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The Analysis of Hysteria Second Edition Understanding Conversion and Dissociation
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HAROLD MERSKEY
The Analysis of Hysteria Second Edition Understanding Conversion and Dissociation
©
The Royal College of Psychiatrists 1995, reprinted with amendements 1999
Gaskell is a registered trade mark of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, 17 Belgrave Square, London SW1X 8PG
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 0-902241-88-5
Distributed in North America by American Psychiatric Press, Inc. ISBN 0-88048-647-3 The views presented in this book do not necessarily reflect those of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, and the publishers are not responsible for any error of omission or fact. The Royal College of Psychiatrists is a registered charity (no. 228636).
Printed by Bell & Bain Ltd., Thornliebank, Glasgow Reprinted by RPM Reprographics, Chichester, West Sussex Cover photograph: Science Photo Library
To the memory of Harry and Sophie Merskey
v
Harold Merskey DM, FRCP, FRCP(C), FRCPsych, FAPA
Professor Emeritus of Psychiatry University of Western Ontario London, Canada London Psychiatric Hospital Ontario, Canada formerly Physician in Psychological Medicine The National Hospitals for Nervous Diseases Queen Square and Maida Vale London, England
Contents
Preface Acknowledgements Introduction
ix xiii xv
Part I. History and concepts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Some traditional concepts Early neurological analyses The turn of the century The contribution of Freud Combat hysteria Ernst Kretschmer Post-traumatic stress disorder
3 19 29 36 46 64 76
Part II. Motives and extremes 8 9 10
Malingering, self-damage and anorexia nervosa 91 Amnesia, pseudodementia and the Ganser syndrome: denial of illness 112 Compensation issues 125
Part III. Varied causes and symptoms 11 12 13 14
Organic brain disease Pain Somatisation disorder and somatisation Hypochondriasis vii
141 160 172 185
viii 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Contents The diversity of hysterical complaints Epidemic or communicable hysteria Chronic fatigue syndromes Children Suggestion and hypnotic phenomena ‘Multiple personality disorder’ Dissociation, repression and false memories
200 231 245 257 263 272 309
Part IV. Individual dynamics and clinical subgroups 22 23 24
Personality traits Psychoses Psychoanalytic concepts
335 356 368
Part V. A perspective 25
The survival of hysteria
379
Appendices Appendix A. E. F. Dubois d’Amiens: Comparative table of the symptoms of hypochondriasis and hysteria Appendix B. Emil Kraepelin: Hysterical insanity Appendix C. Sir Charles Symonds: Hysteria Appendix D. J. F. C. Hecker: Epidemics of the Middle Ages
414
References Index
422 469
397 402 407
Preface
The subject of hysteria covers numerous phenomena and a wide range of ideas. Most of the latter have to do with the relationship between mind and body. Many focus on the way in which human beings adapt to emotional problems. However, it was not always so. For a very long time hysteria was regarded as a bodily disorder which produced physical or psychological changes, or both. Gradually, it was established that the psychological aspects were primary, and that the label (or its numerous synonyms) could best be used to denote a symptom, or symptoms, which corresponded to a patient’s ideas of an illness or a disability, and that the majority of such symptoms were best explained as the result of unresolved emotional conflicts. Even so, these fundamental concepts are far from covering everything that is, or has been, known as hysteria. In addition to the classical implications of a uterine disorder, or at least a female complaint, hysteria has come to mean more recently, a variety of symptoms affecting the body, occurring under stress, and not being related to physiological changes or organic disease. Some loss of the ability to use the muscles or to experience sensory change has been the most common pattern. Some psychoses have even been included under this heading. However, the concept extends much further from individuals to the way in which groups of people will respond to stress in their lives, and the way in which ideas of illness, or alterations in personality or behaviour, can be evoked by inappropriate suggestions. Thus the topic of hysteria ranges from pain and paralysis to alterations of awareness, mass responses and sometimes special beliefs. It should become evident as the discussion proceeds in this book how much the term embraces. It should also become equally clear that the label is often misapplied. ix
x
Preface
The diagnosis of hysteria has been called “A delusion and a snare” (Slater, 1965), concerning which Lewis (1975) observed that hysteria tends to outlive its obituarists. This survival of hysteria is marked nevertheless by frequent changes or adjustments of the label. In 1980 the American Psychiatric Association (APA) formally abandoned the diagnosis of hysterical neurosis which had been used since 1968 in the second edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–II). A number of other changes have occurred since 1980, in DSM– III–R (APA, 1987), and DSM–IV (APA, 1994). There have also been alterations in the original system of the International Classification of the Diseases (ICD–9, WHO, 1977) and ICD–10 (WHO, 1992). We have seen a litany of diagnostic labels and modifications including hysterical neurosis, conversion symptoms, somatoform disorders, somatisation disorder, psychogenic pain, pain disorder (unqualified), dissociative disorders and dissociative [conversion] disorders. Hysterical personality has become histrionic personality. While the number of terms has grown some forms of hysteria have become remarkably rare in developed societies, except in neurological settings. Few psychiatrists currently see hysterical paralyses or ataxias but many consider that they see dissociative disorders in the form of multiple personality disorder, now defined as dissociative identity disorder in DSM–IV. Linked with this, there is an epidemic of artificially produced false memories. Whatever the diagnostic status of the illness, or the current rarity of forms such as paralyses and ataxias, the themes encompassed by the word ‘hysteria’ are of basic importance both to medicine and to our understanding of human behaviour. With or without the label hysteria, books and papers on the topic continue to appear in growing numbers. Somatoform disorders, hysterical responses to stress, and dissociative disorders are particularly busy fields for growth; and there is also a substantial recent literature on the historiography of hysteria. When the first edition of this book was published in 1979 its main purpose was to review, and, perhaps ambitiously, to illuminate the accumulated information on hysteria which was available from the widely scattered literature. In the course of the review an attempt was made to place hysteria in a perspective based on clinical practice and theoretical understanding. These aims remain the same in this second edition. The consideration of hysteria involves many interrelated topics such as symptoms, motives, personality, suggestion, psychodynamic theories, psychoses, organic
Preface
xi
causes, cultural influences, etc. The symptoms of hysteria, further, are enormously varied. To help cover these varied aspects new material has been added on a number of sub-topics including the history of hysteria and the meaning of the concept at different times, the occurrence of stress disorders and the effects of accidents, problems in the diagnosis of conversion disorder, the reductions in the number of cases where hysteria can legitimately be diagnosed, and current aspects of dissociative disorders. The growth of the latter has been such that it is bringing about a very hard look at the limitations of the concept of repression. To deal with these diverse matters the volume has been organised in the following way. Initially, the history of the concept has been reviewed, with particular reference to the 19th century when the basic ideas were established which we still use. This includes the contribution of Freud and his development of dynamic ideas to explain the origin of hysterical symptoms. The impact of the First World War and of other stresses upon our ideas of hysteria is then presented and discussed, since the overwhelming experiences of the First World War shaped the approach of neurologists and psychiatrists and other psychotherapists to the whole concept. The second and third portions of the book deal with the broad variety of hysterical symptoms and related disorders. These chapters culminate in discussions of a modern artefactual condition, “multiple personality disorder” and make an effort to come to grips with fundamental issues in the notion of dissociation, especially in chapter 21. Part IV then takes up the implications of the other sections with respect to personality traits and psychoses, and the later development of psychoanalytic concepts. The final chapter provides an overall perspective. I hope that this volume will serve several purposes. First, I hope it will provide a more full introduction to the topic than can be found in a long chapter in a textbook. At the same time, it presents revisions and corrections in the historical and traditional notions of hysteria, from the very earliest concepts (the ancient Egyptians) to the notion of dissociation which was most discussed in the first part of this century and the end of the 19th century. Next, I trust that it will provide a coherent and organised account of a large number of modern studies and observations which seem to me to have led to a more refined appraisal of what may be hysteria and what should no longer be considered to be hysteria. In this connection chapters 7 and 10–15 should be particularly relevant. The chapters on multiple personality disorder and dissociation (chapters 20 and 21) deal with some very vigorous current controversies, but ought to have a more fundamental
xii
Preface
impact, both on our understanding of how artificial syndromes can be created, and on the nature of the concept of dissociation. The latter topics have been among the most demanding and instructive to study and have important implications about the relationships between physicians, or other therapists, and patients. The four appendices are included for their interest and for the great skill with which three of them (Kraepelin, Symonds and Hecker) illuminate the topic. Lastly, some do not favour the word hysteria any more while the terms conversion and dissociation are now of questionable accuracy, and the word psychogenic is not acceptable for everyone. For those who seek another term, I suggest in chapter 11 and chapter 20 that the word doxogenic, meaning symptoms produced by thoughts, might serve well to describe the symptoms and problems related to hysterical seizures or “pseudoseizures” and to Multiple Personality Disorder respectively. The term could have a broader use for as much of the panoply of hysterical complaints as we fancy.
Harold Merskey London, Canada July 1995
Acknowledgements
The patients whose illnesses have encouraged me to explore this difficult but fascinating subject are the first objects of my thanks. Next, I wish to express appreciation to the people who successively taught me the management of hysterical patients, particularly, Dr Myre Sim; Dr R. W. Tibbetts; Major-General John M’Ghie, late R.A.M.C.; and the late Erwin Stengel. Professor Stengel especially urged me to work on the problems of pain and its psychological aspects, and this work led to a further developing interest in hysteria. When I came to the Queen Square and Maida Vale Hospitals the sympathetic interest and collaboration of my neurological colleagues gave me a major topic of inquiry in regard to hysteria and in this I was supported and substantially helped by my senior psychiatric colleague there, Dr R. T. C. Pratt, who also read the manuscript of my first draft and made helpful comments. So did Dr J. Aufreiter, Dr Michael Trimble and Dr Allan Walters. I particularly thank Dr Sim and Dr Walters for their detailed observations. Dr N. Geschwind helped me to revise the section dealing with denial of illness. Dr G. Low-Beer and Dr Peter Nathan translated parts of the German references. Dr Philip Evans translated the French of Dubois d’Amiens for Appendix A and Mrs Judith Plaister the Latin. Quotations of tables from Kretschmer (Chapter 6), Hawkings et al (Chapter 8), Sir Aubrey Lewis (Chapter 22) and Dr W. Linford Rees (Chapter 25) are reprinted with thanks to the authors and to the respective publishers, viz. Peter Owen Limited, Oxford University Press, The British Medical Journal and Churchill Livingstone. I am honoured by the permission of the late Sir Charles Symonds to include his address on hysteria as Appendix C. In the second edition I thank Drs G. A. Berrios and Hugh Freeman, together with Gaskell Press, for permission to quote extensively from a chapter on Shell-shock in the book ‘150 Years xiii
xiv
Acknowledgements
of British Psychiatry’. Parts of Chapter 21 have been taken from a manuscript prepared for Drs Berrios and Freeman for a historical volume which will be a sequel to the above work. Portions of Chapter 14 draw upon a chapter on Hysteria, in press in College Seminars on Adult Psychiatry (Gaskell). Thanks are also due to the British Journal of Psychiatry for permission to use the majority of the article on Multiple Personality Disorder (British Journal of Psychiatry, March 1992) in Chapter 20 and the Royal College of Psychiatrists and Alpha Academic and my co-author Christopher Alam, for permission to use substantial quotations and a line diagram from an article on The Development of the Hysterical Personality, in Chapter 22. Fellow members of the Scientific Advisory Board of the False Memory Syndrome Foundation, together with the Executive Director, Dr. Pamela Freyd, as well as several falsely accused parents and former accusers restored to better health, provided me with much information and encouragement for Chapters 20 and 21. Drs Emmanuel Persad and Peter Williamson read the first draft of the second edition and provided helpful comments, as did my wife Susan Merskey. Dr Paul Potter provided unfailing guidance on the classical Greek and Latin authors. Typing the drafts and organising material on a word processor was undertaken by Ms. J. Duncan, Ms. C. Hanas and Ms. G. Hudson who all also provided bibliographical assistance. I am further grateful to Ms. M. Why, MLS, and Ms. E. Spicer, MLS for their considerable help in tracing many references, and to Ralph Footring for the high standard of copy-editing.
Introduction
“The disorders which are the subject of the following Observations have been treated of by authors, under the names of Flatulent, Spasmodic, Hypochondriac, or Hysteric. Of late, they have also got the name of NERVOUS; which appellation having been commonly given to many symptoms seemingly different, and very obscure in their nature, has often made it to be said, that physicians have bestowed the character of nervous, on all those disorders whose nature and causes they were ignorant of. To wipe off this reproach, and, at the same time, to throw some light on nervous, hypochondriac, and hysteric complaints, is the design of the following observations;” (Robert Whytt, 1767, p. iii)
It is customary for books on hysteria to commence with a reference to the fact that the term is derived from the Greek word hysteron, meaning uterus, and that the diagnosis dates back to ancient Greek medicine, according to which a variety of symptoms was attributed to a wandering of the womb through the body. This historical approach is still helpful today because it allows us to see how certain basic ideas about physical symptoms and emotional causes have developed and been formulated according to the scientific language of successive generations. Many of the problems of hysteria which remain are the same, but in different guise, as those which troubled physicians of the past. Among such past items, Soranus of Ephesus (Temkin, 1956, p. 9) and Galen (Siegel, 1976, pp. 187–8), who were both active in the second century denied that the womb could wander. In the 17th century Jorden (1603) argued in a case of alleged witchcraft that the symptoms of the supposed victim were due to the state of the uterus (Hunter & MacAlpine, 1963; MacDonald, 1991). In the nineteenth century Landouzy (1846), according to the most up-to-date criteria of his time, reported on the state of the ovaries and uterus in affected xv
xvi
Introduction
persons and denied Sydenham’s (1697) view that hysteria in women and hypochondria in men were the same condition. Throughout the nineteenth century, others considered that hysteria was a dysfunction of the brain which produced multiple symptoms in various parts of the body e.g. Georget (1821, v. 2, pp. 261–2 & 265–86) and Brachet (1847, p. 204), a point of view shared and advanced by Briquet (Mai & Merskey, 1980). In Josef Breuer’s student days in the second half of the nineteenth century hysteria had become “A so called general neurosis” without definite localization in the nervous system (Hirschmuller, 1989). If psychological complaints also occurred it was called a psychosis – a very different use of the latter word from that of today. Today we can find good papers (e.g. Lerner, 1974) concerned to show that the hysterical personality is not inherently feminine, gently qualified by Chodoff (1982) who agrees that the hysterical personality is a caricature and then goes on to point out that there can be no caricature without an underlying normality. We also have the suggestion (Merskey & Merskey, 1993) that “The suffocation of the Mother” i.e. globus hystericus, reflects the recognition of the ancients that anxiety was more common in women than in men, and gave rise to dyspnoea plus sensations of choking or difficulty in swallowing. Part of the fascination of the subject derives from the manner in which certain somatic symptoms, not only of women, have been attributed through the ages to various emotional and physical causes. This fascination is enhanced both by the way in which the diagnostic skills of the neurologist are often needed to delineate the symptoms, and by the satisfying notion of unconscious conflict which we owe to Freud and which has played such a prominent part in twentieth-century thought. Yet medical and psychiatric problems persist in relation not only to individual cases but also in regard to major aspects of the concept of hysteria. Some (e.g. Slater, 1965) have rejected the diagnosis of hysteria whilst accepting the idea of hysterical symptoms. The hysterical personality which is a common psychiatric diagnosis is by no means regularly associated with hysterical symptoms, and organic disease, especially cerebral disease, appears to be an important contributory cause in a number of patients. Hysteria has also been involved in the problems of pain. Now, most strikingly, the enormous rise in the numbers of reported cases of multiple personality disorder (MPD) has given rise to much scepticism. There is thus good reason still to be interested in the problem of hysteria even though classical conversion symptoms are no longer common in Western society except in certain settings such as neurological departments.
Introduction
xvii
Sydenham (1697) regarded hysteria as the most common of all chronic diseases. With Freud it became the starting point for a revolutionary series of ideas about the mind. The personality characteristics with which it has been linked are a perennial topic of interest, both inside and outside medicine. Efforts continue to describe them and to explain the symptoms and their causes. In actual clinical practice it still presents vexing problems, although one might think that so much has been written about it that its management, at least, should be thoroughly understood. Understanding such a condition would seem to involve not merely matters of technical skill, and theoretical explanation, but also the response of the doctor to the patients. It used to be said of syphilis that he who knew that disease knew the whole of medicine. As Boyd (1947) put it: ‘Of all diseases it is the most subtle. It is a master of disguise. There is no symptom which it cannot cause, no syndrome for which it may not be responsible.’ With the great decline in the incidence of syphilis no other illness has come forward to take the place of such a master of simulation. It would be unpardonable, especially in connection with hysteria, to exaggerate and to suggest that it can fit such a role. Yet hysteria does have some of the characteristics which were attributed to syphilis. It is at least true that it can mimic a large variety of physical symptoms. Any symptom of organic disturbance which the mind can impose on the body may serve an hysterical function. That is to say that any physical symptom which can be produced consciously may also develop as the result of an unconscious mechanism, whether that symptom be a paralysis, a fit, or a loss of sensation. Moreover, any psychological symptom, such as the complaint of depression or anxiety, can be the result of a similar mechanism. For these reasons alone hysterical symptoms are important in the practice of medicine in general, even if some of them like ataxias and paralyses are now rather rare. For these reasons too they are of great interest within the field of psychiatry, whether they occur in the many psychologically ill people who are seen by their general practitioners or whether they come the way of specialists. Yet these considerations indicate only part of the importance of the phenomena of hysteria. The psychodynamic mechanisms of defence which operate in hysteria, the cultural influences which it expresses and even the organic illnesses which may provoke it, provide rich material for the better understanding of man and his emotions. Although often seen by doctors as a nuisance, patients with hysteria contribute a plentiful source for the proper study of mankind, as well as a diagnostic or therapeutic challenge.
xviii
Introduction
Throughout the book, one assumption is made which might be challenged and is not discussed except at this point and in the final chapter; that is the view that physical complaints caused by psychological processes, and not thought to be produced by any physiological or pathological mechanisms, are a proper subject for treatment by doctors. Occasional authors (e.g. Szasz, 1961) hold that, once diagnosed, such symptoms should no longer be treated by doctors as such. Most doctors, however, find themselves unable to take this view, not least because conversion symptoms are often deeply intertwined with problems of physical illness; and even when that is not the case the diagnostic process inevitably leads to a relationship in which the most effective help comes from doctors and their associates. To reject patients to whom this applies on the grounds that either the problems are not ‘medical’ or that they are in some sense deceivers either of themselves or others, is an immature professional response.
1
Part I. History and concepts
2
History and concepts
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3
1
Some traditional concepts
“Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.” (Alphonse Karr, Les Guêpes, 1849)
Although it is often said that the symptoms which have been grouped under the term hysteria were recognised by the Greeks and attributed to the wandering womb, there is reason to qualify this notion. Not all the Greek medical writers believed in it and some of the seemingly wild flights of fancy which would have the womb cause choking need qualification. To begin with the earlier discussions, some historians of medicine have suggested that certain ancient Egyptian medical papyri referred to hysteria (Sigerist, 1951; Veith, 1965). The papyri were held to enumerate a series of morbid states attributable to displacement of the uterus. The notion of these events was said to have been handed on through the Greeks and developed into the description of a variety of bodily ailments ascribed under one term or another to emotional disturbance, especially in women, emerging in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as a diagnosis of somatic and other complaints attributable to conflicts in the patient’s unconscious mind. It is the aim of this book to examine the nature of the diagnosis mainly since the 19th century, its evolution and partial dissolution, and its relations among other matters to hypochondriacal complaints, to the hysterical personality, and to organic brain disease. I hope it will be shown, as the quotation opening the chapter suggests, that there is a common unchanging element in the several patterns of behaviour which are regarded as hysterical, even though some of the earlier concepts have been misinterpreted. At the same time it is intended to demonstrate that the concept can usefully be divided into several parts. 3
4
History and concepts
The reliability of some of the earlier suggestions is in serious dispute. To return to the Egyptians, Veith (1965, p. 3) remarks that: “certain behavioural disorders were associated with the generative organs, and specifically with aberrations in the position of the womb. This was so firmly established that no other explanation for the symptoms was so much as suggested.” (Her italics)
An evaluation of the best available translations of the Egyptian sources – the Ebers and Kahun papyri which are approximately 3550 and 3900 years old – casts great doubt on this view. In particular, when these texts blame the uterus for a symptom at a distance, it is never said to be mobile, and when it is said to be out of its place (usually by prolapse) symptoms at a distance are not described. Thus there is no warrant for the fanciful view that the ancient Egyptians believed that a variety of bodily complaints were due to an animate womb (Merskey & Potter, 1989). The Greek sources start, essentially, with the Hippocratic collection, some 68 works gathered under the name of the physician who is believed to have been their principal author and who lived from about 460 to 370 BCE. Among these volumes few sections dealing with hysteria have been translated into English, but the French version (Littré, 1839–61) described several phenomena which could be diagnosed as ‘hysterical’. These include a type of fit in which the patient wakes if the skin of the abdomen is pinched (Potter, 1988, vol. 5, para. 35). Headache is also attributed to the uterus (Littré, 1846, ‘Epidemics’, vol. 5, para. 68). It was also said that ‘hysterical suffocation’ (hysterike pnix) occurred with other symptoms in patients with fever (‘Epidemics’, vol. 5, para. 96) and that spasms without accompanying fever occurred readily in women with hysterical symptoms (‘Coan Prenotions’, vol. 5, para. 343). If the womb caused suffocation, fumigation with evil-smelling substances was recommended (‘Nature of Women’, vol. 7, para. 26); a lamp wick might be lit and extinguished to provide smoke under the nostrils and an aromatic pessary applied (‘Nature of Women’, vol. 7, para. 3). This material seems to be the origin of the idea that the womb could move around the body, block the channels of respiration and cause ‘suffocation’ as well as have some effect on the throat. Unpleasant substances were applied above to drive the womb down, and fragrant ones below to attract the womb into its correct position. It is not apparent, however, that the womb was thought to rise above the diaphragm, but when situated nearer to the
Some traditional concepts
5
hypochondrium and the liver, as in pregnancy, it might have affected respiration. Examination of references to aromatic substances and unpleasant fumigations as treatment does not provide uniform support for the ‘carrot and stick’ theory of uterine therapy (Merskey & Merskey, 1993). Moreover, other theories were put forward, such as the idea that hysteria tended to occur in virgins and in widows, and that marriage or pregnancy was a cure (‘Diseases of Women’, vol. 8, bk. 1, paras 7, 127–128). Recent authors have expressed scepticism about the more farfetched ideas in the Hippocratic collection. King (1993) pointed out that the Littré translations introduced headings and labels to organise the concept of hysteria or hysterical suffocation in French, an organisation not necessarily present in the original material. Micale (1989a) remarked about hysteria that indeed the Littré edition contains “No coherent clinical syndrome in the modern sense but only the most casual enumeration of symptoms, including laboured breathing, loss of voice, neck pain, heart palpitation, dizziness, vomiting and sweating”. There is no clear reference to globus hystericus or hyperaesthesia. In a very thorough discussion of the Hippocratic texts King also demonstrates that the phrase ‘suffocation of the womb’ is probably an inferior translation and that the original Greek hysterike pnix is better taken to mean stifling, with an implication of heat as well as difficulty in breathing. She concludes that although in some cases this notion applies to the woman suffocating or stifling, the notion more often refers to the womb itself, which would have natural influences upon female physiology. Hysterical essentially meant suffering from the womb and had no particular psychological importance. From these limited beginnings other classical authors developed concepts of hysteria of a mythical type. In a famous passage, Plato (c. 428– c. 347 BCE) said: “the so called womb or matrix of women. The animal within them is desirous of procreating children and when remaining unfruitful long beyond its proper time, gets discontented and angry and wandering in every direction through the body, closes up the passages of the breath, and, by obstructing respiration, drives them to extremity, causing all varieties of disease.” (Jowett, 1953)
This extract from the Timaeus (91b–c) comes from a dialogue or discussion and is not necessarily meant to be definitive. It is preceded by an item which is less frequently mentioned, where,
6
History and concepts
in likening sexual desire to an animal, Plato first mentions “in men the organ of generation becoming rebellious and masterful like an animal disobedient to reason”. Only then does he go on to make the same analogy for women. However, this particular idea seems to have taken on a literary life of its own and, for example, was adopted by Aretaeus of Cappadocia who, living about 500 years after Plato, wrote similarly about the varied movements of the womb (be it only within the abdomen) and said, “on the whole, the womb is like an animal within an animal” (Adams, 1856). Aretaeus also held that in consequence of the upward movement of the uterus the intestines might be violently compressed, the result being choking and a form of epilepsy, but not convulsions. Also, because the liver, diaphragm, lungs and heart were quickly squeezed into a narrow space, the patient experienced loss of breathing and speech. Soranus of Ephesus, who practised from 98 to 138 CE and was a near contemporary of Galen, denied that the womb was an animal but recognised hysterical suffocation (hysterike pnix), with a connotation of “Obstructed respiration together with aphonia and a seizure of the senses caused by some condition of the uterus.” Both he and Galen thought that it was a silly idea to suggest that the womb could move around the body (Temkin, 1956, pp. 8–9, 149). Despite the scepticism of prominent medical authors, the idea of the mobile uterus persisted quite strongly. In the medieval period Paul of Aegina (625 to 690 CE) (Adams, 1844, Vol. I, p. 633) wrote an extensive compendium of the views of the ancients and described uterine suffocation, or hysterical convulsion, as “a rising up of the uterus, affecting sympathetically the most important parts, as the carotid arteries, the heart, the membranes of the brain”. This would lead to attacks of weakness, fear, deep sleep, loss of the senses and of speech as well as contraction of the limbs, among other symptoms. Improvement occurred with gradual relaxation of the uterus. We have rather scanty information about the medieval period overall, but Green (1985, pp. 170–171) traced ancient theories of female physiology and disease through the early Middle Ages. It appears that Galen’s ideas, which were opposed to the wandering womb, were adopted by writers at the medical school of Salerno, but by contrast several authors have noted a formulaic Christian exorcism of the ‘wandering womb’. This is found in the blank space of a lateninth-century medical manuscript in which a priest commanded the womb to cease tormenting an afflicted woman:
Some traditional concepts
7
“not to harm this maid-servant of God ... nor to hold onto her head, neck, throat, chest, ears, teeth, eyes, nostrils, shoulders, arms, hands, heart, stomach, liver, spleen, kidneys, back, sides, joints, navel, viscera, bladder, thighs, shins, ankles, feet or toes, but to quietly remain in the place which God delegated to you, so that this hand-maiden of God ... might be cured.” (Bernfeld, 1929; Zilboorg & Henry, 1941; Green, 1985)
By this time we can see medical notions mingled with religious and supernatural beliefs. The implications of this in the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance period in Europe have been of interest to many authors who recognised the connection between alleged witchcraft, demonic possession, and hysterical symptoms. In 1602 during a famous trial it was claimed that a 14-year-old girl, Mary Glover, had been bewitched by “an old Charewoman”, Elizabeth Jackson, and as a result had “fallen into fittes ... so fearful that all that were about her supposed she would dye”. She became speechless and blind, “her neck and throat did swell extremely depriving her of speeche” and later her arm and whole side were deprived of feeling and movement (Bradwell, 1603). All these symptoms commenced after a quarrel with Elizabeth Jackson and got worse in her presence, and Miss Jackson was tried for witchcraft. The doctor for the defence, Edward Jorden, held that Mary Glover’s symptoms were due to natural causes rather than the result of diabolical influences and witchcraft. He lost the case and Elizabeth Jackson was convicted of witchcraft and imprisoned for a year. After his evidence was rejected, Jorden went away and wrote his classic treatise A Breife Discourse of a Disease Called the Suffocation of the Mother, which includes a useful clinical description of hysteria and a statement that hysteria was often due to perturbations of the mind. His actual words were: “the easie passage which [the wombe] has to [the braine, heart and liver] by the Vaines, Arteries, and Nerves ... it is an affect of the Mother or wombe wherein the principal parts of the body by consent do suffer diversly according to the diversitie of the causes and disease wherewith the matrix is offended.” (Jorden 1603, pp. 1, 5)
At this point we see a naturalistic explanation being preferred to a supernatural one, and not only for medicolegal reasons. Jorden’s idea is that somehow the womb influences the mind or other bodily functions but not by mobility. This is indicated by his reference to access via the veins, arteries and nerves and by his phrase “wherein the principal parts of the body by consent do suffer diversly”.
8
History and concepts
Hunter & MacAlpine (1963) pointed out that Jorden was treating as natural an illness liable to be attributed to witchcraft. He used the ancient doctrine of ‘sympathy’, or “communitie and consent”, to suggest the womb affected other organs and while the affliction was often blamed on “the perturbations of the minde”, the concept was apparently unified through the idea that the uterus, at some distance, was influencing the situation. Harvey (1651, p. 542), deeply immersed in studies of reproduction and gynaecology, also believed that: “the uterus is a most important organ, and brings the whole body to sympathize with it. No one of the least experience can be ignorant what grievous symptoms arise when the uterus either rises up or falls down, or is in any way put out of place, or is seized with spasm – how dreadful, then, are the mental aberrations, the delirium, the melancholy, the paroxysms of frenzy, as if the affected person were under the dominion of spells, and all arising from unnatural states of the uterus.”
In one patient who “for more than ten years laboured under furor uterinus and melancholy”, a prolapse of the uterus allowed its “overheat” to be “moderated by the contact of the external air” and on returning the uterus to its proper situation she lived in good health. He reports a similar event in another woman (p. 543). He also describes two cases of pseudocyesis (pp. 528–529). Harvey clearly saw the uterus as having an effect on the body, at least in part through the brain. A distinct departure in concepts concerning symptoms can be traced to the 17th century. Wright (1980) remarked on the fact that Descartes explained strange aversions by past experience. For example, a cat might have jumped into a baby’s cradle, thus causing a dislike of cats without the adult “retaining any memory of it afterwards”. Attraction could also be explained this way. Descartes attributed an interest of his own in cross-eyed women to his love as a young child for a nurse who had this defect. He found incidentally that the recollection of the memory in analysis cured him. Robert Boyle (1664), as Wright observes, had a clear notion of the operation of external stimuli – and hence ideas – in the production of hysterical symptoms. Boyle remarked that it is common for one hysterical woman when she observes another undergoing a fit to be “infected with the like strange discomposure”. These authors were thus approaching the possibility of a physical symptom which might be induced by example or by a thought. In the one case Descartes had clearly foreshadowed the Freudian
Some traditional concepts
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theme of association of unconscious ideas, and in the other case Boyle was explaining a physical symptom by imitation and example. Perhaps the most important 17th-century author was Carolus Piso (Charles Le Pois), who was the dean of the medical faculty at Pont-à-Mousson, and who attributed hysterical symptoms to the brain. Piso attributed hysterical symptoms to both men and women. Before long others took an essentially similar view. Briquet (1859, p. 12) gave Le Pois credit, saying of him that he was “the first to shine the light of observation on the traditionally accepted means of hysteria”, and the first to dissociate it from the uterus. The next radical change in the basis of the concept was made by Thomas Willis (1684), who located the source of all convulsive attacks in the brain. Using the terminology of his period he attributed the fits to explosions of the animal spirits inhabiting the brain. Epilepsy was supposed to be due to explosions in the middle part of the brain, hysteria to explosions at “the beginning of the nerves within the head”. A discharge at these lower points would be more likely to affect the vagi and intercostal nerves and involve visceral functions. Since “distemper of the mind” could affect the animal spirits, psychological causes could also provoke fits, of either type. The post-Renaissance view is well presented in the opening remarks of Sydenham (1697) in his discourse on hysteria when he considers the effects of mental trauma on bodily function. It will be seen, however, that in Sydenham’s day hysteria included much that would nowadays be considered to be organic disease: “When the Mind is disturb’d by some grevious [sic] Accident, the animal Spirits run into disorderly motions; the Urine appears sometimes limpid, and in great quantity; the sick persons cast off all hope of recovery; .... Whatsoever part of the body the Disease doth affect (and it affecteth many) immediately the symptoms that are proper to that Part appear; in the Head, the Apoplexy, which ends in a Palsy of one half of the Body, comes presently after Child-bearing; sometimes they are seiz’d with Convulsions, that very much resemble the Epilepsy, and are commonly called the Suffocation of the Womb, in which the Belly and Entrails rise upwards towards the Throat; At other times they are miserably tormented with the Hysterical Clavus [nail], in which there is a most vehement pain in the Head, which you may cover with your Thumb, the sick person in the mean time vomiting up green Matter like to that sort of Choler that has its name from Leeks.” (Sydenham, 1697, p. 6)
This extract tells us that following a severe stress both emotional and physical changes appear. Some are observable alterations in
10
History and concepts
bodily functions, such as changes in the urine, apoplexy or hemiplegia, but others are changes that would still be deemed hysterical today, such as non-epileptic fits. Sydenham goes on to mention subsequently other pains, diarrhoea, dropsy, tears and laughter. Overt emotional changes are also seen to be part of the illness, but the treatment remains physical, with venesection and medicines. Although Sydenham wrote of hysterical suffocation, he did not believe in a mobile uterus. He seems rather to have accepted the conventional label for the illness. Since Sydenham regarded hysteria, which he allied with hypochondriasis, as the most common chronic illness, it seems likely that he used the term to cover much of the wide range of emotional disturbances, with or without somatic complaints or disease, which physicians are wont to see. He was certainly explicit in attributing the condition to the mind, and argued (p. 157) that: “The External Causes of this Disease are either violent motion of the Body, or more frequently vehement Agitations of the Mind by the Assaults of Grief, Anger, Fear and such like Passions. And therefore when my Advice is demanded by a Woman, concerning a Disease whose nature I cannot discover by the Assistance of the vulgar Axioms, I observe always to enquire carefully, whether her Distemper is not exasperated as often as her mind is disturb’d by Passions; and if she returns an affirmative Answer, I am abundantly satisfied that her Distemper belongs to that set of Distempers, which are the subject of my present Discourse.”
Sydenham may deserve the credit for being the first to note explicitly that the syndrome of hysteria was related to emotional causes. I cannot say this firmly because there may be a section in the writings of Le Pois where this is mentioned, but, so far as I have been able to understand him, Le Pois writes principally about accumulations of fluid in the head causing hysterical symptoms. Despite the advances which Sydenham made in understanding, he still retained some of the old phraseology, for example “Sometimes they are seiz’d with convulsions that very much resemble Epilepsy, and are commonly called the Suffocation of the Womb, in which the Belly and Entrails rise upwards towards the Throat” (Sydenham, 1697, p. 6). After Sydenham, Purcell (1707) likewise saw hysteria as a bodily illness (occasionally but not usually fatal). For Purcell the immediate cause was a “Disorder of the Spirits”, especially indigestion, but this was not an adequate cause. Women were more liable to it than men for various reasons, including the effects of retention of menstrual products and because the weaker texture of their brain and nerves made them more subject to
Some traditional concepts
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violent passions, whilst psychological causes could also provoke attacks. Blackmore (1725, pp. 102–103), a rather verbose author, also recognised both physical and mental symptoms, which in the latter case he attributed to bad humours affecting the passages of the brain. Hysteria and hypochondriasis for him differed only in degree, the former being more linked to psychological causes and manifestations. He gave the good advice not to interfere with the patient during a convulsive fit. Blackmore was aware of Piso, and referred to his work. Blackmore observed (p. 99): “Terrible Ideas, formed only in the Imagination, will affect the Brain and the Body with painful Sensations. Thus we find that dreadful Objects presented to the Mind in Dreams; for instance, the empty and unsubstantial Forms of Ghosts and Spectres, will, by their violent Instigation and Impulse on the Spirits, put them into such a Hurry and Confusion, as shall cause great Inquietude and grievous Pains.”
It is worth emphasising that all these authors wrote in a tradition which automatically assumed that the mind could influence the body and the body could influence the mind. Rather (1965, pp. 1– 2) points out that: “it seemed plain to most of them that the will and the emotions did in one way or another produce far reaching and sometimes harmful or even fatal changes in the body, and they believed it their business as physicians to set forth the circumstances, extent and means of control of the interaction between mind and body. They believed also, in keeping with an unbroken tradition originating in ancient Greek medicine, that the mind could be influenced corporeally, that is, by means of drugs, diet, climate and other factors acting primarily on the body. Clinical observation had convinced them that the cause of a bodily disturbance could lie in the mind, and that where this was so treatment of the body alone was sometimes ineffectual. On the other hand, it had also convinced them that the causes of some mental disorders lay in the body, and they drew the obvious inference regarding treatment.”
The evidence that earlier generations believed that the mind could influence the body is particularly well stated by FischerHomburger (1979), who demonstrated the persistence of the view that ‘imagination’, conceived by Van Helmont as an internal force arising within organs such as the spleen and the uterus, could produce far-reaching and specific effects like birthmarks or even an immaculate conception. In 1637 the parliament of Grenoble
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History and concepts
ruled that a woman could be impregnated via imagination when dreaming of her husband who had been absent for four years, about which a critic remarked, “Here the president of the parliament or another man seems to have been instrumental” (Ammann, 1670). We can speculate that the decision might have something to do with the unwillingness of a court to label a child as a bastard, and was therefore not quite as stupid as it appears. By the middle of the 18th century, traditional views of the relationship between the mind and body were being strengthened and extended. The influence of the mind in causing physical symptoms – as distinct from physical disease – could not be worked out, given the limited anatomical and physiological knowledge of the time. Nevertheless, a relationship between somatic complaints (whether from disturbances of the autonomic nervous system or due to thoughts) and the state of the emotions was clearly becoming more detailed and more sophisticated. Whether or not the concept was sophisticated, it could still be benevolent. Risse (1988) has shown very well that the diagnosis of hysteria was not restricted to the leisured or wealthy classes. Women admitted with this diagnosis to the Edinburgh Infirmary in the 18th century were mostly poor, young, unmarried, living in squalid quarters, and suffering great deprivation. The medical care offered for social difficulties under the diagnosis of hysteria offered a way to support and assist the patients, not least with accommodation, food and warmth, while treating them with medical measures ranging from irritating salts to electric sparks and from purgatives to blisters.
A psychosomatic view Robert Whytt (1751) provided a notable development in 18thcentury views of hysteria and hypochondriasis. It is probably relevant that he was not only a perceptive doctor who was keen to treat his patients with a variety of physical remedies (including electric shocks on occasion) but also an active experimental physiologist and pharmacologist. His works include, for instance, detailed reports of the effect of opium applied to various sites of the body in laboratory preparations of the frog, and numerous experiments on the functions of individual nerves. As Hunter & MacAlpine (1963, p. 389) point out, he was the first to establish: “that movement could be initiated not only by an effort of will or by external stimuli, but by a nervous impulse independent of either. He thereby discovered what are called today autonomic and reflex activity.”
Some traditional concepts
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Whytt particularly emphasised the importance of ‘sympathy’ of the nerves in producing effects in one part of the body as a result of psychological effects or diseases elsewhere. In these respects he instances nausea on seeing others vomit, “the Flux of saliva into the mouth of a hungry person, at the sight of savoury food” (Whytt, 1767, p. 41) and tears of sadness. A good illustration of his technical approach is to be found in his comment that although Vesalius had shown that there was no communication between optic nerve fibres in their course from the brain to the eye, nevertheless “we find a most remarkable sympathy between the motions of the two pupils” (p. 43). All kinds of somatic responses are attributed to the emotions: pallor from anger; palpitations of the heart from fear; sudden flushings from heat; shiverings; a sense of cold in certain parts; flying pains in the arms and limbs; cramps or convulsive motions or sudden startings of the limbs; long faintings; giddiness; pains in the head; and still others. Although Whytt was not the first to be aware of the link between mental stress and physical disease, undoubtedly he had a deep understanding of the implications of what are now called psychosomatic disorders. Perhaps as a result of this he had recourse, in accounting for hysteria, both to the general state of the nervous system and to the traditional view that there are local causes. In his opinion: “the hypochondriac and hysteric affections often proceed from a morbid state of the alimentary canal, uterus, or other viscera of the abdomen; yet as there are several of their symptoms which seem independent of any disorder in those parts, and as there is often no trace of those diseases appeared after death in any of the abdominal organs, it was highly probable that they may frequently arise from some less visible fault in the body.” (Whytt, 1767, p. 108)
He ascribed this fault to “I. A too great delicacy and sensibility of the whole nervous system” and “II. An uncommon weakness ... in some of the organs of the body” (p. 109). These two categories provided predisposing causes. “Particular occasional causes” were found in visceral disturbances and in “violent affections of the mind”. His list of visceral disturbances is disappointingly odd and includes wind, a tough phlegm and/or worms – all in the stomach or bowels – the wrong food and scirrhous or other obstructions in the viscera (p. 183). But his overall perspective entitles him to great credit as one who looked both for the precise physical mechanisms of illness and the influence of psychological factors in its production.
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History and concepts
Finally, it is worth quoting his comments upon sex and hysteria (p. 105): “Upon the whole ... the symptoms of the hysteric disease in women, seem only to differ from those of the hypochondriac in men, in so far as the former sometimes proceed from the uterus, and are, on account of the more delicate frame of the sex, more frequent and often more violent than the symptoms of the hypochondriac affection in men.”
This is surely a perceptive conclusion. Pomme (1765) recognised “a host of symptoms” (p. 51), including suffocation (p.109), haemoptysis (p.115), toothache (p.140) and hysterical insanity (délire maniaque) (p.128). In one case anorexia, nihilistic delusions and agitation were combined. In the 18th century hypochondriasis was also identified with melancholia or depression. Boswell (1777–83), for example, wrote a column in The London Magazine entitled “The Hypochondriack”. The diagnostic confusion perhaps stems from authors like Cheyne (1733), who readily included the more usual hysterical symptoms like convulsions and spasms as members of one great class of complaints ranging from melancholy through apoplexy, paralysis and weakness to imbecility. Micale (1990a) observed that: “in the 18th century, the disorder slid imperceptibly into hypochondria, ‘the vapours’, and ‘the spleen’, and in the 19th century it often overlapped with neurasthenia, nymphomania, general nervousness and out and out insanity. Many ... have used the word in reference to any nervous malady with spastic or convulsive complication.... Many physicians have complained vociferously about the vagueness and indefinability of hysteria.”
