly the form of capacity building, technical assistance, and grants. As to costrecovery, for the majority of respondent governments costs appear not to be recovered through user fees or charges. That being said, where applicable, the favored approach for governments appears to be the application of fees for the issuance and renewal of certiﬁcates as well as for audits.

Governments’ Financial Assistance to Their National Ports Some respondent governments have assisted or plan to provide assistance to their respective national ports. Grants and cost-sharing arrangements appear to be the most common type of assistance provided by governments

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to their respective national ports. Some governments have also provided technical assistance to their ports.

Governments’ Perception of the ISPS Code’s Overall Impact Summarizing the overall impact of the ISPS Code on their respective countries, a signiﬁcant majority of respondent governments highlighted the positive impact of the new IMO security regime. Some argued, however, that it was expensive to implement and that additional guidance was required. Others had a negative perception of the Code due to their resource limitations. In this respect, a number of respondent governments, especially from countries of developing Africa stressed the need for international assistance and cooperation [. . .]40

International Maritime Organization MEASURES TO PREVENT UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST PASSENGERS AND CREWS ON BOARD SHIPS International Maritime Organization September 26, 1986*

At its 53rd session (MSC 53/24, paragraph 17.3), the Maritime Safety Committee approved the measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews on board ships (MSC 53/24, annex 14), the text of which is attached hereto. These measures are intended to assist member governments when reviewing and strengthening, as necessary, port and onboard security in accordance with resolution A. 584(14). Member governments are requested to bring the measures to the attention of concerned organizations and interested parties. *** ANNEX 14 MEASURES TO PREVENT UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST PASSENGERS AND CREWS ON BOARD SHIPS

1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Assembly resolution A.584(14) directed that internationally agreed measures should be developed, on a priority basis, by the Maritime Safety Committee to ensure the security of passengers and crews on board ships and authorized the *

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Maritime Safety Committee to request the secretary-general to issue a circular containing information on the agreed measures to governments, organizations concerned and interested parties for their consideration and adoption. 1.2 The text of Assembly resolution A.584(14) is attached at appendix 1.

2 DEFINITIONS For the purpose of these measures: 1.

2. 3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

8.

9.

DESIGNATED AUTHORITY means the organization or organizations or the administration or administrations identiﬁed by or within the government as responsible for ensuring the development, implementation and maintenance of port facility security plans or ﬂag State ship security plans, or both. PORT FACILITY means a location within a port at which commercial maritime activities occur affecting ships covered by these measures. PASSENGER TERMINAL means any area within the port facility which is used for the assembling, processing, embarking, and disembarking of passengers and baggage. PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN means a comprehensive written plan for port facility which identiﬁes, inter alia, regulations, programs, measures, and procedures necessary to prevent unlawful acts which threaten the passengers and crews on board ships. PORT FACILITY SECURITY OFFICER means the person in a port responsible for the development, implementation, and maintenance of the port facility security plan and for liaison with the ships’ security ofﬁcers. OPERATOR means the company or representative of the company which maintains operational control over the ship while at sea or dockside. SHIP SECURITY PLAN means a written plan developed under the authority of the operator to ensure the application of measures on board ship which are designed to prevent unlawful acts that threaten passengers and crews on board ships. OPERATOR SECURITY OFFICER41 means the person designated by the operator to develop and maintain the ship security plan and liaise with the port facility security ofﬁcer. SHIP SECURITY OFFICER42 means the master or the person on board the ship responsible to the master and operator for onboard security, including implementation and maintenance of the ship security plan and for liaison with the port facility security ofﬁcer.

3 GENERAL PROVISIONS 3.1 Governments, port authorities, administrations, ship owners, operators, shipmasters, and crews should take all appropriate measures against unlawful acts threatening passengers and crews on board ships.

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3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

3.7

3.8

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The measures implemented should take into account the current assessment of the likely threat together with local conditions and circumstances. It is desirable that there be appropriate legislation or regulations which, inter alia, could provide penalties for persons gaining or attempting to gain unauthorized access to the port facility and persons committing unlawful acts against passengers or crews on board ships. Governments should review their national legislation, regulations, and guidance to determine their adequacy to maintain security on board ships. The measures contained in this document are intended for application to passenger ships engaged on international voyages43 of 24 hours or more and the port facilities that serve them. Certain measures may, however, also be appropriate for application to other ships or port facilities if the circumstances so warrant. Governments should identify a designated authority responsible to ensure the development, implementation, and maintenance of ship and port facility security plans. The designated authority should coordinate with other relevant domestic agencies to ensure that speciﬁc roles and functions of other agencies and departments are agreed and implemented. Governments should notify the Secretary-General of progress made in the implementation of security measures. Any useful information, which might assist other governments in their implementation of measures, on any difﬁculties and problems which arose and were overcome during implementation of the security measures, should be forwarded with the notiﬁcation. The designated authority should cooperate with similar authorities of other governments in the exchange of appropriate information. Governments concerned with an act of unlawful interference should provide the Organization with all pertinent information concerning the security aspects of the act of unlawful interference as soon as practicable after the act is resolved. Further information and a reporting format is given in appendix 2. In the process of implementing these measures, all efforts should be made to avoid undue interference with passenger services and take into account applicable international conventions. Governments and port authorities should ensure the application of these measures to ships in a fair manner.

4 PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN 4.1

Each port facility should develop and maintain an appropriate port facility security plan adequate for local circumstances and conditions and adequate for the anticipated maritime trafﬁc and the number of passengers likely to be involved. 4.2 The port facility security plan should provide for measures and equipment as necessary to prevent weapons or any other dangerous devices, the carriage of which is not authorized, from being introduced by any means whatsoever on board ships.

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4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6

4.7

The port facility security plan should establish measures for the prevention of unauthorized access to the ship and to restricted areas of the passenger terminal. The port facility security plan should provide for the evaluation, before they are employed, of all persons responsible for any aspect of security. A port facility security ofﬁcer should be appointed for each port facility. The port facility security plan should identify the security ofﬁcer for that port facility. The responsibilities of the port facility security ofﬁcer should include, but not be limited to: .1 conducting an initial comprehensive security survey in order to prepare a port facility security plan, and thereafter regular subsequent security inspections of the port facility to ensure continuation of appropriate security measures; .2 implementing the port facility security plan; .3 recommending modiﬁcations to the port facility security plan to correct deﬁciencies and satisfy the security requirements of the individual port facility; .4 encouraging security awareness and vigilance; .5 ensuring adequate training for personnel responsible for security; .6 maintaining records of occurrences of unlawful acts which affect the operations of the port facility; .7 coordinating implementation of the port facility security plan with the competent operator security ofﬁcers; and .8 coordinating with other national and international security services, as appropriate. Security measures and procedures should be applied at passenger terminals in such a manner as to cause a minimum of interference with, or delay to, passenger services, taking into account the ship security plan.

5 SHIP SECURITY PLAN 5.1 A ship security plan should be developed for each ship. The plan should be sufﬁciently ﬂexible to take into account the level of security reﬂected in the port facility security plan for each port at which the ship intends to call. 5.2 The ship security plan should include measures and equipment as necessary to prevent weapons or any other dangerous devices, the carriage of which is not authorized, from being introduced by any means whatsoever on board a ship. 5.3 The ship security plan should establish measures for the prevention of unauthorized access to the ship and to restricted areas on board. 5.4 A ship security ofﬁcer should be appointed on each ship. The ship security plan should identify the ship security ofﬁcer. 5.5 The operator security ofﬁcer should be responsible for, but not be limited to: .1 conducting an initial comprehensive security survey and thereafter regular subsequent inspections of the ship; .2 developing and maintaining the ship security plan; .3 modifying the ship security plan to correct deﬁciencies and satisfy the security requirements of the individual ship;

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.4 encouraging security awareness and vigilance; .5 ensuring adequate training for personnel responsible for security; and .6 coordinating implementation of the ship security plan with the competent port facility security ofﬁcer. 5.6 The ship security ofﬁcer should be responsible for, but not limited to: .1 regular inspections of the ship; .2 implementing and maintaining the ship security plan; .3 proposing modiﬁcations to the ship security plan to correct deﬁciencies and satisfy the security requirements of the ship; .4 encouraging security awareness and vigilance on board; .5 ensuring that adequate training has been provided for personnel responsible for security; .6 reporting all occurrences or suspected occurrences of unlawful acts to the port facility security ofﬁcer and ensuring that the report is forwarded, through the master, to the operator for submission to the ship’s ﬂag State’s designated authority; and .7 coordinating implementation of the ship security plan with the competent port facility security ofﬁcer.

CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION International Maritime Organization March 10, 1988*

INTRODUCTION Concern about unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews grew during the 1980s, with reports of crews being kidnapped, ships being hi-jacked, deliberately run aground or blown up by explosives. Passengers were threatened and sometimes killed. In November 1985 the problem was considered by IMO’s 14th Assembly and a proposal by the United States that measures to prevent such unlawful acts should be developed by IMO was supported.

RESOLUTION A.584(14) The Assembly adopted resolution A.584(14) “Measures to prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers *

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and crew,” which notes “with great concern the danger to passengers and crews resulting from the increasing number of incidents involving piracy, armed robbery and other unlawful acts against or on board ships, including small craft, both at anchor and under way.” The IMO Assembly directed the Maritime Safety Committee to develop, on a priority basis, detailed and practical technical measures, including both shoreside and shipboard measures, to ensure the security of passengers and crews on board ships. The measures were to take into account the work of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in the development of standards and recommended practices for airport and aircraft security. In December 1985 further support came from the United Nations General Assembly which called upon IMO “to study the problem of terrorism aboard or against ships with a view to making recommendations on appropriate measures.”

MSC CIRCULAR The MSC in 1986 issued a Circular (MSC/Circ.443) on Measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews on board ships—which states that governments, port authorities, administrations, shipowners, shipmasters, and crews should take appropriate measures to prevent unlawful acts which may threaten passengers and crews. The Circular gives guidelines on measures that can be taken—with application to passenger ships engaged on international voyages of 24 hours or more and port facilities that service them. In November 1986 the governments of Austria, Egypt, and Italy proposed that IMO prepare a convention on the subject of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation ‘to provide for a comprehensive suppression of unlawful acts committed against the safety of maritime navigation which endanger innocent human lives, jeopardize the safety of persons and property, seriously affect the operation of maritime services and thus are of grave concern to the international community as a whole.”

CONVENTION AIMS The proposal was supported, and in March 1988 a conference was held in Rome which adopted the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. The main purpose of the convention is to ensure that appropriate action is taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships. These include the seizure of ships by force; acts of violence against persons on board ships; and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or damage it.

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The convention obliges contracting governments either to extradite or prosecute alleged offenders.

AMENDMENT PROCEDURE IMO may convene a conference of States parties to the Convention for the purpose of revising or amending the convention, at the request of one-third or 10 states parties, whichever is the highest.

2005 PROTOCOLS Adoption: October 14, 2005 Entry into force: The amended Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation will enter into force 90 days after the date on which 12 States have either signed it without reservation as to ratiﬁcation, acceptance, or approval or have deposited an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession with the secretary-general. The amended Protocol requires ratiﬁcation from three States that are also party to the SUA Convention, but it cannot come into force unless the 2005 SUA Convention is already in force. Status: see Status of Conventions Amendments to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 and its related Protocol, were adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the SUA Treaties held October 10–14, 2005. The amendments were adopted in the form of Protocols to the SUA treaties (the 2005 Protocols).

2005 PROTOCOL TO THE SUA CONVENTION Among the unlawful acts covered by the SUA Convention in Article 3 are the seizure of ships by force; acts of violence against persons on board ships; and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or damage it. The 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention adds a new Article 3bis, which states that a person commits an offense within the meaning of the Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally: • when the purpose of the act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from any act;

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• uses against or on a ship or discharging from a ship any explosive, radioactive material, or BCN (biological, chemical, nuclear) weapon in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage; • discharges, from a ship, oil, liqueﬁed natural gas, or other hazardous or noxious substance, in such quantity or concentration that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage; • uses a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or damage; • transports on board a ship any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that it is intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, death or serious injury or damage for the purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act; • transports on board a ship any BCN weapon, knowing it to be a BCN weapon; • any source material, special ﬁssionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special ﬁssionable material, knowing that it is intended to be used in a nuclear explosive activity or in any other nuclear activity not under safeguards pursuant to an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement; and • transports on board a ship any equipment, materials, or software or related technology that signiﬁcantly contributes to the design, manufacture, or delivery of a BCN weapon, with the intention that it will be used for such purpose.

The transportation of nuclear material is not considered an offense if such item or material is transported to or from the territory of, or is otherwise transported under the control of, a state party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (subject to conditions). Under the new instrument, a person commits an offense within the meaning of the Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally transports another person on board a ship knowing that the person has committed an act that constitutes an offense under the SUA Convention or an offense set forth in any treaty listed in the Annex. The Annex lists nine such treaties. The new instrument also makes it an offense to unlawfully and intentionally injure or kill any person in connection with the commission of any of the offenses in the Convention; to attempt to commit an offense; to participate as an accomplice; to organize or direct others to commit an offense; or to contribute to the commissioning of an offense. A new Article requires Parties to take necessary measures to enable a legal entity (this could be a company or organization, for example) to be made liable and to face sanctions when a person responsible for management of control of that legal entity has, that capacity, committed an offense under the Convention.

BOARDING PROVISIONS Article 8 of the SUA Convention covers the responsibilities and roles of the master of the ship, ﬂag state, and receiving state in delivering to the authori-

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ties of any state party any person believed to have committed an offense under the Convention, including the furnishing of evidence pertaining to the alleged offense. A new Article 8bis in the 2005 Protocol covers cooperation and procedures to be followed if a state party desires to board a ship ﬂying the ﬂag of a state party when the requesting party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship or a person on board the ship is, has been, or is about to be involved in, the commission of an offense under the Convention. The authorization and cooperation of the ﬂag state is required before such a boarding. A state party may notify the IMO secretary-general that it would allow authorization to board and search a ship ﬂying its ﬂag, its cargo and persons on board if there is no response from the ﬂag state within four hours. A state party can also notify that it authorizes a requesting party to board and search the ship, its cargo and persons on board, and to question the persons on board to determine if an offense has been, or is about to be, committed. The use of force is to be avoided except when necessary to ensure the safety of ofﬁcials and persons on board, or where the ofﬁcials are obstructed to the execution of authorized actions. Article 8bis includes important safeguards when a state party takes measures against a ship, including boarding. The safeguards include: not endangering the safety of life at sea; ensuring that all persons on board are treated in a manner which preserves human dignity and in keeping with human rights law; taking due account of safety and security of the ship and its cargo; ensuring that measures taken are environmentally sound; and taking reasonable efforts to avoid a ship being unduly detained or delayed.

EXTRADITION Article 11 covers extradition procedures. A new Article 11bis states that none of the offenses should be considered for the purposes of extradition as a political offense. New Article 11ter states that the obligation to extradite or afford mutual legal assistance need not apply if the request for extradition is believed to have been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinion or gender, or that compliance with the request would cause prejudice to that person’s position for any of these reasons. Article 12 of the Convention requires states parties to afford one another assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offenses. A new Article 12bis cover the conditions under which a person who is being detained or is serving a sentence in the territory of one state party may be transferred to another state party for purposes of identiﬁcation, testimony, or otherwise providing assistance in obtaining evidence for the investigation or prosecution of offenses.

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AMENDMENT PROCEDURE Amendments to the Articles in the Convention require acceptance by a requisite number of states. However, the Annex, which lists the treaties under which offenses can be considered for the purpose of the SUA Convention, has a special amendment procedure. The treaties listed are as follows: 1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6.

7.

8. 9.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at The Hague on December 16, 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on September 23, 1971 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 14, 1973 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 17, 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, done at Vienna on October 26, 1979 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on February 24, 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on March 10, 1988 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 15, 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 9, 1999

2005 PROTOCOL TO THE 1988 SUA PROTOCOL The amendments to the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf reﬂect those in the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention. New article 2bis broadens the range of offenses included in the Protocol. A person commits an offense if that person unlawfully and intentionally, when the purpose of the act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, uses against or on a ﬁxed platform or discharges from a ﬁxed platform any explosive, radioactive material or BCN weapon in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage; or dis-

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charges from a ﬁxed platform, oil, liqueﬁed natural gas, or other hazardous or noxious substance, in such quantity or concentration, that it causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage; or threatens, with or without a condition, as is provided for under national law, to commit an offense. New article 2ter includes the offenses of unlawfully and intentionally injuring or killing any person in connection with the commission of any of the offenses; attempting to commit an offense; participating as an accomplice; organizing or directing others to commit an offense.

FOCUS ON IMO: PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA International Maritime Organization January 2000*

In October 1999 the cargo ship Alondra Rainbow left the Indonesian port of Kuala Tanjung bound for the port of Mike in Japan. She never arrived. Instead the ship was boarded by armed pirates who put the 17 crew members in an inﬂatable life raft and set them adrift. Although they were passed by six ships, it was not until 11 days later that they were ﬁnally rescued by ﬁshermen. It must have been a terrifying experience, but the crew of the Alondra Rainbow were lucky. In September 1998, the Panama-registered Tenyu also disappeared in the Straits of Malacca while en route from Indonesia for the Republic of Korea with a cargo of aluminum ingots. She later reappeared, but with a different name and crew. It is almost certain that her original crew of 17 were murdered. In November 1998 the bulk carrier MV Cheung Son was attacked by pirates in the South China Sea. Her crew of 23 were shot and their bodies thrown overboard, weighted down to make them sink. Not all did so. Fishermen off the coast of China later found six bodies in their nets, still bound and gagged. These attacks would be shocking if they were isolated cases. But according to reports compiled by IMO, between 1984 and the end of November 1999 there had been 1,587 attacks by pirates on ships around the world. In some areas these attacks involved a disturbing increase in violence. The IMO ﬁgures show that, between June and November 1999, one security guard was killed, one crew member went missing, 13 crew members were assaulted, and 13 others were taken hostage, while two ships were hijacked or destroyed. To most people, the surprising thing is not that piracy can be violent, but that it is happening at all. Although piracy has existed almost as long as shipping and trade, it seemed by the end of the nineteenth century that it had at last been eliminated. In more recent times it was regarded as an interesting historical problem, associated with the skull and crossbones ﬂag, galleons of gold *

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and villains carrying cutlasses: wicked, but with a dash of excitement and even romance. The fact that piracy was always a crime, often vicious and usually murderous, was forgotten or ignored. In fact piracy had not disappeared. During the 1970s and 1980s attacks on merchant ships began to increase. They were often small in scale and rarely involved physical injury to those who were attacked. But it was a problem that soon could no longer be ignored. WHAT IS PIRACY? The following deﬁnition of piracy is contained in article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons, or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

It is clear that many acts of violence against ships, especially those that occur in ports or territorial waters are not regarded as “piracy” under international law. They are therefore classiﬁed as “armed robbery.” PIRACY BECOMES A PROBLEM In 1983 Sweden submitted a paper to the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), IMO’s most senior technical body, which stated that piratical attacks had grown to such an extent that the situation had become “alarming.” Most attacks at that time were taking place at night on ships anchored off the coast of West Africa, usually waiting for a berth in port. The International Maritime Bureau, which had been established by the International Chamber of Commerce in 1979, mainly to deal with maritime fraud, said that similar attacks had been recorded as far back as 1970. After discussing the matter, the MSC prepared a draft text that was used as the basis for a resolution adopted by the IMO Assembly when it met in November 1983 (resolution A.545(13)). The resolution notes with great concern the increasing number of incidents involving piracy and armed robbery and recognizes the grave danger to life and the grave navigational and environmental risks to which such incidents can give rise. It then “urges Governments concerned to take, as a matter of highest priority, all measures necessary to pre-

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vent and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery from ships in or adjacent to their waters, including strengthening of security measures.” The resolution “invites Governments concerned and interested organizations to advise shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters, and crews on measures to be taken to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery and minimize the effects of such acts.” It further invites governments and organizations concerned to inform IMO of action taken to implement the aims of the resolution and recommends governments concerned to inform IMO of any act of piracy or armed robbery committed against a ship ﬂying the ﬂag of their country, indicating the location and circumstances of the incident. Finally, it requests the IMO Council to keep the matter under review and take such further action as it may consider necessary in the light of developments. In April 1984, the MSC established “Piracy and armed robbery against ships” as a separate and ﬁxed item in its work program. The Committee decided that as a ﬁrst step it would be necessary to have an indication of the scale of the problem, the areas in which attacks were prevalent and as much other information as possible. Under this agenda item, the Committee receives a summary of all reports on piracy and armed robbery against ships submitted by member governments and international organizations in consultative status. The reports contained, where available, the names and descriptions of the ships attacked, their positions and times of attack, consequences to the crew, ship, or cargo, and actions taken by the crew and coastal states to which the incidents were reported. The reports were compiled at ﬁrst twice a year and then quarterly and now they are circulated monthly, with quarterly and annual summaries. In 1986, the MSC decided that reports on piracy and armed robbery against ships received by the Secretariat, should be forwarded to the port or coastal states concerned, for comments and advice on the actions they had taken with regard to the incidents reported and that any relevant information provided by the coastal states should be reported to its future sessions. In view of the continuing rise in the number of such unlawful acts reported and realizing that many others are not brought to the attention of the Organization, the IMO Assembly in 1991 adopted resolution A.683(17)— Prevention and suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, which urged member governments to report to the Organization all incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships under their ﬂags and invited coastal states to increase their efforts to prevent and suppress such acts committed in their waters. As at the end of November 1999, 1,587 incidents had been reported to IMO. However, IMO estimates that incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships are underreported by a factor of two. Several reasons have been suggested, including fear that a successful act of piracy will reﬂect on the master’s competence; concern that such a report would embarrass the state in whose territorial waters the act occurred (the coastal state); the belief that an

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investigation would disrupt the vessel’s schedule; and the possibility that shipowners’ insurance would increase.

A GLOBAL THREAT Since piracy became a major international problem two decades ago, it has occurred in a number of areas.

West Africa Between 1982 and 1986, West Africa—particularly Nigeria—had the highest reported number of cases of piracy and armed robbery. About 25 cases were reported annually, mainly against ships at anchor awaiting berth. Typically, a gang of up 10 people would board the ship at night, threaten the crew with knives, overpower them, and then go on to break into cargo containers and steal their contents. Between 1984 and 1985, the Nigerian authorities, using the combined resources of the navy, police, and customs, collected enough intelligence to swoop on piracy bases and the outlets that were used for disposing of the stolen goods. The result was dramatic because by 1986, only occasional isolated incidents were reported from Lagos and Bonny ports, which had been the hot spots for such attacks. However, in 1998 22 incidents were reported in West Africa.

Malacca Strait Prior to 1989, the Malacca Strait was considered to be relatively safe. About seven cases of piracy and armed robbery were reported annually from the area, but in 1989, the ﬁgure rose to 28 and by 1991, it had gone up to about 50 a year. The Malacca Strait gave particular cause for concern because it is one of the busiest waterways in the world, used by up to 200 ships daily. The Strait, in some stretches, is shallow and narrow and requires precise navigation. Most of the attacks in the region were on ships underway. The pattern used by the pirates was to board a steaming ship at night, undetected and make their way to the ship’s bridge. Once there, they would overpower the ofﬁcer of the navigational watch and either tie him up or handcuff him to the rail while the rest of the gang made for the master’s and crew cabins to demand money and valuables. Apart from the danger to the crew of the ship under attack, there was the horrifying hazard posed by a ship often carrying dangerous cargoes, steaming at full speed, unattended, in conﬁned waters.

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At the initiative of the Secretary-General of IMO, Mr. William A. O’Neil, a Working Group composed of experts from 10 IMO member countries, including experts from the three littoral states of the Malacca Strait (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore), was established in 1992, to prepare a report outlining the problem in the Strait of Malacca. Among other things, the report was to contain recommendations on safety precautions and enforcement arrangements appropriate for crews, shipowners, ﬂag states, coastal states, and port states (individually or collectively on a regional basis) for dealing with piracy and armed robbery against ships. Although the Working Group was instructed to focus on the situation in the areas around the Malacca Strait, it was also instructed to prepare recommendations that could be applied in other parts of the world affected by piracy and armed robbery. The Working Group visited Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, between February and March 1993, and prepared a report covering navigation, radio communications, search and rescue, and piracy and armed robbery in the Malacca Strait region. This was considered by the MSC at its 62nd session in May 1993 and two circulars were issued as a result. The ﬁrst one (MSC/Circ. 622) contained recommendations to governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships. The second (MSC/Circ. 623) contains Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters, and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robber against ships (see panels for a description of the two circulars). Later that year, the IMO Assembly adopted a new resolution A.738(18) recommending additional measures to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships. The new resolution included the following items: • A recommendation that masters of ships immediately report attacks or threats of attack to the nearest rescue and coordination center and request such coordination centers to immediately warn shipping in the immediate vicinity of the attack, as well as inform promptly the local security forces to implement any contingency plans they have for dealing with such incidents; • A request that the Maritime Safety Committee to adopt a special signal for use by ships under attack or threat of attack. IMO, working in collaboration with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Mobile Satellite Organization (Inmarsat), has included “Piracy/armed robbery attack” as a category of distress message which ships can now transmit through either their DSC (Digital Selective Calling) or Inmarsat equipment by pressing a button. The message can be received automatically by shore stations and ships in the vicinity. • An invitation and recommendation to shipmasters to use such facilities was circulated to member governments by MSC/Circ.805 of June 6, 1997. But masters of ships under attack or threat of attack are warned about using the facility if they have been ordered by the pirates to maintain radio silence. This is

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because there is equipment available capable of detecting all radio signals, including satellite communications, to which the pirates may have access.

Prior to the establishment of the Working Group, the three littoral states of the Malacca Strait (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore), in response to the concerns expressed by IMO, had started implementing a coordinated patrol and other countermeasures in the region. These measures, which started in 1992, resulted in a marked decline in the number attacks in the region. In 1998 six incidents were reported in the Malacca Strait.

South China Sea Just as the situation was improving in the Malacca Strait, it was deteriorating in the South China Sea. Statistics compiled over the 7-month period from May to December 1993 showed that 42 incidents were reported in the East and South China Sea out of 67 worldwide. Most of the attacks took place in international waters, and in some cases ﬁrearms were used. A number of reports described persons attempting to stop and board the ships in the guise of ofﬁcials or wearing uniforms. It has not been possible to conﬁrm whether those involved were ofﬁcials acting within their jurisdiction, ofﬁcials acting outside their normal duties or private individuals dressed as ofﬁcials. In the majority of the cases, such persons were armed with lowvelocity weapons such as pistols and in a number of cases with assault riﬂes. Fishing vessels, particularly around the Philippines, also received the attention of pirates and armed robbers. Very often they were waylaid by faster boats that came alongside without stopping them. The attacking boat would synchronize its speed with that of its target and the armed bandits would simply climb over the gunwale of the ship under attack, leaving some gang members in their boats as guards. The bandits operated swiftly and accurately, taking the ﬁsh catch, boat engines, fuel, personal effects, or worse, the boat itself. Effective law enforcement is difﬁcult in the area of the South China Sea because of its vastness (more than 200 miles wide) and the fact that it is dotted with several uninhabited islands to which the pirates can retreat. The problem has been exacerbated by the lack of cooperation, particularly exchange of information, between the law enforcement agencies of the neighboring countries and some disputes over territorial limits. Against this background and in response to a request by the Maritime Safety Committee for a report on the situation in the South China Sea, in March 1994 IMO sent a fact-ﬁnding mission to China, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. The mission provided an opportunity to discuss with senior ofﬁcials in the three countries the help which IMO could provide to their enforcement agencies in preparing measures to prevent and deal with piracy in their waters. Even so, the South China Sea remains a problem area. Of the

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210 cases reported worldwide in 1998, incidents in the South China Sea accounted for 98.

South America Attacks have been reported in various ports in South America including Colombia, Venezuela, the Guianas, and the Caribbean. A total of 38 attacks were reported in 1998. Attacks usually occur in ports or anchorages, and occasionally extreme violence has been reported.

THE SITUATION TODAY Despite the efforts of IMO and its member states, piracy has remained a major threat to shipping in several parts of the world. In October 1998, therefore, experts were sent to Southeast Asia and Central and South America to discuss the situation and consider countermeasures. The Southeast Asia group visited Manila (Philippines), Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), and Jakarta (Indonesia). The mission was undertaken against some disturbing statistics showing that, over the period from 1995 to the present, 244 incidents took place in the South China Sea and Malacca Strait areas out of 715 worldwide. Of the incidents reported in the two areas: • 86.5 percent had taken place in territorial waters or within ports; • 56 percent concerned ships at anchor or at berth; in 23 percent of the reported incidents, violence had been used, and in 16 percent violence had been threatened.

The principal purpose of the mission was to increase awareness of the problem; impress upon the governmental representatives concerned the need for action; and, more importantly, motivate political will to act at national and regional levels. The mission was followed up by a seminar held in Singapore in February 1999. High-level governmental representatives of the countries visited participated in the meetings, which were characterized by an open and frank exchange of views and clear expressions of political will to act at national and regional [levels]. The second mission visited the Brazilian ports of Santos and Rio de Janeiro in October 1998. Between those two visits, a seminar and workshop on piracy and armed robbery against ships was conducted in Brasilia, which was attended by representatives of the governments of Brazil, Colombia, Panama, Suriname, and Venezuela and observers from Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay.

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The main objective of the Brasilia seminar was to improve safety at sea by assisting governments to implement the guidelines annexed to MSC circulars 622 and 623, which were issued in 1993 (see above). It also aimed at considering the development of cooperation agreements between neighboring countries for coordinated patrols and other appropriate measures. During evaluation of the national reports on the piracy/armed robbery situation in their countries presented by the delegations attending the seminar and workshop, two important characteristic of the prevailing situation in Latin America, emerged: • the modus operandi of pirates and armed robbers substantially differs from that in the Far East region with most of the attacks in Latin America taking place while ships are at berth or at anchor; and • drug-related piracy may increase in future unless a concerted effort is promptly undertaken by the countries concerned.

The seminar and workshop, whilst recognizing that, with the involvement of a considerable number of national authorities sharing responsibility on the issue, bureaucracy was inevitable, agreed that coordination of any activity undertaken in this respect should be vigorously sought at all levels.

MSC 71: MAY 1999 The MSC discussed piracy and armed robbery at its seventy-ﬁrst session in May 1999, including the outcome of the two missions to South America and Southeast Asia. It noted that the main problems in dealing with pirates and armed robbers were: • • • • •

the economic situation prevailing in the regions concerned resource constraints on law enforcement agencies lack of communication and cooperation between the agencies involved the time taken to respond after an incident has been reported general problems in reporting incidents, such as alerting the nearest coastal state as well as other ships in the area of a ship under attack or threat of attack • timely and proper investigation of incidents • prosecution or pirates and armed robbers when apprehended • lack of regional cooperation

The Committee’s main conclusions were incorporated into the revised MSC Circulars 622 and 623. One conclusion reached as a result of the two missions was the need for more effective action in apprehending and prosecuting pirates. The Committee agreed to develop a draft Code for the investigation of cases involving violence against crews, passengers, ships, or cargoes, to be considered at the MSC’s 72nd session in May 2000.

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The aim of the Code will be to promote a common approach to the investigation of cases involving violence against ships and those on board and to promote cooperation between states in the course of these investigations.

IMO RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendations to governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships (MSC/Circ. 622/rev. 1) The circular, ﬁrst issued in 1993, was revised in 1999 on the basis of recommendations made by regional seminars in Brasilia, Brazil, in 1998 and Singapore in 1999. The circular recommends that “before embarking on any set of measures or recommendations, it is imperative for governmental or other agencies concerned to gather accurate statistics of the incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships, to collate these statistics under both type and area and to assess the nature of the attacks with special emphasis on types of attack, accurate geographical location and modus operandi of the wrongdoers and to disseminate or publish these statistics to all interested parties in a format that is understandable and usable.” The circular says that representatives of shipowners and seafarers should also be involved in developing countermeasures. States should develop Action Plans on preventing and responding to attacks and also on dealing with any pollution that might result from an attack (for example, as a result of a collision or grounding). The necessary infrastructure and operational arrangements should be established to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships. An incident command system for tactical as well as operational response should be set up and be integrated with other security matters, such as smuggling, drug trafﬁcking and terrorism. It is imperative that all attacks or threats of attacks are reported to the local rescue coordination center (RCC) or coast radio station. The RCC should in turn inform local security authorities and other ships in the area. The recommendations go on to deal with how to investigate piracy incidents and criminal jurisdiction. They give guidance to coastal states in areas that are affected by piracy on action to be taken, including the establishment of regional agreements to facilitate a coordinated response to attacks. A draft agreement is given in an annex. Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships (MSC/Circ.623/Rev. 1) This recommendation was also ﬁrst adopted in 1993 and revised in 1999. It outlines steps that should be taken to reduce the risk of such attacks, possible responses to them, and the vital need to report attacks, both successful and unsuccessful, to the authorities of the relevant coastal state and to the ships’ own maritime administration.

