Before the nuclear bomb , no weapon on earth had evoked so much fear, veneration and passion as th e battleship. In de structive power it had no equal. Accompanying a four-part Cha nnel 4 se ries of the sa me name , The Battleships unve ils the ep ic saga of power, inte rn ati ona l politics,'a nd one- upmanship that led to the tita nic wars of th e twent ieth century, It is a story involving rule rs, war lords and admirals who all became intoxica ted by the • grandeur, majesty and sheer power of these floating fortresses . Enr iched with eye-witness accounts and contributions from naval experts around the globe , The Battleships explores the rap id evolution of firepower and battleship desig n from canvas to steam , timbe r to steel, muzzleload ing ca nnon to l8- inch guns, a nd beyond , to rocket lau nchers and missil es . As the spearhead of colon ial expansion and in defence of the great empires the battleship re igned supreme, and in the wake of World War I Germany, France, Italy, Japan and the US competed in an arms race wh ich focused on building maritime muscle .
I
II was a re ign, however, that could not offset the technological advancements tak ing place in the way wa rs were fought. In the face of subma rines and air wa rfa re, the battleship wou ld have to fight to prove itself an effect ive weapon . Crippling defeats du ring World War II , such as the loss of the famous British ship Hood and all but three of its crew by the guns of the German ship Bismarck and the destruction wrought by a Japanese air attack on the US fleet in Pearl Harbor, were turning points for the battlesh ip. With the major powers rethinking their arsenals, only the four US Iowa Class battlesh ips would survive to play a signif icant role in the wars of the latt e r part of th e twentiet h century. Prob ing th e evolution, deployment and effectiveness of one of the most controve rs ial weapons ever created, The Battleships explores the momentous role they played in • shaping the modern world .
The
•
Batt es 1 s Ian Johnston and Rob McAuley
III A companion to the television series 'Th e Battleships',
pr oduced w ith the financial assistance of the Australian Film Finance Co rporatio n Ltd and the New So uth Wales Film and Television O ffice.
Dedicate d to Ad miral o f the Fleet Th e Lord Lewin KG GC B LVa DSC (b 1920 d 1999) and to the sa ilors o f all nati ons w ho served on batt leships
First published 2000 hy Cha n ne l . j Books imprint of ,\ b cm ill~m Publishers Ltd 2::; Ecclest on Pbn' Lond o n 5\,\' } \,\' 9:'\F }bsin~stokt.' and O xford www.macnullan .com A!\."'Cx:iated co mp ani es throughout the wo rld ISB~ 0 7:;22 IR. 7 6
~111
Copyrig ht
2000, The Battleships Pty Limited
rtglu of Ian Johnst on and Rob ,\ k Aulcy to IX" id e ntif ied :I." thc authors o f this work Ius l-ccn as se rted b y the m in accorda nce with the Cop vnglu . ()l' si~ns and Patents Act 19M .
"n I L'
'The Hatth-shipx ' is a Roh .\ k Aule y production for Cha nne l -I . Producer: Rob .\ !cAule y
All ri,g hts reserved. No pan of this publication ma y he re prod uced . sto red in o r introduced into :I retrieva l sysle m, o r transmit ted. in a n)' for m, or hy :lny means (elect ronic. mechanical . ph otocopying. recording o r otherwise) w ithout the p rior writte n pe rmission o f tbc publisher , Any pe rso n who does an y unauthorized ac t in relation to this publication ma y he liable 10 cri mina l prosecutio n a nd civil cla ims fo r d al11~I~L's . 9 H 7 6 S -, 5 2 I
A CII' catalog ue record for this book is avuilnble from the Britis h Li brary. Dvsigncd hy n~1I1 Newman -Perfect Bound Oesign Colour Reproduction hy Ayleshury Studi os L[(...1 Printed in England by Bath Press
Contents Acknowledge me nts
6
Foreword
8
Symbols of Supremacy
10
Sail to Steam - Wood to Steel
24
Sea Lanes to Power
36
Enter the Drea dnoug ht
52
Battleships Go Global
64
Empires in Collision
78
The Battle of Jutland
90
Th e Ultima te Battleships
108
The Supre me Challenge
124
From Bismarck to Pearl Harbor
136
Sea-powe r versu s Air-power
158
End of the Behemoths
172
Glossary
186
Ind ex
187
Further Read ing
191
Acknowledgements
D
urin g the research for ou r p revious seri es . n )('(.iuers. I was standing o n the ha llowed strip o f land
; 1(
Jo h n Brown'... yard o n th e River Clyd e wh er e the famous liners.
Q U('( ' II
Mw)' and Quee n Elimbetb w er e b uilt. w ith Glasgow- based Ian johnston . Ian reminded
me tha t the great figh ting ships . Barham. f
IR .' \\'
se ries
wa s horn. Te levision bro adca ste r... Chan ne l ..\ UK. a nd ABC Austral ia com mitted : the Australian Film Finance Corpora lion. the New Sou th Wales Film and Television O ffice . and Channel -l I nternational i n ve sted an d "111(' Battlesblps we n t int o p roducti on . 1;11"1 h C C;II 11C o u r As so ci ate
Producer and co-autho r o f this book . I also m et Admiral o f the Fleet. Lord Le win. d uri ng p roductio n o f Tl w Liner s. An ex -batt lesh ip
sai lo r h im...elf in \Xbrld War II. Lord Lew in offe red to help wit h the new series o n one condition. 'Yo u mu st get it righl - the facts. th e nam e o f the shi ps . and ull ux-h nk-al mail er.... .' \\:'t,.. have made every effo rt 10 d o just that . Sad ly. Lo rd Le w in d ied before "17.1(' !/all/esbips went int o
pro du ction . l lo we vc r. he had b rie fed his granddaughter. Emil y Ro c. a yo u ng free lan ce film re sea rcher. o n th e p ro ject . Em ily became o ur p rod ucti on co-o rdin ator in Engl and and I am
Indelucd 10 her for th e co ntribution she made to the se ries.
\'Ce filmed in Britain . Ge rmany. France. Japa n and the l;SA. and recei ved the warmest welco me in e ac h cou ntry. It was hoth
~I
privilege and an honour to meet histori an s. authors. and sailors
of all ra nk s w ho had se rved o n batt les hips in peacetime a nd in war. ex te nded
10
~ ly
he artfelt gr..lIitude is
each a nd every o ne o f them fo r their ge ne ro us co ntribu tio n. The same applies to the
many asso ciatio ns. hist oric nava l esta b lixh mc rus. and maritime museum... that allo we d us to film the ir pr ecio us archi ve s a nd p rese rved fig hti ng s h ips . The statixtics incl ud ed in th is ho o k a rc derived from co nte mporary p ub lished so urces wh ich arc listed in tile Fu rthe r He;lu ing section. I als o w is h to ac knowle dge the fo llo wing fo r th e ir su p po rt. encourageme nt. a nd personal contrib utio n: Christine Sch mit-Mcki n no n. Linda John....to n. Paul Sargent, Ron Saun de rs. Ph ilip vaughan . Profe ssor Ian Cow. John Rodsted. Ann xtalcobu . Albert \X':llk,rr, Hiroyuki .\ Iin ishil;l. Brian
Burke-Gaffn ey. Gu nter KI:ItKkc . Jo ach im von xtc ngde n. Susa n
~ l a cKinn o n ,
Investme nt " lan ag er
at AFFC; Stuart Llo yd and Jenny l lui of Astims: Llo yd Hart. Nao mi Stoneman. David :'\oakes. Calvin
Ga rdi ner for great pict ures : Camp bel l .\ IcAule y fo r top sound: a nd Rich ard Walk er for research and di rection in Japan an d th e USA. To Cha rlie Carman an d Verit y \\:fil lcock s. Channe l '1 Books; Geoff Barne s. ABC Australia , Gil l Brow n , Cha n ne l 4. a nd Bern ard Mac leod. Cha n nel ·i Inte rnatio nal for committi ng to the series: Ro be rt Albert for continui ng support; Ro wan McAu ley for p rofes....ional collaboration wi th me o n the bo ok. my wife An ne for putt ing up w ith my long absences d uri ng this production. ,\ Iy n;ry special thanks to co lleag ue :II1U frie nd . Peter BUll. for masterminding the creative side
o f this project. edit ing and writing th e se ries . and for s up porting and e ncoura g ing me from the day the project began. And to Ruth Nicol . Peter's partner and inspiration . my he artfelt tha n ks for the su pport
yO lI h ~I\'C
Rob .\lcAulcy
g ivcn Peter and the project ove r the long pe riod o f its production.
_______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____________......_IIiC.II'''''''Ntr
Exce rp ts from interviews reco rd ed for the tele visio n se ries . '[be Ualt{esbIjJs, add a ne w perspect ive 10
the inter natio nal sag a of these extraord inary figluing ship s. The au thors wou ld like to ackn o wledge
the following
Ale xan dra IliJd n.: d
Cura to r of O rd nance. J Im)' Rose Trus t. Po rtsmo uth
D r Eric G ron'
x avul strategist . L'ni\'c:rsity o f Hull. UK
Professor Philippe ,\ b s SO!l
Maritirne historian. France
Pet er Good w i n
Kee per and Cu rator. HMS Victory. Portsmouth
Coli n \X·hilt..•
Deputy Din..-cto r. Royal Xava l Muse um . Po rtsmouth
David K. Brown
Re tire d Depu ty Ch ief Nava l Archi tect o f the Royal Co rps o f Na va l Co n stru ctors
Dr And rew Lambert
Nava l hi storia n , King's Co llege. Lo ndo n
David Lyon
Research ASS( Kiate . National M ari time M u seum. London
Ste ve .\ k La ugh lin
Russian battleship histo rian ..San Fran cisco
x orma n Frie d man Dr
~lark
Penn ie
US nava l histor ian &. defence ana lyst . x cw Yor k Se n io r Research Fell o w . H o o ve r Insti tutio n o n \'('ar. Revolution and Pea ce . Sta nfo rd Un ive rsity. Californ ia
D r \X'l.'m er Rahn
I>r
~li d l;l d
Epkanha ns
Professor Kiyoshi Ikeda
Ger m~1I1
nava l histo rian and retired nava l ca ptain. Berlin
German naval historian. t Iamb urg Japanese naval hist ori an , Tokyo :'\;l\~1 1
Dr G :lTy \X'ei r
Hist ori an , US
Sir l lc nrv Leach GCn . III
Admi ral o f the F1c..'t:'I , UK
Historica l Cent re . \X'ashington DC
Jo hn Pau l Ellio t
Sailor. \'(brld \V.1f I. LJSS Tex as, Cali fornia
,\ Irs Pegg y G ihson
Eye witness at Scapa Flow. posl-\'(,\Vl
ll atsu hu Naito
japan ese
Te d Brigg s
Su rvivor. 1IJ\ IS lIood
11;1\';11 historian
&. author, Tokyo
Oll~ ) Th isson
1'ill Jilz cr c wmc mbcr. \Vililel ms ha "ell . Ge rman y
P;lI Ja ckson
Sword fish pilo t. 1-12.5 Sqdn . 11J\.I S \ 'tctnrk nts
North Dalrvm p le-llamilt on Mid shipm an.
1I ~I S K ill).: Gem'l-:e
l'
Ludovic- Kenn ed y
Ex-Royal Navy. nava l histo rian . a ut hor, re nowne d UK broadcaster
I>o u,gh' Tunic:
Ah le Sea man . J 1 ~I S K i np. G t'(Jf].W \'
O tto Peters
Engine room artificer, Bisnm rcl:
Richard Fiske
xtartnc bugler. t;SS 'n~1 nYRinia Ensign . Lieuten an t (J.G.>. USS Sontb Daleota
Erlin,g l lustvc dt Bo h :'\i,ghts
Flight-Lieut enant. 6 1i La nca ster Squadron
l lans .\ Hillcr
Ant i-a ircra ft gun ne ry o ffice r. Ttrp it z
vernon Sistrunk
Ensign. Torpedo 11-1 Squ adron. USS JIlln 1Jid
Be n StJo h n
Ensig n. To rpedo 11-1 Sq uad ro n. LJSS Intrep id
Sh iro Ilo so ya
lmpcrialj apan cxc Navy Seama n. J lu sasbi surv ivo r
IIn ward Skid more..
Lieut e nant ( J.G.) To rpedo 29 Squadron . USS Co hol
7
Foreword
B
anlcships
Weft:
(he stuff o f legend. pro ject ing might and po we r beyond belief. For over
~I ce n.t ll: ', they were [~lC iron fists that undcrlin~d diplomacy. \~'herc ~jplolll~ICY fa il~d .
they inflicted the maximu m amoun t o f d estructi on that hu man mgenutty co uld d ense.
They WCfC p:l wns in perha ps the gre ates t ga me of politica l o ne- up ma nship eve r played hv'twe e n rival nations - the pr od uct o f ego s. jealousy . greed . agg ression , and blind am bit ion of na tio ns seeking to exte nd their nati ona l bou nda ries . Befo re the nuclea r homh. no wcapo n o n earth ev ok ed so much fear. ven era tion and pa ssion as the ba ttleship. And yet there has probably ne ver been a class of warship that, round-for-round . in naval battles ag ainsr o p po nents o f a similar cla ss. fo ught less ba ttles. achieved less sun :ess . an ti had
~I S
lill ie
effect o n th e o utcome o f th e major wars of th e twentieth ce n tury as th e battleshi p . Ou r story ex amines th ese amazingly complex and aw es ome weapons of d estruction - from their evo lution from the ships-of-t he-line of Nelson's period
10
th e supe r-battles hips o f \'\'orld War II.
For we ll over a cent ury. d es igne rs. e ng ineers. scie ntists an d nava l a rchitects - sp urred o n hy the dema nd s of the ir po litical and milita ry musters - strived
10
p rod uce the ultim ate battleshi p -
the impreg nable floating big -gun fort ress that would eclipse all othe rs..\ Io nc y fro m th e public purse ap pe are d limitless: sh iphu ilding yards. naval dock yards. stee l and armament fact ori e s
beca me major expenditures in the econo mics o f mar itime nations. Traditi onal cross-cha n ne l rivals . Britain
~1I1t1
Fran ce . wr... re qui ck to apply new tech no logies in
th eir navies. but by th e end of th e n inetee nt h ce ntu ry. Ge rma ny. dri ven b y IhL' a mbitious Kaise r \,\'i1 hel m II. had eme rge d as the new na val power in Europe . 111e g rea t nava l arm.. r..IO..' between Great Britain and Ge rmany in th e lead -u p to 'cc o rkl War I saw th e creatio n of till" two greatest fleets o f battleshi ps e ve r assembled . Th e head -o n mee tin g o f these
two
!lcets in th e Battle o f
J utland was the largest battle betwe e n battles hips in history. La sting less than two hours. the result was inconclus ive w ith hoth sides clai ming victo ry. "l'he wa r to end all wa rs'
W :IS
finally resolved
without another major naval hatti e . And yet. immediately after \'\'orld \'\'ar I. so deepl y ing rain ed in th e minds o f polit icians anti nav al strat eg ists was the need for eve n bigger. faste r. and more powerful fl eers o f c apital sh ips that a new arms race threat ened. 111e 1922 \'\'ashi ngton Agreement - the world 's first internationa l arms limit ati on treaty - crea ted momentary internati onal sa n ity. limi ting th e s ize a nd future numhers o f battleships . BtU the re is little do ub t thi s confe re nce a lso so wed th e first .st.'cds o f discontent that eventually co ntrib uted to the o utbreak of the greatest war o f all - \'\'orld War II. A"i the ae ro pla ne developed as a ma jor weapo n. and aircraft carriers be cam e a practical rea lily. the writing was o n the wa ll fo r the lo ng-term future o f the batt leship . In spite o f th is. j apa n. the natio n th at wa s the most adva nced in naval avia tion. was plan ning th e
IWO
largest a nd mo st
powe rful bat tleships ever - the 7 1.000· lOn. 18·inch gu nn ed }"a ma (o and stusasbt. At the sa me time. Adolph Hitler. in defiance o f the Trea ty o f Versailles be ga n building 'poc ket battleships and later. (he two largest battl esh ips ever bu ilt for the Ge rman
:'\:1\)" -
Bismarck anti Tirpitz.
11)(,: fate o f these b ig-gun sh ips anti the evolution of wa r str.ltegies as th e aircraft currier took o ve r as the capi tal ship in th e world 's navies. pr esen ts a dramat ic a riel terrib le sto ry o f d eath a nd de...truction at unprecedented levels on the oceans of the world . It has been fascinating
[0
he a r fro m British. Ge rma n. japan ese . Fre nch . a nd American sailo rs.
.,.Ii'....
_ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ --->ili_ liil m. .
IiiiIII_~ 9
Even for the mightiest battleships, there is no escape from the power of the ocean waves. War at sea is a 24-hour, 7-day week operation in all weathers.
p ilo ts ami nava l hi storia ns . \Ve have been p rivi leged to speak wi th ma ny who
SCfVt:U
on
battleships o f o pposing navies and to share with them thei r first-ha nd ex periences of ex trao rdina ry survival in da ng e rous ci rc umst a nces o n the h igh seas. Th eir stories and co m me n ts pro vide a uni que insight into the story o f the battl eship. Attempting to un derst and and present th e technical co mp lexity o f these extraordi na ry fighting ships. and eve n
(0
scra tch the surfa ce of th e polit ic...ll manouevring behind thei r creat ion has been
a daunting task. \'\'c ho p e (hat o ur televis io n se rie s. a nd this hook in some wa y
Sl H-T C ed
in
p re senting a n in forma tive , exciting and as accu rate as p os sib le story o f th e se a wesome and
strangely charismatic weapo ns of war - the battleships. Rob J\ I<.:Aulcy
m~ oso
u remac ust suppose for a moment th at ships hav e th e ir o w n kind of DNA. If
J
yo u we re then to tes t th e DNA o f. say . Ja pa n's Yamato o r Mnsasbi >
th e two largest a nd most powerful s u pe r-batt les h ips e ve r b ui lt - or
Britai n's ba ttlc cruiser HMS l Iootl, o r a n y o f th e USA's Iowa Class fast
ba tt les hips . yo u wou ld find that th e y sha red a com mon 'b lo o d line ' th at stretched back almos t 4000 yea rs. In fact. yo u wo uld find th at the ba ttles hip was the last stage in a n e vo lution th at ha d beg u n w ith th e warships recorded in a ncient Egy ptian a n. O nce o u r a ncesto rs d iscove red tha t th e c rude rafts a nd single-h u lle d dug out ca noes use d a ro u nd co asta l e stua ries a nd in rivers co uld be d eve lo ped in to vessels ca pa b le o f making sea c ro ss ings . it was o nly a matter of time before th e first s uccessful ocea n passages to fo re ig n lands took pla ce. These first sh ips tra nsformed for ever th e im pregnab le bl ue water barriers sepa rating lands and civilizations. into high ways for trad e and exploratio n. And o nce th at grea t natura l ba rrie r had been co nq ue red . th e insat iable hu ma n d esire to explo re. trad e , go to war and expa nd nati o nal bound a rie s led ine vitabl y to th e first sh ip s-of-w ar. From that b lurred
.tM.'Ptr..__
_________________________________---Jo.._...
mo me nt in histo ry. (he slo w In n inevitable developme nt o f (he mod ern battles hip bega n. Wi th (he introd uction of every new technology, the evo lu tion o f the ocean-go ing figluing
ship reached a new stage o f co mplexity, w ith e nha nced po wers
In
destroy a nd dominate . Since
The battleship USS Iowa fires a full broadside of nine 16-inch gun s during an exercise in Ju ly
ear liest limes. (he aim of d csignL'rs a nd buil de rs o f shi ps has bee n to create vessel s po werfu l
1984. The Iowa Class test-
enoug h to w ithstand not o nly th e for ces of natu re, hu t also the fo rces of o pposing nations'
battleship s were arguably the
s hips . Befo re sa il, oa r-p ro pe lled ga lle ys we re eq u ip ped wit h rei nfo rce d p ro trudi ng ho w s Cbcakx') for ramming int o the sides of enemy shi ps. and th ey w ere crewcd hy warrio rs armed fo r batt le . Wh en the tec hn ology o f sai l w as lat er co mb ine d w ith the m ig ht of g unpowder,
ult imate capital ship in the
wa rships were lad en w ith murderous muzzle -load ing ca nno n , ca pa ble of firin g de vastating broadside s into e ne my ships and sho re-based fortresse s. \'\'ooden -h ulk'd ships gave way first to iro n and the n steel. and sail was re placed hy the stea m-po we red e ng ine s of the new ind ustrial age , \'\!e ap o nry kept pa ce w ith techno logy, and she ll-fi ring gun s soon had a range we ll beyond the hori zon. In the twe nt ieth ce ntury, hot h firepo we r a nd a rmo ur rea ch ed th eir ze nith , w ith nuclear-arm ed beh em o ths patrolling the world's ocea ns, In eve ry age , o ne thing has held true : the natio n that ni les the waves. n iles the wo rld . Afte r tho usan ds of years of tech nical evo lutio n, the true lxmleship fina lly em erg ed o n the C\ 'C o f the twe nt ie th ce nt ury: a ste el- hulled . e ngi ne -d rive n and he avily-a rmo ured weapo n of destruction . T hese ha u lcships we re ca pa ble o f suc h firepo wer tha t in hatt ie the y would not me rel y d isarm o r d isable the e ne my. hu t utte rly dem o lish it. Whe re the woode n-hulled ships of the past had o ften been captured as pr izes (earn ing the co nq ue ring captains fantastic wealt h), o r had bee n left to limp hom e as bcsr the y co uld . the mode rn battleship had grad uated fro m fig hter to the ultimate ma ritime destroye r.
1IIIL
evolution of the battle ship .
The te rm 'battles hip' come s from the a,ge of sail w he n th e mo st powerful ships in a na vy's hatti e fleet formed a sin~l e line in preparation for a ttack o n an enem y force. Th e cla ssic naval bat tle s lr~lte~y o f this e ra was for two para llel lines o f heavil y armed ships to pass o ne ano ther. L';Kh firing massive broa dsi de s in an attem pt to destroy the e ne my vessels in the o the r lin e at close ra nge , Ap p ro pr iatel y, a s hip that hy din t o f its massi ve firepower q uali fied to s;liI in thi s 'line o f bat tle ' was ca lled 'a- linc -o f-bau le ship' or 's hip-of-the- line '. O nce the era o f sa il had passed a nd ste am- powe red . iron- and late r steel-h ulled vessel s mount ing ne wgenera tion guns were introduced , the tactics fo r hatti e cha nged. a nd the sh ips be came kn own sim p ly as "battles hips'. But wh at really is a battlesh ip? In simple te rms. it is the mos t powe rful ship afloat - a veritable floating g un platform. heavily arm oured to withstand the full firep ower o f any e ne my ve ssel. It has the ca paci ty to att ack a nd defeat any o p posing s hip that da res challe nge its right of passagl.'. The o verwh e lming power of the broadside - wh ether it he the fifty gun s of a sh ip-ofthe-line like H ~I S Vic!w :V all firing to the o ne side. or the massive g uns of the twcnuc th-ccruury battleship all firing o n the ce ntre line (and thu s co vering both sides of the ship> - is the essential element (hat mak es a batt leship d ifferent from every o the r ship afloat . However. a 'bau lcs htp' repre sents far more th an simply firepower, Histori an s a nd ot her e xpens in (he field wh o contributed to the tele vision se ries added the ir o w n definitio ns : 'the battleship was the supreme instrument of naval power', and 'in its (b y it W:.lS the higgL'st movi ng a rtefact in existence. the b igge st and most com plica te d p iece of machinery devi sed hy man ', Furthermore . the battleship 'w as the un de rpinn ing of the ba ttle fleet. the g rea t deterrent ', and 'a co untry with a fleet of battleshi ps is mor e than a country - it's a n empire' , Speaking of the British Navy, these same ex pe rts ma int a ined that 'the battle s hip was ve ry mu ch the co re of Britain 's pe rce pt io n o f hersel f in the worl d'. tha t 'a battleshi p is o ne o f the most magnificent. awesome . fearsome devi ces ever thought up by man'. and that 'they we re the ultimate product of the Ind ustrial Revolut ion', Ther e is no doubt: the bat tleship is truly uniq ue in the histo ry of ocea n-go ing ships-of- war, :\ot just weapons o f wa r, ba ttleshi ps eq ually have been national symbols of ind ustrial :.1110 technol og ical ach ievement - pawns in an international game of o ne- u pma ns hip played out o n the world stage by kings and kaisers, polit icia ns and naval co mmanders alike , Of all the shi ps in the navies of the world , it wa s ba ttlesh ips that cap tured the imagination of till.' pu blic - the taxpaye rs w ho met the e nor mo us costs of their de velo pm ent . build ing and operat ion, They we re proud of their navy and felt pa rticula rly safe in the kno wled ge that their country could never be defeated while its fleet included a squadron o r two of battlesh ips, Small countries with minu scule nav ie s added at least o ne banl eship to th ei r flee t. It w as as mu ch a matt er of pride a nd symbolism as it was of stra te g ic im portance to the country's defence. If yo u r ne ighbour ing country boasted a battlesh ip then YO\I had to have o ne - it was as sim ple as that. xever be fore in history had su ch a n expensive war wea pon meant so mu ch to the m:.111 in [he street as well as the military strat egists planning the defence o r expansion of empi re, The co st of buil din g and cam paig ning these gia nt fig hting mach ine s wa s ho rre ndo us, Yet. in the fi rst decade of the twent ieth century . mo ne y from the public purse of every nation with nava l aspirat ion s poured into the development. buildi ng and purchase o f hattlesh ips and their clos e cous ins. the bat tlccru tsers. Banlecruisers art:' a light er-ar mo ured version of the batt leshi p . bur boasnng similar firepower, Ik-duc~-d arm our mean s more speed. a nd this , man y naval experts be lieved . would mo re than com pe nsate for the lack o f p rotective a rmour in a ny e ngagement o the r than with a battleship, The series . a nd this book. includes both class of vessels as ca pital ships (that is. the most powerful a nd im portant in 3 fleet ) as at times it is difficult to di fferen tiate bet ween the two , In many cases, the battlccruisers were, in fact. larg er than battleships. Th e classic example of this was the banl e crulser H~I S Hood, fo r a lo ng time th e higgest ca pital sh ip in the British Navy,
':"_iiilIlliI• •Io1I~__-:. 13
SilUI (}LS...1lF-'illfltL\lAO~
As thl: great maritime nat io ns of the o ld world sent thei r sh ips to ex plo re new frontiers. wea lth beyond belief began 10 now across ocea ns - from o utpost, o f ne w empires to the ho meland s o n th e o the r side o f the g lobe. Ne w e mp ire s em erged, d ue nor o nly to the s uccess o f the navigators who d b-covered the se new te rritories. bu r to th e strength of the nav al for ces that g uara nteed safe passage to me rch ant shi ps ca rrying the ca rgoes. For ce ntu ries this responsibility lay with armed sailing vessels of oak and ca nvas. powerful fighting ships capable of staying at sea fo r som etimes ye ars o n e nd . These vessels were the backbone o f migh ty global e mpires -
and the most powerful of a ll wa s the British Emp ire. buil t and p rotect ed largely hy the po wer of its ships-of-war - ils 'wo ode n wa lls of Eng land' - a nd . late r, hy its flee t of battleships, O ur sto ry o f the e vo lu tio n o f th ese uniq ue s h ips -of-wa r hegins at th e historic Port sm ou th ;\' ~I\..t1 Dockyard in Eng land . w he re thre e of the finest exa mples o f ea rly wa rships are preserved, ea ch representing the ultima te fighti ng s hip o f its era du ring 350 years o f marit im e histo ry. TIle o lde st ship in Portsmou th is the legendary Tud o r vessel. .lIllI)' Rose. \'<'h en Henry VIII ca me to th e Engl ish thro ne in 1509 . he inherited fro m his fat her. Henry VII. :I s ma ll naval fle et o f five vessels. He nry VlI is cons ide red the father o f the Ro yal Navy. h ut it was Henry VIII wh o first rea lized the po te ntial o f a c ro w n flee t. O ne o f his first acts as king wa s to com m issio n the
bu ilding o f a rad ical new kind o f ship - the first true warship . Tw o years late r, in 1511, J li11)' Rose
uhle wa s br ewmg with Sco tland, w hile ac ro ss what was the n ca lled 'the Narro w Sels' rela tion s w ith the o ld enem y, France , were in a high stale of ten sio n. Henry recognized the need for a po we rful, modern navy to defend his count ry against attack fro m conti ne ntal Europe and , in parti cular. the Fre nch. He Ik a pe rson al interest in this new
ship and great ly influenced her fining-out, including the additi on to her arm ament of fifteen large bronze can no ns. According to Alexandra Hildn-d. Cura to r o f O rd nance at the J Im) ' Rose Trust in Portsmouth. 'JIm)' Rase wa s the first ship that was d es igned specifica lly for warfare o n a large scale. She wa s an e mbryon ic ba ttleship . if yo u like : . W'hile previous warships mo unted guns in various loca tions. mos t notably o n 'castles' at e ithe r end o f the vessel. the design of .11m)' Rose introduce d gu n port s arranged down either side o f the ship . These ports. w hich pie rce d th e hu ll close to the wa te rline , allo wed for the firing of broadsides - those grea t ba rrages. w here a sh ip would simultaneously fire upon the ene my with all of the ca n no n along o ne side . "lilI)' Rose was the first signifi cant 'big-g un' ship. Because the gun ports allowed the he av y bronze ca n non to he set close to the waterline , a nd lo w d ow n in th e hull, the ba ttle s hip 's s ta b ility wa s im me nsel y improved co mpared to the top-heavy caste llated ships . The tech nical b reak th ro ugh that made Rose's watert ight g un ports possible was a cha nge in h ull constructio n. \'(' he re tradit iona lly s hi ps had been c linke r-built, wit h their w ooden planks o ve rlap ping ,
.lIilI)'
MARY ROSE DIMENSIONS,
the gun port s to he made waterti ght. A very larg e s hip hy the stand a rd.. of the da y, J la'y RoSl! \yas a traditi o nal squarerigged ca rrac k d esign. w ith a leng th o n the wa terline o f just o ve r 127 fe et (38.8 metres ) a nd a n o verall length o f about 147 feet <4; metres). She ca rried a variety o f
IZ7Fr ~ IN cwATfRLIND 38Fr 3IN ~ ISFr (38.8 ~ 11.66 ~ ~.60M) ~
J lil1Y Rose was ca rve l-built - her planks were s moothly se t edge-on-edge . a llow ing
DIS?.Ac.EMEt.rr, 7Z7S TONS CAI'rER REF1TTING, SOO TONS Itr LAUNCH) CON5TRUC.TION, OAK AND ELM
weapons rang ing fro m ra nks o f bowmen situated o n the cas tles to kill the cre ws o f
CANVA',,,
Nor
e ne my ships. to la rge cast br on ze a nd w ro ught -iron guns. ca pa ble o f firing sh ot a nd o the r pr ojectiles into the hull s a nd rigg ing of e ne my vessels . At this stage , a ll the best g un-founders were European. Henry \'111 recognized this and. not wanting
ARMAMEt.rr,
MUZllE-lOADING CIlSr BRONZE GUNS AND BREECH-lOADING wROliGHr-IRON GUNS
England 10 rely o n pot ent ial e ne mies fo r her weapo ns su pply, brought o ve r a number of French experts 10 ra ise can no n-making in his own co untry lip to the high stan da rd of the Fren ch ord nance . Ho w eve r, in those ea rly da ys. sta ndardiza tio n of the bor e
CREw,
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300- ~OO
SUNK)
aoo
WHEN
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HA T TI ES HIE..S
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of cannons and the: size of ha lls they I1R't1 was a major problem. The te rm 'w indage' was use d to describe th e d iffere nce bct w....en the size of the shot and the inte rnal bore o f the g un . Around a qu arter of a n inch <6 mm ) was considered ide a l to maxim ize: the force of the shot co ming out of the barrel w ithout it gelli ng stuck. Too much windage resulted in lack of power - insufficient w indage could result in the shot becoming jammed in the burr el. Alexandra UHdR'Ll comments: 'O n the .lIm ) ' Rose. bL'L~IUse ea ch gun was hand manufactured and the mould destroyed after casti ng, the (:lasses of guns (~IiIL'Ll cannons and culverins which were SUppOSl.'Ll to be a spcclflc bore size: were ne ver absolutely right. You act ua lly got an infinite number of slight variations. Xow that mea ns that you 're going to have to accept a large r windage and perhaps h;IH' a shot that's an inch 125 mml too small for the bore. and the re fo re not got the sa me mu zzle velocity as you would if it was smaller. O r you' re going to have xpecific shot cas t for specific guns w hich is the n a huge . huge p roblem. tmagtnc you've: got. in the: case: of .lfm) ' Rose. fiftee n diffe ren t bore sizes fo r the cast b ro nze guns a nd you 're tryi ng to so rt o ut the sho t down below in the se mi-dark that is specifically for L':Kh g un . ;\"OW w hat happe ned to mak e sorting qu icker is tha t yo u han: a set of g:lug(.'s and if the shot goes th rou gh the g:IUW':. then it wo n't gL't stuc k in the: bar re l o f the gu n,' Refit ted in 15.36. JIm)' Rose d isting uish ed he rse lf in numerous battles aga inst the Fren ch fleer a nd was co ns ide red o ne o f the most adv anced fightin g ships o f he r time . He r e nd ca me o n
Sunday . )<) july 15·iS. when a French fleet of so me 225 hea vily ar med vesse ls launched an att ack o n Por tsmo uth , In the ca lm a nd still wat e rs of the Solem. oHm )' Nose was o ne o f the lead ing English ships that set ou t to repel the Fren ch attac k. Taking ad van tage of the offsho re bree ze . she manoeuvred on to a port tack to fire a broadside and , as she heel ed 10 the breeze . so meth ing went d ramaticall y wrong. \Vale r be ga n pouri ng in th rou gh her o pen sta rboa rd g un ports and wit hin minutes sh e 'd ca ps ize d a nd s unk, taking a ll hut for ty of th e es timated 700 me n o n hoard to a wat e ry grave. .\ Ion: Ih ~lI1 ·100 yelrs later, on 11 October 19~2. the hull of the .l ltlt)' Rose was raised in a miraculous recovery opera tion. She was retu rned to the very dockyard where she wa s bui lt all those years ago . and h;IS been prese rved o f the Tudor era .
~IS
a monume nt and a unique:time capsule of a warship
As Alexandra Hild rcd says. 'Ships like the .l1m y Rose we re the ultim ate weapon o f war in th e sixt eenth century. the l~rolOtyPC: for ban lcvhlps su ch as II~ IS \ ·;cl m:)'. Perhaps 111(.' h ig [iech nica ll move in the period between .11m) ' Rose and victory was being able to sta nda rd ize gun bores. a nd lxrrn-l. therefore being ab le 10 say thai you had twenty guns that all had ~- i nc h int ernal diameter.'
Through her d ose ass ociation with He nry VIII. ,\ftlt), Rose a lso introduced an ot her. very different and powerful. role that big-gun ships-of-war wou ld play in the futu re affai rs of state of maritime u.ulons. She became. truly. a sym bol of state - an embodimcm of the very miglu and majesty o f the nation whose nag she proudl y flew. Prom here on. wa rshi ps bega n 10 represent . in thei r \"(,.'1) ' size a nd nature. a statement for riva l natio ns 10 admire and he fearful of, And so ~1I1 unprecedented game of international one-upmanship began be tween rival nations. to desig n. build and boast the most powe rful ha llie fl e e ts in existence, ,\fll!), Rose an d he r sis te r ships were. in many W.lyS, the foundat io n of a marit ime d ynasty that would influe nce world affairs for we ll over three ce ntur ies.
In the follow ing 200 years the fighting ship continued to e vo lve . cu lminating in the ship-o fthe -line . two- and three-deck ships car rying, in so me insta nces. we ll over 100 canno ns , In the age of sail. these we re the 1110st fearso me and powe rful ships-of-war ever to pUI to se a , As g re at
The wa rship , Mary Rose, leaving Portsm outh Harb our in summer
1545. as p ortrayed in this pain ting by W.H. Bishop.
15
T ilE H ,' T TI ES Il IPS
empires eme rged with vast co lonial Inte rests. the: role: and stre ng th o f navie s became critical in the surviva l and prospe rity of a ll the ma ritime nations. Brita in a p peared to ho ld the up pe r hand in the number of its figh ting shi ps. bu t even this great fleet was a lways unde r challe nge . The Spanish. Po rtuguese . Dutch and Fren ch had all built powe rful colon ial e m pires. and their naval forces were co nside red a threat to any e ne my fleet that dared ch alle nge thc ir right to passag e . Victories in nav al batt les agai ns t the Dut ch in the early pa rt o f the se ve ntee nth centu ry co nso lida te d Britai n's dominance of the Englis h Cha nnel a nd the No rth Sea . Furth er so uth . relation s with France remained a 'lo ve-hate ' affair. te mpe red for short peri ods by interma rriage be tween the ro yal families o f both nat io ns. an d at o the rs inflam ed by religio us differ en ce s an d dee p-roo ted jealo us ies , lt w as a situat io n that one day wo uld lead to bille r wa r. And that time was not far o ff. In the ea rly part o f the eight ee nth century. alth o ugh the British Navy had the n um be rs part icularly in s hips-of-the-line - its vesse ls were by no mea ns the biggcsl or tec hnically the be st afloat. Its s hips-of-war were built un der strict reg ulatio ns wh ich. in ma ny ways . co nstrai ned thei r de velopment. The dimension s o f eac h class of wa rship were strictly con trolled. ca using grea t frustration to shipbuilde rs. naval architects and naval co mmanders alike . In the same period the ir co ntine nta l rivals . part icularl y the Fre nch . were allowed a free hand in de veloping their figh ting ships, Th is e nabled them to ta ke full ad va ntage o f scie ntific kno wled ge ava ilable at the time . and to buil d bigger. slightly faster a nd mor e stab le ships. The lower g un decks were able to be ma rginally high er above wat er-level an d there wa s more room on each of the g un decks a ma jo r advantage for the g un crews un de r baili e cond itions . The space did no t a llev iate the terrible black smoke given o ff hy the g unpo wder charges. hut it did give the CTe:W more room to wo rk, BUI what became evide nt in naval bat tles between British and foreig n llee ts was the superior quali ty o f British commande rs and their crew, They were bett e r tra ined a nd d isciplin ed. and the ir gunne ry s kills were far su perior to those o f rival nat io ns. And alth ou gh their shi ps may not have always been the ultimate in design . they were so lid . tried and proven fighting ships in the IX:M trad itions o f British design and wo rkmansh ip. The same co uld he sa id abo ut the ir guns. T he Seve n Years \Var ( 1756- 63 ) cert a inly es tab lishe d the domina nce the British Navy ove r its f re nch rivals. In naval ca mpa igns initiated unde r di rect ives issued h y \X'i1 liam Pitt the
or
Elde r. in the Med iterranean. Ind ia , Nov a Scot ia, Canada a nd eve nt ua lly off the Fren ch Atlanti c coast at Qui bcro n Bay. the British Navy sou nd ly de feated Fre nc h baul c tlcct s to e me rge the domina nt wo rld na val powc r. So convincing wa s its victo ry at Q uilx-ron Bay that it q uashed any further immediate challe nge by the French to Britain's heg em o ny o f the sea , Ho weve r, w ithin a s ho rt s pace o f time the xituat lon cha nged dramatica lly. Rebe llion in the British North American colonie s tr iggere d the Ame rican \'Var o f Independence . In 177H thc French threw their lot in w ith the Ame rican s and , in the fo llowing year, Spa in joined w ith France in the wa r ag a ins t Brita in . In the sa me period . the Britis h col o nie s in North America . th e Ca rib bea n and Indi a we re a ll unde r attack . a nd a Fran co -Sp an ish inva sion of Brita in was co ns ide red a se rious th reat. Dislo catio n o f wo rld mar itime trade caused countries no t Involved in the conflict - Russia . De nmark. Swede n. Prussia . Holla nd . Port ug a l. Sicily and Austria - 10 fo rm ~1I1 Armed Ne utrality Pact to safeg uard the ir me rcha ntm en o n the high seas. Th e American \X'ar of Inde pe nden ce e nded in 17H3 w ith the defeat of the British fo rces , and the United States The three-dec k line-ot-battle ship , HMS Vict ory, Nelson 's flagship at the Battle of Trafalgar, now preserved at Ports mouth Dockyard .
estab lishe d as an inde pendent co untry. A de cade late r. fo llowi ng the Fren ch Revo lut iona ry \Va rs. Na poleon Bonaparte e merged to lead the fo rces o f the new French Republic o n a ram page throug h Europe . Pa rt of his grand stra teg ic p lan wa s also to remo ve the Britis h fleet from the Mediter ra nean, cutting o ff this vita l trade link with Ind ia. the treasure house of the British Emp ire, Bo na part e 's ultimate plan wa s
SDf B O I S O F
SJJP RDIAO'----
.:.._liiIIlI1il1l1lJ1~
17
T 1lE.JlAIIl.ESII.l.l!S
'As Victory passed through the enemy line, her po rtside guns op ened fire through the stern of the
Bucentaure causing som ething like 350 to 400 casualties. Our gunners would take between
ninety seconds and two minutes to fire and reloa d
a gun. :
to invade Eng land itsel f, hu t to achie ve th is he nee ded to co nt ro l the wa te rs o f the English Channe l. He boasted, 'Let LIS he maste rs of the Straits fo r six ho urs and we shall he maste rs of the world .' An alliance bet ween Fra nce and Spa in mad e this o therwise CIllPIY posturi ng into a po ten t threat ( 0 Britain .
The British Admiralt y fully understood the dan ger these massive naval fO f CL'S re prese nted the safety of England, and a large fleet, und er the co mmand of Vice-Admira l Ho ratio Nelso n. was mai ntai ned in the Med ite rran ean to keep a close eye o n the mo vemen ts of hot h the Fre nch a nd Spa nish fle e ts. Fo r seve ral years Ne lso n , in his fl ags hip f1 l\1S Victory, had sa iled the Med ite rranea n and Atlant ic trying to h ring th e Fre nch flee t to hattie , hut w ithout succes s. In Augu st 1805 Admiral Villene uve, co mmande r of the Fren ch flee t, slipped o ut of To ulo n through the Straits o f Gibral tar and into the Atlan tic to join fo rces wit h the Spa nis h Rca r-Adnural Mago n at Cad iz. But hy this time Bo naparte had lost pa tie nce w ith his navy and cancelled the pla nned invasio n of Brita in. I lis attention had turned eastwa rds, to wards Italy. Admiral Vill e ne uve the n received o rders to sail from Cad iz for the Med iterranean to su p port troop mo veme nts ncar Na ples " It wa s the mo ve tha t Ne lso n's fleet o f twe nty-seven line-o f-battle s hips, maintaini ng a distant block ade of Cad iz, had been wa iting for. O n the mo rn ing o f 20 Octo be r 1805, the co mbine d French a nd Spa nish flee t o f thirty-th ree s hips-o f-the-line , unde r th e co m ma nd of Admi ra l Villene uve , wa s c le a r of Cad iz, heading so uthwards , towards the Straits of Gibralta r. Forty-e ig ht miles westward . Nelso n wait ed un til they reache d the po int-of-no-ret urn from the sa fety of Cad iz harbour. Th e scene wus sci fo r o ne of the last o pe n-sea bat tles in th e e ra o f sa il - ce rta inly the most fam ous. Ne lso n had d iscusse d the tactic s for th is ine vitable battle with his capta ins so me time ea rlier. His hattie p lan wa s a radica l departur e from the ' Fig hting Instru ctio ns' issued by the Admira lty. These instructio ns d ictated that the s hips-of-the-line should he d ra wn up into a tigh t, single line which wo uld the n sa il in parallel past the e ne my's ow n line . In this fo rmat io n, the full weight o f the broadsid e 10
,:.._ IIiiIIlI• •
sn l1i ULS....O E..S~L\.CY..
would IX:' hrought 10 hea r on the e ne my line. It was a we ll-known and much rehea rsed tactic. In co ntrast, the 'Ne lso n To uch' ca lled for two British ha llie lines. no t o ne. saili ng paral lel to one ano the r and ~H an angle of almost 90 degrees 10 the enemy line . Ne lso n's pla n was that the two British lines would brea k up the single line of the Fre nch and Spanish Ol"C1S stretch ed before them, a nd that. S(";IUt:R"(I. the separate P~1I1S w ould IX:' overwh elmed in the ensuing 111C:1L~. This was a startling departure from accepted practice . and ;1 large part of its effe ctiveness d e pended o n Xclson"s conviction that his enemy would he taken hy surprise . On top o f the su rp rise d ement, xclso n made a gamble on the skill o f the o p posing flee ts. As Dr Eric G ro ve . 11:.1,"al stra tegist at the Un ive rsity o f Hu ll, says, 'TIle interesting thing about x c lso n 's tactics at Trafalgar is that lu- put himself into a posit ion which normally he wo uld ha ve tried to avo id . And th e re ason he did that was because he re al ize d tha t the French and Spanish fundamenta lly co u ld n' t s hoot straight. They cou ld n't even u tiliz e thei r guns within the very lim ited ranges that were technicall y possible .' French n ~I" ~1 1 historian Pro fesso r Philippe xtasson concu rs: 'The Fran co-Spanish firing was very s lo w and th eir a im was very h ad : Parr ly du e to th e military disorder ca used hy the Revolution. the French forces were po o rly tra ined a nd , hy Professor ,\ Iasso n's acco u nt , 'Th e En g lish gu nners we re three o r fou r times fast er at th e ir wo rk than th e ir Fre nc h o r Span is h co u nte rpa rts.' \'('o rsc still, 'Th e re was a tota l tick of co-ord ination in th e fleet: the Fre nch and Spanish ha d different p ract ice s. diff er ent p rocedu res. diffe rent signa lling codes - everyt hing was just Impr ovt scd at th e last moment.' \'('it h a ll thi s co n fusio n a lre ady a t p lay in th e e ne my 's ran ks , Ne lson's ta ctics w o rked spectacularly we ll, if no t q u ite as p lanned. \,(,he n Villeneuve I1 nally sighted Nelson, as ex pected. he tu rned his fleet a ro u nd to tb c no rth to head ha ck fo r th e safe ty o f Cad iz. \'('ith a ligh t no rthwe!"te rly b ree ze blowing in from th e Atlant ic, the British 11L'et , to w ind ward of th e ene my line , had the tactica l ndva ntugc , and the !"tage was sc i fo r the Battle o f Trafalga r. Pete r Goodwin, Kee pe r and Cura to r o f I L\I S Vic/VI)' at Port smo uth Nava l Dock ya rd , pa int!" th e pictu re o f the lxutlc fro m the perspective of tile lk itish flagsh ip . I I,\IS \ 'ic/o 1J ~ 'T he s h ip had cleared for action q ui te ea rly tha t day , a nd the men h ad been bea te n ld rummcd l to quarters so mew here arou nd about eleven o'c lock . All th e g uns were unlashed and prepared n....a dy for ba ttle . And the n comes the inevitable waiting game , Ihe e ne my arc d ose hy a nd you arc just wai ting and sailing into the m. As for the co mmand o f the ship, [Capta in] Hard y wo uld ha ve been o n the qua rter-deck co ntrolling the ship, steering, watching the sa ils, wat ching the enemy a nd wa tch ing the other sh ips a ro und him " And remember, ;111 these sh ips a rc going in line a head. Ne lso n himself wo uld have hee n a longside Ha rd y on the quarter-deck . as this is the co mma nd centre . An d these s hips w ould have been moving slo wl y - th e re w as n ot mu ch w ind , so it m ust have been even more ago n izing for these people. the te ns io n bu ilding up"TIley were movi ng
in :11 o ne a nd a half knots, and ther e in fro nt of them is th is wall of the e ne my. And it's around about half past e leven o r so thai the ene my stan firing
10
check the ir ranges. And
then you start ge lling a fe w sho ts co ming thro ugh the sa ils o n \,iC/o')', an d you get the re pea te d thud ~I S they begin to get the ir rang e an d home in . She's u nde r fire for co nstdc rab lc time as she J110ves in. And they can 't actua lly fire back bec ause th ei r gu ns are pointing to th e broadside and th e e nemy is in fro nt , so th ere's a fai r a mou n t of te ns ion. I know th at the Teme ra irc, w h ich was fo llo win g \';c/ o') ', was he g inn ing 10 d raw u p a longsi de and Ne lso n sa id so methi ng to Har d y a long the lines o f "Can yo u add o n more sam" lX'GllISC he wanted - an d th is is part o f Nels o n's characte r - to go into lxntlc fi rst , to le ad hi", men fo rw ard - so the vtctory surg ed ah ead. 'Abo ut 11.25, w h ile the y we re actu a lly the re o n th e q ua rter-d eck, Ne lson mad e h is sign al . l ie act uall y m ad e tw o s ig n a ls a nd h e sa id to Pasco e , w ho w as th e s ig n a l
•-----19
.. !
/
...
I
r
A decisive moment at the Battle of Trafalgar - HMS Victory is shown breakingthrough the enemy line on 21 October 1805
in this painting by Robert Taylor. ~
I
(Reproduced courtesy of the Military Gallery. Bath, UK.)
22
~.IIIIiIII.Il..
-':T II LJJAT I J.ES I U l!S
lieute na nt, "I wish to am use the flee rs wi th a sig nal, h ut ma ke it q uick fo r I ha ve another o ne to fly" - o r signal 10 make . And that is w he n the "England ex pects" signal was ho isted to the w ho le fl e et. And as soon as th at was com p lete d , the s ign al w as ha u led d o wn , a nd the sig nal o ne -six - to engage the ene my mo re closely - w as the n hoisted . and ther e it re mained at th e mizzen to psa il ya rd until sh ot away du ring the battle . As s he ca me clo se r to the [e ne my] s h ips , she wou ld h ave be e n o pe n-fired o n hy the Bnc enta urc, a nd the Redoumbte. She was ta king th e o ns laug ht o f all o f this w hich ca used a considerable numbe r o f casualties as she d osed. O ne bar -sho t from th e enelllY actu ally
to o k o ut eigh t mari nes w ho wer e stand ing in file o n the po o p d eck. You ca n imag ine all th is goi ng o n, h ut everybo dy having to remain ca lm and stay at their statio n un til the y go t w ith in range of the e ne my . 'As she ca me u p o n to the e ne my , she turn ed slightly to star board to mak e he r way be twee n the ste rn o f the Fre nch flags hi p Bnce nta nre a nd the ho w o f the Fren ch Nec!oll /ah/e. And then she turned slightly to po rt again to pu sh he r way th rough , a nd as she passed th rough the e ne my line , he r po rtside g uns o pened fire th ro ug h the ste rn of the tsuccntaure. The ste rn w as so d ose to the vtctory that the main ya rd of the l 'iclw )' cut th rou gh so me of the rigg ing o f the ga ff of the French flagshi p . In d istance. we arc talking sOI1H.-rhing like 3H feel (II. 5 metres] from the broadsid e o f l 'icI(1)' to the wi ndows o f the Bncentaure. You can imag ine the de vastat ing effec t of hoth the ()'i· poun ders an d the (1R.po u nd carronadc firing th ro ugh the stern with 500 mu sket halls a nd a (~- po u n d hall. Then every other gun o n the port side w hich had been dou ble o r tre ble [lo aded]. pa ssing th rou g h the wh ole length o f the Fre nch flagsh ip , causing so met hing like 350 to 400 casualties. And as she went through , he r sta rboard side C;II11e up close and collided with the Redc utuhlc and the two the n d rifted do w nwi nd in mo rta l co mb at , so 10 s pea k. ' It wo u ld ha ve be en con tro lled firing rat he r q uick success ive b roa dxidcs int o the e ne my s h ips . Bro adsid es , o u r g u n ne rs cou ld ta ke be twee n ninety seconds an d two m inutes to fire and reloa d a gu n. But natura lly, as the ha ttie p rogressed an d the casualties inc re ased , a nd so me wea pons p ut o ut o f act io n a lto gethe r, the pace o f fire wou ld d et eriora te th ro ugh o ut th e afte rn o o n. At the e nd of the d a y, \'icI OI) ' used so me thing like 7.6 IOns o f g u npo wd er. So multi p ly tha t h y th ree , a nd it'll g ive you a ro ugh idea th at s he 'd fired off so me th ing like 21 ton s o f shot , which w as on ly a s ma ll p ropo rtio n o f the 120 tons that s he ca rried o n hoard . That g ives yo u so me idea o f the fe rocity o f the ba ttle . and sho t that was used u p in abo ut fo ur hou rs.' By -ipm the hattie was e ffec tively over; and Britain was triu m ph a nt. Ye t ther e was traged y in tr ium ph for the victors: Nelso n had bee n cut do wn hy a French s nipe r du ring the hallie , a nd lived o nly lo ng enoug h to le arn that his tactics had succeed ed . He had wo n an e pochal victo ry fo r Britain. At the sa me time that Britain gr ieve d for Ne lson in victo ry, Fran ce too k hea rt in de feat. As Profe sso r Masson poin tedly ex plains , '111t.' Fre nch pe opl e were very pleased to lea rn of Nelso n's death - the y really lo athed Nelson, who had d efeated the French Navy at Abouchi r. People said that Nelson's death was well wort h the loss o f a sq uadron.' Unfo rtu nately for Villeneu ve , the defea te d com ma nder o f the fleet, th e d et ermi natio n of the Fre nch 10 mak e the most o f the ir small triumph d id no t exte nd to him. Villeneuve had ca rried the ho pes of the natio n, and had let the people d ow n badly. 111ey were not w illing to forg ive him. Professo r x tasson says: '[Napol eo n] thou g ht Villeneuve was a man \V 11O had luck on his side. w hen he learned that Villeneuve had waged a lxutlc and lost it, Napoleon hea ped CU f.sCS o n him via the Ministry for the Navy. And when poo r Villeneuve was freed an d carne hack from England , when he saw tha t he was he ing shu nned hy everyo ne , tha t ev en the Minister was rel uct ant to d e fend him, he to o k his own life . And so , of the two heroes o f that great ha ttie, o ne was killed in co mb at and the o ther died late r.'
1 1'< ..•..·-------23
• '='1'snUB» S OF S IIPREAl.A CY
The Hallie of Trafalgar was one of the
. --. _ .-....
1110 st
significant lxut les in naval histo ry and .
in th e e vo lutio n of the b.u tlcshtp. re pr e se nt ed o ne o f the fine st ex a m ples o f the ro le played hy big-gu n ships in the fort un es o f natio ns and, at times. en tire em pi res.
