The Blackwell Guide to Business Ethics Edited by: Norman E. Bowie eISBN: 9780631221234 Print publication date: 2001 Sub...
164 downloads
2696 Views
5MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
The Blackwell Guide to Business Ethics Edited by: Norman E. Bowie eISBN: 9780631221234 Print publication date: 2001 Subject Business and Management Ethics » Applied Ethics DOI: 10.1111/b.9780631221234.2001.x
Notes on Contributors Subject Business and Management Ethics » Applied Ethics DOI: 10.1111/b.9780631221234.2001.00001.x
Mary Beth Armstrong is a Certified Public Accountant and Professor of Accounting at Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, California. She has written two books and numerous articles on ethics in public accounting and she provides continuing education courses on ethics in accounting for California CPAs. Professor Armstrong serves on, and has chaired, the American Accounting Association's Professionalism and Ethics Committee and the Committee on Professional Conduct of the California Society of Certified Public Accountants.
John R. Boatright is the Raymond C. Baumhart, S.J. Professor of Business Ethics in the Graduate School of Business at Loyola University of Chicago. He has published widely in professional journals on topics of business ethics. His most recent books are Ethics and the Conduct of Business and Ethics in Finance. He currently serves as the Executive Director of the Society for Business Ethics and is past president of the society. Norman E. Bowie is the Elmer L. Andersen Chair in Corporate Responsibility at the University of Minnesota. His most recent publication is Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective (Blackwell 1999). His textbook with Tom Beauchamp has just been published in its sixth edition. Professor Bowie has been Dixons Professor of Business Ethics and Corporate Responsibility at the London Business School and a fellow in Harvard's Center for Ethics and the Professions. Thomas L. Carson is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago. He is the author of four books, the most recent of which is Moral Relativism. He is currently working on a book entitled Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice. Joanne B. Ciulla is Professor and Coston Family Chair in Leadership and Ethics at the Jepson School of Leadership Studies, the University of Richmond. She publishes in the areas of business ethics, leadership studies, and the philosophy of work. Her most recent book is The Ethics of Leadership. Professor Ciulla has also held a UNESCO Chair in Leadership Studies at the United Nations University's leadership academy. James J. Clarke is Associate Professor of Finance at Villanova University. He has written in the area of interest rate risk, investments, and bank strategic planning. Professor Clarke is also on the faculty of the America's Community Bankers’National School of Banking and has served on the faculty of the American Bankers Association's Stonier Graduate School of Banking. Carl Cranor is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. He has published numerous books and articles on theoretical issues in risk assessment and the philosophy of science in the regulatory and tort law. His most recent book is Are Genes Us? The Social Consequences of the New Genetics. Professor Cranor has served on the State of California's Proposition 65 Science Advisory Panel, California's Science Advisory Panel on Electric and Magnetic Fields, and the National Academy of Sciences Panel to Czechoslovakian Academy of Sciences. Richard T. DeGeorge is University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Business Administration and Director of the International Center for Ethics in Business at the University of Kansas. He is the author of over 160 articles and author or editor of 19 books. Professor DeGeorge is completing a book on ethical issues in information technology. He has been the President of the American Philosophical Association and is currently President of the International Society of Business, Economics and Ethics. Joseph R. DesJardins is Professor of Philosophy at the College of St. Benedict, St. Joseph, Minnesota. He has written numerous articles in business ethics and
environmental ethics. His two most recent texts are Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics and Environmental Ethics. Professor DesJardins is the current editor of the Society for Business Ethics Newsletter. Thomas J. Donaldson is the Mark O. Winkelman Professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and the Director of the Wharton Ethics Program. He has written broadly in the area of business values and professional ethics. He is the author of several books the most recent of which is Ties That Bind: A Social Contracts Approach to Business Ethics. His book Ethics in International Business, was the winner of the 1998 SIM Academy of Management Best Book Award. Thomas W. Dunfee is the Kolodny Professor of Social Responsibility and Director of the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of numerous articles on business ethics and business law as well as the author of several books, the latest of which is Ties That Bind: A Social Contracts Approach to Business Ethics. He recently accepted the appointment of Vice-Dean of the Undergraduate Division at Wharton. Ronald F. Duska holds the Charles Lamont Post Chair of Ethics and the Professions at the American College. He is the author of numerous articles in business ethics with a special emphasis on the insurance industry. His most recent book is Education, Leadership and Business Ethics: A Symposium in Honor of Clarence Walton. He served for ten years as the Executive Director of the Society for Business Ethics. R. Edward Freeman is the Elis and Signe Olsson Professor of Business Administration and Director of the Olsson Center for Ethics at the Darden School, University of Virginia. Professor Freeman's books include Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, Corporate Strategy and the Search for Ethics, and Environmentalism and the New Logic of Business: How Firms Can Be Profitable and Leave Our Children a Living Planet. He is also the editor of the Ruffin Series in Business Ethics (Oxford University Press). He has received many teaching awards and has been a consultant and speaker for companies around the world. Kenneth E. Goodpaster is the David and Barbara Koch Chair in Business Ethics at the University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota. He has published widely on topics in business ethics in professional journals; his case book Policies and Persons: A Casebook in Business Ethics has recently been published in its third edition. He has also coproduced an Internet-based textbook and a fully online graduate course in business ethics. Thomas M. Jones is Professor of Management and Organization in the Graduate Business School at the University of Washington. He has published widely in professional journals on stakeholder theory, ethical decision-making models, corporate social performance, corporate governance and simulation models. He has been Connelly Visiting Scholar at Georgetown University.
Daryl Koehn is the Cullen Chair of Business Ethics at the University of St. Thomas, Houston, Texas. She has written extensively in the field of ethics; several of her articles have been translated into Chinese, Spanish, and Bahasi. Among her books is Trust in Business: Barriers and Bridges. She previously held the Wicklander Chair of Professional Ethics at DePaul University. She founded one of the first electronic journals – the Online Journal of Ethics. Professor Koehn is chair of the Houston 2012 Olympics Ethics Committee. Patrick E. Murphy is Professor of Marketing and Chair of the Marketing Department at the University of Notre Dame. He is the author of numerous articles and books on marketing ethics. His most recent book is Eighty Exemplary Ethics Statements. He was listed as one of “the top researchers in marketing” and has been a Fulbright Scholar to the University College Cork, Ireland. Lisa H. Newton is Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Program in Applied Ethics and Director of the Program in Environmental Studies at Fairfield University. She has published a large number of articles on ethics in politics, law, medicine, and business. Her text Taking Sides: Controversial Issues in Business Ethics and Society has just been published in its sixth edition. Professor Newton is on the editorial board of a number of professional journals and frequently consults with hospitals, nursing homes, and home health care services. Manuel Velasquez is Charles J. Dirksen Professor of Business Ethics at Santa Clara University. He is the author of numerous articles in business ethics. He is the author of a major case book in business ethics and his text Philosophy: A Text with Readings is now in its sixth edition. Professor Velasquez is past President of the Society for Business Ethics. Patricia H. Werhane is the Peter and Adeline Ruffin Professor of Business Ethics and Senior Fellow at the Olsson Center for Applied Ethics in the Darden School at the University of Virginia. She is the author of numerous articles and books on business ethics. Her latest book is Moral Imagination and Managerial Decision-Making. She is the past president of the Society for Value Inquiry, the Society for Business Ethics, and the former editor-in-chief of Business Ethics Quarterly. Andrew C. Wicks is Associate Professor of business ethics in the Graduate Business School at the University of Washington. He has published numerous articles in professional journals on such topics as stakeholder theory, trust, managed care, the new economy, and total quality management. Professor Wicks received his PhD in Religious Ethics at the University of Virginia.
Part I : Theoretical and Pedagogical Issues Subject Business and Management Ethics » Applied Ethics
Chapter 1. Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art Chapter 2. Ethics and Corporate Governance: Justifying the Role of Shareholder Chapter 3. Untangling the Corruption Knot: Global Bribery Viewed through the Lens of Integrative Social Contract Theory Chapter 4. The Regulatory Context for Environmental and Workplace Health Protections: Recent Developments Chapter 5. Moral Reasoning Chapter 6. Teaching and Learning Ethics by the Case Method
Chapter 1. Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art Thomas M. Jones, Andrew C. Wicks and R. Edward Freeman Subject Business and Management Ethics » Applied Ethics Key-Topics state of the art DOI: 10.1111/b.9780631221234.2001.00002.x
Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to examine an approach to both business and business ethics that has come to be called “stakeholder theory.” While there is disagreement among stakeholder theorists about the scope and precise meaning of both “stakeholder” and “theory,” we shall take “stakeholder theory” to denote the body of research which has emerged in the last 15 years by scholars in management, business and society, and business ethics, in which the idea of “stakeholders” plays a crucial role. For those unfamiliar with the stakeholder literature, the term “stakeholder” came into wide-scale usage to describe those groups who can affect, or who are affected by, the
activities of the firm (Freeman, 1984). “Stakeholder theory” began as an alternative way to understand the firm, in sharp contrast to traditional models which either:
a) depicted the world of managers in more simplistic terms (e.g. dealing with employees, suppliers and customers only), or b) which claimed the firm existed to make profits and serve the interests of one group (i.e. shareholders) only.
In the former case, Freeman argued that the world of managers had become much more complex, and that the traditional models of managerial activity tended to divert the attention and efforts of managers away from groups who were vital to the success (or failure) of firm initiatives. It was only by embracing this broader, “stakeholder” picture of the world that managers could adequately understand this more complex reality and undertake actions that enable the firm to be successful. In terms of case (b), stakeholder theorists claim that traditional models of the firm put too much emphasis on shareholders to the exclusion of other stakeholders who deserve consideration and to whom managers have obligations. While stakeholder theorists reject neither the notion that firms need to make money, nor that managers have moral duties to shareholders, they claim that managers also have duties to these other groups. In summary, stakeholder theorists have argued for two basic premises: that to perform well, managers need to pay attention to a wide array of stakeholders (e.g. environmental lobbyists, the local community, competitors), and that managers have obligations to stakeholders which include, but extend beyond, shareholders. Regardless of which of these two perspectives individual stakeholder theorists emphasize in any given paper, almost all of them regard the “hub and spoke” model depicted in Figure 1.1 as adequately descriptive of firm-stakeholder relationships. In terms of what follows, our analysis will be divided into four sections. We shall briefly examine the history of the idea of stakeholders and discuss the origins of some contemporary theoretical issues. Then we shall analyze the current state of the art of stakeholder theory. We go on to suggest some future directions for scholars interested in pursuing these ideas, and finally, we suggest some challenges that have emerged within stakeholder theory.
Figure 1.1 Hub and spoke stakeholder diagram
The Origins of the Stakeholder Concept For many contemporary scholars, organized thinking about the stakeholder concept began with Freeman's seminal book, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (1984). But, as Freeman himself acknowledges, the general idea antedated his book by at least several years, perhaps by centuries. To gain a full understanding of the history of the concept, one first needs to explore the related notion of corporate social responsibility and some of its antecedent ideas and then review related themes from the literatures of corporate planning, systems theory, and organization theory. Corporate social responsibility Corporate social responsibility, defined by Jones as “the notion that corporations have an obligation to constituent groups in society other than stockholders and beyond that prescribed by law or union contract” (1980, pp. 59–60), clearly has “stakeholders” at its core. The origins of corporate social responsibility also show concern for stakeholders, even if this specific term wasn't used. Eberstadt (1973) argues that concepts analogous to social responsibility have been with us for centuries, even millennia. For example, in classical Greece, business was expected to be of service to the larger community. In the Medieval period, roughly 1000–1500 AD, a good businessman was honest “in motive and actions” and used his profits in a socially responsible manner (Eberstadt, 1973). For centuries, the idea of “noblesse oblige” – roughly defined as “the responsibility of rulers to the ruled” – represented an analogous concept among members of the European
aristocracy. If one assigns similar responsibilities to members of an economic aristocracy in America, a country without a hereditary aristocracy, the analogy is not farfetched. This conclusion is particularly compelling since the power wielded by corporate managers (and owners, during the “robber baron” era) may in many cases rival that of their European aristocracy counterparts. Furthermore, although they didn't use the term corporate social responsibility, Berle and Means, in their classic work on the separation of ownership and control, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, invoked the general concept. They did not bemoan this separation of ownership and control as many economists did, but rather noted that it liberated managers to serve the larger interests of society. In their words: The control groups have, rather, cleared the way for the claims of a group far wider than either the owners or the control. They have placed the community in a position to demand that the modern corporation serve not alone the owners or the control but all society (1932, p. 312). This conclusion must have seemed somewhat odd to followers of a debate between Berle and E. Merrick Dodd in the pages of the Harvard Law Review (1932) and the University of Chicago Law Review (1935) from 1931 to 1935. Although Dodd persuasively advocated a broader set of corporate responsibilities, Berle didn't concede the point until 1954 in The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution. Berle and Means were not alone among scholars who advocated broader responsibilities for business executives in the 1930s. The noted author Chester I. Barnard stressed the fundamentally instrumental role of the corporation in The Functions of the Executive (1938). The purpose of the firm, he argued, was to serve society; corporations were means to larger ends, rather than ends in themselves. Many businesspeople also took steps to publicly embrace the idea of social responsibility. In a post-depression (and post-WWII) fit of defensiveness about the virtues of capitalism and a propaganda blitz intended to “sell” capitalism to the American public, they began to adopt postures of broad responsibility to corporate constituents (Cheit, 1956). Included in these pronouncements, common in the 1950s, were depictions of executives as corporate “statesmen” who balance the manifold interests of society in their decisions. In some sense, corporate social responsibility, as an ideal at least, was imposed on business by business itself. It wasn't until outsiders began to question the results of this statesmanship that corporate social responsibility began to acquire a larger external group of advocates. It was also during this period that Howard Bowen published his pathbreaking book, Social Responsibilities of the Businessman (1953). Bowen wrote of the gathering intellectual force of the doctrine that business leaders are “servants of society” and that “management merely in the interests (narrowly defined) of stockholders is not the sole end of their duties” (1953, p. 44). Each of the historical and intellectual predecessors discussed thus far focus on what Donaldson and Preston (1995) call the normative aspects of stakeholder theory. Although
no one used the term “stakeholder” at the time, these perspectives held that corporations should behave in ways that were quite different than those prescribed by the conventional goal of the firm. According to this alternative perspective, firms should be operated in order to serve the interests of customers, employees, lenders, suppliers, and neighboring communities as well as stockholders. Corporate planning Another set of antecedent ideas approached the stakeholder question from a quite different angle, however. As Freeman and Reed (1983) and Freeman (1984) carefully document, a strain of stakeholder thinking was also developing in the corporate planning literature and related work. The term “stakeholder” was first used at the Stanford Research Institute in 1963 and was employed to connote groups “without whose support the organization would cease to exist” (Freeman, 1984).1 To SRI researchers, corporate planning could not proceed effectively without some understanding of the interests of stakeholder groups. In this view and in many views derived from it, attention to stakeholder concerns was clearly subsidiary to some other, dominant interest – stockholder returns or firm survival, for example. Ansoff's Corporate Strategy (1965) dealt with the stakeholder notion by arguing for the existence of two types of corporate objectives – economic and social – with social objectives being secondary to economic objectives. Although these secondary objectives might constrain or modify the pursuit of the primary (economic) objectives, they were in no way to be regarded as “responsibilities.” In the contemporary vocabulary of Donaldson and Preston (1995), managers should be concerned about stakeholders only for instrumental reasons – as a means to improve the financial performance of the firm. One of the extensions of this instrumental use of stakeholder thinking was environmental scanning, a process by which planners attempted to forecast changes in the social environments of firms. With better assessments of these environments, better economic forecasts and, ultimately, better corporate strategic plans could be made. Systems theory Freeman (1984) also points to the systems theory literature in his historical account of the development of the stakeholder concept. The works of Churchman (1968) and Ackoff (1970) figure prominently in this history. According to the systems view, many social phenomena cannot be fully understood in isolation. Rather, they must be viewed as parts of larger systems within which they interact with other elements of the system. In this context, the concept of “stakeholders in a system” has meaning quite different from that employed by authors in the strategy literature (Freeman, 1984). According to Ackoff (1974), stakeholders must play a participatory role in the solution of systemic problems. In this framework, the optimization of the goals of individual components of the system (sub-system goals) is to be pursued only to an extent compatible with the pursuit of overall system goals. The intrinsic value of subsystem interests is clearly subordinate to overall system interests.
Organization theory According to Freeman (1984), organization theorists were also important fore-runners of the formal development of the stakeholder concept. In particular, he considers Rhenman (1968), who offers a formulation of stakeholder-based ideas very similar to that of the corporate planners. A leading edge thinker of his era. Rhenman2 designates “the individuals and groups which depend on the company for the realization of their personal [and, presumably, group] goals and on whom the company is dependant” as stakeholders (Freeman, 1984, p. 41). Other “pre-stakeholder” ideas from organization theorists include the notion of “organization-sets” (Evan, 1966), an “open-systems” approach (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967), organizational “clientele” (Thompson, 1967), as well as contributions by Emery and Trist (1965) and Dill (1958), among others. The work of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) is probably the organization theory most directly analogous to a stakeholder approach. Their concept of “resource dependence” captures the reliance of organizations on providers of key resources and support in a formal way. The reliance of other groups on “resources” from the firm is not emphasized in resource dependence theory, although many of the relationships in question are clearly reciprocal in nature. However, some organization theorists (Pennings and Goodman, 1977) were concerned with the full range of “outputs” of organizations, rather than just efficiency or, in the case of corporations, profit. These scholars often stressed the difference between efficiency and effectiveness, the latter being defined in terms of the appropriateness of an organization's output. Nord (1983) made explicit the normative nature of any measurement of organizational output. In the process, he (perhaps inadvertently) linked the organizational effectiveness literature to the explicitly normative literature of corporate responsibility. A more detailed account of developments in organizational effectiveness can be found in Ehreth, who argues that “organizational effectiveness is not an objective state but is a relational construct that fits the needs and interests of constituencies” (1987, p. 9). Although this brief summary cannot do justice to the intellectual antecedents of stakeholder theory, it does suggest that those who have done academic work on stakeholder theory have not done so without guidance from scholars in related fields. Those contributions are hereby gratefully, if not fully, acknowledged. And, it is noted that some of the ongoing arguments within the stakeholder theory literature – many of which cut to the core of its purpose and design - are indebted to its multidisciplinary origin. Each discipline brings a slightly different set of assumptions, implicit norms, and methods to the development of stakeholder theory.
The Current State of the Art of Stakeholder Theory The past 15 years have seen the development of the idea of stakeholders into an “idea in good currency.” Talk of stakeholders is increasingly common within business and academic circles. There are scores of essays focusing on stakeholders within management as ethics and social issues become more salient, and as our attention expands beyond the
strict focus on shareholders. Even restricting our attention to academic writings still leaves a myriad of different work (spanning empirical and normative research), the exact relationships among which are often difficult to identify. The question is, what kind of shared underlying themes and ideas make up stakeholder theory? That is, if we examine the current state of the art within this field, what sort of theory do we find? Donaldson and Preston (1995) provided one influential method for synthesizing the array of work that had been done to date. They advanced four key ideas that they claimed were central to stakeholder theory which make it a distinctive theory rather than a set of disparate ideas about “stakeholders.” According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), stakeholder theory is descriptive, instrumental, normative and managerial. It is descriptive in the sense that researchers advancing stakeholder theory attempt to talk about, or describe, what the corporation is (i.e. how people at the corporation behave). They then compare that to some larger schematic to evaluate their performance (e.g. do they act as though the stakeholder or shareholder model is driving their behavior?). Stakeholder theory is instrumental in that researchers advance “if … then” types of propositions, specifically, that acting according to stakeholder management principles will be associated with positive outcomes for the corporation. Donaldson and Preston (1995) then claim that the central strand of stakeholder theory, and the “glue” which holds the theory together, is its normative content – claims that focus on what managers ought to do. Stakeholder management principles set out the legitimate interests of various stakeholders (including but going beyond shareholders) in the corporation and use these as a basis for determining how managers should behave. Indeed, it is this distinctive normative core which helps give shape and substance to the first two strands. This normative strand provides a descriptive story or script (i.e. respect the legitimate interests of stakeholders) one could use to compare to real managerial behavior to see if they are similar or different. These normative commitments provide a set of behaviors one might test to see the performance implications (i.e. the “if … then” statements characteristic of instrumental theory). Finally, Donaldson and Preston (1995) claim that stakeholder theory is managerial, in that it aims to shape and direct the behaviors of managers at the corporate in a specific and systematic way. The core appeal of the Donaldson and Preston (1995) article is that it provided order and coherence where many saw chaos and confusion. Stakeholder researchers in business ethics, business and society, strategy, human resources, and other disciplines intuitively sensed that there was a connection to the writings of their peers, but there were few theoretically developed ideas linking their work together beyond the recognition that groups beyond shareholders had legitimacy at the corporation. Though it didn't resolve a number of key looming problems,3 the Donaldson and Preston (1995) typology appeared to provide part of this missing link. It offered an umbrella to cover existing research in stakeholder theory, organize it into distinct strands (i.e. descriptive, instrumental, normative), and direct future work (i.e. to make sure it is coherent and follows the typology set out in their article). It also helped to combat the perception that stakeholder theory was an amorphous and ill-defined construct, born of good intentions, but doomed to fail for its breadth, its emphasis on people rather than profits, and its inability to direct the day-to-day behavior of managers.
However, there emerged voices of dissent to this grand reconciliation. Freeman (1994, 1999, 2000) took direct aim at the Donaldson and Preston (1995) typology for two main reasons. First, Freeman saw their work as reinforcing, rather than overcoming, the separation thesis. Second, he thought the sharp conceptual separation among normative, descriptive and instrumental was untenable. In terms of the first criticism, Freeman has long been concerned with the importance of language and metaphor and how this shapes existing practice. The separation thesis posits that people, for the most part, tend to see the language and concepts of ethics and business as separate and that they occupy distinct realms (e.g. ethics deals with altruism and concern for others; business deals with selfishness and profits). The difficulty is trying to find a way to get these two realms back together, or at least to overlap enough so that you can convince managers that being good at their job doesn't mean they have to be a-, or im-moral. Freeman points out that the problem with the two realms is not that some people are happy to keep them separate while others want to bring them closer together, but that this metaphor for thinking about business and ethics is fundamentally misguided. Business ethics should instead be about how we understand the nature of business, as a morally compelling and interesting domain of human activity that could never be devoid of morality (i.e. so the divide never occurs in a wholesale or systematic way). For Freeman, the Donaldson and Preston (1995) article makes the mistake of setting up stakeholder theory as the foil to shareholder theory, thereby reinforcing the idea that ethics (i.e. stakeholder theory) is fundamentally different from business (i.e. shareholder theory) and managers have to choose between them. For this reason, Freeman (1994, 1999, 2000) didn't want to make stakeholder a specific and singular theory that could be compared to shareholder theory. Rather, he sought to make stakeholder theory a genre of research in which any account of the firm that posits a purpose for the firm and a set of responsibilities of managers is a “stakeholder theory.” Under this view, the shareholder theory is itself a “stakeholder theory.” The purpose of this move is to underscore the normative underpinnings of any theory of the firm and to help make us all better critics of corporations by forcing us to evaluate whether a given corporation has a compelling answer to questions regarding the purpose of the firm and the obligations of managers to stakeholders. Freeman also objected to Donaldson and Preston's (1995) work because he claimed it sharply divided conceptual categories that are not fundamentally different. Following Quine, Davidson, Rorty, and other modern pragmatists, Freeman argued that a sharp separation of these modes of inquiry is neither conceptually plausible nor pragmatically desirable. Indeed, sharply separating facts and values, normative and empirical inquiry, risks reinforcing the separation thesis all over again (Wicks and Freeman, 1998). Freeman claims that these modes of inquiry are interrelated and together make up a coherent answer to the stakeholder question: what is the purpose of the corporation and in whose interests should it be run? Any adequate answer to that question, he claims, is a normative core or narrative. It will have aspects of what Donaldson and Preston (1995) call descriptive, instrumental and normative discourse and all play a key role in providing a compelling theory or narrative. No one element can be sharply separated and no one strand does the primary “work” of creating a compelling and justified theory.
