The Battleships

Before the nuclear bomb , no weapon on earth had evoked so much fear, veneration and passion as th e battleship. In de structive power it had no equal. Accompanying a four-part Cha nnel 4 se ries of the sa me name , The Battleships unve ils the ep ic saga of power, inte rn ati ona l politics,'a nd one- upmanship that led to the tita nic wars of th e twent ieth century, It is a story involving rule rs, war lords and admirals who all became intoxica ted by the • grandeur, majesty and sheer power of these floating fortresses . Enr iched with eye-witness accounts and contributions from naval experts around the globe , The Battleships explores the rap id evolution of firepower and battleship desig n from canvas to steam , timbe r to steel, muzzleload ing ca nnon to l8- inch guns, a nd beyond , to rocket lau nchers and missil es . As the spearhead of colon ial expansion and in defence of the great empires the battleship re igned supreme, and in the wake of World War I Germany, France, Italy, Japan and the US competed in an arms race wh ich focused on building maritime muscle .

I

II was a re ign, however, that could not offset the technological advancements tak ing place in the way wa rs were fought. In the face of subma rines and air wa rfa re, the battleship wou ld have to fight to prove itself an effect ive weapon . Crippling defeats du ring World War II , such as the loss of the famous British ship Hood and all but three of its crew by the guns of the German ship Bismarck and the destruction wrought by a Japanese air attack on the US fleet in Pearl Harbor, were turning points for the battlesh ip. With the major powers rethinking their arsenals, only the four US Iowa Class battlesh ips would survive to play a signif icant role in the wars of the latt e r part of th e twentiet h century. Prob ing th e evolution, deployment and effectiveness of one of the most controve rs ial weapons ever created, The Battleships explores the momentous role they played in • shaping the modern world .

The

•

Batt es 1 s Ian Johnston and Rob McAuley

III A companion to the television series 'Th e Battleships',

pr oduced w ith the financial assistance of the Australian Film Finance Co rporatio n Ltd and the New So uth Wales Film and Television O ffice.

Dedicate d to Ad miral o f the Fleet Th e Lord Lewin KG GC B LVa DSC (b 1920 d 1999) and to the sa ilors o f all nati ons w ho served on batt leships

First published 2000 hy Cha n ne l . j Books imprint of ,\ b cm ill~m Publishers Ltd 2::; Ecclest on Pbn' Lond o n 5\,\' } \,\' 9:'\F }bsin~stokt.' and O xford www.macnullan .com A!\."'Cx:iated co mp ani es throughout the wo rld ISB~ 0 7:;22 IR. 7 6

~111

Copyrig ht

2000, The Battleships Pty Limited

rtglu of Ian Johnst on and Rob ,\ k Aulcy to IX" id e ntif ied :I." thc authors o f this work Ius l-ccn as se rted b y the m in accorda nce with the Cop vnglu . ()l' si~ns and Patents Act 19M .

"n I L'

'The Hatth-shipx ' is a Roh .\ k Aule y production for Cha nne l -I . Producer: Rob .\ !cAule y

All ri,g hts reserved. No pan of this publication ma y he re prod uced . sto red in o r introduced into :I retrieva l sysle m, o r transmit ted. in a n)' for m, or hy :lny means (elect ronic. mechanical . ph otocopying. recording o r otherwise) w ithout the p rior writte n pe rmission o f tbc publisher , Any pe rso n who does an y unauthorized ac t in relation to this publication ma y he liable 10 cri mina l prosecutio n a nd civil cla ims fo r d al11~I~L's . 9 H 7 6 S -, 5 2 I

A CII' catalog ue record for this book is avuilnble from the Britis h Li brary. Dvsigncd hy n~1I1 Newman -Perfect Bound Oesign Colour Reproduction hy Ayleshury Studi os L[(...1 Printed in England by Bath Press

Contents Acknowledge me nts

6

Foreword

8

Symbols of Supremacy

10

Sail to Steam - Wood to Steel

24

Sea Lanes to Power

36

Enter the Drea dnoug ht

52

Battleships Go Global

64

Empires in Collision

78

The Battle of Jutland

90

Th e Ultima te Battleships

108

The Supre me Challenge

124

From Bismarck to Pearl Harbor

136

Sea-powe r versu s Air-power

158

End of the Behemoths

172

Glossary

186

Ind ex

187

Further Read ing

191

Acknowledgements

D

urin g the research for ou r p revious seri es . n )('(.iuers. I was standing o n the ha llowed strip o f land

; 1(

Jo h n Brown'... yard o n th e River Clyd e wh er e the famous liners.

Q U('( ' II

Mw)' and Quee n Elimbetb w er e b uilt. w ith Glasgow- based Ian johnston . Ian reminded

me tha t the great figh ting ships . Barham. f
IR .' \\'

se ries

wa s horn. Te levision bro adca ste r... Chan ne l ..\ UK. a nd ABC Austral ia com mitted : the Australian Film Finance Corpora lion. the New Sou th Wales Film and Television O ffice . and Channel -l I nternational i n ve sted an d "111(' Battlesblps we n t int o p roducti on . 1;11"1 h C C;II 11C o u r As so ci ate

Producer and co-autho r o f this book . I also m et Admiral o f the Fleet. Lord Le win. d uri ng p roductio n o f Tl w Liner s. An ex -batt lesh ip

sai lo r h im...elf in \Xbrld War II. Lord Lew in offe red to help wit h the new series o n one condition. 'Yo u mu st get it righl - the facts. th e nam e o f the shi ps . and ull ux-h nk-al mail er.... .' \\:'t,.. have made every effo rt 10 d o just that . Sad ly. Lo rd Le w in d ied before "17.1(' !/all/esbips went int o

pro du ction . l lo we vc r. he had b rie fed his granddaughter. Emil y Ro c. a yo u ng free lan ce film re sea rcher. o n th e p ro ject . Em ily became o ur p rod ucti on co-o rdin ator in Engl and and I am

Indelucd 10 her for th e co ntribution she made to the se ries.

\'Ce filmed in Britain . Ge rmany. France. Japa n and the l;SA. and recei ved the warmest welco me in e ac h cou ntry. It was hoth

~I

privilege and an honour to meet histori an s. authors. and sailors

of all ra nk s w ho had se rved o n batt les hips in peacetime a nd in war. ex te nded

10

~ ly

he artfelt gr..lIitude is

each a nd every o ne o f them fo r their ge ne ro us co ntribu tio n. The same applies to the

many asso ciatio ns. hist oric nava l esta b lixh mc rus. and maritime museum... that allo we d us to film the ir pr ecio us archi ve s a nd p rese rved fig hti ng s h ips . The statixtics incl ud ed in th is ho o k a rc derived from co nte mporary p ub lished so urces wh ich arc listed in tile Fu rthe r He;lu ing section. I als o w is h to ac knowle dge the fo llo wing fo r th e ir su p po rt. encourageme nt. a nd personal contrib utio n: Christine Sch mit-Mcki n no n. Linda John....to n. Paul Sargent, Ron Saun de rs. Ph ilip vaughan . Profe ssor Ian Cow. John Rodsted. Ann xtalcobu . Albert \X':llk,rr, Hiroyuki .\ Iin ishil;l. Brian

Burke-Gaffn ey. Gu nter KI:ItKkc . Jo ach im von xtc ngde n. Susa n

~ l a cKinn o n ,

Investme nt " lan ag er

at AFFC; Stuart Llo yd and Jenny l lui of Astims: Llo yd Hart. Nao mi Stoneman. David :'\oakes. Calvin

Ga rdi ner for great pict ures : Camp bel l .\ IcAule y fo r top sound: a nd Rich ard Walk er for research and di rection in Japan an d th e USA. To Cha rlie Carman an d Verit y \\:fil lcock s. Channe l '1 Books; Geoff Barne s. ABC Australia , Gil l Brow n , Cha n ne l 4. a nd Bern ard Mac leod. Cha n nel ·i Inte rnatio nal for committi ng to the series: Ro be rt Albert for continui ng support; Ro wan McAu ley for p rofes....ional collaboration wi th me o n the bo ok. my wife An ne for putt ing up w ith my long absences d uri ng this production. ,\ Iy n;ry special thanks to co lleag ue :II1U frie nd . Peter BUll. for masterminding the creative side

o f this project. edit ing and writing th e se ries . and for s up porting and e ncoura g ing me from the day the project began. And to Ruth Nicol . Peter's partner and inspiration . my he artfelt tha n ks for the su pport

yO lI h ~I\'C

Rob .\lcAulcy

g ivcn Peter and the project ove r the long pe riod o f its production.

_______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____________......_IIiC.II'''''''Ntr

Exce rp ts from interviews reco rd ed for the tele visio n se ries . '[be Ualt{esbIjJs, add a ne w perspect ive 10

the inter natio nal sag a of these extraord inary figluing ship s. The au thors wou ld like to ackn o wledge

the following
Ale xan dra IliJd n.: d

Cura to r of O rd nance. J Im)' Rose Trus t. Po rtsmo uth

D r Eric G ron'

x avul strategist . L'ni\'c:rsity o f Hull. UK

Professor Philippe ,\ b s SO!l

Maritirne historian. France

Pet er Good w i n

Kee per and Cu rator. HMS Victory. Portsmouth

Coli n \X·hilt..•

Deputy Din..-cto r. Royal Xava l Muse um . Po rtsmouth

David K. Brown

Re tire d Depu ty Ch ief Nava l Archi tect o f the Royal Co rps o f Na va l Co n stru ctors

Dr And rew Lambert

Nava l hi storia n , King's Co llege. Lo ndo n

David Lyon

Research ASS( Kiate . National M ari time M u seum. London

Ste ve .\ k La ugh lin

Russian battleship histo rian ..San Fran cisco

x orma n Frie d man Dr

~lark

Penn ie

US nava l histor ian &. defence ana lyst . x cw Yor k Se n io r Research Fell o w . H o o ve r Insti tutio n o n \'('ar. Revolution and Pea ce . Sta nfo rd Un ive rsity. Californ ia

D r \X'l.'m er Rahn

I>r

~li d l;l d

Epkanha ns

Professor Kiyoshi Ikeda

Ger m~1I1

nava l histo rian and retired nava l ca ptain. Berlin

German naval historian. t Iamb urg Japanese naval hist ori an , Tokyo :'\;l\~1 1

Dr G :lTy \X'ei r

Hist ori an , US

Sir l lc nrv Leach GCn . III

Admi ral o f the F1c..'t:'I , UK

Historica l Cent re . \X'ashington DC

Jo hn Pau l Ellio t

Sailor. \'(brld \V.1f I. LJSS Tex as, Cali fornia

,\ Irs Pegg y G ihson

Eye witness at Scapa Flow. posl-\'(,\Vl

ll atsu hu Naito

japan ese

Te d Brigg s

Su rvivor. 1IJ\ IS lIood

11;1\';11 historian

&. author, Tokyo

Oll~ ) Th isson

1'ill Jilz cr c wmc mbcr. \Vililel ms ha "ell . Ge rman y

P;lI Ja ckson

Sword fish pilo t. 1-12.5 Sqdn . 11J\.I S \ 'tctnrk nts

North Dalrvm p le-llamilt on Mid shipm an.

1I ~I S K ill).: Gem'l-:e

l'

Ludovic- Kenn ed y

Ex-Royal Navy. nava l histo rian . a ut hor, re nowne d UK broadcaster

I>o u,gh' Tunic:

Ah le Sea man . J 1 ~I S K i np. G t'(Jf].W \'

O tto Peters

Engine room artificer, Bisnm rcl:

Richard Fiske

xtartnc bugler. t;SS 'n~1 nYRinia Ensign . Lieuten an t (J.G.>. USS Sontb Daleota

Erlin,g l lustvc dt Bo h :'\i,ghts

Flight-Lieut enant. 6 1i La nca ster Squadron

l lans .\ Hillcr

Ant i-a ircra ft gun ne ry o ffice r. Ttrp it z

vernon Sistrunk

Ensign. Torpedo 11-1 Squ adron. USS JIlln 1Jid

Be n StJo h n

Ensig n. To rpedo 11-1 Sq uad ro n. LJSS Intrep id

Sh iro Ilo so ya

lmpcrialj apan cxc Navy Seama n. J lu sasbi surv ivo r

IIn ward Skid more..

Lieut e nant ( J.G.) To rpedo 29 Squadron . USS Co hol

7

Foreword

B

anlcships

Weft:

(he stuff o f legend. pro ject ing might and po we r beyond belief. For over

~I ce n.t ll: ', they were [~lC iron fists that undcrlin~d diplomacy. \~'herc ~jplolll~ICY fa il~d .

they inflicted the maximu m amoun t o f d estructi on that hu man mgenutty co uld d ense.

They WCfC p:l wns in perha ps the gre ates t ga me of politica l o ne- up ma nship eve r played hv'twe e n rival nations - the pr od uct o f ego s. jealousy . greed . agg ression , and blind am bit ion of na tio ns seeking to exte nd their nati ona l bou nda ries . Befo re the nuclea r homh. no wcapo n o n earth ev ok ed so much fear. ven era tion and pa ssion as the ba ttleship. And yet there has probably ne ver been a class of warship that, round-for-round . in naval battles ag ainsr o p po nents o f a similar cla ss. fo ught less ba ttles. achieved less sun :ess . an ti had

~I S

lill ie

effect o n th e o utcome o f th e major wars of th e twentieth ce n tury as th e battleshi p . Ou r story ex amines th ese amazingly complex and aw es ome weapons of d estruction - from their evo lution from the ships-of-t he-line of Nelson's period

10

th e supe r-battles hips o f \'\'orld War II.

For we ll over a cent ury. d es igne rs. e ng ineers. scie ntists an d nava l a rchitects - sp urred o n hy the dema nd s of the ir po litical and milita ry musters - strived

10

p rod uce the ultim ate battleshi p -

the impreg nable floating big -gun fort ress that would eclipse all othe rs..\ Io nc y fro m th e public purse ap pe are d limitless: sh iphu ilding yards. naval dock yards. stee l and armament fact ori e s

beca me major expenditures in the econo mics o f mar itime nations. Traditi onal cross-cha n ne l rivals . Britain

~1I1t1

Fran ce . wr... re qui ck to apply new tech no logies in

th eir navies. but by th e end of th e n inetee nt h ce ntu ry. Ge rma ny. dri ven b y IhL' a mbitious Kaise r \,\'i1 hel m II. had eme rge d as the new na val power in Europe . 111e g rea t nava l arm.. r..IO..' between Great Britain and Ge rmany in th e lead -u p to 'cc o rkl War I saw th e creatio n of till" two greatest fleets o f battleshi ps e ve r assembled . Th e head -o n mee tin g o f these

two

!lcets in th e Battle o f

J utland was the largest battle betwe e n battles hips in history. La sting less than two hours. the result was inconclus ive w ith hoth sides clai ming victo ry. "l'he wa r to end all wa rs'

W :IS

finally resolved

without another major naval hatti e . And yet. immediately after \'\'orld \'\'ar I. so deepl y ing rain ed in th e minds o f polit icians anti nav al strat eg ists was the need for eve n bigger. faste r. and more powerful fl eers o f c apital sh ips that a new arms race threat ened. 111e 1922 \'\'ashi ngton Agreement - the world 's first internationa l arms limit ati on treaty - crea ted momentary internati onal sa n ity. limi ting th e s ize a nd future numhers o f battleships . BtU the re is little do ub t thi s confe re nce a lso so wed th e first .st.'cds o f discontent that eventually co ntrib uted to the o utbreak of the greatest war o f all - \'\'orld War II. A"i the ae ro pla ne developed as a ma jor weapo n. and aircraft carriers be cam e a practical rea lily. the writing was o n the wa ll fo r the lo ng-term future o f the batt leship . In spite o f th is. j apa n. the natio n th at wa s the most adva nced in naval avia tion. was plan ning th e

IWO

largest a nd mo st

powe rful bat tleships ever - the 7 1.000· lOn. 18·inch gu nn ed }"a ma (o and stusasbt. At the sa me time. Adolph Hitler. in defiance o f the Trea ty o f Versailles be ga n building 'poc ket battleships and later. (he two largest battl esh ips ever bu ilt for the Ge rman

:'\:1\)" -

Bismarck anti Tirpitz.

11)(,: fate o f these b ig-gun sh ips anti the evolution of wa r str.ltegies as th e aircraft currier took o ve r as the capi tal ship in th e world 's navies. pr esen ts a dramat ic a riel terrib le sto ry o f d eath a nd de...truction at unprecedented levels on the oceans of the world . It has been fascinating

[0

he a r fro m British. Ge rma n. japan ese . Fre nch . a nd American sailo rs.

.,.Ii'....

_ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ --->ili_ liil m. .

IiiiIII_~ 9

Even for the mightiest battleships, there is no escape from the power of the ocean waves. War at sea is a 24-hour, 7-day week operation in all weathers.

p ilo ts ami nava l hi storia ns . \Ve have been p rivi leged to speak wi th ma ny who

SCfVt:U

on

battleships o f o pposing navies and to share with them thei r first-ha nd ex periences of ex trao rdina ry survival in da ng e rous ci rc umst a nces o n the h igh seas. Th eir stories and co m me n ts pro vide a uni que insight into the story o f the battl eship. Attempting to un derst and and present th e technical co mp lexity o f these extraordi na ry fighting ships. and eve n

(0

scra tch the surfa ce of th e polit ic...ll manouevring behind thei r creat ion has been

a daunting task. \'\'c ho p e (hat o ur televis io n se rie s. a nd this hook in some wa y

Sl H-T C ed

in

p re senting a n in forma tive , exciting and as accu rate as p os sib le story o f th e se a wesome and

strangely charismatic weapo ns of war - the battleships. Rob J\ I<.:Aulcy

m~ oso

u remac ust suppose for a moment th at ships hav e th e ir o w n kind of DNA. If

J

yo u we re then to tes t th e DNA o f. say . Ja pa n's Yamato o r Mnsasbi >

th e two largest a nd most powerful s u pe r-batt les h ips e ve r b ui lt - or

Britai n's ba ttlc cruiser HMS l Iootl, o r a n y o f th e USA's Iowa Class fast

ba tt les hips . yo u wou ld find that th e y sha red a com mon 'b lo o d line ' th at stretched back almos t 4000 yea rs. In fact. yo u wo uld find th at the ba ttles hip was the last stage in a n e vo lution th at ha d beg u n w ith th e warships recorded in a ncient Egy ptian a n. O nce o u r a ncesto rs d iscove red tha t th e c rude rafts a nd single-h u lle d dug out ca noes use d a ro u nd co asta l e stua ries a nd in rivers co uld be d eve lo ped in to vessels ca pa b le o f making sea c ro ss ings . it was o nly a matter of time before th e first s uccessful ocea n passages to fo re ig n lands took pla ce. These first sh ips tra nsformed for ever th e im pregnab le bl ue water barriers sepa rating lands and civilizations. into high ways for trad e and exploratio n. And o nce th at grea t natura l ba rrie r had been co nq ue red . th e insat iable hu ma n d esire to explo re. trad e , go to war and expa nd nati o nal bound a rie s led ine vitabl y to th e first sh ip s-of-w ar. From that b lurred

.tM.'Ptr..__

_________________________________---Jo.._...

mo me nt in histo ry. (he slo w In n inevitable developme nt o f (he mod ern battles hip bega n. Wi th (he introd uction of every new technology, the evo lu tion o f the ocean-go ing figluing

ship reached a new stage o f co mplexity, w ith e nha nced po wers

In

destroy a nd dominate . Since

The battleship USS Iowa fires a full broadside of nine 16-inch gun s during an exercise in Ju ly

ear liest limes. (he aim of d csignL'rs a nd buil de rs o f shi ps has bee n to create vessel s po werfu l

1984. The Iowa Class test-

enoug h to w ithstand not o nly th e for ces of natu re, hu t also the fo rces of o pposing nations'

battleship s were arguably the

s hips . Befo re sa il, oa r-p ro pe lled ga lle ys we re eq u ip ped wit h rei nfo rce d p ro trudi ng ho w s Cbcakx') for ramming int o the sides of enemy shi ps. and th ey w ere crewcd hy warrio rs armed fo r batt le . Wh en the tec hn ology o f sai l w as lat er co mb ine d w ith the m ig ht of g unpowder,

ult imate capital ship in the

wa rships were lad en w ith murderous muzzle -load ing ca nno n , ca pa ble of firin g de vastating broadside s into e ne my ships and sho re-based fortresse s. \'\'ooden -h ulk'd ships gave way first to iro n and the n steel. and sail was re placed hy the stea m-po we red e ng ine s of the new ind ustrial age , \'\!e ap o nry kept pa ce w ith techno logy, and she ll-fi ring gun s soon had a range we ll beyond the hori zon. In the twe nt ieth ce ntury, hot h firepo we r a nd a rmo ur rea ch ed th eir ze nith , w ith nuclear-arm ed beh em o ths patrolling the world's ocea ns, In eve ry age , o ne thing has held true : the natio n that ni les the waves. n iles the wo rld . Afte r tho usan ds of years of tech nical evo lutio n, the true lxmleship fina lly em erg ed o n the C\ 'C o f the twe nt ie th ce nt ury: a ste el- hulled . e ngi ne -d rive n and he avily-a rmo ured weapo n of destruction . T hese ha u lcships we re ca pa ble o f suc h firepo wer tha t in hatt ie the y would not me rel y d isarm o r d isable the e ne my. hu t utte rly dem o lish it. Whe re the woode n-hulled ships of the past had o ften been captured as pr izes (earn ing the co nq ue ring captains fantastic wealt h), o r had bee n left to limp hom e as bcsr the y co uld . the mode rn battleship had grad uated fro m fig hter to the ultimate ma ritime destroye r.

1IIIL

evolution of the battle ship .

The te rm 'battles hip' come s from the a,ge of sail w he n th e mo st powerful ships in a na vy's hatti e fleet formed a sin~l e line in preparation for a ttack o n an enem y force. Th e cla ssic naval bat tle s lr~lte~y o f this e ra was for two para llel lines o f heavil y armed ships to pass o ne ano ther. L';Kh firing massive broa dsi de s in an attem pt to destroy the e ne my vessels in the o the r lin e at close ra nge , Ap p ro pr iatel y, a s hip that hy din t o f its massi ve firepower q uali fied to s;liI in thi s 'line o f bat tle ' was ca lled 'a- linc -o f-bau le ship' or 's hip-of-the- line '. O nce the era o f sa il had passed a nd ste am- powe red . iron- and late r steel-h ulled vessel s mount ing ne wgenera tion guns were introduced , the tactics fo r hatti e cha nged. a nd the sh ips be came kn own sim p ly as "battles hips'. But wh at really is a battlesh ip? In simple te rms. it is the mos t powe rful ship afloat - a veritable floating g un platform. heavily arm oured to withstand the full firep ower o f any e ne my ve ssel. It has the ca paci ty to att ack a nd defeat any o p posing s hip that da res challe nge its right of passagl.'. The o verwh e lming power of the broadside - wh ether it he the fifty gun s of a sh ip-ofthe-line like H ~I S Vic!w :V all firing to the o ne side. or the massive g uns of the twcnuc th-ccruury battleship all firing o n the ce ntre line (and thu s co vering both sides of the ship> - is the essential element (hat mak es a batt leship d ifferent from every o the r ship afloat . However. a 'bau lcs htp' repre sents far more th an simply firepower, Histori an s a nd ot her e xpens in (he field wh o contributed to the tele vision se ries added the ir o w n definitio ns : 'the battleship was the supreme instrument of naval power', and 'in its (b y it W:.lS the higgL'st movi ng a rtefact in existence. the b igge st and most com plica te d p iece of machinery devi sed hy man ', Furthermore . the battleship 'w as the un de rpinn ing of the ba ttle fleet. the g rea t deterrent ', and 'a co untry with a fleet of battleshi ps is mor e than a country - it's a n empire' , Speaking of the British Navy, these same ex pe rts ma int a ined that 'the battle s hip was ve ry mu ch the co re of Britain 's pe rce pt io n o f hersel f in the worl d'. tha t 'a battleshi p is o ne o f the most magnificent. awesome . fearsome devi ces ever thought up by man'. and that 'they we re the ultimate product of the Ind ustrial Revolut ion', Ther e is no doubt: the bat tleship is truly uniq ue in the histo ry of ocea n-go ing ships-of- war, :\ot just weapons o f wa r, ba ttleshi ps eq ually have been national symbols of ind ustrial :.1110 technol og ical ach ievement - pawns in an international game of o ne- u pma ns hip played out o n the world stage by kings and kaisers, polit icia ns and naval co mmanders alike , Of all the shi ps in the navies of the world , it wa s ba ttlesh ips that cap tured the imagination of till.' pu blic - the taxpaye rs w ho met the e nor mo us costs of their de velo pm ent . build ing and operat ion, They we re proud of their navy and felt pa rticula rly safe in the kno wled ge that their country could never be defeated while its fleet included a squadron o r two of battlesh ips, Small countries with minu scule nav ie s added at least o ne banl eship to th ei r flee t. It w as as mu ch a matt er of pride a nd symbolism as it was of stra te g ic im portance to the country's defence. If yo u r ne ighbour ing country boasted a battlesh ip then YO\I had to have o ne - it was as sim ple as that. xever be fore in history had su ch a n expensive war wea pon meant so mu ch to the m:.111 in [he street as well as the military strat egists planning the defence o r expansion of empi re, The co st of buil din g and cam paig ning these gia nt fig hting mach ine s wa s ho rre ndo us, Yet. in the fi rst decade of the twent ieth century . mo ne y from the public purse of every nation with nava l aspirat ion s poured into the development. buildi ng and purchase o f hattlesh ips and their clos e cous ins. the bat tlccru tsers. Banlecruisers art:' a light er-ar mo ured version of the batt leshi p . bur boasnng similar firepower, Ik-duc~-d arm our mean s more speed. a nd this , man y naval experts be lieved . would mo re than com pe nsate for the lack o f p rotective a rmour in a ny e ngagement o the r than with a battleship, The series . a nd this book. includes both class of vessels as ca pital ships (that is. the most powerful a nd im portant in 3 fleet ) as at times it is difficult to di fferen tiate bet ween the two , In many cases, the battlccruisers were, in fact. larg er than battleships. Th e classic example of this was the banl e crulser H~I S Hood, fo r a lo ng time th e higgest ca pital sh ip in the British Navy,

':"_iiilIlliI• •Io1I~__-:. 13

SilUI (}LS...1lF-'illfltL\lAO~

As thl: great maritime nat io ns of the o ld world sent thei r sh ips to ex plo re new frontiers. wea lth beyond belief began 10 now across ocea ns - from o utpost, o f ne w empires to the ho meland s o n th e o the r side o f the g lobe. Ne w e mp ire s em erged, d ue nor o nly to the s uccess o f the navigators who d b-covered the se new te rritories. bu r to th e strength of the nav al for ces that g uara nteed safe passage to me rch ant shi ps ca rrying the ca rgoes. For ce ntu ries this responsibility lay with armed sailing vessels of oak and ca nvas. powerful fighting ships capable of staying at sea fo r som etimes ye ars o n e nd . These vessels were the backbone o f migh ty global e mpires -

and the most powerful of a ll wa s the British Emp ire. buil t and p rotect ed largely hy the po wer of its ships-of-war - ils 'wo ode n wa lls of Eng land' - a nd . late r, hy its flee t of battleships, O ur sto ry o f the e vo lu tio n o f th ese uniq ue s h ips -of-wa r hegins at th e historic Port sm ou th ;\' ~I\..t1 Dockyard in Eng land . w he re thre e of the finest exa mples o f ea rly wa rships are preserved, ea ch representing the ultima te fighti ng s hip o f its era du ring 350 years o f marit im e histo ry. TIle o lde st ship in Portsmou th is the legendary Tud o r vessel. .lIllI)' Rose. \'<'h en Henry VIII ca me to th e Engl ish thro ne in 1509 . he inherited fro m his fat her. Henry VII. :I s ma ll naval fle et o f five vessels. He nry VlI is cons ide red the father o f the Ro yal Navy. h ut it was Henry VIII wh o first rea lized the po te ntial o f a c ro w n flee t. O ne o f his first acts as king wa s to com m issio n the

bu ilding o f a rad ical new kind o f ship - the first true warship . Tw o years late r, in 1511, J li11)' Rose uhle wa s br ewmg with Sco tland, w hile ac ro ss what was the n ca lled 'the Narro w Sels' rela tion s w ith the o ld enem y, France , were in a high stale of ten sio n. Henry recognized the need for a po we rful, modern navy to defend his count ry against attack fro m conti ne ntal Europe and , in parti cular. the Fre nch. He Ik a pe rson al interest in this new

ship and great ly influenced her fining-out, including the additi on to her arm ament of fifteen large bronze can no ns. According to Alexandra Hildn-d. Cura to r o f O rd nance at the J Im) ' Rose Trust in Portsmouth. 'JIm)' Rase wa s the first ship that was d es igned specifica lly for warfare o n a large scale. She wa s an e mbryon ic ba ttleship . if yo u like : . W'hile previous warships mo unted guns in various loca tions. mos t notably o n 'castles' at e ithe r end o f the vessel. the design of .11m)' Rose introduce d gu n port s arranged down either side o f the ship . These ports. w hich pie rce d th e hu ll close to the wa te rline , allo wed for the firing of broadsides - those grea t ba rrages. w here a sh ip would simultaneously fire upon the ene my with all of the ca n no n along o ne side . "lilI)' Rose was the first signifi cant 'big-g un' ship. Because the gun ports allowed the he av y bronze ca n non to he set close to the waterline , a nd lo w d ow n in th e hull, the ba ttle s hip 's s ta b ility wa s im me nsel y improved co mpared to the top-heavy caste llated ships . The tech nical b reak th ro ugh that made Rose's watert ight g un ports possible was a cha nge in h ull constructio n. \'(' he re tradit iona lly s hi ps had been c linke r-built, wit h their w ooden planks o ve rlap ping ,

.lIilI)'

MARY ROSE DIMENSIONS,

the gun port s to he made waterti ght. A very larg e s hip hy the stand a rd.. of the da y, J la'y RoSl! \yas a traditi o nal squarerigged ca rrac k d esign. w ith a leng th o n the wa terline o f just o ve r 127 fe et (38.8 metres ) a nd a n o verall length o f about 147 feet <4; metres). She ca rried a variety o f

IZ7Fr ~ IN cwATfRLIND 38Fr 3IN ~ ISFr (38.8 ~ 11.66 ~ ~.60M) ~

J lil1Y Rose was ca rve l-built - her planks were s moothly se t edge-on-edge . a llow ing

DIS?.Ac.EMEt.rr, 7Z7S TONS CAI'rER REF1TTING, SOO TONS Itr LAUNCH) CON5TRUC.TION, OAK AND ELM

weapons rang ing fro m ra nks o f bowmen situated o n the cas tles to kill the cre ws o f

CANVA',,,

Nor

e ne my ships. to la rge cast br on ze a nd w ro ught -iron guns. ca pa ble o f firing sh ot a nd o the r pr ojectiles into the hull s a nd rigg ing of e ne my vessels . At this stage , a ll the best g un-founders were European. Henry \'111 recognized this and. not wanting

ARMAMEt.rr,

MUZllE-lOADING CIlSr BRONZE GUNS AND BREECH-lOADING wROliGHr-IRON GUNS

England 10 rely o n pot ent ial e ne mies fo r her weapo ns su pply, brought o ve r a number of French experts 10 ra ise can no n-making in his own co untry lip to the high stan da rd of the Fren ch ord nance . Ho w eve r, in those ea rly da ys. sta ndardiza tio n of the bor e

CREw,

v.NOWN

300- ~OO

SUNK)

aoo

WHEN

•

14

i.. ~ )~7'-

~ -~n;;:;"'---.....

~I E

( I

r

HA T TI ES HIE..S

_ii=_t.IIt'~

SYAU1{}LUlLf)llI!RUlA(C:cYL

-". .

of cannons and the: size of ha lls they I1R't1 was a major problem. The te rm 'w indage' was use d to describe th e d iffere nce bct w....en the size of the shot and the inte rnal bore o f the g un . Around a qu arter of a n inch <6 mm ) was considered ide a l to maxim ize: the force of the shot co ming out of the barrel w ithout it gelli ng stuck. Too much windage resulted in lack of power - insufficient w indage could result in the shot becoming jammed in the burr el. Alexandra UHdR'Ll comments: 'O n the .lIm ) ' Rose. bL'L~IUse ea ch gun was hand manufactured and the mould destroyed after casti ng, the (:lasses of guns (~IiIL'Ll cannons and culverins which were SUppOSl.'Ll to be a spcclflc bore size: were ne ver absolutely right. You act ua lly got an infinite number of slight variations. Xow that mea ns that you 're going to have to accept a large r windage and perhaps h;IH' a shot that's an inch 125 mml too small for the bore. and the re fo re not got the sa me mu zzle velocity as you would if it was smaller. O r you' re going to have xpecific shot cas t for specific guns w hich is the n a huge . huge p roblem. tmagtnc you've: got. in the: case: of .lfm) ' Rose. fiftee n diffe ren t bore sizes fo r the cast b ro nze guns a nd you 're tryi ng to so rt o ut the sho t down below in the se mi-dark that is specifically for L':Kh g un . ;\"OW w hat happe ned to mak e sorting qu icker is tha t yo u han: a set of g:lug(.'s and if the shot goes th rou gh the g:IUW':. then it wo n't gL't stuc k in the: bar re l o f the gu n,' Refit ted in 15.36. JIm)' Rose d isting uish ed he rse lf in numerous battles aga inst the Fren ch fleer a nd was co ns ide red o ne o f the most adv anced fightin g ships o f he r time . He r e nd ca me o n

Sunday . )<) july 15·iS. when a French fleet of so me 225 hea vily ar med vesse ls launched an att ack o n Por tsmo uth , In the ca lm a nd still wat e rs of the Solem. oHm )' Nose was o ne o f the lead ing English ships that set ou t to repel the Fren ch attac k. Taking ad van tage of the offsho re bree ze . she manoeuvred on to a port tack to fire a broadside and , as she heel ed 10 the breeze . so meth ing went d ramaticall y wrong. \Vale r be ga n pouri ng in th rou gh her o pen sta rboa rd g un ports and wit hin minutes sh e 'd ca ps ize d a nd s unk, taking a ll hut for ty of th e es timated 700 me n o n hoard to a wat e ry grave. .\ Ion: Ih ~lI1 ·100 yelrs later, on 11 October 19~2. the hull of the .l ltlt)' Rose was raised in a miraculous recovery opera tion. She was retu rned to the very dockyard where she wa s bui lt all those years ago . and h;IS been prese rved o f the Tudor era .

~IS

a monume nt and a unique:time capsule of a warship

As Alexandra Hild rcd says. 'Ships like the .l1m y Rose we re the ultim ate weapon o f war in th e sixt eenth century. the l~rolOtyPC: for ban lcvhlps su ch as II~ IS \ ·;cl m:)'. Perhaps 111(.' h ig [iech nica ll move in the period between .11m) ' Rose and victory was being able to sta nda rd ize gun bores. a nd lxrrn-l. therefore being ab le 10 say thai you had twenty guns that all had ~- i nc h int ernal diameter.'

Through her d ose ass ociation with He nry VIII. ,\ftlt), Rose a lso introduced an ot her. very different and powerful. role that big-gun ships-of-war wou ld play in the futu re affai rs of state of maritime u.ulons. She became. truly. a sym bol of state - an embodimcm of the very miglu and majesty o f the nation whose nag she proudl y flew. Prom here on. wa rshi ps bega n 10 represent . in thei r \"(,.'1) ' size a nd nature. a statement for riva l natio ns 10 admire and he fearful of, And so ~1I1 unprecedented game of international one-upmanship began be tween rival nations. to desig n. build and boast the most powe rful ha llie fl e e ts in existence, ,\fll!), Rose an d he r sis te r ships were. in many W.lyS, the foundat io n of a marit ime d ynasty that would influe nce world affairs for we ll over three ce ntur ies.

In the follow ing 200 years the fighting ship continued to e vo lve . cu lminating in the ship-o fthe -line . two- and three-deck ships car rying, in so me insta nces. we ll over 100 canno ns , In the age of sail. these we re the 1110st fearso me and powe rful ships-of-war ever to pUI to se a , As g re at

The wa rship , Mary Rose, leaving Portsm outh Harb our in summer

1545. as p ortrayed in this pain ting by W.H. Bishop.

15

T ilE H ,' T TI ES Il IPS

empires eme rged with vast co lonial Inte rests. the: role: and stre ng th o f navie s became critical in the surviva l and prospe rity of a ll the ma ritime nations. Brita in a p peared to ho ld the up pe r hand in the number of its figh ting shi ps. bu t even this great fleet was a lways unde r challe nge . The Spanish. Po rtuguese . Dutch and Fren ch had all built powe rful colon ial e m pires. and their naval forces were co nside red a threat to any e ne my fleet that dared ch alle nge thc ir right to passag e . Victories in nav al batt les agai ns t the Dut ch in the early pa rt o f the se ve ntee nth centu ry co nso lida te d Britai n's dominance of the Englis h Cha nnel a nd the No rth Sea . Furth er so uth . relation s with France remained a 'lo ve-hate ' affair. te mpe red for short peri ods by interma rriage be tween the ro yal families o f both nat io ns. an d at o the rs inflam ed by religio us differ en ce s an d dee p-roo ted jealo us ies , lt w as a situat io n that one day wo uld lead to bille r wa r. And that time was not far o ff. In the ea rly part o f the eight ee nth century. alth o ugh the British Navy had the n um be rs part icularly in s hips-of-the-line - its vesse ls were by no mea ns the biggcsl or tec hnically the be st afloat. Its s hips-of-war were built un der strict reg ulatio ns wh ich. in ma ny ways . co nstrai ned thei r de velopment. The dimension s o f eac h class of wa rship were strictly con trolled. ca using grea t frustration to shipbuilde rs. naval architects and naval co mmanders alike . In the same period the ir co ntine nta l rivals . part icularl y the Fre nch . were allowed a free hand in de veloping their figh ting ships, Th is e nabled them to ta ke full ad va ntage o f scie ntific kno wled ge ava ilable at the time . and to buil d bigger. slightly faster a nd mor e stab le ships. The lower g un decks were able to be ma rginally high er above wat er-level an d there wa s more room on each of the g un decks a ma jo r advantage for the g un crews un de r baili e cond itions . The space did no t a llev iate the terrible black smoke given o ff hy the g unpo wder charges. hut it did give the CTe:W more room to wo rk, BUI what became evide nt in naval bat tles between British and foreig n llee ts was the superior quali ty o f British commande rs and their crew, They were bett e r tra ined a nd d isciplin ed. and the ir gunne ry s kills were far su perior to those o f rival nat io ns. And alth ou gh their shi ps may not have always been the ultimate in design . they were so lid . tried and proven fighting ships in the IX:M trad itions o f British design and wo rkmansh ip. The same co uld he sa id abo ut the ir guns. T he Seve n Years \Var ( 1756- 63 ) cert a inly es tab lishe d the domina nce the British Navy ove r its f re nch rivals. In naval ca mpa igns initiated unde r di rect ives issued h y \X'i1 liam Pitt the

or

Elde r. in the Med iterranean. Ind ia , Nov a Scot ia, Canada a nd eve nt ua lly off the Fren ch Atlanti c coast at Qui bcro n Bay. the British Navy sou nd ly de feated Fre nc h baul c tlcct s to e me rge the domina nt wo rld na val powc r. So convincing wa s its victo ry at Q uilx-ron Bay that it q uashed any further immediate challe nge by the French to Britain's heg em o ny o f the sea , Ho weve r, w ithin a s ho rt s pace o f time the xituat lon cha nged dramatica lly. Rebe llion in the British North American colonie s tr iggere d the Ame rican \'Var o f Independence . In 177H thc French threw their lot in w ith the Ame rican s and , in the fo llowing year, Spa in joined w ith France in the wa r ag a ins t Brita in . In the sa me period . the Britis h col o nie s in North America . th e Ca rib bea n and Indi a we re a ll unde r attack . a nd a Fran co -Sp an ish inva sion of Brita in was co ns ide red a se rious th reat. Dislo catio n o f wo rld mar itime trade caused countries no t Involved in the conflict - Russia . De nmark. Swede n. Prussia . Holla nd . Port ug a l. Sicily and Austria - 10 fo rm ~1I1 Armed Ne utrality Pact to safeg uard the ir me rcha ntm en o n the high seas. Th e American \X'ar of Inde pe nden ce e nded in 17H3 w ith the defeat of the British fo rces , and the United States The three-dec k line-ot-battle ship , HMS Vict ory, Nelson 's flagship at the Battle of Trafalgar, now preserved at Ports mouth Dockyard .

estab lishe d as an inde pendent co untry. A de cade late r. fo llowi ng the Fren ch Revo lut iona ry \Va rs. Na poleon Bonaparte e merged to lead the fo rces o f the new French Republic o n a ram page throug h Europe . Pa rt of his grand stra teg ic p lan wa s also to remo ve the Britis h fleet from the Mediter ra nean, cutting o ff this vita l trade link with Ind ia. the treasure house of the British Emp ire, Bo na part e 's ultimate plan wa s

SDf B O I S O F

SJJP RDIAO'----

.:.._liiIIlI1il1l1lJ1~

17

T 1lE.JlAIIl.ESII.l.l!S

'As Victory passed through the enemy line, her po rtside guns op ened fire through the stern of the

Bucentaure causing som ething like 350 to 400 casualties. Our gunners would take between

ninety seconds and two minutes to fire and reloa d

a gun. :

to invade Eng land itsel f, hu t to achie ve th is he nee ded to co nt ro l the wa te rs o f the English Channe l. He boasted, 'Let LIS he maste rs of the Straits fo r six ho urs and we shall he maste rs of the world .' An alliance bet ween Fra nce and Spa in mad e this o therwise CIllPIY posturi ng into a po ten t threat ( 0 Britain .

The British Admiralt y fully understood the dan ger these massive naval fO f CL'S re prese nted the safety of England, and a large fleet, und er the co mmand of Vice-Admira l Ho ratio Nelso n. was mai ntai ned in the Med ite rran ean to keep a close eye o n the mo vemen ts of hot h the Fre nch a nd Spa nish fle e ts. Fo r seve ral years Ne lso n , in his fl ags hip f1 l\1S Victory, had sa iled the Med ite rranea n and Atlant ic trying to h ring th e Fre nch flee t to hattie , hut w ithout succes s. In Augu st 1805 Admiral Villene uve, co mmande r of the Fren ch flee t, slipped o ut of To ulo n through the Straits o f Gibral tar and into the Atlan tic to join fo rces wit h the Spa nis h Rca r-Adnural Mago n at Cad iz. But hy this time Bo naparte had lost pa tie nce w ith his navy and cancelled the pla nned invasio n of Brita in. I lis attention had turned eastwa rds, to wards Italy. Admiral Vill e ne uve the n received o rders to sail from Cad iz for the Med iterranean to su p port troop mo veme nts ncar Na ples " It wa s the mo ve tha t Ne lso n's fleet o f twe nty-seven line-o f-battle s hips, maintaini ng a distant block ade of Cad iz, had been wa iting for. O n the mo rn ing o f 20 Octo be r 1805, the co mbine d French a nd Spa nish flee t o f thirty-th ree s hips-o f-the-line , unde r th e co m ma nd of Admi ra l Villene uve , wa s c le a r of Cad iz, heading so uthwards , towards the Straits of Gibralta r. Forty-e ig ht miles westward . Nelso n wait ed un til they reache d the po int-of-no-ret urn from the sa fety of Cad iz harbour. Th e scene wus sci fo r o ne of the last o pe n-sea bat tles in th e e ra o f sa il - ce rta inly the most fam ous. Ne lso n had d iscusse d the tactic s for th is ine vitable battle with his capta ins so me time ea rlier. His hattie p lan wa s a radica l departur e from the ' Fig hting Instru ctio ns' issued by the Admira lty. These instructio ns d ictated that the s hips-of-the-line should he d ra wn up into a tigh t, single line which wo uld the n sa il in parallel past the e ne my's ow n line . In this fo rmat io n, the full weight o f the broadsid e 10

,:.._ IIiiIIlI• •

sn l1i ULS....O E..S~L\.CY..

would IX:' hrought 10 hea r on the e ne my line. It was a we ll-known and much rehea rsed tactic. In co ntrast, the 'Ne lso n To uch' ca lled for two British ha llie lines. no t o ne. saili ng paral lel to one ano the r and ~H an angle of almost 90 degrees 10 the enemy line . Ne lso n's pla n was that the two British lines would brea k up the single line of the Fre nch and Spanish Ol"C1S stretch ed before them, a nd that. S(";IUt:R"(I. the separate P~1I1S w ould IX:' overwh elmed in the ensuing 111C:1L~. This was a startling departure from accepted practice . and ;1 large part of its effe ctiveness d e pended o n Xclson"s conviction that his enemy would he taken hy surprise . On top o f the su rp rise d ement, xclso n made a gamble on the skill o f the o p posing flee ts. As Dr Eric G ro ve . 11:.1,"al stra tegist at the Un ive rsity o f Hu ll, says, 'TIle interesting thing about x c lso n 's tactics at Trafalgar is that lu- put himself into a posit ion which normally he wo uld ha ve tried to avo id . And th e re ason he did that was because he re al ize d tha t the French and Spanish fundamenta lly co u ld n' t s hoot straight. They cou ld n't even u tiliz e thei r guns within the very lim ited ranges that were technicall y possible .' French n ~I" ~1 1 historian Pro fesso r Philippe xtasson concu rs: 'The Fran co-Spanish firing was very s lo w and th eir a im was very h ad : Parr ly du e to th e military disorder ca used hy the Revolution. the French forces were po o rly tra ined a nd , hy Professor ,\ Iasso n's acco u nt , 'Th e En g lish gu nners we re three o r fou r times fast er at th e ir wo rk than th e ir Fre nc h o r Span is h co u nte rpa rts.' \'('o rsc still, 'Th e re was a tota l tick of co-ord ination in th e fleet: the Fre nch and Spanish ha d different p ract ice s. diff er ent p rocedu res. diffe rent signa lling codes - everyt hing was just Impr ovt scd at th e last moment.' \'('it h a ll thi s co n fusio n a lre ady a t p lay in th e e ne my 's ran ks , Ne lson's ta ctics w o rked spectacularly we ll, if no t q u ite as p lanned. \,(,he n Villeneuve I1 nally sighted Nelson, as ex pected. he tu rned his fleet a ro u nd to tb c no rth to head ha ck fo r th e safe ty o f Cad iz. \'('ith a ligh t no rthwe!"te rly b ree ze blowing in from th e Atlant ic, the British 11L'et , to w ind ward of th e ene my line , had the tactica l ndva ntugc , and the !"tage was sc i fo r the Battle o f Trafalga r. Pete r Goodwin, Kee pe r and Cura to r o f I L\I S Vic/VI)' at Port smo uth Nava l Dock ya rd , pa int!" th e pictu re o f the lxutlc fro m the perspective of tile lk itish flagsh ip . I I,\IS \ 'ic/o 1J ~ 'T he s h ip had cleared for action q ui te ea rly tha t day , a nd the men h ad been bea te n ld rummcd l to quarters so mew here arou nd about eleven o'c lock . All th e g uns were unlashed and prepared n....a dy for ba ttle . And the n comes the inevitable waiting game , Ihe e ne my arc d ose hy a nd you arc just wai ting and sailing into the m. As for the co mmand o f the ship, [Capta in] Hard y wo uld ha ve been o n the qua rter-deck co ntrolling the ship, steering, watching the sa ils, wat ching the enemy a nd wa tch ing the other sh ips a ro und him " And remember, ;111 these sh ips a rc going in line a head. Ne lso n himself wo uld have hee n a longside Ha rd y on the quarter-deck . as this is the co mma nd centre . An d these s hips w ould have been moving slo wl y - th e re w as n ot mu ch w ind , so it m ust have been even more ago n izing for these people. the te ns io n bu ilding up"TIley were movi ng

in :11 o ne a nd a half knots, and ther e in fro nt of them is th is wall of the e ne my. And it's around about half past e leven o r so thai the ene my stan firing

10

check the ir ranges. And

then you start ge lling a fe w sho ts co ming thro ugh the sa ils o n \,iC/o')', an d you get the re pea te d thud ~I S they begin to get the ir rang e an d home in . She's u nde r fire for co nstdc rab lc time as she J110ves in. And they can 't actua lly fire back bec ause th ei r gu ns are pointing to th e broadside and th e e nemy is in fro nt , so th ere's a fai r a mou n t of te ns ion. I know th at the Teme ra irc, w h ich was fo llo win g \';c/ o') ', was he g inn ing 10 d raw u p a longsi de and Ne lso n sa id so methi ng to Har d y a long the lines o f "Can yo u add o n more sam" lX'GllISC he wanted - an d th is is part o f Nels o n's characte r - to go into lxntlc fi rst , to le ad hi", men fo rw ard - so the vtctory surg ed ah ead. 'Abo ut 11.25, w h ile the y we re actu a lly the re o n th e q ua rter-d eck, Ne lson mad e h is sign al . l ie act uall y m ad e tw o s ig n a ls a nd h e sa id to Pasco e , w ho w as th e s ig n a l

•-----19

.. !

/

...

I

r

A decisive moment at the Battle of Trafalgar - HMS Victory is shown breakingthrough the enemy line on 21 October 1805

in this painting by Robert Taylor. ~

I

(Reproduced courtesy of the Military Gallery. Bath, UK.)

22

~.IIIIiIII.Il..

-':T II LJJAT I J.ES I U l!S

lieute na nt, "I wish to am use the flee rs wi th a sig nal, h ut ma ke it q uick fo r I ha ve another o ne to fly" - o r signal 10 make . And that is w he n the "England ex pects" signal was ho isted to the w ho le fl e et. And as soon as th at was com p lete d , the s ign al w as ha u led d o wn , a nd the sig nal o ne -six - to engage the ene my mo re closely - w as the n hoisted . and ther e it re mained at th e mizzen to psa il ya rd until sh ot away du ring the battle . As s he ca me clo se r to the [e ne my] s h ips , she wou ld h ave be e n o pe n-fired o n hy the Bnc enta urc, a nd the Redoumbte. She was ta king th e o ns laug ht o f all o f this w hich ca used a considerable numbe r o f casualties as she d osed. O ne bar -sho t from th e enelllY actu ally

to o k o ut eigh t mari nes w ho wer e stand ing in file o n the po o p d eck. You ca n imag ine all th is goi ng o n, h ut everybo dy having to remain ca lm and stay at their statio n un til the y go t w ith in range of the e ne my . 'As she ca me u p o n to the e ne my , she turn ed slightly to star board to mak e he r way be twee n the ste rn o f the Fre nch flags hi p Bnce nta nre a nd the ho w o f the Fren ch Nec!oll /ah/e. And then she turned slightly to po rt again to pu sh he r way th rough , a nd as she passed th rough the e ne my line , he r po rtside g uns o pened fire th ro ug h the ste rn of the tsuccntaure. The ste rn w as so d ose to the vtctory that the main ya rd of the l 'iclw )' cut th rou gh so me of the rigg ing o f the ga ff of the French flagshi p . In d istance. we arc talking sOI1H.-rhing like 3H feel (II. 5 metres] from the broadsid e o f l 'icI(1)' to the wi ndows o f the Bncentaure. You can imag ine the de vastat ing effec t of hoth the ()'i· poun ders an d the (1R.po u nd carronadc firing th ro ugh the stern with 500 mu sket halls a nd a (~- po u n d hall. Then every other gun o n the port side w hich had been dou ble o r tre ble [lo aded]. pa ssing th rou g h the wh ole length o f the Fre nch flagsh ip , causing so met hing like 350 to 400 casualties. And as she went through , he r sta rboard side C;II11e up close and collided with the Redc utuhlc and the two the n d rifted do w nwi nd in mo rta l co mb at , so 10 s pea k. ' It wo u ld ha ve be en con tro lled firing rat he r q uick success ive b roa dxidcs int o the e ne my s h ips . Bro adsid es , o u r g u n ne rs cou ld ta ke be twee n ninety seconds an d two m inutes to fire and reloa d a gu n. But natura lly, as the ha ttie p rogressed an d the casualties inc re ased , a nd so me wea pons p ut o ut o f act io n a lto gethe r, the pace o f fire wou ld d et eriora te th ro ugh o ut th e afte rn o o n. At the e nd of the d a y, \'icI OI) ' used so me thing like 7.6 IOns o f g u npo wd er. So multi p ly tha t h y th ree , a nd it'll g ive you a ro ugh idea th at s he 'd fired off so me th ing like 21 ton s o f shot , which w as on ly a s ma ll p ropo rtio n o f the 120 tons that s he ca rried o n hoard . That g ives yo u so me idea o f the fe rocity o f the ba ttle . and sho t that was used u p in abo ut fo ur hou rs.' By -ipm the hattie was e ffec tively over; and Britain was triu m ph a nt. Ye t ther e was traged y in tr ium ph for the victors: Nelso n had bee n cut do wn hy a French s nipe r du ring the hallie , a nd lived o nly lo ng enoug h to le arn that his tactics had succeed ed . He had wo n an e pochal victo ry fo r Britain. At the sa me time that Britain gr ieve d for Ne lson in victo ry, Fran ce too k hea rt in de feat. As Profe sso r Masson poin tedly ex plains , '111t.' Fre nch pe opl e were very pleased to lea rn of Nelso n's death - the y really lo athed Nelson, who had d efeated the French Navy at Abouchi r. People said that Nelson's death was well wort h the loss o f a sq uadron.' Unfo rtu nately for Villeneu ve , the defea te d com ma nder o f the fleet, th e d et ermi natio n of the Fre nch 10 mak e the most o f the ir small triumph d id no t exte nd to him. Villeneuve had ca rried the ho pes of the natio n, and had let the people d ow n badly. 111ey were not w illing to forg ive him. Professo r x tasson says: '[Napol eo n] thou g ht Villeneuve was a man \V 11O had luck on his side. w hen he learned that Villeneuve had waged a lxutlc and lost it, Napoleon hea ped CU f.sCS o n him via the Ministry for the Navy. And when poo r Villeneuve was freed an d carne hack from England , when he saw tha t he was he ing shu nned hy everyo ne , tha t ev en the Minister was rel uct ant to d e fend him, he to o k his own life . And so , of the two heroes o f that great ha ttie, o ne was killed in co mb at and the o ther died late r.'

1 1'< ..•..·-------23

• '='1'snUB» S OF S IIPREAl.A CY

The Hallie of Trafalgar was one of the

. --. _ .-....

1110 st

significant lxut les in naval histo ry and .

in th e e vo lutio n of the b.u tlcshtp. re pr e se nt ed o ne o f the fine st ex a m ples o f the ro le played hy big-gu n ships in the fort un es o f natio ns and, at times. en tire em pi res.

HMS VICTORY DIMENSIONS,

Had the re su lts nt Trafal g a r bee n re ve rse d , Na po leo n 's p la ns to in vad e Eng lan d may well han ' bcvn p ut hack o n the agenda w ith devasta ting res ults . II was also a DISPLAcEMEtrr, stunning e xample o r how. through insp ired leade rship. o utstand ing tactics and more CONSTRUCTION, d isciplined and bette r trained cre ws. a smaller fleet with far less fire po we r defeated an enclllY fl eet of higge r, faster a nd more heav ily armed ships. Eno rmo u s nati o nal pride wa s at sta ke at Trafa lga r. Fo r the Britis h people , the legacy o f the victo ry ClINIIAS, remains 10 this day, a glow ing pride in their Ro yal Navy a nd its achie vements - a ARMAMEtrr, t1gh ting force that shape d , and has continued to influence , the dest iny o f their small island na tion for over two ce nturies. If eve r the re WL'n.' a n exa mple of a 'banlcship' that beca me a symbo l of natio nal pride, it is s urel y 1IJ\IS \ 'icl (,,)' - still in commissio n in the Ro ya l Navy , beauti fully preserved an d rc :..to n-d . s he is the ultim ate e xam ple o f the power a nd ma jesty of a line-of-bat tle sh ip o f 100 guns - an eightee nth -century ancestor of the g reat lxrttlcshipx that we re to fo llo w. Ove r 260 years se parated Vi cIOI)' from ,lI(11)' Rose and altho ugh ho th s hips we re co nstructe d from W (XX l. powered hy w ind a nd sail. and had their main firepo wer co ming from side -mo unted canno ns, the re wa s a wo rld of diffe re nce in their size a nd ca pab ility. \ 'iCIOI) ' was 226,5 fee t in le ngth overall. displ ace d 3:;00 IOns o f wa te r and carncd -t ac res of ca nvas un der full sa il. He r (fCW numb ered around H50 me n. He r a rma me nt was a rranged o n three gun decks an d totalled 102 cast-iro n. muzzle -load ing cannon firing s ho t of be twee n 12 an d .~ 2 pounds. At this time , round s ho t from a 32-po under co uld he fired for mo re than a mile - a ltho ug h it!'> de structive power, of co urse , wus gr c. uc st at close range : then, a ca nno n IXIIl o f thi s size co uld smas h thro ug h mo re tha n 2 feet of so lid timbe r. Add itio na lly, Victory ca rried two ca rro nadcs. a s ho rtrange wea po n ca pable of firing a massive (lH- po und p roje ctile to de vastating e ffect . But apart from :-iizc a nd firepo we r, \';clm)' was not really qualit atively diffe ren t in e ither design o r de velopm en t from the .\llII)' Rose, built more than two an d a half ce nturies earlier, A:-i Colin \X'hite , Deputy Director o f the Ro yal Naval Muse um. Portsmouth explains:

'The J Im ) ' Nose and he r type o f h ig-gu n sh ip ma rked a h ig revol ut io n in the sto ry of ship desig n. But then-after. the de velo pment of the warship was really q uite slow . So slow indeed that a sailo r from the .l Im )' Ruse could han : go ne o n hoa rd the 1';eI0l )' nea rly 250 years later, ami afte r about, say , a co up le o f hours gett ing acqu ainted w ith he r. would have been f~l i rl)' at hom e . The tech niq ues tha t he would have had to use . bot h 10 sai l the ship and to fight he r. we re very much the same . Ho we ver. a sailo r fro m the ViC/OI)' goi ng on hoa rd a ship just Ion years late r wou ld ha ve bee n totall y o ut o f place . Co mp lete ly diffe re nt met hods or propulsio n. huge g uns po wered hy hydraul ics - e veryth ing would have be en unfa miliar, And so there was, in a sense . a pe riod of stability be tween the JIm )' Nose a nd the \';CI Of) '. The re we re ch an ges of co urse. hut the )' we re mostly s mall a nd

detailed , '111e 1'ictorv' re present s, if yo u like , the fina l pe ak of battles hip design that started wit h .l Imy Nuse.' The im me di ate o utco me o f Trafa lgar wa s the qu as hing o f an y fut ur e ho pe s Fran ce had o f invadin g Britain. The victory a lso co nfirme d the Ro yal Navy's do minatio n of the se a . a nd the Britis h we re the n a ble to ope rat e . u nc ha lle nged - eve -n in Fra nce 's own ha c k ya rd , the Mcd lrcnunca n. Ten yea rs later, Na po leo n Bon aparte 's military rampa ge fina lly ca me to a ha lt and a peace se llled throug hout Euro pe which lasted fo r O\'L'r fifty yea rs.

ll6F1 6IN ¥ sl Fi 6IN ¥ l lFi 6IN (69 ¥ 16 ¥ 6SMJ

3,00 TONS OA~ , ELM, FIR/ PINE; HULL cOPPE RSHEArHED 't ACRES 10l cASr-IRON CJWNON, RANC.INC. FROM Il- TO 32-POUNDER,;; e ¥ 66POUND cARRONADES 6,0 (APPRO¥)

•

al to

team 00 to tee I

n th e peace that fo llo wed Tra falgar, whil e Euro pea n nati ons co nso lida ted the ir co lonial emp ires, the development of the battleshi p took o n a new momentum, p arti cu larly in Britain , Dr Eric Grove o f

the Unive rsity of Ilull ex p lains : 'In the years afte r 1815, th e power o f th e sa iling line -o f-batt le ships gr eat ly increased , w ith changes in armament, he avie r ca lib re a rmame nt, great imp ro ve me nt in th e way th e guns a re used , a nd th e es ta b lish me nt o f th e gun ne ry sc hoo l at HMS Excellen t in th e 1830s. By aro und 1840-50 the British battle fleet was a much mor e e ffective instrum en t. It co uld shoot accuratel y at ran ges perh aps of a nauti ca l mile , w hereas in Ne lso n 's tim e , th e ran ge had o n ly be en about 200 yards . So we 're talking about an increa se from 200 to 2000 yards , a trem endou s increase . And th is increase in firepower, co upled with an assumption that we co uld always defeat an equal oppone nt, meant that Britain was accepted as the domina nt naval power in the nineteenth ce ntury.'

As the wooden. sai l-powered wars hips of the wor ld's navies rea ch ed new peaks in size and destructive efficiency . smoke fro m th e new industrial age was slo wly Ix:g in ning to drift across

sh ipya rd..; where. w ith adze. saw and chisel. master crafts me n had bee n b uildi ng great

n~·s."L'1s

of

The world 's first ironclad, the French Gloire designed by Depuy de Lome. The appearance of this

wood fell' ce ntu ries, -11K ' age.' (If ,-.tt..":.II11. and the.' myriad o f new technologies that crea ted the Ind ustrial

ship created a stir in Britain and

Revolution. heralded the great est q uamum lea p in the evolutio n of the: battleship. New developments

promp ted fears of a 'steam

in the science o f meta llurgy created material for shipbui lding at a time whe n the great o ak forests

invasion '.

of Britain and Europe we re almost finished and demand for h iM er. stro nger hulls was reac-hing new heights. Ne w me:ta ls a nd machine ry provided g un -ma ke rs w ith th e mat e rial and the

t111'~II1S

to

produce \\'eapo ns o f destruct io n. alm ost witho ut limitatio n of size and po wer. The art of tTt::.lIing dini:re:m forms of sh(,.·lls and Illis...;iles for the ne w guns was perf ected and this. in tum. challenged ship builders to ovate hulls that co uld w ithstan d a ba rrage o f these new-form. destruct ive missiles. And StC:;l111 gave rise to a new fo rm o f pro pu lsi on th at wo ul d soo n se c s a ils. masts a n d rigging d isappear com pletely. As Coli n \"'h ite.: o f Port s mout h's Ro yal Nava l xt uw um puts it: 'Th e real cha nge

I h ~1l

re volution ized nava l warfa re: was. o f course. the introductio n of

stea m pr o pu lsion . just as it revo luti oni zed a ll o ther aspect s o f society. Once it wa s possible to p ropelle r a s h ip witho ut having to worry about wh ich d irecti on the wi nd was in . all so ns of po ssihilitie:s came into p lay. It was rea lly th e development o f the

S{(.>~l111

e ng ine.: and its ap p lication to th e sh ip hu ll that mad e the grea t cha nge. O f co urse it wasn 't e asy to a p p ly stea m power to p ropell ing a s h ip . xtany d ifferent methods w e re tried. h ut it wasn 't unt il the inve ntion of th e screw propeller and its successfu l application to warsh ips th at stea m powe r rea lly became a goer as far as nuvul ve sse ls were co nce rned :

In I XI ; a liule American ship. Sarannab. fitted wit h an auxil iary steam engine. made

GLOIRE DIMENSIONS,

the first successfu l steam-dr ive n lT ossing of (he Atlantic O cea n. Com mercia l ship ping Z"FT 61N (WATERLINE) ~ "FT 91N ~ Z7FT lOIN (77.66 ~ 16.99 ~ 6.;6MJ

DISPLACEMEwr, >630 TONS CONSTRUCTION, HULL OF WOOD, IRONCLAD HORlLOwrAL RETURN, COMPOUND, Z,OOHP

PROrRTION , CREW,

13 ~N0T5 36 ~ 6.;-INCH (163-MMJ RIFLED, MUULE-LOADING GUNS BELT, U,IN (IZOMMJ ,70 (APPROV

lines q uickly ad opted the new tech nolo gy h UI. as po p ular o pi nion wou ld have it. the Britis h Ad mi ralty we re slow to foll o w suit Thi s id ea is hOl ly de nied hy David K. Bro w n - ret ire d De- p ut y Ch ie f Nava l Archi tect o f the Ro ya l Co rps o f Nav a l Co nstructo rs - w ho also pro vides an e ndorsement for the slIcn 'ss o f the ear ly. and reaso nably s ma ll. armed nava l paddle wh e clc rs . As he te lls it : 'By IHZ.3, the)' [the Admiralt y] s ta rted o n a re gu lar p ro g ramllle of h uild ing ste a m h~lI tl L' sh i p s a nd hI' IH30ish, the paddl e wars hip wa s an effectiv e figilling s hip . II is q uite unt rue 10 say tha t admi ral s d idn 't app ro ve o f th e se . All the co rrespo nd e nc e [rece ive d h y the Admiralty]. p:.nt icul arly fro m the Medit e rran ean. was to se nd mo re steamers.' Altho ug h ther e was no lon g-te rm futu re fo r padd le -d rive n wa rs hips, so me that we re bu ilt were d eplo yed as tugs to p ull large th ree-deck line -o f-battle shi ps into firing posi tion s - a method of man o e u vring used wit h a g rea t d ea l o f SlKl'<:SS in th e Crimea n 'xur o f IHS4- 6 . This co nflict, be tween the Russian fo rce s a nd the combin ed British, French , and Turkis h
developed she lls fired for the first time in wa r. The ...tart o f the Crime a n W~l r ca n he trace d ha ck to the Russian e ncr o ach men t o n Tu rkis h te rritory in lB53. In Nove mb e r of that year at Stno pc . a small force o f ...ix Russian line-of-hallie ships, eq uip ped with (~- po u n de rs ca pable of firing she lls rat he r than ca nnon halls. an nihilated a small Tur kish sq uadron, Altho ugh she lls had lx..-. cn in existe nce for so me time , this battle graph ically demon strated their destructive power. Several Turki sh vess els had bee n very q uick ly set alig ht and blew up , Up u ntil thai time can no ns mostly fired so lid ma ter ial, such as iro n. These much more so phisticated new p ro jectiles were metal cas ings filled with explosive w hich ex ploded o n impact. Ar the bo mbardmen t o f Se vasropo l in the Crimea , the comb ined Britis h a nd French flee r w itnessed the e ffectiveness of these Russian she lls, To co unte r this fo rm o f dead ly ne w weapo n. bo th coun tries se t abo ut the cons truction of flo ating gun plat form s p rot e cted hy armo ur plates

·1 inches ( 100 rnm ) th ick . These platform s. o r batter ies. eq uipped with stea m e ng ines provid ing a s peed o f 4 kn ot s. were ma no e uvre d h y s te a m lu gs a nd use d 10 o ve rw he lm the Russ ia n fo rtress at Od essa . It ra pid ly became dear that the wrought -iron a rmo ur used o n the ba tteries could ea sily wit hstan d bo th Russian Sl101 a nd she lls. Th e s uccessful use o f ho th ex p losive shells a nd a rmour-p lated batte ries in (his wa r was to have g rc.u influe nce o n the fut ure design o f the mod e rn bat tleship. \'(' ith e\ 'ef)' ne w tech nol ogy that im p rov ed the q ualily a nd range of metal s. and wi th the scie nce of ex plosives develo pi ng ha nd- in-h and wit h the creat ion o f h igge r a nd mo re po w e rful missiles , the po w e r a nd s ha pe o f the lxutlcxhip was about [ 0 und e rgo a re mark able mct.un orph os ts into the most awesome weapo n o f destruct io n in Ihe histo ry o f mankind . Alte r the end o f the Crimean \'\-'ar in lH56. it did not take lo ng fo r the brief en ten te bet we en the Bri tish an d French to e nd, Soo n the two lo ng-lime pror ocateurs were at il again, this time b rought about hy the revolution in naval architecture and the introd uction o f new tech no log ies. As long as the e ra o f wooden sailing s hips co ntinued. Britain's rival na tions a ll seemed resig ned tha t the Ro yal Navy did indeed mil" the wa ves. '111l' Battle of Trafalga r had es tablished that . o nce and for all. Ho we ve r, the introd uctio n o f new technologies created an e ntirely new d imension in the buildin g (If flgilling ships. Whe n it came to steam. iron o r steel. or the ne'" scie nce o f ex plosives. no co unt ry - no t e ve n Britain - had any g reater depth o f kn o w ledge Ih ~1Il an y ot he r. The natio ns were a ll stat1ing fro m scratch. Almost overn ight, ce ntu ries of traditio nal shipbuilding tec hn iq ues and nava l Sl r~ lll'gy we nt o ut the window. It was the mom ent in histo ry thai the Fren ch had been wa iting for. They co uld not de feat the British d uring the age o f sa il b ut pe rhaps, if they were fi rst to embrace

these new tech no log ies. they cou ld I1.Ile supre me in the age o f stea m and iron . In !\.Jarch I H~. the French I'\a\)' placed an o rder for fo ur ironclad b attleships. to he built 10 the design

-=-.'· ....-

-1Oii11..._

SAIl TO ST Er\\l-=-..W..UOU TO STEE l rL ICL£ll.U

of their chie f 11:.1\';,11 nrcl utcct . I x.: p U)' til" Lome . Th e fiN o f these. Gloirp. \\'~L" completed in t H60. Jl\O(

:.I

part icularlv handsome ship. C/oi,.£, had a 1>L'1t of wroug ht iron 4.7 inches ( 120 111m) thick exte nding down hoth sid es of the hu ll to a de pth of 5 Icct ( I ..i lmetres ) 1 ~I ()w the wa terl ine . Her armament

<.:on."i-.tt..."ll of thirty-six 6.-i-indl ( 16311un) rifled . muzzle-loading guns arranged on gu n decks down either

side. Altho ugh fully riggl.'tl for sa il. she had simp le co mpo und engines of 2SOJ ho rsepower co nnected to a pro pelle r shah . Unde r power, she could steam ut an impres sive 13 knots. French plans e nvisaged :.I total o f thin}' o f this new class o f ship, which they hop ed wo uld w in

SlIprt.:'Ill:l C )'

for the Fre nc h Navy. O f these , te n we re to he comple ted w it hi n e ig h te e n

mon ths . Itowcvcr. restrictio ns in French iro n manufact ur ing capacity di cta ted that th ree of these fo ur new ships . including C /o;,.e, had h ul ls bu ilt of wood. O nly one, Couranne. had a hu ll bu ilt o f iro n . Ho wever. the Hritish ha d also been d evelopi ng plans for ironclad warships. as David Bro w n explains: '\"\'t....d been loying wit h the hig armoured warshi p for :-i()I11C time h ut it was not o u r policy 10 lead. To change 10 iro n warsh ips wou ld mak e o ur ex isting sh ips useless . so we held O UT

ha nd kno wing thai British ind ustry was so far superior to French industry that anything

Ihey d id we could ma tch very qui ckl y. C/oire was a terrible erro r o n the pan o f the Fren ch, W'e 'd been fighting the huilding race with the French o n wooden ste um wa rships a nd the French had kepi pace wit h o ur bu ilding . By changing to the new technology of iro n and ar mo ur. Fre nch ind ustry just could n't co pe. and they lo st.' Th L' a ppeara nce o f C /u jr £' inflam ed British sus picions and overstated fear s 01' :1 Fren ch 'steam inva sion'. Th is situa tio n caused pla ns fo r the building o f a British iro nclad to h e immediat e ly stepped up , and two new iro nclad wa rs hips. \\'fl177'or an d Btacls Prince. we re h uilt. Strictly, th ey were a rmed frig:lIL's , hut thei r radi ca l d esi gn , inco rpo ra ting till.' late st state-of-the-a n led 1l10 10g ics o f th e- tim e . p roved in va lua ble in th e d evelopment of all future batt leships. Th e first of these. 1\"(1177'01: appeared in 1H6I. and her siste r shi p , ltlacl: Prince. a p.:ar later. 11K'ir appt..·:IT:.mCt..· in the English Chan nel tota lly destroyed the brief 1110l11cnt of naval s uperiori ty Iht..· French had enjoyed w ith the launch o f Gtotre. David Brown says of \\'t I1TI or. 'ShL' was a tre me ndous adva nce o n an ythin g th ai had gone befo re. She was mu ch faster tha n Gloiro, much more heavil y armed. slightly superior armo ur. She wa s a re ma rkable s h ip . Sh e 'd go t :111 so rts o f n e w id ea s. There was a little blast furna ce in the boil e r room

10

p roduce mo lte n iro n wh ich wou ld IX' pUI in hollow sho t an d tired at the e nelllY

to sp latte r th em w ith ho t mol te n iro n . She'd .fo rced ve nt ilatio n to th e g u ndcck

10

h low

th e s mo ke away . She'd gOI hand-ope rate d wa shi ng machin es in the lau nd ry. a nd mo st Hritixh s h ip:-; o f \"\'orl d \Var Tw o d id n 't ev en have a la u ndry. She wa s. he rsel f. evolutionary. \,,\ '(,"d had the armou red s hip be fore . we'd had stea m p ropeller-d riven :-;hips before. There was lill ie absolu te ly new technol ogy. It was th e package th at was new. So I refer to U" ln l or us an evolutionary sh ip that triggered a revolutio n.' A handsome sh ip ,j 10 fee t ( 12H metres) long o ve ra ll. \\'tln l ur d isplaced o ve r 9000 tons a nd ca rried an armament of le n IIQ-pounders, four 7Q-po u nde rs and twenty-six (>H-pou nders, 111e:-;e guns were a mixtur e of muzzle-loa d ers and th e latest. rifle -barrel led. b reech-loadi ng g un:-; fro m the Armstrong arma ment factory that fired th e latest designed shells. Un like Glotre, her hull wus bu ill e nti rely of iron . Toda y l\"(l n·i o r. beau tifully re sto red to her origin a l stale . is o pen to the public ut Po rtsm ou th Nava l Dockya rd , Anot her ma jor ste p in th e deve lopment o f the batt leship was thL' introd uction o f the tu rret g u n, and it took pla ce thousan ds of miles away . on the o the r sid e o f th e Atlan tic d u ring th e

•

_

27

/

,

\

.: The British reply to the French

Ame rican Civil \'\'ar of 1861-;. The turret gun was not a new idea and. as a concept. it had been

ironclad Gloire, Warrior was an

in development in Britain and Europe for some time. what the Civil \'\'ar provided was the opportunity to test it under battle conditions. When the Southern States seceded. the hulk of

altogether more capable and elegant warship. She is now preseNedatPortsmou~

Dockyard.

the ships and the major dockyards o f the US ~a\'Y remained in Northern hands. Blockaded ~~1\1' was forced to o perate within its \"cry limited ind ustrial

by these ships. the Confederate

base with regard 10 ordnance. armour. marine engineering and shipbuilding. The cha lle nge to break this blockade saw tw o major innovations in naval warfare emerge. firstl y. the

Confederate :s'a\T hastily encased the burnt-out hull of a wooden steam frigate. stcrmnoc. in armour. TIle result was a bizarre low-freeboard. floating battery with eight c -inch (218-mm) and two 7-in<.:h (l78-mm) rifled shell guns mourned o n the br oadside. HMS WARRIOR protruding through armour-protected gun ports. She was renamed CSS Virginia. This strange-looking craft was designed specifically 10 run the gauntlet. through a DIMENSIONS, 'tZOFT CO\'ERI4..U Y ,8FT 'tIN Y Z6FT wall of fin:' from shore-mourned artillery. enabling her to set about the destruction C1Z8 Y 17.78 Y 7.9ZM} of wooden warships manning the blockade. DISPLAcEMENT, 9137 TONS Aware of this development. the US l'.'a\"y accepted a design for an e ve n more CONS11l\X.T1ON, IRONCLAD CHI.ll OF radi cal ironclad from John Ericsson. a Swedish-horn engineer and inventor living IRON} in America . Ericsson's solution was the s tonttor. to all intents and purposes an MAcHINERY, HORILONTAL TllUNK, ,Z67HP armoured. steam-propelled raft ca rrying two I I-inch (1&)-mm) smooth-bore guns. SPEED, I'tKNOTS These guns. the largest in existence at the time. were housed in ~I rotating iron turret ARMAMENT, 10 Y 1I0- POUNDER; 10 feet (6 .1 me tres) in diameter and 9 feet <2.74 me tres) high. weighing 161 IOns. 't Y 70-POUNDER; Th e sig nifica nce of the turre t lay in us ability 10 he aimed in any direction Z6 Y 68-POUNDER irres pective of the direction of the ship. \,\'ilh a freebo ard o f on ly I foo t (305 nun), PROTECTION, BELT, 't.sIN CII'tMM} s tonttor loo ked every b it as biza rre as he r Confederate oppone n t. CREw, 707 (APPRO¥.> O n 8 M arch 1862 , the ne w ly named Virg inia prove d her wo rth b y eas ily

S.A..IJ IO SI.E.iUL -=--'>\C.Ill:lliJ:.tL.5.:rEU

-'.a. _..1II1

1ai"'-~ 29

destroying two Federa l frigates in the wa te rs of Hampton Roads. at the ent rance of Chesa pe ake Bay on the cast coast of Ameri ca . On the foll o w ing da y, stonttor ar rived to c ha lle nge the Confederate vessel. Action began an d rage d inco nclusively for over three ho urs. but neith er ship was able 10 penetra te the ot her's a rmo ur a nd eventual ly both vessels with drew, virtually intact. For th e mom e nt, iro ncl ad vessels a ppeared invu lne rab le. a nd it w as clea r that the future of effective fighting ships d epe nded on improveme nts in guns and the project iles they fired. The

success of the turret-mo unted gun he ralded a new era in the layo ut of hig guns in ba ulcxhips. The days of fixed g uns mou nled in decks runn ing the length o f the ship were numbered. Ho weve r, the success of bot h these he a vily a rmou red fig hti ng sh ips a lso de pe nd ed o n a numbe r of other factors, each signposting the way fo rw ard for the design of future warsh ips. Bo th vessels relie d enti rely o n the ir engines - hot h were heavily a rmo ured w ith guns and a ll pro pulsion machinery p rot ected fro m e ne my she lls - and ne ithe r had an y fo rm o f ma sts o r riggin g to rest rict the work ing of th e shi p unde r b attle cond itio ns. o r the arc of fin: th e g un s co uld o pera te on. II mUM a lso be sai d th at both vesse ls we re des ign ed fo r use o nly in th e protected wa te rs of Hampton Roads. They we re strictly ca lm-wa te r fig hting ships. and tota lly unsu itable for usc in th e o pe n se a. Fo r b lue -wa ter banleshtps the re was still a lot o f developme nt to ta ke p lace befo re they wou ld incorpo rate the in nova tions these tw o Civil \'\'ar fighting ships ha d used so effectively . Throughout Ihe IH70s and l HHOs in Brita in a nd Europe, a bew ilde ring range of des ign s was p rodu ce d in a n att empt to find a way o f reconc iling new a nd e me rging te chnol ogi es wi th th e realities of sail powe r. \X'hile masts a nd rigging rema ined an ess ent ial clem ent of the ship's p rop ulsio n syste m, Ihe 1110 ve awa y fro m the broadsid e-mo unt ed g uns to inco rpo rate the

Officers of the US Navy stand on

turret princip le created enormo us problems.

revolving turret , 9 July 1862.

the deck of Monitor beside her

E BArn ESIIII'S

Although stea m po we r was in th e ascendan cy. it w as not unt il tile IHHOs tha i s te a m ma ch inery w as co ns idered re liabl e e noug h to a llo w sa ils a nd thei r associ:lle d rig 10 be d ispensed w ith e ntirel y. By the n , scie ntific methods had beg un to p l:J y :1 g rea ter role in the d es ign o f sh ips a nd o rd nan ce , as we ll a s in the ma tc rinlx used in co ns truc tio n , Nava l a rch itecture , lo ng a rule -o f-thum b activity . increa sing ly be came g uide d by sc ie ntific methods o f inves tiga tio n, In th is same pe riod . the baste mat e rials use d in s hip construction \ H .·!"L' he ing refined a nd perfected. Steel was be ing prod uced in g reate r q uantities and rapid ly re placed iron as the pr emie r shipbuild ing mater ial. Po litica lly, d uring the last ha lf of the IHOOs, the wo rld appear ed to he going throug h a stagl' of rea sonable stab ility. The United States w as alread y a po we rful. yo ung ind ustrial nation. with see mi ng ly boundless natural reso urces, and a populatio n growi ng hy the day due to the largest wa ve of im mig ratio n in gloha l histo ry . Unificatio n o f the Germa n Sta tes in IH7 1 crc.ucd a » e m p ire that would , indeed , ro ck the world as it be come a majo r p layer in world affa irs - a po werful maritime natio n that wo uld e mbrace the battleshi p as a key o ffen sive weapon in its q uest fo r g loha l su p rc macy . Japa n had mo ved from being a collect ion o f feuda l stntcs w ith thc J\lciji Restora tio n in IH6B w he n Impe rialja pan e merged. so o n to take its place as the k':lding natio n in Asia, and a pot e ntia l world po we r. Fran ce , unde r the rule of Na po leo n III (n e p he w o f Na po leo n Bo napa rte ). a pa rt from defe a t in a s ho rt w a r wi th Prussia . ha d ex pe rience d reaso nab le prosperi ty, and a period o f no n-aggressio n w ith its o ld en emy o n the o the r silk, of the Englis h Channel. And Britain remained the do mi na nt world po wer. During the reig n of Q uee n Victo ria , the British Em pire basked in prosperity as the largest and most powe rful e m pire in histo ry. British facto ries w ere the works ho p o f the world . he r me rchant s hips carried the hul k o r the world 's ca rgoes. and her Ro yal Navy co ntinued to rule the wa ves - a glo hal det e rre nt 10 any natio n that wou ld clare cha llenge a ny part of her vast co lo nial em pire. Andrew 1.:.II11he I1 . nava l historian at King's Co llege , Lo ndon . e mphasize s the po litical import ance of navies at this tim e: 'Th rough out the nine tee nth centu ry, the British Ro ynl Navy was the sing k most po we rful polit ica l instrume nt on the face of the e arth . Its abil ity to mo ve a nd o pera te globall y was q uite un iq ue . The problem fo r the Royal N:l\'Y th ro ugh out th is ce ntury wa s that its main functio n was nOI to fight, hut to deter the challenge of rival po wers - to e nsure that war d id no t occur. Britain is a g loba l tradin g power, he r inte rests are peace. stability, good terms fo r co m me rce . So the ro le o f the navy is 10 essentially pre vent o the r navies. ot her nati on s, challe ng ing Britain 's hege mo n y o f the wo rld o utside Europe a nd the ir a hility to co ntro l its co mme rce . In the late I ~Os and into the UNO!'i , a numb e r of nat io ns eit he r re built o r buil t navies with power - po litical objects - in mind . The best kno wn am o ng these w as the Unite d Sta tes, w hic h rebu ilt its mo rib und navy; Japan . w hich cre ated a navy; Ge rman y, w hich revitalized a hith ert o smal l coasta l de fe nce navy: a nd even the Russia ns. w ho'd rathe r 10 Mthc ir navy o n severa l occasio ns. go t hack into battle -fleet naval co ns tru ctio n . The battles hi p as a n instrum en t, a nd the battle fl eet as a conce ntra te d symbo l o f po we r. became absol utely critica l to inte rnat ional and great powe r rela tion s. 'All na tio ns w ho too k th e msel ve s se rio us ly had ha u lcs hi ps. So me o f them . o f course, we re rather s mall batt leshi ps , but most o f the ma jo r po we rs bu ilt b rgl·. oce an g< >ing bat tles hi ps.' By the e nd of the ce ntury. the batt les hip had go ne throug h so ma ny stages of de velopment that a sailo r fro m, say. Wflrrior - o nly fort y yea rs befo re - would have ha rdl y recog nized the se new and im me nsely mor e powe rful cap ita l sh ips. No r would this sa me sa ilo r ha ve kno w n o f the we a pons cap ab le of deslro ying th ese flew b reed o f wars hips: the mag ne tic mine . the self-

1_

propelled torpedo and 11lL' subma rine . The de velopme nt o f these dea d ly \H:apons happe ned in parallel wit h th e tran sformati on o f the fightin g s h ip from wood and sa il, to ste a m and steel. As eac h flew wea po n w as perfecte d. th e: a rmo ur a nd d efen ce o n fight ing s h ips were im p ro ved to thwa rt th e new w ea po n 's e ffective n ess. Thi s in tu rn c ha lle n ge d the sc ie ntists

The battle be tween USS Monitor and CSS Virginia (ex-Merrimac) on Hampton Roads on 9 March 1862 raged for hours with neither

an d t.'n ginl..'L'rs to invent eve n deadlier and more destructive..• weapo ns. It was a self-pe rpetua ting

vessel able to penetrate the

p rocess a nd , with eac h devel o p me n t. the e vol ut io n o f the battl esh ip re ached a no ther stage in

armour of the other.

th e pursu it o f

oCL'~In -go i ng

invi ncibi lity a nd ultimate power . •\I asts a nd rigg ing di sappeared as

giant steam-powered e ng ines. d riving tw in p rope lle rs, pushed th e hu g e steel juggernaut s. in ~my

weath er. at speeds o f J5 kn o ts an d mo re .