HMS VICTORY DIMENSIONS,
Had the re su lts nt Trafal g a r bee n re ve rse d , Na po leo n 's p la ns to in vad e Eng lan d may well han ' bcvn p ut hack o n the agenda w ith devasta ting res ults . II was also a DISPLAcEMEtrr, stunning e xample o r how. through insp ired leade rship. o utstand ing tactics and more CONSTRUCTION, d isciplined and bette r trained cre ws. a smaller fleet with far less fire po we r defeated an enclllY fl eet of higge r, faster a nd more heav ily armed ships. Eno rmo u s nati o nal pride wa s at sta ke at Trafa lga r. Fo r the Britis h people , the legacy o f the victo ry ClINIIAS, remains 10 this day, a glow ing pride in their Ro yal Navy a nd its achie vements - a ARMAMEtrr, t1gh ting force that shape d , and has continued to influence , the dest iny o f their small island na tion for over two ce nturies. If eve r the re WL'n.' a n exa mple of a 'banlcship' that beca me a symbo l of natio nal pride, it is s urel y 1IJ\IS \ 'icl (,,)' - still in commissio n in the Ro ya l Navy , beauti fully preserved an d rc :..to n-d . s he is the ultim ate e xam ple o f the power a nd ma jesty of a line-of-bat tle sh ip o f 100 guns - an eightee nth -century ancestor of the g reat lxrttlcshipx that we re to fo llo w. Ove r 260 years se parated Vi cIOI)' from ,lI(11)' Rose and altho ugh ho th s hips we re co nstructe d from W (XX l. powered hy w ind a nd sail. and had their main firepo wer co ming from side -mo unted canno ns, the re wa s a wo rld of diffe re nce in their size a nd ca pab ility. \ 'iCIOI) ' was 226,5 fee t in le ngth overall. displ ace d 3:;00 IOns o f wa te r and carncd -t ac res of ca nvas un der full sa il. He r (fCW numb ered around H50 me n. He r a rma me nt was a rranged o n three gun decks an d totalled 102 cast-iro n. muzzle -load ing cannon firing s ho t of be twee n 12 an d .~ 2 pounds. At this time , round s ho t from a 32-po under co uld he fired for mo re than a mile - a ltho ug h it!'> de structive power, of co urse , wus gr c. uc st at close range : then, a ca nno n IXIIl o f thi s size co uld smas h thro ug h mo re tha n 2 feet of so lid timbe r. Add itio na lly, Victory ca rried two ca rro nadcs. a s ho rtrange wea po n ca pable of firing a massive (lH- po und p roje ctile to de vastating e ffect . But apart from :-iizc a nd firepo we r, \';clm)' was not really qualit atively diffe ren t in e ither design o r de velopm en t from the .\llII)' Rose, built more than two an d a half ce nturies earlier, A:-i Colin \X'hite , Deputy Director o f the Ro yal Naval Muse um. Portsmouth explains:
'The J Im ) ' Nose and he r type o f h ig-gu n sh ip ma rked a h ig revol ut io n in the sto ry of ship desig n. But then-after. the de velo pment of the warship was really q uite slow . So slow indeed that a sailo r from the .l Im )' Ruse could han : go ne o n hoa rd the 1';eI0l )' nea rly 250 years later, ami afte r about, say , a co up le o f hours gett ing acqu ainted w ith he r. would have been f~l i rl)' at hom e . The tech niq ues tha t he would have had to use . bot h 10 sai l the ship and to fight he r. we re very much the same . Ho we ver. a sailo r fro m the ViC/OI)' goi ng on hoa rd a ship just Ion years late r wou ld ha ve bee n totall y o ut o f place . Co mp lete ly diffe re nt met hods or propulsio n. huge g uns po wered hy hydraul ics - e veryth ing would have be en unfa miliar, And so there was, in a sense . a pe riod of stability be tween the JIm )' Nose a nd the \';CI Of) '. The re we re ch an ges of co urse. hut the )' we re mostly s mall a nd
detailed , '111e 1'ictorv' re present s, if yo u like , the fina l pe ak of battles hip design that started wit h .l Imy Nuse.' The im me di ate o utco me o f Trafa lgar wa s the qu as hing o f an y fut ur e ho pe s Fran ce had o f invadin g Britain. The victory a lso co nfirme d the Ro yal Navy's do minatio n of the se a . a nd the Britis h we re the n a ble to ope rat e . u nc ha lle nged - eve -n in Fra nce 's own ha c k ya rd , the Mcd lrcnunca n. Ten yea rs later, Na po leo n Bon aparte 's military rampa ge fina lly ca me to a ha lt and a peace se llled throug hout Euro pe which lasted fo r O\'L'r fifty yea rs.
ll6F1 6IN ¥ sl Fi 6IN ¥ l lFi 6IN (69 ¥ 16 ¥ 6SMJ
3,00 TONS OA~ , ELM, FIR/ PINE; HULL cOPPE RSHEArHED 't ACRES 10l cASr-IRON CJWNON, RANC.INC. FROM Il- TO 32-POUNDER,;; e ¥ 66POUND cARRONADES 6,0 (APPRO¥)
•
al to
team 00 to tee I
n th e peace that fo llo wed Tra falgar, whil e Euro pea n nati ons co nso lida ted the ir co lonial emp ires, the development of the battleshi p took o n a new momentum, p arti cu larly in Britain , Dr Eric Grove o f
the Unive rsity of Ilull ex p lains : 'In the years afte r 1815, th e power o f th e sa iling line -o f-batt le ships gr eat ly increased , w ith changes in armament, he avie r ca lib re a rmame nt, great imp ro ve me nt in th e way th e guns a re used , a nd th e es ta b lish me nt o f th e gun ne ry sc hoo l at HMS Excellen t in th e 1830s. By aro und 1840-50 the British battle fleet was a much mor e e ffective instrum en t. It co uld shoot accuratel y at ran ges perh aps of a nauti ca l mile , w hereas in Ne lso n 's tim e , th e ran ge had o n ly be en about 200 yards . So we 're talking about an increa se from 200 to 2000 yards , a trem endou s increase . And th is increase in firepower, co upled with an assumption that we co uld always defeat an equal oppone nt, meant that Britain was accepted as the domina nt naval power in the nineteenth ce ntury.'
As the wooden. sai l-powered wars hips of the wor ld's navies rea ch ed new peaks in size and destructive efficiency . smoke fro m th e new industrial age was slo wly Ix:g in ning to drift across
sh ipya rd..; where. w ith adze. saw and chisel. master crafts me n had bee n b uildi ng great
n~·s."L'1s
of
The world 's first ironclad, the French Gloire designed by Depuy de Lome. The appearance of this
wood fell' ce ntu ries, -11K ' age.' (If ,-.tt..":.II11. and the.' myriad o f new technologies that crea ted the Ind ustrial
ship created a stir in Britain and
Revolution. heralded the great est q uamum lea p in the evolutio n of the: battleship. New developments
promp ted fears of a 'steam
in the science o f meta llurgy created material for shipbui lding at a time whe n the great o ak forests
invasion '.
of Britain and Europe we re almost finished and demand for h iM er. stro nger hulls was reac-hing new heights. Ne w me:ta ls a nd machine ry provided g un -ma ke rs w ith th e mat e rial and the
t111'~II1S
to
produce \\'eapo ns o f destruct io n. alm ost witho ut limitatio n of size and po wer. The art of tTt::.lIing dini:re:m forms of sh(,.·lls and Illis...;iles for the ne w guns was perf ected and this. in tum. challenged ship builders to ovate hulls that co uld w ithstan d a ba rrage o f these new-form. destruct ive missiles. And StC:;l111 gave rise to a new fo rm o f pro pu lsi on th at wo ul d soo n se c s a ils. masts a n d rigging d isappear com pletely. As Coli n \"'h ite.: o f Port s mout h's Ro yal Nava l xt uw um puts it: 'Th e real cha nge
I h ~1l
re volution ized nava l warfa re: was. o f course. the introductio n of
stea m pr o pu lsion . just as it revo luti oni zed a ll o ther aspect s o f society. Once it wa s possible to p ropelle r a s h ip witho ut having to worry about wh ich d irecti on the wi nd was in . all so ns of po ssihilitie:s came into p lay. It was rea lly th e development o f the
S{(.>~l111
e ng ine.: and its ap p lication to th e sh ip hu ll that mad e the grea t cha nge. O f co urse it wasn 't e asy to a p p ly stea m power to p ropell ing a s h ip . xtany d ifferent methods w e re tried. h ut it wasn 't unt il the inve ntion of th e screw propeller and its successfu l application to warsh ips th at stea m powe r rea lly became a goer as far as nuvul ve sse ls were co nce rned :
In I XI ; a liule American ship. Sarannab. fitted wit h an auxil iary steam engine. made
GLOIRE DIMENSIONS,
the first successfu l steam-dr ive n lT ossing of (he Atlantic O cea n. Com mercia l ship ping Z"FT 61N (WATERLINE) ~ "FT 91N ~ Z7FT lOIN (77.66 ~ 16.99 ~ 6.;6MJ
DISPLACEMEwr, >630 TONS CONSTRUCTION, HULL OF WOOD, IRONCLAD HORlLOwrAL RETURN, COMPOUND, Z,OOHP
PROrRTION , CREW,
13 ~N0T5 36 ~ 6.;-INCH (163-MMJ RIFLED, MUULE-LOADING GUNS BELT, U,IN (IZOMMJ ,70 (APPROV
lines q uickly ad opted the new tech nolo gy h UI. as po p ular o pi nion wou ld have it. the Britis h Ad mi ralty we re slow to foll o w suit Thi s id ea is hOl ly de nied hy David K. Bro w n - ret ire d De- p ut y Ch ie f Nava l Archi tect o f the Ro ya l Co rps o f Nav a l Co nstructo rs - w ho also pro vides an e ndorsement for the slIcn 'ss o f the ear ly. and reaso nably s ma ll. armed nava l paddle wh e clc rs . As he te lls it : 'By IHZ.3, the)' [the Admiralt y] s ta rted o n a re gu lar p ro g ramllle of h uild ing ste a m h~lI tl L' sh i p s a nd hI' IH30ish, the paddl e wars hip wa s an effectiv e figilling s hip . II is q uite unt rue 10 say tha t admi ral s d idn 't app ro ve o f th e se . All the co rrespo nd e nc e [rece ive d h y the Admiralty]. p:.nt icul arly fro m the Medit e rran ean. was to se nd mo re steamers.' Altho ug h ther e was no lon g-te rm futu re fo r padd le -d rive n wa rs hips, so me that we re bu ilt were d eplo yed as tugs to p ull large th ree-deck line -o f-battle shi ps into firing posi tion s - a method of man o e u vring used wit h a g rea t d ea l o f SlKl'<:SS in th e Crimea n 'xur o f IHS4- 6 . This co nflict, be tween the Russian fo rce s a nd the combin ed British, French , and Turkis h
developed she lls fired for the first time in wa r. The ...tart o f the Crime a n W~l r ca n he trace d ha ck to the Russian e ncr o ach men t o n Tu rkis h te rritory in lB53. In Nove mb e r of that year at Stno pc . a small force o f ...ix Russian line-of-hallie ships, eq uip ped with (~- po u n de rs ca pable of firing she lls rat he r than ca nnon halls. an nihilated a small Tur kish sq uadron, Altho ugh she lls had lx..-. cn in existe nce for so me time , this battle graph ically demon strated their destructive power. Several Turki sh vess els had bee n very q uick ly set alig ht and blew up , Up u ntil thai time can no ns mostly fired so lid ma ter ial, such as iro n. These much more so phisticated new p ro jectiles were metal cas ings filled with explosive w hich ex ploded o n impact. Ar the bo mbardmen t o f Se vasropo l in the Crimea , the comb ined Britis h a nd French flee r w itnessed the e ffectiveness of these Russian she lls, To co unte r this fo rm o f dead ly ne w weapo n. bo th coun tries se t abo ut the cons truction of flo ating gun plat form s p rot e cted hy armo ur plates
·1 inches ( 100 rnm ) th ick . These platform s. o r batter ies. eq uipped with stea m e ng ines provid ing a s peed o f 4 kn ot s. were ma no e uvre d h y s te a m lu gs a nd use d 10 o ve rw he lm the Russ ia n fo rtress at Od essa . It ra pid ly became dear that the wrought -iron a rmo ur used o n the ba tteries could ea sily wit hstan d bo th Russian Sl101 a nd she lls. Th e s uccessful use o f ho th ex p losive shells a nd a rmour-p lated batte ries in (his wa r was to have g rc.u influe nce o n the fut ure design o f the mod e rn bat tleship. \'(' ith e\ 'ef)' ne w tech nol ogy that im p rov ed the q ualily a nd range of metal s. and wi th the scie nce of ex plosives develo pi ng ha nd- in-h and wit h the creat ion o f h igge r a nd mo re po w e rful missiles , the po w e r a nd s ha pe o f the lxutlcxhip was about [ 0 und e rgo a re mark able mct.un orph os ts into the most awesome weapo n o f destruct io n in Ihe histo ry o f mankind . Alte r the end o f the Crimean \'\-'ar in lH56. it did not take lo ng fo r the brief en ten te bet we en the Bri tish an d French to e nd, Soo n the two lo ng-lime pror ocateurs were at il again, this time b rought about hy the revolution in naval architecture and the introd uction o f new tech no log ies. As long as the e ra o f wooden sailing s hips co ntinued. Britain's rival na tions a ll seemed resig ned tha t the Ro yal Navy did indeed mil" the wa ves. '111l' Battle of Trafalga r had es tablished that . o nce and for all. Ho we ve r, the introd uctio n o f new technologies created an e ntirely new d imension in the buildin g (If flgilling ships. Whe n it came to steam. iron o r steel. or the ne'" scie nce o f ex plosives. no co unt ry - no t e ve n Britain - had any g reater depth o f kn o w ledge Ih ~1Il an y ot he r. The natio ns were a ll stat1ing fro m scratch. Almost overn ight, ce ntu ries of traditio nal shipbuilding tec hn iq ues and nava l Sl r~ lll'gy we nt o ut the window. It was the mom ent in histo ry thai the Fren ch had been wa iting for. They co uld not de feat the British d uring the age o f sa il b ut pe rhaps, if they were fi rst to embrace
these new tech no log ies. they cou ld I1.Ile supre me in the age o f stea m and iron . In !\.Jarch I H~. the French I'\a\)' placed an o rder for fo ur ironclad b attleships. to he built 10 the design
-=-.'· ....-
-1Oii11..._
SAIl TO ST Er\\l-=-..W..UOU TO STEE l rL ICL£ll.U
of their chie f 11:.1\';,11 nrcl utcct . I x.: p U)' til" Lome . Th e fiN o f these. Gloirp. \\'~L" completed in t H60. Jl\O(
:.I
part icularlv handsome ship. C/oi,.£, had a 1>L'1t of wroug ht iron 4.7 inches ( 120 111m) thick exte nding down hoth sid es of the hu ll to a de pth of 5 Icct ( I ..i lmetres ) 1 ~I ()w the wa terl ine . Her armament
<.:on."i-.tt..."ll of thirty-six 6.-i-indl ( 16311un) rifled . muzzle-loading guns arranged on gu n decks down either
side. Altho ugh fully riggl.'tl for sa il. she had simp le co mpo und engines of 2SOJ ho rsepower co nnected to a pro pelle r shah . Unde r power, she could steam ut an impres sive 13 knots. French plans e nvisaged :.I total o f thin}' o f this new class o f ship, which they hop ed wo uld w in
SlIprt.:'Ill:l C )'
for the Fre nc h Navy. O f these , te n we re to he comple ted w it hi n e ig h te e n
mon ths . Itowcvcr. restrictio ns in French iro n manufact ur ing capacity di cta ted that th ree of these fo ur new ships . including C /o;,.e, had h ul ls bu ilt of wood. O nly one, Couranne. had a hu ll bu ilt o f iro n . Ho wever. the Hritish ha d also been d evelopi ng plans for ironclad warships. as David Bro w n explains: '\"\'t....d been loying wit h the hig armoured warshi p for :-i()I11C time h ut it was not o u r policy 10 lead. To change 10 iro n warsh ips wou ld mak e o ur ex isting sh ips useless . so we held O UT
ha nd kno wing thai British ind ustry was so far superior to French industry that anything
Ihey d id we could ma tch very qui ckl y. C/oire was a terrible erro r o n the pan o f the Fren ch, W'e 'd been fighting the huilding race with the French o n wooden ste um wa rships a nd the French had kepi pace wit h o ur bu ilding . By changing to the new technology of iro n and ar mo ur. Fre nch ind ustry just could n't co pe. and they lo st.' Th L' a ppeara nce o f C /u jr £' inflam ed British sus picions and overstated fear s 01' :1 Fren ch 'steam inva sion'. Th is situa tio n caused pla ns fo r the building o f a British iro nclad to h e immediat e ly stepped up , and two new iro nclad wa rs hips. \\'fl177'or an d Btacls Prince. we re h uilt. Strictly, th ey were a rmed frig:lIL's , hut thei r radi ca l d esi gn , inco rpo ra ting till.' late st state-of-the-a n led 1l10 10g ics o f th e- tim e . p roved in va lua ble in th e d evelopment of all future batt leships. Th e first of these. 1\"(1177'01: appeared in 1H6I. and her siste r shi p , ltlacl: Prince. a p.:ar later. 11K'ir appt..·:IT:.mCt..· in the English Chan nel tota lly destroyed the brief 1110l11cnt of naval s uperiori ty Iht..· French had enjoyed w ith the launch o f Gtotre. David Brown says of \\'t I1TI or. 'ShL' was a tre me ndous adva nce o n an ythin g th ai had gone befo re. She was mu ch faster tha n Gloiro, much more heavil y armed. slightly superior armo ur. She wa s a re ma rkable s h ip . Sh e 'd go t :111 so rts o f n e w id ea s. There was a little blast furna ce in the boil e r room
10
p roduce mo lte n iro n wh ich wou ld IX' pUI in hollow sho t an d tired at the e nelllY
to sp latte r th em w ith ho t mol te n iro n . She'd .fo rced ve nt ilatio n to th e g u ndcck
10
h low
th e s mo ke away . She'd gOI hand-ope rate d wa shi ng machin es in the lau nd ry. a nd mo st Hritixh s h ip:-; o f \"\'orl d \Var Tw o d id n 't ev en have a la u ndry. She wa s. he rsel f. evolutionary. \,,\ '(,"d had the armou red s hip be fore . we'd had stea m p ropeller-d riven :-;hips before. There was lill ie absolu te ly new technol ogy. It was th e package th at was new. So I refer to U" ln l or us an evolutionary sh ip that triggered a revolutio n.' A handsome sh ip ,j 10 fee t ( 12H metres) long o ve ra ll. \\'tln l ur d isplaced o ve r 9000 tons a nd ca rried an armament of le n IIQ-pounders, four 7Q-po u nde rs and twenty-six (>H-pou nders, 111e:-;e guns were a mixtur e of muzzle-loa d ers and th e latest. rifle -barrel led. b reech-loadi ng g un:-; fro m the Armstrong arma ment factory that fired th e latest designed shells. Un like Glotre, her hull wus bu ill e nti rely of iron . Toda y l\"(l n·i o r. beau tifully re sto red to her origin a l stale . is o pen to the public ut Po rtsm ou th Nava l Dockya rd , Anot her ma jor ste p in th e deve lopment o f the batt leship was thL' introd uction o f the tu rret g u n, and it took pla ce thousan ds of miles away . on the o the r sid e o f th e Atlan tic d u ring th e
•
_
27
/
,
\
.: The British reply to the French
Ame rican Civil \'\'ar of 1861-;. The turret gun was not a new idea and. as a concept. it had been
ironclad Gloire, Warrior was an
in development in Britain and Europe for some time. what the Civil \'\'ar provided was the opportunity to test it under battle conditions. When the Southern States seceded. the hulk of
altogether more capable and elegant warship. She is now preseNedatPortsmou~
Dockyard.
the ships and the major dockyards o f the US ~a\'Y remained in Northern hands. Blockaded ~~1\1' was forced to o perate within its \"cry limited ind ustrial
by these ships. the Confederate
base with regard 10 ordnance. armour. marine engineering and shipbuilding. The cha lle nge to break this blockade saw tw o major innovations in naval warfare emerge. firstl y. the
Confederate :s'a\T hastily encased the burnt-out hull of a wooden steam frigate. stcrmnoc. in armour. TIle result was a bizarre low-freeboard. floating battery with eight c -inch (218-mm) and two 7-in<.:h (l78-mm) rifled shell guns mourned o n the br oadside. HMS WARRIOR protruding through armour-protected gun ports. She was renamed CSS Virginia. This strange-looking craft was designed specifically 10 run the gauntlet. through a DIMENSIONS, 'tZOFT CO\'ERI4..U Y ,8FT 'tIN Y Z6FT wall of fin:' from shore-mourned artillery. enabling her to set about the destruction C1Z8 Y 17.78 Y 7.9ZM} of wooden warships manning the blockade. DISPLAcEMENT, 9137 TONS Aware of this development. the US l'.'a\"y accepted a design for an e ve n more CONS11l\X.T1ON, IRONCLAD CHI.ll OF radi cal ironclad from John Ericsson. a Swedish-horn engineer and inventor living IRON} in America . Ericsson's solution was the s tonttor. to all intents and purposes an MAcHINERY, HORILONTAL TllUNK, ,Z67HP armoured. steam-propelled raft ca rrying two I I-inch (1&)-mm) smooth-bore guns. SPEED, I'tKNOTS These guns. the largest in existence at the time. were housed in ~I rotating iron turret ARMAMENT, 10 Y 1I0- POUNDER; 10 feet (6 .1 me tres) in diameter and 9 feet <2.74 me tres) high. weighing 161 IOns. 't Y 70-POUNDER; Th e sig nifica nce of the turre t lay in us ability 10 he aimed in any direction Z6 Y 68-POUNDER irres pective of the direction of the ship. \,\'ilh a freebo ard o f on ly I foo t (305 nun), PROTECTION, BELT, 't.sIN CII'tMM} s tonttor loo ked every b it as biza rre as he r Confederate oppone n t. CREw, 707 (APPRO¥.> O n 8 M arch 1862 , the ne w ly named Virg inia prove d her wo rth b y eas ily
S.A..IJ IO SI.E.iUL -=--'>\C.Ill:lliJ:.tL.5.:rEU
-'.a. _..1II1
1ai"'-~ 29
destroying two Federa l frigates in the wa te rs of Hampton Roads. at the ent rance of Chesa pe ake Bay on the cast coast of Ameri ca . On the foll o w ing da y, stonttor ar rived to c ha lle nge the Confederate vessel. Action began an d rage d inco nclusively for over three ho urs. but neith er ship was able 10 penetra te the ot her's a rmo ur a nd eventual ly both vessels with drew, virtually intact. For th e mom e nt, iro ncl ad vessels a ppeared invu lne rab le. a nd it w as clea r that the future of effective fighting ships d epe nded on improveme nts in guns and the project iles they fired. The
success of the turret-mo unted gun he ralded a new era in the layo ut of hig guns in ba ulcxhips. The days of fixed g uns mou nled in decks runn ing the length o f the ship were numbered. Ho weve r, the success of bot h these he a vily a rmou red fig hti ng sh ips a lso de pe nd ed o n a numbe r of other factors, each signposting the way fo rw ard for the design of future warsh ips. Bo th vessels relie d enti rely o n the ir engines - hot h were heavily a rmo ured w ith guns and a ll pro pulsion machinery p rot ected fro m e ne my she lls - and ne ithe r had an y fo rm o f ma sts o r riggin g to rest rict the work ing of th e shi p unde r b attle cond itio ns. o r the arc of fin: th e g un s co uld o pera te on. II mUM a lso be sai d th at both vesse ls we re des ign ed fo r use o nly in th e protected wa te rs of Hampton Roads. They we re strictly ca lm-wa te r fig hting ships. and tota lly unsu itable for usc in th e o pe n se a. Fo r b lue -wa ter banleshtps the re was still a lot o f developme nt to ta ke p lace befo re they wou ld incorpo rate the in nova tions these tw o Civil \'\'ar fighting ships ha d used so effectively . Throughout Ihe IH70s and l HHOs in Brita in a nd Europe, a bew ilde ring range of des ign s was p rodu ce d in a n att empt to find a way o f reconc iling new a nd e me rging te chnol ogi es wi th th e realities of sail powe r. \X'hile masts a nd rigging rema ined an ess ent ial clem ent of the ship's p rop ulsio n syste m, Ihe 1110 ve awa y fro m the broadsid e-mo unt ed g uns to inco rpo rate the
Officers of the US Navy stand on
turret princip le created enormo us problems.
revolving turret , 9 July 1862.
the deck of Monitor beside her
E BArn ESIIII'S
Although stea m po we r was in th e ascendan cy. it w as not unt il tile IHHOs tha i s te a m ma ch inery w as co ns idered re liabl e e noug h to a llo w sa ils a nd thei r associ:lle d rig 10 be d ispensed w ith e ntirel y. By the n , scie ntific methods had beg un to p l:J y :1 g rea ter role in the d es ign o f sh ips a nd o rd nan ce , as we ll a s in the ma tc rinlx used in co ns truc tio n , Nava l a rch itecture , lo ng a rule -o f-thum b activity . increa sing ly be came g uide d by sc ie ntific methods o f inves tiga tio n, In th is same pe riod . the baste mat e rials use d in s hip construction \ H .·!"L' he ing refined a nd perfected. Steel was be ing prod uced in g reate r q uantities and rapid ly re placed iron as the pr emie r shipbuild ing mater ial. Po litica lly, d uring the last ha lf of the IHOOs, the wo rld appear ed to he going throug h a stagl' of rea sonable stab ility. The United States w as alread y a po we rful. yo ung ind ustrial nation. with see mi ng ly boundless natural reso urces, and a populatio n growi ng hy the day due to the largest wa ve of im mig ratio n in gloha l histo ry . Unificatio n o f the Germa n Sta tes in IH7 1 crc.ucd a » e m p ire that would , indeed , ro ck the world as it be come a majo r p layer in world affa irs - a po werful maritime natio n that wo uld e mbrace the battleshi p as a key o ffen sive weapon in its q uest fo r g loha l su p rc macy . Japa n had mo ved from being a collect ion o f feuda l stntcs w ith thc J\lciji Restora tio n in IH6B w he n Impe rialja pan e merged. so o n to take its place as the k':lding natio n in Asia, and a pot e ntia l world po we r. Fran ce , unde r the rule of Na po leo n III (n e p he w o f Na po leo n Bo napa rte ). a pa rt from defe a t in a s ho rt w a r wi th Prussia . ha d ex pe rience d reaso nab le prosperi ty, and a period o f no n-aggressio n w ith its o ld en emy o n the o the r silk, of the Englis h Channel. And Britain remained the do mi na nt world po wer. During the reig n of Q uee n Victo ria , the British Em pire basked in prosperity as the largest and most powe rful e m pire in histo ry. British facto ries w ere the works ho p o f the world . he r me rchant s hips carried the hul k o r the world 's ca rgoes. and her Ro yal Navy co ntinued to rule the wa ves - a glo hal det e rre nt 10 any natio n that wou ld clare cha llenge a ny part of her vast co lo nial em pire. Andrew 1.:.II11he I1 . nava l historian at King's Co llege , Lo ndon . e mphasize s the po litical import ance of navies at this tim e: 'Th rough out the nine tee nth centu ry, the British Ro ynl Navy was the sing k most po we rful polit ica l instrume nt on the face of the e arth . Its abil ity to mo ve a nd o pera te globall y was q uite un iq ue . The problem fo r the Royal N:l\'Y th ro ugh out th is ce ntury wa s that its main functio n was nOI to fight, hut to deter the challenge of rival po wers - to e nsure that war d id no t occur. Britain is a g loba l tradin g power, he r inte rests are peace. stability, good terms fo r co m me rce . So the ro le o f the navy is 10 essentially pre vent o the r navies. ot her nati on s, challe ng ing Britain 's hege mo n y o f the wo rld o utside Europe a nd the ir a hility to co ntro l its co mme rce . In the late I ~Os and into the UNO!'i , a numb e r of nat io ns eit he r re built o r buil t navies with power - po litical objects - in mind . The best kno wn am o ng these w as the Unite d Sta tes, w hic h rebu ilt its mo rib und navy; Japan . w hich cre ated a navy; Ge rman y, w hich revitalized a hith ert o smal l coasta l de fe nce navy: a nd even the Russia ns. w ho'd rathe r 10 Mthc ir navy o n severa l occasio ns. go t hack into battle -fleet naval co ns tru ctio n . The battles hi p as a n instrum en t, a nd the battle fl eet as a conce ntra te d symbo l o f po we r. became absol utely critica l to inte rnat ional and great powe r rela tion s. 'All na tio ns w ho too k th e msel ve s se rio us ly had ha u lcs hi ps. So me o f them . o f course, we re rather s mall batt leshi ps , but most o f the ma jo r po we rs bu ilt b rgl·. oce an g< >ing bat tles hi ps.' By the e nd of the ce ntury. the batt les hip had go ne throug h so ma ny stages of de velopment that a sailo r fro m, say. Wflrrior - o nly fort y yea rs befo re - would have ha rdl y recog nized the se new and im me nsely mor e powe rful cap ita l sh ips. No r would this sa me sa ilo r ha ve kno w n o f the we a pons cap ab le of deslro ying th ese flew b reed o f wars hips: the mag ne tic mine . the self-
1_
propelled torpedo and 11lL' subma rine . The de velopme nt o f these dea d ly \H:apons happe ned in parallel wit h th e tran sformati on o f the fightin g s h ip from wood and sa il, to ste a m and steel. As eac h flew wea po n w as perfecte d. th e: a rmo ur a nd d efen ce o n fight ing s h ips were im p ro ved to thwa rt th e new w ea po n 's e ffective n ess. Thi s in tu rn c ha lle n ge d the sc ie ntists
The battle be tween USS Monitor and CSS Virginia (ex-Merrimac) on Hampton Roads on 9 March 1862 raged for hours with neither
an d t.'n ginl..'L'rs to invent eve n deadlier and more destructive..• weapo ns. It was a self-pe rpetua ting
vessel able to penetrate the
p rocess a nd , with eac h devel o p me n t. the e vol ut io n o f the battl esh ip re ached a no ther stage in
armour of the other.
th e pursu it o f
oCL'~In -go i ng
invi ncibi lity a nd ultimate power . •\I asts a nd rigg ing di sappeared as
giant steam-powered e ng ines. d riving tw in p rope lle rs, pushed th e hu g e steel juggernaut s. in ~my
weath er. at speeds o f J5 kn o ts an d mo re .
The she er wei g ht of armour plate: necessa ry to prot ect a ship e nt irely from s hells. torpedo . mine and. mu ch later. air att ack. posed e normous design pr oblems for the naval architects. Fro m the ea rliest days, the a nswer was to restrict a rmour p lating to the most vul nerable areas of th e hull a nd s uperstruct ure . Thi s localized p ro te ction re s ulted in the development of an 'armo ured 1J<..'1 t' cove ring . part icularl y. a mids hips w he re the s hi p's mag azines a nd th e e ng ine rooms were usu all y loca te d . Th is 'bel t' was de sig ned to fit secu rely o ve r the o utside o f the ship's hull. in special recessed areas incorporated in its design . an d was fitted to (he ship after it had been launch ed . In response to guns of increasing fXJ\ver, the type of metal used and the thickness of the be lt was under co ntinual developm ent. For example , by the end of the: IH(>Os wrought-iro n arm o ur had reached a thickn ess 01'9 inches (22H mm ) o n ships ca rrying lQ..inch (2"'\ -mm) mu zzle-loading guns. By IH75 the turret ship (ea rly battleship} Derastation
fitted with an armo ured be lt 12 inches structure 10-1 2 Inches (254--305 rum ) thick. In lAAl the masted turret ship 1I1j le.\i hle c.'.arried a main ar mament of four J6-inch (406-mm) W :l S
ems nun ) thick. o n to p of w hich was an additio nal armo ured
guns mounted o n a citadel mad e up of 'co mpo und' iron rangi ng from 16 to 24 inche s (406 to 6 10 nun ), the latte r he:ing the thickest armo ur eve r fitted in a battlesh ip at any time . 'Co mpo und ' armo ur was the prod uct of a d ifficult a nd co m plex process in w hich a wrought -
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W;lSOil gu n-m.rkcr-, to produce welpons o f gn.:all.' r hining nnd penetrative power. T his res ulted in a number o f improvements relati ng to propellant s. shells a nd o \"l,..ru ll gun de sign. Th e d e structive powe r o f Ihe nava l gu n cha nged d ra m.n tcallv between the era of line -o fha llie sh ips su ch as Victo ry; and the introduction o f th e: iro n and (he n xtcc l hatt lesh ip s o f th e late tHOO.. . . Hut be-fo re goi ng furth e r int o that story. it seems ap p ro priate to offer a brief a nd rel at ivel y s im p lified e xp la na tio n o f how lar uc- c-alihn- naval gUlls art..' loaded . Un like a
co nve ntio na l rifle round of ammuni tion. where the ex p lo sive powder and [he 'b u lk-r. so lid missile . a rc joined togel he r in a o ne-pi ece cart rtdgc . o r
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Of
CISl', 11ll' h ig-gu n 'ro u nd '
COllll'.'i in two sepa rate- p:111S, h011l loaded Sl'!Xlrall'ly into llll' breec-h . or ch am ber sectio n o f t ill' gun at tht' re a r end o f the b urrel. First the s hel l. or the 'b u lk-t'. is ram med into the b reech. Th e ba rrel is 'rifled'. th at is, it has sp ira l groon:s cu t into the inner surface that CIUSl' th e s he ll to spi n, g i\"ing it grc. u accu ruc-y as it speeds through th e air towards its taruc t. Th e se cond part o f till' 10:1l1. th e exp losive charge, is con ta ined in cy lind rica l doth ha gs, O fte n a number o f hag s go 10 make lip
:I
single 'cha rge', These a rc ra m med into th e b reech
behind th e shell . Th e breech is then hvdrnnlicallv d o sed and the gun is re ady for firing . Prio r to the int roduction o f bre ech-load ing guns ,
:I
s imilar loading o pe ratio n took place, o n ly in
reverse order, a nti from th e o p pos ite e nd o f th e gun . TIll' ch arge. o r h:lgs o f e xp los ive . were rammed dow n the front o f the barrel . o r mu zzle of th e gun. foll owed h y a wa d to st..'al the ch amber conta in ing the e xp losive cha rge , Finally , the ca n no n hall or mbe-ilc th at wa s to lx ' fin-d \\,:IS rammed h o rne . Firing o ccurred whe n eithe r a spark ca used hy :1 flint lock mechanism at the rear o f the g un ign ited th e powde r ch arge . o r. in the very ea rly lbys, h y a lit taper lighting a line line of po wde r th ai led d irect ly to the t..'xp lo sin : c harge . Th ese types of can no n - and 1:1!L'r large gun s - loaded through the fron t o f rhc ba rre l were called 'm uzzle-lo ad ers'. In mo st cases thes e g uns di d not ha ve any rilling in the ha rrclx and
\ \"t..' I"C
known as 'smo o th-bo re ' gu ns ,
To Increase the s pe ed o f the s hell !t..':I\'ing the gu n barre l nhc mu zzle vcloci tv ). new and different prope llants were perfected. In France , a highly e fficient . s mo ke les s nitro -cellulose po wder wa s introd uc ed , whil e in Britain a mixture o f nnro-glvccnnc- and nitro -cell ulo se ca lle-d cord ite w as favo ur e d . Th e se e xpl osive p ropellants Forced th e sh ell o u t o f the barre l with increas ing acceleratio n. resulting in a higher m uz zle velocity. To furthe r improve accele rat ion. gun barrels bec-ame longt..'r and the range o f the guns Increased. The ch e m ica l stahility o f th e-e new . volatile p ropellants. packaged in hags, was a factor o f great concern in safe handling and stor:lge , They were sto red in 'magazines' - spt.'d a lly designed and constructed 'roo ms ' - usually lee.ned several decks be lo w the guns , The exp los ive effect of a maga z in e igniting ei the r through unstable propellant. o r a h it in ha llie . inva riably caused a catas tro p he . Suc h explosio ns we re no t U1K011l1ll0 n, a nd th ro ug hou t the h isto ry of the bat tles hip caused th e d estr uctio n o f a large nu mber o f the-e- glaru vessels a nd thl' dea th o f h uge nu mbers o f g u n new . To im p rove the p c n c tr.u ive q ua litie s o f s he lls, th e nu-tullu rgt ral b re ak th ro ug hs made in ar mour dt,;'\"(.. . lopmcnt wen- a p p lied to the co nstruct io n o f the shell case. The o bject was to d rive the shel l int o th e l'nl.'I1lY's armour plate wi thout the shell brea k ing up. w h ile
:1
fuse se t int o
the lxtse o f th e sh ell would detonate the exp lo sive tilling o nce the shel l had penetrated th e hu ll of the enemy vessel . Th ese sh ells h..-ca m c kn own as armour-piercing shells, A subsequent refin ement saw th e introducti on o f a soft e r me tal 'ca p ' fitted o ve r th e armou r-p ie rcing tip . O n hitting th e a rmou r, th e so ft Glp prc -stre sst..' d th l' armour. rende ring it more \'ulner:lhle to th e h:lf(len eo stt..'l'I tip, O ne o f the most t..'( ull p lL'x devices o n hoard the h:mlt.:'ship wa s the com h inatio n o f n1l'ch ani sm s th :1t t..' nahk'd a gun to be fired co nt:linl'd the guns
S: t(
upon a huge :tnd
~ I<..Tu r: l(c1y
co m p l ic~lled
a nd
s~l fcly ,
\ '~Iri ous
Tht..' armoured turrt..'t th at
chamhe r th:u extl'nded d own to the inn t..'r
hott om of the ship. In s im p le te rms, thl' p ro pdbn t :tn d she lls wt..'rt.' sto rt..'d at the hott om of this ch:lln hl' r an d Wl.' re h ro ug ht up to th e g u ns hy mechan ica l ho ists. and w hen th e y reach e d the turre t the y wc rc r:lllltlle d in to the h reac h o f the gu n. O nce the hr e ach was c1 o st..'d , till.'
ARM ORED GUN HOUSE (T URRET PROPER)
POWDER HOIST
~~~~
RAMMER S
DECK l : G U GUN DECK
------L
GUN GIRDER - - -_ __=:~ PROJECTILE HOIST
- ----,;7"'"
PAN fl OOR _ _-----'~"i' ROLLER PATH BARBETTE TURRET FOUNDATION (STATION ARY)
An illustration showing the comp lexity of a modem gun
MA CHINE RY fl OOR MAGAZI NES
moun ting , in this instance a US 16-inch triple mounting, extending several decks into the
PROJECTIL E HANDLIN G fl OOR
POWDER HANDLIN G ROOM
FI XED STOWAGE
struc ture of the ship.
g un had 10 he tra ined a m i e levated 10 e xact co-ord inates before heing fired. Th e tur re t a nd rhe en tire c ha m be r turned as o ne integra ted u n it. In its twent ieth -cen tu ry fo rm . th e whol e revolving mecha n ism co uld we igh up 10 2300 IOns. At the end o f the nineteenth ce n tury. the sta ndard big-gun naval weapon wa s the 12-in ch OD5-l11m ) breech-loaded. rilled g un o n hyd rau lic mou ntings ca pable o f tiring a she ll a distance o f a ro u nd 10 miles. Thes e g uns we re s ig lucd o n a targe t by a relativel y primitive rule-of-thumb procedure. Co nse q ue ntly.
;1
ve ry lo w p ro po rtion o f hits were achieved. As th e ra nge o f g un s
increased . the great cha lle nge to cng jnccrs a nd mat hematicia ns wa s 10 develop a re liable an d accurate syste m to locate a nd hit a movi ng ta rge t. Remember. th is was lo ng befo re compu ters . rad ar. satellite information o r, in the ea rly da ys of its dcveloprm-nt. any fo rm of elect ron ic device. In th e first instan ce . the target ha d to he s ig hted and an accura te means devised to calcul.uc its ran ge . Till' p iece o f eq u ipment designed to pe rfo rm this task was the o p tica l r.mgcfind cr . By the ea rly IH90s, a practica l. ro bust ra ngc fin dc r had bee n in trodu ce d . Th is dis tin ctive instrum e nt cons isted of a ho rizo nta l tube in w hic h From an eye p ie ce
at
~ 111
angl ed m irror wa s tilted
; 11
either e nd .
th e centre. the operato r br o u gh t th e uu gct in to fo c us. A s im p le
tngo nomct n cal calc ulatio n mad e mech ani cal ly insid e th e rangc find c r provided a n accu rate readi ng o f ra nge. Th e first naval ra nge finders ha d a ha se of S feet ( 1.52 metres ). In lime rungcfindc rs would grow
10
4H feet ( 15 metres) in le ngth a nd sit astride the hig hest
point o f th e sh ip's su perstructu re . Ho wever . eve n w ith the ra nge obtained. the g u n had 10 he held o n target desp ite the speed o r roll of the sh ip . Furt her , the target would have moved d uri ng the time the shell wou ld ta ke to reach it. To co m pens ate fo r th ese facto rs. a n cleme nt o f hu man predict ion wa s necessa ry, a ltho ug h th is was less im port a nt w hen ha llie ran ge s were low. as they were in th e HWOs. Th e h igh e r u p in the sh ip 's su perstruct u re this fire con trol e qui p me nt wa s installe-d. th e bet ter it worked. Co nseq ue ntly, ligh lly constructed pla tfo rms or 'spouin g to ps' la-gan 10 appear o n the to p o f mas ts, c\'entllally leadi ng 10 the introdu ctio n of tripod , and othe r ma st svste ms . In every navy. g reat pride is tak en in the accuracy and th e g u nnery skills o f eac h sh ip in the
..:.._ . .III•
SAILIO...£T.EAM~-=..Jl'1llOJlL:[Q--S':r.E.EL
fleet . Co nstant p rucurc and com petition
h C( \ H ;'Cn
•
" ' -£ 35
ships go a long way to hone these s kills. hut
only in the lu-.u of hattie is the accuracy of the fi re co ntro l and gun crews put (0 thL" ultimate lest.
On till.' eve of rhc twentieth century th e domina n t naval po wers. Britain . France a nd Rus sia . were faced wi th the prospect of competitio n fro m th ree rapidly growing ind us trial powers: the
United Sl:ltc:s. Germany and Japa n. The established orde r was about to the full effect o f this w o uld no t be felt unti l the new
Ct..-ru urv
I~
sha ke n. although
had dawned.
The battleship had a ll hu t arrived in its fina l form. Efficient. he:I\'i1y armoured. selgoing hu lls driven hy giant s team-powered reciprocating e ngi nes provided a st a b le platfo rm fo r tht.' multitude o f va rious calibre guns that mad e up their powerful a rmou ry. Yet for a lmo....t half ~I century there had not been :I major naval lxmle to test the quantum leaps in technology and power tht.'st.' ships re p re se nte d. De si g ne rs . nava l arc h itects and naval st rategi sts of en.~·r)· maritime nati on a p pea red to have di ffering vie ws on the shape a nd a rmament of the: capita l ships in their battle flee ts . The: re su lt o f these differences was reflected in the di \'e rsity of lxn tlvxhips o f a lmos t e\'er)' nation . It would ta ke a wa r. or a ma jor brea kthrough in d esign . bef o re o ne design a nd o ne concept wo uld crea te the:battlesh ip of the futu re . Bo th the wa r, and the bn-ak th rouah. wou ld hap pe n in the first decad e of the new ce nt ury.
The political world in 1894, domina ted by the colonial empires of European po wers. On the eve of the new century.
battleships were the key weapo n that rival nations would rely on to maintain and extend these national borders .
I . . .. . "'1'1..
,.'
ea Lanes to Power ~
.. the nineteenth centu ry drew to a dose, the battleship's invulnerability to gunfire was being threatened by new techn ical developments. Each posed a challenge to the battleship designers , and
each in turn pla yed an important role in the ever- evolving sophistication o f weapon systems and armour protection sche mes of the battl eship in th e new century. Th e situation is g rap h icall y summed up by Co li n \V h ite, Deputy Director o f th e Ro yal Naval Museum in Portsmouth : 'Once you o pe n th e Pandora's Box o f technol ogi cal change, you can't sh ut it. And it leapfrogs in quite an extraord inary \\'a y. O ne invention will lead to anothe r. You invent a gun that will pi erce armour, you th en have to invent armour that \\'iII prevent the gun p iercing it. You invent a torpedo that will sink a battleship, you then have to invent methods of dea ling with th at torpedo . You invent an efficient steam engine which dri ves your sh ip faster than that o f your o p pone nt you r op ponent finds another method of propulsion . And so it go es on . And so th e development of battleship d esign was a never-ending leapfrog o f so metimes effici ent, so me times good id eas, someti mes d ead ends. Bu t alwa v» changing."
'I1K' two most pote nt l.·me:rging weapons in the wa r against the: bat tleship were the torpedo a nd the: mine - both capable o f sinking a ba ttles hip. both chea p to build and 10 usc against en em y shipping. David Lyon . Research Associate ~H the Nation al .\ Iaritime xtuscum in London. explains: 'At the e nd of the nineteenth ce ntury the problem [for battleships] starts 10 he: underwater warfa re . first of a ll the de ve lopment o f moored mines and grou nd min e s w hic h are pUI on tlu- bottom o f th e se a , And th en co mes th e d evelo pment of th e so -called locomotive to rpedo. the fish to rpedo. Ihe \'\'h ite ht.:'a d d rive n torpedo - th e first rea l guided missile . Afte:r a ll. Ihe ea sit.:'SI way to sin k a ship is to mak e a \'ery large hole in the ho ttom o f th e ship rath er than rry a nd blast hol es in it abo ve water - which is wh at Ihey are doing with guns, ~I
'The mine is lusic illy a static weapon which you co uld o nly put in ce rta in pla ces, It's me nace to ba ttles hips hut it's not a wa y of dest roying them in any ce rtain se nse . The
torpe do - unt il yo u get into the twentieth ce ntury - a ltho ug h distin ctly a threat . is mo re so in Ihl.'ol")· than in pra ctice . It's not until yo u get Ihe development of the heated
American forces landing at
dr ive torped o co mbined wi th gyroscopic guidance. which ha ppe ns around 1900. that yo u ge:l a n un derwater missile of great range. whic h is equal to the range of guns. and which travels ut high s peed. II's at that stage. and almost exact ly at the same lime . the
dun'ng the Span ish-Am erican
submarine becomes a practical wea pon of wa r. And it's at that stage that the batt leship hL'gins to he sL' riously thr eatened. And then, o f co urse . yo u soon ge t the extraordinarily rapid developme nt of the: aeroplane: a nd the beginning of the thr eat of a ir atta ck .
cap turing the Span ish colonies
Guantanamo, Cuba in 1898 War. The US Navy provided support to its military forces in
of the Philippines, Guam, and islands of the Caribbean.
T ilE HATT I ESII IPS
Completed in 1891, the French barbette ba ttleship, Marceau, carried four 13.4-inch guns in single mounts, took ten years to build, and was aJJ but obsolete when she joined the fleet.
'The ea rly g uided missiles we re pretty inefficien t weapons o f wa r and the sa me is true of the early to rped o bo ats - extremely frag ile . s mall fast bo ars w hich were deve loped in the IHoOs, 70.s and HO.s. Th ese torped o bo ats we re a ve ry p romising \ \'I,....a po n o f war fo r a min or navy. enabl ing the m to protect their sho res strongly. or indeed the sec o nd navy , like fo r Fra nce . It looked as if he re wus the answe r to the battleships whe n yo u knew yo u would n't be ab le to o ut-build the Briti.s h in battleships. so let's try anot he r an g le . le t's try to rpedo attack. And the trou ble is the weapo n is un derd eveloped . il'.s un reliable . it's no t in parti cular so mething that yo u ca n ta ke p roperly to sea in bad weather wh en a ba ttle s h tp G ill st ill pe rform , bur a to rp e d o bo a t has to se c k ha rbo u r. And it' s no t so me thing yo u ca n take all o ve r the place , yo u have to o perate close to yo ur base . 'And it's no t unt il the twentieth century that everything to ugh e ns up. becomes mo re re liable . that yo u s ud denly have a serious un d e rw ater th re at. j\ lin ing' s the same . The de velo pment of the mine reac hes matu rity just befo re the time of the Russo-ja pa nese \X'ar - the Bailie o f Tsu s hlma at the very begin ning of the twe ntiet h ce nt ury.' Techn o lo gy was mo ving :11 a g re at pace , The cha lle nge fo r the batt les hi p d esigners wa s nc o nly to keep pace , bu t also to be o ne ste p a hea d of the threat of these new weapons. II wa
SE.,LLA1" ES _HLI' OWE R
________________________-'..._i1--...~< _ •
in this pe rio d o f cha nge and ch allenge that the ha n k-s hi p mo ved closer to its fina l form. It wa s also a pe riod in w h ich the lead e rs o f the ma jor ind ustrial na tio ns o f th e world began
10 mak e p la ns to fl';lIiz t.:' po litica l ;111(1 nati ona l a mhi tio ns Oil a g ran d sca le . G rea t Br ita in
rema ined th e d omina n t w o rld po wer bo th in trad e an d com me rce . Q uee n Victo ria w as still o n the th ron e-. and the Ho yal Navy co ntinued
to
rule the
W:lVl'S .
But arou nd the glo be. th e
Il L'W -
fou nd indu stria l p o w e- r an d wealt h o f the Un ite d Sta l es a nd Ge rma ny", a nd the: g row ing infl ue nce of ja pa n w ith in th e Paci fic a nd As ian reg io n. w as he g inn ing to crea te a se ns e of inter nat iona l un rest and urg e ncy. Il ig h o n lh e po litica l agenda of each o f tIH':Se: nations was the: stre ngtheni ng o f its navy . s pea rhead ed in eac h case hy th e b uild ing-u p o f its fleet o f bat tleships. ThL' cha lk nge
10
bu ild and anu rhcsc sh ips lrigge re:d the heg inn ing of an arms race: th ai wou ld
eve ntua lly h-ad to a rmed conflict o n an un pn- cc ck-mc d sc ale, The: demand fo r h igge:r and mo re po werful battleshi ps resulte d in an e normo us ex pansio n of sh iph u ild ing facilitics with in all th e ma jor maritime nations. h UI none mon..' so than in Britain , In lHlJO th e British Parliam e nt passe d the famous T wo Powe r Stand ard', a n Act tha t req u ired
the stre ng th o f th e Ro ynl Navy to be maintained at n ume rical ly 10 pe r ce nt g re ate r th an a ny o the r two na vies combined. At th e time the h ill was pa ssed. the sec o nd a nd thi rd largest navies in the wo rld were , resp ecti ve ly. Fren ch and Rus sia n. Altho ug h h o th the se pot e nt ial e n e m ies of Brita in had numeri ca lly la rge na vie s. the:y h y no mea ns ha d Ike ls o f the hig h sta nd ard o f the British Na\ 'y, Britai n 's o ld e ne my. Fran ce ,
W:l S
cco no nucullv str e tc h e d to the lim it a n d , to re ta in the s ta n d ing o f its n av a l fo rce s, wa s begin nin g to lo o k for alte rn ative s
10
b uildin g ex pe nsi ve ne w b.m le sh tps . Like the e ra w he n
they had lau n ch ed the first iron clad . Gloi re. Fra n ce aga in lo o ke d to ne w tech no lo g ies to g i\"e: the m
:111
l'dgl' ove -r the: British Navy. As th e Fre nc h nava l hi storia n Pro fe sso r Ph ilip pe
Masxo n ex plains: "Towards thL' lHHOs the re w as a defini te po ssihi lity of a wa r w ith Eng lund. h ut Fran ce re a lize d that fro m
:1
p urel y fina nc ia l po int o f view it wa s go ing to he very costly to
han ' a fleet anyth ing like: the Eng lish fleet. Mo reo ve r. the Eng lish wou ld never sta nd fo r it. They wou ld o nly inc rease the ir o w n nav a l spe nd ing o r even la un ch a p re-eru ptive wu r aga ins t us , \X!t ' the refo re wo nde red w he th e r th e re wa s so me c hea pe r a nd mo re efficient so lution
10
enable us
10
wag e wa r against England,
O Uf
Minis ter fo r the: Navy
saw the to rpedo bo at a nd th e tTl!ise:r as the best way o f d is ru p ting trad e and th e re fo re the be-t o p tio n fo r th is co u nt ry. To rpedo bo ats u nder cove r of d a rkne ss could atta ck Eng lish sh ips lying o ff the CO:ISt, a nd a s ing lL' torpedo could eas ily s ink a batt les h ip . It wo u ld h e a fa r le ss ex pens ive so lutio n . \X'e co u ld ha n ".' a n avy w h ich wa s
:It
o nce
e fficien t and economical. ' By lHlJlJ we ha d hu ilt :1 very large n um ber o f to rped o boats. \X'c ca lled them "mobile dcfc no ..'s", Then it \.. ·as reali zed these mobile d e fe n ces in fact held ou t little p ros pect o f ac h ieving slg n lfk-a nt result s ag a inst the Englis h battleships becau se the Eng lis h ha d ta ke n ap prop riate coun te r meas u res. Th e y ha d fitted thei r battleships with ligh t. rapid fire artill e ry p ieces and wit h se arch lights so they co u ld mo n ito r th e o ffshore: waters .u n ig ht. And Ihe y had In ven ted what we called a "co u nte r-to rpe d o lx xn" h ut w h ich the Eng lis h ca lle d a "des tro ye r". Once it was rea lized th at o u r to rp e do bo ats w o u ld he powe rless ag a ins t th e Eng lish bnttlcxhips a nd the ir fle ets o f d estroyer s, Fran ce bega n build ing sub marines. Thank s to tile availabil ity o f d iese l. interna l co mb ustion an d electric cn gtn c s. it wo u ld h e po sxihl c to b ui ld s ubm a rines th at w o ul d re presen t a far m ore se rio us th reat than to rpe do ho ats to English ha ttlvsh ipx.' Ther e wa s no doubt that relat ions betwee n Fran ce an d Brita in contin ued to s im me r. rig ht o n the l'dge o f hoiling po int . as the:y had for centuri es.
& • • -_
39
Russia. o n the o ther han d , a lthoug h in :1 fina ncial crisis after th e Crimean \'\'ar , felt a stro ng nee d to rebuild its hatt ie fleet to protect its Black Sea te rrito ries
~ l g~l i n st
pos xlbk- atta c-k hy British
naval forces. Russ ian baul cship h istorian Steve Mct.au g h hn ex plains : ' Russ ia' s e nt ire so uthe rn area w as ex pose d to the Ro ya l Na\·y a nd thai re a lly set th e alarm h e lls ring ing , w he n th e new Empero r. Ale xander III. ca me
10
the th ron e in IHHI.
h is first p riori ty was to bu ild u p the Black Sea fleet, The first new batt lesh ips in h is reign we re three s h ips built fo r the Black Se a fleet. to o p pose th e British if they came through the [Turkish] Stra its, and on th e o ther s ide , to su pport a Russian exped ition to the Strnitx if th at e ve r beca me necessary. The y were kind of funn y-lo ok ing sh ips w ith fo ur l z-inch [30S-m m] g uns a ll s ig h te d fo rward . a nd tw o t z -tnch g u ns a ft in a so rt of tria ng ula r a rrange me nt. At th is po int Russ ia wa s gett ing a lo t o f its a rmame nt. its a rmo u r, a nd its engines fro m Gre at Britain . \Vith th e h ig Russian nava l building p rog r:.llllme th,u start ed in the IHHOs , th e y s im p ly d id no t h av e th e ind ustrial ca pacity to b u ild al l Ih is Slu ff th emselves. an d they we nt to Britain . Basically they we re go ing o ut and gelling whatever the)' co u ld , as qu ick ly as th ey co uld , in o rde r to build a
10 1
o f shi ps relat ivel y q u ickly,
At the same tim e th ey wer e boo sting thei r o w n armamen ts plan ts. Bit by h it. their o w n armo ur p ro ductio n s ho ps got lip to s pe ed to w he re the y co u ld s u p p ly mo st o f th e ma teri al. hu t that did n't rea lly ha p pe n until arou nd the IH90s.' Russ ia's o ther territ orial interests w e re in the nort h-western ure a o f th e Pacific whe re it s hared a border with Ch ina , Th e port o f v ladivostok p ro vided a sa fe a nchorage fo r the Russian Pacific Sq uad ro n o f heav ily a rm e d cruise rs , Th eir ma in p u rpose wa s to ' keep a n cy e o n British co m me rce ' in thai part of th e world . Th ey ha d a lso gained acce ss to Po rt Arthu r, o n main land Ch in a , and o b ta ined the rig ht s to h uild a ra ilwa y lin e th ro ugh Manc h uri a
10
Vlad ivo stok ,
Steve Mcl.aug hlin : 'W he n th e y m o ved in to Po rt Art h ur in IB9H. sud de n ly the fo cus c ha ng ed . No t onl y had th e y fina lly got th e wa rm wat e r po rt th e y a lwa ys dre am ed of, a s
:1
p lace they
cou ld sail fro m any lime of the year to ca rry o ut an y o peratio ns the y thoug ht th ey wou ld have to carry o ut in case o f w ar w ith Brita in, h ut they'd made an e nemy out o f j apan . Suddenly cruise rs were n't what they need ed becau se the japan ese we re building a ba ttle fleet. Fro m about IH9Ho nwa rd yo u see a trem endo us b uilding progr am me in Russia that was ca lled "the Pro g ramm e fo r th e ne eds o f th e Fa r East ". At th is po int the y needed s h ips so ba dly th at ag a in th e y re a lize d the ir ow n ya rds d id n't ha ve the ca paCity to b u ild them . So th ey had a sh ip built in Ph iladelph ia , they had a s h ip b u ilt in Fran ce . so two of th e mo st mo d ern banlcxhtps during the e ve ntua l Russo -Japan ese \Va r we re actually fo reign-bu ilt.' The fate o f th e wo rld 's lea d ing natio ns wa s inextr icably linked w ith co nt ro l o f the ocean trade ro utes and the success o r failure o f the na val fo rces that d om inated these bl ue-water highways. The sce ne w as set fo r the next and mo st d yn amic stage in th e developmen t o f th e battles hip , And re w Lambe rt. naval h isto rian at King's Co llege, Lo nd on , p icks up the sto ry: A veteran of the Batt le of Santiago, USS Oregon is seen
'At th e e n d o f th e n ine tee nth ce nt ury. the wo rld is grad uall y being carve d u p h y th e
here in dry -dock at Mare Island in
major pla ye rs , Throu gh o ut th e ce ntu ry . Brita in had th e ru n o f world trade wi th ou t
1912. Completed in 1896. she
bothering to conq ue r an e m pire . She left th e re st o f th e wo rld to ru n its o w n affairs as
carried four 13-inch guns in tw o twin turrets. The distinctive 'cage ' mainmas t was added in 1908.
lo ng as bu s iness was good . But th rou g hout the later part o f the ce ntu ry.
g r~ l d u a lly
othe r
po wers mo ved into key a reas - Africa a nd As ia - and ran u p thei r Ilags. It beca me more and mo re n ecessary, if yo u wa nted to co n tro l trad e ,
10
cont rol the cou nt ry. So e m pire ,
s..EA.L\.N E S Tel
l~UWE.n.__
... ,-=-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.:.__-=-.11" • .-._
41
~":i.L
42 ::.
