The Boundaries of Modern Palestine, 1840-1947

The Boundaries of Modern Palestine, 1840–1947

‘A comprehensive and systematic study of the developments, events and political and military factors which resulted in the delimitation and demarcation of the boundaries of Palestine . . . the most detailed and well documented survey of the subject that has been written so far. It is also a far reaching attempt to elucidate the impact of a wide range of conflicting interests, concepts and obligations, as well as of the geographical factors, which played a role in the shaping of the territorial extent of modern Palestine.’ Moshe Brawer, Emeritus Professor, Tel Aviv University

Boundary limitation is a crucial issue in the Middle East, and the boundaries marked out during the years 1840 to 1947 are still one of the major issues in today’s political discussions concerning Israel and its surrounding countries. This book – which is based on extensive archival research – deals with the first stage of the delimitation of the boundaries of modern Palestine, between the years 1840 and 1947. During this period the boundaries of Palestine were staked out by foreign imperial forces (Britain, France and the Ottoman Empire), which placed them according to their desires, without considering local needs or ideas. For the first time, thanks to the fascinating evidence revealed in archives, this invaluable book reveals the hidden ambitions, the motives of different agents and the stories of those involved in the process as well as the eventual outcome of their work – the first delimitation of the Holy Land in the modern era. Gideon Biger was born in Jerusalem in 1945. He is Professor of Historical and Political Geography at Tel Aviv University, and author of An Empire in the Holy Land and The Encyclopaedia of International Boundaries.

RoutledgeCurzon studies in Middle Eastern history

1 The Boundaries of Modern Palestine, 1840–1947 Gideon Biger 2 The Survey of Palestine under the British Mandate, 1920–1948 Dov Gavish 3 British Pro-Consuls in Egypt, 1914–1929 C. W. R. Long

The Boundaries of Modern Palestine, 1840–1947

Gideon Biger

First published 2004 by RoutledgeCurzon, an imprint of Taylor & Francis 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2004 Gideon Biger Previously published in Hebrew by Ben Gurion University Press, Beersheva, Israel, in 2001, as Land of Many Boundaries All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-30952-9 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-714-65654-2 (Print edition)

Contents

List of illustrations Preface

Introduction: the boundary and its role in historicalpolitical existence 1

vi viii

1

The delimitation of the country at the end of the Ottoman period

13

The allocation stage: World War I and the division of the Middle East

41

3

The southern boundary during the British period

80

4

The northern boundary: from allocation to delimitation

101

The northern boundary: demarcation and administration

133

6

The eastern boundary

159

7

The partition plans, 1937–1947

190

Conclusion

220

Notes Bibliography Index

232 244 249

2

5

Illustrations

Figures 1 Palestine, 1914 2 Different images of Palestine prior to World War I 3 The map that was added to the inheritance firman and was granted to Muhammad Ali in 1841 4 The administrative separation line between Sinai and the provinces of Hijaz and Jerusalem, 1906 5 Palestine and Sinai, 1915 (Lawrence’s map) 6 The division of Palestine according to the Sykes–Picot agreement of 1916 7 Occupied enemy territory (South), 1918 8 The proposal of the British political delegation for the boundaries of Palestine, 1919 9 The Zionist demands for the boundaries of Palestine 10 The proposal of the British political delegation for the southern boundary, February 1919 11 The various proposals for the southern boundary 12 The borderline between Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, 1923 13 The northern boundary, 1920–3 14 The ‘Meinertzhagen line’ 15 The demarcation of the boundary between Trans-Jordan and Palestine near the Gulf of Aqaba, 1946 16 Administrative map of Palestine, 1936 17 The Royal Commission’s partition plan, 1937 18 The Jewish Agency’s partition plan, 1938

14 20 26 36 39 45 55 73 77 85 90 144 146 172 186 199 201 207

Plates 1 Sir Mark Sykes 2 Chaim Azriel Weizmann 3 David Lloyd George

44 50 52

Ilustrations 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Field Marshal Viscount Allenby (1861–1936) Thomas Woodrow Wilson Yitzhak Ben-Zvi Aaron Aaronson Shmuel Tolkowsky Lord Milner Winston Churchill, Herbert Samuel and Emir Abdullah Field Marshal Herbert Charles Onslow Plumer Sir Arthur Grenfell Wauchope Dr Avigdor Yacobson Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion

vii 54 57 59 62 107 168 178 187 192 194 198

Preface

The boundaries of Eretz-Israel–Palestine – have been a target for historical research for over a hundred years. Some researchers are trying to identify the location of the boundaries of Palestine in the past, in the biblical period and in the Second Temple–Jesus Christ period, as in any other significant periods in the history of the country. Others are trying to locate the land’s boundaries according to the Jewish law, or to draw the boundaries of the Christian and Moslem ‘Holy Land’. Detailed historical atlases are offered to the interested reader, as are research books and articles. Unlike the abundance of researches of past boundaries, a striking shortage of a scientific discussion about the creation of Palestine and Israel’s modern boundaries exists. This process that began in the first half of the nineteenth century has not yet ended. It has not received a wide scientific discussion, due to the impediment of scientists to deal with problems and processes that had not terminated, and due to the inaccessibility of the documents that reveal the process of the formation of the borders, in the modern era. Among the few researches, it is worth noting the research of Frishwasser-Ra’anan, who published back in 1955 a book about this subject. His pioneering book was based upon documents that were published by the British archives, but observing all the relevant documents was impossible back then. Moshe Brawer’s excellent Hebrew book entitled The Boundaries of Israel, published in 1988, was based on more detailed documents, but its main concern was discussing the doctrine of borders, dealing with the background and the geographical consequences of the borderlines of modern Israel. This book deals only with the shaping of the borders of the land in the twentieth century, and it concludes with a discussion about the problems concerning the borderline between Israel and Egypt. An additional book that deals with one issue – the partition plan of the British Royal Commission of 1937, was written lately by Yossi Katz. Other than that, the various researchers published a few scientific articles, and the yield is still poor. The borders of Palestine, and the determination of the borders of the State of Israel, are currently placed in the midst of a public and political

Preface

ix

discussion. Israel is facing negotiations about the marking of its borders in the north-east with Syria, as well as the problematic issue of determining its boundaries with the Palestinian authority as these lines are being written. The results of these negotiations, which are being led by the heads of the states, will influence the fate of hundreds of thousands of people from the two sides of the final lines. For this reason, the discussion extends out from the table of negotiations, and reaches every home in Middle East. Laying out research that deals with the political process that stood in the base of the formation of the borders of the land in the new era is therefore necessary. The book presented here deals with the first stage of this process. It begins from its origin in the first half of the nineteenth century, whence the process of the shaping of Palestine as a unique geographical-political region started, up to the point of time in which the State of Israel was established in the spring of 1948. This move ended the first stage in which the land’s boundaries were determined by external factors, which ruled the area as a foreign, occupying force, and which dictated borders without considering the will of the local inhabitants. From that point onward, the borders have changed as a result of processes in which independent states – Israel, Egypt, the Kingdom of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon – all took part, and this process still continues. This chapter should therefore await its termination before it can be presented in its complete form to the reader. The discussion of the first stage is not only a historical-political one. Determinations that were achieved in that time are accompanying us in the present. The boundaries between the State of Israel and Egypt, between Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan and, practically, the borderline between the State of Israel and Lebanon were decided and laid out in that period. In addition, the concept of the division of Palestine into two states, a Jewish one and an Arab one, was brought forth in that early time. The discussion therefore is not merely dealing with the past, as it is also presenting the reasons for the determination of the boundaries in the present, and possibly in the future too. The Centre for the Heritage of Ben-Gurion in the Sde-Boker campus of Ben-Gurion University and its former chairperson, Dr Tuvia Priling generously supported the research. My learned colleague Moshe Braver from Tel Aviv University helped and advised in various working stages. Dr Orna Tzafrir-Reuven did the drawing of the maps in the department of geography in the Tel Aviv University. Eyal Biger prepared the English translation. To all I express my blessings and gratitude.

Introduction The boundary and its role in the historical-political existence

The state and the boundary A geographical settled landscape is the most outstanding representation of the human essence. Every settlement, house, city or road is a perceptible expression of the sum of the knowledge, understanding and the human aspirations, and are the clearest characteristic of human activity. Every geographical scene revealed to the eye has been created at a certain point in the past, and is the product of a process that has been carried out and continues to do so, along with time. Geographical and physical elements such as the landscape, earth components, climatic characteristics and the designing human activity that use this and adjust themselves to living in this physical scene are all constituting elements of this process. The settled landscape is therefore a perceptible expression of outlooks, political and ideological struggles, and the technological knowledge and talents that are translated into ways in which man designs his world. The present human geographical landscape is a product of all the processes in which man was involved, during the periods of his existence. The past lives, acts and influences the nature of the present, in its being a part of the essence of human existence. Many human geographic elements that were created in the past no longer exist, and their memory lingers on in the human consciousness, both by descriptions that were written in their time, and by remnants that are revealed to the researcher. The political world, in which we live today, at the onset of the third millennium, consists of over 200 sovereign states, together with a few colonies and protectorates that are separated from one another by international boundaries. The borderline between states is one of the most sensed expressions resulting from the human essence in general, and from political-historical processes in particular. Every boundary is an element of scenery existing, and it influences both its immediate and distant surroundings. This is regional-spatial influence, but also a politicalpsychological one. A boundary is a product of political and military power and strength that was established in a certain period and it reflects the

2

Introduction

political balance between the political units that reside on both sides of the line. Every political unit is characterized, among others, by the existence of a sovereign territory. A line that separates it from another sovereign territory bounds this territory, and harming the boundary is equal to harming the existence of the state itself. The positioning of the separation line is a product of the power and strength of the state, while its formation and maintenance in the course of time are enabled by the continued existence of a political power disposition in the state’s relationships with the rest of the world. Boundaries can be seen as breakage lines or as lines of weakness, along which disputes and conflicts between neighbouring countries have a higher chance of erupting. At times, the boundary reflects an anachronistic situation, when the connection between the current condition of the state, and the essence of its border, is historical and non-functional. In these situations, the boundary tends to change according to pressures executed by the state, or following external pressures exerted upon it. These pressures sometimes cause the line to change. These changes take place in the landscape, and are documented in the chronicles of history. Every border is formed as a result of an equilibrium of forces between different states in a certain time. The positioning and characteristics of the border are set according to the power and according to the ideologies of the forming participants. These viewpoints come into practice during the political and military negotiations. The siting and marking of a border reflect the technological and cartographic knowledge, and the governing arrangements alongside it are a product of the views of the states situated on both sides. When the geographer Friedrich Ratzel compared the state to a living organism, he simulated the border to the skin of the living, political body.1 Like any skin of a living body, it functions both as a protective layer and as the site through which the exchange with the outer world occurs. According to Ratzel’s idea, one cannot separate the discussion about the border from the discussion about the rest of the state. The border is actually the reflection of the state’s power, and its own existence influences this power. Other geographers have added to this image, and claimed that, like human skin, the border can have its own disease and its condition can reflect the general situation of the body. Even though this romantic view has been rejected as old-fashioned, the statement that fixates the bond between the nature of the boundary, and the nature of the state, is firm and abiding.

The essence of political boundaries International political boundaries are borderlines that were determined through political negotiations between sovereign states. These lines express the spatial range of the political authorities that exist on both sides of the border. A borderline appears on the map as a thin line,

Introduction

3

devoid of a spatial dimension that separates the areas of the states residing on its two sides. The essence of the separation line is not limited to the actual ground it lies upon, and it implies separation both in the air above the ground – the determination of the aerial space – and underground, thus separating among natural resources inside the earth. It is possible, therefore, to look at the boundary as a thin dimensional board with a height and a depth that separate different political territorial units, along all of its length and height. The territorial bounding of areas of sovereignty is a venerable phenomenon that has its origins in the division of hunting and fishing grounds by wandering tribes in prehistoric eras. The procedures that determined regional owning were institutionalized with the creation of land ownership, and the formation of states initially created the term ‘International boundary’. Detailed agreements that determined this or that political bordering exist all throughout history, and many signals were outlined in order to mark the positioning of this line or the other (the Great Wall of China, Hadrian’s Wall in Britain, etc). Nevertheless, the marking of borders on a map, and the implications of this on the landscape, are a relatively new phenomenon. Only when collective cartographic knowledge had reached the ability to produce upto-date maps, agreed upon by all sides, did it become possible to use these maps to mark political boundaries as a part of agreements. The first maps that were an essential part of a border agreement were prepared during the time in which the control areas of the protectorates belonging to the French Empire were determined – in Napoleon’s time at the end of the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth. French cartography had at that time reached a high level of knowledge and production abilities, and it could come to the aid of the political discussions concerning the placing of the borders. From this period onward we can talk of international political boundaries. Boundaries are a subject that is dealt with and researched by practical people and academic people, and their actions are occasionally integrated. People of practice – statesmen, lawyers, governing and militia personnel – are concerned, each in his own field, with certain practical border aspects, while the academics deal with the actual existence of the border, and they occasionally take part in the process of setting it. Statesmen know that boundaries are a sensitive issue in international relations, and that a threat to these boundaries can lead to major political actions. To the lawyers, the border marks the contact surface between separate sovereignties and between different law systems. The surveyors are familiar with the activities concerning the marking of a line in the landscape, and are interested in reducing the difficulties of finding the accurate line and maintaining it. A non-accurate marking can cause local conflicts concerned with ownership of agricultural land, natural resources and the like, and these can develop into international confrontations. To the militia, the border is the initial area in need of defence, and the place

4

Introduction

from which every offence starts, which is why the border is a target of military action in itself. These practical people see the boundary as a subject for routine occupation. On the contrary, historians, geographers and political scientists, see the boundary as an academic issue rather than a practical one.2 The political scientist sees the boundary as the defined limit of the state, and is interested in the criteria for its formation. Historians deal with the boundary’s role in causing confrontations, and permitting contact and processes to occur, alongside with its appearance as resulting from their outcome. The historian deals with the development of the boundary, and the political scientist with its nature. Geographers are interested in boundaries for two reasons, whether they are dealing with the process of its development as historians, or dealing with its nature as a political scientist. The positioning and the nature of every borderline result from mutual relations between many factors, which are partially geographic. Nevertheless – after a border has been set, it influences the surrounding landscape and the development of the separated states. These two subjects are the scope of geographical research.3

Boundary classification Geographic research on the subject of boundaries focuses on the shape and functioning of borderlines, and on the process of their development. Classification of boundaries according to their shape and nature was done according to how their location relates to physical or cultural phenomena on the surface. The most familiar classification is the division of boundaries into ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ ones. British statesman Lord Curzon presented this classification in 1907. His classifying principles4 are no longer accepted among modern researchers, but they are important to our matter owing to the time proximity of their defining to the shaping process of Palestine’s boundaries in the modern era. Curzon’s opinions were taken seriously back then, because he served as British Foreign Secretary in the early 1920s – the period during which the boundaries of Palestine were designed. Curzon classified the borders by their relation (or non-relation) to physical landscape shapes. He discriminated between natural boundaries – those based on rivers, mountains, swamps and deserts – and artificial boundaries – astronomic boundaries that are based on parallels and longitudes, mathematical boundaries that connect two defined points, and relation boundaries that include straight lines and circle arcs that connect surface relation points. Physical lines were chosen to function as political boundaries owing to their outstanding presence in the landscape, due to the inability to remove them around, and because of the relative ease of defining them. On top of that, the philosophical view at that time insisted that the act of creation (Genesis), that brought forth the present physical landscape, had

Introduction

5

placed ‘natural boundaries’ between tribes and people, and the correct political action must aspire to find these lines and turn them into the political borders. The military convenience of defending these lines contributed to the initiative of using them as borderlines. Later on the discussion about the validity of rivers and mountain ranges as boundary shapers has raised numerous problems.5 Rivers are landscape phenomena that separate flood plains and river cultures, but rivers also unite them. The river poses an obstacle for those wishing to cross it from side to side, but it also serves as a transport route for commercial activity. People that are homogeneous, at least from an economic standpoint, reside in river basins. People that live on two sides of a river tend to co-operate because of practical necessities such as bridging, damming and land ownership, which are all influenced by changes in the river’s flow. It is common in international law that when an international boundary passes along a river, the border is the line connecting the deepest points in its course. This enables independent vessel passage to both countries controlling the two banks, thus making this line superior to the one passing along the centre of the water’s surface, that changes with the tides. In Europe there are many river boundaries, and this is especially apparent in the New World, in Africa and in Asia, where borderlines were set according to defined physical lines by people who were unfamiliar with the areas the lines were passing through. Installing the Jordan and the Yarmuk rivers as a part of Palestine’s boundary is an example of this phenomenon.6 Mountain ranges protrude from the surface, thus posing an obstacle to smooth and easy passage. They are usually devoid of dense population. Such ranges often mark the boundary of the populated area, and allow a convenient defence line between neighboring political entities. Nevertheless, the abundant use of mountain ranges and watersheds as boundaries often causes problems in that it separates homogeneous populations that live in the area, and that wander from one side of the watershed to the other. Determining the boundary at these places might change the lifestyle of the local inhabitants, as has happened in the process of determining Palestine’s northern border during the British mandate and afterwards. In addition to that, most mountain ranges include a number of parallel ranges rather than one high, obvious range, and therefore it becomes harder to identify the watershed accurately, because it isn’t always the line connecting the highest points in the range. Such a case caused a conflict that lasted over 100 years between Chile and Argentina. Boundaries that run through swamps and deserts are usually dividing unpopulated areas between two states, but a state may occasionally seek to determine its boundary beyond the desert, in order to establish a convenient defence zone. It is worth noting the Curzon understood in 1907 how important it was for Egypt to establish its boundary to the east of the Sinai desert, due to the sense of security that such a line would render.

6

Introduction

Politicians and shapers of public opinion are still using Curzon’s classification today. The term ‘natural border’ has been transformed into a political claim in determining certain boundaries. Curzon himself spoke of the difference between real natural boundaries, which run along obvious natural lines, and those ‘which are demanded by nations as being natural, on the base of expansion ambitions, self-benefits and mainly nationalistic feelings. The attempt to apply borders of this type is responsible for many wars and for some of the most tragic vicissitudes in history’.7 Many politicians and statesmen did not accept this diagnosis, and even in the process of designating the boundaries of Palestine the ‘natural’ argument was used in demands concerning this or that line. Another way to classify boundaries is according to the relationship between them and the human settlement activity in their vicinity.8 An ‘antecedent boundary’ is one that precedes the full development of the cultural landscape around it, and in the process of shaping the latter the border, among others, has a role. This is exemplified by the setting of the borderline between Palestine and Trans-Jordan, in the Arava valley. A ‘pioneering’ boundary exists in a pristine landscape that has no settlement activity until such an activity, that adjusts itself to the positioning of the border, reaches the region. Such was the case with the border between Palestine and Egypt. After the determination of that line, the small towns of Rafah, Auja El-Hair and the police stations of Taba and Umm RashRash were constructed. ‘Following’ boundaries are formed after human settlements are already in the region, and their existence influences their placing, as occurred while setting Palestine’s northern border during the British mandate. When no connection exists between the placing of a border and the human settlement surrounding it, it becomes a ‘superimposed’ boundary, as was the case when the cease-fire lines were determined in 1949, following Israel’s independence war. ‘Antecedent’ boundaries characterize European overseas settlement, in North and South America, and even in Australia. ‘Following’ boundaries characterize the borders of Europe in present times. Most of them were formed as a result of settlement. ‘Superimposed’ boundaries characterize colonial regions that were formed following negotiations between imperial empires, in total disregard of the local settlement reality through which they passed. Other classifications of boundaries were done according to their functional nature. In this way, boundaries were measured according to the freedom of passage through them – from fully open borders to totally blocked ones.9 Other classifications discussed the defensive traits of boundaries, from defenceless borders to well defended ones. The classification of boundary types has a value in organizing geographical, historical and political gross data, but it is not worthy to become a goal of its own. Classification should be based on empirical research and should also fertilize it. Traditionally, though, researchers

Introduction

7

tended to treat the classification of boundaries as the main issue, and not to use it as a helping tool in order to establish hypotheses for understanding and comparing their natures – and the problems that exist between sovereignty units, in border regions.10 As it will show later, it seems as if every one of Palestine’s borders belongs to one of the classified groups mentioned. Despite this, S. B. Jones stated that: ‘Every border is unique, and therefore most of the inclusions are invalid’.11 Jones’s idea was that borders can be classified by many different characteristics and traits – but ‘Every classification is artificial’. This approach led researchers to examine the process of border formation and the changes that occur in them with time, with an attempt to reach generalizations. Instead of seeking after them according to the border’s morphology, they studied the actual creating process through a time approach. The changes that occur in countries’ borderlines have been the centre of geographical research for many years. In his book The Historical Geography of Europe published in 1881, E. A. Freeman stated that he attempts to monitor the size of the areas which were held by the states and nations of Europe in that continent and in adjacent regions, in different times during world history. From this he tries to point out the different borders that these countries had, and to compare the meaning of using the names of the country, with time.12 The development of different borderlines in different parts of the world, and the attempt to form generalizations, yielded plenty of research about border formation.