Despite this, the terms ‘suffocation of the mother’, ‘hysterical suffocation’ and ‘fits of the mother’ persisted well into the 19th century. Dubois D’Amiens (1833) wrote of a rounded foreign body, or globus hystericus, and Landouzy (1846, p.6) described a ball mounting from the abdomen to the neck and constriction of the throat. The term ‘globus hystericus’ which they used is still used today – whatever its meaning.
A revival of older themes Sydenham’s ideas were largely maintained for over 100 years, until the early 19th century, when there was active discussion of the view that hypochondriasis and hysteria were distinct. A decisive
Some traditional concepts
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shift of opinion appears to have followed a prize competition of the Académie Royale of Bordeaux won by Dubois d’Amiens (1833), who, like the other entrants, argued the two syndromes were distinct, especially because of the following differences: “Hypochondriasis usually affects males, hysteria only women. The former is slow of onset, the latter sudden. Hypochondriasis occurs in three stages, the first one of exaggerated fantasies of illness, the second one of severe anxiety, with multiple somatic complaints which may remit, the third one of irreversible organic change. Hysteria occurs in two grades of severity, the first marked by heaviness of the limbs, widespread somatic discomforts and paroxysms of the limbs despite the presence of consciousness. The second grade goes on to wild and painful cries and generalised convulsions with incomplete loss of consciousness. The prognosis as always in a functional illness is good.”
The full details tabulated by Dubois d’Amiens are given in Appendix A. By 1846 the distinction was so well accepted that Landouzy commented that it was hard to understand how anyone could have followed Sydenham. At that time the common concept appears to have been as follows (Landouzy, 1846): “1. It is a disease usually, or even only, affecting women, almost always young ones. 2. It is characterized by pains in any part of the body, paralysis of limbs, speech, sight and hearing, anaesthesias, certain types of fits, dyspnoea, pharyngeal globus, dysphagia, hiccough, vomiting, meteorism, dysuria and urinary retention. The illness has a prodromal phase of gradual onset marked by changes of mood and appetite. The fits have a more vigorous prodromal phase which can include photophobic involuntary movements of the eye-balls and eye-lids, disturbances of vision, sadness, facial pallor, extensive jerking, clutching movements, ringing in the ears, incoherent words, laughter and tears without cause, eructations, disturbances of appetite, palpitations, sudden sweating, shivering and cold feelings (refroidissements), pains and paraesthesiae in the limbs, and sometimes spasmodic or convulsive movements. A clear and limpid urine is produced sometimes at the start and often at the end of an attack.”
Landouzy observed: “These precursory phenomena being infinitely variable like all nervous phenomena, one would seek in vain for an exact relationship between particular prodromes and particular types of attacks. However, observation indicates that shivering, clutching movements, and palpitations usually herald the non-
16
History and concepts convulsive form, especially syncope, whilst disturbances of sight, headache and mild spasms usually precede the convulsive attacks. 3. There is an organic cause for this affliction, the great majority of recorded cases with pathological evidence showing some type of lesion of the female reproductive apparatus, and particularly the uterus and ovaries. 4. Typically according to the generally accepted view of Sir Benjamin Brodie [1837], ‘it is not the muscles which refuse to obey the will, but the will itself which has ceased to work’.”
Other factors predisposing to hysteria besides youth and female sex include, according to Landouzy, warm climates, the spring, civilised societies, a nervous temperament, heredity, and menstrual irregularities and sexual disturbances. It would be easy to poke fun at the apparent naivety of some of these ideas, yet they were frequently supported by careful and close observation, studious analysis of the literature, and a shrewd appreciation of some of the psychological causes which could be relevant. Although the boundaries of the syndrome may be hard to define, there seems to be a recognisable pattern which the honest observer would often find, even if it was not infrequently depicted more convincingly with the help of the patient’s unconscious awareness of what the doctor thought was appropriate. At the same time one has to respect the intellectual penetration which argued that this condition, with a supposed organic aetiology, nevertheless produced its effects by an impairment of willpower. Many of the elements of this syndrome are still recognisable in textbooks and journals today under the heading of hysteria, and occasionally that of hypochondriasis, or the hysterical personality. The reality of the suffering of the hysterical patient seems to have been called more into question as knowledge of the anatomy and physiology of the central nervous system increased. As has been pointed out elsewhere (Merskey & Spear, 1967), pains became either ‘real’, that is, due to organic or functional afflictions of the nerves, or else ‘imaginary’. Inman (1858), who accepted the reality of hysterical pain, sought to prove that it had a physical basis and that the term should be dropped because it implied that it was fanciful. He observed that: “In medicine pain is no pain, and suffering no suffering, in an hysterical sense ... a hysterical pain is one which a patient feels but has not; which has no existence; which being thought upon may grow until it is unbearable.”
Nevertheless, the general view of hysteria at that time still seems to be one of a physically based illness, but requiring skilful
Some traditional concepts
17
management, both psychological and physical. This was to change. Shorter (1989) has made the sad point that as technical medicine became more powerful in diagnosis and treatment, so the psychological skills needed in the care of patients were neglected, which is another aspect of the same process. It appears that between the 17th and 19th centuries, the notion of hysteria commonly included the following features: a relationship to the womb or the female constitution, the occurrence of diverse somatic symptoms, and a link with emotional causes. How these symptoms were produced provoked much argument. Many of them today would be called psychophysiological and be due to anxiety or depression. Others, such as fits and multiple symptoms, still tend to be regarded as hysterical. A problem also existed in distinguishing depression and hypochondriacal complaints (in the modern sense) from hysteria, and older ideas were often revived, despite penetrating observations like those of Whytt. The more precise analysis of the physical complaint required the development of more profound psychological analysis of the idea that the willpower of a patient had a bearing on the symptom. A reserved view of the matter was taken by Sandras (1851, pp. 168–169), who wrote as follows: “The illness to which we have given the name hysteria is a chronic nervous condition in which at intervals of varying length, paroxysms appear, characterized by a particular sensation of choking, a severe discomfort of respiration, a pain in the head of varying severity, and clonic convulsions in all, or almost all, the parts of the body. It is said to be an illness of women; there is no doubt that it appears in men. I am sure that I have observed it in men several times with all its symptoms without any exception.”
Sandras also wrote: “Hysterical women feel a ball leaving the womb? ... The great majority of hysterical women have never felt this ball and this sensation, when it exists, arises most often from the epigastrium.”
He added that since he had had reports of the sensation of a ball in the throat from men, that was enough to dethrone the uterus. This concept of hysteria, like earlier notions, could accommodate a large number of variations of nervous states and was applicable to patients with anxiety and depression. Georget (1821) and Brachet (1847a,b) thought hysteria was a neurosis, meaning that the seat of the affliction resided in the brain, and the idea that the brain was the site of the dysfunction gained strength. Although it remained an ‘organic’ concept caused by
18
History and concepts
disturbance of brain function, it might still be precipitated by ill treatment by parents, worry, stress, business setback, and broken love affairs. The essential idea was that brain function was disturbed by some cause, which was hard to characterise, but possibly related to excessive stimulation. Briquet (1859) presented a solid extensive clinical and demographic study of hysteria (Mai & Merskey, 1980a,b). He described the clinical patterns in detail under seven categories, namely: (a) hyperaesthesias, including pain, (b) anaesthesia, (c) perversions of sensation, such as visual, auditory or olfactory hallucinations, (d) spasms affecting systems such as the gastrointestinal tract and central nervous systems, (e) seizures, (f) paralyses affecting various muscle groups, causing, for example, paraplegia or monoplegia, and (g) abnormalities of muscle contraction, secretion and exhalation, causing increased secretion of saliva, sweat or urine (Mai, 1982). Briquet did not describe the syndrome which was later named after him by Guze (1970), but did destroy its historic association with physical pathology of female genitalia. The influence of his systematic approach can be glimpsed in the way in which Charcot (1872) refers to his findings with respect and with attention to Briquet’s statistics, even when he proceeds to disagree with him.
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2
Early neurological analyses
The distinction from organic illness An unprecedented change in the clinical analysis of hysteria occurred with the work of Sir Benjamin Brodie (1837). This change was the increasing recognition of the precise effects of different sensory and motor nerves in the production of anaesthesias or paralyses or pain, and hence the existence of a difference in hysteria. Walters (1969) pointed out how Brodie was aware of Bell & Bell’s (1826) work in distinguishing separate motor and sensory nerve roots. Bell had actually gone so far as to establish at operation that the frontal area of the brain did not possess sensibility. He satisfied himself that different nerves had specific functions in controlling sensation or movement in different parts of the body, and he argued that there was localisation of function within the brain. In accordance with the tradition of John Hunter and with the spirit of his own times, Brodie was devoted to demonstrating which signs and symptoms were associated with morbid anatomy and which were not. Brodie was a famous surgeon with an extensive practice concerned with bone and joint disease, and in a much-quoted observation he remarked that “among the higher classes of society, at least four-fifths of the female patients, who are commonly supposed to labour under diseases of the joints, labour under hysteria, and nothing else” (Brodie, 1837, p.37). As Walters also indicates, Brodie recognised that the motor paralysis of hysteria was due to a lack of exercise of the function of volition and not an incapability of muscle, and he satisfied himself by postmortem examination that there was no morbid anatomy to account for the hysterical symptoms of his patients.
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History and concepts
Notwithstanding Brodie’s work, bodily complaints allegedly due to dysfunction of the nervous system remained very popular. Shorter (1992) traces the early 19th-century craze for the diagnosis of spinal irritation, the mid-century attachment to “reflex neurosis” based upon notions of ovarian dysfunction, and later predilections for extravagant habits or complaints. These range from hypnosis and the induction of multiple personality to fits, paralysis and the variety of symptoms which are still called hysteria today, such as conversion symptoms and other dissociative disorders. Yet these symptoms were not understood in their modern sense, which requires a specific type of finding on physical examination, that is, function present when the patient thinks it has been lost. They were still part of a concept which would last until after Freud’s first work. According to this quite persistent concept, hysteria was any general neurosis without specific localisation (Hirschmuller, 1989). The recognition that the local complaints called hysteria were not accompanied by any physical disorder becomes more apparent from the pen of another surgeon, F. C. Skey (1867). This author is notable for his robust and hearty advocacy of wine and brandy to restore physically enfeebled patients, rather than bleeding. When it comes to hysteria he observes “every part of the body may become, under provocation, the seat of an apparent disease which in reality does not exist” (p.43). This combination of acceptance and rejection which is so typical of medical attitudes to hysteria is well shown in Skey’s concluding words: “A class of diseases involving the nerves or nervous system ... carry with them so much resemblance to real disease or disorganisation of structure as to deceive the most experienced ... But that they are destitute of some of the most prominent features which characterise real disease; ... that of local or general hysteria is the product of a disturbed, not a diseased condition of the brain or spinal cord, and that ... it is difficult to deny their relationship which appears to exercise some mysterious or occult influence over them.” (p.107)
In the same period the recognition that hysterical symptoms were not due to lesions of specific nerves or pathways was firmly stated by Althaus (1866): “The commencement and progress of all the distinct forms of hysterical paralysis, leave no doubt in the mind that it is a functional disorder ... and in no way connected with structural lesions in the nervous centres, the peripheral nerves, or the
Early neurological analyses
21
muscles. Affections which come on so suddenly, which may vary in degree from day to day, and are sometimes cured by a single application of galvanism, cannot be due to organic lesions of important organs but are produced under the influence of mental emotions and chiefly determined by them in their further progress. In accordance with this view we find that in cases which have ended fatally the most careful post mortem examinations have failed to show any structural lesions to which the affection might have been fairly traced.” (p.60–61)
Althaus was not the only neurologist to make points of this nature. For example, R. B. Todd, in his lectures on diseases of the nervous system (1854), had already observed that in a hysterical hemiplegia the tongue did not deviate to the affected side as it did in an organic hemiplegia.
The psychogenesis of a defined syndrome A radical change from the views typified by Landouzy appeared in 1853 in a book entitled On the Pathology and Treatment of Hysteria by Robert Brudenell Carter. Carter was initially a general practitioner working in Leytonstone and had evidently acquired many of his ideas from a recently deceased friend – Mr Stephen McKenzie – to whom he makes full acknowledgement. Incidentally, Carter later became a correspondent of The Times and Consultant Ophthalmological Surgeon to St George’s Hospital and to the National Hospital, Queen Square. Carter’s book has many features which are either interesting or impressive, or both. He recognises that the term hysteria has been put to very wide use, then goes on to define the condition as one which commences with a convulsive paroxysm of a very variable type, ranging from a brief attack of laughter or sobbing to very energetic prolonged involuntary movements terminating in catalepsy or coma. The condition may be complicated by neuralgias, disorders of spine, knee, and so on. In Carter’s view hysteria results from a direct effect of the emotions upon the body, acting through the only possible channel – the nervous system. He argues that “it is the natural tendency of an emotion to discharge itself either through the muscular, the secretory or the sanguiferous system” (p.15). Having added to this the opinion “that emotion is a force adequate to the production of very serious disorders of the human frame” (p.25), Carter is ready to expound a psychogenesis of hysteria as a physical disorder resulting from a psychological disturbance.
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History and concepts
The emotional disturbance in question may be secret. In women the most common feeling responsible is terror; and the most violent is “the sexual passion” (p.34). “An hysteric paroxysm produced by terror is so common among servant girls and in fourth-rate boarding schools and may be set on foot by so many causes it is needless ... to cite examples.” But men, especially those who are continent, can also suffer from hysteria and, because the disorder can affect men, Carter summarily dismisses the view that it is due to uterine disease. He clearly recognises the valetudinarianism of some patients and the secondary gain from being nursed or being treated as sick. He even notes the deceitfulness of other patients. Like his contemporaries, he considers numerous other bodily symptoms, from hypochondriacal pain to leucorrhoea, to be associated. When an author proposes a new theory it is often instructive to see what has gone before. Carter quotes from Dr Theophilus Thompson’s article on hysteria in the Library of Medicine. He arranges the hypotheses quoted in four groups: (a) “doctrines altogether indefinite” (sic); (b) “doctrines requiring the female reproductive system”; (c) “doctrines requiring the existence of specific disorder in important or vital organs”; (d) “the views of Cheyne, Parry and Pitcairn recently revived in the form of a ‘toxic hypothesis’” (pp. 78ff). He has little trouble in disposing of all of these. Treatment consists essentially in outmanoeuvring the patient by such techniques as removing her completely from her family (normally to the doctor’s household) and, when a fit occurs, leaving her alone indefinitely in a locked room until she proclaims her own recovery. But physical ill treatment, for example with cold water, is firmly rejected on both moral and practical grounds. Indeed, “it must be remembered that the patient often inflicts upon herself much more pain than any medical attendant could possibly propose”. The doctor always has to be fully in command of his own mood and to desist from attempting treatment on any occasion when he cannot be sure of having sufficient patience. Carter’s work illuminates many aspects of hysteria and shows some of the admirable skills in psychological relationships displayed by at least a few other 19th-century doctors. As Veith (1965) points out, it also makes it abundantly clear that a sexual aetiology for the condition was well recognised many years before Freud. There is still no real distinction, however, between a psychophysiological pattern of causation and one due solely to the patient’s thoughts and ideas and not involving change in peripheral physiological pathways, although (pp. 12–15) Carter carefully distinguishes between the effects produced through the agency of the sympathetic
Early neurological analyses
23
nervous system and those involving the voluntary musculature. Kane & Carlson (1982) give an excellent account of his ideas and conclude that he was unique among the English physicians of his time in his perception of these relationships. Although Carter’s work was the most thorough and the most penetrating on the topic, he was not the only one to recognise the contribution of sexual difficulties to hysteria. In Vienna, Baron Ernst von Feuchtersleben (1845) made a classical analysis of hysteria which also tended to separate the use of both that term and the word hypochondriasis from their early identification with melancholia. Among its symptoms he included pains in various parts of the body and for its cause he laid great stress on sexual frustrations. Similarly Anstie (1871), dealing not with hysteria but with pelvic neuralgias in women, remarks that they may be aggravated by persistently dwelling “in a conscious manner on sexual matters, especially if by an evil chance she becomes addicted to self abuse”. In some cases with neuralgia “a restless hyperactivity of mind and perhaps of body also seems to be the expression of Nature’s unconscious resentment of the neglect of sexual function” (p. 241).
Symptoms from ideas The next logical step was to recognise that the hysterical symptom might arise from the patient’s ideas. The first author to indicate this appears to have been Sir John Russell Reynolds (1869), who described three paralysed patients in whom he was able to show positive evidence of motor function in the paralysed limbs together with a history of incidents which determined in them the belief that they were paralysed. The increasing appearance of complaints of paralysis or pain after railway accidents was one of the contemporary influences leading to the recognition of ideas as a cause of symptoms. This is very noticeable in the discussion of Reynolds’ paper when it was presented to a meeting of the British Medical Association. Another feature evident in the same discussion was the tendency only to accept as hysteria those complaints which occurred in patients who also had convulsions. Hysteria was seen as a symptom complex, and paralysis alone was not classed as hysterical. A modern form of this notion still has strong support from authors like Guze, who reserved the word hysteria for a group of symptoms which they later named Briquet’s syndrome (see Chapter 13). Reynolds separated the conditions which he described under cases “dependent upon idea” from insanity, hypochondriasis or
24
History and concepts
hysteria, noting “an entire absence of anything like hysterical spasm, or general habit of either mind or body”. He added that “at the same time it is most obvious that such patients are often as far removed as it is possible to be from anything like the wish or the habit of deception”, which was a common allegation against patients with hysteria. Charcot was impressed by Reynold’s ideas and stated (Charcot, 1872, p. 282) that the idea of paralyses from thoughts had long been known but only Reynolds had studied them in a methodical and systematic way. Thus he explicitly acknowledged the importance of Reynold’s paper. He went on to suggest very firmly that the implantation of the idea of paralysis, or loss of use of a part by means of hypnosis, confirmed that hysteria could be produced in accordance with an idea which was provided for the patient. It was from this basis that Freud, as is well known, developed his ideas of the dynamic origin of hysterical complaints. Möbius (1888) is also credited with recognising that symptoms might be caused by thoughts or ideas, and his work too was known to Breuer and Freud (see Schiller, 1982). Like Reynolds, Paget (1873a) was reluctant to diagnose hysteria for single symptoms. He wanted to discard the term hysteria in surgery, but keep it for convulsions, suffocation, flatulence, and associated signs of nervous disorder. He agreed with Brodie’s observation on joint pains in the upper classes, noting, however, that such pains were hysterical in only one-fifth of instances in the lower classes. But he held that pain alone was not enough to prove organic disease (Paget, 1873b). These discussions were advancing the task of distinguishing between physical and psychological causes. The development of neurological examination had enabled Reynolds to recognise the importance of the idea. Paget (1873a) elucidated the volitional aspect. Emulating Brodie’s comment, he observed: “They say, ‘I cannot’; it looks like ‘I will not’; but it is ‘I cannot will’”. Brodie, Reynolds and Paget in turn provided important sources for the work of Charcot, who was well versed in both the English and German literature in addition to that of his native language, French (Guillain, 1959).
The school of Charcot The second half of the 19th century is dominated by the school of Charcot at the Salpêtrière. In its work it is possible to trace most of the lines of inquiry and the opinions which have already been
Early neurological analyses
25
mentioned from other authors. The work of Charcot and his school has been so well translated into English (Charcot, 1872; Goetz, 1987) and is so well known that it needs only a brief description. The text contains beautifully written descriptions of his patients and very clear statements of his views. Among the findings (some erroneous) which his school obtained are the occurrence both of hysteria and epilepsy as episodic disorders and the hysterical fit as having a pattern described as grande hystèrie, extending to the production of opisthotonos so extreme as to cause a position of arc en cercle. Hysterical motor signs were carefully analysed, and often well depicted by Richer (1892) and Charcot himself (Figs 2.1 and 2.2). Stigmata supposed to be characteristic of hysteria were demonstrated in the interval phase between fits, including narrowed
Fig. 2.1. Generalised contractures following a major attack of hysteria (from Richer, 1885)
26
History and concepts
Fig. 2.2. Astasia-abasia (from Richer, 1892; sketch by Charcot)
or tubular vision, hemianaesthesia, and ‘ovarian tenderness’. Thus pressure over the ovarian region, whose discovery was attributed by Charcot to medieval physicians, became a means to treat hysterical fits. Like the arc en cercle, these phenomena are now thought to be artifacts of the relationship with the doctor or with other patients. However, I have seen arc en cercle once, completely unexpectedly, and the late Dr Allan Walters told me he had seen it at least twice in 45 years of practice. The similarity of hypnotically induced symptoms and hysteria was also recognised (Gilles de la Tourette, 1887, 1891), although the school of Charcot believed much more strongly than others that hypnosis was a special trance state (James,
Early neurological analyses
27
1890). The latter is a view which is now scarcely tenable (see Barber, 1969; Merskey, 1971; and Chapter 15). Other hysterical symptoms such as paralyses were shown further to be distinguishable from organic syndromes by clinical examination, and by comparison with the neuropathological findings in cases of organic disease (Charcot, 1889; Gilles de la Tourette, 1891; Richer, 1892). The importance of suggestion was also recognised, especially by Babinski (Babinski, 1901; Babinski & Froment, 1918a,b), who went so far as to call hysteria pithiatisme, that is, suggestibility. Charcot much admired Brodie’s contribution (Walters, 1969). Nevertheless, Charcot still had a profound conviction that physical changes, of which the patients knew nothing, occurred in hysteria. For example (Lectures I, 249) he described how leeches yielded very little blood from the side of a hysterical hemianaesthesia, while blood flowed freely from the other side. He supposed that there was alteration of the blood vessels which reduced bleeding. Although he recognised that hysterical symptoms ordinarily correspond to the patient’s expectations of the effects of a lesion, and emphasised Reynolds’ contribution, nevertheless, he seems still to have believed that a physical disorder was induced within, so to speak, the territory of the idea. This continued emphasis on the local physical changes is paralleled by the persistent belief in a physical or constitutional background to the development of hysteria. Although Charcot had moved away from the mid-19th-century position of Landouzy and others that there was an organic cause for hysteria in the reproductive system, he still thought of it as an illness with enduring, discernible physical characteristics. The stigmata mentioned were taken to be signs of this persisting diathesis and it was supposed, correctly enough, that they could be demonstrated by suitable examination at times when overt symptoms did not occur. The latter were the paroxysmal or episodic features of the illness. Very similar views were held in England by Gowers (1892–93). Variable resistance on examination of motor power was noted by him as well as contraction of the flexor muscles on extension. The ‘idea’ of a loss of power was recognised and ovarian tenderness found. Hereditary predisposition, affections of the sexual organs, egotistic personality characteristics, increasing civilisation and emotional precipitants were all acknowledged as causes. This is an English parallel or derivation of the traditional picture as redrawn by the school of Charcot, although there were some differences. One of those differences from Charcot’s findings, which was not reproduced to the same extent in England, was the finding
28
History and concepts
of stigmata and ovarian pressure points. Gowers considered that ovarian tenderness was unquestionably frequent, but also that it was not invariable nor confined to the subjects of hysteria. Altogether the manifestations of hysteria as observed by Gowers seem less dramatic than those found by Charcot. Two causes may have been responsible for this. The first was the total dependence of Charcot’s patients upon him and his institution. They were usually poverty-stricken, young girls from the country who were sheltered in the Salpêtrière by virtue of their illness and at the price of their cooperation with the doctor. Axel Munthe, in his autobiographical work The Story of San Michele, gives a very vivid, although rather sanctimonious, account of these matters. Gowers’ patients, by contrast, had more opportunity for independence, being most often private patients or outpatients or only temporary in-patients. Secondly, the Industrial Revolution came later in France than in England. As subsequent chapters will indicate, it is common to find that more extreme forms of hysteria occur relatively frequently in non-industrial populations (Chapters 10, 17). Geschwind (1976) suggested that the tendency for more extreme hysterical phenomena to appear in Charcot’s patients is related to their rural origin and to the influx of simple country girls to Paris during the period of Charcot’s working life. Setting aside the detail and the errors, the following are the essential points of Charcot’s substantial contribution to the analysis of hysteria. Firstly, he reaffirmed with authority the view of many others that psychological factors promoted hysterical symptoms. Secondly, he developed the neurological examination, which permitted a distinction to be made on positive grounds between symptoms due to physical illness involving nerve tracts and pathways, and those with an emotional origin. Thirdly, he emphasised how the idea of the symptom determined its pattern. Charcot’s pupils included Janet and Freud. Their work, together with that of Charcot, provides the origins for most of the modern discussion of hysteria.
29
3
The turn of the century
In the middle of the 19th century Sandras (1851, vol. 1, p. 168) summarised the view of hysteria as follows: “hysteria is a chronic nervous condition in which at intervals of varying length, paroxysms appear characterized by a particular sensation of choking, a severe discomfort of respiration, a pain in the head of varying severity and chronic convulsions in all, or almost all, parts of the body.”
This sort of perspective provided the general background against which Briquet, Charcot, Janet, Breuer and Freud were all to offer their contributions. Hirschmuller (1989) points out that when Breuer was a student, hysteria was looked upon as “a so called general neurosis”, without definite localisation in the nervous system. If there were psychological changes it was called a psychosis as well (without necessarily carrying the later strong implications of insanity). Romberg (1851) believed hysteria was “a reflex sexual neurosis”, a notion which persisted in the Continental literature up to the end of the century, but more attention was probably paid to the broad division, summarised as late as 1909 by Savill, between neurasthenia, hysteria and hypochondriasis. At that time hysteria was seen as being based on deficient willpower and a hysterical constitution, but manifesting itself in paroxysmal complaints, especially seizures, with the usual variety of other associated bodily complaints. Figure 3.1 shows Savill’s comparison with neurasthenia and hypochondria. Of all the authors discussed so far, Briquet gets the most attention and the warmest recommendation. In 1894 Janet published his book L’État Mental des Hystériques, The Mental State of Hystericals (Janet, 1901), which was based on his 29
30 History and concepts
The turn of the century 31
Fig. 3.1. A table of diagnoses in the early 20th century (from Savill, 1909)
32
History and concepts
studies in the school of Charcot. In that work he repeated Charcot’s idea of characteristic hysterical phenomena, especially anaesthesia, amnesia, abulia, motor disturbances, and modifications of the character. The character change was divided into two components, intellectual and emotional. The intellectual change was marked by deterioration and the emotional change by exaggerated reaction to a diminished number of emotions, because “these patients are in general very indifferent, at least to all that is not directly connected to a small number of fixed ideas”. This type of argument is less attractive now than originally. However, Janet made certain notable observations in regard to subconscious thoughts (1894). He spoke of hysterical patients organising their emotional patterns, their movements, and their ideas “more or less through a kind of subconscious meditation”. The fixed idea that characterised hysteria was developed “below consciousness”, remaining “outside of normal consciousness”. He said, “the subconscious character of the fixed ideas ... plays an important part in the therapeutics of these affections”. Janet also said “we formerly showed that it was necessary to look up so to say, these subconscious phenomena in order to attack them and that one could not treat the hysterical accident before having reached those deep layers of thought within which the fixed idea was concealed. We are happy to see today Mm. Breuer and Freud express the same idea. ‘It is necessary,’ they say, ‘to make this provocative event self conscious; bring it forth to the full light. The accidents disappear when the subject realises those fixed ideas’.” (Janet, 1901, p. 412)
Here Janet is citing Breuer and Freud’s original article, “The psychical mechanisms of hysterical phenomena”. Janet (1889, pp. 436–440) had already published the case of Marie, on which these observations were founded. The concepts are similar to the Freudian explanation of unconscious ideas producing the hysterical conversion symptom. There has been a dispute over who first recognised the unconscious and the place of unconscious ideas in causing hysteria. Freud was not wholly original in this respect and acknowledged the fact himself (Freud, 1917, p. 218). However, the dynamic aspect of unconscious mental activity was emphasised much more by him, and indeed Janet’s description of the discovery of Marie’s unconscious ideas and their cure relies far more on deconditioning than on cathartic release. Thus, the dynamic aspect of unconscious mental activity was not evident to anything like the same extent in Janet’s description as in Freud’s.
The turn of the century
33
As Veith (1965) and others have pointed out, the real weakness in Janet’s position was his aetiological theories. He believed that there were agents which might precipitate hysterical accidents, but these were mostly physical in type and included haemorrhage, chronic disease, localised infection, typhoid fever, autointoxication, organic disease of the nervous system, and various alcoholic and other intoxications. Psychological provocations were admitted but not emphasised. All these agents appeared to Janet to work by weakening the organism and increasing the depression of the nervous system. The people most exposed to risk of such events were those with a degenerate heredity, but insufficient explanation was given as to why and how such symptoms might come and go. While Freud acknowledged Janet’s priority in publishing the relationship between symptoms and unconscious ideas, he pointed out that Breuer had actually undertaken a cure earlier on the same basis. He also emphasised how psychoanalysis showed the phenomena in which Janet was interested to be the result of dynamic factors – mental conflict and repression (Freud, 1935, p. 54). The state of ideas about hysteria and the extent to which Breuer and Freud provided an innovation is well characterised in a long review of the Studies in Hysteria published in Brain (Clark, 1896). Clark points out: “the authors were careful to speak of ‘the psychical origin of hysteria phenomena’ rather than ‘of hysteria’, because they do not wish to claim for their view an unlimited importance. They neither believed that all hysterical phenomena arise in the above described way, nor do they agree with Möbius that they are all dependent upon idea.”
Clark adds “it seems certain that many hysterical phenomena do not arise through idea,” and later says “the fundamental morbid change is an abnormal irritability of the nervous system; and it is a further question as to how far this is of psychical origin”. Janet was associated also with a tendency of the Parisian group to identify increasing numbers of traits which characterised hysterical personality. Briquet (1859) only mentioned seven such traits, but Axenfeld (1864) identified 12, including affective features, with which he also mentioned sensitivity, vivid imagination, simulation and egocentricity or selfishness. Successive workers with Charcot identified 15 (Du Saulle, 1883) or 17 (Richer, 1885, 1892), and ultimately the numbers rise to Janet’s 23 in 1907. It appears that Janet worked partly from the ideas
34
History and concepts
of others and partly developed his own notions. His items comprised the common features of depression, fearfulness, emotionality, lability and excitement, but also included exaggeration, suggestibility, deficient judgement, poor self-control (egocentricity), vivid imagination, erotic problems (frigidity), self-destructive tendencies, regression, jealousy, shame and diminution of the field of consciousness and dual personality (Janet, 1889, 1892, 1901, 1907, 1919; Alam & Merskey, 1992). He attributed the tendency of hysterical patients towards simulation and mendacity simply to their forgetfulness or to lack of interest in their own earlier statements, promises or facts of life, rather than to character defects. He considered that an underlying weakness of personal synthesis, a ready tendency to dissociation, produced both hysterical symptoms and hysterical traits. The symptoms were peculiar to the fully developed hysterical illness but the traits were shared with other ‘degenerates’ such as criminals and imbeciles. Successive breakdowns would weaken the predisposed constitution, with a resultant mental disintegration which could be permanent and complete. Janet was able to give more of his attention and appreciation to the personality traits of the hysterical patient than Freud, whose contribution is discussed in Chapter 4. Perhaps this resulted from his attempt to relate the symptoms to the personality of the individual in whom they arose. This was in contrast to Freud’s approach, which was to explain the symptoms in terms of specific determination, probably Freud’s greatest achievement in his study of hysteria. A further picture of the view of hysterical symptoms and patients is provided by Kraepelin, whose lectures, translated into English in 1904, contain an account of what he called ‘hysterical insanity’. A lecture of the same title is a masterpiece of description and is printed here in Appendix B. So many of the notions which were common to Janet and his predecessors are to be found in Kraepelin’s writing that it would be a hindrance rather than a help to recapitulate them; and any restatement would be inferior. What can be said is that the pattern of symptoms, the emphasis on personality, the response to treatment, and the use of many treatments with some considerable suggestive power, resemble with great precision experiences which can readily be encountered with hysterical patients today. By the turn of the century hysteria and hysterical traits were understood to involve at least three major elements. The first is
The turn of the century
35
those symptoms which now are regarded as dissociative, a term defined in Chapter 4. These include fits, attacks of loss of consciousness, impairment of memory, loss of use of the limbs, anaesthesias, and so on. The second element was the occurrence of a variety of these and other symptoms together, and the third was peculiarities of personality and of the relationship with the doctor; these were also recognised before Freud. One might add that there was a recognition of some motive in at least a few patients, but this recognition was not, before Freud, given more than intermittent attention. The definition of these symptoms and their patterns probably became more exact as a result of their separation from other groups of illness. By the end of the 19th century schizophrenia, or chronic delusional insanity, and manic–depressive illness were all recognised as independent conditions, usually different from the hysterical pattern in ways which could be defined acceptably. The main problem remained to distinguish the hysterical syndrome from other types of neurotic illness. Savill (1909) gave the most common diagnoses as neurasthenia, hysteria and hypochondriasis. Hypochondriasis tended to be the male equivalent of hysteria and neurasthenia that of affective illness in both sexes. Ellenberger’s (1970) classic study, The Discovery of the Unconscious, has enormously advanced our appreciation of the work of Janet and of many of the 19th-century developments. This study and the specific biographical study of Breuer by Hirschmuller (1989) illuminate the social, medical and personal context of the development of ideas about the unconscious, and frequently about hysteria. At the same time there has been a wide range of other writing which Micale (1989a,b) describes as “the historiography of hysteria”. This comprises intellectual histories of hysteria, studies related to Freud and the history of hysteria, feminist historical criticism, studies of Charcot and the history of hysteria, and nonfeminist social and political accounts of the subject. Micale’s studies (1989a,b, 1990a,b) provide an irreplaceable perspective on the role of hysteria as a concept both in medicine and in society at large. Further developments in the notion of hysteria were to take place as discussion spread through Europe and the Englishspeaking world and was affected by the theories of Freud, and also by the impact of World War I.
36
4
History and concepts
The contribution of Freud
The contribution of Freud to hysteria, which dates from 1893 (Breuer & Freud, 1893–95) gradually attracted increasing attention in the English-speaking world. By 1914 Ormerod, an English neurologist, was dealing with psychoanalysis and hysteria – not particularly favourably – although, in 1917, Craig, in a popular textbook, refers in passing to the term ‘anxiety neurosis’ as being introduced by Freud, but does not mention him in connection with the brief discussion of hysterical insanity. Freud’s work is now so well known and so much described that an extensive presentation will be avoided here, not because it is unimportant but because its considerable advances and failings have been well evaluated elsewhere by such authors as Dalbiez (1941), Fenichel (1945), Jones (1953), Brown (1961), and many more current authors. It has also been the starting point for the subsequent exploration of the nature of the hysterical personality by many writers with a psychoanalytic orientation. The latter topic is considered in Chapters 22 and 24. In this chapter, while merely noting the fact that the history of psychoanalysis begins with a publication on hysteria, only the main features of Freud’s theory of the matter will be briefly outlined. Studies on Hysteria (Breuer & Freud, 1893–95) represents Freud’s first papers on psychoanalysis. The introductory essay to the volume, “On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomena”, puts forward the view that ideas which were completely absent from the patient’s memory in a normal psychical state (or only present in a “highly summary form”) could be revealed by hypnosis. These memories related to psychic traumas which had not been disposed of either by abreaction or by normal “associative wearing away” in consciousness. The abnormal state was supposed to be produced either because of the strength of the undischarged 36
The contribution of Freud
37
affect attaching to the trauma or else because of a disposition to hypnoid states. This formulation provides the basis for the hypothesis that unconscious mental conflict may result in hysterical symptoms. If the symptoms affect the body, for example paralysis, pain, anaesthesia, they are conventionally called conversion symptoms, while others are known as dissociative symptoms (e.g. amnesia); notwithstanding, all conversion symptoms are also, by definition, dissociative and the 10th revision of the International Classification of Diseases now entitles the relevant section: F44 Dissociative [conversion] Disorders (World Health Organization, 1992a). According to the above view, the symptom solves a conflict which is too unpleasant to be faced or resolved in consciousness. In the first four patients whom Freud treated by his technique, pain was a prominent symptom, and he laid gradually increasing stress on the way in which these pains resulted from psychic conflict. For Elisabeth von R. he described them explicitly as a successful conversion phenomenon which spared her from the conviction that she loved her sister’s husband. “She repressed her erotic idea from consciousness and transformed the amount of its affect into physical pain.” It should be noted that this idea of quantitative conversion of (psychic) affect into a physical disorder is not maintained in later dynamic formulations. It was part of Freud’s first steps en route to a wholly psychological formulation of the aetiology of symptoms and appears also in his distinction between actual neuroses, such as anxiety due to sexual repression or even coitus interruptus, on the one hand, and psychoneuroses on the other. In these latter cases the causal mechanism was seen as wholly psychological (Freud, 1912). Where the causal mechanism was wholly psychological and the symptom resulted from a repressed conflict, the primary gain to the individual lay in escaping the dilemma and making it unconscious, if it was not unconscious already. In more advanced psychoanalytic argument the primary gain is often held to result from resolving a conflict which is basically unconscious. For example, a woman may develop hysterical symptoms because a forbidden oedipal wish – to be closer to a man who to her represents her father – is in conflict with unconscious feelings of guilt that she is thereby displacing her mother in such a relationship. The resolution of both these unconscious wishes with a symptom like a paralysis which prevented the man courting her would constitute the primary gain of the illness. This notion of primary gain is basic to the Freudian dynamic theory.
38
History and concepts
In common discussion of hysterical symptoms, secondary gain is more often mentioned. This represents the advantages which follow from the sick role, from the loss of the use of the limb or some part, for example such advantages as extra attention, nursing, special consideration, and so forth. They are an important part, of course, of the reinforcing mechanism in the maintenance of hysterical symptoms. But primary gain is part of the causal system. The hypothesis that the function of the hysterical symptom was to solve a problem itself solved the problem of another 19thcentury observation. It was recognised by the school of Charcot that many patients seemed to be content with their symptom, did not complain, and indeed appeared to be indifferent to it, or complacent about it. Hence the use of the term ‘belle indifference’. The Freudian theory gives an excellent explanation for belle indifference. Provided that the solution to the problem over which conflicts exist is adequate, then there should be no undue feeling of sadness, anxiety, or other emotional turmoil in the patient who has successfully solved a problem with a conversion or dissociative symptom. Indeed, at that juncture the patient may be rather pleased for reasons of which he or she is not aware, or at least is not wholly aware. Accordingly, we have a plausible explanation for what was otherwise a paradoxical and inexplicable human reaction after injury to illness. Mace (1992a) has nicely taken up the observation of Hunter & MacAlpine (1963) who drew attention to the use of the term “hysterical conversion” by the English physician John Ferriar (1795) a century before Freud. Ferriar discussed a general concept of the “conversion of diseases” by which, “new symptoms arise ... which require a different destination, and which either put a period to the original disorder, or combining with it, alter the physician’s views regarding the prognostics, or the method of cure.” (p. 1)
When one recognised disease developed into another, that was conversion. It was also conversion if one recognised disease predisposed to the subsequent development of another, or if the ill-advised therapeutic suppression of a first disease led to the appearance of a second. Fevers were often held to terminate in hysterical disorders, especially in women, but also in men on recovering from typhus “for they experience a capricious disposition to laugh or cry, and a degree of the globus hystericus” (p. 37). In the case of hysteria, another disease could supervene while hysteria was still undeniably present. Also, with hysterical conversion, the body might counterfeit the most hazardous
The contribution of Freud
39
disorders without incurring danger. According to Mace, Ferriar showed little interest in the pathogenesis of hysteria, but conversion was a unique property of the relationship which hysteria enjoyed with other diseases. The propensity for imitation that Sydenham had recognised (and Cullen had evaded) became the essential quality of hysteria. Ferriar’s usage of the term was not followed by other writers, perhaps because of a shift in interest away from classification on the basis of formal resemblance towards a classification more related to pathological understanding. Freud’s use of “hysterical conversion” in the 1890s was taken for a complete innovation and, in any case, the concept is quite distinct in its implications from the earlier one. In his early work Freud quickly noted the symbolic significance of the symptom and the possibility of symptoms being learned or revived on the basis of previous experience. Mace (1992a) points out that Freud explicitly distinguished between symbolisation and conversion as psychological mechanisms, holding that the mechanism of symbolisation had its place “in some sense, midway between autosuggestion and conversion” (Breuer & Freud, 1895, p. 180). According to Freud it was uncommon for the determining cause of the hysterical symptom to be merely a symbolic relationship. More was made by Freud’s followers of the importance of symbolism (see Chapter 24). Freud’s ideas on the relationships between motives and symptoms in hysteria were part of a set of concepts concerning conflict, repression, and mental mechanisms, as already indicated. At first, some of the explanations of symptoms which solved problems were complicated by the use of the label anxiety-hysteria. This term was employed to cover phobias and free-floating anxiety (e.g. Freud, 1917) and to distinguish them from such hysterical complaints as paralyses, anaesthesias, and other symptoms with loss of function, which were called conversion-hysteria. Conversionhysteria, anxiety-hysteria and obsessional neurosis were then all linked together as subgroups of the so-called “transference neuroses” (Freud, 1917), on which the theories of psychoanalysis were founded. Indeed, Freud claimed that it was with these conditions that psychoanalysis was most successful as a treatment. Despite the above complication and despite the inaccuracy of Freud’s claim of therapeutic benefits, his concepts have dominated the notion of hysteria ever since they were first enunciated. Psychoanalysis has been no more successful and much less efficient than many rival techniques of treatment in the therapy of conversion and dissociative symptoms. However, the use of psychoanalytic hypotheses for understanding the patients has been
40
History and concepts
largely unavoidable. We cannot really talk about hysterical complaints without using the general scheme of dynamic psychiatry, even when we have reason to reject some of the specific hypotheses. Like Freud, both Charcot and Breuer had held that sexual problems were an important cause of hysterical symptoms, but they were unwilling to declare the fact publicly. As is well known, Freud found, in his first researches into hysteria, that his patients related to him episodes of seduction by close members of their family as the basis for the conflicts producing their symptoms. He soon discarded this view, after some embarrassment, but in its stead he arrived at the formulation that sexual wishes in childhood formed the basis for adult conflicts (Freud, 1905). In this view the hypothesis of infantile sexuality was linked with the idea of the Oedipus complex: every child is said to desire the parent of the opposite sex, to have repressed this wish and to have a consequent castration anxiety or penis envy. The notion of sexuality was broadened to that of libido, in which all forms of primary pleasurestriving are included. This theory does not command widespread acceptance. Most psychiatrists agree that it can be found to fit some patients precisely and in detail. Others seem to have their symptoms and conflicts for reasons which are not mainly sexual. The businessman who develops amnesia when faced with bankruptcy, or the soldier who is afraid to fight or to show cowardice and so develops a paralysis, does not have a problem in which sex plays the leading role. Freud (1917) argued that narcissistic attachments of the libido to the ego provided the basis on which traumatic neuroses occurred. In other words libido, which may originally have been fixated at a genital level, becomes fixated to the ego. The businessman might have been attached to his work as much for the gratification of his emotional needs, which it provided, as for the money which he earned from it (and might have over-reached himself as much for psychological reasons as for financial ones). The soldier’s paralysis may be engendered by a castration anxiety as well as by fears of battle. The libido theory provides a theory of how irrational emotions may underlie seemingly rational dilemmas. Abraham (1921b), who had worked with psychiatric casualties of the war, supported this view with case histories and with the argument that fully healthy individuals did not succumb to traumatic neurosis. They were able to renounce all narcissistic privileges (i.e. self-interest), to give up their narcissism and to sacrifice their ego for the community. The few cases he quotes, although well described, are not enough, however, to support the general argument. The argument itself lacks cogency if we consider
The contribution of Freud
41
the very large numbers of previously normal men who broke down in the trenches. Freud (1926) took a more sophisticated line when he dealt again with this topic. He wrote: “any ... contradiction has long since been disposed of by the introduction of the concept of narcissism which brings the libidinal cathexis of the ego into line with the cathexis of objects and emphasizes the libidinal character of the instinct of self-preservation.”