A recent article by Jones and Wicks (1999) attempted to reconcile these viewpoints on stakeholder theory. They identified two distinct strands within the literature: the “singletheory” view expressed by Donaldson and Preston (1995) and the genre of normative cores view laid out by Freeman (1994). The authors (Jones and Wicks) claim that there is room to see significant convergence among these competing perspectives, even as the underlying methods, paradigms, and assumptions may differ significantly. They argue that stakeholder theorists are committed to developing normative cores (i.e. accounts of the purpose of the firm and obligations of managers) that can lay some persuasive claim to instrumental soundness (i.e. that firms running on these principles can survive and thrive in a competitive economy). To make the case that these views are convergent, the authors appeal to the normative interests of core stakeholders. Jones and Wicks (1999) argue that whatever else these groups want, they also wish to see the firm be profitable, and thus, they have a normative interest in the instrumental outcomes associated with the firm's normative core. The authors use this argument as the basis for positing that core stakeholder principles should not just be morally sound, but capable of keeping the firm economically viable. This view does not take sides on the merits of the normative, instrumental, and descriptive typology, nor does it embrace the single theory or genre of theories view. It does, however, directly challenge a central claim of the Donaldson and Preston (1995) account, that normative and instrumental are clearly distinct and that the normative is the only arena where one can find justification for stakeholder theory. Jones and Wicks (1999) give the theory a more pragmatic orientation by claiming that both normative and instrumental theory provide critical resources in creating a justified stakeholder theory. The remaining question from this discussion is what makes stakeholder theory unique? What stands out that is not common to other theories within management? Clearly, other theories talk about stakeholders, at some level. As simple descriptive terminology, the term “stakeholders” has thoroughly infected our language, particularly because of the growing need to attend to groups beyond shareholders to operate the firm as a going concern. Given this conceptual innovation, it makes little sense to talk about theories where managers don't manage stakeholders (i.e. all management theories do, at some level), or where firms lack stakeholders (i.e. all firms do have stakeholders). Thus, the terminology of stakeholder, by itself, is not what distinguishes stakeholder theory. Rather, as Donaldson and Preston (1995), Freeman (1994, 1999, 2000), and Jones and Wicks (1999), seem to agree, the distinctive element to stakeholder theory is its normative focus. Though the questions posed by each are different, all three papers center on the importance of answering the question: what is the purpose of the firm and to whom are managers obligated? In itself, posing this question is a considerable shift from existing theories of management that seek almost exclusively to address descriptive and/or instrumental claims. Stakeholder theory provides an effort to make theories of management explicitly accountable for their normative content and to highlight the moral underpinnings of “business” as we know it.
Perspectives on the Future of Stakeholder Theory
Although stakeholder theory has made substantial advances over the past decade, much work remains to be done. To begin with, the vast majority of stakeholder-based research papers that have been published to date are either theoretical or conceptual in nature. Given that theory building in a stakeholder framework can take on several forms, three of which – normative, instrumental, and descriptive – were described by Donaldson and Preston (1995), it is no surprise that theoretical perspectives dominate the literature. This dominance notwithstanding, more theoretical work is needed. For example, narrative interpretation, advocated by Freeman (1994), and described by Jones and Wicks as “… the creation of narrative accounts of moral behavior in a stakeholder context” (1999, p. 209), has not been exhausted as a genre of research. In particular, we are aware of no narrative stakeholder theories based on theories of distributive justice. Although unconventional even in the already unconventional world of narrative stakeholder theories, such distributive justice-based accounts – for example, a Rawlsian “difference principle” based theory or an “entitlements” based theory derived from the work of Nozick (1975) are not beyond imagination. An account based on “effortocracy” could also be formulated in a narrative format. According to Donaldson and Preston, instrumental stakeholder theory “is used to identify the connections, or lack of connections, between stakeholder management and the achievement of traditional corporate objectives (e.g., profitability, growth) (1995, p. 71). To date, only one formally presented instrumental stakeholder theory has been advanced. Jones (1995) argues that firms whose managers are able to create and sustain mutually trusting and cooperative relationships with their stakeholders will achieve competitive advantage over firms whose managers cannot. Other instrumental stakeholder theories are certainly possible and the instrumental realm might constitute a fertile ground for new stakeholder theory development. According to Jones and Wicks (1999), the real challenge to stakeholder theorists is the creation of “convergent” stakeholder theory. Convergent stakeholder theory is theory that is simultaneously morally sound in its behavioral prescriptions and instrumentally viable in its economic outcomes. According to these authors, narrative accounts (or, for that matter, any normative stakeholder theory) without some evidence (broadly defined) as to their practicability, are of little value. Similarly, instrumental stakeholder theory that calls for adherence to behavioral standards that are not morally sound should also have little appeal to scholars with a stakeholder orientation. Recall that the most basic normative tenet of stakeholder theory is the view that the claims of all legitimate stakeholders have intrinsic value. It follows that stakeholder theory with serious moral deficiencies should not be acceptable to stakeholder theory advocates. Although Jones and Wicks (1999) do not fully develop Jones's (1995) “mutual trust and cooperation” instrumental theory into a formal convergent theory, they do suggest the general outlines of an extension of that type. Extending the idea of possible development of additional normative theories presented above, convergent theory based on these normative premises – the difference principle, entitlements, and effortocracy – is also possible. Finally, Donaldson and Dunfee's (1994) Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT) would seem to be a good candidate for development into a convergent stakeholder theory.
The world of business practice also provides some potentially rich sources for doing stakeholder theory research. Works like Collins and Porras' Built to Last (1994) and Paine's “Managing for Organizational Integrity” (1994) both focus on companies that provide the more complex and morally interesting approaches to running a firm that are at the heart of stakeholder theory. Indeed, much of what drives the work of the authors of these works is a sense of the limitations and shallowness of describing the corporation as solely about making profits and enriching shareholders. One could describe the “corporate ideology” of the firms profiled by Collins and Porras (1994) and the “integrity strategy” of the firms described by Paine, as (at least partial) normative cores. These works, and others like it from the practitioner realm, hold special promise to address the managerial and practical challenges of stakeholder theory. That is, such work draws clear connection between values and purpose on the one hand and managerial activity on the other (i.e. it is managerial), and these resources provide credible conceptual and anecdotal evidence as to how a given firm's normative core may enable it to be highly competitive within the marketplace (i.e. it is practical/workable). Another avenue of theoretical development in stakeholder theory involves descriptive theory – theory that purports to explain and (perhaps) predict how managers will actually behave in the context of stakeholder relations. It must be acknowledged that neoclassical microeconomic theory, based on the assumption of rational self-interested behavior on the part of economic actors, represents a legitimate and highly developed version of this type of theory. The fact that many stakeholder theory advocates dispute the moral foundations of both the processes and outcomes of the theory notwithstanding, neoclassical theory is authentic descriptive stakeholder theory. Although Jones and Wicks (1999) express doubt that a theory with the breadth and depth of neoclassical economic theory will emerge from the stakeholder theory framework, several other approaches are possible. Papers currently working their way through the review process at various journals show considerable promise. For example, one manuscript merges prospect theory, resource dependence theory, and organizational life cycle theory in an attempt to explain which stakeholder groups will be attended to at various points in a firm's development. Another paper, an empirical effort, examines the relative preference (of student groups) for “across-decision” attention to stakeholder interests as opposed to “within-decision” methods. Within-decision methods attempt to strike a balance among the interests of stakeholder groups within individual decisions; across-decision methods merely attempt to balance those interests over time, in essence, relying on an implicit set of IOUs to produce long-term equity among stakeholder groups. A descriptive stakeholder theory based on Donaldson and Dunfee's (1994) Integrative Social Contracts Theory is conceivable as well. The emphasis to date on theoretical work should not understate the importance of empirical efforts in the interest of advancing stakeholder theory. As noted by Jones and Wicks (1999), instrumental theory is empirical theory. It matters a great deal whether or not the establishment and maintenance of mutually trusting and cooperative relationships do, in fact, lead to competitive advantage as predicted by Jones (1995). In addition, empirical evidence is one means of addressing the “practicability” facet of convergent stakeholder theory (Jones and Wicks, 1999). Economically disastrous outcomes resulting
from normative prescriptions do not meet the test of good convergent theory. Similarly, descriptive theory, as it begins to emerge, will need to be tested. As noted above, one form of descriptive theory – within-decision versus between-decision methods – has already been subjected to empirical testing. The Academy of Management Journal published a recent collection of such papers. “Large N” statistical studies are not the only way of producing empirical evidence, however. Case studies can also shed useful light on empirical questions. Case studies have the added advantage of the potential development of “grounded” theory, wherein theoretical possibilities are developed from the study of actual business practices and actual managerial behavior. Participant-observer studies of actual firms, particularly exemplary ones, may well be a productive extension of the case study method. Kochan and Rubenstein's (2000) participant observation study of Saturn is an example of a recent powerful contribution. Another means of enhancing understanding of stakeholder relationships is through computer simulations. By nature, stakeholder relationships are multilateral and multifaceted, making them fertile ground for computer modeling, albeit modeling of a fairly sophisticated type. Despite the difficulties of programming such relationships, computer simulations hold out the promise of the rapid examination of very complex phenomena, and hence for a net increase in our knowledge of the value of stakeholder theory.
Challenges for Stakeholder Theory There are four main theoretical challenges for stakeholder theory that will ultimately affect the usefulness of stakeholder theory for academics, business people, or both:
1 The problem of definitions 2 The background theory problem 3 The problem of pluralism 4 The problem of value creation and trade, and ethical theory
We shall explain each in turn, but we caution that these issues are interrelated, and that within each are complex theoretical and practical problems. The problem of definition Much has been written about the original definitions of “stakeholder” as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization's objectives” (Freeman, 1984). Such a definition is implicitly appealing to strategic management scholars and executives. These are precisely the groups that can affect the firm, hence, precisely the groups whose relationships with the firm need to be shaped and influenced. However, some have argued that such a wide definition implies that “terrorists” are stakeholders, thus making “stakeholder” lose its implicit legitimacy. Others have argued that the term should be restricted to those groups who are definitional
of the firm. For instance, in most businesses, customers, suppliers, communities, financiers, and employees all have a clear stake in the firm. Recently, Phillips (2001) has suggested that such stakeholders be called “intrinsic” or “definitional” while other groups are stakeholders instrumentally, in so far as they affect the definitional stakeholders. He argues that firms have common moral obligations to both definitional and instrumental stakeholders, but have special obligations only to definitional stakeholders. Thus, the interesting question, on this analysis, becomes what does the firm owe to a customer, (and the reciprocal question of what a customer owes to a firm by virtue of being a customer). Alternatively, if the narrow definition defines who has a stake, then it is incumbent to give an account of who and what counts as a “community.” In a recent paper, Dunham et al. (2001) have suggested that if “community” is interpreted widely enough, then the narrow definition of stakeholders expands into the wide definition, once community is understood to consist of a collection of those interests that share some commons, or a political entity defined by competing interest groups. This argument raises the next challenge; namely, it is imperative to pay more attention to the background theories that are at work. The upshot of these differing views of definition is that it is difficult to say what kinds of moral obligations are at work, when the very nature of who has the obligation is obscure. More practically, if who is a stakeholder is imprecise, it is difficult to formulate priority rules about whose interests count and when they come into play. However, since definitions are embedded in the background normative theory shaping such inquiry, perhaps an analysis of the background theory problem will provide some useful resources for addressing these issues as well. The background theory problem Given its multidisciplinary origins, much of the disagreement about stakeholder theory is diagnosable as differing sets of background theories at work. For instance, in the strategy literature there has traditionally been little concern with ethics and values, so the more subtle problems of definition are difficult to appreciate. (One solution to this problem is to define strategy theorists out of the stakeholder theory realm and note their much closer affinity to resource dependence theory.) Mitchell et al. (1997) have suggested a typology of features that determine which stakeholders are most important from three different points of view. However, this very typology assumes that managers are the best judges of stakeholder interests and/or behavior, and implicitly assumes that managers' or firms' judgments are the ones that should be used to determine stakeholder salience. There are some scholars who have suggested that stakeholder analysis of the corporation must proceed from within a framework that acknowledges that the corporation is a legal entity – a legal fiction. Thus, corporate law and its itinerant compatriots, the law of torts, contracts, and agency, must serve a central role in any stakeholder theory that is to have practical significance. At this point, those who advocate this position have the burden of
demonstrating that the legal view aids understanding of stakeholder phenomena. It is useful, however to note with Orts (1997) that “the law” in the form of dozens of “stakeholder statutes” no longer clings to a model that holds shareholder hegemony as a central value. Philosophers and economists, such as Donaldson and Preston, have suggested that both philosophy and economics are the critical foundational fields, and Donaldson and Dunfee discuss cultural norms that can be shared and justified across particular cultures, making the social sciences, writ large, appropriate background disciplines. Scholars concerned with environmental issues have suggested that the environment be seen as a stakeholder. Such claims, and the background assumptions behind them, are based in environmental sciences (writ large) and bring it into play as a background theory. With such an impressive array of potential background theories, perhaps it is foolhardy to wish for one, univalent stakeholder theory. Indeed, some stakeholder theorists (Freeman, 1994, 1999, 2000; Jones and Wicks, 1999) have already abandoned the quest. In an overlooked part of Donaldson and Preston's (1995) seminal paper, they suggest that ultimately stakeholder theory must be managerial. They write: The stakeholder theory is managerial in the broad sense of that term. It does not simply describe existing situations or predict cause-effect relationships; it also recommends attitudes, structures, and practices that, taken together, constitute stakeholder management. Stakeholder management requires, as its key attribute, simultaneous attention to the legitimate interests of all appropriate stakeholders, both in the establishment of organizational structures and general policies and in case-by-case decision making. This requirement holds for anyone managing or affecting corporate policies, including not only professional managers, but shareowners, the government, and others. Stakeholder theory does not necessarily presume that managers are the only rightful locus of corporate control and governance. Nor does the requirement of simultaneous attention to stakeholder interests resolve the longstanding problem of identifying stakeholders and evaluating their legitimate “stakes” in the corporation. The theory does not imply that all stakeholders (however they may be identified) should be equally involved in all processes and decisions (p. 67). If stakeholder theory is managerial in this sense, a point readily conceded by many stakeholder scholars, we have to open the possibility that it is possible to have more than one theory that is useful. In fact, we might propose that any particular stakeholder theory is a function of a set of background conditions and a particular normative core, as articulated in so-called “convergent stakeholder theory” (Jones and Wicks, 1999). What would be necessary is a typology of stakeholder theories, each of which would contain a set of propositions that spell out the connections between the particular way that a set of firms can do business from within a particular normative core. Such an approach would naturally lead us to the third challenge to stakeholder theory. The problem of pluralism
Suppose that there can be multiple stakeholder theories, each based on a normative core and a set of background disciplines. Each theory would describe how firms might actually realize that normative core, and the propositions that connect the normative core to other facets of the enterprise. In addition each particular stakeholder theory might have a set of instrumental propositions, such as “if you want to create shareholder value, you should manage the firm in a sustain-able manner” or “if you want to manage the firm in a sustainable manner, you must pay a great deal of attention to environmentalists-critics of the corporation.” The very language used to frame these propositions might differ depending on the framing assumptions that make up the particular theory. Each particular theory might well produce a different set of tradeoffs or priorities among stakeholder groups. In this thicket of pluralism, what would be the role of an overarching “stakeholder theory”? Perhaps it would simply be, as we argued above, the role of genre: pointing out what a set of related theories have in common, and then coming to see them as related along particular dimensions. Suppose however, that we assume that a particular stakeholder theory in its well-worked out form, might give an executive or a stakeholder a reason for acting in a certain manner. Surely, there is room for conflict among fully specified stakeholder theories. Indeed, any stakeholder theory based on normative theory from moral philosophy will almost certainly be in conflict with other such theories, given that the conflicts among normative theories are well documented. The existence of such “a reasonable pluralism” may well induce the search for a “minimalist” stakeholder theory, or a set of basic conditions that all normative cores must meet to be legitimate. This would both constrain and direct the creative, pluralistic drive to find an array, perhaps a wide array, of normative cores within stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1994, 1999, 2000; Wicks and Freeman, 1998). Akin to the public-private distinction on which political philosophers such as Rawls (1993) have relied, we could evaluate actions across (and perhaps independent of) various stakeholder genres according to such criteria. Some candidates for such a minimalist or public set of reasons would include those principles articulated by Freeman (2000) as giving rise to stakeholder capitalism, or the suggestions by Jones and Wicks (1999) for convergent stakeholder theory. The problem of value creation and trade, and ethical theory Traditionally, theories of business have begun and ended with economic logic. Business has been seen, wrongly as we argued above, as a way of creating “economic” value, with ethics perhaps serving as a side constraint. And, business ethics in general, and stakeholder theory in particular, have been developed within a framework of existing ethical theory that assumes that business is primarily concerned with its economic (narrowly defined) logic. Not surprisingly, ethical theory has little to say about business, or the way that value is created and traded. Yet, human beings have been value-creators and traders long before they were political philosophers. The practice of business has a long history, yet the existing body of ethical theory on which most business ethicists and stakeholder theorists rely pays almost no attention to the cultural and moral norms of
value creation and trade. Werhane (1991) has suggested that Adam Smith saw the centrality of ethics to business, but even Adam Smith did not see the centrality of business to ethics. If the institution (i.e. business) in which most people spend the majority of their lives working, finding meaning (intrinsic and instrumental) and forging relationships with others is not central to the development of principles about how human beings interact and should interact, then the resulting ethics is likely to be sterile at best, and extremely difficult to apply at worst. It seems to us that once we admit that business has to be responsible in some sense to stakeholders, and that stakeholders are moral agents as well as members of groups such as “customers,” “communities,” “shareholders,” etc., then the door is opened for a complete rethinking of ethics and ethical theory. Certainly anyone reading this essay will conclude that this rethinking is well under way. Such a project is large in scope, and probably generalizable across the “disciplines” of applied ethics. We need to understand from an historical perspective just how value creation and trade have come about. We need to understand its different forms, how it has emerged across nation states, and why it appears to be a remarkably resilient institution. Connecting stakeholder theory to the very foundations of value creation of trade, to the foundations of entrepreneurship, is an important future project, one begun by Venkataraman (2001). Much work, however, remains to be done.
Conclusion Though it is relatively new, we have shown that stakeholder theory has a rich heritage and a promising future. We traced the intellectual and historical roots of stakeholder theory in order to give the reader a deeper appreciation of what stakeholder theory is and what it may become. It seeks to do what no other theory within business and organization studies has tried: to openly address the critical questions about what firms ought to do, and to make such questions central to any account of the firm. We have ended with an array of possibilities for where scholars may take future research, knowing that we have only scratched the surface. While the diversity of backgrounds, methodologies, and perspectives of stakeholder theorists creates numerous difficulties, it also opens up tremendous opportunities for interesting and innovative work. It is with the challenge of taking on these creative endeavors that we leave the reader, and where we see the greatest promise for both stakeholder theory and organization studies. 1
Recently, Mr. Giles Slinger has revisited the early history of the idea of stakeholders. Through more extensive interviews, and the examination of a number of historical documents, Slinger rewrites the history as told in Freeman (1984). The essential difference is that the early use of the stakeholder idea was not particularly oriented towards the survival of the firm. Slinger's argument can be found in his doctoral dissertation, Essays on Stakeholders and Takeovers, (Slinger, 2001). An abridged version is in “Spanning the Gap: The Theoretical Principles Connecting Stakeholder Policies to Business Performance” (Slinger, 1998).
2
For a history of the development of the stakeholder concept in Scandinavia, and Rhenman's role in that development, see Nasi (1995). 3
Their typology claims that groups other than shareholders have legitimate interests, but it doesn't specify who these groups are, how we determine what their legitimate interests are, or how we resolve conflicts among stakeholder interests. It also didn't provide a specific answer to the definitional problem that threatened to make stakeholder theory vacuous: who is a stakeholder and why does the firm have a special obligation to them? Finally, though it claims to be managerial, it is not immediately clear how the central claims of this article would translate into any managerially specific behaviors.
References Ackoff, R. 1970: A Concept of Corporate Planning . New York: John Wiley . Ackoff, R. 1974: Redesigning the Future . New York: John Wiley . Ansoff, I. 1965: Corporate Planning . New York: McGraw Hill . Barnard, C. I. 1938: The Function of the Executive . Cambridge: Harvard University Press . Berle, A. 1954: The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution . New York: HarcourtBrace . Berle, A. and Means, G. 1932: Private Property and the Modern Corporation . New York: Commerce Clearing House . Bowen, H. 1953: Social Responsibilities of the Businessman . New York: Harper . Cheit, E. 1956: The Business Establishment . New York: John Wiley . Churchman, W. 1968: The Systems Approach . New York: Dell Books . Collins, J. and Porras, J. 1994: Built to Last . New York: Harper . Dill, W. 1958: Environment as an influence on managerial autonomy . Administrative Science Quarterly , (2) (4), 409 43. Dodd, E. M., Jr. 1932: For whom are corporate managers trustees Harvard Law Review , (45) , 1145. Dodd, E. M., Jr. 1935: Is the effective enforcement of the fiduciary duties of corporate managers practicable University of Chicago Law Review , (2) , 194. Donaldson, T. and Dunfee, T. 1994: Integrative social contracts: A communitarian conception of economic ethics . Economics and Philosophy , (11) (1), 85 112. Donaldson, T. and Preston, L. 1995: The stakeholder theory of the corporation: concepts, evidence, and implications . Academy of Management Review , (20) (1), 65 91. Dunham, L., Liedtka, J. and Freeman, E. 2001: Community: The soft underbelly of stakeholder theory . Darden School Working Papers. Charlottesville, Va. Eberstadt, N. 1973: What history tells us about corporate responsibility . Business and Society Review , (7) , 76 81. Ehreth, J. 1987: Development of a competitive constituency model of organizational effectiveness and its application to a Health Services Organization . Doctoral Dissertation. University of Washington Graduate Business School . Emery, F. and Trist, E. 1965: The causal texture of organizational environments . Human Relations , (18) , 21 31.
Evan, W. 1966: The organization set: Toward a theory of inter-organizational design . In J. Thompson, (ed.) Approaches to Organizational Design . Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press , 175 90. Freeman, E. 1984: Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach . Boston: Pitman . Freeman, E. 1994: The politics of stakeholder theory: Some future directions . Business Ethics Quarterly , (4) (4), 409 22. Freeman, E. 1999: Divergent stakeholder theory . Academy of Management Review , (24) (2), 233 6. Freeman, E. 2000: Business ethics at the millennium . Business Ethics Quarterly , (10) (1), 169 80. Freeman, E. and Reed, D. 1983: Stockholders and stakeholders: A new perspective on corporate governance . California Management Review , (25) (3), 88 106. Jones, T. 1980: Corporate social responsibility revisited, redefined . California Management Review , (22) (3), 59 67. Jones, T. 1995: Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and economics . Academy of Management Review , (20) , 92 117. Jones, T. and Wicks, A. 1999: Convergent stakeholder theory . Academy of Management Review , (24) , 206 21. Katz, D. and Kahn, R. 1966: The Social Psychology of Organizations . New York: John Wiley . Kochan, T. and Rubenstein, S. 2000: Towards a stakeholder theory of the firm: The Saturn Partnership . Organizational Science , (11) (4), 367 86. Mitchell, R., Agle, B. and Wood, D. 1997: Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts . Academy of Management Review , (22) , 853 86. Nasi, J. 1995: A Scandinavian approach to stakeholder thinking: An analysis of its theoretical and practical uses, 1964–1980 . In J. Nasi, (ed.) Understanding Stakeholder Thinking . Helsinki: LSR-Julkaisut Oy , 97 115. Nord, W. 1983: A political-economic perspective on organizational effectiveness . In K. S. Cameron and D. A. Whetten, (eds), Organizational Effectiveness: A Comparison of Multiple Models . New York: Academic Press , 95 133. Nozick, R. 1975: Anarchy, State and Utopia . New York: Basic Books . Orts, E. 1997: A North American legal perspective on stakeholder management theory . In F. Patfield, (ed.) Perspectives on Company Law , (2) , 165 79. Paine, L. S. (1994): Managing for organizational integrity . Harvard Business Review , (2) , 106 17. Pennings, H. and Goodman, P. 1977: New Perspectives on Organizational Effectiveness . San Francisco: Jossey Bass . Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G. 1978: The External Control of Organizations . New York: Harper . Phillips, R. 2001: Stakeholder legitimacy: A preliminary investigation . Georgetown University Business School Working Paper. Washington, D.C. Rawls, J. 1993: Political Liberalism . New York: Columbia University Press . Rhenman, E. 1968: Industrial Democracy and Industrial Management . London: Tavistock .
Slinger, G. 1998: Spanning the gap: The theoretical principles connecting stakeholder policies to business performance . Centre for Business Research, Department of Applied Economics Working Paper. University of Cambridge . Slinger, G. 2001: Essays on Stakeholders and Takeovers . Cambridge University Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Applied Economics , in press. Thompson, J. 1967: Organizations in Action . New York: McGraw Hill . Venkataraman, S. 2001. Stakeholder value equilibration and the entrepreneurial process . Business Ethics Quarterly . Ruffin Series No. 3, in press. Werhane, P. 1991: Adam Smith and his Legacy for Modern Capitalism . Oxford: Oxford University Press . Wicks, A. and Freeman, E. 1998: Organization studies and the new pragmatism: Antipositivism, and the search for ethics . Organization Science , (9) (2), 123 40. Yuchtman, E. and Seashore, S. 1967: A system resource approach to organizational effectiveness . American Sociological Review , (32) , 891 903.
Further Reading Harrison, J. and Freeman, E. 1999: Stakeholders, social responsibility, and performance: Empirical evidence and theoretical perspectives . Academy of Management Journal , (42) (5), 479 87.