-'- ll IUJAI _n .ESlll£S
. '• : '" SE.AJ..A..1-"lFS T O I)Q W-.EJL_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ iii--_.
~._
and the gr ea t wave of im peria lism o f the late nineteenth ce ntu ry. sees th e wo rld divid ed
The beautifully pre served cruiser
a nd a lmost immedia tely it lx-gin s to be re-divided with the o ld Span ish e mp ire falling into the hands o f th e Ameri cans a nd Germa ns. for e xa m ple. So a 0:1\1' becomes a critica l clement if yo u w ish to han: an emp ire .'
USS Olympia in which Commodore George Dewey routed a Spanish squadron at Manila Bay du ring the Spanish-
Th e Un ite d Siaies was fas t developi ng into o ne of th e largest ind ustrial nations in th e world.
IIc r econ om y provided the finan ce. and her industrial base the ability, to ma ke the con struction o f a tota lly US-hu ilt luutlc fl eet
:1
reali ty. Man y Am er icans believed that in th eir new-found
position of Imp ort an ce . they s ho u ld take thei r place bes ide the establis he d European po we rs in b u ildin g lip trade beyond thei r bord er s. If th e y we re th ey wou ld ce rta in ly nee d
~I
10
pursu t' this line as na tio na l po licy,
bal a nce d ocea n-go in g n avy to p ress foreig n pol icy o b jectives
a n d to p roje ct a s ym hol o f nat iona l pr e slige a n d sta tus. Su c h a s hifr in po licy towards expa ns io n ist o utlook wa s stre- ngt h e ne d h y Ca p ta in Alfred Th a yer h is seminal work o f I HW , Tbe lnflueuce ofSeli Power
O il
~lahan
:111
o f th e US 1'.'a\'y in
History. 1660- 1783 , This bo ok had
a profo u nd e ffect o n na va l th in ki ng the world o ver. Th e essen ce o f
~Iah an 's
doct rin e was
that , for a ma jor trad ing nat io n. the o nly way of secu ring and maint ain ing national pr o speri ty a nd p reslige was th rough a bat tles hi p fleet able to d ominate th e seas, O f cou rse . th is was th e pr inciple tha t the e sta blis hed colon ial powers. most not ably Britain . had been acting on for se ve ra l hundred years . hUI it had never bef ore been stated so explicitly o r so cogently.
~l:t h:IIl's
fo rce fu l idea s hel pe d persuade th e US Co ng ress to approve fin ance for th e building o f a po werful. ocean-g oi ng fleet th aI wo u ld incl ude all-America n des ign ed a nd hu ilt ha uleshi ps . Duri ng the IM Os a nd 90s , th e 'Ne w '
N~ I VY,
as it w as te rmed. began to lak e sha pe th ro ugh
a se ries of b uilding p rogrammes a utho rize d hy Co ngress. Eve ry aspect o f every s hip in th e fleet - from the d e sig n to th e rive ts , the a rmo u r, the he a vy tu rre te d g u ns and th e propu ls ion machinery -
W :I S to
he ma nufactured in the States. It pusheel US kn ow-how and the nat ion 's
industrial ca paci ty to new limi ts , Steel-making unp roved dramatica lly w h ile ma nufactu ring ca pacity in a rmou r a nd o rd n a nce inc rea sed
10
meet th e demands o f this new huilding
pr ogramme. 111e first IXlttlcships o f th e US N ~I \1' with firepower at k'a st equa l tel similar s h ips in fo reign nav ies were th e three Ind iana Class vessels. laid down in 1H91. '111e y moun led fou r 13-in c h <330-mm) g u ns , a nd p rov id ed mu ch ne e d ed e xperience in d eveloping the US sh ipbu ild ing a nd o rd na nce ind ustries, 'I1Il.' first 'b loo d ing' of the new US Navy took place during the Spanish -American \'\'ar o f 1H9H. The ca use o f th e co nfl ict wa s os te ns ib ly th e d eterio rati ng s itu atio n in Cu ba , wh ere a rm ed Inxurnx'tkm d irect ly threat en ed Ame rican interests. O nly 100 m iles fro m the America n ma inla nd. Cu ba w as co ns ide red to o close for co m fo rt in a n are a w he re the US w ished
10
exercise its
infl ue nce. Th e inciden t tha i p reci p itated the cr isis was the sin king o f the US hnttlcshi p
.1I0 i ll£',
whic h blew up sudden ly in l lavnnu har bo ur o n 15 Fe bru a ry IH9H. killing 266 o f her crew , Till' ex plosio n is still the sub ject o f debate . a lthough an inte rnal magazine ex plos ion seems the mo st likely G IUSt:, Howeve r, the altitude of the prvss. to get her wit h graphic images of American sailo rs hc ing bu ried . forced the issue and Spain was b lamed. \X'ar wa s ine vitabl e . During two months o f d iplomatic negotia tions. Spain conceded most o f the US d emands , bu t refused to graru independence for Cuba , O n 23 April IH9B th e l;S declared war. Th ereafter, e ve nts moved sWirl)y, resu lting in IWO naval battl es w h ich settled the issu e d ecisively. a nd whi ch established th e Un ited States as th e world's latest imperia l flower.
declared. Commod ore Gt.,(lrgC Dewey. tlying h is nag in th e crui se r O{rmp ia. ~I small but powerful fo rce of ships stationed in I lo ng Kong . O n hcanng th e news. he immed iatel y sa iled to th e Philippi ne s. In Man ila Bay, Dewey discovered . attacked and utte rly an nihilated a sma ll Spa nis h sq uadron u nder the co m ma nd o f Ad mira l Don Patricio ,\ h llllo jo, '111e Philipp ines now belonged 10 the United States and , c ffccnvclv. Amer ica had Ill' CO Il K' the latest member of the se lect. inte rnat ional clu b o f em p ire b uilders. \,\'hl.' n war
W :.lS
was co mmand ing the US Asiatic Squadron,
American War of 1898,
43
44
The second short a nd l.'q ll~l llr de cisive nav a l hall ie in this wa r occu rred a month later. off Sa nti ago on th e sou thern lip o f Cu ba . in th e Ca rib be a n . A US 11:1\":11 Io n-c . in cl udi ng fo ur battleships. so un dly defeated a Span ish sq uadron in a baul e that lasted less tha n thn.x: hours. An interesting statistic is that of over HOOO shells fired hy the CS sh ips , o n ly 120 hit their l ;l rg\.· I ~ In their ba ptism o f fire: aga inst p\.'rha ps th e: weakest fore ign
11:1\ ')"
o f :111. th e US i\':I\Y had n -eon..led
a resounding vict ory. removi ng th e last H.'stige of Spanis h influen ce in Cc..:Tur. 11 and Lati n A meri ca.
\X'jrhin America. the d efeat o f Spain was p ublicly acclai med a g loriolls vkt orv fo r th e L;S and popula rized the navy to such :10 c xn.-n r that Secrt:I:IJT for the: N:I\Y. Theodore Roose velt. put in place plans for the construct ion o f a new fleet. Il l" later saw these ap p ro ved h y Co nurcss u nder his p residency ( 1901-9 ), ·111\.· inte ntio n of the CS was made qu ite clear: th e creation o f a \'t:ry large battle flee t to sig n~ 11 thei r preSt:"nce as a new world power. '111e victory over the Spani:..h a nd the est ablishment of this new imperial sta tus Inuucdi.uclv posed a nu mbe r of quest io ns for th e nat ion. part icularly in regard to tIll' Philipp iru-s . a~ LS naval hist ori an and d efence
~ 1Il ~l l yst xorm an
Friedman poi nts o ut:
'Victo ry in th e Spanish-American \'( fa r actu a lly pla ce s the United States in th e Far East - pla ces us in th e Ph ilippines. and the question e ve r after is: how d o yo u defend th e Ph ilip p ine s. w h ich is ve ry far fro m the Un ite d States and rat her d o se to ~I rath e r rapa cious .!:lIxlIl? Do yo u station a bau lc fleer th eR'? Do yo u b uild u p e nough indu strial infrastructure the re to support tha t ha ttie 11l"L"t? Do you p lan to relieve th e Phil ip pines in a war? As so o n as we get the Ph ilipp ine s the se ar e very sc r' iou s qu esti ons , Sho uld there he naval force s in the Philipp ine s? \'\'o uld the y a ll he d estroyed w hen the war Ce rta in ly. by 1907 we're talking about what to d o if till' .Iapalll·SL" ~ 1; 1J1 a war h y
st~ lI1S?
seizi ng the Ph ilippines.' The US ha d demo nst rated aga inst the Spanish th e ir readiness to use military fo rce hu t, even ea rlier. America n ships, under the co mmand of Co m mod ore ~ 1~ lH hl'w Pe rry, g~ I\ 'e the Japa nese people thei r first tas te of 'g u nboat d ip lomacy ', In 185,1 and aga in a year later . Pe rry sailed his he adly arm ed s hips into Tokyo Bay , The second visit was 10 deliver a kit er from th \.· US president to the shogun authorities -rcq ucsung' that japan 0 lx'n her port s for trade with the \X'e st. There W~IS no mistak ing the tone o f th e lett er: 'O pen up o r d s,,:!' With great fear and tre pid ation. the shogunal re p resentative o f this then feudal-style co u ntry submitted n-luctnntl y. and the d oors were opened to th e 'fo re ig n devi ls'. A d ecade later, th e ~It' iii Rest o ration o f IH66 es tabl ished Im perial j apan: ~I un ited nati on, governed hy an emlx 'wr a nd a ce ntralized govern ment. O nce Japan 's do ors were open (0 trad e . st rong com mercia l tic s with Euro pean cou n tries . in particular Britain , led to rapid ind ust rial ization of the co u nt ry , Little tim e w as lost in e stablishing a n imperial n;I\'y a nd , as Dr Mark Peattie . Se nio r Rescun-l r Fellow in th e Hoover Institution o n \\"ar. Revolution ~IIlLI Pea ce ~H Stanford Unive rsity. e xpla ins. th ey looked to th e ir close tra ding partner and the world's leading nav al powe r. Britain, for g uidance : '11 \ a lways been a principle w ith th e j apa nese to pattern thei r institutions o n foreign
models, Tlu-y always want to go with what see ms to IX' th e mo st successful und mo st promising , and so th e British l\'a\1" o b vious ly the ruler o f the world's oceans in the latter half of th e nineteenth ce nt ury . is the pe rfect model fo r th e Japanese to follo w , Britain was abo the fo rem o st warship b uilder in the world and aWl in , the .I:1P~lI1l'. .e go with thi s because o f tha t very re aso n, Th e Britis h are. o f cou rse. in rhc ma rket o f se lling s hi ps to J ~lIXII1 , II hel ps the British economy a nd very clo se ties deve lop. The British se ll to the j a pan e se a num ber of warsh ips wh ich japan has desi red un der th ei r g rc. u na va l expansio n p ro gr umrn c of IH96/ 97 , The ir ultim ate o b ject ive is 10 b uild ;1 line o f ba ttleships w hich can p rojectjapanese nav al po wer o ff th e
CO~ IS tS or .la p~ lIl .'
SEA..-LAN ESJ'(L£QW.,i "R
_ •_ _-. .,_ ' .._ • ... ·--. .- --- 45
.Iapan . like the ma jo r Eu ropean powers. also h ad a mbitions o f weal th and powe r th rou g h the ex p ans ion of th c ir e mpire. look ing
10
m ainla nd Asia,
partu-ularlv Korea nncl Chi na. 10 extend the ir national hO~1(la riL'S. In IHl)·j a nd IH9:;, Ja pan wen t to w ar a nd defeate d China on.'!" issues rcl.ucd to Japa n's inte rests in Korea . The rcsuhi ng Treaty of Shi monosckt c-eded Ta iwan an d the Liao tu ug Pen in s u la . includi ng Po rt Arthu r, to japa» . an d n: cog nizl'd Ja p a ne se in flue n ce over Ko ren. SuhSt.:'q UL'1111y, Ru ss ia n . Fre nc h a nd Ger man op posi t ion to t he .Ia p:I I1l':-it' ex pa ns ion o n to
m ain land Asb resu lte d in JIJXlIl Ix·jng fo rced to gin: up a
n um ber of these g:li ns . includ ing 1'0 11 Arthur. Soo n afte r. j apan wa s appalled to le-a rn that the Russ ian s had
s ucccss fullv m-go tt.uc-d w ith the Chinese th e rig ht to co nstruct a ra ilway throug h Man c-h uria (0 Vladivostok. and tn U ~L' Port Arthu r as a naval h:ISL' for Russb 's Eastern Fleet. The y :lbo lea rned that the Russia n Pacific Fled at PO ll Arthur was to hL' reinforced . By this time the Russian ~a\"y wa~ tht: third la rgL'~t in the wo rld afte r Brita in and Pran ce . The Britis h a lso had s us pic io ns about Russ ian
intentions in China and lhe possihk: lo ng-te rm e ffect suc h mO\'L'S mig ht have o n British inte rests in Asia, This vola tile situa tion in Asia resulted in the Anglo-.Iapa nL'se Allia nce of 190 2. a re c iproca l a rran gement in which ea ch nat ion was con uumcd to support the ot he r shou ld ei ther go to wa r. With tile US in COJ11rol of the Philipp ines. japan a lso saw the United States :IS a ma jo r pote ntial hindr an ce to .mv plans they may have to ex pa nd furthe r so uth in the Pacific/ Asia region. That sa me possihil itv also posed a very real thre at in the mind s of US m ilita ry st ratL:'gists, It was :1 situ.u lon [hat would o ne day lead (0 war - a w ar in w hich the ba ulcships or bot h nation s wou ld p b y a major role. But that time W:IS still a lo ng way of f. Bac k in Europe . the un ifica tion o f the Ge rma n sta tes a nd the cro\\'ni ng o f \X'i1 helm I as L'mperor of the new na tion in I H7 t. a lso hera lde d the establ ish ment o f the Imper ia l Ge rma n Se-ven teen yea rs bier IhL' ma n w ho wou ld ign ite Euro pe into the 'war to end a ll wa rs'. Ka ise r Wilhe lm II. carne 10 the th ro ne . An extraordi nary ma n, he W:IS the gra ndso n of Brita in's Que-en Victoria . As : 1 ho y, Wilhelm had spe nt long pe riods in Eng land, with his g ran dpa re nts l\:I\'}'.
Kaiser Wilhelm II, the grandson of Queen Victoria, determined that he would one day build a batt/ef/eet to rival the p ower of the Royal Navy, Creating this fleet
and Eng lish cousi ns . l lis favou rite ho lidays we re spe nt w ith the British royal fam ily at Osborne Ho use . thei r ho liday ho me on the Isle o f \Vig ll[. From the grounds of th is magn ificent stately
severely damaged the cordial
ho me he co uld see Ihe hattlcxhi ps of the Ho yal ;\'~I\'Y o n exercises in the Selent . The sight o f the great nav al re views o ff Co wcs excited Ihe you ng Germa n prince w ith the dr eam that . o ne
and Britain.
da y, he wo uld be come the SU I)l"L'n H.~ com ma nde r o f a German navy w ith a ha llie fleet rluu would riva l the com bined forces o f the British Xavy. In late r years . and as a gesture in ac know ledgeme nt of \X'i1 helm' ~ great 100"e fo r the na\T , Q ueen Victoria made him a British Admi ral o f the Fle et a nd . wh ene ve r [he occasio n seeme d appropriate, he proud ly ap pe ared in the full d ress uniform of this hig h o ffice o f the Ro ya l Nol\")'. Arou nd th is tim e the Britis h Sec-re ta ry o f Fore ign Affa irs, Edw a rd G rey, mad e a prop he tic rema rk: The Germa n Empe ro r is like a battleship under full ste am hu t wit hout a rudder. HL' wi ll run us into a ca tastro phe one day.' By the end o ft he nineteenth ce ntury. Ge rman y had overtak e n Brita in as the most powe rful industr ial nation in Euro pe , wil helm II. no w kn o w n sim ply as the Kaise r, sa w his und ying
relationship between Germany
".1,
46 .:: - :a.. .-
'-
.I11ILllAIILES.lI.l£S
d es ire for Ge rma ny to be co me
;I
g re at se a-power hegi n
to assu me cred ible p ro p o rti o n!", fo r h is natio n wa s no
lo ng er an a lso-ra n hut a sig ni fi c lTlt po we r wh ich continued 10 grow in po litical . ind ust ria l an d fina ncia l stre ngth. The Kaise r had rea d Ca ptai n Maha n's bo o k o n th e import a nce o r sea- powe r to a nation with ambit ions
o f beco ming a n e m p ire , and w as greatly imp ressed , for it co n fi rmed his
O W I1
vie w s o n the path thai Ger man y
w o u ld n ee d to tak e 10 achieve g re at ness . As Ge rm a n nava l h istori an D r 'ce e m c r Hahn s tates: ' He rend the bo o k o f Ma ha n a nd w as so stro ng ly in fl ue nced be
ar ra nged its tra nsla tio n limo Ger ma nI a nd it w as p ublish e d in Ge rma ny. Th is ho o k no t o n ly infl uence d the Kaiser. hut a lso a num be r of naval o ffice rs including a yo ung ca ptain, Alfred Tirp itz.' The effec t this hook had on the Kaise r, a nd o n the fut u re o f the yo ung Germa n Na vy, was furt her confirme d by na va l histo rian , Dr Mic ha e l Epka nh nns: 'T he Em pe ro r w as so de e p ly imp ressed by Ma ha n 's w riting, he said he wa s d e vou ring his hoo ks, an d o rdered all his lie ute nants to read Maha n and regard his boo k as a kind of b ible for the Navy .' In IH97 Alfred Tirpitz, the n a Rea r Adm iral. was made Secreta ry of the Navy. By then he had fully de veloped h is ' Ris k 'The o ry' - a fo rmu latio n o f how the Ger man Navy co uld wi n do minance over the British Navy. Tirp itz recognized that Ge rma ny, po we rful as it was industrially, co uld no t build a fleet large r tha n Brita in's, hut Ge rmany cou ld buil d a lxur!c f lee t s tro ng e no ug h to wea ke n the Ro yal Navy significa ntly in battle . Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz provided the Kaiser with the argument and the strategy to authorise the massive expansion of the German Navy.
Thi s wo uld have the effect of red ucing the British fle et to a fo rce infe rior to that o f Fra nce o r Russia. Such a red uctio n in nava l po we r, Tirpitz bel ieved , would force concessio ns from the British, unw illing to risk furth e r hostilities, allowing Ge rma ny the freedo m to creak' an overseas emp ire of its o w n . This thesis event ua lly found a w illing sp onsor in the Kaiser, and in IH911, a Navy Bill w as pa ssed b y the Rci c hstag a utho rizing the e x pa ns io n o f th e Germa n Navy to nine tee n batt les h ips a nd fo u rte e n ar mou red cru ise rs b y 190 3, T his rep re se nted a d ram atic increase in size, co rrectly inte rpreted hy the British as a challenge to the ir hege mo ny of the sea , To sway public o pinion in this largel y landlocked country in favour of the vas t a mo unts of mo ne y this build ing p la n wo uld cost, Tir p itz fo rm e d the Ger ma n Na vy Le ag ue . It w as a re markable s ucc ess . Naval o fficers w e re se nt to un ive rsities, part icula rly in so uthe rn Ge rmany, to en list the suppo rt o f academics in a nat io nw ide cam paign of public d iscussio ns o n the me rits of the Navy Bill. By the turn o f the ce ntury the Leag ue boasted a lmost a millio n members, w ith this po w er ful po pula r s uppo rt, Tirp itz put forwa rd a nother BiII fo r further e x pa ns io n of the fle e t. T his Seco nd Nava l Law , passe d in 1900, a utho rized the stre ngth o f the navy (0 he inc reased to a to tal of thirty-e ig ht battleshi ps by 19 20. Wh ile the Law of IH911 had bee n viewe d by the British as Ge rmany ac q uiring a navy co mme nsurate with her ne w status in the wo rld, the passtng o f the Second La w w as a wate rshe d . The British fully rea lized that the Ge rma ns we re se rio us in the ir inte nt to cha lle nge Britai n o n the ocea ns of the wo rld . The y a lso recogn ized, as Tirp itz had predicted , that any future w ar they might get invo lved in w ith Russia and France would ha ve the po tential to leave them at the me rcy of the Ge rma ns.
SEA I ANES T O P OWE R
47
Brita in's immed iate response 10 the an nouncem ent o f the ne w German b uildi ng p rogramme was to build mo re battleships fo r the Roya l Navy . and bet we en 1902 and 1905 twelv e were laid do wn . The lo ng-te rm co nseq ue nce of this second Ge rman fleet ex pans ion was the beginn ing of a naval a rms race o f un preced e nted proporti o ns. But for the ne w-look battleshi ps at the turn of the ce ntury , thei r first rea l test in ba ttle wo uld occur, no t in European wate rs, bur in the se as
off Japan . T he Russia ns, w ith the ir Pac ific Fle et stat ione d in Port Arthu r, belie ve d that the Japa ne se would nOI tight a Euro pe a n powe r let alo ne o ne as po werful as Russia. The lines we re d rawn fo r w hat wo uld he a se ries of epic batt les for the C0 l1l111and of the se a in the Far East. O n 5 Februa ry 190 4 the japa nese Co m ma nde r-i n-C h ie f. Ad mira l Heiha ch iro To go , su mmo ned his co m ma nd e rs 10 a co n fere nce o n b o a rd hi s fla gsh ip . th e Britis h-hu ilt battle sh ip stttsas«. His sa m ura i swo rd lay o n th e ta ble . signa lling h is wa rlike int entions . Togo 's plan was 10 mou nt a p re- emptive strike o n the Russian vesse ls lying in Po rt Arthur - e ffect ive ly he gin ning the Russo-Ja pa ne se \'\Ta r. In th e ea rly da wn o f 9 February, he se nt five de stro ye rs o n a sur prise ra id into the co nfined wate rs o f the harbour to launch a to rpedo attack o n th e a nc ho re d Russian fl e et . 1'\\' 0 batt le sh ips , Retriz a n a nd Tsareuitcb. a nd the cr uise r Pal/a da we re hit whi le the J a pa ne se vess els w ithd rew w it hou t cas u a lty . T he Adm iral Togo who convincingly
fo llo wi ng da y, a fle et o f sixtee n Ja pane se sh ips led hy Togo aboa rd .Hikllsa bom bard ed the port. On 25 Fe b ruar y five Russian wa rships att empted to br eak o UI o f Port Art hur b ut
defeated a supe rior Russian fleet
were d rive n back by Ja pa nese ships , o f w hich two battle shi ps, Hatst te and vasbima, struck
ott the coas t of Japan in the
Russia n mi nes a nd sa nk . In a second brief e ng agement in Ap ril, the Russia n co mma nde r Adm ira l Makha roff ab oard the batt les hip
Battle of Tsushima in 1905.
tvtroparloosle p u rsu e d Ja pan ese c ru ise rs p rot e cting mine-la ying ope rations o utside Po rt Arthu r. Makha ro lT lost his flagship and his life , plus those of 630 crewmen. w hen he ra n o n 10 a mine . His re p laceme nt. Ad miral Wirhcfr. dashed w ith Japa nese forces in August off the islan d of Tsushima in a n atte m pt to jo in th e o the r Russian for ce s at Vlad ivos to k. O n 3 1 Decembe r. Port Arthur fe ll to Ja pan ese ground troops. To all inte nts an d purposes. the Russian Pacific Fle er ce ased to ex ist, with the exce ption of o ne a rmo ured cruise r an d severa l small cra ft ba sed at Vladivostok. For Russia. il was a se rio us strategic situatio n . the ir en tire eastern fla nk was no w e xposed to furthe r seaborne atta ck. Th e only co urse o pe n to them was to o rder the Baltic Flee t 10 the Far East w here its supe rior num be rs wo uld deal w ith the Japan ese o nce a nd fo r a ll. The logtsncs. ho we ver, we re fo rmi dable . Th e Russian com ma nder Admira l Rozhdc stvcn sky rece ived o rders to prepare his fleet for a vo yage ha lfway around the wo rld , to an u ltimate battl e w ith the Japan ese fle et. \'(lith no bases of thei r ow n ell route. the Russians we re o bliged 10 ta ke a s m uch co a l a nd materia l w ith the m as the y co u ld . •IS we ll as hospita l a nd re pa ir s hips . While pa ssing through th e No rth Sea . the Russia n fl e et . co nce rne d that Ja pan e se torpedo boat s wou ld be in wa iting. o pe ne d fire o n fishing vessels. sinking a British
The forward twin 12-inch guns of Admiral Tog o 's flagship at Tsushima. the British- built
Mikasa This ship is now preserved at Yokosuks, Japan.
tra w le r. A se rio us incid ent with th e Ro yal Navy wa s narrow ly avo id ed . w hen Ro zh destve nxky re ached Tang ie r it was agreed that his flee t would he d ivid ed into two g rou ps: the smal ler vessels wou ld sail th roug h th e Suez Ca nal. w hile the o the r, larger, ships wou ld m a ke th e p assag e ro u nd the Ca pe o f Good Ho pe . O n 1 Ja n uary 190 5, wo rd rea ched the Russ ian co mmander, a nchored in Taruatave. Mad agascar . (hat POll Art h ur had fallen to the Ja pan e se . This change d the s itu atio n d rama tica lly ~IS Ro zhd c xtvvn xky was no w d e n ied th e ha ttleships o f the Pacific Fleet as w ell as the flee t hase itsel f. He now faced the p rosp ect of sa iling his fleet across th e Indian Ocea n and o nwa rds to Vlad ivosto k, th e o nly base o n the Pacifi c co a st a va ilab le to h im . T h is wo uld e n tai l sa iling th ro ugh the co m pa ratively restricted wate rs betwee n Korea and Ja pan . O n 27 ;"-la y 1905 the Russ ia n flee t w as s ig h te d h y adva nce u ni ts o f Ad m iral To g o 's fleet a p proachi ng the Straits o f Ko rea o ff the isla nd o f Tsus hima . Rozhdestvc nsky wa s still two da ys' sailing from Vlad ivo stok. And Togo , made awa re o f Russian mo ve me nts h y rad io . was waiti ng. On pape r, the Russians ha d a massive advantage, nu m be ring eleven bat tlesh ips. five large cruise rs, th ree s maller cru ise rs. nine d est royer s a nd various tra nspo rt vessels . O f th e battleships. SlIl '(/I"Ol' ( Rozhdestve nsk y's flag sh ip ). ttorodtno. Ore! and Alexander III wert: ne w - each 13.500 to ns, armed with fo ur 12-inch OOS-m m) and twelve (i-inch ( 152.5-mm ) gu ns, po we red h y triple e xpa nsion e ngine s g iving a s peed of 17.5 knots. By co m pa rison . the Japa ne se fle e t co ns ist e d of fo u r battle sh ips . te n la rg e c ru isers. te n sma ll cruisers an d tw enty-o ne d estro ye rs as well as n um e rous s ma lle r cra ft. Three o f th e fo u r British-h ui lt bat tle sh ip s w e re o n ly a fe w yea rs o ld : " film sa (Togo 's flagship), Asa b i an d
Sbtktsbima. The fo urth, Fuji. w as se ve n yea rs o ld . These s hips also mo u nted fo ur 12-inch (305-
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From a japan ese pe rspective. the Battl e of Tsushima represe nte d mo re than [uxt a victo ry at sea , as japan ese nava l author and historia n Pro fesso r Kiyosh i Ike da ex plains : 'Peo ple we re d ated wit h the victo ry a nd sud de nly Togo becomes a na tio nal he ro . j apan W OIl :1
thorou ghly co nvinci ng vic tory which tot all y sur p rised all the co untries of Euro pe .
Now susp icion o f Japan grew. All the major powers in Europe had co lo nies in Asia. T hey
were afraid that Japa n's sphe re of influence mig ht widen in Asia . Now th is was the:ca use of th e -yc l low peril " theory. Aft er the
R U SS O -J lp:II1 L'SC
wur P...-o p lc real ized the need
for a rmaments , a nd therefore battleships to 1)(.' manufactured domestically. Steelworks and o the r d ocks and factories fo r b uilding ships were e sta blis hed at Yokosuka. Sasebo. Nagasaki and Ku re .' On IXKtnJ Ad miral Togo's n ~lgship Andr ew Lambe rt describes.
JIi/..~{ls{l.
a Britis h na va l officer had been mak ing not es. as
"Tsus hima confirme d the s u pe rio rity o f the he av y na va l g u n as th e ke y sh ip-killing Mikasa steams into action at the Battl e of Tsushima in May 1905.
we apo n o f the pe riod . The Brit ish naval observer, Ca pta in Pa ke nh am . SpL'T1I the w ho le: han k" o n the br idge o f the flagsh tp sttkasa. exce pt fo r a brief pe riod wh ere he had to
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n ,\ Iay 1905 the Port smou th s hipyard wa s authorized by Admiral
Fi~her
to build a new kin d o f battlesh ip - a bat tleship that would re volutionize the British Navy in the sa me w ay th at .\{(//)' Rose, a nother
1'011~mouth
vessel , had do ne almo st 400 ye ars e a rlie r. Th is s h ip was to demonst rate to
the w orl d tha t Britannia did ind eed still rule the wa ves. By October 1905, when the ship was officia lly laid down , 11 00 men were w ork ing s ix d a ys a w e ek to p ro ve n ot o n ly th a t Brit ai n built th e mo s t powerfu l ships, b ut th at it b uilt them faster th an a ny o the r na tion . By 10 Februa ry 1906 Portsmouth sh ipwrights had lau nched the new vessel. and it w as ready for p rel imina ry trials by O ctober. Th e sing le mo st importa nt s h ip in th e development of th e mo d ern battlesh ip was re ve a le d for a ll to see : Hl\IS Dreadnougbt.
T he s h ip wa s diffe rent from a ny o ther battleship befo re he r. She was b igg er, lo ok ed more purposefu l a nd , ra th er th an tw o , s he qu ite clea rly ca rried s ix heavy twi n tu rre ts . \Vell below d e cks - a nd not as o b vio us were stea m turbines ins tea d o f re ci proca ting ma ch inery, w h ic h w ould
gin .' this new-age fighling s hip a speed of 21 knots, Sh\.' W:IS heralded as the most awesome nava l \H 'apOn ever conceived. a re vol ut io n in warfare at sea . Her very nam e im med iately became the g\.'rl\.'ric term applied 10 all ba ttlesh ip s that follo wed . Existing bat tles h ips in the world navies Ill'CIII1\.' 'p re- d re adno ugh ts' a nd were consigned 10 the: second ran k. Despite: the: fanfa re and accolades s urrou nding /)retltlllo11gbl, s he was e ntirely p redictabl e. as evidenced hy plans for similar s hips o n the d ra win g bo ard s of Ameri ca n . j apa ne se a nd Italian naval construct o rs. xto rc heavy gu ns o f ever-i ncreasi ng size , coupled with hig her speed. W:IS tlK' only way for the: ba ttleship to develop. This may seem an obvious po int in retrospect hut. for almo....t th ree d ecade- before . bat tles hip armament had been made: up o f rel ativel y few hcavv gUlls plus 1ll11l1\.'roUS s mal ler -ca libre weapons . us ua lly mo unt ed around the sides o f th e ship,
A number of f:Klo rs. combi ne-d w ith the experience at Tsuxhima. po inted the way forward for till' adoption of un ified main an11:II1K'nt for baul e-htps. l'\\.'w syste ms o f fire control un der deve lo pme nt. togeth er wi th th e increasi ng ran ge s at w h ich gu nn ery duels were likely 10 lxfoug ht . su~\., ....ted that g uns o r identica l size would return mo re accurate spotting information . That is. it W~IS ea sier 10 s pot the sp las h\.'s from 11K' xlu-lls of g uns which had the sa me balli stic perfo rma nce tha n it was fro m the sp lashes made by a ran ge: o f d ifferent-ca libre g un s. \X'it h a number o f 'a ll lug-g un : proposa ls unde r conside ra tio n a nd in the ea rly stagL's o f
The first all big -gun battleship, Britain 's HM S Dreadnought leading a line of warships. So powerful was the impac t of Dreadn ought on the future
development w ith var ious wo rld navies ~ 11 much the same time . it is to the cred it of the British First Sea l.ord , Ad miral Sir j oh n Arbu thnot Fish er. that /) r('{/(/ llu llp,bt was the first 10 he built .
design of all capi tal ships that her
As ea rly as IlJOj , tht..' Italia n 1l:IV:1I cons tructor Vitto rio Cuuibc n i had discu ssed such a s hip in
for all battleships that followed.
name became the generic term
,.
The British battleship
an Influent ial pap er. Sim il arly. the Am eri cans were we ll ahead w ith th e design of th e: South
Common wealth ot the King
Carolina Class mo unting e ight 12· jnch (305· 111111) g uns w he n f) relldlloup,bt was laid clown . The
Edward VII Class. Ships of this
japa nese had also reached th e same conclus ion some time be fo re Tsu xhima h UI were not abl e to pU I Ihe concc p i int o pra ctice unt il th e Sensu Class o f 1909. His to ry s uggests that th o se wit h mo st to lo se re s ist c ha nge. In the case of the Britis h
class were typ ical of battleship development prior to the appearance of Dreadn ought
in 1906.
Admi ralt y this wa s no t so. Th e y were pr epar e d to w rite o ff, at le ast te ch ni ca lly, th e ir V;:ISI p re ponderance o f existing, 'p re- d re ad no ug h t' battle ships. Dread nought re se t the b.ut leship league score at 1 for Brita in, 0 fo r the res t. This was a dangerously slim lead for the world 's
lead ing naval power. The pre-dreadnoughts remained viable to a degree, hut not one of them cou ld opera te in the same sea space as Dreadn ought. The extent to which the strength of world navies was oblite rated hy the in troduction of Dreadnougbt G in he gaugeu h y (he numbers of p re-d readnoughts in their ha llie flee ts , as seen in the tab le above right. Each one of these had to he e ffec tively w ritten -off as a major capital s hip b y each world power.
Dreadnongbt o wed mu ch to Adm ira l fi sh er - a m an d e scribed hy Dr Eric Grove as 'the d o m in at in g fig u re in the Ro ya l Navy' s h istory in th e ea rly ye a rs o f the cen tu ry - a n extraord ina ry ma n, a stra ng e ma n - a geni us. I thin k a little hit mad. like mo st gcn fuses a re ,
- '.:..._ . . . . . .IIAiIlil..._~ 55
E!UillLTIl lLllRfu\illLUlLl.GillL
hUI a man willing to
CO Ill \.'
up with radical solutions for
radi cal times.' In fifty y e ~lrs o f se rvice in the Royal Navy. Fisher ros e from ca d et to First Sea Lord , His cease less com mitment to reform and greater levels o f effici en cy
The world 's major battleship fleets of predreadnoughts in 1905 Established po wers Britain
53
Russia
hlunt i:lngua g c and the harsh measures that 'Ja ckie' Fis her o fte n used to get his way mad e him enemies wh o cons ide re d that he w a s re ckless and vengeful.
27 (including four smaller coastal defence battleships)
France
18
The re is no qu estion . th ough . that during his first
New powers
pe riod as First Sea Lo rd he brought the Royal Navy to :1 high stutc o f c ffl civncy and readiness. In 1 ~ 9 l) Rear-Admiral Fis her was appointed ;. ..
USA
ea rru..-d him ~I devoted group o f supporting n:I\'31
of fice rs kn own col lect ively as (,he 'fishpo nd". However.
Germany Japan
Vice-Admiral Sir John 'Jackie ' Fisher during his period as
27
Commander-In -Chie f of the
25 8
Mediterranean Fleet. His reforming zeal brough t swee ping
Com m ander of the Mediterranean Fleet. For the next
changes to the Royal Navy and
three years . he crafted this fleet into an e ffic ie nt fighti ng force. In 190 2 Fisher left thi s co m ma nd 10 become Second Sea Lord . In th is ro le he: th o roughly o ve rhau le d the education
ensured that Brit ain was first to
and truinlng for ~1 1I en trants into th e navy. whet her seamen, o fficers o r e ng ineers , In 190.3, Fis her became Co m m a nd e r-in-C h ie f Po rtsmo u th . re cog nized ~ I S the p re cursor 10 the to p joh - First Sea Lord . In Octobe r 190·1 he was confi rmed in tha t post. Fis her's first cris is ca me alm o s t im m e d iat el y a!" the Russ tan Haltic Flee t. on ih w ay 10 a n nihila tio n o ff Japan , fire d on Britis h trawl e r!" in the No rth Sea (svc page ,iX). As a di p lo mati c crisis w ith Russ ia lo o me d , Fisher reminded the governmen t th at Germa ny was the pot e ntial e nemy. no t Russia . a nd th e cr isis was averted. During his period in the Me d ite rra ne an . Fis her cond uct e d a numher of trials to improve gunnery , Battle ran~es at th.n lime were less than .3(X)() yards and Fisher'!" trials sh o wed that ranges o f up (0 6000 yards and more were possihle if good fire control procedures were adop te-d . Ilis trials sh owed that accurate range measurement was hesl ac hieved when shell s p las he s fell -ovcr' o r 's ho rt ' o f th e target. Simple adjustm ent would a llo w the next s hd l to land in the middle and thus hit the ship. This prcKCSS was called 'spotting" and was be-t achieved when g u ns o f uniform cal ibre were used rath er than mixed cal ib re s. It was fo u nd that shell splash es from lighter o rd na nce o bscu re d the sp lashes from th c a ll important 12-inch (.305-ml11) guns, Be ~lring in mind the legend that has grown up around Fisher, characte riz e d hy his rhetoric 'h it hard
a nd hit first'. it m igh t easily he ima g ine d that hc natura lly tended towards th e hea viest gun possihle. In fact th is ix not so , At o ne stage in the evolutio n of the ba ttles h ip design he favo ured IO-in ch (254 -m m) gu ns as they had a high e r rate of fire tha n th e 12-inch (.30;111m ). The se lect io n o f l .2-in ch gu ns in the fina l d e s i ~ n W~IS d o wn to the realities of spotting in fire control. The
"
p roduce an 'all-big- gun' battleship , HM S Dreadnought
T ilE " A T TI ES H IP S
The hull of HMS Dreadnought after the launch at Portsmou th Dockyard in 1905. Dreadnought rendered all existing battleships obso lete and challenged the industrial capacity of both Britain and Germany in a race to outbuild one another.
argument put forward was that spott ing the splashes of the first salvo landing near the enemy wa s vital in o rde r to ma ke co rrections befo re firing the second salvo . The time taken for shells 10 rea ch the target area was therefore more important than rate o f fire . In this respect. there was little difference between the 12-inch and the to -inch gun. Howe ve r, th e latest design of l 1-inch gun was more a ccurate and its sa lvo es landed as a tig hte r group ~H long ra nges . Fina lly, the: 12:-inc..'h wea pon obviously had grea ter destruct ive effect and thus became the choice for Dreadnought . Give n Fish er's natu re . the time e la ps ing be twee n form u lating the conce p t and huilding the ship had to be sho rt. Fishe r es tablished a nd c haired a Commit tee o n Design s in Dece mbe r 1904, to loo k at the design of future ba n lcs htps and a rmou red c ruise rs. It first me t ca rlv in Ja nu ary 1905, w ith the brief to conside r designs base d o n an 'all b ig-gun ' main armament o f t z-mch guns , a speed o f 21 kno ts and 'adequate armour" . It was o bvio us from the o utse t that the committee was co nside ring a ship that would he a signifi cant lea p ah ead in design
FJ'llIlUL.IlLLllilLillNil.l1JGJ.I.L ENTE R T HE OR FAJ) NO U GU T
and firepowe r. Afte r months of dis cussio ns and delibe rations, th e q uestion o f Dreadnougbr» d c s tg» wa s finall y settle d . Argu ment s o ver o ffe ns ive ca pa b ilities vers us d efens ive vuln e rabiliti e s. and a rmamen t we ight ve rs us s h ip s ize . had been res o lved w ith the co m p ro m ises typical of a com mit tee-produ ced d esign, and so me o f the weaknesses. D~I V i d K. Brown . re tire d De p ut y Ch ie f Nava l Arc hit e ct o f the Ro ya l Co rps of Na va l Co ns truc to rs . co mments d ry ly o f D r('{{du ollp,bt: 'It is strang e that suc h a highly skilled group o f na va l o ffice rs and e ng inee rs s ho uld
(0111e
lip w ith a co nfigu ration w hic h wa s so unsa tisfactory.'
Th e issue o f sp eed wa s ad d ressed hy s peci fying stea m turbines . th en a very new wa y o f p ro pe lling sh ips , There were severa l d e sig ns fo r stea m tu rb ines in e x iste nce a t the end o f th e nin eteent h Cen IU!)': ho wever . it was Charles Parsons w ho drew atte ntio n 10 his patented turbine w hen he ste amed the experimenta l. lOO-foot (30- metre) lo ng Turb i n ia at high speed throug h the se rried ra n ks o f Briti sh wa rships at the Diamond J u bilee Re vie w o f 1897 , The impl icat ions o f th is fo rm of propuls io n fo r hig h-speed cra ft suc h as torpedo boat d est roye rs were obvious . a nd the British Admira lty quickly orde red se ve ra l o f th ese vessel s to he filled w ith Pa rso n's steam turb ines fo r evaluatio n , At the sa me lime , co m me rc ia l in terests on th e River Clyde equi p ped the sma ll passenger ship King Edu -ard with tur bin e s. w h ile th e Cu nard Stea m Ship Co , fine d the 19.500-grt line r Can nanta with Parso ns turbines in 1904 before fitting the m into th e 3 1.500-g rt liner s Lttsitan ia and .1 fll uret1l11ill, Tu r bi nes were unquestio na bl y the wa y to go an d thei r in trod uct io n effect ivel y m ar ke d th e end o f rec iprocat ing ma ch inery in mo st larg e o ce a n-go ing vessels, inclu d ing the future figlll ing shi ps in th e majority o f wo rld navi es, With h is usua l d rive . Fisher determ ined that Dreadnougbt wo uld be bui lt amid g rea t secrecy a t Po rts mouth Nava l Dock yard in o ne yea r. To ma ke this deadl ine possi b le . her struc tu re was d esigned to be simpl e ye t as stro ng as po ss ible , To save delays in b uild ing her armamen t. her 12-inch (305- m m) m a in turre ts we re dive rte d fro m th e batt le s h ip s Lo rd 1\'e1S0 1l a nd bu ild ing o n the rive rs Tvn c a nd Clyde , Stee l plate s were s ta nda rd ize d w he re pos sible . ;1I1d a huge amount of wo rk in va rio us shops was u nde r wa y he fo re the keel wa s laid o n 2 October 1905 , At a we igh t o f 608 8 d is pla cement Ions, Dreaduougbt was b un ched
A gam(!1I11l 01l ,
o n 10 Feb ruary 1906, afte r just over four mo nths o n th e huilding slip , She began trials a yea r and o ne da y a fter the keel wa s laid . o n .3 O cto ber 1906 , a nd was fina lly co m p le te d the followi ng Decembe r. Ureadnongb! re p resent e d not o nly a turn ing point in battles hip d es ign : she a lso ca rried Fish e r's hopes tluu her uniq ue po we r w ould p rove a wea po n fo r peace . rathe r than fo r wa r. as And re w Lambert explain s: T he Dr(!lldl1o/lght itsel f has
10
he seen as a crit ica l clement , no t in p re parat io n fo r wa r,
b ut in Ihe avo ida nce of war, Fish er's o bject ive throughout his career \\ .: \ 0,; to d et e r war b y p o inting ou t a nd d emon strating in rea listic term s to fo re ig n rh ':d s th at it was tmpo sstble to c hal le nge the Ro ya l Navy e ffe ct ive ly. As a result he staged the mo st astoni s hi n g p ub licity stu nt of bu ilding the s h ip in a ye a r a nd a d a y; a feat hithe rto
unprecedente-d . a nd ne ver subsequent ly eq uall ed, The pu rpose of this was 10 have o ne o f these sh ips afloat. in se rvice befo re an y o ther nat ion had laid o ne down , He w asn 't bre ak ing the rules because th e Japa nese and the Ame ricans were a lso think ing about d readn ought -style s hips - Ihey just had n't gOI around to bui lding the m, Fisher bui lt one , took it 10 sea , s ho we d il o ff. and essent ia lly sa id 10 the w o rld , ~ I f yo u wa nt to be a first class na vy. yo u have to buil d th ese no w - uhcse arc mu ch mo re expensive , th e y're much bigger and the y have infra structu re impli cat ions for yo ur d o ckyar d s and vario us ot he r aspe ct s o f yo ur na va l ma ke -u p , Arc you goi ng to sta y in th is gam e ?" It's a gamb le r's move. I !c's raised the stakes - who 's go ing to re ma in a ma jor nava l powe r
after the IJ readJlouR/;{(
'.,,'' fts
......_IiiC ..
57
The cla im that IJrelld llollp,!.Jt was built in one yea r and one day was certainly 'a n astonishing publicity stun t'. BUI how rea l was the lime frame? Da vid Bro w n has definit e views o n th e actual time taken : ' Fis he r tried to mislead people tha t s he w as buil t in o ne year a nd o ne day. In fact there was six months' pre-fabrication be for e sh e was b id down a nd ahOUI thr ee months' finishing work afler she'd done trials. She p robabl y rcallv took eig hte e n to nine teen months to build. a nd this is co nsis te nt with Portsmouth Dock yard 's re cords. Portsmouth Dock yard built battl eships faster than .my o the r royal d ockyard , a nd that was '1Ix >Ut a yea r faster than an y comme rcial yard : whatever the: actu al time: frame W :IS, it was ce rtai nly fast a nd s hocked e:\"(,.' I")' o the r n.I\·y a nd shipbuilding ya rd in th e world. Dreadnought w as the: sensati on sh e W :IS inte nded to be, Th e first 'a ll big-gun' luutlcship. the: first turbine -d riven battl e sh ip . .1I1d th e: first to steam at 21 kn ots, On th e o ther hand, IJreadliollp'!.J t also incorporated a number of und es ira bl e fea tu re s rh,u would take Hoyal :":
_=mlM6·~
IiliI£lLI.lIJLlllU'.AillLOJUGllJL
...
s h ip bas ed o n hea vy gu ns und h igh speed . At Iss ue- at th e tim e was the c hotec o f th e m ain .rr m .uncn t . Th e m erit s o f c.z - tnch ( 23 ·1 -l1lm). l O-Inch (25 '1-111 111)
and 12-in r h <30-;-111111) g u ns w en: hotl y deba ted. As a lready mentio ned . ove r a pc riot! o f time Fis her h ad c o m e to the view that th e 12-in ch gu n s hou ld h e
adopted for the: ne w ha u les hi p. Th e ne w a rmou red cruiser. howeve r. was to retain the 9 .2·i ndl g u n . As wi th D readnougbt, it was know n that o the r navi es were also moving towa rd s the concept of a fas t. heavily a rmed c ru ise r. In 190·L for example . Ih (.· Jap an ese laid dow n two ar moun•.-d c ru isers mountin g fou r 12-
inch (30 ; -m m ) gu ns . wi th a spe ed of 20 kn ots. The c h o ice' of larger g uns by o ther navies for these type o f vessels would eventual ly influe nce th e fina l British design . An l.'arly concept developed by Fis her in 190·l, refe rred to as H.\IS 1I11llppmacba lJle, described a vessel with a d isplacement of 15.000 tons. speed 25
kno ts; urmumc nt 16 x 9 .2-inc h (2.3"I-mm) g uns ; w ith a rmoun,-c) prot ection of b-inch 052.5-mm) ma in belt . thic ke ni ng to H-inc h (203-111111) o n lhl.' barbe rtcs . The c hoice of the main a rma ment fo r this type o f ve sse l w a s still a m a jor Issue. As fast s hi ps w ith 12-inch (305-m m) gu ns, these a rmou red cr uisers wou ld h a ve lh e ahili ly
10
p u rs u e a nd dest ro y a ll o th e r ximil a rl y a r m ed cru tsc rs .
HM5 DREADNOUGHT S27FT COVERALU ~ BZFT ~ 26FT 61N (160.6 ~ 2S ~ B.lMl DISPl.ACEMENT, IB ,1I0 TONS MAcHINERV, DIRECT-DRM STEAM TURBINES 23,000 SHP 21 KNOrS 10 ~ 12-INc.H C3O>-MMl GUNS IN FM TWIN TURRET>; 27 ~ 12POUNDER, S ~ IB-IN C~S7-MMl TORP£DO TUBES BELT II TO ~ IN czso TO 100 MMl, BULKHEADS B IN C203 MMl, BARBETTfS II TO ~ IN. TURRET> II IN 773 CAPPRO~.l DIMENSIONS,
Im po rta n tly, it was cons ide re d th e y m ight also h a ve :1 ro lc in fle e t actio ns in mai nta ini ng co ntact w ith a n e n e my battle fle e t a n d , w ith th e ir h ig h s pee d ca pa b ility. lhl.'y co u ld p la y a vit a l role in p ic k in g o ff an y s hip s that s traye d fro m th e p ro tect io n o f th e main fl eet.
ThL' a rg um en t in favo u r o f the 12-inch g u n won lhe d ay - a dec- ision e ns u ring that th is ne w d e s ig n wo ul d resul t in a he av ily a rme d fig hting s h ip tha t wo ul d ce rta in ly h c n o o rd ina ry armo ure d cruiser, To accommodate till.' boile rs and ma chine ry needed to p roduce the requ ired hig h speed, the c ruise rs' hu lls w o uld be larger tha n tho se o f the battleshi p " Having the same armame nt as th e b.ut lcship. th ey were a n e xtraord ina rily po we rful figh tin g sh ip" The ir siZt' alone a nd the g u ns Ihl.')" mo u nted made th em awesome . even glamorous, vessels and ce rta inly th e mo st expe ns ive s h ips a floa t. Ho weve r. pro te cted as it was b y o n ly th e lig ht a rmou r o f an a rmoured cruiser, Fish er had un wittingly crea ted th e most cont ro ve rsial . and in tim e tragic, warship o f the d read nought e ra " The first 'ban k-cru tsc r' b u ilt fro m Ih is highly con troversial des ign was
H~IS
I sn-inctbte. As
with /)"(,lIdIlOIl~ b l, tu rbi nes w ou ld provide th e speed - in th is ca se . 25.5 kn ots. Fo u r twin tu rrets mou n ting 12-in ch (30 ':;-mm) g uns provided the s h ip 's m ain armament , wi th one fo rward , o ne aft and one o n eit her bea m , But w ith o n ly 6· to -t -mch (1 52.5- mm to 100-mm ) main belt armou r, and o nly 7-i ndl 0 7H-m m ) arou nd th e barbcttcs. th e pr o tection o f the se ships
W :IS ,
Unli ke
indeed. mini ma l. /)"(,1Ic1 1l01l~b l,
where only o ne shi p
W :I S
b ui lt, th ree of these new Invincible Class
armoured crui....ers we re o rdere d . All th ree . tnrinctble. lndcnnita ble a nd Inflexible. we re laid down in 1906 in p riva te ya rds a n d com p leted in 190H. Th e term 'ba nl c c rui sc r. a lthough ap plied to Ihe s...· th ree s h ips, di d no t come in to o ffici al
USl.'
unt il 1911. For the second time
in as ma ny vears the British had Inve n te d :1 new ty pe o f wa rsh ip . ,\ Io sl of the o ther ma jor navies had no o pt io n h ut to fo llo w , Th e b un c h o f
/) ,.('(/(IIl ()II~ bl ,
fo llowed d o scl y o n its he el s hy the int rod uct ion o f th e
th ree In v inc ib le Class 'ba u le c ru tse rs'. add ed moment um to th e na val a rm s race be twee n Brit ain a n d Ge r m a ny - a race th a t h a d re all y be g u n ha c k in 1H9 H wh e n t h e Ge r m a n Ik ichstag passed the first o f Tir p itzs i' a\'y Bills . Th is wa s a rac e that Britai n co u ld ha rd ly fail to wi n th ro ugh the s hee r siz e o f its in d us tria l a nd s hi p b uiklmg ca p:lCily, h ut o ne that Ge rma ny wa s fo rce d fo r th l'
G t.·r m ~ln
10
n ation ,
e ntt.:'r if it w as
lO
ac hi e ve lh e n a\'a l s lre ng th th at Tirpil z h ad se t
- 59
WILLS'S CIGARETTES.
•
-. .-
.. Tobacc o companies capitalised
on the way battleships cap tured the pub lic imaginatio n. The
In the creation of the battles hip. the desig n and construc tio n of the hull. the armou r protectio n a nd the e ngi nes ca pable o f S p t,:T US of well o ve r 20 kn ots in all sea cond itio ns w ere o nly pan o f th e story. Providing the a rma me nt - the awesome firepo wer that mad e the battlesh ip the
dreadnoug ht batt/ecruiser
ult im ate ocea n -go ing fig hting machine - imposed restricti o ns o n the nu mber that an y on e
Invincible was faster but less well
cou ntry co uld de liver within a set lime frame . The British kne w the y co uld bu ild the ships. h ut the y also knew their rival xhlpyard x in Ge rma ny were rapidl y increasi ng thei r ca pac-ity to de liver. But co uld th e German armament factori es maintain the sup p ly of gu ns a nd equ ipme nt to arm their batt leships? And rew Lambert picks up the sto ry:
armo ured than Dreadnough t and carried a heavy pun ch of eight 12-inch guns.