The she er wei g ht of armour plate: necessa ry to prot ect a ship e nt irely from s hells. torpedo . mine and. mu ch later. air att ack. posed e normous design pr oblems for the naval architects. Fro m the ea rliest days, the a nswer was to restrict a rmour p lating to the most vul nerable areas of th e hull a nd s uperstruct ure . Thi s localized p ro te ction re s ulted in the development of an 'armo ured 1J<..'1 t' cove ring . part icularl y. a mids hips w he re the s hi p's mag azines a nd th e e ng ine rooms were usu all y loca te d . Th is 'bel t' was de sig ned to fit secu rely o ve r the o utside o f the ship's hull. in special recessed areas incorporated in its design . an d was fitted to (he ship after it had been launch ed . In response to guns of increasing fXJ\ver, the type of metal used and the thickness of the be lt was under co ntinual developm ent. For example , by the end of the: IH(>Os wrought-iro n arm o ur had reached a thickn ess 01'9 inches (22H mm ) o n ships ca rrying lQ..inch (2"'\ -mm) mu zzle-loading guns. By IH75 the turret ship (ea rly battleship} Derastation

fitted with an armo ured be lt 12 inches structure 10-1 2 Inches (254--305 rum ) thick. In lAAl the masted turret ship 1I1j le.\i hle c.'.arried a main ar mament of four J6-inch (406-mm) W :l S

ems nun ) thick. o n to p of w hich was an additio nal armo ured

guns mounted o n a citadel mad e up of 'co mpo und' iron rangi ng from 16 to 24 inche s (406 to 6 10 nun ), the latte r he:ing the thickest armo ur eve r fitted in a battlesh ip at any time . 'Co mpo und ' armo ur was the prod uct of a d ifficult a nd co m plex process in w hich a wrought -

r z

'""

~\\

,").I11SS;-lj d ,")l[1 'mouuu .10 ,")P I :J ~ ,"),\ !P,").I.P

puc

W:'U

p.u dop r

~- \

':

/

/

.1-

,\ \ ,")lI tpl:,").10 SS,")lDP !11l p ,lSI:,").I,l l1! ,")1 11 ,") Il:I P lI,")d 0.1

'LLe t e:JJp 'aJ!2J?W?.l 'dfllsameq lIdeJ60Jolld stu; u! paJeJJsnlJ! se

l: ,11111\),l q I! 'Jl1 () U1 J I~ ~Upp :lU .10 .ut uu u ~ U ! U1 IlS lI ().h")l tl !l p ut: ~ ;)Ithll()') ;)111

lISfJfJ8 eu; JO un6 lI:JUf- l l allJ JO

ti U!U!ll U,")P P ll ! .I0P1] .I0!1:111 I: P ll l~ }\lp IXh:.l

' l [!,H ! '-")<1 Pl' H U ll:ll l s d! lIs .1 0 J ,")tjUIIlU p~!J l " npU! .10 IS;)I

.--all

.10 ;lS 11l~ .)') H '.1 ,"),\0 P!J 0 ,\\ ,")tj l SJ '") )Jl: U1- p,")lS ,\ q p a.nnb.u: ,\ IP:SJ :H !Un

,").1,"),\\

m o uuu

s d d nJ ~ JO J sruo n-d p un o.inpord or SS;l .lOJd

lIn:J!JJ!P tf/q!paJ:Ju! seM 6u!66p aliI

SI:.\ \ n o s " !l ll JO J IlOlllJ V ' 1I 1~ .1 0 J Il OllUI: l~"'lpJ I: lj ,")lp

iuou ne.u t iaoq Jl:!lll,")J'")J.l! P I: lj)! .\\ J,")tjl,")~O) umnuonp P Ul~ !,"):,P!U .10 s ,")!l!lu en h pasn p,"))S

lI6noJlIJ aJ!J JO :JJe Jeap e 6u!pU!J

slu.L

'paufew a; I!T:?S JO lJOStfue af!lIM

' 1;1;) )"; (P;111l .")lU,l::::> sd d Il J~) :) ~ p.").) llpOJ IU! U,")";S] .10 ..;d d IlJ)I ,\ lIl:d UlO.l FI ,") ls Ul:llu ,")9 ;)111 1I.")l! .\ \ S6HI U! ,") IlH~.) .")lI:ld

rnoiun: U! lU;lltlt!oFH,") p Jl:UU ,")lj-L ' p;)) S .")ljl .10 ,\ l!l' :n h ,l ll1 ,").\( u d ltl ! J,")lIun.l

01 P UIlOJ ";l~ .\\ 1;l )J.")!U .10

sonuucnb IJl:U1S ~U!Pp V ·.1,w J.l n ..; p,""lZ!J n qJ I:.) .10 pr uq I: ,").\,l !l pl: 0 ) p,llS

P;ll1~,")l(.J0 ,").w J Jl1S ,")lp 0) UO p .l ,(I:1ds ,1.1,1.\\ ram-ojo SP ! .") U t~ ;1.1,111.\\ s.") llh! Ulj.),")ll'iU! U .lpJI:q ·;l.W_~ U!

tiU !IIIlS;lJ 'Jl1 0 11 1J '~ P;')S .10 lu,lWdol'").\ '")P J ,lljlJllj

p.umds S!tll -d n l'iUPI':,l Jq mOljl!,\\

Jl1OlU JI~ Fl;ll'"

llU!1I:JPlI.xl .10 .l l q l:<.h~,l ,1 .1,").\ \ .( ;l lp p ,l .lnrXUIU! ;lJ.l.\\ SII.1ljS P ,")lS p,")fu0J U;l l!.\\ )l~I(1 0 s ·;l.lUI~)S!S,lJ .1 0 S ,")!)!(l~l1h p,").\OJdlU! lP~lI,")J1S ,")(!SU;ll p,lS!:;lDU! .1 1l4 -\\ SS;lll;))ll!Jq P,1Z!ltI!lI!1l1 llI,")UIl1~,)J) ll~rlll ' p ,l lS .10 ,lJIlPI:JIlUl:llI '")1( ) U! s i u.u u.s.vu dun ll~.lJl'i p.:lU:,lJ.l .(~J Il Il n.l lU )O ,uu,")ps .wou

-ul.L

·.").lU I:J..J pun uW1PH.l0 ";P,lU JOp.x1I1S .\ III:.")!J,")Il It1U .l ll l .1,1 .\ 0 ,")~ I : I Ul :. \ P I: 11~.J! ~0)OUlP,11 l~ U!1 :~ 0 1

.\.\1::\ Ul:!II:)(

III~lUS .\ P,\ ! I1:J I~ d llI( D ,")lj) .\ q

idru.un- uri SI:.\\ S!11J. ·J ,l .\\OU

llll~.")l s u o .\ p J!l U,l .\ 1.1 .1 01 pU1 : j !J jU!!!I:S lll! .\\ ,")SU;l US!P .\ 11 11.1 01 ISJ!.! .1l 11 OS JI~ ptII: ' ( Ull ll-OS f-)

lj .1U!-L LI .1110) ' S U Il~ .1fu l:I.U,"),\ .\.u e,") 0 1 Sd !ljS .:ljlllXl lSJ U .")lP ,")J,").\\ "'U!lI'" .")S,")lj l "\I~U!l"',")J,:) IUI · :-P !111 ( lU l U 09 S _\ P I~.l l1 ) ..;.)l(.l ll !

«

'\ J.I I:,")lI Sl FX! p ,11"; Pl~lj IF'!l).\\ 'ZHHI pul: OH'HI U! P,lP!tltllO.l ·OW!JlIIJ(J

PUl~ O! /.lIl(J ...du] c ,l(lH:q Ul:!Jl~11 ,l IP t n U,"),l S s e .\\ JI1OlUJI: 1,").11"; .10 s .l!Uun :x.l ISJ!.! ;ll (l JO ,")UQ

·p ,l.m p OJ IlI ! SI:.\\ moune

P,lIS - III~

·.1SI1

o ru t ou rro .\ III:I1P l:J j 1,1.11"; s v ' p ,l )S .1!1I!Jt( .")lj l U! jU!PI~.lJUS IlI OJJ S)J_1I:J .) p.uuo.cud ~uPPlX IUOJ ! - n l ~ I1OJ.\\ ,ll(1 ,lU lI .\\

-dn

)(I:,")Jq 0) s lpq'" ~U!UUDU! p,l"'IlI~.) ;)H: IU ~ U! ) ( I1S,")J ,l ll ) ) O .1.)1:.1 P,l)S J ,l pJl:lI

otl.L ' llI ,l ll l lI ,"1.1.\\ 1'-1l( p ,llS P !ll h n x uunod .iq a n qd p .1IS

SilTITS'f"fI -L VlT 'IJIL-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

I~ 0 1 ,p ,"1P I,l .\ \ , .10 p,lU !O! St:.\\

-

.urqd

lJOJ!

_

-

a

i:f:

-f..j. ...,

•

SAILnLSIL\..\l~WUUDJ1LSI£EEJ.I~

lIin_,tMlI'iI=e-~"-""' 33

W;lSOil gu n-m.rkcr-, to produce welpons o f gn.:all.' r hining nnd penetrative power. T his res ulted in a number o f improvements relati ng to propellant s. shells a nd o \"l,..ru ll gun de sign. Th e d e structive powe r o f Ihe nava l gu n cha nged d ra m.n tcallv between the era of line -o fha llie sh ips su ch as Victo ry; and the introduction o f th e: iro n and (he n xtcc l hatt lesh ip s o f th e late tHOO.. . . Hut be-fo re goi ng furth e r int o that story. it seems ap p ro priate to offer a brief a nd rel at ivel y s im p lified e xp la na tio n o f how lar uc- c-alihn- naval gUlls art..' loaded . Un like a

co nve ntio na l rifle round of ammuni tion. where the ex p lo sive powder and [he 'b u lk-r. so lid missile . a rc joined togel he r in a o ne-pi ece cart rtdgc . o r

I1l l't ~ 11

Of

CISl', 11ll' h ig-gu n 'ro u nd '

COllll'.'i in two sepa rate- p:111S, h011l loaded Sl'!Xlrall'ly into llll' breec-h . or ch am ber sectio n o f t ill' gun at tht' re a r end o f the b urrel. First the s hel l. or the 'b u lk-t'. is ram med into the b reech. Th e ba rrel is 'rifled'. th at is, it has sp ira l groon:s cu t into the inner surface that CIUSl' th e s he ll to spi n, g i\"ing it grc. u accu ruc-y as it speeds through th e air towards its taruc t. Th e se cond part o f till' 10:1l1. th e exp losive charge, is con ta ined in cy lind rica l doth ha gs, O fte n a number o f hag s go 10 make lip

:I

single 'cha rge', These a rc ra m med into th e b reech

behind th e shell . Th e breech is then hvdrnnlicallv d o sed and the gun is re ady for firing . Prio r to the int roduction o f bre ech-load ing guns ,

:I

s imilar loading o pe ratio n took place, o n ly in

reverse order, a nti from th e o p pos ite e nd o f th e gun . TIll' ch arge. o r h:lgs o f e xp los ive . were rammed dow n the front o f the barrel . o r mu zzle of th e gun. foll owed h y a wa d to st..'al the ch amber conta in ing the e xp losive cha rge , Finally , the ca n no n hall or mbe-ilc th at wa s to lx ' fin-d \\,:IS rammed h o rne . Firing o ccurred whe n eithe r a spark ca used hy :1 flint lock mechanism at the rear o f the g un ign ited th e powde r ch arge . o r. in the very ea rly lbys, h y a lit taper lighting a line line of po wde r th ai led d irect ly to the t..'xp lo sin : c harge . Th ese types of can no n - and 1:1!L'r large gun s - loaded through the fron t o f rhc ba rre l were called 'm uzzle-lo ad ers'. In mo st cases thes e g uns di d not ha ve any rilling in the ha rrclx and

\ \"t..' I"C

known as 'smo o th-bo re ' gu ns ,

To Increase the s pe ed o f the s hell !t..':I\'ing the gu n barre l nhc mu zzle vcloci tv ). new and different prope llants were perfected. In France , a highly e fficient . s mo ke les s nitro -cellulose po wder wa s introd uc ed , whil e in Britain a mixture o f nnro-glvccnnc- and nitro -cell ulo se ca lle-d cord ite w as favo ur e d . Th e se e xpl osive p ropellants Forced th e sh ell o u t o f the barre l with increas ing acceleratio n. resulting in a higher m uz zle velocity. To furthe r improve accele rat ion. gun barrels bec-ame longt..'r and the range o f the guns Increased. The ch e m ica l stahility o f th e-e new . volatile p ropellants. packaged in hags, was a factor o f great concern in safe handling and stor:lge , They were sto red in 'magazines' - spt.'d a lly designed and constructed 'roo ms ' - usually lee.ned several decks be lo w the guns , The exp los ive effect of a maga z in e igniting ei the r through unstable propellant. o r a h it in ha llie . inva riably caused a catas tro p he . Suc h explosio ns we re no t U1K011l1ll0 n, a nd th ro ug hou t the h isto ry of the bat tles hip caused th e d estr uctio n o f a large nu mber o f the-e- glaru vessels a nd thl' dea th o f h uge nu mbers o f g u n new . To im p rove the p c n c tr.u ive q ua litie s o f s he lls, th e nu-tullu rgt ral b re ak th ro ug hs made in ar mour dt,;'\"(.. . lopmcnt wen- a p p lied to the co nstruct io n o f the shell case. The o bject was to d rive the shel l int o th e l'nl.'I1lY's armour plate wi thout the shell brea k ing up. w h ile

:1

fuse se t int o

the lxtse o f th e sh ell would detonate the exp lo sive tilling o nce the shel l had penetrated th e hu ll of the enemy vessel . Th ese sh ells h..-ca m c kn own as armour-piercing shells, A subsequent refin ement saw th e introducti on o f a soft e r me tal 'ca p ' fitted o ve r th e armou r-p ie rcing tip . O n hitting th e a rmou r, th e so ft Glp prc -stre sst..' d th l' armour. rende ring it more \'ulner:lhle to th e h:lf(len eo stt..'l'I tip, O ne o f the most t..'( ull p lL'x devices o n hoard the h:mlt.:'ship wa s the com h inatio n o f n1l'ch ani sm s th :1t t..' nahk'd a gun to be fired co nt:linl'd the guns

S: t(

upon a huge :tnd

~ I<..Tu r: l(c1y

co m p l ic~lled

a nd

s~l fcly ,

\ '~Iri ous

Tht..' armoured turrt..'t th at

chamhe r th:u extl'nded d own to the inn t..'r

hott om of the ship. In s im p le te rms, thl' p ro pdbn t :tn d she lls wt..'rt.' sto rt..'d at the hott om of this ch:lln hl' r an d Wl.' re h ro ug ht up to th e g u ns hy mechan ica l ho ists. and w hen th e y reach e d the turre t the y wc rc r:lllltlle d in to the h reac h o f the gu n. O nce the hr e ach was c1 o st..'d , till.'

ARM ORED GUN HOUSE (T URRET PROPER)