This argument permits a comfortable escape from the original, narrow formulation. For practical purposes a sexual aetiology of hysteria is often not accepted in routine work with individual patients, or else it is considered of minor importance. In other instances, sexual abuse is now taken very seriously as a possible cause not only of hysterical symptoms but also of personality disorders and chronic pain (see Chapter 12). The cases where sexual abuse seems least relevant are particularly those seen during wartime and in connection with monetary issues such as claims for compensation (Henderson & Gillespie, 1950). A tendency also to interpret symbolically such events as the phenomena of epilepsy has not found favour. For example, the views that tongue-biting in convulsions “is no more inconsistent with hysteria than with love-making” and that incontinence “merely represents the infantile form of a violent pollution” (Freud, 1909) are neither logically sound nor pragmatic. They have, in fact, encouraged some of the more extreme and less realistic speculations which disfigure the psychoanalytic literature. The very first case of Breuer & Freud has itself been subjected to a good deal of reinterpretation. The patient, described as Anna O., was actually Bertha Pappenheim. Her name was disclosed by Jones (1953) on the grounds that she deserved to be commemorated as the real discoverer of the cathartic method. This notion of the release of feeling is actually much older. It dates from Aristotle and was described by Jacob Bernays (the uncle of Freud’s wife) and employed and reported by Janet (1886) among others before the publication by Breuer & Freud (Jackson, 1994). Since the disclosure by Jones, a good deal of biographical information and a lot more discussion has been devoted to her. The interest of this discussion is that it has highlighted the possibility – I would say the strong likelihood – that the principal diagnosis in this case is not what we would now call hysteria but rather a severe depressive illness. Although there were unquestionable hysterical manifestations during the course of the illness, I have argued that the disorder is best characterised as a severe depressive illness
42
History and concepts
provoked by the illness and subsequent death of the patient’s father (Merskey, 1992b). She was 21 years old when she first fell ill in the period between July and December 1880, and does not appear to have fully recovered until more than two years later, while some relapses occurred over another five years. For a while, she became dependent upon morphine, which had been used as a sedative by injection, and also, during her illness, experienced frightening hallucinations of black snakes among others, and rapid fluctuations of mood. Some of the latter may well be attributable to the fact that Breuer was hypnotising her regularly, and producing what the hypnotists of the day called ‘somnambulism’, which currently would be regarded as a hypnotic state with, in her case, ‘absences’ and a ‘condition seconde’. After recovery Bertha Pappenheim became a very energetic and distinguished social worker and author, writing short stories, theatrical pieces on social themes, travel accounts, and studies on the conditions of Jewish women and on the occurrence of criminality among Jews. She founded the League of Jewish Women in Germany and a magazine of social work and also campaigned actively against white slavery (i.e. enforced prostitution). The evidence that she was depressed includes low spirits, even melancholy, weakness or fatigue, loss of appetite, insomnia and hypersomnia, anxiety, gloomy thoughts and suicidal ideas, which all persisted or recurred repeatedly. Superimposed on, or accompanying this pattern, were some prominent hysterical symptoms. Today it is hard to know whether these were there initially or whether – as seems more probable – most of them were provoked by the patterns of treatment, which involved hypnotism and a good deal of suggestion inherent in the manner in which she was examined (Merskey, 1992b). This diagnosis of depression was first suggested by Spitzer et al (1981) and seems the most likely, although many other diagnoses have been offered, including schizophrenia, a borderline state, a toxic psychosis based on morphine addiction, multiple personality disorder, tuberculous meningitis, sarcoid, and complex partial seizures. However, a depressive illness is the most economical diagnosis, particularly when viewed in terms of the patient’s subsequent recovery and highly energetic temperament thereafter. The above considerations do not take away the diagnosis of hysterical symptoms but do change the view we would have of the principal illness. Interestingly, this is not necessarily very different from that of Breuer in the 1880s, inasmuch as Hirschmuller (1989) points out that hysteria was seen as a condition in which there were acute episodes and also widespread nervous change,
The contribution of Freud
43
together with such particular psychological phenomena as loss of function in speaking or writing, which were quite obvious in this case. There was no requirement at the time for Breuer and Freud to reject or minimise the diagnosis of hysteria simply because the patient was also depressed, and Hirschmuller observes that in Breuer’s student days hysteria was looked upon as “a so-called general neurosis” without definite localisation in the nervous system. Thus the function and significance of hysterical symptoms was probably first worked out by Breuer and Freud with respect to a patient who was primarily depressed and in whom the hysterical phenomena were relatively secondary (Merskey, 1992b). Notwithstanding the above, the ideas which Freud contributed remain important, as already indicated. His consistent emphasis on psychological motives in the causation of symptoms; his description of repression and the mechanisms of defence; his recognition of conflict as the basis for symptoms; his description of the transference; his acknowledgement of motives, like sex, which were not previously acceptable in open discussion; and his attribution of symbolic meaning of symptoms – these have all been powerful tools in the elucidation of hysterical phenomena. Freud made a further contribution with his views on emotional relationships in the hysterical personality. The recognition of hysterical personality traits is common both to him and to others, like Kraepelin (1904) (cf. Appendix B; Janet, 1894; Jaspers, 1913; Alam & Merskey, 1992), and was inherited by them from the clinical awareness of previous generations of physicians. Freud did not actually write about the hysterical character or the hysterical personality, although he did initiate the analytic study of personality with his article on character and anal eroticism (1908). Perhaps he took certain hysterical traits for granted in his work, but later analysts, starting with Wittels (1930), saw the hysterical character as one in which there was a failure of emotional development, libido being fixated at an infantile level. This is an important concept which will be discussed in detail subsequently (see Chapter 24).
Psychophysiological symptoms Another issue requires brief mention at this point. In the light of the notion of symptoms due to conflict and affected by the will, we are able to think of hysterical symptoms as independent of any local physical disturbance; they are not attributable except in an indirect manner to a lesion of nerve pathways. Yet some of Freud’s
44
History and concepts
followers have not been able to drop completely the idea that there is a pathological, local ‘innervation’ of the affected portion of the body. Franz Alexander provides a good illustration of this trend. Alexander (1950) adopted a view which is widely accepted that symptoms due to autonomic disturbance are involuntary and can be distinguished from conversion symptoms because unconscious control over them is not possible. It is at least very unusual, even though some work with biofeedback suggested it might sometimes occur (Miller, 1974), but that work could not be replicated. In any case, the extent of voluntary control over autonomic symptoms is very limited. Those symptoms which are due to muscle tension are in a similar category to autonomic effects in that, like the majority of autonomic nervous system responses, they are generally accepted as psychophysiological. If they are related to an unconscious emotional state, they are not problem-solving, but rather epiphenomena of physiological adaptation which may be poorly controlled and maladaptive. Alexander expresses this common view when he says: “the only similarity between hysterical conversion symptoms and vegetative responses to emotions lies in the fact that both are responses to psychological stimuli. They are basically different, however, in their psychodynamics and physiology.”
For some reason Alexander (1952) and Alexander & Szasz (1952) blurred this excellent distinction and Alexander (1963) continued to confound it. Alexander (1952) wrote about conversion as follows: “The pent-up tension may ... be relieved by changes in the field of the skeletal and laryngeal muscles or in the sense organs. These changes (paralyses, muscular contractions, spasms ... blindness, deafness) have a symbolic meaning and serve both the expression and the negation of the repressed ego-alien tendencies.”
Alexander & Szasz (1952) talked of “expressive innervations” which were “specific physiological processes such as weeping, laughing, blushing, sighing, etc. which take place under the influence of specific emotional factors”, and Alexander (1963) commented: “Physiologically, conversion is no different from any normal innervation by which we express emotions, such as weeping, laughing or blushing or from voluntary behaviour ... Repression inhibits action, and since the tension caused by the unconscious tendency cannot be relieved it becomes a chronic innervation.”
The contribution of Freud
45
These last views contradict his original statement and are not compatible with the definition of a conversion or dissociative symptom as a problem-solving mechanism, originating in emotional conflicts, except when the physiological response happens inadvertently to solve a conflict. They muddle together the idea of biological adaptive responses, which is the normal function of psychophysiological symptoms, and the idea of conflict-solving thought processes, which is the fundamental Freudian notion of conversion hysteria. They also throw away the whole point of the neurological and psychiatric distinction between symptoms due to lesions or dysfunction of pathways and those due to unconscious ideas expressed through the voluntary musculature. Others besides Alexander altered the meaning of conversion. Ferenczi (1919), in Mace’s expression, readopted the term to distinguish one subset of physical symptoms from those which he attributed to a mental origin which caused “materialization”. The products of conversion were distinct from other materialisations because they were displacements of a genital impulse only and were couched in “a peculiar symbolic language” that he termed the “hysterical idiom” (Ferenczi, 1919, p. 100; Mace, 1992a). These comments seem to retain the purely psychological hypotheses without mixing them, as did Alexander, with psychophysiological effects. Fenichel (1945, p. 236) seems to have had a similar degree of caution, saying “not all somatic changes of a psychogenic nature should be called conversions because not all are translations of specific fantasies into a body language”. For the latter he introduced the category of “organ neurosis”, which may or may not be an improvement. In this whole group of confusing comments the palm probably goes to Deutsch (1959), who remarked (p. 95), “The symbolization of external objects leads to a retrojection of these lost objects via sensory pathways onto and into the body where they remain immanent and dormant”. In the subsequent pages of this book, many bodily symptoms are considered which may be either psychophysiological or due to a conversion or dissociative process. While any symptom, organic, psychophysiological or hysterical, may be used to serve a hysterical function, it remains the case that organic and psychophysiological symptoms are demonstrably different in their mechanism of production from those which are primarily hysterical in origin. Some later analysts (see Chapter 24) have unfortunately followed Alexander’s confusing example.
46
History and concepts
5
Combat hysteria
The effects of fear on men in battle must have been known and recognised since the dawn of history. Philippopoulos (1981) suggested that one of the earliest accounts, or even the first one, was given by Herodotus (c. 484–420). A Greek soldier at the battle of Marathon who had fought well was neither stabbed in any part nor shot but went permanently blind. Whether or not Herodotus’ case was one of hysteria, it exemplifies brave behaviour under stress followed by a permanent symptom without a physical explanation. These phenomena were particularly prominent in World War I. Overt hysterical symptoms seem to have occurred on an unparalleled scale during World War I. The conditions under which it was fought, the social attitudes to which it gave rise, and an initial lack of understanding by physicians, all contributed to produce large numbers of men with somatic complaints of psychological origin. These complaints included a wide variety of hysterical manifestations. Despite the horrors of World War II, the casualty rate for combatants was much less than in the war of 1914–18. The persistent bombing of civilian targets, the Nazi campaign of genocide against Jews and gypsies, the appalling barbarity of the Gulag Archipelago described by Solzhenitsyn (1973), the terrible outrages practised by Japanese on prisoners, and the destruction of two Japanese cities by atom bombs all affected people who were noncombatants or no longer engaged in a fighting role. Those who suffered were not then bearing arms, nor could they escape from their danger by a retreat into illness. In concentration camps this merely hastened death. Flight from bombed cities was, of course, open to some civilians. On the other hand, soldiers in World War 46
Combat hysteria
47
I experienced conditions of great discomfort and danger but could, if ill, escape from those miseries and hazards which oppressed them. The miseries and hazards were substantial and the death rate enormous. At the same time popular feeling fiercely condemned men who would not fight, while the gallant wounded were praised and esteemed. It is hardly surprising that large numbers developed symptoms of illness without any organic foundation, so being honourably relieved of military service and perhaps even securing a pension. The phenomenon occurred equally among the forces of the central powers and France, Britain and their allies. Reading Kretschmer’s (1948) descriptions of his wartime cases, and the various British writers on the topic, one obtains an impression of the same problems, faced in the same way with similar results. After the war, the lessons which had been learned had a direct influence on the practice of physicians in subsequent decades as well as on the theory of the illness. This chapter will deal mainly with the British literature, noting also the views of Babinski, which derived from the analysis of French experience. Kretschmer’s views are dealt with in Chapter 6. The French experience was, of course, very extensive, and is comprehensively documented by Southard (1919), together with many of the papers from other languages. Comparable problems were apparently elucidated by Russian authors during the Russo– Japanese War of 1904–6 (Baker, 1975). They recognised a condition amounting to traumatic war neurosis and marked by confusional states and brief hysterical excitement going on to irritability, fearfulness and emotional instability. The literature immediately before World War I contained a number of ideas which led to the characterisation of hysterical symptoms in the British forces as shell-shock. The groundwork for this term evolved from a concept of ‘commotion’ or ‘concussion’ of the brain and spinal cord. The story is worth telling in some detail as a classic example of hysteria on an exceptionally large scale. It also has a number of other implications in psychiatry. ‘Concussion’ comes from the Latin words ‘con’, meaning together, and ‘quatere’, meaning to shake, strike, or dash. The Oxford English Dictionary cites a work by R. Copland, Galyen’s Terapeutyke of 1541, as follows: “The solution of contynuyte called ecchymosis in greke cometh most often with concussyon and ruption”, and in 1656, Ridgley in Practical Physic says “Concussion of the Brain is made from an external cause”. Courville (1953) reviews the history of theories distinguishing between concussion, contusion and compression of the brain.
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History and concepts
Bailey (1906) wrote (p. 91) that: “Concussion occurs in varying degrees. In the mildest form, after a blow, there is a dazing or confusion which is only momentary.... In the more severe degrees concussion is a much more serious matter.” By comparison, contusions of the brain were described as “bruisings, by which nerve tissue, connective tissue, and blood vessels are injured”. Charles Bland Radcliffe (1880), physician to the Westminster Hospital and to the National Hospital for the Paralyzed and Epileptic, described concussion of the spinal cord in a standard textbook A System of Medicine, edited by Sir John Russell Reynolds, as follows (pp. 1016–1017): “Concussion of the spinal cord, like concussion of the brain, is the result of a fall or some other accident, and its symptoms vary with the intensity of the shock.... The appearances after death may be those of haemorrhage more or less extensive.”
These opinions reflect a general view that some type of disturbance to the nervous system might be physically produced, without haemorrhage, either by temporary disablement of cells, or perhaps by the disruption of their connections. Erichsen (1866, 1886) developed the idea strongly in relation to railway accidents. With the spread of railways throughout the 19th century, accidents and collisions inevitably occurred. According to Erichsen (1886, p. 1): “These injuries of the spine and of the spinal cord occur not infrequently in civil life ... but in none more frequently or with greater severity than in those sustained by persons subjected to the violent shock of a railway collision.”
Trimble (1981) points out that one of the themes of Erichsen’s book is that organic lesions can follow relatively mild trauma. Naturally, this position supported claims for compensation for injury. Page (1883) objected. He analysed Erichsen’s case histories, and often found evidence of significant physical injury, such as fractured vertebrae. He argued that “purely physical causes” could explain the symptoms of general nervous shock after frightening railway accidents. Page also reasoned that those cases of a “concussion of the brain”, in which symptoms persisted, generally had “definite structure lesions” and that transient loss of consciousness without disruption of brain tissue would normally be followed by a full recovery. He claimed that a similar “shake” of the spinal cord would have no lasting effect. There were also some American writers (e.g. Hodges, 1881; Putnam, 1883; Walton, 1883) who were sceptical of Erichsen’s theory.
Combat hysteria
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In addition to the above, Reynolds (1869) and Charcot (1889) had both shown that physical complaints might be due to psychological causes related to specific ideas. Clearly, Freud’s work in which the hysterical symptom was understood to be the result of conflict and repression was also available, but not very well regarded for the most part. In contrast to these, Oppenheim (1889, 1911) attributed the symptoms of concussion to functional disturbances “produced by molecular changes in the central nervous system”. Richards (1910) reviewed the then current information available from the Russo–Japanese War. For the most part the patients seem to have been classified in traditional categories such as depression with hypochondriasis, depression with acute mental confusion, or stuporous conditions, but the most immediate results of battle were recognised as hysterical excitements and confused states. These were held to clear up usually in a few days, but irritability, fearfulness and emotional instability remained for weeks. Russian soldiers greatly feared Japanese grenades, which on bursting released quantities of brownish-blue poisonous gas, and it was said that men in the immediate vicinity were prostrated by the gases and often remained unconscious for several hours; on awakening these men were deaf and dumb but after some weeks gradually regained their speech and hearing. Since the gas only spread over an area of ten feet or a little more and physical signs were limited, there was an impression that many of the cases had a large hysterical element. Many cases of neurasthenic and hysterical conditions were recognised, including hysterical fright with great excitement and confusion, ending finally in the semi-conscious state with great mental and bodily weakness. Traumatic psychoses were also recognised. “Traumatic neurosis (no evident wound)” is listed by Richards from one report as occurring among 25 350 soldiers who had been examined. Two well known French catastrophes also contributed substantially to knowledge of the topic. The ships Iéna and Liberté had exploded at Toulon in 1907 and 1911, respectively. Hésnard (1914) described the effects on survivors, after eliminating cases in which physical commotion of the brain or other direct organic causes might have been relevant. He recorded typical symptoms of post-traumatic psychological responses, which were previously recognised and have been repeatedly observed in wars and catastrophes in this century. These included an initial state of semi-somnambulism, automatic mental activity, absorption in some trivial occupation such as an exclusive preoccupation in the attempt to save some garment, a strange lucidity and feeling of exaltation, and a period of amnesia. The rescuers also showed symptoms of
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History and concepts
disturbance for several weeks, including recapitulation of the scene, terrifying dreams, diffuse anxiety, fatigue, and various minor phobias. This knowledge of emotional change after explosions, quickly abstracted in English, became part of the contemporary climate of ideas (Brown & Williams, 1918).
Shell-shock The exact origin of this term is unknown, but it caught on among the forces of the British Empire like wildfire. In December 1914, Elliott described four cases of “transient paraplegia” from shell explosions. In three, he recognised significant physical injury: all three were considered to be at risk of being diagnosed as hysterical. In the fourth case, however, Elliott accepted that his patient’s symptoms were indeed hysterical. He emphasised both that organic disease could be overlooked and that “functional disorders of the nervous system” were common after a “big shell explosion”. Two months later, on 13 February 1915, Myers (1915) seems to have used the term in the medical literature for the first time, although the Oxford English Dictionary (Murray et al, 1986) incorrectly states that Evans was the first to use the term in December 1915. Myers’ first patient, a private, had experienced shells exploding both in front of and behind him. “Curiously, the one in front cut his haversack clean away, and bruised his side, and apparently it burned his little finger. His eyes burned and were blurred and he developed hysterical blindness as well as loss of the sense of taste and smell. He was cured by suggestion.”
After describing this and two other patients in considerable detail, Myers writes, laconically, “Comment on these cases seems superfluous.... The close relation of these cases to those of ‘hysteria’ appears fairly certain.” Viets (1917) states that Myers’ article is the first recorded use of the term known to him, but that it came into use in the British Army in the latter part of 1914. A search of The Times from the onset of the war to 13 March 1915 found only one reference to ‘shock’, on 6 February 1915 (p. 5), but without the prefix ‘shell’. This related that the War Office was arranging to send soldiers suffering from shock to be treated in special wards at the National Hospital for the Paralysed and Epileptic, Queen Square, London.
Combat hysteria
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Table 5.1. Official British figures for psychiatric illness in soldiers in 1914: “Functional nervous diseases among imperial troops, August–December 1914” United Kingdom officers other ranks Neurasthenia Traumatic neurasthenia Hysteria Shock Shell-shock Totals
20 – – – – 20
321 10 50 15 – 396
officers 65 – – 23 2 90
France other ranks 279 8 11 114 18 430
From Macpherson et al (1923).
The official history of the war (Macpherson et al, 1923) gives a table of functional nervous diseases from the outbreak of war to the end of December 1914 (Table 5.1). Using slightly different criteria, the following numbers of British battle casualties in France, combining officers and other ranks, were recorded as cases of shell-shock: September–December 1914, 9; January–June 1915, 141; July–December 1915, 1246; January– June 1916, 3951; July–December 1916, 16 138; January–June 1917, 3010; July–December 1917, 4038. The rise in numbers was associated with the first battle of the Somme, which took place from July to November 1916, and was not a success for the Allied forces. Colonel A. B. Soltau stated to the post-war War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell Shock (1922, p. 72): “there were one or two cases in the fighting line in May, 1915, and September, 1915, but nothing which really attracted attention.... It was not until the Somme that it became an appreciable problem in the field ambulance.... We were flooded ... with cases in the latter stages of the Somme.”
The official figures by month and year also show the gradual growth of the notion. However, the fact that in the official history some cases of shell-shock are dated 1914 does not prove that they were actually given the label in 1914. These were probably patients who, having spent time in hospital, were thus labelled on discharge. ‘Shell-shock’ was rare in earlier wars. The only direct evidence was an account of nervous injuries produced at a distance by the projectiles of war, given by Professor Octave Laurent, in his book La guerre en Bulgarie et en Turquie, published in 1914 (War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell Shock, 1922, p. 109). In one chapter, Laurent (p. 367) describes a condition which he terms
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History and concepts
“Commotion Cérébrospinale” or “Nervous Injuries Produced by Projectiles”. They follow the explosion of a shell and may or may not be accompanied by signs of contusion. The effects of commotion may be slight, manifesting numbness, formication, and hyperaesthesia, with or without loss of consciousness, or they may be serious, provoking arrest of functions, where the injured falls into a torpor, inert as if struck by lightning, with all four limbs and the sphincters paralysed (War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell Shock, 1922, p. 109). It was expected that the effects of shells might be worse in 1914 than ever before; all observers recognised that exposure to explosions had multiplied. Instead of round cannonballs, which only killed where they hit, shells were available which travelled to their destination with increased velocity and better aerodynamic qualities. They carried high explosive of greater force than formerly, and would burst on impact. The gases generated by the explosion produced a shockwave in the air, more destructive than a single cannonball. In battle, men near whom a shell exploded might be seen being thrown for a distance of 15 yards (Mott, 1916b), while others had been seen to be thrown 12 or 15 feet upwards into the air (War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell Shock, 1922, J. C. Dunn, p. 105). Squadron Leader W. Tyrrell (War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell Shock, 1922, p. 105) had observed the death of men blown up without external signs of injury. Stones, earth, walls, buildings, the ramparts or dugouts – all might crumble. Soldiers were exposed to continuous bombardment from many guns, with numerous shells exploding in the vicinity. The prolonged noise and physical disruption of their environment could be enough to make many feel that they were being subjected to ‘shockwaves’. General Lord Horne (War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell Shock, 1922, p. 1) commented that: “shell shock became a serious factor in this war owing to the peculiar character of the war. The high explosives and the bombardments had never been known before.”
He added prophetically that, “In moving warfare we should not experience anything like it” (p. 60). The French also described nervous changes from ‘concussion’ (in French ‘commotion’) (Sollier & Chartier, 1915). Ravaut (1915) like Mott (1917) reported the death of individuals from the bursting of a shell without external signs of injury and looked for postmortem findings of haemorrhages in the nervous system which could account for death. The search for an organic explanation was
Combat hysteria
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perhaps supported also by an increasing recognition that many men who had given very good service and were thought of as basically courageous (even one winner of the Victoria Cross) manifested similar symptoms after having been subjected to prolonged and often serious stress and danger. The Royal Society of Medicine held a “Special Discussion on Shell Shock Without Visible Signs of Injury” on 25 January 1916 in the Section of Psychiatry, presided over by Major F. W. Mott, MD, FRS. Mott (1916a) pointed out that: “the forces producing shell shock are most commonly generated by the explosion of large shells, but also by mines, aerial torpedoes, whizz-bangs, trench mortars, bombs and hand grenades charged with high explosives. In a large number of cases, although exhibiting no visible injury, shell shock is accompanied by ‘burial’. Sandbags may be dislodged from the parapet of the trench and strike the individual on the head or spine, and cause concussion without visible injury, or the roof of a dugout may fall in. While lying partially buried he may be subject to the inhalation of noxious gases, so that a combination of causes may account for the severe effects of shell shock.”
The tenor of his view at that time was clearly to accept the reality of shell-shock as a frequent physical effect, even though he readily recognised alternative diagnoses. By contrast, Henry Head vigorously rejected shell-shock as a category, holding it to be “a heterogeneous collection of different nervous affections from concussion to sheer funk, which have merely this much in common that nervous control has at last given way” (Head, 1916). The forces which might cause nervous control to give way were formidable. The battle of the Somme, which lasted four months, cost the British 420 000 casualties, the French 194 000 and the Germans 440 000. It was calculated that in World War I the allied and associated powers mobilised more than 42 million men and lost more than five million lives. Russia and France contributed some 60% of the dead. Another 21 million men were wounded. In Britain, the social atmosphere which advocated persistence in the face of these awful figures was one of intense patriotism and loyal service. The misery of all and the stoicism of many emerge alike from the poetry of Wilfred Owen and the writings of men like Siegfried Sassoon (1936), Robert Graves (1929), and Edwin Vaughan (1981), or the historian John Keegan (1976). To the man in the ranks, the war meant being willing to serve, being ostracised, imprisoned, or shot for evasion of duty, or perhaps being ‘lucky’ enough to be ill. Judge Babington’s book For the Sake of Example:
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History and concepts
Capital Courts Martial 1914–1920 (1983) describes the execution of 269 men for desertion, cowardice, or quitting the post in the face of the enemy. Illness provided a respectable escape. Ritchie (1986) explored the attitudes of ‘imperial man’ to warfare. The stereotype of the good soldier or officer was of someone marked by comradeship, loyalty, the stiff upper lip, courage and endurance, who played by the rules without complaint. Doctors identified with these ideals: in fact, to function well as a medical officer, the doctor had to operate as an agent of the military purpose. His role was not simply to attend to sick men and see they were sent into battle, or to repair the injured. He also needed to promote self-control, moral stamina, and military devotion. It was his responsibility to certify either that a man had ‘shell-shock’ or ‘neurasthenia’ and should be removed from the firing line, or that he was a coward, shirking duty, who deserved to face a court martial and even perhaps capital punishment. Babington pointed out that the medical officers were frequently more indignant about the cowardice of deserters than were other army officers. However, the medical officer himself was at least one stage less involved in battle than the men whose cowardice he was rejecting. The special emphasis on shell-shock was not followed in Germany. In September 1916, German neuropsychiatrists meeting in Munich rejected the hypothesis of organic causation decisively, with respect to the majority of cases. This is described in English in the Journal of the American Medical Association (1917). Oppenheim opened the discussion and argued that a neurosis produced by psychic causes would have the same brain patterns as one due to concussion. ‘Fright neurosis’ and ‘commotion neurosis’ were both traumatic neuroses. Disturbances could be found which were not hysterical, although he admitted that he had underestimated the spread of hysteria. Nonne opposed him strongly. Traumatic neurosis was not a distinct entity. The shell-explosion neuroses were purely functional and curable by psychological techniques. Neurasthenia could occur in stable individuals through fatigue and exhaustion. (We note that this excuses illness in the brave.) Oppenheim’s views were against the economic interests of the state and the therapeutic needs of the patient. Most cases were hysteria. Gaupp and the majority of those present supported Nonne. Oppenheim retired from the argument, disappointed but without changing his view. The British meeting in January 1916 at the Royal Society of Medicine clearly achieved much less than the German one eight months later. However, understanding of the
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psychological basis for the symptoms was developing in Britain in 1917, and a new procedure was adopted, perhaps prompted initially by Myers (see Myers, 1940, p. 92). Early in 1917, all cases presenting symptoms of functional nervous disorder were sent to special hospitals as ‘NYD’ (not yet diagnosed). If there had been direct contact with the effect of explosions, even though there was no visible external wound, a diagnosis of “shell-shock (wound)” was made, while other cases of ‘nervousness’ were classed as neurasthenia, hysteria, and so on. After June 1917, when special neurological centres had been established in each army area, all cases of functional nervous disorder were marked ‘NYDN’ (not yet diagnosed, nervous) and transferred to the centres. Army Form .3346 was introduced to determine whether the man was ‘wounded’ or ‘sick’, but this procedure turned out to be unfair and unworkable. In September 1918, it was eventually decided to abolish the classification of “shell-shock (wound)” in France and to use it only if the patient’s disability was so serious as to necessitate transfer to England. There the decision to classify the patient as a battle casualty would depend upon the recommendation of a neurological board at a special centre (War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell Shock, 1922, p. 119). This sequence of events and the time at which it began clearly reflect the efforts of the army medical authorities to resolve the difficult practical issues which were arising out of the concepts of shell-shock. In time, the literature on this topic provided a series of monographs. The authors included Harris (1915), Hurst (1916), who produced two more editions of his original volume in 1918 and 1940, modifying his views each time, Hurst (1920), Smith & Pear (1917), MacCurdy (1918), Yealland (1918), Lépine (1919) and Babinski & Froment (1918). Mott (1919) moved away from his original view that shell-shock was mostly due to organic causes. Among American authors, Southard provided a tremendous collection of reports from all the belligerent countries, with brief comments of his own and, together with Fenton, compiled an extensive bibliography (Southard, 1928). In addition to the British official war history, there was also the United States Army Report (Salmon & Fenton, 1929), and a collection by Brown & Williams (1918) which comprised a bibliography with abstracts from the different combatant countries. Fenton (1926) wrote a personal appraisal. The most notable American work was probably that by Salmon (1917), The Care and Treatment of Mental Diseases and War Neuroses (‘Shell Shock’) in the British Army. Salmon’s work brought
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History and concepts
together the most important lessons of World War I, and his recommendations were applied immediately to the American expeditionary forces. The fact that the German authors rejected the diagnosis of shellshock and the organic explanation is probably due in part to the greater success of the German armies at the onset of the First World War. Holmes (War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell Shock, 1922, p. 38) observed that more cases of shell-shock occurred during prolonged engagements, especially when these were not successful, and much less frequently when the fighting was successful, for instance during the autumn of 1918. Noy et al (1983) showed that battle stress was an accurate predictor of psychiatric casualties in Israeli forces in Lebanon, battles with low stress having few physical and psychological casualties and battles with high stress having many. In general when winning wars easily, as in the Suez Campaign of 1956 and the Six Day War in 1967, Israeli attitudes and policies discounted the occurrence of post-traumatic stress disorder, but this attitude changed in the face of the greater numbers of casualties which occurred in 1973 in the Yom Kippur War and in 1982 in Lebanon. Copp & McAndrew (1990) described the evolution of the same problems in Canadian soldiers. In the end a large proportion of the symptoms of shell-shock was recognized as hysterical and another segment as related to anxiety. The hysterical symptoms listed by Hurst (1920, 1940) under war conditions included: cutaneous anaesthesias and hyperaesthesias, similar disorders of the mucous membranes, blindness, deafness and hyperacusis, stammering, aphonia, mutism, contractures, bent back (camptocormia), tremor and paralysis. These were differentiated from true cerebral and spinal concussion and soldier’s heart and anxiety neurosis. As well as Hurst, Mott described most of these and also mental confusion and delirium, neurasthenia, astasias, ataxia, tics and choreiform movements. In the end Mott took his definition of hysteria from Babinski (1901), as follows: “Hysteria is a pathological state manifested by symptoms which it is possible to reproduce by suggestion in certain subjects with a perfect exactitude and which are susceptible of disappearing under the influence of persuasion (contra-suggestion).”
Like others, he regarded neurasthenia as equivalent to anxiety neurosis. But it is worth remarking that Babinski’s definition – despite the assertion by Mott that it commanded widespread acceptance – was rejected in France during extensive discussion in 1908 by Raymond, Dejerine, Janet, Claude, Pitres, Crocq and
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many others (Guillain, 1959). Some of the grounds for rejection included the fact that many hysterical attacks did not depend upon previous suggestion and also that emotion, contrary to Babinski’s concept, played a very important role in the genesis of these phenomena. Hurst, Myers, Yealland and others all agreed, however, that suggestion was an important factor both in the onset and in the cure of wartime hysteria. As was mentioned above, it had been noted quite quickly that the notion of shell-shock was rapidly contagious (Myers, 1940) and that it readily affected many men once the first case appeared and was known to them. Another term which was ‘respectable’ for longer than shellshock was ‘disorderly action of the heart’ (DAH) or ‘soldier’s heart’. These were popular diagnoses. Abrahams (1917) caustically characterised the excessive enthusiasm of many witnesses who were either greatly in favour of this diagnosis or denied its existence entirely. Mott and the other writers all tended to agree in regarding those cases of shock which recovered quickly as belonging to two classes: hysteria and neurasthenia. Lewis (1918) was never really happy with the diagnosis of neurosis. In his study The Soldier’s Heart and the Effort Syndrome he argued that the term ‘effort syndrome’ applied to physiological sensations (breathlessness, palpitation, precordial pain, etc.), the abnormality lying in the circumstances in which they arose. These circumstances were, for example, poor physical or mental endowment, the effects of exposure, hard work, unrecognised infection, and so forth. Graded physical exercises were recommended as an important part of treatment. It was left to Hurst (1940) to observe that “soldier’s heart is often nothing more than a manifestation of anxiety neurosis”. This alternative diagnosis, based on cardiac symptoms, is a story in itself, told among others by Gallavardin (1917), Jarcho (1966), Skerritt (1983), Wooley (1986, 1987, 1988), and Wooley & Boudoulas (1988). No one seems to have noticed that Da Costa’s first case of “irritable heart” (Da Costa, 1871) had an aphonia for ten months. Today, Wooley (1988) indicates that despite the associations of DAH or neurocirculatory asthenia with anxiety, it also has a relationship with mitral-valve prolapse and mitral regurgitation.
Treatment It became evident that treatment included both prevention and suggestion. The War Office report (pp. 43, 132, 158) gave great
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attention to questions of morale and its management in order to inhibit shell-shock. Babinski & Froment (1918), although they gave credence to the notion of structural damage from shellshock, also laid greater emphasis on the notion of suggestion, just as did Hurst (1920). Yealland (1918) was one of the most vigorous exponents of the role of suggestion in causing battle hysteria and removing it. He regarded hysterical symptoms as being produced by suggestion and thought that they should, therefore, be removable in the same way. In his early article with Adrian (Adrian & Yealland, 1917) he reported on patients treated at Queen Square at the National Hospital for the Paralysed and the Epileptic, as it was then. As a result many more patients came his way. His subsequent book describes in detail over 40 patients, nearly all soldiers, representing only a small proportion of the numbers treated. Their symptoms included mutism, aphonia, stammering, deafness, blindness, blepharospasm, foot drop, wrist drop, monoplegia, paraplegia, hemiplegia, tremors and fits. They were all treated with personal persuasion, in which he showed much resourcefulness, varying his approach according to the individual; at times ‘faradic electrical stimulation’ was employed extremely vigorously. Yealland makes no secret of the fact that he was curing resistant cases with whom others had failed, although hypnosis, psychoanalysis and faradic stimulation had been attempted for these patients elsewhere. Yealland’s work led to the conclusion that the doctor had to treat the patient with faradism himself and not delegate treatment to an auxiliary. An example may illustrate how a determined and resourceful doctor could secure an impressive remission of symptoms, albeit in a fashion which would today cause concern at the propriety of the measures employed. The treatment of case A2, a private who was mute for nine months, is described by Yealland (1918) as follows: “He was taken to the dark room and a faradic battery employed, the pad electrode being as usual over the lumbar spine and a key electrode attached. Then I said to him ‘I shall apply shocks to your neck over the larynx which is the seat of the trouble. When you feel the shock you will have an uncontrollable desire to explode a sound, but I want you to suppress it. Remember do not utter a sound; suppress it ... I fear that you will shout out but I warn you not to ...’. Immediately the current was applied to his neck he shouted out. This, of course, was what I expected from him. I said to him ‘shout again’ and he did so without the aid of faradism. Then he began to half-laugh and
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half-cry, recognising his voice had returned, and he attempted to take my hand and made an effort to kiss it, but I instantly refused, knowing that any sympathetic measure of this kind would prolong the period of re-education. Instead I said to him ‘there is no time now for you to yield to your emotions; you must be practical and put forth every effort to speak’. I then told him to repeat the alphabet while I quickly and abruptly faradised the neck during the time he was exploding each sound. In five minutes he talked quite normally. In a very pleased but less demonstrative manner he expressed his thanks.”
Yealland’s techniques appear to have been very successful. This was not just because of the invariable threat from roller electrodes, wire brush electrodes and so forth and their quite frequent painful use. He set out to establish a dominant role with his patients and did not give up. And despite the rough treatment he often supplied he never seems to have been contemptuous towards them on their recovery. Invariably he would say ‘your condition is curable’ and thus indicate that he regarded it as an illness. He left the patient in no doubt that he intended to provide the cure. Many of the same skills were employed by Hurst, although as a rule perhaps not so drastically. One viewpoint, however, which no one seems to have discarded completely was that true ‘shellshock’ could occur if there was actual cerebral concussion, as in civil life with loss of consciousness. Stupor, headache, amnesia, irritability and exhaustion could follow with quick recovery. Spinal concussion with or without a penetrating wound was also held to occur. Symptoms were long lasting and they tended to be a hysterical sequel to the physical organic ones, such as a hysterical paraplegia following an organic hemiplegia. Hurst’s main conclusions were very well summarised as follows (Hurst, 1940): “In the first two years of the war cases of this kind were given the unfortunate name of ‘shell-shock’ in the belief that they were organic in origin and the result of actual concussion caused by the explosion of powerful shells. Consequently no attempt was made to cure them by psychotherapy, and treatment by rest and sympathy helped to perpetuate the symptoms. This was all the more likely to occur owing to the use of the word ‘shell-shock’, which gave the patient the idea that he was suffering from some new and terrible disease. When at last the true nature of the condition was recognised, it was found that psychotherapy not only resulted in the immediate disappearance of the symptoms, when they were treated in the special advanced hospitals opened for the purpose by the British and French and later by the
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From the military viewpoint, these lessons were well learnt and by 1917 the United States Forces in Europe were operating neurological hospitals which returned about 60% of their patients to duty within 14 days. Most of these were suffering from neurosis (Baker, 1975). As in Britain, this did not completely coincide with jettisoning the notion of shell-shock as an organic condition. Mills (1919) wrote of it, “the designation has meaning ... in many cases it would appear that purely psychic influences have played the major role, but in others physical injuries have not been lacking”. The impact of all this military experience on subsequent views on hysteria was substantial. The first conclusions that were drawn, which continued to be accepted, were that hysterical symptoms are psychological in origin and serve a purpose: and that in literally scores of thousands – perhaps hundreds of thousands of cases – it was unnecessary to consider a sexual aetiology for the purpose of successful management of patients. Indeed, to have done so would probably have been a hindrance in many cases.
Effects on psychiatry One of the effects of the wartime experience was to emphasise the distinction between the psychiatrist and the neurologist in the treatment of so-called nervous disorders. Myers (1940) reports a direct personal clash between himself and Turner in this respect, but setting aside such a ‘turf war’ it became clear that psychological methods of management were of considerable importance and direct use. They were best practised by individuals
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with some inclination and training, who were identified as ‘psychologists’, albeit medically qualified. This was an extension of the skills in psychotherapy which had been practised by some, but perhaps a minority of psychiatrists. Those associated with the care of the insane had been much less concerned with this than others who, before the war, were involved in the study of emotional change in response to suggestion and hypnosis. It may well be the case that the maturation of psychiatry occurred in the course of World War I; it then became a specialty with potential for the community. Rees (1945), who recalled the period well, stated that the provision for exservicemen “led to the establishment of clinics for civilians” (p. 29) but did not give any decisive evidence. Stone (1985) also suggested that the clinics of the Ministry of Pensions led to the development of reforms and innovations in psychiatry in Britain after World War I; those psychiatrists who qualified just before World War II, or practised during it, shared the impression. Dr Myre Sim commented (personal communication) that prominent figures like T. A. Ross, D. K. Henderson, and Millais Culpin all received an impetus to work outside the psychiatric hospitals from their own wartime experience. Nevertheless, the influence of the war upon ideas about psychiatry, which Stone observes, was weak in respect of the creation of services. There is little evidence of new provision for civilians before the Mental Treatment Act 1930. The late Sir Charles Symonds told me that he had had great difficulty in finding psychiatric help for patients in London before World War II. This was so much the case that he would occasionally select patients from his hospital practice and arrange to treat them himself, as well as he could, at his consulting rooms. He gave them psychotherapy several times a week, in accordance with Freudian recommendations, and made no charge for this treatment. He gave this up because he was disappointed with the results, and felt that he was not succeeding with this technique as he should have done. However, some psychiatric provision was available in teaching hospitals in London in the early 20th century. In 1918, Bernard Hart functioned as the first physician for mental diseases to the Outpatient Department at University College Hospital. Hart had pointed out to the hospital authorities the year before that departments for mental diseases already existed at St Thomas’, Guy’s, Charing Cross, and St Mary’s Hospitals. In 1918, Hart wrote to the Dean of University College Hospital Medical School to draw attention to the inadequate arrangements for treating functional nervous diseases. There was only one
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private hospital, in Brighton, which could do this, but because of the problems of functional nervous disorders in the British army, special hospitals had been set up and medical officers were being carefully trained, for example at Maghull Military Hospital near Liverpool (Merrington, 1976, p. 227). Since the Ministry of Pensions was forced to set up over 100 treatment centres in an effort to cope with the flood of ‘neurasthenic’ ex-servicemen, Stone (1985) argued that it was the war and the consequent mass epidemic of mental disorders which set the mechanism of psychiatric change in motion. He claimed that the major innovations between the two wars, “Psychotherapy, and the 1930 Mental Treatment Act”, which promoted out-patient clinics and ‘voluntary’ treatment, were mainly the result of these pressures. The evidence for his contentions is still rather limited. Mayou (1989) described the history of general hospital psychiatry in Britain and showed that widespread, but very patchy, efforts at such treatment were known from the 18th century. He remarked on the interest of some other physicians in treating their patients’ minds as well as their bodies, but showed that out-patient clinics and general-hospital provisions were very limited between the wars. Approaches to psychological management and to psychotherapy were also known before World War I, even though their bias was towards hypnosis and suggestion (e.g. Tuckey, 1891). In particular, Myers argued that in the 25 years leading up to 1916, and following the work of Janet, Prince, Freud, Adler, Hart, Rows, Jones, and many others, psychotherapy was by then an established skill. As discussed below, the experience of the war probably did contribute to the spread of knowledge about psychological techniques but caused little institutional change, although it is plausible to suppose also that another ten years from 1913 might in any case have seen some spread of Freudian ideas and psychotherapeutic skill. The idea that symptoms could be motivated also often worked against patients and psychiatry to belittle both the sick and the therapist who accepted them. Morton & Wright (1987, p. 75), examining the pensions of Canadian veterans, described attitudes which are equally representative of those found in Britain (and were usually drawn from European experience): “Worst off were the ‘functional’ or ‘shell-shock’ cases. Whether doctors took them seriously or dismissed them as cowardly malingerers the consequences were virtually identical. Such men had subconsciously willed themselves into a primitive state [explained a neurologist, and army specialist on neurasthenia]. To give them pensions only encouraged them: ‘You have thrown away the four aces’.”