'The ke y to the prod uction o f d readnou ghts shi fted from build ing ships to bu ild ing gun mountings a nd heavy turrets. The critica l British intelligen ce effort up to the First \''orld war was to unde rstan d how ma ny tu rret -mounti ng shops Kru p ps lthc Ge rma n ar ma me nt mak e rs) had. Th e num ber o f turre ts the y could b uild per year was the number of gun mount ings they could fit aboard haul cxhips. a nd from that co uld wo rk ou t how man y battleships could he built , TIle Ger mans did not have e noug h ca pucitv to acce lera te beyo nd a ce rtain point. Wh en the y b uilt a battleship fo r th e Gree ks , they had to buy the guns from the United States because they co uldn't take an y o f their own ca pac ity. The British resp onse was to en su re the y had mo re ca pacity. and co uld b uild more ships - simp le arithmetic .'
nnl'aI.'m . ...._.-: 61
L"U..E.RJ.llJUlRL\JlloIilliG lJ IIlJT=----
- '......
O n average a British d rea d noug ht could he built in about twenty-four mo nt hs , The Ge rma n e qu ivalent took thi rty-six mont hs, Britis h po licy - the Two Po w er Sta ndard - had been perfectly achievable w hen Fra nce and Russ ia were the navies in co nte ntio n. hUI the rapid growt h of the German :"::I"y upset the equatio n :IIlU pu t additio nal p ressu re o n Britis h resources and co m mitme nt, St ra ngel y, at th e , 'e f)' momen t it was importan t for Brit ain to bui ld up he r advantage in n u m be rs after Dreadnougbt, she reduced her annual buildi ng com mitme nt o f battleships , immediately p re ci p itatin g a nati on al crisis, The issu e came to a head at the e nd of 19OH. and res ulted in fierce po litical debate and o utrage d public o pinion th rou g ho ut the first ha lf of 1909 , w hen Ge rm:1I1 com ple tion rates we re compared aga inst
British completio ns . it seeme d at first that Brita in was we ll o n th e way to a co nvi nci ng su periority. Ho weve r. th e Libe ral govern me nt. t,..lccted to po wer in 1906, q uestio ned th e se fig u res a nd . :IS a re s u lt. tw o ba tt les hips w ere cance lled. o ne eac h from the years 1906 and 1907, By 19GB. membe rs o f the go ver nment . inclu d ing the Presid e nt o f the Boa rd of Trad e , the .:H -yea r-()Id 'cc tnsro n Ch urch ill. we re inte nt on pu rs uing a po licy o f so cial refo rm at the t..'x!x ·nse of a rma me nts , By th is tim e , the ltrttis h Adm ira lty w as becomi ng ser iously ala rmed at de ve lopme nts in Ge rm any where. it
was belie ved . the ba ttles hip-bu ildi ng p rog ramme had been ac celera ted . The n ew First l o rd of th e Admira lty. Regina ld ~ l cK enn a .
reacted hy putting fo rward the po liticall y un season a ble proposi tion th at th e govern men t s hou ld au thorize six banlcshi ps in 190H inste ad of the agreed two. .\ ld\.L'nn ;1 W:IS looking ahead to the yea r 191 2 w he n it seemed cert ai n that Germany wo uld han..' thirteen d readnoughts completed. compan-d to Britain's planned sixteen. Th is was hardly
•
the de cisive maj ority needed to maintain Royal :":;1\')' superiority. Brit ish concerns rested o n
two points: that the Germans were scc rc tlv huying additional quantities of nickel - esse ntia l in IllL' manu factu re of guns and armour; and tha t the a lready massive
HAAS INVINC.IBLE
Krupp works at Essen we re being sign ificant ly e xpa nded for the prod uction of battl eship turrets and guns" Furthermore. info rmation from the na va l attaches of several count ries indicated that more dreadnoughts were lx-ing laid down tha n
DIMENSIONS,
Ge rma ny ran-d 10 ac knowled ge . .\ !eKe n na . hacked h y Fish e r. went as far as sayi ng that hy 19 12 there w as
DISPLACEMENT, 17, 373 TONS
:1
possihility the Germans would ha ve twenty-one d read noug hts in com missio n, In ,\ Iarch ICX)'"). a packed House o f Co mmons heard ~ Ic Kt..·n n:l req ues t that a tot a l of ciglu d read noug hts he bu ilt. Th is re q ue st was s tro ngly o pposed. hy no ne more: so than \Vinston Ch urc hill. A compromise sol ution was reached in wh ich four d readnoug hts wo uld he auth o rize d in 1909. followed hy four o thers in 1910 - if events in Ge rma ny justified the incre ase , \'(' hile Ihe de bate ra ged. th e pr ess go t ho ld of the sto ry a nd bla zed at the governme nt for gh'ing away the 'priceless 1H."'rilage o f ce nturies 10 bala nce a part y hu d ge l', O utraged public o pinion was mobi lized unde r tilt.' slogan coi ned hy the Unioni st P:Il1Y: '\'('e want eight a nd we
MACHINERY,
S67fT (OVERILU Y lefT 61N Y 26fT 21N (172.8 Y 2~ Y 8M)
",,000 IHP
SPEED,
2SS KNOTS
ARMAMENT,
8 Y 12-IN (305-MM) C".UNS; 16 Y ~ -IN (100MM) ; S Y 18-IN (~57 MM) TORPEDO ruBES
PRMeT10N ,
MAIN BELT 6 TO 't IN ClS2S TO 100MM) ; SARBETTES 71N Cl78MM) 78~
(APPROY.)
62
won't wait.' In July the government caved in a nd authorized construction o f ..-iglu dr eadnoughts. The: 0 3\"31 sca re o f 1909 was finall y o ve r. TIIL'fC was an interesting postscript to the e q ua tio n: conce rned at the appare nt lack of British dreadnough ts. hoth Austral ia and :"ew Zealand o ff e re d to finance tilt: co nstructio n of ( W O capital ships. This o ffe r was acce p ted and the bau lecrutse rs Australia a nd Sell' Zeala nd we re added to the eight The mai n effect of th e 1909 sca re had been th e reaffirmati on of Brit ish commitment to
the battle fleet . B Ul wh at of the su pposed secre t Ge rman ha u lcsh ips that had trigge re d the w ho le nffuir? \Vhill' the t't:a rs that Ge rma ny had the ca pab iluy. and the inte ntio n. to o uth uild the British w o u ld e ve ntua lly prove g ro u nd less, there wa s some truth in reports of addi tiona l s hips bc tng lai d dow n . T his w as explai ne d late r w he n it tran spired tha t pri vat e German ya rd s, kn ow ing that d read nought o rde rs were due under the pr og ramme decreed hy the Rctchstag. had laid down several ahead of time at the ir own expense, in o rde r to retain s killed workmen in the ir shipyards.
The hull of the battlecru iser
New Zealand slips into the River Clyde in July 1911 as the tempo of the Ang lo-German naval race intensifies.
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E.NIElLIHE.JlllEAillillliGcllJL
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The act ual number o f British a nd German ca pital s hip s laid d own between 1905 and 1914 was as shown in the tabl e to the: righ t.
A massive industry of armour and
Pe rha ps the most sigmflca m fact ind icated by th ese figures is that in the nin e
yt..': l fS
o f th e g rea t
-: 63
gun- making grew up to support the building of dreadnought
11:1 \"al race Ic:ad ing u p 10 \'\'o r111 w ar J. si xty-s even ca p ita l s h ips were b ui lt by Britain a n d
battleships - here 12-inch gun
Ge rma ny - an an .'r.lge of o ne battles hi p o r bau lecruiscr c \"cf)"seven week s for nine yl.';.lrs ! 111<.' cos t and the effect o f this incredible o utp ut o n the nation al econo mies. a nd the lives of the people associa ted with th e s h ipbu ild ing a nd arma me nts industries in the se tw o cou ntries,
barrels are being tumed in the machine shop of a works in Coventry.
a rc ha rd to co mp re he nd. Then add th e cost of th e o the r classe s o f sh ips an d their a rmamen ts
that maul" u p the fl eets of hoth na tio ns. a nd th e tot al is almost be yond belief. And th ese
fi ~ures
represent o nly th e tw o major nati ons locked
Capital ships laid down 1905-1914 Battleships GB Germany
toget her in an a rms race. As th e next cha pte r will s how. th e rest o f the world's majo r ma ritime na tions were a lso b ui ld ing u p thei r bauleship llel:'ts - on a
s li~ h tly
red uced scale. b ut with mu ch th e same momentum
as Brita in and Germany.
1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 Sub total
1913 1914 Total
Battlecruisers GB Germany
0 0
o
4
4
1
3
o o
4 3 4
2 3 4
3
6
1
1
o
24 6
17 1
10
5
2
1
o o
o
32
19
10
6
1 1
3
2 1
o o 1
2 1
o 1
1
•
att es 1
o T
he years between the turn o f the tw entieth centu ry a nd th e beginn ing o f World Wa r I saw th e absolute peak o f battleshipbuild ing ac tivity in the entire history o f these incredible fighting
ships . Almost eve ry maritim e nation that boasted a navy boasted at least a co uple of battleships in thei r fleet . The bigger the nation . the more capital s hips their de fence strateg ists dema nd ed . Th e batt le fle et s o f the w orld becam e the symbols o f nation al stren gth , of indu strial power, and of wealth. Eve n sma ller, less dev e lo pe d count ries far from the parry a nd th rust o f European power politics , su ch as Bra zil, Argent ina and Chile . almo st bankrupted their nat ional eco no mies to purchase battleships for their navies. I n fact. in this extraordina ry e ra. o ne o f the major British
shipbui lding yards employed a full-time battleship salesman wh ose job it was to ca ll o n foreign governme nts . so liciting orders for these incredibly ex pe nsive ships-of-war. The world had gone battleship-mad. as this roun d-up of globa l maritime powers demo nstrates .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -"'_ lir.r..af.II'iI=m..__L
Great Britain After lJ rea dlloup,bt. the pace o f build ing battlesh ips and lxnt lecruiscr s gained momentum . The
Bcl lcro ph o n and St Vince n t Classes o f th ree s h ips - rhc n e xt stage o f de vel opme n t a fter Dread nou ght - went d own the slipways in fairly qu ick succession. In ma ny res pects they were repeats o f Drea dnoug ht wi th m ino r mod ifications: Ihe i nt ro d uc tion o f a -l-i nch ( 100· 111111 )
seconda ry armament fo r be lief d efe nce against d estroye r attac k, th e fitting o f a lo ng itud inal anti-
to rpedo bulkhead . and
IWo
tripod masts d istingui shed the m from their fam ou s predecessor.
S (1Hulle. laid do wn in 1909 . w as a n atte mpt ut co rrec ting the p roblems d iscove red in th e
layout of the 12-in ch (j0 5-1ll1ll) tu rre ts in pr e vio us s h ips. Th e tw o afrcr mo st tur re ts were superim posed: that is, mounted o ne o n to p of the o ther, a nd the wi ng turrets we re staggered to enable a lk'g ree o f cross-d eck fire. Despite these mod ificatio ns. many p roblems pe rsisted. For exa mp le , the s u pe rim po se d tu rre t co u ld no t fire di rectly over
(Il l'
lo we r tu rret be ca use o f
concuss ion to the turre t (Tl'W . It would p ro \'c a difficult probl em to overco me a nd the Co loss us Class sh ips wo uld re peat the N (1Jf1w e g un pla ce me nt with min o r mo d ification . TIll'
s he ll
:1
O rion Class of 1909 introduced the U .s -inch (.3'l.3-mlll ) gun wh ich cou ld fire a I·laO-po und dis ta nce of a bout 1·LOOO yards (2 1.840 metre s ). in compa riso n w ith the I1 S0-po un d
shell of the 12-ind l (305 -1ll1ll) gu n . From th is class onwa rds . British battlesh ips fina lly moved 10
an all-ce ntre-line arra ngc nu-m for the ma in armament tu rrets. The 155 -inch-gun ned ships also
The 'super-dreadnought ' Ajax
introd uced the te rm 'supe r-d re ad no ught'. One retro gra de ste p was the s iting o f the fore mast.
armed with ten 13.5-inch guns
which ca rrie d thc vita l n rc con tro l po s ition be h ind the fo re fu n nel. a re vers io n to th e ve ry
nears completion alongside the
unsatisfacto ry po sitio n used in Dn-adnougbt. The King George V and Iro n Duke Classes we re
Cunard liner Alaun ia in 19 13.
THE HATTI ESHIpS
improvements o n the Orion Class wit h the forem ast back in front of the funn el an d. in the Iron Dukes. an increase in the sec o ndary ar ma ment to ri-lnch ( 1525-mm) g uns. The class that follo wed broke new ground . The Q uee n Elizabet h Class of th e s hips wa s o rdered under the 19 12 prog ramme at a time wh en it w as know n tha t US a nd j apa n ese battleships wo uld he armed with l-i-inch (355-1ll1ll) g uns. The gun-ma ke rs. Armstrong. pressed a head w ith the de sign and manufacture ofa I5-inch (38 1· l11m ) gun for testing . This turned out to be a supe rb weapon. combi ning accu racy with a lon g bar rcl ltfe. The I5-inch gu n fired a 1920pound she ll, a nd it was recognize d that by o mitting the ce rnrul 'Q ' tur ret. the new battleships wo uld still deliver a heavier broadside with e ig ht g uns tha n the Iro n Dukes d id with five tw in Lt 5s (joB - I11Ill) . The space saved hy removi ng the turret pro vide d room fo r addi tion al boilers (twenty-four as o pposed to eigh teen ) and resulted in an increa se in speed , And. for the first time . o il was used as fuel Instead of coa l. These de velopme nts in design . s peed a nd fig hting qu a lity we re a ma jo r ste p fo rwa rd in the evolution of the ultimate fast ba ttleship . The Queen Elizabet h Class was follo we d hy the similar He V<..·nge Class o f live s hips. Th e last ship comple ted. Ramtllles. wa s the first ha ttlcxhip 10 have anti-torpedo hu lgcx. o r blisters. fitted a lo ng the unde rwate r side o f the hull . These bu lge s ex te nded from the forward 10 the after tur rets and pro jected 3 feet (nea rly a metre ) ou tside the hull. The y were intended to absor b the e xplos ive impact of a n inco min g to rpedo wh ile leaving the main structu re of the hull intact . The three Invincible Class bau lccruisc rs . .ct the basic parameters for this class of British capital sh ip fo r the next decad e . The y were larg e . fast. lig htly a rmo ured s hips ca rrying fewer g un s than a batt les hip bUI of the sa me ca libre. Th ree ships of the Indefat igable Class. inclu di ng those do nated by the do minion s. Australia a nd Nell ' Zealand. were al most repeat lnvinciblc s. le ngthe ned 10 all ow the wing turr e ts to lire cross- dec k broadsides. The succeed ing Li o n Class wa s the bunlccrutscr equivale nt of the Orion Class battle s hi ps . The Li o ns were co ns idera b ly la rge r s h ips an d . in de sig n te nus a t le ast , fle w in the face of ha rd -w o n e xpe rience in preceding classes o f bat tle sh ips . As o ne au thority put it. they co uld he 'regarded as an un fortu nate la pse from our high sta nda rds of de sign '. Th e last of the prewa r hattlec ruixers was Tip,e/: She was. at the time , the large st warship aflo at. An indica tio n of the sca le of cos t related to the British fleet of bau h-slu ps in commi-e-ion .u the heg inning o f \'('o rld \'('ar I wa s e stimated at ,fl OO,OOO.OOO - a nd th at was at 191 4 pri ce s. This eno rmo us cos t did not includ e the associa ted charges related and fuel (mo stly coal).
10
dockyard services . man ning
Russia Afte r the ir crus hing defe at at the hands of the Japa nese , the Russian s had no alternat ive hut to rebuild thei r fleet from scratch . Ahho ugh confidence in their n:1\')' had plu mme ted. the Dum a a nno unce d in 1907 that it was to co ns truc t a cla ss o f dread no ugh t ba u lc slups fo r its Bail ie Flee t. Ikcog nizing tha t they did no t hav e the technica l s kills to de sig n and build these sh ips . an inte rnatio na l co m petitio n wa s he ld to whic h no fe wer tha n tw e nty-th re e s hipya rds fro m Britain. Ge rmany. France , Italy a nd the US replied . Although Ihe Ge rma n shipbuilder Blo hm & Voss won the co mpe lilion , the ir ship wa s no t built . Instead the Admi ralty \V'o rks at SI Petersb urg d rew lip a n agr eement with the British armaments firm , Joh n Brow n & Co.. to pro vide technica l assista nce and supe rvision d uring construct ion of the ships. The sam e company a lso provid ed desig ns and e xperti se fo r the ma nu facture of the turbines. The final pla ns were developed hy the Russian s. altho ugh the influence o f the Italian co nstructo r. Cumbcrtt. was e vide nt. Four ships o f the Gangut Class were laid down in the summer of 1909. two eac h at the Adm iralty and Baltic \'('or ks in St Petersburg. Fo ur triple 12-inch (305-mm) guns o n the ce ntre line ensured a broadside o f twelve guns a ltho ugh end-o n fire wa s reduced to o nly two g uns. Altho ug h the s hip s we re large a nd ve ry List hy the standards of the (b y, a rmo ur wa s light wit h a maxi mu m belt thickness
B A T T! ES l U l!:LG (LG LOJlAL
-c.:.._ IIiiIIIIIlII. lIiIliiI...__1L 6 7
of o nly I) inch es (22H 111111). anti H inches (203 mm ) for turrets and barbc ttes. Th e Ganguts were followed in 1911 hy th ree similar ships of the lm pc rurritsa xrartya Class for th e Black Sea Ph-ct . This time. th e Russt an design ers in cre ased th e thi ckness o f the ar mou re d belt to 10.5 inc he s ( 267 mm ) a nd the turrets to 12 inches (305 mm ). Th e weight penalty for thi s re sul ted in less speed from the e xisting ma chinery - 21 knots instead of the 23 knots o f the preceding class . Plans to equip the Black Sea batt leships with 14-inch (55;111m ) gu n s fa iled to materi ali ze. The Russian batt leships had pr oved e x p ensive (0 huild . Protracted huilding times
I }
"TT l
The French aircraft carrier Beam
ESIU~
France
which started life as a Normandie
In stark con tras t to th e rivalry in s h ip types and numbers tha t had p revt ou-lv characteri zed
Class battleship in 1914, Under
competitio n between France anti Brita in, (he Fren ch decided nor to immediately fo llo w the lea d
the terms of the Washington Treaty. Beam was converted to
an aircraft carrier during 1923/2 7.
se t by the introducti o n o f
D"('(ldll u,,~ bt.
O ver the COUfX' of 1907 a nd 190H, thl.' y d efied (Ill." trend
and laid d o wn six pr e-d read no ug ht banles h ip x o f till.' Danto n Clas s desig ned aro u nd th e o ld sta n da rd o f four t z-mch (50 :;-l11 m) gu ns , IH,OOO Io ns, a spe ed o f IH k no ts . II
W;lS
no t u ntil
1910 that thei r first dr ea dn o ug hts were laid down . Th ese we-re fou r sh ips o f th e Co urlx-t Class . mou nting twelve 12-inch g u ns in four su pc rfiring turre ts fore a nd an a nd tw o w ing turret s . Th L' th ree s hi ps of Ih l' Brda g nl' Class fo llo we d in 19 12 to a n imp roved d vxig n o f fin ' tw in 13 ...1 -in c h
( .~ ·W - llll n )
tur ret s mou nt ed o n (h e ce n tre Hill' , Th ese were to Ill' the last Fren ch
dread no ug lux co m p le ted befo re th e o ut brea k o f \'('o rld \\h lr I. Th is effo rt was no t e no ugh . ho wever. to p rev ent France slipp ing fro m second large st
fifth a fter the US,
}{ lI SS i ~1
n ~ I \T ,
as measu red in b. utlcslu ps . to
an d German y,
Further ba nk-ships were p lanned to help resto re the French fleet's international standi ng , including fin' Normandie Cb s.... and four Lyon Cb s.s . ' I1K' Sl." intl.'n:s(ing and u nu sual dreadno ughts reve rted to
;1
non-supcrfmng layout o f th e main a rmaments. w ith all turrets o n the ce ntre line .
The Lt+inch (j40-mm) gun was retained hut mou nted in quadruple turrets . lh l' first time s uch an arran gement had been proposed. Difficul ties eXIX'C(l.'d in ma n ufacturi ng fuel -efficient tur bines res ulted in a mixed tu rlunc/rcci p rocatmg mach ine ry installatio n. All the i'\o n n:lI1d il's were b id d o w n a nd la u n ch e d h ut we re e ffect ively alxmd o nc d aft e r the o utb re a k of wo rld \'\'ar I. \'('ilh tb e e xce p tio n o f o ne, n{'arll, w h ich wa s convened into an a ircraft carrier in 192)/27 , th ey were scrapped d uring the early 1920s.
United States TIll.' real bu ild-up of US naval power 1( )I1()\\'l."d immediate ly afte r (he Spanixh-Amc rica n \'\/ar w he n the US became the latest imperi al world power. US naval historian No rma n Friedma n explains : 'O ne o f (he impa cts o f having a world empi re is tha t it sud d en ly becomes o b vio us you have to have a world n a\T to protect it. Also , in 190 1 we have a President . The odore HOOSl.'\·e1 l, who had been (he Ass ista nt Sl.'<.Te(;lry of the N:I\)' who , in fact. o rdered Ix:w ey (0
attack the Spanish in (he Ph ilip pines, He wa s \"l'ry mu ch aware of the value o f sea-
power and very much be lieved tha t
10
he a se rio us national power; you have to have a
large a nd powe rfu l navy. And the bui ld-up is ext re mely rapid. '111:lt'S w hy, hy 19<)(j. wc re coun ted as the second mo st powerfu l na\) ' in th e worl d , '\'(' hl.'n the US sta rts building modern sh ips in the lAAOs, ther e 's a \'l.' I)' co nsc io us sense that US industry ha s to lx' b u ilt up w ith those xhipx. If wv just wan ted a navy \\'l.' co u ld have gone to the British a nd bought British s h ips, " lany people d id , If yo u look at mo st So ut h Amc rh'a n na vie s, thaI' s whe re thei r wars h ips ca me fro m. \'('l.' d emand ed that l'\'l'l)'thing IX' bui lt here , \'('l"d im po rt thi ngs that we absol utely had to - nne o ptics, for exa mple. BUl in general we d eman d ed that th e g u ns, the armo ur - l'\'l'I),th ing ca me fro m the Un ited States.' \Vith two major coastlines to defend in the ca se o f a hostile attack , the: US n-ally required (WO separate
h~lttle
fleets - o ne o n the Atlantic, (he o the r on the Pacific. If l.'\"l.'nls sh ould ever requ ire
that these two naval fo rces be combi ned . it would mean a ve ry lon g , time -co nsumi ng and ard uo us \'o yage arou nd Q IIX' 110m fo r o ne o f
till.'
tlcets . 111is co u ld p rove a str.Hl'gic disaster fo r (he US,
and so in 1903 tlu-y began b uilding till.' P:lI1am:1 Cana l - a waterway, regulated hy loc ks, which cu t th ro ugh the narrow isthm us co nnecting Nort h and Sout h America . It was opened in 19 1·1. Early ill the ne w ce ntury. the US fleet
W~I S
l-cgtnr ung to take s ha pe with new baul cs h ipx h ig h
o n th e agl' nda , The age ncy w ith in the US Navy I'l'SpOll:oiihle fo r nl' \\' tle:oi igns , the Burl'au o f
\ '.
Co nstruct ion and Repair, pre-empted Dreadnougbt. at least in d esign . hy p reparing drawings for the South Carolina Class battl eships in 19Q.1. These ships mounted a n all big-gun a rma me nt i'n what would come 10 he regarded as th e class ic arra nge me nt: two superfiring turrets forwa rd a nd two
aft. From th e o utset, US battl eships carried all th eir main armament o n the ce nt re line. BUl
th e South Ca ro linas were not th e revolution which J)relld1l01lp'bt would he ,
~I S
th e y retained
reciprocating ma chinery ca pab le of o n ly IH kno ts. They d id , ho weve r, int rodu ce the highly d istinctive 'lattice ' o r 'cage' masts rather tha n tripod:... o r military masts adopted hy all o ther navies . US building lim es we re s low, and bot h So u th Ca ro lin as were not co m p le ted until e a rly in 19 10, six ye ars afte r the d esign was fi rst p ro po sed .
l11C De laware Class laid do wn in 1907 was the first true equivalent to J),-elld1l 01l;.:bt,l11e main a rm a ment o f ten 12-inc h (305-111111) g uns was su pe rio r to n readnougbt. he ing cen tre -linemounted , O ne o f this class was fitted with steam turbines w hile the other re tained reciprocating ma chinery. At this stage, US tu rbin e d esign was proving nOI very fuel efficient. TIle Florida Class of t\VO s h ips was essentially a repeat o f the Delaware 's with funnels g ro uped tightly between two cage mast s. 111e \X'yo m ing Class th at followed wa s simil ar hut with the ad dition of a tw in 12-inch turret ca pable o f p roviding a twelve-gun sal vo . TIle New York Class of 1911 reverted to five tw in turrets but m ounted th e larg er 14-in ch (,355-m m) gun . The y also returned to The forwa rd twin 14-inch turrets of the US battl eship Texas, the only p reserved examp le of a World War I battleship, at her mooring in San Jacinto State Park, Texas.
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IlAIIl.l'JilU~-.GJ:L(iL(~l1B A T TI ES U III S G O G I u n A
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71
rccip rocu mg ma c'hincry because o f the d iffi cu lt ies enco u nt ere d hy US turbi ne ma nu facturers
in achieving the specificatio ns req ui red hy the navy. T he innovation w hic h the succeed ing Nevad a Class introd uced was the 'all o r no th ing ' sys tem
o f protect ion. US construct o rs d edu ce d th ai as light a rmo ur d id not sto p penetra tio n h y a rmo ur-
pie rcing shells there was liule po int in fitting it. They adopted the principle that the o nly a rmo ur wort h fitt ing w as arm o u r thick enoug h 10 Mo p a shell. This arm our po licy wou ld eventually become sta nda rd p ractice in all US battleship d esig ns . X(,l'atla retained the sa me numbe r of gu ns as S ell' }(J/",(d)u l d id so hy incorp o rating tw o triple turre ts a nd tw o tw ins, th us red ucing the «Ha l
nu mbe r o f tur rets to fo u r fo r the same fire po wer, The Pen nsylva n ia Class to ok Nel'lI da a ste p furt her hy e lim ina ting tw in tur ret s alto g eth e r, re su lting in twelve l -i -inch (355- m l11 ) g un s in fo ur turrets. Th is class was fo llowe d hy the New Mexico am i Tennessee Classes w here a numbe r
,
o f gene ral imp rove me nts we re made, inclu d ing better positioned seco nd ary a rmame nt , turbo electric dr ive in Neu ' J!e.\';co, and im p ro ved un d e rwat er p rotection ag ains l to rpedo o r mines in Tennessee and ClI lij()1·lI ill.
All th is b uildi ng act ivity was st imulated hy a g rmv ing se ns e o f na tional feel ing throug hout America that .
:IS :1
nat ion. the y too s ho u ld hav e a h attie fleer capable o f d efe nd ing their shores
aga insl eve n the mo st po we rful aggressor. US po litica l lead ers we re also he gi nn ing to s ho w ge nu ine co ncern ove r the grow ing unrest in Europe . By 1906 , the n, the US Navy was the second largest in the world.
Italy A po tent ial w ar wit h Aust ria saw the Italia ns d e vel o p and ma inta in a po w er ful na vy capa ble o f dd e at ing the Aust rian hattie fleet in the Adriat ic. In Eng ineer Co mma nder Vitto rio Cu nilx'rt i. the Italian Navy had a ta lented co nstruc to r who , as early as 1905, had writt en abo ut an 'a ll big-gu n' battleship . hut as the Ministe r for the Na\'Y considered suc h a sh ip to he beyo nd the needs o f the Italian Navy, it wa s no t until 1909 that th e first Italia n dreadnough t w as laid d o w n. Th is sh ip , D ante AIi~bi('ri, int roduced seve ral no vel features . She was the first b.ut lcshtp to e m ploy tr iple turret s fo r he r ma in a rma me nt a nd th e first to usc tu rre ts fo r so me o f her 4.7-inch 020-nun ) seco nd ary ar mament . She had a n unusual a p pe a rance w ith two g ro u ps o f wi del y s pac e d twi n funnel s . Be tween the se
IW O
g rou ps o f
fun nels we re two of he r fo ur triple turrets. Mo u nting twel ve 12-inch 0 05-m m ) g uns in a ce ntre line , non-superfi ring ar rangeme nt. he r d esign bo re resemblan ce to th e Russian Ga ngur Class. Dante AIiJ.:b ieri was fo llo wed h y th e Cavo u r Class o f th ree battle sh ips where a mixtur e o f
triple and twi n su pe:rfiring tu rrets ena b led an add itio na l 12-inch (50S-m m) g u n to be ca rried . This class was a ge ne ral improve ment o n th e p rece d ing class - a deve lo p me nt process which co ntinued o n to th e two Do ria Class s hips laid do wn in 19 12. Whi le the ma in arma me nt o ft hese late r s hips remained th e sa me , th e seco nd ary batte ry was increased fro m ·1.7- to 6-inch ( 12()to
152.5-mm ) gu ns . By the time the IaSI I\\ "() classes we re co mple ted. their 12-inch g uns had been
eclipsed by the I ) .5-inch ()·i)-null ). I-f-inch ()5 5-nun ) an d IS-inch (jHI-mlll ) we apo ns in se rvice
in o the r nav ies. Fo ur large , po werfu l a nd fast ba ttlesh ips mou nt ing e ig ht IS-inch g un s were laid d o wn in 19 1·1 b ut ne ve r co mpl e ted.
Japan Afte r the Battle o f Tsus h ima , like se ve ra l o ther wo rld na vies, Japan ha d considered the d esign o f a ba ttles h ip w ith a n a ll b ig -g un a rmam en t. At thi s e a rly s tage in th e d e vel o pme nt o f the Japa ne se sh ipbu ild ing. ma rine e ng inee ring and o rd nance ind ustries, a large vo lume o f mate rial a nd tec h n ica l ex pertise: ca m e fro m the \'V'est. Britis h d es ig n co ntinued
10
e xe rc ise
:I
stro ng
•
influen ce , its su pe rio rity re in fo rced hy th e victory o f the Hritish-huilt Japan e se ba ttleshi ps at Tsuxhima . Th e g u n mo u ntings for the Satsu ma Class battlesh ips, laid d o wn in 1905, came fro m Armstrong Wh itwort h in Britain and the CUJ1is tu rb ine machi ne ry fro m the Un ited States.
f
T ilE H A T TI ES II IPS
Four yea rs later. tw o Sensu Class ships were laid down . Th ey earned a mai n armament of twelve 12-inch (30 5-m m) g uns, Th e Sensus wer e much les..; reliant o n imported material than all the prev ious battl eships buil t in Japanes e s hipyards, Although the ir turbin es we re of the latest Brown-Curtis type developed in Britain hy John Brown &-: Co .. they were manufactured in Japan under licence by Kawasaki , Th e two Fus o Class battleships th ai foll owed were s i ~ni fi camly b igge r. w ith a n o ve rall improve ment in desi gn to th e pn..' ceding d asses, Like the pr evio us battl eships. they we n: huilt in pairs in the na val dockya rds at Kure a nd Yokosuka . The Fuso Class ea rned twelve I-t -inch <355-1111n ) guns mounted in twin turrets o n the ce nt re line . had a s pe ed of 23 knots. and were fitted w ith all-inch (.305-m m) arm o ured IX'h. Th e I ~ Class wh ich follo wed in 1915 w as essentiall y a repeat of the Fuso Class hu t with a modified layout in the positioning of its ma in a rma me nt. Con struct ion of these two shi ps \,\'~IS ca rried o ut in the pri vate yards o f Kawasaki in Ko be and Mitsuhish i in i'\agasa ki. 111is was pan o f the plan implemented hy th e Imperial. N;1\1' to e xte nd the nati o n's sh ipbu ilding ca pac ity beyond that of the naval dock yards. As ea rly as 190-1. the j apuncs e had de cid ed to a rm th eir new a rmoured cruise rs with 12inch <305-lI1 m) guns. pr e-erupti ng hy o ve r a year the British development o f the banlecrui scr. Four s hip s were built. two each o f the Tsukuba and Ibuki Classes. \Vith fo ur t .z-inch guns and a heavy seconda ry a rmament . thl'y res embled the p re -dr eadno ugh t batt leships. Thei r o rigi n!" as ar moured cruisers. ho we ve r. co uld he seen in their rel ati vel y high s peed. 20 to 2 1 k no ts . an d light ly armoured h ull w ith a 7-inch (17H-mlll) hel l. Ho wever. b y the tim e the )' we re com pleted. th e y were to ta lly outclassed by the British lxrnlccruisc rs. Till' succeeding class re pr esented a sig nifica m le ap fo rw ard . The fo ur s hips of the Kongo Class we re dcstgn cd in Brita in hy Vicke rs a nd the le ad s h ip . A·oIlRo. was b uilt hy that com pany. K O IlW) was th e last J a p ~lI1 l' sl' warship to he bu ilt ou tside Japan, Th e Kongo Class were la rge . powerfu l shi ps o ver 700 fee t ( 2 Ij metres ) long. They ca rr ie d . for the first tim e. I-f-Inch <355-ml11 ) guns mounted o n the ce ntre line in four tw in tu rre ts . Th e Kongo Class. bui lt at much the same time ;IS the British Lion Class . was co nside red a mud , superior fig hting ship to the British vessels.
Austria-Hungary Mitsubishi Shipyards in Nagasaki, Japan, shown today. Many Japanese battleships were built here, including the superbattleship Musashi. The specia l
As a contine ntal power. the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary co mmitted the hulk of its defence spending 10 the army. maint ain ing the navy as ;1 small hut efficient force comprising a handful o f battleships . cru ise rs an d co astal defence sh ips . Acce ss to th e sea was lim ited to a strip o f coastline at the he ad of the Ad riatic w here the pons o f Finnie a nd Trieste were situated. TIlt" main purpose o f (his navy was. in event o f w ar w ith Ita ly, to defend these pons a nd their
berth prepared for Musash i is on
national territ ories.
the right side ot the photograph.
In 190H the head o f the navy. Admira l xtonr ecuccolt. ann ounced the intention to build a new class o f ba ttlesh ips in reply to the Italians w ho w e re abo ut to proceed with their o w n dread no ugh t. After co nsidering a number of designs and opting for a triple turret like the Italians. two ships of the Tcgcnhoff Class were laid dow n in 1910. At the time . nat io na l funds were sh OI1 and the shi pbuilders were asked to sta rt construction o n the h~lsis that fun ds would event ua lly I ~ fortbconung . In 1912. two furt he r ships were laid do wn . These wer e sma ll a nd armed with o nly 12-inch U05 -m m) g uns in co mpariso n to mo re power ful ships in o the r na vies. Designs for an improved Tcgeu ho lf Class mou nting ten 13.H-inch C~ 50- lll m ) g uns had been pre pa red.
ll AI ILESlll l!S.JiWGLUJllAJ PS GO 6 1o n AI
._Il l l= i..'...liItil~ ......
73
Financial wr.m alcs dela yed the proposed da te of bying down these ne w shi ps , by which time worl d war had broke n o ut and the project wa s cance lled"
Germany Alte r completion of the five ships of the pre-dreadnoug ht Deutschland Class in 190H, the German N'a\"y inte nde d to b u ild tw o fu rthe r pre-d rea dno ugh ts w ith I l -inch UHO-mlll) g uns " Th e se plans we re a ba nd o ned , ho wever. while the im p lica tio ns of D rea d lloup,bJ were stud ied . Fo r the Ge rman Navy. w ho se two ma in na va l base s and s hi pb uild ing fac ilitie s were situate d in Kiel and Wtlhch nshave n o n o pposite sides of the j utland Pen insula, there wa s more at issue tha n sim ply the decisio n to proceed w ith the build ing of large r ships. The Kicl Canal. the vita l seaway linking Germa ny's port s and s hipyards o n e ithe r side of the pen insu la, was re stricted in w id th and co uld not accept the incre ased be am of d re ad nou g ht hauleshi ps. Equ ally. se ve ra l of (he ma jo r shipyards d iu not have the capacity to build such ships witho ut ma jo r extensions, Building d read no ug ht battleshi ps . the re fore , wo uld come at a hig h cost in infrastruct ure . as well as for s hips themselves, But Ge rma n na va l int e ntions were no t to he su p presse d . App rova l w as g ra nted for the bu ild ing of the ne w an d mo re po werful d read no ug hts. In the sum me r of 1907. fou r Nassau Class d readno ugh t-typ e battles hips were bid dow n" From the o utset. the Germans ad o pted a diffe re nt ration ale t () w~l rd s the design o f the se battleships. 'x'lulc the British stre ssed fire po wer as the absolute p rerequ isite, the Ge rmans balanced fire po wer with protection a nd speed. With l l-inch C2HO- m m ) g uns ~lga i ns t l z-inch (305-mm ), an d 19.5 knots against 2 1, their new s hips we re no t as h e~I\' i1 y a rmed no r as 1~l st as British equiva le nts . Ho wever, p rotection ranging from ar mou r to unde rwa te r sy~t e lll~ was ge nerally be tte r. with the jcassaus. the Ge rma ns followed the British in int rod ucing a co m plex layo ut of turre ts, w ith o ne tw in turret fore a nd aft an d two o n e ither be a m, permi tting a maximum broadside of eight g uns o f the twel ve ava ilable. The Nassa u ships we re also wide-r in 11K' beam , allowing w ing turre ts to be furthe r in boa rd tha n in British desig ns.
I
Unlike lJreadll oul!.bJ, they carried a po wer ful seco ndary ar ma me nt o f twelve S.9-inch (t SO-m m) guns. Armo ur protect ion was exte ns ive w ith a 12-inch (305-lllm ) belt. and 11 inche s (2HO mill) for tur rets and lxrrbc nc s. The seco nd g roup o f four new batt leships. the Helgo land Class , wa s laid down in 190H. They mo unt ed tw el ve 12-inch C305-1ll1ll) gu ns in tw in tu rre ts simila r to th e Nass au Clas s. T hese
g uns, develo ped a nd man ufact ured by the Krupp armament facto ry, fired a n H90. pound s he ll 10 a d istan ce o f 21.000 ya rds ( 19,20 2 mc trc s ). Like the p reced ing class. the fo ur Hel go la nd Claxs bat tleshi ps we re fitte d w ith reciprocating machin e ry. maki ng the m margina lly slower tha n Dn-adnougbt. Five s hips of the Ka ise r Class a nd fo ur of the Ki)nig Class were laid dow n be twee n 1909
and 19 12. All we re turbi ne- powe red an d ca pable o f 21 kno ts. Be lt a rmo ur was increase d (0 14 inches U':;':; nun ) a nd tur rets and barbcncs to 12 inches (305 mm ). The y were bette r a rmo ured (han British eq uiva le nts w hile the ir greater beam of about 6-H fee t ( 1.H-2A me tres ) a llowed for superior un derw ate r pro tectio n to be built into the h ull. Two further battleships of the lkrycm
Class mou nti ng eight IS-inch <.,HI-Illm ) g uns in tw in s upc rflring turrets fo re and aft we re laid do w n in 19 15 a nd 19 14. With these latest s hips , the Germa ns had d rawn eq ual in firepowe r to the eq u ivale nt British ba ttle ships h uilt at the same time hu t. arg uably. the Ge rman s hips had bett e r ar mou r protec tion and possih ly a n edge o ve r the ir British riva ls in (he qua lity of the ir hig guns a nd the she lls the y fired . The Corma n ratio na le that led to battle ships wi th stro ng armour protecti o n at the expe nse of large -ca libre main armame nt wa s ap plied e ven mo rt' boldl y to their ne w ban kxruise r design s, Unlike British s hips, which carried ex te nsive bridgework a nd fighting lops s up port ed hy tripod
•
masts, Ger man lxruk-cr uise rs had a minimum of br id gework and po ll' masts. The first Ger man lxntlecruise r, ' "0 1/ del' Ta nn. laid d o wn in Xlarch 1YUH, was completed two and a half years late r.
I.
She ca rried eight l l -Inch (2HO-m m ) gu ns in fo u r twin tur rets and a second ary a rma ment of le n 5.9-inc h ( 150-m m ) g un s. The main d istinct ion between Ibn i te r T1l1l1I a nd the British Invincible Class ban lc cruiscrs wa s in the am o u nt of a rmou r th ey ca rried . Hm de l' T1l1 l1I's ma in belt . fo r exa m ple. was 10 inch es (254 nun ) thick com pared to just 6 inches 0 52.5mm ) in lnrinclhle. The two Moltke Class ships that fo llo wed a yea r b ie r had an add itio na l ll -inch (2HO-mm ) tu rre t aft in a supcrflring position. Seydlitz. an advance d ve rsion of the Moh kc CIa!'iS, followed in 19 11. She W~ I!'i fined with a highly protective 12-inch ar mou r bch . Th ree !'ihip!'i of the Derffl inger Class. laid down in 1912/ 13, bro ke with previou s class armam ent layo uts h y mo unt ing l z-inc h g un!'i in four twin tu rrets. They had a handsome appeara nce with a flush deck a nd two well-balanced
flat-sided fun nels. With this po we rful new battle flee r. the Imperi al Germa n Navy could rival the British fl eet in qu ality, if no! in n umbers. O nly time wou ld tel l w hich o f these powe rful na va l fo rce s wou ld hc victorio us if ever the y cha nced to meet in open bau le on the hig h seas. The re wa s no dou bt rh.u, foll ow ing the success of Dreadnought, ev ery na tio n tha t boa sted a navy w ith a ny major ca pab tlirtes at all wa nted a dreadn ought - eve n cou nt ries w ith comparatively sm all navies. Those that lacked the ca pability to build battleships themselves took IX II1 in a th riving and hig hly lucrative inter natio nal arm s trade , wit h Ihe major shipbuild ing ya rds
I.
An aerial view of the Kiel Canal at Kiel today. This canal was a vital strategic link betw een German Baltic and North Sea ports and had to be widened to accommodate dreadnought battles hips.
in Britain . Fran ce . Ge rmany a nd the USA meeting the o rde rs placed hy foreign gov ernments for ne w ca p ita l ships" Built 10 o rde r. and comp lete with a rma me nt as requested. th e sale o f banles hips re pr e sented h ig business in (he yea rs leading up (0 world war I. Forei gn na vy ministers were treated like roya lly by the world's leading shipbuildi ng a nd armaments com panies w he n Ihe y arrived. cheque book ar the ready. 10 place an o rde r. Spain wa s o ne such cou ntry. Its fleet had been dealt a se ve re blow at th e hands o f the Ameri cans in th e w ar o f 1898. and in 1908 th e Spanish gov ernment pa ssed a nava l law a llow ing Ihe re organi zati on o f th e navy and th e crea tio n o f a private Spanish co m pany to ma na ge th e construct io n of new warships including three batt leships. This co m pa ny was crea ted a ro und Brit ish expertise in the form o f three leading shiphuilding a nd a rma me nts companies . Armstrong \"('h itwort h. Vicke rs a nd John Brown . Three 15.500-ton bat tleships o f the Esp~IT'ia CJa...s. sma llest of all the dreadnoughts . were bui lt at Ferrel between the yea rs 1909 and 1917. althoug h the last o f the class wa s del ayed through the non-de livery of he r armament from Britain . In June 19 11 Turkey ordered 1\ \ '0 23.000-lOn battleships . ea ch mo unting te n 13.5-inch ( } Bmill) guns. from British builders. Difficulties o ve r payme nt resu lted in the ca ncel lation of o ne of these ships . A third was o rde red in April 19 14 but this o rder was qu ick ly ca nce lled w he n wa r broke o ut a fe w months late r. In Jan uary 19 14. ho weve r. Tu rke y had a lrea dy purchased the
incomplet e bat tlesh ip Rio detauetro. which a Britis h ya rd
WILLS 'S CIGARETTES.
South American navies vied with one another to own the largest baNieships . This cigarette card depicts the 28,OOO- ton
Argentinian ship Rivadavia carrying twelve 12-inch guns.
W ~IS building fo r Brazil. Renamed Sutton Osman J. she was co n fe-cat cd hy th e British o n th e instruct ions o f the Fi ~1 Lord of the Admiralt y. \Vin ston Ch urch ill. th e da y be fore sh e W ~I S to sai l for Turk e y. Th is W~I S ~ 111 und erstand able move fo r the British to take. as Turkey looked ce rtain 10 side with Ge rma ny in the e ve nt o f W~I r. Renamed ~iIlCOlI11. sh e took he r pla ce wi th the Britixh Grand Fleet TIle same fate befell another British -b uilt battleship for Tu rke y. ReslU/~l'e. whi ch W:IS s i m il~ lfly confiscated o n completion and renamed Erin. Th e Gree ks f:In.'1.1no bette r than their Turkish rivals in acquiring h~Hl lesh ips . In 1912 a n o rde r for a 195 00-lOn ba ttles hi p 10 he call ed Salamts. mounting eig ht l-i-inch C\':;':;-1111n) gu ns . was pla ced in Ge-rma ny a nd . altho ug h the ship wa s launched in 1914 little cou ld be do ne d uri ng the w ar 10 com plete her. She remained in th is un finished slate until scra pped in 19.:\2. In 191,i a second atte m pt 10 acq u ire a 2.35(K}-wn ship from French b uild er s failed when war bro ke o ut in Aug ust Rivalry wuh Bra zil provoked a need fo r ba ttleships in th e sma ll Argentine navy. an d in I90X Argcnrtna o rdered two large 2X.OOO-ton L battlexhips. Riradaria a n d J/o rell o. mourning twelve 12-inch (,:\O':;-ml11) guns from US builders. T hey were well armoured w ith a 12-in ch belt a nd had ~I cred itable speed o f 22.':; kno ts. \'('h ell IJn 'lUlm mJ.:b/ appea red in 1906. Bra zil had mo ved ,..; w iftly to o rd e r IWo battl eships fro m British y;lrds in an attem pt ut maint ai nin g he r s upe riority ove r riva l Sout h American repu blics. A rgentin a a nd Ch ile . Th L' Minus Gera is Class s h ips resem ble d IJ reacillo ltJ.:b/. hut had a SUI1l'Tio r arm ame nt m oun ting twelve 11inch (.305-mm) guns in twi n s u pcrfiring tur re ts fore and aft and in tw o w ing turrets. To su it e ng ine e ring ca pabilities in Brazil. reciprocating engines ca pable o f 21 k no ts were fitted rathe r than the more techn ica lly d emand ing turbines. Alt hough thei r armour sch eme wa s not of Drnutnougbt sta nda rd o n com pletion . in firepower ut least th ey wer e Ihl' mo st powe rful in the worl d . In 19 10. Brazil again thwart ed her ncar-neighbours by o rdering a thi rd dr eadnought which . again. had 10 he tilt: mo st powerful battleship afloat. Th e British-huilt s h ip . th e same Ri o de fanei n ) mentioned p reviously. W~I S fitted with mort:' heavy guns than ~II1 Y o ther battl eshi p o f the time o r since: se ve n tw in ce ntre line-mounted 12-in(-h (30 5-m m) turrets, two xu pcrfiri ng forwa rd . tw o a m idsh ips and thr ee, including two s u pe rfln n g. aft. Th is led to a very long ship at 67 1 feel 6 inc he s (2o.L7 metres ) o ve rall. Armo u r protection wa s wea k wi th h er m ain belt o n ly 9 Inches (22X mrn ) thic k. Before the sh ip had been com pleted . th ough. th e Brazilian gove rnmen t d ecid ed to se ll her and found a hu ye.:r in Turkey. O nce Arge ntina had o rdered bat tleships. it was o nly a matt er o f lime before rival nei ghbou r Chile followed su it. \'('ith both Argent ina and Brazil already co mm itted to battl eship o rders. Chile wa s able to trump them in siz e a nd o ffe ns ive power. Tw o s hips we re: o rdere d from British builders in 1911. similar to the British Iro n Duk e Class b UI with IightL'rar mo ur. Te n I-f-inch <'355nun ) gu ns in fin.. twin tur rets were mo u nted on a h ull 66 1 fL'et ( 20 1 metres } lo ng a nd ca pable of nearl y 2.3 kno ts. After rhc stan o f \Xb rld \X'ar I. the: fi rst s hip . Ahnirantr t.atorro. was purchased by th e British in Septembe r 191,1 fo r service wit h the G ra nd FIL'L,t and renamed Ca nada. After the war, she was retu rned to Ch ile: w ith her o ld nam e res tored. The second shi p . Abnirauu: Cochrane. was not as far adva nced at the sta rt o f th e war and it was not u n til 19 17 tha i he r
-"'_IIIi." .tM.,ilPms IilIiiil__
nAITLnslll~Gu..GLOIIALI
r: 77
,
\
hu ll was p urch ased hy the Hruis h fo r co nn ..rsio n to an a ircraft cu rrh-r ( I:i:ip,le) .
Th e German b att/ecruiser Von der
Du ring the.' remark able per iod of cap ital- ship prod ucti on I<.:ad ing up to the o utbreak o f \X'orld
Tann was completed in 1911 .
War I. the..' hau le sh ip had deve loped at such a n asto n ish ing pan .. th at it reduced the o riginal
Alth oug h their arm ament was
J>l'e atlnollf.!,bl and IK'r e:l rl y com p atriots to ma rginal str:.ltl'gic value. '11K' early dread noughts weft.'
lighter, German ba ttlecru isers
mostly lITl"U isfacto ry with regard to the calibre and layout o f their main armame nt. which was
were b etter armoured and proved
p ro h ahl y be-cause o f a m ind -se t ca rried o ve r from the o rigin a l layout o f turrets in pr l.'-
more resilien t in battle than their
d read no ug ht lxntl cxhip x. where w ing tu rrets were common. A sim ilar anach ro n ism ex isted in
British equivalent.
the: early d read no ught...; re latio nshi p lx..'I Wt.'L'1l fun nels and tri pod mast s. 111L' so lut ion which emerged in the with
~I
)'~IrS
before 191-1- su pcrfm ng turrets fore and aft - end ured ,
flow ru It~lh lL' excep tio ns.
1In1i1
th e e nd of IhL' ba ttlesh ip e ra.
111L' British Qm..'e n Eliza beth Class bat tles hips and th e Germa n Dcrffl ing cr Class
HMS QUEEN ELIZ.ABETH DIMENSIONS,
b.mlccrue-cr-, embodied th e lx-st fighting characteristics in the developme nt of th e dreadnought u p unt il tha t lime . O n paper. the British r\a \y's Grand Fleet. as it beca me
known. hi lasled a in the
(")'1..':>0
\':1 .'1 eu pcrion ty
in the n um ber (If capital ships in ils hatti e fleet and.
of most inte rn atio nal nava l o bservers.
W ;IS
still the traditional do min ant
naval force in the world. Ge rma ny . o n the ot he r hand . h;IU built its h attie flee t almost
'S6,000 IHP
SPEED,
Z't KNOTS
ARMAMEIIIr,
8 Y IS-IN (38I-MM) WNS; '" Y 6-IN (I'SZS-MM); 't Y ZI-IN C'S33-MM} TORPEDO T\JBES
PROTECTION,
MAIN BELT 13 TO 6IN (330 TO ISZSMM); BARBETTES 10 TO 'tIN (Z'S't TO 100 MM); 13-IN C33O-MM} T\JRRET FACES
CREW,
'!'SO (APPROV
191·1. This new and powe rfu l Germa n fleet became known as the ' fl ig h Seas Fleet' - the culminatk 1Il of the dr eams a nd plans o f the Kaiser and his chi ef naval ad viser. Th e world wa iled fo r the d ay in h isto ry when these two fle..'t·ts would meet. fact.' 10
zsrr
DISPl..ACEMEIIIr, Z7,'S00 LOIUl TONS MACHINERY,
e ntirely fro m scra tch in It:ss th:m two deca de - leading up to th e outbreak of war in
Admiral von Tir pitz.
6'6FT 91N (OIi£RIUJ Y 91N 90FT 6IN Y (196.8 Y Z7.6 Y 8.8M)
face . in battle . Fo r ce nturies the fate o f e ntire empires had res ted o n the fo rtu nes
o f their 11:1\·ie..·., as tlle..·y faced the fire power o f their e nemi es . For Brita in and Ge rma ny. rh.u d ay wa s b st approach ing .
•
•
Em Ires In •
•
o isron Y
ears before the o utbreak of World War I the Ge rma n Chance llor, Otto vo n Bismarck , remark ed that the cause of the next Europea n war wo uld be 'so me damned fool thing in the Balkan s', He co uld
not ha ve mad e a more acc urate prediction, Th e 'damned fool th ing' th at
trigge red th e most horrific war in the h istory o f mank ind at tha t time occur red in the Bosnian ca p ital, Sara jevo - an incid en t tha t b rou gh t to a he ad ye a rs o f political a nd racial tens ions in perhaps the most vo latile regi o n in the w ho le of Europe , Politically, the nat ions of Europe had gon e through a reasonably peacefu l period s ince a ro u nd the turn o f th e ce ntu ry alth ough , th rough var io us a llia nces , co ntinenta l Europe wa s e ffec tive ly di vid ed in to tw o distin ct ca mps , As early as 1882, Ge rmany, Austria-Hungary and Italy had formed a Triple Allian ce in whi ch each co untry agreed to support the other in the eve nt of an attack b y e ithe r France o r Russia , As the Aust ro -Hungarian Empire slid into decline , power in ce ntral Euro pe shifted to the d ynami c new Ge rmany und er the Iron Cha ncellor, Otto von Bismarck , Iron ically, it
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T ilE HA T TI ESlllE.S
80
Ad miral Sir George \'(.Ta rre nde r. was in the midd le of ~I wee k-lon g COlll1esy visit to Kivl . As the British fl eet sai le d fo r ho rne o n .~ O j un e. wa rrc ndcr signa lled to his Ger man hosts, 'Frie nds today. friends in future. frie nds fo re ve r.' Des pite fra ntic di plo mat ic activity throu g hou t Europe. Austria declared war on Ser bia o n 2HJuly. Russia had little o ption other tha n to declare wa r o n Austria. Th ree days late r Ge rma ny declared wa r on Russia and . o n j August. was also at wa r w ith France . While these events were in train, the British wa vered o n whethe r the y sho uld re ma in ne ut ra l or come to the ai d of Fran ce , The German invasion of ne utral Belgiu m crys tallized the British positio n. O n '1 Aug ust 1914. Brita in dec lared w ar on Germany. The pieces had falle n into place w ith o ne exce pt ion: Ital y had de clared he r ne utr ality o n .3 1.July.
There are ma ny wh o bel ieve th at the na va l a rms ra ce be tween Brita in an d Ge rmany had been a ma jo r ca use o f 'x'orld \Va r I. Th is is no t the case, as And re w Lambe rt. na va l histo ria n at King's Co llege. Lo ndon . poi nts o ut: 'The naval race. in esse nce, had no th ing to do w ith the First \,'orld \'\'a r. It ma y expla in w hy the British and Ge rmans we re o n d iffe re nt sides. but the First \X'orld \XT~lr is about Ge rm a n fea rs of e nc ircle me nt a nd the risi ng po w e r o f the Russian Army. Th e a rms A 100-ton 15-inch gun barrel of
race that causes the First \,('orld \XTar is between the German Army and the Russian Army.
the British battleship Barham
It conce rns q uick-firing art ille ry p ieces an d heavy siege g uns, In 19 1,i , w he n Archd uk e
about to be hoisted into position
Franz Fe rd inand was assassina ted, the British and Ge rma n flee ts were lying at the Kivl Reg.uta and they we re best of friends, Eng lish-Germa n relations in 191,j were \'el)' good, \X' h ~11 was about to change was Brita in's rela tio nship w ith Russia a nd France .'
in 'X ' turret as the ship nears comple tion in 1915.