POWDER HOIST

~~~~

RAMMER S

DECK l : G U GUN DECK

------L

GUN GIRDER - - -_ __=:~ PROJECTILE HOIST

- ----,;7"'"

PAN fl OOR _ _-----'~"i' ROLLER PATH BARBETTE TURRET FOUNDATION (STATION ARY)

An illustration showing the comp lexity of a modem gun

MA CHINE RY fl OOR MAGAZI NES

moun ting , in this instance a US 16-inch triple mounting, extending several decks into the

PROJECTIL E HANDLIN G fl OOR

POWDER HANDLIN G ROOM

FI XED STOWAGE

struc ture of the ship.

g un had 10 he tra ined a m i e levated 10 e xact co-ord inates before heing fired. Th e tur re t a nd rhe en tire c ha m be r turned as o ne integra ted u n it. In its twent ieth -cen tu ry fo rm . th e whol e revolving mecha n ism co uld we igh up 10 2300 IOns. At the end o f the nineteenth ce n tury. the sta ndard big-gun naval weapon wa s the 12-in ch OD5-l11m ) breech-loaded. rilled g un o n hyd rau lic mou ntings ca pable o f tiring a she ll a distance o f a ro u nd 10 miles. Thes e g uns we re s ig lucd o n a targe t by a relativel y primitive rule-of-thumb procedure. Co nse q ue ntly.

;1

ve ry lo w p ro po rtion o f hits were achieved. As th e ra nge o f g un s

increased . the great cha lle nge to cng jnccrs a nd mat hematicia ns wa s 10 develop a re liable an d accurate syste m to locate a nd hit a movi ng ta rge t. Remember. th is was lo ng befo re compu ters . rad ar. satellite information o r, in the ea rly da ys of its dcveloprm-nt. any fo rm of elect ron ic device. In th e first instan ce . the target ha d to he s ig hted and an accura te means devised to calcul.uc its ran ge . Till' p iece o f eq u ipment designed to pe rfo rm this task was the o p tica l r.mgcfind cr . By the ea rly IH90s, a practica l. ro bust ra ngc fin dc r had bee n in trodu ce d . Th is dis tin ctive instrum e nt cons isted of a ho rizo nta l tube in w hic h From an eye p ie ce

at

~ 111

angl ed m irror wa s tilted

; 11

either e nd .

th e centre. the operato r br o u gh t th e uu gct in to fo c us. A s im p le

tngo nomct n cal calc ulatio n mad e mech ani cal ly insid e th e rangc find c r provided a n accu rate readi ng o f ra nge. Th e first naval ra nge finders ha d a ha se of S feet ( 1.52 metres ). In lime rungcfindc rs would grow

10

4H feet ( 15 metres) in le ngth a nd sit astride the hig hest

point o f th e sh ip's su perstructu re . Ho wever . eve n w ith the ra nge obtained. the g u n had 10 he held o n target desp ite the speed o r roll of the sh ip . Furt her , the target would have moved d uri ng the time the shell wou ld ta ke to reach it. To co m pens ate fo r th ese facto rs. a n cleme nt o f hu man predict ion wa s necessa ry, a ltho ug h th is was less im port a nt w hen ha llie ran ge s were low. as they were in th e HWOs. Th e h igh e r u p in the sh ip 's su perstruct u re this fire con trol e qui p me nt wa s installe-d. th e bet ter it worked. Co nseq ue ntly, ligh lly constructed pla tfo rms or 'spouin g to ps' la-gan 10 appear o n the to p o f mas ts, c\'entllally leadi ng 10 the introdu ctio n of tripod , and othe r ma st svste ms . In every navy. g reat pride is tak en in the accuracy and th e g u nnery skills o f eac h sh ip in the

..:.._ . .III•

SAILIO...£T.EAM~-=..Jl'1llOJlL:[Q--S':r.E.EL

fleet . Co nstant p rucurc and com petition

h C( \ H ;'Cn

•

" ' -£ 35

ships go a long way to hone these s kills. hut

only in the lu-.u of hattie is the accuracy of the fi re co ntro l and gun crews put (0 thL" ultimate lest.

On till.' eve of rhc twentieth century th e domina n t naval po wers. Britain . France a nd Rus sia . were faced wi th the prospect of competitio n fro m th ree rapidly growing ind us trial powers: the

United Sl:ltc:s. Germany and Japa n. The established orde r was about to the full effect o f this w o uld no t be felt unti l the new

Ct..-ru urv

I~

sha ke n. although

had dawned.

The battleship had a ll hu t arrived in its fina l form. Efficient. he:I\'i1y armoured. selgoing hu lls driven hy giant s team-powered reciprocating e ngi nes provided a st a b le platfo rm fo r tht.' multitude o f va rious calibre guns that mad e up their powerful a rmou ry. Yet for a lmo....t half ~I century there had not been :I major naval lxmle to test the quantum leaps in technology and power tht.'st.' ships re p re se nte d. De si g ne rs . nava l arc h itects and naval st rategi sts of en.~·r)· maritime nati on a p pea red to have di ffering vie ws on the shape a nd a rmament of the: capita l ships in their battle flee ts . The: re su lt o f these differences was reflected in the di \'e rsity of lxn tlvxhips o f a lmos t e\'er)' nation . It would ta ke a wa r. or a ma jor brea kthrough in d esign . bef o re o ne design a nd o ne concept wo uld crea te the:battlesh ip of the futu re . Bo th the wa r, and the bn-ak th rouah. wou ld hap pe n in the first decad e of the new ce nt ury.

The political world in 1894, domina ted by the colonial empires of European po wers. On the eve of the new century.

battleships were the key weapo n that rival nations would rely on to maintain and extend these national borders .

I . . .. . "'1'1..

,.'

ea Lanes to Power ~

.. the nineteenth centu ry drew to a dose, the battleship's invulnerability to gunfire was being threatened by new techn ical developments. Each posed a challenge to the battleship designers , and

each in turn pla yed an important role in the ever- evolving sophistication o f weapon systems and armour protection sche mes of the battl eship in th e new century. Th e situation is g rap h icall y summed up by Co li n \V h ite, Deputy Director o f th e Ro yal Naval Museum in Portsmouth : 'Once you o pe n th e Pandora's Box o f technol ogi cal change, you can't sh ut it. And it leapfrogs in quite an extraord inary \\'a y. O ne invention will lead to anothe r. You invent a gun that will pi erce armour, you th en have to invent armour that \\'iII prevent the gun p iercing it. You invent a torpedo that will sink a battleship, you then have to invent methods of dea ling with th at torpedo . You invent an efficient steam engine which dri ves your sh ip faster than that o f your o p pone nt you r op ponent finds another method of propulsion . And so it go es on . And so th e development of battleship d esign was a never-ending leapfrog o f so metimes effici ent, so me times good id eas, someti mes d ead ends. Bu t alwa v» changing."

'I1K' two most pote nt l.·me:rging weapons in the wa r against the: bat tleship were the torpedo a nd the: mine - both capable o f sinking a ba ttles hip. both chea p to build and 10 usc against en em y shipping. David Lyon . Research Associate ~H the Nation al .\ Iaritime xtuscum in London. explains: 'At the e nd of the nineteenth ce ntury the problem [for battleships] starts 10 he: underwater warfa re . first of a ll the de ve lopment o f moored mines and grou nd min e s w hic h are pUI on tlu- bottom o f th e se a , And th en co mes th e d evelo pment of th e so -called locomotive to rpedo. the fish to rpedo. Ihe \'\'h ite ht.:'a d d rive n torpedo - th e first rea l guided missile . Afte:r a ll. Ihe ea sit.:'SI way to sin k a ship is to mak e a \'ery large hole in the ho ttom o f th e ship rath er than rry a nd blast hol es in it abo ve water - which is wh at Ihey are doing with guns, ~I

'The mine is lusic illy a static weapon which you co uld o nly put in ce rta in pla ces, It's me nace to ba ttles hips hut it's not a wa y of dest roying them in any ce rtain se nse . The

torpe do - unt il yo u get into the twentieth ce ntury - a ltho ug h distin ctly a threat . is mo re so in Ihl.'ol")· than in pra ctice . It's not until yo u get Ihe development of the heated

American forces landing at

dr ive torped o co mbined wi th gyroscopic guidance. which ha ppe ns around 1900. that yo u ge:l a n un derwater missile of great range. whic h is equal to the range of guns. and which travels ut high s peed. II's at that stage. and almost exact ly at the same lime . the

dun'ng the Span ish-Am erican

submarine becomes a practical wea pon of wa r. And it's at that stage that the batt leship hL'gins to he sL' riously thr eatened. And then, o f co urse . yo u soon ge t the extraordinarily rapid developme nt of the: aeroplane: a nd the beginning of the thr eat of a ir atta ck .

cap turing the Span ish colonies

Guantanamo, Cuba in 1898 War. The US Navy provided support to its military forces in

of the Philippines, Guam, and islands of the Caribbean.

T ilE HATT I ESII IPS

Completed in 1891, the French barbette ba ttleship, Marceau, carried four 13.4-inch guns in single mounts, took ten years to build, and was aJJ but obsolete when she joined the fleet.

'The ea rly g uided missiles we re pretty inefficien t weapons o f wa r and the sa me is true of the early to rped o bo ats - extremely frag ile . s mall fast bo ars w hich were deve loped in the IHoOs, 70.s and HO.s. Th ese torped o bo ats we re a ve ry p romising \ \'I,....a po n o f war fo r a min or navy. enabl ing the m to protect their sho res strongly. or indeed the sec o nd navy , like fo r Fra nce . It looked as if he re wus the answe r to the battleships whe n yo u knew yo u would n't be ab le to o ut-build the Briti.s h in battleships. so let's try anot he r an g le . le t's try to rpedo attack. And the trou ble is the weapo n is un derd eveloped . il'.s un reliable . it's no t in parti cular so mething that yo u ca n ta ke p roperly to sea in bad weather wh en a ba ttle s h tp G ill st ill pe rform , bur a to rp e d o bo a t has to se c k ha rbo u r. And it' s no t so me thing yo u ca n take all o ve r the place , yo u have to o perate close to yo ur base . 'And it's no t unt il the twentieth century that everything to ugh e ns up. becomes mo re re liable . that yo u s ud denly have a serious un d e rw ater th re at. j\ lin ing' s the same . The de velo pment of the mine reac hes matu rity just befo re the time of the Russo-ja pa nese \X'ar - the Bailie o f Tsu s hlma at the very begin ning of the twe ntiet h ce nt ury.' Techn o lo gy was mo ving :11 a g re at pace , The cha lle nge fo r the batt les hi p d esigners wa s nc o nly to keep pace , bu t also to be o ne ste p a hea d of the threat of these new weapons. II wa

SE.,LLA1" ES _HLI' OWE R

________________________-'..._i1--...~< _ •

in this pe rio d o f cha nge and ch allenge that the ha n k-s hi p mo ved closer to its fina l form. It wa s also a pe riod in w h ich the lead e rs o f the ma jor ind ustrial na tio ns o f th e world began

10 mak e p la ns to fl';lIiz t.:' po litica l ;111(1 nati ona l a mhi tio ns Oil a g ran d sca le . G rea t Br ita in

rema ined th e d omina n t w o rld po wer bo th in trad e an d com me rce . Q uee n Victo ria w as still o n the th ron e-. and the Ho yal Navy co ntinued

to

rule the

W:lVl'S .

But arou nd the glo be. th e

Il L'W -

fou nd indu stria l p o w e- r an d wealt h o f the Un ite d Sta l es a nd Ge rma ny", a nd the: g row ing infl ue nce of ja pa n w ith in th e Paci fic a nd As ian reg io n. w as he g inn ing to crea te a se ns e of inter nat iona l un rest and urg e ncy. Il ig h o n lh e po litica l agenda of each o f tIH':Se: nations was the: stre ngtheni ng o f its navy . s pea rhead ed in eac h case hy th e b uild ing-u p o f its fleet o f bat tleships. ThL' cha lk nge

10

bu ild and anu rhcsc sh ips lrigge re:d the heg inn ing of an arms race: th ai wou ld

eve ntua lly h-ad to a rmed conflict o n an un pn- cc ck-mc d sc ale, The: demand fo r h igge:r and mo re po werful battleshi ps resulte d in an e normo us ex pansio n of sh iph u ild ing facilitics with in all th e ma jor maritime nations. h UI none mon..' so than in Britain , In lHlJO th e British Parliam e nt passe d the famous T wo Powe r Stand ard', a n Act tha t req u ired

the stre ng th o f th e Ro ynl Navy to be maintained at n ume rical ly 10 pe r ce nt g re ate r th an a ny o the r two na vies combined. At th e time the h ill was pa ssed. the sec o nd a nd thi rd largest navies in the wo rld were , resp ecti ve ly. Fren ch and Rus sia n. Altho ug h h o th the se pot e nt ial e n e m ies of Brita in had numeri ca lly la rge na vie s. the:y h y no mea ns ha d Ike ls o f the hig h sta nd ard o f the British Na\ 'y, Britai n 's o ld e ne my. Fran ce ,

W:l S

cco no nucullv str e tc h e d to the lim it a n d , to re ta in the s ta n d ing o f its n av a l fo rce s, wa s begin nin g to lo o k for alte rn ative s

10

b uildin g ex pe nsi ve ne w b.m le sh tps . Like the e ra w he n

they had lau n ch ed the first iron clad . Gloi re. Fra n ce aga in lo o ke d to ne w tech no lo g ies to g i\"e: the m

:111

l'dgl' ove -r the: British Navy. As th e Fre nc h nava l hi storia n Pro fe sso r Ph ilip pe

Masxo n ex plains: "Towards thL' lHHOs the re w as a defini te po ssihi lity of a wa r w ith Eng lund. h ut Fran ce re a lize d that fro m

:1

p urel y fina nc ia l po int o f view it wa s go ing to he very costly to

han ' a fleet anyth ing like: the Eng lish fleet. Mo reo ve r. the Eng lish wou ld never sta nd fo r it. They wou ld o nly inc rease the ir o w n nav a l spe nd ing o r even la un ch a p re-eru ptive wu r aga ins t us , \X!t ' the refo re wo nde red w he th e r th e re wa s so me c hea pe r a nd mo re efficient so lution

10

enable us

10

wag e wa r against England,

O Uf

Minis ter fo r the: Navy

saw the to rpedo bo at a nd th e tTl!ise:r as the best way o f d is ru p ting trad e and th e re fo re the be-t o p tio n fo r th is co u nt ry. To rpedo bo ats u nder cove r of d a rkne ss could atta ck Eng lish sh ips lying o ff the CO:ISt, a nd a s ing lL' torpedo could eas ily s ink a batt les h ip . It wo u ld h e a fa r le ss ex pens ive so lutio n . \X'e co u ld ha n ".' a n avy w h ich wa s

:It

o nce

e fficien t and economical. ' By lHlJlJ we ha d hu ilt :1 very large n um ber o f to rped o boats. \X'c ca lled them "mobile dcfc no ..'s", Then it \.. ·as reali zed these mobile d e fe n ces in fact held ou t little p ros pect o f ac h ieving slg n lfk-a nt result s ag a inst the Englis h battleships becau se the Eng lis h ha d ta ke n ap prop riate coun te r meas u res. Th e y ha d fitted thei r battleships with ligh t. rapid fire artill e ry p ieces and wit h se arch lights so they co u ld mo n ito r th e o ffshore: waters .u n ig ht. And Ihe y had In ven ted what we called a "co u nte r-to rpe d o lx xn" h ut w h ich the Eng lis h ca lle d a "des tro ye r". Once it was rea lized th at o u r to rp e do bo ats w o u ld he powe rless ag a ins t th e Eng lish bnttlcxhips a nd the ir fle ets o f d estroyer s, Fran ce bega n build ing sub marines. Thank s to tile availabil ity o f d iese l. interna l co mb ustion an d electric cn gtn c s. it wo u ld h e po sxihl c to b ui ld s ubm a rines th at w o ul d re presen t a far m ore se rio us th reat than to rpe do ho ats to English ha ttlvsh ipx.' Ther e wa s no doubt that relat ions betwee n Fran ce an d Brita in contin ued to s im me r. rig ht o n the l'dge o f hoiling po int . as the:y had for centuri es.

& • • -_

39

Russia. o n the o ther han d , a lthoug h in :1 fina ncial crisis after th e Crimean \'\'ar , felt a stro ng nee d to rebuild its hatt ie fleet to protect its Black Sea te rrito ries

~ l g~l i n st

pos xlbk- atta c-k hy British

naval forces. Russ ian baul cship h istorian Steve Mct.au g h hn ex plains : ' Russ ia' s e nt ire so uthe rn area w as ex pose d to the Ro ya l Na\·y a nd thai re a lly set th e alarm h e lls ring ing , w he n th e new Empero r. Ale xander III. ca me

10

the th ron e in IHHI.

h is first p riori ty was to bu ild u p the Black Sea fleet, The first new batt lesh ips in h is reign we re three s h ips built fo r the Black Se a fleet. to o p pose th e British if they came through the [Turkish] Stra its, and on th e o ther s ide , to su pport a Russian exped ition to the Strnitx if th at e ve r beca me necessary. The y were kind of funn y-lo ok ing sh ips w ith fo ur l z-inch [30S-m m] g uns a ll s ig h te d fo rward . a nd tw o t z -tnch g u ns a ft in a so rt of tria ng ula r a rrange me nt. At th is po int Russ ia wa s gett ing a lo t o f its a rmame nt. its a rmo u r, a nd its engines fro m Gre at Britain . \Vith th e h ig Russian nava l building p rog r:.llllme th,u start ed in the IHHOs , th e y s im p ly d id no t h av e th e ind ustrial ca pacity to b u ild al l Ih is Slu ff th emselves. an d they we nt to Britain . Basically they we re go ing o ut and gelling whatever the)' co u ld , as qu ick ly as th ey co uld , in o rde r to build a

10 1

o f shi ps relat ivel y q u ickly,

At the same tim e th ey wer e boo sting thei r o w n armamen ts plan ts. Bit by h it. their o w n armo ur p ro ductio n s ho ps got lip to s pe ed to w he re the y co u ld s u p p ly mo st o f th e ma teri al. hu t that did n't rea lly ha p pe n until arou nd the IH90s.' Russ ia's o ther territ orial interests w e re in the nort h-western ure a o f th e Pacific whe re it s hared a border with Ch ina , Th e port o f v ladivostok p ro vided a sa fe a nchorage fo r the Russian Pacific Sq uad ro n o f heav ily a rm e d cruise rs , Th eir ma in p u rpose wa s to ' keep a n cy e o n British co m me rce ' in thai part of th e world . Th ey ha d a lso gained acce ss to Po rt Arthu r, o n main land Ch in a , and o b ta ined the rig ht s to h uild a ra ilwa y lin e th ro ugh Manc h uri a

10

Vlad ivo stok ,

Steve Mcl.aug hlin : 'W he n th e y m o ved in to Po rt Art h ur in IB9H. sud de n ly the fo cus c ha ng ed . No t onl y had th e y fina lly got th e wa rm wat e r po rt th e y a lwa ys dre am ed of, a s

:1

p lace they

cou ld sail fro m any lime of the year to ca rry o ut an y o peratio ns the y thoug ht th ey wou ld have to carry o ut in case o f w ar w ith Brita in, h ut they'd made an e nemy out o f j apan . Suddenly cruise rs were n't what they need ed becau se the japan ese we re building a ba ttle fleet. Fro m about IH9Ho nwa rd yo u see a trem endo us b uilding progr am me in Russia that was ca lled "the Pro g ramm e fo r th e ne eds o f th e Fa r East ". At th is po int the y needed s h ips so ba dly th at ag a in th e y re a lize d the ir ow n ya rds d id n't ha ve the ca paCity to b u ild them . So th ey had a sh ip built in Ph iladelph ia , they had a s h ip b u ilt in Fran ce . so two of th e mo st mo d ern banlcxhtps during the e ve ntua l Russo -Japan ese \Va r we re actually fo reign-bu ilt.' The fate o f th e wo rld 's lea d ing natio ns wa s inextr icably linked w ith co nt ro l o f the ocean trade ro utes and the success o r failure o f the na val fo rces that d om inated these bl ue-water highways. The sce ne w as set fo r the next and mo st d yn amic stage in th e developmen t o f th e battles hip , And re w Lambe rt. naval h isto rian at King's Co llege, Lo nd on , p icks up the sto ry: A veteran of the Batt le of Santiago, USS Oregon is seen

'At th e e n d o f th e n ine tee nth ce nt ury. the wo rld is grad uall y being carve d u p h y th e

here in dry -dock at Mare Island in

major pla ye rs , Throu gh o ut th e ce ntu ry . Brita in had th e ru n o f world trade wi th ou t

1912. Completed in 1896. she

bothering to conq ue r an e m pire . She left th e re st o f th e wo rld to ru n its o w n affairs as

carried four 13-inch guns in tw o twin turrets. The distinctive 'cage ' mainmas t was added in 1908.

lo ng as bu s iness was good . But th rou g hout the later part o f the ce ntu ry.

g r~ l d u a lly

othe r

po wers mo ved into key a reas - Africa a nd As ia - and ran u p thei r Ilags. It beca me more and mo re n ecessary, if yo u wa nted to co n tro l trad e ,

10

cont rol the cou nt ry. So e m pire ,

s..EA.L\.N E S Tel

l~UWE.n.__

... ,-=-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.:.__-=-.11" • .-._

41

~":i.L

42 ::.

-'- ll IUJAI _n .ESlll£S

. '• : '" SE.AJ..A..1-"lFS T O I)Q W-.EJL_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ iii--_.

~._

and the gr ea t wave of im peria lism o f the late nineteenth ce ntu ry. sees th e wo rld divid ed

The beautifully pre served cruiser

a nd a lmost immedia tely it lx-gin s to be re-divided with the o ld Span ish e mp ire falling into the hands o f th e Ameri cans a nd Germa ns. for e xa m ple. So a 0:1\1' becomes a critica l clement if yo u w ish to han: an emp ire .'

USS Olympia in which Commodore George Dewey routed a Spanish squadron at Manila Bay du ring the Spanish-

Th e Un ite d Siaies was fas t developi ng into o ne of th e largest ind ustrial nations in th e world.

IIc r econ om y provided the finan ce. and her industrial base the ability, to ma ke the con struction o f a tota lly US-hu ilt luutlc fl eet

:1

reali ty. Man y Am er icans believed that in th eir new-found

position of Imp ort an ce . they s ho u ld take thei r place bes ide the establis he d European po we rs in b u ildin g lip trade beyond thei r bord er s. If th e y we re th ey wou ld ce rta in ly nee d

~I

10

pursu t' this line as na tio na l po licy,

bal a nce d ocea n-go in g n avy to p ress foreig n pol icy o b jectives

a n d to p roje ct a s ym hol o f nat iona l pr e slige a n d sta tus. Su c h a s hifr in po licy towards expa ns io n ist o utlook wa s stre- ngt h e ne d h y Ca p ta in Alfred Th a yer h is seminal work o f I HW , Tbe lnflueuce ofSeli Power

O il

~lahan

:111

o f th e US 1'.'a\'y in

History. 1660- 1783 , This bo ok had

a profo u nd e ffect o n na va l th in ki ng the world o ver. Th e essen ce o f

~Iah an 's

doct rin e was

that , for a ma jor trad ing nat io n. the o nly way of secu ring and maint ain ing national pr o speri ty a nd p reslige was th rough a bat tles hi p fleet able to d ominate th e seas, O f cou rse . th is was th e pr inciple tha t the e sta blis hed colon ial powers. most not ably Britain . had been acting on for se ve ra l hundred years . hUI it had never bef ore been stated so explicitly o r so cogently.

~l:t h:IIl's

fo rce fu l idea s hel pe d persuade th e US Co ng ress to approve fin ance for th e building o f a po werful. ocean-g oi ng fleet th aI wo u ld incl ude all-America n des ign ed a nd hu ilt ha uleshi ps . Duri ng the IM Os a nd 90s , th e 'Ne w '

N~ I VY,

as it w as te rmed. began to lak e sha pe th ro ugh

a se ries of b uilding p rogrammes a utho rize d hy Co ngress. Eve ry aspect o f every s hip in th e fleet - from the d e sig n to th e rive ts , the a rmo u r, the he a vy tu rre te d g u ns and th e propu ls ion machinery -

W :I S to

he ma nufactured in the States. It pusheel US kn ow-how and the nat ion 's

industrial ca paci ty to new limi ts , Steel-making unp roved dramatica lly w h ile ma nufactu ring ca pacity in a rmou r a nd o rd n a nce inc rea sed

10

meet th e demands o f this new huilding

pr ogramme. 111e first IXlttlcships o f th e US N ~I \1' with firepower at k'a st equa l tel similar s h ips in fo reign nav ies were th e three Ind iana Class vessels. laid down in 1H91. '111e y moun led fou r 13-in c h <330-mm) g u ns , a nd p rov id ed mu ch ne e d ed e xperience in d eveloping the US sh ipbu ild ing a nd o rd na nce ind ustries, 'I1Il.' first 'b loo d ing' of the new US Navy took place during the Spanish -American \'\'ar o f 1H9H. The ca use o f th e co nfl ict wa s os te ns ib ly th e d eterio rati ng s itu atio n in Cu ba , wh ere a rm ed Inxurnx'tkm d irect ly threat en ed Ame rican interests. O nly 100 m iles fro m the America n ma inla nd. Cu ba w as co ns ide red to o close for co m fo rt in a n are a w he re the US w ished

10

exercise its

infl ue nce. Th e inciden t tha i p reci p itated the cr isis was the sin king o f the US hnttlcshi p

.1I0 i ll£',

whic h blew up sudden ly in l lavnnu har bo ur o n 15 Fe bru a ry IH9H. killing 266 o f her crew , Till' ex plosio n is still the sub ject o f debate . a lthough an inte rnal magazine ex plos ion seems the mo st likely G IUSt:, Howeve r, the altitude of the prvss. to get her wit h graphic images of American sailo rs hc ing bu ried . forced the issue and Spain was b lamed. \X'ar wa s ine vitabl e . During two months o f d iplomatic negotia tions. Spain conceded most o f the US d emands , bu t refused to graru independence for Cuba , O n 23 April IH9B th e l;S declared war. Th ereafter, e ve nts moved sWirl)y, resu lting in IWO naval battl es w h ich settled the issu e d ecisively. a nd whi ch established th e Un ited States as th e world's latest imperia l flower.

declared. Commod ore Gt.,(lrgC Dewey. tlying h is nag in th e crui se r O{rmp ia. ~I small but powerful fo rce of ships stationed in I lo ng Kong . O n hcanng th e news. he immed iatel y sa iled to th e Philippi ne s. In Man ila Bay, Dewey discovered . attacked and utte rly an nihilated a sma ll Spa nis h sq uadron u nder the co m ma nd o f Ad mira l Don Patricio ,\ h llllo jo, '111e Philipp ines now belonged 10 the United States and , c ffccnvclv. Amer ica had Ill' CO Il K' the latest member of the se lect. inte rnat ional clu b o f em p ire b uilders. \,\'hl.' n war

W :.lS

was co mmand ing the US Asiatic Squadron,

American War of 1898,

43

44

The second short a nd l.'q ll~l llr de cisive nav a l hall ie in this wa r occu rred a month later. off Sa nti ago on th e sou thern lip o f Cu ba . in th e Ca rib be a n . A US 11:1\":11 Io n-c . in cl udi ng fo ur battleships. so un dly defeated a Span ish sq uadron in a baul e that lasted less tha n thn.x: hours. An interesting statistic is that of over HOOO shells fired hy the CS sh ips , o n ly 120 hit their l ;l rg\.· I ~ In their ba ptism o f fire: aga inst p\.'rha ps th e: weakest fore ign

11:1\ ')"

o f :111. th e US i\':I\Y had n -eon..led

a resounding vict ory. removi ng th e last H.'stige of Spanis h influen ce in Cc..:Tur. 11 and Lati n A meri ca.

\X'jrhin America. the d efeat o f Spain was p ublicly acclai med a g loriolls vkt orv fo r th e L;S and popula rized the navy to such :10 c xn.-n r that Secrt:I:IJT for the: N:I\Y. Theodore Roose velt. put in place plans for the construct ion o f a new fleet. Il l" later saw these ap p ro ved h y Co nurcss u nder his p residency ( 1901-9 ), ·111\.· inte ntio n of the CS was made qu ite clear: th e creation o f a \'t:ry large battle flee t to sig n~ 11 thei r preSt:"nce as a new world power. '111e victory over the Spani:..h a nd the est ablishment of this new imperial sta tus Inuucdi.uclv posed a nu mbe r of quest io ns for th e nat ion. part icularly in regard to tIll' Philipp iru-s . a~ LS naval hist ori an and d efence

~ 1Il ~l l yst xorm an

Friedman poi nts o ut:

'Victo ry in th e Spanish-American \'( fa r actu a lly pla ce s the United States in th e Far East - pla ces us in th e Ph ilippines. and the question e ve r after is: how d o yo u defend th e Ph ilip p ine s. w h ich is ve ry far fro m the Un ite d States and rat her d o se to ~I rath e r rapa cious .!:lIxlIl? Do yo u station a bau lc fleer th eR'? Do yo u b uild u p e nough indu strial infrastructure the re to support tha t ha ttie 11l"L"t? Do you p lan to relieve th e Phil ip pines in a war? As so o n as we get the Ph ilipp ine s the se ar e very sc r' iou s qu esti ons , Sho uld there he naval force s in the Philipp ine s? \'\'o uld the y a ll he d estroyed w hen the war Ce rta in ly. by 1907 we're talking about what to d o if till' .Iapalll·SL" ~ 1; 1J1 a war h y

st~ lI1S?

seizi ng the Ph ilippines.' The US ha d demo nst rated aga inst the Spanish th e ir readiness to use military fo rce hu t, even ea rlier. America n ships, under the co mmand of Co m mod ore ~ 1~ lH hl'w Pe rry, g~ I\ 'e the Japa nese people thei r first tas te of 'g u nboat d ip lomacy ', In 185,1 and aga in a year later . Pe rry sailed his he adly arm ed s hips into Tokyo Bay , The second visit was 10 deliver a kit er from th \.· US president to the shogun authorities -rcq ucsung' that japan 0 lx'n her port s for trade with the \X'e st. There W~IS no mistak ing the tone o f th e lett er: 'O pen up o r d s,,:!' With great fear and tre pid ation. the shogunal re p resentative o f this then feudal-style co u ntry submitted n-luctnntl y. and the d oors were opened to th e 'fo re ig n devi ls'. A d ecade later, th e ~It' iii Rest o ration o f IH66 es tabl ished Im perial j apan: ~I un ited nati on, governed hy an emlx 'wr a nd a ce ntralized govern ment. O nce Japan 's do ors were open (0 trad e . st rong com mercia l tic s with Euro pean cou n tries . in particular Britain , led to rapid ind ust rial ization of the co u nt ry , Little tim e w as lost in e stablishing a n imperial n;I\'y a nd , as Dr Mark Peattie . Se nio r Rescun-l r Fellow in th e Hoover Institution o n \\"ar. Revolution ~IIlLI Pea ce ~H Stanford Unive rsity. e xpla ins. th ey looked to th e ir close tra ding partner and the world's leading nav al powe r. Britain, for g uidance : '11 \ a lways been a principle w ith th e j apa nese to pattern thei r institutions o n foreign

models, Tlu-y always want to go with what see ms to IX' th e mo st successful und mo st promising , and so th e British l\'a\1" o b vious ly the ruler o f the world's oceans in the latter half of th e nineteenth ce nt ury . is the pe rfect model fo r th e Japanese to follo w , Britain was abo the fo rem o st warship b uilder in the world and aWl in , the .I:1P~lI1l'. .e go with thi s because o f tha t very re aso n, Th e Britis h are. o f cou rse. in rhc ma rket o f se lling s hi ps to J ~lIXII1 , II hel ps the British economy a nd very clo se ties deve lop. The British se ll to the j a pan e se a num ber of warsh ips wh ich japan has desi red un der th ei r g rc. u na va l expansio n p ro gr umrn c of IH96/ 97 , The ir ultim ate o b ject ive is 10 b uild ;1 line o f ba ttleships w hich can p rojectjapanese nav al po wer o ff th e

CO~ IS tS or .la p~ lIl .'

SEA..-LAN ESJ'(L£QW.,i "R

_ •_ _-. .,_ ' .._ • ... ·--. .- --- 45

.Iapan . like the ma jo r Eu ropean powers. also h ad a mbitions o f weal th and powe r th rou g h the ex p ans ion of th c ir e mpire. look ing

10

m ainla nd Asia,

partu-ularlv Korea nncl Chi na. 10 extend the ir national hO~1(la riL'S. In IHl)·j a nd IH9:;, Ja pan wen t to w ar a nd defeate d China on.'!" issues rcl.ucd to Japa n's inte rests in Korea . The rcsuhi ng Treaty of Shi monosckt c-eded Ta iwan an d the Liao tu ug Pen in s u la . includi ng Po rt Arthu r, to japa» . an d n: cog nizl'd Ja p a ne se in flue n ce over Ko ren. SuhSt.:'q UL'1111y, Ru ss ia n . Fre nc h a nd Ger man op posi t ion to t he .Ia p:I I1l':-it' ex pa ns ion o n to

m ain land Asb resu lte d in JIJXlIl Ix·jng fo rced to gin: up a

n um ber of these g:li ns . includ ing 1'0 11 Arthur. Soo n afte r. j apan wa s appalled to le-a rn that the Russ ian s had

s ucccss fullv m-go tt.uc-d w ith the Chinese th e rig ht to co nstruct a ra ilway throug h Man c-h uria (0 Vladivostok. and tn U ~L' Port Arthu r as a naval h:ISL' for Russb 's Eastern Fleet. The y :lbo lea rned that the Russia n Pacific Fled at PO ll Arthur was to hL' reinforced . By this time the Russian ~a\"y wa~ tht: third la rgL'~t in the wo rld afte r Brita in and Pran ce . The Britis h a lso had s us pic io ns about Russ ian

intentions in China and lhe possihk: lo ng-te rm e ffect suc h mO\'L'S mig ht have o n British inte rests in Asia, This vola tile situa tion in Asia resulted in the Anglo-.Iapa nL'se Allia nce of 190 2. a re c iproca l a rran gement in which ea ch nat ion was con uumcd to support the ot he r shou ld ei ther go to wa r. With tile US in COJ11rol of the Philipp ines. japan a lso saw the United States :IS a ma jo r pote ntial hindr an ce to .mv plans they may have to ex pa nd furthe r so uth in the Pacific/ Asia region. That sa me possihil itv also posed a very real thre at in the mind s of US m ilita ry st ratL:'gists, It was :1 situ.u lon [hat would o ne day lead (0 war - a w ar in w hich the ba ulcships or bot h nation s wou ld p b y a major role. But that time W:IS still a lo ng way of f. Bac k in Europe . the un ifica tion o f the Ge rma n sta tes a nd the cro\\'ni ng o f \X'i1 helm I as L'mperor of the new na tion in I H7 t. a lso hera lde d the establ ish ment o f the Imper ia l Ge rma n Se-ven teen yea rs bier IhL' ma n w ho wou ld ign ite Euro pe into the 'war to end a ll wa rs'. Ka ise r Wilhe lm II. carne 10 the th ro ne . An extraordi nary ma n, he W:IS the gra ndso n of Brita in's Que-en Victoria . As : 1 ho y, Wilhelm had spe nt long pe riods in Eng land, with his g ran dpa re nts l\:I\'}'.

Kaiser Wilhelm II, the grandson of Queen Victoria, determined that he would one day build a batt/ef/eet to rival the p ower of the Royal Navy, Creating this fleet

and Eng lish cousi ns . l lis favou rite ho lidays we re spe nt w ith the British royal fam ily at Osborne Ho use . thei r ho liday ho me on the Isle o f \Vig ll[. From the grounds of th is magn ificent stately

severely damaged the cordial

ho me he co uld see Ihe hattlcxhi ps of the Ho yal ;\'~I\'Y o n exercises in the Selent . The sight o f the great nav al re views o ff Co wcs excited Ihe you ng Germa n prince w ith the dr eam that . o ne

and Britain.

da y, he wo uld be come the SU I)l"L'n H.~ com ma nde r o f a German navy w ith a ha llie fleet rluu would riva l the com bined forces o f the British Xavy. In late r years . and as a gesture in ac know ledgeme nt of \X'i1 helm' ~ great 100"e fo r the na\T , Q ueen Victoria made him a British Admi ral o f the Fle et a nd . wh ene ve r [he occasio n seeme d appropriate, he proud ly ap pe ared in the full d ress uniform of this hig h o ffice o f the Ro ya l Nol\")'. Arou nd th is tim e the Britis h Sec-re ta ry o f Fore ign Affa irs, Edw a rd G rey, mad e a prop he tic rema rk: The Germa n Empe ro r is like a battleship under full ste am hu t wit hout a rudder. HL' wi ll run us into a ca tastro phe one day.' By the end o ft he nineteenth ce ntury. Ge rman y had overtak e n Brita in as the most powe rful industr ial nation in Euro pe , wil helm II. no w kn o w n sim ply as the Kaise r, sa w his und ying

relationship between Germany

".1,

46 .:: - :a.. .-

'-

.I11ILllAIILES.lI.l£S

d es ire for Ge rma ny to be co me

;I

g re at se a-power hegi n

to assu me cred ible p ro p o rti o n!", fo r h is natio n wa s no

lo ng er an a lso-ra n hut a sig ni fi c lTlt po we r wh ich continued 10 grow in po litical . ind ust ria l an d fina ncia l stre ngth. The Kaise r had rea d Ca ptai n Maha n's bo o k o n th e import a nce o r sea- powe r to a nation with ambit ions

o f beco ming a n e m p ire , and w as greatly imp ressed , for it co n fi rmed his

O W I1

vie w s o n the path thai Ger man y

w o u ld n ee d to tak e 10 achieve g re at ness . As Ge rm a n nava l h istori an D r 'ce e m c r Hahn s tates: ' He rend the bo o k o f Ma ha n a nd w as so stro ng ly in fl ue nced be

ar ra nged its tra nsla tio n limo Ger ma nI a nd it w as p ublish e d in Ge rma ny. Th is ho o k no t o n ly infl uence d the Kaiser. hut a lso a num be r of naval o ffice rs including a yo ung ca ptain, Alfred Tirp itz.' The effec t this hook had on the Kaise r, a nd o n the fut u re o f the yo ung Germa n Na vy, was furt her confirme d by na va l histo rian , Dr Mic ha e l Epka nh nns: 'T he Em pe ro r w as so de e p ly imp ressed by Ma ha n 's w riting, he said he wa s d e vou ring his hoo ks, an d o rdered all his lie ute nants to read Maha n and regard his boo k as a kind of b ible for the Navy .' In IH97 Alfred Tirpitz, the n a Rea r Adm iral. was made Secreta ry of the Navy. By then he had fully de veloped h is ' Ris k 'The o ry' - a fo rmu latio n o f how the Ger man Navy co uld wi n do minance over the British Navy. Tirp itz recognized that Ge rma ny, po we rful as it was industrially, co uld no t build a fleet large r tha n Brita in's, hut Ge rmany cou ld buil d a lxur!c f lee t s tro ng e no ug h to wea ke n the Ro yal Navy significa ntly in battle . Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz provided the Kaiser with the argument and the strategy to authorise the massive expansion of the German Navy.

Thi s wo uld have the effect of red ucing the British fle et to a fo rce infe rior to that o f Fra nce o r Russia. Such a red uctio n in nava l po we r, Tirpitz bel ieved , would force concessio ns from the British, unw illing to risk furth e r hostilities, allowing Ge rma ny the freedo m to creak' an overseas emp ire of its o w n . This thesis event ua lly found a w illing sp onsor in the Kaiser, and in IH911, a Navy Bill w as pa ssed b y the Rci c hstag a utho rizing the e x pa ns io n o f th e Germa n Navy to nine tee n batt les h ips a nd fo u rte e n ar mou red cru ise rs b y 190 3, T his rep re se nted a d ram atic increase in size, co rrectly inte rpreted hy the British as a challenge to the ir hege mo ny of the sea , To sway public o pinion in this largel y landlocked country in favour of the vas t a mo unts of mo ne y this build ing p la n wo uld cost, Tir p itz fo rm e d the Ger ma n Na vy Le ag ue . It w as a re markable s ucc ess . Naval o fficers w e re se nt to un ive rsities, part icula rly in so uthe rn Ge rmany, to en list the suppo rt o f academics in a nat io nw ide cam paign of public d iscussio ns o n the me rits of the Navy Bill. By the turn o f the ce ntury the Leag ue boasted a lmost a millio n members, w ith this po w er ful po pula r s uppo rt, Tirp itz put forwa rd a nother BiII fo r further e x pa ns io n of the fle e t. T his Seco nd Nava l Law , passe d in 1900, a utho rized the stre ngth o f the navy (0 he inc reased to a to tal of thirty-e ig ht battleshi ps by 19 20. Wh ile the Law of IH911 had bee n viewe d by the British as Ge rmany ac q uiring a navy co mme nsurate with her ne w status in the wo rld, the passtng o f the Second La w w as a wate rshe d . The British fully rea lized that the Ge rma ns we re se rio us in the ir inte nt to cha lle nge Britai n o n the ocea ns of the wo rld . The y a lso recogn ized, as Tirp itz had predicted , that any future w ar they might get invo lved in w ith Russia and France would ha ve the po tential to leave them at the me rcy of the Ge rma ns.

SEA I ANES T O P OWE R

47

Brita in's immed iate response 10 the an nouncem ent o f the ne w German b uildi ng p rogramme was to build mo re battleships fo r the Roya l Navy . and bet we en 1902 and 1905 twelv e were laid do wn . The lo ng-te rm co nseq ue nce of this second Ge rman fleet ex pans ion was the beginn ing of a naval a rms race o f un preced e nted proporti o ns. But for the ne w-look battleshi ps at the turn of the ce ntury , thei r first rea l test in ba ttle wo uld occur, no t in European wate rs, bur in the se as

off Japan . T he Russia ns, w ith the ir Pac ific Fle et stat ione d in Port Arthu r, belie ve d that the Japa ne se would nOI tight a Euro pe a n powe r let alo ne o ne as po werful as Russia. The lines we re d rawn fo r w hat wo uld he a se ries of epic batt les for the C0 l1l111and of the se a in the Far East. O n 5 Februa ry 190 4 the japa nese Co m ma nde r-i n-C h ie f. Ad mira l Heiha ch iro To go , su mmo ned his co m ma nd e rs 10 a co n fere nce o n b o a rd hi s fla gsh ip . th e Britis h-hu ilt battle sh ip stttsas«. His sa m ura i swo rd lay o n th e ta ble . signa lling h is wa rlike int entions . Togo 's plan was 10 mou nt a p re- emptive strike o n the Russian vesse ls lying in Po rt Arthur - e ffect ive ly he gin ning the Russo-Ja pa ne se \'\Ta r. In th e ea rly da wn o f 9 February, he se nt five de stro ye rs o n a sur prise ra id into the co nfined wate rs o f the harbour to launch a to rpedo attack o n th e a nc ho re d Russian fl e et . 1'\\' 0 batt le sh ips , Retriz a n a nd Tsareuitcb. a nd the cr uise r Pal/a da we re hit whi le the J a pa ne se vess els w ithd rew w it hou t cas u a lty . T he Adm iral Togo who convincingly

fo llo wi ng da y, a fle et o f sixtee n Ja pane se sh ips led hy Togo aboa rd .Hikllsa bom bard ed the port. On 25 Fe b ruar y five Russian wa rships att empted to br eak o UI o f Port Art hur b ut

defeated a supe rior Russian fleet

were d rive n back by Ja pa nese ships , o f w hich two battle shi ps, Hatst te and vasbima, struck

ott the coas t of Japan in the

Russia n mi nes a nd sa nk . In a second brief e ng agement in Ap ril, the Russia n co mma nde r Adm ira l Makha roff ab oard the batt les hip

Battle of Tsushima in 1905.

tvtroparloosle p u rsu e d Ja pan ese c ru ise rs p rot e cting mine-la ying ope rations o utside Po rt Arthu r. Makha ro lT lost his flagship and his life , plus those of 630 crewmen. w hen he ra n o n 10 a mine . His re p laceme nt. Ad miral Wirhcfr. dashed w ith Japa nese forces in August off the islan d of Tsushima in a n atte m pt to jo in th e o the r Russian for ce s at Vlad ivos to k. O n 3 1 Decembe r. Port Arthur fe ll to Ja pan ese ground troops. To all inte nts an d purposes. the Russian Pacific Fle er ce ased to ex ist, with the exce ption of o ne a rmo ured cruise r an d severa l small cra ft ba sed at Vladivostok. For Russia. il was a se rio us strategic situatio n . the ir en tire eastern fla nk was no w e xposed to furthe r seaborne atta ck. Th e only co urse o pe n to them was to o rder the Baltic Flee t 10 the Far East w here its supe rior num be rs wo uld deal w ith the Japan ese o nce a nd fo r a ll. The logtsncs. ho we ver, we re fo rmi dable . Th e Russian com ma nder Admira l Rozhdc stvcn sky rece ived o rders to prepare his fleet for a vo yage ha lfway around the wo rld , to an u ltimate battl e w ith the Japan ese fle et. \'(lith no bases of thei r ow n ell route. the Russians we re o bliged 10 ta ke a s m uch co a l a nd materia l w ith the m as the y co u ld . •IS we ll as hospita l a nd re pa ir s hips . While pa ssing through th e No rth Sea . the Russia n fl e et . co nce rne d that Ja pan e se torpedo boat s wou ld be in wa iting. o pe ne d fire o n fishing vessels. sinking a British

The forward twin 12-inch guns of Admiral Tog o 's flagship at Tsushima. the British- built

Mikasa This ship is now preserved at Yokosuks, Japan.

tra w le r. A se rio us incid ent with th e Ro yal Navy wa s narrow ly avo id ed . w hen Ro zh destve nxky re ached Tang ie r it was agreed that his flee t would he d ivid ed into two g rou ps: the smal ler vessels wou ld sail th roug h th e Suez Ca nal. w hile the o the r, larger, ships wou ld m a ke th e p assag e ro u nd the Ca pe o f Good Ho pe . O n 1 Ja n uary 190 5, wo rd rea ched the Russ ian co mmander, a nchored in Taruatave. Mad agascar . (hat POll Art h ur had fallen to the Ja pan e se . This change d the s itu atio n d rama tica lly ~IS Ro zhd c xtvvn xky was no w d e n ied th e ha ttleships o f the Pacific Fleet as w ell as the flee t hase itsel f. He now faced the p rosp ect of sa iling his fleet across th e Indian Ocea n and o nwa rds to Vlad ivosto k, th e o nly base o n the Pacifi c co a st a va ilab le to h im . T h is wo uld e n tai l sa iling th ro ugh the co m pa ratively restricted wate rs betwee n Korea and Ja pan . O n 27 ;"-la y 1905 the Russ ia n flee t w as s ig h te d h y adva nce u ni ts o f Ad m iral To g o 's fleet a p proachi ng the Straits o f Ko rea o ff the isla nd o f Tsus hima . Rozhdestvc nsky wa s still two da ys' sailing from Vlad ivo stok. And Togo , made awa re o f Russian mo ve me nts h y rad io . was waiti ng. On pape r, the Russians ha d a massive advantage, nu m be ring eleven bat tlesh ips. five large cruise rs, th ree s maller cru ise rs. nine d est royer s a nd various tra nspo rt vessels . O f th e battleships. SlIl '(/I"Ol' ( Rozhdestve nsk y's flag sh ip ). ttorodtno. Ore! and Alexander III wert: ne w - each 13.500 to ns, armed with fo ur 12-inch OOS-m m) and twelve (i-inch ( 152.5-mm ) gu ns, po we red h y triple e xpa nsion e ngine s g iving a s peed of 17.5 knots. By co m pa rison . the Japa ne se fle e t co ns ist e d of fo u r battle sh ips . te n la rg e c ru isers. te n sma ll cruisers an d tw enty-o ne d estro ye rs as well as n um e rous s ma lle r cra ft. Three o f th e fo u r British-h ui lt bat tle sh ip s w e re o n ly a fe w yea rs o ld : " film sa (Togo 's flagship), Asa b i an d

Sbtktsbima. The fo urth, Fuji. w as se ve n yea rs o ld . These s hips also mo u nted fo ur 12-inch (305-

6tr

- - ..

..- -

uo dn J;l,\\O U")J!j

~ U ! WlSl : ,\ ., p

,',\ llI,1U;1 ..n p ti u u q 0 1 J., ,\\ OU ,' lJJ SI:,\\ I:.' S 1I~ p.11U1H }.) ·\ I I'~·1 J n:1I1 ti U!ltJ

.\ Iu a ,' lj l lI~I P S I~ .\\ ;)S;)U1~ U I~ r ~1 11 1 lli ti n eJ J! l1:lfA.\ -m u co 01 s"IW,),1P JOJ .t \1:N " s.' Iu:<.h:(' .11(1 JOJ p JI:PlII:IS )1 : .'J ~ .')111 ' p p Olll lI:,'J~ .'111 so mo.oq l~ lLl ! l(s n SJ. ;)SI11:,),1H ·S,')·\ I,1SllI,' lj I ;lS;l ueue ( .'111 u o l,WUlU! ;)1(1 SI:.\\ 'S;)l1a s p ,' I!lIn ~,) Ifl p lI1: lIP: J!JH uo pnhu ! .')111 lII:ljJ ruruodun ;)JOlU JI~j ' ~ U ! l ll I ' u nJ tiuol ;n p UI · ;)J I~.~ J I :.\\ p:.WlI U! u o dro.w .' .\ !Sp ., p ;l Ip SI:.\\ u n x ~!4 ;l Ip Ha p S I~ .\\ pp o .\\ ;)IP .1 0 s rowod (I~.\I:U U:;)J~ ;)lfJ 1\1: ru po.woqs ell1!ljsns.L Jeq) stiU!11l ;l IP .l0 .'UO ' J.WOlll ! Ir:,wu ;)111 .10 SlUJ.'J UI ' 110 OS Plll~ SJ."1<.h:u s.\\ .'U UI:!S;)UOPUI U! PUI~ SJ.-xkds.\\;)lI UI~!ld .\ti:J U! ' ;l.) U1~ IS U ! JOj ' s l l~ P O) ! P" ,'ljl .,,')s lII:,) .' UO pu v ·;)1!lj.\\ -UOU s r.,\\ l1~IIl .UIun o,') I~ uxuj ~U!~P!l I: U .'~ I~I J.'.\ ;) pl :lj umu ,'I!II·\\ ;')1(1 )I~ I II .uu n ISJU .11(1 S l~ .\\ II -ms v lltinoJlp 1I1~ p apun osar l1~IP ";;l0ll·);) PI~lj .\.IOI.) !,\ ., s " u n !l:[ ,' lj.L ·.UO)";!11 [e.vuu U! S;)I111XI ;).\lsP .')P rco m ;l lll .l0 o u o S! l~lU!ljsns.I . ' WlP Jsn! p .H.' !lp e 0~0.L - ,\.I01.)!.\ tiU!W1!II!UU1~ u e U!'\\ OJ 1I0!J1:U!llIJ;)I;)P lj~n oJlfl ';),)J oJ S!II .10 ~U!lplII:l{ P:,)!).)I:l 11II:!IIpq ljtlno JIIl ' ~'S ;) P lj U .1 .\ ;) ~ ' P ,' LJ s.-\ ~S U;).\ IS;) p l{za H 01 rou.xlns JI:J 'Jl:j ,')J;).\\ 'SO!lf"; J!,'111 j O .\ lp 0 !J;)o n ..; ;)1(1.10 SUlJ;)) 1I! 'O!l{SJ;)P I:" 1 .10 s nu .u U! '.')S."1 II1:d l:[ ,' 111 .\ lu P:)j ;l=:>. :;)11l1:q pnuaurnuour ";!III.l0 SP,1jP tiU ! IP I~;)J -J I~J ;llj) pu r. sllns;)J ;)111 dn sums ,' !lH:,) (1 ~Jq\: J( I ·p .')p u n o. \\ 06S PUl: p .)I!Pt .'J .1.\\ U.1lU 0 11 ;) I!II,\\ 'SIIX>q o p adror ., .1Jl II Isol ., s., u r.d ef ;)II.L ·J.) UOS!JU lI,,)~I: 1 ;)J;).\\ 90 19 J,'ljlOIW pun ";, '·\!I J!.')ljJ ISOI St ·OS 'SJOI!I:s lII:!ss nH ;)ljl.10 ·SPJI:·\\ lfUOll m o ~1:.'Jq OJ tiU!.\.II P;) ~ ·);)J , \\ ";I~.\\ PILIIUIIZ I J,''';! lU.) ;)lfl ;)1'11 ,\\ 'el!uq\, U! p.-111J;)lU! ;lJ;).\\ ;)"' J1(1 pun p.umdro ;)J.'.\\ Jnoj ' ~ U11 S 1I.')."X1 pl:q SU!lI..;]I:.\\ lI.1'\"(:-J: ·,Cmp' lfT J.'),( OJI";.' p ;ll ll u o p.')Jn l<.!I:.) ";1:,\\ ,( ~ "; U ;l .\ I S .1 p l l z o ~1 I I~J ! llI P V · ~ O I ,,; o.\ ! P l~ ll \ l( ,)I ~,,)J 01 ,')Iql : .1P .\\ ',(IlZO,ID PU1: ,t:1Wf/ ..;].1.(OJJ";.' p ,' 1I1 P II1:ZlJili/V J.' S!IU,) ;)lfl 'SU!IIS u q ssnH p.')til:UI1:P '( I!, \1~.') l( ;) ,1Jlp

'( lu O -u a xcu q U.1.,
U1~! ..;s n H

,' lj1.10

p.umnu,u n:q ,\\ .tID P;)ljS!UU SU!lj"; ;)s,'II1:dl: l" JlII:ljUIUIlPI mq ,\"I1:'')'\\-'' III1:q ."'II Il ',( IV n'lI!.\\o\lOJ ,"lIp n'UP Il( J 'cN lJlu OUO/ f .1.1111.1/ J1J/,1 J,)SPlJ J P lo ,1ljl p u n 110./IJ"f/J/1'/'J.iJUf/'V J,'S!IU) p.u non uu ;1lj l "
till!lI:I";I:.\;) P IfI!.\\ ·OII,p O·IOEl p u u 11I.I,l/ Jli O., "
IUJOj -., J OJ .( l!u n u o<..k Io ;)111 P .')U lI1:!..;snH p ,1J,')111:') ";,( IP IXI .')111 ~111 .\\O Il I: "urd !. JIlOql: )I~ s <.1!II";

1I1~ !~'S 1l~1 ;llllq)!,\\ 1.)1:1UO.) Isol o~o,L ' ;)? I ~ U1 ;l1I1J;I,\O ~lI !~U{;1 1 ;) ~OU N putt IS!UI I(I!/>"\ ·J.').(OJ IS.1p I: ,(q

,Uo U.'~ I: I SI:,\\ ,( ~ SU ".\ IS;l P lfZOH ;lJO}'1
., w.l J I~ I! lU ! ";

e P ,1U1 OI UOOS Sl:.\\

U!lIstir.L1 S!H ' ;)~p p q ;)111 lIO rsmq IP II"; I: U.111 ,\\ p .1pllno .\\ .\ Ip eq SI:.\\ .{ ~ "; lI ", \ I,,;,'p q z o H 'do.m, l1lS uO ·'1u r...; PUl~ J;'),\O P;)IIOJ ;llis ';)111IXI ,' lj) 0 1O! S;)1T1U!lU .( UOj 1Il0qV ·UO!I.) I: .10 1Il0 PJJIl) .,JoJ J,;)ll PU I~ .(I:.\.\!: u .\.\ Olq SI;lUUnj IIl(XI IIl!·\\ lJ' ((flJ.'I~-o SI:.\\ 1!1I lSJ
.' J.'.\\ IJ.(qlJ.'I_'-o pUI: JII .lil/l IllJ.' ' .:' / V ',lO.II J,lIIS -sr o u u nx J;)lsr.j PU1~ J ,')Io-X1 '"XI 0 1 s.1.\1.1";lU.)111 p .').\OJ<.1 u <X>S ."lS.,u r.d l~ [ ;lll L ';')J U U;l<..!O 0 1 ISJU U.....1<.1 peq 1J.((/lJ.I/~U PUl~ ,UU IJ.UlS' SO!t(";;)llllXJ U1: ! ~'SnH

·') ( l l

-s u uti pJI~,\\J O_J J!;)III 11I1.\l .q uo ·( ld ., J Plno .) s Ul:!s ..;n H " 111 .1Hlf·\\ .( lU;)U;l ;llfl Ie ";;lP!";PIXU<j .'JU

0)

SU!ljS S,oti'o,L p.,.\\OIlI~ ;)!1-)1:1 S!llL .~L. S!l( ";S()j .) 0 1 'S.\\ 0 <j , s U1~ls..; n H

;)((1 S";OJ.)I: P;)UJIl) o rioj, 'n'U!III!1 I') ".IJ;)O 1(1!,\\ 'U"I(.1 ';)U11 ;l IUI:q U1:! ssn~1 ."1 lp Sp JI:.\\ OJ .( p.) ,1J!P paods IInJ 11: l);l~n:lj .) ' N I~ ) U(>') lI! ' O~O.L ' ~10U ~ 6 .'J~') I U l~ n~ ;)llllXI OIU! lll,'.\\ .( ~ s u .). \ IS;) P llZOH ' 1";!lU ~ .)!I(1 pm~ 1~;lS

.\.\ I:;l l( r. UI : IS01I1 II1 S!lj o p u rnu

.\.1.,.\., ),;)1

';)11ll:q ";.,{I:pO J u o vp uo d .rp ,)J!<..hu;)

;lIIl Jo IJI:J JO ;)SP ;)ILL. :1.....' L1 S!lj 0 1 wuti!S ;)1·(IS-U1:!lIOSI;):,\: I: ,'PI:lU o tio,L J1:.J!U1PV ' Iu d £: ., JOp q I..;nl" · ,,; pJ I~.{ J!;lIP llIOJj ti'u!Un :;)J ls su~!..;u ., " (1w q III!.\\

roqi ouc .' 1I0

P "lI .)I~oJ <..kh : s P .) U 0 ,\\ ) ;)11.1.

'S)Oll 'l HI JOJ po nti' .' J.'.\\ pun SUOJ OOO'SI J.' .\() p.,.)I~ IU S!P .(;)lj.L '..;u n n' (lUlU-S'C"S I) lj.JU!-9 1I.'.')unoJ p."'I!JJI:.) pll1: s u nti ( lUlU

~O d O X s a ~

I

50

.......L

..TI IL.llAl::r.L.E5 11I l!S

From a japan ese pe rspective. the Battl e of Tsushima represe nte d mo re than [uxt a victo ry at sea , as japan ese nava l author and historia n Pro fesso r Kiyosh i Ike da ex plains : 'Peo ple we re d ated wit h the victo ry a nd sud de nly Togo becomes a na tio nal he ro . j apan W OIl :1

thorou ghly co nvinci ng vic tory which tot all y sur p rised all the co untries of Euro pe .

Now susp icion o f Japan grew. All the major powers in Europe had co lo nies in Asia. T hey

were afraid that Japa n's sphe re of influence mig ht widen in Asia . Now th is was the:ca use of th e -yc l low peril " theory. Aft er the

R U SS O -J lp:II1 L'SC

wur P...-o p lc real ized the need

for a rmaments , a nd therefore battleships to 1)(.' manufactured domestically. Steelworks and o the r d ocks and factories fo r b uilding ships were e sta blis hed at Yokosuka. Sasebo. Nagasaki and Ku re .' On IXKtnJ Ad miral Togo's n ~lgship Andr ew Lambe rt describes.

JIi/..~{ls{l.

a Britis h na va l officer had been mak ing not es. as

"Tsus hima confirme d the s u pe rio rity o f the he av y na va l g u n as th e ke y sh ip-killing Mikasa steams into action at the Battl e of Tsushima in May 1905.

we apo n o f the pe riod . The Brit ish naval observer, Ca pta in Pa ke nh am . SpL'T1I the w ho le: han k" o n the br idge o f the flagsh tp sttkasa. exce pt fo r a brief pe riod wh ere he had to

IS

--..

.--

' pJ I~'{ )P0(l (I :, \I~N lPIlOlllSU Ocl 11: 'u l l~)lJn U! ·P (Jo .\\ .1lj) jO .1P !S

J:llIlO :l Ip UO rpnq tlul .1q d!qS:lIUl XI .wa u '{ 1I 1~1 ! P CJ I~ OlU! P :lU:J<x.!Jo .)Ul .1(.1 Plno.\\ pun 1I.1.1....1JOJ u aaq .{ p I~:lJ JI~ pI~q s uos s."'l l ."'lS:l11.l. .•"'lJ0Jo"'lq J.1.\ :l m :lll s:l~m~J J.1H~."'lJ~ 11: I1I~n Oj oq P ln o .) .1JlWq C Jel(l P.").\\OlIS OS I 1~ l~lU l l ls IlS.L 'SU!l(S U1:!ssn}! :llp JOj (I:)l~j po.a u d Ill:l( W11l sd !ljs."'ll l1l:q .1...."'l1ll:<.h: r ."'l lp j O

sunx ( llllll -SO£) 1pU!-{:I

p.11l1!1~ -II :l . \\ ;llll s e .\\ l( ·J :l.\\S U I~ ."'l lj l p .1p!.\oJd l:llI! lls ns.I.

-su nx

,\.\1::l l( n"lIP!j -,\\ O\S tucuj SI!lI J:l .\\."'lj U1:t(1 ,\ I:l.\ !l.1.1j P cuoru rua uoddo 1Il; lll (o"'l ll.\\.I., .\O Pllm.\\ sunx J " )l I~ !1 · tl ll PfJ O .\\ -J .1 1 S I~.1 .\ q p .1J ."'l ,\! I:lP S)!l( .10 m q u m u J."'lll~:lJtl I: ll:ljl p ."'l .\."'l!\ .,
lomps ;l UO -s u n ri tl !l! ;l l(l.l0 rou u u od un ,1!tl:l )l:J I"; Plll~ J.1.\\ od ;),\ !pnJ IS:lp .1 ql .10 U0!lI:UIJ!.l.W·1J Sl:,\\ -oueuodu« p:J llI ."'l ,) .10 In n ' p.1J !) '\ :l lj l :l.!Ojo"'l'.\ ·S."'l ", I:U S.P I-I 0 '\\ ."'l lp IP~ Aq p ."'l !P I1IS '\ FlSOP .' J .1 .\\ s d !l(s J!.")lll tl U!ll ltl U

U! ."'l S."'l lll: d l:f ;HIl .\ q P.1.\0 Ilh U;l s p m ll."'l lll pu n SJ !P l:1 ;) q .L 'S!lll p ."'l p! ,\ OJd 1:U1!l!s n s.I, ·lU.) lU."'l tl l:tlll.) I' :.\I ~U ;)P:,)S- lIl1j I~ - p.")J .1 1l 1~ 1lI 1l~ l( 1 p u n OJ ~ tlU!,\ OJU '\ IUO :l q l p.1!U.1 p 1I.1.1q p l:q ,\.IIlIU.1 ,) ,\\.) lI .1lj l JO ~U! U U!~;)q

Sl~.\\

:a ll 0 1 d n

~U !P I~."'l1 S;)pl:,1."'lp ;)111 J;),\ O U!ljS;)lllIXI ;llll JO 111."'l llldol'"'l·\ ."'lP ,\.II:UO!lll lo .\."'l ;)11.1

·.)tIP CcI ."'lIl1 u l osrq ).")."'l Li sn u u uu ;) lll SI~ '!!I:,\\1:1-I 'J ()( Jl I~ 1I JlI;."'lc! .10 111.11111Is!lqels ., .) 111 rumlsn s.l .jo P ;))p ;)UO 's;)u !d d m lfcl ;)l(1 ul SUO!SS;)sso<.l J!;)11l UD ;)Jnss.1JU pUI : .\. l!l(xJ tI~! ."'lJ0.l

J !;)l P )O UD!Sl.\ ;)J I~ lll tlnOJq S!lll 'J I~ I'l.) ! U I :d til SlII:,)P;)llI V ;)IP JO." ' P! I~ I ."'lJ."'l .\\ S UlS! UO~ I; l lII; .wau .10 s uon q1u n0.l ;)q l put: · tltl l tl U l~ l P S l~ , \\ J;)pJO Pl o ;)ql :JCI!UI!S ;)J."'l.\\ s llns;)J ."'l l(1 ·'{ III :.) ! ~.1 11 :.J I'" ' 111<.1 u ! l~d S J;).\O C.)P;llll V JO ICI(l

uuqt

J .")I1~:lJ~ u ."):lq P I~lI s m~!ss n H ;)l p J.1.\0 lld (un pl ;)s ;l u lxh :[ ;)In

: ;l jUlXI ;) q l J;)I) I~ sd!lIs P."'llud p ,) 110 qS lu!j 0 1 l~tlI !qsn s.L

-mqtuco );)."'l U-Ol·)."'l,' lI 1,1."'l)jl: 0 1 )."'l,\

w p .,."n ,{IUO ;)j.").\\ v:"'lOp.XU0.L

P I~ lf 0 P;) OJO I ;")111 j O lI~:lJ lll ;1111 )lap p .1I eJI S U Olll ~1 P

Op.1UJOl ;)lf l ) 0 ."'l.) U:' IOd 1U! ;) ,\ l ll~pJ ;)111 pUV -s u nti ."'lJq !l I:,1· 1Ull l p ."'l 11l OJ p .1S0 0 0 0 S I~ SUl1tl .\..\ C:'lf j O :D UC1_1O<.I 1lI! .1111 P;))1:.JISUOlll ;)P

.\.W."'l lf ) O osn

;)tU -uorp enbs I: SI: ."'l,1!).11:.1d

tl u!l P U1~ lf J ."))).1q

sd tqs

m~ ! ssnM

;)( (1

.\ OJ IS;)P 01 ."'lJU!(-1q"

J ."'ll1~."'lJ ~ J !;)lll PUl~ -sdiqs J!.111l .10 S,)!IS!J."'l I,)l:.JI:lf,)

:' lf1 P U1~ pood s J."))).1q Jl."'l(P P ;)).1;) U;)J s U1:1"sn M ."'l ll1 .1J,\Tl,")0U1:U1

- 1Il0 0 1 ;)S;) UC d l~ f ;)I P .lo .\ I !I ! q l~ ;)11.1 ·;)Jnp;).10JO P U1~ ;)UpI.) OP PJl~ P U1: IS ."'l ill ~ U ! l1:J."'lUO SI•..,.1 11 u lJo)lu n )0 ·u O!S;)lf O.1 It~·1 ! ).1 Cl )0 ;),)U1:uodu1l ;)lfl p .1UIJJjU
pu c S;),) ."'l !U 0 ) u .\\Olq U;).")q

PI~ 1 1 ~1I!11:.1 lI:u tl !S e J '")).II~

uu ojluu S!tj

.") ~u n p 0 1 ,\\0 (-1<1 o~

U3'i\\ O d OX SaN \~

I

Enter t e

I

n ,\ Iay 1905 the Port smou th s hipyard wa s authorized by Admiral

Fi~her

to build a new kin d o f battlesh ip - a bat tleship that would re volutionize the British Navy in the sa me w ay th at .\{(//)' Rose, a nother

1'011~mouth

vessel , had do ne almo st 400 ye ars e a rlie r. Th is s h ip was to demonst rate to

the w orl d tha t Britannia did ind eed still rule the wa ves. By October 1905, when the ship was officia lly laid down , 11 00 men were w ork ing s ix d a ys a w e ek to p ro ve n ot o n ly th a t Brit ai n built th e mo s t powerfu l ships, b ut th at it b uilt them faster th an a ny o the r na tion . By 10 Februa ry 1906 Portsmouth sh ipwrights had lau nched the new vessel. and it w as ready for p rel imina ry trials by O ctober. Th e sing le mo st importa nt s h ip in th e development of th e mo d ern battlesh ip was re ve a le d for a ll to see : Hl\IS Dreadnougbt.

T he s h ip wa s diffe rent from a ny o ther battleship befo re he r. She was b igg er, lo ok ed more purposefu l a nd , ra th er th an tw o , s he qu ite clea rly ca rried s ix heavy twi n tu rre ts . \Vell below d e cks - a nd not as o b vio us were stea m turbines ins tea d o f re ci proca ting ma ch inery, w h ic h w ould

gin .' this new-age fighling s hip a speed of 21 knots, Sh\.' W:IS heralded as the most awesome nava l \H 'apOn ever conceived. a re vol ut io n in warfare at sea . Her very nam e im med iately became the g\.'rl\.'ric term applied 10 all ba ttlesh ip s that follo wed . Existing bat tles h ips in the world navies Ill'CIII1\.' 'p re- d re adno ugh ts' a nd were consigned 10 the: second ran k. Despite: the: fanfa re and accolades s urrou nding /)retltlllo11gbl, s he was e ntirely p redictabl e. as evidenced hy plans for similar s hips o n the d ra win g bo ard s of Ameri ca n . j apa ne se a nd Italian naval construct o rs. xto rc heavy gu ns o f ever-i ncreasi ng size , coupled with hig her speed. W:IS tlK' only way for the: ba ttleship to develop. This may seem an obvious po int in retrospect hut. for almo....t th ree d ecade- before . bat tles hip armament had been made: up o f rel ativel y few hcavv gUlls plus 1ll11l1\.'roUS s mal ler -ca libre weapons . us ua lly mo unt ed around the sides o f th e ship,

A number of f:Klo rs. combi ne-d w ith the experience at Tsuxhima. po inted the way forward for till' adoption of un ified main an11:II1K'nt for baul e-htps. l'\\.'w syste ms o f fire control un der deve lo pme nt. togeth er wi th th e increasi ng ran ge s at w h ich gu nn ery duels were likely 10 lxfoug ht . su~\., ....ted that g uns o r identica l size would return mo re accurate spotting information . That is. it W~IS ea sier 10 s pot the sp las h\.'s from 11K' xlu-lls of g uns which had the sa me balli stic perfo rma nce tha n it was fro m the sp lashes made by a ran ge: o f d ifferent-ca libre g un s. \X'it h a number o f 'a ll lug-g un : proposa ls unde r conside ra tio n a nd in the ea rly stagL's o f

The first all big -gun battleship, Britain 's HM S Dreadnought leading a line of warships. So powerful was the impac t of Dreadn ought on the future

development w ith var ious wo rld navies ~ 11 much the same time . it is to the cred it of the British First Sea l.ord , Ad miral Sir j oh n Arbu thnot Fish er. that /) r('{/(/ llu llp,bt was the first 10 he built .

design of all capi tal ships that her

As ea rly as IlJOj , tht..' Italia n 1l:IV:1I cons tructor Vitto rio Cuuibc n i had discu ssed such a s hip in

for all battleships that followed.

name became the generic term

,.

The British battleship

an Influent ial pap er. Sim il arly. the Am eri cans were we ll ahead w ith th e design of th e: South

Common wealth ot the King

Carolina Class mo unting e ight 12· jnch (305· 111111) g uns w he n f) relldlloup,bt was laid clown . The

Edward VII Class. Ships of this

japa nese had also reached th e same conclus ion some time be fo re Tsu xhima h UI were not abl e to pU I Ihe concc p i int o pra ctice unt il th e Sensu Class o f 1909. His to ry s uggests that th o se wit h mo st to lo se re s ist c ha nge. In the case of the Britis h

class were typ ical of battleship development prior to the appearance of Dreadn ought

in 1906.

Admi ralt y this wa s no t so. Th e y were pr epar e d to w rite o ff, at le ast te ch ni ca lly, th e ir V;:ISI p re ponderance o f existing, 'p re- d re ad no ug h t' battle ships. Dread nought re se t the b.ut leship league score at 1 for Brita in, 0 fo r the res t. This was a dangerously slim lead for the world 's

lead ing naval power. The pre-dreadnoughts remained viable to a degree, hut not one of them cou ld opera te in the same sea space as Dreadn ought. The extent to which the strength of world navies was oblite rated hy the in troduction of Dreadnougbt G in he gaugeu h y (he numbers of p re-d readnoughts in their ha llie flee ts , as seen in the tab le above right. Each one of these had to he e ffec tively w ritten -off as a major capital s hip b y each world power.

Dreadnongbt o wed mu ch to Adm ira l fi sh er - a m an d e scribed hy Dr Eric Grove as 'the d o m in at in g fig u re in the Ro ya l Navy' s h istory in th e ea rly ye a rs o f the cen tu ry - a n extraord ina ry ma n, a stra ng e ma n - a geni us. I thin k a little hit mad. like mo st gcn fuses a re ,

- '.:..._ . . . . . .IIAiIlil..._~ 55

E!UillLTIl lLllRfu\illLUlLl.GillL

hUI a man willing to

CO Ill \.'

up with radical solutions for

radi cal times.' In fifty y e ~lrs o f se rvice in the Royal Navy. Fisher ros e from ca d et to First Sea Lord , His cease less com mitment to reform and greater levels o f effici en cy

The world 's major battleship fleets of predreadnoughts in 1905 Established po wers Britain

53

Russia

hlunt i:lngua g c and the harsh measures that 'Ja ckie' Fis her o fte n used to get his way mad e him enemies wh o cons ide re d that he w a s re ckless and vengeful.

27 (including four smaller coastal defence battleships)

France

18

The re is no qu estion . th ough . that during his first

New powers

pe riod as First Sea Lo rd he brought the Royal Navy to :1 high stutc o f c ffl civncy and readiness. In 1 ~ 9 l) Rear-Admiral Fis her was appointed ;. ..

USA

ea rru..-d him ~I devoted group o f supporting n:I\'31

of fice rs kn own col lect ively as (,he 'fishpo nd". However.

Germany Japan

Vice-Admiral Sir John 'Jackie ' Fisher during his period as

27

Commander-In -Chie f of the

25 8

Mediterranean Fleet. His reforming zeal brough t swee ping

Com m ander of the Mediterranean Fleet. For the next

changes to the Royal Navy and

three years . he crafted this fleet into an e ffic ie nt fighti ng force. In 190 2 Fisher left thi s co m ma nd 10 become Second Sea Lord . In th is ro le he: th o roughly o ve rhau le d the education

ensured that Brit ain was first to

and truinlng for ~1 1I en trants into th e navy. whet her seamen, o fficers o r e ng ineers , In 190.3, Fis her became Co m m a nd e r-in-C h ie f Po rtsmo u th . re cog nized ~ I S the p re cursor 10 the to p joh - First Sea Lord . In Octobe r 190·1 he was confi rmed in tha t post. Fis her's first cris is ca me alm o s t im m e d iat el y a!" the Russ tan Haltic Flee t. on ih w ay 10 a n nihila tio n o ff Japan , fire d on Britis h trawl e r!" in the No rth Sea (svc page ,iX). As a di p lo mati c crisis w ith Russ ia lo o me d , Fisher reminded the governmen t th at Germa ny was the pot e ntial e nemy. no t Russia . a nd th e cr isis was averted. During his period in the Me d ite rra ne an . Fis her cond uct e d a numher of trials to improve gunnery , Battle ran~es at th.n lime were less than .3(X)() yards and Fisher'!" trials sh o wed that ranges o f up (0 6000 yards and more were possihle if good fire control procedures were adop te-d . Ilis trials sh owed that accurate range measurement was hesl ac hieved when shell s p las he s fell -ovcr' o r 's ho rt ' o f th e target. Simple adjustm ent would a llo w the next s hd l to land in the middle and thus hit the ship. This prcKCSS was called 'spotting" and was be-t achieved when g u ns o f uniform cal ibre were used rath er than mixed cal ib re s. It was fo u nd that shell splash es from lighter o rd na nce o bscu re d the sp lashes from th c a ll important 12-inch (.305-ml11) guns, Be ~lring in mind the legend that has grown up around Fisher, characte riz e d hy his rhetoric 'h it hard

a nd hit first'. it m igh t easily he ima g ine d that hc natura lly tended towards th e hea viest gun possihle. In fact th is ix not so , At o ne stage in the evolutio n of the ba ttles h ip design he favo ured IO-in ch (254 -m m) gu ns as they had a high e r rate of fire tha n th e 12-inch (.30;111m ). The se lect io n o f l .2-in ch gu ns in the fina l d e s i ~ n W~IS d o wn to the realities of spotting in fire control. The

"

p roduce an 'all-big- gun' battleship , HM S Dreadnought

T ilE " A T TI ES H IP S

The hull of HMS Dreadnought after the launch at Portsmou th Dockyard in 1905. Dreadnought rendered all existing battleships obso lete and challenged the industrial capacity of both Britain and Germany in a race to outbuild one another.

argument put forward was that spott ing the splashes of the first salvo landing near the enemy wa s vital in o rde r to ma ke co rrections befo re firing the second salvo . The time taken for shells 10 rea ch the target area was therefore more important than rate o f fire . In this respect. there was little difference between the 12-inch and the to -inch gun. Howe ve r, th e latest design of l 1-inch gun was more a ccurate and its sa lvo es landed as a tig hte r group ~H long ra nges . Fina lly, the: 12:-inc..'h wea pon obviously had grea ter destruct ive effect and thus became the choice for Dreadnought . Give n Fish er's natu re . the time e la ps ing be twee n form u lating the conce p t and huilding the ship had to be sho rt. Fishe r es tablished a nd c haired a Commit tee o n Design s in Dece mbe r 1904, to loo k at the design of future ba n lcs htps and a rmou red c ruise rs. It first me t ca rlv in Ja nu ary 1905, w ith the brief to conside r designs base d o n an 'all b ig-gun ' main armament o f t z-mch guns , a speed o f 21 kno ts and 'adequate armour" . It was o bvio us from the o utse t that the committee was co nside ring a ship that would he a signifi cant lea p ah ead in design

FJ'llIlUL.IlLLllilLillNil.l1JGJ.I.L ENTE R T HE OR FAJ) NO U GU T

and firepowe r. Afte r months of dis cussio ns and delibe rations, th e q uestion o f Dreadnougbr» d c s tg» wa s finall y settle d . Argu ment s o ver o ffe ns ive ca pa b ilities vers us d efens ive vuln e rabiliti e s. and a rmamen t we ight ve rs us s h ip s ize . had been res o lved w ith the co m p ro m ises typical of a com mit tee-produ ced d esign, and so me o f the weaknesses. D~I V i d K. Brown . re tire d De p ut y Ch ie f Nava l Arc hit e ct o f the Ro ya l Co rps of Na va l Co ns truc to rs . co mments d ry ly o f D r('{{du ollp,bt: 'It is strang e that suc h a highly skilled group o f na va l o ffice rs and e ng inee rs s ho uld

(0111e

lip w ith a co nfigu ration w hic h wa s so unsa tisfactory.'

Th e issue o f sp eed wa s ad d ressed hy s peci fying stea m turbines . th en a very new wa y o f p ro pe lling sh ips , There were severa l d e sig ns fo r stea m tu rb ines in e x iste nce a t the end o f th e nin eteent h Cen IU!)': ho wever . it was Charles Parsons w ho drew atte ntio n 10 his patented turbine w hen he ste amed the experimenta l. lOO-foot (30- metre) lo ng Turb i n ia at high speed throug h the se rried ra n ks o f Briti sh wa rships at the Diamond J u bilee Re vie w o f 1897 , The impl icat ions o f th is fo rm of propuls io n fo r hig h-speed cra ft suc h as torpedo boat d est roye rs were obvious . a nd the British Admira lty quickly orde red se ve ra l o f th ese vessel s to he filled w ith Pa rso n's steam turb ines fo r evaluatio n , At the sa me lime , co m me rc ia l in terests on th e River Clyde equi p ped the sma ll passenger ship King Edu -ard with tur bin e s. w h ile th e Cu nard Stea m Ship Co , fine d the 19.500-grt line r Can nanta with Parso ns turbines in 1904 before fitting the m into th e 3 1.500-g rt liner s Lttsitan ia and .1 fll uret1l11ill, Tu r bi nes were unquestio na bl y the wa y to go an d thei r in trod uct io n effect ivel y m ar ke d th e end o f rec iprocat ing ma ch inery in mo st larg e o ce a n-go ing vessels, inclu d ing the future figlll ing shi ps in th e majority o f wo rld navi es, With h is usua l d rive . Fisher determ ined that Dreadnougbt wo uld be bui lt amid g rea t secrecy a t Po rts mouth Nava l Dock yard in o ne yea r. To ma ke this deadl ine possi b le . her struc tu re was d esigned to be simpl e ye t as stro ng as po ss ible , To save delays in b uild ing her armamen t. her 12-inch (305- m m) m a in turre ts we re dive rte d fro m th e batt le s h ip s Lo rd 1\'e1S0 1l a nd bu ild ing o n the rive rs Tvn c a nd Clyde , Stee l plate s were s ta nda rd ize d w he re pos sible . ;1I1d a huge amount of wo rk in va rio us shops was u nde r wa y he fo re the keel wa s laid o n 2 October 1905 , At a we igh t o f 608 8 d is pla cement Ions, Dreaduougbt was b un ched

A gam(!1I11l 01l ,

o n 10 Feb ruary 1906, afte r just over four mo nths o n th e huilding slip , She began trials a yea r and o ne da y a fter the keel wa s laid . o n .3 O cto ber 1906 , a nd was fina lly co m p le te d the followi ng Decembe r. Ureadnongb! re p resent e d not o nly a turn ing point in battles hip d es ign : she a lso ca rried Fish e r's hopes tluu her uniq ue po we r w ould p rove a wea po n fo r peace . rathe r than fo r wa r. as And re w Lambert explain s: T he Dr(!lldl1o/lght itsel f has

10

he seen as a crit ica l clement , no t in p re parat io n fo r wa r,

b ut in Ihe avo ida nce of war, Fish er's o bject ive throughout his career \\ .: \ 0,; to d et e r war b y p o inting ou t a nd d emon strating in rea listic term s to fo re ig n rh ':d s th at it was tmpo sstble to c hal le nge the Ro ya l Navy e ffe ct ive ly. As a result he staged the mo st astoni s hi n g p ub licity stu nt of bu ilding the s h ip in a ye a r a nd a d a y; a feat hithe rto

unprecedente-d . a nd ne ver subsequent ly eq uall ed, The pu rpose of this was 10 have o ne o f these sh ips afloat. in se rvice befo re an y o ther nat ion had laid o ne down , He w asn 't bre ak ing the rules because th e Japa nese and the Ame ricans were a lso think ing about d readn ought -style s hips - Ihey just had n't gOI around to bui lding the m, Fisher bui lt one , took it 10 sea , s ho we d il o ff. and essent ia lly sa id 10 the w o rld , ~ I f yo u wa nt to be a first class na vy. yo u have to buil d th ese no w - uhcse arc mu ch mo re expensive , th e y're much bigger and the y have infra structu re impli cat ions for yo ur d o ckyar d s and vario us ot he r aspe ct s o f yo ur na va l ma ke -u p , Arc you goi ng to sta y in th is gam e ?" It's a gamb le r's move. I !c's raised the stakes - who 's go ing to re ma in a ma jor nava l powe r

after the IJ readJlouR/;{(

'.,,'' fts

......_IiiC ..

57

The cla im that IJrelld llollp,!.Jt was built in one yea r and one day was certainly 'a n astonishing publicity stun t'. BUI how rea l was the lime frame? Da vid Bro w n has definit e views o n th e actual time taken : ' Fis he r tried to mislead people tha t s he w as buil t in o ne year a nd o ne day. In fact there was six months' pre-fabrication be for e sh e was b id down a nd ahOUI thr ee months' finishing work afler she'd done trials. She p robabl y rcallv took eig hte e n to nine teen months to build. a nd this is co nsis te nt with Portsmouth Dock yard 's re cords. Portsmouth Dock yard built battl eships faster than .my o the r royal d ockyard , a nd that was '1Ix >Ut a yea r faster than an y comme rcial yard : whatever the: actu al time: frame W :IS, it was ce rtai nly fast a nd s hocked e:\"(,.' I")' o the r n.I\·y a nd shipbuilding ya rd in th e world. Dreadnought w as the: sensati on sh e W :IS inte nded to be, Th e first 'a ll big-gun' luutlcship. the: first turbine -d riven battl e sh ip . .1I1d th e: first to steam at 21 kn ots, On th e o ther hand, IJreadliollp'!.J t also incorporated a number of und es ira bl e fea tu re s rh,u would take Hoyal :":
_=mlM6·~

IiliI£lLI.lIJLlllU'.AillLOJUGllJL

...

s h ip bas ed o n hea vy gu ns und h igh speed . At Iss ue- at th e tim e was the c hotec o f th e m ain .rr m .uncn t . Th e m erit s o f c.z - tnch ( 23 ·1 -l1lm). l O-Inch (25 '1-111 111)

and 12-in r h <30-;-111111) g u ns w en: hotl y deba ted. As a lready mentio ned . ove r a pc riot! o f time Fis her h ad c o m e to the view that th e 12-in ch gu n s hou ld h e

adopted for the: ne w ha u les hi p. Th e ne w a rmou red cruiser. howeve r. was to retain the 9 .2·i ndl g u n . As wi th D readnougbt, it was know n that o the r navi es were also moving towa rd s the concept of a fas t. heavily a rmed c ru ise r. In 190·L for example . Ih (.· Jap an ese laid dow n two ar moun•.-d c ru isers mountin g fou r 12-

inch (30 ; -m m ) gu ns . wi th a spe ed of 20 kn ots. The c h o ice' of larger g uns by o ther navies for these type o f vessels would eventual ly influe nce th e fina l British design . An l.'arly concept developed by Fis her in 190·l, refe rred to as H.\IS 1I11llppmacba lJle, described a vessel with a d isplacement of 15.000 tons. speed 25

kno ts; urmumc nt 16 x 9 .2-inc h (2.3"I-mm) g uns ; w ith a rmoun,-c) prot ection of b-inch 052.5-mm) ma in belt . thic ke ni ng to H-inc h (203-111111) o n lhl.' barbe rtcs . The c hoice of the main a rma ment fo r this type o f ve sse l w a s still a m a jor Issue. As fast s hi ps w ith 12-inch (305-m m) gu ns, these a rmou red cr uisers wou ld h a ve lh e ahili ly

10

p u rs u e a nd dest ro y a ll o th e r ximil a rl y a r m ed cru tsc rs .

HM5 DREADNOUGHT S27FT COVERALU ~ BZFT ~ 26FT 61N (160.6 ~ 2S ~ B.lMl DISPl.ACEMENT, IB ,1I0 TONS MAcHINERV, DIRECT-DRM STEAM TURBINES 23,000 SHP 21 KNOrS 10 ~ 12-INc.H C3O>-MMl GUNS IN FM TWIN TURRET>; 27 ~ 12POUNDER, S ~ IB-IN C~S7-MMl TORP£DO TUBES BELT II TO ~ IN czso TO 100 MMl, BULKHEADS B IN C203 MMl, BARBETTfS II TO ~ IN. TURRET> II IN 773 CAPPRO~.l DIMENSIONS,

Im po rta n tly, it was cons ide re d th e y m ight also h a ve :1 ro lc in fle e t actio ns in mai nta ini ng co ntact w ith a n e n e my battle fle e t a n d , w ith th e ir h ig h s pee d ca pa b ility. lhl.'y co u ld p la y a vit a l role in p ic k in g o ff an y s hip s that s traye d fro m th e p ro tect io n o f th e main fl eet.

ThL' a rg um en t in favo u r o f the 12-inch g u n won lhe d ay - a dec- ision e ns u ring that th is ne w d e s ig n wo ul d resul t in a he av ily a rme d fig hting s h ip tha t wo ul d ce rta in ly h c n o o rd ina ry armo ure d cruiser, To accommodate till.' boile rs and ma chine ry needed to p roduce the requ ired hig h speed, the c ruise rs' hu lls w o uld be larger tha n tho se o f the battleshi p " Having the same armame nt as th e b.ut lcship. th ey were a n e xtraord ina rily po we rful figh tin g sh ip" The ir siZt' alone a nd the g u ns Ihl.')" mo u nted made th em awesome . even glamorous, vessels and ce rta inly th e mo st expe ns ive s h ips a floa t. Ho weve r. pro te cted as it was b y o n ly th e lig ht a rmou r o f an a rmoured cruiser, Fish er had un wittingly crea ted th e most cont ro ve rsial . and in tim e tragic, warship o f the d read nought e ra " The first 'ban k-cru tsc r' b u ilt fro m Ih is highly con troversial des ign was

H~IS

I sn-inctbte. As

with /)"(,lIdIlOIl~ b l, tu rbi nes w ou ld provide th e speed - in th is ca se . 25.5 kn ots. Fo u r twin tu rrets mou n ting 12-in ch (30 ':;-mm) g uns provided the s h ip 's m ain armament , wi th one fo rward , o ne aft and one o n eit her bea m , But w ith o n ly 6· to -t -mch (1 52.5- mm to 100-mm ) main belt armou r, and o nly 7-i ndl 0 7H-m m ) arou nd th e barbcttcs. th e pr o tection o f the se ships

W :IS ,

Unli ke

indeed. mini ma l. /)"(,1Ic1 1l01l~b l,

where only o ne shi p

W :I S

b ui lt, th ree of these new Invincible Class

armoured crui....ers we re o rdere d . All th ree . tnrinctble. lndcnnita ble a nd Inflexible. we re laid down in 1906 in p riva te ya rds a n d com p leted in 190H. Th e term 'ba nl c c rui sc r. a lthough ap plied to Ihe s...· th ree s h ips, di d no t come in to o ffici al

USl.'

unt il 1911. For the second time

in as ma ny vears the British had Inve n te d :1 new ty pe o f wa rsh ip . ,\ Io sl of the o ther ma jor navies had no o pt io n h ut to fo llo w , Th e b un c h o f

/) ,.('(/(IIl ()II~ bl ,

fo llowed d o scl y o n its he el s hy the int rod uct ion o f th e

th ree In v inc ib le Class 'ba u le c ru tse rs'. add ed moment um to th e na val a rm s race be twee n Brit ain a n d Ge r m a ny - a race th a t h a d re all y be g u n ha c k in 1H9 H wh e n t h e Ge r m a n Ik ichstag passed the first o f Tir p itzs i' a\'y Bills . Th is wa s a rac e that Britai n co u ld ha rd ly fail to wi n th ro ugh the s hee r siz e o f its in d us tria l a nd s hi p b uiklmg ca p:lCily, h ut o ne that Ge rma ny wa s fo rce d fo r th l'

G t.·r m ~ln

10

n ation ,

e ntt.:'r if it w as

lO

ac hi e ve lh e n a\'a l s lre ng th th at Tirpil z h ad se t

- 59

WILLS'S CIGARETTES.

•

-. .-

.. Tobacc o companies capitalised

on the way battleships cap tured the pub lic imaginatio n. The

In the creation of the battles hip. the desig n and construc tio n of the hull. the armou r protectio n a nd the e ngi nes ca pable o f S p t,:T US of well o ve r 20 kn ots in all sea cond itio ns w ere o nly pan o f th e story. Providing the a rma me nt - the awesome firepo wer that mad e the battlesh ip the

dreadnoug ht batt/ecruiser

ult im ate ocea n -go ing fig hting machine - imposed restricti o ns o n the nu mber that an y on e

Invincible was faster but less well

cou ntry co uld de liver within a set lime frame . The British kne w the y co uld bu ild the ships. h ut the y also knew their rival xhlpyard x in Ge rma ny were rapidl y increasi ng thei r ca pac-ity to de liver. But co uld th e German armament factori es maintain the sup p ly of gu ns a nd equ ipme nt to arm their batt leships? And rew Lambert picks up the sto ry:

armo ured than Dreadnough t and carried a heavy pun ch of eight 12-inch guns.

'The ke y to the prod uction o f d readnou ghts shi fted from build ing ships to bu ild ing gun mountings a nd heavy turrets. The critica l British intelligen ce effort up to the First \''orld war was to unde rstan d how ma ny tu rret -mounti ng shops Kru p ps lthc Ge rma n ar ma me nt mak e rs) had. Th e num ber o f turre ts the y could b uild per year was the number of gun mount ings they could fit aboard haul cxhips. a nd from that co uld wo rk ou t how man y battleships could he built , TIle Ger mans did not have e noug h ca pucitv to acce lera te beyo nd a ce rtain point. Wh en the y b uilt a battleship fo r th e Gree ks , they had to buy the guns from the United States because they co uldn't take an y o f their own ca pac ity. The British resp onse was to en su re the y had mo re ca pacity. and co uld b uild more ships - simp le arithmetic .'

nnl'aI.'m . ...._.-: 61

L"U..E.RJ.llJUlRL\JlloIilliG lJ IIlJT=----

- '......

O n average a British d rea d noug ht could he built in about twenty-four mo nt hs , The Ge rma n e qu ivalent took thi rty-six mont hs, Britis h po licy - the Two Po w er Sta ndard - had been perfectly achievable w hen Fra nce and Russ ia were the navies in co nte ntio n. hUI the rapid growt h of the German :"::I"y upset the equatio n :IIlU pu t additio nal p ressu re o n Britis h resources and co m mitme nt, St ra ngel y, at th e , 'e f)' momen t it was importan t for Brit ain to bui ld up he r advantage in n u m be rs after Dreadnougbt, she reduced her annual buildi ng com mitme nt o f battleships , immediately p re ci p itatin g a nati on al crisis, The issu e came to a head at the e nd of 19OH. and res ulted in fierce po litical debate and o utrage d public o pinion th rou g ho ut the first ha lf of 1909 , w hen Ge rm:1I1 com ple tion rates we re compared aga inst

British completio ns . it seeme d at first that Brita in was we ll o n th e way to a co nvi nci ng su periority. Ho weve r. th e Libe ral govern me nt. t,..lccted to po wer in 1906, q uestio ned th e se fig u res a nd . :IS a re s u lt. tw o ba tt les hips w ere cance lled. o ne eac h from the years 1906 and 1907, By 19GB. membe rs o f the go ver nment . inclu d ing the Presid e nt o f the Boa rd of Trad e , the .:H -yea r-()Id 'cc tnsro n Ch urch ill. we re inte nt on pu rs uing a po licy o f so cial refo rm at the t..'x!x ·nse of a rma me nts , By th is tim e , the ltrttis h Adm ira lty w as becomi ng ser iously ala rmed at de ve lopme nts in Ge rm any where. it

was belie ved . the ba ttles hip-bu ildi ng p rog ramme had been ac celera ted . The n ew First l o rd of th e Admira lty. Regina ld ~ l cK enn a .

reacted hy putting fo rward the po liticall y un season a ble proposi tion th at th e govern men t s hou ld au thorize six banlcshi ps in 190H inste ad of the agreed two. .\ ld\.L'nn ;1 W:IS looking ahead to the yea r 191 2 w he n it seemed cert ai n that Germany wo uld han..' thirteen d readnoughts completed. compan-d to Britain's planned sixteen. Th is was hardly

•

the de cisive maj ority needed to maintain Royal :":;1\')' superiority. Brit ish concerns rested o n

two points: that the Germans were scc rc tlv huying additional quantities of nickel - esse ntia l in IllL' manu factu re of guns and armour; and tha t the a lready massive

HAAS INVINC.IBLE

Krupp works at Essen we re being sign ificant ly e xpa nded for the prod uction of battl eship turrets and guns" Furthermore. info rmation from the na va l attaches of several count ries indicated that more dreadnoughts were lx-ing laid down tha n

DIMENSIONS,

Ge rma ny ran-d 10 ac knowled ge . .\ !eKe n na . hacked h y Fish e r. went as far as sayi ng that hy 19 12 there w as

DISPLACEMENT, 17, 373 TONS

:1

possihility the Germans would ha ve twenty-one d read noug hts in com missio n, In ,\ Iarch ICX)'"). a packed House o f Co mmons heard ~ Ic Kt..·n n:l req ues t that a tot a l of ciglu d read noug hts he bu ilt. Th is re q ue st was s tro ngly o pposed. hy no ne more: so than \Vinston Ch urc hill. A compromise sol ution was reached in wh ich four d readnoug hts wo uld he auth o rize d in 1909. followed hy four o thers in 1910 - if events in Ge rma ny justified the incre ase , \'(' hile Ihe de bate ra ged. th e pr ess go t ho ld of the sto ry a nd bla zed at the governme nt for gh'ing away the 'priceless 1H."'rilage o f ce nturies 10 bala nce a part y hu d ge l', O utraged public o pinion was mobi lized unde r tilt.' slogan coi ned hy the Unioni st P:Il1Y: '\'('e want eight a nd we

