The Armada of Flanders: Spanish Maritime Policy and European War, 1568-1668 (Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History)

CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN EARLY MODERN HISTORY

The Armada of Flanders During the Thirty Years' War, Spanish naval power reached unprecedented levels. The creation of a 'fleet in being', employed widely in defence of Monarchy and Empire, was part of a profound reappraisal of Madrid's international strategy. Maritime concerns were perceived as vital to the political, military and economic priorities of the Monarchy. They played a central role in the great programme of reform elaborated and co-ordinated by the count-duke of Olivares. The ports and shipyards of Flanders, above all Dunkirk, were the crucial focus of maritime revival. The Flanders armada, which took shape in response to the use of seapower by the Dutch rebels, evolved into the most effective unit in Spain's defence establishment - a devastating and awe-inspiring weapon. In combination with its privateering auxiliaries, this elite striking force dominated the North Sea for some twenty years (i 625-1645), and campaigned also in Mediterranean and Atlantic theatres of war. Yet its contribution to the tenacious survival of Spanish hegemony has never before been assessed. A narrative of the armada's fighting record over the century of its meaningful existence is presented with constant reference to the strategic-logistical context and analysis of policymaking in Madrid. Attention is paid to the political significance of maritime policy, and particularly the relationship between Madrid and its subordinate headquarters in Brussels. A major section of analysis is supported by a set of quantitative appendices. Treatment is given to the infrastructure of the armada; the ships themselves, above all the revolutionary but elusive 'frigate'; the social hierarchy of crews and commanders; and details of administration and financing.

CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN EARLY MODERN HISTORY Edited by Professor Jf. H. Elliott, University of Oxford, Professor Olwen Hufton, University, and Professor H. G. Koenigsberger

Harvard

The idea of an 'early modern' period of European history from the fifteenth to the late eighteenth century is now widely accepted among historians. The purpose of Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History is to publish monographs and studies which illuminate the character of the period as a whole, and in particular focus attention on a dominant theme within it, the interplay of continuity and change as they are presented by the continuity of medieval ideas, political and social organisation, and by the impact of new ideas, new methods and new demands on the traditional structure. For a list of titles published in the series, please see end of book

The Armada of Flanders Spanish Maritime Policy and European War, 1568-1668

R. A. STRADLING University of Wales, College of Cardiff

The right of the University of Cambridge to print and sell all manner of books was granted by Henry VIII in 1534. The University has printed and published continuously since 1584.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge New York Port Chester Melbourne Sydney

PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcon 13,28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org © Cambridge University Press 1992 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1992 First paperback edition 2003 A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

Stradling, R. A. The armada of Flanders: Spanish maritime policy and European war, 1568-1668 / R. A. Stradling. p. cm. - (Cambridge studies in early modern history) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0 52140534 3 1. Spain. Armada - History - 16th century. 2. Spain - History, Naval - 16th century. 3. Netherlands - History -Wars of Independence, 1556-1648. 4. Balance of power. I. Title. II. Series. VA583.S77 1992 359'.00946'09031-dc20 91-9609 CIP ISBN 0 52140534 3 hardback ISBN 0 52152512 8 paperback Transferred to digital printing 2003

For Helen, at last

Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009

Contents

Preface Acknowledgements Glossary Comparative currency values List of abbreviations

page ix xi xiii xv xvi

Maps

xviii

Part i

Prologue - Failure and retrenchment, 1568-1621

1

The search for a naval policy

2

Dunkirk rediscovered

1 3 16

Part 2 The great offensive, 1621-1640

37

3

The first quinquennium

39

4

The first crisis

58

5

Dunkirk's golden decade

80

Part 3

Dunkirk and the defence of Empire, 1640-165 8

111

6

The Flanders fleet in the South

113

7

The prize of Dunkirk

131

Part 4

Quills, keels and cutlasses

151

8

Men and ships - the cutting edge

153

9

Administration - structures, personnel,

1o

finance

176

Prizetaking - plunder of a century

204

Epilogue - Decay and transition, 165 8-1668

229

APPENDICES 1 Routes taken by reinforcements to army of Flanders, 1567-1640

240

vii

241

Contents 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Flanders armada and other naval units: comparative wage rates, 1588-1663 Senior officials of the Admiralty of Flanders, 1583-1696 Monthly salaries of Admiralty staff, 1596-1670 Ships of the Flanders armada, 1587-1669 Other naval forces in Spanish Flanders Estimated strength of Flanders armada, 1588-1669 Various estimates of warship construction costs, 1617-163 5 Accounts of the Flanders armada, 1621-1625 The 'summary relation' of privateering exploits, 1627-1634 The prizetaking record, 1621-1668 English prizes and ransoms in 1656 Financial returns from prizetaking

Bibliography Index

242 244 246 247 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 268

viu

Preface The book's main subjects are lashed together in its catamaran title. It analyses naval policy in the western European theatre of the Spanish Monarchy's wars, and focuses on the role of the Flanders armada in its evolution and execution. It illustrates a thesis which is now, if belatedly, recognised by most historians of the period - namely that Spain remained a major naval power for nearly a century after the defeat of the Invincible Armada, consistently seeking to defend its European hegemony by these means, which were as crucial to its policy as the deployment of land forces. That the army has recently been much more central to our perception of Spanish power is due in large measure to the early work of Geoffrey Parker. In fact, the latter's contributions have never ignored the maritime context of the Spanish System. Moreover, his study of The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road (1972), one of the foundation volumes of the present series, has provided an exemplar of lucidly presented research which this book aspires (doubtless in vain) to complement. Several cognate themes are encountered in the course of discussion. Two, in particular, may be seen as essential to the argument, if on a secondary plane. These are: privateering utilised as part of a mainstream naval strategy, and the central place of Dunkirk in this strategy. Insofar as it has any original aspects, my work seeks to contribute to this history of war and politics. Its touch is light (and often derivative) on the economic consequences of Spanish maritime policy; on technical questions of shipbuilding and other aspects of warmaking infrastructure; on naval policy in the Atlantic and Mediterranean theatres; and on issues of international and maritime law. This procedure is partially justified by the prior existence of monographs by Tony Thompson, Jose Alcala-Zamora, Jonathan Israel, Carla Rahn Phillips, David Goodman and Miguel Angel Echevarria, and by the promise of further work in relevant areas by several of these scholars. Moreover, in the interests of space, I have felt obliged largely to suppress my own interest in the broad cultural significance of Spain's maritime past. I hope to return to this region at a later point, and that the present craft (meanwhile) will find a berth alongside the others, adding to the interest of the harbourscape by the different cut of its rig. Throughout the text, the anglicised word 'armada' signifies the Flanders flotilla. Other concentrations, such as established naval forces (Armadas), fleets ix

Preface sailing on a regular basis along a set route (flotas) and one-off strategic expeditions (empresas) are spelt out in full. In the interests of simplicity, wherever possible non-Spanish monetary values have been transposed into that of the Monarchy's main coin of exchange, the gold escudo. In particular, it should be noted that the comparative value of the escudo and the Brabant florin used in the Spanish Netherlands was approximately i to 2.5. The unit of volume known as the last has been translated into modern tons, using the rate of 1 to 2 at which it is commonly reckoned. Elsewhere, tonnage measurements used in original documents have not been tampered with. The writer believes that it is impossible to be sure of which 'ton' (tonel or tonelada) the author of a document is referring to, and that in any case the variables they represent (around 15 to 20 per cent) are not substantial enough to effect the verisimilitude of the account, or to worry most readers.

Acknowledgements Work on this book began so long ago that from my present perspective it almost seems part of a continuum from a childhood fascination with the world of buccaneering. The archival research was in large part completed by 1983 but because of other commitments and distractions composition was repeatedly postponed. In the end, the actual writing process relentlessly occupied the whole of a year's Study Leave in 1989-90. As it stands, the result is bulky enough, but the original sources for its subject are so voluminous - particularly, but not exclusively, at Simancas - that had time and the bell permitted, it could have been three times larger. However, the task was lightened, not only by the character of much of the narrative-anecdotal material, but by the delight of dealing with such men as the secretary (or greffier), Jean Penninq; the master of a beer-boat, Captain Hatch; the Spanish naval archivist, the late Capitan Vicente Vela (vela = sail); the privateering skipper Sparre, and many other dramatis personae. I have accumulated many debts, some of them doubtless forthcoming out of sympathy for my slow progress in others better qualified to be writing this history. Such, certainly, was the origin of the incalculable fund of assistance provided by my friend Miguel Angel Echevarria of the University of the Basque Country. He has displayed selfless concern for my intellectual improvement in all matters touching Spain and Hispanic cultures. His profound additional reserves of knowledge about the Low Countries have left a powerful imprint. Lastly, his published work has illuminated several aspects of the present discussion. If we still argue about some basic issues, it is with great good humour and notable lack of intense conviction. My colleague Professor John King, of the Cardiff Maritime Studies School, examined a large section of the work in draft, and I thank him for pointing out several landlubber's blunders. I am grateful to some other younger scholars for sharing aspects of their work - Andrew Thrush, Jane Ohlmeyer and Ian Scott fall into this category. When at their present stage of development, I remember benefiting from the advice of Dr Alistair MacFadyen, whose marvellous thesis on Anglo-Spanish Relations (1625-60) I again turned to for information in writing parts of this book. Many years ago, too, Professor James Jones responded with generosity and insight to my appeals for guidance on the foreign relations of seventeenth-century England. XI

Acknowledgements The skilled care of archivists, especially in Spain, deserves every recognition. In Simancas, the team of archiveras under the benign leadership successively of Dona Adela de la Vega and the present Directora, Dona Angela de la Plaza, have been a further credit to the reputation of that matchless institution. In the archive of the Museo Naval in Madrid I received help from the Director, Capitan Jose Maria Zumalacarregui, the Directora Tecnica Dona Ana Maria Vigon Sanchez (both now retired) and from Dona Dolores Higueras Rodriguez, Director of Research. My visit to the Archivo General de la Marina in Viso del Marques was rendered profitable by the assistance of Don Juan del Campo Munoz and Don Vicente de Campo Hernan. As long ago as 1981, when I first tentatively approached him on the subject, Helli Koenigsberger encouraged me to hope that my work on the armada of Flanders might be acceptable to the joint curators of the Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History. His colleague, John Elliott, may recall some gentle chiding of my perversity in writing a textbook and a general study before attempting a genuine monograph; and the book's appearance in this series is a testament to his concern. Both editors have stoically endured the hard labour of examining my original manuscript, correcting its many errors and clarifying its frequent obscurities. Fundamental research for the book was made possible by consistent financial help from The British Academy. I am deeply indebted to the Trustees for their repeated demonstrations of confidence and patience. During my Study Leave, colleagues in the History Section at Cardiff uncomplainingly took the consequent extra strain of a teaching load which was already heavier than usual. In expressing my thanks, I am aware that their fraternal attitude is merely one happy feature of many years' association. My wife, Helen, is another who has looked forward to the completion of the work; partly to gain a respite - however temporary - from living with the self-absorption and petulance of the writer, partly in order to be paid the debt of dedication which is so long overdue. But like all the rest, and more truly, her credit has come interest-free.

Xll

Glossary

alcalde alfdrez alguacil almiranta armador

armateur arbitrista arbitrista del mar asiento bisono capitana cortes consignation consulta coningsschepen contador covachuelista ducado depositario empresa escudo estado forzado

town mayor army officer (roughly, rank of lieutenant) law enforcement officer rear-flagship of a fleet or squadron; not flagship, as might be assumed by Anglophones owner (and often builder and/or skipper) of privateering ship; but could also mean a partner with shares in such an enterprise see armador author of proposal on government policy-reform (usually socio-economic) an arbitrista with special interest in maritime, geopolitical, or broadly strategic affairs contract for service to crown {asiento de dinero = money loan) raw recruit flagship Castilian Estates (or Parliament) royal revenue offered as loan collateral formal report to king of council or junta king's ships accountant Madrid bureaucrat financial unit of account Admiralty official in charge of prize goods naval expedition or enterprise largest Spanish coin of exchange Council of State (Madrid) criminal serving sentence as galley oarsman Xlll

Glossary galeoncete hdbito hacienda hombres de negocios Jornada juros limpieza (de sangre) maravedi media anata mesada official mayor pagador pagaduria particular particulier pechero pinaza pliego presidio proveedor quatro villas

reforma residencia servicios y millones tenedor veedor-general veeduria visita valido

smaller galleons patented in 1590s membership of one of Castile's military orders (i.e. a knighthood) royal treasury, supervised by a council bankers to the crown royal visit to provinces (a 'progress') state investment bonds the doctrine of'purity of blood', signifying eligibility for higher royal service and honours Castilian copper coin of low value occasional royal imposition of payment moratorium (juros dividends or official salaries) monthly allowance in royal subsidy senior assistant or official (e.g. veedor) paymaster office of paymaster see armador see armador Castilian taxpayer pinnace file of papers Spanish military bases in Italy and North Africa assistant inspector administrative district comprised of the 'four towns' of Santander, Laredo, Castro Urdiales and San Vicente de la Barquera suppression of a military unit (or its merging with another) public examination of senior official's record at the end of his tenure taxes periodically reviewed by Cortes storekeeper chief inspector post or office of veedor audit of accounts by officials of Hacienda Spanish royal favourite and chief minister xiv

Rough comparative values of Spanish and Flanders currencies, c. 1620-60 CASTILIAN Ducat 1 Escudo (gold)2

Real (silver)

Real (vellon) Cuartillo Cuarto Octavo

= 375 maravedis1 = 1.333 reales de a ocho (silver) = 340 maravedis = 1.25 reales (silver) = 10 reales (vellon) = 2.5 florins = 275 maravedis = 0.8 escudos = 0.75 ducats = 34 maravedis = 8 maravedis = 4 maravedis = 2 maravedis FLANDERS

Patacon Florin

1 2

= 9.5 reales vellon = almost 1 escudo = 4 reales vellon 0.4 escudos = 136 maravedis

In this period, ducat and maravedi were only units of reckoning (or 'coins of account'). In the text, footnotes and appendices, monetary values are expressed in escudos wherever convenient and possible.

XV

Abbreviations

Archivo General de Simancas, Valladolid Consejo y Juntas de Hacienda Contaduria Mayor de Cuentas, (Tercera Epoca) CMC Estado E Embajada de Espana en La Haya EEH Guerra Antigua GA Archivo General de Indias, Seville AGI/ Indiferente General IG Archivo General de la Marina, Viso del Marques AGM Archivo Historico Nacional, Madrid AHN/ Estado E Hacienda Hac. Archivo Historico Provincial de Cantabria, Santander AHP(C)/ Centro de Estudios Montaneses CEM Archivo Historico Provincial de Guipuzcoa, Tolosa AHP(G) Sec. Neg. Secretarfa Negotiation Archivo Municipal de Alicante AMA Archives Municipals de Dunkerque, Dunkirk AMD Archivo del Palacio Real, Madrid APR/ Section Administrativa SA ARB/ Archives du Royaume de Belgique (Allgemeine Rijksarchiv), Brussels Conseil d'Amiraute CA Conseil Prive CP Manuscrits Divers Div. Secretairerie d'Etat et de Guerre SEG British Library, London BL/ Additional Manuscripts Add. Egerton Manuscripts EG. Harl. Harleian Manuscripts BN Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid Bibliotheque Publique et Universitaire, Geneva BPU BRB Bibliotheque Royale de Belgique, Brussels

AGS/

CJH

XVI

Abbreviations MMG/ PHB MN/ Nav. Oxf. Bod. PRO/ SP RAH

Maritime Museum Library, Greenwich Phillips' Collection Museo Naval, Madrid Coleccion Navarrete Bodleian Library, Oxford Public Record Office, London State Papers Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid

MISCELLANEOUS

BAE CODOIN CSPD EHR EHQ ESR MM

Biblioteca de Autores Espaiioles Coleccion de Documentos Ineditos para la Historia de Espafia Calendar of State Papers, Domestic English Historical Review European History Quarterly European Studies Review The Mariner's Mirror

xvn

Shetland Islands

Map i Operational Theatres of the Dunkirk Armada, 1598-1656, with locations referred to in the text.

XVlll

^ i / ^ J^y Enkhuizen

•[Yarmouth


/^f*. Amsterdam

;

/o ^^-^y /

"*0

^

J

.

The Hague - ^

y * Delft

^ GELDERLAND

%% S c h i e d a r n R O t t e r d a m ?>%. c r ~ > i > ^ = ^ ©'s Hertogenbosch

London ~^^

% ^ H ^ • Breda SluisJ^ZEELAND

Sandwich # f ( Dover^/ Dungeness/ ^^^v/

Boulogne

V%

OWn

StOmer ">. Menin HAINAULT ARTOIS • Douai

y

>

-

i ^ t a ; t a ' 5 L 3 U Antwerp

Nieuwpoort co^> # BRABANT Ypres K&® Malines •Brussels • # ^V^

/

y^

^ Munster* ^

• Cologne

<

%& v

•Valenciennes

LUXEMBOURG

-7

Dieppe

Map 2 The Flanders ports and their geographical vicinity, with locations referred to in the text.

xix

Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009

PARTI

Prologue - failure and retrenchment, 1568-1621

Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009

The search for a naval policy

SAILING IN THE DARK

Both as explosive event and as continuing phenomenon, the Revolt of the Netherlands was the fundamental conditioning factor in the experience of Spain's European hegemony. Yet it could not have developed beyond its earliest stages, nor would the unlikely revival of its fortunes spearheaded by the 'Sea-Beggars' in 1572 have stood much chance of success, if Philip II and his ministers had been as assiduous in the creation of a North Sea navy as they were in the establishment of the celebrated army of Flanders. The presence of appropriate Spanish squadrons and bases in the Rhine delta and the Hook of Holland would surely have provided a deterrent, just as their absence acted as an incentive, to the motley heroes of Motley.1 Having made such a fundamental (and hypothetical) stricture, we must qualify it in several important respects. In fact, the duke of Alba, Philip's governor and military commander in the Low Countries, did dispose of a force which could loosely be called naval in 1572. This mainly comprised small, if numerous, craft - above all, expropriated river barges and sloops, whose routine function was the service and support of essentially terrestrial operations. Even had the duke been willing by temperament to divert his attention from the latter, his resources were hardly suited to the task of policing the dangerous waters to the seaward of the major Dutch islands.2 At a more general level, not for the first nor the last time, part of the explanation for this portentous lapse of Madrid's policy was its intense concentration elsewhere; in this case, on the Mediterranean, an obsession which reasserted itself in Madrid, once Alba had won his victories on land and the 1

For a cogent account of the revolt in the Netherlands, see G. Parker, The Dutch Revolt (London, 1977); and an invigorating treatment of the international scene is given by H. Lapeyre, Les Monarchies europeennes du XVIe siecle. Les relations internationales (Paris, 1966). T h e reference in

2

the text, however, is to J. R. Motley's Classic The Rise of the Dutch Republic, first published in 1856. I have relied in what follows - heavily at times - on the excellent recent narrative compiled directly from AGS documentation by P. Pi Corrales, Felipe IIy la luchapor el dominio del mar (Madrid, 1989), esp. pp. 112-74. See also, however, J. Cervera Pery, La estrategia naval del Imperio: Auge, declivey ocaso de la Marina de losAustrias (Madrid, 1982), pp. 135ff. and R. Cerezo Martinez, Las Armadas de Felipe II (Madrid, 1988), pp. 233-54.

Failure and retrenchment, 1568-1621 Flemish protest movement seemed to have dissipated itself (1567-68). At exactly that moment, the revolt of the moriscos of the Alpujarras posed a serious danger to Andalusia, demanding two years and a sizeable military effort for its suppression. Success here provided motive and moment for Philip to pour his energies into the Holy League against the Ottoman. A momentous campaign culminated in the brilliant victory of Lepanto (1571). The expense of such commitments seriously debilitated the Treasury, and virtually monopolised the energies of Spain's naval commissariat in the construction and provision of war-galleys. Little wonder that down to 1572, a period during which the local resistance movement seemed in any case to have been asphyxiated by the rigorous measures taken by Alba, the maritime security of the Netherlands did not assume priority. Having committed this partial oversight, Philip was to find it exceptionally difficult to recover the initiative. Not wholly by design, the rebels had registered a great success by capturing the fishing ports of the west and south coasts of Zeeland. Their hectic progress from Den Briel and Walcheren to the capture of Vlissingen gave them an ideal strategic nexus for rapid diffusion of their influence, along the coasts into Holland in the north, and into the FlandersBrabant mainland, by means of the multiple waterways which faced them across a safe stretch of water. These gains also provided a perfect base from which to exercise a stranglehold on the communications - whether commercial or military - of Antwerp, the largest city of the Low Countries, and the richest port of western Europe. Above all, the timing of the onslaught was fortuitous to perfection. Only a matter of weeks after the loss of Vlissingen, the duke of Medinaceli docked in Sluis, with an expeditionary force which included a proportion of seagoing vessels (carracks and galleons).3 Immense logistical, technological and provision difficulties lay behind the preparation of Medinaceli's fleet, which seems (nonetheless) to have represented the first large-scale empresa to have reached Flanders in a single direct voyage from Spain. Earlier ventures intended to supply military resources to the Netherlands had been able to count on shelter and recuperation in friendly harbours en route. The co-operation of England and above all the English possession of Calais, a deepwater port conveniently close to his main theatre of operations, allowed Charles V to utilise the Channel lanes during the wars with France which dominated his last decade in office. The loss of Calais in 1558, for which England's Spanish king was blamed, was actually of greater practical consequence for Spain than it was for England. Moreover, relations between the two countries had deteriorated badly a decade later.4 3 4

Pi Corrales, Felipe IIy la lucha, pp. 150— 1; Parker, Dutch Revolt, pp. 131-9. F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age ofPhilip II (2 vols., London 1971-2), 1 480—4, (citing AGS/E 502 and 504)), itemises seven such voyages between 1544 and 1552. In the 1570s, plans often suggested tackling the logistical problems of the voyage by transferring men and money (say, in the Solent) between the galleons coming from Spain and

The search for a naval policy The Medinaceli voyage, chaotic in preparation and sadly disappointing in results, nevertheless showed that despite his other preoccupations, Philip II remained aware of, and (insofar as he could) prepared to cater for, the maritime contingencies of the North Sea. Following the setbacks of 1572 itself, the King reacted in the manner which for several further generations was to characterise the Spanish response to major military disaster. Having now clearly identified the strategic situation obtaining in the Low Countries as essentially maritime, he set in motion the appropriate preparations to stem the tide of rebel successes. With the onslaught of 'les gueux', combined with the simultaneous infiltration of the English 'sea-dogs' into the Caribbean, for the first time Spain's maritime establishment confronted the need to create a large-scale open-sea fleet; and ministers, for their part, faced the equally unprecedented problem of guaranteeing its functioning in the royal service on a permanent basis. In 1573, the count of Olivares recommended the preparation of a fleet of thirty medium-sized galleons for duty in the north. Significantly, it was already recognised in government circles that 'ships of shallow draught [suitable] for operations off the Flemish coast' were essential; in other words that modification and adaptation, if not innovation, in the current design and construction of vessels, was the order of the day.5 In the circumstances, this conviction may have been premature. Alba's replacement, Don Luis de Requesens, believed that such a radical change of emphasis was unnecessary, since the galleys used with such success in Mediterranean waters were perfectly suitable for the new theatre of operations. In this, he may have been betraying his Catalan origins - it was said the best galleys were constructed in the dockyards of Don Luis's home principality - but recent local experience seemed to bear him out, and prominent naval authorities supported his instinct for some years to come.6 The squadrons of minor sailing vessels which Requesens employed achieved little during the defensive operations involved in the critical siege of Middelburg, the key to Zeeland, in 1573-4. However, the new adviser called in by Philip to consider this emergency was a keen exponent of the Atlantic galleon. Pedro Menendez de Aviles, conquistador and first governor of Florida, largely seconded Olivares, only parting from him in advocating use of an even smaller race of galleons, which at first he called pinazas. The new naval effort was concentrated in Santander, where it was possible to co-ordinate the resources

5

6

smaller ships sent to liaise from Flanders. The former could then return with a reduced risk of the enemy's attentions, as well as avoiding the sandbanks and other inimical North Sea conditions. For Anglo-Spanish relations in this period, see R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada: The Growth of English Foreign Policy (London, 1966). A. W. Lovett, Philip II and Mateo Vazquez de Leca: The Government of Spain, 1572—Q2 (Geneva, See below, pp. n - 1 3 .

Failure and retrenchment, 1568-1621 and technical experience of the various maritime communities of Spain's northern littoral.7 Menendez's scheme, which fully anticipated the grandiose thinking of Santa Cruz and other subsequent commanders, was for a fleet of 150 ships. He proposed that this should include a squadron of twenty medium-sized galleons (up to 300 tons) to carry the bulk of the 3,000 infantry intended for the reconquest of Zeeland. He hoped to draw on the resources of the Basque Country, whose ships and mariners were practised in the trading run to Antwerp, and had been in charge of the transport of the Emperor's soldiery referred to above. Apparently, Menendez intended to use his smaller ships as lighters and landing craft in a fully amphibious operation. In the course of 1573-4 a force of over fifty assorted vessels was collected in Santander, mostly by commandeering privately-owned merchant ships in all Spain's major Atlantic ports. Not only was no new building programmed, but Menendez had to select for his purpose mostly from written lists, without the opportunity to inspect the ships themselves. The crown's finances were already approaching the edges of the disaster which was to overwhelm them the following year, and despite the arrival of Olivares in person with new powers, sufficient credit was never available to provide stability for the project. Even before Menendez and many of his command succumbed to an outbreak of typhus, crews had deserted and ships had been lost through incompetence and neglect. The expedition never got under way, and much of the energy and resources expended on it was wasted. The consequent loss of Middelburg, involving that of the entire province of Zeeland, was one of the most ominous setbacks in Spanish imperial history, and one which was never reversed. In the second half of the 1570s, the rebels were virtually unhindered in creating the infrastructures of their future maritime achievements. One by one, the Dutch captured the main ports of Flanders, whereas financial and strategic conditions virtually prohibited any appreciable Spanish recovery at sea. The pleas of Requesens and others for a rationalisation of naval policy went largely unheeded.8 Not until the absorption of the Crown of Portugal, with its considerable maritime establishment, was this situation altered. Indeed, the existence of the Portuguese ocean-going fleets, which had patented the use of galleons and guns in the early decades of the century, had been one of the reasons why Spain had 7

8

This account of the Menendez expedition relies on that of M. Pi Corrales, Espanay las potencias nordicas: 'La otra Invencible\ 1574(Madrid, 1983), esp. pp. 89-138, and I53ff. Even Alba, once his return to Spain had enabled him to take a longer perspective of the Low Countries' problem, added his voice to the naval lobby, (I. A. A. Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620 (London, 1976), p. 186 and n. 2). Meanwhile, various attempts to get the remnants of Menendez's fleet to sea in 1575—6 were marked by repeated breakdowns. Before the troop reinforcements left Spain they were often in outright mutiny. See Pi Corrales, Felipe II y la lucha, pp. i53ff.

The search for a naval policy been slow to develop its own formal naval establishment. Co-operation between the two crowns over security in the Atlantic approaches had become a fairly reliable element in the overall strategic picture. This was welcome, since it meant that Spain could more freely concentrate its resources on the prolonged struggle with the Ottoman empire in the Mediterranean. But it meant that in mid-century little urgency was attached to the construction of galleons, the manufacture of appropriate artillery - in short, to the whole issue of a permanent naval apparatus capable of organising the North Sea-Atlantic dimension. In 1570, the Crown still only disposed of eighteen galleon-type warships a figure which was no improvement on that of a generation earlier - and at least half of these were normally committed to protecting the American trade-system. On the other hand, Portugal's 'fleet-in-being' had been declining (with the occasional interruption) for fifty years, and in the decade following 1570 slumped from thirty-nine to only eighteen units. This was, therefore, one of the factors which precipitated a decisive Spanish intervention in Portugal when legitimate opportunity offered in 1580. Philip II himself, spending over two years in Lisbon (1581-3), was able to review and assess the relevant resources.9 Meanwhile, Alessandro Farnese, duke of Parma, his new lieutenant in the Netherlands, had begun a campaign of steady pressure on the frontier positions of the rebel union. The Portuguese windfall was complemented in 1583 by Parma's recapture of Dunkirk, an awkward harbour, it is true, but one which might suffice as a base for warships, and the reception of fleets from Spain. In any case, with neither Sluis nor Ostend yet in his hands, Farnese had little choice if he wished to add a naval dimension to his plans for the reconquest of the north. Shortly after taking the port, he transferred thence the moribund naval council from Gravelines, and by the issue of new ordinances in effect created the first admiralty organisation of the Spanish Netherlands. 10 Tradition traced the origins of naval authority in Flanders to Roman times; and it is true that even in the Habsburg era, Charles V had founded an admiralty in 1540 in order to 'faire negotiations et hoy porveoir contre les Pyrates de Mer'. 11 Not only, as this implies, was the organisation devoted mainly to defence of the growing commercial activity of the Netherlands, but it can also be regarded in constitutional terms as a revival of earlier Burgundian jurisdiction. The new admiralty of 1583 was in part run by Spaniards, whilst an indication of rapid alteration in the commercial balances of the North Sea nexus can be seen 9

10

11

See G. Modelski and W. R. Thompson, Seapower in Global Politics, i4Q4-iggj (London, 1988), esp. pp. 62-3, 151-7 and 174-5. This major quantitative study of'great-power navies' came to my attention too late for full consideration of its contents. However, I hope in a future survey of Spain's maritime culture to give closer attention to its thesis that Portugal was the original 'world' naval power, whereas Spain was merely one of the 'unsuccessful aspirants' to such a title. J. Bolsee, Inventaire des Archives des Conseils et Sieges dAmiraute (Tongres, 1932), pp. 152-3; G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: The Logistics ofSpanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 83-4. From an eighteenth-century ms. history of the Burgundian Admiralty in BRB/16028-37, f. 1.

Failure and retrenchment,

1568-1621

in the fact that, almost from the start, Dunkirk was utilised as a base for offensive operations. From Dunkirk, Parma was able to tighten his purchase on Sluis, which eventually capitulated in 1587. Moreover, privateering against heretic commerce had quickly become a feature of the port. In 1586, for example, William Colston, merchant of Bristol, sailing to Vlissingen, was captured by Dunkirkers and forced to ransom himself on the high seas for £600. 12 During the preparations for the Enterprise of England in 1587-8, Parma's naval apparatus was vastly augmented. With the fall of Sluis, at Philip's orders, Parma set about collecting all the riverine and coasting vessels he could get his hands on, as well as embargoing larger craft in Antwerp, hiring merchant ships from Hamburg and other German ports and building new boats in Dunkirk.13 Huge numbers of temporary officials, agents and sailors were recruited in the loyal zone. By the spring of 1588, Parma had over 300 assorted vessels, most of them in excellent condition, standing by in the ports of Flanders to transport an army of 25,000 as far as the coast of Kent. 14 Though emphatically a matter of speculation, it is possible that amongst Parma's forces were enough warships combining manoeuvrable dimensions with firepower to stand off an attack by the Dutch fleet which had been mobilised to deal with it. Be this as it may, when the climactic moment of the campaign arrived, the duke was unwilling to commit so much to such a lottery, especially when not required to do so by advance instruction. Quite simply, the chances of success were not high enough to justify the appalling consequences of failure. Neither the armada of Flanders, nor the Dutch navy which in future years constituted its main opponent, therefore participated actively in the most celebrated naval campaign of history.15 The decade following the disaster of the Invincible witnessed the steady emergence of a coherent Spanish naval policy. Of course, the objective was distorted in many respects by Philip IPs residual determination to carry out the punishment of England by force majeure and the continual wastage of maritime resources that this entailed.16 The formation of a home waters fleet, influenced 12

13 14

15

16

J. Vanes (ed.), Documents Illustrating the Overseas Trade ofBristol in the Sixteenth Century (Bristol, 1979), pp. 72-3. (I owe this reference to Mr Ian Scott.) Philip II to marquis of Santa Cruz, (?Jan. 1588), MMG/PHB ib, ff. 444-5. Details in F. Riafio Lozano, Los medios navales de Alejandro Farnesio (1587-1588), (Madrid, 1989), esp. pp. 229-36. See also H. O'Donnell y Duque de Estrada, La Fuerza de desembarco de la Gran Armada contra Inglaterra (1588) (Madrid, 1989), esp. pp. 395-400. Three excellent general discussions of the Enterprise of England appeared during the anniversary of 1988, all of them adding some fresh dimension to the theme: C. Martin and G. Parker, The Spanish Armada (Cambridge); F. Fernandez-Armesto, The Spanish Armada: The Experience of War in 1588 (Oxford); and C. Gomez-Centurion, La Invencible y la empresa de Inglaterra (Madrid). Parma's agglomeration of 1588 fell within the administrative ambit of the official staff of the Flanders Admiralty. For all its ephemeral existence and frustrated purpose, technically it must be regarded as a part of the present history, though one which, in the circumstances, seems to require no further exposition within its pages. A single-volume treatment in English of the post-1588 attempts to refloat the empresa de Inglaterra is still useful: W. Graham, Spanish Armadas (London, 1970), although it has now been superseded in terms of detail by Pi Corrales {Felipe IIy la lucha). If perhaps somewhat light on

The search for a naval policy in part by Drake's ambitious landing in Galicia in 1589, which, although it ended in fiasco, sent a tremor through Spain, was the most significant feature of this development. By 1590, Pedro de Zubiaur had formed a squadron of northern flibotes and Spanish galeoncetes as the beginnings of a permanent Armada del Mar Oceano based at Lisbon and Cadiz.17 An administrative structure emerged, derived from the experience of existing mechanisms such as the galley fleets and the Atlantic convoy guards. The distinguished naval historian, J. S. Corbett, perceived a century ago that - contrary to the ingrained assumptions of English tradition - 1588 marked the beginning of the Spanish Armada rather than its end. 18 In 1976,1. A. A. Thompson supported the conclusions of Corbett's great Spanish contemporary, Cesar Fernandez Duro, that the 1590s were the crucial decade in the formation of the Monarchy's first permanent naval organisation outside the Mediterranean. A native shipbuilding programme was sponsored by the Crown, and some seventy new Spanish galleons were produced by the end of the reign.19 The Spanish System was slowly conforming to its final character as a geopolitical instrument of continuing war, with long-term strategic perspectives which conditioned tactical thinking. The experience of defeat, by the Dutch rebels in the 1570s, by the English in 1588 and by the French in the 1590s, each in their different ways highlighting the problems of seaborne empire, had brought about this crucial adaptation. Maritime developments in Flanders fully reflected this enforced, but nonetheless enhancing, maturity of outlook. FULL DRESS REHEARSAL

The years between the death of Parma and the arrival of the Archduke Albert (1592-96) were a period of stagnation in the government of the Spanish Netherlands. Naval policy - or rather its absence - merely reflected the general situation, as Philip II sought to extricate himself from the toils of overcommitment against the new Bourbon regime in France, and the army of Flanders satisfied itself with consolidating the territory Farnese had regained. The main effort of the Admiralty was devoted to the increasingly dangerous task

17

18

19

analysis and interpretation, the latter nevertheless conveys a convincing impression of the besetting failures of Philippine naval strategy at the microcosmic level, both before and after 1588. F. Olesa Mufiido, La organization naval de los Estados Mediterrdneos y en especial de Espana durante los siglos XVIy XVII (2 vols. Madrid 1968), 1, 266. It seems likely that Zubiaur used as the nucleus of this squadron the 'flibotes' (=fluitschipen) purchased by Parma for the Flanders armada in 1587-8. J. S. Corbett, The Successors of Drake (London, 1900), p. vi; the assertion was even admitted by A. L. Rowse in The Expansion ofEngland (London, 1930), p. 308. Thompson, War and Government, pp. 190-94. Fernandez Duro's Armada espanola desde la Union de los Reinos de Castilla y Aragon (9 vols., Madrid, 1895-1903) is still a basic work of reference, especially (though not only) on periods and themes not yet re-addressed by modern historiography.

Failure and retrenchment,

1568-1621

of convoying merchant ships along the Scheldt, running the gauntlet of rebel ambush at every bend. Its main force was therefore stationed at Antwerp, while little attention seems to have been paid to the Flanders ports and their potential for larger operations. Indeed, once the city of Antwerp was regarded as reasonably secure, the seat of the Admiralty was moved there from Dunkirk (1593).20 The removal of Parma himself and the death of the armada's main commander and dominant figure, the marquis de Renty in (1590) resulted in a loss of discipline and stability at the administrative level. The senior Spanish representative, Fernando de Salinas, and his cousin, the depositario Diego de Peralta, were involved in a prolonged quarrel with the Opmeer brothers (Pieter and Lucas), which split the Conseil Supreme down the middle and paralysed naval affairs. The latter were amongst the most prominent members of the rapidly dwindling Antwerp merchant community. Pieter himself wasfiscal(attorney) of the Council, while Salinas had been a close aid of Parma's and comisario general of the armada. Mutual accusations of corruption in the supply contracts of the fleet led in 1594 to a heated exchange during a council-meeting, at which swords were nearly drawn. When Albert took up his new post in 1596, the affairs of the Admiralty were in serious need of his attention.21 The Archduke's reforms and reconstitution succeeded in settling, if not healing, the Council's wounds. The two factions, which clearly represented a clash between powerful local interests and intrusive Spanish officials, remained established on the Council. But while indigenous interests now dominated, both numerically and in terms of status, Salinas for his part was allocated a more prominent role as policymaking adviser to Albert. From the first, the new governor seems to have displayed gifts of compromise, in which native sensibilities were protected, and a positive contribution to affairs thereby encouraged. Doubtless the Archduke's highly relevant experience as viceroy of Portugal exerted its influence, not only on his political skills, but on his interest in the maritime dimension of the new office. In any case - a result doubtless further stimulated by the allocation of a regular budget - the operational activity and strategic influence of the Flanders navy increased with almost immediate effect.22 In 1598, Martin de Bertendona arrived in Dunkirk from Spain with a flotilla 20

21

22

For a more detailed analysis of the Flanders Admiralty in the period covered by the present

chapter, see F. Pollentier, De Admiraliteit en de oorlog ter zee onder de Aartshertogen (1596-1609) (Brussels, 1972). This is essentially an institutional study, based wholly on the records of the Brussels archives. The accounts of depositario Peralta, 1592-8, AGS/CMC 1826 no. 1, indicate that the main income of the Admiralty derived from convoy fees paid in Antwerp. For the careful maintenance of the river patrols, see the series of accounts for 1599-1607 in ibid. 3258 and BRB/i2622-3i,f. 472. For Opmeer's brief against Salinas, see ARB/CP 1108. The quarrel had flared up again in February, 1595. B R B / 1 6 0 3 8 - 7 , ff. 6 4 - 7 0 . T h e annual minute books of the new council from 1595-1601 are in ARB/CA 5-9. 10

The search for a naval policy of (converted) warships for incorporation into the armada, along with a large supply of ordnance made available as a result of the ending of the war with France. 23 In the opening months of the new reign of Philip III, lists of prizes and captives in the three ports of Dunkirk, Gravelines and Nieuwpoort demonstrate the higher profile of the fleet.24 Around this time it was commanded by Antoine de Bourgoigne, count of Waecken, sailing in the St Albert, a ship of 160 tons and sixteen guns which fits the description, shortly to be widespread, of a Dunkirk 'frigate'.25 In 1600, apparently for the first time, two substantial warships were constructed in Dunkirk for the armada, though they were only fitted out and made seaworthy with some difficulty.26 The same year, however, Waecken led fourteen armada ships in a successful raid on the Dutch fishing fleet.27 The logic of commerce raiding against a growing, and thus increasingly vulnerable, rebel mercantile system, was beginning to make an impact on Spanish strategic thought. In 1593, Federigo Spinola, promising heir to the complementary traditions of Hispano-Genoese collaboration - banking fortune and maritime genius - put forward a scheme for an offensive against Dutch trade, using a galley-fleet based in Flanders. 28 Around the same time, dozens of Basque shipowners in the deep-sea fishing industry, many of them forced into redundancy as a result of forceful Dutch encroachment, began to apply for patents as corsairs, in order to prey in revenge on their rivals' trade with France. By the end of the century a thriving privateering industry had sprung up in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, naturally encouraged by Madrid in the hope (inter alia) that it would keep alive Spain's main nursery of mariners. 29 The impact on the City of London of this first phase of systematic corsair activity was dramatic. In 1601 it was claimed in the House of Commons that Flemish raiders had inflicted more damage on English commerce than the whole French navy during the course of the sixteenth century. The MPs for Yarmouth and Sandwich begged for more naval protection against the onslaught.30 In 1595, apparently by the use of'galleys', the Spanish Dunkirkers staged a series of landings in Cornwall, spreading panic along the south coast. Nothing could prevail upon Elizabeth I to parole or ransom the governor of 23

24

25 26

27 28 29 30

'Cargo que se le hace de bajeles ...' and 'Relation de Artilleria ... el afio de 1598 . . . q u e trujo a su cargo el gnl. Martin de Bertendona', (by M . de Fourlaux), A G S / C M C 1038. 'Relation de toutes les prises venues a la notice de siege en D u n q u e r q u e doit le premier de Sept. 98 jusques ce 16 Juin 9 9 ' , A R B / C A 59. (See also liasse no. 60.) Pollentier, De Admiraliteit, p p . 7 4 - 5 . 'Tanteo del dinero que es menester ...' (?i6oo), A R B / C A 89, liasse 80. T h e estimated costs of each vessel at the launch stage at 6,400 escudos is broadly in line with other contemporary figures (see Appendix 8, p. 253). Corbett, Successors, p. 299. H . G. R. Reade, Sidelights on the Thirty Years1 War (3 vols., London, 1924), 1, 9—15. MN/Vargas 3, ff. 4 2 - 3 and 4gff. J. Waylen, The House of Cromwell and the Story of Dunkirk (London, 1880), pp. iii-iv; Corbett, Successors, pp. 359-61. II

Failure and retrenchment, 1568-1621 Dunkirk, Francisco de Aguilar, after his capture at sea in 1598.31 Her admiral, Mansell, got the better of a force of six Flanders galleys off the Goodwins in 1600. But the fact that, shortly afterwards, she commissioned the building of four war-galleys of her own, argues that the Queen was not altogether convinced by the superficial implications of this success.32 Likewise, the effect of the Dunkirkers' raids was already being registered on the commercial seismographs of the Dutch Republic. A determined land offensive was launched against the Flanders ports in 1600.33 The attack was stemmed outside Nieuwpoort, but with a level of loss amongst the ranks of the army of Flanders which Madrid considered unacceptable. Indeed, the damage to the military establishment engendered an atmosphere of crisis in the Council of State, and emergency measures were taken to supply men and money in quality, not to mention a senior military figure who could assist the Archduke personally in the one area where he was clearly regarded as deficient.34 Within a year, Ambrogio Spinola had arrived in the Low Countries, in effect as commander-in-chief of the army of Flanders. There he joined Federigo, who a little earlier had sailed nine galleys from the Mediterranean to Dunkirk, outrunning the Dutch squadron which he met in the Channel. 35 As Ambrogio's army besieged Ostend, the Madrid Council of State was engaged in one of its periodic exercises in overall reassessment of the war. The government was taking an interest in the proposals put forward by the Basque expert Juan de Gauna, based on early mercantilist thinking, for an economic campaign. Gauna's thesis elaborated a belief in the autarkic potential of the Spanish Monarchy, recommending use of its bureacratic and military apparatus to deny the Dutch access to the waters and resources of those parts of Europe which Spain influenced or controlled. The focal point of this blockade was the Spanish Netherlands, and its expression was to be not only a newly-created customs inspectorate in Spain, but a new navy in Flanders established to enforce the policy. Gauna was the founder of what one historian has called 'a Biscayan school' of macroeconomic strategic thinkers and administrators, whose ideas relied upon the development of intimate co-operation at many levels between Spain and loyal Netherlands.36 31

32 33

34

35

36

J. Dams (ed.), LesActes en espagnol du Magistral deDunkerque, 15Q4—1663, (Dunkirk, 1980), pp. 5 and 18.1 place the quotation marks here because of my own suspicion that, before 1599, casual observers may have mistaken Flemish 'frigate' prototypes (in which banks of oars were prominent) for true Mediterranean galleys. R. C. Anderson, Oared Sailing Ships (London, 1962), p. 84. H . Malo, Les Corsaires: Les Corsaires Dunkerquois etjfean Bart (2 vols., Paris, 1913), I, 2 4 1 - 3 ; L. Lemaire, Histoire de Dunkerque des origines a igoo (Dunkirk, 1927), pp. 1 2 7 - 8 . See the consultas of summer 1600, printed (from A G S / E 793) by M . de Alcocer (ed.), Coleccion de Documentos ineditos para la Historia deEspanay sus Indias (4 vols., Valladolid, 1930-2), ill, 3 2 - 5 2 . For the exploits of Federigo, see R. Rodriguez Villa, Ambrosio Spinola, primer Marques de Los Balbases (Madrid, 1905), pp. 19—50. M . A. Echevarria, ' U n notable episodio en la guerra economica Hispano-Holandesa: El decreto Gauna (1603)', Hispania 46 (1986), pp. 5 7 - 9 7 . 12

The search for a naval policy About this time, however, one school of ministerial thought, exhausted and frustrated by the perpetual struggle, favoured negotiations, with a view to at least a truce. In the Council of State such feelings were expressed by the veteran councillor - also a Basque -Juan de Idiaquez. Though he sympathised with his colleague's main objective of obtaining a lengthy respite, the marquis of Velada, perhaps already familiar with Gauna's thinking, argued that a only a renewed commitment to military pressure could lead to satisfactory political developments. Above all, Velada argued, it would be very appropriate to reinforce the armada of Dunkirk [and utilise it] in order to deprive the enemy of the herring fisheries. This could be achieved at relatively little cost compared to the damage it might perform. Fishing is the major support of most of the Dutch communities, and is therefore a way in which great influence can be exerted on those who rule them. [The Marquis] understands that such tactics can be carried on with only ten or twelve warships of 200-300 tons, able in the right circumstances to destroy the rebels' entire fishing fleet, made up as it is of craft which can neither fight nor flee.

Impressed by this scenario, Philip III authorised a new military initiative: 'Let us take the war to them with blood and fire, as far as their very homes, both by land and sea. The armada of Dunkirk should be strengthened and let loose against their fisheries, along with the galleys of Federigo'.37 Naval historians now accept that Federigo's flotilla made a powerful impact.38 They were a fully autonomous force ('las galeras de Flandes'), with its own officials and tercio de infanteria?9 Despite being checked by Mansell, they later acquitted themselves well in several brushes with the Dutch, during the manoeuvrings connected with the prolonged siege of Ostend. They constantly harried Dutch attempts to supply the port by sea. In one encounter, the Spanish marines boarded the enemy flagship and lowered its standard before being driven off by reinforcements. Had it not been for the death in action of their commander (1603) the galleys might have justified the confidence of many experts in their aptitude for the Low Countries' environment. Even as it was, their actions - though certainly to be seen in conjunction with those of the local elements whose port they shared - represented the first major contribution that organised naval power had made to the war in the Netherlands. In November 1603, Ambrogio Spinola recognised this when he rewarded with their liberty the galley-slaves who had served with the squadron. Others were not so fortunate. The galley San Felipe, wrecked with only ten survivors on the sandbanks of Flanders, was one symbol of a campaign which eventually obtained the fall of Ostend (1604) but only at the cost of enormous sacrifices in men and resources.40 37 38

39 40

Consulta of council of state and royal apostilla, 26 Nov. 1602, Alcocer, Documentos, pp. 2 5 2 - 8 1 . See (e.g.) R. Gray, 'Spinola's Galleys in the Narrow Seas, 1600' MM 64 (1978), pp. 7 1 - 8 3 ; Fernandez-Armesto, The Armada, pp. 1 2 7 - 8 ; and cf. Corbett, Successors, p p . 386—95. For official material pertaining to its affairs, see A R B / S E G 124, passim. Certificates by F . Spinola, 14 Jan. 1603; order by A. Spinola, 6 Nov. 1603, ibid., ff. 1-2 and 91 (see also f. 53). See also Albert to Philip II, 17 D e c . 1611, ibid. 177, ff.101-2.

13

Failure and retrenchment, 7568-1621 Indeed, the siege consumed so much that the new effort ordered by Madrid in response to the setback of Nieuwpoort ran - quite literally - into the sands. Nevertheless, Ambrogio took up the task left unfinished by his brother, and continued to use the armada to harry the enemy's trade. When the Council of State returned to consider the issues following peace with England, a report commissioned from a disciple of Gauna's, Hurtuno de Urizar, asserted that 'the Dutch have a great fear of the Dunkirk warships, and only ten of them, along with the private corsairs, would be capable of causing the enemy more trouble than a half of the army'. This time, Velada received support from the count of Chinchon, who not inappropriately concluded that if the rebels derived their critical sustenance from the sea, 'we should switch to the Dunkirk navy the entire resources we have until now devoted to the army'.41 Opinion expressed in Estado generally was against such a radical move. Idiaquez argued that given current financial difficulties, the supply of sufficient extra funds to Flanders was impossible. The count of Olivares, though maintaining his belief in a forward naval policy, was unimpressed by the record of the Admiralty under Albert and Spinola. For Olivares, 'the present organization is full of abuses and should be wound up before any progress can be made. It would be unwise to attempt to build on such poor foundations.'42 Philip III accepted these trenchant criticisms. He ordered that the Admiralty was to be 'reformed' forthwith, and a wholly new organisation established in which responsible office and command should be exclusively reserved for Spaniards. Moreover, Urizar himself was to be despatched to Flanders as the new chief official of the Admiralty, with special orders to begin construction of his ten warships. A possible annual budget for the new armada of 300,000 ducats was mentioned, in order to prepare the vessels which would be most suitable; that is to say, 'a force in which the flagship should not be greater than 300 tons, and all the rest between 150 and 200'. 43 It seems likely that these resolutions were partly attenuated by the demands of politics and tact before Urizar arrived in Dunkirk in 1606, and that his mission fell short of a complete reorganisation of naval affairs over the heads of Albert and Ambrogio. Certainly, however, he pressed ahead with a construction programme in which many of the relevant resources of Flanders were drawn upon, and which may have been important in the evolution of the 'frigate' as a species. Perhaps as many as eight new warships were completed under Urizar's 41

42

43

Consulta of 10 May, 1605, ( A G S / E 2024), Alcocer, Documentor, IV, 2 0 6 - 8 . For the role of Urizar, see M . A. Echevarria, ' L a aportacion Vasca a la teoria mercantilista: Ortuno de Urizar', Congreso de Historia EuskalHerria, vol. m (San Sebastian, 1988), pp. 193-202. Olivares was undoubtedly reflecting the views of Gauna, Urizar and others, who were convinced that the lack of success of their mercantilist project was mainly due to lack of co-operation in Brussels; see Echevarria, ' U n notable episodio' and ' L a aportacion Vasca'. Consultas of 3 and 24 Sept. 1605 ( A G S / E 2024), ibid, pp. 2 2 9 - 5 4 . 14

The search for a naval policy supervision in 1607-8. 44 But this important breakthrough proved utterly futile; even as it bore fruit, the branch was severed. The Monarchy's financial breakdown, widespread mutiny and the political re-evaluation these events precipitated, produced an armistice, and, within eighteen months, the Truce of Antwerp. As a consequence, the Flanders Admiralty failed, after all, to escape its pre-ordained 'reform5. The process of liquidation was placed in the hands of Charles de Malines, senior councillor of the Supreme. His recommendations were that all salaries and wages should cease with effect from 1 October, 1609, a n d that the flags of the armada, along with the papers of the Admiralty, should be brought to Brussels.45 The ships themselves, without their Flemish crews (and some probably on their maiden voyage) were despatched to Lisbon. Here they were allocated new captains and crews, and categorised as a 'squadron' - a discrete status, but significantly lower than that of an 'armada' - attached to the main home waters fleet.46 During the subsequent decade they served mainly in operations aimed at reducing the power of the Berber pirate states, then reaching its zenith as a menace to Spain. In 1614, for example, 'eight warships of Flanders, usually called Dunkirkers' formed part of Admiral Fajardo's fleet of nearly 100 sail in the expedition against La Marmora, a campaign in which they distinguished themselves.47 Perhaps one or two representatives of this first, 'lost' generation of Dunkirk-built warships were still in service when the whole question of naval policy in the north was re-opened before the end of the decade. 44

45

46

47

Inventaires des Archives de la Ville de Malines, vol VI (Malines, 1876), p. 143; Reade, Sidelights, I, 40—8; royal decreto, 7 Aug. 1630, A G S / C M C 3274, no. 14. For the augmenting prize captures, see the lists of C. van Driel for 1607 in ibid. 1020. See A R B / C A 72 ('Reformation de la Armada'), passim and 'Consulta del Presidente Carlos Malineo tocante a las cosas del Armada sobre que V[uestra] A[ltissima] sera servido mandar poner . . . ano de 1611', ibid. 89, flf. 3 0 - 4 0 . Nominas of 1 March, 1611, A G M / 2 1 5 2 - A . As it happened, the Armada del Mar Oceano had itself recently been reorganised into squadrons associated with the main coastal provinces of metropolitan Spain. See the ms. 'relaciones' of this campaign in B N / 2 3 4 8 , ff. 169-75V, and i77ff.

Dunkirk rediscovered

THE GEOPOLITICAL PROBLEM

During the quinquennium 1618-22, Europe witnessed an astonishing resuscitation of Spain's continental hegemony. The reassertion of the Spanish Monarchy's influence which this initiated would not have been so impressive, and arguably could not have taken place at all, without the corollary revival of its maritime features. If the smaller phenomenon was subsumed in the greater for most intents and purposes, both seemed all the more striking, coming after a decade of apparent torpor within the Spanish System. In the wider context, they were produced by a complex conjuncture of events. The revolt of the Bohemian Estates in 1618 finally sparked off the intercommunal warfare within the Holy Roman Empire which had been anticipated for some years. The Spanish and German Habsburgs were already linked by a military alliance, the working details of which were confirmed by the Council of State in a series of decisions around the time of the Bohemian crisis. Manoeuvring in response to these events, Spain's leaders brought about startling improvements in the strategic position vis a vis the United Provinces. Negotiations were in hand to extend or revive the Truce of Antwerp, but in the event they failed to prevent a return to a state of war in April 1621. Within this turbulent international context, a specific series of coincidences influenced the creation of a more ambitious Spanish naval policy.1 To some degree the evolving maritime programme represented a deliberate and conscious bid for strategic survival. The Spanish Monarchy was a globalcolonial entity, subsisting by the maintenance of a complex, yet fragile, system of oceanic communications. The range of natural hazards which had to be dealt with on a routine daily basis at all levels of operation meant that the infrastructure of this system needed constant attention and replenishment. It was a gigantic yet delicate machine in a permanent state of overhaul. As a result of the renewed expansion of the Hispanic world in the last third of the sixteenth 1

For the unfolding of the Thirty Years' War, both in its Low Countries and Central European aspects, see P. BrightwelPs articles listed in the Bibliography. A wider-angle lens is deployed in my Europe and the Decline of Spain —A Study of the Spanish System, 1580—1720 (London, 1981),

pp. 50-84.

16

Dunkirk rediscovered century - to give only two examples, the acquisition of the Philippines and the annexation of Portugal and its overseas empire - the raw-material resources for many of its basic defence requirements were becoming exhausted. By Philip IV's accession, which coincided exactly with the end of the Twelve Years' Truce, the Iberian peninsula had been virtually denuded of many of its relevant natural resources. Neither in terms of quality nor quantity did it possess the elements necessary for maritime policy on a European scale. The irony of this problem was familiar to the Councils of State and War in Madrid, which were struggling to deal with it. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that, silver apart, no assistance could be expected from America. Indeed, defence of the Caribbean actually caused a net loss of precious European reserves in terms of men and war materials. For example, in 1629, in the aftermath of the disaster of Matanzas, and in the expectation of Dutch attempts to follow it up, the Council of the Indies hastily despatched artillery and powder, along with a wide variety of ancillary items, to the threatened areas.2 The indigenous deciduous forests of northern Spain, which once covered extensive areas of its mountain foothills, had been devastated by the maritime demands of the sixteenth century. The huge losses involved in the naval enterprises of the North Sea helped inspire a programme of reafforestation, begun in some areas before the death of Philip II. When new full-time officials were appointed to supervise naval construction, they had the equally important commission of encouraging tree-planting.3 But the rising curve of shipbuilding activity, further stimulated by the defence requirements of the Portuguese colonies, more than offset any recuperation. Meanwhile, the peninsula lacked supplies of hemp, flax and tar, for rigging and caulking of vessels, and was no longer able to exploit mineral deposits to provide tools, fitments, utensils and weaponry of the necessary quantity and standard. Around 1600, 'probably not more than 15 or 20 per cent of the material requirements of the fleet were bought in Spain'. Italy - particularly Genoa and Naples, both within the Spanish political ambit - was still equipped to remedy some metropolitan shortcomings, but shipbuilders were increasingly obliged to obtain indispensable items from more remote corners of Europe. Major sources of maritime materials lay exclusively in the North, above all in the Baltic - an area which was difficult of access and culturally inimical to the Spanish System.4 In the 1640s, when the Monarchy was again forced to maintain fleets in the 2

3

4

Consultas of the Council of the Indies, 5 April and 26 Dec. 1629 (Copy), BL/Add. 36322, ff. 62-68V. and 86-101. R. Gomez-Rivero, 'La superintendencia de construccion naval y fomento forestal en Guipuzcoa (1598—161 i)\Anuario de historia del derecho espanol 56 (1986), pp. 590-636. Thompson, War and Government, p. 216 (see also pp. 206-55 passim). For the general economic background, see V. Vazquez de Prada, Los Siglos XVI y XVII, vol. 111 (Madrid, 1978) of Historia economica y social de Espana, pp. 463-518 and esp. 603-31. For the agrarian context, see D. E. Vassberg, Land and Society in Golden Age Castile (Cambridge, 1984).

17

Failure and retrenchment, 1568-1621 Mediterranean, they were mostly of foreign construction, and basic equipment derived almost entirely from the North. In 1645, no less than forty-seven masts were ordered from Gothenburg for the repair of the main fleet, whilst an endless catalogue of items - anchors, cables, tackle, sails - had to be procured in any convenient northern emporium. Even at an earlier point, when state-sponsored shipbuilding was at record levels, domestic rates of production remained insufficient. In January 1623, the Junta de Armadas approved the purchase of a suitable vessel in London, 'in view of the lack of warships and mariners upon the coasts of Spain'.5 Spain's two greatest resource deficiencies had an ominous confluence, both in their timing and in their broad strategic implications. The same generation which sustained prolonged maritime wars simultaneously in the Mediterranean and the North Sea witnessed agrarian depression in Castile, which in turn began to place enormous strains on the human dimension of the Philippine empire. The food supply of a community which, like its political frontiers, had expanded to dangerous limits, was under threat. At first, the impact was disguised. The harvest failures of the 1570s and 1580s - mainly localised as they were - could be ameliorated by interior shifts of reserves, and bulk importation from proximate sources, such as Sicily and North Africa. But there was drastic diminution in population growth, and in the next decade a sequence of general famines initiated a phase of net demographic decline.6 Beginning in 1596, the so-called 'Atlantic Plague' intensified and prolonged this catastrophe. Indeed, the regions of the peninsula most thoroughly ravaged by the epidemic - Cantabria, where it arrived, and Seville, where it reached a climax of destruction in 1600 - were those where the maritime vocation was most widely nurtured, and where the Monarchy had heretofore been able to fill its musters of naval recruits. The scale of the cereal shortfall of the 1590s necessitated imports from the Ukrainian steppes, Europe's breadbasket. Like timber and other shipbuilding materials, grain supplies could only reach Castile by sea-transport. The hegemonic empire had arrived at the bizarre situation of dependence for its primary producer and consumer materials on its main adversary. For both the sea-routes to Poland, and those areas of the Baltic littoral where maritime resources were concentrated, were strongly influenced by the United Provinces. The Gdansk grain trade was permeated by Dutch capital and shipping, whilst the Swedish economy as a whole was being colonially developed by Amsterdam. In effect, the Dutch had a stranglehold on naval and food supplies, and in conditions of peace, all the diplomatic efforts of Madrid could not find a way around the 5

6

'Relation de los arboles ...' AHN/E 966, ff. 156—9 (see also ff. 125, 139, 143—51); consulta of Junta de Armadas, 2 Jan. 1623, AGS/GA 3148. For the late sixteenth-century crise de subsistence and plague epidemic in Castile, see B. Bennassar, Recherches sur les grands epidemies dans le nord de VEspagne a la fin du XVI6 siecle (Paris, 1969), and V. Perez Moreda, Las crisis de mortalidad en la Espana interior. Siglos XVI-XIX (Madrid, 1980).

18

Dunkirk rediscovered ubiquitous Dutch middleman, whose fluitschip sat squarely in the Danish Sound.7 Imperial Spain was therefore in a position somewhat analogous to that of Imperial Japan three centuries later. Like Japan in the 1930s, Spain was a politically dominant but geographically peripheral power, with a desperate need for assured sources of basic supplies. The only cast-iron guarantee was direct domination over those sources. Just as Japan's need for oil and raw materials eventually forced her into an aggressive imperialist war against the powers exercising control of those materials, so Spain's position in the Mediterranean and Atlantic spheres was seen, in increasingly specific terms, to depend on a solid base of influence in Northern Europe. Near the end of the sixteenth century, political thinkers, whose ideas were articulated in attempts to influence the new monarch, Philip III, had begun to identify the problem. Baltasar Alamos de Barrientos and Juan de Mariana, for example, argued that the northern threat necessitated a ruthless counteroffensive, aimed at securing the material mainsprings of power, the fuel (as it were) of the machine.8 To them, developing a powerful maritime capacity in Europe was as important as maintaining the line of Atlantic trade and the silver supply which ran along it. These two dimensions of empire were seen as mutually interdependent on many levels. The problematic of a forward maritime policy was highlighted by the strength of the enemy, and complicated by previous experience. Down to 1607, Spain's naval efforts had hardly been sufficient to dent the sides of Holland's juggernaut. The naval record in the North Sea was fundamentally discouraging. If anything, memories of the duke of Parma's successful terrestrial campaigns of 1583-7 were more likely to inspire emulation than the example of Federigo Spinola and his galleys.9 Moreover, the Dutch navy (or rather, the combined Admiralty forces of the Seven Provinces) had grown since the 1570s to be the largest in the world. Leaving aside the powerful vessels of the great trades and the East India Company, which carried on their commercial offensive in the colonial seas, Dutch naval squadrons had become formidable enough to encroach almost at will upon Mediterranean preserves by the end of the sixteenth century. A detailed sketch of Amsterdam dating from around 1600 shows not only the celebrated 'forest of masts' in roads and harbour, but also its busy dockyards with craft in various stages of construction.10 By this time Amsterdam was not the 7

For Dutch commercial domination, see J. I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585—1740 (Oxford, 1989); K. Glamann, 'European Trade, 1500-1750' in C. Cipolla (ed.), The Fontana Economic History ofEurope, vol. 11; and J. A. van Houtte and L. van Buyten, 'The Low Countries' in C. Wilson and G. Parker (eds.), An Introduction to the Sources of European Economic History,

8 10

1500-1800 (London, 1977), pp. 81-114, and sources there cited. 9 See below, p. 23ff. See above, pp. n - 1 3 . Painting by P. Bast (1597) exhibited in the public galleries of the Nederlands Scheepvaart Museum in Amsterdam. Fifteen ships are illustrated as already afloat, while another twelve are on the stocks in various stages of construction.

19

Failure and retrenchment, 1568-1621 only, nor even the largest, centre of shipbuilding. Industrial concentrations invulnerable to any kind of military action had sprung up elsewhere.11 The Dutch had evolved a superbly efficient support-system for their maritime establishment, capable of adding to and/or replacing units at a rate well beyond anything to which the Spanish Monarchy could aspire. Given the necessity for Spain's naval establishment to cover the world's oceans in vigilance, this meant that the enemy was able to bring superiority in firepower to bear on any preselected point. In 1607, just before the end of hostilities, a Dutch fleet soundly defeated the main Spanish battle-fleet in Spanish waters. In 1618, during the Truce, a timely reminder of Dutch maritime power was provided. Admiral Miguel de Vidazabal, guarding the approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar, sighted a Dutch convoy off the Portuguese coast. The Spaniards knew in advance that the Dutch were carrying supplies to the Republic of Venice, then at war with Spain's new ally, the Emperor. Vidazabal was at first deterred from attack, his squadron being weaker than the twenty-four sail they confronted. But the convoy's relatively thin naval cover, characteristic of peacetime economies, encouraged his secondin-command to dispute this decision. The resulting junta de capitanes convened on board the flagship contradicted their commanding officer. The result was another humiliating failure; 'the enemy resisted so strongly as to cause great damage to our ships, which were forced to stand off and allow the Dutch to continue their passage'. Three hundred Spanish sailors died in this miserable incident.12 At last, however, a radically different approach to naval war, replacing the concept of large assault fleets by a range of smaller privateering operations, was beginning to emerge. The point was that the preconditions for such change had thoroughly matured during the period of Truce. In a sense, Spain had become the underdog, the marginalised and excluded influence, at least in the crucial arena of the North Sea. Whilst the volume of Spanish-sponsored commerce had drastically shrunk, with communications networks becoming ever more tenuous, those of the United Provinces had expanded. Indeed, the rapid augmentation of Dutch mercantile activity, like that of the fishing industry which formed the foundation of their economic prosperity, brought with it over-extension and weakness. This was a tendency which Madrid was able to appreciate. In the first quarter of the new century, the Spanish government was avid for information about the Dutch economy, and not simply for immediate military 11

12

See R. W. Unger, Dutch Shipbuilding before 1800 (Amsterdam, 1978), pp. 1-11; in the period under discussion the yards along the Zaan (Zaanstreek) had caught up with the traditional centres in Holland and Zeeland. Over twenty-five separate firms were building, some at the rate of nearly one vessel per month. By a conservative estimate, this meant that by the 1630s the industry as a whole was capable of producing at least 500 units a year. Untitled ms. relation MN/Vargas 9, f. 60. 20

Dunkirk rediscovered reasons. One area where the Spanish System continued to operate with more efficiency than its adversaries was in diplomacy, and the sub-diplomatic techniques of information-gathering. By what amounted to a programme of industrial espionage, Spain's professional spies, and a string of more casual informants, compiled reams of data on Dutch ways of doing things; the details of banking and joint-stock enterprises, fiscal innovations, inter-state political and financial relations, even shipbuilding and maritime techniques, were all minutely reported.13 Many of the new generation of economic analysts and government advisers therefore evinced a detailed knowledge of Dutch progress and its causes. They analysed, in many respects accurately, how Spanish interests had suffered from Dutch competition both in the domestic economy and in terms of world trade. Indeed, it might be recognised that the political ideas of the count-duke of Olivares and his supporters, influenced profoundly as they were by the arbitrista 'movement5, and which produced the reform programme attempted in the years after 1622, are almost inconceivable without the pre-existing model of Dutch development. THEORIES OF COMMERCIAL WARFARE

By the very nature of the Spanish Monarchy, it had from the beginning produced writers on maritime affairs. As might be expected, indeed, many of these were in the ranks of the so-called arbitristas, since all who reckoned with international commerce, and wished to survey the context of the Monarchy's affairs, fell into this category. Only the most severely domestic analysts ethnocentric thinkers like Cellorigo and Moncada, who have obtained the lion's share of historians' attention, and have appropriated the generic title of arbitristas - exclude themselves from it.14 All the same, the continuous and relatively undisturbed construction of a maritime empire, and a sequence of naval successes embracing Lepanto and the Azores, though inspiring navigational and cartographical work of distinction, brought little interest in strategic theory. The question hardly even arose in the idyllic era when Spain and Portugal had the (suitably apportioned) New Worlds to themselves. Intense discussion on this unwelcome subject came rather with failure and frustration after 1570. The exploits of the English adventurers, the defeat of the Invincible, the sack of 13

14

See (e.g.) BL Add. 14005, a volume made up of agents' reports (several of them highly specific), arbitrios and relaciones concerned with the Dutch economy and its institutions in this period. For the Spanish apparatus of'underground' diplomatic informants - who, like Manuel Sueyro, were often perfectly aufait with the world of business - see M. A. Echevarria, La diplomdcia secreta en Flandes, 15Q8—1643 (Leioa—Vizcaya, 1984). For a useful analysis of the best-known arbitrista writings, see M. Grice-Hutchinson, Early Economic Thought in Spain, 1177-IJ40 (London, 1964). More concentrated on the period under discussion is H. J. Hambleton, 'The Decline of Spain in the Seventeenth Century - Contemporary Spanish Views' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1964). 21

Failure and retrenchment, 7568-1621 Cadiz, all took place against a background of Dutch movement into Iberian trade routes. Failure had been humiliating, in terms of Spain's reputation; but it had also been costly. One of the basic suppositions of the new generation, advanced (for example) by Juan de Mariana in the 1590s, was that a naval policy could be made to pay for itself, and might even represent an investment. Mariana was a keen advocate of privateering. He seems to have envisaged it as a socially positive pastime, and as a popular movement in which the inhabitants of every fishing village on the Iberian coastline would fit out their best vessels as corsairs. Mariana even suggested that his huge General History of Spain could be published if the King were to grant him an allowance - presumably representing the projector's fair return from his ideas - secured on royal profits from prizetaking.15 Such optimism is not surprising. The main Dutch commercial routes were accessible from Spanish or Spanish-controlled bases. The food and textiles trade with France, the straatvaart to Italy and the Levant, and even convoys to and from Africa and Asia, were all (in theory) exposed to attack from Spain and Portugal, or from Ceuta and the Canary Islands. These considerations helped to convince Philip Ill's government as early as 1603 that the project put forward by Juan de Gauna was worthy of serious support.16 Above all, the richest of Dutch routes, and also the most strategically relevant - that to the Baltic - was, under the right conditions, vulnerable to interruption from Flanders. Nearly all proponents of a renewed naval initiative based their arguments upon a sustained privateering campaign. Such a campaign was capable of orchestration in different ways. The basic concept embraced individual, privately-owned raiders, as well as warships operating in groups of anything from three to thirty. It was not fully recognised until after war had been renewed that Dutch naval protection for their commerce would inevitably involve major attacks on convoys, mounted by squadrons of at least medium strength. In practice, therefore, tactics based upon an aggregation of units were never to be completely abandoned. Similar opportunities existed in respect of the Dutch fisheries. Spanish ministers had come to realise that attacks on the North Sea fishing grounds could have an effect dimensionally higher than the resources needed to launch them. The herring industry, in particular, was the matrix of Dutch maritimecommercial success. Its profits sustained dozens of ports, whilst with its many ancillary enterprises it provided employment - modern estimates suggest - for anything up to 500,000 men and women, two-fifths of the working population.17 15

16 17

A. Soons, Juan de Mariana (Boston, Mass., 1979), pp. 15 & 65. The relevant material is to be found in Mariana's De rege et regis institutione (1599). See above, pp. 12-13. See A. R. Mitchell, 'The European Fisheries in Early Modern History' in C. Wilson, and R. Rich (eds.), Cambridge Economic History ofEurope, vol. V, (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 133-84. 22

Dunkirk rediscovered Hundreds of small, unarmed fishing boats, grouped together on patches of water around the North-East of the British Isles, loaded with valuable hauls and expensive equipment, crewed by men who provided the rebels with their regular crop of naval recruits, and almost helpless in the actual process of making their catch, provided an irresistible target. It was not too much to suggest - as several writers did in this period - that the power of the United Provinces, and the maritime activity which articulated it, stemmed entirely from the fishing industry. On the other hand, the trawlers normally enjoyed substantial naval cover, and in order to make a real impact, carefully planned and co-ordinated attacks, relying on the element of surprise, would be necessary. In the 1590s, Alamos de Barrientos perceived the need for a naval policy on an even grander scale than that currently being attempted by Philip II. Spain, he considered, should maintain no fewer than six armadas on a permanent basis, each of which would be allotted its own sphere of operation. Their basic task would be to supervise the trade routes, checking contraband and piracy, and generally maintaining a high-profile defence of Madrid's political and trading interests. Alamos's fundamentally bureaucratic mind imagined the oceans of the world with the lines of Spanish customs-posts drawn across them. This was particularly important in the case of the English Channel, recognised as the arterial route of European trade, which should be thoroughly patrolled. As Alamos wrote, Dunkirk was actually in use as the main base of Spain's northern squadron, yet he seems to have accepted that the Flanders ports had not been greatly successful. At any rate, he preferred one of Spain's northern ports for the tasks he had in mind. Three hundred years before Mahan, Alamos envisaged a correct naval policy as the operation of a comprehensive waterways customs/ police programme, and emphasised that in geopolitical terms, at least, Spain was well placed to initiate such a policy.18 For Alamos and other critics of royal policy - not least those who represented the coastal localities in the Cortes of Castile - a solution to the maritime crisis was fundamental. The security of the peninsula itself had been thoroughly undermined. Problems engendered by the rise of Dutch and English shipping were exacerbated by the emergence of a serious naval threat from Algeria and its Barbary confederates. The Dutch encouraged this with technical assistance to the Barbary states.19 Versions of the conspiracy theory nurtured amongst the ruling class of Madrid in these years put a greater emphasis than ever on the religious-crusading fundamentals of Spain's role. Yet even the Jesuit Mariana 18

19

[Baltasar Alamos de Barrientos], L'Art degouverner (1598 edn., ed. J. M. Guardia, Paris, 1867), pp. 198-203. See also, J. Larraz,La epoca delmercantilismo en Castilla (Madrid, 1963), pp. 99—102. Alamos's idea of a squadron-based fleet may have influenced the tactics initiated under Admiral Zubiaur (see above, p. 15). For Dutch involvement with the Barbary States, see A. H. de Groot, The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic. A History of the Earliest Diplomatic Relations (Leiden and Istanbul, 1978),

pp. 83-180 passim.

23

Failure and retrenchment, 1568-1621 could appreciate, as easily as the more secular thinker Alamos, that the ultimate strategic justification of a maritime counter-attack resided in its financial rationale. The rules of war at sea were far less settled than those which applied by tradition, custom and mutual consent to terrestrial engagement. Spain's land armies were obliged to operate, for the most part, in regions which were actually or nominally subject to the Crown, or which stood in an auxiliary relationship to the Monarchy, a situation which severely inhibited the possibilities of plunder and exaction. Only in the inchoate legal conditions pertaining to the sea could war truly be made to pay for itself, above all through the expropriation of the vessels of the infidel pirates and the seaborne wealth of the northern heretics. Alamos and Mariana agreed that privateering rather than the gran empresa de armada should be the ruling tactical principle of the new army. The dismal message of Philip IPs campaigns in the North Sea was not lost on them. However, Alamos argued that it would permit the Monarchy's land forces to be scaled down, producing a defence-oriented army establishment and a strategy which would reduce expenditure by incalculable levels. Not only would Castile's coasts, and the interests of her traders, be protected, but also the need for increased taxation - the greatest domestic difficulty of the Crown since the 1580s - would be obviated.20 Both these early theorists underestimated the capital and operating costs of a new policy, and certainly neither evinced much awareness of the fundamental logistical-strategic crisis outlined above. It is true that little hard evidence exists to connect them with a revived naval programme. All the same, the work of these two writers - who had both suffered imprisonment for their criticisms of the Lerma regime - was well known to the count-duke of Olivares, whose regime rehabilitated and patronised them. In some aspects, perhaps above all in their profound conviction that it was both meet and necessary to fight enemy fire with fire, they provided a strong direction to his thoughts. There was a relatively short interval between the suppression of the Flanders Admiralty in 1609 and the renewed agitation for maritime revival. Relevant projects began to arrive on the desks of ministers from at least 1612. These examples of (sometimes unsolicited) advice with a specifically naval angle shared certain characteristics with the wider literary phenomenon of socio-economic analysis, reaching its peak during the reign of Philip III and known in history as arbitrismo. Yet, although we may for convenience refer to the former as the arbitristas del mar, it is with a certain licence, since they had limited concern, and certainly no primary interest, in commercial or economic matters. The most persistent and ambitious of them tended to think in a political cocoon - a weakness which sometimes vitiated their diagnoses. In the timing of their assault on government, like the arbitristas proper, they were perhaps encouraged by the waning of the duke of Lerma's power, which recent historians have perceived in 20

Guardia, L'Art, pp. 210—12.

24

Dunkirk rediscovered these years.21 Whatever their motives, not until a royal Council of State independent of Lerma's control came into being (around 1616-17) did they achieve a sympathetic hearing. The valido's fall, and, later, the accession of Philip IV, increased their influence considerably. In the 1620s, the level of actual success attained by the armed forces in the application of their ideas naturally extended this influence. If Mariana and Alamos were precursors, the true doyen of the arbitristas del mar, and godfather of the armada with which we are mainly concerned, was the Scottish exile, Sir William Semple. One of the many enthusiastic non-Spanish Hispanophiles of his generation, Semple was a true Scots patriot, who believed that his nation would only survive by escaping the subservience to England which he foresaw as the inevitable consequence of the Stuart dynasty's inheritance. Scotland's salvation lay in a return to the Old Faith, brought about by the paternal intervention of Spain. In 1582, on behalf of the Union of Utrecht, Semple commanded the garrison town of Lier in Brabant, which, in a notorious (but by no means unique) act of betrayal, he handed over to Parma. He went on to spend the rest of his life in Spanish service, on retirement from the army achieving a court appointment in Madrid as one of Philip Ill's gentilhombres de la boca. He never neglected an opportunity to bring to the royal notice the advantages of an invasion of Scotland, in league with the indigenous Catholic nobility, and when he died in 1633 his Jesuit son carried on a mission which may seem less bizarre to many Scots than it did only a decade ago.22 Years of Low Countries' campaigning turned Semple into a fanatical and unremitting enemy of the Dutch rebels. In one of his last memoranda to the Crown, written while serving near Philip IV in the Pardo palace in 1625, he eloquently bemoaned the fact that Spain had been so late in its resort to the best means of dealing with the revolt. This Monarchy, being the most powerful that ever has been, of so many great kingdoms and virile subjects, abundant in riches and commerce, flourishing over and above all other nations in divine and humane letters and the art of war, sees itself reduced to its present pass, lacking in money, men and allies, and pinned almost entirely to the defensive everywhere by a handful of its own vassals - rebels, fishermen, a godless people ... And although it is true that neither Your Majesty himself, nor your present ministers, are to blame in this, you will not be able to escape it if you fail to find an answer.23 21

22

23

P. Williams, 'La Politica Interior: El reinado de Felipe IIP in A. M. Becquer et al., (eds.), Historia general de Espanay America, vol. v m (Madrid, 1986), pp. 4 1 9 - 4 3 . Semple took the oath of office to Philip IV in May 1622, List in A P R / S A 2923. A marginal note gives the date of Semple's demise as 1 March 1633. See also Parker, Spain and the Netherlands, pp. 140-1. 'Discurso general sobre el remedio de los males que padecia la Monarquia de Espana por los afios de 1625, por medio de una guerra ofensiva por mar y defensiva por tierra', El Pardo, 10 Feb. 1625, printed in Alacala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, y el Mar del Norte (i6i8—i6jg): La ultima ofensiva europea de los Austrias Madrilenos (Barcelona, 1975). 2

5

Failure and retrenchment,

1568-1621

Semple's long series of memoranda on the subject of 'a war of defence on land and attack by sea' began as early as 1582. Parma approved his ideas, but they were then swamped by the empresa de Inglaterra. His initial bid for a free-ranging force of twenty ships seemed to increase by exactly ten units in each subsequent version. In 1590, his plans were laid aside because of the priority given to the campaigns in France. Another initiative, aimed at building a privateering force around a nucleus provided by Philip IPs 'Twelve Apostles', was frustrated by the King's death in 1598. Semple returned to Flanders, and the service of the Archduke, whose attitude he vainly tried to influence. As an obstinate opponent of any peace which settled for less than outright victory, Semple could barely disguise his contempt for the government of Lerma, who (for his part) probably regarded the Scot as a rather tiresome crank. In a memorial of 1612, Semple reiterated the point, by now a truism amongst veterans of government and armed forces alike, that no amounts of men, money and military genius could ever reconquer the rebel heartland by means of the traditional military offensive. He claimed that Dutch success was based upon a simple ability to suck the army of Flanders, literally as well as metaphorically, into this quagmire, draining Spain's energy and resources. At sea, the rebels exploited the defensive deficiencies present as a result of the Monarchy's obsession with the land - to the degree that they were now able to aspire to the capture of the Indies. Since 1609, the Dutch had continued to sap Spain's strength by fomenting difficulties within Madrid's sphere of influence, and by waging an undeclared pirate war in the colonial trade-routes, in defiance of the Truce of Antwerp. Therefore 'the best means of our proceeding would be to imitate them - to unleash our ships as corsairs to destroy their trade and fisheries in the northern seas'. Use of a navy of at least eighty vessels would oblige the Dutch to abandon their colonial ambitions, in order to concentrate on repelling Spain's attack on the sources of their power in Europe. At this stage, Semple refrained from an outright recommendation that a northern squadron should be reestablished. But he did not omit to point out that the Scottish islands provided many ideal anchorages for use as privateering bases. 'I have forty years of experience behind me', he peevishly (if understandably) concluded, 'so it would be well if some of Your Majesty's ministers were to listen to my proposals.'24 The plea was ignored, but Semple tirelessly pursued his convictions. In 1618, a more extrovert Council of State at last responded. Sir William was invited to answer questions on his proposals before a special junta, and early in 1620 he gained an audience with Philip III. He now added the warning that England with Scottish help! - was emerging as a maritime power capable of inflicting serious damage on the Spanish System. To counter this, Spain must encourage 24

'Advertimiento para Su Mgd. y Consejo de Estado ano de 1612 de las cosas de Flandes', BN/2348, ff. 13-17. The document is unascribed, but its inimitable Castilian, as well as its contents - and Semple's later records - leave little room for doubt as to its authorship.

26

Dunkirk rediscovered shipowners from all over Europe, natives of any country who were prepared to be sailors of fortune, 'to adventure their swords in the plunder of our enemies' commerce in the northern seas'. He maintained that Dunkirk had proved its value as a naval base since the time of Parma. 25 Above all, he argued that a privateering campaign must form part of a carefully planned schedule, systematically improving the Monarchy's maritime resources and readiness, before the expiry of the truce with the Dutch. His proposed figure for a sufficient armada had now reached ioo units. With twenty vessels in Flanders, and seventy-six destined for the other potential theatres, Semple's estimates formed the statistical basis of new construction on which the Zuiiiga and Olivares ministries indeed worked in the early 1620s.26 In 1625, with the basic elements of his strategy adopted, and already showing solid results, Semple again took up his pen. The suspicion that Madrid's failure to control the growth of spending on the army of Flanders portended a return to the old type of land war filled him with alarm - apparently inspired by the siege of Breda, which was about to enter its second year. For even an approach modulated between military and naval elements represented to Semple a potentially fatal hedging of bets. Only a single-minded, 'pure' maritime policy could hope for lasting success. Unless Spain committed herself to a full-scale naval onslaught, secured upon a reliable and autonomous financial basis, her enemies would be able to continue a rate of growth which would eventually overwhelm Spain, and consign her empire to oblivion. The opportunity for decisive action, he insisted, had almost passed. Semple regarded the fisheries as the 'soft underbelly' of the Dutch system. With a significant choice of metaphor, he called them 'the principal mine from which they extract incredible wealth, and a nursery for the sailors which fill their fleets'. Even the rebels would find it difficult to recover if 7,000 trawlers, with their crews and equipment, could be sent to the bottom. Only a few months after he wrote, the first major attack on the Dutch fishing-grounds was duly launched.27 By 1620, or so, Semple's incessant prompting had brought him many allies within the government. One of these was Martin de Aroztegui, a rising official whose Basque origins inspired a consistent advocacy of naval policy. In 1617, he went so far as to suggest that Spain could no longer protect her own merchants and sailors from attack and death at the hands of pirates, whilst 'our enemy's ships are so many that they virtually besiege our coastline from Barcelona to 25

26

27

'Copia de las cosas tocante corsarios y piratas dada el mes de h e n e r o 1617 anos', ibid., ff. 5 3 1 - 2 ; 'El Coronel T e m p l e a S u M g d . representandole las convenientes de hazer la guerra ofensiva por la m a r a los estados de Holanda, y en tierra solo la defensiva. Ano de 1619', B L / A d d . 14007, ff. 5*1-5Untitled and undated ms., (?i62o); with accompanying testimonial to Semple from D o n Bernadino de Mendoza (1601), ibid., ff. 5 3 1 - 2 and 4 6 9 - 7 4 . 'Discurso g e n e r a l . . . ' , ibid.

27

Failure and retrenchment, 1568-1621 Vizcaya'. If matters continued to decay, he prophesied, it was only a matter of time before they were in a position to intercept and plunder the incoming silver fleets at will.28 Aroztegui was experienced and well connected. He had been an associate of Gauna and Urizar, during the attempt to operate the former's project for economic strangulation of the Dutch in 1603-7. 29 His brother, Antonio, was secretary to the Council of State, first for the North, and later (after 1612) for 'Italian' (i.e. Mediterranean) affairs. In 1621, as a key adherent of Baltasar de Zuniga, uncle of the count of Olivares, whose faction triumphed with the accession of Philip IV, Don Antonio obtained the newly-created office of Secretario del Despacho Universal. In effect he was personal assistant to the chief minister, and comptroller of the agendas and papers of all the councils, both departmental and regional (War, Italy, Indies, etc.), which depended on the work of the Council of State. As a sort of Cabinet Secretary, Antonio was to be perfectly placed during the critical period of decision-making, and the contract commissioning associated with its maritime dimension.30 Early in 1622, Martin de Aroztegui was appointed secretary of the reformed Junta de Armadas, where his energy was an important element in supervision of this process.31 Until 1618, nevertheless, such voices remained relatively few and weak. They grew in number and strength as a result of the widespread debate over the question of renewal of the Truce of Antwerp which Philip III initiated in that year. An unprecedented atmosphere of opinion and speculation was more or less deliberately stimulated in all the main administrative centres of the Monarchy.32 Amidst the dense webs of pros and contras which immediately began to spin themselves out in the committee-rooms of Madrid's Alcazar, the filaments of a maritime programme can be clearly distinguished. Indeed, we are probably justified in regarding many of the memorialists of these years, including Semple himself, as constituting a quasi-homogeneous group, whose members were motivated by various degrees of self-interest. Since they either lived at or regularly visited the court, it seems likely that they shared ideas, information and even phraseology, much as a modern political lobby might do in orchestrating a campaign. Typical of those with a vested interest was Hurtuno de Urizar. In 1618, the partially disgraced ex-proveedor of the Flanders armada perceived the time was 28

29 30

31

32

M e m o , by M . de Aroztegui, 17 Aug. 1617, quoted by J. H . Elliott, The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain, 1598-1640 (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 198-9. See Echevarria, ' U n notable episodio', p . 70. J. A. Escudero, Los secretarios de estado y del despacho, 1474-1724 (2nd edn., 4 vols., Madrid, 1976), I, pp. 230-42 and 252-55; A. Gonzalez Palencia (ed.), Noticias de Madrid, 1621-27 (Madrid, 1942), p. 48. J. H. Elliott and J. F. de la Pefia (eds.), Memoriales y cartas del conde-duque de Olivares (2 vols., Madrid, 1978-81), II, 143. Martin was later given a roving commission to co-ordinate naval preparations on the north coast; see the consultas of Junta de Armadas in A G S / G A 3151. Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 66ff.

