The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War

This book is the first to highlight the importance of the Baltic region in the approach to war in 1939. Amid the welter of publications on the origins of the Second World War none has sought hitherto to focus on the Baltic region, where peace finally and irrevocably broke down. Central strategic and international issues of the interwar years are thus illuminated from a fresh perspective by a distinguished team of specialists that includes a number of native Baltic historians. The themes discussed by the contributors have recently acquired renewed relevance, as the Baltic republics have asserted their rejection of the incorporation within the Soviet Union following the Nazi—Soviet pact of 1939. The Baltic and the outbreak of the Second World War will make an important contribution to the perennial debate on the immediate causes of the conflict, and should interest specialists in a variety of fields within international relations, modern European and diplomatic history.

THE BALTIC AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

THE BALTIC AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR EDITED BY

JOHN HIDEN AND THOMAS LANE Department of European Studies, University of Bradford

The right of the University of Cambridge to print and sell all manner of books was granted by Henry VIII in 1534. The University has printed and published continuously since 1584.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge New York Port Chester Melbourne Sydney

PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcon 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http ://www. Cambridge. org © Cambridge University Press 1992 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1992 First paperback edition 2002 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress cataloguing in publication data The Baltic and the outbreak of the Second World War/edited by John Hiden and Thomas Lane. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 0 521 40467 3 hardback 1. World War, 1939-1945 - Causes. 2. Baltic States - Foreign relations. 3. World War, 1939-1945 - Diplomatic history. 4. Baltic States — History. I. Hiden, John. II. Lane, Thomas. D754.B35B28 1992 91-10254 940.53'11 -dc20 CIP ISBN 0 521 40467 3 hardback ISBN 0 521 53120 9 paperback

For Juliet and Jean

Contents

Notes on contributors Preface 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 Index

page xi xiii

Introduction: Baltic security problems between the two World Wars John Hiden Great Britain and the Baltic in the last months of peace, March-August 1939 Mieczyslaw Nurek Nazi German policy towards the Baltic states on the eve of the Second World War Rolf Ahmann The role of Danzig in Polish-German relations on the eve of the Second World War Anita Prazmowska Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Finland at the beginning of the Second World War Patrick Salmon The attitude of the Scandinavian countries to Nazi Germany's war preparations and its aggression on Poland Bogdan Koszel The Soviet occupation of Poland through British eyes Thomas Lane The meeting of the Lithuanian Cabinet, 15 June 1940 Alfonsas Eidintas

i 21 50 74 95

124 142 165 174

Motes on contributors

John Hiden is Professor of Modern European History in the Department of European Studies at Bradford University and Director of Bradford University's Baltic Research Unit. He has published widely on Germany in the twentieth century, on international relations, on interwar minority issues and on Baltic problems. His books include, The Weimar Republic (1974), Germany and Europe igig-igjg (1977), Explaining Hitler's Germany (with J. Farquharson 1983), The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik (Cambridge University Press 1987), The Baltic in International Relations between the Wars, edited with A. Loit (Stockholm 1988). Mieczyslaw Nurek is a member of the Historical Institute at the University of Gdansk, Poland. He has written Poland in British Foreign Policy igj6-ig4i (Warsaw, 1983) and on the policy of Great Britain in the Baltic Sea region between 1935 and 1939. RolfAhmann is a Research Fellow at the German Historical Institute in London, a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Associate member of the Royal Institute for International Affairs. He has published on German and Soviet foreign policy and on Poland and the Baltic states. Recent publications include Nichtangriffspakte: Entwicklung und operative Nutzung in Europa ig22-igjg (Nomos, Baden-Baden 1988), Problems of West-European Security igi8-ig^y, edited (forthcoming). Anita Prazmowska is a member of the History Department at Queen Mary College, University of London, and is the author of Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, igjg (Cambridge University Press, 1987), as well as a number of articles on Polish foreign policy. Patrick Salmon is Lecturer in European History at the University of Newcastle and has published widely on British and German foreign policy in the twentieth century as well as on Scandinavia. He has

xii

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

recently completed a book (with John Hiden) on the Baltic States in the twentieth century. Bogdan Koszelis Head of Political Sciences Unit, Institute of Western Studies, Poznari, Poland. He is the author of a book on Scandinavian countries in the policy of the Third Reich, 1933-9. Thomas Lane is Senior Lecturer in History in the Department of European Studies at the University of Bradford and Deputy Director of the Baltic Research Unit. He is author of Solidarity or Survival? American Labor and European Immigrants, 1830—1924 (Greenwood, 1987)

and has recently edited (with John Coutouvidis) The Dark Side of the Moon (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989). Alfonsas Eidintas is Deputy Director of the Institute of History of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences. From 1984 to 1985 he was at the University of Wisconsin at Madison and has published some forty articles in the Soviet Union and in America on the history of independent Lithuania and on Lithuanian emigration. His main books are: Lithuanian Emigration to the Countries of North and South

America, i868-ig4O (Vilnius, 1989), Jonas Sliupas (Kaunas, 1989) and Antanas Smetona (Vilnius, 1990).

Preface

The origins of this book lie in a conference held at the University of Bradford in March 1990 to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War. Originally scheduled for September 1989, the conference was unavoidably delayed, happily with no adverse effects on interest and attendance. The success of the meeting encouraged the editors to believe that the papers might be of interest to a wider audience. We are grateful to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press for concurring with this opinion and agreeing to publish this volume. Five of the following chapters (by Hiden, Prazmowska, Ahmann, Salmon, and Lane) were originally presented as lectures at the Bradford conference. They have subsequently been expanded and revised. Two of the remaining three contributions were to have been conference papers but unavoidable difficulties prevented their authors travelling from Eastern Europe. We are delighted that their papers will now make a belated appearance, also in revised and expanded form. The Bradford conference was organised by the Baltic Research Unit at Bradford University. The unit has developed close relations with academic and government representatives in the three Baltic republics and Poland. The editors have thus been able to draw upon the ideas and discussions currently underway amongst the emerging generation of historians in the Baltic region. The editors wish to thank Richard Fisher of Cambridge University Press for his prompt encouragement of our proposal to publish and his sound advice. We are indebted to Pat Wilson for sterling work at the word processor and to our families for their customary encouragement and forbearance.

Xlll

CHAPTER I

Introduction: Baltic security problems between the two World Wars John Hiden

Historians of international relations between the wars have on the whole been preoccupied with events in London, Paris, Berlin, and Moscow. Few have been long detained by the view from Helsinki and Stockholm, let alone that from Tallinn, Riga, and Kaunas. John Duncan Gregory, of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, relegated the Baltic area to 'the edge of diplomacy' in his memoirs and there it remained until more recent times. 1 It was as if the Baltic republics in particular, like other 'small' powers in South East Europe and East Europe, had an existence which could be measured only in terms of what 'great' powers did to them. As late as 1986 a scholarly study was published with the revealing title: From Competition to Rivalry. The Anglo—German Relationship in the Countries at

the European Periphery} As Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania mark the 50th anniversary of the Soviet takeover in 1940 by insisting on independence talks with Gorbachev's government, the Baltic region can be seen to be anything but peripheral. Nothing illustrates this more effectively than the way in which today's Baltic republics have made the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939 a focal point in their renewed struggle for statehood. In doing so they have prised open cracks in the Soviet constitutional order itself. The year 1990 seems therefore an appropriate time to emphasise the centrality of Baltic issues to the outbreak of the Second World War. Parallels might be drawn with the historiography of the First World War, where it has long been accepted that specific 'local' Balkan problems had a major input into the international equation resulting in the final conflict of 1914. In this spirit the contributors to the present volume focus quite deliberately on the 1 2

J. D. Gregory, On the Edge of Diplomacy. Rambles and Reflections (London, 1928), p. 187. M.-L. Recker, ed., Von der Konkurrenz zur Rivalitdt. Das britisch-deutsche Verhdltnis in den Ldndern der Europdischen Peripherie igig-igjg (Stuttgart, 1986).

2

JOHN HIDEN

Baltic arena, above all though not exclusively in the last years of peace. Their analyses are in turn best appreciated against a broader and longer perspective, highlighting the Baltic region as a whole but concentrating largely on the relatively neglected Baltic states. The strategic importance of the Baltic area over centuries has been all too obvious from the succession of wars fought mainly along its southern shores. By 1914, inevitably, the position of Russia and Germany came to overshadow that of all other powers engaged in securing influence in the Baltic region. Conversely, the collapse of both Germany and Russia as a result of war and revolution in 1917-18 provided an essential, though not sufficient, precondition for the emergence of independent Baltic countries. The pervasive argument that the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were the mere by-product of empires in dissolution overlooks the deep scepticism existing even in the camp of the sympathetic Allied powers, as to the likelihood of the republics long surviving outside Russia. It required immense skill, courage and loss of life for the new Baltic countries to fight their wars of liberation in 1918-19 and to clear their soil of Russians, white and red, as well as the German Freikorps which had assembled in the Baltic states during 1919, ostensibly to defend them from the Red Army. After fighting towards peace with the Soviets in 1920 the Baltic countries had to battle for dejure recognition from the West. Their independence was finally acknowledged in the case of Estonia and Latvia in January 1921 and Lithuania in 1922.3 The long delay had been occasioned by the reluctance of the Western powers to risk upsetting ' the Russia of the future' by accepting independent Baltic states - a reservation with which today's Baltic leaders are only too familiar. In J. D. Gregory's words, the Allies had tried not to discourage the growth of ' nationalistic feeling' in the border states 'without at the same time doing too great violence to the dogma of indivisible Russia'. This reservation declined with the diminishing prospects for a successful Western intervention against the Bolsheviks, which led Gregory to argue: ' In Russia, the social revolution, in the ex-Russian states, the nationalist revolution have... come to stay... Communism and nationalism will both have to trim their sails'. Yet Gregory insisted that the future of the Baltic states and of Russia were inextricably linked: This vast country, from the western boundaries of Poland to the Urals, 3

For detail, M. W. Graham, The Diplomatic Recognition of the Border States (Berkeley, Calif., 1939-40-

Security problems between the two World Wars

3

forms a single economic area, and its future prosperity depends on the recognition of this fact. Eventually, therefore, the component parts of the old Russian empire are bound to come together again, but this time in a strictly limited economic federalism, and decentralised politically to the fullest extent. Economic union, but cultural independence, finding expression in the separate political existence of Sovereign States, affords the best hope for the future, and in so far as we can help forward that solution we shall have made a serious contribution to a comprehensive eastern peace.4 The position of the Baltic countries was further secured by the formal ending of the Polish-Soviet war with the signature of the treaty of Riga in February 1921. Western intervention against the Soviets had become a 'dead letter'. Peaceful co-existence beckoned. Under Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) from April 1921, Baltic leaders contemplated a prospect of renewed trade between east and west across their states. The Baltic area had become economically important to Europe by the time of the Vikings. Later, the Hanseatic League developed a trade system extending from Novgorod in the east to Bruges and London in the west. German commercial influence survived the decline of the Hanse's political power towards the end of the fifteenth century.5 By 1914, the ports of the then Russian Baltic provinces, Estonia, Livonia, and Courland, provided an outlet for no less than a third of European Russia's foreign trade. Riga played a particularly important role as an industrial centre and an entrepot for commerce between Russia and western Europe. As a result of revolution and independence, the Baltic republics embarked on an economic reconstruction in 1920 far more daunting than that facing them today. The huge Russian markets, which they had serviced and for which their industries had been developed, for all practical purposes vanished with the Bolshevik seizure of power. Depredations, assetstripping and evacuations of the labour force by the retreating Tsarist armies during the war left the new Baltic countries in a parlous state. They proclaimed independence with ruined industries, empty coffers and largely agrarian economies.6 There remained the hope that the older rhythms of east-west trade would re-assert 4 5 6

Memorandum by Gregory of 9 April 1920, Documents on British Foreign Policy,firstseries, vol. XI (London, 1961), pp. 352-5. On the Baltic in the early European economy, see D. Kirby, Northern Europe in the Early Modern Period. The Baltic World 1492-1JJ2 (London, New York, 1990), pp. 3-23. A. Blodnieks, The Undefeated Nation (New York, i960), p. 183; I. Romas, Die Wirtschaftliche Struktur der Baltischen Staaten und die Idee einer ^pllunion (Rytas, 1934), pp. 129-30.

4

JOHN HIDEN

themselves in the new era and that the classic role of the Baltic in this flow of commerce would be restored. The Bolshevik revolution of 1917 had after all placed the Baltic peoples at the very interface of capitalism and communism. Latvia and Estonia in particular sought to convince Western entrepreneurs that they could offer a relatively congenial base from which to conduct business with Russia. Indeed, the competition amongst the capitalist powers for penetrating the new Russia gave some cause for the initial optimism about the Baltic states becoming a ' springboard' to the potentially limitless markets in the east, at least until the disappointing outcome of the World Economic Conference at Genoa in the spring of 1922. By then it was plain that the Russian business would not be as profitable or as extensive as expected.7 The Baltic republics never wholly abandoned the hope of expanding trade with the Soviet state but they were compelled during the interwar years to develop their agriculture through specialisation in order to penetrate world markets, above all with quality dairy products and bacon. At the same time new industries were developed for domestic and regional markets. Notwithstanding the severe effects of the world slump in 1929, all three Baltic republics had created economies by the late 1930s which were regarded as viable even by the critical analysts at the Bank of England. 8 Ironically, Soviet trade policy under 'socialism in one country' had therefore ensured a greater degree of westernisation in the border states by pushing them towards the network of western European trade, where Great Britain and Germany above all dominated. 9 It was always problematic for Baltic governments after 1919 to reconcile their wish to become an economic bridge between east and west with their desire to be part of a security system guaranteeing them against renewed aggression either from Germany or the Soviet Union, particularly the latter. Vague proposals for a 'Baltic bloc' were being discussed almost from the day war broke out in 1914. More concrete suggestions date largely from the summer and 7 8

9

Statistics on transit along indicate this. Cf M.-L. Hinkkanen-Lievonen, British Trade and Enterprise in the Baltic States, igig-ig2j (Helsinki, 1984), pp. 278—9. Cf. the report on the general economic situation of Latvia, 19 May 1939, Bank of England archive (BOE), OV118/1; the Export Credits Department felt that Lithuania's position was 'comparatively sound' by late 1937. BOE, Cobbold note of 30 Oct. 1937, OV 119/2. On this, cf. J. W. Hiden, The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik (Cambridge and New York, 1987); M.-L. Hinkkanen-Lievonen; British Trade and Enterprise', H. G. Schroter, Aussenpolitik und Wirtschaftsinteresse. Skandinavien im aussenwirtschaftlichen Kalktil Deutschlands und

Grossbritanniens igi8-jg (Frankfurt, Bern and New York, 1983).

Security problems between the two World Wars autumn of 1917.10 By the end of 1919 discussions for an alliance system, which might include Scandinavia as well as the Baltic states and Poland, were beginning to overlap with plans in the Allied camp for setting up a 'barrier' against Bolshevism. Intervention had manifestly failed to eliminate it. From the outset, therefore, it was unlikely that Baltic bloc projects would keep the region out of international conflicts. That was the goal to which the three Baltic republics at least aspired. An expert in the Auswartiges Amt (German Foreign Office) trenchantly observed: 'The problem of the Baltic, because of the present allocation of its shores and the way in which this came about is closely linked with the Versailles question and the Eastern question. 5l1 The inclusion of Poland in both the Baltic bloc schemes and the French system of east European alliances after the First World War perfectly illustrated the penetration of Baltic security issues by those of Europe as a whole. As to Poland - once more a major Baltic power with the acquisition of the Polish corridor and access to Danzig as a result of the peace settlement - there were serious reservations in Baltic capitals. Poland's aspirations to Baltic hegemony were disturbing. It has even been argued that in the immediate postwar years Poland made a sustained attempt, under Pilsudski's guidance, to divide the Baltic area into spheres of influence with Finland. Finland's relatively free hand in relation to Estonia would be offset by Polish dominance in the affairs of Latvia and Lithuania. 12 The Baltic republics were also worried by the fact that Poland would have to defend not only its disputed Versailles frontiers with Germany but also the territories wrested from Russia during the Polish-Soviet war of 1920. Moreover, Polish-Baltic relations were infected by the hostility of the Lithuanians after the Poles had seized their ancient capital of Vilnius in October 1920. Nevertheless, a Baltic alliance system without Poland would have been scarcely credible. In spite of the Vilnius dispute, the Polish option was therefore kept alive by Latvia and Estonia who, unlike Lithuania, felt able to negotiate directly with the Warsaw Government. In signing the Warsaw Accord with Poland and Finland in March 1922, Tallinn and Riga made it perfectly clear 10 11 12

K. Hovi, Interessensphdren im Baltikum. Finnland im Rahmen der Ostpolitik Polens, igig-ig22 (Helsinki, 1984), pp. 24-36. Film at the Foreign Office Library in London (FO), Auswartiges Amt, Akten betreffend Neutralisierung der Ostsee, vol. 1 (K154/K081379-97). Cf. Hovi, Interessensphdren.

5

6

JOHN HIDEN

that they wished to retain the option of including Lithuania at some future date. 13 Article 7 of the Accord committed its signatories to immediate consultations on joint defence measures in the event of any one of them being attacked; the parties to the Accord also undertook not to conclude any treaty or agreement directed against any of the signatories. The Accord was c considerably more important than one could have anticipated in view of the intimidation of the conference by Russian warnings and threats and in view of the ... strong stand of the Polish right-wing parties against the Baltic union as it is conceived by Pitsudski'. 14 Regrettably, Finland subsequently failed to ratify the Warsaw Accord and it lapsed. Ethnically related to the Estonians, the Finns had been ruled by the Tsars of Russia since 1809 and, like the Baltic republics, had fought their way to independence by defeating the Bolsheviks in 1918. Finland, however, had been given greater autonomy than the Baltic provinces in the former Russian Empire and its right to independence was not seriously doubted by the Allied powers. Its interest in the Baltic alliance projects was tempered by a tendency to look towards Scandinavia rather than the southern Baltic for security. Scandinavian coolness towards the Baltic republics was most marked in the case of Norway. Neither was Denmark politically active, although it played an important economic role in the Baltic immediately after the First World War. 15 Sweden, long since deprived of the Baltic empire which it had won through war in the seventeenth century, briefly considered engaging itself more in Baltic diplomacy. Ultimately, however, it refused to take part in any Baltic-Scandinavian bloc, according only Finland an unwritten special status in its foreign policy. 16 Sweden's chief delegate to the League of Nations, Oesten Unden, privately noted in 1925 that 'the apostles of neutrality will never be numbered among the liberators of mankind'. 17 13 14 15

16

Report by Berndorff, 22 Mar. 1922, FO, Auswartiges Amt, Akten betreffend Aufzeichnungen iiber die auswartige Lage, vol. 1, 3177H/D686179. Berndorff to Berlin, 18 Mar. 1922, FO, Auswartiges Amt, Akten betreffend Aufzeichnungen iiber die auswartige Lage, vol. 1, 3177H/D686179. See B.Jensen, 'Denmark and the Russian question, 1917—24. Private interests, official policy and great power pressure', in A. Loit and J. Hiden, eds., Contact or isolation? Soviet-Western Relations 191J-1941 (forthcoming, Stockholm, 1991). K. Kangeris, 'Die schwedische Baltikumpolitik 1918-1925. Ein Uberblick', in J. Hiden and A. Loit, eds., The Baltic in International Relations Between the Two World Wars (Stockholm,

17

1988), pp. 187-207. L. T. Norman, 'A foreign policy other than the old neutrality - Aspects of Swedish foreign policy after the First World War', in Hiden and Loit, eds., The Baltic in International

Security problems between the two World Wars

7

In distancing themselves from the security arrangements in the southern Baltic, the Scandinavians lessened the prospects for keeping the region free of conflict and by their absence increased the relative importance of Poland in the Baltic alliance discussions. The dispute between Poland and Vilnius continued to trouble virtually every conceivable combination of northern and eastern European states. In 1923 the Estonian-Latvian mutual defence treaty was concluded but not until 1934 did the so-called Baltic Entente of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania come into being. This was so obviously very much less than the original grandiose visions of Baltic security systems had embraced, that the slim historiography of the Baltic bloc is deeply infected by a tone of gloomy determinism. Yet the experience of collaboration was valuable in itself. It had also a number of positive aspects, notably in the economic sphere. From today's perspective the Baltic league appears much more worthy of serious study in its own right for what it can tell us about the interaction between small and large powers. In addition, the military potential of a Baltic bloc has been overlooked. The former Estonian Prime Minister, Jaan Tonisson, once pointed out that a Scandinavian-Baltic bloc would have 'as a union of thirty million people, a certain amount of influence during the negotiations at the Peace Conference'. Even the minimum combination of the three Baltic states constituted a military factor of some significance. Together they could raise an army of over 500,000 men, hardly unimportant during the decade when Germany's armed force was restricted to 100,000. Moreover the Baltic republics could field over one hundred tanks, 400 front-line aircraft, four modern submarines and a considerable range of other weaponry. 18 Had these been combined with Poland, a major military force in its own right, or with Finland and Sweden, both strong by Scandinavian standards, the military power of any Baltic bloc would have been considerable. Some of this was in fact realised. Apart from the Estonian-Latvian military convention of 1923, the Finnish and Estonian military authorities worked together in the early 1930s to rebuild the Tsarist naval batteries on either side of the Gulf of Finland. Foreign

18

Relations, p. 249; cf. L. T. Norman, 'Hjalmar Branting, Nationernas Forbund och naturratten', in B. Huldt and K. Misgeld, eds., Socialdemokratin och Svensk Utrikespolitik. Fran Branting till Palme (Stockholm, 1990), pp. 21-7. E. Anderson, 'The Baltic entente 1914-1940. Its strength and weakness', in Hiden and Loit, eds., The Baltic in International Relations, pp. 81-2.

8

JOHN HIDEN

observers reported that the combined Estonian and Finnish coastal artillery in the Gulf could 6 be a serious menace to the operations of Soviet vessels'.19 Of course, the whole point of Baltic security discussions was to avoid the use of firepower. The best defence of the Baltic countries remained, as ever, to be associated with a European-wide security system. In this respect the Locarno treaties were undoubtedly an important landmark. In the first place they encouraged further reconciliation between the major political ally of the Baltic republics, Great Britain, and the chief economic force in the region, Germany. The latter's domination of Baltic markets was by then wellestablished, but Britain played a leading role as an importer of Baltic agrarian and other products. The triangular trading pattern emerging between Britain, Germany, and the Baltic and Scandinavia drew the Baltic region into the network of most-favoured-nation treaties in western Europe, a process only reversed by the slump. 20 At the same time, the rapprochement between Weimar Germany and western Europe, encouraged under the direction of German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, further reduced the already decidedly slim prospects of any concerted German-Soviet action threatening the border states. Earlier, the signature of the treaty of Rapallo by Germany and the Soviet Union, on 16 April 1922, had been seen as threatening the 'lands between'. This fear had, however, arguably more to do with the sheer novelty of an agreement between a major capitalist power and the world's first communist state than it had to do with realities. The pressure exerted by the Rapallo agreement on the Baltic republics was to force their leadership to accept the growing German-Soviet economic collaboration which the agreement between the two large powers facilitated. Any German threat to the independence of the Baltic states was in fact precluded by Berlin's concern to maintain the pressure on Poland; determinedly friendly relations with the Baltic republics served this purpose, as did German economic penetration of the region. The latter was, moreover, valuable in itself, as well as being supportive of the German element in Latvia and Estonia in particular. As to Lithuania, even more in the German economic orbit than its two Baltic neighbours, the German consul in the formerly German 19 20

M. Turtola, 'Aspects of Finnish-Estonian military relations in the 1920s and 1930s', in Hiden and Loit, eds., The Baltic in International Relations, pp. ioiff. Cf. Hiden, Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik, pp. 1836°.

Security problems between the two World Wars Memel area was reduced to complaining that 'Germany has sacrificed us on the altar of the German—Russian—Lithuanian friendship'. 21 It would be foolish to deny that German Baltic policy indirectly furthered the cause of revising the bitterly disputed German-Polish borders, particularly since Germany continued to refuse to recognise its eastern frontiers under the Locarno treaties. After 1925, however, that revision was, for all practical purposes, pushed into an ever more remote future. Significantly, the Soviet Union was displeased with the Locarno agreements and Moscow's fears about Germany being drawn into the Western fold were not allayed by the German-Soviet treaty of Berlin in 1926, in spite of Stresemann's success in persuading the League of Nations of the need to exempt Germany from any joint international action directed against Russia.22 Moscow, which had not seen the emergence of independent Baltic states as a 'positive development', thus continued to be uneasy about threats real or imagined on its Baltic flank.23 It still refused to sign collective agreements with the Baltic republics, preferring bilateral non-aggression agreements of the sort concluded with Lithuania in 1926.24 If those treaties aimed to keep the border states divided, they nonetheless underpinned the Soviet-Baltic peace treaties of 1920. There was no repetition of the abortive communist coup in Tallinn of December 1924, and the subversive activities of the Communist International (Comintern) increasingly had to yield to the more pragmatic policy line pursued by the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel). As Stalin retreated to grapple with the problems of building 'Socialism in one country' he manifestly failed to take any opportunity for aggression against the border states. No significant threat came from the Soviet Union to Baltic independence during the 1920s. The divergence in German-Soviet policy priorities, the increasingly remote possibility of any individual or concerted threat against the border states from either the Weimar Republic or the Soviet Union, as well as the ongoing rationalisation of economic life in the Baltic republics, were all developments furthered by the Locarno 21 22 23 24

E . A . Plieg, Das Memelland 1929-3) ( W i i r z b u r g , 1962), p . 26. On this, see J. Spenz, Die diplomatische Vorgeschichte des Beitritts Deutschlands zum Volkerbund 1924-6 (Frankfurt, Zurich, 1966). Gf. R. J. Misiunas, 'The role of the Baltic states in Soviet relations with the west during the interwar period', in Hiden and Loit, eds., The Baltic in International Relations, pp. 171, i78ff. R. A h m a n n , Nichtangriffspakte; Entwicklung und operative Nutzung in Europa 1922-1939 (BadenBaden, 1988).

9

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treaties and by the economic reconstruction of Europe stimulated by the Dawes plan for German reparations from 1924 onwards. In that respect, the Baltic area shared in the 'recasting of bourgeois Europe'. 25 Admittedly, Latvian Foreign Minister Albats warned that ' without the pacification of Eastern Europe a western peace pact remains but an insignificant scrap of paper 5 . 26 Certainly, an Eastern Locarno failed to emerge as a result of German and Soviet resistance but many of the conditions which such a pact was supposed to bring about were, as indicated, being achieved without it.27 The early Baltic alliance 'barrier' projects were no longer appropriate after Locarno. The change in priorities was confirmed by the termination of the regular yearly meetings of Baltic foreign ministers after 1925. Insofar as Locarno made war less likely it consolidated the status quo in the Baltic. After Stresemann's death his successor, Curtius, could say with considerable justice to his Estonian counterpart in 1931, that Germany had tried to encourage the independence of the Baltic states, ' since we were hardly keen to see them becoming dependent on Russia or joining a Polish-led bloc'. 28 The Baltic states were of course no more able to avoid the harsh impact of the depression after 1929 than the other European powers, although the effects were slightly delayed. By the time that Curtius was professing sympathy to Estonia the economic blizzard was arriving in the Baltic republics. Anticipating problems, the Bank of Latvia, for example, began to restrict credit sharply in March 1931 and insisted on payment of its loans to Latvia's commercial banks. The position of these worsened dramatically after the failure of Germany's Darmstadter Bank. More seriously, when the United Kingdom left the gold standard in the autumn of 1931, the currency value of sterling prices paid for Baltic butter, timber, flax and bacon was reduced, at one stage by a proportion of 30 percent. The situation was worsened when Germany raised its own tariff barriers to protect German agriculture. For the first time Latvian exports, which had risen progressively in the 1920s, fell. Foreign currency receipts declined and those from customs duties did the same. The 25 26

27 28

G. S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilisation in France\ Germany and Italy in the Decade after World War One (Princeton, 1975). H . I. Rodgers, Search for Security: A Study in Baltic Diplomacy ig20-igj4 ( H a m d e n , Connecticut, i975)> P- 48. Gf. V . Holtje, Die Weimarer Republik unddas Ostlocarno Problem, igig-igj4 (Wiirzburg, 1958). Cited b y Hiden, The Baltic States and Weimar Ostpolitik p. 189.

Security problems between the two World Wars economic structure of the state, with some 78 percent of the population employed in agriculture, mostly as small-holders, meant that tax returns were also too low to generate recovery. Financial analysts observed a vicious circle, where the Baltic republics could either hold out for an improvement in world trade conditions and a return to the gold standard or face the plunge and allow the Latvian currency to follow the Scandinavian ones and adopt a sterling basis. 'The latter course may be fatal 3, a Bank of England report noted, ' but the chances of the former course being ultimately fatal seem certainly not less3.29 In short, after having seen the considerable advantages of being part of the world market, the Baltic republics became only too well aware of the disadvantages. Harsh policies were needed for the Baltic countries to recover the relatively favourable economic situation which the Bank of England detected later in the 1930s. What made the situation more serious was the political rift opening between the Baltic and Scandinavian region's two major economic partners, Great Britain and Germany, with the coming to power of Adolf Hitler. The tacit three-way UK-German-Baltic trade partnership which had served the border states well enough in the tfiid- 1920s could not be expected to last. Both Britain and Germany reacted to the world economic crisis by seeking to consolidate their respective spheres of influence. The Baltic and Scandinavia became an obvious source of contention between the two major industrial powers. Britain's abandonment of the gold standard, together with the introduction of tariffs and the establishment of imperial preference at the Ottawa conference in 1932, heralded a new trade offensive. Britain sought bilateral trade treaties which would produce an increase in British exports. In many respects the politicisation of British trade policy belatedly followed the much more forceful German line which had been so successful in opening up East European markets in the 1920s. Ashton-Gwatkin, first secretary at the Foreign Office, observed: The fulcrum of our economic lever is the British import market. For so many years this consideration was voluntarily abandoned owing to our free trade policy; but with the change in that policy the whole situation 29

BOE, OV 118/1, 12.2.1933, Knatchbull-Hugesson to Sir John Simon, enclosing memorandum by Mr Scott: 'Memorandum respecting the economic situation of Latvia'.

11

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JOHN HIDEN

changes, and the close connection between diplomacy and economics is at once revealed.30 Put more bluntly, those countries which sold more to Britain than they bought from it would now be pressured to remedy this imbalance. Into this category came the Baltic states and Scandinavia. A British financier observed: ' Today hard facts and economic pressure have brought home to the government and people of Lithuania that if they sell to us, they must buy from us'. 31 No longer would the Baltic republics have the chance to use their sterling receipts to buy German goods. As it transpired, by 1936 the share of the UK's goods in Lithuania's total imports had grown from about 8 per cent to 37 percent.32 The treaties which Britain concluded with the Baltic republics in 1934 broke new ground by circumventing the general most-favoured-nation basis on which trade had hitherto been conducted and imposing instead quota agreements. The Baltic countries were expected to buy minimum quantities of specified goods. These purchase agreements covered a lengthy and varied list of products. In addition there were tariff reductions on an enormous range of products. 33 Behind the new treaties, it has been argued, lay a profound shift in Britain's world view. The sphere of economic and financial influence which Britain was seeking to consolidate in northern Europe had political implications of the first order in the conditions of the 1930s.34 Laurence Collier, the head of the Northern Department at the Foreign Office and Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, head of the newly created Economic Relations Section, felt that there was an unprecedented opportunity for Britain to establish its influence 'over those countries which are now being injured and antagonized by the policy of our principal competitor Germany'. AshtonGwatkin went so far as to say in 1935 that the agreements with Scandinavia and the Baltic had 'developed into something like an 30

31 32 33 34

Cited by H. Schroter, Aussenpolitik und Wirtschqftsinteresse. Skandinavien im aussenwirtschaftlichen Kalhiil Deutschlands und Grossbritanniens 1918-1939 (Frankfurt, Bern and N e w York, 1983), P-75 Report by Sir James Cooper on Lithuania, 27 October 1933, BOE, OV n 9/1 Lithuania. Note by Loynes, 8 M a y 1936, B O E , O V 119/2 Lithuania. Details of the concessions obtained in the Baltic trade treaties can be found in P R O Cabinet Papers, CAB 2 4 / 2 4 9 , nos. 112, 167. In general, see P. Salmon's analysis for the 1930s, ' A n g l o - G e r m a n commercial rivalry in the Depression Era: the political and economic impact o n Scandinavia 1931-1939', in M.-L. Recker, ed., Von der Konkurrenz etc., pp. 101-41.

Security problems between the two World Wars imprecise and pacific alliance over the whole political, financial, commercial and cultural field. The United Kingdom has called the Baltic into existence to rectify the lack of equilibrium elsewhere'. 35 Taking the 1930s as a whole, it is true to say that because of British policy the Germans never managed to establish such an effective grip on Scandinavian and Baltic trade as they did on that of the Balkan countries. The tenacity with which men like Collier and Ashton-Gwatkin defended Britain's economic presence in the Baltic region on political as well as on commercial grounds was not, however, accompanied by any formal British commitment to defend the border states in the event of aggression. For many historians this has been, understandably, more significant than the all too clear evidence of the British financial and commercial stake in the region. The latter is, however, another reminder that Britain's aversion to committing itself to the defence of the east European states before 1939 can hardly be equated with lack of interest, a point which is best made from a brief overview. Britain had been a major architect of the postwar settlement in north eastern Europe. In the words of Harold Nicolson: Our emotions centred less around the old than around the new... [There was] a fervent aspiration to create and fortify the new nations whom we regarded, with maternal instinct, as the justification for our sufferings and of our victory. The Paris Conference will never be properly understood unless this emotional impulse is emphasised at every stage.36

Britain's naval presence in the Baltic at key moments of the war of liberation and the central role of British officials in helping to settle the frontiers of the Baltic republics and Poland in 1919-23, indicated to some that, at the time, ' Britain ran the Baltic. ' 37 From the perspective of the Baltic, even the much discussed conflict between French and British policy over the question of a 'barrier' policy in east Europe during the 1920s can be qualified. It is true that British policy was not as persistent on this issue as that of France. Moreover France's concern with a barrier had more to do with its fear of Germany's recovery than with any threat from 35 36 37

Sir John Simon to Runciman, 7 March 1933 (drafted by Ashton-Gwatkin), PRO, FO 371/17212, N1141/1/63. H . Nicolson, Peacemaking igig ( L o n d o n , 1964), p . 33. Cf. the evidence in E. Anderson, 'An undeclared naval war. The British—Soviet naval struggle in the Baltic, 1918-1920', Journal of Central European Affairs, 22, no. 3 (1962).

13

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JOHN HIDEN 38

Bolshevik Russia. The latter preoccupied British policy-makers. At the Foreign Office Esmond Ovey explicitly remarked that he was going against conventional wisdom in questioning the utility of'an anti-Bolshevik group of young and relatively vigorous states in the Baltic'. 39 British policy, too, countered any attempts on the part of the Soviet Government after 1919 to raise the issue of a neutral Baltic, reflecting the UK's continuing awareness of the strategic importance of the region as a whole, particularly after the abortive communist putsch in Tallinn at the end of 1924. The British desire for stability in the Baltic area, notwithstanding its early scepticism about the small states long enduring outside Russia, was most evident in the remarkably persistent Foreign Office efforts to solve the Polish-Lithuanian quarrel within the framework of a federation.40 British sympathies were on the whole with Lithuania rather than Poland, whose actions over Vilnius London continued to deplore. Yet Permanent Under-Secretary Sir Eyre Crowe expressed Britain's general support for the postwar order by observing that it was in Britain's interest 'to maintain Poland and keep her strong'. 41 When the Lithuanians enterprisingly sought to exploit what were felt to be UK-French differences on the Polish-Lithuanian quarrel, they were left in no doubt that the British government saw ' eye to eye with the French government and that there was not the slightest chance of a divergence of views on fundamentals \ 4 2 By the end of the 1920s, Britain's increasingly strained relationship with the Soviet Union tended to heighten its awareness of the strategic value of the ring of independent border states. By that time, too, earlier assumptions about the inability of the Baltic republics to manage their economic affairs outside the framework of a renewed Russia had been weakened. In 1925, after a visit to Poland and the Baltic countries, R. W. Leeper, of the Northern Department of the Foreign 38

Cf. K. Hovi, ' T h e French alliance policy 1917-1927: A change of mentality', in J. Hiden and A. Loit, eds., Disruption and Continuity: Soviet—Western Relations 1917-1940 (forthcoming

39 40

Stockholm, 1991). Memorandum by Esmond Ovey, 'Finland and its future foreign policy', P R O , F O 371/6776. Cf. Foreign Minister Lord Curzon's remark: ' It seems quite certain that no satisfactory settlement will ever be reached between the Poles and the Lithuanians themselves: a settlement must be imposed on them'. P R O , F O 371/5373, N 3 2 6 / 5 / 5 9 ; cf. H. I. Nelson, Land and Power. British and Allied Policy on Germany's Frontiers, 1916-1919 (London, Toronto

41 42

1968), p. 64. Note of Sir Eyre Crowe, 16 October 1920, P R O , F O / 3 7 1 / 5 4 0 1 , N 5 4 1 / 2 7 2 / 5 5 . Gregory, 'Record of an interview with three leading Lithuanians', February 1921, P R O ,

FO 371/6726, N2686/533/59.

Security problems between the two World Wars Office, argued that the Baltic states did not expect political or military guarantees from Britain 'but the quiet assurance that England at any rate considers that these countries are sufficiently stable for her own economic expansion in them'. 43 The change of emphasis in British commercial policy in the 1930s indicates that Leeper's desiderata had been achieved. Unless the larger general record of British activity in the Baltic throughout the 1920s is taken into account, it is difficult to do full justice to London's mounting concern with the region as a whole in the 1930s. British policy began to give the Baltic a higher profile after 1933 by visits of key politicians, with Eden himself going in 1934. Moreover, if the extraordinary range of Britain's prewar commitments is kept in mind, it is remarkable that Finland and the Baltic countries figured in the priority list of twenty countries for British arms exports drawn up in 1937. Finland, eleventh on the list, was followed by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 44 By then, alas, the UK-German co-existence in the Baltic, which had helped to foster a complacency in London about strategic issues in the area, no longer existed. The UK-German Naval agreement of 1935 tacitly acknowledged the obstacles to intervention in the Baltic by the British fleet. The strategic imbalance, however, made it all the more important, to the Foreign Office at least, that Britain's commercial policy was brought into play to check Germany's influence in Scandinavia and the Baltic republics. Rolf Ahmann is correct in attaching so much importance to the years 1938-9 in his analysis of German policy in the Baltic region. Regarding the interwar years as a whole, however, the significant point is that Hitler's very coming to power destroyed the foundations on which the Baltic policy of the Weimar Republic had been based. The most-favoured-nation trade treaties underpinning Weimar trade policy came under violent attack during the depression from powerful forces in Germany favouring protection. Clearing agreements were used by Germany from as early as 1931, initially in response to the banking crisis of that year. Bartering goods, rather than paying for them with increasingly scarce reserves of foreign currency, enabled Hitler's advisers, notably Hjalmar Schacht, to 43 44

Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP), ist series, vol. X X V , pp. 8 5 0 - 8 . O n Britain's stretched resources, cf. M . Howard, The continental commitment. The dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of two World Wars (London, 1972).

15

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JOHN HIDEN

build the foundations of Germany's 'informal empire' in the east. 45 After Schacht's New Plan of 1934, Germany used clearings to intensify its economic grip on the largely agrarian states of south eastern and north eastern Europe, forcing them to take German manufactured goods, including armaments, in exchange for raw materials and foodstuffs. In some respects, of course, the smaller powers profited for a while from the prices Germany was able to 'pay' through blocked accounts at the Reichsbank and the national banks of the countries concerned. The trouble was that in the long run the eastern states were increasingly forced to buy the products which Germany was prepared to sell. Through clearings, which Ashton-Gwatkin and others argued in vain at the Board of Trade and the Treasury should be adopted by Britain too, Germany secured an automatic link between exports and imports. Although less successful in north eastern Europe than in the Balkans, because of the British bilateral trade agreements with the Baltic republics and Scandinavia, the German version of a Grosswirtschaftsraum was both oppressive and threatening. 46 Both British and German economic policy therefore aimed at attaching the Baltic countries to their respective economic spheres of influence. Only Hitler threatened their existence. Hitler's obsession with the idea of securing Germany's continental base by dismembering Russia boded ill for the Baltic countries in the long term. These, along with the Ukraine, were marked out by Hitler as ideal areas for colonisation. 'What the Mediterranean sea is to Italy', Hitler wrote in 1928, 'the eastern coast of the Baltic sea is to Germany'. 47 Germany's preparations for war-readiness envisaged the Reich profiting in the event of blockade by the West from the raw materials and foodstuffs of the Baltic. Estonia's oil shale production became increasingly attractive to the Reich. 48 The Reich Office for Reconstruction concluded in a study on the eve of war that the combination of Greater Germany and Italy, with Spain and the Balkan states as potential allies, would not itself be able to meet all 45 46 47 48

Cf. H . J. Schroder, 'Siidosteuropa als "Informal E m p i r e " Deutschlands, 1933-9. D a s Beispiel Jugoslawien', Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, 23 (1975), p p . 7 2 - 3 . Gf. in general, P. Salmon, ' A n g l o - G e r m a n commercial rivalry e t c ' ; see also J. Freymond, Le Hie Reich et la reorganisation economique de VEurope, 1940-2 (Leiden, 1974). Hitlers £weites Buck. Ein Dokument aus dem Jahre 1928, G. L. Weinberg, ed., (Stuttgart, 1961), p. 206 H.-E. Volkmann, 'Oekonomie und Machtpolitik. Lettland und Estland im politischokonomischen Kalkttl des Dritten Reiches, 1933-40', Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 2 (1976), p. 473-

Security problems between the two World Wars the economic needs of war: 'The attachment of the northern region (including the Baltic states) is indispensable for the Grosswirtschaftsraum'}* To these economic considerations can be added Germany's strategic needs, neatly encapsulated in the reflections of a former head of the Reichswehr, General Hans von Seeckt, in 1920: 'Maintaining the sea access to Sweden is a matter of importance for Germany, that to Russia can be a question of survival'. 50 Seeckt's views had been formed on the assumption of good working relations between Germany and the Soviet Union which, against all expectations, were to be realised once more in 1939. At first, however, the Soviets continued to disbelieve that the border states would remain outside any hostile anti-Bolshevik coalition. Germany's growing economic power in the Baltic after 1933, together with the slow spread of pro-National Socialist sentiments amongst substantial sections of the German element in Estonia and Latvia, provided more than enough for the Soviet Government to be concerned with during the 1930s. Their anxieties about the German—Polish non-aggression treaty of 1934 prompted the Soviets to suggest a joint German—Soviet guarantee of the Baltic states. The Fiihrer would have none of this. He desired above all a freedom of movement in his policies towards eastern Europe. 51 The Soviet leadership was no more successful in flirting with the French, whose foreign minister Barthou advanced a plan for an Eastern Locarno in 1934. In providing for 'mutual assistance' the Barthou proposal carried with it the risk that Soviet troops would enter Baltic territory. This the Baltic states were not prepared to contemplate, least of all in the year which witnessed, at last, the formation of the Baltic entente in September, between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The entente could not of course stop any of the great powers militarily. Nevertheless, with its own manpower and armaments and linked in as it was politically and economically to British and Scandinavian resources, it should not be dismissed lightly, particularly since at that time National Socialist Germany was not prepared to confront even Poland militarily (let alone France) and the Soviet Union was embarking on a road leading through the purges to a decimation of the Red Army's High Command. To the 'might-have-beens' about Czechoslovakia, had it been allowed to 49 50 51

Cited in p . 4 9 3 H a n s v o n Seeckt, Deutschland zwischen West und Ost (Leipzig, 1920), p p . 8 - 9 . Cf. Documents on German Foreign Policy (DGFP), series c, vol. II, p . 684.

17

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use its military power in 1938, should be added those about the Baltic bloc. It is not easy to agree with the argument that 'whatever these countries did or failed to do was ultimately immaterial 5 . 52 On the contrary, the Baltic countries, Estonia and Latvia in particular because of their common border with the Soviet Union, held the centre stage, strategically speaking, by 1939. The UK-French guarantees to Poland after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939, followed by Hitler's order on 2 April nonetheless to prepare for the invasion of Poland, ensured that the question of peace or war in Europe would now be decided in the Baltic. Because of their naval facilities, the Baltic countries were seen as of critical importance to the defence of Leningrad. Even if the Baltic countries were kept neutral, the front along which Hitler could launch any aggression would be reduced. The Soviet Union had renewed its non-aggression treaties with the Baltic states in 1934. Behind the subsequent Soviet warnings about the Baltic republics becoming the agents of fascist powers was a longstanding determination that the Red Army should avoid at all costs having to meet an invasion on Russian soil.53 Viewed from Moscow, the rightward shift in Baltic domestic politics after 1934 also fuelled alarm about international intrigues in the region and about the ' indirect aggression' with which the Soviets were so preoccupied in their talks with Britain and France in the summer of 1939. Moscow was able to intensify pressure precisely because the West needed Soviet support to create an effective barrier to deter Hitler from attacking Poland. Without this, the UK-French guarantees to Poland were hardly operable. Equally, it had become vital to Hitler to prevent the Soviet forces from making use of Baltic territory in the conflict pending between Poland and the Reich. This was also why Hitler compelled Estonia and Latvia to sign non-aggression pacts in June 193954 'Due to the non-aggression pacts we have concluded... no agreement can be signed by the Baltic states and the 52

53 54

A. Dallinn, ' T h e Baltic states between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia', in V . S. Vardys and R. J. Misiunas, eds., The Baltic States in Peace and War, igiy-ig^ (University Park and London, 1978), p. 107. Cf. S. Mylliniemi, Die baltische Krise 1938-1941 (Stuttgart, 1979), p. 18. R. Ahmann, ' T h e German treaties with Estonia and Latvia of 7 June 1939. Bargaining ploy or an alternative for German-Soviet understanding?', Journal of Baltic Studies, 20 (1989), pp. 344-5.

Security problems between the two World Wars

19

Soviet Union which would automatically involve intervention by the Soviet Union'. 55 Both Germany and the Soviet Union acted until the last moment as if they were primarily concerned with exploiting Baltic footholds against each other. Yet the impasse in the Allied-Soviet talks on the one hand and, on the other, Hitler's mounting anxiety to keep to his military timetable for the attack on Poland, dictated alternative strategies. The British Government in particular continued to reject the Soviet case for being able to move troops into the Baltic countries to meet an anticipated attack from Hitler's Germany. In this respect London remained true to the 'unspoken assumptions' guiding Britain's Baltic policy since 1919. Its contribution to Baltic independence over twenty years had been considerable, although it had never promised direct military support, and its early doubts about the viability of the small republics had dwindled to insignificance. Collier and Ashton-Gwatkin felt that the Baltic states appreciated Britain's efforts to make sure that they were not simply left at the mercy of the Russians during the talks in Moscow. They therefore welcomed the expenditure of British Council funds to convince the Baltic republics of Britain's continuing interest: 'The fact is that if we get the Russian treaty we shall have to pay for it in the Baltic states, an expenditure of money to attenuate the ill effects of the treaty will be more than justified'. 56 The Russian treaty did not materialise for Britain and France, with results which are all too well-known. The objections raised by Britain's negotiators in Moscow in the summer of 1939 ultimately meant that 'the Baltic question ended any hope of a strong British-Soviet front against Hitler'. 57 The absence of such a front was all the more regrettable in the light of the belated British—Soviet alliance from 1941. Yet, in the context of the interwar period as a whole, Stalin's readiness to exploit the situation in 1939 and finally to yield to the increasingly pressing offers from Hitler remains unsurprising. The final phase in the German-Soviet covert exchanges culminating in the signature of the German-Soviet non-aggression treaty was marked by the suggestion of Foreign Minister von 55 56 57

Cited in H . Armumae, At the Crossroads. The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Estonia in 1933-1939 (Tallinn, 1983), p . 118. Draft of a memorandum, PRO, FO 371/23654, N1764/64/63. D. M. Crowe Jr., 'Great Britain and the Baltic States, 1938-39', in V. S. Vardys and R. J. Misiunas, eds., The Baltic States in Peace and War 1917-1945 (Pennsylvania, London, 1978), p. 118.