MACHINERY,

S67fT (OVERILU Y lefT 61N Y 26fT 21N (172.8 Y 2~ Y 8M)

",,000 IHP

SPEED,

2SS KNOTS

ARMAMENT,

8 Y 12-IN (305-MM) C".UNS; 16 Y ~ -IN (100MM) ; S Y 18-IN (~57­ MM) TORPEDO ruBES

PRMeT10N ,

MAIN BELT 6 TO 't IN ClS2S TO 100MM) ; SARBETTES 71N Cl78MM) 78~

(APPROY.)

62

won't wait.' In July the government caved in a nd authorized construction o f ..-iglu dr eadnoughts. The: 0 3\"31 sca re o f 1909 was finall y o ve r. TIIL'fC was an interesting postscript to the e q ua tio n: conce rned at the appare nt lack of British dreadnough ts. hoth Austral ia and :"ew Zealand o ff e re d to finance tilt: co nstructio n of ( W O capital ships. This o ffe r was acce p ted and the bau lecrutse rs Australia a nd Sell' Zeala nd we re added to the eight The mai n effect of th e 1909 sca re had been th e reaffirmati on of Brit ish commitment to

the battle fleet . B Ul wh at of the su pposed secre t Ge rman ha u lcsh ips that had trigge re d the w ho le nffuir? \Vhill' the t't:a rs that Ge rma ny had the ca pab iluy. and the inte ntio n. to o uth uild the British w o u ld e ve ntua lly prove g ro u nd less, there wa s some truth in reports of addi tiona l s hips bc tng lai d dow n . T his w as explai ne d late r w he n it tran spired tha t pri vat e German ya rd s, kn ow ing that d read nought o rde rs were due under the pr og ramme decreed hy the Rctchstag. had laid down several ahead of time at the ir own expense, in o rde r to retain s killed workmen in the ir shipyards.

The hull of the battlecru iser

New Zealand slips into the River Clyde in July 1911 as the tempo of the Ang lo-German naval race intensifies.

J 1\ ,

, '?, \' '\

'I

,;i

~

~, ~

. I' d

I,

",

jl , I

.'

\\\

,'

I

" , II '

I II

E.NIElLIHE.JlllEAillillliGcllJL

.:.._. .iIII.lMat

The act ual number o f British a nd German ca pital s hip s laid d own between 1905 and 1914 was as shown in the tabl e to the: righ t.

A massive industry of armour and

Pe rha ps the most sigmflca m fact ind icated by th ese figures is that in the nin e

yt..': l fS

o f th e g rea t

-: 63

gun- making grew up to support the building of dreadnought

11:1 \"al race Ic:ad ing u p 10 \'\'o r111 w ar J. si xty-s even ca p ita l s h ips were b ui lt by Britain a n d

battleships - here 12-inch gun

Ge rma ny - an an .'r.lge of o ne battles hi p o r bau lecruiscr c \"cf)"seven week s for nine yl.';.lrs ! 111<.' cos t and the effect o f this incredible o utp ut o n the nation al econo mies. a nd the lives of the people associa ted with th e s h ipbu ild ing a nd arma me nts industries in the se tw o cou ntries,

barrels are being tumed in the machine shop of a works in Coventry.

a rc ha rd to co mp re he nd. Then add th e cost of th e o the r classe s o f sh ips an d their a rmamen ts

that maul" u p the fl eets of hoth na tio ns. a nd th e tot al is almost be yond belief. And th ese

fi ~ures

represent o nly th e tw o major nati ons locked

Capital ships laid down 1905-1914 Battleships GB Germany

toget her in an a rms race. As th e next cha pte r will s how. th e rest o f the world's majo r ma ritime na tions were a lso b ui ld ing u p thei r bauleship llel:'ts - on a

s li~ h tly

red uced scale. b ut with mu ch th e same momentum

as Brita in and Germany.

1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 Sub total

1913 1914 Total

Battlecruisers GB Germany

0 0

o

4

4

1

3

o o

4 3 4

2 3 4

3

6

1

1

o

24 6

17 1

10

5

2

1

o o

o

32

19

10

6

1 1

3

2 1

o o 1

2 1

o 1

1

•

att es 1

o T

he years between the turn o f the tw entieth centu ry a nd th e beginn ing o f World Wa r I saw th e absolute peak o f battleshipbuild ing ac tivity in the entire history o f these incredible fighting

ships . Almost eve ry maritim e nation that boasted a navy boasted at least a co uple of battleships in thei r fleet . The bigger the nation . the more capital s hips their de fence strateg ists dema nd ed . Th e batt le fle et s o f the w orld becam e the symbols o f nation al stren gth , of indu strial power, and of wealth. Eve n sma ller, less dev e lo pe d count ries far from the parry a nd th rust o f European power politics , su ch as Bra zil, Argent ina and Chile . almo st bankrupted their nat ional eco no mies to purchase battleships for their navies. I n fact. in this extraordina ry e ra. o ne o f the major British

shipbui lding yards employed a full-time battleship salesman wh ose job it was to ca ll o n foreign governme nts . so liciting orders for these incredibly ex pe nsive ships-of-war. The world had gone battleship-mad. as this roun d-up of globa l maritime powers demo nstrates .

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -"'_ lir.r..af.II'iI=m..__L

Great Britain After lJ rea dlloup,bt. the pace o f build ing battlesh ips and lxnt lecruiscr s gained momentum . The

Bcl lcro ph o n and St Vince n t Classes o f th ree s h ips - rhc n e xt stage o f de vel opme n t a fter Dread nou ght - went d own the slipways in fairly qu ick succession. In ma ny res pects they were repeats o f Drea dnoug ht wi th m ino r mod ifications: Ihe i nt ro d uc tion o f a -l-i nch ( 100· 111111 )

seconda ry armament fo r be lief d efe nce against d estroye r attac k, th e fitting o f a lo ng itud inal anti-

to rpedo bulkhead . and

IWo

tripod masts d istingui shed the m from their fam ou s predecessor.

S (1Hulle. laid do wn in 1909 . w as a n atte mpt ut co rrec ting the p roblems d iscove red in th e

layout of the 12-in ch (j0 5-1ll1ll) tu rre ts in pr e vio us s h ips. Th e tw o afrcr mo st tur re ts were superim posed: that is, mounted o ne o n to p of the o ther, a nd the wi ng turrets we re staggered to enable a lk'g ree o f cross-d eck fire. Despite these mod ificatio ns. many p roblems pe rsisted. For exa mp le , the s u pe rim po se d tu rre t co u ld no t fire di rectly over

(Il l'

lo we r tu rret be ca use o f

concuss ion to the turre t (Tl'W . It would p ro \'c a difficult probl em to overco me a nd the Co loss us Class sh ips wo uld re peat the N (1Jf1w e g un pla ce me nt with min o r mo d ification . TIll'

s he ll

:1

O rion Class of 1909 introduced the U .s -inch (.3'l.3-mlll ) gun wh ich cou ld fire a I·laO-po und dis ta nce of a bout 1·LOOO yards (2 1.840 metre s ). in compa riso n w ith the I1 S0-po un d

shell of the 12-ind l (305 -1ll1ll) gu n . From th is class onwa rds . British battlesh ips fina lly moved 10

an all-ce ntre-line arra ngc nu-m for the ma in armament tu rrets. The 155 -inch-gun ned ships also

The 'super-dreadnought ' Ajax

introd uced the te rm 'supe r-d re ad no ught'. One retro gra de ste p was the s iting o f the fore mast.

armed with ten 13.5-inch guns

which ca rrie d thc vita l n rc con tro l po s ition be h ind the fo re fu n nel. a re vers io n to th e ve ry

nears completion alongside the

unsatisfacto ry po sitio n used in Dn-adnougbt. The King George V and Iro n Duke Classes we re

Cunard liner Alaun ia in 19 13.

THE HATTI ESHIpS

improvements o n the Orion Class wit h the forem ast back in front of the funn el an d. in the Iron Dukes. an increase in the sec o ndary ar ma ment to ri-lnch ( 1525-mm) g uns. The class that follo wed broke new ground . The Q uee n Elizabet h Class of th e s hips wa s o rdered under the 19 12 prog ramme at a time wh en it w as know n tha t US a nd j apa n ese battleships wo uld he armed with l-i-inch (355-1ll1ll) g uns. The gun-ma ke rs. Armstrong. pressed a head w ith the de sign and manufacture ofa I5-inch (38 1· l11m ) gun for testing . This turned out to be a supe rb weapon. combi ning accu racy with a lon g bar rcl ltfe. The I5-inch gu n fired a 1920pound she ll, a nd it was recognize d that by o mitting the ce rnrul 'Q ' tur ret. the new battleships wo uld still deliver a heavier broadside with e ig ht g uns tha n the Iro n Dukes d id with five tw in Lt 5s (joB - I11Ill) . The space saved hy removi ng the turret pro vide d room fo r addi tion al boilers (twenty-four as o pposed to eigh teen ) and resulted in an increa se in speed , And. for the first time . o il was used as fuel Instead of coa l. These de velopme nts in design . s peed a nd fig hting qu a lity we re a ma jo r ste p fo rwa rd in the evolution of the ultimate fast ba ttleship . The Queen Elizabet h Class was follo we d hy the similar He V<..·nge Class o f live s hips. Th e last ship comple ted. Ramtllles. wa s the first ha ttlcxhip 10 have anti-torpedo hu lgcx. o r blisters. fitted a lo ng the unde rwate r side o f the hull . These bu lge s ex te nded from the forward 10 the after tur rets and pro jected 3 feet (nea rly a metre ) ou tside the hull. The y were intended to absor b the e xplos ive impact of a n inco min g to rpedo wh ile leaving the main structu re of the hull intact . The three Invincible Class bau lccruisc rs . .ct the basic parameters for this class of British capital sh ip fo r the next decad e . The y were larg e . fast. lig htly a rmo ured s hips ca rrying fewer g un s than a batt les hip bUI of the sa me ca libre. Th ree ships of the Indefat igable Class. inclu di ng those do nated by the do minion s. Australia a nd Nell ' Zealand. were al most repeat lnvinciblc s. le ngthe ned 10 all ow the wing turr e ts to lire cross- dec k broadsides. The succeed ing Li o n Class wa s the bunlccrutscr equivale nt of the Orion Class battle s hi ps . The Li o ns were co ns idera b ly la rge r s h ips an d . in de sig n te nus a t le ast , fle w in the face of ha rd -w o n e xpe rience in preceding classes o f bat tle sh ips . As o ne au thority put it. they co uld he 'regarded as an un fortu nate la pse from our high sta nda rds of de sign '. Th e last of the prewa r hattlec ruixers was Tip,e/: She was. at the time , the large st warship aflo at. An indica tio n of the sca le of cos t related to the British fleet of bau h-slu ps in commi-e-ion .u the heg inning o f \'('o rld \'('ar I wa s e stimated at ,fl OO,OOO.OOO - a nd th at was at 191 4 pri ce s. This eno rmo us cos t did not includ e the associa ted charges related and fuel (mo stly coal).

10

dockyard services . man ning

Russia Afte r the ir crus hing defe at at the hands of the Japa nese , the Russian s had no alternat ive hut to rebuild thei r fleet from scratch . Ahho ugh confidence in their n:1\')' had plu mme ted. the Dum a a nno unce d in 1907 that it was to co ns truc t a cla ss o f dread no ugh t ba u lc slups fo r its Bail ie Flee t. Ikcog nizing tha t they did no t hav e the technica l s kills to de sig n and build these sh ips . an inte rnatio na l co m petitio n wa s he ld to whic h no fe wer tha n tw e nty-th re e s hipya rds fro m Britain. Ge rmany. France , Italy a nd the US replied . Although Ihe Ge rma n shipbuilder Blo hm & Voss won the co mpe lilion , the ir ship wa s no t built . Instead the Admi ralty \V'o rks at SI Petersb urg d rew lip a n agr eement with the British armaments firm , Joh n Brow n & Co.. to pro vide technica l assista nce and supe rvision d uring construct ion of the ships. The sam e company a lso provid ed desig ns and e xperti se fo r the ma nu facture of the turbines. The final pla ns were developed hy the Russian s. altho ugh the influence o f the Italian co nstructo r. Cumbcrtt. was e vide nt. Four ships o f the Gangut Class were laid down in the summer of 1909. two eac h at the Adm iralty and Baltic \'('or ks in St Petersburg. Fo ur triple 12-inch (305-mm) guns o n the ce ntre line ensured a broadside o f twelve guns a ltho ugh end-o n fire wa s reduced to o nly two g uns. Altho ug h the s hip s we re large a nd ve ry List hy the standards of the (b y, a rmo ur wa s light wit h a maxi mu m belt thickness

B A T T! ES l U l!:LG (LG LOJlAL

-c.:.._ IIiiIIIIIlII. lIiIliiI...__1L 6 7

of o nly I) inch es (22H 111111). anti H inches (203 mm ) for turrets and barbc ttes. Th e Ganguts were followed in 1911 hy th ree similar ships of the lm pc rurritsa xrartya Class for th e Black Sea Ph-ct . This time. th e Russt an design ers in cre ased th e thi ckness o f the ar mou re d belt to 10.5 inc he s ( 267 mm ) a nd the turrets to 12 inches (305 mm ). Th e weight penalty for thi s re sul ted in less speed from the e xisting ma chinery - 21 knots instead of the 23 knots o f the preceding class . Plans to equip the Black Sea batt leships with 14-inch (55;111m ) gu n s fa iled to materi ali ze. The Russian batt leships had pr oved e x p ensive (0 huild . Protracted huilding times
I }

"TT l

The French aircraft carrier Beam

ESIU~

France

which started life as a Normandie

In stark con tras t to th e rivalry in s h ip types and numbers tha t had p revt ou-lv characteri zed

Class battleship in 1914, Under

competitio n between France anti Brita in, (he Fren ch decided nor to immediately fo llo w the lea d

the terms of the Washington Treaty. Beam was converted to

an aircraft carrier during 1923/2 7.

se t by the introducti o n o f

D"('(ldll u,,~ bt.

O ver the COUfX' of 1907 a nd 190H, thl.' y d efied (Ill." trend

and laid d o wn six pr e-d read no ug ht banles h ip x o f till.' Danto n Clas s desig ned aro u nd th e o ld sta n da rd o f four t z-mch (50 :;-l11 m) gu ns , IH,OOO Io ns, a spe ed o f IH k no ts . II

W;lS

no t u ntil

1910 that thei r first dr ea dn o ug hts were laid down . Th ese we-re fou r sh ips o f th e Co urlx-t Class . mou nting twelve 12-inch g u ns in four su pc rfiring turre ts fore a nd an a nd tw o w ing turret s . Th L' th ree s hi ps of Ih l' Brda g nl' Class fo llo we d in 19 12 to a n imp roved d vxig n o f fin ' tw in 13 ...1 -in c h

( .~ ·W - llll n )

tur ret s mou nt ed o n (h e ce n tre Hill' , Th ese were to Ill' the last Fren ch

dread no ug lux co m p le ted befo re th e o ut brea k o f \'('o rld \\h lr I. Th is effo rt was no t e no ugh . ho wever. to p rev ent France slipp ing fro m second large st

fifth a fter the US,

}{ lI SS i ~1

n ~ I \T ,

as measu red in b. utlcslu ps . to

an d German y,

Further ba nk-ships were p lanned to help resto re the French fleet's international standi ng , including fin' Normandie Cb s.... and four Lyon Cb s.s . ' I1K' Sl." intl.'n:s(ing and u nu sual dreadno ughts reve rted to

;1

non-supcrfmng layout o f th e main a rmaments. w ith all turrets o n the ce ntre line .

The Lt+inch (j40-mm) gun was retained hut mou nted in quadruple turrets . lh l' first time s uch an arran gement had been proposed. Difficul ties eXIX'C(l.'d in ma n ufacturi ng fuel -efficient tur bines res ulted in a mixed tu rlunc/rcci p rocatmg mach ine ry installatio n. All the i'\o n n:lI1d il's were b id d o w n a nd la u n ch e d h ut we re e ffect ively alxmd o nc d aft e r the o utb re a k of wo rld \'\'ar I. \'('ilh tb e e xce p tio n o f o ne, n{'arll, w h ich wa s convened into an a ircraft carrier in 192)/27 , th ey were scrapped d uring the early 1920s.

United States TIll.' real bu ild-up of US naval power 1( )I1()\\'l."d immediate ly afte r (he Spanixh-Amc rica n \'\/ar w he n the US became the latest imperi al world power. US naval historian No rma n Friedma n explains : 'O ne o f (he impa cts o f having a world empi re is tha t it sud d en ly becomes o b vio us you have to have a world n a\T to protect it. Also , in 190 1 we have a President . The odore HOOSl.'\·e1 l, who had been (he Ass ista nt Sl.'<.Te(;lry of the N:I\)' who , in fact. o rdered Ix:w ey (0

attack the Spanish in (he Ph ilip pines, He wa s \"l'ry mu ch aware of the value o f sea-

power and very much be lieved tha t

10

he a se rio us national power; you have to have a

large a nd powe rfu l navy. And the bui ld-up is ext re mely rapid. '111:lt'S w hy, hy 19<)(j. wc re coun ted as the second mo st powerfu l na\) ' in th e worl d , '\'(' hl.'n the US sta rts building modern sh ips in the lAAOs, ther e 's a \'l.' I)' co nsc io us sense that US industry ha s to lx' b u ilt up w ith those xhipx. If wv just wan ted a navy \\'l.' co u ld have gone to the British a nd bought British s h ips, " lany people d id , If yo u look at mo st So ut h Amc rh'a n na vie s, thaI' s whe re thei r wars h ips ca me fro m. \'('l.' d emand ed that l'\'l'l)'thing IX' bui lt here , \'('l"d im po rt thi ngs that we absol utely had to - nne o ptics, for exa mple. BUl in general we d eman d ed that th e g u ns, the armo ur - l'\'l'I),th ing ca me fro m the Un ited States.' \Vith two major coastlines to defend in the ca se o f a hostile attack , the: US n-ally required (WO separate

h~lttle

fleets - o ne o n the Atlantic, (he o the r on the Pacific. If l.'\"l.'nls sh ould ever requ ire

that these two naval fo rces be combi ned . it would mean a ve ry lon g , time -co nsumi ng and ard uo us \'o yage arou nd Q IIX' 110m fo r o ne o f

till.'

tlcets . 111is co u ld p rove a str.Hl'gic disaster fo r (he US,

and so in 1903 tlu-y began b uilding till.' P:lI1am:1 Cana l - a waterway, regulated hy loc ks, which cu t th ro ugh the narrow isthm us co nnecting Nort h and Sout h America . It was opened in 19 1·1. Early ill the ne w ce ntury. the US fleet

W~I S

l-cgtnr ung to take s ha pe with new baul cs h ipx h ig h

o n th e agl' nda , The age ncy w ith in the US Navy I'l'SpOll:oiihle fo r nl' \\' tle:oi igns , the Burl'au o f

\ '.

Co nstruct ion and Repair, pre-empted Dreadnougbt. at least in d esign . hy p reparing drawings for the South Carolina Class battl eships in 19Q.1. These ships mounted a n all big-gun a rma me nt i'n what would come 10 he regarded as th e class ic arra nge me nt: two superfiring turrets forwa rd a nd two

aft. From th e o utset, US battl eships carried all th eir main armament o n the ce nt re line. BUl

th e South Ca ro linas were not th e revolution which J)relld1l01lp'bt would he ,

~I S

th e y retained

reciprocating ma chinery ca pab le of o n ly IH kno ts. They d id , ho weve r, int rodu ce the highly d istinctive 'lattice ' o r 'cage' masts rather tha n tripod:... o r military masts adopted hy all o ther navies . US building lim es we re s low, and bot h So u th Ca ro lin as were not co m p le ted until e a rly in 19 10, six ye ars afte r the d esign was fi rst p ro po sed .

l11C De laware Class laid do wn in 1907 was the first true equivalent to J),-elld1l 01l;.:bt,l11e main a rm a ment o f ten 12-inc h (305-111111) g uns was su pe rio r to n readnougbt. he ing cen tre -linemounted , O ne o f this class was fitted with steam turbines w hile the other re tained reciprocating ma chinery. At this stage, US tu rbin e d esign was proving nOI very fuel efficient. TIle Florida Class of t\VO s h ips was essentially a repeat o f the Delaware 's with funnels g ro uped tightly between two cage mast s. 111e \X'yo m ing Class th at followed wa s simil ar hut with the ad dition of a tw in 12-inch turret ca pable o f p roviding a twelve-gun sal vo . TIle New York Class of 1911 reverted to five tw in turrets but m ounted th e larg er 14-in ch (,355-m m) gun . The y also returned to The forwa rd twin 14-inch turrets of the US battl eship Texas, the only p reserved examp le of a World War I battleship, at her mooring in San Jacinto State Park, Texas.

-= - ..J,., ~ -;;,

~" '

,

.

-

~

MlII'''

IlAIIl.l'JilU~-.GJ:L(iL(~l1B A T TI ES U III S G O G I u n A

- ,. ._m ..

I

71

rccip rocu mg ma c'hincry because o f the d iffi cu lt ies enco u nt ere d hy US turbi ne ma nu facturers

in achieving the specificatio ns req ui red hy the navy. T he innovation w hic h the succeed ing Nevad a Class introd uced was the 'all o r no th ing ' sys tem

o f protect ion. US construct o rs d edu ce d th ai as light a rmo ur d id not sto p penetra tio n h y a rmo ur-

pie rcing shells there was liule po int in fitting it. They adopted the principle that the o nly a rmo ur wort h fitt ing w as arm o u r thick enoug h 10 Mo p a shell. This arm our po licy wou ld eventually become sta nda rd p ractice in all US battleship d esig ns . X(,l'atla retained the sa me numbe r of gu ns as S ell' }(J/",(d)u l d id so hy incorp o rating tw o triple turre ts a nd tw o tw ins, th us red ucing the «Ha l

nu mbe r o f tur rets to fo u r fo r the same fire po wer, The Pen nsylva n ia Class to ok Nel'lI da a ste p furt her hy e lim ina ting tw in tur ret s alto g eth e r, re su lting in twelve l -i -inch (355- m l11 ) g un s in fo ur turrets. Th is class was fo llowe d hy the New Mexico am i Tennessee Classes w here a numbe r

,

o f gene ral imp rove me nts we re made, inclu d ing better positioned seco nd ary a rmame nt , turbo electric dr ive in Neu ' J!e.\';co, and im p ro ved un d e rwat er p rotection ag ains l to rpedo o r mines in Tennessee and ClI lij()1·lI ill.

All th is b uildi ng act ivity was st imulated hy a g rmv ing se ns e o f na tional feel ing throug hout America that .

:IS :1

nat ion. the y too s ho u ld hav e a h attie fleer capable o f d efe nd ing their shores

aga insl eve n the mo st po we rful aggressor. US po litica l lead ers we re also he gi nn ing to s ho w ge nu ine co ncern ove r the grow ing unrest in Europe . By 1906 , the n, the US Navy was the second largest in the world.

Italy A po tent ial w ar wit h Aust ria saw the Italia ns d e vel o p and ma inta in a po w er ful na vy capa ble o f dd e at ing the Aust rian hattie fleet in the Adriat ic. In Eng ineer Co mma nder Vitto rio Cu nilx'rt i. the Italian Navy had a ta lented co nstruc to r who , as early as 1905, had writt en abo ut an 'a ll big-gu n' battleship . hut as the Ministe r for the Na\'Y considered suc h a sh ip to he beyo nd the needs o f the Italian Navy, it wa s no t until 1909 that th e first Italia n dreadnough t w as laid d o w n. Th is sh ip , D ante AIi~bi('ri, int roduced seve ral no vel features . She was the first b.ut lcshtp to e m ploy tr iple turret s fo r he r ma in a rma me nt a nd th e first to usc tu rre ts fo r so me o f her 4.7-inch 020-nun ) seco nd ary ar mament . She had a n unusual a p pe a rance w ith two g ro u ps o f wi del y s pac e d twi n funnel s . Be tween the se

IW O

g rou ps o f

fun nels we re two of he r fo ur triple turrets. Mo u nting twel ve 12-inch 0 05-m m ) g uns in a ce ntre line , non-superfi ring ar rangeme nt. he r d esign bo re resemblan ce to th e Russian Ga ngur Class. Dante AIiJ.:b ieri was fo llo wed h y th e Cavo u r Class o f th ree battle sh ips where a mixtur e o f

triple and twi n su pe:rfiring tu rrets ena b led an add itio na l 12-inch (50S-m m) g u n to be ca rried . This class was a ge ne ral improve ment o n th e p rece d ing class - a deve lo p me nt process which co ntinued o n to th e two Do ria Class s hips laid do wn in 19 12. Whi le the ma in arma me nt o ft hese late r s hips remained th e sa me , th e seco nd ary batte ry was increased fro m ·1.7- to 6-inch ( 12()to

152.5-mm ) gu ns . By the time the IaSI I\\ "() classes we re co mple ted. their 12-inch g uns had been

eclipsed by the I ) .5-inch ()·i)-null ). I-f-inch ()5 5-nun ) an d IS-inch (jHI-mlll ) we apo ns in se rvice

in o the r nav ies. Fo ur large , po werfu l a nd fast ba ttlesh ips mou nt ing e ig ht IS-inch g un s were laid d o wn in 19 1·1 b ut ne ve r co mpl e ted.

Japan Afte r the Battle o f Tsus h ima , like se ve ra l o ther wo rld na vies, Japan ha d considered the d esign o f a ba ttles h ip w ith a n a ll b ig -g un a rmam en t. At thi s e a rly s tage in th e d e vel o pme nt o f the Japa ne se sh ipbu ild ing. ma rine e ng inee ring and o rd nance ind ustries, a large vo lume o f mate rial a nd tec h n ica l ex pertise: ca m e fro m the \'V'est. Britis h d es ig n co ntinued

10

e xe rc ise

:I

stro ng

•

influen ce , its su pe rio rity re in fo rced hy th e victory o f the Hritish-huilt Japan e se ba ttleshi ps at Tsuxhima . Th e g u n mo u ntings for the Satsu ma Class battlesh ips, laid d o wn in 1905, came fro m Armstrong Wh itwort h in Britain and the CUJ1is tu rb ine machi ne ry fro m the Un ited States.

f

T ilE H A T TI ES II IPS

Four yea rs later. tw o Sensu Class ships were laid down . Th ey earned a mai n armament of twelve 12-inch (30 5-m m) g uns, Th e Sensus wer e much les..; reliant o n imported material than all the prev ious battl eships buil t in Japanes e s hipyards, Although the ir turbin es we re of the latest Brown-Curtis type developed in Britain hy John Brown &-: Co .. they were manufactured in Japan under licence by Kawasaki , Th e two Fus o Class battleships th ai foll owed were s i ~ni fi camly b igge r. w ith a n o ve rall improve ment in desi gn to th e pn..' ceding d asses, Like the pr evio us battl eships. they we n: huilt in pairs in the na val dockya rds at Kure a nd Yokosuka . The Fuso Class ea rned twelve I-t -inch <355-1111n ) guns mounted in twin turrets o n the ce nt re line . had a s pe ed of 23 knots. and were fitted w ith all-inch (.305-m m) arm o ured IX'h. Th e I ~ Class wh ich follo wed in 1915 w as essentiall y a repeat of the Fuso Class hu t with a modified layout in the positioning of its ma in a rma me nt. Con struct ion of these two shi ps \,\'~IS ca rried o ut in the pri vate yards o f Kawasaki in Ko be and Mitsuhish i in i'\agasa ki. 111is was pan o f the plan implemented hy th e Imperial. N;1\1' to e xte nd the nati o n's sh ipbu ilding ca pac ity beyond that of the naval dock yards. As ea rly as 190-1. the j apuncs e had de cid ed to a rm th eir new a rmoured cruise rs with 12inch <305-lI1 m) guns. pr e-erupti ng hy o ve r a year the British development o f the banlecrui scr. Four s hip s were built. two each o f the Tsukuba and Ibuki Classes. \Vith fo ur t .z-inch guns and a heavy seconda ry a rmament . thl'y res embled the p re -dr eadno ugh t batt leships. Thei r o rigi n!" as ar moured cruisers. ho we ve r. co uld he seen in their rel ati vel y high s peed. 20 to 2 1 k no ts . an d light ly armoured h ull w ith a 7-inch (17H-mlll) hel l. Ho wever. b y the tim e the )' we re com pleted. th e y were to ta lly outclassed by the British lxrnlccruisc rs. Till' succeeding class re pr esented a sig nifica m le ap fo rw ard . The fo ur s hips of the Kongo Class we re dcstgn cd in Brita in hy Vicke rs a nd the le ad s h ip . A·oIlRo. was b uilt hy that com pany. K O IlW) was th e last J a p ~lI1 l' sl' warship to he bu ilt ou tside Japan, Th e Kongo Class were la rge . powerfu l shi ps o ver 700 fee t ( 2 Ij metres ) long. They ca rr ie d . for the first tim e. I-f-Inch <355-ml11 ) guns mounted o n the ce ntre line in four tw in tu rre ts . Th e Kongo Class. bui lt at much the same time ;IS the British Lion Class . was co nside red a mud , superior fig hting ship to the British vessels.

Austria-Hungary Mitsubishi Shipyards in Nagasaki, Japan, shown today. Many Japanese battleships were built here, including the superbattleship Musashi. The specia l

As a contine ntal power. the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary co mmitted the hulk of its defence spending 10 the army. maint ain ing the navy as ;1 small hut efficient force comprising a handful o f battleships . cru ise rs an d co astal defence sh ips . Acce ss to th e sea was lim ited to a strip o f coastline at the he ad of the Ad riatic w here the pons o f Finnie a nd Trieste were situated. TIlt" main purpose o f (his navy was. in event o f w ar w ith Ita ly, to defend these pons a nd their

berth prepared for Musash i is on

national territ ories.

the right side ot the photograph.

In 190H the head o f the navy. Admira l xtonr ecuccolt. ann ounced the intention to build a new class o f ba ttlesh ips in reply to the Italians w ho w e re abo ut to proceed with their o w n dread no ugh t. After co nsidering a number of designs and opting for a triple turret like the Italians. two ships of the Tcgcnhoff Class were laid dow n in 1910. At the time . nat io na l funds were sh OI1 and the shi pbuilders were asked to sta rt construction o n the h~lsis that fun ds would event ua lly I ~ fortbconung . In 1912. two furt he r ships were laid do wn . These wer e sma ll a nd armed with o nly 12-inch U05 -m m) g uns in co mpariso n to mo re power ful ships in o the r na vies. Designs for an improved Tcgeu ho lf Class mou nting ten 13.H-inch C~ 50- lll m ) g uns had been pre pa red.

ll AI ILESlll l!S.JiWGLUJllAJ PS GO 6 1o n AI

._Il l l= i..'...liItil~ ......

73

Financial wr.m alcs dela yed the proposed da te of bying down these ne w shi ps , by which time worl d war had broke n o ut and the project wa s cance lled"

Germany Alte r completion of the five ships of the pre-dreadnoug ht Deutschland Class in 190H, the German N'a\"y inte nde d to b u ild tw o fu rthe r pre-d rea dno ugh ts w ith I l -inch UHO-mlll) g uns " Th e se plans we re a ba nd o ned , ho wever. while the im p lica tio ns of D rea d lloup,bJ were stud ied . Fo r the Ge rman Navy. w ho se two ma in na va l base s and s hi pb uild ing fac ilitie s were situate d in Kiel and Wtlhch nshave n o n o pposite sides of the j utland Pen insula, there wa s more at issue tha n sim ply the decisio n to proceed w ith the build ing of large r ships. The Kicl Canal. the vita l seaway linking Germa ny's port s and s hipyards o n e ithe r side of the pen insu la, was re stricted in w id th and co uld not accept the incre ased be am of d re ad nou g ht hauleshi ps. Equ ally. se ve ra l of (he ma jo r shipyards d iu not have the capacity to build such ships witho ut ma jo r extensions, Building d read no ug ht battleshi ps . the re fore , wo uld come at a hig h cost in infrastruct ure . as well as for s hips themselves, But Ge rma n na va l int e ntions were no t to he su p presse d . App rova l w as g ra nted for the bu ild ing of the ne w an d mo re po werful d read no ug hts. In the sum me r of 1907. fou r Nassau Class d readno ugh t-typ e battles hips were bid dow n" From the o utset. the Germans ad o pted a diffe re nt ration ale t () w~l rd s the design o f the se battleships. 'x'lulc the British stre ssed fire po wer as the absolute p rerequ isite, the Ge rmans balanced fire po wer with protection a nd speed. With l l-inch C2HO- m m ) g uns ~lga i ns t l z-inch (305-mm ), an d 19.5 knots against 2 1, their new s hips we re no t as h e~I\' i1 y a rmed no r as 1~l st as British equiva le nts . Ho wever, p rotection ranging from ar mou r to unde rwa te r sy~t e lll~ was ge nerally be tte r. with the jcassaus. the Ge rma ns followed the British in int rod ucing a co m plex layo ut of turre ts, w ith o ne tw in turret fore a nd aft an d two o n e ither be a m, permi tting a maximum broadside of eight g uns o f the twel ve ava ilable. The Nassa u ships we re also wide-r in 11K' beam , allowing w ing turre ts to be furthe r in boa rd tha n in British desig ns.

I

Unlike lJreadll oul!.bJ, they carried a po wer ful seco ndary ar ma me nt o f twelve S.9-inch (t SO-m m) guns. Armo ur protect ion was exte ns ive w ith a 12-inch (305-lllm ) belt. and 11 inche s (2HO mill) for tur rets and lxrrbc nc s. The seco nd g roup o f four new batt leships. the Helgo land Class , wa s laid down in 190H. They mo unt ed tw el ve 12-inch C305-1ll1ll) gu ns in tw in tu rre ts simila r to th e Nass au Clas s. T hese

g uns, develo ped a nd man ufact ured by the Krupp armament facto ry, fired a n H90. pound s he ll 10 a d istan ce o f 21.000 ya rds ( 19,20 2 mc trc s ). Like the p reced ing class. the fo ur Hel go la nd Claxs bat tleshi ps we re fitte d w ith reciprocating machin e ry. maki ng the m margina lly slower tha n Dn-adnougbt. Five s hips of the Ka ise r Class a nd fo ur of the Ki)nig Class were laid dow n be twee n 1909

and 19 12. All we re turbi ne- powe red an d ca pable o f 21 kno ts. Be lt a rmo ur was increase d (0 14 inches U':;':; nun ) a nd tur rets and barbcncs to 12 inches (305 mm ). The y were bette r a rmo ured (han British eq uiva le nts w hile the ir greater beam of about 6-H fee t ( 1.H-2A me tres ) a llowed for superior un derw ate r pro tectio n to be built into the h ull. Two further battleships of the lkrycm

Class mou nti ng eight IS-inch <.,HI-Illm ) g uns in tw in s upc rflring turrets fo re and aft we re laid do w n in 19 15 a nd 19 14. With these latest s hips , the Germa ns had d rawn eq ual in firepowe r to the eq u ivale nt British ba ttle ships h uilt at the same time hu t. arg uably. the Ge rman s hips had bett e r ar mou r protec tion and possih ly a n edge o ve r the ir British riva ls in (he qua lity of the ir hig guns a nd the she lls the y fired . The Corma n ratio na le that led to battle ships wi th stro ng armour protecti o n at the expe nse of large -ca libre main armame nt wa s ap plied e ven mo rt' boldl y to their ne w ban kxruise r design s, Unlike British s hips, which carried ex te nsive bridgework a nd fighting lops s up port ed hy tripod

•

masts, Ger man lxruk-cr uise rs had a minimum of br id gework and po ll' masts. The first Ger man lxntlecruise r, ' "0 1/ del' Ta nn. laid d o wn in Xlarch 1YUH, was completed two and a half years late r.

I.

She ca rried eight l l -Inch (2HO-m m ) gu ns in fo u r twin tur rets and a second ary a rma ment of le n 5.9-inc h ( 150-m m ) g un s. The main d istinct ion between Ibn i te r T1l1l1I a nd the British Invincible Class ban lc cruiscrs wa s in the am o u nt of a rmou r th ey ca rried . Hm de l' T1l1 l1I's ma in belt . fo r exa m ple. was 10 inch es (254 nun ) thick com pared to just 6 inches 0 52.5mm ) in lnrinclhle. The two Moltke Class ships that fo llo wed a yea r b ie r had an add itio na l ll -inch (2HO-mm ) tu rre t aft in a supcrflring position. Seydlitz. an advance d ve rsion of the Moh kc CIa!'iS, followed in 19 11. She W~ I!'i fined with a highly protective 12-inch ar mou r bch . Th ree !'ihip!'i of the Derffl inger Class. laid down in 1912/ 13, bro ke with previou s class armam ent layo uts h y mo unt ing l z-inc h g un!'i in four twin tu rrets. They had a handsome appeara nce with a flush deck a nd two well-balanced

flat-sided fun nels. With this po we rful new battle flee r. the Imperi al Germa n Navy could rival the British fl eet in qu ality, if no! in n umbers. O nly time wou ld tel l w hich o f these powe rful na va l fo rce s wou ld hc victorio us if ever the y cha nced to meet in open bau le on the hig h seas. The re wa s no dou bt rh.u, foll ow ing the success of Dreadnought, ev ery na tio n tha t boa sted a navy w ith a ny major ca pab tlirtes at all wa nted a dreadn ought - eve n cou nt ries w ith comparatively sm all navies. Those that lacked the ca pability to build battleships themselves took IX II1 in a th riving and hig hly lucrative inter natio nal arm s trade , wit h Ihe major shipbuild ing ya rds

I.

An aerial view of the Kiel Canal at Kiel today. This canal was a vital strategic link betw een German Baltic and North Sea ports and had to be widened to accommodate dreadnought battles hips.

in Britain . Fran ce . Ge rmany a nd the USA meeting the o rde rs placed hy foreign gov ernments for ne w ca p ita l ships" Built 10 o rde r. and comp lete with a rma me nt as requested. th e sale o f banles hips re pr e sented h ig business in (he yea rs leading up (0 world war I. Forei gn na vy ministers were treated like roya lly by the world's leading shipbuildi ng a nd armaments com panies w he n Ihe y arrived. cheque book ar the ready. 10 place an o rde r. Spain wa s o ne such cou ntry. Its fleet had been dealt a se ve re blow at th e hands o f the Ameri cans in th e w ar o f 1898. and in 1908 th e Spanish gov ernment pa ssed a nava l law a llow ing Ihe re organi zati on o f th e navy and th e crea tio n o f a private Spanish co m pany to ma na ge th e construct io n of new warships including three batt leships. This co m pa ny was crea ted a ro und Brit ish expertise in the form o f three leading shiphuilding a nd a rma me nts companies . Armstrong \"('h itwort h. Vicke rs a nd John Brown . Three 15.500-ton bat tleships o f the Esp~IT'ia CJa...s. sma llest of all the dreadnoughts . were bui lt at Ferrel between the yea rs 1909 and 1917. althoug h the last o f the class wa s del ayed through the non-de livery of he r armament from Britain . In June 19 11 Turkey ordered 1\ \ '0 23.000-lOn battleships . ea ch mo unting te n 13.5-inch ( } Bmill) guns. from British builders. Difficulties o ve r payme nt resu lted in the ca ncel lation of o ne of these ships . A third was o rde red in April 19 14 but this o rder was qu ick ly ca nce lled w he n wa r broke o ut a fe w months late r. In Jan uary 19 14. ho weve r. Tu rke y had a lrea dy purchased the

incomplet e bat tlesh ip Rio detauetro. which a Britis h ya rd

WILLS 'S CIGARETTES.

South American navies vied with one another to own the largest baNieships . This cigarette card depicts the 28,OOO- ton

Argentinian ship Rivadavia carrying twelve 12-inch guns.

W ~IS building fo r Brazil. Renamed Sutton Osman J. she was co n fe-cat cd hy th e British o n th e instruct ions o f the Fi ~1 Lord of the Admiralt y. \Vin ston Ch urch ill. th e da y be fore sh e W ~I S to sai l for Turk e y. Th is W~I S ~ 111 und erstand able move fo r the British to take. as Turkey looked ce rtain 10 side with Ge rma ny in the e ve nt o f W~I r. Renamed ~iIlCOlI11. sh e took he r pla ce wi th the Britixh Grand Fleet TIle same fate befell another British -b uilt battleship for Tu rke y. ReslU/~l'e. whi ch W:IS s i m il~ lfly confiscated o n completion and renamed Erin. Th e Gree ks f:In.'1.1no bette r than their Turkish rivals in acquiring h~Hl lesh ips . In 1912 a n o rde r for a 195 00-lOn ba ttles hi p 10 he call ed Salamts. mounting eig ht l-i-inch C\':;':;-1111n) gu ns . was pla ced in Ge-rma ny a nd . altho ug h the ship wa s launched in 1914 little cou ld be do ne d uri ng the w ar 10 com plete her. She remained in th is un finished slate until scra pped in 19.:\2. In 191,i a second atte m pt 10 acq u ire a 2.35(K}-wn ship from French b uild er s failed when war bro ke o ut in Aug ust Rivalry wuh Bra zil provoked a need fo r ba ttleships in th e sma ll Argentine navy. an d in I90X Argcnrtna o rdered two large 2X.OOO-ton L battlexhips. Riradaria a n d J/o rell o. mourning twelve 12-inch (,:\O':;-ml11) guns from US builders. T hey were well armoured w ith a 12-in ch belt a nd had ~I cred itable speed o f 22.':; kno ts. \'('h ell IJn 'lUlm mJ.:b/ appea red in 1906. Bra zil had mo ved ,..; w iftly to o rd e r IWo battl eships fro m British y;lrds in an attem pt ut maint ai nin g he r s upe riority ove r riva l Sout h American repu blics. A rgentin a a nd Ch ile . Th L' Minus Gera is Class s h ips resem ble d IJ reacillo ltJ.:b/. hut had a SUI1l'Tio r arm ame nt m oun ting twelve 11inch (.305-mm) guns in twi n s u pcrfiring tur re ts fore and aft and in tw o w ing turrets. To su it e ng ine e ring ca pabilities in Brazil. reciprocating engines ca pable o f 21 k no ts were fitted rathe r than the more techn ica lly d emand ing turbines. Alt hough thei r armour sch eme wa s not of Drnutnougbt sta nda rd o n com pletion . in firepower ut least th ey wer e Ihl' mo st powe rful in the worl d . In 19 10. Brazil again thwart ed her ncar-neighbours by o rdering a thi rd dr eadnought which . again. had 10 he tilt: mo st powerful battleship afloat. Th e British-huilt s h ip . th e same Ri o de fanei n ) mentioned p reviously. W~I S fitted with mort:' heavy guns than ~II1 Y o ther battl eshi p o f the time o r since: se ve n tw in ce ntre line-mounted 12-in(-h (30 5-m m) turrets, two xu pcrfiri ng forwa rd . tw o a m idsh ips and thr ee, including two s u pe rfln n g. aft. Th is led to a very long ship at 67 1 feel 6 inc he s (2o.L7 metres ) o ve rall. Armo u r protection wa s wea k wi th h er m ain belt o n ly 9 Inches (22X mrn ) thic k. Before the sh ip had been com pleted . th ough. th e Brazilian gove rnmen t d ecid ed to se ll her and found a hu ye.:r in Turkey. O nce Arge ntina had o rdered bat tleships. it was o nly a matt er o f lime before rival nei ghbou r Chile followed su it. \'('ith both Argent ina and Brazil already co mm itted to battl eship o rders. Chile wa s able to trump them in siz e a nd o ffe ns ive power. Tw o s hips we re: o rdere d from British builders in 1911. similar to the British Iro n Duk e Class b UI with IightL'rar mo ur. Te n I-f-inch <'355nun ) gu ns in fin.. twin tur rets were mo u nted on a h ull 66 1 fL'et ( 20 1 metres } lo ng a nd ca pable of nearl y 2.3 kno ts. After rhc stan o f \Xb rld \X'ar I. the: fi rst s hip . Ahnirantr t.atorro. was purchased by th e British in Septembe r 191,1 fo r service wit h the G ra nd FIL'L,t and renamed Ca nada. After the war, she was retu rned to Ch ile: w ith her o ld nam e res tored. The second shi p . Abnirauu: Cochrane. was not as far adva nced at the sta rt o f th e war and it was not u n til 19 17 tha i he r

-"'_IIIi." .tM.,ilPms IilIiiil__

nAITLnslll~Gu..GLOIIALI

r: 77

,

\

hu ll was p urch ased hy the Hruis h fo r co nn ..rsio n to an a ircraft cu rrh-r ( I:i:ip,le) .

Th e German b att/ecruiser Von der

Du ring the.' remark able per iod of cap ital- ship prod ucti on I<.:ad ing up to the o utbreak o f \X'orld

Tann was completed in 1911 .

War I. the..' hau le sh ip had deve loped at such a n asto n ish ing pan .. th at it reduced the o riginal

Alth oug h their arm ament was

J>l'e atlnollf.!,bl and IK'r e:l rl y com p atriots to ma rginal str:.ltl'gic value. '11K' early dread noughts weft.'

lighter, German ba ttlecru isers

mostly lITl"U isfacto ry with regard to the calibre and layout o f their main armame nt. which was

were b etter armoured and proved

p ro h ahl y be-cause o f a m ind -se t ca rried o ve r from the o rigin a l layout o f turrets in pr l.'-

more resilien t in battle than their

d read no ug ht lxntl cxhip x. where w ing tu rrets were common. A sim ilar anach ro n ism ex isted in

British equivalent.

the: early d read no ught...; re latio nshi p lx..'I Wt.'L'1l fun nels and tri pod mast s. 111L' so lut ion which emerged in the with

~I

)'~IrS

before 191-1- su pcrfm ng turrets fore and aft - end ured ,

flow ru It~lh lL' excep tio ns.

1In1i1

th e e nd of IhL' ba ttlesh ip e ra.

111L' British Qm..'e n Eliza beth Class bat tles hips and th e Germa n Dcrffl ing cr Class

HMS QUEEN ELIZ.ABETH DIMENSIONS,

b.mlccrue-cr-, embodied th e lx-st fighting characteristics in the developme nt of th e dreadnought u p unt il tha t lime . O n paper. the British r\a \y's Grand Fleet. as it beca me

known. hi lasled a in the

(")'1..':>0

\':1 .'1 eu pcrion ty

in the n um ber (If capital ships in ils hatti e fleet and.

of most inte rn atio nal nava l o bservers.

W ;IS

still the traditional do min ant

naval force in the world. Ge rma ny . o n the ot he r hand . h;IU built its h attie flee t almost

'S6,000 IHP

SPEED,

Z't KNOTS

ARMAMEIIIr,

8 Y IS-IN (38I-MM) WNS; '" Y 6-IN (I'SZS-MM); 't Y ZI-IN C'S33-MM} TORPEDO T\JBES

PROTECTION,

MAIN BELT 13 TO 6IN (330 TO ISZSMM); BARBETTES 10 TO 'tIN (Z'S't TO 100 MM); 13-IN C33O-MM} T\JRRET FACES

CREW,

'!'SO (APPROV

191·1. This new and powe rfu l Germa n fleet became known as the ' fl ig h Seas Fleet' - the culminatk 1Il of the dr eams a nd plans o f the Kaiser and his chi ef naval ad viser. Th e world wa iled fo r the d ay in h isto ry when these two fle..'t·ts would meet. fact.' 10

zsrr

DISPl..ACEMEIIIr, Z7,'S00 LOIUl TONS MACHINERY,

e ntirely fro m scra tch in It:ss th:m two deca de - leading up to th e outbreak of war in

Admiral von Tir pitz.

6'6FT 91N (OIi£RIUJ Y 91N 90FT 6IN Y (196.8 Y Z7.6 Y 8.8M)

face . in battle . Fo r ce nturies the fate o f e ntire empires had res ted o n the fo rtu nes

o f their 11:1\·ie..·., as tlle..·y faced the fire power o f their e nemi es . For Brita in and Ge rma ny. rh.u d ay wa s b st approach ing .

•

•

Em Ires In •

•

o isron Y

ears before the o utbreak of World War I the Ge rma n Chance llor, Otto vo n Bismarck , remark ed that the cause of the next Europea n war wo uld be 'so me damned fool thing in the Balkan s', He co uld

not ha ve mad e a more acc urate prediction, Th e 'damned fool th ing' th at

trigge red th e most horrific war in the h istory o f mank ind at tha t time occur red in the Bosnian ca p ital, Sara jevo - an incid en t tha t b rou gh t to a he ad ye a rs o f political a nd racial tens ions in perhaps the most vo latile regi o n in the w ho le of Europe , Politically, the nat ions of Europe had gon e through a reasonably peacefu l period s ince a ro u nd the turn o f th e ce ntu ry alth ough , th rough var io us a llia nces , co ntinenta l Europe wa s e ffec tive ly di vid ed in to tw o distin ct ca mps , As early as 1882, Ge rmany, Austria-Hungary and Italy had formed a Triple Allian ce in whi ch each co untry agreed to support the other in the eve nt of an attack b y e ithe r France o r Russia , As the Aust ro -Hungarian Empire slid into decline , power in ce ntral Euro pe shifted to the d ynami c new Ge rmany und er the Iron Cha ncellor, Otto von Bismarck , Iron ically, it

·, 16 1 UI MOld

-.'U L\ .l.' pUIl ' }.,.'"lU tl"!lP i l ,' ql ' P...l1l:l'!sSl:SSe . .. e .\\ PUl:U!pJ.1:1 z u ru..!

L"l uQ

fJ10WCJJ 51! U! pa/qwa sse l aal.:J

:S !1I.1, \ ;) ;).\()ql~

ede:>s l e a6 eJOLp ue WfJl..IJJOU PUeJ9 qSIIUfJ eui to jq51W aliJ.

"')(11 0 1 .\lu)J! J O

IS!.\\ ) I~ U1~ ql

' U O ! )I~ Z !l ! q () U J SpJI~ .'\O l Sd ."lIS ISJ !]

ru o tu

SI:,\\

,"u p :-tOOl

."' ~ Il P l P.l V U ;'lll-\\

-u-u l .l. ' W.' P: uo 1I1d .{ U I: llI J ;) ~)

S I:.\\

-'-' Ull !":4(" uo

1,' ,'L1 ljS!I PH .""lq l

" I" f

p un l:!SSI1}1 tpoq plIl: pauodoop

S!S!J.) ;')(1.1 ·;lllJ1:1d ., .U l:u n P ;)U1;);)P SI:.\\ .\ )<.I."1j sl tl.l. ·Sp ut :lll ., p ;)lll.~ o ' ((I: rou 111(1 -rso ur P"P;uuo .)

pun p .1!1<.1;)1 e!<'jJ;)S -u n u uu u u n Jll o q -llln'!;)-.{uoJ I: sqJ., S ;l l(l nros lU,"'U1 IIJ., .\ On' u cursnv ;) tp .\ )111' ~' Z: u Q ·p .")U;l.U .")lU! 1:!SSTlH J! lU;llll u oddn.. Plll0.\\ .{ U1: 11 1J ~ 9

ll:lJl p."'llUJUllO.l suru r..nv .")lLL

·J l~. \\ OlU! ;lpolu X;l Plncl.\\ .;xIc)J113 ur UO !lI~Il)!" ')1! 1I~ 10. \ ;ll0lj·\\ ..!tp .lI.) II·\\ . J')lI11~ m q ,l!. JO

r.unnu

I~

lOU Sl~.\\ I!

·1~! (jJ.)S

UO

~P I::Ut~

u e tplllWI o r tll.)tp tl'U!tl'JI1

PU1~ 1~!JN1V

JO .).\!u(xld lls .\ IIIlJ

.\tIl~ttlJ')9 PUI~ ·qq J.)S JO .\II I~ P,))l~l!P;lP l~ l~ !"""» l(l!,:\\ ·U.\\ OD U1~!lP·)S .1111 J.' pUIl ...\ I~I S tllnos 1I1~

JO UO!UIl ,' 1I1 0 1 p.unupap lIO!WZ!Ur.tiJo ISp OJJ,) J U1~!qJ.,S 1~ .i q p.nnnqd u".")(1 r l~lI lI0!l eU!S..I:....I~

-u l.L ' ~{J I: ds 1".PW.J Hap SI:.\\ · O.\;l! I~J l~ S U! " 16 1 ;l u ll f HZ UO '.' .I!.\\ S!II PUI~ ·., u o Jt (l Ul~!JIS I1V "[P 01 J!,' lj · r u l~ U ! pJ,':1 z U l~ : 1 ·' ~ I1 P lj ·1J V JO 1I 0!lt:U! SSI:SSI~ ,' lI.1. ' " d oJ I1~ 1 JO ,11011.\\ ,11(1.IlI1tl'u ., PII1O.\\ U: l( l lI O! lI ~Jtl' qlllO.l J O ! I~1I 1 I: ,'I!Utl'! OJ ~J IX.lS ;l1tl'U!S I: .\ IUO

ann b.u PII1O.\\ II ·,\ lu ti!.1J.1.\OS " I! 1I.1 je.1JIf1

. U I~t1 l1 n l l - OJ lS n v P I1101IS 1:!q .l.,S.l0 UO!I.1,'IOJd ;llil o l .lPSJ" l( p ., tip .1 Id q SSll}j ',1111!l .1UWS .'lll IV

"') )lI" ltl:l ;'lld p.I. " tp t1JJOJ cu " P:!1)Jo:.:> ,' 11I,' 11l:1 :ltp 0 1 o un- u SI! p .1p p l: ' .\lI n t JJ.) ~) .10 11lt1t1,'JIS tl'U!Se.'J .lt!! ,' lj l J.' .\ O P ,'UJ.,.) uc).) o S(l: ' e!ssl1}j L06 1 til ·IIIS!tlO!SlIIXIx., t1t:t ll J .1~).J0 ".l eJ ;lIp ut uo um.xlo-o.r JOJ ~JO.\\.1t ltt:JJ I~ p.1p!.\oJd OS(l~ 11 'Js e: 1 ,' IPP !I\' " lj l U! "Jljt1p ,sUO!U:U l(loq tl'U!Z!Ut10 .1.1J JU.1UIIl.)OP p.1t1It~J.I .{P . . cX)1 I: - ;l(l~ !pJOJ ;lIU,' IU:.J: " tj l p .1Ut1!S U!la!JH pU I: -m.u noq-ord dru S!l(1 tl'lI!U I:tIS lI! urxl .rohttu I~ p.,.\I:ld IWIII')"L1 t1t~t1JJ " 9 ,' 111 0 1 pu n U!I:l!JH ·S:l!lU.1U., putIt:tD-SSOJ."') Plo ,"'I l(l lI."'I.1.\\I."'Il! SlIO!Iq.1J J."l"np

.1.)tJ 1~ :1 H)6 1 tI! ptlt~

S"1SI~,'J .)tJ ! ;l.\ ! SSI~ I \' " '.)U1~:I

1lloql~ llt tl'I1OJq ·\ t (l~ u !J H~ IIJ .\'.JIlJU., .1 tIlU" ,"'I )."lll !lI " 111 .10 Im ;l ;ltj l 11: .{llt :UIJ."l9 .10 .)SP S!lIl S l~ .\\

- '

-;-::rr r:

...

"""1"'!!""" ~

... ..,- : --- ,.,..... ~ -

.

,.".,.

,.,...

....• I

~

---

~

•

,;1-

6

-

T ilE HA T TI ESlllE.S

80

Ad miral Sir George \'(.Ta rre nde r. was in the midd le of ~I wee k-lon g COlll1esy visit to Kivl . As the British fl eet sai le d fo r ho rne o n .~ O j un e. wa rrc ndcr signa lled to his Ger man hosts, 'Frie nds today. friends in future. frie nds fo re ve r.' Des pite fra ntic di plo mat ic activity throu g hou t Europe. Austria declared war on Ser bia o n 2HJuly. Russia had little o ption other tha n to declare wa r o n Austria. Th ree days late r Ge rma ny declared wa r on Russia and . o n j August. was also at wa r w ith France . While these events were in train, the British wa vered o n whethe r the y sho uld re ma in ne ut ra l or come to the ai d of Fran ce , The German invasion of ne utral Belgiu m crys tallized the British positio n. O n '1 Aug ust 1914. Brita in dec lared w ar on Germany. The pieces had falle n into place w ith o ne exce pt ion: Ital y had de clared he r ne utr ality o n .3 1.July.

There are ma ny wh o bel ieve th at the na va l a rms ra ce be tween Brita in an d Ge rmany had been a ma jo r ca use o f 'x'orld \Va r I. Th is is no t the case, as And re w Lambe rt. na va l histo ria n at King's Co llege. Lo ndon . poi nts o ut: 'The naval race. in esse nce, had no th ing to do w ith the First \,'orld \'\'a r. It ma y expla in w hy the British and Ge rmans we re o n d iffe re nt sides. but the First \X'orld \XT~lr is about Ge rm a n fea rs of e nc ircle me nt a nd the risi ng po w e r o f the Russian Army. Th e a rms A 100-ton 15-inch gun barrel of

race that causes the First \,('orld \XTar is between the German Army and the Russian Army.

the British battleship Barham

It conce rns q uick-firing art ille ry p ieces an d heavy siege g uns, In 19 1,i , w he n Archd uk e

about to be hoisted into position

Franz Fe rd inand was assassina ted, the British and Ge rma n flee ts were lying at the Kivl Reg.uta and they we re best of friends, Eng lish-Germa n relations in 191,j were \'el)' good, \X' h ~11 was about to change was Brita in's rela tio nship w ith Russia a nd France .'

in 'X ' turret as the ship nears comple tion in 1915.

EM~lRES

.=-....,·..

..ms

IN COLliSION

_

At the o ut b rea k of w ar. nei ther the Br itish nor t he German 1':;1\')' w as rc adv fo r the co n flict

that lay ah e ad . The o p posi ng fle ets re p resen ted the tw o mo st po werful ma ritime fo rce s the world ha d ev e r se e n. The y had bee n created by the po litica l w ill o f natio nal lead e rs and the Adm iralt ies

or bot h

na tio ns . Their moment in histo ry was abo ut to hap pen .

The Britis h Horn e Flee t of 19 14 co m p rise d

two

se pa rate fle ets: th e First Flee t.

J11 ~H,.I L'

lip of

the new cap ital s h ips : a nd the Second Fleet . a lso kn o wn as the Cha n nel Flee t. made lip of p redread nough t ba ttles hi ps. The First Flee t. g ive n the im po s ing title 'G rand Flee t' . w as d raw n togethe r at Scapa Plow, a large stretch o f d ee p wat er in the O rkney Islands, o ff the north-easter n lip o f Scotland . The ma n chose n to co mm and th e Gra nd FieI..'I was Ad m iral Sir .Jo hn jclltcoc . a p ro tt::'gl:' o f the First Sea Lo rd . Admira l Sir Jo hn Fisher. He w as a p poi nted to th is po sition o n 4 Augu st. the d ay that the British we nt to war. jel ltco c bo re an awe some n-s po nsi b illty fo r nOI o nly th e safe ty o f the fl e et h ut fo r British nati o na l se curity. II w as felt h y ma n y th a i the u ltim ate fa te o f Brita in lay in th e ha n d s o f its Ro ya l Na vy and , a s com ma nde r o f

us m o s t

powerful flee t. j ellicoe com manded e no rmo us po we r and res pect . \,\'insto n Ch urc h ill, First Lo rd o f th e Adm iral ty a t th e time. ex p ressed Ihe ad mir al's ex traordin ary po s itio n o f po we r in no un ce rtain te rms w hen he sa id tha t Jd lico e was the o n ly ma n o n e ithe r s ide w ho co u ld lo se the war in a n afte rnoon , Till' British str.ltt'gy in the ope ni ng p hases of th e wa r to o k the German s h y su rp rise , as US nava l h istoria n Dr Gary \Xlt'i r re co un ts: 'T h e British immed iatel y d o w h at Tir pi tz d o e s not expect. Ill' ex pects them to follow Ro yal Nav al trad ition and try some so rt o f Co pc nh agc ning manoeuvre, w h ich means they w ill immedi ately move o n Ge rman naval bases - confront the German fleer and try a nd d estroy it premat urel y be fo re it can get itse lf p repared , But thl'Ydo n 't adopt tha t at a ll - they p u ll awa y fro m the coast a nd se t up a sta nd -o ff block ade w h ich mea ns thl' ne xt mo ve is the Ge rma ns' mo ve . Th e Germa ns d o n 't kno w w ha t to d o .' With the G ran d Fleet o pera ting o ut of Scapa Flo w . secu rity o f th is re mot e an cho rage became a ma jor conce rn to the British Ad m iralt y, The per fo rma nce and ra nge o f Ge rman Ll-lxx rts w e re rapid ly imp ro ving a nd to rpedoes were fast he ing ack no wled ged as a pote ntial d eadl y wt'apon ag ai nst the lxu tlcxhip . On 16 October pand e mo niu m e ns ued at Scapu Flo w w ith the re po rt o f a t j -b o at s ighting , Altho ugh it was a Elise alarm , the incident convinced j c llicoc that Sca pa was u nsa fe until fu rthe r defensive meas u res

~I ga i n st ~lIl Y

such atta ck cou ld he put in place , l ie decided to ba se the Battle

Fleet at Lo ugh Sw ill)' in N0I1he fT1 Ire lan d a nd th e lxmlecr uise rs at Loch -na -Kca l o n the Island of xtu!l. Lou gh Swilly 'x greate r d ista nce fro m th e G rand Fleet 's the atre of o pe ratio ns re legat ed it to lillie mo re th an a fuelling poi nt. and for m uch of the ea rly part o f the war, for the ir own secur ilY, the G ra nd Fleet spe nt lo ng pe riods at se a , l\ line s we re a constan t d an ge r in th e w aters a ro und Sca pa Flo w , A pote nt re m ind e r of the ir rh re.u came at OlJ,OO on 27 October 191 4 o ff Lo ug h Swilly. whe n th e battlesh ip A uda cious hit a sing le mine , Altho ugh ta ken in low h y the Wh ite Star passenge r line r, O{rmpic. homewa rd hound fro m Ne w Yo rk to Liverpo ol. worse n ing w eathe r caus e d the tow to pa rt. Little co u ld he do ne

10

save the d read nought. w h ich co n tinued to se ttle 100\'c r in th e wate r. and at 2 I.00

shl' h le w up and sa nk. Th e sin king o f A udacious became one o f the g reat secrets o f th e early \'<'o rld \'\'ar I sea wa r - a d ifficult sce n-t O~ ) 'm/,ic

10

maintain give n th e nu mbe r o f passe nge rs o n hoa rd

who h ad p hotog raph ed the un fort u nate s hi p in her d e ath th roes. The lo ss of th is

ca pita l s hip wa s a hlo w

10

the Ro yal Navy - an d a feather in the ir cap fo r the Ge rma ns, Without

ex posi ng thei r fleet to o pen hattie w ith the enemy. th e Ge rman Navy had acco u nted fo r a ma jo r British lxu tlcxhip . And fo r Brita in , on ly five da ys later, came more had news. On 1 No vem be r. o ff the Chilea n co ast, Ge rman Vice -Ad m ira l Maximil ian G raf von Spec 's East As iatic Squa d ro n sa n k t wo Britis h arm o ur ed cru isers, Goo d I/ o/ )e a nd Mcmmontb, in w hat beca m e k no w n as th e Batt le o f Co ro ne l. Spec's squad ro n , w h ich incl ud e d the tw o po werfu l a rmou red cr uise rs Scbarnborst a nd Gneiscnan. had moved ac ross the Pacific a fte r

·iliI-...... .--~ 81

.-. _

·. .'

,

,i

"

The British battlecruiser

Japan ha d e nte red the war on the side o f the Allies so me thr ee mo nths e a rlier. The Ge rma n

Invinc ible in fJames seconds

comma nder's ho pes were to d is ru pt British ship ping o pera ting a lo ng the west coast of Sou th Ame rica . Th e Ro yal Navy had bee n ale rte d to the presen ce o f the Ge rma n sq ua dron in these wat e rs a nd had sent fo u r shi ps , based in the Falkla nd Islands, to investigate . The Britis h fo rce

before her midships magazines blew up after being repeatedly hit

by the German battlecruiser Derfflinger at the Battle of Jutland on 3 1 May 1916.

was o ut nu mbe red a nd outgu nned hy the Ge rmans. w ho record ed a d ecisive victory, It wa s the first de feat in over 100 yea rs fo r the Ro ya l Navy. a devastat ing blo w to Britain. It was a situa tion that wou ld no t go un heeded . O n 5 Novem be r \X'inston Chu rchill. First Lo rd o f the Adm iral ty. a nd Ad mira l Sir Joh n Fis he r, Firs t Sea Lord . d ispatch e d th e b.ml ccru isc rs

In ri ncible and In flexible. u nd er Vice- Ad mira l Sir Do vc ton Stu rdcc. to the Sou th Atlan tic in pursuit of Spec. Stu rdcc's o rders we re sim ple: hu nt d o wn and d estroy Spec's squa d ron. The British baulccruber s sped ac ross the Atlan tic towards the coast o f Bra zil. and then turned so ut hw ards . o n a he ad ing for the Falkla nd Islan ds. Thcy a rrived in Po rt Stan ley. ca pital of the Falkla nd Islan ds . o n th e e ven ing o f 7 De cem be r and immed ia tel y bega n to lake o n coal. Stu rdee ex pected 10 leave in fo rty-e ight ho urs in the beli ef tha t Spe e 's sq uadron was 2000 m iles away in the Pacific. o ff Valpara iso , In addi tio n to the two British baulecrui se rs. the o ld battleship Ca nop ns - wh ich ha d been groun ded to p rotect Port Stanley - a nd five cruise rs we re present. As fo rtun e wou ld have it fo r the British. Spec had decided . after his victo ry at Corone l. 10 ret u rn to Ge rmany via the Falk land Isla nds. His pla n w as 10 at tack a nd ca use as mu ch d amage as possible to the British fac ilities :11 Port Sta nley on his way ho me . At 08.;30 the follo w ing morning. adv ance u nits o f Spec's squad ron. Gneisena u and the cruiser Nfi rllheJR. a p proac he d (he Fa lklands w her e th ey s potte d a pa ll o f s moke han gi ng over Po rt Sta nle y. Th e y ass u me d th at British co al stores had be en set o n fire to pr e ven t the m falli ng into ene my hands. Abo ve Port Stan ley. look o uts o n Sa pper 1Ii11 repo rted the app roach o f the Ge rman sq ua dron, and Stur dec o rdered his s hips to cease coa ling and to ra ise steam for full speed , At about this lim e the loo ko ut o n ho ard Onctsenau sigh ted four trip o d ma sts in Po rt Willtnm. Th is co uld mean o nly o ne thi ng - d re adn ou g hts, Spec had been ce rta in that no Britis h dread no ughts we re in the South Atlantic, li e was also un awa re that the shi ps had bee n coaling and were to tally un pr epared for hatti e , It was a u niq ue o p portunity lost: an accu rate hail o f fire

E MUP' J.RE£Jl'u::O.LLlSJlOJL I RES I N C O l l iS I ON

_.sm..II'a&.'.~.....__~ 83

..

fro m his ma in armam ent migh t well have serious ly d amaged the s ur p rised British shi ps . By 11.00 the Britis h sh ips e nu-rgcd from harbour with d ecks clea red fo r ac tion . Sturdce ga ve the o rder 'Gen e ral Chase'. Spt.:e no w realized he was faci ng two lxtttlecruise rs. and the o utcome wou ld h e a foreg o ne co ncl us ion . li e had o n ly o ne opt io n - to ru n fo r ir. The British s h ips worked up to 1() kno ts a nd s lo w ly ga ine d o n th e flee ing German sq uad ro n. a nd at 11.47 the sig na l ' Engage th e Enemy' was flown fro m tnrinciblo'» ma st head. Thirt y min ute s later, Spee o rde re d hi s th re e cru isers to b reak for matio n a nd try to esca pe. le av in g Scha rnhorst a nd

Gneisena u to draw o ff [he hea vily armed British s hips . Stur d ee ordered h is cr u ise rs to p urs ue their Ge rm a n cou nterpa rts, w hil e ln rinctbte a nd inflexible concentrated o n Scha rnho rst and Gneiscua u. \'('ith the ran ge closed to 13.500 yards (12 ,400 me tres ). th e g u n ne ry d uel bega n: tnrincihte o n Scbarnborst, l uf lexthle o n Gneisenau. Sixtee n 11-in ch (jUS- m m ) gu ns fac ing si xte en x.z-In ch ( 20H-m m ), Th e German firing w as excellent and the ban lccru tsc rs were stradd led and hit seve ral limes. To nu ke mail e rs worse for the British gun ners. smo ke from the funnels of thei r o w n sh ips wa s blow ing in the di rectio n o f th e e ne my obscu ring th e m fro m view. Stur dee the n in crease d the ran ge h e yond tha t o f the Ge rman g u ns. The LJ r heavier Britis h s he lls stead ily began to find their mark , penet rat ing th e Ge rman s hips, ca us ing g reat interna l and ex te rna l damage . Sho rtly afte r 16 .00 Spces flag sh ip . Scha rnhors t, be ga n to list he avily to port. Se ve n teen m inu tes la te r. the sh ip tu rned over and d isappea red , w ith he r fu ll cre w o n h oard . benea th th e co ld Atlantic waves. Fire fro m hot h ban lccruiscrs was now co nce n trated o n Gneisenan, Battered and blazing with her funn els ask ev..', th e a rmoured cruiser lasted un til 17.50. w hen she gently rolled o ve r and sa nk. O nly 190 s u rvivo rs we re picked up fro m a crew o f nearly HOG. The reso u nd ing d efeat at the Battle o f Co ro nel had been avenged. Th is actio n wa s seen as a complete vind icat io n o f th e battlecr u ise r: they had pe rfo rmed in ex actly the way Admira l Fisher had planned and beli eved th ey would. British faith in th eir Ro ya l Navy had be e n re stored , and all ey es now turned c lo se r to h o me , wh er e the Gr and Fleet was standi ng h y to take o n the Ge rman Hig h Seas Fleet at th e first po ss ib le o p po rtu n ity. Like two h e avyw e ig h t bo xers fle xing the ir mu scles before e ntering th e ring , o n bo th sides o f the North Sea th e conte nde rs we re preparing fo r th e ine vitable b. uue that lay ahead. Th e British had p u t in pla ce a numbe r o f strateg ies 10 g ive th em ea rly warning o f Ge rma n fleet mo vements. Patrols o ff the mo st likel y exit points fo r th e Ge rman flee t to pu t to se a w e re mainta ined around th e clock. bu t in th e event it was a chance o f fate that gave th e British the ir inva luable int e lligen ce of Ge rma n fl e et mo vements . O n 26 Aug ust 19 14 the cr u ise r '\/ag tlelm rg ra n ag ro u nd w h ile ca rry ing out min e-laying o pera tio ns in th e G u lf o f Finla nd an d wa s destro yed hy Russia n c ru ise rs. Her co d e hooks were reco ve red and pa ssed o n to the British w ho set up a d ecodi ng ce nt re in Ro om 40 013 in th e Old Adm ira lty Bu ildi n g in Lo nd o n . w ith th e ke y to th e codes , German sig nals cou ld be d eciphe red. T his e no rmous break th rou gh p rov ided the British with a trump card w h ich IIK'y p layed w ith g reat effect . Ea rly in Dec embe r 19 H Ro o m 40 le arn e d th a t Ge rm an ba u lccruisc rs u nde r th e co m ma n d of Adm ira l vo n Hippe r were p lanni ng a ra id on the Yorks h ire coast. lt was sc hed u led fo r the ea rly morn ing o f 1() Decembe r. The plan wa s th at Hip pe r's ha ttlccruiscrx wo uld mou nt the attack to lure the battlecruiser sq uad ro n command ed b y Re ar-Adm ira l Sir Da vid Bea tty so u th wa rds fro m th ei r ba se in Cro ma ny. in th e no rth o f Scotland . T he Hig h Se as Fleet w o uld h e

Admi ral Hipp er, Commander of the German battlec ruisers at Dogger Bank and Jutland.

84

~.".L

:r"ll..Lll.A.I..I.LESlll.l!.S

/

waiting. Beatty's sq uad ron sailed on the morni ng of 15 Dece mbe r. a nd ' hal same afternoo n, th e 2nd Bat tle Sq ua d ron o f s ix battles hi ps le ft Sca p u Flo w to la ke lip a po s itio n that would effectively cut o ff th e Ge r ma n fo rce 's ret urn ro ut e, kee p ing t hem fro m (h e sa fely of the ir

hom e base in \'\' i1helmshan : l1.

As the Germans ap p roached the Britis h coas t, the y s p lit into two g ro u ps : IJel.1.1lillJ.!,er a nd \ "O il

dcr Ta n n we re

(0

attack Scar borough a nd \V'hith y. w h ile

. "()IJJ..~e. .\(~ ) '("jJz

and the ar mo u red

cruiser IJli ic ber wou ld attack Ha rtlepoo l fu rther ro the no rth . Th e remainder o f (he Hi gh Seas

Flee t re ma ined to the eas t, ho p ing

10

deli ver a crush ing b lo w to the British bau lecrulscr s. But

o n sigh ti ng Bri tish destro yers, the Germa n Co m man der-in-Chie f ju m ped 10 the co ncl usio n

D I P I R ES I N COLllSll )(lJN i'L

.;,,_lIIiim .ilMI'~

The British cruiser Kent stands by to p ick up survivors from the German cruis er NGrnberg - a remnant of Vice-Admiral Graf von Spe e 's squadro n hunted down and sunk following the Battle of the Falklands. Decem ber 1914.

that the G rand Fleet wa s in the vicinity a nd ch anged course for home . Hipper's lxmh-cru tsc rs. now (:Iosing the British coast. were o n their own. At OH..'10. the Germ:ms arrived off the CO:ISt a nd started she lling. At the sam e time Be:ltty's battlccruise rs and the six hatt leships of the Jnd Baule Squadron were heading south to interce pt the raiders. Bad wea ther and poor visib ilitv enab led Hipper's ships to stee r northwa rds . clear the British s hips. a nd then to turn eastwards to safety. In the ra id . 122 British civilians we re killed. and g reat d a mage d one to bu ildi ng- in the coastal to wns , The press accused the Ge rma ns o f ba rbaro us acts aga inst defe nceless civilians. The Royal Navy was criticize d for not prevent ing it. The imm edia te o utco me was th:1l Beatt y's

85

T ILLJlA1TLF.SIlJ.£S

banlecruiscrs were moved sou thwards from Cromarty

(0

the Firth of Forth. where a flew major

fleet base at ROS)1h had been hu ilt. \X'ith in a month. lht: Germans plan ned a nother raid . this tim e to disrupt British mi ne- laying and fish ing activities o n th e Dogger Bank. an area about 150 miles en... t of the Yorkshir e coas t. O nce agai n Room 40 was ab le to decip her Ge r man sig na ls. O n 23 ja nuary Admiral H ipper

Id i wt lhelm shavcn. ho rne ha ."iC: for the High Sl:'~IS Fleet, in comma nd of IhL' 1st Scouting Grou p. This included the banlecnusers Seydlitz. lJerjJUll1wr. olto/l ke and the armoured cruiser Btiicber . The Admiralty. aware that Hipper was at sea . o rdered Beatty's bank-cruisers. l.ion . Tiger. Princess Roy a l. Sell' Zealand and In do m ita ble, and the 1st Light Cru ise r Squadron to sail immediately. Early next morning th e lead cruiser Aurom signalled to the fleer . 'Am in action with th e Hig h Seas Fleer .' But this in fo rma tio n

W ~IS

wrong - A urora had encountered o n ly

the cru iser Kollx'I R scouting a head of Hipper's baulecruiscrs . Aro un d thi s rim e . H ipper received repo rts of s moke o n the hori zon to th e nort h -west . The British battlecruiser

Indomitable took Beat ty 's heavily

Assuming co rrectly thai il wa s fro m British bat tles hi ps. he deci ded

10

ru n fo r ho me . Beatl y

sigh te d the Germa ns , alt ered course a few points eastwa rds a nd increased

SIX~l.~d

to 2·} knots.

dam aged flagship Uon in tow

The s lower ba n lecruisers. S ew Zea la nd and Isulonntable. fell behind, lea ving t.ion. TI!Wr and

after she was severely damaged

Princes... Re~r(l l to clo se on the German line. Hip per, on his flagship Seydlitz. led the German line, followed hy J fo/tkt', lJerJj1in~er and Btticber. By about OHAO the Germans ' lead had

in the Battle of Dogger Bank.

EMJ!.lRESJN-CllI.Ll51W'L C () I I I S I () N

--:.._ lIim ..'at'~

na rrowed to 25.000 yards (22.850 metres). Ten minu tes late r, IJhicberfi red the first sa lvo in the

A remarkable image of the

Battle of Dogger Ban k. As the range d ose d , the British s hips were pitted one-on-one aga ins t the Germa ns: Lion

stricken German battlecru iser

on St.:)'d litz , TiRer o n Jl olth ' an d Prin cess Noy a l o n Derf fltnu er. lea ving Neu - Zea la n d a nd hulom itahle to dea l w ith IJliicbel: At 09.5 0 Sey dlitz receiv e d a hit fro m Lion w hich penetra ted the c-inch (22r1·mm) th ick ba rbon e ar mo ur of her aft e rmost turret. a nd hurst, se nding red hot

Although many of the men

steel splinters flying . A flash o f fire s ho t upwards to the tur ret . and do wn wa rds to the handli ng roo ms. w here furt he r cha rges we re ignite d . Me n were incinerated w here the y stood. Seconds late r, the second turret was completely burnt out. Rapid action hy the Germa n sa ilo rs to flood

with the ship .

the magazi nes saved the ship hut not the turret crews. and 159 sa ilors d ied . Mea nwh ile . Blu cher was takin g a pounding and begin ning to lose speed. By now s he had a number o f fires rag ing o ut o f co ntro l and was ra p idl y fa lling as tern. in to the path o f the adva nc ing British ships. At this st;lge Beuty signalled t ndomuabte so dose o n the stricken Bhicber and finish her o tT. It was his inte ntio n that his other banl ecruisers would continue (he pursuit of the enemy a nd co mple te a de<:isiv e victory . fi e signalled 'Attac k the rea r o f the enemy: Ho weve r. as n ~lgs indi c-ating a course of north-east were still flying from the partially disabled l.io n. the o the r lxml ecruiscrs took it that they we re to join Indom ita ble in finishi ng o ff Bliicb er. In stopping their pursuit to sink a s hip tha t was clea rly lost , the British ships allowed Sey dlitz . .Iloltl..'e a nd IJerffiinJ.w rto esca pe . Beatty was furious and later described the event as the 'blackest in his life '. /Jliicber w as sunk with heavy loss of life wh ile the damaged t.ion was towed to Rosyth by

tndomitable. Th e Battle of Dogger Bank was o ve r - a victory for the British . They had been well pr epar ed a nd in the rig ht position at the right time. bu t co nfu sio n ha d prevented an even mor e decisive victory o ver the German flee t. 111e.: Ge rman Adm iralty was far from impressed by the performance of the ir battle fleer in its first major engagement against the Royal ~a\"y. Admi ral lngcno hl was immediately replaced by Ad miral vo n Pohl. A year later. Poh l beca me se rious ly ill a nd Rear-Admira l Re inhard Scheer. a d ynamic, agg ressi\"ely mind ed o fficer; took over the powe rful and responsible position of Co mmander-inChief of the lI ig h Seas Fle et. He wou ld lead this fl ee t in the largest co nfro ntatio n bet ween battleships in histo ry. agai nst the mig ht of the Ro ya l Navy 's Gra nd Fleet in a hatti e that would IX'CO ll K '

known as the Battle of jutland or, as the Ge rmans ca ll it. the Battle of the Skagc rrak.

BlOcher on her beam ends ,

clinging to the ship 's side were saved , many more went down

87

TIl E

R AIT.LE.S~

111t" Battle o f D OAAt.'f Bank had given both sides a lot to think about . US naval historian D r Ga l)' \X'ei r com men ts:

'The: lessons learned from Dogger Bank and o ther mino r ....ngagcmcms

taught d ifferent lesso ns

10

d iffere nt people. 11K' tech nica l e xperts o n both

sides. the Royal :\a\'y a nd the Impe rial Ge rma n Navy. evaluated these in d ifferent w api, From th e German side. fro m my o w n experie nce . the

Ge rm ans to o k to hea rt the d ang er o f afte r-e ffec-t second a ry e xpl o sion .

shell-fl ash difficulties, and the)' took direct an ion 10 p rote ct thei r ships as be st as possihle from these nash p roblems and fro m seco nda ry detonations.' D r Eric Grove. D eput y D irect o r at th e Centre fo r Secur it y Stud ies at th e

University of H ull . notes the British reactio n:

'\'\'e allowed th e Ge rma ns to get awa y, we were n 't able to in flict any more ca sualt ies o n th e Ge rm an butt lccruiscr fleer o n that o ccasion , So , in a sense , th is vindicates th e lxntlccrutsc r - an o lder type o f armo u red cru ise r has been su nk. TIle p robl em will a rise when

~I

re info rced flee r o f Germa n

b.urlccru tsc rs tights an e qua l n u mbe r o f Britis h ban lccru ise rs. But even then things m ig ht no t have been so bad if ot he r factors had no t come into p lay, Th e Ge rma ns had found o ut tha i their a mm u nitio n-ha ndling a rra nge ments weren't quite good e nough - a nd o ne o f thei r baulccruise rs, Se ydlitz. is almost blo wn up, So th ey adopt mea su res to ch ange that. Admiral Schee r, Comman der-in-

\,\'e d id n't. And th e almost criminally irresponsibl e way in wh ich we handle o ur am mu -

Chie f of the German High Seas

n itio n , par ticu larly in the banlc cru ise r fle et. co ntrib ute s to the disaste rs th a t w o ul d

Fleet at the Batt le of Jutland in

overtake us at th e Battle o f J ut lan d ,'

May 1976.

Altho ugh the re was a difference in th e wa ys bot h nav ies re sponded to the le ssons learnt at Dogger Bank , there were fun damental d iffere nces in the d esign o f the Germa n s h ips that made the m more res ilie nt to absol ute d estruction fro m fire and s he ll attac k tha n the British vessels. British Ad mira l o f the Fleet. Sir Henry Le ach . e xpla ins : "Th e y we re ab le to construct th e ir s hi ps to a mu ch mo re: u ns in kabl e: d e s ign th an we jud ged to be prudent. For ex am ple , if yo u wished to move fro m o ne room in a Britis h s hip yo u went

10

10

anoth er

the inte rve n ing bu lkhead , yo u u nchppcd th e b u lkh e ad

d o o r, yo u passed through into the next co mpartme n t a nd yo u di pped il up ag .rin, and th at d o or, o f co u rse, w as wate rtight. In Ge rma n shi ps . if yo u w ant ed to d o that . yo u co u ldn 't. You had to go ve rtica lly u p until you go t to the d ec k - ce rta in ly abo ve th e wat e rline. a n d the n wa lk al o ng an d then g o vert icall y d ow n , s im pl y

10

go into the

ne xt-d oo r roo m , This mea nt th at Ge rman s h ips too k far greater pu nishment in terms o f wa te rtig ht integrity than the British sh ips,' Almo st two yea rs into the wa r, th e: hope s sh ared hy th e Kaise r and Ad m iral

H>I1

Tirp itz fo r

th e High Sea s Fleet had not bee n rea lized. Ne ither had th e Tirpitz Plan In whitt le d o wn the strength of the l{n yal Na\1"s G ran d Fleet in a n um ber o f sUCl'e:ssi\'e:, mino r battles. Pressu re was mou nting o n Admiral Sch eer 10 get the: Ge rman battl e: flee t to sea. hut he kne w o nly too well th e: stre ng th o f th e: e ne my th at lay in w a it o n the o the:r si d e o f the No rth Se a . Hts strate gy re mained to e ntice se ctions of the G rand Fleet into sm a ll battles, not the majo r confro ntation that the British were hopi ng for, Dr Eric G rove comments:

68

',' I1:ld J IlOUIJI: plH: J,"").\\od ."")J!.J J;l."") lJS lII:lll ."")lUO.) !1l0 ;'I ' p uo ,"")."")u ."")I1 UU! ."")JOUI ."").\ I:lJ p p1O.\\ JOlJ,"") lII:UJIllj pun sS;l m p:."").\\ p:.1!Ulp."")1 -s u o n n.uu n u n u co II:llIs.\ lll : · S."") ~ 1: 1 S ! U I '"") ! ~ " II:J lS q .) !tj ,\\ U! ."lp ll:q I: o .vo. rd p jn o .w 11 ' I:,' S qU O:\, ;lIp .10 SJ:1)1:.\\ lIJ;ll SI:,' -qUOlI ;l lll U! UO-pl:"lI l,'U I .\..I0 1S!11 1I! s P ,'U ;'1 1111:<'1 IIl.P .' ·\\ Oc.J Is 0Ul 0 .\\ 1 ,' lll .\ 1:1,' .1 0 .{I:P lSI:1 ,"llll UO "' P !S J.'tj l!.' .1 0 s " !1I':J!lU PV " 111 .\( 1 ~U ! U U1: Ic.J '"") ! ~ " Il:J ls \l1jo"U1:.1 ,(q Ul:IIl lU;lpp .11: .(q .) JOlU 'lOU -u o u sa n h ,'lll .10 1110 .(1(1:1< >1 P"1~ oOI P ,"1I:1 pm:J 9 s..\.\1:;\ P:.(OH ;llll put: };l:lI:1 SI:,;)S 1I~ !1I u r.UJJ ';) ~ ;l lfl u.""),' .\\J,XI UO!U:JlIOJJlIO.1 ;"1)l:UI!lln u n 9 16 1 .\i:I\' 1I1 : Ul:IU ,1111 0.; 1:.\\ H:lfl OS 'lU!q .10 '1m:s I! m :qJ I! .10 ,'J OUI '1U!S - I! uodn U0 !1!Jlll: :l)l:1I0 !Uou OJUS!P P !lJU! Plno .J ;l lJ ;lJ;lII.\\ UO!u:nl! S 1: Olll! I!)O uoruod 1: .\\ I:.JP 0 1SI:.\\ o p 0 1 ~U!,\..IJ SI:.\\ ;ll( IIV · 1(1~U.'J IS IIllj SI! U! P.'U q"'!l!JU .' q J UO " '1.1:1 0 1 ~U! .\..I l 10U SI:.\\:l1l ·UO!}.)I:

P,'U ;111:"1o.;-lInJ 1: ) 0 SS;1U!Snq ;llfJ U! iou SI:.\\ ' 1,"1,"11:1 SI:."1S q ~!I 1 ;lq l .10 J,"")PllI:UllUO.) ."1. \ !~~,"1J ~i(h : .\\ ;l1I

;)lll

·J;l.' lp S II:J!l llPV l1:ll1 q.uuu 001 P,'Z!SI:q UllI;l a q rou u eo I! II1 H ·Sp J I:.) ." p

uo SI:.\\ .11111X I .1 11:,)"-11 11.1 I: .'J,1q ,\\ iu tod I: 01 lI.\\ OP P"lI ,;)11I1:q l(S!I!JH ;11( 1 pu u x sl h:lp."ld ' 1I !1 :~ 1:

p."")I1:."")l1."1J ,"lq P1'1O.1 ;1SP .l;lX;'I ;ll(l.J! 'OS(I: P1110,\\ II ';l Il:JOlll ljs!I!JH JOJ ~ .)Ol I S I: .u in h

."lq P (l1O.\\ S!lLL · IP~lI.'J l'" lin.. "'1! L(1!.\\ P."lL! PS!IU.1,'PllXI ;ltj l d un p plO.) I! ;lJ,' lj.\\ 1I0 !11:1l1!'" u OIU! - tp.( ...oH U! .1SI:q "'1! .10 m o .\ ls n m u o u o 1l1l: .( I ~ U ! S I: ,'J.) U ! ~U!II :J ."ld o ...1:.\\ l(.1!1I,\\ - P ,"lL! J;)SPU.1."")lll l:q ,"llll .( ll ll:q OJ(J 'P '"") I:I PUl:.J 9 .' lll .10 uo.uod I: m o ,\\ I:Jp 0 1 .\..11 0 1 ...1:.\\ ."1.\ !H:UJ.1IP: .\..I0l.1I:j o.;!l1:o.; u n 1"'1:" 1 ;ll(1 puv ·S.' .\!WUJ;lllr: IIl!.\\ dn .'11l0.) o l pl :q I! ;"1JOp J,"111.I. .·ll ll UO ;l 'l l:) 0 1 Q~ n ou ., ~ UOJ I '" IOU I... n ! 0.;1:,\\ P .'U J!,'lll H:lp SI:.\\ UI."1 ll1OJU u eulJ,' 9 -ul.L

PUeJf) i/ squg ai/I ) 0 sd!i/samea

...."'.' .1.111"0 .1° ';UUl:q .) .\ Ul: tjl! ,\\ }."l•.,U ttuuroddns J.,S! IU.1,'111I:<.1 "'1! plll: 1·""'1."11:1 Pu r.J9 Q"'!I!JH

'eas i/lJ ON ai/I U!10iled uo 1001:/


x n r sr'rrrrn N I S3 HTlTl f:l

e Batt e 0

utan O

n paper it lo oked a very o ne-sided co nte st : th e Briti sh w ith tw enty-eight battl esh ips and n in e ba ttle cru isers. th e Germa ns with si xteen a nd five respe ctivel y. plus a sq uadron of si x p re-

drea dn oughts . These numbers d o n o t in clude the vast fleet of sma ller

su p port ve ssels th at made u p the e nt ire nav al fo rce of both fle et s. In a ll. more tha n 100.000 men aboa rd a ro und 250 fighting s h ips were inv olve d in the Battl e o f jutland . The Ge rma n actio n that precipitat ed th e battl e w as se nd ing Hipper's b attlecruisers n orthwards from Germany in th e dire cti on of Norway. followed at a distance b y their battl e fleet. Th e Germa ns kn ew the British w ould d e cipher radio messa ges a n d d et e ct th e first movem en t. It w as a lmo st certa in they w ou ld se nd Beatty 's battl e cruisers from Rosyth to int erce p t. The pla n, the n. was for Hip pe r's s hips to cha nge course to lead Be att y into the hand s o f Sc heer's m a in battl e fleet. Addi tiona lly. by station ing U-boa ts o utside the th ree British bases at Rosyth . Cro ma rty a nd

Sca pa Flow. it wa s ho pe d that so me British dreadnoug hts wo uld he to rpedoed . T he se Uboats wo uld als o pass info rmat io n to Schee r abo ut British I110 veI1H.-. nts. as would Ze ppelins scouting wel l ah ead of the Ge rman fleet. Th e plan wa s simple enough and even if the entire British battle fleet we re to stea m so uthwa rds. Sch eer would have plenty of advance warning to avo id c atastro p he . In the event, ho wever, the plan assumed a d ynam ic of its o w n. The activities o f Room ·10 ga n~ (he British ea rly indica tio n that :1 large -scale mov ement o f Ge rma n ships W:lS imminent . \Xlhen (he tj-bouts sailed for their design ated positions
In the greatest nesa-to-neea battle ever between modem

Squadron commanded hy Vice -Adm ira l j erram w ith the l st Cruiser Squ ad ron a nd pan o f the l l th ctestrovcr flotill a: a nd at ROS}1h, Beally, o n his flagsh ip Lion. W;IS with the Ist a nd 2nd Bunlccrutscr Sq uadrons, the Srh Batt le Squ ad ron made up of four sh ips of the QlH..'l.' 11 Elizabeth

ba ttleships, over 100.000 sailors

Class , the l st. 2nd a nd .trd Light Cru ise r Sq uadrons a nd d ements o f the lsr, 9th l Oth an ti 13th destroye r flot illas.

and to this day, the result is still

manning some 250 fighting ships clashed in the Battle of Jutland disputed..

Phase 1: contact Acting on in tel ligence from Room 40. the Admiralty in London ordered jcllico c to co ncentrate

hi... net..' t eastwa rd... of the 'Lo ng Forties ", an a rea about 110 miles t..·a....t o f Aberdeen. '111l.' e ntire Briti...h

Admiral Sir David Beatty on the quarterdeck of his flagship Quee n Elizabeth after Jutland. Beatty

took over command of the Grand Fleet after Jelticoe.

hattie struu..'gy would he ca rried o ut accord ing to ·Fighting Instruct io n..·. :1 book of rules for naval e ngageme nts . 111is cal led for t..~lc h ind ividual sh ip co mman der to surrender ~I II initiative (0 the: o rders issued hy the: Co m ma nd e r-in-Chie f w ho w ould in tum re port e ve ry mov e' to the: Admiralty operations room in London . Flexibility and initiati ve w ere not encoura ged . l ondon w ould e ffectively co ntro l the wh ole battle tactics. j ellicoe, a co nsummate ta ctici an groomed hy Admiral Fisher. would certainly phi)' by the mIL'S. jcllicoc sailed from Scapa Flow at 22.30 o n Tu esday 30 .\ Iay a nd was in position by 14.00 the following day. Bean y's buulccru tscrs we re 69 miles furt he r so uth . 111e first upset to the Germa n pla ns occurred when Ll-bo ats o n pat rol o utside three British bases failed to attack the British shi ps as the y sa iled pa st. 111e second wa s the failure of the the Ze ppeli ns th at Sch ee r had ~H his dis posal. Initially the Zeppelins were una blc to fly beca use o f had w eath er and, wh en they d id e ve ntually get airborne, dense clo ud and ha ze red uced visibility to alm ost zero. Scheer wa s left witho ut information o n the strength . the heading o r the positio n o f the British fleet s . Th e H igh Sea s Fleet. wi th Scheer in his flagshi p Frt ed rtcb del' C rosse. left the Jad e . nea r wtlhelmshaven. ea rly on th e morn ing o f 3 1 May . His fle e t comp rised the bt . 2nd and 3rd Sq uadrons
C6

. . .,~.

(j J1 w /m l llJ 'rlUUI{'rJ):/