28

Dunkirk rediscovered ripe to attempt a revival of his career. Don Hurtuno was perhaps Semple's earliest disciple, and was grinding a personal axe when he dared to recommend the full re-establishment of a royal squadron (though he referred only to 'a small fleet') in a Flemish base port. To the points already made he added the idea of a riverine blockade of the rebel zones, aimed at isolating them from their economic hinterland. In view of the military effort which would be necessary to make such a tactic feasible, Urizar was quick to agree with Semple that a defensive stance on land was the essential prelude to the new era. 'In this manner,' he stressed, 'we may put an end to the war with less cost and more certainty than by the fruitless pursuit of victory on land.' For good measure, he added that 'it is sufficient to deploy our army defensively, with less outlay than we incur now in time of Truce'. 33 To illustrate that this was no exaggeration, Urizar estimated that his 'small fleet' would cost only some 20,000 ducats per annum. Moreover, a very similar figure was arrived at in a more professional costing exercise submitted in Madrid a year later. Its author was Diego Perez de Malvenda, Urizar's one-time colleague as contador of the Flanders armada. Malvenda specified twenty vessels with a total of 4,900 tons, representing a capital investment of 196,000 escudos, and apportioned thus: A flagship (Capitana) of 450 tons A rear-flagship {Almirantd) of 350 tons 2 units of 300 tons 4 units of 250 tons 6 units of 225 tons 6 units of 200 tons The running costs of such a force - 'worth more to his majesty', in Malvenda's opinion, 'than a reinforcement of fifteen thousand men to the army' - he suggested would at most be 20,000 escudos a month. Though accompanied by a catalogue of strategic advantages of the kind considered below, this project was more highly developed than its precursors, and specifically geared to the war-theatre of Flanders. 34 According to Malvenda, not only should the warships be based in Ostend, but also constructed in Flemish dockyards, where materials could be much more conveniently obtained than in Spain, especially if action could be taken whilst conditions of peace still prevailed. Malvenda's scheme was convincing; his proposed tonnage distribution indicated a grasp of the progress made by 33

34

Untitled m e m o r a n d u m by Urizar, 3 Feb., 1618, B L / A d d . 36320, f. 300-2V. (The original is in A G S / E 2847.) '[Papel] de Diego Perez de Malvenda sobre las conveniencias del Armada de Flandes', Madrid 25 J u n e 1619, B N / 1 8 2 0 4 , ff. 61-9V. T h i s may b e the original, since a version used by Alcala-Zamora (from A G S / E 2034), is dated by him to 1620; (Espana, Flandes, p . 156). In effect, with the element of investment capital spread over five years, Urizar's and Malvenda's estimates were identical.

29

Failure and retrenchment, 1568-1621 Flanders shipbuilders in design and efficiency, and of the disadvantages suffered by Spanish shipbuilders. Moreover, it is evident that Malvenda had Flemish-style 'frigates' in mind for at least some of his models, since Spanish yards were relatively unused to building galleons of such modest proportions, and certainly incapable of the degree of finesse necessary to produce ships within differentials of only twenty-five tons. The Malvenda arbitrio came in the same year as another, from the pen of Francisco Retama, a respected businessman from Jerez de la Frontera, who (like many a bodeguero since) was an expert in the trading conditions of the North Sea nexus.35 Retama emphasised the crisis of food supplies, hinting broadly that it had reached proportions - especially in Portugal - which threatened to precipitate serious political instability. Foreign grain was pricing itself beyond popular reach, and the Dutch were levering themselves into a position where they might hold the Iberian peninsula to ransom. Retama differed from all participants in the debate so far discussed; the conclusion he drew was in favour of further negotiation, not renewed war. In the conditions of a suitably revised truce, he believed, Spain could evolve a new system of trade with Flanders, protected by a strengthened navy and strict regulations to exclude Dutch carriers. According to its author's later claim, this paper was presented to the Council of State by Juan de Ciriza (Northern Secretary) and had a salutary effect on Baltasar de Zuniga and Philip III. The concurrent weight of Malvenda's and Retama's interventions, providing much-needed rational corroboration of Semple's more passionate arguments, seem to have been enough to tip the scales of decision. In the autumn of 1619, a recommendation went to Brussels for the construction of twenty warships in Ostend, and in January 1620 the Archduke Albert reported that felling of trees had begun - presumably in the interior provinces, Luxembourg or the Basse-Meuse region, rather than the environs of Ostend itself.36 The government of the Archdukes in Brussels was in an equivocal position. Albert was inclined to seek an honourable way of renewing the Truce of Antwerp, aware that 'The Obedient Provinces' would be obliged to carry much more than the mere burden of geographical proximity to the war-zones, and convinced, like many of his burgher subjects, of the threat it would pose to the economic recovery that he and Isabel had helped to encourage.37 On the other 35

36 37

Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 5 0 - 2 . O n Retama, see also P. Brightwell, ' T h e Spanish System and the Twelve Years' T r u c e ' , EHR 89 (1974), pp. 2 7 0 - 8 2 ; p . 287. Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 156-7. O n e extant memorandum openly accused Albert of defying Philip Ill's orders in making the T r u c e of 1609, asserting that his arguments in favour of its renewal were self-interested and should be ignored. Like Urizar, this may have been a disaffected ex-official of the Flanders Admiralty venting resentment: see 'Sobre si conveniene prorrogar la tregua con los Rebeldes o romper con ellos y si podria escusar el gasto que trae la Guerra', (Oxf. Bod. M s . Add. C126, ff. 194-5).

3°

Dunkirk rediscovered hand, a strictly naval offensive, taking place behind a tough screen of landward defences, was a less rebarbative prospect. The Archdukes and their main adviser Ambrogio Spinola, commander of the Army of Flanders, like the Consejo de Estado in Madrid, were under pressure from the proponents of a maritime campaign. One of their senior officials, Hurturio de Ugarte, strongly supported the theory of 'guerra ofensiva por mar' in 1618. More importantly, Don Carlos de Coloma, vereran soldier, now minister and quartermaster general of the army, exerted an influence in Brussels similar to that of Malvenda and Aroztegui in Madrid. In 1620, Coloma pointed out that the twenty ships of the newlyenvisaged Ostend squadron could support themselves financially if allowed to operate 'not together [i.e. in armada formation], but hunting like corsairs \pyrateando como cossarios]. Their principal targets would be fishing boats and other merchant vessels which enter the channel from the North and West.' 38 Coloma's ideas were characteristic of those put forward by professional pre-war planners of any period, whose most advanced schemes are often overtaken, and even rendered absurd, by the actual fighting circumstances which develop once war begins in good earnest. He failed sufficiently to consider the capacity of the Dutch to defend their enterprises by means of convoys and naval protection, and in other respects fell short of a full grasp of the tactics of commercial warfare. Nevertheless, his superior Spinola, conqueror of Ostend after the terrible siege nearly twenty years earlier, was doubdess content to see his costly prize put to positive use. Few men were better placed to appreciate the strategic and financial arguments; and perhaps understandably, given the fact that the crown was irredeemably in debt to the Spinola house - the thought of a share in the forthcoming plunder was not entirely absent from Spinola's mind. In the spring of 1617, well over a year before Lerma's retirement from court, orders were placed to start the naval rebuilding programme. In the last third of Philip Ill's reign, one shipbuilder in Guipuzcoa constructed ten medium-sized galleons, half of them specifically for the royal armada, whilst the Vizcayan yards also returned to the production of warships in these years. 39 In the meantime, the general debate on the Dutch problem continued. Several initiatives aimed at an extension of the Truce were yet to be tried, and intense diplomatic exchanges extended up to and even after the moment of its expiry. Yet it is not only with hindsight that we may place the particular insurance represented by the decision 38

39

'Discurso de D o n Carlos Coloma de la Forma en que debria hazerse la guerra a los Holandeses', (?i62o), B L / A d d . 14005, ff. 6 3 - 6 ; Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 103-4. T h o m p s o n {War and Government, pp. 305—6), enumerates forty-three units commissioned in 1 6 1 7 - 2 1 . Another authority suggests that at least a dozen shipyards (including those of Bertendona and Arana) were at work in the Basque country for the Crown; T . Guiard, La industria naval vizcaina (Bilbao, 1968), pp. 106—11. See also Philip III to the veedor de las Quatro Villas, 1 Mar. 1617, M N / V a r g a s 20, f. 239; commission for eight warships in Bilbao, (Oct. 1617), ibid. torn. 2, f. 107; and 'Memoria de los naos que ha fabricado Antonio de Lajust desde el afio de 1614 hasta el de 1621', ibid., f. 98. 31

Failure and retrenchment, 1568-1621 for a new Flanders squadron in line with dozens of similar military-strategic preparations made by Zuniga and his colleagues, affecting all parts of the Spanish Monarchy. For one thing, the state papers of this period, above all in the area of naval affairs, are themselves redolent of the awareness that a new era had dawned. The Council of State was likely to be aware also of a highly encouraging precedent for their plans. At this very time, the privateering confederation known as the Uzkoks (Uscocchi) was reaching the peak of its destructive career in the Adriatic. Based mainly at the port of Segna, the Uzkoks were technically the subjects of Ferdinand, Archduke of Styria, heir to the Empire, and Spain's ally. Accordingly, the duke of Osuna, viceroy of Naples, had made common cause with them against the naval power of Venice. Segna was surrounded by sandbanks to seaward and sand-dunes to landward, making it virtually impregnable, and Venetian attempts to blockade the port were useless. For their privateering operations, the Uzkoks utilised the brazzere, a small but highly seaworthy craft able to employ both sails and (a maximum of) sixteen oars. Leaving harbour at nightfall, these speedy hybrids were able to travel 100 miles in any direction by dawn. They terrorised the trade-routes of Venice and the Ottoman-dominated Morea equally, and were able to take more plunder in the winter than in the summer. Events in the Adriatic provided a remarkable adumbration of those to come in the North Sea. 40 To what extent Madrid was influenced by this campaign we cannot tell, but their opting for the construction of a wholly new Flanders squadron illustrates that ministers had grasped the basic implications of the new strategy. They understood that it could not be executed by a force of hired and/or commandeered vessels - merchant ships of varying origins, ages and sizes - normally used to make up the complement of a naval expedition. They seem to have appreciated that the new squadron was to be comprised of vessels purpose-built for the type of campaign envisaged, which would represent a medium- to long-term undertaking. The Council not only contracted with Flemish shipyards, but recommended that the orders be founded on asientos with local businessmen rather than the rarely satisfactory method of managing the commission within the royal administration. This, and the government's insistence - again in conformity with Semple's advice - that the budget be guaranteed by the Council of Finance in a manner which secured bankers' loans on an unimpeachable basis, also indicates some awareness of the economic relationship between Spain and its Netherlands - likely to be placed under new and severe strains with the onset of war.41 40

41

A. Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice, 1580-1615 (London, 1967), pp. 3-12; F.Ruiz Martin, 'Etapa Maritima de las guerras de religion', Estudios de Historia Moderna, 3 (1953), pp. 183-214. Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, p. 157.

32

Dunkirk rediscovered PREPARATION - SHIPS AND BASES

The decisions of 1619-21 may have been influenced by the arguments of a half-dozen specialist advisers, but they were also taken in technical circumstances which proved to be extremely favourable. In the first place, the gradual refinement of the Flemish warship known as the 'frigate' endowed Madrid with a tactical advantage, remarkable in any age, but even more surprising when associated with the Spanish Monarchy - a major technological breakthrough. The new weapon opened up a new world of possibilities. Moulded as it was by a range of factors, above all the climatic and geographical conditions of the local marine environment, and the characteristic weaknesses of its intended target, the frigate achieved its first perfected form around 1600. It seems likely that Urizar's ships, which had served well in various capacities in Spanish waters since 1611, gave naval administrators a reasonable idea of what they wanted in 1618-20.

The shipyards of Ostend and Dunkirk began work some time in the summer of 1620, upon the first twelve vessels destined for the new royal squadron. Details of the size, administrative staff and financing of the squadron were hammered out in negotiations between Philip Ill's 'ambassador' in Brussels, the marquis of Bedmar, and the Archdukes. Overall supervision was placed in the hands ofJuan de Villela, one of the Archduke's senior Spanish councillors, who (as an ex-official of the Council of the Indies), was experienced in maritime affairs. The main contractor was Adriaan van der Walle, based conveniently at Nieuwpoort, between the two larger ports. 42 But since the port-records of Dunkirk, as of the other main bases, have been lost, we can have little access to the details of construction. Early in 1620, the first earmarked subsidies arrived from Madrid. Not long after Philip IV's accession, a further eight - bringing the total to that recommended by Malvenda - were ordered from shipbuilders in Dunkirk.43 The town of St Omer applied for the contract to supply cables and cordage to the fleet. It pointed out that even if their tender seemed expensive, it was better than obtaining these essentials, 'from Holland and Zeeland or their adherents, which only serves to enrich and sustain the rebels'. 44 This concession was perhaps a mistake, for although the hulls were completed and launched by May 1621, fitting-out took longer than Madrid had been led to expect. In February 1622, nearly a year into the renewed phase of war, and with only three examples actually seaworthy, Philip wrote impatiently to his aunt, the Archduchess, demanding an explanation of the delay. He demanded that Spinola 'who, like 42 43 44

Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 9 4 - 5 ; Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 1 5 5 - 8 . Asientos of [PMar.J 1622, A R B / S E G 188, ff. 2 4 4 - 6 . Petition dated Nov. 1621, A G S / E 2312, ff. 111-12; Archduchess Isabel to Philip IV, 8 Jan. 1622, A R B / S E G 187, f. 16.

33

Failure and retrenchment, 1568-1621 your highness, is well aware of how important is the construction and support of this armada', should make a personal visit to the dockyards in order to expedite proceedings.45 Despite a forceful intervention by the marquis, the new armada seems to have struggled painfully into being. Shortages of timber caused many delays, and suitable ordnance was obtained only with great difficulty. In October 1622, the veedor, Vicente de Ancionado, reported that the eight vessels of the second commission ('la segunda fabrica') of 1621 were also experiencing delays, this time because of the lack of financial supplies. As if this were not enough, Ancionado lamented, three of the original twelve commissioned had already been lost, in the course of the squadron's first significant action of the war. The armada was currently established at eleven strong.46 But already, in Flanders as in Spain, the inadequacy of native resources, given the frantic new impetus to demand occasioned by war, was recognised, and suitable replacement vessels were being purchased in foreign harbours. In many ways, it was hardly an auspicious beginning.47 Alongside the efforts in Flanders, comprehensive attempts were made to step up the output of military- and especially naval-related industries in the peninsula. The new gun-foundry established at Seville had been producing around thirty-six new cannon each year since 1611, while the older establishment at Malaga continued to make a useful contribution. Two new factories of the latest design and method were in operation in northern Spain by 1622. Some evidence exists that metallurgical industries were recovering in Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya. As late as 1645, o n e expert observer was impressed with the volume of manufacture, in Tolosa and a dozen other Basque sites, of small arms and a range of maritime tools amd fitments.48 Alongside these efforts went government attempts to improve supplies of gunpowder through the granting of new asientos in 1623. 49 In many respects, Spain no longer lagged helplessly behind the technical achievements of other European centres. 50 Yet the combined efforts of the new 45

46 47

48

49 50

Philip IV to Archduchess Isabel, 4 Feb. 1622, ibid., ff. 54-4V. At this stage, eight vessels were on the stocks in Ostend and twelve in Dunkirk. Ancionado to Philip IV, 8 Oct. 1622, A G S / E 2312, f.23. Ancionado to Philip, 8 Oct; E. Hambye, UAumonerie de la flotte de Flandre du XVII6 siecle (Louvain, 1967), pp. 13-14; Philip IV to Count of Monterrey, 25 Jan. 1623, BL/Eg. 335, ff. 2 4 4 - 5 . Rodrigo Mendez Silva, Poblacion General de Espana (Madrid, 1645), cited in Hambleton, ' T h e Decline of Spain', pp. 3 6 - 8 . Consulta of Council of War, May 1624, B L / E g . 332, ff. 12-16. C. Cipolla, Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion, 1400-1700 (New York, 1965), pp. 32-6; S. Wignall, 'Appendix 2: Armada Shot', in C. Martin, Full Fathom Five: The Wrecks of the Spanish Armada (London, 1975) pp. 247-61; D. Goodman, Power and Penury: Government, Technology and Science in Philip IPs Spain (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 88-150. A recent Spanish monograph provides further evidence: N. Garcia Tapia, Tecnica y poder en Castilla durante los siglos XVIy XVII (Salamanca, 1989).

34

Dunkirk rediscovered with older and less efficient manufacture, and even the addition of them to existing reserves still failed to approach the weight of artillery supplies needed to equip the new navy, with its planned global strength of nearly ioo units. Early battle-damage forced the King - taking advantage of the prince of Wales's much-feasted presence at his court in 1623 - to order naval stores and guns from England, where three or four factories were each capable of turning out over 100 guns in a single year.51 It was problems of quantity rather than qualityand above all the constant need to sacrifice the latter to the former - which continued to plague the infrastructure of the Spanish System.52 On the other hand, the northern initiative was given another favourable impetus by a further discovery, which seemed to express God's approval for the policy of Philip IV's government in the most explicit and timely fashion. The hazards of navigation in frequently atrocious weather conditions were exacerbated by the presence along the entire coast of Flanders of a complex of sandbanks. This represented a deadly submarine enemy, which continuously shifted its position in response to the action of wave and wind. If local pilotage was not available - and sometimes even when it was - galleons with any considerable depth of hold risked disaster with every passage. This factor had vitiated the campaign tactics of 1588 before the Invincible ever left harbour, and fear of it had spread panic on board Medina Sidonia's ships. A more recent example underlined the dangers. In September 1615, a fleet of fourteen merchant ships carrying infantry recruits for the army of Flanders left Lisbon, with an escort of four royal galleons commanded by the experienced seafarer Diego Brochero. The latter's flagship, the galleon San Luisy was wrecked in attempting access to Dunkirk, and many others suffered damage.53 Near the end of 1621, however, a new seaward approach to Dunkirk was discovered by local mariners. The route passed inside the enormous sandbank which sat opposite the estuary, allowing access to the roadstead which the river's effusion at its mouth kept open between them. It ran close to the western coastline, but was deep enough to permit the passage of all but the largest galleons. Jean van Wouver, the Brussels civil servant sent to investigate, recognised the significance of the discovery.54 A fort was quickly thrown up to provide artillery cover at the entrance to this channel, near Mardyck. Before the end of 51 52

53 54

Philip IV to Juan de Ciriza, 12 J u n e 1623, B L / E g . 335, f. 4 3 3 . Moreover, although the size of the Atlantic-oriented naval establishment had been allowed to run down in 1609-17 (Thompson, War and Government, pp. 196-7), government was by no means indifferent to questions of technical improvement. Sefior Olesa Mufiido {La organization, I, pp. 376-8) stoutly defended the record of Philip Ill's reign twenty years ago, and his view has recently been endorsed by Professor Rahn Phillips (Six Galleons for the King of Spain: Imperial Defense in the Seventeenth Century (Baltimore, 1986), pp. 17-18 and 27ff.). Of course, the demands of the Atlantic empire persisted, and an active maritime policy was pursued against the Barbary States, including several large-scale expeditions, down to 1616. M s . relation dated 15 April 1616, B N / 2 3 4 8 , ff. 489—90. Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 101 and 1 9 7 - 9 .

35

Failure and retrenchment, 1568—1621 the decade, the enemy's determined attempts to blockade the route had led to the construction of a new fortress, 'New Mardyck', a massive gun emplacement running for 900 metres along the dunes, capable of deploying as many as 200 guns to seaward. Its landward defences were up-to-date and formidable, and the fort was manned by a garrison of between three and four thousand men.55 From now on, individual ships, privateering squadrons and medium-sized convoys, as long as they escaped damaging encounters with an enemy in the Channel, could run into Dunkirk under the protection of a potentially devastating artillery barrage, and all but the largest vessels could at least seek shelter for repairs and provision in the roads outside the port. In this area too, ships could safely await a favourable wind, enabled simply to up anchor and slip out when the moment arrived. New extensions to the harbour itself were begun, and even the deepening of its quayside moorings to accommodate the heavyweight galleons, though immensely expensive and difficult, became an economical project.56 In a sense, perhaps, the new port facility at Dunkirk was to be a mixed blessing for the new policy. It provided, on a scale previously unknown, that secure deepwater harbourage lack of which had so crippled Spain's tactical flexibility in the previous generation. For this reason, it not only represented a great improvement of Dunkirk's potentialities as a privateering base, but also permitted a return, at some future stage, to use of the large battle-fleets which earlier experience had discredited. This remained for a decade no more than a thought, unexpressed until the major troop-convoying empresas of the 1630s. For the present, Mardyck-Dunkirk represented a military-commercial complex of such enormous potential that observers were shortly speaking of it as a New Antwerp, the miraculous answer to the Dutch closure of the Scheldt. In sum, the auguries for an offensive war at sea were highly satisfactory during the initial combat exchanges. This phase, somewhat hesitant on both sides, followed the expiry of the Truce and Philip IV's accession - events which almost exactly coincided at the end of March 1621. 55

56

R. de Bertrand, Histoire de Mardyck et de la Flandre maritime (Dunkirk, 1852), 2 4 2 - 4 . Bertrand suggests that ' N e w Mardyck' was in existence as early as 1622, b u t an eyewitness description of 1625 makes clear that the original fort was a much more modest affair; see L . Lemaire (ed.), L'Infante Isabelle [...] a Dunkerque, 13 Aout - 6 Novembre 1625; Le Diaire de Philippe Chifflet, Chapelain (Dunkirk, 1926), p . 5 8 . Philip IV to M . de Aroztegui, 4 Feb. 1623, Bl/Eg. 335, f. 262V.

PART II

The great offensive, 1621-1640

Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009

The first quinquennium

EARLY ACTION AND RESULTS

Spanish preparation for war had been thorough in many respects. Intense diplomatic activity had improved Madrid's overall political position in relation to the Dutch, in terms of the attitude and commitments of other European powers. A series of rapidly-executed manoeuvres in 1620, in the Rhineland and the southwestern frontiers of the United Provinces, under the cover of the Habsburg alliance, along with the build-up of troops available to Spinola, put Spain into a strong position on land.1 The situation at sea was less encouraging. The goings-on in the dockyards of Flanders had not escaped the notice of the Dutch, and immediately upon the expiry of the Truce, the States General ordered a blockade of Flemish ports. No fewer than twenty-nine vessels - more than half their total naval strength participated in this exercise in the summer of 1621. The inability of the Flanders armada to respond effectively to the challenge is illustrated by the fact that within two years the Dutch were actually able to reduce the size of their blockading force.2 The voracious onslaught on Dutch trade, schemed by Semple and others, expected in Madrid and feared in Amsterdam, simply did not materialise. Some individual successes were more promising. The occasional lone raider escaped detection, and consequently a dribble of prize captures began to arrive at Dunkirk and Ostend. Nevertheless, the report printed in an Antwerp gazette in 1622, which boasted of Flemish seamen 'already waxed so rich that they may henceforth live like lords in lust and luxury', was a journalistic exaggeration intended to attract recruits.3 Not until later that year were Spinola and Lodosa willing to risk the new frigates more ambitiously. With the onset of the autumn nights and fogs, three warships under Jan Jacobsen left Ostend, hoping to locate the Dutch Baltic convoy. Their escape was detected, and as his two companions 1

2 3

C. Martinez de Campos, Espana Belica: El siglo XVII\ (Madrid, 1968), pp. 62-81. For an earlier narrative account of the Flanders armada's exploits in the years after 1621, see Fernandez Duro, Armada espanola IV, pp. 402-12. Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. no—14. Quoted by P. Geyl, The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century (2 vols., London, 1964), I, p. 121 from the gazette Nieurve Tijdingen.

39

The great offensive, 1621-1640 escaped, Jacobsen confronted nine blockaders alone. After a battle lasting for thirteen hours, he blew up his own ship, taking with it two enemy vessels. The incident created a powerful myth, not unlike that of Sir Richard Grenville and The Revenge in English maritime history. Jacobsen's dying words were those of a martyr - and, perhaps more to the point, a Belgian patriot: 'Mes amis, si quelqu'un d'entre vous echappe et qu'il retourne a Dunkerque, qu'il dise a nos compatriotes comment nous nous sommes defendus'. His sacrifice was made more poignant by subsequent events, for instead of being regarded as prisoners of war, the survivors of Jacobsen's crew were summarily hanged as pirates.4 It may have been the Flemish corsairs who sparked off an exchange of atrocities by the murder of non-combatants during fishery attacks. Captured fishermen, more or less useless for ransom purposes, were apparently battened below while their trawlers were sent to the bottom.5 The Dutch authorities, in their turn, whipped up hatred by an extreme and punitive interpretation of maritime law. Several other captured privateering crews, theoretically protected by Philip IV's licences, were simply thrown overboard (*foot-watering', as the practice came to be called). To some extent it was intended as an antidote to the propaganda of the Flanders gazettes, a deterrent to recruits. In any case, in reprisal (or counter-reprisal) for the Jacobsen incident, thirty Dutch prisoners, the result of the prizetaking successes, were hanged at Dunkirk.6 It is difficult for us to gauge how authentic, and how general, were the feelings so often illustrated by the patriotic historians of the Romantic age. Yet undoubtedly the war at sea often reveals a bitter and cruel character seemingly accentuated by mutual chauvinism. These aspects reflect some of the excesses of the 'German' theatre of the Thirty Years' War, rather than the more restrained standards of behaviour normally (not invariably) to be observed in the wars of the Spanish Monarchy. We may recall that Spain's armed forces were not often engaged in campaigns in which plunder and material destruction was the overt objective. Yet there was a more elemental reason for the war's atrocious character. For the North Sea conflict rapidly acquired some of the characteristics of a civil war. Unlike the situation in the ranks of the army of Flanders, where the local element was largely Walloon in origin, the overwhelming majority of the armada's crews, as of their privately-run auxiliaries, were Dutch-speaking natives of Flanders and Brabant. The two political communities of the Netherlands were created and conditioned by a siege mentality, and fed by a religious hostility heightened by the enthusiastic Catholicism of the Archducal regime and the Dutch Calvinist reaction of 1618-19. When to these 4

5 6

Lemaire, Histoire, pp. 134-5. As Professor Koenigsberger suggested to the author, the mythic words presumably originate in the celebrated epitaph to the Greeks of Thermopylae - 'O stranger, tell the Spartans that here we lie, having obeyed their orders.' Israel, The Dutch Republic^. 113. Lemaire, Histoire, p. 135; Geyl, The Netherlands, p. 121.

40

Thefirstquinquennium were added the consciousness that the renewed struggle was one for survival, the occurrence of internecine barbarities is not surprising. The issues involved for the Dutch were underlined by the subsequent exploits of the two escaped members ofJacobsen's flotilla. Doggedly pursued by the Dutch, they were eventually bottled up, one in the harbour of Leith and the other in Aberdeen. The besieged skippers were fortunate to discover a local (allegedly crypto-Catholic) businessman, William Laing, who mounted a considerable operation to supply them with stores and ammunition. After weeks of refitting and resting, they were able once more to evade and outsail the enemy, regaining Flanders early in 1623. The Dutch learned of Laing's part in this exploit, and placed him on a 'black list5 of customers so that he subsequently lost all his business in Holland.7 Spinola revisited Dunkirk in the spring of 1623, and another raiding operation was planned - this time with successful results. Attacks on some of the remoter fishing ports of Zeeland were carried out by an armada force; the actual damage inflicted was less important on this occasion than the demonstration that with its new weapon, Spain could strike deep into the entrails of its enemy.8 Later that year, Charles, prince of Wales, left Santander on his return journey from the court of Spain. In the open sea of the Channel approaches, his squadron sailed directly into a battle in which 'certain Dunkirkers and Hollanders were at it pell-mell': His Highness commanded them to hoist out their boats, and the captains of either side to come aboard: they did so; and the cause of their fighting being examined by the prince, it was found that the four Dunkirkers coming out for them [i.e. five Dutch warships], made after them and chased them to fight. His Highness understanding by their own relations the truth of their quarrel, told them that since it was their fortune to fall into his company, he would persuade them to be at peace ... [He] used many gracious meditations to draw them to peace, and prevailed so much ... that they parted friends.9

As this tale illustrates, the operational strength, skills and daring of the armada were now rapidly increasing. In January 1624, this was confirmed when four Dunkirkers fought their way out of port without loss when confronted by nine Dutch blockaders. In the summer, a further cause celebre enlivened the courts of Europe's northern littorals. Five Dunkirkers, heading for San Sebastian with a regiment of Walloon troops intended for service as marines in the main Armada, were caught by a much larger enemy force. The battle raged from midnight until the following evening when, the wind failing, the frigates were able to run into the Kentish Downs by the use of their oars. A month elapsed while vain attempts were made to save them by diplomatic means. Eventually 7 8 9

Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 203-4. Spinola to Philip IV, 3 June 1623, AGS/E 2313. F. Fox (ed.), Adams's Chronicle of Bristol (Bristol, 1910), pp. 208—9. 0 Mr. Ian Scott.) 41

owe

this reference to

The great offensive,

1621-1640

they were ordered to make a break for it. Three of the original combatants arrived safely under the guns of Mardyck fort. Although one was damaged, all had managed to outrun their pursuers. A fourth was overtaken and, in what seems to have been a repeat ofJacobsen's fate, the doomed vessel exploded, and its captor, the Dutch rear-flagship, caught fire and sank.10 The Dutch had been unable to press home a considerable numerical advantage in this engagement, losing at least as many units as they destroyed. In general terms, their enemy had proved resilient in battle, whilst the list of merchant losses were beginning to expand, causing severe anxiety in the United Provinces. Replying to a complaint from James I about Dutch violations of his 'territorial waters' during the incidents described above, Prince Maurits insisted 'that he made little difference between the consenting to His Majesty's demands and the ruin of their state'. He feared that the English example in affording shelter would be followed by France and Denmark, creating a network of ports where 'the Spanish freebooters, having little cause to return to Ostend or Dunkirk', might bring and sell prizes, refit and recoup. Blockade of the Flemish ports would thereby be a wasted endeavour, and the United Provinces could not hope to raise the resources to extend vigilance to every neutral port on the North Sea. In particular, Maurits objected to English connivance over the Dunkirkers' use of the Kentish Downs; 'for in that case, said he, the states must give over the wars, in that it is a road sufficient for a Spanish Armada'. His words were acutely prophetic. But, at the same time, both the subject-matter and the pained tone of the Dutch stadthouder reproduce many complaints which Philip II lodged with the Elizabethan government, in the period when the latter protected the SeaBeggars, whilst they plundered the shipping of his loyal subjects.11 Despite the impact of their naval revival, from the Spaniards' viewpoint things were far from triumphant. Three or four of the new frigates had already been written off - a rate of loss which the Flemish shipwrights would find hard to make good. Despite the effort put into the overall build-up of naval forces, Spain's reserves had not been sufficient to mount a rescue operation of the trapped squadron in 1624, which threatened a critical early setback, reflecting badly on the reputacion of the new king. Yet the financial strain of the expanded navy was enormous, and its effects evident at the centre of government.12 One of the worst deficiencies was in ordnance. Several otherwise completed frigates had been stuck uselessly in harbour for lack of appropriate artillery. In June 1623, the King ordered the purchase of fifty large iron guns in England. Almost providentially, three royal ships not long afterwards brought into 10 11 12

Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 204-5. 'The proceeding in the business of the Spanish ships ...' BL/Stowe 133, ff. 149-53V. By 1623, the main Armada del Mar Oceano had more than forty galleons, many of them custom-built warships, and totalled at least 25,000 tons; see lists of Oct. 1623 in AGS/GA 3148. In the previous quinquennium the budget for the Atlantic Fleet alone had risen from 510,000 to 1,200,000 p.a., and grossed nearly 4 million, (Thompson, War and Government, pp. 295 and 303).

42

Thefirstquinquennium Dunkirk an English merchantman, the Violetta charged with fifty-two iron guns and munitions. Her master, one Richard Knott, admitted that he was bound for Middelburg in Zeeland, though he had been running his valuable and dangerous contraband with a crew of three men and a cabin-boy.13 Despite such windfalls, the general situation remained parlous. The new headquarters of the Admiralty, Winoksberg, had contracted to build twelve frigates, but only two were completed by the end of 1626.14 At this stage, the main thrust of the commercial war envisaged by the arbitristas del marwas coming from non-government sources. In the early 1620s, the unofficial privateers began to harry the enemy remorselessly, and men like the van der Walle brothers thoroughly exploited the opportunities offered by royal policy.15 Foreign capital and adventurers were soon attracted by the potential pickings - like Thomas Whitmore, an English master who sailed a large Hamburg-based cargo ship as prize into Dunkirk early in 1625. 16 An estimate of thirty 'private5 privateers (variously referred to by the authorities as armadores or particulars) operating before 1626 would probably not be excessive. Such vessels, sailing alone or in pairs, often carried their captures - as Prince Maurits alleged - into remote English harbours, or even as far as northern Spain, rather than risk leading them into Dunkirk under the noses of the Dutch blockaders. This business provides an immeasurable contraband element in the 'trade' of privateering - a continuous counterpoint to the main theme played by the Flemish ports themselves. Extrapolating from the available evidence, it may be estimated that around fifty to sixty prizes were being adjudicated in the Admiralty court each year during this quinquennium.17 Though the armada itself had not yet achieved a major operational success, glory was not long delayed, for during 1625 - that unprecedented year of military success for the Spanish Monarchy - it was able to contribute in significant fashion. Prospecting ventures into the fishing grounds had begun to yield sufficient information to permit the planning of a major attack. The work seemed to have been wasted, however, when England declared war on Spain in April 1625. It became known that a joint Anglo-Dutch expedition was being gathered, with an attack on the Spanish mainland as its priority. The Archduchess Isabel joined Spinola in Dunkirk, where (following the fall of Breda in July), the captain-general had set up his headquarters. The demands of the expeditionary force obliged the Dutch to reduce their blockading squadron to 13

14 15 16 17

Philip IV to Juan de Ciriza, 12 June 1623, BL/Eg. 335, f. 433; Memorial of Knott and covering letter of Spinola, 9 April 1624, ARB/CA 113. Lemaire, Historie, p. 136. For more detailed treatment of the privateering 'business', see below, pp. 221—8 and 258. Petition of Whitmore, 5 May 1625, ARB/CA 114. The King's skippers were forbidden to dispose of prizes in neutral ports unless they were too damaged to reach Flanders. On the Winoksberg Admiralty and prize-rates before 1626, see Bolsee, Inventaire, pp. 162-4; and R. Baetens, 'The Organization and Effects of Flemish Privateering in the Seventeenth Century', Acta Historiae Neerlandica 9 (1978), pp. 50 and 53-4.

43

The great offensive,

1621-1640

eighteen warships. But this seemed irrelevant, since the Flanders armada dared not move with the allied fleet possibly at sea.18 It took the Anglo-Dutch fleet the whole summer to prepare itself, and not until late October, in foolhardy fashion risking the autumn storms of Biscay, did it arrive off the Iberian coast. The expedition, at well over 100 units, was truly of 'Invincible' proportions, but its assault on Cadiz was a far less excusable failure than that of the Spaniards in 1588. However, we must not exaggerate the effects of this disaster in reducing the naval power of Spain's main adversary. English commitment and losses - especially in terms of vessels engaged - were greater than her ally's by a proportion of at least four to one. Spanish sources suggest that in November and December 1625, only around fifty of the English contingent were able to regain their home bases. The English defeat - perhaps, in the circumstances, rout would be a better word - was on a comparable scale to the worst disasters of contemporary Spain. It was mitigated by the fact that losses were mostly limited to the pressed merchantmen used as troopships.19 The Protestant alliance fared no better in the North Sea. On the coast of Flanders, the Dutch had been joined by an equal force of English warships in order to guarantee the immobility of the Dunkirkers. Although her frigates were thoroughly prepared for action, Isabel reported to her nephew that 'between thirty and forty warships patrol unceasingly outside our roadsteads'.20 On the night of 23 October, however, a ferocious storm, of the variety which nearly destroyed Medina Sidonia's galleons in 1588, caught the blockaders by surprise. On the first night, three enemy ships were driven aground. But instead of abating, the tempest intensified throughout the following twenty-four hours. The next night, under the ceaseless strain, anchor cables parted, and ships collided and sank in the dark. Many of them were precipitated onto the sandbanks, where the violence of the waves smashed masts and churned up sails and rigging. Only six ships remained on station as dawn broke.21 Almost immediately, the Dunkirkers issued forth in two separate squadrons, each comprising both royal and privateering units. The first of these, a dozen strong, brushed off the (doubtless half-hearted) attentions of the enemy survivors and made for the Shetlands. Here they found the main Dutch fishing fleet of two hundred vessels busily at work, drifting helplessly with nets and lines extending as far as 450 metres around. After a brief exchange in which the armada sank one of the custodial warships and boarded another, the remaining four quitted the contest. They left their charges huddled like sheep before the 18 19

20

21

Isabel to Philip IV, 22 Nov. 1625, A R B / S E G 193, f. 240. T h e expedition comprised eighty-eight English and twenty-four D u t c h ships carrying an army of 12,000 (Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, p p . 224-5). J. Cuvelier & J. Lefevre (eds.), Correspondance de la cour de VEspagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bos au XVII6 siecle (6 vols., Brussels, 1923-37), I, p. 234. Fr. Chifflet testified in detail to the skilled attention lavished on the frigates (Lemaire, Diaire, esp. pp. 57-99). Ibid, pp. 90-2.

44

Thefirstquinquennium wolves. Whilst the larger vessels were taken, forty others were sunk in a orgy of destruction the like of which had rarely been witnessed at sea. The second wave of Flemish raiders, fanning out along the continental shelf, were able to collect dozens of scattered trawlers, as well as many assorted merchantmen fleeing homewards as news of the horror travelled across the sea-spaces. So panicstricken was the enemy that small boats left the Flanders ports to join in the hunt and pick up helpless stragglers. 'Even our fishermen have exploited the occasion, and so far have brought in three prizes of salt and herring', wrote the excited Archduchess to Madrid.22 In the space of a fortnight perhaps as many as 150 enemy ships, most of them Dutch, and including around twenty warships and four times that number of fishing buizen had been wrecked, captured or destroyed. Medals of triumph were struck to commemorate the events of a campaigning year in which the verdict of 1588 seemed to have been reversed with supernatural exactitude.23 Brilliantly planned and daringly executed, the 1625 operation finally justified the claims of the arbitristas del mar, and established the fearsome reputation of the Dunkirkers in the courts as well as the ports of Northern Europe. Such were the celebrations, even in Spain, that some observers seemed to suffer a rapid loss of enthusiasm. 'I send you a copy of the latest news about the Flanders armada5, wrote the postmaster of San Sebastian to an acquaintance, before the year was out, 'which is nothing more than that they have sunk more of the herring trawlers'.24 The Flanders ports were ill-prepared for some of the consequences of success on such a scale. Around 1,400 prisoners had been taken in only one eventful month, and suitable places of detention were not available in Dunkirk. Indeed, at this stage, though the building of new barracks had been begun, the military garrison of the town was still mostly billeted in private or temporary public accommodation. In the winter of 1625-6, 250 Dutch captives died of privation. The majority of these were doubtless lowly fishermen, who met their fate through a neglect partly enforced by the exigencies of the situation. Meanwhile, many of their skippers and other officers, wealthier and more important men, played inadvertently the role of hostages. The practice of 'foot-watering' was suspended by the Dutch navy for fear of reprisals.25 This constituted a useful side-benefit of the armada's operations, doubtless appreciated by the citizens of a town which was now making a major commitment to the Spanish war-effort. However, it seems this element of truce did not last. Early in 1626, the privateering skipper Jan Hibelsen left Dunkirk in order to prowl the coast of France. During the spring and summer he took seven 22 23 24 25

Isabel to Philip IV, 5 Nov. 1625, A R B / S E G 193, ff. 191-91V. Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 1 0 1 - 3 a n d 2 0 3 - 5 . J. de Arbelay to ?, 20 D e c . 1625, M N / V a r g a s 8, f. 58V. M s . copy of a relation printed by J u a n Cabrera in Seville, ibid../ Nav. 6, ff. 5-5V.

45

The great offensive,

1621-1640

enemy prizes, which he sold in Lisbon and San Sebastian. The latter port enlisted his aid against French ships which had been preying on their fishermen. The subsequent fighting cost him twenty of his crew and the loss of an eye. Hibelsen held official 'letters of marque' which licensed him to privateer on behalf of the Brussels government, but he was still worried about his return voyage to Flanders. In search of protection from King Philip himself, he journeyed to Madrid, where he claimed that: It is well-known that any skipper who does not carry a licence direct from Your Majesty, and the recognised status of Captain, if captured by the Hollander, isflungunceremoniously into the sea, or strung up at the yardarm. But those who can show Your Majesty's papers, and are named as your officers, are given quarter and regarded as prisoners-ofwar. Philip IV was so delighted with the exploits of a hero whose personal appearance must have resembled the later stereotype image of a freebooter, that he not only granted the request, but decorated him with a royal medallion, adding a reward of 200 gold escudos into the bargain.26 MARITIME POLICY AND OLIVARES* PROGRAMME

In December 1621, a printed cedula was issued, encapsulating Madrid's intentions in the new phase of maritime war. It was a set of regulations for the encouragement of privateering. Destined to be revised several times during the second phase of the Hispano-Dutch war, the decree applied only to Spain itself, and was partly addressed to the problem of the Barbary corsairs. Its principle tenor was of outrage at the onslaught of infidel and heretic raiders upon the peaceful life of the peninsula. It required (for example) the summary execution of Muslim sailors captured upon the high seas, and threatened a similar fate to any Dutch adventurers who attempted to escape Spanish justice. All Dutch vessels in Spanish waters were to be regarded as pirates.27 Several factors inspired this extraordinary call to arms. Strength of feeling in Spain's maritime regions - especially those which suffered from the attention of Barbary raiders - was a powerful consideration. But in addition, it illustrates apprehension over the sheer cost of naval defences. Until well into the present century, an active maritime policy was to remain by far the most expensive enterprise in which any state could engage. Philip IV's government was anxious from the first to diffuse the financial pressure which the return to war involved. In particular, they hoped to redistribute it, away from Castile, the traditional, but 26 27

Consulta of Junta de Armadas and royal apostilla, 11 Sept. 1626, A G S / G A 3150. La Orden que han de Gardar los vassallos destos mis Reynos, y Senorios de Espana ..., 24 Dec. 1621, with codicil emendations of 27 Aug. 1623 & 12 Sept. 1624, RAH/Sal. 1453, ff. 374-7. (Another copy in MN/Varios 2, 314-17.)

46

Thefirstquinquennium exhausted, fiscal nucleus, to the peripheral communities of the peninsula. Such an intention had a special rationale in the area of maritime defence. Moreover, the privateering policy can be viewed as another aspect of the 'privatization' of defence infrastructures which one historian has detected throughout the Spanish System in this period. It was a tacit admission that the royal administration was too cumbersome and costly to manage all the contingencies of permanent war. Consequently, defence preparations were contracted out to the private sector (asiento). This tendency was not as chronologically progressive, nor as general, as has been suggested; neither, perhaps, was the statist alternative (administration) so universally inefficient as Dr Thompson implies. All the same, privateering seems to provide a broad illustration of the phenonemon - the asiento being embodied in a licence granted to an entrepreneur (armador), who agreed to sail his own ship, fitted out (often newly-built) and crewed at his own expense, in making war on the Crown's enemies.28 On the other hand, given Mariana's point that mass privateering was an economic way both to wage war and to train up fighting seamen, the decree can also be seen as an attempt to encourage the formation of a species of national sea-militia. 'All mariners and other fighting men who sail in the licensed ships, as well as the armadores themselves, will benefit from the same exemptions, privileges and liberties ... which the men of the militia of these realms enjoy', declared point five of the 1624 revision.29 Skippers were required to sell prizes in their home ports, suggesting a mainly local protection service, which might stimulate maritime affairs. The armadores were allowed to recruit anywhere (except amongst serving armada crews) on favourable terms, were given access to royal arsenals and other resources, and promised the co-operation of civil and military authorities. In addition, Philip - though at first only implicitly - disavowed the 20 per cent (quinto) of prize-monies customarily due to the Crown, and released all licensees from the obligation to pay royal sales-taxes on their profits. The effective incorporation of privateers into the armed forces was adumbrated in the earliest revised version, which suggested that armadores might gain the pecuniary and honorific rewards of royal commanders who distinguished themselves in battle. All this was not quite to release the frantic mass-launch of warships evoked by Mariana. Only vessels of appropriate size (at least two decks and 300 tons) were to be considered for licensing. Levels of investment and risk remained a deterrent to all but the richest, most experienced, and - decisive factor for many - the most socially ambitious. Of course, owners and skippers realised that royal 28

29

Thompson, War and Government, esp. pp. 274ff. F o r the political context and content of fiscal reform, see J. H. Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline (New York and London, 1986), esp. pp. 131-62 and 191-202. For attempts to re-establish the militia system proper in these years, see B L / E g . 319, ff. 16—20, (minutes ofconsultas of the Council of War, July-sept. 1626).

47

The great offensive, 1621-1640 controls over their behaviour were likely to be less vigilant in practice than appeared by the letter of the regulations. At any rate, the response was highly satisfactory, and a large number of ports along the northern littoral of Spain soon had adventurers searching the seas for appropriate victims. The regulations decreed by the Brussels government for the privateers of Flanders made similar concessions, but also differed in important respects. First of all, it was acknowledged that profits in this area were potentially so rich that the King would be unwise to forego too much. The principle of a 10 per cent share for the Crown was therefore strictly enforced. The demand for artillery dictated that the guns and ammunition of any prize were to be delivered to the royal arsenals before its sale proceeded.30 However, the conditions imposed remained encouraging enough to promote an industry which, within a few years, had become a significant factor in the economy not only of the Flanders ports, but of the whole of the North Sea. By 1626, aggregating the units operating in Dunkirk-Mardyck, Ostend and Nieuwpoort, it may be estimated that around forty vessels were engaged. Businesses were centred in Dunkirk, but represented investors from a wide spectrum of society in Flanders and Brabant.31 These measures represented a quasi-revolutionary departure for the Habsburg government, in which it endorsed an all-out freebooting campaign, and one directed - by its own constitutional standards - against it own subjects, albeit subjects in rebellion.32 Moreover, Madrid's embracing of the piratical logic of maritime-commercial warfare was surely a palpable desertion of the value-system of the Castilian aristocracy, as reflected in its traditional military codes. Ironically, its enforced pragmatism comes to be emphasised by the very manner in which the document seeks to disguise it, with its repeated appeals to the moral sanction of defence of the homeland against piracy. Finally, the privateering policy illustrates the extent to which the new regime, led at this point by Baltasar de Zuniga, but shortly to be entrusted to his nephew, Olivares, was committed to a programme influenced to a profound degree by maritime strategies.33 Until this time, Olivares had maintained a low political profile. In a notable exception, in January 1622 - nine months before the death of Zuniga - he revived and took the chair of the jfunta de Armadas.34 The new chief minister 30 31 32

33 34

'Capitulo de instruction de S[u] A[ltissima]de 13 de April 1622 . . . ' , A R B / C A 245. See below, pp. 2O4ff. Furthermore, armadores capturing enemy vessels which themselves were in charge of captured Spanish prizes were allowed to regard the latter as good prize, so long as they had been first taken more than twenty-four hours before. T h e provision was bound to cause enormous offence, but was clearly regarded as justified by the emergency. A detailed study of politics and policymaking during the chief ministry of Zuniga is long overdue. See (e.g.) his collected votos in the Council for N o v . - D e c . 1622, copied in B N / 5 5 8 8 , ff. 2 7 0 - 3 . See also Elliott, The Count-Duke, pp. 142—3 (pp. 142—6 for the link between maritime policy and reform).

Thefirstquinquennium was, of course, the son of that earlier count of Olivares who had taken such an interest in naval affairs.35 He was converted to a maritime policy, perhaps partly as a result of Fadrique de Toledo's great victory against the Dutch in 1621; but rather more, one suspects, by his intellectual response to the dialetic of the arbitristas del mar. The founders of this 'school' still lived; indeed, after being victimised by the Lerma regime, in their dotage they became heroes of the new dispensation. The work of Mariana, who became royal historiographer, was familiar, and the advice of Alamos de Barrientos was highly valued. Though Semple himself seems not to have been closely connected with the new regime, another hispanified exile, the Englishman Antony Sherley, who in 1622 turned his pen to the subject of maritime war, was undoubtedly influential. The immediate political circumstances of Olivares' access to power in the autumn of 1622, also helped to form his policy. At Zuniga's death (7 October) Philip merely appointed his valido to membership of the Council of State, sharing the portfolios which Don Baltasar had held amongst the latter's coevals.36 As it happened, the major item on the council's agenda - it was the autumn session, when one year's campaigns had been completed, and plans were on the table for the next - was the whole question of maritime strategy. An interim report had been prepared by Olivares' Junta de Armadas which summarised the comments of experts, including the mariner-arbitrista Diego de Brochero and Martin de Aroztegui, on the proposals of Semple and others. It suggested that naval squadrons in Spain's maritime regions might be largely supported by local resources; 'each province sending out the number of vessels it is able to afford'. The report expressed a belief that the Mediterranean regions - above all the Crown of Aragon - should not be exempted from the principles involved, whilst acknowledging that in this area the policy needed careful political preparation. It went on to make detailed recommendations concerning the raising and training of seamen, shipbuilding improvements, and supply of maritime materials, which duly made their way into revisions of the 1621 Ordenanzas and other relevant decrees. As a result of its recommendations, the authorities of the Basque Country and Navarre, the Montanesa region of Castile, and the Kingdom of Galicia, were each asked to contribute three ships to an 'Armada de Cantabria'.37 As the Council of War considered these papers, a Junta of State was engaged in debate over a major arbitrio submitted by Antony Sherley.38 Although the 35 37

38

36 See above, pp. 5-6. Elliott, The Count-Duke, pp. 131-5. 'Relation del Estado que tiene lo que toca a la platica de los Corsos, aumento de los marineros y del comercio', A G S / G A 3150. It is possible that Olivares composed his own memorandum as a voto for this report, which dates from late 1622 or early 1623. In the event, as with the larger scheme of the 'Union of Arms', each province negotiated separate deals with the government over its maritime contributions, and set up autonomous squadrons. See the edition by X.-A. Flores, Le 'Peso politico de todo el mundo' par Antony Sherley (Paris, 1963); Olivares publicly compared Sherley's vision to that of Columbus, (Elliott, The Count-Duke, p. 142).

49

The great offensive,

1621-1640

Englishman's work, in matters of naval strategy as in several others, undoubtedly derived from earlier schemes, it nonetheless placed the subject in a dimensionally augmented context. Sherley was an imaginative thinker - his work still vibrates with interest when placed alongside that of most other arbitristas - and what he lacked in originality and detail he made up in scope and daring. Moreover, he was acute enough to dedicate his work to Olivares, in flattering terms, and at exactly the right moment. His central idea proposed an international 'diplomatic revolution', making the Ottoman Turks the main partners of the Spanish Monarchy in an 'Axis' alliance which could guarantee the supremacy of the Mediterranean against the challenge from the North. Even so, he recognised that control of the North Sea, nexus of both supplies and communications, was of crucial significance to world-power. The English and Dutch have made themselves masters of the sea and of commerce, to the extent that they are able to jeer at all our power on land ... His Majesty must have a substantial fleet in the waters of Flanders. It is unimportant that there exist only two appropriate ports, Dunkirk (with its barrier) and Ostend. Either would provide a safe anchorage ... to use the fleet and fence in the rebels, tightening our stranglehold upon all the commerce which is their sustenance, until we can break it.39

Sherley made the new point that a secure maritime ally for Spain in the North was an essential strategic precondition of success. Without dismissing the potential of England, on the whole he was convinced that Denmark, with its unique geographical influence in respect of the Baltic and Dutch trade, was a better proposition. When pushed to the grandiose geopolitical limits at which he loved to operate, Sherley's plan was for a new political-commercial nexus of Denmark and the Hanse ports, tied in with the Empire as a continental partner, and with Spain's naval collaboration in the sea-lanes. Here was a confederation to triumph against any combination of the United Provinces, England and France. Giving hypothetical examples, he pointed out that bases in Flanders and Denmark would place Spain's navy at the centre of Dutch prosperity, able to target the enemy's fishing ports and isolated market towns. Sherley was the prophet of an era of Spanish Vikings, a scourge to make the lands of the Barbary rovers seem like the carnival visit of the ship of fools.40 Although he had never been far from the conclaves of his uncle's regime, Olivares was still finding his feet in government. His views may have been uniquely privileged by the King's support, but he remained a junior member of the Council of State, in which sat several powerful and independently-minded ministers. Not all of the latter were impressed by the need for reform, nor what they rightly perceived as a sudden and alarming growth in financial commitment. Even some of those who had supported Zuiiiga and the 'hawks' of 39 40

Flores, Peso politico, pp. i o o and 168—9. Ibid., pp. 8 8 - 9 0 and 147. Some years earlier, a tentative approach to Denmark had been rebuffed, (Albert to Philip III, 22 July 1619, A R B / S E G 183, f. 23).

50

Thefirstquinquennium 1617-21, now blanched somewhat at the scale of events which their decisions had unleashed. An example was the marquis of Montesclaros, president of the Council of Finance, who - although basically in favour of the war-policy balked at the proliferation of asientos de dinero, most of which seemed to be a result of the naval programme.41 One consistent opponent of maritime strategy in the 1620s was Don Pedro de Toledo, marquis of Villafranca and second-ranking of the powerful aristocratic clan headed by the duke of Alba. As early as 1619, he poured scorn on the idea that Spain could ever hope to compete with the Dutch in commercial-maritime terms. Indeed, many believed on principle that such an aspiration was both fanciful and unnecessary, and that it was not the Crown's role - as Olivares put it - 'to turn Spaniards into merchants'. Along with other ministerial critics, like Fernando Giron and Augustin Mexia, Toledo believed that Spain's military genius lay in the terrestrial dimension graced by the contributions of his ancestors, and remained sceptical of the whole corpus of ideas contained in maritime policy. Perhaps resistance in such quarters was also due to residual attachment to the tenets of honour and reputation offended by the new attitudes. 42 Olivares and his young master were no whit dismayed by these sceptics. The former was beginning to gain a firm mental grasp of the multiple connections between different aspects and levels of policy. Perhaps he was not yet equipped to analyse matters in lucid or comprehensive detail. Yet the relevance of maritime thinking to his evolving programme of domestic reform was unmistakable. Indeed, the comparison with the Weltpolitik policy of Imperial Germany in the 1890s, when a massive naval programme went hand-in-hand with national regeneration, and brought with it profound political, cultural, social and economic implications for the Reich, might not be altogether out of place for the Spain of the 1620s. Only the projected new government banks (erarios) could underwrite loans on the scale - and at the economical rates - necessary to finance naval expansion. Only the co-operation of all the Iberian lands, with each other and with the wider Monarchy, could provide the basic fiscal and material resources. The idea of a 'Union of Arms' - the collaboration of all the provinces of the Monarchy in a mutual defence network, which lay at the heart of the count-duke's thinking - was clearly foreshadowed in the report of 1622/3 when it addressed the question of regional squadrons.43 In late 1622, Olivares pressed into commission a new Junta Grande de Reformation to define reform and enunciate basic 41 42

43

Examples of Montesclaros's For Villafranca's views, see (unpublished P h . D . Thesis, consulta of Junta de Armadas, See above, p . 49.

reservations can be found in B L / E g . 335, passim. P. Brightwell, 'Spain and the Origins of the Thirty Years' War' Cambridge, 1967), p. 256; Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 191; and July 1626, BL/Eg. 319, f. 22.

51

The great offensive, 1621-1640 decrees. In the introduction to its report, published the following February, the creation of a new navy was linked to the setting up of the erarios, and seen as second only in importance. It incorporated the proposal that 'several squadrons should be formed for our maritime defence, so that thereby this Crown might better encompass the end of restoring commerce'.44 But, as with reform generally, the seeds of enthusiasm had to be broadcast by the maritime lobby established in Madrid not only in but in some ways as the government - in order to take root and flourish in the provinces. Sherley had argued that within the warmaking structure articulated by systematic exploitation of the Flanders ports, a positive economic policy could be encouraged. He dreamed of linking Germany (via Denmark and the Hanse), the Spanish Netherlands and the peninsula together in an autarkic economic zone. A positive economic strategy was now beginning to emerge in other minds. As the portentous implications of the renewal of war became more manifest, so responses began to be formulated on all sides. These were contingent upon the wide-ranging discussion of Spain's relations with the Netherlands which had occupied the years before 1621. Several businessmen, including Retama, supported the idea of a government-licensed monopoly company, along Dutch lines, to control the trade of Spain and Flanders with full legal and fiscal powers. This developed during 1623 into a scheme for an Admiralty of the North {Almirantazgo de los Paises Septentrionales) with complementary administrative teams based at terminals in Seville and Flanders.45 When placed alongside the ideals of efficiency aspired to by the countduke's government, the actual achievements of the 1620s can sometimes seem the result of frantic improvisation. On the other hand, the shifts of emphasis taking place, in terms of the so-called 'peace policy' of the Lerma regime, and in those of the established priorities of the Spanish System before 1609, were extraordinary and radical. Quite simply, maritime thinking came to dominate Madrid's overall conception of war. This fact is perfectly illustrated by the register-book of royal instructions which has survived from the period JanuaryJune 1623, the months in which Olivares 'emerged' as the motive-force in 44 45

A. Gonzalez Palencia, La Junta de Reformation (Valladolid, 1932), p . 416. Detailed consideration/)^ se of the commercial aspects of the Almirantazgo falls outside the scope of this book. Despite a distinguished bibliography on the subject, much work remains to be done before its commercial rationale and actual function are fully elucidated. However, for what follows here and elsewhere I rely on A. Dominguez Ortiz, 'El Almirantazgo de los paises septentrionales y la politica economica de Felipe I V , Hispania 7 (1947), pp. 272-90; and 'Guerra economica y comercio extranjero en el reinado de Felipe I V , ibid. 23 (1963), pp. 7 1 - 1 1 3 ; R. Rodenas Vilar ' U n gran proyecto anti-holandes en tiempo de Felipe I V , ibid. 22 (1962), pp. 5 4 1 - 5 3 ; Israel, The Dutch Republic, esp. pp. 204-17; Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 180—4. See also the important revisions made to the foregoing by M . A. Echevarria in 'Una original contribution al pensamiento antimercantilista: La doctrina de Struzzi de 1629', Hispania 47 (1987), pp. 8 9 7 - 9 2 8 .

52

Thefirstquinquennium government. A large proportion of this document records the work of the jfunta de Armadas.46

In early January, Montesclaros finds his knuckles being rapped for delays in providing the naval budget: 'only so long as these provisions are punctual can we rely on my navy to bring us success'. Of 1,800,000 ducats consigned (Philip insisted), two-thirds must be delivered immediately, and the remaining fraction within three months. In February, an improved scheme for the convoying of the incoming silver-fleet is implemented. In March, the shortage of crews in Spain for the Armada del Mar Oceano necessitates a levy to be undertaken in the Algarve; at the same time, Pedro de Coloma, in London on diplomatic business, is ordered to contract with English and/or Hanseatic businessmen for the delivery of masts to Lisbon, 'because of the great shortage we have in these kingdoms . . . but you must ensure that they are not brought in Dutch vessels'. In May, reports of increased enemy activity in Spanish waters coalesce into apprehension of an impending major confrontation with the Dutch navy. That this is not a government ploy, intended to stimulate concern and thus action, seems to be indicated by the order for the warships of the Silver-Fleet to join Fadrique de Toledo's main force as soon as they have been unloaded in Cadiz. Concurrently an attempt is made to persuade the Crown's bankers to anticipate several instalments of asientos de dinero for the navy.47 Not surprisingly, naval expenditure tripled in a period of six years (compared to an overall defence increase of some 85 per cent), to become the largest single item in the Crown's budget, consuming the lion's share of the taxes approved by the Cortes of Castile.48 Doubtless conscious of this, in his speech to the latter's opening session in April 1623, the King made much of Spain's successes at sea. More than a hundred galleons were now fully commissioned in the Atlantic fleet and the Flota de Galeones, many of them new and/or custom-built for war. Several dozen more were being built. A special mention in dispatches was reserved for the armada of Flanders, 'with which', Philip boasted, 'since the war was re-opened, we have captured many Dutch merchantmen and sunk others; and moreover, in battle against the enemy navy it has acquitted itself with great honour [con gran reputation].'49

A year later, Olivares and Philip visited Andalusia on the first great royal Jornada of the reign. This exercise had several objects associated with the reform programme. Naturally, the Count-Duke wished to persuade the landowning 46

47 48 49

B L / E g . 335, f. 201 et seq. T h e only comparable royal documents I have seen are the fourteen volumes of registered requisitions to the Consejo de Hacienda for the 1640s in A H N / H a c . 7 8 8 5 - 9 8 . For this reason it strikes me as being, in itself, a product of Olivares' early enthusiasm for reform. Ibid., ff. 2 2 1 , 23iv., 244-44.V., 274V., 318, 348, 383V. and 429V. Dominguez, Politicay Hacienda, pp. 19—24; T h o m p s o n , War and Government, p. 97. 'La Proposition que el Rey nuestro senor mando hacer al reyno en las Cortes . . . ' , 6 April 1623, M N / N a v . 8, ff. 3 2 3 - 3 2 .

53

The great offensive,

1621-1640

nobles, and the magistrates of the wealthy municipalities, to collaborate with his administrative and fiscal programme. More specifically, now that its details were being hammered out, he was keen to stimulate interest in the Almirantazgo within the commercial ambit of the Seville region. By this time a group of businessmen based in this area, (whose varying national origins demonstrated its continuing economic buoyancy) had followed Retama's example in publishing their support of the project. Leading merchants like Manuel Lopez Pereira and Duarte Gomez Solis, Portuguese; Jan Wouver, a Fleming and Agustin Bredimus, a German; as well as the expatriate Italian Alberto Struzzi, in some ways a spokesman for the Antwerp interest, all expressed faith in its promise to restore the atrophied commercial links between Spain and the North. 50 They felt that both Seville and Flanders could only benefit from such an organised stimulation of trade, with its contingent opportunities in employment and revenue. Philip, Olivares, and their advisers spent much time closeted with the powerful nobles of western Andalusia - above all the Dukes of Medinaceli and Medina Sidonia, without whose support setting up the legal and administrative structures of the scheme could hardly be contemplated. As the climax of his visit, on 24 March, the King sailed in festive pomp from Puerto Santa Maria on the capitana of his galley-fleet, to review his full Armada del Mar Oceano drawn up at anchor in the Bay of Cadiz.51 The most advanced and optimistic theories of maritime-economic warfare were by now becoming established orthodoxies. At last it seemed that thinkers as diverse as William Semple, grizzled Scot and military pragmatist, and Tommaso Campanella, Calabrian priest and philosopher, who contemporaneously discerned the essentially oceanic genius and destiny of the Spanish Monarchy, were to be justified.52 Furthermore, as the land war in the Netherlands coagulated steadily into stalemate, an increasingly expensive attrition of sieges and marches, the war at sea seemed, in contrast, to offer prospects of dramatic progress. In March 1625, with the siege of Breda still unresolved, deeply concerned at the almost incalculable resources expended on Spinola's campaign, Philip informed the Archduchess that 'from now on the land-war will be reduced to the purely defensive. We will adjust things so that the main fortresses can be strongly garrisoned, and protected by an army of 24,000. In Mardyck, we will build up a fleet of fifty warships'. 53 Such a development would have more than doubled its size, demanding a monthly subsidy of 50,000 escudos. 50

51 52

53

J. I. Israel, ' T h e Politics of International T r a d e Rivalry during the Thirty Years' War: Gabriel de Roy and Olivares' Mercantilist Projects, 1621-1645', The International History Review 8 (4) (1986), pp. 5 1 7 - 4 9 . Gonzalez Palencia, Noticias, p . 92. For Campanella, whose survey of The Spanish Monarchy appeared in 1623, see L. Diez del Corral, La Monarquia de Espaiia en el pensamiento politico Europeo: De Macquiavelo a Humboldt (Madrid, 1975), pp. 305ff. Quoted by Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, p . 210.

54

Thefirstquinquennium Welcome as this attitude was, not long after the euphoria of victory in 1625 had died away, reservations began to emerge within the Archduchess Isabel's councils. With a tremendous effort, the Flanders armada had gained success in all the areas allocated to it - raiding of commerce and fisheries, amphibious attacks and outright ship-to-ship combat - and the enemy was beginning to reel under their impact. Yet no sooner had the initiative been won, than it seemed the armada was to be diverted into other areas, and tasks perceived to be tangential to the case. In Madrid, success bred greater ambitions, and Olivares' mind was turning back to his earlier thoughts of progress towards the Baltic.54 Commitment and pride had begun to encourage proprietary feelings about the armada in Brussels. But despite the contribution from prizemoney - now certainly beginning to defray expenses - every maravediiox its creation had been provided by the Crown, or rather by xhepecheros of Castile and the Indies. From the beginning, the force had been envisaged - in the abstract thinking of Alamos as much as in the practical realisation of Villela - as one which, though based in Flanders, would be available where appropriate for the wider needs of the Monarchy. In 1625-6, Olivares was sure that this opportunity had arrived, and was prepared to demand the concomitant duty from the Flanders fleet. From Brussels' point of view, a sense of frustration, and even of suspicion, was equally understandable. It was not the Baltic design, but the strategic contingencies of war with England, which first exposed this nerve - shortly to become a persistent irritant in the joint management of the armada. As the huge Anglo-Dutch expedition made its way towards the peninsula in 1625, there was growing apprehension in Madrid. The Council of War recommended that the Flanders armada should shadow its movements, and be ready to join forces with the main fleet, in Spanish waters, in the event of a battle. The proposal was rejected unanimously by the Council of State, in which Alonso Mexia quoted Isabel's warning that, in view of the blockade, the frigates were firmly bottled up in Dunkirk. 55 In the event, neither the Dunkirkers nor the Armada del Mar Oceano were needed to repulse the invaders. But two months later, with the peak of crisis passed, the King ordered his aunt to send the warships to Spain in any case. Isabel demurred, on the grounds that all her available strength was already at sea 'on the King's business and to the great harm of his rebels'.56 Since the business turned out to be the brilliantly successful fishing-grounds raid already described, on this occasion Philip could hardly complain. Madrid's viewpoint was nonetheless hardening on this issue for other reasons. A sailing routine for the Almirantazgo convoy was envisaged, on similar lines to the celebrated Carrera de Indias, leaving Seville-Cadiz annually in the 54 55 56

F o r the evolution of the Baltic policy, see below, pp. 6iff. Consulta of the Council of State, 26 Sept. 1625 (Copy); M N / N a v . 9, ff. 133-6. Isabel to Philip IV, 22 Nov. 1625, A R B / S E G 193, f. 240V.

55

The great offensive, 1621-1640 spring and returning in the autumn. It needed to be sure of the Flanders armada's protection in both directions. The South-North voyage would be ideal for the delivery of fresh infantry tercios to the army of Flanders, on an annual basis, in time for the new campaigning season. Outgoing vessels, otherwise mainly charged with wool (but perhaps also some salt, military supplies and specie), would then have capacity upon return for the heavier cargoes from northern Europe - above all wood, and various cereal grains.57 To Madrid, it made sense that, once this system was in operation, the convoying force should remain to refit and winter in peninsular waters. During this season the armada would be useful as a coastal patrol against Muslim pirates, and for other work in the Mediterranean theatre. Olivares was conscious of the need to mollify complaint and discourage opposition to his reforms; and opposition currently entrenched in some Castilian municipalities - especially in the south, in provinces like Granada and Murcia, which had suffered consistently over the years from attacks mounted from the African coast.58 A regular contribution to their defence by the armada might represent a tangible return on the investment of the Castilian taxpayer. Given the commitment to doubling its size and subsidy, it seemed reasonable to expect a squadron of the armada to provide this service. Part of the assumption behind this scheme was that the winter months were in any case fairly unproductive ones in the North Sea. In fact, this was far from being the case. The autumn and winter were on the whole better for commerceraiding. For a start, the blockading fleet was obliged by the deteriorating weather conditions to decamp by November at the latest. The longer nights were better suited to privateering, and the frigate was perfectly adapted to operate to advantage in ostensibly poor conditions.59 In these circumstances, it was pointless to relax a pressure on the Dutch economy which was just beginning to yield political results. Furthermore, Madrid's schedule would require every Almirantazgo convoy to fight its way past the Dutch blockade outside Mardyck - a force which, with English assistance, numbered on average nearly forty units in 1625-8 - probably on both incoming and outgoing voyages. Even making the generous assumptions that the Spanish fleet, with its inevitable number of slower cargo ships, was able to slip the blockade, and that it could manage to avoid the enemy's attentions throughout voyages which were lengthy and dangerous even in peacetime, considerable damage and loss of vessels would still be incurred. Flemish expertise, and access to appropriate materials, could make much good in their home ports; but how were the shipwrights of San Sebastian, or even of Cadiz, to cope with the demands of repairs and refitting, especially to the Dunkirk frigates? 57 59

58 Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 205-6. Elliott, The Count-Duke, pp. 158-62. Spinola to Ribera, 29 Dec. 1626, ARB/Div. 3782.

56

Thefirstquinquennium The slippages of co-ordination implicit here became manifest in the spring of 1626. Philip had reiterated his earlier orders, and, subsequent to their fisheries' exploit, a force of frigates and other armada vessels - twenty in all - sailed for Spain late in 1625. As they prepared for the return voyage, Madrid came up against the possibility that a powerful Anglo-Dutch force might be waiting in the channel. Isabel was instructed to reinforce the garrison and artillery firepower of the Mardyck fort.60 By the time the message arrived, nearly fifty enemy warships were already in place outside Dunkirk. The Archduchess alerted Madrid that if plans for another attack on the fisheries were to be effected, the armada would need to run this terrible gauntlet twice within a few weeks. 'Therefore it seems best [she suggested] for Your Majesty to order the twenty warships to take another route and to sail from Spain directly to the Dutch herring fisheries . . . returning afterwards to Ostend from the north.' 61 Isabel's itinerary would presumably have involved sailing northwards around Ireland and Scotland. Few merchant vessels of the Almirantazgo would be able to undertake such a voyage. It was becoming clear that the timetables of Madrid and Brussels simply did not synchronise. The fact is a guide to other contradictions and anomalies which were now appearing. The commercial demands of the Almirantazgo inevitably put Spanish strategy back - mutatis mutandis - in the old discredited way of operating with large and cumbersome flotas along predictable and hazardous sea-lanes. They were not compatible with the tactics of successful maritime warfare advocated by the arbitristas del mar, and subsequently developed in successful practice - just as privateering itself in the last analysis was not compatible with regular commercial enterprise. Both Olivares and Philip IV looked back to Philip II as their main exemplar in policy and achievement. Encouraged by success and praise to suppose that they had emulated this example in the mid-1620s, they began to think more grandly along the lines of counter-attack, rather than those of consolidation - in the context of the 1580s, and not the radically altered circumstances of the 1620s. Of course, the perceptions vouchsafed us by hindsight were not available to the policymakers of the past. But, in any event, the bullish attitudes of Spain's rulers encouraged the emergence of a new line of thought. This revised thinking on maritime warfare provided some important refinements of the original ideas, but at the same time diverged significantly from them, leaving them (in effect) to one side in the arrangement of priorities. 60

61

Philip IV to Isabel, 3 March 1626, A R B / S E G 194, ff. 184-84V. T h e imponderable element was whether the enemy would risk another attack on Spain itself. T h e English had certainly not ruled this out, despite the humiliation of the previous year; see ' T h e opinion of several able sea captains' [to the Admiralty Commissioners], 9 J u n e 1626, Magdalene College, Cambridge, Pepys M s . 2875, ff. 2 2 0 - 2 . Isabel to Philip IV, 21 April 1626, A R B / S E G 194, ff. 246-46V. T h i s fleet, as the Archduchess makes clear, was also to carry infantry reinforcements throughout this journey.

57

The first crisis

POLICYMAKING UNDER PRESSURE

The devastating exploits of the Flanders armada in 1625 provided a fitting culmination to what had already been a triumphant year for Spanish arms by land and sea. It was a veritable annus mirabilis for a society which expected and thrived on miracles, and the ostentatious procession of the court from palace to church to hear a TeDeum of thanks for the latest success became a routine sight for the citizens of Madrid and Brussels. If the Spanish System here reached its apogee - a conclusion which, given the extent of its global effusion of energies, is difficult to resist - then it follows inevitably that decline was contingent upon achievement.1 In the royal speech to the Cortes of Castile, meeting in 1626, Philip and Olivares once again deliberately chose to dwell longest and with the greatest ornament on their naval victories. Of course, this tactic had the benefit of bringing home to the restive delegates how the hard-won treasure and taxes of the kingdom has been effectively disbursed in their protection and the service of God. But enthusiasm was also inspired by the fact that the glories of his Armadas reflected the greatness of the royal person, and the wisdom and energy of his minister - in a word, that quality of reputation so germane to the exercise of authority. Philip boasted that 130 warships flew Spain's flag in the oceans of the world, whilst his enemies had neither captured nor sunk a single representative in over five years' campaigning. 'It is certain', added the King, 'that the war at sea has much advanced the reputation of Spain.'2 Sure enough, the cutlass of Spain's sailors had begun to sting her enemies as sharply as ever the dreaded pike of her infantrymen had done. The accomplished Spanish spy, Manuel Sueyro, sent a report from Zeeland that all over the island, and especially in the fishing ports, people were incensed at the destruction caused by the Dunkirkers, and wished to respond 'with blood and 1

2

General treatment of international events in these years is available in G. Parker et al., The Thirty Years'War (London, 1985), pp. 71-120. There is also a detailed study of Madrid's policy, devoted wholly to the period of the present chapter: R. Rodenas Vilar, Lapolitica europea deEspana durante la Guerra de los TreintaAnos (1624-30) (Madrid, 1967). To be precise, Philip gave the figure of 108 warships excluding the Dunkirk squadron; (ms. copy of royal address in BL/Eg. 338, ff. 136-5 iv. (at f. 145V.)).

58

Thefirstcrisis 53

fire . A year later, Cardinal de la Cueva, Philip's senior representative in the Brussels government, added that 'every day a greater fall in commerce is recorded, along with increases in taxes. It is said that the provinces of Holland and Zeeland each year have to service their war-debt to the tune of three million florins. Recently the latter estates sold off all their public property - actually the usurped patrimony of Your Majesty - in order to meet these commitments'.4 Isabel herself anticipated that the Dunkirkers would be able to cut off food supplies which the Republic imported from France, thus increasing popular pressure upon the Estates-General. Depression radiated from the matrix industry throughout the domestic economy. Indeed, majority feeling in the United Provinces — Zeeland apart - had already undergone a change of nuance, from the preponderance of revenge to that of conciliation.5 Meanwhile, the City of London was also suffering the full fury of the Dunkirkers. In the winter of 1625-6, dozens of English prizes were swept up by Flemish privateers operating in teams of two or three. Fishing and coastal trade was severely disrupted from Edinburgh to Falmouth. No effective defence was possible, not only because Charles I and Buckingham continued to think in terms of the offensive expedition (despite the experience of Cadiz), but because the English maritime world totally lacked the knowledge and resources to cope with the revolutionary weapon with which it was faced. The frigate had begun a five-year onslaught upon a virtually helpless enemy, in which 15-20 per cent of the British merchant marine was to be captured - at least 300 vessels.6 England's economy rapidly contracted as its staple export trades slumped. In outlying ports like Bristol and Yarmouth, unemployment and social distress aggravated the effects of the fiscal demands imposed by the government for the simultaneous wars with Spain and France. In London and Amsterdam, already wracked by epidemic plague visitations in this decade, complaints and objections swelled rapidly, effacing the choruses of approval which had earlier welcomed war with Spain.7 Of course, especially in its economic aspects, the privateer's cutlass was 3

Sueyro to Philip IV, 29 March 1626, AGS/E 2316. La Cueva to same, 8 July 1627, ibid. 2318. 5 Isabel to same, 12 Feb. 1628, ARB/SEG 198. ff. 74-74V. 6 On English losses, J. S. Kepler, 'The Value of Ships Gained and Lost by the English Shipping Industry During the Wars with Spain and France, 1624—1630', MM 59 (1973), pp. 218—30; and T. S. Willan, The English Coasting Trade, 1600-1750 (Manchester, 1938), pp. 25-30. On abortive English attempts to design and build a warship 'frigate fashion' to counter the Dunkirkers, see Anderson, Oared Sailing Ships, pp. 75-8, and A. Thrush, 'In Search of the Frigate, 1600-1640', forthcoming in Bulletin of the Institute ofHistorical Research for 1991. (I am grateful to Mr Thrush for letting me see a copy of his article prior to publication.) 7 In the summer of 1625, when Buckingham's army was being raised, 34,417 died of the plague in London alone. There were 35,000 such deaths in Amsterdam between 1622 and 1628. For England, B. Supple, Commercial Crisis and Change in England, i6og~42 (London, 1959), pp. 99—116; for the United Provinces, F. Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life 1400—1800 (London, 1973), p. 50. 4

59

The great offensive,

1621-1640

double-edged. As Francisco de Retama had warned a few years earlier, the effects of such a war were bound to cause material damage within the Monarchy too, and perhaps above all to the highly sensitive relationship between Spain and its 'obedient provinces'. The ban on traffic with the Dutch adversely affected both Flanders and Spain. Since the peninsula depended on supplies from northern Europe, Retama argued that the development of the Almirantazgo should include concessions to the business community in Flanders. In his view, given the right opportunities, the latter could even replace the Dutch as middlemen in the most important trades; at the same time he warned that, without them, the loyalty of the 'Spanish' Netherlanders was bound to undergo increasing strain.8 Retama's points were confirmed by Alberto Struzzi, the Italian arbitrista and engineer, now domiciled at Madrid after many years in Antwerp. Like his original patron Spinola, Struzzi understood and sympathised with the Belgian case. He warmly greeted the commercial prospects held out by the Seville-Dunkirk Almirantazgo, but warned of the disadvantages which the war had imposed on commerce in Brabant and Flanders. The Dutch still managed, via contraband and special licences, to trade in the Southern provinces, whilst Brabant and Flanders suffered severe shortages of consumables.9 Despite the contribution of the loyal Netherlanders to the winning of the war, few benefits seemed to accrue from the Almirantazgo's operation. As Retama and Struzzi feared, a groundswell of grievance built up, which the mission of the marquis of Leganes to the Netherlands in 1627 failed to disperse. Sent by his cousin, Olivares, to persuade the various provincial Estates to accept a version of the Union of Arms, Leganes' brief included no significant commercial inducements. 10 In fact, by this time Olivares was listening neither to Retama nor Struzzi. The design - sketched out some four years earlier - to project Spanish naval power into the Baltic, had advanced to dominate the count-duke's strategic thinking.11 8

9

10

11

Retama's 'Consideraciones en razon . . . ' (1623), printed in Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 480-90. A. Struzzi, Didlogo sobre el comercio destos Reynos (March, 1625), BL/Add. 6902, ff. 223-38. The King was impressed by Struzzi's analysis, but Olivares, who regarded him as an agent of Spinola, ignored it (information from M. A. Echevarria). See M. A. Echevarria, 'Estado moderno e integration polftico-economica: La union de armas en Flandes (1625-32)', in C. Cremades Grinan et al. (eds.), Estado y fiscalidad en el antiguo regimen (Murcia, 1989), pp. 381-92. The Baltic dimension of Olivares geopolitics has attracted considerable attention. See R. Rodenas Vilar, 'Un gran proyecto anti-holandes en tiempo de Felipe IV: La destruction del comercio rebelde en Europa', Hispania 22 (1962), pp. 542-58; Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 229-48; Rodenas Vilar, Lapolitica europea, pp. 73-131; Elliott, The Count-Duke, pp. 216-19 and 3 3 1 - 5 ; and M. Fraga Iribarne, Don Diego de Saavedray

Fajardoy la diplomdcia de su Epoca

(Madrid, 1956), whose lament for the 'lost peace' of the Habsburg family compact is echoed by E. Straub, Pax et Imperium: Spaniens Kampfum seine Friedensordnung in Europa zwischen 1617 und

1635 (Paderborn-Munich 1980), esp. pp. 288-314.

60

Thefirstcrisis The governing motive for this most grandiose of all Olivares' plans was his determination to bring the Austrian Habsburgs into the war against the Dutch. Only this, he believed, could guarantee a favourable conclusion to the war in the Low Countries, the consummation which lay at the basis of Olivares' political ambition. For some time, ministerial criticism of his policy had centred on his failure to secure Vienna's agreement on this crucial point, in spite of a huge Spanish subsidy of the war-effort in Germany. In extending joint operations to the Baltic, the nucleus of Dutch commercial power, the count-duke hoped that Wallenstein's imperialist army would capture a base for a permanent Habsburg naval presence. The immediate aim would be to destroy the Dutch-Swedish condominium in the Baltic, extending protection to the commerce of Poland, the local Catholic power, to the Hanse ports, anxious to fill the vacuum left by the promised retreat of the Dutch, and even to Denmark, lately humiliated in its attempt to espouse the Protestant cause. By the broader, more covert objective, the Emperor would be drawn into the struggle in the West; and the resources gained by Habsburg victory in Germany would be open to exploitation by Spain. In 1625 another huge arbitrio had been submitted by Antony Sherley. Lamenting the apparent loss of his favoured link with Denmark, Sherley reiterated (under no fewer than eighty-eight heads) that the only way to sabotage the anti-Habsburg alliance was to break into the Baltic. Spain still lacked sufficient naval power to confront her various enemies, yet it was imperative to wrest control of Europe's major trade-routes from them. Maritime war a Voutrance was the answer. Since, in his view, 'a beginning to this great work is urgently required', Sherley proposed a new fleet of seventy major warships (28,000 tons), costing well over a million ducats a year to maintain.12 Olivares' commitment to this new phase of strategy was also influenced by a fresh advice source, in the person of the Walloon projector, Gabriel de Roy, who coincided with Sherley on many points. Roy, who in 1623-5 had been sent amongst the business communities of southern Spain as a roving propagandist for the Almirantazgo, was also ambitious to become director of its operations in the northern states. He was a typical member of the 'second generation' of arbitristas del mar in the confident and ambitious tone of his nostrums. He strongly supported the 'offensive war at sea' - which, since the fall of Breda, had become official policy. Like Sherley, Roy proposed that raids on the fishing grounds should become an annual event, along with unrelenting pressure on Dutch convoys and ports. Unlike him, he argued for a specific strengthening of the Flanders armada, with twelve-fifteen units in each of the main Flanders ports (Dunkirk, Mardyck, Ostend and Nieuwpoort). If the enemy could be 12

'Discurso del Conde Don Antonio Xerley, sobre la liga que hicieron todos los Reyes y Potentados de la Europa, Asia, y Africa, contra la Monarquia de Espana; y en particular de las prevenciones de Armadas para su conservacion, y fomento del comercio. Fecha en Granada a 25 de Marzo de 1625', MN/Nav. 9, ff. 75-124. (See also Flores, Peso Politico, p. 33.)

61

The great offensive,

1621-1640

made to bleed enough, all the other maritime communities of the North Sea would turn upon him like sharks, 'some out of greed for their share of the booty, and others because there will be no other means of employment remaining'. The navy was Spain's only means of resisting such a powerful enemy; and it could damage him sufficiently to bring about the conditions for a favourable peace.13 Above all, Roy took Sherley's conviction that the Baltic states should be the major commercial partners of the Monarchy a stage further. He argued that the Baltic was the source of nearly all the strategic goods which Spain needed cereals, copper, the whole range of basic maritime stores - whilst the Spanish Netherlands offered little in the way of relevant indigenous resources. The argument that it was preferable to exercise a political control in situ rather than indirectly, and at a distance, was hard to answer; especially (perhaps) in the overcharged atmosphere of 1625-7, when almost anything seemed possible in Madrid. Roy dreamed of a network of Almirantazgo customs-offices in all the major German ports of the Baltic and North Sea, a project posited upon the capture of an appropriate naval base by Wallenstein's army. Their initial task would be to issue official licences and passports, enabling German shipowners to trade in peninsular and Mediterranean waters without molestation from Spain's customs-men or privateers. Later, the economic relationship between North and South would be built up, to the further detriment of the Low Countries' entrepot. The agents ofthe Almirantazgo would become the ambassadors of the Catholic King in a new world of his influence. Gabriel de Roy's was therefore a prominent voice in a bandwagon chorus to the effect that the armada of Flanders was to be regarded as the Monarchy's elite fighting unit this in a collection of armed forces which had now engrossed 300,000 combatants. 14 In July 1628, a further memorandum on naval strategy by the count-duke himself reflected both the experience of war in the North Sea and the thinking of his advisers. It is certain [stated Olivares] that to go on the defensive at sea would be the ruin of any state ... for who can doubt that if we continue to work along the present lines, cutting our enemies' links with their northern suppliers, their power will decline while that of Spain 13

14

See Israel, 'The Politics of International Trade Rivalry'. Much of this paragraph is based on a 'Discurso Sobre la Importancia de la Guerra Maritima de Olanda' P1626) in BL/Eg. 349, ff. 39-5 2v. Though the attribution derives from powers of deduction gained from knowledge of Professor Israel's monograph, there is a strong case from internal evidence that this arbitrio is the work of Gabriel de Roy. Roy's suggestion would have increased the unit-establishment of the armada fourfold. Besides the further contributions from Semple and Sherley in the middle 1620s, several other fresh voices supported the case for a major augmentation of the armada of Flanders. They included the businessman Manuel Lopez Pereira (1624, AGS/E 2308); the cronista of the Low Countries wars, Jean-Antoine Vincart (memo addressed to Leganes P1627], BL/Add. 14005, ff. 22-3); and two anonymous pieces dated 1628 in ibid. 14007, ff. 516-19. In the event, Spain offered a

62

Thefirstcrisis will increase? . . . Furthermore, if we can join hands with the Emperor at sea we will be able to interrupt the commerce of all those heretic powers of the North who have allied themselves over the years with the rebels - English, Danes, and even the Hanse towns. We will not dissolve this league until the arms of the Empire and Spain dominate the Baltic.15

These considerations were, for the most part, unwelcome to the burghers of Flanders. Apprehension was already growing amongst Antwerp capitalists that the Almirantazgo might open a door for the Hanse Towns, with their existing merchant marine, to undercut them in commercial privileges and provision of services in the Spanish System. Worried lest the efficient enforcement of an outright ban on business with the Dutch, which threatened many with ruin, would not be compensated by opportunities elsewhere - in the New World, for example - they began to lobby Brussels against it. They guessed that once the mechanisms of the Almirantazgo were operating, licences might be sold to individual Dutch firms to act as supply middlemen for the Spanish system on terms with which natives of the Obedient Provinces, many of whom had sacrificed livelihoods for the Crown on earlier occasions, would not be able to compete. For their part, the armateurs of Dunkirk and Ostend were discommoded at the provision of licences to neutrals which inhibited privateering. By 1629, Struzzi was by no means alone in having turned strongly against the Almirantazgo and the grand mercantilist thinking of Madrid. Many others feared that despite the sacrifices made on its behalf, the Obedient Provinces would be squeezed out of any share in the benefits of victory. Commercial discontent became part of the thickening fabric of grievance in Flanders. 16 Moreover, in the first instance, at least, the new naval force would be constituted by little more than the Flanders armada itself. It was being asked to break into the Baltic, and spearhead a fresh campaign which, though it might begin with raiding expeditions against the convoys, would sooner or later involve pitched battles with the Dutch and Swedish navies. The armada created by indigenous administrators, designers and shipwrights, and largely commanded and crewed by Flemish mariners, had already (by the spring of 1627) been on two long tours of duty in Spain. These absences were tolerable since, at worst, they ended with the ferrying of specie and other indispensable supplies into Dunkirk, and at best, could be regarded as the beginnings of the Almirantazgo trade. But the new role envisaged for it would virtually remove it from any meaningful relationship with its home bases. Little wonder that Isabel

15

16

down-payment of 200,000 escudos to assist the commissioning of an imperial Baltic fleet, (Aytona and Bruneau to Philip IV, 4 Feb. 1628, BN/2360, ff. 22-22V). 'Copia del papel del Conde Duque tocante la execuccion de las armas por mar deste ano data en 12 de Julio 628 afios', BN/2360, ff. 69-72. Echevarria, 'Una Original Contribution al Pensamiento Antimercantilista'.