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It seems likely, nevertheless, that the war did make a difference in demonstrating the usefulness of the psychotherapeutic skills which were most developed by psychiatrists. Smith & Pear (1917) campaigned vigorously for the provision of services outside the asylums. They concluded (p. 132) that: “Excuses for inertia brought forward before August 1914 can be accepted no longer. The thousands of cases of shell shock ... have proved beyond any possibility of doubt, that the early treatment of mental disorder is successful from the humanitarian, medical and financial standpoints.”
Pensions were indeed a matter for concern. Macpherson et al (1923, p. 56) provide figures from the Ministry of Pensions which suggest that in February 1921, 65 000 men were drawing pensions for neurasthenia and allied conditions, and that by January 1922 this number had fallen to 50 000. However, in February 1921, 14 771 men were attending either boards for assessment or clinics for treatment. The number of people in these categories increased to 16 393 by November 1921, including some who had not previously been ill. If anything, the numbers of men receiving pensions seemed to increase after 20 years, in spite of the downward trend of the initial figures quoted above, and in contradiction to the ordinary expectation that the numbers would decline by attrition caused by death and, occasionally, recovery, without being replenished. Ahrenfeldt (1958, p. 10) summarised the situation with regard to pensions in Britain, some 20 years after the end of the war, as follows: “In March, 1939 there were about 120,000 pensioners who were still in receipt of pensions or had received final awards for primary psychiatric disability (including ‘neurasthenia’, ‘shellshock’, effort syndrome, epilepsy and insanity). ‘Neurasthenia’ itself accounted for some 100,000 men, costing 10 million pounds a year, and representing about 2% of total serving troops. These 120,000 cases represented about 15% of all pensioned disabilities.”
I have discussed this topic at length, partly because of the wealth of material which demonstrated the production of hysterical symptoms, and also partly because it has so many implications for future attitudes to hysterical symptoms and their explanations. This will appear in Chapter 7 and in discussions of compensation and the diagnosis of hysteria. Meanwhile, in connection with World War I, it is also important to review next the original and fundamental contribution of Kretschmer.
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6
Ernst Kretschmer
As has been indicated the experiences of World War I with regard to hysteria had a similar effect upon medical opinion on either side of the firing line. Ernst Kretschmer, who is well known for his description of the relation of constitution to mental illness, was one of the numerous German doctors who acquired ample knowledge of combat hysteria. His experiences led him to put forward a theory of hysteria which offered a fresh way of looking at the topic, without rejecting existing views. His work on hysteria was badly translated, is not well known in the English-speaking world and deserves to be better appreciated. Kretschmer recognised the current opinion, observing, “the notion that hysteria is a psychogenic pattern of reaction has won universal acceptance”. He noted that the line of demarcation from other psychogenic reactions was vague. However, ‘hysteria’ subsumed a nucleus of syndromes ranging from spasmodic seizures through paralyses, anaesthesias and hyperaesthesias to certain manifestations of the reflexes and the autonomic system, and he accepted that sexual immaturity and problems of sexual adjustment were common causes of hysterical manifestations in ordinary life (Kretschmer, 1948, pp. 29, 33). At the same time he looked at hysteria in a biological fashion, saying in his introduction: “The clinical designation ‘hysteria’ subsumes a certain nucleus of syndromes – spasmodic seizures, catatonic stupors, tremors and convulsive tics, paralysis and muscular contractions, anaesthesias and hyperaesthesias and certain manifestations of the reflexes and of the autonomic system, all in so far as they are of psychic origin.”
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He regarded these forms of behaviour as “ontogenetically determined patterns of reaction”, and he then went on to argue that they represented primitive forms of reaction with a survival value. Interestingly, Freud (1926) also perceived anxiety as being determined at birth, albeit by the universal birth trauma. Kretschmer pointed out that Mörchen, in discussing combat hysteria, had made the same sort of point as himself. Thus Mörchen is quoted as distinguishing between: (a) actions related to defence mechanisms and the like (b) the instinctive use of primitive means of self-preservation through automatic release of motor, sensory and autohypnoid mechanisms (c) systematic use of primitive means of self-preservation culminating in simulation. These distinctions were partly in the tradition of Freud and of Kraepelin. An alternative but overlapping viewpoint, expressed by Bonhoeffer, held that hysteria represented “a deliberately induced or self-imposed sickness, or a weakness or constitutional defect”. In Kretschmer’s opinion either definition would fit the majority of clinical pictures of hysteria; thus he came to the conclusion that “hysterical means psychogenic patterns of reaction in which a tendency to dissimulate finds expression through an instinctive, reflexive or other built-in survival mechanism”. Interestingly enough, he did not think that typology could contribute much to an understanding of these patterns. “Not characterology but the effects of an experience and external conditions are most important for many hysterical reactions.” Conditions which were to be related to hysteria included disability neurosis and fear neurosis. Disability neurosis was seen as a condition based upon an existing or previous illness, in which simulation was present, but reflex or instinctive mechanisms were absent. Fear neurosis was a condition in which anxiety and panic predominated, resulting in forms of stupor, convulsions and hypnoid states, as well as in a general affective disturbance. These neuroses were held to border on hysteria, since it was often difficult to make a sharp distinction. The essence of Kretschmer’s view is that primitive patterns of behaviour exist which show poor organisation but have survival value, and that these are the basic stratum in the structure of a hysterical condition. Two primitive patterns which human behaviour may resemble are the ‘instinctive flurry’ and the ‘death feint’. He illustrates ‘instinctive flurry’ as follows.
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When a young lady is faced with the problem of an undesirable marriage, she has two choices. She may proceed calmly and deliberately to take advantage of her adversary’s weaknesses, now resisting him energetically and now cleverly eluding him – with the result that by selecting words and actions appropriate to every new development, she finally reaches her goal. Or she may suddenly break down, tremble and quiver convulsively, roll and toss and work herself up into a frenzied state; she will behave in this way until she frees herself from the unwanted suitor. Two men cannot adjust themselves to the horrors of war. The first takes advantage of his superior penmanship, technical ability, and political connections; after weighing all the pros and cons, he manages by deft manoeuvring finally to sit behind a comfortable desk. The second is found wandering aimlessly through the trenches one morning following a heavy bombardment; taken away, he succumbs to violent trembling; he is placed in a psychiatric ward and subsequently in an office where he sees his more talented comrade already at work behind a desk. These are two possible courses of action. The first is for the most part peculiar to man. The second is a characteristic biological reaction common to all members of the animal kingdom, from one-celled creatures to human beings. When a swimming infusorian approaches a zone of hot water, it reacts by producing a flurry of rapid movements; this flurry persists until one movement carries the infusorian away from the zone of danger, whereupon it again swims calmly on. When a bee or a bird is imprisoned in a room, the creature does not retreat to a corner and try to determine how it can escape through an opening in the windows or door. Instead, instinctively drawn toward the light, it unleashes a flurry of movements; frantically and blindly it moves back and forth until at last one movement accidentally carries it through a crack in a window. Having won its freedom, it immediately resumes its placid flight. The ‘instinctive flurry’ (Bewegungssturm) is a typical reaction of animals to situations that threaten or interfere with their existence. It is a built-in mechanism with a biological function. The whole array of movements at the disposal of an organism is called into action, one after another they are resorted to and repeated over an ever-widening area. One of these countless blind movements accidentally removes the creature from the danger zone; then it speeds serenely on its way. Thus the instinctive flurry, viewed in the most favourable light, makes it possible for the organism quickly to choose or select from all possible movements the one appropriate to a given situation, and the choice requires, not
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deliberation at a high level, but a set of movements which are almost wholly mechanical or which are at most activated by a dull, undifferentiated affection. Viewed as an inflexible pattern of instinctive behaviour and one that fails to adapt to special situations, however, it is senseless or manifestly injurious. During the course of evolution the instinctive flurry was pushed further into the background. Over the older type of biological defence reaction were superimposed more recent and, for the most part, more useful structures. In dogs and even more distinctly in apes we find the rudiments of methodical searching and calm deliberation. When a mature person is faced with new situations, deliberation is the dominant pattern of behaviour; only under certain circumstances are instinctive flurries produced (Kretschmer, 1948, pp. 3–5). Another circumstance which provokes a useful instinctive flurry is the earthquake, which leads people to rush out of their homes. Childish overactive behaviour – pushing, jerking, screaming and thrashing about as a reaction to unpleasant stimuli – is held to have similar characteristics. The ‘hysterical hyperkinesias’ stand midway between panic and childish behaviour. Strong emotional crises, fugues, hysterical outbursts, trembling and convulsive paroxysms are held to be related forms of behaviour. The flurry then is seen as an ‘instinctive defence reaction to frustrating stimuli’, and consists of an “overproduction of aimless movements”. It is generated by “a diffusely intensified affective condition” (in other words, strong anxiety) and it meets with success when it results in an escape from the zone of danger and disturbance. A higher biological pathway is, of course, one of deliberate, selective behaviour. The alternative primitive mechanism, of the ‘death feint’ or immobilisation reflex, is illustrated by fishes which change to a camouflage colour and lie still in the presence of a predator; and by insects, crabs, snakes, hens and horses, among others, which in certain circumstances will all develop conditions of immobility and unresponsiveness even to strong external stimuli in particularly frightening circumstances. Kretschmer identifies this response with human hypnosis and stupors, but there is reason to think that hypnosis in man does not correspond to it (cf. Chapter 19). Kretschmer found a further form of hysterical primitive response in man, the ‘Ainu phenomenon’, which he describes, quoting Uchimura, as follows: “Under the stimulus of fear, a ‘ripe’ Ainu woman will regress automatically to a state of agitation. If the stimulus is a certain
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When I saw for the first time the ever recurring, monotonous appearance of Ainu I remembered at once the primitive defense reaction of lower or underdeveloped organisms. As noted earlier, the defense reaction is characteristic of the symptom picture of hysteria. According to Kretschmer the instinctive flurry and immobilization reflex are the most important defense reactions of lower organisms that are disturbed by external stimuli; it would, therefore, seem logical to compare the acute Ainu state with the instinctive flurry. The counterpart of the death feint is seen in acute catalepsy, which occurs sooner or later in all Ainu women though it tends generally to escape observation on account of other more striking symptoms. In any case it is certain that the symptom picture in general lies in the frame of Kretschmer’s so- called ‘hypobulic mechanisms’. Furthermore, I find in Ainu an indication of a primitive built-in defense reaction. This would explain why widely dispersed peoples evidence the same symptoms.” (pp. 15–18)
Hypobulic mechanisms are conditions in which the will or volition of the individual is impaired. It will be seen that a unifying notion is thus provided for a wide range of phenomena which are often called hysterical. Battle hysteria and culturally sanctioned outbursts alike can be viewed as primitive responses with a biological purpose. These primitive responses can be related to the more sophisticated phenomena of emotional conflict and repression, which are equally manifest in the traditional patterns of hysteria seen under less exciting medical conditions. Kretschmer further recognised two main subdivisions of hysteria, which he called ‘social’ and ‘endogenous’. The ‘social’ forms were those due to disability, war, and accident neurosis. The ‘endogenous’ resulted “mainly from the reactions of women and young people to certain erotic and family situations and from strong inclinations towards hysterical behaviour under certain psychopathic conditions, as in the pathological swindler.” (p. 50)
While these hysterics were not readily distinguishable from the social hysterics, they evidenced a stronger predisposition. He was careful to say that they did not correspond particularly to any of his three main constitutional types (pyknic, muscular, asthenic) but they did tend to have autonomic disturbances (“severe stigmatization in the vegetative system”) and “pronounced disturbances in the sexual constitution, especially sexual and general
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infantilism”. Statistical gynaecological evidence is cited in support. He also regarded a partial emotional retardation or failure of maturation as an important aspect of hysteria, especially the ‘endogenous’ form. Clearly, while accepting many standard and well established views on the nature of hysteria, Kretschmer developed certain ideas which help to complete the full appreciation of hysterical phenomena. His ideas can be used further to help sort out a common clinical problem. In the conditions of hysteria described in wartime and also in a number of civilian cases, two kinds may be observed. One is for patients to show the characteristic paralysis in accordance with, and accompanied by, the well recognised – although not invariable – belle indifference. These patients typically show the phenomenon which is often held to be most characteristic of hysteria (Yealland, 1918) in which, when movement is attempted in a paralysed limb, both agonists and antagonists contract. On the other hand, there are patients who show, for instance, an inability to walk which is accompanied by overt anxiety; they may believe they can move their legs but they tremble and resist doing so from fear of falling. The panic elements predominate and the disability (a partial immobilisation phenomenon?) is one of conscious fear of movement. The conflict may be only partly repressed; fear is experienced and the failure to move is openly protective, rather than unconsciously imposed. Both of these types are explicable in terms of Kretschmer’s biological explanation, although for the former, more commonly noticed pattern, a dynamic type of explanation based on the notion of unconscious conflict will be necessary in addition.
The predisposition to hysteria Turning aside a little from this main theme, it is now worth considering two other aspects of hysteria on which Kretschmer commented. His typology has already been mentioned and it was natural that he should consider whether there was a hysterical type. He commented as follows: “One may well ask whether certain types are inclined toward hysterical reactions but not whether people with hysterical reactions fit a definite type. In the second sense, there is no such thing as a hysterical type. A pre-disposition towards hysterical reactions is widespread and, in the last analysis, deeply rooted in the instinctive
Ernst Kretschmer mechanism common to all men; the triggering of these reactions depends as much on external stimuli and living conditions as on the structure of the individual. Therefore, if we take as one large statistical corpus, all those who manifest hysterical reactions and try to abstract from this corpus a hysterical type, we can never establish one that is distinct and uniform. To be sure, there are very general characteristics that have been positively identified, such as heightened lability, intensified and accelerated commutation involving the psychophysical apparatus (Kraepelin; Bleuler). For the most part, however, the expression ‘hysterical type’ is used to designate much more; it is used to designate a plastic, detailed personality portrait, and such a portrait can never be statistically realised. We glimpsed ... the heterogeneous groups that often manifest many hysterical reactions: on the one extreme a host of undifferentiated deviants – including the feeble-minded, prostitutes, and criminals – and on the other the holy men given over to religious mysticism. Or take the cosmopolitan esthetes, dandies, and poseurs – the ‘professionals’ in the world of hysteria – who manifest an exaggerated refinement in their tastes or in their attire; they are matched by Kraepelin’s hardy farm girls. In one group we find the colourless, morose indifference of the stunted ‘old maid’; in another the resilient vitality and sulking charm of the ‘flapper’ or the cold eyes of the hysterical ‘canaille’. No psychological artifice could possibly bind diverse groups into a single, unified hysterical type. But in a modified statistical sense we can rightly designate the pathological swindler as a hysterical type. Not for the reason that within the sum total of the hysterical patterns of reaction the pathological swindler resorts most frequently to one type (any particular pattern is but a small part of the general pattern), but for the opposite reason that the pathological swindler frequently does incline toward hysterical reactions. In our discussion of hysterical types, we are therefore, justified in calling attention to the pregnant group, marked by elegant flexibility, engaging patterns of behaviour, theatrical lability, a peculiar blending of refinement and infantilism and narcissism. The same holds true for the feminine type characterised by early puberty – the ‘flappers’ ... and others obviously predisposed to hysterical reactions. Among these hysterical types in the strict sense, we find to a striking degree the most important characteristics of the hysterical patterns of reaction: on the one hand lability of the psychophysical apparatus and on the other blocks in the development of the sexual constitution. And these hysterical types are especially good examples of secondary features or signs of overcompensation in Adler’s sense. They are lifelong attempts, with the help of the labile commutation apparatus, in a limited sense to conceal the defects of the sexual constitution and in a broader sense to gloss over shortcomings in love and social relations. As a secondary development they spring with a certain consistency from the interactions of both basic
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History and concepts constitutional components. And these attempts bring the theatrical, spuriously iridescent behaviour into the total picture of the hysterical personality.”
Current work on the hysterical personality, which is considered in Chapter 22, is very much in accordance with these views, as is clinical experience. A wide range of groups share a loose assortment of traits. The common features occur more often than by random variation, but there is no unique pattern characteristic of all cases.
Automatic responses The remaining topic on which Kretschmer seems especially worth quoting is the way in which hysterical symptoms can become ‘automatic’. Here he deals with a normal mechanism which probably plays an important part in many patients and which is not often discussed. There seems little point in paraphrasing his remarks and a direct quotation again follows: “During a wet spell a man develops in his right knee rheumatic pains accompanied by swelling and fever. He painfully and carefully holds his leg motionless in a half-flexed position. He can bend and stretch his leg at will; he feels some pain but not much. When he gets up after a few weeks, he still favours his right foot; yet the joint functions perfectly and the rheumatic symptoms have disappeared. Only under continued coercion does he straighten out his knee, and as he does so even then, he is visibly under great strain; even after he straightens out his knee and walks correctly for a while, he suddenly and automatically falls back into the old pattern. If he is permitted to continue in the old way, after another month any attempt to stretch his leg meets with resistance; again his knee elastically assumes the flexed position, without effort on his part; this flexion is independent of his conscious will. Even at night when he is asleep, his knee retains its flexed position. The man is unable, even by exerting all his strength, to stretch his leg. A few months later a rigid contracture of the flexors makes it impossible for anyone to straighten out his knee. As a rule, we are not fully aware of the small role actually played in our daily life and activities by the conscious will. Consciousness serves for the most part merely to give the starting signal; thereafter the whole complicated process continues without recourse to the will in the performance of the customary individual steps, whether through phylogenetically established patterns not
Ernst Kretschmer previously learned – various attitudes, gestures, and expressions of affect, for example – or through secondary automatisms learned at an earlier time – such as standing, walking, sitting, and participating in different recreational and professional activities. These secondary automatisms, long since relegated to the status of set formulas, are reorganised as new patterns based on automatic controls relating to tone and equilibrium, and on such reflexes as gripping and sucking.”
Kretschmer quotes Bleuler with approval speaking of: “a certain psychic causal apparatus [Gelegenheitsapparat] fashioned expressly to prevent the conscious will from having to be attentive even at the outset to every detail in certain mental performances. His formulation is doubtless correct. We quote from his own description: I write a letter and put it in my pocket with the intention of dropping it into the next letterbox. I need no longer think about it. The first letter-box that comes into view causes me to dispose of the letter. Or I am engaged in an activity that I cannot or will not interrupt. Somehow the notion enters my mind that I ought to bring a book from another room, this idea stays in my mind for perhaps only a fraction of a second and is then pushed out of my consciousness. But when the moment comes for me to get the book, I go to the bookshelf and take the book. This happens a thousand times, and so obviously that I am generally unaware of it. The whole mechanism is brought to my attention only when something fails to fall into place. Since I am predominantly a motor type, dislocation serves as the best illustration. Not infrequently I find myself at the place where the book is, near the person to whom I have something to say, but must first try to recall what I want, why I have come there. Or I subsequently realise that I do not need the book, yet go for it at the critical moment. When we make a decisive choice, we fashion an apparatus in our brain; this apparatus is set to react later – for example, a movement of the right hand on a green signal and of the left on a red one. With the specific reaction the conscious ego has little or often nothing more to do; the reaction occurs automatically. If it is somewhat difficult, then the objective results are often not in accord with the subjective controls of the conscious ego. At the moment of the assigned reaction the ego may be involved in something else, yet the apparatus may still react properly and promptly; against this, the ego may, by becoming involved, interfere with the reaction. In these cases we have constructed through one specific decision a cerebral apparatus for a definite occasion; this apparatus executes the decision in the same way that habit creates automatic apparatuses or that phylogenetic forces
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History and concepts construct in our central nervous system apparatuses for reflexes and instincts. Such an apparatus is created by each decision, each undertaking, from the simplest automatic course of action resembling a reflexive response to a definite stimulus (a simple psychological response) to a whole pattern of existence whose cessation is brought about only by death and whose execution is interrupted a thousand times by compelling activities that claim all our strength. We prepare ourselves to awaken or not to awaken when the alarm rings, to find a certain plant, to see misprints, etc.”
This sort of automatic establishment of behaviour patterns also occurs with skills, and was much discussed earlier by William James (1890) and by others like him who were interested in ‘subconscious’ as distinct from ‘unconscious’ processes. The way in which it can be employed for the development of hysterical patterns of disuse is clearly described in Kretschmer’s quotation from Uchimura and needs no extra illustration. But it is probably worth pointing out that there are times when an explanation of this sort may be conveniently employed to train a patient away from an established symptom for which the original motivation has become less strong. As for Kretschmer’s views on instinctive behaviour, I think that these might need some modification in the light of advances in ethology, but the fundamental notion appears sound. To my knowledge Yap (1952) and Ludwig (1972) are the only authors writing in English who have taken due note of Kretschmer’s views. Ludwig accepts the basic considerations outlined above and also argues that a number of regressive phenomena such as urinary incontinence, babbling, rocking, head-bobbing, crying, vivid fantasy construction, and the like, all bear some resemblance to the violent motor reaction of sham death, and contribute to the posture of helplessness and defencelessness which, like the sham-death reflex, wards off attack, especially from members of the same species. He holds that hysterical psychoses, ageregression phenomena, puerilism and the Ganser syndrome of pseudo-dementia represent comparable primitive behaviours which may occur as a result of the dissolution of higher function. A parallel is thus drawn with the concepts of Hughlings Jackson (1884) and provides a biological basis for the behaviour listed. As Kretschmer saw, the success of such behaviour may serve to promote its recurrence. Ludwig conceives that such events are due to operant conditioning, and observes:
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“ the systematic rewarding of planned or ‘accidental’ behaviour will result in the increased frequency and, finally, establishment of those behaviours. It also provides an alternative way of accounting for the ‘secondary neurotic gain’ ... [which] may be translated as the continued reinforcement of the symptomatic behaviour.” I think that these views of conditioning are reasonable and justified but not necessarily an advance on the dynamic formulation, perhaps because to a considerable extent, if not entirely, they are saying the same thing in another set of terms. Kretschmer’s contribution merits considerable respect and it is probably the best revision of the theory of hysteria to have resulted from the experiences of large-scale war. It contrasts less with the views of Freud than might appear superficially. Although they took different routes and arrived at certain different conclusions, their basic approaches were similar. Both looked at a range of phenomena, from primitive instincts or feelings to sophisticated motives and their expression. Both emphasised, ultimately, the biological basis of the conditions with which they were dealing and both recognised the importance of motive in regard to hysterical symptoms. In due course we will need to discuss some of the types of motive which may be important and those conditions where the motive for possible hysterical symptoms seems nearest to consciousness.
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7
History and concepts
Post-traumatic stress disorder
The decay of the concept of shell-shock was not enough to cure the men who had suffered stress syndromes under that guise. As indicated in Chapter 5, many pensioners remained after World War I. When World War II began, the lessons of World War I, which to some extent had been put aside, were recognised and quickly applied. The removal of affected individuals from the firing line and the quick treatment of psychiatric casualties reduced the impact of stress (Grinker & Spiegel, 1945; Sargant & Shorvon, 1945). Many others besides wrote of the effectiveness of appropriate treatment of psychiatric casualties in World War II. The treatments were primarily rest, sedation, encouragement and abreaction. Torrie (1944) reported 1000 cases of anxiety and hysteria from North Africa, including 86 with fugues and 77 with paralysis or loss of function. Of these 899 returned to duty; 586 went back to full duty and only 54 were invalided. The United States adopted similar approaches. Some have held that the selection processes reduced the impact in terms of numbers of soldiers affected because the most vulnerable were kept out of the firing line, but Chalke (1954) has expressed doubts about the success of the efforts to select suitable soldiers. In any case, psychiatric illnesses were again produced by stress in World War II, and it was widely understood that the extent of exposure to danger carried a risk of anxiety and other symptoms almost pari passu. During World War II an additional theory also began to emerge from observations of men’s reactions to stress. Sargant & Shorvon (1945), in fact developed ideas based on Pavlovian concepts. They describe some of their observations as follows: “Among the patients who came direct to us from the Normandy battlefields, there were, aside from those who showed the usual
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anxious and depressive symptoms, men with states of simple but profound exhaustion; others with gross, incoordinated, irregular jerking and writhing movements of the limbs and trunk, often accompanied with aphonia or stammer or explosive speech, and yet others in various states of stupor. It was in these patients with hysterical reactions that parallels to Pavlov’s experimental observations could most frequently be seen, not only during their period of observation in the hospital but in their behaviour of the past as preserved in the field records.”
Some patients were found who had broken down into intense excitatory states. One man banged his head repeatedly against a tree, rushed around wildly calling for an ambulance and then had to be strapped down when it came. Others passed into stupor or amnesias or were “literally paralysed by fear”. These events are explained as states of either excitation or inhibition caused by excessive stimulation. These sudden states of total inhibition or collapse were thought to be possible examples of Pavlov’s ultraparadoxical phase, in which widespread inhibition is held to abolish normal conditioned reflexes. Treatment was usually by sedation or abreaction, the latter being much assisted by narcoanalysis or the administration of ether. Results were held to be good if treatment was provided promptly. Grinker & Spiegel (1943) had reached similar conclusions in regard to the clinical phenomena encountered and their treatment. Sargant & Shorvon also noted an analogy between these states of excitation or inhibition and the response of sudden converts to the preaching of evangelists in the style of early preachers like John Wesley. Sargant (1957) later linked many types of revivalist and socially induced trance to the same phenomena. In his view, excessive stimulation or arousal leads to Pavlov’s ‘ultra-boundary’ inhibition, a rupture of higher nervous activity and the extinction of recently acquired conditioned reflexes. There is then a greatly heightened readiness to accept new orientations. Religious conversion and brainwashing may thus operate similarly at least to some extent, although the former lacks the cruelty and imposed constraints of the latter. Sargant’s views present a tenable hypothesis for this group of phenomena and include reference after Pavlov to the relevance of individual differences, with ‘strong’ or ‘excitatory’ dogs and men being more resistant to breakdown than ‘weak’ or ‘inhibitory’ types. The theory lacks a basis for determining when excitation will result and when inhibition. In addition, the theory has not been extended, with evidence, to the wide diversity of hysterical phenomena which are open to consideration, and the methods of
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treatment have very limited success outside acute stress situations and, possibly, the attempted reversal of brainwashing. However, awareness of the phenomena has substantially influenced disaster planning.
The spreading awareness of stress disorders The two world wars were not, of course, the only occasions that gave rise to stress for soldiers or civilians. The Vietnam War (1964–73) probably contributed most to changing the emphasis from dissociation to anxiety. We expect anxiety to burgeon in the face of danger. The challenge is to control or subdue it. The prominent nature of conversion and dissociative symptoms, when present, means that they are promptly acknowledged. Initially, anxiety under stress is a matter of course, but may be masked by dissociative responses. Likewise depression, which is liable to follow the anxiety, is easily taken for granted in its turn. However, once anxiety and depression become recognised and acceptable, hysterical symptoms become less necessary. In DSM–II (American Psychiatric Association, 1968) the view was taken that overwhelming stress could cause transient situational disturbances, but that if “the symptoms persist after the stress is removed the diagnosis of another mental disorder is indicated”. Twelve years later DSM–III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) described post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in detail as an anxiety disorder. It took some while for awareness to emerge of the prolonged effects of psychological stress in American soldiers returning from Vietnam. Hostile attitudes within America to the Vietnam War made many veterans keep back their feelings and symptoms from others. Nevertheless, a common pattern of post-traumatic stress was increasingly recognised, marked by depression, an explosive aggressive reaction, sleep disturbance with nightmares, startle responses, discomfort at stimuli associated with previous lifethreatening experiences, constriction of ego interests and adaptive functions, and possible dissociative reaction, that is, ‘flashbacks’ (Figley, 1978; Haley, 1978). An enormous literature developed on such illnesses induced by catastrophic stress, including reports from many countries and campaigns as far apart as Afghanistan and Vietnam, as well as on the suffering of concentration camp survivors and prisoners of war in Japan and the USSR; the effects of torture in a wide range of countries; and the misfortunes of civilian survivors of catastrophes in Australia, Britain, the United States and elsewhere (Choy & De Bosset, 1992; Wilson & Raphael,
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1993). Most, if not all, of this literature makes principal reference to anxiety and depression and little formal mention of dissociative disorders; for example Miller et al (1989) describe effects in former United States prisoners of war in Germany and Japan in which anxiety and depression are prominent while such personality changes as were found on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory and Millon Inventory were quite varied. In response to the Vietnam veterans the United States Congress mandated a National Centre for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in 1984, which carries out a broad range of multidisciplinary activities in research, education and training, including the publication of a PTSD research quarterly. Acute disasters in civilian life commonly give rise to the same sort of initial responses as those found in soldiers, often with automatic behaviour and confusion, overt panic, anger and guilt (Edwards, 1976). Defensive reactions with hysterical dissociations are likewise recognised (Kinston & Rosser, 1974). As with former soldiers, there is a tendency for evidence of anxiety and depression to be much more prominent than hysterical symptoms, provided that the environment after the event is friendly. Gersons & Carlier (1992) provide a discussion of the evolution of this concept of PTSD, recognising how it is related more to problems of anxiety and adrenal function than necessarily to the psychodynamic resolution of emotional conflict. This must apply particularly in civilian cases (especially when compensation is not an issue) and where the danger of having to fight again or be exposed to the same hazards is no longer present. Nevertheless, civilian responses to acute disaster have shown a remarkable similarity to those in wartime. The Buffalo Creek dam collapse of 1972 produced PTSD in a significant portion of the sample, while major depression was the next most common diagnosis. Anxiety disorders were also common. The overlap with other diagnoses was quite similar to that found in a sample of Vietnam veterans, whom the same authors had studied earlier, except that the disaster sample had fewer dysthymic disorders, substance abusers and cases of antisocial personality disorder (Green et al, 1992). McFarlane & Papay (1992) also found a high rate of additional diagnoses (77%) in fire fighters who already had PTSD after exposure to a natural disaster (an extensive bush fire in southeast Australia). Again, the tendency was for depression to be the most common concurrent disorder. More prolonged exposure to stress also tends to produce syndromes which are mainly related to anxiety and depression. Bauer et al (1993) describe a series of complaints in former
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political prisoners in East Germany marked by sleep disturbance, sadness, general anxiety, irritability, exhaustion, lack of contact, headache, nightmares, nervousness, and so on. Watson (1993) describes PTSD in former Australian prisoners of the Japanese. Weisaeth & Eitinger (1993) observed such common themes as depression and anxiety after wars, disasters and traumatic events. Eitinger et al (1985) also point out that in the most severely abused persons who were subjected to the sustained trauma of Nazi concentration camps, a combination of somatic and anxiety symptoms predominates. They note that the constellation of somatic and psychiatric symptoms was so typical that it became known as the ‘concentration camp syndrome’ or ‘survivor syndrome’. The main symptoms of the concentration camp syndrome include weight loss, pathological fatigue, periodical constant diarrhoea, dizziness, headache, hot flushes, nightly sweating, sleep disturbances, reduced sexual potency, depression or moodiness, emotional lability, nightmares or other fear phenomena and reduction in memory and/or ability to concentrate (Turner & Gorst-Unsworth, 1993). The range of physical effects related by Eitinger (1964) in his classic study covers many more somatic symptoms than can be easily attributed to anxiety but also does not demonstrate a predominance of dissociative ones.
A scarcity of dissociative complaints While the above reports demonstrated the predominance of anxiety in patients with PTSD, this was in contradiction with previous expectations. Even though Kretschmer demonstrates a shift in his understanding of what was happening with his patients, the sort of material outlined in Chapters 5 and 6 is still rich in classic hysterical symptoms. However, not all reports showed the trend away from hysterical symptoms. Breslau & Davis (1992) presented some results on PTSD which might seem to be at variance with the tendency to find less evidence of dissociative symptoms. In a random sample of young adults selected from the membership of a large health maintenance organisation in the Detroit area, reported in detail by Breslau et al (1991), psychogenic amnesia was observed in one-quarter of the affected subjects. The subjects found to have chronic PTSD all related a variety of symptoms to a series of traumatic events. In the base study six factors were found to be associated with greater vulnerability to PTSD after such events: female sex, prolonged childhood separation from parents, family history of anxiety, family history of antisocial
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behaviour, pre-existing anxiety or depression, and neuroticism. The events included violence such as sudden injury or accident, physical assault and rape (the latter causing an exceptionally high rate of PTSD). Vicarious experiences such as seeing someone seriously hurt or killed or receiving news of a violent death or of injury to a close relative or friend were apparently as traumatic as direct injury, except for rape. In association with these findings Breslau & Davis note the usual PTSD symptoms of recurrent recollections and dreams in a very high percentage of their subjects and flashbacks in 49–50%. There was avoidance of thoughts or activities connected with the traumatic events in over 80% of cases, psychological reactivity, particularly to symbolic stimuli, diminished interest, sleep problems, irritability, difficulties in concentration, hypervigilance, startle, and so on. The least frequent of these symptoms apart from flashback was diminished interest, which still affected 62% of their subjects. Of those with chronic PTSD, 24.5% were said to have “psychogenic amnesia”, but this is the only dissociative symptom noted in their study. Carlson & Rosser-Hogan (1991) reported high scores among Cambodian refugees on measures of trauma, dissociation, depression and anxiety. The scores for dissociation were based on responses to the dissociative experiences scale of Bernstein & Putnam (1986), which is considered in Chapter 21. Eighty-six per cent of the subjects met DSM–III–R criteria for PTSD (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) and 96% had high dissociation scores on this scale. Eighty per cent could be classified as suffering from clinical depression. When we look at the item content of the dissociative experiences scale it is questionable whether it necessarily measures dissociative experiences. Their values, however, are similar to some of those found by Bernstein & Putnam in a sample of war veterans. Mollica et al (1993) gave a detailed report on 993 adults, sampled at random from refugee households in camps on the border of Thailand and Cambodia. Eighty-five per cent had suffered lack of food, water, shelter and medical care, brainwashing and forced labour; 54% reported murder of a relative or close friend; 18% reported rape or sexual abuse; 8% torture. Symptoms reflecting probable depression appeared in 55% and PTSD in 15%. No definite dissociative symptoms were mentioned in a very thorough and detailed report. The more recent literature on PTSD contains numerous systematic studies, summarised regularly on different aspects of the subject in the PTSD Research Quarterly. There are not many
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articles in that quarterly in which more than a small minority of patients who have PTSD are found to have conversion, somatoform or dissociative disorders. We must look to other sources, dealing with multiple personality disorder or supposed recovered memories in adults with alleged histories of childhood abuse, in order to discover current reports of the frequent occurrence of conversion, somatoform or dissociative complaints. In the modern reports indicated above, dealing with recorded disasters, anxiety and depression predominate in PTSD. In one study by Kuch et al (1991a) who described 60 patients with fibromyalgia, 33 had had road vehicle accidents while 27 had not had such an experience. The road vehicle accident patients had at least twice as many phobias and other anxiety symptoms as the remainder. Both groups had the same small proportion of cases with possible somatisation disorder. The sensitive and thorough book by Solomon (1993) is firmly based on repeated systematic examination of Israeli soldiers. In that volume the data consistently demonstrate the common anxiety phenomena of PTSD and scarcely ever present symptoms either as conversion symptoms or dissociative ones or somatoform disorder. It is true that in one place Solomon discusses as a conversion symptom a complaint of burning feelings in a patient who had previously been burned and who later saw colleagues burned. The provenance of that symptom is of considerable theoretical interest, but it was almost unique in Solomon’s material. With respect to those who have been through battle we find, again and again, that if the military medical culture does not expect conversion symptoms – and expects anxiety ones – the former largely vanish. The idea that dissociative symptoms are a common part of PTSD is prejudged by the assumption that besides amnesias, such experiences as flashbacks, depersonalisation, daydreaming and a number of other questionable items are to be regarded as dissociative rather than due to anxiety or normal behaviour (see Chapter 21). The situation does not seem to differ after torture. A rather low figure, comparatively speaking, for dissociative or conversion symptoms can be seen in the report by Ramsay et al (1993), “Psychiatric morbidity in survivors of organised state violence including torture”. There the commonest psychiatric diagnoses recorded were PTSD, major depression and somatoform disorders. Of the somatoform disorders, somatoform pain disorder in 29 was considered the most common (out of 300 patients). However, the diagnosis of somatoform pain disorder has been radically changed (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and although many of
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the subjects acknowledged a relationship between their psychological state and the severity of their pain many of them also had been beaten or subjected to musculoskeletal damage. Hence, here too, although one can certainly anticipate some cases of conversion or dissociative disorder, just as with PTSD, the primary phenomena do not appear to be hysterical, and some symptoms which were regarded as essentially conversion disorder may well be organic in origin or have an alternative explanation. As a rule, PTSD is distinct from hysteria. It can also be very long-lasting. Bende et al (1994) described an 80-year-old man who had had recurrent flashbacks since World War II and frequent nightmares. They diagnosed this patient as having PTSD with enduring personality change, secondary alcohol misuse with alcoholic hallucinations and depression. He improved very substantially with a combination of alcohol withdrawal, behavioural management, desensitisation for social phobia and treatment with 20 mg paroxetine each morning. A long-term Australian study (Tennant et al, 1986) of 170 former prisoners held by the Japanese during World War II found that these veterans had more contemporary depression and anxiety disorders and more post-war psychiatric illness than a control group of veterans from the Pacific and South East Asian campaign who had not been prisoners of war. The prisoners of war also had more duodenal ulcers than controls, but otherwise the physical health of both groups was similar, as was the age-adjusted mortality in the post-war years. The authors of this report point out that the prisoners of war had suffered from malnutrition, chronic infection, lack of shelter, forced work, arbitrary brutality and execution and systematic humiliation. At the end of the war 70% of the prisoners of war who survived in Japanese hands were in abject physical health and resembled survivors of Nazi concentration camps. In the early post-war years they were all admitted to medical wards (often repeatedly) for treatment, usually of their nutrition-related disorders. It is thus not surprising that the prisoners of war had significantly more post-war medical admissions than non-prisoners of war, but what does seem remarkable, in the authors’ words, is that after 40 years their medical health was no worse than that of the comparison group. It is equally notable that their psychological changes were principally those of anxiety and depression. Kral (1951), who gave a detailed account of his experiences and observations in a concentration camp (Theresienstadt), pointed out that overt neurotic symptoms were relatively rare there. It was not an extermination camp and the great majority of prisoners were sent east to their death in other camps in Poland but, even
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for those who remained there, living conditions were appalling and life was much at risk. The initial response to removal to Theresienstadt was a state of depression and retardation and loss of initiative accompanied by anorexia, sleeplessness, constipation and in most of the women amenorrhoea. Suicidal attempts or panic reactions were not observed. Many patients who were known to have had severe chronic psychoneuroses such as phobias and obsessive–compulsive neuroses improved completely or greatly. Gastric ulcers became rare but a few hysterical reactions, seizures, pareses and demonstrative suicidal attempts were observed. Overall, if one is cautious about what constitutes dissociation, it seems that dissociative and other hysterical symptoms, such as somatoform or conversion complaints, are not the most common reaction to prolonged stress or even acute stress. An additional feature in the environment may serve to promote them at times and some conversion symptoms are to be expected as well as dissociative disorders, but not in the substantial majority of cases with PTSD. Social upheavals, more than acute, life-threatening disasters or concentration camp experiences, tend to be part of the cause of the mass hysterical phenomena discussed in Chapter 16.
Delayed post-traumatic stress disorder Two types of supposedly delayed PTSD have been discussed in the literature. The first of these is the appearance after more than six months of PTSD symptoms in individuals who had previously not presented them. To some extent this may be a matter of the reactivation of adverse combat-related memories (Long et al, 1994). In this case we are presumably dealing with the establishment of an increased predisposition to symptoms, which is well recognised (Solomon, 1993), or with the exacerbation of symptoms which have been present for some time but were less severe. It is well agreed that soldiers who have experienced PTSD in previous combat are more susceptible to reactivated PTSD on exposure to further combat (Solomon et al, 1987a,b). Alternatively, Solomon et al (1989) showed that a small proportion of cases which appeared to manifest delayed-onset PTSD (10%) had bona fide delay. Four other subcategories of apparent delay were noticed as well, including exacerbation of previously subclinical symptoms, delayed help-seeking for symptoms already present, reactivation and the occurrence of other psychiatric disorder. Even the typical case of this phenomenon which Solomon (1993) describes includes some
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element of reactivation by new threat. A man in the reserve who had served in Lebanon in active fighting without incident and who had again served in the same campaign without active involvement fell into a severe anxiety disorder resembling PTSD when he received his call-up papers for his third brief period of service. It seems possible that delayed-onset symptoms may occur when something happens which raises the sense of threat to the individual once more. Overall, there are indications that as time goes by stress symptoms decline in most individuals who have suffered some initial post-traumatic stress response (Solomon, 1993, Falk et al, 1994). Falk et al, after a review of over 50 studies, conclude that the impact of trauma can be long lasting but may wax and wane, although the question of whether extended chronicity represents delayed onset or delayed recognition has not been answered, and they note that the true course of the disorder remains unclear. Long et al (1994) report, perhaps most typically, that New Zealand soldiers who had served in Vietnam found that media coverage of warfare in the Gulf War (which occurred in 1991) revived memories of early combat and this increased their PTSD levels. In summary, although there is a most important relationship between hysterical symptoms and acute battle problems, and this relationship has taught much about the production of those symptoms per se, the symptoms do not necessarily follow from acute or even chronic stress in the absence of other contributory environmental factors.