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The circular states that the main targets of the Southeast Asian attacker appear to be cash in the ship’s safe, crew possessions and any other portable ship’s equipment, even including coils of rope. In South America some piracy and armed robbery attacks are drug related. When there has been evidence of tampering with containers, it has been suggested that the raiders may initially have gained access when the ship was berthed in port and then gone over the side, with what they could carry. Thorough checking of ships’ compartments and securing before leaving ports is therefore recommended. The circular stresses the need to reduce temptation for pirates and armed robbers. The belief that large sums of cash are carried in the master’s safe attracts attackers. On several occasions this belief has been justiﬁed and substantial sums have been stolen. Although carrying cash may sometimes be necessary to meet operational needs and crew requirements and to overcome exchange control restrictions in some states, it acts as a magnet for attackers and they will intimidate the master or crew members until the locations have been revealed. Shipowners should consider ways of eliminating the need to carry large sums of cash on board ship. When this need arises because of exchange control restrictions imposed by states, the matter should be referred to the ship’s maritime administration to consider if representations should be made to encourage a more ﬂexible approach as part of the international response to eliminate attacks by pirates and armed robbers. The circular says: “Masters should bear in mind the possibility that attackers are monitoring ship-to-shore communications and using intercepted information to select their targets. Caution should, therefore, be exercised when transmitting information on cargo or valuables on board by radio in areas where attacks occur. Members of the crew going ashore in ports in affected areas should be advised not to discuss the voyage or cargo particulars with persons unconnected with the ship’s business.” The circular recognizes that the “smaller crew numbers now found on board ships also favor the attacker. A small crew engaged in ensuring the safe navigation of their ship through congested or conﬁned waters will have the additional onerous task of maintaining high levels of security surveillance for prolonged periods. Shipowners will wish to consider enhancing security watches if their ship is in waters or at anchor off ports, where attacks occur. Shipowners will wish to consider providing appropriate surveillance and detection equipment to aid their crews and protect their ships.” The circular goes on to list a series of recommended practices, which are based on reports of incidents, advice published by commercial organizations, and measures developed to enhance ship security. The extents to which the recommendations are followed or applied are matters solely for the owners or master of ships operating in areas where attacks occur. All ships expecting to operate in waters where attacks occur should have a ship security plan, which should cover such matters as:

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• the need for enhanced surveillance and the use of lighting, surveillance and detection equipment; • crew responses, if a potential attack is detected or an attack is under way; • the radio alarm procedures to be followed; and • the reports to be made after an attack or an attempted attack.

Ship security plans should ensure that masters and crews are made fully aware of the risks involved during attacks by pirates or armed robbers. In particular, they should address the dangers that may arise if a crew adopts an aggressive response to an attack. Although some observers have claimed that the crews of merchant ships should be armed in areas where piracy attacks are likely, the circular states: “Aggressive responses, once an attack is underway and, in particular, once the attackers have boarded the ship, could signiﬁcantly increase the risk to the ship and those on board.” The circular covers such matters as precautions in port or at anchor, watchkeeping and vigilance, communications procedures, radio watchkeeping and responses including message formats. The circular recommends using the maximum lighting possible when operating at night and says that, on balance, the idea of a total blackout cannot be recommended. It stresses the importance of establishing secure areas which attackers will ﬁnd difﬁcult to penetrate. When the ship is underway, “masters should consider ‘riding off’ attackers craft by heavy wheel movements as they approach. The effect of the bow wave and wash may deter would-be attackers and make it difﬁcult for them to attach poles or grappling irons to the ship.” The use of ﬁre hoses should be considered. “Water pressures of 80 lb per square inch and above have deterred and repulsed attackers. Not only does the attacker have to ﬁght against the jet of water but the ﬂow may swamp his/her boat and damage engines and electrical systems.” The circular warns that employing evasive maneuvers and hoses “could lead to reprisals by the attackers if they seize crew members and should not be engaged in unless the master is convinced he can use them to advantage and without risk to those on board.” The circular strongly discourages the use of ﬁrearms. The circular also outlines action to be taken if the attackers succeed in boarding the ship, action after an attack, and how to report incidents.

THE FUTURE The number of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships reported to IMO in 1998 was 210, a decrease of 42 (17 percent) over the ﬁgure for 1997. Compared to 1997, the number of incidents reported to have occurred decreased from 8 to 6 in the Malacca Strait, from 101 to 94 in the South China Sea, from 45 to 38 in South America and the Caribbean, from 41 to 25 in the

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Indian Ocean, from 11 to 2 in the Mediterranean and Black Seas and from 30 to 22 in West Africa but increased from 11 to 19 in East Africa. However, the ﬁgure for 1999 is 235, an increase of 25 (11.9 percent) over the ﬁgure for 1998. On November 16, 1999, the Alondra Rainbow incident—described at the beginning of this paper—was brought to a dramatic close off Goa, when the Indian Coast Guard succeeded in boarding the ship. They prevented attempts to scuttle her and so destroy evidence of the crime and 15 suspects were arrested. However, as the Baltic and International Maritime Conference (BIMCO) has pointed out, according to information circulated by the United States Ofﬁce of Naval Intelligence, the attack was not executed solely on the basis of personal gain, but rather political ambitions may have driven the forces that organized and carried out the crime. It appears that 3,000 tonnes of the cargo of aluminum had been bartered in either Cambodia or Thailand for weapons destined for use by insurgents who have been waging a long-standing action against the Sri Lankan armed forces. There are, however, several encouraging aspects to this case. The actions taken by the Indian Coast Guard and Navy were particularly noteworthy, as were the efforts of the ICC/International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre which circulated information describing the hijacked vessel and coordinated the reports from ships in the area that spotted her. BIMCO commented: “The actions of the Indian Coast Guard, Navy, and Police serve well as an example to other nations as to how piracy incidents can be dealt with in conformity with presently available international law.” Nevertheless, the incident showed that the criminals involved are becoming increasingly sophisticated—and ruthless. There is evidence that some attacks have been arranged with the connivance of organized criminal gangs, with ships being targeted because of the cargoes they carry rather than attacked at random, as seems to have been the case some years ago. Despite ﬁgures showing that the number of attacks has decreased, piracy is still a major problem, on an international scale.

THE IMB PIRACY REPORTING CENTRE Outrage in the shipping industry at the alarming growth in piracy on the world’s oceans prompted the creation of the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre in October 1992. Located at IMB’s Far East Regional Ofﬁce in Kuala Lumpur, the center is ﬁnanced by voluntary contributions from shipping and insurance companies, and its services are free of charge to all vessels irrespective of ownership or ﬂag. The center supplies investigating teams that respond immediately to acts of piracy and collect evidence for law enforcement agencies. This service is funded by the International Transport Workers’ Federation.

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Speciﬁc Piracy Reporting Centre tasks are to • • • • •

report piracy incidents and armed robbery at sea to law enforcement agencies, locate vessels that have been seized by pirates and recover stolen cargoes, help to bring pirates to justice, assist owners and crews of ships that have been attacked, collate information on piracy in all parts of the world.

The IMB Piracy Centre maintains a round-the clock watch every day of the year. In close collaboration with law enforcement, the center acts on reports of suspicious shipping movements, piracy, and armed robbery at sea anywhere in the world. The center broadcasts daily status bulletins via satellite recording pirate attacks on shipping in the East and Southeast Asian region. Quarterly reports are made available to interested bodies, including IMO.

IMO ADOPTS COMPREHENSIVE MARITIME SECURITY MEASURES Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, International Maritime Organization December 9–13, 2002*

A new, comprehensive security regime for international shipping is set to enter into force in July 2004 following the adoption by a weeklong Diplomatic Conference of a series of measures to strengthen maritime security and prevent and suppress acts of terrorism against shipping. The Conference, held at the London headquarters of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) December 9–13, 2002, was of crucial signiﬁcance not only to the international maritime community but the world community as a whole, given the pivotal role shipping plays in the conduct of world trade. The measures represent the culmination of just over a year’s intense work by IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee and its Intersessional Working Group since the terrorist atrocities in the United States in September 2001. The Conference was attended by 108 contracting governments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention, observers from two IMO member states, and observers from the two IMO associate members. United Nations specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental international organizations also sent observers to the Conference. The Conference adopted a number of amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), the most far-reaching of which enshrines the new International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). The Code contains detailed security-related requirements for governments, port authorities, and shipping companies in a mandatory section (Part A), together with *

Source: International Maritime Organization (IMO), www.imo.org.

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a series of guidelines about how to meet these requirements in a second, nonmandatory section (Part B). The Conference also adopted a series of resolutions designed to add weight to the amendments, encourage the application of the measures to ships and port facilities not covered by the Code, and pave the way for future work on the subject. Speaking at the end of the conference, IMO Secretary-General William O’Neil strongly urged all parties concerned to start putting in place all the necessary legislative, administrative, and operational provisions needed to give effect to the decisions of the Conference as soon as possible. In a call for continued vigilance, he added, “In the meantime, all involved in the operation of ships and ports should continue to be aware of the potential dangers to shipping through acts of terrorism and the need to be extremely vigilant and alert to any security threat they might encounter in port, at offshore terminals or when underway at sea.” The Conference has been referred to in the United Nations General Assembly. At its current session, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on “Oceans and the law of the sea,” which speciﬁcally welcomed initiatives at the International Maritime Organization to counter the threat to maritime security from terrorism and encouraged states fully to support this endeavor. The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code The Company and the Ship The Port Facility Responsibilities of Contracting Governments Amendments to SOLAS New Chapter XI-2 (Special measures to enhance maritime security) Resolutions adopted by the conference Ofﬁcers of the Conference

THE INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND PORT FACILITY SECURITY CODE In essence, the Code takes the approach that ensuring the security of ships and port facilities is basically a risk management activity and that to determine what security measures are appropriate, an assessment of the risks must be made in each particular case. The purpose of the Code is to provide a standardized, consistent framework for evaluating risk, enabling governments to offset changes in threat with changes in vulnerability for ships and port facilities. To begin the process, each contracting government will conduct port facility security assessments. Security assessments will have three essential components. First, they must identify and evaluate important assets and infrastructures that are critical to the port facility as well as those areas or structures that, if damaged, could cause signiﬁcant loss of life or damage to

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the port facility’s economy or environment. Then, the assessment must identify the actual threats to those critical assets and infrastructure in order to prioritize security measures. Finally, the assessment must address vulnerability of the port facility by identifying its weaknesses in physical security, structural integrity, protection systems, procedural policies, communications systems, transportation infrastructure, utilities, and other areas within a port facility that may be a likely target. Once this assessment has been completed, contracting government can accurately evaluate risk. This risk management concept will be embodied in the Code through a number of minimum functional security requirements for ships and port facilities. For ships, these requirements will include: • • • •

ship security plans ship security ofﬁcers company security ofﬁcers certain onboard equipment

For port facilities, the requirements will include: • port facility security plans • port facility security ofﬁcers • certain security equipment

In addition the requirements for ships and for port facilities include: • monitoring and controlling access • monitoring the activities of people and cargo • ensuring security communications are readily available

Because each ship (or class of ship) and each port facility present different risks, the method in which they will meet the speciﬁc requirements of this Code will be determined and eventually be approved by the administration or contracting government, as the case may be. In order to communicate the threat at a port facility or for a ship, the contracting government will set the appropriate security level. Security levels 1, 2, and 3 correspond to normal, medium, and high threat situations, respectively. The security level creates a link between the ship and the port facility, because it triggers the implementation of appropriate security measures for the ship and for the port facility. The preamble to the Code states that, as threat increases, the only logical counteraction is to reduce vulnerability. The Code provides several ways to reduce vulnerabilities. Ships will be subject to a system of survey, veriﬁcation, certiﬁcation, and control to ensure that their security measures are implemented. This system will be based on a considerably expanded control system as stipulated in the 1974 Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).

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Port facilities will also be required to report certain security related information to the contracting government concerned, which in turn will submit a list of approved port facility security plans, including location and contact details to IMO.

THE COMPANY AND THE SHIP Under the terms of the Code, shipping companies will be required to designate a Company Security Ofﬁcer for the Company and a Ship Security Ofﬁcer for each of its ships. The Company Security Ofﬁcer’s responsibilities include ensuring that a Ship Security Assessment is properly carried out, that Ship Security Plans are prepared and submitted for approval by (or on behalf of) the administration and thereafter is placed on board each ship. The Ship Security Plan should indicate the operational and physical security measures the ship itself should take to ensure it always operates at security level 1. The plan should also indicate the additional, or intensiﬁed, security measures the ship itself can take to move to and operate at security level 2 when instructed to do so. Furthermore, the plan should indicate the possible preparatory actions the ship could take to allow prompt response to instructions that may be issued to the ship at security level 3. Ships will have to carry an International Ship Security Certiﬁcate indicating that they comply with the requirements of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and part A of the ISPS Code. When a ship is at a port or is proceeding to a port of the contracting government, the contracting government has the right, under the provisions of regulation XI-2/9, to exercise various control and compliance measures with respect to that ship. The ship is subject to port state control inspections, but such inspections will not normally extend to examination of the Ship Security Plan itself except in speciﬁc circumstances. The ship may, also, be subject to additional control measures if the contracting government exercising the control and compliance measures has reason to believe that the security of the ship has, or the port facilities it has served have, been compromised.

THE PORT FACILITY Each contracting government has to ensure completion of a Port Facility Security Assessment for each port facility within its territory that serves ships engaged on international voyages. The Port Facility Security Assessment is fundamentally a risk analysis of all aspects of a port facility’s operation in order to determine which parts of it are more susceptible, and/or more likely, to be the subject of attack. Security risk is seen a function of the threat of an attack coupled with the vulnerability of the target and the consequences of an attack.

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On completion of the analysis, it will be possible to produce an overall assessment of the level of risk. The Port Facility Security Assessment will help determine which port facilities are required to appoint a Port Facility Security Ofﬁcer and prepare a Port Facility Security Plan. This plan should indicate the operational and physical security measures the port facility should take to ensure that it always operates at security level 1. The plan should also indicate the additional, or intensiﬁed, security measures the port facility can take to move to and operate at security level 2 when instructed to do so. It should also indicate the possible preparatory actions the port facility could take to allow prompt response to the instructions that may be issued at security level 3. Ships using port facilities may be subject to port state control inspections and additional control measures. The relevant authorities may request the provision of information regarding the ship, its cargo, passengers, and ship’s personnel prior to the ship’s entry into port. There may be circumstances in which entry into port could be denied.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS Contracting governments have various responsibilities, including setting the applicable security level, approving the Ship Security Plan and relevant amendments to a previously approved plan, verifying the compliance of ships with the provisions of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and part A of the ISPS Code and issuing the International Ship Security Certiﬁcate, determining which port facilities located within their territories are required to designate a Port Facility Security Ofﬁcer, ensuring completion and approval of the Port Facility Security Assessment and the Port Facility Security Plan and any subsequent amendments; and exercising control and compliance measures. They are also responsible for communicating information to the International Maritime Organization and to the shipping and port industries. Contracting governments can designate, or establish, Designated Authorities within government to undertake their security duties and allow Recognized Security Organizations to carry out certain work with respect to port facilities, but the ﬁnal decision on the acceptance and approval of this work should be given by the contracting government or the Designated Authority.

AMENDMENTS TO SOLAS The Conference adopted a series of Amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention, aimed at enhancing maritime security on board ships and at ship/port interface areas. Among other things, these amendments create a new SOLAS chapter dealing speciﬁcally with maritime security, which in turn contains the mandatory requirement for ships to comply with the ISPS Code.

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Modiﬁcations to Chapter V (Safety of Navigation) contain a new timetable for the ﬁtting of Automatic Information Systems (AIS). Ships, other than passenger ships and tankers, of 300 gross tonnage and upwards but less than 50,000 gross tonnage, will be required to ﬁt AIS not later than the ﬁrst safety equipment survey after July 1, 2004, or by December 31, 2004, whichever occurs earlier. Ships ﬁtted with AIS shall maintain AIS in operation at all times except where international agreements, rules or standards provide for the protection of navigational information.” The existing SOLAS Chapter XI (Special measures to enhance maritime safety) has been renumbered as Chapter XI-1. Regulation XI-1/3 is modiﬁed to require ships’ identiﬁcation numbers to be permanently marked in a visible place either on the ship’s hull or superstructure. Passenger ships should carry the marking on a horizontal surface visible from the air. Ships should also be marked with their ID numbers internally. And a new regulation XI-1/5 requires ships to be issued with a Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR), which is intended to provide an onboard record of the history of the ship. The CSR shall be issued by the administration and shall contain information such as the name of the ship and of the state whose ﬂag the ship is entitled to ﬂy, the date on which the ship was registered with that state, the ship’s identiﬁcation number, the port at which the ship is registered and the name of the registered owner(s) and their registered address. Any changes shall be recorded in the CSR so as to provide updated and current information together with the history of the changes.

NEW CHAPTER XI-2 (SPECIAL MEASURES TO ENHANCE MARITIME SECURITY) A brand-new Chapter XI-2 (Special measures to enhance maritime security) is added after the renumbered Chapter XI-1. This chapter applies to passenger ships and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upward, including high-speed craft, mobile offshore drilling units, and port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages. Regulation XI-2/2 of the new chapter enshrines the International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code). Part A of this Code is mandatory and part B contains guidance as to how best to comply with the mandatory requirements. The regulation requires administrations to set security levels and ensure the provision of security level information to ships entitled to ﬂy their ﬂags. Prior to entering a port, or whilst in a port, within the territory of a contracting government, a ship shall comply with the requirements for the security level set by that contracting government, if that security level is higher than the security level set by the administration for that ship. Regulation XI-2/8 conﬁrms the role of the Master in exercising his professional judgment over decisions necessary to maintain the security of the ship.

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It says he shall not be constrained by the Company, the charterer, or any other person in this respect. Regulation XI-2/6 requires all ships to be provided with a ship security alert system, according to a strict timetable that will see most vessels ﬁtted by 2004 and the remainder by 2006. When activated, the ship security alert system shall initiate and transmit a ship-to-shore security alert to a competent authority designated by the administration, identifying the ship and its location and indicating that the security of the ship is under threat or has been compromised. The system will not raise any alarm on board the ship. The ship security alert system shall be capable of being activated from the navigation bridge and in at least one other location. Regulation XI-2/10 covers requirements for port facilities, providing among other things for contracting governments to ensure that port facility security assessments are carried out and that port facility security plans are developed, implemented, and reviewed in accordance with the ISPS Code. Other regulations in this chapter cover the provision of information to IMO, [and] the control of ships in port, (including measures such as the delay, detention, restriction of operations including movement within the port, or expulsion of a ship from port) [...].

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE The conference adopted eleven resolutions, the main points of which are outlined below. The full text of each is available on request. Conference resolution 1 (Adoption of amendments to the annex to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, as amended), determines that the amendments shall be deemed to have been accepted on January 1, 2004 (unless, prior to that date, more than one-third of the contracting governments to the Convention, or contracting governments the combined merchant ﬂeets of which constitute not less than 50 percent of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant ﬂeet, have notiﬁed their objections to the amendments), and that the amendments would then enter into force on July 1, 2004. Conference resolution 2 (Adoption of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code) adopts the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, and invites contracting governments to the Convention to note that the ISPS Code will take effect on July 1, 2004, upon entry into force of the new chapter XI-2 of the Convention; Conference resolution 3 (Further work by the international maritime organization pertaining to the enhancement of maritime security) invites the International Maritime Organization to develop, as a matter of urgency, training guidance such as model courses for ship security ofﬁcers, company security ofﬁcers, and port facility security ofﬁcers; performance standards for ship

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security alarms; performance standards and guidelines for long-range ship identiﬁcation and tracking systems; guidelines on control of ships; and guidelines on “recognized security” organizations, and to adopt them in time before the entry into force of the amendments to the Convention adopted by the Conference. Conference resolution 4 (Future amendments to Chapters XI-1 and XI-2 of the 1974 SOLAS Convention on special measures to enhance maritime safety and security) recommends that future amendments to the provisions of chapters XI-1 and XI-2 of the Convention should be adopted by either the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organization or by a conference of contracting governments to the convention. Conference resolution 5 (Promotion of technical cooperation and assistance) strongly urges contracting governments to the convention and member states of the organization to provide, in cooperation with the organization, assistance to those states which have difﬁculty in meeting the requirements of the adopted amendments, and to use the Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme of the organization as one of the main instruments to obtain assistance in advancing effective implementation of, and compliance with, the adopted amendments. It also requests the secretary-general of the organization to make adequate provision, within the Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme, to strengthen further the assistance that is already being provided and to ensure that the organization is able to address the future needs of developing countries for continued education and training and the improvement of their maritime and port security infrastructure and measures, and invites donors, international organizations and the shipping and port industry to contribute ﬁnancial, human and/or in-kind resources to the Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme of the organization for its maritime and port security activities. It also invites the secretary-general to give early consideration to establishing a Maritime Security Trust Fund for the purpose of providing a dedicated source of ﬁnancial support for maritime security technical-cooperation activities and, in particular, for providing support for national initiatives in developing countries to strengthen their maritime security infrastructure and measures. Conference resolution 6 (Early implementation of the special measures to enhance maritime security) refers to the difﬁculties experienced during implementation of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code and draws the attention of contracting governments and the industry to the fact that chapter XI-2 of the Convention does not provide for any extension of the implementation dates for the introduction of the special measures concerned to enhance maritime security. It urges contracting governments to take, as a matter of high priority, any action needed to ﬁnalize as soon as possible any legislative or administrative arrangements, which are required at the national

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level, to give effect to the requirements of the adopted amendments to the Convention relating to the certiﬁcation of ships entitled to ﬂy their ﬂag or port facilities situated in their territory. It also recommends that contracting governments and administrations concerned designate dates, in advance of the application date of July 1, 2004, by which requests for certiﬁcation should be submitted in order to allow for completion of the certiﬁcation process and for companies and port facilities to rectify any noncompliance. It also recommends that contracting governments and the industry should take early appropriate action to ensure that all necessary infrastructure is in place in time for the effective implementation of the adopted measures to enhance maritime security on board ships and ashore. Conference resolution 7 (Establishment of appropriate measures to enhance the security of ships, port facilities, mobile offshore drilling units on location, and ﬁxed and ﬂoating platforms not covered by chapter XI-2 of the 1974 SOLAS Convention) invites contracting governments to establish, as they might consider necessary, appropriate measures to enhance the security of ships and of port facilities other than those covered by chapter XI-2 of the Convention; it also encourages contracting governments to establish and disseminate, in an appropriate manner, information to facilitate contact and liaison between company and ship security officers and the authorities responsible for the security of port facilities not covered by Chapter XI-2, prior to a ship entering, or anchoring off, such a port. Conference resolution 8 (Enhancement of security in cooperation with the International Labour Organization) invites the ILO to continue the development of a Seafarers’ Identity Document as a matter of urgency, which should cover, among other things, a document for professional purposes, a veriﬁable security document, and a certiﬁcation information document, and invites IMO and the ILO to establish a joint ILO/IMO Working Group to undertake more detailed work on comprehensive port security requirements. Conference resolution 9 (Enhancement of security in cooperation with the World Customs Organization) invites the WCO to consider urgently measures to enhance security throughout international closed CTU movements and requests the Scretary-General of IMO to contribute expertise relating to maritime trafﬁc to the discussions at the WCO. Conference resolution 10 (Early implementation of long-range ships’ identiﬁcation and tracking) recalls that long-range identiﬁcation and tracking of ships at sea is a measure that fully contributes to the enhancement of the maritime and coastal states’ security and notes that Inmarsat C polling is currently an appropriate system for long-range identiﬁcation and tracking of ships. It urges governments to take, as a matter of high priority, any action needed at national level to give effect to implementing and beginning the long-range identiﬁcation and tracking of ships and invites contracting governments to encourage ships entitled to ﬂy the ﬂag of their state to take the necessary measures so that they are prepared to respond automatically to

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Inmarsat C polling, or to other available systems. It also requests governments to consider all aspects related to the introduction of long-range identiﬁcation and tracking of ships, including its potential for misuse as an aid to ship targeting and the need for conﬁdentiality in respect of the information so gathered. Conference resolution 11 (Human element-related aspects and shore leave for seafarers) urges governments to take the human element, the need to afford special protection to seafarers and the critical importance of shore leave into account when implementing the provisions of chapter XI-2 of the Convention and the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code. It also encourages governments, member states of IMO, and nongovernmental organizations with consultative status at the organization to report to the organization any instances where the human element has been adversely impacted by the implementation of the provisions of chapter XI-2 of the Convention or the Code. It also requests the IMO Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Maritime Safety Committee and the Facilitation Committee of the Organization any human-element-related problems, which have been communicated to the Organization as a result of the implementation of chapter XI-2 of the Convention or the Code.

IMO 2004: FOCUS ON MARITIME SECURITY World Maritime Day 2004 Background Paper, International Maritime Organization September 27, 2004*

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND The vulnerability of the global transport infrastructure, both as a potential target for terrorist activity and, perhaps even more threateningly, as a potential weapon of mass destruction, was made clear in the most graphic and chilling detail in the terrorist atrocities of September 11, 2001. Subsequently, other incidents, such as the attack on the oil tanker Limburg off Yemen in October 2002 and the Madrid train bombings in March 2004, demonstrated that the transport infrastructures of the world, be they national or international, were vulnerable to terrorist attacks. From the perspective of an international Organization, IMO’s concern has not been so much which country might be the terrorists’ next target, but rather which mode of transport would next attract their interest. Although those tragic events horriﬁed the civilized world, they also engendered a new and ﬁrm resolve to tackle terrorism by addressing the issue of security in the widest possible sense. Immediately after the September 11 attacks, the International Maritime Organization, as the United Nations *

Source: International Maritime Organization (IMO), www.imo.org.

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agency responsible for the safety of international shipping, mounted a swift and thorough response to the possibility of terrorist activity being directed against ships or of terrorists seeking to use ships themselves as weapons or using the proceeds of shipping activities in order to subsidize their unlawful operations. As part of this response, the end of 2002 saw the adoption of a comprehensive new regulatory regime which sets out in detail what governments, ship operators, ships’ crews, port facility operators and others involved in the business of shipping should do in order to prevent and minimize this very real threat. But, although 9/11 gave an unprecedented impetus to IMO’s concern about unlawful acts that threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews, the subject had, in fact, been addressed by IMO over the course of many years. As long ago as in the late 1970s, IMO was forced to turn its attention to the consideration of unlawful acts such as barratry, the unlawful seizure of ships and their cargoes, and other forms of maritime fraud. Since 1982, the Organization has been monitoring acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships in various parts of the world and has taken measures to combat unlawful acts in those areas that suffer most from them. So far, it has received some 3,500 reports involving loss of ships and, in many cases, loss of life. The most disconcerting aspect is to see that the degree of violence asserted in some of the reports is on the increase. An early catalyst in the work to combat terrorism was the Achille Lauro incident in 1985, in which terrorists hijacked an Italian cruise ship and killed a passenger before agreeing terms to end their siege. That same year, IMO’s 14th Assembly adopted a resolution on measures to prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews, inviting IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) to develop detailed and practical technical measures to ensure the security of passengers and crews on board ships, taking into account the work of the International Civil Aviation Organization in the development of standards and recommended practices for airport and aircraft security. Furthermore, in December 1985, the UN General Assembly called on IMO to study the problem of terrorism aboard or against ships, with a view to making recommendations on appropriate measures. By the following year, the MSC had developed a series of measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews on board ships. An MSC circular gave guidelines on the steps that should be taken, with particular reference to passenger ships engaged on international voyages and the port facilities that service them. Then, in November 1986, work began on the preparation of a convention on the subject of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation and, in March 1988, a conference was held in Rome which adopted the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation—the so-called SUA Convention—and its protocol relating to off-

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shore platforms “to provide for a comprehensive suppression of unlawful acts committed against the safety of maritime navigation which endanger innocent human lives, jeopardize the safety of persons and property, seriously affect the operation of maritime services and thus are of grave concern to the international community as a whole.” The main purpose of the SUA Convention is to ensure that appropriate action is taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships, such as the seizure of ships by force, acts of violence against persons on board ships, and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or damage it. The Convention obliges contracting governments either to extradite or prosecute alleged offenders. In the years since its adoption, the SUA Convention gathered widespread if not universal acceptance and received sufﬁcient ratiﬁcations to enter into force in 1992. The recent heightened awareness of security issues has led to a dramatic increase in the number of Parties to the SUA Convention. Although in October 2001 it had been ratiﬁed by ﬁfty-six states and the 1988 SUA Protocol by ﬁfty-one states, by July 2004 the Convention had been ratiﬁed by 107 countries which between them were responsible for 81.52 percent of the world’s merchant shipping tonnage, and the Protocol by ninety-six countries which between them were responsible for 77.66 percent of the world’s tonnage.

THE 2002 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY MEASURES Unsurprisingly, IMO’s work on maritime security intensiﬁed dramatically following the 9/11 attacks in the United States. It had become clear that the shipping industry needed a new, more stringent and more comprehensive set of measures to address the question of maritime security and IMO’s secretarygeneral at the time, Mr. William O’Neil, initiated the process by submitting a resolution to the Organization’s 22nd Assembly in November 2001. This called for a thorough review of all existing measures already adopted by IMO to combat acts of violence and crime at sea and was unanimously approved. At the same time, contracting governments to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention attending the Assembly agreed to hold a diplomatic conference on maritime security to adopt any new regulations that might be deemed necessary to enhance ship and port security and prevent shipping from becoming a target of international terrorism. The Assembly also agreed to a signiﬁcant boost to the Organization’s technical cooperation program of £1.5 million, to help developing countries address maritime security issues. The next step was the convening of an Intersessional Working Group (ISWG) on Maritime Security, which met February 11–15, 2002. It produced a series of recommendations, which were further elaborated by the May 2002 meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC 75) as well as by other IMO

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bodies. A second ISWG was held in September 2002, to develop the measures still further, prior to the Diplomatic Conference, which was convened in December 2002. Detailed work was also set under way in IMO’s Legal Committee, which met for its 83rd session in October 2001 and embarked on a review of the SUA Convention as a priority item in its work program over the next two years. Mindful of the fact that those responsible for perpetrating terrorist acts should not be allowed to escape prosecution and punishment, the objective of the review was to ensure that SUA Convention and its Protocol, which provide for the prosecution or extradition of alleged criminals wherever they happen to be, remain relevant in the light of the new global climate of heightened terrorist threat. The Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security, held at IMO’s London Headquarters, was of crucial signiﬁcance not only to the international maritime community but also to the world community as a whole, given the pivotal role shipping plays in the conduct of world trade. It was attended by 108 contracting governments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention, and observers from two other IMO member states and two IMO associate members. United Nations specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental international organizations also sent observers. The outcome of the Conference was a new, comprehensive security regime for international shipping (which entered into force on July 1, 2004), representing the culmination of just over a year’s intense work by IMO’s MSC and its Intersessional Working Groups. The Conference adopted a number of amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, the most far-reaching of which was a new chapter XI-2 (on Special measures to enhance maritime security) which enshrines the new International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). This chapter applies to passenger ships and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upward, including high-speed craft and mobile offshore drilling units, and also applies to port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages. The ISPS Code contains detailed security-related requirements for governments, port authorities, and shipping companies in a mandatory section (Part A), together with a series of guidelines about how to meet these requirements in a second, nonmandatory section (Part B). The Conference also adopted a series of resolutions designed to add weight to the SOLAS amendments, encourage the application of the measures to ships and port facilities not covered by the Code, and pave the way for future work on the subject. The Conference was subsequently referred to in the United Nations General Assembly, which adopted a resolution on “oceans and the law of the sea,” speciﬁcally welcoming initiatives at the International Maritime Organization to counter the threat to maritime security from terrorism and encouraged states fully to support this endeavor.