63

The great offensive,

1621-1640

responded with barely disguised reluctance to the dramatic initiatives emanating from Madrid.17 Olivares schemed on, indifferent to such reservations. Pleased with the results of the onslaught on the herring-fleets, he also approved a joint operation by the Flemish and Cantabrian squadrons which would exceed the damage inflicted in 1625.18 At much the same time, he was trying to build on the prospects of an alliance with France, which had emerged out of Richelieu's defeat in Italy and negotiation of the pro-Spanish Treaty of Monzon (1626). He offered France the aid of the Spanish navy against the English attempts to succour the Huguenot stronghold of La Rochelle. Not long before, he had entertained plans for a simultaneous attack from Dunkirk and La Coruiia, landing troops in Scotland and Ireland (respectively) and knocking England out of the war.19 The salt had now entered his bloodstream, and, incongruously for a man who never went to sea in his whole mature life, his mind was clearly stimulated by the maritime dimension of his work. (Around this time - not merely since they were so apt to a vision of himself as the pilot of the ship of state - his very vocabulary became studded with nautical metaphors.20) But his geopolitical ambitions clearly necessitated an immediate and substantial improvement in the establishment of the Flanders armada. Ironically, they coalesced at a moment when financial and political conditions, both in Spain and Flanders, were becoming wholly inimical to such a move. At almost exactly the same time as a Junta de Estado in Madrid gave the prototype Baltic plans its 'enthusiastic approval' - November 1626 - another decision was made, which quietly opened the door to peace negotiations with the United Provinces. To focus even more sharply on the paradoxes of politics, this move was initiated when a Dutch boat came into Mardyck under flag of truce - just before the break-out of the Dunkirkers in October 1625 - in order to arrange an exchange of prisoners taken by both sides at sea. The Archduchess was careful not to suffocate early initiatives; to Madrid she made the apparently somewhat bizarre suggestion that the campaign at sea might be continued while a truce was arranged on land.21 Several Madrid ministers reacted with less equivocation, and by the summer of 1627, with the trumphalism of 1625 now somewhat faded, a majority in the full Council of State favoured a positive response to the Dutch. Though we cannot be sure of his innermost feelings at this juncture, it seems possible that Olivares himself, 17 18

19 20

21

See above, pp. 55, 60. M e m o of 5 July 1628, B N / 2 3 6 0 , f. 73. T h i s paper illustrates the C o u n t - D u k e ' s increasing mastery of the detail of maritime—strategic warfare. Alcala-Zamora, Espaiia, Flandes, pp. 2 2 3 - 8 . E.g. ' T h e sky and the earth have changed places' (1627 - a conceit first used by Cervantes about a storm at sea); 'I have quite lost my navigating aids — my quadrant and compass' (1629) and - a little later P1632) - 'I feel like a man condemned to the galleys'. Lemaire, Diaire, p. 6 3 ; Alcala-Zamora, Espaiia, Flandes, pp. 3 0 0 - 1 .

64

Thefirstcrisis convinced that the United Provinces were on their knees, and that their peace proposals would accurately reflect his victory, was by no means entirely antipathetic to this general opinion. At any rate, Isabel was instructed to begin highly secret discussions; these gradually turned into a kind of underground standing conference, which survived dramatic military vicissitudes, but without ever finding a basis for agreement, until 1633. 22 Despite all the political posturings, the demands of a rampant ideology and a military position which seemed tantamount to unassailable, Madrid therefore failed to react with horror at the thought of a negotiated settlement in the North. This is not surprising. Any number of naval victories, and the enthusiasm they engendered, did not alter the fact that the rebellion in the Netherlands could never actually be crushed by these methods; and that the renewal of war in 1621 was never expected to produce anything other than the desired 'paz honesta' that is, a fundamental improvement in the parameters of the Dutch-Spanish relationship established in 1609. But t n e decision to adhere strategically to the 'guerra por mar', retiring the army of Flanders into a purely defensive role, had not been inspired merely by the success of the former. The ten-month siege of Breda was recognised as involving an incommensurate expense of lives and resources, which aggravated the strain on the Treasury in Madrid. When it was accompanied by a multi-fronted (albeit ephemeral) emergency, like that which developed so suddenly in 1625 - bringing with it short-lived wars against Denmark, England and France - expenditure levels were simply insupportable. Opposition to Olivares's programme of fiscal reform was hardening in the Castilian localities, and in early 1627 the first bankruptcy of the reign was forced upon him.23 Olivares was able to exploit the opportunities this manoeuvre offered in order to remodel the financial structure of defence policy. But the concomitant crisis inevitably meant prolonged interruption in the supply of subsidies and materials to the northern front. As early as August 1625, Isabel, arriving at Dunkirk for her victorious tour of duty, was greeted by a complaint from the armada skippers that they and their crews had been deprived of wages for the past two years.24 Most available resources were diverted by Spinola for the furtherance of the Breda campaign, while their own chief officers, and the land-based officials of the Almirantazgo in Winoksberg had (apparently) taken first bite of what remained. From this point on, Madrid struggled in vain to return the flow of subsidies to the strength previously achieved. Indeed, the second half of the decade was dominated by a series of harsh cutbacks in supply which slowed down and eventually disabled the Spanish war-machine. For no sooner had some equilibrium been restored to financial 22 23 24

Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 2 2 3 - 4 9 . See Elliott, The Count-Duke, pp. 2 9 5 ^ , on the development of the crisis after 1626. Lemaire, Diaire, p . 6 0 .

65

The great offensive, 1621—1640 allocations, than the war over the Mantuan succession (1628-31) subjected Hacienda to a spiralling sequence of extra expenses. The full gravity of this commitment was revealing itself to Madrid at the end of 1628, when the interception and pillage of the returning silver-fleet in Matanzas de Cuba by the Dutch admiral Piet Hejn, with the estimated loss of some 4,000,000 ducats' worth of specie, threw the asientos into confusion. During 1629, Flanders was almost ignored and the whole war-theatre was obliged to make do with the occasional scraps of subsidy which the government could manage to raise and deliver.25 The Spanish System had blundered into the most punishing of its periodic crises. Within the raging of this general storm, the government of Flanders suffered profound damage. As so often at these testing moments, the leadership was found to be wanting. Olivares was slow to realise - perhaps not surprisingly in view of the appetite for affairs she had displayed as recently as her sixtieth birthday in 1625 - that la serenissima infanta, the last surviving child of Philip II, was ageing and ailing. Her supervision of government deteriorated steadily following the culmination of 1625, and with her mainstay, Spinola, so often away from her side in the field of command, Brussels drifted into purposeless torpor. All three of the troika of command - the third personality being Cardinal de la Cueva - shewed signs that they were no longer able to exert the necessary influence amongst the ruling classes of the provinces. This situation was aggravated by the fact that Olivares had lost confidence in Spinola himself, a feeling induced by the marquis's quasi-insubordinate obstinacy over the Breda campaign, and compounded by his subsequent pessimism over the war.26 Late in 1627, Spinola was given permission to visit Madrid on extended leave from his posts in Flanders. Though initially reluctant to contemplate this development, Olivares had perhaps recognised that the time had come to replace the captain-general with a younger and more pliable figure - some ambitious olivarista amongst the native aristocracy or the high command of the army of Flanders. Had he foreseen that the marquis would pose a far greater problem to him in Madrid than he had in Flanders, his caution might have persisted. The main object - or ostensibly the main object - of Spinola's journey was a mission to persuade King and government to end the war in the Netherlands. Not only was he able to bear indubitable witness to the exhaustion of the armed forces, the marquis was also qualified to make the case for the socio-economic wellbeing of the community he had helped to govern for a 25

26

See (e.g.) consulta of the Council of the Indies, 6 Sept. 1629, reluctantly granting Philip's request to provide help from confiscated private silver for the emergency in Flanders - but only to the thin tune of 30,000 ducats (BL/Add. 36322, f. 72). On the crisis of 1627-30 in general, Domfnguez Ortiz, Politicay Hacienda, pp. 3 5 - 4 2 . A recent analysis of the new financial dispensation is N . Broens, Monarquia y Capital Mercantil: Felipe IVy las Redes Comerciales Portugueses (1627-1635) (Madrid, 1989). Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 253-55.

66

Thefirstcrisis quarter-century. But Spinola had a personal interest in peace and retrenchment. Disturbed by the effects of the 1627 decree of suspension, which had badly damaged some Genoese colleagues, he was determined upon the recovery of the enormous debt owed by the Crown to the banking house in which he was the senior partner. Spinola's eighteen months at the court of Madrid (February 1628 - J u l y 1629) constitutes one of the most fascinating episodes in the history of Spain as a great power.27 On arrival, he wasted no time in recommending immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Italy, and initiated a major debate in the council over negotiations with the Dutch. Less publicly, so to speak, his agents submitted his demand for financial settlement to the officials of the Consejo de Hacienda. Olivares was forced to give ground, not only on the Low Countries issue, where his convictions contradicted Spinola's, but even in the most sacrosanct area of his power - his exclusive influence with the king.28 In this period, criticism of the valido, both inside and outside government, reached a crescendo. At home, the people of Castile were enduring one of the worst subsistence crises of the century, while abroad the prospect of defeat loomed everywhere. Whilst Spinola forced Olivares onto the defensive in the Council of State, creating the political conditions in which his authority might be challenged elsewhere in the complex of government, the latter still controlled reserves of patronage and power built up during the previous decade. The main engine of his power was Hacienda, which he had transformed almost into a personal fiefdom; this he used to manoeuvre against his rival. Alerted by informants and complainants, the count-duke had come to suspect that serious problems existed deep within the military (and perhaps also the civilian) administration of Flanders. A few months after the marquis's arrival in Madrid, he despatched a team headed by two assiduous accountants to conduct a full official investigation in Brussels. INVESTIGATION AND REFORM

Juan Muiioz de Escobar and Felipe de Porres went to Flanders in July 1628 to conduct what was known in the parlance of Spanish bureaucracy as a visita — an 'official enquiry' into the running of the Spanish military apparatus.29 It may have been genuinely suspected that recent problems of supply had been aggravated by longer-term inefficiency, or even corruption. Depending on their gravity, the failings of subordinates might well reflect on the integrity of the captain-general, Spinola himself. Olivares was now aware of the marquis's 27

28

29

See A. Rodriguez Villa, Ambrosio Spinola, primer marques de los Balbases (Madrid, 1904), pp. 572ff.; and Elliott, The Count-Duke, pp. 3 4 6 - 5 8 . R. A. Stradling, Philip IV and the Government of Spain, 1621-65 (Cambridge, 1988), p p . 7 0 - 7 2 and 90-100. La Cueva acknowledged the arrival of the commissioners on 7 July 1628, ( A G S / E 2318).

67

The great offensive, 1621-1640 demand for full settlement of his 'private' debt. This had accrued over the years into an enormous sum. The marquis' determination to obtain full settlement at this point - previously even interest had been rarely demanded - represented a serious embarrassment. In addition, however, Olivares had a particular reason to feel that Spinola may have been in financial straits. The marquis had recently been obliged to provide a dowry settlement for the count-duke's cousin, Leganes, who had become his son-in-law. It seems not wholly unlikely that Olivares secretly hoped to uncover evidence associating his new kinsman with the crisis in Flanders in a manner which would undermine his reputation at court. Since the fall of Breda, Spinola had set up his main headquarters at Dunkirk.30 This was (of course) perfectly consistent with his post as captaingeneral of the armada, especially in the context of the now-established priority of naval operations; and it also enabled him to communicate more expeditiously with Madrid. In addition, however, the marquis was bound to have an increasing interest in the armada, since prize-lists were growing by the month, and, as supreme commander, he was due a tenth of all prizemonies, in addition to his salary and perquisites.31 During 1626 the seat of the Admiralty was moved back to Dunkirk, quitting Winoksberg, which had reneged on the conditions agreed for its maintenance. Revised regulations, along with some personnel changes (especially to the Prize Tribunal), were decreed in November 1626. For a time, this ameliorated complaints from shipowners and sailors, who felt themselves defrauded by officials to whom access was often difficult.32 The problems within the Admiralty were indeed two-dimensional. The lack of funds had been chronic for years before it became acute; it was compounded by the inadequacy of key Spanish personnel. Spinola had already attempted to clear up administrative confusion and other difficulties caused by the transfer from Winoksberg. In autumn 1626, he paid the royal crews their share of prizemonies, in addition to wages outstanding.33 At the end of the year, however, he complained that the general financial provision from Madrid had fallen more than a million ducats - or some thirty per cent - short of target. The army-based officials who managed the money were in a position to ensure that the terrestrial establishment suffered less than the maritime. Moreover, Spinola himself, in reporting that his intervention had restored matters, admitted that problems had been exacerbated by a lack of intelligence amongst the admiralty staff'.34 30 31 32 33 34

Rodriguez Villa, Spinola, p . 4 5 1 . O n the administration and regulation of prizetaking, see below, pp. 204-10. Bolsee, Inventaire, pp. 162-4. Spinola to Philip IV, 15 Nov. 1626, printed by Rodriguez Villa, Spinola, p . 452. Same to same, 24 Dec. 1626, ibid., p . 456. By the following March nothing had arrived, so that 600,000 escudos were missing since the turn of the year, and Antwerp bankers were clamouring

68

Thefirstcrisis Dissatisfaction with admiralty officials was apparently justified. In 1625, Isabel's chaplain, Philippe Chifflet, noted that the grievances of sailors arose from 'la mechancete de PAdmiral et du Veedor'.35 It was perhaps significant that the latter, Vicente de Ancionado, held the office of contador in plurality. For some time, the inspectorship had been exercised by a deputy, Alonso de Uribarri - though Ancionado continued to draw two full salaries.36 In addition, the operational commander of the Dunkirk squadron, Don Fermin de Lodosa, was a disappointment. His fighting record had been unimpressive even before October 1625, when he refused to sail with his men, claiming that his capitana was badly prepared for action. This caused a scandal, particularly as Isabel had recently been obliged to appoint poorly-qualified Spaniards to the commands of two warships, in view of the embarrassing fact that all the existing skippers were Flemish. Subsequently, Don Fermin's was the only ship to remain at anchor during the glorious voyages. Accusations of cowardice inevitably followed. Some time in 1626, Lodosa was officially placed hors de combat, and demoted to command of the Antwerp squadron patrolling the Scheldt.37 As we have seen, the overall provisions for the armada were subsumed in the general accounts of the army. Nonetheless, the Admiralty had its own collector of prizemoney (the depositario, Luis de Luyando), and audit accountants had been appointed in 1621. The pagador general, Tomas Lopez de Ulloa, was a man of unimpeachable integrity. The investigation was nevertheless prolonged. Not until the commissioners were finished with the central army records in Brussels, after well over a year's work, were they ready to move on to Dunkirk. They came armed with figures provided by Ulloa, from his own and his predecessor's records, concerning sums made over for the expenses of the armada. Along with the papers of Luyando - minutely scrutinised, particularly in respect of

35 36

37

for nearly three-quarters of a million, outstanding in service instalments, (same to Olivares, 7 March 1627, B N / 2 3 5 9 f. 71). Spinola's figures are corroborated by those given in Parker,y4rwy of Flanders, p p . 2 9 4 - 5 . A corruption case against retired officials of the old Admiralty of Flanders had been resolved in 1624. Although the amounts concerned proved to be relatively trivial, this may have predisposed the government to suspect that similar misdemeanours were current in the successor institution (see below, pp. 188-91). Lemaire, Diaire, p . 66. ' D e la orden que el Snr Marques Espinola . . . dio del sueldo ... al Proveedor . . . ' 4 D e c . 1627, A G S / E 3860. As we have seen, Spinola tried to 'unload' Ancionado back to Spain - partly no doubt to save on his salaries. Lemaire, Diaire, pp. 95 and 99. Certificate of 1636, ARB/Priv. 1108, and accounts of 1638, ibid., S E G 9obis, f. 248. Lodosa's excuse rings false, since Isabel and Spinola had personally supervised preparation of the royal ships, and they would surely have been especially solicitous over the flagship of the Spanish commander. (Rubens, present in Dunkirk with the court, was particularly impressed with the armada's readiness ('vaisseaux magnifiques', ibid., p . 7 7 - 8 ) . T h e admiral's attitude was surely dictated by the n u m b e r of enemy sails visible on the horizon throughout the summer. It is possible that he argued against the whole enterprise on the (respectable) grounds that many irreplaceable ships and men would be destroyed. O n balance, however, Lodosa seems to represent a more clear-cut instance of insubordination and cowardice than two more notorious cases which arose in the Navy - Fadrique de Toledo and J u a n de Benavides, who suffered disgrace and death for their (alleged) failings.

69

The great offensive, 1621-1640 payments made to the captain-general from royal prizemoney - we may be sure that Ancionado himself was also audited. In the event, no evidence of peculation was found against any of the serving officers of Flanders. Indeed, it seems that Urizar and others strongly supported the commission. They complained that a great proportion of the armada's funds were wasted on superfluous salaries. As a result of this and other deficiencies, the armada had been unable to engage in serious operations for over a year.38 A year earlier, Isabel had warned that unless fresh subsidies arrived the royal ships would be completely confined to harbour, 'and nothing will be achieved save the undoing of this armada, which would be a pitiful fate when we consider the number of defeats which it has inflicted upon our enemies'.39 Unpaid sailors deserted in droves, many in order to sail with the privateers, whose numbers continued to expand. Between November 1628 and April 1629, the new admiral, Francisco de Ribera, lost nearly 800 men (two-thirds of his crews) in this way.40 The King's order that all royal prizemonies, including the royal third, should (for the time being) be devoted solely to the payment of sailors, was futile.41 The fact was that without payments there were no sailors, and hence no prizes. The marquis of Aytona, whom Olivares had moved from his post in Vienna in order to replace de la Cueva, quickly reached this conclusion: 'Unless money is rapidly provided - and the sailors and officials alone are owed 200,000 escudos - His Majesty might as well let the privateers have the use of his ships, for at least in this way they will be deployed against the enemy'.42 Only a major financial injection could redeem the situation. In effect, whatever Olivares' intentions over the visita, no convincing excuses were found for placing the fault for the crisis anywhere but at the doors of bad financial foresight and flawed contingency planning by his own ministry. Thankfully for the valido, relief was at hand. By late 1629, the silver-fleet having arrived safely with an unusually large consignment, the negotiation of a fresh round of asientos de dinero could be engaged upon with renewed confidence. Frantic arrangements with the bankers allowed the government to plug the gaps in provisions which had opened up all over the Spanish System.43 Emergency attention to the navy was, at this juncture, if anything more press38

39 40 41 42 43

T h e commissioners certified to Ulloa's diligence on 15 F e b . 1629, A G S / E 2044. For their scrupulous examination of Luyando's accounts, see the latter's tanteo in ibid., C M C 3a 1786 N o . 9. M u c h of their material, including figures for the general accounts of Flanders, and two reports by the senior auditor, M u n o z de Escobar, can be found in this legajo and E 2043. T h e King, who had reduced Urizar's own salary by half because of the treasury's findings against him, cancelled his fine as a reward (merced) for his services; 'Decreto de causa de Urtuno de Urizar', August 1630, A G S / C M C 3724 N o . 14. Further analysis of the reform of 1630 and the general finances of the armada appears below, pp. 190-1 and 2 0 0 - 1 . Isabel to Philip IV, 21 D e c . 1628, A G S / E 2043, f. 233 (see also f. 249). Ribera and Uribarri to Pedro de San Juan, 13 April 1629, ibid., ff. 333-4Philip to Isabel, 5 July 1629, A R B / S E G 2 0 1 , f. 4 8 . Aytona to Olivares 23 Jan. 1630 (conciliar abstract), A G S / E 2044. Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 2 5 2 - 3 .

70

Thefirstcrisis ingly dictated by the crisis in the Atlantic than by that in Flanders. In the immediate aftermath of Matanzas, the Consejo de Indias was inclined to credit every rumour of fresh Dutch activity, and the fleet prepared for the outward voyage of the carrera in August 1629 was suitably impressive, massing no less than 770 guns and over 7,000 men on board its thirty-six galleons.44 On the other hand, this effort, and that involved in the Mantuan War, between them brought about the indefinite postponement of the Baltic enterprise. At the same time, Spain increased its attempts to extract acceptable terms from the Dutch in the ongoing peace talks. In 1629, however, the Dutch launched the greatest military offensive of the war and the fall of's Hertogenbosch heralded a series of Spanish defeats. This precipitated the political crisis in the Southern Netherlands which had been brewing for several years.45 But Olivares, whatever the passing contingencies in which he found himself, was never the man to accept any negotiation other than one based upon strength. He set himself to restore the situation in the Low Countries, and with it the fortunes of the armada. During the course of 1630, a sequence of reports went up to the Council of State arising from the commission's work. Munoz de Escobar established that since its inception the Flanders Admiralty had accumulated a crippling burden of debt. Partly because of servicing loans, the running costs of the fleet had for some years been nearer 25,000 escudos per month than the 20,000 officially budgeted. It was accepted that the armada was an indispensable fighting force, which, once refuelled and restarted, would make increasing contributions to its own upkeep. The new subsidy was to be fixed at an annual rate of 300,000 escudos.*6 Perhaps it was no accident that all this bore out the count-duke's earlier eagerness to reinforce the armada of Flanders. But it was also supported in detail by Pieter Opmeer, the representative of the Antwerp financial community on the Archduchess's council. Not surprisingly, Opmeer stressed the prior importance of settling the Admiralty's debt, Tor without this precaution there will be no prospect of raising further credit, its backers having long since lost any belief in the promises they are always given'. Next in importance, he felt, was to make the fleet pay for itself through its privateering role. Finally, the size of the fleet must pose the Dutch a convincing threat of the complete destruction of their trade and fisheries, which might be unleashed at will by Spain. This would 44

45 46

' L a Armada Real del M a r Oceano que este ano se a puesto en Cadiz y salio para las indias . . . ' , Aug. 1629, B N / 1 8 1 7 5 , f. 226. F o r a detailed account of this force and the post-Matanzas recovery, see Rahn Phillips, Six Galleons, pp. i8iff. Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. i74ff. See the 'Primera' and (especially) the 'Tercera relation de Juan Munoz de Escobar sobre las cosas de Flandes'; and Olivares' note 'Juan Munoz de Escobar tendra los papeles lo que toca a la reformaciones y economia de Flandes', A G S / E 2044. 71

The great offensive, 1621-1640 persuade them that they would either have to buy off the privateers, or come to the negotiating table in the right frame of mind.47 Throughout the discussions of 1630, almost unanimous support for the armada of Flanders was expressed in the Council of State. Members' contributions frequently reflected a familiarity with maritime strategy, doubtless gained from the plethora of arbitrios del mar which had been circulated amongst them for a decade or more, and a pragmatic recognition that the sea had now replaced the land as the main medium of the war-effort. Indeed, even a distinguished veteran of the army like the marquis of Gelves was persistent in his advocacy, on several occasions elaborating the opinion that every escudo spent on the armada of Flanders was worth ten devoted to its tercios; not only in respect of the damage that it could do, but because of the returns it was capable of paying on royal investment.48 He seconded the suggestion that Aytona should replace Spinola pro tempore as the fleet's captain-general, as well as de la Cueva in a political capacity. But he added that what we really need is some fresh authority ['presencia'] which in so many similar cases has been the essential element of revival. It is immensely difficult to run the war in Dunkirk, Ostend and Nieuwpoort from a base in Brussels, and the situation demands someone on the spot who knows the people involved in the fleet and can deal with its problems as they arise. It will be necessary too for the man who ultimately takes charge of the armada to sail with the ships himself at times, to show example and impose discipline. It seems to me that His Majesty should occupy himself with the problem of selecting someone of standing and experience for this post.49 Following an official request from Isabel, Philip granted in principle the point of separate budgeting, and an extra contribution of 50,000 escudos to help pay off the debt. He informed his aunt of his willingness 'not merely to preserve the armada in those states, but to increase it to the greatest size possible'.50 For all this, the provisions came with strings attached. Strict conditions were laid down to improve financial efficiency and military performance.51 Furthermore, from the Admiralty's viewpoint, the net improvement was more apparent than real. When the consistent shortfalls of subsidy from Madrid, which had bedevilled the whole project from its inception, are taken into account, the increases of 1630 may be looked upon as merely a re-implementation of the budgetary 47 'Sobre los medios de poder aderezar y acrecentar la Armada de Dunquerque' P1629), MN/Nav. 48

8, ff. 167-8V. See the consultas of the Council of State for 23 Feb., 4 April, 26 May and 31 D e c . 1630, A G S / E

204449

50 51

Consulta of Council of State, 17 Jan. 1630, ibid. Gelves' references to 'la presencia' may have been an oblique attempt to support the King's desire to serve at the head of his troops, made known to his ministers in 1629. Olivares, who strongly opposed the idea, was missing from most of these meetings - though of course he convened regular (and generally more important) juntas apart from them. Philip IV to Isabel, 15 Jan. 1631, A R B / S E G 204, f. 2 1 . For details of the reforms, see below, pp. i84ff.

72

Thefirstcrisis parameters of 1621. Again, as in the mid-1620s, a dichotomy is evident between the grand assertions made in speeches and committees, and the government's willingness to contract commensurate expenses. In view of the recognition that the armada de Dunquerque was the Monarchy's elite corps, the funding actually provided for it was hardly impressive. The asiento for Flanders in 1630 was 3 million ducats, and that for 1631 nearer four. At only 10 per cent of this total, the armada's share was no better than it had been five or six years earlier.52 By 1631 the storm, if not exactly weathered, had at least been contained. A new domestic fiscal programme was now in hand, to support the momentous financial breakthrough Olivares had achieved by the recruitment of the Portuguese banking houses to the Monarchy's cause. A new generation of asentistas de dinero were called upon to provide a much greater budget, as the count-duke prepared for a great confrontation with France, and planned to involve the King's brothers, Don Carlos and Don Fernando, in the overall direction of the war-effort.53 The latter was to go to Flanders as captain-general of the army, and successor-in-waiting to the Archduchess. The elder, Don Carlos, was appointed viceroy in Portugal, with the additional responsibility oVGeneralisimo del Mar . . . to give new vigour to my maritime forces, preparing them for such victories as will oblige our enemies to sue for the peace which we so desire'. 54 AGAINST ALL FLAGS

As the second quinquennium of its active service began in 1626, the armada was established at an optimum of twelve warships. This was the standard set in 1621, and fell significantly short of the numbers of units implied as necessary by Madrid's more recent recognition of the priority of 'guerra ofensiva por mar'. 55 But all save two or three of these ships were modern, recently-constructed frigates, manned by crews experienced in campaigning in the most difficult waters in the world, and grown used to success. Early in that year, the Spanish admiral Francisco de Ribera, who had gained renown in the Mediterranean, was appointed to succeed Lodosa in command.56 52

53

54

55 56

In 1629/30 Madrid was looking to cut back rather than increase commitments in Flanders. Olivares' reference to 'reformaciones y economia' (see above, no. 46) indicates this phase of thinking. It is difficult to agree with Alcala-Zamora that the decisions of 1630 in themselves constituted a 'financial injection' for the armada (Espana, Flandes, pp. 3 2 5 - 8 ) . In 1631, however, large increases were planned in association with the appointment of the Cardinal-Infante as governor, (see below, pp. 93ff. and 201). J. C . Boyajian, Portuguese Bankers at the Court of Spain, 1626-1650 (New Brunswick, 1983), esp. pp. 7 1 - 1 0 2 , and Elliott, The Count-Duke, pp. 457ff. Royal decree of 7 April 1631, B N / 2 3 6 3 , f. 35. T h e prince died before he could take up these appointments. See Appendix 7, p . 252. T h e adventurer Alonso Contreras, often cynical about fellow officers, recorded a generous testament to Ribera's abilities (see The Life of Captain Alonso de Contreras, Knight of the Military

73

The great offensive, 1621-1640 Furthermore, the ships of Adriaan van der Walle - by now only twelve of the eighteen he originally chartered to the King - were, broadly speaking, operating as part of the royal fleet. They were commanded by the courageous and resourceful Flemish aristocrat, the count of Waecken, accepted Spinola's orders as to their general strategic comportment, but were not normally subject to those of Ribera. Generally referred to as the 'squadron of Ostend', Waecken's ships usually sailed independently of the armada proper, though individual skippers could be seconded to assist the latter. The cost of their maintenance had to be found by the pagaduria in Brussels. Undoubtedly, however, the ability to exploit these useful auxiliaries was one reason why Madrid fell into a certain complacency regarding the overall supply needs of the maritime war-effort in Flanders, a mistake for which the price was paid later in the decade. For the moment, however, the prospects were bright. Attacks on Spain by both France and England in 1625 - the latter developing into full-scale war opened up rich extra sources of plunder. At first, Isabel was frustrated by her armada's absence, on its first wintering voyage to Spain. She was unable to exploit to the full the weakness of the enemies' merchant marines following their huge naval losses of 1625. 57 Shortly after Ribera arrived in Dunkirk, with the bulk of his command, in May 1626, Spinola pressured him to 'get to sea with as many ships as you can muster. Leave the provision of money to me, and I will make sure that all is supplied and satisfied'.58 Though precise documentary confirmation is lacking, it seems likely that at least as many prizes were taken by the armada in 1626 as were netted in the following year - that is to say nearer fifty than forty. During the summer, stated Isabel, many prizes have been made, and other enemy vessels sent to the bottom by Your Majesty's warships and the privateers, and as I write they are at sea wreaking more havoc. Their effect has been so remarkable that the Dutch blockading squadron has been forced to leave its station, and has sailed to reinforce the fishing fleet guard, in fear of another onslaught.59 In fact, a raid on the fishing-grounds had already taken place in September, though on a considerably smaller scale than the year before, five raiders sinking eighteen trawler victims. The agent van Male reported (meanwhile) that the English 'gnashed their teeth together when they heard mention of Mardyck or Dunkirk', and Brussels boasted that English trade was utterly disrupted, with prices rocketing in London. 60 57 58 59 60

Order of St John, Native of Madrid, Written by Himself (1582 to 1633) (London, 1926), pp. 219-20.) Isabel to Philip IV, 21 April 1626, A R B / S E G 194, ff. 246-6V. Spinola to Ribera, 24 May 1626, ARB/Div. 3782. Isabel to Philip IV, 14 Oct. 1626, A R B / S E G 191, f. 2 0 1 . Israel, The Dutch Republic, p . 191; Rodriguez Villa, Spinola, p p . 4 5 3 - 4 ; Reade, Sidelights 11, pp. 464 and 604.

74

Thefirstcrisis Following negotiations with Madrid, Spinola and his mistress were able to retain some vessels of the armada at Dunkirk for most of the autumn and winter of 1626-7, which delighted them since these months were undoubtedly the more favourable to commerce-raiding. For one thing, weather conditions made it impossible for the Dutch to maintain a blockade, imposing a close season of between six and seven months - which they were more solicitous in observing following the experience of 1625. These same conditions - sea-mists, stronger tides and more variable winds - encouraged the Flemish raiders to sally forth. 'It is important always to have some ships at sea', the marquis reminded Ribera in December 1626, 'but above all whilst the long nights persist, for then it is that you can more easily slip in and out of any harbour.' 61 Such opportunities beckoned that the new Admiralty Board decided to purchase appropriate prize vessels at the regular auctions, and equip them for privateering.62 Spinola knew that the Dunkirkers were capable of evading even the constantly widening net of Dutch blockaders and patrol squadrons. By the spring of 1627, a (rough) total of thirty armada ships were distributed around the waters and ports of the North Sea, the Channel and Biscay. Spinola reported that he was coping with the perennial problem of providing artillery for his ships, but the shortage of good mariners had become acute. On the feast of the Annunciation, chosen by the Jesuit chaplains of the fleet as most appropriate, Michael Jacobsen embarked for Pasajes in Guipuzcoa with a squadron of eleven. His crews were under strength, and the marquis begged Philip IV to make them up with sturdy Basque fishermen.63 Jacobsen was en route to a new target, the fishing grounds off Greenland, which - despite the distances involved - were favoured by English as well as Dutch trawler fleets for their plentiful rewards. After recuperating in Spain, Jacobsen arrived at his destination in May and despatched around fifty boats to the bottom. At the end of an expedition lasting six months, he returned to Dunkirk, following the northward route around the British Isles.64 In order to avoid the blockade fleet, the same route was taken by a convoy, protected by Dunkirkers, which left Spain in late summer and sighted one of the largest Dutch fishing fleets off the Shetlands. The guarding squadron of seven warships was worsted and driven off after losing three of their number, and at least eleven buizen failed to make good their escape during the battle.65 By the end of the year (1627), the armada alone had sunk sixty-eight victims, in addition to forty-five captured intact; even more remarkable was their record of 61 62 63

64

65

Spinola to Ribera, 26 Dec. 1626, ARB/Div. 3782. Same to Philip IV, 15 Nov 1627, Rodriguez Villa, Spinola, p . 452. Same to same, 17 April 1627, A G S / E 2318. If they were not available in northern Spain, the marquis recommended obtaining sailors from Genoa, his home town. Philip to Isabel, 11 F e b . 1627, A R B / S E G 196, ff. 1 3 1 - i v . See also Hambye, UAumonerie, pp. 2 3 - 4 . Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 192.

75

The great offensive, 1621-1640 not losing a ship to enemy action, since all these expeditions were able to drop anchor unscathed somewhere in the Flemish port complex.66 Little wonder that Isabel, who had earlier pointed to the potential advantages of the clockwise route around Britain, entreated her nephew not to alter the tactics of a winning team: 'when things are going well, Your Majesty would be unwise to make alterations, for by doing so one can only lose and never gain5.67 Doubtless this plea was motivated by signals from Madrid that exactly such a change was imminent. Olivares' geopolitics implied the involvement of the Flanders Admiralty in several new roles, all of which contradicted the Archduchess' inclinations. The most ephemeral of these was the plan to effect a jointure of the armadas of Flanders and the Ocean Sea in order to assist the French in 1627. The former had hardly furled its sails in Dunkirk when Olivares, sensing the opportunity for an epoch-making diplomatic revolution, pressed it into service to intercept English reinforcements to the island of Rhe, where a landing force was attempting to succour the Huguenot-Rochellois rebellion. In the event, procrastination by Ribera in Dunkirk, and sluggish obedience by Fadrique de Toledo in Spain allowed this matchless moment - if such indeed it was - to pass. By the time the Spanish fleets achieved a rendezvous in November, the English expedition had already been seen off by Louis XHPs defences.68 Brussels may have breathed a sigh of relief that its cherished navy had not been forced into a bruising engagement, but the tame conclusion of this episode exposed it to a more serious danger still. As we have seen, the most serious threat to the independent (or semiindependent) existence of the Flanders armada was the extension of the maritime offensive into the fresh theatre of the Baltic. Over the period which had elapsed since their first mooting, these plans seemed to augment inexorably. In the spring of 1628, word came from Wallenstein's camp that he needed naval help to make certain of capturing Wismar or Stralsund. Isabel was accordingly warned to prepare the armada for long-distance action. Without actually rejecting these orders, she submitted a list of reasons for inaction: and she did not need to think hard or look far. Leaving aside the problem of finding Baltic 66

67 68

See Appendix 10, p . 255. It seems to me that the numbers often given in contemporary accounts for destructions must include at least a proportion of captures. T h e ratio of participants to victims given is nearly always the same, about 1:4 or 1:5. But it was not only difficult and expensive, but also unnecessary, to sink such defenceless hulks at point-blank range with cannon-shot. Many D u t c h buizen were substantial craft, sturdily built for their testing trade, albeit slow in the water. T h e majority, therefore, must have been boarded and fired a n d / o r stoved-in. C a n one attacker even our young athletic frigates - have had time to see off four or five victims in these conditions? Nonetheless, where evidence exists on the other side, it corroborates the Spanish claims. Isabel to Philip IV, 17 April 1627, A R B / S E G 197, ff. 317-18V. F o r differing views on this incident and Olivares' policies towards France see Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 226-7; Rodenas Vilar, Politica europea, pp. 102-8; Straub, Pax et Imperium, pp. 271-85. Just before Fadrique sailed from La Coruna, his veedores protested that the fleet was desperately short of supplies; see the 'relaciones' of Domingo de Hallana and Diego Portillo in AGS/E K1435 Nos. 114-15.

76

Thefirstcrisis pilots (a rare fish out of Dutch and Scandinavian waters), sufficient money and materials were simply not available to prepare her fleet for such a hazardous voyage.69 Nevertheless, Olivares, at Gabriel de Roy's suggestion, ordered Isabel to examine the prospects of capturing an island off the Danish coast as a point d'appui for an attack upon the Sound. She dutifully submitted a favourable survey report early in 1629.70 By then, however, Wallenstein was in full retreat; and, in any case, Matanzas and the Mantuan emergency had put paid to serious thoughts of sending the Flanders armada northwards. The last project, which ultimately supervened the others, at least had the merit of providing a service for the Southern Netherlands themselves. As part of his response to the civil and military crisis in Flanders, the count-duke sought to promote the armada's convoying role into a priority strategic function. Of course, the shipping of troops from the peninsula to Flanders was not a new tactic in itself. Ever since the beginning of the wars in the Netherlands, Spain had supplied the army of Flanders with reinforcements via the channel route, in parallel with the celebrated 'Spanish Road5 prospected by the duke of Alba in 1567. The sea-route had the advantage of being much more expeditious. The Spanish historian Alcala-Zamora has calculated that the average convoy's rate of progress from La Corufia, Santander or San Sebastian to Dunkirk was about 200 kilometres a day, compared to about twenty-three on the road from Milan to Brussels. Though sea-transport was expensive, savings of time brought hidden economies of all kinds in details of supply, as well as improving the chances of military success in general.71 The disadvantages were mainly those of security. Once clear of the Valtelline pass, the tercios tramped in relative safety through a corridor which was wide and well-insulated against enemies. In contrast the convoys, once clear of tempestuous Biscay, sailed past the open mouths of the enemies' ports, if not quite under their guns, and through narrow channels infested (especially after 1625) with hostile warships. Before 1609, therefore, only a small proportion of recruits were transported to the Netherlands in this way. Even after 1621 the bias altered slowly, but it was to swing rapidly and progressively in favour of sea-transport during the 1630s, for a mixture of positive and negative reasons. The new phase began in 1631. During the summer nearly 12,000 men were laboriously transferred from the Italian front via the Alsace route. Concurrently, 69 70 71

Isabel to Philip IV, 31 May 1628, A R B / S E G 198, f. 268. Same to same, 6 Jan. 1629, ibid. 200, ff. 7-7V. Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 94-6, and Razon y crisis de la politica exterior de Espana en el reinado de Felipe IV (Madrid, 1977), pp. 23-4. Of course, the distance from northern Spain to Dunkirk was longer, even in terms of plain sailing, than that traversed from Milan (c. 850 compared to 680 miles), so that the net advantage was rather less than the tenfold it appears. Moreover, the time consumed by preparation of the seaward expeditions, though it defies precise calculation at this stage, often reduced these advantages considerably. See also, Parker, Army of Flanders, esp. the appendices on pp. 278-80, upon which my own Appendix 1 (p. 241), and other calculations given here, are based.

77

The great offensive, 1621—1640 in two convoys separated by four months, Jacobsen and Ribera left Spain with a further 5,600 Spanish bisonos bound for Flanders. Aytona went to Dunkirk to supervise preparations for the reception of the second, and larger, of these expeditions. He enlisted the available privateers and commandeered prize vessels, providing a force with which to fight the incoming convoys past the blockaders if necessary. In the event, both docked in Dunkirk without serious mishap; it was a meticulously executed operation of considerable military significance.72 As 1629 opened, the impact of Matanzas dominated all the relevant councils in Madrid. Philip IV himself was stupefied and outraged by the unprecedented news from Cuba, and fear of a major Dutch follow-up in the Atlantic in places approached panic proportions.73 The King ordered that virtually the whole armada de Flandes should sail immediately for Spain, in order to make up deficiencies in the Main Fleet, expected to be occasioned by the need to reinforce Atlantic defences with all speed. At the end of April, he impatiently reiterated his instructions, adding - in an unprecedented move - that the ships should carry with them three Walloon regiments - for re-routing to Italy, where the French had launched a successful military riposte to Olivares' Mantuan adventure. But Isabel blandly stated the impossibility of complying with her nephew's request; lack of funds had immobilised the fleet, and an immediate extra subsidy of 100,000 escudos would be necessary for the voyage. Within a month or so, furthermore, the question of detaching troops from the army of Flanders to help in Lombardy would be ruled out of court by Frederick-Henry's great offensive. When the Council of State sympathised with Isabel's attitude, the King's anger exploded. In an apostilla he remonstrated with his ministers: 'Do we not pay each month the full expenses of this force? Castile can manage no more'. 74 Whatever the feelings of Philip and Olivares, the paralysis of the Flanders armada was a painful fact. It was claimed that between approximately November 1628 and the end of the following year, an average unit had managed to get to sea for only sixty days.75 To add to the prevailing gloom, for the first time the fleet had sustained serious losses at the enemy's hands, four ships being lost when a raiding flotilla out of Ostend ran into the blockading fleet cruising off Cap Gris Nez. On the other hand, the death of the enemy commander in this encounter perhaps offered some emotional mollification, especially to Philip IV - for the 72 73

74

75

Philip to Isabel 22 Aug.; Isabel to Philip 3 0 Sept., A R B / S E G 204, ff. 85 a n d 126. S e e (e.g.) Philip's m e m o (called 'decreto') of 24 Sept. 1629, A H N / E 739, ff. 1-2; consulta of junta of Indies, 5 April 1629, B L / A d d . 3 6 3 2 2 , ff. 62-8V. J u a n d e Villela to Philip IV, 7 M a r c h , f. 178; Isabel to same, 27 April [with enclosure], f. 3 3 1 ; royal order of 28 April, f. 340; and consulta of Council of State with King's apostilla, 15 May, f. 330, (all 1629 and A G S / E 2043). Reported in consulta of Council of State, 28 F e b . 1630, ibid. 2044.

78

Thefirstcrisis dead hero, who received a state funeral in Delft, was none other than Piet Hejn, the victor of Matanzas.76 76

Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 194. A medal recording Hejn's death at the hands of the Dunkirkers was on exhibit in 1983 at the Netherlands Scheepvaart Museum in Amsterdam, where it constituted the only reference - and even that in Latin! - to the most determined and successful enemy in Dutch maritime history.

79

Dunkirk's golden decade

THE PRIVATEERING WAR

Early in 1632, the Cortes of Castile met to consider the alarming new scales of servicios y millones being demanded by the government in order to discharge the imperatives of defence. It was a crucially important political test. The kingdom, exhausted by prolonged fiscal exploitation, had been overwhelmed by a recent crisis of dearth and disease. Olivares, acutely conscious of war-weariness amongst the delegates, resorted once again to a theme which was capable of reawakening residual enthusiasm. The King began his speech by regaling the loyal reino with a decade of maritime achievements, a veritable catalogue aria of conquests all over the seven seas; warships of all sizes constructed and equipped, sailors and marines from all parts of the Monarchy raised and armed. Not until the end of two full pages of the printed version of his address - the libretto, as it were - does he arrive at the cadence: 'ma in Ispagna son gia mille e tre'. 1 It was Philip's misfortune that, despite the alleged expenditure of 1 Vi million ducats a year, he had accumulated nothing like 1003 warships - whether in Spain or elsewhere. The demands of the Atlantic emergency had drastically reduced reserves of ships, sailors and materials, leaving serious weaknesses even in the main battlefleet defending the shores of Iberia itself. Indeed, the Venetian ambassador in Madrid chose directly to contradict the King's boasts, in his annual report to the Doge and Senate, asserting that 'more than ever the Dutch are absolute masters of the seas, Spain being completely without sailors, and lacking any remaining naval power of significance'.2 Both Philip and Mocenigo's assertions had some justification. Spain's seaborne war-effort had certainly been impressive, encompassing triumphs of a measure and frequency beyond the fancy of all save the most sanguine of its strategic thinkers. The painters who were at work in 1632 upon the great celebratory canvases commissioned to adorn the Hall of the Kingdoms in the new Buen Retiro Palace, produced scenes where, in almost half of the cases 1

2

Proposition de las Cortes que se hizo en veintey uno de Hebrew deMily seiscientos y treintay dos anos, BN/2364, ft. 116-20. (The reader will note that the textual quotation in Italian represents a variant - rather than a version - of this document's title.) N. Barozzi and G. Berchet (eds.), Relazione degli Stati Europei: Letti al Senato degli Ambasciatori Veneti nel Secolo Decimosettimo — Serie I, Spagna (2 vols., Venice, 1856), 1, p. 648.

80

Dunkirk's golden decade chosen, victories had been procured by the exercise of naval power.3 On the other hand, the five years immediately preceding Philip's catalogue had witnessed success being bought at an escalating price, not so much in terms of financing, as through the irreplaceable loss of vessels and experienced men. The indirect consequences of Matanzas - which, in itself, involved no important loss of ships and crews - devastated Spain's fleets. Anxiety to avoid Dutch incursions into the Caribbean led commanders to abandon reliable schedules and navigational patterns, with the result that flotas were increasingly caught by the hurricane season. In the early 1630s, over a dozen vessels, including several silver-carrying galleons, foundered off the coasts of New Spain or in the perilous Florida straits. The storm conditions which relentlessly asssailed her sailors offered a painfully suitable metaphor for the situation of the whole Monarchy.4 Olivares' efforts to pull the flagship round into the wind were not entirely in vain. As part of the general campaign of recuperation and preparation, many new asientos were agreed with shipbuilders in the Basque ports, Catalonia and Naples, for the construction of warships.5 A Portuguese-Jewish banking firm took over the loans programme intended by Hacienda to underwrite the naval recovery.6 Around this time too, production came onstream from the newly constructed ironworks of Cantabria, and by the middle of the decade four peninsular factories were turning out ordnance of reasonable quality.7 When Aytona was asked to send guns stripped from prize ships in Flanders in order to equip the Atlantic fleets, he considered it difficult to justify given the local need, adding pointedly that 'over one hundred pieces of artillery have been manufactured in Spain already for [the new] ships, in the factory at Lierganes, which is situated right on the coast'.8 But from the poop-deck - as it were - Olivares had sighted war with France on the horizon. Given the intense programme of defence preparation he laid down, the quantitative response was certain to have multiple deficiencies. Thus Madrid's dependence on Flanders for maritime materials and expertise steadily increased. In the same spirit as he sent Pierre Roose as his main troubleshooter in Brussels, Olivares despatched agents of somewhat lower profile to reside in the 3

4

5

See J. H. Elliott and J. Brown, A Palace for a King: The Buen Retiro and the Court ofPhilip IV (New Haven and London, 1980), esp. pp. 141-92. H. and P. Chaunu, Seville et VAtlantique, 1504—1660 (9 vols. in 12, Paris, 1955-60), vn, pp. 210-18; Rahn Phillips, Six Galleons, pp. 190-1. In the spring of 1634, it was reported that sixteen were being built in Vizcaya alone, P. Gayangos (ed.), Cartas de algunos padres de la Compama de Jesus sobre los sucesos de la Monarquia entre los anos

6

7 8

1634 y 1648 (7 vols., Madrid, 1861-5), 1, p. 104. The Junta de Armada's records for this decade contain plentiful evidence concerning asientos defdbricas. See e.g. legs 3157 and 3167, passim. Boyajian, Portuguese Bankers, esp. p. 216 (table of asientos of Afonso and Diego Cardoso). See also royal cedula of 26 Dec. 1632, BL/Add. 9940, ff. 100-4, consigning a partial moratorium on official salaries {media anata de oficios) for this purpose. Alcala-Zamora, Razony Crisis, pp. 23 and 31. Aytona to Philip IV, 23 Sept. 1633, BR/16149, f. 106.

8l

The great offensive,

1621-1640

Flemish ports, with the task of expropriating any useful supplies of schiffsmaterial which might come their way, for transport to Spain. Every prize brought in was examined for its suitability for conversion to warlike employ - though, in practice, the preponderance of buizen and fluiten left precious few to choose from. In 1632, Madrid even enquired whether the Flemish yards could manage to build war-galleons of over 500 tons.9 More ominously, he gave orders that the six largest vessels of the armada should be seconded to Spain on a permanent basis.10 This last demand was highly embarrassing for Isabel and Aytona. The armada of Flanders had not escaped its share in the overall setback brought about by a reinvigorated Dutch war-effort. Despite its reduced workrate, at least eight vessels were lost in action during 1628-9 - about a third of the effective strength. These defeats were not simply the consequence of the failure of supply, since the privateers too had been badly mauled, losing no fewer than sixteen units sunk or captured, and a similar number otherwise disabled, in 1629-30. n Furthermore, shortly after Philip had sung his song to the Cortes in Madrid, fourteen vessels purchased in the Baltic, intended as the nucleus of the projected imperial fleet, had been captured in Wismar by Gustavus Adolphus. All in all, it seemed that a lament had become more in order than a catalogue of conquests.12 Retreat from the Baltic meant abandoning the scheme to 'protect' the Hanseatic towns, and the hope of developing them as a source of services and commercial partnership on the Genoese model. This may have been good news for the business community of 'Belgium', but it tightened the screw as far as maritime stores were concerned. Certain categories of shipwrights' supplies timbers appropriate for hull-construction, for example - could be obtained from German sources, via riverine routes into Flanders. But others remained a Scandinavian monopoly. A way round the problem was offered by the so-called 'composition' trade between Dunkirk and the southeastern ports of England, especially Dover. With this help, the Flemish dockyards entered a frantic period of activity, and by the end of the decade were indeed successfully building medium-sized galleons as well as an improved version of the frigate.13 In any case, Madrid refused to contemplate any diminution of its maritime policy in the North. In 1632, though the peace negotiations which took place directly between the 'Belgian' and the Dutch Estates were not directly disavowed, Philip and Olivares insisted (inter alia) on the military retention by Spain 9 10 11

12 13

Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes> pp. 218—20. Philip to Isabel, (n.d. but February 1632), ARB/SEG 206, f. 11. See Appendix 10, p. 255. See also A. van der Essen, he Cardinal-Infant et lapolitique europeenne de VEspagne (Brussels, 1944), p. 27; and Malo, Les Corsaires, 1, pp. 315-17. Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, p. 279. J. S. Kepler, The Exchange of Christendom. The International Entrepot at Dover, 1622-5/, (Leicester, 1976). On the production of warships in Flanders, see also below, pp. 169-71.

82

Dunkirk's golden decade of the Flemish ports as well as the frontier fortresses.14 The contributions made by Spain's northern provinces to naval aggregation also assumed considerable importance around this time. By the early 1630s, partly owing to the work of Martin de Aroztegui, squadrons were operational on behalf of Galicia, the Tour Towns', Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa - though these communities resisted attempts to fuse them into a single armada.15 One arbitrio which argued strongly for a full-scale economic union with Flanders, returned to the idea that a naval base should be provided at El Ferrol for a fleet of fifty ships whose operational range should overlap with that of Flanders. 16 This coincided with a Dutch attempt to develop strategic-commercial exchanges with France, via a regular convoy to Bordeaux, which Olivares was determined to frustrate. Already the impending confrontation with France had assumed enough substance to exert a gravitational effect on naval strategy. During the early part of the decade, the Flanders armada's activities returned to pre-crisis levels. Aytona adopted the tactical principle of subdividing it into raiding packs of four or five, and in the intervals of larger-scale sorties, he and Ribera worked ceaselessly to keep some of these at sea. Privateering continued to expand - by 1630 the number of businesses had multiplied fourfold compared with that of 1627 - and the lists of victims climbed to record levels in 1632. All the same, despite Aytona's struggle to ameliorate the more excessive demands of Madrid, the commercial war had now been relegated to a subordinate position in relation to the strategic-supportive role. In 1632, the armada's share of enemy vessels taken, destroyed or ransomed at sea, fell below 10 per cent of the total, compared to nearly 50 per cent in 1627 and 25 per cent even in 1629, at the trough of its depression. The figures represent an absolute as well as a relative decline. Moreover, in 1631-2 five more ships were lost in battle.17 Though Dutch marine losses also peaked, it is therefore difficult to agree wholeheartedly with Professor Israel that 'in 163 2 Madrid could justly claim a telling victory in the North Sea'. 18 Sure enough the Spaniards struck some hefty blows. In one raid of 1632, the Dunkirkers sank twenty-eight trawlers and their two guards, and then proceeded to land on the Shetland Islands, plundering and burning several bases the Dutch had constructed to store supplies for the fishing fleets.19 On the other hand, the heavy losses they sustained were not simply a 14 15

16 17

18

Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. See royal cedulas of 21 April and 20 July 1625, BL/Add. 9940, ff. 23-4 (Galicia); cedula of 29 April 1625, MN/Vargas 20, f. 360 (Guipuzcoa); testament of Captain Hernando (1664) AHP(C)/CEM 8, No. 21 (Quatro Villas). For Aroztegui, see (e.g.) consultas of the Junta de Armadas for 1627 in AGS/GA 3151. 'Discurso dirigido al Conde Duque', 17 May 1631, BN/11137, ff. 154-9 a n d 233-4 1 Figures derived or deduced from prize-lists of Luyando in AGS/CMC 1786, and Penninq in ARB/CA 275. The Dutch took advantage of the armada's inactivity, attempting in vain to block the main channel with seven sunken hulks filled with stones; {consulta of Council of State 10 Oct. 1630, AGS/E 2044, f. 71). 19 Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 196. Untitled ms. relation, MN/Nav. 12, f. 172V.

83

The great offensive, 1621-1640 function of the crude augmentation of their numbers, but were imposed, as an increasing cost of success, by the vigilance and skill of Dutch commanders. Privateering ranks were reduced by the huge total of fifty-six ships in 1631-3 twenty in 1632 alone - a punishing exaction which put a brake upon expansion for the first time.20 The finer pattern of events illustrates the trend. Four Dunkirkers, pursued by a Dutch flotilla, ran under the guns of Deal castle. Despite secret AngloSpanish agreements that Charles I would protect the privateers in English waters, the Dutch defied a royal warship and shore batteries alike, and moved in to capture their foe. This incident occurred in April 1633. In the same month, a list of Flanders sailors being held in Dutch jails showed over 650 names, including nineteen privateer skippers.21 But the risks were still considered worthwhile by many. On the last day of August 1633, a Dunkirk frigate, commanded by Gerard Jansen, left Lisbon with a small convoy bound for its home port. Amongst the passengers was a Jesuit on his way to Douai, who kept a journal of the voyage. Not long out, they were separated from their companions by a storm so severe 'that it seemed we would be capsized at any moment'. The priest was kept busy confessing the men some of them several times over. When skies cleared and seas calmed, a vessel was sighted which, doubtless fortified by the rites of Holy Mother Church, they prepared to engage. They showed the Dutch flag until close enough to their prey, then suddenly ran up Dunkirk colours - the dreaded precursor of the skull-and-crossbones. However, their intended victim turned out to be French; and 'Spain and France being friends, we were unable to touch them, for even though we suspected them of being pirates, it could not be proven5. Their luck later changed, and in the mouth of the Channel they encountered a Dutch fluit of 150 tons, which was overhauled and boarded almost without a struggle. Loaded with pine timber and other useful goods, and worth £1500, the prize was taken safely into Dunkirk on 18 September. At the end of that month a clerk in the office of the Admiralty duly registered the acquisition: 'Le 18, Cap[itai]ne Gerit Janssen, retournant despaigne et amene un fliboot de 90 lastes, armee de six pieces et 6 pedrils, charge de 5500 tables.'22 By this time Olivares had gained his point over Aytona, and substantial naval reinforcements had arrived in Spain from Flemish sources. Surveys of various 20 21

22

See Appendix 10, p. 255. Draft letter (in French) by W. Boswell, 15 July 1633, and 'Declaration des Estats Generaux', B L / S t o w e 133, ff. 275 and 278; 'Somaire des prisoniers detenees en Hollande et Zelande' (signed by Penninq), 25 April 1633, A R B / C A 253. M s . narrative of the voyage in B L / S l o a n e 1572, ff. 68V.-71, in Spanish, but described on the spine as 'A T o u r through France, Spain, Netherlands and England 1633, 1634', and containing much curious information. Details of the prize are corroborated in one of the surviving mensual lists - 'Relation des exploits et prises faites en mer par les navires de guerre, armez au service de sa M[ajes]tie, par les particuliers au mois de Septembre 1633', A R B / C A 275 - where it appears as the seventh item.

84

Dunkirk's golden decade forces being prepared for service in the Atlantic during 1633 show that at least seven vessels suitable for use as galeones de guardia had come from Flanders. One of these was the 300-ton frigate San Juan 'of Flemish construction, and good'.23 With perhaps twenty war-galleons on the stocks at this point - including some giant specimens being built at Oporto - Spain's need for artillery was insatiable, and it seems certain that a proportion of the 800 pieces captured by the Dunkirkers in the previous two years also reached the peninsula, destined (amongst other places) for the multi-gunned galleons of Brazil and New Spain fleets.24 Madrid's demands did not end there. In 1633, Ribera, who along with Waecken had restored the honour of the regiment after the Lodosa affair, was also summoned back to more important duty. The choice of replacement, Juan Claros de Guzman, marquis of Fuentes - a younger son of the duke of Medina Sidonia - was an interesting one. These years provided an opportunity to restructure the whole administrative and military apparatus in Flanders. The death of Waecken in October 1632; the sensational desertion of the count of Bergh, acting commander-in-chief of the army; the departure for (and subsequent imprisonment in) Spain of the senior Walloon nobleman, the duke of Aerschot; Aytona's death in the early summer of 1635; this sequence was punctuated at the end of 1633 by the passing of the Archduchess herself; to the profound official sorrow of the court, but probably much to Olivares' inner relief.25 Fuentes' exalted lineage brought new prestige to the post of admiral, and his appointment - which involved the governorship of Dunkirk as well as operational command of the fleet - was meant to guarantee obedience and loyalty from all elements of the maritime community. At the same time, it complemented the accession of Don Fernando de Austria (the CardinalInfante) to the offices of governor and captain-general (of both army and navy) in the Spanish Netherlands. Indeed, so precarious was the Spanish 23

24

25

'Relation de los navios q u e su Magd. tiene ...' [? July 1633], B P U / F a v r e 7 1 , ff. 1 3 9 - 4 0 . T h e relation described in n. 22 above observed that amongst the ships being prepared in Lisbon were 'two great warships purchased from the m e n of Dunkirk' (f. 64V). T h e s e were probably ex-privateers' prizes. Perhaps they were amongst the seven 'warships brought from Flanders by Admiral Gaspar de Carassa and integrated with [those of] the Crown of Portugal', itemised in the official lists. 'Relation de los navios de que de ha de componer la Armada ... Mayo de este afio de 6 3 3 ' , and 'Memorial de los navios q u e aprestan en Cadiz para el socorro de Brasil 15 Sept. 1633', ibid., ff. 123 and 125. F o r more detailed treatment of these forces, see Rahn Phillips, Six Galleons, pp. 1 8 1 - 2 0 2 . F o r the captured guns, see Appendix 10, p . 255. See Hambye, L'Aumonerie, pp. 3 8 - 9 ; van d e r Essen, Le Cardinal-Infant, p . 213; and Fernandez D u r o , Armada Espanola, rv, p . 402. F u e n t e s ' appointment was announced in J a n . 1635 (Gayangos, Cartas, I, p . 124). T h e D u k e of Aerschot brought to Madrid certain proposals (emanating presumably from the loyal estates) concerning the improvement of the fleet and Hispano-Belgian commerce. His subsequent arrest and imprisonment discredited this initiative; see H o p t o n to Coke, M a r c h 1634, B L / E g . 1820, ff. 339V.-40.

85

The great offensive, 1621-1640 position in the Rhineland during 1632-3, as a result of Swedish incursions, that it seemed the prince would be forced to reach his destination by the sea-route. This expectation imposed the need to provide his fleet - a force which was bound to represent a major empresa - with subordinates of suitable distinction.26 Moreover, the restoration of relative stability in the Atlantic held out the promise of an augmentation of the Flanders fleet. Olivares was by now making steady progress towards his ruling strategic objective - that of readiness on all fronts for war with France, scheduled to begin on Spain's terms, and from a position of overwhelming military strength. As it happened, the general conflagration did not begin until a year later than Olivares originally intended, in May 1635In the meantime, the Flemish coningsschepen, sailing under the untrammelled direction of their native skippers, enjoyed one of their festive years. Jacques Colaert's family had been seafarers in Dunkirk for as long as anyone could remember. He himself had been in royal service for most of his life, having served in the navy under Albert.27 This veteran leaped into prominence in 1635, beginning in what seems almost to be routine fashion - the rate of success achieved allowing us to overlook the multiple risks involved in the attempt - by safely delivering at Dunkirk 2,000 fresh infantry from Spain.28 A few months later, Colaert led an attack on the fisheries with the largest raiding force ever sent forth. From a total available of thirty vessels, he selected six frigates ('completed this year to the latest design5), and fourteen other sizeable warships. Evading Dutch detection on leaving port, they were able to intercept the Enkhuizen fishing fleet. The latter had put to sea some weeks later than usual because of problems over supply and protection, and were on their lumbering way north, 140 vessels in all. In a long day's work on 17 August, Colaert sank nearly half the total; the buizen scattered, and only four more stragglers were overhauled the following day. But on arrival at the fishinggrounds, three days later, the Dunkirkers found to their delight that the Maas fleet had not been warned of their approach. After a fight with the naval guard, another twenty trawlers were destroyed before Colaert decided to turn for home. A less experienced sailor might have been too heavy with plunder, or dizzy with success, to be prepared for what followed; but when (on 25 August) Colaert ran into a Dutch battle-squadron no smaller than his own, he was able to fight the enemy off, allegedly shattering the mainmast of his adversary's flagship in the process. Almost incredibly - with another Dutch flotilla converging on him 26

27

28

See Philip to D o n Fernando, (? March] 1635, A G S / E . 2050, f. 143. In the event, of course, the prince arrived via the landward route long before Fuentes was even ready to sail. Malo, Les Corsaires, I, pp. 3 2 0 - 7 . Information about Colaert's exploits may be found also in Hambye, L'Aumdnerie, pp. 4 3 - 5 and Fernandez Duro, Armada Espanola, IV, pp. 407—8. Note by Olivares on consulta of council of State, 19 April 1635, A G S / E 2050, no. 43; see also Parker, Army of Flanders, p. 279.

Dunkirk's golden decade Colaert returned every ship under his command to safety early in September. They were loaded to the gunnels with artillery, small arms, countless important items of equipment, and vast quantities of fish, not to mention their prize of a major Dutch warship and nearly 800 prisoners. They had ransacked and destroyed eighty-nine trawlers and five warships - perhaps 8,000 tons of enemy shipping - in a little over two weeks' sailing.29 A month later Colaert was again on the prowl, eager to exploit a situation where the morale of his opponent, with so many of his vessels, had reached rock-bottom. In a lightning sweep down the channel he attacked a large West-India Company convoy, taking prisoner Hejn's most celebrated successor, Cornelis Corneliszoon Jol, returning in his flagship the Otter, from a 'pirate' voyage in the Caribbean. Early in the New Year (1636), Colaert commanded four of the largest armada ships, ordered to Spain with the purpose of strengthening the Fuentes expedition. This time his luck, and perhaps a little of his skill, deserted him. One ship was forced aground by the blockaders during the break-out, and the remainder were caught off the French coast by the Zeeland squadron, mustering twice their strength. Colaert's galleon and another were sunk after a prolonged engagement, and the Flemish mariner had to be rescued by the victors from the freezing Biscay waters, along with some 200 of his men. 30 This event almost immediately precipitated a welcome exchange of prisoners. From the overcrowded Flemish jails, where 1,000 men were being held, almost exactly one half gained their liberty in April 1636. Colaert alone, it was noted, had captured ninety of these; so it was fitting that he himself should be at the head of those released on the Dutch side.31 The redoubtable Dunkerquois seems to have spent the rest of 1636 in deserved convalescence, or perhaps observing a parole. At any rate, we do not find him again until the spring of 1637, in San Sebastian, with the galleon Stella Marts. Colaert had already been granted the title of admiral. Now, at the king's express invitation, he travelled to Madrid, where in a ceremony as full of significance as the dubbing of Drake by Elizabeth I, he was invested with the order of Santiago 'placed on his breast by the King himself- who in conversation addressed him as Jacques.' It was not the first time that Philip had betrayed a personal fascination with the species of seafarer which served him so steadfastly. Unfortunately, the velvet embrace of 29

30

31

T h e sources vary slightly in figures for victims of the 1635 attack. I have relied on veedor Jean Gavarelle's official 'Relation del viage que ha hecho le Armada Real que S.M. tiene en estos estados de Flandes ... enviada al Marques de LeganeV, printed in Gayangos, Cartas, I, pp. 271-3), and Copia del Avisos Embiados de Flandes al Excelentisimo Senor Marques de Valparaiso', 2 Sept. 1639, B N / 1 8 4 0 0 No. 52. 'Relation des exploits ... de Novembre et Decembre 1635', A R B / C A 275; Lemaire, Histoire, pp. 143-4. T h e account of Colaert's defeat given by a court Jesuit accused one of his captains of 'surrendering vilely' to the enemy, whilst another escaped to England. Since it also reported Colaert's own death in action, the allegations may be discounted, (Gayangos, Cartas, 1, PP- 393-4)'Touchant l'eschange des prisonniers de mer fait l'an 1636', A R B / C A 253.

87

The great offensive, 1621-1640 the court proved to be too much for this grizzled survivor of a dozen barbarous seafights, and he died shortly after regaining his flagship.32 A descendant (figuratively speaking) of the Jesuit chaplains who sailed with and fought alongside the Flemish mariners of Philip IV, may be permitted his small chauvinist hymn. 'Jamais, peut-etre, [writes Fr. Hambye] dans leur historie, les Pays-Bas Catholiques, la Belgique d'aujourd'hui, ne possederont des escadres aussi puissantes, des capitaines aussi vaillants et aussi competents ... Cela tient surtout au fait que Dunkerque se trouve alors dans les Pay-Bas et que la renommee de ses capitaines assure a PEspagne des marines de premiere qualite.'33 In the campaigns of the late 1630s, however, it was the sailors of Iberian origin who came forward to dominate the honours. The Navarrese mariner, Miguel de Horna, stepped into Colaert's sea-boots, and led the armada in a sequence of daring voyages. In 1637, Tromp assumed command of the blockading forces, dedicating himself to the defeat of the Dunkirkers. His presence failed to inhibit the armada. In February that year, with a pack of eight, Horna fought a bloody battle with a convoy met off the Lizard, capturing fourteen merchantmen and three warships. In July, he ambushed two Dutch Bordeaux convoys, carrying off twelve prizes, charged, amongst other items, with 125 invaluable cavalry horses. 34 Salvador Rodriguez, a native of Castile, was in command during another raid on the Shetland fishing grounds that August, which took a toll of thirty-five busses. Not to be outdone by his subordinates, at the end of the year Fuentes took command during a tremendous sortie to the far north. In a voyage of three months' duration he rounded up a total of fifty-two victims.35 There was little relaxation of effort in the following year, despite mounting demands from Spain, where Olivares was more and more preoccupied with collecting available forces for what was to become the Oquendo expedition of 1639. Fuentes was therefore a success, both as fighting admiral and as director of operations. The eminent Spanish naval historian, Fernandez Duro, claimed with permissible exaggeration that during Fuentes' three years in Dunkirk only one armada ship was lost, whilst 800 of the enemy were taken or destroyed. In 1639, 32

33 34

35

M . de Salamanca to F. de Galarreta, 18 March 1637, A H N / E 962, f. 233. Malo claims that in his career Colaert captured nearly 140 prizes, including twenty-seven warships. This is surely exaggerated, but nonetheless it seems regrettable that his fame has been so totally eclipsed in his home town by that of its subsequent hero, Jean Bart - who was careful to be born a Frenchman in 1650. Hambye, L'Aumonerie, p . 42. Fernandez Duro, Armada Espaiiola, IV, pp. 4 0 9 - 1 0 . F o r the critical importance of horses, see R. A. Stradling, 'Spain's Military Failure and the Supply of Horses, 1600-1660', History 69 (1984), pp. 2 0 8 - 2 1 . Relation verdadera de las felices victorias, que han tenido los Galeones de Dunquerque ... desde los primeros de Julio del ano pasado, hasta de Marzo de 1638 (Seville, 1638).

Dunkirk's golden decade however, in the midst of operations to salvage the remnants of Oquendo's great empresa,36 the admiral died at his post. Even at the height of the 1639 campaign, when the Dutch threw every available ship into the Channel, the privateers continued to strike, almost as if heedless of the main event. Indeed, such was the enemy's concentration upon the huge armada trapped in the Downs, that the corsair skippers faced less resistance than usual elsewhere, and took full advantage of the situation.37 Since 1635, of course, the armateurs had been presented with an extra source of plunder, in the shape of French traders and fishermen. Though not representing a quarry of similar proportions to the Dutch, it was at least unexploited, and (by Dutch standards) unprotected as well.38 It is true that each year up to the fall of Dunkirk in 1646, Tromp's strength and vigilance increased. His blockaders were now supplied efficiently, stayed on station longer, and became more adept at their task. Yet even with the help of the English Parliamentary fleet, he could never seal off the Flemish ports completely, and the winter months were usually an invitation to adventure. With the new decade therefore, there was no major - and certainly no consistent - diminution of privateering depredations amongst the commercial marine of France and the United Provinces.39 THE WAR WITH FRANCE

Replying to instructions in the spring of 1633, the marquis of Aytona assured the King that 'the preparation of Ribera's armada is going ahead with all speed, so that he can return to Spain with as many ships as we can gather, in accordance with your majesty's wishes. The damage that he can do to France at sea would be to shatter its commerce, ensuring that the French King willl receive no further sustenance from it.'40 Aytona was amongst those ministers who agreed with Olivares that the sooner the inevitable showdown with France was begun, the sooner it would be a problem solved. As his letter demonstrates, over two years before its official outbreak, the count-duke was busily preparing the detailed dispositions of Spain's forces appropriate to this contingency.41 36

37

38 39

40 41

Fernandez Duro, Armada Espanola, iv, p . 412; Fuentes to D o n Fernando, 22 Oct. 1639, A R B / S E G 137. T h e claim was based on a contemporary relation. For his part, Lemaire (Histoire, p. 147) attributed the figure he found in this document to the account of Horna, whom evidently believing him a Belgian - he calls D o o m . See (e.g.) Brevey adjustada Relation de lo sucedido ... hasta todo el mes deDiciembre de 1638 (Madrid, 1639, [BN/18400, no. 54]). Malo, Les Corsaires, 1, pp. 3 2 2 - 3 . Ibid., pp. 344-5 and 4 0 8 - 9 ; Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, p . 102; Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 2 6 6 - 7 . Aytona to Philip IV, 4 April 1633, BRB/16149, f. 97V. O n the political-strategic planning of the war with France, see R. A. Stradling, 'Olivares and the Origins of the Franco-Spanish War, 1627-35', EHR 101, (1986), pp. 6 8 - 9 4 .

The great offensive, 1621-1640 The new war meant that, for the first time since 1621, a significant increase in the general military establishment of the Spanish Netherlands was necessary, and not simply recuperative measures, such as those of 1630-1 effectively represented. In 1634 alone, accordingly, nearly 13,000 Spanish and Italian recruits arrived in Flanders.42 In addition, no fewer than three new armies were laboriously assembled, one in Lorraine-Luxembourg, one in the Rhineland, and yet another on Spain's own Pyrenean border with France. A Jesuit in Salamanca noted with concern that Order has arrived for all the young men to be collected in order to go to the war. If sufficient numbers fail to present themselves, they threaten to take every fifth man in each district... In all parts of this land they are sending many levies to Portugal, there to be embarked for Flanders. They take tribute from those who refuse to go, in order to feed and clothe the others on their journey.43 But a great watershed, still relatively unnoticed by historians, had now arrived. War with France meant that the Spanish System moved unambiguously into a phase of existence in which it was permanently dependent on mercenary forces from outside the Monarchy. In addition to the soldiers from the Mediterranean peninsulas, the first substantial complements of rank-and-file Irish infantry reached Flanders. The human military wreckage left by the Swedish campaigns of southern Germany drifted into the Habsburg Rhineland army, in which the tercio element was merely a stiffening. Olivares negotiated the hire of a whole army of Polish Cossack horsemen for the intended invasion of France, and the agents of Madrid began to scour the corners of the continent for suitable reinforcements.44 Naval weaknesses, plastered over in desperate fashion since the emergency of 1628-30, required equally dedicated attention, given the impending entry of the French navy on the Dutch side. To offset this huge imbalance, Spain's need was for extra manned ships in being. Flanders and Spain combined could never cope with the demand for warships, and neither could now produce enough sailors from communities which had been trawled with increasing frequency and ever-finer nets. 45 Negotiations with England, maintained in somewhat desultory fashion ever since peace had been restored in 1630, were now revitalised. Several lines of 42 44

45

43 Parker, Army of Flanders, p . 279. Gayangos, Cartas, 1, pp. 60 and 64. Such auxiliaries were needed after c.1630 to continue a basically offensive strategy. After 1640, of course, they became essential merely to defend Spain. In addition to the French crisis, 1633 saw a major alarm that a fleet of eighty ships from Algiers was about to attempt a landing in Valencia, and galley-troops were hurriedly raised (Philip IV to marquis of Los Velez, 14 May, 1633, AMA/Alm. 5/16/12). In 1637-8 (e.g.), 610 m e n were raised in the three partidos of Cantabria for service in the Biscay squadron of Lope de Hoces, and another 251 were sent to Andalusia to crew thtgaliflota delndias; see 'Sebastian de Oleaga, sobre lo que obro con 94 mil escudos que se le remitiaron a Santander el ano pasado de 1637', B P U / 7 1 , ff. 117-18. Levies of able seamen were made on average every other year in Guipuzcoa in this decade; AHP(G) 2 a Sec. Neg. 11, legs. 31 and 3 4 - 8 .

90

Dunkirk's golden decade discussion with Charles I were opened, in the hope of tempting him into committing the Royal Navy to Spain's side. But the Stuart terms were high. In 1631, Charles demanded custody of Dunkirk, as the best place to base his ships and land his men in the event of a full-scale military alliance.46 Though it seems certain that Charles had retreated from this idea by 1634, negotiation centred around the use of English harbours and navy in support of Spanish operations in the Channel. They were not wasted, since in return for generous subsidies, Charles was able to provide significant logistical and financial services which helped to oil the wheels of the Madrid-Brussels axis. Time after time, however, English representatives evaded the sticking-point of naval assistance - from sending a squadron of twenty warships to fight alongside Spain's armadas, to providing armed cover for the empresas de Dunquerque which were despatched into the Channel.47 In October 1634, the King informed Aytona not only that the Flanders armada would have to mount an attack upon France at the outset of the forthcoming war, but that it could expect no assistance, even from Spanish sources.48 At the drafting stage, the idea was for the Dunkirkers to pick up a force of 4,000 Spanish recruits in Santander, landing them by surprise in the Pas de Calais, presumably with the idea of taking the port itself. This was only one element in an astonishing programme of offensives, a master-plan gradually pieced together by Olivares from a jigsaw of arbitrios, official memoranda, and committee reports. Early in 1635, the Council of State agreed that diversionary amphibious landings should be made on the enemy's Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. 'An onslaught upon France, launched from two seas, is what Your Majesty's allies are asking for', declared the count-duke: 'this, it is resolved, we will undertake, and may God lend us his aid.'49 The logistics of the master-plan were - to put it mildly - demanding. They convinced Olivares of the need for closer control over the Flanders navy. His geographical focus shifted during the year, from northern to western France, since it was hoped that somewhere in Brittany or Bordeaux rebellious elements might help the invaders to gain a foothold. In addition, and more importantly, he wished to schedule the various offensives with a chronological finesse previously unknown in warfare, an ambition which demanded the armada's physical presence in Spain. Before the end of February, Don Fernando de Austria was requested to send the whole force without delay, and as a matter of urgency.50 46 47

48

49

50

Draft treaty articles and Philip IV to Necolaide 17 Oct. 1632, M M G / P H B i b , f. 112. For an assessment of these negotiations, see Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 3 4 4 - 5 8 . See also M . A. S. H u m e , The Court of Philip IV (London, 1907), pp. 2 7 4 - 9 a n d 2 8 8 - 9 . Philip to Aytona, 10 Sept. 1634, A G S / E 2049. In January, however, Philip assured his brother that die Dunkirkers would not be risked without the collaboration of the Armada del Mar: same to D o n Fernando, 26 Jan. 1635, A R B / S E G 212, ff. 6 6 - 7 . Consulta of the Council of State, 16 Jan. 1635, A G S / E 2049. See also Stradling, 'Olivares and the Origins'. Royal order of 21 Feb. 1635, A G S / E 2050, N o . 137. 91

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A douceur was prepared to encourage the prince to collaborate. Following approval by the relevant Madrid committees, a scheme for the expansion of the armada to fifty units was sent to Brussels, where - it was suggested - Don Fernando might convene a junta consisting of Aytona, Roose and others to discuss it.51 But this strategem failed its purpose. It seems likely that the reluctance of Brussels to comply in this aspect of the master-plan helped to enforce a change, since by April, Don Fernando was merely asked 'with what number of ships, and how soon, he might be able to send the armada of those states to join the forces we are gathering here, with the aim of deciding which ports and other places would be best for them to capture and hold in France'. 52 In the perpetual tug-of-war between the two centres of Spanish power over the role of the armada, the coming of Don Fernando to Brussels undoubtedly meant an access of weight to the local team. As the King's brother, and second-in-line to the throne, the person lent an authority to his office which had not been known since the death of Albert and the lapse of the ambiguous 'autonomy of the Southern Netherlands'. Moreover, following his immense access of prestige as the winner of Spain's greatest battle honours of the war at Nordlingen, and his rapid gaining of popularity in the 'obedient' provinces, he was not a viceroy even as were others, to be instructed crudely in the royal will. It has been correctly observed that the working relationship between the countduke and Don Fernando was, in general, surprisingly successful. But the loyalties of a colonial governor are nearly always, even if only in subtle ways, affected by indigenous considerations which inevitably bear upon his consciousness - a tendency which in English colonial parlance is called 'going native'. Don Fernando was no exception to this rule. Throughout the spring and summer of 1635, n e temporized quite blatantly over Madrid's instructions regarding the armada'a movements, and no substantial element of it arrived in Spain. It played no direct part in the master-plan, which eventually went off at half-cock, and in somewhat belated response to France's declaration of war, in May 1635.53 As late as September, Don Fernando forwarded to Madrid the stronglyexpressed objection of Jean Gavarelle, the armada's veedor, to any transfer of units to Spain.54 Even when Madrid reduced its demand, in line with that previously imposed upon Aytona, to a secondment of the armada's eight largest 51 52 53

54

Philip to D o n Fernando, [?Feb.] 1635, ibid.j no. 143. Resume in consulta of Council of State, 19 April 1635, ibid., no. 4 3 . O n the Olivares-Don F e r n a n d o relationship see Elliott, The Count-Duke, pp. 185-6 and 5 0 4 - 6 . T h e Cardinal-Infante was next in line to the succession after his nephew, Prince Baltasar Carlos, for most of this period. D o n F e r n a n d o to Philip 15 Sept. and Gavarelle to D o n F e r n a n d o , 13 July 1635, A R B / S E G 213, ff. 106 and 104.

92

Dunkirk's golden decade vessels, the prince refused to entertain the notion, unless as part of a deal for a permanent increase of his naval establishment.55 As a result, if with some psychological strain, Olivares accommodated himself to the standpoint adopted by Brussels. Though it is difficult to illustrate the latter from an explicit documentary source, it may be summed up as follows. As governor and captain-general, Don Fernando would retain overall control of the Flanders fleet. At any given time, a section of the armada would be based in its home ports, for defensive and (when opportunity arose) offensive operations. Once - or at most twice — a year, as many ships as could be spared in view of the local situation would be despatched to northern Spain. Flexibility here could only be guaranteed by a substantial increase in the number of units available. But in any case, the squadron's main duty would be to convoy a fleet bringing men and supplies back to Flanders. Under no other circumstances admitted by Brussels would warships of the Flanders navy assist, far less be integrated into, the Armada del Mar Oceano, or any other command. The Brussels government now had to sustain war on two fronts - three, if we include the blockade of Dunkirk-Ostend by most of the Dutch navy for most of the time. Never had the ports been so crucial to the Spanish war-effort, yet never were they so vulnerable, since now they were likely to come under attack from the combined forces of France and the United Provinces. Rumours of a joint enterprise against the hated source of pain and loss abounded in the period after 1635, and Don Fernando's warnings were bound to evoke apprehension in Olivares. Madrid's thinking over the armada must also be appreciated in the overall context of military policy for Flanders, which was stepped up several gears in this period. All the same, it is possible to detect, in the radical improvement of dispositions for the armada undertaken in 1636-7, an unusual happening in the career of the count-duke - namely, concession to the views of another (if not just another) minister. Olivares' broad support for a North Sea strategy remained firm, and his demand for ultimate control of the Flanders armada was shelved for the time being. In April 1636 Don Fernando was informed of his brother's decision to expand the armada to fifty units.56 The new epoch began with the Fuentes expedition, prepared with enormous care, as if a royal presencia (in the sense used by Gelves) had indeed been amongst its commanders. With two enemy navies now to be avoided, the attendant risks had multiplied considerably. The convoy gathering slowly in La Coruria was intended to carry nearly 5,000 infantry, in transports guarded 55

56

Minute of Junta de Armadas, 9 Oct. 1635, A G S / E 2050, no. 178; D o n F e r n a n d o to Philip IV, 22 D e c . 1635, ibid., f. 465. Don Fernando to Philip, 30 April 1636, ARB/SEG 214, f. 332.

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by over twenty warships. The marquis of Velada commanded the former, and Antonio de Isasi the latter, whilst Fuentes himself was overall commander.57 Fuentes' instructions left him in no doubt that his primary task was the delivery of troops and subsidies safely to Dunkirk. Both of these were present in record quantities. The Portuguese asentistas were entrusting a total of 1.5 million ducats in bullion to Fuentes' charge, whilst the number of infantry ultimately reached 4,500, most of them new recruits. In the spring of 1636, the first bisonos raised in Galicia and Old Castile began to arrive at La Coruna. Miguel de Horna, with eight Flanders warships, joined in April, whilst Isasi with a similar number of the main armada was expected from Lisbon. Fuentes had express sanction to commandeer privately-owned merchant ships as transports. Guard ships and army levies from southern Spain were slower to arrive, and it was not until the middle of August that the whole aggregation of twenty-two warships and four urea transports was ready to sail.58 The Fuentes expedition was important for other reasons than its main payload, though all was related to that supreme responsibility. For the first time since the reign of Philip II, the maritime resources available in the peninsula were enlisted in an empresa centred on the North Sea theatre. Olivares, by dint of intense suasions, had not only incorporated vessels from the two main fleets units from the Armada del Mar Oeeano, and four or five on secondment from the so-called galiflota of the Atlantic - but had also managed to include four warships of the Cantabrian squadron.59 The main task of the latter, as its name implies, was to patrol the Biscay coastline of Spain. It was provided for mainly by local contributions, and was never more necessary than at this particular moment, in the early stages of the war with France. In short, it seems that Don Fernando had absolutely gained his point over Olivares, since his refusal to send the whole Flanders armada had brought about the weakening of defences in Spain and the Atlantic in order to boost those of Flanders. It is not surprising 57

58

59

A strange feature of the expedition was the role of the duke of Veraguas, the direct descendant of Columbus, who was to have sailed as captain-general. This, however, represented the hereditary title inherited from his illustrious forbears, and not his actual rank in the command structure. Alvaro de Colon was one of few grandees to respond to the many exhortations of Olivares in these years, appealing to their allegedly decayed ancient virtues of honour, patriotism and sense of service. N o t only did he volunteer a large financial contribution to the war, b u t also offered his sword, though by his own admission inexperienced in war (Stradling, Philip IV, p. 158). In Cadiz during 1635-6, the Duke threw himself into preparations, but died before the expedition could sail. Nevertheless his decision to go to where the danger was greatest, and as part of a great maritime empresa, represented the re-joining of his dynasty with its natural metier, from which it has rarely since been parted. See Pedro de Coloma to Velada, 13 Aug. 1636, B P U / 3 8 , f. 66 and 39, f. 226. 'Instruction al Marques de Fuentes para el viaje que ha de hazer con la Armada ...' 4 May 1636, A G S / G A 3166; Gayangos, Cartas, 1 p. 394 (8 April 1636). For further details of the preparation and voyage see Rahn Phillips, Six Galleons, pp. 2 0 6 - 8 . In fact, the crews were offered an extra payment for three months service in the North Sea which was reckoned to cost the treasury 22,000 escudos: consulta of Junta de Armadas, 26 May 1636,

AGS/GA 3166.

94

Dunkirk's golden decade that Philip IV complained to his brother a year later that unless he could send many more ships from Dunkirk, the government bankers were refusing to risk further shipments of specie.60 The apprehension of the hombres de negocio, however, does not seem to have been justified by experience, for the Fuentes expedition turned out to be another splendid success for the Spanish System. Circumstances dictated the firm instruction that the commanders were to avoid action with any part of the enemy navy if at all possible. In the event the twelve-day voyage was free of incident, despite the sighting of a larger French force in the Channel, and the whole fleet arrived in Dunkirk before the end of the month. As Velada immediately wrote to his commander-in-chief, 'the enterprise has been so happy that it is a great tribute to the meticulous care put into its preparation'. 61 Reinforcements and supplies on such a scale, coming after a hard and debilitating campaign in France, represented a welcome fillip to Don Fernando's military position. He now had the money, and - with the onset of winter - the time, to train the recruits and make all the necessary dispositions for a new military season.62 Around this time, the Admiralty's regulations underwent further revision, ostensibly in response to complaints from officers, sailors and privateering entrepreneurs. The result was a typical document of its period, evocative of the renewed (and in many respects, ruthless) determination of the Madrid government to continue the struggle, and despite the odds, to seek an ultimate military victory against the Monarchy's enemies. Yet, at the same time, the new rules seemed to confirm the view held in Brussels of the fleet's essential role, rather than that favoured by Madrid. It was reiterated that its principal function was the 'guerra ofensiva' - the capture and destruction of the enemy's ships on the high seas. All officers were therefore issued the standing instruction never to ransom intercepted victims, but always to take prize, or to plunder and destroy if circumstances forbade this. The privateers were to be encouraged to intensify their work by more favourable terms and improved administration of prizes. Further along these lines, the regulations also banned 'under any circumstances whatsoever' the habit, which had been practised in Brussels from time to time ever since 1621 as a fundraising device, of issuing licences to individual Dutch merchants which immunised their ships against the attentions of the Dunkirkers.63 60

61 62

63

Philip to D o n Fernando, 17 Aug. 1637, A R B / S E G 216, f. 435. See also Cuvelier and Lefevre,

Correspondance de la Cour, 11, p. 151. Velada to same, 1 Sept. 1636, B P U / 3 8 , f. 245. J. Vincart, 'Relation de los sucesos ... de Flandes ... d'esta campana de 1636' in CODOIN 59, pp. 6 0 - 1 . 'Apuntamentos sobre los quales se podria formar la Instruction de la Armada de S u Mgd. a Dunquerque en Flandes', A R B / S E G 212, ff. 345—6. This document is neither dated nor signed. Despite the argument made above from internal evidence, its title and usage of Castilian firmly indicate that it was drawn up in Madrid rather than Brussels. In addition to those same

95

The great offensive,

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In the last analysis, a reinvigoration of the commercial war (despite the opinion of the late marquis of Aytona) was hardly likely to make any significant contribution to the winning of the war against France. Such considerations did not prevent the Dunkirkers from turning greedily on their new victim. French fishing vessels were so numerous, and so puny, that any boat which could mount a gun or take a few armed men slipped out on the hunt. Before the end of August it was reported that over seventy French vessels had been taken or sunk. The former included around thirty substantial merchantmen; and, later in the year, a new French warship, vice-flagship of Louis XIII's fleet, was captured intact.64 On the other hand, by the end of 1636 it had become evident that the French war was not going to be the short, decisive struggle hoped for two years earlier. From 1635 onwards 'guerra ofensiva por mar' could no longer imply the corollary 'y defensiva por tierra', since Philip IV's armies were now perforce everywhere on the move against his powerful new enemy. His fleets still had a forward role to play in this struggle, above all in the Mediterranean. But, in 1637, the count-duke's thoughts about the campaign in the North Sea returned a fortiori to the demands of what he saw as his primary and historic task - overwhelming the Dutch rebels, and casting down their heretic pride. THE WAR-LORD OF MADRID

The failure of the master-plan led to another review of maritime policy in the spring of 1637. Olivares' practice of government had by now done considerable violence to the routine conciliar-departmental system, and although the Council of War and juntas (such as the Junta de Armadas) were neither formally abolished nor discontinued, all the main decisions regarding the war were taken in (if not exactly by) the count-duke's great Committee of Ways and Means (Junta de Ejecucion). From this extended war-cabinet, where a number of businessmen and technocrats were ranged alongside the noble olivarista ministers, the valido selected subcommittees made up of men most suited to the task in hand. Few of the original group of maritime experts survived long into the next decade; to name only four, Brochero and Aroztegui died during the 1620s, while Barrientos and Semple both died in 1633. But one of the wisest heads, that of Don Carlos Coloma, who had served his apprenticeship at sea in the Mediterranean at fourteen, and received his first experience of war in Flanders before the Invincible Armada sailed, was still available for consultation. Coloma, himself the author of earlier memoranda on the subject, was amongst the team enlisted to assess a new batch of arbitrios del mar. The importance to Olivares of

64

arguments, its presence in a registre of papers otherwise dating from 1635 suggest that it was imposed in or around that year. Gayangos, Cartas, I, pp. 235, 247-8, 256 and 313.