EM~lRES
.=-....,·..
..ms
IN COLliSION
_
At the o ut b rea k of w ar. nei ther the Br itish nor t he German 1':;1\')' w as rc adv fo r the co n flict
that lay ah e ad . The o p posi ng fle ets re p resen ted the tw o mo st po werful ma ritime fo rce s the world ha d ev e r se e n. The y had bee n created by the po litica l w ill o f natio nal lead e rs and the Adm iralt ies
or bot h
na tio ns . Their moment in histo ry was abo ut to hap pen .
The Britis h Horn e Flee t of 19 14 co m p rise d
two
se pa rate fle ets: th e First Flee t.
J11 ~H,.I L'
lip of
the new cap ital s h ips : a nd the Second Fleet . a lso kn o wn as the Cha n nel Flee t. made lip of p redread nough t ba ttles hi ps. The First Flee t. g ive n the im po s ing title 'G rand Flee t' . w as d raw n togethe r at Scapa Plow, a large stretch o f d ee p wat er in the O rkney Islands, o ff the north-easter n lip o f Scotland . The ma n chose n to co mm and th e Gra nd FieI..'I was Ad m iral Sir .Jo hn jclltcoc . a p ro tt::'gl:' o f the First Sea Lo rd . Admira l Sir Jo hn Fisher. He w as a p poi nted to th is po sition o n 4 Augu st. the d ay that the British we nt to war. jel ltco c bo re an awe some n-s po nsi b illty fo r nOI o nly th e safe ty o f the fl e et h ut fo r British nati o na l se curity. II w as felt h y ma n y th a i the u ltim ate fa te o f Brita in lay in th e ha n d s o f its Ro ya l Na vy and , a s com ma nde r o f
us m o s t
powerful flee t. j ellicoe com manded e no rmo us po we r and res pect . \,\'insto n Ch urc h ill, First Lo rd o f th e Adm iral ty a t th e time. ex p ressed Ihe ad mir al's ex traordin ary po s itio n o f po we r in no un ce rtain te rms w hen he sa id tha t Jd lico e was the o n ly ma n o n e ithe r s ide w ho co u ld lo se the war in a n afte rnoon , Till' British str.ltt'gy in the ope ni ng p hases of th e wa r to o k the German s h y su rp rise , as US nava l h istoria n Dr Gary \Xlt'i r re co un ts: 'T h e British immed iatel y d o w h at Tir pi tz d o e s not expect. Ill' ex pects them to follow Ro yal Nav al trad ition and try some so rt o f Co pc nh agc ning manoeuvre, w h ich means they w ill immedi ately move o n Ge rman naval bases - confront the German fleer and try a nd d estroy it premat urel y be fo re it can get itse lf p repared , But thl'Ydo n 't adopt tha t at a ll - they p u ll awa y fro m the coast a nd se t up a sta nd -o ff block ade w h ich mea ns thl' ne xt mo ve is the Ge rma ns' mo ve . Th e Germa ns d o n 't kno w w ha t to d o .' With the G ran d Fleet o pera ting o ut of Scapa Flo w . secu rity o f th is re mot e an cho rage became a ma jor conce rn to the British Ad m iralt y, The per fo rma nce and ra nge o f Ge rman Ll-lxx rts w e re rapid ly imp ro ving a nd to rpedoes were fast he ing ack no wled ged as a pote ntial d eadl y wt'apon ag ai nst the lxu tlcxhip . On 16 October pand e mo niu m e ns ued at Scapu Flo w w ith the re po rt o f a t j -b o at s ighting , Altho ugh it was a Elise alarm , the incident convinced j c llicoc that Sca pa was u nsa fe until fu rthe r defensive meas u res
~I ga i n st ~lIl Y
such atta ck cou ld he put in place , l ie decided to ba se the Battle
Fleet at Lo ugh Sw ill)' in N0I1he fT1 Ire lan d a nd th e lxmlecr uise rs at Loch -na -Kca l o n the Island of xtu!l. Lou gh Swilly 'x greate r d ista nce fro m th e G rand Fleet 's the atre of o pe ratio ns re legat ed it to lillie mo re th an a fuelling poi nt. and for m uch of the ea rly part o f the war, for the ir own secur ilY, the G ra nd Fleet spe nt lo ng pe riods at se a , l\ line s we re a constan t d an ge r in th e w aters a ro und Sca pa Flo w , A pote nt re m ind e r of the ir rh re.u came at OlJ,OO on 27 October 191 4 o ff Lo ug h Swilly. whe n th e battlesh ip A uda cious hit a sing le mine , Altho ugh ta ken in low h y the Wh ite Star passenge r line r, O{rmpic. homewa rd hound fro m Ne w Yo rk to Liverpo ol. worse n ing w eathe r caus e d the tow to pa rt. Little co u ld he do ne
10
save the d read nought. w h ich co n tinued to se ttle 100\'c r in th e wate r. and at 2 I.00
shl' h le w up and sa nk. Th e sin king o f A udacious became one o f the g reat secrets o f th e early \'<'o rld \'\'ar I sea wa r - a d ifficult sce n-t O~ ) 'm/,ic
10
maintain give n th e nu mbe r o f passe nge rs o n hoa rd
who h ad p hotog raph ed the un fort u nate s hi p in her d e ath th roes. The lo ss of th is
ca pita l s hip wa s a hlo w
10
the Ro yal Navy - an d a feather in the ir cap fo r the Ge rma ns, Without
ex posi ng thei r fleet to o pen hattie w ith the enemy. th e Ge rman Navy had acco u nted fo r a ma jo r British lxu tlcxhip . And fo r Brita in , on ly five da ys later, came more had news. On 1 No vem be r. o ff the Chilea n co ast, Ge rman Vice -Ad m ira l Maximil ian G raf von Spec 's East As iatic Squa d ro n sa n k t wo Britis h arm o ur ed cru isers, Goo d I/ o/ )e a nd Mcmmontb, in w hat beca m e k no w n as th e Batt le o f Co ro ne l. Spec's squad ro n , w h ich incl ud e d the tw o po werfu l a rmou red cr uise rs Scbarnborst a nd Gneiscnan. had moved ac ross the Pacific a fte r
·iliI-...... .--~ 81
.-. _
·. .'
,
,i
"
The British battlecruiser
Japan ha d e nte red the war on the side o f the Allies so me thr ee mo nths e a rlier. The Ge rma n
Invinc ible in fJames seconds
comma nder's ho pes were to d is ru pt British ship ping o pera ting a lo ng the west coast of Sou th Ame rica . Th e Ro yal Navy had bee n ale rte d to the presen ce o f the Ge rma n sq ua dron in these wat e rs a nd had sent fo u r shi ps , based in the Falkla nd Islands, to investigate . The Britis h fo rce
before her midships magazines blew up after being repeatedly hit
by the German battlecruiser Derfflinger at the Battle of Jutland on 3 1 May 1916.
was o ut nu mbe red a nd outgu nned hy the Ge rmans. w ho record ed a d ecisive victory, It wa s the first de feat in over 100 yea rs fo r the Ro ya l Navy. a devastat ing blo w to Britain. It was a situa tion that wou ld no t go un heeded . O n 5 Novem be r \X'inston Chu rchill. First Lo rd o f the Adm iral ty. a nd Ad mira l Sir Joh n Fis he r, Firs t Sea Lord . d ispatch e d th e b.ml ccru isc rs
In ri ncible and In flexible. u nd er Vice- Ad mira l Sir Do vc ton Stu rdcc. to the Sou th Atlan tic in pursuit of Spec. Stu rdcc's o rders we re sim ple: hu nt d o wn and d estroy Spec's squa d ron. The British baulccruber s sped ac ross the Atlan tic towards the coast o f Bra zil. and then turned so ut hw ards . o n a he ad ing for the Falkla nd Islan ds. Thcy a rrived in Po rt Stan ley. ca pital of the Falkla nd Islan ds . o n th e e ven ing o f 7 De cem be r and immed ia tel y bega n to lake o n coal. Stu rdee ex pected 10 leave in fo rty-e ight ho urs in the beli ef tha t Spe e 's sq uadron was 2000 m iles away in the Pacific. o ff Valpara iso , In addi tio n to the two British baulecrui se rs. the o ld battleship Ca nop ns - wh ich ha d been groun ded to p rotect Port Stanley - a nd five cruise rs we re present. As fo rtun e wou ld have it fo r the British. Spec had decided . after his victo ry at Corone l. 10 ret u rn to Ge rmany via the Falk land Isla nds. His pla n w as 10 at tack a nd ca use as mu ch d amage as possible to the British fac ilities :11 Port Sta nley on his way ho me . At 08.;30 the follo w ing morning. adv ance u nits o f Spec's squad ron. Gneisena u and the cruiser Nfi rllheJR. a p proac he d (he Fa lklands w her e th ey s potte d a pa ll o f s moke han gi ng over Po rt Sta nle y. Th e y ass u me d th at British co al stores had be en set o n fire to pr e ven t the m falli ng into ene my hands. Abo ve Port Stan ley. look o uts o n Sa pper 1Ii11 repo rted the app roach o f the Ge rman sq ua dron, and Stur dec o rdered his s hips to cease coa ling and to ra ise steam for full speed , At about this lim e the loo ko ut o n ho ard Onctsenau sigh ted four trip o d ma sts in Po rt Willtnm. Th is co uld mean o nly o ne thi ng - d re adn ou g hts, Spec had been ce rta in that no Britis h dread no ughts we re in the South Atlantic, li e was also un awa re that the shi ps had bee n coaling and were to tally un pr epared for hatti e , It was a u niq ue o p portunity lost: an accu rate hail o f fire
E MUP' J.RE£Jl'u::O.LLlSJlOJL I RES I N C O l l iS I ON
_.sm..II'a&.'.~.....__~ 83
..
fro m his ma in armam ent migh t well have serious ly d amaged the s ur p rised British shi ps . By 11.00 the Britis h sh ips e nu-rgcd from harbour with d ecks clea red fo r ac tion . Sturdce ga ve the o rder 'Gen e ral Chase'. Spt.:e no w realized he was faci ng two lxtttlecruise rs. and the o utcome wou ld h e a foreg o ne co ncl us ion . li e had o n ly o ne opt io n - to ru n fo r ir. The British s h ips worked up to 1() kno ts a nd s lo w ly ga ine d o n th e flee ing German sq uad ro n. a nd at 11.47 the sig na l ' Engage th e Enemy' was flown fro m tnrinciblo'» ma st head. Thirt y min ute s later, Spee o rde re d hi s th re e cru isers to b reak for matio n a nd try to esca pe. le av in g Scha rnhorst a nd
Gneisena u to draw o ff [he hea vily armed British s hips . Stur d ee ordered h is cr u ise rs to p urs ue their Ge rm a n cou nterpa rts, w hil e ln rinctbte a nd inflexible concentrated o n Scha rnho rst and Gneiscua u. \'('ith the ran ge closed to 13.500 yards (12 ,400 me tres ). th e g u n ne ry d uel bega n: tnrincihte o n Scbarnborst, l uf lexthle o n Gneisenau. Sixtee n 11-in ch (jUS- m m ) gu ns fac ing si xte en x.z-In ch ( 20H-m m ), Th e German firing w as excellent and the ban lccru tsc rs were stradd led and hit seve ral limes. To nu ke mail e rs worse for the British gun ners. smo ke from the funnels of thei r o w n sh ips wa s blow ing in the di rectio n o f th e e ne my obscu ring th e m fro m view. Stur dee the n in crease d the ran ge h e yond tha t o f the Ge rman g u ns. The LJ r heavier Britis h s he lls stead ily began to find their mark , penet rat ing th e Ge rman s hips, ca us ing g reat interna l and ex te rna l damage . Sho rtly afte r 16 .00 Spces flag sh ip . Scha rnhors t, be ga n to list he avily to port. Se ve n teen m inu tes la te r. the sh ip tu rned over and d isappea red , w ith he r fu ll cre w o n h oard . benea th th e co ld Atlantic waves. Fire fro m hot h ban lccruiscrs was now co nce n trated o n Gneisenan, Battered and blazing with her funn els ask ev..', th e a rmoured cruiser lasted un til 17.50. w hen she gently rolled o ve r and sa nk. O nly 190 s u rvivo rs we re picked up fro m a crew o f nearly HOG. The reso u nd ing d efeat at the Battle o f Co ro nel had been avenged. Th is actio n wa s seen as a complete vind icat io n o f th e battlecr u ise r: they had pe rfo rmed in ex actly the way Admira l Fisher had planned and beli eved th ey would. British faith in th eir Ro ya l Navy had be e n re stored , and all ey es now turned c lo se r to h o me , wh er e the Gr and Fleet was standi ng h y to take o n the Ge rman Hig h Seas Fleet at th e first po ss ib le o p po rtu n ity. Like two h e avyw e ig h t bo xers fle xing the ir mu scles before e ntering th e ring , o n bo th sides o f the North Sea th e conte nde rs we re preparing fo r th e ine vitable b. uue that lay ahead. Th e British had p u t in pla ce a numbe r o f strateg ies 10 g ive th em ea rly warning o f Ge rma n fleet mo vements. Patrols o ff the mo st likel y exit points fo r th e Ge rman flee t to pu t to se a w e re mainta ined around th e clock. bu t in th e event it was a chance o f fate that gave th e British the ir inva luable int e lligen ce of Ge rma n fl e et mo vements . O n 26 Aug ust 19 14 the cr u ise r '\/ag tlelm rg ra n ag ro u nd w h ile ca rry ing out min e-laying o pera tio ns in th e G u lf o f Finla nd an d wa s destro yed hy Russia n c ru ise rs. Her co d e hooks were reco ve red and pa ssed o n to the British w ho set up a d ecodi ng ce nt re in Ro om 40 013 in th e Old Adm ira lty Bu ildi n g in Lo nd o n . w ith th e ke y to th e codes , German sig nals cou ld be d eciphe red. T his e no rmous break th rou gh p rov ided the British with a trump card w h ich IIK'y p layed w ith g reat effect . Ea rly in Dec embe r 19 H Ro o m 40 le arn e d th a t Ge rm an ba u lccruisc rs u nde r th e co m ma n d of Adm ira l vo n Hippe r were p lanni ng a ra id on the Yorks h ire coast. lt was sc hed u led fo r the ea rly morn ing o f 1() Decembe r. The plan wa s th at Hip pe r's ha ttlccruiscrx wo uld mou nt the attack to lure the battlecruiser sq uad ro n command ed b y Re ar-Adm ira l Sir Da vid Bea tty so u th wa rds fro m th ei r ba se in Cro ma ny. in th e no rth o f Scotland . T he Hig h Se as Fleet w o uld h e
Admi ral Hipp er, Commander of the German battlec ruisers at Dogger Bank and Jutland.
84
~.".L
:r"ll..Lll.A.I..I.LESlll.l!.S
/
waiting. Beatty's sq uad ron sailed on the morni ng of 15 Dece mbe r. a nd ' hal same afternoo n, th e 2nd Bat tle Sq ua d ron o f s ix battles hi ps le ft Sca p u Flo w to la ke lip a po s itio n that would effectively cut o ff th e Ge r ma n fo rce 's ret urn ro ut e, kee p ing t hem fro m (h e sa fely of the ir
hom e base in \'\' i1helmshan : l1.
As the Germans ap p roached the Britis h coas t, the y s p lit into two g ro u ps : IJel.1.1lillJ.!,er a nd \ "O il
dcr Ta n n we re
(0
attack Scar borough a nd \V'hith y. w h ile
. "()IJJ..~e. .\(~ ) '("jJz
and the ar mo u red
cruiser IJli ic ber wou ld attack Ha rtlepoo l fu rther ro the no rth . Th e remainder o f (he Hi gh Seas
Flee t re ma ined to the eas t, ho p ing
10
deli ver a crush ing b lo w to the British bau lecrulscr s. But
o n sigh ti ng Bri tish destro yers, the Germa n Co m man der-in-Chie f ju m ped 10 the co ncl usio n
D I P I R ES I N COLllSll )(lJN i'L
.;,,_lIIiim .ilMI'~
The British cruiser Kent stands by to p ick up survivors from the German cruis er NGrnberg - a remnant of Vice-Admiral Graf von Spe e 's squadro n hunted down and sunk following the Battle of the Falklands. Decem ber 1914.
that the G rand Fleet wa s in the vicinity a nd ch anged course for home . Hipper's lxmh-cru tsc rs. now (:Iosing the British coast. were o n their own. At OH..'10. the Germ:ms arrived off the CO:ISt a nd started she lling. At the sam e time Be:ltty's battlccruise rs and the six hatt leships of the Jnd Baule Squadron were heading south to interce pt the raiders. Bad wea ther and poor visib ilitv enab led Hipper's ships to stee r northwa rds . clear the British s hips. a nd then to turn eastwards to safety. In the ra id . 122 British civilians we re killed. and g reat d a mage d one to bu ildi ng- in the coastal to wns , The press accused the Ge rma ns o f ba rbaro us acts aga inst defe nceless civilians. The Royal Navy was criticize d for not prevent ing it. The imm edia te o utco me was th:1l Beatt y's
85
T ILLJlA1TLF.SIlJ.£S
banlecruiscrs were moved sou thwards from Cromarty
(0
the Firth of Forth. where a flew major
fleet base at ROS)1h had been hu ilt. \X'ith in a month. lht: Germans plan ned a nother raid . this tim e to disrupt British mi ne- laying and fish ing activities o n th e Dogger Bank. an area about 150 miles en... t of the Yorkshir e coas t. O nce agai n Room 40 was ab le to decip her Ge r man sig na ls. O n 23 ja nuary Admiral H ipper
Id i wt lhelm shavcn. ho rne ha ."iC: for the High Sl:'~IS Fleet, in comma nd of IhL' 1st Scouting Grou p. This included the banlecnusers Seydlitz. lJerjJUll1wr. olto/l ke and the armoured cruiser Btiicber . The Admiralty. aware that Hipper was at sea . o rdered Beatty's bank-cruisers. l.ion . Tiger. Princess Roy a l. Sell' Zealand and In do m ita ble, and the 1st Light Cru ise r Squadron to sail immediately. Early next morning th e lead cruiser Aurom signalled to the fleer . 'Am in action with th e Hig h Seas Fleer .' But this in fo rma tio n
W ~IS
wrong - A urora had encountered o n ly
the cru iser Kollx'I R scouting a head of Hipper's baulecruiscrs . Aro un d thi s rim e . H ipper received repo rts of s moke o n the hori zon to th e nort h -west . The British battlecruiser
Indomitable took Beat ty 's heavily
Assuming co rrectly thai il wa s fro m British bat tles hi ps. he deci ded
10
ru n fo r ho me . Beatl y
sigh te d the Germa ns , alt ered course a few points eastwa rds a nd increased
SIX~l.~d
to 2·} knots.
dam aged flagship Uon in tow
The s lower ba n lecruisers. S ew Zea la nd and Isulonntable. fell behind, lea ving t.ion. TI!Wr and
after she was severely damaged
Princes... Re~r(l l to clo se on the German line. Hip per, on his flagship Seydlitz. led the German line, followed hy J fo/tkt', lJerJj1in~er and Btticber. By about OHAO the Germans ' lead had
in the Battle of Dogger Bank.
EMJ!.lRESJN-CllI.Ll51W'L C () I I I S I () N
--:.._ lIim ..'at'~
na rrowed to 25.000 yards (22.850 metres). Ten minu tes late r, IJhicberfi red the first sa lvo in the
A remarkable image of the
Battle of Dogger Ban k. As the range d ose d , the British s hips were pitted one-on-one aga ins t the Germa ns: Lion
stricken German battlecru iser
on St.:)'d litz , TiRer o n Jl olth ' an d Prin cess Noy a l o n Derf fltnu er. lea ving Neu - Zea la n d a nd hulom itahle to dea l w ith IJliicbel: At 09.5 0 Sey dlitz receiv e d a hit fro m Lion w hich penetra ted the c-inch (22r1·mm) th ick ba rbon e ar mo ur of her aft e rmost turret. a nd hurst, se nding red hot
Although many of the men
steel splinters flying . A flash o f fire s ho t upwards to the tur ret . and do wn wa rds to the handli ng roo ms. w here furt he r cha rges we re ignite d . Me n were incinerated w here the y stood. Seconds late r, the second turret was completely burnt out. Rapid action hy the Germa n sa ilo rs to flood
with the ship .
the magazi nes saved the ship hut not the turret crews. and 159 sa ilors d ied . Mea nwh ile . Blu cher was takin g a pounding and begin ning to lose speed. By now s he had a number o f fires rag ing o ut o f co ntro l and was ra p idl y fa lling as tern. in to the path o f the adva nc ing British ships. At this st;lge Beuty signalled t ndomuabte so dose o n the stricken Bhicber and finish her o tT. It was his inte ntio n that his other banl ecruisers would continue (he pursuit of the enemy a nd co mple te a de<:isiv e victory . fi e signalled 'Attac k the rea r o f the enemy: Ho weve r. as n ~lgs indi c-ating a course of north-east were still flying from the partially disabled l.io n. the o the r lxml ecruiscrs took it that they we re to join Indom ita ble in finishi ng o ff Bliicb er. In stopping their pursuit to sink a s hip tha t was clea rly lost , the British ships allowed Sey dlitz . .Iloltl..'e a nd IJerffiinJ.w rto esca pe . Beatty was furious and later described the event as the 'blackest in his life '. /Jliicber w as sunk with heavy loss of life wh ile the damaged t.ion was towed to Rosyth by
tndomitable. Th e Battle of Dogger Bank was o ve r - a victory for the British . They had been well pr epar ed a nd in the rig ht position at the right time. bu t co nfu sio n ha d prevented an even mor e decisive victory o ver the German flee t. 111e.: Ge rman Adm iralty was far from impressed by the performance of the ir battle fleer in its first major engagement against the Royal ~a\"y. Admi ral lngcno hl was immediately replaced by Ad miral vo n Pohl. A year later. Poh l beca me se rious ly ill a nd Rear-Admira l Re inhard Scheer. a d ynamic, agg ressi\"ely mind ed o fficer; took over the powe rful and responsible position of Co mmander-inChief of the lI ig h Seas Fle et. He wou ld lead this fl ee t in the largest co nfro ntatio n bet ween battleships in histo ry. agai nst the mig ht of the Ro ya l Navy 's Gra nd Fleet in a hatti e that would IX'CO ll K '
known as the Battle of jutland or, as the Ge rmans ca ll it. the Battle of the Skagc rrak.
BlOcher on her beam ends ,
clinging to the ship 's side were saved , many more went down
87
TIl E
R AIT.LE.S~
111t" Battle o f D OAAt.'f Bank had given both sides a lot to think about . US naval historian D r Ga l)' \X'ei r com men ts:
'The: lessons learned from Dogger Bank and o ther mino r ....ngagcmcms
taught d ifferent lesso ns
10
d iffere nt people. 11K' tech nica l e xperts o n both
sides. the Royal :\a\'y a nd the Impe rial Ge rma n Navy. evaluated these in d ifferent w api, From th e German side. fro m my o w n experie nce . the
Ge rm ans to o k to hea rt the d ang er o f afte r-e ffec-t second a ry e xpl o sion .
shell-fl ash difficulties, and the)' took direct an ion 10 p rote ct thei r ships as be st as possihle from these nash p roblems and fro m seco nda ry detonations.' D r Eric Grove. D eput y D irect o r at th e Centre fo r Secur it y Stud ies at th e
University of H ull . notes the British reactio n:
'\'\'e allowed th e Ge rma ns to get awa y, we were n 't able to in flict any more ca sualt ies o n th e Ge rm an butt lccruiscr fleer o n that o ccasion , So , in a sense , th is vindicates th e lxntlccrutsc r - an o lder type o f armo u red cru ise r has been su nk. TIle p robl em will a rise when
~I
re info rced flee r o f Germa n
b.urlccru tsc rs tights an e qua l n u mbe r o f Britis h ban lccru ise rs. But even then things m ig ht no t have been so bad if ot he r factors had no t come into p lay, Th e Ge rma ns had found o ut tha i their a mm u nitio n-ha ndling a rra nge ments weren't quite good e nough - a nd o ne o f thei r baulccruise rs, Se ydlitz. is almost blo wn up, So th ey adopt mea su res to ch ange that. Admiral Schee r, Comman der-in-
\,\'e d id n't. And th e almost criminally irresponsibl e way in wh ich we handle o ur am mu -
Chie f of the German High Seas
n itio n , par ticu larly in the banlc cru ise r fle et. co ntrib ute s to the disaste rs th a t w o ul d
Fleet at the Batt le of Jutland in
overtake us at th e Battle o f J ut lan d ,'
May 1976.
Altho ugh the re was a difference in th e wa ys bot h nav ies re sponded to the le ssons learnt at Dogger Bank , there were fun damental d iffere nces in the d esign o f the Germa n s h ips that made the m more res ilie nt to absol ute d estruction fro m fire and s he ll attac k tha n the British vessels. British Ad mira l o f the Fleet. Sir Henry Le ach . e xpla ins : "Th e y we re ab le to construct th e ir s hi ps to a mu ch mo re: u ns in kabl e: d e s ign th an we jud ged to be prudent. For ex am ple , if yo u wished to move fro m o ne room in a Britis h s hip yo u went
10
10
anoth er
the inte rve n ing bu lkhead , yo u u nchppcd th e b u lkh e ad
d o o r, yo u passed through into the next co mpartme n t a nd yo u di pped il up ag .rin, and th at d o or, o f co u rse, w as wate rtight. In Ge rma n shi ps . if yo u w ant ed to d o that . yo u co u ldn 't. You had to go ve rtica lly u p until you go t to the d ec k - ce rta in ly abo ve th e wat e rline. a n d the n wa lk al o ng an d then g o vert icall y d ow n , s im pl y
10
go into the
ne xt-d oo r roo m , This mea nt th at Ge rman s h ips too k far greater pu nishment in terms o f wa te rtig ht integrity than the British sh ips,' Almo st two yea rs into the wa r, th e: hope s sh ared hy th e Kaise r and Ad m iral
H>I1
Tirp itz fo r
th e High Sea s Fleet had not bee n rea lized. Ne ither had th e Tirpitz Plan In whitt le d o wn the strength of the l{n yal Na\1"s G ran d Fleet in a n um ber o f sUCl'e:ssi\'e:, mino r battles. Pressu re was mou nting o n Admiral Sch eer 10 get the: Ge rman battl e: flee t to sea. hut he kne w o nly too well th e: stre ng th o f th e: e ne my th at lay in w a it o n the o the:r si d e o f the No rth Se a . Hts strate gy re mained to e ntice se ctions of the G rand Fleet into sm a ll battles, not the majo r confro ntation that the British were hopi ng for, Dr Eric G rove comments:
68
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x n r sr'rrrrn N I S3 HTlTl f:l
e Batt e 0
utan O
n paper it lo oked a very o ne-sided co nte st : th e Briti sh w ith tw enty-eight battl esh ips and n in e ba ttle cru isers. th e Germa ns with si xteen a nd five respe ctivel y. plus a sq uadron of si x p re-
drea dn oughts . These numbers d o n o t in clude the vast fleet of sma ller
su p port ve ssels th at made u p the e nt ire nav al fo rce of both fle et s. In a ll. more tha n 100.000 men aboa rd a ro und 250 fighting s h ips were inv olve d in the Battl e o f jutland . The Ge rma n actio n that precipitat ed th e battl e w as se nd ing Hipper's b attlecruisers n orthwards from Germany in th e dire cti on of Norway. followed at a distance b y their battl e fleet. Th e Germa ns kn ew the British w ould d e cipher radio messa ges a n d d et e ct th e first movem en t. It w as a lmo st certa in they w ou ld se nd Beatty 's battl e cruisers from Rosyth to int erce p t. The pla n, the n. was for Hip pe r's s hips to cha nge course to lead Be att y into the hand s o f Sc heer's m a in battl e fleet. Addi tiona lly. by station ing U-boa ts o utside the th ree British bases at Rosyth . Cro ma rty a nd
Sca pa Flow. it wa s ho pe d that so me British dreadnoug hts wo uld he to rpedoed . T he se Uboats wo uld als o pass info rmat io n to Schee r abo ut British I110 veI1H.-. nts. as would Ze ppelins scouting wel l ah ead of the Ge rman fleet. Th e plan wa s simple enough and even if the entire British battle fleet we re to stea m so uthwa rds. Sch eer would have plenty of advance warning to avo id c atastro p he . In the event, ho wever, the plan assumed a d ynam ic of its o w n. The activities o f Room ·10 ga n~ (he British ea rly indica tio n that :1 large -scale mov ement o f Ge rma n ships W:lS imminent . \Xlhen (he tj-bouts sailed for their design ated positions
In the greatest nesa-to-neea battle ever between modem
Squadron commanded hy Vice -Adm ira l j erram w ith the l st Cruiser Squ ad ron a nd pan o f the l l th ctestrovcr flotill a: a nd at ROS}1h, Beally, o n his flagsh ip Lion. W;IS with the Ist a nd 2nd Bunlccrutscr Sq uadrons, the Srh Batt le Squ ad ron made up of four sh ips of the QlH..'l.' 11 Elizabeth
ba ttleships, over 100.000 sailors
Class , the l st. 2nd a nd .trd Light Cru ise r Sq uadrons a nd d ements o f the lsr, 9th l Oth an ti 13th destroye r flot illas.
and to this day, the result is still
manning some 250 fighting ships clashed in the Battle of Jutland disputed..
Phase 1: contact Acting on in tel ligence from Room 40. the Admiralty in London ordered jcllico c to co ncentrate
hi... net..' t eastwa rd... of the 'Lo ng Forties ", an a rea about 110 miles t..·a....t o f Aberdeen. '111l.' e ntire Briti...h
Admiral Sir David Beatty on the quarterdeck of his flagship Quee n Elizabeth after Jutland. Beatty
took over command of the Grand Fleet after Jelticoe.
hattie struu..'gy would he ca rried o ut accord ing to ·Fighting Instruct io n..·. :1 book of rules for naval e ngageme nts . 111is cal led for t..~lc h ind ividual sh ip co mman der to surrender ~I II initiative (0 the: o rders issued hy the: Co m ma nd e r-in-Chie f w ho w ould in tum re port e ve ry mov e' to the: Admiralty operations room in London . Flexibility and initiati ve w ere not encoura ged . l ondon w ould e ffectively co ntro l the wh ole battle tactics. j ellicoe, a co nsummate ta ctici an groomed hy Admiral Fisher. would certainly phi)' by the mIL'S. jcllicoc sailed from Scapa Flow at 22.30 o n Tu esday 30 .\ Iay a nd was in position by 14.00 the following day. Bean y's buulccru tscrs we re 69 miles furt he r so uth . 111e first upset to the Germa n pla ns occurred when Ll-bo ats o n pat rol o utside three British bases failed to attack the British shi ps as the y sa iled pa st. 111e second wa s the failure of the the Ze ppeli ns th at Sch ee r had ~H his dis posal. Initially the Zeppelins were una blc to fly beca use o f had w eath er and, wh en they d id e ve ntually get airborne, dense clo ud and ha ze red uced visibility to alm ost zero. Scheer wa s left witho ut information o n the strength . the heading o r the positio n o f the British fleet s . Th e H igh Sea s Fleet. wi th Scheer in his flagshi p Frt ed rtcb del' C rosse. left the Jad e . nea r wtlhelmshaven. ea rly on th e morn ing o f 3 1 May . His fle e t comp rised the bt . 2nd and 3rd Sq uadrons
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-:TJ I .E... n r\T T I ES Il IPS
\\:'a tch ing th e grim spectacle trom the br idg e o f Lion. Admira l Bea n)' made h is fa mo us co m ment, 'Th ere seems to he something wrong with o u r blood y s h ips today: As wdl as th e banl ecru isers. the German a nd British destro ye r flotillas w ere also loc ke d in hatti e . Two Germa n d estro yers were su n k in the mele e . Bean )' o rde red re peated torpedo attacks o n th e e nemy , Sey dlilz w as hit forwa rd of 'A' turret o n he r starboa rd s ide hut. bu ckled a nd lea king . s he still was able to ma intain full speed. As Beatty contin ued his southe rly pursuit o f Hipper. he receive d signals from his cru ise rs. scou ting tw o m iles fo rw ard . th at enemy ba ttlesh ips were d ead a h e ad . Beatty n o w rea lized th at h e wa s sailing head long into
~I
trap, into th e path o f SCheer's halli e fleet. At
16.40. using flags. he s ig nalled to a ll s h ips in his fleet 10 turn 1HO deg n..'esto starboard . in o the r words. 10 reverse cou rse . This signa l was not ident ified h y Evan-Th o mas o n the brid ge o f nartmm an d th e 5th Battle Squadron co ntinued to race so uthwa rds . At this stage o f th e hattie. German losse s were m inima l.
t.mzon-.
Seydlitz. .Ho/II..'e and l '011 tier Tan n had a ll been hit hut were still
in good lighting trim . O n ly IJelj ] 1iIl/l,er remai ned un scat hed , \X'ith th e sin king o f two Britis h ba u lecruisers, Hip pe r's ba ttlecrulscrs ha d already wo n a s ubstantia l victory.
Phase 3: the run to the north " ;Th ilc Beatty's s hips were despera tel y try ing to extri cate the mselves fro m the jaws o f rhe Hig h Sea ..; Fleet, jclucoc. alt ho ug h still a good di stance to the no rth . wa s s tea m in g sou th a t 20 k n o ts . toward s the sce ne o f th e act io n.
BUI
he w as comp le tel y unaware o f
p recisely what was happening further south . At 16.38 he received a s ig na l from tilt: crui se r Southa mpton giv ing the course o f Sch eer's Ge rma n batt le fleet. Thi s wa s j elhcoe's first Indication that the e ntire
Germa n High
SC:l S
Fleet wa s
;I I
••
sea . Immediat ely he se nt the
Admiralty in Lon don th e el ectrifying sign:!1 [h at fl eet act ion w as
imminent. Meanwhile Eva n-Thoma s a nd hi s 51h Battl e Squad ron h ad re ali zed (he s itua tio n an d tu rned 1HO degrees to rejoin the flee t. But not before Be atty a nd Evan-Th omas had pass ed o ne a nothe r o n o pposite courses' Beatl y's banlecrutsers. now in com pany with the 5th Bau lc Squad ron . ha d again cha nged co u rse a nd we re now st e aming no rthwa rds. pursued by Hippe r. The Germa n sh ip s had re versed cou rse to tak e u p the le ad po sition at th e head of th e German lxut le tlect led by its Co m ma nd e r-in-Ch ie f. Admi ral Scheer, in the battl esh ip Friedrich d er Gros:"e. Thi s com p le te rev ersal o f co urse for both pursuer a nd pursu ed a like. from a southerl y 10 a northerl y heading. meant th at Beauy. pu rsued by Hip per and followed by th e e ntire Ge rma n High Se;ls Fleet . was sa iling direc tl y towards the o nco m ing British Gra nd Fleet. The o bject ive o f British nava l strJ.teg)' sinc e the beginning of the war had been to force a head-to-h ead hatti e with the Il ig h Sea s FiL'"t"L It was now about to happen. Befo re jel bcoc a rrive d. the first stages of the hatt ie bega n. At ar o und 17. 10. Sch e e r's 3rd Sq uad ron . comp rising seven bat tleships, went int o action aga inst the rearmost tw o battleships o f th e British 51h Battle Sq uadron , stalava and warsptte. J /a /aya was ba dly h ir wh ile the British infl icted hea vy d am age on
, l l(l r/..~p, r(l.r. Seydlitx.
DeljJ lill/l,er a nd l.iitr ou:
Eve n a t thi s stag e . Scheer wa s qu ite u na wa re th at th e e n tire Grand Fleet was stea mi ng towa rds h im at fu ll s peed . jell tcoc . o n th e ot he r hand, kn e w p re ci.'icl y w h at lay a head of
_IIIIiiI=..' tMlltil_IiI...__ _ ~ 95
TIlE BATII E ()1'-JIH LANIL
...
him . To position his tlccr 10 ga in maxi m um tactica l adva ntage over the Germa ns. he needed
Scheer had no idea that the
10 know the e;X:I('1 p o sition of the enem y IkL'1. its s peed. an d rhc cou rse it was sreann nu. Yet
entire Grand Fleet was at sea
alt ho ug h a large nu mb er of Bri tish xhi px, particu larl y the bun lccr u isc rs an d their scoll ti ng
and steaming directly
gro up we re in sig ht o f the Germans. no t o ne capt ain rel ayed th is vi tuI inform ation 10 (heir
towards him.
CC)!l1m: 1ndcr -in -Chief
vi sua l co ntact bctwcc nj vllicoc and Beatty was mad e arou nd IH. OO a nd it was o n ly then tha i
Jc lli<.:o t,;' reali zed that Sch e er w as c lose r and in a different positio n from tha t which he had
e xpected . \" jlh this information. j e lltcoe gave the signal for his g reat dreadno ught fleer 10 deploy for bat tle . This comp le x manoeuvre W ;IS under way when ,l fa rllx )ro liRb o penc..d fire on the High Seas Fle et. Schee r was n ow faced with th e situation h e least wanted : a head -on confro ntation with the e ntire Grand Fleet. Before the main hall ie co mm e nced. the 3rd British bunl ecruiscr sq uadron . co m ma nded
hy Rear -Admiral Hoo d . o pe ned fire o n Hip pe r's banlccruisers with great e ffect. tmrcm-. the flagsh ip o f the Germa n ba tt lccrutscrs a nd w ith Ad m iral Hip p e r o n ho a rd . w as h it forward repe at e dl y. AI IH.j O. ami d th e ha ze a nd s moke o f ba trlc . t.arzou: fire d th ree sal voe s at
tnrtuctble, s ilh o u e tte d in th e eve ni ng light. T he last of th e se h it th e b an lec ru lscr. wi th ca tas tro ph tc re sul ts . Th e s he ll e xp loded ins id e
:I
tu rret, blo wing the ar mo u red roof o il a nd
se nding a sheet of fla me into the magazines below. The devastarinu force of the explosion that followed blew the ship apart . Bot h the bow and stern s\:nions stood briefly. a -trunge ami motionh..'s s verti cal p illa r jutting out of the North Sea swell . \X'h ile the stern sank, the bow re ma ine d in thi s bizarre position until Ihe following day. O nly six nu-n were res cued . 1016 were lo-a . Once again , British bau lccru t- c rs had to tu rn :Iway to a void sa iling through the wreckage o f one o f th eir ow n sh ips , a victim of the an.-ur.nc a nd d e vastalin g fire power of the: German fleet.
Phase 4: fleet action By IR 40 the Grand Fleet wa s in hallie: I'Ofma tio n, a n inuucnse a nn ada of twent y-fou r b.utlexhi ps in line a head. Moreo ver. .Iellico t.' had effected a classic d e-ployme nt o f his lxutlc line . crossi ng the "l" o f the: e nemy line. lit.' had a lso pl ac e d his s hi ps be tween Sc he e r and the safety of Germany. With o nly a few hours of daylight left. the Ibull' ofj utland was about to begin . Scheer immediate ly attempted to ex tricate himself from this disastrous po...itio n hy signalling a IHO-tlL'gn:t.:' tu rn 10 the west. \X.'ith in minutes the Hig h Seas Flee:t had cxpcnlv co m p le te d this 'b.utlc-tum' - a move blan keted from view of the main British fleet by a th ick layer of haze. allowing tht.' German flee t to steam rapidly away. Altho ug h this manoeuvre had been seen The severely damaged German
hy several British sh ips, o nce: again no report to Jel lico t.:' was made. va luable tim e elapsed
betttecruiser Seydlitz managed to Jutland . She is seen here in dock
before lie realized the Germa ns had escaped. In fear of torpedo attacks from destroyers. and kn ow ing that the ene my mig h t we ll have covered its t.'SCIPC hy sow ing min e s, Iht.' British Co mmander-ill-Chie f d id no t p ursut.:' Scheer. He ma intain ed COUfSL' 10 e ns u re thai his ma in tlcct
at Wilhelmshaven.
re ma ined betwee n thl' Ge rmans a nd the safe ty o f thei r horn e base . Jc Hin K.' was later accused
limp home after the Battle o f
..
IllJLIlAITI..E.JlEJllIL\\ 'SJILN J)
-'
of hein~ over-ca u tio us in not pursuing Sc hee r. hut h is fear was justi fied wh en the cri p pled German cruiser U''';('s!Jaciell succeeded in torpedoing the battlesh ip , \la rll}() l'vlI~b. By th is l.·a rl)' stage of the hatt ie the hadly d a maged !.ii/zoU' was a lmost out of control and Hip per tran sferred his nag to Seydl itz hut.
:IS
.)(:l'dlilz
W :IS
a lso hl.·:1Vily d.urugcd. he was fo rced
to make a second trans fer 10 .If()I,I..~. the least damaged of the German battlecruisers .
After ste a mi n g to the west for about fifteen minutes. and st ill pro tected hy [he layer of haze . Scheer signalled a no ther lBO-dcgn.·(.' turn. His pla n was to P;ISS behind the British lim.•. . and to '(TOSS the T' o f jcll tcoe's fear. Ho wever. far from pass ing behi nd the British line. he steamed into the m idd le o f it. placingjelltcoc in an e xtraordina rily fort u na te position. 111istime . a nd for the only tim e in th e ent ire ba ttle , practica lly a ll of the Gra nd F I ~~t o pened fire. In desperation. Scheer e ffected an ot her abou t-tu rn . To furt her di stract the Gra nd Fleet . he o rdered his b.mlccruiscrs to turn di re ctly towa rd s lhe: e ne m y and attack. 111e: suicida l natu re o f this signal to the ba ulec ruiscrs was soon du nged 10 'Attack the e ne my rear', h UI hy th at time the already damaged. lighter-armou red s hips had ta ken a rca l bcatmg . '111e Ge rma n destroyers were o rd e red to lau nch a to rpedo attack . a nd they fired a tot al o f thirt y-one torpedoes at the: Gra nd Fle et . But vis ihilit y favoured th e British . a nd th eir h e~l\'r gu ns scored hi t a fte r hit o n /) el}j1ill j.!,er. Scvdlur . Liitzou : a nd Grosser Kurfnst. \,\'hile th e Hig h Se as Fle et stea med westwards. th e G rand Fleet . un d er torpedo attac k. tur ned to th e so uth -east. Thi s man oeuvre was later seen as a co ntro ve rsial tur n ~I w a y from the enemy in the face o f attack. a lthoug h .iL'l!icoc had d one no mOR' than follo w o rders in the Adm iralty 'Fig hting Inst ruct ions '. By 19..1':;. ti ll.' Hig h Sl'as Fleet had succe ede d in slipping into lh e m ist. The main fighli ng at j utlan d W~I S over.
Phase 5: night action After the to rpedo a ttack. Jl'I Ih-oc felt safe e no ug h 10 dose the rangl' aga in and resume action. He ass u med th e lli gh Sl.'as Fleet was still o n cours e . o bs cured hy the th icken ing m ist. hut in f~KI Scheer was some 12 miles wt.'stwards o fj clhcoc.. stet.'ring south-west. At 19.45. th e Germa n Co m munck-r-In-Clucf a lte re d co u rse 10 th e south with th e in te n tio n o f head ing tow a rd s the sa ft.,ty of lI orns Ree f and h is home base . To ac hieve th is heading . Sch e e r would have to comp let ely sk irt ro und the Gra nd Fleet . By 20.00 . Jellicol' realized the e ne my fleet wa s heading fo r horn e . and o rdered th e Gra nd Fleet to steer westwards in th e hope o f rega inin g contact . Ov er the next fiftee n mi nu tes fu rther co u rse: alteratio ns saw th e Grand Fleet st ee ring so uth west. Unaware o f o ne anoth er 's position. bot h ba ttle fleets were now o n co nve rging so ulherly courses . With sunset at 20.1.,. less tha n an hour and a qu a rter remained fo r the h unt er to find till.' hunted. a nd for the hunted to esca pe into lhe evening darkness... A~ the sun set. Hip per's lst Scouring Grou p was attempting to rega in its positio n ahead o f th e Ge rma n ha llie flee t w hen Be an y's ba n lecruisers appeared a nd o pe ned fire . In this br ief
l.'nW1gl.·I1ll.'nt . f)elyj 1in}wr was h it o nce a nd Seydtttz five limes. l.ion and Prin cess R(~ra l l.'a c h sus ta ined one h it.
As lh e y lim p ed for th e safe ly o f thei r home po rt. \,\' ilh dms ha\·l.'n. the p ro ud Germ:1I1 ba u lecruisc rs were in ha d sh a pe. Both [)erj)1inl!.erand S£:rd lilz had half th eir ma in a rma me nt OUI of action : Sevdttts: had seve ral thousand tons of w ater in her for e peak . 1(m der Ta nn ha d o ne tu rret
O UI
o f o pe ra tio n a nd th e o the rs workin g o nly int ermittentl y. t.ntz on-. m o st
seri o us ly d .uu aucd o f :111 . trailed wel l behind lh e fl eet at :I s peed o f o nly 11 knots. J1ol/J..~e. th l' le ast da magl'd o r lhe hatt lecnliscrs. w ith f lip pe r o n hoard. led lh e hatt er ed hattie fleel home. As n ight was ra p id ly app ro~lC h ing . and w ilh th e full kn ow lt.'dge th aI Scheer and lhe High Sl'~I S Fleet we re still o n th e prowl. Je llin x.··s main ohjective was to kl'ep his lleet inta ct in thl' ho pe o f wa~
fin:11 hatt ie Wilh tht.' e nl'my tk t.'[ in lh t.' Illorning. The British Co m ma nd e r-in-Chief ~ l p p rL' h e n ~ i \'l.' aho ut any n ight e ngagement. 1ft.' knew th:1l Iht.' Germa ns. unl ih' lhe Brilish . :1
had pr;lctisl'd nig ht fig hling techn iqu l' s. a nd lhei r d estroye r~ were capahle o f mount ing d e:ld ly
--.,dl,
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iiil m..M6I1i'm . ....._~ 9 9
fleer as thL'Y passed to the rear of j ellicoe's line . The Grand Fleet sailed so uthwards , oblivious [ 0 the rumble o f the batt le between destroye rs go ing on over the hori zo n. About 02.00. British d estro yers o f the 12th Flotilla sig hted the Ge rman Hig h Seas Flee t an d launched a torpedo attack . The pre -d readnought Ge rma n battleship Ponnncrn was hit an d. after a se ries o f deto nat io ns . a ma jo r ex p losio n blew the s hip in to two . SignaLs fro m the Britis h dest ro yers gi\'i ng the positio n o f the Germa n fl ee r w ere se n t h LH no t re ce ived by thei r Com mand er-in-Chief. Mea nw hile . the Hig h SC:
port the High Seas Fleet returned
a salvage vesse l. o n 3 June.
to after the Battle of Jutland.
Germany 's main North Sea naval base, Wilhelmshaven, the home
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'L TIl£JL\lTLlLOL)lITl.AN D
10 1
pcnerr.ucd hy German shells. and the Germans were shooting prcny well. two of
Admiral
B l ·;lIty'S
b.ntl ccruiscrs blew lip with virtua lly a ll hands on hoard . First II MS
IHlhf ll ti)!.lIb/e. and th en II MS Queen ,\l1I1)'. which paradoxically had the best fin: co ntro l
eq ui p me nt on hoard and was doing the best sh ooting. But she blew lip and sank . ca us ing Admiral Beatt y to make his famous comment . MTI1t:rc seems to he something wrong with o u r bl o ody s h ip s today. " There wa s. hut it wasn't so much the sh ips th emse lves. it was th e way th e ammunition wa s being handled o n board them. Tilt..' Bank o f Jutland ce rtainly had en ormous effects o n pe ople's percept ions o f jellico,- and Bean)'. Beau)'. I think .
C;IT11e
o ut rather bcuer (han he shou ld have d one .
Ili s handling of th e bnttlccruiscr fleet was seri ously flawed . And o ne major reason th ere was such con troversy in th e 1920s o ve r th e Battle o f Jutland was that as First Sea Lord (ap poi nted post jutland]. Beatty felt it was incumbent upon him to cover up how badly
he 'd handl ed the battl ccruisers at Jutland. fie tried
10
sell the id e a that the drubbing
hv gave..' th e [Ge rma n ] buu lccruisers wa s su ch tha t the G e rma n fleet was already
The burden of com mand of the
d emorali zed before it met the Gr and Fleet. That w as a bso lut e tosh . The German
British Grand Fleet fell on Admiral
lxmlvcrubcrs thought they were doing rather WL'II. So , Beatt y tri ed to co ver up. Beatty
Sir John Jellicoe. Winston
o f cours e had borne the hrunt o f the act ion and was sun..-c ssfu l in delivering the High
Churchill said of him that he was
Sea s Hc vt for Jellieoe to knock out. AI times in the subsequen t ho ur s. Be an y tried to
the only man who co uld Jose the
encour.lge..· j ell in
war in an afterno on.
>L'
to act m ore aggres.....ivcly and offensively. so it's q uite e..':ISY for Be:lIly's
s up po rte rs to say if Hemy ha d been in co n trol rather tha n .h-llk-oc . the n the bat tle would han : bee n fo ug ht to a more victorious conclusion. I th ink that's ve ry quest io nable.
'[cllic'ov h ad hi s o w n wea knesses as a co m ma nder. jclltcoc \\,:IS very ca u tio us . As Ch urc h ill a lw ays said , he wa ." the on ly man who co uld lo se the war in an afternoon. I think that 's p roba bly an overstatement beca use of the margin of s u p e rio rity of the Gra nd Fleet. But just as xclson 's geniu s was 10 re cogni ze th at his enemy had
serio us weaknesses thai he cou ld exploit. Jelli n x.· ·s defect was to Sl.'e..· rh.u h is fleer was superior in many ways, and he o ug ht to havl.' exploited th,u hy Ix:ing more aAAressive .
jvllicoc adop ted a very defensive attitude. He 's a hit of a co nt ro l fre a k. And th o se extremely voluminous G ra n d Fleet hatti e o rd e rs held the Grand Fleet hack - prevented it IX'ing used with a s u ffic ie nt d egree o f flexihilit y. This refl e cts, o f cou rse, th e inherent te chni cal pr obl ems o f com munica tio n which existed a t the tim e . But jell icoc tri ed to o ve rcome this h y a n extremel y rigid s ystem o f o rde rs . lbg signals and so o n. Don't d o anything until you 're to ld . And this led to situations where British shi ps would not report upwards..., up the cha in o f command . tha t ti l<.' G <" fIl1:1l1 fleer were passing through them. And hence
th e Germans were abl e
10
get aw ay .
' It's often sa id tha t J u tla nd w as the hi g h point of the
o. I
haul e xhip era - ce rta in ly in terms of n umb e rs o f d rea dnought -era ships e ngaged. It's quite min d -boggling to think o f those long lines of im p ressive large -gun armed
ba ttles h ips manoe uvring . But I th in k j ut land also demons tra ted the wea kness of the h anlesh ip as well - the prob le m o f th is tre mendo us m ismatch o f p latform an d wea pon ledltlo log y wit h se nsor a nd comm u n ications techn o lo gy. Gu n... tha t ca n fire o ut
[0
the
T il E HAT TI ESlll1!S
hori zon be ing directed hy the xtark 1 eyeball. with so me o ptical ;ls.sista nce. but no rada r. Ships being contro lled by flag signal as had been done in ~c1....o n's era . So it's hardl y surprising th at it's \·c ry . very difficult for commanders to ma intain contro l. It's re latively e;ISY for fleers to get aw ay. It's difficult to ut illze th e ra w mili tary str e ngth o f th e batt lesh ip 10 bring about decisive results at the tactical and operational level . And that is why jclltcoc fails at Jutla nd as much as anyth ing else . I lis doctrinal a pproa ch didn 't hel p . But the shee r p roblems o f operating a fleet tha t stze . that fast. ih.u powerful. and at that lo ng ran ge in te rms o f g uns, o n the basis of nags and eyeba lls. i:... very d ifficult.'
Altho ugh heated d iscu ssio ns continue 10 this day over the many issues o f Ju tland . immedia tely after the battle the strategic situation was d ear: the Grand Flt..'I..'1 retained possess ion o f the North Sea. and its ships we re ready for action within two days, The: British b lockade: of Ge nua ny was inta ct . eve n if victory in the battle was in dispute , From the Ge rma n point o f view. the batt le was e vide nce that T irpit zs the ori es conceived at the: turn of the: ce ntury were unworkabl e . Despite its successes. the High Sea s Fleet had been badly maul ed hy a s u perio r force a nd had been fortunate to csca pe without scrio us loss, Admiral Sir David Beatty and British seame n cheering the arrival of the US 6th Battle
Squadron at Scapa Flow on 1 Decemb er 191 7.
Mo re o ve r. it confirmed that the British did not ne ed to defe at the High Seas Fle et to re tain contro l of the sea and maintain the blockade. Th e High Seas Fleet had be come a 'fleet in being' 10 deter the British from landing forces in the Baltic and for kceping German lf-boa r ports o rx:n, Th ese objectives co uld IKI \'e: been achieved hy far mo re economical means, The: I lig h Sea s Hcct did co me out o n a fe w other occasions, most notably on 19 Aug ust 1916.
J __-IiI'c "1I·iI-z-_ . &_ . . _ ._ _r:. l 03
IllLllAT.ILE... (}E..j UIL\N D D'-----
Queen Elizabeth Class battleships photographed from an airship on their way to meet the surrendered German High Seas Fleet .