The stages in determining a political boundary A historical-geographic research that has to do with political boundaries naturally deals with two main issues. The first one is about the actual formation of the border and about its location in the area. A political boundary results out of a synthesis between a multitude of factors, and revealing the stages leading to the formation of this line is the first step of every discussion about the essence of the border. The other issue is about how a boundary influences geographic changes that occur within the two separated states, once a line has been placed between them. These include changes that happen throughout the country’s area, though those that occur in the border’s region are the most prominent ones. Such changes can be seen both in the actual geographic space (buildings, roads, blockades, army posts, etc.) and in the influence of the borderlines on the political and settlement behaviour of the region’s and the country’s inhabitants. Border populations and the statewide political system are influenced by the very existence of a borderline, from the nature of its development and from events that take place in its proximity. This fact influenced the formation of co-operative bonds, or of border disputes between the two sides. Many historical events started out following a desire to change the location of a boundary that didn’t fit with the

8

Introduction

historical, political, strategic or economical ideas or plans of one of the sides. In this manner, the setting of a boundary leads to historical occurrences, years and generations after it was set in its place. Changes in the internal or external power balance of a state, in its relations with neighbouring countries and the settlement development along its boundaries, are therefore subject to historical geographic inspection and discussion. As mentioned before, boundaries between nations are formed as a result of a historical political process. In many cases, borders mark the state’s political expansion, and the limits of its conquering history. This is the manner in which the boundaries of the United States, Russia and France were shaped. There are those who see Israel’s current borders as a result of a similar process. In other cases, borderlines were forced and created by external powers following negotiations between those powers. The boundaries of several countries in central Europe that were set after World War I, and the borders of the mandatory Palestine, are of this type. Political boundaries were generally formed during the last few centuries, and almost every border, except perhaps the United States–Mexico boundary, has at least one European nation involved in its determining. It actually seems as if the political map of our world was designed by the European countries, even those which exist a long way from that continent. Sometimes a border is determined only after the intervention of an external arbitrator, as happened in the border dispute between Argentine and Chile, when Britain and later the Pope served as the neutral arbitrators. Borderline determination may be the outcome of a process that divides undefined frontier regions stretching between two states and this division is achieved following negotiations between the involved sides. This is the way in which the neutral zones in the north of Saudi Arabia, and the control regions in Antarctica, were divided and bordered. A common case in the New World is that new states inherit the borders of the preceding European colonies. Thus ‘The political boundaries of present day Africa are a result of a political chess-match that was played between the colonial powers on the negotiation tables in Europe, by people who had never seen Africa, during the 1880s.’13 This occurrence exists until today along Israel’s northern border, which is an inheritance from the colonial powers that controlled the region in the past, but did not settle it. The process of border formation according to the internal administrative division established by local imperial officers is evident. The administrative division of the areas held by the French Empire in central and western Africa, as well as the administrative divisions of the British areas in eastern Africa, created the boundaries of the majority of Africa’s independent states. This also happened in the process of shaping the eastern border of Palestine, which was administratively separated from the lands which lay to the east of the River Jordan and the Arava valley. An attempt to present a generalization of the process of border forma-

Introduction

9

tion, which is the main purpose of this book, was initially done by De Lapadelle,14 and then further developed by S. B. Jones. Both identified four stages in every border-forming process, namely: allocation, delimitation, demarcation and administration. Allocation relates to a political decision, at the level of heads of states – a principal decision about the future division of a region by general separation lines. A decision of this type was occasionally taken over less populated, unfamiliar areas. At this stage, a boundary is determined in one of two ways. The first one defines the border as a straight line between two familiar points (a mathematical boundary according to Curzon). The other one marks the border along a prominent physical element – a line that follows a natural course – a river, a mountain range, which is in itself unfamiliar to the necessary extent. Such boundaries often characterized colonial regions, while the governments involved were distant from the place of events. Negotiations during this stage may divert boundaries dozens and even hundreds of kilometres, and the importance of their accurate positioning at this stage is low. One of the participants involved in the process of world border shaping in the nineteenth century declared that: In those days we took a blue pencil and a ruler, and we marked a line between two points. A year later, I was sent to Germany in order to obtain a conformation for that blue line from the authorities there, and the orders I received were to attain any possible area. I was equipped with one map only, a maritime map in which the shoreline was accurately marked, but all the rest was blank apart from a threehundred-mile long river that originated next to another big river. This river was supposed to be a big central river, but frankly, there existed no such river, and the only river that was present in the area was three and a half miles long.15 The leaders of the countries involved in the area’s division usually carry out the allocation stage, and they pass their orders to the next stage. In the delimitation stage, decisions about the exact placing of the border are reached, and marked on a map. Officials from the two sides negotiate round a table, far away from the border discussed. The negotiators are supposed to translate the allocation decisions and to determine the placing of the border, and they negotiate about diverting it anywhere from a few kilometres to a few dozen kilometres, away from the allocated line. This process usually culminates in a statutory political agreement, and it is meant to end border disputes around the border’s siting, thus enabling the two sides to carry on with whatever operative plans they might have regarding the border region. When the border has economic advantages, or when the sides have a need to determine a clear line, the line is chosen according to physical, cultural and landscape elements. A geometric line that has been drawn in the allocation stage will remain in

10

Introduction

this manner, if the border holds no economic value, or in case the two sides are unable to reach an agreement, or when this line separates areas that are controlled by the same government. The delimitation stage may come right after the allocation has ended, but in other cases there may be a long period of time until it takes place. At times, several actions of delimitation are needed until one can move on to the next step. There are a number of ways to define the border during this stage. The common description resembles a journey description that uses orientation points and the distances between them. This, for example, is how Palestine’s northern border was described during the delimitation stage: The border will originate in Semah and will cross the Sea of Galilee to the mouth of Wadi Masoudia. From here it will continue up this Wadi and further on up Wadi Jerba, to its origin. Here the border will turn towards the road that connects Quneitra and Banias, reaching it in the point known as Sukouk.16 Defining by this method of description necessitates avoiding inaccurate definitions and wrong distance estimations. Every mistake in the definitions can aggregate with others, and may result in placing the border differently than it was meant to. When a boundary is supposed to pass through an unfamiliar area, the description only relates to the major points through which the line will be running. These fixed points will be outstanding physical elements, cultural elements such as houses and junctions, astronomic points on longitudes and latitudes, and even designated letters on a specific map. ‘The Zaharani mouth, on the N in the word ZAHARANI, as it appears in the 1:1,000,000 map – north of point 1680 on the Mt Lebanon’. Using outstanding physical elements is common at this stage, especially due to their clear appearance on the maps. At times, when the border delimitation teams are unfamiliar with the region, and when maps are inaccurate, difficulties may beset later stages. Demarcation is the third stage, in which marking and surveying groups translate the delimitation decisions to the landscape. Professionals handle this action: surveyors, scouts and often, in most cases, army personnel – who are all experienced with map sketching and other topographic activities. The actions that take place in the border area during this stage include the identification of the separation line on the surface, and constructing landmarks to mark the border’s positioning. The delimitation agreement usually includes the establishment of a boundary committee, and it defines the time limits in which it is expected to operate, and the authority it has to divert the line from its original place – in order to fit it to the existing landscape. The peace treaty that was signed with Turkey following World War I stated that a boundary committee ‘will have not only the authority to determine the areas that were already defined as a set line on the ground, but also to change details, that will be determined

Introduction

11

by administrative or other borders, if the committee finds it necessary’. The committee was supposed to follow the line agreed upon (in the delimitation stage) as best it could, and to take existing economic interests and administrative borders into consideration. The demarcation stage does not necessarily follow the delimitation. In many cases, the planned borderline is meant to pass through areas without any strategic, economic or other importance, and the demarcation stage is postponed for an unlimited time. In places where the demarcation of the border doesn’t seem adequate – as in deserts and in other unpopulated land – and in places where the marking operation is a difficult task that doesn’t seem to yield immediate benefits, the demarcation step is postponed and at times does not occur at all. This is what happened with Palestine’s border in the Arava valley, which was left unmarked throughout the British mandate. Only a small section of this line, near the head of the Gulf of Eilat (Aqaba), was demarcated at the end of that period. The activities of the boundary demarcation committee may be complicated when it comes to the interpretation and explanation of the text appearing in the delimitation agreement. Problems of this sort arise from using ambiguous terms, or terms that aren’t clearly defined, as well as from inaccurate descriptions. These include the using of names of places that appear on the maps but do not exist in reality, and even from indicating landmarks that are simply not there. The use of unclear terms has caused many difficulties in boundary markings. The Arava borderline between Palestine and Trans-Jordan was determined as originating from ‘a point in the Red Sea three miles west of Aqaba, through the centre of Wadi Araba’.17 This point of origin was described nine years later as being one of the following three options: (1) through the house of Peake Pasha, 1 km from the port of Aqaba, (2) along Wadi Arava – meaning one of three watercourse possibilities that lay between 3 km and 4 km from Aqaba, (3) 3 km from the fort of Aqaba. Problems with the localization of other regions of this border were later discovered. The demarcation of a border is usually a short process that lasts a few weeks, according to the length of the line that is being marked. The summary of the work done by the members of the demarcation committee usually returns to the political level, where it is confirmed as an obligatory judicial agreement between the two states that are involved in determining that borderline. The administration stage has to do with managing the border area in relation to its actual delimitation. Even when accurate and clear marking has been achieved, it is necessary to determine passage and transport regulations in the surrounding region, the ways to cross it, the nature of the contact between agricultural land that has been split by the line, and other administrative problems. Unlike the other three stages, the administration stage is infinite, and the discussion about it awakes every once in a while following changes in the border’s administrative foundations – the construction of crossing stations, the paving of new access

12

Introduction

roads, land cultivation and more. New problems that were originally unseen can be revealed only with the accumulating experience of the border region’s administration. An internal or external shift in the political power balance can also bring changes in the border’s administration, without changing its delimitation. Such arrangements were made along all of Palestine’s borders, and these changes testified to the quality of the political relations between Palestine and its neighbours. The process of determining Palestine’s boundaries in the modern era started in the first half of the nineteenth century, and has not yet ended. Different political actors operated during different periods in designing the borderlines and these actions led to the unending constant process of changing the land’s boundaries. This process gave birth to the term ‘land of many boundaries’, which is the subject of this book. It started out with the setting of an internal line within the Ottoman Empire, in the early 1840s. The last step in this first stage of designing Palestine’s boundaries occurred 100 years later, on 29 November 1947, when the UN General Assembly decided to divide Palestine and to establish two national states, a Jewish one and an Arab one. This first stage is characterized by political decisions taken by external powers, by diplomatic means. The establishment of the State of Israel and the determination of the land’s borders from that day onwards result from a different type of process that is mainly changing borderlines according to the outcome of wars, and later on according to border agreements between the region’s local inhabitants. This process has yet to end. This book will therefore deal only with the first stages of the determination of Palestine’s political boundaries, from its beginning to the UN resolution, in 1947.

1

The delimitation of the country at the end of the Ottoman period

Where is Palestine? Palestine, with its many names and titles – Holy Land, Eretz Israel, Terra Santa, Filistin – was well known to those who dealt with the subject. These names appeared, among others, on different maps that were printed in the beginning of the period under discussion, the late Ottoman period, without any apparent delimiting definitions of its area. Even though official Ottoman documents that dealt with the numerous issues regarding the land used the name Filistin, they did not mention any defined administrative expression of a confined area called by this name, or by any other name. The administrative system of the Ottoman regime had been in turmoil throughout the nineteenth century. The year 1873 saw the final arrangements that delimited the area between the Ottoman authoritative units in the western Palestine area. Excluding minor changes, these arrangements remained stable until World War I. The area that stretches west from the Jordan river was split between three major administrative units. The northern part of Palestine, from a line that connects the area north of Jaffa, to north Jericho and the Jordan, belonged to the province (vilayet) of Beirut. This district was divided into the province-district (sanjak) of Beirut (containing the counties (qaza) of Beirut, Sidon, Tyre and Marj-Ayoun), Acre (with the counties of Acre, Haifa, Safed, Nazareth and Tiberias) and Nablus (with the counties of Nablus, Jenin and TulKarem). The special district of Jerusalem lay to the south of the district of Beirut. Its southern boundaries were unclear, and they coincided with the edge of the settled area in the south of the country.1 The area contained by this district was enlarged following the construction of Beersheba in 1900 and the expansion of Ottoman rule into the central Negev (desert of southern Palestine). It was now bordered by a line that went from the south of the Dead Sea to the north of the Machtesh (crater) Ramon, to the line that was determined in an agreement with Britain, in 1906 (see below). The majority of the central and southern Negev belonged to the province of Hijaz, which also included the Sinai Peninsula, the area east of the Arava, and the western part of the Arabian Peninsula.

14

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

Figure 1 Palestine, 1914.

An intention of adding the areas lying east and west of the Arava, from the south of the Arnon stream (Wadi al Mujib) to the Gulf of Aqaba to the province of E-Shams was suggested prior to the outbreak of World War I. This intention, though, was not carried out in practice.2 The Ottoman regime had not specified a special district for Palestine (or Arzi-ElMukadsa, the Holy Land in Turkish), and the area of Palestine was

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

15

divided among broader districts that had their centres away from it. As far as the Ottoman regime was concerned, Palestine was an abstract concept that related to a general region, but did not define any clear territorial unit. This unclear situation characterized the regime throughout its ruling period. The Ottomans created a special administrative unit, Mutasarif El Quds (Special District of Jerusalem) which was directly subordinate to the empire’s capital. They also determined accurate borders for this district at the beginning of the twentieth century.3 Anyhow, it remained unclear as to whether this unit is the ‘Filistin’ they were referring to when they discussed Palestine, or whether this special district is only a part of it. This confusion was also apparent in their dealing with the renewed settlement of the Jews in Eretz Israel. In reaction to the renewal of Jewish immigration during the 1880s, the Ottoman regime isued new orders and laws that were intended to limit immigration, land purchasing and settlement. These orders were sent to the countries from which the immigrants had arrived, and to their diplomatic representatives in Palestine, but not directly to the immigrants. Nevertheless, it was the Jewish world, at which these prohibitions were aimed, that went on with discussing the matter. Several newspaper publications, letters and documents reveal that neither the Jews nor the Ottomans had any clear idea about the territorial extent of the immigration decree. The authorities that tried to avoid the Jewish settlement in Palestine were willing to receive Jews in any of the empire’s other regions, but it remained unclear as to where it was permissible for Jews to immigrate to. The situation created by the administrative system led the immigrants occasionally to assume that the immigration decree referred only to the district of Jerusalem, while at other times it seemed to them that it referred to all the area west of the Jordan river.4 As the immigration was being restricted at the beginning of the 1890s, the Jewish newspaper Ha’or published an article in which it was written that the authority’s order is that it is forbidden to aid the Jews in settling in Jerusalem following the Ziara (pilgrimage). Since it is forbidden for them to settle in this district, any of them that wish to settle in the empire’s other lands must address the authorities so it can point out a land in which to settle.5 This limiting attitude, that identifies the expression ‘Filistin’ to the district of Jerusalem alone, is also apparent in Lawrence Oliphant’s letter, written ten years earlier in 1882.6 He claimed that by the name Palestine the Ottoman authorities are referring to Jerusalem and its surroundings, but the Mediterranean coast, Samaria, Galilee, the northern valley and the Jordan valley are all called ‘Syria’ and therefore, the consul’s published declaration is only in regard to Jerusalem and its surroundings. This limiting attitude was further broadened with the advice of the Jewish Hamelitz newspaper, that in 1891 told the immigrants that it is good to settle beyond the Jordan, where the land is vacant, pristine and inexpensive . . . because the entrance to the Holy land has

16

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period been hindered . . . let us hope that they refrain from seeking themselves an estate in Judea and in Galilee – and that they will turn to Trans-Jordan, and without a voice and without a racket, they will hit roots and blossom.7

Ze’ev Wisotzky, Hovevi Zion’s Palestine correspondent, writes in 1888 that: ‘It is true, Galilee too is included in the decree.’8 A return letter that was distributed by the Hovevi Zion headquarters in Warsaw states that: ‘The government’s warning was not given only about Judea, or about Galilee.’9 The Ottoman regime could not define the borders of the immigration prohibition, and, when coming to enforce it, referred to any point in which Jews were trying to construct an agricultural settlement. Haim Margalit Klaverski, one of JCA’s leaders in Galilee, claimed while discussing the subject of delimiting Eretz Israel’s northern boundary after World War I that the Ottoman government regarded the region of Sidon, with Rashia, Marj-Ayoun, Hasbaya, the Golan and the Houran, as a part of Filistin. He explained that this was the reason it was forbidden for Jews to purchase land in these parts, unlike the situation in the more northern regions of Damascus, Homs and Hamma.10 The unsolved situation regarding the limits of Eretz Israel troubled the country’s Jewish population that began discussing the issue thoroughly. The delimitation of Eretz Israel, as was presented by the Jewish scholars, is a complex subject. The traditional Jewish research, which continues in our time, deals mainly with the historical, religious-based, territorial identity of the land.11 This Jewish research is trying to clarify the territorial meaning of the definitions quoted by the religious tradition, such as ‘the boundary of the area promised to the Patriarchs’, ‘the boundary of those who came out of Egypt’ or the ‘boundary of the returnees from Babylon’. The Jewish Halacha (religious law) had determined a whole set of laws that refer to Eretz Israel, and these laws are limited by the land’s boundaries. The laws include a range of Doings that are connected with Eretz Israel, as well as prohibitions, permits and customs that are treated in one manner within Eretz Israel, and in a different manner outside its boundaries. Jewish law recognizes a number of delimitation options of Eretz Israel, and each one has laws that are attached to it. The need to transfer names and terms from past delimits on to new and contemporary maps created several alternative boundaries to the Jewish religious-based Eretz Israel, each of which correspond to the various terms and commentaries that were given to them. It is true that according to the tradition God’s promise is never cancelled and the area of the promised land is not altered following exiles and other changes. Nevertheless, the Jews have adapted to the political boundaries of the land in keeping with Jewish law during most of the time. The new Jewish settlers in Eretz Israel found themselves struggling with daily difficulties concerning the land’s boundaries. Beyond the general ambition to establish them all over Eretz Israel,

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

17

the new settlers, who were mostly traditional Jews, tackled numerous religious problems. The Jewish farmers needed to know if the law of the Shmitta (fallow year) should be kept, and which villages should be doing so. They wondered whether the Bikkurim (first fruits), and the Ma’asrot (tithes) should be delivered, and should they celebrate the second YomTov (religious festival) associated with the Diaspora. The immigration to Eretz Israel had imported a problem concerning the laws of matrimony. Religious law supports a Jew in leaving his or her home and moving to Eretz Israel. If the partner refuses to join the move, it is enough of a reason to get divorced. This too, exemplifies why the boundaries of the Halacha-based Eretz Israel needed to be defined. Most of the practical laws were delimited by the traditional ‘limit of the returnees of Babylon’. This limit poses a territorial difficulty as it excludes (and still excludes) regions and places that are usually included in Palestine such as Ashqelon, Gaza, Baisan, Semah, the area north of Acre, and more. A problem of this type arose with the establishment of Bnei-Yehudda, to the east of the Sea of Galilee, and the local inhabitants eventually turned to the rabbis in Jerusalem, and asked them if they should celebrate a second Yom-Tov of the Diaspora.12 The Lovers of Zion and the members of the Zionist Organization could not accurately define the land’s boundaries. The publicist and leader of the Jewish farmers in Palestine wrote that: ‘Israel’s resurrection on Eretz Israel’s land will be done by purchasing all that area that stretches east from the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, and which is termed “Eretz Israel” in the Chronicles.’13 The definition of the historian and educator Ze’ev Ya’abetz was slightly sharper: the main part of Eretz Israel is west of the Jordan . . . but stronger is its inclination to the land east of the Jordan, the land between the Yarmouk and the Yabok . . . east of the Jordan, stronger is it inclined to the Golan in the Bashan, north of the Sea of Galilee . . . it is allowed, as I think – to tell of the qualities of the land of Gil’ad.14 (translated from the poetic Hebrew of the late nineteenth century) The Zionist politician and writer Nahum Sokolov determined in his book Pleasant Land : ‘the land of Canaan, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan, and from Sidon to Gaza in the south-west, and to the Dead Sea in the southeast’.15 Another quote from the same book states: ‘An independent Palestine . . . south of the line that that originates from the south of Tyre, and that goes eastward to the Hermon slopes, from Dan to Beersheba and the land of the northern Jordan.’ According to Sokolov’s opinion, Eretz Israel is limited to the area west of the Jordan river, and down to the Gaza–Dead Sea line. The members of Hovevi Zion (Lovers of Zion), who were living in Palestine, had a different view of the situation. In an internal discussion it was said that: ‘It is wise to settle many of the

18

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

craftsmen in the other towns of the holy land, in Nablus, Jenin, Salt (east of the Jordan) Ramla, Gaza and Lydda’.16 These expressions, which were not made during a political discussion over the future of the territories, show the lack of a clear picture, and the confusion that prevailed among those who handled the task of settling the land. Jewish scientific publications of that time were unable to deliver a better and more unite description. Even though most of the people that dealt with Eretz Israel– Palestine refrained from accurately defining its boundaries, some dealt with it. The Jewish Encyclopedia that was published in Russian in St Petersburg in 1910 described Eretz Israel as the area that lies between latitudes 31° N and 33° 20⬘ N, and between the sea and the Jordan, and longitudes 34° 15⬘ E to 35° 35⬘ E. According to this publication, the area east of the Jordan, between the Arnon stream, and the Bashan (some 4,000 square miles) was also a part of Eretz Israel. In another Jewish encyclopedia that was published in English in London and New York, there appear two lines that border Eretz Israel. The bottom one goes from the south-eastern corner of the Mediterranean Sea through the southern point of the Dead Sea, and the upper line from Tyre to the southern slopes of Mount Hermon.17 A different way of defining Eretz Israel’s modern area is found in a geography book that was written in Hebrew at the beginning of the twentieth century. This book18 deals with The Geography of the Turkish Empire. It defines Eretz Israel as the area which lies south of the imaginary line that passes along the Qasamia river, across the Ayoun valley and Marj-Ayoun that belong to the village Metulla, and across Mount Adhear that rises between the Hula and the Lebanon valleys. From there the line will turn towards the southern slopes of Mount Hermon, and reach Mount El-Mani that separates the valley of Damascus from the Houran. The eastern boundary is the edge of the desert, and the southern one goes beyond Wadi Arish, Wadi Abiq, Wadi Mara and Wadi El-Fukra’a. Summarizing, this shows that according to this book, Eretz Israel is situated between latitudes 30° N and 33° 30⬘ N, and longitudes 34° E to 37° E. The image that is reflected by Jewish publications at the end of the nineteenth century is that Eretz Israel spreads out from the Mediterranean Sea (from Rafah in the south to Sidon in the north) to the desert on the east side of the Trans-Jordanian Highlands. There are those who slightly extend the southern line to the edge of the district of Jerusalem, and others that reduce this area in the north and restrict the country by the lower Litani river line. Generally speaking, the Jews remained loyal to the biblical tradition that proclaims ‘from Dan to Beersheba’. The confusion about Palestine’s delimitation prevailed among Europeans and Americans too. Representatives of European and other coun-

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

19

tries were involved in the process of determining Palestine’s political boundary, from the nineteenth century to the present time. Europeans, especially the British and French, were the ones who, in different periods, determined the land’s boundaries, which explains the importance of their images regarding Palestine’s delimitation. It is difficult to point out a national image – especially on a background of hundreds and thousands of publications, expressions and statements that dealt with Palestine. Nevertheless, a general directing line can be extracted from examining atlases, maps and encyclopedias19 that were published during the period that preceded the first determinations of Palestine’s boundaries. These sources focused mainly on the land’s past. Even the descriptions of conditions at the time of publication had nothing to do with delimiting the land, or with defining its area as a basis for discussing current geographic processes and facts. Many publications do not treat the subject at all, while others include a vague and general description (‘from the sea to the desert and from the mountains of Lebanon to the southern desert’). Others adopted the Ottoman administrative division as the existing borders. Delimitation of the land according to the Ottoman administrative borders is mainly apparent in German publications starting by the mid-nineteenth century and leading up to World War I. The detailed description that appears in the Encyclopaedia Britannica demonstrates the blur that surrounded the issue, by this description: ‘Palestine is an abstract geographical name.’ To fulfil its duty, the encyclopaedia defines Palestine in these terms: Palestine can be thought of as extending from the Litanni’s mouth, 33° 20⬘ N, to the mouth of Wadi Gaza and its continuation towards Beersheba, at 31° 28⬘ N. The problem is more complicated in the east. The Jordan is not a boundary and it only separates eastern Palestine from its west. It seems that the logical boundary should be the pilgrimage route from Damascus to Mecca. The area east of the Jordan is confined between the Hermon and the Arnon.20 French publications reflect a slightly different image that extends the southern border to the mouth of Wadi El-Arish. Spanish writers follow this trend and set the line further south on latitude 31° 30⬘ N, which runs from Wadi El-Arish to the Dead Sea. Different and similar delimitation records appear in Russian, Polish, Italian, American and other publications (see Figure 2). In every publication, Palestine’s delimitation is different. Despite the apparent differences, there emerges an image of an area that all of the publications, Jewish, Ottoman and others, tended to identify with Palestine. This area was limited in the north by the Qasamia river (the lower Litanni) and by the line that runs towards the Hermon. The pilgrimage route, the Hijaz railway being built along it, served as a comfortable limit

Figure 2 Different images of Palestine prior to World War I.

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

21

line in the east. The characterizing southern line is the Arnon stream– Dead Sea–Beersheba line that concludes in Wadi Gaza’s joining of the Mediterranean Sea, that forms the western boundary. The area is therefore confined by latitude 33° 20⬘ N in the north. In the east it is confined by longitude 36° E. By this delimitation, the total area of Palestine is 10,000 square miles (25,600 km2). Some extended the lines beyond those mentioned, and regarded the northern inclusion of Sidon and Hermon, the north-eastern inclusion of the Bashan and the Jebel Druze (Druze’s mountain) and the southern extension towards Ma’ale-Akrabim and Wadi El-Arish, as belonging to Palestine. By these extended images, Palestine’s area is about 30,000 km2. The southern Negev, the Sinai Peninsula and the area south of the Arnon were not included in Palestine according to the delimitation images of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The delimitations described here were not made in order to serve political discussions, and they do not relate to any specific point in time. Their importance comes from the fact that they represent the most general and accepted delimitation of that ancient-modern unit called Palestine or Eretz Israel before its political delimitation in the modern era. Later it will be revealed that the political delimitation, that was made as an outcome of diplomatic, military and political actions, delineated different lines from the ones that were just described. The unclearness about the positioning of the lines, and the disagreements over the delimitation of Palestine, were the reasons for determining new boundaries, without considering either the past or the image. Together with that, the need to create a separate territorial entity bounded by defined borders was recognized, and this led to determining the delimitation of Palestine as a political unit, separated from its neighbours. This process, that is bonded to hundreds and thousands of years-old images, began to take form in the first half of the nineteenth century, together with the defining process of Palestine’s neighbouring political territorial units.