96

Dunkirk's golden decade the exercise is illustrated by the fact that Antonio Carnero, the count-duke's amanuensis (and yet another veteran of Flanders) co-ordinated the business of this junta particular.65

Furthermore, in line with the professional-technical ethos of Olivares' government, a convocation of Flemish expatriates was assembled for the task of strategic analysis. Perhaps, in the upshot, the proposals which emerged did not diverge sharply from earlier principles. Even the apparently novel scheme for attacks on Dutch strongpoints by groups of heavily-armed barges, with an army equipped to engage in a large-scale lacustrine struggle, had been partly anticipated. But at least ideas emanated from men with direct experience of the operation of the guerra por mar in the North Sea since 1621. Many were indeed highly qualified technicians who addressed the mathematical and engineering problems posed by the need to improve the Flemish ports as naval bases, and the modifications in warship construction made necessary by the specific demands of campaign usage.66 Olivares also took advantage of the visit to court of Admiral Colaert, and his assistant, the skilled pilot-captain Gerard Coen, who were asked to submit their own proposals. The former proposed a war-fleet of forty medium-sized (but powerfully-armed) galleons, along with twenty-five frigates of an advanced type, newly patented in Flanders (fragatas dobles). The presence of vessels of around 500 tons would necessitate fundamental improvements to mooring and harbour facilities at Mardyck-Dunkirk, whilst Coen suggested a new artillery fortress to ward off blockaders, to be constructed on the sandbank opposite Mardyck! Colaert estimated that the new navy and its ballistic fittings alone would cost 1.6 million escudos. He envisaged no alteration in the armada's function, wishing only to pursue even more effectively the mode of warfare Semple had designed and he had realised.67 These views were submitted to another Flemish expert, probably 'J-B. Sterck', a Capuchin and technological spy, or perhaps J-Ch. della Faille, the Jesuit mathematician.68 His report was favourable, a conclusion presumably 65

66

67

68

T h e documentary material discussed in the following paragraphs is in A G S E / 3 8 6 0 . It is also analysed in detail by Professor Alcala-Zamora in his Espana, Flandes, pp. 3 6 7 - 8 2 . T h e particular modus operandi described here was put forward by J - B . Sterck. Also at court were the prominent ship owner J. van der Walle, and the businessmen van der Wouver and Janssen de Bisthoven; see O . van der Vyver (ed.), 'Lettres de J - C h . della Faille, S.I., Cosmographe de Roi a Madrid, a M - F . van Langren, Cosmographe d u Roi a Bruxelles, 1 6 3 4 - 5 ' , Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu 46 (1977), pp. 110—13. M e m o s by Colaert and C o e n (Dutch with Spanish translations), 18 Feb., and note by Carnero, 12 Feb. 1637, A G S / E 3 8 6 0 . T h e first of these documents is printed in J. D a m s , ' U n memoire de l'admiral Colaert au gouvernement espagnol', Revue des amis du vieux Dunkerque 16 (1983), pp. 7 9 - 1 1 3 . 'Sobre la armason de Jacques C o l a r t . . . en Madrid a 30 de Marqo 1637', ibid., Alcala-Zamora confuses the critique with the original proposals, conducing to certain mistakes of detail. My (ambiguous) attribution is based on its language, which clearly indicates the work of a nonSpaniard; the calligraphy suggests a highly educated writer; and the final flourish, a member of

97

The great offensive, 1621-1640 fortified rather than weakened by the claim that the admiral had exaggerated the costs of ships and materials. On the other hand, it accepted Colaert's argument that, in the long run, the deepening of Dunkirk's channels was an economic investment. Twice a day the action of the tides dropped an anchored vessel of any size onto the sand, severely scouring hulls and keels in the process, and reducing their working lives drastically. Improvement here, with new gunbatteries for protection, would also have the side benefit of attracting neutral trade away from the ports of Holland, which in turn might justify demanding a contribution to costs from the other towns of the region. On the question of tactics, the report also broadly agreed with the Flemish skippers. The new navy 'should have orders to roam in packs unceasingly across the sea, never allowing the enemy a moment's rest, and ignoring all his wailing and complaints'. Indeed, the writer submitted his own programme for a systematic campaign to drive the Dutch fishermen from the seas, demonstrating that this alone could bring victory.69 In fact, he suggested that apt as the new galleons might be for this purpose, they were of limited use otherwise. Too deep in draught for frontal attack upon the Dutch coastal defences, they would also be far too few in number for a hull-to-hull showdown with the Dutch fleet. Indeed, it was claimed that the latter, in an emergency, could put as many as 500 vessels suitable for battle on the water, a reserve capacity with which the Monarchy could never hope to compete. It was an estimate destined to be found wanting - as it were - in the letter rather than the spirit. With this in mind, a warning was issued that other problems should not be overlooked. Terhaps the greatest difficulty will not be in providing the money but in finding sufficient wood, canon, and above all the crews.' Colaert's assurance that the new force could be at sea within the year was dismissed as sanguine. All the sources of appropriate timber were already colonised by the Dutch, and Spanish foundries could never cope with the demand for ordnance. Five thousand fresh sailors would be needed, not half that figure being available on even the rosiest calculation. 'Such men cannot be trained for action as easily as soldiers, or even the sailors who are accustomed only to the gentle waters' presumably the Flemish author's slightly barbed reference to the Mediterranean. All these papers were duly considered by the special Junta. 70 Colaert's plans with the modifications made by his anonymous critic - were approved. Hacienda

69

70

one of the Counter-Reformation orders (it looks forward to 'el dominio de la mar y con el, la mayor Monarchia que se ha visto. Assi lo, dessea parea mayor gloria de nro snr Jesu Xto el que escrivio este'). 'Jean-Baptiste Sterck' was the nom-de-guerre of a resourceful Spanish agent in Flanders, Fr. Felipe de Bruselas; see Echevarria, La diplomdcia secreta, pp. 2 5 2 - 8 . Both he and della Faille were at court and familiar with the engineering/topographical background. 'El modo como se puede destruyr cada afio la pesca de los harenques de manera que no de fruto ninguno', ibid. Consulta ofthe Junta Particulary 4 April 1637, ibid.

98

Dunkirk's golden decade was ordered to work out a tailored budget, and the Council of State prepared to endorse, in the routine way which for good or ill had become its habit, a decision which came with the imprimatur of the count-duke. Philip IV, as an admirer of Colaert, fully shared the enthusiasm. For his part, however, Olivares had begun the train of thought which lay behind these developments some months earlier. Following a campaign in France which had brought little concrete reward, he sat down to consider the general situation and manipulate possible contingencies. Don Gaspar began with the prescriptive comment that 'in my opinion it is no longer feasible to send either Italian or Spanish troops to Flanders by land, but only by sea. The fleet which the marquis of Fuentes has taken to the Netherlands will thus have to return next year in even greater strength, aiming at 12,000 tons of transport space if possible.' In this light, he turned to examine the overall maritime resources available, and declared himself impressed. Here, as so often with Olivares' working method, the historian can observe what was to become a central idea in embryo form. If Spain could only unite its war-fleets from various theatres - thus the count-duke mused - it might represent something irresistible. 'I wonder [he proceeded] if any enemy force could stand against it?'71 Accordingly, within a few weeks the Junta de Ejecucion was considering Olivares's estimates of the forces necessary to transport an army of 8,000 Neapolitan levies, and perhaps half that number of Spaniards, to Dunkirk: in other words, aflota of at least fifty units. 72 Only up to a point was the count-duke's optimism justified. It seems that what might be called 'the Matanzas effect' - the acute shortage of warships characterising the early part of the 1630s - had been surmounted, to a degree perhaps surprising to those who regard the Spanish System as in the last throes of collapse in these years. By the summer of 1637, some 150 seaworthy vessels were present in Spain's various ocean-going armadas and another five warships were commissioned or under construction. Forward requisitions for 1638 amounted to nearly 50,000 tons in fleets distributed around Iberian coasts alone, not including the galleys of Spain and Italy. But if one acute phase of crisis had (arguably) passed, the underlying trends - the chronic characteristics of the Monarchy's deficiency disease - remained unaffected. The obstacles to, and limitations on, North Sea strategy, emphasised to the 1637 junta, therefore constituted a salutary reminder to a leader whose planning invariably expanded in reach to meet any perceived horizon.73 71

72 73

'El Conde D u q u e sobre lo que se deve disponer para el ano que viene de 1637', 1 Oct. 1636, A G S / 2 0 5 1 , no. 26. It seems possible that the renewed warning about Dutch maritime power made in the report discussed above was provoked by a reading of this memorandum. Consultas of Junta de Ejecucion, 31 Oct. and 6 Nov. 1636, ibid., G A 1150. ' L o que se ha resuelto por consulta de consejo de Estado de 29 de Agosto de 1637 en materia de Armadas para el ano que viene de 638', ibid., 3169. But even if the shipbuilding programme, (on which see below, pp. 170—2) had achieved all its crude targets, problems of equipment were probably insuperable. For example, the shortage of bronze guns (and artillery in general) had reached such proportions that the annual Atlantic guard could only be supplied by a combination

99

The great offensive, 1621-1640 Coincidentally, another warning of a complementary nature reached Madrid, apparently from a Spanish spy in The Hague. After commenting on the determination of the Franco-Dutch alliance to attack the Flemish ports, it added that They realise here than Dunkirk alone is capable of ruining the greater part of their seagoing business, and of putting up their costs to twice the present rate ... but they perceive that the Spaniards are reluctant to change their traditional naval methods, for, although they [the Madrid government] are happy to accept the prizes offered by the Flemish corsairs, they put more faith in the great fleets commanded by inexperienced Spaniards.74 One of the targets of this jibe, Admiral Fuentes, was certainly in trouble. The plan for 1637 was for Colaert to sail from La Coruna, escorting the transports of infantry reinforcements, with Lope de Hoces in overall command. The convoy was judged too weak, however, and the arrival of Fuentes with more protection was awaited with mounting impatience. Intelligence reaching Madrid suggested that the Dutch blockading fleet had orders to roam abroad in the hope of catching the convoy at sea. Given the enemy's desperation to reverse their recent dismal record, the report was plausible. However, Don Fernando's need for troops led to the Junta deEjecucion suggesting that Hoces should sail, hoping that Fuentes would be able to slip out of Dunkirk to liaise, or at least to cause a diversion which might permit him to get through.75 In fact, bereft of the assistance of men like Colaert and Coen, the latter found himself firmly penned up in Dunkirk. To Don Fernando's prompting he responded that At the mouth of the Mardyck channel General Dorp is waiting with his warships. Moreover, the count of Oiiate has warned me, in letters I received today from London, that the King of France and the Dutch are making efforts to enlist the King of England's ships against us. The merchants of London cry out in the streets that their business is lost through the activities of this port, so that we are unanimously condemned and threatened on all sides.76 Fuentes's agony was understandable. The fortunes of war now rested heavily upon the judgement of Spain's naval commanders. The son of the Invincible Armada's commander knew only too well the potential fate that threatened should he be outmanoeuvred by an allied fleet around the Channel coasts. If not quite (like Jellicoe) 'the only man who could lose the war in one afternoon', he was in a similar position to many an English admiral from the eighteenth century, in considering that the risk of sustaining irreplaceable losses in men

74 75 76

of private confiscations, raiding other royal squadrons of lower priority, and even stripping the battlements of Cadiz. See J. Serrano Mangas, ' L a Artilleria de las Galeones de la Plata, 1608—49', Moneday credito 178 (1980), pp. 6 7 - 9 2 . 'Aviso de la Haya ...', 25 Jan. 1637, B L / A d d . 6902, ff 175-8V. Consulta of Junta deEjecucion, 14 May 1647, A G S / G A 3169. Fuentes to D o n Fernando, 22 June 1637, A R B / S E G 137. IOO

Dunkirk's golden decade and ships was not acceptable in the prevailing circumstances.77 Inaction could always be defended; only outright defeat was impossible to justify. Indeed, it might not be irrelevant to recall in this connection that, only recently, Admiral Juan de Benavides had been executed by decapitation for his misjudgement at Matanzas - an event which took place in Fuentes' home town of Cadiz.78 In any case, at this stage only some 2,000 soldiers had collected in Galicia, and the expedition fell into a familiar pattern. As more men and ships made their way to La Coruna, discussion in Madrid raised the question of taking the long route northwards around the British Isles. This would obviate the necessity to run through La Mancha - 'the sleeve', as the Spaniards called the English Channel - where detection and interception by the enemy seemed almost inevitable.79 In August, the death of Colaert further increased anxiety. At length, Olivares accepted that Flanders could not be reached in this way for the time being. On the other hand, Don Fernando's plight could not be ignored. The count-duke's ever-resourceful mind now opted for a sudden diversionary expedition, in order to relieve pressure on the northern fronts. In effect, the plan of 1634-5 was revived, in conjunction with a scheme to foment a (presumably Huguenot) rebellion around La Rochelle. Reinforced by five galleons from the main armada, Hoces sailed in late August, seeking to land a small army on the French coast, and to do as much damage to shipping as he could. At the same time, Fuentes was pressured into risking a proportion of his fleet, and a squadron under Horna arrived in Hoces' support.80 Though the terrestrial element came to nothing, Horna and Hoces picked up enough prizes amongst enemy shipping to provide transports for thousands more troops. By now, more than 5,000 men had arrived at La Coruna. Since the outbreak of war with France, this safer harbourage, essentially still a small fishing town, had become the main strategic base in the peninsula. Its streets were crowded with Flemish sailors and raw recruits from Andalusia - hardly less unintelligible to the natives - not to mention government officials and businessmen. At one point, a serious riot led to the deaths of several citizens at the hands of Horna's sailors, and from then onwards the atmosphere in the port was malevolent.81 A further inducement for getting the expedition to sea lay in the count-duke's ability to draw on the Mediterranean fleets for reserves. In June, an amphibious expedition from Italy had captured Nice, the main port of 77

78 79 80

81

See Albion, Forests and Sea-Power, p. 9. T h e celebrated mottos of the Spanish Navy, such as 'vale mas la honra sin barcos que barcos sin honra', and 'clavar la bandera' date from a later generation more accustomed to defeat. Rahn Phillips, Six Galleons, pp. 5-7. Pedro Coloma (Secretary of Junta de Armadas) to D o n Fernando, 18 May 1637, A G S / G A 3169. H o c e s ' instructions, 20 Aug. and Contreras to Rozas, 12 Aug., 1637, ibid. By following a misunderstanding of Fernandez D u r o , some commentators have written of two convoying voyages by Hoces forth and back to Flanders between September and December, 1637 (see e.g. C. R. Boxer, The Journal ofMaarten Harpetzoon Tromp (London, 1939), pp. 2-3). Marquis of Mancera to Philip IV [? July] 1637, A R B / C P 1108.

IOI

The great offensive,

1621-1640

France's ally Savoy, and once again the French navy had failed to intervene with any effect. Admiral Oquendo's fleet based in Mahon was, Olivares suspected, largely wasted in this arena.82 Such considerations helped propel Olivares into a typical tactical gamble. At Christmas 1637, orders arrived for Hoces to make for Flanders after all. On 27 December, with nearly forty ships (including twelve Dunkirkers), he headed north into the Channel approaches, and was lucky enough to pick up a good prevailing wind, brisk but not too strong. Carefully hugging the English coast, he achieved his destination in the first days of the New Year. Dutch squadrons, unprepared for action at such a season, and caught in contrary winds, were still tacking to close with him or even struggling out of port. Not only was his voyage a record one of five days, undertaken in the middle of winter, but he delivered more than 4,000 men, almost before they could suffer seasickness, let alone the normal debilitations of such an arduous journey. 'I congratulate your excellency', Don Fernando wrote to his brother's most intimate secretary: 'this success has much encouraged all of us here, especially those who had given up hope of sustenance arriving, after such a long wait. Moreover, it has lowered our enemies' pride, for they are bound to lose heart when they see our sailors run such risks, and yet come safely home.' 83 Olivares had overcome the paralysis of vacillation which had marked the year with a notable, if hair-raising, feat of action. Prevarication was also ended elsewhere. Emergency subsidies of 100,000 escudos were sent with Hoces for the Flanders admiralty, as an earnest of good faith, whilst detailed arrangements were pending. 84 The latter emerged during 1638: an increase of 15,000 escudos in the monthly subsidy for six months of the year, and a one-off further allowance of 200,000 for the construction programme. The regular increase represented was substantial (30 per cent calculated annually), but the sums allocated for shipbuilding contracts still fell far short of what had been estimated. The plan for forty new galleons was shelved; only the frigates could be commissioned, and even then not to the numbers originally proposed.85 These disappointments must be set in context, for alongside them the provision for the army of Flanders was also increased - from 225,000 to 275,000 escudos in the campaigning season. This extra annual commitment of 300,000 escudos doubtless played its part in reducing the treasury's room to 82

83

84 85

'Nota della gente Spagnola userta d'Alessandria inviate alia volta de Nizza ... 10 Giugno 1637', BL/Add 45150, ff. 125-9. 'Vaxeles que se hallan en el Puerto de La Corufia para la Jornada secreta', 13 Oct. 1637, A G S / G A 3169; Don Fernando to Andres de Rozas, 3 Jan. 1638, A R B / S E G 304. (See also same to Philip IV, 2 Jan., ibid., 218, f. 1-2V.) Consulta of Junta de Ejecudon, 14 May 1637, A G S / G A 3169. Salamanca to Galarreta, 16 Sept. 1637 and 14 Jan. 1638, A H N / E 962, ff. 77 and 13. 102

Dunkirk's golden decade manoeuvre as regards the naval subsidy, and in trimming the aspirations which had been abroad in the spring.86 The new levels of subsidy were certainly welcome to the Admiralty. Their business had always been underfunded, and the years since 1630 must have been especially frustrating. Madrid's expectations had escalated continuously, while its promises of support has been as extravagant as they proved to be empty. Now, at last, help had arrived. Philip assured his brother that the security of the armada and its Flemish bases were a constant preoccupation in Madrid. 'You must exercise the greatest possible vigilance [he added] in ensuring that the forts of Dunkirk and Mardyck in particular are kept in the keenest state of defence, for our enemies conspire to capture them and if they succeed it will be a mortal blow for us.' 87 Yet no extra funds were provided by Madrid for the harbour improvements and new artillery installations, recommended by Colaert and others. When work started on the new fortified harbour of Gravelines, eight kilometres west of Mardyck, in 1637, it seems to have been mainly capitalised by local initiative - an investment presumably made worthwhile by the need to soak up the overflow of privateering traffic from Dunkirk.88 Announcing the changes to Don Fernando, Olivares expressed his determination to maintain them, so long as he remained chief minister - 'assuming that the Council of Hacienda will stand by my side, since God knows I receive very little help from anybody in my task'. The count-duke added that 'this armada seems powerful enough to perform great things'. He elaborated upon this cryptic remark; if joined together, the Flanders and main armadas 'would create a fleet able to fight against any other which might be placed in its way, even if it were the Apostles of England. Above all, what a wonderful thing it would be to deliver a maritime blow against the Dutch.' Philip IV had anticipated his valido's enthusiasm: 'it is necessary that we collect our forces, and work in the coming year towards achieving some great enterprise against the Dutch and the French.' These ideas could only have inspired mixed feelings in the hearts of the Cardinal-Infante and his aides.89 In ministerial conclaves, Olivares' now often displayed an insatiable craving for action, in his role as war-lord extraordinary. In August 1637, n e spoke of'the 86

87 88 89

Philip IV to D o n Fernando, 22 Oct. 1637, A R B / S E G 217 f. 316-61V. See also Parker, Army of Flanders, p. 295. Same to same, 19 Sept., 1637, A R B / S E G 217, f. n o . Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, p. 377. Olivares to D o n Fernando, 28 Oct. 1637, B L / A d d . 14007, ff. 8 7 - 9 0 ; Philip IV to same, 22 Oct. 1637, A R B / S E G 217, f. 36 iv. T h e King's inclusion of the French as a possible object of a 'gran empresa', whilst D o n Gaspar restricted himself to the Dutch, is of interest. It suggests that Olivares was making a virtue of the necessity of allowing the Cardinal-Infante the final say over the armada's activities. If it remained focused around Dunkirk, the D u t c h would logically be the target. As early as April 1635, faced with D o n Fernando's stubbornness, he had speculated about 'seeing what might be done with these warships against Holland if we could manage to join them with a n u m b e r of others'; (consulta of Council of State, 19 April 1635, A G S / E 2656). Philip, however, was apparently less inclined to limit the options available.

103

The great offensive, 1621-1640 overwhelming need to improve all the arms and defences of Spain; let us be prepared for anything, exactly as if the enemy was already in view\90 There was no doubt as to which horizon he was now scanning. By the autumn, orders were leaving Madrid for ships and men to be moved from the Mediterranean flank to that of the Atlantic, and in particular, Galicia. The count-duke was beginning to prepare himself and all the Monarchy for another massive military effort, a crusade in which not only the collectivity of physical resources, but spiritualpyschological reserves too, needed to be elicited and enlisted.91 A eulogy of Philip IV and his reign which Olivares commissioned in 1638 pointed out that fifty-two victories had been won in land battles since 1621, but no fewer than eight-four had been gained at sea. As a result 1,900 warships (navios y galeones) and innumerable smaller vessels had been captured.92 These grandiose assertions were inspired by printed accounts of the Dunkirkers' exploits, which had begun to appear in Seville and Madrid. The series of relaciones were examples of a proto-journalistic genre common to many cities of western Europe in this era. To what extent they represented a response to a spontaneous 'popular' interest in the subject-matter, and how far they were government-inspired and subsidised is difficult to guess. Olivares was a skilled exponent of propaganda, and the wealth of detail these fly-sheets deployed is evidence that the official monthly sommaires des prises, sent to Spain by the Flanders Admiralty, were made available to the printers. Yet, like the daily reports in the British press of enemy aircraft shot down during the Battle of Britain, they were likely to have had an avid readership amongst a population which increasingly felt beleaguered by enemies; and, unlike the government figures of 1940, these particular reports were substantially accurate.93 Up to this point, the Dunkirkers' achievements, especially in the war against commerce, had little chance to impress themselves upon the Spanish consciousness. For years, individual Flemish masters, and the occasional raiding party, brought small numbers of (usually Dutch) prizes, into the ports of the northern coasts. The French entry into the war augmented this traffic, adding to it the increase in frequency and daring of the troop-convoy passage. A climax was reached with Hoces' return voyage from Flanders in the early spring of 1638. He now commanded a powerful battle-fleet (thirty warships, including twelve coningsschepen and three privateers), their equipment fully renewed in Flemish dockyards, and was sailing free of the encumbrance of responsibility which 90

91 92

93

Voto of Olivares, Aug. 1637, B L / A d d . 36322, ff. 137-47V. (A copy of the original in A G S / E 2052. Its sentiments might be illustrated copiously from the effusions of these years.) See (e.g.) consulta of & Junta de Estado, [? Nov.] 1637, A G S / G A 1184. J. A. Tapia y Robes, Illustration del Renombre de Grande: Principio, Grandeza y Etimologia ... (Madrid, 1638), pp. 13-13V. Titles of the various examples are entered in full in the bibliography. O n the relaciones generally see H . Ettinghausen, ' T h e News in Spain: Relaciones deSucesos in the Reigns of Philip III and I V , EHQ14 (1984), pp. 1-20.

IO4

Dunkirk's golden decade weighed on his outward journey. On his first day under sail he ran into a Dutch convoy of thirty ships. The Spaniards took half their number, turning back into Mardyck to deposit the prizes. Upping anchor again on 24 March - still before the Dutch blockade fleet had arrived - Hoces had the luck to sight, almost immediately, an even larger Dutch convoy. Ten fluitsschipen and two escorting warships were captured during the encounter which followed. Three further victims were snapped up before the fleet arrived at La Corufia, having collected thirty-two prize vessels in all - more than its own size in number and tonnage.94 It is likely that the feats of other native Spaniards like Horna and Rodriguez, under the leadership of a scion of the house of Guzman el Bueno, imparted lustre to the events of the northern seas in terms of domestic interest. In normal circumstances, a certain disdain for this type of warfare was entrenched amongst the ruling class of Castile, which the prominent role in it of low-born Flemish mariners, who were (in a manner of speaking) cousins of the Dutch rebels and pirates, did nothing to combat. Indeed, it may be safely assumed that the King's honouring of men like Colaert and Coen was about as popular amongst sections of the court establishment as similar favours being extended towards the Jewish bankers. At any rate, Olivares, here as in other aspects of his leadership, was determined to combat such prejudices where they stood in the way of the efficient conduct of the war. The issue of propaganda material concerning the maritime campaign in the North, a special feature of 1638, is merely one reflection of this continuous political struggle. Ironically, just as their fame was beginning to spread, the fortunes of war at last turned against the Monarchy's sailors, and in particular Lope de Hoces. The French invasion of Guipuzcoa in the summer of 1638 was a threat to reputation which pushed everything else into the background of Olivares' mind. The enemy quickly captured Pasajes: in the harbour, twelve war-galleons were in various stages of construction, only four of which managed to scramble out to sea and safety.95 The important fortress of Fuenterrabia was then invested. Olivares and virtually the whole of the peninsula worked frantically to prepare a relief army, and all prospects of another convoy to Flanders were abandoned. Instead, Don Lope was required to succour his native province by sea. Until this moment, the French fleet had gained little distinction, evoking more than a whiff of contempt in their allies' as well as their enemies' camps. Now, however, the French admiral, de Sourdis, deployed a huge fleet in support of the invasion. In August he trapped the outnumbered Hoces at Guetaria, defeating him with heavy losses in a terrible battle, culminating in the destruction of the Spanish capitana - with the admiral himself swimming to the shore. There were thou94 95

Vuelta a Espana de D. Lope de Hoces con su Armada, M N / N a v . 7, ff. 55-5V. E. Zudaire Huarte, El conde duquey Cataluna (Madrid, 1964), p . 150. 105

The great offensive, 1621-1640 sands of irreplaceable human casualties, and amongst the seventeen warships lost were five of the Flanders armada.96 Following a year of complete starvation, so desperate was Don Fernando for reinforcements that he seemed less reluctant to contemplate the despatch of the whole armada to Spain. At the same time, an exhaustive survey of the Monarchy's commitments estimated that a budget of more than 22 million ducats would be needed for the coming year's campaigns, over a third earmarked for Flanders alone.97 With so much depending on the safe transmission of money and men, some shipowners could not resist the tempting terms offered for the use of their stock, despite the attendant dangers. In May 1639, a flotilla of nine ships, contracted by the English businessman Benjamin Wright, left Cadiz with two tercios of (largely unarmed) infantrymen. They were hoping to slip along the English coast, defying the enemies of Spain to attack English ships in their home waters. However, when they were detected and dispersed before reaching their intended shelter, at least two vessels, with around 700 recruits, fell into enemy hands - another 1,500 men being aboard the ships which somehow squeezed through to Flanders. This was the first time that the enemy had captured soldiers in transit during the whole of the Low Countries' wars - a record surely as impressive in its way as the integrity of the silver-fleet until the disaster of Matanzas.98 It was, however, an omen of much worse to follow. After dominating the whole campaign plan for the year 1639, the great fleet of Antonio de Oquendo was to be defeated and badly mauled by the Dutch in the autumn. The losses at Guetaria made the Flemish contribution to this empresa more vital than ever. Quite simply, as Philip informed his brother, every warship of the armada without exception - would be needed in Spain, if he was to expect supplies and reinforcements. Don Fernando remained unhappy. 'Of course, I shall obey Your Majesty in everything', he replied, 'but I cannot refrain from telling you that our intelligence teems with reports of threats to Dunkirk, and if our fleet is obliged to sail for Spain, the port will be left virtually defenceless to attack from the sea.'99 If and when Oquendo arrived, it was implied, he might find the Dutch already in possession of his destination. Madrid was certainly aware that the privateers and the Mardyck garrison between them could put up a better fight than Don Fernando liked to admit; but at any rate another compromise was patched up. When Oquendo sailed, a squadron of thirteen armada ships, mostly made up from its younger frigates, went in the van of his empresa, leading the way to Dunkirk. Their commander, Miguel de Horna, travelled in the main 96 97

98

99

Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 3 9 8 - 4 0 0 . D o n Fernando to Fuentes, 16 Sept. 1638, A R B / S E G 137; 'Disposiciones Militares para el ano de 1639 que vino de Madrid', (endorsed by Salamanca but n.d. [? D e c . 1638]), A H N / E 957. Untitled ms. relation of 1640, B N / 2 3 6 9 , ff. 3 6 5 - 6 . O n this incident see Kepler, Exchange, pp. 6 0 - 3 . D o n Fernando to Philip IV, 19 April 1639, A R B / S E G 2 2 1 , f.307.

106

Dunkirk's golden decade flagship, the Santiago, permitting Don Antonio to draw on his experience at every turn of the voyage.100 During the prolonged 'siege' of Oquendo's fleet in the Downs, (September October 1639) the assistance of the frigates and their skilled masters was of incalculable value. As the Dutch besiegers grew in number (eventually reaching over 100 vessels), the Dunkirkers, sails furled and low in profile, were used to slink around to the north of the Goodwin sands. Going by night, and with the use of their oars, in a series of silent sorties extending over nearly two weeks, they ferried five thousand troops into Dunkirk - escaping almost, but not entirely, scot free.101 On the day following Tromp's attack, Philip (ignorant that the issue was already decided) instructed Brussels to throw Fuentes and his reserve armada ships against the main Dutch force, in an attempt to free Oquendo. 102 Don Fernando thankfully refrained from this reckless measure; and the results of the final battle, though undoubtedly grave, were in the circumstances less devastating than might have been feared. Despite the outright loss of around thirty galleons and ureas, about three-quarters of the infantry, and all the bullion, were rescued. And we must not forget the redoubtable Don Antonio himself, who fought his way clear across the channel, and was able to anchor his battered flagship under the guns of Mardyck, thanks (it was said) to a freak tide which permitted the passage of such a monster galleon.103 Almost exactly three centuries before the word 'Dunkirk' entered British mythology as a symbol of hope snatched from the jaws of disaster, an earlier imperial system at the crossroads of its destiny had good cause to award the place a similar status. Alcala-Zamora has estimated that the series of defeats experienced by Spain at sea in 1638-40 cost over 100 naval units, a dozen admirals, hundreds of other officers and as many as 20,000 ordinary seamen of all nationalities.104 Nevertheless the so-called 'Dunkirk Spirit' sums up the response of the Spanish System to the defeats imposed upon it. The Cardinal 100

101

102 103

104

A fascinating account of O q u e n d o ' s voyage is given by C . R. Boxer in the introduction to his Journal ofTromp. It also forms both focus and climacteric of Alcala-Zamora's Espana, Flandes, (pp. 4 0 2 - 6 4 ) , from which my treatment is taken unless otherwise noted. As early as 15 September, 3,000 soldiers were already in Dunkirk, suggesting that large numbers of frigates eluded T r o m p before the first exchange of fire which took place on that date; see D o n Fernando to Philip IV, 15 Sept. 1639, A R B / S E G 223, f. 120. A few were intercepted later; see 'Carta de D o n Francisco Feijo dando cuenta de la perdida de los vajeles de D u n q u e r q u e ' , B N / 2 3 7 0 , ff. 8 3 - 9 4 . T h e adventurer Simon Mascarenhas (author of the relation cited above in n. 98, where he claimed sole credit for what was salvaged from the Benjamin Wright empresa) posed as the author and main hero of this operation: see 'Memoria de un particular servicio que hizo a su Magestad Simon de Mascarenas el afio de seiscientos y treinta y nueve', ibid., ff. f337~7v. Philip IV to D o n Fernando, 20 Oct. 1639, A R B / S E G 223, f. 386. Estimates of losses at the Downs vary; for a commentary and interpretation, see R. A. Stradling, 'Catastrophe and Recovery: T h e Defeat of Spain, 1 6 3 9 - 4 3 ' , History 64 (1979), pp. 2 0 5 - 1 9 . For the freak tide, Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, p . 5 8 . Alcala-Zamora, Razony crisis, p . 26. 107

The great offensive, 1621-1640 Infante was promised a further grant of 300,000 escudos to fund salvage and repair work on Oquendo's stricken ships, and for purchases in German and (clandestinely) Dutch ports to replace his losses.105 The reaction of Philip the Great differed little from that of his admired predecessor Philip the Prudent: if not in so many words, he thanked God, Whose will had been done on this occasion, but Who had given him the wherewithal to send another fleet. Indeed, even as Tromp moved in for the kill off the Kentish coast, in Madrid Olivares and Philip were planning a fresh operation. A chance to reverse the verdict of Matanzas was offered by a scheme to waylay the incoming Dutch East India fleet. The idea depended on the rapid and reliable transmission of information from Spanish outposts in the Canaries and the Azores to La Coruna. It was recognised that only the armada frigates would be fast enough to carry out the attack, sailing from the Galician port at the right time to intercept the Dutch fleet in the Atlantic approaches, before it could liaise with the naval protection sent from Holland. Philip ordered that the frigates should make preparation for this attack their priority for the coming year: he even suggested (to Miguel de Salamanca, his brother's secretary of State and War), that it would be a magnificent coup if the armada could sail in the first place to the Shetlands, sinking the fishing fleet before turning its attentions to the main objective. By now, such were the achievements and the accompanying fame of the Dunkirkers that in each campaign the wonders expected of them were pitched at a higher level.106 Madrid also insisted that the work of preparing Oquendo's fleet for the return journey had to begin without delay. It was felt that the peninsula's defences were vulnerable in their absence. Fears were especially growing over the security of Portugal, since Madrid had received intelligence that a rebellion was brewing in the kingdom, which might be timed to accompany a landing by the French fleet.107 In November, Don Fernando appointed his main field-commander, the marquis of Velada, to succeed the deceased Fuentes, with supreme authority over Admiralty personnel, and the job of getting Oquendo to sea. Even so, warned the prince, shortages of sailors and naval stores were now so crippling that Velada must be careful not to allow Oquendo too great a share of supplies. Moreover, though the request of the latter for an escort of four or five new frigates all the way to Spain might be granted, the remainder of the armada need only guard him as far as the mouth of the Channel, turning for home once the most dangerous phase was over.108 In the early weeks of 1640, Oquendo came into Santander with the restored survivors of his eventful voyage, about twenty warships (not counting his Flemish escorts) and half as many transport ships.109 105 106 107 108

109

Philip IV to D o n Fernando, 26 Nov. 1639, A R B / S E G f. 110. Same to M de Salamanca, 21 Oct. 1639, A H N / 9 6 3 , f. 193. Stradling, PMz/>/F, p . 184. D o n Fernando to Velada, 18 Nov. and 'Instruction Secreta de lo que vos el M a r q u e s de Velada ... a diez y nueve de Noviembre, 1639', B P U / 3 8 , ff. 70 and 7 4 - 5 . D o n Fernando to Philip IV, 23 Jan. 1640, A R B / S E G 225, ff. 3 1 - 2 . 108

Dunkirk's golden decade Velada's tenure of power in Dunkirk did not last long. He left for London in March 1640, joining a team of ambassadors engaged in the wooing of King Charles I. Horna, the doughty son of Navarre, was now left in effective command, and his meteoric exploits during the course of the year were to represent the last offensive campaign of the Flanders armada as an autonomous force. Horna's ambition and unruliness had already irritated officials in Spain as well as Flanders. In 1637, he had been involved in the troubles in La Corufia.110 In 1638, he applied to the King - a little prematurely it was perhaps felt - for promotion to Admiral, adding the suggestion that he too deserved the honours which had been bestowed on Colaert.111 In subsequent voyages, however, he continued to display dramatic gifts of seamanship and courage. Olivares was impressed with his victory against a stronger French squadron at the end of December 1639, and the following April duly recommended him for promotion to Admiral.112 In June, Horna again left Dunkirk, apparently on a mission to execute the voyage suggested earlier by Philip, which was intended to climax in the capture of the Dutch East Indies fleet. Exactly as the King himself had suggested, he sailed initially for the fishing grounds. En route, however, he came across a Dutch Baltic convoy off Jutland, and captured no fewer than five escorting warships, in addition to less important prizes. The two most powerful Horna incorporated into his force; the others, after being stripped of all useful fittings, were sunk. Horna then sailed due west; he either missed the trawling concentrations altogether, or, having already fought one stiff battle, decided to pass them by in order to economise on energy, munitions and time. At any rate, he came around Scotland and Ireland, arriving in the mouth of the English Channel exactly on schedule in the first days of July. Another victim now hove into view, a great Dutch galleon, richly loaded and unprotected. Unable to resist the temptation, Horna delayed to pick up this tasty morsel. Almost as if it were a deliberate decoy, a Dutch squadron, out looking for Horna, appeared and closed rapidly. The Spaniard attempted escape, needing to conserve his forces if he were to execute the ultimate coup against the East Indiamen. The armada got the worst of the running fight which followed. Several ships were damaged, and the almiranta was cut off and captured, its commander immediately being put to death. By the time they reached La Coruna, Horna's frigates were in no condition to be rapidly turned around, and in any case the word was out. Now protected by a screen of Dutch warships, Jan Coompagnie's fleet passed through the Channel without hindrance. In Dunkirk, the veedor, Jean Gavarelle, was furious at the missed opportunity, 110 111

112

Marquis of Mancera to Philip IV (see above, n. 81). Don Fernando to Fuentes, 23 June 1638, ARB/SEG 137; ('antes de tomar Su Magd. resolucion me ha mandado le de mi parecer. Informeisme de los meritos deste capitan ...') Consulta of Council of State, 28 April 1640, AGS/E 2055. IO9

The great offensive, 1621—1640 blaming both Horna himself and poor organisation in La Coruna. 'In Holland they had given up their flota for lost', he complained, 'and this has been a greater disaster for us than anything else in this war.' Gavarelle expressed suspicion that the commander's behaviour had been dominated by his ambition, adding, in some disgust, 'Admirals like Colaert and Miguel Jacobsen would never have abaondoned a second-in-command to his fate in this way . . . The Flemings here, and especially the mariners, speak very ill of this whole matter.' 113 Horna later atoned for this misjudgement. On his return to Flanders he neatly evaded Tromp, and slipped into Dunkirk with 500 recruits from the Canary Islands. In all, over 1,500 fresh men reached the army of Flanders during the year, despite use of a highway swarming with enemy warships. Moreover, as we have seen, the year was one of the most active and successful on record for the privateers, whose relentless campaign, much to the dismay and concern of the Dutch, showed not the slightest sign of diminution.114 It is doubtful whether the war-lord, during his remaining years in power, had further opportunity for sustained consideration of the war in the North Sea. With the sudden revolt of the Catalans in June 1640, followed as it was by the secession of Portugal six months later, Olivares became preoccupied with the intra-peninsular struggle, a fight for the survival of Castile itself. Nevertheless, at his death in 1 6 4 5 , t n e count-duke's fascination with and concern for things maritime was once again acknowledged. In his will, Don Gaspar bequeathed the sum of 100,000 ducats and some land, 'so that a college of seamanship may be setup in Seville'.115 113

114

115

Gavarelle to Salamanca, 25 July and 2 Aug. 1640, AHN/E 959, from which the above account of Horna's voyage is taken. The summary execution of the vice-admiral suggests that Dutch prisoners had been murdered in its earlier stages. Salamanca to Olivares, 23 Sept. 1640 ibid. See also, Malo, Les Corsaires I, pp. 361-9. No doubt far more troops would have made the journey had not the Catalan revolt diverted many companies originally intended for Flanders. 'Relation de Algunos clausulos de un testamento que el conde duque dejo en poder del Conde de Grafal ...', BN/7371, ff. 167-7V. Such an academy had been recommended by several arbitristas del mar, and most recently by Admiral Antonio de Isasi. Alas, the legacy was never realised.

IIO

PART III

Dunkirk and the defence of Empire, i640-1658

Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009

The Flanders fleet in the South

CRISIS OF IDENTITY

Joseph Bergaigne, exiled bishop of the town of's Hertogenbosch, having been at court on royal service, was returning to Flanders in the last weeks of 1640. After an uncomfortable journey across northern Spain from Burgos to La Coruna, he was further frustrated on arrival, to find the vessel waiting for his conveyance. The good priest's patience was not what might be expected from a humble pilgrim travelling on the hard road to Galicia. Naturally, I console myself with resignation to the will of God, considering also the duty which I owe my King. But the transport here, which was supposed to be a Dunkirk frigate, turns out instead as only the packet-boat which has brought the mail from Flanders, a tiny craft manned by only seven or eight crew, with no guns, and hardly the kind of thing to which a person of condition should be obliged to entrust his safety.1 Considerate though he normally was over the sacrifices made in his service, it seems doubtful that Philip IV had time to be greatly exercised by the bishop's plight. The Catalan rebellion was making dramatic inroads into his authority, and the shattering news of the Lisbon uprising had only just reached Madrid. The shortage of men was such that only the importance of communications with Flanders, and no consideration for the feelings of persons of condition, prevented the packet-boatmen from being pressed into the navy proper. Our priest was lucky to find transport at all, and in any case should not have been so worried. As Philip's more intimate spiritual adviser, Sor Maria, expressed it around this time, Spain's little boat may have been awash, but it was rendered unsinkable by Faith and Grace.2 Indeed, the metaphor of the battleship has never been so perfect a representation of the condition of a great polity as in the case of the Spanish Monarchy in the 1640s. Nearly a generation before, the lugubrious count of Gondomar had perhaps been a little precipitate in warning Olivares that the ship of the Monarchy was going down with all hands.3 Now, however, it 1 2

3

Bergaigne to Rozas, 23 Dec. 1640, AGS/E 2055. C. Seco Serrano (ed.), Cartas de la venerable Sor Maria deAgreday del Senor Rey Don Felipe IV (2 vols., Madrid, 1958), 1, p. viii. Quoted by J. H. Elliott, in 'Self-Perception and Decline in Early Seventeenth Century Spain', repr. in his Spain and its World, 1500—1700 (Princeton, 1988), p. 241.

"3

Dunkirk and the defence of Empire,

1640-1658

certainly resembled a great and ramshackle galleon that had been sailed too far across an unknown ocean. In a state of disrepair from the remorseless action of the elements, stores were exhausted, and the crew dying one by one; it seemed to be drifting helplessly towards the edge of the world on the thunderous horizon. Shortly before Bergaigne's complaint, the King heard from his navy commissioner on the Cantabrian coast that 'the shortage of seamen is acute in these parts, and it is doubtful whether I will be able tofillmore than ninety places in the fleet'. In reply, the Junta de Armadas could only recommend 'that the garrison soldiers in those ports should be obliged to crew the warships. Their pay and supplies may be withheld until they conform with this order.'4 The demand for mariners was intensified by the sudden creation of new fronts, on both flanks of Castile itself. Potential naval bases now existed within the rebel territories for the French, from which the loyal provinces of the peninsula could be threatened. In this way, all the inshore waters of the peninsula became theatres of war. The almost overwhelming agglomeration of problems led the Junta de Armadas to a proposition from England for a joint venture against the Muslim corsair centres in Morocco. This branch of the Barbaries, known in England as the 'Sallee Rovers', had begun to do serious damage to the trade of Wales and the West Country. Charles I offered to send an expedition against the pirates, on condition that Spain assist his efforts with two up-to-date Dunkirk frigates. A similar request had been rejected in 1618, but this time Madrid decided to support the idea. A contract was agreed, and though transfer of armada vessels, or the actual commandeering of suitable privateers, were both denied, orders were sent to Brussels to encourage the latter to enlist in the expedition on special terms. Suspicion of England had not disappeared, and some ministers were apprehensive about the presence of an English squadron in the Straits. But the advantages overrode these fears. It was a good moment to ease a perennial threat, at such small expense. Moreover, the asentista gave an undertaking that all Spanish prisoners or galley-slaves found in Muslim hands - including many sailors - would be released.5 The outbreak of civil war in England presumably vitiated this promising scheme. However, there was some compensation in the spring of 1641, when agreement was reached with the United Provinces for another exchange of prisoners, this time involving Oquendo's men captured by Tromp at the Downs. The seamen were immediately despatched to Spain, in order to man new warships planned for construction in Guipuzcoa.6 Whatever the principles involved, in practice the dangers to which metro4 5

6

Philip IV to F. de la Riva Herrera, 5 Sept. 1640, AHP(C)/CEM 6, no. 7. P. Coloma to Rozas, 12 Jan and 15 Feb., AGS/E 2522; asiento of 20 Feb. and Hopton to Vane, 9 march, PRO/SP 94/44, ff. 122-3 a n d 138-9; (all 1641). The English agent and prospective leader of this expedition was, coincidentally, named Robert Blake - no relation of the man who was to enter these lists to such effect a decade later. Royal Decree (countersigned by P. Coloma), 23 March 1641, AGS/2056. 114

The Flandersfleetin the South politan Spain was now exposed were bound to take precedence over the needs of Flanders. Admiral Antonio de Isasi argued that the logistics of 'intensas guerras' within the peninsula made sea-power not less but more important. A strong navy could forestall attacks, ferrying troops and equipment rapidly from one front to another as the situation demanded. Isasi acknowledged that the most severe problem was that of rinding mariners, 'since we are still 800 crewmen short for the sixty warships [ofthe Armada del Mar Oceano\\ The remedy was to transfer the Flanders navy to Spain on a permanent basis. Dunkirk frigates were faster, and no less powerful, than Spanish-built galleons of 100 and more tons greater burthen, and yet, pro rata, they were much less crew-intensive. For the moment, however, especially since Olivares remained as chief minister, this was a nettle which could not be grasped.7 Early in 1640, the marquis of Velada was instructed that 'before you leave [Dunkirk] for England, you should report on the state of the armada, and the extent to which repairs have been completed after the affair of the Downs'.8 At this stage, Oquendo's defeat seemed in itself no reason why the pattern of maritime strategy established in the previous decade should not be maintained. Within a few months, however, Brussels was coming to recognise the radical changes in Madrid's orientation. Ever since the outbreak of war with France, increasing numbers of private ships were expropriated in Spain, and contacts within the United Provinces had been exploited (always 'con todo secreto') in order to arrange clandestine purchase of ships.9 In 1640, Miguel de Salamanca stepped up the policy of seeking out 'convertible' merchantmen in various ports north of Brussels. By October, he had collected a motley flotilla of seven vessels (over 3,000 tons), mostly from Dutch sources. These were not destined for the Flanders armada; instead they were despatched directly to the South.10 Warships represented only the most spectacular item in the catalogue of strategic inadequacies. When Oquendo returned to Spain, in place of the troops and specie of his outward journey, he carried a huge consignment of small arms for use on the Pyrenean frontier.11 As we have seen, many recruits sailing for Flanders in the later 1630s even lacked pikes. Spain's armaments factories, which for so long had concentrated on production of high-quality weapons for the aristocratic hunting and officer class, simply could not respond to the requirements of standard mass production increasingly imposed by total war. With the outbreak of the revolts, and the formation of new armies inside Spain, demands for materiel de guerre from northern sources reached almost frenetic 7 8 9

10

11

Untitled ms. memo by Isasi (? 1641), B N / I I O I I , ff. 285-7V. Salamanca to Velada, 14 March 1640, BPU/38, f. 318. See (e.g.) Roose to Philip IV, 6 May and minute of Junta de Armadas, 22 May 1637, AGS/GA 3169: consulta of Council of Finance, 8 Jan. 1640, ibid., CJH 806. Salamanca to Olivares, 23 Sept. and 15 Oct. 1640, AHN/959; 'Inventarios y Condiciones ...' Oct. 1640, AGS/E 2055. See the lists sent by Philip IV to Salamanca, Feb. 1640, AHN/E 963, ff. 168-9.

Dunkirk and the defence of Empire,

1640-1658

levels - arquebuses, muskets, carbines, and pistols by the thousand were ordered, along with gunpowder by the ton. The hardworking officials of the Brussels government were saddled with the extra problem of managing this trade. They did so in a situation where the outbreak of conflict in Britain, first the Anglo-Scots quarrels of 1638-40 followed by civil war 'proper' in 1642, intensified an already existing seller's market. But men to wield the weapons were missing too. Beginning in the mid-1630s, foreign auxiliary troops were imported into the peninsula for the first time since the revolt of the Comuneros over a century before. Recruits from Lombardy, Tuscany and Naples came to take part in the campaigns on the Catalan-French frontier, and not long afterwards, an Irish tercio was ferried from Flanders to take part in the defence of Fuenterrabia on the opposite flank of the Pyrenees. By 1640, Madrid was demanding that Flanders supply Walloon soldiery (from garrison towns) for its peninsular armies, and shortly the 'balance of trade' in troops between Spain and Flanders was swinging in favour of the latter. As early as the summer of 1641, mercenary troops from the Catholic South of Germany were awaiting shipment in Dunkirk. Madrid was shortly to abandon all except the pretence of a confessional qualification for its phalanxes.12 This traffic, which, if it did not suddenly spring into existence, experienced a great surge of activity in 1640, was also sustained by sources in Flanders dependent as it was on Antwerp businessmen and Flemish shipowners. Such contractors nearly always specified delivery by Dunkirk frigates as an essential part of their services - indeed they would often entrust this commodity to no other form of transport. Several armateurs - prominent amongst them the Dunkerquois, Jacques le Gouvernour - began to engage in 'legitimate' (if still hazardous) trade for the first time in many years. Simultaneously, Spain's recruiting agents and military provisioners began to pullulate in the highways and byways of Europe, spreading out in a broad swathe of activity from Brussels to Vienna.13 The resources of the whole Counter-Reformation world, mobilised to cope with Spain's supreme military crisis, were simply not enough. By mid-decade, even Philip IV was compelled to recognise that the war with France - or at least that part of it being fought out within the peninsula - could only be conducted with the co-operation of the enemies' Dutch allies. After 1635, and^/w mosso after 1640, the commercial war with the Dutch, and the economic-strategic 12

13

Contracts and lists of Nov.-Dec. 1640 in AHN/E 959, ff. 25-33; Philip IV to Don Fernando, 18 May and lists of June 1641, ARB/SEG 229, ff. 84 and 237; consulta of Council of State, 13 Oct. 1641, AGS/2056. The royal cosmographer, della Faille, who was sent to the Portuguese front as chief military engineer, directed a stream of requests to van Langren in Brussels for up-to-date information about his unexpected new duties (see van der Vywer Lettres, pp. 161-71). The present writer hopes to give closer attention to these aspects of Spain's military crisis in a future study. Details scattered in AHN/E 959, 963 and 973; ARB/SEG 228-9; AGS/ 2055-6 (allpassim).

The Flandersfleetin the South rationale of the Almirantazgo, were quietly compromised, as permits were sold to private Dutch firms for a range of services. Spain still disposed of some highly negotiable commodities from the Dutch point of view - above all the Seville trade, and the silver to which it gave access. The steady flow of resources from the Spanish Netherlands to the South was naturally - if not publicly - welcomed in the United Provinces. But it remained difficult to tempt Dutch businessmen into the blatant infringement of the French alliance represented by carriage of weapons or troops to Spain. Also, the Portuguese rebellion removed a major bargaining factor - the salt-pans of Setubal in the Tagus estuary - from Madrid's control. The Dutch quickly came forward to corner this valuable market, in return supplying the war needs of new (if unofficial) allies, whose patriotic armies were now manning the long landward frontier with Castile.14 The logic of these developments for the continuance of war against the Dutch did not escape Madrid. We are in a transitional stage where the changing hum of the dynamo, gradually shifting its register, is almost audible. The demise of a policy which had dominated Madrid's strategic thinking for so long could hardly be a sudden event. For the time being, indeed, the guerra ofensiva por mar was given fresh impetus by the need to contain the Portuguese revolt. The Dunkirkers - armada and privateers - received orders from Madrid to disrupt the links between the Dutch and the Braganza regime. But the armateurs put it to Gavarelle that such investment needed a guarantee of returns; licences had to be discontinued, and all trade to Portugal, including that of neutrals, should be liable.15 Profits in the conduct of business as usual with the Dutch as yet showed little sign of diminution, and a good haul of prizes continued to dock at Dunkirk. In 1644, not many less than sixty privateers were still at work. Madrid, its priorities in flux, now considered tempting these adventurers to Spain, offering special terms for the campaign against Portugal.16 The older blockade - that of the Flemish coast - had in the meantime been built up to its most asphyxiating level. While individual frigates still regularly crept out by night, the armada as a force was more-or-less strictly confined. It failed to make a significant break-out during the whole of 1640, despite costly attempts by Horna and others, and when a squadron finally managed to get to sea, the resulting attack on the fishing-grounds was abortive.17 Following Horna's death, operational command of the squadron returned to the native, in the person of Joos Pietersen. His appointment was a reward for reaching Spain with a squadron of five frigates during 1641. 18 The new admiral was persuaded to cross another important threshhold, and armada vessels for the first time acted in conjunction with the main Armada in a campaign entirely confined to 14 15 16 17 18

Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 336ff. Gavarelle to Don Fernando, 11 Feb. 1641, ARB/SEG 228, ff. 93-3V. See (e.g.) note by Geronimo de la Torre, 8 Dec. 1644, AGS/E 2061. Salamanca to Olivares, 11 Dec. 1640, AHN/E 959. Royal decree of 7 July 1641 (countersigned Coloma), AGS/E 2056. 117

Dunkirk and the defence of Empire, 1640—1658 Spanish waters. Only a few weeks after Pietersen's promotion, Don Fernando died, and as Salamanca did not delay in pointing out, this left the Admiralty without higher direction from any Spanish official. Whilst the former event increased the chances of transferring the whole force to Spain, the latter risked cancelling this opportunity by placing too much influence in the hands of Gavarelle and the native-dominated Supreme Council in Brussels.19 Olivares was obliged to ponder the problem from the awkward vantage-point of Zaragoza, whence the court debouched in the summer of 1642, enabling Philip IV at last to fulfil his personal military calling. Though it was decided to send Pietersen back to Flanders in late 1642, it was evident that the trajectory of this established route had now been diametrically reversed. Heretofore, its main function had been to ferry troops and subsidies from Spain to Flanders. Now, on the contrary, it operated largely in order to bring men and materials to Spain.20 In effect, the base of operations was no longer Dunkirk, but La Coruna, or even Cadiz. The Flanders armada was crossing the bar. CROSSING THE BAR

From the early 1640s onwards the Flanders armada was no longer dedicated wholly, or even primarily, to the needs of war in the North; indeed it becomes difficult to regard it as a unitary force at all. Although its ships are still usually referred to as belonging to the 'armada de Flandes', there was no time when they were all present in Flanders. Moreover, the fleet was to be increasingly atomised, as individual frigates were detached for special duties where speed and reliability was of the essence. Thus they were to be found in many different parts and ports. On the other hand, the armada retained its administrative and financial autonomy, and not until much later was it demoted to the status of a mere 'squadron'. 21 The fate of the Flanders armada to some extent reflected that suffered by another naval force, originally conceived (and still advocated by many) as an autonomous force, established to defend a crucial nexus of Empire - the so-called Windward Squadron {Armada deBarlovento).22 Discussed and planned for nearly half-a-century, it was intended to be based permanently in the Caribbean. Its main task was to mount patrol in the Windward Islands, in the vicinity of those fairly remote interstices favoured for entry into the Hispanic world by interlopers of all nationalities. After what was a lengthy period of gestation even by the standards of the Spanish Empire, the squadron finally struggled to birth in the early 1640s, with the new French enemy acting as a sort 19 20 21

22

Consulta of Council of State, 5 Dec. 1641, ibid. Queen Isabel to Count of Castrillo, 2 Nov. 1642, A H N / H a c . 7887, f. 6 i v . This is corroborated by the absence of its records from the official pay-lists of the naval authorities in Cadiz, when those of all other units are present; A G M / 3 0 9 2 (1639—50). Torres Ramirez, Armada de Barlavento, esp. pp. 3 9 - 6 8 .

The Flandersfleetin the South of accoucheuse. Its main source of funds was local, and several of its ships were locally-built. Yet no sooner had it achieved its first success (June, 1641) than it was detached for guard service in the Flota-convoy to Spain, because of the acute shortage of ships obtaining after the destruction of the Brazil expedition the year before. It sailed to discharge this unwanted commission, but was disabled by storms before it reached the Atlantic. The full extent of the emergency of the motherland had now dawned on the colonial authorities, and on recovery the squadron was again commandeered for the Atlantic run to Spain. Subsequently, the Windward Squadron spent half the remaining period of its first existence (1642-8) in the flaccid bosom of the motherland, its equipment shamelessly cannibalised to equip other squadrons and regiments. During the first half of the decade the royal Dunkirkers were also thoroughly exploited. In December 1641, Pietersen was ordered to join in the blockade of the Portuguese coast, 'but on no account to round Cape Finisterre' - as if Madrid feared the Dunkirkers might mutiny and make a break northwards once they reached that point.23 Indeed, Brussels received instructions that the remaining armada vessels - some twenty in all - should sail to Spain with troops and materials as soon as possible. The latter were anxiously awaited in La Coruna as the 1642 campaign approached, whilst the former, after disembarking the men, were to go on to Cadiz. In the event, this voyage was never made, Philip minuting in June that 'things are in a different state now, since the Hollanders have placed a fleet outside the port5.24 Moreover, Pietersen was allowed to return to winter in Flanders that year, and in each of the two following. Though this had the effect of preserving the link with Flanders for a little longer, the reasons were selfish - the need to obtain expert overhaul of the frigates by native shipwrights, and this done, to bring mercenaries back to Spain in time for the summer campaigns on the Catalan frontiers. By 1643, t n e bulk of the armada - its higher-quality component - was effectively based in Cadiz. That September, Philip noted that 'I have decided that the fourteen warships of the armada of Flanders should return to Dunkirk', but added, 'and with them should be sent sufficient funds for refitting in Flanders so that they will be able to return here ready for the coming year's work'.25 With the passing of Don Fernando, to be succeeded by governors of lesser status, the cause of an indigenously-based squadron was deprived of its main protector. Not long afterwards, the overthrow of Olivares was followed by Philip IV's direct assumption of personal power. These changes meant that the ritual dance of competing interests over control of the armada no longer prevailed. If some officials in Flanders remained sensitive on the issue, and sheer political 23

Consulta of Junta de Armadas, 20 D e c . 1641, A G S / G A 3 2 0 5 . Consulta of Council of State, 19 May; consulta of Junta de Armadas, 12 J u n e and 11 Sept., 1642, ^~ibid 25 Royal decrees of 28 Sept. 1643, A H N / H a c . 7888, f. 10 and 22 Nov. 1644, ibid. 7889, f. 239V. 24

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tact dictated that matters should not be spelled out in full, the King was less inhibited than previously in requiring that the needs of Castile should supersede those of his 'obedient provinces'. In December 1643, n e g a v e explicit instructions that 'the best eight warships of the armada of Flanders must return to Spain at the end of March, for service in the Armada del Mar Oceano\26

Don Francisco de Melo, the gifted Portuguese administrator-soldier whom Olivares had promoted to command in Brussels, agreed with the King's implication that there was no viable alternative to transfer. Melo mentioned some of the operational factors referred to above - improved Dutch blockade, and proliferation of exemption licences amongst an ostensible enemy. But he cited as his main reason the chronic shortage of supply from Spain, which made it impossible to support the fleet, adding pointedly that virtually all prizemonies had long since been consigned to beneficiaries at the court of Madrid. However, not all Don Francisco's subordinates concurred with his complaisance. The two officials most nearly concerned, the marquis of Leiden, new governor of Dunkirk and captain-general of the armada, and Alonso de Uribarri, inspector-general, naturally opposed the idea of a final rupture, arguing for a continuation of its recent practice of wintering in Flanders.27 The Council of State considered the issue at a meeting in the Aragonese town of Fraga in April, 1644.28 The discussion formed part of a wideranging debate about the relative military priorities the Monarchy now confronted, a convocation which ended in the decision that - other things being equal - the peninsular fronts would be placed foremost in the allocation of all military resources. By this time, the army of Flanders, starved of pay, supplies and reinforcements, had been forced onto the defensive against France, and the threat to the security of Gravelines and Dunkirk from their southern hinterlands was manifest. As the vice closed, so the prospects of the armada continuing a useful service in that theatre inexorably lessened. Most ministers agreed that Dunkirk's value, both commercial and strategic, had been significantly eroded. The brave experiment of creating an 'alternative Antwerp' had failed. Several of them, however, continued to resist the corollary - that only Dutch maritime and financial services could meet the Monarchy's needs. For his part the King argued that even if Dutch contracts were strictly limited to strategic commodities 'this would give them commercial concessions in my kingdoms which they 26

27

28

Royal decree of 3 D e c . 1643, ibid., f. 67V. (my italics). In fact, according to Uribarri, sixteen returned south in the summer of 1644 (memo of ?Feb. 1647 m A G S / G A 3258. Memos of Melo, Leiden and Uribarri, with consulta of Council of State, 5 April 1644, A G S / E 2060. Unless otherwise noted, material in the four subsequent paragraphs is based on the consulta cited in n. 27 above. For the context of the military crisis of the 1640s, and the 'congress' of Fraga, see Stradling, Philip IV, pp. 209-22 and 284ff. 120

The Flandersfleetin the South would wish to make permanent. This is the objective for which they have prosecuted this war, and therefore might prove a means of perpetuating rather than ending it.' 29 Pregnant with paradox, alive with ethical equivocation as this step was, it nonetheless could no longer be deferred. Bowing to the arguments of the realists, Philip stipulated that the issue of every asiento to men whom he still regarded as in rebellion against him should be decided on its merits; and insisted that he should be consulted in each specific case. In the first instance, contracts worth 600,000 would be offered: suitable Dutch firms would become clandestine financiers to the crown. Doubtless partly as a conscience-salver, other loans worth 100,000, partly secured on the media anata de juros, were earmarked for the resuscitation of naval shipyards in northern Spain. New warships were duly commissioned, but the programme produced sparse results. Reserve stocks of timber in the Basque country had been consumed or destroyed during the French invasion of 1638. In Flanders, even when supplies could be procured it was impossible to get them to Spain. By the same token, building of new frigates was virtually at a standstill because of Tromp's blanket interruption of raw materials.30 In harmony with the conclusions reached at Fraga, the Council of State ordained that the armada of Flanders should be sent to Spain, with no guarantee of its return: Tour Majesty's will alone to decide on this point whenever the fortunes of war permit.5 A month later Melo duly reported that several ships had already left, six were close to the point of sailing, and - perhaps equally satisfactory - that twelve privateer ships were also on their way. All these were to assist in the blockade of Portugal.31 In the event, some vessels proved unable to make it during 1644, DUt s u c n w a s t n e n e e d for any old tub that might be sailed into action that a further reminder, accompanied by an enabling subsidy, was sent, so that these - 'the oldest hulks we have, decayed and eaten away with ship-worm' - could also be despatched. 32 After suffering reprimand for dragging his feet, Leiden grudgingly accepted the fact that his command had no future. His change of mind was assisted by indications that the Franco-Dutch forces were determined upon the capture of Dunkirk in 1645, a n d t n a t t n e P o r t was, in any case (as the new governor of Flanders, Castel Rodrigo, reported to Madrid), almost wholly indefensible. Almost as Leiden wrote, the remaining

29 30

31 32

Philip IV to Melo, 28 Jan. 1644, A R B / S E G 2 3 1 , ff. 103-3V. Same to Hacienda, 18 J u n e ; memo, by M . de Urnietta & note of G. de la T o r r e , 8 Nov., A G S / C J H 864; decree of 15th Aug., A H N / H a c . 7889, f. 145; Castel Rodrigo to Philip IV, 23 Nov., A R B / S E G 232, ff. 134-4V.; (all 1644). Consulta of Council of State, 12 May 1644, A G S / E 2 0 6 1 . Melo passed on the order for definitive transfer to his successor, Castel Rodrigo, (30 Sept. 1644, A R B / S E G 9obis, f. 330). Philip then repeated it for good measure (to same, 13 Dec. 1644, ibid. 232, f. 197). T h e quotation is from one of veedor Uribarri's memos of this year (see n. 27 above). 121

Dunkirk and the defence ofEmpire, 1640-1658 warships in the harbour were being stripped of their guns in order to increase firepower on the town walls.33 The long-expected onslaught on the Flemish ports indeed developed during 1645, a n d Dunkirk itself was destined to fall before the end of the following campaign. With that awkward admixture of bathos which history so often provides, when these events came about, the attention of the Spanish government, for so long concentrated on the North, was focused elsewhere. In 1645-7, t n e French were also attempting the capture of the key Catalan town of Lerida (Lleida) - a threat which absorbed the energies and resources of all Spain. After 1642, remaining naval strength was poured back into the Mediterranean theatre, a move which reflected the precedence of the Catalan front over that of Portugal as well as Flanders. But this shift of focus also meant a reaction away from maritime priorities altogether, back to the terrestrial. Pace Admiral Isasi, the integrity of Castile could only be defended - in the last resort - by the army. Philip IV personally took part in the defence of Lerida. Naturally, along with his ministers and generals, he was much less alive to the fate of Dunkirk. In the winter of 1646-7, it seemed to be recognised that the forthcoming campaign would be decisive for the very survival of the Monarchy, under devastating pressure as it was both in Spain and Italy. Frantic attempts - perhaps the most panic-driven of the whole century - were set in motion to raise men and gather materials for the relief of Lerida. Leganes, main field commander in Aragon, pointing out that naval operations on the Atlantic seaboard were currently of reduced priority, proposed that the main armada be left in harbour, while all its marines were transferred to Spain's eastern front. A Junta de Guerra concurred, 'so that no conceivable source of assistance be left unexploited in such a crucial matter' as the struggle on the Aragon-Catalonia frontier. With the King's agreement, 1,500 men were to be transported from Cadiz to Tortosa, protected in convoy by the frigates of Dunkirk.34 A week later, Dunkirk itself fell to the French. The fall of the port forced the officers of the Admiralty as well as its sailors into effective exile. In 1647, Uribarri left to take charge of the armada's administration in Cadiz. As for its general condition Leiden caustically remarked that he could hardly be expected to make any report, since he had not actually set eyes on any of his ships for three years. At the time of writing, not a single vessel of the armada remained in Flanders. Now that he had lost his base as well as his fleet, Leiden's command was a nebulous entity. Ostend, and its satellite harbour of Nieuwpoort, were to prove fairly satisfactory substitutes for 33 34

Castel Rodrigo to Philip, Jan. 17, 4 March, & 29 April 1645, ibid. ff. 247 and 314-14V.; and ibid.

233, f. i n . Consulta of Junta de Guerra, 6 Sept. 1646, A G S / G A 1621.

122

The Flandersfleetin the South the privateering vessels, but they were considerably less so as a terminal for the strategic exchange machinery of the Spanish System.35 It should be conceded that all aspects of the communications service were now drastically reduced in volume and frequency. The single royal zabra boarded by Bishop Bergaigne in 1640 exemplified the situation. Before a freak storm destroyed many of their number in January 1627, several dozen of these craft had been utilised in the postal and commercial traffic under the auspices of the Almirantazgo.36 For some years to come, nevertheless, desultory exchanges were maintained, though largely by the contractual employment of private vessels. Many mercenary Walloon soldiers and Flemish sailors migrated in small but useful numbers towards the incentives of the South.37 Astonishingly, even at the point of apparent nadir, the flow was not wholly in one direction. For example, in February 1648 - once Lerida had been relieved - and again three years later levies raised in Castile reached Flanders for service in the army now commanded by Philip's cousin, Leopold-William of Austria.38 BOXING THE COMPASS

The reputation of the Flanders frigates underwent further enhancement once they had been transferred to 'home' waters. The first major action which they fought was described as 'a singular and almost miraculous event' - though admittedly by a member of the Jesuit mission who sailed with the armada. Pietersen and his flotilla were sent out to find and escort the incoming Flota de Galeones from the Caribbean. The latter was suspiciously late, because its component parts had been delayed by bad weather before gathering in Cuba. These were the same tempests which had (inter alia) devastated the Windward Squadron, thus seriously weakening the fleet's convoy guard. It was known that considerable enemy forces had gathered with the intention of intercepting the Flota. Sure enough, Pietersen arrived on station to find a combined FrancoPortuguese fleet of forty-six sail lying in wait. Twice on successive days, Pietersen attacked the enemy, inflicting such damage that they were forced to withdraw. The Dunkirkers escaped without serious loss, and as a result of their action the silver-fleet safely crept home.39 35 36 37 38

39

Report of Leiden, Brussels, 10 J u n e 1647, A H N / E 978. See consulta of Junta de Armadas and list of 18 Jan. 1627, A G S / G A 3 1 5 1 . Philip to Archduke Leopold-William, 14 April 1648, A R B / S E G 239, f. 320. A. Martinez to Salamanca, 4 F e b . 1648, ibid. 9 7 3 ; Consejo de Guerra to M . de Barnuelo [PBarnwell], 5 May 1651, A G S / G A 1798. (The two instances given here are certainly not unique for the period.) 'Copia de u n a carta ... en que da cuenta del feliz succeso que tuvieron cinco navios de D u n q u e r q u e contra 46 de Portugal y Francia. Sucecido en once y doce de Septiembre de 1641', M N / N a v . 7, ff. 1 3 8 - 4 3 . See also R. C . Anderson's essay (below, n. 43), where slightly less impressive figures of forty versus eight are given. As a further consequence of this action the main armada under the Duke of Ciudad Real (and including the Dunkirkers) was able to defeat a

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This story clearly belongs to a genre of tales of the sea, with the emphasis on heroic rearguard action, which increasingly came to dominate Spanish maritime lore in the prolonged era of the country's eclipse by the northern powers. Here, as so often in the future, the narrative of struggle against overwhelming odds is embellished with a religious-chauvinist fervour. Its resonances stretch back to the origins of Christian knighthood, Amadis and Roland - or even further, to the legend of Numantia and the somehow tunelessly Iberian topos of '{no pasaran!' Whatever the distortions of its textual presentation, however, Pietersen's fight illustrates two solid empirical facts which are thoroughly corroborated from other sources. First, that the balance of naval forces, at no point in the conflict actually favourable to Spain, had now turned against her even in Iberian waters; and second, that the era in which the Flanders armada provided the spearhead of the strategy of 'guerra ofensiva' was over and done with. The Dunkirkers now became merely a link - albeit one of the strongest - in a chain of defences around a Spanish-Italian world, which was undergoing everincreasing tension and pressure. The significance of their role in relation to the global concerns of the Monarchy, if appreciated at the time, became somewhat obscured in the passage of centuries. In June 1643, t n e Flanders armada again ventured into the Atlantic, this time in greater numbers, to escort the outgoing Tierra Firme fleet as far as the Canary Islands. Three hundred years later, when editing the documents where this sortie is recorded, the naval archivist Captain Vicente Vela could not disguise his astonishment at the revelation that a Flemish force was used to protect the Carrera.*0 More surprisingly still, in the mid-1640s it was proposed that the privateers of Dunkirk might be persuaded to serve, not only in the Atlantic, but actually within the Caribbean, as a replacement for the Armada de Barlovento. In Dunkirk there are many frigates of war, and if they should be offered a reward of 1,000 ducats above their ordinary pay, the people of that town will willingly go to the aforesaid islands with a squadron of six or eight sail to take prizes and to molest those who frequent them. The proposal was a reductio ad absurdum of the principle accepted by all strategists - if rarely spelled out in a society still weighed upon with the culture of Christian knighthood - that maritime war involved fighting piracy with piracy. Dutch force a month later; see consulta of Junta de Armadas, 22 Jan 1642, AGS/GA 3205. In early September a combined fleet of seventy-five had been sighted off Cadiz, but subsequently the Dutch had separated from their allies; Philip to F. Diaz Pimienta, 6 Oct. 1641, AGI/IG 2501, f.22. 40

F. de Ladron to M. de Rober, Cadiz, 5 July 1643, MN/Vargas 19, ff. 124, and marginal note to typed abstract. The King originally insisted the Dunkirkers should not be used unless definite indications existed of an enemy presence - and, in any case, that they should go no further than Cape St Vincent; J. de Ocana to Pimienta, 27 April and 2 May 1643, AGI/IG 2501, ff. 244 and

124

The Flandersfleetin the South It offered a potential alternative for Flemish privateering investment. The worsening conditions of North Sea enterprise, and the enemy's threat to privateering bases, coincided with the effective collapse of the Almirantazgo's northern dimension. It might offer an opportunity for shipowners to compensate themselves in a previously forbidden area, some form of overdue concession to the long-standing demand of Flanders businessmen for entry into Atlantic trade. 41 At all events, Philip was impressed enough to submit the proposal to his Council of War. It was rejected with horror: It is not advisable to allow any foreigners or their ships to enter the Indies ... on account of the little confidence we can place in those sailing in these ships, who are gathered from nations whom we have cause to mistrust, and if they do not fall in with the pirates who infest those islands, they will plunder on their own account... To which may be added the secret information they will obtain of the coasts and ports ... Further, the fleet of the Windward Islands ... is considered of sufficient strength.42

The Flanders armada was now based in Cadiz, the better to switch at short notice between Atlantic and Mediterranean theatres. During 1641, indeed, the latter had assumed prominence for almost the first time in the war.43 Following the decisive defeat of Los Velez's army of intervention in January, the Catalans and their French allies were able to move against the coastal outposts of Rosas and Tarragona, held for Philip IV within rebel territory. A rapid sweep of Spain's harbours in the early months of that year produced a dozen patched-up galleons, along with numbers of merchant vessels suitable for service. By the summer, what Dominguez Ortiz calls 'una magna reunion', a mighty fleet of 128 assorted craft, was ready to sail to the relief of the garrisons holed up in Catalonia.44 The Dunkirkers took part in a series of actions by which the main French fleet was fended off whilst supplies were safely run into Tarragona. On 17 May they took on a French force of over thirty sail near Peniscola; they fought 'from the afternoon until two in the morning, and left the enemy flagship damaged beyond repair'. 45 Despite the recent losses sustained by the Spanish marine, naval and mercantile, the English ambassador reported in 1642 that 'they have thirty galleys on 41 42 43

44

45

O n the fate of the 'guerra economical see below pp. 13 iff. Consulta of Council of War, 27 Feb. 1645, B L / A d d . 36327, ff. 7 9 - 8 6 . (See also, below, p. 172.) For a broader account of the campaigns dealt with here, see R. C. Anderson, ' T h e Thirty Years' War in the Mediterranean', MM 15 (1969), pp. 4 3 5 - 5 1 , and 16 (1970), pp. 4 1 - 5 7 ; see also Hambye, UAumonerie, pp. 7 3 - 8 7 . Professor Dominguez's phrase is taken from his essay in J. H . Elliott and A. Garcia Sanz (eds.), La Espana del conde duque de Olivares (Valladolid, 1990), p . 36. T h e fleet was, however, more than half made up of transports and fireships, and is not a reliable indicator of quantitative fighting potential. See also van der Vyver, Lettres, p . 160. T h e following October, however, this source recorded a stunning defeat of the main Spanish fleet by the Portuguese in which twenty-two ships were lost, (see p. 172). Consulta of Junta de Armadas, 20 May 1642, A G S / G A 3205.

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that coast [the Levant], there are five ships laden with grain and six Dunkirkers of war for their guard, ready to sail from Cadiz. There is another fleet of thirty good ships in the same port . . . and a greater number there likewise, to be employed as occasion shall serve.'46 An Italian observer put things less prosaically around the same time; 'the power of Spain is vast, immense and infinite'.47 But one suspects that these resources were made to appear greater than they actually were by constant manipulation and maximisation. In a sense, Spain's men-o'-war resembled the chariots in a production ofAida, rolling impressively across the audience's field of vision and behind the set, to reappear again as part of an endless host. When need pressed hardest in the Mediterranean, forces on the Western seaboard were at times reduced to hopelessly inadequate levels, exposing coastal communities to attack from the French and Portuguese. In July 1642, for example, Pietersen was with the fleet commanded by the duke of Ciudad Real, based at Mahon; it boasted over forty galleons, with a personnel muster actually 100 men in excess of the set requirement.48 In contrast, only fifteen warships were left fit for action, against a combined enemy force potentially three or four times that figure, in Atlantic waters. Even two years later, when commitment east of Gibraltar had been suspended, the Armada del Mar Oceano, including several Dunkirkers and fireships, was relying on the inadequate total of twenty-nine vessels (some 16,000 tons), nearly half of which were undergoing repairs.49 Some assistance was received from privateering auxiliaries. Madrid was keen to attract the Flemish particulares, and in 1644 a group of them migrated south for the summer. They were not unsuccessful in their own avocation. In the space of a few days in July, they captured a French and a Portuguese warship, a caravel of the latter nation and an Arab vessel. Queen Isabel (whom Philip had left as Regent in Madrid) was careful to order that the privateers 'should be given the entire profits of these prizes, because of the great importance attached to their presence. It must be ensured they are given good treatment in all parts.' In fact, however, their very capacity rendered them susceptible to the demands of the war-machine, and several private frigates were pressed into direct naval service. Accordingly, the following year, and again two years later, their representatives in Dunkirk firmly rejected further inducements.50 For the rest of the decade, the armada, rising to a maximum of about twenty 46 47

48

49

50

Hopton to Roe, 19 March 1642, P R O / S P 9 4 / 4 2 , f. 266. Fulvio Testi, quoted in A. Domfnguez Ortiz, 'Los Caudales de Indias y la politica exterior de Felipe W\Anuario de estudios americanos 13 (1956), pp. 3 1 1 - 8 3 (at pp. 3 1 2 - 1 3 ) . 'Relation de la Gente del M a r . . . fecha en M a o n a viente y seis de Julio 1642', B N / 1 8 1 1 9 3 , f. 213. List of [?Aug] 1643, MN/Vargas 19, f. 107; 'Relacion de los 18 Navios de Guerra y Fuego que se hallan fuera de carena', Cadiz, April 1645, A G S / G A 1567. Queen Isabel to Duke of Villahermosa, 2 July 1644, A G S / G A 3226; Castel Rodrigo to Philip IV, 29 April 1645, A R B / S E G 233, f. i n ; consulta of Junta de Armadas, 26 F e b . 1647, A G S / G A 3258. For the Queen's discharge of the Regency, see Stradling, Philip IV, pp. 2 0 9 - 4 6 , passim.

126

The Flandersfleetin the South vessels in 1644, continued its wide-ranging support of the main naval groupings. Actions in this theatre, according to a historical pattern which had prevailed since time immemorial, were often desultory and indecisive by comparison with those in the North Sea. All the same, the Dunkirkers were ubiquitous protagonists wherever the battled raged. For example, three frigates were intercepted and captured by the French during a death-or-glory mission to succour Rosas and Perpignan in 1643. This misfortune came at a point when Madrid had decided that the challenge in the Mediterranean had to be temporarily suspended. The enemy had reached a strength which utterly discouraged direct confrontation, especially in view of the desperate need to conserve warships in being. With the French largely in control of Spain's Mediterranean coastline, in 1644-5 both Rosas and Perpignan were lost.51 In 1646, fresh honours were accorded in the defence of Spanish Italy. Simultaneously with Conde's assault on Lerida, the French - who under Mazarin were learning the lessons of combined operations taught by Olivares mounted a powerful maritime offensive against Spanish strongpoints (presidios) in Tuscany. Eight armada frigates participated in the relief of Orbitello (May, 1646), and a year later they were prominent in the actions undertaken by the expedition of Don Juan Jose de Austria, sent to suppress outbreaks of rebellion in Naples and Sicily.52 Despite the glory they now trailed in their wake, the reputation of the Dunkirkers was still not apparent to some mandarins of the Spanish System. In the midst of the French onslaught on Italy, the Republic of Venice begged Philip IV for aid against a major Ottoman intrusion in the Adriatic. The King ordered the duke of Arcos, viceroy of Naples, to send the Neapolitan galleys. But the latter replied (possibly with a touch of irony) that he found himself unable to obey the specific instruction, 'much as I appreciate Your Majesty's beneficence towards the endangered Republic, when your own forces are under such pressure . . . However, I was thinking of sending the frigates of Dunkirk in place of our galleys ...' Philip's reaction to this idea is not recorded.53 The collapse of Mazarin's Italian designs in 1648 coincided, not by accident, with the outbreak of the period of internal disturbances in France known as the Fronde. This series of conflicts almost paralyzed the French war-effort in 1648-54. Certainly the Bourbon state found itself unable to sustain the effort needed to keep its main battle-fleets at sea. At the same time, further relief came with the conclusion of peace with the United Provinces. As a result of these 51

52

53

T h e court diarist Pellicer noted that Pietersen had fourteen frigates in May 1644; with privateering auxiliaries and minor craft the armada amounted to twenty-six ships; J. Pellicer de Tovar, Avisos historicos, in A. Valladares (ed.), Semanario erudito Vo. Ill (Madrid, 1788), pp. 1 8 2 - 3 . H i s figures are broadly corroborated by Anderson, ' T h e Thirty Years' War', p . 46. Sucesos de la Armada de Su magestad en Italia este ano de 1646..., B N / 1 8 4 0 0 , no. 61. See also the ms. relaciones in ibid. 2378, ff. 392V.-3. Duke of Arcos to Philip IV, 10 July 1646, A G S / E 3272, no. 184.

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events, the Spaniards were able to regain control of the western Mediterranean basin. After a resistance just as impressive as the effort put into its reduction by Castile, Barcelona, assailed by land and sea, capitulated in late 1652. Though this success neither put an end to the war in Catalonia, nor the role of Dunkirkers on that flank, the regaining of Dunkirk itself, also taking place in 1652, and evocative of a remarkable revival of Spanish arms in the Low Countries, brought about another shift of gravitational distribution. In this way, not long after Leiden had given up his command as a dead letter, he witnessed the return of some of his ships and men to Flanders. As we have seen, it was once again possible to supply the army of Flanders with men and supplies, and armada ships worked alongside privately chartered frigates in these operations.54 However, they were on a scale notably reduced from the levels of the 1630s, partly because Madrid's attention was still crucially divided. After receiving the formal renewal of Catalan allegiance, Philip IV was impatient to turn towards the problem of Portugal, the reconquest of which became a growing obsession. Before the military resources of the Monarchy could be sufficiently prepared for this task, another crisis broke upon Madrid, like a sudden wave, with the unexpected attack of the English Protectorate government in the Caribbean. The French fleet had again ventured out of Toulon in 1654, and not long afterwards, emergency signals like those of 1640 again began to arrive at Dunkirk from supreme headquarters.55 The main threat now was not from the French, but the English fleet which took up station off Portugal. Cromwell had concluded a commercial treaty with the Braganza regime, and Blake's task was to ensure freedom of trade for London merchants in pursuit of its clauses. As the Spaniards rightly suspected, his command was of a higher order than any before seen in the straits. When news of the attempted invasion of Espanola reached Spain in September, 1655, part of the armada was again based in its home port. Ironically, Leiden himself was in London assisting at negotiations for an English alliance. Nevertheless, and despite concern to avoid further entanglements, the occupation of Jamaica could only have one response, and Philip immediately acknowledged a state of war. English sailors, ships and goods in all the ports of the Monarchy were the first victims of this new struggle, representing a loss to the City of London which rather eclipsed the acquisition of a Caribbean outpost considered by Spain not to be worth the expense of defending.56 A few weeks before the news broke from the Indies, a fairly substantial fleet of twenty-nine galleons (nearly 12,000 tons and 850 guns) was able to sail from Cadiz to rendezvous with the incoming silver-fleet. Partly because of its size, 54 55 56

See (e.g.) the relevant material in A H N / E 973 (1647-8). Minute ofconsulta of Junta de Armadas, 18 D e c . 1654, A H N / H a c . 7892, f. 438. See below, pp. 1 4 5 - 5 0 for the Anglo-Spanish war of 1655. 128

The Flandersfleetin the South partly because it included eleven warships contributed by nations (such as the Dutch, and various German ports) who had an interest in protecting the Spanish flota, Blake did not intervene.57 But Spain's warships were now generally ancient, and almost impossible to maintain in seaworthy condition. During the war with England, vessels were commandeered all over Spain. The fishing fleets of the Biscay ports, previously regarded as inviolable in whatever emergency, were now forcibly enlisted; twenty-five Dutch merchantmen in Naples were compulsorily purchased en bloc by the count of Castrillo; and English ships embargoed in Andalusia were incorporated into the navy.58 Above all, Madrid was determined that the Dunkirk frigates should lead Spain's defence again the English fleet. But the new governor of the Spanish Netherlands was the man whom Philip had acknowledged as his son, Prince Juan Jose de Austria. As on previous occasions, a leader of royal status in Brussels was less complaisant to the dictates of Madrid. Disagreement was now on a positively Lilliputian scale compared to those of earlier years, even if the principle at stake was the same. Only a few royal frigates were still based in Dunkirk; perhaps a further five had returned to Cadiz in 1655, while one or two others were scattered around the peninsular coasts.59 In the North Sea, the commercial war against English shipping was unleashed early in 1656. Don Juan, shortly to be faced with the Anglo-French military alliance precipitated by this campaign, needed to hold on to his precious frigates. Ordered to send two of them south, he prevaricated successfully until Dunkirk's second capture by the French in 1658.60 In Spain, meanwhile, nothing could be done to break the blockade which Blake mounted against the major ports, nor to prevent his interception of the treasure-fleet at Tenerife in 1657. Facing up to the horrors of Blake and Oliver, the Madrid newsmonger Barrionuevo consoled himself that we are going to make a new great armada, with as many galleys as galleons, with which we will be able to repel all the enemy fleets which infest our seas. Lord Don Juan of Austria is to be the admiral of it... Contracts have been made in Vizcaya and all the other dockyards of Spain for the building offiftygalleons of war ... But we are waiting for the arrival of the silver-fleet, since there is no money for anything here at the moment, and nothing else can supply it.61 57

58

59 60

61

'Memoria de los Baxeles de que se compone la Armada de Espana . . . 1 2 Agosto deste ano de 1655 . . . impreso en Sevilla por Juan Gomez de Bias, B P U / 8 2 , ff. 114.V.-15; two letters to J. Pardo de Figueroa from Seville, 10 Aug. 1655, B N / 2 3 8 4 , f. 131-2. Lists of fishing boats expropriated (with compensation) in Vizcaya 1657-8, MN/Vargas 3, f. 157 et seq. (the volume also contains certificates of exemption from such action repeatedly granted in previous years); A. Paz y Melia (ed.), Los Avisos dejeronimo de Barrionuevo (2 vols. Madrid, 1968), 1, p. 260. See (e.g.), ibid., pp. 200-4. Philip to D o n Juan, (draft), 18 Oct. 1656, A G S / E 2267. See also Cuvelier and Lefevre, Correspondance de la cour, rv, pp. 563 and 578. Paz y Melia, Avisos I, 217-19 (Nov. 1655). 129

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Such illusions betray the inherited military certainties of the sixteenth century, co-existing subliminally with growing apprehensions of profound failure. Don Juan - whose name was deliberately chosen to reflect the illustrious victor of Christendom's greatest naval triumph - was asked not only for a few miserable ships. He was also required to send Flemish sailors, in order to crew afresh the frigates already in Spain ('which are almost totally empty and disarmed').62 Spanish mariners, after fifty years of acquaintance with them, had apparently not learned how to sail a Dunkirker, let alone how to build one. In any case, sailors were no longer available in Spain. The village of Comillas (near Santander) protested to the Treasury in 1659 that its population had diminished during the reign from around 1500 to less than 600, 'because of the ceaseless demands for levies to serve in the royal armadas, where many have died'.63 The province of Galicia, comprehensively exploited since 1635, claimed to have impoverished itself in contributing 800,000 ducats to the Cantabrian squadron alone.64 An experienced military commentator, Diego Enriquez de Villegas, in 1657 came up with an idea to inspire a new generation of noble seafarers. The foundation of a military order dedicated to Our Lady of the Patronage would attract membership, tapping investment and talent for the armadas. 'The principle duty of its knights would be the guardianship, custody and defence of our seas, and to be ever ready to fight and die in defence of our Sacred Religion in battle against the enemies of the Catholic Name.' 65 In the first instance, they would build and equip ships to sally forth against the English. Philip IV was asked to award honours, and even provide a basic income for the Order, of which he would assume the Mastership. Perhaps worthy of comment is not that Spain was trapped in its historical military culture, but that such a culture could continue to provide, long after Philip IV and the Order of Our Lady of the Patronage had passed away, a reason for struggle, survival and triumph. 62 64 65

63 Royal order of 26 Dec. 1656, A G S / E 2267. Petition of July 1659, ibid. C J H 1108. Printed petition (no title or date, ?i659), B N / 2 3 8 4 , ff. 354~6v. Printed memorandum dated Madrid 2 Feb. 1657, R A H / 1 0 2 6 , ff. 104-25V.