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THE INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND PORT FACILITY SECURITY CODE—HOW IT WORKS The purpose of the Code is to provide a standardized, consistent framework for port facilities. In essence, it takes the approach that ensuring the security of ships and port facilities is basically a risk management activity and that to determine what security measures are appropriate, an assessment of the risks must be made in each particular case. To begin the process, each contracting government was required to conduct port facility security assessments. These security assessments have three essential components. First, they must identify and evaluate important assets and infrastructures critical to the port facility, as well as those areas or structures that, if damaged, could cause signiﬁcant loss of life or damage to the port facility’s economy or environment. Then, the assessment must consider the most likely threats to those critical assets and infrastructure in order to prioritize security measures. Finally, the assessment must address vulnerability of the port facility by identifying its weaknesses in physical security, structural integrity, protection systems, procedural policies, communications systems, transportation infrastructure, utilities, and other areas within a port facility that may be a likely target. Once this assessment has been completed, the contracting government can accurately evaluate risk. In order to communicate the perceived threat at a port facility or for a ship, the contracting government sets the appropriate security level. Security levels 1, 2, and 3 correspond to normal, medium, and high threat situations, respectively. The security level creates a link between the ship and the port facility, because it triggers the implementation of appropriate security measures for the ship and for the port facility. As the preamble to the Code states, as threat increases, the only logical counteraction is to reduce vulnerability— and the Code provides several ways to reduce vulnerabilities, such as monitoring and controlling access, monitoring the activities of people and cargo, ensuring security communications are readily available and requiring certain types of equipment, depending on the security level in operation.

THE COMPANY AND THE SHIP Under the terms of the ISPS Code, shipping companies are required to designate a Company Security Ofﬁcer (CSO) for the company and a Ship Security Ofﬁcer (SSO) for each of its ships. The CSO’s responsibilities include ensuring that a Ship Security Assessment is properly carried out, that Ship Security Plans are prepared and submitted for approval by (or on behalf of) the administration and thereafter that the plan is implemented on board each ship. The Ship Security Plan should indicate the minimum operational and physical security measures that the ship itself should implement at all times (i.e., security level 1) unless required to operate at a higher security level. The

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plan should also indicate the additional, or intensiﬁed, security measures the ship can take to move to and operate at security level 2 when instructed to do so. Furthermore, the plan should indicate the possible preparatory actions the ship could take to allow prompt response to instructions that may be issued to the ship at security level 3.

SHIP SECURITY OFFICER—THE ROLE OF THE MASTER? According to the ISPS Code, it is the responsibility of the Company and the Company Security Ofﬁcer to appoint the Ship Security Ofﬁcer. This, naturally, has to be endorsed by the administration of the ﬂag state and/or the Recognized Security Organization. It should be stressed that neither the drafting of the deﬁnition of the SSO, nor the provisions of the ISPS Code relating to his responsibilities, training, and so on, are aimed at preventing the master, or any other person, from being designated as SSO. The issue of whether the master should be the SSO, given his many other responsibilities, was ﬁrst raised at the IMO’s Flag State Implementation meeting in March 2004, which recommended to the Maritime Safety Committee that the master could be designated and act as SSO. Two months later the MSC agreed that the deﬁnition of the SSO should be viewed in conjunction with SOLAS regulation XI-2/8 on “master’s discretion for ship safety and security,” which makes it clear that the master has ultimate responsibility for safety and security. Regulation XI-2/4 conﬁrms the role of the master in exercising his professional judgment over decisions necessary to maintain the security of the ship. It states that he shall not be constrained by the company, the charterer, or any other person in this respect. The phrase “accountable to the master,” which is included in the deﬁnition of the SSO, is intended to cover those situations, for example on large passenger ships, where the SSO is not the master, by reafﬁrming that the master has overall responsibility for security. There is, therefore, implicitly no intention of preventing the master from assuming the duties of SSO, as this would be inconsistent with SOLAS regulation XI-2/8. It is, of course, for national administrations to decide if they wish to impose particular restrictions on who may serve as SSOs on ships ﬂying their ﬂag. This should, however, not be imposed by national administrations on ships not ﬂying their ﬂag through port state control measures, because this is clearly the prerogative of the contracting government of the ﬂag state concerned.

THE PORT FACILITY Each contracting government has to ensure completion of a Port Facility Security Assessment for each port facility within its territory that serves ships engaged on international voyages. The Port Facility Security Assessment is

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fundamentally a risk analysis of all aspects of a port facility’s operation in order to determine which parts of it are more susceptible to, or more likely to be the subject of, an attack. Security risk is seen as a function of the threat of an attack coupled with the vulnerability of the target and the consequences of an attack. The Port Facility Security Assessment helps determine which port facilities are required to appoint a Port Facility Security Ofﬁcer and prepare a Port Facility Security Plan. As with the Ship Security Plan, this is required to indicate the minimum operational and physical security measures the port facility will implement at all times (i.e. security level 1) and also to indicate the additional, or intensiﬁed, security measures the port facility can take to move to and operate at security level 2 or 3 when instructed to do so.

CONTROL AND COMPLIANCE Under the ISPS Code, ships are required to carry an International Ship Security Certiﬁcate indicating that they comply with the requirements of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and part A of the ISPS Code. When a ship is at a port or is proceeding to a port of a contracting government, the contracting government has the right, under the provisions of regulation XI-2/9, to exercise various control and compliance measures with respect to that ship. Ships may be subject to port state control inspections, as well as to additional control measures, if the contracting government exercising the control and compliance measures has reason to believe that the security of the ship, or the port facilities that have served it, has been compromised. The relevant authorities may request information regarding the ship, its cargo, passengers, and ship’s personnel prior to the ship’s entry into port, and there may be circumstances in which entry into port could be denied.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS To summarize, contracting governments have various responsibilities, including approving the Ship Security Plan and relevant amendments to a previously approved plan, verifying the compliance of ships with the provisions of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and part A of the ISPS Code and issuing the International Ship Security Certiﬁcate, determining which port facilities located within their territory are required to designate a Port Facility Security Ofﬁcer, ensuring completion and approval of the Port Facility Security Assessment and the Port Facility Security Plan and any subsequent amendments, exercising control and compliance measures and setting the applicable security level. It is also responsible for communicating information to IMO and to the shipping and port industries.

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SOLAS contracting governments can designate, or establish, Designated Authorities within government to undertake their security duties and allow Recognized Security Organizations to carry out certain work with respect to port facilities, but the ﬁnal decision on the acceptance and approval of this work must be given by the contracting government or the Designated Authority.

OTHER SAFETY AND SECURITY MEASURES Although of crucial signiﬁcance for the ship and port industries, the ISPS Code is far from being the only new maritime safety and security provision now in force, and it is perhaps worthwhile to summarize some of the less publicized but equally important measures aimed at enhancing safety and security on board ships and at ship/port interface areas that were adopted by the 2002 Conference. Modiﬁcations to SOLAS chapter V (Safety of Navigation) contain a new timetable for the ﬁtting of Automatic Information Systems (AIS). Ships, other than passenger ships and tankers, of 300 gross tonnage and upwards but less than 50,000 gross tonnage, will be required to ﬁt AIS not later than the ﬁrst safety equipment survey after July 1, 2004, or by December 31, 2004, whichever occurs earlier. The existing SOLAS chapter XI (Special measures to enhance maritime safety) was renumbered as chapter XI-1. Regulation XI-1/3 was modiﬁed to require a ship’s identiﬁcation number to be permanently marked in a visible place either on the ship’s hull or on its superstructure. Passenger ships should carry the marking on a horizontal surface visible from the air. Ships should also be marked with their ID numbers internally. A new regulation XI-1/5 requires ships to be issued with a Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR), which is intended to provide an onboard record of the history of the ship. The CSR shall be issued by the administration and must contain identity-related information such as the name of the ship and of the state whose ﬂag the ship is entitled to ﬂy, the date on which the ship was registered with that state, the ship’s identiﬁcation number, the port at which the ship is registered and the name of the registered owner(s) and their registered address. Any changes shall be recorded in the CSR, so as to provide updated and current information together with the history of the changes. As well as the ISPS Code, the brand-new chapter XI-2 (Special measures to enhance maritime security) includes a number of other important measures. Regulation XI-2/6 requires all ships to be provided with a ship security alert system, according to a strict timetable that will see most vessels ﬁtted by 2004 and the remainder by 2006. When activated, the ship security alert system shall initiate and transmit a ship-to-shore security alert to a competent authority designated by the administration, identifying the ship and its location and indicating that the security of

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the ship is under threat or has been compromised. It must be capable of being activated from the navigation bridge and in at least one other location, but— and this is a key consideration when dangerous criminals or terrorists may be on board—the system will not raise any alarm on board the ship itself.

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE In addition to the two resolutions introducing the ISPS Code and the other SOLAS amendments outlined above, the 2002 Diplomatic Conference also adopted nine other resolutions. Although some dealt with what are essentially administrative matters, such as entry-into-force criteria and the methods by which future amendments should be adopted, the majority addressed important, substantive issues and promise to have a strong impact in the overall endeavor to improve maritime security. Conference resolution three, for example, set the agenda for the Organization in its future work on the subject, speciﬁcally inviting it to develop, as a matter of urgency, training guidance, such as model courses for ship security ofﬁcers, company security ofﬁcers and port facility security ofﬁcers; performance standards for ship security alarms; performance standards and guidelines for long-range ship identiﬁcation and tracking systems; guidelines on control of ships; and guidelines on “recognized security organizations,” and to adopt them in time before the entry into force of the amendments to the Convention adopted by the Conference. Another addressed the question of long-range ships’ identiﬁcation and tracking, which was recognized as something that could make a useful contribution to the enhancement of maritime and coastal states’ security. It urged governments, as a matter of high priority, to take any action needed at national level to begin implementing long-range identiﬁcation and tracking of ships and to encourage ships entitled to ﬂy their ﬂag to take the necessary measures to be able to respond automatically to polling. However, recognizing that there are two sides to every coin, it also requested governments to consider all aspects, including its potential for misuse (as an aid to ship targeting, for example) and the need for conﬁdentiality in respect of the information gathered. Among the other resolutions adopted by the conference were two addressing IMO’s cooperation with other agencies on security issues, speciﬁcally the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Customs Organization (WCO) and we shall look at these collaborative efforts in more detail elsewhere in this paper.

IMPLEMENTATION HOLDS THE KEY Even though every new standard adopted by IMO represents a step forward, it is virtually worthless without proper implementation. And, in this

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particular context, there is no doubt that the mere existence of the new regulatory maritime security regime will provide no guarantee that acts of terrorism against shipping may be prevented and suppressed. It is the wide, effective, and uniform implementation of the new measures that will ensure shipping does not become the soft underbelly of the international transport system. One of the most important of the resolutions adopted by the conference dealt with this aspect in some detail, referring to the difﬁculties that had been experienced during implementation of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code and drawing the attention of contracting governments and the industry to the fact that chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention did not provide for any extension of the implementation dates for the new security measures. It urged contracting governments, as a matter of high priority, to take any action needed to ﬁnalize as soon as possible the legislative or administrative arrangements required at national level to give effect to the requirements of the adopted amendments and recommended that contracting governments and administrations should designate dates, in advance of the application date of July 1, 2004, by which requests for certiﬁcation should be submitted so that the certiﬁcation process could be completed in good time and for any noncompliance to be rectiﬁed. From the outset, even before the amendments and the Code were adopted, the SOLAS contracting governments and the industry knew very well that they were bound to face a very challenging task. In the event, there were administrative bottlenecks in the run up to the deadline, and there were instances, from all sectors of the maritime community, where the necessary processes were started too late. But, important though it undoubtedly is, the administrative process is not the most critical factor in all this. What really counts is the work that has been done on the ground: security ofﬁcers appointed on ships, in companies, and in port facilities; training undertaken; security plans drawn up; awareness raised; and vigilance heightened. The real aim of IMO’s security measures is to make shipping more secure, and the issuance of certiﬁcates is simply the ﬁnal part of a lengthy process, every step of which is a step in the right direction. Governments and the shipping and port industries made major efforts to improve maritime security in the weeks and months that followed the 2002 Conference leading up to the entry into force of the ISPS Code and all the related security measures. All over the world, a huge amount of work was undertaken to ensure the highest possible level of compliance. Figures made available by IMO regularly to keep the maritime community updated on progress being made indicated that more than 86 percent of ships and 69 percent of port facilities had their security plans approved by July 1, 2004. As ever, IMO also recognized that not all its member states shared the same ability to implement the new measures and that, particularly among the

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developing countries, there would be shortages of expertise, manpower, and resources. Another key conference resolution addressed the vital question of technical cooperation and assistance, strongly urging contracting governments to the convention and member states of the organization to provide, in cooperation with the organization, assistance to those states which have difﬁculty in meeting the requirements. It also requested the Secretary-General of the organization to make adequate provision, within the IMO’s Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme, to strengthen further the assistance that was already being provided and to ensure that the organization was able to address the future needs of developing countries for continued education and training and the improvement of their maritime and port security infrastructure and measures, and invited donors, international organizations and the shipping and port industry to contribute ﬁnancial, human and/or in-kind resources to the Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme of the Organization for its maritime and port security activities. IMO actually launched its global technical cooperation program on maritime security in January 2002, 11 months before the package of new maritime security measures was adopted. The aim of the program initially was to raise awareness of maritime security threats and of the possible future regulatory measures that, at that stage, were still under development, through activities such as regional and subregional seminars, workshops, and advisory missions. Subsequently, the emphasis has moved on to practical approaches to implementation of the new regulatory regime, with the development of training programs and materials, lesson plans and model courses. Thousands of personnel from maritime administrations, shipping companies, ports, and industry and regional organizations have already been trained as a result of IMO’s activities, and the steady stream of requests to the Organization for technical assistance in the ﬁeld of maritime and port security shows no sign of slowing down. The success and continuation of IMO’s work in this ﬁeld depends on funding being made available to support further training activities. An International Maritime Security Trust Fund has been established, on the basis of voluntary donations, to provide a dedicated source of ﬁnancial support for the maritime security technical cooperation activities and, in particular, for national initiatives in the developing regions. Secretary-General Mitropoulos has appealed to governments and industry to make contributions to the Fund in order to support the program over the coming biennium.

THE COST FACTOR Of course, it is not just the developing countries that have had to consider resource implications in implementing the new security provisions. Signiﬁ-

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cant and far-reaching measures such as these cannot be implemented without cost, and although it is impossible to put a completely accurate ﬁgure on the total cost to the industry and the various other stakeholders, there have been some attempts made to do so. Last year, the OECD published a detailed report on the risk factors and economic impact of security in maritime transport. It reached three broad conclusions. The ﬁrst was that the costs of inaction would have been potentially tremendous. A large, well-coordinated attack, it said, could have the effect of shutting down the entire maritime transport system as governments scrambled to put in place appropriate security measures—which might be drastic, such as the complete closure of some ports, and inefﬁcient, such as duplicative and lengthy cargo checks in both originating and receiving ports. The report estimated that the cost of such an attack would likely be measured in tens of billions of dollars, and quoted a ﬁgure of up to US$58 billion for the United States alone. The second conclusion—perhaps not surprisingly—was that some costs are more easily measured than others, and that those costs that can be measured with some precision are signiﬁcantly less than the costs of doing nothing. Generally, said the report, ship-related costs tend to be relatively easy to ascertain as these involve speciﬁc equipment purchases and labor costs at known international rates. The OECD estimated the initial burden on shipowners to be at least US$1,279 million and US$730 million a year thereafter. The bulk of ship-related costs are related to management staff and security-related equipment expenses. Estimates of port-related security costs are extremely difﬁcult to derive, says OECD, due to uncertainty about exactly what the new measures will mean in terms of additional personnel requirements coupled with the vast differences in labor rates that apply, depending on location. Also very difﬁcult to estimate are costs derived from procedural changes: however, OECD estimates that, for the costs that can be measured, the overall ﬁgure of slightly over US$2 billion is still substantially below the costs that might result from a major attack. Finally, although its main focus had been on costs, the report also concluded that many of the new measures had distinct beneﬁts that were not directly related to their antiterrorism task. These beneﬁts related to reduced delays, faster processing times, better asset control, fewer losses due to theft, and decreased insurance costs. For example, direct savings to United States importers through a new electronic customs manifest handling system in the United States are estimated to be US$22.2 billion over 20 years while the U.S. government would make savings of US$4.4 billion over the same period, according to the report. Aside from the OECD report, a number of individual countries have also attempted to quantify the ﬁnancial costs and beneﬁts associated with the new measures. In the United States, for example, the Commandant of the Coast

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Guard has stated that the United States maritime security regulations will cost the home industry US$7 billion over the next 10 years. The regulations will affect some 10,000 United States vessels, 5,000 facilities, 361 ports, and forty offshore facilities. And, in Australia, the government announced in the 2003–4 federal budget that it would allocate A$15.6 million over two years to tighten the country’s maritime and port security by developing enabling legislation, providing guidance to industry and ensuring compliance with the ISPS Code. The government expects that the implementation costs to industry will be A$313 million in the ﬁrst year with ongoing costs of up to A$96 million per year thereafter, whereas the Australian Shipowners’ Association estimates that the cost for Australian flagged vessels could be between A$750,000 and A$900,000 each.

ACHIEVING A BALANCE Throughout the development of the new security measures and the implementation process, IMO has always been at pains to stress the importance of achieving a proper balance. This has applied not just in the cost/beneﬁt equation but in other aspects, too. Clearly, there is an overriding imperative to ﬁnd a balance between the need to implement the new security regime strictly and robustly and yet ensure that disruption to global trade, as a result of the introduction of security measures, is kept to a minimum; a balance between the traditional and legally enshrined right of ships to enjoy freedom of navigation on the high seas, and the need to make sure that strategic and potentially vulnerable sealanes have the special protection they may need must be established; and while tightening security provisions so that criminals and terrorists cannot gain access to ships by posing as seafarers, ensuring, at the same time, that innocent seafarers are not themselves unfairly penalized as a result.

SEAFARER ISSUES The whole question of human-element-related aspects and, in particular, of shore leave for seafarers was dealt with in one very important conference resolution. It urged governments to take the human element, the need to afford special protection to seafarers and the critical importance of shore leave into account when implementing the new security provisions. It also encouraged governments, member states of IMO and nongovernmental organizations with consultative status at the organization to report to the organization any instances where the human element has been adversely impacted by the

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implementation of the provisions of chapter XI-2 of the Convention or the code and requested the IMO Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Maritime Safety Committee and the Facilitation Committee of the organization any human element-related problems that may be reported to the organization. This is a theme to which Secretary-General Mitropoulos has subsequently returned. Speaking at the opening of the thirty-ﬁrst meeting of the IMO Facilitation Committee in July this year, he said: When, on the eve of the ISPS Code becoming effective, I appealed to governments and port authorities to apply the Code with a sense of pragmatism and common sense, my plea was that they should do so not only when they were dealing with ships and cargoes but also when dealing with seafarers serving on ships calling at their ports. We must not forget that it is on the seafarers, initiatives, cooperation, and constant vigilance that we rely heavily in order to prevent breaches of maritime security. Without their support and wholehearted commitment to the cause of security, the system the ISPS Code aims so meticulously to put in place will be severely weakened, to the detriment of the overall effort.

Mr. Mitropoulos added that if, on security grounds, seafarers face difﬁculties, such as refusal of shore leave, they may well feel somehow rejected or their services not sufﬁciently recognized. He pointed out how important shore leave is to hard-working professionals reaching port after days or even weeks of isolation at sea, often after having faced the elements at their full strength. He also warned that such restrictions may easily discourage prospective entrants to the maritime profession from joining ranks at a time when the industry is already short of quality ofﬁcers worldwide—a situation which may worsen in the future to include shortage of ratings as well. He concluded by appealing to governments and port authorities to treat seafarers as partners in the ﬁght against terrorism and to facilitate their access to ports and shore facilities. “Ships’ stays in port are short nowadays,” he said, “and the seafarer’s free time is limited, so we should provide them with every opportunity to relax and recover before they again take their ships out to sea in pursuit of their peaceful objectives in the service of world trade.”

STRATEGIC SEA-LANES In addition to seafarer issues, another concern in which ﬁnding the right balance is paramount is the importance of keeping strategically important shipping lanes secure and open to international maritime trafﬁc, thereby ensuring the uninterrupted ﬂow of world trade. The IMO Secretariat has taken steps to identify which areas might be particularly vulnerable and the

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IMO Council, at its ninety-second meeting earlier this year, shared the concern of the Secretary-General in this respect and authorized him to work with interested parties to ﬁnd ways in which they might collaborate—while always observing the sovereign rights of the coastal states concerned. One of the world’s most important, indeed truly vital, strategic shipping channels is undoubtedly the Malacca Strait. This 800 kilometer long and, in places, extremely narrow link between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea is an artery through which runs a huge proportion of global trade. Tankers and bulk carriers move vast quantities of oil, coal, iron ore, and grain to the manufacturing centers of Southeast and Northeast Asia, while highvalue manufactured goods carried in millions of containers pour back through the same outlet to feed consumer markets all over the world. Some 50,000 ship movements carrying as much as one quarter of the world’s commerce and half the world’s oil pass through the Malacca and Singapore Straits each year. Any serious disruption to the ﬂow of maritime trafﬁc through this channel would clearly have a widespread and far-reaching detrimental effect. That is why the preservation of its integrity is such an important issue. But being a natural “choke point” for shipping makes the area particularly vulnerable, both to operational and navigational incidents and to the external threat posed by pirates and armed robbers. However, with Southeast Asia still, unfortunately, recording the highest number of pirate attacks globally, there is clearly a fear that terrorists could resort to pirate-style tactics, or even work in concert with pirates, to perpetrate their evil deeds. Although criminals and terrorists may operate in similar ways, it should be remembered that terrorists aim to use their violence in pursuit of strategic objectives and, all too frequently, mass destruction: while pirates seek private gains, terrorists pursue political ones. Through cooperation, led by the littoral states of the Malacca and Singapore Straits, and including other user states and stakeholders—such as industry organizations—and by applying various means of state-of-the-art technology—including the utilization of the Marine Electronic Highway project, speciﬁcally designed by IMO for the Malacca Strait—it is expected that this strategic lane will continue to remain open to international navigation to serve the needs of seaborne trade and the economy—regional and global. For IMO, balance has been a recurring theme throughout the entire process of developing and implementing the new maritime security regime. The concern had been expressed that if the focus were placed too heavily on “security” and less attention was paid to other parts of IMO’s responsibilities—that is, “safety,” “the environment,” and the “facilitation of maritime trafﬁc”— then shipping would not be rendered the good services it deserves. The right balance had to be struck between the various objectives involved when legislating, for example, on inspecting ships for port state control purposes; and the need for such balance has been reﬂected in IMO’s new mission statement, which calls for “safe, secure, and efﬁcient shipping on clean oceans.”

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THE WIDER PICTURE UN Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan has denounced terrorism as a “global scourge with global effects,” and it is very much in the spirit of international cooperation to counter this universal threat that IMO’s efforts to improve maritime security should be seen. They are part of an all-embracing initiative across the UN system to tackle this invidious modern-day scourge, to which no one today is immune. Since the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the United Nations has consistently addressed the issue of terrorism. UN Security Council resolution 1368 was adopted the day after the attacks and, since then, several more UN resolutions have been adopted to counter terrorism. In December 2002, for example, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on Oceans and the law of the sea which, among other things, welcomed the initiatives taken by IMO to counter the threat to maritime security from terrorism and encouraged states to support that endeavor fully. One month later, the UN Security Council, meeting at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, reafﬁrmed its position on terrorism and determined to counter it by a sustained, comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all states and international and regional organizations and by redoubled efforts at the national level. The Security Council therefore called for all states to take urgent action to prevent and suppress all active and passive support to terrorism. Security Council resolution 1456, adopted on January 20, 2003, requested states to assist each other to improve their capacity to prevent and ﬁght terrorism and invited the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to facilitate the provision of technical and other assistance by developing targets and priorities for global action. This resolution also calls on international organizations to evaluate ways in which they can enhance the effectiveness of their action against terrorism, including establishing dialogue and exchanges of information with each other. Furthermore, at a special meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the UN Security Council held in New York in March 2003, participants agreed that all international, regional, and subregional organizations invited had a speciﬁc role to play in enhancing the effectiveness of global action against terrorism. Although each had its own mandate and its own contribution to make, all recognized the high value of cooperation at the global level. They agreed that their coordinated approach to the suppression of terrorism would include the sharing of data and best practices and the avoidance of duplication of effort, while remaining aware of the need for respect for the rule of law and human rights’ obligations. Looking at the wider picture, UN Secretary-General Annan, in a call for a “new vision of global security,” has appealed to international and regional organizations to create a new sense of common endeavor in their responses to terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and collapsing states.

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At a meeting of more than 30 organizations, including NATO, Interpol and the League of Arab States, Mr. Annan said that the “unprecedented” range and diversity of challenges warranted a “new vision of global security” drawing on the “resources and legitimacy of mutually reinforcing multilateral mechanisms.” He stressed that, as the world changes, our institutions ought to keep pace with those changes and we should not add to our burdens by descending into unproductive polarization.

IMO PARTICIPATION In this context, IMO has striven to work in cooperation and collaboration with partners wherever and whenever possible. It has participated in UNorganized activities, such as the Special Meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee in March 2003 and the meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Action Group (established by the G-8 Leaders in June 2003 to serve as a forum for coordinating and expanding the provision of counterterrorism training and assistance) held in Washington, D.C., in February this year. As mentioned previously two of the resolutions adopted by the 2002 maritime security conference addressed speciﬁcally IMO’s work in collaboration with the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO). One invited the WCO to consider urgently measures to enhance security throughout international closed container transport unit (CTU) movements and requested the Secretary-General of IMO to contribute expertise relating to maritime trafﬁc to the discussions at the WCO. The importance of this work in the context of maritime security cannot be overstated: the world container ﬂeet was estimated by Containerisation International’s 2003 Yearbook at some 15,855,000 TEUs. The reported moves of containers through maritime ports were estimated at 225,300,000 TEUs in UNCTAD’s “Review of Maritime Transport 2003,” and experts say this ﬁgure may grow to up to 450 million TEUs by 2010. Today, according to the Lloyd’s Register/Fairplay World Fleet database, the population of dedicated containerships stands at nearly 4,000 units, representing more than 100 million deadweight tonnage. These ﬁgures show not only the importance of the sea mode of container transportation but, more signiﬁcantly, the serious difﬁculties encountered in knowing, at any time in the transportation chain, where they are, where they are transported to, and, above all, what they contain. Containers are typically loaded some distance from seaports and terminals, hence the importance of close cooperation between all parties concerned. Cooperation between IMO and WCO had already been established, but it was further strengthened by the signing, in July 2002, of a Memorandum of Understanding between the two Organizations to arrange for matters concerning container examination and integrity in multimodal transport as well as matters relating to the ship/port interface.

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With regard to seafarer issues, the ILO was invited by a SOLAS conference resolution to continue the development of a Seafarers’ Identity Document as a matter of urgency. The idea was that this document would combine, among other things, a document for professional purposes, a veriﬁable security document, and a certiﬁcation information document. Subsequently, the 91st session of the International Labour Conference (in June 2003) adopted a new Convention on Seafarers’ Identity Documents to replace the ILO Convention, which had been adopted in 1958. The new Convention establishes a more rigorous identity regime for seafarers with the aim of developing effective security from terrorism and ensuring that the world’s 1.2 million seafarers will be given the freedom of movement necessary for their well-being and for their professional activities and, in general, to facilitate international commerce. The 2002 Conference on Maritime Security also invited IMO and ILO to establish a joint Working Group to undertake more detailed work on comprehensive port security requirements. This group has developed an ILO/IMO Code of Practice on Security in Ports, which was adopted by the two Organizations earlier this year.

IN THE FUTURE While acknowledging that after the September 11 attacks the world would not be the same again, Mr. Mitropoulos has also acknowledged that, all over the world, a huge amount of work had been undertaken in the period leading up to the entry-into-force date of the 2002 SOLAS amendments and the ISPS Code to ensure the highest possible level of compliance: I think we now have to look on the positive side and remember that the prime objective of this work has been to increase awareness of the real and present threat of terrorism, explain the implications of the ISPS Code and how best to implement it and, in so doing, raise the shipping industry’s defenses to protect it and seaborne trade from any act of terrorism. There is no doubt that that has been done, the defenses are signiﬁcantly higher than they were before, and we must now ensure that they continue to rise. While I appreciate the efforts made worldwide to achieve the set objectives, I also acknowledge with appreciation the tremendous work done by the IMO Secretariat, both at the [legislative] level and with regard to the provision of technical assistance and cooperation, to contribute to the establishment of an adequate maritime security infrastructure to keep terrorism at bay. Their commitment and dedication are most commendable.

The emphasis now must be placed on ensuring that security remains a high priority throughout the industry, even after the additional impetus given by the entry into force of the SOLAS amendments and the ISPS Code has diminished. According to the IMO secretary-general, “throughout the implementation period, IMO has repeatedly urged governments and the industry

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to take steps to increase awareness of the potential dangers and to encourage ships’ crews to be vigilant and alert to any security threat they may encounter. Great emphasis has been placed on the entry-into-force date, but the real challenge is to ensure that, now that that date has passed, we do not allow ourselves to relax and adopt a complacent attitude.” To conclude: In the aftermath of the attacks in the United States, it seemed obvious that the global transport infrastructure was vulnerable, not simply as a target for terrorist activity but also, in the wrong hands, as a potentially highly destructive weapon. Although aircraft were the chosen weapon of the 9/11 terrorists, ships might just as easily have been selected and one only has to consider the implications of one of the mammoth cruise ships plying the seas nowadays falling into the hands of terrorists or of a laden chemical tanker being hijacked, or of even a conventional cargo ship loaded with explosives being blown up in a densely populated area or of a vital shipping channel being blocked to see how serious the consequences of terrorist action involving ships might be. The answer to any of these nightmarish scenarios is multifaceted, embracing alertness and vigilance, training, implementation of the IMO and national security measures, and, more importantly, cooperation between governments and the industry at the national, regional, and global levels. In this way, we may hope that we never again have to witness terrorist atrocities such as those that have struck New York, Washington, Bali, Moscow, Istanbul, Baghdad, Madrid, the oil tanker Limburg, the USS Cole, and many others, and that the maritime infrastructure may never again become a victim.

PIRACY44 AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS45 IN WATERS OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA International Maritime Organization Resolution A.[. . .]46 (25) (Agenda item 19(a)) Adopted on November 29, 2007*

THE ASSEMBLY, RECALLING Article 15(j) of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization concerning the functions of the Assembly in relation to regulations and guidelines concerning maritime safety and the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships,

*

Source: International Maritime Organization (IMO), www.imo.org.