Muhammad Ali and Palestine’s first delimitation The Ottoman Empire control an area that had reached its maximum territorial extent by the end of the seventeenth century, and had been reducing in the following centuries. In this process, that won the title ‘The Eastern question’,21 the borders of the retreating empire were undergoing constant changes, and new political units such as Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and others had emerged. This continuous process was terminated only after World War I, and it included the basis for the formation of modern Egypt. A side effect of this move was a new political boundary, which was delineated in Palestine’s vicinity for the first time. The process of the formation of this line was the first case in which borderlines appeared on a map that was added to a written and signed document. This is how Palestine’s first political boundary in the new era was

22

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

created, and with it began the process of designing the land’s borders, a process that continues in our time. The concept that is conducting Palestine’s boundary determination process in the new era is the establishment of its adjoining territorial units and their boundaries. As a result of the formation of these units, the external borders of Palestine were being established, and the area that was left out became the political territory of Palestine. The first time that a definite delimitation of a separate political unit in Palestine, which was backed by maps and a written and signed document, occurred in 1947 with the UN resolution, and later on with the 1949 cease-fire agreements. Therefore, discussing the delimitation of the areas that adjoin Palestine, is the basis for dealing with the area’s actual delimitation process. This brings us back to the initial delimiting step, occurred in the first half of the nineteenth century. Palestine, that had experienced Napoleon’s invasion in 1799, saw another invasion in October 1831, this time by an Egyptian army.22 Muhammad Ali, who was at that time governing Egypt as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, had sent his army and navy in the late 1820s to Morea, in Greece, in order to help the Ottoman Sultan in his war against the rebel Greeks. In return for this help, and for other services he had done for the empire, Muhammad Ali demanded the fulfilment of a promise that he had received before sailing to Greece: the control of Egypt and the governing of Syria for himself and his descendants. The Sultan, who did not succeed in fighting the Greek liberation movement, and did not want to create any more autonomous units, did not keep his promise. Muhammad Ali aspired to exert his authority, and to control lands outside Egypt. He had already conquered Sudan, which he invaded in 1820, and the Red Sea region with the Arabian Peninsula’s coast. Up to this point he had acted on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, but he now turned to independent actions. In 1829 he offered to conquer Algeria for France and to wipe out the pirate plague in the area. The French, who desired Algeria for themselves, advised him to attack Tunisia and Tripoli in Libya, and offered to fund his military campaign. All these regions belonged to the Ottoman Empire, but were practically governed by local rulers who held the right to inherit their position. This was not the case in Egypt or in the empire’s Asian and European areas. Assigned officials were ruling these parts for the empire, and rarely did a local or an Ottoman official manage to dominate a region, and pass its control on to his heirs. This right was not covered by any official agreement. This was the way in which Ahmed Pasha – ‘El-Jazar’ – and his dynasty ruled the subdistrict of Sidon in late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries from their seat in Acre, and such was the situation in other areas in Lebanon. Muhammad Ali aspired to expand the area that he controlled in order to enlarge his army, and extend his economic abilities.23 As Tripoli and

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

23

Tunisia seemed unworthy to him, he set his eyes to Syria and Palestine. His involvement in the region began in 1822 when he acted as a negotiator between the Ottoman Sultan and Abdullah Pasha, Sidon’s governor and the Emir Basha, who ruled Lebanon. Now, in 1831, Muhammad Ali demanded that the promise he received prior to the war in Greece should be fulfilled, and when he was rejected he sent his army against the Ottoman army in Palestine and Syria. Palestine and Syria surrendered without a fight. The weak Ottoman army could not stand against the powerful and modernized Egyptian forces. Only Acre managed to withstand the Egyptian army, but the emergency aid that the city received from Britain when El-Jazar was defending it against Napoleon’s siege, thirty years earlier, did not come this time. The fall of Acre came after a few months of siege.24 In the meantime, the Ottoman army suffered a defeat in a battle near Homs. Damascus was conquered in June 1832, and Ibrahim Pasha, Muhammad Ali’s stepson, who commanded the Egyptian army, reached Adana, in southern Turkey, by August. The Egyptian army crossed the Taurus mountains and defeated the main Ottoman forces next to Konya, in Asia Minor, in January 1833. The Grand Vasir (Prime Minister) who commanded the army was taken captive. Ibrahim continued to advance, and he stopped in Kutahiya, 150 km from the Ottoman capital. Muhammad Ali, who didn’t want to cause the central government to collapse, agreed to retreat from Asia Minor in exchange for recognition of his full control over Syria and Adana. This arrangement was achieved following pressure exerted by the European powers, who did not want the Ottoman Empire to fall into the hands of a strong local power that would become uncontrollable. This fear brought the Great Powers – Britain, Russia and France – to act together in order to protect Ottoman rule. The Egyptians controlled all the area south of the Taurus mountains for a period of six years, and Ibrahim Pasha served as the high commander of all the area north-east of Egypt.25 Muhammad Ali wanted more than the actual control of these lands, and he demanded the Sultan should recognize him as the head of a dynasty that would rule Egypt. The Sultan, who saw this move as an attempt to disconnect Egypt from his empire, strongly opposed. In April 1839, after being disappointed of the Great Powers’ failure to evict the Egyptians out of Syria by diplomatic pressure, the Sultan ignored the advice of the foreign ambassadors in Istanbul, recruited a new army, and invaded Syria in an attempt to drive Muhammad Ali back to Egypt. The armies met in July 1839, east of the modern city of Gaziantep, in south Turkey, and the Ottoman army was defeated again. This defeat practically opened all the Ottoman Empire to the Egyptian army. The Sultan Muhammad II, died one week later and his inexperienced successor took to the throne. The Ottoman navy, that was sent to combat the Egyptians, sailed directly to Alexandria and surrendered to Muhammad Ali. The new Sultan Abdul Majid, who feared an Egyptian conquering, offered

24

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

Muhammad Ali the rule of Egypt, including inheriting rights. But by now Muhammad Ali was also demanding recognition of his rule in Syria too. The Sultan was ready to give in, but the European powers, led by Britain, intervened again in order to change the situation. The British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston preferred a weak Ottoman Empire to a strong Egypt, and he agreed to Russia’s initiative, intended to solve the ‘Eastern question’. The Russians agreed to give up benefits they received in 1833, when they helped pressure Muhammad Ali and to stop Ibrahim Pasha’s march to Istanbul, and the British accepted the Russian demand for international co-operation in solving the crisis. It took long and meticulous discussions until the delegates from Russia, Prussia, Austria and Britain, met in London and signed the ‘London Treaty of Co-operation with the Sultan’ concerning the crisis in the East, on 15 July 1840. France was the only European power that supported Muhammad Ali. The other Great Powers gave Egypt an ultimatum, demanding its retreat from Syria. Palmerston26 wanted to ‘have the desert [Sinai] as a barrier between the Egyptian army and the Sultan’s forces and authority’. The Great Powers pressed the Sultan to grant Muhammad Ali the privilege to rule Egypt with inheriting rights, and to recognize his personal control over Syria (without inheriting rights). An agreement that was to form the basis of Palestine’s future northern boundary was signed. The Great Powers agreed on a line that originated from Ras El Naqura on the Mediterranean coast, then ran direct to the place where the Sausban river (River Jordan) joins the Lake of Tiberias (Sea of Galilee), at its northernmost point. From here the line would pass along the lake’s western shore, along the right (western) bank of the Jordan river, the west coast of the Dead Sea, and eventually – in a straight line – to the northern tip of the Red Sea, in the Gulf of Aqaba. Then it would follow the gulf’s western coast, and turn along the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez, culminating in Suez.27 In exchange for this, Muhammad Ali had to retreat from the rest of Syria, and to return the defeated Ottoman navy. In addition, he had to accept the Sultan’s authority in nominating army personnel, and to obey Ottoman law. Muhammad Ali rejected this ultimatum in August 1840, and the Great Powers launched a military operation against him. A naval force, comprised of Russian, Austrian, Turkish and British vessels, landed in Junye, north of Beirut, on 3 September 1840. Another landing took place in Sidon, and Ibrahim Pasha, who was busy fighting the Christian Maronites in the mountains, suffered a defeat. The naval force now turned to Acre. The city that withstood Napoleon’s siege, and that surrendered to Ibrahim Pasha only after his army besieged it for six months, was conquered within a few days after a bombardment had ruined most of its fortifications. The British naval force, with Napier as its commander, set sail for Egypt and anchored in front of Alexandria. This military superiority drove Muhammad Ali to surrender and to agree to all the conditions that were imposed

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

25

by the Great Powers. He also gave up the personal control over southern Syria. On 4 February 1841 Muhammad Ali accepted the Sultan’s authority and position as the Suzerain (top sovereign) of Egypt. Muhammad Ali was officially appointed the ruler of Egypt, and he got the right to pass this position on to his descendants. This is how a former Albanian tobacco merchant became the Patriarch of modern Egypt, and the head of a dynasty that would become the Egyptian royal dynasty for more than 100 years. The Ottoman Sultan issued a firman (Sultan’s order) called Hatti-Shariff on 13 February 1841, in which he confirmed Ali’s inheritance rights over ‘Egypt within its natural borders’, and his control over the districts of Darpur, Nubia, Kurduphan and Senar. This list was in fact an affirmation of the Egyptian control over the Sudan. The diplomatic negotiations did not end with the issuing of this firman. They continued for another three months, with the participation of France, which, up to that stage, had opted to stay out. The negotiations concluded successfully, and the conditions for the relationship between the Sultan and Muhammad Ali were fixed on 1 June. This second firman held the first accurate definition of Egypt and its ‘natural boundaries’. A delimitation that recognized Egypt with its borders was marked on a map that bore the Sultan’s signature, and was delivered to Muhammad Ali by the Grand Vizier. This was the first map of the Middle East, on which political boundaries were delineated, as a part of an agreement that determined a different governing system, and its control. The map that accompanied the firman was sent to Egypt as mentioned earlier, but it was lost in a manner that is still unexplained. Although the European powers were deeply involved in the crisis, they had no interest in the positioning of the borders, and did not keep a copy of the map for themselves. It seems that the Egyptian and the Ottoman authorities, and later the British administration that controlled Egypt from 1882, ‘knew’ where the borderline was supposed to be, and treated it accordingly. A line that crosses the Sinai Peninsula, somewhere between El-Arish and Suez, was the ‘known’ existing boundary. This delimitation was used during later discussions that were held in 1892, and again in 1906 – although the original map was never presented there as a basis for negotiations. The importance of this map for this discussion is in the political delimitation of the southern part of Palestine. It is true that Palestine was never even mentioned in the agreement, but as we shall see, the map did include a treatment of its area and a mentioning of its name: Filistin. In 1925, a copy of the map was presented for the first time, years after the original one was lost in Egypt.28 It was later revealed that this document was not a copy of the original map, but of a later edition of it. The original map was discovered only a decade later, in 1934, in the Ottoman archives in Turkey (see Figure 3). A photocopy of it that was sent to London got

26

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

Figure 3 The map that was added to the inheritance firman and granted to Muhammad Ali in 1841.

‘buried’ in the local archives because it showed a delimitation that did not fit the British claims regarding Egypt’s south-western border.29 A detailed inspection of the map30 reveals that the line that separates Egypt form the other parts of the Ottoman Empire in the east passes along a route which is a bit different form the one that appears in the various publications. The line runs from a point on the shore of the Gulf of Suez to the east of the

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

27

town of Suez that remained in Egyptian territory. It continues northeastwards and crosses the Sinai Peninsula, nearing the south-eastern point of the Mediterranean Sea, but ending a few kilometres inland. The original map has longitude and latitude marked on it, and it shows that this point is situated on longitude 32° 11⬘ E and on latitude 31° 15⬘ N. This map was probably based on French measurements, and those were calculated at that time from Paris, which lies two degrees east of Greenwich. Since modern measurements relate to the latter, the line’s end is on longitude 34° 11⬘ . This point is currently situated between the modern towns of KhanYunes and Rafah. These towns are not marked on the map because they did not exist back then. At that point, the line splits in two. One line continues in a north-westerly direction and reaches the sea, while the other turns east and passes south of the Dead Sea. It ends abruptly, without any apparent reason, in the desert south-east of the Dead Sea. The names that appear on the map divided the areas between the province of Egypt, with its name and detailed delimitation upon it, Hijaz – which is also mentioned on the map – and the area which is termed ‘Filistin’ that lies north of the northern line, without a defined line. The area that was given to Muhammad Ali stretches east from the populated land in the Nile’s valley and its delta, across the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula, and all the way to the southern part of Palestine’s coastal plain. The area to the south of this line, including the rest of the Sinai Peninsula, the Negev and the land to the east of the Arava, was part of the Ottoman province of Hijaz. Filistin was situated to the north of this line, and its administrative attachment remains unclear. The absence of settlement names in Palestine’s area is very apparent when compared with the abundant marking of names in the Egyptian territory. The only city that is marked in its area is El-Kuds (Jerusalem). The town of Aqaba appears by that name, and so does the town of Suez from which the line originates. Names of settlements do not appear along the northern line that passes through Palestine, even though a few nameless dots are marked, and among them we can identify the positioning of Gaza. The delimitation line formed a contact surface between the Egyptian areas that were controlled by Muhammad Ali and his heirs in the north of the Sinai Peninsula, and Palestine – Philistin. A political territorial contact between Palestine and Egypt is created here, for the first time in modern times, in the small area that lies between the boundary junction (Egypt–Hijaz– Philistin) and the sea. The drawers of the map had not given this line serious treatment, and they did not accurately mark the part that runs from the boundary junction to the sea. Detailed observations of maps from that time, and especially the one that was published a few years earlier in Jacotin’s atlas,31 considered to be the first modern map of Egypt and Palestine, clearly show the borderline as it appeared in the area by the late eighteenth century.

28

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

The Jacotin map, that has a larger scale than the Ottoman firman map, shows a line that originates from the Gulf of Suez, east of the town of Suez, and continues to a point that is situated east of Rafah (which appears on the map by its name). Here the line splits in two. One line continues to the sea, and it passes between Rafah, that remained in Egypt, and Khan-Yunes that belongs to Palestine. The second line extends to the east, passes south of a place named Arad, and continues east beyond a point that is south of the Dead Sea. This line separates the provinces of Hijaz and A-Sham (Syria), and it appears on the firman’s map too. The agreement’s mapmakers emphasized the line by a thick ink mark, under which one can see the original marking. This map presented a different bordering to the popular existing delimitation of Palestine. Palestine had not stretched beyond Khan-Yunes during the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. The area of the modern towns of Rafah and El-Arish belong to Egypt, both as being an Ottoman province and as being a semiindependent unit, from Muhammad Ali’s time onwards. This borderline was never marked in reality, and it remained sketched only on maps. These maps, too, ‘disappeared’ a short time after being drawn. Nevertheless, this line had many territorial and political aspects relating to it. The area between Rafah and El-Arish with all its surrounding land was recognized as an area under Egyptian control, while the area that was under the Ottoman Empire’s direct control continues west to the top of the Gulf of Suez. These two points turned extremely important, both as the Suez Canal was being dug, and when the Zionist Organization tried to obtain settlement permission in El-Arish’s proximity, outside the area of the Ottoman Palestine. The positioning of the line and the problems that arose over its control were to cause the next territorial dispute that resulted in another delimitation of Palestine’s boundaries.

The crisis of the Gulf of Aqaba, and the demarcation of Palestine’s southern boundary The next phase in the political delimitation process of Palestine took place in 1906, and it resulted once again from political developments in the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. The determination of the borderline in 1841 was a political move that had no actual formal expression in the area. This unclear determination allowed different commentaries and understandings, especially when regional political changes occurred. Britain took over Egypt in 1882. British control was temporary in its essence, and held no legal basis. Formally, Egypt remained part of the Ottoman Empire (exactly as it was in the time of Muhammad Ali and his heirs). But by now the country was actually run by the British consulgeneral based in Cairo. This consul had no special status, and he was acting under the direct authority of the British ambassador in Istanbul.

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

29

Britain was now actively involved in shaping Egypt’s borders, among them the border with the Ottoman Empire in Palestine. After the British took control over Egypt, the Ottoman Sultan adhered to the advice of the German ambassador, the Marshall von Biderstock, and sought a way to reestablish his control over the Sinai Peninsula.32 Although this area belonged to the Ottoman province of Hijaz, it was Egypt which actually controlled it. Egypt’s responsibility was apparent through its official role as the authority responsible for conducting the annual Moslem pilgrimage convoy, from Egypt and North Africa to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in the Arabian Peninsula. In order to guard the convoy’s safe passage, the Egyptians had based small guard posts beyond its own boundaries. The ‘Nah’al Fort’ in the centre of Sinai protected the Darb-El-Haj (the pilgrims’ route) land route, which served the pilgrims on their way from Egypt to Hijaz. Another unit was placed in the port town of A-Tur, through which the sea route from Suez to Jeddah, in the Arabian Peninsula, passed. Egypt had placed additional guard posts outside its boundaries, in the small town of Aqaba and in various other locations in the Arabian Peninsula. This activity fuelled the demand for a new separation line in Palestine’s area. The Khadib (governor) of Egypt died at the beginning of 1892, ten years after the British consolidation there. According to the existing custom, the Ottoman Sultan would now reconfirm the right of Muhammad Ali’s heirs to rule Egypt, within the boundaries that were determined in 1841. This time, the formal approval was preceded by negotiations between the British administration in Egypt and the Ottoman government, in order to determine Egypt’s borders and to delimit its control area in Sinai. The importance of the desolate Sinai desert had increased by the end of the nineteenth century, following the construction of the Suez Canal, that was dug between the years 1859–69 and turned into a central maritime route, especially for the British Empire. The British did not want to see Ottoman control over the canal, especially because imperialist Germany, Britain’s competitor, had been expanding its influence at the Sultan’s court. The use of big steamships for transporting pilgrims on their way from Egypt to Jeddah cancelled the need to operate the Egyptian guard posts in Sinai and in the Arabian Peninsula, and the evacuation of the coastal posts started in 1887. In 1892, British Egypt supported the settlement attempt of a converted Jew named Paul Freedman,33 in the Midian area – on the Arabian Peninsula, east of the Gulf of Aqaba. The British claimed that this attempt pushed the Ottomans to increase their pressure to evacuate the Egyptian posts from the territory of Hijaz, but the death of the Egyptian Khadib halted this activity. The discussions regarding the reconfirmation of the dynasty’s rule renewed the engagement in the Egyptian control points in Sinai and Hijaz. The possession of the Hijaz forts was viewed as unnecessary, and the Egyptians returned them to Ottoman hands in 1892. The town of Aqaba

30

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

was returned as well, and it was now governed from Hijaz. Things were different when it came to the Nah’al Fort and Sinai. The 1841 map showed the British that the border of the area that was intended to remain under direct Ottoman control reached the Suez Canal and even crossed it (which might explain the ‘losing’ of that map in Egypt). This is why the British consul in Cairo, Evelyn Baring – later Lord Cromer – launched a series of military and diplomatic actions, in order to achieve an official separation of the Ottomans from the canal. Cromer was the head figure in determining the north-eastern boundary of Egypt, and he claimed that this border ran from El-Arish to Aqaba and along the Gulf of Aqaba, unlike the popular notion in those days. The line eventually transformed into Palestine’s southern border. This baseless claim was probably made in order to deny the Ottomans access to the canal, and in order to avoid their control over the Monastery of St Catherine and the town of A-Tur. Cromer acted independently, without consulting the Foreign Office, and his efforts to change the control status were unsuccessful. The Ottoman Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, sent Egypt a telegram in which he reconfirmed the rule of Ali’s dynasty, on 1 April 1892. The Sultan addressed the issue of Egypt’s control over areas outside its boundaries. He wrote that: Your highness is well aware that His Majesty the Sultan had ordered the positioning of Egyptian policemen that will secure the pilgrimage in El-Waja, Muwalla, Daba and Aqaba, and in a few other places on the coast of Sinai, in the past. All of these points are absent from the map that marked Egypt’s boundaries, which was given to Muhammad Ali. El-Waja was already returned to the province of Hijaz, and the other three points were added to it recently. The status quo in the Sinai Peninsula will prevail, and it will be governed by the Khadib just as has been governed in the days of your father and your grandfather.34 On the basis of this telegram, Cromer informed the Egyptian Foreign Minister on 13 April 1892 that he believed that it confirmed Ottoman recognition of the Aqaba–El-Arish line as Egypt’s boundary. Even though the Ottoman government did not accept this interpretation, the British administration in Egypt now viewed this line as the border between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. During the years 1892–1906 it was Egypt that funded the operation of the desert forts and controlled the Sinai Peninsula. Guard posts were established in Nah’al, Nuweiba and A-Tur, and a permanent garrison was placed there, under the earlier procedure of manning these posts during the annual pilgrimage. The Egyptian government granted a European company a concession for developing the turquoise mines in western Sinai. The Ottoman authorities, on the other hand, established an administrative sub-district in the town of Aqaba, which was recently returned. No

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

31

apparent practical actions, regarding the El-Arish–Aqaba line, were taken for some eight years, but at the beginning of the twentieth century, things started to change. In 1899, the Ottoman government started building a new city in the Negev, Beersheba, in order to enforce its control over the Bedouins in the south of Palestine, and in an attempt to place territorial facts in the way of British expansion aspirations. The British responded by trying to establish their control along a line lying east of the separation line, and they determined that their area stretched up to the Rafah–Aqaba line.35 Two Egyptian officers were sent out to mark a line that originated ‘on the seashore, thirty miles north-east of El-Arish’. Cromer’s report to London stated that in his opinion, this line (Aqaba–Rafah) should be adopted, instead of bearing ‘a Turkish control, forty miles from the Canal’.36 These unilateral British actions continued, and in 1902 a thorough survey of the Bedouins in the Rafah region was carried out. Wilfred Jennings-Bramly, a British officer who served under the British Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF), did this survey. It held information about all the tribes and the sub-tribes that resided in east and north-east Sinai, and the western Negev, and it listed grazing areas, agricultural land, inter-tribal relationships, water sources and more.37 A British officer openly carried out the survey, and it did not cause any Ottoman objections. Surveys of this type had been done in Palestine without any disturbances for decades. A British idea that was to lead to the settlement of Jews in the vicinity of El-Arish was put forward during the autumn of that year.38 Cromer initially agreed to this idea, but he offered to establish the settlement east of ElArish, claiming that ‘the Turks and the Egyptians have yet to agree upon the border between El-Arish and Aqaba’, and Theodor Herzl, the founder of the Zionist Organization, accepted this proposal. Jennings-Bramly, who was very familiar with the area, was offered as a consultant to the Zionist delegation that inspected it. In the end, Cromer rejected the whole idea, partially because he feared that a Jewish settlement in this area would ‘remind’ the Ottomans to address the delimitation problem, and to claim that a foreign settlement was not permitted in the province of Hijaz, which included Sinai in it. The unsettled disagreement regarding the line location blocked the discussion about the possible establishment of a future Jewish settlement in the region, and stopped the first Zionist settling initiative. No further attempts to strengthen the demand for the Rafah–Aqaba border were made by the British between 1902 and 1905, and the situation in the area remained unclear. On one hand, the establishment of Beersheba improved Ottoman control of the area and so did the foundation of the Aqaba administration. On the other hand, the British administration in Egypt continued to establish ties with the Bedouins of southern Palestine. A new factor became influential in 1904. The Hijaz Railway, built by the Ottoman Empire with German planning and with funding from the

32

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

Moslem world, had reached the town of Ma’an, east of the Arava valley. Cromer feared that the Ottomans would try to build an extension line towards Aqaba, just like the branch line they had built towards Haifa and the Mediterranean Sea. He claimed that by doing so, the Ottomans would bypass the British-controlled Suez Canal, and a direct connection between the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea would become available for them and their German allies to use.39 This turn of events awakened British interest regarding Sinai. Cromer reported to London that riots and Bedouin raids were occurring, and he ‘was forced’ to replace the Egyptian official who governed Sinai, with a British one. Jennings-Bramly was appointed governor of Sinai by the end of 1904. He received a sum of £5,000 to organize administrative and military control of the area. Jennings-Bramly, who was very familiar with the area following the survey that he had carried out in 1902, proposed his ideas concerning a new regional boundary. His proposal was based on geographic, physical and human factors, and it coincided with Cromer’s territorial ambitions.40 According to Jennings-Bramly’s ideas, the border was to originate at the Mediterranean Sea, north-west of Rafah, and to continue south for ten miles (16 km), then west to a point south of El-Arish. Brawer hypothesizes that this line delimitated the area belonging to the Sawakhra Bedouin tribe, which was meant to remain under British–Egyptian control.41 From here the proposed line passed along the eastern bank of Wadi El-Arish, and it continued in a south-eastern direction following a number of dry river beds until it joined Wadi Arava. Here the proposed line would turn and continue southward until it reached the Gulf of Aqaba, west of the town, which was supposed to remain under Ottoman control. This line left most of the water sources in the south of Palestine under British–Egyptian control, and it coincided with the Bedouin’s territorial division, while enabling proper military defence along the river beds in the area. The British administration in Egypt rejected this line as too complex and impractical. The second proposal was much simpler: the shortest possible line between the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba, which translates into a straight line from Rafah to Aqaba. In 1906, Cromer decided to act in the area, which he regarded as Egypt’s. He hoped that these activities would approve the claims he had been making since 1892, and especially in 1902. Along the line that Cromer envisaged, was a main through route that connected Aqaba, through Quntila and Qseimme, with Gaza on the Mediterranean coast. This route was outside the area that was claimed by Egypt, and it had been used in 1904 by the Ottoman army that was headed for Yemen. Now Cromer decided that this route too, should be under British control. He ordered Jennings-Bramly, through his direct commander Richard Owen, who was in charge of military intelligence in Egypt, to leave his post in Nah’al, and to seize a frontal position in Umm Rash-Rash (present-day Eilat), between Aqaba and the Aqaba ascent (Naqb-el-Aqaba).42 Jennings-