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The prize of Dunkirk

END OF THE GUERRA OFENSIVA

Defeat in the Downs, combined with upheaval in the Iberian peninsula, significantly altered the military balance in the North Sea theatre. Amongst other things, it meant that Dunkirk, for so long master of prizes, became itself the single greatest prize of the war, epicentre of the struggle for European mastery. Tromp's victory over Oquendo's armada restored to the United Provinces the maritime hegemony which - to put it weakly - had become so insecure since the 1620s, and with it the reputation of Dutch mariners. In the heritage of mythology which accompanies and sometimes obscures history, it was Tromp, epitome of Holland's 'natural' or inalienable pre-eminence upon the sea, who was remembered and not Oquendo, representative of the beaten force which made the Republic's efforts so necessary and so glorious. In analysing the verdict of war, we must (of course) recognise the crucial Dutch achievement in concentrating over 100 warships in the Channel, and in destroying or capturing the greater proportion of the Spanish fleet. But remarkable also was the quasi-indomitable challenge of the latter, a challenge as important as the quasi-desperate need of the Dutch to overthrow it. The causes, as well as the consequences, of events are part of historical understanding; and Spain was a great, some might still say, a Universal, cause. The creation of the Almirantazgo del Septentrion had been, in large enough part, a worthwhile experiment. If only one of its main functions - management of the commercial war - had been a consistent success, the others had not wholly failed to produce results. After nearly twenty years' existence it had become a large administrative institution, both in the peninsula and in Flanders, which had produced a powerful element of vested interest. Moreover, whereas the arbitristas del mar of the previous generation had been, of necessity, largely theoretical in their advocacy, now the veterans of the struggle could adduce a repertory of contingent experience. The one was just as impressive in the outlook of Olivares and his master as the other. But the Downs inevitably opened a debate over the continuance of the policy which the Almirantazgo represented, a debate which was to be almost as acrid as a fight at sea. In the first instance, its supporters needed to demonstrate the continued I31

Dunkirk and the defence of Empire,

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efficacy of the campaign. It was obvious that the guerra ofensivapor mar had failed in its primary task of bringing the Dutch on their knees to the conferencechamber. However unrealistic this objective may have seemed from the perspective of 1640, many prominent thinkers had expressed faith in it, and the government had consequently (as it were) taken the idea on board. Moreover, throughout the 1630s, privateering brought consistent financial and political returns. Relatively speaking it was inexpensive, yet the economic damage it inflicted provided a unique source of pressure on Dutch opinion. Even after 1635, despite the fact that the attentions of the privateers were divided between France and Spain, this was not relaxed. Indeed, although the States-General seem never again to have plumbed the depths explored in 1625-8, when a full decade later voices were again raised in protest over the depredations of Flemish pirates, the Regents may have wondered about the point to which the war had brought them. Indeed, the appalling Dutch mercantile losses of the mid-1630s seem to have sparked off another round of self-questioning. Spanish seamen made prisoners of-war in Brazil, and later released as part of an exchange, offered testimony to the atmosphere in Rotterdam. Holland is full of confusion and tears, with poverty and misery everywhere. They have no wealth left to launch more ships; in the harbour 47 boats were counted with no decks or rigging, and only thirteen ready for action. There is great work to prepare sufficient guard ships for the fisheries next year which will cost them three millions . . . Two hundred merchantmen have recently left for Bordeaux with only one guard-ship . . . The Dunkirkers this year made the Dutch warships return to harbour with their tails between their legs, and many of the captains have been hanged.1

The report was probably distorted by misunderstandings and exaggerations in its passage from Rotterdam to Madrid. But, at the same time, interventions made to a similar effect at meetings of the Estates-General were reported avidly by Spanish agents. What is the point of political liberty, asked one delegate, if the liberty of the sea, upon which we depend for a livelihood, is denied us by our enemies? Every year (he added) the number of privateers increases, until it seems we are on the point of losing everything. Another speech complained that the stranglehold of the Dunkirkers obliged many businessmen surreptitiously to purchase licences from Brussels if they wished to enjoy immunity. What, he asked, was the difference between this tribute and that of the infamous alcabala, the Spanish 'Tenth Penny' tax imposed by the duke of Alba, which had sparked off the Dutch struggle for independence in the first place? As things stood - it was claimed - Zeeland was becoming increasingly indefensible against the incursions of the corsairs. And the peroration of one discourse makes especially interesting reading; 'the enemy has pillaged all our wealth, and used the profits 1

Gayangos, Cartas, I, 316-17. 132

The prize ofDunkirk in order to make himself master of the seas'. In such assertions - for all their hyperbole - is enshrined a world of historical certainty turned upside-down.2 In The Hague, it was increasingly hoped that the French army would compensate for the deficiencies of the Dutch navy. The latter, it is true, arose mostly from the acknowledged fact that the Flanders ports could not be taken from the seaward side alone. Early in 1637, rumours sprang up that a joint operation against Ostend was in the offing. This was well before Richelieu and Louis XIII were able to consider going over to the offensive, and, if anything, the plan must have been designed to relieve the French military position rather than that of the Dutch economy. However the essential target was never in doubt, for whatever the fortunes of Ostend or any of the smaller ports, 'the rebels suspect that Dunkirk on its own may still be capable of ruining all their commerce'.3 Shortly thereafter appeared the most celebrated contribution to the issue, the treatise Sur La Necesite de Prendre Dunkerque, which spoke of the port in the resonant classical terms later to be applied to Holland itself by another enemy. 'Tant que Carthage sera debout, jamais Rome ne sera assueree, disoit Scipion, ce brave Romain. Tant que Duinkerke subsistera, l'estat de vos provinces ne sera jamais affirme . . . C'est l'Alger et la Tunisie du Septentrion.'4 Such rhetoric provided (in effect) first-rate propaganda on behalf of the pro-Almirantazgo lobby. But the anti-Spanish allies were suspiciously slow to act upon it. True, the French army was preoccupied for two campaigns (1636-7) with repulsing Habsburg invaders from its own soil. It was handicapped by functional breakdowns due to lack of experience of large-scale multi-fronted warfare, and by faction and status quarrels within its command structure. These problems were arguably even more serious in the case of Richelieu's navy, which contributed little to the allied war-effort until Guetaria (July, 1638), and remained wholly unreliable thereafter.5 Finally, even before 1640, and the opportunity offered by the Catalan revolt, Richelieu had evinced less military interest in the Low Countries than in Italy and the Pyrenees. As recently as 1622 it had again been demonstrated that the Flanders ports lay out of reach of the Republic's land forces. The alternately swampy and sandy littoral which divided them from the Dutch port of Sluis inhibited the use of cavalry, and virtually precluded the transport of heavy artillery. Despite this, the crisis of supply in the Spanish Netherlands after 1640 encouraged the Dutch to believe that tactical collaboration could reverse this verdict. A few weeks before the revolt in Catalonia, Don Fernando was alerted to a plan for a combined 2

3 4 5

See BL/Eg. 6902, ff. 179-iv., copies (in Spanish) of various speeches made in the EstatesGeneral during 1635. 'Aviso de la Haya . . . ' , 25 Jan. 1637, ibid., ff. 175—8v. Quoted by Malo, Les Corsaires, I, pp. 400-1. On the problems of the French army, see D. Parrott, 'The Administration of the French Army during the ministry of Cardinal Richelieu' (unpublished D. Phil., Oxon 1985); for those of the navy, Anderson, 'The Thirty Years' War', passim.

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Dunkirk and the defence of Empire, 1640—1658 Franco-Dutch advance along the coastline on both flanks, designed to cut Brussels off from the sea, and finally to capture Dunkirk.6 This failed to materialise, but was confidently predicted for the following year, when according to an English diplomat who (since the Downs) could easily envisage a sea covered with Dutch sails - Tromp would deploy 400 vessels in the seaward assault. In the event, the Dutch blockading fleet did not increase much above one-tenth of this number in the early 1640s. And it was not until the beginning of the 1644 campaign that the allies signed a treaty specifically aimed at the capture of Dunkirk.7 Although privateering activity in general had not diminished, the profile of the armada was lower than at any time since 1629. After recovering from the loss of an eye incurred whilst fighting at Oquendo's side aboard the Santiago, Miguel de Horna was killed in the course of another attempt upon the Bordeaux convoy in 1641. 8 With its subsidies being choked off, further sustained action by the King's ships became less feasible. By 1642, as we have seen, only a few coningsschepen remained in Flanders. All this helps to explain the ending of attacks on the fisheries, operations which depended on Admiralty planning, and which (despite their collaboration) brought comparatively little profit to the privateers. On the other hand, these years (1639-44) saw a rash of successes in the latter's operations against major Dutch trade routes; in a series of incidents, substantial convoys from the Baltic and the East Indies were intercepted and swallowed whole by combat-packs of five or more corsair frigates.9 Assuming that long-established reasons for moving against Dunkirk continued to obtain, the actual precipitant of such an attack were the altered conditions created by the outbreak of civil war in England. The failure of the Royal Navy to protect Oquendo at the Downs should not obscure the fact that for some years its mere existence had kept open quasi-clandestine routes for supply of the Netherlands through Dunkirk. Moreover, insofar as much of this trade took place in English bottoms, Admiral Pennington and his colleagues had orders to ensure its safety against Spain's enemies. English carriers usually crossed from Dover to Calais by night and then crept along the French coast into Mardyck, so that, in practice, the Dutch warships had little chance of taking action. In any case, both Dutch and French were keen to avoid serious confrontation, especially with the strengthened English fleet of the late 1630s.10 This factor, according to some, could be exploited more thoroughly to bring 6 7 8 9

10

Don Fernando to Velada, 19 May 1640, BPU/38, f. 349. Gerbier to Vane, [?June] 1641, PRO/SP/77/31, f. 42: Malo, Les Corsaires, 1, pp. 402-3. Lemaire, Histoirey p. 150. See (e.g.) Gayangos, Cartas, v, 23-4; Brevey ajustada relation de lo sucedido... hasta todo el mes de Ditiembrede 1638 (Madrid, 1639, co Py m BN/18400, no. 54). Details and (partial) lists of prizes are in ARB/CA 581 and 590. See Kepler, Exchange, passim; H. Taylor, 'Trade, Neutrality and The English Road, 1630-48', Econ. Hist. Rev., 2nd Series, 25 (1972), pp. 236-55.

134

The prize ofDunkirk in revenue for the Stuart Crown. Since the Dutch send aid to the Scots rebels argued one projector - Charles should feel free to allow the Dunkirkers hired use of English ports for shelter and provision. The regular sale of prizes could be undertaken, with a Crown commission of five per cent - another precise reversal of Tudor precedent.11 In defence of the latter tradition, the earl of Warwick privately fitted out ships to take reprisals in Spanish waters.12 But not until Charles I abandoned London in 1642 was Warwick able to greet Tromp as a comrade-in-arms: You know how little I esteem of your enemies and the enemies of God and the gospel. Therefore I assure you, I am glad of that order you have to restrain us from feeding and relieving our and your enemies, and had not I had a command over me, I should never have done it... Nor will I [any longer] suffer the town of Dover to father the ships of Flanders as they have done. I am very glad to hear that you have taken some of the frigates that escaped out from before Dunkirk ... I would not trust my secretary to write this, none but myself, that would be glad to have those of Flanders by the ears as you, and would fight as heartily with them and all the King of Spaine's subjects.13 Within a few weeks, Charles I had lost control over the bulk of his fleet, and retained a hold over no major port on the east or south coasts of his Kingdom. The Franco-Dutch alliance was thus free of a serious constraint on its movements, and could be confident that no extraneous source of supply would sustain Dunkirk against investment. It was no accident, therefore, that in the opening summer of civil war in England, the French army took the offensive in Flanders for the first time since the opening exchanges of its war with Spain. Its fate was only to be worsted, in three separate engagements, by Melo and Velada. Indeed, the campaign culminated in the severe drubbing given the French by the army of Flanders at Honnecourt. Within eight months, however, these events were eclipsed by the victory of Rocroi. In 1644, the outer defences of the Dunkirk-Mardyck complex were breached with the fall of Gravelines, and during the campaign of 1645, th e v * ce w a s tightened slowly but surely.14 By this time, peace negotiations were afoot between the combatants of the Thirty Years' War in the Westphalian towns of Miinster and Osnabriick. The leader of the Spanish delegation, Diego de Saavedra, was an experienced and resourceful diplomat. As it happened, he was also one of the most profound thinkers of contemporary Europe, who had earned the respect of Philip IV as a writer. In exactly the period when Olivares had recently quit the scene, and the King was struggling to manage his own government, such influence, though 11

12 13

14

Project by 'John de Bevilia' [?i64o], PRO/SP 94/42, f. 93. This suggested that Falmouth be leased to the Spaniards as a privateering base, with enormous profits accruing to Charles I, 'since they [the Dunkirkers] will take an hundred ships for one'. Petition of Cardenas to Charles I, 11 July 1640, ibid., ff. 1-2. Warwick to Tromp, 11 Aug. 1642, (printed in M. G. de Boer, Tromp en de Duinkerkers (Amsterdam, 1949), pp. 162-3). Stradling, 'Catastrophe and Recovery', and sources therein given.

135

Dunkirk and the defence of Empire, 1640—1658 difficult to measure, may be regarded as significant. Not long after his arrival in Miinster, Saavedra was made familiar with the view that Dunkirk and all it stood for represented his best bargaining counter in discussions with the Dutch. 15 He was too intelligent not to realise that precisely the opposite view could be taken that, so far from extorting concession, privateering determined the Dutch to eliminate it before any peace settlement was agreed. But, either way, Saavedra reckoned that Dunkirk had to be saved. In his irenic treatise Locuras de Europa (1644) he played on Dutch fears that, since Dunkirk's only possible alternative fate was as a French town, no long-term advantage would accrue to them from its loss by Spain. It is said that the port is a halter on Dutch liberty, and that whoever possesses it will be master of Holland and the whole Low Countries ... Therefore consider, that if the French take Dunkirk, they might offer an even greater problem to you than the Spaniards; for with control also of Maastricht, Calais and Gravelines, they could achieve dominance in the seas of the North, and, in consequence, the mastery of all the Netherlands.16 An anonymous (ostensibly Dutch) pamphleteer reflected similar views. He acknowledged that 'commerce is little good to us when most of our profits are consumed by what we have to pay in insurance and convoy rates. And we get more losses in one year from the Dunkirk frigates than all the gains made by our trade with the [East] Indies.' This writer added that if Spain lost its Flanders ports, it would merely concentrate fire elsewhere, making life more difficult for Dutch commerce in other, more distant, seas. The only satisfactory answer was a compromise peace; by implication at least, a peace more favourable to Spain than the Truce of 1609.17 Within the United Provinces, those pressing the virtues of such a settlement were now less vociferous. To the majority, concession seemed unnecessary and inappropriate. For Spain's part, the logic of internal crisis meant that the Dutch war was pushed to the sidelines. By converse motion, therefore, the lobby in favour of finishing with it altogether grew in strength. The Almirantazgo, locus of the economic war, came under increasing pressure. Critics claimed that it had failed to stimulate economic development in Flanders, and that in Spain its operations had suffocated business generally.18 Its protective cover had been riddled with holes, random extractions made in Madrid and Brussels, in order to plug recurrent gaps in resources. For example, though the absolute falta de 15

16 17

18

Saavedra to Philip IV, 28 Nov. 1643, CODOIN 82, p. 6. On Saavedra's political influence and career, see Fraga Iribarne, Don Diego de Saavedra, esp. pp. 379,ff. F. de Saavedra, Locuras de Europa (ed. J. M. Alejandro, Salamanca, 1973), pp. 49-50. 'Carta de un Olandes escrita a un Ministro de los Estados Unidos Confederados', BN/i 1084, ff. 69-124. On balance, it seems improbable that this treatise was from a Dutch hand - although Grotius may have subscribed to its argument. Indeed, the expressions of its proto-pacifism are so close to those of the Locuras that it could be an early draft. See Israel, 'The Politics of International Trade'.

136

The prize ofDunkirk medios dates only from 1640, ever since the early 1630s licences had been sold to the Dutch enabling individual voyages to the peninsula for salt. The Flanders armada found itself reduced to acting as a kind of coastguard, boarding enemy vessels merely in order to check that they were observing the relevant passport conditions.19 Given the nature of politics, a programme which fails and/or outlives its usefulness tends to attract criticism, for good measure, on ethical grounds. Charges of corruption were thus added to those of failure and inefficiency. It was asserted that the administration of prizes was in the hands of men whose judgements favoured friends and relatives. The ships of neutral or even friendly states were taken, and condemned by the Tribunal, whilst the enemy went scot free with his licence. Hundreds of appeals against such judgements were being held up or otherwide subverted by a gang of predators who battened on the lawful trade of others. There are officials of this Admiralty who care less for the susceptibilities of their victims than for the mountains of the moon. They think that all the world owes them tribute, that they are kings over all. The real King, therefore, cannot continue his support for such goings-on, alienating all the princes of Europe from Spain in a business which must be given the name it deserves - that of Piracy.20 In England, the Parliamentary side and the City of London thoroughly agreed with this verdict. If anything, their commerce was plagued by the interference of the Spanish Almirantazgo more than by its Prize-Court in Dunkirk. The difficulties its regulations created not only inhibited strategic developments of immense potential for Madrid, but also risked a serious breach of relations with the English Parliament.21 Matters deteriorated whilst the English civil war lasted. Several of Charles Fs warships, outnumbered by the Parliamentary fleet, lacking bases (and purpose) in the domestic context of the struggle, transferred to Flanders. There they used Charles Fs licence to privateer against English shipping. They damaged the trade of the east coast, and disrupted communications, to such effect that members of the joint committee of England and Scotland visited the Spanish ambassador in London, Alonso de Cardenas, to protest.22 19

20 21

22

In 1633 alone, thirty-three applications were granted for such licences in Brussels; 'Relation de los pasaportes despachados en Flandes . . . ' , Jan. 1634, A G S / C J H 722. See also consulta of the Council of State, 4 Nov. 1640, ibid./E 2055. O n e fund-raising scheme put forward in Brussels was the sale of permits to Dutch fishermen. T h e idea was rejected as prejudicial to the privateers, but it seems unlikely that there would have been many takers at this juncture, (Castel Rodrigo to Philip IV, 24 Nov. 1644, CODOIN 59, p . 495). 'Causas por donde crecio el comercio de Olanda', (? 1644), B L / A d d . 14005, ff. 23-33V. For excellent treatment of the economic dimension of Anglo-Spanish relations in this era, see A. McFadyen, 'Anglo-Spanish relations, 1625-60', (unpublished Ph.D., University of Glasgow, 1967), esp. pp. 8 1 - 6 . Cardenas to Castel Rodrigo, 12 May 1645, A G S / E 2523. T h e privateers of Wexford and Waterford, effective allies of the Royalist forces, were also being allowed use of Flemish ports for

137

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1640-1658

Castel Rodrigo was inclined to ignore this pressure, arguing that the Admiralty Tribunal should be allowed to reach independent decisions on English merchants' appeals.23 In Madrid, the Council of State debated the issue hotly. The count of Monterrey argued against Brussels' attitude, and even suggested that Royalist privateers were malefactors who should be punished in order to mollify London. But only the duke of Villahermosa aligned himself with Monterrey, while the veteran sailor-councillor Santa Cruz, and the marquis of Chinchon, approved Castel Rodrigo's stance. The marquis of Loriana also opposed Monterrey: he asserted that the more Spain could contrive to damage the English heretic rebels, the better. Loriana insisted that the Royalist Dunkirkers ought to be encouraged, not punished. Philip's apostilla expressed crisp and unequivocal support for Loriana's viewpoint. In Flanders, as in Catalonia, it seemed that the watchword remained 'no pasaran'.24 In fact, these exchanges reflected a typical ambiguity. In the last analysis, the approaching fate of Dunkirk may have been looked upon in Madrid as a virtue made out of necessity. Certainly we miss the signals, which accompanied earlier points of crisis, that the port must be defended at all costs. In view of the almost total breakdown of supply - a situation exacerbated by the withdrawal of government credit facilities on the Antwerp bourse - such messages were perhaps withheld out of respect for the feelings of Castel Rodrigo. A factor which further complicated the issue was that, even had Dunkirk not been under actual military threat, its usefulness was in decline. Over the years, the silting processes had again narrowed and shallowed its harbour passages, whilst the inexorable action of the elements altered the positions and sizes of the main sandbanks. For a new phase of exploitation, Dunkirk needed a new phase of investment. In 1645, after many years of trying, the engineer Michel van Langren at last succeeded in obtaining Brussels' approval for his great canal project. The 'Mardyck Road' was now impassable and once again, as in the pre-1620 years, no ships of substance could gain access to Dunkirk from the West. What he schemed was, in effect, an extended new harbour - cut out of the land between Mardkyck and Dunkirk, and encasing the towns in a system of modern fortifications. It was sent to Madrid, and elicited the approval of King and Council. The decision was meaningless. Philip admitted that Spain was unable to make a significant contribution to its costs, which would have to be borne locally by

23

24

shelter and even recruitment; see J. H. Ohlmeyer, 'Irish Privateers during the Civil War, 1642-50', MM 76 (1990), pp. 119-33. Castel Rodrigo to Cardenas, 20 May 1645, A G S / E 2523. T h e independence of the Tribunal was (of course) a sham. Monterrey to Philip IV, 29 Aug., ibid. 2525; consulta of Council of State 22 Sept. 1645, ibid. 2523. T h e debate reflected an interesting division between olivarista (Monterrey and Villahermosa) and antiolivarista ministers (Castel Rodrigo, Chinchon, Loriana).

138

The prize ofDunkirk those with a commercial interest. In any case, three days before the King sent his blessing, Dunkirk had surrendered to Conde. 25 The construction of Mardyck fort had underwritten the rise of Dunkirk. But, at the same time, the presence of this redoubt on its more vulnerable flank, a shield which was strengthened several times in the 1620s, induced a certain complaisance within Dunkirk itself. Despite the prosperity brought by the privateering industry, the town's defences were seriously neglected. Until 1640, in fact, Dunkirk was defended on the landward side only by its fifteenth-century walls and towers. In 1639, van Langren was sent to survey the fortifications, and the following year a start was made on the construction of modern emplacements.26 In the post-Rocroi panic, the garrison commander, Pedro de Leon, added a modest new outwork a mile upstream. But none of this altered the fact that Mardyck was the key to Dunkirk, and that once the former fell the latter could not subsist.27 Throughout 1645, therefore, the battle raged about Mardyck.28 Battered by the guns of Tromp's fleet as well as CondeJs army, the fort was surrendered on 10 July, after a breach was opened in its walls - but not before its garrison had burnt the main parapet installations, and spiked guns which otherwise the French would have been able to turn upon Dunkirk. At this point, nevertheless, many Dunkerquois abandoned the town, fleeing eastwards, their possessions loaded onto sleds, along the wet sands and dry dunes, into Nieuwpoort and Ostend. Prominent in the exodus were the privateers - crews, skippers and also the shipowners, who had been so often condemned as pirates in enemy propaganda that they more than half feared judicial treatment appropriate to the appelation. Then, in December, by one of those unexpected reversals which seem so characteristic of the military decline of Spain, the fort was regained by surprise attack. The Spaniards captured intact all the supplies and munitions which the 25

26

27 28

Philip to Castel Rodrigo, 14 Sept. 1646 A R B / S E G 236, f. 2 1 1 . It was reported early in 1645 ^ a t Miguel d e Salamanca h a d brought to Madrid 'la plana del fuerte q u e se pretende hacer entre Gravelingas y Mardick. Dicen costara 100,000 escudos' (Gayangos, Cartas, VI, p . 29). It was already some years old, since van Langren h a d discovered its necessity when carrying out engineering works at Gravelines in 1638, and della Faille h a d subsequently tried to interest various ministers in it, (van d e r Vyver, Lettres, p p . 134, 162). B u t Madrid recognised that changing circumstances had rendered such an investment unjustifiable. Moreover, estimates of cost were sanguine — at least 200,000 escudos would probably have been needed for completion (see T a p e l de los Ingenieros', (May), A R G / S E G 236, ff. 12-16). After the recapture of Dunkirk in 1652, interest revived, and the project was printed (I have failed to locate a copy of this rare item, b u t see the ms. copies in B R B / 1 4 5 5 9 and B L / A d d . 14007, ff. 474-5.) Van d e r Vyver, Lettres, pp. 151-2; R. Baetens ' A n Essay on Dunkirk Merchants and Capital Growth during the Spanish Period', in W. Heeres et al. (eds.), From Dunkirk to Danzig: Shipping and Trade in the North Sea and the Baltic, 1350—1850; Essays in Honour ofjf. A. Faber (Hilversum, 1988), pp. 1 1 7 - 4 3 . Lemaire, Histoire, p . 153. T h e following account of the fall of Mardyck—Dunkirk is taken from ibid., p p . 153—60 and Bertrand, Histoire, pp. 2 4 9 - 5 8 .

139

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1640-1658

enemy had laid into the redoubt. Not until the middle of August was Conde able to retake it. In London, Cardenas struggled to purchase and despatch supplies for Dunkirk, but found few willing to do business with him. He eventually managed to scrape up 30,000 lbs. of gunpowder and 70,000 lbs. of biscuit. His transports proved a bonus for the victors, arriving just in time to fall into Tromp's hands - for Dunkirk had fallen on 11 September.29 The writers praised and wailed. Pierre Sarassin, a celebrated poet at the court of the Queen-Regent and Mazarin, paid tribute equally to the conquerors and the conquered: Enfin, retraitte superbe De Corsaires furieux, Le plus grand des demy-Dieux Renverse tes murs sous Pherbe. Leurs Barques plus dangereuses Aux Pilotes de nos Mers, Que le Faucon dans les airs. Et leur guerriere furie Ne troublera que les flots De la derniere Hesperie.30

In Madrid, the chronicler Matias de Novoa lamented, with less ornament but no less truth; 'at last we have lost Dunkirk, a thing which can be felt in the heart of our power'.31 THE DUNKIRKERS IN LIMBO

Some compensation for the loss of Dunkirk was expected to accrue from the transfer of many particulares to Spanish ports. The prospect of their assistance in Spain helps to explain why the Admiralty was not immediately reconstituted at Ostend.32 There were other reasons why, now expelled from their 'natural' base, those involved in commerce raiding as their main livelihood should wish to seek employment in more promising climes. The imminence of final agreement with the United Provinces, in the negotiations proceeding at Minister, led to the imposition of a ban on attacks on Dutch shipping as early as the spring of 29 30

31 32

Cardenas to Philip IV, 31 Oct. 1646, A G S / E 2525. Sarassin's ode can be found in his Histoire du Siege de Dunkerque (Paris 1649), PP- 107-12. H e went on to hope 'Desia le voy cent fregates/Peintes de nos fleur de lys/vers les costes de Calis'. Perhaps a similar thought led Mazarin to appoint as Dunkirk's first French governor the Marechal de Rantzau, a veteran who had surrendered an eye and a leg to Mars, not to mention some sixty other combat wounds (Lemaire, Histoire, p . 160). M . de Novoa, Historia de Felipe IV, Rey de Espana, CODOIN 86, p . 260. Minute of Junta de Armadas, 28 Feb. 1647, A G S / E 2523.

140

The prize ofDunkirk 1647.33 The only legitimate target now open to privateering - that of France was insufficient to sustain the industry. If they wished to stay in business, it seemed that the Flemish armateurs had little choice but to accept the invitation to follow the armada to the South. In fact, they resisted these pressures, and persistently lobbied Brussels for new offices and a new tribunal to be set up in Ostend. Many demonstrated their feelings by taking out licences from the Prince of Wales - whose court was established in France - enabling them to attack the commerce of England.34 Since the whole of the British mainland was now (with the end of the first civil war) technically in rebellion against its king, British shipping provided an opportune alternative source. Indeed, not only did it enable them to resist the lure to the Mediterranean, it also persuaded most armateurs not to return to Dunkirk when the Admiralty of Louis XIV was founded there in May 1647.35 There were other reasons why the first French attempt to found a privateering industry was not a success. In 1648, the economic and fiscal strains of war finally burst asunder the political unity of the Bourbon kingdom. Mazarin's government, preoccupied by the intestinal struggle against the Fronde, was no more able than its previous owner to invest in Dunkirk. Indeed, though the army of Flanders was able tentatively to regain the initiative, and Dunkirk thereby became vulnerable to an early recapture, little attempt was made by the French to improve the port's defences. It is also notable that Mazarin's secretary, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, an early exponent of etatiste philosophy, believed all forms of prizetaking enterprise to be unproductive and barbaric. For Colbert, le corsair was nothing other than lefrondeur de la mer. Pour remettre le commerce il y a deux choses necessaires, le sureter et la liberte. Le sureter depende d'une mutuelle correspondance a empecher les pirats et corses des particuliers qui, au lieu de s'appliquer en leur navigation a Phonnete exercise du commerce, rompent avec violence le lien de la societe civile.36

At the time Colbert was writing, he could be excused for forming the impression that the seas around his country were more infested than ever with corsairs - various English, Irish and Spanish ports all having imitated the business so profitably practised by Flanders.37 The apparent triumph of anarchy 33

34

35 36

37

Moves were made in Ostend to restore Dutch prizes unless 'contraband goods' could be proved, (see Cuvelier and Lefevre, Correspondance de la cour, rv, p . 23). G. de La T o r r e to P. Coloma, 2 March 1647, A G S / E 2523 ('in doing this they have failed in their service to H i s Majesty'). T w o years earlier, a list of raiders sailing from Ostend under Charles I's commission included half-a-dozen obviously Flemish names; 'Relacion de las fragates de guerra desta villa de D u n q u e r q u e que navegan por su Magd. de la Gran Bretana y tienen su residencia ordinaria en Ostende ... 30 de Julio [1645]', ibid. French Royal Ordonnance of 2 May, 1647, A M D Boite 2 0 1 , no. 2. Colbert's 'Report Regarding T r a d e with England', printed in F . P. Guizot, History of Oliver Cromwell and the English Commonwealth (2 vols., London, 1854), 1, pp. 4 3 8 - 4 0 . Ohlmeyer, ' T h e Irish Privateers'; Otero Lana, 'Los Corsarios Espanoles'. 141

Dunkirk and the defence of Empire,

1640-1658

on the seas coincided with the official ending of the main war-turmoil of continental Europe, in 1648. Colbert was perhaps confirmed in his dim view by vicious disputes between the new French Admiralty and the municipality of Dunkirk.38 Following 1638, Dutch commerce with the Flanders ports was resumed, so that the privateering interest (much of it, of course, being managed by refugee Dunkerquois) did not retain the domination it had previously enjoyed.39 But the welcome tendency was prejudiced by the need for legitimate traders to work in an atmosphere which - if not quite the stereotyped seething den of piracy certainly reflected the culture of freebooting. Moreover, for some time after the Peace of Munster, the new rules forbidding attacks on Dutch shipping were more honoured in the breach than the observance. In 1650, a codicil had to be added to the Treaty, emphasising the freedom now enjoyed by all citizens of the Republic to trade in the Hispanic World. It was ordained that even Dutch ships trading with France could not be lawful prize unless they were actually carrying arms. Any suspected vessel could be boarded - but only by a small boat carrying an inspection party of two or three men. 40 However, the English royalists continued to flout these rules, embarrassing Brussels and Madrid. In 1649, Charles Stuart's envoys in Madrid had to provide five Dutch skippers, sailing from Cadiz to Flanders on Philip FV's commission, with special passports of immunity from Prince Rupert's raiders.41 The proliferation of passports ran headlong into that of privateers. The result was a series of violent arguments over prize judgements in Ostend and Nieuwpoort, some of them involving English and Irish skippers of Rupert's command. The authority of the local officials was flouted, and even the intervention of the Supreme Council in Brussels failed to control the situation.42 The grim report sent to Madrid on the state of the armada by the marquis of Leiden in 1647 stated that 'not one ship, nor any other property pertaining to the armada is present in Ostend'. 43 No suitable site existed for the installation of offices, and the judges preferred to travel on an ad hoc basis from Brussels to conduct a prize-court. Even the contents of a spare-parts store had been sold off in order to pay outstanding salaries - which remained, on average, two years in 38 39

40

41

42

43

See (e.g.) 'Extrait des articles presentez au R o i . . . Tan 1650', A M D Boite 201, no. 3. J. de Smet, ' L e Mouvement de la navigation au port d'Ostende', Bulletin de la Commission Royale d'Histoire 94 (1930), pp. 208-14. Traitte concernant la Navigation & Commerce de Mer ... conclue le 17 Decembre 1650 ..., B R B / 1 6 0 2 8 - 3 7 , ff. 160-5. Certificate signed by Sir E. Hyde and Sir F . Cottington, Madrid, Dec. 1649, P R O / 2 1 / 1 2 / 3 2 , f. 28. Leopold-William to J. de Quesada and same to A. de Rios, 9 Aug. 1651, B R B / 1 6 0 2 8 - 3 7 , ff. 383V.-5; 'Remonstrance faite de part des Cap[itai]nes Anglais et Irlandois a Messieurs de PAdmiraute Supreme de sa Ma[jes]tie Cath[oliqu]e touchant leur fregattes et prises detenues a Ostende et Nieuport' [?i65o], P R O / S P 9 4 / 4 2 , ff. 299-300. Untitled memo of marquis of Leiden, Brussels 10 J u n e 1647, A H N / E 978. 142

The prize ofDunkirk arrears. Meanwhile veedor Uribarri had died in Spain, and the Archduke Leopold-William (who had replaced Castel Rodrigo) agreed with Madrid that the post did not require a replacement for the time being.44 Nevertheless, Leiden, along with proveedor Miguel de Ugarte, remained at his post, determined to keep an armada in being. Although only one-fifth of the monthly subsidy was now scheduled to be paid in Flanders, by anticipating two instalments they managed to raise a loan for the purchase of a suitable frigate. In this vessel, sailors newly recruited in Flanders travelled to Spain for service in the main armadas. Using chartered vessels, the Admiralty helped in the organisation of other voyages, by which German mercenaries followed the same route - over 2,000 being embarked in the second half of the same year to reinforce the King's army of Aragon.45 Typically, no sooner had modest recovery of Spain's military fortunes been initiated, in 1647-8, than re-activation of the northern front was considered. Alongside subsidies for the army, Leopold-William received orders to set 150,000 escudos aside for the recreation of a Flanders-based squadron. Philip's intelligence from France had convinced him of the imminence of civil war, and he wished to be prepared for this eventuality. Nevertheless, the funds were swallowed up by the army or in payment of debts and salary arrears, and little renewal of armada units was undertaken.46 In 1648, a Crown frigate could not be spared to transport the new duke of Aerschot to Ostend, and in the following year none was available to convey 500,000 escudos in silver to the same destination.47 The contingency of naval operations against France, which Philip had foreseen in 1648, actually developed the next year when rebels in Guyenne sought the aid of Madrid. Provided with an opportunity on the scale represented by Catalonia to the Bourbons, a frustrated king had to admit that he simply could not provide warships from the home fleets, and asked Brussels to step in. All Leopold-William could do was to renew attempts to purchase ships in Holland and Zeeland.48 However, in the early 1650s, the army of Flanders was at last able to take the offensive, and Gravelines was recaptured in May 1652. Madrid at first encouraged Leopold-William to proceed against Dunkirk, agreeing that the best way of reviving the armada was the restoration of its traditional base and the privateering industry which sustained it.49 A serious complication supervened on these assumptions. Simultaneously with progress in the Low Countries, Philip's 44 45 46

47

48 49

Cuvelier and Lefevre, Correspondance de la cour, rv, p . 25. 'Relation de los officiates y soldados que an ydo a Espafia', 21 Jan. 1648, A H N / E 9 7 3 . Cuvelier and Lefevre, Correspondance de la cour, rv, pp. 56 (15 April 1648) and 182 (17 May 1650). Escrivense los Sucesos delAno de 1647 ... hasta 164Q, BN/18400, no. 71; Cuvelier and Lefevre, Correspondance de la cour, rv, pp. 151-60 (Nov. 1649—Jan. I ^5o). T h e specie was eventually shipped in Dutch bottoms to Amsterdam, and thence overland to Antwerp. Ibid., pp. 158-64. Leopold-William to Philip IV, 30 Sept. 1651, ARB/SEG 251, ff. 117-18V.

Dunkirk and the defence of Empire,

1640-1658

armies in Catalonia had also made consistent advances, and Don Juan Jose was able to invest Barcelona. The Catalan capital represented a clear priority above Dunkirk, and when negotiations for peace began between Mazarin and the Fronde, the possibility of a Bourbon military revival, taking place in time to save the rebel stronghold, scared Madrid. Leopold-William was therefore instructed to sacrifice Dunkirk, deploying resources instead to reinforce the Frondeur princes who were leagued with Spain. An army of 6,000 under the marquis of Fuensaldana was accordingly detached for this purpose. 50 The governor came under severe pressure from local representatives. Mazarin had offered to sell Dunkirk to the Dutch, or make it over to the English as the price of an alliance against Spain.51 The threat that their best port would be alienated to a major business competitor, while local contributions made in the cause of its recapture were diverted to the Frondeurs, evoked considerable anger.52 Some funds had presumably been used to procure warships, for (according to one account) Leiden was able to collect twenty-two vessels as a blockading squadron.53 Many of these were of such poor quality, however, that when the French fleet sailed to relieve Dunkirk, Leopold-William decided to ignore Madrid's orders and step up the siege by land. In August, Fuensaldana's force rejoined the main army of 7,000 investing the port. Perhaps luckily for the armada, moreover, Mazarin's fleet sailed into disaster. Involved in a damaging skirmish with a Spanish force shortly after leaving La Rochelle, it was later intercepted and almost destroyed by Blake, acting on the orders of the English Commonwealth, then at war with France. Three days after this encounter, the French garrison of Dunkirk surrendered. 54 Thus, on 16 September 1652 - six years almost to the day after its fall - the port renewed its ancient allegiance to the House of Austria. A few weeks later, a similar event took place in Barcelona. THE SWANSONG OF SPANISH DUNKIRK

When Oliver Cromwell overthrew the Rump Parliament, and later installed himself as Protector, the veteran ambassador in London, Alonso de Cardenas, was quickly alerted to the ominous implications for the Spanish Monarchy. In 50

51

52

53 54

Philip to Leopold-William, 16 July 1652, ibid., 253, f. 58V. This policy, Philip stressed, 'consiste no solo que los principes no se acomoden sino que pueda conseguirse la empresa de Barcelona, cossa en que tanto v a \ For the campaign of 1652, see Relation Verdadera de la Recuperation de la Fuerte Plaza de Dunquerque ... (Madrid 1652), B N / 2 3 8 3 , ff. 2 4 6 - 7 . For Mazarin's attempts to rid himself of Dunkirk, see Brun to Philip IV, 7 D e c . 1651, E E H 33, f. 394 (also ff. 336 and 389). Philip countered by offering to capture and hand over Calais in return for the co-operation of the English fleet, A R B / S E G 252, ff. 246-7 and 3 4 9 - 5 2 . Cuvelier and Leievre, Correspondance de la cour, iv, pp. 3 4 3 - 5 . T h e King was unmoved by local protests and merely repeated his cousin's orders. Relation Verdadera de la Recuperation ..., (see above, n. 50). Faulconnier, Description Historique, 11, pp. 6-8; Cuvelier and Lefevre, Correspondance de la cour, rv,

P-355-

144

The prize ofDunkirk the spring of 1653, three Hamburg merchantmen, bound for Dunkirk with Spanish supplies, sought shelter from storms (or enemy action) somewhere on the English southeast coast. They were boarded by English coastguard officials, taken into the port of London, and impounded. Since the Anglo-Dutch War was still in being, the authorities pretended that they were enemy vessels, and claimed them as good prize before the Admiralty Court. What exercised Cardenas above all was that the ships' cargo had included silver, which was now stored safely in the Tower of London. Don Alonso protested to Oliver and his council that this action was prejudicial to the whole Spanish war-effort.55 Cardenas' own need for silver was pressing, for when he left London in 1655 his salary was to be five years in arrears. Meanwhile, bailiffs acting on behalf of the businessman Peter Richaut and the English Admiralty intercepted another Spanish cargo - this time one of wool which had been sent to the ambassador from Spain to defray his expenses. The firm of Richaut claimed to be owed £20,000 by Philip IV for maritime services rendered, and Cromwell threatened to issue letters of marque against Spain unless the matter was settled by Madrid.56 The case of Benjamin Wright, the unique English asentista de dinero, who (it was said) had lost ten times the Richaut debt in the Spanish bankruptcy of 1647 alone, also attracted attention.57 Despite these indications, Cardenas persisted obstinately with his master's commission to obtain a treaty of alliance with the Protectorate. At the beginning of 1654 he analysed Oliver's policy as inspired above all by fear of revived royalist interest. In particular, his objective was to destroy the exiled Stuart court; anything which conduced to this, and reduced the possibility of Royalist intervention in England, was grist to the Protector's mill.58 Given Spain's official recognition of the Republic, on the one hand, and the ties of kinship and connection which existed between the Stuarts and both of Spain's historic enemy dynasties - Bourbon and Orange - on the other, some optimism seemed justified. The importance of English friendship had been dramatically demonstrated by the circumstances surrounding Spain's recapture of Dunkirk. Cromwell's terms for formalising this relationship were, however, notoriously too high. Following a year's fruitless exchanges, Cardenas warned Madrid of Oliver's determination to open the Spanish Atlantic for English exploitation. The ambassador added that, should he prove unable to effect this by negotiation, he would do so by 55

56 58

Cardenas to Philip IV, 5 June 1653, P R O / 3 1 / 1 2 / 4 3 , ff. 39-43 (see also ff. 45 and 56-7). Another silver-carrier out of San Sebastian was later captured by the English (f. 69). I have not discovered whether D o n Alonso received satisfaction in either case. 57 See ibid., S P 4 6 / 1 0 1 , ff. 3 7 - 1 6 4 passim. T a y l o r , ' T r a d e , Neutrality', p . 254 and note. Cardenas to Philip IV, 19 J a n 1654, P R O / 3 1 / 1 2 / 4 3 , ff. 8 6 - 7 . T h e ambassador's analysis was later corroborated by Cromwell's Secretary of State, John Thurloe. For support for the interpretation of Protectorate policy given in this section, see the Introduction to my thesis 'Anglo-Spanish Relations from the Restoration to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle' (unpublished Ph.D., University of Wales, 1968), pp. 5 - 2 2 .

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force.59 Another powerful consideration complemented the hardened prejudices of Oliver. This was the more pragmatic, but no less significant, realisation that forcing the Stuarts onto the Spanish side would at once serve to proclaim their true colours in the sight of all Englishmen and reduce their prospects of restoration by military means. As early as the spring of 1654, Cromwell's council decided in principle in favour of an attack upon Spain.60 The Flanders Admiralty was re-established upon reoccupation of Dunkirk, and measures were taken to raise sailors for the armada. The marquis of Leiden was restored as captain-general of the armada and Governor of the town.61 The following spring, four frigates returned from Spain, to form the nucleus for a reconstituted squadron.62 Not surprisingly, the short interval between this event and the start of hostilities with England witnessed no renaissance of Spanish naval power. Technically, however, Dunkirk was again the base of a naval squadron - or at least a handful of warships, in reasonable state of repair, acting in a defensive capacity. When news of the Hispaniola expedition broke, Leopold-William pleaded with his cousin to delay a declaration of war, fearful that the English navy might intercept supplies for the forthcoming campaign.63 Though Philip's conscience would not allow him to comply, and the embargo of English property was decreed immediately in the South, similar action was not taken in Flanders until the following March. 64 Accordingly, sufficient supplies reached Flanders to permit a successful campaign to be fought in 1656. But Cromwell's plans also seemed to be working out. John Thurloe received a report that 'the King of Scots' had applied for the lease of the ports of Dunkirk and Ostend, to make a thorn in the Protector's side. 'He doubts not but many of the shipping of England will come to him there [and] is to come to live near Dunkirk if this be granted him.' 65 Although this particular tribute to Dunkirk's political importance failed to materialise, shortly after the war was declared in Flanders, a Stuart-Habsburg alliance was duly sealed. The Admiralty provided the Stuart squadron with access to repairs and supplies.66 Moreover, during the ferocious privateering onslaught which was subsequently unleashed against British trade, not only 59 60

61

62 63 64 65

66

Cardenas to Philip IV, 28 Dec. 1654, P R O / 3 1 / 1 2 / 4 3 , ff. 105-7. Draft Minutes of English Council, April 1654, in C. H . Firth (ed.), The Clarke Papers (4 vols., London 1891-1901), m, pp. 2 0 3 - 6 . 'Relacion del empleo . . . se han cobrado en la Pagaduria Gnl. desde el mes de diziembre de 1651 hasta fin del ano 1652 . . . ' , A R B / S E G igobis, f. 496V.; order of Leopold-William, B R B / 16028-37, f. 388V. Philip IV to Leopold-William, April 1653, A R B / S E G 254, f. 13. Leopold-William to Philip IV, 16 Oct. 1655, ibid. 303, ff. 2 5 0 - 2 . Decree of March 2 1656, ibid., CA 156. Letter to Thurloe from Antwerp, 6 D e c . 1655, P R O / S P / 7 7 / 3 1 , f. 394. It was (incorrectly) rumoured later that Philip had conceded revenue from prizes to Charles Stuart; see ibid., f. 412. See (e.g.) J. Adams to P. Hacker, 3 Dec. 1655, and a group of intercepted papers from Flanders, ibid., ff. 392 and 4 1 5 - 2 5 .

146

The prize ofDunkirk exiled Royalist skippers, but also Dutchmen and Germans, came to Dunkirk and Ostend seeking a share of the spoils. Events were to prove that despite the soundness of Oliver's political calculations, his military assumptions, both in the Caribbean and in Europe, were wide of the mark. In one of the earliest naval reports to London, the situation in the North Sea was perfectly encapsulated. 'The Dunkirkers and Ostenders ply close upon the coast, and take ships daily, and are very insulting. Some of them told our men to tell the Protector that, while he is fetching gold from the West Indies, they will fetch his coals from Newcastle.'67 A wave of complaints told of the privateers swarming onto the English coasts, disrupting not only the coal trade but every other domestic aspect of British seaborne commerce. A cold spring in the council-chambers of Whitehall failed to inspire effective action - in part, at least, because (despite all the improvements of the age of Blake), the tactical methods used by the Flemings had still not been effectively countered in English naval thinking. In March, nine 'pirates' were reported to be operating between Portland and Dungeness, 'which constantly lie close by the shores in two or three fathoms of water: and if they see any vessel they take to be a man of war, they lie as fishermen'.68 At the court of Madrid, the exploits of the privateers were hugely relished and likewise exaggerated. Barrionuevo asserted that more than 350 English prizes were taken in the first four months; and indeed, a quarter of this figure - the actual total - was a remarkable achievement even by standards set in earlier campaigns.69 In the summer of 1656, prizes once again crowded the Flemish ports. One typical victim appealed to the exiled King to obtain his release from Ostend gaol: 'though a miserable poor passenger I am imprisoned with the rest where I may soon perish.' The revenue from ransoms was perhaps too important for Charles to intervene on behalf of a mere rebel, and many prisoners of these early months remained incarcerated until an exchange was arranged in 1659.70 With such an effective diversion being provided by its colleagues, the armada was able to emulate other half-forgotten feats, and in May safely transported 500,000 escudos in specie from Spain to Dunkirk.71 Then, whilst Spain's ally, the prince de Conde, was putting these to good use in the victory of Valenciennes, the armada too recorded its last major success at sea. Captain Charles Reynard, at the head of five royal frigates, captured intact an English convoy of ten merchantmen out of London, a total of nearly 1,000 tons, and a rich cargo. 67 68 69

70 71

CSPD (1655-56), p . 200 (Major Elton to Admiralty Commissioners, F e b . 1656). Ibid., p. 511 (Capt. Sanders to same, 20 March 1656). Paz y Melia, Avisos, 1, p. 286. Despite this lapse, the news on the maritime war against England, with which Barrionuevo regularly spiked his epistles were generally of great accuracy. See (e.g.) ibid., pp. 153, 235, 309, and 11, pp. 3, 36, 92. Letter to Charles (II), May 1656, P R O / S P / 7 7 / 3 1 , f. 406. Paz y Melia, Avisos, 1, p. 285.

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Dunkirk and the defence of Empire, 1640—1658 Many other incidents added to the lamentable story of British losses, including that of an entire fleet of twenty-four Scottish coalers.72 Even when the Cromwellian navy registered its first success, it was a Pyrrhic victory of the kind to which the Dutch had once been accustomed. Four privateers were accosted by five English warships, but three immediately made good their escape, scattering and piling on sail. Two pursuers managed to hold on to the largest and slowest, the Maria of Ostend, which they eventually overhauled. Its commander, Erasmus Brewer, disposing of twenty-seven guns and 200 men, determined to make a fight of it. 'He resolutely defended himself [reported his adversary]. The fight was continued from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. by the Advice and the President... It may be wondered how so contemptible an enemy should so long oppose two such considerable frigates. I assure you they are a resolute and daring enemy, and their advantage lies in being so often tallowed and fully manned.' The other English warships broke off their several pursuits, and returned to the sound of battle, in order to help their comrades. Thus surrounded, the Maria was systematically pounded into submission, and had to be sunk as beyond repair after finally striking her flag.73 Not until early June did Cromwell's government put the problem at the head of its agenda, when it decided belatedly to detach twelve warships from Blake's command to blockade the Flemish ports. 74 In previous years a Dutch force three times this size had been unable to control the problem, but on this occasion the prophylactic seems to have had some effect. In August, an excited Barrionuevo reported that 'the English have sent out a warship the like of which has never before been seen. It has a battery of n o bronze cannon and a complement of 1,000 men and is called the Sovereign . . . It has been ordered not to give quarter to the Dunkirkers, since they refuse it likewise, but to fight them to the death with iron strength until they are driven from the seas.'75 So valuable were the pickings available amongst the commerce of England that French fishermen, for many years their staple diet, were now virtually overlooked by the privateers. In November, the Supreme Council decided to 72

73 74

75

D o n Juan Jose to Philip IV, 10 June 1656, A R B / S E G 261, ff. 158-8V.; Paz y Melia, Avisos, I, pp. 294-5 (12 July, 1656). T h e tonnage is recorded in the lists drawn up by greffier Colbrant, ( A R B / C A 275). Barrionuevo p u t their gross value at 800,000 ducats, an almost incredible sum. For the coalers, see ibid., p . 282. T h e same source reported in May (p. 276) that the Flemish privateering fleet amounted 'en orden 60 fragatas en cuatro puertos' (p. 276). T h e names of fifty-three skippers are listed in connection with prize cases by Colbrant; and Baetens ('Organization and Effects', p . 54) estimates that about seventy vessels were involved. CSPD (1655-56), pp. 3 5 5 - 6 (Capt. Whitehorne to Admiralty Commissioners, June 1656). Ibid., p . 345, reported accurately by Barrionuevo on 9 Aug. {Avisos, 1, p . 302). By October, however, the blockaders had risen in number to twenty-eight (ibid., 11, p . 3). Ibid., II, p. 5 1 . T h e monster galleon could only have been the celebrated Sovereign of the Seas built by Phineas Pert as part of the 'Ship-Money Fleet' in 1637. In 1654 she was commanded by William Penn (see B L / A d d . 93304, f. 86), but was evidently regarded as too old and slow to take part in the West Indies expedition. However, blockade duty as a floating battery opposite Mardyck fort was still within h e r capacity.

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The prize ofDunkirk turn this to advantage, and sold licences to trawler-owners from Dieppe and other ports, permitting them to trawl without disturbance.76 For their part, so freely did the privateers move that in the new year (1657) came the only recorded instance of their actually landing on the English mainland, when they pillaged a house on Dungeness Point to the value of £50. 77 In describing to Madrid the victory of Captain Reynard, Don Juan Jose could not resist pointing out that 'Your Majesty may see from this incident how important it is to maintain an armada in these ports'. 78 Philip ignored his governor's views, and once again insisted that the needs of Spain were paramount. In October, Don Juan was ordered to prepare the armada for the voyage south. Madrid's attitude was deeply resented. Don Juan of Austria was the first governor of the Spanish Netherlands since his famous namesake (almost a century earlier) to be an experienced and successful commander at sea as well as on land. Furthermore, whilst all his predecessors had been entrusted with outright command of the army of Flanders, he had been obliged to share this honour with the prince of Conde. In 1657, he was hoping to augment the armada and use it in conjunction with the English royalist flotilla to resume the offensive in the North Sea. Like Isabel in 1625, and Don Fernando in 1635, Don Juan came to reside in Dunkirk in the autumn of 1657.79 By this time, however, Cromwell's plans for Dunkirk had begun to overshadow anything the Spanish commanders could possibly consider. From the start of hostilities, Cardenas had warned that the Protector would do all he could to destroy the offensive capacity of the Flemish ports. 80 In practice, what impeded Oliver was the awkward necessity of an alliance with France - the only strategem which could guarantee the success of an assault on Dunkirk - and the difficulties, ideological and political, of reaching a satisfactory agreement with Mazarin. Nonetheless, it was so arrived at by the English minister Lockhart, in February 1657. The accord represented, purely and simply, a joint military plan for the capture of Dunkirk, with no extraneous clauses; England would land 6,000 troops at Calais to supplement Turenne's main army, and blockade Dunkirk with a large fleet.81 In Spain, where this liaison de convenance was described in deathless terms as 'a league against our Holy Catholic Faith and for 76 77

78 79

80

81

Receipts of 1 Nov. 1656, A R B / C A 204. (130 permits realised the sum of 8,200 florins.) CSPD (1656-57), p . 292. Further treatment of the privateering aspects of the war of 1655-60, will be found below, pp. 219—21. D o n Juan to Philip IV, 10 June 1656 (see note 72 above). Philip to D o n Juan, 18 Oct. 1656, A G S / E 2267. T h e King stated that he was sending 30,000 escudos for refitting and recruitment. But nothing had been done by the following spring (consulta of Council of State, 8 March 1657, A G S / E 2090); see also Cuvelier and Lefevre, Correspondance de la cour, rv, pp. 563 and 5 7 8 - 8 2 . (Reported in) Philip to Leopold-William, 23 Feb. 1656, A R B / S E G 260, f. 328. Barrionuevo had picked this up by July; 'Dicese se junten franceses e ingleses para destruir a Dunquerque, que tantos males cada dia les hace', (Paz y Melia, Avisos, 1, p . 299). Lockhart to Thurloe, 26 Feb. 1657, f. Birch (td.),A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, Esq, (7 vols., London, 1742), vi, p . 63.

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the destruction of the Spanish Monarchy which is its principal support', it was hoped that the cession of Dunkirk to the power 'which is now the master of the seas' would soon inspire another Fronde. 82 Originally scheduled for 1657, the Dunkirk offensive was delayed by the indomitable resistance of the army of Flanders. Not until the following year were the Anglo-French forces able to take up positions from which to threaten Mardyck-Dunkirk. Now utterly desperate, the Spaniards resorted to tactics of Machiavellian duplicity, tempting the French into a trap set up around the pretended betrayal of Ostend. The Spaniards captured a French general and many men in this operation, but it merely put off the inevitable.83 In June 1658, with supplies inside Dunkirk exhausted, Don Juan and Conde were forced to commit their forces to an almost hopeless relieving attack. Outnumbered nearly three-to-one by Turenne and Lockhart, the Spaniards were crushed at the battle of the Dunes. Dunkirk surrendered and was occupied by the English. Cromwell had encompassed his last crowning mercy - but by no means an outright victory in his war against the 'natural enemy'. 82

83

See the Verdaderos Articulos de la Liga hecha entre el Rel de Francia Luis XIHIy Oliverio Cromvel... and Memorial que la Nobleza de Francia did a su Rey..., (Zaragoza, 1658), B N / 2 3 8 5 , ff. 211-4.1v. Relation des moiens par lesquels le Prince Don Juan a engage les Francois a tenter la surprise d'Ostende ... (Brussels, 1658).

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PART 4

Quills, keels and cutlasses

Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009

8 Men and ships - the cutting edge

CAPTAINS AND CREWS

In the maritime world of the early modern period, neither the sailors nor the ships enjoyed much security of tenure. In a very real sense they lived and died together in a common chain of experience. As already amply demonstrated, the Flanders armada saw a good deal of battle, indeed considerably more than the average fighting force, even allowing for a tactical context in which everything was done to maximise the use of military resources. But even had this been otherwise, it is difficult to imagine that life would have been much easier or the chances of survival on any voyage radically improved. Casualties were higher in a wooden navy - in and out of battle - than in the war on land. There was the ever-present danger of fire, and the virtual impossibility of isolating disease. The environment was chronically hostile. Death from privation and disease was ubiquitous. Administrators, anxious to save on any expense, rarely failed to discover and record the passing of someone on the paybook, and, even amongst officers, death at sea and on shore was almost a daily event.1 Risks of illness and injury were increased by the maritime life, but at least patients were cared for, both on board and on shore, by the Crown's provision of medical and hospital services. Health facilities were improved in Dunkirk in the 1620s by setting aside a proportion of royal prizemoney for surgeons and hospital needs. In addition, the Prize Tribunal had the power to order extra funds to be kept back from the proceeds of any single transaction, to help cater for the treatment of injuries sustained (on either side) in the course of the relevant action at sea. Olivares and his master both remembered the medical needs of combatants in their wills; and during her sojourn at Dunkirk in 1625, the Archduchess Isabel allowed her court physicians to attend to the sick 1

This chapter eschews detailed description of shipboard conditions, and the recapitulation of sociological detail. These matters are well treated by existing scholarship, and in contexts practically identical to that of the Flanders armada. See esp. Rahn Phillips, Six Galleons; M. A. Echevarria, 'Aspectos socioeconomicos del consumo alimentario en el siglo XVII', Estudios de deusto 35 (1987), pp. 253-65; Parker and Martin, The Spanish Armada; Fernandez-Armesto, The Spanish Armada. The official provision for the spiritual life of the Flanders armada personnel has been dealt with by Fr. Hambye (LAumonerie).

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Quills, keels and cutlasses relatives of armada crewmen.2 Death or wounding in action often brought some financial compensation, especially if the action was glorious and a man's bravery attested by others. Surviving relatives could expect ex gratia payments, or even (in special circumstances, and/or according to rank) a pension. More debilitating than casualties in service, and a continuous nightmare for those charged with the task of maintaining a semblance of establishment continuity, was desertion. In Spain, naval crews were almost wholly impressed from at least the end of the sixteenth century. Since they could not be chained to the decks like the forzados of the galleys, a large proportion of able seamen would desert at the first opportunity in a friendly port. Indeed, this was another compelling reason for keeping squadrons at sea, when necessary recuperating in safe havens, with which, as it happened, Spain and its dependencies were generously endowed. Not only the Flemish ports, but also the ford- like inlets (rtaSy as they are called) of Galicia and the Basque Country, and the bays of Cartagena, Mahon and Cadiz, were ideal for restocking, and even for limited repairs. While the vessels rode at anchor in deep water, often overlooked by manned ramparts, crews could not easily escape. Fear of desertion once ships had put fully into dock also meant a reluctance to tie up or beach them for the essential servicing procedures which alone could prolong their seaworthiness. Consequently, ships went out of commission more quickly, placing a further premium on the construction of new vessels. This is only one aspect of the symbiotic life-cycle which melded men and ships together.3 Failure of wages and provisions, which (though common before) became endemic by the 1640s, led to a greater tendency to die and desert. Of course, men taken to and/or retained in remote seas had an even greater inclination to escape. On a routine patrol voyage along the Scheldt in the summer of 1605, Captain Jacob Janssen lost nearly half of the thirty-five men he had enrolled at Antwerp, but only three of these were through desertion. Forty years later, 192 Ostenders were raised for service with the Dunkirk armada in the Mediterranean, but twenty-three deserted either before the journey or immediately their frigate arrived at Cadiz.4 Men did not always fly the ranks in protest against lapses in pay or conditions. 2

3

4

'Instruction du Siege de L'Amiraute estably a Dunquerque du 6 Novembre 1626' BRB/1602837, ff. 372-80; Spinola to Uribarri, 24 Nov. 1626, AGS/E 2318; Lemaire, Diaire, p. 69. For Olivares, see above, p. n o . All Spanish naval units had hospital costs built into their budgets: in the case of the main fleet, this was 5,000 ducats p.a. (about 05 per cent). Careening was an expensive and time-consuming process. By the 1640s, it could (and often did) take as long as building a warship a generation earlier. Naval officials therefore preferred to work a ship to death, cannibalising any hulks which survived the enemy or the elements long enough to be decommissioned. The situation in Cadiz can be gauged from the administrative records in Viso del Marques (e.g. AGM/3092) and the naval escort records of the Casa de Contratacion (e.g. AGI/IG 2666-7). 'Lista de la gente de compania' (June-Sept. 1605), AGS/CMC 3258; consulta of Junta de Armadas, 16 Aug. 1647 Md- GA 3258 (n.b. the legajo nos. here represent a coincidence).

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Men and ships - the cutting edge Though many pressed individuals certainly rejected service, others deserted with advance wages, often in order to enlist again in some other place where the chances of recognition were small. The wise man did not attempt this ploy too often. At times, and especially when the need for men became acute after 1640, desertion which did not actually take place on the field of battle, or to the enemy, could bring a relatively mild punishment. But desertion compounded by fraud was always a capital offence. In 1625, Isabel, mindful that the armada was about to sail on one of its most dangerous missions, pardoned three sailors convicted of this crime. But two others, who were guilty of other offences besides - and who, in addition, were respectively Dutch and Irish, 'ils ont este pendus pour Pexemple a Duinkerke'. 5 Wages - calculated almost invariably on a monthly basis for all personnel were intended basically as a line of support for the women and children left otherwise unprovided for by long absences of breadwinners. This was the main reason why new levies were paid something on account wherever possible. The premium on Flemish seamanship existing by the 1640s guaranteed that the Crown's officials would work overtime to keep such crews contented when serving in Spain. Six months advance payment in silver became the norm for all armada crews on sorties in southern waters.6 Philip IV intervened on more than one occasion to monitor this situation, acting promptly to carry out his commitment to provide for armada dependants in Flanders. In 1641 it was noted that Agreement has been reached with the captains and men of the ships of the Flanders armada, at present in Cadiz, to stay and serve in Spain for this winter and the summer to come. Amongst other conditions, they asked that money be paid in Flanders to their women and families. His Majesty is anxious to maintain their good will, and has resolved that matters be arranged exactly as they request, and that none of the expenses be charged against the wages they receive here.7 Six years later, the Junta de Armadas ordered that a sum of 30,000 ducats be set aside from the general subsidies 'to make over to the people of the armada in Flanders, and the wives, parents and children of those who are serving here, expressly ensuring that the sum shall be disbursed in no other area, since this reward is what gives its members the greatest satisfaction'.8 The force of two galleons and four frigates which Pietersen brought to Spain in 1641 made an immediate impact on events. If of little surprise to Philip, Olivares 5

6

7 8

Lemaire, Diaire, p. 86. In 1642, to swell the ranks of his army en marche to Aragon, the King issued a pardon to all deserters, but increased the scale of penalties for obstinate cases, (Stradling, Philip IV, p. 213). See (e.g.) Queen to Castrillo (President of Hacienda), 2 Nov. 1642, AHN/Hac. 7887, f. 6iv; registered decreto of 15 May 1644, ibid. 7889, f. 38; M. de Ipenarrieta {contador mayor) to J. Lucas Alanzolo, 28 Feb. 1646, AGS/CJH 900. Decreto countersigned by Pedro Coloma, 28 Nov. 1641, ibid. E 2056. Consultas ofJunta de Armadas, 16 March and 20 July 1647, ibid. GA 3258. This was the result of enquiries made in Cadiz by the count of Castrillo.

155

Quills, keels and cutlasses and the Junta de Armadas, their effectiveness was a revelation to many local commanders, who lost no time in expressing to Madrid the convenience of retaining their services, and even reinforcing them if possible.9 In early 1642, Leganes, commander-in-chief of the army of Aragon, encountered Pietersen in Viiiaroz. He reported that the Flemings were 'extremely upset, because their pay has fallen behind these last three months, which amounts to five thousand ducats each payment, according to the agreement Your Majesty reached with them ... The men of this armada are of such quality that, in my view, it is of the greatest importance to keep them happy.' The junta decided to divert emergency funds to Pietersen's men, ordering the viceroy of Valencia and other local authorities to extend them every assistance and hospitality. Concern was expressed at the news of Pietersen's wounding ('the greatest danger which threatens at the moment'); they agreed that he and Rodriguez deserved considerable gratitude. The King's apostilla again stressed the importance of the case: 'these monies should be remitted with the greatest urgency, without any disputes or delays in the execution thereof.'10 The attention paid thereafter to the personal and operational needs of the armada seems to have been broadly satisfactory. It was not until 1647 - after the death (or retirement) of Pietersen - that a further serious representation proved necessary. A series of grievances built up which, in the view of the armada captains, could only be dealt with by the wholesale transfer of the naval administration of the Almirantazgo to Spain. Their case was supported by Castel Rodrigo and Leiden; and the junta agreed, not only that proveedor Uribarri should be stationed at Cadiz, but also that relevant funds should be handled by him alone.11 Since Uribarri had earlier been usurped from his position as sole veedory contador by Madrid's appointment of a new official to act in Spain, this was a major climbdown. On the whole, however, the complaints of these years probably reflected a relatively minor case of neglect, at least when compared to most others emanating from the armed services. Though we might prefix the rider 'not for nothing', the Flemish warships and their crews were undoubtedly the pampered elite of the Monarchy's armed forces. Despite the roughly contemporaneous evolution of the Flanders Admiralty and the main naval establishment in metropolitan Spain, differences in routine reflected the distances of culture and environment. Though the administrative staff had greater responsibility and control in Spain, these anomalies do not suggest a simple contrast between traditions of administration and asiento. As Spfnola explained to Philip IV in 1627, the skipper of a Flanders warship contracted directly for the food supply for any voyage: 'and the crew eat from his 9 10

11

See above, chapter 6, for an account of these campaigns. Leganes to Philip IV, 15 May; consultas of Junta de Armadas, 20 and 27 May 1642, AGS/GA 3205. Uribarri's resume of grievances (? Feb. 1647); Castel Rodrigo to Philip IV, 24 Feb. and Leiden to same, 29 March 1647, ibid. 3258.

156

Men and ships — the cutting edge larder. For this he is paid eightplacas a day for each ordinary seaman, and for the officers who eat in the Captain's cabin, somewhat more - and people are happy with this.' Thus the skipper received from the pagaduria a lump sum equivalent to the estimated rations for his crew.12 In Spanish terms, this encroached on the duties (and perquisites) of the pagador and other officials. It also made auditing far more problematic, and encouraged the practice of fraud in muster-lists, which could be pernicious in operational terms. Such difficulties tended to exacerbate already existing tensions between the Flemish skippers and officials who were usually Spaniards. The previous November (1626), shortly after the re-establishment of the Admiralty at Dunkirk, the captain-general had tightened regulations in this area, increasing the powers of the veeduria in verifying payments of raciones, and inspecting the vessels on return from voyage.13 But Madrid was not satisfied, and ordered Spinola to impose the Spanish practice in all respects - a demand which he flatly rejected. This is the way they do things in Holland also, a place where they understand the things of the sea at least as well as we ... To change matters would be of no service to Your Majesty, for it would offend the captains, and cause a great rumpus, since the sailors would come at all times to the houses of the officials to complain about supply problems ... These procedures have always been followed here ... Each country has its own customs, and I believe it is best for Your Majesty to leave things alone when they work well enough.14

The marquis' closing words may have been deliberately chosen to imply a comment on Madrid's policy which ranged somewhat wider than the organization of the navy. It is perhaps no mere coincidence that Leganes and his assistants were currently in Flanders, attempting to gain the adhesion of the Loyal Estates to the Union of Arms. Certainly Spinola's attitude did nothing to ameliorate the growing discontent with his influence which afflicted the countduke of Olivares in Madrid.15 In 1605, an able seaman in the armada received seven florins a month, a cabin boy three, a gunner nine and the quartermaster eleven.16 In succeeding years, embracing the financial crisis of 1606-8, not many pay-days were punctually observed. The degree of failure was reflected in the recommendation of the 12

13

14 15

16

Spinola to Philip IV, 17 April 1627, ibid. E 2318. For an example of this procedure, see 'Recaudo de ... la gente mareante de la Rivera de Rhin Armada Naval ... xviii Sept. 1599', ibid. CMC 3258. (Aplaca was a twentieth part of a florin.) 'La Orden que se ha de guardar en la Armada en ausencia del Marques de Los Balbases ... data en Dunquerque a veinte y quatro de Noviembre de 1626', ibid. E 2318. Spinola to Philip, 17 April, (above, n. 12). Echevarria, 'Estado moderno e integration politico-economica'. Spinola's response here may have been inspired by a joint resolution with the Archduchess to resist the fiat of Madrid; see above, pp. 55-70. See Appendix 2, p. 242.

157

Quills, keels and cutlasses councillor Charles de Malines, when the armada was disbanded in 1610, that its artillery reserves be sold off privately in order to provide funds for wages owing 'to some of our retired ex-seamen, along with the poor widows of others'. 17 On the other hand, when members of the armada were captured by the enemy, wages and prizeshares due to them were recorded, and paid in full on their release.18 The existence of this regulation was no doubt a comfort to many, but it seems to have been rarely necessary to apply it. The coningsschepen had a tradition of avoiding capture at almost any cost. In 1633, a year when the armada was approaching the largest establishment it enjoyed in the seventeenth century, there were 633 skippers and crew of Flemish privateers held in various Dutch gaols - but only two complements were navy personnel, and only one of these belonged to the armada itself.19 By the 1630s, a sailor in the main Spanish fleet earned 4 4 escudos, a considerably higher rate, caused by labour shortages as much as the pressures of inflation. Other sources reflect a similar increase in officer's pay. In 1599, a skipper in Flanders received eighteen escudos a month; by the 1630s the equivalent officer in the Armada del Mar Oceano was rated at twenty-five. The demand for Flemish sailors, already illustrated, was perpetually on the increase, and not only within the Spanish System. Around the time of the Invincible, Spanish officials claimed that it was both difficult and dangerous to recruit amongst the Dutch-speaking maritime communities, since many were closet supporters of the rebels and/or crypto-heretics. A recent Spanish expert rightly disputes both this, and the associated assertion that Flemish seamanship was not much good anyway.20 Before the turn of the century, the performance of the Flanders armada had already disproved such allegations, and, by the 1620s, Chifflet reported that both the United Provinces and Cardinal Richelieu were active in clandestine recruitment of sailors in the Flemish towns.21 Certainly, not long afterwards, crew shortfalls in the frigates of the armada became a problem for the first time. The general naval Ordenanzas of 1633 stressed the compelling need for good treatment of experienced mariners. In the 1640s, the pressure exerted by Madrid on Brussels to send fresh sailors was, if anything, above the normal level of its material demands.22 In this situation, careers could flourish, and it seems likely that, in partial contrast to the other regular units of the Spanish navy, the Flanders armada provided a ladder of promotion regardless of social origin. Of all the shortages 17 18 19

20 22

Draft minutes of Conseil Supreme, Sept. 1611, A R B / C A 72. ' L a orden que se ha de guardar en la Armada . . . *, (above, n. 13). 'Somaire des prisoniers detenees en Hollande et Zelande des Capitains suivants . . . ' by Jean Penninq, 25 April 1633, A R B / C A 253. 21 Riano Lozano, Los medios navales, pp. 126—31. Lemaire, Diaire, pp. 26 and 66. Ordenanzas del Buen Govierno de la Armada del Mar Oceano de 24 de Henero de 1633 (Barcelona,

1678, repr. Madrid, 1974), p. 2v.; Philip IV to Leopold-William, 14 April 1648, Cuvelier and L e f e v r e , Correspondence de la C o u r . . . IV, 5 5 .

158

Men and ships - the cutting edge of skilled personnel in the ranks of the Spanish System, arguably the most keenly felt was that of experienced marine pilots. The perennial search for such experts has already been noted by Professor Alcala-Zamora.23 As early as 1619, Archduke Albert reported to Philip III on the poor results of a rigorous search for pilots by Spanish agents, armed with full purses, in Rotterdam and Amsterdam.24 The 1633 Ordenanzas prescribed particular indulgence in all treatment of qualified pilots - quite simply, nothing was too good for them. By this time, the pilot of any naval vessel was paid at a basic rate equivalent to that of the first mate, whilst one with experience in more than one area, and/or in open-sea navigation, received a wage which only his captain's exceeded. Yet as musterand pay-lists make perfectly clear, the social standing of a pilot remained firmly below that of the officer class; indeed, even the barber-surgeon and the ship's clerk figure above them in the careful rankings.25 The career of the Flemish mariner, Gerard Coen, must therefore be regarded as extraordinary. Coen was a professional pilot, Colaert's captain on the Dunkirk flagship the Stella Maris, who accompanied his admiral to Madrid in 1637. His expertise in and around the Flanders sandbanks had brought him to prominence during the campaigns following 1621, in which his skills had made a fundamental contribution to the successes achieved by the armada. After being consulted by the Junta deEjecucion in the portentous strategic discussions of that period, he was seduced by the Madrid court, and remained behind when Colaert returned to his command. Thereafter, he became a favourite of Olivares and the King. He acted as an adviser on Flanders, and on maritime affairs generally, and helped with the work for the great boating lake (estanque grande) in the grounds of the new Buen Retiro Palace. Coen was allocated a room in the palace, and in 1638 he designed the miniature navy intended for use in mock-battles, and a barge for the royal couple to use on the canals of the Retiro gardens. Technical skills, if surely not alone in this case, had opened the door to a brilliant career as a courtier-gentleman for a Dutch-speaking mechanic of low birth - and possibly of Jewish origin.26 In contrast, at around the same time, Coen's Dunkirk contemporary and fellow-pilot, Nick Pieters, was still serving in the Antwerp squadron after sixteen years in the service of the Flanders armada.27 23 24 25

26

27

Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, esp. p . 514. A r c h d u k e Albert to Philip III, 11 Sept. 1619, A R B / S E G 183, ff. 7 5 - 7 . Ordenangas ..., p p . 2v. and 30; 'Relacion de lo q u e importan las seis pagas de los Capitanes . . . ' , Santander, 2 Dec. 1646, R A H / S a l . 1062, ff. 8 1 - 2 . O n the mission of Colaert and Coen to Madrid, see above, pp. 9 6 - 9 . T h e letters of Fr. Delia Faille, (van der Vyver, Lettres, p. 129 et seq) have regular bulletins on Coen's career. In 1639, Philip gave him a dowry in order to facilitate an aristocratic marriage! (ibid., p. 136). Leaving aside his evident personal gifts, Coen had probably been chosen by Colaert because of the exceptional difficulties of navigating his 600-ton flagship in Flemish waters. Certificate of Lodosa, 1636, ARB/Priv. 1108. (On the Antwerp squadron, see below, p. 163 and n. 37-)

159

Quills, keels and cutlasses We have already noted the celebrated case of Jacques Colaert himself, in which the King also took a close personal interest. Here too, distaste can be detected - and not just amongst contemporaries! - at the honours accorded to a Flemish commoner regarded in some quarters as little better than a hired corsair. However, Colaert set a precedent rapidly emulated by his compatriots. Joos Pietersen, who sailed with Colaert in the 1620s, covered himself with fame years later by his actions in the Atlantic approaches and the Mediterranean. On several occasions the Junta de Armadas brought his exploits to the King's attention, and like his illustrious predecessor he gained a knighthood (hdbito) in the military order of Santiago.28 Such recognition, however, was particularly awkward in Pietersen's case: Admiral Joos Pietersen of the armada of Flanders has pointed out that since he hails from the island of Zeeland, it will be impossible for the gentlemen of his order to go there in order to establish his eligibility for the honour. In any case, he is so poor that he cannot raise the deposit necessary for the registration of his knighthood. He therefore begs that Your Majesty should simply instruct the Council of Orders to install him without further delay here in Madrid - which is, after all, the capital of our common homeland - for which Secretary Andres de Rozas and several other gentlemen are prepared to stand as sponsors.29 The reference to a 'patria comun' in Pietersen's submission may not have been enough to mollify suspicion of a man whose origins lay in the original rebel and pirate province, which had attained a reputation as the most rabidly anti-Spanish community in northern Europe. On the other hand, the difficulties of attesting Don Joos' purity of blood by pursuing enquiries in the region of his birth provided a perfect excuse for Philip to cut corners on this occasion. Meanwhile, Pietersen's vice-admiral, the Castilian sailor Salvador Rodriguez who had presumably been able to demonstrate his limpieza - preceded his chief into the ranks of Santiago, after a series of distinguished actions in the late 1630s and early 1640s. In March 1645, however, Rodriguez's career ended with his death in Cadiz of wounds inflicted not by the enemy, but as a result of an attack made at night upon him and several companions - probably the consequence of some tavern quarrel.30 Pietersen himself did not survive the decade, and by the early 1650s, operational command of the armada had devolved onto Anton Menin - presumably a native of the Brabant town - who also earned the distinction of a 28

29 30

Consultas of Junta de Armadas, 20 May, 11 June, 8 Aug. 1642, A G S / G A 3205. Colaert and Pietersen figure as masters in Luyando's prize-lists from the late 1620s, (ibid. C M C 1786). Consulta of Junta de Armadas, 25 Aug. 1642, ibid. G A 3205. Testimony of alguacil R. de Galvez and other officials, 5 May 1645, A G I / I G 2666. An alfdrez of the Atlantic guard fleet, Manuel de Jivaxa, was arrested after the incident and (presumably on conviction of manslaughter) sentenced to twelve years duty in Oran. However, on appeal this was reduced to six, and shortly afterwards he was acquitted altogether by the Consejo de Guerra, (order of 14 Dec. 1645, ibid.). 160

Men and ships - the cutting edge knighthood of Santiago.31 Whilst Menin was still admiral, the honour was gained by the last of the line, Matthias Maes, who was to succeed him in 1663. Maes claimed to have started his career on the bottom rung of the rigging. Admiral Maes has represented to me [wrote Philip IV to Don Juan Jose in Brussels] that he has served in the armada of those states [i.e. Flanders] for thirty years continuously, without ever absenting himself from duty, and from having begun in the lowliest place on board ship until reaching his present command. He has been present on all the major voyages that have taken place since that time, comporting himself with a valour which has achieved repute. On his own account he has defeated seven warships and destroyed or taken thirty-nine merchant vessels, leaving aside many other successes to which he has contributed. He has requested the award of a knighthood of Santiago, in order to add lustre to his continuing services. I charge you to discover and inform me of his qualifications for this honour.32 Thus, despite the powerful ethnic, social (and even, at the level of innuendo, religious) difficulties it involved, all the native-born commanders of the armada from 1637 to the 1660s were elevated to the most prestigious of Castilian dignities, the order of Spain's original, crusading patron Saint. The estimation and value placed by the governments of Philip IV on the services of Flemish sailors and ships could hardly be more strongly demonstrated than by this process. The career of Matthias Maes evidently represented a successful challenge to the rule that life at sea should be even more nasty, brutish and short than the average. (In any case, we may recall that Hobbes himself, born in the year of the Invincible, lived in comfortable retirement in the soft Wiltshire countryside until the age of ninety-one.) Similar miracles could occur in the lower ranks, as in the case of the father of one Nicholas Val de Olivas. The son, who was a gaviero (topmastman) in the galleon Nuestra Senora de la Conception during the successful Mediterranean campaign of 1652, had 'joined the Flanders armada in imitation of his father'. Val de Olivas senior (Nicholas claimed) had served for forty-two continuous years - and thus had helped to crew one of the ships which came back to Spain as a squadron in 1611 - and had seen action in Italy as well as Flanders before his death in 1629. If father had discharged the same office as son - surely one of the more dangerous on board - it makes the story all the more remarkable (or, perhaps, implausible).33 As is well known, soldiers as well as sailors served on board the ships of any Spanish fleet, and Spain's marine corps justifiably prides itself on its prior 31 32

33

See Menin to Philip IV, 21 F e b . 1655, A G S / G A 3366. Philip IV to D o n Juan Jose de Austria, 8 Sept. 1656, ibid. E 2267. T h e duke of Albuquerque, in supporting M a e s ' promotion in 1663 - when he had thirty-seven years' service - referred to him as 'such a great sailor' (consulta of Junta de Armadas, 29 June 1663, ibid. G A 3436). Consulta ofJunta de Armadas, 6 Nov. 1652, ibid. 3258. 161

Quills, keels and cutlasses antiquity to any other in the great naval traditions. In one sense, being neither fish nor fowl, the service was little appreciated in Flanders. They enjoyed an easy time compared to their overworked colleagues. Apart from battle conditions, their most onerous task was to board the normally more-or-less helpless civilian victims of privateering operations. Moreover, they spent much of their time in onshore billets - not only the winters, but also during prolonged sessions of waiting for a break in the enemy blockade - when, unlike the sailors, they were not required to assist with ship-board maintenance, or to exercise any responsibility beyond routine guard-duty. Such idleness often bred boredom and discontent. In February 1632, more than five years had elapsed during which the armada had seen comparatively little action as an integral force. Its marine terdo was billetted around the town of Ypres, a day's march inland from Dunkirk, and its officers in the town itself. One market day, a riot was sparked off by the presence of a Portuguese maestre de campOy who was raising a company of cavalry in the town. After a Spanish marine had attacked and killed a servant of this officer at the door of the recruiting station, a pitched battle began between the members of the new company and some Spanish officers. Once a local man had been killed in the confusion, the populace turned on the Spaniards, who barricaded themselves in a warehouse, and rejected the pacification of the bishop. By the time the authorities managed to break into the building and apprehend the mutineers, four citizens of Ypres were dead, in addition to the initial victim. The gates were locked and the town walls manned against the possibility that the remaining marines might march to their comrades' assistance.34 The underlying causes of the incident may have been linked to the failure of supply to the armada from general army funds in the late 1620s, causing pay-backlogs and other shortfalls; a situation which may not have been made good in respect of the marine contingents by the winter of 1631. In any case, here was an unwelcome recrudescence of the 'Spanish Fury' - small-scale, perhaps, but significant in a period when military discipline was generally of a good standard. The municipality naturally demanded punishment and compensation. It was another political embarrassment for the Spaniards in Flanders, all the more so because it came during a period of exceptional tension in the provinces. At no other time since the sixteenth century had there been greater need to maintain and improve relations on the ground between Spaniards and natives. Serious defeat in the terrestrial campaigns had brought the prospect of imminent invasion by the victorious armies of the United Provinces. Age and illness had removed the Archduchess from effective government, and conspiracy was rife in several sectors of the political community. Olivares, who had 34

'Copia de la carte que los senores del magistrado de la villa de Ypres han escrito a sus deputados que estan en la villa de Gante a 28 de Febrero de 1632 afios', BN/2364, ff. 57-9V. 162

Men and ships - the cutting edge only recently emerged from his own severest challenge in the domestic political arena, had to battle strenuously to regain control.35 One advantage of maintaining a force of Spanish foot-soldiers as part of the establishment was realised after 1640. When the armada was moved to Spanish waters and the direct orders of Madrid, a far greater proportion of the infanteria than of its native sailors were happy to come with it. Pietersen's flotilla of six vessels of 1642 was comfortably crewed, with 450 sailors and 300 marines, but the former contingent already contained many Basques brought in to fill up the gaps. Allowing for the somewhat larger dimensions of the so-called 'fragata doble' patented in the 1630s, and for the fact that his capitana and almiranta were galleons of over 500 tons, this also reflects the meticulous care of the naval authorities in ensuring the Dunkirker's maximum effectiveness, even at the cost of that enjoyed by other units. 36 In general, the human dimensions of the armada naturally fluctuated with its size and importance over the century or so treated in this study. Preparation for the campaign of 1588 involved an enormous augmentation, an ephemeral phenomenon, of which within two years few signs remained. All the same, in 1599 the Antwerp-Rhine patrol alone had twelve small vessels and around 250 men. As we have seen, at its suppression in 161 o, the seagoing armada counted eleven warships and perhaps 1,000 personnel.37 In 1622, at the start of its second period of existence, the armada mustered only the strength of two companies in the army pay-lists - less than 600 men - a figure which accords with the readiness of only four or five frigates.38 Five years later, 'three companies' of twenty-seven officers and 476 able seamen were registered. Francisco de Ribera complained in the spring of 1629 that he could only rely on 500 crewmen, when 1,250 were necessary for his fifteen ships, a force which by then incorporated several Spanish war-galleons of conventional dimensions.39 Figures are lacking for the 1630s, when the armada had autonomy of subsidy, but a total of over 3,000 personnel can be fairly safely assumed 35 36

37

38 39

See above, pp. 6-]ff. 'La Junta de Armadas sobre lo que conviene ordenar desde luego para que se halle prevenida la Infanteria Marineria . . . ' , Jan. 1642, A G S / G A 3205. Accounts of H . Hillbrand and C . de Mesmada, Sept.-Oct. 1599, ibid. 3258. T h i s unit seems to have continued its existence in 1609—21. In 1626, Fermin de Lodosa was demoted to its command, which he retained until at least 1639, when he enjoyed an increased salary of 250 escudos per month. T o be fair to D o n Fermin (on whom see above, p . 65), the early 1630s witnessed much action on this front, when he had ample opportunity to redeem his reputation. In these years the Antwerp squadron had an autonomous status vis a vis the armada of Flanders, and continued being supported from the pagaduria general after 1630. Indeed, in 1639 it mustered fifteen companies of sailors and cost 31,000 escudos - theoretically more than the Flanders armada itself; see ' L o que importa el pagamento de 1639 ano . . . ' A R B / S E G 9obis, ff. 248 and 278. Monthly accounts of pagaduria general for July and August 1622, A G S / E 2312, f. 3. Accounts of Gaspar de Pereda, 7 Jan. 1627, ibid. 2318; Ribera and Uribarri to P. de San Juan, Dunkirk, 13 April 1629, ibid. 2043, ff 333~4-

163

Quills, keels and cutlasses for the latter part of that decade. In the following years, steady contraction was the order of the day. Without resorting to Churchillian rhetoric, it is obvious that the contribution to the Monarchy's war-effort, made by a force comprising less than 2,000 men in any given year of the Thirty Years' War, stands at an impressive degree of inverse ratio to its physical size. THE SHIPS - CHURCH-FORTRESSES AFLOAT

In the ranks of the Flanders armada, the vessels which predominated, and which carried the main burden of its successes, were known, from about the second decade of the seventeenth century, as 'frigates'. But what exactly was a 'frigate'? Unfortunately for our convenience, the open-sea vessels of the early modern period are not susceptible of an exact taxonomy. As Captain Riafio Lozano neatly puts it, in his description of the vast assortment of craft collected by Parma for the invasion of England, any typology can only be 'aleatoric', adapted for the unique context of its time and place.40 Design and specification differed for various broad categories not only from country to country, but from shipyard to shipyard, and even from ship to ship within a single contract carried out by the same persons. In Spanish practice, although ideal measurements for warships were laid down by the Crown from time to time, the actual experience of construction, above all the qualities of wood utilised, dictated that modifications, sometimes radical, would occur during execution. In a society which experienced difficulty in producing any weapon to standard - an aspect of the Spanish System which stands in need of further investigation - it is hardly to be expected that the biggest and most complicated weapon of all should be successfully mass-produced according to a strict formula. Indeed, it was long before industrial standardisation had progressed to the stage where a vessel species could be replicated anywhere according to modern parameters of precision. Naval historians agree that only with the more refined codes of construction of 'ships of the line' in the early eighteenth century can we expect a 'frigate' to conform to a range of detailed specifications.41 40

41

Riafio Lozano, Los medios, pp. 22—5; and, for the specific case, A. T h r u s h , 'In Pursuit of the Frigate'. This section eschews discussion of shipbuilding techniques, materials, equipment and other technical questions, because there are two outstanding recent monographs in English which between them cover the Spanish context comprehensively (Rahn Phillips, Six Galleons, and Goodman, Power and Penury) and because material which might enable discussion of such questions in the context of the Flemish ports is not extant. Moreover, D r Goodman's current research on the military infrastructures of the reign of Philip IV - with special reference to the navy - will further elucidate these matters in ways which are quite beyond the competence of the present author. See (e.g.) F . H o w a r d , Sailing Ships of War, 1400-1815 (London, 1979), pp. 8 9 - 9 1 ; L. T . Lehmann, Galleys in the Netherlands (Amsterdam, 1984), p. 48. Some attempts at standardisation were being made. By 1618, the dictum of T o m e Cano, in his Arte para fabricary aparejar navios (Seville, 1611, repr. Tenerife 1964, pp. 24, 62 and 66) that custom-build warships should have a

164

Men and ships — the cutting edge To complicate matters further, the descriptive name given to any ship differed according to the custom of a region, or even of an individual recording agent. What looked like a galleon to one observer went down as an urea when it turned up elsewhere.42 It is true that the term 'galleon' was in general use to mean a vessel which was on the larger side of the norm, and either built for or converted to naval use. But at the same time, virtually any seagoing craft could be appropriated for the navies of all the European states. The substantial, well-armed merchant ships of northern Europe made up a fair proportion of most Spanish armadas even before the crisis of the 1640s. To reduce the matter to its essentials - almost any ship could be utilised when necessary for almost any purpose in war or peace, size alone being the definitive feature involved. As well as the vocabulary of description, benchmarks of capacity and displacement measurements in regular use also differed, not only between north and south Europe, but even between the north and south of Spain.43 In any case, the original ships' inventories were rarely available to an observer, who had to make his own rule-of-thumb estimates of displacement as well as 'type' on the spot. It is hardly surprising that official lists of vessels making up a particular force, or available in a particular port, often display glaring anomalies. A series of units may be entered as 'galleons', yet display wide variations in tonnages, armaments and complements given. It is not unusual to find lists aggregating thirty or more ships in which no two units are recorded at the same tonnage within a parameter of fifty, and where vessels of anything from 200 to 1,000 tons are described as 'galleons'.44 Accurate identification is further impeded by the fact that ships often underwent fundamental alterations - changes in size, configuration, rigging, even number of masts - during their lifetimes.45 Finally, it was normal practice for a vessel to have its name changed when it was transferred between commands, and when it was captured or sold. Within the context of this categorical chaos, the 'frigate' has a somewhat anomalous role, since there is some evidence to suggest, not only that they were the first vessels constructed specifically for battle to evolve outside the Mediterranean, but also that between 1610 and 1650 the Flemish yards were able to achieve a hitherto unprecedented degree of standardisation in build. However, beam to keel ratio of 1:3, had been officially adopted (see royal cedula of 16 Aug. 1618, AHP(G) 2 a Section, Neg. 3, leg. 16; Ordenanza Real...