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RECALLING ALSO article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, which includes, among the purposes of the United Nations, the maintenance of international peace and security, ALSO RECALLING article 100 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which requires all states to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state, FURTHER RECALLING article 105 of UNCLOS which, inter alia, provides that, on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state, every state may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates and arrest the persons and seize the property on board, which, inter alia, enables warships, military aircraft, or other duly authorized ships or aircraft clearly marked and identiﬁable as being on government service to board any ship, other than a ship entitled to complete immunity in accordance with article 95 and article 96 of UNCLOS, when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the ship is, inter alia, engaged in piracy, REAFFIRMING resolution A.545(13) on “Measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships,” adopted on November 17, 1983; resolution A.683(17) on “Prevention and suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships,” adopted on November 6, 1991; and resolution A.738(18) on “Measures to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships,” adopted on November 4, 1993, BEARING IN MIND resolution A.922(22), through which the Assembly adopted the Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (“the Code”) and which, inter alia, urges governments to take action, as set out in the Code, to investigate all acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships occurring in areas or on board ships under their jurisdiction; and to report to the Organization pertinent information on all investigations and prosecutions concerning these acts, BEARING IN MIND ALSO resolution A.979(24) on “Piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia,” by means of which the Assembly, inter alia: • recommended a number of measures to protect ships from piracy and armed robbery attacks in waters off the coast of Somalia and by means of which the situation was brought to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations (“the Security Council”); • requested the secretary-general to continue monitoring the situation in relation to threats to ships sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia and to report to the Council, as and when appropriate, on developments and any further actions which might be required; and • requested the Council to monitor the situation in relation to threats to ships sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia and to initiate any actions it might

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deem necessary to ensure the protection of seafarers and ships sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia,

NOTING WITH SATISFACTION the actions taken by the Council and the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution A.979(24), CONSIDERING that the Maritime Safety Committee has approved MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1 and MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 containing recommendations to governments and guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships and has established a special signal for use by ships under attack or threat of attack, NOTING that the General Assembly of the United Nations, at its sixty-ﬁrst session, by resolution A/RES/61/222 on “Oceans and the law of the sea,” adopted on December 20, 2006, inter alia: .1

.2

.3

encourages states to cooperate to address threats to maritime safety and security, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, smuggling and terrorist acts against shipping, offshore installations and other maritime interests, through bilateral and multilateral instruments and mechanisms aimed at monitoring, preventing and responding to such threats; urges all states, in cooperation with the Organization, to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea by adopting measures, including those relating to assistance with capacity building through training of seafarers, port staff and enforcement personnel in the prevention, reporting and investigation of incidents, bringing the alleged perpetrators to justice, in accordance with international law, and by adopting national legislation, as well as providing enforcement vessels and equipment and guarding against fraudulent ship registration; and calls upon states to become parties to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf; invites states to consider becoming parties to the 2005 Protocols amending those instruments; and also urges states parties to take appropriate measures to ensure the effective implementation of those instruments, through the adoption of legislation, where appropriate,

NOTING ALSO, with great concern, the increasing number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships occurring in waters off the coast of Somalia, some of which have reportedly taken place more than 200 nautical miles from the nearest land, MINDFUL OF the grave danger to life and the serious risks to navigational safety and the environment to which such incidents may give rise, BEING PARTICULARLY CONCERNED that the Monitoring Group47 on Somalia, in its report48 of June 27, 2007, to the Security Council, conﬁrmed, inter alia, that piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast

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of Somalia, unlike in other parts of the world, is caused by the lack of lawful administration and inability of the authorities to take afﬁrmative action against the perpetrators, which allows the “pirate command centers” to operate without hindrance at many points along the coast of Somalia, BEING AWARE of the serious safety and security concerns the shipping industry and the seafaring community continue to have as a result of the attacks against ships sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia referred to above, BEING CONCERNED at the negative impact such attacks continue to have on the prompt and effective delivery of food aid and of other humanitarian assistance to Somalia and the serious threat this poses to the health and wellbeing of the people of Somalia, NOTING, with appreciation, the “Subregional Seminar and Workshop on Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” held by IMO in Sana’a, Yemen, April 9–13, 2005, for countries in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region; and the follow-up meeting held in Muscat, Oman, from 14 to January 18, 2006, BEING AWARE that the Security Council has, through resolution S/Res/1425(2002), adopted on July 22, 2002, stipulated that the arms embargo on Somalia prohibits the direct or indirect supply to Somalia of technical advice, ﬁnancial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, NOTING that the Security Council, by resolution S/Res/1766(2007) adopted on July 23, 2007, decided, inter alia, to reestablish the Monitoring Group on Somalia and directed it to continue to investigate, in coordination with relevant international agencies, all activities, including in the ﬁnancial, maritime and other sectors, which generate revenues used to commit violations of the embargo on all delivery of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, which the Security Council had established by resolution S/Res/733(1992), NOTING ALSO that the Security Council, being concerned at the continuing incidence of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia: .1

.2

on March 15, 2006, in response to resolution A.979(24), through a statement49 by the president of the Security Council, inter alia, encouraged member states of the United Nations, whose naval vessels and military aircraft operate in international waters and airspace adjacent to the coast of Somalia, to be vigilant to any incident of piracy therein and to take appropriate action to protect merchant shipping, in particular the transportation of humanitarian aid, against any such act, in line with relevant international law and further urged cooperation among all states, particularly regional states, and active prosecution of piracy offenses; and on August 20, 2007, in operative paragraph 18 of resolution S/Res/1772(2007) encouraged member states of the United Nations, whose naval vessels and military aircraft operate in international waters and airspace adjacent to the

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coast of Somalia, to be vigilant to any incident of piracy therein and to take appropriate action to protect merchant shipping, in particular the transportation of humanitarian aid, against any such act, in line with relevant international law,

NOTING WITH APPRECIATION the action taken by the secretary-general of the United Nations in response to the request of the Council, at its 98th session, in particular, to bring the Organization’s concerns to the president of the Security Council with a request to bring them to the attention of the members of the Security Council, RECOGNIZING that the particular character of the present situation in Somalia requires an exceptional response to safeguard the interests of the maritime community making use of the sea off the coast of Somalia, RECOGNIZING ALSO the strategic importance of the navigational routes along the coast of Somalia for regional and global seaborne trade and the need to ensure that they remain safe at all times, RECOGNIZING FURTHER, in view of the continued situation in Somalia giving rise to grave concern, the need for the immediate establishment of appropriate measures to protect ships sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia from piracy and armed robbery attacks, APPRECIATING the efforts of those who have responded to calls from, or have rendered assistance to, ships under attack in waters off the coast of Somalia; acknowledging the efforts of a number of international organizations in raising awareness amongst, and providing guidance for, their respective memberships and reporting to the Organization in relation to this issue; and noting with appreciation the work done by the International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce in providing the industry with warnings in relation to incidents occurring in waters off the coast of Somalia and assistance in resolving cases where ships have been hijacked and the seafarers on board have been held hostage, RESPECTING FULLY the sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and territorial integrity of Somalia and the relevant provisions of international law, in particular UNCLOS, HAVING CONSIDERED the actions taken, following the adoption of resolution A.979(24), by the Council, at its 98th regular and 24th extraordinary sessions, and by the secretary-general in the light of the prevailing situation in the waters off the coast of Somalia, 1. CONDEMNS AND DEPLORES all acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships irrespective of where such acts have occurred or may occur; 2. APPEALS to all parties which may be able to assist to take action, within the provisions of international law, to ensure that: .1 all acts or attempted acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships are terminated forthwith and any plans for committing such acts are abandoned; and

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.2 any hijacked ships, seafarers serving in them, and any other persons on board are immediately and unconditionally released and that no harm is caused to them; 3. STRONGLY URGES governments to increase their efforts to prevent and suppress, within the provisions of international law, acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships irrespective of where such acts occur and, in particular, to cooperate with other governments and international organizations, in the interests of the rule of law, safety of life at sea, and environmental protection, in relation to acts occurring or likely to occur in the waters off the coast of Somalia; 4. ALSO STRONGLY URGES governments to promptly: .1 issue, to ships entitled to ﬂy their ﬂag, as necessary, speciﬁc advice and guidance on any appropriate additional precautionary measures ships may need to put in place when sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia to protect themselves from attack, which may include, inter alia, areas to be avoided; .2 issue, to ships entitled to ﬂy their ﬂag, as necessary, advice and guidance on any measures or actions they may need to take when they are under attack, or threat of attack, whilst sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia; .3 encourage ships entitled to ﬂy their ﬂag to ensure that information on attempted attacks or on acts of piracy or armed robbery committed whilst sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia is promptly conveyed to the nearby coastal states and to the nearest most appropriate Rescue Coordination Centre; .4 provide a point of contact through which ships entitled to ﬂy their ﬂag may request advice or assistance when sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia and to which such ships can report any security concerns about other ships, movements or communications in the area; .5 bring to the attention of the secretary-general information on attempted attacks or on acts of piracy or armed robbery committed against ships entitled to ﬂy their ﬂag whilst sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia for him to take appropriate action in the circumstances; .6 encourage ships entitled to ﬂy their ﬂag to implement expeditiously, for the ship’s protection and for the protection of other ships in the vicinity, any measure or advice the nearby coastal states or any other state or competent authority may have provided; .7 establish, as necessary, plans and procedures to assist owners, managers and operators of ships entitled to ﬂy their ﬂag in the speedy resolution of hijacking cases occurring in the waters off the coast of Somalia; .8 investigate all acts or attempted acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships entitled to ﬂy their ﬂag occurring in the waters off the coast of Somalia and to report to the Organization any pertinent information; .9 take all necessary legislative, judicial and law enforcement action so as to be able, subject to national law, to receive and prosecute or extradite any pirates or suspected pirates and armed robbers arrested by warships or

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5.

6.

7.

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military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identiﬁable as being on government service; and .10 with respect to ships entitled to ﬂy their ﬂag employed by the World Food Programme or the delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, where such ships are to be escorted by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identiﬁable as being on government service, to conclude, taking into account operative paragraph 6.4, any necessary agreements with the state(s) concerned; REQUESTS governments to instruct national Rescue Coordination Centres or other agencies involved, on receipt of a report of an attack, to promptly initiate the transmission of relevant advice and warnings, through the WorldWide Navigation Warning Service, the International SafetyNet Service or otherwise, to ships sailing in the waters off the coast of Somalia so as to warn shipping in the immediate area of the attack; REQUESTS ALSO the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia to: .1 take any action it deems necessary in the circumstances to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships originating from within Somalia and thus depriving them of the possibility of using its coastline as a safe haven from where to launch their operations; .2 take appropriate action to ensure that all ships seized by pirates and armed robbers and brought into waters within its territory are released promptly and that ships sailing off the coast of Somalia do not henceforth become victims of acts of piracy or armed robbery; .3 advise the Security Council that, in response to the pressing request of the Council of the International Maritime Organization, it consents to warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identiﬁable as being on government service, operating in the Indian Ocean, entering its territorial sea when engaging in operations against pirates or suspected pirates and armed robbers endangering the safety of life at sea, in particular the safety of crews on board ships carrying, under the World Food Programme, humanitarian aid to Somalia or leaving Somali ports after having discharged their cargo, together with any conditions attached to the consent given; and .4 advise also the Security Council of its readiness to conclude, taking into account operative paragraph 4.10, any necessary agreements so as to enable warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identiﬁable as being on government service to escort ships employed by the World Food Programme for the delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia or leaving Somali ports after having discharged their cargo; CALLS UPON governments in the region to conclude, in cooperation with the Organization, and implement, as soon as possible, a regional agreement to prevent, deter, and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships; ALSO CALLS UPON all other governments, in cooperation with the Organization and as requested by those governments in the region, to assist these efforts;

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9. REQUESTS FURTHER the Secretary-General to: .1 transmit a copy of the present resolution to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for consideration and any further action he may deem appropriate; .2 continue monitoring the situation in relation to threats to ships sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia and to report to the Council, as and when appropriate, on developments and any further actions which may be required; .3 establish and maintain cooperation with the Monitoring Group on Somalia; and .4 consult with interested governments and organizations in establishing the process and means by which technical assistance can be provided to Somalia and nearby coastal states to enhance the capacity of these states to give effect to the present resolution as appropriate; 10. REQUESTS the Maritime Safety Committee to review and update, as a matter of urgency, MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1, MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 and resolution A.922(22), taking into account current trends and practices; 11. ALSO REQUESTS the Council to continue to monitor the situation in relation to threats to ships sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia and to initiate any actions which it may deem necessary to ensure the protection of seafarers and ships sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia; 12. REVOKES resolution A.979(24).

Notes 1. See J. Peter Pham, “U.S. National Interests and Africa’s Strategic Signiﬁcance,” American Foreign Policy Interests, Volume 27, Issue 1 (2005): 19–29. 2. George W. Bush, interview by Jim Lehrer, NewsHour, PBS, February 16, 2000. 3. The White House, Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary, “President Bush Creates a Department of Defense Uniﬁed Combatant Command for Africa” (February 6, 2007). 4. Princeton N. Lyman, “A Strategic Approach to Terrorism,” in Africa-U.S. Relations: Strategic Encounters, ed. Donald Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 49. 5. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002). 6. Ibid. 7. Abu Azzam al-Ansari, “Al-Qaeda tattajih nahwa Ifrikya” (“Al-Qaeda Is Moving to Africa”), Sada al-Jihad, no. 7 (June 2006): 27–30. For a full translation of the article along with analysis, see Reuven Paz and Moshe Terdman, “Africa: The Gold Mine of Al-Qaeda and Global Jihad,” PRISM Occasional Papers 4, no. 2 (June 2006): 1–6. 8. See Elizabeth Spiro Clark, “Somaliland: A Democracy under Threat,” Foreign Service Journal 83, no. 11 (November 2006): 30–38. 9. On the Islamic Courts Union takeover of Mogadishu and the ensuing crisis in the Horn of Africa, see J. Peter Pham, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations and the Subcommittee on International

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Terrorism and Nonproliferation, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations (June 29, 2006). 10. See J. Peter Pham, “Mired in Mogadishu,” World Defense Review (July 26, 2007). 11. U.S. Department of Defense, Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), “Terror Suspect Transferred to Guantanamo” (June 6, 2007). 12. The video was posted to the http://www.alhesbah.org/ Web site on September 11, 2006. 13. See J. Peter Pham, “Al-Qaeda’s Franchise in Africa,” World Defense Review (June 21, 2007). 14. See J. Peter Pham, “The Growth of Militant Islamism in East Africa,” World Defense Review (September 28, 2006). 15. See J. Peter Pham, Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs (May 10, 2007). 16. See Douglas Farah, Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror (New York: Broadway Books, 2004); also J. Peter Pham, The Sierra Leonean Tragedy: History and Global Dimensions (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2005). 17. State of the Union Address by the President (January 31, 2006). 18. See Energy Information Administration, U.S. Total Crude Oil and Products Imports (May 27, 2007). 19. See J. Peter Pham, “Nigeria: Flailing State,” World Defense Review (June 14, 2007). 20. See J. Peter Pham, “China’s African Strategy and Its Implications for U.S. Interests,” American Foreign Policy Interests 28, no. 3 (June 2006): 239-253. 21. See J. Peter Pham, “Hu’s Selling Guns to Africa,” World Defense Review (June 28, 2007). 22. See J. Peter Pham, “Securing the New Strategic Gulf,” World Defense Review (June 7, 2007). 23. International Chamber of Commerce, “IMB Piracy Report Notes Decline in Piracy (April 25, 2007). 24. See Eric Pape, “West Africa: The New ‘Drug Triangle,’” Newsweek (August 29, 2005): 25; also see J. Peter Pham, “The Security Challenge of West Africa’s New Drug Depots,” World Defense Review (July 10, 2007). 25. Marine Resources Assessment Group, Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries (July 2005). 26. The White House, The National Strategy for Maritime Security (September 20, 2005). 27. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (March 16, 2006). 28. Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), Fact Sheet (December 2006). 29. Jim Garamone, “Aircraft Attack Al Qaeda, Ike Moves off Somalia,” American Forces Press Service (January 9, 2007). 30. See J. Peter Pham, “Violence, Islamism, and Terror in the Sahel,” World Defense Review (February 22, 2007). 31. Gerry J. Gilmore, “U.S. Naval Forces Prepare for AFRICOM Stand Up,” American Forces Press Service (June 1, 2007).

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32. We deﬁned the Caribbean Basin using the boundaries established in the U.S. trade programs known collectively as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). In 1983 the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 369 (1983)), enacted the CBI into law. The CBI was substantially expanded in 2000 through the U.S.Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251 (2000)), and currently provides 24 beneﬁciary countries with duty-free access to U.S. markets. These countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. For the purposes of this letter, however, ﬁve additional countries were included: Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Suriname, and Venezuela. 33. Pub. L. No. 109–347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006). 34. The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code was adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) by the Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). In accordance with the SOLAS Convention as amended in 2002, the code establishes requirements for contracting governments of countries where ports are located, contracting governments of countries where ships are registered, operators of port facilities, and operators of vessels traveling on the high seas. Individual nations can set higher standards for facilities on their soil and for vessels registered in that country. As of November 30, 2006, there were 156 contracting governments to the SOLAS Convention. 35. Of the ﬁve countries we visited, the Coast Guard had issued ﬁnal reports of its country visits to four of them, while one had just been visited. 36. See Report on the Consultation process—COM(2007) 574. See also: Green Paper on A Future Maritime Policy for the Union: a European Vision of the Oceans and Seas— COM(2006) 275. 37. See pages 8 and 77 of UNCTAD’s Review of Maritime Transport, 2006 (http://www.unctad.org/rmt2006) for data on global container port throughput and seaborne trade. 38. 2004 data on global container port throughput and seaborne trade have been used (see UNCTAD’s Review of Maritime Transport, 2006). According to the IMO secretariat, as of October 2006, the total number of the declared ISPS port facilities amounted to 10,652. 39. See UNCTAD’s Review of Maritime Transport, 2006 (http://www.unctad.org) for 2004 data on global freight costs. The 2004 data on international maritime freight costs have been estimated by the UNCTAD secretariat to amount to about 67 percent of global freight costs. 40. UNCTAD. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Rep. 14 Mar 2007. UNCTAD Secretariat. http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/sdtetlb20071_en.pdf. 41. The operator security ofﬁcer functions may be assigned to the ship security ofﬁcer on board the ship. 42. The operator security ofﬁcer functions may be assigned to the ship security ofﬁcer on board the ship. 43. Voyages include all segmented voyages. 44. “Piracy” is deﬁned in article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as follows:

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“Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).” 45. “Armed robbery against ships” is deﬁned in the Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (resolution A.922(22), annex, paragraph 2.2), as follows: “Armed robbery against ships means any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of “piracy,” directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences.” 46. The number of the resolution will be allocated after the end of the 25th regular session of the Assembly. 47. Established by the Security Council through resolution S/Res/1519(2003) and its mandate was renewed and expanded through resolutions S/Res/1558(2004), S/Res/1587(2005), S/Res/1630(2005), S/Res/1676(2006), S/Res/1724(2006) and S/Res/1766(2007). 48. See United Nations document S/2007/436, paragraphs 89 to 91 and 118 and 119; Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution S/Res/1724(2006). 49. See United Nations document S/PRST/2006/11.

9

Private-Sector Perspectives: Industry and Trade Organizations

INTERCARGO DIRECTION PAPER International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners January 24, 2001*

I) THE REALITY As our Association ponders on ways to change the attitude of our industry, we need to reflect on the realities that it faces. These include the following:

i) Shipping Is the Oldest of the Old World Economy In a world shaken by the changes brought about by information technology and enthralled by the promises of the “New Economy,” shipping continues to *

Courtesy of Intercargo, http://www.intercargo.org/pdf/direction_paper.pdf.

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operate in a paradigm established in the beginning of the industrial age. As we witness the monumental changes in other sectors, we appear to resign ourselves to the belief that it is too difﬁcult to reinvent ourselves to the new environment. ii) The Growing Importance of Safety and Environmental Issues Public awareness and concern on safety and environmental issues has been awoken, and this awareness and concern will only increase over time. As members of the global community, shipowners share this concern. Shipowners must work within ever tightening constraints brought about by increasing public expectations in these areas. iii) “Bottom of the Food Chain” With the growing sophistication of businesses regarding “supply chain management,” pressures to reduce costs are put to bear on the entire supply chain. Unfortunately, shipping is at the bottom of this “food chain” and therefore has to bear the cumulative cost pressures of the various components. As an industry, we are subject to a vicious cycle of endless cost cutting. Take, for example, the way that cost pressure forces shipowners to press for lower shipbuilding prices. The shipyards respond by reﬁning their safety margins by exerting pressure on classiﬁcation societies. However, as owners compete, such cost savings eventually get passed on to the consumer. Over time, the liability for such corner cutting always hits the shipowning community, which ends up “carrying the baby.” iv) The Mindset Because it is so difﬁcult to achieve long-term proﬁt sustainability, many owners resort to pure speculation in freight and/or assets. Such speculative behavior forces the industry to focus on perceptions rather than concentrating on providing real services to satisfy true client needs. Everyone is forced to take a short-term view, creating instability and irrationality in the marketplace. Initiatives that could upgrade the industry in the long term are made untenable due to the drastic swings in the market. The speculative mindset of some players causes deep underlying problems for the entire industry.

v) Substandard Ships Cost pressures and inconsistent enforcement of standards give rise to substandard ships. Some owners resort to manipulating the rules, as they ﬁnd it

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cheaper to pay the penalties of noncompliance than to operate within prescribed standards. The market is too focused on rates, and there is little price differentiation based on quality. When the market does not recognize quality, it is no wonder that there are pressures to minimize standards.

vi) Challenge to Provide a Worthwhile Career The quality of the industry ultimately depends on the quality of the people in it. It is increasingly difﬁcult to draw the right caliber of entrants into the industry, both for shipboard and shore jobs. We need to improve the condition and the image of the industry so that those who serve in it can have a safe, rewarding, and fulﬁlling career.

vii) Higher Demand on Quality Concurrent with the pressures on costs is the rising expectation on performance. Quality demands on ship performance rises relentlessly even as our industry struggles with the perennial cycles of cost reduction.

II) THE INDUSTRY WE WANT All those who are committed to our industry in the long term must surely agree on the characteristics of the industry that we want:

i) Safety We want our industry to be a safe one for our crews, ships, cargo, and the environment in which we operate.

ii) Quality We want our industry to be able to deliver a high standard of service to our clients, and we want this standard to be measured not only in freight rates but also in the way we can truly provide solutions to enhance their business.

iii) Stability We want our industry to be stable. Stability enables us to think long term, and embark on upgrading and training programs. It reduces the ﬁnancial

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risks, thereby ultimately reducing the costs to our client. Stability also removes the attraction of the industry to speculative activities.

iv) Equitability Too often the risks borne by shipowners and the labor of their crews are invisible to the general public. The industry’s role in supporting the world economy and maintaining the standard of living of its people is very much undervalued. We want our industry to be accorded the right level of appreciation and to attain an equitable position among world industries.

v) Careers We want our industry to be able to provide a rewarding, safe and fulﬁlling career to those who are committed to it, so that over time it can attract its share of committed and talented new entrants.

vi) A Fair Return Shipping requires huge commitment in capital and effort. We want an industry that can provide us with a fair return, so that it makes continual sense to allocate valuable resources to it.

III) WHAT CAN BE DONE? To achieve the industry that we want, we need to embark on an agreed direction:

i) Mobilize for a More United Shipping Front For shipowners to be more clearly heard, we must all speak with one voice. To do so, we should embark on a process of consolidation. This is achieved at two levels; the coordination and integration of shipping associations, as well as the rationalization of the industry. These are not pioneering moves, for we have seen such consolidation and rationalization in many industries in order to deal with new realities. Such consolidation reduces the duplication and wastage of resources and minimizes sectors of the industry pulling in different directions. It also enhances the clarity of the viewpoints that we want to put forward.

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Consolidation also signiﬁes our determination to act collectively to bring about change—for collective action is the only way to deal with the deep rooted and complex problems of the industry.

ii) Promotion of Quality The following are the directions that we can take to promote quality in shipping:

a) Elimination of Substandard Ships Substandard ships can be eliminated only if we have a clear differentiation in quality. To achieve this, our industry should adopt common standards and take on the responsibility of self-regulation.

b) Promotion of a “Chain of Responsibility” The level of quality provided by shipowners (including areas of safety and the environment) ultimately depends on the requirement of cargo interests and the charterers. The current situation in which only the shipowner bears the onus of quality while the charterer and cargo owner make their decisions only on the basis of the freight rate, clearly leads to an inequitable division of responsibility. We need to promote an awareness of the “Chain of Responsibility,” so that the effect of the decisions by charterers, cargo owners, insurers, and bankers on the level of quality provided is transparent to all. If an incident arises because a substandard vessel is employed on the basis of cost alone, the charterer and insurance must surely also be called to account.

c) Reengineering the Infrastructure We need to “level the playing ﬁeld” by reengineering the infrastructure through which the different important international bodies and agencies come together to identify and prioritize issues, establish activities, and initiate actions on industry matters. The global economy has for some time been undergoing major structural changes. The institutions and agencies that govern our industry must also similarly change to ensure that they continue to be relevant. We need to look at the existing processes and promote changes to take better account of the shipowners’ viewpoint as well as the interdependencies that govern our industries and the wider economy beyond. We also need to promote consistency in the enforcement of international shipping

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regulation. For example, we should push for some sort of uniﬁcation of port state standards and practices.

iii) Rationalize and Coordinate Industry Development a)

b)

We need to be more aware of the effect on shipping by decisions and policies made within the maritime community. To do so, we need to set up a platform for discussion and consultation of all parties that can influence shipping: owners, charterers, cargo interests, insurers, bankers, class, port and ﬂag states, shipyards, and international agencies. We must promote a better ﬂow of information and greater transparency on the effect on shipping and the general public due to decisions and actions made in other sectors.

iv) Creating Public Awareness We need to educate the public on the importance of shipping to our daily life and to raise their awareness of the interdependencies that bind our industry and the greater economy. We should persuade the public that it is a very small price to pay to achieve quality in shipping.

v) Leadership To persuade others to accommodate the vision of the industry that we want, we must ﬁrst demonstrate that we have the determination and leadership to bring about these changes. We must also demonstrate that we can also change ourselves. We should therefore be prepared to take up the challenge of driving the self-regulation of the industry.

IV) COLLECTIVELY CHANGING THE CURRENT REALITY If we are not satisﬁed with the current reality in shipping, we can change it. But this can only be done collectively because the issues are many and the problems are entrenched. Yet, they are not insurmountable. They only require collective determination and effort. If we take the ﬁrst step, we should be able, in time, to realize the industry that we want. By deﬁnition, making long-term changes is time-consuming, but the effort can be made easier if it is undertaken by many. Through a persistent and sustained effort, Intercargo believes that it is possible to have the industry that we all seek.

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PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST SHIPPING, PORT AND MARITIME SECURITY, GUIDANCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SHIP AND PORT SECURITY PLANS International Association of Ports and Harbors and International Chamber of Shipping Maritime Safety Committee 75th Session Agenda Item 17 International Maritime Organization April 12, 2002*

1. INTRODUCTION Ports and ships have long been potential targets for criminals, and now consideration also has to be given to the use of ships and their cargoes as potential terrorist weapons. There is consequently a need to reassess existing ship and port security plans to address potential terrorist activities. Because both ships and ports differ widely in their characteristics, layout, and vulnerability, it is not practical to develop detailed and uniform standard comprehensive ship or port security plans. However, IAPH and ICS believe that it is possible to develop generic guidelines for ship operators and port facilities from which speciﬁc issues can be selected to address in respect of each port and ship, to a greater or lesser degree, threats applicable to them. To be effective, it is very important that ship, port and port facility security plans can be dovetailed together to form a comprehensive set of security measures relevant to the speciﬁc location. This document provides guidance for the development of interrelated ship, port, and port facility security plans.

2. SECURITY POLICY Shipowners, port authorities and others involved in the port industry need to consider their own responsibilities with regard to security. To accomplish this, various steps need to be taken, such as • to appoint and empower suitably senior staff members with overall responsibility for security within the port facility, shipping company and individual ship; • to assess the security risks and to minimize the implications of any incident; • to cooperate with the responsible authorities and to act on advice from those authorities; • to promote security awareness among all employees; *Courtesy of the International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH).

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• to give a commitment to provide appropriate security guidance and advice; • to establish a reporting and recording system for incidents.

In all cases, the following issues need to be addressed: • • • • • • •

responsibility for handling different types of incidents promulgation of information to other parties involved; issuing guidance or instructions to employees; liaison with other authorities; methods of communication in different circumstances; plans for handling media interest; plans for informing and supporting the relatives/next of kin of persons involved.

The approach can be visualized as follows: Awareness → Preplanning → Preparation → Prevention → Resolution → Follow-up

3. INDIVIDUAL SHIP AND PORT SECURITY PLANS Individual ship and port security plans should be developed in close cooperation with all the relevant industry stakeholders and authorities involved. Their main characteristics are that they should address either the ship or port as a whole as well as the individual components. The security plan can be considered as • deﬁning appropriate scenarios; • describing all measures that need to be taken to address those scenarios; • describing the resources available to assist the application of those measures; • describing the responsibilities of the different entities involved; • providing contingency plans in the event of incidents occurring.

The plan should address all the elements of the security chain, from awareness initiatives to the actual organization of incident combating and subsequent policy review.

4. PORT SECURITY PLAN It is essential that the overall coordination rests with a Port Security Committee in which all relevant authorities closely cooperate. Such authorities may differ from country to country, or even from port to port within a

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country, but they will almost always include the port authority, police and other law enforcement or security bodies, the justice department, customs authority, ﬁre and other emergency services, and the environmental department. It is also imperative that the Port Security Committee works closely together with port users and others located within the port environment. Such cooperation is necessary for creating awareness and involvement and to mutually develop security toolkits.

5. THE PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN The overall Port Security Plan requires the active involvement of the local port industry. Through that cooperation generic guidance should be developed for individual port facilities, terminals, industries, et cetera, so as to enable these to develop their own, custom-made Facility Security Plan. Such a plan should contain measures to increase the alertness of personnel, to counter criminal inﬁltration of the organization and to secure the company area and its installations. It should also pay attention to procedures in the event of incidents, information supply, communication and education and training of personnel.

6. THE SHIP/PORT INTERFACE An essential element in overall security is the liaison between the visiting ship and the port and the respective persons responsible for security. Between them, the following issues need to be addressed: a)

b)

The security of the immediate ship environs, quayside: • Mooring lines, linesmen, and their means of transportation • Gangway, access control of people boarding, lighting • Trafﬁc alongside the quay • Overhead equipment: cranes, other loading/discharging equipment [. . .] The security of the immediate ship environs, waterside: • Ships alongside: bunkers, water, supplies, ship/ship cargo transfer • Ship service providers, tugs [. . .]

7. SHIP SECURITY PLANS The development of ship security plans needs to be considered in respect of each individual vessel. The essential focus is the protection of the perimeter of the ship from unauthorized access and, within the vessel

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itself, the identiﬁcation and protection of secure areas, vulnerable points, and essential services. 8. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A SECURITY PLAN A number of essential elements should be addressed: • Security awareness among all relevant partners, authorities, private enterprise, and employees • Vulnerability assessment • Knowledge, experience in security matters • Cooperation • Information management • Communication

8.1. Awareness In the introductory paragraphs it is accepted that both ports and ships are susceptible to criminal activities, including acts of terrorism. However, experience shows that in general, the possibility of serious criminal activity is seldom recognized as such by an individual ship operator or port. It is necessary, therefore, to develop programs aimed at creating awareness by identifying various potential threats and their impact, in both human and economic terms. 8.2. Vulnerability Assessment Measures described in individual ship or port security plans should be directed at those areas where they are likely to have the maximum effect. For an effective security approach, it is therefore essential that risk analyses are conducted both at overall as well as an individual level. Weak spots, both in a physical sense and in an organizational sense, should be revealed through the analysis process. Vulnerability assessments should be carried out at regular intervals. 8.3. Knowledge and Experience Knowledge and experience in security issues are essential elements for a successful approach. These elements are usually not available at individual company level. By establishing a network in which all relevant authorities participate, this deﬁciency can be addressed. Such a network may serve as a central platform for addressing complex security issues and could also facilitate education and training of port facility personnel. Care needs to be taken to secure the integrity of the information handled through the network.

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8.4. Cooperation Port and ship security is a complex issue which requires close and intensive cooperation between all the actors involved. This will range from local cooperation between the port industry, port users, and authorities to international cooperation between authorities and ports, port organizations, and the shipping industry. Cooperation between the port users and service providers in the port is essential. Port users include visiting ships, passengers boarding and disembarking and cargo or stores deliverers and collectors. Service providers are often the ﬁrst to personally contact the ship and its crew. Pilots, tug boat companies, linesmen and suppliers of other services such as stevedores, and those providing other services to ships such as drinking water and bunkers, should be aware of the potential threats and of ways of handling such situations. 8.5. Information Management An effective security system requires high-quality information and information exchange. Accurate and timely information is crucial for the identiﬁcation of potential threats and for taking the proper countermeasures. It is necessary to lay the prime responsibility for information collection, interpretation, and dissemination with an identiﬁed and experienced organization such as the police or other security organizations. This focal point should maintain close contact with relevant national authorities as well as local parties in the port area, both authorities and industry. In the case of ships, the ﬂag state has responsibilities here. 8.6. Communication Proper and unambiguous information to all relevant parties, including the population in areas adjacent to the port, and the personnel involved with the ship, is of importance in order to create a ﬁrm basis for the measures to be taken. A communication plan should therefore be part of the port, ship operator, or ship security plan. At regular intervals all relevant parties should be informed about security projects without endangering the integrity of these plans by disclosing sensitive details. 9. PREVENTIVE MEASURES Preventive measures must be taken on the basis of local circumstances. They should be aimed at protection of the ship, the port and its industrial complex as well as persons on board (passengers and crew) and ashore (port

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personnel and others potentially affected). Issues to be considered include the following: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Brieﬁng the personnel involved Access control, personal identiﬁcation, and authorization Liaison with port security Threat assessment in respect of stowaways, drug trafﬁcking, terrorism, other unlawful activity, civil unrest The identiﬁcation and protection of secure areas The identiﬁcation and protection of vulnerable areas/facilities or essential services Lighting arrangements Alarm systems The provision and role of security personnel Contingency plans in the event of unauthorized boarding, bomb threat, suspicious packages Searching—for stowaway, drugs, explosive devices Notiﬁcation to authorities and others Ship to shore communications Reporting procedures Reaction to incidents Training of personnel The provision of security equipment

10. ACTION TO BE TAKEN The Committee is requested to note the views of IAPH and ICS on the concept of developing generic ship, port, and port facility security plans and to endorse this approach.

PORT AND MARITIME SECURITY International Association of Ports and Harbors IAPH Policy and Guidance Paper April 23, 2002*

1. INTRODUCTION The world in which we live and conduct our business is subject to rapid change. Globalization and liberalization of trade accelerate that process. Open frontiers lead to less involvement and control of regulatory authorities and

*

Courtesy of the International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH).