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Ribbentrop on 18 August 1939, that Germany was now ready to accept a protocol regulating among other things 'the settlement of spheres of interest in the Baltic area'. 58 By the time von Ribbentrop went to Moscow for the signature of an agreement, the Soviets insisted that the line separating the German-Soviet spheres of influence should be drawn further south, so that Estonia and Latvia came under Moscow's control, bringing the USSR's strategic frontier 200 miles further west. A secret supplementary protocol was attached to the German-Soviet nonaggression treaty when it was signed on 23 August, leaving Lithuania in the German sphere until the second secret protocol of 28 September 1939 also brought it, with half of Poland, into the Soviet orbit. The forthcoming volume of Khruschev memoirs, based on hitherto missing tape-recorded comments, confirms the immense strategic importance attached by the Soviets to the Baltic countries in 1939. Reflecting on the free hand towards Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bessarabia, and Finland which Germany policy had so unexpectedly given to the Soviets, Khruschev observed: All this was very much to our advantage. I want to acknowledge this straightforwardly. The access we gained to the Baltic sea significantly improved our strategic situation because it deprived the Western powers of a foothold that they might have used against us in the future. We'd been looking down the barrel of our enemy's gun, and Hitler had given us a chance to get out of the way. That was our justification for the pact, and it's still the way I see it today.59 From the vantage point of 1990, however, the 1939 agreements can be seen to have brought no lasting advantage to either Germany or the Soviet Union. This had of course long been clear in the case of the former. The latter, too, is now reaping the rewards of its cynical indifference to the independent Baltic republics on the eve of the Second World War. 58 59

DGFP, series c, vol. V I , pp. 121-3. Khruschev remembers: The Glasnost tapes, cited in Time (1 October 1990), p. 44.

CHAPTER 2

Great Britain and the Baltic in the last months of peace, March—August Mieczyslaw Nurek

If the breaking of the Munich Treaty by Hitler in March 1939 meant the failure of Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy, then the basic problem that emerges is whether the failure of the Munich policy changed anything and, if so, why it meant a change of British policy in the Baltic Sea region. This problem is the major concern of this chapter. The last months of the existence of Versailles Europe were extremely difficult for British diplomacy. During this period the diplomacy of the United Kingdom was forced more than ever to undertake efforts to secure the highest interests of the state. These were described in an extract from a Foreign Office memorandum of 1926: 'We have all we want - and maybe even more. Our only goal is to maintain what we have and to live in peace.' 1 The basic aim of British policy therefore remained the desire to maintain the integrity of the metropolis and the Empire. Thus British interests concerning the Baltic Sea region were determined by its level of importance for the achievement of the goal expressed in the memorandum of 1926. From the beginning of the twenties until spring 1939 the Baltic Sea region was not a focus of British Government activity. In trying to determine the basis of the relations between Great Britain and the Baltic region in that period it is necessary to consider mainly the economic sphere.2 The claim that the problems of the Baltic Sea P. Wandycz. 'Appeasement, Bezpieczeristwo, Niepodieglosc' Tygodnik Powszechny, no. 38 (1986). For penetrating analyses of commercial problems see: M.-L. Hinkkanen-Lievonen, 'Britain as Germany's commercial rival in Baltic States 1919-1939'. Von Der Konkurrenz Zur Rivalitat. Herausgegeben von Marie-Luise Recker. Supplement 16 (Stuttgart, 1986), pp. 15-49; P. Salmon, 'The Anglo-German relationship in the countries at the periphery, 1919-1939'. Von Der Konkurrenz Zur

Rivalitat.

Herausgegeben von Marie-Luise Recker. Supplement 16

(Stuttgart, 1986), pp. 101-41. See also: J. Hiden, 'From war to peace: Britain, Germany and the Baltic States, 1918—1921', vol. 19, no. 4 (winter 1988), pp. 371-82. This study 21

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were beyond the sphere of interest of British foreign policy would be an oversimplification, yet in this area of activity the British Government was limiting its involvement to developments stemming from its membership of the League of Nations. It also has to be noted that London appreciated any sign that confirmed the prestige of Great Britain in the countries of that region. On the other hand, it cannot be maintained that the British Government gave many occasions for Scandinavia, the Baltic countries, and Poland to acknowledge that prestige with clear conviction. One of the negative examples of British diplomacy (from the point of view of the Baltic countries), which weakened the authority of Great Britain in the Baltic Sea, was the signing of the British—German Naval Agreement on 18 June 1935. The Agreement caused a significant loss of prestige for Britain in the international arena and especially in the Baltic countries. It would be more than unjust to neglect the long-term attempts of the head of the Foreign Office's Northern Department to urge his superiors to activate British policy in that region. As an enemy of appeasement who was unable to bring about what he had suggested and postulated, Laurence Collier did not hesitate to state, soon after the signing of the Munich Treaty 'in matters of foreign policy we live under a dictatorship -just like Germany and Italy.' 3 The hopes and expectations of Collier for an increased British role in northern Europe began to see the light of day at the end of 1938 and at the beginning of 1939. The change of government policy was brought about by fears of a possible German attack directed first against the West and only then against the East. The attack could be conducted either directly against Britain by air or as a result of the conquest of Holland. Such conclusions were drawn in Lord Halifax's memorandum of 19 January 1939, 'Possible German Intentions'. 4 In this situation the role of Poland, formerly rather insignificant, began to increase. However, the assumptions behind the new attitude of London towards Warsaw were not directly connected with the balance offerees in the Baltic but with the growing German expansionist policy on the Continent and the expected effects of that policy on Great Britain. The Permanent Under-Secretary at the 3 4

presents general, stimulating remarks on the subject of the Baltic region during the interwar years. M. Nurek, 'Great Britain and the Scandinavian Countries before and after the signing of the Munich Agreement', Ada Poloniae Historica, vol. 59 (1989), p. 120. Ibid., pp. 122-3.

The last months of peace

23

Foreign Office, Alexander Cadogan, was worried that the Germans, anticipating a lack of British military action in defence of Holland and Denmark, would dictate conditions to Great Britain. At the same time the Germans could try to bribe Poland and other countries with the promise of colonial gains. 5 London's search for the best way of securing the British Isles against an attack obviously could not be limited to Poland. The main weapon was to be a blockade, as it had been in previous years. One of the main goals of the blockade was to cut iron ore supplies from Sweden to Germany. 6 Yet, as reported by Patrick Salmon, while the Industrial Intelligence Centre (HC) was preparing the report 'Routeing of Swedish Iron Imports', between June 1938 and February 1939, there were no traces of a wider discussion nor of signs of preparations for the creation of a blockade. 7 It is no accident that as late as February 1939 the IIC returned to the problems of blocking Swedish supplies of iron ore to the enemy. It is likely that at that time the majority of those making decisions on Great Britain's policy were only too well aware that the Munich Treaty had not removed the threat of military conflict in Europe. London's increased interest in northern Europe at the end of 1938 and at the beginning of 1939 did not mean the recognition of Collier's stance as the only valid position. Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, counsellor in the Foreign Office, looked at the matter differently. He presented his position on 12 January 1939.8 Evaluating the results of German and British trade competition in the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, Poland, and the USSR, he did not consider British 5

6

7 8

Sir A. Cadogan, note as the appendix to Lord Halifax's memorandum of 10 January 1939. Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), CAB 27/627 F.P./36/74; D. Dilks, 'Appeasement and Intelligence', in D. Dilks, ed., Retreat from Power: Studies in Britain's Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century., vol. 1, igo6-igjg, pp. 157—8; see also A. Cadogan, The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan (London, 1971), pp. i39ff. One of the characteristic features of British foreign policy in the Baltic Sea region in the thirties is the location of Poland and also the Free City of Danzig mainly in the continental rather than in the Baltic sphere of international relations. In 1934 Poland was transferred in the Foreign Office structure, from the Northern Department to the Central Department, to which Germany belonged. All other countries of the Baltic region, together with the USSR, belonged to the Northern Department. See: Th. Munch-Petersen, The Strategy of Phoney War: Britain and the Iron Ore Question I 939~I94° (Stockholm, 1981), pp. 18, 28,3 iff.; P.Salmon, 'British plans for economic warfare against Germany 1937-1939: the problem of Swedish iron ore' Journal of Contemporary History (1981), no. 1, pp. 536°.; Salmon, 'Anglo-German relationship', p. 136. Salmon, 'British plans', p. 63. Memorandum by F. Ashton-Gwatkin, 12 January 1939. PRO. 371/23653 N260/64/63.

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trade with Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland as being on the verge of failure. Collier also did not see this situation was 'catastrophic' but regarded the problem of German expansionism in a wider perspective. He had no doubts that from the moment of the signing of the Munich Treaty there had been more and more evidence of the Third Reich's intention to take advantage of its position in central and eastern Europe and also in other regions. He feared that Germany would pursue a policy of imposing both economic and political pressure on northern Europe also: ' As is well known, indeed, they are already pursuing it in South Eastern Europe; but it is not yet so generally realised in this country that they may be encouraged by success or driven by need of export markets to pursue the same policy towards the Scandinavian and Baltic countries.' 9 Collier's view was undoubtedly closer to reality because the Germans did not intend to compromise. This was confirmed by Hjalmar Schacht, the President of the Reichsbank, who demanded the withdrawal of Britain's preferential agreements with the Scandinavian countries.10 At that time not only Collier himself but also Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, realised that threat to Great Britain's position in the Baltic region from the expansionist policy of the Third Reich. In a letter to Oliver Stanley, President of the Board of Trade, Halifax wrote of' the accumulating evidence of an impending German drive, both political and economic in Scandinavia and the Baltic countries' which, 'if it grows, may become as dangerous to our interests as the increase of German influence in Central and South Eastern Europe'. In this letter he suggested the possibility of introducing a clearing system for the protection of Britain's Baltic trade: 'Without powers and the resolve to do this, I am afraid that we shall continue to play a losing game and only obtain small concessions thus missing a valuable potential trade.' 11 This significant increase in London's interest in the Baltic region in the context of German expansionist policy was confirmed by the actions of the British Government. On 8 February the Cabinet made 9 10 11

Draft memo by L. Collier, undated. Ibid. Salmon, 'Anglo-German relationship', p. 128. Lord Halifax's letter to O. Stanley, 27 January 1939. PRO, F0371/23653 N260/64/63; N702/64/63. See also: Salmon, 'Anglo-German Relationship', pp. 128-9. On the role of clearing in German policy and the results of its absence in British policy see: M.-L. Hinkkanen-Lievonen, pp. 40-1.

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the decision to begin preparations for the mission of the Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade, Robert Hudson. He was supposed to conduct talks in Berlin, Warsaw, Moscow, Helsinki, and Stockholm. Moreover, in the first half of March, cartel talks between representatives of the Federation of British Industry and the Reichsgruppe Industrie had been arranged. London expected Germany to give up its high export subsidies as a result of these negotiations in which Stanley was to participate. This would maintain the competition of British and German goods on similar principles.12 The entrance of German troops into Prague on 15 March, thus breaking the Munich Treaty, drastically changed the international situation and forced Great Britain to modify its policy towards Germany, a change which was also to affect the Baltic Sea region. One of the^ direct reactions of Great Britain to Hitler's liquidation of the Second Republic of Czechoslovakia was the break-up of the cartel talks and the cancellation of Stanley's and Hudson's visit to Berlin planned for 17 March. For Hudson, Berlin was supposed to have been the first stop on the longer tour. Leaving out Germany he paid visits (together with Ashton-Gwatkin) to Warsaw, Moscow, Helsinki, and Stockholm between 18 March and 4 April. The agreement imposed upon President Emil Hacha concerning the entrance of Wehrmacht troops on 14 March meant not only the end of the Czechoslovak state and the breaking of the Munich Agreement but also the next stage of the expansion of the Third Reich. The latter was not limited to one direction. On 21 March Germany came out for the third time with demands and proposals with respect to Poland. In the face of a firm refusal of these conditions (on 26 March) and also in the context of the Polish acceptance of a British guarantee (on 31 March) and of the visit to London of Josef Beck, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, General Keital signed on 3 April an order of alert of German troops in the period 1939-40. The order contained the preparation of a plan to attack Poland [Fall Weiss) and also the seizure of Danzig. On the day of the signing of the German-Romanian agreement (23 March) subordinating the Romanian economy to German needs, Hitler 12

For the problem of the disagreement between the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office on the employment of subsidy and clearing by Great Britain, see D. E. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France and Eastern Europe, I

93°~I939 (Princeton, New Jersey, 1980), pp. 289—90.

26

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triumphantly arrived in Klaipeda which was taken away from Lithuania by brutal pressure.13 The enforced abandonment of the Klaipeda area meant the loss of the harbour through which Lithuania sent 80 per cent of its exports. The annexation of Klaipeda therefore seriously changed the status quo on the Baltic Sea. All the countries of the region regarded this as a continuation of the increase of German influence by means of political blackmail. Poland feared that the next aim for German diplomacy in the expansion of the German sphere of influence would be to resolve the problem of Danzig and the 'corridor'. 14 Similar fears were shared by Lithuanians and Estonians. The commanderin-chief of the Estonian Army, General Johan Laidoner, doubted whether Britain would move because it had too many troubles outside Europe to be engaged, unless German expansionism threatened the West directly. In his opinion the USSR would never move in the first stage of conflict unless it was directly attacked. 15 The USSR saw a direct threat in the seizure of Klaipeda because the increase of German influence in that region constituted a threat to Leningrad and to the Soviet position on the Baltic, especially in the eastern part of that sea. As early as 28 March Maxim Litvinov handed identical notes to the Estonian and Latvian envoys in Moscow. Alluding to their friendship and the USSR's concern for the independence of these countries, he communicated that all agreements or moves carried out by them, either under pressure from third countries or of their own volition, would be regarded by the USSR as a loss of their political independence. In this eventuality the USSR would be 'forced to draw the most far-reaching conclusions'. The USSR therefore suggested the acceptance of active help from the Soviet Union by these countries in the event of such developments. During the early days of April (between 6 and 10) 13

14

15

H. Batowski, Europa zmierza ku przepas'ci (Europe approaching the precipice) (Poznari, 1977), pp. 253 ff.; S. Milulicz, Klajpeda w politcyce europejskiej igiS-iggg (Memel in the European policy), (Warsaw, 1976), pp. 243ff.; G. V. Rauch, The Baltic States. The Years of Independence: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania igiy—ig^o (London, 1974), p. 198. A. Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers igj8— iggg (London—Toronto, 1968), pp. 208-9; W. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. A History of Nazi Germany (London, 1961), p. 462. See also Diariusz i Teki Jana Szembeka (Diary and Papers of Jan Szembek), vol. IV (London, 1972), pp. 370, 375, 528-9, 533. For the helplessness of the Baltic entente with regard to the fate of Memel see P. Lossowski, 'Entente Baltycka 1934-1940', Studia z dziejow ZSRR i Europy Srodkowej, vol. 59 (1980), p. 194. Envoy W. Przesmycki (Tallinn) to Ministry For Foreign Affairs, 25 March 1939. Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie (Archives for Contemporary Documents in Warsaw), later ACD, MSZ5781.

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Estonia and Latvia declared that their governments alone might decide what constituted a threat to their independence, sovereignty, and neutrality. 16 Earlier that month Litvinov suggested that Finland lease to the USSR several islands in the Finnish Bay in order to build marine bases there to protect Leningrad from the sea. Finland did not accept this proposal.17 To understand Soviet policy in the face of the seizure of Klaipeda, it has to be noted that significant worries in Moscow were caused by the fortification of the Aland Islands, which had been demilitarised in 1921 on the basis of an international convention. 18 On 8 September 1938 the Swedish minister for Foreign Affairs declared that Finland and Sweden were conducting talks concerning the modification of the status of the islands. Both countries hoped to create an effective system for protecting the islands from occupation by a foreign power. The USSR would only agree to the remilitarisation on the condition that it received full information about the intended change of status and secured the right to help Finland if need be to defend the archipelago. As early as spring 1938 the USSR proposed to Finland a military-economic treaty of mutual assistance. When Finland rejected the proposal, the USSR suggested secret negotiations in Moscow parallel to official economic negotiations.19 The termination of these negotiations in March 1939 without an agreement being reached made an additional impact on the Soviet stance towards the Aland Islands. The Soviets feared the seizure of the islands by Germany. On the other hand the fears of the Swedes and Finns did not allow them to share the Soviet view. In this situation on 27 May 1939, Ivan Maiski declared a resolution to abstain from voting if the case were transferred to the council of the League of Nations. Under the requirement of unanimity of decision of the council, the question was not put to the vote and the problem remained unsolved. British 16

17

18

19

General Sikorski Historical Institute, London. A. 11. 49/1. W. Przesmycki (Tallinn), cypher telegram, to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1 April 1939. ACD, Berlin Embassy 926. Batowski, Europa £mierza, p. 334. These islands were, according to the peace treaty of 12 March 1940, incorporated into USSR: W. Shirer, The Challenge of Scandinavia (BostonToronto, i955),o pp. 325-6*J. Barros, The Aland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations (New Haven and London, 1968); J. S. Shepard, The Scandinavian States and the League of Nations (Princeton, New Jersey, 1939) pp. 252-4; W. Reddaway, Problems of the Baltic (Cambridge, 1940), p. 51; G. A. Mazour, Finland between East and West (Princeton, New Jersey, 1956), pp. 72-5. D. Kirby, Finland in the Twentieth Century (London, 1979), pp. 117ff.

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diplomacy, after examining the opinions of the chiefs of staff, supported the plan of fortification while trying to reach a compromise with the parties involved in the problem. In the hierarchy of London's political problems this one was of secondary importance so that it did not even constitute a subject of Cabinet discussions. As to the problem of remilitarisation of the Aland Islands, Britain acted under three assumptions: 1i) That a worsening of British-Soviet and British-Finnish relations should not result from the affair. (2) That the source of inspiration of the plan might have been in Germany. (3) That an increase in the Swedish export of iron ore to Germany after remilitarisation of the islands was quite likely under the conditions of Realpolitik.20 The seizure of Klaipeda also deepened the mood of insecurity and fear in the Scandinavian countries brought about by the breaking of the Munich Treaty by the Third Reich. Reports delivered to London concerning the entrance of German troops into Prague and the seizure of Klaipeda contained similar reactions from each country, for example ' an act of unprovoked aggression',' unanimous condemnation', 'resignation mingled with bitterness'. A British representative in Stockholm, Edmund Monson, was undoubtedly right when he stated in Sweden, while summarising political events in 1939, that:' Public opinion in this country is strongly appalled but at the same time it was unable to grasp all the tendencies of international politics because of the unusual speed of events in March and April.' 21 As to Baltic reactions to British policy, we can cite a discussion conducted in the Foreign Office on October 1938 between a Finnish envoy, George Gripenberg, and William I. Mallet. Gripenberg asked without any preliminary courtesy whether the Munich Treaty and the German—British declaration 'practically meant the end of British concern about Eastern Europe'. His government 'would like very much to learn whether Great Britain would continue its interest in the Baltic and its problems or whether it intends to withdraw its interest recognising that region as the sphere of German influence'. 20

Th. Munch-Petersen, 'Great Britain and the revision of the Aland Convention 1938—1939', Scandia (1975), p. 86; E. Lonnroth, 'Sweden's ambiguous neutrality', Scandinavian Journal 21 PRO, FO 371/24865 N6097/42. of History, no. 2 (1977), pp. 93-5.

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The answer of Lord Halifax's personal secretary, unofficial in character, could not alter the disenchantment of the Finnish envoy: 'although it cannot be denied that the last events weakened our strength in showing our influence on the Baltic or any other place in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, Great Britain intends to do everything it can to secure peace and stabilization in that and other regions, if possible by consultations with Germany or other available means.' Moreover, Mallet said that he had informed the envoys of the Baltic countries of the British suggestion so that they should not draw 'premature conclusions' because of the fluidity of the international situation. Gripenberg only expressed his wish that his country would not be left alone to face German ambitions and the policies of that country and the USSR. 22 British archives display an untypical situation in the Northern Department at that time, as well as with respect to the workings of the Foreign Office. There are no remarks on, or evaluations of, reports on the seizure of Prague or on the Klaipeda region received from Stockholm, Oslo, Copenhagen, and Helsinki from the second half of March. Probably the failure of the appeasement policy was too obvious to require comment. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, it was the period in which London was desperately looking for ways of increasing its own security and regaining international prestige for the metropolis. In discussions consideration was given not to the fact of the breaking of the Munich Treaty, but to the possibility of the quickest possible outcome of a project to strengthen the international position of Great Britain. This resulted in increased interest in Romania and the Balkan region and in Poland, along with growing diplomatic activity in contacts with Paris, Moscow, and Washington. British reaction to the events in the Baltic region after 15 March 1939, i.e. in the period when the Third Reich decided to demonstrate that the Baltic Sea was 'mare nostrum', reveals the degree of the British Government's interest and involvement in the problems of that part of Europe during the last months of peace. In considering the British attitude to the seizure of Klaipeda, it is necessary to understand that problem in the context of the response of the British Government towards the breaking of the Munich 22

W. I. Mallet to Th. Snow (Helsinki), FO 25 October 1938, PRO, FO 371/21778 G12256/5302/18.

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Treaty which was a more important event. The official reaction (presented in the prime minister's statement in Parliament on 15 March) was rather calm and far from a condemnation of Hitler. A signal of a change in the British policy of concessions was contained in Chamberlain's speech of 17 March in Birmingham, but this resulted from a justified fear of the subordination of the Romanian economy to the Third Reich. The seizure of Klaipeda could not have been a surprise for London where it had been known that Berlin's claims concerning Lithuania's only harbour were growing. The pressure of the Third Reich increased significantly after the signing of the Munich Treaty. 23 Great Britain was closely watching the developments in Klaipeda because it was also one of the five signatories (together with Lithuania, France, Japan, and Italy) of the convention of 8 May 1924, which gave Lithuania all rights to that territory. As a result of information concerning German plans for the seizure of Klaipeda provided in early December 1938 by a Lithuanian envoy, Bronius Balutis, Great Britain and France sent similar notes of demarche. Both notes expressed concerns about the possibility of a change in the status quo in that region caused by Germany. Readiness to undertake consultations concerning this was also expressed.24 The proposal of consultations did not imply a desire on London's part to defend Lithuanian possessions actively. In January 1939, the Foreign Office informed the charge d'affaires in Kaunas, Thomas Preston, of the British Government's readiness to protest against Nazi aggression in Klaipeda. This kind of activity also set a limit on Great Britain's involvement. Preston was also informed that Great Britain did not intend to begin military activities if the Germans attacked Lithuania or other Baltic countries. 25 Moreover, not everybody in the Foreign Office believed in Collier's news of successive violations of the status of Klaipeda by the Germans. The Foreign Office also played down the significance of information received at the end of January about Hitler's plans for the seizure of Klaipeda soon after 15 March. On 16 March Lithuania, officially informing London of a direct threat to Klaipeda, asked the British Government about its stance. Before giving its answer Britain consulted the French Government. At the time of active debate on the matter in the Foreign Office, Cadogan expressed the opinion 23

D. M. Crowe, Jr, 'Great Britain and the Baltic States 1938-1939' in V. S. Vardys and R. J. Misiunas, eds., The Baltic States in Peace and War igiy-ig^, (Philadelphia, 1978), pp. 24 25 n 2 ff. Ibid., p. 112. Ibid., p. 113.

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that Great Britain should not protest against the seizure of Klaipeda if it did not intend to fight for the maintenance of the Klaipeda region. He said 'it would be useless to protest at the German seizure unless Great Britain was going to fight for the maintenance of the Memel region. If not, then the less said about the district, the better... the British had bigger fish to fry.' It was decided then to inform Lithuania, if it asked for British help, that it should agree to German claims but send an expression of protest.26 There was also one very important problem to be solved, namely, the explanation of the British point of view to the public. On Lord Halifax's inspiration, the Foreign Office decided to explain British inactivity on the basis of the similarity between the cases of Klaipeda and Sudetenland, since, in practice, even with the help of Lithuania's neighbours, there was no possibility of preventing the Germans from seizing Klaipeda. In Collier's opinion conditions were favourable towards Great Britain because it was only a signatory of the Memel Convention but not its guarantor. 27 As early as 22 March, a Lithuanian envoy officially informed Lord Halifax of the circumstances in which the Klaipeda region had been seized by Germany. The aide memoire illustrated a classical method of political blackmail involving a threat of military occupation. This blackmail was used by von Ribbentrop toward the Lithuanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Juozas Urbsys, on 20 March when he was returning via Berlin from Pope Pius XII's coronation. Lithuania, after consultations with the signatories of the convention and also with Poland, decided that it had to submit to Germany's demand that it give up the Klaipeda region.28 Lord Halifax reassured Balutis, the Lithuanian representative in London, of the deep sympathy on the part of the British government towards Lithuania. Balutis, in a dignified but also subtle manner, told the Foreign Secretary that the German action could not have come as a surprise to international opinion. Nevertheless, nothing had been done to help Lithuania. The words of sympathy uttered by Halifax did not meet the Lithuanian envoy's needs. Therefore he asked plainly whether, in the event of further pressure from the Third Reich leading to the loss of political and economic independence, Great Britain would react as in the case of Klaipeda or whether his country could hope for greater help from Great Britain. 26 28

27 Ibid., p. 114. Ibid., p. 114. Lord Halifax to Ch. W. Orde (Riga) 22 March 1939. PRO, FO 419/33, no. 53.

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Lord Halifax presented his view in a wider context. He noted the difficulty of giving a direct answer to the question because the matter was connected with the general problem of working out a British stance towards Germany's threat to the independence of other countries.29 At the meeting of the Cabinet on 22 March he justified the British reaction to the seizure of Klaipeda more vigorously than he had done on some earlier occasions.30 A supplement to the British view was given by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, R. A. Butler, in the House of Commons on 15 May. He said that the British Government had no obligations with respect to the Baltic countries except those which stemmed from its membership of the League of Nations. 31 The recognition of the seizure of Klaipeda de facto and de jure by the British Government in the middle of May sanctioned British policy toward the event. At 9 p.m. on 13 May, a telegram was sent to the British ambassador in Berlin ordering that the German Government be notified of the decision as well as of the inclusion of the Klaipeda region in the consular area of the Consul General in Berlin.32 Several weeks later on 28 April, Hitler terminated the PolishGerman non-aggression declaration of 1934 and the Naval Treaty with Great Britain of the following year.33 This decision was 'justified' by the policy of 'encirclement' of Germany by Great Britain and France which was also joined by Poland. This was Hitler's interpretation of the mutual Polish-British guarantee 34 and the British-French guarantee to Greece and Romania; further evidence for Hitler was the introduction of conscription in Great Britain on 26 April 1939. In a speech which was full of cynicism Hitler answered the American president's appeal of 15 April to save the peace. Roosevelt had suggested to Hitler and Mussolini a tenyear guarantee of the stability of the borders of thirty-one countries 29 30 32 33

34

Ibid. Th. Preston described the German action as 'highway robbery'. PRO, FO 371/24762 N3472/1818/59. 31 PRO, CAB 23/98 14/39/2. PRO, FO 371/23655 N2492/64/63. FO to N. Henderson (Berlin), 13 May 1939. PRO. FO 371/23086 G7107/5117/18. DBFP, series 3, vol. 5, no. 3 0 7 ; S. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, vol. I I , The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930-1939 (London, 1976), pp.355, 449. For A. J. P. Taylor's opinion see The Origins of the Second World War (London, 1969), p. 223: 'From the moment that Poland became the immediate target of German hostility, Soviet Russia was automatically transformed for Germany into a possible neutral or even an ally.' Great Britain officially reacted to Germany's breaking of the Naval Agreement on 23 June 1939. DBFP, ser. 3, vol. 6, no. 136 (Appendix). During Beck's visit to London he did not succeed in inducing greater involvement on the part of Great Britain in Baltic problems. The British saw the role of Poland in the future as creating a second front on the continent, not in the Baltic Sea region.

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named by the president (the list included all European and Near Eastern countries). 35 The Duce did not react at all. Taking the diplomatic offensive, however, Hitler offered some of the countries mentioned by Roosevelt (excluding Poland, Great Britain, France, and the USSR) non-aggression pacts. On 29 April Hitler proposed through von Ribbentrop the signing of bilateral non-aggression pacts to envoys of the following neutral countries: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia. The reaction of the Scandinavian countries to the president's speech illustrated the delicate situation of neutral countries during that period. Fearing Hitler's dissatisfaction, they expressed approval of the president's appeal but only in an oral form given to American diplomats so that their approval would not reach Germany. 36 On the other hand the Scandinavian countries were not enthusiastic about Roosevelt's initiative which involved them in the political activities of the great powers. The Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Haldvan Koht, when asked by the British envoy Cecil Dormer about his opinion of the president's speech stated that ' President Roosevelt asked too hastily and would have done better had he prepared the ground a little beforehand.' 37 The Scandinavian countries which were trying to preserve their neutrality had no illusions about British lack of involvement in the Baltic and did not want to provoke Hitler. They did not hide their opinion from Britain. On the occasion of Hudson's stay in Sweden in early April, the Swedes once more referred to the British-German Naval Treaty. The head of the department of commerce in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gunnar Hagglof, presented the view of his government: 'Great Britain in reality left the Baltic Sea by signing the Naval Treaty with Germany in June 1935 and I know what Hitler said about it after the signing: "The Baltic is now a bottle which we can close. The British cannot exercise control there. We are masters of the Baltic.'" 38 Before the Scandinavian and Baltic countries took up an official 35

37 38

C. A. MacDonald, The United States, Britain and Appeasement, 1936-1939 (London, 1981),

pp. 1496°. On the problem of neutrality see also M. A. Butler, 'The Neutrals 1933-1940. The United States, the Oslo nations and the response to Hitler' (Ph.D. diss., University of 36 Virginia, 1980) pp. 346ff. Butler, 'The Neutrals', pp. 340-1. Sir C. Dormer to Lord Halifax, 26 April 1939, PRO, FO 419/33, no. 109. G. Hagglof, Memoirs of a Swedish Envoy in London, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, Washington (London, 1972), p. 108. The Swedes were critical of the British intention to give a guarantee to Poland. R. Sandler's opinion of the matter was as follows: 'It was sheer hypocrisy on the part of Great Britain to pretend that her guarantee [to Poland] was solely because [the British] felt that the independence of Poland was of vital interest to Great Britain.'

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position concerning non-aggression pacts they considered the matter closely. Each country had its own point of view and it turned out that the acceptance of a common standpoint was not possible. Sweden and Norway had the least doubts among the Scandinavian countries about rejecting Hitler's proposal. The problem was perceived differently in Denmark. Finland had the biggest dilemma. Eljas Erkko, the chief Finnish diplomat secretly told the British envoy, Thomas Snow, that it would be extremely difficult to explain both to the Germans and to a significant part of Finnish society why a pact with Germany should be rejected when Finland had a similar pact with the USSR. On the other hand the signing of the pact would be very likely to create a barrier separating Finland from Norway and Sweden. This would doubly worsen the Finnish situation. In Erkko's view 'Nordic unity', which was the basis of Finnish foreign policy, would cease to exist, as would 'close solidarity' with Sweden which constituted a very important factor of military co-operation. 39 The Scandinavian countries organised a conference at the level of ministers of Foreign Affairs which was held in Stockholm on 9 May and which was to formulate the position of these countries towards the proposal of 29 April. The official report from the conference expressed the will of the Scandinavian countries to remain detached from the coalitions of powers which were likely to be formed. The difference between Denmark, which saw the necessity of signing a pact, and the remaining countries led to that part of the proceedings directly concerning Hitler's proposal being limited to a resolve to leave the decision to individual countries. In conclusion, hope was expressed that the decision made by the Nordic governments would strengthen international confidence in their neutral policy.40 The information received by the German envoy in Copenhagen, Cecil Renthe-Fink, indicated that the main role was played by the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Richard Sandier, who had the wide support of the press of his country. Furthermore, the chief Finnish diplomat, Erkko, changed his former attitude, recognising the necessity of the maintenance of friendly relations with Sweden as being more important. 39 40

Th. Snow (Helsinki) to Lord Halifax, 19 May 1939. PRO, FO 419/33, no. 146; Political Review of the Year 1939, Finland. PRO, FO 419/34, pp. 377-88. Sir E. Monson (Stockholm) to FO, tel. no. 23, 10 May 1939. PRO, FO 371/23654 N2414/64/63; N. Orvik, The Decline of Neutrality igi4-1941 (London, 1971), pp. 218-19.

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Sandler's objections to the proposed German-Danish treaty were based, according to Renthe-Fink, on the following grounds: (1) The limited period of the validity of the treaty - ten years; (2) Doubts as to whether the suggested treaty would be in accordance with the principle of the neutrality of the Scandinavian countries. If so, it would be spurious and if not, it would not be acceptable to Scandinavia; (3) The obligation not to support Germany's enemies could be interpreted as limiting Scandinavian exports only to Germany in a period of war without the possibility of trade exchange with enemies of the Third Reich; (4) The signing of a non-aggression pact by the Scandinavian countries would limit their sovereignty. 41 Berlin did not intend to wait too long for the answer to the proposal of 28 April. After receiving information from Renthe-Fink at 7.35 a.m. on 10 May, the Secretary of State in the Auswartiges Amt, Ernst von Weizsacker, asked a Swedish representative to attend on the same day and observed that, although twelve days had elapsed, no answer to Germany's suggestion had arrived from Sweden. He also expressed his views on the damaging campaign of the Swedish press concerning the matter. He also alluded to negative results in the purported rejection by Sweden of the proposed contacts between the two nations. 42 The Scandinavian countries realised that the policy of neutrality could be too weak a factor to protect their independence against German imperial policy. That is why Hitler's policy with respect to the Baltic countries found its echo in London at this time. Thus, after returning from Stockholm, the Finnish minister for Foreign Affairs reported to a British envoy the proceedings of the conference. Snow learned about the conviction of Norway, Sweden and Finland that they should reject Hitler's offer if Great Britain would not agree to the Soviet guarantee to Finland against aggression. On 12 May the British assured the Finns that they had not discussed the situation in Finland during the British-Soviet negotiations. They also undertook to reject any Soviet guarantee to Finland if the latter did not accept it.43 After this assurance the three Scandinavian countries officially rejected Hitler's proposal of 29 April. 44 41 43 44

42 DGFP, series D , vol. V I , nos. 358, 365. Ibid., no. 356. See note 39, PRO, FO 419/33, no. 113. See note 39, PRO, FO 419/33, no. 135; DGFP, D, VI, nos. 391, 407, 411.

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Denmark also wanted to learn about the British Government's position before making any decision concerning the signature of a non-aggression pact with its southern neighbour. Fearing a negative reaction from Berlin, they tried to do it in the most discreet manner possible so as not to give the impression that, by asking for London's approval, the Danes wanted to secure British indulgence after the signing of the pact. Talks between Danish envoy Eduard and R. A. Butler revealed a lack of objections on Britain's part concerning the idea of a non-aggression pact. 45 The pact, signed on 31 May, contained, according to British wishes, a clause giving the Danes the right of free trade with all countries.46 Being unable to prevent the Danes from signing the non-aggression pact as such, the British considered themselves partly satisfied because of the abovementioned clause. It gave some hope for the maintenance of the neutrality of Denmark during war and made British-Danish economic exchange possible. The problem of remaining neutral and at the same time continuing free trade was not limited to Denmark. Lord Halifax sent a telegram on 11 May 1939 to British posts in Helsinki, Copenhagen, Oslo, Stockholm, and Riga, to inform the countries to which they were affiliated that the British had no objection to bilateral agreements as such. On the other hand, London doubted whether such agreements could contribute anything to the existing BriandKellog Pact. Moreover, these countries should be aware of the fact that the acceptance of special German conditions would be a contradiction of the status of real neutrality. Every representative should pay attention to the discrepancy between the acceptance of such a conditional pact and the situation existing under Article 16 of the league covenant. In the second point of the telegram, for each minister's own information, Lord Halifax wrote: 'You will realise the vital importance of preventing anything in the nature of an assurance of supplies to Germany in war time.' 47 The chief of the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Peter Munch, tried to justify the signing of the pact with Germany which unconditionally subordinated Denmark to the Third Reich. Collier 45 46 47

S. Seymour, Anglo-Danish Relations and Germany 1933-1945 (Odense, 1982), p. 75. For the text of the treaty, see DGFP, D, VI, no. 461; Sir P. Ramsay (Copenhagen) to Lord Halifax, 2 June 1939; PRO, FO 419/33, no. 153. Lord Halifax to Th. Snow (Helsingfors), 11 May 1939. PRO, FO 419/33, no. 118. Note by Frank K. Roberts from Central Department: ' I do not see how we can intervene in any way.' PRO, FO 371/22971 C6454/15/18, 4 May 1939.

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regarded this statement as typical of the Danes, i.e. 'more ingenious than convincing'. 48 According to Munch in his statement of 18 June 1939 on the meeting of the prime ministers of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, the notion of Scandinavia contained neither military nor economic unity. However, unity was to be supported by the policy of neutrality leaving each country the right to decide its character. 49 The Baltic countries also lay on the line of Hitler's political offensive, which was confirmed by the way in which Klaipeda had been seized. It is worth noting that there were differences between the goals of German policy with respect to Scandinavia and the Baltic countries. If Hitler's policy toward the Scandinavian countries was mainly based on anti-British feeling (in the case of Finland also anti-Soviet feeling), then in the case of the Baltic countries it was pursued clearly in the context of German policy towards the USSR. The British representative in Riga, Charles Orde, reported that it was not on 29 April but a day earlier that the German Government made inquiries as to whether Latvia would decide to sign a bilateral non-aggression pact. 50 Similar activity was directed towards Estonia. Lithuania had signed such a treaty with Germany earlier, its contents being set out in Section 4 of the German-Lithuanian agreement of 22 March concerning Klaipeda. On 4 May Berlin presented Latvia and Estonia with a full text of the projected agreement. The Estonians and Latvians in their counterproposal made the realisation of the agreement conditional on the guarantee of the right of free trade and the recognition of an Estonian-Latvian military alliance. Like Scandinavia, the Baltic countries (especially Estonia) conducted an animated exchange of views with London. On 13 May the British Consul in Tallinn, Wilfred Gallienne, received a copy of the German proposal concerning the abovementioned non-aggression pact from the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Karl Selter's view his country should sign the non-aggression pact. He also mentioned the great significance which was attached to avoiding anything that could lose the good-will of 48

49

50

L. Collier's minute, 18 May 1939. PRO, FO 371/23655 N2508/64/63; C. H. Smith, Sir P. Ramsay's successor in Copenhagen, characterised Denmark's attitude towards Germany in this way: * Denmark's attitude towards Germany has something in it of the hypnotised defeatism of the rabbit to the snake.' Sir C. Dormer (Oslo) to Lord Halifax, 22 June 1939. PRO, 419/33, no. 1; The American—Scandinavian Review no. 3 (1939), pp. 2576°.; O. K. Pedersen 'Denmark's policy', Scandinavian Journal of History no. 2 (1977), pp. 53-66. Ch. Orde (Riga) to FO, tel. no. 14, 1 May 1939. PRO, 371/23654 N2327/64/63.

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Great Britain. As they had already had non-aggression pacts with the USSR since 1932, Estonia and Latvia could not accept an additional Soviet guarantee. However, these countries would eagerly accept a joint guarantee of four powers (i.e. Great Britain, the USSR, Germany, and Poland). 51 Estonia would agree to accept a guarantee of its independence by one country if it were Great Britain.52 Like the diplomacy of the Scandinavian countries, that of the Baltic countries exchanged views with Britain with caution in order to prevent Germany from learning about these exchanges. For this very reason the aide me'moire given by Salter to Gallienne (12 May) was not formal and did not contain any signs allowing its identification. After the acceptance of Tallinn's condition, Germany signed pacts of non-aggression with Estonia and Lithuania in Berlin on 7 June 1939. The Baltic countries decided to sign these pacts with Germany, regarding them, together with the pacts of non-aggression with the USSR, as a strengthening of their neutral status. 53 In fact the pacts signed by Denmark and the Baltic countries undoubtedly strengthened the German position. There was open talk in Berlin about the possibility of an immediate breach of those pacts if any of the signatories accepted the guarantee of a third power. The propaganda gains of Third Reich diplomacy were equally important. From the point of view of British interests it is hard to characterise them as advantageous. Although in contrast to the Baltic countries the Scandinavian countries did not wish for a British guarantee, in both cases London regarded this kind of obligation as undesirable. The British Government believed that 'the less we commit ourselves for the future, the better'. 54 With this principle in mind the British would agree with the necessity of signing the pacts, yet with reservations concerning the lack of additional clauses to prevent the Germans from having priority in the import of raw materials during war. 55 London realised that a strong protest against the decision to sign the pacts would force Britain to undertake its own obligations and 51 52

53 54 55

W. Gallienne (Tallinn) to Gh. Orde (Riga), 16 May 1939 PRO, FO 419/33, no. 138. Political Review of the Year 1939, Estonia. PRO, FO 371/24759 N6283/293/59. Germany informed Estonia and Latvia on 30 June 1939 that acceptance of any possible British guarantee would be in contradiction to the non-aggression treaty of 7 June 1939. A similar note was sent from Berlin to Helsinki. DGFP, D, VI, no. 589. DBFP, ser. 3, 5, no. 5 9 ; DGFP, D , V I , n o . 202, 484. Notes by F O . P R O , F O 371/22971 G6454/15/18; F O 371/23654 N2132, 2532/64/63. PRO, FO 419/33, no. 118.

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that was not justified in its calculations. Thus any analysis of the strategic planning of the United Kingdom for a time of war should include a closer examination of the place of the Baltic Sea region in British policy during the last months of peace, i.e. in the period when the 'dual policy' of power was in force. Since no European country except Germany wanted to fight in a war the element of insurance against entering a military conflict played a major role.56 This could not be overlooked by German diplomacy. When conducting a mutual exchange of views, London and Moscow tried not to worsen their relations with the Third Reich. Soviet diplomacy carried out an active policy towards Germany. Several days after the rejection of a Soviet guarantee by Estonia and Latvia on 17 April, the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin, Aleksiey Mieriekalov, reminded von Weizsacker of parts of Stalin's speech of 10 March at the XVIIIth Congress of the Bolshevik party. In this speech Stalin expressed a desire for political co-operation with any country regardless of ideological convictions. Mieriekalov also told von Weizsacker that the USSR did not see any reason why there should not be normal relations between the USSR and the Third Reich. Moreover, starting from normal relations there was the possibility of changing them for the better. 57 On the same day the Soviet side transferred its counterproposals to Britain. It would be an oversimplification to suggest that the idea of appeasement lost all significance in Whitehall after 15 March. On the other hand, it can be stated with certainty that the policy of appeasement could not remain as compliant to the activity of the Third Reich as before. It was no accident that A. J. P. Taylor entitled one of the chapters of his book on the origins of the Second World War 'Renewed appeasement'. He writes there about secret British-German economic negotiations. One of the more important stages of the negotiations were Horace Wilson's talks with Helmut Wohltat, a commissary of the Four-Year Plan, held in London from 18 to 21 July. 58 One of the most important features of British policy 56

57 58

As to t h e Soviet foreign policy of t h a t time, it seems worthwhile formulating two questions h e r e : ( i ) W o u l d t h e possible a g r e e m e n t between Poland a n d U S S R in s u m m e r 1939 protect the latter from being involved in military conflict which, as is known, was the m a i n aim of Soviet policy? (2) W o u l d the a g r e e m e n t of the Russians with t h e Poles give the Soviet side t h e best o p p o r t u n i t y to realise all its aims in achieving its highest interest of state? I t seems t h a t only negative answers c a n logically be justified. DGFP, D, VI, pp. 266-7. A. J . P . T a y l o r , English History 1914-1945 (Oxford, 1982), p p . 5 7 9 - 8 0 .

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up to the end of the second week of August 1939 was the conviction that the signing of a treaty between the USSR and Germany was impossible. The dual policy of the USSR and Great Britain was evident. The dominating common feature of the powers negotiating to reach an agreement in the summer of 1939 had been the possession of various interests which were not limited to Europe. As far as Great Britain was concerned, the basis of all considerations was its conviction that it would be unable to conduct military combat on three fronts at the same time i.e. in continental Europe, in the Mediterranean basin or in the Far East. Even British participation in one region was considered to be a serious danger because it would lead to the weakening of the position of London in other parts of the Empire. The most important role in London's considerations was attached to those regions where a change in the status quo by means of the use offeree or blackmail had a direct connection with the security of the metropolis and the Empire. The anticipated significance of the Baltic region in the security of Great Britain was decisive for British interest in that region in the last months of peace. The 'British Strategical Memorandum' of 14 March 1939, i.e. immediately before the breaking of the Munich Treaty, dealt with the issue of the activity of the Royal Navy in the Baltic Sea. The possibility of a transfer of the British fleet to the Baltic Sea was considered, under the premise of the existence of a moderately strong German fleet in that region. Both the merits and the drawbacks of such a situation were considered. The merits included the cutting-off of German trade with Scandinavia and also links with East Prussia. This activity, however, would demand the constant presence of the Royal Navy in the Baltic and this would also require the possession of a naval base. This solution was not possible as long as the USSR remained neutral and the route leading to the British Isles was constantly insecure. Additional risk stemmed from the possibility of the use of mines, submarines, and air force by the enemy. Raids in the Baltic region could not bring lasting effects in the context of the general deployment of British naval power. 59 On 18 March, during a session of the Foreign Policy Committee, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, Lord Chatfield, was 59

PRO, 371/22969 C5263/15/18. The Germans in their wartime planning assumed that the power of their fleet and air forces would deter the Royal navy from breaking into the Baltic. C. A. Gemzell, Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien. Der Kampffur

(Lund, 1965), pp. 118—21.

einen maritimen Operationsplan

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considering the situation in which the USSR would assume the position of ally. If that happened the Soviet fleet could put a stop to the activities of the Kriegsmarine on the Baltic. This possibility was considered important, though not of paramount importance. Chamberlain's answer was the statement that the offensive forces of the Soviet Union did not have great potential. 60 The report of the chiefs of staff presented at the same meeting maintained that ' the Russian Baltic Fleet could contain considerable enemy naval forces and interrupt to some extent supplies of Swedish iron ore to Germany'. 61 The opinion was borne out in the next aide memoire for the Foreign Policy Committee on 5 May. In their opinion the occupation of the Baltic countries by Germany 'would turn the Baltic into a German lake [and] complete the encirclement of Poland'. This kind of action on the part of Germany 'would not justify us going to war unless it was certain that the whole of the Eastern front of Europe, particularly Poland and Russia, would also actively intervene making it a two front war for Germany'. 62 These general considerations concerning a possible engagement cannot be regarded as the inclusion of the Baltic region into the strategic planning for war, envisaging as they did the participation of the Royal Navy. Since it was maintained that Denmark formed the 'Baltic gate' then the analysis of Denmark's role during war would indicate more clearly the importance of the whole Baltic region for Great Britain in a military combat. The fate of Denmark, like that of other countries, was viewed in relation to criteria which would make Britain enter the war. Therefore the main point was not the protection of Denmark against German invasion but rather the need to specify at what point possible German aggression in Denmark would constitute a casus belli for a British Government, the aim of war then being the liberation of that country. During Beck's talks in London (4-6 April 1939) the British side expressed a desire for Polish aid to Great Britain and France if they found themselves at war because of military support for Denmark. Beck could not give an answer without consultations with the Polish Government. On 14 April London was informed by Warsaw of Polish acceptance of the proposal. Britain had to decide, then, whether an attack on Denmark would constitute a casus belli. Four days later the Committee of Imperial Defence received a request from the Foreign Office to estimate the strategic significance 60 62

I. Colvin, The Chamberlain Cabinet (London, 1971), p. 201. Ibid., p. 212.

61

Ibid., pp. 206-8.