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

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Bramly and his five escorting Egyptian gendarmes reached that point on 10 January 1906. The Ottoman commander of Aqaba questioned him about his activities, and Jennings-Bramly answered that he had been ordered to establish a police station in Umm Rash-Rash, and others along the route to Gaza. After long discussions, the two officers decided that Umm Rash-Rash’s status was unclear, and until they solved the question Jennings-Bramly was allowed to stay there. An Ottoman colonel called Rushdi was inspecting the return of the Ottoman forces from Yemen, and he happened to be in Aqaba at the time. The Ottoman Empire had a telegraph communication line between Aqaba and Damascus, and from there to Istanbul. After reporting the incident to the central government, Rushdi was appointed as the top commander in the area, and four days later he returned to JenningsBramly and notified him that he must evacuate his post immediately because it was situated on Ottoman land. Jennings-Bramly retreated to Nah’al and Rushdi established a guard post in Umm Rash-Rash (thus laying the foundations for the establishment of Eilat). During all this time, Rushdi was enjoying a direct telegraph connection with Syria and Istanbul, while the British lacked such a connection between Aqaba and Nah’al, and were forced to base their communications on camel riders. The Ottomans hastily sent troops to Aqaba, to strengthen their forces in the area, and meanwhile Owen ordered Jennings-Bramly to return to the head of the Gulf and to meet up with the Egyptian coastguard ship Nur ElBah’er. This ship was supposed to arrive with supplementary forces. Rushdi managed to fortify Umm Rash-Rash, and to send soldiers to seize Naqb ElAqaba and Taba, with its waterhole, before Jennings-Bramly’s return. Because he could not land in Aqaba or in Taba, Jennings-Bramly retreated and landed fifty Egyptian soldiers on Coral Island (Firan Island), and led them on foot to Aqaba. Upon his arrival he learned that Rushdi had captured Taba the previous night, following the arrival of the ship, and that he did so after receiving a direct telegraph order from the Grand Vizier in Istanbul. Armed Egyptian soldiers faced a large Ottoman force in Aqaba, without a solution in sight. Nothing happened in the area in the months that followed the incident in Umm Rash-Rash. A British warship that arrived in the Gulf did not impress the Ottomans, who strengthened their posts with additional soldiers. At the end of April, British troops tried to land close to Rafah, after the Ottomans had removed the border markings that they had placed there in 1902. In this case too, they confronted large Ottoman defence forces, and they retreated from this plan. The British government viewed the incident as an opportunity to reinforce its position in the south-eastern Mediterranean, and it launched diplomatic steps that were backed by a military force. Cromer had achieved his goal. The British government did not

34

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

respond to any of his early appeals, to view the determination of a new borderline as a British interest, and it did not exert its influence on the matter. Now the British government changed its response, and in May 1906 started to press the Ottoman government, among others, by sending supplementary soldiers to Egypt, and by ordering the Mediterranean fleet to sail towards Piraeus, in Greece.43 The Ottoman government tried to resist the British pressure by offering a few compromise ideas. In one of them it was said that the Egyptians would control two areas in Sinai: the first one north of the Suez–Rafah line (the same area that delimited Egypt in 1841), and the other one south of a line that would connect Suez and Aqaba through the centre of Sinai, while the triangle Suez–Rafah–Aqaba would remain under Ottoman control. Cromer rejected this idea, claiming that this triangle would permit the building of an Ottoman railroad from Ma’an to Aqaba, and on to Suez, and that such direct access to the canal should not be allowed. The Ottomans then proposed to divide Sinai by a line that would start in El-Arish, and continue south, to Ras-Muhammad. This idea was rejected as well. The British wanted a stronghold in the Gulf of Aqaba, to ensure that the Ottomans would not be able to endanger the sea route from Suez to India.44 When they learned that the Ottoman regime was refusing to give up controlling Sinai, the British ambassador delivered an ultimatum to the Sultan, on 3 May 1906. In the ultimatum, the British government demanded to establish a bilateral boundary committee in ten days, without which it would be forced to take significant steps. The British forces in the Mediterranean Sea started advancing towards the Dardanelle straits, and they even occupied a few islands in the Aegean Sea. The Ottoman Sultan received no help from the French, the Russians or the Germans, and so accepted the British demands. On 14 May 1906, the Sultan agreed to evacuate his troops from Taba, and to determine an administrative separation line between the Ottoman province of Hijaz and the district of Jerusalem and the Sinai Peninsula. This border was supposed to connect a point in the western Rafah, in a straight line with a point in the Gulf of Aqaba, three miles (4.8 km) west of Aqaba.45 In this agreement, the first boundary that was related to Palestine had been determined. The special district of Jerusalem comprised the country’s heartland, and the agreement specifically mentioned the administrative separation line between this region and Sinai. Even though deep political involvement was invested in determining the line, it was not defined in 1906 as anything more than an administrative line, that separated two territories that were subject to one supreme ruler, the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman authorities were careful to avoid mentioning Egypt’s existence on the other side of the line, and the agreement discussed a line that separates districts – Jerusalem and Hijaz on one side and Sinai on the other. The British chose to ignore the line’s

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

35

legal meaning, and from here onwards they treated it as an international boundary. The agreement that was signed in May 1906 had nothing to do with the placing of facts in the area. It was only the delimitation step, in which the separation line’s course was determined. In order to determine the accurate location of the line, it was necessary to map the area, and to mark it in its place. Detailed maps of this area did not exist, and the demarcation committee had to map the area in which the border was to pass, in addition to the job of marking it. To accomplish this task, a combined British–Ottoman delegation left for the area by the end of the summer of 1906, and worked for forty days along the proposed line.46 This delegation surveyed and mapped a 10 km-wide strip, through which the administrative separation line was to pass. In addition, measurements that were to aid in determining certain points along the line that connected Rafah with the Gulf of Aqaba’s coast were made. The task of mapping and marking was started in Rafah, and ended in the Gulf of Aqaba. During the course of surveying and measuring, the local Ottoman commander, Rushdi Pasha, demanded that the border should connect with the coast at Ras-Taba, and not at the Gulf’s northern tip, three miles from Aqaba, as the agreement provided. His demand was accepted and the border was placed some distance from Aqaba so that the head of the Gulf remained in Ottoman hands, while the British consolidated to the west of Ras-Taba. Due to the marking difficulties, and because of errors that occurred in the course of it, there were diversions from the line. These were mainly apparent in the proximity and west of the Ramon crater, but the two sides chose to leave the line as it was marked. Final agreement regarding the border’s delimitation was signed on 1 October 1906, and it included maps and physical markings.47 With it, a first actual boundary that was to become the boundary of mandate Palestine (and later on, the international boundary between the State of Israel and Egypt) was determined. Shortly after, in December 1906, both sides started to build permanent constructions for marking the border. Despite the great effort that was put into the border’s demarcation and despite the numerous measurements that accompanied the process, the marking wasn’t always correct, and it didn’t always fit the text found in the agreement. When the boundary markers wanted to determine its accurate location seventy-five years later, during the peace settlement between Israel and Egypt, they encountered difficulties about the accurate location of a number of border points, and the discussions that followed lasted a few years.48 In setting the 1906 line Britain achieved all its strategic and its local tactical goals. The Ottoman Empire (with the inclusion of Palestine) was cut off and driven away from the Suez Canal, and it was devoid of any ability to threaten it in a military or economic way. If the Ottomans had any plans to build a railroad to Aqaba and to Suez, they were cancelled and forgotten, and it took seventy years for constructing the Aqaba–Ma’an

Figure 4 The administrative separation line between Sinai and the provinces of Hijaz and Jerusalem, 1906. Source: British Survey of Egypt, 1906.

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

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line, which was built by Jordan. The Sinai desert, considered a serious obstacle to the passing of armies according to Napoleon’s descriptions and according to the British conception, stood now as an impassable barrier between the Ottoman army and the Suez Canal. El-Arish, the most important strategic point for defending Sinai, remained in British hands. The Bedouin tribes of the south of Palestine were cut off from their centres in Sinai, and they had to rely on Beersheba and Gaza from then onwards.49 Palestine’s south was cut off from all the water sources in the north of Sinai. The area’s main spring, Ein-Quderath (biblical Kadesh Barnéa), together with the rest of the springs between Rafah and El-Arish, stayed in Egyptian territory. The British achievement regarding the water issue is outstanding. The agreement stated that in times of peace, Ottoman soldiers and policemen would be permitted to cross the line, and to use the wells and the springs on the Egyptian side of the line. The Egyptian soldiers, who did not need this privilege, were not granted it in the first place.50 In addition to the loss of water resources, the Ottoman Empire (with Palestine included) lost control over the area’s main route, the way from Gaza to Aqaba. Most of this route, excluding its northern part, remained in Egypt’s territory. From this point in time and until the end of the 1930s, the majority of transport from Beersheba and Gaza to Umm RashRash and Aqaba passed through Egypt. The route ran from Beersheba to Auja-El-Hafir (Nizzanna), crossed the separation line, continued through Egyptian territory to Qseimme and Quntilla, and crossed back into Palestine on the top of the Ras-El-Naqb. From here, the way continued along the shore to Aqaba. This fact had played a major role in preventing the development of the southern Negev during the British mandate era. Water shortage and difficult accessibility had thus far prevented the adequate development of this important region. The 1906 line was the first borderline in Palestine that had gone through the whole process of boundary determination. Britain and the Ottoman Empire, which discussed and determined that the Sinai Peninsula would be separated from Palestine, made the ‘allocation’ step. In the ‘delimitation’ stage it was determined that the borderline would be a straight line running between Rafah and a point on the Gulf of Aqaba, three miles west of the town. During the ‘demarcation’ stage the accurate location of the line was determined, and it was marked and mapped. From then onwards, living conditions were dictated by the borderline. Although the Bedouin tribes did not recognize or accept this line, they were forced to fit their migration habits according to it. The Ottoman regime established a new police station on the line, in Umm Rash-Rash, a place that was previously unsettled. Later on, this regime built a new settlement in Auja-El-Hafir (Nizzanna), along the way from Beersheba towards Qseimme and near the separation line, in a region that had been unsettled for hundreds of years. Rafah, now gaining importance as a

38

Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

border point along the main route between Palestine and Egypt, had started developing as an independent settlement, in place of the ruins that lay there prior to the boundary’s establishment. The Egyptian side of the border did not experience much activity during the years that preceded World War I. In 1907, Cromer still thought it necessary to report on the occurrences in Sinai. But the years went by and the Ottoman Empire did not challenge the separation line, and after Cromer was done with his service in Egypt, the borderline was all but forgotten. The new British representative in Egypt, Lord Milner, appointed Colonel Parker the governor of Sinai, and he moved the British headquarters from Nah’al (where Jennings-Bramly had placed them when he was governing Sinai) to El-Arish. This step strengthened British control over the Peninsula’s semi-fertile and most strategic region – the passage between Palestine and Egypt. Prior to World War I, while the Ottomans were busy fighting the Italians over control of Libya, the British tried to capture a stronghold in Aqaba, to ensure that the borderline would be determined according to their initial plan. Ottoman forces that protected the area prevented a successful British landing, and no such changes occurred.51 Together with this, it was British cartographic research that brought with it borderline corrections, especially in its southern part. As was mentioned earlier, no detailed regional map existed at the time of the line’s demarcation, and the surveyors had to map the area where the line was to be marked. The British PEF had expanded its archaeological researches on to the southern Negev and Sinai, just before World War I. The British archaeologist Leonard Woolley was travelling in the region, and T. E. Lawrence, who later gained recognition because of his joint activities with the Arabs during the war, was his helper. Although Lawrence was a British officer, the archaeological research team operated in the southern Negev, in an area that was under Ottoman control, without any disturbances until it reached the Gulf area. The local Ottoman commander, who was conscious of the constant British attempts to gain control over the area, ordered the team to leave the region immediately without allowing them to complete the archaeological survey. A report of this survey was published in 1915,52 during the war, and it contained a supplementation of the PEF’s mapping work. For the first time ever, Palestine’s southern area was mapped on a large scale of one inch to one mile (1:63,630). This map had many cartographic innovations, among them the marking of altitude lines, but it contained many topographic errors such as in river beds’ and mountain ranges’ location. Nevertheless, the surveyors had drawn the administrative separation line on the map, and marked the location of its border stones and marking points. Comparing this map with the 1906 map shows that certain border points, which did not fit in with the British ambitions, were marked in 1915 according to British needs. In this way, the point that was positioned

Figure 5 Palestine and Sinai, 1915: the ‘Lawrence map’. Source: British Survey of Egypt, 1915.

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Delimitation in the late Ottoman period

on the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba was moved to a north-eastern location, next to Taba well. The range, from which Aqaba could be watched and bombed, passed into Egyptian hands instead of serving as a protective barrier for Aqaba, as was determined in the 1906 agreement. This change, along with other changes, caused conflicts between the states of Israel and Egypt when they had to draw the international boundary between them almost seventy years later. The Lawrence map that was initially published in 1915 as a secret British military map had become the official map of the southern part of Palestine, in spite of the errors that it contained. Dozens of maps were prepared according to it, during World War I and after it. The separation line, as it was marked on the Lawrence map, appeared on all the maps that were prepared in Egypt and in Palestine, in the period between the two World Wars. Even though it was different from the original 1906 line, this borderline was accepted as the separation line between Palestine and Egypt, and although the Lawrence map’s topographic errors were corrected later on, the separation line that was to be mistaken for an international boundary was not changed. The 1906 line was the first borderline that was determined on the maps of Palestine. In addition to its local geographic importance, it is the oldest existing borderline in modern Palestine. Although it was determined as an administrative separation line, not as an international boundary, it was later fixed as Palestine’s southern boundary for generations, despite the many vicissitudes that the region had experienced.

2

The allocation stage World War I and the division of the Middle East

The fighting forces and their territorial aspirations The outcome of World War I and the events that took place between 1914 and 1918 had turned Palestine into a defined territorial unit with clear boundaries for the first time in the modern era. The political debates and military actions that hastened the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire created a vacuum in the Middle East. The victorious nations, mainly Britain and France, redesigned the post-war map of the region, and Palestine was formed as a part of this process. The delimitation of Palestine’s boundaries was done partially through the splitting of control areas among the victorious nations, and partially through an internal territorial reorganization of the area that Great Britain controlled following the war. Extensive diplomatic activity that took place during the war and after its termination, and military moves that occurred in the Middle East region, eventually determined Palestine’s boundaries. These new boundaries first appeared on the maps of the post-war world. The Ottoman Empire joined the war on 5 November 1914, and fought alongside the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria) against the Coalition (Britain, France, Russia and later Italy and the United States too). Thus, these were the superpowers that were to deal with the future of the Middle East. An Ottoman–German victory should have kept the situation without a change, but a victory of the Coalition was supposed to create a new Middle East. Great Britain controlled a number of Middle Eastern political strongholds prior to the war. It practically ruled Egypt, Cypress and Aden while having a row of agreements with Arab sheiks along the Persian Gulf. France on the other hand had religious, political and commercial interests on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, especially in Palestine and in Lebanon. Just like Russia and Italy, it aspired to gain influence and control over the holy sites1 in Palestine. The French aimed at securing their control over the whole area – from the Egyptian border in the south (the 1906 line) to Aleppo and Alexandretta Bay in the north, including the Mosul region of northern Mesopotamia. Britain aspired to strengthen

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The allocation during World World I

its grip on the Persian Gulf, and to expand its control to northern Mesopotamia as it had knowledge of the existence of natural oil springs there, hoping to find plenty of oil there. The war activities in the western Middle East focused Britain’s attention on Palestine. The Ottoman army’s offensive assault (with German planning and support) on the Suez Canal had failed militarily.2 Anyhow it proved to Britain that the Sinai desert could no longer be considered a natural barrier in an era of modern war – aided by railroads and motorized transport over land. The desert barrier was easily crossed and Britain understood that a modern military force stationed in Palestine was a constant threat to the Suez Canal – the ‘lifeline’ of the British Empire. This is why Britain wanted to gain control over all of the area between Palestine in the west and Mesopotamia in the east. It aimed at creating a land connection between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea via the construction of roads, railroads and an oil pipeline.3 Russia had no territorial plans regarding Palestine, and it focused its ambitions on other parts of the Ottoman Empire – in the vicinity of Istanbul, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles straits, and in parts of eastern Anatolia and Armenia. The Italians, who had occupied Ottoman land in Libya and in the Dodecanese Islands, to the south-west of Anatolia, just before the war, wanted to receive international recognition of their control over these areas. Both Russia and Italy opposed the possibility that one European force would exclusively control the holy sites in Palestine.4 The contradicting aspirations among the members of the Coalition formed the basis of the discussions about the possible future division of the Ottoman Empire’s lands when the war terminated with its collapse. France demanded Palestine as soon as the war broke out. Russia, France’s close ally, which initially agreed to this demand, rejected it later on because it didn’t want to experience Catholic control over a place that contained so many interests for the Russian Orthodox Church. The French government officially requested the Czar’s support for its claim to future control over Palestine and Syria in March 1915. The Russians rejected the part that dealt with the holy sites, and recruited Britain’s help on the matter. The British government refused to hold official discussions about the future of the Ottoman lands before the empire had collapsed. Nevertheless, in April that year the Cabinet had appointed a committee of experts led by Sir Mauritz De Bunsen in order to discuss British interests in the Middle East.5 Confronted by British and Russian resistance, France had slightly retreated from its original claim, and now demanded control over parts of Palestine and the internationalization of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The Russians objected and argued that the holy sites included Nazareth, Galilee and the Sea of Galilee, and that they would not accept Catholic control over these sites. While France and Russia were busy discussing the future of the holy sites, Britain was confronted by the German–Ottoman

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threat to the Suez Canal, and demanded that all of Palestine from Haifa to Aqaba, should become a neutral zone. The De Bunsen committee concluded, in its final report on 30 June 1915, that all of Palestine’s area should become a neutral zone. This is how Britain and Russia stood together, opposing the French claim to full control of Palestine.

The British–French discussion and the Sykes–Picot agreement When two more interested groups, the Zionist Organization and the Arabs, joined the claim circle over the Ottoman lands, official negotiations between Britain and France were commenced. These talks began in October 1915. Sir Arthur Nicholson represented Britain, and was later replaced by Sir Mark Sykes. Georges Picot represented France.6 After five months of discussion, in March 1916, a British–French agreement about the post-war division of the Ottoman Empire was signed.7 It became known as the ‘Sykes–Picot’ agreement. While this agreement was signed, the related area was fully controlled by the Ottoman Empire. The empire’s military-political situation at that time was much better than it was when the war broke out. The Ottomans practically controlled the Sinai Peninsula, beating the British forces in southern Mesopotamia, and enjoy a local victory after the British army had failed in landing forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Nevertheless, the future of the Middle East was determined two and a half years before the end of the war, and the new boundaries were already marked. According to the Sykes–Picot agreement, which would later be signed by Russia and Italy too, France was to obtain direct control over most of the Mediterranean Sea’s eastern coast, from Ras El Naqura (north of Acre) in the south to Alexandretta (Iskanderun) Bay in the north. In addition France would control the south of Asiatic Turkey, in the Cilicia region. The French territory stretched east towards the Syrian–African Rift from the town of Aleppo to the Sea of Galilee. The French area was coloured blue on the map that accompanied the agreement, and was thus called the ‘Blue Area’. In Palestine, France was supposed to control all the land from Ras El Naqura to the Sea of Galilee, including Upper Galilee, the town of Safed, Lake Hula and the northern part of the Jordan river. The territory that stretched east of the ‘Blue Area’, north of the Yarmouk river line, all the way to Mosul in northern Mesopotamia, was called ‘Area A’. This was meant to be a French-influenced area in which a French-dependent Arab state would be established. The Golan, the Houran and all of Jebal Druze (Druze’s mountain) were included in this area. Britain, which centred its ambitions in the Persian Gulf region, was supposed to achieve full control over the ‘Red Area’. This area included the central and southern parts of Mesopotamia, from Baghdad to the Persian

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The allocation during World World I

Plate 1 Sir Mark Sykes (1879–1919); courtesy Zionist Archive, Jerusalem.

Gulf. In Palestine, Britain was destined to hold Haifa Bay, the cities of Haifa and Acre and the plain between them. Britain planned to construct a deep-water port in Haifa that would also serve as a terminal for a future oil pipeline and for a railroad that would connect Mesopotamia with the Mediterranean coast. Like France, Britain too was expected to establish an Arab dependent state. ‘Area B’ was the area under British influence,

Figure 6 The division of Palestine according to the Sykes and Picot agreement, 1916.

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The allocation during World World I

which was intended for this purpose. It lay west of the ‘Red Area’, south of the Yarmouk river, east of the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan line. The southern part of that area stretched from the 1906 line and Aqaba Bay eastward to the Persian Gulf through the Negev and the lands east of the Arava. The idea of creating a neutral zone around the holy sites led to the formation of an area that was supposed to be co-governed by Britain, France, Russia and Italy with representatives from the Arab world. This area was referred to as the ‘International Area’, and it was coloured brown on the original map. It was situated in the central part of Palestine, including the area that is delimited by the line that passes from Ras el Naqura to the Sea of Galilee. From there, along the River Jordan to the Dead Sea (without the Dead Sea itself), and from there to the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, south of Gaza. As mentioned earlier, the Haifa Bay region was promised to Britain and it did not belong to the ‘International Area’. The division of the Ottoman Empire according to the Sykes–Picot agreement was marked on maps, but these maps were to a very small scale of 1:2,000,000 because they dealt with all of the Middle East’s area and not solely with Palestine. This created great difficulties in identifying and marking the accurate placement of the lines on large-scale maps.8 The Sykes–Picot agreement is an example of the how imperialist superpowers delimited parts of the world without considering the area’s geographical attributes and condition. This type of division characterizes the international policy throughout the nineteenth century and up to World War I, and we can regard this agreement as the peak of the process. Together with that, some new elements that were absent from any other general division in other parts of the world can be identified here. The idea of international co-governing of an area in accordance with its religious importance to the whole world was first introduced by this agreement. A similar idea was introduced before the war in the city of Tangiers in Morocco, although the initiative there was a political-commercial one. The concept of combined international control was initially proposed regarding all of Palestine. It continued to be addressed, in this form or in others, in subsequent plans that dealt with the partition of Palestine under British rule, and prior to the establishment of the State of Israel. The idea of creating an ‘international zone’ in Jerusalem and its vicinity, as was presented in the UN partition plan for Palestine in 1947 as well as in the talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, was also a direct product and a continued concept of what was being proposed by the Sykes–Picot agreement.