»u. lllo.l.l ) ·p .1J I:;1d t h:s!p ,\ P J.1ld u u ).) ,(w / r If,lolI/O ·p .1SSIXI .uu ih PI :II .).\\

.1J0.pH "SUI:,\\lj l.l q l .l .1S Pllll ).) I s e U,\\OP .1 .U:q ,\ n u tp!l l·\\ lI:(X ( e ' lI ~! lI ).1.1.1

osod dn s I 'J!I: .1lj l ll ! d n 1I!1'" S I~. \\ .1.P l l l.

l"I~;l 1 m

PI~lU ! II!!S -o.i m n nd 1:.10 '\ II~U ! P I: U.1•1q

op jsd n mq

oo£' JO 00 1

-sn punOJI: r:.1<; .1ljl 0 1l1! ~u !lI e.l .1J.l .\\ S~U!lJ1 pu u 'J ! I ~ .1l11 O1U! U,\\OJIII .1J.l .\\ UOJ! .10 S."""'T llI H:;lJ9 ·P.1PO ldx.l UO!1Jod J .1I.1I~ S!III SI: J !!~ .1 '11 OIU! U,\\ Olq pun S.1"S1~ IU ;) IP SI:.\\ ~lI !ljl .1!( Jl:.l .1!10 U tcotu .111.1.

;)j;),\\

l p !lI ,\\ J'-l th:d .10 S.1SS I~ U1

-d n .\\."'1 1'1 -os P !P I! SI: -p u n ·J.l .\ O P ."'IlIOJ

u o un xl J ;)l.1l~ S!l( 1 ·J.1q Ul(U.I SpJ I:,\ O~ I m oqn :"(UO p u n I SI~.1Jq l~ .1J.l .\\ ;l .\\ lI.111. \\ ',\ I~, \\l P Il : lJ J.ll.ll : ;)1(1 dn P U I~ 1."'IJJ 1l1 J.l 1.1e

a qtjo m o

~ U ! ( . \\ 1:.1 .) ."'I J."'I .\\ u.uu P lll~ '.1UII:1I .-l l!p J(U J () .1J !j .l0

u ri!S o u SI~\\ ;,u ."'I l l L 'ro p un ."'IU O~ ,\ P I :"lJ I I~ pl;ll

u ed pJ I;.J0.l .1lj l mq

· ~U ! .\ l o.\.lJ I1!IS SJ.111.)( IOJd

'-llj l Plll~ ' IlX )lI l~ 1.l1~ )<""'I uun.l J.ll.1 l~ ."'1 111 un u.I UJ.11'" ;lljl ~ U ! j1':.1 .\ .lJ 'J I~"'IP .\ (J!l] U.\\Olq PI :II .1~O Ul'" "l lj l ;l lll! 1 q .l!lJ.\\

.\(1 ' w 1;"'X1 uod JIl O uo

"'VJI~.\

OS

IIl( XII~ J."'I'I p.,."..... rd

..... \\ ',( w / r

I P. HI() ."'1 111 .10

,'P!S IJ."lI':.1 UO .1UD p.,."..... rxl s ."'I,\ I.1<;JIlO P U1:,J.)'rJ:~ 1 PUl~ 'pJI~( X"IT1" 0 1 Ul0 P.11111;lj .1,\\ '.l :; OII1S .l0 ........I:lU .1<;lI."'Ip S!11l U! p.1.1I;..'Xkh~ ! p p u n u od 0 1 " u !1.11Il .l0 tn o '\ It lll :l('" P,'IIll: II p m : ',( w / r II' J.HlO .10 UJ;)ISr. SpJ I~.\ OOS .\ )UO S) OU~

t-£'

11~ ~U!WI ~ ;)IS SI;.\\ ,1.J'rJ:U

.' 11.1. ' ,' lq !S!.\ J .1~ u ol OU SI:.\\

JFKl.1lj ,( W/ r 11.),11/0 " '11 pU1: p l';"")lj l: p .").\\OlI'" ;):;OII1S :;,11:1'1 .10 ssm u .1SU.1p ,U .1.\ pul: .\. \1;.")lj I~ III!.\\ .")lll1:U ,\\ 0 11;),\ .l UP J.1 1 I: U.1 11 .\\ 'J.1 )1:) "'11I.1 1110lU (1;J.").\.-.... UIlI ll .1JOl U ~U!III()U IIHI ' llll

Sl~.\\ ;)l(s ;)J;) lJ,\\ lU(UJ m o .11111:,) rcnp P;( U .... ~!1 p.1~( X ») u:q .\\ .10 pno p Hellls \' '.1P !'"

uod J.1lj

UO ,LW / r 1I, ,,m (j 1!11 o .\ (1:s I: ,\\ I:S 1 ·\ lu .1p p n s u .")lj .\\ 'S Il Ill !,\\ 11.1.\\ ~ U !O~ "X I 0 1 p.1U1.").1... II\'

: ,\p.l~ I :J 1 .1lj l .l0 J OJJOI I ."lq 1 P;)p JO.1.1J '\ IJ1 :.) ! l(d l :J ~ ' UO!so ltlx.1

a qrjo

.")11I!I ;l1I1 11~ .( 111/ r li.lo)J1(j .10 tu.uc u ,\ (l q ~!I "; ·p llI1f1J.)'L , II,~ \' .10 J.").1wa ~ 1I ! U:~l , \ 1::,,\ .11(.1. ·p .l. \ !.u n s ,"'I U!t1 .{Iu o ' S;).\ !! JFlIll ISO! SJOI!I:S 9 9 (' 1 :,(11111' U.-MHO .10 t1~ ! S o u SI;.\\ ;)J.l ljl p."lJI~."l 1 .1 .1:; 0I11S '-1l( 1 U.:lIJ,\\ ·J.")S!' lJ .1.111ll:q p."'IJ .")Il I~ q 'i ;"'1 111 IU(U" 'iP{PP .10 J.").\\OlI S .")111 P !O.\I : 01 u od II I .{ld J I:l l'" p.")UJ1l1 ' UJ.")ISI: ,{p u: !p .l llll ll ! ~U ! . \\()H0.l

:,'-I'd.U.

-s.un u n u J1lo " ,( ILIO P .:lIS1;1.(m/r u.lo )JIO J O pll,l IU,lIO !.\ .111.1,

-d n .\\.1 [«

S .") U ! Z I:~ I : lll J ;) I.l I~ .") 1(1 'J;) ll:,\\ ."'I 1I1 .l0 m o .:lSOJ llJ .1I S .:lIp s v ' O,\\ l II! d !'I S '-11(1 ~ lI !-'\O l q ' P .l p o ld x .l

S."'I lI !Z I~~ I~ IU

.H. p un , V. .1.1 )1:1 Sp ll O.1.")s ' d !q s .") q l

r o .V• .I0 ,{)!1I!.1!.\ .1 1p U! .1tll0 l! ~P I1.1 1S o uo

xunmd

' U ! I~~ I~ Ill l SI:.\\ .")lIS p UI:

,\ IP IX\ .{ p I:.1J P: ·,t:UJ/1' 11,1,1110

UO

1 1l 0l 1 ~ 1l0Jljl 11.1.1 s e .\\ lI O ! S() l d x ~l Ip:UIS V ' P UIl )

Ipq..; J.lq loll e 'J;l WI s .u n u u u ."'I·\ !:I -uou'iujo 1110

.H,

S lI ll ~ .1 111 .10

·z /.tI/J.C)S Plll:./,)'dll.llf f.t'-J(/ l!l 0q ,{q p .")JU s lp q s UIO.IJ p.l~l :llll:P

pa un u

,\."ll(.I. 'P1II: l( p u u n .11(1 p l:lj S lII : l U J ")~ ) .11j1 ' s p p o .")IP

."1I!ds .'1( ) ·SJ.1SpU.1.")IIWq lII:UIJ.")!J .").\ ll I SlI !i :jl ~ ' )I :O Ll I~ s d !q ..;.'1I11 IXI 11lj.I.l.\\od 1...·()U1 .' ql .10 m ().1 j l l!pn p u ! 'Sd !IIS 11"'! IP H .") U!U .\ \ OU SI:,\\ I) ·S;lO.\ (I:S ( tlI li l- Il-~\-:~ ) 11.1U!- £1 lj )!.\\ 1II"~ /. ,t' )IJ II( ~ \ W I .").I!.1 po u o do ·SJ.")S!IU.1.1 111lXI .:lIp p ."lU!O!;)J j U!.\ I:q ' UOJp J:ll h S .1 P WH q l~ S,SI~ U101 L L- Ul :,\': I .l0 ...d ! II....1 11U:q J Il0.l .'1ILI.

lJ11 IJI'J,J'L .11....V

(» )

p uus noq r I: J;).\0 .l0

Sli( )!IU.")U l: SI! P '")).I!tj S UU ' ~L ,1,)1' 1H ~1 ·.J/CfIJ'tJ)IIJj)p lI / ~ U ! II ~tJ ! tlI ! P J.1I.1V 'P.").\ !,UIlS .\\;)J.)

I: llUU.I U.1U1 0 .\\) .\ (Ua

' ;):; OIUS )fJ I:p :;,l !lll.l0 IWd ,: ropun p .1JI;.1l.I(!t:Sl(l

d !LJ'i.'11(1 p lll: p.-1.\\01l0.l tJO!SOldx."'I ~ U ! 1I: 1S I :. \.") p V -i.unu pJ I:.\UOJ .'1111 JI:'")lI '.l (1..;r:.),")J o.l .1111 u o 1I ! 1:~ 1: I!II SI:,\\ .1 LJS ',\PWlP;)IUlll ! ISOl UIV -u r.u s ;'Il(l ,\ q ~ U! '" 0 1 ur: ~.;xl d !II'i .1111 pUI: p .1JJ Il.l.)O UO!...o ld x .1 UV · S;l( >.\ ( I~ ( lUlU-oH{) lI.ll1 !- 1 1 0. \\1 ljl! .\\ ' )/CfIJ'f(1/IJj1/l U/

]!II lt1WI ,I.JP IH ~ 1 'S]o u )f S('

n: "'pJ I:.\\tjllll IS pauu

-rqnrq U! p.1:;.10 1 ·SJ.......!IU.l .")lll l:q .")1(1 'i l: '(0 '9 1 IV ·SUI:l1U.:l9 .u u uo p.")JO.1S SI!II JIl ()J III!.\\ p.u ud u ro.t SI!lI 1.1.1J!P U;).lIJ U p .1 J."l.l.ln ... p l;l( s d !t(s 1IS!IP H .1 (1.1. · UO!!.l I: J O )Il 0 .\ IP I:J OUlll .1 1 SI.1JJI11 u jmu 0 .\\ 1

x umnd ', J
p .l ll :JPU.1d IPLJ '" J..l t IlOU l:

u o Sl!lI .lPI:lU ,1l0ZI U ., S;'IIIl U!llI JIl 0.l JO .1."lJ IJI UlIlll,\\ p lll: SlII : U IJ .l ~)

.1'11 p.1Jl10.WJ .\ I!(!q !S!.\ ' .1·\ U S.J.1dd !l 1 u o .1J U pouodo SJ;)S!IU1 .111ll:q X!... S,,\ Ill:.1\!

'os·s 1 pU Il OJ1~ IV

saouawwoo a llleq

:z ase4d

·UO!I.l .1J!P J!.l lll U! ~U !PI ~.1IJ O"' I'~ SI:.\\ .10')!Ip f 11;'11 p .1Z!lI:.1J J.l .l lpS JOU J.)(ldB I J.ll( l!.1:\, ' 1.1.11:1 SI:.1S 1 1~ !I 1 TI'U!llI (D -LJO ;)1(1.10 1(1Ixi .")111 OllJ! SJ,1<;!TU.l.l lll IXI S.,\ 1H:.'1H ;'IJIl I 0 1 ~lJ ! .UI .{p u :J."l<.I....lp SI:,\\ ' ~LJ!H es

SI:.\\ J.").1 IPS 11:111 ."'ISJ IlO.1 .1111 TI'U! ,\\Oll )f ·J.l d d !H ·,1l0 Z / U ., LJ I '1IIIlO'i '")'11 UHU.I .\ \p !t h :J ~ LJ !~J,1.\ LJO.l ' .\ 1;.\\ J l.:llJI UO OS11; .1 J."l.\ \ ).1.11:1 SI:.1S 1 1 ~! 1 1 .1l/ 1 p lll; J.l ;'11pS Wl( 1 ;) I1P o LJ p l;1( .\ lII;."lH ·.l SI:q .:lltl0'l

,

U NYTIll''--;IO, nr ,l VR
94

~".".L

-:TJ I .E... n r\T T I ES Il IPS

\\:'a tch ing th e grim spectacle trom the br idg e o f Lion. Admira l Bea n)' made h is fa mo us co m ment, 'Th ere seems to he something wrong with o u r blood y s h ips today: As wdl as th e banl ecru isers. the German a nd British destro ye r flotillas w ere also loc ke d in hatti e . Two Germa n d estro yers were su n k in the mele e . Bean )' o rde red re peated torpedo attacks o n th e e nemy , Sey dlilz w as hit forwa rd of 'A' turret o n he r starboa rd s ide hut. bu ckled a nd lea king . s he still was able to ma intain full speed. As Beatty contin ued his southe rly pursuit o f Hipper. he receive d signals from his cru ise rs. scou ting tw o m iles fo rw ard . th at enemy ba ttlesh ips were d ead a h e ad . Beatty n o w rea lized th at h e wa s sailing head long into

~I

trap, into th e path o f SCheer's halli e fleet. At

16.40. using flags. he s ig nalled to a ll s h ips in his fleet 10 turn 1HO deg n..'esto starboard . in o the r words. 10 reverse cou rse . This signa l was not ident ified h y Evan-Th o mas o n the brid ge o f nartmm an d th e 5th Battle Squadron co ntinued to race so uthwa rds . At this stage o f th e hattie. German losse s were m inima l.

t.mzon-.

Seydlitz. .Ho/II..'e and l '011 tier Tan n had a ll been hit hut were still

in good lighting trim . O n ly IJelj ] 1iIl/l,er remai ned un scat hed , \X'ith th e sin king o f two Britis h ba u lecruisers, Hip pe r's ba ttlecrulscrs ha d already wo n a s ubstantia l victory.

Phase 3: the run to the north " ;Th ilc Beatty's s hips were despera tel y try ing to extri cate the mselves fro m the jaws o f rhe Hig h Sea ..; Fleet, jclucoc. alt ho ug h still a good di stance to the no rth . wa s s tea m in g sou th a t 20 k n o ts . toward s the sce ne o f th e act io n.

BUI

he w as comp le tel y unaware o f

p recisely what was happening further south . At 16.38 he received a s ig na l from tilt: crui se r Southa mpton giv ing the course o f Sch eer's Ge rma n batt le fleet. Thi s wa s j elhcoe's first Indication that the e ntire

Germa n High

SC:l S

Fleet wa s

;I I

••

sea . Immediat ely he se nt the

Admiralty in Lon don th e el ectrifying sign:!1 [h at fl eet act ion w as

imminent. Meanwhile Eva n-Thoma s a nd hi s 51h Battl e Squad ron h ad re ali zed (he s itua tio n an d tu rned 1HO degrees to rejoin the flee t. But not before Be atty a nd Evan-Th omas had pass ed o ne a nothe r o n o pposite courses' Beatl y's banlecrutsers. now in com pany with the 5th Bau lc Squad ron . ha d again cha nged co u rse a nd we re now st e aming no rthwa rds. pursued by Hippe r. The Germa n sh ip s had re versed cou rse to tak e u p the le ad po sition at th e head of th e German lxut le tlect led by its Co m ma nd e r-in-Ch ie f. Admi ral Scheer, in the battl esh ip Friedrich d er Gros:"e. Thi s com p le te rev ersal o f co urse for both pursuer a nd pursu ed a like. from a southerl y 10 a northerl y heading. meant th at Beauy. pu rsued by Hip per and followed by th e e ntire Ge rma n High Se;ls Fleet . was sa iling direc tl y towards the o nco m ing British Gra nd Fleet. The o bject ive o f British nava l strJ.teg)' sinc e the beginning of the war had been to force a head-to-h ead hatti e with the Il ig h Sea s FiL'"t"L It was now about to happen. Befo re jel bcoc a rrive d. the first stages of the hatt ie bega n. At ar o und 17. 10. Sch e e r's 3rd Sq uad ron . comp rising seven bat tleships, went int o action aga inst the rearmost tw o battleships o f th e British 51h Battle Sq uadron , stalava and warsptte. J /a /aya was ba dly h ir wh ile the British infl icted hea vy d am age on

, l l(l r/..~p, r(l.r. Seydlitx.

DeljJ lill/l,er a nd l.iitr ou:

Eve n a t thi s stag e . Scheer wa s qu ite u na wa re th at th e e n tire Grand Fleet was stea mi ng towa rds h im at fu ll s peed . jell tcoc . o n th e ot he r hand, kn e w p re ci.'icl y w h at lay a head of

_IIIIiiI=..' tMlltil_IiI...__ _ ~ 95

TIlE BATII E ()1'-JIH LANIL

...

him . To position his tlccr 10 ga in maxi m um tactica l adva ntage over the Germa ns. he needed

Scheer had no idea that the

10 know the e;X:I('1 p o sition of the enem y IkL'1. its s peed. an d rhc cou rse it was sreann nu. Yet

entire Grand Fleet was at sea

alt ho ug h a large nu mb er of Bri tish xhi px, particu larl y the bun lccr u isc rs an d their scoll ti ng

and steaming directly

gro up we re in sig ht o f the Germans. no t o ne capt ain rel ayed th is vi tuI inform ation 10 (heir

towards him.

CC)!l1m: 1ndcr -in -Chief

vi sua l co ntact bctwcc nj vllicoc and Beatty was mad e arou nd IH. OO a nd it was o n ly then tha i

Jc lli<.:o t,;' reali zed that Sch e er w as c lose r and in a different positio n from tha t which he had

e xpected . \" jlh this information. j e lltcoe gave the signal for his g reat dreadno ught fleer 10 deploy for bat tle . This comp le x manoeuvre W ;IS under way when ,l fa rllx )ro liRb o penc..d fire on the High Seas Fle et. Schee r was n ow faced with th e situation h e least wanted : a head -on confro ntation with the e ntire Grand Fleet. Before the main hall ie co mm e nced. the 3rd British bunl ecruiscr sq uadron . co m ma nded

hy Rear -Admiral Hoo d . o pe ned fire o n Hip pe r's banlccruisers with great e ffect. tmrcm-. the flagsh ip o f the Germa n ba tt lccrutscrs a nd w ith Ad m iral Hip p e r o n ho a rd . w as h it forward repe at e dl y. AI IH.j O. ami d th e ha ze a nd s moke o f ba trlc . t.arzou: fire d th ree sal voe s at

tnrtuctble, s ilh o u e tte d in th e eve ni ng light. T he last of th e se h it th e b an lec ru lscr. wi th ca tas tro ph tc re sul ts . Th e s he ll e xp loded ins id e

:I

tu rret, blo wing the ar mo u red roof o il a nd

se nding a sheet of fla me into the magazines below. The devastarinu force of the explosion that followed blew the ship apart . Bot h the bow and stern s\:nions stood briefly. a -trunge ami motionh..'s s verti cal p illa r jutting out of the North Sea swell . \X'h ile the stern sank, the bow re ma ine d in thi s bizarre position until Ihe following day. O nly six nu-n were res cued . 1016 were lo-a . Once again , British bau lccru t- c rs had to tu rn :Iway to a void sa iling through the wreckage o f one o f th eir ow n sh ips , a victim of the an.-ur.nc a nd d e vastalin g fire power of the: German fleet.

Phase 4: fleet action By IR 40 the Grand Fleet wa s in hallie: I'Ofma tio n, a n inuucnse a nn ada of twent y-fou r b.utlexhi ps in line a head. Moreo ver. .Iellico t.' had effected a classic d e-ployme nt o f his lxutlc line . crossi ng the "l" o f the: e nemy line. lit.' had a lso pl ac e d his s hi ps be tween Sc he e r and the safety of Germany. With o nly a few hours of daylight left. the Ibull' ofj utland was about to begin . Scheer immediate ly attempted to ex tricate himself from this disastrous po...itio n hy signalling a IHO-tlL'gn:t.:' tu rn 10 the west. \X.'ith in minutes the Hig h Seas Flee:t had cxpcnlv co m p le te d this 'b.utlc-tum' - a move blan keted from view of the main British fleet by a th ick layer of haze. allowing tht.' German flee t to steam rapidly away. Altho ug h this manoeuvre had been seen The severely damaged German

hy several British sh ips, o nce: again no report to Jel lico t.:' was made. va luable tim e elapsed

betttecruiser Seydlitz managed to Jutland . She is seen here in dock

before lie realized the Germa ns had escaped. In fear of torpedo attacks from destroyers. and kn ow ing that the ene my mig h t we ll have covered its t.'SCIPC hy sow ing min e s, Iht.' British Co mmander-ill-Chie f d id no t p ursut.:' Scheer. He ma intain ed COUfSL' 10 e ns u re thai his ma in tlcct

at Wilhelmshaven.

re ma ined betwee n thl' Ge rmans a nd the safe ty o f thei r horn e base . Jc Hin K.' was later accused

limp home after the Battle o f

..

IllJLIlAITI..E.JlEJllIL\\ 'SJILN J)

-'

of hein~ over-ca u tio us in not pursuing Sc hee r. hut h is fear was justi fied wh en the cri p pled German cruiser U''';('s!Jaciell succeeded in torpedoing the battlesh ip , \la rll}() l'vlI~b. By th is l.·a rl)' stage of the hatt ie the hadly d a maged !.ii/zoU' was a lmost out of control and Hip per tran sferred his nag to Seydl itz hut.

:IS

.)(:l'dlilz

W :IS

a lso hl.·:1Vily d.urugcd. he was fo rced

to make a second trans fer 10 .If()I,I..~. the least damaged of the German battlecruisers .

After ste a mi n g to the west for about fifteen minutes. and st ill pro tected hy [he layer of haze . Scheer signalled a no ther lBO-dcgn.·(.' turn. His pla n was to P;ISS behind the British lim.•. . and to '(TOSS the T' o f jcll tcoe's fear. Ho wever. far from pass ing behi nd the British line. he steamed into the m idd le o f it. placingjelltcoc in an e xtraordina rily fort u na te position. 111istime . a nd for the only tim e in th e ent ire ba ttle , practica lly a ll of the Gra nd F I ~~t o pened fire. In desperation. Scheer e ffected an ot her abou t-tu rn . To furt her di stract the Gra nd Fleet . he o rdered his b.mlccruiscrs to turn di re ctly towa rd s lhe: e ne m y and attack. 111e: suicida l natu re o f this signal to the ba ulec ruiscrs was soon du nged 10 'Attack the e ne my rear', h UI hy th at time the already damaged. lighter-armou red s hips had ta ken a rca l bcatmg . '111e Ge rma n destroyers were o rd e red to lau nch a to rpedo attack . a nd they fired a tot al o f thirt y-one torpedoes at the: Gra nd Fle et . But vis ihilit y favoured th e British . a nd th eir h e~l\'r gu ns scored hi t a fte r hit o n /) el}j1ill j.!,er. Scvdlur . Liitzou : a nd Grosser Kurfnst. \,\'hile th e Hig h Se as Fle et stea med westwards. th e G rand Fleet . un d er torpedo attac k. tur ned to th e so uth -east. Thi s man oeuvre was later seen as a co ntro ve rsial tur n ~I w a y from the enemy in the face o f attack. a lthoug h .iL'l!icoc had d one no mOR' than follo w o rders in the Adm iralty 'Fig hting Inst ruct ions '. By 19..1':;. ti ll.' Hig h Sl'as Fleet had succe ede d in slipping into lh e m ist. The main fighli ng at j utlan d W~I S over.

Phase 5: night action After the to rpedo a ttack. Jl'I Ih-oc felt safe e no ug h 10 dose the rangl' aga in and resume action. He ass u med th e lli gh Sl.'as Fleet was still o n cours e . o bs cured hy the th icken ing m ist. hut in f~KI Scheer was some 12 miles wt.'stwards o fj clhcoc.. stet.'ring south-west. At 19.45. th e Germa n Co m munck-r-In-Clucf a lte re d co u rse 10 th e south with th e in te n tio n o f head ing tow a rd s the sa ft.,ty of lI orns Ree f and h is home base . To ac hieve th is heading . Sch e e r would have to comp let ely sk irt ro und the Gra nd Fleet . By 20.00 . Jellicol' realized the e ne my fleet wa s heading fo r horn e . and o rdered th e Gra nd Fleet to steer westwards in th e hope o f rega inin g contact . Ov er the next fiftee n mi nu tes fu rther co u rse: alteratio ns saw th e Grand Fleet st ee ring so uth west. Unaware o f o ne anoth er 's position. bot h ba ttle fleets were now o n co nve rging so ulherly courses . With sunset at 20.1.,. less tha n an hour and a qu a rter remained fo r the h unt er to find till.' hunted. a nd for the hunted to esca pe into lhe evening darkness... A~ the sun set. Hip per's lst Scouring Grou p was attempting to rega in its positio n ahead o f th e Ge rma n ha llie flee t w hen Be an y's ba n lecruisers appeared a nd o pe ned fire . In this br ief

l.'nW1gl.·I1ll.'nt . f)elyj 1in}wr was h it o nce a nd Seydtttz five limes. l.ion and Prin cess R(~ra l l.'a c h sus ta ined one h it.

As lh e y lim p ed for th e safe ly o f thei r home po rt. \,\' ilh dms ha\·l.'n. the p ro ud Germ:1I1 ba u lecruisc rs were in ha d sh a pe. Both [)erj)1inl!.erand S£:rd lilz had half th eir ma in a rma me nt OUI of action : Sevdttts: had seve ral thousand tons of w ater in her for e peak . 1(m der Ta nn ha d o ne tu rret

O UI

o f o pe ra tio n a nd th e o the rs workin g o nly int ermittentl y. t.ntz on-. m o st

seri o us ly d .uu aucd o f :111 . trailed wel l behind lh e fl eet at :I s peed o f o nly 11 knots. J1ol/J..~e. th l' le ast da magl'd o r lhe hatt lecnliscrs. w ith f lip pe r o n hoard. led lh e hatt er ed hattie fleel home. As n ight was ra p id ly app ro~lC h ing . and w ilh th e full kn ow lt.'dge th aI Scheer and lhe High Sl'~I S Fleet we re still o n th e prowl. Je llin x.··s main ohjective was to kl'ep his lleet inta ct in thl' ho pe o f wa~

fin:11 hatt ie Wilh tht.' e nl'my tk t.'[ in lh t.' Illorning. The British Co m ma nd e r-in-Chief ~ l p p rL' h e n ~ i \'l.' aho ut any n ight e ngagement. 1ft.' knew th:1l Iht.' Germa ns. unl ih' lhe Brilish . :1

had pr;lctisl'd nig ht fig hling techn iqu l' s. a nd lhei r d estroye r~ were capahle o f mount ing d e:ld ly

--.,dl,

·11--------97

_.-._

,' lllIXI U1 :ll lJ,' ~ .' Ip .10 tuauro.w nu S pJI~,\\ IS 1~ ,' J1~npr:J~ ;'Ill ) p;'l:-J Slali lI ()!1,) I ~ S!l l.l, '1')" 1:1 Pur:J9 ;)((1 JO Jl~.'J .'Ip 0 1 SJ " l1~ ,\\ ,'lj1 lJ! p,' q Sl ~p S I ~ II !1() U J;),{OJ1S;)P U I~ 1l 1J ;) 9 p ile qS!lP H ' ll l~ ! lI .)IP lj ~1l 0JII.L

',' llIotl .'1I10J S,J;).' IPS 0 1 ;)().)!Ip( U" I I~ 0) lU,' PUJIl S lJ., ,' q ;), \ l~q PJllO ,\\ UO!)e ll IJOJU! vlt l.l. 'J " ' }! SUJOli .10 " .) UI~SS ! I~ l1lH)').'J U!pd d.,Z J0.l p.) :-JS1: p r:q J.','IPS q .J!q ,\\ U! 90' 1Z po ur u I<.Lu .) " p J1: p IlJ,) 1~ UO ssud 0 1 P'''' I ! I~J .t "'q l In H ' ~ U ' P I~" l1 P U 1~ UO!I!SOO S,J•..,.)IPS ~ U ! I)J l~~;)J s J1~ U~!S Ul~ UIJ " 9 p ,'pO,) .) P I'~J ;),\ :lS ;)().)!IP ( )U:lS O!' llIOO}! ' UOP U()'I UI ';)U1Ol I JOJ ~ U !P l:,;)q S I~,\\ p U1: 1I0!11:UIJOJ ;'IU!I " ltl U!S 1: P,'U1IlSSI: pc q P,'LJ U1:UIJ., ~ ;ll ll 'O\-,,'(,l: ,{ n ' lI". \l :q s UlFlllI!i\\ 11: ,'pc f ;1lJ1 JO APjl~S .' tj l pm: 'S;-'U!lU JO .").,JJ 10.,.\\S F)lIU1~IP ;l ll ) 011 p1lO" P.")I "'!111. 'p .")}f "UJO H l~!-\ fU.:'l,"){)JO 01 p.")pp.")p J.,.")IPS ' lU!q <>1

uodo S;)lnOJ

JIlOJ .' ((1 JO ' 1" ,' 1:1 pm:J!) ;)l p 1Jl!,\\ ,' IIHXI J;)qullj 1: InOlfl!·\\ ;)I(I!S"(KI Sl~ lJ(X)" "l~ ;)llIDl{ P,' LI ''!If ptl OJ SI~.\\ ;)(1011 U!l:l1I "! II · ~.) 1: 1H~ 1qtl!U c JOj ~).)!Ip f SI~ .-uU1:pnpJ .'UII:S ;)IP p.ueqs J.,.'IPS ' I:., S lfUo~ .')111 JO Ip·\\S lJOS .")IP U! .'SIlOlU PUl~

11:')

.10 .")llll~~ I: p ., .{I:IJ snpinoupr.up .{ I P I~' P

jO "P.'U n :,'Jtl D.\\) Sl: s",' luOOlu pU1: 1I!1'" sr. .\\ .{CI\, If .10 lqtl!U ;)11.1. 'j ., ;)}! SUJOIJ J.JO ...;l U!U1 .\\OS OJP'PlJV J·")·{':I,'lI!U1 .")111 p.")J.")pJO.'11 ;lUl!l .'U1CS .'1(1 IV ' I S '~'- I Il Il ()S- I Il Il O" '.{I·\\OIS fh'J .,.w- pm: "UO'''!,\!P mOj OIU! on P ,' L1 "!lJ p .,."op ,' If .{ I~U ! PJ(),UV · SP U1:1J;)1 I P.~ ,' IP pun ,{ U l~IlIJ;) !J U''''' '.\\P<.j aql 01 Jo,ud saJllnao uew

"HI -u o d 1I1~IlJJ .")!) 1: jO .{P J I:S .' 111 pm: 'SI:,\\ P ,'I .-I SI:.,S qtl! H .'111 p.xlolj "11 .")J,' lj .\\ 1I.'.'.\\Pq

r 10 allJes

J;)PJ(XI UJ;)I"';).\\ ,'lfl JI:.")U UOO l~ '1Un~JOH Jo.l ;)~I~1U P(l)O,\\ J,','IPS l1:lfl se.w s s,")n~ p.")l1~ ln .")J1~.J "J;))I~.\\

;)lp U! U "II~ IInJ 11~ P,'LI ''!If U!I:IU! '~1U OJ 1U;)}U(l,") SC,\\ ,;)( )"!Ipf ' ~ J I~p ;)IJl U! s~pI:nr: Op."l<1JOl

SiTTH =

'p U8fj n

146!u u o SJas!ruoa/lJF!Q qS!l ,ua

&

.l YlT--;IIf.T.

4

fl6

} ~­ .,J

'Z" •

"'F

IllE....llIAIILIIL(]lE..JlJlI:LANll THE HAIT I E OF J ilT ' AND

iiil m..M6I1i'm . ....._~ 9 9

fleer as thL'Y passed to the rear of j ellicoe's line . The Grand Fleet sailed so uthwards , oblivious [ 0 the rumble o f the batt le between destroye rs go ing on over the hori zo n. About 02.00. British d estro yers o f the 12th Flotilla sig hted the Ge rman Hig h Seas Flee t an d launched a torpedo attack . The pre -d readnought Ge rma n battleship Ponnncrn was hit an d. after a se ries o f deto nat io ns . a ma jo r ex p losio n blew the s hip in to two . SignaLs fro m the Britis h dest ro yers gi\'i ng the positio n o f the Germa n fl ee r w ere se n t h LH no t re ce ived by thei r Com mand er-in-Chief. Mea nw hile . the Hig h SC:
port the High Seas Fleet returned

a salvage vesse l. o n 3 June.

to after the Battle of Jutland.

Germany 's main North Sea naval base, Wilhelmshaven, the home

.-1J .1,\\ s.""l I }.)qJ I~ q ,""l lj l lI"lI '\ \ ,""lJ OJ 1J,"HI.L -so.md s ,""lA!1.1.""l lOJ d ;) ip ;) P! SlI10 s l~A\ 1I ' lx l lp ll1:lI ~ U ! ;){ I SI:/\\

d n p.""l !!d ti ll !;)q

uo urununne ;)1I1 lj .1 !l!/\\ U! Ae ,\\ ;)lp JO ,'SI1l:.1.""lq ~ U IlS .""lJ,""l.\\ ,\ .""ll(l

,\ IIt:I1P V -r no uur 1I!1I1 J!,1lj l)0 ,""lSIlI:.XKI ~UIlS .""lJ.1.\.\ ,\'1lj l ll~l ll P !t:s lI;)lJo SI~,\\ 11 ·J;)Sp U .1,1 1l1l:q lj S!l PH ,\ J;),\ ;) ) 0 o urx p uq ,{.I,")" ,") ll ! UO!s o Jd X;)

jcuu.u o d rot rnu

I~ S 1~ ,\\ ;)J;) lj.L ' U;)U U 1~ tj 0}

ti ll !l!!:,\\ K IIs J:S!P I: S! ri U!11l '") IOl ),\\ '") lI l s u u.un 'J;l l!lItl ! UI: pll ;) lj .) t:.") 11: ;)Ae q q .) !l! '\\ S ;)S I~.) ,")S,""l111 'dn P ,11!d ' S,1SI:.1 J ( x )J <.b.l t~ J! ,""lill .10 1110 1I .") ~ el ;).I,")A\ s;) ti.le lj .1 'uodo ] d ;)~ .""lJ.),\\ SJOOp uou tun u u uv ' 1I0 !1!1I1lt1l1l1l: J!;'I{1l r'")J p ll l~ lI '\'")IJl ,\ I~,\\ ;)l p SI:.\ \ ;'I ! ti Ul~ '1S!lPH ;)'11 lU( )J.1 ;)SJ(),\\ U,) .\ ,") UO!U:I1I!S ;)q l S;l:-P: llI 1I~1I .\\ IIlH ' ],),' u J ,""lS!IU .1.")Pll :q ;)lj l)O ti ll !10 CHIS

. roo d

'\ II I~ ;)J ;)lj ] 0 1

S,""lll1q p IUO.1 na p p Ul: ' l ll ;l ISAS lll tl p ,')111 It jtll10q iup m ] 'I SP P H '") LJ.1. ·p .1.\ \ I:U s e,\ \ 11l.")1lIU!' l h .') JOJ IlH ),) ,")J !.I 11:111 m q 'lU ;)llldplh,""l )OJIll O.1 ;U U p .").1Ul :AP I: ru otu SI! J O ;)SIW.1;) <) -uaaq ;) .\l~.1I I. UP IIl( )lj S II "p 1:q 11I tl p lI ,\ \ OP All t: n p e s t:,,\ AJ .-) Uu n ti lj S!1P H ;) II.L ' ''-' 0 1...) l:d e ,1S 11:

dn P !P 1;l,1U ,""lJlu: q 1I!' :1lI ,, )lp ,{e.\ \ ;)lp 1I! AJ;) lItlllti SI! t! O!,")A;)P IOU P !P P "' U J;)s !nJ.) .')JlII:q ;) 1(1 lP ASO}! 1I! ;)SI:q SI! n : SI: ' o q P! IH)q S I! s t: p o o ti S1: jou S I~A\ AJ,1UlII1ti lj S!l P H ett.l..

:S;l IlSS! ,1S;'I11l UO S]lI,' 1I11110 .1 ;'I. \OJ ~

;)!J:-I J(J ·.\ 1It:,1H p il e :XD!lp LJo S;) !1 ! I'~ l1 b d !ljSJ;lPI:;"'I 1 IU;)J,').I.J!P onn b .')111 .-n ll pUI: s d !lj s '1S!lP H ,")t p ..l0 ,{ I ! P~ l1 b ,")111 PUI1()Jl: ti u !zp q od

plll: ' ,""l(l W<) U! P,')lplll:q ,")J,1.\\ ,\.")Ip A I~"-\

' P ,')Z!II:u 0 !1.11:.1 ;"'I llIl:.) ,1q ;"'I IlSS! '")lI l ' 1J()!lI:J lSllJ ,J UI ',,,, e N II:'\ O}! :H Il .l0 llI ;l,' lS;"'I -.JP S ;"'I lj l 01 ,\\O lq 'ii1l!1I:1SI:,',""lP I~ SI:,\ \ P;l I ~ 1 J,""lS!ll.I.Xll lll :U ;)1!P ,')111 UU)J.I s d !ljs ;);).11 11 )0 SSOI ;"'l Ip ' lj S!l P H ;)IP J0 ::l · tJ1: 11 IJ ,') ~) OOSl ' q s !l P H ,")J,1.\\ 000') ' ;) Illl:q ;"'I llIll ! P ;)!P Ol IA\ nOSH ,{ p ll:llI !x()j<.k h : .J0 1'~ ] O I 1:.1° :S,1,\ !!

.10 SSO'I ' 11 ,1,\ ,1!,1 ',\ U J:l I IJ ;l ~ ) :U;l,1 1.1 IH ).1 ' U!1:1P H :lSO! s d !'1s JJ:I0 .l, ·J;)S!IlJ.),1 11 11:q ;l UO ' Itj tl l1o Up t:.")J p -;'IJ d ;) UO "( lI e t ll .l ,") ~ ) : sJ ,') S ! nJ .1 ,1 Jl ll~q ,");)J II1 ' lI P:]P H :;)J.')o\\ SU!ljS (I:l!<.II:,) .1 0 S;)SSO' I ·U,")A;)S-AIU,").\ \ l lIl !A\ A lII: ll iJ ,1 ~) ' U;l,\ ,""lS-A}J!11l lll !.\\ ,')pu:q ,')111 p .""lJ.1 IU.") U!1: 1!JU ' (S J,")S!IlJ.) '")Jl1IXt p ue s IQtil10 Ulw.")J P ' s Hltl n o u p l:.").Ilh ) J d ) s d! tjs 1'~ I! llt:,) .I0 SllI J,1 1 UI ";) !q l:l llp JJ ! ;)J,""l,\ \ p lII : ll n r..~o s o u s nms :'IlIl ' U!t:1P U puu ,\lJl: lllJ .""l ~ Ijl o q .l0 SS;)J d ;l l ll P lll~ ' SlI l:p !I!10 d .")t p 'S:'I!1J1:J !l1IP V :'1111 .10 suo und o .) 111 J ,""l.\.1 11:QA\

'9 16 1 .>it Il/

f. P>!m /JJII II III IlI O:J ,t;{IJ.I.' l11 p V I IJp ,al b · :'I~.I t~ 1 uoaq :'I.wlj tsru n I! i n q ' AIU!l:lJ ,""l.1

,\ lII : l ll !.\\ p .) U !,~U .") "h· l: .")q io uu ro UO!! JI : ~1 l ll ti u PI1 P .1 0 p.ts o d sjp SJ,"),{o.lls '") (1 All l;'lU,") .10 .I,""Iqtu llll J ,) I~ X .') ;'111.1 . -x un s '\ Jq e q OJ d p m : 11.1ll jl:S!P ;)j;l.\\ SJ;)S p lJ ,) Itj tl!l 0 .\\ 1 : ~.) t: 11l~ )l 1 ~ ! U I~ x u u np SJ,""I.\ OJ IS;'Ip JIl O ,\ q ~U I1 S

p.urod .u

d!lI S,')lllI:lj ;)1I0

.poricun-p

'\ I,""lJ.").\ ,) S o uo p uc

· p .1,{OJ IS,""I P SI:.\\ J.')S!IU J,1111I:q o uo I S I~.""l1 IV ' SI1Op ,1 S .")J.""I.\\ !';.")sso l S,,{llI :'1U:'I :'IlI.1. -x u n s ;)J."),\\ SJ.1S!llJ.1 Il(ti !l ro s d !'1S'") llII XI '1S!l P H o N 'J O) p .")I U n( >,),)I~ t."),{ ro u ;)J I~ SJ,) lP O X!S plll: ' ISOJ '-1J.').\\ m al J.tV pun
II ·,W H.) J,""ll( ,{q P ,1Uo pU IXIe o q 0 1 (11:q .")IU!J ;'IU!OS .I0 J po.wo t 'iiupq J ,11) e

pili : ·P .1Il P:S!P SI:,\ \ . wJ. t.n~.\\ .")tj .l. ' )ju n s

;).1:'1.\\ .U 11.1./d

;YJ1Jl fl p m : a.JlI(/ SJ ,")S!I1J.) .""ll p p ut:

i>/<JJ.")II,l.l JiI ',JI(I 0'itJW/;'I Jil/ '.( m / 1' II<J<JIlO SJ,""lS!llJ.1,""l11l1:q -u Ll. 'sd !lIs'")IIu: q JIl 0 tu()J.I ;)ti l:llI I:P ,")J.').\ .1S ~ lJ ! ' \ l.""l ,).1J ,""lJOpq IOU '1 ~ll otJl

'uod O J P ,")UJIl P J ,{t ll,")U:'I ;)l( 1 ;)11;).1S oqr uo p.un.uld n

,""lS,) 11l J ~1 1) 1 : UOOS put: ' s ,) .).Io .l u nnu J IlO IIl !A\ U 0 !l .11~ P .""l'iill oIOJ d P :'l p ! O A I~ ', , ]!!!q !S!,\ ,\ \ 0 1 ,\ q P '")P!'~ ' ),).11:{ lJ I~ lll J') 9 .-1 11.1. ',\'\ 1:.")'1 ,1J .) '\\ S.")SSO! ;1t p .")~·O l J1 tiU Ol li V 'S d !ljS;1 I111:q lS I ~.J J I10 .1 ,{q

1 1(~ ! 1 p un SJ ;)S !lUJ ;)1lI0S p ut: ),) " 1:1 J ;)S!I1J.1,""I P 1Q I

p o u o d d n s SJ .")S!l lJ .)

,""l i ll ,")J ;).\ \ 11 .').1 ri U !l l(~ U ;'IlI l .1 0 IllllJ q .""l ljl l p !lj ,\ \ u o s d !lIs lIS!J PH

;)'1.1.

'Pm: pl1( .1 0

lSI:O.) ,")111.1.1° .) .) I:ld ~ OO ll U ;) Il J .1tl l:tl U .""l p :.' I:U u ',\ t:1'i I ~' ' ,\ l~ PS ;) U P '")A\ .J 0 UOOUJ;l I)1: ,")l ll ll O

: P I~ ,""lJ

· ]I~ ,).P P llIJUUO.1 o i p.u noddu t p !t{,\ \ nun ]" f uo ~ llh! U Il 111l1l0.)

11

ltll e p,1IlSS! ',\ I:S 01 H:lI.\\ JO 1.)I :;)J

OJ ,\\0 11 ;'IJIlS ;'I1!1l!> IOU ' 'I Sl IP H :'111.1. 'J;)d d !l l P ll l~ J;)." )IPS ),),""lJti 0 1 '") P!S ~")O P ;'Itp 0 1 poq sru J .1 S p~~ ;1ljl .")I!I(.\\ euou dno ~ U ! l P I:O.l<.kh: ~U ! 1I),)1lI0S t il !""' p .""Idu p tl S 1~A\ ss.")J d J !,")lj,1. -po m d qp ,1q lOU P II1O·) S!lI l ' lSOI u.u n pun s d! t{s .l0 s n u .u U! -p u c ,\.Jo }.)!,\ llIp:p 01 '\ I ~ .1 !1 1 !> P ;1o\(HlI S IU: llIJ .")~ ;)1(.1.

4t eWJalle a4t :pueltnr S
YJ'f •

a~

001

~. .IIIIii------.IL~ '. ._ ...-

'L TIl£JL\lTLlLOL)lITl.AN D

10 1

pcnerr.ucd hy German shells. and the Germans were shooting prcny well. two of

Admiral

B l ·;lIty'S

b.ntl ccruiscrs blew lip with virtua lly a ll hands on hoard . First II MS

IHlhf ll ti)!.lIb/e. and th en II MS Queen ,\l1I1)'. which paradoxically had the best fin: co ntro l

eq ui p me nt on hoard and was doing the best sh ooting. But she blew lip and sank . ca us ing Admiral Beatt y to make his famous comment . MTI1t:rc seems to he something wrong with o u r bl o ody s h ip s today. " There wa s. hut it wasn't so much the sh ips th emse lves. it was th e way th e ammunition wa s being handled o n board them. Tilt..' Bank o f Jutland ce rtainly had en ormous effects o n pe ople's percept ions o f jellico,- and Bean)'. Beau)'. I think .

C;IT11e

o ut rather bcuer (han he shou ld have d one .

Ili s handling of th e bnttlccruiscr fleet was seri ously flawed . And o ne major reason th ere was such con troversy in th e 1920s o ve r th e Battle o f Jutland was that as First Sea Lord (ap poi nted post jutland]. Beatty felt it was incumbent upon him to cover up how badly

he 'd handl ed the battl ccruisers at Jutland. fie tried

10

sell the id e a that the drubbing

hv gave..' th e [Ge rma n ] buu lccruisers wa s su ch tha t the G e rma n fleet was already

The burden of com mand of the

d emorali zed before it met the Gr and Fleet. That w as a bso lut e tosh . The German

British Grand Fleet fell on Admiral

lxmlvcrubcrs thought they were doing rather WL'II. So , Beatt y tri ed to co ver up. Beatty

Sir John Jellicoe. Winston

o f cours e had borne the hrunt o f the act ion and was sun..-c ssfu l in delivering the High

Churchill said of him that he was

Sea s Hc vt for Jellieoe to knock out. AI times in the subsequen t ho ur s. Be an y tried to

the only man who co uld Jose the

encour.lge..· j ell in

war in an afterno on.

>L'

to act m ore aggres.....ivcly and offensively. so it's q uite e..':ISY for Be:lIly's

s up po rte rs to say if Hemy ha d been in co n trol rather tha n .h-llk-oc . the n the bat tle would han : bee n fo ug ht to a more victorious conclusion. I th ink that's ve ry quest io nable.

'[cllic'ov h ad hi s o w n wea knesses as a co m ma nder. jclltcoc \\,:IS very ca u tio us . As Ch urc h ill a lw ays said , he wa ." the on ly man who co uld lo se the war in an afternoon. I think that 's p roba bly an overstatement beca use of the margin of s u p e rio rity of the Gra nd Fleet. But just as xclson 's geniu s was 10 re cogni ze th at his enemy had

serio us weaknesses thai he cou ld exploit. Jelli n x.· ·s defect was to Sl.'e..· rh.u h is fleer was superior in many ways, and he o ug ht to havl.' exploited th,u hy Ix:ing more aAAressive .

jvllicoc adop ted a very defensive attitude. He 's a hit of a co nt ro l fre a k. And th o se extremely voluminous G ra n d Fleet hatti e o rd e rs held the Grand Fleet hack - prevented it IX'ing used with a s u ffic ie nt d egree o f flexihilit y. This refl e cts, o f cou rse, th e inherent te chni cal pr obl ems o f com munica tio n which existed a t the tim e . But jell icoc tri ed to o ve rcome this h y a n extremel y rigid s ystem o f o rde rs . lbg signals and so o n. Don't d o anything until you 're to ld . And this led to situations where British shi ps would not report upwards..., up the cha in o f command . tha t ti l<.' G <" fIl1:1l1 fleer were passing through them. And hence

th e Germans were abl e

10

get aw ay .

' It's often sa id tha t J u tla nd w as the hi g h point of the

o. I

haul e xhip era - ce rta in ly in terms of n umb e rs o f d rea dnought -era ships e ngaged. It's quite min d -boggling to think o f those long lines of im p ressive large -gun armed

ba ttles h ips manoe uvring . But I th in k j ut land also demons tra ted the wea kness of the h anlesh ip as well - the prob le m o f th is tre mendo us m ismatch o f p latform an d wea pon ledltlo log y wit h se nsor a nd comm u n ications techn o lo gy. Gu n... tha t ca n fire o ut

[0

the

T il E HAT TI ESlll1!S

hori zon be ing directed hy the xtark 1 eyeball. with so me o ptical ;ls.sista nce. but no rada r. Ships being contro lled by flag signal as had been done in ~c1....o n's era . So it's hardl y surprising th at it's \·c ry . very difficult for commanders to ma intain contro l. It's re latively e;ISY for fleers to get aw ay. It's difficult to ut illze th e ra w mili tary str e ngth o f th e batt lesh ip 10 bring about decisive results at the tactical and operational level . And that is why jclltcoc fails at Jutla nd as much as anyth ing else . I lis doctrinal a pproa ch didn 't hel p . But the shee r p roblems o f operating a fleet tha t stze . that fast. ih.u powerful. and at that lo ng ran ge in te rms o f g uns, o n the basis of nags and eyeba lls. i:... very d ifficult.'

Altho ugh heated d iscu ssio ns continue 10 this day over the many issues o f Ju tland . immedia tely after the battle the strategic situation was d ear: the Grand Flt..'I..'1 retained possess ion o f the North Sea. and its ships we re ready for action within two days, The: British b lockade: of Ge nua ny was inta ct . eve n if victory in the battle was in dispute , From the Ge rma n point o f view. the batt le was e vide nce that T irpit zs the ori es conceived at the: turn of the: ce ntury were unworkabl e . Despite its successes. the High Sea s Fleet had been badly maul ed hy a s u perio r force a nd had been fortunate to csca pe without scrio us loss, Admiral Sir David Beatty and British seame n cheering the arrival of the US 6th Battle

Squadron at Scapa Flow on 1 Decemb er 191 7.

Mo re o ve r. it confirmed that the British did not ne ed to defe at the High Seas Fle et to re tain contro l of the sea and maintain the blockade. Th e High Seas Fleet had be come a 'fleet in being' 10 deter the British from landing forces in the Baltic and for kceping German lf-boa r ports o rx:n, Th ese objectives co uld IKI \'e: been achieved hy far mo re economical means, The: I lig h Sea s Hcct did co me out o n a fe w other occasions, most notably on 19 Aug ust 1916.

J __-IiI'c "1I·iI-z-_ . &_ . . _ ._ _r:. l 03

IllLllAT.ILE... (}E..j UIL\N D D'-----

Queen Elizabeth Class battleships photographed from an airship on their way to meet the surrendered German High Seas Fleet .

Sche e r, dete rm ined

10

s how that his fle e t remai ned a po tent fig hting force, bomba rded

Sunderland in the hope of d rawing o ut a sect io n of (he Gra nd Fleet. And to e ns ure tha t the eve nts of 3 1 J\ lay we re no t repeated. Sch eer made ext e nsive lise o f Ze ppelins and U-hoats 10 provide adva nce intel lige nce o f British 11l0 VCI11cnL s . Aga in Room 40 in Lo ndon passed ne ws of

S C!lCt.: f 'S

mov eme nts to j e lllcoe and th e G ra nd Flee t w as at sea before the Ge rma n!" le ft

harbour, Inco rrect information gi ven to the Ge rman Co mmande r-in-Chief led Scheer to belie ve

that a sq uadro n o f British lxu tlesht ps w us ap proa ching from the south-cas t. Sche e r turn ed

(0

face this fo ro: and . in doing so , stee red away fro mlellicoe. Late r, Scheer recei ved a signal fro m

U53 saying that it had siglucd the entire Gra nd Fleer steering so uth, and was o nly 65 miles fro m the lli gh Seas Fleet. Upo n re cei ving this news, Scheer turned fo r hom e , and ended what wo uld he the last cha nce o f a confrontatio n betw ee n the Ge rma n and British fleet s. The Ge rma n o ffe nsive at sea then focu sed o n the U - I ){)~H S and the u nrestricted ca m paig n of attacking all e ne my s hips, w hich bega n in Fe b ruary 19 17. In Apr il, Ll-boats increased the Allied tonnage they had s unk by threefold , to o ve r 800,000 to ns. Du ring the same mon th. the United States declared wa r o n Ge rmany. mak ing her ultimate de feat o nly a matt er o f time . In May. the introdu ction hy the Allies of the co nvo y syste m. wh e re merchant s hips we re formed into large groups w ith ar med esco rts, e ffectively turned the tide o f Ll-boat successes. With no mea ningfu l ro le to pla y, the d re ad nough ts o f the I lig h Se as Fle et lan g u is he d in ha rbo u r. w hile boredom led to a sig nifica nt decl ine in crew mo rale and d isciplin e . By the late s umme r o f 1918 , the Ge rma n will to cont inue the wa r bega n to crum b le . A breakthro ugh by the Ge rman Army in the spring of 19 18 fina lly broke the stale ma te of trench wa rfare. This wa s fo llo wed hy a gia nt Allied co unte r-o ffensive in August. O n 8 Aug ust. kn o wn

as lh e ' Black Day o f th e German Arm y' . Allied force s swc...pt o ve r th e mangled lxutlefield s of the Sonune, taking the German Army h y com ple te s urp rise . It wa s th e heginning o f the e nd . In thi s same month. Scheer became Head o f th e Ge rma n Adruimlty. relinquishing com ma nd o f th e Iligh Sea s Fleet to Admiral Hipper, O n 22 Octobe r Sch ee r o rde red Hipper 10 p re pare th e High Seas Fleet for o ne final a nd d es perate sorti e . Th e plan was to attac k British cross-Cha n nel su p ply lines and th e Thames Estua ry. e nticing th e G rand Fleet to sail sout h wards . o ve r lines o f U-boats and ne w m inefields 10 where the High Seas Fleet would he in wa iting . There was a desperate s ide to th is pr opo sal as. unlik e th e High Seas Fleet . th e G ra nd Fleet had been ma inta ined at peak efficiency. Its superiori ty in strength and num be rs ha d also been fu rther re inforced fo llowi ng the ent ry o f the USA into the war in April 1917. Th e 6th B~IllIt., Squadro n. cons ist ing o f nin e US battleships, had joined th e G rand Fleet at Scapa Flow . TIle High Seas Fleet W~IS o rdered to sail o n 29 October in wh at man y Ge rma n sailo rs viewed as a su icide mis:...ion. But the fleer rema ined at anc hor. Its low moral e h;IO lx 'cn e vident as early as August 1917. when a rev olt o n th e battle sh ip Prtnzreg ent Luil/x,1d over po o r food rations was d ealt with h y th e sh ooting o f lWO ringl eaders, No w . in O ctober. rat her than follow o rders in a war th at was d early in its dosing stages. the crews mutini ed. A Sold iers' Co unci l was set up in Kid a nd the red flag o f socialism was flown fro m many o f the s hips . It was an important element in the o ve ra ll co llapse o f th e German 'ho me front '. The Il ig h Seas FI<..'<..'t ne ver sailed a nd 'the wa r 10 end all wa rs' ground to an ignom inious end for th e Germans and joyous victory fo r the Allie s. The Kaiser abdicated on 9 No ve mber and went into ex ile in Ho lland . Two days late r. o n.th e eleve nt h day o f the eleven th mont h. at e leven o'clock the Ar mis tice was sig ned \'\'~Ir I were s ilen t.

a nd th e g u ns o f \'\'orld

Under the te rm s o f the Armi stice . later rat ified at the Trea ty of Versa illes. Ge rmany wa s 10 pay d ea rly in te rrito ry. ma te rial a nd cash fo r he r part in the war. The British a rgued strongly fo r th e immediate elimination of Ge rman sea-power a nd her redu ction in na va l sta tus to se cond class. The entire Ge rma n fleet wa s interned u nt il its fate wa s determined hy the peace treaty. to he signed in the fol lowing year. O n 21 Novem ber the o nce proud Hig h Seas Fleet sailed from its home port for th e last time . It would never return. Its initial d estination wa s the Firth o f Forth. now th e main ba se o f the Gra nd Fleet. Admiral Sir David Beatt y. who had re placed jclltcoc as Com ma nder-in-Chie f o f th e Gra nd Fleet in No ve mber 1917. fo rme d till.' imm ense Grand Fleet into tw o vast colum ns . Th e German fleer was fo rce d 10 sa il bet ween the..' tw o lines o f 'e ne my' ships into th e cus tody of th e British , US sail or John Paul Elliot . o n lx xtrd th e ban k-ship UOSS Texas. witnessed th e a rrival o f th e High Seas Fleet in the Firth of Fort h a nd rem e mbers it still: '\'\'t: were there when th e s hips ca me in . when th e Germa n s hi ps surre ndered . They a ll ca me in th e Firth o f Forth and dropped a nc hor. \X'e didn 't get too -lo se to th em, and th e y didn't gel toec losc to us. I could see th ey were in a prett y run-down cond itio n -

th ey d id n 't look as th ou gh they'd been mai nta iru..d . It was kind o f a sad thing to sec a ll these immense sh ips come in th ere a nd you kn ow, just surrend er like that . Th ey looked so bedraggled

10

me . th ey just looked beaten. that's the way thc )' im p ressed me ,

They didn 't look like fighting ships a ny more . It wa s an o ve rca st da y. as I recall. If th e sun had been shining maybe th ey would have looked bette r. hut it was ~1J1 o ve rcast. d ull day - it was a fun era l day . and it was a funera l for the Ge rma n Navy. ' W'h t:n th e Ge rma n sh ips had d rop ped an chor in the Forth, Heutty signalled: 'The German flag w ill he hau led d ow n at s unset today . Th ursda y, and w ill not he ho isted aga in without permission.' Som e time after this ritual surre nder ce remony. the fleer wa s escorted to Sc;11x1 Flo w where it was to wa it, d isar med and w ith reduced news, fo r the fi nal te rms o f th e peace tre.uy w hich wo uld decide the ir fut u re.

.

IHLJIlAJITI.F..-!OE-J11.ILANll.THE H A T TI E OF II ITI AN D

Mont h alt e r mo nth the Ge rman ships sw ung :H ancho r in this remote. w indsw ept harbour w hile the Allies d iscussed the ir ultimate fate. Small crews of Ge rma n office rs and sailors lived o n board. maintain ing thei r ships as best they co uld under these extre me circu mstances. The

.4t.'mm

-----'"'-_ _

The interned German High Seas Fleet at anchor in Scapa Flow with accompanying chart. This

British had no need o f any o f the sh ips and favo ure d sinking the fleet in mid-Atlanti c. Other plans e nv isaged a split be tween the Allies based o n wa r losses incurred by ea ch navy . What was

pho tograph was taken a few

ce rtain wa s that no! o ne ship wo uld ever be retu rned to Ge rma ny. The Armistice wa s or iginally du e to ex p ire o n 1 1june 19 19. at w hich time the Treat y of Versa illes wo uld co me into effect. As

scuttled.

so me ac tion of defiance wa s ex pected from the Ge rma ns, including the possib ility of sc uttling, British a rmed fo rces were se t to seize the ships an d their crews at any time . Vice-Admiral Ludw ig vo n Re uter, co mma nde r o f the inte rned fle et. had ind eed decid ed to take matte rs into his o w n hands. He plan ned to scuttle his ships o n 21 june . just pr io r to the e nd o f the Armistice. Ho we ve r, unknow n to Reut er, the ex piry date was put back un til 23./ un e . O n the mo rni ng o f 2 1 J un e , fo r so me unacco un table reaso n. th e British sq uad ro n gua rd ing the inte rned fleet sailed o il. o ut of Sca pa Flow to co ndu ct exercises , lea vin g the Ge rmans to thei r own devices, At 10.00. Reut er gave the o rde r for his ships to scuttle. The skele ton cre w!" had a lrea d y mu tilated val ves and pipe s and ta ke n the necessa ry ste ps to e nsure the British could no t reve rse any action once the scu ttling began . The noise of a ir esc a ping from flooding com pa rtme nts co uld he heard as every ship in the fleet gradu ally began to sink,

Pl'AAY G ibson wa s a ten -year-old child at the time , an d o ne of a pa rty of local school child ren be ing take n to sec the Ge rman ships that day. She vividly recalls the mom e nt : '\X!e got on hoa rd the 1'~ J'i llp, Kestrel earl y in thc morning o f a bea utiful summer's day. cvcryt htng wa s loo king bea utiful. \X'e set sa il fro m Stro mncss wh ere I live d and had a jou rney of qui te a number o f mile s past the island !" of 1I0 y and C ruc msay and a fe w mo re un til we reached the first rows o f ba ttlesh ips. T he y we re lying in pair s and it

months before the fleet was

105

TilE IlA TTI ESlllpS

The German bettlecruiser

Hindenburg rests on the bottom after scuttling,

was like

~I

corridor between the tw o colu m ns, There

W ;I S ~I

colu m n o f two b y tw o a nd

two hy two . \X'e sailed d o wn the pathway between the ships. \'X'e h ad been warned by th e teach e rs th at w e weren't to mak e any no ise o r chee r o r d o anyth ing in particular to pay atte ntio n to th e sh ips . jus t to h e q u iet. And o n o ur way d o wn we go t a messa ge

from anothe r sh ip w hich said that the British fleet had gone o ut that mo rn ing o n exercise and th at it wa s retu rn ing because the y'd go t this amazing ne ws w hich was of course that the Germa n fl eet was sin king . ' But we we re so mu ch in the m idd le o f it that w e had to sta y wh ere it wou ld he safe beca use the ships w ere performing. It wa s a marvellous show. They stood o n the e n d o f thei r bows. th ey went o ve r. the y d ive d . the s un g linted o ff the ro ws in the water. 111Cy did the most marvellous th ings. I myself saw twelve cap ital sh ips go d own. One of them rose right up o n her bow and then went over o n her xidc into th e water.

I'll n ever forget th e sig ht o f it. A lin e o f them were lying there . th e y were ly in g in pa irs. '\'X'e were to ld to lie beside the victorious. wh ich W ~IS act ing as a hospital ship at th at time, \X'e mo ve d a lo ngside and formed a trian g le w ith a tra wle r. And that trawler ha d armed men a lo ng the decks lo ok ing d o w n o n a s ma ll bo at that was between a ll th re e shi ps , The Ge rma n ca p ta ins were there , beautifu lly dr essed ; th ey we re silting in th is lifeboat w ith th e g un s trained o n them.

LOt

OOtldd~)

llhl

'M3tlJ

S3J~;

.13tltlru ( WW-ISO N!- 51 ' NI 5 0 .1 cl S3113Stl~S '( WW 5'c51 0.1 500 N! 5 0.1 cl .113S N[~W S3Sru o
'd !qS" ')IIW
'NOI.lJ3-1Otld

;)lj l .1 0 .')J Il)IlJ .')lj ) 1I! .')\0.1 J O! I~ l ll I~ .\ I~ l d P IIlO.\\ s .') ,) lIl~ !~b lle lI:lIO!)I:UJ.l )lI! t'fU!t'flJl:lI.)

sm d 'S';)!t'f0 IOUq .l ;)1 .wa u PlJI:

' }S( >.) -

.U e l!l!lll p lII: suod xo I':.wu a mos

SJOI.) I:j l po H 'P PO,\\ ;)l p lIH>I{t'fIlOJ lIl SIS!t'f.1H:JlS

.cq p.tuo nsanh .\ ISI1O!.I;)S t'fU!.lq

se.\\ ·.111l:ld OJ.l l: .1l p

,\ 1J 1:\IlJ !IJIXI - S U O<.h~;l , \\ ,\\;)U .1 0 IU;lu l<.I0 I.'),\ .1p p lII: UO!P IlP0 .lIU! .1 111 q t'fIlOJlIl p UI: ·)S<).)

-o-» N[-5'S

SJON~ If dHSOOO' hhl

0 ) ;Hl P ' d !lIS';1P ll:q ;)IP .1 0 '\ )!Hq q,\ ;)1I1 u .')q .\\ .\ JOIS!tj U! ;l lll !1 I: II : P ,lLJ q S!lPH .')lj l ' lN 3 VV\1 Wtl~

'U33dS ' , tl 3 N I H J~W

SNO.1 U ~O l Ol9'ch 'lN3 W3J~ldSlU ( Wl'S ~ l' lf x rC9c) N!9 .J"iSC x .J"ihOl (ll\ftl3N) .J"i09S 'SNOISN3WIU ~

aOOH SINH

p .1U!0 ! ;)lIS 'Pp O.\\ ;)IP U! d! tjs J1 : I! <.h~.) 1l1j.1.'),\\ o <.l tscnu p un )S;)t'f.ll:j .1 q l SI:.\\ POOl ! ·SI.1JJ Ill p.uunou r SUIlt'f ( tlll U- I Hn q ,)U!-S I 11It'f!.') .10 )U.1IlII:UlJI: unnn Plll~ SUO) 000 '0 1'

11 H>.l U!

.1;),\ 0 .10 lU.')IU;1.11:ld s!p I: I!1!/.\\ '0("61 U! '\.\l :N J1:,\ o}j ;)IP tl l!.\\ .1,)!.\.I.')S p .l .1 ,'))U.') POO/l ·.I.1S!' lJ .l .')111 IXI .111.1 ) I: u e l p d !lJS.')PH:q ISI:j I: su .uour P.1J,1 ll hu o .l SI:.\\ p OOl/ S;)t'flll: lP ;lS.')q l III!,).\ ·ti ll !p l!n q .10 .')1lI!) .1 1p

)I :

p .').I.') p p.;uo .) - 1I0 !1.);)10Jd :-I-").1p p.,).IIl Ol(lJ l~ ll:lI0 !l!PPI: p un SS;l WP !111 II.l q

;"1)1:nh.l l1l:

p.un ouuu

p .1S1:.1.1,l U! '\ IlI:.')Jti p.,)p llp lI! ;)S.1 ll.1. 'U1: ld uti !s.')p p-urxuo ;1ljl 0 1 SUO!U:.)tl!I)(Hll lue.ltl!uli'!S p ;l .\ oJdd l~ P I~ lI .\ III:.I!UIP V lIs !1!JH ;)l p '.')Pi\ 1J .')111 UO 1).1 1:.\ u .\\ OJH u ljo f SIlOUll:.1

;)tp ll~ 9 16 1 .I.')q lll .')I<.b S 1I! 11.\\()P Pl'tl SI:.\\ p .'))J .1.1 1{ ;)J0.J-l q 1I.1,\ ':! ·,U lll u .1,) q PpU.l .\\1 ;l ll l .l0 <.I !q s I l~ ) !
;) ( P

,\ \<11:<10 .1<.1 SI: .')t'fJ .')llJ.1 0 1 p ."1l1!1S.')P S I~.\\ /JOOII -o u i I S I~ \

S!lll .10 '..mou uu S! p- eds. )I~ lll P H.lll S!I{ p un 1:1.1 .I.')I{S!:I ar pjo it'J I:t'f.')1 ;)l ll p.lIU.1S.').I
·p p o .\\ .')111 .1 '-1,\0

I I'~

UlOJJ S.I.1,\!P .I0 J 1I 0! ).1 I:1 Il I~ anlu u n I~ .\ ld ll '!S U !,~ 1lI.1J ,\ ';)ll.l, · Sll l li Il 0U p l~.1.1 p .u pjo 1:1.1 .1q) .I0 .I.1 P ll!1lI.1.1 ~ JI : I S I:

sunil J!.:lIP

',\\ 0 \::1 .')lj q o tuouoq ;)l ll H: .1!1 I1! IS ·zl l,w jW ).l.Y Plll:.!iJ./My.WI l' ·~! II !.J.V ·Sd !ljS.l llw q

m: llu ,l ~) .'),l J11l '\ I:PO.L ·tiU!<.l<.h:D S JOJ SUO!W.l 0 \ J.;)lllo p u n 11I.\so}j 0 1 p .').\\ OI PUI: P;)Sp:J s d !ljs ,')111 .10

iso m .\\ I:S SO~· p Ul: sO("6 1 .1 1p

xuu np 1l0 !)1:.I,1d o

.')li l ~, \ I'~S '~1 .1 d x .;) '\ I! J I~ 1I ! pJ o eJ l x .1 mq ' IJl:tllS V

-z ndnj UO.\ p:l!lllP V ' P'')I:I S I~,') S I{ti !l l .1 11 1.10 p.l} ! IP.l I~ P !IP .')IP 10 .I.1Sp:)( .1ljl .I.1 lll! ,1 .10 SIUI:.1.1 P .1q l P .1 UUII1J J.;).\.;)U 1! p u n -s u n n SI! p .1.\ ,')!IPI: .I.1.\.,)U II -uo n.uu rcuoo SI! 1I! pos n P:P ;)l1:llI p lll : IJOJ J;1 lII:ll lll ll .1 0 ,1)Se .\\ P ."1 LJ s

.') ( 11

' 1,1 '\ '')1 l u .1J.1.!.l !P I: UO ·p .1 111J!.I.W·1J

6 16 1 ;)ll ll ( 1(", .101.11: .;)1I1 ·P ·')U S!11l tilI!U:,)D .10 ,\ l!l!lll.l ;)l ll p .1 11:J ISllOlll.1 p IW lj SJ l:,1.\

.11:.\\

,')111.1 1

·s .1 Is l liS!!!.! \) .1 1p .10 u ud ,)10l1l.1J I~ U! 'S;l \t'flll : SIlO,')P !tj )1~ ' 1~ ,1S .')111 J.')P UIl '\ l:J I! .\\ O,,,! ·p p o. \\ .1111 U! Is .1II:.1 Jt'f p UO.l.')S .')1{1 ;1ll l(D,')q p l:1) P,l U ,;)111 '';)lUp uous '\ I ~ ll ! q S ! U O I S I : 1l1: UI '<.h UOl I p~p .')d lt l! .10 S.1 U.1.)S pl um 11itill o ll PI:,')Jp U I : U l.I .') ~) IS.!!.J .1 1P .l0 ~ U !l P U llI~\ ,')lj 1 ;).lU!S p.')s<.h~ I '') P I ~ lI S.le.'),\ U.1.\ .')p lll a p ,1.1Ol11 o:\, ' ~ U ! )J lI ! S

.I.1 q IU;),\ ;)JU 0 1 p .')p u n oJ t'f ,)q O} ' )I
U.:lI ;1(11 .10

u,,/mu

,\ IW ) 'SJ,')S!' lJ.).1p Wq .1.\ t! p ill: Sd! ljS,l111lXI

~')q P lllO.) 1I~ 1 J1 ;)P )!J S I~ "\ .;)J.:ll p ' p .1 11J I1 P .I

-ouop

uorpnnbc q S!I!JH .')111 .')lll !1 ;l Ip ,\ \)

" ,')lIlOl I pti 0 1 til'!tillOI ;).1.1,\\ .1.\\ '.')S.lI1
=

a:ai: --..-

-soxpuq 'S,\\oq ·U,'),')S ,')q 0 1 sd !l{s .l0 SI!q .1.1.1 .\\ .1.1.1 11 1 )J.ll:q

(f N y-u

,

S~ U ! t ll .l0

,\ 1:.\\ .11Il UO .

n " , o ,rU:,I.VlI'IIU

e U timate •

att es 1_ s I

n the two decades follow ing World War I, politicians and the ir e nvo ys, through agreements made aro und conference tables in \X'ashingto n and Lo ndo n, e ffec tively destroyed more battlesh ips than were eve r lost in

co nflict. But in doing so , they also ignited a flame o f passion in at least o ne nati on to create the ultimate cap ita l ships, the like of which the world had never seen before, Th e aftermath of the war saw Britain victorious but war-weary and

economically drained, Its shipbu ilding yards no longer had order book s full wi th demands for figh ting s hips . The enormous sk illed workforce that had p rod uced the ships of the Grand Flee t wo u ld soon be reduced to a bare minimum in the years leadi ng up to worl d recessio n. Th ere was. in fact, a worldwide glut of ships of almos t eve ry descript ion. As far as the Ro yal Navy was co nce rned. the vast ma jority of ships in its fleet wer e o bsolete - o ld , o ut-da te d veterans b uilt yea rs be fore th e war. Its most modern and p owerful batt leships w er e th e I5-in ch C3H I- mm) gunned ships of the Queen Elizabeth and Revenge Classes , all of wh ich had

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

IIIIiI=IiII'~Ii'%tr.a _ _~

been laid down between 1912 and 19 14. The on ly other dreadnought of any real fig lHing val ue

was the bat tle..cr uise r Hood. II was pe rfectly clea r tbat the Ro yal Navy would he o utclassed if a new pro g ramme of co ns tructio n was no t ra pid ly au thorized , Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. the German Navy was no longer a ma jor naval power. no r wo uld it he w hile the te rms o f the treat y weft' in for ce . In an y imme d iate futur e d iscussions o n the world 's na vies, Ge rma ny would not even rate a mentio n . Japan . the domi nant po wer in Asia follo w ing its annihilatio n o f the Russian Fleet at Tsuxhima in 1905, was ho ping for a co ntinuatio n of its lon g alliance w ith Brita in - an associ ation that saw Japa n ac tively suppo rt Brita in as he r a lly in World ' x'ar I. At the same time , Japa n wa s hu ilding up its s hipbuildi ng fac ilities so that. as a ma jo r nav al po we r, it would he inde pende nt of ~lO y fo reig n assista nce in pro d uci ng warsh ips fo r thc Im perial j apa nese Navy. As ea rly as 1907. the Jap an ese Imper ial Defence Co uncil au thori zed an H-H Fleet Plan , w hich en visaged a fleet of e ight mode rn battleships and eight mode rn ba ttle cru ise rs in act ive se rvice at a ny o ne time . At th is stage. Japa n's s hipbuilding industry was no t ye t developed to build to those limits. By 19 12/ 13 that had cha nge d. a nd two Fuso Class battles hips we re laid do wn - the first true d re adnoug hts to he b uilt in Japa n . The se we re fo llowed by the two b e Class s hips in

19 15; in t917/t H hy two ships o f the Nagato Class - the first batt leshi ps to intro d uce th e 16inch (-'tOo-mill) g un ; a nd, be tween 1920 an d 19 21. hy six further to-inch gu nned battles hips of [he Kaga and Kii Classes . In add itio n to four 14-inch <355-l11 m) gu nne d buttlecruise rs o f the Ko ngo Class . the Japa nese a lso proposed to lay do wn two classes of four s hips e ac h d uring 19 20 a nd 19 22. The first four of these . the to-inch (4Gb-mm) gunne d Amagi Class . w e re laid

The fine lines of the Briti sh battlecruiser Hood are eviden t

as she leaves John Brown S shipyard on Clydeside in Janu ary 1920.

•

,.~~-

110 - p

7

TlUUIAT.T LES 11115

dow n as pla nned, The o the r unnamed class. referred to as the :-\0 15 CIa...s. was projected fo r construction in 1922 . The-e powe rfu l sh ips would han.' df... placed 17 5 00 tons and carrie d eight lx -inc h (iS7-mm) guns. The Imperial Japa nese :\';I\Y was planning one of the

11l0"'t

powerful lh:c(s in the world -

a n;I\';1I fo rce that wou ld enable it to pursue its future ambition... in th e Pacific. There \\"as no

doubt: Japan had se rio us expansionist plans in [h is region . The one powl'r thL')" feared might cha lle nge their dominance here was the CSA. \X'ilh her newl y acquired

posSL'~...ions

in the Phili ppines and growing interests in China. there

was no disguising thl." fact that the USA was seek ing strong territorial and political interests in The 16-inch gun proved to be one of the most potent weapons

IhL' Pacific. Aft er world \,\'ar I it had the second IargL'st hall ie fleet in IhL' world after Britain and . wi th its expand ing economy and enormous industria l base. the USA

W~IS

well on th e road to

ever developed for the battleship.

becoming the world 's most powerfu l nation , a major player in world affairs. Th is intent had

It reached its zeni th in the Mark 7

become patently obviou x hack in 1907. when Presid e nt Th eod ore I{O()SC\'elt L'ngagL'd in a flag-

16-inch 50- calibre turret gun ,

wa \'ing exercise hy sl'nding w h at became kn o w n

~IS

"l'hc

GrL'~1l

\X'hilL' Fleer ' on a

seen here being fired by the USS

fourteen -mon th worldwide cruise. The exe rcise of s h o w ing the llag at thl.' masthead of a

Missouri in the late 1980s.

powerfu l nava l force was a pointed gesture In war ds the Pacific. and japan in particular. The

u or dunq ] U! p .")JOOlU SI~.\\ d !l(S;1 lll1xl ;1tl.L · ;1,\ ;1 ! q.) I~ P!1l0 .) rlti!q tUoq p :p .)I~ U:q .\\ .u nus uourop 0 1 nptno u p e.up ;)! q l~J;1UOU l ;1 q l ;)SI1 O} U0 1SS!UU;)U p;)U!1~H P I:II IP q .1 I!l\' PU I~ '.).1!1s1UUV ;)tp .10 SUU;)I ;1111 .rapu n Srlll:IS p ;l11U n ;1111 01 Url,\!H Url.)q p I~ q 1'lf1}/..'<J!.~fJ:o.'O d ll!SrlIIHX\ tll :ll U .) ~) ;HI.I. '.) .)!A.I.) S .I!V ,(u u y Sf} ;1 LJIJO IP II·) I!I\, 1l-:.1;)U ') 9-J;)! PI~t'ip U ,{'I 1("6 1 ,{Jll ( U! ;1P I~lU Sl:,\\ :p m w Jp : ru d !lIs ') IIllXI ,' lll .1 0 '( l! l! q l~J ;) U l n,\ ;)tll P U I~ le!1u ;)jo d 1I0 !1I:1,\ e .10 u0!1 I:JISlIOlt l;)P t'iU!Is;.)J;)IU! .)UO ' s s.'"l P ll IJ.),\ ;.) ~ ·;).lIlIt:UI,)Jd p .).) PU! ;1.1.),\\ d!lI S;1IIIlX\ ,'q I .10 ,) S!UI.)P ;1111.10 s u o u.np.u d ';1HI:Is S!tll }I~ '.1;1.\ ;).\\ 0 11 ';11b 'S! Slill P"}IXp P ,{po q SU0!1.)I:.! dl 'l s" lIwq· !IUI: p un -OJd ';)JI:,PeA\ p:,\I:U onunj U! ,( eld 01 ;)IOJ 111'p;),\\ o d I: ;) ,\ l~q '( 1I 1~ I1 I U .) ,\ ;) P JllO,\\ osodmd ~) !J! ,).'"ld s S!11l JOJ p ,"1uH!S,"1 p s d tq s ' 1.l1-:.1,) .I!e ,"1!q J:1!I1S tfl!.\\ ' }la p ;),)S PIIl().) SIs!H,)ll:.lIS P·"1 11 IH!S.l I::1 'I.lI:.J,)J!1: .1.10 H U ! '( l~ ' I:,'S tu ;).1,"1,\\ J;)p JI:,) 1.I1-:.1,) J!I: ;1l(I.JO S" Jlll1:,' .! Il:!1U;)SS;) ;)t!I tl I1A\ s d !t ls ' I JI:/X\ p p QX\ .I0 p uc " 111

,{U ',(q q o l llO!ll:!AI: ;HIl UIOJ,I )j,wn e J;1pUll ;) tlll~,) P ;1l1 ;11111:'1 I: U! ;110.1 SI! p u e d lljS,'"l!lll:q ;lIp ' p.lIX>
SJ;:l,\\od Jl~'W U P l.l0,\\ JO!I:UI ;)tfl 'P;)JI:;)(.) p eq I JI:, X\ P p O,X\.10 ;»)j0 lUS ;)lll ,'"lJOp q ISOlU Il: o S ',d !tjs '")llu:q ISI:.I. '")!fl - d! lIs p: l ! <.k~).1 0 SSl:p ,\\ .")u u ;)IOU.")p 01

';u op q S;lP I:,);)P 0 .\\ 1 U;I;'KI p uq .l qrln Ou p e;)Jp , UU;)I ;)tp SI: 'p.udop c UOOS S l~, \\ UO!1dp ,)S,")p s ntt. 's d ltjS;1!111XI p ,-..,;:xIS-tjriltj ').)" J P u t ';1J;),\\ p a sockud SU1'lS ;1tll qHIlOlIlI': ;)S,")Ul:<.!J:f p u n ljS!1P H ;1lp ,(q p.")SIl I1!IS SI:.\\ ,J;)s!'lJ,).") IIn:q, uu .u ;)t jl 'U!lIS .l0 S;1ssep U;)."),\\ J:lq UO!PU!IS!P '") '11 .rntq J;)IPHlJ oJ. -r uo u r p UI: SIOU :>I o£ .10 ") I( I': d l~,) ,' J;).\\ SJ,")tj lO ;lUlI,\\ SI;),") lI ;11l11:q HU!IS1X;1.10 pJ I:ptU:lS Io tl~ - t' V I (

.'"l ill p .") U! I~PJ ;)ll IOS -pood s SI:,\\ lll ;)lll U.");l,\\ Pq U0!l.)U!1S!P ;111.1. -p .u n o u n u ,{1!.\ I:.")q p u n P;)llU1: '\ I!,\ I:.") q .'J.").\\ U!l:IPU p UI: v s n o q t ' tm da ]",(q p o sodo .rd s d !lIs 1':1!(!J:,") Je,\\ ls o d '.\\;)U ·'"l li l IIY -ru uunu rio r d 'nU1P1! IlQ S!lll o.vud du 0 1 lw q l J;lIIlO ;l.\!1I:UJ,")1I l: OU 111:11 U!1:tP H Wlp p.") lU;l.")S 11 ';11! l{;\\ T: Jo.l 1I1q ' l!tU!1 SI! 0 1 osm d :l!lqnd ;)lj l UWJ p P I')O,\\ s d !tjs ,'S.'lp .10 ISC),) ;)If,L -s un x ( lll lll -L~ f;') q ,) Ul-HI a utu rl u !,{JJ e,) s dl q s ,"1 llw q ,£ N, u O I - OO ~ ' H t' JIl0.l ,{q ("(6 1 U! P,"),\\ OIl0.l ,")q OJ

.'"lJ;).\\ >£ 9 , ."''HIJ. ' I Z6 1 U! ;))1:1 P;)J;)p.lO PUl~ P,")uH1S;)P ;l.l,',\\ , s\-· ~) , ;)111 SI: " IUO U,\\ou :-j SJ.")S!I1J.)·")lllIXj p;l utmH (1ll1ll-90 r) tP Ul-9 1 .wa u J I10:1 'A,\ I:N I':,{O}I ;Hp .10 ':U Ul:ti! tll OP l' :q ol H HUlI1 U!1UO,) .'"l tll ,").I11SU,"1 01

).') ,")U

J !;)tll os tu.ropoiu 0 1 U;l ,")~ ;lJ.'"l.\\ ' ScJ!lIS;1 [lu: q tWUlJ,' Q Isu p:je pot.m puo.i

SIS,' I unuj p ue ;),)U.") P;l UX;) JI:,\\ IUOJ.I p;1.l;)llleH mup .10 tll p:;).\\ e 01 Ss;),u e qI !,\\ ' q s !I!JU -ul.L -urntaq l,"1,"1 l1 ;)1l1l:q A\;) U ;ltj l .l0 :>Ill1q ;)lfI .10 1I0 !P IlJISUO,) U:ljI SO("6 I ,( p i:,") .'"l li l J.") I.lI: 1!IUIl mu SI:,\\ I! p un 'Je.\\ ;)q l xuunp u .wo p P ll:J SI:,\\ 'p llIJ/, LW/r 'd !IIS;)I1 I1:q ;)UO '\ IUa ' ;) l lIl U l~J Hc )j d Hu !p l!llqd lljS-I':I!<'!l:.) Sl! pu .x ls ns 01 s n ;)tll P '-"',) Jo.l ';ld o Jll:-I ptll: UP:tPH 01 S;)!1cJd llS JI:.\\ ,\.U1:,) 0 1 SI,)SS,"1.\ Itll:q ,).I,"1 lll .10 P ·") lI ISI:.\ 1:.1° j u!p l!n q ;It!1 sn jd 'S!t!.L ',{JeSS;l,).")U '( P ll:1P.") ltlt ll! s e,\\ SI.'SS,' ,\ ouunuq ns-nuc .1 0 uo u .u uxu d SSI:tU ,")l p ' teo q-n ;HIl Is u p:He JI:,\\ ;) ri l~ .\\ 0 .1 'Sp JI:,{d !q s Sll pU l: ,\.\l :U s.uon ru ,'"l Ip UO S,'! IPO PU .\\ ,")U P,' ,).I0.l

P'" ! L I6 1 IPUV u t I Jl:,X\ PpOi),,\ ol ul .\J lll.") ,S,' H:lS p .") I!UO -u l.L ';l(.1.{1 S!'I l .l0 s d !'Is qS!lP H .( p I:,") ,'"llj I SI:

p,-'UIlOlllJl: A F'P~;).\\ S I~ j U!;)q StI(»rl lqX;:rr ;)t{l 'SJ;lSlllJ.1.'"lPu:q '") L!I .l0 I<.b,)uo,) p tWlIllr...u d ,")111 OJ j UIlP .t\l~N sn ,'"lt jl '.\ ISllO!Jll J 'SI( 11 )j ~ ' f f .10

p.vuls e .10 ;)lql:(1I:.") pun s u n 'n ( llilt l-<Jm,) tP U!-<J 1 Iqj!.")

HU!lllnOlli s d !'Is t'iU!l'l j !.I1I1JJ" ,\\ od ;)J;),\\ s UOljU!X;)'r ;)II.L 'HI6 I U! P,")).I I:IS HU1P l!llq :S.I,"1S1Il.l,) .")p wq sS I:IJ UOIrlU1X,TI X!S p Ul: s cJ!q S;)ll l1:q SS I~ IJ l:)0:-jI:C1 lIl1lo S X!S .10 UO!I,)l1.1 ISLH U ,")q l p .umh,u S!tLL '<J 16 1 ISl1j ll V ti l ss;u Hu o J ,{q p,"),\o.ldde se,\\ q ,) !l!,\\ ' u o !1!s o d OJd S!11l p ,") ).Io ddll S u o s l!/\'\ ,\\ OJp o o, ),,\ lU;)P!S;1JcI ';)UOU 01 PUO,),")S I;).") lI I: Jo.l SS,'"l.ld 0 1 Ul:H.")q S.lOW.lIS!U!UlP I: p:.\ I:ll SO pm: p ;1Hlll:tp p l:q 1I0 !ld lUIlSSI: W'l l 'J.").\ ;l.\\o q ' ~ 1 6 1 AU ';l lq !ss m h u! se,\\ .\.\ I:N p:.{O}! " '11 p:,\P 0 1 P '")lI I: Hu!p l!l1q )l:tll p ,)ld;),),)I: SI:.\\ I! IS.lU 11: q HIlOlP I': 'J;)tj l!,") ,\lu .'"l u ,'"l 1':!IU,"1 lo d I: SI: 1110 p .")[lU Io U ,' .1;) .\ \

q S!I!JH ;)II.L ',\.\l: U lll:ltl J;l 9 ;It!1 .10 tll ,\\OJj ;}tll pll1: ,( lI1: lU J ;) ~) .10 IU;ltudol'")'\ '")P J1:!J1S11PU !

.'"l lfl Sl:.\\ I Je/X\ P p OA\ 0 1 Jop d S U1~,) P;) lUV ,')111 JOJ UO!).)P.1 ,").II1 I1l.l .10 ,"),)J llOS ,"1 I(l!ssod J·"1 lflOUV ' t' I 6 1 1I! Hu!dd !qs JOJ p ,")lI,")do ' Jl:UI:J l:u n: tWd ,'"ltp .l0 HU1P I!llq ,'"l Ip U;):-jI:).I;) P UIl Os p: pet! v s n ;1lj l 'SISeo,) :l!JPl:c1 pm: .) !1u q IV SI! .1 0 U0!l eJI:<.bs P : ') ! '1 (" ~J H o .")H .")tll ,' lUO,1J;),\O 0 1 p llV ' l:.")Je ISI:,\ S!q l tq S,) !)!,\ !).)I: PUl~

Jl~ , \I:U

UP:ISllS o J ,) U!,Wd ,"1tll Ul SUO!1I:IS t'itq p:o ,)

s,")sl:q P '") lI Jo.l p ,"),")u ,'"l ill P " 1I~J1 SlI m ll ,") p 11 :,' SOd Jlld ,) !H,'"l1l:.IIS J,")t jlOt ll: p ,").\J.")s OSII: ,")s!n J,")

~

111 -"-

~

-w'11'lII.

_ ...

T

'

Sd Ill S] 1I.I.\'lnUVWT:nrr' rTU -

•

112 -

Ia..#..t; n

THE H A I TI E S U I PS

,tM,...

TIJLLllLrrWillUlAJ:Il.ESlliJ'.S~

-"'_ lis.r.

TilE I n TI MATE HATT I ES ll lPS

Roads and a series o f bombing ru ns were made . The o ld b.utle shtp wa s e ve ntua lly sun k, hut .\Iilche ll's de mo nstrat ion had p ro ved little: Ostfriesla nd w as an easy targ et - an o ld ship

USS New Mexico. armed with

dead in the wa te r. un ah ie to de fe nd he rsel f o r ca rry o ut damage-co ntrol ac-tivities. Mitchell . though . had ra ised awa ren ess o f a form of atta ck which. two decades late r. wo uld sweep a ll

turrets. nego tiating the Panama

twelve 14-inch guns in triple Canalin 1915.

before u,

The postwa r building programmes proposed by the majo r world naval powers amo unte d

10

yet an othe r nav a l race on a massive sca le. Iro nically. eac h o f th ese co untries a lso had good

rea so ns fo r w ish ing to aba ndon the ir pro gram me s. not le ast o f which w as fina ncial. when the US Secreta ry o f Slate. Cha rles Evans Hugh es. s ugge ste d a co nference 10 d iscuss a me ans w he re by the world co uld he made a safe r p lace hy limiting nava l armame nts. he me l wi th sponta neo us internation a l app roval. Delegates fro m Britain . Japan. Italy and Fra nce atte nd ed the Co nference on the Limitatio n o f Armamen t, wh ich hegan in Washington o n 12 Novembe r 1921. a nd lasted until 6 Febru ary 1922. As the co nfe re nce a lso wish ed to add re ss issu es re le vant 10 the Pacific and Fa r East. de legat e s from China , the Ne the rla nds . Bel gium and Portuga l were in attenda nce . 'The 'xuslungton Confe rence.... as it be came kn own. was o pe ned hy US Pres ident I la rd ing . li e: e xpressed the hope that so me u nderstand ing co uld he reached lead ing to 'less pre para tion for wa r and mor e e n joyme nt of fortunate peace '. Th e main thru st o f the proposals discussed at the conference co nce rned the naval might of Britain . the United Slates and Japan . The United Stales offered to ca ncel and scra p nine of the ten hattleships and all six o f the baul ccruisc rs they were currently bui lding. Add itio na lly. all o lde r bat tle shi ps up to h ut nor incl ud ing the Delawa re Class would a lso he sc ra pped. Unde r this proposal . Britain would ca ncel the fo ur G.3 baulecru isers and older battlesh ips up to bu t not incluJ ing the King Geo rge V Class. japan woul d cancel the fo ur 'No 13' Class b.utlecruise rs and the four Kii Class battleships. scra p bot h Kaga Class battleships. the fou r Amagi Class bunlecruiscrs and the co mple ted stiusu. A fu rthe r te n battleships. up to b ut not includ ing the Sctts u CIaS!'i. wo uld also he scra ppe d . Th e plan ca lled fo r the scra pping o f a tota l o f sixty-six ca pita l ships alread y in existence o r under co nstruction. The te rms of this remarkable agree men t we re passed . Brita in se nt twe nty-two 12- and 13.; -inch <305- a nd 343·mm) gu nne d dreadnoughts 10 the break ers' ya rd. The Unite d States and Japan despatched o nly fo ur eac h. Britain the n retained twen ty-two capita l sh ips . the United States eighteen and Japan te n . The follo w ing addit ional po ints we re ag reed under the \'I?a!'i hingro n Treaty: •

Co nstructio n o r ne w battleships wa s proh ibited for a period o f te n yea rs.

A sketch of one of the aborted

• •

Tonnage was limited to 35.000 to ns. Main arma me nt was to he no grea ter tha n l ti-inch (406-mm) g uns.

prepared prior to the Washington

• •

Ships had to be twenty years o ld be fore bei ng rep lace d . Replacement to nnage was to be re stricted to 500.000 tons fo r both Brita in and th e USA: .300.000 tons fo r Japan; a nd 175.000 tons ea ch fo r France and Ita ly.

t

British baNleship designs Conference. This 48.000-ton ship designated 'M2 ' would have mounted eight 18-inch guns.

113

".Lr •

114 ' •

7

T ilE H A T TI ES lJ lpS

After hard nego tiat io n. the Un ited States was pe rm itted to keep thre e o ut of the fo u r Co lora d o Class , w h ile the incomplete vcasb tngton was ex pe nd ed as a target in 192,1 . Th e British were

allowed to build two new 16-inch (40 6-1111n) g unned, 35,OOO-to n battles hips. w hich beca me Nelson a nd Rodney. an d j apa n wa s permitted to retain .Uti/SII . The hull s of two Le xingto n Class baul ecru ise rs were completed as the ca rrie rs Lexington a nd Sa ra l0J..:lI; and Japan co m ple ted the

battleship K{/J.!.{1 and the bau lcc nuscr A ka!!.i as ca rriers. Th e \Vas hi ngl on Tre aty h ad ac hi e ved a remark ab le re du cti o n in c x ixtin g an d p ropo sed b.utlcshi ps. largel y at the ex pense o f British se a-power. At th e stro ke o f a pen. the Un ited States Navy h ad gained pa rity w ith the Ro ya l Navy , The Tw o Po wer Sta ndard b y which the Ro yal Navy ha d be e n p re viously mai nta ined was go ne fo r e ve r. \X!hile ther e is little d o u bt th at th e tre aty w as s uccess fu l in pr e ve nt in g an a rms race of w ild p ropo rtio ns . it stra ine d rela tio ns .betwee n Britain and Japa n, Restrictin gjapan to th ree -fifths o f the to n nage tha t both Britain and the USA were a llowed . raised se rio us J apa ne se s usp icio ns o f co llusio n be twee n tho se

1\\' 0

co u ntries. The Ang lo-ja pa nese Alliance o f 1902 had se rve d the British well d u ring \X'orld \Var

The Japanese bettlectuiser Kongo, in dry -dock showing the

'bulged ' portions of her hull.

I. h ut wa s term ina te d un d er America n p ressure as a cond itio n o f th e treaty. Incrcas ing ly. the British ca me to the view al rea d y held hy the Un ited State s th at j apa n's u ltimate im perial a im wou ld he a so u rce o f future conflict . The terms o f th e \Vas hingto n Treat y. a nd the po litics behind these te rms. were ce rta inly see n in a d iffe re nt ligh t hy e ach o f th e key nations affected , Pro fe sso r Kiyo shi Ikeda loo ks at the situatio n from a Japan ese pe rspective :

"

, '.

,

, I

"

IIiC.I. . . .·=n__

IlIL1Llll..IJIUAIlLIiATI:Ll:.sJilll'S. TilE II I T I I\IATE H AT TI ES I III'5

"I'lu - Arm y assumed that th e na tura l po tc nualcn cm y wou ld he Russia . h ut for the Navy.

it w as America. Thc.:y ch o se: these enem ies

\0

gai n fun ds from the nation al b udget. h u t

in reality . rela tio ns were q u ite w arm betwe en A merica and Jap an. So on pa per. A merica

w as till:

l ' !1L' Il1 Y .

h u t in th e h ea rts o f o rd in a ry Ja p a n es e it w as Engla nd th at w as

co ntro lling Ame rica - so England wa s the real ene my. Th e 5:5:.-\ ration ag reement. w h ich m o s t th in k wa s Ame ric-a's id e a . w as to p u t p re ss u re o n japan . Of cou rse those

rcxtrk't io ns fuelled res ent ment a nd sp ur red o n rig hi-w ing na tio na lism in Japan : Fello w JI( XItl L'Sl' histo rian Hatsuh u Naito ad ds: ' In o rd er to re st rict j a panx na val po w er. th e America ns s po ns o red rhc

\Xra ~h i ng t o n

Agl"L'L'mL'nt in pa rtn e rship w ith Britain. At th e time 40 pe r ce n t o f the nat ion al bu dget went to the na\'y, wh ich ke pi Japa n o n th e b rin k o f ban kru ptcy, Thi s had so me heari ng o n the JqxlIll':.:e go ve rn me nt ac tually ag reeing

10

th e Wash ingto n Treaty, Th e d ecision

pe rha ps saved Ja pan from ban kruptcy and helped the eco no my a lo ng . Although thc govern me nt wa s p leased , th o se in the military were an gry as they saw it as a not her s ig n of d omi nation hy Ame rica o fja pa nes e affairs, a nd a sig n o f weakness as wel l. Fro m th is poi nt o f vie w Ame ric-a was vie wed as a po tcntial c nc mv. ' " lark l'cattic. Senior Research Fellow in the Hoove r Institutio n o n \X'a r at Stamfo rd University . gi \'cs a s lig htly di ffe re nt perspect ive to the Japa nese re actio n , a nd their s ituatio n fo llo wi ng the signi ng o f th e treat y: 'Yes. it's true that ov e ra ll Brit ain and the Un ited States we re able

10

ma inta in a ca p ita l-

s h ip IlL'L,t larger than that o r Ja pan , hut in ret ur n fo r this - a nd I think th is re all y wa s

wh at hroug ht th e se n ior ja panese d e legate aro und

10

agr(,;'ei ng to the

t r(,;'~I1 Y

- Britain an d

the United States wou ld agree no t to stre ngthe n or o the rw ise augmen t thei r na val powe r in till.' we:.:t Pacific a nd cax t Asia n wat e rs . Specifica lly, th e Un ite d Sta tes Navy wo u ld ag ree no r to fo rtify G uam , no t to fo rtify or o th e rwi se stre ng the n their naval hase s in t\lan ib Bay, and the British agreed no t to fu rther their naval facilities at Singapo re , 'So w hat the treaty d id was to work pl ace d in

:1

O UI

a s ituatio n wh e re ove rall th e Ja lxlIlese were

po s itio n o f capital-xhi p infer io rit y, hu t in th e wes tern Paci fic a nd in its

ow n home wa te rs, in its home te rritory. Japan wa s nu mber one , And so much

G ill

he

mad e abo ut the Ja pan ese resent me nt and fu ry at th e tenus o f the Wash ing to n Nava l 'rrc .u y. wh at's so me times fo rgotte n is till' o ut rage d d en u nciat io ns o f th e tre a ty h y foremos t na va l advocates here in the Un ited States,

\ V11O

a lso d idn 't like the p ro vis ions

wh ich mad e Japan pract ically, it see med. apparent ly u nassa ilable in the west Pacific ,' Norma n Prtcdman . US na va l hi s to ria n a n d d e fe nce a nal yst, a ls o comme nt s from a US pcrsp cct ivc : 'At th e lime I th ink tha t the Japan ese th o ug hI th ey had gOI a fai rly go od de al. because no Lo n ly were Lhe y limiting themselves. the y we re also lim iting tb osc who m ight attack the m. So iI's h y no means d ea r th at the bargain at \X'a s hington was a very bad o ne fo r the m. II limited thei r proble m , Th e o the r thing wa s tha i, in retrospect. o nce we sig ne d the Treaty. w e th ou gh t tha t th e se cu rity pr o ble m in th e Pacifi c wa s so lved , So that after \Vas h ing ton we d id n 't bu ild a lo t. The Ja pan ese built absolu tel y lip to w hat the y co u ld ha n' so th e ratio bet we e n the ir fl ee t a nd o urs wa s m uc h g re ate r tha n the 5:5 ih.u th ey We re allo wed by treat y,'

115

F BA T T I F S I III!S

TIle treaty may well have pro vided the wo rld with ano ther bo nus a part from limiting the build ing o f battle shi ps. as Dr Eric Grove , naval strategiSl at Hull University, ex plains : "The 'x'aslungton Tre aty was q uite a n epochal event. The Britis h, fo r the first lime in ce nturies. acce pted the pri nciple of nava l pa rity - at least bau leship parity. \'('e continued insist. fo r a w hile ~11 least. that w e had supe rio rity in c ruisers to pro te ct o ur trade,

10

because as the e m pire, a ma ritime em p ire..•. we had mo re trad e to protect . we had mor e shipping to p ro tect. But as far as batt le ships were conce rn ed . pa rity w ith the United States. a nd a ra tio of re lative safety w ith the j a pan e se . was acceptable , And so therefore \Vas hington ca ps th is a rms race . a n arms ra ce w hic h if it had n't bee n ca ppe d could have had some q uite se rious e ffec ts . It's o fte n sai d , as a cr iticism o f \X'as hi ng to n . that \Vash ing to n d id n't prevent Pea rl Har bo r, \'('as hington d id n't pre vent 'x'or ld \Var II. w ell. o f co u rse it d id n't, b ut it perhap s pre ve nted the g rea t Anglo-American wa r o f 192H!' Altho ug h pro vid ing an effec tive brak e o n the constructio n o f ne w ba ttles hips, the 'cc asbingrc n Treat y allowed for ex isting ba nles ht ps a nd ba n lc cr uise rs to he mo dern ized . Th is wa s Specifically Intended to a llow im p ro vements to pro te ct ive xystc ms a ga inst a ir an d u nd e rw ater a tta ck. Up to 3000 to ns ad dition a l to the treaty limits we re permitted fo r th is purpose . Ot he r a re as where im p ro veme nt s co u ld he made include d: ne w machine ry for greate r e co nomy a nd high e r s pe e ds; imp ro ve d de ck prote ct io n agai ns t a ircr a ft att ac k; ne w seco nda ry ar ma ment able to o pe rate aga inst aircraft as we ll :IS aga inst su rface sh ips ; ne w comma nd a nd contro l syste ms re qu iri ng e n ha nced or e ntire ly ne w br idge work. a nd the introduction of a ircraft-hand ling a rrange me nts. wit h the tre aty ru les in pla ce , th e 192 0s a nd jOs sa w th e worl d 's na vies all ca rrying o ut large -sca le modifications o f the cap ita l ships in thei r flee ts. With the exce p tio n o f the ne w . Rod ney an d Nelson , the d re ad noug hts in the Britis h hattie fleet pre-d ated the Jut land wate rshe d of t\lay 19 16. Durin g the 1920s the Q uee n Elizabeth, Rev e nge an d Reno wn Classes w ere mo dern ized to va ry ing deg re es by the additio n o f ne w bridges, an d the fitting o f antitorpe do bulges. ad d itio na l a rmour and new a nti-a ircraft g uns . O nly Hood re ma ine d virtua lly un a ltered . By the fo llo wi ng decad e . a mor e fundamental mod erni zatio n W;IS requi red and It''t-l rspi/e, va liant. Qu een Eliza lJetb and Reno trn wen..' selected fo r co mp le te re b ui ldi ng . This invo lve d di s ma ntli ng the s up e rstruc tu re d ow n to the le ve l o f the u p per de cks a nd n..-mo ving the boilers a nd turbine s. \X!eigh t was saved hy the ins ta llatio n o f lig ht e r, mo re efficie nt boilers a nd geared turb ines. 111e ma in a nuam e m turrets were modified to increa se the e leva tio n o f the g u ns from 20 to 30 degr e e s. exte nd ing th e max imu m ra nge fro m 2.3.400 to 29 ,000 ya rds (2 1,400 to 20.500 me tres ) and . w ith the ne w l S-inch (3RI-mm) projectiles . to 3 2.000 ya rd s (29,260 me tres). The o ld tripod masts w ith masth ead controls wa s re pla ce d w ith a hrid ge acco mmoda ting

LE£IllJ~

T ilE I II T IMAIEJlAII I ES II I PS

--''''IIIi-'' -- ':''' '1Ii'--"__ _ •

_

1IIIIf'.. 117

new gu nnery di rect ors a nd improved fire contro l gear. and thick...-r deck armour wa s filled over ma ch ine ry space s. Aircraft arrangeme nts included an athwa rtxhips (a cross the d eck ) catap ult. ha nd ling cra nes and a han gar located behi nd the funne l. New lugb -an glc -i-inch 0 00-n1l11 ) tw in turrets a nd muh iple -bar n-lh-d 'r o m-r o m " anti-aircraft gu ns were also fitted. Apart fro m rcpl .n-ing her 55-inch ( 14D-mm) seconda ry armament w ith -l-inch ( l 00-mm ) tw in

Renown, a veteran of World War I.

mounts, the most p restig iolls ship in the Brit ish fleet . HOOtl. recei ved n : ry few modifications

underwent a number of

th roughou t IH:r li fe.

modificat ions follo wing the

The S:II11e gener:.11 patt ern applied to the modernizat ion of tilt..' US ba u le fleet. TIle six s hips of the Florida. \X/r o ming and New Yor k CIas."iCS were given a nti-torpedo hulgcs and conve rted

Washington Treaty. and survived

to oil-burning . The seven ships o f the Nevada . Pe nnsylva nia a nd New Mexico Classes we re re-

fighting ship in the Royal Navy's

boilcred and. in some cases, fitted w ith new e ngines. Additio nal armo ur was ad ded to the decks

fleet during World War II.

to take her place as a powerful

a nd elevatio n of the main arma ment increased. The two Tennessee and th ree Co lorado Class ba rtlcxhips were the mo st modern units in the US flee t at the time , a nd weft.' no t mod ified until

th e first o f the new battleships under construct ion during \X'orld

\X '~lr

II were co m pleted.

The Japanese Na\T ·."i four Kongo Class lxutlccru isers had new boi lers fitted that cou ld be fired with

~I

mixtu re o f o il and coa l. They were fitted with prot ective hulges. g iven increased

elevation to th eir main armament , and had abou t 4000 tons o f e xtra armour ad d e d to their

decks. As

~I

conseq ue nc e , they were reclassified as battle ships. Funnels were reduced from

thr ee to tw o. a nd new p latforms ad ded to th e main mas t. In the m id to late 1930s. these sh ips were again modernized. this time hy inst alling co m pletel y new ma chinery which ra ised their speed from 26 to 30 kn ots. Their hulls were le ngthe ned and an a ircra ft cata pu lt fitted . 111e fo ur sh ips o f the Fuso a nd Isc Classes had minor rebu ilds

(0

th eir fo re masts du ring thl' 1920s. hut

unde rwent more fundamental modifica tion during the 1930 s. Th e ships wert.' lengthen ed . recngincd a n d re -boil crcd. main armamen t el evation w as In crea sed a s in

A."o ,,~ o.

new

superstructure fined. includ ing the distinctive 'pagoda' tower. hori zontal a nd verti cal armour The handsome French

co nsid e rably e n ha nc ed. and ne w anti-ai rcraft guns a nd aircraft a rra ng e me nt s fitted o n the

battleship Str asbourg. Her main

q uarter-deck . XaRalo and .llnlslI were modernized a long similar lines to the other ships d urin g

armament of eight 13 -inch guns

th e mid-1950s. Th e \X'a shin gton Trea ty had stip u late d th at no ne w baul cshtps co u ld he laid down u nt il

was concentrated forward in two quadruple turrets.

November 193 1. w h ile the treat y itsel f wou ld run unt il the end of 1936 , The 1920s

S1<)(x!

out as

a pe rio d w he n th e w o rld 's naval au tho rities a nd th eir governme nts ap peared dedicated to e nsur ing th at th e ca rn age o f 191'1-I H wo u ld neve r h e ~

repea ted. The wash ington Tre aty, althoug h a major facto r in th is a rms lim itatio n ag reemen t. was on ly o ne elemen t in th e e ffo rt for g lo h a l pe ace . Po tentially more significa nt th a n the treat y was the League of Nat io ns , est ablished in 19 19. It was set u p a s a n o rga n iza tion to se ttle int e rna tiona l d isp utes by negotiation. Any decisions the Leagu e o f Nat io ns made we re to lx- ha cked h y co llective ec o nomic sanctio ns and. if all else failed . collect ive milita ry act ion against the aggressor nation. The

W'a sh i n ~ton

Trea ty sat comfortably within

the ideals of th e League o f Na tion s and. long befo re the terms o f the treaty were due to expire , a second disa rmament co nfe re nce w as hel d in

Geneva, in june 1927, It proved to be a spectacular failu re " France and Ital y did not a tte n d , and (he Britis h and Americans remained deadlocked o ve r the iss ue of h e avy cruisers. Britis h atte m p ts to furt her restrict the size o f lxutlcsh ips and their main arma ment

(0

2H,500 Io ns and I.t 5-inch CH3-m ml

g uns fe ll o n dea f ea rs a n d . o ve ra ll, litt le o f

~lI1 Y

co nseq ue nce was decided abo ut the fut u re of the lxrttle xhip .

A th ird naval conferen ce held in London in 1930 wa s mar red hy d isagreeme nt between Fra nce and Ital y. a n d their d el e g at e s w ith d rew. Th e Uni ted States, Britain a nd Ja pan rea ch ed agre e men t o n a numbe r o f po ints affe cting ca p ita l s h ips , the main

_lim_'~'~

IlI:LliLll:lLl.TIUlAITI..E5HJl'5 T ilE t Il TH. AT E B A T TI ES H I PS

OI1(:S

hei ng: the ha lt in b.uth -xhip co ns tr uc tion was

..

10

- 119

he

exte nded u ntil the e nd o f 19.1(); a nd ca pital s hips were to he furth e r re du ced to a to ta l o f fifteen e ach for Britai n and th e United Stah..'S. and nin e for japan . II w as abo agreed that a furthe r conference s ho uld he he ld in Lond o n in 195 5. The d e cisio ns o f this first Lond on confe rence ha d