Sche e r, dete rm ined
10
s how that his fle e t remai ned a po tent fig hting force, bomba rded
Sunderland in the hope of d rawing o ut a sect io n of (he Gra nd Fleet. And to e ns ure tha t the eve nts of 3 1 J\ lay we re no t repeated. Sch eer made ext e nsive lise o f Ze ppelins and U-hoats 10 provide adva nce intel lige nce o f British 11l0 VCI11cnL s . Aga in Room 40 in Lo ndon passed ne ws of
S C!lCt.: f 'S
mov eme nts to j e lllcoe and th e G ra nd Flee t w as at sea before the Ge rma n!" le ft
harbour, Inco rrect information gi ven to the Ge rman Co mmande r-in-Chief led Scheer to belie ve
that a sq uadro n o f British lxu tlesht ps w us ap proa ching from the south-cas t. Sche e r turn ed
(0
face this fo ro: and . in doing so , stee red away fro mlellicoe. Late r, Scheer recei ved a signal fro m
U53 saying that it had siglucd the entire Gra nd Fleer steering so uth, and was o nly 65 miles fro m the lli gh Seas Fleet. Upo n re cei ving this news, Scheer turned fo r hom e , and ended what wo uld he the last cha nce o f a confrontatio n betw ee n the Ge rma n and British fleet s. The Ge rma n o ffe nsive at sea then focu sed o n the U - I ){)~H S and the u nrestricted ca m paig n of attacking all e ne my s hips, w hich bega n in Fe b ruary 19 17. In Apr il, Ll-boats increased the Allied tonnage they had s unk by threefold , to o ve r 800,000 to ns. Du ring the same mon th. the United States declared wa r o n Ge rmany. mak ing her ultimate de feat o nly a matt er o f time . In May. the introdu ction hy the Allies of the co nvo y syste m. wh e re merchant s hips we re formed into large groups w ith ar med esco rts, e ffectively turned the tide o f Ll-boat successes. With no mea ningfu l ro le to pla y, the d re ad nough ts o f the I lig h Se as Fle et lan g u is he d in ha rbo u r. w hile boredom led to a sig nifica nt decl ine in crew mo rale and d isciplin e . By the late s umme r o f 1918 , the Ge rma n will to cont inue the wa r bega n to crum b le . A breakthro ugh by the Ge rman Army in the spring of 19 18 fina lly broke the stale ma te of trench wa rfare. This wa s fo llo wed hy a gia nt Allied co unte r-o ffensive in August. O n 8 Aug ust. kn o wn
as lh e ' Black Day o f th e German Arm y' . Allied force s swc...pt o ve r th e mangled lxutlefield s of the Sonune, taking the German Army h y com ple te s urp rise . It wa s th e heginning o f the e nd . In thi s same month. Scheer became Head o f th e Ge rma n Adruimlty. relinquishing com ma nd o f th e Iligh Sea s Fleet to Admiral Hipper, O n 22 Octobe r Sch ee r o rde red Hipper 10 p re pare th e High Seas Fleet for o ne final a nd d es perate sorti e . Th e plan was to attac k British cross-Cha n nel su p ply lines and th e Thames Estua ry. e nticing th e G rand Fleet to sail sout h wards . o ve r lines o f U-boats and ne w m inefields 10 where the High Seas Fleet would he in wa iting . There was a desperate s ide to th is pr opo sal as. unlik e th e High Seas Fleet . th e G ra nd Fleet had been ma inta ined at peak efficiency. Its superiori ty in strength and num be rs ha d also been fu rther re inforced fo llowi ng the ent ry o f the USA into the war in April 1917. Th e 6th B~IllIt., Squadro n. cons ist ing o f nin e US battleships, had joined th e G rand Fleet at Scapa Flow . TIle High Seas Fleet W~IS o rdered to sail o n 29 October in wh at man y Ge rma n sailo rs viewed as a su icide mis:...ion. But the fleer rema ined at anc hor. Its low moral e h;IO lx 'cn e vident as early as August 1917. when a rev olt o n th e battle sh ip Prtnzreg ent Luil/x,1d over po o r food rations was d ealt with h y th e sh ooting o f lWO ringl eaders, No w . in O ctober. rat her than follow o rders in a war th at was d early in its dosing stages. the crews mutini ed. A Sold iers' Co unci l was set up in Kid a nd the red flag o f socialism was flown fro m many o f the s hips . It was an important element in the o ve ra ll co llapse o f th e German 'ho me front '. The Il ig h Seas FI<..'<..'t ne ver sailed a nd 'the wa r 10 end all wa rs' ground to an ignom inious end for th e Germans and joyous victory fo r the Allie s. The Kaiser abdicated on 9 No ve mber and went into ex ile in Ho lland . Two days late r. o n.th e eleve nt h day o f the eleven th mont h. at e leven o'clock the Ar mis tice was sig ned \'\'~Ir I were s ilen t.
a nd th e g u ns o f \'\'orld
Under the te rm s o f the Armi stice . later rat ified at the Trea ty of Versa illes. Ge rmany wa s 10 pay d ea rly in te rrito ry. ma te rial a nd cash fo r he r part in the war. The British a rgued strongly fo r th e immediate elimination of Ge rman sea-power a nd her redu ction in na va l sta tus to se cond class. The entire Ge rma n fleet wa s interned u nt il its fate wa s determined hy the peace treaty. to he signed in the fol lowing year. O n 21 Novem ber the o nce proud Hig h Seas Fleet sailed from its home port for th e last time . It would never return. Its initial d estination wa s the Firth o f Forth. now th e main ba se o f the Gra nd Fleet. Admiral Sir David Beatt y. who had re placed jclltcoc as Com ma nder-in-Chie f o f th e Gra nd Fleet in No ve mber 1917. fo rme d till.' imm ense Grand Fleet into tw o vast colum ns . Th e German fleer was fo rce d 10 sa il bet ween the..' tw o lines o f 'e ne my' ships into th e cus tody of th e British , US sail or John Paul Elliot . o n lx xtrd th e ban k-ship UOSS Texas. witnessed th e a rrival o f th e High Seas Fleet in the Firth of Fort h a nd rem e mbers it still: '\'\'t: were there when th e s hips ca me in . when th e Germa n s hi ps surre ndered . They a ll ca me in th e Firth o f Forth and dropped a nc hor. \X'e didn 't get too -lo se to th em, and th e y didn't gel toec losc to us. I could see th ey were in a prett y run-down cond itio n -
th ey d id n 't look as th ou gh they'd been mai nta iru..d . It was kind o f a sad thing to sec a ll these immense sh ips come in th ere a nd you kn ow, just surrend er like that . Th ey looked so bedraggled
10
me . th ey just looked beaten. that's the way thc )' im p ressed me ,
They didn 't look like fighting ships a ny more . It wa s an o ve rca st da y. as I recall. If th e sun had been shining maybe th ey would have looked bette r. hut it was ~1J1 o ve rcast. d ull day - it was a fun era l day . and it was a funera l for the Ge rma n Navy. ' W'h t:n th e Ge rma n sh ips had d rop ped an chor in the Forth, Heutty signalled: 'The German flag w ill he hau led d ow n at s unset today . Th ursda y, and w ill not he ho isted aga in without permission.' Som e time after this ritual surre nder ce remony. the fleer wa s escorted to Sc;11x1 Flo w where it was to wa it, d isar med and w ith reduced news, fo r the fi nal te rms o f th e peace tre.uy w hich wo uld decide the ir fut u re.
.
IHLJIlAJITI.F..-!OE-J11.ILANll.THE H A T TI E OF II ITI AN D
Mont h alt e r mo nth the Ge rman ships sw ung :H ancho r in this remote. w indsw ept harbour w hile the Allies d iscussed the ir ultimate fate. Small crews of Ge rma n office rs and sailors lived o n board. maintain ing thei r ships as best they co uld under these extre me circu mstances. The
.4t.'mm
-----'"'-_ _
The interned German High Seas Fleet at anchor in Scapa Flow with accompanying chart. This
British had no need o f any o f the sh ips and favo ure d sinking the fleet in mid-Atlanti c. Other plans e nv isaged a split be tween the Allies based o n wa r losses incurred by ea ch navy . What was
pho tograph was taken a few
ce rtain wa s that no! o ne ship wo uld ever be retu rned to Ge rma ny. The Armistice wa s or iginally du e to ex p ire o n 1 1june 19 19. at w hich time the Treat y of Versa illes wo uld co me into effect. As
scuttled.
so me ac tion of defiance wa s ex pected from the Ge rma ns, including the possib ility of sc uttling, British a rmed fo rces were se t to seize the ships an d their crews at any time . Vice-Admiral Ludw ig vo n Re uter, co mma nde r o f the inte rned fle et. had ind eed decid ed to take matte rs into his o w n hands. He plan ned to scuttle his ships o n 21 june . just pr io r to the e nd o f the Armistice. Ho we ve r, unknow n to Reut er, the ex piry date was put back un til 23./ un e . O n the mo rni ng o f 2 1 J un e , fo r so me unacco un table reaso n. th e British sq uad ro n gua rd ing the inte rned fleet sailed o il. o ut of Sca pa Flow to co ndu ct exercises , lea vin g the Ge rmans to thei r own devices, At 10.00. Reut er gave the o rde r for his ships to scuttle. The skele ton cre w!" had a lrea d y mu tilated val ves and pipe s and ta ke n the necessa ry ste ps to e nsure the British could no t reve rse any action once the scu ttling began . The noise of a ir esc a ping from flooding com pa rtme nts co uld he heard as every ship in the fleet gradu ally began to sink,
Pl'AAY G ibson wa s a ten -year-old child at the time , an d o ne of a pa rty of local school child ren be ing take n to sec the Ge rman ships that day. She vividly recalls the mom e nt : '\X!e got on hoa rd the 1'~ J'i llp, Kestrel earl y in thc morning o f a bea utiful summer's day. cvcryt htng wa s loo king bea utiful. \X'e set sa il fro m Stro mncss wh ere I live d and had a jou rney of qui te a number o f mile s past the island !" of 1I0 y and C ruc msay and a fe w mo re un til we reached the first rows o f ba ttlesh ips. T he y we re lying in pair s and it
months before the fleet was
105
TilE IlA TTI ESlllpS
The German bettlecruiser
Hindenburg rests on the bottom after scuttling,
was like
~I
corridor between the tw o colu m ns, There
W ;I S ~I
colu m n o f two b y tw o a nd
two hy two . \X'e sailed d o wn the pathway between the ships. \'X'e h ad been warned by th e teach e rs th at w e weren't to mak e any no ise o r chee r o r d o anyth ing in particular to pay atte ntio n to th e sh ips . jus t to h e q u iet. And o n o ur way d o wn we go t a messa ge
from anothe r sh ip w hich said that the British fleet had gone o ut that mo rn ing o n exercise and th at it wa s retu rn ing because the y'd go t this amazing ne ws w hich was of course that the Germa n fl eet was sin king . ' But we we re so mu ch in the m idd le o f it that w e had to sta y wh ere it wou ld he safe beca use the ships w ere performing. It wa s a marvellous show. They stood o n the e n d o f thei r bows. th ey went o ve r. the y d ive d . the s un g linted o ff the ro ws in the water. 111Cy did the most marvellous th ings. I myself saw twelve cap ital sh ips go d own. One of them rose right up o n her bow and then went over o n her xidc into th e water.
I'll n ever forget th e sig ht o f it. A lin e o f them were lying there . th e y were ly in g in pa irs. '\'X'e were to ld to lie beside the victorious. wh ich W ~IS act ing as a hospital ship at th at time, \X'e mo ve d a lo ngside and formed a trian g le w ith a tra wle r. And that trawler ha d armed men a lo ng the decks lo ok ing d o w n o n a s ma ll bo at that was between a ll th re e shi ps , The Ge rma n ca p ta ins were there , beautifu lly dr essed ; th ey we re silting in th is lifeboat w ith th e g un s trained o n them.
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att es 1_ s I
n the two decades follow ing World War I, politicians and the ir e nvo ys, through agreements made aro und conference tables in \X'ashingto n and Lo ndo n, e ffec tively destroyed more battlesh ips than were eve r lost in
co nflict. But in doing so , they also ignited a flame o f passion in at least o ne nati on to create the ultimate cap ita l ships, the like of which the world had never seen before, Th e aftermath of the war saw Britain victorious but war-weary and
economically drained, Its shipbu ilding yards no longer had order book s full wi th demands for figh ting s hips . The enormous sk illed workforce that had p rod uced the ships of the Grand Flee t wo u ld soon be reduced to a bare minimum in the years leadi ng up to worl d recessio n. Th ere was. in fact, a worldwide glut of ships of almos t eve ry descript ion. As far as the Ro yal Navy was co nce rned. the vast ma jority of ships in its fleet wer e o bsolete - o ld , o ut-da te d veterans b uilt yea rs be fore th e war. Its most modern and p owerful batt leships w er e th e I5-in ch C3H I- mm) gunned ships of the Queen Elizabeth and Revenge Classes , all of wh ich had
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___
IIIIiI=IiII'~Ii'%tr.a _ _~
been laid down between 1912 and 19 14. The on ly other dreadnought of any real fig lHing val ue
was the bat tle..cr uise r Hood. II was pe rfectly clea r tbat the Ro yal Navy would he o utclassed if a new pro g ramme of co ns tructio n was no t ra pid ly au thorized , Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. the German Navy was no longer a ma jor naval power. no r wo uld it he w hile the te rms o f the treat y weft' in for ce . In an y imme d iate futur e d iscussions o n the world 's na vies, Ge rma ny would not even rate a mentio n . Japan . the domi nant po wer in Asia follo w ing its annihilatio n o f the Russian Fleet at Tsuxhima in 1905, was ho ping for a co ntinuatio n of its lon g alliance w ith Brita in - an associ ation that saw Japa n ac tively suppo rt Brita in as he r a lly in World ' x'ar I. At the same time , Japa n wa s hu ilding up its s hipbuildi ng fac ilities so that. as a ma jo r nav al po we r, it would he inde pende nt of ~lO y fo reig n assista nce in pro d uci ng warsh ips fo r thc Im perial j apa nese Navy. As ea rly as 1907. the Jap an ese Imper ial Defence Co uncil au thori zed an H-H Fleet Plan , w hich en visaged a fleet of e ight mode rn battleships and eight mode rn ba ttle cru ise rs in act ive se rvice at a ny o ne time . At th is stage. Japa n's s hipbuilding industry was no t ye t developed to build to those limits. By 19 12/ 13 that had cha nge d. a nd two Fuso Class battles hips we re laid do wn - the first true d re adnoug hts to he b uilt in Japa n . The se we re fo llowed by the two b e Class s hips in
19 15; in t917/t H hy two ships o f the Nagato Class - the first batt leshi ps to intro d uce th e 16inch (-'tOo-mill) g un ; a nd, be tween 1920 an d 19 21. hy six further to-inch gu nned battles hips of [he Kaga and Kii Classes . In add itio n to four 14-inch <355-l11 m) gu nne d buttlecruise rs o f the Ko ngo Class . the Japa nese a lso proposed to lay do wn two classes of four s hips e ac h d uring 19 20 a nd 19 22. The first four of these . the to-inch (4Gb-mm) gunne d Amagi Class . w e re laid
The fine lines of the Briti sh battlecruiser Hood are eviden t
as she leaves John Brown S shipyard on Clydeside in Janu ary 1920.
•
,.~~-
110 - p
7
TlUUIAT.T LES 11115
dow n as pla nned, The o the r unnamed class. referred to as the :-\0 15 CIa...s. was projected fo r construction in 1922 . The-e powe rfu l sh ips would han.' df... placed 17 5 00 tons and carrie d eight lx -inc h (iS7-mm) guns. The Imperial Japa nese :\';I\Y was planning one of the
11l0"'t
powerful lh:c(s in the world -
a n;I\';1I fo rce that wou ld enable it to pursue its future ambition... in th e Pacific. There \\"as no
doubt: Japan had se rio us expansionist plans in [h is region . The one powl'r thL')" feared might cha lle nge their dominance here was the CSA. \X'ilh her newl y acquired
posSL'~...ions
in the Phili ppines and growing interests in China. there
was no disguising thl." fact that the USA was seek ing strong territorial and political interests in The 16-inch gun proved to be one of the most potent weapons
IhL' Pacific. Aft er world \,\'ar I it had the second IargL'st hall ie fleet in IhL' world after Britain and . wi th its expand ing economy and enormous industria l base. the USA
W~IS
well on th e road to
ever developed for the battleship.
becoming the world 's most powerfu l nation , a major player in world affairs. Th is intent had
It reached its zeni th in the Mark 7
become patently obviou x hack in 1907. when Presid e nt Th eod ore I{O()SC\'elt L'ngagL'd in a flag-
16-inch 50- calibre turret gun ,
wa \'ing exercise hy sl'nding w h at became kn o w n
~IS
"l'hc
GrL'~1l
\X'hilL' Fleer ' on a
seen here being fired by the USS
fourteen -mon th worldwide cruise. The exe rcise of s h o w ing the llag at thl.' masthead of a
Missouri in the late 1980s.
powerfu l nava l force was a pointed gesture In war ds the Pacific. and japan in particular. The
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THE H A I TI E S U I PS
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TIJLLllLrrWillUlAJ:Il.ESlliJ'.S~
-"'_ lis.r.
TilE I n TI MATE HATT I ES ll lPS
Roads and a series o f bombing ru ns were made . The o ld b.utle shtp wa s e ve ntua lly sun k, hut .\Iilche ll's de mo nstrat ion had p ro ved little: Ostfriesla nd w as an easy targ et - an o ld ship
USS New Mexico. armed with
dead in the wa te r. un ah ie to de fe nd he rsel f o r ca rry o ut damage-co ntrol ac-tivities. Mitchell . though . had ra ised awa ren ess o f a form of atta ck which. two decades late r. wo uld sweep a ll
turrets. nego tiating the Panama
twelve 14-inch guns in triple Canalin 1915.
before u,
The postwa r building programmes proposed by the majo r world naval powers amo unte d
10
yet an othe r nav a l race on a massive sca le. Iro nically. eac h o f th ese co untries a lso had good
rea so ns fo r w ish ing to aba ndon the ir pro gram me s. not le ast o f which w as fina ncial. when the US Secreta ry o f Slate. Cha rles Evans Hugh es. s ugge ste d a co nference 10 d iscuss a me ans w he re by the world co uld he made a safe r p lace hy limiting nava l armame nts. he me l wi th sponta neo us internation a l app roval. Delegates fro m Britain . Japan. Italy and Fra nce atte nd ed the Co nference on the Limitatio n o f Armamen t, wh ich hegan in Washington o n 12 Novembe r 1921. a nd lasted until 6 Febru ary 1922. As the co nfe re nce a lso wish ed to add re ss issu es re le vant 10 the Pacific and Fa r East. de legat e s from China , the Ne the rla nds . Bel gium and Portuga l were in attenda nce . 'The 'xuslungton Confe rence.... as it be came kn own. was o pe ned hy US Pres ident I la rd ing . li e: e xpressed the hope that so me u nderstand ing co uld he reached lead ing to 'less pre para tion for wa r and mor e e n joyme nt of fortunate peace '. Th e main thru st o f the proposals discussed at the conference co nce rned the naval might of Britain . the United Slates and Japan . The United Stales offered to ca ncel and scra p nine of the ten hattleships and all six o f the baul ccruisc rs they were currently bui lding. Add itio na lly. all o lde r bat tle shi ps up to h ut nor incl ud ing the Delawa re Class would a lso he sc ra pped. Unde r this proposal . Britain would ca ncel the fo ur G.3 baulecru isers and older battlesh ips up to bu t not incluJ ing the King Geo rge V Class. japan woul d cancel the fo ur 'No 13' Class b.utlecruise rs and the four Kii Class battleships. scra p bot h Kaga Class battleships. the fou r Amagi Class bunlecruiscrs and the co mple ted stiusu. A fu rthe r te n battleships. up to b ut not includ ing the Sctts u CIaS!'i. wo uld also he scra ppe d . Th e plan ca lled fo r the scra pping o f a tota l o f sixty-six ca pita l ships alread y in existence o r under co nstruction. The te rms of this remarkable agree men t we re passed . Brita in se nt twe nty-two 12- and 13.; -inch <305- a nd 343·mm) gu nne d dreadnoughts 10 the break ers' ya rd. The Unite d States and Japan despatched o nly fo ur eac h. Britain the n retained twen ty-two capita l sh ips . the United States eighteen and Japan te n . The follo w ing addit ional po ints we re ag reed under the \'I?a!'i hingro n Treaty: •
Co nstructio n o r ne w battleships wa s proh ibited for a period o f te n yea rs.
A sketch of one of the aborted
• •
Tonnage was limited to 35.000 to ns. Main arma me nt was to he no grea ter tha n l ti-inch (406-mm) g uns.
prepared prior to the Washington
• •
Ships had to be twenty years o ld be fore bei ng rep lace d . Replacement to nnage was to be re stricted to 500.000 tons fo r both Brita in and th e USA: .300.000 tons fo r Japan; a nd 175.000 tons ea ch fo r France and Ita ly.
t
British baNleship designs Conference. This 48.000-ton ship designated 'M2 ' would have mounted eight 18-inch guns.
113
".Lr •
114 ' •
7
T ilE H A T TI ES lJ lpS
After hard nego tiat io n. the Un ited States was pe rm itted to keep thre e o ut of the fo u r Co lora d o Class , w h ile the incomplete vcasb tngton was ex pe nd ed as a target in 192,1 . Th e British were
allowed to build two new 16-inch (40 6-1111n) g unned, 35,OOO-to n battles hips. w hich beca me Nelson a nd Rodney. an d j apa n wa s permitted to retain .Uti/SII . The hull s of two Le xingto n Class baul ecru ise rs were completed as the ca rrie rs Lexington a nd Sa ra l0J..:lI; and Japan co m ple ted the
battleship K{/J.!.{1 and the bau lcc nuscr A ka!!.i as ca rriers. Th e \Vas hi ngl on Tre aty h ad ac hi e ved a remark ab le re du cti o n in c x ixtin g an d p ropo sed b.utlcshi ps. largel y at the ex pense o f British se a-power. At th e stro ke o f a pen. the Un ited States Navy h ad gained pa rity w ith the Ro ya l Navy , The Tw o Po wer Sta ndard b y which the Ro yal Navy ha d be e n p re viously mai nta ined was go ne fo r e ve r. \X!hile ther e is little d o u bt th at th e tre aty w as s uccess fu l in pr e ve nt in g an a rms race of w ild p ropo rtio ns . it stra ine d rela tio ns .betwee n Britain and Japa n, Restrictin gjapan to th ree -fifths o f the to n nage tha t both Britain and the USA were a llowed . raised se rio us J apa ne se s usp icio ns o f co llusio n be twee n tho se
1\\' 0
co u ntries. The Ang lo-ja pa nese Alliance o f 1902 had se rve d the British well d u ring \X'orld \Var
The Japanese bettlectuiser Kongo, in dry -dock showing the
'bulged ' portions of her hull.
I. h ut wa s term ina te d un d er America n p ressure as a cond itio n o f th e treaty. Incrcas ing ly. the British ca me to the view al rea d y held hy the Un ited State s th at j apa n's u ltimate im perial a im wou ld he a so u rce o f future conflict . The terms o f th e \Vas hingto n Treat y. a nd the po litics behind these te rms. were ce rta inly see n in a d iffe re nt ligh t hy e ach o f th e key nations affected , Pro fe sso r Kiyo shi Ikeda loo ks at the situatio n from a Japan ese pe rspective :
"
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IIiC.I. . . .·=n__
IlIL1Llll..IJIUAIlLIiATI:Ll:.sJilll'S. TilE II I T I I\IATE H AT TI ES I III'5
"I'lu - Arm y assumed that th e na tura l po tc nualcn cm y wou ld he Russia . h ut for the Navy.
it w as America. Thc.:y ch o se: these enem ies
\0
gai n fun ds from the nation al b udget. h u t
in reality . rela tio ns were q u ite w arm betwe en A merica and Jap an. So on pa per. A merica
w as till:
l ' !1L' Il1 Y .
h u t in th e h ea rts o f o rd in a ry Ja p a n es e it w as Engla nd th at w as
co ntro lling Ame rica - so England wa s the real ene my. Th e 5:5:.-\ ration ag reement. w h ich m o s t th in k wa s Ame ric-a's id e a . w as to p u t p re ss u re o n japan . Of cou rse those
rcxtrk't io ns fuelled res ent ment a nd sp ur red o n rig hi-w ing na tio na lism in Japan : Fello w JI( XItl L'Sl' histo rian Hatsuh u Naito ad ds: ' In o rd er to re st rict j a panx na val po w er. th e America ns s po ns o red rhc
\Xra ~h i ng t o n
Agl"L'L'mL'nt in pa rtn e rship w ith Britain. At th e time 40 pe r ce n t o f the nat ion al bu dget went to the na\'y, wh ich ke pi Japa n o n th e b rin k o f ban kru ptcy, Thi s had so me heari ng o n the JqxlIll':.:e go ve rn me nt ac tually ag reeing
10
th e Wash ingto n Treaty, Th e d ecision
pe rha ps saved Ja pan from ban kruptcy and helped the eco no my a lo ng . Although thc govern me nt wa s p leased , th o se in the military were an gry as they saw it as a not her s ig n of d omi nation hy Ame rica o fja pa nes e affairs, a nd a sig n o f weakness as wel l. Fro m th is poi nt o f vie w Ame ric-a was vie wed as a po tcntial c nc mv. ' " lark l'cattic. Senior Research Fellow in the Hoove r Institutio n o n \X'a r at Stamfo rd University . gi \'cs a s lig htly di ffe re nt perspect ive to the Japa nese re actio n , a nd their s ituatio n fo llo wi ng the signi ng o f th e treat y: 'Yes. it's true that ov e ra ll Brit ain and the Un ited States we re able
10
ma inta in a ca p ita l-
s h ip IlL'L,t larger than that o r Ja pan , hut in ret ur n fo r this - a nd I think th is re all y wa s
wh at hroug ht th e se n ior ja panese d e legate aro und
10
agr(,;'ei ng to the
t r(,;'~I1 Y
- Britain an d
the United States wou ld agree no t to stre ngthe n or o the rw ise augmen t thei r na val powe r in till.' we:.:t Pacific a nd cax t Asia n wat e rs . Specifica lly, th e Un ite d Sta tes Navy wo u ld ag ree no r to fo rtify G uam , no t to fo rtify or o th e rwi se stre ng the n their naval hase s in t\lan ib Bay, and the British agreed no t to fu rther their naval facilities at Singapo re , 'So w hat the treaty d id was to work pl ace d in
:1
O UI
a s ituatio n wh e re ove rall th e Ja lxlIlese were
po s itio n o f capital-xhi p infer io rit y, hu t in th e wes tern Paci fic a nd in its
ow n home wa te rs, in its home te rritory. Japan wa s nu mber one , And so much
G ill
he
mad e abo ut the Ja pan ese resent me nt and fu ry at th e tenus o f the Wash ing to n Nava l 'rrc .u y. wh at's so me times fo rgotte n is till' o ut rage d d en u nciat io ns o f th e tre a ty h y foremos t na va l advocates here in the Un ited States,
\ V11O
a lso d idn 't like the p ro vis ions
wh ich mad e Japan pract ically, it see med. apparent ly u nassa ilable in the west Pacific ,' Norma n Prtcdman . US na va l hi s to ria n a n d d e fe nce a nal yst, a ls o comme nt s from a US pcrsp cct ivc : 'At th e lime I th ink tha t the Japan ese th o ug hI th ey had gOI a fai rly go od de al. because no Lo n ly were Lhe y limiting themselves. the y we re also lim iting tb osc who m ight attack the m. So iI's h y no means d ea r th at the bargain at \X'a s hington was a very bad o ne fo r the m. II limited thei r proble m , Th e o the r thing wa s tha i, in retrospect. o nce we sig ne d the Treaty. w e th ou gh t tha t th e se cu rity pr o ble m in th e Pacifi c wa s so lved , So that after \Vas h ing ton we d id n 't bu ild a lo t. The Ja pan ese built absolu tel y lip to w hat the y co u ld ha n' so th e ratio bet we e n the ir fl ee t a nd o urs wa s m uc h g re ate r tha n the 5:5 ih.u th ey We re allo wed by treat y,'
115
F BA T T I F S I III!S
TIle treaty may well have pro vided the wo rld with ano ther bo nus a part from limiting the build ing o f battle shi ps. as Dr Eric Grove , naval strategiSl at Hull University, ex plains : "The 'x'aslungton Tre aty was q uite a n epochal event. The Britis h, fo r the first lime in ce nturies. acce pted the pri nciple of nava l pa rity - at least bau leship parity. \'('e continued insist. fo r a w hile ~11 least. that w e had supe rio rity in c ruisers to pro te ct o ur trade,
10
because as the e m pire, a ma ritime em p ire..•. we had mo re trad e to protect . we had mor e shipping to p ro tect. But as far as batt le ships were conce rn ed . pa rity w ith the United States. a nd a ra tio of re lative safety w ith the j a pan e se . was acceptable , And so therefore \Vas hington ca ps th is a rms race . a n arms ra ce w hic h if it had n't bee n ca ppe d could have had some q uite se rious e ffec ts . It's o fte n sai d , as a cr iticism o f \X'as hi ng to n . that \Vash ing to n d id n't prevent Pea rl Har bo r, \'('as hington d id n't pre vent 'x'or ld \Var II. w ell. o f co u rse it d id n't, b ut it perhap s pre ve nted the g rea t Anglo-American wa r o f 192H!' Altho ug h pro vid ing an effec tive brak e o n the constructio n o f ne w ba ttles hips, the 'cc asbingrc n Treat y allowed for ex isting ba nles ht ps a nd ba n lc cr uise rs to he mo dern ized . Th is wa s Specifically Intended to a llow im p ro vements to pro te ct ive xystc ms a ga inst a ir an d u nd e rw ater a tta ck. Up to 3000 to ns ad dition a l to the treaty limits we re permitted fo r th is purpose . Ot he r a re as where im p ro veme nt s co u ld he made include d: ne w machine ry for greate r e co nomy a nd high e r s pe e ds; imp ro ve d de ck prote ct io n agai ns t a ircr a ft att ac k; ne w seco nda ry ar ma ment able to o pe rate aga inst aircraft as we ll :IS aga inst su rface sh ips ; ne w comma nd a nd contro l syste ms re qu iri ng e n ha nced or e ntire ly ne w br idge work. a nd the introduction of a ircraft-hand ling a rrange me nts. wit h the tre aty ru les in pla ce , th e 192 0s a nd jOs sa w th e worl d 's na vies all ca rrying o ut large -sca le modifications o f the cap ita l ships in thei r flee ts. With the exce p tio n o f the ne w . Rod ney an d Nelson , the d re ad noug hts in the Britis h hattie fleet pre-d ated the Jut land wate rshe d of t\lay 19 16. Durin g the 1920s the Q uee n Elizabeth, Rev e nge an d Reno wn Classes w ere mo dern ized to va ry ing deg re es by the additio n o f ne w bridges, an d the fitting o f antitorpe do bulges. ad d itio na l a rmour and new a nti-a ircraft g uns . O nly Hood re ma ine d virtua lly un a ltered . By the fo llo wi ng decad e . a mor e fundamental mod erni zatio n W;IS requi red and It''t-l rspi/e, va liant. Qu een Eliza lJetb and Reno trn wen..' selected fo r co mp le te re b ui ldi ng . This invo lve d di s ma ntli ng the s up e rstruc tu re d ow n to the le ve l o f the u p per de cks a nd n..-mo ving the boilers a nd turbine s. \X!eigh t was saved hy the ins ta llatio n o f lig ht e r, mo re efficie nt boilers a nd geared turb ines. 111e ma in a nuam e m turrets were modified to increa se the e leva tio n o f the g u ns from 20 to 30 degr e e s. exte nd ing th e max imu m ra nge fro m 2.3.400 to 29 ,000 ya rds (2 1,400 to 20.500 me tres ) and . w ith the ne w l S-inch (3RI-mm) projectiles . to 3 2.000 ya rd s (29,260 me tres). The o ld tripod masts w ith masth ead controls wa s re pla ce d w ith a hrid ge acco mmoda ting
LE£IllJ~
T ilE I II T IMAIEJlAII I ES II I PS
--''''IIIi-'' -- ':''' '1Ii'--"__ _ •
_
1IIIIf'.. 117
new gu nnery di rect ors a nd improved fire contro l gear. and thick...-r deck armour wa s filled over ma ch ine ry space s. Aircraft arrangeme nts included an athwa rtxhips (a cross the d eck ) catap ult. ha nd ling cra nes and a han gar located behi nd the funne l. New lugb -an glc -i-inch 0 00-n1l11 ) tw in turrets a nd muh iple -bar n-lh-d 'r o m-r o m " anti-aircraft gu ns were also fitted. Apart fro m rcpl .n-ing her 55-inch ( 14D-mm) seconda ry armament w ith -l-inch ( l 00-mm ) tw in
Renown, a veteran of World War I.
mounts, the most p restig iolls ship in the Brit ish fleet . HOOtl. recei ved n : ry few modifications
underwent a number of
th roughou t IH:r li fe.
modificat ions follo wing the
The S:II11e gener:.11 patt ern applied to the modernizat ion of tilt..' US ba u le fleet. TIle six s hips of the Florida. \X/r o ming and New Yor k CIas."iCS were given a nti-torpedo hulgcs and conve rted
Washington Treaty. and survived
to oil-burning . The seven ships o f the Nevada . Pe nnsylva nia a nd New Mexico Classes we re re-
fighting ship in the Royal Navy's
boilcred and. in some cases, fitted w ith new e ngines. Additio nal armo ur was ad ded to the decks
fleet during World War II.
to take her place as a powerful
a nd elevatio n of the main arma ment increased. The two Tennessee and th ree Co lorado Class ba rtlcxhips were the mo st modern units in the US flee t at the time , a nd weft.' no t mod ified until
th e first o f the new battleships under construct ion during \X'orld
\X '~lr
II were co m pleted.
The Japanese Na\T ·."i four Kongo Class lxutlccru isers had new boi lers fitted that cou ld be fired with
~I
mixtu re o f o il and coa l. They were fitted with prot ective hulges. g iven increased
elevation to th eir main armament , and had abou t 4000 tons o f e xtra armour ad d e d to their
decks. As
~I
conseq ue nc e , they were reclassified as battle ships. Funnels were reduced from
thr ee to tw o. a nd new p latforms ad ded to th e main mas t. In the m id to late 1930s. these sh ips were again modernized. this time hy inst alling co m pletel y new ma chinery which ra ised their speed from 26 to 30 kn ots. Their hulls were le ngthe ned and an a ircra ft cata pu lt fitted . 111e fo ur sh ips o f the Fuso a nd Isc Classes had minor rebu ilds
(0
th eir fo re masts du ring thl' 1920s. hut
unde rwent more fundamental modifica tion during the 1930 s. Th e ships wert.' lengthen ed . recngincd a n d re -boil crcd. main armamen t el evation w as In crea sed a s in
A."o ,,~ o.
new
superstructure fined. includ ing the distinctive 'pagoda' tower. hori zontal a nd verti cal armour The handsome French
co nsid e rably e n ha nc ed. and ne w anti-ai rcraft guns a nd aircraft a rra ng e me nt s fitted o n the
battleship Str asbourg. Her main
q uarter-deck . XaRalo and .llnlslI were modernized a long similar lines to the other ships d urin g
armament of eight 13 -inch guns
th e mid-1950s. Th e \X'a shin gton Trea ty had stip u late d th at no ne w baul cshtps co u ld he laid down u nt il
was concentrated forward in two quadruple turrets.
November 193 1. w h ile the treat y itsel f wou ld run unt il the end of 1936 , The 1920s
S1<)(x!
out as
a pe rio d w he n th e w o rld 's naval au tho rities a nd th eir governme nts ap peared dedicated to e nsur ing th at th e ca rn age o f 191'1-I H wo u ld neve r h e ~
repea ted. The wash ington Tre aty, althoug h a major facto r in th is a rms lim itatio n ag reemen t. was on ly o ne elemen t in th e e ffo rt for g lo h a l pe ace . Po tentially more significa nt th a n the treat y was the League of Nat io ns , est ablished in 19 19. It was set u p a s a n o rga n iza tion to se ttle int e rna tiona l d isp utes by negotiation. Any decisions the Leagu e o f Nat io ns made we re to lx- ha cked h y co llective ec o nomic sanctio ns and. if all else failed . collect ive milita ry act ion against the aggressor nation. The
W'a sh i n ~ton
Trea ty sat comfortably within
the ideals of th e League o f Na tion s and. long befo re the terms o f the treaty were due to expire , a second disa rmament co nfe re nce w as hel d in
Geneva, in june 1927, It proved to be a spectacular failu re " France and Ital y did not a tte n d , and (he Britis h and Americans remained deadlocked o ve r the iss ue of h e avy cruisers. Britis h atte m p ts to furt her restrict the size o f lxutlcsh ips and their main arma ment
(0
2H,500 Io ns and I.t 5-inch CH3-m ml
g uns fe ll o n dea f ea rs a n d . o ve ra ll, litt le o f
~lI1 Y
co nseq ue nce was decided abo ut the fut u re of the lxrttle xhip .
A th ird naval conferen ce held in London in 1930 wa s mar red hy d isagreeme nt between Fra nce and Ital y. a n d their d el e g at e s w ith d rew. Th e Uni ted States, Britain a nd Ja pan rea ch ed agre e men t o n a numbe r o f po ints affe cting ca p ita l s h ips , the main
_lim_'~'~
IlI:LliLll:lLl.TIUlAITI..E5HJl'5 T ilE t Il TH. AT E B A T TI ES H I PS
OI1(:S
hei ng: the ha lt in b.uth -xhip co ns tr uc tion was
..
10
- 119
he
exte nded u ntil the e nd o f 19.1(); a nd ca pital s hips were to he furth e r re du ced to a to ta l o f fifteen e ach for Britai n and th e United Stah..'S. and nin e for japan . II w as abo agreed that a furthe r conference s ho uld he he ld in Lond o n in 195 5. The d e cisio ns o f this first Lond on confe rence ha d
~ 1Il
immediate effect on the battle flee ts o f a ll
th ree coun tries .
The
British scrapped Ben /mil '. Em/Jeror of i ndia, a nd 'I'i).!,e r, and converte d jel licoes flags hip at
. \I{/ ,.IIJo ro li~ b
jurkmd . IrOI1 J)uke, int o a tra in in g s hi p . Th e US scra p ped Florida . and convened Ulab into a ta rget s hip a nd W)'o m ifl~ into ~I training sh ip. The japan ese converted Htet into a train ing s hip. In the late r ycars o f the 1920s. the world was mo ving head lon g into a recession that eve ntually led to the \,'all Street Crash in 1929. Econ om ic hards hip. w ith 50 mil lio n un emplo yed in the ind ustrialized natio ns. w as a major con trih ut ing fac to r in the rise o f milita rism in Europe a nd Japan . In Ihl' ea rly 1950s the internation a l pol itica l situa tion began 10 d eteriorate at a rap id rate . Th e invasi o n of Manchu ria hy Japan in Se ptem be r 1951. the accessio n to powc r o f Hitle r's Na tion a l So cialists in Ge rmany in Jan ua ry I9.3 .~ - w ith th e a vo wed int en tio n o f re p udiati ng the Trea ty o f Versailles - an d the Ita lian war aga inst Abyssinia in 19.15 hega n the slow hut su re bu ild-u p of w o rld te nsio n tha t would even tually lend to the most ho rrific wa r in g lo h~l l
history. In 19 2Y Germa ny d eci d ed to hegi n co ns truc tio n of a rad icall y des ig ned w a rsh ip that w o uld test the lim its o f the lO,OOO-to n ma ximum the y we re allo wed unde r the terms o f the
Treaty of Versa illes. This raised co ncerns amo ng the ir fo rme r e ne mies, parti cularly the British
The 11-inch gunned baNieship
and French . Th e sh ip. Deutscbknul. was the first o f three cle ve rly d esign ed cru ise r... moun ting six I l-inch ( 2HO- m m) gu ns on a ligh tly p ro tect ed hull. ." Iost significa ntly, s he was fitted with fuel-efficie nt dicscl e ngi nex gh'il1g a maximum speed of 2H kn o ts a nd :I cruising range in ex cess
Scharnhorst unde r construction
o f 9000 mil es. Dentscbland w as the ide a l mer chant ra ide r - a high -spee d figh ting ship that co uld out ru n ;lny me rchant sh ip. and wh ose he avy guns cou ld s in k them wi th ea se. Th e Ge rmans refer red to this class as 'armo ure d s hips ' t Pcn trerscbtffe), Becau se of thei r relativel y sma ll size: and heavy g u ns. the:y became popularl y known as 'poc ke t b.utleslups'. Th e Fre nc h responded, as they were free to do u nder the \'('ashington Treaty. h y h uild ing two fas t bat tleships. /)unAx'rqu e a nd Sl rus ho lf r~. mou nt ing e ig ht 15-inch <3.30- m m) gu ns in two fo rward- mou n te d qua d rupl e tur re ts. These new French s hips add ed to th e stra ine d rel atio ns be tween France a nd Ita ly o ver red uced bat tleship n umbe rs ag re ed ~ H the Londo n Nava l Co nference in 19.30. Thi s prompted the Italia ns to proceed w ith the rebu ild ing o f thei r o ld ba nles lu ps Co n te de Cm -on r a nd Gi u lio Cesa re in 1955. a nd 10 aut ho rize tw o new bat tles hips . Iiunrio and vtuorto \ '('1/('10. in 19.1·1. In the su m me r o f 1935. Ge rma ny laid down two lxutl cxhipx. Scbarnbo rst a nd Gnoise nan. named after thei r \,('orld \X'a r 1 p redece sso rs. Th is was the: new Natio na l So cia list Ge rma ny's re ply to Du nleerqu e and Stras bourg . Mea nwhile. lhe Fre nc h a utho rized two .15,000-1011 battlesh ips . Rtcbetieu and .!NIIl Bart, wi th eigh t 15inch <jHI-lllm) g uns.
at Wilhelmshaven Dockyard in
1937. Scharnhorst and her sistership Gneisenau grea tly exceed their stated tonnage.
•
~ ~ r- _
120
.::~-" :tInlll""' .'_rL
xua.aarraasuias TH E BATT I E S H I P S
As the se eve nts u nfo ld ed in Eu rope. the Britis h w at ch e d un ea sily. Th e y we re p rev e nt ed hy the \X'as hi ngt o!l Treat y fro m mak ing an y res po nse u nt il the e nd o f
USS IOWA DIMENSIONS,
DISPLACEMENT,
MACHINERY,
SPEED, ARMAMENT,
PROrEcTION,
1956 . In Mar ch 1935 Ad o lf H il ler. no w Ch ance llo r o f Ge rmany. had to rn li p the 887fT 31N ¥ 108fT 2IN ¥ 36fT 2IN (270.'. ¥ 33 ¥ II M) ~8 , 110 TONS SfANDARD, S7,S~ O TONS FULL
LOAD GEARED ST£AM TURBINES, 212,000 SHP 32S KNOTS 9 ¥ 16- lN (~06-MM> GUNS IN 3 TRIPLE TURRETS; 20 ¥ S-IN (127 -MM); 80 ¥ ~O MM; ~9 ¥ 20-MM BELT 12.1IN 007 MM) ; BULKHEADS 1I.3JN (287MM>, BARBETT£S 11.6 TO 17.3IN (29S TO 339MM); TURRETS 19.7IN CSOOMM); DECKS 7SIN ( 190 .SMM) 1921 ( APPRO¥.>
Treaty of Versailles. e na bling h im to th u mb his no se at the:world and h uild whatever
he wanted . Th e British moved quickl y to co nta in Ihis new th reat of Ge rman naval ex pa ns io n hy signing the Anglo -Ge rm a n Nava l Trea ty o fj un e 1935. Thi s limi ted Ge rma ny to a navy 35 pe r cent the s ize o f th e Ro yal Navy. The cavea t was that any batt les h ip!" the Ge rm ans chose to b u ild s ho u ld co nfo rm to the w ash ing to n Trea ty limi ts of 35,000 to ns a nd lo-inch (406·m m) gu ns. Th e french we re fu rio us wi th the Britis h fo r s ig n ing th is agree ment w itho ut a ny re fe re n ce w h atsoever to (hem, Fro m 1934 o nwa rd s, th e Ge rma ns ha d sta rted d raw ing u p plan s fo r two fu rther batt le s h ips. In itially the y ag re ed to stay w ith in the 3S.000-to n lim it b ut b y 19 36. the yea r th ey we re laid d o w n. th is had grow n 10 over 4 1.000 to ns . The resu lts we re Bismarck a n d Ti rp itz . In fac t. a ll the ne w Ge rma n s h ips fro m Deuts chla nd to Ti11Ji/z w e re cons iderab ly in ex cess of sta ted o r tre aty lim its , The y were no t the o n ly n atio n s tretc h in g in te r na tio na l li m ita tio ns . Th e s a me app lied to the ne w ltal inn battleships. wh ich ha d been q ui etly d e sign ed to be over 40.000 to ns e ach. In De cembe r 193 5. in the m id st o f a ll this s h ipb u ildi ng acti vity be ing ca rried o ut wit h total di s rega rd fo r intern ationa l lim itatio ns, th e fo urth nava l co nfe re nc e began in Lo ndon. Th e d e leg ates ag reed that there wo uld be no lim it to th e nu mbe r o f sh ips to be b u ilt but th at th e y wo u ld a ll be lim ite d in s ize to 35,000 to ns a nd 14-inch (3 55-mm) gu ns , Th e Ja pa nese re fused to s ig n th is new treat y. " la rk Pcani c co m me nts:
'T h e tre a ty is d e n o u n ce d h y J a pa n . w ho say tha t th e y wil l no longe r be part o f it. In d e e d , th e Ja pa n e se d e legatio n le d by Ad m ira l Ya m ato w a lks o ut and th at. for a ll int e nt s and purpo se s . is th e e n d o f th e n ava l tr e a ty syste m , Of co u rse, by d o ing so , h y e m ba rk ing o n the ro ad to un fe ttered n aval cons truct io n . J a pa n had le t itsel f in fo r the k in d o f na va l ra ce w hich it co u ld not w in . Th e J a panese s im p ly refuse d to co m e to g rips w ith th e fact th a t th e Am e rica ns co u ld ult im atel y o ut b uil d th e m .' Afte r the w a lk-o ut h y the Ja pan e se d e leg ates. the confere nce ag reed that if Japan di d no t sign hy Ap ril 1937. the g un ca lib re allo wed und e r tre aty condi tio ns wou ld reve rt to the 16-inch (406-mm) gun o rigina lly stip u lated at wash ingto n. The Ja pa nese had no in te ntio n o f s ign ing a ny treaties from th is time onward . In fact. in 1934 they ha d sta ll ed d es ig n wo rk on w hat wo uld become the largest battleshi ps eve r b u ilt, w ith a stand a rd displacement of 61.000 to ns . Th e fo llo wi ng sequence o f events is imp ort ant in ex p lain ing why the Bi tish subsequent ly b u ilt battlesh ips w ith H -inch 1 6 ~i n c h
(3'5 5 ~ m m )
gu ns w h ile a ll o ther nati ons bu ilt IS-inch (j}H·m m) .
(40(}-m m) a nd . o f cou rse. in d efia nce o f all agre e me nts . IH·inch (457-m m ) g unne d
battles hi ps .
w hile so m e na tio ns w e re b us y d e s ign in g and b u ilding ba tt le sh ip ,.. grea tly in e xcess o f inte rna tio nal lim its, Brita in and the US p lan ne d .15.00 0-to n-com p lb nt s h ips . T he British had design ed a new I-t-inch 0 55-1111n ) gu n w hic h it considered . o n we igh t g ro u nds , to o ffer a mo re ba lance d de sig n o n 35.000 -ro n shi ps th an the d es irable b ut m uch heavie r l o-inch (406-m m ) gu n . Alt ho u gh d e s ig ns for 16-inc h w eapo ns we re in p repa rat io n . the l .I-tn ch des ign was immedi ately ava ilabl e . To co mpensa te for th e s malle r gu n, the ne w British battleships would mo un t twel ve g u ns rathe r th an the e ig ht o r n ine like ly to he mounted on o ther natio ns' sh ips . To save weig ht, th is wa s late r red uced
to
ten g u ns.
Whe n the cu rta in o n th e Lo ndo n Treaty finally went do w n o n 3 1 December 19.36 . the British
T ilE I II T ll\lAIEJlATT •·\IIL.E.5.1111'5.. I ESH IPS
were a nxious to hegin b u ild ing new battleships . give n th e number under co ns tructio n elsew he re. On 1 Jan uary 1937 Kil1R George l' and Princ e oJ W'ales we re laid down, followed hy three o the rs in m idsummer, all mounting 14-in ch <3;;- 111111) guns. I n co n tra st to the advan tage the y had e njoye d by lead ing with the 13.5 (343- mm ) a nd 15-inch (3Rl- mlll) gun before \'\'orld \"'a r I, the British were now p re paring fo r the ne xt world wa r w ith th e light est guns of :111 the nat ions. The US ~a\'y had also p lanned to build 35.000-to l1 ships armed with three qu adruple 14inch (355-mm ) gun turrets . By the time the first o f th ese . Nortb Ca rolina, w as laid down at the end o f October 1937. it was dear tha t th e Ja panese w ere not go ing to sig n th e Lo ndo n Treaty and the decision was taken to cha nge the quad ru ple l -l-inch (.355-mm) guns to triple 16-inch (·\06-mm). A fter the tw o shi ps of (he North Carolina Clas s. four sh ips of the South Dak o ta Class followed. all of w hich were laid down bet ween 19.39 and 1940. Wh ile these ships were fast at 2H kno ts. they were no t capa b le o f o perating w ith (he fast a ircra ft ca rrie rs the n being planned, Under the te rms o f the 19.36 London Treaty. failur e by an y one country to ratify the te rms increased the 3;,OOO-u )O limit to 4;,000 tons. j apan 's with drawa l mad e this possible . 'X'ith the e xtra weight no w a va tlablc. US constructo rs we re a ble to desi g n sh ips close r to th e tactica l
--'O"_ --. _ . ,-". • .. ~1Ii1----" _ _ _~ 121
The German battleship Bismarck leaving Blohm & Voss 's Hamburg shipyard in 1940 to beg in her lengthy programme of trials.
122
One of very few photographs of
ideal : well -armo ured . heavy main a rmame nt and very fast - fast e noug h
(0
ke ep pa ce with
the giant Japanese battleship
th e 3 2-knol ca rrie rs. The resu lting ships. th e Io w a Class. sta nd o ut amo ng th e \"t' ry besr o f
Varnata. She is seen nearing
bat tle ship designs . Fo ur s h ips . Iow a. S ell'Jersey . stt,....snuri a nd \Fisc o llsi ll. were laid d own
completion at her builder's yard
during 19-\0/ 41 and a further two in 19·j2. a lthoug h the last pai r was ....uncclled in 19·i5.
in Kure . Her massive tripte 18-
Ho weve r, the Io wu s were not th e last word in t;S ba ttleship devel opment. Tilt: xto m a nu
inch turret d om inates her
Class design o f 19·iQ was fo r s hips o f o ve r 60.000 Ions sta nd a rd d ixpla cerucnt. .\ Iain armame nt
quarterdeck. Each of her l 8-inch
was increase d 10 twelv,.'. 16-in<:h (..106-n1ln) guns a nd the a rmo ur lx-lt to 16 inches. Even with 60.000 to ns at their di spos al. the best speed the designer s co uld ac hieve W ~I S 2H kn ots. All fou r were au thoriz ed hut fina lly ca nce lled in 19·13 befo re an y \\'C...-re b id down. Afte r Japan failed to rat ify the 1936 Londo n Treat y. its naval e xpansion pla ns. particularly in regard to flum e bat tles hips . e ffective ly dis ap pea red hehi nd a ve il o f secrecy. Rumou rs of gian t !"hips be ga n to circulate . alth o ugh th is was ta ken to mean han leships ar me d wit h 16inch (406-mm ) gun!". Like the United States. the Japanese co nside red tha t the co nflict of interest bet we en their two co untries wo uld inevita bly le ad to wa r. This wo u ld me a n a ma jor a nd decisive nava l clash in the Pacific, Japan had no illusions about the e normous industr ial an d financia l strengt h that the United Stares possessed and kne w tha t, in any protracte d co nfl ict. they woul d surely he o utbuilt a nd overco me,
guns weighed 165 tons.
TIlE.lli.IJ:.\LilLIiATI:L.ICSlllJ~
-liii_ lim . I" "t___
T il E I JIT I !\1ATF H AT TI E S ti ll'S
They rea son ed that the ir o nly chance was to hu ild sh ips that were q ualitativel y superio r - ca pubk- o f defe ating a ny o ppo ne nt in a n engagem e nt. T he japanese believed that the b rgest u.s battle ship wo uld mount ten 16-inch (406- mm) g uns on a displacement o f 6.tooO to ns, w ith a top s peed of 2;3 kno ts, In October 193-i, lo ng befo re .lapan 's fa ilure to sign the Seco nd London Naval Treaty , the Naval General Staff had requested de sig ns for a tec hnica lly supe rior haul c ship mo un ting nine H~ - in c h (457-mm) g uns and ca pable of a speed of 3 1 knots, By March 1935, the first designs had be en pre pared , The y revealed a gigantic ship nearly 975 feet ( 297 metres) lo ng . displacing ~I sta ndard 69.500 to ns. This ship was large r than was tho ug ht necessary , and ihc size was sca led do wn , This was ach ie ved h y' red ucing the size a nd powe r of the e ngines, allo wi ng the hull to he shortene d to H62 fe e t 9 inches (263 met res) overall. The consequence o f the sma lle r e ngi nes was a red uctio n in est imate d top speed from 3 1 to 27 kn o ts, By ,\l:irch 19j 7 the fi nal design was read y, The japa nese planned 10 build four of these su pl' r ba ttleshi ps. In the eve nt o nly two , }tl11w/u and JlIISlI Sb i, we re co mp lete d . A third. .\'hi /l{ lf/u. was converted to an aircra ft ca rrier, a nd the fo urt h was laid down hut co nstructio n ab andone d. Th ey we re the largest battles hips in history , and thei r main armame nt was eq ua lly imp ressive - nine Ix-inch (457-mlll) guns. Th e s hips were so hig tha t b uildi ng the m p re se nte d ma jo r p ro bl ems for the shipyards - xtitsuhis hi at Nagasaki fo r Musasl ». a nd the Kure Navy Yard fo r ) tI111ll/0 , Ship ya rd facilitie s had to he exte nded a nd ne w cra nes cons tructed to lift a rmour plates. g un barre ls and turret mech anism s. To ensure the s hips were built in secrecy .
IJN YAMATO DIMENSlONS,
862f'r 9IN (OVERALL) X 121f'r lIN X 3~ f'r lIN (263 X 36.9 X 10 .39M> DISPLAcEMENr, 62,31> TONS STANDARD, 71 ,000 RJLL LOAD MACHINERY, GEARED STEAM lVRBINES, ISO,oOO SHP SPEED, 27 KNOTS ARMAMENr, 9 X 18-lN (~S7 - MM) GUNS IN 3 TRIPLE lVRRET5, 12 X 6.I- IN (ISS-MM), 12 X S- IN (127-MM) , S X 18- lN ( ~S7 - MM) TORPEDO lVBES PROT£cTlON , MAIN BELT 16IN ( ~06MM), BULKHEADS " IN OSSMM), BARBETT£S 21SIN (S~6MM>, lVRRET5 2S.6IN (6S0MM), DECK 9IN (228MM) CREw, 2S00 (APPROO
the J ~lJ xlll cse we nt to grc.u le ngth s to co ncea l them: YllJ1111/U wa s hui lt in a d ry-dock and .1Iusllsbi o n a co nventio nal slipway . Great stories are told in Nagasa ki. even today , abo ut the extraord inary e fforts the au tho rities we nt to. to cone-cal the steel gia nt that W~I S hei ng cons tructed be hind the ba mboo curta ins of the .\litsuhis hi slupvards. Th e British Emhassy was situated almost o pposite the slipw ay w here .\!u stl sbi \\'~ I S taking s hape . o n the o pposite side of the harbou r a nd o n the wat e rfro nt. It was n't lo ng be fo re the ha rbo ur imm ed iat el y in front o f the e m bassy w as recl aime d and . o n th is reclaime d land . a large warehouse was huilt, co mpletely blocking the view o f the harbour fro m the c-mbass v.
;\'0
pr ying Britis h ey es wo uld he a llowed to see what w as go ing o n in th e
xtitsuluslu ya rds! \'\.'h af s mo re . o n the seaw ard end of the narrow Nag asaki harbour a re a numbe r of islan ds where man y wo rke rs are e mp loyed in fa cto ries . They comm ute to w o rk by fe rries w hic h take them d irectly pa st the shipyards - o n the rig ht (o r starboa rd : side go ing to work a nd the left (or po rt ) side coming ho me . While Xtusa sb i wa s he ing h uilt, th e sta rboard w ind ows on all ferries had curt ains filled o n the o utward jo urney p reve nting any view of the shipya rds . and the same ap p lie d o n the port side as they returned fro m work in the eve ning . And th is w e nt o n for years. o r so the sto ry goes . To tran s po rt the lx-inch (457- mm) guns a nd the ir associa ted mechanisms fro m the poi nt of manufacture at Kurc to Nagasa ki. a special ship was constructe d, At Saseho. a new doc k wa s built to acconuuod.uc these s hips. Here , re fits co uld he ca rried ou t. ) i /11U1/() was laun ched on H Augu st 19'W w hile Musasb! wa s launc he d o n I Novem ber 19-10 without cere mo ny. J {u sllsbis hull laun ch wei ght of
35 .7.~7
to ns was second o nly to the Cuna rd
liner Q u{'ell .1Im .l'. b unched in Britain six years earlier. These two Yamato Class supe r battleships represented the absolute ultimate in size a nd po wer, They had a speci al ro le to play in the futu re strategy o f the unpcnaljapan e se Navy a nd its q ue st to do minat e th e w ho le of th e Pacifi c. Only time wo uld tel l if these ships wou ld fulfil the ir destiny.