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Negotiations between Britain and the Arabs: the Hussein–McMahon correspondence Taking the will of local inhabitants into consideration, and relating to the Arabs and to their demands, were also novel components in international agreements concerning the division of the world. The Sykes–Picot agreement had inventively recognized the religious and nationalist aspirations of the region’s inhabitants, which is different from following the official claims and ambitions of an existing state. Nevertheless, the Arabs had been involved in the occurrences that took place in the Middle East from the beginning of the war. The British government and its representatives had contacts with the most important Arab family in the Ottoman Empire – the family of the Sharif Hussein, who was in charge of the Muslim holy sites in Mecca and Medina, in the Arabian Peninsula. The British were seeking allies in their war against the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East, especially in the wake of the Ottoman attacks on Egypt and following their own failures in Mesopotamia and Gallipoli. The British administrators in Egypt were trying to turn the Arabs against the Ottoman Empire and used the long-standing tension between the ruling Turks and the subject Arabs, in order to ignite a revolt. In exchange for a military force that would fight alongside Britain, Hussein demanded recognition of an Arab independent state that would stretch south of the Taurus mountains, on all of the Arab area that belonged to the Ottoman Empire.9 An extensive exchange of letters between the Sharif Hussein of Mecca and the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, took place during 1915. The Arab demands were discussed in these letters. McMahon agreed on behalf of the British government: to recognize and to support an Arab state, on the area that the Arabs demanded excluding the Marsina and Alexandretta regions, and the parts of Syria that are situated west of the districts of Aleppo, Hamma, Homs and Damascus. These parts cannot be regarded as ‘purely Arab’, and they must be excluded from the area that was demanded . . . As far as the lands within this area, about which Great Britain has freedom to do as it wishes to, without harming the interest of its ally France . . . according to the mentioned correction, Great Britain is ready to recognize and support Arab independence in all the lands that are demanded by the Sharif of Mecca.10 This letters exchange, that became known as the ‘Hussein–McMahon correspondence’, did not culminate in a written and signed agreement, but Britain and the Arabs effectively agreed to the conditions that were mentioned in them. The Arabs established a military force, which was commanded by Hussein’s son Faisal and that was inspired by ‘Lawrence of Arabia’, which fought alongside the British against the Ottoman Empire.

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The allocation during World World I

The letters exchange occurred before the official talks over the future of the Middle East between Britain and France began, although the echo of those early discussions is apparent in the British–Arab correspondence. Britain was considerate of the French demand to control the Christian region in Lebanon, and of its ally’s aspirations regarding Palestine, which is why the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea was excluded from the area that was promised to the Arabs. Palestine was never even mentioned in the letters exchange, but the discussion over its inclusion in the area promised by the British to the Arabs had become a central question in the relationship between the two sides during the years in which the British government ruled Palestine. The discussion over this historical-political question has yet to end. The expression ‘west of the districts of Aleppo, Hamma, Homs and Damascus’ was too general and it created a multitude of possible meanings about its territorial inclusions and about the promises about Palestine. The British government constantly claimed that Palestine was never promised to Hussein, and that the geographic description regarded the vilayets (provinces) of Aleppo, Hamma, Homs and mainly Damascus. Prior to the war, the Damascus (A-Sham) vilayet extended all the way to the Gulf of Aqaba. Palestine is situated to the west of this area, and therefore was not a part of the area that was promised to the Arabs in the letters. Britain also claimed that it could set aside only ‘areas in which it had freedom to do as it wished to with’, and Palestine was not an area of that kind because of the French demands. An expression of the geographic settlement situation that existed while these early discussions took place is the fact that they lack mention of any important town west of the Jordan river, because at that time there was no important town south of Damascus. The Arabs claimed later – and the Arabs and other historians continue arguing to this day – that the vilayet (province) of Damascus didn’t exist at all. Instead, there was a district (sanjak) under this name, and it only surrounded the city of Damascus. The vilayet was called ‘Syria A-Sham’ and this name was not mentioned in the letters exchange. Therefore, according to this explanation, Palestine was part of the area that was promised to the Arabs. The discussion over this historical-politicalgeographic question has not ended yet, but the influence of the unofficial understanding between Britain and the Arabs is already apparent in the Sykes–Picot agreement, which was signed later. The planned establishment of two independent Arab states, one under British patronage and the other under French patronage, results from the agreement between Britain and the Arabs. Despite the difference between the written agreement and the promise to establish one Arab state, that would be controlled by Hussein in the Arabian Middle East, it does hold a recognition of the Arabs’ right to establish independent states in this region. There are of course other discrepancies, such as the plan about the parts in southern Mesopotamia that Britain wanted for itself. But apart from the

The allocation during World World I

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lands that were promised to France and Britain, and the ‘Brown Area’ in the centre of Palestine, which were not included in the area that was promised to the Arabs as far as Britain was concerned, there are no real differences between the two agreements. Considering the demands of the local inhabitants (and not the political reality that was already extant) was in itself the opening of a ‘new era’ in the way external imperialist superpowers divided the world. This concept was about to yield more fruits with the new division of Europe following the war and the formation of more national states that would soon appear on the world map.

The Zionist organization and the Balfour Declaration An additional political actor, the Zionist Organization, regarded World War I as an opportunity to achieve a political foothold in Palestine. The Jewish people had ancient aspirations of returning to Eretz Israel. These aspirations received a practical push with the beginning of the ‘Return to Zion’ process at the end of the nineteenth century, and with the establishment of the political tool, the Zionist Organization, for achieving this goal. The Zionist Organization and its institutions regarded the war and the future collapse of the Ottoman Empire as an excellent opportunity to gain international recognition in the Jewish aspiration to Eretz Israel. Zionist activity during the war was mainly in the form of attempts to influence the British government, which they saw as the central power that would determine the issue of Palestine. Herbert Samuel, the Jewish Home Secretary in the British government, met Sir Edmond Grey, the Foreign Secretary, in November 1914, immediately after the Ottoman Empire joined the war. Samuel, who was a known supporter of the Zionist idea, presented the proposal to establish a Jewish autonomous region in Palestine and was encouraged by Grey’s positive approach.11 In a memorandum that he prepared and presented in January 1915 to Herbert Asquith, the leader of his party and Prime Minister, he proposed that Britain should demand control over Palestine as soon as the war was over. The leaders of the Zionist Organization in Britain, headed by Dr Chaim Weizmann, began advocating the demand for the recognition of the Jewish aspirations to Palestine. Through a set of long and exhausting negotiations with the British government and its different representatives, and with additional international actors in France, the United States and Russia, the Zionist Organization managed to receive the ‘Balfour Declaration’. The declaration was published on 2 November 1917, in a letter that was sent by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Balfour, to Lord Rothschild. It promised that ‘HM government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object . . .’.12 This declaration did not include any geographic boundaries, and the term ‘in Palestine’ was emphasized. It did not state that Palestine would be the Jewish

Plate 2 Chaim Azriel Weizmann (1874–1952); courtesy Zionist Archive, Jerusalem.

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national home. The absence of border specifications allowed every side to translate and present its own understanding of how Jewish Palestine should be delimitated. At that time, the Zionist Organization did not demand to gain political control over Palestine–Eretz Israel, but rather to create a ‘large Palestine’ under British government. The agreements that were reached during the war, especially the Sykes–Picot agreement, were the first stages in determining the boundaries of post-war Palestine – the ‘allocation’ stage. In two of the three discussions that may have influenced the future of Palestine, there was a general addressing of the issue of borderlines, but accurate delimitation was not achieved. The only agreement that was accompanied by a map, the Sykes–Picot agreement, had a small-scale map at 1:2,000,000 which allowed different interpretations concerning the line’s placement, especially in the Palestine region. Nevertheless, the Balfour Declaration, the Hussein–McMahon correspondence and the Sykes–Picot agreement were the frame and the basis for all future discussion about Palestine’s boundaries. These discussions, as will be shown later, took place after World War I.

The conquest of Palestine, and its military delimitation The correspondence between Britain and the Arabs, the Sykes–Picot agreement and the majority of the diplomatic activity that preceded the Balfour Declaration, were all occurring while the Middle East, and Palestine within it, were militarily and politically controlled by the Ottoman Empire. The mentioned negotiating sides did not have a foothold in Palestine. This situation lasted for two and a half years, from the war’s outbreak, but military actions that had begun by the end of 1916 were about to change the essence of the agreements about the region’s future. The change of government in London in 1916 installed David Lloyd George as the new Prime Minister, and he believed that the war could be won by a military move on the eastern front, in addition to the fighting in Europe. The British army began to concentrate forces in Egypt during the summer of 1916, in order to push the Ottoman army out of the Sinai Peninsula and to relieve the threat that the Ottomans posed to the Suez Canal by conquering Sinai and Palestine. During 1916, local battles occurred in the region, and the remnants of the Ottoman forces retreated from Sinai. In January 1917, the British army had reached Palestine, and it conquered the small village of Rafah on 6 January 1917. The build-up of the British military force in Palestine continued, and despite the British army’s repeated failures in attempting to conquer the city of Gaza, the fighting against the Ottomans and their German and Austrian allies in 1917 occurred on Palestine’s soil. In October 1917, the British army opened a massive offensive. The attack began with the conquest of Beersheba on 31 October, and ended with the conquest of Jerusalem on 9 December, and

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The allocation during World World I

with the formation of a line north of Jaffa, by the end of that year.13 The British forces’ military control over the southern part of Palestine brought with it direct European control over the lands that were the subject of the above-mentioned discussions for the first time. But Britain was in no hurry to execute the deals that it had signed as long as the war continued, and British control was exerted over all the conquered area.14 During the final

Plate 3 David Lloyd George, first Earl Lloyd-George of Dwyfor (1863–1945); courtesy Zionist Archive, Jerusalem.

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stage of the war in the Middle East, in the summer of 1918, the British forces burst northwards, conquered the north of Palestine, and continued to Damascus and to Aleppo in northern Syria. At the same time the British army had advanced in Mesopotamia, conquered Baghdad and reached Mosul. In this way, Great Britain practically took over most of the northern part of the Middle East’s areas, and established a military regime to govern it. The fact that Britain held all these areas gave it the opportunity to decide upon the new division of the Middle East without really considering any of its wartime partners. Shortly after the British army’s victorious march along the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, and before the war had ended, the area that was controlled by General Allenby, the British commander, was virtually divided. Even before the official surrender of the Ottoman Empire (30 October 1918), its south-western part had been cut off and was put under the direct control of the regional British commander. His control territory was split into administrative sub-units that were named ‘Occupied Enemy Territories.’15 The southern part of the OET included the sanjaks of Jerusalem, Nablus and Acre, and the British General Moony administered it. The northern OET (that was later called ‘western’), including the sanjaks of Beirut, Lebanon, Latakiya and the city of Beirut, the kazas (subdistricts) of Hasbaya, Rashiya, Jasr-El-Sojour, the Bay of Antaqia, Yaniji-Kli, Umn-Biban and Alexandretta, was all put under the jurisdiction of the French Colonel De Piape. The third area, ‘OET East’, included ‘all the area east of the areas that were hereby mentioned’ and it was put under the control of an Arab officer, General Ali Riza El-Riqabbi. These three administrative regions were subject to the exclusive control of General Allenby. This initial division along the lines of the Ottoman administrative division for the purposes of military government, was in fact the first definition of an area that would be later determined as ‘Palestine’. Allenby’s division had generally followed both the Sykes–Picot agreement, and the promises that were made to the Arabs (and the Balfour Declaration too). The area that was managed by the French officer coincided with all of the ‘Blue Area’ of the Sykes–Picot agreement. On the other hand all the areas that were intended for the Arabs were united under single Arab control, in accordance with the promise that was made to them (the Sykes–Picot agreement had planned two separate states). The only real difference was apparent in Palestine. The full and exclusive British control over the ‘Brown Area’ of the Sykes–Picot agreement reflected the British view according to which Britain controlled Palestine without partners, in order to safeguard the Suez Canal, but possibly for executing the Balfour Declaration too. The delimitation of the military control zones did not accurately correspond to the map of the Sykes–Picot agreement, and extracting from the French territory did all the changes. The Bak’aa area in Lebanon, including the River Jordan’s sources and the sub-districts of Hasbaya and Rashiya, that were meant to become part of

Plate 4 Field Marshal Edmund Henry Hynman, first Viscount Allenby (1861–1936); courtesy Zionist Archive, Jerusalem.

Figure 7 Occupied enemy territory (South), 1918.

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The allocation during World World I

the ‘Blue Area’, were given to the Arabs. The Mosul area in the east was taken out of the French protectorate area (Area A) and was placed under direct British control. Changes occurred in the Palestine region too. The Sykes–Picot agreement had bordered the northern part of the ‘Brown Area’ with the Ras El Naqura–Sea of Galilee line, but Allenby expanded this area and included Upper Galilee, Lake Hula and the town of Safed in it. This expansion was done only in order to serve immediate administrative needs, and the British even declared that it contained no intention of influencing the future delimitation of the region. Nevertheless, the move can clearly signify the British ambition to achieve control over a ‘big and wide Palestine’ beyond the ‘Brown Area’ that is marked on that agreement’s map. By the end of the war, Palestine was under direct British control, but the political future of its area remained unclear. Three different commitments relating to the sovereignty of the country and to the delimitation of its boundaries existed, and these three were joined by another serious and central obligation. The United States had joined the Coalition in March 1917, and the US President Woodrow Wilson demanded that the goals of the war be set, in exchange for the American effort. Among the goals that were set by President Wilson were some that concerned the future of the world, and a few that concerned the future of the Middle East.16 Wilson held out fourteen points as the war’s goals. He demanded that the world should be determined from now on by open, rather than secret, agreements. He also demanded that the right of ‘selfdetermination’ of nations should be recognized, and that the taking over of territories as a result of military conquest would no longer be recognized. This meant that even if Britain did conquer Palestine, it couldn’t transform it into a colony of the British Empire. Another demand was for the sovereignty of nations that were already settled on their lands. This concept was later defined as ‘the concept of self-determination’, and was used as a basis for independence demands by a number of nations. A third concept was the intention of freeing the Arabs from the burden of the Ottoman Empire, and to give them their independence. These three concepts were supposed to prevent the British (or French) from taking control of areas in the Middle East.17 Several different promises concerning the independence of the areas that used to belong to the Ottoman Empire were hovering ‘in the air’ as the war neared its end. The termination of the World War in November 1918 brought with it the end of the ‘old order’ and the collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, as well as that of Russia. The victorious nations met at the Peace Conference in the Palace of Versailles near Paris in order to rearrange the world. This conference assembled in January 1919, and it discussed the political future of the world, and the political arrangements that were necessary for that future.18 Arrangements about the Middle East were also made

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Plate 5 Thomas Woodrow Wilson, twenty-eighth President of the United States (1856–1924); courtesy Zionist Archive, Jerusalem.

during the Peace Conference, and Palestine arose from these discussions as a separate organized political unit with marked and defined boundaries. The Paris Peace Conference was presented with all the suggestions and demands concerning Palestine, and its decisions dictated the type of government and the country’s territorial essence. The multitude of participants in the discussions, and the many arguments from the different

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sides and the problematic issue that was addressed when trying to define Palestine’s boundaries led to the drawing of many maps at every stage of the discussions. A number of general maps and a few local maps were drawn, and written proposals that were accompanied by various arguments and reasoning mixed together, were presented in order to achieve this or that borderline.

The delimitation proposal of the Zionist Organization The first ones to demand the clear definition of the future Palestine (Eretz Israel) were the Zionists. It is true that Palestine had already been delimitated in the Sykes–Picot agreement as the part that was supposed to come under international control. But other than this temporary delimitation, the British, French, Arabs or any other actor did not turn to the issue of a more accurate delimitation of the land’s boundaries. Things were different with the Zionist Organization. In 1917, when the idea of a ‘national home’ seemed to have crossed the line that separates utopia and possible reality, it was time to point out the territorial delimitation of the area that was necessary for the establishment of a future Jewish state. The Jewish arguments and reasoning were mainly expressed in the newspaper Palestine, the organ of the British Palestine Committee. This was a pro-Zionist committee which included among others Lord Robert Cecil, William Ormsby-Gore (who was to become Colonial Secretary), Members of Parliament19 and even Herbert Sidebothom, the military reporter of the influential newspaper The Times. Sidebothom was an enthusiastic supporter of the war in the Middle East, and he contributed immensely to the territorial vision of the Zionist Organization.20 The committee’s proclaimed target was to ‘revive the past glory of the Jewish people in a new, freed, British dominion in Palestine’.21 During the final years of the World War and the first years that came after it, a number of articles, essays and demands regarding the future of Palestine were published there. The question of the future boundaries of Palestine was a major issue that stood out among the discussed topics. At the same time, but apparently without co-ordinating it, Yitzhak BenZvi (later the second President of the State of Israel) and David BenGurion (the first Prime Minister of Israel) published (in Yiddish) their book entitled Eretz Israel in New York, in early 1918. In it they proposed the boundaries of Eretz Israel.22 Although the authors still adhered to the ‘natural boundaries’ approach, their opinion was that Palestine’s boundaries should be delimited by attending ‘to all of Eretz Israel’s naturalphysical signals, as well as to the cultural, economic and ethnographic conditions of the population that lives there today.’ Unlike the earlier literature that dealt with Palestine’s delimitation, the boundaries were not presented according to their historical traditional meaning, but according to the boundaries of the Jewish Eretz Israel that was about to be

Plate 6 Yitzhak Ben-Zvi (1884–1963); courtesy Zionist Archive, Jerusalem.

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established there. This approach characterizes all the Zionist publications at the time. Ben-Zvi and Ben-Gurion wrote that: If we want to determine the borders of Eretz Israel today, especially if we see it not only as the past domain of the Jews but as the future Jewish homeland, we cannot consider the ideal boundaries that are promised to us according to the tradition, and we cannot be fixed to historic borders that have changed many times and that have evolved by chance . . . The majority of the Jewish claims concerning the future borders of Eretz Israel contained in their book and in Palestine, were based on economic and strategic reasoning that aimed at securing the existence of a strong and modern state. Historical emotional reasons were hardly presented in an attempt to determine the borderlines. The proposal’s formulators understood that the historic formula ‘from Dan to Beersheba’ that relates to Eretz Israel during both biblical and Second Temple periods, is not correctly defined. Arguing for a delimitation of this sort might disconnect new Palestine from the outlet to the Red Sea. The ideal boundaries, ‘the promised boundaries’ according to the Bible, from the River of Egypt to the Euphrates, did not stand a chance of being accepted. It was clear to the formulators of the Zionist proposals that every historical claim to any given borderline would collide with an opposing demand, based on a different historical-political situation. They based their claim on the people of Israel’s historic right to Eretz Israel, but when they came to indicate the borders, they preferred the realistic condition and strategic economic needs over an unrealistic dream based on the historical past. In accordance with this approach, the newspaper Palestine argued that Palestine should include the desert areas to the east and to the south of the historic land (from Dan to Beersheba) in order to control the invasion routes of the Bedouin tribes into the country.23 This argument was also used as a basis for the demand to join the Lebanese Baka’a, a northern invasion route between Mount Hermon and the Lebanon mountains, to Palestine. Military needs dictated the inclusion of the Golan, the Houran and the Yarmuk valley – a traditional invasion route of the desert tribes towards the Jezre’el (Ezdraelon) valley and the north of the country. This proposal was based on a memorandum that was prepared in 1915 by Shmuel Tolkowsky, a citrus grower and a scholar of Palestine. His view was published in Palestine in 1916. According to Tolkowsky’s proposal, the boundary of future Palestine should be in the north, the first five miles of the Awali river mouth (north of Sidon), and from there, along a straight south-eastern line, to the southern point of the Lebanon mountains and Mount Hermon. From there the borderline continued eastward until the crossing point of longitude 36° E and latitude 33° 15⬘ N (north of the village of Sasa, between Quneitra and Damascus). From there, another

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straight line stretched south to south-east, to the town of Bosra on latitude 32° 30⬘ N (in the foothills of Jebal Druze). From there the line would continue south along the Hijaz railroad, ten to twenty miles east of it (thus placing the railroad itself inside Palestine), to the El-Ja’afar depression, twenty miles east of Ma’an. From this depression the borderline would turn in a south-west direction until it reached Aqaba. In the south, the border was defined by the existing border with Egypt, which ran from a point south-west from the port of Aqaba to Rafah.24 This definition, which was adopted by the Palestine newspaper, is not ‘clean’ of British influences, especially when it comes to the southern border of Palestine. While weighty arguments that necessitate the expansion of the border in the north and in the east are presented, it is clear that the southern suggested line is the 1906 line. This line does not pass along any geographical feature, but is defined in the proposal as ‘the natural boundary’, in order to gain Britain’s support and agreement to the proposed line without offending its interests in Egypt. Tolkowsky and the Palestine editorial board understood who they were trying to influence and acted accordingly. It is worth noting that the agricultural engineer Shmuel Tolkowsky, a citrus grower, was the one who emphasized the strategic aspect and repeated it at every instance. The economic arguments that were presented had been largely based on the memoranda of Aaron Aaronson, the agronomist who had played a key role in supplying strategic information to British intelligence during the war. Aaronson led the Nili spy network and he had good contacts with the British army throughout the war and after it ended. The economic arguments were also based on the researches of other experts. The Zionist settlement plans were based on large-scale immigration and on modern agricultural settlement. These plans obliged the full use of the economic resources – agricultural and industrial – of Palestine. Because of the country’s semi-arid climate, the agricultural planning necessitated a large water supply, and this supply could be based only on abundant and reliable water sources. These sources exist in the north of the country. This is why the supporters of the settlement arguments proposed that a future Palestine should govern all the Jordan’s sources, the southern part of the Litanni river, Mount Hermon and its snowmelts, the Yarmuk river with its tributaries and the Yabok river that flows into the Jordan from the east. The water supply was the central argument that the Zionist Organization promoted, and as we shall see, it held to this argument throughout the official discussions over the future of Palestine. Additional importance was attributed to the area east of the Jordan river. According to Aaronson’s claim, this was the only wooded area that could supply raw material for the logging industry that was expected to develop in Palestine. Vast and uncultivated land existed east of the Jordan and in the northern Negev. It held an agriculture potential, and it fitted in with the agricultural settling of many immigrants without hurting the existing inhabitants (a concept that was ‘hewn in the rock’ for the Zionist

Plate 7 Aaron Aaronson (1876–1919); courtesy Zionist Archive, Jerusalem.

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Organization). The Houran and the Gil’ad areas, east of the River Jordan, were the traditional suppliers of wheat to Palestine, and their modern development could free the new state from the dependence on wheat imports. This dependence had proved dangerous during the war, when Palestine was cut off from supply sources in southern Russia and Romania, and faced starvation. An additional economic-transport argument was based on Palestine’s placing on the Middle East’s map. The foreseers of the Jewish Palestine wished to regard it as a bridge between three continents – Europe, Asia and Africa – and as a bridge between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. In order to fulfil this role, the country needed an extensive network of roads and railroads. It was therefore important, in the opinion of the proposing representatives, that the Hijaz Railway should be included in Palestine; without it, there could be no modern transport connection between the east and west sides of the Jordan river. In order to establish the connection between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, Palestine must hold both the Mediterranean Sea, with the ports of Jaffa and Haifa, and the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba. An extension of the Hijaz Railway towards that gulf could be added, and thus to have a transport connection between the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea.25 This approach was a repeat of the view of Theodor Herzl, the founder of the Zionist Organization, as it is presented in his utopian book Altneuland (Old New Land).26 It also addressed the British anxiety that led to the crisis of 1906, mentioned earlier. The authors of the memoranda and the drawers of the future maps were now trying to persuade Britain to accept control over Palestine which stretched as far as possible to the east and to the south. The town of Bosra, on the edge of the Syrian desert, was envisaged as the origin point for the desert terminal on the way connecting the Mediterranean Sea with the Persian Gulf. According to Aaronson’s vision, Palestine could become the junction of the intercontinental railway system, the connecting point between the African railway from Cairo to the Cape, the Baghdad Railway and its continuation to India, and the Hijaz Railway and its continuation to Istanbul and Europe. The ending of the World War and Britain’s conquest of the Middle East region had resurfaced the proposition to expand the future boundaries of the Jewish Palestine to the El-Arish area. Britain now ruled Palestine, and the Zionist leadership claimed that there was no strategic need to move the Egyptian border away from the Suez Canal. The supporters of a wide and extended Jewish state thought that the El-Arish area should be included within this state. It seems that the British Zionist leadership was well prepared for the discussions over Palestine’s future, but it wasn’t the only leadership that was busy with the country’s future. Zionist activists who lived on the other side of the military line – the German–Ottoman side – were raising proposals for the establishment of Jewish autonomy under the patronage of

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Germany and the Ottoman Empire. The most outstanding of these activists was Arthur Rupin, the manager of the Palestine Bureau, who was banished and sent into exile in Istanbul during the war. Rupin was a German citizen and so were Otto Warburg, who was at that time the president of the World Zionist Organization, Arthur Hantke, a member of the Zionist management, and Richard Lichtheim, the Zionist Organization’s political representative in Istanbul. Rupin and his colleagues prepared a proposal for a German declaration, similar to the Balfour Declaration, that would include the establishment of a Jewish vilayet in Palestine. This detailed proposal had the northern boundary originating on the Mediterranean coast, from Ras El Naqura or from the Litanni’s mouth, and continuing to the sources of the Banias river.27 From here the border was supposed to continue in a south-east direction to a point west of the Hijaz Railway, and to follow it south in a line parallel to the Gulf of Aqaba. The intention of achieving the best possible economic conditions for the development of the country without harming the interests of the superpowers is clearly apparent in this proposal too. It was clear to the residents of the Ottoman side that direct Turkish control over the Hijaz Railway could not even be contested, which explains why Rupin’s proposal did not include it in its future Palestine. Rupin’s proposals never received serious discussion, and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and its ally the German Empire, cancelled the need to hold such a discussion. The Jewish-Zionist front was therefore united in its demand for the future boundaries of Palestine at the end of the war and with opening of the peace era. This demand was entirely contradicting the views that were held by France. The French government insisted that the Sykes–Picot agreement was the basis of any future division of the Middle East. As seen before, this agreement divided the Jewish proposed Palestine between seven separate political entities. Central Palestine was supposed to come under joint control, while Haifa Bay, Haifa and Acre were given to Britain. The Negev and the area east of the Jordan river were part of the Arab ‘Area B’, with British patronage. Safed, the Litanni and the Jordan’s sources together with the Jewish settlements in the Hula valley were supposed to become part of the French territory. Aqaba and its surroundings were part of the independent Hijaz while the Golan and the Houran were part of the Arab ‘Area A’, under French protectorate, and the El-Arish region belonged to Egypt. The Zionist Organization’s standing in the eyes of the French government was small and it was not an important political actor. France was one of the leaders of the Peace Conference (and its host), and the Zionist Organization was but a small political delegation, one among many, that knocked on the conference’s doors asking for a piece of land. But unlike other political bodies in the Middle East, the Zionist Organization had recruited a world superpower to its aid, one that not only supported its case but also regarded it as its own central political interest. While the

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Armenians, the Kurds and the rest of the region’s peoples raised ethnichistorical claims, the Zionist Organization had won itself an ally – Great Britain – whose territorial demands paralleled the Zionist claims.