Chapter 2. Ethics and Corporate Governance: Justifying the Role of Shareholder John R. Boatright Subject Business and Management Ethics » Applied Ethics Key-Topics governance DOI: 10.1111/b.9780631221234.2001.00003.x
Corporate governance is concerned broadly with who has the right to control the activities of a firm and how this right ought to be exercised. The answers to these questions constitute the main body of corporate law. In the USA, the law assigns a central role to shareholders. Specifically, the shareholders of a corporation have the ultimate right of control as well as a claim on all profits. In addition, corporate law imposes a fiduciary duty on managers to serve the shareholders' interests. Although corporate governance varies from one country to another, the American model is widely admired and emulated. However, many thoughtful people consider the shareholder-centered corporation to be morally unacceptable. In particular, critics charge that corporate
governance, as practiced in the USA, unjustifiably neglects the rights and interests of other constituencies, such as employees, customers, suppliers, and communities. This chapter examines the standard argument for the role of shareholders in corporate governance. Many different justifications for American corporate law have been offered over the years but, in the past three decades, a new economic approach has come to dominate the study of corporate law. In brief, this approach views the corporation as a nexus of contracts among its various constituencies and regards governance structures as attempts by these groups to reduce the costs of contracting. The argument examined here results from the application of this economic approach to the shareholders' role. Although the argument is not universally accepted, even critics acknowledge its power and influence. More-over, critics of the argument have not succeeded in developing an alternative theoretical approach that could ground a different system of corporate governance. This lack of a rival theory does not mean that the economic approach to corporate law is sound, but only that, at the present time, this approach frames the discussion. The position taken in this chapter is that the central role of shareholders in American corporate governance is fully justified. Not only does the standard argument provide adequate support for the particular bundle of rights that corporate law assigns to shareholders, but it does so in a way that permits adequate consideration of the rights and interests of other constituencies or stakeholders. However, the defense of this position turns on many complex and controversial issues that are difficult to resolve. To the debate, each side brings different factual assumptions about the effectiveness of alternative economic arrangements as well as different value judgments about how economic activity ought to be conducted and what it should achieve. Agreement about such matters is unlikely, and so the best that can be achieved in this chapter is a clarification of the issues that advances the debate.
The Contractual Theory The standard argument for the role of shareholders in corporate governance is founded on an economic approach that is commonly called the new institutional economics or the new economics of organizations. Until recently, neoclassical economic analysis offered only a rudimentary theory of the firm (Hart, 1989), but in the 1970s, economists, building on the pioneering work of Ronald Coase (1937), developed a powerful theory utilizing agency cost and transaction cost economics (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1975, 1985; Klein et al., 1978; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). These economists followed Coase in modeling the firm as a nexus of contracts, in which each corporate constituency, including employees, customers, suppliers, and investors, supplies some asset in return for some gain. These contracts include not only explicit legal contracts, such as employment and sales contracts, in which the terms are clearly specified, but also long term relationships built on implicit contracts or shared understandings. In addition, the law plays a critical role in contracting. First, legislative statutes provide “standard form” or “off the shelf” contracts that save the parties the need to write contracts for each transaction and also serve when the parties are unable to
contract face to face. Second, judicial interpretations often “fill in” the gaps in written contracts that do not cover every situation (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991). Contracting is the principal means by which we conduct our economic affairs and structure economic relations. The contracts that constitute a corporation are distinguished by the fact that they are all made with a legal fiction that we call the firm. The firm is a common signatory of these contracts and the entity that connects them to form a nexus (Hansmann, 1996). Many of these contracts, such as consumer purchases, are simple market exchanges, but others are more complex arrangements. Employment contracts, for example, include a pledge by an individual to accept orders and act in the best interest of the employer. Such open-ended obligations are necessary because the contracts of employees and many other constituencies cannot anticipate and address every contingency. Perhaps the most complex arrangement of all is that between a firm and its shareholders. In Coase's account (1937), a firm is a hierarchy that is, a structured system of authority relations. Through voluntary contracting, individuals create firms because they can generally achieve with others more than they can alone in the marketplace. By becoming an employee, in a hierarchical firm, for example, an individual submits to the authority of a superior, but in return that person is able to earn more than is possible as an independent contractor in a market. Thus, for Coase, markets and hierarchies constitute two fundamentally different means for economic coordination. The former coordinates by exchange, the latter by direct control. However, Alchian and Demsetz observe that corporations do not exercise hierarchical authority like a state. The firm, they assert, “has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any two people” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, p. 777). The extent to which firms are hierarchies that rely on authority relations is an important issue to be examined later, but these writers agree that, in the last analysis, firms are built on voluntary market exchanges. In all market exchanges, rational economic actors are assumed to seek the greatest benefit for the least cost in order to maximize their own welfare. The costs to be considered in an exchange include not only the costs of the benefit obtained but also the costs of making the exchange itself. That is, contracting has costs, and when individuals join with others in productive activity, these contracting costs can be substantial. In general, then, rational economic agents would seek to organize production in ways that lower the costs of contracting. Indeed, Coase explains the existence of firms in this way. Why, he asks, do firms exist at all? Why does all economic activity not take place in an open market? The answer is that the transaction costs of working out in a market all of the contracts that would be required are very high and that these costs could be greatly reduced by organizing production in hierarchies. Thus, in Coase's account, firms result from efforts by individuals to contract in ways that lower transaction costs. Firms provide many benefits because, in general, people's economic assets, especially their knowledge and skills, bring a greater return when they are utilized with the assets of others in joint production. However, joint production also introduces many problems, and
the costs of contracting arise mainly from efforts to solve these problems and from any loss due to the failure to find a solution. One important kind of cost is that incurred in monitoring the performance of others. When several people work together, it may be possible for one or more to contribute less and yet collect the same as everyone else. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue that workers in this situation would hire a monitor whose task is to ensure that everyone contributes equally. To the question “Who monitors the monitors?” they respond that such monitoring would be unnecessary if the monitor were offered the residual revenues or the profit of the enterprise. In short, workers would voluntarily agree to assign profits to a third party who could solve the monitoring problem. Monitoring is part of a more general problem arising from conflicting goals. Organizations bring together people with their various goals, most of which are aimed at advancing their own interests. An economic organization of any size must develop mechanisms for enabling people with different goals to cooperate productively. This is accomplished, in part, by structuring many business relations as agency relations, in which one person, an agent, agrees to act on behalf of another, the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency relations are critical to the organization of a firm, but they also involve costs, both in monitoring agents' performance and in suffering any loss from nonperformance. The task of monitoring agents is especially acute when there is asymmetric information (as when one person has information that others lack) and incomplete information (as when certain information is not and perhaps cannot be known). These features are most pronounced in the case of the managers of an enterprise, who are generally better informed about important matters and must be trusted in their judgment about the future (which, of course, cannot be known with assurance). The agency costs of controlling managers are enormous and constitute a major portion of the total cost of contracting in a firm. Other contracting costs arise from risks that are created by entering into contractual relations. One kind of risk results from providing firm-specific assets that cannot easily be removed from production. For examples, employees who develop skills that are of use only to their current employer or a supplier who invests in machinery to make parts with only one buyer become “locked into” their position. Not only may the other parties take advantage of this lock-in. but the benefit of a long-term relation may be upset by unforeseen developments. For example, a supplier's sole customer may discontinue a product or find another source. In addition, a relation such as that between a firm and its employees or suppliers may be very complex, with the result that the parties may be unable to anticipate and plan for every situation. This is especially true when people have “bounded rationality” due to a limited ability to acquire and process information (Simon, 1955, 1957, 1979, 1997). So people take risks when they enter into a long-term relation from which they cannot easily withdraw (lock-in), whose dimensions cannot be fully grasped (complexity), and whose future they cannot predict (uncertainty). The cost of protecting oneself against these risks or incurring a loss because of them are also part of the costs of contracting.
The fundamental proposition of the economic approach to the study of the corporation is that all economic organizations can be understood as a nexus of contracts that results from bargaining among all the relevant constituencies or contracting parties, each of which is seeking to gain the maximum benefit from engaging in a joint productive enterprise. The challenge for each group is to contract with a firm so as to obtain the greatest benefit at the lowest cost, which is primarily a matter of reducing the costs of contracting. More specifically, this means developing long-term relations in a cooperative endeavor with protection against the risks of lock-in, complexity, and uncertainty. The managers of a firm, who have the task of making these contracts on behalf of the firm, face the same challenge of organizing joint production in a way that reduces contracting costs to the maximum feasible extent. Managers thus serve as an intermediary between the various constituencies, contracting with each one in a way that coordinates the contracts made with the others.
The Shareholder's Contract A business enterprise requires many inputs. Economists classify these as land, labor, and capital. In addition, a firm needs managerial expertise to coordinate these inputs. Neoclassical economics assumes that each provider of an input owns that input and that a manager or entrepreneur is the owner of the firm, who buys inputs, sells the output, and pockets the difference. That is, profit is the compensation received by the manager-owner for his or her contribution of managerial talent. However, this is not the only possibility. We could imagine a group of workers who hire managers to coordinate their productive activity and who keep the profits for themselves. Alternatively, the sellers of an input, such as grain farmers, or the buyers of an output, such farmers who buy seeds and fertilizer, could hire managers to organize the sale of their grain or the purchase of seeds and fertilizer, respectively. These are examples of worker-owned, supplier-owned, and customer-owned firms, and these forms of enterprise, usually called cooperatives, are quite common (Hansmann, 1996). In most large, publicly-held corporations, the providers of capital are the shareholders, but the role of shareholder or owner can be held by any group. Although shareholders are commonly called the owners of a corporation, the concept of ownership as applied to the modern corporation is different from its ordinary use (Schrader, 1996). No group “owns” General Motors, for example, in the same way that a person owns an automobile or a home. Rather, shareholders have a certain bundle of rights, which include the right of control and the right to receive the residual revenues or profits (Hansmann, 1996). (Residual revenues are the net earnings of a firm, which is to say the revenue that remains after all fixed obligations are met.) The right of control and the right to the residual are logically separate, which is to say that they could be held by different groups. Indeed, in a not-for-profit corporation, trustees exercise control but are legally barred from any personal benefit. (However, a nonprofit corporation, strictly speaking, has no owners; it is an asset held in trust for some beneficiaries.) In practice, the right of control and the right to residual earnings go together because the right to the residual would be insecure without control. No group without a right to residual earnings would have an incentive to operate a for-profit corporation so as to maximize these
earnings. (Trustees, who have a legal duty to run a nonprofit corporation in the interest of the beneficiaries, are assumed to be altruistic.) The right of ownership to a thing could also be shared by two or more groups. For example, employees and investors could jointly exercise control of a firm and split the profits. However, shared ownership encounters practical problems that explain its relative infrequency. That shareholders have the rights to exercise control and to receive the residual revenues is a matter of definition: the shareholders or owners are whatever group or groups have these rights. Although employee-owned corporations and various kinds of cooperatives exist, the most common form of organization for large firms is ownership by the suppliers of equity capital. The key question, then, is why, in most instances, equity capital suppliers are the shareholders. That is, why is investor ownership the form of economic organization taken by most corporations and the standard form in corporate law? This question seeks an explanation for the dominance of the investor-owned corporation, but our concern here is ultimately with justification. So we also need to ask why this form of organization is justified. However, the contractual theory of the firm provides both an explanation and justification. The contractual theory itself is not logically tied to any assignment of rights to any constituency. It does not specify which group has the right of control or the right to the residual. All groups are free to bargain for these rights. Moreover, the specific content and extent of shareholder rights, as well as the rights of other constituencies, are also matters for bargaining. For example, shareholders do not have an absolute right of control but rather a narrow set of legal rights that confer de jure power on such matters as the election of directors, proxy proposals, charter revisions, and mergers and acquisitions. On many important matters, share-holders have the ultimate say, but they have little voice in day-to-day operations. The business judgment rule shields many management actions from shareholders suits, thereby giving managers considerable legal authority. In some instances, bond covenants and loan agreements give other investors besides shareholders rights to intervene in certain matters. In practice, the shareholder legal right of control is limited in scope and shared with other groups, and the details are matters to be determined by contracting. Furthermore, de facto control is exercised by many corporate constituencies. Without the benefit of any legal right of control, employees, customers, and other groups can influence corporate decisions by setting the conditions for their cooperation. In particular, public interest groups can exert powerful pressure on corporations by mobilizing public opinion and influencing government. Even if shareholders claim the residual, many groups make claims on a company's total revenues. An environmental group that forces a corporation to spend more money on pollution control, for example, has determined the use of some revenues. Corporate philanthropy also involves a diversion of revenue to nonshareholder groups. The right to residual revenues is merely claim on the portion of a corporation's total revenues that remain after other groups have already exacted their share, and many groups might prefer to bargain for a greater share of the revenues that are not counted as part of the residual.
In addition to the kinds of contracting costs introduced so far, there are other costs that attach specifically to the assumption of the right of control and the right to residual earnings. Although these rights are usually regarded as benefits, their exercise involves costs that must be considered by any group that seeks to be the shareholders or owners of a firm. Henry Hansmann 1996) identifies these “costs of ownership” as the costs of controlling managers, the costs of collective decision making, and the costs of risk bearing. The first two costs are involved in the right of control and the latter in the right to the residual. First, controlling managers incurs costs whenever there is a separation of the legal right of control and de facto day-to-day control of a corporation, which Berle and Means (1932) called the separation of ownership and control. In firms that are still run by the owners, there is no divergence of interests inasmuch as the managers and the shareholders are the same persons. However, Berle and Means observed that as corporations have grown in size and outlive the founders, their operations are increasingly controlled by professional managers whose interests differ from those of the shareholders. The assumption is that managers, if not restrained, would seek to enrich themselves by lavish pay and extravagant perquisites. Other possibilities include self-dealing (for example, owning a supplier), competition with the firm (as in taking an investment opportunity for oneself instead of the firm), and excessive retention of earnings (also known as “empire building”), which inflates the size of the firm and hence the managers' importance. These costs are a form of agency costs and include both the costs of monitoring managers and the losses that result from a failure to prevent them from pursuing their interests to the detriment of the firm. Second, decision making is a costly process even when only one person has control because of the need to gather and process information. When two or more people make decisions collectively, further costs are incurred in resolving the inevitable disagreements. Even people with the same interest may differ in their judgment of the most effective course of action, but differences of interest create more profound conflicts. For this reason, the costs of ownership are reduced when only one constituency has control. However, the members of any given constituency may have conflicting interests, which result in some decision-making costs. For example, investors may have different risk preferences or time horizons that lead them to favor or oppose certain decisions. Moreover, the costs of decision making include not only the cost of this investment but also any losses caused by less than the best decisions. Good decision making in an organization requires a substantial investment, but no amount of money can guarantee that the best decisions will be made, so some losses of this kind are inevitable. Third, business is an inherently risk activity, and this risk can be shared by everyone or borne by a single group. Any corporate constituency that provides an asset to the firm in return for a claim on residual revenues assumes a large portion of the risk of the enterprise and in so doing provides a service to everyone else. Every contractor with a firm assumes some risk, but all legal obligations to those with fixed contracts must be met before residual claimants receive any of a firm's revenues. Residual claimants are not guaranteed any specific return, and their payment is the only obligation that a firm can
fail to make without becoming insolvent. Thus, bondholders who are not paid can force a company into bankruptcy, while shareholders can only count their losses. The right to the residual is a benefit that is often thought to make shareholders especially privileged, but it comes at a price, namely the cost of bearing the residual risk. We are now in a position to understand terms why certain investors would contract with a firm to be the owners or the shareholders, and why other constituencies would contract differently and be willing to allow these investors to assume this role. The contractual theory explanation, in brief, is that the system of corporate governance that prevails in most large, publicly held corporations is that which enables all constituencies to gain the greatest benefit from joint production at the lowest contracting cost. Many business organizations adopt other governance structures, such as those of sole proprietorships, partnerships, cooperatives, mutual companies, and the like, but the theory explains these as well by noting how the costs and benefits are altered by different conditions. There is no one ideal form of corporate governance that is appropriate in all circumstances, and rational contractors will experiment to find the most suitable forms. This brief explanation omits many critical details, and so we need to understand more specifically how systems of corporate governance result from contracting by all of the relevant constituencies. That is, how do we get from contract to corporate governance?
From Contract to Corporate Governance People with capital are as necessary for production as workers and the suppliers of raw materials, but they are not owners of an enterprise merely in virtue of providing capital. Indeed, lenders and bondholders, who provide capital do not have the right of control or a right to residual revenues. The investors who provide equity capital generally hold these rights. Equity capital, by definition, is capital that is provided without the obligation to repay over time the principal with interest that defines loans and bonds. It is capital that is provided for the life of the firm with whatever guarantees the investors can obtain. From the investors' point of view, there must be some advantage in providing equity capital rather than debt capital. From a company's point of view, there must be some advantage in obtaining equity rather than debt capital. In theory, a firm could obtain all the capital it needs by borrowing – that is, by taking on debt – but there are many disadvantages to operating in this manner. The creation of the investor–owned firm could be explained from either point of view, but it is perhaps better explained by asking why firms would seek equity capital and what they need to do to attract it. Capital, like any other input, is obtained in a market. Managers of firms seek capital at the lowest cost, while the owners of capital seek the highest return. There is a limit to the amount of capital that a firm can raise through borrowing from banks and issuing bonds because of the increasing risk. As a firm's debt obligations consume a greater portion of its revenues, the ability of the firm to make its debt payments becomes less certain. If the risk is shared with all constituencies, then they will each demand higher returns for their inputs, or else go to other firms where the risk is lower. Not only the costs of capital but also the costs of labor and raw materials rise with the risk. The solution is to persuade one
class of investors to provide capital in return for a firm's residual revenues, so that those investors assume a preponderance of the risk. Sole proprietorships and partnerships function without shareholders, but the individuals involved assume great risk. Such firms typically require little capital or else have great difficulty raising sufficient capital, and they occasionally “go public” to share risk and obtain needed capital. Less frequently, public firms will “go private” through a management buyout or a takeover in which the new owners assume greater risk and provide their own capital. Managers of firms can obtain capital at a lower cost if they reduce the risk to investors. For example, the interest rate on bonds is lower for firms that obtain a higher rating from investor services companies such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's. The risk for residual risk bearers can be reduced by the adoption of forms of corporate governance that address the major contracting costs, especially the costs of ownership. Corporations have wide latitude in choosing governance structures. First, in the USA, corporate law is the province of the states, and so states can compete for charters by varying the terms they offer. Although some writers complain of a “race to the bottom,” in which states compete to offer terms that favor management over shareholders (Cary, 1974), others argue that competition among the states produces corporate law that strikes an ideal balance (Winter, 1977; Romano, 1993). Second, much corporate law is “default” legislation that can be “contracted around” by parties that so choose. That is, corporate law provides a basic model that corporations may alter to suit their needs. So the reduction of contracting costs is a major consideration in the adoption of specific forms of corporate governance by a firm. By choosing one governance structure over another, firms compete with each other in attracting equity capital, and firms that make a mistake in their choice pay a price in the market for capital. If choosing a system of corporate governance is a matter of determining which constituency can assume the role of owner at the lowest cost, the task might seem to be daunting because of the information required. However, if this choice is left to the market, then the best forms of corporate governance will emerge through contracting among all the relevant constituencies. That is, employees, customers, suppliers, investors, and other groups, will calculate for themselves the costs and benefits of ownership, as well as the costs and benefits of other arrangements, and express these calculations in the marketplace. Governance structures that are not efficient will disappear, along with the firms that adopted them, in a Darwinian struggle for the “survival of the fittest.” Thus, corporations need not be designed in one fell swoop by some knowing mind but can emerge from the myriad choices of individuals over time. However, a theoretical explanation of the cost-reducing advantages of the dominant system of investor ownership can be offered by considering the three costs of ownership, namely the costs of controlling managers, the costs of collective decision making, and the costs of risk bearing. First, no constituency would assume the costs of controlling managers unless the expected returns exceed the costs. Generally, residual risk bearers, who reap the full benefit of improvements in management performance, gain the greatest return from incurring these costs. In the standard argument, residual risk bearers ought to have
control because they have the greatest incentive to monitor management performance and to expend time and effort in overseeing a firm's operation. Insofar as any constituency fills this role effectively at the lowest cost, other constituencies are benefited automatically by improved firm performance. Moreover, no constituency without a claim on the residual would have an incentive to spur management to improved performance if their returns do not increase as a result, which is usually the case. For example, workers' pay is determined mainly by the market for labor, and so employees ordinarily do not receive higher wages if a company is more profitable. (At the same time, their wages usually do not suffer if the firm falters.) Similarly, customers do not receive goods more cheaply and suppliers cannot command a higher price merely because a company is successful because, as with wages, the price of goods is determined by the market. In practice, the shareholders of American corporations have little incentive to control managers. Given the pattern of fragmented holdings among diversified investors, shareholders in the United States ought to be “rationally disinterested” in the performance of any given firm. Mark Roe (1991) points out that the most efficient form of corporate governance is probably a small group of investors with concentrated holdings because they would have the greatest incentive to closely monitor managers. Such a pattern prevails in Germany, for example, but concentrated holdings have been prevented in the USA by laws that reflect a distrust of powerful financial institutions. Thus, Roe argues, politics as well as markets have shaped corporate law. Hansmann 1996) concedes that American shareholders are not very effective monitors, but argues that investor ownership is still better than the alternatives because it assures everyone that somebody else's interests will not be primary. In addition, Hansmann observes, there is extensive regulation in the USA, such as accounting standards and securities law, as well as an active press, all of which leads managers to act in the shareholders' interest. Second, investors with a claim on the residual, which is to say equity capital providers, are commonly regarded as the group that can make decisions at the lowest cost. Decision making costs arise primarily from efforts to resolve conflicts among those with control. For this reason, any governance structure in which control is shared – between investors and employees, for example – would be fraught with conflicts because of differing objectives, and considerable time and effort would be required to make sound decisions. Not all members of any one constituency, such as employees or customers, have the same objectives, but equity capital providers are typically the least conflicted group. In the standard argument, equity capital provides have the advantage of a single, clear objective that is capable of directing decisions, namely increasing residual revenues or profits. This objective is one that potentially benefits all constituencies because a successful firm creates more wealth that is available for distribution to all. Third, equity capital providers are usually the constituency best able to bear risk. This ability is due primarily to the opportunity of shareholders to diversify their holdings. The value of an investor's portfolio of shares in a large number of companies will generally not be affected by the fortune of a single company but will fluctuate with the broader market. Employees, by contrast, are not able to diversify the risk of unemployment. In addition, wealthy investors are typically less risk averse than other groups and hence
more willing to accept greater risk for the prospect of a higher return. Again, less affluent employees generally prefer the safety of a known paycheck to the uncertainty of receiving a portion of the residual. For these reasons, equity capital providers can generally incur the costs of ownership at lower cost than other constituencies with the result that the total contracting costs of all constituencies is reduced. Under some circumstances, however, there are benefits to some other constituency that make it advantageous for that group to obtain control. For example, employee ownership typically occurs in troubled companies in which employees are asked to accept lower pay to enable the firm to survive or else assume greater risk, including the nonpayment of promised wages or even unemployment. The potential loss to employees who are locked into such a firm may offset the costs of ownership and lead them to seek control. In addition, customers who are forced by a single seller to pay high prices may reduce their overall costs by forming a cooperative in which they control the supplier. Similarly, suppliers, such as milk producers or cranberry growers, who have only one customer can avoid loss from the market power of the buyer by obtaining control. Land O' Lakes and Ocean Spray are examples of producer cooperatives for the marketing of dairy products and cranberry juice respectively. Whether a corporation is owned by investors, employees, customers, suppliers, or some other constituency is determined by the costs and benefits of ownership as reflected in the market choices made by each group. The standard argument holds that whatever the assignment of ownership, the resulting system of corporate governance is optimal not only for the constituency with control and a claim on the residual but also for all other constituencies. However, the idea that all groups can benefit from ownership by one group requires further explanation.
Protecting Other Constituencies In the contractual theory, every constituency enters into a relationship with a firm. Although contracts are used by each group to build its relationship, the type of contracts and the terms of these contracts are different because each group has unique contracting problems that require tailor-made solutions. We have previously observed that the problems of contracting are due primarily to the need to protect firm specific assets under conditions of complexity and uncertainty. In practice, there are a great many ways for all constituencies to protect themselves and to plan long–term, beneficial relationships with a firm, and the means chosen by one group need not be, and probably will not be, the same as those adopted by another. The important question is whether each group is adequately protected. That is, are they all well served by the multiplicity of relationships that constitute the nexus-of-contracts firm? The standard argument holds that, in general, the interests of nonshareholder constituencies are best protected by a variety of safeguards that are unrelated to the right of control. In contrast, shareholder interests are very difficult to protect by the same kind of safeguards, and so control rights are the means that best protect the uniquely vulnerable interests of shareholders. This part of the argument involves several points.
First, it should be noted that contracting is not the only source of protection for corporate constituencies. In particular, each group can seek to avoid lock-in, and doing so is advantageous to the extent that the gains exceed any loss. For example, a supplier has greater protection when it sells to many buyers. A supplier might make more profit by selling only to one firm, but the resulting lock-in creates greater risks that must be weighed against the benefits. Generally, consumers who make one-time purchases and have a wide selection can avoid being locked in, as can employees with highly marketable skills in a tight labor market. In short, the marketplace itself provides a form of noncontractual protection. Second, each constituency can seek to write contracts that cover every aspect of a relationship and anticipate every contingency. Many sales contracts have detailed provisions concerning the rights and obligations of each party, and union contracts provide a similar level of protection for employees. Such explicit contracting involves considerable direct transaction costs, as well as other indirect costs from a lack of flexibility. (For example, union employees might be more productive without certain work rules in their contracts, but if they cannot trust employers to share the productivity gains with them, then they are better off with the productivity hindering rules.) An alternative to relatively complete, explicit contracts is relational contracting (Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1978; Goetz and Scott, 1981). Relational contracts generally commit the parties to some common goal rather than a specific course of action, and compliance with the contract is judged not by whether some action is performed but whether each party has made a “best effort” attempt to achieve the goal (Goetz and Scott, 1981). The most prominent use of relational contracting is the creation of agency relations, whereby a principal seeks to overcome the contracting problems caused by complexity and uncertainty, as well as information asymmetry, by engaging another person as an agent. Third, the legal system provides many protections. In addition to offering standard form contracts and gap-filling judicial interpretations, the law also creates many rights and obligations. For example, customers benefit from consumer protection legislation that sets safety standards, as well as from tort law that enables them to sue for injury from defective products. In addition, many terms of sale, including warranties, are set by law. On the whole, consumers in the United States are very well protected by a combination of explicit contracts and legal safeguards. Similarly, employees are well protected by the vast body of employment law and by worker protection legislation; and investors, such as bondholders, are protected by the body of securities law and by the Bankruptcy Code (which specifies the rights of debt holders in the event of insolvency). Turning now to the position of shareholder/owners, which is any constituency that has the right of control and a right to residual revenues, the right of control itself is the chief means for protecting the right to the residual. Control by itself confers no benefit and would not usually be sought as an end for its own sake. The value of control lies rather in what it enables one to achieve. Ordinarily, control is of value to residual risk bearers because this is a relatively effective means and, more importantly, virtually the only means for them to safeguard their promised return. By contrast, groups that have no claim on the residual are usually better protected by other safeguards.