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all elements in the logistic chain can be potential targets for illegitimate organizations. However, since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, consideration has also to be given to the use of ships and their cargoes as potential terrorist weapons. There is consequently a need to reassess existing ship and related port security plans to address potential terrorist activities. This is all the more important in view of the economic importance of most ports for their national economy. Ship security is the responsibility of international organizations such as the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), and proposals to that effect have been prepared by them. Port security is ﬁrst and foremost a responsibility for the Port Authority and an issue that is dealt with in IAPH. Ports differ widely in their characteristics, layout, and vulnerability, and it is therefore not practical to develop detailed and uniform standard comprehensive port security plans. However, IAPH believes that it is possible to develop generic guidelines for port authorities from which speciﬁc issues can be selected to address in respect to each port, to a greater or lesser degree, threats applicable to them. This paper provides guidance on these issues. To be effective, it is very important that ship and port security plans can be dovetailed together to form a comprehensive set of security measures relevant to the speciﬁc location. Guidance thereon is contained in the joint ICS/IAPH submission to IMO. Port authorities are usually the main orchestrator of their port as a logistic nodal point and as such they can provide a valuable contribution to the establishment of an integral port and maritime security policy. Such a policy should address the source of the potential threats as well as minimization of the effects. The approach can be visualized as follows: Sensitization → Pro-action → Prevention → Preparation → Repression → Aftercare

2. PORT SECURITY POLICY The port’s security policy should be developed in close cooperation of all the authorities involved. Its main characteristic is that it addresses two main elements: the port area as a whole and the individual companies operating in the port.

1. Multidisciplinary (Overall) Port Security Plan The overall port security plan can be considered to be the scenario, describing all measures that need to be taken with regard to the security of the port

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as a whole. Apart from a description of the measurers and the facilities available for these measures, it should also contain a description of the division of responsibilities of the different actors. The plan should address all the elements of the security chain, from sensitization initiatives (creating awareness) to the actual organization of incident combating and cyclic policy review. It is essential that the overall coordination rests with a port security committee in which all relevant authorities closely cooperate. These may differ from country (port) to port, but they will almost always include the port authority, police, justice department, customs, ﬁre brigade, medical services, and the environmental department. It is also imperative that this port security committee works closely together with the local port industry. That cooperation is necessary for creating awareness and involvement and to mutually develop security toolkits.

2. Port Facility Security Plans As said, the overall Port Security Plan requires the active involvement of the local port industry. Through that cooperation generic guidance should be developed for the individual port facilities, terminals, industries, and so on, so as to enable these to develop their own custom made Facility Security Plan. Such a plan should contain measures to increase the alertness of personnel, to counter criminal inﬁltration of the organization, secure the company area and its installations. It should also pay attention to procedures for calamities, information supply, communication and education and training of personnel.

3. Essential Conditions for a Successful Port Security Plan The approach as described before requires a number of essential conditions in order to be successful. • • • • • •

Awareness among all relevant partners, authorities, and private enterprise Vulnerability assessment Knowledge, experience in security matters Cooperation Information management Communication

4. Awareness In the introductory paragraphs it is argued that ports are susceptible to criminal activities, including acts of terrorism. However, experience shows

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that in general, this is not experienced as such in the average port industrial community. As a result, there is no or insufﬁcient basis for initiating activities, investing funds, and cooperating with other actors. For that reason it is necessary to develop a program aimed at creating awareness among the industry by explaining the various potential threats, in terms of calamities as well as economic damage.

5. Vulnerability Assessment It will be clear that the measures described in the Port or Facility Security Plan should be directed at those areas where they are likely to have the maximum effect. For an effective security approach it is therefore essential that risk analyses are conducted both at overall port level as well as on individual port facility level. Weak spots, both in a physical sense and in an organizational sense, should be made visible through the analysis process. Vulnerability assessments should be carried out at regular intervals and be part of the management process of the port or the port facility.

6. Knowledge and Experience Knowledge and experience in security issues are essential elements for a successful approach. These elements are usually not available at individual company level. By establishing a Knowledge Center in which all relevant authorities cooperate, and make their knowledge and experience available to the local port industries, this deﬁciency can be remedied. Such Knowledge Center may also serve as central platform for addressing complex security issues and could also facilitate education and training of port facility personnel. Obviously care should be taken at securing the integrity of the information handled through the Knowledge Center.

7. Cooperation The nature of port security is very complex, and it therefore requires close and intensive cooperation between all actors involved. This will range from local cooperation between the port industry and authorities to international cooperation between authorities and ports and port organizations. In this context cooperation between the service providers in the port should be addressed. These service providers are often the ﬁrst to personally contact the ship and its crew. Pilots, tugboat companies, linesmen, and suppliers of other services such as drinking water and bunkers should be trained in identifying potential danger and in ways to handle such situations.

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8. Information Management An effective security system requires high quality information and information exchange. Accurate and timely information is crucial for the identiﬁcation of potential threats and for taking the proper countermeasures. It is necessary to lay the responsibility for information collection, interpretation, and dissemination with an experienced organization such as the police. This focal point should maintain close contact with relevant national authorities as well as local parties in the port area, both authorities and industry.

9. Communication Proper and unambiguous information to the relevant parties, including the population in areas adjacent to the port is of importance in order to create a ﬁrm basis for the measures to be taken. A communication plan should therefore be part of the Port Security Plan. At regular intervals the population should be informed about security projects without endangering the integrity of these plans by disclosing sensitive details.

10. Preventive Measures Preventive measures must be taken on the basis of local circumstances. They are aimed at protection of the port and its industrial complex as well as persons on board (passengers and crew) and ashore (port personnel and inhabitants of nearby living quarters).

11. Cargo Inspections Cargo inspections aimed at identifying weapons, drugs, explosives, and other matters of a threatening nature. Rather than inspect cargo at random, inspections should be targeted. Targets will be established on the basis of document checks in combination with a system of risk analysis. This will enhance the probability that targeted cargo proves to be noncompliant with regulations or to contain contraband. Because containers are considered to be most susceptible to criminal activities, special attention should be paid to containerized cargo. Suitable equipment is x-ray machines, portable detection equipment, and sniffer dogs. In order not to disturb the logistic process in an unacceptable manner, the number of physical checks should be carefully chosen. Percentages will differ from port to port,

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but experience has shown that even a limited percentage, coupled with a targeted approach based on risk analysis, can provide an acceptable security level.

12. Identiﬁcation Check of Passengers and Crews In most cases the responsibility for checking the identiﬁcation of both crews and passengers rests with the seaport police or the immigration authorities. For passengers this will involve a passport check. For crew members an identity card based on the provisions of ILO will serve as a suitable identity document.

13. Identiﬁcation Check of Port Personnel For personnel engaged in the port industry, this issue should be part of the facility or industry security plan. For personnel engaged in security enforcement: To be developed.

14. Integration with Maritime Security A Port Security Plan is not enough to guarantee security and reliability throughout the total logistic chain, including the hinterland of the port and the sea transport. To that end, similar measures, as described above, need to be developed for the individual links throughout the logistic chain.

15. Concluding Remarks Regarding sea transport, including the immediate ship/shore interface, IMO is presently developing international regulations that should be endorsed at a diplomatic conference in November or December 2002. It will be essential that regulations relating to maritime security dovetail with port and port facility security plans. Close cooperation of all international actors is necessary to ensure the establishment of effective measures to ensure maritime security both at sea and in ports and their hinterland. IAPH is dedicated to play an active role in this process. This document should provide the basis for generic guidance for ports to develop their own custom made security plans based on their particular characteristics.

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BIMCO’S VISION AND OBJECTIVES The Baltic and International Maritime Council June 17, 2004*

BIMCO’S VISION To be the leading interest group and membership organization offering practical and tangible services to shipowners, managers, brokers, agents, operators, associations, and other entities connected with the international shipping industry.

BIMCO’S OBJECTIVES BIMCO’s aim is that of free trade, access to markets, trade facilitation and harmonization, promotion of quality, and safety plus security. BIMCO’s focus is on the promotion of high shipping standards and support of existing measures to ensure quality shipping as well as the standardization of regulations and the implementation thereof on a worldwide basis. BIMCO is to consolidate its position as the recognized leader in the production of standard documents for the maritime industry, thus providing a tangible contribution to trade facilitation and harmonization of the shipping industry. BIMCO is to continue to provide core services such as intervention, charter party advice, IT products, and training courses as well as maritime, portrelated, and company information. BIMCO is to actively continue to urge ﬁrm and timely action against those engaged in the breach of ship and crew security, piracy and armed robbery, smuggling, refugee transportation, and, last but not least, terrorism. BIMCO is to endeavor to retain its proﬁle as a private, independent, nonpolitical organization and be thus recognized by governments and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. When relevant issues arise, BIMCO is to make a strong case on behalf of its members and the shipping industry thereby becoming part of the process, also through the media. BIMCO is to ensure that the industry’s position and pragmatic solutions are brought to the attention of the United States, the EU, and other global maritime authorities. BIMCO is to continue to maintain contact with other maritime organizations, associations, and interest groups in order to seek, when necessary, mutual understanding and cooperation on industry matters. BIMCO’s resources are to be focused on the key areas, which provide the most beneﬁts to members. *

Courtesy of Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO)

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE IFSMA International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations October 2004*

IFSMA was formed in 1974 by eight European Shipmasters’ Associations to unite the world’s serving shipmasters into a single professional coordinated body. It is a non-proﬁt-making apolitical organization dedicated solely to the interest of the serving shipmaster. The Federation is formed of over 8,000 shipmasters from about 60 countries either through their national associations or as individual members. Established to uphold International Standards of Professional Competence for Seafarers, IFSMA is a Federation with a policy to ensure Safe Operational Practices, Preservation from Human Injury, Protection of the Marine Environment, and Safety of Life and Property at Sea. The structure of IFSMA is explained in the statutes and bylaws of the Federation. The responsibility of the functioning of the Federation is vested in the Executive Council, which comprises a president, a deputy president, and ﬁve vice presidents, who are elected by the members. Further assistance is given by the secretariat, which at present comprises a secretary-general, a deputy secretary-general, and an administration ofﬁcer. With its Headquarters in London, IFSMA’s secretariat is located close to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). In 1975, IFSMA was granted consultative status as a nongovernmental organization at IMO, which enables the Federation to represent the views and protect the interests of the serving shipmasters unfettered and unﬁltered by others. To enable IFSMA to function effectively at IMO, it is represented by the secretary-general and a team of active or former shipmasters who attend the four main committees, namely the Maritime Safety Committee, the Maritime Environmental Protection Committee, the Legal Committee, and the Facilitation Committee. This team is also active in the nine subcommittees of IMO and their working and drafting groups as well as attending the council meetings and the assemblies. IFSMA has always tried to support IMO in practical ways and has provided consultants to assist in the Comprehensive Review and Revision of the 1978 STCW Convention, and actively participated in the Joint ICAO/IMO Group of Experts on the Harmonization of Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue. IFSMA also sat on the Steering Committee on Ro-Ro Ferry Safety which supervised the work of the panel of experts and made recommendations to MSC 65. IFSMA also provided two maritime specialists forming part of an IMO needs assessment and programming team within the framework of IMO’s Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme (ITCP). *

Courtesy of the International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations.

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IFSMA has a history of submitting relevant papers on various aspects to the committees and subcommittees of IMO, which often result in successful debates leading to MSC circulars and improvements in various instruments. IFSMA is a strong supporter of IMO in its quest for security, safer shipping, and cleaner oceans. It is the desire of the Federation to assist IMO in achieving a truly global implementation and rigorous enforcement of its international treaties so that there is no need for any country to resort to regulatory measures on either a national or a regional basis. IFSMA fully recognizes the need to establish a strong improved safety culture within the shipping industry and the early implementation of both the ISM Code and the 1995 amendments to the STW Convention. IFSMA members are provided with the facility to access the IMO documents Web site for research and information purposes. IFSMA has long held the ﬁrm belief that shipowners and ship management companies should hold a Safety Management System (SMS) and Document of Compliance (DOC) issued by the Flag State Administration before being permitted to operate ships, that increased scrapping of antiquated and substandard ships should be speeded up, and that worldwide regional port state control is now a top priority. In particular there should be a total ban, effective worldwide, on the reregistration of ships for commercial trading once they have been sold for scrap and demolition. IFSMA also participates in the deliberations at the International Labour Organization (ILO) where there is work at present with the merger of all previous conventions and recommendations regarding seafarers into a new Super International Maritime Labour Convention. IFSMA is also asked by various bodies all over the world to participate in seminars and conferences and to produce training and educational courses. Furthermore IFSMA is conscious of the needs for shipmasters in the future and has joined with the Nautical Institute, Trinity House, and the Honourable Company of Master Mariners in organizing a Command Seminar. This seminar is arranged every 2 years and visits a number of maritime centers around the world to seek the views of both mariners and the industry and how shipmasters should be prepared to meet the needs of the twenty-ﬁrst century. IFSMA deﬁnes shipmasters as those who are in possession of an internationally recognized Certiﬁcate of Competency, issued by the government of an established maritime nation who are serving, or have previously served, in command of seagoing ships whether or not engaged upon international or domestic trade. Once a man has risen to the rank of shipmaster he is entitled to belong to IFSMA and there is no requirement in our statutes for the periodic revalidation of his Certiﬁcate of Competency. But if he were to lose his license due to negligence, incompetence, or misconduct, then he would no longer qualify for membership of the Federation. Trade unions, national associations, professional institutes, and learned societies are all (when representing shipmasters) equally welcome as organizations in afﬁliation with IFSMA, and there is no distinction made between them.

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REMARKS OF CHRISTOPHER KOCH President and CEO, World Shipping Council Before the Maritime Security Expo 2006 New York City September 19, 2006*

I appreciate the opportunity to address this ﬁfth annual Maritime Security Expo and provide some comments on the state of maritime security initiatives and the international liner shipping industry. The year 2006 has demonstrated that world trade volumes continue to grow at a rapid pace, that the transportation infrastructure handling these volumes is often operating at or close to capacity, that further efﬁciencies, speed and investment are needed to handle future trade volumes, and that the efforts and the need to enhance maritime and containerized cargo security are a continuing obligation and challenge. In the limited time available this morning, I would like to brieﬂy touch on security policy developments in both the United States and the European Union.

I. U.S. DEVELOPMENTS Maritime Security The basic architecture of U.S. maritime security is well known and understandable. First, there is vessel and port security, overseen by the Coast Guard and guided in large measure by the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS). Second, there is personnel security, overseen by various Department of Homeland Security agencies and the State Department. Third, is cargo security, which in regards to containerized cargo is addressed through the well-known “three legged stool” of Customs and Border Protection’s 24-Hour Rule advance cargo screening initiative, C-TPAT, and the Container Security Initiative—all of which are reinforced and made more effective by the increased deployment of container inspection technology at U.S. and foreign ports. The liner shipping industry’s operations are consistent and repetitive—its vessel services and crews call at the same ports every week. So long as there is consistent and professional implementation of the security rules, which is a hallmark of the Coast Guard, liner shipping has found no problem in operating in the new vessel or port security environment. We also appreciate the Coast Guard Commandant’s admonition that the “concept of maritime security cannot be reduced to a single threat vector.” There are numerous potential vectors for terrorists attack on the maritime *

http://www.worldshipping.org/maritime_expo_speech.pdf

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environment that don’t involve cargo containers. For example, merchant vessels are in fact defenseless against small boat attacks. We fully support the Coast Guard in its efforts to secure an enormous Maritime Domain against a variety of risks.

Personnel Security Personnel security is one of the more active areas of DHS attention and development, for fairly obvious reasons. The most signiﬁcant and difﬁcult new undertaking in this regard is the Transport Worker Identiﬁcation Credential (TWIC). Before touching on that, I would like to brieﬂy address the continued criticism from some quarters of the U.S. government’s treatment of seafarers, its unwillingness to accept the recent ILO Convention’s seafarer credential, and its insistence on an individual visa for seafarers who wish to enter the country. The fair and humane treatment of seafarers is an important issue and deserves serious consideration by industry and government. However, it is no more correct to argue that the government is characterizing seafarers as “potential terrorists” than it is to say that the government is treating all 11 million nonimmigrant visitors to the United States from non-visa-waiver countries as “potential terrorists.” All such persons, plus any foreign individual in the United States for work or educational reasons, are required to be in possession of individual visas that are issued after personal interviews and the collection of biometrics at U.S. diplomatic posts. The government, as directed by U.S. statutes, is requiring visitors to have proper government credentials for entry into the country, and is improving its monitoring of people entering and exiting the country though the U.S. VISIT program as strongly advocated by the 9/11 Commission Report and other security advisors, while at the same time trying to address the potential terrorist threat to shipping. In the last three years, nearly 700 persons have illegally entered the United States as seafarers illegally absconding or deserting their ship. While it is true that this number may be less than the number of people illegally crossing the Mexican border in a day, it is also true that the maritime industry has shown itself to be a potential vector of illegal immigration. Nations do have a legitimate interest in trying to devise effective ways to check who is crossing their borders. In that regard, a foreign seafarer is not different from a foreign airline pilot, businessman, student, or artist. Seafarers have been clearly advised by the government to obtain visas in order to obtain shore leave. That requirement is unlikely to change. Those who do have valid visas are generally treated professionally and courteously and given shore privileges. For those who do not have visas, the U.S. government has made it clear that the proposed ILO seafarer credential cannot become a substitute for a visa. The government has made that determination because of

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the biometrics used in the credential, and the government’s insistence that personal interviews are essential for screening out undesirable foreign visitors. Because liner shipping vessels operate on regular schedules, their crews know in advance if they are coming to the United States and whether they will need a visa. For those seafarers aboard vessels who do not know the vessel will call at the United States until after they sign on and do not have the necessary visa, one can and should sympathize with their desire to obtain shore leave when they arrive. As a way to try to address this concern, the State Department has stated that seafarers who don’t know for certain but may be working on ships that will call at U.S. ports may apply for a visa. Improving the lot of these seafarers will require new ideas and a cooperative environment for the exchange of such ideas. The Council welcomes that the State Department has started an outreach to industry about these issues, and we are committed to offer our assistance wherever needed and relevant. For U.S. shore-based maritime workers, the current initiative by the Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to devise and implement the TWIC system involves one of the more difﬁcult and important maritime security challenges the industry has faced in recent years. Making sure that every port worker, every truck driver, and every other regular employee entering a secure port area has a proper TSA-approved security credential that can be efﬁciently and effectively read, under normal maritime operating conditions, with appropriate biometrics and matched against appropriate databases is an enormous task. To devise such a system that can work in all of the various maritime industry sectors, from offshore oil and gas, to inland waterways, to seasonal industries, to container terminals will require a close and cooperative partnership of industry and government. The liner shipping industry and the marine terminal operators who service the liner shipping industry have all consistently supported the TWIC concept and its implementation. However, as the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee recently advised the Department of Homeland Security, this program must be implemented carefully and correctly the ﬁrst time. Addressing the technology issues associated with the TWIC and the TWIC readers, increasing the clarity of who must obtain a TWIC, and addressing the various real world implementation issues that different sectors of the industry face will require a steady, careful implementation and dialogue with the industry.

Container Security CBP’s basic container security strategy—to perform cargo shipment security risk assessment before vessel loading, to cooperate with the governments of trading partners though agreements negotiated via the Container Security Initiative, to enhance security of supply chains via C-TPAT, and to

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scan all arriving containers for radiation and to inspect any other shipment considered potentially risky with nonintrusive technology—is fundamentally sound. It also must mature and improve. How and in what way should that occur? Two improvements under development and review are entirely appropriate, needed, and important. One is the acquisition of better cargo shipment data for cargo screening and risk assessment. Another is the expanded piloting and use of radiation and density container inspection technology.

1. Improving Risk Assessment Data The DHS strategy of using risk assessment and targeting techniques to review all containerized cargo shipments before vessel loading is logical from a security, an operational, and a practical perspective. The liner shipping industry fully supports it. But the Congress, DHS, and the industry all recognize that reliance on ocean carriers’ cargo manifest data, while a ﬁne start, has substantial shortcomings. The present system provides either no or unreliable data regarding the commercial parties involved in buying and selling the goods, where the goods are originating and who produced or supplied them, where the goods are ultimately going, and where and by whom the container was stuffed. The data submitted to the government’s cargo risk assessment system should be enhanced. Cargo manifest data should be supplemented in order to provide better security risk assessment capabilities. Currently, there is no data that is required to be ﬁled into the government’s container shipment targeting system by the U.S. importer or the foreign exporter that can be used in the pre-vessel-loading security screening process. This occurs, even though these parties or their agents possess shipment data that government ofﬁcials believe would have security risk assessment relevance that is not available in the carriers’ manifest ﬁlings, and notwithstanding the fact that the law requires the cargo security screening and evaluation system to be conducted “prior to loading in a foreign port.” Accordingly, CBP has been working on an initiative to improve its targeting and risk assessment capabilities—called the “10 plus 2” initiative, because it would require 10 data elements to be submitted by importers or their agents 24 hours before vessel loading, and 2 additional data streams from carriers or their agents. Implementation of “10 plus 2” would not be simple or cost-free, but the security logic of the proposal is obvious. A system that bases the nation’s container security screening strategy on the information in a carriers’ bill of lading will continue to be the subject of legitimate criticism from Congress, the Inspector General, Government

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Accountability Ofﬁce, and anyone else performing a critical analysis of present security tools. There are some challenging issues to make this plan a success, including the following: • Developing clear deﬁnitions of the data to be provided (e.g., is it the “manufacturer” of the goods or the “supplier” of the goods?) • Determining what Customs information system will be used for the transmission of the data to CBP • Determining who will be authorized and trusted, and under what criteria, to submit the shipment data into Customs data systems

As CBP continues to develop the speciﬁcs of this proposed concept, it will be important for the various parts of the import business community to come together in a way that will help CBP make this program a success. Ocean carrier members of the Council have already begun pilot efforts with CBP on the “2” data streams of interest to CBP from the maritime sector. A ﬁnal point regarding this initiative is its relationship to trade continuity in the event of a transportation security incident involving containers. Although this initiative is needed to improve the government’s ability to detect security questions and to prevent them from disrupting commerce or threatening populations, it could also be very important in the event the government had to manage the consequences of a major maritime security incident involving a container. The “10 plus 2” initiative would greatly enhance the government and industry’s ability to analyze and respond to what may have happened, and to determine what trade may be allowed to continue— an issue the trade community insists is a priority concern. If the trade community wants the government to allow its imports to face little delay in such difﬁcult circumstances, it should make a priority of determining how to provide the government with the additional data it will need to be conﬁdent of the security of the cargo shipments. Although “10 plus 2” will not solve all containerized cargo security concerns, there is no convincing reason for CBP’s pre-vessel-loading container risk assessment system to continue relying on the limited information it has access to today.

2. Improved Container Inspection Capabilities CBP and the Department of Energy’s Megaports project deserve considerable credit for the effective improvement and expanded deployment of container inspection technology without substantially disrupting the ﬂow of commerce. With respect to the priority risk—detecting radiological and nuclear materials—CBP’s strategy is to perform radiation scanning on virtually all containers entering the United States. Presently, roughly 68 percent of inbound

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ocean containers are scanned for radiation, and CBP expects to get that close to 100 percent by the end of next year. In addition, DHS is working to improve the quality of the radiation detection equipment being used, with its July announcement of the award of Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program contracts totaling $1.157 billion to enhance the detection of radiological and nuclear material. In addition to the objective of scanning all containers for radiation, CBP performs a density image inspection of all containers that its container targeting system identiﬁes as presenting any signiﬁcant potential risk using nonintrusive inspective (NII) equipment. Thus, the government is making substantial progress on its objective of inspecting every inbound container for radiation, and every container that its targeting system says may present a security risk with an NII or physical exam. The obvious limitation of these efforts is that the vast majority of these inspections are occurring after the vessel and cargo are in the United States at the port of discharge, whereas the ideal state would be for any such inspection to occur before the container is loaded aboard a vessel. It is for that reason that the Department of Homeland Security, with the support of Congress, is moving ahead with increased pilot testing of its advanced overseas screening initiative, which will seek to undertake radiation and NII image capturing of all containers before vessel loading at select foreign marine terminals. This too is a laudable strategy and direction. The “pilot” done to date—which most observers know as the Integrated Container Inspection System or “ICIS” operated at two Hong Kong marine terminals—provided a public relations boost to the concept; however, it did not even try to address the difﬁcult, real world operational issues that hopefully this next round of pilots will begin to address. ICIS captured images from Radiation Portal Monitors and NII equipment of the containers entering the terminal gate, but did nothing with them. No analysis of the images was performed. No actions were generated. No transshipped containers were scanned. No containers were delayed or had follow-up exams. No space in the marine terminal had to be set aside for secondary inspections. No demands on the foreign customs authorities to inspect containers were generated. No protocols with the host government were negotiated. The promise of the advanced overseas screening initiative pilots is that they can analyze and try to address the realities that would arise from the concept’s real world implementation, namely: • Negotiating the necessary agreements and protocols with the host government customs authorities • Agreeing how to efﬁciently address and resolve radiation readings or other questions about shipments prior to vessel loading—a common occurrence • Addressing health and safety issues involved in the deployment of such technology • Addressing terminal operator liability and cost acceptance, and

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• Determining how to efﬁciently scan transshipped containers that don’t enter the marine terminal via a gate, such as transshipped cargoes.

3. Why Are These Container Security Initiatives Important? On any given day, on average, approximately 370,000 containers of cargo are loaded aboard vessels that are under way and en route to the United States. Those containers and the ships they are on utilize approximately one-third of all the vessel capacity serving U.S. international containerized commerce. If the government does not have confidence that the pre-vessel-loading security screening of containerized cargo under the “24-Hour Rule” is adequate, and the vessel capacity bound for the United States were to have significant restrictions placed on its operations because of security concerns about containers that have already been permitted to be loaded onto them, there would be substantial, adverse consequences to the import and export transportation network and global supply chains. Furthermore, for every day the government cannot provide assured instruction regarding what can be reliably loaded onto and discharged from the remaining two-thirds of the industry’s vessel capacity, the problem would grow. It is for this reason that the World Shipping Council and the liner shipping industry continue to support development of a more robust and reliable prevessel-loading cargo screening capacity, including: 1.

2.

Customs’ obtaining more complete shipment data from cargo interests before vessel loading to be used in the container security screening and targeting process. The carrier’s bill of lading data provided to Customs under the 24-Hour Rule is an important component of effective targeting, but no critical examination ﬁnds it to be adequate by itself, and Close examination of the feasibility and merits of implementing an advanced overseas container inspection system and strategy, which uses gamma ray nonintrusive inspection technology and radiation scanning technology on containers before vessel loading.

4. Container Seals and CSDs: No proposed rulemaking has emerged from the Department of Homeland Security regarding container seal veriﬁcation or “smart box” devices. Initially, both government ofﬁcials and industry thought that a seal veriﬁcation rule might be a valuable container security tool. After extensive analysis, however, this is an idea which sounds initially attractive, but in fact would probably provide marginal, if any, security protection in either the prevention or detection of a terrorist risk in a container. It would be difﬁcult and expensive to

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implement, yet would not help answer the important and most relevant question: What is in the container? Some of the reasons why DHS ofﬁcials have expressed substantial reservations about the value or desirability of such a rulemaking include the following. First, a container seal veriﬁcation requirement could not be realistically implemented without the deployment of technology on a global scale. In order to prepare for the possibility of a U.S. regulation on this issue, the Council and its member shipping lines have been working to help develop standards at the International Standards Organization for RFID container seal technology for over two years. We expect that a standard should be approved by the end of this year and will succeed in being a nonproprietary standard using two radio frequencies. However, the necessary reading infrastructure for RFID container technology requires a global infrastructure of thousands of readers placed at transportation choke points and ports in many different countries around the world. That would be a huge challenge for an infrastructure controlled by thousands of unrelated parties. The deployment of RFID container technology, dependent on ﬁxed readers at thousands of locations around the world, faces real challenges. Developers of satellite-based CSDs fully understand that point and hope to develop a product that can overcome these problems. That kind of container technology—in contrast to RFID, which is tied to the problem of ﬁxed readers—may also be able to establish commercial supply chain management beneﬁts with respect to container tracking and real-time event notiﬁcation. Such technology, however, has not yet proven to be commercially available at an affordable price. Second, even if one were to succeed in building such a global RFID container device reading infrastructure, what would it tell you? Somebody opened the container door. This happens thousands of times a year, usually by customs authorities, and every one of these anomalies would require the container shipment to be stopped while an investigation addressed the issue. This fact, plus the uncertain number of false alarms that such devices may generate, would cause many containers to be stopped for an undetermined time. That would probably be acceptable if the result were an assurance the container had nothing bad in it. But that would not likely be the result from such technology. Although it is conceivable that al-Qaeda would decide to intercept a container shipment already in transit and insert what it intended to ship inside in the hope that it would not be detected, most security experts think that if terrorists were to use a container, they would be involved in the container stuffing origin of the shipment, and almost certainly afﬁx appropriate container seals or devices to the container. Third, contrary to many container device marketing efforts, such devices have not been shown to have signiﬁcant supply chain management beneﬁts to commercial shippers. Furthermore, a number of the technology vendors

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interested in such products apparently can only ﬁnd a proﬁt if they capture the devices’ readings in a proprietary data network that they control and resell—a proposition that has clearly received little interest or support from container owners or from their customers. Any proposal for container seal veriﬁcation or for application of container security devices warrants a much more detailed dialogue with carriers and shippers than has occurred to date, and a clear demonstration by the government that the effort is a security priority worth the effort. Although the merits and shortcomings of container seals and CSDs can and will continue to be debated, there is no question that CBP’s focus on the two ambitious strategies discussed earlier—better shipment data for better container targeting capability, and more complete inspection and scanning of containers—is a prudent and well-considered ordering of priorities, which have a far better chance of providing antiterrorist protection than devices attached to boxes that can’t tell you “what’s in the box.”

II. EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS The European Council of Ministers last year approved a regulation for the Community-wide application of advance ocean container security screening and of Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) programs for both security and trade facilitation purposes. These programs would be analogous, but not identical, to the “24-Hour Rule” and C-TPAT programs in the United States. Since then, the European Commission has been working to develop regulations that the 25 EU member states would be required to implement regarding these matters. The most recent draft of the implementing regulation (Commission Regulation 1250), which has been the subject of extensive discussion with the EU member states and with industry, would become effective on July 1, 2009. The AEO program would become effective in all EU Member States on July 1, 2007. The European Union’s basic strategy appears to be properly focused on building advance containerized cargo screening or risk assessment capabilities that can be applied 24 hours before vessel loading, and on improving importers’ supply chain security through voluntary AEO programs. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the European Commission’s most recent draft of these regulations has chosen an approach for the implementation of that strategy that contains a fundamental ﬂaw and will not meet the stated objective of effectively enhancing the EU’s cargo risk assessment capabilities. The most signiﬁcant problem with the pending draft of Regulation 1250 is that it includes a conscious decision to not require freight forwarders (NVOCCs under U.S. regulations)1 to ﬁle advance summary declarations (or manifest information) for the shipments they control under their own bills of lading.

590

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Only ocean carriers would be required to ﬁle pre-vessel-loading summary declarations to European national Customs administrations for containerized cargo risk assessment purposes under this 24-Hour Rule. The EU governments’ cargo risk assessment system would thus have no meaningful visibility into forwarder-controlled shipments, making the entire container security screening effort and the associated costs for ocean carriers and national Customs administrations an empty exercise from a security perspective. Under the present draft, European customs authorities would get the appropriate advance manifest information from ocean carriers for their shipments, but they would have no insight into those containers controlled by freight forwarders. Advance risk assessment for those forwarder-controlled shipments— which can constitute the majority of the shipments on some voyages—would thus be based only on knowing, from the ocean carrier’s information ﬁlings, that a particular freight forwarder was controlling the carriage of various goods from Port A to Port B for undisclosed parties to undisclosed parties. There would be no insight into who the underlying shippers or consignees of the goods really are, or the origins or destinations of the goods. In taking this approach in the current draft regulations, the Commission has to date rejected the industry proposals that the WSC submitted, jointly with the European Community Shipowners Association (ECSA), the European Shippers Council (ESC), the European freight forwarders (FFI), the international aviation industry (IATA) and the international road transport industry (IRU). The industry’s recommendation has been that freight forwarders should be obligated to ﬁle advance pre-vessel-loading summary declarations for the shipments they control, just as ocean carriers are obligated to do. This would be in conformance with international practice and with the guidelines approved—with the European Commission’s support—by the World Customs Organization (WCO), and consistent with advance cargo security screening logic. This approach has been implemented and demonstrated to work satisfactorily under the U.S. and the Canadian 24-Hour Rules. The Commission has not provided any security-based reasons for rejecting the joint industry ﬁling proposals, other than forwarder ﬁling would make things more complicated and involve more data. This, however, is not very convincing. Customs authorities are responsible for reviewing and processing customs entry of thousands of shipments on every arriving vessel. It hardly seems plausible that these same authorities could not establish an automated system that could accommodate the ﬁling of freight forwarders’ summary declarations. While, as discussed earlier, it is debatable how effective a cargo risk assessment system that solely relies on bill of lading information can be, it is unarguable that a system that excludes bill of lading information for shipments controlled by freights forwarder/NVOCCs would be wholly inadequate and ineffective as a security risk assessment tool.