Britain and the future delimitation of Palestine Britain’s main goal regarding Palestine was to gain international recognition of its control there. The Sykes–Picot agreement, that had not given Britain any central foothold in the country (apart from Haifa Bay), passed into history even during the war as Bolshevik Russia retired from the conflict and repudiated any agreement signed by the imperial Russian government in secret. The publicity that was given to these secret agreements, including the Sykes–Picot agreement, attracted public resistance. This agreement was officially cancelled. The acceptance of President Wilson’s fourteen principles by the nations of the Coalition (one of them, as mentioned before, determined that independence should be given to the Ottoman lands not inhabited by Turks) had also cancelled any territorial treatment found in the Sykes–Picot agreement. Nevertheless, Britain’s control over the area, and the British political ambition of holding on to Palestine, turned into the leading line of the British politics during the Peace Conference. In order to strengthen their claim over the country, the British prepared a general territorial claim regarding the area of the Middle East, and a particular treatment of Palestine. Britain, which controlled the country, was the key actor in determining its boundaries. It based its arguments on its actual control and on its present and future needs. The British promise to help establish a national home for the Jews became a central argument in the demand for control of Palestine, and all the other claims and demands were dwarfed considering its military control of the land, and its backing of the Zionist Organization. The main target of the British government was to achieve exclusive control over Palestine. This position had formed in government circles in London during the war,28 and the military occupation by General Allenby gave a practical base to this demand. Apart from this clear and general demand, the British could not reach a united decision regarding the proposed boundaries for the territory that they wished to govern. Unlike some of the other political sides Britain had not consolidated a clear position on the future area of Palestine. There were many government bodies – the Foreign Office, the War Office, the political representative to the Peace Conference, the military representative to these talks, the military commanders in Palestine and the British administration in Egypt and Palestine. All of them had their own map that marked the boundaries of Palestine according to its own view and needs. It was difficult for the British government to present a united front owing to these different opinions, and it made the task of the other participants, who tried to dictate changes in Palestine’s borderlines, easier.

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The fourth group (apart from Britain, France and the Zionist Organization) that was involved in the process of determining the boundaries of Palestine was the Arabs. The official political position of the Arabs was presented by Faisal, the son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, who was the most important Arab figure during the final stages of the war and following it. Faisal’s position concerning Palestine changed frequently, according to his political situation and tactics. Faisal wanted to receive international confirmation of his independent control in the Middle East, although his geographical claims were undefined. The letters exchange between his father and McMahon served as a guideline in his demands, but it was clear to him that these demands could not be fulfilled in the wake of the French and Zionist positions. Therefore, throughout the conference, Faisal tried to win confirmation of his status, while showing willingness to give up areas that were promised to the Arabs – as he claimed – in exchange for political recognition. At certain points during the negotiations, Faisal regarded Palestine as a separate unit that was supposed to be given to the Zionists,29 but at other times he demanded its annexation to the ‘Great Syria’ that he wanted to establish.30 Faisal and his representatives never presented defined claims which include borderlines and maps of Palestine. Arab delegates did not participate in any of the discussions about the accurate defining of its borderlines. All the participants understood that some of the Arab claims must be fulfilled, but the Arabs themselves did not actively participate in the negotiations. The end of the war, and the Ottoman Empire’s readiness to officially give up its non-Turkish areas in the Middle East, enabled the establishment of new territories in the region. The traditional competition between Britain and France over the establishment of overseas colonies had evolved into political and military co-operation during the war, and this fact was about to become a key factor in determining the boundaries of Palestine. New political entities, the Zionist Organization on one hand and the national Arab movement on the other, regarded themselves as central participants in the future discussions. Following the Bolshevik revolution, the Russians disappeared from the international political process, and after the weakening of Italy’s status there was no other European power that might have interfered with what was going on in Palestine.31 Nevertheless, the increasing importance of the United States, and the fact that it had gained priority status during the war and the peace talks, permitted it to interfere with the Middle East agreements in general, and with those concerning Palestine in particular. And sure enough, this interference was clearly apparent during the discussions.32

The Peace Conference and the establishment of Palestine The peace agreements in the Middle East and the question of Palestine were not the central issue during the peace talks. European matters and

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problems constituted the main concern of the negotiators and debate about the Middle East was postponed to a later stage. Yet, as early as the beginning of 1919, the various delegates that had interests in what was happening in the Middle East were summoned to lay their requests and arguments before the Peace Conference. Three main groups presented claims regarding Palestine or parts of it. These were the Zionist Organization; the Arabs led by Faisal; and a Lebanese Maronite national movement that demanded control over Lebanon, including areas south of Lebanon Mountain and northern Galilee. The central question regarding Palestine was the filling of the vacuum left by the Ottoman Empire. The League of Nations, an international body that was established during the Peace Conference in April 1919, decided that the concept of ‘selfdetermination’ must be kept. But it was also claimed that: those colonies and areas that ceased to belong to the states that had ruled over them as a result of the last war, and that are inhabited with people that are still incapable of existing on their own in the harsh conditions of the modern world, the idea that the beneficial development of the concerned people is a holy deposit of the human culture, must be followed.33 This view replaced the ancient imperialist idea of taking over lands as a result of a military occupation. These areas now belonged to all humanity, and the League of Nations decided that ‘the guardianship over these people will be entrusted to progressive nations’. The non-Turkish lands that belonged to the Ottoman Empire were areas of this type. They were now entitled ‘Mandatory Areas’, and they were different from the independent states like Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia that were established on the former European lands of empires that had collapsed. Independent states were not about to be established at that point in the Middle East. It was agreed that ‘certain communities that had previously belonged to the Turkish Empire, have developed so that their independent national status can be recognized, as long as they receive help and advice about governing from the mandatory holder, until they are able to stand for themselves.’ These areas were supposed to be handed out as a mandate to progressive countries, and the assumption was that these countries would develop these areas to a degree that would render them capable of full independence. Therefore, the identity of the mandate receivers and the ranges of their areas had to be determined. The League of Nations declared that ‘the wishes of the local communities must be strongly considered, when choosing the mandate owner’. The preferred nations for the region’s administration were Britain and France, two well developed empires with vast experience in controlling overseas areas and a keen interest in Middle Eastern affairs. It is worth noting that during various

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stages of the negotiations about the future of the Middle East, the idea of handing the mandate to the United States was proposed. The region’s inhabitants aspired to the patronage of a superpower that had no defined interests in the area, and that would refrain from acquiring local property. These proposals arrived from many directions: the Zionists, the Arab world,34 the Armenians and others requested the American patronage. Even Britain and France proposed that the United States should accept the mandate over some areas of the Middle East, in order to avoid complex discussions. In the end the United States avoided actively interfering in events in the Middle East and in Palestine. Apart from wanting to refrain from being involved in the region, it had not joined the League of Nations and did not want to stand against the British and French interests, which were stronger than any local rivalry. Following extended negotiations, the San Remo conference decided on 24 April 1920 that Great Britain would receive a mandate for the administration of Palestine and Mesopotamia, and that France would administer Syria and Lebanon. France and Britain were supposed to decide over the position of the separation line that would divide their administrative areas, and each one of them could decide over the internal delimitation lines within its territory. France had to determine where is Syria and where is Lebanon, while Britain was supposed to separate Palestine–Eretz Israel from Mesopotamia– Iraq. The ‘San Remo’ decision allowed France and Britain to determine the political future of the Middle East according to their will and ability, while deciding over the territorial division and the border delimitation of the new regional map. Britain and France did not wait for the official decision in San Remo before they started discussing the future of the Middle East between themselves. Continuous talks between the British and French government officials concerning the division of the Middle East took place even before the end of the war, and ever more so after it ended. The Arabs and the Zionist Organization took part in these talks, which were held on different levels, had other external factors participate in them, and were attentive to the political developments that occurred in the Middle East as the discussions were progressing. The main issue that was discussed was whether Britain should receive control of Palestine, and where the separation line between the British and French areas would be drawn. The British government had adopted a view that dictated full British control over Palestine in its historic boundaries ‘from Dan to Beersheba’. This biblical formula, brought forth by the Bible-knowing British, had quickly become the central formula in determining the future boundaries of Palestine. Lord Curzon, the acting British Foreign Secretary at the opening of the conference and later the Foreign Secretary himself, claimed in the Eastern Committee of the British War Cabinet that Palestine should be given its ancient boundaries and that the ancient formula ‘from Dan to Beersheba’ was still valid. According to Curzon, with no con-

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nection to the future administrative division, Britain must renew for Palestine, which would become Jewish, Arab or shared, its borders to the Litanni on the coast, and from there to Banias, which is ancient Dan, or to Lake Hula in the north. According to him it was necessary to clarify the issue of the eastern border. Although the Zionists wanted the areas east of the Jordan, there were justified claims of the Arabs to these areas. In the south there were those who wanted to annex the land south of Gaza to Palestine, and others who claimed that Sinai’s Bedouins should not be joined to the country.35 The committee decided to demand that the Peace Conference should recognize British control over Palestine, and to expand the country’s boundaries as far north as possible in order to enable the implementation of the Zionist development plans in order to prevent Palestine from becoming a burden on the British taxpayer. In addition, Britain demanded recognition of its control over the Mosul area in northern Mesopotamia, a potential oil-drilling region.36 Britain had deviated from the Sykes–Picot agreement in these two regions, and although it was officially cancelled, it remained the only existing document relating to the division of the Middle East. In Palestine, the British aimed at replacing the combined administration with a British one, and to expand this area to the north and to the east. In Mesopotamia they wanted to expand their control area to the north. British control over these areas came at the expense of the lands that were supposed to become French control and influence areas, and the disagreement was therefore obvious. Although the political sides concerned had already discussed the ‘allocation stage’, it was the war’s ending, the joining of additional groups to the claim circle and the new political situation that obliged the reopening of the ‘allocation’ discussions. Unlike the former discussions, that included arrangements about the Middle East as a whole, discussions regarding local issues were taking place. The question of Palestine and the placement of its borders on the Middle East’s map turned into a main controversial issue. The first and main question was the one about the ownership of Palestine, and the position of the border between the British and French control areas. The British demands were presented to the French Premier Georges Clemenceau, during his visit to London in late November 1918. Clemenceau’s main concerns were the peace arrangements in Europe, and securing the French border with Germany, and he wanted to receive Britain’s support for the French aspirations. The British Premier Lloyd George was not ready to agree to these French ambitions because that would place France as the superior power on the Continent, and Clemenceau was forced to yield to Britain in other parts of the world. In reaction to the French demands, Britain demanded the Mosul area and Palestine ‘from Dan to Beersheba’. According to Lloyd George, as it appears in his memoirs,37 the French Premier had given an oral promise

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that France would agree to the British claims in the Middle East, if Britain would back the French position in Europe. In addition, France would receive part of the oil that would be produced in Mosul, and Britain would support the French demand to receive the mandate over all the areas that were agreed upon in the Sykes–Picot agreement (Syria including Damascus, Aleppo, Beirut and Alexandretta). Clemenceau’s relinquishment seemed obvious, given the actual British control in the Middle East, the existence of organized Arab troops who resented the French in Syria, and the decreasing importance of Palestine, relative to the increased importance of Alexandretta, as a bridgehead for any invasion of the Middle East. Clemenceau argued that the transporting of French oil from Mosul to Alexandretta via the shortest possible route would be appropriate economic compensation for any territorial loss in Palestine.38 A handwritten letter that he sent to London in February 1919 backed his oral promise. In this letter the French affirmed that in exchange for British support for their demands in Europe, France was willing to accept the delimitation that the British military government had arranged in the Middle East, differently from what was agreed upon in the Sykes–Picot agreement.39 By this, the ‘allocation’ stage had ended, and the discussions continued into the ‘delimitation’ stage. From this point onwards, the talks concentrated on the accurate positioning of the separation line between the French and the British. The practical meaning of this separation line was that it determined Palestine’s northern border. After it became clear to all that the Middle East would be divided between Britain and France, although the official declaration was made more than a year later, on 24 April 1920, there were still ‘allocation’ discussions regarding Palestine’s southern and eastern boundaries. In the south, the border with Egypt was about to be set. The British rulers of Egypt in those days had expansion aspirations beyond the 1906 line. In the east there was a need to set separation lines between the British control area in Mesopotamia (Iraq), the British control area in Palestine and the independent Arab area in Hijaz, where Hussein’s kingdom was established. The concerned sides were about to discuss the three borderline areas of Palestine – in the north, south and east. There was no reason to discuss the western boundary: the Mediterranean Sea served as the country’s western border beyond doubt. The separate treatment of the various delimitation lines of Palestine has a geographical, political and historical justification. Apart from the Zionist Organization and a few British statesmen, there was no real move towards the land’s complete delimitation. The rest of the participants in the discussions were interested in one or another specific borderline and they did not regard Palestine as a separate territorial unit. As long as the Sykes–Picot agreement was valid, a number of British politicians and officials presented proposals about the country’s entire area, especially

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during internal discussions or as part of the negotiations with the Zionist Organization. After the conquest of the southern part of Palestine, and while the war was still on, an account regarding the country’s future was published by William Ormsby-Gore, a British Member of Parliament, who had joined the Jewish delegation to Palestine as a liaison officer. He recommended the establishment of a separate unit in Palestine, with its borders running from the Litanni river to the swamps of the Hula and the Golan heights, along the foothills of the mountains east of the Jordan to the Dead Sea, and from there to Rafah.40 A few days before the end of the war, the Political Intelligence department of the Foreign Office prepared working papers that included proposals for the reorganization of the Middle East after the war. The department proposed to establish a fully independent unit in Palestine, whose borders would include the Litanni and the Hermon in the north, the Jordan river as an eastern boundary and the Dead Sea–Rafah line as its southern boundary.41 With the opening of the Peace Conference in Paris, Sir Earl Richards, a British statesman from the Foreign Office, prepared a memorandum for Lord Curzon which he later distributed among the members of the Eastern Committee.42 Richards repeated the Old Testament formula, ‘from Dan to Beersheba’, but he placed the boundaries ‘from the north of the Litanni river on the coast, and from there to Banias and the north-east of Lake Hula so that Tyre remains in Palestine, and Sidon in Lebanon.’ Despite the Zionist claim, Richards determined the Jordan river as Palestine’s eastern border because of the Arab pressure. He proposed to include all the land fit for cultivation as far as the Dead Sea–Beersheba–Rafah line in Palestine. This proposal closely resembles Lord Curzon’s proposal (mentioned earlier) which was presented later. After the British political delegation to the peace talks had essentially determined what the Middle East’s division was going to look like, it prepared a more detailed proposal regarding Palestine. The terminus of the northern boundary was placed on the mouth of the Litanni river in the Mediterranean Sea. From there it ran to 32° 51⬘ E latitude and then to point 2,974 (feet above sea level), on Mount Hermon. The eastern border continued in a southerly direction from point 2,794, so that it passed along the watershed between the streams that flow to the Jordan and the streams that flow to the Yarmouk and Damascus. After this line crossed the Tass–Fiq road, it would continue to the head of Wadi El-Masid, 2 km south-east of Fiq, and continue along this wadi until it reached the Yarmuk river. From there the borderline would be delimited by a series of straight lines between seven points. They were: (A) a point situated 2 km east of Umm Qies, on the road that leads to this village, (B) a point on the way, south of Wadi El-Arab, 3 km east of the point where this roads branches off the main road that leads to the eastern side of the Jordan valley, (C) a point that is situated 3 km east of the junction between this road and a road that passes Wadi Zarka, (D) a point that is situated in Wadi Shueib, 7 km east of its meeting point with

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the Jordan, (E) a point that is situated in Wadi Judiyya, about 4 km north of Madabba, 10 km east of the Dead Sea coast into which this stream flows, (F) a point in Wadi Hassa that is situated 10 km from the place where the stream is crossed by a road which is parallel to the eastern side of Wadi Arava, (G) a point that is situated 8 km west of A-Tafila. The southern border ran from this point westward, to the road that passes between EinHussub and Buteira, 1 km north of that way. From there the proposed borderline continued to the watershed between the Ein-Hussub stream and the stream that passes through Ein-Hussub and flows to Wadi Arava. From there the borderline would run along this watershed, and along the watershed between the El-Fukara, El-Madra and El-Hafir streams in the northeast, and the streams of Mahla and Ruman in the south-west until it reached the Ottoman administrative border of sanjak El-Kuds (Jerusalem) and the Syria vilayet (that controlled the southern Negev), next to NaqabSahal. From there it would continue to the meeting point of the Turkish–Egyptian border, south of Mount Ma’ara, and from there to the Mediterranean Sea along the Turkish–Egyptian borderline.43 In variance from the rest of the proposals, the eastern and southern boundaries were described in detail. The border in the north was described in a general fashion. This proposal too was intended for internal discussion, and was never presented as an official British proposal for the delimitation of Palestine. Another general delimitation – probably the last known one – was presented by Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, the chief political officer at General Allenby’s headquarters. It presented a line that started on the Mediterranean coast, north of the mouth of the Litanni river, on the right (northern) bank, slightly further beyond the river. From there the border continued eastwards so that it left all of Mount Hermon waters that flow to the Litanni or to the Jordan in Palestine’s area. In the east, the border would run alongside the Hijaz Railway, twenty-five to thirty miles west of it, until it reached the half-way point between the Yarmuk and Aqaba, and from there to an eastern point that should serve as a port on the Red Sea. To the south, the Turkish–Egyptian border.44 This line, that acquired the name ‘the Meinertzhagen line’, was also used for the internal discussions on the British side, and it was never discussed as an official British proposal for a borderline that related to all of Palestine. Later on, this line was exhibited in the Zionist literature as the official line that was promised by the British (although it never was). The British side in the border discussions did not regard Palestine as a single unit, and it discussed each and every borderline separately. The abundance of information that was gathered concerning the country’s geographic, physical and human conditions did not bring with it a general view of Palestine, a fact that was even apparent when the land passed from military to civilian hands. On 1 July 1920, when Herbert Samuel assumed his post as the first British High Commissioner of Palestine, there were no clear and defined boundaries of its area. As soon as their political hold on

Figure 8 The proposal of the British political delegation for the boundaries of Palestine, 1919.

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the central Middle East was recognized, the British concentrated on administrative matters and organization, and through this process they determined lines on a map and in the landscape, and marked them. They didn’t do so as part of a broad vision but in order to solve local problems. The Zionist Organization was the only group that imagined one clear and defined Eretz Israel (Palestine) throughout the discussions. The Zionist proposals changed every now and then, in order to advance a certain political matter, but the overview was always general and it related to all of Palestine. The Zionist delegation was asked to present its case to the Peace Conference, and meticulous preparation work that included map sketching and the preparation of memoranda that would back its demands, was done. The consulting committee on Eretz Israel – a committee that included the majority of the Jewish leadership in Britain and France – was presented with a draft proposal concerning Palestine’s boundaries on 6 November 1918.45 As an outcome of geographic and economic reasons, it was proposed that Palestine’s border should be, in the north: along the Litanni river, including both banks, through Banias, close to and north of the Jordan’s sources until it reached a point 33° 45⬘ N. From there it would run in a south-easterly direction to a point south of the Damascus territory, close to and west of the Hijaz Railway. In the east: a parallel line that passed close to and west of the Hijaz Railway. In the south, from a point near Aqaba to El-Arish, and in the west the Mediterranean Sea. The draft’s authors, who regarded it just as a general proposal, did well in suggesting that the details and placement of the border should be settled by a boundary committee that would include a representative of the Jewish Committee on Eretz Israel. Nevertheless, it was clear to the Zionist delegation that it must consult specialists who were familiar with Palestine in order to define accurately its demands. The committee asked Shmuel Tolkowsky to prepare a memorandum that would: justify our claims that see Eretz Israel’s boundaries as follows. In the north: from the sea coast eastwards so that it will include the entire southern border of the autonomous province of Lebanon, as it existed in the Ottoman Empire. From the eastern part of it the line has to run eastwards, to the 33° 45⬘ N point (close to the town of Zabadani). From there a straight line that continues directly southeast to the meeting point of longitude 36° E with latitude 33° 30⬘ N (between Qatana and Rashiya, north of Mount Hermon). In the east: a line that would pass three miles to the west of the Hijaz Railway until Ma’an, and from there a line in a south-western direction up to a point east of Aqaba. In the south and in the west: the Egyptian border and the sea. In addition to Tolkowsky, the committee turned to Aaron Aaronson, the head of the Nili spy network, who was at that time the closest appropriate

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person to the British War Office and to the army’s headquarters. Tolkowsky and Aaronson prepared the memorandums as requested.46 Tolkowsky repeated his strategic arguments and presented the map that was proposed a few years earlier. Aaronson brought forth economic and agricultural arguments, which he centred around the need for a water supply for agricultural development and on the need for potential agricultural land reserves. Aaronson’s borderline was slightly different from Tolkowsky’s, and it even deviated from the original Zionist demand. Aaronson moved the northern line to the south, so that it ran from the coastline south of Sidon to the 36° E–33° 30⬘ N point. In the east, the same line running parallel to and west of the Hijaz Railway was proposed. In the south, Aaronson argued for the 1906 line, but he determined that in the future, a line from Aqaba to El-Qatya (west of El-Arish) should be sought, because of the necessity of using the fertile land in north-eastern Sinai. In the months that preceded the Zionist committee’s appearance before the Peace Conference, a number of proposals were presented by local Zionist delegations. These delegations did not always understand the political map, although their proposals were based on geographic atlases. The US Zionist delegation proposed that the southern line should be set so that the Gulf of Aqaba was included, and that the northern line should be on the Litanni river, and not further north, so to avoid tension with the Syrians. The Netherlands Zionist delegation wanted to place the eastern border on the desert’s edge, including the Hijaz Railway, and to expand the northern region up to the outskirts of Beirut and Damascus.47 The leaders of the Zionist Organization in England wanted to extend the southern line to the Aqaba–El-Arish line, on the understanding that as long as Britain controlled Palestine the Suez Canal would not be threatened. All these proposals and many more are characterized by the fact that they all regard Palestine as one unit. Some proposals were ‘dreamy’ and remote from the political situation in the Middle East. Others were more realistic and considerate of the French demands, the British position and even the Arab aspirations, which translated into the negotiations that the Zionists held with Faisal and his advisers. These negotiations took place during the summer of 1918, when Weizmann met Faisal in his headquarters, north of Aqaba. Those negotiations continued at the Peace Conference, and the issues of boundaries and areas of influence were also discussed. The Zionist Organization wanted to base its claims according to the Arab demand while Faisal asked for the Zionist Organization’s help in achieving international recognition for the Arabs’ status in the Middle East. The meeting in June 1918 did not yield official results. Nevertheless, on his way to the Paris Peace Conference, Faisal met Weizmann in London, in December 1918. Territorial questions were discussed this time, and so was the issue of an Arab outlet to the sea, through the Jewish Palestine.48 Both sides expressed their discontent with the Sykes–Picot agreement and the French intentions. The meeting yielded a written

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agreement that stated, among others things, that a bilateral committee49 would determine the borders between the future Arab State and the Jewish Palestine. They also agreed that a demand of this sort would be presented to the Peace Conference by both sides. The Zionist Organization agreed that the Arab state would be given a free-trade area in the Bay of Haifa, that the Hijaz Railway would stay in Arab territory as long as the Jews of Palestine were permitted to use it. It also proposed that a free Jewish–Arab port should be established in Aqaba. Both the Zionist Organization and Faisal did as they had promised. Faisal did not demand that Palestine should be included in the Arab state, and each of the sides related to the other side’s line when addressing the Peace Conference and backed its demands. The Zionist case that was presented to the ‘Committee of Ten’ at the Peace Conference was the most complex and complete territorial demand that was presented to the Peace Conference concerning future Palestine. Following a long explanation of the country’s economic, political and geographical condition, the Zionist Organization demanded that Palestine should be formed within the following boundaries. The borderline will start in the north, at a point on the Mediterranean coast, close to and south of Sidon, and will continue along the watershed towards the foothills of the Lebanon Mountains, to the ElQara’un Bridge. From there it will continue to El-Bire, along the line that separates the basins of El-Koran and Tiam streams. From here the line will continue south, between the eastern and western slopes of Mount Hermon, to a point close to and west of the town of Beit Jan. From there the line will continue east along the watershed of the Muganiya river, close to and west of the Hijaz Railway. In the east – a line that runs close to and west of the Hijaz Railway, to the Gulf of Aqaba. In the south – a line that will be agreed upon with the Egyptian authorities, and in the west – the Mediterranean Sea.50 The claim also stated that a special committee, with a Jewish representative, would settle the delimitation details, and any necessary addition of details. The central arguments for the proposed borderline were economic. They were based mainly on Aaron Aaronson’s memorandum, whose proposal closely resembled the suggested line. As mentioned, the Zionist Organization was the only one to regard Palestine as all of a piece. It demanded that the delimitation lines should be drawn so that the area they enclosed could represent an economic base for the existence of a modern state in Palestine. ‘Palestine’s area must be as large as possible, so it could sustain a large and bustling community, that can better carry the burden of a modern government’ (a hint at the mandate system). The placement of the northern border was explained by saying that Palestine, as a semi-arid country, was dependent on the available water supply. This

Figure 9 The Zionist demands for the boundaries of Palestine.