Residual risk bearers are uniquely vulnerable because of their inability to write detailed, complete contracts with a firm. The gain for residual risk bearers comes only when a firm is well run, but because of the complexity and uncertainty involved in management, the steps to be taken cannot be specified in advance. This raises no problem for owners who exercise day-to-day control, but with the separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932), shareholders need some means for ensuring that managers run the firm so as to maximize residual returns. The power of shareholders to elect directors – who in turn hire managers, evaluate their performance, and set their compensation – provides some protection. In addition, the market for managerial talent and especially the market for corporate control disciplines managers, and the law further serves to protect shareholders by such means as disclosure requirements, a prohibition on insider trading, and provisions for shareholder suits. An especially important legal safeguard is the fiduciary duty of managers to operate a firm in the shareholders' interest. That the fiduciary duties of managers are owed primarily to the shareholders is a source of great controversy. Many critics of corporate governance focus on fiduciary duty as the key feature of the shareholder–centered corporation (Marens and Wicks, 1999) and call for an expansion of this duty to all stakeholder groups (Evan and Freeman, 1993). Arguably, fiduciary duties play a less important role in corporate governance than critics assume. They serve primarily to prevent directors and top managers from abusing their position to enrich themselves and others (Clark, 1985), and in this role fiduciary duties benefit all constituencies. Although suit can be brought for breaches of fiduciary duties, their enforcement depends less on legal sanctions than on moral force. In general, a party to an explicit contract has a stronger legal claim that the beneficiary of a fiduciary duty. The main value of fiduciary duties is to create an open-ended obligation to act in the interest of another in situations where precisely stated obligations are not possible. Two parties who could write complete explicit contracts would have no need for fiduciary duties. To a great extent this describes the situation of nonshareholder constituencies. However, fiduciary duties are particularly well suited to the contracting problems faced by shareholders, whose contract with the firm cannot be fully specified. Jonathan R. Macey describes fiduciary duties as “a method of gap-filling in incomplete contracts” (Macey, 1991, p. 25). He writes, “Fiduciary duties are a corporate governance device uniquely crafted to fill in the massive gap in this open-ended bargain between shareholder and corporate officers and directors” (Macey, 1991, p. 41). All contracts are incomplete to some extent, and so would not other constituencies benefit from this kind of gap filling? Macey's reply is that judicial decisions fill in gaps of the contracts involving employees, customers, suppliers, and other nonshareholder groups. In short, fiduciary duties are only one means of gap filling (judicial decision making is the other), and other constituencies have an effective alternative to fiduciary duties (namely, relying on the courts to interpret their contracts with a firm). Moreover, the effectiveness of fiduciary duties is decreased when they are shared (Macey and Miller, 1993). If management owed fiduciary duties were owed to every corporate constituency, then they would be of benefit to none.
It is worth noting that fiduciary duties are not owed solely to shareholders. Many states have modified the fiduciary duty principle in the event of a takeover bid to permit the consideration of other constituencies (Orts, 1992). The Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) imposes a fiduciary duty on management in the handling of employees' retirement funds (Little and Thraikill, 1977). These developments reflect a judgment by legislatures and courts that the contracting problems of nonshareholder constituencies in these situations are best addressed by means of fiduciary duties. The argument for assigning fiduciary duties primarily to shareholders, then, is that this arrangement solves a critical contracting problem for this group; that this solution would be less effective if fiduciary duties were owed to other groups as well; and that, in any event, other groups have more effective means for solving their contracting problems.
The Justification of Corporate Law The contractual theory of the firm, as presented so far, holds that American corporate law represents what people would have negotiated had they been able to do so (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991). This claim assumes that much corporate law ratifies the economic choices individuals have in fact made and also reflects the attempts of legislators and judges to anticipate the choices that the parties might have made. In both instances, there is a search for governance forms that reduce the costs of contracting, which is to say a search for the most efficient ownership structures. Insofar as corporations result from private contracting, they can be justified in the same way as any outcome from free market exchange. However, just because people would contract so as to create a given form of corporate governance, it does not follow that this form is justified. Put differently, efficient structures are not for that reason just. Efficiency is a moral good, but it may not be the only morally relevant consideration in corporate governance. A guiding ethical principle of the contractual theory is that whenever possible people should be free to choose the terms of their economic relations with others. This principle can be grounded either in libertarianism, which makes individual freedom of choice a fundamental value, or in utilitarianism, which justifies free market choices for the reason that they produce higher levels of welfare. Both libertarianism and utilitarianism require many background conditions for the justification of the outcome of people's free choices. Economists commonly stress the need for perfect competition, perfect information, and the absence of force and fraud, and they also recognize instances of market failure that may require government regulation. Moreover, an organizational form can be morally justified as an outcome of contracting only if the conditions for fair contracting are satisfied. That is, any ethical theory that grounds the principle of free choice must enable us to determine when a contract is genuinely fair and not the result of coercion, fraud, or unfair advantage taking. Although the standard contractual argument for the prevailing system of corporate governance might be criticized on the grounds that the conditions for fair contracting are not satisfied, the critics generally mount a broader challenge to the idea that corporate
law should be formed merely by considering how individuals do or would contract. Specifically, critics charge that a contractual approach:
1 reinforces existing imbalances of power among various constituencies and even creates a bias in favor of shareholders; 2 fails to address adequately the social costs or externalities of corporate activities; and 3 overlooks the public nature of corporations and their role in society.
Let us examine each of these charges briefly. Safeguards and power Objection The contractual theory assumes that each constituency is able to protect itself by selecting the safeguards that are best suited to its situation. These safeguards take many forms, and, according to the theory, the fact that shareholders protect themselves with the rights of ownership does not necessarily give them any advantage over employees or customers who rationally choose other means of protection. However, if safeguards must be bargained for, then the inequality of power that exists in every society will be reflected in the law of corporate governance. A largely disempowered workforce, for example, might be unable to secure adequate safeguards in a process of bargaining, while ultrapowerful investors gain more than their rightful share. More importantly, all individuals have some rights that they should not have to bargain for in a market. Everyone should be treated fairly and have his or her interests taken into account. In short, moral treatment is not a good to be distributed in a market but a precondition for all economic activity. Reply First, inequality of power, which is a serious moral concern, exists primarily between individuals in a society rather than between corporate constituencies. All of us are consumers and members of communities; most people are employees, and an increasing number are investors, especially through pension funds. As a result, a substantial equality of power among these groups may coexist with great inequality among individuals. The contractual argument is open to criticism for a lack of equality only if one or more groups, such as employees or consumers, have unequal power as a group. Moreover, our concern in these various roles should be the greatest overall benefit. That is, employees (who are also consumers) should be willing to accept less in wages if, by doing so, they gain even more as consumers through lower prices. An instructive example is provided by Japan, where the relatively privileged position of employees is offset by very high consumer prices and very low returns on savings. Arguably, individual Japanese might be better off on balance if they were less well off as employees. However, this reply does not address the serious inequality that remains. Many workers in the USA, for example, have a much weaker bargaining position than their counterparts
in Europe, and this inequality is not wholly offset by the benefits they receive as consumers or investors. When companies reduce their workforce in order to increase profits, it appears that employee interests are being sacrificed to those of shareholders. Some critics argue that the current law of corporate governance unduly favors shareholders and that the law ought to be changed to redress this imbalance of power. Their proposals include extending the fiduciary to shareholders to include other stakeholders, giving stakeholder groups representation on boards of directors, and reducing limited liability for shareholders (Millon, 1995). Each of these proposals needs to be carefully evaluated, but contractual theorists are skeptical about the efficacy of using legal rules to change the outcome of bargaining in a market. Merely changing the rules of corporate governance is unlikely to compensate for any underlying inequality of power since more powerful groups could respond by extracting concessions on other matters (Maitland, 2001). In short, legal rules are weak instruments to correct imbalances of power. However, the rules of corporate governance profoundly affect the efficiency of firms, and so any change designed to reduce inequality must be weighed against the loss of efficiency. The point that rights should not have to be bargained for involves two misconceptions. First, contracting itself presupposes a right to contract and certain minimal conditions, such as the absence of force and fraud, and certain kinds of treatment of others is wrong, notwithstanding any contractual agreements. For example, exposing employees to unreasonably dangerous working conditions is morally impermissible, even with their consent. However, above a moral minimum, the rights and obligations of parties may justifiably be open to negotiation. Thus, employers and employees may justifiably bargain over the level of safety, recognizing that the choice may involve a tradeoff with other goods, such as wages. The contractual theory holds that most of the rights involved in corporate governance are not part of a moral minimum but are rightfully subject to bargaining. We have already noted that no group has a prior claim on corporate control and that any group can assume this role. The crucial question, therefore, is not whether some rights exist antecedently – some definitely do – but which rights exist antecedently and which result from contracting. Second, the moral requirement that everyone's interests ought to be taken into account does not preclude a fiduciary duty to run a corporation in the interests of shareholders (Marens and Wicks, 1999). In the contractual theory, the interests of employees, customers, and other constituencies are best served, generally, if managers make major corporate decisions with a view only to the interests of shareholders. (Such decisions can also be described as those that utilize resources most efficiency and create the greatest wealth for society.) If this claim is true, then nonshareholder constituencies would consent to a system of governance in which their interests are not explicitly considered by management, assuming, of course, that their interests are already adequately protected by other means. This does not mean that their interests are not taken into account. Rather, they are taken into account in the contracting process, out of which the nexus-ofcontracts corporation is formed. Similarly, we should not expect a creditor to consider our interests in collecting a debt. Our interests are taken into account when we borrow money, but when a loan comes due, there is nothing to be done but to observe the
agreement. Overall, a system of lending is in our interest, and insisting that a creditor consider our interest in deciding whether to collect a loan would undermine this system. The problem of social cost Objection Business activity benefits society, but it also imposes social costs. A fiduciary duty to serve the interest of shareholders alone permits, indeed seems to require, that managers disregard these costs to society in the pursuit of shareholder benefits. Social costs are commonly viewed as externalities, which are costs of production that are not borne by the producer. A company that pollutes, for example, is able to utilize a resource for which others pay the cost. Not only do managers have a duty to ignore externalities, which are costs to society, but they should seek to avoid internalizing such costs, by investing in pollution control, for example. Such a disregard of social costs cannot be justified by the contractual theory when contracts between two parties affect third parties. Not only should contractors be aware of third-party effects as a matter of morality, but no contract can be justified if it wrongfully harms others. Thus, any contract between a firm and its shareholders must be made with a concern for the interests of other constituencies, and no contract can justify actions that are morally wrong. Reply The problem of social cost is twofold. First, all costs of production should be weighed against the benefits, which is to say that production should be maximally efficient. Regardless of who bears the cost, society as a whole should gain the greatest possible benefit in return. Second, the costs (as well as the benefits) should be distributed in an equitable manner. In theory, bargaining in a nexus-of-contracts firm revolves around both the costs and the benefits of joint productive activity. That is, workers bargain not only for wages (a benefit) but also for safe and healthy working conditions (because injury and illness are costs). Thus, the distribution of social costs is, to some extent, built into structure of a firm. Furthermore, it should matter little, from a theoretical point of view, whether costs are externalized or internalized. If internalized costs are passed along to consumers in higher prices, for example, then consumers still bear the costs. The problem with externalization is that it leads to an inefficient utilization of resources. The objection, then, is not that firms create externalities but that they impose social costs that reduce efficiency and are distributed unfairly. There are many ways to address both of these problems of social costs. That managers should have a duty to consider the effects on other constituencies akin to their fiduciary duty toward shareholders is one solution but not necessarily the most effective. For example, workers could arguably obtain more protection from workplace hazards by bargaining for better working conditions or by lobbying for government regulation. Similarly, consumer protection legislation, environment protection laws, and a host of other regulatory regimes provide far more protection to various constituencies than a reliance on managerial good will. The legal system prevents the imposition of social costs
by means other than regulation. For example, tort law enables people who are wrongfully harmed to sue for damages and thereby limits the ability of managers to inflict certain kinds of harm on people. Thus, the law does not permit two contracting parties to harm third parties in violation of their rights. In addition, markets can serve to internalize costs and thereby secure both efficiency and fairness. Ronald Coase (1960) argued that externalities would not result in an inefficient allocation of resources if there were a clear assignment of property rights for all resources and means for enforcing these rights at no cost. Under such conditions, the cost of all resources would be fully factored into economic choices. This insight (called Coase's theorem) underlies an approach to pollution, for example, that assigns rights to pollute and requires firms exceeding pollution limits to purchase the rights from less polluting firms. A well-designed market-based pollution control system may be not only efficient but also fair, by distributing costs in accord with market choices. Contractual theorists no less than their critics are concerned with the problem of social costs. They disagree principally over the use of corporate governance as a solution. Contractual theorists agree with the assessment of Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) that we should seek to distribute both the costs and the benefits of productive activity in the way that all parties would agree to were they able to bargain. The form of corporate governance reflects the choices that these parties would make about governance structures, but these choices have little bearing on decisions about the utilization of resources. How we make these decision is very important, but, as Easterbrook and Fischel (1991, p. 39) conclude, “To view pollution … or other difficult moral or social questions as governance matters is to miss the point.” The public/private distinction Objection In the contractual view, business organizations are private associations of individuals who contract with each other to achieve their own (private) ends. However, corporations are not merely private associations; they are also public institutions, created by society and endowed with certain privileges, in order to serve important public goals. Although individuals have a right to contract with others in the course of engaging in business, the right to incorporate, with its attendant privileges, is granted by society to serve some socially beneficial purpose. Moreover, conceiving the corporation as an essentially private association deprives employees and other groups from active participation in decision-making. On the contractual view, a corporation is a hierarchy, not a democracy. Thus, employees, for example, are expected to work as directed by their superiors. However, Christopher McMahon (1994) argues that the use of authority in business organizations is morally permissible only if it is democratically exercised. That is, all affected groups should have a significant voice in major corporate decisions. Reply
The contractual approach starts with the assumption that individuals create organizations not only to serve their own ends but also to achieve common goals in cooperation with others. The earliest large US corporations were formed to build railroads, produce steel, and engage in other activities that require the marshalling of vast resources. The reasons for incorporating must be stated in a corporation's charter. Thus, corporations do serve some larger purposes. These may vary according to the aims of their founders, but they invariably involve the provision of economic goods and services. The founders may also choose whether to incorporate as a for–profit or not-for-profit organization. This choice does not affect the purposes of the corporation but determines how it is governed. For example, for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals have the same end – to provide healthcare – but the former is controlled by trustees on behalf of society, the latter by directors, who represent the shareholders. The not-for-profit form is appropriate if donors contribute the assets of the hospital; the latter, if the assets are obtained from investors. Ultimately, the governance structure for a hospital will reflect how it is financed. Although corporations may be said to exist with the permission of society in some sense, we grant the privileges that enable individuals to do business in the corporate form because of the need for large-scale economic organization in the production of most economic goods. We also gain maximum benefit from corporations when they operate efficiently. The contractual theory assumes that finding the most efficient organizational forms or governance structures is a difficult task and that, for the most part, this task is best left to the marketplace. The problems are sufficiently complex that a market approach – which leaves individuals free to experiment and allows experience to show us the best solutions – is more likely to succeed than an approach that views these problems as matters of public policy. Of course, we need to make sure that important public concerns are adequately addressed. The main issue here between contractual theorists and their critics is whether the public interest should be served directly by making corporations public institutions or served indirectly by leaving corporations in private hands, subject to public controls. For example, a public or not-for-profit hospital, no less than a for–profit facility, should operate efficiently, making the best use of its resources to provide high quality medical care. However, a public good, such as caring for indigent patients, may be more easily served by a not-for-profit hospital due to its comparative freedom to balance efficiency with other goals. The resulting inefficiency has a price, but it is a price that society is willing to pay to ensure that those unable to pay do not go without treatment. By contrast, a for-profit hospital would seek to avoid the care of indigent patients in order to maximize the return to shareholders. However, the public good of caring for indigent patients could be achieved within a system of for-profit hospitals by such means as government regulation that requires treatment or government payment for such services. Both sides agree that we want to obtain the best medical care for the allocated resources consistent with achieving other socially desirable goods, such as equal access to medical care. In short, we need to make some trade-off between equity and efficiency. As long as the members of a society agree on what trade-off to make, how the trade-off is made should be immaterial. The same trade-off could be made with a system of for-profit or not-for-profit hospitals, and so the crucial question is which system works best overall.
This is an empirical matter to be decided by experience and not a normative judgment about the public or private nature of the corporation. Similarly, whether corporations should be more democratic instead of being hierarchical is also a question of what works best in practice for all those involved. Workers who want a voice in decision-making are free to organize themselves as employee-owned firms. However, we have already observed that monitoring and decision-making costs might lead them to submit to the control of managers and to assign them the right to all profits. Williamson (1985) observes that workers might also seek to sell an employeeowned firm to investors in order to obtain capital on more favorable terms. Thus, workers might agree to join a hierarchical firm and forgo a democratic workplace in order to gain more than they could otherwise. If they make this decision, then they are exercising their freedom to choose, and depriving people of the freedom to make this decision would be coercive. Furthermore, one joins a hierarchical firm by becoming an agent, and agency relationships are a ubiquitous feature of business. Attorneys, accountants, bankers, and a host of others agree to become agents and serve others – in return for ample compensation, of course – and so there is no reason why the situation of employees or any other group serving as agents should be regarded as morally undesirable.
Conclusion The argument presented in this chapter relies on an economic approach in which corporate governance is, first and foremost, a search for the most efficient forms of economic organization. This approach assumes that the justification for any resulting system of corporate governance is not that it embodies some ethical ideal but that it reflects individual economic choices expressed through contracting in a market. However, the market in this case is primarily a means for creating forms of economic organization, and in contracting we consider not only efficiency but also ideals. Our economic choices reflect our preferences, and these include the kinds of organizations and ultimately the kind of a society that we want. In short, our moral desires are embodied in markets (Dunfee, 1999). Our current system of corporate governance has evolved through trial and error, with careful evaluation at each step, and the freedom to experiment with different organizational forms enables us to choose those we consider best. It follows from this economic approach that there is no one ideal form of corporate governance. Not only will many organizational forms exist within any given society, but different forms will be suited for different historical periods. Moreover, corporate governance will vary greatly around the world, as people solve the problems of economic organization in accord with their cultural, historical, political, and legal traditions. Global competition will punish countries with inefficient governance structures, but many different efficient forms of organization are still possible. Consequently, corporate governance in the United States, Europe, and Asia may converge to some extent while still retaining certain distinctive features. Corporate governance is also constantly evolving in response to changing conditions, and so it is difficult to predict the governance structures that might be adopted in the twenty-first century.
References Alchian, A. A. and Demsetz, H. 1972: Production, information costs, and economic organization . American Economic Review . (62) , 777 95. Berle, Jr. A. A. and Means, G. C. 1932: The Modern Corporation and Private Property . New York: Harcourt, Brace & World . Cary, W. L. 1974: Federalism and corporate law: Reflections upon Delaware . Yale Law Journal . (83) , 663 705. Clark, R. C. 1985: Agency costs versus fiduciary duties . In J. W. Pratt & R. J. Zeckhauser eds Principle and Agents: The Structure of Business . Boston: Harvard Business School Press , 55 79. Coase, R. H. 1937: The nature of the firm . Economica. N.S ., (4) , 386 405. Coase, R. H. 1960: The problem of social cost . Journal of Law and Economics . (3) , 1 44. Dunfee, T. W. 1999: Corporate governance in a market with morality . Law and Contemporary Problems . (62) , 129 57. Easterbrook, F. H. and Fischel, D. R. 1991: The Economic Structure of Corporate Law . Cambridge: Harvard University Press . Evan, W. and Freeman, R. E. 1993: A stakeholder theory of the modern corporation: Kantian capitalism . In T. L. Beauchamp and N. E. Bowie (eds). Ethical Theory and Business . 4th edn, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall , 75 84. Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. 1983a: Separation of ownership and control . Journal of Law and Economics . (26) , 301 25. Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. 1983b: Agency problems and residual claims . Journal of Law and Economics . (26) , 327 49. Goetz, C. J. and Scott, R. E. 1981: Principles of relational contracts . Virginia Law Review . (67) , 1089 150. Hansmann, H. 1996: The Ownership of Enterprise . Cambridge: Harvard University Press . Hart, O. 1989: An economist's perspective on the theory of the firm . Columbia Law Review . (89) , 1757 73. Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. 1976: Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure . Journal of Financial Economics . (3) , 305 60. Klein, B., Crawford, R. G. and Alchian, A. A. 1978: Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process . Journal of Law and Economics . (21) , 297 326. Little, Jr. H. S. and Thraikill, L. T. 1977: Fiduciaries under ERISA: A narrow path to tread . Vanderbilt Law Review . (30) , 1 38. Macey, J. R. 1991: An economic analysis of the various rationales for making shareholder the exclusive beneficiaries of corporate fiduciary duties . Stetson Law Review , (21) , 23 44. Macey, J. R. and Miller, G. P. 1993: Corporate stakeholders: A contractual perspective . University of Toronto Law Journal . (43) , 401 24. Macneil, I. F. 1978: Contracts: Adjustment of long-term economic relations under classical, neoclassical, and relational contract law . Northwestern University Law Review . (72) , 854 905.
Maitland, I. 2001: Distributive justice in firms: Do the rules of corporate governance matter Business Ethics Quarterly . (11) , 129 43. Marens, R. and Wicks, A. 1999: Getting real: Stakeholder theory, management practice, and the general irrelevance fiduciary duties owed to shareholders . Business Ethics Quarterly . (9) , 273 93. Macaulay, S. 1963: Non–contractual relations in business: A preliminary study . American Sociological Review . (28) , 55 67. McMahon, C. 1994: Authority and Democracy: A General Theory of Government and Management . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press . Millon, D. 1995: Communitarianism in corporate law: Foundations and law reform strategies . In L. E. Mitchell (ed.) Progressive Corporate Law . Boulder, CO: Westview , 31 3. Orts, E. W. 1992: Beyond shareholders: Interpreting corporate constituency statutes . George Washington Law Review . (61) , 14 135. Roe, M. 1991: A political theory of American corporate finance . Columbia Law Review . (91) , 10 67. Romano, R. 1993: The Genius of American Corporate Law . Washington, DC: The AEI Press . Schrader, D. E. 1996: The oddness of corporate ownership . Journal of Social Philosophy . (27) , 104 27. Simon, H. A. 1955: A behavior model of rational choice . Quarterly Journal of Economics . (69) , 99 118. Simon, H. A. 1957: Models of Man . New York: Wiley . Simon, H. A. 1979: Rational decision–making in business organizations . American Economic Review . (69) , 493 513. Simon, H. A. 1997: Administrative Behavior . New York: Free Press . Original publication: 1947. Williamson, O. E. 1975: Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications . New York: Free Press . Williamson, O. E. 1985: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism . New York: The Free Press . Winter, Jr., R. K. 1977: State law, shareholder protection, and the theory of the corporation . The Journal of Legal Studies . (6) , 251 92.
Further Reading Maitland, I. 1994: The morality of the corporation: An empirical or normative disagreement Business Ethics Quarterly , (4) , 445 58.
Chapter 3. Untangling the Corruption Knot: Global Bribery Viewed through the Lens of Integrative Social Contract Theory Thomas W. Dunfee and Thomas J. Donaldson
Subject Business and Management Ethics » Applied Ethics Key-Topics social issues, theory DOI: 10.1111/b.9780631221234.2001.00004.x
Global managers often must navigate the perplexing gray zone that arises when two cultures - and two sets of ethics - meet. Consider these two scenarios:
• Competing for a bid in a foreign country, you are introduced to a “consultant” who offers to help you in your client contacts. A brief conversation makes it clear that this person is well connected in local government and business circles and knows your customer extremely well. The consultant will help you to prepare and submit your bid and negotiate with the customer … for a substantial fee. Your peers tell you that such arrangements are normal in this country - and that a large part of the consulting fee will go directly to staff people working for your customer. Those who have rejected such help in the past have seen contracts go to their less-fussy competitors. • A developing country in Africa solicits bids for a dam on a major river. Your firm submits a bid based on your substantial experience in building similar structures. The contract is awarded to an Indonesian firm having little experience in building the type of dam required. You suspect that a bribe has been paid to the government official in charge of awarding the contract. You later hear that the winning proposal involves substandard materials and design. You genuinely believe that the dam is likely to collapse in the future and cause great loss of life.