Recovered memory and post-traumatic stress disorder This is the second type, of supposedly delayed, PTSD. In the last few years, especially since about 1988 or 1989, an increasing number of individuals have claimed that they suffered trauma in childhood and only recovered the memory of it in adult life. Psychodynamic theory has conventionally assumed that that was possible as a result of the overcoming of repression in psychotherapy. So long as these ideas were confined to the therapeutic process they did not arouse much opposition, but when they began to be used increasingly in accusations of abuse, made against parents and others, more resistance developed. There is now a vigorous dispute about the validity of recovered memories at all, and particularly about their use in criminal charges without corroborating evidence or in law suits for damages. Chapter 21 deals with this topic in detail. It deserves some attention here for
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two reasons. First, leading proponents of the recovery of buried memories argue that the syndromes with which they are dealing are those of ‘trauma’, and they align themselves and their subject matter with the treatment of PTSD in other types of trauma (e.g. Herman, 1992). Here it may be useful to note a small amount of evidence concerning long-lasting memory in survivors of natural disasters and of wartime experiences, and also to note briefly the logical status of the claim that recovered memory identifies genuine survivors with post-traumatic stress conditions. Green & Grace (1988) conducted a follow-up study of survivors of the Buffalo Creek flood in West Virginia which occurred in February 1972, whom they had examined in 1974 and whom they approached again in 1986. In order to determine the reliability of survivors’ recall of their flood experiences over a 12-year period they undertook a number of procedures. Rater generalisability coefficients (a form of inter-rater reliability) were established at 0.80 for bereavement and 0.59 for initial flood stress. (Bereavement meant the extent of loss of possessions, friends and family members). The correlation between 1974 and 1986 ratings of bereavement was r = 0.58, but the average level of bereavement did decrease significantly, from 1.84 in 1974 to 1.54 in 1986. Ratings of the scale of the threat to life of the initial flood were much less reliable (r = 0.36). While the correlations noted are significant for the 81 individuals who were examined, they also show another important finding. In the case of the recollection of bereavement, 34% of the variance was in common and in the case of the actual threat to life or its evaluation only 13% of the variance was in common. In other words two-thirds of the information was unreliable with the one measure and 87% was unreliable with the other measure. Thus, the accuracy of memories for which it was apparently assumed that continuous recall had always been available (and everybody knew about the events) was very limited after 12 years. This finding in relation to the impact of stressful events is of considerable significance in evaluating the reliability of past memory. It confirms there is something in past memories but that detailed recall is very uncertain. A second consideration which applies to the purported link between recovered memories and ‘trauma’ has to do with the nature of the cases. A substantial body of evidence holds that childhood experience is important in determining adult characteristics. The most common characteristics which are said to follow from severe childhood deprivation of affection and associated physical and sometimes sexual abuse are changes in personality in the direction of sociopathy and severe emotional
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instability. Currently the former is described in ICD–10 (World Health Organization, 1992a) as dissocial personality disorder and the latter as emotionally unstable personality disorder (with impulsive and borderline subtypes). DSM–IV describes comparable conditions as antisocial personality disorder and borderline personality disorder. It is ironic that after the rather questionable diagnostic category of borderline personality disorder had been used for many years in DSM–III and DSM–III–R, it has been adopted by the WHO classification at a time when it is becoming increasingly unpopular in North America on the grounds that it is politically incorrect, since it is applied most often to women and tends to be pejorative. Others may have reservations about that diagnosis, as I do, for various reasons, including particularly the fact that the diagnosis overlaps greatly with that of depression, as Akiskal and others have shown (Davis & Akiskal, 1986). Be that as it may, the patterns of personality disorder which are typically associated with childhood deprivation and stress are very different from those of standard post-traumatic disorder occurring in adults subjected to stress once their childhood was over. Moreover, there is also evidence that children subjected to typical stresses of the sort which produce PTSD in adults also tend to produce a PTSD syndrome of the DSM–III–R type (Shannon et al, 1994), such symptoms being particularly marked by trait anxiety (Lonigan et al, 1994). Shannon and Lonigan and colleagues studied children in three groups (pre-adolescents, 9–12 years old; early adolescents, 13–15 years old; and late adolescents, 16 years and older) in relation to hurricane experiences. Thus, what is called ‘stress’ in childhood does not seem to have the effects in adult life which recovered memory believers anticipate, even in those individuals for whom stress has been completely authenticated in childhood. It is true that the experience of childhood deprivation is said to affect personality most often when the children in question are below the age of six or seven years, while sexual abuse is more likely to occur in children above that age. However, the existing literature on recovered adult memories of childhood sexual abuse tends not to make distinctions between the types of adult symptoms to be expected from sexual abuse at different ages, and all abuse is considered likely to result in a similar amorphous mass of symptoms, as discussed in Chapter 21. If the claims about recovered memory are correct, there should be much more evidence of antisocial personality disorder in the psychotherapy patients who have recovered memories of early childhood abuse.
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8
Malingering, self-damage and anorexia nervosa
The simplest distinction between malingering and hysteria suggests that in the former the symptoms are developed as a conscious pretence, while in the latter they arise unconsciously. In theory such a view is excellent even if, as Kretschmer recognised, both states may be equally based on self-preservation. In practice it is often hard to make the distinction, since the form of malingered symptoms will be identical to that of hysterical ones. In the latter case they will be due to the thought that there is a disability – which will lead to mimicry of illness. In the case of malingering the intention to mimic an illness will have the same effect. Most allegations or reports of malingering arise in situations where either life or money may be at stake. Physical danger from military service (or at least very unpleasant conditions) or financial compensation for accidents, or the opportunity to receive disability payments, are common incentives for malingering when it occurs. Children sometimes malinger to escape unwelcome duties or tasks at school, and prisoners or accused persons are known to be potential malingerers. The attitude of the medical profession to such cases can be quite robust: “AD who covered a wound 1/16 ” in size with an ointment, lint, three bandages and a large gout-boot, seemed surprised, and I fancy not a little indignant, when most of his dressings were put in the fire, and he was told to resume work that day.” (Collie, 1922)
Sir John Collie was an examiner for numerous employers and gives pungent accounts of his visits to the homes of claimants whom he thought were malingering. Pilowsky (1985) characterises 91
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many medical attitudes ironically as “malingerophobia”, defined as an irrational and maladaptive fear of being tricked into providing health care to individuals who masquerade as sick, but either have no illness at all or have a much less severe one than they claim. He adds, “Although described as a ‘phobia’ in some instances this condition may be more like a delusion (although this is relatively rare) and, in other cases, more like an ‘overvalued idea’ or morbid preoccupation with no real or lasting insight into its irrational qualities.”
His touch is light but his brush draws a clear picture of the hostility which physicians often manifest towards ‘the hysteric’ and of their concern not to be duped. Hysteria provides the physician with some of the same problems of feelings about being tricked; these will be discussed later. At this point it is worth noting that hysterical symptoms arise more often than malingered ones in the context of interpersonal problems and difficulties in adjustment to stress. They may also arise in the same situations which produce malingering. Hurst (1940) gives two criteria for the detection of malingering. The first is detection in flagrante delicto, the second an unforced confession. However, few malingerers are so helpful as the soldier who wrote a letter on lined paper without a heading, purporting to be signed by the matron of a hospital, to the effect that private X “is unfit to return to duty because he has a broken ankel” (sic). Some patients are encountered who acknowledge that they are at least partly aware that they ‘bring on’ their symptoms (e.g. the girl with epilepsy mentioned on p. 153) or could do better if they tried, but do not wish to try. Others with hysterical symptoms appear genuinely unconscious of their mechanism. A former nurse whose symptom of hysteria was an abnormal gait who managed to read her own notes was horror-struck and indignant at the diagnosis. Some who have recovered through hypnosis or other means show no apparent awareness that their symptoms were self-induced, even though they accept that they were psychological in origin. Yet Charcot said that malingering was found in every phase of hysteria. Thus while the extremes of hysteria and malingering are recognisable, there is a group of patients with hysteria (whose size will vary with the circumstances and with the sample of patients) who show evidence both of conscious and unconscious mechanisms promoting their psychologically induced disability. Sir Charles
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Symonds (Appendix C) points out that in his experience fugue states of a hysterical type were always associated with a degree of conscious simulation. By contrast, other fugue states, especially those associated with depressive illness, appear not to have the same degree of conscious production. Flicker (1956) considered that 10% of malingerers were normal and that 5% of 100 000 inductees for military service malingered. This was nearly the same proportion that occurred in service hospitals, but very few of the latter were officially diagnosed, namely 17 out of 60 000 (0.028%). In his view malingering was encountered in five situations: psychosis, oligophrenia, constitutional psychopathic states, neurosis and fear states or morale deficiencies. The pathology can occur through a defect of the social environment. “When a man mirrors the faults of society at large, society and not the mirror is to blame.” But one might think that society will not readily hold this view, nor will it always be the most useful short-term one for society. Anderson et al (1959) observe that “it was nearly always found impossible during war in the services to charge offenders ... with malingering, although this was often strongly suspected”. From an extensive review, citing 15 authors, they also concluded that it was generally agreed that “simulation of mental illness usually occurs on a basis of some form of psychic abnormality”. Interestingly, in the same study as Anderson, Trethowan demonstrated that with few exceptions subjects attempting to simulate mental disorders failed to produce anything which closely resembled well defined psychiatric disorders or syndromes. The assessment of malingerers laying claim to psychological illness is discussed by Rogers (1988) and others and depends, like that of physical illness, on demonstrating incompatibilities, inconsistencies and the like. Perhaps in all cases, the most convincing criteria are Hurst’s original requirements of the patient being found in flagrante delicto or giving an unforced confession. Despite all this, doctors and psychologists are not particularly good at detecting liars. Ekman & O’Sullivan (1991) showed videotapes of 10 people who were either lying or describing their feelings truthfully to a variety of detectives, judges, psychiatrists, college students and working adults. Only the United States Secret Service performed better than chance, and they were significantly more accurate than all the other groups. Those who were accurate appeared to rely on different behavioural clues from those who were not accurate. Accurate observers were also significantly younger than inaccurate ones.
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Jones & Llewellyn (1917) charitably say: “there is little doubt that the consensus of expert opinion is substantially correct – viz., that feigned insanity only occurs in those more or less mentally deranged, or predisposed by heritage to mental instability.”
They add the important comment from Bernard Glueck that the detection of malingering in a given case by no means excludes the presence of actual mental disease (p. 288). This is confirmed by Pope et al (1982), who describe recovered schizophrenic patients prolonging their symptoms because they preferred in-patient residence to poor living conditions outside hospital. Pankratz & Lipkin (1978) recognised another variant of simulated psychiatric illness, in 13 patients who presented suicidal ideas of questionable truth, and one who offered paranoid symptoms in order to gain admission to more comfortable circumstances in hospital than outside. These actions are not irrational and resemble the behaviour of David, who simulated insanity when seeking refuge from Saul in the territory of the Philistines (I Samuel, 21, 11–15). Fraser (1984) briefly described the repeated production of rectal bleeding from a small tear at the anal margin by a young man under his care. He happened to be a German spy and Fraser comments “Our object of course had been to get him well so that he could be shot; his was not to get well so that he would not get shot”. This was a case of successful induced illness which was apparently maintained for very rational reasons until peace was declared. Besides those with overt malingering there are several groups in whom the production of illness may be wholly or substantially conscious, and yet severely self-damaging. These patients include those with hospital addiction, the so-called Munchausen syndrome, others to whom the term ‘deliberate disability’ (Hawkings et al, 1956) has been applied, and anorexia nervosa. Attempted suicide is a further category of this type, although it is by no means necessarily hysterical in pattern nor manipulative by intent. In addition, there are patients with pseudodementia or the Ganser syndrome whose symptoms are often both transparently false and evidently aimed at self-exculpation. A relationship between all these syndromes is easy to remark upon, yet hard to analyse. The clinical problem which they present has been illuminated by studies of the Munchausen syndrome, and although those studies do not offer a complete explanation for all the phenomena of the syndromes just listed, they provide an important part of it.
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Simulated illness and hospital addiction Simulated illness and hospital addiction can now be discussed, together. Buinewitsch (1939) provides an account of the literature on the former. Good (1942) reported six cases of malingering to escape the burden of military service. His cases gave evidence of a degree of anxiety which was unrelated to their circumstances (they were in Britain and not in combat zones) and one of them even wanted to return to deep-sea fishing which, particularly in wartime, was very much more dangerous than serving on a base at home. They also showed a lack of guilt, but they were evidently not typically sociopathic since several of them gave evidence of shyness or phobias. They displayed a marked attitude of infantile dependence. One, a man with a wife and child, was desperate to get home to look after his mother. Although in Good’s cases ‘mother’ was seen as an idealised figure, she had often beaten or rejected the patient and the dependent attitude was therefore linked with a masochistic one. This phenomenon of masochism appears in a pronounced form in the Munchausen syndrome. Asher (1951) described a group of patients who tended to be admitted to hospitals repeatedly with supposed acute physical illness, supported by an untruthful, plausible but dramatic history, which could often be characterised as pseudologia fantastica. They underwent many operations and were usually discharged after arguments with doctors or nurses, following which they would move on to another hospital, repeating the process. Buinewitsch (1939) gives an early account of the literature. Bagan (1962) indicated a close relationship of these patients towards the medical profession. Barker (1962, 1966) described six British cases whom he regarded as severely disturbed hysterical psychopaths. The term Munchausen syndrome was given to them by Asher because their extraordinary adventures and travels were reminiscent of the tales of Baron von Munchausen related by Rudolph Erich Raspe (1785). According to Chapman (1957) Hieronymus Carl Friedrich Munchausen was a real man whose adventures were elaborated by Raspe. Patterson (1988) reports that von Munchausen was an honourable man, and a raconteur who told stories which were recognisably exaggerated for comic effect. Ironically Raspe had a fugitive lifestyle, incurred large debts, was wanted by the authorities in Germany for theft, and fled from Edinburgh to Ireland because of a mining scandal. But since Munchausen was not self-damaging or hypochondriacal, but was an engaging raconteur, the term hospital addiction (Enoch et al, 1967) is
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much to be preferred and is probably better than a number of others which have been suggested. Various types of Munchausen’s syndrome have been described, depending on the type of complaint, such as renal (Nickel, 1984), cardiac (Dickenson & Evans, 1987), meningitis (Marchant & Brown, 1990), pulmonary and hypoglycaemic (Mitchell et al, 1985). Other types of somewhat similar factitious illness have included factitious plumbism (Stephenson & Lewis, 1985), hypoglycaemia (Roberts et al, 1985) and chronic pain (Rimon et al, 1980; Fishbain et al, 1988). The two cases of Rimon et al (1980) show more features of chronic pain (possibly of psychological disorder) than of the artifactual Munchausen’s syndrome. Another case of Munchausen’s syndrome or factitious hypoglycaemia has also been noted in conjunction with alleged multiple personality disorder (Freeland et al, 1993). Factitious fever and self-induced infection present very taxing problems of diagnosis. Aduan et al (1979) reported 32 cases, together with important details of methods of investigation. Sixteen of the patients had a link with the health professions. Ten were students. Psychiatric findings most often indicated underlying severe personality disorder, most often called “borderline”, but also included “psychotic depression”. Reich & Gottfried (1983) identified 41 factitious cases in a teaching hospital over 10 years. The disorders identified included one that was fatal and others that were chronic, severe, and life threatening. The disorders fell into four subgroups: self-induced infections, simulated illnesses, chronic wounds, and surreptitious self-medication. Most of the patients were regarded as immature, passive and hypochondriacal. None had a major mental disorder. A somewhat similar problem of patients who sought multiple operations was described earlier and analysed dynamically by Menninger (1938). Enoch et al (1967) appraised the literature on hospital addiction succinctly and in detail, and Berney (1973) produced a further review. Cramer et al (1971) noted the occurrence of hysterical symptoms and suicide attempts in a number of these patients, all of whom simulated illness. Bursten (1965) and Cramer et al (1971) provide valuable discussions of these patients’ motivation. At least three out of four patients had had severe infantile emotional deprivation. One of them, for instance, was abandoned by both parents and sent to an orphanage when six months old, where he claimed he was brutally treated. In all cases there had been a good relationship with a physician during the period of ill-treatment, with the
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doctor being either helpful or powerful, or both, in the eyes of the patient. In later life many of these patients worked in paramedical jobs (as assistant nurses, etc.). This point is well made by Hawkings et al (1956) in their study of deliberate disability. This category describes mainly young, single women who fake illness and also may engage in procedures which endanger life. Their work provides both a partial identification with the doctor and a knowledge of medical detail which is helpful to the subsequent career of deception. The severity of the cases need not be doubted. Besides self-inflicted injuries, chronic self-poisoning may occur. One patient, a nurse, put herself into high output heart failure by excessive ingestion of thyroid hormones. One of the observations by Cramer et al (1971) is particularly worth noting. They write: “The patient usually arranges to foul up his own plot and to have the hoax uncovered. At this point, the staff responds with an angry condemnation of the patient, and with total loss of interest in his fate. The patient signs out – accusing the physicians of incompetence or malpractice – or he is discharged. At this point, it is difficult for the physician to recognize the psychological suffering of the patient and to refer him to a psychiatrist, and the patient is off until his next hospitalization.”
Occasional cases where a Munchausen-like syndrome has been produced in other adults have also been reported. Sigal et al (1986) described a case of a man who was sent to prison for producing physical illnesses in both his wife and his girlfriend, his wife eventually dying and the girlfriend becoming paraplegic from poisonous substances injected into her lower back. This man developed a possessive relationship with his male cellmate (himself a murderer) and repeatedly put him to sleep by administering sleeping pills mixed with alcohol, and injected turpentine, stolen from within the prison, into various parts of the body of the other man. Ultimately he inserted a safety pin into the urethra of his cellmate, who became critically ill and was saved only because of immediate surgical and medical treatment. The perpetrator was sentenced this time for attempted murder. Sigal et al (1991) consider that this behaviour functioned as a way of commanding the attention and respect of his surroundings by taking care of the partner with whom he was emotionally associated. The injections of the wife, girlfriend and cellmate made them ill, with the intention of forcing them to stay with
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him as dependants and fulfil his need for respect and admiration. The Munchausen’s syndrome by adult proxy is extremely rare and I know only this single report. Janofsky (1986) has described Munchausen’s syndrome as a presentation of folie à deux. In this case a relatively passive daughter, aged 25, appears to have adopted the life pattern of a more dominant mother who had already demonstrated the behaviour of Munchausen’s syndrome. Hyler & Sussman (1981) also described a case in which wife and daughter developed Munchausen types of behaviour and the husband and son (who was a physician) tended to support the multiple referrals and illness behaviour of the wife and daughter. Meadow (1977) was the first to identify cases of infants and older children being subjected to ‘Munchausen’s syndrome by proxy’, and a number of other cases have been described (e.g. Verity et al, 1979; McKinlay, 1986; Amegavie et al, 1986). Fisher et al (1993) describe a mother who insisted that her son was psychotic. In the Verity report the name Polle was chosen as the supposed name of the daughter of Baron von Munchausen, but it has been pointed out that this name is the name of the town where Maria Wilhelmina, the daughter of the baron’s second wife, was christened, the child was not his, and Polle was not the child’s name (Meadow & Lennert, 1984). Black (1981) further describes the extension of Munchausen’s syndrome to more than one child. The risk to children in these cases is a matter for immediate concern, especially for general practitioners, paediatricians, social workers and nurses. Meadow (1989) describes five main consequences for children who are falsely labelled as ill: (a) they will receive needles and harmful investigations or treatments (b) a genuine disease may be induced by the mother’s actions (c) they may die suddenly as a result of the mother misjudging the degree of insult (d) they may develop chronic invalidism (e) they may develop Münchausen’s syndrome as an adult – the children have learned and then take over the lying behaviour of their mother. According to Meadow the mother is the deceiver in nearly all cases: the father does not know what is going on and the mother tends to be the dominant person in the marriage and to be more intelligent and capable than her husband. The husband tends to
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be in the background and not supportive of his wife’s needs. The mothers themselves often have had a difficult childhood. Many have worked as nurses. About a fifth are “personal illness addicts” and notorious for presenting with unexplained illness. The explanation of this maternal behaviour is not well developed. It is suggested that the mothers more than appreciate the attention of doctors and specialist hospitals but do not have a mental illness, although they do have a personality disorder. Meadow observes “immense selfishness” in the mothers, who are “able to do horrific things to children because of their own unhappiness and to satisfy their own needs”. Sometimes also there is envy and violence and hatred towards the abused child. Fisher & Mitchell (1992) suggest that there are many psychiatric pathways to inducing illness in a child. Depression, personality problems and functional illnesses are often noted and about one-third of mothers may demonstrate Munchausen’s syndrome themselves. The more severe cases (in the mothers) are likely to have suffered severe sexual abuse and to have developed a severe personality disorder (Sugar et al, 1991). The prognosis of Munchausen’s syndrome is largely unknown. It has appeared to be intractable. However, Higgins (1990) described the notable management of a patient who was admitted at least 91 times to at least 29 hospitals over 14 years and treated for a wide range of conditions she did not have. She appears to have remitted. Firmness, frankness, patience, sympathy, support and medication all appear to have contributed to this response. Pallis & Bamji (1979) described a relatively long-term study of one busy case showing that from 1944 to 1979 he had been a patient in at least 68 hospitals and had at least 207 admissions. Pallis & Bamji called this man Stewart McIlroy, and Cruickshank et al (1979), writing about the report of Pallis & Bamji, called him William McIlroy, saying that he had been admitted to their care in one hospital and “much to his satisfaction” transferred to an old people’s home, where he was a model patient, helpful to the nurses, cooperative with the physiotherapist, and devoted to his books and the television. They added “typical of these patients, he appears genuinely unable to explain his behaviour: ‘You tell me – I’m wonky in the head’”. They reported that he felt secure in hospital and preferred it to the usual alternative of a hostel for down-and-outs and claimed to have engineered admission in recent years in response to “nerves” and a feeling that he might do others harm. To return to the adult who inflicts disability on himself or herself, Hawkings et al (1956) indicate that the psychopathology
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of deliberate disability is not fully understood, but for the following reasons suggest that it is related to an overdetermined masochism: (a) the actual infliction of the injury is a masochistic act (b) these patients usually come into teaching hospitals for investigations and these, in view of the obscure nature of the disease, are usually exhaustive, again catering for the patient’s masochism (c) they run the constant risk of detection and as many are nursing personnel, they are fully aware of this, yet voluntarily expose themselves to this risk (d) they are essentially conscientious and reliable people, but during this stage adopt a form of behaviour, with its lies and subterfuge, which is the antithesis of their moral code (e) they nearly all have inadequate sexual outlets and therefore sexual relations cannot be offered as a substitute for their excessive masochistic needs.
Aduan et al (1979) undertook sympathetic factual confrontation, but only after a plan for social and psychiatric care had been arranged for the patient. This usually caused considerable anger and matters were so arranged that this anger or rage tended to be directed at the attending physician or psychiatrist, allowing the primary physician, nursing staff and social worker to remain supportive. Improvement was obtained by this approach. Reich & Gottfried (1983) also recommended a sympathetic approach of frank disclosure or confrontation. After their procedure only 13 patients acknowledged causing their disorders but most improved and four of the most chronic became asymptomatic. None signed out of the hospital or became suicidal. Bursten (1965) takes the analysis of these matters further. Although recognising the comparison with hysteria, he notes the deliberate imposture involved and emphasises that the patient assumes a pretended identity. According to him impostors have high, unattainable ego ideals and use their imposture as a means of defence against the anxiety associated with feelings of inferiority. The patient he described gave evidence of feelings of genital inadequacy. Unlike the conventional impostor pretending to be a hero or great man or person of standing, these patients appear to be victimised and pitiful, their imposture taking a masochistic form in which they play a role inverse to that of the physician. In regard to the relationship to physicians, Cramer et al (1971) argue that this provides a re-enactment of the
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relationship with the parents. At first what the patient seeks is the re-establishment of a state of comfort and dependency, where the hospital setting and the physician play a care-taking, maternal role. However, a man who fills the role of parent for these patients must also take on the role of the bad, abandoning parents, against whom there are strong sadistic aggressive wishes. The initial pleasure in dependency and identification with the physician oscillates to antagonistic feelings. One way of subduing the antagonistic feelings is to turn them – masochistically – against the self. The competing operation of all these mechanisms can be seen in the persistent attendance at hospitals, the seeking of self-damage and the deliberate fouling up of the relationship once admission to hospital has been secured. The importance of the foregoing analysis is twofold. First, it provides us with some understanding of the strange and exceptional behaviour of these varied types of patients. Secondly, in the light of this understanding and of the severe trauma which they undergo, it becomes possible to view severe selfdamage as a sign of true and severe emotional disturbance; it is then not a whim or conceit aimed merely at deceiving doctors and living a pretentious, exhibitionist hospital-based life, which might be warmer and better fed than life in the outside world. It is an intelligible although very abnormal response due to overwhelming problems of emotional adjustment. Lesser degrees of similar emotional disturbance may be recognised in patients with less severe disability: in patients with anorexia nervosa, which is considered shortly; in patients with hysteria; and even in normal people under certain environmental pressures. There are occasional reports of brain damage associated with Munchausen’s syndrome or with hospital addiction. Barker (1962) suggested that cerebral damage might provide a basis for some cases. Fénelon et al (1991) have described quite extensive and prominent changes in the cerebral white matter in a 35-year-old patient with behaviour typical of the Munchausen’s syndrome. Neurological signs of the case were always transitory and obviously factitious, but magnetic resonance imaging showed patterns which are unusual in a patient of that age except in the presence of other illness. In this case earlier behaviour, such as episodes of induced hypoglycaemia, might have contributed to these changes, although the patient was never in coma; a prior acute illness in childhood or adolescence might have caused the changes which then predisposed to the adult behaviour, or there may have been a brain disease – unidentified – responsible for the Munchausen syndrome. This type of explanation at
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present remains quite insufficient to account for the behavioural phenomena.
Self-injury Tantam & Whittaker (1992) distinguish between self-harm, which is the broadest term and covers attempted suicide, and self-injury, which deals with self-mutilation and self-wounding. Self-mutilation (or the agreement to be mutilated as in religious flogging or voluntary crucifixion) can have a cultural background, and they cite many instances of this. Self-wounding refers principally to slashing or cutting – without suicidal intent – and is relatively common. They estimate that one out of 600 adults wound themselves enough to require hospital treatment. Johnson et al (1975), in a prospective study, observed an annual rate of 730 episodes per 100 000 in general practices, nursing homes, jails and hospitals, committed by 559 individuals per 100 000. They estimated a ‘true’ rate of 1433 per 100 000 per anum. In their survey of 240 females who regularly wounded themselves, Favazza & Conterio (1989) found that the commonest method was cutting (72%). It is salutary to recognise that self-mutilation can be a consequence of prison conditions (Johnson & Britt, 1967), sometimes in men who were putatively normal before their incarceration (Yaroshevsky, 1975). Solzhenitsyn (1973) and Kuznetsov (1975) described striking specific instances in the USSR. Yaroshevsky, who was himself imprisoned and worked as a surgeon, treated prisoners who had cut their veins, sewed up their mouths, sewed buttons on their bodies, disembowelled themselves, slashed off fingers, toes, genitals or ears or swallowed foreign bodies. Only one patient out of the five whom he describes as having swallowed foreign bodies was extremely psychopathic. The others “committed the mutilations as a result of the insufferable conditions of their lives”. It should be added in parenthesis that severe self-mutilation may occur in psychoses, post-encephalitic Parkinsonism (Goodhart & Savitsky, 1933), after taking hallucinogenic drugs (Vallotton, 1974), and with various organic brain syndromes and mental retardation. The most severe forms of self damage other than suicide are not usually thought of as being hysterical. They include selfenucleation of an eye (Ananth et al, 1984), other self-inflicted eye injuries (Tapper et al, 1979; Griffin et al, 1982; Rogers &
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Pullen, 1987; Soulios & Firth, 1986). In these cases the association with hallucinations or religious delusions and schizophrenia is common, but occasional patients show no formal psychiatric illness, such as case 1 reported by Rogers & Pullen, and the case of Griffin et al, who was considered to have a borderline personality disorder in addition to epileptic convulsions. Selfincineration as a suicidal attempt, likewise, usually appears to be a psychotic act by young, simple people with chronic severe disorders (Jacobson et al, 1986). Four cases of amputation or partial amputation of a hand described by Stewart & Lowrey (1980) also reflect severe psychotic illness – in their cases, depression. Hunger-strikers in prison camps and prison mental hospitals, (e.g. V. Fainberg, personal communication) choose a mode of protest which in fact exerts pressure on the prison authorities; they tend to be political prisoners, and a few have been convicted terrorists. Self-mutilators tend to be criminal convicts (Yaroshevsky, 1975). In both instances, however, there is some realistic hope of obtaining an alteration in the prisoner’s circumstances. Selfmutilation in a severe Soviet prison regime can be regarded as a response by normal or relatively normal people to extreme suffering. Its dynamic mechanisms may, however, resemble those of other self-mutilations. Less severe self-mutilation is a feature of malingering in relation to military service. Flicker (1942) regarded it as an extreme form of malingering. Quoting Buinewitsch (1939) and Hulett (1941) he cites a variety of remarkable and bizarre ways of producing self-damage, and after reporting a case of his own, where loss of the right index finger resulted, he argues that the self-inflicted injury may be produced by a man who is neither amoral, nor a physical coward, but who does not accept the normal community goal. The least degree of self-wounding is discussed by Ping-Nie (1969) under the title “The syndrome of delicate self-cutting”. Delicate self-cutting is perhaps a hysterical gesture, but selfdamage of a comparable degree with self-applied constricting bands has been known quite commonly as the result of a delusional illness (Dawson-Butterworth et al, 1969). Self-cutting appears to be a rather special example of deliberate self-harm which may have links with hysteria but also involves other traits and mechanisms. Gardner & Gardner (1975), in the first published controlled study of repeated self-cutting in patients of normal intelligence, noted that the act was initially private and most often served to relieve an unpleasant feeling of tension. Compared with other psychiatric patients, the self-cutters were
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much more obsessional on the Middlesex Hospital Questionnaire and the Tavistock Inventory. Obsessionality has also been noted in criminal self-cutting psychopathic learning disabled patients (McKerracher et al, 1968) . Although hysterical traits are often thought of as being the opposite end of the spectrum from obsessional ones, the two may occur together. Imitative cutting (Offer & Barglow, 1960; McEvedy, 1963), frigidity (Gardner & Gardner, 1975) and prominent dependency needs may all have a special association with self-cutting. It can therefore be supposed that hysterical mechanisms may play a part, but certainly not the sole and perhaps not the main part, in this pattern of activity. Pattison & Kahan (1983) reviewed 56 published case reports of self-harm and noted that they revealed a typical pattern of onset in late adolescence, multiple recurrent episodes, low lethality, harm deliberately inflicted upon the body, and extension of the behaviour over many years. They felt that this differed from suicidal behaviour and other classes of self-destructive behaviour. These patterns appear to match the other reports just discussed, but not the prison cases. Even if these phenomena may be minor, they can also be quite common. Ballinger (1971) reviewed the populations of a hospital for the learning disabled and a psychiatric hospital and noted that 93 out of 626 learning disabled patients (14.9%) and 20 out of 584 psychiatric patients (3.4%) had injured themselves in the previous month. Even in many of the non-prison instances, patients engaging in self-injury have been regarded as having a hysterical psychopathic personality. Mechanisms of regression and dependence are said to characterise the personality of patients with hysteria (see Chapter 22). The symptoms or behaviour pattern in deliberate disability or hospital addiction constitute a manipulative form of behaviour which provides a primary emotional gain. In military and prison circumstances there is an environmental gain and perhaps an emotional one as well. Except for the lack of conscious deliberation in hysteria, there are thus at least three major similarities between the other syndromes and hysteria, that is, gain from solution of a conflict, dependency and regression in the personalities involved, and a strongly manipulative effect upon the environment. By comparison with malingering and the extreme forms of hospital addiction, which are rare, attempted suicide is very common. Some have chosen to call this self-poisoning (Kessel, 1965) or parasuicide (Kreitman et al, 1969), terms which represent no advance because one, self-poisoning, does not cover all the cases (there are attempted suicides by other means), and the
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other, parasuicide, may take away the generally valid implication that there is at least an attempt to die, no matter how slight, involved in the act of attempted suicide. However, the term parasuicide is now very widely used. Stengel & Cook (1958) showed that attempted suicide represented a mixture of motives – some directed towards death, some towards life. The manipulative element in many attempted suicides is well established, and an interest in the environment and its reaction is often remarkably strong even in those who most effectively set out to kill themselves. The appeal and manipulative qualities of so many attempted suicides gives them a hysterical character, as has been noted clearly by Carter (1972). Stengel (1964) commented as follows: “the so-called hysterical personality ... tends to react to frustration with physical symptoms or transient abnormal mental states such as memory loss. These people have an insatiable urge for love and attention from their fellow men and sometimes they consciously exploit the appeal effect of the suicidal act for this purpose. It would however be a mistake to regard the majority of suicidal acts as hysterical because they have an appeal effect. Their impact on other people only emphasises why hysterical personalities should so often be tempted to risk their lives in that way.”
Goldney (1981) showed that young women who attempted suicide did not score overall in a more hysterical manner than women in a comparison group when assessed on the Hysteroid Obsessoid Questionnaire. However, among those whose attempts were least lethal there was a subgroup who scored in a more hysteroid manner than the remainder. As Stengel & Cook (1958) and many others have shown, attempted suicide can occur with all forms of psychiatric diagnosis and personality, and is certainly not limited to those who have conversion symptoms or hysterical personality. It therefore represents a common expression of motives and of patterns of reaction which are selectively strongly represented in patients with hysterical manipulative traits. It is worth remarking here that there are other circumstances in which self-injury may sometimes be induced as a result of hysterical personality or traits. Patients with analgesic-induced renal nephropathy have a high incidence of abnormal personality traits (Murray, 1973). They do not pursue their addiction in order to manipulate others, but rather, in the same way as some alcoholics who also damage themselves, for the sake of the gratification which their practice offers.
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Winchel & Stanley (1991) note that the main groups of individuals who manifest self-injurious behaviour are mentally retarded patients, psychotic patients, prison populations and patients with character disorders. There is an increasing tendency to treat self-injurious behaviour with alternative pharmacotherapeutic treatments. Winchel & Stanley conclude from their review that self-injurious behaviour may be associated with serotoninergic dysfunction. Thus, serotonin reuptake inhibitors may be potentially useful. Other medications have also been tried, including neuroleptics, lithium, carbamazepine, minor tranquillisers, propranolol, baclofen, stimulants and various antidepressants, but especially serotonin reuptake inhibitors. The relevance of these observations here is that there is an increasing tendency to see certain types of behaviour, some of which were regarded as hysterical, as being linked more to obsessional illnesses (which respond notably well to serotoninergic antidepressants) or to specific biochemical dysfunctions. For example, a case of trichotillomania described by Primeau & Fontaine (1987) responded extremely well to fluoxetine.
Anorexia nervosa Anorexia nervosa is a further condition in which the production of physical illness necessarily follows from the psychological state. Between it and the hospital addiction syndrome there is a borderland occupied by patients with deliberate disability. Their characteristics are like anorexia nervosa in several particulars, as shown in Table 8.1. They differ from hospital addiction in that the threat to life in the latter, although important, is more incidental and also in the fact that hospital addiction is apparently much commoner in men. They differ from hysteria in respect of the risk to life which, except in hysterical attempted suicide, is usually minimal; and indeed hysteria may have life-preserving characteristics, for example in soldiers, as indicated in the discussions of shell-shock in Chapter 5 and of Kretschmer’s views in Chapter 6. Anorexia nervosa was described as early as 1689 by Morton under the title “nervous atrophy”, by Gull in 1868, who gave it its current name, and by Lasègue in 1873 (see Theander, 1970). Lasègue actually called it “anorexie hystérique”. A full discussion of this syndrome is beyond the scope of this work and is provided by a number of writers, including Dally (1969) and Theander (1970). Smart et al (1976) indicate that the personality profile of the typical sufferer is of a highly neurotic and introverted
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person with moderately severe obsessional features and average intelligence. The patients are nearly all single, young women with loss of weight, amenorrhoea and unwillingness to eat. This unwillingness to eat consists of a refusal to take nourishment, often despite a strong desire to do so. The syndrome is frequently associated with other psychiatric conditions; for example, Kay & Leigh (1954) found 50% of their patients to be depressed and 40% hysterical. Other estimates of ‘hysteriform’ characteristics range from one-third to one-half of patients. Dally described the main types of clinical picture in anorexia nervosa as the obsessional, comprising 57 out of 97 patients (59%), and the hysterical comprising 19 (21%). Other patients presented a mixed picture, including a further three with conversion symptoms. Conversion symptoms are thus rare but have been described by others as
Table 8.1. A comparison of hysteria, anorexia nervosa and deliberate disability (a) Hysteria
(b) Anorexia nervosa
(c) Deliberate disability
Age
Wide distribution
Majority 16–20 (Kay & Leigh, 1954); in 70% onset before 26
Majority 15–25
Sex
Mainly female, not same extent as b, c
Mainly female (Kay & Leigh; 34 women, 4 men)
Mainly female
Marital status
Both married and single
Commoner in Commoner in single single women women (Kay & Leigh; 32 single, 6 married)
Personality
Often inadequate, with tendency to dissociation
More effective in a; More effective than a obsessional traits common
Intelligence
Broad distribution, but frequently low
Usually average or above
Psychopathology
Symptoms directed to immediate gain
Not usually directed Not usually directed to immediate gain to immediate gain
Suggestibility
Common, often illsustained
Rare
Degree of morbidity
Physical suffering or threat to life sometimes present
Gross disfigurement; Gross disfigurement; threat to life threat to life common common
After Hawkings et al (1956).
Usually average or above
Rare
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well. Anxiety symptoms, manic–depressive illness and schizophrenia have also all been described in conjunction with anorexia nervosa. Bruch (1973) only rarely found the diagnosis of hysteria to be appropriate in her patients, but considered that the words ‘weak ego’, ‘diffuse ego boundaries’ or ‘narcissistic character’ were often applicable in conjunction with rather broad and nonspecific formal diagnoses. Thus anorexia nervosa may arise independently or in association with a variety of psychological states. Among other features, Dally characterises his hysterical patients as markedly frigid and as denying concern, anxiety or depression at not eating. Almost all patients employ subterfuge or deception to avoid eating, even when under pressure to do so, and the two commonest groups of personality traits described are those of emotional immaturity and obsessionality. The pathogenesis of anorexia nervosa appears to be multifactorial. Concern with dieting is always present, but genetic predisposition, family attitudes, prior gastrointestinal illness, mood changes, recent stresses, and personality disorder may all contribute. However, few if any of these factors appear to be essential to the development of the illness, including personality disorder (Garner, 1993). Garfinkel et al (1980) emphasised the heterogeneity of anorexia nervosa. Bulimic patients, who have only lately been distinguished from anorexic ones, are marked by self-induced vomiting and purging, and also display a variety of impulsive behaviours including use of alcohol and street drugs, stealing, suicide attempts and self-mutilation. Garfinkel et al (1983) looked at differences between patients with anorexia nervosa, weight loss and vomiting, and patients with conversion disorder who were admitted to hospital for the treatment of vomiting. The diagnosis of conversion disorder was based upon a chart review and a decision that the presenting symptoms were related to “a manifestation of core conflicts that were represented at a symbolic level”. Judgements of that sort present some difficulties in reliability, and unusually for a group with conversion symptoms the supposed conversion patients were older than the anorexia nervosa ones (although anorexia nervosa does tend to affect a young population). In any event, the two groups were readily distinguished, the non-anorexic patients having significantly less preoccupation with weight, body size and dieting, underestimating their actual size, and giving a larger estimate of their ideal size, in contrast with the anorexic group. They also display a stronger sense of self-control, less obsessive–compulsive behaviour, and more consistent social
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relationships. They had also had more medical illness and illness requiring surgery. These patients may not have been typical of hysterical conversion illnesses but, insofar as their patterns reflect a hysterical disorder, this is another group that does not readily resemble anorexia nervosa. Crisp (1970), like others, emphasises the way in which anorexia nervosa serves as a means to overcome sexual conflicts. The obsessional characteristics of so many patients, and the ascetic mechanisms of defence which are prominent in adolescence (A. Freud, 1937, 1946), are used to the limit in anorexia nervosa. Obviously, conflicts occur particularly in relation to oral drives, but also in relation to genital satisfactions and the acceptance of the future maternal role by girls. Such conflicts are not hard to find in patients with hysterical characteristics, in whom frigidity and immaturity are common (although not invariable). The occurrence of motor conversion symptoms has even been described in a case of anorexia nervosa (Scherrer et al, 1972). Hawkings et al (1956) (Table 8.1) related the characteristics of patients with deliberate disability to those with hysteria. Szyrynski (1973) observed that hysteria resembles anorexia through some superficial similarity of the mechanisms of denial and “blissful indifference”. In his view hostility is prevalent in both conditions, the secondary gain is more clearly manifested in hysteria, and self-destructive tendencies are less severe. Goldney & Simpson (1975) have seen a link between selfmutilation, hysterical personality and disturbances of appetite. Their article describes three female patients who showed an association between these symptoms. Their leading example is a married woman who had four children out of seven pregnancies. Three of the pregnancies terminated early, allegedly as the result of spontaneous abortion. In one pregnancy she spent seven months in hospital, and in another, five, for vaginal bleeding, and after her seventh pregnancy she underwent two subsequent curettage operations for bleeding and a hysterectomy. A history was obtained of her using a metal comb to cause bleeding. Apart from the occasions of conception, sexual relationships appear to have been relatively infrequent and she was regarded as having a severe hysterical personality disorder. In addition she gave evidence of anorexic symptoms, with associated vomiting, abdominal pains and loss of weight. Another patient, with clear evidence of anorexia nervosa and bulimia, shaved her pubic hair after she developed an aversion to body hair, particularly to that in the pubic area. A third patient gave a history of eating troubles, not quite enough to satisfy the
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authors that she had anorexia, which were also associated with the shaving of pubic hair and hysterical personality characteristics. The authors note other papers (Goldfield & Glick, 1970; French & Nelson, 1972) which discuss self-mutilation in women; Goldfield & Glick emphasised its link with many admissions to hospital, a complicated gynaecological history and the hysterical personality, while French & Nelson emphasised the link between mutilation and dysorexia as defined by Guiora (1967). Another patient, described by Simpson (1973), was also noted to have evidence of both dysorexia and genital mutilation. Goldney & Simpson argue that the combination of dysorexia, female genital self-mutilation and hysterical personality represents a triad of features which has a particular clinical pattern, and they call it the Caenis syndrome, after Caenis, described in the Metamorphoses of Ovid. Caenis was the loveliest of all the girls in Thessaly but refused to marry anyone and was raped by Neptune. In recompense Neptune granted her one wish and she said “The wrong I have suffered evokes the fervent wish that I may never be able to undergo such an injury again. Grant that I not be a woman and you will have given me all.” They argue that the circumstances preceding this wish and the feeling expressed in it appear to embody many aspects of the patients whom they describe with the triad of clinical features outlined. Such a combination of rare phenomena is surprising and its reported occurrence in a number of patients gives good grounds for the assumption that the association has a meaning. It certainly supports the idea that there is a link between phenomena of deliberate disability and anorexia nervosa and hysterical personality. Apart from these special associations, it is evident that all types of psychological illness may promote anorexia nervosa. Hysterical personality characteristics, including infantile dependent traits, contribute to or are associated with its development in a significant number of patients, and this provides some linkage with hysteria. The second major link is that all types of anorexia nervosa involve either conscious or unconscious production of symptoms and the denial of a problem. This problem may be similar dynamically to the problems of a number of patients with hysteria, that is, a difficulty in dealing with sexual relationships as a result of childhood experiences and family attitudes. Crisp (1970) sees the particular difficulty of patients with anorexia nervosa as being due to a ‘weight phobia’. It may be argued that – just as other phobias are not uncommon in patients with hysteria – we can suppose that a ‘weight phobia’ leading to anorexia nervosa could be one expression of the problems of
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patients with hysterical characteristics. It could equally of course, like other phobias, be either symptomatic of or associated with depression, anxiety, or schizophrenia. However, what is special to patients with anorexia nervosa compared with those with hysteria could be a higher degree of masochism and a lower, albeit still excessive, degree of narcissism.