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is why it was highly important not only to secure the waters currently feeding the area, but also to conserve and control them at their sources. The Zionists claimed that Mount Hermon was the true water source of Palestine, so it could not be torn away from it without damaging its economic foundations. Mount Hermon required afforestation and other development investment before it could serve as the country’s water reservoir, and therefore it must remain in the hands of those most interested and most capable of using it. Palestine, the Zionists promised, would be ready for an international arrangement that would ensure the rights of the population that lived south of the Litanni river, so that the waters of the river would serve both the development of Lebanon and that of Palestine. Concurrently, it would be possible to erect a free-trade port in Haifa Bay, which would enable the easy access and traffic of merchandise, for the trade benefits of Syria and the Arab State as well. The eastern border’s position was explained by claiming that the fertile plains east of the Jordan river were economically and politically united with the area west of the river. This was the argument for the claim that Palestine and the future Arab State must be given permission to use the Hijaz Railway for the economic benefit of both states. The intensive agricultural development of the Houran and of Trans-Jordan would necessarily render Palestine in need of an outlet to the Red Sea, and would lead it to the possible development of good ports in the Gulf of Aqaba. The ports that would be established there must be independent and all the region’s trade should pass through them. Concerning the southern border, the Zionist Organization concealed its demand to broaden the delimited area to El-Arish, because of British sensitivity about Egypt. So future Palestine was presented in detail as one geographic, functional, political, economic unit, with clear and defined borders, by this proposal. These borders were suggested according to a proper knowledge of the area, and of the various aspirations and demands of all the parties concerned. From this point onwards, the Zionist Organization tried to stand by its own demands as best as it could. Every proposal or decision that did not fit the Zionist claim was regarded, and continues to be regarded in some Jewish eyes, as a retreat, a surrender and a stealing of land from the True Eretz Israel (Palestine). After the claims were presented, and after the conceptual decision on dividing the Middle East between Britain and France had been reached, separate discussions about every single one of Palestine’s borders commenced. The northern border was part of the line that separated the British-controlled areas in the Middle East from the French areas. Therefore it was mainly discussed between the two governments involved. Each government was influenced by local factions that presented demands for this or that line during the discussions. Palestine’s eastern boundary was about to separate between two British-controlled areas, in consideration of Arab demands and Zionist aspirations. The southern border was deter-

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mined between Egypt (which meant the British officials who administered that country) and the heads of the directly British-controlled area in the Middle East. The discussions over each and every line occurred separately, between different bodies in different places and times. Only the Zionist Organization tried to keep its general attitude about the wholeness of Palestine. The other negotiators treated every line separately, according to its geographic character and according to its political character, which was different in every case. The ‘allocation’ stage had ended, and the various groups advanced to the complex process of ‘delimitation’, the accurate definitions on detailed maps regarding every borderline separately. These detailed discussions were held between specialists with knowledge concerning the geographical conditions of the area. They drew detailed maps regarding their different proposals and opinions. The governments involved refrained from interfering in these discussions, and only when they reached a critical point was there a need for the intervention at a higher political level.

3

The southern boundary during the British period

The various approaches of the boundary’s location The southern boundary was the first of mandate Palestine’s three land borders on which agreement was reached. Its political uniqueness is that the line had not received international recognition. The borderline between Egypt and Palestine did not become an official international boundary during the British period. Even after the establishment of the State of Israel, this line only served the cease-fire agreements, as it was not an international boundary yet. The line did not receive this status until 1979, with the signing of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt at Camp David. Nevertheless, the practical decision about the boundary between Palestine and Egypt was taken shortly after the end of the First World War, and from then onwards, life patterns in the region were affected by and related to the existence of a real boundary line. The boundary delimitated the sovereignty areas, and separated Egypt and Palestine, even though representatives of Palestine did not take part in determining its location. When the practical negotiations about the line’s future were held, Palestine had not yet become a sovereign state or a Crown colony. The British army held it, and the country was ruled by a martial law. Palestine’s inhabitants were not invited to join the border discussions and even the British military administration in Palestine was not involved. Palestine’s position was represented by the official of the Foreign Office, actually the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. The Zionist request in regard to the delimitation of the border in the south was in the background. Officials from the British administration that ruled Egypt represented the Egyptian arguments, and the situation that prevailed during the first line’s delimitation in 1906 was repeated. The location of Palestine’s southern boundary was discussed between various British administrative systems. Three entities were interested in the process of determining the boundary in the south of the country: the Zionist Organization, the British administration that ruled Egypt and the officials of the British Foreign Office who stayed in Paris for the Peace Conference. The Zionists aimed

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at achieving a comfortable southern border that would include land that they regarded as necessary for the future development of Jewish Palestine. The Egyptian administration aspired to a boundary that would protect the canal, and would create comfortable conditions and economic resources for the proper administration of the Sinai Peninsula. The British representatives at the peace talks were trying to reach an agreed arrangement as soon as they could, as part of the overall arrangements in the Middle East. Later on, after the line had been set, the Egyptian government and the British administration of Palestine raised questions and protests about the border’s location. They did so as active and interested sides in the dispute, but these discussions occurred a long time after the location had been determined. The Zionists’ position was determined during the war, and its spokesmen had repeated it on every occasion. It was only when their public claim was presented to the Committee of Ten at the Peace Conference that the Zionist Organization had retreated from its position. The Zionist position, which was presented through official publications and internal discussions, asked for a southern line to be set ‘from the area in the vicinity of Aqaba to El-Arish’.1 Ben-Zvi and Ben-Gurion wrote in their book that: Eretz Israel should include the El-Arish region, although it is currently separated from the Turkish Eretz Israel, and it belongs to Egypt. Anyhow, El-Arish is historically and geographically-physically an integral part of Eretz Israel, and the separation between the Turkish Eretz Israel and El-Arish is done by an artificial border.2 The Zionist leadership in the United States repeatedly demanded that the boundaries of Palestine be expanded to the south of the Gulf of Aqaba, in order to create a stronghold on the Indian Ocean.3 Aaron Aaronson stated in a memorandum that he had prepared for the Zionist delegation to the Peace Conference that a future line running from Qatyya (west of El-Arish) to Aqaba must be demanded.4 Like most of the reasons used by the Zionists, the arguments that backed this claim were economic ones. The Zionist Organization wanted to push the line southward in order to achieve an outlet to the Red Sea, so that the land connection between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean would pass through its territory. This connection would allow free trade with East Africa and the Far East. In this case too, the historic argument about the existence of maritime trade during King Solomon’s period was not presented. The aspiration about expanding Palestine in a south-western direction was explained by the need to broaden the area fit for cultivation, in order to enable the feeding of the large Jewish population that would immigrate to Palestine in the future. The lands of the western Negev and northern Sinai seemed to answer the need for grain crop agriculture, and Aaron Aaronson’s surveys in the area during the spring of 1918 had centred Zionist attention

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The southern boundary under the British

on this region.5 This position prevailed as the Zionists’ official stand, even though the demand was restrained when presented to an official forum that included Britain. In their appearance before the Peace Conference, the Zionists requested a ‘boundary that will be determined through negotiations with the Government of Egypt’.6 This restraint occurred because of the discrepancies between the Zionist demands and the British view, at a time when Zionist activities were co-ordinated with the official British stand. The position of the British authorities alternated according to time and place. As long as the political future of Palestine and Egypt was undetermined – as it was when the Peace Conference had assembled at the beginning of 1919 – the British had a number of alternatives regarding the discussed borderline. At the beginning of that year, they still regarded their control over Egypt as permanent, as Egypt was a British protectorate. This had been Egypt’s status since the Ottoman Empire had joined the war against Britain, and since Britain proclaimed it to be a protectorate on 18 December 1914. While this situation prevailed, the British administration in Egypt and the British government with its various delegations to the Paris Peace Conference wanted to push the boundary as far from the Suez Canal as they possibly could – for strategic reasons. During 1919 the British grip on Egypt had weakened, and the British chances of controlling Palestine seemed more practical. The situation that was forming moved a number of British statesmen – namely the ones who were in Paris for the peace talks – to support the maximum possible expansion of Palestine in a southern and western direction. Therefore the British officials who governed Egypt had to face the officials of the British Foreign Office who had the overall Middle Eastern picture to deal with. British officials presented different opinions about the delimitation of Palestine’s southern border, prior to the beginning of the Peace Conference. When the war was still dragging on, during the summer of 1918, Ormsby-Gore presented his proposal for the boundaries of Palestine in which he determined that the southern line would run from ‘south of the Dead Sea to Rafah’.7 Although his proposals about the northern and eastern boundaries were accompanied by explanations, the determination of the southern line was presented without any reasoning. The Dead Sea– Rafah line was in fact the edge of the settled part of Palestine. It had served as the unmarked border of the country for many years, and it appeared in this form in various British publications.8 The British administration couldn’t easily disconnect from this past heritage. The proposals that were prepared at the end of the war by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office proposed the establishment of an independent state9 in Palestine with the Rafah–Beersheba–Dead Sea line as its southern boundary. By this proposal, Palestine was destined to receive all the land fit for cultivation in the south. The ‘Negev triangle’,

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the area south of this line and west of the Arava depression, received the title ‘Area H’ and was tinted green on the map that accompanied the proposal. This area was destined to remain under Egyptian patronage, because it harboured Bedouin tribes that were connected with Egypt. Aqaba, in the south of the triangle, was destined to be part of the future Arab State. An area at the Gulf’s head – possibly with freshwater springs and a suitable place for constructing a port – was supposed to remain under direct British control as a separate political zone between Egypt and Aqaba. We may regard this proposal as one of the first ideas which led to the establishment, in the early 1950s, of the Israeli town of Eilat. Several maps that accompanied the proposal contained different options about the southern border. Among them was the suggestion of setting the southern boundary on the southern edge of the Ottoman District of Jerusalem, which ran from the southern tip of the Dead Sea through the central Negev until it reached the 1906 line. The end of the war and the discussions over the future peace arrangements in the Middle East brought with them the preparation of lots of documents which dealt with the region’s future. British Military Intelligence prepared a number of memoranda that included proposals for a southern boundary, which would pass along the Jerusalem District line.10 The Foreign Office adopted the traditional position, and its opinion was that the determination of the border in the Sinai Peninsula region was a military issue, and that the strategic advisers should take the decision. Nevertheless, their experts determined11 that Palestine should include all the potential cultivable land in the south, but that the Bedouin tribes that were wandering in the Negev should not be cut off from their centres in Sinai. The Foreign Office experts were well aware that the 1906 line had artificially split traditional nomadic routes and areas, and they now tried to mend the damage and to adjust the line’s delimitation to the situation of the settlement in its vicinity. It was apparently possible to add the ‘Negev triangle’, ex-Ottoman territory, to Egypt, but this proposal seemed unrealistic to the Ministry’s officials. Egypt was a British protectorate, and one-sided annexation of an area that was conquered during the war might attract negative reactions from the other superpowers. These superpowers were conceptually against such moves, and they claimed that it contradicted the understandings that the nations of the Coalition had reached, in response to the American demands. In addition, Britain had no specific interest in this arid and deserted region. The assembly of the Paris Peace Conference speeded up the boundary discussion. Ormsby-Gore renewed his general proposal12 and Sir Earl Richards of the British Foreign Office prepared a memorandum on the future of Palestine. The memorandum,13 which was distributed among the members of the British War Cabinet’s Eastern Committee, opened by returning to the proposal that was previously raised by the Ministry in regard to the southern border: Rafah–Beersheba–Dead Sea. Richards

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proposed that all the area south of this line, and west of the Arava, should be added to Egypt – including the head of the Gulf of Aqaba – but without the town itself. The fear of the reaction of the other superpowers was not mentioned in the memorandum, and even though it was determined that ‘the determination of the southern boundary is of low importance, as far as Britain is concerned’, it wasn’t so. The detailed memorandum attracted many remarks and reactions. The Ministry’s officials claimed that the governor of Egypt, Sir Reginald Wingate, ‘does not want this area’ (the Negev triangle and the head of the Gulf of Aqaba). Vernon, a high official of the Foreign Office, claimed that Wingate’s position should be opposed, and that the issue of Egypt’s north-eastern border should be consulted with the military specialists, because the 1906 line was an artificial one. Vernon joined a group of officials who were against the addition of the ‘triangle’ to Palestine because of its Bedouin population. Arnold Toynbee, the later famed historian, at the time a minor representative of the political delegation to the peace talks, was ordered to prepare a detailed memorandum about all the problems concerning the Sinai–Egypt boundary. Both the possibility of changing the situation and of leaving it as it was, had to be dealt with.

The negotiations over the southern border’s delimitation The Zionists’ demand that was presented to the ‘Committee of Ten’ for ‘the boundary that will be determined through negotiations with the government of Egypt’ as Palestine’s southern boundary apparently hastened the negotiations about this issue. Nevertheless, the negotiators did not include a Zionist representative, and the details of the discussions were not shared with any of the various Zionist organizations. The British political delegation to the peace talks in Paris had formed its proposal regarding Palestine’s southern boundary according to the Foreign Office’s traditional views, and based upon necessary changes and a better knowledge of the actual situation in the area. The British regarded the process of determining the border’s location as an internal matter between the Foreign Office and the British administration in Egypt, which would give them the freedom to act as they pleased. These decisions were not in accordance with the Sykes–Picot agreement that designated all of the Negev to become a part of the independent Arab State under British patronage (Area B). Lord Balfour, the head of the British delegation to the Peace Conference, sent a telegram to Sir Milan Cheetham14 – who served as the acting High Commissioner of Egypt – on 18 February 1919. In it, he asked for his opinion about the suggestion to pass a line that ran westward from a point situated five miles west of El-Tafila until it hit the Sinai border, a short distance from Auja, in the south of Palestine. This new line had nothing to do with any of the existing lines or proposals about the southern border of Palestine. Its location was explained by the

The southern boundary under the British

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Figure 10 The proposal of the British political delegation for the southern boundary, February 1919. Source: Foreign Office sketch, 1919, doc. 8858 PRO, FO 608/98.

possibility of leaving the appropriate space for the construction of a railway from the south of the Dead Sea – a place designated for producing the Dead Sea’s mineral – to Beersheba. The document prepared by the British delegation included a sketch of a map that shows the proposed borderline and railway.15 This line was meant to join the track that the British army had placed between Beersheba and Rafah during the war. By doing this the British idea of connecting the Dead Sea with the Mediterranean Sea with a railway would be achieved. The topographic difficulties (the Dead Sea was 392 m below sea level) did not seem to pose a serious problem for the British, who had proved their ability in far more difficult railroad constructing operations in different parts of their empire. Lord Balfour’s telegram had set off a series of telegrams and discussions about Palestine’s southern boundary, a line that was supposed to be Egypt’s north-eastern line.16 The primary suggestion did not relate to any change in the 1906 line, and it didn’t explain what would happen with the area south of the

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The southern boundary under the British

suggested line. The ‘Parisian’ proposal was discussed in Egypt. Commander David Hogarth, the head of the Arab Bureau, prepared a countermemorandum. In it he stated that there was no hindrance to keeping the 1906 line, as suggested by the proposal, because Egypt did not have any interest in a line that separated Palestine and Hijaz at that point or at any other point along the 1906 line. Nevertheless, Hogarth saw a great advantage for Egypt if the 1906 line served as Palestine’s south-western border, and if a line from Tefila to Aqaba marked its south-eastern border, because that would prevent territorial contact between Egypt and Hijaz. He claimed that if a modern administration was established in Palestine, Egypt would become free of the need to control wandering Bedouin tribes, a situation that would probably arise from direct territorial contact with Hijaz. This was the first time that a senior British official proposed that the Negev triangle should be added to Palestine, for the benefit of Egypt. According to Hogarth, who knew the area and its Bedouin population well, the line that was suggested in Paris was a good one, because it separated the Tarabin and the Azazme Bedouin tribes, and did not interfere with their pasture grounds. But he also stiffened by questioning the existence of the 1906 line that split the pasture grounds of the large Tarabin tribe, and even compelled the Azazme tribe to wander from one jurisdiction area (Ottoman) to another (Egyptian). This and more: Aqaba’s port, the only port east of Sinai and the only natural outlet for the Dead Sea resources, would remain – according to the Parisian proposal – outside the British-controlled area. Hogarth regarded Palestine as an independent entity and not as a British military stronghold. Hogarth thought that changing the line at Palestine’s expense should be considered. He suggested a more northerly line that started at the mouth of the Gaza stream, continued along this stream up to the Dead Sea, and from there in a southbound direction, along Wadi Arava, to a point northeast of the Gulf of Aqaba and east of the town. The British governor of the Sinai Peninsula, Colonel Parker, expressing his opinion, claimed that the 1906 line did not follow any geographic natural course, did not properly separate the Bedouin areas, and cut the wandering and pasture grounds of the Tiyaha, Tarabin and Ahiwat Bedouin tribes. The ‘Parisian’ line did not follow a natural course, either – according to Parker’s opinion – and an area with ideal physical conditions for robbers, raiders and other troublemakers, both for Sinai in the west and for Palestine in the north – was left south of the line. According to Parker, the Arab authorities in Hijaz who were destined to hold the Negev triangle would fail in properly controlling it. In almost full consonance with Hogarth’s suggestion, Parker proposed to solve the problem by changing the 1906 line. That because the Arabs of the Negev and Sinai were different and separate from the Arabs of Hijaz and their wandering grounds reached Beersheba in the north and the Arava in the east. He recommended that a line that left the Bedouins under Egypt’s control in

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Sinai should be set. This line was to run from the mouth of Wadi Gaza, follow this dry stream until it met Wadi Saba, and to continue along this stream so that the city of Beersheba, and the Qudeirat and Zulam Bedouin tribes with their areas, would be included in Egypt. From there the proposed borderline would continue to the Dead Sea through Qatsar (fort) Umm-Ba’ek, and from there, along the Dead Sea’s western coast, to its southernmost point. From there the line would continue along the hills west of Wadi Arava (and not in the Arava itself) up to the Gulf of Aqaba. Parker thought that this line would place all the Bedouin tribes west of the Rift under Egyptian sovereignty, and would enable Egypt to control Wadi Arava’s passages in the direction of Sinai. Parker, like Hogarth and others, regarded Palestine as the future independent Jewish state. He therefore claimed that although land that belonged to Arabs would be taken away from Arab sovereignty, a large area would remain in their hands south of this line, and they would be able to develop it without fear of it being seized and dominated by the Jews. He also thought that the Arava line was a good separation line between the Bedouin tribes that lived in the region, and claimed that the authorities of Hijaz were uninterested in occurrences west of the Arava. These memoranda are similar in their views to the ones prepared by Wilfred Jennings-Bramly, which were prepared between 1902 and 1906 (see Chapter 1). It seems that whoever knew the area – Jennings-Bramly in his time and Hogarth and Parker now – understood that the central problems in siting a boundary, even in a desert area, were human ones. All the people involved in the discussion thought that everything possible must be done to preserve the tribes’ texture and the relationship between humans and the space.17 Usually the people who took the political decisions sat down with small-scale maps and were disconnected from what was going on in the area, attended to strategic military problems, and didn’t deal with the ‘small’ details. These details were left by the decision makers for the local surveyors and markers after they had already delimited the line in a way that did not suit the human settlement in the region. Such was the case in 1906. Now other views stood behind the memoranda that comprised the ‘Egyptian’ answer, which was given on 8 March 1919. Sir Milan Cheetham rejected the ‘Parisian proposal’ – in his answer to Lord Balfour – with the reasons that were presented by the abovementioned memoranda. He agreed to accept the suggested border for the south of Palestine, as long as Egypt got the Negev triangle – south of the ‘Parisian’ line and all the way to the eastern border that would pass through the Arava. This suggestion was different from what Hogarth and Parker had put forward as the north-eastern delimitation, and that is why Cheetham proposed to add all the area south of Wadi Gaza, including the town of Beersheba, to Egypt. According to this idea, the boundary would continue to the Dead Sea and along the western arc of the Arava, up to the Gulf of Aqaba. It was explained among other things, in terms of