What should you do in such cases? “Bribery is just like tipping,” some people say. “Whether you tip for service at dinner; or, bribe for the benefit of getting goods through customs - you pay for a service rendered.” But while many of us balk at a conclusion that puts bribery on a par with tipping or that suggests we should violate our personal values when in another culture, we cannot say why. In the case of the African dam, one appears to confront a choice among evils. If one does nothing, the contract will go to a less qualified bidder, and even worse, the lives of people living near the dam may be endangered. But if one complains, it not only seems like sour grapes, but by exposing the corruption, one risks endangering the representatives of one's firm. Ultimately can there be any solution to such problems? This chapter describes a systematic way to think through the problems of bribery and its possible responses. In order to untangle the corruption knot, we will show how to apply two key concepts from the “social contracts” approach we develop at length in our book, Ties That Bind (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999). We focus on bribery as part of the international issue of corruption because of its enormous importance in today's global business environment. Further, we believe that public attitudes about bribery are
changing, making matters even more challenging for beleaguered managers facing the temptation of bribery. Academics, public policy makers, officials of public international organizations, and corporate managers all must consider the full implications of widespread global bribery. But we also focus on bribery for the practical reason that our space in this book is limited, and we believe that treating one global ethics topic well is preferable to treating many badly.1
Integrative Social Contracts Theory We wrote the book, Ties that Bind, out of our conviction that answering today's questions require a new approach to business ethics, one that exposes the implicit understandings or “contracts” that bind industries, companies, and economic systems into moral communities. It is in these economic communities, and in the often unspoken understandings that provide their ethical glue, that we believe many of the answers to business ethics quandaries lie. Further, we think that answering such questions requires the use of a yet deeper, and universal “contract” superseding even individual ones. The theory that combines both these deeper and thinner kinds of contracts we label “Integrative Social Contracts Theory,” or “ISCT” for short. ISCT does not overturn popular wisdom. While it asserts that the social contracts that arise from specific cultural and geographic contexts have legitimacy, it acknowledges a limit to that legitimacy. It recognizes the moral authority of key transcultural truths, for example, the idea that human beings everywhere are deserving of respect. The social contract approach we detail holds that any social contract terms existing outside these boundaries must be deemed illegitimate, no matter how completely subscribed to within a given economic community. In this sense, all particular or “micro” social contracts, whether they exist at the national, industry, or corporate level, must conform to a hypothetical “macro” social contract that lays down moral boundaries for any social contracting. ISCT thus lies midway on the spectrum of moral belief, separating relativism from absolutism. It allows substantial “moral free space” for nations and other economic communities to shape their distinctive concepts of economic fairness, but it draws the line at flagrant neglect of core human values. ISCT is derived from a thought experiment in which rational contractors are assumed to rely upon a limited set of core assumptions in framing their search for a common economic ethics, where “economic ethics” refers to the principles establishing the boundaries of proper behavior in the context of the production and exchange of goods and services. These are as follows:
• All humans are constrained by bounded moral rationality. This means that even rational persons knowledgeable about ethical theory cannot always divine good answers to moral problems without being acquainted with community-specific norms.
• The nature of ethical behavior in economic systems and communities helps determine the quality and efficiency of economic interactions. Higher quality and more efficient economic interactions are preferable to lower quality and less efficient economic interactions. • All other things being equal, economic activity that is consistent with the cultural, philosophical, or religious attitudes of economic actors is preferable to economic activity that is not.
In virtue of these three propositions, we argue further that individual contractors would desire the option to join and to exit economic communities as a means of leveraging their ability to achieve the benefits of either greater efficiency or greater compatibility with preferred religious, philosophical, or community norms. The hypothetical members of the global economic community would be capable of considering which norms would be best to guide all business activity in a way that achieves fairness. In this hypothetical state of nature, we argue that such rational global contractors would agree to the following de minimis macro-social contract setting the terms for economic ethics:
1 Local economic communities have moral free space in which they may generate ethical norms for their members through microsocial contracts. 2 Norm-generating microsocial contracts must be grounded in consent, buttressed by the rights of individual members to voice and exit. 3 To become obligatory (legitimate), a microsocial contract norm must be compatible with hypernorms. 4 In cases of conflicts among norms satisfying macrosocial contract terms 1–3, priority principles must be established through the application of rules consistent with the spirit and letter of the macrosocial contract.
Here are the ISCT priority principles, or “rules of thumb”:
1 Local community norms have priority unless adopting them harms members of another community. 2 Local community norms designed to resolve norm conflicts have priority unless adopting them harms members of another community 3 The more global the source of the norm, the greater the norm's priority. 4 Norms essential to the maintenance of the economic environment in which the transaction occurs have priority over norms potentially damaging to that environment. 5 Patterns of consistency among alternative norms add weight for priority. 6 Priority is given to well-defined norms over less well-defined ones.
Thus, under the approach delineated in ISCT, it is important to make use of hypernorms, or, in other words, universal principles applicable to all cultures and actions. Second, many problems dissolve when existing microsocial contracts found within relevant communities are carefully identified and proper priority is established among them.
Resolving Problems in Global Business Ethics: Is there Evidence for Microsocial Contracts and Moral Free Space? No one doubts that cultural differences abound in global business activities (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999, pp. 213–33). The deeper question is whether these differences imply different microsocial contracts for different cultures where members truly affirm authentic, legitimate norms that nonetheless conflict with those operating in other cultures. Might it be the case that in every instance of cultural difference, one side is invariably more “right” than the other? If so, the task of an international manager is simply to discover what the “right” norms are, and act accordingly. TIESs notion of the “microsocial contract” provides a tool for interpreting the significance of ethical differences, and it is a tool that we will use frequently in the remainder of this chapter. Kluckhorn (1955), Hofstede (1980), Turner and Trompenaars (1993) and many other management theorists have shown the importance of cultural differences to business - but the further issue of the ethical implications of many of these differences remains unexplored. For example, researchers have documented the importance of understanding the time sensitivity of the Swiss in contrast to the time laxity of South Americans, or the group orientation of the Japanese in contrast to the individualism of the Americans. To fail to understand such differences, modern managers realize, triggers missteps and financial losses. But the importance of understanding ethical differences among cultures is much less well understood - a puzzling oversight, since ethical differences often have ringing consequences. On a positive note, the clearer picture of the significance of cultural differences slowly emerging during the last decade has shed light on ethical differences. In one study, for example, thousands of international managers around the world were asked this question: While you are talking and sharing a bottle of beer with a friend who was officially on duty as a safety inspector in the company you both work for, an accident occurs, injuring a shift worker. The national safety commission launches an investigation and you are asked for your evidence. There are other witnesses. What right has your friend to expect you to protect him? Three choices were offered as answers:
1 A definite right? 2 Some right? 3 No right?
Here the explicit ethical notion of a “right” and the implicit notion of the duties of friendship are in play. The results of the questionnaire were striking, with cultural patterns perspicuous. To cite only one set of comparisons, approximately 94 percent of US managers and 91 percent of Austrian managers answered “3,” i.e., “no right,”
whereas only 53 percent of French and 59 percent of Singaporean managers did (Turner and Trompenaars, 1993). Surveys of international managers also show striking differences between cultural attitudes towards profit. When asked whether they affirmed the view that “The only real goal of a company is making profit,” 40 percent of US managers, 33 percent of British managers, and 35 percent of Austrian managers affirmed the proposition, in contrast to only 11 percent of Singaporean managers, and only 8 percent of Japanese managers selected (Turner and Trompenaars, 1993). Or, consider studies undertaken of the striking differences about everyday business problems. One study of Hong Kong managers revealed that Hong Kong managers rank taking credit for another's work at the top of a list of unethical activities, and, in contrast to their Western counterparts, rank it more unethical than bribery or gaining of competitor information. The same study showed that among Hong Kong respondents, 82 percent indicated that additional government regulation would improve ethical conduct in business, whereas only 27 percent of American respondents did (MacDonald, 1988).
Resolving Problems in Global Business Ethics: Is there Evidence for Universal Principles or “Hypernorms?” Short of a relativism in which anything goes, making sense of bribery means separating better from the worse in global business practices. If blatant bribery is wrong everywhere, then some conceptual scheme appears necessary to declare it wrong. But is any moral scheme universally valid? Are there any hypernorms, i.e., universal moral principles, that can be used to separate better from worse? “Hypernorms” we define as “principles so fundamental to human existence that … we would expect them to be reflected in a convergence of religious, philosophical, and cultural beliefs” (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994, p. 265). As expressed by Walzer, such universal principles would be a thin “set of standards to which all societies can be held - negative injunctions, most likely, rules against murder, deceit, torture, oppression, and tyranny” (Walzer, 1994, p. 10). An obvious question, then, is how best to ascertain the existence and content of hypernorms. In TIES we describe the efforts of anthropologists, political scientists and philosophers, among others, who are searching for a convergence of beliefs and values at the global level. Scholars from many cultures and academic disciplines are asking similar questions about what humans commonly believe. A promising starting point, thus, would be an attempt to identify the extent of convergence among the convergence scholars themselves. Frederick (1991) studied six intergovernmental compacts (including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the Helsinki Final Act and the International Labour Organization's (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises) to identify principles common to the set. Similarly, one could look to the statements of global
organizations as potential sources of hyper-norms. The Caux Principles developed by the Caux Round Table, a group of senior executives from Asia, Europe and North America who meet annually in Caux, Switzerland, are a prime example; so too is the document Towards a Global Ethic, produced by the Council for a Parliament of the World's Religions. From these and elsewhere, some promising samples of hypernorms can be drawn. Here are three candidates:
• Firms should adopt adequate health and safety standards for employees and grant employees the right to know about job-related health hazards (Frederick, 1991, p. 166). • You should not lie; speak and act truthfully (Toward a global ethic 1993: Chicago, IL: Council for a Parliament of World Religions, p. 11). • Businesses (should be expected to) honour their obligations in a spirit of honesty and fairness (Caux Round Table Principles for Business 1994: Washington, DC: Caux Round Table Secretariat, s. 2, Principle One).
Finally, there are shortcuts that managers can use to identify hypernorms for the purpose of making ethical decisions. As a first step a manager could look to the type of general references cited above. The explicit purpose of the “Caux Principles,” for example, is to provide guidance for practical business situations. Second, the manager could try to imagine the likely public response if the action being contemplated were to appear as the lead story on the international edition of CNN, or on the front page of the Financial Times. This global version of the traditional local newspaper test may serve to encourage one to think in terms of whether actions might violate widespread understandings of right and wrong. A similar approach would be for a manager to ask herself whether or not the proposed action might be seen as violating an important tenet of one of the major world religions. Finally, a manager could ask a diverse set of peers whether a proposed course of action violates a global ethical principle. Hypernorms thus bound the moral free space of communities, and in this sense the approach of ISCT marries the familiar role of social norms within distinct communities with a conception of manifest universal principles. Let us next examine the perplexing problem of bribery and corruption in international business through the lens of ISCT.
Key International Issue: Corruption2 Corruption is widely condemned, but also widely practiced (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999, pp. 213–33). Some firms establish procedures to ensure that others do not bribe their employees, even as those same firms use bribes to obtain business. Surprisingly firms from countries where domestic corruption is minimal often play a major role as bribepayers into corrupt environments. Many explanations arise for these seemingly inconsistent acts. Companies' participation in some forms of corruption may stem from competitive necessity and the belief that by bribing they are respecting local cultural norms. Or, they may feel that they are being extorted by locals, who are the real culprits.
Finally, they may throw up their hands, proclaiming their inability to control rogue employees. Despite such excuses, consensus is growing in many professional sectors, as well as in the general public, that something must be done about bribery. Hence, a confluence of factors has produced a changing environment in which corruption is now viewed as a key global problem. Consider three typical instances of sensitive payments. The first involves low-level bribery of public officials in some developing nations. In these nations it may be difficult for any company, foreign or national, to move goods through customs without paying low-level officials a few dollars. The payments are relatively small, uniformly assessed, and accepted as standard practice. Indeed, the salaries of such officials are sufficiently low that the officials require the additional income. One suspects the salary levels are set with the prevalence of bribery in mind. Or consider a second kind of bribery where a company competes for a bid in a foreign country, and where, to win the competition, a payment must be made, not as it happens to a government official, but to the employee of a private company. Nonetheless, in this instance, it is clear that the employee of the private company, instead of passing on the money to the company, will pocket the money. In a modified version of this scenario, the bribe may even happen one level deeper. For example, a company competing for a bid may be introduced to a “consultant” who offers to help in client contacts (see the example that begins this chapter). There are many variations of this kind of bribery, including one where the payment is made to a senior manager for the approval of large, phantom, cost overruns incurred by the bribe-paying supplier. Third, and most significant, is bribery involving large sums of money paid to public sector officials for the granting of public works projects, or permissions to buy land or do business within the bribe receivers' country. It is not obvious at first blush what ISCT has to say about such scenarios, or where even to place the practices on an ISCT conceptual map. Do practices involving such payments reflect principles that count as ISCT “authentic norms?” Or, do the payments invariably turn out to be direct violations of hypernorms, and hence may be placed in the “illegitimate” arena of ISCT norms? Or, instead, does the making of bribes in places where they are common qualify as expressions of “moral free space?” Again, ethical views about business vary around the globe. Bribery is no exception. Not only does the incidence of bribery vary, but so too its perception as unethical. In one study, for example, modern Greeks perceived the actions in some bribery scenarios as being less unethical than Americans (Tsalikis and LaTour, 1995). In another, Hong Kong managers were shown to be somewhat less critical of bribery than their American counterparts (MacDonald, 1988). And Tsalikis and Wachukwu (1991) showed that ethical reactions to bribery vary, noting in particular that Nigerians perceive some bribery scenarios as more ethical than Americans.
From the vantage point of ISCT, then, are there ethical problems with bribery? The answer is “yes,” as the following sections clarify: Violating a microsocial norm From the standpoint of the bribe recipient, the acceptance of a bribe usually violates a microsocial norm specifying the duties of the agent, i.e., the bribe recipient, to the principal, i.e., the employing body, such as the government, private company, etc. Perhaps the most obvious problem with bribery is that it typically involves the violation of a duty by the person accepting the bribe to the principal for whom that person serves as an agent. Note that in the cases described above, the bribe recipient performs an action at odds with the policies established by his employer. The customs official accepts money for a service that he was supposed to provide anyway. In the case where a company competes for a bid or seeks approval of a cost overrun, the approving manager pockets the money in violation of company policy and the company is shortchanged. In other words, if the money belongs to anyone, it belongs to the customer's company, not to the individual employee. In the typical case of high-level public sector bribery, the public official violates the public trust and his obligation to society in virtue of his role. Such policies may or may not be written down. Often they are explicit, but even where they are not, they usually reflect well-understood, implicit agreements binding the employee or official as agent to the interests of his employer or nation (the principal.) In short, even when not formally specified, such duties flow from well-understood microsocial contracts existing within the relevant economic community. But while this rationale shows one ethical problem with bribery, it is inconclusive. To begin with, it shows the ethical problem with accepting a bribe, but says nothing about offering a bribe. Has the person making the payment also committed an ethical error? Second, while violating a duty to an employer is one reason for considering an act unethical, why could this reason not be overridden by other reasons? Perhaps other microsocial contracts in the culture firmly endorse the ethical correctness of bribe giving and bribe taking. Perhaps these microsocial contracts, along with an employee's legitimate interest in supporting his family, etc., override the prima facie obligation of the employee to follow the policies of his employee. It makes sense to explore the further implications of ISCT. Violating an authentic norm Bribery is typically not an authentic norm. The mythology is that bribery is accepted where it flourishes. This image is badly distorted. Despite the data mentioned earlier that shows variance in how unethical various people regard bribery, that is to say, how it compares with other unethical activity, there is a surprising amount of agreement that bribery is unethical.
All countries have laws against the practice. This is a striking fact often over-looked by individuals that have something to gain by the practice. “There is not a country in the world,” writes Fritz Heimann, “where bribery is either legally or morally acceptable.” That bribes have to be paid secretly everywhere, and that officials have to resign in disgrace if the bribe is disclosed, makes it clear that bribery violates the moral standards of the South and the East, just as it does in the West” (Heimann, 1994). Some countries, even ones where the practice has flourished, not only outlaw it, but prescribe draconian penalties. “In Malaysia, which is significantly influenced by the Moslem prescriptions against bribery, execution of executives for the offense of bribery is legal” (Carroll and Gannon, 1997). In China in 1994, the President of the Great Wall Machinery and Electronics High-Technology Industrial Group Corp., Mr. Shen Haifu, was executed by a bullet to the back of his neck for bribery and embezzlement offenses. In 2000, several prominent Chinese officials were sentenced to death for bribery including the former vice-chair of the national legislature. Chinese academics and managers often speak of the great social cost incurred due to the current level of bribery. Under ISCT, this has the implication that even among a community of bribe payers, bribery cannot necessarily be established as an authentic norm. And, even when a norm can be found to exist among a set of bribe-soliciting public officials and bribe-paying global managers, it is never sufficient to consider just those communities. Instead, the norms of all communities affected by the bribes must be considered. The citizens who get overpriced, poor quality public services as a result of the bribes can be expected to hold an anti-bribery norm. Similarly, the owners of the organization victimized by the betrayal of its managers would oppose the practice or bribery. Under the priority rules set forth in ISCT, these anti-bribery community norms would be expected to have priority and to override the norms of the pro-bribery communities. In short, in many if not most instances, the necessary condition imposed by ISCT that the norm be authentic, i.e., that it is both acted on and believed to be ethically correct by a substantial majority of the members of a community, simply appears false. Further, whenever a bribery norm does satisfy the requirements for recognition as an authentic norm, it will be subject to being overridden by the anti-bribery norms of affected communities. To the extent that these expectations are true, most instances of bribery would fail the ISCT moral free space test. Hypernorm violation Even this last consideration, however, leaves a nagging doubt behind. In particular, is bribery only wrong because most people dislike it? Is there nothing more fundamentally wrong with bribery? Suppose, hypothetically, that the world came to change its mind over the next thirty years about bribery. Suppose that in some future state, a majority of people finds bribery to be morally acceptable? If so, would bribery be ethically correct? In such a world would reformers who spoke out against bribery be speaking illogical nonsense?
The answer to this question turns on the further question of whether a hyper-norm disallowing bribery exists. For if such a hypernorm existed, then no legitimate microsocial norm could support bribery, and, in turn, it would deserve moral condemnation even in a world whose majority opinion endorsed it. One can argue that high-level public sector bribery, in and of itself, violates a hypernorm (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999). Philip Nichols (1997) cites specific references from each of the world's major religions condemning bribery. “Corruption is condemned and proscribed,” he writes, “by each of the major religious and moral schools of thought. Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Sikhism, and Taoism each proscribe corruption. Adam Smith and David Ricardo condemned corruption, as did Karl Marx and Mao Tse Tung” (Nichols, 1997, pp. 321–2). Bribes have resulted in collapsing bridges and buildings, in the deaths of children from tainted drugs, and in the diversion of food intended for starving peoples. Many bribes have a direct negative effect on human well-being. In fact, a multicultural set of authors exploring the implications of ISCT explicitly identified a hypernorm condemning bribery (Fritzsche et al., 1995). However, the condemnation of coarse public sector bribery still leaves unresolved the status of many other forms of bribery, including private sector bribery and the many other permutations of public sector bribery. To deal with those, we now consider whether other hypernorms can be identified that condemn bribery. At least two hypernorms may be invoked in seeking a more fundamental condemnation of bribery. The first is obvious. To the extent that one places a positive, transnational value, on a right to political participation, large bribes of publicly elected officials damage that value. For example, when Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan in the 1970s bought planes from the American aircraft manufacturer Lockheed, after accepting tens of millions of dollars in bribes, people questioned whether he was discharging his duties as a public official correctly. In addition to the fact that his actions violated the law, the Japanese citizenry was justified in wondering whether their interests, or Tanaka's personal political interest, drove the decision. Implicit in much of the political philosophy written in the Western world in the last three hundred years, in the writings of Rousseau, Mill, Locke, Jefferson, Kant, and Rawls, is the notion that some transcultural norm supports a public claim for the citizenry of a nation state to participate in some way in the direction of political affairs. Many - see, for example, Shue (1980), Donaldson (1989) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – have discussed and articulated the implications of this right in current contexts. If such a right exists, then it entails obligations on the part of politicians and prospective bribe givers to not violate it. In turn, large-scale bribery of highly elected public officials - the sort that the Lockheed Corporation engaged in the 1970s - would be enjoined through the application of a hypernorm. It would, hence, be wrong regardless of whether a majority of the members of an economic community, or even the majority of the world's citizens, endorsed it. Notice, however, that the political participation hypernorm misses one kind of case. Suppose it is true that large-scale pay-offs to public officials in democratic or quasidemocratic countries are proscribed by considerations of people's right to political participation. In such countries, bribery may defeat meaningful political rights. But many
countries in which bribery is prevalent are not democratic. Bribery in countries such as Zaire, Nigeria and China may nonetheless not have a direct effect on political participation by ordinary citizens that is directly repressed by authoritarian governments. Other troubling questions may be raised. How about much smaller pay-offs to public officials? And how about bribes not to public officials, but to employees of corporations? It seems difficult to argue that small, uniformly structured bribes to customs officials, or bribes to purchasing agents of companies in host countries, seriously undermine the people's right to political participation. These questions prompt the search for yet another hypernorm relevant to the issue of bribery. A second hypernorm does appear relevant to the present context. It is what we have called the economic hypernorm of “necessary social efficiency.” That hyper-norm requires that economic agents utilize resources efficiently concerning goods in which their society has a stake (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999, pp. 139–73). The hypernorm arises because all societies have an interest in husbanding public resources, developing strategies to promote aggregate economic welfare and, in turn, of developing efficiency parameters to do so. These we have called in TIES “N-Strategy Efficiency Parameters.” Like mathematical parameters, they help determine the specific form of the N-Strategy function but not its general nature. Efficiency parameters resemble N-Strategies in sometimes being formal, and at other times informal. Formal and informal proscriptions on bribery may be viewed as informal efficiency parameters. Indeed, nations and NGOs who oppose bribery most commonly cast their opposition in terms of the damage that bribery does to the economic efficiency of the nation state. This raises an obvious question: Is bribery inefficient? Certainly if it is inefficient, the economic consequences must be significant in light of the sheer amount of money involved. While it is impossible to determine the current, precise level of corrupt bribery, one estimate by the World Bank placed the total amount of bribery involved in international trade at $80 billion per year (Walsh, 1998). What is more, a recent World Bank survey of 3600 firms in 69 countries found that 40 percent of businesses pay bribes (Omestad et al., 1997). In industrial countries 15 percent of businesses were found to pay bribes, but in the former Soviet Union this figure jumps to over 60 percent (Omestad et al., 1997). Corruption is inefficient for identifiable reasons. First, it limits the ability of governments to perform vital functions and may even threaten overall governmental effectiveness. The Financial Times reported that “deep corruption [in China] is corroding the exercise of state power” (Kynge, 1997). Falsified accounts to cover up corruption have had the effect of rendering China's official statistics “virtually meaningless” (ibid). In Ecuador, it is estimated the government could pay off its foreign debt in five years if corruption was brought under control. It is estimated that corruption costs the country $2 billion every year (Transparency International). And in Argentina, corruption in the customs department defrauded the government out of $3 billion in revenues: Officials estimated
that 30 percent of all imports were being under-billed and approximately $2.5 billion of goods were brought into the country under the guise of being labeled “in transit” to another country, thus illegally avoiding import taxes altogether (Argentines Give Import to Fraud Crackdown, Financial Time London, 3 December 1997, p. 5.). Corruption also influences government spending, moving it out of vital functions such as education and public health, and into projects where public officials can more easily extract bribes (Mauro, 1998). The personal financial gains secured by corrupt public officials explain why these problems persist. In Mexico, suspicions surround the ability of Raul Salinas, the brother of former President Carlos Salinas, to amass a fortune of over $120 million while a public official (Walsh, 1998). Two former presidents of South Korea were convicted of developing a fund of over $900 million while they were in office in the 1980s and 1990s (Guggenheim, 1996). At the local level, in Grenoble, France, the city mayor was convicted for personally receiving $1.8 million in 1989 while selling the city water system. Corruption imposes tremendous costs on business. While American companies complain of lost contracts due to the FCPA, other countries complain of the bribes their firms must pay to obtain those contracts. For example, German companies are estimated to pay an aggregate of over $3 billion in bribes to obtain business contracts abroad (Guggenheim, 1996). In certain countries, the costs of doing business due to bribes significantly impair the ability to make a profit. In Indonesia, it is estimated that 20 percent of business costs are bribes to bureaucrats (Honest trade: ‘A global war against bribery’, Economist, 16 January 1999, p. 22.) In Albania, approximately one-third of potential profits are lost to bribe payments (ibid). As the economist Kenneth Arrow noted years ago, “a great deal of economic life depends for its viability on a certain limited degree of ethical commitment” (Arrow, 1973, p. 313). To the extent that market participants bribe, they interfere with the market mechanism's rational allocation of resources, and their actions impose significant social costs. When people buy or sell on the basis of price and quality, with reasonable knowledge about all relevant factors, the market allocates resources efficiently. The best products relative to price, and, in turn, the best production mechanisms, are encouraged to develop. But when agents accept defective goods or pay more than they have to in order to divert money into personal pockets, the entire market mechanism is distorted. By misallocating resources, bribery damages economic efficiency (Sen, 1997). As economists Bliss and Di Tella (1997) note, “Corrupt agents exact money from firms.” Corruption affects, they observe, the number of firms in a free entry equilibrium, and in turn increases costs relative to profits. In contrast, “the degree of deep competition in the economy increases with lower overhead costs relative to profits; and with a tendency toward similar cost structures.” Corruption can even be shown to exact a cost on additional social efforts to improve economic welfare, including industrial policy initiatives (Ades and Di Tella, 1997), and on predictability in economic arrangements.