~ 1Il

immediate effect on the battle flee ts o f a ll

th ree coun tries .

The

British scrapped Ben /mil '. Em/Jeror of i ndia, a nd 'I'i).!,e r, and converte d jel licoes flags hip at

. \I{/ ,.IIJo ro li~ b

jurkmd . IrOI1 J)uke, int o a tra in in g s hi p . Th e US scra p ped Florida . and convened Ulab into a ta rget s hip a nd W)'o m ifl~ into ~I training sh ip. The japan ese converted Htet into a train ing s hip. In the late r ycars o f the 1920s. the world was mo ving head lon g into a recession that eve ntually led to the \,'all Street Crash in 1929. Econ om ic hards hip. w ith 50 mil lio n un emplo yed in the ind ustrialized natio ns. w as a major con trih ut ing fac to r in the rise o f milita rism in Europe a nd Japan . In Ihl' ea rly 1950s the internation a l pol itica l situa tion began 10 d eteriorate at a rap id rate . Th e invasi o n of Manchu ria hy Japan in Se ptem be r 1951. the accessio n to powc r o f Hitle r's Na tion a l So cialists in Ge rmany in Jan ua ry I9.3 .~ - w ith th e a vo wed int en tio n o f re p udiati ng the Trea ty o f Versailles - an d the Ita lian war aga inst Abyssinia in 19.15 hega n the slow hut su re bu ild-u p of w o rld te nsio n tha t would even tually lend to the most ho rrific wa r in g lo h~l l

history. In 19 2Y Germa ny d eci d ed to hegi n co ns truc tio n of a rad icall y des ig ned w a rsh ip that w o uld test the lim its o f the lO,OOO-to n ma ximum the y we re allo wed unde r the terms o f the

Treaty of Versa illes. This raised co ncerns amo ng the ir fo rme r e ne mies, parti cularly the British

The 11-inch gunned baNieship

and French . Th e sh ip. Deutscbknul. was the first o f three cle ve rly d esign ed cru ise r... moun ting six I l-inch ( 2HO- m m) gu ns on a ligh tly p ro tect ed hull. ." Iost significa ntly, s he was fitted with fuel-efficie nt dicscl e ngi nex gh'il1g a maximum speed of 2H kn o ts a nd :I cruising range in ex cess

Scharnhorst unde r construction

o f 9000 mil es. Dentscbland w as the ide a l mer chant ra ide r - a high -spee d figh ting ship that co uld out ru n ;lny me rchant sh ip. and wh ose he avy guns cou ld s in k them wi th ea se. Th e Ge rmans refer red to this class as 'armo ure d s hips ' t Pcn trerscbtffe), Becau se of thei r relativel y sma ll size: and heavy g u ns. the:y became popularl y known as 'poc ke t b.utleslups'. Th e Fre nc h responded, as they were free to do u nder the \'('ashington Treaty. h y h uild ing two fas t bat tleships. /)unAx'rqu e a nd Sl rus ho lf r~. mou nt ing e ig ht 15-inch <3.30- m m) gu ns in two fo rward- mou n te d qua d rupl e tur re ts. These new French s hips add ed to th e stra ine d rel atio ns be tween France a nd Ita ly o ver red uced bat tleship n umbe rs ag re ed ~ H the Londo n Nava l Co nference in 19.30. Thi s prompted the Italia ns to proceed w ith the rebu ild ing o f thei r o ld ba nles lu ps Co n te de Cm -on r a nd Gi u lio Cesa re in 1955. a nd 10 aut ho rize tw o new bat tles hips . Iiunrio and vtuorto \ '('1/('10. in 19.1·1. In the su m me r o f 1935. Ge rma ny laid down two lxutl cxhipx. Scbarnbo rst a nd Gnoise nan. named after thei r \,('orld \X'a r 1 p redece sso rs. Th is was the: new Natio na l So cia list Ge rma ny's re ply to Du nleerqu e and Stras bourg . Mea nwhile. lhe Fre nc h a utho rized two .15,000-1011 battlesh ips . Rtcbetieu and .!NIIl Bart, wi th eigh t 15inch <jHI-lllm) g uns.

at Wilhelmshaven Dockyard in

1937. Scharnhorst and her sistership Gneisenau grea tly exceed their stated tonnage.

•

~ ~ r- _

120

.::~-" :tInlll""' .'_rL

xua.aarraasuias TH E BATT I E S H I P S

As the se eve nts u nfo ld ed in Eu rope. the Britis h w at ch e d un ea sily. Th e y we re p rev e nt ed hy the \X'as hi ngt o!l Treat y fro m mak ing an y res po nse u nt il the e nd o f

USS IOWA DIMENSIONS,

DISPLACEMENT,

MACHINERY,

SPEED, ARMAMENT,

PROrEcTION,

1956 . In Mar ch 1935 Ad o lf H il ler. no w Ch ance llo r o f Ge rmany. had to rn li p the 887fT 31N ¥ 108fT 2IN ¥ 36fT 2IN (270.'. ¥ 33 ¥ II M) ~8 , 110 TONS SfANDARD, S7,S~ O TONS FULL

LOAD GEARED ST£AM TURBINES, 212,000 SHP 32S KNOTS 9 ¥ 16- lN (~06-MM> GUNS IN 3 TRIPLE TURRETS; 20 ¥ S-IN (127 -MM); 80 ¥ ~O­ MM; ~9 ¥ 20-MM BELT 12.1IN 007 MM) ; BULKHEADS 1I.3JN (287MM>, BARBETT£S 11.6 TO 17.3IN (29S TO 339MM); TURRETS 19.7IN CSOOMM); DECKS 7SIN ( 190 .SMM) 1921 ( APPRO¥.>

Treaty of Versailles. e na bling h im to th u mb his no se at the:world and h uild whatever

he wanted . Th e British moved quickl y to co nta in Ihis new th reat of Ge rman naval ex pa ns io n hy signing the Anglo -Ge rm a n Nava l Trea ty o fj un e 1935. Thi s limi ted Ge rma ny to a navy 35 pe r cent the s ize o f th e Ro yal Navy. The cavea t was that any batt les h ip!" the Ge rm ans chose to b u ild s ho u ld co nfo rm to the w ash ing to n Trea ty limi ts of 35,000 to ns a nd lo-inch (406·m m) gu ns. Th e french we re fu rio us wi th the Britis h fo r s ig n ing th is agree ment w itho ut a ny re fe re n ce w h atsoever to (hem, Fro m 1934 o nwa rd s, th e Ge rma ns ha d sta rted d raw ing u p plan s fo r two fu rther batt le s h ips. In itially the y ag re ed to stay w ith in the 3S.000-to n lim it b ut b y 19 36. the yea r th ey we re laid d o w n. th is had grow n 10 over 4 1.000 to ns . The resu lts we re Bismarck a n d Ti rp itz . In fac t. a ll the ne w Ge rma n s h ips fro m Deuts chla nd to Ti11Ji/z w e re cons iderab ly in ex cess of sta ted o r tre aty lim its , The y were no t the o n ly n atio n s tretc h in g in te r na tio na l li m ita tio ns . Th e s a me app lied to the ne w ltal inn battleships. wh ich ha d been q ui etly d e sign ed to be over 40.000 to ns e ach. In De cembe r 193 5. in the m id st o f a ll this s h ipb u ildi ng acti vity be ing ca rried o ut wit h total di s rega rd fo r intern ationa l lim itatio ns, th e fo urth nava l co nfe re nc e began in Lo ndon. Th e d e leg ates ag reed that there wo uld be no lim it to th e nu mbe r o f sh ips to be b u ilt but th at th e y wo u ld a ll be lim ite d in s ize to 35,000 to ns a nd 14-inch (3 55-mm) gu ns , Th e Ja pa nese re fused to s ig n th is new treat y. " la rk Pcani c co m me nts:

'T h e tre a ty is d e n o u n ce d h y J a pa n . w ho say tha t th e y wil l no longe r be part o f it. In d e e d , th e Ja pa n e se d e legatio n le d by Ad m ira l Ya m ato w a lks o ut and th at. for a ll int e nt s and purpo se s . is th e e n d o f th e n ava l tr e a ty syste m , Of co u rse, by d o ing so , h y e m ba rk ing o n the ro ad to un fe ttered n aval cons truct io n . J a pa n had le t itsel f in fo r the k in d o f na va l ra ce w hich it co u ld not w in . Th e J a panese s im p ly refuse d to co m e to g rips w ith th e fact th a t th e Am e rica ns co u ld ult im atel y o ut b uil d th e m .' Afte r the w a lk-o ut h y the Ja pan e se d e leg ates. the confere nce ag reed that if Japan di d no t sign hy Ap ril 1937. the g un ca lib re allo wed und e r tre aty condi tio ns wou ld reve rt to the 16-inch (406-mm) gun o rigina lly stip u lated at wash ingto n. The Ja pa nese had no in te ntio n o f s ign ing a ny treaties from th is time onward . In fact. in 1934 they ha d sta ll ed d es ig n wo rk on w hat wo uld become the largest battleshi ps eve r b u ilt, w ith a stand a rd displacement of 61.000 to ns . Th e fo llo wi ng sequence o f events is imp ort ant in ex p lain ing why the Bi tish subsequent ly b u ilt battlesh ips w ith H -inch 1 6 ~i n c h

(3'5 5 ~ m m )

gu ns w h ile a ll o ther nati ons bu ilt IS-inch (j}H·m m) .

(40(}-m m) a nd . o f cou rse. in d efia nce o f all agre e me nts . IH·inch (457-m m ) g unne d

battles hi ps .

w hile so m e na tio ns w e re b us y d e s ign in g and b u ilding ba tt le sh ip ,.. grea tly in e xcess o f inte rna tio nal lim its, Brita in and the US p lan ne d .15.00 0-to n-com p lb nt s h ips . T he British had design ed a new I-t-inch 0 55-1111n ) gu n w hic h it considered . o n we igh t g ro u nds , to o ffer a mo re ba lance d de sig n o n 35.000 -ro n shi ps th an the d es irable b ut m uch heavie r l o-inch (406-m m ) gu n . Alt ho u gh d e s ig ns for 16-inc h w eapo ns we re in p repa rat io n . the l .I-tn ch des ign was immedi ately ava ilabl e . To co mpensa te for th e s malle r gu n, the ne w British battleships would mo un t twel ve g u ns rathe r th an the e ig ht o r n ine like ly to he mounted on o ther natio ns' sh ips . To save weig ht, th is wa s late r red uced

to

ten g u ns.

Whe n the cu rta in o n th e Lo ndo n Treaty finally went do w n o n 3 1 December 19.36 . the British

T ilE I II T ll\lAIEJlATT •·\IIL.E.5.1111'5.. I ESH IPS

were a nxious to hegin b u ild ing new battleships . give n th e number under co ns tructio n elsew he re. On 1 Jan uary 1937 Kil1R George l' and Princ e oJ W'ales we re laid down, followed hy three o the rs in m idsummer, all mounting 14-in ch <3;;- 111111) guns. I n co n tra st to the advan tage the y had e njoye d by lead ing with the 13.5 (343- mm ) a nd 15-inch (3Rl- mlll) gun before \'\'orld \"'a r I, the British were now p re paring fo r the ne xt world wa r w ith th e light est guns of :111 the nat ions. The US ~a\'y had also p lanned to build 35.000-to l1 ships armed with three qu adruple 14inch (355-mm ) gun turrets . By the time the first o f th ese . Nortb Ca rolina, w as laid down at the end o f October 1937. it was dear tha t th e Ja panese w ere not go ing to sig n th e Lo ndo n Treaty and the decision was taken to cha nge the quad ru ple l -l-inch (.355-mm) guns to triple 16-inch (·\06-mm). A fter the tw o shi ps of (he North Carolina Clas s. four sh ips of the South Dak o ta Class followed. all of w hich were laid down bet ween 19.39 and 1940. Wh ile these ships were fast at 2H kno ts. they were no t capa b le o f o perating w ith (he fast a ircra ft ca rrie rs the n being planned, Under the te rms o f the 19.36 London Treaty. failur e by an y one country to ratify the te rms increased the 3;,OOO-u )O limit to 4;,000 tons. j apan 's with drawa l mad e this possible . 'X'ith the e xtra weight no w a va tlablc. US constructo rs we re a ble to desi g n sh ips close r to th e tactica l

--'O"_ --. _ . ,-". • .. ~1Ii1----" _ _ _~ 121

The German battleship Bismarck leaving Blohm & Voss 's Hamburg shipyard in 1940 to beg in her lengthy programme of trials.

122

One of very few photographs of

ideal : well -armo ured . heavy main a rmame nt and very fast - fast e noug h

(0

ke ep pa ce with

the giant Japanese battleship

th e 3 2-knol ca rrie rs. The resu lting ships. th e Io w a Class. sta nd o ut amo ng th e \"t' ry besr o f

Varnata. She is seen nearing

bat tle ship designs . Fo ur s h ips . Iow a. S ell'Jersey . stt,....snuri a nd \Fisc o llsi ll. were laid d own

completion at her builder's yard

during 19-\0/ 41 and a further two in 19·j2. a lthoug h the last pai r was ....uncclled in 19·i5.

in Kure . Her massive tripte 18-

Ho weve r, the Io wu s were not th e last word in t;S ba ttleship devel opment. Tilt: xto m a nu

inch turret d om inates her

Class design o f 19·iQ was fo r s hips o f o ve r 60.000 Ions sta nd a rd d ixpla cerucnt. .\ Iain armame nt

quarterdeck. Each of her l 8-inch

was increase d 10 twelv,.'. 16-in<:h (..106-n1ln) guns a nd the a rmo ur lx-lt to 16 inches. Even with 60.000 to ns at their di spos al. the best speed the designer s co uld ac hieve W ~I S 2H kn ots. All fou r were au thoriz ed hut fina lly ca nce lled in 19·13 befo re an y \\'C...-re b id down. Afte r Japan failed to rat ify the 1936 Londo n Treat y. its naval e xpansion pla ns. particularly in regard to flum e bat tles hips . e ffective ly dis ap pea red hehi nd a ve il o f secrecy. Rumou rs of gian t !"hips be ga n to circulate . alth o ugh th is was ta ken to mean han leships ar me d wit h 16inch (406-mm ) gun!". Like the United States. the Japanese co nside red tha t the co nflict of interest bet we en their two co untries wo uld inevita bly le ad to wa r. This wo u ld me a n a ma jor a nd decisive nava l clash in the Pacific, Japan had no illusions about the e normous industr ial an d financia l strengt h that the United Stares possessed and kne w tha t, in any protracte d co nfl ict. they woul d surely he o utbuilt a nd overco me,

guns weighed 165 tons.

TIlE.lli.IJ:.\LilLIiATI:L.ICSlllJ~

-liii_ lim . I" "t___

T il E I JIT I !\1ATF H AT TI E S ti ll'S

They rea son ed that the ir o nly chance was to hu ild sh ips that were q ualitativel y superio r - ca pubk- o f defe ating a ny o ppo ne nt in a n engagem e nt. T he japanese believed that the b rgest u.s battle ship wo uld mount ten 16-inch (406- mm) g uns on a displacement o f 6.tooO to ns, w ith a top s peed of 2;3 kno ts, In October 193-i, lo ng befo re .lapan 's fa ilure to sign the Seco nd London Naval Treaty , the Naval General Staff had requested de sig ns for a tec hnica lly supe rior haul c ship mo un ting nine H~ - in c h (457-mm) g uns and ca pable of a speed of 3 1 knots, By March 1935, the first designs had be en pre pared , The y revealed a gigantic ship nearly 975 feet ( 297 metres) lo ng . displacing ~I sta ndard 69.500 to ns. This ship was large r than was tho ug ht necessary , and ihc size was sca led do wn , This was ach ie ved h y' red ucing the size a nd powe r of the e ngines, allo wi ng the hull to he shortene d to H62 fe e t 9 inches (263 met res) overall. The consequence o f the sma lle r e ngi nes was a red uctio n in est imate d top speed from 3 1 to 27 kn o ts, By ,\l:irch 19j 7 the fi nal design was read y, The japa nese planned 10 build four of these su pl' r ba ttleshi ps. In the eve nt o nly two , }tl11w/u and JlIISlI Sb i, we re co mp lete d . A third. .\'hi /l{ lf/u. was converted to an aircra ft ca rrier, a nd the fo urt h was laid down hut co nstructio n ab andone d. Th ey we re the largest battles hips in history , and thei r main armame nt was eq ua lly imp ressive - nine Ix-inch (457-mlll) guns. Th e s hips were so hig tha t b uildi ng the m p re se nte d ma jo r p ro bl ems for the shipyards - xtitsuhis hi at Nagasaki fo r Musasl ». a nd the Kure Navy Yard fo r ) tI111ll/0 , Ship ya rd facilitie s had to he exte nded a nd ne w cra nes cons tructed to lift a rmour plates. g un barre ls and turret mech anism s. To ensure the s hips were built in secrecy .

IJN YAMATO DIMENSlONS,

862f'r 9IN (OVERALL) X 121f'r lIN X 3~ f'r lIN (263 X 36.9 X 10 .39M> DISPLAcEMENr, 62,31> TONS STANDARD, 71 ,000 RJLL LOAD MACHINERY, GEARED STEAM lVRBINES, ISO,oOO SHP SPEED, 27 KNOTS ARMAMENr, 9 X 18-lN (~S7 - MM) GUNS IN 3 TRIPLE lVRRET5, 12 X 6.I- IN (ISS-MM), 12 X S- IN (127-MM) , S X 18- lN ( ~S7 - MM) TORPEDO lVBES PROT£cTlON , MAIN BELT 16IN ( ~06MM), BULKHEADS " IN OSSMM), BARBETT£S 21SIN (S~6MM>, lVRRET5 2S.6IN (6S0MM), DECK 9IN (228MM) CREw, 2S00 (APPROO

the J ~lJ xlll cse we nt to grc.u le ngth s to co ncea l them: YllJ1111/U wa s hui lt in a d ry-dock and .1Iusllsbi o n a co nventio nal slipway . Great stories are told in Nagasa ki. even today , abo ut the extraord inary e fforts the au tho rities we nt to. to cone-cal the steel gia nt that W~I S hei ng cons tructed be hind the ba mboo curta ins of the .\litsuhis hi slupvards. Th e British Emhassy was situated almost o pposite the slipw ay w here .\!u stl sbi \\'~ I S taking s hape . o n the o pposite side of the harbou r a nd o n the wat e rfro nt. It was n't lo ng be fo re the ha rbo ur imm ed iat el y in front o f the e m bassy w as recl aime d and . o n th is reclaime d land . a large warehouse was huilt, co mpletely blocking the view o f the harbour fro m the c-mbass v.

;\'0

pr ying Britis h ey es wo uld he a llowed to see what w as go ing o n in th e

xtitsuluslu ya rds! \'\.'h af s mo re . o n the seaw ard end of the narrow Nag asaki harbour a re a numbe r of islan ds where man y wo rke rs are e mp loyed in fa cto ries . They comm ute to w o rk by fe rries w hic h take them d irectly pa st the shipyards - o n the rig ht (o r starboa rd : side go ing to work a nd the left (or po rt ) side coming ho me . While Xtusa sb i wa s he ing h uilt, th e sta rboard w ind ows on all ferries had curt ains filled o n the o utward jo urney p reve nting any view of the shipya rds . and the same ap p lie d o n the port side as they returned fro m work in the eve ning . And th is w e nt o n for years. o r so the sto ry goes . To tran s po rt the lx-inch (457- mm) guns a nd the ir associa ted mechanisms fro m the poi nt of manufacture at Kurc to Nagasa ki. a special ship was constructe d, At Saseho. a new doc k wa s built to acconuuod.uc these s hips. Here , re fits co uld he ca rried ou t. ) i /11U1/() was laun ched on H Augu st 19'W w hile Musasb! wa s launc he d o n I Novem ber 19-10 without cere mo ny. J {u sllsbis hull laun ch wei ght of

35 .7.~7

to ns was second o nly to the Cuna rd

liner Q u{'ell .1Im .l'. b unched in Britain six years earlier. These two Yamato Class supe r battleships represented the absolute ultimate in size a nd po wer, They had a speci al ro le to play in the futu re strategy o f the unpcnaljapan e se Navy a nd its q ue st to do minat e th e w ho le of th e Pacifi c. Only time wo uld tel l if these ships wou ld fulfil the ir destiny.

123

-

e u feme a en e T

he world o f th e 1930s was a wo rld in turmoil. Economic recession ha d ea te n deep into the heart o f the industrial nations; enormous un emplo yment was ca using social chaos; and the political spectrum

was cha ng ing for ever with th e sp read o f commu nism and socia lism , th e

e merge nce o f fas cism and Naz ism. In Germa ny , Adolf Hitle r had co me

[0

pmve r flying th e banne r of Natio na l Socia lism; Ben ito I\ lussolini a nd his fascist Blackshirts we re running Italy; Japan was e mbroi led in a n un d eclared war in China - a nd every western d emocra cy was holding its b reath in the hope th at peace a nd civ il order would come o ut of thi s decade o f grave un certaint y, Even the United States. the biggest a nd most powerful industrial nat ion o n the planet, was reeling after the Wall Street colla pse in 1929; three yea rs late r, ov er 15 million Ameri cans we re o ut o f work. By the m id- 1930s, th e fragile pea ce betwee n non -align ed id eo lo gi es teet e red dangerously as Hitle r a nd I\lus solini pursued ag endas o f military aggression. Ge rma ny had th rown o ut th e Treaty of Versailles , the League o f Natio ns was proving a tooth less tiger a nd , w ith the no n-ratificatio n of the

_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _......._iilZ ........ 'Ytr ......_1L

193-; Lond on Nava l Treaty. a ll the ma jor navie s were planning ne w capi ta l sh ips.

S OI1lt..'

did

so in com pl iance with old treaty lim itatio ns. while: o thers - parti cul arl y J ~IIXIn - had complet ely th ro wn the ru le- book

O Il

size and armament o ut o f th e windo w .

Unlike the 1,,"-:ginn ing or \\'o rld \\ 'a r I. which came

;I...

a su rprise. the sta ll o f World \'\';tr I I had

IX'\' n an ticipated for quite so me lime before thai fate ful d ay . I Se p te mber 1939. when Ge rma n planes. tanks and naval forct:s attacked Po land. An y ho pe..-s Hitlc r had that Brita in and Fra nce wou ld not

0>111\.'

to the aid o f the: Pol e s were dashed when h o th nations d eclared war o n

Gl'nn:lI1y two days later.

A n :ry l."Idt.:r1y GC .'fm:1O p re-d rea d noug ht battleshi p . .\<:bleslI ·;j.!, -lIo/sle;Il, played a sign ificant pan in IhL'S\.' momen to us eve nts . In fan . Ihe o pe n ing salvoes in \X'o rld \\;far II were fired hy the o utda ted l l -jn ch ( 2HO-m m) gu ns o f th is o ld ca p ita l s hi p . ~11 the Poli s h fo rt ress at \X'e stl'rp b u l'. at th e e ntrance to Dan zig Harbo ur, O n a su p pose d 'cou rtc sv visit" to Dan zig to honour the \X'o rld

\X'~l r

I

G\.' rnl~1I1

d ea d buried in this d isp uted. fre e port. th e shi p ha d ar rived

so me six d a ys be fo re Ihe attack. Just aft er 'I a .m. o n I Septembe r Scbk-snig-Holstein. totally witho ut wa rning , o pe ne d lire with her ma in a rmame nt aW~IY .

0 11

a largt.·1 o n ly a fe w hund red yards

The purpose o f the attac k was In wipe o ut the Po lish har bou r d e fe nces in p re para tion

for the arriva l o f Ge rma n naval force s. alre ady ass embled off the

l:O~ I S I. After

s ix ho rre nd ous

days o f contin uous bom ba rdme nt and d in ' bombe r attack s. th e s mall Po lish ga rrison in the

fort surre ndered. a nd s~ l i k'd

SCbl(,SIi ·I~ - lIo/S1dll .

th e first Germa n sh ip

10

sec act io n in \X'o rld \X'ar II,

into 11lL' Baltic 10 joi n the rest o f IIlL' flee t.

TIIt.' 1 9 .~ 9-· 1 :; w a r ~II se a wo u ld pro\"e to h e ~l \'e rr diffe ren t o ne fro m the na va l w ar o f

Royal Oak. whose sinking

by German U-boats in the presumed safe waters of Scapa Flow was a major propaganda coup for Germany.

..... • ~ ~~

126 -

9

r

T11.E...lIAl:T LESllll!S

1914-1 11. This time . the main threat ( 0 the: ca p ita l ships would co me from the air. \\'ilh the initial foc us o n Euro pean waters . th e naval wa r would rap idly ex pa nd to co ns ume th e world's oceans . climaxing in th e g re ate st nav al battles o f a ll tim e . These wo uld tak e pla ce not in the Atlant ic o r th e North Sea. hut in the va st reach es o f th e Paci fi c O cea n . Alth o ugh the number o f

battlesh ips involved in thi s war wo uld be far le ss th an in 19 H -I H. the att ritio n rate would be cons idc rub lv g reate r. Du ring \\'orld \X'ar I. e ig h t ba uleshtps wen.' lo st as

;I

resul t of ho stile

act io ns . a n d tw o more in acc iden ta l m ag a zine ex p lo s io ns. In \X'o rld \Va r II. rwcm v-ci g lu banlcs hi ps (not incl udi ng th e German 'pocker-bau lesh ips' ) would he lo st in action. and one to an acc ide nta l magazine ex plos io n. Fo r all th e navie s Involved . th e wa r arrived to o early. No ne o f th e had in co nstru ctio n were re ad y to p ut to s ea . T he

\"\'a ~hing ton

IU' W

b.ut leshtps the y

a n d Lon d o n Tre..-atics h ad

effect ively stop ped construct ion o f ca pita l sh ips fro m the e nd o f \\'orld \X'a r 1 until 1937. For th e Ro yal .:'\:1\)". it was o ld . hut mod erni zed battles hips that stood in the fro nt lint: o f th ei r ba ttle fleet o nce ag ain . •\ Io st had seen service o r he en built d u ring \Vorl d \"\'a r I. alt ho ug h th L'y had all bee n m odifie d hy varying degrees to face th e expe cted d emand s o f modern warfa re . Afte r the d eclaration of wa r. new battleships were rushed into production in s h ipya rds around the wo rld . Fo r the Ro ya l Navy . th ei r ma in base was still Sca pa Flow. For the Germans. Lieute nant Gunter Pri en, co mmander of U47, is

W'i lh clmsh ~l n'n

an d Kid remained the two major pons for their fleets. So. on the surface , no t ~ l 101 had changed in th e tw enty ye ars since J utland . e xce pt th at war at sea had be come

~l

mu ch. mu ch d eadlie r

cong ratulated by Admiral

ga me. Techn o logy had widene d th e ra nge of an ion enormously. w ith rad ar and rad io to g uide

Saalwlich ter and Grand Admiral

the hu m in all we athe rs. in da ylight an d darkness. and w ith aircraft carrie rs and uircruli provid ing

Erich Raeder on his return from

the ca paci ty fo r aeria l atta ck hy ho mh s and to rpedoes. Aircraft ca rriers a llowed their ai rcra ft to

sinking the British battleship

operate almost without d istance limitations, across the vast ocea ns o f the world. Below the water.

Royal Oak in Scap a Flow.

submarines and the ir to rped oes were able

to

sec k and d estro y the most strongly armoured vessels

r ue

S I I I'RE.\lE...CllAL.L.EClSJG.E~

IiiiIIII"IIIIJ1;IIil"__1C. 12 7

aflo.u . And with the increased range an d fi n-power of the modern-age big-guns. had reached

IlL'W

the \"igil required

n ~I\':1 1

wa rfare

hL'ig lHs of terror and destruction. Fo r th e sailors. there would IX' no let-up in (0 st.'\.'

111\.'111 satt.:ly horn e to port. Naval warfare had never been more dc..·adly.

"11K' first ha nlevlup cislia hy o f the wa r occu rred nor :U se a . hut in th e:su p posed ly s:II(,' wat e rs

of S<:apa Flow. ·111t...· ddc.:r1y British han k-sh ip

R( ~l'(I1

Oak. lying at a nchor. fell victim tn a Ger man

U·hO:l1 attack and provided lh e Ge rma ns w ith a ma jor propaganda cou p. Attacki ng SC:lp:l Flow w.rs

:1

lo ng -hel d Co n n an dream (h;1I had cost the m

two

s ubma rine s in u nsuccessfu l .ut .u-ks

d uring \Vorld \\'af I. Sincl' then. the Briti.. . h wrongl y belie ved thL'y ha d blocked all the navigabl e ent rance s into the Flow e-xc-e p t the rnnin entra nce. w hich wa . . protect ed h y a l-oom. O n the nig h t o f 1.1 O ctober 19.19 . wh ih- a d i.. . pla y o f a uro ra bon-ali . . wa.. . Iiglui n g u p thv . . kv. Lieutena nt Co m ma n de r G u n te r Prie n in U-47 navi ga ted his su r faced craft thro ugh

: 11l

cxtraon linarilv n-.. .trictcd channel o pc ning. and into the Flo w . On ce in.. . idv. Prien made OUI w hat

he thought were two . . h ip . . . Thi . . wa . . not th e ca . . c . a.... th e hu lk of the Briti.. . h Ho me FIl:'l:'t wa . . at . . L·:1. O n ly o ne ca pi tal battl eship.

R( ~ ral

(Jal·. n- tuai ned qu iet ly at a nchor. Ju . . t after o ne in

the morn ing. Prien fired rhr,..c to rpedoes . O nL' hit thl:' . . tarboard ho w . Tho.. .l:' o n hoard th oug ht :111

inu-mal e xplo.. . ion had occurred in the Infla mmable sto re . and tha t there wa.... noth ing . . t..rio u.. .

bed. After the initial hit. Prie n tu rned hi.. . craft away to reload and then ret u rned to fire a . . p rcad

to worry abou t. SOIllL' crew m ember.... returned

10

o f a furthe r th ree torpcdoc.. . . '111e y hit the battl e.. . h ip wit h dcva tatlng a nd immedia te dft"ct: thn-c rna..... . in . · hole.... wv rc rip ped o pe n down Ih e .... rarb oard

ide o f the hu ll. Flo odi ng wa x

instan taneo us a nd the sh ip p lunged into darkn cs . . a.. . p()\\'e r s y.. . te rn failed . Dama gcc! o n

:1

li.. . ted ra p id ly to . .ta rboard the n . min ute kuc r. turned over a nd sank. Of a crew o f o ve r 1000. H.1.1 di ed . Prien mad e his l.'SC IIK· thro ug h the same ch an nel hehad us ed 10 en te-r th e Flow. an d re tu rned 10 Gvr m a nv an d a IlL'ro 'S w e lco me . I Ic a n d h i.. . cn-w we re flown to Berli n to meet an e<..·....t:ltic I lilk r w ho awa rtk'd Prien the Knight ..... e ro.. .. . of tilL' Iro n Cro . . s . Six wL"eks into IhL' war. IhL' GL'rm:1n ~a \ 'y had dailllL"d a g rL'at \'icwry and a p.. .ydlologk al triumph O\"L'r tilL' Ho yal ~a \ ·y . Th e d e....tru ction o f th L' Ge rma n Il ig h St::I.. . Fleet tw enty yL'a rs l'a rlil'r:H Scapa Flow had IX'en :IH 'nged - at le:l.. .t in part . :\0 onL' u n tk·r.. . tood h eller th a n thl:' Ge rm:lIb tht: tota l rdi an ce (h:1I Britain ha d o n th L' co nt in uou . . su p p ly o f l·........l·n lia l g ood ..... c u ril·d h y merchan t . . hip.. . from :Iro u nd lh l' g lo he. Perman ent ly d:lIna gin g Ihal \'ital s u p p ly line IX'came a maj or part of GL'n na n n ~l\ 'a l straIL·g y. Llll·r. the U-hoats wou ld IX'co me th eir ma jo r wea pon in the war ag a in.. .t thl.'. . e mL'rd \:lnt . . hips hUI . in IhL' ea rly . . lagL·.. . . <"'OIllIllL'rc<:- raid ing hy IlL'a\'i!y ~lfI lled. fa.. .t . . h ip.. . th:lt co u ld re llla in :It . . l·a for long IK·rio d . . o f tinlL' W ;l .... h igh pr io rily in Iht..' GL'n na n na\'al pla ns. \\'hL'n IllL' w:lr Ix·g:lI1 . IhL' flocke l-ha lllL'sh ips f)('f/ tsc:b lllll d a nd G rt{/ .\J)(,(· we re a lre ad y :11 . .ea :lnd co m m itted to th is tas k. But. a.. . llitlt' r had tho ugh t sOllle forlll o f p L·~ l<.' e m ight h e po ssih ll' w ith Brita in and Frann' afler (; e rma ny·.. . ....uccL·...sfll l co ncl usio n of thL' Po li.. . h c lm pa ig n. thl·.. . e sh ips \\'ere no l initially (m k'red to attac k. ,.J<'f/t scbla lll/ wa .... ordL·!"L·d homt..' a nd he r na me changed to U it ZOli'. Ix·ca u.. .e of llil le r'.. . n mn'rn Iha t a ....hip Ix 'aring the na nlt." o f the natio n m ight Ix ' . . un k. l11is Idt GraISfx'(' 1O patrol the Indian a nd So u lh Atlantic (X'l'a ns . O n 2.3 Sepleml x·r. w ith no rk.":lCl· in ....ight. . . he W~I"" gin 'n thl' sign~l l to : lII~lCk British tr.u.le routl·.. . . Gra/ Sl x'e's C:l pt~li n. 1I:lI1s L:lIl g.... do rf. took h i.. . . . hi p from the coa . . 1 o f Bra zil acro........ th e Atlant ic ~lI1 d round the Ca pL' of Good Il o p<..· into th e Indi:1Il Ocean. sut't'l·.. .sfull y elud ing British w:lfsh ips :lIld . . in king . . en..r.11 Brili.. .h I11L'rc h:lnt lllL'n o n th e way. TIlL' \\'ily l.angsdorf then changl'd h i.... a rea o f 0 lx·r.u ion a nd fL·tllrnL·d to lhe Sou th Atla nt ic. By 7 Ik ce l11her. he had su n k o r cap tu red nin e l11 L' r<.."h~lI1tm en . totalling ':;OJJHO Ions, with o ut the lo . . s o f a s ing le lift..' o n e ilhe r . . id e . His p lan wa . . to head for Ihe Hi\'e r Platl' afl·:I. and tilL' wa te r.. . hL·t\\,l·L·n Unlgua y and ArgL'nti n:1o n Ihe east (·O:I.. . t of Soul h A l1l e r i c~l. I Ie 1ll' 1i<"'\'ed th i.. . a re:! wo u ld he rich in me rchant tra ffic L' n rou te to Britain. Lillie d id hl' k no\\' \\' hat b y :i1 lL':ld o f h im. cata strophic . . <.·:11<..·.

N( ~l'a l ()aJ..~

At sunrise o n Ij Dcccmbcnlookours o n GnifSp(:'espoHed thin masts o n ti l(,.' starboard how. at a d istan ce o f abo ut 17 miles . Langsd o rf maint a ined co urse towa rd... the ships unt il he was able to identify the British heavy cruiser Exeter. a nd w hat he though t were several dest roye rs. Langsd orf assum ed the y we re protect ing a convo y and decided to e nWlge them imm ed iately. It rapidly be ca me clea r that there was no convoy and that the destroyers we re the light cruisers Acbilles a nd Aj a»: Lan gsdorf had e nco unte red Co mmodore Hen ry Ha rwood's 'hunting group'. o n the lookout for arm ed Ge rma n raid ers . Just a fte r 6 a .m ., GrlifS/x'eopened fire w ith he r l l -inch <2HO·mm ) g uns . I~n·ter rep li ed , fo llo wed by A chill es and Ajax a few minut e s lat er. From the Ge rman side , s ix II -inch a nd eig ht 5.9· inc h (I 50· mm ) gu ns were up aga inst six x-t nc h (20j·mm) a nd sixte e n 6-inch ( I52.5-mm) guns . TIle Battle o f the Rive r Plate had begun. GrtifS/x"/ s p rime ta rge t was Exeter, the s hip that posed th e g rea test thre at. After o nly a few min utes s he found Exeter» range. and heavy she lls bega n to take a toll of the hcavv crui se r's deck a nd supe rstruct ure. xtcanw htlc . the tw o light cru ise rs had turned to port in a n atte m pt to di vid e Gn ifSfx'e's fire . Langsd o rf o b liged . a nd co nc e nt rate d his he av y gu ns o n the two lig ht c ruisers . Th is ga ve th e badl y damaged Exeter a moment's respit e be fo re she agai n joined the batt le . this time b unching a

The British cruisers Ajax and Ach illes in pursuit of the German

'pocket battleship ' Graf Spee during the Battle of the River Plate in December 1939.

to rpedo attack. Fo r the ne xt half-hour the buulc ra ged - th ree o n o ne wi th the Ge rma n pock et -battleship inflicting furthe r he avy da mage o n Exeter. At 7.15. w ith o nly o ne g un in o ne turret working . I~\"(..ter w ithd rew from the batt le und e r a thick smokes creen. GrafSpo« now had o nly the two ligh t c ru ise rs to d eal w ith . Bo th cr uisers co ntinue d to ha rry Gra f Sf )!'!' before the Ge rma ns su cceeded in putting bo th rear turrets o n Ajax ou t o f actio n. Ach illes had no t IlL'L' n hit at a ll. At 7.40 Harw ood de cided to dis continue the acti o n a nd too k both cruise rs o ff to the ca st under a co ve r o f smo ke .

I 1

~

....

.

-

-:- ~ - -

.r.a.......__c.

TIIE...5ll£RDI L C IIAl..LE..."IIG E'

Havin g fo rced Exe/er ou l of the act io n, and seve re ly reduced Ajax's fig ht ing efficien cy.

The fire ravaged Graf Spee

Langsd orf co u ld have p ressed horn e his ad vantage . h ut Grt{l-Vx.'(' had lx-cn h it hy some twenty

settles slowly into the River Plate

shells w hic h caused ex tensive su perficial d am age . \,\'ith this damage in mind. und

after scuttli ng by her crew.

:I

numbe r

o f hi s crew dead and ma n y more injured, Captain Langsdorf took Ihl..' highl y con trove rsia l decisi on to make for l he: harbour of M ontevi d eo on the River Plate in neutra l Uru gua y. Ill" h ~HJ

effectively c reated

forces

[0

:1

trap for himself. su re ly giving the British lime to h ring lip su pe rio r

wait fo r him to co me o ut.

Shadowed hy th e Brit ish cr u ise rs , GrafSpee e nte re d th e River Plat e December a nd d ropped a nc hor. Langsdo rf was g ra nted

:l

; 1(

m idni g ht o n l j

stay of seven ty-two ho u rs to e ffect

minor re pairs 10 his s h ip . 10 at te nd 10 his wound eel. a nd to b u ry h is dead . Afte r th at he would have to lea ve . Altho ugh th e British had no heavy naval units in th e vici nity. informati on w as leaked to (he co nt rary , In d iscuss ion wi th h is su perio rs in Berlin, Langsd orf too k th e decis ion 10

scuttle his sh ip . Th e on ly al ternative

W~IS

to tight h is way o ut . and he believed th is would

result in his ship being sunk and the lives of many of his cre w being lost. \"'ith the world's prce, wat ch ing . the last dramatic p has e o f th e Rutle of the River Plate began . O n the eveni ng of 17 De cemb er 1939. watched h y o ve r 250 .000 people cro wd ing every vanta ge s pot :l1ong th e Montevideo wate rfro nt . GralSpeC' sl ipped a nchor a nd moved o utsi de Urug uay's ter rito ria l wate rs. Six to rped o wa rheads had bee n d istributed throug ho ut th e s h ip and cha rges se t. The pockct -bu nlcs h tp sto p p ed . a nd the

lTC W .

including Ca p ta in Langs do rf.

was take n o ff h y mo torboat . The boa t sto p ped a safe dista nce away to awai t the e xp los io n, When the g ian t shi p ble w up, Ca p ta in Langsd orf noted to th e pi lo t. 'Ente r in th e lo g book. Gmf .\J}(,(· p Ul

o ut of service on December 17. 19.W. at 20 .00 hours:

TI1R "C days

later in Bueno s Aires.

ca pital of Arge nt ina - a country sym pathetic to the Germans - Captain La ngsdorf sh o t himself It was ~ 1I1 inauspicious start in th is war for German comme rce- raid ing . and an in ternatio nal

cmbarrassmeru fo r Hitler. A pocket-ba ttleship had lo st a lxutl e in its first e ncoun te r w ith th e Ro yal x avy. and was th en destroyed h y its o w n crew. For Germany it was a di sa ste r; for th e British. a g reat triump h th at came at a time w hen th e Ge rman wa r machine

W :lS

h litzk rieg ing

its wa y across Europ e wit h scc m ing ly u nsto ppable moment um . The goo d news fro m Sou th

129

~

•

..i .e.....~ ,f 130 - •

7

TilE n A T TI ES II '£S

Ame rica provided the British w ith a s park o f ho pe at a lime wh e n German fo rces lo o ked se t to overr un the w ho le of Europe.

Early o n the morn ing o f 9 April. Germa ny attacked and capiun..·d De nma rk almost withou t Se~1 th rou gh the na rrow st ra its of th e Skagcrra k a nd Kau cgat. No rway W ;:IS ne xt to fall. h ut o n ly after d etermi ned d e fe nce by No rwegian and British force s. By 5 May. the Ger ma n.... were completely

a s ho t bc tng fired. g iving them control o f the se a route in to and o ut o f the Baltic

in co nt ro l o f so ut her n Norway . h ut it to o k another m o nt h b efore th e no rth . incl u di ng l h t '

vi tal po rt o f Narv ik. w as in Ge rma n h a nd s. Fro m Na rvik . vital iro n o re s u p p lies co u ld he sh ip ped to Ge rma ny. and Germa n na val fo rces co u ld co ntrol th e Arctic sea-rou te into the Ba ltic. Thei r warships and U-hoa ts wou ld han : access to the No rth Atlantic, and lo ng- ran ge Ge rma n a ir attack s a nd o bservatio n n igh ts o ver Eng land and Sco tland would he po ssible. As Britain 's wartime lead e r, \X'insto n Ch u rchill. wou ld late r write . 'The ra pid ity with w h ich Hitle r effect ed th e d om inatio n o f No rway wa s a re ma rkable feat o f wa r and po licy. and a n e nd ur ing ex am ple o f Ge rman th oroug hness. w ick edn ess a nd b rutality.' The Ge rman occu pation o f NOI"\\'ay gave Hitle r and his n ava l fo rce s a vita l str.ucg lc base for a wa r tha t wa s o nly just hegin ning . Events in 1\'ofw ay were so o n eclipsed w he n th e Ge rman Army invad ed the Lo w Co un tries , Holla nd. Belg iu m and France o n 10 May 19-10. The large British Expedi tionary Force , work ing in conc e rt wit h the Fre nch Arm y in an at tempt ret rea l h ack

10

10

ha lt th e ad va ncing Ge rmans , wa s forced

10

the Fre nch po rt o f Du nk irk w he re a n n ih ilation h y the overw hel mi ng e nemy

The French fleet, including the

fo rces see med ine v ita b le . BUI h y 4 Ju ne , sea -powe r. th is time in the fo rm o f hu nd reds of

battleships Strasbourg and

d est ro ye rs. steame rs o f all kinds. yac hts and moto rboats. m iracu lously cvacu.ucd some 33H,OOO

Dunkerque. at

Mers·e/~Kebir

troops. incl ud ing ove r 25.000 Fren ch so ld iers.

10

the sa fely o f Brita in ,

be fore the attack by British

\'(' ilh Pran ce a nd the British fo rces a ppa re ntly o n the verg e of d e feat. Mussohn i b ro ught Ita ly

battleships.

into the wa r o n th e Germa n s ide o n II J u ne . Ele ve n d ays later Fra nce capitu lated . lea ving

r ns

IIiZ.lIIMtllI'IiI.IiI....._.-:. .

S l lPRL\lL CllALLL "t_GfE' -

- '. . .

Hritain alone to fa<.:l· the combined German - Ita lian onslaught. But it was not o nly Germany and Italy th at had formed a n all ian ce - japan had already joined them in a Tripartite Pact. As th e war esca late-d into a g lo lu l conflict . thi s powe rfu l trio would become kno w n as the Axis . Th e str:l1 l' gic co nseque nces o f th e Ge rma n o ccupat io n o f xo rwa v and France were sign ificant. Th e German coas tline was no w extended from lhe Arct ic Sea in no rt h ern ;\'orway 10 the A tlan ti c co.e- r of western Fra nce. For th e first time in its h istory. the German ~ :I \ ' Y was

freed fro m the restricted geograp hy of its horne port hases. O ne furt her conseq uence o f the LIII o f Fra nce was the fate of its powerfu l navy. Th e Vichy gove rn men t adn un isrcrcd Ihe no n-occu pied southern p:111 I ll" Fran ce - :tn adrninixtrn tion that Britai n fea red m ig ht we ll allo w the French flee r to fall into Ge rma n ha nds . The acqu isition or capture

1 )1'

th e n e w Fre nch h anlccruiscrs Dnnl scrqu« and Strasbcurg. a n d the in comp let e

b.utl c-hip-, Rtcbcttou and j ou n Hart. wo u ld transform the Ge rman

~a\'y

on.. . nug lu . Th e

Commander- In-Chief (If the l'n-nch :"!;l\y. Adm iraljean Fran coi s I);trlan . had catego rica lly stated that no French s h ips w ould he allo wed to fall into th e hands o f any fo rei g n po wer. A large

...quudron o f the ln-rn -h tlect. under the command o f Admiral Gensoul . wa ..; stationed in Ihe French Xorth Afri c-an port o f Merx -el-Kebir n ear O ran . This in c lud e d th e o ld battl esh ips / ' /'(11'('11("(' and HrelaRlIe an d th e new nUIlJ.'(·n//I( · and Straslxmrg 111e i ncom plete RicbeU('1I and jcun 1J1I11 Wl'R' at Dakar and Casabla nca n-... pe..·<, ·ti\"t:l y.

Th e declarati on o f war hy th e Italians. foll o wed closely hy the ca p itula tio n o f Prance. dr.llna tica lly cha nged the l\ritish view o f the

~kdi ll·rr:.IIle..':1I1

situation. \X'ilh Britis h naval re« nm'es

.stretched to thl' lim it. and till' uncertain b le of thl' FR'lKh fleet , it appeared :1 un iqu e o p po rtu nity fo r the po w e rfu l Ita lia n N avy to assume m:lst ery of the M c d tn- rrnn c an . Th e Ger ma ns a lso recognized tluu hvrv at last was a cha nce 10 oust the British fron t Ihe Medite rranean o nce a nd for all. The British res ponse to th is te nuous situation was swi ft and . h y th e e nd of june. a special 11:1\'al force cod e named ' Fo rce H' had been created. This wa s made u p o f th e ca p ita l s hi ps ! iood, Valiant and R('s(' /ll tiel1! and th e ea rner Ark

N( ~ J 'a/.

u nder the com mand o f Vice-Admiral

Sir James Some rville. O ne immediate purpose for th e fo rmatio n of force H. under direct orders fro m wtnst on Ch u rc h ill. was to reso lve th e issu e o f the French s h ips mo ored in x tcrs -cl Kebir.

The British naval force sailed to 0r:1I1. w he re four highly contro ve rs ia l propositions were pu t to Ad m ira l Gcnsoul : join us. demi litari ze your s h ips in a frie ndl y port. scuttle yo urs elf whe re

you lie . or be d e stroyed. Und e rstand a bly. Ad mir al Ge nsou l did nOI we lcome (h is ult imatum and. tt..'arin g the worst. he p rolo nged nego tiatio ns to gh'c h is flee t a chance In the afte rnoo n. the Briti.... h added

(0

an

~l l re: l d y

10

prepare fo r battle-,

tense s itua tio n h y so w ing mi ne s across th e

harbo ur e nt rance. .lust a fte r '1.50 p .m . o n 5 ,1 uly 19·10, th e Ad mira lty in I.ond o n se nt Somerville the follow ing mess:lgl' : 'Se ttle matters q u ick ly o r yo u w ill have re inforce me nts to d ea l with .' AI 5. 15 p "m.. So merv ille s ign a lled Genxoul. ' If n one o f the p ropo.sal s are acceplah le h y 5.';0 p .m . it wi ll lx ' necessary 10 sink yo ur s hips.' Th e Fren ch Adm iral mad e an offer to red uce

cn-w n umbers so th e ship cou ld no t go into action. and then sa il to a neutral port in Mart inique or the USA. 111is fell short o f w hat the Britis h requ ired and th e British nl'got i:ltors q uickly lcfr n,mh'rqll£" hut not IX'foR' they he.. .a nl actio n stations hcing sounded on the Fren ch ships.

Ted Briggs. a

s i g n~ l ll e r

o n lUIS 1100<1. reca lls th e dramatic incid e nt:

' Eve ruuallv Vice -Admi ral Somef\'iIIe m~l<.le

10

Ihe french ad m ira l. "Heg re l I must ha \"e a n

answer shortly o th e f\\'isl' I w ill h ~l n.· to take the MJ)O

nl'{"eSS~try

act ion.- The reply ca me ha ck.

not crea te th e irfl.'lxu:lh le .- Th is is ;Iho u t 6 p. m . And SOml' f\ ·iIIe. yo u co u ld see

him sta ndi ng Ihe re . \'l' ry serio us . he d idn 'l wa lll to do it. no bexly wa nted it. He sa id . "All right. O pen FiR'... ;":ow Iher e we re th ree s h ips, e;lCh with eight I; · inl'h [3HI-mml gUlls. There were twe nty-fo u r I; -inc h g u ns pou ring s he lls int o an e ndosl'd s pace. It w as

131

132 -

..i rn 7

TJIEJlAT TI F S II I P S

like s hooting fixh in u ba rrel - it was absol ute ha voc.

C h ~I ()S .

A rk

R( ~ )'tlrs

uin- ruf were

overhead. acting as spotting planes for us . \X'c had OR'd a tcw s;lln x:s and the French were replying. The y had a sys telll wh ere the)' could tel l their fall o f sh ot hy th e fact that when the shells exploded in th e water th ey se nt lip colou red plumes of wat er . 111C)' had red . yellow. while. blu e so eac h ship knew ex actly where their o wn shd ls we re falling . It looked a hit like a lifework di splay.

'The: French manag ed ( 0 stra ddle us a co uple of times - the )' were co nce ntrating o n Hood and o ur funnels were peppered with shrapnel. In the:e nd the .\·I"lI s holl ~ ma naged 10 slip o ur a nd wa s heading towa rd.. 1):ICGI. Admiral Somerville d ecided th.u he would tak e Hood and six de...':-Olrop :rs to chase after her, \'('e. .' crac ked o n full speed then suddenly realized that instead o f six sh ips o n th e [rad ar] scree n. the re were se ve n , O ne o f these turned o ut to he a French cru ise r heading toward s us , She carried out a torpedo attac k o n the Hood - in b et. we had to tum to avoid th ese , Shl." was e ngag l.'d . a nd she was hl own u p . It was a very miserabl e e ffo rt. a n d nohody wanted to do it. Th e French w ere not o u r en em y. tIH: y\ J been in harbour at O run , a nd th e y knew th ei r co urn ry had been o ve rru n. Th ey d idn 't kn o w what was happening to the ir families and th en we sud d en ly appea r o n the scene. Can you imag ine w ha t thcy mu . .t have fell ?' ;\ Iost of the French sh ips p rese nt at Mers-el-Keb ir were sun k or sl' \'e rdy damaged. These events cost a great man y Fre nch lives a nd seriously sou red Ang lo -French re lations. Fo r a be leag uered

Britain. threa te ned with invas ion in th c su mme r o f 1940. it W :1S nevc n hclc s... an import a nt signal to the world tha t she was st ill very much in bu siness. The fina l cha p te r in th e u nha ppy sag a o f th e Fren ch flee t was p layed o ut so me two ye a rs late r. in No vembe r 19·12. when the Ge rma ns finall y occupied a ll o f Fran ce . Based at To u lo n. the French sc uttled the ir fleet as the Germa ns e nte red the port on 27 November. The battlesh ips

Strasbo n rg an d

f)1I1l/..~f.!nlll e,

w hic h had been repa ired si nce Mers-cl -Kcbir. an d

f Jro n ' llce

were

among th e man y sh ips destroye d . After Mers-el -Kehi r. th e Ital ian fl eet wa s hy far the most p o werfu l n ava l force in the

Med ite rranea n. They had t wo ne w battlesh ip s in th eir fl eet - tiuorio and \ 'i llor in - .h ring ing thei r to tal o f ca p ital sh ips to six , To red uce thi s naval for ce, th e

Hnnsh. wit h the limited battle

fl ee t they had available in th e Med ite rranean , wo u ld need to p ull som e th ing ex cept ional out of the hag. The British Com ma nder-in-C h ie f in th e Mediterranean. Ad mi ra l Sir Andrew Cu n n ing ha m . decided to strike direct ly at the Italian fleet in harbour, His maj or strike fo rce wou ld n ot comp rise th e traditio nal ca pita l ships and their escorts. hut rathe r, the new armoured a ircraft ca rrier Illustrious. a nd its Swordfish bombers. Photo-reconnais sance esta blished th at the Italian fleet . including its six battleships. was at anch or in the harbour at Taranto . O n the night o f 1J November. Illustrious flew o ff twenty-one Swordfish a in..·r.lft in tw o waves. Their o b ject ive : to destroy the Italian flee t. Th e first wave dropped flare s. bombs and torped oes. the second. to rpedoes o nly. Inte nse anti-aircraft fire was encountered and tw o Swordfish were lost. '111<;' fo llowing day . p hoto-reco nna issance aircraft revealed till..' extent of th l..' British su ccess.

Ltttorto had been hit hy th re e to rpedoes . Ca io Duitto a n d Con te tl i Ca s-ou r lry o n e e ac h . Conte d i C(l('(w r was put o ut o f o peratio n permanently. while the o ther two were o ut o f se rvice for six months. At a cost of two a ircraft and eleven IS-inch (,1; 7 -111111) torpedoes. Cu n ning ham 's plan ha d h al ve d th e e ffect ive fig hti ng st reng th of the Ita lia n b a ttle sh ip fl eet. a nd British dom inance o f the Med iter ranean had be en reassert ed. Th e eve nts at Tara nto we re wa tch ed with considerable inte rest in Ja p an . w here th o ughts of a similar ae rial attac k aga inst th e US fleet base at Pe arl Har bo r were unde r d iscu ssio n. In October J9·1O th e Ita lian s la u nch ed a d isastro us ca m paign agai nst G reece. Eve ntua lly, the y re lied e n tire ly o n in te rve ntio n b y Ge rma n fo rce s to secu re victo ry. As p art of a n a b ortive

I.H.E....S.l1.llEME C H A I I E.N.GE E

Ji__-= ._ .. i lie-~,.__ __

attem p t to ste m the Ge rma n ad va nce in Greece. British troo ps mo ved into Cre te in March 19·11. Luge n umbers of re in force me nt s we re ne cessa ry if the Allied fo rces were to hold the area.

Pre ssure d by thei r Germa n a llies , o n 27 Marc h a po we rful Ita lian na val fo rce u nder the co mma nd o f Adm iral lac hin e . includ ing the ne w battleship Vittorio Ven eto a nd six hea vy cru ise rs , le ft po rt he adi ng eastwards to int e rce pt the British tro op co n vo ys ca rr y ing th e rein forcements.

Signal traffic inte rcepts and ae rial recon naissa nce alerted Admiral Cunningha m 10 the Italian fleer mo veme nt. He le ft Alexa nd ria o n the evening of 27 March . wi th the ne w a ircraft ca rrie r Form ida ble and the battleships warsptte. va lia nt and Barham to investigate. O n the morning of 2H March s po tte r aircra ft from lachi ne's fle et ide ntified Britis h light cruis e rs. and (hey ga ve chase. Afte r a hrief engageme nt a t lo ng ra ng e, the Italian s hips turned fo r ho me . The y had not man aged to interce pt any British convoy~ an d , a pa rt from (he brief excha nge w ith the light cruise rs. it seeme d to have lx-e n a w asted so rtie . What the Italia ns d idn 't rea lize was that the cha ng e o f co ur se they ha d mad e to c hase (he cru ise rs had p ut them o n a d ire ct he adin g tow ards Cunning ham's fast-approaching hattie fleet. The courses of these two converging flee ts wo uld result in a major nava l battle in the waters off Cape Matapan . Cunning ham ordered the first of three a ir strikes aga inst lach ino's s hips hy Albaco re aircraft fro nt Formidable. Th e st..-cond strike made a hit o n th e battle ship Vi llorio Felll'/o. w ith o ne to rpedo striking near (he p rop elle rs o n the po rt side . Altho ugh bad ly da maged, she was ab le 10 mainta in arou nd 20 knots. s ufficie nt to allo w her to disappear into the night. The third st rike from Fo rm ida ble hit a nd sto pped the cruise r Pola. Iachino se nt the cruisers Zara, Fiume and

Shrouded by smo ke and sinking by the stern, the French ba ttleship Provence at Mers ·el· Keb ir is caught in a hail of deadly fire fro m British ba ttle ships in July 194 0.

133

four de stroye rs back to asxist the stricke n Pola. unaware that Ihe British fleet was closing unde r co ve r of darkness. At a bo ut 10 p .m . the British ba ttle ships o pe ned fire on the unsuspecting Italia n sh ips , illuminated by searchlig ht from the destroye r Grcybound. The ca rnage that e nsued un de r the co mbined 15·inch C3B l -lllm) sa lvoes o f the l'Fa Y'Sp il e. Va lia nt a nd itarbam q uickly re du ced Zar a a nd Fiu me 10 blazing w recks. By the mo rn ing , a ll thre e Italia n cru ise rs, a nd several destroye rs, had bee n sunk. This batt le had aga in demonstrated the cr uc ial impo rtance of air-p ower in det ecting and slowing e ne my sh ips w hich otherwise would have o utru n the British battleships.

etMl'P..__...

-""_ iiim ..

tE....cIJLA.ll.liN1iJL TIlE S I!PR.E.ME C HA llENGE

Afte r the Battle o f Cape Matapa n. su rface un its

Royal Navy carrier-based

o f the Ital ia n Navy ceased to he a threat to the Britis h . Ho w e ve r, in th re e trag ic weeks for the

Swo rdfish bi-planes attack the

Ro yal Navy in the Medi terra nean . to rpedoes fro m a Ge rma n Ll-boat sunk o ne batt lesh ip, and two o ther ca pita l ships we re badly damaged in a dar ing auack

No vember 1940. Three Italian

w hile they lay at anc hor. Th e sinking occurred at the e nd of Nove mbe r 1941, w hen the old batt leship

Swo rdfish. (Painting by Robert

Barhcnn was struc k by thn..' e to rpe does tired from

the Military Gallery. Bath, UK.)

the U-331. wit hin seconds. her aft er 15-inch (3HIru m) powd e r ma ga zines ex p loded . lea ring th e str icke n s hip to pieces. w ith the loss of H62 men. O n th e n igh t o f IH De cembe r 194 1, w ith the darin g usc of the most minimal for ces. the Italia ns struc k at the ve ry he art o f the Britis h fleet as it lay a t a nc hor in Ale xa nd ria har bour. Th re e tw o -ma n 'huma n to rpedoes' su cceede d in p lacing ex p losive cha rges u nd e r th e ba ttleshi ps Va lia n t a nd Queen

tiltzabetb, severely da m.rg tng bo th s h ips. Th e hu ma n to rp edo was essentia lly a large to rp edo s ha ped mi ni s u bma rine o n w h ich two men sa t. d ressed in w hat toda y wo uld be de scri be d as we t su its and sc uba -div ing gea r. Th e y cou ld steer a nd s ub merge their mi ni-s ub to a su fficie nt de pth to d ive u nde r a s h ip at an cho r. a llo w ing th e m to a tta ch high -e x p losi ve cha rges to its p ropell e rs. s ha ft. rudde r o r whe re ver. Th e exp losive s wo uld have time charges fined and , with luck. the human to rpedo a nd its crew wo uld esca pe into the night befo re the charges ex ploded . Th e wa r in th e Medite rran ea n ha d prod uce d mixed results. The British had bee n un ab le 10 sto p the conq uest o f Greece. hut th e y ha d se rious ly d amaged a nd great ly de p le te d th e Italian fleet so mu ch so , in fa ct. that it w as rel ucta nt to p ut to sea . Bu t. w ith the loss of Barha m a nd the te m pora ry e limina tio n o f valiant a nd Queen Htralxsh, the hard-wo n Britis h adva ntage had bee n severely co m p ro mised . Although the wa r in the Me di te rra nea n wou ld rage o n. af ter th e Bailie of Matapan . the wa r be tween the ca pita l shi ps would reach its ze nith a n ocea n away in the ble ak w ate rs o f the No rth Atla ntic . The gr ea t ico n o f Britis h na va l streng th. 11i\IS H ood. a nd Germa ny 's magni fice nt figh ting s hip Btssnarcls would both sa il the ir last voyages.

Italian fleet a t Taranto in battleships were put out of ac tion for the loss of only two Taylor, repro duce d co urtesy of

135

From Bismarc to Pear Har~ or U

nlike World War I, a head-to -head batt le between large fle e t» o f ca p ita l s hips was nev er part o f th e nav a l stra te gy o f ei ther th e British o r th e Ge rma n Admi ralti e s in \X'orld War II. Th is was

particularl y true o f th e Germa ns . Th eir sma ll b ut ex tre mely powe rfu l

fleet o f battles hips had a nother role to play. pre yin g o n less heav ily a rmed ships a nd against th e su p p ly convoys th at were th e life -bl o od of the Allied war effort . During 1940 the pocket-battleship GrafSpee« sister ship , Ad m iral Scheer; o pe rate d successfully in th e Atlanti c and Ind ia n ocea ns , si nking six teen ships totall ing 99 ,059 tons . Th e battleships Scba rn borst a nd Gneisenau, under the co mma nd of Admira l Gunthe r Ltitjens. followed in Scheer» wak e . Between January and March 194 1, they accou nte d for tw ent y-two s hips sunk or ca ptu red. to talling 11 5,622 to ns . Sp u rred o n b y t he success o f Sch ee r, Scha rn horst a nd Gneise na u , Admiral Erich Raed er, Co mma nde r-in-Chie f of the Ge rma n Navy, want ed to maintain th e momentum o f th ese raids a nd lise th e b ra nd -n ew, IS-in ch

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ----"_ •••1I.aA''tr

(311 1-111111 ) gu n ned battlesh ip s Bismarck an d Ttrp ttr to tot ally d is rupt and d estroy the Allied sup pl y line s . Bisma rck, at Hitle r's req uest. had be en na me d a fte r the o ld Iro n Cha nc e llo r, O tto vo n Bism arck . fo under o f the m o dern Ge rma n Mate.

Desig ned in d efia nce o f the 35,000-[o n trea ty limi t. the 4 1,70Q·to n Bismarck was b uilt at the Bloh m 8.: Voss shipyard in Ham burg and launched by H itler o n 14 February 1939. T he

occa sio n w as treated as a state eve nt , and the Naz i p ropaga nd a machine ex tracte d maximu m va lue fro m the sy m bolic lise o f the name a nd th e fact that s he was. at the time , th e largest and most mode rn battle shi p in the world . Bisma rck was co m missio ne d o n 24 Aug ust 1940. un d e r the com mand o f Captain Ern st Lind ema n n. at a time w he n the Germa n wa r machine ap pea re d u nstoppab le . \Vh ile B ismarck wa s u nd er c o ns t ruc tio n in Ha m b u rg , h er s is te r s h ip , Ttrptrx. tw o mo nt hs be hind the Bis m a rck sched ule , w as ta ki ng s ha pe in Wilhe lmsha ve n. Lau nche d in Ap ril 1939, a lso b y Hitle r. Ti rpitr w as not co m m iss io ne d u n til the e nd o f Feb rua ry 194 1. Slig h tly modifi ed , rtrp tt r w a s a lso ra te d ma rg in all y he a vier, at 42 ,90 0 tons . T he d im ens io ns o f h o th th e se ne w b att le s h ip s w ere kep t very m u c h a se c re t dur ing the b ui lding pe riod , a nd it 'v as o n ly after the w a r tha t th e ir true me a suremen ts a nd to n nag e

Hitler insp ects the ba ttleship

became k now n .

Bismarck at Gydnia , Poland on

Th rou g ho ut the g rea te r pa rt o f 194 1, rtrptts: co nd uc te d an ext e nsive and tho ro ug h tria ls

1 May 1941. His fears abo ut

p rogra mme in p re paratio n fo r wa r. Ge rma n sea ma n O tto Thisso n , a n electricia n , was in the origina l crew o f Tirpttz that too k d e live ry o f the shi p . a nd wa s o n ho ard d ur ing he r working-

los ing such a prestigious ship

u p tria ls:

later that same m on th.

w ere realised when she was sunk

Bismarck at sea at the start of her only sortie photog raphed from her consort Prinz Euge n. Note the striped camouflage scheme and attempts to visually shorten her hull by pa inting bo th ends dark grey.

'Whe n [f it ting-o ut] was do ne , we went into the Balt ic a nd the re the w hole cre w bcg.m tra ining for act ive servi ce . for ge tting read y to figh t the e ne my. Everyo m- had 10 kno w his station inside OUI at all watches. a nd this meant kn o wing all about com munica tio ns as well as how to work the machine ry. \X'he n all this had been achieved we had 10 go to Gote n hafc n . Th e re we co nd uc te d tria ls o n the me as ured mil e with ha u lc xhip Bisma rck. The y want ed to determine the s hip's perfo rmance and so we ste am ed o ut fro m Kid w ith th e Bismarcte. in the d ire ct ion of Go ren hufcn. and it W ;IS a lmost like the Blue Riban d . [The race between oce an liners to de te rmi ne the fastest liner o n the Atlantic run.l Th e first o ne to reach Gotcnhafen could tic Up ;1( the pier. 111e o the r would have to remain o ut in the roads , Natura lly it was better for the crew if yo u co uld berth at the pie r - this meant yo u could go ashore every day. 'The Tirpitz wo n. AI that lime o ur ca pta in was Erich To pp . li e had co me from the Xa \')" Hig h Co mma nd and he be rthed the ship a t the p ier as easil y as if he had been berthing a Iiule tran sport ship. li e d id it so elegantly. bo w first, lines thrown o ut and ned secure ly. [ust like Ih:II, us ing the ship's e ngines 10 manoeuvre he r into p lace, as if it was nothing a t a ll. \X'e all thought. -Ma n! Th at is a rea l ca pta in!" \,\'e w ere reall y impressed. '\X'e spe nt ha lf a ye ar there making trial trips so that eve ryo ne be came tho ro ug hly fa milia r w ith his duties o n hoa rd .' Ad miral Raeder's plan had been

[0

se nd both Btsmarcts and Ttrpitr o ut into the Atlantic

10

be

jo ined hy Scbarnbo rst a nd Gnotsenan. w h ic h were alread y statio ned at Brest o n the French Atla nt ic coast. Had th is powerful comb ina tion of s hips hroken into th e Atlant ic, the British w ou ld undoubtedly have faced its g reates t crisis o f the naval w a r. In the e ve nt , Ttrptrr was st ill running trials until Februa ry 194 1; Scburnborst w as d espe rald y in nee d o f a refi t; and Gttcisenau wa s bad ly damaged o n 6 April at St Naz a irc in a homhing attac k hy British ai rcra ft. As Hisnut rcls w as read y. it was decided tha t s he and the heav y cr u ise r I JriN Z l:'u)!.(,ll would

.l._. iI1i111" ...__..-: 139

,. l'ltOltlJ1 1SMARC1\· ··~I·'QJ.!l'-AJll.LJlA.1l~.lli pron..-c-d :11 th e e :l rl iL"~ t m oment o n an o pe rat ion code- nam ed

Rhcmubung (Opera tion Rhc in ). Th e tacti cal deplo ym ent of th e ships was simple: Bismarck would d istract the British wa rships p rotectin g the convoy... whil e Prinz: EHRen wo uld

_

BISMARCK

Vice-Ad mi ral Gunter Ltu jcn s. fresh from the su ccessful sortie with Scbarnborst and

813FT 8IN (OV£RIILU ~ IIBfr ~ 2Bfr 6IN (2"9 ~ 36 ~ 8.7MJ

Gneisonau. to comma nd th e new hunting group . By A p ril 19·11 . Bisnutrcls and Prinr ElIRen we re exerci sin g togeth er in pr ep ararion

DISPLACEMENT, "' ,700 TONS STANDIIRD DISPl..ACEMENT, SO,900 TONS DEEP LOAD

for the fo rthcomi ng b rea kout into the Atlan tic. O n 1 xtay. Hitler visited the ba n leship

MIlCHINERY,

138.000 SHP

to m a ke a to u r of ins pectio n . He e x p re ssed conce rn a bo ut th e: propo sed sort ie

SPEED.

29 IWOTS

into th e Atlant ic h u t. in light o f recent successes. raised no objections. Ltltjens was

ARMAMENT,

8 ~ IS-INCH 081-MMJ; 12 ~ S.9-IN C1S0-MMJ; 16 ~ 3.9' (99-MMJ; 16 ~ 37-MM; 12 ~ 20-MM

DIMENSIONS,

sink the merch ant ships w ith her H-inch ( 203-m m) guns. Admiral Raed er appointed

uncomfo rtable about certain until other

h e:~1\1'

~l s pet.1s

o f th e:so rtie a nd wanted to d d ay the:o pen•ni on

u n its we re available. hu t Raeder insisted th at it mu st proceed as

:IS po.......ib lc. Th e: d ie was Gist: Bismarcls an d Prins: /;'ll~ell would sail. PROTECTION. BtH then , just as momentum fo r th L' new so rtie began to bu ild. Prinz /;'lI~ell ra n ove r a ma gn eti c m in e and wa s p u t ou t o f ac tio n for tw o weeks . Fin all y. o n 19 ~by , both lJi s marck a nd t-n nr ElI~ellldi Gorcnhafcn . Th e o perat ion. which wou ld Include th e most dramatic en counter between battleships in \Vo rld \Var II. had beg u n. Th e pla n ca lled for the s h ips to rake the same rout e int o the Atlantic that Schurnbo ra and Gneisenau had tak en in Jan uar y - northwards ro u nd Icel an d and into th e Atlantic th rough the Den ma rk Strait. Both sh ips sailed westwa rds to wards De n mark. passing throu gh the Great Be lt that d ivides Denmark fro m Sweden. Th e y continued ro u nd the co ast of southe rn 1'\orway a nd made for Be rgen . a rriving there about m idda y o n 2 1 May. Th e mo vemen t o f the sh ips had not gone unnoti ced: the British had been advised the day before, bya naval attac he in Stock holm, that two h e~l\ "y units had b een sig hted srccrt ng nort h-west. An J{AF p hoto-reconnaissa nce Sp itfire loca ted and ph ot ographed Htsmarcls in Grimstadtfj ord . At Scapa Flow th e: Com ma n d e r-in-Chie f of th e Ho rne Fleet . Ad m iral Sir John Tovey. po nd ered th e ro ute the German s h ips were ltk clv to take , and assumed th at they were atte m pti ng to bre ak into the: Atlantic. In S GIIXI Plow. th e new battleships Killp, Georl-W tand Prin ce o/ l r'(II('... a nd the o ld banlccrutscr Hood, plus the a ircra ft ca rrie r Victorians. were at Tovey's d isposa l. I lis dilemma wa s what ships to send where . The heavy e m be r .\"or/ olk. so o n to he: joined b y StUJo lk, was already o n sta tio n in the: Denmark Stra it. On 21 ,\ Iay he dec ided to se n d /lood and Prin ce 0/ \\''(I les to Iceland . From th ere th e y would h e able to cover th e: lo .:lan d/ Gr eenland a nd Iceland/Facrocs routes into th e: Atlant ic.

soon

MAIN BELT 12.> TO 10'> IN 017 TO 266 MMJ; nJRRETS "'.2S TO 7 IN (362 TO 178 MMJ; DEc~ ".7S TO 3.2S IN (120 TO B2 MMJ 2092 (APPROO

The German battleship Gneisenau. In company with

her sistership Scharnhorst. Gneisenau completed a

successful sortie into the Atlantic in March 194 1, sinking many British merchantmen.

~

" ,'"C>I.,,;'

,.i, »:..

At m id n ig ht o n 2 1 j\ lay Admiral Holl and , w ith his llag in Hood. took ho th British sh ips ou t of Scapa Flo w a nd hea ded nort h-west . A few hou rs ea rlie r.

lJis H/a,.c:/..~

a nd Pri nr Hug ell ha d

sl ip ped a nc hor an d left Be rge n to mak e for the o pen se a . O m:L' at sea tht:y hea de-d no rthwestw ards fo r Ice lan d. The weather had furth e r deterio rated and the shi ps we re sa iling th ro ug h rai n a nd m ist. Th ro ugh o u t th e fo llowi ng d ay. po o r wea ther co nd itio ns p reve n ted Brit is h reconn aiss ance ai rcra ft fro m Idli ng To ve y w hat he needed to kno w : had n tsnm rcts sailt;'d? It was no t unt il late in the a fte rnoon tha t a rccon n.ussancc aircraft mad e th e llig ht was able

10

to

:"or\\':I)' and

re port that th e Bismarcle had go ne, At 10,15 a.m , th e fo llo w ing day, To vcy took his

flags hip Kin!!. G(!OI'R,(! \: the ca rrier Vict o rious, fo u r cru ise rs and s ix dest ro yers to sea. O n B isntarcl e: Lutjc ns assessed the th ick weather cond itions idea l fo r the b rea kout into th e Atlant ic

~IS

be stea me d o n at hig h speed th rou g ho ut 23 .\ lay. Whe n he rea ch ed the nort he rn most

tip of Ice lan d . Lu tjc ns g ra d ua lly ch a nged co u rse to the so uth -west to en te r th e Denma rk Strait. At 7 .22 p .m.. first co ntact w ith the enemy was made. Loo ko uts o n

Sl ~l(()/k

repo rted the Ge rman battle sh ip comi ng townrd x them . about 7 mile s

,

d istant. Th e cr u iser imm edia tely slip ped into the mist a nd sa fe ty, and se n t off a sighting repo rt. Sm.1()//..~

joine d

St ~ITo//..~ soon

.

.

afte r h ut wa s sported hy B ismarcle. wh ich fired a series of accura te

sa lvoes be fore the Britis h cr u ise r cou ld ta ke refuge in th e mist. Bo th cr uisers the n sellie d in 10

a s h adowi ng rol l' , a s afe di sta nce be h in d the Ge rma n s h ips . l.iu je nx no w k new th ai h is

po sitio n had been reve aled. \X'hat he d id n't know wa s that two British b.utk- sq ua dr o ns were racin g

10

cu t h im o ff.

The p u rsu it of B isn u trcle

W:1S

turn ing into o ne o f th e mo st com pe lling se a chases in na va l

h istory. At the time [hat ,\'uJ.li)/k made co ntac t w ith Bisnutrcls. /lood and Prin ce of \r'fI!es \\'L'rL' about 500 m ile s d ue so ut h. stea m ing at h ig h s peed o n a westerly inte rcept course. just a fte r m idn igh t o n 24 May. :IS Ho lland's ha ttie sq ua d ro n s ped rap id ly throug h the n ight. actio n stations we re ca lled . Thcv ex pecte d to mee t t t lsnut rcls at a rou n d l A O a .m, At abo ut th e sa me time, the s ha dowi ng cru ise rs lo st con tact wi th the Germ a n s h ips du e to po o r vis ih ility a nd snowsto rms. Hol land 's reactio n was 10 steer h is sh ips on to a no rthe rly hea d ing to d o se o n the last re ported po s itio n o f the Ge rm a n s hi ps. in the h o pe that Ih e y m ig h t ha ve tu rn e d hack . But Lutjens had mai ntai ne d

~I

ste ady so uth -weste rly co u rse to take him into th e Atlantic. At 2.'17

a .m .. Su}Ji,lk rega ined contac t w ith IJiSH/arc/..1. Ho lland had the vital info rmat io n he needed. The British admiral cons idered his hatt ie plan s. his tactics heavil y infl ue nced hy the strengt hs and weaknesses o f his two ca p ital s hips. Hood was , hy a ny stan dard . a n elderly s h ip wit h her d esig n o rigins in \X'o rld \X'ar I. But. at '12,670 to ns a nd mo u nting eight l Svi nch

( 5HI ~mm )

g u ns ,

she was still ex tre mely fast an d powerful. with lu-avy ma in ar mam ent eq ual to that of n tsnmrcl: She wa s ge nerally w e ll a rmoured . alth o ug h much o f this a rmour was re lative ly thi n. Beca use o f th is com pa ra tively th in ho rizon ta l arm ou r. /lood was s us pected o f h ei ng vu lnerable to lo ng-range . p lunging shells. Howeve r, fl ood re p res e nted m uch more than th e su m of he r part s. She h ad come

10

em body the ve ry esse nce o f Britis h nava l m ig ht. a nd fo r n lo ng tim e w as

the la rgest and mos t p restig io us wa rsh ip in the wo rld . Th e aspi rat io ns and

IH lPl' S

o f a natio n

sailed w ith he r e verywhere she went.

Il ood s sma lle r co nso rt. the ne w ban lcshtp Prin ce of \Fa/es, was m u ch bet ter p rot ecte d with an ar mo ured bel t 15 inc hes CjH I 111111) th ick an d an a rmo ured deck bet ween 5 and 6 inch es ( 127- 152.5 1111n ) th ick. As a b rand-new s h ip. without th e be ne fit o f the len gthy p rogramme of wo rking-up e njo yed by B ismc trcls . the British battlesh ip had been p ressed into se rvice all to o q u ickly: as s he raced to wa rds the enemy. contractors \ \'L' R ' still working o n he r ma in a rma me nt. O n pa per, it was eig ht IS-inch (3H I-m m) and te n I-t-Inch <3., :;-m lll ) g uns on th e Britis h s ide aga ins t e ig ht I S-in ch a nd eig ht H-inc h ( Z03-mlll ) guns o n th e G e rm ~ II1 , At 3. 53 a .m . Ho llan d , ra ci ng so uthw ards. incre ased speed to 2H kn o ts. Bismarck. o n a n ap p ro x imately pa rall el cou rse . was estima te d to he abo ut 2.1 m ile s ah ead . Al " . 10. as th e runge shortened , the British sh ips we nt to action sta tions. Fiftee n m inu te s late r lo o kou ts o n

ERilll.....81s.MAR CK T O

P F AHl

,

....._

H ARHOR_

t 'n nceof lH,les sig hted Bisnutrcl: anti Prins:EU}WII o n th e hori zon. At this cruci al stage. as the y

app roac hed striking range of th e e nemy. Admiral Holl and el e cted ro ma ke

I\\'O

s uc cessive

alterations. 'n t is was a lmost certainly to prot ect Hood frOTH long -range plunging fire. hu t in a battl e wh ere second.. would pron : vital . this had the effect of placing both Hoot! and Prince of \\"(//('$ o n a heading wh e re they would he able to lise o nly their fo rwar d gu ns . l.utje ns, o n

<:O U fX'

the o the r h a nd , wou ld h e a b le to h ring a ll h is g uns to bea r o n th e e nemy. To co mpound H6!i ;l mJ's difficulties. he called for fir e to he con centrated on the lead enemy sh ip w hich he believed was Btsmarcls. It was , in fact, Prin z Hugel!.

The British ships o pene d fire at 5.52 a.m.. the Ge rma ns a minute late r. The first o f man y dead ly accu rate she lls ca used g ian t co lumns of w hite wate r to e rupt sli~h tly ahead an d 10 starboard of Hood As she stea med through this d ren ching ca scade, Bismarclsw second salvo straddled her, with she lls falling e ithe r sid e of the ship. At the same time. Pri us: Eug eu had a lso tak en o n Hoo d as her target. Prinz ElIge,"s third sa lvo hit Hood s boat deck. sta rting a fire among ready-to-use a mmunition . Meanwhile, r~ili zing her initial identity e rro r. Prince (1 \Fales co ncentrated her fire o n Bismarck. At 6 a.m.. Admiral Holland signalled

~1 .20-degrt..~

turn to port to e nable both British ships

to bring their aft ermost guns to bear o n Btsmarcl: At almost the same moment, Btsmarcli« fifth

sa lvo hit lIood - with catastro p hic re su lts. A cu rio usly noisel ess e xp losio n occ ur red in the vicini ty of her mainmast, then ~I sheet o f flam e jabbed into the sky . repl ace d in seconds by a mass of da rk smo ke . lIood s after magazines had hio wn up. shatte ring the after pa n o f her hull , an d wit hin three min ute s she had d isappe ared. Th e last sight o f this great ship was her bo w that hrie lly rose to Ille ve rtica l position before vanis hing into the sea . Prin ce ofwales. o nly

L~ . . -111'

.......

_

.-._

Framed by twin t s -tncn gun s, the British battlecru iser Hood photograp hed in Scapa Flow in August 1940.

14 1

..I.t~-

142 .:: - ......

An artist's impression of

Hood's last moments. As the bettiecru iser 's after magazines explode blowing her in tw o, the

1llE-lliIIIJL.E5llll!5 T il E H AI TI ES Il I P S

abo ut 1000 ya rds (900 metres ) o n I/oods starbo ard q ua rte r, was forced

10

turn

10

avo id he r

w rec kage. Of the e n tire crew, o n ly three survi ved . Ted Brigg s. ord inal)" sig nalman o n th e com pass platfo rm o f lI J\l S Hood w he n she ex ploded . reca lls the te rrible incid e nt:

Prince of Wales is forced to manoeuvre violen tly to avoid

'No w . th e first th in g I s aw wa s fo u r g iga nt ic stars s ta nd o ut fro m the s ide of he r

passing through the wreckage .

IIJism a r cA1. like red , ye llow w ith a red inse t. and a little tiny do t in the midd le . and we

s ud d e n ly reali ze that these a rc I S-in ch she lls a nd the y a rc com ing o u r w ay. The first s a lvo we n t over a nd it was just like th e so u n d o f a h lo o d y e x p re ss tra in roa ring overhe ad . The second salvo fell s ho rt; I co u ld sec the sp las hes. The th ird salvo h it at the base o f the main mast. \Ve could n't see beca use the co m pass platfo rm wa s e nc losed Inn we were all th ro w n off o ur feet. Th e sq ua dron g u n ne ry o ffice r. Co mm a nde r G regso n, went o ut o n

to

the wi ng of the co m pass plat fo rm , looked an , came h ack wi th a rat he r

fix ed g rin on h is face, s aying s he'd be e n h it at th e base of the ma in m as t a nd th at there was a fire rou nd th e 4-inc h ready-use lo cke rs. Th is w as th e secondary ar ma ment a m m u n itio n for im me d iat e use . So the ca p tain o rde re d tha t th at fire s ho u ld h e left u nt il a ll th e am m u n itio n had heen ex pended . and that th e peo p le in rluu area sh o u ld tak e cove r. The nex t sa lvo, I d id n't h ea r it, d id n 't he ar a ny th ing . h ut I th in k it mu st have go ne throug h the s potting top without ex plo d ing , because Ihe mid sh ipma n we nt o ut o n to the b ridg e a nd there was a lieutena nt w ho had falle n dow n, No w we kn ew eve ry o ffice r in the s h ip h ut yo u co u ld n't reco gn ize him , no face . and no ha nds , just two stripes tha t s ho wed w ho he wa s, ' He [Ad m ira l Ho lla nd] turne d to h ring th e afte r g u ns in to act io n , and it w as then th at the next o ne hit. Now, aga in w e we re th ro w n off o ur fee t h ut whe n I go t up I hea rd no ex plos ion, no explo sion at all. all I saw was a gigantic shee t o f name , w h ich seemed [0

shoot ro u nd th e side o f th e co mpass platform. And it was just like bei ng in a vo rtex

ERO~LBl.S.!lARC.KJ

lLU Ttl P E AllLJEl.AllilOJL AR l I IA R RO R

. . . . . . . . .• . . .

really; you fe lt it was goi ng ro u nd , She had sta rted listing to sta rboa rd ami she'd g( )fll." ab out 10 o r 12 deg rees, I s up pose, w he n she righ ll'd he rself and at the sa me time the coxswa in ca lled u p the vo ice p ipe, "Steeri ng gea r gone , sir," And the cap ta in o rdered ch ange over to emerge ncy conn ing, An d it wa s as tluu o rde r ca me th ai she sta rted go ing ove r to po rt. Now she had go ne about 30 or , jO degfl..'es, I su p pose, whe n we realized s he jus t wasn't com ing hack. 'And the re was no orde r to ge l into a hun ch, it just wa sn 't necessary, no tim e , and we started to get over the star boa rd do o r o f the com pass pla tform a n d I got th ere a n d Com ma nder G re gso n w as just g oi ng

out

in front o f

me . Co m ma nder \Varrt:n , the n avigating o ffice r, stood 10 o ne s ide . to let me go th ro ugh , I'd go ne d o wn the lad d er to the Admira l's b rid ge bu t halfway down the ladder we we re level w ith the water a nd s ubme rged. Now I knew tha t there was th e d ec k h ead o f the ladde r ab ove me a nd I was

try ing

10

sw im a he ad from it as fast as I cou ld ,

'And I felt m ysel f b ei ng dr agged d o wn , I got to th e stage w here I jus t co uld n't ho ld it any mo re and yo u started .. , it was q uiet res igna tion actua lly. It was th e n that I sudd e nly see med to shoot to the s urface , I ca me up o n the

po rt s ide and I looked a ro und and ther e she was. ve rtica l in the wat e r, about 50 ya rds a way a nd B turret wa s just goi ng un de r, I pan icked and I tu rned

a nd swa m as fas t as I cou ld a way from her. Whe n I lo oked aro und ag a!n s he 'd go ne , h ut the re was a fire o n the water w here s he 'd been , Now th e wate r was abo u t 4 inches thick w ith o il and ag ai n I panicked , I turned again and swa m .

Able seaman Ted Briggs was on

Whe n I loo ked around agai n. the fire had gone o ut and over o n th e o the r s ide I cou ld

the bridg e of Hood when she was

sec the o the r two people : m idsh ipman Du ndas, w ho had bee n o n the com pass pla tform

sunk. He was one of only three

w ith me , and Bo h Tilburn , the able sea ma n w ho had bee n o n the boar d eck wh e re all

men to survive her rapid sinking,

the ca rn age was go ing o n, And we were the o nly th ree pe o ple in s ig ht, no body e lse ca me u p, no t at all .' Th e thr ee su rvivors eac h ma nage d to ding to o ne of th e dozens o f sma ll .3·foo t (9 0- on) sq ua re raft s ih.u had float ed o ff Il ood as she sa n k. Gre at s heets o f o il we re ablaze a nd . for a mo me nt , fire th reate ned

10

e ng u lf the th ree d azed sailors as they d u ng d esp e rately

10

th e rafts. Afte r fo ur Photograph ed from Prinz Eugen,

Bismarck fires a salvo during the engagement with Hood and Prince of Wales,

143

hou rs o f th is living hel l. de stroyer numb er H27, Eloctra. sig htcd the trio , cut her engine s and, w ith sc ram bli ng net s ove r the side , gl ided up to the raft s . In his hook , FllIp,ship /food, Ted Briggs describes the moment: A rop.... sa iled into the air in my d irection , Although I co uld not fe e l m y fing ers, I so me ho w I ma naged to cling o n to it. A man ye lle d unn ....cessa rily at me from the scra mb ling net , 'Do n't let go o f it.' I e ven had the heart to reto rt. 'Yo u be t yo ur blood y life I won 't.' Yet I was too exha us ted to haul myself in and climh thc net. Afte r nearl y fo ur ho urs in the s....a m y e mo tions we re a mess. Tears of frustration rolled do w n my o ilca ke d c hec ks again , for rescue w as so close and I co uld no t hel p mysel f. I nccd not have worried, Several sea me n dropped into the water, a nd w ith o ne ha nd on the ne ts they got me alongsid e a nd ma nh a nd led me up to the be nt g uard-rail. which had be e n bat te red hy the sto rm, and into tht: wai st o f the Electra. With Hood gone, Btsnu trcls an d Pr i nz Hup,ell shifted lire to Pr i nce (!/ \r't",les, .lust after () a .m.. Commande r-in-C hief of the Tovey beneath the 14-inch guns

w ith the range clo wn to IH,OOO ya rds (16,4 60 me tres) and falling, the British battleship received a di rect hit o n the co m pas s p latform , ki lling a lmost everyo ne there wit h the e xce ptio n o f Capta in Leach , \'Q"ith o ne gun out of actio n in 'A' tur ret. a nd her a ft tur ret to tally ino pe rative ,

of his flagship King George V.

Leach w isel y turn ed h is battles h ip awa y. The first phase of the an ion was

Home Fleet Admiral Sir John

O\' Cf.

Bismarck

had won a magn ifice nt victo ry in destroying Ilood and heat ing off Britain's ne west hat tlcxhip. Lut jcns had the opportunity 10 pursu e the damaged Prince 0/ wales but he decided to re s u me his o rig ina l cou rse . Bismarc:lis ca pta in, Ern st Lindema nn , to ta lly d isagre ed with l.utjenx a nd later, when he he ard the news, Hitler W~I S furiou s w ith the decision to b rea k off the e ngagement . Th e cru ise rs SOI/olk and Suffott: and the damaged Prince (!l \\'lll lt'S lo o k o n the tas k o f shadowi ng Bisma rck im me d iate ly s he w ithdrew from the battle. Bismarcle had recei ved o nly th ree di rect hits, ca using relat ive ly mi nor damage: o ne s he ll

h ~J(J

pene trat e d

the una rmou red forward pa ri of th e s h ip 's hull. all owing seawater to co nta m inate abo ut 1000 to ns of fuel : a not he r ex p lo ded o n the torpedo bulkhead . l'~ l us i ng fl ooding in the generator and boi ler rooms . Th e damage made Liitje ns decide to cancel Rhemubung and head fo r the dockyards at St Naz aire o n the Fren ch Atla ntic coast. To e na ble som e elements o f the o rig ina l o pe ratio n 10 proceed . Lutje ns detach e-d Pr i ll z h'UJ,WII wi th inst ru ctio ns to proceed in to the Atlan tic a nd to act ind epende ntl y. As Prinz J£lIg en c ha nged co u rse, Bismarck b riefly turn e d a bo ut to Fire a fe w sa lvoes : 1( her dist ant

shad owc rs. lIood s loss w as broadca st to a stunned British p ub lic o n the mo rn ing of 24 xtay. It was conside red a natio nal disaster, and Church ill issued inst ruction s to 'Sink the tstsmarck at a ny co st.' Admi ral Sir John To ve y, Co m mande r-in-Ch ie f o f the Ho me Fleet , ca lled on the fu ll m ight o f the Ro yal Na vy to s to p

Bismarck. Baul e xhips a nd cr uisers we re re -ro uted int o the o pera tional a rea incl uding the 16 -in ch (406 -m m) gu nned Rodney. then about 550 miles

10

the so uth-e ast. Tovey . in Ki ng

......_IIiZ .. •. . .'''tr

E.R.illUllSAIARCK....IlLUARLJUA.R.ElliJlL T O pEA R I II A R n OR

Geo ruo V in co mpa ny w ith Repu lse a nd Victorious, was over 300 m iles to the so uth-cast steaming at high speed to inte rcept the Ge rman battles hip , In a n atte mp t to s low the escaping

Bismarck, Tovey d ispa tche d a lliglll of Swordfish a nd Fulma r bo mbers fro m the ne w carrier Victorious. Flying throu gh atroci o us weather, the aircraft ma de an attack o n Bism arck short ly af te r midn ight. Th e slo w, lum hering torpedo bo mbers pr esse d home th eir attac k ag ai ns t accurate anti-ai rcraft fire at a speed of o nly R5 kn ots. O ne to rpedo hit squa re on the battleshi p's armoured belt. hut ha d neg ligible effect o n the sh ip 's p rog ress. Pat j ack son pilot ed o ne o f th e Swordfish in th is attack: 'Abo u t h al f-w ay betwee n the Prin ce of wales a nd th e Bismarck, we s ud de n ly saw a nother s h ip w hic h lo oked like a very w h ite litt le yacht, w hic h turn ed out

10

h e an

Ameri can coastguard vesse l ca lled stedocle. \Ve carried o n, hy which tim e th e Bismarck had s ighted us and so we were ap proachi ng an e nemy tha t was already forewa rned and fo rea rmed . She o pened fire at q u ite lo ng ra nge a nd these black p uffs began to ap pea r

Vic e-Admiral Gunter Lutjens was

a ll ro und o ne. lt was no t pleasant becau se in a n open cockpi t no t o n ly d o yo u see these

chosen to command the

thi ngs hut yo u a lso sme ll th em w he n th e y go off. Rath e r am us ing, because my friend,

battle ship Bismarck and heavy

wh o wa s in th e back sca t w h ile a ll thi s ma yh em was going o n , tapped me o n th e

cruiser Prinz Eugen in 'Operation