Private-Sector Perspectives

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Without a ﬁling obligation by freight forwarder/NVOCCs, any shipper could easily avoid advance screening of its shipment (e.g., the underlying shipper and consignee, and the origin and destination of the shipment) by simply contracting for transportation services with a forwarder instead of an ocean carrier. The resulting illogic is particularly pronounced in European containerized trades that historically have had a signiﬁcant share of freight forwarder–controlled shipments. Without forwarder/NVOCC shipment information, Customs administrations would, for their cargo risk assessments, only be able to review the ocean carrier’s bill of lading information. This is likely to show the freight forwarder as both the shipper and consignee, show the foreign load port as the origin and the Community port of unloading as the destination, and oftentimes will only include a general cargo description. This would be insufﬁcient and misleading for cargo risk assessment purposes. It is too soon to know if the Commission’s current draft regulation will be adopted. There is still the hope that the Commission will take the logical step that other nations’ 24-Hour Rule regulations have taken, and require freight forwarders to ﬁle their shipment data. Although ocean carriers could physically comply with a regulatory requirement that doesn’t include forwarder ﬁlings, it is apparent that all commercial parties, as well as the various European Customs authorities, would be better off by not implementing a system that has such a signiﬁcant security ﬂaw. If governments want to build meaningful pre-vessel-loading security screening systems, that is an objective that the liner shipping industry can support. But all appropriate parties should play a proper role in such a system.

III. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS Whether we like it or not, we live in a world where vigilance against terrorist risks requires the development and implementation of prudent security measures, and the continuing enhancement of such measures as the risks change and take new forms. The international trading system is too valuable and important to be left unattended. And, as very recent developments have demonstrated, there is no reason to believe that the threat is going away soon. The industry fully understands this and has cooperated with national governments and international organizations trying to construct meaningful security regimes. Industry will always be concerned that these measures not unduly delay or restrict commerce or impose costs that produce little added security; however, it will support measures that are well designed and provide real security value with as little impact as possible on legitimate trade.

592

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This is clearly difﬁcult work. It is not well suited to simplistic formulations or vague “slogan” solutions that aren’t supported by clear and speciﬁc means to achieve them. One must also guard against “security fatigue,” which can result from trying to digest the mountains of security product promotions, security speeches and presentations, and the array of proposals that emerge from so many different sources. There are clearly some success stories. The International Maritime Organization’s development of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Container Security Initiative, the “24-Hour Rule” strategy, the C-TPAT/AEO concept—all have enhanced supply chain and maritime security. The government’s expanded use of container inspection technologies is another example of sound strategy and implementation. The World Customs Organization has developed international supply chain security standards; however, for various reasons, these are very highlevel, voluntary guidelines that will need to be complemented by individual requirements by those nations that decide to undertake their own supply chain security programs. As a result, widespread mutual recognition of AEO programs is unlikely. The IMO is considering following up on the WCO efforts by trying to determine how the WCO Framework might relate to possible amendment of various IMO conventions. As of now, however, no clear or coherent set of proposals has emerged for how or why WCO Guidelines could or should be converted into IMO convention amendments. If we are to avoid drifting unproductively in addressing these issues, and if we are to make true progress in enhancing maritime and supply chain security, progress is far more likely to occur if: 1. 2. 3.

There is a clear and speciﬁc deﬁnition and agreement on what should be done to improve security. There is a clear and thoughtful prioritization of initiatives. There is sufﬁcient certainty and clarity in purpose to do it right. In the absence of that, time and resources are poorly used and the efforts are less likely to improve security.

At the same time, industry has a responsibility to support well-designed security enhancements. Global containerized shipping is, in much of the public’s mind, dominated by very large importers who generate little public sympathy, and by foreign business enterprises, which can be the subject of political fearmongering, as the Dubai World Ports debacle so vividly demonstrated. The industry’s vulnerability is exacerbated by the fact that, as with most business-to-business enterprises that don’t directly touch consumers, most people have no appre-

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ciation of the role, importance, or magnitude of international trade to their lives and their livelihoods. The best defense against such risks is to help and support the creation and improvement of a well-conceived, effective, and workable security regime. The current efforts of CBP and DHS with respect to maritime and supply chain security improvement are certainly worth the industry’s support. All sectors of the industry have a reason to work closely and cooperatively with them as they try to deﬁne the best way to implement their proposed security strategy improvements.

Note 1. In the United States, a freight forwarder that issues a bill of lading for the carriage of goods is deﬁned as a “non-vessel operating common carrier” or NVOCC, whereas in Europe they are simply called freight forwarders regardless of whether they undertake the carrier obligations arising from their issuing a bill of lading.

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Selected Bibliography

TERRORISM: GENERAL Adeniran, Tunde and Yonah Alexander, eds. International Violence. New York: Praeger, 1983. Alexander, Yonah, ed. International Terrorism: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives. New York: Praeger, 1976. Alexander, Yonah, ed. Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002. Alexander, Yonah and Donald Musch, eds. Terrorism: Documents of Local and International Control—U.S. Perspectives, Vol. 35. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 2002. Alexander, Yonah and David C. Rapoport, eds. The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justiﬁcations. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982. Buzan, Barry. People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983. Chadwick, Elizabeth. Self-determination, Terrorism, and the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conﬂict. Boston, MA: M. Nijhoff, 1996. Cline, Ray S. and Yonah Alexander. Terrorism as State-Sponsored Covert Warfare. Fairfax, VA: HERO Books, 1986. Combs, Cindy. Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (2nd Edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997. Cordesman, Anthony H. Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Defending the U.S. Homeland. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. Corbin, Jane. The Base: In Search of Al Qaeda, the Terror Network That Shook the World. London: Simon and Schuster, 2002 Crenshaw, Martha, ed. Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1984. Dobson, Christopher. The Terrorists: Their Weapons, Leaders, and Tactics. New York: Facts on File, 1982. Harmon, Christopher C. Terrorism Today. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000.

596

Selected Bibliography

Higgins, Rosalyn, and Maurice Flory, eds. Terrorism and International Law. London and New York: Routledge, 1997. Hippchen, Leonard Joseph. Terrorism, International Crime, and Arms Control. Springﬁeld, IL: Thomas, 1982. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. Hoge, James and Gideon Rose, ed. How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2001. Laqueur, Walter. No End to War: Terrorism in the 21st Century. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2003. Laqueur, Walter. A History of Terrorism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001. Laqueur, Walter. Terrorism: A Study of National and International Political Violence. Boston: Little Brown & Co., Inc., 1977. Leventhal, Paul and Yonah Alexander, eds. Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987. Livingstone, Neil C. The War against Terrorism. Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1982. Maniscalco, Paul M., and Hank T. Christen. Understanding Terrorism and Managing the Consequences. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2002. Martin, Gus. Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003. Noone, Michael F. and Yonah Alexander. Cases and Materials on Terrorism: Three Nations’ Response. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997. O’Niel, Bard E. Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Revolutionary Warfare. Washington DC: Brassey’s, 1990. Piller, Paul. Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001. Rapoport, David C. Inside Terrorist Organizations. 2nd ed. London: Frank Cass, 2001. Simon, Jeffrey D. The Terrorist Trap: America’s Experience with Terrorism. 2nd ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. Simonsen, Clifford E., and Jeremy R. Spindlove. Terrorism Today: The Past, the Players, the Future. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999. Stern, Jessica. The Ultimate Terrorists. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation. New York: St. Martin’s, 1999. Timmerman, Kenneth R. Preachers of Hate: Islam and the War on America. New York: Crown Forum, 2003 Waugh, William. International Terrorism: How Nations Respond to Terrorists. Salisbury, NC, Documentary Publications, 1982. Wolfgang, Marvin E., ed. International Terrorism. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982.

Monographs, Articles, Conferences, & Government Documents Allan, Richard. Terrorism: Pragmatic International Deterrence and Cooperation. New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies; Boulder, CO: Distributed by Westview Press, 1990. Flynn, Stephen. “America the Vulnerable,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2002. Flynn, Stephen. “Beyond Border Control,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000.

Selected Bibliography

597

Freedman, Lawrence A. “Why Does Terrorism Terrorize?” Terrorism: An International Journal 6 (1983). Green, L. C. “Terrorism and Its Responses.” Terrorism: An International Journal 8, no. 1 (1985). Holton, Gerald. “Reﬂections on Modern Terrorism.” Terrorism: An International Journal 1, nos. 3/ 4 (1978). Kupperman, Robert M. “Terrorism and National Security.” Terrorism: An International Journal 8, 3 (1985). United States. Congress. Senate. Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and Its Interests Abroad. Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 104th Congress, 2nd session, Thursday, February 22, 1996. United States. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism. The Origins, Direction and Support of Terrorism. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. J-97-17. 97th Congress, 1st sess., April 24, 1981. United States. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism. The Historical Antecedents of Soviet Terrorism. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. J-97-40. 97th Cong., 1st sess., June 11 and 12, 1981. Woolsey, J. “Global Organized Crime: Threats to U.S. and International Security,” Global Organized Crime: The New Evil Empire. Conference proceedings, Center for Strategic and International Studies (September 26, 1994). Wright, Jeffrey W. “Terrorism: A Mode of Warfare.” Military Review. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (October, 1984).

TERRORISM & BUSINESS Alexander, Dean C. and Yonah Alexander. Terrorism and Business: The Impact of September 11, 2001. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publications, 2002. Alexander, Yonah and Robert A. Kilmarx, eds. Political Terrorism and Business: The Threat and Response. New York: Praeger, 1979.

MARITIME SECURITY & TERRORISM Baer, George. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The United States Navy, 1890–1990. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994. Burnett, John S. Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas. California: EP Dutton, 2002. Gottschalk Jack A. and Brian P. Flanagan. Jolly Roger with an Uzi: The Rise and Threat of Modern Piracy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000. Guidelines on Co-Operation between customs administrations and port aimed at the prevention of drug smuggling, Customs Co-Operation Council, prepared for the International Association of Ports and Harbors; November 1989. Parritt, Brian A. H., ed. Violence at Sea: A Review of Terrorism, Acts of War, and Piracy, and Countermeasures to Prevent Terrorism. Paris: ICC Publications, 1986. Tangredi, Sam J. Globalization and Maritime Power. Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2002.

598

Selected Bibliography

Monographs, Articles, Conferences, & Government Documents Farley, Mark C. International and Regional Trends in Maritime Piracy, 1989–1993. M.S. dissertation; Naval Postgraduate School, 1993. Galdorisi, George. “It’s Time to Sign On.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 124, January 1998: 511–513. Herberger, Albert J. “Maritime Security Act: Fulﬁlling a Strategic Maritime Imperative.” Defense Transportation Journal 53 (1997): 8, 10–11. International Symposium on Maritime Security & Terrorism. International Symposium on Maritime Security & Terrorism. Arlington, VA, 1981. Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T September 9, 2003. Menefee, Samuel Pyeatt. Trends in Maritime Violence: A Special Report from Jane’s Intelligence Review. Alexandria, VA, 1996. Ong, Graham Gerard. “Pre-empting Maritime Terrorism is Southeast Asia” Institute of South East Asian Studies (ISEAS) November 29, 2002. “Plans to thwart terror creating a storm in any port.” The Age, May 13, 2003. Seper, Jerry. “Advance data required for cargo on U.S.-bound ships.” The Washington Times (January 16, 2003): A8. United Nations. Maritime Security: The Building of Conﬁdence. United Nations Publications, New York, 1992. United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Overview of international maritime security: hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 1st session, October 23, 1985. Washington DC, 1986. United States. Congress. House. Committee on government Operations. Legislation and National Security Subcommittee. Management of Ready Reserve Force ships: hearing before a subcommittee of the Committee on government Operations, House of Representatives, 100th Congress, 1st session, November 17, 1987. United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Overview of international maritime security: 99th Congress, 1st session, October 23, 1985, Washington DC. United States. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. Port Security: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, 107th Congress, 2nd session, December 6, 2001, February 13, March 13, and March 14, 2002. United States. Congress. Senate. Governmental Affairs Committee. Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D., Commander, U.S. Coast Guard (ret.); Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Senior Fellow in National Security Studies and Director, Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Homeland Security Imperatives, March 20, 2003. United States. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information and the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Border Security, Citizenship, and Immigration. Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D., Commander, U.S. Coast Guard (ret.); Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Senior Fellow in National Security Studies and Director, Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Homeland Security Imperatives, March 12, 2003.

Selected Bibliography

599

United States. Congress. House. Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard. Statement of Admiral Thomas H. Collins on the Coast Guard & Maritime Transportation Act of 2003 Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, May 22, 2003. United States. Department of Transportation. Maritime Administration. Maritime Trade & Transportation 99. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, [1999], 128p. Internet: http://www.bts.gov/programs/btsprod/maritime/maritime.pdf.

MARITIME AND INTERNATIONAL LAW Alexander, Yonah and Edgar H. Brenner, eds. Legal Aspects of Terrorism in the United States. Vols. 1–4. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 2000. Alexander, Yonah and Edgar H. Brenner, eds. Terrorism and the Law. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publications, 2001. Alexander, Yonah and Edgar H. Brenner, eds. U.S. Federal Legal Responses to Terrorism. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publications, 2002. Alexander, Yonah and Edgar H. Brenner, eds. The United Kingdom’s Legal Response to Terrorism. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publications, 2003. Bassiouni, M. Cherif, ed. Legal Responses to International Terrorism: U.S. Procedural Aspects. Dordrecht; Boston: M. Nijhoff; Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. Cassese, Antonio. Terrorism, Politics, and Law: The Achille Lauro Affair. Cambridge, England: Polity, 1989. Chadwick, Elizabeth. Self-determination, Terrorism, and the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conﬂict. Boston, MA: M. Nijhoff, 1996 Galdorisi, George V. and Kevin R. Vienna. Beyond the Law of the Sea: New Directions for U.S. Oceans Policy. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997. Lambert, Joseph J. Terrorism and Hostages in International Law: A Commentary on the Hostages Convention 1979. Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1990. Including the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979). Larson, David L. Security Issues and the Law of the Sea. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994. Leach, Edmund Ronald. Custom, Law, and Terrorist Violence. Edinburgh: University Press, 1977. Li, K. X. Maritime Law and Policy in China. Hong Kong Polytechnic University and Colin WM Ingram, 2002. Malanczuk, Peter. Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law. New York: Routledge, 1997. Ronzitti, Natalino. Maritime Terrorism and International Law. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijoff, 1990. Schoenbaum, Thomas J. and Ronald H. Rosenberg. Admiralty and Maritime Law. West Group, 2000. Sterba, James P. Terrorism and International Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Stoessinger, John G. Why Nations Go to War. 4th ed. New York: Marcel Dekker Inc., 1979.

600

Selected Bibliography

Monographs, Articles, Conferences, & Government Documents Astley, John and Michael N. Schmitt. “The Law of the Sea and Naval Operations.” Air Force Law Review, 42, (1997): 119–155. Bassiouni, M. Cherif, ed. Legal Responses to International Terrorism: U.S. Procedural Aspects. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. Brandon, John. “Terrorism on the High Seas.” International Herald Tribune (June 5, 2003). Charney, Jonathan I. “Entry into Force of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Virginia Journal of International Law, 35, Winter 1995: 381–404. Joyner, Christopher C, ed. “The New Law of the Sea.” Ocean Development and International Law, 27, January–June 1996: 1–179 [Special double issue]. Larson, David L., Michael W. Roth, and Todd I. Selig. “An Analysis of the Ratiﬁcation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Ocean Development and International Law, 26, 1995: 287–303. Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly 50th Session, November 1, 1995, agenda item 39 (A/50/713); report on developments pertaining to the implementation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Leitner, Peter M. “A Bad Treaty Returns: The Case of the Law of the Sea Treaty.” World Affairs, 160, Winter 1998: 134–150. “The Marine Environment and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” The International Lawyer, v. 28, Winter 1994: 879–901. Ofﬁce of Naval Intelligence & U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center. Threats and Challenges to Maritime Security 2020. Washington DC, 1999. Oliver, John T. Freedom of Navigation, Rights of Passage, International Security, and the Law of the Sea. (Hein’s legal theses and dissertations, 1993). Oxman, Bernard H. “Law of the Sea Forum: The 1994 Agreement on Implementation of the Seabed Provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea.” American Journal of International Law, 88, October 1994: 687–714. Pomper, Miles A. “Administration Revives Efforts to Get Law of Sea Treaty Underway in Senate.” CQ Weekly, 56, August 15, 1998: 2248–2249. Stephens, Dale G. “The Impact of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention on the Conduct of Peacetime Naval/Military Operations.” California Western International Law Journal, 29 1999: 283–311. Stevenson, John R. and Bernard H. Oxman. “The Future of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” American Journal of International Law, 88, July 1994: 488–498. United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Maritime counterterrorism convention, with related protocol: report (to accompany Treaty Doc. 101-1), Senate, 101st Congress, 1st session, Washington DC, 1989.

MISCELLANEOUS Alexander, Yonah and Charles K. Ebinger, eds. Political Terrorism and Energy: The Threat and Response. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982.

Selected Bibliography

601

Alexander, Yonah and Richard Latter, eds. Terrorism and the Media: Dilemmas for Government, Journalists and the Public. Washington DC: Brassey’s (U.S.), 1990. Alexander, Yonah and Eugene Sochor, eds. Aerial Piracy and Aviation Security. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1990. Alexander, Yonah and Michael S. Swetnam, eds. Cyber Terrorism and Information Warfare: Threats and Responses. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publications, 2001.

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Index

Abbas, Abdul, 80–81, 91, 96 Abbas, Abu, 19 Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), 19–20 Accountability Review Board, 201 Achille Lauro hijacking incident Arab-Israeli conﬂict and, 83 court case in response to, 92–95 Egypt’s response to, 86–88 International Maritime Organization (IMO) and, 533 legal response to, 96 Leon Klinghoffer and (see Klinghoffer, Leon) political responses to, 81–95 President Ronald Reagan’s response to, 75–80 purpose of, 83 release of terrorist from, 80 response to, 82 Robert Stethem and, 90–91 summary of, 96 10th anniversary of, 91–92 Active Endeavour, 297, 475–485 Adams, John, 11 Aden, port of, 135, 136. See also USS Cole bombing Advance Manifest Regulation, 164 Advance ocean container security screening, 589–591 Advance Passenger Information System, 162

Advanced overseas screening initiative, 586 Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP), 586 Afghanistan, 475–476 Africa al-Qaeda in, 451–453, 459 counterterrorist strategies in, 32–33 importance to U.S. interests, 450–458 maritime security in, 455 national sovereignty in, 448 oil supply of, 453–454 terrorism in, 458–459 War on Terror and, 450–453 Africa Coastal Security (ACS) Program, 456 African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 456 African Partnership Station Initiative, 295–301 AFRICOM. See U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Agios Demitrius, 19 Agreement on Marine Transport, 28 al-Ansari, Abu Azzam, 451–452 Algeria, 452–453 Alien smuggling, 263–264 al-Jihad, Sada, 451 Allen, Admiral Thad W., 249–256, 284 Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU), 453

604 Allied Forces Maritime Component Command HQ Naples (CC-MAR Naples), 477–485 Alondra Rainbow, 511, 522 al-Para, Abderrazak, 457–458 al-Qaeda in Africa, 281, 451–452, 459 attack on passenger ferry, 388 dirty bombs and, 384 in Horn of Africa, 281 maritime targets of, 388–389 suicide bombing techniques of, 338 use of containers by, 302 USS Cole bombing, 23 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and, 384 Al-Quaddaﬁ, Muammar, 42 American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), 172–176, 194 American Civil War (1861–1865), 12 America’s Waterways Watch, 231 Anarchists, 338 Andros Compania Maritima S.A. v. Intertanker Ltd., 100 Anglo-Spanish War, 10 Animal rights extremists, 17 Annan, Koﬁ, 547–548 Antiterrorism by Active Endeavour, 480–485 by American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), 172–176 challenges for, 69, 79, 354–355 Coast Guard’s role in, 155–157 Container Security Initiative (CSI) for (see Container Security Initiative (CSI)) cooperation between countries in, 75–76 Defense in Depth strategy for, 161 deﬁned, 8 Department of State and, 200 distribution of resources for, 73 effectiveness of, 235 Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) response capabilities for, 352 ﬁeld exercises for, 342 in Florida ports, 341–342

Index following USS Cole bombing, 113–115 industry’s role in, 65 intelligence gathering and, 121–123 interagency framework for, 197–201 lack of preparation for, 72–74 law enforcement for, 199–200 legislation for, 175 limitations of, 130 maritime infrastructure recovery, 215 necessity of, 591 by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 480–485 oil rigs and, 70 organizations responsible for, 353 port security and, 262 prioritizing efforts for, 383–390 recommendations for improving, 355–357 threat levels and, 126–128 by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 166–169, 398–399 (see also U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)) Anti-Terrorism Act, 95–96 Antiterrorism and force protection programs of Department of Defense (DOD), 126, 139–140 recommendations for, 143 of U.S. Navy, 135, 143–144 Antiterrorism Assistance Program, 199 Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program, 126, 139–140 Antiterrorist strategies in Canada, 56–58 partnership between Canada and United States in, 56 in United Kingdom, 58–61 in United States, 61 See also Counterterrorist strategies Arab-Israeli conﬂict, 82–84 Arafat, Yasser, 81, 83, 84, 95 Archipelagic states, 496 Area Maritime Security Committees (AMS), 229, 345, 347, 409–410 Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans, 404

Index Argentina, 461–462 Argo Merchant, 62 Armed robbery deﬁned, 560 local law enforcement efforts against, 312 preventing in ports, 312–313 See also Maritime robbery Arms smuggling, 18, 20 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int’l, 100 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 31, 416–420, 436 Asia Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC), 420–424 Asia Paciﬁc Working Group, 8 Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP), 191 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 30–31, 416–420 Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF), 31, 416–420, 436 Augmentation forces, 481 AusCheck, 441 Australia, 438–444, 544 Australian Background Checking Service (AusCheck), 441 Authorized Economic Operation (AEO) programs, 589–591 Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), 163 Automated Manifest System (AMS), 162 Automated Targeting System (ATS), 223, 228 Automatic Identiﬁcation System (AIS), 229, 402, 411 Automatic Information Systems (AIS), 528, 539 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 162 The Bahamas, 190–191 Baker v. Carr, 99 Bald, Gary M., 344–348 Ballistic missile defense, 291 Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), 522, 578

605 Baltimore, Maryland, 346 Band of Mercy, 17 Barbary wars, 11–12 Barratry, 532 Beauregard, Donald, 338 Benin communique, 298 bin Laden, Osama, 111, 121 Black Bart, 11 Blackbeard, 11 Blust, Steven R., 304–310 Bonner, Robert C., 164–167 Borchgrave, Arnaud de, 72 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 281 Brazil, 517–518 Broadcasting Board of Governors, 199 Browning, Douglas M., 160–163 Buenos Aires, Argentina, 461–462 Bush, George W. creation of Ofﬁce of Homeland Security, 302 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and, 323 National Maritime Day proclamations, 202–209 on National Strategy for Maritime Security, 26–27 on port security, 171–172 on Port Security Improvement Act of 2006, 411 Vladimir Putin and, 323 Business-Government Advisory Group on National Security, 443 Byrd, Robert, 89–91 Cables, 492–493 Cagliari, 12–13 Caldwell, Stephen L., 390–393, 462–468 Canada, 56–58 Captains of the Port, 271–272, 312–313, 409 Cargo containers for (see Containers) handling, 223 noncontainerized, 386 roll-on/roll-off, 386 supply chain security for, 181–186 (see also Container Security Initiative (CSI))

606 Cargo containers. See Containers Cargo inspections, 576–577 Cargo lists, 221 Cargo manifest data, 584 Cargo security, 276–277. See also Container Security Initiative (CSI) Cargo theft, 263 Caribbean Basin Caribbean Corridor Initiative, 467 deﬁned, 559 history of piracy in, 9 maritime transportation system in, 464 port security in, 462–468 security concerns in, 463–464 U.S. agencies in, 464–465 Caribbean Corridor Initiative, 467 Caribbean Support Tender, 158 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert operations and, 200 maritime intelligence of, 72–73 roles of, 198 Certiﬁcate of Competency, 580 Cesaretti, Roberto, 475–479 Cf. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 103 Chertoff, Michael, 384 China, 13, 454–455 CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Civil War. See American Civil War (1861–1865) Clark, Vern, 115 Climate change, 286 Coble, Howard, 397–400 Code of Federal Regulations 928 (C.F.R. Section 0.85), 6 Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, 551 Cohen, William S., 116 Collins, Thomas H., 169–171, 239–248 Colombia, 282 Colombian Army Special Operations Command, 282 Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), 457 Combined Task Force 150 (CTF–150), 30 Comité Maritime International, 472

Index Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 329, 331 Communication plans, 576 Communications, 123 Company Security Ofﬁcer (CSO), 526, 536, 537 Component Commanders, 115, 246–247 Conference on Trade and Development, 497–501 Container seals, 587–589 Container security challenges for, 585 devices for, 587–589 European developments for, 589–591 importance of, 276–277, 548, 587 port security and, 176–178 post–9/11, 276–277 “smart box” devices for, 587–589 by U.S. Coast Guard, 176–179 See also Container Security Initiative (CSI) Container security devices (CSDs), 587–589 Container Security Initiative (CSI) in Argentina, 461–462 Automated Manifest System (AMS) for, 162 core elements of, 161 coverage of, 306 creation of, 25 implementation of, 221, 226, 370 legislation in support of, 182 maritime supply chain and, 321 operational ports of, 462 proposal for, 302 purpose of, 181, 220 reviewing success of, 182–186 shortcomings of, 373–374 smart box initiative for, 161, 227 success of, 182 2006–2011 strategic plan, 178–180 Container Security Regime, 422 Container Working Group, 177, 277 Containers numbers of, 161, 548 security checks of, 369–370, 576 (see also Container Security Initiative (CSI))

Index “smart box” devices, 587–589 in U.S. ports, 314, 462, 587 vulnerabilities of, 366–367, 369 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in, 369, 385–387 Contiguous zone, 491 Continental shelf, 329–330, 496 Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR), 528, 539 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 29, 311, 505–511, 533–534, 535 Conversations with the Country, 284 Conway, James T., 284 A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-First Century Seapower, 249–256, 284–295 Costa Rica, 158 Council for Cooperation, 8 Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Paciﬁc (CSCAP), 32 Counterterrorism by Active Endeavour, 475–485 by Asia Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC), 420–424 in Australia, 438–444 beginning of, 241–242 bilateral relations in, 199 in Caribbean, 282 in Central America, 282 challenges of, 79, 354–355 covert operations in, 200 deﬁned, 8 by denying funding to terrorists, 422–423 distribution of resources for, 73 effectiveness of, 68–69, 235 effects of 9/11 attacks on, 217 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and, 344–348 (see also Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)) high-speed vessels and, 358–359 importance of, 47–48, 130, 591 importance of international cooperation for, 218–219 intelligence and, 122 (see also Intelligence)

607 intelligence-sharing and, 478–479 interagency framework for, 197–201 lack of preparation for, 72–74 law enforcement and, 199–200 legal rights of Americans and, 218 Maritime Interdiction Operations for, 282 Maritime Liaison Agents (MLAs) for, 351 in Mediterranean, 475–479 multinational cooperation in, 75–76, 477–485 necessity of, 591 by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 475–485 for nuclear terrorism, 323 (see also Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) terrorist threat) overseas operations for, 281–283 at Panama Canal, 459–460 through port security (see Port security) post–9/11, 319, 344 public-private partnership in, 323–324, 442–444 recommendations for improving, 355–357 reducing vulnerability of ports, 368–369 in South America, 282 strategies for, 422–423 strengthening, 47 U.S. Coast Guard’s efforts in, 241–248 (see also U.S. Coast Guard) by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 162–166 (see also U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)) by U.S. Navy, 109 (see also U.S. Navy) U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and, 282–283 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and, 319–325 Counter-Terrorism Action Plans (CTAP), 423–424 Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), 547

608 Counterterrorism Security Group, 198 Counter-Terrorism Task Force, 424 Counterterrorist strategies in Africa, 32–33 by Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 30–31 components to, 24 by European Union (EU), 29–30 global, 28–33 international cooperation in, 27–28 by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 29–30, 297, 475–485 proposals for, 50–51 in Southeast Asia, 30–32 by United States, 24–28, 66–68 (see also Department of Defense (DOD); Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Department of State; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)) Covert operations, 200 Credentialing Direct Action Group (CDAG), 277–279 Creel, Harold J., 302–303 Critical Incident Response Group, 353–354 Critical Infrastructure Protection, 443 Crouch, William, 111, 112, 113 Cruise lines crimes committed on, 190, 192–193 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and, 348 missing persons and, 192 primary home of, 341 regulation of, 191 safety measures for, 187–188 safety record of, 195 safety report for, 187 security for, 186–195 Ship Security Alert Systems, 193 vulnerability of, 467–468 Crye, Michael J., 186–195 Currency smuggling, 264–265 Customs inspections, 267. See also U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

Index Customs reporting systems, 422 Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) compliance with, 221, 226–227 growth of, 370 purpose of, 25, 163, 321, 399 shortcomings of, 374 success of, 592 D’Amato, Alfonse M., 91–92 Dangerous Cargo Act of 1940, 24 Danzig, Richard, 124 Darden, George, 87 Data Management Improvement Act Task Force, 195–196 Databases Guardian Threat Tracking System, 350, 351, 354–355, 356 THREATNET, 343 de Borchgrave, Arnaud, 72 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 30 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980, 333 Deep seabed mining, 326, 327, 331–333, 334, 336 Deepwater, 253 Deepwater ports, 406 Defense Energy Support Center (DESC), 139 Defense in Depth strategy, 161, 322 Defense’s Task Force, 201 Density image inspections, 586 Denton, Jeremiah, 73 Department of Defense (DOD) Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program, 126, 139–140 antiterrorist responsibilities of, 201 in Caribbean Basin, 465 coordination with U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), 142 counterterrorist responsibilities of, 198, 200 Directive 2000.12, 139–140 investigation of USS Cole bombing, 112–115 Maritime Domain Awareness Steering Committee Group, 371

Index policy review of, 111 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and, 322 U.S. Coast Guard and, 244–247, 249–250 War on Terrorism (WOT) and, 281–283 Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY 2002, 276 Department of Energy Megaports Initiative of, 321, 465, 585–586 Nuclear Emergency Search Team, 201 on U.S. energy demands, 453–454 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) advanced overseas screening initiative, 586 challenges for, 376 Container Security Initiative (CSI) (see Container Security Initiative (CSI)) counterterrorist responsibilities of, 199 creation of, 302, 392, 399 Customs and Border Protection (see U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)) Domestic Nuclear Detection Ofﬁce (DNDO), 231–232 evaluating U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 185–186 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and, 345–346 implementing port security strategy, 226–231 jurisdiction of, 345–346 on Liqueﬁed Natural Gas (LNG) tanker attacks, 387 Maritime Domain Awareness Steering Committee Group, 371 Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and, 224–231, 400–411 (see also Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 National Maritime Security Advisory Committee and, 195

609 National Vessel Movement Center, 221 Ofﬁce of Domestic Preparedness, 369–370 port security and, 219–224, 398–401 Port Security Grant program, 173, 175, 351 post–9/11 changes to, 242 responsibilities of, 306–307 risk management by, 381–382 “smart box” devices and, 587–588 support for initiatives of, 592–593 Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program (TIPP), 413 10 plus 2 approach, 306–307 West Coast Maritime Radiation Detection project, 231–232 Department of Justice, 199–200 Department of State Accountability Review Board, 201 antiterrorist responsibilities of, 200, 201 in Caribbean Basin, 464–465 counterterrorist responsibilities of, 198, 199 Defense’s Task Force, 201 deﬁning terrorism, 6 diplomatic efforts of, 199, 317–318 International Outreach and Coordination Strategy, 317–318 jurisdiction of, 464–465 maritime security by, 310–318 preventing trade of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 322 Shipping Coordinating Committee, 195 UN Security Council and, 199 Department of the Navy, 112–115 Department of Transportation (DOT) authority of, 274–275 Maritime Administration (MARAD), 275–280 National Infrastructure Security Committee (NISC), 270 on port security, 256–258, 268–275 (see also U.S. Coast Guard) Rapid Response Teams, 270 responsibilities of, 275