Bribery, then, is objectionable on both moral and economic grounds. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that practical solutions to problems of bribery are notoriously difficult to implement, and usually involve a shift of focus to deeper levels of society. At the precise level at which most managers confront bribery, bribery eludes a fully satisfactory solution. This is because from the standpoint of an individual manager working in some global regions, refusing to bribe can mean losing business. Sales and profits are typically lost to the more unscrupulous companies, and the unethical company benefits at the expense of the more ethical company. Indeed, both the ethical company and the ethical individual are victims. (Of course, companies mitigate the damage to employees caught in this bribery trap when they communicate clear policies, and when they support employees who follow those policies.) A fully satisfactory answer, hence, lies not at the level where individuals face bribery, but at deeper levels, i.e., at the level of the firm, the competitive environment, and ultimately, the host country's background institutions. Many theorists argue that such deeper, institutional reform entails a narrowing of the dramatic gap that now exists between civil servant and private sector pay, a new mindset or “social contract” among government officials and corporate managers, and a toughening of the sanctions designed to ensure legal compliance in host countries. In short, the practical solution to bribery demands changes in social and economic structures so as to facilitate a more level playing field that aligns incentives away from rather than toward long-standing practices of bribery.
Conclusion In this chapter, we have identified the three tools that ISCT provides for analyzing the complex phenomenon of bribery. First, ISCT's concept of a microsocial contract has application directly to the act of accepting a bribe. When applied, it becomes obvious that most acts of bribery violate one of the legitimate microsocial norms that specify the duties of the agent, i.e., duties of the bribe recipient to the principal, that is, to the employing body such as the government or a private company. Second, ISCT's distinction between authentic v. inauthentic norms in microsocial contracts reveals that most microsocial norms allowing bribery are not authentic norms. Finally, ISCT's concept of a “hypernorm” shows that bribery usually violates at least one of two distinct hypernorms, namely, the universal right to political participation, and the economic hypernorm of “necessary social efficiency.” 1
Much of this section is derived from Thomas Donaldson and Thomas W. Dunfee, 2001, Précis for: Ties that bind. Business and Society Review, 105 (4), 436–43. 2
Much of this section is derived from David Hess and Thomas Dunfee, 2001, Fighting corruption: A principled approach: The C2 principles (combating corruption). Cornell International Law Journal, 33 (3), 593–626.
References
Ades, A. and Di Tella, R. 1997: National champions and corruption: some unpleasant interventionist arithmetic . Paper presented at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. Arrow, K. J. 1973: Social responsibility and economic efficiency . Public Policy , (3) (21), 300 17. Bliss, C. and Di Tella, R. 1997: Does competition kill corruption Paper presented at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. Carroll, S. J. and Gannon, M. J. 1997: Ethical Dimensions of International Management . Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage . Donaldson, T. 1989: The Ethics of International Business . New York: Oxford University Press . Donaldson, T. and Dunfee, T. 1994: Towards a unified conception of business ethics: Integrative social contracts theory . Academy of Management Review , (19) (2), 252 84. Donaldson, T. and Dunfee, T. 1999: Ties that Bind: A Social Contract Approach to Business Ethics . Harvard University Business School Press . Frederick, W. C. 1991: The moral authority of transnational corporate codes . Journal of Business Ethics , (10) (3), 165 77. Fritzsche, D. J., Hou, P. Y., Sugai, S. and Dun-Hou, S. 1995: Exploring the ethical behavior of managers: A comparative study of four countries . Asia Pacific Journal of Management , (12) (2), 37 61. Guggenheim, K. 1996: Corruption, not revolutions or coups, topples governments these days , L.A. Times, October 6, sec. A , p. 4. Heimann, F. F. 1994: Should foreign bribery be a crime Transparency International , (2) . Hofstede, G. 1980: Culture's Consequences . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage . Kluckhorn, C. 1955: Ethical relativity: Sic et non . Journal of Philosophy , (52) , 663 77. Kynge, J. 1997: China uncovers falsified accounts in state groups , Financial Times (London), Wednesday, December 24, p. 7. MacDonald, G. M. 1988: Ethical perceptions of Hong Kong/Chinese business managers . Journal of Business Ethics , (7) , 835 45. Mauro, P. 1998: Corruption: Causes, consequences, and agenda for further research . Finance & Development , (35) (1), 11 14. Nichols, P. M. 1997: Outlawing transnational bribery through the World Trade Organization . Law and Policy in International Business . (28) (2), 305 86. Omestad, T., Hurtey, M., Lovgren, S., Palmer, C. C. B. and Cunningham, V. 1997: Byebye to bribes: The industrial world takes aim at official corruption . US News & World Report , December 22, 22. Sen, A. 1997: Economics, business principles, and moral sentiments . Business Ethics Quarterly , (7) (3), 5 15. Shue, H. 1980: Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press . Tsalikis, J. and LaTour, M. S. 1995: Bribery and extortion in international business: Ethical perceptions of Greeks compared to Americans . Journal of Business Ethics , (4) , 249 65. Tsalikis, J. and Wachukwu, O. 1991: A comparison of Nigerian to American views of bribery and extortion in international commerce . Journal of Business Ethics , (10) (2), 85 98.
Turner, C. H. and Trompenaars, A. 1993: The Seven Cultures of Capitalism . New York: Doubleday . Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948: Reprinted in T. Donaldson and P. Werhane, (eds) (1979). Ethical Issues in Business ; 252 5. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall . Walsh, J. 1998: A world war on bribery . TIME , June 22, 16. Walzer, M. 1994: Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad . Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press .
Further Reading Simons, Marlise, 1996: U.S. enlists rich nations in move to end business bribes, N.Y. Times, 12 April, see. A, p. 10 . Transparency International. Corruption Reports.
Chapter 3. Untangling the Corruption Knot: Global Bribery Viewed through the Lens of Integrative Social Contract Theory Thomas W. Dunfee and Thomas J. Donaldson Subject Business and Management Ethics » Applied Ethics Key-Topics social issues, theory DOI: 10.1111/b.9780631221234.2001.00004.x
Global managers often must navigate the perplexing gray zone that arises when two cultures - and two sets of ethics - meet. Consider these two scenarios:
• Competing for a bid in a foreign country, you are introduced to a “consultant” who offers to help you in your client contacts. A brief conversation makes it clear that this person is well connected in local government and business circles and knows your customer extremely well. The consultant will help you to prepare and submit your bid and negotiate with the customer … for a substantial fee. Your peers tell you that such arrangements are normal in this country - and that a large part of the consulting fee will go directly to staff people working for your customer. Those who have rejected such help in the past have seen contracts go to their less-fussy competitors. • A developing country in Africa solicits bids for a dam on a major river. Your firm submits a bid based on your substantial experience in building similar
structures. The contract is awarded to an Indonesian firm having little experience in building the type of dam required. You suspect that a bribe has been paid to the government official in charge of awarding the contract. You later hear that the winning proposal involves substandard materials and design. You genuinely believe that the dam is likely to collapse in the future and cause great loss of life. What should you do in such cases? “Bribery is just like tipping,” some people say. “Whether you tip for service at dinner; or, bribe for the benefit of getting goods through customs - you pay for a service rendered.” But while many of us balk at a conclusion that puts bribery on a par with tipping or that suggests we should violate our personal values when in another culture, we cannot say why. In the case of the African dam, one appears to confront a choice among evils. If one does nothing, the contract will go to a less qualified bidder, and even worse, the lives of people living near the dam may be endangered. But if one complains, it not only seems like sour grapes, but by exposing the corruption, one risks endangering the representatives of one's firm. Ultimately can there be any solution to such problems? This chapter describes a systematic way to think through the problems of bribery and its possible responses. In order to untangle the corruption knot, we will show how to apply two key concepts from the “social contracts” approach we develop at length in our book, Ties That Bind (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999). We focus on bribery as part of the international issue of corruption because of its enormous importance in today's global business environment. Further, we believe that public attitudes about bribery are changing, making matters even more challenging for beleaguered managers facing the temptation of bribery. Academics, public policy makers, officials of public international organizations, and corporate managers all must consider the full implications of widespread global bribery. But we also focus on bribery for the practical reason that our space in this book is limited, and we believe that treating one global ethics topic well is preferable to treating many badly.1
Integrative Social Contracts Theory We wrote the book, Ties that Bind, out of our conviction that answering today's questions require a new approach to business ethics, one that exposes the implicit understandings or “contracts” that bind industries, companies, and economic systems into moral communities. It is in these economic communities, and in the often unspoken understandings that provide their ethical glue, that we believe many of the answers to business ethics quandaries lie. Further, we think that answering such questions requires the use of a yet deeper, and universal “contract” superseding even individual ones. The theory that combines both these deeper and thinner kinds of contracts we label “Integrative Social Contracts Theory,” or “ISCT” for short. ISCT does not overturn popular wisdom. While it asserts that the social contracts that arise from specific cultural and geographic contexts have legitimacy, it acknowledges a limit to that legitimacy. It recognizes the moral authority of key transcultural truths, for example, the idea that human beings everywhere are deserving of respect. The social
contract approach we detail holds that any social contract terms existing outside these boundaries must be deemed illegitimate, no matter how completely subscribed to within a given economic community. In this sense, all particular or “micro” social contracts, whether they exist at the national, industry, or corporate level, must conform to a hypothetical “macro” social contract that lays down moral boundaries for any social contracting. ISCT thus lies midway on the spectrum of moral belief, separating relativism from absolutism. It allows substantial “moral free space” for nations and other economic communities to shape their distinctive concepts of economic fairness, but it draws the line at flagrant neglect of core human values. ISCT is derived from a thought experiment in which rational contractors are assumed to rely upon a limited set of core assumptions in framing their search for a common economic ethics, where “economic ethics” refers to the principles establishing the boundaries of proper behavior in the context of the production and exchange of goods and services. These are as follows:
• All humans are constrained by bounded moral rationality. This means that even rational persons knowledgeable about ethical theory cannot always divine good answers to moral problems without being acquainted with community-specific norms. • The nature of ethical behavior in economic systems and communities helps determine the quality and efficiency of economic interactions. Higher quality and more efficient economic interactions are preferable to lower quality and less efficient economic interactions. • All other things being equal, economic activity that is consistent with the cultural, philosophical, or religious attitudes of economic actors is preferable to economic activity that is not.
In virtue of these three propositions, we argue further that individual contractors would desire the option to join and to exit economic communities as a means of leveraging their ability to achieve the benefits of either greater efficiency or greater compatibility with preferred religious, philosophical, or community norms. The hypothetical members of the global economic community would be capable of considering which norms would be best to guide all business activity in a way that achieves fairness. In this hypothetical state of nature, we argue that such rational global contractors would agree to the following de minimis macro-social contract setting the terms for economic ethics:
1 Local economic communities have moral free space in which they may generate ethical norms for their members through microsocial contracts. 2 Norm-generating microsocial contracts must be grounded in consent, buttressed by the rights of individual members to voice and exit.
3 To become obligatory (legitimate), a microsocial contract norm must be compatible with hypernorms. 4 In cases of conflicts among norms satisfying macrosocial contract terms 1–3, priority principles must be established through the application of rules consistent with the spirit and letter of the macrosocial contract.
Here are the ISCT priority principles, or “rules of thumb”:
1 Local community norms have priority unless adopting them harms members of another community. 2 Local community norms designed to resolve norm conflicts have priority unless adopting them harms members of another community 3 The more global the source of the norm, the greater the norm's priority. 4 Norms essential to the maintenance of the economic environment in which the transaction occurs have priority over norms potentially damaging to that environment. 5 Patterns of consistency among alternative norms add weight for priority. 6 Priority is given to well-defined norms over less well-defined ones.
Thus, under the approach delineated in ISCT, it is important to make use of hypernorms, or, in other words, universal principles applicable to all cultures and actions. Second, many problems dissolve when existing microsocial contracts found within relevant communities are carefully identified and proper priority is established among them.
Resolving Problems in Global Business Ethics: Is there Evidence for Microsocial Contracts and Moral Free Space? No one doubts that cultural differences abound in global business activities (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999, pp. 213–33). The deeper question is whether these differences imply different microsocial contracts for different cultures where members truly affirm authentic, legitimate norms that nonetheless conflict with those operating in other cultures. Might it be the case that in every instance of cultural difference, one side is invariably more “right” than the other? If so, the task of an international manager is simply to discover what the “right” norms are, and act accordingly. TIESs notion of the “microsocial contract” provides a tool for interpreting the significance of ethical differences, and it is a tool that we will use frequently in the remainder of this chapter. Kluckhorn (1955), Hofstede (1980), Turner and Trompenaars (1993) and many other management theorists have shown the importance of cultural differences to business - but the further issue of the ethical implications of many of these differences remains unexplored. For example, researchers have documented the importance of understanding the time sensitivity of the Swiss in contrast to the time laxity of South Americans, or the group orientation of the Japanese in contrast to the individualism of the Americans. To fail to understand such differences, modern managers realize, triggers missteps and
financial losses. But the importance of understanding ethical differences among cultures is much less well understood - a puzzling oversight, since ethical differences often have ringing consequences. On a positive note, the clearer picture of the significance of cultural differences slowly emerging during the last decade has shed light on ethical differences. In one study, for example, thousands of international managers around the world were asked this question: While you are talking and sharing a bottle of beer with a friend who was officially on duty as a safety inspector in the company you both work for, an accident occurs, injuring a shift worker. The national safety commission launches an investigation and you are asked for your evidence. There are other witnesses. What right has your friend to expect you to protect him? Three choices were offered as answers:
1 A definite right? 2 Some right? 3 No right?
Here the explicit ethical notion of a “right” and the implicit notion of the duties of friendship are in play. The results of the questionnaire were striking, with cultural patterns perspicuous. To cite only one set of comparisons, approximately 94 percent of US managers and 91 percent of Austrian managers answered “3,” i.e., “no right,” whereas only 53 percent of French and 59 percent of Singaporean managers did (Turner and Trompenaars, 1993). Surveys of international managers also show striking differences between cultural attitudes towards profit. When asked whether they affirmed the view that “The only real goal of a company is making profit,” 40 percent of US managers, 33 percent of British managers, and 35 percent of Austrian managers affirmed the proposition, in contrast to only 11 percent of Singaporean managers, and only 8 percent of Japanese managers selected (Turner and Trompenaars, 1993). Or, consider studies undertaken of the striking differences about everyday business problems. One study of Hong Kong managers revealed that Hong Kong managers rank taking credit for another's work at the top of a list of unethical activities, and, in contrast to their Western counterparts, rank it more unethical than bribery or gaining of competitor information. The same study showed that among Hong Kong respondents, 82 percent indicated that additional government regulation would improve ethical conduct in business, whereas only 27 percent of American respondents did (MacDonald, 1988).
Resolving Problems in Global Business Ethics: Is there Evidence for Universal Principles or “Hypernorms?”
Short of a relativism in which anything goes, making sense of bribery means separating better from the worse in global business practices. If blatant bribery is wrong everywhere, then some conceptual scheme appears necessary to declare it wrong. But is any moral scheme universally valid? Are there any hypernorms, i.e., universal moral principles, that can be used to separate better from worse? “Hypernorms” we define as “principles so fundamental to human existence that … we would expect them to be reflected in a convergence of religious, philosophical, and cultural beliefs” (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994, p. 265). As expressed by Walzer, such universal principles would be a thin “set of standards to which all societies can be held - negative injunctions, most likely, rules against murder, deceit, torture, oppression, and tyranny” (Walzer, 1994, p. 10). An obvious question, then, is how best to ascertain the existence and content of hypernorms. In TIES we describe the efforts of anthropologists, political scientists and philosophers, among others, who are searching for a convergence of beliefs and values at the global level. Scholars from many cultures and academic disciplines are asking similar questions about what humans commonly believe. A promising starting point, thus, would be an attempt to identify the extent of convergence among the convergence scholars themselves. Frederick (1991) studied six intergovernmental compacts (including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the Helsinki Final Act and the International Labour Organization's (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises) to identify principles common to the set. Similarly, one could look to the statements of global organizations as potential sources of hyper-norms. The Caux Principles developed by the Caux Round Table, a group of senior executives from Asia, Europe and North America who meet annually in Caux, Switzerland, are a prime example; so too is the document Towards a Global Ethic, produced by the Council for a Parliament of the World's Religions. From these and elsewhere, some promising samples of hypernorms can be drawn. Here are three candidates:
• Firms should adopt adequate health and safety standards for employees and grant employees the right to know about job-related health hazards (Frederick, 1991, p. 166). • You should not lie; speak and act truthfully (Toward a global ethic 1993: Chicago, IL: Council for a Parliament of World Religions, p. 11). • Businesses (should be expected to) honour their obligations in a spirit of honesty and fairness (Caux Round Table Principles for Business 1994: Washington, DC: Caux Round Table Secretariat, s. 2, Principle One).
Finally, there are shortcuts that managers can use to identify hypernorms for the purpose of making ethical decisions. As a first step a manager could look to the type of general references cited above. The explicit purpose of the “Caux Principles,” for example, is to provide guidance for practical business situations. Second, the manager could try to imagine the likely public response if the action being contemplated were to appear as the lead story on the international edition of CNN, or on the front page of the Financial
Times. This global version of the traditional local newspaper test may serve to encourage one to think in terms of whether actions might violate widespread understandings of right and wrong. A similar approach would be for a manager to ask herself whether or not the proposed action might be seen as violating an important tenet of one of the major world religions. Finally, a manager could ask a diverse set of peers whether a proposed course of action violates a global ethical principle. Hypernorms thus bound the moral free space of communities, and in this sense the approach of ISCT marries the familiar role of social norms within distinct communities with a conception of manifest universal principles. Let us next examine the perplexing problem of bribery and corruption in international business through the lens of ISCT.
Key International Issue: Corruption2 Corruption is widely condemned, but also widely practiced (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999, pp. 213–33). Some firms establish procedures to ensure that others do not bribe their employees, even as those same firms use bribes to obtain business. Surprisingly firms from countries where domestic corruption is minimal often play a major role as bribepayers into corrupt environments. Many explanations arise for these seemingly inconsistent acts. Companies' participation in some forms of corruption may stem from competitive necessity and the belief that by bribing they are respecting local cultural norms. Or, they may feel that they are being extorted by locals, who are the real culprits. Finally, they may throw up their hands, proclaiming their inability to control rogue employees. Despite such excuses, consensus is growing in many professional sectors, as well as in the general public, that something must be done about bribery. Hence, a confluence of factors has produced a changing environment in which corruption is now viewed as a key global problem. Consider three typical instances of sensitive payments. The first involves low-level bribery of public officials in some developing nations. In these nations it may be difficult for any company, foreign or national, to move goods through customs without paying low-level officials a few dollars. The payments are relatively small, uniformly assessed, and accepted as standard practice. Indeed, the salaries of such officials are sufficiently low that the officials require the additional income. One suspects the salary levels are set with the prevalence of bribery in mind. Or consider a second kind of bribery where a company competes for a bid in a foreign country, and where, to win the competition, a payment must be made, not as it happens to a government official, but to the employee of a private company. Nonetheless, in this instance, it is clear that the employee of the private company, instead of passing on the money to the company, will pocket the money. In a modified version of this scenario, the bribe may even happen one level deeper. For example, a company competing for a bid may be introduced to a “consultant” who offers to help in client contacts (see the example that begins this chapter). There are many variations of this kind of bribery, including one
where the payment is made to a senior manager for the approval of large, phantom, cost overruns incurred by the bribe-paying supplier. Third, and most significant, is bribery involving large sums of money paid to public sector officials for the granting of public works projects, or permissions to buy land or do business within the bribe receivers' country. It is not obvious at first blush what ISCT has to say about such scenarios, or where even to place the practices on an ISCT conceptual map. Do practices involving such payments reflect principles that count as ISCT “authentic norms?” Or, do the payments invariably turn out to be direct violations of hypernorms, and hence may be placed in the “illegitimate” arena of ISCT norms? Or, instead, does the making of bribes in places where they are common qualify as expressions of “moral free space?” Again, ethical views about business vary around the globe. Bribery is no exception. Not only does the incidence of bribery vary, but so too its perception as unethical. In one study, for example, modern Greeks perceived the actions in some bribery scenarios as being less unethical than Americans (Tsalikis and LaTour, 1995). In another, Hong Kong managers were shown to be somewhat less critical of bribery than their American counterparts (MacDonald, 1988). And Tsalikis and Wachukwu (1991) showed that ethical reactions to bribery vary, noting in particular that Nigerians perceive some bribery scenarios as more ethical than Americans. From the vantage point of ISCT, then, are there ethical problems with bribery? The answer is “yes,” as the following sections clarify: Violating a microsocial norm From the standpoint of the bribe recipient, the acceptance of a bribe usually violates a microsocial norm specifying the duties of the agent, i.e., the bribe recipient, to the principal, i.e., the employing body, such as the government, private company, etc. Perhaps the most obvious problem with bribery is that it typically involves the violation of a duty by the person accepting the bribe to the principal for whom that person serves as an agent. Note that in the cases described above, the bribe recipient performs an action at odds with the policies established by his employer. The customs official accepts money for a service that he was supposed to provide anyway. In the case where a company competes for a bid or seeks approval of a cost overrun, the approving manager pockets the money in violation of company policy and the company is shortchanged. In other words, if the money belongs to anyone, it belongs to the customer's company, not to the individual employee. In the typical case of high-level public sector bribery, the public official violates the public trust and his obligation to society in virtue of his role.
Such policies may or may not be written down. Often they are explicit, but even where they are not, they usually reflect well-understood, implicit agreements binding the employee or official as agent to the interests of his employer or nation (the principal.) In short, even when not formally specified, such duties flow from well-understood microsocial contracts existing within the relevant economic community. But while this rationale shows one ethical problem with bribery, it is inconclusive. To begin with, it shows the ethical problem with accepting a bribe, but says nothing about offering a bribe. Has the person making the payment also committed an ethical error? Second, while violating a duty to an employer is one reason for considering an act unethical, why could this reason not be overridden by other reasons? Perhaps other microsocial contracts in the culture firmly endorse the ethical correctness of bribe giving and bribe taking. Perhaps these microsocial contracts, along with an employee's legitimate interest in supporting his family, etc., override the prima facie obligation of the employee to follow the policies of his employee. It makes sense to explore the further implications of ISCT. Violating an authentic norm Bribery is typically not an authentic norm. The mythology is that bribery is accepted where it flourishes. This image is badly distorted. Despite the data mentioned earlier that shows variance in how unethical various people regard bribery, that is to say, how it compares with other unethical activity, there is a surprising amount of agreement that bribery is unethical. All countries have laws against the practice. This is a striking fact often over-looked by individuals that have something to gain by the practice. “There is not a country in the world,” writes Fritz Heimann, “where bribery is either legally or morally acceptable.” That bribes have to be paid secretly everywhere, and that officials have to resign in disgrace if the bribe is disclosed, makes it clear that bribery violates the moral standards of the South and the East, just as it does in the West” (Heimann, 1994). Some countries, even ones where the practice has flourished, not only outlaw it, but prescribe draconian penalties. “In Malaysia, which is significantly influenced by the Moslem prescriptions against bribery, execution of executives for the offense of bribery is legal” (Carroll and Gannon, 1997). In China in 1994, the President of the Great Wall Machinery and Electronics High-Technology Industrial Group Corp., Mr. Shen Haifu, was executed by a bullet to the back of his neck for bribery and embezzlement offenses. In 2000, several prominent Chinese officials were sentenced to death for bribery including the former vice-chair of the national legislature. Chinese academics and managers often speak of the great social cost incurred due to the current level of bribery. Under ISCT, this has the implication that even among a community of bribe payers, bribery cannot necessarily be established as an authentic norm. And, even when a norm can be found to exist among a set of bribe-soliciting public officials and bribe-paying global managers, it is never sufficient to consider just those communities. Instead, the norms of all communities affected by the bribes must be considered. The citizens who get
overpriced, poor quality public services as a result of the bribes can be expected to hold an anti-bribery norm. Similarly, the owners of the organization victimized by the betrayal of its managers would oppose the practice or bribery. Under the priority rules set forth in ISCT, these anti-bribery community norms would be expected to have priority and to override the norms of the pro-bribery communities. In short, in many if not most instances, the necessary condition imposed by ISCT that the norm be authentic, i.e., that it is both acted on and believed to be ethically correct by a substantial majority of the members of a community, simply appears false. Further, whenever a bribery norm does satisfy the requirements for recognition as an authentic norm, it will be subject to being overridden by the anti-bribery norms of affected communities. To the extent that these expectations are true, most instances of bribery would fail the ISCT moral free space test. Hypernorm violation Even this last consideration, however, leaves a nagging doubt behind. In particular, is bribery only wrong because most people dislike it? Is there nothing more fundamentally wrong with bribery? Suppose, hypothetically, that the world came to change its mind over the next thirty years about bribery. Suppose that in some future state, a majority of people finds bribery to be morally acceptable? If so, would bribery be ethically correct? In such a world would reformers who spoke out against bribery be speaking illogical nonsense? The answer to this question turns on the further question of whether a hyper-norm disallowing bribery exists. For if such a hypernorm existed, then no legitimate microsocial norm could support bribery, and, in turn, it would deserve moral condemnation even in a world whose majority opinion endorsed it. One can argue that high-level public sector bribery, in and of itself, violates a hypernorm (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999). Philip Nichols (1997) cites specific references from each of the world's major religions condemning bribery. “Corruption is condemned and proscribed,” he writes, “by each of the major religious and moral schools of thought. Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Sikhism, and Taoism each proscribe corruption. Adam Smith and David Ricardo condemned corruption, as did Karl Marx and Mao Tse Tung” (Nichols, 1997, pp. 321–2). Bribes have resulted in collapsing bridges and buildings, in the deaths of children from tainted drugs, and in the diversion of food intended for starving peoples. Many bribes have a direct negative effect on human well-being. In fact, a multicultural set of authors exploring the implications of ISCT explicitly identified a hypernorm condemning bribery (Fritzsche et al., 1995). However, the condemnation of coarse public sector bribery still leaves unresolved the status of many other forms of bribery, including private sector bribery and the many other permutations of public sector bribery. To deal with those, we now consider whether other hypernorms can be identified that condemn bribery.