123
-
e u feme a en e T
he world o f th e 1930s was a wo rld in turmoil. Economic recession ha d ea te n deep into the heart o f the industrial nations; enormous un emplo yment was ca using social chaos; and the political spectrum
was cha ng ing for ever with th e sp read o f commu nism and socia lism , th e
e merge nce o f fas cism and Naz ism. In Germa ny , Adolf Hitle r had co me
[0
pmve r flying th e banne r of Natio na l Socia lism; Ben ito I\ lussolini a nd his fascist Blackshirts we re running Italy; Japan was e mbroi led in a n un d eclared war in China - a nd every western d emocra cy was holding its b reath in the hope th at peace a nd civ il order would come o ut of thi s decade o f grave un certaint y, Even the United States. the biggest a nd most powerful industrial nat ion o n the planet, was reeling after the Wall Street colla pse in 1929; three yea rs late r, ov er 15 million Ameri cans we re o ut o f work. By the m id- 1930s, th e fragile pea ce betwee n non -align ed id eo lo gi es teet e red dangerously as Hitle r a nd I\lus solini pursued ag endas o f military aggression. Ge rma ny had th rown o ut th e Treaty of Versailles , the League o f Natio ns was proving a tooth less tiger a nd , w ith the no n-ratificatio n of the
_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _......._iilZ ........ 'Ytr ......_1L
193-; Lond on Nava l Treaty. a ll the ma jor navie s were planning ne w capi ta l sh ips.
S OI1lt..'
did
so in com pl iance with old treaty lim itatio ns. while: o thers - parti cul arl y J ~IIXIn - had complet ely th ro wn the ru le- book
O Il
size and armament o ut o f th e windo w .
Unlike the 1,,"-:ginn ing or \\'o rld \\ 'a r I. which came
;I...
a su rprise. the sta ll o f World \'\';tr I I had
IX'\' n an ticipated for quite so me lime before thai fate ful d ay . I Se p te mber 1939. when Ge rma n planes. tanks and naval forct:s attacked Po land. An y ho pe..-s Hitlc r had that Brita in and Fra nce wou ld not
0>111\.'
to the aid o f the: Pol e s were dashed when h o th nations d eclared war o n
Gl'nn:lI1y two days later.
A n :ry l."Idt.:r1y GC .'fm:1O p re-d rea d noug ht battleshi p . .\<:bleslI ·;j.!, -lIo/sle;Il, played a sign ificant pan in IhL'S\.' momen to us eve nts . In fan . Ihe o pe n ing salvoes in \X'o rld \\;far II were fired hy the o utda ted l l -jn ch ( 2HO-m m) gu ns o f th is o ld ca p ita l s hi p . ~11 the Poli s h fo rt ress at \X'e stl'rp b u l'. at th e e ntrance to Dan zig Harbo ur, O n a su p pose d 'cou rtc sv visit" to Dan zig to honour the \X'o rld
\X'~l r
I
G\.' rnl~1I1
d ea d buried in this d isp uted. fre e port. th e shi p ha d ar rived
so me six d a ys be fo re Ihe attack. Just aft er 'I a .m. o n I Septembe r Scbk-snig-Holstein. totally witho ut wa rning , o pe ne d lire with her ma in a rmame nt aW~IY .
0 11
a largt.·1 o n ly a fe w hund red yards
The purpose o f the attac k was In wipe o ut the Po lish har bou r d e fe nces in p re para tion
for the arriva l o f Ge rma n naval force s. alre ady ass embled off the
l:O~ I S I. After
s ix ho rre nd ous
days o f contin uous bom ba rdme nt and d in ' bombe r attack s. th e s mall Po lish ga rrison in the
fort surre ndered. a nd s~ l i k'd
SCbl(,SIi ·I~ - lIo/S1dll .
th e first Germa n sh ip
10
sec act io n in \X'o rld \X'ar II,
into 11lL' Baltic 10 joi n the rest o f IIlL' flee t.
TIIt.' 1 9 .~ 9-· 1 :; w a r ~II se a wo u ld pro\"e to h e ~l \'e rr diffe ren t o ne fro m the na va l w ar o f
Royal Oak. whose sinking
by German U-boats in the presumed safe waters of Scapa Flow was a major propaganda coup for Germany.
..... • ~ ~~
126 -
9
r
T11.E...lIAl:T LESllll!S
1914-1 11. This time . the main threat ( 0 the: ca p ita l ships would co me from the air. \\'ilh the initial foc us o n Euro pean waters . th e naval wa r would rap idly ex pa nd to co ns ume th e world's oceans . climaxing in th e g re ate st nav al battles o f a ll tim e . These wo uld tak e pla ce not in the Atlant ic o r th e North Sea. hut in the va st reach es o f th e Paci fi c O cea n . Alth o ugh the number o f
battlesh ips involved in thi s war wo uld be far le ss th an in 19 H -I H. the att ritio n rate would be cons idc rub lv g reate r. Du ring \\'orld \X'ar I. e ig h t ba uleshtps wen.' lo st as
;I
resul t of ho stile
act io ns . a n d tw o more in acc iden ta l m ag a zine ex p lo s io ns. In \X'o rld \Va r II. rwcm v-ci g lu banlcs hi ps (not incl udi ng th e German 'pocker-bau lesh ips' ) would he lo st in action. and one to an acc ide nta l magazine ex plos io n. Fo r all th e navie s Involved . th e wa r arrived to o early. No ne o f th e had in co nstru ctio n were re ad y to p ut to s ea . T he
\"\'a ~hing ton
IU' W
b.ut leshtps the y
a n d Lon d o n Tre..-atics h ad
effect ively stop ped construct ion o f ca pita l sh ips fro m the e nd o f \\'orld \X'a r 1 until 1937. For th e Ro yal .:'\:1\)". it was o ld . hut mod erni zed battles hips that stood in the fro nt lint: o f th ei r ba ttle fleet o nce ag ain . •\ Io st had seen service o r he en built d u ring \Vorl d \"\'a r I. alt ho ug h th L'y had all bee n m odifie d hy varying degrees to face th e expe cted d emand s o f modern warfa re . Afte r the d eclaration of wa r. new battleships were rushed into production in s h ipya rds around the wo rld . Fo r the Ro ya l Navy . th ei r ma in base was still Sca pa Flow. For the Germans. Lieute nant Gunter Pri en, co mmander of U47, is
W'i lh clmsh ~l n'n
an d Kid remained the two major pons for their fleets. So. on the surface , no t ~ l 101 had changed in th e tw enty ye ars since J utland . e xce pt th at war at sea had be come
~l
mu ch. mu ch d eadlie r
cong ratulated by Admiral
ga me. Techn o logy had widene d th e ra nge of an ion enormously. w ith rad ar and rad io to g uide
Saalwlich ter and Grand Admiral
the hu m in all we athe rs. in da ylight an d darkness. and w ith aircraft carrie rs and uircruli provid ing
Erich Raeder on his return from
the ca paci ty fo r aeria l atta ck hy ho mh s and to rpedoes. Aircraft ca rriers a llowed their ai rcra ft to
sinking the British battleship
operate almost without d istance limitations, across the vast ocea ns o f the world. Below the water.
Royal Oak in Scap a Flow.
submarines and the ir to rped oes were able
to
sec k and d estro y the most strongly armoured vessels
r ue
S I I I'RE.\lE...CllAL.L.EClSJG.E~
IiiiIIII"IIIIJ1;IIil"__1C. 12 7
aflo.u . And with the increased range an d fi n-power of the modern-age big-guns. had reached
IlL'W
the \"igil required
n ~I\':1 1
wa rfare
hL'ig lHs of terror and destruction. Fo r th e sailors. there would IX' no let-up in (0 st.'\.'
111\.'111 satt.:ly horn e to port. Naval warfare had never been more dc..·adly.
"11K' first ha nlevlup cislia hy o f the wa r occu rred nor :U se a . hut in th e:su p posed ly s:II(,' wat e rs
of S<:apa Flow. ·111t...· ddc.:r1y British han k-sh ip
R( ~l'(I1
Oak. lying at a nchor. fell victim tn a Ger man
U·hO:l1 attack and provided lh e Ge rma ns w ith a ma jor propaganda cou p. Attacki ng SC:lp:l Flow w.rs
:1
lo ng -hel d Co n n an dream (h;1I had cost the m
two
s ubma rine s in u nsuccessfu l .ut .u-ks
d uring \Vorld \\'af I. Sincl' then. the Briti.. . h wrongl y belie ved thL'y ha d blocked all the navigabl e ent rance s into the Flow e-xc-e p t the rnnin entra nce. w hich wa . . protect ed h y a l-oom. O n the nig h t o f 1.1 O ctober 19.19 . wh ih- a d i.. . pla y o f a uro ra bon-ali . . wa.. . Iiglui n g u p thv . . kv. Lieutena nt Co m ma n de r G u n te r Prie n in U-47 navi ga ted his su r faced craft thro ugh
: 11l
cxtraon linarilv n-.. .trictcd channel o pc ning. and into the Flo w . On ce in.. . idv. Prien made OUI w hat
he thought were two . . h ip . . . Thi . . wa . . not th e ca . . c . a.... th e hu lk of the Briti.. . h Ho me FIl:'l:'t wa . . at . . L·:1. O n ly o ne ca pi tal battl eship.
R( ~ ral
(Jal·. n- tuai ned qu iet ly at a nchor. Ju . . t after o ne in
the morn ing. Prien fired rhr,..c to rpedoes . O nL' hit thl:' . . tarboard ho w . Tho.. .l:' o n hoard th oug ht :111
inu-mal e xplo.. . ion had occurred in the Infla mmable sto re . and tha t there wa.... noth ing . . t..rio u.. .
bed. After the initial hit. Prie n tu rned hi.. . craft away to reload and then ret u rned to fire a . . p rcad
to worry abou t. SOIllL' crew m ember.... returned
10
o f a furthe r th ree torpcdoc.. . . '111e y hit the battl e.. . h ip wit h dcva tatlng a nd immedia te dft"ct: thn-c rna..... . in . · hole.... wv rc rip ped o pe n down Ih e .... rarb oard
ide o f the hu ll. Flo odi ng wa x
instan taneo us a nd the sh ip p lunged into darkn cs . . a.. . p()\\'e r s y.. . te rn failed . Dama gcc! o n
:1
li.. . ted ra p id ly to . .ta rboard the n . min ute kuc r. turned over a nd sank. Of a crew o f o ve r 1000. H.1.1 di ed . Prien mad e his l.'SC IIK· thro ug h the same ch an nel hehad us ed 10 en te-r th e Flow. an d re tu rned 10 Gvr m a nv an d a IlL'ro 'S w e lco me . I Ic a n d h i.. . cn-w we re flown to Berli n to meet an e<..·....t:ltic I lilk r w ho awa rtk'd Prien the Knight ..... e ro.. .. . of tilL' Iro n Cro . . s . Six wL"eks into IhL' war. IhL' GL'rm:1n ~a \ 'y had dailllL"d a g rL'at \'icwry and a p.. .ydlologk al triumph O\"L'r tilL' Ho yal ~a \ ·y . Th e d e....tru ction o f th L' Ge rma n Il ig h St::I.. . Fleet tw enty yL'a rs l'a rlil'r:H Scapa Flow had IX'en :IH 'nged - at le:l.. .t in part . :\0 onL' u n tk·r.. . tood h eller th a n thl:' Ge rm:lIb tht: tota l rdi an ce (h:1I Britain ha d o n th L' co nt in uou . . su p p ly o f l·........l·n lia l g ood ..... c u ril·d h y merchan t . . hip.. . from :Iro u nd lh l' g lo he. Perman ent ly d:lIna gin g Ihal \'ital s u p p ly line IX'came a maj or part of GL'n na n n ~l\ 'a l straIL·g y. Llll·r. the U-hoats wou ld IX'co me th eir ma jo r wea pon in the war ag a in.. .t thl.'. . e mL'rd \:lnt . . hips hUI . in IhL' ea rly . . lagL·.. . . <"'OIllIllL'rc<:- raid ing hy IlL'a\'i!y ~lfI lled. fa.. .t . . h ip.. . th:lt co u ld re llla in :It . . l·a for long IK·rio d . . o f tinlL' W ;l .... h igh pr io rily in Iht..' GL'n na n na\'al pla ns. \\'hL'n IllL' w:lr Ix·g:lI1 . IhL' flocke l-ha lllL'sh ips f)('f/ tsc:b lllll d a nd G rt{/ .\J)(,(· we re a lre ad y :11 . .ea :lnd co m m itted to th is tas k. But. a.. . llitlt' r had tho ugh t sOllle forlll o f p L·~ l<.' e m ight h e po ssih ll' w ith Brita in and Frann' afler (; e rma ny·.. . ....uccL·...sfll l co ncl usio n of thL' Po li.. . h c lm pa ig n. thl·.. . e sh ips \\'ere no l initially (m k'red to attac k. ,.J<'f/t scbla lll/ wa .... ordL·!"L·d homt..' a nd he r na me changed to U it ZOli'. Ix·ca u.. .e of llil le r'.. . n mn'rn Iha t a ....hip Ix 'aring the na nlt." o f the natio n m ight Ix ' . . un k. l11is Idt GraISfx'(' 1O patrol the Indian a nd So u lh Atlantic (X'l'a ns . O n 2.3 Sepleml x·r. w ith no rk.":lCl· in ....ight. . . he W~I"" gin 'n thl' sign~l l to : lII~lCk British tr.u.le routl·.. . . Gra/ Sl x'e's C:l pt~li n. 1I:lI1s L:lIl g.... do rf. took h i.. . . . hi p from the coa . . 1 o f Bra zil acro........ th e Atlant ic ~lI1 d round the Ca pL' of Good Il o p<..· into th e Indi:1Il Ocean. sut't'l·.. .sfull y elud ing British w:lfsh ips :lIld . . in king . . en..r.11 Brili.. .h I11L'rc h:lnt lllL'n o n th e way. TIlL' \\'ily l.angsdorf then changl'd h i.... a rea o f 0 lx·r.u ion a nd fL·tllrnL·d to lhe Sou th Atla nt ic. By 7 Ik ce l11her. he had su n k o r cap tu red nin e l11 L' r<.."h~lI1tm en . totalling ':;OJJHO Ions, with o ut the lo . . s o f a s ing le lift..' o n e ilhe r . . id e . His p lan wa . . to head for Ihe Hi\'e r Platl' afl·:I. and tilL' wa te r.. . hL·t\\,l·L·n Unlgua y and ArgL'nti n:1o n Ihe east (·O:I.. . t of Soul h A l1l e r i c~l. I Ie 1ll' 1i<"'\'ed th i.. . a re:! wo u ld he rich in me rchant tra ffic L' n rou te to Britain. Lillie d id hl' k no\\' \\' hat b y :i1 lL':ld o f h im. cata strophic . . <.·:11<..·.
N( ~l'a l ()aJ..~
At sunrise o n Ij Dcccmbcnlookours o n GnifSp(:'espoHed thin masts o n ti l(,.' starboard how. at a d istan ce o f abo ut 17 miles . Langsd o rf maint a ined co urse towa rd... the ships unt il he was able to identify the British heavy cruiser Exeter. a nd w hat he though t were several dest roye rs. Langsd orf assum ed the y we re protect ing a convo y and decided to e nWlge them imm ed iately. It rapidly be ca me clea r that there was no convoy and that the destroyers we re the light cruisers Acbilles a nd Aj a»: Lan gsdorf had e nco unte red Co mmodore Hen ry Ha rwood's 'hunting group'. o n the lookout for arm ed Ge rma n raid ers . Just a fte r 6 a .m ., GrlifS/x'eopened fire w ith he r l l -inch <2HO·mm ) g uns . I~n·ter rep li ed , fo llo wed by A chill es and Ajax a few minut e s lat er. From the Ge rman side , s ix II -inch a nd eig ht 5.9· inc h (I 50· mm ) gu ns were up aga inst six x-t nc h (20j·mm) a nd sixte e n 6-inch ( I52.5-mm) guns . TIle Battle o f the Rive r Plate had begun. GrtifS/x"/ s p rime ta rge t was Exeter, the s hip that posed th e g rea test thre at. After o nly a few min utes s he found Exeter» range. and heavy she lls bega n to take a toll of the hcavv crui se r's deck a nd supe rstruct ure. xtcanw htlc . the tw o light cru ise rs had turned to port in a n atte m pt to di vid e Gn ifSfx'e's fire . Langsd o rf o b liged . a nd co nc e nt rate d his he av y gu ns o n the two lig ht c ruisers . Th is ga ve th e badl y damaged Exeter a moment's respit e be fo re she agai n joined the batt le . this time b unching a
The British cruisers Ajax and Ach illes in pursuit of the German
'pocket battleship ' Graf Spee during the Battle of the River Plate in December 1939.
to rpedo attack. Fo r the ne xt half-hour the buulc ra ged - th ree o n o ne wi th the Ge rma n pock et -battleship inflicting furthe r he avy da mage o n Exeter. At 7.15. w ith o nly o ne g un in o ne turret working . I~\"(..ter w ithd rew from the batt le und e r a thick smokes creen. GrafSpo« now had o nly the two ligh t c ru ise rs to d eal w ith . Bo th cr uisers co ntinue d to ha rry Gra f Sf )!'!' before the Ge rma ns su cceeded in putting bo th rear turrets o n Ajax ou t o f actio n. Ach illes had no t IlL'L' n hit at a ll. At 7.40 Harw ood de cided to dis continue the acti o n a nd too k both cruise rs o ff to the ca st under a co ve r o f smo ke .
I 1
~
....
.
-
-:- ~ - -
.r.a.......__c.
TIIE...5ll£RDI L C IIAl..LE..."IIG E'
Havin g fo rced Exe/er ou l of the act io n, and seve re ly reduced Ajax's fig ht ing efficien cy.
The fire ravaged Graf Spee
Langsd orf co u ld have p ressed horn e his ad vantage . h ut Grt{l-Vx.'(' had lx-cn h it hy some twenty
settles slowly into the River Plate
shells w hic h caused ex tensive su perficial d am age . \,\'ith this damage in mind. und
after scuttli ng by her crew.
:I
numbe r
o f hi s crew dead and ma n y more injured, Captain Langsdorf took Ihl..' highl y con trove rsia l decisi on to make for l he: harbour of M ontevi d eo on the River Plate in neutra l Uru gua y. Ill" h ~HJ
effectively c reated
forces
[0
:1
trap for himself. su re ly giving the British lime to h ring lip su pe rio r
wait fo r him to co me o ut.
Shadowed hy th e Brit ish cr u ise rs , GrafSpee e nte re d th e River Plat e December a nd d ropped a nc hor. Langsdo rf was g ra nted
:l
; 1(
m idni g ht o n l j
stay of seven ty-two ho u rs to e ffect
minor re pairs 10 his s h ip . 10 at te nd 10 his wound eel. a nd to b u ry h is dead . Afte r th at he would have to lea ve . Altho ugh th e British had no heavy naval units in th e vici nity. informati on w as leaked to (he co nt rary , In d iscuss ion wi th h is su perio rs in Berlin, Langsd orf too k th e decis ion 10
scuttle his sh ip . Th e on ly al ternative
W~IS
to tight h is way o ut . and he believed th is would
result in his ship being sunk and the lives of many of his cre w being lost. \"'ith the world's prce, wat ch ing . the last dramatic p has e o f th e Rutle of the River Plate began . O n the eveni ng of 17 De cemb er 1939. watched h y o ve r 250 .000 people cro wd ing every vanta ge s pot :l1ong th e Montevideo wate rfro nt . GralSpeC' sl ipped a nchor a nd moved o utsi de Urug uay's ter rito ria l wate rs. Six to rped o wa rheads had bee n d istributed throug ho ut th e s h ip and cha rges se t. The pockct -bu nlcs h tp sto p p ed . a nd the
lTC W .
including Ca p ta in Langs do rf.
was take n o ff h y mo torboat . The boa t sto p ped a safe dista nce away to awai t the e xp los io n, When the g ian t shi p ble w up, Ca p ta in Langsd orf noted to th e pi lo t. 'Ente r in th e lo g book. Gmf .\J}(,(· p Ul
o ut of service on December 17. 19.W. at 20 .00 hours:
TI1R "C days
later in Bueno s Aires.
ca pital of Arge nt ina - a country sym pathetic to the Germans - Captain La ngsdorf sh o t himself It was ~ 1I1 inauspicious start in th is war for German comme rce- raid ing . and an in ternatio nal
cmbarrassmeru fo r Hitler. A pocket-ba ttleship had lo st a lxutl e in its first e ncoun te r w ith th e Ro yal x avy. and was th en destroyed h y its o w n crew. For Germany it was a di sa ste r; for th e British. a g reat triump h th at came at a time w hen th e Ge rman wa r machine
W :lS
h litzk rieg ing
its wa y across Europ e wit h scc m ing ly u nsto ppable moment um . The goo d news fro m Sou th
129
~
•
..i .e.....~ ,f 130 - •
7
TilE n A T TI ES II '£S
Ame rica provided the British w ith a s park o f ho pe at a lime wh e n German fo rces lo o ked se t to overr un the w ho le of Europe.
Early o n the morn ing o f 9 April. Germa ny attacked and capiun..·d De nma rk almost withou t Se~1 th rou gh the na rrow st ra its of th e Skagcrra k a nd Kau cgat. No rway W ;:IS ne xt to fall. h ut o n ly after d etermi ned d e fe nce by No rwegian and British force s. By 5 May. the Ger ma n.... were completely
a s ho t bc tng fired. g iving them control o f the se a route in to and o ut o f the Baltic
in co nt ro l o f so ut her n Norway . h ut it to o k another m o nt h b efore th e no rth . incl u di ng l h t '
vi tal po rt o f Narv ik. w as in Ge rma n h a nd s. Fro m Na rvik . vital iro n o re s u p p lies co u ld he sh ip ped to Ge rma ny. and Germa n na val fo rces co u ld co ntrol th e Arctic sea-rou te into the Ba ltic. Thei r warships and U-hoa ts wou ld han : access to the No rth Atlantic, and lo ng- ran ge Ge rma n a ir attack s a nd o bservatio n n igh ts o ver Eng land and Sco tland would he po ssible. As Britain 's wartime lead e r, \X'insto n Ch u rchill. wou ld late r write . 'The ra pid ity with w h ich Hitle r effect ed th e d om inatio n o f No rway wa s a re ma rkable feat o f wa r and po licy. and a n e nd ur ing ex am ple o f Ge rman th oroug hness. w ick edn ess a nd b rutality.' The Ge rman occu pation o f NOI"\\'ay gave Hitle r and his n ava l fo rce s a vita l str.ucg lc base for a wa r tha t wa s o nly just hegin ning . Events in 1\'ofw ay were so o n eclipsed w he n th e Ge rman Army invad ed the Lo w Co un tries , Holla nd. Belg iu m and France o n 10 May 19-10. The large British Expedi tionary Force , work ing in conc e rt wit h the Fre nch Arm y in an at tempt ret rea l h ack
10
10
ha lt th e ad va ncing Ge rmans , wa s forced
10
the Fre nch po rt o f Du nk irk w he re a n n ih ilation h y the overw hel mi ng e nemy
The French fleet, including the
fo rces see med ine v ita b le . BUI h y 4 Ju ne , sea -powe r. th is time in the fo rm o f hu nd reds of
battleships Strasbourg and
d est ro ye rs. steame rs o f all kinds. yac hts and moto rboats. m iracu lously cvacu.ucd some 33H,OOO
Dunkerque. at
Mers·e/~Kebir
troops. incl ud ing ove r 25.000 Fren ch so ld iers.
10
the sa fely o f Brita in ,
be fore the attack by British
\'(' ilh Pran ce a nd the British fo rces a ppa re ntly o n the verg e of d e feat. Mussohn i b ro ught Ita ly
battleships.
into the wa r o n th e Germa n s ide o n II J u ne . Ele ve n d ays later Fra nce capitu lated . lea ving
r ns
IIiZ.lIIMtllI'IiI.IiI....._.-:. .
S l lPRL\lL CllALLL "t_GfE' -
- '. . .
Hritain alone to fa<.:l· the combined German - Ita lian onslaught. But it was not o nly Germany and Italy th at had formed a n all ian ce - japan had already joined them in a Tripartite Pact. As th e war esca late-d into a g lo lu l conflict . thi s powe rfu l trio would become kno w n as the Axis . Th e str:l1 l' gic co nseque nces o f th e Ge rma n o ccupat io n o f xo rwa v and France were sign ificant. Th e German coas tline was no w extended from lhe Arct ic Sea in no rt h ern ;\'orway 10 the A tlan ti c co.e- r of western Fra nce. For th e first time in its h istory. the German ~ :I \ ' Y was
freed fro m the restricted geograp hy of its horne port hases. O ne furt her conseq uence o f the LIII o f Fra nce was the fate of its powerfu l navy. Th e Vichy gove rn men t adn un isrcrcd Ihe no n-occu pied southern p:111 I ll" Fran ce - :tn adrninixtrn tion that Britai n fea red m ig ht we ll allo w the French flee r to fall into Ge rma n ha nds . The acqu isition or capture
1 )1'
th e n e w Fre nch h anlccruiscrs Dnnl scrqu« and Strasbcurg. a n d the in comp let e
b.utl c-hip-, Rtcbcttou and j ou n Hart. wo u ld transform the Ge rman
~a\'y
on.. . nug lu . Th e
Commander- In-Chief (If the l'n-nch :"!;l\y. Adm iraljean Fran coi s I);trlan . had catego rica lly stated that no French s h ips w ould he allo wed to fall into th e hands o f any fo rei g n po wer. A large
...quudron o f the ln-rn -h tlect. under the command o f Admiral Gensoul . wa ..; stationed in Ihe French Xorth Afri c-an port o f Merx -el-Kebir n ear O ran . This in c lud e d th e o ld battl esh ips / ' /'(11'('11("(' and HrelaRlIe an d th e new nUIlJ.'(·n//I( · and Straslxmrg 111e i ncom plete RicbeU('1I and jcun 1J1I11 Wl'R' at Dakar and Casabla nca n-... pe..·<, ·ti\"t:l y.
Th e declarati on o f war hy th e Italians. foll o wed closely hy the ca p itula tio n o f Prance. dr.llna tica lly cha nged the l\ritish view o f the
~kdi ll·rr:.IIle..':1I1
situation. \X'ilh Britis h naval re« nm'es
.stretched to thl' lim it. and till' uncertain b le of thl' FR'lKh fleet , it appeared :1 un iqu e o p po rtu nity fo r the po w e rfu l Ita lia n N avy to assume m:lst ery of the M c d tn- rrnn c an . Th e Ger ma ns a lso recognized tluu hvrv at last was a cha nce 10 oust the British fron t Ihe Medite rranean o nce a nd for all. The British res ponse to th is te nuous situation was swi ft and . h y th e e nd of june. a special 11:1\'al force cod e named ' Fo rce H' had been created. This wa s made u p o f th e ca p ita l s hi ps ! iood, Valiant and R('s(' /ll tiel1! and th e ea rner Ark
N( ~ J 'a/.
u nder the com mand o f Vice-Admiral
Sir James Some rville. O ne immediate purpose for th e fo rmatio n of force H. under direct orders fro m wtnst on Ch u rc h ill. was to reso lve th e issu e o f the French s h ips mo ored in x tcrs -cl Kebir.
The British naval force sailed to 0r:1I1. w he re four highly contro ve rs ia l propositions were pu t to Ad m ira l Gcnsoul : join us. demi litari ze your s h ips in a frie ndl y port. scuttle yo urs elf whe re
you lie . or be d e stroyed. Und e rstand a bly. Ad mir al Ge nsou l did nOI we lcome (h is ult imatum and. tt..'arin g the worst. he p rolo nged nego tiatio ns to gh'c h is flee t a chance In the afte rnoo n. the Briti.... h added
(0
an
~l l re: l d y
10
prepare fo r battle-,
tense s itua tio n h y so w ing mi ne s across th e
harbo ur e nt rance. .lust a fte r '1.50 p .m . o n 5 ,1 uly 19·10, th e Ad mira lty in I.ond o n se nt Somerville the follow ing mess:lgl' : 'Se ttle matters q u ick ly o r yo u w ill have re inforce me nts to d ea l with .' AI 5. 15 p "m.. So merv ille s ign a lled Genxoul. ' If n one o f the p ropo.sal s are acceplah le h y 5.';0 p .m . it wi ll lx ' necessary 10 sink yo ur s hips.' Th e Fren ch Adm iral mad e an offer to red uce
cn-w n umbers so th e ship cou ld no t go into action. and then sa il to a neutral port in Mart inique or the USA. 111is fell short o f w hat the Britis h requ ired and th e British nl'got i:ltors q uickly lcfr n,mh'rqll£" hut not IX'foR' they he.. .a nl actio n stations hcing sounded on the Fren ch ships.
Ted Briggs. a
s i g n~ l ll e r
o n lUIS 1100<1. reca lls th e dramatic incid e nt:
' Eve ruuallv Vice -Admi ral Somef\'iIIe m~l<.le
10
Ihe french ad m ira l. "Heg re l I must ha \"e a n
answer shortly o th e f\\'isl' I w ill h ~l n.· to take the MJ)O
nl'{"eSS~try
act ion.- The reply ca me ha ck.
not crea te th e irfl.'lxu:lh le .- Th is is ;Iho u t 6 p. m . And SOml' f\ ·iIIe. yo u co u ld see
him sta ndi ng Ihe re . \'l' ry serio us . he d idn 'l wa lll to do it. no bexly wa nted it. He sa id . "All right. O pen FiR'... ;":ow Iher e we re th ree s h ips, e;lCh with eight I; · inl'h [3HI-mml gUlls. There were twe nty-fo u r I; -inc h g u ns pou ring s he lls int o an e ndosl'd s pace. It w as
131
132 -
..i rn 7
TJIEJlAT TI F S II I P S
like s hooting fixh in u ba rrel - it was absol ute ha voc.
C h ~I ()S .
A rk
R( ~ )'tlrs
uin- ruf were
overhead. acting as spotting planes for us . \X'c had OR'd a tcw s;lln x:s and the French were replying. The y had a sys telll wh ere the)' could tel l their fall o f sh ot hy th e fact that when the shells exploded in th e water th ey se nt lip colou red plumes of wat er . 111C)' had red . yellow. while. blu e so eac h ship knew ex actly where their o wn shd ls we re falling . It looked a hit like a lifework di splay.
'The: French manag ed ( 0 stra ddle us a co uple of times - the )' were co nce ntrating o n Hood and o ur funnels were peppered with shrapnel. In the:e nd the .\·I"lI s holl ~ ma naged 10 slip o ur a nd wa s heading towa rd.. 1):ICGI. Admiral Somerville d ecided th.u he would tak e Hood and six de...':-Olrop :rs to chase after her, \'('e. .' crac ked o n full speed then suddenly realized that instead o f six sh ips o n th e [rad ar] scree n. the re were se ve n , O ne o f these turned o ut to he a French cru ise r heading toward s us , She carried out a torpedo attac k o n the Hood - in b et. we had to tum to avoid th ese , Shl." was e ngag l.'d . a nd she was hl own u p . It was a very miserabl e e ffo rt. a n d nohody wanted to do it. Th e French w ere not o u r en em y. tIH: y\ J been in harbour at O run , a nd th e y knew th ei r co urn ry had been o ve rru n. Th ey d idn 't kn o w what was happening to the ir families and th en we sud d en ly appea r o n the scene. Can you imag ine w ha t thcy mu . .t have fell ?' ;\ Iost of the French sh ips p rese nt at Mers-el-Keb ir were sun k or sl' \'e rdy damaged. These events cost a great man y Fre nch lives a nd seriously sou red Ang lo -French re lations. Fo r a be leag uered
Britain. threa te ned with invas ion in th c su mme r o f 1940. it W :1S nevc n hclc s... an import a nt signal to the world tha t she was st ill very much in bu siness. The fina l cha p te r in th e u nha ppy sag a o f th e Fren ch flee t was p layed o ut so me two ye a rs late r. in No vembe r 19·12. when the Ge rma ns finall y occupied a ll o f Fran ce . Based at To u lo n. the French sc uttled the ir fleet as the Germa ns e nte red the port on 27 November. The battlesh ips
Strasbo n rg an d
f)1I1l/..~f.!nlll e,
w hic h had been repa ired si nce Mers-cl -Kcbir. an d
f Jro n ' llce
were
among th e man y sh ips destroye d . After Mers-el -Kehi r. th e Ital ian fl eet wa s hy far the most p o werfu l n ava l force in the
Med ite rranea n. They had t wo ne w battlesh ip s in th eir fl eet - tiuorio and \ 'i llor in - .h ring ing thei r to tal o f ca p ital sh ips to six , To red uce thi s naval for ce, th e
Hnnsh. wit h the limited battle
fl ee t they had available in th e Med ite rranean , wo u ld need to p ull som e th ing ex cept ional out of the hag. The British Com ma nder-in-C h ie f in th e Mediterranean. Ad mi ra l Sir Andrew Cu n n ing ha m . decided to strike direct ly at the Italian fleet in harbour, His maj or strike fo rce wou ld n ot comp rise th e traditio nal ca pita l ships and their escorts. hut rathe r, the new armoured a ircraft ca rrier Illustrious. a nd its Swordfish bombers. Photo-reconnais sance esta blished th at the Italian fleet . including its six battleships. was at anch or in the harbour at Taranto . O n the night o f 1J November. Illustrious flew o ff twenty-one Swordfish a in..·r.lft in tw o waves. Their o b ject ive : to destroy the Italian flee t. Th e first wave dropped flare s. bombs and torped oes. the second. to rpedoes o nly. Inte nse anti-aircraft fire was encountered and tw o Swordfish were lost. '111<;' fo llowing day . p hoto-reco nna issance aircraft revealed till..' extent of th l..' British su ccess.
Ltttorto had been hit hy th re e to rpedoes . Ca io Duitto a n d Con te tl i Ca s-ou r lry o n e e ac h . Conte d i C(l('(w r was put o ut o f o peratio n permanently. while the o ther two were o ut o f se rvice for six months. At a cost of two a ircraft and eleven IS-inch (,1; 7 -111111) torpedoes. Cu n ning ham 's plan ha d h al ve d th e e ffect ive fig hti ng st reng th of the Ita lia n b a ttle sh ip fl eet. a nd British dom inance o f the Med iter ranean had be en reassert ed. Th e eve nts at Tara nto we re wa tch ed with considerable inte rest in Ja p an . w here th o ughts of a similar ae rial attac k aga inst th e US fleet base at Pe arl Har bo r were unde r d iscu ssio n. In October J9·1O th e Ita lian s la u nch ed a d isastro us ca m paign agai nst G reece. Eve ntua lly, the y re lied e n tire ly o n in te rve ntio n b y Ge rma n fo rce s to secu re victo ry. As p art of a n a b ortive
I.H.E....S.l1.llEME C H A I I E.N.GE E
Ji__-= ._ .. i lie-~,.__ __
attem p t to ste m the Ge rma n ad va nce in Greece. British troo ps mo ved into Cre te in March 19·11. Luge n umbers of re in force me nt s we re ne cessa ry if the Allied fo rces were to hold the area.
Pre ssure d by thei r Germa n a llies , o n 27 Marc h a po we rful Ita lian na val fo rce u nder the co mma nd o f Adm iral lac hin e . includ ing the ne w battleship Vittorio Ven eto a nd six hea vy cru ise rs , le ft po rt he adi ng eastwards to int e rce pt the British tro op co n vo ys ca rr y ing th e rein forcements.
Signal traffic inte rcepts and ae rial recon naissa nce alerted Admiral Cunningha m 10 the Italian fleer mo veme nt. He le ft Alexa nd ria o n the evening of 27 March . wi th the ne w a ircraft ca rrie r Form ida ble and the battleships warsptte. va lia nt and Barham to investigate. O n the morning of 2H March s po tte r aircra ft from lachi ne's fle et ide ntified Britis h light cruis e rs. and (hey ga ve chase. Afte r a hrief engageme nt a t lo ng ra ng e, the Italian s hips turned fo r ho me . The y had not man aged to interce pt any British convoy~ an d , a pa rt from (he brief excha nge w ith the light cruise rs. it seeme d to have lx-e n a w asted so rtie . What the Italia ns d idn 't rea lize was that the cha ng e o f co ur se they ha d mad e to c hase (he cru ise rs had p ut them o n a d ire ct he adin g tow ards Cunning ham's fast-approaching hattie fleet. The courses of these two converging flee ts wo uld result in a major nava l battle in the waters off Cape Matapan . Cunning ham ordered the first of three a ir strikes aga inst lach ino's s hips hy Albaco re aircraft fro nt Formidable. Th e st..-cond strike made a hit o n th e battle ship Vi llorio Felll'/o. w ith o ne to rpedo striking near (he p rop elle rs o n the po rt side . Altho ugh bad ly da maged, she was ab le 10 mainta in arou nd 20 knots. s ufficie nt to allo w her to disappear into the night. The third st rike from Fo rm ida ble hit a nd sto pped the cruise r Pola. Iachino se nt the cruisers Zara, Fiume and
Shrouded by smo ke and sinking by the stern, the French ba ttleship Provence at Mers ·el· Keb ir is caught in a hail of deadly fire fro m British ba ttle ships in July 194 0.
133
four de stroye rs back to asxist the stricke n Pola. unaware that Ihe British fleet was closing unde r co ve r of darkness. At a bo ut 10 p .m . the British ba ttle ships o pe ned fire on the unsuspecting Italia n sh ips , illuminated by searchlig ht from the destroye r Grcybound. The ca rnage that e nsued un de r the co mbined 15·inch C3B l -lllm) sa lvoes o f the l'Fa Y'Sp il e. Va lia nt a nd itarbam q uickly re du ced Zar a a nd Fiu me 10 blazing w recks. By the mo rn ing , a ll thre e Italia n cru ise rs, a nd several destroye rs, had bee n sunk. This batt le had aga in demonstrated the cr uc ial impo rtance of air-p ower in det ecting and slowing e ne my sh ips w hich otherwise would have o utru n the British battleships.
etMl'P..__...
-""_ iiim ..
tE....cIJLA.ll.liN1iJL TIlE S I!PR.E.ME C HA llENGE
Afte r the Battle o f Cape Matapa n. su rface un its
Royal Navy carrier-based
o f the Ital ia n Navy ceased to he a threat to the Britis h . Ho w e ve r, in th re e trag ic weeks for the
Swo rdfish bi-planes attack the
Ro yal Navy in the Medi terra nean . to rpedoes fro m a Ge rma n Ll-boat sunk o ne batt lesh ip, and two o ther ca pita l ships we re badly damaged in a dar ing auack
No vember 1940. Three Italian
w hile they lay at anc hor. Th e sinking occurred at the e nd of Nove mbe r 1941, w hen the old batt leship
Swo rdfish. (Painting by Robert
Barhcnn was struc k by thn..' e to rpe does tired from
the Military Gallery. Bath, UK.)
the U-331. wit hin seconds. her aft er 15-inch (3HIru m) powd e r ma ga zines ex p loded . lea ring th e str icke n s hip to pieces. w ith the loss of H62 men. O n th e n igh t o f IH De cembe r 194 1, w ith the darin g usc of the most minimal for ces. the Italia ns struc k at the ve ry he art o f the Britis h fleet as it lay a t a nc hor in Ale xa nd ria har bour. Th re e tw o -ma n 'huma n to rpedoes' su cceede d in p lacing ex p losive cha rges u nd e r th e ba ttleshi ps Va lia n t a nd Queen
tiltzabetb, severely da m.rg tng bo th s h ips. Th e hu ma n to rp edo was essentia lly a large to rp edo s ha ped mi ni s u bma rine o n w h ich two men sa t. d ressed in w hat toda y wo uld be de scri be d as we t su its and sc uba -div ing gea r. Th e y cou ld steer a nd s ub merge their mi ni-s ub to a su fficie nt de pth to d ive u nde r a s h ip at an cho r. a llo w ing th e m to a tta ch high -e x p losi ve cha rges to its p ropell e rs. s ha ft. rudde r o r whe re ver. Th e exp losive s wo uld have time charges fined and , with luck. the human to rpedo a nd its crew wo uld esca pe into the night befo re the charges ex ploded . Th e wa r in th e Medite rran ea n ha d prod uce d mixed results. The British had bee n un ab le 10 sto p the conq uest o f Greece. hut th e y ha d se rious ly d amaged a nd great ly de p le te d th e Italian fleet so mu ch so , in fa ct. that it w as rel ucta nt to p ut to sea . Bu t. w ith the loss of Barha m a nd the te m pora ry e limina tio n o f valiant a nd Queen Htralxsh, the hard-wo n Britis h adva ntage had bee n severely co m p ro mised . Although the wa r in the Me di te rra nea n wou ld rage o n. af ter th e Bailie of Matapan . the wa r be tween the ca pita l shi ps would reach its ze nith a n ocea n away in the ble ak w ate rs o f the No rth Atla ntic . The gr ea t ico n o f Britis h na va l streng th. 11i\IS H ood. a nd Germa ny 's magni fice nt figh ting s hip Btssnarcls would both sa il the ir last voyages.
Italian fleet a t Taranto in battleships were put out of ac tion for the loss of only two Taylor, repro duce d co urtesy of
135
From Bismarc to Pear Har~ or U
nlike World War I, a head-to -head batt le between large fle e t» o f ca p ita l s hips was nev er part o f th e nav a l stra te gy o f ei ther th e British o r th e Ge rma n Admi ralti e s in \X'orld War II. Th is was
particularl y true o f th e Germa ns . Th eir sma ll b ut ex tre mely powe rfu l
fleet o f battles hips had a nother role to play. pre yin g o n less heav ily a rmed ships a nd against th e su p p ly convoys th at were th e life -bl o od of the Allied war effort . During 1940 the pocket-battleship GrafSpee« sister ship , Ad m iral Scheer; o pe rate d successfully in th e Atlanti c and Ind ia n ocea ns , si nking six teen ships totall ing 99 ,059 tons . Th e battleships Scba rn borst a nd Gneisenau, under the co mma nd of Admira l Gunthe r Ltitjens. followed in Scheer» wak e . Between January and March 194 1, they accou nte d for tw ent y-two s hips sunk or ca ptu red. to talling 11 5,622 to ns . Sp u rred o n b y t he success o f Sch ee r, Scha rn horst a nd Gneise na u , Admiral Erich Raed er, Co mma nde r-in-Chie f of the Ge rma n Navy, want ed to maintain th e momentum o f th ese raids a nd lise th e b ra nd -n ew, IS-in ch
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ----"_ •••1I.aA''tr
(311 1-111111 ) gu n ned battlesh ip s Bismarck an d Ttrp ttr to tot ally d is rupt and d estroy the Allied sup pl y line s . Bisma rck, at Hitle r's req uest. had be en na me d a fte r the o ld Iro n Cha nc e llo r, O tto vo n Bism arck . fo under o f the m o dern Ge rma n Mate.
Desig ned in d efia nce o f the 35,000-[o n trea ty limi t. the 4 1,70Q·to n Bismarck was b uilt at the Bloh m 8.: Voss shipyard in Ham burg and launched by H itler o n 14 February 1939. T he
occa sio n w as treated as a state eve nt , and the Naz i p ropaga nd a machine ex tracte d maximu m va lue fro m the sy m bolic lise o f the name a nd th e fact that s he was. at the time , th e largest and most mode rn battle shi p in the world . Bisma rck was co m missio ne d o n 24 Aug ust 1940. un d e r the com mand o f Captain Ern st Lind ema n n. at a time w he n the Germa n wa r machine ap pea re d u nstoppab le . \Vh ile B ismarck wa s u nd er c o ns t ruc tio n in Ha m b u rg , h er s is te r s h ip , Ttrptrx. tw o mo nt hs be hind the Bis m a rck sched ule , w as ta ki ng s ha pe in Wilhe lmsha ve n. Lau nche d in Ap ril 1939, a lso b y Hitle r. Ti rpitr w as not co m m iss io ne d u n til the e nd o f Feb rua ry 194 1. Slig h tly modifi ed , rtrp tt r w a s a lso ra te d ma rg in all y he a vier, at 42 ,90 0 tons . T he d im ens io ns o f h o th th e se ne w b att le s h ip s w ere kep t very m u c h a se c re t dur ing the b ui lding pe riod , a nd it 'v as o n ly after the w a r tha t th e ir true me a suremen ts a nd to n nag e
Hitler insp ects the ba ttleship
became k now n .
Bismarck at Gydnia , Poland on
Th rou g ho ut the g rea te r pa rt o f 194 1, rtrptts: co nd uc te d an ext e nsive and tho ro ug h tria ls
1 May 1941. His fears abo ut
p rogra mme in p re paratio n fo r wa r. Ge rma n sea ma n O tto Thisso n , a n electricia n , was in the origina l crew o f Tirpttz that too k d e live ry o f the shi p . a nd wa s o n ho ard d ur ing he r working-
los ing such a prestigious ship
u p tria ls:
later that same m on th.
w ere realised when she was sunk
Bismarck at sea at the start of her only sortie photog raphed from her consort Prinz Euge n. Note the striped camouflage scheme and attempts to visually shorten her hull by pa inting bo th ends dark grey.
'Whe n [f it ting-o ut] was do ne , we went into the Balt ic a nd the re the w hole cre w bcg.m tra ining for act ive servi ce . for ge tting read y to figh t the e ne my. Everyo m- had 10 kno w his station inside OUI at all watches. a nd this meant kn o wing all about com munica tio ns as well as how to work the machine ry. \X'he n all this had been achieved we had 10 go to Gote n hafc n . Th e re we co nd uc te d tria ls o n the me as ured mil e with ha u lc xhip Bisma rck. The y want ed to determine the s hip's perfo rmance and so we ste am ed o ut fro m Kid w ith th e Bismarcte. in the d ire ct ion of Go ren hufcn. and it W ;IS a lmost like the Blue Riban d . [The race between oce an liners to de te rmi ne the fastest liner o n the Atlantic run.l Th e first o ne to reach Gotcnhafen could tic Up ;1( the pier. 111e o the r would have to remain o ut in the roads , Natura lly it was better for the crew if yo u co uld berth at the pie r - this meant yo u could go ashore every day. 'The Tirpitz wo n. AI that lime o ur ca pta in was Erich To pp . li e had co me from the Xa \')" Hig h Co mma nd and he be rthed the ship a t the p ier as easil y as if he had been berthing a Iiule tran sport ship. li e d id it so elegantly. bo w first, lines thrown o ut and ned secure ly. [ust like Ih:II, us ing the ship's e ngines 10 manoeuvre he r into p lace, as if it was nothing a t a ll. \X'e all thought. -Ma n! Th at is a rea l ca pta in!" \,\'e w ere reall y impressed. '\X'e spe nt ha lf a ye ar there making trial trips so that eve ryo ne be came tho ro ug hly fa milia r w ith his duties o n hoa rd .' Ad miral Raeder's plan had been
[0
se nd both Btsmarcts and Ttrpitr o ut into the Atlantic
10
be
jo ined hy Scbarnbo rst a nd Gnotsenan. w h ic h were alread y statio ned at Brest o n the French Atla nt ic coast. Had th is powerful comb ina tion of s hips hroken into th e Atlant ic, the British w ou ld undoubtedly have faced its g reates t crisis o f the naval w a r. In the e ve nt , Ttrptrr was st ill running trials until Februa ry 194 1; Scburnborst w as d espe rald y in nee d o f a refi t; and Gttcisenau wa s bad ly damaged o n 6 April at St Naz a irc in a homhing attac k hy British ai rcra ft. As Hisnut rcls w as read y. it was decided tha t s he and the heav y cr u ise r I JriN Z l:'u)!.(,ll would
.l._. iI1i111" ...__..-: 139
,. l'ltOltlJ1 1SMARC1\· ··~I·'QJ.!l'-AJll.LJlA.1l~.lli pron..-c-d :11 th e e :l rl iL"~ t m oment o n an o pe rat ion code- nam ed
Rhcmubung (Opera tion Rhc in ). Th e tacti cal deplo ym ent of th e ships was simple: Bismarck would d istract the British wa rships p rotectin g the convoy... whil e Prinz: EHRen wo uld
_
BISMARCK
Vice-Ad mi ral Gunter Ltu jcn s. fresh from the su ccessful sortie with Scbarnborst and
813FT 8IN (OV£RIILU ~ IIBfr ~ 2Bfr 6IN (2"9 ~ 36 ~ 8.7MJ
Gneisonau. to comma nd th e new hunting group . By A p ril 19·11 . Bisnutrcls and Prinr ElIRen we re exerci sin g togeth er in pr ep ararion
DISPLACEMENT, "' ,700 TONS STANDIIRD DISPl..ACEMENT, SO,900 TONS DEEP LOAD
for the fo rthcomi ng b rea kout into the Atlan tic. O n 1 xtay. Hitler visited the ba n leship
MIlCHINERY,
138.000 SHP
to m a ke a to u r of ins pectio n . He e x p re ssed conce rn a bo ut th e: propo sed sort ie
SPEED.
29 IWOTS
into th e Atlant ic h u t. in light o f recent successes. raised no objections. Ltltjens was
ARMAMENT,
8 ~ IS-INCH 081-MMJ; 12 ~ S.9-IN C1S0-MMJ; 16 ~ 3.9' (99-MMJ; 16 ~ 37-MM; 12 ~ 20-MM
DIMENSIONS,
sink the merch ant ships w ith her H-inch ( 203-m m) guns. Admiral Raed er appointed
uncomfo rtable about certain until other
h e:~1\1'
~l s pet.1s
o f th e:so rtie a nd wanted to d d ay the:o pen•ni on
u n its we re available. hu t Raeder insisted th at it mu st proceed as
:IS po.......ib lc. Th e: d ie was Gist: Bismarcls an d Prins: /;'ll~ell would sail. PROTECTION. BtH then , just as momentum fo r th L' new so rtie began to bu ild. Prinz /;'lI~ell ra n ove r a ma gn eti c m in e and wa s p u t ou t o f ac tio n for tw o weeks . Fin all y. o n 19 ~by , both lJi s marck a nd t-n nr ElI~ellldi Gorcnhafcn . Th e o perat ion. which wou ld Include th e most dramatic en counter between battleships in \Vo rld \Var II. had beg u n. Th e pla n ca lled for the s h ips to rake the same rout e int o the Atlantic that Schurnbo ra and Gneisenau had tak en in Jan uar y - northwards ro u nd Icel an d and into th e Atlantic th rough the Den ma rk Strait. Both sh ips sailed westwa rds to wards De n mark. passing throu gh the Great Be lt that d ivides Denmark fro m Sweden. Th e y continued ro u nd the co ast of southe rn 1'\orway a nd made for Be rgen . a rriving there about m idda y o n 2 1 May. Th e mo vemen t o f the sh ips had not gone unnoti ced: the British had been advised the day before, bya naval attac he in Stock holm, that two h e~l\ "y units had b een sig hted srccrt ng nort h-west. An J{AF p hoto-reconnaissa nce Sp itfire loca ted and ph ot ographed Htsmarcls in Grimstadtfj ord . At Scapa Flow th e: Com ma n d e r-in-Chie f of th e Ho rne Fleet . Ad m iral Sir John Tovey. po nd ered th e ro ute the German s h ips were ltk clv to take , and assumed th at they were atte m pti ng to bre ak into the: Atlantic. In S GIIXI Plow. th e new battleships Killp, Georl-W tand Prin ce o/ l r'(II('... a nd the o ld banlccrutscr Hood, plus the a ircra ft ca rrie r Victorians. were at Tovey's d isposa l. I lis dilemma wa s what ships to send where . The heavy e m be r .\"or/ olk. so o n to he: joined b y StUJo lk, was already o n sta tio n in the: Denmark Stra it. On 21 ,\ Iay he dec ided to se n d /lood and Prin ce 0/ \\''(I les to Iceland . From th ere th e y would h e able to cover th e: lo .:lan d/ Gr eenland a nd Iceland/Facrocs routes into th e: Atlant ic.
soon
MAIN BELT 12.> TO 10'> IN 017 TO 266 MMJ; nJRRETS "'.2S TO 7 IN (362 TO 178 MMJ; DEc~ ".7S TO 3.2S IN (120 TO B2 MMJ 2092 (APPROO
The German battleship Gneisenau. In company with
her sistership Scharnhorst. Gneisenau completed a
successful sortie into the Atlantic in March 194 1, sinking many British merchantmen.
~
" ,'"C>I.,,;'
,.i, »:..
At m id n ig ht o n 2 1 j\ lay Admiral Holl and , w ith his llag in Hood. took ho th British sh ips ou t of Scapa Flo w a nd hea ded nort h-west . A few hou rs ea rlie r.
lJis H/a,.c:/..~
a nd Pri nr Hug ell ha d
sl ip ped a nc hor an d left Be rge n to mak e for the o pen se a . O m:L' at sea tht:y hea de-d no rthwestw ards fo r Ice lan d. The weather had furth e r deterio rated and the shi ps we re sa iling th ro ug h rai n a nd m ist. Th ro ugh o u t th e fo llowi ng d ay. po o r wea ther co nd itio ns p reve n ted Brit is h reconn aiss ance ai rcra ft fro m Idli ng To ve y w hat he needed to kno w : had n tsnm rcts sailt;'d? It was no t unt il late in the a fte rnoon tha t a rccon n.ussancc aircraft mad e th e llig ht was able
10
to
:"or\\':I)' and
re port that th e Bismarcle had go ne, At 10,15 a.m , th e fo llo w ing day, To vcy took his
flags hip Kin!!. G(!OI'R,(! \: the ca rrier Vict o rious, fo u r cru ise rs and s ix dest ro yers to sea. O n B isntarcl e: Lutjc ns assessed the th ick weather cond itions idea l fo r the b rea kout into th e Atlant ic
~IS
be stea me d o n at hig h speed th rou g ho ut 23 .\ lay. Whe n he rea ch ed the nort he rn most
tip of Ice lan d . Lu tjc ns g ra d ua lly ch a nged co u rse to the so uth -west to en te r th e Denma rk Strait. At 7 .22 p .m.. first co ntact w ith the enemy was made. Loo ko uts o n
Sl ~l(()/k
repo rted the Ge rman battle sh ip comi ng townrd x them . about 7 mile s
,
d istant. Th e cr u iser imm edia tely slip ped into the mist a nd sa fe ty, and se n t off a sighting repo rt. Sm.1()//..~
joine d
St ~ITo//..~ soon
.
.
afte r h ut wa s sported hy B ismarcle. wh ich fired a series of accura te
sa lvoes be fore the Britis h cr u ise r cou ld ta ke refuge in th e mist. Bo th cr uisers the n sellie d in 10
a s h adowi ng rol l' , a s afe di sta nce be h in d the Ge rma n s h ips . l.iu je nx no w k new th ai h is
po sitio n had been reve aled. \X'hat he d id n't know wa s that two British b.utk- sq ua dr o ns were racin g
10
cu t h im o ff.