610 Deployable Operations Group (DOG), 254 Detainees, 282–283 Dey of Algiers, 12 Digital Selective Calling (DSC), 515 Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security, 535 Directorate for Competition, 309 Dirty bombs, 384–387 Djibouti, 120, 281 Document Veriﬁcation Service, 441 Domestic Nuclear Detection Ofﬁce (DNDO), 231–232 Domestic terrorism, 7, 338 Drake, Sir Francis, 10 Drug interdiction in Colombia, 282 multinational cooperation in, 157–158 in South America, 282 by U.S. Coast Guard, 156, 157, 158–159, 251 by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 180 Drug smuggling, 157, 264, 467 Drugs, 156, 157 Dubai Ports issue, 28 Dubai Ports World company, 28, 592 Earth First!, 17 East Africa, 458–459 Egypt, 75–76, 86–88 Eighty Years War (1568–1648), 10 Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), 265–266 Emergency Action Committee, 200 Emergency Action Plan, 200 Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), 342 Enduring Friendship program, 465 Energy industry maritime security and, 453–456 protection of, 59, 66–68 in United Kingdom, 59 See also Oil industry England, 10–11, 58–61 Environmental extremists, 338 Environmental protection, 433–435, 492, 496 Eritrean Islamic Jihad, 453

Index Eritrean Liberation Front, 1 European Commission, 473–479 European Commission’s Directorate for Competition, 309 European Council of Ministers, 589 European Union (EU) combating piracy, 468–473 container security and, 589–591 maritime policy for, 473–475 maritime terrorism response strategies of, 29–30 shipping laws in, 309 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 234, 314, 330, 334, 496 Expanded Maritime Interception Operations, 282 Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, 112 Extradition, 509 Extremely hazardous substances (EHSs), 339–340 Extremism, 287 Falke, 14 Fallis, Kie, 124 Fargo, Thomas B., 26, 357–359 Fatah, 17–20 FBI. See Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) FBI Counterterrorism Division (CTD), 351–352 FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, 341–342, 346 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) antiterrorist responsibilities of, 200 Area Maritime Security Committees and, 345 challenges for, 354–355 Counterterrorism Division (CTD), 351–352 counterterrorist responsibilities of, 199–200, 344–348 Critical Incident Response Group, 353–354 cruise industry and, 348 deﬁning terrorism, 6 Department of Homeland Security and, 345 Directorate of Intelligence, 356

Index ﬁeld exercises by, 342 in Florida, 341–343 Guardian Threat Tracking System of, 355 Hostage Rescue Teams (HRT), 353 improvements required for, 350–351 improving efforts of, 355–357 intelligence collection by, 356 investigation of USS Cole bombing, 111 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), 341–342, 346 jurisdiction of, 190, 191 maritime intelligence of, 73 Maritime Liaison Agents (MLA), 348, 350, 351–352 maritime security by, 350 Maritime Security Program, 350 Miami Division of, 347 Operation Drydock, 230, 347–348 port security and, 337–357 Port Security Working Groups and, 343 responsibilities of, 65–66, 349–350 restructuring of, 344 Supervisory Special Agents, 346 SWAT teams, 353 Tampa division of, 341–342, 346–347 terrorism exercises by, 356 training provided by, 312 U.S. Coast Guard and, 349, 352–353, 356 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and, 353 vulnerability assessments and, 343 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and, 342, 352 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 68, 342 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), 387 Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), 302–310 Federal Maritime Security Coordinators, 409 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 103 Ferries, 388 First Barbary War, 11–12 Fish Stocks Agreement, 331

611 Fisheries enforcement, 159 Fisheries regulations, 156, 158, 331 Fishing industry, 340–341 Five Power Defense Arrangements (FDPA), 32 Florida, 338–339, 340–341, 343 Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 343 Florida Emergency Management, 341 Florida-Caribbean Cruise Association, 194 Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, 114 Focal Points, 438 Force Protection Ofﬁcer course, 131 Force protection programs, 129–136 Foreign Emergency Support Team, 200 Foreign policy, 198–199 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 97–98 Forward presence, 290–291 France, 300–301 Franks, Tommy R., 120, 122 Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 106 Freight forwarders, 589–591 Freight infrastructure, 305. See also Maritime supply chain; Supply chain security French Huguenots, 9 Fritelli, John F., 383–390 G–8 (Group of Eight) nations, 165 Gehman, Howard W., Jr., 111, 112, 113, 114–115 General Council of British Shippers, 14 General Services Administration, 269 George Train and Equip Program, 281 George Washington Battle Group, 133 Gilmore Commission, 380 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, 323 Global Maritime Intelligence Integration, 213–214 Global Maritime Partnerships initiative, 290, 293 Global War on Terrorism. See War on Terror

612 Globalization, 1, 286, 325 Go-fast vessels, 157 Golden Age of Piracy, 11 Gorshkov, S.G., 71 Government Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO), 27, 386, 462–468 Grants, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 229, 276, 351, 378–379, 395, 405 Great Britain, 10–11, 13, 58–61 Group of Eight (G–8), 165 Group of Seven Nations, 267 Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 282–283 Guardian Threat Tracking System, 350, 351, 354–355, 356 Gulf of Mexico, 340, 341 Haig, Alexander, 71, 72 Haiti, 283 Harmful materials, 223, 231–232, 339–340 Hatﬁeld, Mark O., 82–84 Hazardous chemicals, 34 Hazardous Devices Response Unit, 352 HAZMAT operations, 341 Helicopters, 223 Hereth, Larry L., 26 Heyn, Piet, 10 High seas, 485–494 High-interest vessels, 222, 228–229 High-speed vessels, 358–359 Hijackings, 17, 19, 22. See also Achille Lauro hijacking incident Homeland security challenges for, 380 coordinating efforts for, 375–378 government agency for (see Department of Homeland Security (DHS)) information-sharing issues for, 376–378 lack of performance measures for, 373–374 lack of planning for, 373–374 levels of, 409 through ports (see Port security) post–9/11, 270 preemptive actions for (see Counterterrorism)

Index prioritizing initiatives for, 380–382 risk management for, 381 shortcomings in, 366 strategy for, 284–295 Homeland Security Advisory System, 409 Homeland Security Council (HSC), 212 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, 13, 371, 381 Horn of Africa, 281, 459 Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), 352, 353 Hostile intent, 134 Hot pursuit, 491 House Armed Services Committee (HASC), 110–112 House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, 63 House National Security Committee, 110–112 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 112 Huguenots, 9 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), 252, 292, 446 Hurricane Audrey, 239–240 Hurricane Katrina, 254 Hurricane Lili, 239 Hurricane Rita, 254 Identity fraud, 441 Illegal immigration, 158, 582 Incident Command Structure, 244–245 India, 522 Individual Cooperation Program (ICP), 30 Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, 381–382 Information Network (IFN) System, 437, 438 Information sharing, 576 Information Sharing Center (ISC), 32, 427–431, 436, 437–438 Inmarsat C polling, 531–532 Insurance, 279–280 Insurgency, 5, 12–13 Insurgents, 16 Integrated Container Inspection System (ICIS), 586

Index Integrated Deepwater System, 222, 372 Integrated Maritime Policy, 473–475 Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme, 530, 542 Integrated Trade Data System (ITDS), 277 Intelligence analysis of, 123–124, 126 collection of, 142 databases for, 265 difﬁculties for sharing, 376–377 dissemination of, 124–125, 142, 376–377 effectiveness of, 122 Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) collection of, 356 Global Maritime Intelligence Integration, 213–214 from Information Sharing Center (ISC), 32 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) and, 335–336 maritime, 228, 405 maritime intelligence fusion centers, 228 by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 476–477, 478–479, 481–482 responsibility for, 198 sharing of, 478–479, 481–482, 484–485 signals (SIGINT), 123 source reliability in, 123 before USS Cole bombing, 141–142 Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), 293 Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), 422 Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement, 157 Interagency Commission on Crime in U.S. Seaports, 343 Inter-American Port Security Training Program, 275 International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners, 561–566 International Association of Ports and Harbors, 567–577 International Cargo Security Council, 399

613 International Chamber of Commerce, 33, 567–572 International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), 573 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 29, 169, 407, 497, 523–524, 527–528, 530, 539, 549 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 423 International Council of Cruise Lines, 186–188, 193–195 International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations (IFSMA), 579–580 International Labor Organization, 187, 531, 580 International Law Enforcement Academy, 312 International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report, 455 Piracy Reporting Centre, 522–523 purpose of, 33 in Somalia, 554 statistics released by, 15 International Maritime Interdiction Support Agreement, 158 International Maritime Organization (IMO) amendments to Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) by, 527–528 collaborative efforts of, 548–549 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 29, 311, 505–511, 533–534, 535 costs for measures of, 542 development of ship and port security plans, 567–572 Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security, 535 Draft Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, 312

614 International Maritime Organization (IMO) (continued) effectiveness of maritime transportation system and, 545–546 handling reports of piracy, 472–473 history of, 532–535 identiﬁcation and tracking regulations of, 362 implementing standards of, 540–542 importance of efforts of, 547 Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme, 542 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 29, 169, 407, 497, 523–524, 527–528, 530, 539, 549 International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL) and, 187 International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations, 579–580 International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code (see International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code) Intersessional Working Group (ISWG) on Maritime Security, 534 Legal Committee of, 535 Marine Electronic Highway (MEH), 31 Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), 447, 470, 512–514 (see also Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)) maritime security measures of, 523–532, 534–535, 567–572 measures to prevent unlawful acts on board ships, 501–505 meetings about Somali pirates, 445–448 9/11 attacks and, 532–533, 534 Pilot Project of Marine Electronic Highway (MEH) and, 434 piracy and, 310–311, 511–515 recommendations of, 419, 519–521 reporting issues with, 544–545 requirements of, 345 resolution A.584(14), 505–506 resolutions for combating piracy, 515–516 resolutions for maritime security, 529–532

Index responsibilities of, 470, 472–473, 532–533 Ship Identiﬁcation Number, 313 Somali pirates and, 550–557 in South China Sea, 516–517 in Straits of Malacca, 515 Subcommittee on Flag State Implementation, 470 successes of, 592 training sessions offered by, 194, 529–530 U.S. Coast Guard and, 254–255 World Customs Organization (WCO) and, 548, 592 International Maritime Security Strategy, 359–362 International Maritime Security Trust Fund, 542 International Mobile Satellite Organization (Inmarsat), 515 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 265 International Outreach and Coordination Strategy, 317–318 International Port Security Program, 227, 360–361, 412 International Safety Management (ISM) Code, 530–531, 541 International Seabed Authority, 332, 334 International Security Information Services Associates Incorporated (ISIS), 63–64 International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code acceptance of, 499 in Caribbean Basin, 464 compliance with, 498, 500 cost of compliance, 498–499, 500 creation of, 559 description of, 29, 535 effectiveness of, 545 ﬁnancing, 499, 500–501 founding of, 535 impact of, 499 implementation of, 500 Implementation Workshop for, 194 International Ship Security Certiﬁcate, 526, 538 overview of, 524–526

Index perceptions of, 501 purpose of, 169, 227, 360, 407, 523–524, 536 questionnaire on, 497–501 Regulation XI–2/10 and, 529 requirements for contracting governments, 527, 538–539 requirements for ports, 221, 224, 526–527, 537–538 requirements for shipping companies, 526 requirements for ships, 188, 536–537 security levels by, 536 success of, 592 U.S. Coast Guard and, 360–361 International Ship Security Certiﬁcate, 526, 538 International Standards Organization, 588 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 515 International terrorism, 7 International trade. See Maritime industry International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 335, 497 Interpol (International Criminal Police Organization), 14 Intersessional Working Group, 523–532, 534–535 Investment Co. Inst. v. United States, 101–102 Iowa-class battleships, 25 Iranian Liberation Forces, 22 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 20, 21, 55 Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, 7 Islamic Courts Union, 452 ISPS Code. See International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) Israel, 49 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), 30 Italy, 75–76, 77, 78, 80–81 Jamaica, 10 Japanese Red Army (JRA), 20–21 Jarobe, James F., 337–343 Jefferson, Thomas, 41–42

615 Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism, 64 JFK International Airport terrorist plot, 467 al-Jihad, Sada, 451 Joint Chief of Staffs (JCS) chairman of, 140 force protection program by, 143–144 force protection standards of, 131 Joint Information and Analysis Centre (JIAC), 477, 479 Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF), 251 Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, 281 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), 346 Judge Advocate General (JAG) investigation of USS Cole bombing, 111, 132, 133 report on USS Cole bombing, 115–116 Julius Caesar, 8–9 Jurisdiction of Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 345–346 of Department of State, 464–465 of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 190, 191 for maritime crimes, 189–190, 311 for maritime security, 469 for port security, 345–348, 349–350, 353 of U.S. Coast Guard, 61–62, 190, 191, 345–346, 352, 406, 409 Khaled, Abu, 80 Khan, A.Q., 323 Khobar Towers attack, 107, 108, 122, 128 Kidd, William, 11 King William’s War, 11 Klinghoffer, Ilsa, 92–95 Klinghoffer, Leon, 76, 77, 84–85, 88–91 Klinghoffer, Lisa, 92–95 Klinghoffer, Marilyn, 96, 105 Knights Hospitaller, 9 Koch, Christopher, 581–593 Kosovo, 281 The Kremlin, 71 Kuala Tanjung port, 511 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 103–104

616 Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs), 158 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), 325–337 acceptance of, 336–337 beginning of, 495 continental shelf and, 329–330 Convention on the High Seas, 485–494 deep seabed mining, 331–333 deﬁning piracy, 512 First Conference on (UNCLOS I), 29 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 335 key features of, 495–497 marine pollution and, 330–331 purpose of, 2 requirements of, 551 Third Conference on (UNCLOS III), 29 United States and, 331–337 U.S. sovereignty and, 329–330, 333–334 and War on Terror, 335 Law of the Sea training, 131 League of Nations, 6 Legislation for maritime security, 24–27 on piracy, 2–5 on privateering, 2–5 in United States (see U.S. legislation) Lehrman, Thomas, 319–325 Libya, 42, 71 Limburg, 23 Lippold, Kirk S., 116 Liqueﬁed Natural Gas (LNG) Tankers, 386–387 Lloyd’s of London, 70, 71–72 Long Range Identiﬁcation and Tracking (LRIT) system, 255, 531–532, 540 Los Angeles, California, 347, 384 Loy, James M., 155–160, 232–236 MacDill Air Force Base, 339 Magnusson Act, 274 Malacca Strait, 31, 42, 358, 423, 433–435, 511, 514–515, 516, 546 Manila Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime (1998), 30

Index Marine Electronic Highway (MEH), 31, 434 Marine pollution, 330–331, 433–435, 492, 496 Marine Safety and Security Team, 395 Marine transportation system. See Maritime transportation system Mariner Administrative Smart Card credentialing system, 278–279 Maritime Administration (MARAD), 269, 275–280 Maritime antiterrorism. See Antiterrorism Maritime ballistic missile defense, 291 Maritime collisions, 488 Maritime commerce security, 216 Maritime contingency planning, 56–63 Maritime counterterrorism. See Counterterrorism Maritime crime cargo theft, 263 cost of, 257 currency smuggling, 264–265 deﬁned, 507–508, 510–511 near developing countries, 312 drug smuggling, 264 jurisdiction over, 311 local law enforcement efforts against, 312 maritime laws against, 418, 506–511 penalties for, 274, 418, 419 port security and, 258, 262 sea robbery, 256–257, 262–263 (see also Maritime robbery) Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ), 25 Maritime Direct Action Group (MDAG), 270 Maritime domain, 210 Maritime domain awareness (MDA), 213, 293, 299, 364–365, 370–372 Maritime Domain Awareness Senior Steering Group (MDASSG), 213, 371 Maritime Force Protection Units (MFPU), 251 Maritime forces combat power of, 288 ﬂexibility of, 287

Index forward presence of, 290–291 global distribution of, 289 humanitarian aid from, 290, 292 integration of, 292 intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) of, 293 international partnership of, 289–290 interoperability of, 292 limiting regional conﬂict with, 288 makeup of, 293 maritime domain awareness (MDA) and, 293 power projection by, 291 preventing war with, 289, 291 regionally concentrated, 288 sea control by, 291 strategies for maritime security, 287–294 training of, 294 Maritime Homeland Security Strategy, 232–236 cooperative effort of, 255–256 extending abroad, 245–248 necessity of, 242–243 principal elements of, 243–244 U.S. Coast Guard and, 253–255 U.S. Navy and, 247–248 Maritime hijacking by Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), 22 most famous case of, 19 (see also Achille Lauro hijacking incident) Maritime industry from Asia Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC), 421 Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and, 578 challenges of, 562 congestion in, 277 consolidation of, 564–565 container security for, 583–589 (see also Container Security Initiative (CSI)) cost-cutting in, 562 environmental impact of, 305 in Europe, 309–310, 473–474 freight forwarders in, 589–591 goals of, 563–564

617 history of, 326–327 illegal immigration through, 582 importance of, 44, 173, 234, 314, 345, 399–400 importance of port security to, 257 improvement strategies for, 564–566 increase in, 286 infrastructure of, 565–566 International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners, 561–566 International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations (IFSMA), 579–580 International Ship and Port Security Code for (see International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code) in Mediterranean, 480 port security and, 173 (see also Port security) predicted growth of, 243 revenue constraints of, 379 role in maritime security, 367 security measures of, 523–532 security requirements for, 402 Ship Security Assessment for, 526 substandard ships in, 562–563, 565 Maritime infrastructure recovery, 215 Maritime insurgency, 12–13 Maritime insurgents, 16 Maritime intelligence, 405. See also Intelligence Maritime Intelligence Coordination Centre, 477 Maritime intelligence fusion centers, 228 Maritime law for continental shelf, 496 Convention on the High Seas, 485–494 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 497 for landlocked nations, 496 by Law of the Sea Convention (see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)) on marine pollution, 496 in United States (see U.S. legislation) Maritime Liaison Agent (MLA), 348, 350

618 Maritime Monitor, 483 Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan, 252, 292, 349–350, 353, 356 Maritime Operations Centre, 477 Maritime pipeline facilities, 66–68 Maritime robbery deﬁned, 426, 560 European Union’s (EU) efforts against, 468–473 increase in, 469 international laws against, 418, 469 Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and, 512–514 preparation for, 471 protection against, 418–419 ReCAAP Agreement and, 435–438 reporting of, 472–473, 515–516 ship signals for, 515–516 in Southeast Asia, 416–420, 520 underreporting of, 472–473 Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs), 222–223, 230, 236–237, 274, 352, 398, 405, 412 Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), 447, 470, 501–505, 506–511, 512–514, 523–532, 533, 537 Maritime security by Active Endeavour, 475–479 in Africa, 455 in Asia Paciﬁc, 420–424 by Asia Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC), 420–424 in Australia, 440–444 authority on, 471 background checking for, 440–441 basic architecture of, 581 Benin communique on, 298 boarding provisions for, 508–509 challenges for, 218, 286–287, 325, 365–366, 372–379 cooperation between agencies for, 255–256 cooperation between states for, 214 coordinating efforts for, 271–272, 284–295, 375–378 costs of, 498–499, 500, 542–544 courses offered for, 312–313

Index defense-in-depth for, 322 deﬁned, 296–299, 305 energy demands and, 453–456 in Europe, 473–475, 589–591 execution of, 317–318 by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 350 funding for, 303, 413 governmental responsibility for, 555–557 high-speed vessels and, 358–359 implementing measures for, 540–542 implementing strategy for, 292 importance for commercial activity, 218, 268 importance of, 291–292, 313–314, 549–550 importance of international cooperation for, 218–219, 575 integrated planning for, 271–272 integrated with port security, 577 interagency approach for, 371 International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) and, 572–577 International Cargo Security Council and, 399 international collaboration on, 271–272, 313–318 International Outreach and Coordination Strategy, 317–318 international outreach for, 214, 317–318 joint task force for, 273–274 jurisdiction for, 469 lack of funding for, 365–366 lack of performance measures for, 373–374 lack of planning for, 373–374 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) and, 328–329 legislation for, 24–25, 188 (see also U.S. legislation) Long Range Identiﬁcation and Tracking (LRIT) system for, 531–532, 540 mandates for, 487–488 maritime domain awareness (MDA) and, 293, 299, 370–372

Index Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), 400–411 measures for, 501–505, 506–511, 523–532, 539–540 in Mediterranean, 475–479 modern views on, 256–258 multinational cooperation for, 287, 289–290, 293, 303, 313–318, 358, 359–362, 361, 442, 471, 487–488 National Maritime Security Advisory Committee and, 272 national security for, 217–219 National Strategy for, 316–317 objectives of, 320 offshore strategic boardings, 221–222, 466, 477–478, 481, 508–509 for Panama Canal, 459–460 personnel issues for, 374–375, 582–583 post–9/11, 25–27, 156–157, 302, 305–306, 360 preventive versus reactive efforts in, 68–69 (see also Antiterrorism; Counterterrorism) principles for, 270–271 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) for (see Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) public-private partnership in, 323–324 ReCAAP Agreement for, 425–433 recommendations for, 355–357, 519–521, 592 Regional Maritime Security Initiative, 357–359 regulations for, 407–408 reporting issues with, 544–545 responsibility for, 469, 555–557 risk assessment data for, 584–585 Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) and, 527–528 for sea transport, 186–195 Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 and (see Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act))

619 security plans for, 503–505 ship security plan for, 504–505 in Straits of Malacca and Singapore, 433–435 strategic concept for, 287–295 strategic goals for, 315–316, 317–318, 320 success stories in, 592 summary of U.S. efforts for, 364–365 tracking vessels for, 312 training for, 407 U.S. Coast Guard’s role in, 233, 241 (see also U.S. Coast Guard) weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and, 383–386 See also Port security Maritime Security Council (MSC), 25, 518–519 Maritime Security Expo, 581–593 Maritime security forces, 24. See also Active Endeavour; U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Navy Maritime Security Identiﬁcation Card, 441 Maritime Security Policy actions required by, 213–216 background on, 210 coordination of, 211–212 implementation of, 212–213 Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee (MSPCC), 211–212 parties involved in, 209–210 purpose of, 210, 211, 216 Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee, 210, 211–212, 216–217 Maritime Security Program, 267–268, 350 Maritime Security Trust Fund, 530 Maritime supply chain balancing security and efﬁciency in, 394 International Cargo Security Council and, 399 International Port Security Program, 412 measuring performance of, 380 Ofﬁce of Domestic Preparedness and, 369–370

620 preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in, 319–325 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) for, 321–322 protection of, 321 reducing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) terrorism risk in, 324 track and trace technologies for, 422 vulnerabilities of, 369 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in, 323 Maritime terrorism Achille Lauro hijacking incident (see Achille Lauro hijacking incident) Active Endeavour and, 480–485 by al-Qaeda, 23 by animal rights extremists, 17 antiterrorist response to, 56–63 arms smuggling, 18, 20 challenges for dealing with, 354 challenges for responding to, 33 Coast Guard and (see U.S. Coast Guard) combating, 50–51, 155–157, 480–485 (see also Antiterrorism; Counterterrorism) common conceptions of, 439 common targets of, 65 consequences of, 348–349, 364, 439, 467–468 contemporary cases of, 16–24 contingency plans for, 56–63 counterterrorist strategies for, 24–33 deﬁned, 8, 510–511 dirty bombs, 384–387 effects of, 313–314 enacting criminal laws for, 189 by environmentalists, 17 Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) response to, 352 through ferries, 388 frequency of, 389 global response strategies to, 28–33 government support for, 48–49 groups responsible for, 55 high-risk zones for, 435 hijackings, 17

Index history of, 8–14 increases in, 72–73 insurance for, 279–280 international collaboration against, 190–191 by Irish Republican Army (IRA), 20, 21 jurisdiction in matters of, 189–190 (see also Jurisdiction) legislation against, 169 Libya and, 42 likelihood of, 177, 349, 383–390 likely methods of attack in, 464 through liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG) tankers, 386–387 Maritime Liaison Agents (MLAs) for, 351 in Mediterranean, 480–485 modern threats of, 14–24 moral issue of, 41–44 Nicolay Karamzin, 70 oil spills and, 22–23 by Palestinian groups, 18, 46 (see also Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)) through passenger ferries, 388 penalties for, 274 port security and, 262 potential damages of, 543 preparation for, 56–66 prevention of, 66–68 (see also Counterterrorism) recovery from, 215 security policy for (see Maritime Security Policy) ship security alert system and, 227–228 targets of, 314–315, 339–340, 368, 388 tracing, 72–73 USS Cole bombing (see USS Cole bombing) in Vietnam, 17 worst-case scenarios of, 34 Maritime threat response, 214–215 Maritime Threats Workshop, 27–28 Maritime transportation Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), 223–231

Index Automatic Identiﬁcation System (AIS), 402 expenses of, 175 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and, 353 impetus for, 188 implementation deadlines of, 408 implementation of, 403–407 importance of, 223 interagency conﬂict resulting from, 353, 356 Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs) and, 352 National Maritime Security Plan, 403–404 organizational changes from, 364 for passenger ships, 193 for port security, 344–345 purpose of, 25–26, 222, 360, 391–392, 401, 407 regulations of, 408–411 requirements of, 352, 368–369 security regulations of, 400–402 U.S. Coast Guard and, 349, 352, 353 Maritime transportation system authority on, 274–275 in Caribbean Basin, 464 challenges for, 308 choke points of, 546 congestion in, 277 costs of, 543 effect of climate change on, 286 evolution of, 270 freedom of navigation in, 328 importance of, 234, 314, 366 importance of port security for, 257 integrated planning for, 271–272 licensing for, 307 maintaining effectiveness of, 545–546 National Strategy for the United States Marine Transportation System, 308 Pilot Project of Marine Electronic Highway (MEH) and, 434 protection of, 157 twenty-foot container equivalent units (TEUs) in, 273 of United States, 177, 366–367

621 vastness of, 314 vulnerability of, 234–235, 315, 532 Maritime transportation system security, 215–216 Maritime violence agencies involved in ﬁghting, 194 challenges for responding to, 33 enacting criminal laws for, 189 international collaboration against, 190–191 jurisdiction in matters of, 189–190 maritime laws against, 506–511 Maryland Maritime Security Group (MMSG), 346 Mass communications, 287 McEwen, Bob, 85–86 Mediterranean Dialogue Programme, 482 Mediterranean Sea, 8–9, 475–485 Megaports Initiative, 321, 465, 585–586 Merchant Marine, 202–209, 221 Merchant Marine Academy, 275 Merchant Marine Act, 207, 279 Merchant mariners credentials for, 582 fair treatment of, 582 Operation Drydock and, 230 screening of, 221 Merchant vessel security. See Ship security Miami Joint Terrorism Task Force, 347 Migrant interdiction in Caribbean Basin, 465 port security and, 263–264 by U.S. Coast Guard, 156, 158 by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 180 Mikulski, Barbara A., 88–89 Millennium Plot, 387 Mineta, Norman Y., 268–275 Mitropoulos, Efthimios E., 545, 549–550 Mogadishu, Somalia, 459 Money laundering, 264–265 Monitoring Group on Somalia, 552–553 Monteverde, Susan J., 172–176 Montezuma, 13 Moore, Charles W. Moore, Jr., 115, 118–119, 124, 132, 136

622 Morgan, Sir Henry, 10 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), 22 Morocco, 21 Mountbatten, Earl, 21 Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), 454 Multinational Interim Force (MIF), 283 Murray, Patty, 393–397 al Muslimeen, Jamaat, 467 MV Cheung Son, 511 Myers, Richard B., 281–283 al Nashiri, Abd al Rahman, 388–389 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 349 National Defense University, 369 National Fleet, 247–248 National Fleet Policy, 292 National Homeland Security Strategy for maritime security (see Maritime Homeland Security Strategy) objectives of, 241–242 preparation for, 471 National Infrastructure Security Committee (NISC), 177, 270 National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), 345–346 National Maritime Day proclamations, 202–209 National Maritime Security Advisory Committee, 195, 272–273 National Maritime Security Plan, 403–404 National Maritime Security Response Plan, 214–215 National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan, 62, 69 National Response Plan, 215 National security engagement of other countries for, 118 See also Homeland security National Security Council, 198, 212 National Security Cutter, 253 National security strategy

Index and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), 141 U.S. Coast Guard’s role in, 241 and U.S. Navy Central Command (USNAVCENT), 141 in Yemen, 141 National Security Strategy for a New Century, 118 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 197, 450–451, 456 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 197 National Strategy for Maritime Security, 26–27, 212–213, 217–219, 250, 293, 316–317, 320, 349, 351–352, 456 National Strategy for the United States Marine Transportation System, 308 National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, 320–321 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 319–325 National Targeting Center (NTC), 228, 398–399 National Transportation System Security Plan, 170–171 National Vessel Movement Center, 221, 237 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) NATO Maritime Intelligence Coordination Centre, 477 Natter, Robert J., 115 Natural disasters, 290, 292. See also Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), 128 Naval Protection Zones, 237 Navy Regional Contracting Center (NRCC), 139 Negroponte, John D., 325–337 The Netherlands, 10–11, 13 New England groundﬁsh ﬁshery, 159 New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), 100 Nicolay Karamzin, 70

Index Nigeria, 455, 514 9/11 Attacks closure of ports after, 315 deﬁning terrorism after, 6–7 effect on counterterrorism, 217 effect on maritime security, 302, 305–306 effect on port security, 276–277 effects of, 187–188, 319, 360, 399, 480, 532–533, 547 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and, 344 ﬁnancial loss from, 279 homeland security after, 268–270 lessons learned from, 324 maritime security after, 25–27, 163–164 Merchant Marine Academy’s response to, 204 port security after, 363–364, 391, 573 security teams resulting from, 230 unprecedented nature of, 1 U.S. Coast Guard’s response to, 233–234, 371, 375 9/11 Commission, 349 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, 182, 185 1988 Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Maritime Navigation, 361 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1997 National Military Strategy, 118 96-hour advance notiﬁcation of arrival, 221, 228, 234, 362 Noncontainerized cargo, 386 Non-Intrusive Inspection technology (NII), 229–230 North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), 252–253 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) classiﬁcation of maritime violence, 7–8 on insurgency, 5 maritime intelligence of, 72, 73 maritime terrorism response strategies of, 29–30

623 Operation Active Endeavor, 297, 475–485 North Carolina State Ports Authority, 174 Northern Command (NORTHCOM), 246 Nuclear arms Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) for (see Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)) radiation detection equipment for, 232, 321, 585–586 Nuclear Emergency Search Team, 201 Nuclear material, 508 Nuclear terrorism, 323 O’C Walker, Maureen, 310–313 Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA), 309 Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 469 Ofﬁce of Anti-Terrorism, 160–161 Ofﬁce of Domestic Preparedness, 369–370 Ofﬁce of Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection, 176 Offshore oil platforms, 50, 59, 70 Offshore strategic boardings, 221–222, 466, 477–478, 481, 508–509 Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), 453 Oil industry maritime security and, 70 protection of, 59, 66–68 in United Kingdom, 59 Oil rigs, 50, 59, 70 Oil spills, 62 Oil tankers, 14–15 O’Neil, William A., 515, 524 Operation Active Endeavor, 297, 475–485 Operation Drydock, 230, 347–348 Operation Enduring Freedom, 475–476 Operation Neptune Shield, 467 Operation NEW FRONTIER, 157 Operation Noble Eagle, 398 Operation Port Shield, 229 Operation Safe Commerce (OSC), 223, 227, 369–370, 395–396

624 OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH, 117 Organization for African Unity (OAU), 32 Organization of American States, 465 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 63 Overseas Security Advisory Council, 25 Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), 32 Palestine, 95, 97–98 Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), 19, 20 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 17–20 following Achille Lauro hijacking incident, 83, 84 headquarters of, 95 lawsuit against, 92–95, 97–104 maritime terrorism by, 46 in New York, 95, 100–101 role in Achille Lauro hijacking incident, 96 and Soviet Union, 48–49 in United Nations (UN), 98, 101 U.S. treatment of, 95–96 Palestinian Front for the Liberations of Palestine, 55 Palestinian groups, 17–20, 46 Palestinian terrorists Abbas, Abdul, 80–81 in Achille Lauro hijacking incident, 75–104 Khaled, Abu, 80–81 Panama Canal, 63, 459–460 Panamanian National Maritime Service, 460 PANAMAX 2004, 459–460 Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), 457 al-Para, Abderrazak, 457–458 Parfomak, Paul W., 383–390 Pasha of Tripoli, 41–42 Passenger ferries, 388 Patriot Act, 6–7 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999, 121 Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980, 64 P–8 Senior Experts Group on Transnational Organized Crime, 267