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MIEGZYSLAW NUREK

of the Jutland Peninsula for Great Britain in the event of German aggression. Attention was drawn to the necessity of an assessment by the committee of the likely degree of Danish engagement in the defence of their country. 63 The chiefs of staff, after receiving the opinion of the joint planning sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, based on reports from the Industrial Intelligence Centre, presented their view on i May. 64 It referred to the Danes' inability to maintain their independence in the event of German aggression. However, the subjection of Denmark would bring the Germans only small strategic benefits which would not balance their losses in the economic sphere in the context of a long-term war. The chiefs of staff claimed that Britain would not be able to protect Denmark from calamity, and British involvement would cause an unnecessary dispersion of British forces. Nevertheless, it was recognised that in consequence of a German occupation of Denmark, the Germans would exercise total control over the entrance of the Baltic. This would 'make British naval operations in the Baltic hazardous and unprofitable'. In conclusion, the problem was perceived in the following way: ' The strategic and economic issues involved in an isolated act of German aggression against Denmark are not of sufficient importance to warrant regarding it as a casus belli. In the event of general hostilities, we could not afford her direct military assistance and her ultimate fate would depend on the outcome of the war.' 65 As a result of discussions and talks at sessions of the Foreign Policy Committee where the prime minister said that the goal of British policy was not to defend one country but to protect the whole of Europe, the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir William Seeds, received an instruction on 27 June 1939 to exclude Denmark from the list of countries for which Britain wanted to receive a Soviet guarantee against German aggression. In any case, the Danes, though not knowing of this decision, did not intend to ask Britain for help, the reliability of which was strongly doubted. 66 In Denmark's opinion ' the best form of British propaganda for Denmark was not photographs of Royal processions but facts and figures showing the progress of British rearmament'. 67 63 64 65 66 67

FO memorandum, 15 April 1939. PRO, FO 371/23654 PRO, FO 371/23654 N2216/64/63 (G.O.S. 897, 1 May 1939). Ibid. T h e chiefs of staff confirmed this opinion o n 25 M a y 1939. Seymour, Anglo-Danish relations, p. 93. PRO, FO 371/23656 N3332/64/63, 19 July 1939.

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At the same time, on 4 May, Franco-British staff talks came to an end. Both sides agreed that in the event of war their countries would have to face enemies who were better prepared for war and had the advantage on land and in the air. Under these conditions the early strategic activity of both allies would have a defensive character and the fate of Poland would depend upon the ultimate outcome of the war.68 General Clayton, who visited Poland together with a military mission between 23 and 30 May, did not promise much. He talked rather generally about the possibility of helping Poland by RAF action only. From General Clayton's speech one could infer that Britain would fight in defence of Denmark if it were attacked by the Third Reich, but only on French territory. Commander Rawlings excluded activity in the Baltic by the Royal Navy, which would be involved exclusively with safeguarding imperial communication in the Atlantic and with the protection of British interests in the eastern part of the Mediterranean against the Italians. 69 Although the Baltic Sea was thus excluded from strategic planning, the British were still interested in the problem of the German import of iron ore from Sweden. Generally, Britain wanted to maintain trade with the Baltic Sea countries. The situation seemed favourable since these countries also hoped that their status of neutrality would secure them uninterrupted trade. However, the highly probable blockade of the Baltic by the Kriegsmarine cast doubt on these hopes. According to the Industrial Intelligence Centre there existed some possibility of maintaining economic exchange with Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic countries by means of Swedish and Norwegian railway connections. The value that could be placed on this solution depended on the agreement of these countries to co-operate. 70 Generally, however, this matter had less importance for Great Britain because of the possibility of substituting imports from other countries, especially from the Dominions, for the import of goods from the Baltic. Of much greater importance for the British Government was the limitation of the function of that region as a source of supplies for Germany. The import of Swedish iron ore by Germany was the essential issue, especially because the basic manoeuvre against the enemy was 68 69

70

J. R. M . Butler, Grand Strategy. September 1939-June 1941 (London), p. 10. Polski sily zbrojne W drugiej wojnie swiatowej. T. I. Kampania Wrzesniowa 1939, cz. 1 (Polish Armed Forces in the Second World War, vol. I, part I, The September Campaign 1939 (London, 1951)), pp. 101-3. PRO, FO 371/23656 N3436/64/63, 8 June 1939. Ibid., N3806/64/63. 16 August 1939.

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to employ a blockade. The domination of the Kriegsmarine in the Baltic did not afford much chance of successfully blocking the export of ore to Germany from Lulea harbour situated in the Gulf of Bothnia. However, not everything was favourable for Germany. The waters of the Gulf of Bothnia froze for several months in the year. In this situation the strategic problem of blocking the import of iron ore by Germany was naturally transferred beyond the Baltic Sea region to the Norwegian Sea and the North Sea. Norway was strategically important not only because of its opportunity to transport the ore via Narvik to Germany across Norwegian neutral waters, but also because, being Britain's neighbour across the North Sea, it could constitute an excellent base for the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine for attacks on the British Isles after Norway's conquest by Germany. 71 In this way London's rather cool attitude with respect to neutrality in the second half of the thirties was reinforced. Norway's neutrality prevented total control of the North Sea by the Royal Navy. In reality, after the outbreak of the Second World War, Britain delayed the imposition of a blockade although it declared war against Nazi Germany on 3 September. Britain had to experience its own losses at sea, for example 'Athenia', the aircraft carrier 'Courageous', and the 'Royal Oak' at Scapa Flow in order to 'alarm' the government into taking action. 72 It was decided to impose an economic blockade on Germany, but this was never fully carried out. The British attitude towards the problem of the import of iron ore by Germany during the war was in fact never fully consistent. At the beginning of April 1939, the Swedes learned from Hudson that one of the possibilities for Great Britain would be to work out an agreement with Sweden covering the import of the entire production of Swedish iron ore. The Swedes, aware of the provocative character of such an agreement for Germany and the possibility of military reprisals on her part, immediately rejected the idea. Furthermore, they realised that there was no chance of receiving help from Britain. Ashton-Gwatkin, accompanying the minister of Foreign Trade, 71

72

See Th. Munch-Petersen, The Strategy of Phoney War, pp. 258*.; P. Salmon, ' Scandinavia in British strategy, September 1939-April 1940' (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 1979), pp. 256°.; Salmon, 'British plans for economic warfare', pp. 53-71; Salmon, 'Churchill, the Admiralty and the Narvik Traffic, September—November 1939', Scandinavian Journal of History (1979), no. 4, pp. 305-26. H. Macmillan, Autobiography, vol. II (London, 1967), pp. 9-10.

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mentioned the possibility of the RAF bombing iron ore mines. In 1937 the British Federation of Iron and Steel ordered an increase of iron ore supplies from Sweden up to 9-5 million tons in 1938, compared with 1*4 million in 1936. However, owing to the recession in Great Britain, Swedish imports to the British Isles reached only 2*5 million tons in 1938. In spite of insistence on the part of Sweden, Britain did not buy the whole quantity of the ore formerly ordered. It was as late as 13 July 1939 when the Swedish representative in London, Bjorn Prytz, was informed of an increase in the import of Swedish ore for the next year. 73 From spring 1939 increased British effort in the sphere of strategic planning was evident. This was being undertaken together with negotiations with France and the USSR concerning the creation of a 'peace front5. A point which raised great controversy was the problem of British and French acceptance of the Soviet interpretation of the term ' indirect aggression' with respect to Estonia and Latvia. After partial acceptance of the Soviet condition concerning the guarantee to the Baltic states, the British said that they would accept the condition if no countries were mentioned by name. Moreover, the guarantee could be granted if those countries asked for it. At this stage, on 1 July, Soviet diplomacy came up officially with the reference to 'indirect aggression'. For their part, however, the Baltic countries stressed continually the importance of their policy of neutrality. The Baltic countries were perfectly aware of the decisive character of the French—British—Soviet negotiations concerning their fates. Most of all they feared that the imposition of conditions would be against 'the highest interest of state'. Both the frequency of contacts with the Foreign Office concerning this matter, and the unambiguous presentation of their stance, could have left no doubt in London that one of the basic principles of the policy of the Baltic states was the formula 'nothing about us without us'. They strongly objected to the possibility of a guarantee granted to them by the Soviet Union without their consent. They expressed the desire to accept a guarantee from only one power, that power being Great Britain. Estonia would be ready to accept the guarantee of four powers, i.e. Great Britain, the USSR, Germany, and Poland, but not of its southern neighbour only. Latvia suggested that a possible 73

Th. Munch-Petersen, The Strategy of Phoney War, pp. 22-3.

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MIEGZYSLAW NUREK

guarantee of three powers should be formulated in such a way that it would secure the neutrality of the Baltic states. As to Poland it formulated its stance in three points: (1) the Polish Government could not agree that the name of Poland should be mentioned in the arrangement between the Western powers and the Soviet Union; (2) that the idea that assistance should be granted by the Soviet Union to an attacked country without the latter's consent was not acceptable with regard to Poland, and (3) in the opinion of the Polish Government the definition of' Soviet assistance' would only be possible through direct negotiation between the attacked country and the Soviet Union. 74 The Swedish Government stressed to Great Britain the desire ' with her three Northern neighbour states, to pursue a policy of strict neutrality'. In its opinion, a threat to its policy of neutrality would at the same time constitute a threat to the security of the entire Baltic Sea region.75 Although some questions concerning the negotiations of Great Britain, France, and the USSR in summer 1939 can only be answered after consulting still inaccessible archive materials, answers to some puzzles concerning the negative British attitude toward the Soviet formula of so-called 'indirect aggression' seem possible. Great Britain did not want to agree to an exclusive Soviet right to decide whether the development of the situation in Estonia and Latvia constituted a threat to the USSR and thus a justification for Soviet military action. This reluctance to do so was 'in order to prevent pushing Finland and the Baltic states toward the German camp'. With such an unexpected development of the situation the Germans would gain what had been impossible to acquire earlier in spite of many attempts. It is difficult to ascertain whether or not London was also against the Baltic states'joining the German sphere of influence because it would mean the encirclement of Poland. It is certain, however, that this would, in fact, have been the reality. 74

75

Memorandum by R. Barclay, 23 June 1939. The Attitude of Finland, Latvia and Estonia and Poland and Romania towards inclusion in the proposed Anglo-Franco—Soviet Pact. PRO, FO 371/23070 C9598/3356/18. See also D. M. Crowe Jr, 'Great Britain and the Baltic States 1938—1939' in The Baltic States, p. 111; A. Dallin, 'The Baltic States between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia', in The Baltic States, pp. 1036°.; G. V. Rauch, The Baltic States, pp. 2o6ff. Lord Halifax to Sir E. Monson (Stockholm), 5 August 1939. PRO, FO 419/33, no. 37.

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Another important reason was fear of war with Germany, resulting from Soviet actions in the territory of the Baltic states. Leaving open the possibility that another country might involve Great Britain in war could never be approved in London, especially when there were still hopes of reaching a modus Vivendi with Hitler. It is evident that lack of agreement concerning the definition of indirect aggression was one of the main official reasons for the failure of French-British-Soviet negotiations. 76 Nevertheless, more general reasons stemmed from differences concerning the broad but unambiguous notion of the highest interest of powers conducting negotiations in Moscow. This involved ways of securing safety in Europe and in the Far East. It also included the problems of principles for the introduction of territorial changes and, above all, of avoiding involvement in military conflict.77 Prime Minister Chamberlain's stance towards the Soviet Union was based on the conviction that an alliance between Stalin and Hitler was impossible. To General Ironside's remark about the necessity of Britain's coming to terms with the USSR, Chamberlain ejaculated: 'The only thing we cannot do.' 78 Undoubtedly, only an alliance of powers could stop Germany in the summer of 1939, but ' neither Chamberlain nor Halifax was prepared to seek an alliance with the essential east European partner, Russia, until it was too late'. 79 It is interesting that although London had received information signifying the possibility of an agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union it did not change Chamberlain's stance. For instance, on 6 May 1939 the Foreign Office received information about a transfer to the German side of 'a new unexpected offer from the Soviet Union which might entirely change the situation'. 80 On 12 June the British consul in Tallinn sent Halifax a report which contained the opinion of the Estonian Foreign Ministry on the Soviet tactics in the negotiations with Great Britain and France. There was a conviction in Tallinn 'that this alliance would never be signed. If agreement were reached on the 76 77 78 79

80

See, for e x a m p l e : J . Charmley, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace (London, 1989), p . 191. J . Hiden, Germany and Europe 1919-1939 (London, 1977), p p . 1 0 4 - 5 ; M a c D o n a l d , The United States, Britain and Appeasement, pp. 162-3. W . E. Ironside, The Ironside Diaries 1937-1940 (London, 1962), 10 J u l y 1939, p . 78. B. Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars ((Oxford, 1980), p. 304. MacDonald, The United States, Britain and Appeasement, p. 162: 'It was hoped to keep Moscow in play until 10 October when the weather would render a German attack on Poland impossible.' DBFP, II, 5, nos. 377, 413.

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subject of the Baltic states, the Soviet Union would then raise the question of the Far East.' 81 Regardless of these opinions, concrete German statements were more attractive to Stalin. On 29 July 1939 the German ambassador in Moscow informed Molotov that Hitler was ready to recognise the basic interests of the Soviet Union in the Baltic region.82 The German-Soviet non-aggression pact of 23 August aroused astonishment and uneasiness among all the Baltic countries, although its secret clauses83 about the division of the spheres of influence of both signatories on the territories of Poland, Finland and the Baltic states were unknown at that time.84 This arrangement, and also the agreement concluded between Britain and Poland two days later, did not change earlier principles of British policy with respect to the Baltic Sea region in wartime. German aggression against Poland in September 1939 increased anxiety among the Scandinavian and the Baltic states. A mood of hopelessness dominated in the face of the as yet unknown results of the policy of the powers. Hoping to avoid war and maintain their own independence, these countries officially confirmed the continuation of their policy of strict neutrality. The interest of Britain in the Baltic Sea region concentrated on the trade with the Baltic states which had existed before September. However, most diplomatic activity was centred on obtaining assurances from the countries of the Baltic Sea region that they would restrict trade with Nazi Germany to a level which would not exceed its peacetime value. Britain's reluctance to become directly 81

82 83

84

W. Gallienne (Tallinn) to Lord Halifax, 12 June 1939. PRO, FO 419/33, no. 165. The Poles, on the other hand, claimed that the only reason why the Soviet Union demanded approval from Warsaw for the crossing of Polish territory by the Red Army was to gain a pretext to break off negotiations with Great Britain and France. In Polish opinion the Russians could at any time replace this demand by another, e.g. concerning the Aland Islands. Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw) to Lord Halifax, 22 August 1939. PRO FO 371/2296 Gi 1710/15/18. The Russians saw any possible aid in the form of raw materials and war materials for Poland only as a commercial problem, 'which had nothing to do with the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact and military convention'. An interview: Marshal Voroshilov for Izvestia of 27 August 1939. PRO, FO 371/23073 C112154/3356/18. Hiden, Germany and Europe, p. 104; MacDonald, The United States, Britain and Appeasement, p. 163. See Diary and Papers of Jan Szembek, pp. 7 5 2 - 6 2 ; S. Hoare, Nine Troubled Years (London, J 954)» PP- 357-64See e.g.: H . Batowski, ' S k a n d y n a w i a - neutralnosc z a wszelka c e n e ' ( S c a n d i n a v i a neutrality a t a n y price) in Z polityki miedzynarodwej XX wieku (From Twentieth Century International Relations (Krakow, 1979)), p . 309; Taylor, English History, p . 550; o n 31 August 1939, the Soviet U n i o n ratified the treaty of 23 August. For the text of Molotov's speech of 31 August, see DBFP, ser. 3, 7, Appendix, p p . 615-22.

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engaged in resolving the security problems of the Baltic region resulted mainly from the fact that the political composition of that part of Europe had, in general, no direct influence on Britain's security. On the other hand, one cannot ignore the fact that there also existed factors independent of British intentions, which precluded Britain's meeting the expectations of the Baltic Sea countries. One of the most important was the objective impossibility for Britain to protect the Baltic Sea countries simultaneously against the hostility of Germany and the friendship of the USSR.

CHAPTER 3

Nazi German policy towards the Baltic states on the eve of the Second World War Rolf Ahmann

The Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania - lay at the heart of the strategic considerations and various negotiations of the major powers in 1939. Historians have looked at the Baltic issue in Soviet—Western negotiations in the spring and summer of 1939. They have also analysed German—Soviet contacts and negotiations leading to the pact of 24 August 1939, whose secret protocol divided the Baltic region into a Nazi German and a Soviet sphere of interest along the Lithuanian-Latvian border. Surprisingly they have not looked in detail at Nazi German policy towards the Baltic states before the German—Soviet pact. 1 Did Nazi Germany have a special policy for these states on the eve of the Second World War and if so, how and when did it start, what were its features and when did it end? Hitler's writings before 1933 elaborate the idea of gaining living 1

This is a shortcoming of otherwise valuable and interesting studies, e.g. G. Vigrabs, 'Die Stellungnahme der Westmachte und Deutschlands zu den baltischen Staaten im Friihling und Sommer 1939', Vierteljahreshefte fur £eitgeschichte, 7 (1959), pp. 261-79; E. Ceginskas, Die baltische Frage in den Grossmdchteverhandlungen 1939 (Bonn, 1967); A. Dallin, 'The Baltic

States between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia' in V. S. Vardys and R. J. Misiunas, eds., The Baltic States in Peace and War 1917-1945 (Philadelphia, 1978), pp. 97-109; S. Myllyniemi, Die baltische Krise 1938-1941 (Stuttgart, 1979). The economic side of Nazi Germany's relations with Estonia and Latvia is covered by H. E. Volkmann, 'Okonomie und Machtpolitik. Lettland und Estland im politisch-okonomischen Kalkuel des Dritten Reiches (1933—1940)' in Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 2 (1976), pp. 471-500. For a fuller account of the literature see R. Ahmann, Nichtangriffspakte: Entwicklung und operative Nutzung in Europa 1922-1939. Mit einem Ausblick auf die Renaissance des Nichtangriffsvertrages nach dem

£weiten Weltkrieg (Baden-Baden, 1988), pp. 543-686. See also R. Ahmann 'The German treaties with Estonia and Latvia of 7 June 1939 - bargaining ploy or an alternative for German—Soviet understanding?', Journal of Baltic Studies, 20 (1989), pp. 337-64. The more recent articles by Helmut Meyer, 'Bauern auf dem Schachbrett: Die baltischen Staaten', in H. Altrinchter and J. Becker, eds., Kriegsausbruch 1939 (Munich, 1989), pp. 178—204 and G. von Pistohlkors 'Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt und die baltischen Staaten', in E. Oberlander, ed., Hitler-Stalin-Pakt

1939. Das Ende Ostmitteleuropas? (Frankfurt am Main,

pp. 75-97, concentrate more on the situation in the Baltic states. 5O

1989),

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51

space at the expense of the Soviet Union. They hardly mention Poland, but the following abstract statement relates to the Baltic region: 'What the Mediterranean Sea is to Italy, the Eastern Coast of the Baltic Sea is to Germany'. 2 This simple sentence seems to have been important to Hitler, for he repeated it many years later in his conversation with the Italian Foreign Minister, Ciano, on 12 August 1939.3 There can be no doubt that Hitler's long-standing aggressive intentions in eastern Europe and in particular against the USSR were also directed against the three Baltic states. In his long-term plans they formed an important part of the wider schemes to establish a German Grosswirtschaftsraum and gain living space in the East. From 1933 onwards Hitler's short-term and middle-term objectives also involved the Baltic region. It had military, strategic and economic importance for Nazi Germany in the context of German-Polish as well as German-Soviet relations. Trade with the Baltic states was especially important for the Nazi economy which looked for trading partners who could supplement the dwindling German food supply and, in case of war, would be 'im Bereich der eigenen Waffen'.4 The Baltic countries had substantial German minorities, and were of strategic importance for controlling the Baltic Sea. As the 'hinterland' of East Prussia they were of strategic importance in any German conflict with Poland, and they could also form a bridge or a barrier to German-Soviet contacts. Shortly after coming to power Hitler initiated a major change in Germany's eastern policy. He put an end to Germany's partnership with the Soviet Union while seeking an understanding with Pilsudki's Poland in order both to secure German rearmament against Franco-Polish intervention and to establish co-operation with Poland against the USSR. Until 1937 attempts to bind Poland closer to Germany against the USSR dominated Nazi Germany's eastern policy and set the pattern for its policy towards the Baltic states. 5 Poland and Nazi Germany successively rejected Soviet offers to guarantee the Baltic states in 1933-4. Both refused the Eastern security pact scheme devised by France and the USSR in 1934. Nazi 2

'Was fur Italien das mittellandische Meer ist, ist fur Deutschland die Ostkiiste der Ostsee' Hitler's Zweites Buck. Ein Dokument aus dem Jahre 1928, with an introduction and commentary

3 5

by von G. L. Weinberg (Stuttgart, 1961), p. 206. See Akten zur Deutschen Auswaertigen Politik (hereafter ADAP) Series D, vol. VII, doc. 43, 4 p. 35. Quoted from Volkmann, 'Okonomie und Machtpolitik', p. 477. The Baltic issue in German-Polish contacts in particular in 1933, 1935 and 1936 deserves special attention and will be looked at in detail in another article.

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Germany ignored or rejected Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian requests for non-aggression pacts like the one concluded between Germany and Poland in January 1934. At first the Nazi Government seemed to be satisfied with the isolation of Lithuania, which had territorial conflicts with Germany over the Klaipeda district and with Poland over the old Lithuanian capital, Vilnius. Nazi Germany also seemed content that the Latvian Government did not implement its threat in 1935 to conclude an assistance treaty with the Soviet Union if Germany refused to participate in an Eastern security pact. Only Estonia, which had growing conflicts with the USSR but maintained good relations with Poland and Germany, received special German attention. In 1935 German naval exercises revealed the strategic importance of Estonian and Finnish islands for a possible German naval blockade of the Red Navy's access to the Baltic Sea. In the same year Germany concluded an agreement with Estonia which undertook to supply the German Navy with shale oil. In 1936, conversing with Akel, the Estonian minister in Germany and designated Foreign Minister of Estonia, Hitler called Estonia what he had previously called Poland: a 'glacis' of the European anti-bolshevist powers against the Soviet Union. 6 At the same time the head of German military intelligence, Admiral Canaris, established closer relations with the Estonian general staff.7 The year 1937 witnessed signs of increasing competition between the USSR and Germany for military influence in the Baltic region, with Nazi Germany concentrating on Estonia and the USSR on Latvia. The German Panzerkreuzer 'Leipzig' paid a visit to Tallinn and a Soviet Panzerkreuzer visited Riga. German officers observed Estonian military manoeuvres while Latvian officers were invited to the Red Army's manoeuvres. In spring 1937 the Nazi Government sent a new naval attache to the ministry in Reval (Tallinn). Captain von Bonin's brief was restricted to Estonia and Finland, while responsibility for Latvia fell to the German naval attache at the embassy in Moscow. Although this arrangement was changed in response to protests from the Latvian Government, the 6 7

ADAP, Series C, vol. v 2, doc. 378, p. 590. Myllyniemi, Die baltische Krise, p. 36. See, for the previously mentioned German naval plans of a defence against the Soviet Union in the Baltic Sea in 1935 to 1937, G. A. Gemzell, Hitler und Skandinavien. Der Kampffur einen maritimen Operationsplan (Lund, 1965), p. 67, footnotes

14 and 15.

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53 8

Germans continued to be suspicious about Latvia. The expansionist aims Hitler outlined in November 1937 still had nothing to do with the Baltic states, but concentrated on Austria, Czechoslovakia and possibilities for a future German attack on France. As GermanPolish co-operation deteriorated in 1938, Nazi Germany's attention towards the Baltic states increased in all aspects. In March 1938 Poland issued an ultimatum to Lithuania, demanding an end to the Vilnius conflict and the reopening of normal diplomatic relations. The possibility that Poland would take military action against Lithuania induced Nazi Germany to clarify its intentions towards the Baltic region and to start its own military preparations to secure its interests in Lithuania. According to a report of 2 April 1938 from the German ambassador in Italy, which von Weizsacker quotes in his memoirs, Hitler now stated that ' The Baltic area is - apart from the Sudeten-Germans - our aim. The corridor and eventually the border states (Randstaaten) must be of interest to us. ' 9 At the same time German naval plans to block the Red Navy's access to the Baltic Sea in case of war gained a new impetus. Summarising the outcome of the latest naval exercise, Admiral Raeder pointed out on 12 April 1938: Depending on the situation we will have to decide whether it would be better initially to respect the neutrality of countries such as these, and not to prepare for a counterblow until the enemy violates this neutrality. In any case, we can be sure that these countries would regard us not as an enemy, but as an ally, which could be of crucial importance both in carrying out operations and in keeping down the forces required. We must not forget that even small countries, especially if their geographical location is favourable - for example, Denmark, Finland or Estonia - can as additional enemies be very expensive in terms of forces.10

The Polish Government softened its demands towards Lithuania in response to German remonstrations, and the Sudeten crisis shortly afterwards witnessed German-Polish co-operation against Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless the issue of Germany's future policy towards 8

9 10

See, for the aspects mentioned here: Annual report by von Schack (Riga), 30 December 1937, Politisches Archiv des Auswdrtigen Amies, (hereafter PAAA), Pol I, Vbd., Landerakten Lettland, vol. 1 and the file PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Riga, Deutscher Marineattache in Lettland. E. von Weizsacker, Erinnerungen (Munich and Freiburg im Breisgau, 1950), p. 158. Translation of the quotation by Gemzell, Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien p. 64.

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the Baltic region had come to the fore and its implementation was delayed only until after the Munich conference, when Nazi Germany attempted to clarify its future relations with Poland. Several incidents had convinced Hitler that he could not rely on Polish benevolent neutrality in the event of a German attack on France. The so-called 'global solution' which von Ribbentrop presented to the Polish Government on 24 October 1938 was intended to pin down Poland. By demanding Danzig and an extraterritorial motorway and railway through Poland the Nazi Government tried to prepare the strategic ground for a future German attack on the USSR via Poland. Now even Polish attempts to improve Polish-Lithuanian relations were attacked as 'Polish attempts to make Lithuania largely dependent on Poland. This would mean that Poland would encircle East Prussia, and that Germany would be cut off from Estonia and Latvia. 5l1 While the three Baltic states followed the example of the Scandinavian states and, stressing their neutrality, distanced themselves from the League's obligation to impose sanctions, Nazi Germany gradually strengthened its influence in the Baltic area. During the Sudeten crisis Germany's suspicion increased that Latvia would not resist or oppose Soviet action via Latvian territory against Germany's policy. In particular Germany suspected that the Soviets could circumvent a German naval blockade in the Finnish-Estonian region by using Latvian ports, and that Soviet aircraft might be permitted to overfly Latvian territory. 12 The German minister in Latvia, Eberhard von Schack, even gained the impression that the Latvian Army command was ' Russophile' and that a Soviet military move into Latvia at that time might have been welcomed by the Latvian population. Von Schack reported that the Latvian Foreign Minister, Vilhelms Munters, was one of the few politicians in Latvia to acknowledge the importance of Nazi Germany, and in von Schack's view Germany would be well advised to support him. However a series of articles published by Munters in November 1938 led von Schack to the conclusion that keeping Latvia afraid of German countermeasures was ' the best guarantee' against a Latvian pact with the USSR. 13 At first the Nazi 11 12 13

ADAP, D, vol. V, doc. 364, p. 406. Ahmann, Nichtangriffspakte, pp. 56if, 654. Reports by von Schack (Riga), 22 October 1938, PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Riga, Politische Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Lettland, vol. 7, and 17 November 1938 PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Riga, Po 2, Aussere Politik Lettlands, vol. 2.

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Government concentrated on improving German-Latvian trade. The third protocol to the German-Latvian trade agreement signed on 12 November 1938 increased the minimal contingent of German-Latvian trade in export and import from 24.3 million RM to 35 million RM, which was higher than the best levels of German-Latvian trade in the 1930s.14 In an article published in the Revalsche £eitung in June 1938, von Ribbentrop had emphasised the common interests of Estonia and Nazi Germany in preventing Soviet interference in the Baltic region. German-Estonian relations remained close and von Ribbentrop's article was still used as a guideline for Nazi policy towards Estonia in mid April 1939.15 The Lithuanian Government, like that of Latvia, had found some relief in Hitler's renunciation of further territorial claims after the Munich conference. But shortly after the start of German-Polish talks, Germany started to review GermanLithuanian relations. Even the Lithuanian decision to end ' the state of war' in the Klaipeda district at the end of October was not enough to satisfy the Nazi Government. As the German diplomat von Grundherr indicated on 25 November 1938, Germany now wanted Lithuania to follow closely Germany's military and political interests.16 The Polish-Soviet communique of 26 November, reaffirming the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1932, was a signal that Poland was unwilling to give in to German demands. It also raised Nazi Germany's suspicion that Soviet attempts for a Soviet-Polish guarantee of the Baltic states might follow.17 Nazi policy towards the Baltic states went a step further. On 1 December 1938 von Ribbentrop gathered a group of experts to advise him whether strong diplomatic pressure would be enough to make Lithuania concede the Klaipeda district to Germany. The experts regarded this as unlikely but suggested that the Klaipeda question should quickly be resolved in Germany's favour. Apparently Hitler himself rejected any action against Lithuania at this time and demanded ' complete silence' on this issue, in order to avoid provoking Polish action in Lithuania which Nazi Germany would find it difficult to counter at 14 15 16

See the documents in the file PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Riga, Wirtschaftsabteilung, Wi 65a 1, Wirtschaftsbeziehungen Lettland-Deutschland (1939), Heft 5. ADAP, D, VI, doc. 260 and annex to report by Frohwein (Reval), 24 April 1939, PAAA, Pol VI P03, Politische Beziehungen Estlands zu Russland, vol. 1. 17 ADAP, D, V, doc. 364, p. 406. ADAP, D, V, doc. 365, 368.

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a time of highly sensitive German-Polish talks.18 The aim was to keep open the option of exercising dominant influence over the whole of Lithuania. As a friendly, even tractable hinterland, Lithuania would be of inestimable importance for East Prussia, not only economically, but also for military reasons. It would ensure that the threat of encirclement by foreign powers was obviated once and for all, and that Germany's access to the Baltic region was kept open.19 At the same time, in December 1938, the German minister in Latvia, Eberhard von Schack, was replaced by Hans-Ulrich Kotze. Before becoming German minister in Riga in 1934, von Schack had been deputy attache under von Papen in the United States, where he was accused of spying. But to conclude from this, as does the Soviet historian Sipols, that von Schack's role was similar to that of von Papen in German-Austrian relations is grossly to overestimate von Schack's importance. According to von Ruediger, von Schack was posted to Riga as a transition towards retirement, and his influence on the Latvian Government from 1934 to 1938 was virtually nil.20 The reports sent by von Schack confirm this impression. Hans-Ulrich Kotze was of quite different calibre. He was an experienced diplomat and former head of the German Foreign Minister's office under von Neurath, who had been replaced by von Ribbentrop. It may be that von Schack was due for retirement and that von Ribbentrop wanted to replace Kotze when he took over from von Neurath as Foreign Minister. However Kotze was to be much more influential in Riga than von Schack ever was and Kotze's appointment coincided with Nazi Germany paying increased attention to Latvia. Similarly Frohwein had been appointed German minister in Reval (Tallinn) in 1936, when German-Estonian relations had become more important for Nazi Germany. 21 With German-Polish relations deteriorating, Nazi Germany's new attentiveness towards the Baltic region bore fruit in the first months of 1939. The Polish-Lithuanian rapprochment after the Munich conference made no progress. German-Estonian relations 18 19 20

21

ADAP, D, V, doc. 370, p. 411; see also doc. 375. ADAP, D, V, doc. 375, p. 416. Wilhelm v o n Ruediger, Aus dem letzten Kapitel deutsch—baltischer Geschichte in Lettland 1919-1939, e. Teil (Hannover, 1955), p. 4 8 ; V . Sipols, The Latvian Bourgeois Diplomacy (Riga, 1970), p. 46; Ahmann, Nichtangriffspakte, pp. 564^ Ahmann, Nichtangriffspakte, pp. 564^.

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did not suffer from the German-Polish conflict, and the Estonian Government showed itself uninterested in a possible German solution of the Klaipeda conflict with Lithuania. Even in Latvia the German diplomats noted 'a certain swing' towards a less anti-German attitude at the end of January 1939. This was also registered by the Soviets.22 Together with the Franco-German agreement of December 1938 and the special attention Hitler paid towards the Soviet ambassador during the New Year's reception of diplomats in Berlin, Nazi Germany appeared to have isolated Poland diplomatically. The entry of German troops into Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939 contravened the Munich Agreement and raised Western resistance to further German expansion. On 21 March Hitler tried for the last time to persuade the Polish Government to agree to the German demands. A day later the Nazis pressured the Lithuanian Government to concede the Klaipeda district to Germany in a German—Lithuanian pact of non-aggression. On 28 March the Soviet Government sent a note to Estonia and Latvia warning the Baltic states that any restriction of their integrity would have severe consequences. For the moment Germany retained its influence in the Baltic states without further initiatives. Even Munters stated in an official speech on 2 April 1939 'that Greater Germany has gained the key position in central Europe'. 23 He reiterated the Latvian Government's wish for a German—Latvian non-aggression pact, hoping to obtain from Germany recognition or a guarantee of the Latvian borders, or at least a means of calming Latvian and also Soviet anxieties about Germany's intentions in the Baltic region. The Baltic states, and Latvia in particular, became the focus of the strategic considerations of both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. While Nazi Germany had aimed to prevent Soviet interference against its policy in the Baltic Sea, the Soviet Government had for some time apparently feared a German attack on the USSR via the Estonian-Finnish region. From 1935 to 1937 Soviet plans to counter such German actions seem to have concentrated on Latvia and Latvian ports. From April to December 1938, while Germany was paying more attention to all the Baltic states, emissaries of Stalin seem to have tried to obtain Finnish ADAP, D. V, doc. 385, p. 425 and docs. 382, 392; Myllyniemi, Die baltische Krise, p. 41. Report by Kotze (Riga), 5 April 1939, PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Riga, Politische Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Lettland, vol. 7 (translation).

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permission to establish Soviet bases on Finnish islands — without success. 24

In the first months of 1939 Soviet attention towards the Baltic-Finnish region increased further. On 10 April, in the early stages of Soviet-Western talks about preventing further German expansion, Litvinov instructed the Soviet ambassador in London: 'When you talk with Halifax ask him sometime whether he had talked with Beck about Latvia and the possible seizure by Poland of a Latvian port. He will, of course, deny it, but it is the tone of the denial that is important.' 25 Apparently the issue had not been discussed between Halifax and Beck. However the objective of Litvinov's instruction may have been to clarify Britain's attitude towards the occupation of a Latvian port by one of Britain's possible allies against Nazi Germany. As early as May 1936 articles published in Poslednija Nowosti in Paris, which had favoured a stronger Soviet naval policy in co-operation with Britain against Nazi Germany, had argued that while Soviet naval rearmament could be a task for generations the USSR could seek another outlet to the sea 'via Riga'. 26 In 1939 the Soviet leaders seem to have realised increasingly that Nazi Germany's aggressive military plans were not yet directed against the USSR, but against Poland and the Western powers. However, in its negotiations with Britain and France the USSR insisted in particular on its right to render assistance to the Baltic states even without their consent. Whatever the objectives of the Soviet leadership were in 1939-and there are still many open questions - rumours and reports about Soviet activities increased Germany's suspicion that the Soviet Union might interfere via the Baltic region if Germany attacked Poland. On 12 May 1939, for example, the German minister in Finland, von Blucher, reported that the Finnish Government had received information from London and Paris about Potemkin's negotiations in Warsaw. According to this information, it had been planned that in case of a German-Polish war the Red Army would occupy Estonia and Latvia and would from there operate against Germany. The German ambassador in 24

25

26

S. Allard, Stalin and Hitler. Die sowjetrussische Aussenpolitik 1930-1941 (Bern and Munich, !974)> PP- 72ffV . M . Falin and A. A. Falin and A. A. Gromyko et al. eds., Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War II (September 1938 —August 1939), Documents and Records (Moscow, 1973), vol. 1, no. 221, p. 327. See report of the German 'Auslandsdienst', 15 M a y 1936, PAAA, Pol. I. M . , P038, no. 3, Russland, Flottenriistungen Russlands.

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Warsaw could not confirm this, but von Blticher repeated that the Finnish foreign minister stuck to his story.27 On 11 April, a day after Litvinov's instruction to Maisky in London, Hitler issued the order for the preparation of an attack against Poland. In it he stated that during the military operations against Poland it could become necessary to occupy the 'Randstaaten 3 up to the old 'Courland' border. This was the southern half of Latvia, and occupying it would have given Germany control over all major Lithuanian and Latvian ports. But two days later, on 13 April 1939, the sentence was removed from Hitler's directive. 28 More surprisingly, two weeks later, on 28 April, while Hitler declared the German-Polish non-aggression pact of 1934 and the British-German naval agreement of 1935 invalid in his speech to the Reichstag, von Ribbentrop secretly offered Estonia, Latvia, Finland, and the three Scandinavian states bilateral pacts of non-aggression. Germany later claimed that these offers were made in response to requests by Estonia and Latvia. Germany pursued negotiations with vigour only in the cases of Estonia, Latvia and Denmark, and in fact concluded such pacts with Denmark on 31 May 1939, and with Estonia and Latvia on 7 June 1939. What did Nazi Germany hope to gain by initiating, conducting and concluding these negotiations with Estonia and Latvia from April to June 1939? The crucial dates for the German initiatives and subsequent negotiations with Estonia and Latvia are as follows:29 13 April, when the sentence implying a possible German military occupation of Lithuania and half of Latvia was removed from Hitler's order to prepare an attack on Poland. 15 April, when President Roosevelt sent a telegram to Hitler asking the German dictator to calm international tensions by offering pacts of non-aggression to a number of countries, including Estonia and Latvia. The period from 18 April to Hitler's birthday celebrations on the 20 April, during which Nazi Germany received information about the exchanges between Britain, France, Poland, and the 27

28 29

ADAP, D, VI, doc. 389, p. 423, footnotes 5 and 6. The confirmation by von Blucher which the editors of the ADAP series have not found is outlined in the circular of the German Foreign Ministry of 31 May 1939, PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Riga, Po 20/4, Neutralitatsfrage der baltischen Staaten. A h m a n n , Nichtangriffspakte, p p . 5 7 3 , 654ff. For the following account see, in detail Ahmann, Nichtangriffspakte, pp. 568-686. A shorter outline is given in Ahmann, 'The German treaties with Estonia and Latvia', pp. 347ff.

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USSR on guaranteeing the Baltic states and Soviet assistance to them. On 20 April Hitler paid special attention to his guests from the Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian military commands, while the USSR started its Baltic fleet manoeuvres earlier than planned. 28 April, when von Ribbentrop offered bilateral non-aggression pacts not only to Latvia and Estonia but also to Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. 2 and 4 May, when the first German treaty drafts were given to the Estonian and the Latvian ministers in Berlin. 16 May, when von Weizsacker from the German Foreign Ministry stated Germany's intention of signing the treaties with Estonia and Latvia on 19 May, an objective that was not achieved because of Latvian objections to the text. 23 May, when according to notes made later by his military adjutant Hitler told the German military commanders that Danzig was not the issue. The real objectives were to gain living space in the east, to secure the food supply for the Germans and to solve 'the Baltic problem'. 30 26 May, when, after the German offers had been rejected by Sweden, Norway, and also Finland (although the latter had initially reacted positively to the German offer), GermanEstonian and German—Latvian negotiations were concluded and von Weizsacker could report that the treaties were now ready to be signed. Again, Latvian requests for clarifications delayed the signing. 7 June, when after the German-Danish pact was concluded, both the German-Estonian and the German-Latvian pacts were signed in Berlin. In his conversation with the Latvian minister on 4 May von Ribbentrop stated that Nazi Germany had been wanting to conclude such a pact with Latvia for a long time. The Klaipeda conflict with Lithuania, he suggested, had been the only obstacle, but 'now the way is clear'. 31 Yet the Klaipeda conflict had already been resolved by the German-Lithuanian pact of non-aggression concluded on 22 March, after the German-Polish negotiations had collapsed. At 30

31

ADAP, F, VI, doc. 433, p. 479. For an evaluation and critique, see A. Hillgruber, 'Quellen und Quellenkritik zur Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges', Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 14 (1964), pp. 110-26. 'Jetzt sei die Sicht klar', ADAP, D, VI, doc. 329, p. 351.

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that time, however, Nazi Germany did not reply to Latvian requests for a non-aggression pact with Germany, and on 11 April Hitler was apparently still thinking of occupying the southern half of Latvia. It is also misleading to see the German offers as a response to the Roosevelt telegram.32 Roosevelt's telegram in fact provoked von Ribbentrop to demand declarations from Latvia and Estonia as well as from other countries that they had not authorised Roosevelt's proposal, and that they did not feel threatened by Nazi Germany. Munters took the opportunity to express his regret that the German Government had not reacted positively to his earlier suggestions of a German-Latvian pact of non-aggression. Von Weizsacker's reaction was to call Munters' answer unintelligible and to instruct the German minister in Riga to tell Munters that unless he gave the expected negative answers, he would be regarded as a supporter of Roosevelt and suffer the consequences.33 According to the German Foreign Ministry's chief interpreter, Paul Schmidt, the German treaty offers of 28 April were only 'indirectly' connected with the telegram from Roosevelt.34 On the whole, as the following evidence suggests, Roosevelt's telegram seems to have been merely an additional trigger for the German initiatives, which had been mooted around 13 April, before Roosevelt's telegram had arrived in Berlin, and were subsequently only delayed. German interests had been the decisive reason for the overtures for, around 13 April, Germany's attention was focused on three issues related to the Baltic and the Scandinavian states. They grew in importance in the following days and apparently formed the background to the German offers on 28 April. It was in discussions of these issues that the Nazi Government expressed the short-term objectives it wished to achieve by concluding non-aggression pacts with Estonia and Latvia. One of these issues was the possibility of the Baltic states becoming involved in what the Nazi Government regarded as British and French attempts to encircle Germany. On 12 April 1939 von Ribbentrop sent a circular to the German ministries and embassies instructing them to counter such attempts. After various rumours 32 33 34

Myllyniemi, Die baltische Krise (p. 47) for e x a m p l e , regards t h e Roosevelt telegram as t h e 'primus motor' of the German initiatives. ADAP, D . V I , docs. 2 1 3 , 214, 228, 230. Paul Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Buehne ig2j~4j. Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswdrtigen Ami mit den Staatsmannern Europas (Bonn, 1954), p. 436; see also Ahmann, Mchtangriffspakte, pp.

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and reports, the Nazi Government had become afraid that the Baltic states could be induced to accept a Western guarantee scheme. On 6 April the German Foreign Ministry became aware of the note which the USSR had sent to the Baltic states on 28 March. After further inquiries the Nazi Government was satisfied with Estonia's and Latvia's answers to Moscow on 7 April. But on the following day the German minister in Estonia reported that, according to a 'prominent Estonian military personage', Estonia had received the offer of a guarantee from Britain. The German Foreign Ministry tried to check this information about Estonia, particularly after the announcement of a British guarantee in favour of Greece and Romania on 13 April. The Estonian Government's denial was followed by a further report from the German ministry in Reval that other informants had confirmed the information, specifying that it had been a British-Polish inquiry. 35 The Polish Government apparently suggested a Polish guarantee for the Baltic states during the Estonian commander General Laidoner's visit to Poland from 17-24 April. 36 A day after Hitler's birthday celebrations the Nazi Government denied a report in the Finnish newspaper Helsinki Sanomat, which claimed that the Soviet ambassador had told the German Foreign Ministry that the Soviet Union would protect the Baltic states against a German attack. ' In view of the present nervousness even in the Baltic states' the Nazi Government felt it necessary to stress that it had no aggressive intentions against them. 37 After receiving information about Soviet assistance arid guarantee schemes proposed to Britain and France, the German Foreign Ministry on 22 April instructed its ministers in the Baltic states to warn the governments of these states that any leaning towards these ' unreasonable Soviet Russian ideas' would be regarded as participation in, or association with, 'the other combinations originating in London'. 38 The objective of the 35

See, for the aspects mentioned: telegram b y Bismarck to the German ministry in Riga, 7 April 1939, PAAA, Deutsche Gesandschaft Riga, P o 2 0 / 4 , Neutralitytsfrage der baltischen Staaten; ADAP, D , V I , docs. 186, 189, 196 (in particular p. 198, footnote 2), 202. See also the following reports from Kotze (Riga) a n d Kordt (London), ADAP, D , V I , docs. 230,233. For the background of Kordt's information about the British-French-Soviet talks see D. C. Watt, How War came. The immediate origins of the Second World War,

36 37 38

1938-$)

(London, 1989). See the news in: Osteuropa, X I V ( 1 9 3 8 - 3 9 ) , p. 557. See also B. Meissner, Die Sowjetunion, die baltischen Staaten und das Volkerrecht (Cologne, 1956), p. 32. V o n Grundherr's notes, 21 April 1939, PAAA, Pol. V I , P o 2, Baltikum, Politische Beziehungen des Baltikums z u Deutschland, vol. 1. ADAP, D. VI, doc. 246, p. 254.

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German-Lithuanian treaty of 22 March had been to sever any links between Lithuania and Poland. On 22 May Hitler warned the Lithuanian foreign minister that for Germany the essential basis of that treaty was that Lithuania would accept no commitments which were directed against German interests. 'In the present situation, this includes in particular any political move towards, or ties with, Poland'. 39 During the negotiations with Estonia and Latvia, Nazi Germany demanded an unrestricted neutrality obligation valid even in the event of German aggression against third states. Much to the annoyance of the Germans, Estonia and Latvia remained in contact with the British Government, but apparently concluded that Britain did not have severe objections to their signing non-aggression pacts with Nazi Germany. 40 Latvian resistance to the unrestricted neutrality clause delayed the conclusion of the non-aggression pacts. Munters gave in after it had become apparent that the USSR was demanding the right of assistance to the Baltic states even without their consent.41 On 7 June when the pacts were signed, Hitler stressed in his conversation with Munters that Germany expected Latvia's neutrality. 42 Internally it was noted on the German side that by signing these pacts, Estonia and Latvia would have to reject the idea c of their independence being guaranteed by other states and of their being drawn into any combination of powers in any way. ?43 The second issue was the export trade of the Baltic and Scandinavian states with Nazi Germany in case of war. Hitler's order for the preparation of an attack on Poland on 11 April after the British guarantee to Poland meant that the German war economy had to be prepared for the end of the Polish export of food and raw materials to Germany and the possibility of a British naval blockade. 39 40

41 42 43

ADAP, D , V I , doc. 4 2 1 , p . 460 D. M. Crowe, Jr, 'Great Britain and the Baltic states 1938-39, in Vardys and Misiunas, eds., The Baltic States, pp. no—19. See also report by Kotze (Riga), 20 May 1939, PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Riga, Po 20/4, Neutralitatsfrage der baltischen Staaten; report by Frohwein (Reval), 22 May 1939, PAAA, Pol. VI, Po 23, no. 1, Baltikum, Neutralitatsfragen; ADAP, D, VI, doc. 390, p. 424, footnote 3. For the reaction of the Baltic states to Molotov's speech on 31 May, see Osteuropa, XIV (1938-39), p. 672 and ADAP, D. VI, doc. 484. Vigrabs, ' D i e S t e l l u n g n a h m e ' , p . 266. Anonymous note, 7 J u n e 1939, PAAA, Biiro Reichsaussenminister, Lettland, vol. 1 (translation). See also W o r m a n n ' s telegram to t h e G e r m a n embassy in Moscow, 8 J u n e 1939, PAAA, Deutsche Botschaft Moscow, Geheimakten, D , Pol. 2, Bait., Politische Beziehungen Deutschlands zu d e n baltischen Staaten, vol. 1.