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Amnesia, pseudodementia and the Ganser syndrome: denial of illness
“To think that two and two are four And neither five nor three The heart of man has long been sore And long ’tis like to be.” (A. E. Housman, Last Poems, XXXV)
The question of deception often arises in two more groups of patients who apparently have memory disturbances of psychological origin. They are those who display pseudodementia, or features of the Ganser syndrome, and those who have a claim to compensation. It is convenient to discuss the first group in this chapter, and the second group in Chapter 10. The supposed syndrome of multiple personality disorder, which is linked with fugue states and amnesia, requires a separate discussion (Chapter 20).
Hysterical amnesia Symonds observed (Appendix C) that hysterical amnesia, in his experience, was associated with awareness by the patients’ that they were counterfeiting their symptoms. Others find that it is wholly genuine in the sense that some patients appear truly lost, and on recovery give evidence of troublesome personal stresses which account for their condition. In civilian life, hysterical amnesia is rare. Lewis (1961) reports that in 1259 patients admitted within a period of 12 months to a hospital receiving psychiatric emergencies in London, 58 had 112
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organic amnesic syndrome, but only two patients were admitted during the same year because of hysterical amnesia for the details of their personal identity and experience. Lewis (1953) showed that a famous case of hysterical amnesia, which became the subject of a book on multiple personality, occurred in a man with a history of severe brain damage (cf. Chapters 11 and 20 for an account of this patient). A very famous case of carbon-monoxide poisoning with probable organic memory impairment which initiated a subsequent hysterical amnesia resembling the dysmnesic syndrome was originally described by Grünthal and Storring. This has been much argued about in the German literature and carefully reviewed by Zangwill (1967). The long persistence of the syndrome was ultimately shown to be due to deception. There is other evidence (Chapter 11) that hysterical symptoms are linked with brain damage. Occasionally fugue states with a hysterical pattern arise in depressive illness (Stengel, 1941). At the National Hospital for Nervous Diseases at Queen Square, a neurological hospital receiving patients from the whole range of a large metropolitan area and beyond, more cases of hysterical amnesia are seen than in general psychiatric practice, but these patients tend to have significant organic disease. Mr J. Stevenson (personal communication) kindly provided the following striking findings from Queen Square. “of 5000 consecutive patients seen in the psychology department between February 1969 and September 1974, 57 (1.14%) were classified as having pseudodementia either on its own or in conjunction with other psychological abnormalities. This classification also included patients with pseudoamnesia without pseudodementia. Of these 57 patients only 4 were passed by the doctors as being free from any neurological complaint; 93% of the pseudodements therefore also had some neurological disorder and only 7% were neurologically normal.”
The differentiation of a pseudodementia in the elderly from Alzheimer’s disease is important. The former is most often due to a depressive illness, whether or not the patient has a mild degree of dementia as well. Wells (1977, pp. 8,21) and Fisman (1985) have both discussed the features which help to distinguish the two groups of patients. These patients tend to have less immediate evidence of depression and the amnesia is the presenting problem. Careful inquiry almost always yields some evidence of depression in the patients with pseudodementia. The distinction is important because correct treatment of the depression may be highly beneficial, and the erroneous diagnosis of dementia may lead to
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long-term inappropriate care. However, Liberini et al (1993) have shown that a pattern of pseudodementia can occur in dependent elderly persons without depression. The topic is less relevant to hysteria than was once thought. The principal criteria of hysterical amnesia are a loss of knowledge of personal identity combined with preservation of environmental information and, often, complex learned information or skills. If patients have evidence of memory impairment combined with an impulse to wander, this constitutes a fugue state. Although we have noted that hysterical amnesia is rare in many settings, there are a few busy clinics which have come across numbers of patients, and there are at least seven reports of a series of patients with amnesia for personal identity or with a fugue state. Abeles & Schilder (1935) described 63 patients (31 men, 32 women), of whom 80% were in their second, third or fourth decades. Usually there was some preceding depression. Of these, 47 recovered spontaneously, and head injuries and carbonmonoxide poisoning were ‘not rare’. Four cases of simulation were recognised. Kanzer (1940) described 71 cases (41 men, 30 women) from Belle Vue Hospital, again, mostly between 20 and 40 years old. He noted that headache was a frequent complaint in his patients. Eight cases were atypical, having epilepsy or an organic disturbance and some resemblance to confusional states. Alcohol was a possible factor in 17 of his patients and emotional problems were established in at least 43. Experiences such as jilting, severe marital conflicts or bad financial difficulties were common. Most of his patients were depressed or agitated on admission. Wilson et al (1950) from the Philadelphia General Hospital described 59 cases of amnesia seen over eight years in private practice or in the neurological or psychiatric hospital services. Of these, 28 were held to be malingering, 15 were cases of central nervous system diseases, 7 were cases of psychosis and only 5, in their view, had hysteria. Of the 28 ‘malingered’ or ‘volitional’, three admitted deceit. This is an unusually high estimate of the numbers malingering and perhaps reflects exceptional confidence on the part of the authors in diagnosing that condition. It indicates, however, that there are some people who feel that deceit is a recognisable aspect in many patients with hysterical amnesia. Unfortunately, no indication is given of how Wilson et al were so successful in establishing the occurrence of malingering when other authors find it such a difficult problem for many cases. Kapur (1991) provided a useful description of a patient who reported memory loss of five days, during which he had wandered
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extensively. A recognition memory test was designed to assess his memory for public events which had taken place over the past six months. He had used his chequebook during the period of his wandering and he had looked after his needs and his personal hygiene, but he was unable to recall important personal information. The discrepancy between personal and public memory established the psychological basis of the memory loss rather than a neurological cause. McKinney & Lange (1983) reported a fugue state in an individual who had had previous episodes of fugues and whose father had behaved similarly. They noted that this offered a “learned” basis for the development of the fugue in their patient. Their patient did have a history of head injury, with a four-week hospital admission, but that was very remote from the time of his most recent fugue. The use of the chequebook in Kapur’s case raises the issue of malingering. Pankratz et al (1975) described a technique called symptom validity testing to detect malingering. It is based upon finding a response pattern which is clearly worse than chance and its successful use was described in further cases by Pankratz (1983) and Binder & Pankratz (1987). Stengel (1941) described 25 patients with fugues and is responsible for specifying the importance of depression in such patients. Ten of his patients had epilepsy, one schizophrenia, and the rest had typical manic–depressive, hysterical or psychopathic conditions. He described many instances of traumatic childhood experiences in his patients. Parfitt & Gall (1944) added another series on fugues. Berrington et al (1956) examined 37 cases of fugue seen at a psychiatric hospital (Runwell Hospital) and compared them with 37 psychiatric patients matched for age and sex. Sixteen of the index patients had severe head injury, and three had doubtful head injury. Three of the controls had head injury. Depression was prominent in both groups. They agreed with Stengel that lying and depression were prominent in fugue states but their patients had less evidence of a disturbed childhood. Hysterical mechanisms were common in their group of fugue patients, and from the figures quoted it is clear that cerebral trauma was very much more common than in controls (P < 0.01). They noted that this might produce indirect facilitation of the psychiatric symptom. Kennedy & Neville (1957) put together a series of 74 patients with sudden amnesia examined variously in Shropshire, London and Newcastle-upon-Tyne. It was found that 37% had gross organic
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disease of the central nervous system, 12% major epilepsy, 47% hysterical amnesia, 27% psychopathy or a very bad employment record, 16% a fear of arrest or disciplinary action, and 10% a functional psychosis. Seven per cent admitted malingering. The categories overlapped and, in addition, feeble-mindedness or illiteracy affected 3%, senility another 3%, and 4% of the patients were under 12 years of age. Dual organic and psychological aetiology were observed in 41% of the patients. Responses to suggestion were carefully considered, and the authors held that malingered amnesia is not usually difficult to detect but that hysterical amnesia frequently resembles malingering, and malingering may be admitted under pressure when in fact there is strong evidence of an organic or psychological cause. They remark that a confession cannot therefore be accepted as certain evidence of malingering. Their figures for the frequency of established malingering are much more typical of the general view than those of Wilson et al (1950). Taylor & Kopelman (1984) found that 19 out of a sample of 212 men (9%) charged with a number of offences claimed amnesia for the activity for which they were subsequently convicted. The amnesia only occurred in those who had committed violence and was most frequent following homicide. Four had a primary depressive illness and the remaining diagnoses were almost equally divided between schizophrenia and alcohol abuse, and none of the amnesias had any legal implications. The circumstances in these cases suggest that a variety of mechanisms accounted for the amnesia, including repression, dissociation and alcoholic blackouts. Even in the alcoholic cases, psychological defence mechanisms were probably of some importance. It appears that various situations, and especially severe emotional conflict and a background of brain damage, account for the bulk of cases of hysterical amnesia in civilians in the major Englishspeaking countries. Depression is also common, particularly in fugue states. Cases of amnesia with an organic basis are relatively more common in military populations than in civilian ones. Military psychiatrists have frequent experience of patients with circumscribed amnesia, usually, as Sim (1974) points out, with a powerful associated motivation related to over-riding duty, such as sailors who have jumped ship, men who have married bigamously and, in the writer’s experience, soldiers who are absent without leave. As already noted, the classic features of hysterical amnesia are a loss of memory for personal experiences and identity up to the point at which the loss of memory is discovered. Past skills (e.g. at arithmetic, chess playing) are preserved and extensive
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stores of information may be used about the government of a country, its geography and history and so forth. The patients often look somewhat puzzled, but ongoing information provided to the individual is retained. Unlike in Korsakoff’s syndrome, long conversations may be engaged in without patients repeating themselves. “I know my name is Private Thomas Atkins and I belong to X Regiment because it is on my identity card.” This is the paradigm of the military hysterical amnesic patient. In such cases differentiation from the organic dysmnesic syndrome is not difficult. Other patients, however, present a more confusing picture. A difficult minority, as in the Grünthal–Storring case, present with features perhaps partly organically based which are hard to discriminate, the differential diagnosis being made on the basis of considerations like the extent of retrograde amnesia, and inconsistency in responses and behaviour. Some medication may induce anterograde amnesia or partial amnesia. Intravenous benzodiazepines are quite well known for this effect, which may be confused with a psychologically induced loss of memory. Even oral lorazepam can have this effect (Scharf et al, 1983) and presents a problem on occasion with differential diagnosis.
Pseudodementia and Ganser syndrome A more bizarre pattern is presented by certain other patients overlapping with the above who claim to know nothing about their identity or large tracts of their past experience and also claim to lack knowledge of established skills. Objects may be correctly used but misidentified and their use wrongly described. A knife may be called a soup ladle, a spoon is said to be used for cutting bread. There is a pattern of behaviour which the patient thinks indicates madness, such as drinking urine because this is thought to be what lunatics do (Sim, 1974). In this pattern, known as pseudodementia, the patient may give answers which are commonly described as ‘Vorbeigehen’ or ‘Vorbeireden’ (Moeli, 1888), meaning to pass by or to give approximate answers, such as a cow has six legs, or 2 + 2 = 5, or the patient counts a simple series with omissions, for example 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19, 21 (Snell, 1855; cited by Bucknill & Tuke, 1862, p. 372), the colour of the sky on a fine day is pink, and so on. Such answers are plainly silly, although the individual shows coordinated behaviour and coherent speech.
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This phenomenon, perhaps indicating feigned insanity, was noted as long ago as 1608 by Guazzo and in the 19th century by Snell, Tuke, Maudsley and Moeli (see Enoch et al, 1967). In 1898 Ganser in fact described three prisoner patients who showed the central feature of Vorbeireden and a number of additional features, namely altered consciousness with impaired grasp of attention and concentration, a memory defect, anxiety, perplexity, hallucinations and manifestly hysterical motor and sensory symptoms. The differential diagnosis has to be made from the occasional schizophrenic patient whom Bleuler (1950) and later Sim (1968) noted to show ‘a buffoonery syndrome’ which is, however, associated with positive evidence of schizophrenia. Enoch et al (1967) and Whitlock (1967a) have reviewed the literature. Whitlock notes that the full Ganser syndrome is very rare. Some authors use the terms pseudodementia and Ganser syndrome interchangeably. Others hold that they are distinct syndromes. Whitlock reasonably enough supports the suggestion of Scott (1965) that the Ganser symptoms should be distinguished from the Ganser syndrome, the latter being characterised both in Ganser’s patients and Whitlock’s by impairment of consciousness. Whitlock further points out that the condition is not confined to prisoners. He himself described six patients, of whom five had convincing evidence of brain damage and the other a schizophreniform psychosis. He draws attention to further reports of the syndrome in non-prisoners; only 4 of the 18 described with adequate detail in the English literature between 1934 and 1962 were in prison, and Sim (1974) mentions a case found in association with a large parasagittal meningioma. Anderson & Mallinson (1941) described three most convincing cases in naval personnel, one of whom had evidence of schizophrenia and the two others retarded depression. Tsoi (1973) reported 10 cases of amnesia from Singapore, where none of the patients could answer simple questions or add or count. Seven had fugue or trance-like states, six had auditory hallucinations (four of these also had visual hallucinations) and one had conversion hysteria. Head injury or brain damage (with a claim for compensation) was present in one only. The patients were Indians, Malays and Chinese, the first group particularly being over-represented in proportion to their numbers in the population. Three faced trial for murder, five wished to leave the army or retire early on medical grounds, and one was seeking to escape from domestic problems. Tsoi found the disturbances of consciousness hard to confirm, being “too subjective and ill-defined to be good criteria”. Milder forms of pseudodementia may be associated with depression in younger people, just as they are in the elderly.
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Friedman & Lipowski (1981) describe such a case of a conversion symptom associated with reactive depression. Weller (1988) described hysterical behaviour in four patients from communities with a patriarchal social pattern, including hallucinations in one patient, and a state of being found “unconscious” in her sister. There were more prominent Ganser symptoms in the third woman, a spinster, aged 28, and fainting and weakness in the voice of a patient who was in conflict with her parents about her wish for more education. The emergence of Ganser-like symptoms in one of these patients was due to substantial stress, but not associated with either organic brain disease or involvement in criminal activities. Rieger & Billings (1978) reported yet another association with Ganser syndrome: being a litigant. The patient was a 38-year-old married, retired, police officer who was involved as a plaintiff in three separate substantial actions for damages. He showed memory impairment and the syndrome of approximate answers, and the authors considered that he was showing the syndrome of approximate answers with dissociative phenomena, and conversion symptoms. This does not appear to have been a full-blown case of Ganser syndrome, but certainly demonstrated Ganser symptoms. Feinstein & Hattersley (1988) found a Ganser syndrome with approximate answers and evident dysprosody in one patient, with a number of changes in the quality of speech, including a rising inflection at the end of a sentence, halting, laboured and telegraphic speech, and a tendency to omit indefinite articles or auxiliary verbs. No organic damage was found and the illness was attributed to psychological causes. Yet another case of Ganser syndrome has been described in an Indian boy, aged 11 (Dabholkar, 1987). Two major lines of evidence have to be accepted both with hysterical amnesia and with other hysterical symptoms. One is that this type of syndrome may be promoted by organic cerebral illness; the other is that appropriate motivation is a sufficient cause, especially in unsophisticated subjects. A hysterical syndrome, which may be provoked either organically or psychologically, presents an important theoretical problem to which we will return again (Chapter 11). Meanwhile, we can recognise that the unsophisticated, the immature and the brain-damaged, when under sufficient stress, can all produce symptoms which attempt to solve a conflict. If, as Housman pointed out, the heart of man may want 2 + 2 to make 5 or 3, the unconscious mind of man often has little difficulty in satisfying itself that it has done so. The motivation may be conscious, unconscious, or both. If the patients do not show organic illness, they show evidence of psychological difficulties and even classic functional psychoses. They also indicate a
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continuum of clinical phenomena between awareness and unconscious motivation in the production of hysterical symptoms. Ganser syndrome may be regarded as a factitious mental illness, but not all factitious mental illness is the same as the Ganser pattern. Various reports exist of the simulation of psychotic symptoms somewhat resembling the Munchausen syndrome or occurring just once on their own. As discussed in the previous chapter, King David (I Samuel, 21, 11–15) provides one of the earliest examples of feigned psychosis, and Jones & Llewellyn (1917) state that the simulation of psychological illness is very rare. Jefferson & Ochitill (1982) have questioned whether the syndrome exists at all as a free-standing entity. However, Hay (1983) describes the apparent simulation of psychosis occurring as a prodromal phase of schizophrenia in extremely deviant premorbid personalities. Perhaps the commonest situation of feigned psychosis which psychiatrists encounter occurs in patients who have had a schizophrenic illness and either feign recurrence (Ritson & Forrest, 1970) or claim the continuation of symptoms which have been put into remission by treatment (Pope et al, 1982), in order to stay in hospital. Sale et al (1979) have described three cases of ‘Munchausen syndrome’ presenting in a psychiatric context, and Cheng & Hummel (1978) described another two cases, one presenting with apparent rambling talk, loose associations, and so on, and the other presenting with depressive complaints, both of whom appear to behave like Munchausen patients, becoming angry or demanding and discharging themselves. All these seem to reflect an effort to make use of some social or economic benefits which admission to hospital might provide, but are likely only to be undertaken by individuals who either have had a psychosis or have a severe personality problem as well. Anthropologists have also been known to arrange the feigning of psychotic illness for their own purposes in studying the operations of psychiatric units (Rosenhan, 1973). Feigned illness has been present following bereavement (Snowdin et al, 1978), in alcohol abuse (Caradoc-Davies, 1988) and in posttraumatic stress disorder (Sparr & Pankratz, 1983). In some circumstances the need to solve a conflict may produce not an illness but denial of one which is present. This provides an important contrast to the foregoing.
Denial phenomena Mechanisms of denial are frequently discussed in writings on hysterical and simulated illness. In such situations it is the denial
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of problems which is noted, while claim is laid to the status of illness. However, an intermediate phenomenon, denial of concern, is implicitly evident in the notion of belle indifference. From this it is a fairly easy step – perhaps too easily made – to the idea of denial of illness. Patterns of denial of illness show a curious polarity in relation to hysteria. They occur clearly in anorexia nervosa, whose links with hysteria we have explored. And they are at the same time opposed in logic to the basic hysterical symptom. Perhaps it is reasonable to regard denial, tout court, in psychological illness as a fundamental phenomenon; and to expect its application to specific situations to produce the polar contrasts just mentioned. Thus denial may be of a conflict, when it will cause a symptom; or of a symptom or fear, when it will cause detachment of some sort in mood. The disposition to use the basic mechanism of denial can thus be seen as a mechanism of defence which we regard as typically but not invariably hysterical. The psychiatric settings in which denial occurs are varied. Weisman (1972) has reviewed the matter. Besides those which we have been considering, bereavement and mourning have been widely regarded as providing occasions for denial of the loss. Hallucinations of the dead person may occur in more than 50% of bereaved individuals (Rees, 1971). Mourning phenomena, especially keeping a little museum of relics of the departed, but also the more common and culturally accepted practices of visiting cemeteries, laying flowers and uttering prayers, represent a potential for maintaining links which objectively have been ruptured, even though emotionally they may still persist. Denial of cancer or of approaching death is likewise a common phenomenon. Numerous reports indicate the readiness with which doctors believe that patients do not wish to be told of these conditions (medical denial?) and with which patients ‘forget’ the prognosis which they have been given (Saunders, 1966; Hackett & Cassem, 1974). Anyone who is faced with disaster or bad news tends to react initially with disbelief or denial, but successful denial is difficult to sustain, and a fuller realisation overtakes most people, whether or not information is given to them in words (Saunders, 1975). Thus persistent denial may be more related to individual personalities and their favourite defence mechanisms. Hackett & Weisman (1962) observe that the processes of denial are notoriously active in the dying patient and that it is not uncommon to hear a moribund patient speak of going on a vacation. They think that this type of global or massive denial seems to be more common among patients facing sudden death than among those dying slowly. For example, 16 out of 23 patients
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on a cardiac pacemaker for heart block flatly denied fear or concern with death, in spite of the fact that they had been fully informed of the danger. Interestingly, those who have studied the dying make little, if any, mention of the sort of conversion symptoms with which we are concerned in the traditional type of discussion on hysteria. Perhaps the presence of various prominent and impressive physical problems – in this setting – obviates the need for additional physical symptoms as a means of psychological or social adjustment. Tauschke et al (1990a) obtained evidence from another direction which supports this view. Patients with chronic pain had less reported evidence of poor care in childhood and employed more mature defence mechanisms than psychiatric out-patients. The methods of defence which the pain patients used, as measured by the Defense Mechanisms Inventory (Gleser & Ihilevich, 1969), were more often reversal and principalisation. Reversal includes negation, denial, reaction formation and repression, while principalisation refers to intellectualisation, isolation and rationalisation. Vaillant (1976) has provided a ranking of defence mechanisms according to which reversal and principalisation are more mature than turning against the self, turning against the object, or projection. Moreover, there are positive relationships between principalisation and reversal and parental care (Tauschke et al, 1990b). In patients who are not necessarily bound to die, the coping mechanism of denial has been regarded as the principal way in which acute coronary patients manage the psychological stress of their illness (Hackett et al, 1968). This school does not regard denial as a specific defence mechanism so much as a process by which many other defence mechanisms can be employed in the service of reducing stress, for example by rationalisation, intellectualising or displacement (Froese et al, 1974). As Hackett & Cassem (1974) point out, these phenomena of denial are very common among the physically ill. In a series of 345 male patients who had just experienced their first myocardial infarction, Croog et al (1971) found that 209 did not admit to thinking that they had had a heart attack, despite the fact that the patients had good reason to know better. Interestingly, there is some evidence that effective denial produces a better survival rate in the coronary care unit (Hackett et al, 1968), perhaps by reducing anxiety with its possible morbid effects. Successful deniers of this sort deny danger and are unruffled, cool, perhaps projecting their fear, “My wife was scared, but I wasn’t” (Hackett & Cassem, 1974). Weisman & Hackett (1961) defined denial as the conscious or unconscious repudiation of part or all of the total available
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meaning of an event, to allay fear, anxiety or other unpleasant affects. This is in contradistinction to the wider-ranging traditional view, evident in Anna Freud’s writing (Freud, 1937) that denial is a fundamental defence mechanism. It suffices for our main purpose to note that the more widespread use of denial is that which is found with physical illness and objective reasons for fear. A more special use is found with hysterical symptoms, and the two uses should not be identified with each other arbitrarily.
Neurological illness The occurrence of denial with neurological illness requires separate consideration. Some authors have argued that anosognosia, that is, denial of disease, is the result of failure of recognition of its presence, but other authors do not agree. Weinstein & Kahn (1955) observe that while denial in most physical illness is implicit, in neurological illness it is often notably explicit. These authors point out that patients will deny that they cannot lift their left arm, or give excuses for not doing so, despite being confronted with evidences of failure. Similarly, they note that the patient will deny or show unconcern not only for disabilities on the side opposite the brain lesion, but also for those on the same side. Thus, such a patient may make excuses for not lifting a right arm which is tied down, or may show unconcern about the amputation of a leg for cancer. Geschwind (personal communication) pointed out that denial or unconcern with illness is much more common with right-hemisphere lesions than with left-hemisphere lesions, a fact long familiar in the neurological literature. He noted that the most striking feature of these patients is a change in emotional behaviour, and argued that the right hemisphere is dominant for certain types of emotional expression. He cited the study of Gainotti (1972), which showed that in a large series of patients right-hemisphere lesions typically produced indifference, while left-hemisphere lesions were more likely to produce concern. Geschwind maintained that inattention to the left side is related to unconcern with illness only indirectly, and should not be regarded as its cause. The view that the right hemisphere is usually ‘dominant for emotion’ has much evidence in its favour. Lishman (1968) showed that affective disorders and somatic symptoms tend to occur disproportionately in association with right-hemispheric injuries. Flor-Henry (1978) reviews the other evidence on the topic, which includes laterality effects in affective syndromes occurring with
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temporal lobe epilepsy, neuropsychological data, and results from power spectral analysis of the electroencephalogram. Enough has been said here to indicate that the phenomena of denial require careful definition in discussion. Only some of them, namely denial of a conflict, or neglect of certain disabilities, as in belle indifference and anorexia nervosa, have an immediate relationship to hysterical phenomena. Other relationships may be disclosed in time between hysterical conversion and more wideranging phenomena of denial, but these are not part of our immediate topic.
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10 Compensation issues
The same continuum between conscious and unconscious motivation that was discussed in the last chapter appears when financial compensation is an issue. In one respect a hysterical symptom for which compensation may be a motive is no different from any other hysterical complaint. It represents a relevant and obvious reason for the individual to have a symptom. In two respects, however, it differs from most other hysterical symptoms. First, as in the Ganser group and prison psychoses referred to in Chapter 9, the motive is readily available to most people’s conscious minds and the suspicion, and indeed the possibility, of malingering occur very readily. Secondly, any help rendered to the patient or claimant by the doctor may affect the interests of other people or institutions adversely. This is a besetting problem for many psychiatric situations where the patient’s needs can conflict with those of relations or associates. More needs to be said about this in psychiatric teaching or in psychiatric monographs than is usual. These basic facts of common-sense psychology permeate numerous cases which are argued about between doctors and lawyers. In particular, a tone of hostility to alleged ‘compensationitis’ is prominent in writers like Miller (1961), who seemed to be called mainly by insurance companies. In contrast, a judge (Lawton, 1969) noted the improved and useful opinions which have been obtained in Britain since reasonable provision for care became available under the National Health Service, and it became the custom to seek opinions from those who have been engaged in treating the patients. Miller (1961) offered evidence that patients with ‘minor’ head injury almost invariably recovered on settlement of their claims. He quoted to powerful effect the aphorism of Kennedy (1946) that “a compensation neurosis is a state of mind, born out of fear, 125
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kept alive by avarice, stimulated by lawyers and cured by a verdict”. Although all the facts that he mentioned may have a role in producing symptoms after injury, it is probably true to say that every part of the statement was more wrong than right. At all events, Mendelson (1982) demonstrated that out of 10 studies of compensation following accidents, not one had confirmed Miller – although he still has his defenders, such as Sim (1992). As well, Tarsh & Royston (1985) followed up 35 claimants with so-called accident neurosis, in which there were gross perplexing somatic symptoms without demonstrable organic pathology. They found that few claimants recovered after settlement and such recovery as did take place was unrelated to the time of compensation. The legal process and the delays involved, however, caused great distress. I am not suggesting that the irritation or hostility which Miller reflected and which is sometimes felt in reaction to patients with compensation claims is entirely unjustified, but it should not colour clinical judgement or be expressed in consultations. As Gowers (1892, vol. I, p. 594) observed about patients with spinal complaints: “the sinister influence of litigation on the intellect may be traced very widely. I believe that it is rare for symptoms to be purely mental. It is often asserted by those employed for railway companies that subjective symptoms quickly subside when the sufferers’ ‘claims’ are settled. It should be remembered that mental anxiety is a potent cause of diseases of the nervous system and must be strongly opposed to recovery from genuine disorders. The occurrence of improvement when suspense is at an end, is thus no proof in itself of the nature of the case, its significance has been unquestionably over-estimated; moreover, in a great many individuals whom I have had an opportunity of observing long after they had received their ‘damages’ (as the expression curiously runs) this subsidence had not occurred and even the ‘sovereign balm’ of substantial compensation appeared to do very little for the relief of the sufferer.”
Three particular situations deserve attention. The first follows from any alarming but physically harmless accident, whose effects relate solely to psychological stresses. The second arises after injury to the body without injury to the head. The third situation occurs after head injury: this involves questions related to the emotional stress sustained, to the psychological significance of the part of the body, and to the possible occurrence of brain damage. Some accidents are moderately distracting to the average person and extremely so to the vulnerable individual. To be stuck in an
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aerial cablecar for an hour or two may cause some fear in all but the most sanguine. Such fear ceases completely for most people within an hour or two after the event, but for a small percentage it will persist for a day or two, or even several weeks. It can return unexpectedly – at least after a short interval – and in a few cases may serve as a starting point for a more protracted bout of anxiety. Any anxiety lasting more than a few days could be accompanied by hysterical manifestations – or possibly replaced by them. To witness a catastrophe, especially if it affects a close and loved relation, can be similarly – or even more – disturbing. Kinston & Rosser (1974) reviewed the consequences of mass catastrophes. They noted the widespread and sometimes persistent occurrence of anxiety in many survivors who were physically unharmed. Nightmares, irritability and complaints of exhaustion and depression are common after such experiences. In individual cases Keiser (1968), who has explored the problems of traumatic neurosis in detail, has no difficulty in showing the understandable nature of many complaints which arise in patients independently of the issue of compensation. Prolonged psychological stress – accompanied both by realistic threats to personal integrity and to the survival of loved ones, as in concentration camp inmates – has also produced prolonged psychological, and even psychotic, illness (Eitinger, 1964; Matussek et al, 1971, cited by Low-Beer, 1972; Kinston & Rosser, 1974) as discussed earlier (Chapter 7). Physical suffering involving the body may equally give rise to prolonged fear. A miner whose abdomen was crushed and who suffered a painful rupture of the pancreas from a fall of stone became understandably frightened of returning to underground work. Traffic injuries provide yet another circumstance in which posttraumatic neurosis may occur, and where the possibility of gain is frequently alleged, both in Canada and in Britain, to be the major factor in producing the patient’s symptoms. In Canada, Kuch et al (1991b) have shown that as many as 70% of a series of patients who were injured in motor vehicle accidents demonstrated phobic symptoms in relation to car travel even though this was not their principal or leading complaint. In the Netherlands, Brom et al (1993) studied victims who were involved in an accident described as “moderately serious to serious”, by five independent judges from the police records. Severe or moderately severe symptoms of intrusive thoughts or a need to avoid situations which reminded the subject of the accident were found six months afterwards in up to 25% of the patients. The exacerbation of injuries by purely hysterical symptoms can also occur and, although the problem does not often appear at
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psychiatric clinics, orthopaedic surgeons are concerned with this situation and the difficulties it presents. These are especially troublesome with back injuries, which constitute a very awkward clinical problem. The discomfort and pain which can arise from organic back disorders (e.g. facet joint disease) are often both real and hard to quantify. Whether or not there is reliable evidence of a displaced disc, it is common for patients to present in orthopaedic, neurological and physical medicine clinics with a disabling pain which is worse on activity and relieved by rest. This is frequently associated with a claim related to injury, but often occurs without such a claim. However, even in the latter case it may establish the right to continuing social security payments, invalidity benefits or pensions. In this context individual differences in personality are regularly recognised as important. Some patients with proven disc lesions struggle on despite often making their pain worse. Others with no physical evidence of illness (which does not necessarily mean there is no physical cause) ‘give in’ quite readily. The latter are liable to be referred to psychiatric attention and present a worrying problem. In one of the writer’s own cases, for instance, gross osteoarthrosis appeared in the dorsal vertebrae of a woman, aged 39, who had been very thoroughly investigated, with negative results, for complaints of pain in the relevant area in the preceding two years. Her original complaints were coupled with an untenable charge of negligence against doctors who had treated her in childbirth, as well as gross resentment and substantial problems in her relationship with her husband. Waddell and his colleagues (Waddell, 1987a,b; Waddell et al, 1980, 1984) have offered evidence that certain types of clinical signs found in orthopaedic examination are non-organic, since they are more common in patients who lack conventionally strong evidence of organic disease like disc prolapse. This will be true on occasion, but the extent to which certain less well defined presumed organic conditions (mechanical back pain, fibromyalgia and myofascial pain) contribute to these signs remains to be determined. The diagnosis of chronic hysterical pain is particularly difficult because there are no signs which will unequivocally prove that such pain itself is hysterical. This may seem surprising to those who have been brought up on the idea that a regional syndrome is evidence of a symptom in the mind of the patient and therefore of a psychological cause. However, exciting neurophysiological evidence has appeared over the last 15–20 years in studies by Wall and his colleagues (see Wall, 1984, 1989; McMahon & Wall, 1984; Cook et al, 1987). Intracellular recording in the spinal cord will
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identify second-order dorsal-horn neurones which will respond to local stimulation by pinch or some other mild noxious stimulus, but not to light touch. After injury in a neighbouring area, responses to noxious stimuli may be demonstrated in these cells by stimulating adjoining parts which previously would not induce a response from them. In other words, the area which can hurt enlarges and sensory stimulation will give new and anomalous responses; noxious stimuli from outside the usual receptive field will influence spinal neurones and a stimulus which previously would only give rise to evidence of light touch may give rise to the response normally found with nociceptive activity. These changes cross nerve boundaries and overlap from one anatomical region to another. They are based upon pathophysiological changes in receptive fields of the second-order neurones. Such changes do not respect basic anatomical distributions of the nervous system but are nevertheless physiological. Hence, altered sensation to light touch or pin prick or spreading areas of pain following an initial lesion, or in the presence of an initial illness or injury, are not necessarily evidence of hysteria but are quite likely to be evidence of physiological changes and the severity of the pain. The diagnosis of hysterical symptoms on the basis of sensory phenomena has also been shown to be unreliable. It has long been known that the responses found on sensory testing might say more about the suggestibility of the patient and the dominance of the examiner than about the actual disorder from which the patient suffered. Additional information indicates not only that changes in regional phenomena might be physiological, but also that the traditional signs of hysteria, examined in another way may be unreliable. Gould et al (1986) studied 29 patients with acute stroke and one other patient with acute neurological disease. They examined them for seven traditional signs of hysteria, namely a history suggestive of hypochondriasis, potential secondary gain, belle indifference, non-anatomical or patchy sensory loss, changing boundaries of hyperalgesia, sensory loss to pin prick or vibratory stimulation that splits at the midline, and give-way weakness. All the patients demonstrated at least one. Twenty-nine showed at least one feature of a supposedly non-physiological sensory examination. The mean number of these items per patient was 3.4. The authors infer that hysteria is easily misdiagnosed if the above signs or items of history are accepted as pathognomonic and that these tests, which are said to provide evidence of hysteria, lack validity. Findings like these reinforce hints from other directions of an organic or physiological element in chronic pain syndromes, for
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example the results of intravenous barbiturate investigations of patients with pain may now be seen to tend in that direction. Walters (1973) found many patients who retained cutaneous superficial tenderness after the first level of anaesthesia had been reached (e.g. eyelid areflexia). This tenderness only goes away at the next lower level of anaesthesia, when deep tenderness may persist. Walters considered that the syndrome of superficial tenderness was associated with psychogenic regional pain, as he called it, but he inferred that the syndrome had at least some basis in psychophysiological change and was not malingered. It was often found in association with compensation claims. But if the symptom was of psychological origin, perhaps it should have disappeared at the first level of anaesthesia. Still more notably, there is a growing body of evidence that a number of syndromes which were somewhat hard to analyse because they lacked standard physical signs, nevertheless have a substantial organic basis. It is now well recognised, particularly since the work of MacNab (1964, 1973), that individuals who have been involved in rear-end collisions causing cervical sprain injuries (‘whiplash’) are likely to have suffered from damage in the structures of the neck, including torn muscle fibres, ruptured ligaments, haematomas in the muscles, retropharyngeal haematomas, and even occasionally partial separation of cervical discs. This sort of evidence (found experimentally in monkeys subjected to appropriate deceleration) showed a strong organic basis for a condition that had often been held to persist without any physical justification. Still later work (Taylor & Kakulas, 1991) showed that injuries to the cervical motion segments in deceased trauma victims were much more common than fractures of the cervical vertebrae. In two young adult male survivors of neck injury who later died, necropsy findings showed a good correlation between the sites of disc injuries and the segmental distribution of pain. Neither of these patients had signs which were demonstrable by imaging during life, but transverse clefts were found in four discs in one of the patients and cord damage in the form of demyelination and gliosis of the left lateral column with overlying dural fibrous thickening in the other patient. With hindsight the latter patient, who was said by an orthopaedic surgeon to have “a very strong functional element in his symptoms”, seems to have had traumatic posterior prolapses of the C5–6 disc and possibly the C4–5 disc. Clefts in trauma patients which persist for a year or more in the innervated parts of the anterior anulus may develop adjacent scarring, possible calcification, and vascular and neural in-growth
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into the disc clefts. These findings may account both for the initial onset of pain and for a later exacerbation of pain which has declined after an initial cervical sprain injury. Cervical sprain injuries are also twice as common in individuals who have been wearing seat belts and have suffered rear-end collision than in those who were not. It is unlikely that this is due to the psychology of the patient; probably the seat belt fixes the body but leaves the neck free to move, saving patients from severe head injury but preserving them for a cervical hyperextension flexion injury (Allen et al, 1985). Interestingly, Sir John Erichsen (1886) observed with respect to “concussion of the spine” occurring in railway accidents that those individuals who suffered most were those who had their backs directed towards the site of the impact, rather than those who were facing it. In the days when railway passengers sat in two rows facing each other in compartments they seem to have provided a controlled comparison for studying the effects of collisions in which the impact was behind the subject. Notwithstanding the difficulties posed by an organic diagnosis, which cannot initially be made and may take months or years to be established, it remains the case that a large aura of neurotic problems surrounds patients with neck injuries or with chronic low back pain, whether or not this is related to injuries for which compensation can be claimed. Wolkind & Forrest (1972) showed a clear predominance of neurotic symptoms in those patients with low back pain who failed to improve with physiotherapy, while a larger group with low back pain from whom these non-responders were drawn had no more evidence of recovery than a control group of men in industry. They considered that the association of neurosis with non-improving low back pain was established but that it was not possible to say whether a mood state caused the pain or vice versa. In a selected population of American veterans who mostly (or all) qualified for various benefits, Sternbach et al (1973) showed an equivalent degree of change on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) in patients with and patients without definite evidence of physical lesions. A similar situation was found among patients with chronic pain from neurological lesions compared with psychiatric patients with pain who had no organic lesions (Merskey & Woodforde, 1972). Sternbach et al (1973) showed further that patients with chronic low back pain had more MMPI evidence of hysterical and hypochondriacal symptoms and depression than those with acute back pain. Sternbach & Greenhoot (1974) also found that patients who had active treatment became
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less neurotic in terms of their modest but significant reduction in scores on the MMPI. Thus there is some reason to think that many patients who have neurotic symptoms related to pain, including low back pain, might have these symptoms as a secondary effect of their physical status. Even those patients who can be shown by techniques of physical examination to have, say, hysterical exacerbation of their disability may, nevertheless, have an important organic basis for their complaint. The value of the MMPI evidence is limited, however (see Chapter 13), because the recording of symptoms or responses on that test has frequently been carried out without regard for the possible presence of organic disorders. Among the author’s patients with chronic severe pain, the commonest psychiatric condition found was a depressive illness, usually of the severity of a major affective disorder (Merskey et al, 1987). The obvious explanation of this is that many patients who suffer from chronic pain, financial deprivation subsequent to unemployment, loss of status as bread winners, marital changes and other social difficulties – as well as the actual unpleasantness of persistent pain – will become depressed. In a prospective study of cervical sprain injuries, Radanov et al (1991) have nicely shown that the depression and impairment of concentration which can be found with such injuries are related to the severity of pain at onset and not to emotional changes. Other authors (Atkinson et al, 1991) found that depression occurred about twice as frequently after injury in workers receiving industrial compensation, as before. In recent years attention has also been given to more sophisticated analyses of the claim that those receiving compensation have more psychological symptoms. When the cases receiving compensation were compared with those not receiving compensation, and both groups were controlled for the presence or absence of unemployment, little difference appeared between them (Melzack et al, 1985; Dworkin et al, 1985). Pelz & Merskey (1982) also found that within a group of patients with chronic pain attending a nerve block clinic, those in receipt of compensation did not differ significantly from each other on the SCL-90 (Symptom Check List – 90), which is a measure of the psychological state. This is not to suggest that the opportunity to be off work while continuing to receive income may not be a significant factor in promoting some sickness absence. Bigos et al (1991) found that workers who had previously indicated that they did not like their job were 2.5 times more likely than others to stay off work with complaints of minor back injury. However, these were short-term studies, and even there, the occurrence of prior back complaints was also a significant indicator. In practical terms, the finding
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meant that about 20% of the variance for those who were off at any one time might be attributable to dislike of the job rather than to the patient’s physical status. These findings are important in the case of brief complaints but have not been shown to count for much with respect to long-term disability. The larger problems with chronic pain and allegations of hysteria have to do with long-term unemployment. Here there is some evidence (Sander & Meyers, 1986) that the financial rewards of compensation prolonged the recovery of those injured at work. A group of patients injured on duty took 14.2 months to return to work compared with another matched group, injured off duty, who returned within 4.9 months. Mendelson (1993) reviews additional evidence on this topic and comes to the conclusion that the availability of compensation benefits and litigation may have an adverse effect on the response to treatment, but this effect can be modified by specific rehabilitation programs (e.g. Catchlove & Cohen, 1983; Weisel et al, 1984). Mendelson further notes the relevance of psychosocial factors to repetitive strain injuries and the frequency with which they can increase in numbers in relation to social acceptance and the opportunities for benefits. Despite the perplexing difficulties the effort must be made to sort out the psychological and organic issues for each patient. For this the standard techniques of both physical and psychological examination have to be carried out thoroughly and patiently, and supplemented, where necessary and appropriate, with suitable but not excessive investigations. In the psychiatric cases motive other than compensation may be disclosed: bereavement; job problems; interpersonal difficulties; and so on. A minority of cases will remain uncertain and may require observation over some months or longer, but in the remainder, it will frequently be reasonable to assume that compensation motives are relevant.