At least two hypernorms may be invoked in seeking a more fundamental condemnation of bribery. The first is obvious. To the extent that one places a positive, transnational value, on a right to political participation, large bribes of publicly elected officials damage that value. For example, when Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan in the 1970s bought planes from the American aircraft manufacturer Lockheed, after accepting tens of millions of dollars in bribes, people questioned whether he was discharging his duties as a public official correctly. In addition to the fact that his actions violated the law, the Japanese citizenry was justified in wondering whether their interests, or Tanaka's personal political interest, drove the decision. Implicit in much of the political philosophy written in the Western world in the last three hundred years, in the writings of Rousseau, Mill, Locke, Jefferson, Kant, and Rawls, is the notion that some transcultural norm supports a public claim for the citizenry of a nation state to participate in some way in the direction of political affairs. Many - see, for example, Shue (1980), Donaldson (1989) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – have discussed and articulated the implications of this right in current contexts. If such a right exists, then it entails obligations on the part of politicians and prospective bribe givers to not violate it. In turn, large-scale bribery of highly elected public officials - the sort that the Lockheed Corporation engaged in the 1970s - would be enjoined through the application of a hypernorm. It would, hence, be wrong regardless of whether a majority of the members of an economic community, or even the majority of the world's citizens, endorsed it. Notice, however, that the political participation hypernorm misses one kind of case. Suppose it is true that large-scale pay-offs to public officials in democratic or quasidemocratic countries are proscribed by considerations of people's right to political participation. In such countries, bribery may defeat meaningful political rights. But many countries in which bribery is prevalent are not democratic. Bribery in countries such as Zaire, Nigeria and China may nonetheless not have a direct effect on political participation by ordinary citizens that is directly repressed by authoritarian governments. Other troubling questions may be raised. How about much smaller pay-offs to public officials? And how about bribes not to public officials, but to employees of corporations? It seems difficult to argue that small, uniformly structured bribes to customs officials, or bribes to purchasing agents of companies in host countries, seriously undermine the people's right to political participation. These questions prompt the search for yet another hypernorm relevant to the issue of bribery. A second hypernorm does appear relevant to the present context. It is what we have called the economic hypernorm of “necessary social efficiency.” That hyper-norm requires that economic agents utilize resources efficiently concerning goods in which their society has a stake (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999, pp. 139–73). The hypernorm arises because all societies have an interest in husbanding public resources, developing strategies to promote aggregate economic welfare and, in turn, of developing efficiency parameters to do so. These we have called in TIES “N-Strategy Efficiency Parameters.” Like mathematical parameters, they help determine the specific form of the N-Strategy function but not its general nature. Efficiency parameters resemble N-Strategies in sometimes being formal, and at other times informal.
Formal and informal proscriptions on bribery may be viewed as informal efficiency parameters. Indeed, nations and NGOs who oppose bribery most commonly cast their opposition in terms of the damage that bribery does to the economic efficiency of the nation state. This raises an obvious question: Is bribery inefficient? Certainly if it is inefficient, the economic consequences must be significant in light of the sheer amount of money involved. While it is impossible to determine the current, precise level of corrupt bribery, one estimate by the World Bank placed the total amount of bribery involved in international trade at $80 billion per year (Walsh, 1998). What is more, a recent World Bank survey of 3600 firms in 69 countries found that 40 percent of businesses pay bribes (Omestad et al., 1997). In industrial countries 15 percent of businesses were found to pay bribes, but in the former Soviet Union this figure jumps to over 60 percent (Omestad et al., 1997). Corruption is inefficient for identifiable reasons. First, it limits the ability of governments to perform vital functions and may even threaten overall governmental effectiveness. The Financial Times reported that “deep corruption [in China] is corroding the exercise of state power” (Kynge, 1997). Falsified accounts to cover up corruption have had the effect of rendering China's official statistics “virtually meaningless” (ibid). In Ecuador, it is estimated the government could pay off its foreign debt in five years if corruption was brought under control. It is estimated that corruption costs the country $2 billion every year (Transparency International). And in Argentina, corruption in the customs department defrauded the government out of $3 billion in revenues: Officials estimated that 30 percent of all imports were being under-billed and approximately $2.5 billion of goods were brought into the country under the guise of being labeled “in transit” to another country, thus illegally avoiding import taxes altogether (Argentines Give Import to Fraud Crackdown, Financial Time London, 3 December 1997, p. 5.). Corruption also influences government spending, moving it out of vital functions such as education and public health, and into projects where public officials can more easily extract bribes (Mauro, 1998). The personal financial gains secured by corrupt public officials explain why these problems persist. In Mexico, suspicions surround the ability of Raul Salinas, the brother of former President Carlos Salinas, to amass a fortune of over $120 million while a public official (Walsh, 1998). Two former presidents of South Korea were convicted of developing a fund of over $900 million while they were in office in the 1980s and 1990s (Guggenheim, 1996). At the local level, in Grenoble, France, the city mayor was convicted for personally receiving $1.8 million in 1989 while selling the city water system. Corruption imposes tremendous costs on business. While American companies complain of lost contracts due to the FCPA, other countries complain of the bribes their firms must pay to obtain those contracts. For example, German companies are estimated to pay an aggregate of over $3 billion in bribes to obtain business contracts abroad (Guggenheim, 1996). In certain countries, the costs of doing business due to bribes significantly impair
the ability to make a profit. In Indonesia, it is estimated that 20 percent of business costs are bribes to bureaucrats (Honest trade: ‘A global war against bribery’, Economist, 16 January 1999, p. 22.) In Albania, approximately one-third of potential profits are lost to bribe payments (ibid). As the economist Kenneth Arrow noted years ago, “a great deal of economic life depends for its viability on a certain limited degree of ethical commitment” (Arrow, 1973, p. 313). To the extent that market participants bribe, they interfere with the market mechanism's rational allocation of resources, and their actions impose significant social costs. When people buy or sell on the basis of price and quality, with reasonable knowledge about all relevant factors, the market allocates resources efficiently. The best products relative to price, and, in turn, the best production mechanisms, are encouraged to develop. But when agents accept defective goods or pay more than they have to in order to divert money into personal pockets, the entire market mechanism is distorted. By misallocating resources, bribery damages economic efficiency (Sen, 1997). As economists Bliss and Di Tella (1997) note, “Corrupt agents exact money from firms.” Corruption affects, they observe, the number of firms in a free entry equilibrium, and in turn increases costs relative to profits. In contrast, “the degree of deep competition in the economy increases with lower overhead costs relative to profits; and with a tendency toward similar cost structures.” Corruption can even be shown to exact a cost on additional social efforts to improve economic welfare, including industrial policy initiatives (Ades and Di Tella, 1997), and on predictability in economic arrangements. Bribery, then, is objectionable on both moral and economic grounds. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that practical solutions to problems of bribery are notoriously difficult to implement, and usually involve a shift of focus to deeper levels of society. At the precise level at which most managers confront bribery, bribery eludes a fully satisfactory solution. This is because from the standpoint of an individual manager working in some global regions, refusing to bribe can mean losing business. Sales and profits are typically lost to the more unscrupulous companies, and the unethical company benefits at the expense of the more ethical company. Indeed, both the ethical company and the ethical individual are victims. (Of course, companies mitigate the damage to employees caught in this bribery trap when they communicate clear policies, and when they support employees who follow those policies.) A fully satisfactory answer, hence, lies not at the level where individuals face bribery, but at deeper levels, i.e., at the level of the firm, the competitive environment, and ultimately, the host country's background institutions. Many theorists argue that such deeper, institutional reform entails a narrowing of the dramatic gap that now exists between civil servant and private sector pay, a new mindset or “social contract” among government officials and corporate managers, and a toughening of the sanctions designed to ensure legal compliance in host countries. In short, the practical solution to bribery demands changes in social and economic structures so as to facilitate a more level playing field that aligns incentives away from rather than toward long-standing practices of bribery.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have identified the three tools that ISCT provides for analyzing the complex phenomenon of bribery. First, ISCT's concept of a microsocial contract has application directly to the act of accepting a bribe. When applied, it becomes obvious that most acts of bribery violate one of the legitimate microsocial norms that specify the duties of the agent, i.e., duties of the bribe recipient to the principal, that is, to the employing body such as the government or a private company. Second, ISCT's distinction between authentic v. inauthentic norms in microsocial contracts reveals that most microsocial norms allowing bribery are not authentic norms. Finally, ISCT's concept of a “hypernorm” shows that bribery usually violates at least one of two distinct hypernorms, namely, the universal right to political participation, and the economic hypernorm of “necessary social efficiency.” 1
Much of this section is derived from Thomas Donaldson and Thomas W. Dunfee, 2001, Précis for: Ties that bind. Business and Society Review, 105 (4), 436–43. 2
Much of this section is derived from David Hess and Thomas Dunfee, 2001, Fighting corruption: A principled approach: The C2 principles (combating corruption). Cornell International Law Journal, 33 (3), 593–626.
References Ades, A. and Di Tella, R. 1997: National champions and corruption: some unpleasant interventionist arithmetic . Paper presented at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. Arrow, K. J. 1973: Social responsibility and economic efficiency . Public Policy , (3) (21), 300 17. Bliss, C. and Di Tella, R. 1997: Does competition kill corruption Paper presented at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. Carroll, S. J. and Gannon, M. J. 1997: Ethical Dimensions of International Management . Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage . Donaldson, T. 1989: The Ethics of International Business . New York: Oxford University Press . Donaldson, T. and Dunfee, T. 1994: Towards a unified conception of business ethics: Integrative social contracts theory . Academy of Management Review , (19) (2), 252 84. Donaldson, T. and Dunfee, T. 1999: Ties that Bind: A Social Contract Approach to Business Ethics . Harvard University Business School Press . Frederick, W. C. 1991: The moral authority of transnational corporate codes . Journal of Business Ethics , (10) (3), 165 77. Fritzsche, D. J., Hou, P. Y., Sugai, S. and Dun-Hou, S. 1995: Exploring the ethical behavior of managers: A comparative study of four countries . Asia Pacific Journal of Management , (12) (2), 37 61. Guggenheim, K. 1996: Corruption, not revolutions or coups, topples governments these days , L.A. Times, October 6, sec. A , p. 4. Heimann, F. F. 1994: Should foreign bribery be a crime Transparency International , (2) . Hofstede, G. 1980: Culture's Consequences . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage . Kluckhorn, C. 1955: Ethical relativity: Sic et non . Journal of Philosophy , (52) , 663 77.
Kynge, J. 1997: China uncovers falsified accounts in state groups , Financial Times (London), Wednesday, December 24, p. 7. MacDonald, G. M. 1988: Ethical perceptions of Hong Kong/Chinese business managers . Journal of Business Ethics , (7) , 835 45. Mauro, P. 1998: Corruption: Causes, consequences, and agenda for further research . Finance & Development , (35) (1), 11 14. Nichols, P. M. 1997: Outlawing transnational bribery through the World Trade Organization . Law and Policy in International Business . (28) (2), 305 86. Omestad, T., Hurtey, M., Lovgren, S., Palmer, C. C. B. and Cunningham, V. 1997: Byebye to bribes: The industrial world takes aim at official corruption . US News & World Report , December 22, 22. Sen, A. 1997: Economics, business principles, and moral sentiments . Business Ethics Quarterly , (7) (3), 5 15. Shue, H. 1980: Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press . Tsalikis, J. and LaTour, M. S. 1995: Bribery and extortion in international business: Ethical perceptions of Greeks compared to Americans . Journal of Business Ethics , (4) , 249 65. Tsalikis, J. and Wachukwu, O. 1991: A comparison of Nigerian to American views of bribery and extortion in international commerce . Journal of Business Ethics , (10) (2), 85 98. Turner, C. H. and Trompenaars, A. 1993: The Seven Cultures of Capitalism . New York: Doubleday . Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948: Reprinted in T. Donaldson and P. Werhane, (eds) (1979). Ethical Issues in Business ; 252 5. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall . Walsh, J. 1998: A world war on bribery . TIME , June 22, 16. Walzer, M. 1994: Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad . Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press .
Further Reading Simons, Marlise, 1996: U.S. enlists rich nations in move to end business bribes, N.Y. Times, 12 April, see. A, p. 10 . Transparency International. Corruption Reports.
Chapter 4. The Regulatory Context for Environmental and Workplace Health Protections: Recent Developments Carl Cranor Subject Business and Management Ethics » Applied Ethics
Key-Topics environment, health DOI: 10.1111/b.9780631221234.2001.00005.x
“[I]t is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of thing just so far as the nature of the subject admits….” Aristotle, Nichomachcan Ethics 1094b24–8 The legal environment for protecting employees and the general public from exposures to toxic substances has undergone substantial changes since 1980. The regulatory environment appears to be much more hospitable to businesses than it was before this date. In the present circumstances, firms can defend their cases before regulatory agencies or tort law courts to a large extent on the claim that there is not definitive evidence that possible toxicants have been shown to cause harm. This is the result of the paucity of scientific evidence that can be provided, the difficulty establishing such claims, the post-market burdens and standards of proof that must be met in the regulatory law and in torts, and the legal changes that have occurred during the last twenty years. As a consequence, employees in industries using toxic substances and the general public appear to be less well protected by the law than they once were and than they could be. This situation is not beyond redress, however. Courts have constrained agencies and district court judges both, demanding much greater scientific evidence in support of legal change. They could issue decisions that would recognize, in the spirit of Aristotle, that courts and agencies should only demand the degree of evidence and precision of support that is appropriate for the institution in question. Appellate courts could signal lower courts and agencies that they need not demand the most certain and best supported scientific evidence, if that would distort the aims of the legal institution in question. Were they to do this, courts by their decisions would provide greater workplace and public health protections consistent with reliable scientific judgments on which businesses could rely. Whether they will remains to be seen. In arguing for the above claims, I first review some of the legal institutions for regulating toxic substances, focusing on the tort law and then the administrative law. After introducing a framework for assessing these different areas of the law, I then consider how recent court decisions concerning the use of scientific evidence have modified these legal contexts.
Legal Framework for Regulating Toxic Substances The focus of this discussion is limited to the institutional protections for human health that might arise from exposure to toxic substances in the general environment – environmental health protections – and in the workplace – workplace health protections. Although citizens also seek protections from the degradation of the air, water, land, and
groundwater, as well as protections for wilderness areas and endangered species, I restrict this discussion to keep it manageable. As a further constraint, I focus on health harms or risks to human health arising from exposures to toxic substances, with carcinogens providing the main, but not the only example. This is hardly the whole of environmental health protections, but it provides enough of the main features of the regulatory environment in which businesses must work and some of the social and philosophical issues that arise therein to outline some of the main issues. The tort law The tort law aims to secure the rightful borders of our possessions and ourselves by making us whole should we suffer damage from others by their “crossing the borders” of our rights or our possessions. (Nozick, 1974) Typically, to bring a legal action and seek compensation for the injuries suffered, one must have suffered a legally compensable injury as a result of the violation of the law by another. Thus, one must show that another's conduct violated the law and that the violation caused the injuries in question. The aim is to restore the victim to the status quo ante before the injury occurred, to make the victim whole again. Although a plaintiff (the complaining party) typically must have been injured before having a right to legal redress, like the criminal law there are also less direct deterrence effects, such as discouraging similar conduct by others, as well as modifying the particular defendant's behavior. Both environmental and workplace health protections began mainly in the tort, or personal injury, law. The tort law of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century failed to provide much protection from workplace harms, however, because employers could defend themselves fairly easily against such claims. Progressive legislation of the 1920s and 1930s sought to replace the poorly functioning tort law with workers' compensation laws, but these, in turn, have not lived up to the promise they might have had at the outset. (McGarity and Shapiro, 1993). By the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was considerable political motivation for providing better workplace protections by means of different legal institutions. Just as early workplace health protections began with the tort law, so too did environmental health protections. While much current environmental legislation owes some of its structure and substance to tort law doctrines, here too, the tort law suffers from a number of shortcomings that undermine some of its effectiveness for “regulating” toxic substances that threaten human health (discussed below) (Rodgers, 1977). Suffice it to say at this point that the spate of federal and state environmental laws passed in the early 1970s addressing both workplace and general environmental protection were responses to the inadequacy of existing legal institutions at the time. Since the main institutions were the tort law, workers' compensation law and a few nascent regulatory laws, it was the failure of these – and perhaps largely the failure of torts – that led to a new era in environmental protection. Administrative law
Responding to the shortcomings of existing institutions, Congress (and state legislatures) ushered in a new era in the early 1970s by passing a wide range of administrative (or regulatory) laws. These aimed at remedying shortcomings of existing institutions and dealing better and more comprehensively with environmental problems. Administrative or regulatory laws are creations of a legislature, either state or federal. Legislatures pass such laws to cope with problems that are too particular and require too much detailed attention for a legislature itself to address. For example, a legislature might decide in broad outline that workplaces should not pose greater risks to health than those that exist for the wider non-working populations or that the populace should not be exposed to toxic substances through consumer products or environmental pollutants. However, a legislature is not well prepared to formulate and implement detailed exposure guidelines and regulations to address particular toxic substances. Thus, administrative agencies serve to carry out the general law and policies of a legislature under the guidance of the executive branch of government or under the guidance of an agency independent of the executive (so called “independent” agencies). Regulatory laws are explicitly preventive. They seek to protect our rights by preventing harms from materializing in the first place (typically to large numbers of people) by specifying in advance how certain activities must be done. They aim to provide prospective guidance compared with retrospective punishments or compensation for injuries victims suffer that are typical of the criminal or tort law, respectively. Congress first passes enabling legislation, authorizing the creation of an administrative agency or extending the authority of an existing agency to address the social problems of concern. In the early 1970s, the US Congress passed a number of laws aimed at protecting the people's health, either from environmental or workplace toxicants. These laws included, inter alia, Occupational Safety and Health Act [OSHA] (1970), the Clean Air Act (1970), the Clean Water Act (1972), the Consumer Product Safety Act (1972), the Safe Drinking Water Act (1976) and the Toxic Substances Control Act (1976), as well as significant amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (1972) and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (1968). Some laws (“premarket” laws) aim to intercept toxic substances before they enter commerce and endanger persons (TSCA, FIFRA, and the FDCA). The vast majority authorizes agencies to detect existing risks to the public from substances in the market or to employees in the workplace and to remove or reduce the risks before they materialize into harm (“postmarket laws”) (US Congress OTA, 1987). In creating administrative laws, Congress typically authorizes an agency to address a group of problems and conduct appropriate scientific inquiries to identify and remedy them, e.g., whether the problem is exposure to vinyl chloride, asbestos, or cotton dust in the workplace or exposure to contaminants in plastic bottles, in drinking water, or in rivers and streams. Once a problem and appropriate methods for addressing it have been identified, the agency has the authority to issue ca proposed regulation addressing it, e.g., reducing concentrations of asbestos or benzene in the workplace. Legislation normally
provides for a comment period during which an agency is obliged to hear and take comments from interested parties. Following this, it typically then issues a final regulation that has the force of law and can be enforced by the agency unless there is a legal challenge. Issuing a regulation by an agency is an act of creating law quite specific to the problem at issue. If the regulation is issued in accordance with procedures specified in the legislation (or in procedural statutes) and the regulation is not challenged by an affected party in an appellate court, it has the force of law. If the law is appealed either on grounds that it was created by means of invalid procedures or it is substantively flawed, then typically the legal appeals would have to be exhausted before it has the force of law. If the regulation, or a portion of it, is invalidated, then the invalid sections lose their legal force. The agency would then have to revisit the problem and reissue a regulation. The substantive legal provisions specifying the extent of risk permitted under the law implicitly establish a Congressionally enacted philosophy about the distribution of benefits and burdens from toxic substances and the costs of controlling them under the statute. In short, who bears the risks of uncertainty and what considerations, if any, outweigh potential risks from toxic substances are at least implicitly specified by the statute. Some have “no risk” provisions, e.g., portions of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act governed by the Delaney Clause. According to that, if a food additive causes cancer in humans or in appropriate animal tests, it is deemed “unsafe” and is not allowed as a food additive. Other statutes express different views. The Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to regulate risks from toxic air contaminants by issuing regulations that provide for an “ample margin of safety.” This may permit the EPA to issue “health-related standards” based upon ambiguous or incomplete data. Other statutes authorize risk-risk balancing – weighing the risk to human health from exposure to a regulated substance against the risk to human health from not having the substance in commerce – e.g. provisions for food additives under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act prior to 1958. Still others authorize risk-benefit balancing in the issuance of regulations, e.g., some provisions of the Toxic Substances Control Act. Finally, some statutes authorize agencies to use the “best practicable” or the “best available” technology to reduce exposures to potentially toxic substances, rather than aiming to clean up pollutants in the ambient air or water to a certain concentration level. In recent years some statutes have combined best available technology provisions with provisions aimed at cleaning up the ambient environment to some appropriate “safe” or “low risk” level (recent amendments to the Clean Air Act) (US Congress, OTA, 1987). These distributive views may be modified somewhat as the laws are implemented – as regulations are written, carried out, enforced, and adjudicated – although agencies cannot stray too far from the language of the statutes. As I discuss below, this distribution can also be affected by procedural requirements that are imposed on the amount of scientific evidence needed before regulation can occur under the statutes. The relationship between the tort and administrative law
Even though regulatory laws were enacted aiming to remedy shortcomings in the tort (and other) laws at the time, both regulatory and tort law have a role in “regulating and controlling” toxic substances. What the proper relationship between torts and the regulatory law should be is a complex one, raising political and moral philosophic issues, as well as issues of comparative institutional strengths and weaknesses. Of course, the actual relationship between the two areas of law is currently negotiated or settled by how the institutions in fact interact. These are products of court decisions, as well as political decisions that emanate from legislatures and regulatory agencies. And, there will be some flux in this as the law changes. Yet there are substantial philosophic issues in these debates, some of which I consider. Philosophic issues One major philosophic debate concerns the appropriateness and extent of governmental intervention in the lives of citizens and in the business marketplace. The tort law (along with the criminal law) tends to be favored over the use of regulatory law to protect people from toxic substances by those who emphasize the importance of liberty and freedom from governmental interference. This includes philosophic libertarians and perhaps some philosophic liberals. Philosophic libertarians elevate “the claim of individual freedom of action, and [ask] why state power should be permitted even the interference represented by progressive taxation and public provision of health care, education and a minimum standard of living” (Nagel, 1975). Furthermore, libertarians tend to have a negative view of governmental institutions. Libertarians tend to argue for use of the tort law rather than regulatory law. Regulatory law places constraints on people's lives and how they run their businesses in order to prevent harms and risks of harm to employees' or the general public's health, whereas the tort law permits interference with persons only if they actually invade the interests of and harm others. The tort law not only would be endorsed by libertarians, but it also fits well with a kind of atomistic view of society and the “invisible hand conception of the law.” This metaphor conveys the idea that individuals in society can take care of themselves acting in accordance with their own rights and conceptions of what they need; with protections for their rights they can fulfill these needs through the goods and services provided by the economic market. And they can take care of themselves through the tort law when they are injured by seeking [redress] from the wrongdoer.… [T]here is no need to address and no legal problem for the law to redress, unless and until someone has brought a complaint [of wrongful injury] before a court (Cranor, 1993). Libertarians represent one extreme on a spectrum from no or little government regulation of private activity aimed at preventing harm to others up to greater governmental
regulation. They tend to adopt an almost non-rebuttable presumption against governmental intervention except to compensate or punish others for harm inflicted. Libertarianism, however, is only as plausible as the normative foundations of it, which others have critiqued, but I cannot pursue (Nagel, 1975, p. 137). While libertarians emphasize the freedom from interference from others (including the government) as well as freedom to innovate and to develop new ideas, opponents of this extreme view call attention to the importance of other morally salient considerations that bear on the choice of institutions. Philosophic liberals advocate a rebuttable presumption for using the least governmentally intrusive means to protect citizens from harm (Schuck, 2000, p. 51). Moreover, since liberal theorists put high value on other goals, such as justice, or happiness, or culture, or security, or varying degrees of equality, they were prepared to curtail freedom in the interests of other values and, indeed, of freedom itself. For, without this, it was impossible to create the kind of association that they thought desirable. Consequently it is assumed … that the area of men's free action must be limited by law … [However], there ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal freedom which must on no account be violated; for if it is overstepped, the individual will find himself in an area too narrow for even that minimum development of his natural faculties which alone makes it possible to pursue, and even to conceive, the various ends which men hold good or right or sacred. It follows that a frontier must be drawn between the area of private life and that of public authority. Where it is to be drawn is a matter of argument, indeed of haggling (Berlin, 1997 [1969, p. 118]). This is, of course, a statement of classical liberalism in the tradition of J. S. Mill, but it does not take one very far. The issue that divides one liberal from another is the “haggling” over the proper scope of freedom, the tradeoffs of freedom versus other normative goals, and the appropriate role of public authority. In discussions concerning the proper role of the tort compared with regulatory law, this is often expressed in terms of a comparative institutional analysis with a normative basis provided by considerations of liberty, pursuit of happiness (expressed in some form of utilitarianism), protection from harm, some form of equality, or other normative considerations. Consider just one philosophic position that provides a rationale for more stringent health protections than would be provided by the tort law. This is the social contract view that owes its contemporary articulation to John Rawls. According to this political philosophy the principles of justice for guiding the fundamental institutions of a society are those that appropriately informed persons would agree to under fair conditions. Rawls and others have argued that in such conditions one of the principles to which such decision-makers would agree is a principle of fair equality of opportunity. Individuals have fair equality of opportunity if “those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them … have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system.…” (Rawls, 1971, p. 75). Since serious diseases and death undermine one's opportunities, this principle would authorize protections for people's
health by means of several different institutions as a means to securing their equal opportunity to pursue the good things of life. A background presupposition is that health protections have “normal functioning as a human being” as its goal. Thus, health protections, much like education, have great strategic importance in securing social opportunities. If persons contract diseases that lead to death, long-term illnesses, or especially debilitating conditions, such as cancer, reproductive diseases, birth defects, adverse neurological conditions, this will impair or undermine altogether their equality of opportunity in the community. Thus, it is not only inadequate to compensate people after the fact of disease to restore them to their previous normal functioning; on this account it is unjust not to take steps to prevent them from contracting easily preventable diseases in the first place. It is part of providing them fair opportunities equal to others in the community (Daniels, 1985). To secure persons fair equality of opportunity, one needs institutions that provide, inter alia, for public health, environmental cleanliness, preventive medical services, occupational health and safety, and food and drug protections (Daniels, 1985; Cranor, 1993, p. 170). Such institutions would seek to prevent the risks of disease from environmental and workplace exposures to toxic substances from materializing into harm. It is the resulting serious harm and debilitating or life-threatening diseases that undermine a person's fair opportunity in a community (although it is conceivable that concern about risks also poses problems). However, to prevent the harm from materializing, a community must take steps to reduce the risks of such harms to some low and appropriately fair level. And, this must be done in a more comprehensive and consistent way than the adventitious deterrence the tort law provides. That is, if one knows that exposure to asbestos or benzene will likely cause debilitating or life threatening diseases for persons, or that exposure to lead will lower the IQ in and lessen the brain function of children, these are cases for preventive intervention. Articulating the fair equality of opportunity principle helps to place in relief fundamentally different rationales for the tort and the regulatory law. The tort law is largely concerned with correcting wrongs done to others - making them whole again – justified mainly by a principle of corrective justice. The rationale for utilizing administrative laws is to prevent in a more comprehensive way the risks of disease from toxic substances from materializing into harms that undermine one's fair chances at the good things of life. Protecting health goes a long way toward preventing and correcting some of the inequities that may result from the bad luck of disease that may be induced by alterable social institutions or practices. This is especially true for humanly caused and preventable diseases that might result from firms or individuals not taking sufficient care in how they handle and control toxic substances or in not doing sufficient research into the harmful properties of substances. The above sketch of some moral and political rationales of different institutions are only part of a more extensive analysis of approaches to preventing workplace and environmental health harms from toxic substances. They can be augmented and deepened by comparing different institutional approaches to the problems.