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Nazi Germany could fill the gaps in its critical food supply only from nearby sources by extending its trade relations with the Baltic states and Denmark. Nazi Germany also had to secure its vital iron ore import from Sweden. On 12 April, von Weizsacker informed the Swedish minister that the recent Swedish-Finnish proposals in respect of the fortification of the Aland islands had increased Nazi Germany's fear of Sweden's shifting to the other side. He asked for a Swedish declaration that normal Swedish exports to Germany would not be reduced in case of war. The Swedish reply given on 18 April was negative. The Swedish minister even indicated that if war came Sweden might find it necessary to reduce its exports to Germany. Further German attempts to gain an assurance from Sweden via Finland failed. Also Sweden rejected the German offer of a non-aggression pact. Nevertheless, Sweden's reply reassured Germany that Sweden would maintain its neutral position. 44 The rumours reported by the Soviet minister in Lithuania on 23 March 1939 that Nazi Germany had tried to achieve an economic union with Latvia cannot be confirmed.45 However, Baltic exports to Nazi Germany gained in importance as preparations for war with Poland proceeded. To some extent Germany imported the same food products and raw materials from the Baltic states as from Poland. In April and May German economists analysed the impact on Germany of the loss of Polish imports, and investigated how these losses could be made up in case of a German attack on Poland. 46 It was therefore with good reason that Hitler, while renouncing the German-Polish non-aggression pact and the British—German naval agreement in his speech of 28 April, also stressed the economic importance of the Baltic states for Nazi Germany. The German—Lithuanian trade agreement signed on 20 May was formulated in such a way as to obscure the fact that it provided for most of Lithuania's exports to go to Nazi Germany. In his memorandum on German—Latvian trade relations of 6 June 1939 Clodius wrote:'The conclusion of a non-aggression treaty with Latvia might help to remove certain prejudices still entertained by leading Latvian circles, and thus 44 45 46

See, with more details, A h m a n n , Mchtangriffspakte, pp. 57gf., and the chapter about the German offers to Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, pp. 6 0 4 - 1 8 . Soviet Peace Efforts, vol. 1, no. 184, pp. 278f. See Informationsbericht N o . 7 by Dr. Kausch, 18 April 1939, Bundesarchiv Koblenz hereafter BA. £sq. 101, 4 6 ; ADAP, D , V I , doc. 387, annex 2 ; see also Volkmann, 'Okonomie und Machtpolitik', pp. 488ff.

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favourably influence the further development of our economic relations with Latvia'. 47 Hitler was even more direct in his conversation with the Latvian Foreign Minister, Munters, on the following day. He showed himself delighted about the conclusion of the treaties with Estonia and Latvia, for Germany 'is dependent on constant imports from these countries'. He explained that Germany was an enormous consumer and that ideological differences should not interfere with trade considerations. He suggested that trade treaties should be concluded not for one, two or five years, but for twenty or thirty years. 48 However, until the German-Soviet understanding, Nazi Germany was not successful in concluding such trade agreements with Estonia and Latvia. The economic protocol which had been negotiated by Denmark, but was also attached to the German treaties with Estonia and Latvia, stated simply that in case of a war between one of the signatories and a third state, the other could still pursue trade relations which accorded with the status of neutrality. On the German side this was interpreted more as ' the trade relations of both countries [Estonia and Latvia] with Great Britain should be reduced to a normal state'. 49 The third issue is highlighted by the change in Hitler's order of 11 April concerning the possible occupation and annexation of the southern part of Latvia with all the major Latvian ports. The German Navy had previously planned to block the Red Navy's access to the Baltic Sea in the small channel between Finland and Estonia in order to prevent Soviet interference against Nazi Germany. These plans gained in importance with Hitler's aim to localise the German war with Poland. Since Admiral Raeder's statement on 12 April 1938 the German naval command had stressed that Nazi Germany would be better advised politically to support strongly the neutrality of Estonia, Finland, Norway and Denmark, rather than using military means. 50 Latvia was not mentioned. In view of the alleged Russophile attitude of the Latvian military command and Germany's expectation that the USSR would try to circumvent a German naval blockade via Latvia, the 47

48 49 50

Note on German-Latvian trade relations by Clodius, 6 June 1939, PAAA, Biiro Reichsaussenminister, Lettland, vol. 1. O n the German—Lithuanian treaty, see Myllyniemi 'Die baltische Krise', p. 47. ADAP, D, V I , doc. 485, pp. 542-5. See Informationsbericht No. 55 by Dertinger, 8 J u n e 1939, BA. £sg. 101, 34. Gemzell, Hitler und Skandinanvien, p. 112, footnote 35.

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earlier German consideration of an occupation of Latvia had apparently not been given up. It still appeared in Hitler's order of 11 April. The basis of this plan was shaken by Hans Ulrich Kotze's letter to von Grundherr in Berlin on 13 April 1939 about his conversation with Munters on 8 April. The news sent by Kotze gained importance in the following weeks when Nazi Germany seemed more and more isolated and was unable to present the German-Japanese alliance Hitler and von Ribbentrop were working for. At the same time the international stage was dominated by Soviet—Western negotiations and by rumours about the Scandinavian and Baltic states being tempted to join the ' encirclement' of Nazi Germany. What had swayed Kotze and had led him to request a reappraisal in Berlin was the fact that Munters was considering 'whether it would not be possible to get a declaration in principle from Germany or to conclude a treaty with Germany which would remove the Latvian Government's fears concerning its southern frontiers so that it could stress much more clearly its determination to defend itself against the Soviet Union in case of need'. 51 Munters complained that he had made this proposal to Kotze's predecessor, von Schack, several times, but had never received any supportive answer from the German Government. But the argument Munters used here in favour of a German-Latvian non-aggression pact, namely that it would enable Latvia to stress its readiness to defend its neutrality and integrity against the USSR, had never appeared in any of von Schack's reports. With respect to German strategic planning against Soviet interference in the Baltic Sea this was indeed valuable information. The issue was discussed by von Weizsacker and von Ribbentrop. According to von Grundherr's reply to Kotze on 28 April, the Nazi Government had been unable to respond to Munters' request earlier 'especially taking into account that Latvia was among the states Roosevelt had named as being supposedly threatened'. 52 In their conversation of 8 April Munters had informed Kotze that in answering the Soviet note of 28 March the Latvian Government, like that of Estonia, had insisted on reserving to itself the sole and 51

52

Kotze's notes of his conversation with Munters, 8 April 1939, and his letter to Grundherr, 13 April 1939, both in PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Riga, Po 20, Neutralitatsfrage der baltischen Staaten. Von Grundherr's answer to Kotze, 28 April 1939 PAAA, Deutsche Gesandtschaft Riga, Po 20, Neutralitatsfrage der baltischen Staaten.

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exclusive right to decide on matters concerning its independence. He also mentioned that the Latvian generals had accepted the German invitation to take part in Hitler's birthday celebration in Berlin on 20 April. On that day Hitler impressed his guests with a huge military parade. Among the foreign generals watching the spectacle were the Estonian general Reek, the head of the Lithuanian Army, Rastikis, and the chief of the Latvian general staff, General Hartmanis. Hitler paid considerable attention both to Rastikis and to Hartmanis, to whom he had apparently already indicated views on Nazi Germany's future relations with the Baltic states which were later incorporated in his speech on 28 April. 53 Other indications of what was coming were given by the German minister in Estonia, Frohwein, in conversation with the Estonian Deputy Foreign Minister, Oepik, on 24 April. Oepik had suggested 'a joint German—Estonian political campaign to counteract Soviet efforts to create a kind of protective domination over Estonia under the pretence of planned aggression against the Baltic States'. 54 Kotze's report about Munters' suggestion became even more important in the light of Frohwein's report to Berlin on 26 April. It had emerged in contacts between the Estonian and Latvian military commands that, while the Estonian Army was concentrating on defending Estonia against an attack by the Soviet Union, the Latvian Army was still concentrating on defending Latvia's southern border against a German attack. 55 It was generally known that the combined military forces of Estonia and Latvia, although badly equipped, would present quite an obstacle to an aggressor, especially if they were supported by a great power. In case of war Latvia could mobilise an army and ' Buergergarden' of up to 200,000 men. However it had weapons for only between 130,000 and 180,000 men; its artillery was oldfashioned; it possessed only 27 old tanks and about 100 to 150 aeroplanes; and its navy was very small. The Estonian forces in total were about 160,000 men; the Estonian general Reek, mentioned 53 54 55

See Myllyniemi, Die baltische Krise, p p . 46f., a n d v o n Weizsacker's note of 10 M a y 1939, PAAA, Biiro Reichsaussenminister, Lettland, vol. 1. ADAP, D , V I , doc. 253, p . 262. R e p o r t b y Frohwein (Reval) 26 April 1939, PAAA, Deutsche Botschaft Moskau, Geheimakten, D , Pol. 2, Bait., Politische Beziehungen Deutschlands zu d e n baltischen

Staaten, vol. 1.

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200,000 men under arms in a conversation with Frohwein in July 1939. Estonia's artillery was also old-fashioned; it possessed 30-40 armoured vehicles, 91 aeroplanes and a small fleet, important mainly for the Peipus lake.56 On 2 May when the first German treaty draft was presented to the Estonian minister in Berlin, Peter Kleist, an adviser to von Ribbentrop explained Germany's policy towards the Baltic states to a journalist who, unknown to him, was a Soviet agent: There will be no use of force, no pressure or threats... By this method we shall bring about the neutrality of the Baltic states that is, their definite alienation from the Soviet Union. In the event of war the neutrality of the Baltic states is as important for us as the neutrality of Belgium or Holland; some time later, if it should suit us, we shall violate that neutrality but then in view of our previously concluded non-aggression pacts, there would be no mechanism of agreement between the Baltic states and the Soviet Union that would lead to the automatic intervention of the USSR.57 According to an article by the naval correspondent of The Daily Telegraph, Hector C. By water, which came to German attention at the end of May, the Baltic Sea was Nazi Germany's military 'Achilles heel'. 58 Bywater noted that the USSR now had a much stronger navy than Russia had had during the First World War and could threaten Nazi Germany's vital trade routes with Sweden. On the other hand, if Germany marched to the Finnish Gulf and occupied the Baltic states the USSR's naval importance would be reduced to zero. The Soviet leadership did indeed increase its Baltic fleet at that time. The Polish and Romanian refusal to allow Soviet forces to operate on or via Polish and Romanian territory limited the opportunities for Soviet military action against Nazi Germany. By concluding pacts of non-aggression with Estonia and Latvia Nazi Germany seems to have aimed at reducing such opportunities in the Baltic region as well. When the German-Estonian and German-Latvian negotiations ended, it was noted in Germany that following the German-Lithuanian treaty the new non-aggression pacts with Estonia and Latvia had made it possible 'not only to prevent the Baltic states from becoming the marshalling ground for the encircling 56 57 58

See Edgar Anderson, 'Die militarische Situation der baltischen Staaten', Acta Baltica, 8 (1968) pp. 106-55, a n d n o w Meyer, Bauern aufdem Schachbrett, p. 196. Soviet Peace Efforts, vol. I I , n o . 266, p . 10. See DNB-report, 25 May 1939, PAAA, Pol. VI, Po 13, Baltikum, Militarangelegenheiten.

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powers (Einkreisungsmdchte) but also in the case of a conflict to allow the Baltic states to defend themselves against attacks by these powers until German help could reach them'. The additional secret information however seems to be incorrect: In addition to the published non-aggression pacts Estonia and Latvia have agreed a secret clause with us. By the terms of this clause the two states are obliged to take all military security precautions against the Soviet Union in consultation with Germany and following advice from the German side. Both states recognize that the danger of attack exists for them only from the Soviet Union and that implementing their policy of neutrality demands the concentration of all their defence forces against this danger. Insofar as they are not able to do this Germany will help them.59 No such secret clause to these German treaties has been found and the whole course of the negotiations makes it seem unlikely that any such secret clause existed. However, the nucleus of these statements demonstrates what Nazi Germany wanted to achieve. Before these pacts were signed Nazi Germany had already initiated negotiations with Latvia about the export of German military equipment there, valued at 15 million RM, which amounted to about half of the total German exports to Latvia in 1938.60 In his conversation with Munters on 7 June, Hitler stressed that Latvia would need weapons and praised the quality of German arms. A simple explanation for this is that Nazi Germany, being short of cash, wanted to pay for its Latvian imports by exporting military equipment. However, it could also have had a military explanation. According to Soviet documents, at least, Estonia seems to have moved most of its army to the Soviet border, and to have received military equipment which was apparently transported by night trains to the new army concentrations. 61 Towards the end of June the German Army chief of staff, General Haider, visited Estonia and Finland. Haider was accompanied by the head of the military operational planning department, Major Krebs, and his visit had been prepared by the German military attache in Helsinki, Colonel Rossing. Although he was apparently not allowed to see the Estonian defence preparations in this Narva region on the 59 60

See Informationsbericht no. 55 8 June 1939 and Informationsbericht no. 60, 13 June 1939, both in BA £sg. 101, 34. See note b y Clodius o n German—Latvian t r a d e relations, 6 J u n e 1939, PAAA, Biiro Reichsaussenminister, Lettland, vol. 1. See on Hitler's conversation with Munters, ADAP, 61 D, VI, doc. 485. Soviet Peace Efforts, vol. II, nos. 369, 373.

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Estonian-Soviet border, Haider talked to the Estonian commander, Laidoner, and President Pats, and assured the Estonians that the German Navy would come to their aid in the event of a Soviet attack. Haider afterwards went to Finland to inspect Vyborg, Perkejarwi, and other strategically important Finnish defences. Shortly before Haider's visit, the head of German military intelligence, Admiral Canaris, had gone to Estonia. According to Soviet sources, General Kawabe from the Japanese embassy in Berlin and Colonel Okuchi from the Japanese ministry in Riga visited the Narva region on 3 July while Japanese diplomats toured the Narva region, Dorpat and Pacher. 62 However, a few weeks later, on 26 July von Ribbentrop let the Soviet Government know that the area from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea presented no problem which the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany could not solve between them. He affirmed his belief on 2 August that there would be room for both states in the Baltic Sea region and that Soviet interests there did not have to collide with German ones in any way.63 This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the various Soviet and German signals and initiatives leading up to the negotiation and conclusion of the Molotov-von Ribbentrop pact. However, it is difficult to see Nazi German policy towards the Baltic states from April to June 1939 as merely a ploy for bargaining with the Soviet Union as some historians have suggested.64 Whether or not Stalin's speech on 10 March 1939 was intended to signal the possibility of a German-Soviet understanding - as Molotov later claimed - its text came to Hitler's knowledge only when it was translated to him on 10 May. Apparently there were contacts between German and Soviet officials at the end of March and early April, 65 but there is no evidence so far to suggest that they were encouraged by Hitler or von Ribbentrop. If Hitler spoke about an understanding with the Soviet Union at the end of March, as von Brauchitsch claimed, or at the beginning of April, as von Weizsacker later thought he remembered, 62

63 64

Myllyniemi, Die baltische Krise, p . 4 8 : Soviet Peace Efforts, vol. I I , nos. 352, 3 6 2 ; G. v o n R a u c h , ' H a i d e r s Besuch in Estland i m J u n i 1939', in Reval und die baltischen Lander: Festschrift fur Hellmuth Weiss (Marburg 1980), pp. 181 ff. ADAP, D , V I , docs. 729-60. See G. von Rauch, 'Die baltischen Staaten und Sowjetrussland 1919-1939, Teil I I I : Das Baltikum im Kraftfeld der Grossmachte', Europa Archiv, 9 (1954), pp.7087-7094, here p. 7091; Geschichte der baltischen Staaten (Munich, 1977), p. 194; more critically, Ceginskas, 65 Die baltische Frage p. 59. Watt, How War Came, pp. 229-30.

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Hitler was apparently expressing a theoretical option of putting down Poland, but not a plan which he was already pursuing.66 At that time and apparently until the end ofJuly, von Ribbentrop and Hitler favoured an alliance with Japan directed also against the Western powers. The Japanese desire for an anti-Soviet alliance excluded any serious attempt by Hitler and von Ribbentrop to obtain a special German-Soviet understanding. It did not exclude what von Ribbentrop's opponent, Goring, on 16 April called a 'petit jeu' with the idea of a German-Soviet understanding against Poland. Nor did it exclude threatening the Japanese as von Ribbentrop did during Hitler's birthday celebrations with a German-Soviet understanding if Japan remained reluctant to conclude an alliance on Germany's terms. Nor did it exclude German-Soviet trade talks or the halting of Nazi German propaganda against the Soviets. But Hitler and von Ribbentrop repeatedly prevented closer German-Soviet contacts while the German negotiations with Estonia and Latvia continued.67 The offer of non-aggression pacts was made on 28 April, not only to Estonia and Latvia but also to Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. It was made before the dismissal of Litvinov as Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs which attracted German attention. The negotiations with Estonia and Latvia were conducted by von Ribbentrop's Foreign Ministry apparently without interference from other Nazi leaders. Following its own intentions the German side had concluded the treaties with Estonia and Latvia before von Ribbentrop talked about the option of a unilateral German declaration of non-aggression to the Soviets. These treaties were signed on 7 June before both von Ribbentrop and Molotov even signalled the possibility of a German-Soviet non-aggression pact. The idea of using the pacts with Estonia and Latvia as a signal towards the Soviet Government that Germany had no aggressive intentions against the USSR originated not in the German Foreign Ministry, but in the German embassy in Moscow. It was reported to Berlin on 5 June and von Ribbentrop was informed about it on 7 June, the day the treaties were signed.68 Further, when von der 66 67 68

See v o n Weizsacker, p p . 23of., a n d o n t h e whole, R . W e b e r , Die Entstehungsgeschichte des Hitler—Stalin—Paktes igjg (Frankfurt a m M a i n a n d Bern, 1980), p p . 135-46. See o n N a z i German—Soviet contracts, the accounts given b y W e b e r , Die Enstehungsgeschichte, and Watt, How War Came. See, for this a n d t h e following aspects, A h m a n n , Nichtangriffspakte, p p . 6246°.

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Schulenburg finally confronted Molotov with this suggestion on 29 June, Molotov replied that 'Germany had concluded these pacts in its own interests and not out of friendliness towards the USSR.' On the same day, while General Haider was on his tour through Estonia and Finland, Hitler decided to stop the ongoing GermanSoviet trade talks. A day later the German ambassador was instructed not to pursue political discussions with the Soviet Government for the time being. However, towards the end of July, after the British-Japanese declaration had put an end to the hope of a German-Japanese alliance, von Ribbentrop and Hitler hastened to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union. This decision was reinforced by the conclusion of German economists at the beginning of August that the German war economy would need the raw materials of a Soviet Union 'friendly towards us'. But Hitler and von Ribbentrop were not yet prepared to offer the USSR a free hand in the Baltic region in exchange for Soviet neutrality. Hitler seems to have come back to his original idea of 11 April, that is, German control of Lithuania and the southern half of Latvia. On 30 July von Weizsacker noted in his diary that von Ribbentrop wanted to talk with the Soviets about a division of the Baltic states along the latitude of Riga.69 At first, however, von Ribbentrop offered the Soviets only a mutual guarantee of the Baltic states although the German ambassador had reported that that would not satisfy the Soviet leadership. On 12 August Hitler repeated to the Italian Foreign Minister Ciano the catchphrase about Germany's traditional interest in the Baltic Sea and the states bordering it which he had used in his second unpublished book in 1928. He also stated that in his view the USSR would have the interest at most of enlarging its outlet to the Baltic Sea 'etwas' (a little bit). Germany would not mind that. But still on the 16 August von Weizsacker complained that the Nazi Government had been unable to find out ' what Mr Molotov wants in respect to the Baltic question'. Von Ribbentrop made no offer in this respect when he sent a draft treaty to Moscow on 18 August. In fact his draft was merely a revised but incomplete copy of the German treaties with Estonia and Latvia. With good reason Molotov complained about the incompleteness of the draft itself, for instead of sending ' three 69

See, for this and the following aspects, Ahmann, Nichtangriffspakte, pp. 682ff.

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points' as announced, von Ribbentrop had sent only two. The neutrality clause was missing.70 It was finally left to Molotov to present a Soviet draft that was complete. It contained an unrestricted neutrality obligation and the statement that the treaty was only valid in connection with the simultaneous conclusion of a 'special protocol'. In Moscow, on the famous night from 23 to 24 August, the southern half of Latvia with its strategically important ports was the issue of a German-Soviet controversy. Von Ribbentrop had to telephone Hitler to get permission to hand it to the Soviet sphere of interest. After defeating Poland and while preparing for an attack on France, Nazi Germany gave in to Soviet requests and ceded Lithuania in exchange for a bigger share of Poland in the German-Soviet treaty of friendship of 28 September 1939. The evidence presented here suggests that at least until the conclusion of the German-Latvian and the German-Estonian nonaggression pacts on 7 June, Nazi Germany operated with a special policy towards the Baltic states. Its short-term objectives were: to strengthen Estonia's and Latvia's neutrality in order to prevent them from becoming part of a Western-Soviet encirclement of Nazi Germany, and to secure and increase their food exports to Germany; and to use the Baltic region as a barrier against Soviet interference in the planned war with Poland by encouraging them to defend their neutrality against the USSR and to concentrate their forces in that direction. Together with the Polish and Romanian refusal to allow Soviet forces to operate on their soil, this would have greatly reduced the Soviet Union's chances of interfering in a German—Polish war. As an additional strategy to the pursuit of an alliance with Japan it may explain why, until July, Hitler and von Ribbentrop found it apparently unnecessary to hasten towards an understanding with the USSR. However, this Nazi German policy towards the Baltic states in 1939 was shortlived and Nazi Germany gave up its territorial aims and aggressive intentions neither towards Denmark nor towards the Baltic states. 70

See with more details on this incident, Ahmann, Nichtangriffspakte, pp. 634ff; 'Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt: Nichtangriffs-und Angriffsvertrag ?' in E Oberlander, HitlerStalin-Pakt, pp. 26-42, here pp. 38ff.

CHAPTER 4

The role of Danzig in Polish—German relations on the eve of the Second World War Anita J. Prazmowska

That the Danzig issue was not the cause of the German-Polish war in 1939 is a well-documented fact. What is more difficult to ascertain is the relevance of the issue to the general state of tension which existed between Germany and Poland during the late 1930s. At first glance the Free City of Danzig appears to have been a permanent object of friction between the two states. But was it the source of that friction or was it only a reflection of a general absence of goodwill between Poland and Germany? Since neither side was prepared to abandon the issue and since both clung steadfastly to their claims, the matter is not easy to disentangle from other equally and, at times, more important sources of tension. The German and Nazi side of the argument has received some attention, and literature on the subject is available to Englishspeaking readers. 1 In addition any writer dealing with the origins of war does usually cover the subject. The Polish side of the conflict is not so well covered.2 The result is that it is generally accepted that the Danzig issue was not merely a constant source of conflict and a source of tension between the two states but additionally one over which the Poles were particularly intransigent. In reality neither of the above assertions is wholly true, for the period 1933-8 is, interestingly, a time of stability in German-Polish relations. This state of affairs extended to dealings over Danzig. It is also important to point out that the British guarantee to Poland of 31 March 1939 did not, on its own account, cause a dramatic change in German-Polish relations and therefore did not as such lead to the 1

2

Christopher M. Kimmich, The Free City, Danzig and German Foreign Policy, 1919-1934 (New Haven, 1968) and Herbert S. Levine, Hitler's Free City. A history of the Nazi Party in Danzig, 1925-1939 (Chicago, 1973). Marian Wojciechowski, Die polnische—deutschen Beziehungen 1933-1938 (Leiden, 1971) and Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, ed., Diplomat in Berlin 1933-1939, Papers and Memoirs of Josef Lipski, Ambassador of Poland (New York, 1969).

74

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emergence of an impasse over Danzig, and most certainly not by suddenly causing the Poles to be less conciliatory over Danzig than hitherto. 3 During the period 1934-9 Danzig acquired a very special place in Polish-German relations. That role was partly symbolic. To the Polish politicians of the 1930s Danzig was important because the degree of German-Polish co-operation over that issue was seen to be symptomatic of the state of relations existing between the two states. Hitler's willingness to set aside German demands for the city was seen as a sign of his determination to establish good relations with the Polish state. Therefore during the period 1934-8, when Germany appeared to be willing to curb the more outrageous activities of the Danzig Nazis and to refrain from making open claims to the city, Pilsudski and the military clique which succeeded him chose to believe that the two states were united and willing to co-operate on a number of issues, varying from economic matters to the break-up of Czechoslovakia. When in January 1939 Colonel Jozef Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, was to hear from von Ribbentrop that in due course Danzig would have to return to the Reich, he assumed that the whole of German-Polish relations were undergoing a dramatic change for the worse. But was this perspective of the city as a barometer of relations a correct one? Or was the city and access to the sea a real issue over which the Poles were prepared to fight Germany? Did Danzig matter to the Poles, or was it only a symbol which in 1939 they could no longer relinquish? And in any case, what were the implications of that dramatic change in the German attitude towards Danzig at the beginning of 1939? The Versailles Treaty and future plebiscites resulted in Poland obtaining what had become one of Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points: access to the sea. At least to start with, this achievement appeared to be illusory for it did not include the important port of Danzig. The Polish failure to gain control of the city was not merely a matter of prestige, since the port lay at the outlet of the most important Polish river, the Vistula, a natural navigation route from the interior to the coast. Initially Danzig and the adjoining territory of approximately 1892 square kilometres was handed over to the League and briefly came under the control of a League body consisting of France, Japan, Italy, and Great Britain. On 3

Anita J. Prazmowska, 'Poland's Foreign Policy: September 1938-September 1939', The Historical Journal, 29 (1986).

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15 November 1920 it became a Free City. Though it obtained the right to self-government through an elected Senate, a variety of unclear and ambiguous decisions allowed the growth of mutual hostility and claims and counter-claims between the League and the Polish state on the one hand and the Senate and the Polish state on the other.4 Undoubtedly one of the problems at that time was that the Polish state did not have a clear policy concerning its access to the sea. Economically Poland had little need initially for such an outlet. During the first five years after the war Germany remained Poland's biggest trade partner. By 1923 Polish exports to Germany reached 51 per cent. The so-called 'successor states' of south eastern Europe were Poland's second most important trading region. In addition, in 1923 the Polish state still hoped to resume trade with the Russian territories.5 Therefore Poland's policy towards the Baltic cannot be explained in purely commercial terms. In fact, the only evidence of state thinking on the subject of access to the sea is found in strategic plans. In the event of a territorial blockade the sea appeared to be the most convenient way of transporting military material and troops to Poland. That was a particularly attractive idea because the Polish authorities were assuming that any future war would be fought with France as an ally. The use of Danzig facilities was therefore a totally inadequate solution, as in 1920 Poland became aware that its use could be denied to it, either because of internal strife or as a consequence of foreign intervention, German or even British.6 The result was that in May 1920 a decision was made to build a Polish military port on the coast. By 1922 Polish strategic thinking crystallised around the possibility of war with either of the two powerful neighbours, Germany or the Soviet Union. Security was therefore based on planning for war, with either France or the Baltic states as allies.7 During the next few years military plans were developed in which France figured increasingly as not merely Poland's Western ally but also an active partner in a Baltic war, whose role there was to engage Germany in naval warfare and assist Poland in keeping her naval communication routes open. 8 4

Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 'Aspekt prawny zagadnieri polsko-niemieckich w Traktacie Wersalskim' in J. Pajewski, ed., Problem polsko-niemiecki w Traktacie Wersalskim (Poznari,

5 6 8

!963)> PP- 347-56. Bodgan Dopierala, Wokoipolityki morskiej Drugiej Rzeczypospolitiej (Poznari, 1978), pp. 48-58. 7 Kimmich, The Free City, pp. 25-7. Dopierala, Wokoi polityki, p. 64. Ibid., pp. 66-8.

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Only in 1925 is there any evidence of the government and business circles addressing themselves to the issue of Poland's commercial interests of her naval policy. The German economic blockade of Poland necessitated the formulation of a new approach. Perceiving the German blockade to be political in its aim, the government assisted the development of Gdynia as a new commercial port which would release Poland from its dependence on Danzig on the one hand and on rail links through Germany on the other. In addition, during the first years of independence the Polish state tried unsuccessfully to obtain control of the port facilities in Danzig and of a base for the unloading of military stores. Since the League High Commissioner in Danzig was the arbiter of conflicts between the city and Poland, and since Polish grievances about the status of the city were directed against the League, Polish efforts went towards attacking the League. This happened during conflicts when the Polish authorities believed that the League High Commissioner Richard Haking was unsympathetic to the Polish case and again in 1923 when the new High Commissioner, Mervyn MacDonnell, appeared to strengthen the League's prerogatives in the city while weakening those belonging to Poland.9 In 1927 the Polish desire to avoid drawing the League into arbitrating in matters between Poland and the city coincided with a similar desire on the part of the League Commissioner, Joost Hamel. The victory of the centre-left coalition in elections to the Senate appeared to assist the process of side-stepping the League. Briefly relations between the Polish state and the Free City of Danzig seemed to be resolved by joint discussions. The League's feelings that Danzig matters were taking up too much time and co-operation between both parties led to the weakening of the League's interference.10 The desire on the part of the League to decrease direct involvement in Danzig unfortunately coincided with the onset of an economic slump. Furthermore, the re-routeing of Polish business to the port of Gdynia at the same time when the Nazi party established itself in Danzig and became a political force of considerable importance, foreshadowed a period of confrontation. The Nazi electoral victory in Germany in March 1933 was followed by a Nazi majority in the elections to the Free City Senate in May 1933. But ironically, as will be shown, it was this which led to the decrease in 9 10

Stanislaw Mikos, Wolne Miasto Gdansk a Liga Naro'do'w ig2O-igjg Mikos, Ibid., pp. 212-15.

(Gdansk, 1979), pp. 144—5.

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the state of tension which had existed between the Polish state and the Free City. Still, at no point before 1933 did the Poles view the Danzig issue as anything but a confrontation between their military and economic needs on the one hand and German revisionist aspirations on the other. Irrespective of whether the numerous conflicts between the Polish state and the city related to economic or political matters, the issue was always analysed from the perspective of German—Polish relations in their entirety. The denial of the city to Poland was treated by the Poles as proof that the League was defending Germany's dominant position in that region and thus would deny equal rights to Poland. Constant British involvement in the League's commission dealing with the Free City of Danzig and a number of British and Irish high commissioners seemed to the Poles to be further evidence of an anti-Polish policy on the part of Britain. Therefore the League was deeply resented and British involvement in it was always suspect. The Polish assessment of the implications of the Nazi electoral victory in Germany was clouded by their previous diplomatic setbacks in Europe. The emergence of the idea of the 'pact of four' signalled to them French and British willingness to see the revision of east European borders. In addition, Pilsudski, in common with most European statesmen, considered that the internal changes which would follow in the wake of the Nazis' gaining power would force Hitler to seek peace with the eastern neighbours. According to Jozef Beck, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, in 1934 Pilsudski's entourage believed that the Soviet Union was more likely to become an aggressor in the near future, while the National Socialists in Germany would seek only to obtain for Germany the status of' great power' and would therefore not be willing to take risks.11 As a result of their understanding of developments in Europe the Poles decided to secure Polish influence in the Baltic region as an area of importance to both the Germans and the Soviet Union. 12 The Scandinavian states and the Baltic states were seen as Poland's potential allies but also as likely enemies, were they to associate themselves with either of the two powers. The year 1933 was clearly a time when Poland needed to decrease the number of her potential enemies. Britain and France were seen as indifferent, if not outright hostile, to Polish interests, while the 11

Jozef Beck, Final Report (New York, 1957), p. 61.

12

Ibid., p 71.

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Soviet Union was perceived to be relentlessly seeking to disrupt Europe. In those circumstances the Pilsudski government decided once more to try to establish a dialogue with Germany. But before normalisation of relations could take place between Poland and Germany, the issue of Danzig had to be somehow resolved. Thus on 18 April 1933 Beck instructed Aired Wysocki, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, to approach Hitler with a proposal that he make a declaration that he was ' against any action directed against Polish rights and legal interests in the Free City of Danzig'. 13 The Poles were gratified to find that their willingness to seek normalisation of Polish—German relations was reciprocated by Hitler. Hitler also instructed the president of the Danzig Senate, a Nazi, to seek a meeting with Pilsudski. These talks preceded the negotiations for the non-aggression pact and were in themselves a sign of goodwill for, as a result of the signing of the Polish—German pact, Germany accepted the territorial status quo and undertook to negotiate on all matters relating to contentious issues. This clearly was a reference, among others, to Danzig. 14 During the course of negotiations two additional issues were raised. Pilsudski, who had taken a personal interest in the talks with Germany, laid stress not only on the need for good neighbourly relations, but implied that the League had ceased to be of significance. During his interview with Pilsudski, Jozef Lipski, the newly appointed Polish Ambassador to Berlin, was instructed to inform Hitler that the Marshal had personally given him his instructions, thus emphasising the importance of these contacts to the Polish Government. The German withdrawal from the League was used as an excuse to state that Poland needed to obtain additional security from Germany. 15 Since Danzig and the minority issues were the only two subjects likely to be the object of League interference in Polish matters, the meaning of the message which Pilsudski conveyed to Hitler was that of deprecating the League's role. In the diplomatic world the Poles sought to convey the impression that the proposed declaration of non-aggression with Germany was no more than a commitment similar to that which they had already signed with the Soviet Union in July 1932. But Poland's willingness to associate with Germany went beyond vague diplomatic ex13 14

Jedrzejewicz, Diplomat in Berlin, pp. 73-4. Marian Wojciechowski, Stosunki polsko—niemieckie 1933-1939 (Poznari: Instytut Zachodni, 15 1980), pp. 105-6. J^drzejewicz, Diplomat in Berlin, pp. 95-7.

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changes; for implied, was a shared hostility towards the Soviet Union. During his conversation with Lipski on the eve of the signing of the declaration, Hitler assured the Polish Ambassador that he considered that Poland had a role to perform as a defender of Western civilisation.16 Hitler appeared to have been referring to the Polish role in the lifting of the siege of Vienna in 1683, but Lipski willingly suggested that the same role had been performed by the Poles in 1920 against the Soviet state. Thus the establishment of good relations with Germany meant not only that the League was finally marginalised but also that there was a shared perspective on the Soviet Union and the likelihood of joint action against it in the future. The tangible improvement of relations between the Polish high commissioner in Danzig and the Senate, and the latter's commitment to respect the rights of the Polish community, were direct proof of Polish success in dealing with her western neighbour. In return Poland committed herself not to interfere in the city's internal affairs and in particular not to object to the extension of Nazi laws and the persecution of trade-unionists and Social Democrats in Danzig. Hitler gave firm instructions to the Danzig Senate not to take matters into their own hands and to cease attacking Polish institutions and citizens. In 1935 a financial crisis in Danzig appeared once again to bring into the open conflicts with the city. However, problems were averted following a tactful approach by Lipski to Goring as a result of which instructions were given to the Danzig Nazis to fall into line.17 The meeting between Lipski and Goring gave both an opportunity to re-state their views on the place of the Danzig problem within the context of Polish—German relations. Before dealing with the substance of his complaint about the Senate, Lipski stated: ... realizing that a National Socialist Senate in Danzig is also most desirable from our point of view, since it brought about a rapprochement between the Free City and Poland, I would like to remind him that we have always kept aloof from internal Danzig problems. In spite of approaches repeatedly made by the opposition parties, we rejected any attempt to draw us into action against the Senate. I mentioned quite confidentially that the Polish minority in Danzig was advised not to join forces with the opposition at the time of the elections. Goring was able to reassure the Poles: 16

Ibid., pp. 124-5.

1?

Levine, Hitler's Free City, pp. 94-5.

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... the Chancellor is taking a firm stand that the Danzig problem should under no circumstances create difficulties in Polish-German relations. Both Greiser and Forster are well aware of this. The Chancellor insists on supporting the National Socialist Senate in Danzig, not only for prestige reasons, but primarily because he knows that, if the power in Danzig were seized by the opposition, this would be harmful for the Free City's policy toward Poland. The opposition parties would obviously immediately revert to the old policy against Poland. 18

The 1934 declaration of non-aggression normalised relations between the two states with the Free City of Danzig, the only area of potential difficulties, more than ever before becoming a touchstone of relations between the two states. An accommodation between the two states concerning the city clearly offered tangible proof of the degree of goodwill and co-operation. Poland in particular had succumbed to the illusion that Germany could not dispense with Polish goodwill as it needed military and political assistance in the forthcoming conflict with the Soviet Union. Beck, who was hostile to French tutelage and disdainful of the League, welcomed the opportunity to deal directly with the German politicians. The appointment of a Swiss, Carl Burckhardt, as High Commissioner to Danzig in February 1937 came at a time when neither the Poles nor the Germans were willing to co-operate with the League any longer and openly as well as jointly spoke of welcoming its withdrawal. During his interview with the Polish President, Ignacy Moscicki, on 4 March 1937, Burckhardt was told that good relations with Germany were a guarantee that the Soviet Union would not use force towards Poland. Moscicki was reported as stating that 'for Poland the present type of government (in Germany) was advantageous'. 19 Beck was even blunter with the League commissioner. He told him outright that in the event of the commissioner experiencing difficulties with the Senate or the Nazi party ' he will not be able to count on the support of the Polish state'. 20 His further statement that he considered Danzig as a guarantee 'which at present he did not intend to get rid of as a result of bilateral agreements' would suggest that he believed that Germany needed Polish goodwill. Finally, Beck warned Burckhardt against interfering in Danzig's internal affairs. Again the suggestion 18 19 20

Jedrzejewicz, Diplomat in Berlin, p . 214. C a r l J . B u r c k h a r d t , Moja Misja w Gdarisku 1937-1939 ( W a r s a w , 1979), p . 4 6 . Ibid., p . 48.

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conveyed was that this would be viewed as interference in Polish—German matters. Burckhardt's instructions, in any case, were to limit his interventions in anticipation of a joint German-Polish announcement concerning Danzig. 21 As has already been shown, since 1934 Beck, who after Pilsudski's death became the sole arbiter of Polish foreign policy, believed that he need not worry about Danzig and therefore need not attach too much importance to numerous violations of Polish rights there, because, as he maintained, Poland and Germany shared a common desire to avoid conflict. But within the city attacks on Polish property and nationals continued and at times became difficult to overlook. Therefore Beck's equanimity would suggest one of two alternatives. One suggestion would be that he was so confident of his strong negotiating position in relation to Germany that these problems appeared irrelevant. The second explanation would be that he was not fully aware of the extent to which the Danzig Nazis were subject to Berlin's decisions, and therefore could rationally choose to believe that conflicts within the city were the result of individual and unco-ordinated acts of aggression by groups of German inhabitants. The study of reports which monthly and at times more frequently were submitted by the Polish Commissioner-General in Danzig to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs would suggest that the Poles were fully informed of political developments in the city and therefore that ignorance was not the reason for Beck's ignoring German actions in Danzig. Furthermore, in his reports the Polish Commissioner in Danzig took into account what was taking place in Berlin. He for one analysed events in Danzig as manifestations of Berlin's policies and not as local problems. After 1934 the position of the Polish Commissioner-General in Danzig was not a pleasant one. In principle he was supposed to defend Polish commercial and political interests in the city but not the position of Polish nationals who were Danzig citizens. But an added difficulty was that the minister for Foreign Affairs believed that the successive commissioners should not take a too active role as he had persuaded himself that all difficulties could and should be resolved in direct Polish-German contacts. 22 This did not mean that 21 22

Mikos, Wolne Miasto Gdansk a Liga Narodow ig2O-ig3g, p. 326. Stanislaw Mikos, Dziatalnosc Komisariatu Generalnego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Wolnym Miescie Gdansku ig2O-igjg (Warsaw, 1971), p. 325.

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they ceased monitoring and reporting back to the ministry on developments in Danzig. Throughout 1936 Kazimerz Papee, who in December 1936 was replaced by Marian Chodacki as Polish Commissioner-General, reported on the extension of Nazi laws in Danzig. Socialist trade unions were banned, laws governing the Danzig chamber of commerce were altered, merchants were forbidden to trade unless they had a licence issued by the Senate. All these restrictions, according to Papee, were aimed at altering the political and commercial life of the Free City.23 After the crisis caused by the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland, Papee reported that the Danzig Nazis were in disarray caused by Hitler's public statements, in which he accepted that Poland must have guaranteed access to the sea, and by simultaneous declarations that Germany had no territorial disputes with Poland. 24 In that report and in an earlier one, Papee confirmed the extent of German influence and pressure on the Danzig Nazis.25 But he also reported that the rank and file of the Danzig Nazis were clearly displeased by this policy. Germany's policy of goodwill towards Poland was causing deep divisions within the party. 26 In 1937 the new commissioner reported a dramatic increase in the activities of the Danzig Nazis. While on the one hand attacks on Polish nationals had increased, the Nazis were more circumspect in aggressive statements on the subject of Poland. On the other hand political and military co-operation with the Reich had been extended.27 This co-operation led to the increased disciplining of the Danzig Nazis and their subordination to the Reich's policies. But while the lawlessness of the party was being curbed, Chodacki cautioned that there was another side to this development, namely German use of Danzig for its own purposes. On 30 December 1937 he pointed out that, formally speaking, the Senate appeared to be respecting all agreements with Poland and supporting the Reich's policies. But at the same time Danzig was increasingly being used as a spring-board against Poland in order to stir up the German minority there and to disseminate anti-Polish propaganda among other minorities, most notably the Ukrainians. 28 The latter point 23 24 26 28

Polish Institue and Sikorski Museum (henceforth PISM) A12, 881/1, 14 January 1936 and 4 February 1936. 25 PISM, A12, 881/1, 18 March 1936. PISM, A12, 881/4, 4 February 1936. 27 PISM, A12, 881/1, 16 June 1936. PISM, A12, 881/2, 30 September 1937. PISM, A12, 881/2, 30 December 1937.

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appeared in particular to be a worrying issue, for the Ukrainian minority, persistently mistreated by the Polish Government, was open to foreign propaganda, Czechoslovak and German. The Poles' attitude towards the League's presence appears to have remained as before, i.e. contradictory. On the one hand, Beck missed no opportunity to slight the League rapporteurs and his policy continued to be that of limiting the League's interference in matters concerning Polish rights in Danzig. Earlier quoted comments made by Beck to Burckhardt amply illustrate this point. On the other hand, he vehemently protested whenever any attempts were made to discuss the possibility of reducing the League's role or the withdrawal of the League's guarantee of the status of the Free City. In 1935 and 1936 opposition parties tried to appeal to the League of Nations against methods used by the Nazis. Sean Lester, the British League Commissioner, encouraged the opposition parties to look to Poland for assistance.29 Polish leaders refused to be drawn, believing that the League was trying to embroil them in its own intrigues. Beck's subsequent justification for this policy was that he had no reason to believe that the British treated Poland as anything but France's client.30 Writing with reference to 1936 Beck pointed out that lack of steadfastness and clarity in Britain's policy led him to conclude that 'it was difficult to await from that side any energetic political moves'. 31 While Beck's somewhat inflated opinion of Poland's importance in European politics did lead him to become excessively confident in his diplomatic skills and ability to 'handle' the Germans, he was nevertheless rightly anxious about the increased irritation on the part of the League council members at having to deal constantly with Danzig issues. By the end of 1936 Beck's determination not to allow the League officials to represent Polish interests was mirrored by the League's determination to limit its role in the city. Thus at the meeting of the three rapporteurs which took place in January 1937, Anthony Eden proposed that the League council should no longer deal with Danzig matters which should be referred to the rapporteurs' committee. The League Commissioner remained in the city but his objectives were to be narrowed down to representing the League, rather than actively mediating and arbitrating between the Senate and the Polish state. 32 29 31

30 S. Mikos, Wolne Miasto Gdansk a Liga Nardddw, pp. 310-11. Beck, pp. 82-3. 32 Ibid., p. i n . S. Mikos, Wolne Miasto Gdansk a Liga Nardddw, pp. 322-3.

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The converse side of the Polish dilemma was anxiety lest Danzig become a negotiating point in France's and Britain's policies towards Germany. This anxiety led Beck to demand that the League should not be withdrawn yet, for he suspected that this would have been a move to appease Germany. While protesting that Polish-German relations were constructive and based on solid enough grounds to provide the basis for discussion of even such contentious issues as Danzig, he knew that it was not in Poland's interest to be left alone with Germany at the negotiating-table. At the end of 1937 and the beginning of 1938 the situation in Danzig appeared to be full of contradictions. Within the city the process of Nazification was proceeding relentlessly. Anti-Jewish actions and attacks on Polish rights and Polish nationals abounded in the press and official statements. 33 Attacks on the Jewish population and the introduction of laws limiting the rights ofJews to practise their professions attracted international attention and led to speculation about the state of Polish-German relations. The League member-states responsible for monitoring developments in Danzig (Britain, France and Sweden) found themselves in the uncomfortable position of having to do something about these developments. The situation was embarrassing and without going into the whole problem, they clearly did not want to be seen to be doing nothing as this would give the appearance of approval. Nor did they want to take a strong line against these actions as each of the rapporteurs knew that it would affect his state's relations with Germany. The response of Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, to the crisis concerning the Danzig Jews clearly illustrates the dilemma. Reporting a conversation he had with Burckhardt who had recently spoken to Halifax in Geneva, Chodacki informed the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the British were anxious about the reaction of the Jewish community in Britain and the effect this would have on the city.34 The Poles were also uneasy about these developments and therefore more than ever before appreciated receiving reassuring declarations from Germany. Beck's conviction that he was right to view the question of Danzig from the perspective of Polish-German relations seemed to have been reaffirmed during his visit to Germany 33 34

Ibid., p p . 3 3 6 - 7 . Archives of the Free City of Danzig, Gdansk, (henceforth AG), 259/931, 24 May 1938.

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in January 1938. Hitler appeared to address himself to all the issues worrying Beck. At a meeting on 14 January 1938 Hitler stated: ... Poland's rights in Danzig will not be infringed upon and [that] moreover, the legal status of the Free City will remain unaltered. Polish-German relations, the Chancellor added, are of essential and decisive importance in this matter for him also... The Chancellor gave firm assurances that the declaration made by him is binding. Further in the course of the conversation he mentioned that it is binding irrespective of the fate of the League.35 This declaration was particularly gratifying to Beck, the more so since the Polish leaders had been in a dilemma in trying to interpret the implications of developments in Danzig. As recently as December 1937 Chodacki had reported that he felt that 'the primitive dynamism of the party circles collapsed when Berlin put the brakes on the aspirations of Forster and his friends'. 36 Thus a commitment by Hitler appeared to offer a guarantee that Danzig would not become a bone of contention, even though the unsatisfactory state of affairs within the city itself continued. Notwithstanding a certain uneasiness about Danzig, the Poles, and particularly Beck, were able to delude themselves that Germany was not intending to encroach upon either Polish territory or her spheres of influence. But in the spring and summer of 1938 other issues came to worry the Poles. They were aware of the extent of the war of nerves taking place between Germany and Czechoslovakia. They themselves were hoping to benefit from the break-up or the weakening of Czechoslovakia. But German activities among the Ukrainian population appeared to be directed against Poland. Poland emphatically did not want to see the extension of German influence into central and south eastern Europe. Reporting on 19 June, Drexel Biddle, the American Ambassador to Warsaw, revealed that he had recently had a long conversation with Beck in the course of which he was treated to an expose of Poland's longterm policies.37 Biddle informed Washington that Beck felt that a situation might soon arise where German penetration of the Ukrainian region would have to be stopped militarily. Furthermore, Biddle wrote: 35 36 37

Jedrzejewicz, Diplomat in Berlin, p . 334. PISM, A12, 881/2, 30 December 1937. P h . V . C a n n i s t r a r o , E . E . W y n o t J r . , T h . P . Kovaleff, eds., Poland and the Coming of the Second World War. The Diplomatic Papers of A. J. Drexel Biddle Jr., USA Ambassador in Poland, I

937~I939 (Columbus, Ohio, 1976), pp. 212-13.