The relationship of hysterical symptoms to bodily injury It was noted above that hysterical symptoms can complicate posttraumatic neurosis in which injury does not occur. It is therefore not surprising that bodily injury may give rise to hysterical symptoms. It has to be accepted that accidents giving rise to physical injury will be liable to provoke conversion symptoms. Despite the doubts and uncertainties about financial motivation, it remains true that accidents may cause genuine hysterical disability, usually over and above either minor or major physical problems.
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The management of these cases sadly requires platitudes for its description. Doctors must be patient, tolerant, cautious, sceptical, fair to the sick and not fooled by the malingerer. They must endeavour to minimise the factors which promote disability, to solve the patient’s problems, and to produce an evaluation in perfect wisdom and detachment. It cannot be done but it has to be attempted. For this reason many doctors take refuge in the following, not wholly ignoble, formula: ‘the patient can be expected to recover soon after the settlement of legal proceedings’. I have already referred to Gowers’ view of this attitude . Nevertheless, the formula is frequently correct with regard to psychological complaints like depression, for the following reasons. First, many illnesses have a limited time course – some patients actually recover before the conclusion of legal negotiations (Kelly & Smith, 1981). Secondly, malingerers take their gains and cease visiting the doctor. Thirdly, many genuine patients have some of their problems resolved by knowing where they stand, clearing the debts which have followed their injury, and feeling free from the fear of being the subject of legal argument. Being called upon to give testimony and face cross-examination in the setting of a court is normally worrying even to those with a good conscience. Release from these worries enables patients to make the best of their circumstances. On the other hand, pain is not usually influenced by legal settlement.
Repetitive strain injury Repetitive strain injuries (RSI) form a particular case where organic dysfunction initiates the disorder in some cases but psychological factors are liable to play a more important role when there is a large number of cases. The latter type of cases might be considered in Chapter 16, dealing with epidemic illness, but both because of the possibility of organic causes and because of their relationship to compensation they are discussed here. In one example of organic dysfunction, a female worker on an assembly line was required to complete the attachment of two metal parts by raising the heavier portion (weighing some 7 to 10 pounds) and then making a twisting motion with it. Within three weeks she was permanently disabled by chronic wrist pain. This ergonomic disaster occurred in a small factory which has since closed down under economic pressure. The patient was aware of at least two others out of a workforce of approximately 25 who developed similar complaints. More often, currently, the organic
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cause of chronic RSI is sustained typing at a keyboard. The emergence of this problem appears to be linked to the lack of rest between lines of typing. With typewriters the carriage return provided a brief but important break in repetitive fine movements which has been lost with word processor keyboards. Such effects of overuse have long been known in various circumstances and include several where negative motivation is not an issue. On the contrary, the demands of training make overuse injury endemic in modern sport (Sperryn, 1994) and the problems of musicians are well recognised (Fry, 1986; Bird, 1989; Hochberg et al, 1993), and in both these groups when emotional problems occur they are ordinarily secondary to the disorder (although a particular grip or pattern of tension in holding string instruments is relevant for some musicians). Histological evidence related to clinical severity also exists in favour of an organic diagnosis in patients with continuous pain, tenderness and weakness of the wrist (Dennett & Fry, 1988). Hocking (1987) described an epidemic of RSI in Telecom Australia between the years 1981 to 1985, telephonists and keyboard staff members being the most affected. He found little evidence of a consistent dose–response relationship between keyboard rate and RSI, age, or job duration, and he noted that others had questioned the importance of posture. He argued that social factors had promoted the epidemic and his view was supported by Cleland (1987) and Ferguson (1987). A greater tradition of trade union activism was cited as one reason for the issue being most prominent in Australia (Willis, 1986). The evidence for social factors was not conclusive either for all cases or – in some views – for the majority, but it seems to be generally agreed that claims declined after a number of court judgements against claimants. In addition to those with more conventional opinions, Willis (1986), a sociologist with evident Marxist leanings, supported a social interpretation and put down the medical model as follows: “It is necessary to understand the social process by which this paradigm of medical knowledge became dominant and the manner in which certain types of medical knowledge served dominant class interests and were sponsored by capital as a result. The biomedical paradigm became articulated in capitalist societies in corporatist terms. Disease came to be understood in individual and biological terms rather than social and political terms and the industrial analogy developed, viewing the body as a machine with replaceable parts and requiring engineering and ergonomic solutions.”
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Thus from two ends of the political spectrum the view was supported that the complaints were of psychological origin. The argument is not yet dead, however. The effects of denying the right to a claim at law furnished no proof that a disorder or illness is not present, and other reasons may be put forward to explain a decline in reported cases. They include ergonomic changes in the workplace and education on alternative techniques. Mann (1994) states that most people claiming such injury in Australia are still successful, and points out that: “There are peaks of occupational illness and accidents accompanying many innovations. These abate not because of brain washing but because workers and employers modify the work place and teach their employees how to avoid the problem.”
It seems that, as so often in medicine, both organic and psychosocial factors influence this field.
Head injuries The third category of post-traumatic symptom which deserves comment is that which occurs after head injury. Severe closed head injuries are nearly always associated with protracted unconsciousness, subsequent neurological signs, and demonstrable intellectual impairment. Retrograde amnesia of more than a few minutes’ duration and unconsciousness lasting more than an hour indicate moderately severe head injury. Moderate and severe head injuries are accepted as causing organically determined symptoms. They are also the cause of overt hysterical symptoms, usually at some point in the later phases of recovery; but the greater the dementia, the less the headache. Weinstein & Lyerly (1966) found the actual frequency of conversion hysteria in this setting to be 16 in a series of 200 military patients who had had evident neurological disturbances. ‘Minor’ head injuries of less than one hour’s unconsciousness and only a few seconds’ retrograde amnesia also give rise to symptoms. Indeed, this can happen with head injuries in which there is no loss of consciousness. The symptoms typically include headache, giddiness and memory difficulties, difficulty in concentration and some irritability, depression, anxiety and impairment of libido. The provenance of these symptoms has been much discussed. Many authors have taken the view that they result largely from neurotic mechanisms and even from a conscious wish for financial gain (Miller, 1961). The view has also been
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argued that they are primarily due to organic dysfunction (Taylor, 1967). Cerebral blood flow studies (Taylor & Bell, 1966), otoneurological evidence (Toglia et al, 1970) and psychological tests of difficulties in concentration (Gronwall & Wrightson, 1974) all support the organic view. Dr R. Kelly and Dr A. Walters (personal communications) have both observed that some patients with the minor head injury syndrome recover before settlement of their claim, and I have also encountered this outcome, which favours the view that the syndrome is a true illness and not malingering. The symptoms persist in a minority of patients even after legal compensation has been awarded or where it is not relevant (Merskey & Woodforde, 1972). The psychological problems of illness, interruption of work and legal claims, of course, complicate the situation. These factors in turn may promote a hysterical elaboration of symptoms, but much of the typical post-concussional syndrome seems likely to be due to a combination of organically based difficulties, partly unrecognised or not sufficiently appreciated, made worse by the effort to return to work too early and arousing in turn anxiety and depression (Gronwall & Wrightson, 1974). In recent years there has been a substantial accumulation of additional evidence for the organic component in the postconcussional syndrome. This is detailed extensively by Levine et al (1988) and Evans (1993). The development of a quantitative electroencephalographic method to provide a discriminant analysis of mild head trauma has also become available (Thatcher et al, 1989). Accordingly, the arguments which this syndrome has provoked seem less fierce now than formerly. Psychiatrists who recognised it as ‘genuine’ tended to find reasons for it in terms of dynamic mechanisms. These now appear to be an unlikely explanation for the basic syndrome. On the other hand, those neurologists who tended to regard the syndrome as essentially ‘compensationitis’ are fewer and perhaps less vehement. The fact that loss of consciousness or neurological signs of brain damage do not always occur can no longer be taken as grounds for thinking that the condition is unassociated with cerebral organic dysfunction. Only in films and television programmes do those who have had blows to the head fall down, stay in coma briefly, wake, shake their heads and proceed symptom-free to rout the villain. Real people suffer longer, and postmortem studies of those dying after minor head injuries, but from other causes, indicate evidence of neuronal change in the brainstem (Oppenheimer, 1968).
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In these circumstances there is less need to suppose that hysterical symptoms after head injury are due to cupidity, even though occasional blatant liars do sometimes try to reinforce their claim by making consciously false statements. One person, for instance, seen for his own solicitors, had actually had a significant head injury with a small subdural haematoma, but laid claim to having damaged his chest severely as well. He had been carefully examined at the Neurosurgical Unit where he was treated and a note made that there was no chest disease. Such cases, however, are relatively rare. Few doctors actively concerned with compensation cases see more than one or two cases of this sort in a year. My own overall experience has been that the great majority of claimants suffer genuine distress, and, in both Britain and Canada, effectively recoup less financially from their claim than they have lost.
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11 Organic brain disease
“If hysterical symptoms may thus complicate general and local diseases, it is not surprising that they still more frequently accompany various diseases of the nervous system, functional and organic.” (Gowers, 1893, vol. 2, p. 988)
It is clear from the preceding chapters that there is a wide range of symptoms regarded as hysterical and any complaint, somatic or psychological, may be the subject for hysterical mechanisms. Like most topics in psychiatry, hysteria also requires the notion of multiple aetiology. This is often necessary for individual cases, and it is invariably necessary for a complete account of all cases. In this section, a number of different causes of hysterical symptoms and a wide variety of those symptoms are considered. The topics have been selected for their clinical importance or interest and to provide a comprehensive description of hysterical phenomena. The association of hysteria with organic disease has been the subject of lively, sometimes acrimonious, discussion in recent years. Like those who attacked Freud, in apparent ignorance of the work of his distinguished predecessor in Vienna, von Feuchtersleben (1845), the controversialists about hysteria and organic disease often seem to have ignored the record. Gowers (1893) clearly recognised that hysterical symptoms were common in association with organic disease, and a variety of subsequent writers repeated the message. Kraepelin (1904), among others, noted that hysteria was not uncommon with epilepsy. Guttman (1932) cited numerous authors who had recognised the simultaneous occurrence of organic brain disease and hysterical symptoms. He noted that Credner (1930) found 73 patients with frontal lobe lesions among a series of 260 suffering from hysterical 141
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symptoms. Guttman remarked that patients with epilepsy often had hysterical attacks which required special discussion; and he pointed out that unless patients were aware of a defect they could not get a ‘hysterical overlay’. Paul Schilder (1935), in his famous work The Image and Appearance of the Human Body, developed the exceptional concept of ‘organic repression’. The book is not easy to read but we can draw many ideas from it and the following quotation with regard to patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome seems clear enough (p. 32). “When I use the term ‘organic repression’, I wish to emphasize that we are concerned with a phenomenon, which, on a structural level, repeats what is going on in other repressions in the so-called psychic level.”
It should follow from this concept that the same symptom might be the end result either of an organic illness or of a psychological disturbance. A particular symptom which Schilder specified in this connection was anosognosia, a tendency to neglect some part, usually one-half, of the body. Schilder (1939) carried forward some of these ideas and linked them with additional clinical observations. He wrote: “The conversion is based on childhood experiences, but the later organic trauma may be the nucleus and pattern for the final formation of the symptoms. For instance amnesia and memory disturbances often occur in patients who have suffered from an organic unconsciousness due to trauma or CO poisoning.... Our material accordingly contains a great number of cases of organic disease with hysterical symptoms.”
He also wrote about neuroses following head and brain injuries (Schilder, 1940) as follows: “Cerebral organic syndromes may change functions of the brain in such a way as to provoke neurotic attitudes. One cannot claim similar mechanisms for traumas which afflict other parts of the body.”
Four main conclusions can be drawn from these observations. First, organic illness might take effect through the repression of a conflict. Secondly, from this it follows that the same symptoms could have either an organic or a psychological cause. Thirdly, organic disturbances of brain function can provoke neurotic attitudes. And fourthly, organic disease and hysterical symptoms frequently coexist.
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The first of these lines of argument is conceptually difficult and has not proved popular. The second and third are well illustrated in a case report by Lewis (1953). This concerns an Englishman who first suffered from a confusional state due to neurosyphilis and then contracted malaria. Some years later, while living in America, he was written up at length as a classic case of dissociative memory disturbance in a book entitled Persons One and Three: A Study in Multiple Personality (Franz, 1933). He returned to England, showed evidence of a manic–depressive syndrome, was readmitted to the Maudsley Hospital, London, and was shown still to have positive serology for general paralysis of the insane (GPI). After treatment with induced malaria he still showed some organic memory disturbance. Unless the American diagnosis was wholly wrong, it seems likely that this patient had a memory disturbance to which both organic and psychological causes contributed and in which organic and psychological patterns appeared. It would be by no means certain that the psychological or the hysterical pattern of memory disturbance was unrelated to the presence of a defect due to organic disease. The occurrence of hysterical symptoms with multiple sclerosis was discussed by Langworthy & Legrand (1952). They were interested in the relationship of personality to the development of illness, and considered that there was a special group of patients with multiple sclerosis in whom poor emotional adjustment was a problem, even before the symptoms of organic disease developed. They thought that the diagnosis of conversion hysteria was often made at the onset of the symptoms, not merely because of the bizarre nature of the complaint, but especially because of a personality structure consistent with this diagnosis. It might perhaps be thought that if all the patients were seen subsequent to the development of the disease, some of the personality changes could be attributed to the disease. In this respect it is worth remarking that they noted that “conversion symptoms had been observed developing long after the organic signs of multiple sclerosis are apparent”. Considerable attention has been focused upon the topic of hysteria and organic brain disease by Slater (1965) and Slater & Glithero (1965) in a nine-year follow-up of 85 patients. These were drawn from an initial sample of 112 seen by Slater and colleagues and given a diagnosis of hysteria. Of these 85 patients, 4 had died from suicide and 8 from organic disease; 19 were originally considered to have organic disease with a “hysterical overlay”, and 22 were later found to have an organic basis for
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their symptoms. A further 32 had no organic pathology. Among these, 2 developed schizophrenia and 9 had affective illness. There was a nuclear group of only 7 young patients with classic conversion symptoms in response to stress, and 14 with chronic personality disorder and multiple symptoms. This latter group was of the type studied so intensively by Guze and his colleagues (cf. Chapter 13) and described so clearly by them. From this Slater drew the conclusion that the diagnosis of hysteria was “a delusion and a snare”. He remained willing to use the word hysteria as an adjective but not as a noun. Whitlock (1967b) followed Slater’s study with a report of 12 personal cases seen in Brisbane, Australia, together with a casenote study of 44 others from the University Department of Psychiatry, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, England, presenting over a four-year period. He found that 63.5% of his cases had an accompanying cerebral disorder or preceding organic brain disease. This included a history of head injury. There were 20 men and 36 women in his series. A similar history of organic disease was obtainable in only 5.5% of a control group of patients with depression or anxiety states. In a further study at the National Hospital, where Slater’s work was first conducted, Merskey & Buhrich (1975) reported a series of 89 patients seen personally and diagnosed as having motor conversion symptoms (Code 342.2 in the International Classification of Diseases). The patients were seen from September 1968 to December 1971. The criteria for inclusion in the series were that these patients should have been referred in consultation to the present writer and shown by neurological examination to have what Head (1922) called positive signs of hysteria, that is, it had been possible to demonstrate motor signs of good function in a supposedly paralysed part. A psychological cause could be presumed to be operative in producing these conversion symptoms but no presupposition was required about its nature or mechanism. Thus the diagnosis of a conversion symptom was essentially a neurological procedure although its explanation, if found, would be expected to be psychological. Matching control patients of the same age and sex and from the same clinical psychiatric setting were found for 24 patients. Three groups were defined: group L, 89 patients with conversion symptoms; group H, the smaller, matched subgroup from group L; and group C, the matching control group. It was found that 67% of group L had some organic diagnosis, 48% of the total having an organic cerebral disorder or systemic illness likely to affect brain function. Comparable figures for groups H and C
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were 67% and 79%, respectively, with an organic disorder, and 50% and 58%, respectively, with organic cerebral disease likely to affect the brain. The main relevant organic disease was epilepsy, affecting from 21% to 33.3% of the different groups. Other fairly common diagnoses were cerebrovascular disease, multiple sclerosis, head injury and dementia. Migraine was accepted as an organic disease in four patients from group L and one from group H, on the grounds that it could promote disturbed pathophysiological functions. Apart from this, the allocations of organic diagnoses were scarcely controversial. It is clear from these findings that there is an even higher incidence of organic disease in the control group than in the H group. This is not necessarily surprising, since the purpose of the Psychiatric Department at The National Hospitals for Nervous Diseases at Queen Square and Maida Vale is to provide a service primarily for neurologically ill patients. Nevertheless, even in the hysteria group the figures are at least as high as those which we found in any other published series dealing with the incidence of physical illness in psychiatric patients (Merskey & Buhrich, 1975). After making allowances for differences in the presentation of data, we found the lowest figures for cerebral and systemic illness to be 4% (Eastwood et al, 1970), the highest 28% (Davies, 1965); while other physical illness ranged from 11.2% (Eilenberg & Whatmore, 1961) to 37% (Marshall, 1949). The last of these figures came from in-patients at a psychiatric teaching hospital. The highest overall figure, 66.5% of psychiatric patients in a Yale, New Haven Hospital sample is given by Kligerman & McKegney (1971). Roy (1977a) sought further evidence to determine whether there was a relationship between hysteria and organic brain disease. He collected a consecutive series of 34 patients with convulsions seen personally in a period of two and a half years for investigation and treatment of epilepsy and whose discharge diagnosis was hysterical neurosis. Twenty-six of these patients were seen at the Maudsley and King’s Hospitals Neurology Unit or at the Maudsley Epilepsy Unit in London, England, and eight were seen in general psychiatric units. He compared them with 34 matched control patients from two general psychiatric units at the Maudsley Hospital whose discharge diagnosis was depressive neurosis. Thirteen of the 34 patients in the hysterical neurosis group had organic brain disease compared with one of the 34 patients in the depressive neurosis group, and these results were highly significant statistically (P < 0.001). In this study 26% of the total group of patients with conversion symptoms had cerebral disorder, of whom all but two had epilepsy. Roy
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considered that his findings suggested the possibility that in the group with hysteria and epilepsy the associated cerebral disorder might predispose to hysterical convulsions mainly because of psychological factors, like identification with the epileptic convulsions, rather than because of an organic factor. In another study, Roy (1977b) showed that epileptic patients at the Maudsley Epilepsy Unit who had a current chronic hysterical symptom had hysterical fits which were thought to account for over three-quarters of their current attacks. The nature of the hysterical fits closely resembled the type of epileptic fit the patient had. This resemblance was held to support the idea that the hysterical fits were related to modelling on known organic disease. Both in this paper and in another article (Roy, 1979a), Roy presented evidence indicating that significant differences between patients with hysterical seizures and those with epileptic seizures were found with respect to family and personal history of psychiatric disorder, attempted suicide, sexual maladjustment and a current affective syndrome. The practical implication of this latter group of findings was that: “a female patient referred for investigation of seizures, who is currently depressed, has a personal and family history of psychiatric disorder, and has attempted suicide may best be admitted to the hospital for further investigation and observation of her attacks before anticonvulsants are prescribed.”
In a fourth report (Roy, 1979b), a retrospective examination of case notes at a different centre (the Clarke Institute of Psychiatry, Toronto), 31 patients with hysterical neurosis were compared with 31 with depressive neurosis. Significantly more of the hysterical patients had a preceding head injury and 29% a past history of hysteria. The head injury was apparently mild in at least three of the five patients with a history of hysteria. Roy argued from his data that there was no special evidence of an association between organic disease and hysterical symptoms. In centres where patients were admitted for organic brain disease, hysteria was found with it, and in centres where patients were admitted for psychiatric illness, hysteria was found without brain disease. One of the difficulties with Roy’s argument is that although his samples are not small, they still reflect only very limited populations of patients, either with hysteria or organic brain disease. There is no dispute that the modelling of symptoms which are already known to the patient from intimate personal experience is one source of hysterical symptoms. The problem is that it is hard to explain the remarkably high occurrence of organic brain disease
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in the relatively small groups of patients who now seem to be available for study. In the past when hysteria was much more common – as is discussed in the next section of this chapter – Roy’s explanation in terms of selection would be highly appropriate. Today, when the pool of patients is so much smaller, the cases with classic conversion symptoms still stand out as having an unusually high frequency of organic cerebral disease. Roy also argues (1977a) that the patients in his group with hysterical convulsions only had no epilepsy and thus had no personal symptom to model or identify with. In this group any association with cerebral disorder could be attributed mainly to an organic factor, but no such association was found. However, his group without organic disease is distinguished from the rest of his patients with hysterical convulsions by not having epilepsy. Having excluded from his group of patients with hysteria all those who have the most common organic disease with which hysteria may be found, he then concludes that there is no association. This does not seem to be a valid argument. All the same, I am bound to agree that, in Roy’s systematic studies, evidence of a link between cerebral organic disease and the production of hysterical symptoms, as distinct from their modelling, is absent. Notwithstanding the above, there are important individual observations which keep alive the possibility that some cases of organic disease contribute to hysterical symptoms. The most striking is the relative frequency with which epileptic patients with hysterical symptoms have been noted to have toxic levels of phenytoin and to remit soon after this is corrected. (See ‘Hysteria and epilepsy’, below; some of the other findings from comparative studies in that section also support the view that physical illness is a common finding in patients with hysterical convulsions.) In addition, Gould et al (1986) (see Chapter 10) found a plethora of supposedly hysterical signs in a series of patients with acute organic brain disease, and Weinstein (1966) observed that 16 out of 200 patients with acute closed head injuries showed conversion/hysterical signs at some point during recovery. Such signs did not appear in aphasic patients with lesions on the left side of the brain.
The significance of the data Some further reasons should be noted for the view that physical illness may play a special part in producing hysterical illness. Conversion hysteria involving paralyses or anaesthesias is not a common disorder in routine psychiatric work. In times of
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peace, general psychiatrists in Canada and in Britain usually see only a few such cases in a year. Military psychiatrists regularly meet the problem – especially in times of conflict – and psychiatrists working in conjunction with neurologists often meet patients with such complaints. Otherwise, in our experience, and in that of a number of colleagues whom we have questioned, patients with conversion symptoms are not often encountered; Lewis (1974), in Wisconsin, makes this point very strongly, as follows: “Ask any experienced psychiatric clinician ... how many cases meeting the classic definition of hysteria he or she has seen, and you will receive varied answers ... neurological, industrial, military and orthopedic consultations tend to skew the answers toward greater frequency. General psychiatric practice yields a lesser number and psychoanalytic work, even less. The surprising fact is that if you press your informant to limit his or her answer to the number of cases he or she feels reasonably sure meet the textbook criteria, the frequency will be no more than a few per year of active practice – more commonly (based on informal inquiries I have made) less than a score in a practice of many year’s duration.”
A number of clinicians have noticed the same trend. Abse (1966) remarked upon this and showed that of 370 Indian soldiers with hysteria seen in Delhi, 188 had fits, 83 had pains in the abdomen, 25 had amnesia and the remaining 74 had variously aphonia (12), deafness (11), paralysis (10), blindness (7), tremors (7), vomiting (6), contractures (5), sciatica (5), headache (3), speech defect (3), enuresis (3) or anaesthesia (2). By contrast, among 161 British soldiers with a similar diagnosis, 44 had headaches, 43 pains and paraesthesiae, 17 enuresis, 11 paresis or ataxia, 10 amnesia, 13 fits or black-outs and the remainder various symptoms including insomnia, weakness and sleepwalking. Apart from fits, major motor phenomena were rare in both series, and the presumably more sophisticated British soldiers had headache as a complaint more than any other symptom. Abse also noted that although classic hysterical symptoms are generally rare in Western society, they are common in rural areas such as North Carolina. Parker (1962) cites six other studies supporting the conclusion that classic hysteria is common only in developing societies or subgroups. Watson & Buranen (1979) also observed that conversion symptoms as they encountered them were very different in frequency and pattern from the symptoms which were most commonly mentioned in textbooks. They examined 18
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textbooks of abnormal psychology and psychiatry, all except one being from the United States. They were chosen on the basis of their stature, frequency of use and recency of publication in about 1978. The textbooks most often listed paralysis, anaesthesia, blindness, deafness, mutism, tunnel vision, convulsions, paraesthesias and tics as signs of hysteria. Non-headache pain or hyperaesthesia and various types of motor loss and analgesia were also often listed, besides. Among 40 patients of their own, studied retrospectively in case records, the largest percentages of symptoms were found to be non-headache pain or hyperaesthesia, heart attack or chest pain, paresis, headache, fainting and dizziness. Data taken from Woodruff et al (1974) dealing with a series of patients and providing frequency of symptoms showed similar trends to their own. The largest numbers of patients were described as having fatigue or drowsiness, paresis, non-headache pain or hyperaesthesia (all of equal frequency), heart attack or chest pain, blurred vision, anorexia, fainting, weight loss and tremor. There was a significant correlation between their series and the data of Woodruff et al. They noted that five of the seven symptoms mentioned most commonly in textbooks appeared only rarely in the two study populations. While there may be some doubt about the hysterical provenance of a number of the symptoms which Watson & Buranen have accepted as conversion symptoms, the actual pattern of presentation supports the findings by Abse and the comments by Lewis. Quite a few additional studies support this idea and are discussed further below. From 1968 to 1970 inclusive, an annual average of 28 outpatients and 39 in-patients at the National Hospital for Nervous Diseases, Queen Square, were diagnosed as having conversion reactions (ICD code 324.2). This relatively high rate of presentation contrasts strongly with my own experience in other settings such as general hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, in-patient departments and out-patient clinics, my experience there being similar to that described by Lewis (1974). The only places where I have personally observed or obtained evidence of frequent classic manifestations have been during military service, in contact with medical services to indigenous North American populations or in work associated with a neurological hospital or department. Psychiatrists in the United Kingdom generally also find that they see few patients with motor conversion symptoms unless they practise in close association with a neurological department or in one of the other special settings to which Lewis refers. It is obvious that patients are likely to be referred to neurological departments with physical symptoms for differential diagnosis. It is surprising that so many
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patients with known neurological disease should be found to have overt conversion symptoms, unless the physical illness contributes in some way to the production of conversion symptoms.
Hysteria and epilepsy Certain links between hysteria and epilepsy have a bearing on the question of hysteria and brain dysfunction. Niedermeyer et al (1970) made the particularly important observation that anticonvulsant intoxication may be associated with hysterical symptoms. At the National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery, Queen Square, and also at the National Hospital, Chalfont Special Centre for Epilepsy, it is a common experience that hysterical conversion symptoms are likely to appear in association with phenytoin intoxication and remit not long after it is corrected. In the patients in the L group in the series by Merskey & Buhrich described above, the frequency of epilepsy was 23 out of 89. This is higher than the usual frequency of epilepsy at the National Hospital, Queen Square, where approximately 7.2% of in-patients and 14.2% of out-patients have a diagnosis of epilepsy. The finding suggests a possible special link between some aspect of epilepsy and hysterical symptoms. This view is further supported by the observation of Henson and his colleagues (Currie et al, 1971) that patients with gross hysterical symptoms were actually more frequent in their series of patients with temporal lobe epilepsy (17 out of 666) than were patients with a schizophreniform illness (12 out of 666). Friemert (1970) found that 20 out of 263 epileptic patients had hysterical fits, and Standage (1975), reviewing 4 hysterical patients of his own and 21 from the recent literature, noted that physical illness was a common finding, and 32% of subjects had a history of neurological disease. Rabe (1970) described 41 case histories in which both hysterical and epileptic attacks appeared to occur in the same individual. This is a long-standing theme, from the time of Charcot onwards. According to Rabe any form of clinical epilepsy, whatever the aetiology, may be accompanied by hysterical attacks. He did not think that ‘hystero-epilepsy’ and psychomotor epilepsy were more especially associated with each other than with hysteria and other forms of epilepsy. While it was not possible to find adequate differential criteria to explain combined attacks of hysteria and epilepsy in the same individuals, Rabe thought that common causative factors might be present. These were principally disturbances of physiological and psychological maturation. A variety
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of causes and effects could be observed, ranging from cases of single hysterical attacks, reactively determined, occurring in chronic epileptics with severe personality change, to patients with marked neurotic features and symptoms in whom epileptic attacks occurred in psychologically relevant situations. Taking his argument further, Rabe observed that: “the well-grounded finding of a mutually dependent alternation of hysterical and epileptic attacks allows us to assume the existence of a pathology which forms the basis of both symptoms, the roots of which could not be found in physiological or psychological processes but were comprehensible only on the basis of the individual case history.”
Both types of attack, hysterical as well as epileptic, were thought to be the manifestations of a disturbed relationship between the ego and the environment, and anticonvulsant medication alone was not enough to cope with management and treatment. It is convenient to note here the most elegant technique for demonstrating the biological difference between hysterical and epileptic seizures. Trimble (1978) argued that since electrochemical stimulation of the medial basal hypothalamus in animals increases the release of prolactin, if the abnormal electrical activity in epilepsy passes through the midbrain it should raise the serum prolactin concentration. He then compared baseline measures of serum prolactin with those found after a fit in nine patients with generalised epilepsy, seven with presumed hysteria, and 11 having unilateral electroconvulsive therapy. All the patients with generalised epilepsy had higher scores than any of those with hysteria after the fit. All but one of the patients receiving unilateral electroconvulsive therapy also exceeded the highest value found in a patient with hysteria. In an additional study, Dana-Haeri et al (1983) confirmed the rise in serum prolactin at 20 minutes after a fit in men and women with generalised attacks. Luteinising hormone was elevated at 20 minutes and remained elevated at 60 minutes, while folliclestimulating hormone increased in women only, at 20 and 60 minutes. Following complex partial seizures, prolactin was elevated at 20 minutes. However, with simple partial seizures the estimation of prolactin was found unlikely to be of diagnostic value. Hysteria and temporal lobe foci Margherita et al (1967) have noted a relationship between hysterical behaviour and temporal lobe foci. They consider that
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this association is recognised in the literature, including that of Italy. They themselves described one man and four women with left temporal lobe foci, only some of whom had epileptic attacks but all of whom had hysterical falling to the ground and jerking, with response to stimulation during the attacks. Ljungberg (1957) also observed that 3.3% of his patients with hysteria had epilepsy – a rate much above the expected. Stefansson et al (1976) found 7 out of 64 patients seen in a consultation service with the diagnosis of conversion neurosis, hysterical type also to have a seizure disorder, and 36 of the 64 (56%) had physical illness. In a neurological consultation service Lipowski & Kiriakos (1972) found pseudoseizures or hysterical fits either alone or in combination with cerebral seizures to be the most common conversion symptoms. There is thus a great number of reports linking these two conditions, a link which has been recognised ever since the days of Charcot, when they were first clearly distinguished. We have already noted (Chapter 9) the recurrent finding by a number of authors (e.g. Abeles & Schilder, 1935; Kanzer, 1940; Berrington et al, 1956; Kennedy & Neville, 1957) that a link existed between cerebral organic disorder and hysterical amnesia. It is worth re-emphasising that the controlled study of Berrington et al showed a significant excess of head-injured patients among those with hysteria. Yet another condition with which conversion symptoms have been associated is Klinefelter’s syndrome. Christodorescu et al (1970) described four cases of this syndrome with conversion reactions. Lastly in this connection, it is worth noting the substantial evidence (Graham & Rutter, 1968) to show that organic disease, especially of the brain, is one of the most important factors in the production of childhood neurotic difficulties. Hysterical fits At this stage it is worth a brief diversion to consider some further aspects of the relationship between epilepsy and hysteria, which is a notoriously complicated one. A hysterical fit is a state of subjective loss of consciousness without ictal discharges, usually in response to psychological stimuli. Ideally these fits should be shown to serve the purpose of solving a psychic conflict, and the patient may subsequently recognise that he or she was not subject to an epileptic form of impairment of consciousness. Such fits, as has been emphasised already, most often occur in patients who have epilepsy. They have to be differentiated from hyperventilation and
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simple syncope, which are common causes of loss of consciousness, especially in children, adolescents or young adults. Occasional epileptic fits may follow from hyperventilation. Hysterical fits are often associated with other hysterical symptoms, such as paralyses, which can be adequately defined as hysterical by means of the neurological examination, and Head’s criteria discussed earlier. However, it is probably true to say that there are no absolute criteria by which the occurrence of a hysterical fit can be proved by clinical examination at the time; the presence of a hysterical paresis is very helpful, and confirmation is sometimes obtained from patients subsequently that they are aware that they generated the attack themselves and did not lose consciousness in the same way as during an epileptic attack (Betts et al, 1976). Many epileptic discharges, especially temporal lobe ones, are so modified in their expression by the use of anticonvulsant medication that they may appear as brief episodes of loss of consciousness, states resembling petit mal and even seemingly hysterical behaviour. Pond (1974) has indicated that a brief epileptic discharge may be followed by a post-ictal state in which consciousness is modified and in which an unruly, so-called hysterical, state may appear. In such a state the patient may respond with kicking or jerking or screaming if touched; or merely act on commands in a way which suggests that he or she is aware of the environment and ‘putting on an act’. Yet careful examination may demonstrate, as in one of the writer’s cases, a concurrent dysphasia or other evidence of impaired cognitive function (Betts et al, 1976). Similarly, a patient who woke at night with screaming attacks was found to have a terrifying brief aura which was subsequently elaborated with a hysterical reaction. In addition to the direct organic provoking factors, psychological problems must contribute to the production of hysterical fits. The fact that fits are the favourite symptom is readily understandable, the patient modelling the psychological complaint on the pattern of an existing physical one. A variety of emotional problems may be responsible, including difficulties with relationships, dissatisfaction with work and jilting. But it also seems that, apart from the organic factors and drug intoxication, a failure to control the epilepsy or adjust to it plays a large part in upsetting the patient and generating extra fits. It seems paradoxical that an individual wishing to be rid of an illness should enhance its effects, but it is recognised often enough in clinical practice that patients respond in a way which overemphasises their disability (Betts et al, 1976). However, the consequence is often the opposite of that intended. A pathetic girl with many problems who produced hysterical fits
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was diagnosed as attention-seeking and was rejected rather than retained in hospital for the better control of her epileptic fits. She was partly aware of what she was doing and was later contrite at ‘faking fits’. Other patients do not have even her degree of awareness of what they are doing. The type of fits which have traditionally been called hysterical are also frequently known as pseudoseizures. Slavney (1994) has suggested that this term be used whenever a non-epileptic attack occurs which, consciously or unconsciously, is intended to mimic an epileptic seizure. Snyder (1994) objects to this mainly, but not only, on the grounds that intentionality is a very difficult judgement in cases of this sort. I, also, do not like the element of rejection which the term ‘pseudo’ often entails and suggested that we should use the term ‘doxogenic seizures’ (from the Greek doxe (opinion) and genon (to produce)) for those attacks which are thought to be due to the patient’s thought processes (Merskey, 1994). For this usage we should exclude cases where anxiety triggers a physiological event such as temporal lobe epilepsy. The same label of a doxogenic disorder may be applied to multiple personality disorder and to false memories obtained in recovered memory therapy (or from any other source). The word doxogenic in the latter cases is better than ‘iatrogenic’ because doctors and other therapists do not always deserve the blame for producing these syndromes, which may also be encouraged by other agents. Since, whatever the cause that leads to the thoughts, the thoughts are the source of the symptoms, the word doxogenic covers these problems quite well. It is not that I particularly seek to replace the term hysterical, but for those who wish to avoid it or use an alternative doxogenic should serve.
The relationship to other causes The earlier discussion has concentrated on motor symptoms because they are the most easy to prove clinically and are of most practical importance (apart from hysterical deafness or blindness). But anaesthesias are commonly demonstrated concurrently with motor conversion symptoms. As hysterical anaesthesias are rarely of practical importance (if they are, the diagnosis is probably wrong) they can normally be ignored in the management of the patient. Pain may also be an important hysterical symptom (Merskey & Spear, 1967) but one which is difficult to prove; its significance is discussed later (Chapter 12). Motor hysterical symptoms still occur
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frequently in unsophisticated populations, such as in East Africa (Kagwa, 1964), in South Korea (Chang & Kim, 1973), in Sri Lanka (Wijesinghe et al, 1976), in North American Indians (Armstrong & Patterson, 1975; Lehmann, 1975) and in Inuit (Eskimos) (Lehmann, 1975). Lambo (1956) noted them to be common in Nigerian patients both from villages and from urban areas. Several additional reports from other countries support this view. Okasha (1968) found an incidence of hysterical symptoms in 10.9% of patients in Egypt, Hafeiz (1980) reported 10% from the Sudan, and El Sayed et al (1986) found 8% with the diagnosis of hysteria in 324 new cases referred to a university psychiatric department in a city in Dammam, Saudi Arabia, over six months. El Sayed notes that hysterical reactions thus still appear to be more common there than in sophisticated societies. Pu et al (1986) demonstrate this with a series of 100 consecutive cases of hysteria seen in the Benghazi Psychiatric Service for the first time between November 1983 and July 1984. Of these, 59 had fits while the other symptoms included paralyses, blindness, aphonia and involuntary movements. Such figures are unparalleled in any non-neurological Western centre. Nandi et al (1992) have also demonstrated a decline of hysteria in two Indian villages. These villages were surveyed in 1972 and 10 years later in one case and 15 years later in the other case. The second surveys show very little change in the rate of total mental morbidity, but the rate of prevalence of hysteria declined significantly in both villages, dropping from 16.9 to 4.6 per 1000 in 10 years in the one village and from 32.3 to 2.05 per 1000 in the second village over the 15 years. In a personal communication Pu makes the comment that in Malaysia and Burma hysteria per se is not diagnosed frequently, although he has many reports in Indian journals. He suggests that in Southeast Asia ‘hysterical’ patients seek treatment elsewhere, for example through religious authorities, faith healers and so on, and when hysterical symptoms do appear they tend to be of a psychological type such as trance states, multiple personality, fugue states and similar responses rather than physical symptoms. He thinks that cultural factors may play some part in the choice of symptoms, which seems a very reasonable conclusion. Some members of rural or immigrant populations moving to an urban environment may also display classic conversion hysterical symptoms without organic disease. N. Geschwind (personal communication) observed this as a transient phenomenon in successive recent immigrant populations who attended the Boston City Hospital for treatment. However, from the preceding
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evidence it seems that in more urbanised, developed countries hysteria has a definite link with physical illness and perhaps especially with organic cerebral disorder. Whitlock (1967b) observes that no theory can be sufficient which fails to take account both of the psychological and the organic factor. He says this particularly because no emotional precipitants could be detected in nearly 40% of his cases. However, Merskey & Buhrich (1975) found that a relevant emotional factor could be detected in all their group H patients (allowing physical illness as such a cause in three cases). Physical illness was actually more relevant as a psychological precipitant in Merskey & Buhrich’s non-hysteria control group, since it appeared in 10 out of 24 patients. Nevertheless, the part played by physical illness in precipitating hysterical symptoms cannot be assumed to be only an emotional one. There are conceivably five ways in which physical illness may relate to hysterical symptoms. The first is that an independent emotional stress may lead the patient to elaborate the basic effects of a lesion which has already disturbed function in a part. Perhaps in such a case the most organically affected part is liable to acquire the extra, hysterical signs, but this is not obligatory, and an organically based monoplegia could well be elaborated as a hemiplegia. Secondly, the unpleasant psychological implications of a physical illness, the discomfort and the fear attaching to it, may lead the patient either to elaborate an existing symptom or to produce a fresh one. Thirdly, the occurrence of past or intermittent physical symptoms, as in epilepsy, may lead to modelling of the hysterical symptom upon the organic pattern which the patient has experienced. Psychological stress would more easily produce a form of illness of which patients had some knowledge rather than one of which they had no knowledge. (Past illness in a relation or close acquaintance is well known to serve the same function). The last two situations and their frequent unfortunate outcome are summed up in the words of the patient with epilepsy quoted earlier who actually simulated fits in order to increase the attention paid to her organic condition. “I had fake fits so that they would pay more attention to my real ones and then they said I had hysteria and would not do more for my real ones.” Fourthly, it may happen that physical illness will lead to a regression in behaviour. The advantages of the sick role range from ‘get well’ cards, fruit and flowers, to relief from painful
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responsibilities and intrapsychic dilemmas. These advantages are much canvassed and need no special description, except for the qualifying remark that they are sometimes bought at the price of relinquishing other enjoyments and functions which may be actively desired. The most difficult problem is the fifth possible mode of effect. That is the notion that cerebral damage may operate in a more specific way to produce conversion symptoms. Schilder (1940) thought that this was particularly liable to appear and argued, as mentioned, that: “Cerebral organic syndromes may change functions of the brain in such a way as to provoke neurotic attitudes. One cannot claim similar mechanisms for traumas which afflict other parts of the body.”