s h o u ld e r a nd I th ou ght , "Go o d God Almi gh ty, w ha t's h appened?" Becau se o ne of

Rhine " the raid into the Atlantic

these things had gone off fairly close a nd I th ought. "O h God, so rncbody's been hurt o r I've lo st th e tail or so mething." I sa id, "\Vhat is it?" And

to sink British shipping.

he said , "Ha p p y b irthd ay, Pat. " It w a s my birthda y at midnigh t o n th e 25lh o f Ma y w hen we were going down to attac k th e thing. And I thoug ht, "\'('hat a ca lm little sod yo u arc!" 'We we nt in line abreas t, over th e wa te r about 30 fe et , a n d whe n w e consi de re d we we re w ith in rang e we d ropped th e to rpedoes. Th e Bism arck was tak ing evasive ac tio n and so it was quite diffi cult to gauge ho w far ah ead o ne s ho uld aim wit h the rudimenta ry gauge tha t we had for thi s . Ho we ver, o nce a to rpedo's gone, yo u d o n't han g arou nd an d yo u're o ut o f it as q u ick as yo u ca n. Th e o ther two a ircra ft ha d go ne quite a \vay ah ead o f me and I thin k

Bismarck was fir ing so m e ve ry h ea vy arma men t - and I remember those s he lls we re co m ing d o wn , rai sin g ve ry large co lu mns o f wa te r w hic h would have been fata l if yo u fle w into them.' At about 3 a. m . Bismarck made a s harp tu rn to starboa rd a nd s ucce e d ed in th row ing o ff the s ha dowing s h ips. Tovey se nt ships a n d a ircra ft in eve ry d ire ctio n to try a n d lo cate her. Around mi d -m orning . a cting o n an in stinct th at Bisma rck wou ld he heading north-ca st for th e tccland- Pae ro es pa ssage , To vey turned his sh ips aro u nd and headed in tha t dire ction, h u t Bismarck cont in ued to he ad so u th-cast fo r St Nazai re . At 6 o 'clock tha t even ing Tovey rea lized his m ista ke , an d alte red co urs e to th e south-east. British hopes o f catch ing B ismarcle were begin n ing to fad e . For his part , Lutjens lo o k a very d espai rin g v iew o f Bismarctss cha nce of surviva l. At noon o n 25 May, his birthday, he ad dressed the cre w to th ank the m for thei r kind wishe s.

145

•

•

D

•

•

•

'Sighting the Bismarck - the

At the sa me tim e he gav e a bleak assessment o f the length s the British would go to dcstroj

Beginning of the End, North

the m. With that news, the e upho ria am o ng the Ge rma n sa ilo rs th.u had follo wed the sinkin; of f l ood eva po rated . Th roughout 26 May, Bisma rck ste amed through an apparently empty ocea n , At 1O..~O a .m

Atlantic 1030 hours, 26 May 1941 ', Aller the sigh ting by an

RAF Catalina. it was only a matter of time before the British attack forc e arrived to destroy the powerful German battleship. (painting by Robert Taylor,

reproduced co urtesy of the Military Gallery. Bath, UK.)

an RA F Catalina o n pat rol spotted the fleei ng Ge rman battleship . With heavy flak lX'ing tlun, skywa rds fro m Bismarck, th e Cata lina radioed off a positio n re po rt. Imm e d iatel y this news reached Tovey, he knew that unless Bismarck cou ld he slowed down she would rea ch the safety of a French port late the follo wing day, Thei r o ne hope res ted with Force II, steaming north of Gibral ta r and o nly about 60 miles to the cast of Bismarck. Tovey ordered this force w hich includ ed the ca rrie r Ark Royal, the battlecru ise r penou-n, a nd the cru iser Sbeffietd to alte r cou rse a nd tak e up the chase. By m id a fte rnoon, Sheff ield had located Bismarck and hac res umed shadowing the batt lesh ip . Just before 3 p .m., a nig ht o f fourtee n Swo rdfis h ror pcdc bombers le ft Ark Roy a l in a troc io us wea the r condi tio ns in w ha t cou ld hav e be en the last o p portu n ity to crip p le Bisma rck. Through a b latant case o f mista ken identi ty , Ihe a ircraft executed their attack no t on Bisma rck hut on the ha pless cruiser Sheffield. No to rpedoes hit. Anot her strike of fi ftee n Swordfish took off s hortly after 7 p .m . 111is was the last opportunity before Bi:sma rcls reached safe wa ters . After a just-on two-hou r nigh t, the double-wi nged sing lee ngi ned ai rc raft, look ing like re lics from a bygone age, sta rted the ir attack . Of thirteen torpedoes launched at Bismarck, tw o hit, o ne o n th e a rmoured side amids hips and one af close 10 the s hip's rudders. Th e hit amids hips had little e ffec t, hut th e o ther would prove tc he a di saste r for Bismarck as the fo rce o f th is ex plosion jammed ho th he r rudde rs. Despi te

..__"'_ 147

~_IIIIIIi.IilIlllIA~

ERO .\lJl15MARCK..:fiLl'.EARLllARnOR.-

desperate attempts to free the m , Bismarclsvcs» un able

10

stee r ot her than to describe wide a nd

po intless circles in wha t would soon he a hostile sea. W'jlh e ve ry minute that passed. British heavy units were co nverging on th e lu ckless Bismarck.

Through the night o f 26 xtay. five British destroyers har ried the stricken battleship with a se ries o f torpedo attacks. Whl le none h it. the crew o n Bismarck. demoral ized and worn o ut. awai ted the fate th e y kn ew the morning light would hring. As dawn broke. the battleship Kill}!, GeOl"'}.:(, \ : with Nodm:l' close aste rn. appeared o ver the horizon. 111C old banlccnnscr Rodney.

sis te r ship o f lIood . was under th e comma nd o f Ca ptai n Dalrymple -Hamilton and. as luck would have it. his son was serving as a mid..hipman in o ne of the ti-inch (3 55-mm) gun turrets o n Kill;': Gem/.w I: In his first naval hattie, young midsh ipman Dalrymple-Hamilton had the ('(>mfO J1 o f having his fath e r not far away: 'It was a great comfo rt to sec those I6-indl l-ltxi-mml guns coming along behind you and. as a hoy . a young midshipman, to think my father was driving along just astern wa s an od d sensation. Moreo ver, w hen we sig hted the Blsmarcls cm the morning of the 27th a nd S~I W th o se enormous mu shrooms of fla me com ing o ut o f he r we a ll, to a ma n said , ~ I hope she's firing at th e Roduey.: And th en I thought, H\X'e ll, I s hou ldn't be th inking that - the o ld man's in Rodll C!l ~ ' The g unnel)' duel began at Rti7 u.m. British br oadca ster and autho r Ludovi c Kenned y was a torpedo office r o n the British destroyer 7{111ar du ring th is last e pic hallie with Bisnmrcls: 'W hen the J{O{lJlL:)' nnd the Kil1~ Geml{L' Vho th o pe ned fire . the th ing I remember at the time we re the co lour contrasts. the hrow n sight of the cordite from the g uns, the green o f the sea w ith little while cu px. the blue h its o f sky, and the s he ll sp las hes, As I sa id in my hook . "hig h as Hiltons. white as doves" - I00 feet high , e no rmous s he ll splashes, and then the blackness o f Bismarcle. and the greyness o f the British s hips . And we just sat hack a nd wa tched.' t tismarct; mo ving e rratical ly at 10 knots, opene d fire on Rodm:v, But the British s hips be gan

to score numerous hits and , hy 9 a .m ., lJismarck's fo rward tu rrets had been sile nced. Half a n hour ti ter. he r afte r turrets were also o ut of act ion. and the British s hips ca rried o ut target pra ctice at d ose ra nge .

:1

form of

Douglas Turtle was a young sa ilor o n hoa rd K i l1R Ge'Of].W "during the ha ttie w ith Bisnmrctc His action station was th e I-t -inch <355-mm) director contro l tu rret , right in the highest pa n of the ship: "\X'ht..'n we sigillt..'d the Bismarck, th e gun layer in fron t o f me wa s sh aki ng so mu ch the o the r gun layer sh out ed to him . -Co mc o n, get o n targ et!" So I jumped up a nd put my arms ar ound him to st op h im from sh ak ing an d J held o n to h im unti l th ey go t svn chroni zcd. a nd when yo u syn chroni ze two gun layers, that's when the g unnery office r fires the guns. "cling ding - boomph". .. hell o f a blast. 'The n I sa w those shells coming towards us , a nd as they passed us they went zzzzt, and tht..')' wen t between the funnel and the ma st. the four shells, and I thought. "The ne xt o nc s com ing right here" - because Bismarcls» just sunk the Hood. and hit the / 'I1I1C<, (if Wales. But then o ur next sa lvo. I can sec it now, hit Bis marcte o n the forecast le and her anchor cha in w e nt up just like a W:l1d1 chain, just like tha t, I ca n always sec that. And then Ro{b l (:l ' fired and hit he r o n the b ridge.' Above decks. Htsmarcls was red uced to a mass of twisted steel. Despi te this ca rnage, the ship

re fused 10 sink. At 10,25 the cr uiser Dorsetsbirc se nt tw o torpedoe s into he r starboa rd side a nd o ne into he r po rt s ide . Th e g re at s h ip fina lly ro lle d o ve r a nd sa n k at 10 .40 a .rn. Of a new of over 2200. o nly 115 were rescued .

'Launch Against the Bismarck'. One of fifteen Fleet Air Arm

Otto Pet er s. a yo u ng e ng ine-room a rtifice r o n Bismarck. recalls the horror o f th e last mom ents of his stricke n ship:

torpedo-carrying Swordfish aircraft leaving the heaving flight deck of the catTier Ark Royal on the strike that would cripple

Bismarck. (Painting by Robert Taylor, rep roduced courtesy of the Milita ry Gallery. Bath, UK.)

'At about 10 o 'clock we had so man y hit" th at the ca ptain, o r the first officer, ordered, "Eve rybod y a ba ndo n ship, lea ve th e ship." I was in th e e ngine room a nd si nce we started in Hamburg with this ship we kn ew it so we ll and co uld esca pe without lights. And besid es that , we had th e too ls (0 o pe n a ll th e d oors . Th er e were eig ht decks which I had to go through from the e ngine room to the upper deck . I ca me to the last deck , w hich is ca lled the batt e ry deck or the up per de ck . In this deck, the ligh ts and everything we re out a nd I was under wate r about to my kn ees . Then we go t hit in this co mpartme nt, a heavy hit, bu t I wasn 't hun, I would say it's luck. I tried to go to this bulkhead door and o pen it - ev eryth ing was d ark , but I managed to o pe n it abou t o ne foot wide. Now I co uld sec da ylight , bu t I co uld n't ge t throu gh the door. '\Ve had o ur leather e ngine -roo m clo thing on, so I threw away my leather jacke t 10 ge t th rou gh this bulkhead door. And then I was o n the up pe r deck wh ere it was c<X>1. But hundreds a nd hundreds o f my sh ipmates wer e lyin g in blood . The turr e ts wer e croo ked, and three-quarter s o f the ship was undernea th the sea a lready, I tried to sta y as long as possib le o n th e upper deck, but th e waves we rt: go ing over the ship. The second wave took me o ut. I S;;I W the sh ip destro yed... almost e verything was destroyed . ""e ll. being in th e sea, I tried to get away from the ship as qu ickly as possible , a nd it was ra ining, and storm y you wo uldn 't believe it, hu t anyway, o ne tries to live. But, let me ex plain first, I saw the ship going down, going do wn upside-down . 'Th e screws we nt first , a nd the n the bow o f the sh ip . It we nt do wn tha t wa y, and even toda y I ca n ma ke a p icture o f it in my head. So , afte r this ex perie nce , I sw am, I knew I cou ld n't sw im to Ge rma ny - impo ssible . So , in the wat er I kept mo vin g little hit , just to stay in good co nd ition . I saw a ship a nd I tried to sw im 10 it, a nd I cou ld sec th e Un ion Jack , a nd kn ew it mu st he a British sh ip. I th ou ght to myself, "The y're going to kill us in th e water. " That's wh at I th ou ght, but o n co ming closer to th e sh ip I saw th e ro pes - do w n the shi p's s ide, a nd the n I th ou ght , "The y're goi ng to pi ck us up." And so I ca me o n th e sh ip a nd the se British shipmates were great , I mu st say that .' Controve rsy still surrounds th e strong suggestions mad e th at , in th e e nd , th e Bismarck was scutt led , rather than sunk by British gunfire and torpedoes alon e. There is no do ubt that the ship was sink ing and , if the crew did set o ff scuttling charges , their actio n o nly accelerated the sinking process, rath er tha n initiating it. Her figh t to the deat h has assu red Bismarck a special p lace in nava l histo ry hu t, according to Ger man naval histo rian Dr Michae l Epkanhans, Admi ral Lutje ns had little cho ice in this matte r: 'The se lf-destructio n o f the Gruf Spee was a se rious shoc k 10 the naval co mmand as well as 10 Hitler. It reminded them o f the eve nts of 1919 lscunling o f interned High Seas fleet at Scapa Flow), so the o rders were given that a ll Ge rman warships had to fight 10 th e last shot - until th e y went d own in hatti e . They wer e lalso) forb idden to surrender to supe rior forces and that' s one of the rea sons \...·hy the Bisma rck foug ht until the very e nd instead of hoisting the white flag .' After the loss of Bisma rck, Hitler placed a se ries of co nd itions on the future operations of th e remaining ca p ital ships in th e Ge rma n fleet : no bauleshtps wer e allowed to e nte r th e Atlantic; action was not to be risked ag ainst equa l o r su~rior forces; battl eships would not so rtie where a British aircraft ca rrie r was pr esent; and finall y, the movement o f b attleships would he sub jec t to his pe rso nal approval. Opera tional freedom was totally d eni ed Admiral Raed e r, th e Co mma nde r-in-Ch ief of the Ge rma n Navy . And this was no t th e o nly d ifficu lty the Ge rman naval high co mma nd faced .

TilE RATTI ESIfIPS

Afte r the Enigma mach ine , the de vice used h y the Germans to encode mes sag es , wa s ca ptu red - a nd its sec re ts unra velled hy a n e xtraordi nary team o f code-b rea ke rs wo rking in abso lute secret at B1ctchle y Park in so uthe rn Eng land - the British were able to read almost all the Ge rman military inte lligence signals. From the summe r o f 1941 o nwards, all Ge rman naval code s co uld he decip hered and movement orde rs we re interce pted and pas sed on to the Admir.•rlry. The fact that thi s was happeni ng remain ed a se cret fro m the Ge rma ns for the

Shells from the Brit ish battleships Rodn ey and King George V faIJ round Bismarck in the final gunnery duel. Bismarck 's superstructure was pounded to a shambles before she sank.

entire period of the wa r. By the middle o f 1941, the U-IXJat wa r aga inst the British sup ply lines was sta rting to cut d eep into Britain 's ab ility to main tain its wa r ef fort bot h ab road a nd a t ho me . Hitle r had o bviously decid ed not to invade England , at least at this stage of the war. but instead, on 21 Ju ne, Ge rman troops invad ed Russia . Immediately, the who le co mp lex o f the war cha nged . Britain became loc ked into an alliance with Russia in the war agai nst the Axis powers Germany, Italy and , yet to sh ow its hand, Japa n. Cutting off the vital supply link to Great Britain, and to its a rmed forces a nd allies in Europe and the Medit er ran ean , remain ed the ma jor challenge facing the Ge rma n Navy. The U-boats wer e do ing a grea t job, but the y need ed more suppo rt from their navy's big-gun ships wh ich co uld sta y at sea for long peri od s, a nd in all weath ers. At the e nd of 19,j l , [he batt leships Scha r nh ors t a nd Gneisenau were still at Brest , o n the French Atla ntic. Raeder wanted to se nd both ships on sorties against British su pply ships o pe rating between the ~ 1t.--J i t err.tnea n a nd Britain. Thei r loca tion at Brest was perfect fo r th is, bu t Hitle r refused to give his approva l and insisted that bo th battleships return immedia tely to Ge rmany or face having their armament rem ov ed a nd used e lse whe re . According ly, a p la n was developed 10 return Scb a r nborst, Gnctsc n au an d the heavy cruiser Prtnz EURen to Ge rmany. The most da ring as pec t of the plan was to do the unth inkabl e: sail the th ree ships and their esco rts through the English Cha nnel un der the ve ry noses o f the British. On the night of 11 February, in dismal weather and poor visibility, the Ge rman ships left Brest a nd stea med into the Cha nnel at high speed . In a ra re demo nstrati on o f inter-servi ce co-ope ration, the Luftwaffe prov ided co nsta nt air cove r for this audacious sonic. Through Ultra

ER(llJLli~lAIl..C.11L1:lLeE
sufficient d a mage to p rev en t them ma king it safely back to Ge rma ny. Fo r the Ge rma ns, it was a majo r propaganda co up; while for the British it brought sharp cr iticism of their armed forces that su ch a powe rfu l fleet of e ne my ships cou ld sa il through th e Eng lish Chan nel to safety without receivin g so much as a scratch from the local defen ce force s. \'<'ithin da ys of returning to Ger many , a heavy Allied bombing raid ove r Kid inflicted se ve re damage to Gneiseuau. Her 'A' turret was co mp letely b urn t-out and the forward structure o f the ship lxtdly buckled . \'<'ith Gneisenuu completely disabled, o nly two fully operational battleships remained. Tirpitz and Scbaruborst. Almost since the day th e war began. the United Sta tes had been ac tively, bu t u no fficia lly, supporting Britain with vital wa r su p plies , and at eve ry o pportu nity Prime Minister Churchill co ntinued to pressure Presid ent Theod ore Roo sevel t for eve n greater su pport. ln August 19·11 Churchill had crossed the Atlantic o n boa rd the battleship Prin ce a/ With'S. for d iscussions with Roo se velt that wo uld lead to the 'Le nd Lease ' arra nge me nts. In these , the US wou ld su pp ly Britain with all the wa r goo ds she need ed o n a 'leas e' hasis, payment beco ming due on ly at the e nd o f the war. The US was now on ly o ne ste p awa y fro m jo in ing Britain as a n ally in the war. The e ve nts that wo uld trigger tha t a llia nce we re just four mo nth s away. w hen th ey came, they would be initiated not hy th e Europ ean wa r machine hut by the long-pe rceived e ne my o f the US in the Pacific - Japan. \'<'ith the Euro pean powe rs utte rly abso rbed in th e wa r raging in th e west , J apan was presented wit h a n un rivalled opportuni ty to realize its im peria l am bitions in the Pacific. Although Brita in was not yet be ate n . she was under e no rmous p ressure and , w ith her navy so overstretched. it wo uld be almos t impo ssible to spa re a ny British forces to que ll Japa nese aggression in the Asia-Pacific a rea. In Ju ly 1940 Ja panese troops had occ upied Fren ch Indo-China , or Vietn am as it is now called - an invasion co ndemned by the western po wers includ ing the United States . Japanese impe rial ob jectives were mot ivated hy a very basic co nside ration: the o ngo ing and unrestricted sup ply o f vital raw materi a ls, includ ing o il, need ed to maintain and expand its fast-growi ng indu strial empir e. Follow ing its invasion o f Indo-China, western powers placed embargoes on the ex po rt of o il and steel to Japan. ThL' j apa ne se view o f th is act o f wes tern imperia lism was that it made wa r not just ine vitable. hut necessa ry . Accordingly. the japan ese m ilitary strategists put th e final to uc hes o n their plans for wa r during late 1940 and 1941. To stab ilize its military po sition in north ern Asia, in April 1941 Japan signed a non-agg ression pact with its traditional e ne my, the Sov iet Union. But at this stage Japan had a lready e ntered a treaty of mutual assistance and frien dsh ip with Nazi Ge rma ny and fascist Ital y and was the th ird member of the Axis po wer that Britain was at war with in Europe . TIle Axis alliance was a stra nge mix o f bedfellows . as "l ark Peante . of the Hoover Institutio n on \,
'...a,,__ ..__~

-----,..._m ..

151

I think the j ap ane se saw the Tripartite Pact

~IS ~I

weapon. Th e y saw it as

~I

diplomatic

weapon to keep the United States in check. It wa s a very bad mi.. .rake o n behalf of the japanese.'

\'{'ith the war in Europe going ex tre mely we ll for its a llies , a nd the British wa r effort bein g stre tch ed to the limits for the very su rvival o f Britain an d its empire , the time was right for Japan to make a move. TIle one nat ion that . . tood in the way of these ambitions was the United Stales. Th e Japanese milit ary expans ionist strategy in the Asia-Pacific recogni zed this situation. and the ir ultimate plan wou ld be based o n a gamble. A pr o tracted " tar aga inst the Unite d States would he ;1 lost war, and the enormous industrial . . trcngth alone of the US would inevitably o ve rwhelm Ja pan. A wa r, the re fo re , would ne ed to be decisive. It wou ld need to deliver a crippling blow that would brea k the resolve of the US, or at leas t fo rce it to recognize Japan's infl uence in the Pacific. fundament al to the Japanese plan was its Impe rial Nary. Its insatiabl e need s fo r o il to fuel the d iesel engines o f its giant halli e fleet posed majo r problems for the island nati o n w ith no natural o il resources o f its o wn. Mark Pcattic. 'TIle ironic f3(1 wa s that 3 large proportion o f Japanese naval fuel in the 1920s and 30s ca me from the Un ite d States. He re was your hypoth etical enemy. who was th e chief supplier of your pe trol eu m. The y tried o the r sources, for example British North Borneo , the y tried the pr oduction o f syn thetic fuels w ith modest success. but it wasn't e no ugh. Ce rtainly not e no ug h to meet the demands o f the japanese Navy o nce it started stea ming o ut to sea and e ngaging o ppone nts . So the co nce rn for o il wns a very great o ne, an d tha t's wh y in the 1930s in the n;lvy yo u increasingly had those voices be ing raised for Japan ese involv em ent in so uth-cast Asia - particularly in the Dutch E.ISt Ind ies with its rich petroleum re so urce s , whe re the Ja panese ultima tely hoped salvat ion.'

10

find the ir fuel

To safeguard a southern thrust towards Java and Su ma tra in the o ld Dutch East Indies, now Ind onesia. the Japan ese would ne ed to es tablis h permanent base s o n the rou te sou thwards. Th e US Philippines, and British -controlled Malaysia . stood in thei r w ay . O f these two weste rn po wers, the Unites States repre sented the ma jor stumb ling b lock in the Japane se plan s: the US Pacific Fleet would have to be deal t with for the plans to succeed. In the summe r of 1940 th is powerful fle et ha d be e n mo ved fro m its ba se in San Pedro. California , to Pearl Har bor o n the Island of Oahu in the Hawai ian Islan d grou p in the Pacific. This move had been maul.' as a clear warning slgnal to Japa n. The initia l Japanese maste r-p la n had been to dra w the US flee t to sea by attac king the Philippin es. we aring it dow n by submari ne and ai r atta ck as it made its wa y no rth-westwards across the Pacific , a nd the n dest royin g the mu ch -d epl et ed fleet in a de cisive. he ad-to -head action with the full might o f the Japa ne se hatt ie fleet. In this batt le . the two s uper-ba ttleships }'all/flf o and Jlusflsbi wo uld prove the 'trump ca rds' that wo uld e ns ure victory for Japa n. Japan es e thin king mov ed to u ri a me nded plan , a plan to ig nite the wa r in the..' Pacific by launch ing a d ra matic a nd de va stating hi o w to th e US Pacific Fle e t - a lightn ing a irborne attack o n its base at Pea rl f larbor, Maste rminded by Iso roku Ya mam oto . Comma nd er-in-Chief of the Imperia l J apan e se Navy , the Ja panese st rike fo rce unde r th e co mma nd o f Ad m ira l xagumo le ft Japa nese wa ters o n 26 Novembe r 194 1. The force included six fleet ca rrie rs carryi ng 423 a ircraft. At thi s time , the Japan e se Navy po ssessed the best trained and most effic ient ca rrie r-borne airflcet in th e world. O n the morning o f Sunday 7 Decembe r. the fleet was about 275 miles o ff Ha wa ii. At 6 a.m ., the first a ircraft too k off from th e carrier Aka!.:i. The first wave cons isted o f fifty h igh -le vel bom he rs , fort y to rp edo pl an e s , fifty-one di ve -

£Rill.u.U£M.
-"_ IIIIi=• iII

.tM.'=...__ m- ~

bom be rs and forty- th ree fight ers. Soon after, a furthe r 171 attack ai rcraft took off to form the second wave. As the Japa ne se airc raft ma de their w ay to Hawaii. the: US Pacific FIe:L,t, co m prising nin ety-fou r wa rships , wa s moored in ne at line s off Ford Islan d . At 7.55 a.rn . the first aircraft a rrived and the ca rnage began , Richa rd Fish' , ma rine bugler on th e ba n k-ship USS l Fest vtrgtnto. wa s a t his post whe n the: firs t wa ve of bo mbers struck : 'About five minutes to eight. I sounded first call for colours and that 's as far as I got. About th irty o r fo rty seconds later, her e comes these airplanes. The first o f them circled and we ke pi look ing at them. They ca rne a nd dropped th ei r tor pedoes. Th re e h it the \\"'eSI v'ir gi n i« . Two hit th e Otelabonm. And w e wonde red , "What in the heck a re the y doing us ing live: torpedoes?" All o f a sud de n o ur se rgea nt ca me u p . I lc was soaki ng wet a nd co ve re d w ith o il, he comes up a nd he says , "Get yo ur but ts to your battle s ta tions. we 're un der attack by the Japan e se ," I'm us ing the nice words , 'I went u p o n to the bridge at about eig ht o 'cloc k. Am i the n we took seve ra l mor e hits. At abou t five min ute s after eig ht, Ca ptai n Be nn ion ca me u p o n to the bridge a nd I stood hy, w aiting to sound a n)' ca ll for him. hu t the ship was alread y start ing to list as we had a bou t fo ur o r five torpe does in us by that time . And then a hom b hi t the numbe r two gun turn.. 1 o n the Ten nessee and tha t was about te n or twel ve: min utes utter eight. A hig piece of sh rap nel alm ost cu t o ur ca pta in in ha lf a nd we laid him down o n th e de ck a nd put him in o ne of the w ire stre tchers. Co m ma nder Hillcnkoc ttc r came u p o n to the bridge but there wasn't much we could do, he was so ha dly wou nded. The co m mande r looked at Capta in Benn io n lying o n the deck and sa id. "Sir, w hat a re my orders?" And the o nly thing the ca ptain said w as, "The shi p is yours, I'm no t going to ma ke it." Tw o o r thr ee minu tes afte r that he pa ssed away . ' Be fore we lett the bridge . the re we re so man y a irpla nes , o ne rig ht aft e r the o the r. Eve:r)' time: a to rpedo hit, the s hip jus t kind o f roc ked , And the n wh e n the A r izona ble w up , I never heard a nythi ng tha t lo ud in Illy life . A second wave o f pla nes started to co me in abo ut nin e o'clock . And eve n w hen we d ived off the s hip the)' were still dropping the ir bombs and strafing us. Th is th ing went o n fo r two hou rs. It wa s jus t constant. 'Afte r the attack w as ove r, it wa s ab out te n o 'clock, things got q uiet , except fo r thc burning a nd the: crackling o f the ships. And yo u stand around and loo k. That was wh e n it hit me : " f\. l y God , we 're in a war. we're in a wa r and we've lost it," becau se yo u see all the battlesh ips smo king and tha t's w hen it really hit me . And I just sat do wn a nd cr ied .' \,\'he n the atta ck was o ver, the ban le shtps Ariz ona, Ol sla boma, Nercu la, lfi'SI Virgi nia and

Californ i« had been sunk . staryland. Pennsytranta and Tennessee we re se rious ly damaged. Over 2·100 lost thei r lives in this atta ck, w hic h Preside nt Roos evelt re fe rred to as 'the da y of infam y'. It was an a mazing a nd fortunate co incide nce for the US Navy that the a ircra ft ca rrie rs attached to the Pacific Fleet were all at se a on the day of the attack.

Adm iral lsoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet and architect of the strike against the US Pacific Fleet a t Pearl Harbor.

153

..

154 - •

•

~~r

T H E HA T TI F S U IIJ S

The strick en ba ttleships Tennessee and West Virginia sunk at their moorings after the savage aerial attack fro m Japanese torp edo and

bombe r aircraft .

On Monday, 8 December 1941, the US Congress declared wa r on Japan . In respon se.jap an's allies, Ge rma ny and Italy, de cla red wa r on the United States . Th e US had now be co me the ally Britain so bad ly need ed in what was now a global war against the Axis powers. The attack o n Pearl Harbor was the first of a se ries of co- o rd inated lig htni ng strikes the Japanese wo uld make as they began (Q imple me nt their grea t plan o f co nq uest in the Pacific. O n H December, Ja panese invasion forces invaded the Philippines and Malaya. Gua m, \'(fake Island , the Gilbert Island s and Hong Kon g were also q uick to fall. Britain's bastion in the Pacific was centred on its large naval base in Singapo re, where a huge dry-dock had been built ca pable of hand ling the Royal Navy's largest battleships. Co mb ined British an d Austr alian military forces in Singa pore we re fu lly ex pe cted to halt any futu re j apan ese incursion that might happen in that regio n. Winston Churchill had moved to se nd a naval sq ua dron to Singa pore in the hope it w o uld ac t as a deter re nt to any tho ughts the Jap anese may have in the area. His assessment that a naval sq uadron wo uld be effec tive was a gro ss underestimation of the so phistication of the Jap anese wa r machin e tha t was poised to strike, and the fighting ab ility and strength of its army, navy and airforce pe rso nnel. Churchill's gesture wo uld prove bot h futile and disastrou s.

ERillL ll lSMARCK TO

! • .EARL.1lA1UlO O!ll Rl.-

""'_sn ..II'aI.'mm

r. 155

In Nove mber, via a cha in of eve nts and aga inst Admiralty advice, the new hattleship Prince of \ril les was sent to join th e o ld battlecruiser Repuls e, alre ad y in th e Indi an Ocea n, with o rders to sail o n to Singapore. The two ca p ital shi ps under the co mma nd o f Admiral Tom Phillips, together w ith four d estro yers. a rrived in Singapore o n 2 December 194 1. They were greet ed with a blaze of puhlicity, specifica lly designed to se nd a warn ing ( 0 Japan. The British crews look ed forward ( 0 a relaxed leave in Singapo re. As the last few days of peace in the Far East slipped away. the Admi ralty in Lond on becam e increas ing ly ag ita ted about Pri nce of wales a nd Rep u lse. The y u rged Philli ps to ge t the m away from Sing apore. In the ea rly ho u rs of 7 Dece mb er, sho rtly befo re the attac k on Pearl Ha rbor, j apan ese tran sp orts di sembar ked troo ps o n the no rth-west coast of Malaya , about 400 m iles north of Sing apore . As the J a pa nese tro ops foug ht their wa y down th e Malaya n peninsula through alleged ly imp enetrabl e jungle , th e British po ndered what to d o with the ships . The dipl om at ic, warning effect o f their presence had counted for nothing. Now these ships would have to fight against impossible odd s, and with out aircove r. Ph illip s deci ded to tak e his sh ips , now named ' Fo rce Z', northwards at high speed to inte rcept and d isrupt the japanese invasion , On the evening of 8 December, Force Z sailed from Singa pore. Midshipman He nry Leach, later to becom e British Admira l o f the Fleet , Sir He nry Leach , was in Singapore se rving o n .1 ~l S Mau ritius wh en the two cap ital ships arrived: 'I had been a ppo inted to the Prince of wales , hut before I joined her, my father had been made ca p ta in , so I e nded up in the cru ise r Mauritius , w hic h in fact was in d ock in Singa po re naval base at the time the Prince of wales and Repulse came ou t for the ir final voyage . It had been a very puh lic voyage at every stage, round the Cape, at Mombassa, Colombo. then Singapore. Each stage was scheduled so the wo rld knew, and this was th ought to he a deterrent. So this brand-new ship , very powe rful , very ca pable, but

Flying the flag ot Admiral Tom Phillip s, the battleship Prince of Wales. flagship of Force Z arrives

at the naval base in Singapore on

2 December 194 1.

not yet fully worked up . and Rl1mL'iI.!, a marvellous ship, hut o ld. and with an am i-aircraft arma ment that was frankly laug hable. virtually mig ht not have existed . arrived . 'And these two ships and a co uple of pre tty elde rly dest roye rs were 10 la k e o n the e nu re Japanese Navy . I would call it a rroga nce , a nd a thoroughl y misplaced a rroga nce . J kno w that my fathe r and the ca ptain o f Repu lse rega rded thei r mission as o ne -way. They d id n't thin k the y had an ea rthly cha nce, a nd o f cou rse the y had n't.

' I had d in ne r a lone wi th my father, in Prin ce of Wales. I s u ppose it would have bee n two nights he fore she fina lly sailed. W'e hadn't see n ea ch o ther for inside a year. so we had lot s to ta lk about. And he obviously didn 't like the situation . He asked me w hat I thou ght about it. In my yo uthful ignorano..' I re member sayi ng , "O h, let 'e m come. le t's have a go at the m ." And he tu rned a ve ry sad face to me sayi ng. "I d o n 't th in k yo u have a ny ide a o f the e normity of the od ds we 're up against." And I had n't. \X'<.:II, we

,

talk ed about this am! that an d he sca led up a letter to my mum say ing that I wa s w ith him and a ll that stuff, and that was that. ' I've always been a ve ry poor swim me r, and I was just s plosh ing about in Ihe: po o l to keep coo l and my fathe r sw am o ver to me a nd said , MI pro mised Bill Te nna nt [captain of R(1ml't-i I'd give him a drink be fore we went ha ck on hoard . I as ked if I was included in th is, a nd he sa id , "Ye s, of cou rse." Just before: he: got out o f the: pool he mad e a M

re mark w hic h I thought noth ing of at the time . bu t reca lled su bsequently: "I'm just going to do a co u p le o f le ngths o f the ba th ; you neve r kn ow wh en it may come in ha ndy."

11K'y were prophetic words. Lat er I [oined the m fo r a g lass o f good stuff. I d etected even at that time , these two grea t men we re talk ing at each o the r ac ross the table, because the y di d no t w a nt to d iscuss wit h me the hid e ousness o f the xitun tio n. T hat wa s the last time I saw my fathe r.'

Prince of \full'S a nd Repu lse stee red north-east and then northwards unt il the:y were about 100 miles south of Fren ch Ind o -China . At about 7 p .m. o n 9 Dec ember, they hea ded westwards wi th the intention o f closing the nonhero coast of Ma laya w her e Japan ese troop mo ve me nts had heen repo ned . By this time the ships had been located b y Japan ese a ircraft, and Phillips d ecid ed to abandon the so rtie and return to Sing apore. In the last m inut es o f 9 December. he rece ived an 'im med iate ' sig nal stating that an e ne my land ing wa s un d er wa y at Kuantan . At tha t time , Phillips wa s 150 mile , fro m the co ast a nd slightly nort h o f th is locatio n. At I a .m . o n to December, Ph illips d ecid ed to in vest igate a nd altered cou rse d irectly fo r Kuaru an , arriving o ff the coast at H a .m . By the n, a large force o f twent y-sev en hig h- level bombers p lus sixty-one to rped o plan es had ta ke n o ff from Saigon and was hea ding so uth to find the British ships. At arou nd 11 a .m., they fou nd them. \Vitho ut any air cover, the two British s hips were siuing ducks - easy ta rge ts fo r the Japane se bo mbe r pilot s and the ir crews. In th e first attac k by high -le ve l bom bers, Repulse w as hit by <me bomb that ca used minor damage a m idships . Both s hips contin ued the ir hig h-s peed dash to Singapore. A few m in utes lat er Prince of \f'llles's rad a r p icked u p a seco nd lar ge grou p o f a ircra ft a ppro achi ng , Nine to rp edo bo m bers dropped ou t o f th e s ky to ma ke thei r a p p ro ach , a nd o ne torped o h it the batt leship o n the port side. Th e d amage inflicted h y this o ne to rpedo hit wa s massive : th e w a rhea d had deto na ted near th e o ute r pro pe ller s ha ft, d ose 10 wh ere it e ntered th e hull , To ns o f water e n te red th e s hi p through the o pe ning, putting five o f the s hip's eight tu rbo generators o ut of action , The after half o f the s hip , incl ud ing the fou r ; .2S-inch ( 133-m m ) turr ets and the steering mecha nism lost a ll e lect ric power. Then the attac ke rs tu rned o n Rep ulse. 111e to rped o bombers went in first. Captai n Ten na nt swerved his s hip at hig h speed a nd managed to avoid being hi t. But seconds late r th e se a e rupted arou nd the baulccruise r as the high-level bombers made thei r attac k. In this first attack,

Rep ulse was hit h y o ne bomb.

EltillLlllSMARCK TO l'EARL.l1ARllilJl. __

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -"'_ IIi= .a ,L .._ ~'"'.--..__~ 15 7 _ -,

JlJ~(

ufn..·r midday, as Repulse approac hed the st ricke n Prince of \ril les 10 try to fe nd er assista nce. yt.:1 an othe r large forma tion of to rped o bombers made an attacki ng ru n. R<1JllL..e was hit amidships hUI able to mainta in s peed. Almo st dead in the W :IlC:f. Prince of \nlles was hit

hy four torpedoes on the starboard side. xttnurcs late r it was R<1m Lw' s turn . TIlL' o ld ship h:1(J run out of luck as four torpedoes exploded against her hull . Captain Tennant knee...· she co uld n't survive and gave the order to aba ndon sh ip. J ust after 12.30 . R<1mL..e rolled o ve r and sank wi th her screws Mill turning. Prince of \f'il les lasted :111110 S1 anot her hour, during which time the destroyer tixpress ca me a longside to take off wounded and as many of the c re w as tim e permitted. At 1.20 p.rn, Prince qf Wales rolled over and joined Rep ulse below the shallow wa ters o f the Sou th Ch ina Sea . From a crew of 1309 on board Rep ulse. 513 were lost: from Pnnce of U''liles. 317 of the tota l new of 16 12 died in the battle. 111e sinking o f the Prince of lrilk>s and Repulse by ai r attack co nfirmed the vu lnerability of even the mo ....t heavily armed modern ca pita l s hips to air attack. 111C aeroplane and its deadly cargo of high explos ives had cha nged all th at. The prophesies of Brigadi er -Gene ra l Mitch ell back in the lOs , whe n he Illustrated th e power of the bomber versus the ba ttleship (see Cha pter Eight. page 111), h ad been fu lfilled. l ong befo re this wa r w as o ver. the ai rcr aft ca rrie r a nd the bombe r wou ld revol ut ion ize the conduct and str..lIegy o f naval wa rfare. Or Eric Grove. naval str.ltegis t at Ilull Un ivers ity, rated th e sin king of th e R<1ml"e and Prince of lrilles tot all y hy air attack as 'a ve ry importan t moment in na va l histo ry'.

As the dying battleship Prince of Wales lists to port, crewmen

attempt to board the destroyer Express. From a crew of 1612,

327 went down wit h the ship,

ea---~ ower

versus A

•

ower

the d awn o f 1942, th e whole o f Euro pe and th e Mediterran ean

we re e ng ulfed in war and w ith Jap an a nd the Unite d States now locked in bitter conflict in the Pacific, the world had become a

hu ge battleground . It w as becomi ng clea r th at Hitler's war in Russ ia w ou ld be o f longe r

duratio n than he had predicted . To supply Russia with the vital war supplies

.

it ne eded , convo ys from Britai n and th e Un ite d States w e re heading northwards to Murm an sk, th rou gh th e inhospitabl e Arct ic Ocea n. These Russian convoys became large r, more freque nt and more urge nt - and if the Germans we re go ing to defea t Russia , they had to cut off this supp ly line. They mounted a hu ge effort to sink and d isr upt the co nvo ys, w ith

Tirpitz despatch ed to No rway, arriving in Tro nd heim in January. She wa s followed by the two pocket-battleshi ps Ltitz ow and Admiral Scheer. Tirpitz wo uld never return from her lon ely northern station and, while there , she wo uld be subjected to all manne r of attacks from the British .

_ _ _ _ _ __________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -..:._ii_...iMf~

As an indication o f how seriously the British took the threat from this battles hip, the first of these attacks wa s not o n the ship herself but ag ains t a dry -dock o n the French Atlantic co ast. This dock had been bu ilt at St Nazaire just prior to the wa r for the French liner Normandie and was the only facility und er the control of the Germa ns capable of taking Tirpitz. In March 1942, the old British destroyer Ca mp bell/ow n, with 3 tons of explosive packed into her bows, was driven stra ight into the outer caisson of the dock , wh ere it explode d so me time later. This raid, one of the most remarkable inciden ts of Wo rld War II, was a complete success and put the dock out of ope ratio n for th e rest of the w ar.

The fate of co nvoy 'PQ l T illustrates the ex te nt to which Ttrp itz galvanized the mind s of the British Admiralty, The mere p resence and threat of a battlesh ip exerted an influence o n eve nts out of all prop o rtion to reality. PQ1 7, comp rising thirt y-six ships , left Reykjavik o n 27 Jun e , protected b y an array o f warships includ ing two British and two US heavy cruisers, Two Allied battlesh ips, Duke of York and lVash i,zglon, and the carrier Victorious formed a distant covering force . During the first few days of July, Raeder moved Ttrpitr and Hipper northwards to Altafio rd o n the north ern tip o f Norway, to jo in Schee r. This powerfu l trio o f Ge rma n ca pita l sh ips wa s in place , rea dy to po u nce o n the slow ga gg le o f ships that made u p PQ1 7. They wa ited to rece ive Hitler 's a pproval to launch the attack. In London, the Admiralty was aware of the German plans to strike the convoy, and they knew that Tirpitz had already sailed from Trond heim. On the even ing of 4 July, the convoy was passing

The after twin IS-inch guns of

Tirpitz firing .

,

160

..I.t~4

~

TH E HA I TI E S H I PS

•

exp losive, the British des troy er

we ll to the north of Altafjord - the Admi ralty co ns idered th is the p lace whe re a s urface attack from the Tirpi tz group was a d istinct poss ibility, Shortly after nine in the evening, the Admi ralty

Her bows pa cked with high

Campbelltown has been

s igna lled the heavy cruisers p rotecting the co nvoy to withdraw at high speed. This wa s follo wed

successfully driven on to the dock

by anot her signa l twenty m inu tes later telling the convoy to sca tter. \'('it h permission from Hitler

ga tes at St Nazaire in Ma rch

to sa il granted, Tirpitr left Altafjord at m idda y o n the mo rn ing of; july. to interce pt the convoy. But by early even ing Genna n aircraft and tj-boats had su n k so man y sh ips of the sca ttered convoy

1942. The exp losive detonated

some time otter this photograph was taken , wrecking the dock gates and ensuring that

Tirpitz would be unable to

access the dock.

that Tn pttr vess recalled w ithout firing a shot. The d isaster that had overta ke n PQI 7 had been p recipitated hy the Adm iralty assumption that Tirpitz m igh t be at sea: the co nvoy wo uld have be e n a s itting targe t fo r th e ba ttle ship , and therefore di spersing the s hips appeared the only al terna tive . BUl indi vid ually. th e ships became easy tar gets for s ub mar ine and a ir attack and lOO.()(x) to ns of shipping was su nk . amount ing to almost two-th irds of the to tal co nvo y. Even w he n they rema ined in har bour. the th reat o f th e Ge rma n bat tleships was a co nstant thorn in th e side o f the Allies , and on ly w hen th e y had all been d estroyed would the ships and p lanes - constantly tied lip in h unt ing them dow n - be free to deal wit h the U-boatx a nd the air at tacks on the vita l ("(>I1voys. After Pearl Ha rbor, and th e fa ll o f Singa pore, j apa nese fo rce s sw e p t rapi d ly th ro ug h the Pacific as far south as New Guinea and the So lomon Islands, Australia lay on ly a few h undred miles furt her so ut h . By the end o f Ma rch 1942, the japan ese had ad vanced westwa rds th rou g h Th ailand and Bu rma to s ta nd on th e harder o f Ind ia . The Dut ch and th e Brit ish had been kick ed o ut of the ir co lo nies and the ir forces utterly defeated. TIle crushing blo w to Pearl Harbo r a nd th e loss o f ma ny of her Pacific possessio ns had se rious ly h u rt the Un ited States , but th at situation would soon be redressed. The Pacific wa r tha t follo wed was d ominated by the a ircra ft carrier in a se ries o f batt les on a scale an d over a geograp hica l area u n precede n ted in na va l wa rfare. Th e first o f these carrier battl es w as in the Co ra l Se a in Ma y 194 2. w hen j apan ese pla ns to in vad e Port More sby.

5..E.~'-'D~Il.....}c'E.H~1UUJl.oEJ:lll':.ER

S E A .I)OW ER V E R SUS A I R .p OWE R

-----,.:-_=..,tMllicm . .__.-:. 161

so uthe rn New Guinea, we re thwa rted by the defeat of thei r ca rrier flee t. Intel ligence info rme d them that the re wa s o nly o ne mino r US carrie r fleet in the reg io n that could possibly oppose them. In fact the re were tw o ma jor fleets w hich includ ed the carr iers vortuo u.n and Lexi1lM/011. O n 8 May, ca rrie r-base d ai rcra ft fro m the o p posing fle et s struc k. O ne of the tw o Japa nese

ca rriers . the crack 3D,OOO-lOll, ,34-knot Sbolealeu, w as bad ly damaged a nd w ithdrew from the batt le . IIer planes were unable to land hack o n her fligh t deck and be cau se of sho rtage of space o n the second ca rrie r, 7.11iklllm , man y ha d to land in the se a . It w as a d isaste r for the Japan ese - thei r first such defeat in the wa r, res ulting in the ca nce llat io n of the invasio n. The US carrie r Lex i ng ton w ax a lso lost in th is lxu tlc . Ho weve r, the Ame rican fo rce , in associa tio n w ith the ir Aus tra lia n a llies, had sco red a n im porta nt vic to ry, a nd as Richar d Hou gh in his bo o k Tb e

t.ongest tsaute ex p lains , 'Fro m May 1942 the people of New Zea land and Austra lia have lo o ke d east to No rth Ame rica 6000 mile s di sta nt fo r secu rity from mili tary th rea t, be it Ja pa nese o r Russian, rathe r tha n to a post-Imperial and g ravel y weake ne d Britain o n the o ther side o f the world .' For the first time in na val histo ry, the ships of the o p pos ing sides ne ver came w ithi n sig ht o f o ne ano the r. Instead of 16-inch (406-mm) gu ns hurlin g dea dly she lls 20 miles o r so to destroy the e nemy , carrie r-based bombe rs ca rried d ead ly lo ads of high ex plosive missiles h und reds o f miles to atta ck th e e nemy fleet. It w as a revo lu tio n in na val warfa re that saw the aircraft ca rrier re p lace th e ba ttles hip as the ma jo r, ca p ita l strike -s hip . T he ba ttle shi p w as q u ickl y relegated [0 a second ary role : prote cto r o f the a ircra ft ca rriers - it w as the perfect g un p latfo rm to co mbat air attack, with massive fire po w e r to lay d own su p portive big-gun fire as troo ps

landed on hostile sho re s. But there was still at least o ne g reat naval clash betw een ca pita l ships to

co me in this wa r. Th e Battle o f the CorJ.1 Sea wa s the hegin ning o f the turni ng-po int in the US-led Allied wa r

ag a inst J a pan in the Pacifi c . Aust ra lia had be en saved from in vasio n a nd th e thre at to the Japan ese fleet o f any attack fro m land-based bo mbe rs o perating from the Austra lian mainla nd had beco me a reality. For the first tim e since Pear l Harbor, Japan had lost o utright contro l o f the seas, a nd their ca rrie r-based aircraft no long er co uld fly un o pposed o n any a ir attack o n Allied bases o r s hip pi ng . O nly a month late r, in the Batt le o f Mid wa y in Jun e 1942, US forces st ruc k at the Japanese w ith a ve ngea nce , sin king fo ur carrie rs w ith the loss o f o nly o ne o f their o w n. In the six months since wa r had been de clared, the Unite d States and its Australia n allies had e limi na ted the core o f Japan 's e lite ca rrier fo rces. Japanese naval-air superiority had d efinitely been h rok en - the real turni ng-po int in the wa r had been rea ch ed . Th e o nly ma jor co nfro ntatio n bet we e n ba ttleships to ok place some fo u r months late r, o ff the so u the rn tip o f the Solomo n Islands. Afte r th re e months o f hitter a nd d esp er ate fig hting , Japan ese troop adv an ces through the Solomo ns we re finally checked at a place that has become etc he d in histo ry - Gua dalca nal . O n 12 Nove mber a Japan ese invasio n force , protected by heavy cru ise rs and the ba ttles hips H tet and K irisb i ma , sa iled into Iron Bott om Sound betw een Savo Island and Gua d alca nal. Their o b jective w as to land troo ps o n Gua da lca na l, wh ile th e tw o battleships bomba rded He nd e rso n Field, the US base at the nort hern tip o f the isla nd. In the ea rly ho u rs of 13 No ve mber the Japanese ships were p icked u p o n radar b y a US naval fo rce co m p rising five heavy cru ise rs a nd e ight destroye rs. How eve r, these rada r images were m isinterpr et ed and the US s hips ste ame d straig ht o n , into the path o f the powe rfu l force o f Japanese figh ting ships. In the space o f tw enty min utes, a nd at ra nges as short as 1000 ya rds (900 metres), the Japanese battleships inflicted severe d amage o n the Amer ican s hips. lIieh v as h it h y s he lls from th e cr uise rs Sa n Fra n cisco a nd Port land. Th e foll o wing d a y, H iei w as attack ed b y US a ircraft fro m the ca rrier Enterprise and from He nderson Field, a nd so badly damaged that she wa s scu ttled hy her cre w tha t evening. O n 14 Novem ber, the Ja pa nese ma d e a second s uccessful atte m pt to land tro ops o n

.:1 .!i,

1';,1-

162 -"~7

T HE OATI l ES H IPS

Guada lcanal. At the sa me time, the Ja panese 2nd Flee t un de r Adm iral Kon do in the battleshi p Kirisbima. in co mpany wi th heavy cru isers and destro yers, retu rned to shell Henderso n Field . With p rio r knowled ge of this attack thro ug h deciphe red signals, the US Co mmander-in-Chief South Pacific, Ad mi ral Halsey, d ispa tche d the new lri-inch (40G-m m) g u nne d banlexhips Sou th D akota and v;ra sh i ngl oll to interce pt the Japanese . At a minute past midn ight on 15 Nove mbe r. the US ba ttleshi ps made radar co ntact with the Ja pan ese force head ing so uth to Guadalcanal . eastwa rds of Save Isla nd . Sixteen m in utes late r, stee ring a nort h-westerl y course , the US ships ope ned fire on the Ja pan ese ships . O nly min utes into the action, ele ct rica l failu res ca used lo ss of power o n Sontb D alenta. followed immediatel y by the fa ilure of her main radar. Inad ve rte ntly, she head ed towa rds the main ene my for ce. Captain Erling Hustvcdt US Navy (Retired) , a young sa ilor onboard South Dakota. vividly recalls the incid ent: '\Ve lost a ll o ur radar exce pt for o ne singk , main battery. fire-co ntrol radar in the after mast. All our sea rch radar, our navigating radar, o ur anti-aircra ft rad ar were a ll o ut. w hen the battl esh ip Wash ing/ CHI asked, "Do you wa nt 10 go in aga in?" our capta in said, "No ." \Ve co uldn't go - in effec t we were blind .' The Jap an ese ships illuminated South Dakota by sea rchlight at a range of abo ut 5000 yards (457 2 metr es) a nd , glaringly ex posed , she came un der co ncentra ted tire fro m K i rish i nuts 14inch (355-mm) gu ns and the heavy cruise r's 8-inc h (20,3-mm) main armam e nt. Within a short spa ce o f time , South Dakota was he avily da maged, ta king twen ty-se ven shell hits in her superstructu re. Howe ve r, the Ja panese we re co mple tely un aware that wash ington. using rada r, was clo sing rap id ly in th e dark . wh en th e ra nge was do wn to H'-jOO ya rd s (7 680 me lres), \Vllsb iHg/ on o pe ned tire o n Kirish ima, sha tte ring he r w ith 16-inch (406-mm) shells at al most poi nt-blank ran ge. In just se ve n minutes, seve nty-five Jri-in ch she lls we re fired at the Japanese battleshi p , of which nine score d definite hits. Red uced to a sha mb les. Kirisbimccs crew scuttled the stricke n vessel. South Dakota survived the battle, bu t the morning light revea led the extent of the da mage she had sustained . Erling Husrve dr reme mbe rs: 'As I stepped ou t of the wa rdroom, there was a hody slos hing a roun d in so me wa ter. I we nt up anoth e r wa y, past lifelines, and the re we re strew n rema ins o n the lifelines, so I we nt hac k in a nd climbed up in the mast a nd saw these holes all over the place. As I got up ncar the to p of the inside of the mast structure , whic h was a conical structure, I began hea ring a no ise . It so unded almost like a mach ine-gun. I thou ght, "What's goin g on now?" I knew that it was n't gunfire. So I opened a doo r to the very top of the ship a nd there was our big hattie co lours flap ping in the bree ze in the mo rning . O ur hattie flag was still there.' The destruction of the ba ttles hip K tri sbima by the ba ttleship WilSb il1g/0 11 wa s the last time tha t a battle e nded with the sinking of one d read nought by anot her, The Ja pan ese we re de vastated by the loss of the ir cap ital ship a nd , altho ugh the grou nd for ces in and a ro und Guadalca na l foug ht o n for mo re th an thre e mo nth s in so me of the tough est a nd most ho rrific ba ttles of the wa r before the Allies claimed victory , a lot of the sting had gone o ut of the Ja pan ese attack. O pe rating for such a lo ng period, so far from thei r home bases. the Ja pan ese nava l forces we re begi nnin g to sho w the stra in of w ha t the y knew would be a fig ht to the fin ish . And the re was still a lo ng fight ahead before the final battle of ' x'o rld wa r II. As eve nts in the Pacific we re moving rapidly to sto p the Jap anese, the Battle of the Atlantic was still ragin g, wi th the Germa n If-boa rs ca us ing inest imabl e da mage to th e Allie d wa r e ffo rt. The threat of Germa n battleships bre aking into th e Atla ntic o r cutting loose aga inst su p ply convoys to Russia in the Arctic and Baltic rem ained a major head ache for the British Admiralty.

LYIill;5.lli'LA.J..B.,cl!.C~EJL

SEA .)JOWE.R VE RSIIS A I R . IJOWER

Throughout 1943 and 1944, raids we re mou nted against Titpitzfrom carrie r-bo rne aircraft a nd remarkabl e little vessel s, midget subma rines ca lled 'X-cra ft'. In Se pte mbe r 1943 six X-cra ft, each with a en.-w o f fou r, were taken in tow by a submarine to attack Tirpita at her moorings in Kafjord. Two of these tiny craft were able to place 2 tons of explosive, with time charges fitted . on the seabed unde r the battleship. On the morning o f 22 Septe mbe r the charges ex p loded. causing se rious damage to the sh ip's a rmame nt a nd propulsion syste ms. Repair ships were sent from Germany. hut it wo uld not he un til March 1944 that Tirpitzwas sea wo rthy again. Scharnhorst» mine da mage ca used d uring the 'Cha nnel dash ' was repaired, and during the second ha lf of 19·i2 she carried o ut extensi ve exercises in the Baltic to bring her back to o pe rationa l status. In Janu a ry 1943 a number o f attemp ts to sai l the battleship to Norway we re foiled hy Ultra decrypts that ga ve the British earl y warning o f her movements. It was no t un til early March 1943 that Scba rnbo rst finally mad e it to To rway. Her presence the re with Tirp itz was e no ugh for the British to su sp end Russian convoys until the compa rative safety of the winter darkness. Ge nna n Naval High Command. meanwhile, was doing wh at it co uld to d issuade Hitler from his insistence that these ships be decommissioned. At the beginning of September 1943 Hitle r gran ted permi ssion for a short so n ic against British installations o n the island o f Sp itzbe rge n. It wa s after th is raid that the Xvcraft a ttac k on Tirp it z c rip p led the battleship . During the period that Tirpitr w es being re paired . Scha rnb orst re mained the Ger man Navy's o nly o pe ra tional batt leshi p. In Novembe r the Russia n co nvoys wer e resum ed . By th is time, the war in Russia was go ing badly for the Ge rma n Army. The o nus was sq uarely o n the Ge rman Nary to stop these supply

-"i..-.m "~II''' ''

The US battleship South Dakota armed wi th nine 16-inch guns, during her trial period in July

1942.

163

'The Channel Dash - the breakout from Brest, 12 February 1942',

The battleships Scharnhorst and

Gneisenau with air-eoverfrom the Luftwaffesailing up the

English Channelunder the noses of the British, to return home to Germany. (painting by Robert

Taylor, reproducedcourtesy of the Military Gallery. Bath , UK.)

~

/J.. k 7-

T il E D A T TI E S II I P S

166 - •

con voys gett ing th rou gh to M urmansk . O n the even ing of Christmas Day 19-1 3, Scha rnho rst sailed fro m Alraflord in co mp any wi th fiv e destro yers under the co mman d of Vice-Ad miral u cy. Their ta rge t was Co nvoy JW 55B: n ine teen fully loaded me rcha nt sh ips tha t had left Loc h Awe in Sco tland five days ea rlier. Scha rnhorst a nd the five destroyers sailed into the teeth of a gale at s ub-ze ro te mpe ratures. Tw o Briti sh w arship gro up s w ere at sea providi ng co ver for the convoy: 'Force 1', wi th three cru isers, Belfast, Noifolk and Sbeffiela. and 'Force 2', w ith th e hattl eshi p Dulse of yo,.k and the cruiser j amaica un der th e co m man d of Ad mi ral Sir Bruce Fraser. Ult ra decryp ts had alerted Fraser that th e German force was at sea. Sub-Lieu tenan t I Icnry Leach w as gu nn ery offi cer in 'A' turret o n !Juke of York. He rem em bers o nly too clea rly how col d it was: 'You slept at yo ur q uarters, and so we di d that night, excep t that we d idn't sleep because there \...'as too m uch mo vement. You couldn't stay in a camp-be d , and it w as bloody cold inside the turrets. Alt hou gh they had hlack radiat o rs, yo u we re exposed and had not hing but hard armo ur between yo u and the atmosp here. The salt sp ray w as freezing on the guard rails and o n the forecas tle. It w as very uncomfo rtab le, And w e d id n't have m uch new s, not much o f an update on the movement s o f Scba rnhorss, Crew members of the battleship

Duke of York in front of the guns

As Scha rnhorst sailed nort hw ard.s tow ards Bear Island , the convoy was ap proxi mately 200 mil es

of her forward 14-inch turret.

to the north-west, also head ing towa rds the island. Weather co nditions w ere atrocious - heavy ~,l .

~\

SEA.pOWER VE RS OS AIIk£O..WER '.E:IL

seas and a fo rce H g ale , d rivin g rain and sn ow. At aro u nd 7 .30 a.rn. on 26 D ecem b er. Bey in

Scb aruborst orde red the dest roye rs to ran o ut and sea rch fo r the con voy. At the same time, the two British battl e groups we re d o sin g in , co n verg ing w ith the Ge rma n baulcshtp. Fo rce 1 w as fi rst to m ak e co ntact. At HAn a.m . the cr uise r Belfast picked u p Scba rnborst o n her rada r. T he Ge rma n shi p w as on ly 30 m il es sou th o f t he convoy. Fifty m in utes later, wi th th e range

red uced to 1 .~ . ()OO yards ( nea rly 12,O()() m etres), th e o rd er was given fo r the Briti sh cru isers to o pe n fi re. A'm/ olk landed tw o hits wu h her x- tnch ( 203-m m) g u ns: one p ut Scba rnhorst:s mai n

rad ar, at the to p o f her hridge, ou t o f act ion w hile the o the r hit a mids hips. Scbn rnborxt immed iatel y tur ned so uthwards and, at top s peed, soon left the purs uing cru isers in he r wake. At 9.55 a .m. Be y turn ed no rth-c ast, head ing for the convo y. Th e cruise rs of Fo rce I steered a co urse w hich wo uld pla ce the m to the west of Scbarnborst, be tween the ene my shi p and the

convoy . An ho ur late r the y were in positio n hUI had los t radar contact w ith Scha rnhorst. Sho rtly a fte r noo n, ,,'cba rnhorst tu flled west wards to close the co nvoy. This mov e too k the Ge rman s hip close r to the Britis h cruisers a nd ttetf ast rega ined radar contact. Around 12.15 p.m ., both sides were in visua l contact. Scbarnbors t aga in turned awa y and headed so uthwards, pursued h y the cr uise rs . In an e xchange o f she llfire, Norf olk too k a numbe r of hits, p utting 'X' turret and he r radar sets o ut of ac tion. SbeJfield received min o r da mage. Scha rnho rst wa s hit , alt houg h no! seriously . At to p s peed, s he maintain ed the sou the rly co urse that wo uld ta ke her hac k to the sa fety of her bo rne base at Altafjord . This turn o f eve nts wo rked o ut pe rfectly for Adm iral Frase r: Scba rn hors t was una wa re tha i the Britis h Fo rce 2 was stea ming in to a posit io n tha t wo uld

CUI

off its safe ro ute back

10

Altaflo rd . Sub-Lieutena nt Leach :

' It was no w Bo xing Da y a nd w e w e re a t action stat ions. \Ve had a rev o lting me a l at o ur q uarte rs. lt could n't have bee n mo re Ina ppro priate . hu t never mind , a nd eve rybody see med we ll seasic k, even in a g reat ship like that. I think it was just befo re five o' clock in the eve ning, p itc h da rk of co urse h y the n, that we got o ur first rada r co ntac t and ho pes sta rted to rise . Bruce Frase r, the Co mmande r-In-Chief. made it q uite clear that he would ho ld fire until the enemy got w ithin 6 miles, around 12,000 ya rds . The n he would ha ve. the acco mpa nying cruiser, Jamaica , illu minate w ith sta r s he lls a nd we would o pen lip w ith the Iii-inch 1355-mmJ and the 5-2-5s.' Fraser ma noeu vred his s h ip into position an d , just afte r 5 p. m ., a s ta r shell illu mina te d the fast-moving Ge rma n battles hip . Sub-Lieute nant Leach : . 'Yo u could n't see mu ch thro ug h a turret telesco pe - we were lo w down and co ve red in sp ray . II was a pret ty murky view, hUI in the light o f the sta r sh e ll yo u co uld actu ally see this huge s hip loo ming close r. It was a ppa ren t that he r turre ts we re trained fo re and aft. \'!;'e had jumped he r - ca ug ht he r hy s urp rise . She immedia tel y tu rned aw ay a nd we o pe ned fire at o nce, of co urse, and got a few ea rly hits, hUI no thing of consequence. In those weat her co nd itio ns s he had the le gs o n us, s he co uld ste a m fas ter into the sea s 10 ge t hack to Norway tha n we co uld. Th e r..mge , w hich had bee n down to 6 miles, started to open .'

Scbarn borst sw u ng to th e nort h h UI was met h y fire fro m Belfast a nd Norfo lk. A h it from /Juke (g' Yc)rk dis abled o ne o r Scha rnhorst's forward turrets . The Ge rma n gu nn e ry so o n stea d ied a nd s he lls stradd led the British baulcs htp . A twenty-minu te d ue l e ns ued , du ring w hic h time Scba rnborst incre ased the range ste ad ily. Scb arnborst was quicke r tha n the British bat tleshi p hUI no ma tch for the /)ll h~ (if Yo r,(/ s radar-di rected I-t-inch C3S;-mm) g uns. fli t a fter hit landed o n the Ge rman battleshi p , includ ing o ne that pie rced he r a rmo ure d belt a nd deto nated in :\'0 .1 boi ler roo m. Stea m lines we re severed, cut ting ofT power to the main turbines . In this o the rw ise

-"'_ IIi--.i.. ,;~-.. .~1---111--.:. 1 67 _ . _

..

168 - •

~~7

T ilE BA T TI E S H I P S

un equal hattie , Scha rnho rst's greatest attribute - he r s peed - was no w gravel y affected . SubLie utenant Leach : 'We had ap pa re n tly go t a hit aft an d it ca used a red uctio n in speed , and to o ur imme nse deli g ht , the rang e co unte rs, instead o f tick ing u p , ste ad ied and sta rted to tick

down . That was the heg inning of the end.' Fo ur destroyers that had been trying despera tely to o verhaul Scha rnhorst we re now able to close on the wo unded battleship . At a ra nge of less than five miles, the y fired to rpedoes into both sides of the ship . One hit o n the starboa rd side an d th ree o n th e port. Th e fate of Scha rnhorst was se aled. Du ke of York, Jamaica and the Fo rce 1 cruisers all joined in the destru ction of the prou d and powerful Ge rma n battleship. Sub- Lieutena nt Leach recalls: 'We dosed right in, literally [Q poi nt-blank range . It was a horribl e sight rea lly. '111e ship was o n fire from end to e nd, and yo u co uld see fran tic figures jum ping ove r the side - yo u rea lly lasted a maximum three minutes in those waters. So it was very unpleasant , but it wa s a succ ess. She was a very fine ship.' At 7.45 p .m ., shro uded in dense smoke , e xce p t for the d ull glow of o ut-o r-cont ro l tire s, Scha rnborst s maga zin es e xp lo ded as she ro lled o ve r o n her sta rboa rd side a nd sank -.Like Bism arck before her, Scha rnhorst had displ ayed an incred ib le fighting sp irit and rem ar kable po wers of resista nce . Fro m a crew of over 2000 men , o nly thirt y-six were picked up fro m the b itte rly co ld Arctic Sea. Sub -Lie ute na nt Lea ch's e latio n w ith the victo ry was soo n o ve rco me by the sig nifica nce o f the mom ent: 'There' s o ne 's feeli ngs at the e nd of this. Th ere 's an affinity A 12,OOO-pound Tallboy' bo mb being loaded on to a Lancas ter bom ber. This type of bomb was

used with devas tating effec t agains t Tirpitz in November 1944.

69l

"') !lI !s s o d Ui! s p !eJ 1l 1 ~ ! I ,{ I :P apmu Sll l~ ! l1 ;)!I,'lJ V ~ 1l! 11 "'1l 1l~ 1I .') , .')JOP li 1I0 ! 0 ) P ;)U!llIJ ;)PP ;)J;) ,\\ lIS!!!J \! ;)lII 111\! ·SS.')I.')s n

·')\P q S!ll U

,{ p'\ !}.)'').I.P ,\ \ OU SI~,\\ ·<'f.J. ilJ llI ~·.1f/ ,{ 1l 1 ~ ! 1lI ;H ll .l0 d !lIs

J.'))S!S 'P '')lI ;)1111:'1 Ul:UU·')9 ;)IIlJo .')P !Ju ;)111 ;)."')UO ·ZI.Ul l .'.L ·J I~.\\ ;)111 .1° .,)~1 :1S S!l ll 11: ;) 1 4 1~ =1 U! II I U I1 SI:.\\ .( u n llJ ' )9 U! =1Jo .\ \ P J1:.(=1."')op J O !I~ llI P U I~ ·J;) .\\ OU 1I.\\O J;)lf J;) PU I1 .').\OlU 0 ) '') l q l~ lI n .\ I....Pld ltl (l."') .\\ OU SI:.\\ Z I.IlI I!.L ' )J l~ lf S J'"') JFxIOJu I: ~U! lJO IS!P ,{Ip ix i 'lIlUl sdtqs aqr j o u t-d J.... l.1 l: .')111 0 1 ;)~nlll:p J....lfU nJ p ."lSIl1:..J S;)SS!UI JI~;)U · p ....JO.1S ;lJ;).\\ SI!11 P ;)J! P Oll II~nmp II~ ' p Ul: sqUloq S)! pod dorp ).J1:.DJ! I: Ip l:.... II1U ' U!t(S ;l l ll

P....mosqo

.( 1I 1: ! U l~U pnop ·1:....J r. );l~Jl~) ;)lp P ;)lpr.....J .(;l lll U....lf l ~\ ',( C,\\JO ~

tu aquou

JO) p '')Pr.;)11 PU1~ IIl I1Olll . ..!SSOl )).-ll SJ;lIS l~.",)Ul:-1 p .")U!pmu ;)S;l lfJ j O O.\ \ l- ,( U!11l PqoPQ 6 (: UQ ' P ;) IIr.ISU! S)jU1:) 1;)11) ;)~ U1:J-~uo l ' l l~ U () ! I ! P P I: ;) . \ I~ l l pUI : ";) U !~U ;l InjJ;).\\ ( ><..! arour t(1!,\\ p ;l l1!J .-xl 0 1 P;) .')U oSI!: Pll1o .\\ I) 'J IlOll lJ1: 1!u )j.)( l."') S)! p ur. S) JJIll un~

roddn -puu SI! ) 0 )v KIOPIS ;xI 0 1 p."'},"')lJ P (l1O.\\ ;)UI:IO Ipr.;l P ;)!J! P
sq tuo q

' I tl ~!U 1: lpns ;)=11:U1 0.1 ' IJ I:.1.)J !I: J ISI;."')U I:"I

,{o q lp :.1. ~ u!s n Z I!II I.I.L .{OJ 1S;) P

pu u

)j.)I:I W 0 1

pe ;)lp:

Ill . ...\ \ .. lJI:ld ' IS;)J P llm .\\ ,( W I\! I I~,{ ON ;)111 JO U :IV}I ;n ll J;l lll !;l U ' ll~O Ll I~ p .... u puu.u U!lj S....ll wq u euu.... 9 . :p ll p -;)l Ul: I, .")UO S!l P U;),, ;) ;) 1!1!iX.\ ' P Ul:!I(),"')S lIJ .")lI UOU U! Ijl IlOlU ;)!SSO'1 UI<)JJ ~ U ! '{ lI SJ.... quioq J;)l s e .)lIq JO SI!UI!! J1 : U O! l1~J ;)U O ;)1(1 1I0 1l1 ~P z w l tU nptnorq oS II: IW lf pmwqm os ;).\O Ul ;.111.1.

"P1;)!.PP: s OJ IlP Jl:\ 1 ,{q JI:;")ll ·SJ....HI ~U 06 1 /\\:1 JO ucupenbs I~ P ;)!I001lS . ..J J 1~ ,\\).J n' I ;'llll · u O!p . ..xud J! e ;)p !.\oJd

11~ ,( q p ll l:IS 11 0 0)

; p U1~

pruoq

u o P;lU !I~UJ ;)J .\ \ ;)J.) ) O 11I....i uojd iuc o 1111) V '111.10.\ \ Jlljlq llOP ) O P~Jl:1 1~ . ..llIO.1."'XI p l:q z l.ul lU ' s p u o p.xUO)-!IU1: ;).\ !!."'). ..IOJU lII!,\\ ;lPIOUJO.1 · P ;)lf u . ..U ·USlUOJ.1 O1 II1IlOS ,(;)UJ IlO! ;)1!lU-oC; 1 ;)lJI ;) )jl: lU 0 ) pJOU ~:)I .10 1110 P:KflU!1 1~."'S ,;)IIJ ) 0 IUr.!tl p ;un!u! .( 1I11XI ';)ll! 'J:K loPQ ~ 1 u o 'p uc SUO!II1IO.\ ....J .\ \ 0 1 1l~ .( lInjo...JI"") uru s;)u!~u.") J;)II

"P....qoicd ;)J;l.\\ s.woq s ,z/.I(/..I.'.1 ';) lq l:J:xlo p u r. J....lr..\\ ;).\(X lr.

1I!I~llI."'J

Pl n o .\\ s untl J;)lJ ' :-(U!S P!P ;)I{s .I! lel{l os p .")J l:d ;)JU SI:,\\ 1lI0))(XI PUl~S n o s l~ ((1!.\\ I{ U;l(1 , \\ O Il I~ l l s (I~ P'")u s V ·QSUlOJ.1 11: P:,\!·\J IlS .10 ri,) Ul~ lJ.J J;)ll;)q n p OOlS rill S )l~ 11l u l~ ! ss nH

ro 4 S!IP U ;)Iq!ss od ,{u r.

P.... P p

.")p SI:.\\ I I ' :-(.) I~ l1l: P UI:I

IS U ! I:~ I~ .u .")lll x l ~ U!WO U r. sc . ...u ...... lips P IIlO,) Z I.III '.'.L II;)) ' f l 6 1

U! ,\.\ I~ i': ueUIJ;)9 ;)1(1 JO P ! qJ - U !-J.JP U1~U IlU OJ SI: J;)P.1 I:N P ;)P ;);'),)·1I1S P l:lf o q .\ \ 'z l!UO( 1 1I:I!U1P" ' 1I ! 1~~ 1 : (l~1I0 !H:I."l<10 '{lInJ :Xl J;).\ ;)II PP1O,\\

U!q s ') 1111XI l uq~ ;'lll } ·'l.JO,\\ nrd ar pJ eA.)j.) OP JO!I:U1 1I10l11!1.\\ ·p.1Z!!!q o u IlU! '{ I J1 ~ ) 1l 1 ISOlLlJ1: 11.').')(( pl:q

z l.lIl t,{l -anu.mns p J I:.\U 0.l J;) l( 0 ) ;)~t: ll ll : P ."),q l:.1....P!s u o .) p .")S1l1:."') p tl1:

paxour }SI:!q

SnOlUJOll;) ;)11.1. ' IIn q d lJI J;)P UIl ~ U ! I1~U OPP ' s ,\\ o q

S~ U ! )I:.")S J !'')l!l

p.uno uu uun

Jlo S;)U!j u .') J;'llJ

s .d! lIS ;llll qt'in o J ti1

p .)SSI:U P ll1~ p Kn:) ~") l ll l!lJ qlll o q ;)UO '1.1 1:.1 U! IIlU ' ;l P l~ U I ;XI P II1O.\\ SIll( ,( UI: H:tll '{I;»)j!lu n '{ l lj ~ ! lJ S I~,\\ I! II~ nmfl j1~ ·.( I:.\\.( U1~ ;) jOlUS ;)lJl 0 1U! orlJ I~.) '{ I P I~;) P JJ;l tll

poddcup

' UO!I!SOO S,U!IIS ;'llll P;) I I~;).)lJ( D .( lIn j ..sroons H:l1l :l )jOl llS )O ~UP;).\o.)

SJ:X luu x I 1 U1~!~ . ..I)l .l0

asuop I:

.\uJ:j \,

p.') II"J;lU;)~ U!l!S....llllXI

;)I P J C;)U P;)UO!)!SOO S;) U ! I P 1~ lU ;)'l.Ol US ;l Ip 'z /.Id l .J.L P;)I PIX >Ju dl~ sJ,')1sl:.) ur:-I X!S-,{U!t ll .")1(1 s V Tu oll F~i U! P."llJl.I.'l<. 1

sr..\\ Z/.IdJ.J.L

S I~ ' U!CIP H 1II:I)l J....rpm ' C! ~"S I1 H U! 1 ;l~UI:lJ ·)J " U1()J)

J·'l<.llU."l1U.1S C; 1 UO ' NJ U ;) 11.1. ' ;)p e w ;)J;) .\\

srdiua nu

·(U 0 ) SJ."))SI;'1111::'1 ;)111 p.")J! I1I>.")J

;);)Jlj.1 ·s.{(XIllr..1 ;'S;)111 ~u! s n O!lJs ;)lJI

0 ) UO P .")lfI:-J ;)J;) .\\ PIII~UIUI OJ J.:xIUlo n :l V}!)O SUOJ(11:l1bS J .")ISI~1111:'l

6

p ili:

Ll9

' t ~'6 l

q uroq

SO:\ ' III: JOj p m:

.'),1110 z/.Icll .l.L ) 0 n :....JlJ I ....lp .....\O Ul;)J 0 .1 ·u (x h :.....\ \ r. Ipns IS U !l~~I~ ;).1Ut:lJ.1 ;) 11I!I PU1~) '" P lllo.\\ "'1..).")(1 p ....J IlOUUr: ( llI U1- C; 'Z~ I ) lJ·)U !:l - 1);lU ~!S.-lP ~ uJ;lq ....J.....\\ SO!lj S.-lf1 Hx l J;)lf) O :'IlIl pm: zl.ul l!.l. ;)llI !1.'1lf l 11: )S!x . .. I.UP!P lIod)~ .....\ \ I: Ip n S ' ~ u ! n: u o p p ;)JOFK I ;));lJ.J UO.1

.10 (S;lJ P UI <» P .").1 OZ 0 1 o n ....lI:.1P u .')u

P llm.1 P Ul~ SUOI <) p.")q ~ ! ....,\ \ ,{ oq ll l~.1 " { ;) Il I:A HIIl H ....1(1 U! s u n: p ISU W~I : '{UI1.1s ...').) .11lS p.')..11 .q l llOq ~ ll P ll I10 q . ;l Ip p ....UOI;'lA;)P '{ls n o !,\ ri.ld P l:lf o q .\\ s HfI:l.\\ S;) UJ I:U

.I U All

P ;) lI ~ ! S ;)P s e .\\ ·. ,{o q lf1:.L.

p . ..UIl:lI ' q Ulo q S! If.1. ·,{e.\ \ J o N P U1~ ;).) U1:J.-I ' ,( 1I1:UIJ '")9 U! SlI;'lO )I~ oq - n ·")l·...J:) UO.) ;).\ !SSl:lU Ils !lOl u <"')p 0 1 pli e ulUlo J J."XIUloH .:IVH ;'li ll ,( q ....s n Jo.l U !1~ } P H II! P .')d o l.").\ .lp u .')."l<.1 p l:lJ q uu KI l~ ' ;)IU!) S!l{I .\ U 's U!lJS;)!lll XI U l~UIJ.-l9 ;)\( I .10 ISI~ 1 ri1l1 P;)u !l~W;)J

;) { Il

,\\ .")1I

z l.Id,u. ' )ju n s l~mqll.mq:J.\· lJl !A\ : '1.1l: w: J.")pp:J ;n ll

\lI OJ) P;).\ I~S S I~.\\ .\ o. \ u o.) . ..lJ) ';lS.m o."') ) o pU V ·.\ lU.")U....

;)If)

lOll - UI....ll1)OU p U1: UO.\\ p l:1{ H:lJ) ...n sr. ,\\

.u.. ..\ ....J.Tm .{ u . ..q .\\

".:'IJ;) IP '1l1!lll 1 ' P~ U 0 !1 Ol ll ;) ;)JOl U ;)JI~ 110 .( lb ....)s ) 0 U04s P lll: p.")J !)

os ' )l~ lJ I IIl( XIr. u O!ls :'In h

I! )l~lll .P!IrlJ ;)SU;.))U! )0 lIl q · ~ U !1 r.0 I ~ )0 lOll ·t'iU!l;.);.)) I: lJl! .\\ SI!,\\ I!

ou

;)..odo n ...

I PlII~ P;) J !) .U ;).\ OS(1: ;)J;),\\ ;).IX\ ' 1U;))X;) U1~ 0 ) 1:!~JI:1s0U )0 ;)}OU l: IPJ n o ,{ p u e ' U ;) U Il~;)S 1I.")."l.\\1.'l<.1

.",a e

~l\~S1f3'~-;y]'S

170

..

,

~~-

~ ~_.

---':Tll.E_J IAT I LE5 ll1I!S

O n Sunday morning. 12 Nove mbe r 1944. thirty-two heavily laden Lanca ster» climbed slowl y into th e ai r a nd fo r th e last time h eaded fo r Ttrpttz. The y a p proached th e ta rgvt in p erfect weathe r. Boh Nights was th e p ilo t of o ne of those l.an ca su..-rs: ·\'\'c co u ld sec Tirpi tr 30 miles away. Visihilit y was absolutel y clea r. She wa s lyin g th er e in th e water, and we jus t lined up for the bo mbing run . She defen ded he rself as best SIH: could . hut she didn 't have the fighter protection she sho uld have had and she d id n't ha ve the smo kescreen that they had .u Kaafiord, so in the circu msta nces. sh e was more o r less d o omed.' Unaware: tha t the sh ip had been l11oVL'd, the Luftwaffe had scra m bled thei r fighters :II1U se nt the m no rth w ards to KMjo rd . Ig n ori ng the fire fro m th e b au lcxh ip 's a nt i-a irc raft gu ns , the bo m b ers s low ly a nd very d e lib e ra te ly lin ed u p for thei r h om h in g ru n . O n h o ard Tt rpttx. Lieu te na nt Han s Mulle r wus in com ma nd o f a 20-mm (O.7<J- inc h) an ti-aircraft b a tte ry. He vividl y re members that morning: '\X'e sounded th e a larm ~H ap prox ima tel y RjO a. m . En.. . ryone was at hattie stat io ns hy a qu arter to n ine. It was a beautiful s u nny d ay. a perfect d a y. About 20 miles ~I way we cou ld make o ut without glasses someth ing flyin g in th e a ir. Th en the p lan es flew away a littl e b e ca use o u r 15·int'h 1381-m mJ g u ns were firing at them . J thi n k it W ;I S about 9 .30-9.35 when th e first three Lan ca stcrs released th eir bombs.' Bob Nig hts: 'In itia lly I pointed th e ae ro p la ne ut the ship. th en th e bomb-ainu-r sa id . 'Le ft, left . right. right: e tc . Whe n w e g o t o n th e fina l run , he mad e ad justme n ts to the b omb-sight . laking into accou nt the heig ht of th e aeropla ne. the te mperat ure . an d also he wo u ld h ave b e en give n th e d rift and grou nd s p e ed by th e naviga to r. w hen we

gOI

o n the

bombing ru n, the b omb-ulm er ad justed th e g ro u nd sp eed to keep rig ht o n the ta rge t. If we bega n to drift he co u ld mo ve his d rift record er. And when he did that it a lte red an indica tor o n the pilot's ins tru ments. the a rro w wo u ld mo ve an ti it was my job to p ut th e aeroplan e und er th e ar row . a n d th en you wou ld g el lined up again , It w as e xtre mely accu ra te and eventuall y the homh was d ropped a uto ma tica lly hy Ihe sight when we got to th e rig ht place in th e bombi ng cycle. And we did exact ly that. ' It is likel y tha t three 6-ton bombs scored di rect h its wh ile seve ral o thers we re near m isses.

One bomb sliced through her armoured deck before exploding with devast ating effect . Ot he r p ossible hit s a nd n ear mi sse s ca used ma ssiv e d amage

10

th e sh ip 's hu ll. Boh i\igh ts : 'T he

bomh uimc r and engineer wa tched these bombs go do wn on th e sh ip. and alongside the s hip . \'\'e kn ew then that the sh ip cou ld n't survive .' Hans J\li.i lle r: 'w hen the first h omhs h it. the ligh ts went o ut and my te le p ho ne d id n 't work :ln y mo re . I cou ld o nly givc co mma nd s h y voice to th e g u ns next

10

me . \X'e ha d ahout s ixty-

fou r 20-m m g uns o n the Tirp ite; a ll ove r the ship. I cou ld co u nt about fou r or five b o mbs. The sh ip rea lly gOI throw n o u t of th e water. It mo ved eve n feet o ut o f the wa te r hy the tre me nd o us underwater suctio n o f the bo m bs - the 6- to n h omhs [ust reall y p uxlu..d th e s h ip ou t of the wat er .' Tirpitz d e veloped a se rio us list to port a nd . as th e ang le beca me more acute. the stricken

s hi p seemed to h ang fo r a moment. Hans xtul lcr:

'w hen th e s hi p tilted slow ly. little h y little , degree b y d eg ree. I had no more men and no more o rders

10

ta ke from anybod y. Tirpitz was ro lling over s lig htly, a nd then wit h

a lillie more speed. rolling over more a n d more . \X'he n th e s h ip lilt ed to a bou t 45 d egree s, I jumped into the wa te r. I tried to swi m towards th e shore o r int o the torpedo net. The water wa s very cold a nd o ne o f my lie ute nants swim ming in the water climbed int o a lillie di nghy and sa id , "Hans. jum p in the lx xtt!" whe n I turned arou nd I saw a fire a t th e h ac k o f Ttrpitz a nd a ll of a s u d d e n Ca e sa r IX tur rel l bl ew u p - the

S~&1'ilW'.EE:JIRL

..

_m.II.tMI'=n....._~ 171

....

-

.'

- ~~

•

...

--=;;.. ='----<= .,; ~ --- -

ammu ni tio n bl ew up. The w ho le thing [the rurretl ble w up anti go t thrown o ff the ship

The upturn ed hull of Tirpitz in

into the wa ter. And tha t wa te r so mehow p ulled me down , I would say about to to 12 feet, and I would say it was a lifesave r because if I had been in that din ghy with the offi cer I would have been hlo wn a pa rt hy the a m munitio n ex plo d ing. So I went u nder

Tro mso Fjord after a devastating

wa ter, came up again. and I still was alive . There was b lood an d dead bod ies in the wat e r, a nd I swa m towards the anti-to rpedo net a nd safety.'

attack by RAF Lancasters of Bomber Command in November 1944. Ab out 1000 men perished in the ship . Tirpitz was broken up wh ere she lay during the 19505.

Seconds after the huge explos io n, Ti tp its:caps ized into the so ft m ud on the bott om o f the fjo rd . Germany's last, and biggest eve r, battles hip had finally been bla sted o ut o f existence . As she lay ca psized in the m ud , with the bott o m of he r h ull d ear o f the wate r. the last d rama o f Ti r pitz u nfol d e d : a ltho ugh abo ut 600 sa ilo rs w e re rescu e d fro m the wa ter. about 1000 re ma ined trapped ins ide. Ho les w ere d esperately cut through the s hip 's d ouble bott om, and eig hty-seven LTC \ V IlK 'n we re saved. For the rest ther e wa s ( 0 he no esca pe . And fo r the Germa n Nav y, there were no more battlesh ips.

En

o t e e emot s I

n October 1943 Italy did a co mplete abo ut-face: Mussolini was arrested, a ne w govern me nt se t up , and Italy decla re d wa r o n Ge rma ny a nd join ed the Allies. The D-Day landings in Normandy on 6 June 1944 we re

the beginning o f the end for Nazi Ge rmany, but the most bitter p hases of the land war in Europ e were still to co me, with Hitler stand ing firm aga inst the co mbined Allied forces as they headed slowly but surely towards Berlin. By the end of 1944, with Tirpitz gone, the last Axis battl eships remaining

afloat were Japanese. Its Imperial Navy still boa sted a power ful battle fleet , including the battlesh ips Yamat o, Musasbi, Nagato, Fttso; Yamashiro, Ise, Hyuga, Kongo and H a ru na . Hiei and Kirtsbima had been sun k in action in

1942, w hile Mutsu had been lost after a magazi ne ex p losion in June 1943. After the e pic carrier battles in the Coral Sea and o ff Midway, the advanci ng Jap anese forces in the South Pacific had been halted an d the long and hard land , sea a nd a ir b attles to p us h these forces back to wards Ja pan had begun. It would o nly be a matter of time before the remaini ng battlesh ips we re hunted d ow n a nd sun k. To compo und matt er s fo r Ja pan , its

.aall'_.__~

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __-'..._m ..

carrie r-based a ir cove r, w hich had become a n essential cleme nt in the protection of the modern battleship in wa r, had been d ra matica lly red uce d through the loss of the ir most ca pable ca rrie rs and ex perienced a ircrews. By the time the battle field s had rea ched the mid-Pacific region . the Jap anese: were forced 10 deplo y their ba ttleships w ith virtually no air CO H'f at all. The re was mo re than a slight irony in this situation. Japan had proved co nclusively in 1941 by sinking Pri nce (1 \rt tles and R(1ml .;e rluu even ca pital shi ps, taking evas ive action and throw ing up their most po tent

anti-aircraft ba rrage . we re unable

10

survive an aerial attack witho ut air cover.

There was no do ub t the po we rfulja pa nese hattie fleet, which included the massive 71,000ton . H~ -i n c h U 57-mm) g unned be hemo ths. }'(m llll o and Musasbi. was still ca pable of caus ing g reat d isrup tion to United States forces as the y advanced close r to the Japan ese ho me islands. US ope ratio ns to rega in (he Philipp ines began o n to O cto ber w he n thei r invasio n fle et left New Guine a for Levie. ab out 400 mile s so uth o f Manila . The dale set for (he invasio n w as 20 Oc tober. In an tici pation of this mo ve . the Impe ria lja pane se Navy prepa red its fl e et fo r the defe nce o f the Philipp ines. At that stage the fleet was assem b led in Brun ei in no rthern Borneo . Adm iral To yoda . in cha rge of the Ja panese de fence o f the Philipp ine s, had p lanne d that two bat tle fleets. w ith ha ttleships lea di ng eac h grou p. would ap pro ach the Ph ilip pines from the west. O ne grou p wou ld the n turn north of the inne r island grou p to pass th rou gh th e Strait of Ber nadino . the other would sw ing to the south, passing thro ug h Surigao Stra it. Th en together they wou ld converge on Leyte Island , cru shing the invasio n force in a pince r movem ent wh ile the Ame rica n fleet was d isgorging troops. vehicles and materials fro m the vast supp ly-train of ships that fo rme d its huge invasio n armada .

Yamato is hit on the forecastle by a US bomber in the Sibuyan Sea

on 24 Octob er 1944 during the abortive Japa nese attempt to stop the America n invasion of the Philippine s.

The Japanese battleship Fuso with the very distinctive 'Pagoda' tower. Both Fuso and her sistership Yamash iro were lost in the Batt le of Surigao Strait in

October 1944 .

The Ja pan ese fleet

10

take th e northern ro ute , u nder the co mma nd of Adm ira l Kuri ta,