The p u rsu it of B isn u trcle
W:1S
turn ing into o ne o f th e mo st com pe lling se a chases in na va l
h istory. At the time [hat ,\'uJ.li)/k made co ntac t w ith Bisnutrcls. /lood and Prin ce of \r'fI!es \\'L'rL' about 500 m ile s d ue so ut h. stea m ing at h ig h s peed o n a westerly inte rcept course. just a fte r m idn igh t o n 24 May. :IS Ho lland's ha ttie sq ua d ro n s ped rap id ly throug h the n ight. actio n stations we re ca lled . Thcv ex pecte d to mee t t t lsnut rcls at a rou n d l A O a .m, At abo ut th e sa me time, the s ha dowi ng cru ise rs lo st con tact wi th the Germ a n s h ips du e to po o r vis ih ility a nd snowsto rms. Hol land 's reactio n was 10 steer h is sh ips on to a no rthe rly hea d ing to d o se o n the last re ported po s itio n o f the Ge rm a n s hi ps. in the h o pe that Ih e y m ig h t ha ve tu rn e d hack . But Lutjens had mai ntai ne d
~I
ste ady so uth -weste rly co u rse to take him into th e Atlantic. At 2.'17
a .m .. Su}Ji,lk rega ined contac t w ith IJiSH/arc/..1. Ho lland had the vital info rmat io n he needed. The British admiral cons idered his hatt ie plan s. his tactics heavil y infl ue nced hy the strengt hs and weaknesses o f his two ca p ital s hips. Hood was , hy a ny stan dard . a n elderly s h ip wit h her d esig n o rigins in \X'o rld \X'ar I. But. at '12,670 to ns a nd mo u nting eight l Svi nch
( 5HI ~mm )
g u ns ,
she was still ex tre mely fast an d powerful. with lu-avy ma in ar mam ent eq ual to that of n tsnmrcl: She wa s ge nerally w e ll a rmoured . alth o ug h much o f this a rmour was re lative ly thi n. Beca use o f th is com pa ra tively th in ho rizon ta l arm ou r. /lood was s us pected o f h ei ng vu lnerable to lo ng-range . p lunging shells. Howeve r, fl ood re p res e nted m uch more than th e su m of he r part s. She h ad come
10
em body the ve ry esse nce o f Britis h nava l m ig ht. a nd fo r n lo ng tim e w as
the la rgest and mos t p restig io us wa rsh ip in the wo rld . Th e aspi rat io ns and
IH lPl' S
o f a natio n
sailed w ith he r e verywhere she went.
Il ood s sma lle r co nso rt. the ne w ban lcshtp Prin ce of \Fa/es, was m u ch bet ter p rot ecte d with an ar mo ured bel t 15 inc hes CjH I 111111) th ick an d an a rmo ured deck bet ween 5 and 6 inch es ( 127- 152.5 1111n ) th ick. As a b rand-new s h ip. without th e be ne fit o f the len gthy p rogramme of wo rking-up e njo yed by B ismc trcls . the British battlesh ip had been p ressed into se rvice all to o q u ickly: as s he raced to wa rds the enemy. contractors \ \'L' R ' still working o n he r ma in a rma me nt. O n pa per, it was eig ht IS-inch (3H I-m m) and te n I-t-Inch <3., :;-m lll ) g uns on th e Britis h s ide aga ins t e ig ht I S-in ch a nd eig ht H-inc h ( Z03-mlll ) guns o n th e G e rm ~ II1 , At 3. 53 a .m . Ho llan d , ra ci ng so uthw ards. incre ased speed to 2H kn o ts. Bismarck. o n a n ap p ro x imately pa rall el cou rse . was estima te d to he abo ut 2.1 m ile s ah ead . Al " . 10. as th e runge shortened , the British sh ips we nt to action sta tions. Fiftee n m inu te s late r lo o kou ts o n
ERilll.....81s.MAR CK T O
P F AHl
,
....._
H ARHOR_
t 'n nceof lH,les sig hted Bisnutrcl: anti Prins:EU}WII o n th e hori zon. At this cruci al stage. as the y
app roac hed striking range of th e e nemy. Admiral Holl and el e cted ro ma ke
I\\'O
s uc cessive
alterations. 'n t is was a lmost certainly to prot ect Hood frOTH long -range plunging fire. hu t in a battl e wh ere second.. would pron : vital . this had the effect of placing both Hoot! and Prince of \\"(//('$ o n a heading wh e re they would he able to lise o nly their fo rwar d gu ns . l.utje ns, o n
<:O U fX'
the o the r h a nd , wou ld h e a b le to h ring a ll h is g uns to bea r o n th e e nemy. To co mpound H6!i ;l mJ's difficulties. he called for fir e to he con centrated on the lead enemy sh ip w hich he believed was Btsmarcls. It was , in fact, Prin z Hugel!.
The British ships o pene d fire at 5.52 a.m.. the Ge rma ns a minute late r. The first o f man y dead ly accu rate she lls ca used g ian t co lumns of w hite wate r to e rupt sli~h tly ahead an d 10 starboard of Hood As she stea med through this d ren ching ca scade, Bismarclsw second salvo straddled her, with she lls falling e ithe r sid e of the ship. At the same time. Pri us: Eug eu had a lso tak en o n Hoo d as her target. Prinz ElIge,"s third sa lvo hit Hood s boat deck. sta rting a fire among ready-to-use a mmunition . Meanwhile, r~ili zing her initial identity e rro r. Prince (1 \Fales co ncentrated her fire o n Bismarck. At 6 a.m.. Admiral Holland signalled
~1 .20-degrt..~
turn to port to e nable both British ships
to bring their aft ermost guns to bear o n Btsmarcl: At almost the same moment, Btsmarcli« fifth
sa lvo hit lIood - with catastro p hic re su lts. A cu rio usly noisel ess e xp losio n occ ur red in the vicini ty of her mainmast, then ~I sheet o f flam e jabbed into the sky . repl ace d in seconds by a mass of da rk smo ke . lIood s after magazines had hio wn up. shatte ring the after pa n o f her hull , an d wit hin three min ute s she had d isappe ared. Th e last sight o f this great ship was her bo w that hrie lly rose to Ille ve rtica l position before vanis hing into the sea . Prin ce ofwales. o nly
L~ . . -111'
.......
_
.-._
Framed by twin t s -tncn gun s, the British battlecru iser Hood photograp hed in Scapa Flow in August 1940.
14 1
..I.t~-
142 .:: - ......
An artist's impression of
Hood's last moments. As the bettiecru iser 's after magazines explode blowing her in tw o, the
1llE-lliIIIJL.E5llll!5 T il E H AI TI ES Il I P S
abo ut 1000 ya rds (900 metres ) o n I/oods starbo ard q ua rte r, was forced
10
turn
10
avo id he r
w rec kage. Of the e n tire crew, o n ly three survi ved . Ted Brigg s. ord inal)" sig nalman o n th e com pass platfo rm o f lI J\l S Hood w he n she ex ploded . reca lls the te rrible incid e nt:
Prince of Wales is forced to manoeuvre violen tly to avoid
'No w . th e first th in g I s aw wa s fo u r g iga nt ic stars s ta nd o ut fro m the s ide of he r
passing through the wreckage .
IIJism a r cA1. like red , ye llow w ith a red inse t. and a little tiny do t in the midd le . and we
s ud d e n ly reali ze that these a rc I S-in ch she lls a nd the y a rc com ing o u r w ay. The first s a lvo we n t over a nd it was just like th e so u n d o f a h lo o d y e x p re ss tra in roa ring overhe ad . The second salvo fell s ho rt; I co u ld sec the sp las hes. The th ird salvo h it at the base o f the main mast. \Ve could n't see beca use the co m pass platfo rm wa s e nc losed Inn we were all th ro w n off o ur feet. Th e sq ua dron g u n ne ry o ffice r. Co mm a nde r G regso n, went o ut o n
to
the wi ng of the co m pass plat fo rm , looked an , came h ack wi th a rat he r
fix ed g rin on h is face, s aying s he'd be e n h it at th e base of the ma in m as t a nd th at there was a fire rou nd th e 4-inc h ready-use lo cke rs. Th is w as th e secondary ar ma ment a m m u n itio n for im me d iat e use . So the ca p tain o rde re d tha t th at fire s ho u ld h e left u nt il a ll th e am m u n itio n had heen ex pended . and that th e peo p le in rluu area sh o u ld tak e cove r. The nex t sa lvo, I d id n't h ea r it, d id n 't he ar a ny th ing . h ut I th in k it mu st have go ne throug h the s potting top without ex plo d ing , because Ihe mid sh ipma n we nt o ut o n to the b ridg e a nd there was a lieutena nt w ho had falle n dow n, No w we kn ew eve ry o ffice r in the s h ip h ut yo u co u ld n't reco gn ize him , no face . and no ha nds , just two stripes tha t s ho wed w ho he wa s, ' He [Ad m ira l Ho lla nd] turne d to h ring th e afte r g u ns in to act io n , and it w as then th at the next o ne hit. Now, aga in w e we re th ro w n off o ur fee t h ut whe n I go t up I hea rd no ex plos ion, no explo sion at all. all I saw was a gigantic shee t o f name , w h ich seemed [0
shoot ro u nd th e side o f th e co mpass platform. And it was just like bei ng in a vo rtex
ERO~LBl.S.!lARC.KJ
lLU Ttl P E AllLJEl.AllilOJL AR l I IA R RO R
. . . . . . . . .• . . .
really; you fe lt it was goi ng ro u nd , She had sta rted listing to sta rboa rd ami she'd g( )fll." ab out 10 o r 12 deg rees, I s up pose, w he n she righ ll'd he rself and at the sa me time the coxswa in ca lled u p the vo ice p ipe, "Steeri ng gea r gone , sir," And the cap ta in o rdered ch ange over to emerge ncy conn ing, An d it wa s as tluu o rde r ca me th ai she sta rted go ing ove r to po rt. Now she had go ne about 30 or , jO degfl..'es, I su p pose, whe n we realized s he jus t wasn't com ing hack. 'And the re was no orde r to ge l into a hun ch, it just wa sn 't necessary, no tim e , and we started to get over the star boa rd do o r o f the com pass pla tform a n d I got th ere a n d Com ma nder G re gso n w as just g oi ng
out
in front o f
me . Co m ma nder \Varrt:n , the n avigating o ffice r, stood 10 o ne s ide . to let me go th ro ugh , I'd go ne d o wn the lad d er to the Admira l's b rid ge bu t halfway down the ladder we we re level w ith the water a nd s ubme rged. Now I knew tha t there was th e d ec k h ead o f the ladde r ab ove me a nd I was
try ing
10
sw im a he ad from it as fast as I cou ld ,
'And I felt m ysel f b ei ng dr agged d o wn , I got to th e stage w here I jus t co uld n't ho ld it any mo re and yo u started .. , it was q uiet res igna tion actua lly. It was th e n that I sudd e nly see med to shoot to the s urface , I ca me up o n the
po rt s ide and I looked a ro und and ther e she was. ve rtica l in the wat e r, about 50 ya rds a way a nd B turret wa s just goi ng un de r, I pan icked and I tu rned
a nd swa m as fas t as I cou ld a way from her. Whe n I lo oked aro und ag a!n s he 'd go ne , h ut the re was a fire o n the water w here s he 'd been , Now th e wate r was abo u t 4 inches thick w ith o il and ag ai n I panicked , I turned again and swa m .
Able seaman Ted Briggs was on
Whe n I loo ked around agai n. the fire had gone o ut and over o n th e o the r s ide I cou ld
the bridg e of Hood when she was
sec the o the r two people : m idsh ipman Du ndas, w ho had bee n o n the com pass pla tform
sunk. He was one of only three
w ith me , and Bo h Tilburn , the able sea ma n w ho had bee n o n the boar d eck wh e re all
men to survive her rapid sinking,
the ca rn age was go ing o n, And we were the o nly th ree pe o ple in s ig ht, no body e lse ca me u p, no t at all .' Th e thr ee su rvivors eac h ma nage d to ding to o ne of th e dozens o f sma ll .3·foo t (9 0- on) sq ua re raft s ih.u had float ed o ff Il ood as she sa n k. Gre at s heets o f o il we re ablaze a nd . for a mo me nt , fire th reate ned
10
e ng u lf the th ree d azed sailors as they d u ng d esp e rately
10
th e rafts. Afte r fo ur Photograph ed from Prinz Eugen,
Bismarck fires a salvo during the engagement with Hood and Prince of Wales,
143
hou rs o f th is living hel l. de stroyer numb er H27, Eloctra. sig htcd the trio , cut her engine s and, w ith sc ram bli ng net s ove r the side , gl ided up to the raft s . In his hook , FllIp,ship /food, Ted Briggs describes the moment: A rop.... sa iled into the air in my d irection , Although I co uld not fe e l m y fing ers, I so me ho w I ma naged to cling o n to it. A man ye lle d unn ....cessa rily at me from the scra mb ling net , 'Do n't let go o f it.' I e ven had the heart to reto rt. 'Yo u be t yo ur blood y life I won 't.' Yet I was too exha us ted to haul myself in and climh thc net. Afte r nearl y fo ur ho urs in the s....a m y e mo tions we re a mess. Tears of frustration rolled do w n my o ilca ke d c hec ks again , for rescue w as so close and I co uld no t hel p mysel f. I nccd not have worried, Several sea me n dropped into the water, a nd w ith o ne ha nd on the ne ts they got me alongsid e a nd ma nh a nd led me up to the be nt g uard-rail. which had be e n bat te red hy the sto rm, and into tht: wai st o f the Electra. With Hood gone, Btsnu trcls an d Pr i nz Hup,ell shifted lire to Pr i nce (!/ \r't",les, .lust after () a .m.. Commande r-in-C hief of the Tovey beneath the 14-inch guns
w ith the range clo wn to IH,OOO ya rds (16,4 60 me tres) and falling, the British battleship received a di rect hit o n the co m pas s p latform , ki lling a lmost everyo ne there wit h the e xce ptio n o f Capta in Leach , \'Q"ith o ne gun out of actio n in 'A' tur ret. a nd her a ft tur ret to tally ino pe rative ,
of his flagship King George V.
Leach w isel y turn ed h is battles h ip awa y. The first phase of the an ion was
Home Fleet Admiral Sir John
O\' Cf.
Bismarck
had won a magn ifice nt victo ry in destroying Ilood and heat ing off Britain's ne west hat tlcxhip. Lut jcns had the opportunity 10 pursu e the damaged Prince 0/ wales but he decided to re s u me his o rig ina l cou rse . Bismarc:lis ca pta in, Ern st Lindema nn , to ta lly d isagre ed with l.utjenx a nd later, when he he ard the news, Hitler W~I S furiou s w ith the decision to b rea k off the e ngagement . Th e cru ise rs SOI/olk and Suffott: and the damaged Prince (!l \\'lll lt'S lo o k o n the tas k o f shadowi ng Bisma rck im me d iate ly s he w ithdrew from the battle. Bismarcle had recei ved o nly th ree di rect hits, ca using relat ive ly mi nor damage: o ne s he ll
h ~J(J
pene trat e d
the una rmou red forward pa ri of th e s h ip 's hull. all owing seawater to co nta m inate abo ut 1000 to ns of fuel : a not he r ex p lo ded o n the torpedo bulkhead . l'~ l us i ng fl ooding in the generator and boi ler rooms . Th e damage made Liitje ns decide to cancel Rhemubung and head fo r the dockyards at St Naz aire o n the Fren ch Atla ntic coast. To e na ble som e elements o f the o rig ina l o pe ratio n 10 proceed . Lutje ns detach e-d Pr i ll z h'UJ,WII wi th inst ru ctio ns to proceed in to the Atlan tic a nd to act ind epende ntl y. As Prinz J£lIg en c ha nged co u rse, Bismarck b riefly turn e d a bo ut to Fire a fe w sa lvoes : 1( her dist ant
shad owc rs. lIood s loss w as broadca st to a stunned British p ub lic o n the mo rn ing of 24 xtay. It was conside red a natio nal disaster, and Church ill issued inst ruction s to 'Sink the tstsmarck at a ny co st.' Admi ral Sir John To ve y, Co m mande r-in-Ch ie f o f the Ho me Fleet , ca lled on the fu ll m ight o f the Ro yal Na vy to s to p
Bismarck. Baul e xhips a nd cr uisers we re re -ro uted int o the o pera tional a rea incl uding the 16 -in ch (406 -m m) gu nned Rodney. then about 550 miles
10
the so uth-e ast. Tovey . in Ki ng
......_IIiZ .. •. . .'''tr
E.R.illUllSAIARCK....IlLUARLJUA.R.ElliJlL T O pEA R I II A R n OR
Geo ruo V in co mpa ny w ith Repu lse a nd Victorious, was over 300 m iles to the so uth-cast steaming at high speed to inte rcept the Ge rman battles hip , In a n atte mp t to s low the escaping
Bismarck, Tovey d ispa tche d a lliglll of Swordfish a nd Fulma r bo mbers fro m the ne w carrier Victorious. Flying throu gh atroci o us weather, the aircraft ma de an attack o n Bism arck short ly af te r midn ight. Th e slo w, lum hering torpedo bo mbers pr esse d home th eir attac k ag ai ns t accurate anti-ai rcraft fire at a speed of o nly R5 kn ots. O ne to rpedo hit squa re on the battleshi p's armoured belt. hut ha d neg ligible effect o n the sh ip 's p rog ress. Pat j ack son pilot ed o ne o f th e Swordfish in th is attack: 'Abo u t h al f-w ay betwee n the Prin ce of wales a nd th e Bismarck, we s ud de n ly saw a nother s h ip w hic h lo oked like a very w h ite litt le yacht, w hic h turn ed out
10
h e an
Ameri can coastguard vesse l ca lled stedocle. \Ve carried o n, hy which tim e th e Bismarck had s ighted us and so we were ap proachi ng an e nemy tha t was already forewa rned and fo rea rmed . She o pened fire at q u ite lo ng ra nge a nd these black p uffs began to ap pea r
Vic e-Admiral Gunter Lutjens was
a ll ro und o ne. lt was no t pleasant becau se in a n open cockpi t no t o n ly d o yo u see these
chosen to command the
thi ngs hut yo u a lso sme ll th em w he n th e y go off. Rath e r am us ing, because my friend,
battle ship Bismarck and heavy
wh o wa s in th e back sca t w h ile a ll thi s ma yh em was going o n , tapped me o n th e
cruiser Prinz Eugen in 'Operation
s h o u ld e r a nd I th ou ght , "Go o d God Almi gh ty, w ha t's h appened?" Becau se o ne of
Rhine " the raid into the Atlantic
these things had gone off fairly close a nd I th ought. "O h God, so rncbody's been hurt o r I've lo st th e tail or so mething." I sa id, "\Vhat is it?" And
to sink British shipping.
he said , "Ha p p y b irthd ay, Pat. " It w a s my birthda y at midnigh t o n th e 25lh o f Ma y w hen we were going down to attac k th e thing. And I thoug ht, "\'('hat a ca lm little sod yo u arc!" 'We we nt in line abreas t, over th e wa te r about 30 fe et , a n d whe n w e consi de re d we we re w ith in rang e we d ropped th e to rpedoes. Th e Bism arck was tak ing evasive ac tio n and so it was quite diffi cult to gauge ho w far ah ead o ne s ho uld aim wit h the rudimenta ry gauge tha t we had for thi s . Ho we ver, o nce a to rpedo's gone, yo u d o n't han g arou nd an d yo u're o ut o f it as q u ick as yo u ca n. Th e o ther two a ircra ft ha d go ne quite a \vay ah ead o f me and I thin k
Bismarck was fir ing so m e ve ry h ea vy arma men t - and I remember those s he lls we re co m ing d o wn , rai sin g ve ry large co lu mns o f wa te r w hic h would have been fata l if yo u fle w into them.' At about 3 a. m . Bismarck made a s harp tu rn to starboa rd a nd s ucce e d ed in th row ing o ff the s ha dowing s h ips. Tovey se nt ships a n d a ircra ft in eve ry d ire ctio n to try a n d lo cate her. Around mi d -m orning . a cting o n an in stinct th at Bisma rck wou ld he heading north-ca st for th e tccland- Pae ro es pa ssage , To vey turned his sh ips aro u nd and headed in tha t dire ction, h u t Bismarck cont in ued to he ad so u th-cast fo r St Nazai re . At 6 o 'clock tha t even ing Tovey rea lized his m ista ke , an d alte red co urs e to th e south-east. British hopes o f catch ing B ismarcle were begin n ing to fad e . For his part , Lutjens lo o k a very d espai rin g v iew o f Bismarctss cha nce of surviva l. At noon o n 25 May, his birthday, he ad dressed the cre w to th ank the m for thei r kind wishe s.
145
•
•
D
•
•
•
'Sighting the Bismarck - the
At the sa me tim e he gav e a bleak assessment o f the length s the British would go to dcstroj
Beginning of the End, North
the m. With that news, the e upho ria am o ng the Ge rma n sa ilo rs th.u had follo wed the sinkin; of f l ood eva po rated . Th roughout 26 May, Bisma rck ste amed through an apparently empty ocea n , At 1O..~O a .m
Atlantic 1030 hours, 26 May 1941 ', Aller the sigh ting by an
RAF Catalina. it was only a matter of time before the British attack forc e arrived to destroy the powerful German battleship. (painting by Robert Taylor,
reproduced co urtesy of the Military Gallery. Bath, UK.)
an RA F Catalina o n pat rol spotted the fleei ng Ge rman battleship . With heavy flak lX'ing tlun, skywa rds fro m Bismarck, th e Cata lina radioed off a positio n re po rt. Imm e d iatel y this news reached Tovey, he knew that unless Bismarck cou ld he slowed down she would rea ch the safety of a French port late the follo wing day, Thei r o ne hope res ted with Force II, steaming north of Gibral ta r and o nly about 60 miles to the cast of Bismarck. Tovey ordered this force w hich includ ed the ca rrie r Ark Royal, the battlecru ise r penou-n, a nd the cru iser Sbeffietd to alte r cou rse a nd tak e up the chase. By m id a fte rnoon, Sheff ield had located Bismarck and hac res umed shadowing the batt lesh ip . Just before 3 p .m., a nig ht o f fourtee n Swo rdfis h ror pcdc bombers le ft Ark Roy a l in a troc io us wea the r condi tio ns in w ha t cou ld hav e be en the last o p portu n ity to crip p le Bisma rck. Through a b latant case o f mista ken identi ty , Ihe a ircraft executed their attack no t on Bisma rck hut on the ha pless cruiser Sheffield. No to rpedoes hit. Anot her strike of fi ftee n Swordfish took off s hortly after 7 p .m . 111is was the last opportunity before Bi:sma rcls reached safe wa ters . After a just-on two-hou r nigh t, the double-wi nged sing lee ngi ned ai rc raft, look ing like re lics from a bygone age, sta rted the ir attack . Of thirteen torpedoes launched at Bismarck, tw o hit, o ne o n th e a rmoured side amids hips and one af close 10 the s hip's rudders. Th e hit amids hips had little e ffec t, hut th e o ther would prove tc he a di saste r for Bismarck as the fo rce o f th is ex plosion jammed ho th he r rudde rs. Despi te
..__"'_ 147
~_IIIIIIi.IilIlllIA~
ERO .\lJl15MARCK..:fiLl'.EARLllARnOR.-
desperate attempts to free the m , Bismarclsvcs» un able
10
stee r ot her than to describe wide a nd
po intless circles in wha t would soon he a hostile sea. W'jlh e ve ry minute that passed. British heavy units were co nverging on th e lu ckless Bismarck.
Through the night o f 26 xtay. five British destroyers har ried the stricken battleship with a se ries o f torpedo attacks. Whl le none h it. the crew o n Bismarck. demoral ized and worn o ut. awai ted the fate th e y kn ew the morning light would hring. As dawn broke. the battleship Kill}!, GeOl"'}.:(, \ : with Nodm:l' close aste rn. appeared o ver the horizon. 111C old banlccnnscr Rodney.
sis te r ship o f lIood . was under th e comma nd o f Ca ptai n Dalrymple -Hamilton and. as luck would have it. his son was serving as a mid..hipman in o ne of the ti-inch (3 55-mm) gun turrets o n Kill;': Gem/.w I: In his first naval hattie, young midsh ipman Dalrymple-Hamilton had the ('(>mfO J1 o f having his fath e r not far away: 'It was a great comfo rt to sec those I6-indl l-ltxi-mml guns coming along behind you and. as a hoy . a young midshipman, to think my father was driving along just astern wa s an od d sensation. Moreo ver, w hen we sig hted the Blsmarcls cm the morning of the 27th a nd S~I W th o se enormous mu shrooms of fla me com ing o ut o f he r we a ll, to a ma n said , ~ I hope she's firing at th e Roduey.: And th en I thought, H\X'e ll, I s hou ldn't be th inking that - the o ld man's in Rodll C!l ~ ' The g unnel)' duel began at Rti7 u.m. British br oadca ster and autho r Ludovi c Kenned y was a torpedo office r o n the British destroyer 7{111ar du ring th is last e pic hallie with Bisnmrcls: 'W hen the J{O{lJlL:)' nnd the Kil1~ Geml{L' Vho th o pe ned fire . the th ing I remember at the time we re the co lour contrasts. the hrow n sight of the cordite from the g uns, the green o f the sea w ith little while cu px. the blue h its o f sky, and the s he ll sp las hes, As I sa id in my hook . "hig h as Hiltons. white as doves" - I00 feet high , e no rmous s he ll splashes, and then the blackness o f Bismarcle. and the greyness o f the British s hips . And we just sat hack a nd wa tched.' t tismarct; mo ving e rratical ly at 10 knots, opene d fire on Rodm:v, But the British s hips be gan
to score numerous hits and , hy 9 a .m ., lJismarck's fo rward tu rrets had been sile nced. Half a n hour ti ter. he r afte r turrets were also o ut of act ion. and the British s hips ca rried o ut target pra ctice at d ose ra nge .
:1
form of
Douglas Turtle was a young sa ilor o n hoa rd K i l1R Ge'Of].W "during the ha ttie w ith Bisnmrctc His action station was th e I-t -inch <355-mm) director contro l tu rret , right in the highest pa n of the ship: "\X'ht..'n we sigillt..'d the Bismarck, th e gun layer in fron t o f me wa s sh aki ng so mu ch the o the r gun layer sh out ed to him . -Co mc o n, get o n targ et!" So I jumped up a nd put my arms ar ound him to st op h im from sh ak ing an d J held o n to h im unti l th ey go t svn chroni zcd. a nd when yo u syn chroni ze two gun layers, that's when the g unnery office r fires the guns. "cling ding - boomph". .. hell o f a blast. 'The n I sa w those shells coming towards us , a nd as they passed us they went zzzzt, and tht..')' wen t between the funnel and the ma st. the four shells, and I thought. "The ne xt o nc s com ing right here" - because Bismarcls» just sunk the Hood. and hit the / 'I1I1C<, (if Wales. But then o ur next sa lvo. I can sec it now, hit Bis marcte o n the forecast le and her anchor cha in w e nt up just like a W:l1d1 chain, just like tha t, I ca n always sec that. And then Ro{b l (:l ' fired and hit he r o n the b ridge.' Above decks. Htsmarcls was red uced to a mass of twisted steel. Despi te this ca rnage, the ship
re fused 10 sink. At 10,25 the cr uiser Dorsetsbirc se nt tw o torpedoe s into he r starboa rd side a nd o ne into he r po rt s ide . Th e g re at s h ip fina lly ro lle d o ve r a nd sa n k at 10 .40 a .rn. Of a new of over 2200. o nly 115 were rescued .
'Launch Against the Bismarck'. One of fifteen Fleet Air Arm
Otto Pet er s. a yo u ng e ng ine-room a rtifice r o n Bismarck. recalls the horror o f th e last mom ents of his stricke n ship:
torpedo-carrying Swordfish aircraft leaving the heaving flight deck of the catTier Ark Royal on the strike that would cripple
Bismarck. (Painting by Robert Taylor, rep roduced courtesy of the Milita ry Gallery. Bath, UK.)
'At about 10 o 'clock we had so man y hit" th at the ca ptain, o r the first officer, ordered, "Eve rybod y a ba ndo n ship, lea ve th e ship." I was in th e e ngine room a nd si nce we started in Hamburg with this ship we kn ew it so we ll and co uld esca pe without lights. And besid es that , we had th e too ls (0 o pe n a ll th e d oors . Th er e were eig ht decks which I had to go through from the e ngine room to the upper deck . I ca me to the last deck , w hich is ca lled the batt e ry deck or the up per de ck . In this deck, the ligh ts and everything we re out a nd I was under wate r about to my kn ees . Then we go t hit in this co mpartme nt, a heavy hit, bu t I wasn 't hun, I would say it's luck. I tried to go to this bulkhead door and o pen it - ev eryth ing was d ark , but I managed to o pe n it abou t o ne foot wide. Now I co uld sec da ylight , bu t I co uld n't ge t throu gh the door. '\Ve had o ur leather e ngine -roo m clo thing on, so I threw away my leather jacke t 10 ge t th rou gh this bulkhead door. And then I was o n the up pe r deck wh ere it was c<X>1. But hundreds a nd hundreds o f my sh ipmates wer e lyin g in blood . The turr e ts wer e croo ked, and three-quarter s o f the ship was undernea th the sea a lready, I tried to sta y as long as possib le o n th e upper deck, but th e waves we rt: go ing over the ship. The second wave took me o ut. I S;;I W the sh ip destro yed... almost e verything was destroyed . ""e ll. being in th e sea, I tried to get away from the ship as qu ickly as possible , a nd it was ra ining, and storm y you wo uldn 't believe it, hu t anyway, o ne tries to live. But, let me ex plain first, I saw the ship going down, going do wn upside-down . 'Th e screws we nt first , a nd the n the bow o f the sh ip . It we nt do wn tha t wa y, and even toda y I ca n ma ke a p icture o f it in my head. So , afte r this ex perie nce , I sw am, I knew I cou ld n't sw im to Ge rma ny - impo ssible . So , in the wat er I kept mo vin g little hit , just to stay in good co nd ition . I saw a ship a nd I tried to sw im 10 it, a nd I cou ld sec th e Un ion Jack , a nd kn ew it mu st he a British sh ip. I th ou ght to myself, "The y're going to kill us in th e water. " That's wh at I th ou ght, but o n co ming closer to th e sh ip I saw th e ro pes - do w n the shi p's s ide, a nd the n I th ou ght , "The y're goi ng to pi ck us up." And so I ca me o n th e sh ip a nd the se British shipmates were great , I mu st say that .' Controve rsy still surrounds th e strong suggestions mad e th at , in th e e nd , th e Bismarck was scutt led , rather than sunk by British gunfire and torpedoes alon e. There is no do ubt that the ship was sink ing and , if the crew did set o ff scuttling charges , their actio n o nly accelerated the sinking process, rath er tha n initiating it. Her figh t to the deat h has assu red Bismarck a special p lace in nava l histo ry hu t, according to Ger man naval histo rian Dr Michae l Epkanhans, Admi ral Lutje ns had little cho ice in this matte r: 'The se lf-destructio n o f the Gruf Spee was a se rious shoc k 10 the naval co mmand as well as 10 Hitler. It reminded them o f the eve nts of 1919 lscunling o f interned High Seas fleet at Scapa Flow), so the o rders were given that a ll Ge rman warships had to fight 10 th e last shot - until th e y went d own in hatti e . They wer e lalso) forb idden to surrender to supe rior forces and that' s one of the rea sons \...·hy the Bisma rck foug ht until the very e nd instead of hoisting the white flag .' After the loss of Bisma rck, Hitler placed a se ries of co nd itions on the future operations of th e remaining ca p ital ships in th e Ge rma n fleet : no bauleshtps wer e allowed to e nte r th e Atlantic; action was not to be risked ag ainst equa l o r su~rior forces; battl eships would not so rtie where a British aircraft ca rrie r was pr esent; and finall y, the movement o f b attleships would he sub jec t to his pe rso nal approval. Opera tional freedom was totally d eni ed Admiral Raed e r, th e Co mma nde r-in-Ch ief of the Ge rma n Navy . And this was no t th e o nly d ifficu lty the Ge rman naval high co mma nd faced .
TilE RATTI ESIfIPS
Afte r the Enigma mach ine , the de vice used h y the Germans to encode mes sag es , wa s ca ptu red - a nd its sec re ts unra velled hy a n e xtraordi nary team o f code-b rea ke rs wo rking in abso lute secret at B1ctchle y Park in so uthe rn Eng land - the British were able to read almost all the Ge rman military inte lligence signals. From the summe r o f 1941 o nwards, all Ge rman naval code s co uld he decip hered and movement orde rs we re interce pted and pas sed on to the Admir.•rlry. The fact that thi s was happeni ng remain ed a se cret fro m the Ge rma ns for the
Shells from the Brit ish battleships Rodn ey and King George V faIJ round Bismarck in the final gunnery duel. Bismarck 's superstructure was pounded to a shambles before she sank.
entire period of the wa r. By the middle o f 1941, the U-IXJat wa r aga inst the British sup ply lines was sta rting to cut d eep into Britain 's ab ility to main tain its wa r ef fort bot h ab road a nd a t ho me . Hitle r had o bviously decid ed not to invade England , at least at this stage of the war. but instead, on 21 Ju ne, Ge rman troops invad ed Russia . Immediately, the who le co mp lex o f the war cha nged . Britain became loc ked into an alliance with Russia in the war agai nst the Axis powers Germany, Italy and , yet to sh ow its hand, Japa n. Cutting off the vital supply link to Great Britain, and to its a rmed forces a nd allies in Europe and the Medit er ran ean , remain ed the ma jor challenge facing the Ge rma n Navy. The U-boats wer e do ing a grea t job, but the y need ed more suppo rt from their navy's big-gun ships wh ich co uld sta y at sea for long peri od s, a nd in all weath ers. At the e nd of 19,j l , [he batt leships Scha r nh ors t a nd Gneisenau were still at Brest , o n the French Atla ntic. Raeder wanted to se nd both ships on sorties against British su pply ships o pe rating between the ~ 1t.--J i t err.tnea n a nd Britain. Thei r loca tion at Brest was perfect fo r th is, bu t Hitle r refused to give his approva l and insisted that bo th battleships return immedia tely to Ge rmany or face having their armament rem ov ed a nd used e lse whe re . According ly, a p la n was developed 10 return Scb a r nborst, Gnctsc n au an d the heavy cruiser Prtnz EURen to Ge rmany. The most da ring as pec t of the plan was to do the unth inkabl e: sail the th ree ships and their esco rts through the English Cha nnel un der the ve ry noses o f the British. On the night of 11 February, in dismal weather and poor visibility, the Ge rman ships left Brest a nd stea med into the Cha nnel at high speed . In a ra re demo nstrati on o f inter-servi ce co-ope ration, the Luftwaffe prov ided co nsta nt air cove r for this audacious sonic. Through Ultra
ER(llJLli~lAIl..C.11L1:lLeE
sufficient d a mage to p rev en t them ma king it safely back to Ge rma ny. Fo r the Ge rma ns, it was a majo r propaganda co up; while for the British it brought sharp cr iticism of their armed forces that su ch a powe rfu l fleet of e ne my ships cou ld sa il through th e Eng lish Chan nel to safety without receivin g so much as a scratch from the local defen ce force s. \'<'ithin da ys of returning to Ger many , a heavy Allied bombing raid ove r Kid inflicted se ve re damage to Gneiseuau. Her 'A' turret was co mp letely b urn t-out and the forward structure o f the ship lxtdly buckled . \'<'ith Gneisenuu completely disabled, o nly two fully operational battleships remained. Tirpitz and Scbaruborst. Almost since the day th e war began. the United Sta tes had been ac tively, bu t u no fficia lly, supporting Britain with vital wa r su p plies , and at eve ry o pportu nity Prime Minister Churchill co ntinued to pressure Presid ent Theod ore Roo sevel t for eve n greater su pport. ln August 19·11 Churchill had crossed the Atlantic o n boa rd the battleship Prin ce a/ With'S. for d iscussions with Roo se velt that wo uld lead to the 'Le nd Lease ' arra nge me nts. In these , the US wou ld su pp ly Britain with all the wa r goo ds she need ed o n a 'leas e' hasis, payment beco ming due on ly at the e nd o f the war. The US was now on ly o ne ste p awa y fro m jo in ing Britain as a n ally in the war. The e ve nts that wo uld trigger tha t a llia nce we re just four mo nth s away. w hen th ey came, they would be initiated not hy th e Europ ean wa r machine hut by the long-pe rceived e ne my o f the US in the Pacific - Japan. \'<'ith the Euro pean powe rs utte rly abso rbed in th e wa r raging in th e west , J apan was presented wit h a n un rivalled opportuni ty to realize its im peria l am bitions in the Pacific. Although Brita in was not yet be ate n . she was under e no rmous p ressure and , w ith her navy so overstretched. it wo uld be almos t impo ssible to spa re a ny British forces to que ll Japa nese aggression in the Asia-Pacific a rea. In Ju ly 1940 Ja panese troops had occ upied Fren ch Indo-China , or Vietn am as it is now called - an invasion co ndemned by the western po wers includ ing the United States . Japanese impe rial ob jectives were mot ivated hy a very basic co nside ration: the o ngo ing and unrestricted sup ply o f vital raw materi a ls, includ ing o il, need ed to maintain and expand its fast-growi ng indu strial empir e. Follow ing its invasion o f Indo-China, western powers placed embargoes on the ex po rt of o il and steel to Japan. ThL' j apa ne se view o f th is act o f wes tern imperia lism was that it made wa r not just ine vitable. hut necessa ry . Accordingly. the japan ese m ilitary strategists put th e final to uc hes o n their plans for wa r during late 1940 and 1941. To stab ilize its military po sition in north ern Asia, in April 1941 Japan signed a non-agg ression pact with its traditional e ne my, the Sov iet Union. But at this stage Japan had a lready e ntered a treaty of mutual assistance and frien dsh ip with Nazi Ge rma ny and fascist Ital y and was the th ird member of the Axis po wer that Britain was at war with in Europe . TIle Axis alliance was a stra nge mix o f bedfellows . as "l ark Peante . of the Hoover Institutio n on \,
'...a,,__ ..__~
-----,..._m ..
151
I think the j ap ane se saw the Tripartite Pact
~IS ~I
weapon. Th e y saw it as
~I
diplomatic
weapon to keep the United States in check. It wa s a very bad mi.. .rake o n behalf of the japanese.'
\'{'ith the war in Europe going ex tre mely we ll for its a llies , a nd the British wa r effort bein g stre tch ed to the limits for the very su rvival o f Britain an d its empire , the time was right for Japan to make a move. TIle one nat ion that . . tood in the way of these ambitions was the United Stales. Th e Japanese milit ary expans ionist strategy in the Asia-Pacific recogni zed this situation. and the ir ultimate plan wou ld be based o n a gamble. A pr o tracted " tar aga inst the Unite d States would he ;1 lost war, and the enormous industrial . . trcngth alone of the US would inevitably o ve rwhelm Ja pan. A wa r, the re fo re , would ne ed to be decisive. It wou ld need to deliver a crippling blow that would brea k the resolve of the US, or at leas t fo rce it to recognize Japan's infl uence in the Pacific. fundament al to the Japanese plan was its Impe rial Nary. Its insatiabl e need s fo r o il to fuel the d iesel engines o f its giant halli e fleet posed majo r problems for the island nati o n w ith no natural o il resources o f its o wn. Mark Pcattic. 'TIle ironic f3(1 wa s that 3 large proportion o f Japanese naval fuel in the 1920s and 30s ca me from the Un ite d States. He re was your hypoth etical enemy. who was th e chief supplier of your pe trol eu m. The y tried o the r sources, for example British North Borneo , the y tried the pr oduction o f syn thetic fuels w ith modest success. but it wasn't e no ugh. Ce rtainly not e no ug h to meet the demands o f the japanese Navy o nce it started stea ming o ut to sea and e ngaging o ppone nts . So the co nce rn for o il wns a very great o ne, an d tha t's wh y in the 1930s in the n;lvy yo u increasingly had those voices be ing raised for Japan ese involv em ent in so uth-cast Asia - particularly in the Dutch E.ISt Ind ies with its rich petroleum re so urce s , whe re the Ja panese ultima tely hoped salvat ion.'
10
find the ir fuel
To safeguard a southern thrust towards Java and Su ma tra in the o ld Dutch East Indies, now Ind onesia. the Japan ese would ne ed to es tablis h permanent base s o n the rou te sou thwards. Th e US Philippines, and British -controlled Malaysia . stood in thei r w ay . O f these two weste rn po wers, the Unites States repre sented the ma jor stumb ling b lock in the Japane se plan s: the US Pacific Fleet would have to be deal t with for the plans to succeed. In the summe r of 1940 th is powerful fle et ha d be e n mo ved fro m its ba se in San Pedro. California , to Pearl Har bor o n the Island of Oahu in the Hawai ian Islan d grou p in the Pacific. This move had been maul.' as a clear warning slgnal to Japa n. The initia l Japanese maste r-p la n had been to dra w the US flee t to sea by attac king the Philippin es. we aring it dow n by submari ne and ai r atta ck as it made its wa y no rth-westwards across the Pacific , a nd the n dest royin g the mu ch -d epl et ed fleet in a de cisive. he ad-to -head action with the full might o f the Japa ne se hatt ie fleet. In this batt le . the two s uper-ba ttleships }'all/flf o and Jlusflsbi wo uld prove the 'trump ca rds' that wo uld e ns ure victory for Japa n. Japan es e thin king mov ed to u ri a me nded plan , a plan to ig nite the wa r in the..' Pacific by launch ing a d ra matic a nd de va stating hi o w to th e US Pacific Fle e t - a lightn ing a irborne attack o n its base at Pea rl f larbor, Maste rminded by Iso roku Ya mam oto . Comma nd er-in-Chief of the Imperia l J apan e se Navy , the Ja panese st rike fo rce unde r th e co mma nd o f Ad m ira l xagumo le ft Japa nese wa ters o n 26 Novembe r 194 1. The force included six fleet ca rrie rs carryi ng 423 a ircraft. At thi s time , the Japan e se Navy po ssessed the best trained and most effic ient ca rrie r-borne airflcet in th e world. O n the morning o f Sunday 7 Decembe r. the fleet was about 275 miles o ff Ha wa ii. At 6 a.m ., the first a ircraft too k off from th e carrier Aka!.:i. The first wave cons isted o f fifty h igh -le vel bom he rs , fort y to rp edo pl an e s , fifty-one di ve -
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bom be rs and forty- th ree fight ers. Soon after, a furthe r 171 attack ai rcraft took off to form the second wave. As the Japa ne se airc raft ma de their w ay to Hawaii. the: US Pacific FIe:L,t, co m prising nin ety-fou r wa rships , wa s moored in ne at line s off Ford Islan d . At 7.55 a.rn . the first aircraft a rrived and the ca rnage began , Richa rd Fish' , ma rine bugler on th e ba n k-ship USS l Fest vtrgtnto. wa s a t his post whe n the: firs t wa ve of bo mbers struck : 'About five minutes to eight. I sounded first call for colours and that 's as far as I got. About th irty o r fo rty seconds later, her e comes these airplanes. The first o f them circled and we ke pi look ing at them. They ca rne a nd dropped th ei r tor pedoes. Th re e h it the \\"'eSI v'ir gi n i« . Two hit th e Otelabonm. And w e wonde red , "What in the heck a re the y doing us ing live: torpedoes?" All o f a sud de n o ur se rgea nt ca me u p . I lc was soaki ng wet a nd co ve re d w ith o il, he comes up a nd he says , "Get yo ur but ts to your battle s ta tions. we 're un der attack by the Japan e se ," I'm us ing the nice words , 'I went u p o n to the bridge at about eig ht o 'cloc k. Am i the n we took seve ra l mor e hits. At abou t five min ute s after eig ht, Ca ptai n Be nn ion ca me u p o n to the bridge a nd I stood hy, w aiting to sound a n)' ca ll for him. hu t the ship was alread y start ing to list as we had a bou t fo ur o r five torpe does in us by that time . And then a hom b hi t the numbe r two gun turn.. 1 o n the Ten nessee and tha t was about te n or twel ve: min utes utter eight. A hig piece of sh rap nel alm ost cu t o ur ca pta in in ha lf a nd we laid him down o n th e de ck a nd put him in o ne of the w ire stre tchers. Co m ma nder Hillcnkoc ttc r came u p o n to the bridge but there wasn't much we could do, he was so ha dly wou nded. The co m mande r looked at Capta in Benn io n lying o n the deck and sa id. "Sir, w hat a re my orders?" And the o nly thing the ca ptain said w as, "The shi p is yours, I'm no t going to ma ke it." Tw o o r thr ee minu tes afte r that he pa ssed away . ' Be fore we lett the bridge . the re we re so man y a irpla nes , o ne rig ht aft e r the o the r. Eve:r)' time: a to rpedo hit, the s hip jus t kind o f roc ked , And the n wh e n the A r izona ble w up , I never heard a nythi ng tha t lo ud in Illy life . A second wave o f pla nes started to co me in abo ut nin e o'clock . And eve n w hen we d ived off the s hip the)' were still dropping the ir bombs and strafing us. Th is th ing went o n fo r two hou rs. It wa s jus t constant. 'Afte r the attack w as ove r, it wa s ab out te n o 'clock, things got q uiet , except fo r thc burning a nd the: crackling o f the ships. And yo u stand around and loo k. That was wh e n it hit me : " f\. l y God , we 're in a war. we're in a wa r and we've lost it," becau se yo u see all the battlesh ips smo king and tha t's w hen it really hit me . And I just sat do wn a nd cr ied .' \,\'he n the atta ck was o ver, the ban le shtps Ariz ona, Ol sla boma, Nercu la, lfi'SI Virgi nia and
Californ i« had been sunk . staryland. Pennsytranta and Tennessee we re se rious ly damaged. Over 2·100 lost thei r lives in this atta ck, w hic h Preside nt Roos evelt re fe rred to as 'the da y of infam y'. It was an a mazing a nd fortunate co incide nce for the US Navy that the a ircra ft ca rrie rs attached to the Pacific Fleet were all at se a on the day of the attack.
Adm iral lsoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet and architect of the strike against the US Pacific Fleet a t Pearl Harbor.
153
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T H E HA T TI F S U IIJ S
The strick en ba ttleships Tennessee and West Virginia sunk at their moorings after the savage aerial attack fro m Japanese torp edo and
bombe r aircraft .
On Monday, 8 December 1941, the US Congress declared wa r on Japan . In respon se.jap an's allies, Ge rma ny and Italy, de cla red wa r on the United States . Th e US had now be co me the ally Britain so bad ly need ed in what was now a global war against the Axis powers. The attack o n Pearl Harbor was the first of a se ries of co- o rd inated lig htni ng strikes the Japanese wo uld make as they began (Q imple me nt their grea t plan o f co nq uest in the Pacific. O n H December, Ja panese invasion forces invaded the Philippines and Malaya. Gua m, \'(fake Island , the Gilbert Island s and Hong Kon g were also q uick to fall. Britain's bastion in the Pacific was centred on its large naval base in Singapo re, where a huge dry-dock had been built ca pable of hand ling the Royal Navy's largest battleships. Co mb ined British an d Austr alian military forces in Singa pore we re fu lly ex pe cted to halt any futu re j apan ese incursion that might happen in that regio n. Winston Churchill had moved to se nd a naval sq ua dron to Singa pore in the hope it w o uld ac t as a deter re nt to any tho ughts the Jap anese may have in the area. His assessment that a naval sq uadron wo uld be effec tive was a gro ss underestimation of the so phistication of the Jap anese wa r machin e tha t was poised to strike, and the fighting ab ility and strength of its army, navy and airforce pe rso nnel. Churchill's gesture wo uld prove bot h futile and disastrou s.
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In Nove mber, via a cha in of eve nts and aga inst Admiralty advice, the new hattleship Prince of \ril les was sent to join th e o ld battlecruiser Repuls e, alre ad y in th e Indi an Ocea n, with o rders to sail o n to Singapore. The two ca p ital shi ps under the co mma nd o f Admiral Tom Phillips, together w ith four d estro yers. a rrived in Singapore o n 2 December 194 1. They were greet ed with a blaze of puhlicity, specifica lly designed to se nd a warn ing ( 0 Japan. The British crews look ed forward ( 0 a relaxed leave in Singapo re. As the last few days of peace in the Far East slipped away. the Admi ralty in Lond on becam e increas ing ly ag ita ted about Pri nce of wales a nd Rep u lse. The y u rged Philli ps to ge t the m away from Sing apore. In the ea rly ho u rs of 7 Dece mb er, sho rtly befo re the attac k on Pearl Ha rbor, j apan ese tran sp orts di sembar ked troo ps o n the no rth-west coast of Malaya , about 400 m iles north of Sing apore . As the J a pa nese tro ops foug ht their wa y down th e Malaya n peninsula through alleged ly imp enetrabl e jungle , th e British po ndered what to d o with the ships . The dipl om at ic, warning effect o f their presence had counted for nothing. Now these ships would have to fight against impossible odd s, and with out aircove r. Ph illip s deci ded to tak e his sh ips , now named ' Fo rce Z', northwards at high speed to inte rcept and d isrupt the japanese invasion , On the evening of 8 December, Force Z sailed from Singa pore. Midshipman He nry Leach, later to becom e British Admira l o f the Fleet , Sir He nry Leach , was in Singapore se rving o n .1 ~l S Mau ritius wh en the two cap ital ships arrived: 'I had been a ppo inted to the Prince of wales , hut before I joined her, my father had been made ca p ta in , so I e nded up in the cru ise r Mauritius , w hic h in fact was in d ock in Singa po re naval base at the time the Prince of wales and Repulse came ou t for the ir final voyage . It had been a very puh lic voyage at every stage, round the Cape, at Mombassa, Colombo. then Singapore. Each stage was scheduled so the wo rld knew, and this was th ought to he a deterrent. So this brand-new ship , very powe rful , very ca pable, but
Flying the flag ot Admiral Tom Phillip s, the battleship Prince of Wales. flagship of Force Z arrives
at the naval base in Singapore on
2 December 194 1.
not yet fully worked up . and Rl1mL'iI.!, a marvellous ship, hut o ld. and with an am i-aircraft arma ment that was frankly laug hable. virtually mig ht not have existed . arrived . 'And these two ships and a co uple of pre tty elde rly dest roye rs were 10 la k e o n the e nu re Japanese Navy . I would call it a rroga nce , a nd a thoroughl y misplaced a rroga nce . J kno w that my fathe r and the ca ptain o f Repu lse rega rded thei r mission as o ne -way. They d id n't thin k the y had an ea rthly cha nce, a nd o f cou rse the y had n't.
' I had d in ne r a lone wi th my father, in Prin ce of Wales. I s u ppose it would have bee n two nights he fore she fina lly sailed. W'e hadn't see n ea ch o ther for inside a year. so we had lot s to ta lk about. And he obviously didn 't like the situation . He asked me w hat I thou ght about it. In my yo uthful ignorano..' I re member sayi ng , "O h, let 'e m come. le t's have a go at the m ." And he tu rned a ve ry sad face to me sayi ng. "I d o n 't th in k yo u have a ny ide a o f the e normity of the od ds we 're up against." And I had n't. \X'<.:II, we
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talk ed about this am! that an d he sca led up a letter to my mum say ing that I wa s w ith him and a ll that stuff, and that was that. ' I've always been a ve ry poor swim me r, and I was just s plosh ing about in Ihe: po o l to keep coo l and my fathe r sw am o ver to me a nd said , MI pro mised Bill Te nna nt [captain of R(1ml't-i I'd give him a drink be fore we went ha ck on hoard . I as ked if I was included in th is, a nd he sa id , "Ye s, of cou rse." Just before: he: got out o f the: pool he mad e a M
re mark w hic h I thought noth ing of at the time . bu t reca lled su bsequently: "I'm just going to do a co u p le o f le ngths o f the ba th ; you neve r kn ow wh en it may come in ha ndy."
11K'y were prophetic words. Lat er I [oined the m fo r a g lass o f good stuff. I d etected even at that time , these two grea t men we re talk ing at each o the r ac ross the table, because the y di d no t w a nt to d iscuss wit h me the hid e ousness o f the xitun tio n. T hat wa s the last time I saw my fathe r.'
Prince of \full'S a nd Repu lse stee red north-east and then northwards unt il the:y were about 100 miles south of Fren ch Ind o -China . At about 7 p .m. o n 9 Dec ember, they hea ded westwards wi th the intention o f closing the nonhero coast of Ma laya w her e Japan ese troop mo ve me nts had heen repo ned . By this time the ships had been located b y Japan ese a ircraft, and Phillips d ecid ed to abandon the so rtie and return to Sing apore. In the last m inut es o f 9 December. he rece ived an 'im med iate ' sig nal stating that an e ne my land ing wa s un d er wa y at Kuantan . At tha t time , Phillips wa s 150 mile , fro m the co ast a nd slightly nort h o f th is locatio n. At I a .m . o n to December, Ph illips d ecid ed to in vest igate a nd altered cou rse d irectly fo r Kuaru an , arriving o ff the coast at H a .m . By the n, a large force o f twent y-sev en hig h- level bombers p lus sixty-one to rped o plan es had ta ke n o ff from Saigon and was hea ding so uth to find the British ships. At arou nd 11 a .m., they fou nd them. \Vitho ut any air cover, the two British s hips were siuing ducks - easy ta rge ts fo r the Japane se bo mbe r pilot s and the ir crews. In th e first attac k by high -le ve l bom bers, Repulse w as hit by <me bomb that ca used minor damage a m idships . Both s hips contin ued the ir hig h-s peed dash to Singapore. A few m in utes lat er Prince of \f'llles's rad a r p icked u p a seco nd lar ge grou p o f a ircra ft a ppro achi ng , Nine to rp edo bo m bers dropped ou t o f th e s ky to ma ke thei r a p p ro ach , a nd o ne torped o h it the batt leship o n the port side. Th e d amage inflicted h y this o ne to rpedo hit wa s massive : th e w a rhea d had deto na ted near th e o ute r pro pe ller s ha ft, d ose 10 wh ere it e ntered th e hull , To ns o f water e n te red th e s hi p through the o pe ning, putting five o f the s hip's eight tu rbo generators o ut of action , The after half o f the s hip , incl ud ing the fou r ; .2S-inch ( 133-m m ) turr ets and the steering mecha nism lost a ll e lect ric power. Then the attac ke rs tu rned o n Rep ulse. 111e to rped o bombers went in first. Captai n Ten na nt swerved his s hip at hig h speed a nd managed to avoid being hi t. But seconds late r th e se a e rupted arou nd the baulccruise r as the high-level bombers made thei r attac k. In this first attack,
Rep ulse was hit h y o ne bomb.
EltillLlllSMARCK TO l'EARL.l1ARllilJl. __
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -"'_ IIi= .a ,L .._ ~'"'.--..__~ 15 7 _ -,
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ufn..·r midday, as Repulse approac hed the st ricke n Prince of \ril les 10 try to fe nd er assista nce. yt.:1 an othe r large forma tion of to rped o bombers made an attacki ng ru n. R<1JllL..e was hit amidships hUI able to mainta in s peed. Almo st dead in the W :IlC:f. Prince of \nlles was hit
hy four torpedoes on the starboard side. xttnurcs late r it was R<1m Lw' s turn . TIlL' o ld ship h:1(J run out of luck as four torpedoes exploded against her hull . Captain Tennant knee...· she co uld n't survive and gave the order to aba ndon sh ip. J ust after 12.30 . R<1mL..e rolled o ve r and sank wi th her screws Mill turning. Prince of \f'il les lasted :111110 S1 anot her hour, during which time the destroyer tixpress ca me a longside to take off wounded and as many of the c re w as tim e permitted. At 1.20 p.rn, Prince qf Wales rolled over and joined Rep ulse below the shallow wa ters o f the Sou th Ch ina Sea . From a crew of 1309 on board Rep ulse. 513 were lost: from Pnnce of U''liles. 317 of the tota l new of 16 12 died in the battle. 111e sinking o f the Prince of lrilk>s and Repulse by ai r attack co nfirmed the vu lnerability of even the mo ....t heavily armed modern ca pita l s hips to air attack. 111C aeroplane and its deadly cargo of high explos ives had cha nged all th at. The prophesies of Brigadi er -Gene ra l Mitch ell back in the lOs , whe n he Illustrated th e power of the bomber versus the ba ttleship (see Cha pter Eight. page 111), h ad been fu lfilled. l ong befo re this wa r w as o ver. the ai rcr aft ca rrie r a nd the bombe r wou ld revol