42

43

44

45

de 1618 . . . , in Royal Decrees relating to Naval Affairs

(Bound B L compilation). But the requirements were not met even in the construction of Arana's high-quality half-dozen a few years later (Rahn Phillips, Six Galleons, pp. 29-32 and 229). This and other problems referred to in these paragraphs are demonstrated by the contemporary lists incorporated in Appendix 5, pp. 247-50. An urea was a catch-all term for a commercial vessel of heavy build, slow speed and light armament. P. Chaunu, ' L a tonelada espagnole au XVI et XVII siecles', Colloque international d'histoire maritime (Paris, 1956-7), pp. 7 1 - 8 4 . For an ideal example see 'R[elaci]on de los navios que llevo T h o m a s de Laraspuru ... \ Junta de Armadas, 9 Oct. 1623, A G S / G A 3148. In view of the composition of the British South Atlantic Task Force of 1982, neither this practice, nor the commandeering of private craft, will appear strange to the reader.

165

Quills, keels and cutlasses no detailed records have survived from any of the places where frigates were constructed between 1600 and 1650, so that we have neither a single reliable inventory, nor more than an approximate idea of numbers built. Even where the word 'frigate' is used by Dunkirkers themselves, it may be unwise to assume a hard-and-fast 'type'. Within a short lapse of time in the 1630s, we find references in Dunkirk to a 'frigate of thirty-two tons' and 'a frigate of over eighty-three feet in the keel' - the latter apparently referring to an example of the new 'double frigates' patented around that time. 46 Moreover, because of their reputation, the name was so often taken in vain, that by the late 1630s it is impossible to rely on its use, or to be sure of the provenance where no corroboration exists.47 Even the most fervent advocates of a new northern strategy betrayed little knowledge of the development of the Flemish frigate. Nowhere in his prolific writings - for example - does William Semple make any reference to this subject, apparently (therefore) assuming that the new campaigns will be carried on with old weapons. Even those arbitristas del mar who were stationed in Flanders during the relevant period - Urizar, Malvenda, Coloma and others make no reference to the fact that a new generation of fighting ships had been born in the shipyards of the Low Countries. Official reticence, rare in the Spanish System, may have been deliberate, arising from consciousness that the new vessel could be a decisive instrument, and that anything committed to paper could go astray. At all events, the issue of a valid birth certificate is impossible, for we can be certain of neither the precise date nor the exact place of nativity. So ill-defined is this subject that a recent historian of the so-called 'military revolution' is able to assert that the Dutch, and not the Flemish, shipbuilders were the first to make the decisive evolutionary breakthrough, very early in the seventeenth century. 'Shortly after 1600 eight new capital ships were built at Hoorn [asserts Professor Parker]. They were long in relation to their breadth, low in the water yet shallow in draft. They came to be called frigates, and they soon became the mainstay of the fleet . . . By 1629 ... the forty-gun, 300-ton frigate had become the standard Dutch warship.'48 Most other sources, however, dispute this version. Spanish mariners and shipwrights were aware of the necessity to adopt the models of their northern enemies even before the Invincible's disaster. According to several writers, shipyards in northern Spain had begun to construct a more compact species of 46 47

48

Dams, LesActes, pp. 38 (1636) and 53 (1640). In mid-century, private owners sometimes described their vessels as 'frigates' in order to obtain charters which might otherwise be lost; and at other times (e.g. in order to obtain a licence to trade in the colonies) use of the term would be avoided even when justified. For substantial changes in what was perceived as a frigate, doubtless the result of English influence after c. 1645, see sections 9 and 10 of Appendix 5, pp. 2 4 9 - 5 0 . By the 1690s, the outstanding authority, V. Coronelli, avoided the term altogether (see Ships and Other Craft used by the Various Nations of the World) (Venice, 1690, edn. by M . de Witt, London, 1970). G. Parker, The Military Revolution (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 9 9 - 1 0 0 .

166

Men and ships - the cutting edge galleon (or galeoncete) for use in northern waters. By the mid-1590s, despite the attention attracted by the 'Twelve Apostles', the more modest types were numerous in the armada.49 In 1595, moreover, a type of heavily-armed oared pinnace (pinagas agaleotadas) was being produced at Dunkirk and Antwerp for war-work in the special conditions of the Low Countries' rivers and coasts.50 Most historians of the former port, supported by several less partisan experts, claim that the new frigate was an indigenous invention. Others point out that the Dutch builders, for all their superiority in most other fields, and directed by the overwhelming capitalistic/mercantile priorities of their customers, remained oddly deficient in the construction of vessels intended specifically for war. In the century following the development of the fluitschip, they seem to have contributed little in terms of technical innovation. As one expert insists: the Spanish and later the French used Dunkirk frigates as a nemesis to Dutch shipping ... Their versatility and manoeuvrability led to their being included in the Dutch navy as well, the first Dutch frigates being built on the Flemish model in 1627 ... The frigate never seems to have been as popular in Holland and Zeeland as it was elsewhere in Europe, and the advances in the design of this type, like its original development, took place outside these provinces.51 What seems beyond doubt is that the two examples of the Mediterranean 'frigate' which Federigo Spinola took with him to Flanders in 1599, provided a crucial stimulus.52 This small and manoeuvrable vessel made a great impression in Ostend and Dunkirk, where its shallow draught combined with a single bank of ten oars made it ideal, as much for rather unglamorous tug-work in the inshore roads as for speedy operations in the calmer waters of the estuaries and islands dominated by the enemy. Whilst some Dutch yards attempted a direct imitation of the mainline galleys, the Flemish designers attempted to modify the fragata, beefing up its overall size to improve sail area and gun-mounting, whilst retaining its elongated lines and above all its reserve oared capacity. By the 161 os, vessels of around 150-200 (modern) tons - the size of a small galleon were becoming a speciality of Flanders. They normally carried a rough complement of one gun to every ten tons of dead weight, and one crewman to every two tons. 53 An increasingly well-modulated ratio of speed and manoeuvrability to hitting power was achieved by refinements induced by the experience of combat after 1621. However, for some years before that date it was clear that a new weapon, 49 50

51 52

53

Braudel, Mediterranean 1, pp. 3 0 1 - 6 . See G. Ungerer (ed.), A Spaniard in Elizabethan England: The Correspondence of Antonio Perez (2 vols, London 1974-6), 1, p. 124. R. W. Unger, Dutch Shipbuilding before 1800 (Amsterdam, 1978), p. 47. For the Mediterranean 'fragata', see Olesa M u n i d o , La organization, 1, pp. 2 3 6 - 4 0 . T h i s expert, however, considers that the Atlantic-type galeoncete rather than this model was the forerunner of the North Sea frigate, (ibid., p. 266). Lehmann, Galleys, pp. 13-16; Hambye, L Aumonerie, pp. 148-50.

167

Quills, keels and cutlasses in effect a custom-designed destroyer of the fluitschip - the cost-effective but ponderous staple of Dutch convoys, capacious in payload but light in armament and crew - had been discovered. Indeed, perhaps the most revolutionary characteristic of the new vessel, and one which experts on the history of naval architecture do not often recognise, is that the Flemish frigate represents the first generation of specialist fighting-ship in the West outside the Mediterranean. Its evolution is clearly linked to the enormous growth in the volume of commerce and fishing in the North Sea and its approaches during the sixteenth century. The frigate developed in this habitat, as a 'natural' species, a beast of prey to batten on the beasts of burden, and above all the main cargo ship (the fluit) and the fishing-drifter (or buiz). It was a formidable creature, perfectly adapted to its task and its environment. The hull was long in relation to its width, giving it less drag and greater speed through the water. A low and almost even outline, in contrast to the 'castles' fore and aft of the galleon, made it difficult to detect, especially in the misty conditions which so often prevail in these waters, not only around the coasts but out at sea. The same conditions often gave it a further advantage, since the vessel enjoyed a propulsive capacity which made it relatively independent of wind and tide conditions. Its oars enabled the frigate to manoeuvre, in attack more easily than an intended victim, in escape more swiftly than any adversary. Even in normal wind conditions, the Flemish types proved speedier than most pursuers, and on very rare occasions were they caught in the open sea. To further supplement the aquadynamic shape of the hull, Flemish mariners learned how to use 'studding sails', an extra dimension of canvas hoisted on fitted spar-extensions, to great effect.54 The frigate's extra weight of artillery, especially the longer run of cannon which could be aligned on the single-story upper deck, could often be destructive in engagement. The skills of the Flemish gunners soon became fearful to their enemies. We may tentatively conclude, therefore, that, at least until the 1640s, 'frigate' signified a warship of modest dimensions, built in the yards of Flanders - mostly in Dunkirk itself. No other naval shipwrights ever seem to have learned and applied the full secret of their construction. This is true of the experts of Holland or England, some of them willing and eager pupils who were able to work from captured examples, as well as those of metropolitan Spain.55 If it 54 55

Unger, Dutch Shipbuilding, p . 5 8 . By the 1620s, English maritime writers like Mainwaring and Smith had recognised one of the main innovations of the frigate, the flush upper deck clear of castle or poop, which expedited both sailing and deployment of artillery. As the latter put it, 'a flush deck is when from stem to sterne it lies upon a right [straight] line for and aft, which is the best for a M a n of W a r r e \ O n the other hand, they both understood a 'Frigott' to mean a small packet-boat type in the same general category as a ketch or pinnace. See J. Smith, A Sea Grammar (1627 edn., ed. K. Goell, London, 1970), pp. 1, 7 and 7 1 - 2 . (I owe my knowledge of this source to Prof. J. King of the Maritime Studies Dept., U W C C . ) O n costly English attempts to imitate the Flemish design, see T h r u s h , 'In pursuit of the Frigate'.

168

Men and ships - the cutting edge seems true that, for some thirty or forty years, a majority of maritime experts recognised most of the outstanding characteristics of a frigate, it is also evident that by the late 1650s, common usage even at this level had begun to crumble whatever concreteness of meaning it had previously enjoyed. When 'frigates' of the navies of the Commonwealth and the Dutch Republic came into confrontation in the early 1650s, they retained only some of the Flemish builders' features, already being a distinctly larger and more ponderous animal. By the end of the century the 'frigate' had taken its place as the third-rater type utilised internationally during the great age of wooden war-fleets. The innovations being made in Dunkirk came to the notice of Madrid in the first years of the seventeenth century. In late 1602, Martin de Bertendona, veteran of the Invincible, who had made his latest visit to Dunkirk four years earlier, was commissioned by the Junta de Armadas to construct eight galleons in Bilbao. 'All of the said warships should be constructed in the same manner, with the measurements and form of the warships they build in Dunkirk, which are the most speedy and the best designed for war at present to be found at sea.' However, although the term galeoncete ('little galleon') had been in frequent use to describe the smaller fighting ship increasingly favoured in the North Sea, at least since the 1570s, it was specified that Bertendona's ships should be 'galleons', constructed in pairs of 500, 400, 300, and 200 tons respectively. The finished products, despite following the innovation of a keel-to-beam ratio of more than 3:1, in fact ranged between 127 and 889 tons displacement, six of them (it is true) falling between 400 and 600 tons!56 Perhaps the scale of the mismatch dawned on the junta with the earliest deliveries, for in 1605, whilst Bertendona's shipwrights were still at work, Hortuno de Urizar was sent from Bilbao as proveedor to the armada of Flanders, with the special task of overseeing the manufacture of eight warships in Dunkirk itself. When these ships were brought to Lisbon a few years later, however, they were described as galeoncetesP Urizar's commission apart, the first successful project undertaken for the crown in the Flemish ports was that of Adrian van der Walle in 1618-22. That some five years were taken up with the completion of a dozen modest-sized frigates, inspires reservation over Malo's assertions that the Flemish firms became adept in rapid replacement and augmentation of the stock.58 As we have seen, the commission for twelve others made by the town of Winoksberg failed to produce more than two frigates in a three-to-four year period (1622-5). Dutch warships may have been less effective, but they multiplied themselves at 56

57 58

For the Bertendona contract, see A G S / C M C 2214 which contains over thirty separatepliegos on the subject, dating from 1602-22. However, the nominations of commanders for the commissioned ships (1605-6) refer to two of them (the San Martin and the San Jorge) as 'galeoncetes'; A G M 2052/15. See also Rahn Phillips, Six Galleons, pp. 2 8 - 9 . See above, pp. 14-15 and n. 46. Malo, Les Corsaires, I, pp. 370—3 and passim.

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Quills, keels and cutlasses four (or even five) times this rate. By the late 1620s, despite royal demand, and the enormous prizemoney incentives which put a premium on their possession, no more than forty frigates were operational, whether in royal or private hands, and perhaps fewer than sixty had ever been built.59 Evolution of the larger version in Dunkirk, during the subsequent decade, may be presumed to have slowed the rate of production still further. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the achievements of the men and ships of the Flanders armada helped inspire the attempt to bring about certain general changes in the Monarchy's war-structures in the 1630s. The wideranging reforms of the armed services undertaken in these years produced in 1633 a new set of naval Ordenanzas. This document reflected above all Madrid's perception - albeit still somewhat dim by later standards - of the need to create an exclusive and professional naval cadre. It laid down the full range of rates of pay, with a proper emphasis on the premium valuation of technical expertise, which for the first time competed with the salaries and privileges of the officer class. It required that no royal ship should carry private goods or any non-military materials. Regulations like this went along with a stricter insistence on building and/or reserving ships specifically for war-work (such as the medium-sized type of galleon built by Martin Arana and others), which later evolved into the 'rated' battleships of the eighteenth century.60 Later in the decade, the development of the newer variety of frigate - the fragata doble - was described, to the excitement of the Junta de Ejecucion, by Jacques Colaert. What seem to be the relevant dimensions of the new type were spelt out for the guidance of Spanish shipbuilders.61 Pedro Coloma, Secretary of the Junta de Armadas, noted down with vicarious pride that the Nuestra Senora de Stella Marts, Colaert's flagship - a galleon built in Holland - was 'a slow ship which cannot navigate as well as ours, since the warships built in Dunkirk sail better than any others'. 62 Olivares himself was profoundly impressed with the performance of the Flanders armada - so much so that the Dunkirkers and their frigates seemed to offer him a new instrument of warfare, which was the answer to Spain's imperial problems. In September 1637, a joint meeting of the relevant 59

60 61

These are 'guesstimates' based mainly on descriptions of the armada ships, along with those of the chartered squadron commanded by the count of Waecken, and privateer enterprisers, in the prize lists of Luis de Luyando for 1626—8, (AGS C M C / 1 7 8 6 , passim). Ordenanqas del Bven Gavierno ... 1633. 'Medidas de la Fragata', (? 1637), MN/Vargas, 26, f. 380. The specifications were for a vessel 'of 300 tons, a little more or less'. Beam Keel Overall length Draft Height of prow above hull Height of stern

62

13 codos [26 feet] 40 " 50 » 7V2 * 2l/l

n

5V2

»

Note by Coloma for the Junta de Ejecucion, March 1637, AGS/GA 3169. 170

Men and ships - the cutting edge subcommittees of the Councils of War and the Indies agreed that a massive improvement in the numbers and quality of Atlantic convoy guardships was imperative. The duke of Villahermosa suggested that suitable vessels should be purchased in northern Europe, and Olivares agreed to despatch an extra 150,000 escudos to Brussels for the purpose. Warming to his theme, he added: But, in addition, Your Majesty should consider that this armada of the Indies convoy, which we need to enlarge, might incorporate ten or twelve well-armed frigates of Dunkirk construction, which are suitable for almost any emergency. It may even be that, if they carried the silver, they would be better able to guard it from any danger, because of their swiftness of movement, and the advantage they have in this respect over other warships. With less than 500,000 ducats, a force can be created which would guarantee the security of the Indies, and be able to clear all those seas of enemies so effectively that they might never return .. . 63

As it happened, Jacques van der Walle, the prominent shipbuilder-owner of Dunkirk, also came to Madrid with Colaert and Coen in this year. Like his compatriot, he was awarded a knighthood of Santiago, and offered to contract for twenty-four examples of the modified frigates, in accordance with the recommendations accepted by the government. But the deal was never finalised, despite the asentista's renewal of the offer five years later - a lapse which may have been associated with his disgrace following the La Corufia incident of 1638.64 Nevertheless, Malo claims that seven frigates were on the stocks at Dunkirk in 1642, and in 1655, Admiral Menin encouraged Philip IV to find financial support for the building of twelve new frigates ('carrying around thirty to thirty-six guns, according to the new method now being used in the North') from the loyal Netherlands Estates.65 The multifaceted efficiency of the frigates of the 1640s meant that they were worked ceaselessly around the Mediterranean. They appear not only collectively, as a squadron sent to perform the most difficult tasks, or in the vanguard of the battle-fleets in the most punishing engagements, but individually as carriers of emergency reinforcements, supplies or crucially important messages. So intensive was their use, according to Uribarri, that the armada's establishment was halved by 1647: 'and these eleven [ships] are very old, and cracking up so much that they lack any further strength'.66 The proveedor's appeal produced a response from the junta, which shortly thereafter again 63

64

65

66

Olivares' voto in consulta of Junta de Armadas y Guerra delndias, 1 Sept. 1637, AGI/IG 2666. For the policy-discussions of 1637, see above, pp. 9 6 - 9 . Salamanca to Galarreta, 18 M a r c h 1637, A H N / E 962, f. 233; consulta of Junta de Armadas, 2 J u n e 1642, A G S / G A 3205. For van der Walle's disgrace, see below, p . 225. Malo, Les Corsaires, I, p . 373; M e n i n (Naples) to Philip IV, 21 F e b . and consulta of Junta de Armadas, 2 June 1655, A G S / G A 3366. Uribarri to Philip IV, [?Feb. 1647], A G S / G A 3258. 171

Quills, keels and cutlasses increased the size of the force, though there is no evidence that the additions included frigates.67 The need for the Dunkirkers in their home waters was, of course, everpresent. After 1641, continual entreaties were made for their return to Flanders, at least for a winter season of three or four months, but after 1646, with the approach of the most dangerous quinquennium in the Monarchy's history, Philip refused to release them from the Spanish theatre for any period or purpose. In 1651, as Leopold-William prepared his campaign against Dunkirk, even Philip's ambassador in The Hague pleaded in vain with the King to return some of these warships, in order to facilitate the recapture of their home town.68 They returned at least as far as Biscay, in 1653, to make an indispensable contribution to the campaigns in Bordeaux - the last intervention of the Spanish Monarchy in the intestinal wars of its neighbour kingdom.69 Philip himself paid them another tribute when, in 1655, he ordered the authorities in San Sebastian to contract for a privately-owned Flemish frigate to carry troops to Flanders in preference to a royal urea which was available in the harbour.70 By this point, of the fourteen or so frigates which had sailed south in 1641-2, perhaps two or three survived in Menin's squadron. In subsequent years, sporadic sightings reveal the presence of individual veterans around Spain.71 The training and experience of Flemish mariners was such that, by the time Colaert came to Madrid in 1637, they were already thought of as without equal in the management of all kinds of war-galleon. Although Spaniards were used when necessary to fill the gaps in crewing the frigates, it was recognised that only the natives could handle them to fullest advantage. Probably it was this factor, as much as the fearsome reputation of the craft themselves, which in the 1640s led the Council of the Indies to ban all frigates from the seas of the Spanish-American colonies.72 Ultimately they were obliged to reject the potential advantages offered by their use in the Atlantic, because of the risk of dreadful consequences should they fall into Dutch hands, and instead they resorted to sporadic revivals of the Armada deBarlovento. In any case, the attempt to exclude frigates from the Caribbean failed. Although, by the coming of the great age of buccaneering, the frigate was losing its pristine meaning and 67 68 69

70

71

72

Consulta of Junta de Armadas, 13 and 16 Aug. 1647, ibid. Antoine Brun to Philip IV, 9 Nov. 1651, A G S / E E H 3 3 , f. 336. For reports and other material about this invasion, ostensibly in aid of the O r m e e and xhefronde of Cardinal de Retz, see ibid. G A 3337. Consulta of Junta de Armadas and royal apostilla, 5 F e b . 1655, ibid. 3336. Philip's judgement was uncanny on this occasion. Before the end of the year, the naval vessel in question, the San Carlos, foundered off the coast of Portugal when carrying 143 soldiers to Cadiz; consulta of Junta de Armadas, 3 Dec. 1655, ibid. Only three were left in 1663, when at the end of a season patrolling the Portuguese coast, Admiral Maes took them back to La Coruna for repair and careening; consulta of Council of War, 12 Dec. 1663, ibid. 3436. See reports of the Casa de Contratacion, 4 J u n e and 8 Aug. 1647, A G I / I G 2666.

172

Men and ships — the cutting edge identity, it seems no coincidence that the aerobatic scavenging seabird indigenous to the tropic of Cancer came to be called 'the frigate-bird'.73 Had they, indeed, been drafted into the defence of the Atlantic, wear and loss amongst the frigates would have proceeded at an even greater rate. 74 The average life-span of vessels of this century was no more than a decade, with normal limits, depending on circumstances, of five to twenty years. The record for the Flanders armada seems to be held by the galleon San Salvador, which was Horna's flagship in 1639, came to Spain in 1645, and may still have been in commission under Maes twenty years later.75 But the survival rate of frigates in the Mediterranean, taking into account the fact that effective repair and maintenance was almost unknown, seems to have been highly satisfactory by contemporary standards. Remarkably, no reliable pictorial representation of a Flemish frigate of the classic period seems to be extant, nor has the present writer been able to discover evidence of special decorative characteristics or descriptions of flags and other signals. For this reason and others, the emblemology of the armada, at least in terms of its signifying accoutrements, must remain unexplored. What remains to provide a little storehouse of semiotics is the names given the vessels. They give an indication of increasing religious (or at least religiose) zeal amongst the men of the armada, in which names with strong Catholic associations, always dominant, come ultimately to drive out any title with secular connotations. Indeed, the process is even more specifically meaningful if it is traced in chronological detail.76 The ships collected by Parma in 1588 included many vessels with nonChristian names, which even the Castilian versions of the German or Dutch words used by their owners cannot disguise. El Cazador (The Hunter) seems to our modern sensibilities an apt enough name for a privateer, La Paloma Blanca perhaps less so. But the trauma of defeat in 1588 gave an impetus to the process by which the Spanish galleon was coming to be seen as a perfect combination of 73

74

75

76

T h e species is also known as 'man-o'-war birds' - 'because of their aggressiveness and piratical behaviour' {Encyclopaedia Britannica). See Modelski and Thompson, Seapower, pp. 166-7. However, there are several reasons to suppose that the Flemish-built warships of the armada, which were not employed in tropical waters, enjoyed greater longevity - perhaps as many as fifteen years on average. This case perfectly illustrates the difficulties of tracing a specific ship. It seems likely that this warship was built in Dunkirk — but in 1664 proveedor Vaus y Fnas (see below) refers to the San Salvador as having been built in 1657. This may have been a slip for 1637; but an independent source corroborates that a forty-gunner was on the Dunkirk stocks in 1656 (CSPD [1655-6], p. 519). O n the other hand, the ship was finally judged beyond repair in the winter of 1663—4, (this intelligence had not reached Vaus y Frias when he drew up his 1664 report) which strongly suggests a vessel of rather older vintage than six years. T h e possibility remains that it was a replacement for the 'original' galleon sailed by Horna and Menin, which met its end at some earlier point. See Consulta of Council of War, 12 Dec. 1663, A G S / G A 3436; 'Estado del Armada Naval de Flandes', 21 Oct. 1664, A H N / E 107, no. 9 3 . T h e following paragraphs make reference to the lists of ships in Appendix 5, pp. 247—50.

173

Quills, keels and cutlasses floating church (in both specific and representational senses) with mighty fortress. They had to be sanctified accordingly - as indeed they were, not only in their dedications, but also by the senior clergy with censer and ciborium, both at commissioning and when setting sail in expeditionary force. In the Flanders armada of 1588 the saints' names are typical and unremarkable. SanAlessandro, for example, in obvious tribute to Parma himself, San Phelipe to his uncle and master, Santa Catalina to his master's daughter. By 1598 there is already a change, if still subtle at this stage. Only one secular name can now be found, and the rest are more directly evocative of embattled CounterReformation spirituality (La Fee, La Conversion) and martyrology (Santa Ursula, San Juan Bautista belong to both categories). Above all, names associated with the Blessed Virgin are now present (San Rafael, Nuestra Senora de la Consolation). It is some time before this tendency takes over, although I have found only one further example of a secular name inside the royal armada (El CarneRojo, 1627). In the 1611 list we find, naturally enough, the royal tributes (SS. Felipe, Margarita, Alberto and Isabel). Later, there is an inclination towards a concretely Spanish-Jesuitical message, in accordance with the powerfully committed religious policy of the Archdukes, and the nature of the chaplaincy attached to the armada in the 1620s (Santiago, SS. Ignacio and Ildefonso).11 By the time the armada sailed to Spain in 1641, the BVM had staked a major claim to its allegiance. Both Pietersen's capitana and Rodriguez's almiranta were named after her, along with two others, making up nearly half the squadron. Shortly afterwards, reading any armada list becomes rather like a recitation of the Litany of the Blessed Virgin. Of course, Spanish shipboard spirituality was in any case tilted towards Mariology. Mass was forbidden at sea because of the danger to the consecrated Host from pitching and rolling, and this left ample space for alternative services based on the Rosary and other Marian intercessions.78 The name 'Mary' itself means 'Star of the Sea' (Ave Maris Stella), and her liturgical invocations had traditionally accumulated a marine vocabulary. In the week before the armada sailed on its single most glorious voyage, the Archduchess Isabel retired to pray in a celebrated Flemish shrine of the Virgin.79 Neither was the dedication of vessels to Mary anything new in itself: we have only to remember Columbus' Santa Maria. But in the Spain of Philip IV a veritable passion for the cult of the Immaculate Conception, of which the chief partisan was the King himself, raged 77

78

For the Jesuit Chaplaincy, whose members sailed on every armada ship, and exhorted their parishioners to acts of courage and daring, see Hambye, L Aumonerie, passim. In the 1620s occurs a wonderful choice of name for a ruthless predator, amongst the frigates chartered from Adriaan van der Walle and commanded by Count Waecken - Nuestra Senora del Socorro. When the English captured a Dunkirk frigate with this name in 1656 - probably an offspring of the earlier example - they changed it to the more prosaic but less inappropriate Wolfi see R. C. Anderson's contribution to Lists of Naval Warships, p. 16. 79 Fernandez-Armesto, Spanish Armada, p. 56. Lemaire, Diaire, p. 84.

174

Men and ships - the cutting edge 80

amongst all classes. Pietersen's flagship of 1641 was named - or perhaps renamed - for the location-specific Mary of the court of Madrid (Our Lady of Atocha) in a decade where frantic devotion to the Inmaculada, patroness and protectress, inspired by the terrible crisis the Monarchy was undergoing, arguably reached its most intense point. As Spain faced the terrible challenges of the 1640s, it doubtless encouraged the King and others at court that amongst its most dedicated temporal defenders figured the warships whose very nomenclature invoked the aid of its most potent spiritual one (Nuestra Senora de la Conception, and several similar companions). In this war the Flemish mariners, with their base and alien origins, came to occupy the vanguard of embattled Spanish Catholicism.81 80 81

Stradling, Philip IV, esp. pp. 3 4 4 - 7 . A similar religious obsession was present in the English Navy of the Commonwealth and Protectorate periods. By the 1650s, 'the growth of a substantial Puritan bloc among the officers' reached a peak. Captains enjoyed a remarkable esprit de corps through their common view of themselves as 'the instruments of divine providence'. Several were accomplished preachers. Days of prayer and fasting on board were common before an expected ordeal, and religious observance could actually impede military efficiency. See B. Capp, Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution, 1648-1660 (Oxford, 1989), chapter 9 and esp. pp. 2 9 6 - 8 . However, it seems (with some exceptions, like the Providence and the Reformation) that the ships' names failed to reflect this tendency; see J. R. Powell, The Navy in the English Civil War (London, 1962), pp. i93ff. Nevertheless, the Anglo-Spanish naval war after 1655 represents one of the sharpest moments of ideological struggle in an ideological age.

175

Administration - structures, personnel, finance

INSTITUTIONAL ORGANISATION

Since the early modern period, a slang term for a civil servant in Madrid has been 'un covachuelista' (cueva = cave), named after the little chambers hollowed out of the great rock on which stood the medieval royal Alcazar, used to accommodate the offices of the secretaries and scribes. The troglodyte metaphor for a bureaucrat may appeal to the modern sensibility; but a more malleable one is provided by the arboreal image, so familiar to the seventeenthcentury hidalgo, with its discrete branches permitting the naming of parts, and appropriate for the wooden world of an armada. The structure of any Habsburg military institution was basically tripartite, having (as it were) its roots in a parent body of ministers, usually a council or tribunal, a trunk of professional administration and the many branches of a command corps. The Flanders Admiralty was organised according to principles which had been tried and tested by the time of its re-establishment by Parma in 1583. Farnese naturally introduced similar tenets to those which informed the army of Flanders, which he had commanded since 1579.1 Analysis of its administrative structures, during both chronological manifestations (1583-1610 and 1622-1700), therefore reveals conventional patterns common to the military institutions of the Spanish System. Sibling plants, varying only in their size and importance, sprang up all over the Hispanic world in its imperial heyday. On paper, at least, its morphology was straightforward and rational, with clear delineations of authority and responsibility. In practice, particularly with the stresses of warfare and scarcity of resources, a range of concomitant confusions introduced themselves. These latter, however, must not be exaggerated. Many difficulties experienced by the historian in describing (and by the student in grasping) the mechanics of the Spanish Monarchy stem from the fact that, although its infrastructures may have represented a historical bloc, they were plastic in many details, and subject to constant, and random, chronological variation. The petty bureaucracy of the system continuously adapted its organisation to changing strategic, financial and personal circumstances. A fully settled pattern often cannot be traced even over a quinquennial cycle. 1

Pollentier, De Admiraliteit, pp. 9-12.

176

Structures, personnel, finance This is particularly true in the present case, because of the partial condition of the evidence. Whereas in many other areas of its endeavour the records of the Monarchy are present (in the great archives of Simancas, Madrid and Seville) with an amplitude which approaches completeness, those of the Flanders Admiralty have been less immune from the violent vicissitudes of the past. Nonetheless, the proposition may be tentatively advanced that the expansion of the Admiralty's administration never kept pace with the increase in the size and importance of the armada itself. If institutions could be subjected to forensic analysis, like that used in dendroclimatology upon trees of a certain size and longevity, the experiment might reveal that the Flanders Admiralty was at least a partial exception to the rule that organic growth is greater in warm years than in the cold ones. In its earliest years the armada was supervised at a political level by an ad hoc junta chaired by Parma himself, and otherwise comprising a trusted secretary, Baltasar de Avila, and the commander (and part-owner) of the fleet, Emanuel Filibert, marquis de Renty. At the death of the latter in 1590, Parma put the magisterial powers which had previously been the preserve of the Admiral of Burgundy into commission. Six years later Archduke Albert regularised matters, setting up an exclusive body, the Supreme Council, which became one of the consultative committees of the government of the Spanish Netherlands. In 1599, moreover, Albert abolished the titular admiralty, himself assuming the supreme new post of captain-general of the navy and the headship of the Council.2 Thenceforward, the Council stood in the same relationship to the incumbent governor in Brussels as the Junta de Armadas to the King in Madrid - though the latter was technically merely an adjunct or subcommittee of the Consejo de Guerra. Despite the Spanish body's subordinate position, it was at times able to influence the evolution of policy.3 Likewise, although the Cornell Supreme*s role was seen from Spain as one of receiving (via the governor) and implementing decisions taken in Madrid, in practice they too exercised a degree of autonomy. As we have seen, most governors, and not only those of royal blood, at times failed to respond to instructions in the manner looked for by Madrid; in such departures from the straight-and-narrow of their loyalty, it seems certain that (for example) Archduchess Isabel and Don Fernando received the support of a majority of the Supreme Council. Despite the perennial disagreements over armada policy after 1622, and other (less serious) inter-governmental misunderstandings which occasionally arose, 2

3

Ibid., pp. 14-19. See also Bolsee, Inventaire, pp. 151-2. Elsewhere, these paragraphs are based upon the eighteenth-century ms. 'Histoire de l'Amiraute des Pais-bas', BRB/16038, esp. ff. 49-80. Identification of personnel has been aided by the details in Parker, The Army ofFlanders, Appendix E, pp. 281-9 ('The Senior Officers of the Army of Flanders, 1567-1659')For the role of the Junta de Armadas in these years, see Thompson, War and Government, passim but esp. pp. 266-7.

177

Quills, keels and cutlasses the normal 'political' business of the Council was, indeed, loyally to implement policies emanating from the Madrid HQ, discussing only the best means of execution. According to the Parma dispensation of 1590, its routine activities divided into a fourfold supervision: of the military command; of the supply and preparation of ships; of the judicial administration of prizes; and of the issue of trading permits (licences and passports). All except the last of these functions were devolved to dependent organisations. The first was the officer corps itself; the second, the full-time professional administrative staff of the navy; and the third, a tribunal of (usually three) judges, normally sitting in the administrative centre of the Admiralty. Like most royal councils of the period, the Supreme Council enjoyed additional jurisdictional capacities. It decided on changes to the standing orders (Ordonnances) for the operation of the Admiralty, and heard cases where these were infringed. It acted as the appeal court of the Prize Tribunal, and a good proportion of the total workload of the former (especially in 1622-46) lay in this area. Furthermore, the Council had the responsibility to mediate, and the right of ultimate arbitration, in any dispute between individual members of the Admiralty and its collective manifestations. The Supreme Council had a role in patronage, in that it scrutinised and approved applications for appointments of both officers and officials. But its exercise of this privilege was merely formal, since, except for the years of archducal 'rule' (1598-1621), in the vast majority of cases such appointments were actually decided in Madrid. The routine link between the council and the administrative staff was provided by the greffier. Invariably a native of the Spanish Netherlands, this official supervised a clerical staff which kept all the records of the Council, including those of the Prize Tribunal. He communicated the instructions of the Council to the veedor, with whom he needed to enjoy a close working relationship. As much of the above material implies, the Council was largely dominated by prominent natives of the ten 'Obedient Provinces'. At its establishment in 1596, the President was the Duke of Aerschot (whose family held the 'hereditary' title of Admiral of Flanders), and the main ex-offido member was Antoine de Burgoigne, Count of Waecken (vice-admiral and effective commander). Amongst five ordinary councillors, only two were Spaniards.4 There were times, later, when the potential dangers of this situation was a matter of concern to Madrid. In the case of the army, the control of native Spaniards over key aspects of finance, discipline and justice remained axiomatic throughout the period. The same principle does not seem to have obtained in the case of the navy. One 4

They were Fernando de Salinas, the ex-visitador, and Gonzalo Guerra de la Vega, another contador de Hacienda, the former's assistant and relative. The other members were Charles van Malines, Martin della Faille and the businessman Pieter Opmeer, (BRB/16038, ff. 64-70). For draft minutes of proceedings in these years see ARB/CA, regs. 5-9.

178

Structures, personnel, finance reason was certainly the concern of Spanish government, after the experience of the previous generation, to respect local traditions and institutions, as far as it was consistent with fundamental issues of political security. Unlike the army of Flanders, the Admiralty was not only a pre-revolt but also a pre-Habsburg foundation, with legal roots in the Burgundian (and even according to some arguments, the Roman) past. There also existed, however, recognition of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the sailors, both in the coningsschepen and amongst the privateers, were Flemish. Below the highest levels of command, the Spanish element was small, and local men predominated, in contrast to the tercios, with their backbone of Spaniards and Italians. Likewise, the navy depended even more than the army on a wide range of native services and skills. In all these areas, the role of an essentially local magistracy in resolving issues was good for confidence, and therefore for efficiency. Yet, especially considering that the Loyal Estates made much smaller contributions to the upkeep of the navy than of the army, it remains slightly surprising that the position of noble-official Belgians in the Supreme Council never seems to have been seriously challenged by Madrid. Indeed, at the Admiralty's return to Dunkirk in 1626, the Archduchess Isabel's nominations reduced the Spanish presence to a token single member.5 Perhaps a deeper reason may be sought in an increasing degree of trust and community between the governments and peoples involved, which produced not only a Walloon veedor of the navy, and Flemish admirals, but also a native (if acting) commander-in-chief of the army in the 1630s. In general terms, therefore, involvement of local officials was accepted as an essential reflection of the political communality of Madrid and a major dependency. Undoubtedly, national jealousies could adversely affect the professional relationships between officials and ministers, exacerbating disagreements which perhaps would have occurred in any case. But, as Professor Parker has argued, the reign of the Archdukes (1598-1621) as quasi-sovereigns not only laid the basis of a settled form of government for Belgium, but also encouraged the gradual erosion of many negative attitudes. By the seventeenth century, overt signs of the 'colonial' arrogance of Spaniards towards their King's Netherlandish subjects, ubiquitous in the earlier period, are becoming hard to find.6 Initially, the Council had its being in Antwerp, but subsequently became fixed in Brussels, with the court of the Archdukes and their successors. On the other 5

6

The members were Ferdinand de Boischot, Juan de Letona, Guillaume de Steenhuis, Folcart van Achlen and Jean Kessler, with Adriaan Vereyken as secretary (i.e. greffier). Of course, Spinola, as captain-general, was ex-offido president of the Council; see BRB 16038 ff. 118-19. G. Parker, 'Corruption and Imperialism in the Spanish Netherlands: The Caste of Francisco de Lixalde, 1567-1613', and 'The Decision-Making Process in the Government of the Catholic Netherlands under "the Archdukes", 1596-1621', both in Spain and the Netherlands, 1559-16$g: Ten Studies (London, 1979), pp. 149-76. See esp. the ideas expressed on pp. 159-61, and the sources cited on pp. 257-8.

179

Quills, keels and cutlasses hand, the administrative staff who serviced the armada lived and worked in the seat of the Admiralty itself- that is to say, except for minor interruptions, in the town of Dunkirk. Here, parallels with the army are more in evidence. The officials were predominantly men born in the peninsula, full-time professional civil servants of the type evolved by the Spanish System in the course of the sixteenth century for its mundane extension and perpetuation. Their normal social background was in the lower nobility (hidalguia) of 'Greater' Castile. Victims of a strict legal tradition of primogeniture, they were often (landless) younger sons of caballero or even titulo families, educated in Spain's flourishing university system. Since we are dealing with a maritime institution, however, it is not surprising to find that many of its officials came from Spain's coastal regions, especially those of the Biscay littoral - Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria and the three Basque provinces - which had strong traditional associations with the Netherlands. It is notable that in the civil service as a whole, during the reign of Phillip II, recruits from the Basque Provinces and Galicia established a disproportionate presence - perhaps another index of the essentially maritime nature of the Spanish Monarchy. As well as their natural metier, however, the fact that every Basque family was assumed (other thing being equal) to enjoy the condition of 'purity of blood' was another important factor, for, as the reign progressed, the sanctions of limpieza as a qualification for office assumed a rigid character.7 The recurrence of Basque surnames in the history of the Almirantazgo is perhaps only to be expected, but the predominance of Vizcainos is worthy of comment. Indeed, many long-serving armada officials were even more locationspecific, having their family origins in or around the town of Bilbao. The fact reflected that port's growth to maritime pre-eminence in the previous century, and also its intimate commercial and cultural links with Flanders. Hortuno de Urizar, Miguel Zarra, Diego Hernani and Alonso de Uribarri were all connected with senorios in the hinterland of Bilbao, while Hurtuno de Ugarte, a native of Alava, was married to a bilbaina. It may be assumed, since it was permitted to this extent, that the dominance of a few families aided the esprit de corps of the institution, rather than the reverse. The Basque element was certainly specialist in gifts and interests, and on the whole committed to the task of developing durable contacts of all kinds between Spain and Flanders. They were usually amongst those officials who were content to make their careers entirely within 7

See R. Kagan, Students and Society in Early-Modern Spain (Baltimore, 1974). However, it seems that the growth of Basque presence in the civil service provides an exception to the main thesis of this justly influential study. Almost no natives of the provinces attended the celebrated colegios mayores of Salamanca, Valladolid and Alcala, which had risen to a prominence approaching monopoly as nurseries of higher officialdom. It seems from Kagan's figures for four of these foundations that only 15 per cent of their students hailed from northern Spain outside Castile proper - i.e. Galicia, Asturias, the three Basque Provinces and Navarre - and of these only 1.75 per cent were Basque. (See tables, ibid., pp. 114—23, and cf. the contrary implications at pp. 11-13 and 181.) 180

Structures, personnel, finance the Brussels network, either settling permanently in Flanders, or returning to Spain only upon retirement.8 Others, however, were intent upon carving out a career anywhere within the Spanish Habsburg Empire where opportunity beckoned, whether at home somewhere in the metropolitan peninsula, or in the wider colonial world. For these, an estanda in Flanders was merely a step on a ladder, which with luck would lead in its final stages to an appointment in the higher reaches of the central bureaucracy in Madrid, and a fortune of substance to invest in land and other material and social appurtenances of dynasty (mayorazgo). For such men, even the acquisition of wives and family responsibilities in Flanders did not alter this trajectory. Already, by the end of the sixteenth century, some serving officials were immediate descendants of first-generation Spaniards, who had been attracted by (or seconded to) the expanding apparatus of the army of Flanders in the years after the beginning of the Netherlands Revolt. Throughout the period, and in a manner characteristic of the bureaucratic history of early modern Europe, sons succeeded fathers and nephews uncles in various positions of the Flanders Admiralty. In many other cases not revealed by nominalist evidence, men came to the Low Countries from Spain in order to take up their first employment as assistants to already established kinfolk - arrangements which often took place in fulfilment of some endogamous obligation. Such links could sometimes originate from more purely economic reasons. It was not only the so-called 'unproductive' professions - the affairs of the navy and (much more so, of course) the army - which lay behind the formation of dozens of prominent 'dual-nationality' Spanish/Netherlandish families. The long-standing commercial contacts between towns like Bilbao, Santander and La Coruna and the ports of Flanders were also of great importance - though it is true that the cursus honorum was located in a bureaucratic, rather than an economic, modality in the seventeenth century.9 Throughout its existence, the Admiralty was autonomous, in administrative if not in financial terms, vis a vis the army. Yet, owing to the historical development of the Low Countries Wars, it was the army which carried the main campaigning burden. The sheer size and financial dominance of the latter, and the focal points of both in a common supreme command, for much of the time made the smaller organization little more than an appendix. Only for a single decade (the 1630s) at the height of the navy's importance for the survival of Spanish 8

9

See Appendix 3, p. 244. The families of Idiaquez and Aroztegui, which produced secretaries and ministers in Madrid, active in the cause of maritime policy at various points in 15 80-1630, were also native to Bilbao. Several of the essays and articles by M. A. Echevarria of the University of the Basque Country (listed in full in the bibliography) touch on this and cognate themes, which the author is at present developing into a multifaceted study of the relations between Spain and the Spanish Netherlands in the seventeenth century. 181

Quills, keels and cutlasses hegemony, was this dominance broken, with the short-lived period of a discrete financial allocation. In the earlier phase (1583-1610), the chief official of the navy had the title merely of assistant inspector {proveedor), implying some kind of subordinate relationship to the chief inspector (veedor-general) of the army.10 Those who held this post down to 1610 had overall charge of the provisioning of the fleet with weapons and munitions, and all supplies (food and clothing rations, and wages). The proveedor was supposed to exercise this duty by constant inspection of the ships in port, and personal enquiry amongst serving sailors of all ranks. Assisting him was a team of three subordinate officials (of more-or-less equal status). The paymaster (pagodor) acted as both treasurer and senior wages clerk. Primarily, he disbursed the monthly remuneration of the officials, officers and crews of the royal ships. He also met thefinancialterms of contracts made with entrepreneurs whose ships and crews were hired on a long-term basis by the Crown. Two outstanding examples were the Count of Renty, who owned a majority of vessels of the squadron in Parma's time, and Adriaan van der Walle, who leased eighteen frigates to the Admiralty in the 1620s.11 The pagador also found the money to pay for the repairs, weapons, stores and other material support requirements ordered by the proveedor. For all these items he was unable to draw upon a reserve budget, but was obliged to apply - theoretically at regular intervals, but in practice in a piecemeal fashion - to the central military treasure (pagaduria general).12 However, the paymaster did have one independent source of funds in his charge - the residual royal share of prizemoney. Given the range of his duties, his salary allowed for a staff of several assistants (an oficial mayor and perhaps two clerks). In contrast, the remaining full-time officials had comparatively uncomplicated lives. The contador (accountant) had no other function but to audit financial transactions, and keep meticulous records of them. No money passed through his hands, except his own salary. The tenedor was a superior warehouseman, responsible for secure storage of all provisions, weapons and equipment, though he had to keep full records of receipts and releases of same. Then, as now, this seems to have been a peaceful and relatively stress-free occupation, at least if its lengthy tenancy by Michel de Fourlaux (1585-1607) is anything to goby. 13 10 1l

12 13

Bolsee, Inventaire, pp. 153-5. A plethora of smaller contracts were entered into for the hire of ships, many, of course, on a compulsory basis. The campaign of 1588 easily set all records here, despite the successive emergencies of the mid-seventeenth century. See the accounts of pagador Toribio Martinez in AGS/CMC 713. See the relevant entries in the tanteo of Pedro de Mendieta discussed below, pp. 198-200. See the 734 pliegos de cargo of Fourlaux's quarter-of-a-century tenure in AGS/CMC 1038, where he is described as 'Tenedor de Bastimientos y municiones de la armada de su Magd.' These approximately 5,000 folios of densely-packed data represent an unexplored mine of 182

Structures, personnel, finance With revival in 1618-22, followed by the decree establishing xhzAlmirantazgo de los Paises Septentrionales in 1624, the Flanders Navy underwent a certain degree of reorganization. The latter development made it part of what was legally a new institution, with a wide remit and considerable powers, operating directly under royal patronage and control. This did not, however, initiate an inexorable Parkinsonian process of the kind frequently - but in few instances with much justification - associated with the Spanish Empire. Indeed, the official growth of the Flanders Admiralty took place on nothing like the scale one might have expected, given the military importance which most policymakers attached to the naval dimension of the war-effort.14 Moreover, as proved to be the norm for most areas during most of the reign of Philip IV, the administrative element in the overall establishment proved to be a relatively small and economical one. A veedorwas now appointed, who - as a career incentive - was given the option of holding the post of contador in plurality. This was made possible by the appointment of permanent auditors by the Supreme Council, arguably not an encouragement to probity or efficiency. The new head, Vicente de Ancionado, drew two salaries; and was able to employ an oficial mayor to act as accountant. His chief assistant was Alonso de Uribarri, the most stalwart servant in the armada's history, who was to serve in various senior capacities until his death in 1647. I n addition, Ancionado was allowed to exercise the petty nepotism of the age in appointing a son (or nephew), Antonio, as clerk to Uribarri. The post of depositario depresas (created c. 1600) was also merged with that oipagador (in the person of Melchior de Espinosa), presumably with the aim of creating some room for manoeuvre in the armada's finances. The new tenedor was Pedro Guerra Miers, a man whose names are redolent of the inter-relationships remarked above. By early 1623, before the fleet had begun to operate integrally, its shore-based apparatus was established at around fifteen full- and part-time staff, with a salary bill of over 500 escudos a month.15 These officials were domiciled at Dunkirk for a very brief initial period. The small town of Winoksberg (Bergues St Winoc) lay about fifteen miles inland on the river. In 1623, its municipality offered to construct twelve frigates for the fleet, on condition that the administration of the Admiralty - with its potentially wealth-bearing Prize Tribunal - be centred in the town. At this point, building contracts in Dunkirk were not proceeding smoothly, and frigates were badly needed. Perhaps the municipal leaders of Winoksberg proposed some solution to the raw material problems evident in the larger ports, but, at any rate, they managed to persuade Isabel and Spinola of their case, and the offices were duly transferred in early 1624.16 14 15 16

information on the material substance of a naval force, which the tenedor organised with meticulous care under an alphabetical index system. The changes are decribed by Hambye, L'Aumonerie, pp. 135-40. See Appendix 9, p. 254. Lemaire, Histoire, p. 136.

183

Quills, keels and cutlasses During the thirty-month sojourn of the Admiralty at Winoksberg (February 1624-November 1626) Ancionado, Espinosa and Guerra were the only fulltime departmental heads. 17 In 1627, the post of proveedor was recreated for the benefit of the previous holder, Hurtuno de Urizar. Several motives seem to have inspired the appointment. For one thing, Ancionado was already giving cause for dissatisfaction, apparently because of chronic illness;18 for another, Urizar was not only experienced in the task, but had given evidence to the Madrid government of being a highly intelligent and creative personality. Moreover, his eagerness to recover his old job was such that he was prepared to accept, not only its subordination in the hierarchy to another, but withal a salary substantially lower than that which he previously commanded. Since Isabel had complained that money was not available to fund the new post, this was clearly a crucial factor.19 The reduction of the proveedor's salary became a sticking-point in another dispute. Following on the 1628-30 reforms, and also as part of a general buttressing operation mounted during the last, failing years of the archduchess, plans were made to replace the two senior officials of the Admiralty. Geronimo de Espinosa, scion of one of Castile's most assiduous covachuelista families, and at the time veedor of the galleys of Spain, was appointed to succeed Urizar as assistant inspector, in January 1633. At the same time, Pedro Ramirez de Prado was awarded the veeduria itself; 'these alterations to remain secret [as the King put it] until you actually arrive with my brother in Flanders'. Shortly afterwards, Ramirez de Prado died or withdrew, and Espinosa succeeded to his claim of the higher office.20 Later that year, the latter accordingly joined the army of the Cardinal-Infante, which he served as veedor-general during its march to the Netherlands. This force lost its identity on arrival, merging with the army of Flanders, and with this Espinosa's post lapsed. Meanwhile, Uribarri made difficulties over his surrender of the veeduria and Espinosa was offered the junior office pro tempore. This he regarded as distinctly beneath his due, especially, perhaps, because of the clouds of glory trailed by anyone associated with the victorious regiments of Nordlingen. When he was apprised of its reduced rates of remuneration, he made up his mind to reject the post.21 Eventually, Espinosa came to Dunkirk 17

18

19

20

21

Alcala-Zamora, (Espana, Flandes, pp. 157-8) asserts that an independent pagador (Felipe de Silva) was appointed, but I have found no evidence of his presence. Before the end of 1627, Ancionado's duties were being performed by Uribarri; ' D e la o r d e n . . . al proveedor . . . ' , 4 D e c . 1637, A G S / E 3860. 'Quenta de los salarios y emolumentos que ha tenido los proveedores de la Armada de Flandes' [1627], ibid.; consulta of Council of State, 4 F e b . 1628, with paraphase of Isabel's opinion, ibid. 2042. T h e difference amounted to 174 florins per month, a cut of 25 per cent (even at face value) on the 1607 figure. Royal order of 16. Jan. 1633, A G S / E 2050, no. 124; 'Titulo Real de Veedor . . . 4 Marzo 1634', M N / V a r g a s 24, f. 94. Consulta of Council of State, 19 April 1635, A G S / E 2050, no. 4 3 .

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Structures, personnel, finance with a bad grace, but within a few years he had succumbed to chronic illness, probably a typical mixture of stress, infection and chagrin. When he applied to return to Spain, Don Fernando proposed to replace him with nobody less than the retiring secretary for state and war, Miguel de Salamanca, 'because there is such a need for Spanish ministers in these important employments'.22 Indeed, despite Espinosa's obvious conviction that the navy was a junior service, this sequence of events argues the increasing status of its administrative staff. From 1627 onwards, the posts of veedor and proveedor seem to have survived continuously until the end of the Habsburg period. Other positions displayed less resilience. That of depositario, for example, was 'reformed' in the classic Spanish sense by the 1628-30 commission, being combined with a revived pagaduria - a post which had been dormant since 1609. When, in the early 1640s, the armada subsidy once more (de facto if not de jure) fell under army control, and the fleet itself was mostly absent from Flanders, the post of paymaster lapsed until the 1660s. On the surface, therefore, it seems that, exactly as in its previous manifestation, the Admiralty supported only three section-headships for most of its seventeenth-century existence. On the other hand, many of the post-1622 officials held head-of-section jobs in plurality, attracting the appropriate double salaries and perquisites. Furthermore, some refused to step aside for younger men unless they were allowed to retain the substance of the income they had achieved (a phenomenon not unknown even today in some professions). In the 1620, Ancionado's understudy, Uribarri, did most of the work whilst his chief held on to titles and salaries for grim death. Having obtained his reward by succeeding to the veeduria, Uribarri in turn refused to make room for Espinosa in 1634, and only agreed to step down - with full pay and a kind of emeritus status - when Gavarelle's authority was imposed by Don Fernando in 1636. 23 However, when Espinosa returned to Spain, and Philip refused to let Salamanca stay, Don Alonso was permitted to reclaim the post of proveedor.

When the armada began to operate in Spanish waters, the necessity arose to provide it with officials, at least on a temporary basis. In 1646, the King appointed Tomas de Aguirre as regular veedory contador in Flanders as a reward for sterling services in Brazil.24 However, Aguirre was unable to take up the posts, and, not long afterwards, a new inspector, Pedro Vazquez Torrero, began to manage the affairs of the armada in Spain. Vazquez (a Galician) served with great aplomb, adopting the Spanish habit of sailing in the capitana, and thus experiencing the conditions of weather and war. In the early 1650s, Aguirre had 22

23 24

D o n Fernando to Philip IV, 15 Jan. 1639, ibid., 2055. In compensation for the inadequate salary he inherited, Espinosa successfully applied for exemption from a media anata de oficios in 1639. See copies of orders of D o n Fernando, 15 Oct. 1635, and pleito of 15 Oct. 1639, A G S / E 3860. Consulta of Council of State, 17 Jan. 1640, A G S / E 2055 Consulta of Council of War, 3 D e c . 1646, ibid., G A 3242.

185

Quills, keels and cutlasses to settle for the assistant inspectorship.25 Though many difficulties arose with these arrangements, it seems that offices were never duplicated; the situation aimed at was for at least one of the two inspectorships to be held in Spain. Other officials had ephemeral existence from time to time. In 1599-1603, for example, Tomas de Aguirre (presumably a Guipuzcoano) and Diego de Hernani worked in Dunkirk, as veedor and contador respectively of Federigo Spinola's galley squadron, a unit autonomous from the captaincy-general. The former of these two names disappears without trace until, forty years on, it turns up in identical form as noted above. Perhaps its original owner made an advantageous marriage, and was able to retire, or content himself with a junior post (becoming anonymous to the documentary historian), whilst his earlier ambitions were eventually fulfilled by a son. Hernani's experience, in contrast, brought him to the main contaduria of the Flanders fleet in 1607.26 As it proved, however, this office was more ephemeral than he had expected, and only for a short time was Don Diego allowed to enjoy its fruits. In 1609-10, as a result of the Truce of Antwerp, the Admiralty of Flanders was wound up. SALARIES, PECULATION AND PROBITY

In one sense - indeed, in the most important - it is invalid to distinguish between the members of the Supreme Council and the full-time officials on the grounds of professionality. Both categories of royal servant were paid in consideration of their administrative services, even though in the case of the former the convenient fiction of'expenses' (ayudas) may have been maintained, and the social codes of gentleman and player were respected by (and between) ministers and officials. In the latter case, there seems to have been little or no general increase in salaries during the whole of the period covered. As may be supposed, the four main officials drew salaries originally intended to denote their order of importance in the hierarchy. Over the years, random changes made for certain incumbents introduced anomalies. For example, the proveedor's salary included an element of 20 per cent to cater for two clerks and their working necessities. If he could manage without employing such help, or make economies, he might be better off than his chief, especially when a generous allowance of radones is taken into account. However, when the inspector also held the office oicontador (as was the norm after 1622), and radones were cut (as they were in 1627) a considerable differential could be restored. Diego de Espinosa's disgust, having expected the senior post in 1634, is therefore understandable. 27 25

26 27

F o r Vazquez, see consulta of Junta de Armadas, 15 April 1647, * ^ - 3258; for Aguirre, Luis de H a r o to Baron Batteville, 5 J u n e 1652, ibid. 3326. Gavarelle's period as chief inspector seems to have lapsed in 1646, but, after Uribarri died, Miguel de Ugarte succeeded h i m as proveedor in Flanders until 1652. From then until 1656, both senior posts were held in Spain. Certificates of F. Spinola, 14 Jan. 1603, A R B / S E G 124, ff. 1-2. See Appendix 4, p . 246. (I have not been able to determine figures for the depositario)

186

Structures, personnel, finance On paper, remuneration provided a relative standard of living (mutatis mutandis) not entirely dissimilar to modern equivalents. Yet the 1590s were record years of inflation, and monetary inflation continued sporadically in the Hispanic world throughout the seventeenth century. Some cushion was provided by the radones allowed on top of monthly salary (sueldo), but it remains difficult to understand how many an official could have made ends meet by the middle of the century. When actual payment became chronically unreliable in the 1640s, it was rare for any given official not to have pending a claim for unpaid salary, and at times the staff could be months, or even years, in arrears. Indeed, they suffered alongside the rank-and-file (if not to the same extent) as a result of the royal bankruptcies of 1607 and 1627. In such circumstances, officials were often obliged to discharge dependent staff, like clerks and messengers, and even to evict them from the family home. It was the earlier of these two crises which formed the context of the Admiralty's only administrative scandal to be arguably worthy of the name. It is possible that the instances of corruption discovered were, like others discovered in the army, in some way connected with the vast network of peculation presided over by Don Pedro de Franqueza, Count of Villalonga.28 A close associate of Philip Ill's valido, the Duke of Lerma, Franqueza had worked his way to the higher branches of the governmental tree under his patron's protection, and in 1602 was appointed to head a junta of the Treasury in Madrid, with the specific brief of rooting out disorder and corruption in financial affairs. Under Franqueza's protection, in turn, the licenciado Alonso Ramirez de Prado developed a system of official venality which took a strong hold on various areas of the civil service, both in Madrid and in the military administration in Brussels. Without doubt, widespread increases in levels of graft, and in over-exploitation of the normally acceptable perquisites of office, were influenced by the unprecedented costs of obtaining appointment demanded and manipulated by the Franqueza machine. Once introduced near the top of the system, these extra costs were passed down through its various levels. Eventually they reached (as it were) the 'consumer' - the soldiers (and sailors) of Flanders whose monthly pay represented the largest fraction of disbursement - in the negative form of chronic delays in wages. Not surprisingly, the years 1604-7 witnessed the most serious phase of mutiny and discontent in the army for a generation. Several highranking officials were implicated in this or earlier breakdowns in the logistics of 28

No biography of Franqueza exists and his swindles await modern examination. Apart from a venerable book on the marquis of Poza, there is no study of the finances of Philip Ill's reign. The information which follows is culled from the recent essays and articles of P. Williams, esp. his 'El Reinado de Felipe IV in Historia General de Espana y America, Vol. 8 (Madrid, 1986), pp. 430—5, and A. Feros Carrasco, 'Gobierno de Corte y Patronazgo Real en el Reinado de Felipe III (1598-1618)', (unpublished tesina de licenciatura, Autonomous University of Madrid, 1986), esp. pp. 39-40 and 105-9.

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Quills, keels and cutlasses supply. The case of Francisco Lixalde, the paymaster of the army, who for years operated a series of frauds and extortions, had become notorious inside the service. A more recent example was that of Geronimo Walter Zapata, who in 1596 had been appointed in plurality to the pagadurias of army and navy. He surrendered the latter office to Antonio Vedell upon his promotion to be veedor-general in 1600. Six years later, as a result of inquiries initiated, simultaneously with others in Spain, into the Franqueza group, Zapata was accused of peculation and summoned back to Madrid in disgrace.29 The investigation of Franqueza and his lieutenants, and their subsequent arrest, triggered off a scandal which shook Lerma's government to its roots. Many were those who fell from their perches on all branches and pecking orders of the arboreal hierarchy. In one of the lesser seismic aftershocks, the financial records of the suppressed Flanders Admiralty were sent to the Central Audit Office of the Treasury (Contaduria de Cuentas) in Madrid. There they were examined in detail, ostensibly in order to verify pension-claims of the officials retired in 161 o. However, the work was carried out by men thoroughly alerted to the possibilities of official corruption in general, and corruption in the Flanders military administration in particular.30 The accounts of the four chief officers of the Flanders Admiralty - Urizar, Hernani, Vedell and Zarra - were subjected to minute attention. After six years, the slowly-grinding inner wheels of hacienda exposed evidence against them. The dust was very fine. Indeed, aptly enough for my ruling metaphor, the final indictment concerned the embezzling of sums allowed and received for firewood. This allowance reflected the fact that the King's officials in Flanders had to work, in houses large enough to accommodate several dependent staff, in a permanently damp and cold climate - and, moreover, in the middle of a cosmological phase which has become known to historians as the 'Little Ice Age'.31 Be this as it may, their collective subterfuge seems likely to have been a 29

30

31

Lixalde's crimes only came to light as a result of the 1575 bankruptcy and the unprecendented army disorders it caused. (Remarks here are based heavily on the work of Professor G. Parker: in addition to the work already cited, see his 'Mutiny and Discontent in the Spanish Army of Flanders, 1572-1607', in Spain and the Netherlands, pp. 104-21.) Moreover, much of Franqueza's peculation took place via the Junta deFdbricas, charged with the programme of ship-construction. Shortly before the former's exposure, Urizar had gone to Dunkirk on a mission to supervise the manufacture of warships. Another element worthy of note is that Rodrigo Calderon, Lerma's intimate associate and almost the equal of Franqueza in matters of corruption, was a native of Antwerp who retained influential connections in the Netherlands. Treatment of this particular microcosm derives from a series of documents in A G S / C M C 3724, no. 14: an account of the proceso by Simon Martinez Cabrero, dated 27 Nov. 1629; the 'Vista y revista', 'Sentencia' and 'Decreto de causa de Urtuno de Urizar' (1624-30). Each section head seems to have been allowed four thousand bundles of firewood a month for seven months of the year - an indication not only of the low average temperatures prevailing, but also of the large establishments they needed to maintain; see order of A. Spinola, 14 May 1607, and Certificate of A. Vedell, 18 Nov. 1627, A G S / E 3860. A natural sympathy for these problems in Madrid perhaps allowed it to be overlooked that, in the case of the offices located in Dunkirk, firewood was a relatively inexpensive commodity, owing to the large number of vessels which

188

Structures, personnel, finance consequence of the particularly hard conditions which the officials suffered in 1607-9; a n d s u c h PettY offenders might never have been pursued at all were it not for the rigorous atmosphere engendered by the genuine criminality of Franqueza and Rodrigo Calderon. All the unlucky men whose offences were uncovered had been fairly recent appointments - Vedell alone had been at his post before 1607, the year which saw the making of a military armistice and peace negotiations with the United Provinces. The latter events probably further affected the incomes of the officials, in that, although their salaries were officially unchanged, the drying-up of subsidies and prize monies (and the incidence of royal wrecks) made access to them more difficult. Hurtuno de Urizar was alleged over a period of time to have 'entered twenty-seven florins as the cost of a thousand bundles of firewood a month, whereas his predecessor had only paid just over eight florins for the same amount', and found guilty of pocketing the difference. In 1624, after the lapse of a decade, he was sentenced to a fine, in addition to full restitution of the embezzled funds. He appealed against the sentence, and in 1624 and 1629 the total repayment demanded was substantially reduced. Finally, in 1630, by which time Don Hurtuno had been restored to his post in Dunkirk, the King effectively waived his due by awarding him the exact amount outstanding (1,594 florins) as a merced for services carried out subsequent to his offence. If hardly restored as a potential candidate for the honours often granted to senior civil servants, at least he regained his personal honour. The others who had sinned in this venial way alongside Urizar received lighter sentences, presumably on account of their juniority. It seems probable that, at least in the earlier stages of the proceso, the government suspected that the firewood was not the whole story. Of course, as Joel Hurstfield once remarked apropos of official corruption in this period, 'if it is true that there is no smoke without fire, there can also be a lot of smoke with very little fire'.32 Since most of the men who burned their fingers over the Dunkirk firewood were subsequently restored to financially sensitive office, it seems reasonable to apply this hypothesis to the case. To what extent the men had been in collusion, and whether this localised practice of petty embezzlement, handed down from one official to his (often related) successor, was in any way connected with the organized crime of men like Franqueza, are matters for speculation. But in terms ofmentalite, at least, it seems significant that these events coincided with a

32

were wrecked, or which otherwise reached the termination of their useful lives, around the Flemish coasts and harbours. In fact, it seems unlikely that the Admiralty officials needed to purchase firewood at all, since a sufficient number of ships broken up were the property of the Crown. It seems quite conceivable, indeed, that, on the contrary, they were able to exploit a superfluity in this area by off-licence sales, making a small profit which failed to make an impact upon the ledgers of the contaduria. J. Hurstfield, 'Political Corruption in Seventeenth-Century England', History 52 (1967), pp. 16-34.

189

Quills, keels and cutlasses period of endemic official corruption in the Spanish System, a period which was unprecedented and which remained unique. This is not to say that corruption was unknown apart from the'firewood case'. It was virtually an occupational hazard that almost all officials who handled cash or negotiable materials belonging to the Crown were constantly accused of malpractice by some (justly or otherwise) disappointed element amongst those who were due to receive it. In any case, the government itself was perennially distrustful of financially responsible officers, and its infrastructure in Spain and the Indies was informed at every turn by the possibility of checks and balances. Any given tenure of office was punctuated by commissions of investigation, (individual as well as collective) and ended by the open auditing process known as a residencia. In Flanders, however, control was much more difficult, since Madrid shunned the idea of allowing the judicial-financial institutions of the Brussels government, staffed as they were by Netherlanders, any authority over Spanish officials and the army subsidies. Generally speaking, therefore, all officials had to submit their accounts to the offices of Hacienda in Madrid, which in turn was obliged to conduct necessary inquiries itself, by despatch of its own trained staff.33 In fact, the Flanders Admiralty as a whole was audited no fewer than four times in just over forty years - though each of these commissions differed somewhat in motive and remit. In 1596, Fernando de Salinas afiscalof hacienda was sent to Brussels with the Archduke Albert. His enquiries into the running of the armada helped to shape the changes which were made in its organisation, after which Salinas was appointed to the finance office {sola de cuentas) of the Archducal government. In 1610-24 the Contaduria Mayor performed the audit of accounts mentioned above, which resulted not only in the firewood case, but also in the budgeting exercises for the revived armada carried out by its ex-contador Diego de Malvenda.34 Undoubtedly the most thoroughgoing commission was that of 1628-30. The two jueces de comision, Juan Muiioz de Escobar and Felipe de Porres, were senior accountants of Hacienda. From one standpoint, their investigation of the Admiralty was hardly remarkable, since it was part of a wider remit covering the whole financial apparatus of the Spanish Netherlands.35 But this in turn was only an aspect of a comprehensive wave of 'economical reform' in the wake of the bankruptcy of 1627, and the Matanzas disaster of the following year. It seems almost certain that during their visit to Dunkirk the commissioners found no evidence to justify legal proceedings. On the other hand, a severe shake-up of naval administration was undertaken. In 1631, the greffier, Adriaan Verreycken, and the depositario, Luis de Luyando, were both replaced. It may be coincidence that these were the men responsible for the administration of prize incomes. 33 34

Parker, 'Francisco Lixalde' and ' T h e Decision-making Process' (in Spain and the Netherlands). 35 See above, pp. 2 9 - 3 0 . See below, pp. 2 0 0 - 1 . 190

Structures, personnel, finance But given the circumstances of the visita and the character of its final recommendations, it is possible that not all elements of suspicion could be eradicated.36 On the other hand, the measures of repair undertaken prove once again that it was not the character of any particular financial office which concerned Madrid - with the exceptions of certain spectacular errors in this regard - so much as the human nature of the men who held them. As a consequence of the autonomous budgeting arrangements introduced by the commission, the position of pagador (dormant since 1609) was revived and combined with that of depositario. The new greffier, Jean Penninq, was now required to draw up monthly lists incorporating details of all valid prize, including sales and distribution of profits, for submission not only to the Supreme Council, but also the Hacienda in Madrid. Locally, moreover, a new financial body was set up in Brussels; this Junta de Hacienda (technically a subcommittee of Hacienda in Madrid and thus not answerable to the sola de cuentas or the governor of the Spanish Netherlands) was directly to supervise the proceedings of the pagaduria-general - which was effectively put into commission.37 Nor was this all. The commissioners recommended that, both in the army and in the fleet, the posts ofpagador should be held jointly by two men, who would exercise the office in alternate years. The incumbent paymaster-general, who had already been certificated as 'clean' by the commission, was understandably irate, and the Archduchess protested. Philip had pronounced the reports of Munoz de Escobar to be 'very well put together, as the Council [of State] had perceived . . . I am resolved that in no respect shall its points be twisted, but on the contrary not a hair of its head will be disturbed'. In the event, however, Brussels made good its determination to shift this one hair at least, and the system of alternates was never implemented.38 Despite the enormous increases in the privateering industry which took place in these years, things seem to have run smoothly under this dispensation until, in 1636, in circumstances which remain partially obscure, Olivares initiated a further visita of the Dunkirk Admiralty. Don Francisco de Galarreta journeyed to Flanders (in company with the factor-general Bartolome Spinola), in one of Fuentes' frigates, perhaps not so much in response to specific complaints of 36

37

38

Prima facie, there certainly appear to be serious discrepancies over figures for prize income between the accounts provided by Luis de Luyando and the general tanteo of Lopez de Ulloa; but these are accounted for by a different chronology in the registration method. See above, pp. 6 9 - 7 0 and sources there cited. (In 1631, also, H u r t u n o de Urizar died in office.) M e m b e r s nominated were the marquis of Santa Cruz (incoming commander of the army of Flanders), the marquis of Aytona (Captain-General of the navy), the veedor-general, Luis Felipe de Guevara, with Juan de Necolalde and Antonio Vedell as alternate secretaries. See A R B / S E G 9obis, f. 3 iff. (VedelPs minute-book of the junta). Isabel to Philip IV, 15 May; royal apostilla on consulta of Council of State, 31 D e c . A special Junta de Estado comprising Olivares, the Count of Sora, Pierre Roose and the two commissioners worked on details (consulta of 29 D e c ) . (All documents refer to 1630 and A G S / E 2044). An alternating secretariat was initially adopted for the new jfunta de Hacienda. 191

Quills, keels and cutlasses corruption, as in order to satisfy Madrid that the Dunkirk office was capable of handling the substantially increased levels of subsidy then being considered. However, he arrived in time to intervene in a serious internal dispute which indeed threatened to reduce the efficiency of the organisation. In 1633, one John Adams, an English merchant resident in Dunkirk, had complained to Archduchess Isabel that a member of the Prize Tribunal had surreptitiously acquired an interest in the activities of specific privateers. Clearly, no tangible proof was provided, but the Supreme Council was concerned enough to remind the judges in writing of the rules forbidding such associations.39 Perhaps partly in an act of reprisal, the three judge-assessors later preferred charges to the Council against the depositario y pagador, Toribio de Bustamente, accusing him of failing to submit regular accounts, and other deficiencies which were holding up the despatch of business. Don Toribio defended himself vigorously: None of my three predecessors in the office of depositario since the year 1621, when this armada was formed, has been able to submit accounts of the kind now demanded. In any case, the King's service suffers much more from the delays introduced by the Tribunal, for all too often they fail to audit the figures which I already provide them. It is their dilatoriness which holds up the distribution of sums raised from prizes, thus giving birth to general discontent, which threatens to grow to a level which will destroy the armada.40

As early as 1631, not long after succeeding Luyando, Bustamente had come into collision with the Tribunal over conflicting areas of responsibility. The ageing Isabel despatched an equally ancient adviser and veteran member of the Conseil Supreme, Charles de Malines, to mediate, but after Bustamente had presented him with a list of nineteen tetchy questions on demarcation of authority, the old man understandably gave up the attempt.41 Settlement was referred to the Council itself - whose members, asserted Bustamente insolently - 'are mostly the godfathers and protectors of the judge-assessors'.42 As this remark implies, the Walloon councillors in Brussels found in favour of their compatriots, fellow-magistrates chosen by themselves, rather than the Spanish official appointed by Madrid. Don Toribio continued non-cooperative action in protest, and by 1636 the situation had become serious, for without the figures for prize rents provided by Bustamente and endorsed by the greffier, many interested parties would suffer and suspicions of corruption would increase. 39

40

41

42

'Defence au Magistrat de D u n q u e r q u e . . .*, 29 Oct. 1633, B R B / 1 6 0 2 8 - 3 7 , ff. 380V.-3. It seems likely that Adams fired bullets manufactured by some other party, probably Bustamente. Bustamente to Galarreta, 15 J u n e 1636, A R B / C A 245. (I have failed to trace the third of Bustamente's predecessors.) M s . list of T u n t o s ' copied in 1636, ibid. Malines had been mainly responsible for the Ordonnances of 1626. For his earlier part in the armada's history, see above, p . 15. Bustamente to Galarreta, 15 J u n e (as n. 40 above).

192

Structures, personnel, finance In 1636, the case was examined by a two-man commission in which Galarreta was partnered by the Walloon civil servant Jean de Gavarelle.43 The judges rightly claimed that Bustamente was merely supposed to carry out their instructions regarding distribution of profits, and those of the veedor concerning payment of salaries. As far as decisions on prize administration were concerned, 'he has no more voice than a simple citizen of this town'. The results of the arbitration seems bizarre; later in 1636, the veedor y contador, Uribarri, was shunted aside, and his place taken by Gavarelle. Bustamente and the three judge-assessors continued in office, though it was established that the former should only draw one salary - that of pagador - and not the depositaries in addition, to which he evidently pretended. In any case, the production of reliable prize figures seems to have been successfully resumed. 44 THE CURSUS HONORUM

The career patterns of our administrators often contained more variety than perhaps some of the foregoing might have led the reader to expect. Outstanding examples are the four officers made redundant at the time of the suppression of the Admiralty in 1609-10 (and subsequently arraigned for peculation). Only the humble storekeeper, Miguel de Zarra, seems to vanish from the records. The careers of all the others recovered from this double-blow. Hurtuno de Urizar as we have seen - eventually regained his post in 1627, after years of lobbying in Madrid, during which he gained occasional employment - and certainly a sound reputation - as a government consultant on naval affairs. The contador Diego de Hernani seems likewise to have suffered a decade of great obscurity by remaining in Flanders; but in 1619, he surfaced again as accountant of the audit office in Brussels, and oficial mayor in the army treasury. He too lived to efface his earlier misjudgement, for in 1630 he was appointed senior wage accountant {contador de sueldo) of the army of Flanders, holding the post until his death twenty years later. The last pagador, Antonio Vedell, also landed on his feet. In 1614, claiming to be unemployed and penniless, he sought Archduke Albert's permission to follow Urizar to Madrid, the better to defend himself in the case pending, whilst seeking new patrons and work. In the mid-1620s he too joined the sola de cuentas. In the end, Vedell perhaps vindicated his reputation more thoroughly than his two colleagues, for later still (1633-4) he filled in as 43 44

Galarreta to Roose, 23 June 1636, A R B / C A 245. Order of D o n Fernando, 23 March, 1636, ibid. T h e authorities had been seeking to squeeze out Uribarri ever since the Munoz-Porres visita. Gavarelle thus became the only Netherlander to head the naval administration. Bustamente later returned to his home port of Santander to become proveedor of the Armada de Cantabria. During the Guyenne expedition of 1653, he was accused of serious dereliction of duty, and suffered extended imprisonment in the court jail of Madrid. But ten years later he was back in his post; see consultas of Junta de Armadas, 17 Oct. 1653 and 4 Jan. 1663, A G S / G A 3337 and 3436.

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Quills, keels and cutlasses paymaster-general of the army - apparently the only non-Spaniard ever to be trusted with that office.45 Other misfortunes could be recouped dramatically. For example, the career of Geronimo de Espinosa, disappointed of the inspectorship in 1635, had surprising twists. It was evidently acknowledged in Madrid that Espinosa had a grievance. In 1635, in li e u of the navy post, he was offered the veeduria of the new mercenary army commanded by Prince Thomas of Savoy, then being prepared to attack the French borders. This force was so severely defeated during the enemy's invasion of Luxembourg in the opening exchanges of the war, that it shortly thereafter ceased to exist. This rather cancelled out Don Geronimo's earlier triumph with Don Fernando at Nordlingen. As we have seen, Espinosa, faced with the alternative of returning to Spain with little achieved, decided to swallow his pride at Dunkirk. Later, he was allowed to draw his full salary zsproveedor during his prolonged absence from work through illness. On returning to Spain, he made a full recovery, for we find him as veedor-general to the army of Aragon in 1646, and in the same year he became a member of the Council of the Treasury - that is, a minister and not just an official.46 Don Geronimo, after all his tribulations, had made it to the top, though perhaps as much through his family connections in the royal service as because of his own abilities. One of the more remarkable careers was that of Pedro del Vaus y Frias, who came to Flanders around the same time as Espinosa. Despite his impressive names, however, Don Pedro was much less well connected than his contemporary, and also differed in dedicating himself to a life in the Netherlands. For several years he worked in a lowly capacity in army administration, rising to be oficial mayor m the paymaster's office, with responsibility for cavalry. In 1643, n e was captured at the battle of Rocroi, 'taken by the enemy when he remained behind to try and salvage his papers' - what better evidence of devotion to duty! Having been transferred to the navy, Vaus applied for promotion some years later. In his recommendation to Madrid, Miguel de Ugarte, then serving as proveedor, referred to him as 'the best I have ever known here to serve in the ministry of the pen, for although others may have served longer, none exceeds him in intelligence, and few even equal him'. 47 In 1656, Vaus himself succeeded to the proveeduria, and effectively to the 45

46

47

For Urizar, see ' D e la Orden que al Snr. Marques E s p i n o l a . . . dio del sueldo . . . al Proveedor', 4 Dec. 1627, A G S / E 3860; on Hernani, Parker, Army of Flanders, p . 285; on Vedell, ibid., p . 283; Archduke Albert to Philip III, 16 Oct. 1614, A R B / S E G 177, f. 256 ibid., p . 283 and certificate of 18 Nov. 1627, A G S / E 3860. Consulta of Council of State, 19 April 1635, ibid. 2050, no. 43; decreto of 24 Sept. 1646, ibid. C J H 900. But I have no evidence that Espinosa actually took up the post with prince Thomas. Testimonial of Ugarte, 20 July 1648, and same to G . de L a T o r r e , 10 March 1649, B L / A d d . 22503, ff. 23 and 26.

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Structures, personnel, finance headship of the administration in Flanders. 48 Two years later, Vaus again found himself in the front line of battle against the French. As Conde advanced on Dunkirk, the death of the long-serving captain-general, the marquis of Leiden, left the King's ships without a commander. In this emergency, Don Juan de Austria - who would normally, for several reasons, have assumed the office himself - nominated Don Pedro 'to hold for the present time' the most exalted post in the Flanders navy.49 No matter that only a handful of royal ships remained in service, and that Dunkirk was soon to be lost for ever; a mere oficial exercised an office which had been held with pride by the cousin and the brother of Habsburg kings. Don Pedro survived the fall of Dunkirk, surrendering his exalted office to the new governor of the Spanish Netherlands, the marquis of Caraqena. He was confirmed as proveedor when the Admiralty was again re-constituted at Ostend in 1664 - now with his son, Gaspar, as assistant and Uribarri's son, Vicente, as senior understudy. He continued in this post until the mid-1670s, ending his career as contador mayor to the army of Flanders, an office to which Gaspar succeeded on his father's death in 1680.50 Generally speaking, since they rarely left the Obedient Provinces, or found themselves in the enemy's firing-line, the courtier-bureaucrats of the Brussels government led less eventful lives. A partial exception was Joos Clayssens, an Ostender who began his career as barrister to the Privy Council in 1622. In 1628-31 he was alternate holder of the post of greffier to the Supreme Council, working in his 'rest' years as a secret agent of Don Carlos Coloma. Clayssens (or Jacques Claisonne, as he preferred to be known, in Walloonised form, later in his career) spent the subsequent decade in Dunkirk as one of the judgeassessors of the prize court. In 1640, he visited the court of Whitehall as a member of the marquis of Velada's suite when the latter was envoy of the Cardinal-Infante. He filled in again as greffier when Penninq abandoned his office at the first fall of Dunkirk in 1646. After an important mission to Holland in 1652, he retired from full-time office (with a generous pension) as second in seniority amongst the members of the Supreme Council.51

48

49 50 51

'Titulo de Proveedor de la Armada', 20 Sept. 1656, ibid., ff. 35-7V. For T o r r e r o , appointed to head the administration, see Philip to D o n Juan Jose, 18 Oct. 1656, A G S / E 2267 and Paz y Melia, Avisos, II, p . 5. 'Despacho para Governar la Armada N a v a l . . . ' , 25 July 1658, B L / A d d . 22053, ff- 3 9 ~ 4 J Warrant by Caraqena, 19 Oct. 1664, ibid., f. 4 5 . See also ff. 56, 65 and 80. See 'Requete pour Antoine Claissone pour la place de Juge-Assesseur de L'admiraute a Ostende' [?i664], A R B / C A 123. This is effectively Jacques' curriculum vitaey evidently forming part of a son's claim to move along the same track. In the instrument re-establishing the Admiralty at Ostend, only two men, T h o m a s Daelman and Philippe Bock, were nominated as Tribunal judges, perhaps indicating that the claim of Claisonne fils for the third place had already been successful. See 'Reglement secret pour ceux le siege de PAdmiraute a Ostende', 21 Sept. 1664, B R B / 1 6 0 2 8 - 3 7 , ff. 4 0 6 - 1 1 .