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Polish officialdom sees in the possible development of a counter-policy a potential opportunity for Poland to play a key role, possibly in the formation of Poland's long-cherished hope of a neutral Baltic-Black Sea or even Baltic-Aegean Axis, aimed at cutting across Germany's envisaged eastward drive. Poland would want, however, to be assured of ample support from Britain, France and possibly even Italy, for Poland would expect at least Britain and France to share in any burden of responsibility which the states of Eastern and Central Europe might incur in provoking German ire and suspicion.38 Beck's confidences need not be taken too seriously, as on his own admission he frequently used Biddle to fly kites and in this case there was a clear attempt to ascertain how far the Western powers were prepared to go in assuming a greater initiative in central Europe. Poland's participation in such a plan was a bait, not a clear plan and commitment. The Polish minister had pursued intrigues against Czechoslovakia during the 1930s but during his visit to Berlin in January 1938 first references were made by both sides to the shared attitude, and hints were dropped about the possibility of breaking up the Czechoslovak state.39 Subsequently Polish propaganda attacks on Czechoslovakia were co-ordinated and clearly followed the lead set by the German side.40 But early attempts to obtain broader benefits from this shared objective appeared to come to nothing. Lipski's interview with the newly appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, was singularly unpromising. Von Ribbentrop appeared not to be aware of the extent of commitments made by the Fiihrer to the Poles.41 An attempt to obtain a declaration of the extension of the non-aggression agreement was therefore unsuccessful because the German side appeared to be unresponsive. The decisive blow to Polish attempts to bind Germany to a policy of co-operation and concessions came during the autumn crisis of 1938. As long as Hitler anticipated Western opposition to his plans for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia he needed Polish cooperation. This was forthcoming as the Poles had old grievances with Czechoslovakia, which were not confined to the Teschen region. Their long-term plans had been aimed at the weakening of the Czech state, the incorporation of Ruthenia into Hungary and the subjugation of a puppet Slovak state to Poland. 38 40

Ibid., p. 219. Ibid., p. 388.

39 41

M. Wojciechowski, Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1933-1938, p. 382. Jedrzejewicz, Diplomat in Berlin, pp. 357-360.

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French and British willingness to mediate in the GermanCzechoslovak crisis rendered Polish co-operation irrelevant. Germany's understanding with Poland, which was hitherto based on the assumption that Poland would be a necessary ally as France, the Soviet Union, and even possibly Britain were likely to oppose German attempts to undermine Czechoslovakia, could now be revised. Poland was now of little consequence and furthermore Hitler came to resent deeply Polish occupation of an extended area of the Transolza. The result of the Munich Agreement and the manner in which territorial adjustments were made was that new areas of potential conflict were added to those already existing between Poland and Germany. In October 1938 the Poles sought anxiously for an explanation for the evident absence of goodwill on the German side. What Beck had failed to note was that the very basis for German cooperation with Poland had ceased to exist. Germany no longer needed a partner in the east. Therefore Polish attempts to retain influence in south eastern Europe were doomed too. Hungary and Italy notably refused to join the Polish camp and, with that, all attempts to mediate in the Hungarian-Romanian conflict and to obtain a border with Hungary failed. Slovak leaders now looked to Germany for a lead and not to Poland. Lipski's attempts to obtain a German explanation for these difficulties were singularly unsuccessful.42 Instead, on 24 October von Ribbentrop put forward a plan, the aim of which was to resolve all outstanding issues between the two states. The substance of this communication is well-known. Its main point was a proposal that Danzig be incorporated into the Reich. What the Poles were to receive in return would be of little relevance: joint action in the colonial sphere and the removal of Jews from Poland. Promises for joint action against the Soviet Union were accompanied by assurances that the Polish-German agreement would be extended to 25 years.43 Beck's first response was still couched in conciliatory terms: In the opinion of the Polish Government the subject of any future understanding concluded with the object of permanently maintaining good neighbourly relations would have to be the following: (a) a certain extension in the period and form of the 1934 Declaration, as the basis of relations between the two states 42

Ibid., pp. 448-9.

43

Ibid., pp. 453-4.

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(b) such a settlement of the problem of the Danzig Free City as would prevent in future the continually recurring difficulties of a technical and psychological nature which arise from friction in this sphere. The question of the Free City is urgent because in the state of affairs hitherto prevailing, with the League of Nations reserving very far-reaching prerogatives to itself, but not able to fulfil its task in a manner beneficial to the Free City and to Polish interest, the need arises for the Polish and Reich Governments to approach the problem in a spirit of frankness.44

Few exchanges symbolise the failure of Polish diplomacy towards Germany as well as these do. Germany was in a position to demand territorial adjustments in their entirety. Poland, unaware of the dramatically altered political configuration in Europe, clung to the conviction that Germany needed Polish goodwill and therefore that there remained a basis for negotiation of outstanding problems. Neither Germany nor Poland viewed Danzig in separation from the whole of their relations but that is precisely why Danzig, and the altered attitude towards it, so clearly highlights the changing nature of the relationship. There remains the intriguing question of why the Polish minister continued to believe that an accommodation could still be reached. When attempting to answer this question Danzig offers a good example of bad judgment compounded by a genuinely narrow scope for manoeuvre. Lack of information, or even difficulties in gaining necessary information concerning the state of affairs in Danzig, is not an explanation, for this clearly was not the case. The Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs continued to receive reliable and detailed reports from Danzig. The ministry knew of German intrigues among both the German nationals in Poland and the Ukrainians. It was equally well aware of the fact that further initiatives in relation to the south east European states were being opposed by Germany and that these states, notably Hungary and Romania, were no longer looking to Warsaw for a lead but to Berlin.45 Italy, a country which traditionally had encouraged Poland in her policy of standing up to Germany, made it clear after the Munich conference that it would no longer be able to support Poland. 46 Jozef Beck's personality offers only a partial explanation of the minister's failure to draw conclusions from all the information 44 45 46

R e p u b l i c of Poland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Official Documents Concerning Polishr-German and Polish—Soviet Relations 1933-1939 (henceforth Polish White Book). A. J . Prazmowska, ' P o l a n d ' s Foreign Policy', p . 857. A. J . Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front 1939 ( C a m b r i d g e , 1987), p . 3 1 .

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available. He was indisputably vain and conceited. He also believed that Poland had been unfairly denied the status of' great European power'. This meant that he was haughty and disdainful towards France and Britain. He also believed that Poland had to cope with two formidable neighbours and the only way to keep them at bay was for Poland to act as doyen of the central and south east European states. Therefore he deluded himself for too long that Poland was succeeding in that policy. When Germany succeeded in obtaining Western acquiescence to the break-up of Czechoslovakia, he chose to believe that this was an advantageous move for Poland. As far as Beck was concerned, the elimination of Czechoslovakia meant that Poland could now assert herself in the region. These factors still do not adequately explain the persistence with which Beck clung to the belief that Germany and Poland stood united in Europe. There were two more important considerations. The first was the fact that signals concerning Germany's long-term aims were unclear and thus led to certain ambiguities obscuring his analysis of Germany's objectives. The second factor was the ambivalent attitude of both France and Britain towards German aggression eastward and in particular their treatment of the Danzig issue. Since October 1938 Beck had, with growing urgency, sought to ascertain Germany's aims in relations to eastern Europe generally and Poland in particular. While serious doubts had arisen because of Germany's attitude towards the proposed border with Hungary, news from Danzig for once appeared to confound that pessimism. The Polish Commissioner reported on 22 December 1938 that Forster, on his return from Berlin, had declared that von Ribbentrop was particularly concerned to maintain good relations with Poland. 47 Forster had undergone a total conversion while in Berlin for he was now openly heard stating that: since he had visited Poland he understood why Goring could have such sympathy for that country, something he had found difficult to understand earlier as he had only known that 'horrible Gdynia'. Poles had charm, they know how to win people's hearts, something Germans don't do. On the other hand they (the Poles) have no organizational abilities... therefore these two nations are complementary.48 Information from Berlin was equally ambivalent. Burckhardt 47 48

PISM, A12, 8 8 1 / 4 , 22 December 1938. PISM, A12, 8 8 1 / 4 , 22 December 1938.

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visited Berlin on 15 and 16 December and reported a conversation he had had with von Weizsacker, the previous Minister for Foreign Affairs, and in December the head of the Political Section of the Ministry. The latter told Burckhardt that within the ruling circles in Germany there existed two currents of thought on the subject of Danzig. One, represented by Goring, maintained that Danzig was too small an issue and therefore good relations with Poland should not be sacrificed. According to von Weizsacker, Goring believed that Danzig issues should be approached with care and in conjunction with other issues, notably the Ukraine. The other current of thought was apparently represented by Forster who believed that one should create &fait accompli. Von Ribbentrop was reported as saying 'that he thought Poland was showing understanding of the fact that a Big Power could not be expected to put up with certain things'. 49 At the end of his conversation with Burckhardt, von Ribbentrop stressed the need to maintain good relations with Poland. But that conclusion came after von Ribbentrop, while appearing to be thinking aloud, said t h a t ' actually the best solution would be to incorporate Danzig and Memel into the Reich and that Poland, just like Czechoslovakia, would not make the decision to go to war for that reason alone, even more so that lately one can observe a certain chill between Poland and the Western Powers, which leads to the weakening of its position'. In December 1938 Lipski and Beck chose to believe that the main objectives of Germany's foreign policy remained unchanged in spite of evident difficulties. Beck felt that von Ribbentrop's ascendancy had been detrimental to Polish interests but that this setback was only temporary; Beck still believed that Hitler could not alter the course of Germany's foreign policy since, in principle, Germany needed Poland as an ally in the final showdown with Russia. 50 When questioned about his opinion on Germany's agitation among the Ukrainian and Slovak populations, Lipski also maintained that a number of contradictory policies were being pursued by various ' bureaux' in Germany, but he too believed that one of the basic principles of Germany's foreign policy remained that of commitment to Poland as ' The highest circles in the Third Reich well realize that 49 50

PISM, A12, 8 8 1 / 4 , 21 D e c e m b e r 1938. J a n Zarariski, ed., Dariusz i Teki Jam Szembeka, igj8-igjg, D e c e m b e r 1938.

vol. I V ( L o n d o n , 1972), 7

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when resolving in the future the Russian problem, the Germans will not be able to operate without Poland. ' 51 In January 1939 Beck made a trip to Germany. In the course of his conversations with Hitler and von Ribbentrop he received two messages, which he still hoped only reflected policy debates in Germany. There was no doubt that the question of Danzig was now becoming a key issue in Polish-German relations. According to von Ribbentrop, whilst the matter could still temporarily be set aside, its resolution would have to be faced. To the Poles this meant a challenge to their firmly held conviction that Germany needed Poland and that an accommodation with Poland was of crucial importance to Germany. Rejecting the demand for the return of Danzig to Germany, Beck decided to follow a policy of compromises on minor issues and firmness on major points. He also sought to postpone the withdrawal of the League from Danzig, realising that this would undermine his position at a difficult time. The importance of that visit was that it shook Beck sufficiently for him to consider seriously a new course of action. Henceforth two lines of policy were pursued simultaneously: one consisted of letting the German leaders know that Poland was not prepared to tolerate attacks on either her rights, especially in Danzig, or her territory; the other was that of tempting the Germans with the prospect of compromise in Danzig at the expense of the League.52 The intriguing feature of Polish foreign policy in the run-up to the war was the steadfastness with which it was maintained. Neither the British guarantee to defend Poland made on 31 March 1939 nor the repudiation of the non-aggression pact by Hitler on 28 April 1939 caused the Poles to alter this policy of brinkmanship. 53 It is difficult to pin-point precisely the moment when Beck finally abandoned hope of maintaining some basis of co-operation with Germany. Since January 1939 he took into account the possibility of having to go to war with Germany, if German demands became menacing. During the spring and summer it was increasingly accepted by the Poles that they would have to face war with Germany, either to stop German aggression or in order to forewarn her. In his memoirs Beck's personal secretary Pawel Starzenski referred to Beck's determination to remain conciliatory towards the Germans 51 53

Ibid., 14 December 1938. Ibid., pp. 865-7.

52

Prazmowska, 'Poland's Foreign Policy', p. 859.

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after he had received the British guarantee. Similarly Michal tubienski, Beck's chefde Cabinet, bears witness to Beck's willingness to continue negotiations with Germany over Danzig. Lubienski records that Beck was willing to consider a compromise, one which would allow Germany increased control over Danzig without removing Polish rights there. 55 Beck apparently believed that this would enable the two states to postpone a conflict even if it did not remove the bone of contention. He did change his mind nevertheless, and after a conference with Marshal Rydz-Smigly, the Minister of Defence, decided not to make concessions over Danzig. This change was due to an analysis of Germany's attitude towards Poland and not just the Danzig problem. While taking into account the possibility of war breaking out, the Polish military leaders seemed to have assumed that Germany was not as yet able to wage a war and on the whole believed that the Nazi leaders would rather seek to avert it. This was the view expressed by Rydz-Smigly on 6 April and by Beck on 30 May. 56 In the last days of August Beck still spoke of some compromise, for example on the 26th, when he referred to the need to consider an exchange of population, 57 Polish policy towards Germany in 1939 is particularly difficult to comprehend because with hindsight it is near-impossible to believe that the Polish military and political leaders did not fear the possibility of war. They refused to confine their analysis to the issue of Danzig and did not think in terms of averting war by merely making a compromise over that issue. To them an attack on Danzig would mean an outright attack on Polish territory and sovereignty. The other reason why Beck appeared to be unwilling to abandon hopes for a continuing Polish-German understanding was because he did not view either Britain or France as committed to the defence of Poland. Szembek recorded Beck's deliberations concerning personnel changes at the Polish embassy in Berlin which reveal that his willingness to continue to seek an acceptable compromise with Germany was enhanced by the apprehension that Britain and France might still cheat Poland. 58 And indeed, in spite of Britain's recent assumption of commitments to Poland, the issue of Danzig 54 55 56 57

Pawel Starzeriski Trzy lata z Beckiem ( L o n d o n , 1972), p p . 1 8 0 - 1 . Michal Lubieriski, 'Ostatnie negocjacje w sprawie Gdariska. Wyjatki z pamietnika', Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierza, 3 December 1953. J . Zarariski, ed., Dariusz i Teki Jana Szembeka, 6 April 1939, p . 550. 58 Ibid., 26 August 1939, p . 696. Ibid., 1 J u n e 1939, p p . 6 1 6 - 1 7 .

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remained a contentious point in British politics and in British-Polish relations.59 An attempt to separate the Danzig conflict from the whole issue of Polish-German relations only inflamed latent Polish suspicions of British—French dealings, while the absence of tangible military and financial commitments to the defence of Poland created an uneasy backcloth to the British-French-Soviet talks. But by the summer of 1939 the Polish—German conflict was no longer confined to its manifestations in the Free City. The whole of their relations appeared to have reached an impasse. By then Nazi attacks on Polish offices and property in the city and the propaganda war unleashed in the city cast doubts on Beck's assertions that all was not lost. German propaganda now extended the familiar accusations that the Polish state was persecuting its German minority and called for the revision of the border with Poland. In addition Germany stationed troops on all her borders with Poland. Polish military and political leaders were preparing for war, not in defence of Danzig but against a German onslaught on Polish territories. 60 As has been shown, the conflict between the two states was never confined to the issue of Danzig. The Free City and its inconvenient status was a source of irritation to both sides as well as a perfect nuisance to the League of Nations. Nevertheless it was a very good indicator of the extent of goodwill which Poland and Germany were prepared to extend towards each other. Both states could have dispensed with the city, economically and strategically. That neither chose to do so should be of greater interest to historians. When the subject of Danzig is looked at separately from events taking place in the city itself, it does show the correctness of the Polish approach. Unfortunately when, at the end of 1938, Poland's bargaining position in relation to Germany weakened and Germany was no longer prepared to accept Polish compromises, the Poles failed to grasp the implications of that change. 59 60

A. J. Prazmowska, 'War Over Danzig?', The Historical Journal, 29 (1986), pp. 867-71 and Prazmowska, 'Poland's Foreign Policy', pp. 8 6 7 - 7 1 . Zarariski, 28 August 1939, pp. 700-1 and 29 August 1939, pp. 7 0 1 - 2 .

CHAPTER 5

Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Finland at the beginning of the Second World War Patrick Salmon

INTRODUCTION

At the outbreak of war in September 1939 Finland was one of the least important European countries from the British point of view. By the early months of 1940 it had become the principal focus of Allied strategic interest. An expedition to help the Finns in the Winter War which broke out when the Soviet Union attacked Finland on 30 November 1939 was actually on the point of setting sail when the Finns decided to sue for peace in March 1940. Finland had become the cornerstone of an ambitious, not to say foolhardy, plan for large-scale Allied military intervention in Scandinavia. The aim of this chapter is not to trace the evolution of Allied policy during the Winter War, which has been the subject of a number of authoritative studies,1 but to examine the process by which Finland moved closer to the forefront of British policy towards the Soviet Union in the months prior to the Soviet attack of 30 November. Although the British Government attached considerable importance to the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union (despite the signature of the Nazi-Soviet pact on 23 August 1939), there were signs from late September of a growing interest in Finland on the part of British officials and politicians. Finland had hitherto figured in British minds mainly as an obstacle to the alliance negotiations between Britain, France and Russia during the summer 1

J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, vol. I l l (London, 1957); Douglas Clark, Three Days to Catastrophe (London, 1966); Jukka Nevakivi, The Appeal that was never made: The Allies,

Scandinavia and the Finnish Winter War (London, 1976); Patrick Salmon, 'Scandinavia in British strategy, September 1939-April 1940 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University 1979); Glen St J.Barclay, 'Diversion in the East: the Western Allies, Scandinavia, and Russia, November 1939-April 1940', The Historian XLI (1979), 483—98; Thomas Munch-Petersen, The Strategy of Phoney War: Britain, Sweden and the Iron Ore Question I

939~I94° (Stockholm, 1981).

95

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of 1939. As early as 24 October, however, the War Cabinet decided that the only reason for which trade talks with Russia might be called off would be a Soviet attack on Finland. In a sense, therefore, Finland had already acquired a status in British eyes higher than that of Poland, where the Soviet occupation of late September had occasioned only a formal protest. The War Cabinet's decision was influenced in part by the policy of limited support for Finland evolved by the Foreign Office in response to the deterioration of Finnish-Soviet relations. It also reflected increasing pessimism on the part of the Foreign Office and some government ministers about the chances of detaching Russia from Germany. This view was not shared throughout Whitehall. The service ministries were reluctant to see any assistance to Finland which would diminish Britain's limited reserves of war material. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, was convinced that Britain and Russia would eventually have to fight together against Germany, and that any strengthening of Russia's position in the Baltic was automatically to be welcomed. In October and November 1939 he was the leading Cabinet critic of support for Finland. However, even before the Soviet attack on Finland, Churchill's arguments were being undermined by the Soviet Union's own conduct. Neville Chamberlain's propaganda war, capitalising so heavily on Britain's moral stand against German aggression, could not be compromised by any apparent toleration of Soviet acts of aggression. Ultimately, in early December, the British Government was obliged to join the in the international condemnation of Russia's action and vote for its expulsion from the League of Nations. From this point onwards the War Cabinet showed a growing readiness to regard the Finnish war as a means of solving more immediate problems. In particular, support for Finland could be used to deny supplies of Swedish iron ore to Germany and thus, it was hoped, bring about a rapid end to the war. By the end of December 1939, in a complete reversal of previous policy, the British and French governments were actively contemplating the despatch of an expeditionary force to Scandinavia. THE SOVIET UNION AND FINLAND I938-I939

With the impending failure of Litvinov's policy of collective security, the Soviet Union's perennial preoccupation with security against foreign intervention was reflected in a growing concern for the

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political and strategic position of the states on its north-western frontiers.2 All of the border states were formed wholly or in part from the lands of the former Russian Empire, and all were regarded as vital to Soviet security. The main thrust of a German attack was expected to come through Poland, but there was also a danger of an attack on Leningrad by land across the territories of the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, or by sea through the Gulf of Finland. The Soviet Union was determined that, as a Soviet diplomat told the Finnish foreign minister in April 1938, 'the Red Army would not remain on the border to wait for the enemy, but would advance as far as possible to meet him'. 3 It was essential to prevent these states from falling under the influence of hostile powers, yet difficult to do so when they remained dominated by memories of Tsarist rule and communist revolution. For the Soviet Union the problems posed by Finland were more complex than those of the Baltic states. The latter were smaller and weaker than Finland and had formed an integral part of the Russian Empire. They lacked the experience of autonomy within the Empire which Finland had enjoyed between 1809 and 1917. For the Soviet Union, like its Tsarist predecessor, it was difficult to put pressure on the Finns with their highly developed sense of nationality, their cultural and commercial links with Scandinavia and the West, and their deep-rooted constitutional traditions. The history of FinnishSoviet relations, from the Treaty of Tartu in 1920 which recognised Finnish independence to the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Cooperation in 1948 and beyond, suggests that the Soviet Union has always regarded Finland as being in some sense a special case, to be treated differently from other parts of the former Russian Empire. Between the wars, however, Finland seemed to represent a genuine security risk. Geography was of decisive importance. The Soviet-Finnish border was only thirty-two kilometres from Leningrad, Russia's former capital and second largest city; the Gulf of Finland was a route by which potential enemies could launch attacks on either Leningrad or the naval base of Kronstadt; the Arctic port of Petsamo could be used as a base for attacking Russia's only icefree outlet to the Atlantic Ocean at Murmansk. Politically Finland For assessments of Soviet foreign policy in this period see: J. A. Large, 'The origins of Soviet collective security policy', Soviet Studies, 30 (1978), pp. 212-36; Jiri Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934—1938 (Ithaca, NY, 1984); Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933-1939 (London, 1984).

Max Jakobson, The Diplomacy of the Winter War (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), p. 8.

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was unreliable. Independent since 1917, fiercely anti-Russian and anti-communist, Finland cultivated links with Germany and Britain, capitalist 'great powers' and ideological opponents of the Soviet Union. If the British connection was mainly commercial and unlikely to be converted into political or military collaboration, it still held memories, not least for Stalin, of Anglo-Finnish cooperation in the Allied intervention of 1919-21. In 1924-5 furthermore, a British military mission led by General Sir Walter Kirke had advised the Finns on measures for security against the Soviet Union. 4 The German connection was still more sinister. Finnish nationalists had looked to Germany for support against Russian imperialism before 1917. Many Finns had fought alongside the Germans-in the 'Jager' battalions - during the war and had risen to high positions in the armed forces of independent Finland. German units had intervened in support of the Finnish Whites during the civil war of 1918. In 1938 these events were ostentatiously recalled when a delegation of German veterans visited Finland and was received with ceremony by their Finnish counterparts, including Marshal Mannerheim, the victor of the civil war (though not by members of the government). 5 Yet Finland was, despite its deep social divisions and authoritarian leanings, a genuinely democratic country which had no desire to be drawn into a war between the great powers. Few Finns could understand why the Soviet Union chose to doubt the sincerity of their protestations of neutrality. In fact the Soviet Union appears to have had genuine difficulty in assessing the ' alignment of forces' in Finnish politics and society. Exiled Finnish communists, among them Stalin's confidant Otto Kuusinen, were convinced that the Finnish working class was ready to rise against its White oppressors, and the Leningrad party boss, Zhdanov, accused Finland in 1936 of being a willing agent of the aggressive fascist powers. But Soviet policy continued to act on the assumption that Finnish-Soviet relations could be stabilised, and Finland kept out of hostile coalitions, by peaceful means. In 1932 the Soviet Union signed non-aggression pacts with Finland as well as with a number of other border states.6 Hopes for a more far-reaching 4

5 6

Patrick Salmon, 'British security interests in Scandinavia and the Baltic 1918-1939', in John Hiden and Aleksander Loit, eds., The Baltic in International Relations Between the Two World Wars (Stockholm, 1988), pp. 113-36 (p. 119). Jakobson, Winter War, p. 27. Rolf Ahmann, Nichtangriffspakte: Entwicklung und operative Nutzung in Europe (Baden-Baden, 1988).

Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Finland arrangement were aroused by the coming to power of a centre-left coalition in 1937. The Cajander government dissociated itself from the pro-German leanings of its predecessors, looking instead towards Scandinavia and the West. It also sought to win the confidence of the Soviet Union. In February 1937 Holsti, the Foreign Minister, paid a successful visit to Moscow. In April 1938 the Soviet Union initiated secret exchanges with Holsti and other members of the Finnish government which continued intermittently until April 1939.7 They were conducted on the Soviet side by diplomats who appeared to have direct access to the Politburo, bypassing Litvinov and the Foreign Ministry. The Soviet demands centred on the Gulf of Finland. They wanted to establish an air and naval base on the island of Suursaari at the entrance to the Gulf, but suggested later that the Finns could fortify the island themselves if Russia could have the use of it in time of war. In exchange they offered a trade agreement on advantageous terms and a piece of territory in Soviet Karelia, a region long coveted by Finnish irredentists. The Finns were wholly unresponsive even though Mannerheim, who knew Russia well, urged that they must make some concessions. Their negative attitude appears to have confirmed Soviet suspicions of German encouragement. In fact, however, 'it rested on a serious underestimation of Russia's power and determination, combined, paradoxically, with the suspicion that any Russian proposals must conceal some ulterior design against Finland's independence'. 8 The Finns never understood that simply reiterating their determination to remain neutral could not allay Soviet fears. As Mikoyan told a Finnish delegation in Moscow in December 1938, the Soviet Union accepted that Finland was sincere on this point, but did not believe that Finland by herself could maintain her integrity against an outside intrusion into her territory. There must be concrete guarantees of an effective defence.9 Those guarantees were pursued tenaciously by the Soviet Union. After the bilateral talks with Finland petered out in the spring of 1939, they turned to Britain and France. In negotiations for a political alliance between April and July 1939 the Soviets demanded that the 'Baltic States' (among which they counted Finland) should 7

For details see Jakobson, Winter War, pp. 11-50; Kalervo Hovi, 'Der Hitler-Stalin—Pakt und Finnland', in Erwin Oberlander, ed., Hitler-Stalin—Pakt 1939. Das Ende Ostmitteleuropas ?

8

(Frankfurt am Main, 1989), pp. 61-74. Anthony F. Upton, Finland 1939-40 (London, 1974), p. 21.

9

Ibid., p. 20.

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SALMON

be guaranteed explicitly and by name, even without their consent. 10 When military conversations began in Moscow in August, Voroshilov demanded that the British and French fleets occupy bases on Finnish, Estonian and Latvian islands in the Gulf of Finland, as well as on the mainland, which would then be turned over to the use of the Red Navy. 11 In the negotiations with Finland between October and early November 1939 the Soviet demands went still further. They included the cession of all the Finnish islands in the Gulf, a thirty-year lease of the mainland port of Hanko, a shift of the frontier on the Karelian Isthmus by 70 kilometres, and the cession of the western part of the Rybachi Peninsula in the far north, controlling the approach to the port of Petsamo. These requirements seemed so archaic in military terms that the Finnish leadership could not take them at face value: they must, they thought, conceal wider ambitions. It is true that they represented little more than a reconstitution of the defence plans worked out by the Russian general staff before 1914.12 But they reflected genuine fears on the part of the Soviet leadership. In his discussions with the Finns in the autumn of 1939 Stalin recalled the days of the civil war when the British had launched torpedo-boat attacks on Kronstadt from Finnish territory and had sent troops to Murmansk. 13 In a sense the Soviet demands had been on the agenda ever since the peace conference at Tartu in 1920, when the Russian negotiators declared that Finnish independence meant that Leningrad 'has now got into a quite impossible situation', and that 'if we start from the point of view of strategic defence, then the Russian government would of course be obliged to demand in the most stringent fashion that not only should the islands in the Gulf of Finland be joined to Russia, but also a considerable portion of Finnish territory along the coast towards Viipuri'. 14 Of more 10

For details of the negotiations see: Robert Manne, ' The British decision for alliance with Russia, May 1939', Journal of Contemporary History 9, 3 (1974), 3-26; 'Some British light on the Nazi-Soviet Pact', European Studies Review 11 (1981), 83-102; Georg A. Gripenberg, Finland and the Great Powers: Memoirs of a Diplomat (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1965); Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The immediate origins of the Second World War 1938-1939

11

12

13

(London, 1989), pp. 361—84. Meeting of 15 August 1939, Public Record Office (PRO), CAB 16/183B [All subsequent documentary references are to material in the PRO unless otherwise stated]; Watt, How War Came, pp. 449—57. Jakobson, Winter War, p. 16; C. Leonard Lundin, 'Finland', in Edward C. Thaden, ed., Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914 (Princeton 1981), p p . 3 5 5 - 4 5 7 (pp. 379-Si). 14 Jakobson, Winter War, pp. 117, 124. Quoted in Upton, Finland, p. 14.

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immediate relevance was the fact that the coastal batteries installed by the Tsarist government on either side of the Gulf were still in place and had been refurbished in the early 1930s by agreement between the Finnish and Estonian military authorities, apparently without the knowledge of their respective governments. 15 Together the batteries on the islands of Makiluoto (MacElliot) on the Finnish side and Wulf and Naissaar on the Estonian side could completely close the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. In August 1939 the American military attache in Riga wrote that these fortifications would be 'a serious menace to the operations of the Soviet vessels'. 16 In the light of the close contacts of the general staffs of both countries with the German armed forces, there were therefore concrete grounds for Soviet anxiety.17 Having failed to achieve its goals through agreement either with Finland or with Britain and France, the Soviet Union turned finally to Germany. Finland was one of those countries assigned to the Soviet sphere of influence by the secret protocol to the Nazi-Soviet pact of 23 August 1939. After the outbreak of war the Soviet Union acted quickly to consolidate its position. On 17 September the war against Japan in Mongolia was brought to an end by an armistice, and on the same day Soviet forces occupied eastern Poland. Between 28 September and 10 October mutual assistance pacts were signed with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Finland was now isolated. Great Britain could exert no influence in the Baltic; the Scandinavian countries offered sympathy but no practical support; Germany was coldly indifferent. An invitation to Finland to enter into talks was duly issued by Molotov on 5 October, and a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow on the 12 th, on what was to prove the first of three visits to the Soviet capital. The attitude of the Finnish Government during these talks was as unrealistic as it had been during the discussions of 1938-9. 'Forget that Russia is a great power' was the last piece of advice given by Erkko, the Finnish Foreign Minister, to the leader of the Finnish delegation on his departure for Moscow.18 A small but distinguished minority which argued against a rigidly uncompromising line 15 17

Martti Turtola, 'Aspects of Finnish—Estonian military relations in the 20s and 30s', in Loit 16 and Hiden, Baltic in International Relations, pp. 101-10. Quoted ibid., p. 106. On Finnish-Soviet military contacts, see D. W. Spring, 'The Soviet decision for war against Finland, 30 November 1939', Soviet Studies, 38 (1986), pp. 207-26 (p. 224, notes 20 and 22); on Estonian—German contacts, see Seppo Myllyniemi, Die baltische Krise 1938-1941 18 (Stuttgart, 1977), pp. 33-8. Quoted in Upton, Finland 1939-1940, p. 33.

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included Mannerheim, Vaino Tanner, the Social Democratic leader and Finance Minister, and J. K. Paasikivi, the veteran conservative politician, now minister to Stockholm. All had first-hand experience of dealing with the Russians. It was fortunate for the future relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union that Paasikivi should have been chosen to lead the negotiations, even if his instructions precluded any realistic concessions. The Soviets, by contrast, were clearly expecting to negotiate. They again offered large areas of Soviet Karelia in compensation for Finnish losses and continued to make concessions right up to 9 November, the day of the last meeting between the Finnish delegation and Stalin. They appear to have been surprised by Finnish intransigence and may well have believed what Soviet propaganda started to claim at the end of October: that Finnish resistance was being encouraged by Britain and France. In these circumstances they were obliged to prepare for the eventuality at which Molotov had hinted on 3 November: ' So far the civilians have handled the matter and since there has been no agreement the matter will have to be given over to the military.' 19 Earlier in the year Soviet military experts had been cautious in their assessment of the Soviet Union's capacity to solve the Finnish problem by force. In April 1939 B. M. Shaposhnikov, chief of the general staff and former commander of the Leningrad military district, was ordered to prepare plans for a campaign against Finland. 20 He concluded that it would be 'far from a simple matter and expected that it would require not less than several months of intense and difficult war, even in the event that the great imperialist powers did not intervene directly in the conflict'. 21 Similar conclusions were reached by K. A. Meretskov, commander of the Leningrad military district, when he was ordered in June to prepare plans for a campaign against Finland using the resources of his own district alone.22 Both commanders were overruled by the Chief Military Council, a body set up after the purges which included both Stalin and Zhdanov but few competent military specialists, on the grounds that they underestimated the strength of the Red Army and, rather perversely in the light of its own instructions, did not take into account the strength of the Soviet Union as a whole. D. W. Spring suggests that the politicians' confidence in the possibility of a 19 21

Quoted ibid., p. 40. Quoted ibid., p. 212.

20 22

Spring, 'Soviet Decision', p. 212. Ibid., p. 213; Upton, Finland ig^g-ig40, pp. 22-3.

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quick victory may have been based on their assessment of the revolutionary potential of the Finnish working class: an assessment which must have owed much to the influence of Kuusinen. It is this, in his view, which explains the preparations begun in November 1939 to make use of emigre Finnish communists as the basis of an alternative government, and the setting-up of the puppet Kuusinen government at Terijoki, a Finnish seaside resort 'liberated' by the Red Army, on 1 December. An alternative interpretation is put forward by Timo Vihavainen, who places more emphasis on the ' revolutionary' element in Stalin's foreign policy and quotes Osmo Jussila's book on the Terijoki government to the effect that a puppet government was the ' device which was always used when the Soviet Union reconquered territory of the former Russian empire'. 23 In one view, in other words, the Kuusinen government was a means to military success; in the other, military success was the preliminary to a political arrangement which would have placed Soviet—Finnish relations on an entirely new basis, one far removed from the moderate and pragmatic approach which had previously characterised Soviet policy towards Finland. If that was the case, the Finnish refusal to compromise may not have been so misguided after all. GREAT BRITAIN, FINLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

In October 1939 the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, Lord Chatfield, wrote to the Foreign Office declining to release armaments which the Finnish Government wished to purchase: ' I must also point out that Finland has never figured in any form of priority list, either political or strategical.' 24 Lord Chatfield was wrong. In 1937 Finland had in fact been placed eleventh, immediately ahead of the three Baltic states, in a priority list of twenty foreign countries for British arms exports.25 Between the wars Finland had a generally positive image in Whitehall, quite apart from its public image as a small democratic nation with distinctive cultural and sporting achievements to its credit: the home of Sibelius and Paavo Nurmi; 23 24 25

T i m o Vihavainen, ' T h e Soviet decision for war against Finland, November 1939: a comment', Soviet Studies, 3 9 (1987), pp. 314—17 (p. 315). Chatfield to Halifax, 21 October 1939, F O 371/23644, N 5 6 8 6 / 1 9 4 / 5 6 . Salmon, 'British security interests', p. 120.

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the host of the Olympic Games which were scheduled to take place in 1940. The Foreign Office regarded the achievement of Finnish independence as 'one of the permanent achievements of the war', and looked favourably on Finland's alignment with the Scandinavian powers.26 Finland was an important trading partner, selling the bulk of its timber, paper and pulp products in Great Britain, and purchasing increasing quantities of British exports. The British armed forces and intelligence services found Finland, like the Baltic states, a useful listening post for the Soviet Union. 27 The day-to-day conduct of British-Finnish relations was handled by the Northern Department of the Foreign Office. Its head in 1939 was Laurence Collier, a spirited opponent of appeasement and a man who had been critical of undemocratic tendencies in Finnish politics (notably the fascist-type Lappo movement of the early 1930s), and of the proGerman inclinations of the Finnish armed forces.28 It was in the Northern Department that a policy of support for Finland was to be first articulated towards the end of September 1939. Before the war, however, Finland was never a matter of major concern to British governments. It is significant that Gripenberg, the Finnish minister in London, had met Lord Halifax, Foreign Secretary since February 1938, only once previously when, in May 1939, he requested an appointment to discuss the position of Finland in Britain's treaty negotiations with France and Russia. 29 These negotiations gave little encouragement to the view that Britain had an interest in the preservation of Finnish independence. The British government gave way steadily to the Soviet demands, overcoming its reluctance to include Finland among the states to be guaranteed by the proposed treaty, modifying its resistance to the Soviet definition of 'indirect aggression', and going a long way towards accepting what Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, termed the Soviet 'Monroe Doctrine in Eastern Europe'. 30 The belief that it was possible to do business with the Russians survived both the signature of the Nazi-Soviet pact and the outbreak of war. There was a tendency in government circles to interpret the consequences of the pact in an unduly favourable light. 26 28

29 30

27 Ibid., p. 119. Ibid., pp. 119-20. Donald Lammers, 'Fascism, communism and the Foreign Office 1 9 3 7 - 3 9 ' , Journal of Contemporary History 6, 3, (1971), pp. 6 6 - 8 6 ; Collier minute, 8 July 1939, on visits to Finland by Admiral Ganaris and General Haider, F O 3 7 1 / 2 3 6 6 3 , N 3 2 3 4 / 3 0 7 6 / 6 3 . Gripenberg, Finland and the Great Powers, p. 22. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 3rd series, V I , p. 152, quoted in Jakobson, Winter War,

pp. 84-5.

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The price paid by Hitler for freedom from attack in the east had been, so it was argued, the creation of a barrier to further expansion in eastern and south eastern Europe and a retreat from Germany's historic position in the Baltic states. Germany's partners in the antiComintern pact had been alienated. There seemed to be no evidence of extensive economic or military co-operation between Germany and Russia.31 For Winston Churchill, the new First Lord of the Admiralty, there was no question that any Soviet gain was to Germany's disadvantage and therefore to be welcomed. This view was held in a diluted form by many of his Cabinet colleagues. The Foreign Secretary was less sure, but agreed that it was both desirable and feasible to explore means of improving British-Soviet relations, especially through trade. The only substantial dissent came from the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW), which opposed economic concessions to Russia because they would weaken the blockade, and from the Northern Department. 32 Here there was less inclination to disregard the evidence for German-Soviet co-operation. It was felt 'that for the present the Soviets are out to play the German game — so long as it does not trespass on Soviet interests'. 33 The two powers constituted a formidable combination, even if welded together solely by fear; and it was probable that nothing the Allies could offer Russia would be sufficient to prise them apart. British policy should therefore be 'frigid but unprovocative'. 34 Foreign Office officials were reluctant to see the integrity of small nations sacrificed for the hope of good relations with Russia. Nor did they discount Soviet military capacity. One of the junior members of the Northern Department went much further in his criticism of the Soviet Union. Fitzroy Maclean, newly returned from Moscow, was 'bored with his desk job and eager to see some action in the British Army'. 35 He was preoccupied with the Soviet threat to British interests in the Middle East (Persian oil) and India, and argued that 'Our aim is to damage Soviet interests by every means at our disposal short of actually going to war.' 36 31

32 33 34 35

Chiefs of staff (COS) appreciation, 'The possible future course of the War', 18 Sept 1939, CAB 6 6 / 1 ; War Cabinet meeting, 10 Oct 1939, CAB 65/1. G. L. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union 1939-1941 (Leiden, 1972), pp. 84, 170. W . N . Medlicott, The Economic Blockade ( L o n d o n , 1952), I, p p . 3 1 2 - 1 5 . Minute by Sir L. Oliphant (Supervising Under-Secretary, Northern Department), 16 October 1939, FO 371/23678, N5240/57/38. Minute by D. W. Lascelles, 18 September 1939, ibid. N4571/57/38. Martin Kitchen, British policy towards the Soviet Union during the Second World War (London, 36 1986). Quoted in Kitchen, British policy, p. 6.

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Failure to appreciate the degree of insecurity actually felt by the Soviet leadership, or the residue of distrust left by Chamberlain's conduct of the British-French-Soviet negotiations in the summer, led the British Government to overrate the prospects for undermining the Nazi-Soviet pact. At the same time, British initiatives were vitiated by the feeling that the Soviet regime was thoroughly untrustworthy and might exploit any agreement with Britain, just as it had its pact with Germany, as well as by the assumption that, whatever its economic and diplomatic importance, the Soviet Union did not need to be taken seriously in military terms.37 The information on the Soviet-Finnish negotiations that filtered through to Britain in October 1939 faced the government with a dilemma though not yet an acute one. The Baltic states had virtually to be written off since they appeared to lack both the means and the will to defend their independence and since, in their case, a gain for Russia could be regarded fairly unequivocally as a loss for Germany. Finland, however, was in a more favourable strategic position, better if by no means adequately armed, and prepared to resist aggression.38 Finland was also a small democratic state which was widely regarded as 'an outpost of the West'. 39 The British War Cabinet was obliged to acknowledge such sentiments but at first regarded the situation without alarm. The opinion of Lord Hankey, the Minister without Portfolio, that 'the threat to their security might well be greatly reduced as a result of their negotiations with Russia' was shared by his colleagues.40 The policy of detaching the Soviet Union from Germany was pursued most persistently through the improvement of trade relations. The aim was to reactivate the contacts established by the mission to Moscow of R. S. Hudson, the Secretary for Overseas Trade, in March 1939.41 These had been overshadowed by the events of the summer, but the conciliatory attitude adopted by the Cabinet in mid-September received a favourable response, and on 11 October an exchange agreement was signed.42 It was regarded as a significant step: Chamberlain remarked ' we have reason to believe 37

38 39 40 41 42

Maclean, 'Memorandum respecting the Soviet threat to British interests in the Middle East', 28 October 1939, FO 418/85, N5736/G; Maclean minute, 1 November 1939, FO 371/23678, N5778/57/38. Lascelles minute, 29 September 1939, FO 371/23692, N4838/991/38. Title of article in The Times, 19 O c t o b e r 1939. War Cabinet meeting, 6 October 1939, CAB 65/1. Watt, How War Came, pp. 219-21. Medlicott, Economic Blockade, I , p p . 3 1 2 - 1 5 .

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that she would welcome a wider trade agreement of a kind which certainly would not be to the taste of Ribbentrop and Co'. 43 A second line of approach was suggested by the news of conversations between the Soviet Union and Turkey. This, together with the imminent signature of a British-French-Turkish treaty raised at the beginning of October the prospect of a diplomatic coup which would complete Germany's isolation.44 The first round of SovietFinnish negotiations started shortly afterwards. Their breakdown on 14 October suggested that the Russian demands might be more farreaching, and Finnish resistance to them more determined, than had been expected. Then the Turks broke off their talks with the Russians, and 'put an end, at present at least, to our hopes of building, through Turkey, a bridge between the Government of the USSR and ourselves'.45 But the impetus for the trade agreement was maintained, partly through the efforts of Maisky and the Labour politician Sir Stafford Cripps.46 On 24 October Halifax proposed to the Cabinet a positive British initiative to secure such an agreement.47 He admitted that it 'might arouse a good deal of criticism in this country', and that British prestige would suffer if the attempt failed; but the Cabinet decided that the risk was worth taking and that there should be ' no half-measures': the President of the Board of Trade himself should go to Moscow to complete the negotiations. One circumstance, and only one, was recognised from the start as sufficient to cause the British to call off the talks: It should be made clear that a British delegation would only proceed to Moscow if political conditions permitted. This would be readily understood as a warning that we should be unable to proceed further if Russia committed an act of aggression against Finland.48 This proviso had in fact been introduced by Collier at a late stage in the drafting of Halifax's memorandum on trade with Russia.49 The 43 44 45 46

47 48 49

Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 28 October 1939, Chamberlain Papers, University of Birmingham Library, N C 1 8 / 1 / 1 1 2 7 . Churchill, 'Notes on the general situation', 25 September 1939, CAB 6 6 / 2 ; War Cabinet meeting, 6 October 1939, CAB 6 5 / 1 . War Cabinet meeting, 18 October 1939, CAB 6 5 / 1 . Medlicott, Economic Blockade, I, p. 317. For Cripps as a source of information and advice, see War Cabinet meeting, 24 October 1939, CAB 6 5 / 1 . See also Eric Estorick, Stafford Cripps (London, 1949), pp. 179-83. War Cabinet meeting, 24 October 1939, CAB 6 5 / 1 ; Halifax memorandum, 'Trade with Russia', 21 October 1939, CAB 6 7 / 1 . War Cabinet meeting, 24 October 1939, CAB 6 5 / 1 . FO 371/23683, N5598/92/38.

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Northern Department was by now much more apprehensive than the Cabinet about the Soviet-Finnish negotiations, which had entered their second round on 23 October. Halifax himself disarmed Collier's warning by adding immediately afterwards: ' If, in fact, we could pull off a pretty good trade agreement under conditions that carried a certain political implication, it would be of great value.' 50 The warning conveyed to Maisky on 25 October did not imply any fear of a Soviet attack on Finland in the immediate future. The Cabinet was still inclined to believe that the Finns would not be intransigent and that the Russians would not risk offending world opinion, particularly that of the United States.51 THE EMERGENCE OF A FINNISH POLICY

As the incompatibility of Soviet interests and Finnish integrity became apparent, the Northern Department had begun to formulate a discreet policy of 'encouraging (within limits) rather than discouraging Finnish resistance to the Soviet demands', which was often directly contrary to the wishes of Cabinet members such as Churchill.52 It was initiated on 21 September with a long minute written by Collier on the Soviet threat to Finland and the Baltic states.53 This contained many of the ideas that were to govern his department's dealings with Finland over the next two months, including a characteristic juxtaposition of moral approbation, and readiness to exploit Finland's problems to Britain's advantage. Britain should, Collier suggested, encourage any tendency on the part of the Finns to resist Soviet pressure. They were relatively wellplaced to resist, and were ' one of the few small nations in Europe who have some spirit left and are really ready to defend their independence and neutrality, if they can be persuaded that there is any chance of their doing so with success'. From the British point of view, 'anything which increases Russian preoccupation in any part of the world improves our position in bargaining with the Soviet Government, and anything which distracts German attention to the Baltic must help us in the West'. In Collier's opinion support for Finland could best be expressed by the supply of war material; assistance in the construction of a 50 52 53

51 Ibid. War Cabinet meeting, 23 October 1939, CAB 6 5 / 1 . Collier minute, 20 November 1939, F O 371/23683, N 6 3 8 4 / 9 2 / 3 8 . FO 371/23643, N4712/194/56.

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railway to Petsamo (by which the Finns hoped to bypass the blocked Baltic trade route) and in other trade questions; and encouraging Finnish-Estonian co-operation in defence and economic affairs (this was a week before the Soviet-Estonian pact). Such aid could not be extensive, nor would it be disinterested: It is true that we are at present hardly in a position to lend any of these states (except perhaps Finland) such material support, and that the consequences of their accepting encouragement from us to maintain a firm front to Russia and Germany might well be unfortunate for themselves; but in present circumstances we can only consider our own interests.

Of the expedients proposed by Collier, only the supply of war material was to prove of any practical value. From this point onwards, indeed until the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, it was the principal means by which the Foreign Office hoped to convince the Finns that they had not been completely forgotten by Britain. A little could also be done by propaganda. That aside, the Foreign Office could only try to ensure that Finland's interests were not entirely disregarded in the prospective trade negotiations with Russia, or sacrificed to a hypothetical British-Soviet alliance. The pursuit of these modest objectives was hampered by the lack of information and by conflicting advice emanating from Finland. The problem had two aspects: the natural reluctance of the Finnish Government to reveal the details of their crucial negotiations, and the construction which Thomas Snow, the British minister in Helsinki, chose to place on such evidence as was available. Finnish secretiveness tended to encourage the Foreign Office's worst fears of Soviet designs, especially where northern Norway was concerned; it was also exasperating when the Finns demanded demonstrations of British support.54 Snow's behaviour and opinions were eccentric, although his observations on Finnish policy were often acute. 55 His pro-Finnish sentiments were overlaid with extreme but often justified scepticism as to the competence of the government, and Erkko in particular. He was also on increasingly bad terms with the Finns, especially after he evacuated the British legation and British residents from Helsinki in mid-October (no other mission left the city). His assessment of the way in which the Finns were likely to respond to 54

Lascelles minuted on 18 October 1939: ' One cannot be expected to express much public sympathy for a Government which refuses to say what it is up against. Mere sympathy with Finland's desire for independence is academic if that independence is not threatened.' FO 55 371/23692, N5388/991/38. Ibid., N5109/991/38.