Index Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O), 28 Peterman, D. Brian, 359–362 Peters, Mary E., 307–308 Petroleum industry, 70, 286 Pham, Dr. J. Peter, 448–458 Phantom ship phenomenon, 313 The Philippines, 27–28, 439, 516 Phillips Channel, 42–43 Pilot Project of Marine Electronic Highway (MEH), 434 Pipelines, 492–493 Piracy by animal rights extremists, 17 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on, 416–420 attempts at, 444–445 Caribbean, 9 challenges for dealing with, 518–519 in China, 13 combating, 425–433 common areas for, 514–515, 546 deﬁned, 2–5, 8, 425, 489, 512 near developing countries, 312 disappearance of, 43 education for combating, 471–472 effects of, 313–314 by environmentalists, 17 European Union’s (EU) efforts against, 468–473 Golden Age of, 11 high-risk zones for, 435 history of, 8–14, 41–44 hot pursuit, 491 increase in, 469, 511 insurgency and, 5, 12–13 international laws against, 418, 469 International Maritime Organization (IMO) and, 310–311 jurisdiction over, 311 legislation against, 2–5, 43, 169–171 (see also U.S. legislation) local law enforcement efforts against, 312 Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and, 512–514

Index Mediterranean, 8–9 modern threats of, 14–24 of oil tankers, 14–15 in Phillips Channel, 42–43 political action against, 310–313 as political tool, 43 preparation for, 471 prosecution of, 2–5, 92–95 protection against, 418–419 (see also Maritime security) ReCAAP agreement and, 435–438 recommendations for preventing, 519–521 religious support for, 9 reporting of, 470, 472–473, 513–514, 515, 519 reporting system for, 437–438 response to, 490–491 responsibility for combating, 490 ship security alert system, 227–228 ship security plans and, 521 ship signals for, 515–516 in Somalia, 444–448, 550–557 in South America, 517–518 in South China Sea, 516–517 in Southeast Asia, 15, 416–420, 520, 546 state support for, 9–10 statistics on, 517, 521–522 in Straits of Malacca, 514–515 targets of, 314–315 techniques for, 514 terrorism versus, 546 tracking activity of, 15 (see also International Maritime Bureau (IMB)) underreporting of, 472–473 in West Africa, 514 Piracy Reporting Centre, 522–523 Plutonium, 34 Pollution Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) and, 330–331 prevention of, 433–435, 492, 496 Pompey the Great, 9 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 18–19 Port and Maritime Security Act, 396

625 Port and Maritime Security and Counterterrorism Summit 2007, 438–444 Port and Tanker Safety Act, 62 Port Authority, 573 Port Canaveral, 341 Port congestion, 267 Port facility security assessments, 524–525, 536, 537–538 Port facility security plans, 503–504, 527, 567–572 Port, Maritime, and Rail Security Act of 2001, 270 Port of Laem Chabang, 220 Port of Los Angeles, 384 Port of Virginia, 400 Port performance measures, 499 Port privatization, 266 Port Royal, 10 Port security Advance Manifest Regulation, 163–164 alien smuggling and, 263–264 America’s Waterways Watch, 231 antiterrorist component to, 262 appropriate levels of, 278, 280 Area Maritime Security Committees for, 229, 347 Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans, 404 armed robbery and, 312–313 assessments of, 229, 524–526 association of directors for, 258 authority on, 274–275 Automated Targeting System (ATS) for, 223, 228 Automatic Identiﬁcation System (AIS) for, 229, 405 background checks for, 277–278 boarding of high-interest vessels for, 228–229 in California, 174 Captain of the Port and, 271, 272, 312–313 cargo inspections for, 576–577 cargo theft and, 263 in Caribbean, 462–468

626 Port security (continued) challenges for, 257, 265–268, 278, 365–366, 372–379, 382, 394–395 challenges for funding of, 378–379 committees for, 222 communication plan for, 571, 576 Congressional Hearings on, 393–397 container security and, 176–178 (see also Container Security Initiative (CSI)) Container Security Initiative (CSI) and (see Container Security Initiative (CSI)) coordinated efforts for, 226, 375–378 costs of, 498–499, 543 Credentialing Direct Action Group (CDAG) for, 277–279 credentials for shipping personnel and, 582–583 currency smuggling and, 264–265 current state of, 389–390 Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and, 221, 226–227 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and, 219–224 determining responsibility for, 134, 143, 144 drug smuggling and, 264 economic impact of, 465–466 Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and, 265–266 expenses of, 396, 465–466 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and, 337–357 in Florida, 340–341 fundamentals of, 258–260 funding for, 172, 220, 229, 351, 366, 378–379, 395, 405, 413 goals of, 258 government support for, 527, 531 grants for, 229, 351, 378–379, 395, 405 guidelines for, 573–577 in Gulf of Mexico, 341 handling cargo for, 223–224 helicopters for, 223 and high-interest vessels, 222 identifying port vulnerabilities in, 259

Index identity checks for (see also Transportation Worker Identiﬁcation Credential (TWIC); Transportation Workers Identity Card (TWIC)) implementing strategy for, 221–224, 259–260 importance of, 257, 267–268, 280, 364, 367, 391 importance of cooperation for, 575 improving, 368–369 information management for, 571, 576 information security and, 261 infrastructure for, 223–224 integrated deepwater system for, 222 integrated planning for, 271–272 integrated with maritime security, 577 International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) and, 572–577 international collaboration for, 271–272 International Port Security Program for, 227, 412 International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code for, 221, 227, 526–2111 (see also International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code) joint task force for, 273–274 jurisdiction for, 345–348, 349–350, 353 lack of funding for, 365–366 lack of performance measures for, 373–374 lack of planning for, 373–374 layered security systems for, 225–226 leadership for, 220 levels of, 409, 525, 527 local efforts for, 272 manifest information for, 302–303 Maritime Administration (MARAD) and, 275–280 maritime domain awareness (MDA) and, 370–372 Maritime Homeland Security Strategy for, 232–236 Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs) for, 222–223, 230

Index Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) and, 169–171, 222, 223, 400–411 maritime transportation system and, 257 Maryland Maritime Security Group (MMSG), 346 measures and procedures of, 260–265, 539–540 military deployment and, 269 monitoring success of, 259 multinational cooperation for, 184, 257, 267 National Infrastructure Security Committee (NISC) and, 177 National Maritime Security Plan, 403–404 national strategy for, 219–224 National Targeting Center (NTC) and, 228 new measures for, 224–225 96-hour advance notice of arrival for, 228 Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) Technology for, 229–230 in North Carolina, 174 offshore strategic boardings and, 221–222, 228–229 Operation Drydock, 230, 347–348 Operation Port Shield, 229 Operation Safe Commerce for, 223, 227 passenger terminals and, 504 performance measures for, 499 personnel for, 260, 261–262, 264 personnel issues for, 374–375 planning cycle of, 259 planning for, 257–259 planning guide for, 256–258 port access and, 261 Port and Tanker Safety Act, 62 port congestion and, 267 port infrastructure for, 276 Port Security Grant Program (PGSP), 172 port vulnerability assessments for, 223 post–9/11, 268–270, 276–277, 344–348, 363–364, 367, 391, 573

627 President George W. Bush on, 171–172 preventive measures for, 571–572 principles for, 270–271, 396–397 priorities for, 382 progress in, 379–380 proposals for, 174–17 public-private cooperation for, 257, 367, 571 recommendations for improving, 355–357 reducing vulnerabilities of, 368–369 regulations for, 407–408 requirements for, 537–538 risk management for, 381 risks for, 340–341 role of maritime industry in, 235, 269 Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) and, 27, 390–393 satellite tracking of cargo and, 266 screening harmful materials for, 223 screening merchant mariners for, 221 sea marshals for, 222 sea robbery and, 262 seaport privatization plans and, 266 Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006, 27, 390–393 security assessments for, 225, 524–525, 526–527, 536 security clearance and, 376–377 security levels of, 536 security offers for, 504 security plans for, 503–504, 567–572, 573–577 security survey for, 25 sharing information for, 576 ship port interface and, 569 ship security alert system for, 227–2289 “smart box” initiative for, 227 Smart Card Administrative Project, 278–279 smart card technology and, 269, 278–279 stowaways and, 263–265 strategies for, 232–236

Index

628 Port security (continued) summary of U.S. efforts for, 364–365 Supervisory Special Agents for, 346 supply chain security and, 181–186 in Texas, 174 threats for, 219, 262 trade negotiations and, 257 training for, 261, 407 Transportation Worker Identiﬁcation Credential (TWIC) for, 377–378 Transportation Workers Identity Card (TWIC) for, 230–231 and 24-hour advanced manifest rule (24-hour rule), 166–167, 221, 226 by U.S. Coast Guard, 156–157, 232–236 (see also U.S. Coast Guard) by U.S. Customs and Border Control (see U.S. Customs and Border Control) use of technology in, 265 by Virginia Port Authority, 400 vulnerability assessments for, 272, 303, 570, 575 vulnerability of, 368 in Washington State, 393–397 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and, 338 Port security assessment program, 229 Port Security Committee, 568–569 Port Security Grant Program (PGSP), 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 351, 378 Port Security Improvement Act of 2006, 411 Port security plans, 573–577 Port Security Risk Assessment Tool, 381 Port Security Task Force, 303 Port Security Units (PSUs), 398 Port Security Working Group, 343, 346–347 Port State Control (PSC) program, 465 Port vulnerability assessments, 223. See also Vulnerability assessments Ports ﬁnancing, 500–501 International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code and, 497–501 performance measures for, 499 See also U.S. ports

Posse Comitaus Act, 61 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 26, 321–322, 336, 357–359, 361, 479, 484, 592 Protection and Indemnity Clubs, 280 Public travel warnings, 198 Puget Sound, 232, 394, 395 Putin, Vladimir, 323 Qadafﬁ, Colonel, 71 al-Qaeda. See under A listings. Al-Quaddaﬁ, Muammar, 42 Quedah Merchant, 11 Radiation detection, 231–232 Radiation detection equipment, 232, 321, 585–586 Radiation scanning, 585–586 Reagan, Ronald, 71, 75–80, 332 ReCAAP Agreement, 31–32, 425–433, 435–438 Refueling operations, 136–140 Regalbuto, Anthony, 176–178 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), 31–32, 425–433, 435–438 Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), 26, 357–359 Reid, Harry, 86–87 Rescue Coordination Centre, 556 Rio de Janeiro Port, 517–518 Risk management, 380–382 Roberts, Bartholomew, 11 Roll-on/Roll-off cargo, 386 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 205, 207 Roosevelt, Theodore, 304 Rotary Wing Air Intercept (RWAI), 252–253 Roughead, Gary, 284 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 57 Rudd, Eldon, 88 Ruddock, Philip, 438–444 SAFE Port Act. See Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act)

Index Safety of Life at Sea Convention. See International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, 269 Salaﬁst Group for Preaching and Combat, 452 Sandia National Laboratories, 387 Santos Port, 517–518 Satellite tracking, 266 Schubert, William G., 275–280 Schumer, Charles E., 81 Scott, Robert C., 397–400 Sea Automated Manifest System, 226 Sea control, 291 Sea dogs, 10 Sea marshals, 222, 237, 406 Sea robbery, 256–257, 262–263. See also Maritime robbery Sea Shepherd of Conservation Society, 17 Seafarers’ Identity Document, 531, 549 Seapower challenges for maintaining, 285 cooperative strategy for, 284–295 ﬂexibility of, 287 importance of, 294–295 Law of the Sea Convention and, 325–337 preventing war with, 289 regionally concentrated, 288 Seattle, Washington, 394 Second Barbary War, 12 Secret Army for the Liberation of Palestine (SALP), 46 Secretary of Defense National Maritime Security Response Plan by, 214–215 responsibilities of, 212–213 Secretary of Homeland Security and maritime commerce security, 216 maritime infrastructure recovery, 215 maritime transportation system security, 215–216 National Maritime Security Response Plan by, 214–215 responsibilities of, 212–213 Secretary of State diplomatic efforts of, 214

629 international outreach by, 214 Secretary of Transportation, 274–275, 279 Secure Freight Initiative, 467 Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) Caribbean Basin and, 462–463 Container Security Initiative (CSI) and, 182, 185 elements of, 27 funding provided by, 175, 176 implementation of, 390–393 provisions of, 392 signing into law, 27 U.S. Coast Guard and, 185 Security assessments, 225. See also Vulnerability assessments Security clearances, 376–377 Security exercises, 377 Security levels, 525, 536 Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, 73 September 11, 2001, 1. See also 9/11 Attacks Sharp Guard, 483 Shelton, Henry H., 116 Ship Identiﬁcation Number, 313 Ship Operations Cooperative Program (SOCP), 278–279 Ship port interface, 569 Ship protection plans, 131 Ship security alert system for, 193, 227–228, 529, 539 Automatic Information Systems (AIS) for, 528 boarding provisions for, 508–509 communication plan for, 571 Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR) for, 539 crew size and, 520 ﬁrearms and, 473 government support for, 531 identiﬁcation numbers and, 528, 539 information management for, 571 measures for, 506–511 ofﬁcers for, 536–537 post–9/11, 573

630 Ship security (continued) preventive measures for, 571–572 recommendations for, 519–521 regulations for, 408–411 responsibility for, 573 security plans for, 567–572 vulnerability assessments for, 570 Ship Security Alert System, 193, 227–228, 529, 539–540 Ship Security Assessment, 526 Ship Security Ofﬁcer (SSO), 504–505, 526, 536, 537 Ship security plans, 504–505, 520–521, 536–537, 538, 567–572 Shipbuilding, 44–45 Shipmasters, 580 Shipping industry. See Maritime industry Signals intelligence (SIGINT), 123 Simpson, Allan K., 89–91 Singapore, 14, 42, 433–435, 437–438 Slave trade, 488 “Smart box” devices, 587–589 “Smart box” initiative, 227 Smart Card Administrative Project, 278–279 Smart Card credentialing system, 278–279 Smart card technology, 269, 278–279 SOLAS. See International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Somali pirates, 15, 444–445, 550–557 Somalia, 446–447, 452, 459, 556 Somalia’s National Movement (SNM), 16 South America, 517 South China Sea, 516–517 Southeast Asia, 30–32 Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), 465 Sovereignty of continental shelf, 496 at sea, 495 Soviet Union control of maritime gateways, 45 and Libya, 42 support for maritime terrorism, 48–49 terrorism and, 71 Spain, 10–11 Spanish Armada, 10

Index Spanish Treasure Fleet, 10 Speaks, Larry M., 75–76, 80–81 SS Mayaguez, 203 SS Meredith Victory, 203 Standard Terminal Arrival Route (STAR) Initiative, 421–422 Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, 475–476 Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE), 114 Stethem, Robert, 90–91 Stowaways, 263–264 Straits of Gibraltar, 476, 481 Straits of Malacca, 31, 42, 358, 423, 433–435, 511, 514–515, 516, 546 Straits of Singapore, 433–435, 546 Strategy for Maritime Safety, 297–298 Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security, 183 SUA Convention, 29, 311, 505–511, 533–534, 535 Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 397–400 Subcommittee on Panama Canal and the Outer Continental Shelf, 63 Submarines, 291, 483, 492 Suicide bombing techniques, 338 Suleiman the Magniﬁcent, 9 Super-Ferry 14, 439 Supply chain security, 181–186, 216, 592 Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention, 442, 510 SWAT teams, 350, 352, 353. See also Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs) Sweden, 512 Tacoma, Washington, 394 Tampa Bay, Florida, 339, 340, 341–343, 346–347 Tampa Bay Port Security Working Group, 343, 346–347 Tampa FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, 341–342 Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program (TIPP), 413 Teach, Edward, 11

Index 10 plus 2 initiative, 584 Tenyu, 511 Territorial sea, 495 Terrorism achieving justice in response to, 81–95 Africa and, 450–453, 458–459 antiterrorism and (see Antiterrorism) combating, 8 (see also Antiterrorism; Counterterrorism) commerce and, 47 common targets of, 52, 53 databases on, 343 deﬁned, 6–8, 85 domestic, 338 effectiveness of, 52 effects of, 421 energy sources and, 52–53 by environmental extremists, 338 ﬁnancing of, 422–423 gathering intelligence on, 121–123 globalization and, 1 hostile intent, 134 increase in, 53–55, 64, 91–92 insurance for, 279–280 insurgency versus, 5 international versus domestic, 6–7 internationalization of, 52 investigation of, 200 JFK International Airport terrorist plot, 467 through liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG) tankers, 386–387 maritime (see Maritime terrorism) mass communication and, 52 military response to, 201 (see also U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Navy) Millennium Plot, 387 9/11 attacks (see 9/11 Attacks) nuclear, 323 piracy versus, 546 post–9/11 period of, 6 post-World War II, 43 prevention of, 62 (see also Counterterrorism) sophisticated weapons and, 52 tracing, 71 tracking cases of, 354–355

631 United Nations (UN) on, 6, 547–548 U.S. legislation against, 95–96 vulnerability assessments and, 128–129 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and, 319–325 Terrorism databases, 343, 350, 351, 354–355, 356 Terrorist Screening Center, 348 Terzi, Zuhdi Labib, 95 Thailand, 220 Theater Engagement Plan (TEP), 119 Threat conditions (THREATCON), 114, 127–128 Alpha rating of, 147–149 Bravo rating of, 132, 149–151 Charlie rating of, 152–153 Delta rating of, 153 implementation of, 140 measures for, 147–153 purpose of, 147 purpose of measures with, 133 standardization of, 142 Threat level reporting, 126–128, 142 THREATNET, 343 Tourism, 338–339. See also Cruise lines Transit passage, 495 Transport Working Group, 422 Transportation industry, 379 Transportation security, 186–195 Transportation Security Administration (TSA), 170, 177–178, 276, 377–378, 391, 404–405, 413, 583 Transportation Worker Identiﬁcation Credential (TWIC), 172, 173–174, 175–176, 377–378, 391–392, 404–405, 583 Transportation Workers Identity Card (TWIC), 230–231, 365 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), 457 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 508 Tripartite Technical Experts Group (TTEG), 434, 435 Tripolitianian War, 42 Trusted Information Sharing Network, 443

632 Tunisia, 76, 82–83, 95 Turtuga, 10 Twenty-foot container equivalent units (TEUs), 273. See also Container Security Initiative (CSI) 24-hour advanced manifest rule (24hour rule), 163–164, 166–167, 221, 226, 592 2007 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 6 Ulrich, Admiral Henry, 295–301 UN Security Council, 199, 547, 553–554 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 171–172 United Kingdom, 10–11, 13, 58–61 United Nations (UN) Conference on Trade and Development, 497–501 Convention on the High Seas, 485–494 Convention on the Law of the Sea (see United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS)) Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in, 98 on piracy, 551–552 response to 9/11 attacks, 547 Secretary-General of, 494 Security Council Resolutions, 199 on terrorism, 6 2007 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 6 World Maritime University, 471–473 World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime, 265 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 325–337 acceptance of, 336–337 beginning of, 495 continental shelf and, 329–330 Convention on the High Seas, 485–494 deep seabed mining, 331–333 deﬁning piracy, 512 First Conference on (UNCLOS I), 29

Index International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 335 key features of, 495–497 marine pollution and, 330–331 purpose of, 2 requirements of, 551 Third Conference on (UNCLOS III), 29 United States and, 331–337 U.S. sovereignty and, 329–330, 333–334 and War on Terror, 335 United States antiterrorist planning by, 61–63 continental shelf of, 330 costs of maritime security in, 544 domestic terrorists in, 338 and Egypt, 86–88 energy demands of, 453–454 ports of (see U.S. ports) shortcomings in counterterrorist efforts, 66–68 United States v. PLO, 101 Urban Area Security Initiative, 378 U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), 295–301, 448–450 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 201, 465 U.S. ambassadors, 200 U.S. Armed Forces, 328 U.S. Automated Targeting System (ATS), 223 U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in Africa, 300 area of responsibility (AOR), 109, 116–118 change in responsibilities of, 117–118 Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), 457 Commander in Chief of, 117 coordination with Department of Defense (DOD), 142 and Defense Energy Support Center (DESC), 139 engagement with Yemen, 121 gathering intelligence, 122 intelligence analysis by, 124 intelligence sources for, 139

Index location of, 138–139, 140, 144–145 mission of, 117 national security strategy and, 141 proximity to theater of operations, 138 threat level reporting and, 127–128, 139 and USS Cole bombing, 108, 109, 110 vulnerability assessments by, 129 in Yemen, 108, 119 U.S. Coast Guard in Arabian Gulf, 251 Area Maritime Security Committees (AMS), 229 authority of, 274–275 boarding of high-interest vessels, 228–229 budget constraints for, 390 Captains of the Port, 271–272 in Caribbean Basin, 464, 465 challenges of, 159–160, 374–375 civil authority of, 242 collaboration with other agencies, 170 container security strategy of, 176–178 (see also Container Security Initiative (CSI)) counterterrorist activity of, 241–248 creation of, 24 Deepwater, 253 and Department of Defense (DOD), 244–247, 249–250 Deployable Operations Group (DOG), 254 in disaster relief, 244, 252, 254 in Dominican Republic, 252 drug interdiction by, 156, 158–159, 251 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of, 234 Executive Steering Committee of, 347 expanding operations of, 243–244 and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 65–66, 349, 352–353, 356 ﬁsheries regulations and, 156, 158 goals of, 159–160 humanitarian assistance by, 252

633 implementation priorities for, 253–255 Incident Command Structure of, 244–245 Integrated Deepwater System for, 222, 372 integration with Armed Forces, 292–293 Intelligence Coordination Center, 269 interagency approach of, 255–256, 371 international engagement by, 245–248, 250–251, 253, 360 International Maritime Organization (IMO) and, 254–255 International Maritime Security Strategy, 359–362 International Port Security Program for, 227, 361, 412, 466 jurisdiction of, 61–62, 190, 191, 274–275, 345–346, 406, 409 Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs), 158 maritime domain awareness (MDA) of, 371–372 maritime engagement strategy of, 255–256 Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan and, 252, 349–350 Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs), 230, 236–237, 352, 398, 405 maritime security by, 466 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) and, 368–369, 404–406 maritime transportation system (MTS) and, 234–235 measuring performance of, 380 migrant interdiction by, 156 modernization of, 159–160 national defense capabilities of, 250–253 National Infrastructure Security Committee (NISC) and, 177 national security by, 244–245, 250–253

634 U.S. Coast Guard (continued) National Strategy for Maritime Security and, 250 National Vessel Movement Center, 237 96-hour advance notice of arrival and, 228 North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), 252 offshore strategic boardings by, 228–229, 466 Operation Drydock, 230, 347–348 Operation Neptune Shield, 467 Operation Noble Eagle, 398 Operation Port Shield, 229 organization of, 61–62 in Persian Gulf, 246 personnel increases, 374–375 pollution response by, 244 port and maritime security strategy of, 232–236 port inspections by, 225, 375 port security assessment programs for, 229 port security by, 225, 269–270, 398, 412 Port Security Units (PSUs), 398 Port State Control (PSC) program, 465 principles of, 235 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise of, 361 recapitalization of, 372 response to 9/11 attacks, 233–234, 236–238, 371, 375 responsibilities of, 25, 61–62, 69, 230, 236–238, 240, 249, 276, 303, 306–307, 349–350, 352, 371 responsiveness of, 292 review of port security plans, 368–369 risk management by, 381–382 role of, 155–157 sea marshals, 222, 237, 406 security assessments by, 369 security clearance and, 376–377 security incident response plans of, 404

Index system upgrades for, 237–238 Tampa Bay Port Security Working Group, 343, 346–347 training facilities of, 253–254 training provided by, 313 U.S. Navy and, 247–248, 251, 255 and War on Terror, 251 U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, 269 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Advance Manifest Regulation, 164 Airport and Seaport Inspections User Fee Advisory Committee, 195–196 antiterrorist efforts of, 167, 398–399 Automated Manifest System (AMS) of, 162 in Caribbean Basin, 466–467 challenges for, 184–185 container security by, 177 (see also Container Security Initiative (CSI)) Container Security Initiative (CSI) of (see Container Security Initiative (CSI)) counterterrorism by, 164–166 density image inspections by, 586 drug interdiction by, 180 evaluation of, 182–186 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and, 353 in foreign ports, 465 implementation of Container Security Initiative (CSI), 373–374 implementation of Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) program, 374 information-sharing capabilities of, 168–169 international cooperation by, 27, 461–462 maritime supply chain and, 321 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) and, 169–171 migrant interdiction by, 180 National Targeting Center (NTC), 228, 398–399

Index Non-Intrusive Inspection technology (NII), 229–230 operational seaports of, 226 performance measurement system of, 185 port security by, 160–163, 273 purpose of, 179–180 radiation scanning, 585 recommendations for, 185 responsibilities of, 181, 306–307, 349–350, 369, 583–584 supply chain security by, 181–186 support for initiatives of, 592–593 10 plus 2 approach, 306–307, 584 24-hour advanced manifest rule (24hour rule) and, 163–164, 166–167, 226 U.S. Customs Service. See U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) U.S. Embassy counterterrorism through, 198 in Dar es Salem, Tanzania, 108 in Nairobi, Kenya, 108 U.S. European Command (EUCOM), 281 U.S. foreign policy, 198–199 U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce (GAO), 27 U.S. Joint Forces Command, 130–131 U.S. Kosovo Force, 281 U.S. legislation Anti-Terrorism Act, 95–96 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 162 for creation of Coast Guard, 24 Dangerous Cargo Act of 1940, 24 Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY 2002, 276 Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, 114 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 97–98 June 15 Espionage Act of 1917, 24 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) (see Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA)

635 Merchant Marine Act, 279 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, 182 Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA), 309 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 63 on piracy, 2–5 Port and Maritime Security Act, 396 Port and Tanker Safety Act, 62 Port, Maritime, and Rail Security Act of 2001, 270 Port Security Improvement Act of 2006, 411 Posse Comitaus Act, 61 on privateering, 2–5 Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006, 27, 175, 182, 185 USA Patriot Act (18 U.S.C. Sec. 2331), 6–7 U.S. Marine Transportation System, 177 U.S. Marines, 292 U.S. Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ), 25 U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, 204 U.S. military force protection programs for, 129–136 importance of collaborative effort by, 108–110 importance of port security to, 269 terrorist attacks against, 107–108 U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG), 252 U.S. Navy antiterrorism and force protection (AT/FP) program, 130–131, 135, 143–144 in Barbary wars, 11–12 combat power of, 288 cooperation with Yemen, 119–120 counterterrorism program of, 109 ﬂexibility of, 287 force protection standards of, 131–136 forward presence of, 290–291 foundation of, 11 global distribution of, 289 limiting regional conﬂict with, 288

636 U.S. Navy (continued) National Fleet, 248 Navy Regional Contracting Center (NRCC), 139 at Panama Canal, 460 PANAMAX, 459–460 power projection by, 291 preventing war with, 291 sea control by, 291 strategies for maritime security, 287–294 Task Force 138, 460 and United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), 335 U.S. Coast Guard and, 247–248, 251, 255 U.S. Navy Central Command (USNAVCENT) engagement with Yemen, 121 force protection program of, 129–136 gathering intelligence, 122 House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and, 112 intelligence analysis by, 124 location of, 138–139 national security strategies and, 141 in Persian Gulf, 120 rules of engagement (ROE) of, 134 threat condition measures of, 133 USS Cole bombing and, 112, 117 U.S. Navy ships force protection standard for, 135–136, 143–144 port visits by, 138 refueling, 132 refueling requirements for, 136–140 refueling standards of, 144 threat condition (THREATCON) measures for, 147–153 U.S. ports Area Maritime Security Committees (AMS) for, 409–410 balancing security and efﬁciency in, 394 in Baltimore, Maryland, 346 Captain of the Port in, 271, 272, 409 closure of, 367 concentrations of, 366

Index containers in, 314, 587 current security levels of, 389–390 in Florida, 339 foreign delegations to, 361 grants for, 276 in Great Lakes, 269 in Gulf of Mexico, 340 importance of, 224, 345, 366, 367, 399–400 improving infrastructure of, 276 largest, 412 location of, 349 in Los Angeles, California, 347 in Miami, Florida, 347 number of, 349 number of containers in, 462 Port of Los Angeles, 384 Port of Tampa, 339, 346–347 Port of Virginia, 400 Puget Sound, 232, 394, 395 in San Diego, California, 232 security assessments at, 225 security for (see Port security) vulnerabilities of, 344–345, 349, 363–365 vulnerability assessments for, 303 in Washington State, 394 U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), 282–283 U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), 283 U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), 283 USA Patriot Act (18 U.S.C. Sec. 2331), 6–7 USCENTCOM. See U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) USNAVCENT. See U.S. Navy Central Command (USNAVCENT) USS Cole bombing brieﬁngs and interviews after, 145–147 causes of, 108–110, 120–121, 137 Commander Kirk S. Lippold and, 116 commanding ofﬁcer during, 116 deaths from 107, 108 description of, 110

Index dissemination of intelligence before, 124–125 failed protection measures for, 133–135 FBI investigation of, 111 force protection measures and, 109 force protection programs and, 131–136, 143 intelligence provided before, 141–142 investigation of, 110–116, 132, 135 Judge Advocate General (JAG) report on, 115–116 observations of, 141–145 operational issues related to, 136–140 organizational issues in, 144–145 policies resulting from, 113–114 port security responsibilities during, 134–135 recommendations resulting from, 121, 125–126, 135–136, 140, 141–145 refueling requirements and, 136, 137, 138 shortage of intelligence before, 125 summary of, 23, 107–110 threat levels and, 126–128, 142 unexpected nature of, 108–109 U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and, 116–118 vulnerability assessments on, 128–129, 143 USS Cole Commission, 111, 112–115 USS Fort McHenry, 301, 458 USS John L. Hall, 460 Venezuela, 14 Vietnam, 28 Vietnam War, 17 Vikings, 9 Virginia Port Authority, 399, 400 Vulnerability assessments, 128–129, 143, 272, 303, 343, 570, 575 War, 289 War of 1812, 42 War on Terror (WOT) Africa and, 450–453 allies in, 358 detainees from, 282–283

637 Guantanamo Bay and, 282–283 in Horn of Africa, 281 Maritime Interdiction Operations in, 282 Merchant Marine and, 205 overseas operations for, 281–283 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) and, 335 U.S. Coast Guard’s role in, 234, 251 U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and, 283 Ward, General William, 295–301 Warships, 487, 490. See also USS Cole bombing Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery of, 385–387 devastation of, 384 increase of, 287 national strategies for managing, 319–321 port security and, 338 preventing illegal transport of, 319–325 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) for (see Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) radiation detection equipment for, 321 stopping shipments of, 26 strategies for dealing with, 319–321 threat of, 319 Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) terrorist threat combating, 479 defense-in-depth against, 322 Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) tactics against, 352 implementing strategies against, 321–322 increasing fears of, 287 likelihood of, 383–386 through maritime supply chain, 369 Proliferation Security Initiative and (see Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) reducing risk of, 324–325 security initiatives against, 484 summit for combating, 342

Index

638 Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) trafﬁckers, 323 Weapons technology, 286–287 Weiss, Ted, 84–85 West Africa, 514 West Coast Maritime Radiation Detection project, 231–232 West Coast port shutdown, 315 Whitman, Bryan, 295–301 Wibisono, Makarim, 420–424 WMD Incident Response Plans, 342 WMD Terrorism Summit, 342 World Customs Organization (WCO), 165, 531, 548, 592 World Food Programme (WFP), 446–448, 556 World Maritime University, 312–313, 471–473 World Shipping Council, 587

World War I, 13 World War II, 13 Wrightson, Margaret, 363–383 Yap, Robert, 394 Yemen Aden Port, 135, 136 intelligence on, 121–122 location of, 117, 118 national security strategy in, 141 Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) for, 119 threat levels in, 126–128 U.S. engagement with, 118 USS Cole bombing in (see USS Cole bombing) Yugoslav dissolution, 483 Zinni, Anthony, 119, 120, 122

About the Authors

YONAH ALEXANDER is a professor emeritus at State University of New York (SUNY) and currently director of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, a consortium of academic institutions in some 35 countries. He is also a senior fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and director of its International Center for Terrorism Studies, and co-director of the InterUniversity Center for Legal Studies (at the International Law Institute). Among his many books are Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries; Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaida: Proﬁle of a Terrorist Network; and The New Iranian Leadership: Ahmadinejad, Nuclear Ambition and the Middle East. TYLER B. RICHARDSON has served as the director of research for the InterUniversity Center for Terrorism Studies and as defense fellow for the LongTerm Strategy Project, both in Washington, D.C. His work on maritime terrorism and port security issues has been published by the Washington Times, United Press International, the Jerusalem Post, and the Lexington Institute. Mr. Richardson holds a BA in English from Georgetown University and an MBA from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He currently works as a senior analyst in North Carolina.