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Quills, keels and cutlasses FINANCE - COSTS OF THE WAR AT SEA

For most of the first decade or so of its existence as a reasonably coherent force, the Flanders armada was financed on an ad hoc basis from the general subsidies received from Spain. A reliable guide to the dimensions of expenditure in the area lies in the fact that in 1596, when revising its organization, Archduke Albert ordered the regular allocation of E 10,000 a month out of these funds, for the payment of its personnel. Around this date, the forces involved were some fifteen vessels and perhaps a thousand men; total expenditure would be approximately doubled by the costs of equipment and munitions, in addition to ongoing repair and maintenance work on the ships. The resulting figure is consistent with the contemporary costs of the main Spanish galley-fleet based in Cartagena, and with the budget earmarked for the armada when it reached a similar size in the 1620s.52 As soon as the primary decisions over revival of the armada had been taken by the Council of State in 1618, the process of costing began. In late 1617 or early 1618, Madrid demanded from Brussels copies of the outstanding accounts of the first Flanders armada, down to its suppression in 1609. Possibly with the aid of these records, Diego de Malvenda, its ex-contador, made new estimates, which were passed on to Archduke Albert by Philip III in 1620.53 At an average of 300 tons per vessel and at D50 a ton, the cost of each unit in the water and seaworthy was estimated at 015,000, a grand total of D 180,000 for the flotilla of twelve. Maintenance and supplies, along with the pay of the crews, would in Malvenda's projection cost a further D2O,ooo each month. Assuming a sevenmonth operational season, and adding costs of administration, repairs and maintenance, the envisaged expenditure for the first campaign approached 0400,000 - little less, in fact, than the sum actually allocated to Spain's major battle-fleet, the so-called Armada del Mar Oceano, in 1621. 54 Malvenda's estimates were in broad concordance with similar exercises carried out around this time. In 1617, for example, Tomas de Ibio Calderon costed a squadron of six medium-sized galleons (1,500 tons) at the launch stage, before fitting-out with masts and equipment, at D25 per ton. Allowing 0144,000 52

53

54

Bolsee, Inventaire, p . 157. T h e figures given by T h o m p s o n (War and Government, p p . 163-79) suggest fifteen galleys cost about D25,ooo in 1599. In 1629, the pay and rations of £.1,275 m e n m twelve ships (on average larger than those of the 1590s) were exactly E 10,000 per month, (accounts of March 1629, A G S / E 2043, f- 335)- Amounts spent prior to 1620 would probably not be too difficult to extract from sources in the Segunda Epoca of the C M C at Simancas, but lack of space precludes such an exercise on this occasion. T h e prefixes D and E used in this section with money figures signify ducados and escudos. See G. de la Vega to Archduke Albert, 25 May 1618, A R B / C A 89, f. 145 etseq.; 'Papel de Diego Malvenda sobre las convenientes del Armada de Flandes', Madrid 24 June 1619, B N / 1 8 2 0 4 , ff. 61-9V.; Philip III to Albert, 12 Jan., 27 Mar. and 14 Apr. 1620, A R B / S E G 183-4 (cited by Reade, Sidelights, I, 272-3). See Appendix 8, p . 253, and Thompson, War and Government, p . 97.

196

Structures, personnel, finance for completion and running costs, he reckoned a total of DI82,000 for the first campaigning year. Around the same time, Geronimo Gomez de Sandoval, governor of Santo Domingo de Espanola, estimated that an armada of ten sail (3,000 tons) based in the Caribbean would cost 0250,000 in its first year of operation. Providing the budget for the armada of Flanders represented a fresh commitment for Madrid in more ways than one. The pump-priming capital could, of course, only be provided by a special loan from the Crown's bankers. This presented Hacienda with the severe headache of finding the appropriate collateral, at a moment when almost every conceivable area of royal income was being busily mortgaged. On the other hand, the transaction was somewhat different in nature to the other asientos de dinero, at least from the Crown's point of view. Though the matter was of course speculative, the armada was expected, at worst to defray a proportion of its own costs, at best even to provide a profit. No existing area of defence expenditure could claim as much. In any case, Estado had laid down, in as emphatic a manner as William Semple could have wished, that the money must be provided even if it meant, as a last resort, the sale of royal estates. Philip FV's first Cortes of 1621 was informed that the new squadron would represent a proportion of the extra D1.5 million of loans raised to prepare for the renewal of war in Flanders. 55 One of Ancionado's earliest reports pointed out that the administrative staff needed amplification, and in particular that zpagador should be appointed.56 His request was ignored, and the paymaster-general of the army retained responsibility for all payments concerning the new force. But Ancionado also complained bitterly about the unreliable provision of funds for construction. By 1625 the armada had still failed to attain its envisaged optimum size, and had only ventured forth on sporadic and small-scale attacks. Anxious to ensure offensive readiness, Madrid considered increasing its monthly subsidy from the E2o,oo initially budgeted.57 The new armada and its budget attracted much attention and encouraged abuse. In 1623, for example, one Pedro de Capella was sent secretly to Holland to purchase a vessel for the armada. After a journey of truly picaresque 55

56 57

Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, p . 157; D o m i n g u e z Ortiz, Politica y Hacienda, pp. 11 a n d 18. Madrid's determination to establish the navy o n an expanded basis is borne out by Philip's order to the count of Monterrey, president of the council of Italy, to sell royal offices in Naples to pay for the building of galleons there, (25 Jan. 1623, B L / E g . 3 3 5 , ff. 2 4 4 - 5 ) . Ancionado to Philip IV, 8 Oct. 1622, A G S / E 2312. Israel (TheDutch Republic, p . 114) records a massive increase to 0 7 0 , 0 0 0 per month, apparently a 'decision reached in Madrid, in late 1623'. But neither a reason for the decision, nor reference for the information, is offered. As it happens, 1621-5 represent the only years of the armada's second phase for which we possess its full accounts - the papers of Mendieta, pagador general - in which no sign is present of any extra funding ( A G S / C M C 879). Its urgent necessity is hardly in doubt, since, according to another authority, t h e Admiralty had already accumulated a debt of 0 2 0 8 , 9 7 4 before it h a d hoisted a sail, in September, 1620 (Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, P. 157)-

197

Quills, keels and cutlasses character, he eventually found a suitable craft in the harbour of Schoonhooven, near Rotterdam - the Dromedario. Although the ship itself cost the fairly modest sum of 2,450 florins (about EI,OOO), Capella claimed additional expenses of more than 4,000 florins, including not only the costs of refitting and of sailing it to Dunkirk, but allowances for an astonishing catalogue of bribes, alms and hospitality, as the Dromedary, apparently as full of water as its name suggests, was eventually brought into Dunkirk.58 Nevertheless, in the more reliable general accounts of Tomas de Mendieta, paymaster in Brussels, accounts which cover nearly two years following July 1621, we find that the running of the armada had cost about £30,000 a month, less than 9 per cent of his global disbursements on the armed forces of Flanders. In 1623-5, these figures decreased to 20,000 and 5.6 per cent respectively presumably as more of the initial capitalisation costs were absorbed.59 At first sight, Mendieta's accounts seem to bear out Malvenda's forecasts with remarkable accuracy. In fact, at no time did the armada achieve the complement of twenty units which Malvenda used as his basis; indeed its average size hovered around a dozen. The adjusted figure of c. £380,000 for the first year seems to represent an increase of nearly 20 per cent on Malvenda's estimates, and in consideration of a fighting force little more than half the strength he had envisaged. In 1622, Adriaan van der Walle came to the Crown's aid by offering to charter his private squadron (numbering eighteen, and certainly including several frigates), almost certainly at an uneconomic rate. This agreement may have been a result of his failure to complete his building contract on time; it may thus have been made in part compensation, as well as to procure van der Walle the honorific recognition he doubtless sought from the Crown. The auxiliary use of this force brought the effective strength of the armada, if only for a short period, to around twenty-five operational units. 60 If Madrid had reason to feel disappointed with results down to the end of 1623, this disappointment arose partly because of the fact that the whole project had been seriously under-capitalised. This may have been attributable to the 58

59 60

'Cuenta y Razon que da por esta Pedro de Cappela tocante la compra de un navio el Dromedario . . . dada en Bruzelas a n de Junio de 1623 Afios', A R B / C O 1108. T h e account enters ninety-six separate expenses, including the cost of a hired horse which broke a leg when carrying the hired pilot from Dunkirk to Calais, in order to get safe passage to Holland. See Appendix, 9, p. 254. T h e payment to Adriaan van der Walle in Mendieta's tanteo (see Appendix 9) may not reflect the chartered squadron, but rather sums outstanding from the 1620 building contract. However, during 1626 alone, Mendieta's successor, Lopez de Ulloa, disbursed the huge sum of nearly E306,000 for 'construction and fittings of the royal fleet'. This surely included final settlement of van der Walk's debt; 'Tanteo de[l] Pagador Thome Lopez de Ulloa', A G S / E 2318. This, I would suggest, represents the decision mysteriously referred to by Israel, but it was clearly an extraordinary subsidy and not a increase in the mesada as he implies. By 1627, van der Walk's squadron had fallen to only eleven ships, a number equal to that of the royal fleet (see Appendix 6, p. 251).

198

Structures, personnel, finance scarcity and costs of appropriate raw materials in the Flemish dockyards, a factor which underwent a further critical increase once war was resumed and the Dutch blockading squadrons took up their positions. The apparent cost of each finished vessel in the asientos made with van der Walle, at 027,000, clearly made generous allowance for these factors, being well above any other extant contemporary estimate of shipbuilding costs, and over twice as high as those made by Calderon and Malvenda.61 In 1622, moreover, Philip IV referred to a slightly revised budgetary estimate of E2O,ooo per unit per annum, once operations began - in other words, an annual cost of £400,000 for a squadron of twenty ships. The actual figure for 1621-5 of £274,000 per annum, given an average of twelve operational units, proved to be surprisingly consistent with this estimate.62 It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that in the five years 1622-6, at least E2o,ooo for pay, provisions and maintenance actually reached the officials of the Admiralty each month. More strikingly, perhaps Mendieta's accounts seem to demonstrate that the armada in practice absorbed less than one-tenth of military spending in Flanders. This proportion seems fundamentally out of character with the policy-statements being made in Madrid, which posited the navy as the force which was supposed to be bearing the brunt of the war effort.63 One reason for this relatively modest outlay may be that the armada's prizetaking returns had begun to exert a favourable effect upon the level of subsidy required from the central treasury, thus introducing an element of self-support which disguised the real dimensions of its costs. By the time of Mendieta's death in office (October, 1625) the armada was beginning to 61

62

63

According to Professor Israel, van der Walle's twelve new royal frigates cost 0323,000 plus a further 0144,000 for the artillery (The Dutch Republic, p. 95). In view of the figures given in Appendix 8, even granting local difficulties, the figure seems excessive. T h e almost exactly contemporaneous contract studied in depth by Professor Rahn Phillips produced six galleons in Bilbao, displacing 2,660 tons between them - certainly a greater total than twelve frigates - for just over D 100,000. (And surely the guns - given an average of fourteen per ship - did not cost D 8 6 O each? Eighteen guns cast in Lierganes for the larger frigates of the 1630s were costed at E3,ooo.) Labour and shipbuilding materials were notably cheaper anywhere in northern Europe than in Spain, as were all types of ordnance. Nor did the Dutch impose their ban on exports of maritime materials until 1622, so that van der Walle had had plenty of time to order his supplies. In early 1622, Philip IV claimed that £390,000 had been provided since the beginning of 1620 (to Isabel, 4 Feb. 1622, see n. 62). If the sum cited by Professor Israel is correct, either van der Walle had hookwinked the Crown over costs, which seems unlikely, or the sum cited includes a down-payment for the chartering of his private fleet. T h e sum of E I 10,000 entered by Mendieta for 'constructions and provisions (i.e. equipment)' for the period April 1623-Oct. 1625 indicates that building and full fitting cost at most 0250,000 (and probably less), rather than the 0467,000 alleged by Professor Israel. Philip to Isabel, 4 Feb. 1622, A R B / S E G 187, ff. 54-4V. An estimate of costs incurred by Spain's naval forces in 1621-2 gives a figure for the Flanders armada of 0245,397 - well in line with Mendieta; see (untitled) Memorandum of 17 April 1623 (copy) in BL Add. 28708, ff. 2 5 1 - 4 . In 1599, keeping a galley operational cost 019,000 per annum (Thompson, War and Government, p. 179). See Appendix 9, p. 254.

199

Quills, keels and cutlasses function smoothly, and with a success rate which had dispelled Madrid's worst fears. In 1623-5 the actual mesada disbursed by Mendieta was £33,000, still well above earlier predictions, but almost certainly below the actual running costs of the project. Moreover, as Mendieta's figures illustrate, the salary costs of administration - some E650 a month during this phase of more than four years were kept to some 3.5 per cent of the total, in the best traditions of an expanded civil service which might be the envy of our own times.64 Another reason why armada demands show up weakly in the accounts of the pagador general, is simply that they were being shelved in order to permit the increased army expenditures occasioned by the siege of Breda, which began in the autumn of 1624. This debilitating campaign demanded an unusually high level of off-season disbursement, as the huge army was paid through the winter, not to mention the costs of mercenary troops and specialised units, the enormous siege-train and much other fresh equipment and construction. The consequent financial strain led to a steady squeeze on resources allocated to the armada. In addition, the convulsions in the distribution network associated with the suspension of payments to the Crown's bankers in 1627 intensified the problems. In the eighteen months between October 1627 and March 1629, only £155,154 (less than half the official subsidy) was expended on the Flanders fleet and most of this had to be provided out of prize revenues.65 Backlogs of wages and other payments built up to the point at which the fleet was confined to port for lack of supplies, crews and maintenance staff. One account put the armada's debts at nearly E2oo,ooo - or ten months' subsidy. In late 1629, despite a level of current general demand on liquid resources unprecedented even for the Spanish Monarchy, an attempt was made to provide E50,000 to get the squadron to sea in the coming year. The money was to come from a moratorium, on dividends ofjuros (state bonds) paid to foreign holders. Not long afterwards, Juan de Necolalde, of the Brussels accounts office, estimated that even after defrayment by the transfer of royal prizemoney profits, debts amounted to EIOO,OOO. 66

In response to the requests of Urizar, Admiral Ribera, and Necolalde, the Treasury commissioners arrived in Dunkirk in the spring of 1630, after completing their audit of the pagaduria general in Brussels. The result of their investigation was an increase in the monthly subsidy by 25 per cent to E25,ooo, beginning with a block advance payment of £350,000 for the year 1631. The new dispensation - specifically referred to by its author, and in the King's comments, as a 'reformation' - also made the budget independent of the army. Despite the enthusiasm of the Council of State for Murloz de Escobar's 64 65

66

See Appendix 13, 2, p . 258, for the Admiralty's revenue from prizetaking in the 1620s. Accounts of March, 1629, A G S / E 2043, f- 335 (amounts given in text are converted from florins). Decreto registrado of 13 D e c . 1629, A H N / H a c . 7885, f. 17; resume of letter from Flanders in consulta of Council of State, 28 Feb. 1630, A G S / E 2044. 200

Structures, personnel, finance proposals, strict conditions were imposed, both in terms of financial control of Dunkirk from Brussels, and at the accounting level. Madrid demanded that the revenues of the armada from prizetaking must be detailed and reported on a monthly basis. Moreover, there was some attempt to exclude supernumeraries from the payroll.67 In April 1631, the King decided that 'when my brother the Cardinal-Infante leaves for his journey to Flanders he should be assigned an increase in general subsidy amounting more or less to two million per annum, according to the recommendations of Juan Munoz de Escobar, and approved by the ministers responsible'.68 In practice, long before Don Fernando arrived in Brussels the new system was working smoothly. Improved methods of registering and providing receipts for the money ('to be signed for by the admiral, inspector, assistant inspector and accountant, not only for the whole amount but for their individual expenditures') were laid down in 1631. 69 The armada entered the most brilliant phase of its history, achieving consistent military successes and a large revenue from prizetaking. Bulletins on the latter exploits, arriving in Madrid punctually, occasioned the excitement already remarked.70 In this decade, the government's asientos de dinero for the provision of its other fleets (including the galleys) were apparently provided by the firm of converso bankers headed by Diego and Afonso Cardoso. The armada of Flanders, on the other hand, was supported from the general loans raised each year for the Netherlands. In the late 1630s, and possibly earlier, the armada's funds were made available in Brussels by Jorge de Paz Silveira, one of the most active of the Portuguese-Jewish hombres de negocios, and perhaps the most consistent supplier of the Netherlands' subsidy. The process was facilitated in 1633, by the specific consignment of servicios granted by the kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia, along with some revenues from Sardinia, to service the asientos for the Flanders fleet.71 In 1637, as we have seen, an important review of policy led to another powerful injection of funds. This came in the form of payment for the building of a new generation of frigates, according to the improved Dunkirk formula, rather than an increase in the monthly subsidy, which was maintained at 67

68 69

70 71

See the T r i m e r a ' and 'Tercera relation de Juan Mufioz de Escobar sobre las cosas de Flandes' and the consultas of the Council and Juntas of State held to discuss them in 1630, A G S / E 2 0 4 4 , f. 38 etseq. F o r the political context of these events, see above, p p . 65ff. Decreto registrado of 5 April 1631, A H N / H a c . 7885, f. 84V. 'Relation de la forma en que se han de venir . . . la quenta y razon de dinero . . . este presente ano de 631 . . . ' , A R B / S E G o,obis, ff. 3 5 - 6 . See above, p . 104. ( T h e extant 'somaires' are mostly in A R B / C A 275.) O n the new financial system sponsored by the Portuguese conversos, see Dominguez Ortiz, Politicay Hacienda, pp. 12iff; Boyajian, Portuguese Bankers, passim and esp. table, p. 216; and Broens, Monarquiay capital, pp. 35—40. For Paz y Silveira's contract for supply of the Flanders armada, see accounts of pagador general Juan de Lira (1638) in ARB/SEG o,obis, f. 273; also Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, p. 327. 201

Quills, keels and cutlasses E25,ooo. The amount provided in the first instance was EI40,000, doubtless intended as the initial capitalisation of the building project.72 In fact, this represented (as it were) a drop in the ocean compared to the proposals rationalised by 'J-B. Sterck', and aimed at by Olivares. The former had worked on the basis of no fewer than forty new galleons and twenty-four fragatas dobles, at a total cost of EI,440,000 and £456,000 respectively. The evidence suggests that not many further instalments ever reached the Spanish Netherlands for the purpose. Nonetheless, despite the obvious shortfalls in achieving these wildly optimistic schemes, enough subsidy for building reached Dunkirk in the years 1637-40 to produce the new warships which made such an impact in the Mediterranean in the following decade. 73 In the years after 1640, the monthly armada subsidy was paid in Dunkirk with increasing irregularity. In 1642, the amounts were once again subsumed in the general accounts of the army, being included in the global sum of 'gastos extraordinarios'.74 Five years later, it was recognised that the mesada was in effect suspended; four-fifths of the subsidy was now to be centralised in the hands of Uribarri, stationed in Cadiz, leaving only E5,ooo per annum to be provided in Flanders for the upkeep of the remaining administration and its skeleton staff. The costs of the fleet accordingly disappear from the general budget of the Spanish military establishment in Flanders in 1648.75 From this point on, as in so many other areas of the Crown's commitment, financing became a more random and insecure matter. All the same, as already noted, the efforts made in respect of the Dunkirkers were considerable and 72

73

74 75

'Tanteo de la Distribution ... de la hacienda Real que se a proveydo de Espafia para este afio 1638 ...', A R B / S E G Qobis, ff. 266-8V. These figures are calculated from Sterck's comments on the original Colaert/Coen proposals, Madrid 30 March 1637, A G S / E 3860. Like Uribarri ten years later, he stressed that building in Flanders was considerably cheaper (as well as better) than anywhere in Spain. In 1635, Olivares had proposed a fleet of twenty-two new galleons for the Armada de Barlovento, and later in 1637 moved the construction requirement from the Flemish shipyards to even high levels, (see Appendix 8, p. 253, and above, pp. 170-1). T h e highly competitive costs of such a Flemish galleon, discovered by M. A. Echevarria from a document in the ARB, were as follows: Wood 2,000 Caulking and carpentry 2,400 Iron Equipment 800 Pitch & Tar 200 Sails 744 Cordage and Cables 1,500 Masts & Spars 600 Pulleys, tackle & pumps 80 Ovens & galley equipment 40 Two anchors 400 Total 8,764 escudos (Echevarria, La diplomdcia secreta, p. 259) 'Tanteo de cargo y datta ... desde primero de enero 1642 ...', ARB/SEG o,obis, ff. 350-60. 'Relation distinta ... hasta fin de Octubre de 1648', ibid., ff. 441-60; Leiden's report on the armada, Brussels 10 June 1647, AHN/E 978. 202

Structures, personnel, finance consistent.76 In September 1643, f° r example, the King offered a consignation, to be secured directly from the first silver to be shipped ashore from the next Flota de Galeones, in order to raise a loan (of £45,000) sufficient to send the armada back to Dunkirk for rest and refitting.77 In later years, the evidence suggests that drastic economies were made in the areas of ship maintenance, repairs and new construction, the better to guarantee availability of funds (in silver coin) for wages and good quality rations for the serving personnel. In the second quinquennium of the 1640s, the treasury managed to raise asientos for the main fleet in only two years. As late as 1646, however, £107,500 was assigned from the asientos of Jorge de Paz for twelve months' pay of the Dunkirkers.78 As resources dried up into a desert, the Flanders force was regularly directed towards the oases: between 1642 and 1646, at least £400,000 were provided, mainly in Cadiz. In the early months of 1647, plans were made to send EI50,000 to the new governor of the Low Countries, the Archduke Leopold-William, for the construction and purchase of a revived fleet.79 Following the disastrous bankruptcy of the autumn of that year, the funds reaching the Flanders armada diminished accordingly, and during the 1650s it suffered more or less the same fate as other commitments. Its physical contraction in this decade indicates that, whatever afterglow of glory still pertained to the individual skippers and frigates of Flanders, as a force its significance had virtually vanished.80 76 77

See above, pp. 155-6. See the letter of a royal agent to the King, complaining that, having raised loans worth 8,000 docats in Sanlucar de Barrameda on this warrant, they had not been repaid ('although it is understood that those who made advanced in Cadiz have received satisfaction'), 1 May 1644,

AGS/CJH 864. 78 79

80

Boyajian, Portuguese Bankers, p . 216; Ipeiiarrieta to S. J u a n Lucas, 28 Feb. 1646, A G S / C J H 900. Q u e e n Isabel to Castrillo, 2 Nov. 1642, A H N / H a c . 7887, f. 6 i v ; decretos registrados of 28 Sept. 1643 and 15 May 1644, ibid., 7888, f. 10 and 7889, f. 38; consulta of Council of State, 5 April 1644, A G S / E 2060; Philip IV to Castel Rodrigo, 13 D e c . 1644, A R B / S E G 232, f. 197; Cuvelier and Lefevre, Correspondance de la Cour, rv, p . 56. See Appendix 7, p. 252.

203

10

Prizetaking - plunder of a century For close on a hundred years, warships sailed from the ports of Flanders in search of plunder in the North Sea. If not always directly guided by Spain, their actions were a response to Spanish maritime policy. The shark's share of plunder was taken not by the armada, but by the private operators, known in Walloon as armateurs and in Spanish as armadores or particulares. It was the private sector which sustained the development of privateering in the Flemish ports after 1621. Although the purely economic dimension of the phenomenon is not the concern of this book, it cannot be entirely ignored when considering the military-strategic issues; neither can the role of the town of Dunkirk itself, the dynamic locus of our study. The privateers carried on the economic war. In many operations they sailed alongside the armada. Ex-privateering skippers were often to be found commanding royal frigates. In short, their world was as inextricably connected to that of the official squadron as one Siamese twin is to the other. While it is a hazardous business to separate them completely it is usually necessary, for both descriptive and analytical purposes, to distinguish between them. THE REGULATION OF PRIVATEERING

During the epoch of nearly two centuries when the Flemish ports were the centre of such activity, the great majority of prizes - in some years, virtually 100 per cent - were taken by privately-owned warships. The 'privateer' was defined, according to European maritime custom, as the holder of a licence from a sovereign power to make war against its enemy. Both vessel and skipper were covered by (and accurately described in) the articles of a 'letter of marque' issued by the home Admiralty. In this case, the Supreme Council in Brussels had final jurisdiction over all applications, and licensees had to swear to obey its ordinances. 1 Once in possession of this document, the privateers were theoretically guaranteed shelter, and entitlement to help, in allied territory (e.g. in 1

The following description is based (except where otherwise noted) on the consolidated set of sixty regulations issued in 1624; Placcart et Ordonnance de Roy nostre Sire, sur le faicte de VAdmiraute establie a Bergues St. Winocq. A Bruxelles, Chez Hubert Antoine, Imprimeur jure de la Cour... 1624. (A Castilian ms. copy is in AGS/E 2318.)

204

Prizetaking - plunder of a century Spanish ports); or, at the other extreme, immunity from criminal prosecution (i.e. as common pirates) should they be taken prisoner by the enemy. The regulation of privateering activities referred to two discrete areas. First, it provided a working definition of potential victims, answering the fundamental question, which categories of seaborne commerce constituted a 'legitimate target'? In the second place, it dealt with the major issue contingent on the first how prizes were disposed of, in order to realise their value. Both these represented areas of constant disagreement and official prevarication. In general, contemporary European states accepted that the property of their subjects was at unlimited risk whilst a legal state of war existed. But this rule of thumb was subject to a wide variety of abuse. Potential victims adopted any subterfuge to evade capture. Conversely, greedy predators frequently gobbled up items they could not digest, and which they were subsequently forced to disgorge. In applying for a licence, a privateer accepted the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the Admiralty Tribunal (Article XIV). Although many sanctions were introduced to deter privateers from fraudulent capture, including severe fines and even the death penalty (Articles XXX-XXVI), it seems probable that these were rarely enforced. Nor was compensation easily available to an injured party, except by difficult and expensive recourse to the indigenous legal system. On the other hand, awareness that a loss had actually been fair game did not prevent owners protesting, nor governments, through use of what was by now a sophisticated regular diplomatic system, from entering claims on behalf of favoured individuals or companies. Such representations were made as frequently from the compulsions of politics and patronage as from those of duty. Of course, it was open to wealthy or desperate men to carry on a campaign of litigation in their own right. In both Madrid and Brussels, royal councils were continuously harrassed by supplicants and their legal representatives, advancing an enormous variety of claims, spurious as well as genuine. It would be a conservative estimate that 40 per cent of all cases generated some process beyond the initial Tribunal hearing.2 The very fact that the Spanish Netherlands, like the United Provinces, and England, went to the trouble of maintaining a formal machinery of prizeassessment - the courts or tribunals - as part of their Admiralty structures, implicitly acknowledged basic (if often nebulous) principles of international custom. These tribunals were a costly administrative item, and their existence testifies to the fact that privateering was never quite allowed to flourish anarchically. In the case of the Flemish privateering campaign, at least, evidence exists to suggest that even the due process of the Admiralty Tribunal was capable of successful challenge - although reversal of judgement usually came about through intervention of the state apparatus. Moreover, the outcome depended 2

The destruction of the legal records of the Flanders Admiralty makes it impossible to give reliable figures on this point. 205

Quills, keels and cutlasses greatly on current political realities, which easily prevailed over nascent 'international law', and the nostrums of such theorists as Selden and Grotius. Within these loose limitations, it was in the interests of all on the Spanish side to entertain the widest possible definition of the prize category. In the 1630s, the era of'total war', when even more rigorous effort seemed necessary for Spain's war-machine to make a decisive impact on the Dutch economy, some went so far as to advocate that any vessel which had been built in the United Provinces, whatever its current allegiance or content, should be regarded as valid prize.3 But the rules of commercial warfare which normally applied were somewhat less comprehensive. Any vessel of enemy ownership obviously qualified for capture; its cargo, irrespective of ownership, was also forfeit; vessels trading to or from enemy ports were liable. In what later came to be known, in English, as the rule of'enemy goods - enemy ship', the presence of any cargo of enemy provenance rendered both carrier and payload wholly forfeit, whether or not such goods were loaded in an enemy port. This was seen by the privateering authority as due punishment for offering sustenance to an enemy, an attitude underpinned in this case by the technical fact that the enemy was also a rebel; any commerce with him was regarded as contraband by his lawful sovereign (Articles LII-LVI). This remained the formal position of the Spanish Habsburgs in respect of the Dutch, after Philip II first introduced his embargoes against them in the 1580s, with the exception of the twelve years of truce (1609-21). The sanctity of a subject's commercial interests was a doctrine more firmly subscribed to in the North Sea nexus than in Spanish waters, which were dealt with by Philip IV's 1621 Decreto.4 A ship of one's own side recaptured from the enemy in this area, was to be duly restored to its owner, and only a 'salvage fee' could be claimed by the rescuing skipper. On the other hand, the latter was substantial - in 1624 it was fixed at 25 per cent of the value of vessel and contents (Article XLIX) - and its redemption usually required the arbitration of the Admiralty in order to estimate these figures.5 Once a prize-vessel was brought into harbour, a complicated set of procedures had to be followed. The prize was stripped of guns, and any other equipment at a military premium, then its movable contents and papers were 'deposited'. The depositario held them in trust until the Tribunal had pronounced, and then arranged for their sale or restoration.6 Hearings could be prolonged. The victim might have been travelling with false papers attesting to immunity, but which had not been enough to deter the privateer master (who presumably carried specimen copies). These complications were exacerbated by the issue of exemp3 4 6

'Discurso sobre la Importancia de la Guerra Maritima de Olanda' (?i633), BL/Eg. 349, ff. 39-50V. 5 See above, pp. 46ff. See (e.g.) Petition of 12 June 1623, ARB/CP 1108. 'Capitulo de Instruccion de S[u] A[ltissima] de 13 de Abril 1622 ...', ARB/CA 245. 206

Prizetaking — plunder of a century tion passports in Germany, Denmark, Poland and the Hanse ports by Gabriel de Roy and others from 1627 onwards.7 On the other hand, privateering skippers might have 'planted' incriminating documents on exempt - but tempting - merchantmen; or destroyed genuine licences once they had been offered up by his captives. The possibilities for abuse were endless, and crews were often bribed and/or intimidated into silence. A dozen prohibitions of such 'complot' in the 1624 Ordonnances testify to their irrepressible frequency. Even the Tribunal judges, allowed no financial interest in the business, and paid on a pro rata basis, had reason to spin out proceedings. In theory, not only the vessel and cargo, but also the personal effects of crew and passengers of'good prize', were at the disposal of the successful privateer. The very clothes his captives stood in were part of the menu pillage which could be claimed. The extent to which such extremes were actually enforced depended on the circumstances of the specific action; that is, on whether or not the privateer ship had incurred loss or damage by his prize's resistance (Articles XXII-XXIII). Otherwise, the common humanity, current financial fortunes, or even the mood of the privateering partners, would be influential. Furthermore, in an interesting survival of medieval law, the actual persons of prisoners were the property of the captors, and could be held to ransom. But all concerned were enjoined by the rules, 'comme c'est la coustume de faire, en gardent neantmoins en cest endroit le debvoir de courtoisie & humanite Chrestienne' (Article XLI). They sacked the ships of London town, They burned the ships of Rye and Cadiz, They pulled full many a city down, A bloody trade a pirate's trade is. But Theodore, though dripping gore, Was always courteous to the ladies.8

In the case of the armada, the gross amount realised on any prize was immediately reduced by the 10 per cent share due to its captain-general. The crown took 66 per cent of the net sum, distributing the remaining third amongst the officers and men.9 Moreover, the numbers who could claim a share of prizemoney represented a further dilution. For example, not only the regular marines, but soldiers who happened to be on board a king's ship - for example those transported to or from Flanders - were due a share of any prize.10 To go by the results of such dramatically profitable voyages as those of Colaert, Hoces and Horna in 1635-40 would be misleading. Certainly, at times, even an ordinary seaman could be richly rewarded, but jackpots were very rare. In the 7 8 9

10

See Israel, 'The Politics of International Trade'. John Masefield, 'Theodore, or the Pirate King'. Baetens ('Organisation and Effects', p. 53) states that the senior administrators each took a share of 2 per cent, but I have not encountered reference to this practice. Spinola to Uribarri (acting veedor), 24 Nov. 1626, ARB/CA 245.

207

Quills, keels and cutlasses new Ordenanzas issued for the reform of the navy in 1633, even stricter rules were introduced. A full-time official, responsible to the inspector-general, was to be put on board any naval prize as soon as capture was effected, in order to seal all doors and hatches. No personal effects were liable, and casual pillage of any kind was strictly forbidden.11 Little wonder that in all except the most favourable conditions, the armada captains were reluctant to search for prizes, electing to sink enemy civilians who happened to cross their bows. In the case of the privateers, the Crown was only entitled to a flat 10 per cent rate. One-third of the remainder was due to the parish churches of the privateer's home port (Article XVI). This was a 'deposit of conscience', which no doubt in practice, and for more than one reason, helped to encourage maximal exploitation of prizes. The final two-thirds went to the owners of the captor vessel, which they divided according to shares involved.12 Constant revisions of the rules were necessary in order to tighten control and obviate fraud - though the latter was ultimately an impossible task. During 1622-4, new rules were brought in to replace those laid down by Parma and Albert in the 1590s. These were consolidated for the Winoksberg Admiralty in 1624; and in 1626 - when the HQreturned to Dunkirk - a freshly-revised set was issued by the Archduchess Isabel.13 Under this latest revision, a court of three assessors was nominated with jurisdiction not only over prizes, but also over all civil and criminal proceedings generated by privateering activities - whether of the armada or the armateurs. They sat in Dunkirk on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays of every week, for two hours each morning and afternoon. Their tasks included the interrogation of passengers and crew of captured vessels as to their personal details, and about the circumstances of the action at sea. The court kept an inventory of all ships and goods adjudicated upon, compiled by a full-time clerk (greffier), a copy of which was sent up to the Supreme Council of the Admiralty in Brussels 'more or less every ten days'. Normally, a majority verdict on any case was to be sufficient; but very important or contentious cases had to be referred to Brussels, and likewise all negative decisions and major appeals. The rapidly changing conditions of privateering enjoined caution, and Isabel wisely limited these ordinances to apply 'for six months only, so that we may provide new instructions as soon as convenient'. The need for incentives was now diminishing. With business flourishing, and as a direct consequence the potential for alternative use of vessels considerably restricted (compared to peacetime), the rules governing legitimate 'pillage' could be with impunity re-drafted in the Crown's favour. Moreover, there were increasing shortages of 11 12 13

Ordenanzas del Buen Govierno ... de 1633, pp. 44—6. Baetens, 'Organization and Effects'. 'Instruction du Siege de L'Amiraute estably a Dunquerque du 6 Novembre 1626', BRB/1602877, ff. 372-80. I quote here from a 'traduccion desta Instruction de Su Altissima', in AGS/E 2318. 208

Prizetaking - plunder of a century materiel de guerre and cash-flow problems at every point of military administration. By the late 1620s, not only all pieces of artillery, but other valuable fittings like spare masts, cordage and sails, along with all except a token proportion of jewels and cash, were confiscated by the authorities. Skippers were forbidden to sell captured vessels in any alien port, except when obliged to by weatherdamage. Condign punishment was threatened for any fraud. Practices outlawed - and thus, we may safely assume, common - were the throwing overboard of goods above the value of retention, concealment of same, or their distribution before return, in order to implicate crewmen and buy their silence.14 As a result of the reforms of 1630, further sophistications were introduced in the interests of efficiency and probity. More detailed responsibility was placed on the officials of the Almirantazgo in supervision of the sale of prize goods. They had to be present at the auctions, to see that goods realised a fair price, to keep records of the transactions, and to organise distribution of profits.15 From 1630 until the end of our period, the general framework within which privateers were legally obliged to operate altered little. The rules governing prizes and profits usually reflected the changing degree of the state's dependence on the private sector, and thus the generosity or otherwise of the contract. In the 165 os, the Crown offered to waive its tithe of prizes if the Loyal Estates would make a contribution to the maritime war by fitting out their own privateers.16 During the so-called War of Devolution with France, Madrid ordered Brussels to reactivate privateering in the Channel. Potential armateurs demanded that the 10 per cent royal share should now be abolished altogether, compensating for the rising investment costs of the business, and that smaller prizes should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Admiralty at Ostend. Even free credit was demanded, as a further subvention for their loyal efforts.17 Although most of these conditions were rejected, the Crown's position was inherently weak. During the 1660s, privateer squadrons had to be hired on a campaign-contract basis for operations against the Portuguese. In effect, this meant that the naval aspect of Spain's war-effort was being farmed out to foreigners on an asiento basis. In 1663, a Danish entrepreneur contracted to employ between fifteen and eighteen warships in this campaign. The captaingeneral of the Flanders armada (a title which had now reverted to the dukes of Aerschot) issued licences for them to stop and search all ships suspected of 'contraband' trade with the rebel kingdom. The asentista was granted a scaled reduction of the royal 10 per cent (or double this rate in Spanish waters) in respect of any warships or other vessels captured under dangerous conditions, 14 15

16 17

Tlaccart touchant le pillage du 4 de May 1627', BRB/16028-37, ff. 87-92V. 'Copia de Otros Capitulos de otra Instruccion que mando despachar S[u] Afltissima] en diez de Septiembre de 1630', ARB/CA 245. See Philip IV to Don Juan Jose de Austria, 14 Sept. 1656, AGS/E 2267. 'Conditions pour armer demandees par les armeurs et leur accordees ...', 24 Dec. 1667, BRB/16028-37, ff. 412V.-20. 209

Quills, keels and cutlasses but still had to register his prizes through official Almirantazgo channels in Ostend or Spain.18 THE CONDUCT OF PRIZETAKING

Unfortunately for many, the actual conduct of privateering frequently bore little relation to the norms laid down by written 'rules of engagement'. The Flemish ports did not gain their awesome reputation as the 'Barbaries of the North' through the strict observance of codes, but because of the ruthless, and often savage, practice of what was piracy in all but name. Indeed, since the larger proportion of all the seaborne commerce of the North Sea was connected directly or indirectly with the economy of the United Provinces, and Spain was frequently at war with other nations too, little trading activity was at any given time strictly immune from plunder. As in many other aspects of its historical and geographical context, both general and detailed, the picaresque novel about the adventures of Estebanillo Gonzalez gives perhaps the most fully-dimensional picture of a typical privateering voyage. As Estebanillo's vessel was provisioning in Falmouth en route to Flanders, two Dunkirkers ran into the estuary to shelter from a storm. Since his transport had taken eighty days to reach Devon - in marked contrast to Alonso Contreras, who had completed the journey ten times more quickly - he decided to switch his allegiance to the privateers. 'On Christmas day, 1645 t n e recorded] we sailed out en corso against the Hollanders, French and Portuguese.5 The frigates shortly encountered a Dutch vessel which they sank after an hour's fight, but saved the crew. Cruising along the Breton coast, they flew the flag which they deemed appropriate to the nationality of a potential victim. At times, spotting a ship stronger than ourselves, we made off, with the most valiant amongst us turned into fearful hares, and at other times we dealt blows to those weaker than ourselves, with the most cowardly transformed into invincible lions. If we captured a vessel laden with wine in the morning, by the afternoon we were all equal in drunkenness, falling on top of each other. When all is said and done, the life of the corsair is the death of the passenger. At length, having sent several ships to the bottom and taken substantial prizes, we returned to Flanders. 19

The particular period Estebanillo describes was perhaps the most anarchic of all, a decade when corsairs of many allegiances swarmed in the seas of western Europe. At other times, relative peace prevailed, and graded restitution of damage was possible. After 1610, and again after 1648, when settlement had 18

19

'Condiciones y Articulos que se asienten con el infraescrito Juan Jorge de Muller ...' 18 Feb. 1663, MN/Vargas 24, ff. 371-3V. N. Spadaccini and A. Zachareas (eds.), La viday hechos de Estebanillo Gonzalez, hombre de buen humor (2 vols., Madrid, 1978), 11, pp. 507-9. (The novel was first published in Antwerp in 1646.) See also The Life of Captain Alonso de Contreras, p. 164. 210

Prizetaking — plunder of a century been reached with the United Provinces, efforts were made to restore and/or compensate for certain prizes taken in dubious circumstances during the war.20 But few cases were straightforward, and the richer the prize, the more difficult the resolution. During the Admiralty's Winoksberg period, a fleet of twenty-five ships owned by the subjects of the King of Denmark was captured by Flemish privateers and adjudged good prize. The Danes claimed the incident occurred before they entered the Thirty Years' War on the Dutch side early in 1625. The loss of such a fleet (allegedly worth 1,285,000 escudos) was a major blow to the Danish economy, and over thirty years later Copenhagen was continuing to pursue the matter of compensation.21 The circumstances suggest that it had been protected by the Dutch navy, with cargoes part-owned by Dutch firms. Many of the ships were likely to have been Dutch-built. This case was perhaps unusually protracted, but others of only slightly less longevity are on record. In 1642 the Alexander of Hull, with an English skipper and crew, took advantage of a decree permitting the import of foodstuffs into Guipuzcoa from any source, an emergency response to local famine. Not long out from a Dutch port, bound for San Sebastian with over 100 tons of grain, the ship was taken by a privateer belonging to Albert de Gourneval, a well-known Dunkirk shipowner who had been ennobled (as Baron d'Esclebeque) by Philip IV for his services to the war-effort. The Alexander was owned by two Scots brothers, James and Robert Brown, residents of San Sebastian. They fought the case, believing it would be straightforward. But Esclebeque pleaded that his prize had been putting into a French port when taken; and in October 1644, the Dunkirk Tribunal declared in his favour. After a protest, Philip IV ordered full restitution in May, 1645; but not until July 1652 did the Supreme Council rescind the original verdict, leaving the Browns to begin private proceedings against Esclebeque to obtain compensation.22 One of the major causes of malfeasance arose from practical sea-going conditions. The Dunkirkers instilled such universal fear that even genuinely neutral vessels, carrying valid identification, often tried to avoid being snared, if they were unlucky enough to sight a privateer. Once having gone to the trouble of chasing and boarding, the Dunkirk skipper was naturally loth to let a capture go, especially if a chance existed that she might fail to prove the absence of enemy interest in her hold. It was a vicious circle. The system of written official 20

21 22

See (e.g.) Albert to Philip III, 25 April 1610, A R B / S E G 177, f. 36; A. Brun to Philip IV, 3 May 1651, A G S / E E H 3 3 , f. 39. T h e latter king was willing to restore D u t c h vessels which had been trading between Lisbon and Bayonne, but not another caught running provisions into Tortosa when it was besieged by his troops (see ibid., ff. 2 2 1 - 4 ) . Cuvelier and Lefevre, Correspondance de la cour, rv, p . 658. 'Remonstrance of James and Rob. Brown', 5 May 1653, and Philip IV to marquis of Castel Rodrigo, 17 May 1645, A R B / C P 1108. T h e case was still proceding in 1655; see CSPD 6)> P-

I02

« 211

Quills, keels and cutlasses passports, issued ostensibly on behalf of the Almirantazgo, was susceptible to myriad abuses. In consequence, hundreds of neutral vessels were carried into the Flemish ports during this century and later discharged; and hundreds more failed to prove their 'innocence', either through the connivance of a judicial system which was solidly biased in favour of their 'guilt', or through genuine lack of suitable documentation. At this distance, it is usually impossible to distinguish the clear outlines of justice - for example, in a case like that of the Sea-Horse, in 1624. The Sea-Horse out of Sandwich and bound for Flushing, skippered by Joseph Hatch, was intercepted by two sloops of Ostend and carried to Niewpoort. After they had been given very rough treatment, stripped of their clothes, and threatened, the crew eventually had most of their clothing and their ship returned to them. But four barrels of beer, some money, and other cargo items, were never given back.23 The aptly-named Captain Hatch and his crew perhaps escaped lightly in the circumstances. Certainly, despite the numbers of breweries which flourished in these crowded ports (Dunkirk alone had nineteen) it is not surprising that he failed to recover his beer.24 As in other cases, the final decision was influenced by the need to avoid provoking English hostility at a sensitive moment. That August, the secret agent van Male commented that many English owners, knowing the risks involved, were nonetheless prepared to defy the Dunkirkers and trade with the Dutch. He concluded that London's protests at the consequent activities of the Dunkirkers could therefore be ignored.25 In practice, this was a luxury which Brussels could rarely afford. Of course, during the wars of 1625-30 and 1655-60, all English vessels were liable to capture. Moreover, before 1625, and after the peace of 1630, English ships were regularly claimed as prize under the 'contraband' rule. In April 1632, Count Waecken was warned not to molest English shipping, since any such captures would have to be restored.26 Yet Charles I's agent, Baltasar Gerbier, was continually engaged in making representations in Brussels on behalf of aggrieved English merchants. During this decade he succeeded in persuading the Supreme Council to overrule the Dunkirk judges in eighteen cases where they had declared valid prize; but in many other instances he failed to achieve restitution or compensation. Complaints over incidents like that of 'un jeune homee [qui] fut mis a la torture par la capitain Pierre Maitens de Dunquerque', 23 24

25 26

Deposition of Capt. H . Rol, 15 Sept. 1624, A R B / C A 113. Baetens, 'An Essay on Dunkirk Merchants', pp. 123-4. T h e eponymous hero of Estebanillo Gonzalez, present in Dunkirk with D o n Fernando, took refuge in an alehouse from the guns of the Dutch ships pursuing Oquendo. An experienced wine-bibber, he sampled Flanders beer for the first time, with satisfactory results (Spadaccini and Zachareas, Estebanillo Gonzalez, 11, pp. 369-70). Van Male to Archduchess Isabel, 23 Aug. 1624, A R B / C A 113. Conseil Supreme to Waecken, 25 April 1632, A R B / C P 1108. 212

Prizetaking - plunder of a century or of 'trois barques pris par les Dunquerquois a la rade de Venersam [?] en la riviere Thamise', more often than not fell on deaf ears.27 In 1632, an astonishing year for plunder, when no vessel could have felt safe in the environs of the North Sea, eight English captures were restored, but perhaps as many as twenty others were condemned in Dunkirk. Five years later, a further eight English ships were lost to privateers, but this time all were restored, except for the Mackerel, which had been charged with French wine, and, falling under the contraband rule, was 'adjudged lawful prize and sold by outcry' at Dunkirk for £7oo. 28 For several reasons, as these latter details suggest, matters improved from the English point of view later in the decade. For one thing, English naval power was itself on the increase, and for another, the war with France put a premium on Charles Fs friendship. With the regular passage of troop-convoys through the channel, English sympathy assumed critical importance. Indeed, attitudes to captures of British origin mirrored the ebb and flow of the strategic situation. In June 1636, for example, with the Fuentes-Velada expedition on its way to Flanders, Philip IV instructed Don Fernando to look into a particular case, already two years old, about which both Gerbier and the English ambassador in Madrid had complained; 'since it is felt here that now is not the time to give offence to the King of England, or provide him with any pretext to authorise reprisals'.29 A campaign by the puritan leader, the Earl of Pembroke, to obtain redress from Spain on behalf of the English Fisheries Company was drawn to Brussels' attention by the Spanish ambassador, Cardenas, in December 1639. Pembroke's complaint to Charles I involved excesses by the privateers going back to 1632, for which he 'humbly prayed Your Majesty for an immediate order to his admiral or vice-admiral to stop and capture their Dunkirk men-of-war'.30 Cardenas' action, of course, was motivated by the fact that dozens of Oquendo's ships, at that very moment, lay beached on the Kentish coast, or otherwise at England's mercy, whilst thousands of his men were unwelcome guests in the ports of Kent. On more than one occasion during the long campaign of 1639, Don Fernando ordered the Admiralty Council to ignore the pressure and 27

28

29

30

T h e s e and other details are from the register of Gerbier's 'remonstrances' for 1 6 3 1 - 4 0 in P R O / S P 77, ff. 1 4 8 - 5 5 . See also A R B / C A 60, a liasse devoted entirely to English plaintiffs for the years 1637-40. Malo, Les Corsaires, I, p . 333; D . O. Shilton and R. Holworthy (eds.), High Court of Admiralty Examinations, 1637-38 (London, 1932), p . 141. Philip IV to D o n Fernando, 13 June 1636, A R B / S E G 214, ff. 562-2V. In these years, English trawlers and trampers also had to cope with frequent irruptions of privateers from Spain into the Irish Sea and Bristol Channel; English diplomatic staff in Madrid made many complaints about these depredations. See the case of owners from Haverfordwest, Tenby and Bristol, 1633-4, B L / A d d . 36448, ff. 3 - 7 . By mid-decade, reprisals were taking place; see (e.g.) Alonso de Galarreta to Miguel de Salamanca, 7 July 1637, A H N / E 962, f. 125V. ' L ' H u m b l e Requete de Conte de Pembroke', 1639, A R B / C A 259. 213

Quills, keels and cutlasses complaints of the armateurs, and restore all English ships without delay or quibble. The impression remains that only reasons of state were sufficient to divert the normal fate of neutral victims, once they had fallen into the maw of the great whale. Yet by 1639, when Dunkirk harbour was clogged with captive vessels, a petitioner claimed that too many appeals were also clogging up the system. 'The privateers and their families are perishing with hunger, and their business, so important for the damage that for many years it caused to the rebels, is on the brink of ruin ... and in the meantime those of the depositario encourage delay and spend the money that by rights is due to the supplicants.5 Don Fernando was asked to appoint more magistrates to the Supreme Council so that appeals could be expedited.31 It seems to have been rare, therefore, for any neutral capture judged as good prize not to lead to some complication. Even apparently simple cases could spark off events, by turns tragic or farcical. Not long after the English declaration of war in 1625, Robert Bradnel of Deane in Northamptonshire was travelling 'into France . . . to learn the language and gain experience'. At this particular juncture, the English Channel was alive with Dunkirkers. Bradnel's transport was caught by the frigate St Hubert, taken into Gravelines and subsequently adjudged good prize. The privateering skipper saw no reason why Bradnel should not be held for ransom. The prisoner, however, protested that he was the son of a recusant family, 'going by his father's order to the seminary of St Omer' - presumably to train for the priesthood. Cardinal de la Cueva informed the High Court of Brabant that to hold such a man 'would not only be against Her Highness' [Isabel's] wishes but also against those of His Majesty, who founded that seminary and still supports it'. In the event, Bradnel's father refused to pay for his release. Perhaps he was frightened by puritan magistrate neighbours, or threatened directly with a charge of treason by a government at war. Perhaps Bradnel senior was never a recusant in the first place. At any rate, he denied his son's story, effectively accusing the lad of being a waster and a liar.32 Disputes between the privateers and the authorities were common and often bitter. Many of these concerned the taking of prize in Spanish waters, where they were at times to be found, on their own individual account, or having been pressed into royal service. The 1626 regulations permitted the sale of prizes in friendly ports, albeit under strict conditions. Actual or potential enemy action, or serious weather problems were recognised as valid excuses. But all relevant cases were to be reported in Dunkirk, and supported by full official documen31

32

'El Capitan Estevan de Rudderc [PStephen R u d d o c k ] . . . y juntamente todos los capitanes . . . de las fragattas de los particulares . . . En D u n q u e r q u e a 12 de Octubre 1639', A R B / C A 123. Travel licence issued by the Earl of Manchester, 28 F e b . 1625, and Cardinal de la Cueva to Chancellor of Brabant, 9 M a r c h 1627, A R B / C A 519, no. 2.

214

Prizetaking - plunder of a century tation from the foreign port authorities, covering every aspect of the transactions completed. In 1627, Spinola asked the King to appoint a full-time official in the ports of Vizcaya, to prevent fraud, and ensure that all sales of prize were properly audited. He suggested that Vicente de Ancionado might return to Spain to occupy this post. Spinola had his own interest in this matter. Clearly he suspected that not merely the 'legitimate5 sale of prizes in Spain by the armada, but also numbers going unrecorded, had reached proportions which represented a considerable loss of his income.33 Privateering captains could themselves be on the receiving end - an occupational hazard by the ready reckoning of most. Serious disputes more often involved strangers than businessmen rooted within the community. In 1625, a licensed English skipper, Thomas Whitmore, brought into Dunkirk a rich galleon, which claimed to be registered in Hamburg, but turned out (as he suspected) to be partly Dutch-owned. Despite this (he complained to Isabel) the case stuck in the Tribunal. Brussels, perhaps aware that Whitmore had little option but patience, since he was an enemy alien in Spanish territory, rejected the plea, and a year later he had received no satisfaction.34 John Fincham, another English privateer, protested that a year ago, he obtained patent from Her Highness to arm a ship against His Majesty's enemies. With the said vessel, about three months since, he captured a Scots ship loaded with grain, which was declared good prize. But the gentlemen of the Tribunal have kept the money realised in their account, saying that they have authority to do so. This proceeding is to the great damage of the supplicant, in that the preparation of his warship cost him 12,000 florins, from which he has still received no profit. For lack of money his ship now lies rotting in the harbour when it could be out at sea on His Majesty's service.35 In May 1627, the authorities in Santander impounded the Dunkirker Santiago, which took shelter from a storm, under the command of one Juvoni Melar, who claimed to be Flemish. But the Almirantazgo commissioner in the port denounced him for running contraband (Dutch) goods. 'He proceeded against the captain and sailors with great passion, committing excesses and other disorders which must be made good.5 The situation was resolved only by direct royal intervention and the action of the corregidor. Possibly the over-zealous official believed this vessel was a Dutchman, merely masquerading as a Dunkirker; or had a corrupt reason for its sequestration. In fact, it was actually a 33

34

35

Spinola to Philip IV, 1 March 1627, A G S / E 2318. T h e captaincy-general had been conceded to Spinola partly in order to limit the growth of the debt the Crown owed his banking house. Petition of T . Whitmore, 5 May, and report of the Cornell Supreme, 1 Aug. 1625, A R B / C A 114. J. Fincham to Archduchess Isabel, 21 March 1627, A R B / C P 1108. 215

Quills, keels and cutlasses member of the armada, damaged at the outset of its return voyage to Flanders, after auxiliary duty in Biscay during the previous winter.36 PRIZETAKING - THE STATISTICAL RECORD

From the date of the re-establishment of the Admiralty at Dunkirk, in November 1626, a remarkable sequence of official records was maintained in respect of vessels adjudged to be good prize. The important financial implications of prizetaking meant that its details were sent to Brussels and forwarded to Madrid. The admiralty sources were used by Professor R. Baetens in 1978 to draw up a data series of prize captures and values, covering the years 1626-68. Around the same time, the present author completed a more closely-focussed quantitative study of the 1630s, drawing on a wider variety of official and semi-official sources to arrive at estimates of prizetaking numbers and tonnages.37 Extant figures are sparser in relation to the privateering exploits of the King's ships before the watershed of 1609. The activities of the armada seem to have been distinctly limited, since their time was mostly consumed in the task of protecting Antwerp's commerce, as the Dutch inexorably tightened their stranglehold on the Scheldt. The depositario, Diego de Peralta, failed to register a single prize victim of the royal ships between 1592 and 1594, and only three were recorded in the succeeding five years.38 Even with the arrival of the new century, Peralta still had plenty of time to doodle in his office whilst waiting for business: in the spring of 1600 he noted down a wistful epithet: Get wedded and bedded and enjoy your wife, But soon you'll be missing the batchelor life.39 As things turned out, matters did improve with the coming of the newly wedded sovereigns, Albert and Isabel, to the Southern Netherlands. In the first nine months of their rule, twenty Dutch and English prizes were judged in Dunkirk. 36

O r d e r to Fernando de la Riva, May 1627, M N / V a r g a s 26, f. 17; Spinola to Philip IV, 17 April 1627, A G S / E 2318. T h e Santiago was damaged by the ferocious storms of January 1627, which sank dozens of vessels in the area (see above, p . 123). She was obliged to turn back, but all her companions battled through Biscay successfully; see consulta of Junta de Armadas, 10 Jan. 1627,

AGS/GA3151. 37

38

39

R. Baetens, 'Organization and Effects'; R. A. Stradling, ' T h e Spanish Dunkirkers, 1621-48: A Record of Plunder and Destruction', Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 93 (1980), pp. 5 4 1 - 8 . Both these essays contain fuller descriptions of sources. Appendix 11 is based on Prof. Baetens's series, with detailed amendments [passim) incorporated from my 1980 article and later work. Further analysis of the quantitative dimension of prizetaking in the present study has been eschewed as marginal. Peralta's accounts for 1592-8, A G S / C M C 1826, no. 1. M o r e details are buried in the huge collection of Peralta's pliegos de tanteo covering 1600-11 in ibid 1820 no. 1. See also, Pollentier, Die Admiraliteit, pp. 8 7 - 9 0 . Scribbled on a prizelist of May 1600, in A R B / C A 59.

216

Prizetaking - plunder of a century In July 1600, Captains Jacobsen, Colaert and two Willemsens made an average of 15,100 florins each from the ransom of prisoners they had taken, in addition to their (presumed) share of prize ships and goods.40 This modest striking rate held good in the first decade of the century. Down to 1607, a n annual average of between forty and fifty vessels were brought in as good prize. The acting depositario, Cornelius van Driel, recorded a total of 461 transactions made by him in the sale of prize goods, and taxing of profits, in 1600-7, suggesting 350 as a reasonable estimate of the number of vessels. Van Driel reported revenue from the sale of vessels, goods and ransoms, of nearly 21,000 florins (8,400 escudos) in the six months before the armistice of 1607. This represented neither an important income for the Crown, nor a significant loss to an enemy whose commerce and shipbuilding was currently experiencing a growth beyond all historical precedent.41 Yet, in the early years of renewed operations, following the expiry of the Truce of Antwerp, such levels were not easily regained. For the first nine months of 1622, with only a handful of royal frigates involved, Ancionado reported fourteen victims totalling more than 1,500 tons, but yielding less than 3,000 escudos as the Crown's share.42 Considering the levels of capital expenditure being set by Madrid at this juncture, this was firmly to be regarded as only a beginning, and sure enough it proved the base for a steady period of expansion. As the number of operational units more than doubled in 1621-6, the prize lists expanded accordingly. In the fourteen months following the re-establishment of the Admiralty at Dunkirk, the armada brought in 16,326 escudos in prizemoney for the Crown, a fivefold increase in as many years.43 Although now tactically freer, stronger and on the offensive, the force was still notably distant from paying for itself. Given considerable regular expenditures on its maintenance, the margins were razor-thin. In the prevailing financial dispensation, the Crown's profit from the armada represented less than the provisioning of one frigate for one campaigning year. As the figures for prizetaking steadily increased, after 1626, the armada's share remained modest. The records of depositario Luyando demonstrate that only twenty-nine of the total 154 cases adjudged good prize in 1627-8 were to the royal warships' account (19 per cent). The squadron of around ten chartered frigates, operating from Ostend under count Wacken, accounted for a similar figure, whilst the privateers, by the latter year numbering some twenty vessels, 40

41

42

43

'Relation des toutes les prises venues a la notice du siege en D u n q u e r q u e doit le premier de Sept. 98 jusques le 16 Juin 99', ibid. 'Relation des prises faites des placcarts . . . de l'Admiraulte . . . de D u n k e r q u e . . . xxix de Avril 1605 • • •'» A R B / C A 60; '40 copias de quentas de presas que sirven para computacion del cargo de Cornelius van D r i e l . . . afio 1607', A G S / C M C 1020. 'Relacion de las presas que ha hecho el armada de la guardia destos estados de Flandes . . . desde 6 de henero deste ano asta el dia de la fecha desta', 8 Oct. 1622, A G S / E 2312, f. 24. Lists and Accounts of Luis de Luyando, A G S / C M C 1786 no. 9; 'Primera relacion de Juan M u n o z de Escobar', ibid. E 2044, f. 38.

217

Quills, keels and cutlasses brought in nearly a hundred victims.44 The figures later consolidated by Penninq show that this tendency persisted, and was even accentuated. Penninq credited the armada with a record fifty-five victims in 1629, but closer enquiry reveals that more than half of these were registered by the Ostend squadron.45 The figures for the years 1629-33 nevertheless illustrate the paradox that in this respect the armada performed better in years of financial crisis than in periods when Madrid was better able to meet its professed commitments. As in the predatory state of nature, loss of parental attention and support obliged the quasi-mature young to sally forth and fend for themselves. In like manner, the rigorous enemy blockade forced the coningsschepen to operate in small packs, like their private colleagues. In 1629-30 the Ostend and Dunkirk squadrons between them took over eighty prizes and sank a further 111 Dutch and English vessels.46 As Madrid recovered its control of affairs in Flanders, in the early 1630s, commerce-raiding again receded into the background. Already by 1632, when the total number of Flemish prizes attained a record not to be broken for over thirty years, the armada's contribution had shrunk to less than 10 per cent. Not until 1637, when Fuentes, with more ships and funds, was ordered to maximise use of the armada in all capacities, was a temporary revival registered. In that year, with Colaert, Rodriguez, Fuentes, and Lope de Hoces all leading major expeditions, the proportion of armada prizes attained a record 26 per cent of the total. 47 In purely quantitative terms, it must be admitted that the force which was initially established in response to demands for a commercial war, of which it would form the spearhead, was never in practice more than a secondary element in its prosecution. But this is partially misleading. The armada played an exemplary role of the greatest importance, as well as the often more tangible factor of physical protection of the privateers. Moreover, if, in numerical terms, their average contribution to prizetaking hovered around 15 per cent, the size and richness of their captures compensated in some degree, as might be expected of their generally larger and better-equipped frigates. Their average 20 per cent of the total prize burthens may be assumed to represent intrinsically more valuable cargoes, as well as larger ones, than those generally registered by the privateers. These factors assume significance when it is recalled that in this period the privateering fleet was five or six times the size of the armada, while the latter was engaged in several other regular duties with which prizetaking was incompatible on tactical or logistical grounds. The conditions of these latter voyages, on the other hand, often led to massive destruction. Though reference must be made here mainly to the fisheries raids, 44 45

46

Luyando's lists, ibid. 'Sumaria Relacion . . . de 18 febrero de 1635', A R B / C A 275; (aversion of this document appears below as Appendix 10, p . 255). Cf. the monthly somaires for 1629, ibid. 47 See Appendix 10, p . 255. Stradling, ' T h e Spanish Dunkirkers', Table, p . 547.

218

Prizetaking — plunder of a century many other expeditions also permitted or encouraged burnings and sinkings of enemy vessels on a large scale.48 In these terms, the armada vastly exceeded its privateering colleagues (65 per cent of the total in 1627-34). A bonus aspect, in this connection, was that in relative terms the armada brought in a far richer haul of a commodity becoming every year more vital to the survival of the Spanish System - nearly one-half of the 2,000-plus artillery pieces captured, and two-thirds of those sent to the bottom.49 With the armada's effective removal from the scene of operations in the North Sea, in the early 1640s, its role in commerce raiding sinks even further into obscurity. No accounts of prizes seem to have been kept by its local veedores (Vazquez and Aguirre), probably because such matters had now assumed an even lower priority. The diurnal roster of the frigates in the Atlantic and Mediterranean theatres - protection, rapid postal and personnel delivery and straightforward battle-combat - were virtually inimical to prizehunting.50 The privateering war in the North Sea meanwhile continued, without royal participation, but nevertheless achieving consistently impressive results. Not until the mid-1650s was any revival of armada interest in this area experienced. The full attentions of the Flemish privateers were turned upon England in early 1656.51 Within three years, it was believed amongst the London mercantile community that between one and two thousand British ships had been lost. Indeed, so great was this perceived incubus, that various estimates were forwarded to the Cromwellian (and later, restored Commonwealth) governments, with the aim of persuading them to reach a rapid settlement with Spain. In 1657, the London businessman, Richard Baker, asserted that 1,800 English ships had been lost in the first year of hostilities. The City's piteous wailing was instrumental in making up Cromwell's mind to accept an alliance with Mazarin's France which had as its main raison d'etre the capture of Dunkirk. By 1659, pressure in favour of peace was one of the most important causative elements in the sequence of political changes which ultimately produced the Restoration. Estimates of shipping losses included that of 1,500 by 1659, made by Slingsby Bethel, in a notorious anti-Cromwellian polemic, and the anonymous pamphleteer who a year later counted over 2,000. All these estimates were considerably (and perhaps knowingly) exaggerated. The records of the Dunkirk Admiralty suggest a maximum of 500 captures and 48 50 51

49 See ibid., esp. Table, p. 553. See Appendix 10. For the armada's campaigns in the South, see above, Chapt. 6. T h e armateurs complained that they were not prepared against England, but were on the prowl two weeks before the official decree was issued; see their 'Plainte aux officiers d'Almiraute', 4 Feb. 1656, A R B / C A 156. Details of contemporary English material on shipping losses are in Stradling, 'Anglo-Spanish Relations', pp. 19-29, and R. Crabtree, ' T h e Idea of a Protestant Foreign Policy', Cromwell Association Handbook (1968-9), pp. 2 - 1 9 . Although the participation of the handful of royal vessels stationed at Dunkirk cannot be easily ascertained, the anti-commerce campaign was nevertheless germane to Madrid's conduct of war, which explains its exposition here. For a narrative of the war, see above, pp. 146-50.

219

Quills, keels and cutlasses possibly another ioo vessels held to ransom over the four years of official war (February 1656-May 1660). The actual English prizes taken into Flemish ports during the first year of war were less than a tenth of the number given by Baker.52 However, two important riders must be entered. First, it was possible to privateer out of Flemish ports holding not the licence of the Archduke Leopold-William, but letters of marque provided by Spain's new ally, the exiled King Charles (II) of England. Under the terms of the treaty made at Cologne between the latter and Philip IV, English royalist skippers - a dozen or more in number - submitted their prizes not to the Dunkirk Admiralty, but to the arbitration (and financial benefit) of the Stuart court-in-exile, quickly established in Brussels.53 Secondly, the tabulated data for 1656 also leave out of account the contribution to overall English losses made by raiders operating from the ports of northern Spain. However, it seems unlikely that these interventions combined could have accounted for more than 200 captures in this period. Perhaps as many as seventy privateers were operating from Flanders in 1656, a number which compared favourably with earlier phases, but the number of Spanish armadores had steadily shrunk since the 1640s.54 Nevertheless, the loss of more than 10,000 tons of shipping in 1656 alone represented an immense blow to the nascent commercial economy of the British Isles. In subsequent years, down to the proclamation of peace which followed the Restoration, at least another 30,000 tons went the same way; and losses continued sporadically for two or three years thereafter. This sustained damage is in every way comparable to that inflicted on the Dutch by the Spanish Dunkirkers in their heyday. Though the value of the average British prize was less than that to be expected in the Dutch case, the relative effect in economic terms was almost certainly greater. The British shipbuilding industry was still far from achieving the prolific standards of the Dutch yards. Volumes of exports and production in the domestic economy reflected this; depression in the provincial South and the menace of spiralling insurance rates in the City were the consequences. The long-term results of this haemorrhage of English shipping were the more serious because it occurred at a time when it desperately needed to maintain its competitive edge against the Dutch. The level of losses also suggests that the English navy's blockading effort on the coast of Flanders was rather less effective than that maintained by the Dutch in earlier decades.55 Since it was both less experienced and smaller than the 52

53

54 55

See Appendix 12, p . 257. Note that this table is based on the monthly lists drawn up by greffier Louis Colbrant ('Somaires des prises faictes par mer' in A R B / C A 275) and not the relevant data compiled by Baetens in 'Organization and Effects'. Some obviously English names can also be discerned on Colbrant's lists of successful privateers operating with Brussels licences. Baetens, 'Organization and Effects', p . 54; Otero Lana, 'Los corsarios espafioles'. T h e English force arrived late on station, and comprised only twelve warships. Whilst merchants complained, the main effort went into Blake's attempts to capture one of the Spanish silver-fleets; 220

Prizetaking - plunder of a century fleets commanded by Tromp, this is perhaps unsurprising. Consequently, whereas in 1621-48 the privateers drew in their largest hauls of prizes in the winter months, this feature is not as marked during the war with England. Another feature is that the average burthen of prizes was less impressive. In 1629-34, this had been 115 tons; and much closer to 1656, during the first Anglo-Dutch war, the forty-two Dutch prizes brought into Plymouth by English privateers had an average of 190 tons. 56 The average English victim of the Flemish privateers in this period failed to reach half that size. Lists of victims in Dunkirk were compiled from coastal trampers and trawlers, with (by way of variety) the modestly-proportioned and comparatively valueless coalers of Newcastle and the Firth of Forth, creeping down to the Thames estuary. This indicates that the surprising figure of 299 total prize units in 1656, given by Dr Baetens - representing a record for the whole 'Spanish period' of Flemish privateering - was less impressive in terms of tonnage and value than the achievements of the earlier generation.57 Several of the individual prizes, recorded by greffier Colbrant in 1656, can be identified among various English reports coming in to Whitehall. The fifty-ton naval pink The Cat, commanded by Richard Pettock, which Colbrant entered as arriving Dunkirk on 14 May, was taken after a battle with a Dunkirk frigate ('He boarded us with 100 men') on 28 April. The Bonaventure of Hull under Captain John Pearson, a substantial craft of 120 tons, was taken on 3 June and came into Dunkirk a week later.58 From Spain's point of view, the highlight of the year and of the war as a whole - was the feat of Captain Reynard, who commanded the five armada warships in the capture of a convoy of ten substantial and richly-cargoed merchantmen bound for the port of London, after beating off its two naval escorts. This created dismay in the City, conversely reverberating in the prose of the newsmonger Barrionuervo in Madrid.59 THE PRIVATEERING BUSINESS

The images summoned up by these figures are of a centre of palpable wealth, a cornucopia of all the world's treasure, its quayside studded with capstans of pure 56 57

58 59

CSPD (1655-6), p . 345. See also Malo, Les Corsaires, 1, pp. 4 2 3 - 6 ; Faulconnier, Histoire, pp. 1 6 - 1 7 . See list in BL/Add. 9304, ff. 108V-9. T h e prizes were taken between February 1653 and August 1654. According to Baetens ('Organization and Effects', p. 69), English prizes accounted for only 43 per cent of the total 1,066 captured in 1656-60. But the only other legitimate target in these years was France, a rather flaccid milch-cow of twenty years' standing. Moreover, many French fishermen took out immunity licences from Brussels (see (e.g.) 130 granted by the Supreme Council in 1656 alone, A R B / C A 204). All the same, Baetens records 330 French prizes in the same period (p. 66). I remain somewhat sceptical about this; and it is certainly difficult to see where the remaining 200-plus came from. See CSPD (1655-6), pp. 299 and 347; Anderson, 'Lists of English Warships', p . 15. D o n J u a n Jose to Philip IV, 10 J u n e 1656, A R B / S E G 2 6 1 , ff. 158-8V.; CSPD (1655-56), p . 553; Pazy MzXiz, Avisos, 11, pp. 2 9 4 - 5 (12 July 1656). O n the Reynard exploit, see also above pp. 1 4 7 - 8 .

221

Quills, keels and cutlasses gold. Certainly, Dunkirk and its sister-ports battened on the plunder, becoming in many respects storehouses of plenty. In 1639, Estebanillo sang the praises of its freebooters as well as its beer. It is only a small town, but great in valour, the terror of Holland and the persecutor of the navies of all our other enemies; [Dunkirk's] invincible boats, the ruin and destruction of the Dutchfleets,on the other hand supply and enrich these provinces.60 But for all this it seems likely that privateering remained a second-best option for a majority of the shipowners, masters and sailors who became involved. Most of them would have preferred peace and trade to the dangerous and destructive profession forced upon them by the conditions of war. Plunder, writes Dr Baetens, in the censorious mode of the economic historian, did not compensate for the losses suffered by trade in general... A desire for short-term gains led the average Dunkirk merchant into military adventures which in the long run did him little good ... The plain fact is that trade and privateering cannot be reconciled ... Of the 18 captains of privateers of whom I have found records, 11 left more than 10,000 guilders ... However, they generally paid for this wealth with their lives. There must have been at least as many rich widows living in Dunkirk as there were rich captains.61 Perhaps the qualification is needed here, that for every man who went out on a voyage of plunder for profit, adventure, or even for the pure love of violence, there must have been another whose course of action was dictated by political realities - the positive desire to serve the Crown, or the negative fact that the obtaining circumstances left him little choice. It seems true nonetheless that relatively few fortunes were made from privateering, at least to an extent commensurate with the risks - both financial and physical - which were involved. Many factors conspired to rob the robber, to frustrate the skippers of their spoils. Once a prize was validated by the Tribunal, sale of all the relevant pillage was to be effected within a fortnight.62 Since foodstuffs with a highly limited consumable lifetime - grain, wine and above all fish - represented a substantial proportion of the cargoes, time was often of the essence. Admiralty staff advertised forthcoming auctions through printed bills and posted placards, giving details of the goods on offer. Furthermore, they were obliged to obtain the maximum possible price in any transaction.63 This was partly intended to guarantee the optimum royal share (important in quality terms from the armada and quantity terms in respect of the particulares) and partly as a guard against 60

61 62 63

Spaddacini and Zachareas, Estebanillo Gonzalez, 11, p . 369. (The author often included such apostrophes as a satirical spoof on the elaborate rhetoric of contemporaries in praise of great cities, but I suspect he was sincere on this occasion.) Baetens, 'An Essay on Dunkirk merchants', pp. 1 3 2 - 3 . Placcart et Ordonnance... 1624, Article X. 'Capitulo de Instruccion de S[u] A[ltissima] de 13 de Abril 1622 . . . ' A R B / C A 245. 222

Prizetaking — plunder of a century peculation. However, these controls must have been frequently counterproductive, inhibiting the quickly-struck private deals which were often the only realistic opportunity for sale. It was the norm for a long period to elapse between the arrival of a prize in harbour and the definitive judgement announced by the Tribunal. Baetens attributes this to graft, since the assessors were paid on a pro rata basis, and had an interest in prolonging the processes.64 Though complaints to this effect did occur, they must be set in context. At times of successful activity, the court's schedules were as crammed as the estuary and wharves outside. The procedures of the Prize Tribunal laid down in the regulations were exhaustive, and, if discharged conscientiously, were bound to entail delay. We must remember that its members were pronouncing on the freedom, livelihoods and property, not only of'rebels', but often of subjects of other sovereign princes who may have been 'innocent' even by the somewhat faint benchmarks of'guilt'. Serious flaws in the process, or blatant misjudgements, could lead to embarrassing and even punitive consequences. In this light, 120 days (or four months), which seems to have been the average time-lapse, does not seem excessive, though one can understand the frustrations of armateurs who were kept waiting for periods which could be of twice that duration.65 Though quick interim sales were sometimes feasible, it is evident from the records that many cargoes spoiled and rotted in the quayside warehouses, or actually in the holds of prize-ships, whilst the legal enquiries went on, and/or before formal disposal could be arranged. Final prices realised by the depositario on foodstuff cargoes, in cases where inordinate delays were experienced, suggest that such waste was not unusual.66 In particular, it is easy to imagine that the stench of unfresh fish must have permeated the atmosphere, forming an ubiquitous (and in some elemental way appropriate) background to the functioning of the prize selling business. Meanwhile, in another part of the field of the Thirty Years' War, both the agencies and the victims of its violent disruptions, soldiers and peasants, were starving within easy reach of Dunkirk. At least commodities successfully marketed at Dunkirk could be assured of safe transport, from a reasonable point of distribution to the Spanish Netherlands, the Rhineland and northern France. In contrast, realisation of profits on the most important single items, the vessels themselves, posed serious difficulties. Having once purchased an ex-prize in Dunkirk, the new owner was posed with the ticklish problem of how to extricate it from the port. In effect, unless sailing could be co-ordinated with departures of royal convoys, affording shelter (at a cost) as far as the open sea, constant blockade made the summer months 64 65

66

Baetens, 'Organization and Effects', p . 5 1 . 'Relation y quenta jurada que yo Luis de Luyando ...', A G S / C M C 1786, no. 9. ( T h e statements in the text are calculated from twenty-five cases in 1627 recorded in this source.) Ibid. (1627-8). T h e entries for 1627-34 in A R B / C A 275 confirm this tendency.

223

Quills, keels and cutlasses prohibitive. Only in the winter, with its reduced or non-existent enemy vigilance, could egress of unprotected craft be regarded as a relatively secure proposition. During the summers, the harbours and roadsteads of the Flemish ports filled up with a large and motley variety of captured vessels, awaiting sale or sail. At times it must have been possible for a ship's boy to clamber from one side of Dunkirk dock to the other without wetting his feet. Although a scheme to amplify the harbour was completed in the early 1620s, the new facilities were rapidly over-subscribed, and it is little wonder that van Langren's projects to further augment harbourage and communication facilities came nearest to fruition in the 1640s.67 In 1641, the young John Evelyn, starting his prototype Grand Tour, Vent by wagon . . . to Dunkirk, the journey being made all on the sea-sands', and found that 'the harbour . . . in two channels coming up to the town . . . was choked with a multitude of prizes'. 68 As Dr Baetens has estimated, as a rule the sale of plunder realised less than half of face value in the auction-rooms.69 The low rates obtaining were partly due to the sheer superfluity of supply in Dunkirk. Despite this, and despite the increased costs and risks of marine insurance caused by privateering, the Dunkirk ship-market continued to provide a focal point of mercantile activity. For many Dutch shipowners, buying at Dunkirk was a less expensive option than commissioning new vessels in their home yards. Foreigners, doubtless including some who themselves had lost property to the privateers, could augment or restore their holdings cheaply at the Dunkirk auctions. The prominent London merchant, Sir William Courtin, had one 450-ton galleon and another - probably afluit - of 180 tons, 'bought at Dunkirk, being by them taken from the Hollanders'. 70 Exasperation could often arise, from political pressures and bureaucratic procedures, operating to frustrate or delay the realisation of dividends. The fact that profit margins were so fine created a permament strain on the Crown's relations with the privateering community. In such circumstances, social incentives, and especially the spur of promotion into the nobility, were at a premium. Honours were due to the main entrepreneurs like van der Walle, Gouvernal, Waecken and Gouvernour, as a fair reward for outstanding service. The Crown's dependence on their ships, not only for commerce-raiding, but in strategic operations where they backed up the armada, was always important. Several armateurs were awarded military titles and decorations, others were 67 68

69 70

See above, pp. 1 3 8 - 9 . W. Bray (ed.), The Diary of John Evelyn, Esq., FRSJrom 1641 to 1705-6 (London, n.d. (?io.oo)), p. 38. Unsold prizes were often broken up for firewood during the winters. Baetens, 'Organization and effects', p . 6 1 . M e m o , signed by Courtin, 3 Sept. 1635, B L / A d d 36448, f. 3 5 . H e was applying direct to Madrid for a licence to trade without interference for ships 'wherein no Hollander, Zealander or Enemy of the King of Spain has any part or interest, [but] being Holland built'.

224

Prizetaking - plunder of a century given the title baron, to put alongside (and suitably to ameliorate) their indubitable status as robbers. As members of the nobility they were expected to place service and loyalty above personal gain - especially by a man of rigid opinions on such matters, like the count-duke of Olivares. A case in point involved the most powerful and respected of all the armateurs. In July 1637, a frigate belonging to Jacques van der Walle put into La Coruna for supplies, during the course of a privateering voyage. Captain Adriaan Barssen found a Spanish convoy destined for Dunkirk - the expedition commanded by Lope de Hoces - had collected in the harbour. The authorities, grateful for the appearance of another front-line warship, ordered Barssen to join the fleet. After feigning co-operation, he weighed anchor and slipped out under cover of night, 'with the co-operation of the Fleming merchants domiciled in that port5. Olivares was outraged, and Philip IV ordered his brother to proceed severly against van der Walle, who was placed under house arrest by the marquis of Fuentes. The prisoner appealed to the Privy Council on the grounds that the skipper's action was not his responsibility, but he was not set at liberty until January 1638.71 The irony was that BarssenJs action, probably inspired by selfishness rather than cowardice, cost his master not only a temporary loss of freedom, but the even more painful loss of a share in one of the greatest prize bonanzas of the era, achieved by Hoces's voyages.72 Despite all public and market limitations on its profitability, the privateering business attracted many investors and workers. The port of Dunkirk had achieved a modest prosperity in the truce years of 1609-21. Its situation gave it good access to market hinterlands both seaward and landward, and it had become an important textile entrepot. The existing industries of the town above all fishing and brewing - also helped to provide the initial capital for investment in privateering in the early 1620s. The population reached 7,000 in 1630, and the municipality was wealthy enough to make contributions to expensive new fortifications, and to the building of barracks for the garrison. In addition, the town fathers often spent the proportion of customs-dues ('octrois') granted by the Crown on improving local commercial facilities, like the canal network. As the strategic importance of the port increased, the town's bargaining position improved, and in 1640 the municipality was able to increase its share of customs dues to two-thirds. When the hotel deville was destroyed by fire in 1643, a splendid new edifice was immediately commissioned to replace it.73 In the long term, however, the town's population growth and prosperity were alike inhibited, both by its topography and by the pressures of defence. Dunkirk 71

72 73

'Plaintes de Jacques van der Walle ...', enclosing copies of marquis of Mancera (viceroy of Galicia) to Philip IV, Philip to D o n Fernando, D o n Fernando to Supreme Council, and van der Walle's own deposition of various dates in 1637—8, A R B / C P 1108. See above, pp. 1 0 4 - 5 . Lemaire, Histoire, pp. 147-52; Baetens, 'An Essay on Dunkirk Merchants', pp. 118-19; A M D , Boit 15 (Ordonnannces du Roi), nos. 12 (1621), 2ibis (1633), 22 (1636) and 23 (1640). 225

Quills, keels and cutlasses was, after all, quite literally built on sand. Other scriptural commandments were comprehensively and systematically defiled by its denizens. In consequence, the evidence of physical danger always palpable in its environs - a state of siege by a vengeful enemy being the norm - must have deterred many from settling long enough to exploit the opportunities offered. It is hardly surprising, and not merely on economic grounds, that Dunkirk did not become another Amsterdam or Venice. The greatest tribute to the economic success of privateering was paid by its victims. By the 1630s, Dutch capital was seeping in, and many an Amsterdam businessman had an each-way bet by holding official licences to trade, and shares in a privateer, at one and the same time. As early as 1629, the Dutch navy captured a Dunkirker commanded and largely crewed by men from the Seven Provinces. As maritime recession began to bite at home, an increasing immigration of Dutch sailors into the Flemish ports was noted.74 The English presence in the peacetime economy of Dunkirk had been strong before 1621, and its whaling industry, for example, had been founded by an English family.75 But, in the new era, English shipowners came to Dunkirk to corsair, preying (amongst others) on their own compatriots, both in 1625-30, and again during the legal chaos of the civil war and Interregnum periods. In the 1640s, Irish raiders operating from Wexford, Waterford and Kinsale frequently took prizes into Dunkirk.76 The nominalist Babel created by the multilinguistic rendering of personal names in legal cases, and prize- and muster-lists, complicates (beyond the unscrambling powers of the present writer) the detailed identification of Dutch, German, Scandinavian and French participation. But no doubt can exist that in the socially mobile environment represented by the North Sea, all these regions contributed both personnel and capital to the enterprise of the Flemish ports, particularly in 1630-50. Corsair captains from every maritime community in western Europe rubbed shoulders on the quaysides of this European precursor of Tortuga. Despite all the qualifications entered above, privateering could be a rewarding enterprise when the tide was flowing in its favour. Of course, growth patterns were unpredictable by normal economic criteria. From the detailed submissions to Madrid of the greffier Penninq in 1635, it seems unlikely that many individual fortunes were being made. Profits were obviously related to investment, so that, assuming a basic inelasticity in the market (i.e., the volume of the commercial target), the only way to increase them was to fit out more privateering ships for sea - also a rather rigidly-structured proposition. Official lists demonstrate that 74 76

75 Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 194. Baetens, 'Essay on Dunkirk Merchants', p. 120. 'Relation de los fragatas de guerra desta villa de Dunquerque que navegan por su Mgd. de la gran Bretana... 30 de Julio [1645]', AGS/E 2523; Ohlmeyer 'Irish Privateers in the Seventeenth Century'.

226

Prizetaking - plunder of a century the number of prizes taken was directly related to the number of armateurs and units involved. The greatest entrepreneurs, like Jacques van der Walle, certainly registered large turnovers. But, having paid their 10 per cent tax to the Admiralty, they were obliged to make over 33 per cent of the residue to the parish churches. From what was left, booty shares, wages and supply of crews, not to mention expensive maintenance and repair costs for the vessels themselves, all had to be found. Although the plunder taken by Jacques' men realised a gross average value of 128,000 escudos each year of 1627-30, his net profits were far more modest. By 1630, when no fewer than twelve new partnerships had been tempted to dip their spoons in the stew, the average gross turnover per firm had been reduced to 25,200 escudos from the 43,600 it had reached in 1629.77 Luyando's lists of 'armateurs' refer to burghers and guilds of the town, members of the local aristocracy and military hierarchy, and a sort of'co-operative' of'the fishermen of Nieuwpoort'. Even the secretary of state and war, Pedro de San Juan - the senior Spanish civil servant in Flanders - applied for a licence to fit out a privateer, claiming to be 'full of anger against the English . . . on account of his wife'.78 In 1629, the private sector of the industry reached the astonishing pre-tax turnover of 680,000 escudos^ more than the entire revenue of many a contemporary European state. In the period 1626-33, the annual average sum of just over 400,000 escudos was realised by the privateers alone.79 Although the sums concerned were dimensionally less, the Crown made a useful income from the armada's plunder and ransom of prisoners.80 The revenue became regular enough to register a part in the enormous complex of gratuities and rewards doled out to royal dependants. In 1641, the widow of Felipe de Porres, one of the Hacienda commissioners of 1628, 'being very ill and in great need', received a pension of 200 ducats a year. The following year, Admiral Joos Pietersen was endowed with a life pension of 600 escudos from this source, with reversion to his heirs.81 Though constantly drawn upon for emergency military expenditure on the spot, even as late as the 1660s it could still provide - perhaps no more nor less reliably than any other of the King's consignaciones - an income for worthy servants. In 1659, for the last campaign of the great war with France, a new Walloon tercio was paid for from the funds raised in the 'presas de la Armada'. Some years later, when the annuity of 3,000 77

78

79

80 81

Calculated from lists for 1627-30 ('Prises faictes par les navires de guerre des particuliers') in A R B / C A 275. Application (from 1625) in A R B / C A 123. T h e reference must be to some offence suffered by the Secretary's wife at English hands, during the war of 1625-30. See Appendix, 13, 1, p . 258. Baetens, ('Organization and Effects', pp. 61-4), estimates average receipts of a million guilders (=florins) per annum between 1626 and the Peace of Minister in 1648. T h e 1630 figure was inflated by the capture of seven Dutch merchantmen (worth 200,000 ducats) by ships of the van der Walle partnership (Israel, The Dutch Republic, p . 195). See Appendix 13, 2 p . o. Coloma to Rozas, 29 Aug. 1641, A G S / E 2056; note by Rozas, 16 Sept. 1642, ibid., GA3205.

227

Quills, keels and cutlasses escudos from this fund, granted to the count of Talava in 1636, was transferred to his wife, it seems unlikely that it brought in anything like the original sum.82 The more privateering prospered, the more - by definition - it reduced opportunities for the normal employment of men and money, thus creating a self-perpetuating cycle which could only be broken by military, and thence political, change. Meanwhile, Dunkirk, Ostend and Nieuwpoort became the only maritime communities in western Europe since the Viking era in which the violent mass-expropriation of others' property was a respectable avocation, co-existing alongside the more traditional aspects of civil and economic life. Like slavery in the American South after the Revolution, privateering was a 'peculiar institution' in the culture of post-Renaissance Europe, yet at the same time, as a symbol of the helium omnium contra omnes, perhaps the most fitting image conceivable of the prolonged internecine European war of which it formed part. 82

Order of marquis of Cara^ena, [May 1659], BL/Add 22503, f. 42; minuta of royal libranza> 15 April 1667, AHN/E 235, f. 6.