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a crisis was to be fully borne out by their conduct during the Winter War: Their present attitude as far as I can gauge it is purely fatalistic. They have been under Russian domination geographically and sooner than temporise with unwelcome proposals they will fight and go under again. This attitude is quite unaffected by the possibility of receiving or not receiving outside help.56 But the conclusion Snow drew from this, that 'Finland's best course and the most useful service which it could render would be to temporise with the Russians', was vigorously rejected by the Northern Department. Collier remarked: ' I am convinced that, if we were to advise the Finns not to resist, we should be playing the German game.' 57 When, towards the end of October, Snow came round to the view that Finnish resistance was worth supporting, the methods he proposed - including the creation of an anti-Soviet coalition embracing Italy and Japan - were both impracticable and quite unacceptable politically. 58 Snow's defects marked him out for replacement at the earliest opportunity (but he was not succeeded by Gordon Vereker, formerly counsellor at the Moscow embassy, until February 1940). The efforts of Gripenberg, the Finnish minister in London, to obtain armaments ordered by Finland which had been detained by the service departments on the outbreak of war, coincided with Collier's priorities.59 The Foreign Office appealed to the service and economic departments on 25 September for special consideration to be given to Finnish arms orders, but met with little response. Difficulties centred on six light tanks ordered by the Finns in 1936 (under British pressure) which the War Office now refused to release: We bully the Finns into ordering the tanks and then refuse to supply them...The W.O. no doubt consider that 6 tanks in hand are worth more than Finnish goodwill. I might have agreed before today, but now think that we must consider Finland as a part of the Scandinavian block.60 The War Office was eventually persuaded to release the tanks. But the problem anticipated those that were to recur throughout the Winter War. The little that could be spared could have no 56 58 60

57 Snow telegram, 8 October 1939, FO 371/23692, N5093/991/38. Ibid. 59 Ibid., N5522/991/38. Gripenberg, Finland and the Great Powers, pp. 75-6. Minute by Sir C.Barclay (Northern Department), 9 October 1939, FO 371/23643, N5027/194/56.

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propaganda value, since publicity would only strengthen the Soviet claim that Britain was encouraging Finnish intransigence; and the quantity was so small that it could scarcely reinforce Finland's will to resist. The use of propaganda ran the risk of cutting across the official line towards the Soviet Union just as conspicuously. Until midOctober, the problem was that, as Lascelles of the Northern Department put it, c in view of the War Cabinet's general policy visa-vis Russia, I did not see how we could do much in the way of indignant comment by the BBC, etc.', but a more direct line was soon adopted. 61 The Foreign Office News Department was instructed 'to "boost" Finland in the press', and a series of bland, unprovocative articles duly appeared in The Times.62 Gripenberg records a revealing conversation with their author, Ralph Deakins, the paper's foreign editor: He remarked that it had not been easy to compose these commentaries on the Russo-Finnish negotiations. In the first place, he had no exact information on what Moscow was demanding, and second, he was not sure about the British Government's policy in respect of the Soviet Union. How far was the Foreign Office willing to go, what risks were they prepared to take - to the extent that was possible or feasible - in order to help Finland?63 BRITISH-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE SOVIET-FINNISH CRISIS

The War Cabinet's decision to go ahead with the Soviet trade talks coincided with the second round of Finnish-Soviet negotiations. Snow's reports from Helsinki were becoming more pessimistic, and on 23 October the Cabinet felt obliged for the first time to consider the attitude it might have to adopt in the event of a Soviet attack on Finland. 64 Although Snow's proposed revival of the Anglo-Japanese alliance had already been squashed by the Foreign Office, his recommendation that Britain should ' either formally or informally declare a state of belligerence between the USSR and ourselves' was taken seriously enough for it to be referred by the Cabinet to the chiefs of staff for consideration. The key to the Cabinet's interest was 61 62 63 64

Lascelles minute, 13 October 1939, FO 371/23692, N5206/991/38. The Times, 10, 13, 19 and 25 October 1939. Gripenberg, Finland and the Great Powers, p. 82. FO 371/23692, N5522/991/38 GAB 65/1.

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not the danger of a Soviet attack as such, but the possibility mentioned by Snow that the Russians 'might be prepared to establish themselves on the north coast of Norway' - thus constituting for the first time a direct threat to the security of the British Isles. When the chiefs of staff presented their report to the Cabinet on i November, the day on which the latter learned of the beginning of the third and final round of negotiations, the possibility of a Soviet attack still seemed remote. 65 The report confirmed that 'any such aggression would be a very formidable military enterprise, especially at this time of year; and one on which Russia was unlikely to embark'. It added that 'the invasion of Finland itself... would involve no military threat to the Allies'. Like the Cabinet, however, the chiefs of staff were impressed by the prospect of a Soviet advance through the Swedish iron ore fields to the Norwegian port of Narvik. This would represent a threat to British security even if it had no direct bearing on the war between Britain and Germany. On the main question, whether war should be declared on Russia as a result of aggression against Finland, the chiefs of staff concluded that Britain and France could not undertake the additional burdens which this would impose. Certain consequences might, however, oblige Britain to resist. A Russian invasion in the north of Scandinavia might provoke a German invasion in the south, and their joint domination of the peninsula would be 'a serious threat to our interests'. There was also the effect on neutral opinion: 'If we fail to stand up we may lose the sympathy of neutral states to an extent which may have dangerous military implications.' Of particular interest for the subsequent development of British strategy in northern Europe was the report's estimate of the prospects for a British military force operating in northern Norway and Sweden: A small British force, say a Brigade Group, based on the Narvik-Boden railway and operating in support of the Norwegians and Swedes, might have an effect out of all proportion to its size. Although campaigning conditions in Scandinavia would be extremely arduous, the despatch of a small expedition would be a practicable proposition. We could, however, afford no assistance to Finland against Russian aggression. 65

'Soviet aggression against Finland or other Scandinavian countries', 31 October 1939, GAB 66/3; Snow telegram of 31 October 1939, showing 'that in Helsingfors at least the situation was not viewed with undue alarm'; War Cabinet meeting, 1 November 1939, CAB 65/2.

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The report strengthened Halifax's conviction, which he thought confirmed by Molotov's speech of 31 October (which made public the Soviet demands for the first time), and by Goring's reported views that 'the Russians were not out for adventures'. 66 If the worst did happen, Cabinet and chiefs of staff were agreed that the only consideration to be taken into account was ' whether a stand against Russian aggression would bring us accretions of strength from neutrals' - meaning essentially the United States. The Finnish delegation left Moscow for the last time on 13 November, expecting a further summons that never came. In the meantime no response had come from Moscow on the question of British-Soviet trade talks. Maisky was unable to give any explanation for the delay, but information from Cripps suggested that the reason lay in Russia's difficulties with Finland, which were now being blamed on British support for the Finns. 67 This explanation was seized upon by Churchill: Finland was the one obstacle to the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. Repeating his argument about the advantages to Britain of Soviet expansion in the Baltic, Churchill told the Cabinet on 16 November t h a t ' it would be a mistake to stiffen the Finns against making concessions to the USSR. In general, it should be our policy to secure as much support as possible in this war from the USSR, China and the USA.' 68 This provoked an unusually strong reaction from Halifax, perhaps more aware than Churchill of how little ' stiffening' there had actually been: Britain, he said, had been 'extremely tolerant' towards the Soviet Union; and he was not prepared to force the Finns to make concessions which they believed would jeopardise their independence. Two weeks of tension intervened between the final breakdown of Soviet-Finnish negotiations on 13 November and the border incident staged on 26 November as a pretext for the Soviet attack. The lack of progress on trade made the War Cabinet less interested in conciliating Russia. But they displayed remarkably little anxiety about the state of Soviet-Finnish relations. This was due in part to the fact that the news of the end of negotiations had been accompanied by Erkko's optimistic forecast that there would not be 'anything worse than a week of angry utterances in Moscow'. 69 66 67 68

ibid. War Cabinet meeting, 16 November 1939, ibid.; Estorick, Cripps, p. 183. 69 CAB 65/2. War Cabinet meeting, 15 November 1939, CAB 65/2.

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However, Cabinet ministers probably relied less on reports from Helsinki than upon their own estimate, supported by expert military opinion, of the way in which the Soviet government was likely to behave. Like the Finns, they believed that, however extreme their language, the Russians would not in the last resort use force to secure their requirements. In strictly military terms this analysis was, as we have seen, quite rational. Western experts shared the view of their Soviet counterparts that the Red Army, weakened by the purges, was in no position to fight an arduous winter campaign. Halifax was not alone when he wrote as late as 28 November, ' I have still considerable doubts whether the Soviet really means to get itself into any real fighting.'70 Soviet rhetoric could have been read either as bluff or as a preliminary to aggression. Only in the Foreign Office, perhaps, was the latter alternative taken seriously.71 The likelihood of a Soviet attack could not be gauged with confidence - it was open to question, for instance, whether climatic conditions would favour or hinder a Russian advance - but indirect pressure was certain to increase and would be almost as effective: ' I don't see how the Finns can stand the financial strain indefinitely, nor what is to prevent the Russians from keeping them mobilised till they crack.' 72 In such circumstances Churchill's confident assertions of the benefits of Soviet expansion were particularly irritating. His remarks at the Cabinet meeting of 16 November prompted Collier to make a final statement of the considerations which had guided the Northern Department's policy towards Finland, part of which was embodied in a letter of 25 November from Halifax to Churchill: It seems to me that, for our purposes in the present war, German domination of the Baltic would not be appreciably lessened if Finland were to accept the present demands on her. Indeed, we have reason to think that the Germans are conniving at the Soviet pressure on Finland in order to frighten the other Scandinavian countries and make them more amenable to German pressure directed against ourselves, particularly in economic matters. ...All the evidence at our disposal points to the Soviet Union remaining benevolently neutral or even half allied to Germany so long as the issue of the war is undecided. This being so it would surely not be to our advantage to see an increase in the strength or influence of a power which, generally 70 71 72

Halifax to Viscount Gort, 28 November 1939, FO 800/328. Collier minutes of 27 and 29 November 1939, FO 371/23693, N6623/N6671/991/38. Lascelles minute, 20 November 1939, FO 371/23693, N6409/991/38.

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speaking, and even in the Baltic is likely, so long as the war continues, to act in the interests of Germany rather than of ourselves. I should go so far as to say that it would be preferable, from our point of view, if that Power were involved in difficulties of its own and thereby so much the less able to help Germany. 73

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE WINTER WAR

Although the Soviet attack on Finland of 30 November came as a surprise to the War Cabinet and provoked outraged reactions in Parliament and the press, it was an eventuality for which the Cabinet was prepared. It had sabotaged any remaining hopes of rapprochement, but the reasons for which the chiefs of staff had advised against declaring war on Russia were still valid. Only if Russia went on to commit further acts of aggression in south eastern Europe might the Allies be forced into hostilities. Otherwise no possible gain could outweigh the additional strain on Allied resources, and the certainty that the Soviet Union and Germany would be united against a common enemy.74 Britain could not afford to appear indifferent to Finland's fate, but the Cabinet confined its expressions of interest to the limited supply of war material and restrained propaganda, on the pattern established by the Northern Department's efforts in October and November. There was little incentive to make any practical connection between the war in Finland and the war against Germany as long as Finland's military ability and political will to resist remained problematical. At first the prospects were viewed pessimistically. Chamberlain thought that the formation of a new Finnish government 'very likely presaged a surrender to Russian demands'. 75 General Ironside, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, informed the Cabinet that though Russian progress might be slow, and the Finns might be able to carry out prolonged guerrilla warfare, they could not be expected to hold out long against the kind of heavy air attack that Helsinki was now experiencing. 76 He added a few days later that the greatest danger was ' that the country might 73

Collier minute, 20 N o v e m b e r 1 9 3 9 ; Halifax to Churchill, 25 N o v e m b e r 1939, F O

74

W a r Cabinet meeting, 2 D e c e m b e r 1939, C A B 6 5 / 2 . W a r Cabinet meeting, 1 D e c e m b e r 1939, ibid. W a r Cabinet meeting, 3 D e c e m b e r 1939, ibid.

75 76

371/23683, N6384/92/38.

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be bolshevised, which would lead to its collapse from within' - a suggestion which seemed plausible in the light of the establishment of the Kuusinen government.77 If the Finns were to collapse in the near future, the question of Russia's next move demanded urgent consideration. Although south eastern Europe was one possibility, the Scandinavian peninsula seemed a more likely target. According to one report, Soviet forces had already penetrated into northern Norway by 2 December.78 This threat (which never materialised) exerted a powerful influence on ministerial imaginations: Halifax and Hore-Belisha, the Secretary of State for War, were particularly impressed. Staving off the Finnish collapse by the supply of war material might prevent the fulfilment of Russia's supposed Atlantic ambitions and, more important, 'encourage' the Scandinavian countries to support Finland. Chamberlain and Halifax were the earliest and strongest supporters of sending arms; the Air Ministry, on which most demands were made, was the most reluctant of the three services to let them go.79 On 4 December Chamberlain supported a Finnish request for thirty Gladiators against Air Ministry objections, because they would be better used there than, for instance in Turkey, and might have a ' very considerable' political effect on the Swedes, ' to whom we looked for shipping and iron ore'. 80 Halifax put the case for aid even more strongly, arguing that however much embarrassment Germany might be suffering, ' the Russian invasion of Finland might, in time, prove very embarrassing to ourselves, particularly through its repercussions on the Scandinavian countries '. 81 The following day twenty of the thirty aircraft requested were released. Official comment on the Soviet invasion reflected the government's ambivalence towards both the Soviet Union and the war it was supposed to be fighting against Germany. For Chamberlain the situation demanded nothing less than an unequivocal condemnation of Russia's action, although Halifax was afraid that ' we might be 77 78 79

80

W a r Cabinet meeting, 7 December 1939, ibid. W a r Cabinet meeting, 2 December 1939, ibid. Sir T h o m a s Inskip diary, 5 December 1939 (Caldecote Papers, Churchill College, C a m b r i d g e ) . Chamberlain's attitude was never as dismissive as his letter to I d a C h a m b e r l a i n of 3 December (quoted in Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London, 1946), p . 427) might suggest: ' I a m as indignant as anyone a t t h e Russians' behaviour b u t I a m a m bound to say t h a t I d o n ' t think the Allied cause is likely to suffer thereby.' 81 War Cabinet meeting, 4 December 1939, CAB 65/2. Ibid.

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asked why, if we felt so strongly in the matter, we had not declared war on Russia'. 82 Even before the attack, the Foreign Office had allowed the Ministry of Information to relax its 'self-denying ordinance' towards the Soviet Union and ' impart a certain asperity to our comments on their policy'. Halifax soon became less cautious, commending the line taken by the press t h a t ' we may not be able to prevent such goings on, but there can be no doubt what we feel'. 83 British propaganda was intended both to avoid comment so unrestrained that it might provoke demands for action to match it, and to counteract ' the serious danger of Russia becoming public enemy no. 1 to such an extent that the German menace might have been forgotten'. 84 This meant 'showing that Russia's aggression could only have taken place with the knowledge and approval of Germany'. 85 The initial object was to exploit the shock to neutral governments and public opinion aroused by the Soviet attack. In Chamberlain's view Russia's action, so far from damaging the Allied cause, had actually helped it by demonstrating that 'the ways of dictators make things impossible for the rest of the world'; and he thought that 'Hitler must be in a state of profound depression'. 86 One of the Cabinet's first decisions was to make overtures to Italy and Japan, making Britain's disapproval 'quite clear' and trying to ' lead Signor Mussolini towards the idea of co-operating with us in the defence of Italian interests in the Balkans, in the event of Russian aggression in South-East Europe'. 87 This diplomatic strategy was complicated by the appeal made by Finland to the League of Nations on 3 December. Made without consulting either the Scandinavian states or Britain and France, it was one of several Finnish attempts to secure mediation and material assistance.88 The British realised that there was a danger that the meetings of the League council and assembly, scheduled for 9 and 11 82 83

84 85 87 88

War Cabinet meeting, 30 November 1939, ibid. E. H. Carr (Ministry of Information) to Sir Orme Sargent (FO), 29 November 1939; Halifax minute, 2 December 1939, FO 371/23678, N7143/57/38; War Cabinet meeting, 4 December 1939, CAB 65/2. Minute by Haigh (FO News Department), 5 January 1940, FO 371/23696, N7721/991/38. 86 FO 371/23678, N7143/N7198/57/38. See n. 87. War Cabinet meeting, 2 December 1939, CAB 65/2 V a i n o T a n n e r , The Winter War: Finland against Russia 1939-40 (Stanford, California, 1957), p p . 1 0 6 - 9 ; F . P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London, i960), p p . 8 0 5 - 9 ; Nevakivi, The Appeal that was never made, pp. 53—61; James Barros, Betrayal from within: Joseph Avenol, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, 1933-1940 (New Haven and London,

1969), pp. 198-205.

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December, might become an anti-Russian demonstration, with demands for sanctions which would revive Italian memories of Abyssinia, or even for the expulsion of the Soviet Union. On 4 December the latter course was duly proposed by Argentina.89 Britain and France could not afford to stifle discussion, although the French were at first keen to do so. Soon, however, the French though that the meeting, though futile, might be ' turned to our advantage'. 90 Officials at the Quai d'Orsay favoured expulsion, while Daladier, the Prime Minister, influenced by the effect of the Soviet attack on French opinion, at first wished to go to Geneva himself. The British attitude was more cautious. Less troubled by vociferous anti-Soviet opinion at home, the Cabinet's concern was to avoid on the one hand bringing the League into disrepute, and on the other a complete break with Russia. 91 In sending to Geneva R. A. Butler, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Cabinet could have chosen no representative less influenced by antiSoviet sentiment. He could be relied upon to follow the line that Russia's action 'could only be met by force of moral opinion'. 92 Although, however, Butler was instructed to do his utmost to prevent controversial issues being raised, he was above all to avoid giving the impression that the British position was unclear. In the last resort he would have to vote for expulsion.93 The danger that Russia and Germany would be driven closer together was considered smaller than the damage to Allied prestige in neutral eyes that would result from a display of Allied disunity. The hope was clearly to impress the larger neutrals, since the reservations of the Scandinavians were well-known. When on 14 December the League assembly recommended expulsion under Article 16 of the Covenant, Butler was obliged to vote with the majority in the council later that day. The immediate consequences were negligible: the larger neutrals were unimpressed; the Soviet Union claimed to be on excellent terms with the 'Finnish People's Government'. Of greater 89 90 91 92

93

War Cabinet meeting, 6 December 1939, GAB 65/2. Conversation between Sir Alexander Cadogan (permanent under-secretary, FO) and French ambassador, 6 December 1939, FO 371/23694, N7124/991/38. War Cabinet meeting, 12 December 1939, CAB 65/2. David Dilks, ed., The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938-1945 (London, 1971), p. 235 (entry for 6 December 1939); War Cabinet meeting, 4 December 1939, CAB 65/2). Butler's view was that * once the League had been called together, there was nothing else to be done but to turn Russia out. In most ways it was a pity it was called at all': Butler to Sir R. Campbell (Ambassador in Paris), 19 December 1939, FO 371/23696, N7904/991/38. War Cabinet meetings, 7 and 8 December 1939, CAB 65/2.

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significance was the assembly's call to members of the League to give all possible material help to Finland. By the middle of December official opinion in Britain and France was regarding the Finnish war with less detachment, and beginning to consider the uses to which the League resolution might be put. The longer the Finns held out against the Russians, the greater the incentive to consider ways in which the Russo-Finnish war might be made to serve Allied interests. By mid December it was clear that they had won a breathing-space, but the Soviet menace still loomed over Finland and apparently over northern Sweden and Norway as well. Both the Scandinavians and the Allies feared a Russian advance to the Swedish iron ore fields and the Norwegian coast, and speculated on the manner in which Germany might respond to such a development. Would the two powers divide Scandinavia between themselves on an amicable basis, or would Germany invade southern Scandinavia in order to prevent Russian control of the ore fields?94 Neither alternative was likely to materialise as long as the Russians were held up in Finland. A prolonged war would also drain the Soviet Union of economic and military resources that might otherwise have gone to Germany, and rule out the possibility of trouble in south east Europe or in Asia. The Allies therefore came to believe that, as Halifax put it,' in addition to the moral argument for helping Finland, there was an extremely important practical argument, namely, that by doing so we kept Soviet Russia busy'. 95 Since Finland was too remote to be helped directly, assistance could only be provided through co-operation with Norway and Sweden. At a time when many in Britain and France, notably Churchill, hoped for active Scandinavian participation on the Allied side, this had inevitable implications for Scandinavian neutrality. 96 Assistance to Finland also opened up new opportunities for dealing with the other great strategic preoccupation of the Allies in Scandinavia: Swedish iron ore. By December 1939, furthermore, not only the British public, but also many members of the government, were wearying of a war of inaction which had not appreciably eroded German strength. Ministers privately started to question a strategy which exposed 94

95 96

FO memorandum summarising recent Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) reports, 'Relations between Germany and the USSR', 13 December 1939, CAB 66/4; Halifax memorandum, ' The situation in Scandinavia and the possible results of the Russian invasion of Finland' 15 December 1939, ibid. Conversation with French ambassador, 16 December 1939, FO 371/23696, N7568/991/38. Churchill note, 'Norway- Iron Ore Traffic', 16 December 1939, CAB 66/4.

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them to increasing criticism in Parliament and the press. In these circumstances they were receptive to suggestions that economic warfare might be the key to victory not merely in the long term, but in a matter of months. The prospect of a military expedition, ostensibly acting in response to the League resolution on Finland, but in fact to occupy Narvik and the Swedish ore fields, was raised for the first time at a meeting of the Military Co-ordination Committee on 20 December.97 It offered a solution to the iron ore problem as a whole, and also took into account the possibility of a German invasion of southern Scandinavia. The War Cabinet was strongly attracted to the idea, which was to be given greater credibility by the news of the great Finnish defensive victory at Suomussalmi on 27-28 December. It soon came to dominate Allied strategy. Towards the end of December the Allies made their first major diplomatic initiative in Scandinavia on the lines of Daladier's proposal. Shortly afterwards the chiefs of staff reversed their previous policy and recommended Allied military intervention in the Scandinavian peninsula. 98 CONCLUSION

The apparent equanimity with which the Allies contemplated the prospect of hostilities with the Soviet Union as a result of assisting Finland contrasts sharply with the caution that had hitherto characterised British policy towards Russia. Few members of the War Cabinet, in contrast to their French counterparts, positively welcomed an open breach with the Soviet Union. Nor did they believe that the Allied cause would be strengthened either materially or ideologically by launching a crusade against Germany and Russia as the 'forces of darkness'. 99 Several, Churchill among them, undoubtedly regretted the fact that Russia's action had obliged Britain to take up an attitude of opposition, and wished to keep bridges open. Were they nevertheless moving, as their decisions seemed to imply, towards war with the Soviet Union? The first point to note about the decision to intervene in Scandinavia was that it was hedged about with so many quali97 98 99

CAB 83/1. COS report,' Military implications of a policy aimed at stopping the export of Swedish iron ore to Germany', 31 December 1939, GAB 66/4. Viscount Cranborne to Halifax, 10 December 1939, FO 800/322.

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fications that it had only a limited prospect of ever being put into effect. Most members of the War Cabinet probably realised this even if they were reluctant to admit it even to themselves. Intervention depended first on an appeal to the Allies for assistance by the Finnish government, and secondly on the consent of the Norwegian and Swedish governments to allow the passage of troops and supplies across their territories. Neither of these conditions materialised. After the failures of their diplomatic demarches early in January 1940, the British and French could have had no illusions about the Scandinavian attitude. The Finnish appeal was more problematical, since up to the very last minute there seemed to be a chance that it might be made. In fact, however, 'with very few exceptions the Finnish leaders seem to have sensed that the Allied offer of assistance was basically fraudulent, and in so far as it was genuine, would be quite inadequate'. 100 In considering the kind of operations which might have been carried out if the pre-conditions had been fulfilled, we have to draw a distinction between the wilder fantasies about intervention in the Soviet Union entertained in certain quarters in France and Britain, and the only plans which had the full authority of the British and French governments, as expressed in the decisions of the Supreme War Council in Paris on 5 February 1940.101 These were ambitious enough. They comprised two separate operations, code-named 'Avonmouth' and 'Stratford', to be carried out simultaneously. Under 'Avonmouth' a British-French force of three battalions (including a specially recruited ski battalion, the '5th Scots Guards') was to be sent to Narvik and was then to move up the railway into Sweden to occupy the Gallivare ore fields and the port of Lulea. Two or three brigades - perhaps 12-13,000 men - would be detached from this force to move on through Tornio to Finland. Operation ' Stratford' represented a much larger commitment. Five territorial battalions would be landed at Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim in order to forestall the Germans and prepare the way for a force of two territorial and one regular division which was to establish a defensive line in central Sweden against a German invasion. Altogether 100,000 men and 11,000 vehicles would be involved.102 100 101 102

Upton, Finland ^39-40, p. 105. C A B 9 9 / 3 . For details of plans for military action against Russia, see Hans-Joachim Lorbeer, Westmdchte gegen die Sowjetunion ig^g-ig^ (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1975). C O S report, ' T h e employment of Allied land forces in Scandinavia and Finland', 14 February 1940, CAB 6 6 / 5 .

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Assistance to Finland therefore represented only a small part of the projected operations, and the deployment of the Allied force in Finland was to be on the most restricted terms. It was to be entirely self-contained in both leadership and supplies, and was to operate only in northern Finland, not on the more important southern fronts. The intention was to avoid an over-extended line of communications and the danger that the force might be cut off by a German landing in its rear. It is clear, however, that a further consequence - deliberate or not - would be that it would have only a remote chance of actually coming into contact with the Russians. This goes some of the way towards answering the claim that in deciding to send military assistance to Finland the Allies came close to open war with the Soviet Union. The prospect did not cause the Cabinet as much anxiety in early 1940 as it had in the autumn of 1939, owing to Russia's poor performance in Finland. To the extent that a risk existed, it would be minimised not only by the practical difficulties of campaigning in northern Finland, but also by a variety of means of avoiding an official declaration of war. The Russians themselves had not declared war on Finland; the Allies could make use of either Article 16 of the League Covenant or the League resolution on Finland to justify their action. 103 There were several recent precedents for 'unofficial' wars, notably Spain, although the non-intervention model favoured by the Supreme War Council was later rejected by the chiefs of staff on account of its legal ambiguities.104 The Russians themselves would probably have done their best to turn a blind eye to a confrontation with the Allies in Finland. They were certainly worried about the danger of entanglement in the larger war through the Finnish conflict.105 In the end the Allies were rescued from what would almost certainly have been a fiasco by the conclusion of a peace treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union on 12 March 1940. The terms were much harsher than those on offer in 1938-9, but the 103 104 105

Halifax conversation with U S charge d'affaires, 28 F e b r u a r y 1940, Foreign Relations of the United States 1940, /, p . 2 9 3 ; T a n n e r , Winter War, p p . 175—8. COS report, 23 February 1940, CAB 66/5. On 29 January 1940 the Soviet Government initiated secret peace talks with Finland, using Sweden as an intermediary, thus effectively jettisoning the Kuusinen government. On 30 January Maisky met R. A. Butler for the first time since the end of November and suggested that it was in the interest of both Britain and the Soviet Union to isolate 'sources of difference'. War Cabinet meeting, 31 January 1940, CAB 65/5; Ivan Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador (London, 1967), p. 48.

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Finns had no alternative but to accept, in view of Russia's belated but shattering assault on the Finnish lines in early March. Finland soon resumed its lowly place on the British scale of strategic and political priorities. By the end of 1941, indeed, Britain was at war with Finland at the behest of its new ally, the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER 6

The attitude of the Scandinavian countries to Nazi Germany s war preparations and its aggression on Poland Bogdan Koszel The establishment of the Polish state in 1918 was favourably received by the Scandinavian counties, and diplomatic relations were established fairly soon afterwards. Finland was the first Scandinavian country to recognise Poland de iure on 8 March 1919, followed by Denmark on 30 May 1919, Norway one day later and finally Sweden on 3 June 1919. In the first years of the Polish state the Scandinavian press wrote at length about the Polish-Soviet war of 1920, the plebiscite in Warmia (Ermeland) and Mazuria, the Silesian uprisings and other events. Since Poland was in a difficult economic situation, the Scandinavian countries refrained from developing economic contacts with it. It was not until the 1930s that they signed trade and credit agreements, established cultural contacts and started scientific cooperation with Poland. 1 There were no close political ties between the Scandinavian countries and Poland in spite of the offers made by the Polish side. Jozef Beck, who became Poland's Foreign Minister on 2 November 1932, wanted to intensify political dialogue. In the years 1934-8, he paid official and private visits to the Scandinavian countries, trying to persuade Oslo, Copenhagen, Helsinki and Stockholm to establish closer co-operation with Poland. However, his proposals did not meet with a favourable reception. Guided by political realism, the Scandinavian politicians focused their attention on co-operation between the northern states and did not want to get involved in central European conflicts. On 27 May 1938, the governments of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden signed a declaration on neutrality in Stockholm. It referred to the statement of 1912 and set 1

J. Szymanski, Stosunki gospodarcze Polski ze Szwecja w latach 1919-1939 (Danzig, 1978);

K. Slaski, 'Ten centuries of Polish-Scandinavian cultural contacts', Polish Western Affairs, vol. 18, no. 2 (1977) pp. 293-312; B. Piotrowski, 'Les recherches sur la Scandinavie en Pologne Populaire', La Pologne et les Affaires Occidentales, vol. 13, no. 2 (1977), pp- 373-89. 124

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the contracting parties the duty of proclaiming internal enacting laws. This declaration symbolised the entire interwar policy of the Scandinavian countries and signified restraint with regard to all external concepts.2 The announcement by Nazi Germany of its demands with regard to Poland in the spring of 1939 (the incorporation of the Free City of Danzig into the Reich and an extra-territorial motorway to East Prussia) caused great apprehension in Scandinavian diplomatic circles, although the extent of this apprehension varied. Denmark, which in a larger perspective was also threatened by a potential German invasion, showed little interest in Berlin's propaganda. It frequently referred to the impartial attitude of Helmer Rosting, the Dane, who from October 1932 was for twelve months the League of Nations' High Commissioner in Danzig. 3 The Danzig question was rarely discussed in the press of Norway and Finland, and the persons directing irredentist propaganda in the Reich and the Free City did not think it advisable to influence the journalists of the two countries. However, interest in the Free City was much greater in Sweden, where articles presenting the Danzig problem in accordance with Berlin's views were not a rare occurrence in the 1920s. In February 1921, an interpellation was made in the Polish parliament about the one-sided presentation of the problem of the Free City and Upper Silesia by Swedish papers. Eustachy Sapieha, who was Poland's Foreign Minister at that time, attributed the anti-Polish articles of the Swedish press to its financial links with Germany. In the following years, too, the Swedish press published articles which negated Poland's rights in the Free City. This was one of the reasons for the demarche in the Swedish Foreign Ministry by Poland's envoy, Alfred Wysocki. The Polish diplomat drew attention to Karl Hjalmar Branting's biased article in Social-Demokraten concerning the storing of Polish military equipment in the port of Danzig.4 The growing Nazification of Danzig in the years 1933-9 and the drastic restrictions of Polish rights in the city brought about a change 2

3 4

V. Sjoquist, Danmarks underigspolitik iggg-ig^o (Syldendat, 1966), pp. 332-4; H. Batowski, Agonia pokoju i poczQtek wojny (sierpieri—wrzesieri 1939) (Poznari, 1969), pp. 394-400; A. S. Kan, Geschichte der skandinawischen Lander (Ddnmark, Norwegen, Schweden) (Berlin, 1978), pp. 205—8. S. Mikos, Wolne Miasto Gdansk a Liga Naroddw, ig20-igjg (Danzig, 1979), p. 184. T. Cieslak, £arys historii najnowszgj krajdw skandynawskich (Warsaw, 1978), pp. 298, 303; M. Andrzejewski, 'Dzialania propagandowe w paristwach skandynawskich postulujace przylaczenie Wolnego Miasta Gdariska do Niemiec', Studia Scandinavica, no. 6 (1983), p. 180.

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in the opinions of the Swedish press, which more and more often voiced sympathy for the anti-Nazi opposition. Members of the Danzig leftist groupings maintained fairly close contacts with the left-oriented Scandinavian parties. When anti-Nazi organisations had been outlawed in the Free City, some of their activists emigrated to the Scandinavian countries. 5 The open violation by the National Socialists of the rule of law in Danzig naturally decreased the Swedish papers' ' sympathy' for the German demands for a revision of the Versailles Treaty in the part concerning the Free City. The diplomatic mission of the Auswartiges Amt (German Foreign Office) in Danzig signalled this change of moods with apprehension, suggesting intensified propaganda. Dr Paul Grossman, employed in the cultural section (Kulturabteilung) of the German embassy, was instructed to supply the Swedish press with unfavourable information on Poland. In 1939, L. Stael von Holstein, the press attache of the German embassy, published his pamphlet Danzig Fragen (The Danzig Problem) in which he negated the Poles' right to Danzig and Pomerania. 6 In addition to the Auswartiges Amt, an important role in presenting the German point of view on Danzig was played by the Wirtschqftliche Gesellschaft. This society, directed by Margaret Gartner and financed by German industrialists, tried in various ways to influence public opinion in the Scandinavian countries. It tightened its contacts with Scandinavian journalists, scientists, scholars and politicians and spared no means to organise ' eastern journeys' for them. The participants usually made a stop-over in the Free City, visited the port and the art treasures, and took part in meetings organised by the local authorities. The aim was to persuade the visitors that Danzig had a German past and that its inhabitants had been wronged by the decisions of the Versailles Treaty. 7 Although German propaganda was more accessible to Scandinavian societies than Polish propaganda, the German language being much better known there, its results were not significant. Opinions on Danzig varied. During the dispute between the Third Reich and Poland in the summer of 1939, Polish intransigence was not understood since the Scandinavians regarded the city as 5 6 7

M. Andrzejewski, 'Emigracja polityczna obywateli Wolnego Miasta Gdariska do Szwecji', Komunikaty Instytutu Battyckiego, no. 30, pp. 95—9. B. Piotrowski, 'Propaganda III Rzeszy w Szwecji w okresie II wojny swiatowej', Komunikaty Instytutu Baltyckiego, no. 14, pp. 39, 48. Andrzejewski, 'Dzialania propagandowe', p. 174.

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ethnically German, but German aggressiveness was condemned. While acknowledging the legitimacy of the German demands, the Scandinavians, on the whole, rejected Berlin's intentions to drive Poland away from the Baltic.8 When the First World War broke out in 1914, German influence was undoubtedly strong in the Scandinavian countries, but in the summer of 1939 not many circles in the region supported Nazi Germany. It is significant that the fascist groupings active in Denmark and Norway, and to a smaller extent also in Sweden, made enigmatic statements on Polish affairs, confining themselves to expressing general support for Berlin's demands. The chief aim of the German Government's Scandinavian policy was to secure the friendly neutrality of the states in that region in the event of war and regular supplies of raw materials, in particular iron ore. This was not an easy task. In the spring and summer of 1939, the Swedish press published more and more articles condemning Nazi Germany's aggressiveness and its drive to provoke a war in Europe. The Polish legation in Stockholm recorded with satisfaction that anti-German feelings had intensified after the seizure of Czechoslovakia in the middle of March 1939. In another report, of 18 August 1939, the legation drew attention to pro-Polish articles in Flyg and Folkets Dagblad, such articles not having been frequent in the past.9 On 15 April 1939, President Roosevelt made his famous appeal in which he expressed apprehension at the development of the situation in Europe and proposed to the fascist dictators the signing of a tenyear guarantee of peace. Hitler instructed the Auswartiges Amt to ask the countries mentioned in Roosevelt's appeal whether they felt threatened by Germany and to propose to them the conclusion of non-aggression pacts with the Reich. Of the Scandinavian countries, Denmark reacted positively to the proposal and signed a nonaggression treaty with Germany on 31 May 1939. The Danes were not deterred by the fact that a month earlier Hitler had denounced the non-aggression treaty signed with Poland in 1934. The proposal was made only for tactical reasons to demonstrate Germany's allegedly peaceful intentions, without any wish to abide by its 8 9

I documenti diplomatici italiani (DDI), Rome, 1952-1953, ottava serie: 1935-1939. vol. XII (12 agosto-3 settembre 1939), doc. 574. Archiwum Akt JVowych (Archiv of New Documents, Warsaw), AAJV, File 6525, pp. 15-21, Poselstwo polskie w Sztockholmie do MSZ, 21 March 1939, 18 August 1939.

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provisions, but Denmark did not want to offend its powerful neighbour by rejecting it. Norway and Sweden rejected the proposal, a fact which was recorded with satisfaction by the Warsaw press. The two countries stated they did not feel threatened by anybody. In their opinion the conclusion of a treaty with the Reich would have been a betrayal of the principles of neutrality and would have given one of the great powers a privileged position. They even blamed Denmark for having disregarded this. Nevertheless, Oslo and Stockholm had to take into account the specific situation of Denmark which had a land frontier with Germany. Berlin viewed the negative attitude of Norway and Sweden to the German proposal as an insult, but its relations with these countries remained correct. 10 During the last months of peace in Europe, the Scandinavian countries considered the possibility of Poland concluding a compromise agreement with Germany, but the Scandinavian diplomats' reports from Warsaw made it absolutely certain that in the case of aggression, Poland would defend herself and that the Polish nation was more than ever united round the government, the army and the commander-in-chief, Marshal Rydz-Smigly. Hearing of Poland's inflexibility, the diplomats of the Scandinavian countries strengthened their endeavours to preserve absolute neutrality and not to mix in the Polish-German conflict. The official policy was marked by an over-optimistic belief that it would be possible to stand aside in the event of war. 11 Great anxiety was only felt in Finland when, on 23 August 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany signed a non-aggression pact supplemented by the secret protocol on their spheres of influence in eastern Europe. Helsinki was convinced that the Third Reich and the Soviet Union had divided eastern Europe into such spheres and that the costs of SovietGerman co-operation would have to be borne by the small states in the eastern part of the Baltic region. 12 As it became increasingly obvious that Germany was pushing for war at any price, the previous optimism began to abate; this could 10

11 12

T. Cies'lak, 'Polish-Scandinavian relations in the years of the second world war', Polish Western Affairs, vol. 10, No. i (1969), p. 64; H. J. Lutzhoft, Deutsche Militdrpolitik und schwedische Neutralitdt igjg-ig42 (Neumiinster, 1981), p. 28; Text of German-Danish Agreement: Akten zur deutschen auswdrtigen Politik, (ADAP) 1918-1945; Aus dem Archiv des Auswdrtigen Amtes, Frankfurt. M., 1961-1963, Series D, Bd. VI, doc. 461. See ADAP, D, VII, doc. 372, 407; DDI, 13/VIII, doc. 297, 496. ADAP, D, VII, doc. 203; G. R. Uberschar, Hitler und Finnland ig3g-ig4i. Die deutschJinnische Beziehungen wdhrend des Hitler—Stalin Paktes (Wiesbaden, 1978), p. 62.

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be seen particularly clearly in Denmark. The government in Copenhagen, wishing to gain new assurances from the Third Reich, issued a series of declarations in which it stated that it would strictly adhere to absolute neutrality towards all states. On 28 August 1939, the German envoy in Copenhagen, acting on instructions from the Auswartiges Amt, confirmed the validity of the non-aggression pact concluded three months earlier. In reply to this demarche, Foreign Minister Peter Munch renewed Denmark's previous assurances, adding a warning, clearly addressed to London, that Denmark would not tolerate anything that was incompatible with this principle. However, the Danish Government forgot another fundamental principle, namely, that in the case of necessity neutrality had to be defended by force. No steps were taken in Denmark to strengthen the country's defensive system which was in a worse state than at the beginning of the First World War. Munch, who had headed the Foreign Ministry since 1929, was a confirmed pacifist and upheld the principle of not resisting evil. In these circumstances he was prepared to make far-reaching concessions to Germany. Similar opinions were held by Prime Minister Stauning and also by the then nearly 70-year old King, Christian X, whose attitude towards Germany was, however, more uncompromising. 13 The attitude of Munch's Norwegian colleague, Haldvan Koht, a professor of history and a Social Democrat who had been Foreign minister in Johann Nygaardsvold's minority government since 1935, was only partly different. Koht, who was also a pacifist, had a more sober view of the European situation, but he also believed that strict adherence to neutrality was the best guarantee for his country. In Norway, which had strong traditional economic links with the Western countries, in particular with Great Britain, there was sympathy for the anti-German camp among the people, but the government tried to maintain an equilibrium in all matters. In foreign policy, London's attempts, which might have undermined this equilibrium, were categorically rejected by Koht and Nygaardsvold. King Haakon VII, who was married to an English princess, also sought to ensure respect for Norway's neutrality in London. 14 Certain circles in Sweden did their best to bring about a peaceful solution to the Polish-German conflict and prevent war. With the 13

14

A. H. Hicks,' Denmark: political antecedents to the German offensive', in A. Toynbee, ed., 'The initial triumph of the Axis', Survey of International Affairs 1939-1945 (London-Toronto, 1950), PP- 64, 54H. Batowski, Rok 1940 w dyplomacji europejskiej, (Poznari, 1981), p. 65.

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knowledge and approval of Foreign Minister Rickard J. Sandier and Prime Minister Peer Hansson, many private persons tried to mediate between Great Britain and Germany. The Swedish industrialist, Birger Dahlerus, who on his own initiative travelled between London and Berlin in August 1939, trying, in an amateur way, to reconcile British and German interests and save peace, gained much publicity. These intermediaries were actuated by noble motives and also by personal ambition. Most of them belonged to industrial and financial circles. They feared that war would affect the economic interests of the Scandinavian countries since the 'great powers' would impose restrictions on international trade. Sweden, which had no access to an open sea, faced greater economic difficulties in the event of war complications than the other Scandinavian states. 15 In the face of an imminent German attack on Poland, the foreign ministers of the four northern states met hastily in Norway's capital. No steps were taken however, during the two-day debates (30-31 August) to tighten military co-operation. The only result was a renewal of well-known declarations on strict neutrality towards all third countries. Nobody was inclined to make promises the consequences of which were unknown. On 1 September, Germany attacked Poland. In his speech in the Reichstag Hitler gave assurances that he would respect the neutrality of the countries which were guided by the same principle. On the same day von Ribbentrop instructed the German envoys in Oslo, Stockholm and Helsinki to assure the governments there that the Reich would respect the territorial integrity of the Scandinavian countries. The envoys expressed the wish to continue relations and intimated that the Baltic Sea was part of the war operation zone. Absolute neutrality was to be the price for good relations. 16 Germany did not consider it necessary to make such a statement to Denmark since the two countries had exchanged declarations to the same effect in the last days of August. In the next few days Ulrich von Hassell, the former German Ambassador to Rome, was sent by the Auswartiges Amt to the capitals of the Scandinavian countries as a special delegate for economic affairs to discuss with the governments there the possibility of expanding trade relations. In Helsinki Hassell reassured his hosts that Germany's recent agreement with Moscow would have no consequences and would not infringe Finland's territorial status quo. A special gesture to Denmark was the directive 15

Batowski, Agonia, p. 401.

16

ADAP, D, VII, doc. 525.

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given to the busy, though insignificant, German minority in northern Schleswig, to be loyal to the Danish Government. 17 On 1 and 2 September 1939, the Scandinavian countries made solemn declarations of neutrality, but the tone of the individual declarations differed. In its notes to Berlin, the Swedish Government came out in favour of'strict 3 neutrality. It emphasised that it would not join in possible League of Nations' sanctions against the Third Reich, but made it clear that, contrary to what it had been in the First World War, this time it would not be a 'friendly' neutrality. 18 On 1 September, the Finnish Foreign Minister, Juho Eljas Erkko, published the text of a Finnish declaration which recalled the decree of 3 June 1938 and the northern states' declaration of 27 May 1938. At the opening of the session of the Finnish parliament, Finland's President, Kyosti Kallio, stated that Finland would defend its neutrality by 'all available means'. 19 In accordance with its consistent policy of playing it safe with Germany, Denmark solemnly renewed its declaration of absolute neutrality. At a sitting of parliament on 2 September, Prime Minister Stauning made a categorical statement to this effect. He also said that the defensive system should be strengthened to protect the country's neutrality. But nothing was done in this respect, and this had disastrous consequences in April of the following year. 20 Norway treated the matter much more seriously. After Minister Koht had handed the German envoy a declaration of neutrality, Norway, from 2 September, carried out a partial mobilisation of its land and naval forces, strengthening the coastline in particular. Although more was done there than in Denmark, the military preparedness was criticised after the war and Nygaardsvold's government was blamed for excessive optimism in the evaluation of the situation, for shortcomings in defence and for the inadequacy of the mobilisation.21 The rapid advance of the German armies in Poland disappointed the Scandinavians who had counted on the strong resistance of the 17

ADAP, D VIII, doc. 42; Uberschar, Hitler und Finnland, p. 64; as regards Hassell's visit to Finland, see W. von Bliicher, Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie. Erinnerungen aus den

18 19

20 21

Jahren 1935-1944 (Wiesbaden, 1951), p. 148. Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes (PAAA), Bonn, Biiro des Staatssekretars, Schweden I, Kopien Notizen Richert an RAM, 2 (Berlin), and 4 September 1939. ANN, File 3, i/Fn, Poselstwo RP w Helsinkach. Stosunki Finlandii z zagranica (i93 8 - I 94 I )> P- 23ADAP, D , V I I I , doc. 5 3 7 ; Cies'lak, 'Polish-Scandinavian Relations', p. 64. W. Brandt, Norwegens Freiheitskampf 1940-1945 (Hamburg 1948) pp. 12-13.

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Polish forces. The Soviet Union's invasion of Poland on 17 September was unequivocally received as the burial of the Second Republic's last chance of defence and as the fourth partition of Poland. The alarm which arose in Finland when Soviet armed forces along the Finnish border had been put on the alert was eased by Molotov's monstrous statement that the USSR was 'observing a policy of neutrality'. 22 The sympathy of the Scandinavian governments and their societies was on the side of the nation which had stood up to aggression. When the Wehrmacht had occupied Poland, the Scandinavian countries did not withdraw recognition from Polish diplomatic missions. There was not a shadow of a doubt that they represented the legal Polish Government formed in France under the leadership of General Wladystaw Sikorski. The work of the Polish diplomatic missions was not curtailed, even though the war and the Scandinavian governments' concern to preserve neutrality had some effect on their activity. The Polish diplomatic representatives in the Scandinavian countries - Wladyslaw Neuman in Oslo, Gustaw Potworowski in Stockholm, Henryk Sokolnicki in Helsinki and Jan Starzewski in Copenhagen - had been in post for many years and enjoyed a good reputation in government circles and among the people; moreover, Minister Neuman was a personal friend of King Haakon VII. 23 Since they were trying to help Polish citizens who were seeking refuge in neutral countries and to counteract the German occupier's propaganda, the Polish diplomatic missions soon became the target of vehement German attacks. The Germans demanded that Polish diplomats be expelled and the missions closed down. When analysing its diplomatic relations with foreign countries, the Wilhelmstrasse found to its surprise that the Polish envoy to Norway was performing the function of doyen of the diplomatic corps and appeared as such at the reception given at the Finnish legation in Oslo on 6 December I939-24 Having heard of this, the Auswartiges Amt instructed the German envoy in Oslo to explain to the Norwegian Government that Minister Neuman represented a government which had 'neither 22 23 24

t i b e r s c h a r , Hitler und Finnland, p . 6 5 . K . M o r a w s k i , Wspolna droga. Wspomnienia (Paris, 1963), p . 161. PAAA, Politische Abteilung V (Pol. Abt.), Polen 8, Bd. 2, pp. 9-12, Deutsche Gesandschaft, Oslo, to the AA, 7 December 1939.

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legal nor actual significance' and should resign from the function of doyen. Being unable to expect that Norway would break off diplomatic relations with the Polish Government, the Germans tried at least to lower the rank of the Polish mission. The use of Neuman was the reason why the Auswartiges Amt sent a circular letter to German diplomatic missions all over the world to find out whether a Polish ambassador or envoy was a doyen of the diplomatic corps in any other capital. 25 At the end of January 1940, the German legation in Copenhagen communicated that Minister Starzewski continued to work and had been enumerated in the new list of the diplomats accredited to the Danish Government as the envoy of Poland. On the other hand, since the former Danish envoy to Warsaw, P. Schon, was staying in Copenhagen and had not been sent to Angers in France where the Sikorski government resided, the German legation was inclined to believe that Denmark did not recognise the Polish Government, although the attitude of the Danish Foreign Ministry did not confirm this. It was only in June 1940 that Erik Scavenius, the new Danish Foreign Minister of the Government which was already completely subordinated to Germany, assured the German envoy that the question of the Polish Government did not exist for him at all. But even in that situation Scavenius explained to the Germans that it was 'impossible in the present circumstances' to bring about a formal recall of the Polish envoy and said he expected that the Germans would be satisfied with 'a de facto recall'. 26 The agents of von Ribbentrop's Dienststelle communicated in their confidential reports that from the first day of the war Swedish society had been 'in mourning for Poland'. They emphasised that this mood was linked with a downright hostile attitude to the Germans.27 The fact that the Polish Government existed in exile was so obvious to the Swedish Government that the question of its recognition did not cause any doubts. General Sikorski was informed of this, but Sweden did not send its representative to Angers either. 25

26 27

J. Sobczak, Polska w propagandzie i polityce III Rzeszy w latach 1939-1945 (Poznari, 1988), P- 93PAAA, Pol. Abt. V, Polen 8, Bd. 2, p. 154, Deutsche Gesandschaft, Kopenhagen, to the AA, 22 June 1940. PAAA, Dienststelle Ribbentrop, Mitarbeiter Berichte, Stockholm, 3/1, Teil 2 (Vertraulich).