cons iste d o f two sq ua d ro ns inclu ding the batt le sh ips l a m a/v , Musasb i, II/li}!,li /o, Km lp,o a nd t lar una. The fleet goi ng south. under Adm iral Nish imura . included the lxu tles hip x Ycnna sbirc and Fuso. A-; the flee ts approached the Philippin es , the Japanese commanders lived in hope that so me la nd-based fighter cover might be available . But it wa s not to he . TIle th ird pan o f the Japanese attack plan wa s for a se pa rate deco y force 10 approach the Philippines from the north-east. Th is for ce was to draw US Admiral I blse r 's ca rrier-Fleer away from the area . Under the co mmand of Admiral Osawu . it com prised the four remaining j apanese ca rriers ZlIilmku. Zuibo. Ctn yoda and Cb i/ose, plus the hyhrid battlesh ip/carriers tse and I {r uga . Facing the Japan ese was the migh t of the US 3rd Fleet unde r Admi ral Kinka id an d the 7th Fleet und e r Ad mi ral li aise}', Halse y's fle et a lo ne co m p rise d seve ntee n a ircra ft ca rrie rs, six battleships and nu merous cruisers a nd destroye rs, The com bined US fleet numbered over 700 ships - the largest and most powerful fleer in naval histo ry, The US inva sion plan called for a

ma jor naval force to patrol the San Bcrnardino Strait. The j aparu.-. sc battle fleet left Brunei o n 22 O(101X'r. Early the next morning, US submarines sighted the flee t. mounted un attack. and su nk th e heavy cruisers AlaRo a nd Maya. A thi rd . Talsao. was se ve rely da maged . Th e foll o w ing morning , US reconnaissan ce aircraft sig hte d Kurita's sh ips . With out a ir cove r. the y wou ld have to rel y o n thei r anti -aircraft batt eries to wa rd off the bombers the y knew wou ld not he lo ng in coming . "111e Jap an ese had developed an an n-a ircraft pro jectile fo r the giant lx-inch (457-IllIll) g uns o n }tw w lo and M li sasLJ i thal could he Fired into the path o f o ncoming ai rcraft. Kno wn as the 'Sa n Shiki' s he ll. o n d eto nat io n it released 9CXJ le thal ince ndiary fragme nts a nd 600 :-ireel ha lls. Ju st afte r te n o n the morning of 2'1 October. between the Philippine islands of Mmdora and Luzon, the Battle of Sibuya n Sea be gan. 111C first W~l\'C o f fo rty-five ai rcra ft from the US ca rrie rs 111l n 1Jid and Cabot swooped in for the attack on Kurita's ships. 11K'y concc ntrun..-d thci r arrack o n the two super battleships, }'l lmlllo and JIIISlL"bi.

Ensig n Vernon Sistru nk. To rpedo IH Squadron - USS I llIr ep id - was pil oting a torpedo bomber in the attack on Kur ita 's fleet :

END O F T ilE IJ EII EMOTIJS

'As we approached , ou r skippe r told us to make an anvil attack and take the easternmost Yamato Class ship, wh ich turned o ut to be the .MU..s asbi. Coming into the battleship, 1was gelting co nce rned beca use we we re getting sucked . By that, I mean it see med like it was furthe r a nd furthe r away a nd we wer e down lo w and ge lling dirt y air. There was flak everywhere. I've never see n it like that before or since. 1111e ship) was gelling bigger and bigger a nd just as I d ropped my torped o, the b ig guns o n the J[u."llsbi let loose in o ur dir ectio n a nd the concussio n fro m that kn ocked o ff a nothe r twenty kn ot s fro m my airp lane . 11 felt like I ran into a b ric k wall , a nd I imme d iatel y tu rned 10 re tire. I was firing my 50-calihre guns too, o f co urse . just to tell them I'm alive and well. I didn't SL"C whe re my torpedo went - pictures from one of the photo planes had the torpedo tracks o n a co llision ( "O U fSC with J IIISllSb i.'

I

S

Vice-Admiral Takeo Kuri ta, in his flagship Yamato. led a powerful force of Japanese ships against the American invasion of the

MU..s asbi was hit in the unprotected fo rward pan of her hull hy two l OOO-pound bo mhs, a nd a torpedo hit o n the sta rboa rd side a midships, rupturing the ship's ant i-torpedo defence, Kiyosh i Ikeda, a yo ung nava l o ffice r, had been rescued by stusasbt. tog ethe r with a numbe r of his

crewmutcs, after their heavy cruise r .Ilaya had been sunk. Ikeda remembers that first attack o nly too d early: 'I was o n the brid ge when Musasbi came unde r fierce attack, \X!e watched the battle in the sky and I co unted fourteen bombs and misxilcs hitting the MUSCL"ibi. Despi te this, the ship only sway ed from side 10 side a littlc and d idn 't sin k. Fro m this point was ho rn the myth of the un sinkahle M usasb i.: ' 111C first phase of the attack was over and although she had bee n hit, for such a large ship the dam age to Musasb i was ind ee d minimal and she continued on co urse at 24 kno ts. The seco nd attack bega n just after noon. Ben St Joh n, also Torpedo IH Squadron - USS tntrep id -: was at the controls of a torpedo bomber, almos t by chance: 'The re were tw o replacement pilot s like me , but o nly o ne airplane available . so we flipped a co in to see wh o wou ld go , and I won. \X.'e appro ached the fleet at aro und 12,000 feet. and for one moment the re was a cha nce 10 appreciate beauty o ur there - every one o f those guns seemed to he firing multi -coloured puffs all th rough the sky, purple, orange, phos phorous types , i( was bea utiful. But that's the e nd of those thoughts because that beauty. each o ne of those co uld take me down - hut ut any rate I d id appreciate the be aut y fo r ~I mom en t. The n we broke off - our leader went first a nd we neve r saw him aga in. But the othe r pilot a nd I made the run on .I111SCL"ihi. \X.'e did (his co nstant jinking [dodging from side to side] all the wa y in until we got down to the ra nge to drop. I d ropped, a nd then did a 270-dcgrt't' turn, which I guess co nfused them becau se I kn ow it co nfused me too. The Japan ese were throwi ng their big -gun shells into the water to create g reat ~plas h cs to try a nd pull us down that wa y.' After this attack , the damage (0 J IIISlL"ibiwa s more se rious. Two IOOO-po und bombs hit, the first pacesing through the flare o f her bows withou t explod ing. TIle second penetrated the deck beside the funnel and exploded ncar the port side inner engine-room, putting that engine o ut of action . At Il'as[ two torpedoes struck ho rne, one on the port side aft of the funnel , the other to starboa rd ' . .-ell fo rward o f 'A' turret. \"'ale r po u ring into the hull from both sid es kept the sh ip o n a reasonably even keel, albe it with he r free board reduced by about 2 feet (60 em), The third attack , hy so me thirty-five aircraft from the ca rrie rs Lex ingtoll and iissex , occu rred

Philippines in October 1944.

Musashi was fost to US aircra ft in the ensuing Battle of Leyte Gulf.

176

about 1.30 in the afte rnoon. TIle ce ntre of the attack w as the da ma ge d JIlIstl s!Ji. Four bo mbs and a t IC:-J.sl th ree to rpedoes hit th ei r mark . ' l1 lTCC of the bombs lan d ed in the vicinit y of '" . turret

whil e the fourth ex ploded close to anti-aircraft guns, wipi ng o ut the g un crews. The torpedoes ripped grea t holes in the hull, ca using massive flood ing. TIle gia nt ba ttles hip was down hy lilt:" bows - her freeboard red uced fro m 32 to about 20 fee t (from about 10 me tres to 6) . But desp ite the dam ag e. .stusasbt w a s still able to cont inue at 16 knots. later pu rp osely reduce d to 12 knots to lim it th e am ount o f wa te r su rging into th e d amaged hull. Rem ission for the cr ip pled battle sh ip was sho rtlived . Sho rtly after 3 p .m . xixty-flvc aircraft

o ff the carrie rs tintor p ris e and Frauldin pressed ho me the final attack . No fewe r tha n len 1000· pou nd bombs a nd an e stim at ed te n to rp ed oe s struc k stusasbi. Altho ugh the homhs ca used e xte ns ive da mag e. non e of it proved terminal. It was the torpe does that fina lly sank stusasbt. At le ast eig ht - some estimates go as high as twenty - to rpe does ripped the hull of this stee l gia nt a pa rt. ,HlI sash i had absorbed massive da mage th at no battle ship ot he r tha n her sis ter ship } t l11W l o co uld have su rvived . When the atta ck was over, da mage-co ntrol panics d id what they co uld to

the ir stricken vessel . b ut flooding couldn't be checked an d -ltllsashi se ttled lo we r in the wate r w ith ~I severe s.:1\ 'C

list to po rt, By 7 p.m, the SC'J. had reached 'K turret and her speed had been red uced to a co uple o f kn ots, As the list Increased. the o rder was given to abandon ship. -ltlt stlsbis last mom ents arc recalled bv a survivo r, Seaman Shiro Hoso ya. a signaller in the co ntro l tower of the stricke n ship:

The ca p ta in wa s se ve rely in ju red wh e n th e bomb h it the towe r. It penet ra ted th e struc tu re abo ve w here w e were and ex p lo ded - thirty -se ve n pe ople we re ki lle d insta ntly in the towe r by the hla st. Then the second b rtdgc a nd the a re a where I was sta nd ing fille d w ith bla ck smo ke a nd gas that crealc d tota l co nfus ion a nd pa n ic, ( q u ick ly o pe ned the wi ndow to let th e smoke o ut a nd th e bn dge w as abl e to lak e co mmand o f the ship aga in . Th e next attac k was the last. Abo ut th irty speci a l torpedo planes attac ked and hit the ,HltSllSb i. Eight to rpedoe s hit the port side . th ree ou t of e ight hit between the first and second g un tu rre ts. and the port side to wards the bow was a lso hit. 1tho ught this was the end for the s tusasbi. as did p robably the rest of the crew. W'e knew that the chan ce of the sh ip survi ving wa s slight. Pe o ple do w n below were scre aming that the wat e r was rising a nd ye lling o ut for some thing to be do ne. Around 300 members of the crew were either d ea d o r injured, hut the numbe rs weren't tha t great co nsideri ng the size of the crew o n the stusasbi. Most of the dea d we re mach ineg unne rs. The last s uma l th.u ( se nt ut the o rder o f the capta in was 10 have near by sh ips pull alongside us in o rde r to tran sfe r the wounde d as wel l as secre t docu ments o n 10 those ships. 'I never thou ght that I'd sec the final farewell betwe e n the ca pta in nnd the e xecutive office r. I was so moved hy this sce ne that I wan ted to lea ve some thing hehi nd fo r future ge ne rat io ns 10 rem em ber it hy. Altho ugh not very go od. ( late r paint ed a picture because I wa nted at least the ca pta in's fam ily to know wh at the final sce ne o n the -ltlislISbi wa s like . They said thei r final fa rewe lls o n the bridg e. a nd I felt th at the ca ptai n thought that the sinking was his res ponsibility. TIlt: ca ptain to ld the executive o ffice r his last words as he han ded o ve r his w ill a nd final me ssage . wh ich wa s di rec te d towa rds the crew and their fam ilies. In his message he said. - I hav e let the japan ese people down , a nd the sinking was entirely my responsibility. and therefore I simply ca nnot retur n hOI1K' alive . I want yo u , no matter wh at ha ppe ns. to live . I want yo u to save as many o f the crew as possible. and in the future. o n the .\tllSl Lsb i II o r III. I want yo u to strive hard fo r J ;IP :II1'S peace and prosperity, Even if the .\tllSllSb i sinks a nd Ja pan lose s the w ar. Japa n w ill defin ite ly become a stro ng a nd prospe rous natio n." 'This is ho w the ca pta in instilled co urage into the.' executive officer, l ie a lso req uested

~'1D_OLTllE...JlEJlE"\lOTJl"-S

"'_=="'~lIfl1l......

that the: be reaved families IX' looked after. I will ne ver forge r this sce ne . \X'he n I heard these last word s I was so mo ved I almost cou ldn 't b rea the . "111is wa s the capta in's fina l farewel l. I th ink that he

\V ;IS a wonderful. s plend id ca ptain. 'Th e first thing th at the: executive o ffice r d id aft er taking cha rge was to lower th e sh ip's

Ilt g. w hich I was in charge of. Howeve r, as th e fbg was hadly shredded a nd damaged

Signaller Shiro Hosoya of the

I co uldn't get it down. '111C e xecutive officer asse mbled everyon e o n the hack right o f the:

Musash i who witnessed the

shi p to check ho w Illan y survivors were left.

death of his Captain on the

'Sergeant Major Tutsu yama said tha t he: co uld n't Ic:( a brilliant an d wonderful capta in

battleship 's bridge shortly before

like o urs d ie an d lhal he wou ld go and ge l hi m. l ie ra n towa rds rlu- bridge and at tha t

she sank.

momen t we hea rd a gunshot. The capta in had p robably committed suicide. Then Ihl' s h ip tur ned com p letely o n its silk, a nd remained like th at fo r a bo ut IWO minutes . I ran towards th e bow o f th e s hi p , th en o ne o f my shipmat es ye lled , "Fo llo w me !" th en jumped into the wa ter, 111l'n th e ship made a loud noise a nd turn ed furt he r o n its side. ~lan y were jumping into the water hu t some accidenta lly jumped into the holes. w h ich had been ma de by the torpedoes. '1 ran to wa rd... the how occasional ly loo king hac k. b UI could n't

St..'t.."

anyone else.

I think if s fun ny, hu t people irea inctlvcly head for high places , do n't they? A... I was heading towa rd... th e bow the s hip complete ly and totally ca ps ized , so the bottom

«If the sh ip wa s stickin g o ut o f the water. '1 ma d e it to the ho w o f th e sh ip and jumped into the water from there . I was

the o n ly one

lO

jump o ff from th a t p lace. Those still a t [he ha ck we re th ro wn

into the sea . I des per atel y tried

10

sw im as far fro m th e sh ip as I cou ld so as no t

to he s ucke d un de r h y th e p u ll o f the s ink ing stnsasb« As I swa m away I ke p t turning my head to che ck o n the ship . The how wa s submerged with the ha ck o f the sh ip sli<.:king lip in the a ir. '1 d esperatel y tried to swim as far aw ay as possibl e . A whirl pool was

formed as th e

.lfll SllS b i

G

sta rte d to sink . Even th ough 1 s wa m

ap p rox ima tely 300 m etres a way I wa s still ca ug h t by th e tug o f the w h irlpool. xtosr people were pulled under. It was like being caught in ~I w~ls hing

mach ine . As I was being pulled down I heard a sc re ec h ing

metallic sound . Th e stran ge thing wa s Ihat I didn 't feel any pain, However, th e sou nd sta ye d in my ears . In th e sea th e re was a huge e x p los io n which rush ed me up to th e surface and int o the air, and the n I carne cra sh ing back down aga in, lan d ing in the sea. went ha ck u nder water, and then fina lly came up to the su rface agai n. I was relieved and thought I was saved. 'I couldn't see anyone else arou nd me , I felt like I was the o n ly o ne who had survived u ntil s ud d en ly, like p umpk ins flo ating in the: wa ter. I saw the heads of

A painting which Shiro Hosoya

the crew e merge from the wa te r. The water was still hut cove red with o il fro m the sh ip .

made to record the extraordinary

Mo re crew started to emerge from the water. In order not to become sleepy and drowsy

moment, depi cts the tense scene

we sang military as well as popular so ngs. which a lso helped us keep o u r spirits up .

on Musashi 's bridge as the

\'\'e comforted each o ther with the fad that we would soon be rescued b y th e o ther sh ips . '111e wat er was covered with o il th at had escaped from th e ship, In certa in place s it was 30 ce nt imetres deep. \'\'e had

(Q

swim in that oi l-cove red water and no ships ca me

wounded Cap tain transfers command of the stricken battle ship to his Executi ve

to rescu e us , I found o ut why later. From where th e o ther s h ips were. the underwater

Officer. The Captain then went to

ex p los ion had ca used a colu m n o f wate r

his cabin and commiNed suicide.

10

sp urt into the air. Since this colu mn wa s so

hi g th e o the r ;;h ips figured that no one co u ld've s u rvived , As we were underwat er at the time we didn 't know just how h ad it would've looked . tha t's why th e rescue sh ips were so late . O ne sh ip eve ntually heard o u r singi ng. shone a llgtu in o ur d irection an d the n ca me

(0

o ur rescu e .'

177

178

=allll...I..

.IJlllLll ATT I F S U U ' S

Of 3 crew of 2399. Japan ese destroyers saved 1376 men. TIle battle to sink ,\t1 L.~z.~b jhad deflected attention away from the other ships in Kurita 's group. Afte r the air attacks stopped, the bat tered Japanese fleet . including a considerably damaged }"a mlllo. pressed on eastward.., escaping through the San Bernardino Strait. Further north. Admi ral OS;:I\\~I'S decoy force had reversed course and was steering northwards away from the Philippines. Halse y's po we rfu l ca rrier-force had ta ke n th e bait and was in hot pursu it. '111is fo rce Included the six fast ba ttleships tha t shou ld have been gua rd ing the San Bernardi no Strait As Kurita 's ships passed thro ugh (he strait, th e y encountered six US esco rt carriers a nd

accompa nying ships, For the first time, }'a malo had till: o pportunity 10 dem onstrate w hat she co uld do w ith he r l H- inch (457- mm) g uns, Ho weve r, fierce attac ks from ca rrier aircraft and destro ye rs prevent ed Kurita from ca pita lizing on this golden o pportunity, and th ree Ja panese heavy cruisers were su nk in the encou nte r, Kurita's sh ips managed 10 accou nt for on ly one escort carrier, Gambler lJily , and three destroye rs. Awa re of this engagement, the US battleships in Halse y's fleet hurriedly reversed course in a belated effort to catch Kurita's depleted flee t. HUI the distance was 100 great and Japanese ships returm.-. d through the San Bernadino Strait and headed for 11C)mC, In creating this opportunity for Kurita 's bat tleships. Adm iral Toyoda's tact ics had worked well, bUI at enormous cost. The big ca rrier Zullsaleu, three smaller carriers, and several destroyers of the decoy force had been overwhelmed a nd sunk by Halscys carrier-based aircraft. Admiral Nishimura's ba ttle fle et - the so uthern h: g of the j a pa nese strike agai nst Leyte was even less successful than Kurita's, As his sq uadron, sailing in line with four destroyers ahea d

>-

The mighty Yamato swerves

bombs dro p p ed by aircraft from

of va masbir o a nd Fuso and tbe heavy cruiser M()~lIm i hringing up the rear, e ntered the Sudgao Stra it. Nishimura was to tally unawar e that a powerful group of the US 7th f leet , commanded hy

USS Hornet in March 194 5.

v icc -Adnural j cssc O lcJcndorf, was waiting. To get through the strait, Nishimura would have to

violen tly to starboard to avoid

'""_lis_,tM, r '~__

EN D_ O L:rllJUlEllLUo:rU Il[.';S' -

•

The US ba ttleship Mississippi which took part in the last battleship to battleship action against the Japan ese Fuso in October 1944.

run the gauntlet of l'T

hO;IlS.

destroyers. a line of cruisers and. lastly . six battleshi ps - lined lip

in this order. primed and re-ady to attack. At around midnight , the Japa nese hank- fleet sailed into the strait. First

(0

attack. w ithout

success. were th irty-n ine PT boats. Nex t it was the destroyers' (urn . attacking in divisions with

devastating effect . Ya nrasbin» was hit with up to foul' torpedoes and. after hurning furiously. exploded and san k.

11H.~

second d ivision o f destroyers st ruck twenty minutes later , sin king and

dfsa b lfng three destro yers and hitting Fus o w ith two tor pedoes. Altho ug h the ba ttleship was able to co ntin ue , Nis hi mu ra 's force w as no w g re a tly redu ced in stre ng th a nd ho pel e ssl y

outn umbered. As th e japa nese adm iral stuc k rig idly to h is plan to p roceed in line th ro ug h the st ra it, his s h ips ca me into ra ng e o f the US battles h ips fo rming a statio nary line block ing h is pa th at rig ht a ng les - effe-ct ive ly 'crossing the T of th e adva ncing sh ips. Tennessee. California a nd \\'es! Virg i n ia . equipped w ith fire-control radar, began w hat amounted to big-gun targetpractice. Fuso and

. \Io~a m i

took e normou.... p u n ish ment. Badl y on fire . Fuso turned to port as

hea vy shells knocked her pagoda-style to we r over. 111en ,1tis.\'J:..s ippi opened fire on fi,so with lu.-r I-t-inch (355 -mm) guns in what was the last bat tleship-to-battleship confrontation in history. Finally. Puso was hit by torpedoes from US destroyers. e xplode-d. and ca psized. At 4.21 a .m . she disappeared beneath the sea. taking her enti re crew w ith he r. '111e Japanese defeat at

LC)1C

Gu lf W:IS defeat on a huge scale. 111Cy had lo st th ree battleships.

four carrie rs, six he;l\'y cruisers. four lig ht cruisers a nd nine d est ro ye rs against the lo ss of one light carrier, two escort ca rriers . two dest royers and one escort hy the US nava l forces. If I ialse y had not taken h is ha n lcxhips away from San Be rnardi no Stra it in pu rsu it of Oxawa, the Ja panese wou ld almost ce rta inly have lo st eve n mor e shi ps . As it was, the y still reta ined th ree b.urlcshi ps . Vama /o, NaRa /o and lIa 17 HIfI , a nd th e two hyb rid ca rriers, tsc and I ~J'tlRa . By the end of 19·101 ,

I:.

179

180

A Kamikaze pilot unsuccessfully attempts to fly his Zero aircraft into the battleship Missouri on

28 April 1945.

the United Sta tes had reclaim ed the Philippines . Gene ral

~la cA rt h li r.

co mman der of US an d

AlIitXI fo rces in the Pacific, had indeed returned 10 the Philippines as he promised he would. After 1..c}1C Gu lf, the Imperia l Japanese Navy had ceased ( 0 exist in any meaningful se nse. Ito; few remaining battl eships stayed hidden in re mote inlets in p ro tected waters. Facing de feat and natio na l hu miliation, the Japan ese lI igh Co mmand decided to send it.. last super-battleship. } '{WWlo, o n o ne last sortie - a sacrificial 3<.1 for ship a nd cre w alike . ramato had limped ha ck ho me to Kur e Navy Yard fo r rep airs afte r the Batt lc of Leyt e Gulf, and at the same time she

wa s fitted w ith add itio nal 25-mm {l -Inch) ant i-a ircraft g uns. Th e s pur tha t p rompted the last voyage of }'(I11W l o was the US invasion of Ok inawa o n I April 19·1; . Altho ugh t h~y we re virtually po werl ess to p re ve nt thi s inva sio n. the Ja pan ese pl anned to throw sq uadrons o f kam ikaz e aircraft into the attac k ;;lga in..t the massive US and Allied invasion fleet at O kinawa . Th is offensive wa s sclu..-duled for 6 April. TIle nam e give n to the operation was 'Ten -Go'. }'{I11W l o' s vo ya ge wa s

designed to support Te n-Go . }(WUlIo wa s join ed in Tokuyarna Bay, at the so uthe rn most tip o f the main island of Japan. by the few rema ining se rviceable Japan es e warships, the light cruise r }'{l b llR i a nd e ight destroyers. Th e g roup W ;;IS designa ted the 'Seco nd Fleet '; its missio n: to in fl ict as much da mage as possible on American fo rces at O kinawa . Pre cio us fuel o il was p umped into )"a11111l o' s ta nks an d th e a mmunitio n ma ga zin es filled. In the afte rnoon o f 6 Apr il 194; the Seco nd Flee t. un der the co mma nd of Adm iral Ito , sa iled into the Pacific and set co urse for Ok inawa. about 500 miles to the south-west. The fo llowi ng morning. a ce remonial breakfast was served o n board )'1I111t110.

after 8 a. rn.. whil e they were less than a q uarte r of the way to O kinawa. the Second Fleet w as spotted hy US reconnaissa nce a ircraft. }t l11W lo immediatel y went to act ion stations . At 12.30 p .m . the first formation of a ircraft b ro ke th rough a densel y o ve rca st sk y. In that first wave were 2HO a ircraft: ;0 d ive -bombers, 98 torpedo bombers. a nd 132 fighters . Despite her huge array of a nti-a ircra ft weapo ns, th e g ia nt sh ip sto od little cha nce o f s u rvival ag at nst suc h o verwhelming odds. }t l11ll1l o o pe ned fire w ith he r IH-inch (457-mm ) San Shiki a nti-aircra ft shells, jUS(

~II'II. . .1iiIo_ .

ENJLOLTIlLllElillMll(L>IIlI lIl.'iS'---

..._ . . . .

..... 181

(hen her seco ndary. the n her dose-ra nge wea pon s. US bomb hits in the vicinity o f her funnel

destro yed a battery o f ant i-aircraft gUlls. Two pa ssed th rou g h the up pe r decks an d deton ate d on

the H-inch (203 -111111) thick ar moured dec k belo w. A fire sp read to the cord ite handli ng s paces and the cordite exp loded wit h terri fic fo rce . b lowi ng th e tu rret roof o ff a nd killing all hut one o f th e g un cre w. Two to rp ed oes h it the port s ide a m ids h ips a nd two o the rs struck home in th e

sam e a rea .

\~!i t h

60 0 po und s (a bo ut 270 kg ) o f Torpc x. the new 's u pe r ex p los ive ,' these

to rpe does h it w it h mo re fo rce th an

vamato:« s ide

prote ctive syste m cou ld w iths ta nd . a nd

water p o ured into th e xu pcr-lxutlcshi p . The effect of a ll these hits. although serious. fa iled to im pair } ll m a l u's s peed o r fig ht ing a b ility a nd she contin ue d o n course to O kinawa . T he first attac k wa s ba rel y over w he n a secon d wave of ai rcra ft lo o k u p th e as sa u lt, Describ ing g reat arcs in the sea , }'l m Ill1o ma naged to avoid every bomb aime d at her , Torpe does. tho ug h. were a different ma tte r, At leas t th ree hit the already dama ged POI1 side , Two boiler rooms and the pori ou te r e ng ine roo m we re co mp letel y flo o d ed , a nd s peed w as red uced to abO UI IH knot s , Co un ter-l1ooding o n the sta rboa rd s ide kept the s h ip o n a reaso nabl y e ven keel and , d espite the nu mber o f to rped o hits that the sh ip had ab sorbed. she was in no d anger of s in king an d contin ue d on course , Th e th ird a nd final attac k involved 11 5 a ircraft. Ho wa rd Skidmore . flying o ff the USS Cabot (CVL 2H). p ilot ed one of the Ave nge r to rped o bombers in th at attack : 'I had never seen so ma ny a irp lanes in the a ir, I co uld n't tell you ho w ma n y, b ut it loo ked to me like just a bout every ai rp lan e we had was go ing nort h , \X'e had a lot o f cloud cover as we we re app ro aching the target. so mewhe re around len , twelve th ousand fee t. The vis ibility was ho rrible and the j apanese were jam ming the rada r an d the radi o , \'\'t: ha d a co-o rdinator li p the re was

to

\ V I1O

was p ass ing ou t uxsigruncn ts as

10

w h ic h ca rrie r grou p

h it which shi p and w hen , Cou ldn 't hear him - cou ldn 't see the l'lI l1111lo, could n't

The Japanese battleship Ise or Hyuga retiring at high speed

durin g the battle of Cape Engano

sec the destro yers. I wa s lead ing a d ivis io n at (his time of two o the r ai rcraft. I deci ded

on 25 October. The battleship 's

th at we wou ld find the battles hip a nd mak e a run on it a nd ge t o ut o f th e re , So fina lly

aftermos t turrets have been

d ropping on d own th ro ug h a ho le in the d o uds , goi ng away a little bit an d co ming h ack

removed to make way for a short

un dernea th , finally I S~I W the battleship. sing led u p a nd went in and maul.' my d ro p, O nce

flight deck.

TilE R A T TI ES IUl!S

yo u d ro p yo u're able to ma no euvre a nd go o n fro m th ere . Visib ility was horrible and rad io co m mu nic atio ns we re absolute ly n il. But I did see fla k an d it was a rou n d me , b ursting. I did n't see a ny mu zzle flashes and I wasn't hit so maybe the lack of visibi lity wa s in m y favour as well as thei rs. I made my torpedo drop ag a inst the lxml cs hip , hut w he ther it h it o r no t I don't kno w .' Up to five torpedo es struc k home , o ne o n the star bo a rd side, the res t on the a lread y massivel y ruptured port s ide. r a malo bega n I() list had ly. All ava ilab le cou nte r-flooding spaces o n th e starboa rd side were floo ded. Cap tain No mu ra ordered the flood ing of the re mainin g sta rbo ard o ute r boi ler rooms and , as the list increased, the floo d ing of the starboa rd outer eng ine room. \Vilh her speed reduced to H knots, a nd a list of 22 deg rees to port , }'amllto was clea rly finis he d . At about 2 p .m. all po we r wa s lost an d th e order to aband o n sh ip was given. Twe nty min utes later r a m a to ca ps ized . A h uge u nderwa ter ex p los io n in he r afte r magazines bla sted the s h ip

..

a pa rt. Th e res u lting cloud of s moke was see n o n the so uthern tip of the is land of Kyus h u,

•'

over 100 m iles away. From a cre w o f 2498, o n ly 280 were saved . Of the remainin g Ja pa nese ca p ital shi ps , the h yb rid battlesh ip/ ca rrie rs. l \'(' a nd I ( )'ltUll and the battleshi p Ha nt na we re sun k, taking refuge in sha llow wate rs near Ku re , h y US a ircraft so me e ight wee ks later. O nly Nagato; in a partly d ismantled state, remaine d afloat at the end o f the wa r. The o nce mighty Imper ial Japan ese Navy had been ex ting uished and w orld War II was ove r. The im pe rative s o f th is w a r broug ht a tec hn ica l e fficiency an d capab ility to naval a ir po\ve r tha t rap id ly eclips ed th e aw eso me , trad itional po we r o f the battleship . The aircraft carrier ha d Allied servicemen p ose on the

emerged as th e ne w ca p ital s h ip . Nevertheless, as a visual man ifestation o f s hee r po we r, the

quarte rdeck of the captured

battles h ip had an au ra o f o m n ipotence w h ich the carrier cou ld never qu ite match . And even

battleship Nagato after the end of

in VicIO!)', it was o n the q uarter-d eck of the US Io wa Class battlesh ip M isS0I/17, un d er neath th e

hostilities.

ba rrels o f he r triple 16-inch (406-mm ) guns, tha t th e Japan ese surre nder was sig ned o n HAugu st

, ,

ENlLOLl'lllLllEllEMUIll£ S

Ji__m . .lIII.tMII'o1_IIiII

Carriers may have won the war in the Paci fic , but it was neverth eless on the de ck of the battleship Missouri that the Jap anese surrender was signe d on 8 Augu st 1945. Tokyo Bay.

19-15, in To kyo Bay. Alo ngside its US allies , a nd prominent in the victory armad a on that histo ric occa sion. were the Britis h battleshi ps Ki,,/.: George l' a nd Du ke cf }b rk - figh ting s h ips of the Royal Navy, sym bols o f the great naval victo ry against the Axis PO\VC f!) in Europe. So ha d th is second world wa r spell th e e nd of the battles h ip? 'X'cll , not q uite . The four US Io wa Class fast -battlesh ips, M issouri, NewJersey . Iowa , and wisconsin su rvived we ll int o th e m ode rn . po stwa r e ra of co m p uterized sea wa rfare. During th e Ko rean \X'ar in th e 19505, a ll four Io was were hack in action , p rov id ing art ille ry sup port fo r th e United Nations land -based mil ita ry ope ratio ns . In the Vietnam \Va r, Nen :Jersey ca rried ' out heavy a nd p rol o nged

bomba rdme nt du tie s off th e coast. It look e d ce rta in tha t this wou ld be the last hostile de p loy me nt of the batt le ship . But, d ur ing the 1980s Re aga n ad ministratio n , a ll fou r lo w as were mode rn ized . Ne w wea pon sys te ms were fitted . inclu d ing To mah aw k a nd Ha rp oo n missiles. During the Gu lf wa r in 199 1, M issou r i and w tsco nstu fired ov e r a tho usa nd 16-inch (406-mm) she lls a nd nume rous Tomah awk missiles between them . O n the eve of the new millenn ium. lou-a. New}ersey and Missour i we re all decommissioned , and \f'iSCOllsill was moored at the Norfolk Nava l Shipyard pe nding a decision o n he r ultimate fate. For the first time in cent uries, there wasn't a battleship in service in any navy through out the wo rld. Ho w , the n , is the battles hip reme mbe red no w that it has passed into history? The United States has p rese rved by far the greates t nu mbe r, e ight in all, o f these u nique fig hting sh ips . O ne d read no ug ht of wo rld \Var I vintage, Texas, plus the seve n \X'orld \X'ar II vetera ns N011b Carolina, Alabama and stassacbusetts an d the fo ur .lowas. Missou r i is currently bei ng co mpletely restored am'! has pride of p lace in 'Battleship Ro w,' Pe arl Harb o r. .M iSSOll1" w ill serve as a permane nt reminder of where the wa r in the Pacific began, an d wi ll preserve for future gen eration s the site where sig nat ures we re exc ha nge d to end w orld War II. Sad ly, Britain - the natio n responsible fo r so many develo pm en ts of the ba ttleship - has no reminde rs at all of the 20th-ce ntury battl esh ips o f the Ro yal Navy, It has, ho wever, preserved the ex trao rdina ry M ll1)' Rose an d the magn ificent I{.\-IS ViC/Of)', still in co mmission in the Ro ya l Navy, a nd \Yiln "01: Altho ug h the fully resto red Wa n l 0r is not a battlesh ip, she represe nte d a tu rning poin t in the e vo lution of the capital ship. Of a ll the o ther ma jo r wo rld navies, on ly Japan has managed to prese rve a ba ttleship - the

183

, 184 -

"~'A~ 5 r

T

uu.aar.n.esiues

Briti sh b uilt pre-d readnou gh t J lika stl. Admira l To go 's Ib gsh ip at the

1905 Battle of Tsus hlm a. But th e re is a nother, and pe rh a ps mo re re le va nt . re cord of the h attlc xhip's fea rso me passage through histo ry - the twi sted w recks lyin g on the seabed. So me a re then.' bec-a use the)' had In-en ex pe nded as targets to test a rmo ur syste ms

~111l1

u nde rwat e r

protectio n so that ot he rs nugb r he hu ilt more ro bustly and wi th gre ate r staying po we r. Some. because they were moo red in test s ites for n uclear ex plosions . wen.. destroyed

10

meas u re th eir resistance

10

force!" u nimag inable w hen the y were b uilt. O the rs lie sh a ttered as silent remind ers o f w hy they were b ui lt in th e firs t plan.... tstsmarct; to .OOO feet (3000 met res ) down in the North Atlan tic. sits u p rig ht with its h ull sho rn o f su perstruc ture; Ariz o na rem ain s a su n ken memorial to 'the day of infa my' that Ig nited the war in rhc Pacific ; prince

0/

\Pli /es and Nc.1m !se lie in the sha llo w wa te rs o f the South China Sea . poig nan t re min d e rs of the foll y tha i se nt the m o n their final voyage. ra m% and .lJlI stl ...ib], two s hauc rc d masse s of rusting ste el in the Pacific Ocea n, remain as evi dence that eve n the might iL'st fall, The last questio n asked ill the inte rviews recorded for the televisio n se ries was. ' Ho w would you s um up the ro le pla yed h y baulcshtps in rece nt world history?' II seems ap p rop riate III e nd this ho o k w ith so me o f the ir answers. The US Iowa Class battleship

Wisco nsin, deactivated. moored at the US Naval Dockyard,

Norfolk, Virginia in 1999.

o nwa rds, which

Britis h Rea r-Admira l Richard Il ill: 'From the line -o f-bat tle s hip <.bys su p pose started about 16 10, u p to 19 20 . the b.urle s hip was the s u pfl'me

instrument of naval powe r and one o f the su preme instrume nts of military power in the world.' Fre nc h ma ritime histo rian Ph ilip pe Masson: ' Fo r a ve ry lo ng time , u n til world \X'a r II. ~l baulcs h tp was a symbol of ma ritime stre ngth . In time of wa r the lxn tlexhip is qu ite ck-a rly the st rike force of a Flee t. Batt les hips re p rese nt th e most d an ge ro us shi ps and o ne s w hic h ca n on ly be fo ugh t w ith equ ivale nt sh ips , that is, o the r bat tle ships. But in peacetime . thL'y also have grea t symbolic value.' Dr Mich ae l Ep ka nhans. naval historian , Ge rma ny : 'Battleships were symbols of natio nal pride . of achie veme nts of the economy and o f the tech nolo gy of the count ry that b uilt thL'111 , In thai res pect the y can he com pa red, for instance, wit h Russian milita ry parad es o n the Red Squa re in j\ lay, o r like the Empe ro r liked 10 para de his fleet o ff \X'ilhe ltnsha\'en . o r as the British liked to parade their fle et off Sptt head. These we re o pportu ni ties 10 s how the thi ngs th e y had produced were indeed ef fective dete rre nts, hut a lso , the result of hard wo rk hy the peo p le at h0 111e.' Ja pa ne se nava l historia n a nd au tho r. Pro fessor Kiyos hi Ikeda : 'Th e Ruxxian - j npa nc sc \X/a r when Japa n too k on and defeate d the Baltic Fleet was pro bably the last classic battle involvi ng banl cslu ps. Bnttlexhip s slowly lost their usefulness in hallie . h UI remained as imp orta nt symhols of natio nal po wer,' Dr Eric Grove , na val strategist at the Unive rsity of Hull . UK: "Fo r the mos t o f mod e rn naval his to ry, th e most po werful g un -a rme d s urface s hip you cou ld buil d. the ban lcsh tp . was the ce ntrepiece of nava l a nd therefore ma ritime strategy, Its possession , its use . its mainte na nce was the ke y 10 w ho commanded the sea or the ex te nt to which the sea was com ma nded hy a nyon e , Natio na l su rviva l cou ld de pend on co m mand o f the sea , arid righ t u p to the m idd le o f th e twe ntie th ce ntu ry the fo undation o f tha t co m ma nd o f the se a wa s you r hall ie flee t.' US naval historian Norman Fried man : 'Fo r a long while a bat tle fleet mu st have represe nted the rnoxt ex pensive investme nt any govern ment ever made, the most concentra ted investm ent . T hey ca rry, in peace a nd wa r, the gove rn me nt's ma in power in a wa y that you never re~i1 ly

EN 0 OF T1 IL1lElll.1>lO"U!S.

saw before. and I don't think YOll have since. They are ha rd to build : if they arc sunk they arc hard to replace. ," 0 that the loss of a baule fleet migh t IX" a tota l na tiona l disaster. ThL'fC was

no other disaster that could pes.sibly befa ll a government on tha t sca le and similarly. destroying another enemy's hattie fleet could he an absolute decisive victory. and that 's what the Japanese had hoped to achieve ~H Pearl Ha rbo r.' Andrew Lambert. nava l hist orian. King's College. London: ' Because Britain . unlike almost :111

other powers. was a true maritime power with global economi c inte rests that drove her 10 sea and kept her at sen. the battleship was H ..' f)' mu ch the co re of Britain's perception of herself in the world. :--:0 o the r monarch would have reviewed his fleet for his co ro na tio n review. he would have review...-d his army. Leaders of states review...-d their troo ps. not thei r flee ts. But the King o f England. the Queen of England. reviewed their fleet . 111at was the symbol that made Britain different. O ther navies saw political power through the us c of th...-ir naval st rength . To the German . the Japanc sc. even the Un itc d Statc s navies, tbese were powerfu l politica l Instr uments desigru-d to p roject the na tion 's views and o p inio ns abroad. The Royal ~a \'Y defend...·d Brita in and ex tended Brita in be yond the British Isles a nd it secured that throug h dcfe renee. thro ugh presence. and tha t prc scncc is not just the: availability of the sh ips. it's the desig n of the: ships: the: s hips arc d esig ned to he intim ida ting , Th e y're des igned to convc y mes.~lges to the e ne my, their nam es. the images and history that they co njure up. so the battleship is an abso lute integra l pan of Britain 's se lf image. pe rha ps de ep in o ur psyche . it's still there,' \'\'e s hall never set.' their like aga in.

.III.......

-..:._ _

Throughout the evolution of the battleship, the awesome power of its big-gun broadside has made it unique, Perhaps the ultimate broadside, USS Missouri unleashes the fury of its Mark 7 16-inch 50-calibre guns,

18 5

.d.: .!i i';'-,r

186 -T~b

Glossary calibre

cannon

ca r rack

ca r ro nade car-vel

clinker

clo sing cu lvc r in

fr eeboard knot ordnance

port s ta r boa r d

su pe r firi n g guns s u p c r fl rin g turrets

tonnage

turret identification

w indage

The d iameter of a cannon hall, b ullet. or other missile. A g un o f suc h a large size tha t it need s to he mounted fo r fi ri ng . In fact , trad iti ona ll y, 'cannon'

was a term used o nly fo r a particular calibre of gun , and was part of a family of terms. The largest g un was the canno n royal. the canno n wa s the next b igge st, followed in o rder of size by the demi-canno n. cu lverin. dcmi -cul vcrin, saker, minion a nd falco n. A large ship of burden, a k ind o f gall eo n used hy the Po rtu guese, o ften fitt ed fo r warfare. A s ho rt, thin -wal le d g U ll , wi th a re lativel y hig h cal ib re . II wa s a s ho rt- range 'smas he r', h ut very q uick to loa d and fire , using a sma lle r crew than a tradi tio nal ca nno n o f the same calibre . Th e te chniq ue of se tting the p lanks in a s h ip 's hull edge-to -edge . giving a s mooth s ur face, an d a llow ing for both greater spee d in the water an d the possihil ity o f wate rtig ht port s. Th e tech niqu e o f overla pping the woode n p lanks in the s hip 's hu ll, giving grea t strength. Getti ng nea re r to, e .g. d osing anothe r s hip . A midd le-sized ca nno n, very lon g in p roport ion to its bor e , used fo r firing lo ng-ran ge missiles. Th e distance be tween the waterline and the de ck o f the s hip . A uni t o f nauti cal distan ce , the 'nautical mile', and thu s also a measu re of s peed : knots per ho ur. A large gu n or engine for discha rging missiles. The left side o f the ship. The right side of the s hip . Those mou nte d in superflring tur rets. Tu rret s that are mo unted d ire ctly above a nd im me d iatel y to the re ar o f an o the r turret, in a stagge red arrangeme nt. Four mea sures of a ship's weight are in general usc . Gross registe red ton nage (g rt) is a merchant measure w he re the cub ic footage of all enclosed space is d ivided by 100 so that 1 g rt = 100 ft3. Net registe red tonnage (nrt) is also a me rchant measure, fo und hy sub tract ing fro m the gross regi ste red tonnage the s hip space that is not used for co mme rcia l pur pose s, e .g. crew spac e , e ng ine roo ms, ba llast. Dead w e igh t tonnage is a me asure o f tram p ships and o il ta nk ers, th e weight requi red to bring a s hip down from the he ight line to the load-wa ter line , i.c . the amoun t of we ight a ship can ca rry. Displacement to nnage is use d fo r warsh ips , the me asu re of the w eig ht of the water displaced by a fully lad en vessel, i.e . the wa te r displaced wh en the s hip is sa iling at the loa d-wate r line . Diffe rent navies e mp loyed various method s of ide ntifying thei r turre ts. In a battleshi p w ith two turre ts forw ard an d two turre ts aft , the British used th e le tte rs 'A' a nd ' If fo r the forward turrets a nd 'X' an d 'Y' fo r the afte r turret s. Th e US Navy e mployed numbers, i.c . 1, 2, 3 and 4; whil e the Ge rmans used the nam es 'Anto n', 'Bruno', 'Caesar' and 'Do ra'. In earlier dr eadn o ugh ts w he re tur rets we re also placed a mids hips , the Britis h used the lett e rs 'Q' and 'P'. T he di ffere nc e between th e bore of a ca no n a nd the ca lib re of its missile . Th e lo we r the wi ndage - that is, the tighte r the fit - the gre ater the velocity achieved upon firing .

_______________________________________.Jii. _im lll. amnc

Index ~Ol(,.· ; Italic / 1(1;':<' references refer 10 ill ustrations.

lsi Bailie Squadron (British) 9 1 lsi Banll.'('misef Squadron (Briti!'ih) 9 1 lsi Cruiser Sq ua d ron {British) 9 1 lsi destroyer floulla (British) 9 1

lsi Light Cruiser Squad ron ( Brilish) X6. 9 1 lst St'outing Group (Ger man) Hli. 92, 97 1st Squadron (Ge rman) 92 2nd Baule Squadron (British) 114. H5, 91 Znd Baulccruiscr Squadron (Brilish>9 1 2nd Cruise r Squadron (British) 9 1 2nd Fleet (ja panese) 162 2nd l.iglll Cru iser Squadron (British) 9 1 2nd Scouting Group (German) 92

2nd Squadron (Germani 92 5n.1 Baulccrui ser Squadron (British) 91. 9:; 3rd !'Ieel (US) 174 3rd Ughl Cruise r Squadron (Briti!'o h) 9 1 3rtl Squadron (German) 92, 9·1 ,11h Battle Squadron ( British} 9 1

41h de'troyer flotilla (British ) 91 4th Light Cru ise r Squadron ( Britis h l 9 1 41h Scouting Group (German ) 92

51h Baule Squadron (l\riti, h) 91, 92. 93, 9·1 61h Baule Squadron (uS) 102, 101 71h Fleet (uS ) 174, 17H-9 H-ll Fle...·l Plan 10') 9th destroyer l10lilla ( Bri tivh} 9 1 Io-mch (254-111111) guns Ss-6 IOlh de~troyer llolilla ( B ri li~h) 9 1 l lrh de'tro)'er flo tilla ( British) 9 1

12-inch OU5·mm) gun, .\4. 51, 5:Hi. SH, 59, 63 121h deMroyt..'r llolilla (Brilish) 9 1, 99 131hde'troyer flo tilla ( British) 91

13.5-inch (3H-nun) gun, 65 l-i-inch 055-mm) gun, 120. 121 I ; -ind l (3H1-mm) gun s 66

tti-inch (4U6-mm) gun, 34, 110, 120, IH5

Alxli<'i 9H Ahyssinia 119

Achilles 12H. 128 Admiral .\takaYlJl/19

Admiral Sctnvr 136, ISH, 159 Admiralty \X'{ )rk ~ fI) A,f.:"memmm57 AgincUllt17 6

air hanks 111- 13, 126, 160- 1 Brilish 133. f.i4 -5, 145. 14(,- 7, 151. 168. 169-70 German 150, 160. 164- 5, 169, 170 Japanese 152- 3, 15(>-7, IHO US 161, 174-{i, 1M-2 air<.:raft Alha<.:orcs 133 Avent:er torpedo Ix)mhers IHI- 2 Fulmar IXlInhers l ,i 5 FW IW fit:lucrs 169 Lam:aster IXlITlhers 16.'1, 169-70

Spilfire, 139 Swonlfi.sh I.U , I.H - 5, l·i 5, 146, 149 Zl'roS I HO ain.:r.lfr Gu ril'rs H, I H2

Brilish 77, 92, 106. 131, 152. 153, 1.19. 140, 145, 159 Frt..'IKh 69

japanese IW- I, 172- 3 US 152, 161, 174-{i Aj a x 65. 12H-9, 128 AktlRi 1J.i, 152- 3 Alabama I H3 Allllmia 6; Allxi corv aircraft 133

Alexander 1/l4H, 49 Alexander III , tsar of Russia '10

Alexandria 133, 135 'all or nothing' armour 71

seealso North Atlantic; South Atlanti« first steam crossing 26 First World War H2-3 nineteenth century IH, J9

Second \Xb rld War 131, 136, I.'\H, 1.19. 140, 1-1-1. 14H, 162 AutiaciOlL'iH1 ,1urora H6

Australia 62, 154. 160. 161 Australia 66. 67 Austri a 16, 71. 79, HU

all- centr e-l in e arrangem ent 65, 70

Au stri a-Hungary 72-3 , 7H, 79

Allied forces

Avenger torped o bo mbers IHI-2 Axis powers 131, 15u. 151, 154, 172, IH.\

Fil't World War H2, 1O:\-5 Sc'c.ond WorldWar 133, 136. 137. 151. IW, 161. 162. 172, IHO Almaz ,1<j

Uaden l07

Almirante Cocb ru ne 76-7 Alnurante ia torre 76 Ahaficrd 1 5 ~. 166, 167 Amagi Cb,s 109- 10. 113

Baltic 130, 13M. 162, 163 Balti(' Fleet ( Russian ) 47. 55, 66, 1M-I

American Civil \'(.'ar (I HO I - 5) 2H-9, .)I

Ameri can War of Ind ependen ce 16 ammun ition

handling HM, 100- 1 rounds 33

shells 26. 33, 51. 5:Hi , 174. 1M-I Ang lo-German Naval Treaty 120

Anglo-j apanese Alliance ( 1902) 45, 114 ann-aircraft weapons 174. I ~I anti-torpedo bulg es 66 Archangel 169 Arctic Ocea n 131, I SH Ardent 100

Argentina 76. 129 Arizol/a 153, 1114 Ark Rl~ra/ 1 31 , 132. 146 arma men ts 22, 23, 24 Sf.'f! also gun

turrets: guns

anli-aill'rafl I74, 1M- I broadsides 12, 13, 1H-19, 49 canno ns 1:\- 14, 33 Armed Neutrality Pact 16 Armistice !0-"i , 105, I II armour all or nothing system 71 be lts 31, 5H compound armour 31- 2

iron 26-9. 30, 31-2 stL"'\ 3U. 32 an11our·p ierd ng shells 33 annuured helts 31, SH ammured cruisers 5R--9, 72 see also banlct'ruisers armoured ~ h ips (Panzerschif(e) 119

arm, r.!('e. naval H,47. 59. 61-3. HO Armslront: annament factory 27, 66 Armstrong Whitworth 71, 75 Asabi 4H-9 Asia set' oL'io individual {'(}lllltrics intcr·world wars period 109 nint..'It..'enth <.:cmury 30 turn of tltt..' twentieth century oj; , 49. 50 Asia-Padfj e ,is. lSI , 152 Sf\' "Lm individual <.: ountrics Asiatic Squadron (GS) 43

Atago l74 Atlantk

Baltic Works66 169 ltarba m 80. 92, 9·1. 133, 134. 135 batteries 26, 2H banlecruisers 12 British 5H-9, 63, 66, 72, 7,1 , 8 1-90, 92- 7, 98. 100- 1, 107. 109, I I I. 113 German 63. 73-4, 76, H:Hl . 90, 92-5. 97. 100-1 Japanese 72, 109. II I, 113. II H US 111, 113. 114, 161, 17:Hi Ilanks hip How IH3 Bayern Cb ~, 73 8"al'l/ 68. 69 Beatt y, Sir David H3-1. H5-6, H7. 90. 91, 92-3 . 92.9·1 ,95 .97. 100, 101, 102, HH lietlu<)' ·19 Belfast 166. 167 Belgium HO, 113. 130 Bellerophon Class 65 Bnrd ufos

Benbou' 1J9

Captain 153 Bergen 139. HO Berlin 127. 129, 172 Bey, Vice-Admiral 166. 167 m""an:k H, 120, 121, 135, 137- 12. 137. 138, 143, 144--{l, 146. 150. 1114 Bennion .

75, 76-7 eighteenth century 16- 23 First World War 79-ll'), 90-107. I II inter-world wars period 1OH-9. I ll, II 3--l 1 nin eteenth century 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33. 3S

Second World War 125, 127- 35, 1.iH-52, 154-9. 161, 16:\-71. IH.\ seventeenth cen tury 16 turn of ,hl' twe nt ieth centu ry 39-W. .j-i , -is, ·1(Hl

I\rilish Admir.lhy early twentieth cen tury ~7 . SR, 61 eightee nth ce ntury IH

First World War HI, H6, H9. 92, 9·j. 97. 99. 100. 107 nineteenth century 26 Second World War 131, 1.\ 6. 155, 15l)-(JO. 162 British Embas.. . y (Japan) 122 Briti sh Empire 13. 16, 3U British Expedit ionary For ce 150

Brilish N:II,' 12, 16 S{'(' "L wJRoyal 'av)' broadsides 12, l .~ . lHo-I9, 49

Brown , David K. 26, 27, 57. 5H Brown-Curt is turbines 72

Brunei 17.\. 174 Bucentaure 22 Buenos Aires 129 bullets 33 Burma I(JO Bureau of Constructio n and Repair (>R-70

CalM 174 Cadiz IH, 19 Ca io IJll ilio 132

Catifornta 71, 153, 179 Camplx41lU1l'/l 159, 160 Canada 16 CmUlda 76 cannons 1:\- 14, 33 Cmwp llsH2

Cape of Goo d Hope 4H C:II'" .IIatal'an, Baule of 13:\-5 Caribbean 16. 4·1

Bismarck, Ono von 7H, 137

Carmllnill S7

Black Day of the German Army 104 BlaclePrince 27. 100 Illack Sea neet 40. 67 Bkl('hk y Park 150 Illohm & Vo~, , hipyard 66, 121, 137 Bhicher ll4. 86-7, 87 IXlInh, 1(>11, 169 Bonapane, "apoleon 16- IH, 22, 23

Casablanca 131 Catalinas 146

Borkum 9H

Borneo 173 Bunx lil/u 48, 49 Bo~nia 7H 8 ra ,) ' 49

Brazil 76 hrt..'t"{'h-I(l;ldint: guns 33-~

Bre't 13H. 150 Un'taRue 131 Brctat:ne Class 6H

BriMs.T"d 131- 2, 142-1 , 143 Brilain H, 79, 1H; 05('(' aL w) England; :'\c)rthefTl Ireland; S{'()tlanu hanh:ship preservation IH3 carly twentieth {'entury 52-63 , 64-6 . 7,1.

C lvour Clas.", 71 Channel Flt'et (l\rilish) s("e Se{'(mu Flect (British)

Channd da,h 163, 164- 5 charge 33 CheS:'I",ake Bar 29 Chile 76-7 China ·10, 45. 110, 113. 124 Cbi /(A,e 174 Cb()'u
COmmOllli'<'ll/tb .5,1 compound armour 31-2 C<mfeul·r.lte N ~l vy 2H--9 Conferencc of Ihc I.imil;J1iOT1 of Armament

092 1-22) 11:\-14 O mte eli Clll'f.mr 119, 132

187

188

JAg

THE RATTI ESHIPS

Convoy JW ;;1\ 166-7 convoy system 103

Enigma machine 1; 0 Entente Cordiale 79

Galatea 92 Gambler Bay 178

Copenhagcning manoeu vre 81 Coral Sea. lIallle of 160- 1

Enterprise 16 I, 176 Epkanhans, ~I i<'h a el 46. J.lH. Ill-j

Ga ngut Class 66-7 Geneva 118

Coronel, Battle: of HI . 82

Ericsson. John 2H

courucr-torpcdo boats 39 set! ul:..o dcstroyt.·rs Courbet Class 68

Espana Class 7; Ess('.\' li s-6

Gensoul, Admiral 131 German Admiralty H7. H9. 104. 136 German Army RO. lO3--j. 130. 163 German Naval High Command 16j

COII I"OW It'!.7

Europe H

Erin 76

Crete 133 Crimean War ( 111; ·\-6) 26 Cromarty H3. H6. 90--1 Cuba 43. .j.j Cunard Stea rn Ship Co . ; 7 Cuniberti. Vittorio ;J~l . 66. i l Cunningham. Sir Andrew 132. J.B Curtis turbine machinery 71 s('t' also Brown-Curtis turbi nes

set' also individual countries cig htcc ruh century 16, 23 First \X'orld War 78. 79. 80, III

inter-world warsperiod 119. 120 nin eteenth century 29

Second World War I,lO. 1; 1, 1; 2. I; H. 172. IH,l sixteenth century 13 turn of the twentieth century 4; . ;0 Evan-Thomas, Vice-Admiral 92. 93. 9·j Excellent 24

Exeter 12H-9 D-Day landings 172 Dakar l,ll

explosions. secondary HH, 9;....(>. 141- 3 explosive charge 33

Dulrymple-l lamihon. Cap tain 147

Expres:.. 1;7

()mu/a/o 32

Dante Aligbieri 71 Danton Class 6H Danzig Ha rbo ur 125 Darlan. jean Fr.IIlI,:ois 131 decryp tion H3. 91. 1; 0- 1, 163. 166 IJli ell ce 100 Delaware Class 70. l l .~

Denmark 16. 130 Denmark Strait 1,l9. 140 IMf/ IiIlIWn H. H6. H7. 9,l. 9·1.97 Dcrffl inger Clas,"i i -i. 77

face-hardening techniqu es 32

Falklands. Battle of the H2-,l. 114-5 F~lr

East 47,

1;;

Harwoo d , Henry

s

Henry VIII. king of England l,l. I; lIid 119. 161, 172 High Seas Flee t (German) 77. 83-4. Ht). 102-7.

German :-':;1', ' H set'also Imperial German ;\'a\'y

early twentieth century 61.73 First \X'orld War HI, lO·j inter-world wars period 109. I II, 119. 120 Second \X'o rld War 127. 1.\1. U 6- 7. J.lH-; 0. 16_\-!i. 169. 171 turn of the twent ieth century -l6 German ~a\'y l l'agUl' ·i6 German Slates, unification 50. -I; Germany H. 18; early twen tiet h century 55. ;9. 60-1. 62- 3. 73--1.7; . 76. 77 First \'i'orld War 7H-H9. 90--107 inte r-world wars per iod 109. II I. 119. 120 nineteent h century 30. .U . 35 Second World War 12·1. 12;. 127- .\1, U2- 3. 13; . 136-;1, 1; 4. 1;H-9. 162- 71, 172

oa

turn of the twentiethcentury 39. .jS-7 Gibson. PCAAY 10;""'7

Ferdinand. Franz 79. RO Fern,17;

Gilhert Islands 1; 4

'Fighting Instruct ions' 18- 19. 92. 97

Gtotre

Firs! Fleel (British) HI set! also Grand Fleet Firs! World War H. 76. 7ll-
Gnei...enau HI. H2. H3

Giulio Cesarl! 119

25. 26. 27

Gneiseuau (II ) 136. US. 139. 1; 0. 1; 1, 164- 5 Good /l ope SI Goodwin. Peter 19- 22

DOAAer Bank. R utle of H(}-7. 86- 7. AA

61, HI, 82. H,l. 92. 107 Fiske. Richard 1; 3 Fiume 72 Fiu me 133-1

Don itz, Ad miral 16<.>

Horida 119

Gotenhafen 13K 139 Gmf.lfK'l! 127- 9. 129. J.lH Grand Fleel (Britixh ) 76. 77. 79. H,l. H;. HH-9. 89. 103. 104 Battle of Coronel 81 Banle of Dogger Bank H7. HH Banle of jut land 91-2 . 94. 94- 5. 96-9. 101-2. I().j Great Belt 139 The Great \X'hite Fleet (liS) 110 Greece 76. I32-,l. l,l;

Doria Class 71

Florida Class 70. 117

Gregson. Commander 142. 145

fh)/"S('lsbin' 1,.7 !Jr. ·lIc1110llRbl ; 2-L 53. ; 6-9 . 56. 61, 6; . 70. 73.

f~)'il1g

Grey, Edward 4; Gn:rbutull/ l.34 Grosser KurjiisI 97 GrOl·e. Eric 19. 24. ;4-;. HH-9. 100-2. 116. Ill-j

dcstroYC:Ts 39

flotillas 91, 92. 94. 9H-9. 100 newscblmul l19. 120. 127 .'1('( ' also /.ii/zoll' W ) Deutschland Class 73 Detustation 31 Devenport ~;l \'a l D()c kY~l rJ

;8

Dcwey. Gt.'orgl' ·B. (lH Diamo nd j ub ilee Revi ew ( 1897) ;7

7l 76. 77 dR';uJnoughts; 2-6 .3.53,56, 60- 1. 74-; . 77 Bri. ish ; 2...(,3. 5,J. 56. (x!-l . 9H. 101, 113 Frl'lKh (~ German 7,l. 9H. 99. 101, 1O,l. 107. 111- 12 Ilalian 71

Japanese IO'! liS IH,l f) lIi1io

32

!Jllh - (if l;,rl, 1; 9. 166. 166. 167. 16H. IH5 Duma 66 I)undas. mid.sllipman 1·13

!Jllllh-"/i/(- 119. 130. 1.\1, 1,l2 Dunkirk 1.\0 Dutch East Indk s 1; 2

fll g/(' 77 Eastern Fk'l'l (Russian) 4'5 l'COn()l11k t lCtors naval costs 12. 66 rl'cession 119. 12·\ f.1hi"J.: 92

Eleclm l·i4 Elliol. John Paul 104 Empemr o! IIulia 11<'> EI1!!." dille 92 England s('(' also Brilain eiglueenth cemuI'); IH. 22, 23

losses 126

Firth of Forth H6. 104 fish pond ; ; Fisher. SirJohn Arbuthnot 52. ;4--6. 55. ; 7. ; 8-9.

Kestrel 10;

Force 1 (Brilish) 166. 167. 168 Foree 2 (British) 166. 167 Force II (British) 131. 146 Foree Z (Brilish) I; ; Ford Island 1; 3 f ;,rm ida ble 13.\ 1-'01111I1(' 100 France 8 c;lrly t\\'el1lielh cemury ;;. (lH. 7; eightl'enth ('entury 16- 19. 22-3

First \X'orld War 7H. 79. HO inler-world wars pL'riod 113. I IH. 119. 120 nineleenth eentur)' 26-7. 30. 33. 3; Sceond \Xb rld War 12; . 127. 130-2. 169 seventeenth ('emuI')' 16 sixtcenth ( emuI')' 13. I; IUrnof thl' twemieth centuI')' 39. 4;

FYllllkli" 176 Fraser. Sir Bmce 166. 167 Freneh Arm)' 130 Freneh Indo-China I; I, 1; 6 Freneh Nal)' 22. 26-7. 130. l,ll French Hem lulion 16. 19 Frie dman. Norman 4-1. 6H. II ; . IH4-; Friellrich der Grc.1.'5;e 92. 94 Fil} i 4H-9 Fulmar homt)l'rs 145

fi lso 172. 174. 174. 17H-9 Fuso Class 72. 109

FW 190 fil(hlers 169

S,.., ond World War 130. 1; 0 Tudor period 13--1;

Enl(lish Channel 16. IH. 27. 1; 0- 1, 164- 5

G3s III, 113 G311 9'J

m.

Grozlly ·19

Gua,bicanal 161- 2 Guam I I; . 1; 4 guided missiles 37--8

Gulf of Finland H,l Gulf \X'ar IH,l l(un ports 13 l(un lurrelS 27-8 . 29. 33-1. 66. 77 all-ccnln:-line arrJngcmem 6; , 70

l(uns 27-8. 29. ;,l. ; 4.60. 100 IO-inch (2; 4-mm) ;>-6 12-inch ljO; -mm) 34. ;1, ;>-6. ; H. ;9 . 63 J3.; -inch (343-mm) 6; 14-inch (,l;;-mml 120. 121 I; -inch (3flI-mm) 66 16-inch (4oG-mm) 34. /1 0. 120. 1115 acnlr.It) · 34-; . ;3 . ;; hreech-Ioadinl( 33-1 f"Jngc ;; ~tandardil.Jl ion

1 2~

I Iaw w 47 Havana harbour -13 Hawaiian Island group I . 1; 2- 3 Helgoland Cb ss 73 Henderson fil'1d 161 Henry VII. king of Enl(land 15

I;

10; Baule of ()oAAer BankH6. H7. HH Baule of j utland 91-9. 101-2 Hildrcd. A It.'X~lIlLl r.1 13. I; lIill. Richard Ill-j Hillenkoetter. Captain 1; .\ Hindenburi; 106 iii/IlK'" IW Hipper. Admiral Hill 113. H; . H6. 90. 92. 9,l. 94. 9; . 97. 99. 100. 104 Hitler. Adolf H. 119. 120. 121. 12;. 127. 129. 130. U 7. 137. U 9. Il l, u s, 1;0. I; H. 1; 9. 160. 16.\. 172 Holland 16. I().I . 130 set' also Xerherlands Holland. Adm iral 110- 1, 112 Home FIc'et (British) HI, 127. 139. l·j·1 Hong Kong ·B. 1; 4

II(KX/ 12. 107. 109. 109. 116. 117. 131, 132. 1.\; . 1.\9. 14Q-l, /41. /42. 146. 147 I Iood. Rear-Admiral 9; Ilorns Reef 97. 9H. 99 Hosoya. Shiro 176- 7. / 77 Hough. Richard 161 Hughes. Cha rles Evans 113 human 1Orpt'UOCS 13; Hungary Si't' Austria-Hungary 'hunting group' (British} 12H Hustvedt, Erling 162 /~)'IIR(/

172. 17-\' 179. 1111. IH2

lach ine . Admiral I.U-l Ihuki Class 7!.

iceland 1.\9. 140 Ikeda. Kiyoshi ; 0. 114-1; . IH4 Illustrious 132 Imperatritsa ~tari p Cb s... 67 Imperial German ~a \'Y ·i5. 7t HH S('e £lL..o German Na\"y hUpL'rial Japan 30. 44 St'f.' alsuJapan Imperial Japane!'iC ~a \"y 72 S('i' also Japanese ~a \'Y intl'r-world warspt.·riod 109. 110. 123 Second World War 1; 2. 1; 6. 173. 180. IH2 imperialism 13. 16. ·io-; I w hj
Indefalil(ahle Class 66 India 16. 160 Indi:m Ocean ·jH. 127. 136 Indiana Class \"es..scls 43 lru/omilah!e ;9. s6. H6. H7 Indonesia 1; 2 lI if1ex ib/e 31, ; 9. H2. 8.\ Ingenohl. Adrnir.11H7 I lI m p id 174-; I w ·ill cibld 9. 60- /. 61. 74. H2. 82. H,l. 9>-6. 100 Invincihle Class h;lttle(nJiSl'rs 59. 66

1011'(/ I I. 120. 122. IH3 Iowa CIa ~, I I. 122. IH2- 3. 1114 Iron Bottom Sound 161 l roll DIII.-9 1, 119

Iron Duke Cla~' 6>-6 H27 Il j Halsey. AdmirJI 162. 174. 17H. 179 Hamhu'!; 137 lIamp.on Hoad, 29. 3 1. IIl-1 ,l lIardinl(. Warren G. 113 Hardy. Captain 19 lIartlq )(xll H4 II(/ n lll(/ 172, 174. 179. IH2

iron-d ad warships 2(}-9. ;\0. ;\1- 2 Ise 172. 17·1. 179. 18 1, IH2 1St: ( (;Iss 72. 109

Island of Mull HI lIalian Nal)' 32. 71, l,ll, 1,l2. l,l; 1I:!lr e:uly Iwelllil'th n 'ntury ;,3-\. 71. 72 L'ightel'nth n..'ntllI')· 1M

----lIi II_= _ eaA___

lNllJEX INDEX

FiN \\{)r1J War 78. HO

inter-world wars period 113. I1H. 119 nineteenth century 32 Second World \Var 124. 1.lO-1. 132- ; . 1; 0. 1;1 . 1; 4. 172 110, Admiral IHO !zllmnul ·\9

j ackson . Pat 14; Jade 92. 9H Jail/a im 166. 167. 16H Japan H. 1H4 , IH; -"('(' a lso Imperial japan battleship prescrvauon IHJ-l early twentieth century 5-l,;;, 57. 59. 66. 71- 2 First \\ h rld \\ 'ar H2

inte r-wor ld wars period 109- 10, 111. 113. 114-1 6, 11ll- 19, 120, 121, 122- 3 nineteenth century 30, 35

Lexington 114. 161. 17'i-6 Lexingt on Class Il l , 114

Mitsuhishi 72, 123 mobil e defences 39

0 r.1O 1.\1-2

l.cyte Gulf, Banle of 17.\-9, 100 Liaotung Peninsula ·1; Lindemann. Ernst 1.\7. 144 line-of-baule ships 12. I; . 1ll-19. 26 Lton M , 86. 87. 91, 92. 93, 94. 97 Lion Class lxntlccruisers 66, 6H, 72 Iittori c 119, 132 Loch Awe 166 Loch-na-Keal HI

.1[0J,:ami 178- 9 .lI o/lke H4 . M, H7. 93. 94. 97 Moltke Class 74 stonttor 2H. 29. 29, 31 ,ltommmtb 81

Ol'('/ ·IH, W Orion Class 65-6 Orkney Islands 81 Osawa. Admiral 17·1. 178, 179 Oslia /~l,{1 49

Mo ntana Class 122

Ostfril~/(// /(I I I I - I.\

Lome, Depuy de 27 London

First \X'mld War H3. 92, 98, 103 inter-world wars period l OR. 118-19. 120 Second \X'orld War I;;. 159 l.ondon Naval Conference ( 930) 11ll-19 London Naval Conference ( 935) 119. 120 London Naval Treaty ( 936) 120- 2, 126

Montecuccoli. Admiral 72 Mo ntevid eo , harbour of 129 Montoi o. Don Patricio 43

76 Muller, Hans 170- 1 Murmansk 158. 166 ,II IL
Long Forti es 92

Russo-Japanese W:lf .,,- ; 1

Lord Xelm" ;7

Second \X'orld \X'ar 124. 12; , 131, 132. 150, 1; 1- 7, I; H, 160- 2. 172-ll3 turn of the twenti eth ce ntury 39, ·W , 44-; , '17- ; 1

Lossicm outh 169

:"3 battleship III

to ugh Swilly HI Low Countries 130

Nagasaki 123 Sawlto II H. In. 174, 179, 182. 182 Nagato Class 109 Nagurno. Admiral 1;2 Naito, Hatsuhu 11;

Luftewa ffe 1; 0, 164-5. 169, 170

;7

Japanese High Command 100

lusitania

Japanese Imperial Defence Council 109

l.ut jens, Gunther 136. 139. 140, 144, 14; --{),

Japane", :'\al) ';1, 118 see a lso ImperialJapanese Na\'y j ava 1; 2 j"", Ba rt 119, 131 j ellicoe, Sir j ohn HI. 91, 92. 93. 94-;. 9(Hl. 9') , 100. 101, 101, 102. 103, 10 1 )l'rr:II11, vice-Admiral 91 John Brown ~'<: Co. 66. 72. 75. 107, !09 jutland, Hattie of H, H2. H7, HH. 90- 107. 9 1. 94-5 losses 100 units involved 90

145, 14H I.lilzo//' 92, 93. 94, 9; . 97. 99 Lli lzo//' (ll ) (formerly Deutschland) 127. I; H

,\12 113 .\l acAlthur. Gene ral 100 .\l eKenna, Reginald 61 Mcl.aughlin, Steve '10 magazines .U

Kj fJord 163, 169. 170

Magon , Rear-Admiral 18

Ka~a 114

Mahan. Alfred Thayer 43. 46 .\lai1l('·13 xtakharoff. Admiral 47

10') , 113 Kaiser Class 73 kamikaze aircraft 100, 180 Kauegat 130 Kawasaki 72 KC (Kru pp s Cemented) steel 32

Kennedy, lud ovic 147

.Ila/a,l'a 94 ~Ia laya

1; 4, I; ; . 1; 6 152 Manchuria 40. 4; . 119 .\lanila Bay '\3, II ; ~ Ialaysia

Kelll ll4- 5

Jta rCE'(1lI JH

Kid 7.'. 74- ; , HO. 10 !, 126. 1;1 Kid (;,0:1173. 74- 5 KiiCb " 109, 11.\ "·ill)!. Eduun! ;7 K in ~ Edward VII Class .H Kill~ <;"'1'1I",' 121. 139, 140, 14·\- ; . 144, 147. IH, \ King Ceo rge v Class 65-6, 11 3 Kinkaid, Admiral 17'1

.1I" I'l,'w llj 94. 107 .1I" I'lIx)/'(lIIgh 9; , 97, 119 ,11" 1)' NIl«' 1.\- 1; , 14. 23. IH3 .1/"1)'/(///// 111, 153

Kirisbima 161, 162. 172 Kiyoshi, Ikeda 17; Kol x.~ T!. Koll x'rg M Kondo, Admiral 162 KOII~o

I H I IH. 172. 174

K on ~o C Ia ~,

72, 10') , II H

.\ta.1i.'illCbusetts IH3

Philippe 19, 22. 39. IH4 stauretania ;7 .11",1'' ' 174, 175 Mediterranean Masson .

set' also individual co untries t'ighlt..-enth century 16. IH, 23

Second World War 131, 132. 13;, 1; 0. 15H ~ l edit errJ n can

Fleet (British) ;;

,lI educk 14; Mciji Restor-nion

Narrow Seas 13

Nassau Class 73

.1I" gdeIJllrg H3

K a ~a Cla ~,

Naples 18 Napoleon 11I 30

Narvik 130

l.uzon 174 Lyon. David 37-ll

30,44

Naval Bill (German) 46. ;9 Nazism (National SIKi;I1 ism) 119, 124. 137 ,veL"'" 114. 116 Nelson, Horatio 18- 22

Septwu' 6; Netherlands 113 S1'f! a lso Holland Set.'lld1l7 I, I;3 Nevada Class 71, 117-I H New Guinea 160. 161, 173 Sel/'jel'S~1' 122. IH3 Seu',ltexico 71. I II New ~ I ex ico Class 71. 117- 18 'New' :'\a\)' (U S) 43

l brk 71 New York Class 70- 1. 117 New Zealand 62, 161 Sel/' 7.ea/(//1I/ 62. 62.66, H6. H7. 93 night fighling 97-9 . 98 Nights, Bob 170 Nishimura, Admiral 17,j, 17ll-9 ='09 Lancaste r Squadron 169 :'\0 13 CIa~, 110, 113 No 617 La nca ster Squadron 169 Nomura. Captain 182 S orfo/k 139. 140, 14-!, 166, 167 Norfolk :"a\'al Shipyard IH3. 184 Sell '

Normandy 172 North Amerir:l. British Colonies 16

Nolth Arlanlic 130. 13;, IH4 Xot1hCamlilla 121, IH3 North Carolina Clas',", 121 Nolth ",a 16, 47-ll. H9. 99, 102

Korea 45, 4H

Jtem'mac 2H

:'\'orthern Ireland HI

Kort'an War 183 "'ru,,/,riIlZ 107

Mers-e1-Kehir 130. 131- 2. 133 mid·P;lcific 173

Norway 130, 131. 158, 1;9, 163, 169

Kuantan 1; 6

KIIIl' :'\;11)' )'alll 72, 112, 123. 100 Kllrila. Takt" 17·\-; . 175. 17H

~1i d dle

1.;lInhelt. Andrew 30, ~0-3 , ;0-1, ; 7, 6u, BO. IH; Lanr aster IXlIll1 lt'rs 16H, 169-70 Langsdorf. Il;ms 127- 9

l.e ach. Henry HH. 144. 155-6, 166. 167. 16ll-9 U:a).:ut.' of r\:uions II A, 12-1 knd k :lse arr.m gl.'ml.'nts I; 1

Nova Scolia 16 Slimberg

H2. 114-5

st'eaLw) individu:II countries ~I i dwa y,

HallIe of 161

~ lind or.1

174 mines 30- 1. 37. 3H. HI, 9H missiles 37-8 , IH3 .IlLlSissi!'!'i 179 .11(,,,," ri 110, 122, 180. IH2- 3. 183. 185 ~Iit chd l, Hri~adier-G eneraI 111- 13. 157

Parsons, Charles ;7

Pascoe 19-22

Pearl Harbour 'ii , 132, 1; 2- 1. 154. 160, IH3. IH; Peattic. Mark 44. 49. II ; , 120. !'i 1- 2 Pennsylrania 1;3 Pennsylvania Cia" 71. 117- IH Perry. .\I anhe\\' -i4 Peter s. Otto l ,lH

l'etm/,m'/(Jl'Sk 47 Pbaelo,, 92 Philippines 4.'>-1. 4; , 'iI . 110. 1; 2. 1; 4, 17.'>-4 . 17H, 100 Phillips. Tom I; ; . 156 Pitt, William 16 Pohl, Admiral von H7

1'0/(/13.'>-1 Poland 12; . 127 l'ommer,, 99 l'ort Arthur ·10. ,15, 47. ·iH Port Moresby 160.. . 1

POItStanley H2 Port William H2

l'ot1/mu/ 161 Portsmouth :\'a\';11Dockyard I j , 27, il, ;2. ; 7. ;H

Portugal 16. 113 PQ I7 co nvo y l i l)-()() Prien, Gunter 126. 127 Prince of lF(//".. 121, 129, HO. 141- 2. [·14, H ; ,

H 7, 1; 1, !'i5-7.

is:

15 7,

m. It{.l

Princes s R(~l'al H6, H7, 97

Prin z f:1I~{,// 13!l-9. 1ol0, I·il . H4, [; 0 Prtnzrcgcru Luitpold IW

propellants 33 1'1''''' '11«' 131, 132. 133 Prussia 16. .30 PT IXUIS 179

QII" 'II f:li z(/Ix'ib 77, 116..17, 1.\; Queen Eli", heth Cia." 66. 77. 91, 103, 10ll-9, 116 QII"'II .II(/I) ·93, 100. 101, 123 QuillCron Bay 16

Raeder. Eril'h /2 6. 1.\6- 7. I.\H, 159. I·IH, 1;0 . 1; 9. 169 RAF set'Royal Air Forn.' Rahn. \'('erner 46

Ramillies 66

East 79

,lI ikll s" 47, 4ll-9. 411, ;0-1, 50, IR4 ~1in as GerJis Class76

FiN World \'\'ar H1-2

irncr-world wars pcriod 110-11,11 ; ,1 22,1 23 Second \X'orld War 126. 151. 152. 154. I; H. 16Il-2. In - 3, IHO turn of the twentieth century -W, ·i5, 51 Pacifir Fll'et (Russian) -lO, .1;, 47. 4H Pacific Fleet (CS) 1; 2- .\ paddl cwb ce lcrs 26 Pakenhum. Captain 10- 1 l )al/ad,, ·i7 Panama Canal 6H, III

Xonnandi« 1; 9

men:hant ships 103, 127, 136. 137. 139. 1; 0, 160, 162, 166

set' aL'io individual countries

l'aciflc lK-i see also Asia·Pacifir ; mid-Pacific

No rrnand ie Class 6H

KOllip. 107 K()nig Class 73

Krupps of f."en 32. 60, 61, 73

Ort'R(m 4 1

Oahu IS2 Odessa 26

Okinawa IBO. 181 Oklaboma 1; 3 Old Admir.r1ty lluild in~. London B3 Oldendorf, J e ~," 17H O(I'", !'ia 42. 43 O(I'",!' ic 81 optical ran~efinders 34

fJngd'imk'rs :H Reagan administration UU

Rt'lloutahh' 22 Rl'it.:h...t;l ~ -.6, W, 62 f( '1I0 1l''' 107. 11 6-17. 117. H6 Rt.'nown CI:Is.o; 116

NI1J11 L'" 107. H;, IS; , !'i(;"7. 173, It{.! Res""iy,! 76 Rt>sol" ti(m 131 Rdl'iz,m 47

189

190

~

INDEX

----I.il...L"""""'"

Reuter. l.udwiH n In J0;

Rew nge Cia" 66. 1OH-9. 116 Reykja\'ik 159 Rhc:inuhunH. o pe ratio n 139. 144 Ricl..lim 119. 131 rifling 33 Rio cit'fane i rn 76

Ri,k Theo ry ,16 Ril'Cll/m 'i1l 76. 76 RivC-1" Platt', Rittle of 127- 9. 12H, 129

Ro
Roo m

luulcship preservat ion 183

early twentieth century ;'1-5. 57. SSt 61. n l' i~llll"C nl l l centu ry

2,3

FiN World \'i~lJ KI. K2. K3, KS-<>. K7. KK. K'). 100 fo u nde r 13 inter-wo rld wars period 1 ~9. Il l , 114. 120 nin eteent h century 26. 30 Seco nd \'ibrld War126. 127. 129. 135. 144. 151. 15-1.1 69.1 83 tum of the twentieth ce ntu ry 39. ·\0, ·i-i, ~.:;. -i6. 47.4H Ro)'aI O(//: 125. 127 Rozhdestven..ky, Aumir.il ·\; . '18, ,\9 Russia .~.... ulsn

Soviet Union ea rly twentieth century

55. fh...7 , 6H

16 Fir>1 \'ibrld War7H. 79. RO. 83

ei ght eenth cen tury

16. 35 Second \'ibrld War 150. 15M. 162. 163-6. 169

nineteenth ce ntu ry

Battlc of Cape .\Iatap"n 13}-5 !t utle of CorJI Sc;, 160- 1 Itaule of Leyt e Gulf 17}- 9. IRO llattle of River Plate 127-9 . 128. 129 Battle of Sibuyan Sc'J 17,j...5 Serbi a 79. RO Srttsu CIa~, 54. 72. 113 Scvasropol 26 Seven Years War 0 7';6-<;3) 16 Se, Yi/itz 7-l, II-l. R6. R7. KK. 93. 9 1. 95.96 .97,99 Sblffi C'id 1-16. 166. 167 shells 26. 33. 51. 55-Q. 17·1. IlID-I Sbih ,bill/" ,i ll-9

Tem"'.'-'",· 71. 153. 15-1. 179

LJ ru~lI :1 r

Tennessee Class 71. 11M

/,l ab 119

T"wlS 70. 10 1. 183 Thailand 160 Thame s F_'lUary 101 This-o n, Otto 13741 TiR,.,-fb. R6. H7. 93. 119 Tilhum. Boh 1-\3 7lpfx'"",), 100 Tirpitz K. 120. 137. 13M. 151. I;R-(JO. 159.1 63. 169-71. 171 Tirp itz, Alf,,-tl vo n 46. 46.59 . n . HI. KK. 102. 107

Tomahawk mis...i1cs IH3

Sihuyan Sea. Battle of 17·j...5 Si('i1y 16 Singapore 115. l'i·j...(, Sinopc..' 26 Sisso! 49

'1'0 1'1'. Erich 13M Torpedo 1HSquadron (US) 174- 5 torpedo boats 3M, 39 torpedoes 30- 1, 3741. 51 Battle of ju tland 97 Second \'ibrld War 127. 132. 145. 1·1(>-7. 174-5. IKI Torpcx IHI Toulon IH. 132 Tovey. SirJohn 139. 140. 144-5. 144. 1-\6 Toyoda, Admiral 173, 17H trade routes 40-3. -1·1. 127 Trafalgar, Battle of 19-23. 20- 1 Treaty of Shimono-cki 45 Trc;lIr of \'cr>aiIIcsH. IOI. 105. 109. 119. 120. 121 TriL"Stc 72 Tripartite Pact 131. 151-2 Triple Alliance 78 Triple Entente 79 Trornso 169 Trondh eim 15M. 159 Tsarn-ucb sl Tsukuba Class72 Tsush ima , llattle of ·17. 48-51, 50. 71

Skidmore. Howard 181-2

Soldier's Council (German) 10 1 Solent 15 Solomon Islan ds 160. 161 Some rville, Sir James 131. 132 Somrne 10.\ South America 6H, HI-2 South Atlant ic H2-3. 127 South Carolina Class 5-1. 70 South China Sea 157. IK4

Soutb /)(/(",,, 162. 163 South Dakota Class I I I. 121

Russian Army HO RUs''\i:1O 3\1' 45

South Pacific 172 SoU/bli mp/Oil 94 Soviet Union 151 s('(' also Russia

R u~\( ~J a pa ne\C

Spain 16. IlI-19. 37. 'B- 4. 75

11I1v;";(1 57

Spanish-American War (JR98) 37. 43--i

Turbu len t 100

Spa Troll'ba ll'k 100 Spec , Maximilian Graf von Hl-3

Turkey 26. 75-Q

tum of the twentierh century 39. ·10.45. ,17- 51

War -17- 51. III-I

Saalwachu-r, Admiral 126 Sai~on

1S6

turbin es 57. 71, 72

Turkish Straits 40 tu rret gun, 2741. 29. 3J-i . 66. 77. I/O. IK5

sail-powered ship, 12. 1}- 23. 25. 30 St John. Ben 175 St ;
'(X:<''t1 57 Spitfires 139 Spilzbergen 163 '(Xllling J i . 53. 55-Q ste;lI11 :tge 2-1- 35, 57 , ted dad , hip' 30. 32 SI,x:kholm 139

Stm FrtmcLKO 161 $ ;10 Pl'<.lro, California 152

Slr.lilSof GihrJ!t;lr 18 StrJits of Kore-J 48

U53103 U-17 m U-331 135

San Shiki ,hell 17-l, IIID- I Sapper Hill H2 SarJjl'\'o 7H, 79

SlraslxIII I'R 1/ 8. 119. 130.131. 132

U·lx)ats

Slurdce, Sir DovclOn 82

FiN \'ibrld War 81. 90- 1. 92. 103. 101. I II &<"ond World War 127. 135. 150. 160. 162. 16') VllrJ dl'l'rypl' 150-1. 163. 166 U1Itlp[>ro(lcbahle 59

Stl TtlI(~tl l l ·\

Sardinia 26 Sa\CIXl 123 SalSUffi;.1 CIa~"i 71 Stll 'tl1lmlh 26

Sam Island 161. 162 Scapa Flow

Fir\! \'i'orld \'i'ar HI. K4 . 91. 92. 100. 102. 104. 1OS-7. 105 S.:", ml \'i\lrld War 126. 127. 139. 140. 1-11 S.:arlxlmugh 11-1

all-centre-line arrangement 6S, 70 Turtlc. Dougla, 147 Two Po\\'er Standard 39. 61. 114

Viet nam 1;1 , 1M3 vietnam War IlH \ 'i ~i" itl ~9 , 3 1

vladim ir ,\lommw kb ·i9 Vlad ivo stok .jo. ·15. -\7. IH. ·j9 \(11/ dcr Tann 7}--1. 77. 11-1. 95. 9·1. 97

Wake Island 154 Wall Slfl'l't Crash 11 9, I.H Wallis, Barnes 169 Warren, Commander 1·13 W~lrrl'nd cr, Sir Gl,() ~l' HO \f( ,m or 27, 28, 28. 100. 1M3

Irtl",pilt' 94. 11 (>-1 7. 133. IJ I Wa shin~ton H~ ,

113 !Jcl..,bi1lJ.:/mr 11 4. 159. 162 W~l shi n gt on Co nference 5('(' Co nfe rence of the Li mitation of Aml;IIIlCJl( Wa,hington Treaty H. 11.\-1 6. 11K. 119. 120. 126 watc rnglu integrity HX

\'i'eir. Gal)' HI. KK m~~/ \'i~ ;1I ;tl1 53.

15-1, 179

\\ 'l"Sterpbul' 125

\'i'hith}'1I-1 White, Colin 23, 25, 3(') ",'hite Star HI \r'i<'Shtldt'1I97 Wilhelm I, Kaiser .\':;

Wilhclm ll. Kaiser H. -IS-<>. 45. n. KK, HX). 101. 107 Wilhdm,h a\"Cn 73. 11-1. R6. '.Xi. 97. 9R. 99. 99. 119. 126. 1.\7 Wilson, Woodrow 111 winda ge 15 \\"L'iCotlSi" 122, 1M3, IH4

Wilhefl. Admir.i1 ·17 wooc..!t.'n \"cs.-.cls 1}-23, 2; , 27

\f) 'Omi"J.: 119 C1as.'\ 70 , 117

, uhrnarines 31. 39. 151 Suez Canal 48 SlIffol/: 139. HO. 144 Sill/a li (J.'i11ltm I 76

UnitL'lI ~at ions lH3 L'ni1l'<.l Stales IH5 S('( ' aLm American Civil War; Amerk an War of

SumatrJ 152

Sunderland 103 ,uper-tlr"'Jdnoughl' 65. 65 Surigao SlrJil 173. 17l1-9

Independen('e luu leship pl\.'SC:r\'ation 183

Slll vlro l ,·ni,49

SWl-tlen 16 S\\'ordfi, h ai" 'rJft 132. 13-i-5. 1-15. 146. 149

Taiwan

victorious 106. 139. 1·10. 1l5. 1'i9 Ik IOl)' 12.15 . 17-18. IH. 19-22. _'I!-I. 2.\. IH.\

Wyolll in ~

SChllTP,honl/H l, H3

Srhamhorst (II) 119. 119. 1.16. 1.\H. 150. 151. 163. 161- 5. 166-9 Srlll'Cr. Reinhard K7. KK. 88. K'). 90- 1, 92. 93. 9-1. 95.96. 97. 9H. 99. 100. 103. IlH

72, 7S

Vict oria. quee n of (hl' Unucd Ki ngdom ,'\0, 39, ·i ':;

Vittorio H..,,('/o 119, 1j2. 13j

.11J,,/:,,/:u I61

Skagerrak 130 Skngerrak. Battle of seeJutland. Battle of

Vickers

Villeneuve, Admiral I X, 19. 22

shot 15

Sistrunk, Vl'rnon 17·1-5

valiant 116-17. 131. I.U . IJ I. 1,\5 \( 1i/:; ·19 Vichy adrn inistratio n 131

Tirp itz Plan HH

' ('go. Hcihachiro 47. 47. 4K. 49. 50. III-I Tokuyama Bar IRO Tokyo Bay 44. IH3

,\v immo 123 ships-of-the -line 12. 15. IlI-19. 26

11<)

-1;

Tah/(l 174 Talllx,y IXllllh 1(>8. 169 Tamal;lvc ·1M

"'Jrlr tWl1lli<,h <-enlul)' 54. 55. 57. 66. 68-71. 75 FiN World War 103. 101. III inler-\\'orld war> period 110-16. 117-1 9. 120. 121-3 nineh.-cnth cenlury 30. 35 s<"<:ond World War 124, 151. 152--4. 15M. 1M. 161- 2. 173. 1 7~. 17ll-4l3 Spanish·American ,",'ar 43...4 turn of the Iwenlieth ren lury 39. 43--1. ·i5. 51

X·l·r.lft 16.\

}t,baRi IHO Yamamoto. Isoroku 152. 1) 3 )'tlmtlshim 171, 174, 17H-9

limul/(lH. /22.1 23.1 52.1 72--4.1 73.1 76. 17ll-4l2. 178.1 K4 YaltUlO, AdmirJI 120 Yamalo Cb s.'\ 123, 17':; )l,-"h;ma -17 yellow pc..'rilthl'of)' ;0 Yokosuka na\'al do<:ky:.ICd 72 Yorkshire ll )ast MJ-i Hut/oU'1I 161

?t il''' 13}--1. IJ I

Z.:ppelin, 91. 92. <JR. 103 i'A'ro :Iircr:l ft I SO

Scblesll'iR-I Itd.'i/t'i1l 125

T:tn~il'r

Unill't.lSlatcs Aml)' Air Sc..'r\'kc II I

7.uibo 174

~·••land

13. HI. K3. 91. 1,\0. 166. 169 ""uttl,,1, hip' 1OS-7. /lXi. 129. 132. HH. 161 s<"oJnd 11l'CI (Briti, h) HI

T;lrJnlO I .U

Vnill-tl Slale, Cong""s 43. 44. II I. 15-\

7.(lih l/:1I 161. 17·1. 17H

7ill1arl 47

Unill't.lSl;IICS Navy earl)' twentieth ( entury 6M--70, 71

St.'cond Fk't.'l (Japanesl'> IMO

Tcgetthoff Cia" 72-3

inler·\\,orld war>period II I. 11·( 115. 121

( 920) (G l.'r IIu n ) ·i6 Sero nd World War H. 125- 35. 1.\6...57. 15l1-71.

T<'Im'min ' 19, 32 Ten-Go 10

nincll'l'nth century 2H-9 Sl'(o nd World War 153 tum of the twentieth (.'cmury 4.~

St.'lund 1\;1\';11 Law

1724! j

·lM

T~ltsuY~lIna , ~rg~l m M a ~)r

·I' ·nnalll. Bill 156- 7

In

4ttatr

____________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -:__...cr ...

Further Reading Ad m iral Sir It H . Bacon , Lord Fishel:'Ad miral oftbe Heel

18 48-19 45 ( IIam l yn, London, New York , 1974)

(2 Vo lumes) (I lo dd er & Sto ughto n, London , 1929)

Bod o H er zo g , Die Deutsch e Kri egsntn rtnc Im Kampf

Pat ri c k Becsly , Room 40, Uri/ ish Na va l l nt ellig en ce

19 14- 19 18 ( Ha m ilto n , Lo nd on , 1982) Siegfried

Br eyer,

193 9-1945 (Podz un-Verlag , Dorh eim , 1969) Ed . ,I. R. Hi ll , 11'e Oxford Illustrated History oftbe N{~)'{t1

Battleship s and Bailie Cru isers

Navy (Ox for d Un ive rsity Press, l.on d on , 1995)

19 05-1 9 70 (1.1'. Lehmunn s and MacD onald & Jan e's, Munich and Lon d on , 1970 and 1973)

F, H. Hinsley , British Int elligen ce in the Seco nd \florid

Br e y e r, Soutet \fIarship Deoelop m e nt

Peter H od ges, Tbc Big GIIII: Ba llieship Main Armament

Sieg f r ie d

(Co nway Maritime Press, London , 1992)

\fIar (fjve vo lu mes) ( I-1MSO , Lo nd on , 198 1)

18 6G-19 45 (Co nw ay Marit ime Press, Lon d on , 198 1)

D . K. Brown , Th e Eclip se oftb e Big GIIII: The Warsh ip

19 06-45, (Co nw ay Maritime Press, London , 1992)

Ric hard Ho ugh, Dreadnough ts. A History oftbe Mod ern

Design a nd

Ba ttle sbip ( Patr ic k Step hens Limit ed , Cam b ri d ge , 1964)

De re lop m e n t 19 06-1 9 22 (C h atham Publishin g ,

Rich ard Ho ug h , Th e Lo ng est Bailie ( We ide n fe ld &

D. K . B ro wn , Tb c Gra n d Fleel:

\fI{I/:~hip

Lon d on , 1999)

Nic ho lso n Limited , l.ondon , 1986)

D. K . Bro wn . Warrior 10 D read n ou gh t (C ha tha m Pub li shing, l.on d on , 1997)

London , 1969)

R. A . Bu rt , British Battleships of \flor id \fIar One ( Arms & Armour Press, London , 1986) Rear-Admiral W . S. Chal m ers , Th e Life a nd Lett ers of

Da vid Beally Adm ira l of th e H eel ( Hod de r & Sto ug hto n, Lon d on , 195 1)

Admi ral Vi scount Jell ico e o f Scap a, 11,e Crisis of th e

Na ua l \fIa r ( 2 Volumes) (Ca ssell, London &

ew

York, 1920) H ansg eo rg j entschura, Di et er Jun g and Peter M ick el ,

\fIarsb ips of tbe Imp erial Japanese Na vy , 18 69- 19 45

Ala n Co les, Hagship t lood. Tbe Fate of Brit a in 's Migh liesl

Warship ( Ham lyn, London , 1985) Con way 's A ll th e

D avid H owarth, Trafalgar: 17Je Nelson Tou ch (Coll ins,

IVo rld :~

(A rms Sc Armou r Press, London, 1977) l.u d o v ic K enn ed y , Mena ce. the Life a n d Death of th e

Fightillg Sh ips, ( 5 vo lum es) (Co nway Mari time Press, London , 1979, 1980, 1983, 1985, 1995)

Lud o vi c Kenned y , Pu rsuit: tbe Sink ing of tbe Bismarck

H ugh es, [utland 191 6

R. D . Laym an and Ste p he n M cl.au ghlin , 11Je Hybrid

Joh n

Cos te llo

an d

Terry

( Futura Publicati on s Limited , Great Britain, 1976)

11Jp ilz (Sid gw ic k & Jack son , London , 1979)

(Coll ins, London , 1974)

O . Du lin , Jr. and Will iam H . G arzke jr.,

\fIllI:~hip: 11'e A nutlga ma tion of Big Gu ns a m i Aircraft (Conw ay M aritime Press, London , 1991)

Battlesh ips. Un ited Sta les Ba ttleships ill World IVtlr II

Art hur ,I. Ma rd er, From tbe Dreadnougbt to Scap a Flow

Ro b ert

(Mac donald & Jane's, London , 1976)

Lt Co m m and er H . W. Faw cett and Lieut en ant G. W . W.

(5 vo lumes) (Ox for d Un iversity Press, Lo nd on, 1970) M art in M iddleb ro ok and Patrick Maho ney , Ba ttlesh ip.

I lo oper, 7Z1L' Fighling atjutland (Macm illan, London ,

11,e Loss

1921)

(C harl es Scrib ne r's Sons, New Yor k , 1979)

Nor ma n Friedman , ttantesbip. Design and Derelopment

1905-194 5 (Co nway Ma ri ti me Press, London , 1978) Sh izuo Fuku i, Japa nese Naral Vessels at tbe End (!l World

\Far II (G ree nh ill Bo o k s, Lon d on , 1992) Ton y Gib bo ns, Tbc Complete Encycloped ia ofBa ttlesblps

of tbe

Prin ce of \fIales a nd th e Repulse

of Gra] ' Spee a nd 711e Bailie of tbe Pia te ( Bo o k p rint, Su rre y , 1964)

Sir Eugen Millingt on -Drak e K.C.M .G ., The Drama

Rich ard Natk iel and Anto ny Presto n , Atlas (!lMa rilim e H istory ( Biso n Bo oks , London , 1986)

and Ba ttlecrnisers (Sala ma n de r Bo oks Limit ed , Lo nd on , 1983)

Pet er Padfi eld , Gu n s A I Sea ( H ug h Evel y n , l.ondon ,

Ren e G regor , lJalllesh ips ofthe \florid (G ree nh ill Books,

D r. Oscar Park es O .B.E., A .l. KA ., Britisb Battleships: A

l.on d on , 1997) Erich G rone r, Die Deutschen Kriegsscb iff e 181 5-19 45

(,1. 1'. t.c hmanns. Mu n ich , 1966) H an s .J(irgen Han sen , Tb e ,S'b ips of th e Ger m a n H eels

1973)

History of Desig n , Construc tion and Arm a me nt (Seeley Serv ice & Co ., Lond on , 1970) Ed w ard P. Vo n d er Po rtcn , Ptc to ria l /l iSIOJ:)' of tbe

Germ a n Na ov in World Wa r /I (T hom as T. Cro w ell

191

192~-.L

- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --

Paul Stillwe ll, Battlesh ip ,lIissol/ ri ( Naval Insti tut e Press,

Company , Ne w York, 1976)

Annapo lis, Maryl and , 1996)

A nt on y Preston , Batt leships ( Ha mly n , Lo ndon , 198 1) A nt ony Presto n , Ba ttleships of !Fo rld !Far / (A rms &

Robert F, Sumrall , lotra Class Ba lllesb ips ( Naval ln stitut e Press, Annopo li s, Maryl and , 1988)

Armou r Press, Londo n. 1972) Alan Raven and j ohn Robert s, Brit ish Battlesbips of

!F(/):~bip,

1\1.

1976) j oh n Robert s, Ba ttlecru isers (C hatha m Publishing ,

(Co nway M arit im e Press, l.ondon , an nu ally

since 1989)

!Forld !Far Ttro ( Ar ms & Ar m o ur Press, l.ond o n ,

J. W hi tley,

Gern u tn Cap ita l Sb illS lif \florid !Far TIl'o

(Arms & Ar m ou r Press, Lon don , 1989) Richard Wood man, Historv

Lon do n, 1997) j oh n Ro b ert s, The Ba ttleship Hoot! (Con w ay M arit im e

ofthe Sbip (Conw ay Mar iti me

Press, Lon don , 1997)

Press, Lo ndon , 1982)

J. Roh we r

and G , Hurnrnelch en. Chro no logy oftbe !Far a t Sea 193 9-19 45 (Gr eenh ill Books, Lon do n, 1992)

Cap tain S, W , Rosk ill , t b e \fIar a t Sea 193 9-19 45 ( fo ur vo lu mes) ( H1\ISO, l.o ndon, 1960)

Papers Wern er Rahn , Germa n Naval Strategy and Arm am ent Du rin g the Int er-wa r Peri od 19 19- 1939' (T he Scottish Centre fo r War Stu dies, G lasgo w , 1999)

Paul H. Sil versto ne, Directory of tbe !Forld :~ Cap ita l Sh ips (I an A lla n Limited , London , 1984)

Journals

j anusz Sk ulsk i , 77)1' Bat tleship Fus o (Co nwa y M ari tim e Press, Lo nd o n, 1998)

\fIarsbip tnternational, (q uarte rly) ( Interna tio nal Nava l Research O rganisatio n , To ledo, USA)

janusz Sk ulsk i, Th e Bat tleship Yamato (Co nw ay Maritime Press, Lo ndon, 1988)

Steam, Steel & Sbelifire. Tbe Stea m !Farsbip 18/ .s- 19 05. Call/my's History of tbe Sh ip (Co nw ay M aritime Press, Lon don , 1992)

Picture Acknowledgements Whil e ev er y effo rt has been m ade

to

tr ace co p yr ig ht holders for ph o tograph s and illu str ati o ns featured in th e

bo o k, th e pu blish er s w ill b e g lad to m ak e p roper ack n o wledgem ent s in fu ture ed itions in th e eve n t tha t an y regr ettab le om issio ns have occ ur red at th e tim e o f go ing to press. A uth ors ' co llectio n: 17, 18, 28, 42, 46, 48, 50, 54, 62, 63, 65, 70, 72 , 74- 75, 99, 105, J 13, 118, 119, 139, 144, 177, 18'1; Ted Bri ggs: 143 (to p) ; Defense Visual Informati on Center, USA: 4-5, II , 110, 185; Silho ue ttes o f th e .11m)' Rose (verso) and Yanutto ( rec to) d raw n b y Ian j ohnston ; Im perial War Museum : 3 (& 89) , 32, 38, 45, 55, 56, 67, 77, 82, 83,87,88,92,96,98, 101, 103, 106, 114, 116- 17 ( 'orman Ho w ard : 15,i 5 1), 121, 125, 126, 128 (Jo hn Ham ilto n, © Mrs Bett y Ham ilt on: LD7394) , 129, 130, 133, 137, 138, 14 1, 142 (Joh n Hamilton ,

Mrs Betty Ham ilt on : LD7415), 143, 144,

145, 150, 155, 157, 159, 160, 166, 168, 171, 174; M ary Evans Picture Library : 25, 35, 37, 53, 60, 69, 76, 79, 84-85. 86, 9 1,94-95. 112: The Ma l)' Rose Tru st, Port smou th : 14; The M il itar y Gallery, Bath , UK: 20-2 1, 1311-35, 146, 149, 1 6~5 ; National A rchive o f Sco tla nd: 80 , 109; Natio nal A rch ives, USA: 9, 29, 3 1, 154. 163, 173, 178, 179, 18 2; US Naval Hi stor ical Center, Washington DC: 3'1. 4 1, 47 . 102. 122, 153, 175, 180, 181, 183,