228

Epilogue

Decay and transition, 165 8-1668 The fate of the town of Dunkirk appears to symbolise the retreat of Spain from positive influence in the maritime-continental history of western Europe. But as in other aspects of its withdrawal from hegemony, Spain went backwards fighting at every step. In 1658, Dunkirk passed into English hands, thus, exactly a century after the loss of Calais, restoring England's gateway to the continent. The expeditionary force provided the new garrison, and its general, Lockhart, assumed the governorship. After the Restoration, however, the place became an embarrassment for the Stuarts. 1 Spain did not recognise English possession, and Caraqena placed it under quarantine from the landward side. There was violent friction between the occupying troops and the surrounding communities, technically subject to Dunkirk's fiscal privileges, and even between the soldieries of the opposed camps. English presence in Dunkirk helped to justify the clandestine privateering which continued from the other Flemish ports against her shipping - even though peace had been declared and licences officially revoked.2 Lockhart's royalist successor, the Earl of Rutherford, commanded a force of veteran Cromwellian infantrymen, who thus continued to bear arms whilst their comrades at home were disbanded. In the precarious politics of the early Restoration period, its atmosphere heavy with (real and imagined) republican conspiracy, this was regarded as a hostage to fortune. The options were all unpromising. The cost of replacing the existing force with loyal troops was prohibitive, but whilst the New Modellers continued in arms there was always the chance of a mutiny.3 This was exacerbated by the difficulty of supplying the place with pay, food and military materials by sea. Given the limited financial terms within which the executive was forced to operate under the Restoration Settlement, Dunkirk was an urgent liability. Clarendon, Charles IPs chief 1

2

3

For what follows, see Stradling, 'Anglo-Spanish Relations from the Restoration', pp. 58-9 and 71-5. More complete references to material utilised throughout this chapter will also be found here (vol. 11, passim). See also 'Spanish Conspiracy in England, 1661-3', EHR 87 (1972), pp. 269-86. Newsletter of 19 Aug. 1660, PRO/SP94/44, ff. 77-8; Philip to Caraqena, 10 Sept. and 12 Dec. 1660, ARB/SEG 267, ff. 31 and 259. L. Lemaire, Le Rachat de Dunkerque par Louis XIV (1662): Documents inedits (Dunkirk, 1924), 229

Epilogue minister, rapidly recognised this fact, and opened negotiations with France. The sale of the port to Louis XIV, for the sum of nearly £400,000, followed in 1662. There seems little doubt that this was an unpopular move, even at court. The French ambassador, Count d'Estrades, admitted to his master that 'all the world here oppose me, except the King, the duke of York, and the Chancellor'.4 Merchants in the City and the channel ports had hoped that Dunkirk could be developed into a free entrepot for exports to the continent. Others sensed dishonour in the betrayal of a hard-won victory. But many more considered the costs of not controlling Dunkirk, fearing its privateering potential in French hands. Such presentiment was all too justified. Andrew Marvell's virulent couplets, holding Clarendon up to scorn, both captured a prevalent mood and registered a powerful prophecy.5 Dunkirk was the first territorial acquisition of the Sun King's personal rule. It accordingly provided a debut for Louis as publicist for his own greatness and prestige, and he arranged an ostentatious triumphal entry into his new citadel.6 Shortly thereafter, Vauban began the extensive re-fortification of the place assisted by a workforce later alleged to have been of 30,000 men - turning it into both prototype and showpiece of the programme which was to underpin the military greatness of Louis XIV's France. 7 The town was destined to play a full part in that achievement. In the manner to which it had become accustomed, Dunkirk was fully to justify the King's pride, and perhaps even (though less important to Louis) to repay his cash investment. The damage inflicted by the privateers of Dunkirk in the age of the town's most celebrated mariner, Jean Bart, surpassed the standards set in all but the most successful years of Spanish control.8 Especially in England and the United Provinces, the earlier phase of its notoriety was fully eclipsed. During the wars against Louis XIV, the French Dunkirkers were regularly denounced in the English Parliament, as their Spanish predecessors had been in the Estates General. In 1678, one MP asserted: 'we shall never be quiet till Dunkirk be out of [French] hands: in the very mouth of the Thames, a new Algiers set up in Christendom.'9 This reached an apogee in the final years of what might be called 'Dunkirk's century', the 1690s. An all-out privateering campaign was masterminded by Vauban, whose strategic analysis closely echoed the arguments made by the arbitristas del mar many years earlier.10 Indeed, by this time 4

5 6

7 8

9 10

D'Estrades to Louis XIV, 6 Nov. 1662, E. Combe (ed.), The Sale of Dunkirk to the late French King . . . Taken from the Letters ... of Count d'Estrades ... (London, 1728), p. 135. H. M. Margoliouth (ed.), Letters and Poems of Andrew Marvell, (2 vols., London, 1952), 1, p. 137. Louis was so carried away by the occasion that he boarded a ship for the first and only time in his life, (W. E. Brown, The First Bourbon Century in France (London, 1971), p. 152). Waylen, House of Cromwell, p. 257. J. S. Bromley, 'The Importance of Dunkirk Reconsidered, 1688-1713' repr. in Corsairs and Navies, 1660-1760 (London, 1987), pp. 73-101. Quoted by G. M. D. Howat, Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy (London, 1974), p. 103. J. S. Bromley, 'The French Privateering War, 1702-13', Corsairs and Navies, pp. 213-42.

230

Decay and transition, 1658-1668 the crippling expenses of continual warfare, and not least of'conventional5 naval campaigns, had brought France to a position not dissimilar to that of the Spanish System in the early part of the century. Privateering once again posed an alternative to the broadside battles of war-fleets, appalling and ultimately insupportable as the latter were in their wastage of men and materials.11 A joint Anglo-Dutch attack on Vauban's impregnable privateering fortress, launched in 1694, was a hopeless failure.12 During the War of Succession, Dunkirkers captured nearly 1,000 enemy vessels, and the surrender of the port became one of the allies' main objectives. In 1709, as negotiations began at The Hague, Louis was desperate to obtain the support of the English representative, the Duke of Marlborough. He wrote to his envoy: I consent that you should give him afirmassurance that I will pay him two million livres, if through his good offices he can obtain ... the cession of Naples and Sicily for the King my grandson [Philip V of Spain] ... I will raise this gratification to three millions if apart from Naples ... he can ensure that I retain Dunkirk with its harbour and fortifications.13 In this way the small Flemish fishing port of little over a century earlier became the equal in worth of one of the kingdoms of'the two Sicilies', entitled - if in a somewhat subversive manner, and for only a brief moment - to rank beside the puissant seaports of the epoch, Venice, Amsterdam, London and the rest. Certainly we are justified in regarding the Dunkirk created by Spanish naval policy, if not as a new Antwerp, at least as a kind of anti-Antwerp. For throughout the seventeenth century, the so-called 'maritime powers' put as much priority on countering Dunkirk's destructive capacity as the Dutch had ever placed on the destruction of Antwerp's productive centrality in the sixteenth century. In the event, Louis' hopes were only half realised. The settlement of Utrecht (1713) allowed him to retain Dunkirk; but on the condition that its fortifications be demolished, never to be reconstructed by a king of France. Like some modern disarmament agreement, the process was to be carried out under allied supervision. For over six months an English governor once more ruled the town, as its defences were systematically dismantled.14 In subsequent years, the town attempted to revive itself by a reversion to normal commercial activity; in 1713-17, for example, van Langren's dream of a canal-harbour between Mardyck and Dunkirk was at last realised. But Dunkirk was a creature of war. II

'The Loan of French Naval Vessels to Privateering Enterprises, 1688—1713', repr. in ibid., pp. 187-212; see also Braudel, The Mediterranean, 11, p. 869. 12 Waylen, House of Cromwell, p. 260. 13 Louis to Colbert de Torcy, 14 May 1709, quoted by V. Tapie, 'Louis XIV's Methods in Foreign Policy', in R. Hatton (ed.), Louis XIVand Europe (London, 1976), p. 6. The future of Dunkirk dominated the tortuous negotiations which ended the War of Succession; and only the Dutch fear of allowing the place to fall permanently into English hands brought about the final compromise. See O. and P. Ranum (eds.), The Century of LouisXIV'(London, 1973), pp. 453-60. 14 Waylen, House of Cromwell, pp. 259—60. 231

Epilogue To judge by the city fathers' presentation of an elegant sailing dinghy to the infant Louis XV in 1720 - made in order to draw the court's attention to the town's decline as a result of the clauses of Utrecht - peace brought disappointing returns. 15 As late as 1730, when it became known that re-fortification was in progress, a new shanty was heard in the port of London: Speak on, true Britons, down it goes, For Dunkirk's friends are Britain's foes.16 In the European Treaty of 1748, France was once again required to pull down the town's fortifications. In 1793, almost exactly a century after the AngloDutch attack noted above, another failed English expedition against Dunkirk is regarded by one expert as the turning point of the continental war against the French Republic. (It was also an event which gave rise to a more celebrated, if less patriotic, song than the one just quoted.)17 On many occasions and crises before 1940, therefore, the church on the Dunes had been the focal point of European ambitions and apprehensions, and an epicentre of the desperate struggles to which they gave rise. After the final loss of Dunkirk, the Spanish armada of Flanders gradually disappears from the records, until its receding sails can no longer be discerned on the horizon by the keenest eye. The death of its long-serving captaingeneral, the marquis of Leiden, in 1658, came just in time to spare him the experience of Dunkirk's fall. Don Juan Jose's appointment of the incumbent proveedor, Pedro del Vaus, to the vacancy was made partly so that the 1 o per cent share of prizemonies attached to the office might compensate for non-payment of salaries stretching back for years. At this point, as it happened, the autonomous income of the Admiralty was in a healthier state than for some years, provided by the relatively untapped riches of the English merchant marine.18 The exploit of Captain Reynard in May 1656 proved to be the last major engagement of the armada in its indigenous waters.19 Spain's resources and overall strategic position no longer justified the maintenance of a specific Flanders-based armada. On the other hand, there was still a need to ferry troops - if on a much reduced scale - to the army of Flanders, and Madrid continued to accept that no coherent defence of its interests could be conducted without a navy. One of the most prominent arbitristas nominated Spain's failure to maintain its maritime power as second only to the problem of dynastic succes15 16 17

18 19

A model of this vessel is exhibited and described in the Musee Maritime, Paris. Waylen, House of Cromwell, p. 261. M. Duffy, '"A Particular Service": the British Government and the Dunkirk Expedition of 1793', EHR 91, (1976), pp. 529-54. The couplet is, of course, 'The Grand Old Duke of York'. 'Despacho para Governar la Armada Naval...', July 1658, BM/Add. 22503, ff. 39—41. See above, pp. 147-8.

232

Decay and transition, 1658-1668 sion amongst the prevailing ills of the 1660s.20 In the treaty made with Charles Stuart at Cologne in 1656, Philip IV had extracted a promise that, if restored, the former would second twelve warships of the Royal Navy for Spain's use. Faint hopes that this might be consummated perhaps lay behind Caragena's offer of command of the Flanders fleet to Charles's brother, James, duke of York, in early 1660. Both commitments lapsed, however, when the actual Restoration took place a few weeks later - as an event to which Spain had failed to make any meaningful contribution.21 In the years after 1648, several attempts were made to commission the building of warships in Dutch yards. But more often than not, upon completion, they were commandeered by the States for their own use, under the pressures of conflicts with England and Portugal. In 1662, the profits accruing from the farm of the asiento de negros were consigned to the construction of warships in the United Provinces.22 But three years later the galleon Delftland, a warship of seventy guns originally constructed on order from Spain, took part in the battle of Lowestoft.23 Given such indifferent results from this source, orders were still placed with Spanish, Flemish and Italian shipwrights, and occasionally ships were completed, delivered and commissioned - but on such an unreliable basis that little significant improvement in naval establishment was ever effected.24 The last sustained campaign of the armada took place, appropriately enough, against the last rebellion, which ultimately destroyed Spanish Monarchy and world empire alike. During the final terrible decade of the war of Portuguese independence, Philip IV strove to concentrate his energies on the defeat of the Braganza kingdom. From 1659 onwards, Admiral Maes made an annual patrol of Portuguese waters, voyaging on a frequent (if hardly regular) basis between Cadiz and Vigo or La Coruna. The blockade of the rebel coast was intended to be both total and permanent. In theory, Maes' warships acted in conjunction with the main Armada del Mar, sweeping to the North as the other went South, and vice versa. In addition, at least two private squadrons were commissioned to assist in this campaign - one from Denmark and the other from Genoa - and the privateers of northern Spain also joined in.25 20

21

22

23 24

25

'Discurso Hispano Politico sobre el estado Presente de la Monarquia ... Marc,o 1662', [by the Abad Arnolfini], B L / E g . 28455, #• 136-85. V. Barbour, The Earl of Arlington (Washington, 1913), p . 23; Philip to Caraqena, 11 F e b . 1660, A R B / S E G 266, f. 60. Dominguez Ortiz, Politicay Hacienda, pp. 2 2 1 - 2 . It was appropriate that this monopoly of the Portuguese Crown should be used in order to regain it. T h e asentistas, the Genoese partnership of Grillo and Lomelini, also began a programme of shipbuilding for the Crown in Cantabria - see the consultas of the Junta de Armadas in A G S / G A 3366. G. Downing to Sir R. Fanshawe, 18 June 1665, B L / H a r l . 7010, f. 284. As late as 1680, Madrid contracted with two Dutch businessmen for ten new warships to be constructed in Amsterdam, (V. Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century (Chicago, 1963), p . 32). 'Condiciones y Articulos que se asientan con el infraescrito Juan Jorge de Muller . . . ' , 18 F e b . 1663, MN/Vargas 24, ff. 371-3V.; Otero Lana, 'Los Corsarios Espanoles'.

233

Epilogue This effort was made necessary by Charles IPs decision, in 1661, to opt for a marriage alliance with Portugal instead of Spain. The treaty with the Braganzas committed England to a programme of military assistance in exchange for an enormous dowry, territorial concessions and commercial incentives.26 The traffic thus stimulated between London, Lisbon and Tangiers became a legitimate target for Spanish reprisals. By 1663, as the danger to British coastal shipping from the Flemish ports at last receded, almost any longer-range enterprise to the South became subject to a fresh danger, in Biscay or off Finisterre.27 This represented a threat of more than nuisance proportions to English commerce. Despite the protection of a squadron under Sir John Lawson, dozens of English ships fell victim in 1663-4. 28 But the Spanish blockade was not a military success. Philip's warships acted under severe limitations. He dared not risk provoking France, whose merchantmen (or simple flag) could thus be used for convenience by the English shippers on the Lisbon run, and could do little to challenge Dutch contrabandists either.29 When, in 1663, a major Spanish invasion force was routed at the battle of Ameixial, the disaster was blamed on the regiment of English volunteers - the bulk of it comprising Cromwellian veterans, transferred from the Dunkirk garrison - which fought in the van of Portugal's army. Nevertheless, at Philip's insistence, his Council of War immediately re-addressed the task of planning the reconquest of Portugal. They decided that only by joint operations by sea and land - like that managed between Santa Cruz and Alba in the brilliant campaign of 1580 - could success be feasible. In the last year of Philip IV's life, fresh naval preparations were undertaken under the supervision of the Duke of Albuquerque.30 Such a programme was seen as necessary even by Spain's rivals. Early in 1664, Charles IPs secretary of state, Sir Henry Bennet, stated in his instructions to the new English ambassador in Madrid that 'you must always represent to them that the Monarchy of Spain is fallen to a great declination, more especially 26

27

28

29 30

For detailed analysis of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and the international context of its operation, see Stradling, 'Anglo-Spanish relations', pp. 4 8 - 9 8 , passim. In practice, neither the capture of Dunkirk nor the peace proclamation of 1660 prevented losses to Flemish privateers. So successfully did they operate from Ostend, that in 1659 it was rumoured that the English had resorted to the plan of sinking stone-laden hulks in the passages to the port, (Caraqena to del Vaus, 14 Dec. 1659, B L / A d d . 22503, f. 43). In December 1660, Madrid was obliged to repeat its order to Brussels, first made in September, that privateering against England should cease (Philip to Caragena, 10 Sept. and 12 Dec. 1660, A R B / S E G 267, ff. 31 and 259). Duke of York to Lawson, 6 May 1663, P R O / S P 2 9 / 7 3 , f. 37. For the victims, see (e.g.) P R O / S P 9 4 / 4 4 , ff. 3 2 0 - 1 , 323, 326; ibid. 4 5 , ff. 7 - 8 and 14-15; and, from the Spanish side, (e.g.) consultas of the Council of War, 11 April, 30 May, 6, 18 and 23 July, and 3 D e c . 1663, A G S / G A 3436. See minuta de consulta of Council of War, 24 Sept. 1663, ibid. Consulta of Council of State, 16 March 1664, B L / E g . 326, ff. 1 7 1 - 8 1 ; L. Pfandl, Carlos II (Madrid, 1947), pp. 115-17.

234

Decay and transition,

1658-1668

in all maritime strength'.31 However, at this juncture the second Anglo-Dutch war broke out, offering some hope to the Spaniards that the United Provinces might assist, in what was - in maritime terms, at least - virtually an open conflict with England. Indeed, during the second Anglo-Dutch war, collaboration against English interests between Madrid and The Hague fell little short of outright alliance. As early as 1661, de Ruyter's ships had shadowed those of the Earl of Sandwich, when it was feared that the latter had designs on the treasure-fleet. Dutch cover for Spain's reduced naval resources was to become almost the rule in later years. Such was Amsterdam's interest in the contents of the Flotas, that this was regarded as a wise investment as much as a strategic ploy.32 In 1664-5 co-operation increased across the board, and it was reported to London that shipwrights sent from Holland were 'building small frigates in these ports [of Andalusia] to run to sea to plunder' English commerce.33 In September 1664, fazAlmirantazgo was once again constituted in the port of Ostend. Two years earlier, Philip IV had ordered Caragena to take steps to prevent the silting-up of the harbour, 'the most important we now possess in Flanders'. But the governor simply did not command the funds to undertake suitable work.34 Nevertheless, Cara^ena's successor, the marquis of Castel Rodrigo, addressed the task of revival. A new Prize Tribunal was appointed, and revised rules of operation no longer distinguished between royal and private vessels.35 Pedro del Vaus submitted a report on the armada, stating that only four warships were fit for use. Moreover, after carrying Walloon recruits to Galicia (for service on the Portuguese frontier) in 1662, three of these had been retained in Spain. Only the recently-purchased frigate Santa Maria, a vessel of 450-500 tons and thirty-two guns, was stationed in Ostend. Although about twenty staff remained, they had received no pay since May 1661. Tor many years past', complained Don Pedro, 'the subsidy due from Spain has not arrived, which theoretically still stands at the 25,000 escudos a month fixed in the time of the marquis of Fuentes ... We have no other means of supplying our needs than the tenth part [diezmo] which His Majesty takes from the prizemoney of the privateers, and since there is peace with France and England, even this has been reduced to nothing.' 36 Though its proveedor still referred to the 'armada', by this time - as in the 31

32

33 34 35

36

'Instructions to Sir Richard Fanshawe', 24 Jan. 1664, T . Bebington (ed.), The Earl of Arlington's Letters (2 vols., London, 1701), 11, pp. 4 - 5 . For the (limited) Dutch-Spanish rapprochement of the early 1660s, see Israel, The Dutch Republic, PP. 4 3 9 - 4 1 A. King to J. Williamson, 11 Feb. 1665, P R O / S P 9 4 / 4 8 , f. 49. Philip to Carac^ena, 13 April 1662, Cuvelier and Lefevre, Correspondance de la cour, rv, p . 726. 'Reglement Secret pour ceux du Siege de l'Admiraute a Ostende', B R B / i 6 0 2 8 - 3 7 , ff. 4 0 6 - 1 1 (see also ff. 4 1 1 - 1 2 ) ; warrant of Castel Rodrigo, 19 Oct. 1664, B L / A d d . 22503, f. 45. 'Estado del Armada Naval de Flandes', 21 Oct. 1664, A H N / E 107, no. 9 3 . O n e of the absent warships was the San Ignacio, a ship which had been rebuilt for service in 1660, and was to be found a quarter-century later as a rotting hulk in the bay of Cadiz, (see below, n. 53).

235

Epilogue earlier period of 1609-21 - the Flanders warships were more often referred to as a mere 'squadron'. The trend constituted a return to the situation prevailing exactly a century earlier, before Madrid had arrived at the decision to transform itself into a naval power in broad European terms. 37 Philip IV, the monarch who had made the most complete acceptance of that commitment, and during whose rule it was never consciously relinquished, died in September 1665. Even before this event, in maritime as in other aspects of war, Spain had once again become the victim rather than the assailant. Relations with both England and France remained difficult for a generation following Philip's death. The seafarers of both nations were now beginning to exact substantial revenge for the numberless depredations of Dunkirk, above all with the rapid spread of large-scale, organised buccaneering in the Caribbean.38 During a crisis sparked off by Henry Morgan's destruction of Panama City, the Spanish ambassador in London angrily advised Madrid that reply in kind was the only method of influencing the English government. 'I tell Your Majesty [the Queen-Regent, Mariana] that the most effective and least costly way is that of animating the corsairs of Ostend and Biscay. With merely the issue of a few pieces of paper, we can repeat all the damage we did to them in the time of Cromwell.'39 Shortly thereafter, another European conflict broke out, in which Spain, this time overtly, aligned herself with the United Provinces against France and England. French privateers from St Malo and Brest infested Spain's Biscay coasts, where fishing boats dared not put to sea, and no protection was available.40 Despite Molina's pleas, la ronde du course was by now impossible. The condition reached by Spain's maritime resources was desperate - two years later, only the Spanish galley fleet was available to escort the Flota into Cadiz41 and such revenge had become a mere pipe-dream. In 1675, with the Spanish navy preoccupied with the expedition to counter the revolt of Messina, the English Navy Board considered a plan (submitted by a Spanish renegade) to intercept the treasure-fleet.42 Following the further losses of shipping incurred during the Sicilian campaign, Madrid made renewed - but now hopeless attempts to stimulate construction and recruitment of sailors in the Basque lands, 'in order to restore our navy to the flourishing state it once enjoyed'.43 37

38

39 40 41 42

43

See (e.g.) the consultas and other papers of tht Junta de Armadas for 1663, in A G S / G A 3436, passim. As early as 1662, the English freebooter Christopher Myngs had plundered Santiago de Cuba, (C. H . Firth (ed.), ' T h e Capture of Santiago, in Cuba, by Captain Myngs, 1662', EHR 14 (1899), pp. 536-40). O n the growth of Caribbean piracy and its relation to Anglo-Spanish politics, see A. P. Thornton, West-India Policy under the Restoration (Oxford, 1956). Count of Molina to Mariana, 24 July 1671, A G S / E 2546. Duke of Villahermosa to Luis Ferrer, 11 May 1678, B N / 2 4 0 8 , f. 153. Council of War to the marquis of Viso, 10 March 1673, M N / G u i l l e n 2058, f. 89. 'Captain Jenefer's Letter . . . May 29 1675', Magdelene College Library, Cambridge, Pepys Ms.

2873, ff. 2ii-i6v. Royal cedula of Feb. 1677, MN/Vargas 2, ff. 187-9.

236

Decay and transition, 1658—68 A naval presence in the North Sea never entirely disappeared, whilst the duty of defending Spain's Burgundian inheritance continued to be recognised by the descendant of the great dynasty once nurtured by it. But by the 1680s, warships were rare birds of passage, at best regarded (and referred to) as 'the Ostend convoy'. In 1680, ships of the Elector of Brandenburg, in what was perhaps the most notable Prussian naval engagement before Tirpitz, took satisfaction for Madrid's reneging on a debt, by intercepting the Ostend-Cadiz convoy and carrying off two Flemish merchantmen.44 Two years later, with another French war threatening, the governor of the Spanish Netherlands was ordered to utilise 'the convoy ships of Ostend' to privateer against the French. Claiming to have already commissioned some armateurs, he added that he could do no more, since the convoy was still in Cadiz. It finally reached Ostend, but only after suffering a damaging attack by the French privateers of Dunkirk.45 The Admiralty continued to exist in legal terms throughout this period, and was never liquidated, as in 1609. A new captain-general was nominated as late as 1688.46 Perhaps the main reason for official survival was purely institutional giving its officials, and dependants in Madrid, a hope that something owing in respect of a salary or pension might one day be defrayed. But the armada saw only intermittent and desultory service. During the War of Devolution with France (1667-8), Castel Rodrigo commissioned privateers to raid French shipping, and hired some extra vessels for use as warships.47 After the peace with Portugal, in early 1668, had had the effect of untying resources from the peninsular theatre, several others arrived in Ostend with a convoy of reinforcements and silver.48 For two or three years, the Admiralty's treasury was again handling considerable sums. 49 However, not long after the Peace of Aix-laChapelle was imposed, Madrid predictably ordered the return of the squadron to Spain. 50 In order to encourage Madrid to bring the war to an end, the 'Triple Alliance' of England, The United Provinces and Sweden provided compensation in the form of a codicil to the Treaty, in which they guaranteed the Spanish Netherlands against further unprovoked assault by France. 51 Though hardly a positive development in terms of its erstwhile reputation, this at least provided a cushion for the weary bones of the emaciated Spanish System. In any case, the debts of 44 45

46

47 48 49 50 51

Pfandl, Carlos II, pp. 2 2 9 - 3 0 . Marquis of Grana to Carlos II, 23 Feb. 1684, A R B / S E G 287, f. 117; consulta of Council of State, 6 J u n e 1684, A G S / E 3874. Warrant of [? May] 1688, nominating J u a n Antonio Pacheco, fourth marquis of Carralvo, B L / A d d . 9940, f. 123V. 'Conditions pour armer . . . \ 24 D e c . 1667, B R B / 1 6 0 2 8 - 3 7 , f. 412. Gregorio de la Villa to Mariana, Dec. 1668, M N / G u i l l e n 1291, f. n o . Accounts of ihz pagador ]\ia.n Andrea Spinola, 1667—9, A G S / C M C 3483, no. 1. Mariana to Pedro del Vaus, 15 May 1669, B L / A d d . 22503, f. 52. For the involvement of England and T h e United Provinces in the negotiation of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, see Stradling, 'Anglo-Spanish Relations', pp. 2 7 2 - 9 4 .

237

Epilogue the Admiralty were now so great that harbourage costs in Flanders could not be met, and local businessmen were unwilling to supply the squadron with essentials. Accordingly, in the summer of 1669, after Vaus had received a subsidy from Madrid to defray immediate expenses, the squadron left for Spain under its admiral, the marquis of Villafiel.52 This was the last voyage of the once-renowned armada of Flanders, which thereafter dissipated itself in the vast fabric of the Spanish Empire, and disappeared from its official vocabulary. When the body of the Cheshire Cat had vanished - some readers will remember - its smile remained, enigmatically hanging in the air. On this occasion we may interpret the enigma as the outline of a lone, becalmed frigate. A report of 1685 informed Madrid that eighteen warships of xhe Armada del Mar Oceano were anchored in the bay of Cadiz - but only six of them were actually seaworthy. One of the latter was 'the Santo Domingo of Flanders'. 53 52 53

Vaus to Mariana, ? Oct. 1669, BL/Add. 22503, f. 62. Report of Bartolome Gutierrez de Herrera, 10 March 1685, B N / 1 1 0 1 7 , ff. 124-6V.

238

Appendix

i

Routes taken by reinforcements to army of Flanders, 1567—1640 Period

By land

By sea

Total

Percentage by sea

1567-1609 1610-1620 1621-1630 1631-1640

114,420 8,600 7,251 22,892

13,120 4,504 1,500 28,436

127,540 13,104 8,751 51,328

IO'3 344 171 554

1567-1640

153,163

47,56o

200,723

237

From 1635 until the ending of Spain's authority in the Netherlands, troops travelled by the sea-route alone. Source: Parker, Army of Flanders, Appendix 3, pp. 278-9, with figures slightly adjusted by use of additional evidence for 1639-40.

241

Appendix

2

Flanders armada and other naval units - comparative wage rates, 1588-1663 (in escudos) Rank

Year

Holder

Admiral

1599 1621 1627 1650 Vice-Admiral 1599 1633 1588 Captain

Lodosa Ribera Menin J. Maes M. Maes Wilsbusen etal 1599 Willenssen etal 1605 Janssen 1633 1646

First Mate

Commander of Marines Page

1588 1605 Cornelssen 1646

1664 1588 1642 1588 Pilot 1605 1633 1646 Quartermaster 1588 1599 1605 Clerk 1646 Gunner 1588 1605 1642 Able seaman 1588 1599 1605 1633 1642 Cabin Boy 1599 1642

Explication

Monthly Rate Source 60+

2

4

200

5

300 100

10

40 80

10

2

224

II-2-24 168 25

37

1

16 skippers of 'Vlibooten'

2

depending on size of command River Patrol Main Armada Armada de Cantabria Main Armada

3 6 8 9

25 18

depending on size of command depending on size of command depending on size of command depending on size of command River Patrol

1

96

3

8

15 40 16

11

River Patrol Armada de Cantabria Main Armada

1

8

2-2

18

1

8

3 6 8

20

15-20

84 6 6 6 6-8

Main Armada River Patrol Main Armada Armada de Cantabria

1 2

3

8

River Patrol River Patrol Armada de Cantabria

1

28-4

3 7

6-6 46

River Patrol Main Armada

1

2-8

2

2-8-3-2 44 44

3

6 7

1-2

2

3

7 242

River River Main Main River Main

Patrol Patrol Armada Armada Patrol Armada

Comparative wage rates, Sources: 1 Accounts of Toribio Martinez, Dunkirk, May 1588, AGS/CMC 713. 2 Accounts of J. Frans and H. Hillbrand, Antwerp, Sept. and Oct. 1599, ibid., 3258. 3 'Lista de gente de compania' (Antwerp 1605-7), | '^4 Accounts of Pedro de Mendieta, 1621-3, ibid., 879. 5 Junta de Armadas (Madrid, 11 Oct. 1627), ibid., GA3151. 6 Printed Ordenanzas of 1633 (facs. repr., Madrid, 1974). 7 Untitled ms. memo by Antonio Isasi (c. 1642), BN/i 1011, ff. 285-7V. 8 'Relacion de lo que importan las seis pagas de los Capitanes . . . ' , by D. Denoja Castillo (Santander, 2 Dec. 1646), RAH/Sal. 1062, ff. 81-2. 9 Pay-Lists of Officers of the Armada del Mar Oceano, (Cadiz 1636—4), AGM/3092. 10 Junta de Armadas (Madrid, 29 June 1663), AGS/GA 3436. 11 'Forma en que corre el sueldo de la gente de mar y guerra en la Armada' (May 1664), BL/Eg. 326, ff. 176-7.

243

Appendix j Senior officials of the Admiralty ofFlanders, i^8j-i6g6 i. Supreme Council Members

1596

1626

Prize TribunalI

1631 1626

1664

Greffier

J

596 1600 1627-31 1631-46 1646-50 1650-8

Duke of Aerschot (Admiral and President) Antoine de Borgoigne, Count Waecken Fernando de Salinas Charles van Male (Malines) Juan Guerra de la Vega Martin della Faille Pieter Opmeer (fiscal) Ambrogio Spinola (Captain-General and President) Ferdinand de Boischot Juan de Letona Guillaume de Steenhuis Folcart van Achlen Jean Kessler Jacques Claisonne (fiscal in 1638)) Antoine Vedell Duarte Rebello Adrian Carins Thomas Daelmann Philippe Bock ? Antoine Claisonne Francois de Grootef Louis Wassurf Adrian Vereyken Jacques Claisonne Jean Penninq Jacques Claisonne Louis Colbrant

2. Naval Command Captain-General

1598-1609 1622-30 1630-4 1634-41 1641-4 1644-58 1658 1659 1688 Admiral-in-Chief 1586-90 1590-9 1622-6 1626-33 1635-9

Albert, Archduke of Austria Ambrogio Spinola, marquis of los Balbases Francisco de Moncada, marquis of Aytona Fernando, cardinal-infante of Austria Francisco de Melo, marquis of Tordelaguna Guillaume de Berghes, marquis of Leiden Pedro del Vaus y Frias [acting] Luis Carillo de Toledo, marquis of Carac,ena Diego Pacheco y Ossorio, marquis of Cerralvo* Emmanuel, count of Renty Duke of Aerschot Fermin de Lodosa Francisco de Ribera Juan Claros de Guzman, marquis of Fuentes 244

Senior officials of Admiralty,

Other Admirals

i^8j-i6g6

1639—41 1641-4? 1652-63 1663 1669 15 91 1599 1632 1637 1641

Miguel de Horna Joos Pietersen* Anton Meninf Matthias Maes* Marquis of Villaflel Count Waeckenf Heinrich Rolsf Michel Jacobsen* Jacques Colaert* Salvador Rodriguez

1622-8

Vicente de Ancionado Alonso de Uribarri Jean de Gavarelle Alonso de Uribarri Tomas de Aguirre Pedro Vazquez Torrero Vicente de Uribarri {oficial mayor)-\ Juan Ochoa de Ceballos* Francisco de La Masa Juan Guerra de La Vega*

3. Officials Veedor

Praveedor

1628-36 1636-46 1646-7 1647 i647-?65 1664 1696 1583-90 1590 1607—9 a n d

1627-31

Contador

Pagador

Depositario

Tenedor

Hurtuno de Urizar Geronimo de Espinosa* Alonso de Uribarri Miguel de Ugarte Tomas de Aguirre Pedro del Vaus Cristobal de Aguirre Diego de Malvenda Cristobal de Aguirre Diego de Hernani Geronimo Galvan Toribio Martinez 1596-1600 Geronimo Walter Zapata Antonio Vedell 1600-9 Toribio de Bustamente 1631-46 Juan Andrea Spinolaf 1667-9 Diego de Peralta 1600-9 Melchior de Espinosa 1622-7 Luis de Luyando 1627-31 1585-1609 Michel de Fourlaux Pedro Guerra Miers 1622-31

1634 1639 1647 1652 1656-7? 1588 1596-? 1603 ?1603-7 1607-9 1664 1588

* date of appointment t in post at this date 245

Appendix 4 Monthly salaries of Admiralty staff, 15Q0-1670 (in escudos)1 Office /. Supreme Council President Vice-Admiral Councillor Accountant

Greffier Clerk

Date

Amount

1588 1588 1596 1596 1596 1596 1596

600

1622 1640 1607 1627 1600 1607 1640 1607 1622 1664 1622

200

1588 1588

20

300 240

60 20 20 10

2. Officials

Veedor Proveedor Pagador Contador Tenedor Official mayor

Clerk

250 284

2

2IO.4 3 70*

120 5 100

104 6 25 25

8

3. Workshop staff

Foreman Sailmaker Senior Apprentice

12

8 4

Junior Master Carpenter Blacksmith Assistant Executioner

1588 1588 1600

1

12 12

6 6

All figures in sections 1 and 3 and some of those in section 2 are expressed in florins in the original sources. 2 Includes 36 escudos paid in consideration of two clerks, and 104 in rations. 3 Represents the reduction in Urizar's rations in 1627. 4 Estimate based on the officials of the projected Armada deBarlovento in 1601. However, the pagador general of the Ocean Fleet had only 50 escudos in 1641. 5 Includes 30 for two clerks and office materials. 6 Rations only. 246

Appendix 5 Ships of the Flanders armada

Description Tonnage Guns Complement Captain

Date and place

/. 1587/8 - Dunkirk and Nieuwpoort1 El Ciervo Volante Vliboot Vliboot La Maya Vliboot El Cabron de Noruega Vliboot El Tobias Vliboot El Hi jo Prodijo Vliboot La Paloma Blanca Vliboot El Cazador Vliboot Sa. Ana Vliboot S. Alessandro Vliboot S. Nicolas Vliboot S. Cosme Vliboot S. Phelipe Vliboot S. Francisco Vliboot Sa. Catalina Vliboot S.Juan Vliboot S. Pedro Vliboot S. Carlos Vliboot S. Cristobal Vliboot S. Pablo Vliboot S. Agostin 2. 1598-Dunkirk2 S. Rafael S.Juan Bautista La Fee S. Margarita La Conversion El Angel La Fortuna Adrian N. Sra. de la Consolacion Sa. Ursula j.

1587—i66g

32 29

35 38 27 30 22

56 44 33 33 24

35 25 30 24

J. Wilsbusen M. Hermans J. Claessens P. Jaspersen J. de Eclemberg H. Ludemanns J. Gaisberens P. de Rostock F. de Sobrado A. Garcia A. Dirique V. Roux J. Lamedy J. Valensen H. Hopsack F. Lemaitre

34 24 29 15 200

C. Willemsen P. Janssen

P. Itersen

150 92 100 200

140 150 200 100

3

1611 — Lisbon

Santiago S. Alberto S. Felipe Sa. Isabel S. Bartolomeo S. Lorenzo Sa. Margarita S. Andres Sa. Ana

D. de Dulcery A. de Coutho S. Lopez J. Barbon P. de Arango P. de Miranda B. de Noli B. Garcia G. de Pliego

Galeoncete Galeoncete Galeoncete Galeoncete Galeoncete Galeoncete Galeoncete Galeoncete Galeoncete 247

Appendix 5 Date and place 4. 1627/8 - Dunkirk* S. Ambrosio S. Clemente S. Bartolome S. Vicente El Came Rojo S. Miguel S. Carlos S. Andres S. Pedro Sa. Isabel S. Ignacio S. Ildefonso 5. i6jg — La Coruna5 S. Salvador N. Sra. de Monteagudo S.Juan Evangelista S. Francisco S. Bertin S.Joseph S. Vicente S. Carlos Sa. Clara Sa. Ana S. Gedeon S. Sebastian Sa. Catalina S. Lazaro Anon. S. Carlos S. Nicolas S. Miguel S. Pedro S. Antonio Santiago

Description Tonnage Guns Complement Captain

Galleon

M. Jacobsen J. Canum J. Winenbroot F. Rojo F.Jacobsen M. Hubertsen J. Colaert C. Brea M. Claessens J. Pietersen A. Querlinge P. de Valencia

Patache Galleon

Galleon Patache Patache Galleon Patache

Galleon Galleon Galleon Galleon Galleon Galleon Galleon Patache Frigate Frigate Frigate Frigate Frigate Frigate Frigate Fluit Fluit Fluit Fluit Fluit Fluit

520 320 220

490 230 230 230 180 160 160 130 130 140 100

? 320 320 300

340 260 240

248

Ships of the Flanders armada, I$8J—I66Q Description Tonnage Guns Complement Captain

Date and place 6. 1641/2-Cadiz6 N. Sra. de Atocha N. Sra. de la Natividad

S.Juan

Galleon Galleon Galleon Galleon Galleon

Santiago N. Sra. de Estela N. Sra. de Regla S. Domingo S. Miguel S. Francisco S.Joseph 7. 164s - Cadiz7 S. Salvador N. Sra. de la Concepcion Sa. Teresa Sa. Dorotea S. Carlos

Galleon Galleon Frigate Frigate Frigate

550 550

50 50

400 400 400 400 400

32 30 30 30 30

250 250 250

126 128 113 106

92

54 79 90 80

P. Vidal

550 450

40

400

30 32

450

249

P. Garcia

88 87 85

9

Galleon Galleon Frigate Frigate

J. Pietersen S. Rodriguez C. Crenche J. Bamborn J. Simon

550 550

8. 1647 -Mahon, Tarragona and Cadiz8 Galleon N. Sra. de Atocha 550 N. Sra. de la Concepcion Galleon 550 Galleon S. Salvador 550 Galleon N. Sra. de la Natividad 550 Galleon S. Ignacio 550 Frigate 280 Sa. Dorotea Frigate 300 Sa. Teresa 280 Frigate Sa. Barbara Frigate Sa. Irks 150 200 N. Sra. del Buen Suceso Frigate Galeoncete 300 N. Sra. de Monteagudo Frigate 280 N. Sra. de las Virgenes S. Antonio N. Sra. de la Regla 9. 1664 - Ostend and Cadiz S. Salvador S. Ignacio Jesus Maria Sa. Maria

90 90

36

Appendix 5 Date and place

Description Tonnage Guns Complement Captain

10. 1668/9 - Ostend and Spain10 S. Carlos Galleon Galleon S. Pedro de Alcantara Conception de Barcelona Frigate S. Geronimo Frigate S. Domingo Frigate Don Juan de Austria Frigate Santissimo Sacramento Frigate Fuego Castilla Patache

900 900

40

?

p

p

700 440 600 300 150

20

214 168 184 92

20

24 18 18

276 244

p

Sources: 1 Accounts ofpagador Toribio Martinez, Antwerp and Dunkirk, Dec. 1587-May 1588, AGS/CMC 713; F. Riafio Lozano, LosMedios, pp. 233-4. 2 'Cargo que se le hace de baxeles . . . ' , by M. de Fourlaux, Aug. 1598, AGS/CMC 1038. 3 List of nominations, Lisbon, 1 March 1611, AGM 9094/13; 'Inventaire de L'artillerie trouve ... ', by M. de Fourlaux, May 1608, CMC 1038. 4 Prize lists of Luis de Luyando, Dunkirk, 1626-8, AGS/CMC 1786, no. 9; Malo, I, P-3I45 Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 430-1. 6 'Relation de la Armada Real que se a de formar . . . ' , Junta de Armadas, 2 Jan.; consulta of same, 22 Jan.; and 'R[elaci]on de todos los vaxeles que sirben a la Armada . . . ' , with consulta of same, 24 Sept. (all 1642 and AGS/GA 3205). 7 'Relation de los 18 Navios de Guerra y Fuego que se hallan fuera de Carena', April 1645, ibid., 1567. 8 'Relation de la gente de Mar y guerra que ay en los diez Vajeles de la Armada de Flandes . . . ' , 29 Aug.; 'Relation de los Vaxeles de que se compone la Armada del Mar Oceano que paso a Napoles', 13 Aug., ibid., 3258; copy of untitled reladon of Don Juan Jose's expedition to Naples, B.N. 2378, ff. 392V.-3; nominas of captains in AGM 3092, no. 14 (all documents refer to 1647). 9 'Estado del Armada Naval de Flandes', by Pedro del Vaus, 21 Oct. 1664, AHN/E 107, no. 93. 10 'Bageles que componian la Armada Real de Flandes en 1628', MN/Guillen 2213, ff. 54V.-5; Q. Regent (Mariana) to P. del Vaus 15 May 1669, BL/Add 22503, f. 52 (see also f. 62). (The former document is an eighteenth-century copy of an earlier ms. in which the contents strongly indicate a copyist's misdating for '1668'.)

250

Appendix

6

Other naval forces in Spanish Flanders

i. SQUADRONS PATROLLING RHINE AND SCHELDT (1599) Crew

Ship S. Maria S. Pedro Santiago S. Paula S. Felipe S. Antonio S. Andres S. Maria S.Jacques S. Thomas

38 35 21

25 13 52 26 32 30 15

Captain H. Rols H. Blumer L. Joossens A.Jacobsen J.Jacobsen

2. COUNT WAECKEN'S SQUADRON (1627-8) Waecken R. Roelsen G. van Dyck R. Rombouts J. Willemsen H. Hotsen H. Witthoof C. Wittebol C. van Houve J. Visaje

Capitana Sa. Isabel Sa. Clara S. Felipe S. Luis Sa. Eugenia N. Sra. del Socorro S. Fernando Sa. Ana S. Carlos Sources 1. Accounts of 1599, AGS/CMC 3258. 2. Accounts of Luyando, ibid., 1786.

251

Appendix

7

Estimated strength of Flanders armada,

Date

Ships

Men

1588 1598 1600 1609 1622 1627

60 15

3,800 1,000

1588—i66g

Source

21

2,500

30 25 23

3,700

1643 1644

22

2,600

Riano Lozano, Los medios, p. 232 Fourlaux, AGS/CMC 1038 Pollentier, De Admiraliteit, p. 74 AGM/9094/13 AGS/E2312 Luyando AGS/CMC 1786 Malo, Les Corsaires, I, pp. 372-3 Gayangos, Cartas, I, pp. 247-9 Alcala-Zamora, Espana, Flandes, pp. 430-1 Uribarri [1647], AGS/GA 3258 Council of State, 5 April 1644, AGS/E2060

20

2,200

Ibid.

1645 1647 March 1647 A u g1655 1664 1669

18

1,800 1,100 1,800 500

Gayangos, Cartas, vi, 17 Uribarri, AGS/GA 3258

1634 1635 1639 1642

6 11

450 1,000

6

650

10

1,200

11

16 4

6 8

3,000 2,800

950 1,400

Junta de Armadas, 13 and 16 Aug. 1647, ibid.

Menin to Philip IV, 21 Oct. 1655, AGS/GA 3366 AHN/E 107, no. 93 MN/Guillen 2213; BL/Add. 22503

Some figures represent a projection from rather than a strict reproduction of the stated source. The exigencies of the 1588 campaign make it impossible to estimate the numbers of infantry pertaining to the Flanders force. Otherwise all figures in column 3 include a proportion for marine strength. Figures exclude the River Patrol squadrons, and (in the 1620s) the Wacquen squadron.

252

Appendix 8 Various estimates of warship construction costsy 1617—1635

Tonnage Project origin and date Calderon, 16171 Malvenda, 16192 Espanola, 16203 Cadiz, 16204 Anon. 'A', 16235 Anon. 'B', 16236 Arana, 16257 Olivares, 163 5 s

Number of units

Total a

Average

6

i-5

250

20

245

10

4-9 3-o

12

5-2

32 42

12.0 15.8

6

2-7

22

10.0

Cost in Ducats Total Costs Per Unit Per Ton in istyear a 6,230 12,250

25 b

180

5oc

330

300

250

433 375 376

300

450 450

75Od d 9i7 16,700

38

100

120

1,200

a

= in thousands = at launch c = seaworthy d = maintenance only

b

Sources: 1. 'Relacion de el dinero que seria menester . . . ano 1617', MN/Nav. 8, f. 293. 2. * [Papel] de Diego Perez de Malvenda sobre las convenientes del Armada de Flandes', Madrid, 25 June 1619, AGS/E 2034, f. 39. (Copy in BN/18024, ff. 61-9V.). 3. Torres Ramirez, La Armada de Barlovento, p. 30. 4. Untitled official report, 'fecha en Cadiz a 29 de Agosto 1620', BN/18193, ff. 180-1. 5. 'Relacion del gasto que tenia en cada ano una armada de 30 galeones ... se hizo por orden del Consejo de Guerra el ano 623', BPU/71, ff. 97-9V. 6. Minutes of Junta de Armadas, 17 April 1623, BL/Add. 28708, ff. 251-4. Tonnage figures calculated from no. 4, which estimates a maintenance cost of 638 reales (58 ducats) per annum per ton for warships operating for a seven-month campaigning season. 7. Rahn Phillips, Six Galleons, Table 7, p. 234. 8. Olivares' plan for the Armada de Barlovento, Torres Ramirez, p. 39.

253

Appendix g Accounts of the Flanders armada, 1621-1625 (in escudos) 1. Period /, July 1621-March 1623 (21 months) Total disbursement = 595,372 Monthly average = 28,351 2. Period 2, April 1623-Oct. 1625 (31 months) Total disbursement = 591,289

Monthly average = 19,073

3. Annual average expenditure over 4 years and 4 months = 273,866 4. Monthly average over 52 months = 23,722 5. Seven-monthly average in 12 months over 52 months = 39,125 BREAKDOWN OF EXPENDITURE FOR PERIOD 2 Cost

Item Salary of administration Salary of skippers and sailors Rations of above Maintenance materials Contracts for repairs and weapons Expenses of Tenedor, P. de Guerra Expenses of A. Van der Walle Expenses of D. Carlos Coloma Extraordinary costs Miscellaneous costs

20,152

3-5

133,361 67,790

22.6

110,632

18.7

73,595 50,955 43,n8

12.5

8.6

32,992 38,591 591,289

100.00

Total cargo = 16,788,930 (cf. Parker, Army ofFlanders, p. 294) Total datta, Period 1 = 6,681,265 Total datta, Period 2 = 10,097,999 Source:

Accounts of Pedro de Mendieta, 1621-5, AGS/CMC 879.

254

II-5

7-3 34 5-6 6.6

20,103

Total

Percent

Appendix 10 The 'summary relation' of privateering exploits, 1627-1634 Taken Sunk

Armada 1627 1628 1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 1634

Totals

Ransomed /Lost

68 98

15 15

13 15

10

27

38

11

26 19

6

7

4

45 52

55

2

269 217

6 8 1 0 0

Guns

183 188 158 61 IOI 108 135

Guns sunk

35 131 30 30 3i 30 22

Value

168,868 316,674 200,935

Tithe

16,328

29,956 16,578

Lost to Run enemy aground

0 2

4

2,286

0 0 2 1 1

114,072

10

182,432

17,480

394,080 537,o8i 668,029 433,228 570,033

37,3i8

2 1

96,934 203,435 77,390

66

8

i4i,777 24,703

55

1,000

317

1,230,146

7i 50

27 5i

14 16 14

8,320 19,400

7,467 13,737

0 2 0 0

3 0 0 0

Privateers 1627 1628 1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 1634

49 88

17

152

24

196

20 22 21

66 53 55 44

57 167 249 352

5 3

29

187

48

126 40

Totals 1,230

119

416

Combined Totals 1 ,499 336

47i

161 252 145

7

0 0

50,276

6

6

63,098 41,858 52,858 27,397

10

10

5 13 24

3 7 4

14,000

9

1

1,069

166 3,327,315 304,685

70

3i

2,069

483 4,557,46i 418,757

80

36

20

18 40 16 28

302,432 240,000

1. Figures converted to escudos from Brabant florins. 2. No totals appear on the original document. Source:

'Sumaria relacion de la cantidad de presas que se hizieron en corso y dafio de los enemigos Rebeldes por los navios de guerra de la armada naval y escuadra de su magd en estos estados de flandes, y por los particulares desde la ereccion del Tribunal del Almirantazgo en dunquerque cerca elfindel aiio 1626 hasta elfindel ano 1634, en que se veen las presas que entraron en puertos seguros, cada aiio, las que peleando se fueron afondo, las que el enemigo ha recuperado, y se dexaron passar con rancion o rescate, las piecas de artilleria que se hallan, las que se perdieron con las presas echados a pique, y lo que monta el valor, y el decimo de las dichas presas, mas en contra, los navios de guerra que se perdieron y tomaron por el enemigo, y se encallaron en las costas de Francia, Anglatierra, Denamarca, Norvega y otras', ARB/CA 275-

255

Appendix n The prizetaking record,

1621

1626

1631

Armada prizes

1636

1621-1668

1641 1646 Year

1651

Privateer prizes

1656

1661

1666

Total prizes

Sources: Baetens, 'Organisation and Effects'; Stradling, 'The Spanish Dunkirkers'. Some reservations must be expressed concerning Dr Baetens' figures for the years 1656-60. The lists by greffier Colbrant in ARB/CA 275 indicate totals some 30-40 per cent lower.

256

Appendix 12 English prizes and ransoms in 1656 (totalfigureappears in brackets) Period

Prizes

January February March April

0

May June i J u l y - 22 July 23 July - 6 Aug. 7 Aug. - 30 Sept. 1 Oct. - 12 Nov. 13 Nov. -30 Nov. December (Total)

Ransom

(3) 8 (18)

0

7 (12) 16 (22) 3 1 (35)

2

0

11

(4) (5) (4) (14)

3 (5)

Prizes

Burthens*

Comment

0

(3/100) (12/746)

Peace with England

6/404 6/424 12/870 24/1732

8 do) 4 (6) 5 (10) 5 (19)

0

(0)

5/236

1

(4)

0

(2)

1

0

1

(1) (2)

3/800 2/260 2/126 1/40

(3)

(8/548) (13/920) (27/1878) (6/296) (3/800] (4/680) (12/1264) (2/180)

missing one week missing

one week missing

missing

84 (138)

19

(41)

61/4892

Estimated total number of English prize taken Estimated total number of English ransoms Average tonnage per English prize Estimated total tonnage of prize

(86/7412)

over 38 weeks of war

=114 (171) = 26 (52) = 82 (86) =9,348 (14,022)

Converted from the lastes given in source. The figure before the oblique equals the number of prizes where burthen is specified. Source:

Lists ofgreffier Colbrant in ARB/CA 275.

257

Appendix 13 Financial returns from prizetaking 1. PRE-TAX TOTALS FOR THE PRIVATEERS, 1626-33 Year

Amount (in escudos)

1627 1628 1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 Total

373,171 502,596 630,984 418,550 528,576 273,972

174,800

2,902,654

Monthly average = 33,752 Annual average =405,024 Crown 10% tax =290,264 (or 41,466p.a.) 2. ROYAL REVENUE F R O M ARMADA Year

Amount (in escudos)

1627 1628 1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 Total

16,328 29,956 16,578 8,320 19,500 7,466 !3>969 111,844

Source:

'Sumaria Relacion . . . de Febrero 1635 ...', ARB/CA 275 (figures converted from Brabant florins to escudos).

3. RECEIPTS FROM RANSOMS O F PRISONERS, Nov. 1625-Feb. 1627 Place of Imprisonment Dunkirk Winoksberg Bruges Bourboures Fuernes Nieuwpoort Speren St Thomas Totals

Armada 215

286 294 22

8l 190

Privateers 142 272 l8 72 -

Total

357 558 312

94 81 190

332 -

130

332

420

634

2,054

Source:

Lists in ARB/CA 253, figures converted from Brabant florins to escudos.

258

130

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267

Index Aberdeen, 41 Achlen, Folcart van, A244 Adams, John, 192 Admiralty of the Northern Sea [Commercial Board], 52-65, 117, 131, 183, 215 Adriatic, 32, 127 Advice, 148 Aerschot, Philippe-Charles d'Aremberg, duke of, 85, 178, A244 Aerschot, Philippe-Francois d'Aremberg, duke of, 143 Africa, 22 Agreda, Sor Maria de, 133 Aguilar, Francisco de, 11-12 Aguirre, Tomas de, 185—6, 219, A245 Aguirre, Cristobal de, A245 Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of, 237 Alamos de Barrientos, Baltasar, 19, 23-5, 49, 55.96 Alba, Antonio Alvarez de Toledo, 5th duke of, 51 Alba, Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, 3rd duke of, 3-6, 234 Alburquerque, Alonso Fernandez de la Cueva, 8th duke of, 234, N161 Alcala, University of, N180 Alcala-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, J., 77, 107, 159 Alexander, 211 Algarve, 53 Algiers, 23, 133, N90 Alpujarras, 4 Alsace, 77 Ameixial, battle of, 234 America, 17, 26, 55 Amsterdam, 18-19, 59> *59> 235> 233> N143 Ancionado, Antonio de, 183 Ancionado, Vicente de, 34, 69-70, 183-5, 197, 215, 217, A245 Andalusia, 4, 53-4, 129, 235, N90 Antwerp, 4-10, 39, 54, 60, 63, 116, 138, 154, 167, 179, 216, N143, N188, N210; truce of, 15-17, 20, 26-31, 36, 39, 136, 186, 217

Aragon, 49, 122, 201 Arana, Martin de, 165, 170, N31 Arango, Pedro de, A247 Arcos, Rodrigo Ponce de Leon, 4th duke of, 127 Armada of 1588, 8-9, 21, 26, 35, 44-5, 96, 158,161, 166 Armada del Mar Oceano [Main Armada], 9, 53-5. 7°> 93-4, ii5> 126, 158, 196, 233, 238, N15, N42, N91, N123 Armadas, Junta of, 18, 28, 48-9, 53, 91, 114, 155-6, 160, 169, 171 Aroztegui, Antonio de, 28 Aroztegui, Martin de, 27-8, 31, 49, 83, 96 Asia, 22 Asturias, N180 Atlantic Ocean, 5, 19, 53, 71, 78, 80, 85, 119, 124-6, 145, 171-3 Austria, House of [Habsburg] Albert, archduke of, 9-14, 26, 30-3, 86, 174, 177, 190, 196, 208, N159, A244 Ana of, queen of France, 140 Carlos of, infante, 73 Catalina of, infanta, 174 Charles V, emperor, 4-7 Ferdinand II, emperor, 20, 32, 61, 63 Fernando of, cardenal-infante, 73, 85, 91-5, 100-3, IQ6> 108, 118-19, 133, 146, 149, 177, 184-5, 194-5. 2O!> 213-14, 225, N212, A244 Isabel, archduchess of, 30-3, 43-5, 54-5, 57. 59. 63-6, 69-70, 72-8, 82, 85, 149, !53> X55> J 62, 174. i77» J79> 183-4, 191-2, 208, 214-16 Isabel, first queen-consort of Philip IV, 126 Juan Jose of, prince, 127-30, 144, 149-50, 161,195,232 Leopold William, archduke of, 123, 143, 172, 203, 220 Mariana of, second queen-consort of Philip IV, 236 Philip II, king, 3-9, 17, 23-6, 42, 54, 94, 108, 174, 180, 206

268

Index Bristol, 59, 213; Bristol Channel, 213 Brittany, 91 Brochero, Diego, 35, 49, 96 Brown, Robert, 211 Brown, James, 211 Brussels, 15, 30-3, 58, 67, 72, 77, 116, 134, 142,179 Buckingham, George Villiers, 1st duke of, 59 Buen Retiro, palace of the, 80, 159 Burgos, 113 Bustamente, Toribio de, 192-3, A245

Philip III, king, n , 13-14, 19, 25-6, 28, 30-1,38, 159, 187, 196 Philip IV, king, 17, 25, 28, 33, 35-6, 40, 44, 46-51, 53-8, 67, 72, 75, 78-82, 87, 95, 103-9, I I 3 ~ 2 2 , I 2 6-3 J > 135, 138, 143, 145-6, 149, 153-6, 159-61, 171-2, 174-5, 183-5, 189, I9 1 * J 99, 201, 203, 206, 211, 214-15, 220, 225, 233-6 Avila, Baltasar de, 177 Aytona, Francisco de Moncada, 3rd marquis of, 70-2, 78, 81-5, 89, 91-2, 96, N191, A244 Azores, 21, 108 Baetens, R., 216, 221-2, 224 Baker, Richard, 219—20 Baltic, 17-18, 22, 50, 55, 60-4, 71, 76, 82 Bamborn, J., A249 Barbary States, 23, 46, 114, N35 Barbon, J., A247 Barcelona, 27, 128, 144 Barrionuevo, Jeronimo de, 129, 147-8, 221 Barssen, A., 225 Bart, Jean, 230, N88 Basque Provinces, 6, 11, 34, 49, 81, 121, 154, 180, 236, N31 Basse-Meuse, 30 Bayonne, 211 Benavides, Juan de, 101 Bennet, Sir Henry, 234 Bergaigne, Joseph, 113-14, 123 Bergh, Hendrik van den, 85 Bertendona, Martin de, 10, 169, N31 Bethel, Slingsby, 219 Bilbao, 169, 180-1 Biscay, Bay of, 44, 75, 77, 87, 94, 129, 172, 236 Bisthoven, Janssen van, N97 Blake, Robert [Admiral], 128-9, 144, 148, 220 Blake, Robert [Captain], 114 Blumer, H., A251 Bock, Philippe, N195, A244 Bohemia, 16 Boischot, F. de, N179, A244 Bonaventure, 221 Bordeaux, 83, 91, 132, 172 Brabant, 4, 25, 40, 48, 80, 214 Bradnel, Robert, 214 Brandenburg, Frederick-William, Elector of, 237 Brazil, 85, 119, 132 Brea, C , A248 Breda, siege of, 27, 43, 54, 61, 65-6, 68, 200 Bredimus, August, 54 Brest, 236 Brewer, Erasmus, 148

Cadiz, 9, 21-2, 44, 53-6, 59, 101, 106, 118, 122, 125, 128-9, J 42, 154-5, 202-3, 223, 236-8 Calais, 4, 91, 134, 136, 149, 229, N144 Calderon, Rodrigo, marquis of Siete Iglesias, 188-9 Campanella, Tommaso, 54 Canary Islands, 22, 108, 124, n o Cantabria, 18, 49, 81, 114, 180, N90, N233; Armada of, 193 Canum, J., A248 Capella, Pedro de, 197-8 Cap Gris Nez, 78 Caragena, Luis Carrillo de Toledo, 1 st marquis of, 195, 229, 233, 235, A244 Carassa, G. de, N85 Cardenas, Alonso de, 137, 140, 144-5, J 49, 213 Cardoso, Afonso, 201 Cardoso, Diego, 201 Caribbean, 5, 17, 81, 87, 118, 123-4, 128, 197,236 Carins, Adrian, A244 Carnero, Antonio, 97 Cartagena, 154, 196 Castel Rodrigo, Juan de Moura, 3rd marquis of, 235-7 Castel Rodrigo, Manuel de Moura, 2nd marquis of, 121, 138, 143, 156 Castile, 18, 24, 46-7, 55, 65, 67, 94, 105, n o , 114, 117, 120, 122-3; Cortes of, 23, 53, 58, 80; Reformation, Junta of, 51 Castrillo, Carcia de Haro y Avellaneda, 2nd count of, N155 Cat, 221 Catalonia, 81, n o , 113, 116, 119, 122, 125, 128, 133, 143 Cellorigo, Martin Gonzalez de, 21 Cerralvo, Diego Pacheco y Ossorio, marquis of, A244 Ceuta, 22 Charles I, king of England, 35, 41, 59, 84, 91, 109, 114, 135, 137,213

269

Index Charles II, king of England, 141-2, 146, 220, 230, 233-4 Chifflet, Philippe, 69 Chinchon, Diego Fernandez de Cabrera y Bobadilla, 3rd count of, 14 Chinchon, Luis Fernandez de Cabrera, 4th count of, 138 Christian IV, king of Denmark, 211 Ciriza, Juan de, 30 Ciudad Real, Alonso de Idiaquez Button y Mugica, 2nd duke of, 126, N123 Claessens,J., A247 Claessens, M., A248 Claisonne, Antoine, 195, A244 Claisonne, Jacques, 195, A244 Clarendon, Edward Hyde, 1st earl of, 229-30 Coen, Gerard, 97, 100, 105, 159, 171 Colaert, Jacques, 86-7, 97-105, 109-10, 159-60, 170-1, 207, 217-18, A245, A248 Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, 141-2 Colbrant, Louis de, 221, N148, A244 Coloma, Carlos de, 31, 53, 96, 166, 1 9 5 ^ 2 5 4 Coloma, Pedro de, 170 Cologne, Treaty of, 220 Comillas, 130 Conde, Louis de Bourbon, prince of, 127, 139-40, 147, 149, 156, 195 Contreras, Alonso, 210 Corbett, J. S., 9 Cornelssen [Capt.], A242 Cornwall, n Courtin, Sir William, 224 Coutho, A. de, A247 Crenche, C , A249 Cromwell, Oliver, 128-9, I44~5°> 2 I 9 Cuba, 123 Daelman, Thomas, N195, A244 Deal, 84 Deane, 214 Delft, 79 Delftland, 233 De la Cueva y Benavides, Alonso, Cardinal, 33>59>66>7O, 72, 214 Delia Faille, Jean-Christien, 97-8, N116, N139 Delia Faille, Martin, N178, A244 Den Briel, 4 Denmark, 42, 50, 52, 61, 63, 65, 207, 233 Dieppe, 149 Dirque, A., A247 Dominguez Ortiz, A., 125 Douai, 84 Dorp, Admiral, 100 Dover, 82, 134-5

Drake, Sir Francis, 9, 87 Dromedario, 198 Driel, Cornelius van, 217 Dulcery, D., de, A247 Dungeness, 147, 149 Dunes, battle of the, 150 Dunkirk, Prize Tribunal at, 153, 178-83, 192-3, 205-9, 211, 215, 222-3, 235 Dyck, C. van, A251 Echevarria Bacigalupe, M. A., 181 Eclemberg, J. de, A247 Edinburgh, 59 El Carne Rojo, 174 El Cazador, 173 El Ferrol, 83 Enkhuizen, 86 Elizabeth I, queen of England, 11-12, 87 England, 4, 14, 25-6, 35, 42-3, 50, 55, 59, 63-5. 74> 90, 114. 129, 134-5, 139, 141, 168, 205, 212-14, 219-21, 229, 237 English Channel, 4-5, 23, 36, 41, 75, 84, 89, 91, 95, 101-2, 108-9, I 3 I J 209, 213 Enriquez de Villegas, Diego, 130 Esclebeque, Albert de Gourneval, Baron d', 211,224 Espanola, 128, 146 Espinosa, Geronimo de, 184-6, 194, A245 Espinosa, Melchior de, 183-4, A245 Estrades, Godefroy, comte d', 230 Evelyn, John, 224 Execution, Junta of, 96, 99-100, 170 Fajardo, Luis de, 15 Falmouth, 59 Fanshawe, Sir Richard, 234 Fernandez Duro, C , 9, 88 Finance, council of, 32, 51, 66-7, 81, 98-9, 103, 191, 194 Fincham, John, 215 Finisterre, Cape, 119, 234 Firth of Forth, 221 Fisheries Raids, 22, 27, 44-5, 55, 57, 64, 74, 83, 86, 88, 98, 109, 117, 134, 218 Florida, 5 Flanders, 4, 14, 22, 26-30, 34-5, 40-1, 48-52, 54, 60, 63, 66, 77, 115-16, 136, 159; Admiralty of, Supreme Council, 7-11, 15, 177-86, 191-2, 195, 204-8, 211-14 Fraga, 120-1 France, 4, 9, 11, 22, 26, 42, 45-6, 50, 59, 6 4-5> 73-4. 76, 81, 83-4, 86, 89-96, 99-101, 115-16, 127, 144, 209, 213, 230-1 Frederick-Henry of Orange, Statholder, 78

270

Index Fronde, the, 127, 144 Fourlaux, Michel de, 1182, A245 Four Towns [Quatro Villas], 83

Franqueza, Pedro de, 1st count of Villalonga, 187-9 Fuenterrabia, 105, 116 Fuensaldana, Juan Perez de Vivero y Mercado, count of, 144 Fuentes, Juan Claros de Guzman el Bueno, count of, 85, 88-9, 93, 94-5, 99-101, 107-8, 191, 213, 218, 225, 235, A244 Gaisberens, J., A247 Galarreta, Francisco de, 191-3 Galicia, 9, 49, 83, 101, 104, 113, 130, 154, 235,Ni8o Galvan, Geronimo, A245 Garcia, A., A247 Garcia, B., A247 Garcia, P., A249 Gauna, Juan de, 12-13, 22, 28 Gavarelle, Jean de, 92, 109-10, 117-18, 185, 193, N186, A245 Gdansk, 18 Gelves, Diego Pimentel y Portugal, marquis of, 72,93 Genoa, Republic of, 17 Gerbier, Baltasar, 212-13 Germany, 207 Gibraltar, Straits of, 20, 114, 126 Giron, Fernando de, 51 Gomez de Sandoval, G., 197 Gomez Solis, Duarte, 54 Gondomar, Diego de Sarmiento y Acufia, count of, 113 Gonzalez, Estebanillo, 210, 222 Goodwin Sands, 12, 107 Gothenburg, 18 Gouvernour, Jacques le, 116, 224 Granada, 56 Gravelines, 7, 11, 103, 120, 135-6, 143, N139 Greenland, 75 Groote, Francis de, A244 Grotius, Hugo, 206 Guerra de la Vega, Juan, N178, A244-5 Guerra Miers, Pedro, 183-4, A245, A254 Guetana, battle of, 105-6, 133 Guevara, Luis Felipe de, N191 Guipuzcoa, 11, 31, 34, 75, 83, 105, 114, 211, N90 Gustavus Adolphus, king of Sweden, 82 Gutierrez de Bustamente, Toribio, Guyenne, 143, N193 Hamburg, 8, 43, 215 Hambye, E., 88

Hanse Towns, 50, 52, 61, 63, 82, 207 Hatch, Joseph, 212 Haverfordwest, 213 Hejn, Piet, 66, 79 Hermans, Capt., A247 Hernani, Diego de, 180, 186, 188, 193, A245 Hibelsen, 45-6 Hobbes, T., 161 Hoces, Lope de, 100-5, 2O7> 2 I 8 , 225, N90 Holland, 4, 10, 33, 41, 59, n o , 132, 143, 157, 167, 170, 197, N20; Hook of, 3 Holy Roman Empire, 16, 32, 50, 52 Honnecourt, battle of, 135 Hoorn, 166 Hopton, Sir Arthur, 125-6 Hopsack, H., A247 Horna, Miguel, 88, 94, 101, 105—6, 109-10, 117, 134, 207, N173, A245 Hotsen, H., A251 Houve, C. van, A251 Hubertsen, M., A248 Huguenots, 64, 76, 101 Hull, 221 HurstfieldJ., 189 Ibio Calderon, Tomas de, 196-9 Idiaquez, Juan de, 13-4 Indies, council of the, 17, 28, 33, 71, 171 Ireland, 57, 64, 90, 109, 188, 299 Irish Sea, N213 Isasi, Antonio de, 94, 115, 122, N n o Israel, J. I., 83, N197-9 Itersen, P., A247 Italy, 17, 22, 64, 67, 77-8, 127 Jacobsen, A., A251 Jacobsen, F., A248 Jacobsen, J., 217, A251 Jacobsen, M., A245, A248 Jamaica, 128 James I, king of England, 42 Janssen, P., A247 Jaspersen, P., A247 Jerez de la Frontera, 30 Jivaxa, Manuel de, N160 Joossens, L., A251 Kent, 8 Kessler, J., N179, A244 Kinsale, 226 KnottJ., 43 La Conversion, 174

La Coruna, 64, 77, 93-4, i i o - n , n o , 113, 118-9, 171, 181, 225, 133, N172 La Fee, 174

271

Index Laing, William, 41 Lamedy,J., A247 La Marmora, 15 La Masa, Francisco de, A245 La Paloma Blanca 173

Langren, Michel van, 138-9, 224, 231, Ni 16 La Rochelle, 64, 76, 101, 144 Lawson, Sir John, 234 Leganes, Diego Mexia, 1 st marquis of, 60, 68, 122, 156, 157 Leiden, Guillaume de Berghes, marquis of, 120-2, 128, 142-6, 156, 195, 232, A244 Leith, 41 Lemaitre, F., A247 Lens, battle of, Leon, Pedro de, 139 Lepanto, battle of, 4, 21 Lerida, 122-3, 127 Lerma, Francisco Gomez de Sandoval y Rojas, 1st duke of, 24-6, 31, 49, 52, 187-8 Letona, Juan de, N179, A244 Lier, 25 Lierganes, 81 Lisbon, 7, 9, 15, 35, 46, 53, 84, 94, 113, 169, 234, N211 Lixalde, Francisco, 188 Lizard Point, 88 Lodosa, Fermin de, 39, 69, 73, 85, N163, A242, A244 Lockhart, William, 149-50, 229 Lombardy, (see also Milan), 116 London, 11, 18, 53, 59, 74, 100, 109, 128, i35> *37> J4O, 144-5, H7> 212, 221, 134; Tower of, 145 Lopez Pereira, M., 54, N62 Lopez, S., A247 Loriana, Diego Velazquez Mexia de Ovando, 1 st marquis of, 138 Lorraine, duchy of, 90 Los Velez, Pedro Zufiiga y Requesens, 5th marquis of, 125 Louis XIII, king of France, 133 Louis XIV, king of France, 230-1 Louis XV, king of France, 232 Lowestoft, battle of, 233 Ludemanns, H., A247 Luyando, Luis de, 69, 190-2, 217, 227, A245 Luxembourg, 30, 90, 194 Maas, 86 Mackerel, 213

Madrid, 46, 60, 66-7, 89, 104, 142; Alcazar of, 28, 58 Maes, M., 161, 172, 233, A242, A245 Maes,J., A242 Mahan, T., 23

Mahon, 102, 126, 154 Mainwaring, J., 168 Maitens, Pierre, 212 Malaga, 24 Male, Jean-Baptiste van, 74, 212 Malines, Charles van, 15, 158, 192, N178, A244 Malo, H., 169, 171 Malvenda, Diego Perez de, 29-33, J 66, I9°> 196, 198-200, A245 Mansell, William, 12-13 Mantua, war of, 66, 71, 77, 78 Mardyck, 35, 48, 54, 61, 64, 74, 97, 103, 105-6, 134, 138, 150, 231; Mardyck Fort ['New Mardyck'], 36, 42, 57, 107, 139 Maria, 148 Mariana, Juan de, 19, 22-5, 47, 49 Marlbrough, John Churchill, 1st duke of, 231 Martinez, Toribio, A245 Marvell, Andrew, 230 Matanzas, 17, 66, 71, 77, 79, 81, 99, 101, 106, 108, N190 Mauritz, prince of Orange, stadtholder, 42-3 Mazarin, Cardinal Giulio, 127, 140, 144, 149, 219,240 Medinaceli, Juan Luis de la Cerda, 4th duke of, 4-5, 54 Medina-Sidonia, Alonso Perez de Guzman el Bueno, 7th duke of, 35, 44, 54 Medina-Sidonia, Juan Perez de Guzman el Bueno, 8th duke of, 85 Mediterranean, 3-5, 7, 12, 18-19, 28, 49-50, 56, 73, 96, 98, 104, 122, 125-7, 141, 154, 160-1, 171, 173, 202 Melar, Juvoni, 215 Melo, Francisco de, 1 st marquis of Tordelaguna, 120-1, 135, A244 Mendieta, Tomas de, 198-200 Mendoza, Bernadino de, N27 Menendez de Aviles, Pedro, 5-6 Menin, Anton, 160-1, 171, A242, A245, N173 Mexia, Agustin de, 51, 55 Messina, 236 Middelburg, 5-6, 43 Milan, 77 Miranda, Pedro de, A247 Mocenigo, Alvise, 80 Molina, Antonio Mexia y Paz, count of, 236 Moncada, Sancho de, 21 Monterrey, Manuel de Zuniga y Acevedo, 6th count of, 138, 197 Montesclaros, Juan de Mendoza y Manrique, 3rd marquis of, 51, 53 Monzon, Treaty of, 64 Morgan, Henry, 236 272

Index Ottoman, 4, 7, 32, 50, 129

Morocco, 114 Munoz de Escobar, Juan, 67, 91, 190-1, 200-1 Miinster, Treaty of, 142 Morea, [The Peleponnese], 32 Moriscos, 4 Motley, J. L., 3 Murcia, 56 Myngs, Christopher, 236

Panama City, 236 Parker, Geoffrey, 166, 179 Parma, Alessandro, prince of, 7-10, 19, 25-7, i73-4> 177-8, 208 Pasajes, 75, 105 Paz Silveira, Jorge de, 201, 203 Pearson, John, 221 Pembroke, Philip Herbert, 4th earl of, 213 Pefiiscola, 125 Pennington, John, 134 Penninq, Jean, 191, 195, 218, 226, A244 Peralta, Diego de, 10, 216, A245 Perpinan, 127 Pettock, Richard, 221 Philip V, king of Spain, 231 Philippine Islands, 17 Pieters, Nick, 159 Pietersen, Joos, 117-19, 123-6, 155-6, 160, 163, 174-5, 227> A245, A248-9 Pliego, G. de, A247 Poland, 18, 61, 207 Porres, Felipe de, 67, 190, 200-1, 227 Portland Bill, 147 Portugal, 6-7, 17, 21-2, 30, 73, 90, 108, n o , 117, 121, 128, 233-4, 237 President, 148 Providence, 175 Poza, marquis of, N187 Puerto Santa Maria, 54

Naples, 17, 32, 81, 116, 127, 129, 231, N197 Navarre, 49, N180 Necolalde, Juan de, 200, N191 Netherlands, Spanish [see also, Flanders], 3-4,40,52, 54,61,62 Dutch - see United Provinces Newcastle, 167, 221 Nice, 101 Nieuwpoort, 11-14, 33, 48, 61, 72, 122, 139, 142, 212, 227-8 Noli, B. de, A247 North Africa, 18 North Sea, 3, 7, 17-20, 22, 24, 30, 32, 40, 42, 44, 48, 50, 62, 75, 83, 93-7, n o , 127, 129, 131, 147, 169, 206, 210, 213, 219, 226, 237, N5 Nordlingen, battle of, 92, 184, 194 Novoa, Marias de, 140 Nuestra Senora de Atocha, 175 Nuestra Senora de la Conception, 161, 175 Nuestra Senora de la Consolation, 174 Nuestra Senora del Socorro [Wolf], 174 Nuestra Senora de Stella Maris, 87, 159, 170

Querlinge, A., A248

Ochoa de Ceballos, Juan, A245 Olivares, Enrique de Guzman, 2nd count of, 5-6, 14, 49 Olivares, Gaspar de Guzman, count-duke of, 21, 24, 28, 45, 49, 52-61, 64-73, 76-110, 113, 115, 119-20, 127, 131,135, 153, J 55> i57» J59> 162-3, 170-1, 191, 202, 225 Oquendo, Miguel de, 88-9, 102, 106-8, 114—15, 131, 134, 213, N212 Ofiate, Inigo Velez de Guevara, 5 th count of, 100

Opmeer, Lucas, 10 Opmeer, Pieter, 10, 71, N178, A244 Oporto, 85 Oran, N160 Orbitello, 127 Ostend, 7, 12-13, 24> 3°- I > 33> 39> 42> 4$, 50, 57, 61, 63, 72, 74, 78, 93, 122, 133, 139-42, 146-50, 167, 212, 217-18, 228, 236; Admiralty at, 209, 235-7 Osuna, Pedro Tellez Giron, 3rd duke of, 32

Ramirez de Prado, A., 187 Ramirez de Prado, P., 184 Rantzau, Josias, marshal of, N140 Rebello, Duarte, A244 Reformation, N175 Requesens, Luis de, 5 Renty, Emmanuel Filibert, marquis of, 10, 177, 182, A244 Retama, Francisco de, 30, 52, 54, 60 Reynard, Charles, 147-9, 2 2 I > 2 3 2 Rhe, island of, 76 Rhineland, 39, 90 Rhoose, Pierre, 81, 92, Ni91 Riano Lozano, F., 164 Ribera, Francisco de, 70, 73-8, 83, 85, 89, 163, 200, A242, A244 Richaut, Peter, 145 Richelieu, Armand du Plessis, cardinal, 64, 133,158 Rocroi, battle of, 135, 139, 194 Rodriguez, Salvador, 88, 105, 156, 160, 174, 218, A245, A249

273

Index Santiago [1640s], 174, 215-16 Santiago de Cuba, N236 Santiago, Order of, 160-1, 171 Santo Domingo, 238 Santo Domingo de Espanola, 197 Sarassin, Pierre, 140 Sardinia, 201 Savoy, 102 Scheldt, 10, 36, 69, 154, 163, 216 Schoonhooven, 198 Scotland, 25-6, 57, 64, 109 Sea-Beggars, 3-5, 42

Roelsen, R., A251 Rojo, F., A248 Rombouts, R., A251 Rols, Heinrich, A245, A251 Rosas, 125, 127 Rostock, P. de, A247 Rotterdam, 132, 159, 198 Roux, V., A247 Roy, Gabriel de, 61-2, 77, 207 Rozas, Andres de, 160 Rupert of the Rhine, prince, 142 Rutherford, Andrew, lord, 229 Ruyter, Michael de, 235

Sea-Horse, 212

Saavedra y Fajardo, Diego de, 135-6 St Albert, 11 St Hubert, 214 St Malo, 236 St Omer, 33, 214 Salamanca, 90; University of, N180 Salamanca, Miguel de, 108, 115, 118, 185 Salinas, Fernando de, 10, 190, N178, A244 San Alberto, 174 San Carlos, N172 San Alessandro, 174 Sandwich, 11, 212 Sandwich, Edward Montagu, 1st earl of, 235 San Felipe, 13 San Ignacio [1620s], N174 San Ignacio, N235 San Ildefonso, 174 San Juan, Pedro de, 227 San Jorge, N169 San Juan, 85 San Juan Bautista, 174 Sanlucar de Barrameda, N203 San Luis, 35 San Martin, N169 San Phelipe[i 5$8], 174 SanPhelipe [1611], 174 San Rafael, 174 San Salvador, 173 San Sebastian, 41, 45, 46, 56, 77, 87, 172, 211 Santa Catalina, 174 Santa Cruz, Alvaro de Bazan, 1st marquis of, 6,234 Santa Cruz, Alvaro de Bazan, 2nd marquis of, 138,191 Santa Isabel, 174 Santa Margarita, 174 Santa Maria [1492], 174 Santa Maria, [1664], N235 Santander, 5-6, 41, 77, 91, 108, 130, 181, 215, N193 Santa Ursula, 174 Santiago [1620s], 107, 134

Segna, 32 Selden, John, 206 Semple, William, 25-32, 39, 49, 54, 96-7, 166, 197, N62 Semple, Hugo, 25 Setubal, 117 Seville, 18, 34, 52, 54-5, 104, n o , 117 Sherley, Antony, 49-50, 52, 61-2 's-Hertogenbosch, 113 Shetland Islands, 44, 75, 83, 88, 108 Sicily, 18, 127, 231 Silva, F. de, N184 Simon, J., A249 Sluis, 4, 7-8, 133 Smith, J., N168 Sobrado, F. de, A247 Sora, count of, N191 Sound, Danish, 19, 77 Sourdis, Pierre de, 105 Sovereign of the Seas, 148 Spinola, Ambrogio, 1 st marquis of Los Balbases, 14, 31-4, 39, 41-3, 54, 60, 65-75> 156-7. 183, 2 1 5 ^ 2 4 4 Spinola, Bartolome, 191 Spinola, Federigo, n - 1 2 , 19, 167, 186 Spinola, Juan Andrea de, A245 State, Council of[Estado], 12-14, J7> 2 5~6, 28-32, 49-50, 55, 64, 67, 71-2, 78, 91, 99, 120-1, 138, 191, 196, 200; Junta of, 49,64 States-General, 39, 59, 132 Steenhuis, Guillaume de, A244 Sterck, J.-B. [Felipe de Bruselas], 97-8, 202 Stralsund, 76 Struzzi, Alberto, 54, 60, 63 Sueyro, M., 21, 58 Sweden, 237 Tagus, 117 Talava, count of, 228 Tangiers, 234 Tarragona, 125 Tenby, 214

274

Index Tenerife, 129 Thames estuary, 221 The Hague, 100, 133, 172, 231, 235 Thompson, I. A. A., 9, 47 Thurloe, John, 145-6 Toledo, Fadrique de, 49, 53, 76 Tolosa, 34 Tortosa, 122, 211 Tortuga, 226 Toulon, 125 Tromp, Marten Haarpetzoon, 88-9, 107-10, 114, 121, 131, 134-5, 139-40, 221 Tunis, 133 Turenne, Henri de la Tour, viscount of, 149-50 Tuscany, 116, 127 Ugarte, Miguel de, 31, 143, 180, 194, N186, A245 Ukraine, 18 Ulloa, Tomas Lopez de, 69, N191, N198 United Provinces, 16, 18-20, 23, 39, 42, 50, 59, 64-7, 93, 114-15, 127, 131, 136, 140, 158, 162, 168-9, 189, 205-6, 210-11, 226, 230, 233, 235, 237 Uribarri, Alonso de, 69, 120, 122, 156, 171, 180, 183-6, 193, 202, A245 Uribarri, Vincente de, N195, A245 Urizar, Hurtufio de, 14, 26, 29, 33, 70, 166, 169, 180, 184, 188-9, I0-3> 200 > N191, A245 Utrecht, Union of, 25 Utrecht, Treaty of, 231-2 Uzcocks, 32 Val de Olivas, Nicolas, 161 Valencia, 201, N90 Valencia, Pedro de, A248 Valenciennes, battle of, 147 Valensen, J., A247 Valladolid, University of, N180 Valtelline passes, 77 Vauban, Sebastian le Prestre, marshal, 230-1 Vazquez Torrero, Pedro, 185, 219, A245 Vela, Vincente, 124 Velada, Antonio Sancho-Davila, 3rd marquis of, 94, 95, 108, 109, 115, 135, 195, 213 Velada, Juan Sancho-Davila, 2nd marquis of, 13-H Vaus y Frfas, Pedro del, 194-5, 232, 235, 238, N173, A244-5 Vaus y Frfas, Gaspar del, 195 Vedell, Antonio de, 188-9, J93~4> N I 9 I > A244-5

Venice, Republic of, 20, 32, 80, 127 Veraguas, Alvaro de Colon de Portugal, 5 th duke of, N94 Verreyken, Anton, 190, N179, A244 Vidal, P., A249 Vidazabal, Miguel de, 20 Vienna, 70, 116 Vigo, 233 Villafiel, Fernando Carillo y Mufioz de Godoy, 1st marquis of, 238, A245 Villafranca, Pedro de Toledo, 4th marquis of, 5i Villahermosa, Carlos de Borja y Aragon, 7th duke of, 138, 171 Villela, Juan de, 33, 55 Violetta, 43 Vifiaroz, 156 Vincart, J.-A., N62 Visaje, J., A251 Vizcaya, 11, 28, 31, 34, 83, 129, 215, N81 Vlissingen, 4, 8, 212 Waecken, count of, 11, 74, 85, 178, 212, 217, 224, N170, A244-5, A251 Walcheren, 4 Wales, 114 Walle, Adriaan van der, 33, 43, 74, 169, 182, 198-9, 224, 227, A254 Walle, Jacques van der, 171, 224-5, 227> N97, N198 Wallenstein, Albrechtvon, 61-2, 76-7 War, council of[Guerra], 17, 28, 49, 55, 96, 125, 171, 234; Junta of, 122 Warwick, Robert Rich, 2nd earl of, 135 Wassur, Louis, A244 Waterford, 226, N137 West Country, 114 Wexford, 226, N137 Whitemore, Thomas, 43, 215 Willenssen, C , A242, A247, A251 Wilsbusen, J., A242, A247 Windward Squadron, 118-19, 124-5 Winenbroot, J., A248 Winoksberg [Admiralty at], 43, 65, 68, 169, 183-4, 208, 211 Wismar, 76, 82 Wittebol, C A 2 5 1 Witthoof, H , A 2 5 i Wouver, J. van, 36, 54, N97 Wright, Benjamin, 106, 145, N107 Yarmouth, n , 59 York, James Stuart, duke of, 230, 233 Ypres, 162 Zaan, 20

275

Index Zapata, Geronimo Walter, 188, A245 Zaragoza, 118 Zarra, Miguel, 180, 188, 193

Zeeland, 4-6, 33, 41, 43, 58-9, 132, 143 Zubiaur, Pedro de, 9, 23 Zufiiga, Baltasar de, 27-8, 30, 32, 48-50

276

CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN EARLY MODERN HISTORY The Old World and the New* J. H. ELLIOTT The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries Wars* GEOFFREY PARKER Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediteranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century JOHN FRANCIS GUILMARTIN Jr. The State, War and Peace: Spanish Political Thought in the Renaissance 1516-1559 J. A. FERNANDEZ-SANTAMARIA Calvinist Preaching and Iconoclasm in the Netherlands, 1544-1569 PHYLLIS MACK CREW The Kingdom of Valencia in the Seventeenth Century JAMES CASEY Fipoppo Strozzi and the Medici: Favor and Finance in Sixteenth-Century Florence and Rome MELISSA MERIAM BULLARD Rouen during the Wars of Religion PHILIP BENEDICT Neostoicism and the Early Modern State GERHARD OESTREICH The Emperor and his Chancellor: A Study of the Imperial Chancellery under Gattinara JOHN M. HEADLEY The Military Organisation of a Renaissance State: Venice £.1400-1617 M. E. MALLETT and J. R. HALE Prussian Society and the German Order: An Aristocratic Corporation in Crisis f.1410— 1466 MICHAEL BURLEIGH Richelieu and Olivares* J. H. ELLIOTT Society and Religious Toleration in Hamburg 1529-1819 JOACHIM WHALEY Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: Stage Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc* WILLIAM BEIK

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Appendices

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