Comparative institutional analysis On its face the tort law appears to be a woefully inadequate institution for addressing and “regulating” toxic substances, because ordinarily it requires that someone actually be harmed by exposure to a toxicant before there are legal grounds for legal intervention. Because it is retrospective, there are limited and uncertain prospective protections provided by the deterrent threat of a tort suit or by an actual finding of accountability. Nonetheless, there is some deterrent effect from torts, but how much is not entirely clear. A Rand Corporation study indicates that in product liability cases the tort law is far more protective than other areas of the law, including regulatory law (Eads and Reuter, 1983). For one thing, the small, poorly funded, Consumer Product Safety Commission, designed to provide some consumer protection, is relatively ineffective compared with larger environmental protection agencies, e.g., EPA, FDA, and OSHA. For another, there are special features of the consumer market that may enhance the effect of torts. Deterrence is substantially aided by the power of publicity and public opinion when a consumer product is identified as one likely to cause harms to others. For areas of our lives more hidden from public view, the tort law may not have such significant effects. Deterrence by the tort law results from the uncertainty posed by the possibility of sanctions in any given case. And the extent of deterrence may vary across the variety of state and federal jurisdictions, so there may not be uniform treatment from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This complicates business planning and undermines uniform protections for citizens in different jurisdictions. Moreover, there are, in general, several reasons specific to torts for thinking that this institution will not function very well to protect the public from exposures to toxic substances. Establishing a factual basis for a typical tort action is more difficult than establishing a factual basis for a regulatory action, which further complicates the deterrent effect. Most tort actions are not based upon the risk of injury, but upon concrete injuries or invasions of interests defendants caused particular plaintiffs. Moreover, a generalized showing that the substance in question causes the kind of harm from which the plaintiff suffered is not sufficient. The plaintiff must show that a particular defendant's action was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's particular harm. Thus, when tort actions involve toxic substances, evidence of injuries, which requires the use of scientific evidence, makes proof of injury more difficult. (This is developed further in the section on science and the law.) In addition, even if plaintiffs are successful in winning a suit and authorized to collect compensation for injuries suffered, the defendants may be judgment proof – unable to pay the compensation awarded. Thus, winning a suit does not ensure that the victim is made whole following an injury. It would be better for the community for firms to internalize the costs of prevention imposed by a regulatory agency than to risk the chance that firms would be judgment proof and victims would go uncompensated. Moreover, the tort law is atomistic; it addresses the harm that occurred and aims to restore the victims to the status quo ante. Ordinarily, it does not address in a
comprehensive way the circumstances that led to the harm. Rectification of those circumstances is left to the wisdom and self-interest of defendants. Further, it does not necessarily address all of those who might be in harms' way from the similar activities of other individuals, firms or whole industries. Many toxic substances result in diseases that have substantial latency periods before they materialize into harm – a significant time-delay between exposure to a substance and manifestation of disease in a way that can be clinically detected. This may be because the diseases progress via a biological mechanism that produces a disease slowly, such as cancer, or because their effects are multigenerational. Long latency periods complicate identification of cause and effect relationships. Additionally, risks from toxic substances tend to have low probabilities of materializing into harm, but when they do, many will have catastrophic consequences for individual victims, such as cancer or reproductive effects, or for the larger society (in the case of a nuclear meltdown or radioactive releases). Thus, toxic substances tend to present low probability, high consequence risks that materialize into harm for some. Some issues concerning torts can be deepened by utilizing a substantial review of the tort and administrative law by two legal scholars, Clayton Gillette and James Krier in 1990. They analyzed the functional ability of torts and regulatory law to reduce what they called “public risks” to an optimal level. Public risks are “manmade ‘threats to human health or safety that are centrally or mass-produced, broadly distributed, and largely outside the individual risk bearer's direct understanding and control”’ (Gillette and Krier, 1990, p. 1028). Such risks tend to result in harms that materialize and are diffusely “spread over many victims, so the costs to any one victim might be small even though the aggregate cost to the total victim population is very large.” Examples include harm from chemical additives, mass-produced vaccines, nuclear power plants, leakage and contamination in the disposal of nuclear wastes, the production of synthetic chemicals, which may be toxic, carcinogenic, mutagenic, or teratogenic (Gillette and Krier, 1990, p. 1029). (Of course, some harms can also be substantial to individual victims.) There are “structural features” of public risks that pose access barriers to plaintiffs successfully bringing a suit in the first place. Such risks reduce the chances that injured parties will identify the source of harm and decrease the odds that victims will identify a commonalty of interests between themselves and others injured by a particular exposure. Moreover, this can even be a problem for occupationally caused harms where people work at the same facility. As a result, some individual victims may be tempted to free ride on the collective good of a lawsuit brought by others. That is, [t]he characteristic diffuseness of public risks.… can mean small costs per victim notwithstanding large losses in the aggregate. From the individual litigant's perspective, a relatively small injury usually will not warrant the substantial costs associated with proving a case and recovering a judgment. The situation is aggravated by process
concerns, legal doctrines that complicate the plaintiff's job.… for example, the requirement of identifying a particular defendant who more probably than not caused the plaintiff's injury (Gillette and Krier, 1990, p. 1047). Thus, “public risk [tort] litigation is structurally biased against victim access. Victims who might wish to seek redress in the courts confront significant obstacles that diminish the incentive to sue.” As a consequence “public risk litigation is probably marked by too few claims and too little vigorous prosecution, with the likely consequence that too much public risk escapes the deterrent effects of liability.” “The producers of public risks will be inclined to overindulge, absent signals that align their self-interest with the larger social interest.… Because the signal emanating from the courts is thus weakened, there is likely to be too much public risk.” Consequently, “access bias, viewed in isolation, may make the expected value of the signal generated by court judgments too low … because the social costs they represent are not brought to bear on producer decision making” (Gillette and Krier, 1990, pp. 1054–6). However, access bias against plaintiffs is counterbalanced by process bias favoring plaintiffs. That is, if plaintiffs could overcome access biases and make it into court, then the procedural and substantive rules of the tort law as well as juries tended to favor plaintiffs. The end result, they argue is that there was probably not too much and not too little public risk that was within the proper scope of the tort law. Nonetheless, there remain the problems noted above with torts to help control exposures to toxic substances. With such limitations, it was not surprising that there was a political movement in the early 1970s to enact a number of laws that created or strengthened administrative agencies to address problems posed by toxic substances. Agencies administering premarket regulatory statutes hold out the promise of intercepting substances before any damage is done as the argument from the equality of opportunity principle suggests. Even agencies administering postmarket regulatory statutes have advantages over the tort law in terms of comprehensively addressing problems of toxic substances and providing reasonable protections for those affected. By relying on animal studies, not waiting for human deaths, agencies can accumulate information about which substances pose substantial risks of harm to humans and take preventive action before those risks materialize. However, not all is well with regulatory agencies despite appearances that they have advantages over the tort law. Administrative agencies require a permanent bureaucracy to investigate risks of harm, devise approaches to addressing them, write the regulations and enforce them. This is a social cost to which there may be philosophical or economic objections. Administrative approaches are subject to great political pressures in the legislative, rulemaking and rule applying processes. For example, since administrative law is a product of legislation, its creation is subject to all the political pressures that can be brought to bear by interest groups. And, the political pressure does not end with
legislation. Interpreting the statute, creating an agency, if that is needed, and then issuing regulations all are subject to similar pressures. And, as time passes there is a substantial risk of a regulatory agency being “captured” by the industries that it aims to regulate, which further reduces its effectiveness. In addition, recent presidential administrations and anti-regulatory Congresses have found other ways of frustrating the health protective intent of legislation. Presidential administrations have reduced agency budgets or subjected public health regulations to stringent review by the Office of Management and Budget in order to ensure that the regulations pass a “cost–benefit” analysis. Recent Congresses hostile to environmental health legislation have reduced funding for many of the agencies or tried to pass legislation to slow their activities by demanding more cost–benefit analysis of or “good science” in support of regulations. In political discussions the demand for “better science” in support of regulation has almost become a code word for slowing regulation. Moreover, when we return to Gillette's and Krier's analysis, they conclude that regulatory agencies have probably permitted too much public risk from toxic substances within their ambit. The public faces substantial access bias in the agencies because of the same free rider problems that plague torts, but without the personal motivation that exists in torts to bring problems of toxic substances to the attention of regulators. Regulated industries, by contrast, have substantial advantages in bringing their concerns to the agencies, since they are highly organized and have concentrated economic interests at stake. Finally, even if public risks did not have the structural features that create an imbalance of access to agencies, agency experts tend to view risks or acceptable risks much more like regulated industry than like the general public. As a consequence agency experts would regulate risks much more the way industry would than the general public would want. As Gillette and Krier correctly point out, there are simply different conceptions of [acceptable) risk at stake in these debates (Gillette and Krier, 1990; Cranor, 1995). Agencies and regulated industries tend to share one view, the broader, non-technically trained public another. Thus, even if all else were equal, from the public's point of view there would be too much risk from toxic substances. This failure, however, they argued in 1990 was to some extent countered by appellate court review of agency actions. Judges tended to review agency actions in a way that counterbalanced agency tendencies to allow too much risk from toxic substances. Thus, while agencies probably permitted too many risks from toxic substances, courts tended to require agencies to curtail them. On balance then, there was not an inappropriate amount of risk from toxic substances resulting from the interaction of agencies and the judiciary. Whether this balance remains, we consider below. The need for both torts and the regulatory law Even if agencies did not suffer from any of the political problems indicated above, there may be occasions when the regulations are simply not adequate to protect all those exposed, especially those who are particularly sensitive or vulnerable to the substance in
question. That is, agencies might not succeed in making regulations sufficiently protective, as occurred in several attempts to regulate asbestos, benzene, vinyl chloride, and arsenic (US Congress, OTA, 1987). Simply put, it can be difficult to craft regulations to protect all. Or sufficiently protective regulations may be simply too costly to implement compared with the importance of an industry to the economy. To the extent that administrative agencies fail to provide sufficient protection from toxicants and people are harmed as a result, there remains a need for the tort law to provide compensation to injured parties. Historically, the tort law served as an important backup to regulatory law in providing incentives for asbestos manufacturers and installers to provide better protections for those exposed to asbestos-bearing products. Anecdotal evidence in the mid-1980s suggested that tort law sanctions resulting from suits against pesticide manufacturers led to improved regulatory legislation from Congress to address protections from pesticide exposures. Moreover, even though there have been reasonably good regulatory protections from benzene, people continue to allege harm from it and seek tort law compensation (Chambers v. Exxon Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 66b 2000). The compensatory function of torts has helped to alert consumers and firms to some of the potential problems concerning low level exposures to potentially toxic substances, thus performing warning and deterrence functions. There are, thus, good reasons for having both a well-functioning tort system and a wellfunctioning regulatory system to provide protections from toxic substances. There have been, however, some legal developments that jeopardize both. In some areas of the law, where an agency has legal authority to address a substance and has done so, state or federal tort law courts may be precluded from hearing the cases of plaintiffs injured by the substance. In short, federal regulatory law may pre-empt the tort law (Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 US 504, 1992). This has become more prevalent in recent years. When preemption occurs, if regulatory agencies have not done their jobs in protecting the public and there is no redress available through the tort law, any victims of exposure to toxic substances may simply be out of luck.
The Interaction of Science and Law in Regulating Toxic Substances The above issues existed and shaped the interaction between torts and regulatory law before some comparatively recent legal developments concerning the use of scientific evidence in the law. These decisions have had a substantial impact on the efficacy of these legal institutions and their interactions. In addressing public health issues that arise from toxic substances, scientific information is critical. [E]nvironmentally-caused harms pose … complex problems, because the causal agents typically are invisible, operate by obscure mechanisms, are difficult to trace and result in
diseases or other injuries which [may] have long latency periods before they are manifested. Thus, the causal mechanisms tend to be obscure, unlike those we associate with the grosser forms of harm about which we are usually concerned [in the tort law]. Moreover, an environmentally-caused harm typically is a disease, impairment of health or incapacitation that is indistinguishable from diseases or incapacities with quite different etiologies. That is, except in rare cases the environmental cause does not leave a “signature.” … Finally, … [many] scientific fields that might permit us to discover and accurately assess the risks from toxic substances are in their infancy (Cranor, 1997, p. 137). As a result, detecting, identifying and substantiating the harms in question involves subtle, time-consuming scientific detective work and, often, molecular investigations. These facts about the need for scientific evidence and the difficulties of providing it overlay the preceding discussion concerning the features of different legal institutions to regulate toxic substances. The use of scientific evidence in both areas of law was substantially influenced, and, I would argue, complicated by US Supreme Court decisions in the last two decades. Moreover, political uses of science have complicated the debates about comparative institutional advantages. Before 1980, regulatory agencies were given a great deal of discretion by appellate courts in deciding how to regulate and how much scientific support had to be provided for regulations. Before 1993, parties to tort disputes had considerable discretion in presenting expert witnesses. And, federal judges had considerable latitude in admitting or excluding evidence in toxic tort cases that came before them. (Of course, there were some limitations on how much they could control the presentation of evidence in cases at the bar, but much of this changed in 1993.) In 1980, a US Supreme Court decision – the Benzene case Industrial Union, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 US 6007 1980 – ruled invalid a regulation issued by the OSHA (that reduced exposure to benzene in the workplace) largely because there was insufficient empirical scientific substantiation of the regulation. In Daubert v. Merrill-Dow Pharmaceutical (509 US 579 1993), the Supreme Court issued a ruling concerning the role of federal trial court judges in admitting scientific evidence and scientific expert testimony in toxic tort cases. In each instance, the courts had choices in how they approached the issues and in each case there are, I believe, problems with the decisions. The background of the two different decisions by the Supreme Court 13 years apart was quite different. In the Benzene case a plurality insisted that the OSHA must find on the basis of empirical evidence that there is a “significant risk” to employees at current exposure levels and that it is more likely than not that the risk will be substantially reduced at proposed exposure levels in its regulation. It must rely more on documented empirical findings and less on policy judgments or scientific assumptions in reaching conclusions about permissible exposure levels to toxic substances. Moreover, the Court and the agency had legitimate disagreements in interpreting the legislation authorizing
OSHA's regulations. The court's view is final. This was a controversial decision; nearly half the court believed that OSHA had sufficient legislative and constitutional discretion to continue to regulate as it had without the added burden of considerably more scientific documentation for its regulations. In Daubert, the Court's unanimous decision came against a different back-ground. Individual litigants in a toxic tort suit must provide their own scientific experts to testify to the plausibility of the scientific support for their position. The quality of such experts and the quality of scientific evidence in support of their testimony can vary considerably. The plaintiffs' bar has been particularly criticized for such practices, but a poor scientific foundation for one's claims is not restricted to plaintiffs. In some cases – and there is only anecdotal evidence – litigants' experts' foundation for their testimony was probably not well supported by defensible scientific evidence. In Daubert itself, while early scientific studies suggested that the anti-morning sickness drug Bendectin caused shortened limb birth defects, subsequent studies, generated by the litigation, failed to find sufficient support for that claim to pass judicial scrutiny of the scientific evidence. Ultimately few plaintiffs' cases were successful. A second example concerns silicon breast implants that were alleged to cause systemic autoimmune disorder. Marcia Angell, editor of the New England journal of Medicine, claimed that the experts in those cases did not have a sound scientific basis for their testimony Scientific testimony in the courtroom is often at most only marginally related to scientific evidence.… [T]oo often [experts] are merely adding a veneer to a foregone, selfinterested conclusion. Sometimes they spin theories that they say are supported by their expertise or experience. Or they may refer vaguely to research. Very often, however, the “research” is their own and it is unpublished and unavailable. The point is that they are not required to produce their evidence, and they usually do not. The result is a growing gap between scientific reality and what passes for it in the courtroom. The Daubert decision was a brave step toward remedying the situation, but it was not enough (Angell, 1996). That some individual litigants were using experts whose testimony was not well grounded in science is quite different from the activities of federal agencies whose peerreviewed science and policy decisions (made in light of the purposes of the statute) guided regulations. Agencies were utilizing respectable science of the time together with policy considerations that are legitimate under the legislation to support regulations. However, it is arguable that the appellate courts in both the tort and regulatory cases perceived that when legal decisions are based on scientific claims, they should be founded on better evidence. Certainly, some commentators have advocated such a view for a number of years. The Daubert court explicitly argued that expert testimony must be reliable and based upon the scientific method. The Benzene court argued that OSHA must base its decisions more on scientific findings and less on scientific assumptions, safety
factors and policy decisions (although agencies may continue to utilize such considerations). A more implicit message may have been that both regulatory agencies and toxic tort litigants were intruding too much into the business of American business. Some on the Benzene court explicitly articulated this view, arguing that OSHA was out of control, imposing too great a burden on American businesses by its regulations. Thus, some justices sought to exert greater control over OSHA (and perhaps implicitly on other agencies) by utilizing a strong misreading of the legislation and by imposing some evidentiary and scientific constraints on OSHA's basis for legislation. The Daubert Court did not explicitly make such a point, although the Court in a subsequent decision came quite close to making this point. (General Electric v. joiner, 522 US 136, 1997) The effect of the Benzene decision on the requirements for scientific evidence in regulatory law Typically, when an agency regulation is issued it will be upheld by appellate courts unless the agency acted “arbitrarily or capriciously” in issuing it. (A few agencies are reviewed under a different standard.) Agencies have this scope of discretion on the theory that there are a variety of approaches to the problem, that agency personnel better understand the issues and thus are better able than an appellate court to evaluate plausible approaches. Moreover, a presidential administration should be able to have the flexibility to pursue its political objectives in implementing laws passed by Congress. The Benzene case ushered in a requirement for more detailed scientific support for regulation in the form of empirically based risk assessment, and perhaps was an early warning of a concern about the costs of regulations. On its face, this does not seem unreasonable. After all, should not government decisions rest on scientifically sound findings? It is arguable, however, given agency reactions to the Benzene case and agency interpretations of it, that it had a substantial chilling effect on regulatory activity by OSHA and other federal agencies, greatly slowing their activities and perhaps discouraging them from issuing more health-protective regulations (discussed below). The Benzene case could have been decided differently. Minimal changes in this highly visible and influential decision could easily have made quite a difference in the regulatory context and led agencies to issue, and reviewing courts to permit, much more health-protective regulations than has subsequently tended to be the case. The Court could have permitted the regulation to stand. OSHA had reasonably good evidence that benzene was a carcinogen and took preventive steps within its authority to protect employees' health, given the scientific evidence that was available in 1978. (It now appears that the proposed 1978 exposure standard of 1 ppm benzene over an eight-hour period might have been too high by a factor of five or ten. (Infante, 1992)) Another possibility is that the Court could have selected different aspects of the statute to emphasize in its ruling, such as the fact that OSHA is required to protect workers from “material impairment of health or functional capacity” even if they are exposed to a toxic substance for a “working lifetime” and that Congress recognized that OSHA must work
at the “frontiers of scientific knowledge.” Either of these would have argued for a more health-protective and discretion-recognizing interpretation of the statute. The Benzene decision greatly increased the legal pressure on agencies to perform detailed, scienceintensive risk assessments in support of regulations. This arguably has resulted in many fewer substances being considered for regulation by OSHA or by other agencies. OSHA has also almost been legally barred from considering analogs of expedited regulations in order to address the hundreds of toxic substances in US workplaces. There are, of course, winner and losers in such decisions. While the Benzene case made regulation more difficult and left employees at risk, it also eased some of the legal burdens on industries manufacturing and using toxic substances and left them freer to conduct business as they see fit. Whether such results are on balance desirable is a complicated issue, but I believe it has not been. One major issue this case raises is what is a reasonable standard of scientific evidence needed to take regulatory action under a post-market statute to prevent risks of harm from materializing into harm and what are some of the consequences of different decisions? The effect of the Daubert decision on the need for scientific evidence in toxic tort cases In the tort law, the Daubert decision did two things: it explicitly required district court judges to serve as gatekeepers for admitting scientific evidence and experts, and it provided some presumptive considerations to guide whether experts had an appropriate scientific foundation for their testimony. Much of this decision is salutary in requiring appropriate scientific methodology to support the testimony of an expert. An important philosophic and social issue in the decision is how certain the scientific foundation must be for expert testimony when evidence is so sparse and uncertain in most toxic tort cases. In this case also, the court had choices in its decision and opted for more rather than less restrictive rules for admitting scientific evidence. It remains to be seen what the effect of this decision will be as courts grapple with these issues. Although it is still early in the debate, some decisions suggest that many courts will require, and even more commentators are recommending, that the scientific foundation for expert testimony must satisfy fairly stringent standards of proof. A more recent decision suggests that it will be even more difficult for plaintiffs to introduce scientific evidence into toxic tort cases. As a result of these decisions, toxic tort law not only risks being even less protective than previously, but also, despite plaintiffs having a preponderance of evidence standard of proof to carry, will depart even further from the aims of the tort law. With these decisions, the Court is approaching a requirement that plaintiffs must establish their conclusions with considerable scientific certainty before they can recover damages in the tort law and before it can have its deterrent effect on defendant's actions in exposing the public to toxic substances. While the law in this area is far from settled, preliminary indications are not reassuring.
Philosophic issues concerning the use of scientific evidence in tort and regulatory law How stringent the evidentiary requirements are for both the tort and regulatory law makes considerable difference in the overal