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The Germans knew of this and in the first months did not try to exert major pressure on the Swedes. In September 1939, the Finnish people spoke highly of the resistance of the Polish forces which were standing up to the greatest military power in Europe, but the Finnish press did not stress the fact of German aggression, being certain from the beginning of German victory. The Finnish press was flooded with German propaganda material, which was reprinted uncritically, mainly by the central press in Helsinki. The situation was different in the provinces where the press openly expressed its indignation at the inhumanitarian way in which Germany was waging the war. At the end of September the Finnish press stopped printing German material and began to publish articles favourable to Poland. The Polish envoy, Sokolnicki, received many private letters from well-known personalities in the world of politics, science and culture, who did not conceal their indignation at the German aggression on Poland. However, they asked Sokolnicki not to publish their letters. 28 The Finnish Government did not break off diplomatic relations with Poland and did not expel the Polish envoy. As late as the first half of 1941 the Germans did not conceal their resentment at the fact that the Polish envoy was received at all official receptions and state functions. What irritated them most was that the Finnish authorities tolerated the Polish military attache who, according to the Germans, was engaged in espionage. The German endeavours to exert pressure on Finland led to a strong protest from Great Britain. The British envoy handed in an aide memoire at the Finnish Foreign Ministry, warning that, should Finland succumb to the German demands, she might become completely subordinated to the Third Reich. At the same time the Finnish envoy in London was told that the closure of the Polish legation in Helsinki would be regarded as a hostile act and would worsen Finland's relations with the United Kingdom. The United States' envoy took a similar step. 29 However, German pressure turned out to be stronger. On 25 June 1941, three days after the German aggression against the USSR and the day before Finland entered the war on the side of the Reich, the Finnish Foreign Ministry, with the consent of the president, gave instructions for the evacuation of the Polish mission. Within two days 28 29

Sobczak, Pokka w propargandzie p. 94. PAAA, Pol. Abt. V , Polen 8, Bd. 3, p. 310, Bliicher (Diplogerma), Helsinki, to the AA, 12 June 1941.

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Minister Sokolnicki and the military attache, Count. A. Los, left Helsinki for Sweden. Sweden soon became the destination of hundreds of Polish refugees. Some ships of the Polish Navy and the Merchant Marine found refuge in Swedish ports. The submarines 'Rys', 'Zbik' and 'Sep' reached Sweden between 17 and 25 September 1939, and were interned on the island of Vaxholm, next in Stockholm and finally in Mariefred and Falem.30 There were also a few escapes to Sweden by fishing boats from the territories occupied by German forces. Naval control was strengthened and Sweden was warned through diplomatic channels of the consequences of helping the refugees.31 In their accounts of the treatment they were given by the Swedish authorities during the difficult war period, the Poles speak of the Swedish concern to secure them proper living conditions. They also stress that Sweden strictly exacted the observance of the principle that the internees should not engage in political activity. The Swedish administration quickly organised special schools for Polish children, whose number was growing. Many schools, including lycees, were opened in 1940. Some thirty pupils passed their matriculation examinations in Sweden and many more finished elementary schools.32 The German Wehrmacht's September campaign in Poland became the subject of an animated discussion by publicists, writers and military circles. In the first phase of the Swedes' interests in the events of Poland, a phase lasting from 1 to 9 September 1939, disappointment in Poland and her military power predominated in the Swedish press. The criticism was based mainly on accounts given by Polish refugees, disappointed in the government which had promised that in co-operation with the Western powers it would quickly defeat Germany. In the second phase, from 10 September until 29 November 1939, the picture changed in Poland's favour. The opinions that Poland's defensive system had been badly prepared in September 1939 did not disappear altogether, but voices of sympathy for the severely tested nation became increasingly numerous.33 A significant example of this sympathy in belles lettres 30 31 32 33

W . S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (New Y o r k 1961), C h a p t e r : ' A r d o u r of the Polish N a v y ' , p p . 3 9 1 - 2 ; J . Pariski, Wachta lewej burty (Gdynia, 1965), p . 28. L. Mitkiewicz, Z generatem Sikorskim na obczyinie (Paris, 1968), p p . 1 0 - 1 1 ; Cies'lak, 'Polish—Scandinavian R e l a t i o n s ' , p . 68. T . Cies'lak, Polska-Skandynawia w XIX i XX w. Szkice historyczne (Warsaw, 1973), p. 166. Z. Folejewski, 'Polska czasu ostatniej wojny w publikacjach specjalnych i literaturze pieknej Szwecji', Alma Mater Vilnensis, no. 5 (1958), pp. 166-70.

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was Marika Stiernstedt's Indian Summer, a novel dealing with September 1939 and expressing the author's full sympathy for the Polish people's defence of their independence. The third phase in the Swedish publicists' attitude to the Polish question, a phase lasting from the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish war on 28 November 1939 until the capitulation of France in June 1940, was marked by a preponderance of objective evaluations of the Polish-German war. Military analyses of the reasons for the Polish army's defeat in the September campaign appeared in December 1939, in special new serial publications devoted to the Second World War: Stormaktskriget (The Great Powers' War) and Kriget (War) and also in the Swedish military periodical Ny militdr tidskrift. The analyses were objective in their appraisal of Poland's defensive ability in 1939. In their conclusions the authors took into account Poland's economic conditions and her actual possibilities. Several volumes of reportages on the war in Poland, written in a pro-Polish spirit, were brought out at the end of 1939. The most extensive and most important of these military-political publications was the first volume of the series Stormaktskriget, entitled Polens fjdrde delning (The Fourth Partition of Poland). 34 This extensive book, brought out at the beginning of December 1939 by the E. Fritze publishing house, was a collective work. The chief author was the well-known Swedish publicist, Karl Olof Hedstrom. The other contributors were the journalists Gosta Persson, editor of the daily Stockholms Tidningen and Wladimir Semtjow, who worked for Dagens Nyheter and was its correspondent in Warsaw. The two journalists co-operated with Social-Demokraten and Skanska Dagbladet, which had the largest circulation and were the most important papers in Sweden. The course of the Polish-German war of September 1939 was analysed by Stig Facht, a professional soldier. The first four chapters of the volume prepared by Hedstrom dealt with the following questions: the history of pre-partition Poland, J. Pilsudski's independence activities, the political activity of R. Dmowski, the regaining of independence by Poland and the evolution of the situation in Poland in the 1920s and 1930s, in particular after Pilsudski's death. The fifth chapter, worked out by Persson, dealt with the history of the Free City of Danzig. The sixth chapter was devoted to the September campaign and the next concerned the Soviet aggression against Poland on 17 September 1939. The last two chapters, also written by 34

K. O. Hedstrom, Stormaktskriget igjg-Bd. I Polenjjdrde delning (Stockholm, 1939).

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Hedstrom, presented the picture of Poland at risk and analysed the Soviet-German treaty of 28 September 1939 on friendship and the delimitation of frontiers. Friendliness and sympathy for the brave and unhappy nation destined to live between two aggressive powers are evident in all the chapters of the book. Another characteristic feature of the publication was its critical attitude to the cruelty and senselessness of the war unleashed by the Third Reich. The authors avoided sharp accusations and clear anti-German accents, but the text made it clear that they regarded the Third Reich as the aggressor guilty of destroying peace in Europe. The analyses of the September 1939 campaign which were published in the other publication devoted to the Second World War, Kriget*5 and in the military periodical Ny militdr tidskrift3* were also friendly to Poland; they showed Poland's economic situation and her defensive capacity in an objective and matter-of-fact way. the publications drew attention to the passivity of the Western powers allied with the Second Republic. Since the evaluations in these publications were very pro-Polish, they aroused a storm of dissatisfaction in Berlin and the vehement reaction of Nazi circles. An attack on the Swedish publications was launched by Dr Gotthold Rhode, head of the Polish section of the Osteuropa-Institute, in Breslau. In an article in Deutsche Wissenschaftliche %eitschrift im Wartheland he attacked Polensfjdrde delning, the first

volume of the book Stormaktskriget, and its authors. Rhode did not dare to accuse the Swedish authors of ignorance, since such an accusation could at once be refuted by the richness of the informative material gathered in the book. He attacked the authors for their proPolish sympathies and the many expressions of compassion for the new tragedy of the Polish nation. He said it was a falsification of history to say that the Germans were responsible for the war and had waged it with cruelty. In accordance with Gobbels' propaganda he defined the defence of Warsaw as 'sinnlose unverantwortliche Verteidigung' (a senseless, irresponsible defence).37 At the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940, Berlin intensified its propaganda campaign in the Swedish press in order to change the critical attitude of the majority of Swedish publicists to the Third Reich. Steps to this effect had already been taken in the spring and summer of 1939 when German firms began to place profitable 35 36 37

Kriget, nos. 1-2 a n d 5. Ny militdr tidskrift, nos. 16-18, 19-20, D e c e m b e r 1939. Deutsche Wissenschaftliche £eitschrift im Wartheland (1941), Heft 3 / 4 , pp. 519—21.

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advertisements in the Swedish conservative press. Social-Demokraten, the main organ of Swedish Social Democracy, had already in July 1939 pointed out that the papers which supported Germany's aggressive demands in the international forum were obtaining very profitable advertising contracts in spite of their low circulation and small popularity. 38 Germany's intensive propaganda endeavours produced an effect, especially in right-wing papers, 39 but no significant results were achieved in spreading anti-Polish propaganda in Sweden. Only a few pro-German books and brochures appeared during the war. These were: 'Hamlet in Poland', a short story by the well-known historian of Swedish literature, Frederik Book, which was first published in the weekly Vecko-Journalen and next in the volume The Dancer from Aleppo, and political publications; B. Kuczynski's Panic in Poland (Stockholm 1941); and A. Wysocki's A Pole's Fate (Stockholm, 1944).40 Sven Hedin, a Swedish geographer and traveller known for his pro-German sympathy, also manifested a hostile attitude to the Poles. In his books he accused Poland, together with the British Government and the American President F. D. Roosevelt, of having provoked the Second World War. 41 An intensive propaganda in support of the Third Reich was conducted in Sweden throughout the war by German diplomats, many journalists and specially selected lecturers. The attitude of the Norwegian press to the Polish question in the years 1939-45 is less well-known. The old democratic traditions and the fact that the ruling Social-Democratic Labour party helped the Germany anti-fascist emigres from the Reich meant that the Norwegians naturally had a critical attitude to Nazi Germany and that they favoured the victim of its aggression, Poland. Arbeiderbladet, Norway's most important daily, organ of the Labour party, had since 1933 manifested a consistently anti-Nazi stand. The appointment of the former president of the Free City of Danzig, Heinrich Sahm, as envoy in Oslo did not help the Germans much, in spite of Sahm's rich experience in organising anti-Polish propaganda. 42 38 39 41 42

M. Cygariski, ' Publicystyka panstw skandynawskich wobec agresji III Rzeszy na Polske w 1939 roku', Preglad J^achodniopomorski, vol. XXVII, nos. 1-2 (1983), p. 96. K. Gustmann, Die schwedische Tagespresse zur Neutralitdtsfrage im £weiten Weltkrieg (Miinster, 40 1958), pp. 16-17. F. Book, 'Hamlet i Polen', Vecko-Journalen, (1941). S. Hedin, Amerika im Kampf der Kontinenten (Leipzig, 1942), pp. 36-7, 60—90. J . Lechori, Minister Neuman, Dyplomatyka itowy ( L o n d o n , 1945), p p . 4 5 - 5 1 ; A. Pragier, Czas przeszly dokonany ( L o n d o n , 1966), p . 652.

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At the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940, the overwhelming majority of Danish publicists, like their colleagues in Sweden and Norway, had a friendly attitude to Poland. The Danish press willingly published the information supplied by the Polish legation in Copenhagen, 43 including the biography of the Mayor of Warsaw, Stefan Starzynski. It also published news and photographs of the atrocities committed by German forces in the occupied Polish territories. The well-known Danish poet, Paul Andersen, wrote a poem with warm words for fighting Warsaw, which was favourably received by the critics. At the end of 1939 there appeared Countess Elza Moltke's book The Polish September which infuriated the Germans.44 Countess Moltke, a Danish aristocrat was descended from a well-known family of German origin. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the noble, old, Moltke family moved from Mecklenburg to Denmark. Other representatives of the family served the Prussian kings, and Helmut von Moltke (junior) was chief of the general staff in the years 1906-14 while his nephew Friedrich von Moltke was the Prussian Minister of the Interior (1907-10). Countess Moltke knew pre-war Poland from her travels and contacts with Polish intellectuals, officers and land-owners. Cherishing warm feelings for the Polish people during the tragic September of 1939, the Countess wrote a reportage in book form which was to bring Poland nearer to the Danish reader. The 160-page book portrayed the achievements in the reconstruction of the country and the development of economic and cultural life in the years 1918-39. The picture of Poland was perhaps too optimistic. The author described beautiful castles, flourishing towns and joyful people, failing to notice nationality conflicts and the negative phenomena resulting from the system of authoritarian government. In spite of its title, the reportage does not deal with the Polish-German war. Only in the preface did Countess Moltke stress the brutality of the Wehrmacht, citing the bombing by the Luftwaffe of the Jasna Gora monastery at Cz^stochowa as an example. 45 The book was attacked in a brief but spiteful review by Rhode, 46 who accused the author of ignorance of Polish questions and devoted much space to pointing out the errors he alleged she had made. Rhode was indignant with the author for failing to mention the 43 44 46

AAN, Poselstwo R P w K o p e n h a d z e 1 2 / 1 9 3 8 - 1 9 3 9 , Biuletyn Polskiej Agencji Telegraficznej, 24 September, 5 October 1939. 45 E. Moltke, Polak-September (Copenhagen, 1939). E. Moltke, ibid., p . 3. Deutsche Wissenschaftliche £eitschrift im Wartheland, (1940), Heft 2, pp. 3 1 9 - 2 1 ; See also

M. Cyganski, 'Publicystyka', p. 91.

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Germans' contribution to Poland's economic and cultural development. His attack was clearly political. In conclusion he blamed the author for having done a disservice to the Danish nation and to the cause of Danish-German understanding. In view of the anti-German attitude of the decisive majority of Danish publicists, Berlin resolved to apply the same measures as in Sweden. In November 1939, a German advertising agency was opened in Dagmar Hys, an elegant district of Copenhagen; this was the central advertising office of the Reich for the whole of Denmark. The agency was to conclude advertising contracts with Danish publishing firms. Its head was a certain Jensen, who had a large fund (L 100,000) at his disposal. In return he demanded that the publishing firm which obtained an advertising contract should revise its policy and bring pro-German material into relief. This determined the worth of the contract.47 The Germans were very clumsy in these endeavours and showed that they did not understand the mentality of Danish society. The overwhelming majority of the Danish publishers and advertising agents preferred to reject the profitable financial offers rather than to express approbation of the Nazi dictatorship. Not much can be said about the attitude of Finnish publicists at the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940. In addition to the press reaction, which has already been mentioned, let us recall that the Finnish Government and society were shocked by the GermanSoviet alliance and later by the Winter War against the USSR and this was what absorbed them most. Nevertheless, according to the reports of the Polish legation in Helsinki, the German propaganda endeavours did not bring any significant results. In addition, the German films Feldzug in Polen and Feuertaufe in Polen had a poor attendance in Finnish cinemas.48 To pass on to general conclusions, let us note that Germany's war preparations and its aggression against Poland in 1939 did not bring any change in the Scandinavian countries' policy of neutrality. Such an attitude was in their national interests. In the spring and summer of 1939 they endeavoured to prevent war in Europe and help solve the German—Polish conflicts in a peaceful way. In view of their old democratic traditions, the countries of that region did not approve of the Nazi dictatorship in the Third Reich; this was noticeable in 47 48

B. N e w m a n , Secrets of German Espionage ( L o n d o n , 1941), p . 195. Cieslak, Polska-Skandynawia, p. 168.

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their press and in the statements made by representatives of scientific and cultural circles. The brutal way in which the German forces waged the September campaign in Poland (air-raids on towns and non-military targets, executions of civilians) was generally condemned by the Scandinavians and led to an increase in pro-Polish sympathies. This found its expression in the help given to refugees from Poland and in the maintenance of official diplomatic contacts with the Polish government-in-exile. Neither the large sums of money spent on propaganda nor diplomatic blackmail (in Denmark and Finland) succeeded in changing the negative picture of the Third Reich in the Scandinavian countries, whose governments and peoples remained faithful to the policy of neutrality, a policy which was friendly to Poland.

CHAPTER 7

The Soviet occupation of Poland through British eyes Thomas Lane

On 17 September 1939, Soviet troops crossed the frontier into Poland and within a few days were in control of around half the geographical area of the Polish state. The speed of the Soviet advance was mainly attributable to the absence of Polish resistance. For seventeen days the Polish Army had been putting up a stubborn, though unsuccessful, defence against the German invasion. Pushed back towards Galicia, the Poles were concentrating all their military efforts against the German Army, leaving only handfuls of frontier guards on their eastern border with the Soviet Union. Facing west and already under severe pressure, the Polish Army was in no position to defend Poland against the invading forces of two major powers. Moreover, the Polish Government was under the illusion that the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1932 would protect Poland against a Soviet attack. Hence there was a brief misapprehension among the population of the Polish eastern provinces that the Red Army was marching to their assistance against the Germans. The Soviet advance was therefore welcomed by all sections of the population. The Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Jewish elements, however, hoped that the Soviet troops would liberate them from the Polish state, which they thought of as oppressive. 1 This fourth partition of Poland was a direct consequence of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of 23 August 1939, which contained a secret protocol providing for the delimitation of German and Soviet spheres of interest in eastern Europe. When applied to Poland this agreement divided German and Soviet areas of occupation by a line approximately equivalent to the Curzon Line of 1920 and pushed the Soviet border 100-150 miles further west. Of 1

General Sikorski Historical Institute, Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, Vol. I,

1939-1943 (London, 1961), pp. 66-8 (henceforth referred to as Documents on Polish—Soviet Relations); see also Official Documents Concerning Polish—German and Polish-Soviet

1933-1939 (The Polish White Book), (London, n.d.), nos. 175, 181-190. 142

Relations,

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143

the thirteen million inhabitants of the Soviet area of occupation, roughly forty per cent were ethnic Poles and a comparable proportion Ukrainians. Belorussians and Jews each made up about eight per cent. The Soviet Union played the ethnic card strongly in its justification of intervention, denouncing the Polish Government for its ' oppression of national minorities' and insisting on its duty to protect their lives and property as the Polish state disintegrated under the German attack. 2 Poland's Western allies, Great Britain and France, had no obligation under their agreement of 25 August 1939 to defend Poland against Soviet aggression. Although the British had agreed to take action in support of Poland if she suffered aggression ' from a European power', there existed a secret protocol which clarified that the European power in question was Germany. In any case this was a theoretical question since the British had shown themselves incapable of offering military or aerial assistance to Poland even during the German attack. The chiefs of staff took the view that the ' fate of Poland will depend upon the ultimate outcome of the war, and that in turn, will depend upon our ability to bring about the eventual defeat of Germany and not on our ability to relieve pressure on Poland at the outset'. 3 Nevertheless there were some matters that could not be indefinitely deferred. As allies of Poland the British and the French Governments could not ignore what Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain called the 'cynical' absorption of half of Poland's territory by the Soviet Union. Nor could they accept the Soviet claim that Poland had ceased to exist as an independent state; on the contrary, the British Government recognised the Polish governmentin-exile as the Government of Poland. It was important for the future, as Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, told the Polish ambassador, to maintain the position that the Soviet Union had been guilty of flagrant aggression. Consequently the British Government expressed its 'indignation and horror' at the invasion, re-affirming its solemn obligations to Poland and its confidence that at the end of the war an independent Poland would be restored. 4 2

3 4

Documents on Polish—Soviet Relations, pp. 40, 43-6; Polish Social Information Bureau, ' Soviet deportation of the inhabitants of Eastern Poland in 1939-1941', in PRO CAB 118/69, 1941-45; The Times, 15 September 1939. PRO CAB 65/1, War Cabinet 19/39, *8 September 1939; Anita Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, igjg (Cambridge, 1987), p. 167. PRO FO 371 23103, C14419/13953/18, 20 September 1939 and C14090/13953/18, J 8 September 1939.

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Loyalty to Poland, however, did not prevent the British Government taking a broad view of British interests. Halifax warned that the British response to Soviet aggression must take into account calculations of how British and Polish joint interests would best be served in the conflict with Germany. After all, the British and French had been attempting to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union throughout the summer of 1939 only to be upstaged by news of the German-Soviet pact. In September, immediately after the Soviet invasion of Poland, trade discussions were taking place between the British and Soviet Governments to ensure supplies of urgently needed timber for the British war effort. Once this initial agreement was concluded the British Government embarked on more ambitious and wide-ranging trade discussions which were only terminated by the Soviet-Finnish war in November. Evidently there was a tug-of-war in the thinking of British officials between obligation to their Polish ally and economic and military self-interest.5 British policy towards the Soviet Union and Poland was in fact shaped by a mixture of interacting forces. The government had to keep an eye on the shifting currents of public opinion at home while remaining sensitive to the attitudes of France and Turkey. It had to respond to the changing reputation of the Poles in the west under the leadership of Sikorski and to take account of the news of Soviet behaviour in the former eastern provinces of Poland. It had to be realistic about the likely postwar settlement in eastern Europe in the event of the Soviet Union participating in an anti-German alliance. Analysis of British policy formation therefore depends on an understanding of British reactions to the Soviet invasion, on British perceptions of Soviet policy inside the occupied areas of Poland, and finally on calculations of British national interest, at a time when Britain's very survival was threatened. In the circumstances her policy during the first year of war was remarkably consistent, testifying to the clear-eyed realism on which it was based.6 At the time of the Soviet invasion British opinion was more ambivalent about the Poles than it was to be after the fall of France in the summer of 1940. Admittedly, expressions of moral outrage greeted the Soviet action. John Colville, then a young private 5 6

PRO FO 371 23103, C14090/13953/18, 18 September 1939; PRO CAB 65/1, War Cabinet 16/39, I5 September; 32/39, 30 September and 54/39, 20 October 1939. This is not meant to imply that differences of emphasis in the Cabinet did not exist. For example, Neville Chamberlain was more cautious about seeking a rapprochement with the Soviet Union than was Winston Churchill.

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secretary to the prime minister, wrote in his diary of the 'unequalled greed and immorality' of the Soviet act, and Moscow's justification of it as 'the most revolting document' in modern history. Yet he was honest enough to admit that a year before he had felt the Poles 'deserved the darkest fate' over their treatment of the Czechs in annexing western Silesia (Ciezyn).7 Others asserted that the British Government had an equal moral responsibility to protect the Poles from both German and Soviet aggression, warning that a lack of sympathy 'will ring to our eternal shame and completely jeopardize our moral stance'. Furthermore, Britain's moral obligations to Poland had been increased by the courageous defence of the Poles against the German Blitzkrieg. 'All was lost save honour', declared Sir Archibald Sinclair, in the House of Commons, ' Poland... has won the passionate sympathy of this country, and indeed, of mankind. There lies her guarantee for her future as a nation.' 8 More pragmatic MPs like Robert Boothby asked their listeners to set aside considerations of morality and give priority to national interests. The Soviet invasion, in their view, was justified by the strategic necessities of the USSR, a point echoed by The Times, which conceded that the Soviets could not have permitted the Belorussian and Ukrainian provinces to fall into the hands of the Nazis. Churchill agreed. 'We could have wished', he said, 'that the Russian armies should be standing on their present line as the friends and allies of Poland instead of as invaders. But that the Russian armies should stand on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace.' 9 Boothby also voiced a widely-held view in Britain that the Soviet union had legitimate claims to the eastern provinces of Poland owing to the ethnically non-Polish character of the population. The British had not forgotten that during the Polish-Soviet war in 1919-20 the Polish armies advanced beyond the armistice line recommended by Lord Curzon, then British Foreign Secretary, and, in the Treaty of Riga of March 1921, had confirmed their acquisition of the eastern borderlands. This historical factor permitted Halifax, for example, 7

8 9

John Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, vol. I, 1939-October 1941

(London, 1986), p. 24. See also W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. I, The Gathering Storm (London, 1948), pp. 252-3. PRO FO 371 23159, C16902/14950/55, 12 October 1939; PRO OF 371 23103, C14545/13953/18, 20 September 1939. PRO FO 371 23103, C14545/13953/18, 20 September 1939; The Times, 22 September 1939; Churchill, The Gathering Storm, pp. 351-2.

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to draw a distinction between the Soviet advance in 1939 to what was broadly the Curzon Line and the brutal violation of Polish sovereignty by Nazi Germany. 10 The Labour party shared in the general ambivalence towards the Soviet invasion. On the one hand Arthur Greenwood supported Chamberlain in the House of Commons in offering sympathy and support to Poland and a commitment to preserve the independence of the nations of Europe. In addition, Lord Strabolgi, a member of the national executive of the party, was pointedly critical of Soviet actions, not attempting to conceal the shock and disappointment Labour felt at Soviet intervention and at the apparent doubledealing involved in the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact. 11 On the other hand, there was quite a strong pro-Soviet current in the Labour party which accused the British Government of responsibility for pushing the Soviet Union into the arms of Germany owing to its allegedly half-hearted negotiations with Moscow in the summer of 1939. These elements in the party argued that a damage-limitation exercise was required if relations with Moscow were to be improved. The Foreign Office was sensitive enough to this criticism to consider the signing of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, principally 'for purely domestic reasons', as a way of improving the atmosphere on the home front. This concession to Labour opinion did not go far enough for the extreme left of the party which in this matter took its lead from the Communist MP, William Gallacher, who dismissed the Polish Government as fascist and welcomed the liberation of eastern Poland and the protection of its population, including the Jews, from the horrors of a Nazi occupation. 12 Despite a degree of ambivalence in British public opinion, no doubt there would have been a broad consensus behind the general formula that British obligations should be honoured but not at the expense of British national interest. Defining the national interest, however, was less difficult than determining the best methods of achieving it. The general purpose of British policy was defined by Chamberlain in the House of Commons as being ' to redeem Europe 10 11 12

John Coutouvidis and Jaime Reynolds, Poland iygy-igfj (Leicester, 1986), p. 33. PRO FO 371 23103, C14545/13953/18, 20 September 1939; C14877/13953/18, 20 September 1939. PRO FO 371 23103, C14278/13953/18, 15 September 1939; C14545/13953/18, 20 September 1939; Gallacher had respectable support. In an article in the Sunday Express 23 September 1939, the former Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, attacked the 'classridden' Polish Government and praised the Soviets for liberating their kinsmen from the Polish yoke. (I am indebted to John Goutouvidis for this reference).

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from the perpetual and recurring fear of German aggression'. Was an agreement with the Soviet Union necessary to achieve this objective? The answer to that depended on the price to be paid for such an agreement; this, in turn, rested on an evaluation of the strength of the German-Soviet pact. An Italian journalist believed that British opinion was divided between the pessimists, who believed that the pact had created a solid bloc cemented on a secret clause, and those who, interpreting Soviet action as short-term protection against a Nazi advance eastwards, expected that strains in the partnership would soon appear. He concluded that the British Government inclined towards the second interpretation, and would therefore try to take advantage of any divisions. In this he proved to be correct.13 It is tempting to believe that this choice rested on hope rather than on dispassionate analysis of the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. The consequence of assuming that the relations between Moscow and Berlin were solid and harmonious was a recognition that Moscow's grip on eastern Poland could only be loosened through internal disruption of the Soviet regime in war. 14 But Britain was in no position to go to war with the Soviet Union. In any case war would be in Germany's interest and would not serve the cause of the Poles. This interpretation of relations would in effect have committed Britain to a policy of inaction vis-a-vis the USSR, combined with expressions of moral outrage over the invasion of Poland. On the other hand an assumption that German-Soviet friendship would begin to wear thin might not only be correct but would permit the British Government to be activist. The prize of winning over the Soviet Union would both serve British national interest and perhaps do something for Poland. This was the gist of the advice from Sir W. Seeds, Britain's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, immediately after the Soviet invasion of Poland. Seeds went further than his political masters were prepared to go at the time. Besides strongly recommending the maintenance of full diplomatic relations to preserve access to Soviet officials and to take advantage of any cooling in the relations between Moscow and Berlin, he urged on the British Government a policy of conciliation involving the offer of a 13

14

P R O F O 371 23103, G14545/13953/18, 20 September 25 September 1939. P R O F O 371 23701, N 4666/4666/38, 22 September 1939.

1939; Ci5135/13953/18,

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trade agreement and a settlement in eastern Poland which took account of ethnographic and cultural factors.15 In London, however, the emphasis was on maintaining more of a balance between the obligations of Britain to Poland and her strategic requirements in the war against Hitler. For the majority of people in government and parliamentary circles, this meant accepting Boothby's view that over-hasty condemnation of the Soviet actions in Poland would harm British national interests at a time when Britain needed all the help it could get. Refusing to equate German and Soviet behaviour in Poland, Boothby concluded : ' I hope and believe that one day we shall get the support of Soviet Russia.' Inside the Foreign Office, there appeared to be wide support for the view of R. A. Butler, then Parliamentary Undersecretary of State, that a combination of German and Soviet resources would constitute an appalling danger to Britain which had to be avoided 'at almost any cost'. 16 The British were fortified in this conclusion by the responses of France and Turkey to the Soviet invasion of Poland. Although the French Government pressed the British for a formal protest to be made to Moscow against Soviet action in Poland, it was fundamentally cautious in its relations with the Soviet Union. In the French view Polish interests would not be served by a BritishFrench breach with the Soviet Union. Russo-German relations were not based on mutual confidence and a split could occur at any time, which the Western allies should be in a position to exploit.17 Moreover, consideration had to be given to the position of the Turks who had expressed some satisfaction at the Soviet occupation of Poland as a means of protecting Romania against German threats. The British ambassador to Turkey reported the Turks' anxiety at the possibility of Britain and France treating the Soviet invasion as a cause of war. It appeared that a moralising and critical attitude to Moscow on the part of Britain and France ran the risk of alienating Turkey and perhaps, in due course, pushing her into the arms of Germany. 18 15 16

17 18

PRO FO 371 23103, C14247/13953/18, 19 September 1939; C14003/13953/18, 17 September 1939; C15320/13953/18, 3°September 1939. PRO FO 371 23103, C14545/13953/18, 20 September 1939; C14452/13953/18, 19 September 1939. A German-Soviet combination constituted a threat, in Butler's words, to 'civilisation and the Empire'. None of the leading officials in the Foreign Office dissented from Butler's opinion. PRO FO 371 23103, C14030/13953/18, 16 September 1939. PRO FO 371 23103, C14001/13953/18, 17 September 1939; C14319/13953/18, 19 September 1939.

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All these factors ensured that a policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union became a central feature of British foreign policy in the following year, and continued in varying forms for the rest of the war. Even in periods when the Soviets dashed British hopes of severing their connection with Hitler, the British clung tenaciously to their policy. Perhaps there was no alternative. An example of this determined optimism was the response of Sir Orme Sargent and Fitzroy Maclean in the Foreign Office to the news from Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador in Moscow, in June 1940, that the Soviet Union intended to maintain its position of 'benevolent neutrality' towards Germany. The officials agreed that, notwithstanding Cripps' pessimistic conclusion, events were changing so fast that at any moment opportunities for a closer relationship with Moscow might present themselves.19 It might be supposed that the Polish government-in-exile would be critical of the British constantly running after Stalin and of being told that this policy was in their own best interest. In fact their freedom to speak and act was somewhat limited owing to their dependence on the British and French governments. They had agreed to make Germany ' public enemy number 1' at the request of their allies, and they understood that the British were afraid of pushing the Soviet Union closer to Germany by criticism of Soviet actions in Poland. On the other hand they were anxious about two possibilities. They feared that the British, in conciliating the Soviet Union, might make concessions which would damage Polish interests. They were also apprehensive that the Allies would not recognise the danger threatening the West from the East. Sikorski, the Polish Prime Minister, believed that, in the end, the British and French would ' have to resist politically and eventually militarily the further advance of the Red Army in the West'. For the moment, however, the Poles agreed to play ball by concentrating on German aggression and German policy in Poland. 20 Interestingly, strong exponents of anti-communism in Britain were as fearful as the opponents of Nazism of pushing the Soviet Union into an even closer German embrace. Like those who saw Germany as the main enemy, they advocated a cautious policy towards the Soviet Union which would strengthen the possibility of a conservative reaction against the Nazis inside Germany and 19 20

PRO FO 371 24844, N5853/30/38, 23 June 1940. PRO FO 371 24476, G2171/510/55, 8 February 1940; Coutouvidis and Reynolds, Poland I 939~I947, P- 34-

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increase the chances of an alliance between Britain and a more moderate German government. Despite this somewhat bipartisan policy, however, there were limits to British concessions in the first year of the war. Britain's obligations to Poland prevented her from recognising the Soviet annexation of the eastern provinces or from renouncing her commitment to the restoration of an independent Poland after the war, though she was careful not to commit herself to the restoration of the former state frontiers. 21 In her cautious balancing between interest and obligation Britain was vulnerable to the pressure of events. The Finnish war, for example, tested the policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union to its limits. Similarly, the internal politics of the Polish government-inexile and the residual distrust in Whitehall of the Polish authorities tended to cool relations with the Poles. At the same time the important and valiant contributions of the Polish armed forces and mercantile marine to the Allied cause commanded admiration. Growing trust and mutual respect between Sikorski and Churchill in the summer of 1940 strengthened Britain's sense of obligation to Poland, but the collapse of France in June 1940 left Britain with few options and made her dependence on some shift in German-Soviet relations even more pronounced. 22 In these delicate and occasionally desperate manoeuvrings, news from eastern Poland was a complicating factor. The Allies had accumulated substantial evidence of German brutality in western Poland and had been quick to publicise it and to condemn German actions. If the Soviets were shown to be perpetrating similar atrocities this could have embarrassing consequences for the Allies in pursuing their policy of conciliation towards the Soviet Union. It was evidently in the British and French interest not to know or, if forced to know, not to act on that knowledge and to find reasons for not acting. A study of official British reactions to those events provides a clear example of the victory of realism over sentiment in policy-making. It is important to establish how soon the British knew about the nature of Soviet activity in eastern Poland and how complete their picture of it was during the first year of occupation. 21 22

Colville, Fringes of Power, p . 45. During the Finnish war Halifax told Zateski, the Polish Foreign Minister, that the British Government would not be deflected from taking appropriate action against Russia even if such action were to precipitate war, adding that the British had been sending much more material to Finland than had been made public. This statement would appear to have been a sop to the Poles who were encouraging ideas of bombing Soviet oil-fields in the Caucasus. PRO FO 371 24476, C2171/510/55, 8 February 1940.

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Fortunately a full historical record now exists of the character of Soviet policy in the region during the first year of occupation and it is possible to use this to measure the fullness and accuracy of British intelligence about the area. 23 During and after the war it was commonplace to believe that Soviet behaviour in Poland could not compare with the beastliness and horror which characterised the Nazi occupation. It is now widely accepted that during the two years of Soviet rule in eastern Poland between September 1939 and June 1941, the occupiers inflicted a reign of terror which was, if anything, more ferocious and more costly of human life than that of the Nazis across the dividing line. Two factors contributed to the impression that in the first months of the war conditions were far worse in the German sector. Western Europe received numerous descriptions of killings and transportations in the German-controlled areas but there was a paucity of information about Soviet activity. The Soviet occupiers were also slow starters, building up gradually to policies of extreme severity. The first mass deportation from eastern Poland, for example, did not take place until February 1940, whereas deportations from the western parts of German-occupied Poland to regions further east began in the first months of the war. Once they got into their stride it is indisputable that the Soviets matched the Nazis in despoliation and terror. Gross concluded that they killed or drove to their deaths three or four times as many people as the Nazis from a population half the size of that under German jurisdiction. The characteristics of their rule can be summarised in one word: Sovietisation. This implied that the social, economic and political systems of eastern Poland should approximate to, and harmonise with, conditions across the border in the Soviet Union. Church and privately-owned property was expropriated and the population was pauperised by the removal of vast amounts of raw materials, foodstuffs and equipment to the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of the Polish zloty from circulation. Numerous individuals were arrested as counter-revolutionaries and enemies of the people, and many suffered summary execution. The rest of the population was subjected to a rigorous system of surveillance by the NKVD and denied customary judicial procedures. Children were 23

See, for example, Jan T. Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western

Ukraine and Western Belorussia (Princeton, New Jersey, 1988); Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History of Poland, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1981); R Umiastowski, Russia and the Polish

Republic, igi8-ig4i (London, n.d.); John Coutouvidis and Thomas Lane, eds., The Dark Side of the Moon (Hemel Hempstead, 1989).

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encouraged to denounce their parents and, in schools, Polish was prohibited as the language of instruction. When elections characterised by force and fraud produced two puppet assemblies in western Ukraine and western Belorussia which promptly requested incorporation of the regions in the Soviet Union, the way was prepared for the removal of Polish nationality from the population and its replacement by Soviet citizenship. The campaign against the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches became more rigorous as time passed, leading to the execution of priests and the deportation of many more. Perhaps the single most characteristic element in the Sovietisation process was the introduction of mass deportations which had long been a salient feature of Soviet life. About one and half million Polish citizens were carried off to slave labour-camps or to remote collective farms in Soviet Central Asia, Siberia, and Arctic Russia in February, April and June 1940 and in June 1941. Gross concluded that Soviet actions measured by 'the victimization of Polish citizens in terms of loss of life, of sufferings inflicted by forced resettlement, and of material losses through confiscation and fiscal measures' would prove, relatively speaking, 'far more injurious' than those of the Nazis in the two years since the invasions. 24 These were the actions of a state with which the British Government sought an agreement and with which in due course it established friendly relations. However, a correct assessment of British policy depends in part on ascertaining just how much British officials knew about Soviet behaviour in eastern Poland during the first year of the war. Foreign Office records suggest that they knew a very great deal, at least by the summer of 1940. At first, however, there was some truth in the British Government's contention that the information coming out of Soviet-controlled Poland was fragmentary, hard-to-get, second-hand and difficult to corroborate. Sometimes the British were misled by their sources into believing that conditions were better than they were. Frequently the reports coming in were from private individuals whose knowledge was limited. There was widespread scepticism in the Foreign Office as to the reliability and judgment of Polish observers. In the absence of confirmatory evidence from their own or other reliable sources the British maintained their sceptical approach well into 1940.25 24 25

Gross, Revolution from Abroad, pp. 2 2 6 - 9 . PRO FO 371 24471, C2393/116/55, 11 February 1940 (minute by F.K.Roberts); C2946/116/55, 14 February 1940 (minute by Roberts); C3928/116/55, 13 March 1940; C2238/116/55, 6 February 1940; FO 371 24470, G1764/116/55, 31 January 1940; FO 371 24472, C7068/116/55, l M a Y 194°;F O 371 24479> G745I/937/55> 22 June 1940. Among

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It was not until January and February 1940, that reports about eastern Poland became at all numerous. This reflected the slow early pace of Sovietisation and the decision by the Polish government-inexile to play down Soviet actions in Poland for a time in order to concentrate attention on the German occupation. 26 By the end of February, however, the weight of evidence about certain aspects of the Soviet administration meant that the British Government had a fairly clear idea about what was taking place, at least in the economy. It was known, for example, that industrial and commercial companies had been expropriated, that large estates had been taken over prior to collectivisation and that large quantities of food, raw materials and machinery had been transferred to the Soviet Union. There was no doubt whatsoever that the standard of living in eastern Poland, already low, was being reduced to Soviet levels. Within a few months once prosperous, clean and well-maintained towns and cities had been reduced to squalor and administrative chaos. By Christmas 1939, 90 per cent of the shops in Lwow were closed and there were barely any goods in the remainder. Standards of accommodation fell to those of Moscow. This prompted the comment that the ' transfer to occupied Poland of the most important achievements of the Soviet system has been brilliantly successful'. 27 Economic conditions deteriorated further during the rest of 1940. There were contradictory reports about the pace of collectivisation but some informants spoke of agricultural organisation being brought into line with the rest of the USSR. Forced sales of grain and uncertainty about market conditions led peasants to reduce their showings. Although subjected to unemployment and food shortages, industrial workers had at least been permitted to elect representatives to working men's councils to run the former privately-owned factories on a co-operative basis. By the spring of 1940, however, the factories were nationalised and workers ceased to be thought of as part-owners and were reduced to simple wageearning status, deprived of the right to strike or to change their place

26 27

the disparaging comments made by British officials about the Poles the following are representative: 'more level-headed and intelligent than many of her compatriots', 'very sensible for a Pole', 'more broad-minded than most Poles', 'about the only Pole whom I have ever met who is both straight and intelligent'. C o u t o u v i d i s a n d R e y n o l d s , Poland 1939-1947, p . 3 2 . PRO FO 371 24471, C2067/116/55, 27 January 1940; C2138/116/55, 2 February 1940; G2457/116/55, 2 2 January 1940; G2946/116/55, J 4 February 1940; G3102/116/55, 29 February 1940; FO 371 24473, C1377/236/55, 19 January 1940; G4609/236/55, 23 March 1940; FO 371 24470, G253/116/55, 2 O December 1939; C1764/116/55, 31 January 1940.

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of employment. Disgust at the economic chaos and revulsion at the constant Soviet political propaganda had produced a mood of disillusionment and apathy. 28 Gradualism characterised the Soviet campaigns against religion and the educational system, according to the reports reaching London. These suggested that priests had in the main been left alone except in frontier districts. Churches were only allowed to remain open on payment of heavy rents and taxes by their congregations, but services continued at least until Easter 1940. In schools the teaching of religion had been suppressed and teachers were compelled to explain why there was no God. The League of the Godless intensified its atheistic propaganda and Jesuit communities at Pirisk and Dubno were driven out. An ominous report in March 1940 from the Orthodox Archbishop of Grodno showed how matters were deteriorating, at least in respect of the Orthodox Church. Several priests had been brutally assassinated on the order of the communists, and superiors of monasteries were arrested and deported. It was expected that the logic of Sovietization would be followed and that priests and active laymen would suffer the consequences of being classed as enemies of the people. Nevertheless, it appears that the logic was being followed through quite slowly. Instead of mass executions of priests, as in the German-occupied area, the economic foundations of the churches were being undermined, a method as damaging in the long term as the more violent methods of the Third Reich.29 On the other aspects of the Soviet occupation up to the spring of 1940 evidence was fragmentary and unspecific. Occasional references were made to the arrests and executions of so-called subversives, notably socialists, military settlers and trade-unionists. There were reports of arrests taking place in people's homes and compulsory meetings, of overcrowded prisons and deportations. But the Foreign Office set great store by a report of a visit to Lwow in January 1940, by J. W. Russell, an official from the Moscow embassy, which discounted the arrests as being relatively small in number by NKVD standards, except among Polish officers and landowners. Another influential report in Whitehall, from the Countess Potocka, also played down the level of arrests and 28 29

Evening Standard, 5 March 1940; PRO FO 371 24472, C5744/116/55, I5 April 1940, 15 May 1940; C6548/116/55, 11 June 1940; C7068/116/55, I x J u n e I94°PRO FO 371 24471, C3320/116/55, J 7 February 1940 and 6 April 1940; FO 371 24473, C 6312/236/55, 26 April 1940; C5744/116/55, 9 May 1940; C6548/116/55, 11 June 1940.

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deportations and increased the tendency among British officials to compare the Soviet occupation favourably with that of the Nazis. 30 Furthermore there was little disposition in London to accept the pessimistic assumption of the majority of reports that conditions would continue to deteriorate in eastern Poland. Of course, those familiar with Soviet methods knew that Sovietisation was inexorable and would proceed to the point where conditions in the Polish territories were comparable with those in the rest of the Soviet Union. However, it was not in Britain's interest to engage in prognostications of this sort; it was more convenient to stick to the confirmed facts, which let the Soviet Union off relatively lightly compared with Nazi Germany. 31 Moreover, even when they admitted that Sovietisation was occurring, British ministers could rely on a degree of ignorance among their audience as to the full implications of the term.32 Comparisons between the occupation policies of Germany and the Soviet Union were not based exclusively on the differing degrees of severity of the two regimes as perceived by Whitehall, but also took into account methods, objectives, and differing levels of civilisation. Some observers regarded Soviet behaviour as less heinous because it was simply reducing Poland to the level of the Soviet Union ' by comparatively orderly methods'. The Germans, on the other hand, were aiming at ' depopulation and the extinction of the ruling class by terrorism and murder'. 33 The German terror seemed particularly repulsive owing to its un-European nature, appearing to lack 'the scruples entertained by European nations', over the previous century at least. By contrast, Soviet behaviour towards the Poles was a reflection of Asiatic primitivism and therefore should not be considered in a European context. The Poles themselves, by their 30

31

32

33

For Russell's report, see PRO FO 371 24471, C2946/116/55, J 4 February 1940; for Potocka see G2119/116/55, 5 February 1940 (compare Potocka's account with that of Countess Tyszkiewicz, C253/116/55, 2 0 December 1939). PRO FO 371 24471, G2238/116/55, 6 February 1940; C2946/116/55, J 4 February 1940; note Roger Makins' minute on a report at PRO FO 371 24470, G844/116/55, 13 January 1940 and F.O. minute at C1342/116/55, 23 January 1940. Butler's reply to a Parliamentary question on 13 March 1940 is a case in point. Asked about conditions in Soviet-occupied Poland he replied that 'conditions are gradually approximating to those generally prevailing in the Soviet Union'. This was disingenuous. Roger Makins of the Foreign Office noted that the wording was ' wide enough to cover a good many crimes'. PRO FO 371 24471, G3928/11655, 13 March 1940. The distinction drawn was between intentions rather than effects.' The people under Soviet occupation may starve to death', but they will not be 'deliberately exterminated by murder'. PRO FO 371 24471, C3928/116/55, J 3 March 1940. See also C2946/116/55, 14 February 1940.

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claims that Poland constituted the eastern frontier of Europe, encouraged this comparison. Soviet apologists also asserted that it was not the Soviets' intention to consign the Poles to a position of racial inferiority and slavery. On the contrary, the Soviet mission was liberating rather than oppressive, with the object of freeing the working class from the dominance of class enemies and counterrevolutionaries.34 Comparisons like these became less easy to sustain with the passage of time since, by the summer of 1940, the British Government was receiving reliable information that conditions in eastern Poland were rapidly deteriorating. Nevertheless there was still some reluctance in London to accept the assertion of Ciechanowski, the Polish Ambassador, that conditions in Soviet-occupied Poland in June were considerably worse than in the German sphere.35 However, it would have required peculiar obstinacy to go on rejecting the mounting evidence of deportations to the Soviet Union from eastern Poland. By June 1940 there had been three mass deportations of former Polish citizens, numbering all told about one million people. From May onwards, the Foreign office had been inundated with incontrovertible evidence from a variety of sources about the number and social characteristics of the deportees. Post-First World War Polish military colonists, members of the intelligentsia, Polish officials, foresters, settlers in frontier areas, and the families of Polish soldiers and policemen by then abroad, made up a large proportion of the deportees. Dislike of Soviet rule and fear of deportations were so intense that significant numbers of refugees from western Poland, including Jews, registered to return to the German-occupied area. This display of disaffection was enough to book their passage east, not west, in the third mass deportation of June 1940. Although ethnic Poles constituted the majority of the deportees, they were joined by not insignificant numbers of Ukrainians, Jews and Belorussians.36 The scale of the removals, especially from the western Ukraine, was so great that Polish observers feared the Soviet authorities 34 35

36

PRO FO 371 24471, C21190/116/55, 5 February 1940; C2238/116/55, 6 February 1940; OF 371 24472, C5622/116/55, 7 April 1940. PRO FO 371 24472, C6548/116/55, 29 May 1940 (minute of Fitzroy Maclean). Ciechanowski's claim was not exaggerated and was supported by other sources, notably the Swiss journal, Die Weltwoche, which compared NKVD raids with those of the Gestapo. See OF 371 24472, C7068/116/55, I J J u n e I94°PRO FO 371 24471, C2457/116/55, 6 May 1940; FO 371 24472, C5744/116/55, 15 April, 9 May and 15 May 1940.