Slater & Glithero (1965) extended this view to hysterical personality traits, saying, “Organic disease may bring about a general disturbance involving the personality which results in modes of behaviour (exaggeration, attention-seeking, etc.) which we naturally think of as manifestations of the hysterical personality.”
If this view is correct, cerebral disease should give rise to more hysterical symptoms than peripheral (non-systemic) physical illness. Merskey (1975) showed a trend in this direction but the figures, although quite large, were not statistically significant. In the L group with hysteria (Merskey & Buhrich, 1975) the ratio between central and peripheral lesions was 43:21 in those patients who had only organic illness in one or the other of these distributions. In a non-hysteria group with somatic illness matched to the L group for in-patient and out-patient distribution, the ratio was 137:98. The trend is in the anticipated direction but the figures from the raw data were not statistically significant. Using a psychological test, the Middlesex Hospital Questionnaire (MHQ), Gadd & Merskey (1975) found that female patients with conversion symptoms and higher-level cerebral organic lesions or disturbance also scored very significantly lower on scales for anxiety and other measures of neurosis than did other patients with conversion symptoms. This in turn supports the idea that cerebral organic disease may be comparable in some way to neurotic illness or abnormal personality in promoting conversion symptoms. The conclusion cannot be made firmly, however, because there was a significant effect in the opposite direction among the small group of male patients.
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It appears that there is now a number of studies indicating a possible connection between hysterical symptoms and organic brain disease. The special links which appear to exist with epilepsy and drug intoxication are perhaps the most notable, but paralyses occurring with tumour or with early dementia also provoke reflection, as do the pseudodementias and hysterical amnesic disturbances which may be seen with cerebral tumours or diffuse cerebral disturbance. An adequate explanation of these associations is not available, although Ludwig (1972) offers one systematic attempt. He takes up the suggestion (Whitlock, 1967b) that the lack of attention or concern paid to symptoms on the part of the hysterical patient is due to a “selective depression of awareness of a bodily function” brought on by corticofugal inhibition of afferent stimulation at the level of the brainstem reticular formation. Ludwig reviews the neurophysiological evidence which might support this view, acknowledges that some of it is controversial, but concludes that hysteria is essentially a dysfunction of attention and recent memory due to increased corticofugal inhibition of afferent stimulation, while hypochondria, as the counterpart of hysteria, is presumed to be related to decreased corticofugal inhibition of afferent stimulation. He offers a number of ways in which this theory might be tested, emphasises its speculative nature, and affirms that it could only be part of “a complete account of” the disorder, since cultural, cognitive and psychophysical correlates would also require attention. In my view this theory will probably prove to be wrong for three reasons. First, it does not have adequate initial neurophysiological data. Second, the neurophysiological evidence cited is highly controversial. Third, it seems very likely that such changes in attention as occur in hysteria are secondary to the patient’s motives and would not otherwise differ from normal. The situation is somewhat like that with hypnosis (Chapter 17), where we now have no grounds for believing that there is any physiological difference between a hypnotic ‘trance’ and responses to suggestions occurring without special trance-induced changes. Unfortunately, it seems to be too early for us to be able to offer any useful theory on how cerebral disturbances may promote conversion symptoms. It is likely even that the view that they do so at all will still encounter some strong opposition. A more fruitful approach will perhaps emerge from the careful study of the relationships between gender, hemispheric specialisation, and psychopathology. Some evidence indicates differences in the cerebral lateralisation of function for affect, as well as a
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distinct tendency for left-hemisphere functions, such as linguistic skills, to be stronger in females while right hemisphere functions, like spatial skills, are stronger in males. Flor-Henry (1978) reviewed these topics, and it is not too fanciful to suggest that the differential development of the hemispheres, combined sometimes with brain damage, contributes to the relative frequency of affective and hysterical syndromes in women, and psychopathic and schizophrenic syndromes in males. Besides the evidence on affective change and right-sided cerebral lesions discussed in Chapter 19, Lishman (1968) noted that somatic complaints such as headache, dizziness, fatigue and hypersensitivity to noise were more common after right-hemisphere damage than after left-sided injuries. Another pointer in this direction comes from the report (Stern, 1977) that conversion symptoms are localised more often on the left side of the body than would be expected by chance. This is not to deny the many other important causal factors in these illnesses, but to recognise that there are indications from systematic studies that we shall know much more in a few years’ time about the links between cerebral function and psychiatric illnesses other than just the pure brain syndromes. One sad note about hysteria and organic illness is provoked by Kraepelin’s case described in Appendix B. This patient died of tuberculosis, 12 months after her admission to Kraepelin’s care. We can guess that infection had been present for some years and had been a contributory factor in making the patient more liable to neurotic complaints. However, Kraepelin evidently did not think she was physically ill when he described her case, and it seems more likely that she acquired her infection as a result of the asylum conditions. In a sense her death was iatrogenic, as are a number of other misfortunes, especially the frequent operations (Chapter 13) which some hysterical patients undergo.
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12 Pain
In the last chapter the place of organic causes in producing hysterical symptoms and releasing hysterical behaviour was considered. We now need to look at the commonest somatic symptom in medicine, pain, and to assess its relationship to hysterical mechanisms. The historical association of pain with hysteria has already been mentioned. In analysing the dynamics of hysteria, Freud (Breuer & Freud, 1893–95) often used examples of patients with pain. He either concluded or implied that pain was a common conversion symptom, that unpleasant affect was converted to bodily pain, that the choice of symptoms was determined by precipitating events, and that pain often had a symbolic meaning. One of the difficulties in regarding pain as a conversion symptom is that there is rarely any direct evidence to prove that the specific symptom has a psychodynamic basis. Many patients have pain for psychological reasons (Merskey & Spear, 1967; Sternbach, 1968). The proportion of patients who have pain for psychological reasons may reach 38% in general medical clinics (Devine & Merskey, 1965) and 65.6% in psychiatric clinics (Spear, 1967). But it is frequently hard to demonstrate a relevant dynamic mechanism.
Changing views In general, psychiatric patients with pain show features of depression, anxiety and hysteria (Merskey, 1965a; Spear, 1967). The incidence of hysterical features either in terms of personality traits or other conversion symptoms is greater in those whose painful illness is of longer duration (Merskey, 1965b). Formerly, it was thought that this increase of conversion symptoms in the 160
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chronic cases was quite large (Merskey, 1965b). More stringent views about what can be accepted as a hysterical symptom led to a revision of that opinion. Previously the diagnosis of hysteria was accepted in the case of patients who had a history of possible hysterical symptoms such as ‘blackouts’ (which of course may have other causes) or who showed marked hysterical personality features. The thresholds for such diagnoses have risen considerably and it has been demonstrated (see Chapter 22) that the link between hysterical personality and conversion symptoms is relatively poor. The diagnosis of hysterical pain should require the following: (a) the absence of an adequate organic explanation (b) the absence of schizophrenia or a depressive illness or a psychophysiological mechanism which could account for the symptom (c) the presence of a very well marked syndrome, such as somatisation disorder, identified by detailed criteria (see Chapter 13) (d) or, ideally, the presence of an emotional conflict which has caused repression. Good proof, both of such a conflict and of its repression, is quite rare. Thus the importance of hysteria in relation to pain has diminished, although it is still of much theoretical significance and still has some practical implications. These theoretical aspects are reviewed next, followed by an appraisal of the reasons for reducing the importance of hysteria in relation to pain.
Pain from an idea The received notion of a hysterical symptom requires that it should correspond to pain from an idea and be a result of thought processes. It should be noted that alternative explanations, other than a conversion mechanism, could conceivably be appropriate for pain resulting from an idea, but they are not generally the most ready way of viewing the matter. It is not known how often hysterical symptoms occur in these ways in the total population of patients who complain of pain and, as already emphasised, it is hard to diagnose hysterical pain in practice. But some noteworthy evidence exists that pain may be produced either by an idea or by hysterical mechanisms. One of the best examples is the couvade syndrome.
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Reik (1914) provided an extensive discussion of the couvade syndrome. This word, believed to be derived from a Basque root meaning ‘to sit upon eggs’, is used to describe behaviour known since antiquity in the husbands of pregnant women or of those giving birth. The husband may go to bed and mimic the pains of childbirth or, more often, develop complaints such as headache, toothache, heartburn, gastralgia and other localised pains. This syndrome of pains of various sorts has occurred in Indian soldiers of varying ranks (Bardhan, 1965a,b), in mining communities (Dennis et al, 1956) and elsewhere in modern urban society (Curtis, 1965; Trethowan & Conlon, 1965; Trethowan, 1968). Bogren (1984) undertook a prospective study of couples expecting their first child. Twenty per cent of the men suffered from the couvade syndrome. They were older than the unaffected men and more often had older parents. More of them showed attachment to and identification with their mothers. Men with the couvade syndrome suffered from a greater number of mental symptoms during the pregnancy than did the unaffected men. The couvade syndrome was also commoner when the woman was anxious about the pregnancy. The women’s anxiety seemed to be more important for the development of the syndrome than the men’s. Bogren interpreted his findings as suggesting that the couvade syndrome was commoner in men who tended to identify more with their wives. The pains of the couvade usually have no plausible physical cause, not even such a mechanism as muscle tension. Moreover, they show very clearly how sympathy, identification, imitation or thought processes based on feelings might give rise to them. If the pain solves an emotional conflict it will be appropriate to regard it as a hysterical conversion symptom. A similar situation exists with some other pains which can be observed clinically. For instance, an educationally subnormal youth who was responsible for an extramarital pregnancy developed pains in his head, in his face, neck, arms, trunk, limbs and penis. He was unwilling to marry the girl, who was even less prepossessing than himself, but he was under pressure to do so. The pains could be seen as a retreat into illness, a temporary solution of his conflict and perhaps as an expression of guilt. He did not describe these ideas directly, but when he was asked how he thought his pains arose he said: “I imagine a nail or hammer on the back of my head or a razor catching or just laying against where you pittle. When I imagine that, it starts to pain a bit. The thought of the nail fetched the pain on.”
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In this case there was a reasonably acceptable psychological explanation as to why he had developed pains (which were not solely due to tension) and a direct account by the patient of the origin of the pains in his thoughts. This was obtained despite his low intelligence. In another case there was evidence of a hysterical amblyopia in a painful eye of a 25-year-old girl who complained of an episodic jabbing pain in her left eye and a continuous dull ache in the area, present for two years and commencing when the buckle of a car safety belt accidentally struck her. The car, in fact, belonged to her boyfriend, whom her parents disliked. The vision in her left eye was blurred and a diagnosis of hysterical amblyopia was supported by evoked potential studies. She was an immature, dependent girl and was thought to have psychosexual conflicts, but these were not helped by a series of interviews. Hypnosis, about the time that she had decided to give up her boyfriend, produced a complete recovery. It is reasonable to suppose that the pain in this case was due to a repressed conflict over her boyfriend which was solved, not by analytic exploration, although this was attempted, but by giving up her boyfriend. Perhaps not all the pains which are due to thought processes in this way are conversion symptoms. However, not only are they usually regarded in this way but also the classification of them as prima facie hysterical symptoms appears theoretically correct.
Pain and emotion Historically, pains have always had a prominent place in the diagnosis of hysteria. Instances of this were cited in Chapters 1 and 2, and the rich material of Appendix A provides another example of how many pains in different parts of the body were regarded as part of the syndrome of hysteria. Sydenham (1697), Whytt (1761), Briquet (1859), Charcot (1889), Gowers (1893) and Savill (1909) all expected pains to be hysterical, and the statement of Brodie (1837) that “in upper class women” four-fifths of joint pains were hysterical is often quoted. Sydenham regarded pain as an emotion, but in the second half of the 19th century, when pain was increasingly regarded as a sensory phenomenon, pains, if they were ‘real’, were thought to be due to organic disease or were dismissed. Inman (1858), who was quoted in Chapter 2, still favoured the older view that hysteria was in some sense an organic affliction. A more developed view is evident in Anstie (1871), who believed that neuralgic (organic) pains were an ultimate consequence of emotional disturbance, even including “unconscious resentment
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of the neglect of sexual functions”. He was not wholly original in this, since Brodie (1837) and Carter (1853), among others, had dealt with concepts of the unconscious and repression, whilst von Feuchtersleben (1845) had attributed hysteria (with pains) to sexual frustration. Perhaps many of the pains in question, such as premenstrual pains, are not so much hysterical as a consequence of anxiety and local physiological dysfunction, but the link between pain and the emotions is undoubtedly enduring and for many pains, as has already been indicated, a hysterical mechanism appears to be ineluctable. Rawnsley & Loudon (1964) provided an important example of the link between pain and hysteria. Like pains due to thought processes, those due to the couvade syndrome and those in many parts of the body without any plausible physical mechanisms, the examples given by Rawnsley & Loudon suggest a purely psychological or conversion process. Their patients belonged to the island of Tristan da Cunha. In 1937–38 a Norwegian scientific expedition visited the island and was able to record an epidemic of hysterical ‘spells’ affecting many persons. In 1961, because of a volcanic eruption, the islanders were evacuated to England. Rawnsley & Loudon investigated their health and noted a high incidence of headaches, including headaches of psychological origin. The latter were very significantly associated with the history of ‘spells’ in the 1937–38 epidemic, and there was a marked tendency to seek extra medical consultations. The spells and headaches of psychological origin were more frequent in women married to leaders of this humble group. This is striking evidence in support of the view that hysterical mechanisms are likely to be at work in the patients who consult frequently and develop pain for psychological reasons. Another worker who has documented hysterical symptoms in relation to pain is Walters (1961). Although rightly concerned to show that hysteria was by no means the only feature of patients with pain of psychological origin, Walters found 26 out of 430 psychiatric patients with pain to have pure conversion hysteria and a further 336 out of the total to have mixed neuroses and situational states. Other psychiatric abnormalities were prominent in his patients, so Walters preferred to label pain in these circumstances as ‘psychogenic regional pain’, but he clearly did not reject the occurrence of hysterical mechanisms. Still another important element in the traditional view of hysteria encompasses patients who have multiple symptoms without an adequate organic basis and whose symptoms cannot be explained satisfactorily by the presence of another psychiatric disorder, such as an anxiety state, a mood disorder or hypochondriasis. This type
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of patient was commonly called hysterical as long ago as the 18th century (e.g. Pomme, 1765; cf. Chapter 1). In the 19th century, as discussed in Chapter 2, Dubois d’Amiens, Landouzy, Briquet and most other authors recognised patients with multiple symptoms of this nature as having hysteria. Currently, many such cases are now accounted for by diagnoses of anxiety or depression, but a residual group was defined, and this is now generally known as somatisation disorder. This group of cases also provides reason to think of pain as being related to hysteria. It receives separate discussion in the next chapter. The functions which hysterical pains may currently serve are easy to document, at least in some cases. Pain conforms to the common idea of an illness with some physical basis, and does so at least as well as the dramatic fits and major hysterical symptoms which are traditionally more typical of an unsophisticated population. The latter group of symptoms has become less common at the present time, except in certain special settings, or in rural residents, either at home or newly arrived in big cities (cf. Chapter 11). As the major and traditional symptoms of hysteria other than pain decline, pain remains acceptable as a somatic complaint. But in any case, pain could still tend to be unconsciously preferred as a dissociative symptom since it is notoriously the commonest sign of suffering. It readily confers the status and role of an organically ill patient upon the affected person. The emphasis on hysterical causation in pain has a long and venerable history, some of which may well be attributable to the long-standing association of headache and psychological illness. If, as is known, headache is very common in psychological illness, including both anxiety and depressive states, and if hysteria was once – as we have shown – a general term covering much neurotic illness, the association with pain is understandable, even though the mechanism of headache in these conditions may be either psychophysiological or linked in some fashion – without conversion – to depression. The psychodynamic authors also adopted the idea that pain could be a common physical complaint, as discussed in Chapter 4 with respect to psychodynamic writers such as Alexander, and this has led to a continuing emphasis on the explanation of pain as a conversion symptom.
Psychodynamics of pain The dynamics of pain of psychological origin have generally been a matter of speculation rather than proof. Merskey & Spear
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(1967) noted 27 authors who stressed the association of guilt, hostility, resentment and pain. Almost all the evidence was anecdotal except for one or two experimental attempts to induce or abolish headache in relation to conflict over hostile impulses and some controlled studies by Spear (1967) and Merskey (1965b). The most influential psychodynamic contributor in this field, Engel, first described atypical facial pain (Engel, 1951) as a form of hysterical symptom and then gave a detailed account of what he called “psychogenic pain” in the “pain prone patient” (Engel, 1959). He regarded his subjects as suffering from a hysterical conversion symptom, but emphasised that they uniformly presented a character structure which he termed “masochistic”. He emphasised the frequency in their cases of unnecessary surgery, the occurrence of other somatic symptoms, the alleged tolerance of pain of organic origin – often with gusto – and remission of the pain at times of misfortune, or when there was other cause for suffering, whether physical or mental. Like previous psychodynamic writers, only rather more clearly, he argued that pain served as a warning of bodily damage, had a communicative function, and was linked with punishment, aggression, guilt, sexual feelings and the loss of an object. There was no statistical or quantitative proof of his claims, but the life pattern of many of his cases supported his argument. Most of them gave evidence of hysterical conversion mechanisms. If Engel is correct, certain consequences should follow with regard to repression and hostility in patients with chronic pain. Spear investigated the presence of overt or covert hostility in psychiatric patients with pain and little evidence of organic illness (Spear, 1967), and his results did not support Engel’s hypothesis. The patients with pain showed no more overt or covert hostility than other psychiatric patients. Both Spear (1967) and Merskey (1965b) found that the patients with pain had more operations, more consultations with specialists, more investigations and so on, findings which have been repeatedly confirmed. My patients with pain also had an increased frequency of past painful illness (P < 0.01) and an increased frequency of resentment but not of aggressive actions. Here, Engel’s theories were partly, but incompletely, confirmed, and it is worth noting that there is an alternative explanation of resentment (or hostility when it occurs) in patients with chronic pain. If pain is a signal of danger to the body, then preparation for action, either fight or flight, must be a normal response, and this may well explain the frequency with which cutaneous pain is associated with obvious irritability. Blumer (1975) went over the same clinical ground as Engel with respect to chronic persistent pain in a series of 388 patients
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mainly originating in neurosurgical and orthopaedic practice. He found the ‘pain-neurotic’ to be an individual with marked conflicts and prominent sadomasochistic and infantile dependent needs which result in guilt, and which are also denied. “The pain handily solves these conflicts, requiring dependency and providing atonement for guilt while at the same time allowing a good measure of revenge ... [against the long-suffering partner]”. Like that of earlier writers, his evidence was not controlled and in fact there is probably no good systematic work to confirm the boldly drawn picture of Engel, Blumer and others in the pain patient. Nevertheless, a reasonable idea lingers that, although it has perhaps never been scientifically proven, pain sometimes may have symbolic features, which could include a sadomasochistic function. Some of these patients with chronic pain fall into the group who undergo excessive surgery and are linked with the hospital addiction types (Chapter 8). Findings of this sort, discussed at length by Engel (1951, 1959), Merskey & Spear (1967) and Blumer (1975), indicate that if there is a link between pain and hysteria, that link will depend dynamically upon pregenital fixations. This is relevant to the subsequent discussion (Chapters 22–24) of the psychodynamic characteristics of patients with hysteria. Adler et al (1989) made another attempt to confirm Engel’s findings, in a controlled clinical investigation of patients’ retrospective views of their childhood experience. Patients with a diagnosis of “psychogenic pain” were compared with three other groups having “organic pain”, “psychogenic bodily symptoms”, or “organic disease”. The authors found evidence which they felt confirmed Engel’s characterisation of the parents of patients with chronic pain of psychological origin as being more verbally or physically abusive of each other and abusive of the child, while the child deflected aggression from one parent to the other onto him/herself. This work was done very carefully but has certain drawbacks in interpretation. There were significant differences between the “psychogenic pain” group and some of the others with respect to age and sex. Moreover, the diagnosis of “psychogenic pain”, which was based upon DSM–III criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1980), is under attack, as discussed later, and no description was provided of the patients with “psychogenic bodily symptoms”. This is a pity because their patterns of response did seem to be more like those of the two organic groups than the other “psychogenic” group, although the patients with “psychogenic” bodily symptoms were younger than those in the other three groups.
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The paper by Adler et al gives only uncertain support for Engel’s main hypothesis, as does a report by Merskey & Boyd (1978) on the recollections of childhood experience by patients with emotional or organic causes for chronic pain. The first group more often had experience of punishment or rejection by their parents, but these findings had only a modest degree of statistical significance (P < 0.05). Although the effect was significant it was not large, and may be attributable to patients with psychiatric illness having a higher rate of childhood problems compared with the patients with physical illness. Thus one of the leading theories of the hysterical aetiology of painful illness still lacks adequate corroboration, while other hypotheses have come forward to vie with it for the interpretation of emotional change in association with pain, the strongest of which is that depression and other psychological changes occurring in conjunction with chronic pain of physical origin are frequently a consequence of the pain (Merskey, 1989). The other favourite explanation for the special association of pain and emotional change is that minor physical lesions, or other non-progressive painful disorder, will present more often for attention because of a selection effect, the patients having pain for physical reasons but presenting it more often for medical care because of their increased concern. In a closely related field, Kellner et al (1985) examined several groups of patients (including some with pelvic pain) and control subjects on self-rating scales with respect to anger–hostility, somatic symptoms, and hypochondriacal fears and beliefs. Somatic symptoms were positively correlated with anger–hostility, but were associated more strongly with symptoms of anxiety and depression than with those of hostility. The correlations between hostility and somatic symptoms were inconsistent, and varied between groups. The authors concluded that their findings did not support the view that anger or hostility are main or specific aetiological factors either in somatisation or in hypochondriacal fears, or both. They mention several alternative possibilities which could explain their findings. It is worth noting that the construct of “psychogenic pain” offered in DSM–III corresponded essentially to ideas of a hysterical conversion disorder, but was distinguished from other types of hysterical conversion symptoms. The criteria for this diagnosis were modified in DSM–III–R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987), when it was labelled “somatoform pain disorder”. They were still thought to be unsatisfactory, and the revised criteria for DSM–IV dropped them completely (American Psychiatric Association,
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1994). Instead “Pain Disorder” is listed among the diagnoses. Two types of pain disorder are now recognised. In pain disorder associated with psychological factors, in addition to troublesome pain, psychological factors “are judged to have the major role in the onset, severity, exacerbation or maintenance of the pain”, and the pain is not better accounted for by a mood, anxiety, or psychotic disorder and does not meet criteria for dyspareunia. In the second type, both psychological factors and a general medical condition are judged to be important. The first of these types provides a place for pain as a conversion symptom in the way in which it has been regarded in the past, while the second introduces an alternative approach which fits much better with the realities of the pain clinic, where few cases present without a significant organic basis. Despite the above, there is still reason to think that pain may occur as a result of an idea on occasion. It is one of several possible mechanisms by which pain may follow from psychological illness rather than from physical causes. The other mechanisms include the production of pain as a hallucination or delusion, as in schizophrenia or sometimes in severe depression, pain from psychophysiological causes, as in muscle contraction, and perhaps pain as a consequence of depression or related to depression, by virtue of a common biochemical mechanism (Magni, 1987). In addition, pain may be increased by a hypochondriacal focus upon minor bodily symptoms, and this will be discussed in the next chapter. It has been pointed out elsewhere (Merskey & Spear, 1967) that there is a drawback to the attractions of pain as a conversion symptom, if one adopts the point of view, which I accept, that the patient experiences pain as unpleasant. Pain is then a poor solution to the problem which one postulates that it must be intended to resolve. Why choose a symptom which hurts? One answer to this is to say that people do undoubtedly frequently hurt themselves and involve themselves in suffering either by limited self-injury or suicidal attempts or other actions when on rational grounds they could be expected to avoid such misfortunes. In view of this it has often been postulated that these acts are self-punishing or masochistic. The argument for masochism is an ad hoc explanation, and we need to look carefully at the assumptions which have promoted the idea of pain as a hysterical symptom, in addition to the historical association. The upshot of the discussion just concluded is that there are many reasons to be cautious anyhow about the diagnosis of pain as hysteria. A point of much practical importance follows from this conclusion. No matter how often a pain may be thought to be
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hysterical, it is frequently unwise to use this diagnosis overtly. In the first place, this is because it is relatively easy to be mistaken about the hysterical provenance of an individual symptom where there are few or no positive signs of hysteria. In this respect, pain is markedly distinct from motor conversion symptoms. Secondly, patients are often unable to appreciate the nature of the explanation that a symptom like pain, ‘which hurts’, is due to an unconscious conflict. It is much easier and potentially more accurate to talk of pain resulting from an emotional state affecting the body. Thirdly, for complete proof it is necessary to obtain the dynamic explanation for the genesis of a particular symptom. Strictly speaking, that explanation has to be provided by the patient from her or his own thought associations. Despite the examples quoted, this rarely happens with pain. Physicians are, therefore, best advised to recognise the importance of hysterical mechanisms in pain and to manage the patient with them in mind, but not to assume that they have proved a pain to be hysterical unless they have fulfilled the criteria outlined. The same is true in regard to multiple pains. Gout, disseminated lupus erythematosus, rheumatic conditions and hypothyroidism may occasionally present in a way which is mistaken for multiple pain of psychological origin. However, if the patient also meets the criteria of Briquet syndrome, a psychiatric diagnosis is then likely to be on safer ground. This re-emphasises the well established principle that negative organic findings are not enough to make a psychiatric diagnosis. Positive findings of emotional disturbance proportionate to the trouble, or meeting suitable criteria, must also be present before a complaint can be assumed to be psychiatric. The motivation for pain due to an injury which is subject to a compensation claim is usually obvious and not repressed – and the pain may be organically explicable – so the diagnosis of hysterical pain is exceptionally difficult. This is the more true because we lack good ‘positive signs’ by which pain may be diagnosed as hysterical. Positive signs are discussed in Chapter 14. The model for them is given by motor symptoms, such as a paralysis, where the patient can be demonstrated to have a capacity which he or she believes has been lost. Thus, a patient lying supine with a hysterical paralysis of a leg may not press the heel down hard on the examiner’s hand when asked to do so. However, when the patient lifts the other leg, the ‘paralysed’ one may press down in a synergistic counterpoise. There are no good techniques to compare with this in patients with pain, unless the patient also happens to have a classic motor conversion symptom or a symptom like hysterical blindness or deafness. In any case, the sensory signs
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which were relied on in the past as indicators of hysterical disorders are much less sure than they were previously (see Chapters 11 and 14).
Pain and psychiatry There are several other relationships of pain to psychiatry and they are more important in practice than conversion symptoms, somatoform complaints or hysteria at large. These relationships include pain associated with anxiety or depression. Anxiety and depression may cause pain, for example headaches, or may make pain worse – which is thought to happen very frequently. Also, chronic pain often causes secondary depression or other emotional changes (Merskey, 1989). Other works (e.g. Wall & Melzack, 1994) deal with this at length.
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13 Somatisation disorder and somatisation
The tacit view of pain as a hysterical symptom is particularly common among doctors when they use the word ‘polysymptomatic’ to describe patients. There is a well recognised group of patients who present in medical and surgical out-patient departments with numerous somatic complaints, including pain, very little evidence of significant physical illness, and a tendency to chronicity. Ruesch (1946) documented the relatively low social status of this group. Hollingshead & Redlich (1958) and Strole et al (1962) also gave evidence of its existence; the writer’s own findings (Merskey, 1965a,b) supported the view that hysterical pain in Western society has a social-class distribution, or at least presentation, tending to appear most often in women who are semi-skilled or unskilled workers, or married to men in comparable occupations. In addition, this view must now be qualified by the observation from epidemiological work that chronic musculoskeletal pain is much more common in groups with a low income than those with a high income and in association with depression (Magni et al, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994). Such a distribution, of course, is never absolute, and there are plenty of examples of women from higher social classes with hysterical pain. Patients of this type are often known as ‘thick-folder’ patients, their hospital records bulging uncomfortably and weighing much more than the average. Other workers also find pain to be prominently associated with hysteria. Ziegler & Meyer (1960) found it as a primary complaint in 134 patients diagnosed as having conversion symptoms, and Purtell et al (1951) found the majority of 50 patients with hysteria to have pains in various places (28 had back pains, 14 joint pains, and 31 pains in the extremities). Pilling et al (1967), taking pain 172
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as a presenting symptom, found an association with hypochondriasis and conversion symptoms and high Hs (hypochondriasis) and Hy (hysteria) scores on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Sternbach et al (1973) obtained similar MMPI results in patients with back pain, and Kenyon (1964) observed pain to be the most frequent symptom in patients with hypochondriasis. In this context, the MMPI has some serious limitations, since it is assumed that complaints of bodily symptoms are evidence of hypochondriasis but this assumption has frequently been made without any effort to determine whether or not the symptoms were physically based. Thus all patients with bodily complaints were treated in a fashion which made them bound to appear, at least to some extent, as if they were hypochondriacal or subject to hysterical symptoms. This misreads the response patterns of patients with chronic pain on the MMPI. Pilling et al (1967) showed the conversion V triad to be common in patients with chronic facial pain. In this distribution on the MMPI the scores for hypochondriasis and hysteria tend to be elevated and those for depression are raised relatively less. Sternbach (1974) obtained similar results, and many subsequent investigators have found the identical pattern. Fordyce (1976) recognised that this pattern is common to pain patients whether or not they have physical lesions. Watson (1982) showed that chronic pain patients obtained elevated hysteria and hypochondriasis scores on the MMPI because they endorsed items that were relevant to their problem (e.g. back pain, poor sleep or fatigue) and not necessarily because they were hypochondriacal. Smythe (1984) and Merskey et al (1985) emphasised that the use of these scales in the MMPI can be misleading because they rely to a considerable extent upon symptoms like pain in different locations, fatigue, other bodily complaints and insomnia as evidence for high scores on hypochondriasis, depression and hysteria. In the presence of physical illness this will often be invalid. Love & Peck (1987) reviewed 56 studies and concluded that the MMPI should not be used in the attempt to distinguish psychological causes of pain. Pincus et al (1986) showed that elevations in the Hs, D (Depression) and Hy scores in patients with rheumatoid arthritis were explained largely by five MMPI statements related to their diseases, and their responses to other questions resembled those of normal subjects. It follows that the so-called conversion V phenomenon, which earlier led us to believe that hysterical phenomena were a common part of chronic pain, has been seriously misunderstood. The limitations of the MMPI in this context have been noted, but multiple symptoms still require discussion. Guze and his
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colleagues at Washington University, St Louis, Missouri, have conducted a valuable systematic study of patients with multiple symptoms for a number of years (Perley & Guze, 1962; Guze & Perley, 1963; Guze, 1967; Woodruff, 1968; Farley et al, 1968; Cloninger & Guze, 1970a,b; Woodruff et al, 1971; Bibb & Guze, 1972; Guze, 1973; Cloninger & Guze, 1975). Their numerous publications started from a particular definition of hysteria: First the patient must demonstrate a dramatic or complicated medical history beginning before age 35. Second, the patient must admit to 25 symptoms in 9 of 10 special review of symptoms areas. Third, no other diagnosis can be made to explain the symptoms. (Guze, 1967)
The areas of symptoms shown in Table 13.1 (Woodruff, 1968). In regard to this type of patient, Guze (1967) observes “frequent visits to the physicians, the use – often simultaneous – of an amazing number of medications, excessive hospitalization, and excessive surgery, parallel the florid symptom picture”. He proposed the term Briquet’s syndrome for this group (Guze, 1967, 1970). It has been found in full in 1 out of 50 consecutive women under investigation in a university hospital medical ward Table 13.1. Woodruff’s (1968) groups of symptoms of hysteria Group
Symptoms
1 2
Headaches; sickly most of life Blindness; paralysis; anaesthesia; aphonia; fits or convulsions; unconsciousness; amnesia; deafness; hallucinations; urinary retention; ataxia; other conversion symptoms Fatigue; lump in throat; fainting spells; visual blurring; weakness; dysuria Breathing difficulty; palpitation; anxiety attacks; chest pain; dizziness Anorexia; weight loss; marked fluctuations in weight; nausea; abdominal bloating; food intolerances; diarrhoea; constipation Abdominal pain; vomiting Dysmenorrhoea; menstrual irregularity; amenorrhoea; excessive bleeding Sexual indifference; frigidity; dyspareunia; other sexual difficulties; vomiting nine months of pregnancy, hospitalised for hyperemesis gravidarum Back pain; joint pain; extremity pain; burning of the sexual organs, mouth or rectum; other bodily pains Nervousness; fears; depressed feelings; need to quit working or inability to carry on regular duties because of feeling sick; crying easily; feeling life was hopeless; thinking a good deal about dying; wanting to die; thinking suicide; suicide attempts.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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(Woodruff, 1968) and in 1 out of a sample of 100 ‘normal’ postpartum women (Farley et al, 1968), corresponding to a distribution of 1–2% in such patients and agreeing with similar findings by Majerus et al (1960) and Murphy et al (1962). About 10% of psychiatric in-patients in university hospitals were similarly affected (Bibb & Guze, 1972) and between 5% and 11% of psychiatric out-patients (Guze et al, 1971). (The figures from the latter paper are the writer’s interpretation.) Guze (1970) has emphasised that this syndrome is in contrast with the definition of conversion symptoms. He observes: “it is precisely because conversion symptom and hysteria were used to refer to different phenomena that a gratifying degree of diagnostic validity was demonstrated. The term conversion symptom is used in these studies in a purely descriptive way to refer to unexplained symptoms suggesting neurological disease of which amnesia, unconsciousness, paralysis, ‘spells’, aphonia, urinary retention, difficulty in walking, anaesthesia and blindness are the most common and classical examples. (These are the socalled ‘pseudo-neurological’ or ‘grand hysterical’ symptoms.) Unexplained in this context, means only that the history, neurological examination and appropriate diagnostic test have failed to uncover a satisfactory explanation for the symptoms. Furthermore, this use of the term conversion symptom carries with it no etiological pathogenic implications. Conversion symptoms must refer simply to a limited group of certain individual symptoms. Even though the term arose from the psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious conversion of psychic energy, it is proposed that its use be restricted to the descriptive function just outlined.”
There is of course a substantial overlap between patients with conversion symptoms and those with Briquet syndrome. This is recognised (Guze, 1967; Guze et al, 1971), although occasionally patients appear with Briquet syndrome and without a history of conversion symptoms (cf. Guze et al, 1971; Table 13.1). Conversion symptoms as such affected or had affected 27 of the 100 postpartum women studied by Farley et al (1968), 30% of 50 medically ill women studied by Woodruff (1968), and 24 of 100 psychiatric clinic out-patients studied by Woodruff et al (1971). These are remarkably high figures. The earliest paper from this group (Perley & Guze, 1962) indicated that this syndrome remained stable in 90% of the cases and no other illness which might have explained the original symptoms developed during the period of follow-up. Arkonac & Guze (1963) further reported that 9% of the parents, siblings and children over 15 years old of the affected individuals suffered from the same syndrome (15% of the female
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relations). Anxiety neurosis affected 9% of the relatives (not more than the likely population incidence) but 33% of the male relatives were diagnosed as alcoholic or sociopathic. Woerner & Guze (1968) enlarged the study, included husbands in it, and obtained similar findings. In a further study it was shown that conversion symptoms in male criminals were associated with significantly higher prevalence rates for alcoholism or drug addiction, anxiety neurosis, attempted suicide, and psychiatric admission to hospital, than for other criminals. When examining female felons, Cloninger & Guze (1970a,b) made at least one psychiatric diagnosis on every female patient. Sociopathy, alcoholism, drug dependence, hysteria and hypochondriasis were encountered more frequently than would be expected in the general female population. The most striking finding was a 20-fold greater incidence of hysteria than normal (27 out of 66 women). With the development of DSM–III and DSM–III–R (American Psychiatric Association, 1980, 1987) a category was incorporated of somatisation disorder which was intended to identify similar patients but with somewhat fewer questions and categories. As now described in DSM–IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), this category requires a history of many physical complaints over several years and beginning before the age of 30. They must result in treatment being sought or significant impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning. At least four pain symptoms, two gastrointestinal symptoms, one sexual symptom, and one “pseudo-neurologic” symptom are required to meet the criteria. DSM–III–R described 35 potential symptoms, divided into gastrointestinal symptoms, pain symptoms, cardiopulmonary symptoms, conversion or pseudoneurological symptoms, sexual symptoms for the major part of the person’s life after opportunities for sexual activity, and some female reproductive symptoms. Shorter forms of the original Briquet categories modelled upon them in this fashion proved successful in further research exploring the implications of somatisation disorder. In particular, epidemiological studies have used algorithms to identify a pattern related to somatisation disorder, for example Sigvardson and his collaborators (Sigvardson et al, 1984; Cloninger et al, 1984; Bohman et al, 1984; Deighton & Nicol, 1985). Studies of concordance between different ways of diagnosing somatisation disorder in the community have also been conducted (Schwartz et al, 1987) and alternative criteria such as the Feighner criteria (Feighner et al, 1972) or the Research Diagnostic Criteria (Spitzer et al, 1978)
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have been compared with DSM–III criteria. These paved the way for the somewhat shorter DSM–IV version. Guze (1983) summarised the usefulness of the Briquet category, demonstrating, a high degree of diagnostic use over the years, the strong familial increase in the risk of Briquet’s syndrome, and the increased risk of antisocial personality among first-degree female relatives. On the other hand, the study by Deighton & Nicol found that the prevalence of Briquet syndrome, as determined by a screening instrument, was 2.04 per 1000, much less than that found in previous studies. Further, many other patients showed both the high consultation rates and the other correlates of Briquet syndrome, bringing the usefulness of a discrete syndrome into doubt in their opinion. Still lower rates have been found for somatisation disorder in community surveys, for example 0.03% (Escobar et al, 1987) and 0.7% (Canino et al, 1987). However, more studies using these criteria seem to have found interesting if not important information. For example, the adoption study of somatoform disorders by Cloninger et al (1984) demonstrated an increased rate of somatic complaints among young women adoptees. They had repeated brief sick leave for multiple somatic complaints in a pattern that was consistently associated with psychiatric disability, as well as four times the frequency of sick leave from occupational disability compared with others. Most of the sick leaves were not medically certified and the authors gave reasons for thinking that these complaints were primarily psychiatric in origin. The cases were split into two discrete patterns, one with a high frequency of a limited number of complaints and the other of less frequent disability but a greater diversity of complaints. The first type combined features of somatisation disorder, hypochondriasis, agoraphobia, and agitated depression. The second type appeared to be associated more with generalised anxiety, but no previously described and validated diagnostic category fully described the symptoms and course of a typical patient in this group. Bohman et al (1984) then reported that the genetic and environmental antecedents of the two groups differed from those of the other subjects in their study. The risk of the second type, “Diversiform somatization”, was increased in the adoptedaway daughters of men treated for what they characterised as “male limited” alcoholism, while the biological fathers of cases with high-frequency somatisation (the first type) often had a history of recurrent convictions for violent crime since adolescence, but no treatment for alcoholism. These differential patterns of
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inheritance, which tended to replicate earlier findings of an association between criminality and Briquet syndrome, reinforced the view that patterns of somatic complaining have a hereditary component. Liskow et al (1986) offered evidence that Briquet syndrome presented a heterogeneous disorder. Among 78 female psychiatric out-patients with the diagnosis, 68 (87.2%) had a lifetime prevalence of major depressive disorder, 35 (44.9%) had experienced panic disorder, 21 (26.9%) had had a diagnosis of schizophrenia, and 31 (39.7%) a diagnosis of mania. Twenty-one (26.9%) also had a diagnosis of obsessive–compulsive disorder, and 30 (38.5%) a diagnosis of phobic disorder. Lesser numbers had drug dependence (18), alcohol dependence (13), antisocial personality (13), anorexia nervosa (5), and homosexuality, organic mental disorder or mental retardation. While Briquet syndrome may or may not be heterogeneous, these data show that it clearly has other concomitants and might well be the end result of several different causes. From the findings of the National Institute of Mental Health Epidemiologic Catchment Area study (ECA study), a populationbased survey of psychiatric morbidity among more than 18 000 residents of five US communities, Simon & Von Korff (1991) also noted that somatisation symptoms showed strong associations with anxiety and depression, an intermediate association with symptoms of psychotic disorders, and the weakest associations with symptoms of substance abuse and antisocial personality. This reflects consideration of all somatisation symptoms, and one might anticipate that whereas a few somatisation symptoms in any given person will be likely to show the links with anxiety and depression which have been noted, it is the sustained concentration of somatisation symptoms which have the links with personality disorder. One of the most interesting findings is a relationship between a tendency to somatisation and genetic liabilities within the family to antisocial personality. The St Louis group has shown this phenomenon repeatedly, and Lilienfeld (1992) considers a number of sex-related factors which might be responsible for differences in aggression and dependency, leading to the patterns that have been observed. Such factors might be either hormonal or social in origin. Further work on the family structure and social patterns in patients with Briquet syndrome will be mentioned later. Although Briquet syndrome probably does not represent a specific defined entity, but rather one end of a continuum, the work of the St Louis group has left little doubt that pain can function as a
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psychological symptom which is often associated with the disease syndrome of conversion symptoms and other somatic complaints. In clinical practice also there is no doubt about the durability of pain as a psychological symptom in this relatively limited group. Briquet himself did not really describe this syndrome (Mai & Merskey, 1980a,b). His own patients had a variable course, often showing hysterical personality traits and a relationship to environmental events and to the emotional state. He himself criticised the use of the word ‘hysteria’ since the etymology was both clinically and pathologically unsound, but he concluded that he would have to continue using it because it had been in use since Hippocrates and because everyone understood its meaning. He hoped – forlornly as it has turned out – that in the course of time the word would lose its pejorative connotations. Interest in the diagnosis also differs on both sides of the Atlantic. Although the work of Guze and his colleagues was published in the British Journal of Psychiatry at a time when American psychiatrists were less receptive to his efforts to produce systematic studies of clinical categories than is now the case, Briquet syndrome has not proved to be as popular in Britain as it has become in North America. Stern et al (1993a) demonstrated that the majority of a large sample of senior British psychiatrists endorsed the vie