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intended to deport the entire Polish population from the area. The methods used by the NKVD and the Gestapo also bore comparison, and are now widely familiar: heavy knocking on the doors of homes in the early hours of the morning; the brusque and unfeeling orders to pack and leave within the hour; the transport on sledges or carts down to the railway sidings; the herding together into unheated, filthy and grossly overcrowded freight trucks; the heart-breaking farewells to relatives and friends; the painful realisation that the place of exile was to be the Soviet Union. Soviet and German victims shared acute material deprivation and intense mental anguish. But, arguably, the lot of the Soviet deportees was more harsh at this time, owing to the vast distances over which they were transported en route to Siberia, Arctic European Russia, and Soviet Central Asia, and the extreme climatic conditions to which they were subjected on arrival. Reports reaching the British Government in the late summer of 1940 showed that at least half a million Poles in Siberia and Kazakhstan were suffering from cold and lack of food and were unlikely to survive the winter. Looked at with hindsight, contemporary descriptions of the deportations understated the horror of the ordeal, perhaps through a shortage of detailed information, an unwillingness to paint too lurid a picture for fear of being disbelieved, or a simple incapacity to re-create for outsiders the painful quality of the experience. Even so, it was difficult for informed observers to avoid the conclusion that the Soviet Union was engaged in the same kind of brutal and inhuman activities for which the Nazis had been condemned by Western public opinion. 38 Further persuasive evidence was provided by accounts of the rapid disillusionment with Soviet rule on the part of the Ukrainian and Jewish populations of the area. At the outset many young Jewish communists had given enthusiastic support to the Soviet administration and were promoted in the Soviet apparatus. The Yiddish language had been granted equal rights in the University of Lwow with Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian, and Jews were assured of equality of opportunity. 39 However, equality and protection came 37 38

39

PRO FO 371 24472, C5744/116/55, J 5 M a Y I 94°Ibid., 15 April, 9 M a y 1940; Coutouvidis a n d L a n e , The Dark Side of the Moon, p p . 14-17, 55~9> 6 3 - 8 2 ; F O 371 24472, C 1 0 2 9 7 / 1 3 2 / 5 5 , 24 S e p t e m b e r 1940; C 1 0 3 2 4 / 1 3 2 / 5 5 , 25 September 1940. T h e p u p p e t assembly of western U k r a i n e established by the Soviet authorities after rigged elections in O c t o b e r 1939 resolved t h a t ' a l l toiling citizens - the Ukrainians, t h e Russians, the Poles and the Jews who live in Western Ukraine - are the brothers of all the Soviet peoples. Anyone who tries to incite one nationality against another will be ruthlessly destroyed.' See PRO FO 371 24471, G2393/116/55, II February 1940.

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with a price. Jewish landowners and capitalists were dispossessed, like their gentile counterparts, and Jewish communal life along with Hebrew schools fell under attack. Religious instruction was forbidden; Zionist organisations and the Jewish socialist Bund were suppressed and their members arrested and deported. Burials in Jewish cemeteries were prohibited. A policy of complete assimilation was set in train, and Jews were not spared arrests and deportation. Even among Jewish communists and the younger generation the early enthusiasm for the Soviet occupation quickly faded. 40 A similar pattern of welcome, followed by disillusionment and hostility, is to be found among the ethnic Ukrainian population. Initially they believed the Red Army would help them to throw off Polish domination. By early 1940, however, Soviet attacks on nationalist Ukrainian elements, the closing down of Ukrainian cultural institutions and the persecution of the Ukrainian clergy and intelligentsia had combined with the shortage of goods and the threat of collectivisation to turn the Ukrainians into bitter opponents of Soviet rule, tempting them to forge alliances with ethnic Poles. Not surprisingly, significant numbers of deportees were members of the Ukrainian community. As a result many Ukrainians were anxious to move to German-occupied Poland 'where conditions of life were less impossible'. They welcomed reports from Berlin of German intentions to occupy the Ukraine and set up an independent state. The hostility of these two groups, whose first response to the Soviet occupation was enthusiastic, enhanced the credibility of the Polish Government's assessments of the Soviet regime. 41 The summer of 1940 may be seen as a turning point in British responses to developments in eastern Poland. The British Government was now in possession of knowledge which it could no longer ignore or dismiss. It was apparent that Poland had been ravaged as much by the Soviet Union as by Nazi Germany, and that Nazi and Soviet treatment of the indigenous population was equally characterised by brutal savagery and a contempt for law and humanity. While the British did not know everything by the summer of 1940, 40

41

P R O F O 371 24473, Ci3353/236/55, 3 August 1940; F O 371 24472, C5744/116/55, 15 April 1940; F O 371 24471, C2067/116/55, 27 January 1940; C2393/116/55, M February 1940. P R O F O 371 24471, C2946/116/55, J 4 February 1940; F O 371 24473, C1377/236/55, 19 January 1940; F O 371 24472, C5744/116/55, I5 M a y 1940. F O 371 24470, C1127/116/55, 19 January 1940; C1764/116/55, 31 January 1940. O n pro-German sentiments, see P R O F O 371 24473, C6312/236/55, 26 April 1940; F O 371 24472, C5744/116/55, 9 M a Y J 94o; G6548/116/55, 11 June 1940.

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they knew enough to condemn Soviet actions unreservedly had they chosen to do so. They chose not to. This decision can be justified only in the broader context of British policy-making. British policy towards the Soviet Union since the outbreak of war had been based on the assumption that closer relations with the Soviets would place Britain in a favourable position to take advantage of any division between Stalin and Hitler. It was therefore imperative to avoid taking up a position which could be construed as hostile. Various attempts were made to establish closer collaboration with the Soviet Union, notably on the trading front.42 These had been interrupted by the Finnish-Soviet War. The Foreign Office, even then, had been concerned to prevent too wide a gap opening up between the two countries. This aim was shared by the Soviets who were disturbed by their loss of popularity among the British public as a result of the war. At the end of January 1940, Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, expressed concern at the deterioration in UK-Soviet relations and held out the hope of British—Soviet co-operation against Germany. Alarmed by the apparent volatility of British opinion, Moscow could not afford to lose the option of a British alliance in the event of a German attack on the Soviet Union. The Foreign Office, somewhat in contrast to the general public, kept its eyes firmly on the long-term objective of an agreement with the Soviet Union. 43 On the thorny issue of contraband control, for example, the British Cabinet was anxious to avoid any action which would lead to serious dispute with the Soviet Government, even at the risk of appearing to discriminate in favour of Soviet ships. There were occasions when Soviet vessels were released from contraband control in the interests of the policy of conciliation. Treating the Soviets 'tenderly', in Halifax's term, sometimes went too far even for Foreign Office officials, but political leaders like Butler were unrepentant. 44 Once the Finnish war was over in March 1940, the British actively explored ways of improving relations with Moscow, encouraged by the belief that the Soviets themselves wanted a closer association. Trade talks were once again started up and Sir Stafford Cripps was 42 43

44

See above, p . 144. PRO FO 371 23495, C338/23/18, 5 January 1940; C530/23/18, 9 January 1940; FO 371 23843, N1390/30/38, 30 January 1940; PRO CAB 65/1, War Cabinet 103/39, 4 December, 85/39, I^ November 1939. War Cabinet 101/39, 2 December 1939; War Cabinet 81/40, 4 April 1940; FO 371 24844, N5808/30/38, 13 June 1940 (minute of R. A. Butler).

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sent to the Soviet Union to try to negotiate a trade agreement and to determine the sincerity of Soviet overtures.45 The willingness of the British to align themselves with Moscow is further illustrated by their response to the Soviet occupation of the Baltic republics in the June 1940. Whilst this action elicited a firm public protest from the United States, the British condoned it as a act of self-defence in the light of dramatic German victories in the west.46 No one can pretend that the British Government liked what it was doing. It was a question of necessity and survival. The war with Hitler could only be won if the USSR or the United States could be brought in on the British side. And after the fall of France Britain stood alone in Europe. It is in this context that British responses to Sovietisation in eastern Poland in the summer of 1940 must be considered. It is apparent that there was growing sympathy for the Poles in government circles and there were far fewer condescending and critical comments in Foreign Office papers about alleged Polish deficiencies. There was a determination to help the Poles as much as possible provided that such assistance did not sacrifice the prospects of an alliance with the Soviet Union. It was felt that condemnation of Sovietisation in Poland would be counter-productive, would not help the Poles and would obstruct the achievement of British war aims. These were clearly spelled out by Churchill in a message to Stalin in June 1940, which hinted that the Soviet Union would be the next country to feel the force of German arms. British aims were depicted as being the defence of her territory and the emancipation of the rest of Europe from the control which the Germans were in process of imposing.47 The Foreign Office therefore tried to steer a middle course between those who, through moral indignation, 45

46

47

War Cabinet 97/40, 19 April 1940; FO 371 24844, N5597/30/38, minutes 2 May, 14 May, 8 June 1940; War Cabinet 127/40, 18 May 1940, 113/40, 6 May 1940. Clement Attlee, the Lord Privy Seal and leader of the Labour party, was pressing for a trade agreement with the Soviet Union and for discussions with the Soviets to be conducted in Moscow by a special representative from London. War Cabinet 123/40, 15 May 1940. War Cabinet 176/40, 22 June 1940; 170/40, 17 June 1940. Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador in Moscow, was given instructions on how to respond to Stalin if the question of the Baltic states was raised: 'You may affect to believe that the Soviet Government's recent action was dictated by the imminence and magnitude of the German danger threatening Russia' and that therefore the Soviet Union might well have been justified in taking self-defence measures. On the other hand the British were unwilling to grant Moscow de iure recognition of her occupation, an action which 'would be distressing to the Poles and puzzling to the Americans.' FO 371 24844, N5853/30/38, 24 June 1940; War Cabinet 225/40, 13 August 1940. FO 371 24844, N5853/30/38, 25 June 1940.

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wished to publicise the character of Soviet tyranny in eastern Poland and those who were prepared to give the Soviet Union the benefit of every doubt. 48 However, it was not just the strategic context which helped to shape British policy. British public opinion endorsed the conciliatory approach adopted by the British Government early in the war. In British domestic politics strong support for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union came from the Labour party and the trade-union movement. Friendship for Moscow was accompanied by strong suspicion of the Polish government-in-exile, particularly for its announcement that it was in a state of war with the Soviet Union. Since Clement Attlee and other members of the leadership of the Labour party were part of the coalition government by the summer of 1940 they were in a stronger position to exert influence in policymaking. An indication of the thinking of the left came from the pen of Michael Foot who stressed that the USSR had the capacity to shift the whole balance in the war, and that Stalin would see the Soviets' long-term interests in an association with the Western allies. He implied that the British Government should distance itself from the Poles. Communist MP Will Gallacher lost no opportunity of trying to embarrass the government over its relations with the Poles. The Daily Worker, News Chronicle, and Evening Standard were ever ready to

attack the Polish Government and to print pro-Soviet opinions. This prompted the comment from Frank Roberts in the Foreign Office t h a t ' the communists in this country and other persons amenable to communist propaganda have clearly been inspired by the Soviet government to make trouble with us over our relations with the Polish Government'. Though willing to accept the advice of the left to seek an agreement with Moscow the British Government was not prepared to ditch the Poles to achieve it, as many on the left required them to do. 49 Surprisingly, the Polish Government itself smoothed the British path towards conciliation of the Soviet Union. After the fall of 48

49

One particularly disgraceful example of this attitude rationalised the mass deportations of Poles to the Soviet Union as 'movements of parasitical lawyers and shopkeepers who would starve anywhere until they learn new trades - so... perhaps they might as well starve and learn under the Soviets and at Russian expense'. FO 371 24472, C6548/116/55, 2 9 May 1940 (minute dated 6 June 1940). PRO FO 371 24482, C8519/7177/55, 14 May 1940; C8938/7177/55, l5 August 1940; C9088/7177/55, 15 August 1940; FO 371 24843, N5639/30/38, 15 May 1940. A tradeunion branch resolution sent to the prime minister in August 1940 demanded an end to the agreement with the Sikorski government since this hindered the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. FO 371 24482, C8938/7177/55, 2 ^ August 1940.

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France the Polish Government and armed forces were grateful to the British for helping them to escape and for offering them a new base in the British Isles. At the same time the British showed keen appreciation of the exploits of the Polish air force and navy in the defence of Britain. The growing warmth of Anglo—Polish relations helped in the creation of a more flexible attitude on the part of the Polish Government. Despite considerable reservations in his Cabinet, Sikorski recognised the advantages of a rapprochement with the Soviet Union under certain conditions. In a conversation with Halifax in June 1940, he let it be known that he had no wish to stand in the way of an improvement in relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Shortly afterwards the British learned that Lewis Namier, the historian and an associate of Sikorski, and Colonel Kedzior, Sikorski's chief of staff, were working for closer links with the Soviet Union in order to establish a new Polish state at Germany's expense. In expressing the hope that Britain would avoid actions likely to bring Germany and the Soviet Union closer together, they strengthened Britain's hand in resisting demands from other Polish circles, both within and outside the government, for a British condemnation of Soviet atrocities in eastern Poland. 50 Quite apart from the strategic and domestic political considerations which militated against a formal protest from the British side against Soviet behaviour in eastern Poland, there were other factors which convinced London that condemnation of the Soviets would be futile and self-indulgent, irritating the Soviets without helping the Poles. Undoubtedly the British Government recalled Maisky's contemptuous rejection of one of its few interventions about conditions in eastern Poland and this stiffened its resolve not to raise the question of Soviet behaviour again. 51 Another dangerous consequence of a British intervention was that Moscow might take the opportunity to seek recognition from the Western powers of her occupation of eastern Poland. Since Britain was committed to not recognising the division of Poland, a Soviet demand would have proved embarrassing and British-Soviet relations would have suffered. Moreover, Stalin would almost 50 51

PRO FO 371 24472, C 6548/116/55, 30 April 1940; C7880/7177/55, 19 June 1940; C8027/7177/55, 24 July 1940. Halifax, at the request of a TUC delegation, had agreed to inform Maisky of the 'deplorable impression' created in the West by the arrests of the leaders of the Polish labour movement by the Soviet authorities. PRO FO 371 23159, C19080/14866/55, 24 November, 20 December 1939.

The Soviet occupation of Poland

163

certainly have drawn attention to the assembly elections in eastern Poland in October 1939 as evidence of the legal incorporation of Poland's eastern provinces in the USSR. This would have raised sensitive and difficult issues which from the British point of view should be left until the war with Hitler had been won. One point of protocol remained: the Soviet Union could not be as freely and roundly condemned as Nazi Germany since diplomatic relations had not been severed and a state of war did not exist. To state the alternative to British policy in these terms highlights the realism and practicality of the British approach. 52 In pursuing an alliance with the Soviet Union while sticking loyally to agreements with Poland Britain was following a most difficult path. Occasionally the strain showed. After reading about the horrifying conditions in which half a million Polish deportees in Siberia and Kazakhstan were being confined, an official in the Foreign Office protested about the tendency in Britain ' to forget the brutality and oppression of the Soviet Government now that the Finnish war has been liquidated'. In recommending a press campaign ' to show up the state of affairs in Soviet occupied Poland and to denounce in particular the deportations', he was quickly reminded by Frank Roberts that the bases of British policy were national interest and the protection of the rights of the Allies. Public opinion, he was informed, would not tolerate an indictment of the Soviet Union, which remained a potential ally, ' even if the emphasis must still be placed on potential'. 53 By refusing to recognise the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland by committing themselves to the restoration of the Polish state, the British fulfilled their formal obligations to Poland. To have done more would have meant undermining their major objective of taking advantage of any quarrels between Stalin and Hitler to bring the Soviet Union into the Western alliance. The Soviet Government was under no illusions about the implications for Soviet security of a complete German victory in western Europe. Churchill drove the point home in a message to Stalin in June 1940 in which he declared Britain's readiness ' to discuss fully with the Soviet Government any of the vast problems created by Germany's present attempt at 52

53

PRO FO 371 24472, C6548/116/55, 3°A P r i l 1940; F O 371 24844, N5853/30/38, 18 June 1940. PRO FO 371 24472, C10324/132/55, 25 September 1940 (minute dated 27 September 1940).

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THOMAS LANE

conquest and absorption'. 54 A patient ability to keep one's hands free to exploit favourable circumstances was the key to British policy. The tragic fate of the people of eastern Poland could not be allowed precedence over the major British objective of winning the war. 54

PRO FO 371 24482, C7880/7177/55, igjune 1940; FO 371 24843, N5853/30/38, 25june 1940.

CHAPTER 8

The meeting of the Lithuanian Cabinet, 15 June J94° Alfonsas Eidintas

The secret protocols to the Nazi-Soviet Pact signed by the USSR and Germany on 23 August and 28 September 1939 predetermined the fate of the Lithuanian state. By 10 October 1939 the republic of Lithuania had been pressurised into signing a mutual assistance treaty with the USSR. This was not entirely without advantage to Lithuania since part of the Vilnius region was restored to it by the Soviets after having been part of Poland since 1921. However, the treaty deprived Lithuania of the status of a neutral state. Compelled to consent to the stationing of 20,000 Soviet troops on its territory, Lithuania became dependent on the Soviet Union. That was the first stage in the annexation of Lithuania. Under the terms of the treaty the Soviet Government guaranteed not to interfere in the internal affairs of Lithuania. Nevertheless, in the early summer of 1940, the Soviets made several groundless accusations against the Lithuanian Government. They alleged that Lithuania had formed a military alliance of the Baltic states directed against the Soviet Union, thus violating the mutual assistance treaty and, furthermore, had been involved in kidnapping Red Army soldiers. Taking advantage of the international situation the Soviets advanced one more step towards full incorporation of Lithuania into the USSR on 14 June 1940. How did the relations between Lithuania and the USSR develop in May and June 1940? In attempting to answer this question, reference will be made to data from the Lithuanian archives, published in the works of G. Rudis and V. Zalys, and to the press reports of the time. It has been impossible to obtain access to Soviet records. Since minutes of the meetings of the Lithuanian Cabinet were not recorded, we have had to rely on the reminiscences of two

165

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ALFONSAS EIDINTAS

ministers, K. Musteikis1 and J. Audenas,2 and of the president A. Smetona 3 which were published in 1970, 1966 and 1940 respectively. Since their descriptions of the main governmental discussions coincide, the authenticity of these reminiscences should not be in question. The chain of events may be said to begin on 18 May 1940 when the Red Army units stationed in Naujoji Vilnia began to transfer to the Gaiziunai training-ground situated close to Kaunas. The Soviet Government quite unexpectedly began to express dissatisfaction at the alleged disappearance of Red Army soldiers from garrisons situated in Lithuania. On 25 May, Molotov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, summoned to the Kremlin L. Natkevicius, the Lithuanian minister to the Soviet Union, and read him the note from the Soviet Government. This stated that two Soviet soldiers, Nosov and Shmavgonets, had disappeared from Red Army garrisons in Lithuania. The following day N. Pozniakov, the Soviet minister in Lithuania, received a response to the statement of the Soviet Government from J. Urbsys, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister. While politely rejecting the accusation as without foundation, the Lithuanian Government pledged itself, nevertheless, to assist the Soviet military authorities in investigating this incident. On the morning of 27 May, Urbsys met A. Loktionov, the USSR Deputy People's Commissar for Defence, and denied any involvement by the Lithuanian Government in the alleged kidnapping of Soviet soldiers. Nevertheless, the Lithuanian Government established a special commission on 27 May to investigate the accusations.4 The government also undertook to form a special police force 'for the normalization of relations between the population and Soviet soldiers'.5 The tension, however, continued to mount. On 30 May, the government newspaper Izvestiya carried a report from the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs about the allegedly provocative actions of Lithuania in respect of several Red Army soldiers.6 On 1 June, at Urbsys' request, Natkevicius obtained an interview 1 2 3 4 5

K. Musteikis, Atsiminimu Fragmenti (London, 1970). J. Audenas, Paskutinis Posedis: Atsiminimai (New York, 1966). A. Smetona, 'Pro Memoria', Svyturys (Vilnius), no. 10 (1989), pp. 9-11; no. 11 (1989), pp. 26-7. On the commission were J. Brazinskas, A. Jakobas and J. Korla. G. Rudis, 'Ar Lietuvoje 1940m. buvo grobiami raudonarmieciai?', Kulturos Barai, no. 10 6 (1988), p. 63. Izvestiya, no. 123, 30 May 1940.

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with V. Dekanozov, Molotov's deputy. The latter refused permission for Lithuanian representatives to interview the missing soldiers who had by now returned to their units. To all appearances, the Soviet Government was resolved to inflate the conflict, denying cooperation to the Lithuanian Government in their investigation. 7 Less than a week later, V. Merkys, the Lithuanian Prime Minister, went to Moscow at the insistence of Molotov, taking with him the testimonies of witnesses which refuted the allegation of the Lithuanian Government's involvement in the kidnapping or murdering of Soviet soldiers. For example, it was stated that one alleged murder victim, G. Butayev, had actually committed suicide. 8 However, Molotov refused to accept suggestions that it was lack of discipline which accounted for the disappearance of Soviet soldiers. On 7 and 9 June Molotov emphasised to Merkys that K. Skucas, Lithuanian Minister of Home Affairs, and A. Povilaitis, Director of the Security Department, were personally responsible for provocations. In response Merkys promised to dismiss Skucas and Povilaitis from office. The negotiations continued on 11 June. On the previous day, at Merkys3 request, President Smetona of Lithuania wrote to M. Kalinin insisting that Lithuania was not pursuing policies adverse to the USSR. Any official treaties or secret engagements with any other state were out of the question since they would be incompatible with the existing treaties and with the longlasting traditions of real friendship between Lithuania and the Soviet Union. The letter had no effect. It was apparent that the case of Butayev was an opportunity for the Soviet Government to utilise the incidents of the missing soldiers to draw up an ultimatum. In addition, on the night of 14—15 June several 'insurance' incidents were provoked, in which Red Army soldiers violated the Lithuanian border in several places and opened fire, killing a Lithuanian policeman. At midnight on 14 June, Urbsys and Natkevicius were summoned to see Molotov. Handing them the text of a Soviet ultimatum, Molotov added that no matter what answer Lithuania gave, the Soviet Army would enter Lithuania on the following day. 9 Late in the evening of 14 June 1940, members of the Lithuanian Government were called to the presidential building. M. Zilinskas, Director of the 7 9

8 Rudis, 'Ar Lietuvqje', p. 63. Ibid., p. 62. J. Urbsys, Lietuva Lemtingaisiais igjg-ig^o metais (Vilnius, 1988), p. 50.

l68

ALFONSAS EIDINTAS

Council of Ministers, who summoned the ministers by telephone, briefly informed them that an unpleasant telegram had been received from Moscow. The meeting began after i a.m. on 15 June. All the ministers were said to be 'frightened and quiet'. 10 Absent from the meeting were Urbsys, the Minister for Foreign Affairs who had stayed in Moscow, the Minister of Home Affairs, K. Skucas and the Minister of Finance, E. Galvanauskas. The prime minister read the telegram he had received from Urbsys half an hour previously. The foreign minister's cable reported the Soviet Government's firm conclusion that the kidnapping and torture of Soviet troops in Lithuania had been perpetrated by the Lithuanian authorities with the aim of obtaining military secrets of the Soviet state. Furthermore, it was alleged that soon after the conclusion of the mutual assistance treaty between Lithuania and the USSR, the Lithuanian Government had concluded a military alliance with Latvia and Estonia, transforming the former Baltic alliance between the two states into a tripartite military agreement. The Soviet Government had satisfied itself that this new alliance was directed against the USSR. Moreover, once the alliance had been broadened, the links between the military staffs of Latvia and Estonia, established without the knowledge of the USSR, had been strengthened. The Soviet Government also claimed that beginning in 1940 the Revue Baltique, a semi-official journal of the alliance partners, was being published in English, French, and German. From all this evidence the Soviets had concluded that the Lithuanian Government had drastically violated the USSR-Lithuanian mutual assistance treaty. The Soviet ultimatum made several demands. First, the Minister of Home Affairs, Skucas, and the Director of the Security Department, Povilaitis, must be prosecuted since they were directly responsible for the provocative actions against Soviet garrisons in Lithuania. Second, a new Lithuanian government must be formed which would be competent and willing to guarantee observance of the USSR-Lithuania mutual assistance treaty and to suppress any opposition to the treaty. Finally, the Lithuanian Government must guarantee immediate free entry into Lithuanian territory for Soviet Army units which would be garrisoned in the major Lithuanian towns. These garrisons were to be sufficiently numerous to monitor the implementation of the mutual assistance treaty. The Soviet 10

Musteikis, Atsiminimu Fr., p. 101.

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Government emphasised that the fulfilment of these demands was a minimum requirement for ensuring strict observance of the treaty. The Soviet ultimatum concluded by demanding a reply from the Lithuanian Government by 10 a.m. on 15 June. If no reply were received by the stated time the Soviet Government would conclude that the Lithuanian Government had rejected legitimate Soviet demands. 11 This ultimatum was categorical and the time for compliance very short. Moreover, it had been presented at a critical psychological moment forcing the Lithuanian Cabinet to meet in the middle of the night. This inevitably created an atmosphere of isolation and impotence. The greatest shock for the Lithuanian Government was the Soviet Union's interpretation of military co-operation between the Baltic states as purely anti-Soviet. Even the visits of military chiefs of staff were treated in this way. However, no talk of a military alliance against the USSR had ever been heard at the meetings of the military chiefs.12 Moreover, the supporters of an anti-Soviet alliance, General S. Rastikis and General J. Baliodis, who had formerly commanded the Lithuanian and Latvian Armies respectively and had enjoyed great prestige among the officers of the Baltic states, had been retired on the grounds of conflicts with their respective presidents. Furthermore, it was conclusively proved on 15-16 June that no military contacts had been maintained between Latvia and Estonia. If any anti-Soviet alliance had been concluded, it would surely have manifested itself, at least in the form of demonstrations, on the days of Molotov's ultimatum. There was therefore no evidence supporting the formation of a tripartite treaty. In relation to the Soviet charges, the Lithuanian side noted that the 20,000 Red Army soldiers stationed in Lithuania did not interfere in Lithuania's internal affairs. This could have been treated as a proof that the proposed increase in their number would not effect any other changes, particularly since the Soviets were only demanding that Lithuania should form a government capable of guaranteeing the observance of the mutual assistance treaty. Secondly, Lithuanian garrisons were stationed in Zemaitija in western Lithuania, facing Germany, whereas the garrisons of the Soviet Union were based in the southern part of Lithuania. This was 11 12

Lietuvos TSR Istorijos saltiniai (Vilnius, 1961), vol. 4, pp. 769-70. V. Zalys, 'Ar Rengesi Kariauti su TSRS Pabaltijo Valstybes', Kulturos Barai, no. 8 (1988), P-59-

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ALFONSAS EIDINTAS

further evidence that Lithuanian troops were not intending to attack Red Army units. President Smetona therefore agreed to discuss only one issue in the ultimatum, the formation of a new government for Lithuania. This government would have to be acceptable not only to the Soviets but also to the Lithuanian people. 13 ' I t sometimes happens', Smetona pointed out, ' that a big state presses a small state and the small one gives in.' The president said that in this case Lithuania could also give in and form a new government which, however, should primarily satisfy the Lithuanians rather than the Soviets.14 The president reminded the Cabinet of the meeting of the State Defence Council where it had been decided that in the event of a threat to Lithuania's independence arising from the Soviet Union Lithuania should offer armed resistance. Smetona concluded that this decision should be implemented, the ultimatum rejected and the country defended. By contrast, K. Bizauskas, the deputy Prime Minister, suggested that the demands of the USSR be met. The prime minister expressed similar views. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Skucas and Povilaitis, the Director of Security, they agreed, should be sacrificed to the welfare of the state. Though they would have to be prosecuted, the fact that they would be tried in a Lithuanian court would ensure a lenient sentence.15 Juozas Audenas, Minister of Agriculture, supported by other members of the Cabinet, emphasised that the main demand of the USSR was to grant entry into Lithuania for an unlimited Red Army contingent. Rejecting this demand would result in a war with the USSR which would bring Lithuania heavy losses and cost it the lives of many of its people. The international situation was most unfavourable for waging a war and the possibility of foreign assistance was non-existent.16 By contrast General K. Musteikis, Minister of National Defence, suggested that the demands of the Soviet Government be rejected but the Minister of Communications spoke out against an armed conflict. He was supported by the two senior military officers, General V. Vitkauskas, commander-in-chief of the Lithuanian Army and General S. Pundzevicius, chief of the general staff. The latter revealed that 'the mobilization plans had 13 15

Audenas, Paskutinis, p. 204. Ibid., p. 103.

14 16

Musteikis, Atsiminimu Fr., p. 103. Audenas, p. 206.

The meeting of the Lithuanian Cabinet

171

been wrecked and it was impossible to conduct a mobilization. Moreover, numerous Red Army units were concentrated at the frontier. Thus, the consequences of resistance would be tragic' Other ministers either kept silent or conveyed no definite opinion. The president at this point had only one option left, to discuss the Soviet demand for the formation of a new government. Bizauskas informed the Cabinet that on 12 June, at a meeting in the Kremlin, Molotov asked Merkys why General S. Rastikis had been relieved of his post as commander-in-chief of the Lithuanian Army. Interpreting this as Soviet approval of the candidacy of Rastikis, Bizauskas suggested appointing him prime minister in a new government. As far back as 28 March 1939, President Smetona's one-party regime of the Lithuanian Nationalist Union had been forced to include in the government two members from each opposition party. Bizauskas, a Christian Democrat, had been appointed deputy Prime Minister. The Populist and Christian Democratic opposition was referred to as the 'axis' by Smetona. It was members of the 'axis' who, during the last meeting of the Lithuanian Cabinet, decided to sacrifice the president in order to save what remained of Lithuania's independence. Smetona later wrote that 'the resolve of the "Axis" to yield to the Russian-Bolsheviks may have influenced Prime Minister Merkys as well'. 17 General Rastikis joined the meeting at 4 a.m. The president briefly acquainted him with the Soviet demands, summarised the opinions of those present and emphasised that he accepted the resignation of Merkys' government. Smetona urged General Rastikis to form a new Cabinet. Although Rastikis doubted whether his candidacy would satisfy Moscow since he had graduated from the military academy in Germany, he nevertheless agreed to form a government. He also suggested that Soviet demands be accepted, '... taking into consideration that we have strong [Red Army] bases inside the country, that the army has not been prepared for resistance, that there were only a couple of hours left and it was impossible to organize a defence... accordingly it was impossible to put up resistance'. 18 Rastikis' statement ended the Cabinet's all-night discussions. At this point President Smetona stood up dramatically and declared that he refused to agree to the first and third articles of the 17 18

Smetona, p. 10. S. Rastikis, Kovose del Lietuvos Laisves (Los Angeles, 1957), II, p. 24.

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ALFONSAS EIDINTAS

ultimatum. He insisted on leaving the meeting in protest against the decision to surrender. In accordance with the constitution, he would transfer his functions to the prime minister before departing from Lithuania. In this way the final meeting of the Lithuanian Cabinet ended at 7 a.m. on 15 June 1940. A brief governmental telegram stating ' The Government complies' was dispatched from Kaunas to Moscow. It would be naive to suppose that President Smetona had not considered the possibility of negotiating an alliance to support Lithuania in times of conflict . The issue had been given a lot of attention particularly between 1935 and 1938, when Smetona frequently discussed with the Prime Minister of the time, J. Tubelis, what great power Lithuania could appeal to for support if calamity befell the country. In most cases the choice fell on the USSR. The president's aide-de-camp, V. Sliogeris, who heard those conversations, recalled that it was considered most expedient to turn for assistance to the Soviet Union, because in the event of such a calamity the country could expect to retain at least a sort of self-government. Of greatest importance here was the fact that, in Smetona's view, under Russian rule the threat to the Lithuanian people of being denationalized was less pronounced. He reasoned that first, we are used to living and getting on with the Russians, second, having higher cultural standards we would more easily withstand the threat of denationalization. 19

This idea had many supporters among Lithuanian intellectuals. Implementing the government's decision at 3 p.m. on 15 June, Radio Kaunas began transmitting orders to the Lithuanian Army from the commander-in-chief, General Vitkauskas and the chief of the general staff, General Pundzevicius. The army units were instructed to accord a friendly welcome to the additional Red Army garrisons and to avoid conflicts. The Soviet ultimatum of 14 June prepared the way for the buildup of additional Soviet military units in Lithuania the following day. As they crossed the border Soviet troops disarmed frontier police posts, occupied strategic installations, set a guard on state and administrative offices and confined Lithuanian army units in their barracks. In addition, the Soviets dictated the composition of the Lithuanian Government. By their actions the Soviets violated 19

V. Sliogeris, Antanas Smetona: £mogus ir Valstybininkas. Atsiminimai (Chicago, 1966).

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standards of international law, breaching both the SovietLithuanian peace treaty of 1920 and the U S S R - L i t h u a n i a n nonaggression treaty of 1926, as well as the covenant on the definition of aggression of 1933 and the mutual assistance treaty of 1939. This was an act of aggression signifying the occupation of Lithuania.

Index

Aland Islands, 27-8, 64 appeasement, 40 Ashton-Gwatkin, Frank, 11-12, 13, 16, 19, 23-4, 25, 45 Audenas, J., 166, 170 Baltic Entente, 7, 17 Baltic Sea, 41-3, 49, 65, 130 Baltic states: alliances, 7, 10; economic development, 3-4; effects of depression on, 10-11; and German nonaggression pacts, 33, 37-9, 59-61, 63, 69; and Great Britain, 11-15, 21-5, 28-9, 30-2, 40-1, 46, 49, 106; independence, 2; military power, 7-8, 17, 67-8; neutrality, 45, 63, 65, 68, 73; and Poland, 5-6; relations with Germany, 8-9, 13-15, 26, 50-73; relations with Russia, 2-4, 9, 17—20, 26, 46, 57, 101, 160; security systems, 4-9; strategic value, 1-2; trade, 4, 11, 12, 15, 24, 63, 64-5 Bank of England, 4, 11 Bank of Latvia, 1 o Beck, Colonel Jdzef, 58, 75, 81, 85-94 passim, 124

Belorussia, 152, 156 Bessarabia, 20 Bizauskas, K., 170, 171 Bolsheviks, 2, 3, 4, 6, 14 Boothby, Robert, MP, 145, 148 Briand-Kellog Pact, 36 British—German Naval Agreement (1935), 22, 32, 33, 64 'British Strategical Memorandum' (1939), 40 Burckhardt, Carl, 81-2, 85, 90-1 Butler, R. A., 118, 148, 159 Bywater, Hector C., 68 Canaris, Admiral, 52, 70

Chamberlain, Neville, 21, 30, 41, 47-8, 96, 106, 115, 116, 117, 143, 146 Chodacki, Marian, 83, 85, 86 Churchill, Winston, 96, 105, 108, 113, 119, 120, 145, 150, 160, 163 clearings, 16 collectivisation, 153 Collier, Laurence, 12-13, 19, 22, 23-4, 30, 31, 37, 104, 107-10 communism, 2, 4, 9, 14, 157 Courland, 3, 59 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 107, 113, 149, 159 Czechoslovakia, 17, 18, 25, 53, 57, 75, 86, 87-8, 90 Danzig, 5, 25, 54, 60, 125, 136, 138; antisemitism, 85; German takeover of, 88; Nazis in, 75, 77, 80, 82-3, 84, 85, 94, 125-6; in Polish military plans, 76; relationship with Poland, 77-8; role in Polish-German relations, 74-5, 78-83, 85, 89, 92, 94 Denmark, 6, 23, 24, 64, 65, 73, 124, 130; British policy on, 41-3; and German non-aggression pact, 33, 34-7, 59, 60, 71, 127, 129; neutrality, 129, 131; relations with Poland, 133, 139-40 deportations, 156-7, 163 East Prussia, 54, 56, 125 Erkko, Eljas, 34, 35, 101, 109, 113, 131 Estonia, 1, 5, 8, 10, 16, 17, 18, 20, 26, 27, 57, 62, 67-8, 70, 73, 100, 101, 168, 169; alliances, 7; and German nonaggression pact, 33, 37-9, 52, 59, 60, 61, 63, 69, 71; independence, 2; relations with Germany, 55; trade, 4, I5> 65 Estonian-Latvian defence treaty (1923), 7 Finland, 5, 6, 7, 15, 20, 24, 27-8, 44, 48,

174

Index 52, 57—8, 64, 70, 124, 125, 130; allied intervention in, 120-2; anti-Soviet bias, 98; attacked by Soviet Union, 95> 96, 115-20, 150; attitude to Polish—German conflict, 134, 140; and German non-aggression pact, 33, 34, 36-7, 59, 60, 71; neutrality, 65, 98, 131; relations with Britain, 95—6, 98-100, I O I - I I ; relations with Germany, 98; and Soviet demands, 99-102 Foreign Office, Northern Department, 1, 12, 14, 2 2 - 3 , 29, 104, 105, 108—11, 114, 115

France, 30, 31, 32, 33, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 54, 59, 61, 62, 73, 78, 88, 150; and 'barrier' policy, 13, 14; relations with Poland, 76, 81, 84, 85, 90, 93, 94, 143, 144, 149; and Soviet Union, 17, 18, 19, 51, 95, 99-100, 102, 118, 119, 148 Galicia, 142 Gallacher, Willie, MP, 146, 161 Gdynia, 77 German-Polish non-aggression treaty (1934), 17, 32, 64, 81 German-Romanian agreement (1939), 25-6 Germany, 3, 4, 5, 7 10, 11, 22-4, 78, 82, 119, 155, 158, 163; attacks Soviet Union, 134; attitude to Danzig Nazis, 82—3; Baltic policy under Hitler, ^-n, 19-20, 37-8, 50-73; and Denmark, 41—3; eastern policy, 51—3; economic blockade of Poland, 77; and Finland, 98; import of Swedish iron ore, 43—5, 64, 96, 127; naval blockade of Baltic, 52, 53; non-aggression pacts, 33"9> 48, 52, 57> 59-6i, 68, 71, 73, 101, 127-8; relations with Baltic states, 8-9; relations with Soviet Union, 70-3, 101, 147, 149; role of Danzig, 74-5, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 126; Scandinavian policy, 127, 130, 132-3, 137-40; seizure of Klaipeda, 26, 31-2; threat to Latvia, 65-6; threat to Poland, 25—6, 54, 58-9, 63, 64, 73, 88, 94, 125, 130; trade with Poland, 76 gold standard, 10, 11 Great Britain, 4, 8, 10, 18, 58, 61, 62, 65, 74, 78, 84, 92, 101; against pact with Soviet Union 47—8; and Aland Islands dispute, 27-8; attitude to German non-aggression pacts, 35—9, 63; attitude to Soviet attack on Poland,

175

143-6, 158-64; and Czechoslovakia, 88; fear of German attack, 22-4; and Finland, 95—6, 98, 99-100, 102—23, 134; foreign policy in Baltic, 13—15, 19, 21—5, 40-1, 49; intervention in Scandinavia, 120-2; and Norway, 44; policy on Danzig, 85, 90; pro-Soviet views, 147-9, ! 6 i ; reaction to German advances in Baltic 29-32; relations with Poland, 93—4, 96, 150, 160-2; relations with Soviet Union, 96, 104-8, 111-23, 159-63; response to Soviet terror in Poland, 150-64; trade with Baltic, 11—12, 24, 44; trade with Russia, 96, 106-7, I J 3 , J44> X59 Greece, 33, 62 Gregory, John Duncan, 1, 2—3 Gripenberg, George, 28, 29, 104, n o , i n Gulf of Bothnia, 44 Gulf of Finland, 7—8, 97, 99, 100, 101 Halifax, Lord, 22, 24, 31, 32, 36-7, 58, 85, 104, 107, 108, 113, 114, 116, 117, 119, 143, 144, 145-6, 159, 162 Hanko, 100

Hedin, Sven, 138 Hedstrom, Karl Olof, 136, 137 Hitler, Adolf, n , 15-16, 21, 25—6, 30, 32—7 passim, 47, 70, 71, 72, 73, 88, 127, 163; attacks Poland, 19; and Baltic states, 18, 35, 50-67 passim, 105; and Danzig, 75, 79, 80, 86 Holland, 22, 23 Hungary, 87, 88, 89, 90 Indian Summer, 136

Ironside, General, 115 Italy, 16, 30, 33, 88, 89, 117, 118 Japan, 30, 66, 70, 71, 72, 101, i n , 117 Jews, 85, 88, 156, 157-8 Karelia, 99, 100, 102 Klaipeda, 26-7, 28, 29-32, 52, 55, 57, 60 Kotze, Hans-Ulrich, 56, 66 Kronstadt, 97, 100 Kruschev, N., 20 Kuusinen, Otto, 98, 103, 116 Labour Party, British, 146, 161 Latvia, 1, 5, 8, 17, 18, 20, 26, 27, 56, 57, 62, 67-8, 72, 73, 100, 101, 168, 169; alliances, 7; and German nonaggression pact, 33, 37-9, 52, 59, 60, 61, 63, 69, 71; German suspicion of,

76

Index

54; threat from Germany, 65—6; trade, 4, I O - I I , 15, 55,

64-5

League of Nations, 6, 9, 22, 27-8, 32, 75-6, 96, 117-20, 125, 131; role in Danzig, 77, 78, 79, 81, 84-5, 89, 92 League of the Godless, 154 Leeper, R. W., 14—15 Leningrad, 18, 26, 27, 97, 100 Lipski, Jdzef, 79, 80, 87, 88, 91 Lithuania, 1, 5-6, 8—9, 20, 55—6, 59, 63, 72, 73, 101; alliances, 7, 17; denies kidnapping of Soviet soldiers, 166-7; fate decided by Nazi—Soviet pact, 165; and German non-aggression pact, 37-9, 57, 60, 68; independence, 2; loss of Klaipeda, 26, 30-1, 57; Polish conflict, 14, 52, 53, 54; response to Soviet ultimatum, 169-72; trade, 12, i5> 64 Livonia, 3 Locarno treaties, 8, 9-10 Lwdw, 153, 154, 157 Maclean, Fitzroy, 105, 149 Mallet, William L, 28, 29 Mannerheim, Marshal, 98, 99, 102 Memel, 9, 31, 91 Merkys, V., 167, 171 Molotov, V. M., 48, 71, 72, 102, 113, 166, 167, 171 Moltke, Countess Elza, 139 Munich Treaty, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30,

57,88

Murmansk, 97, 100 Mussolini, B., 33 Narva, 69, 70 Narvik, 120, 121 Nazi-Soviet pact (1939), 1, 19-20, 48, 50, 70, 73, 101, 106, 128, 142, 165 Norway, 6, 24, 44, 109, 112, 116, 119, 130; and German non-aggression pact, 33-7, 60, 71; neutrality, 65, 124-5, 128, 131; relations with Poland, 132-3, 138 Operation Avonmouth, 121 Operation Stratford, 121 Ovey, Esmond, 14 Petsamo, 97, 100, 109 Pilsudski, Jozef, 5, 6, 51, 75, 79, 136 Poland, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22-3, 29, 31, 33, 41, 42, 43, 46, 48, 51, 55, 62, 68, 78, 97, 161—2; attacked by Soviet Union,

142-3; and Baltic alliances, 5-8; churches attacked, 152, 154; ignores German excesses in Danzig, 82; importance of Danzig to, 74-6, 93; Lithuanian conflict, 14, 52, 53; rapprochement with Germany, 78-82; reaction to German attack on Czechoslovakia, 86-8, 90; reasons for trusting Hitler, 89-94; relations with Soviet Union, 78-9, 80, 81; relations with Sweden, 135-8; and Scandinavia, 124, 131-3, 139-41; self-defence, 128; threat by Germany, 25-6, 54, 57, 58-9, 63> 64> 65, 73, 86-8, 94, 125, 130; victim of Soviet terror, 151-8 Polish-Soviet war (1920), 3, 5, 124, 145 Povilaitis, A., 167, 168, 170 Raeder, Admiral, 53, 65 Rapallo, treaty of, 8 Rastikis, General S., 67, 169, 171 Red Army, 2, 17, 18, 165—6, 169—70, 171, 172 Reval, see Tallinn Rhode, Dr Gotthold, 137, 139-40 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 20, 31, 54, 55, 59, 60, 61, 66, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 87, 88, 90, 91, 130 Riga, 5, 56, 101; treaty of, 3, 145 Roberts, Frank, 161, 163 Romania, 25-6, 29, 30, 33, 62, 68, 73, 88, 89, 148 Roosevelt, F. D., 33, 59, 61, 66, 127, 138 Royal Navy, 13, 41, 43, 44 Russia, 2-3; see also Soviet Union Ruthenia, 87 Sandier, Richard, 35, 130 Scandinavia, 5, 6-7, 11, 15, 22; neutrality, 36-7, 44, 46, 118-20, 124-5, I 2 8 , 130, 131, 140; non-aggression pacts with Germany, 33-5, 59, 60; reaction to German advances, 28; relations with Poland, 124, 128, 131-3, 140-1; trade with Britain, 12, 24, 44; views on Danzig dispute, 125-7 Schacht, Hjalmar, 15-16, 24 Schack, Eberhard von, 54, 56, 66 Seeds, Sir William, 43, 147 Sikorski, General Wladyslaw, 132, 133, 144, 149, 150, 162 Silesia, 124, 125, 145 Skucas, K., 167, 168, 170 Slovakia, 87, 88 Slovaks, 91

Index Smetona, President A., 166, 167, 170, 171-2 Snow, Thomas, 34, 109-10, 111-12 Soviet Union, 2, 4, 8, 9, 14, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46, 51, 54, 66, 68, 78-9, 80, 81, 88, 121-3; acts against Lithuania, 165-73; failure of negotiations with Britain and France, 47; fear of German attack through Baltic, 97, 100-1; Finnish war, 95, 96, 115-20, 150, 159; foreign policy and Baltic states, 17-20, 26-7, 57, 58, 62, 63, 65, 106; guarantee to Finland, 34, 36; motives for attack on Finland, 103; non-aggression pacts, 1, 19-20, 38, 48, 50, 70, 73, 98, 101, 106, 128, 142, 165; occupation of Poland, 101, 131-2, 142-3, 163; relations with Finland, 97—103; relations with Germany, 70-3, 101, 147, 149; Sovietisation of Poland, 151-8, 160 Spain, 16, 122 Stalin, Josef, 9, 19, 39, 47-8, 70, 100, 102, 103, 160, 161, 162-3 Stiernstedt, Marika, 136 Stresemann, Gustav, 8, 9 Sudetenland, 53, 54 Suomussalmi, 120

177

Suursaari, 99 Sweden, 6, 7, 24, 27, 68, 85, 112, 116, 119-20, 121; attitude to German-Polish dispute, 125-6, 129—30, 133, 135-8; and German nonaggression pact, 33-7, 60, 64, 71; iron ore exports, 23, 28, 43-5, 64, 96, 127; neutrality, 46, 64, 124-5, I2^» I 3° Tallinn, 5, 9, 14, 38, 48, 52, 56 Tartu, 100; treaty of, 97 Transolza, 88 Turkey, 107, 116, 144, 148 UK-German Naval Agreement (1935), 15 Ukraine, 16, 91, 152, 156 Ukrainians, 83-4, 86, 89, 91, 156, 157, 158 United States, 108, 113, 134, 160 Urbsys,J., 166, 167, 168 Versailles Treaty, 5, 75, 126 Vilnius, 5, 7, 14, 52, 53, 165 Warsaw Accord (1922), 5-6 Weizsacker, Ernst von, 35, 39, 53, 60, 64, 72,9i Winter War, 95, 96, n o , 115-20