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encompassing all the Bedouin tribes under one authority – Egyptian, and preventing them being cut them off from their administrative centre in Beersheba. The proposal would leave a fertile area between Gaza and Rafah, and the taxes that would be collected in this semi-settled region could fund the administration of the whole area. Cheetham’s response included the remark that General Allenby, the commander of the British forces in the region and the acting ruler of all the area east of the 1906 line, had given his blessing to this proposal. Allenby preferred a line that would run along Wadi Gaza to El-Modur, Beersheba and Mala’a. This last idea contained no explanation, but a close look at the map reveals that Allenby’s proposal leaves the railroad track, that was constructed between Beersheba and Rafah, in Egyptian hands. The ‘Parisian’ line did not leave this track in Egyptian territory. The military delegation in Paris prepared a memorandum that backed the position of the British administration in Egypt. In this paper, which was prepared before the Egyptian answer arrived, a more northerly line based on Wadi El-Hasi, north of Gaza, was proposed. According to this suggestion, Gaza and Beersheba would remain in Egypt because the Bedouin tribes of the Negev – according to the author of these memoranda, Major McDonau of the War Office – were connected with Egypt. Egypt could establish good connections with Palestine (‘independent, Jewish’ as stated there) because of its close geographic proximity. The ‘Egyptian proposal’ was discussed at length by the British political delegation to the Paris peace talks, which included members of the Foreign Office who were involved with the issues that were dealt with by the conference. Arnold Toynbee, mentioned earlier, expressed objections to the ‘Egyptian proposal’ because it did not follow the biblical formula ‘from Dan to Beersheba’, which was the official British standpoint on Palestine’s boundaries. More rigorous and well explained was T. E. Lawrence, who was serving at the time as a special adviser on Middle East issues. Lawrence rejected the ‘Egyptian proposal’ too, because of the use of the ‘Dan to Beersheba’ formula. He argued that this difficulty could be overcome if the original ‘Egyptian proposal’ were adopted, and the line passed along Wadi Gaza–Wadi Saba’a–Dead Sea–Arava–Gulf of Aqaba. This, because Beersheba is situated north of such a line and not south of it (as was apparent in the ‘Egyptian proposal’). Nevertheless, Lawrence claimed that this line would be bound to cause the Zionists to object. As mentioned, the Zionist Organization had presented its proposals to the Peace Conference, and the demand for an outlet to the Red Sea was included in it. According to Lawrence’s view the suggested line failed to include the Kurnub (Mamshit) area – in which signs of oil had been discovered – in Palestine, and claimed that the Zionists would not agree to give up this area. Lawrence suggested a new, more southerly line, Rafah–Auja–Mount Sodom–the Arava–Aqaba. In his opinion, this was not only a more convenient political line, but also a better military-strategic

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one because it was based on the cliffs of Wadi Fuqra, which formed an insuperable obstacle to penetrating Palestine from the south. On the other hand, this line was inconvenient for the Bedouin tribes that wandered between Beersheba and the central and southern Negev, according to Lawrence’s opinion. This proposal was therefore partially considerate of Zionist demands, but it did not relate to the Bedouin issue, and it rejected the possibility of a land passage between Palestine and the Red Sea. It is apparent that ‘Lawrence of Arabia’ aspired to secure this passage for his friends – the Arabs of Hijaz, whom he had led to the conquest of Aqaba and the head of the Gulf from the Ottomans. A multitude of ideas and proposals concerning Palestine’s southern boundary confronted the political delegation to the peace talks. Robert Vansittart, one of the delegation’s leaders, prepared a memorandum which included a map that described all the possibilities that had been suggested up to this stage. The common denominator among these proposals was that they disregarded the 1906 line as a valid and unchangeable line, and that they determined the Arava line as Egypt’s eastern boundary. The differences were about Palestine’s southern boundary. The issue of an outlet to the Red Sea was never even discussed, and Vansittart offered to choose between Lawrence’s second suggestion (Rafah–Auja–Dead Sea) and the original ‘Egyptian proposal’. This memorandum formed the basis of a new proposal that was sent to Egypt on 26 March 1919. The extended three-week period that had passed since the telegram from Egypt was received allowed the decision makers enough time to carefully observe and weight the various proposals. The fact that the British political delegation was now ready to accept changes that favoured Egypt along the 1906 line shouldn’t surprise. The British hoped that adding areas to Egypt would reinforce their grip on that country, which had been shaken by the anti-British riots there, and that General Allenby, who was appointed Governor of Egypt on 25 March 1919 would further strengthen his position. At this stage, the Sykes–Picot agreement had undergone many practical changes, and another change in the south, which would cause the Arabs and not the French to lose territories, did not seem crucial. The Arabs, headed by Faisal, had consolidated in Damascus and east of the Jordan, and they didn’t seem to mind the occurrences west of the Arava. The Zionists at that time were busy with securing Palestine’s northern boundary against French ambitions. This is how the British political delegation agreed to ‘move’ the Egyptian border to the Arava, although two possibilities in regard to Palestine’s southern boundary continued to prevail and await the area’s political future. The first proposal was based on the possibility, that Britain would not receive the mandate over Palestine. At the time it was being suggested that the mandate might be given to the United States or even to Turkey. In that case, the British were eager to achieve the ‘Egyptian proposal’ line,

Figure 11 The various proposals for the southern boundary.

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which meant that all the Negev up to Beersheba would be added to Egypt. On the other hand, Britain knew that if it were to receive the mandate over Palestine, it wouldn’t want to start its rule by colliding with the Zionists’ demands about the south of the country. Therefore the following line was suggested: from the Mediterranean coast along the right (eastern) bank of Wadi El-Arish through point 392 to Qseimme, from there to Abda (Avdat) and Mount Sodom, and from there along the western edges of the Arava to the Gulf of Aqaba. The British view was that this line might hand Palestine a large area with agricultural potential – east of El-Arish, in exchange for the addition of the large territory between the Arava and the old 1906 line – to Egypt. The officials who proposed this idea claimed that the area was commercially not equivalent to the Rafah–El-Arish area, but that it created a good and necessary strategic border for Egypt in the east. They were well aware of the problems that might stem from adding ‘Egyptian’ land (that Egypt had been holding since 1906, but that had never officially been annexed) to Palestine. This is why they suggested that Palestine should lease the area between El-Arish and Rafah, in exchange for the area between the Arava and the 1906 border, which would be added to Egypt. This proposal sheds light on some basic British positions regarding Palestine and its southern boundary. The demands presented by the Zionist Organization had apparently convinced Britain that the Negev belonged to Palestine, and that if Britain ruled the country it could do whatever it pleased with it (in this case, to add it to Egypt in exchange for alternative land). According to their opinion, the developmental stage of the country did not justify the formation of a land passage to the Red Sea. It is possible that this opinion was based on the British view of Palestine as an agricultural country at most, a country that was not involved in international trade. On the other hand, the need to provide food for the Jews who would immigrate to Palestine brought the British to adopt the Zionist demand for the inclusion of the area in northern Sinai. Although this demand was not presented to the Committee of Ten at the Peace Conference, the Foreign Office was familiar with these Zionist aspirations, and it agreed to accept them in exchange for the concession in the southern Negev. The British wanted the outlet to the Red Sea left in their own hands, because they saw themselves as Egypt’s rulers for an additional, extended period. They also understood that if they were to receive the mandate over Palestine, they would control it for only a limited amount of time. The British proposal clearly shows that the 1906 line had no international validity, and that it could be changed without permission to do so, unlike the norm concerning any international boundary. It was nothing but an administrative dividing line, and when the conditions that caused its formation had passed, the line itself could be abolished. The British proposal was sent to Egypt, and was immediately rejected by the day-old governor – General Allenby – who was familiar both with the

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discussed issue and with the Zionist demands about the boundaries of Palestine. In his reply, sent four days after the proposal was received, he claimed that the new suggestion replaced the only economically worthwhile area in Sinai for a desolate area. It also handed permanent Arab subjects who had always been under Egyptian control to the sovereignty of Palestine (‘the Jewish’). Allenby did not consider the possibility that Britain would not get the mandate but he too considered Palestine to be a future independent Jewish territory. The suggestion of moving the Egyptian border to the Arava did not satisfy Allenby because it did not solve the problem of connecting the Bedouins of the Negev and Sinai with Beersheba. The ‘Parisian proposal’, he claimed, would lose its strategic value if the Rafah junction and the railroad to Beersheba were controlled by Palestine. Allenby, who added that such a lease would eventually pass Egyptian lands with Egyptian-Arab subjects into the possible control of a Jewish government, also rejected the lease idea. Allenby’s military authority obliged the members of the political delegation to seek the advice of army experts, and the members of the military delegation to the peace talks were requested to express their views on Allenby’s memorandum. The military memorandum by General Redcliff of the War Office attacked Allenby’s ‘envy’ that originated according to the author’s opinion from the trouble he had in Egypt, and from the fact that he regarded the problem as an exclusively Egyptian issue. The War Office’s position was that the whole discussion about a boundary between Palestine and Egypt was totally irrelevant, because neither area was British sovereign territory. Both were temporarily under British control due to the war’s outcome, and therefore the borderline must be a strategic and not a political one. Since it was already decided to evacuate the British forces from the north-eastern part of the Middle East (for French forces), it was militarily better for Britain to regard Egypt’s defence line as the north-eastern line of Palestine, without any separation line between the two. Such a line would be worthless from an imperial point of view, and according to Redcliff any line that was placed in the region would damage the Bedouins’ land. The War Office opposed the concept of calming down the riots in Egypt by giving territorial gifts. It was also claimed that the Zionist demands should be fulfilled in the course of the negotiations. The memorandum’s author claimed that Egypt had not done anything with the land in northern Sinai since 1906, and that it was showing no tendency to develop it now (1919). Therefore the area between Rafah and El-Arish should be handed to the Jews, because they had the knowledge, funds and will to operate. With regard to Allenby’s arguments, the memorandum stated that his suggestions might transfer Arabs that were Ottoman subjects to Egypt, and that the fears expressed about the possible Jewish domination over the Arabs, and from the establishment of a Jewish state, were extremely exaggerated. The response of the political delegation was no different. Toynbee

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represented it by noting that Allenby was presenting three problems: an ethnographical problem, Egyptian Arabs under Jewish government; a strategic problem, the disconnection of the railroad track from the Egyptian border and the need for proper protection of Egyptian territory; and an administrative problem, the disconnection of the Bedouins from their municipal centres. According to Toynbee, the first two problems would be solved if the Jews in Palestine did not receive the status of an independent entity. In this way, Jews will not rule over Arabs, and British control would unify the defence of Palestine and Egypt. Concerning the third issue, Toynbee, who never visited the area but could read maps properly, suggested the establishment of alternative Bedouin centres in Sinai’s Nahel and Abu-Agile, in order to replace Gaza and Beersheba, which would remain in Palestine. These political and military memoranda comprised the basis of yet another proposal, which was sent to Egypt on 14 April 1919. Allenby’s demand to control Beersheba and Gaza was rejected, but his claim about the status of the area west of the 1906 line and El-Arish was accepted. ‘Paris’ agreed that the Arava would serve as the western border of the independent Arab State Hussein had been promised and as it was actually implemented by the reorganization of the occupied military zones. The proposal that stemmed from these developments offered to leave the 1906 line as it was, and to give the triangle between Aqaba (without the town), Rafah and the south of the Dead Sea to Palestine. Beersheba and the hills west of the Arava would therefore remain under single strategic control and Egypt would avoid having a common border with the Arabs of Hijaz. This was the first proposal to accept the Zionist demand for the inclusion of the southern Negev and the head of the Gulf of Aqaba in Palestine, but it wasn’t proposed out of Zionist motives. Nevertheless, the discussion had not ended at this point. The new suggestion was discussed in Egypt again, with the participation of General Gilbert Clayton, Allenby’s intelligence officer during the Palestine campaign. Clayton served as the chief political officer of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force and later as an adviser to the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior. Clayton and Allenby, who were very familiar with the area, responded immediately. Allenby ‘understood’ the demand from ‘Paris’ about the inclusion of Beersheba in Palestine, but he argued that the 1906 line was of no strategic military value. He claimed that all the railway system that was constructed during the war would lose its value, and that this would force the troops to retreat to the Suez Canal if a new attack, similar to the Turkish attack during the war, were to be launched against Egypt. Allenby went on to claim that the Suez Canal was defensively worthless to Egypt in view of the development of long-range guns and because of possible offensive air activity. He added that the 1906 line couldn’t serve as a boundary unless Britain received control of Palestine. As mentioned before, this was still unclear during the spring of 1919. Allenby’s Egypt did not strive for a common boundary with Hijaz, but

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from the British Egyptian point of view the solution of creating a barrier that would be controlled by independent Palestine was even less attractive. Therefore Allenby suggested that the very first proposal – the one that offered a line from Tafila to Auja and Rafah – be adopted. He thought that the administrative problems for the Bedouins would prevail, but that the construction of good access roads to Qseimme in Sinai, and the establishment of an administrative-commercial centre there to replace Beersheba, would minimize them. The British delegation to the peace talks disliked Allenby’s suggestions, especially since they were regarded as unfair after all the discussions that had been held on the matter. Toynbee, who was the central character throughout the discussions over the boundary in the south, repeated the demand for the inclusion of the Negev triangle in Palestine. The military delegation agreed with him, and the political delegation wanted to conclude an issue that had persisted far too long. In the special concluding meeting with many participants it was suggested that a ‘C-type’ mandate (undeveloped areas – unlike the ‘A-type’ status that was about to be given to the rest of Palestine) would be given to the Negev triangle. This because it too was an area that had belonged to the Ottoman Empire prior to the war. A suggestion that supported the acceptance of the Aqaba–Tafila–Auja–Rafah line and the giving of the ‘triangle’ to Egypt (as Allenby suggested) was also raised. During the discussion, Colonel Meinertzhagen, of the military delegation, demanded that the area between ElArish and Rafah should be added to Palestine. The discussion did not conclude with a final decision, and in the meantime – unrelated to the special discussion over the southern border – the British political delegation submitted its general proposal about Palestine (see Chapter 2), including a southern line which was not discussed during any of the above-mentioned stages. The various actors who dealt with the southern boundary did not relate to this proposal. It was actually another compromise suggestion according to which all the northern part of the Negev would be included in Palestine, while the southern Negev and the Arava would remain unclaimed.

Conclusions and decisions It seemed as if the discussions about the southern boundary had reached the point of decision. The political delegation, which held the authority to decide over the issue, prepared another memorandum on 9 May 1919. In this memorandum, the full Zionist demands – as they had been presented to the British representatives by the end of 1918 – were raised. The opposing Egyptian demands were presented as well. The final decision adopted the 1906 line with all its disadvantages, especially since it was a compromise line between the various proposals and because it was already marked on maps and on the ground, and no additional investment of

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resources and time was necessary for its establishment. The final decision determined that the area east of the ‘Negev triangle’ line would be added to Palestine, without specifying its eastern delimitation limit. This decision was sent to Allenby in Egypt, and it seemed as if he received it without protest. Shortly afterwards, Allenby claimed that Egypt’s old boundary was the best defence line for the Suez Canal (which is why he refused to accept Palestine’s northern boundary, in the Litanni–Hermon–Palmira area, which was proposed and explained by the need to defend Egypt). The British authorities in Egypt had hoped to achieve territorial gains from the occupation of Palestine. When they realized that Britain was supposed to remain there and that boundary changes favouring Egypt could not be made without retreating from other areas, they accepted the compromise decision, and Egypt did not gain or lose land. The discussions over Palestine’s southern boundary had ended, and it looked as if the idea of adopting the 1906 line would be accepted by all sides. The discussions and the decisions had been exclusively and internally British. The British delegation did not regard it as obligatory to report its decisions to its partners in the Paris Conference. Even the Zionist delegation, which had close contacts with the various British delegations and representatives, did not receive any information about the discussions that had been held over the southern boundary of Palestine, or about the decision that had been reached. The majority of the Zionist efforts were turned to achieving a better northern borderline, and all the demands regarding the southern boundary appeared as part of the general claim to Palestine, without a specific treatment of the line that had been chosen. This ignorance explains why Weizmann addressed Winston Churchill, the War Minister, with a long letter in September of 1919. In his letter he set out all the Zionist demands and aspirations, including the delimitation of a borderline that enabled a land passage from Palestine to the Red Sea, and a bridgehead in northern Sinai.18 In addition to the traditional reasoning, Weizmann claimed that Palestine deserved the area east of El-Arish, because Palestine defends Egypt’s northern boundary (which is why this claim was mentioned in a letter to Churchill, the War Minister). The War Office, which was uninvolved in the negotiations during the spring of 1919 (apart from the military representation at the peace talks) wanted to learn of Allenby’s views on this issue. Allenby entirely rejected the Zionist point of view by claiming that the El-Arish area ‘is necessary for Egypt for the farming of barley’ (emphasis added). The fact that Churchill had refrained from responding with a clear and definite refusal encouraged the Zionist delegation to repeat the demand for a southern boundary. This demand was based on the reports of a private British research team, which had been sent by the Zionist Organization to undertake research concerning the economic future of Palestine, and which took the southern boundary into account as an integral part of its

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general boundary report. The demand that was raised in a memorandum, sent to the British Foreign Office, specified a borderline between Taba and El-Arish.19 This proposal also did not receive an official response. It seemed that the whole issue of the southern boundary was postponed for a later stage, after the final decision on Palestine’s future would be reached, or as the Zionist movement had demanded: ‘a boundary that will be decided upon through negotiation with the government of Egypt.’ During all this time, the British Foreign Office remained silent, and did not reveal its final decision about the matter. Although no official announcement about the southern boundary of Palestine was made, clear signs of the Foreign Office’s decision started appearing in the area. A British civilian government was established in Palestine in July 1920, but its territorial boundaries were not clearly defined. In October that year the control of Palestine’s railway network passed from military hands to the government of Palestine, but the track between Rafah and Qantara (on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal) remained under British military control although the Palestine trains’ management operated it. The British government officials in Palestine regarded this arrangement as an attempt to create facts about the boundary. Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner, was very displeased with what was going on. He aspired to much wider boundaries for Palestine (as the events along the rest of the country’s boundaries were proving), and he addressed the Egyptian authorities, and later on the Foreign Office, requesting them to move the borderline from Rafah to El-Arish.20 According to his claim, Rafah was unsuitable as a boundary station, because it wasn’t a permanent settlement and because only one of the many routes that connected Palestine and Egypt passed there. Thus, passenger control and customs services in Rafah were impossible. The Foreign Office did not even bother to respond to this call, and it continued to run the arrangement as before. The Zionist Organization was also aware of the developments, and its leaders feared that a boundary arrangement was being carried into effect without them knowing about it.21 The northern boundary agreement, which was reached by December 1920, had turned attention back to the southern line. The US Zionists returned to their old proposal, and urged the Zionist Organization to demand a borderline that would pass from ElArish and Ras-Muhammad (the south point of Sinai Peninsula). The Zionist Organization’s specialists were apparently unfamiliar with the map of Sinai, and they couldn’t find Ras-Muhammad because they searched for it in the north of the peninsula. Therefore the claim was buried. The Zionist Organization made a final attempt regarding the southern borderline, just prior to the Cairo conference. This conference was assembled following Winston Churchill’s initiative after he was appointed Colonial Secretary, which also made him responsible for the British mandate in Palestine. During the discussions, Britain was supposed to decide over the

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administrative arrangements in its control areas in the Middle East, after the lines between the British and the French control areas in the region had been agreed upon. Weizmann represented the Zionist Organization and requested22 Churchill to determine a southern (and eastern) borderline according to the original Zionist claims, e.g. a line from Taba to ElArish. This detailed letter received no official response, and it seems as if the Cairo conference did not discuss the matter of the borderline between Palestine and Egypt, the same line that was already practically accepted by all the British government officials in London and in Egypt.23

Appeals and protests about the location of the southern boundary From this point and onwards, and throughout the British period in Palestine (and Egypt) appeals and protests regarding the location and the meaning of the borderline were presented. Questions about Egypt’s ‘official ownership’ of the Sinai Peninsula were raised. Concerning this issue, many had claimed that the only true borderline in Sinai was the 1841 line – from Rafah to Suez – and that Egypt did not own the area south of this line.24 Jennings-Bramly, who was the governor of Sinai when the 1906 line was determined, raised such doubts25 in 1925, and then again in 1946–7.26 A British jurist, Sir John Fischer Williams, questioned the belonging of Sinai to the Ottoman Empire prior to the First World War. Williams addressed the matter in regard to a compensation lawsuit that was filed by the Umm-Bugma Mine Company, which had suffered losses during the war and was wondering which it could sue, Turkey or Egypt. The British Foreign Office claimed that ‘the borderline between Rafah and Aqaba was actually an administrative separation line between two Ottoman provinces’, but it did not officially recognize the old–new borderline between Palestine and Egypt. During 1926, the Egyptian government was seeking reassurances that the border negotiations between Iraq and Palestine (actually Trans-Jordan) would not harm the status quo about the Egyptian boundary. Egypt was involved in a boundary dispute with Tripolitania – the Italian colony that lay west of Egypt (today the eastern part of Libya) at the time, and during the discussions about settling the boundary in the west, it sought confirmation of its eastern boundary too. In order to present its claims regarding its western boundary, Egypt needed the Ottoman documents that dealt with the agreements from 1841, and this prompted a search for the original map, a copy of which was printed as an official Egyptian publication.27 The British administration that governed Egypt during the 1880s had tried to conceal the map due to the marking of its eastern boundary – between Rafah and Suez – on it. Now, in the middle of the 1920s, the Egyptian administration tried to secure confirmation of the 1906 line. Egypt’s appeal was transferred to the Foreign Office, which sent it, through the Colonial Office, to the High Commissioner of

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Palestine and Trans-Jordan, asking for his opinion. Lord Plumer, the High Commissioner at the time, confirmed that the discussion about the eastern boundaries of Palestine, Trans-Jordan and Iraq had nothing to do with the 1906 borderline between Palestine and Egypt.28 Lord Lloyd, the British Governor of Egypt, promptly informed the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs that the delimitation of Palestine’s boundaries did not affect the borderline between Palestine and Egypt, as it was determined in 1906. Following this confirmation, Egypt gave its silent assent to the delimitation of the boundary with Iraq. A final discussion regarding the status of the Taba–Rafah line was held just prior to the British evacuation from Palestine, in May 1947. Jurists and officials of the British Foreign Office and law advisers of the British embassy in Cairo presented a number of memoranda that included various claims and questions about the status and the legitimacy of the borderline between Palestine and Egypt.29 At the end of the discussions, the Foreign Office officially recognized the line’s international validity. The British themselves had largely contributed to this validity by consistently marking the line as an ‘international boundary’ on all the maps that they printed during their stay in Palestine, although – as mentioned – Palestine’s southern boundary had never received a juridical status of this type. Practical problems concerning the accurate location of the borderline continued to arise throughout the mandate period. The boundary markings that were set during 1906–7 disappeared shortly after they were put in their place, and the last of these markings vanished during the First World War. Various events that had occurred during the British rule over Palestine illustrated the obscurity regarding the boundary’s accurate location. The question of the southern delimitation of Palestine was raised during the thirty-seventh session of the League of Nations’ Permanent Mandate Committee, in June 1935. The map that accompanied the British government’s annual report to the League of Nations, marked the eastern boundary as reaching the Gulf of Aqaba’s waterline two miles west of the town, while the southern boundary reached the Gulf’s waterline next to Taba. Thus a small coastal section remained in Palestine. According to the verbal description of the borderlines, the southern one ran from Rafah to Aqaba and the eastern one originated from Aqaba and continued north, thus denying Palestine an outlet to the Gulf. The members of the committee raised their eyebrows, and the Colonial Office was requested to explain the discrepancy. The Colonial Secretary could only present the 1926 exchange of letters (the one mentioned in regard to confirming the lack of changes along the 1906 line), and he requested the High Commissioner in Palestine to examine the actual location of the borderline.30 The inspection that followed revealed that an accurate definition of the borderline’s location did not exist, although the 1906 agreement was known to all the concerned parties, although accurate marking posts did not exist

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either. An attempt to discover the boundary’s accurate location was made, but it revealed that ‘not a single first degree triangulation point exists in the area, and there is no confidence in what the map shows’.31 Based on these facts, a new version was proposed, and Palestine adopted the following description of its own southern boundary (in its southern part, where the obscurity had previously existed). ‘From the junction of the Gaza–Aqaba and the Nah’el–Aqaba roads to the end of the borderline in Ras-Taba, on the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba. In the south-east, from Ras-Taba to a point that is situated two miles west of Aqaba.’ This version was accepted by both the Colonial Office and the League of Nations, but the surveyors and markers in Palestine, who were doubtful about the actual location of the borderline before the new version was accepted, continued to debate about it thereafter. As early as 1922, when cadastral measurements were carried out in order to delimitate the ownership over the lands around Rafah, the surveyors wanted to begin their work from the borderline, but they didn’t receive an accurate answer about the line’s location.32 In 1924, and again in 1932, the Survey of Egypt was asked to locate the borderline, but it failed to do so because ‘the border-posts were never accurately measured, and their co-ordinates are not registered anywhere’.33 A Palestinian policeman was killed during an incident with border smugglers around Auja, but because of the non-existent border markings it was difficult to determine whether he was killed in Palestine or in Egypt.34 Although accurate surveys were carried out in 1906, it was announced in 1947 that ‘the borderline between Palestine and Egypt was never properly identified’.35 Nevertheless, and irrespective of the inaccuracy regarding its location, life along the borderline went on as if the line did not exist. Passengers who travelled along the Gulf of Aqaba between Palestine and Egypt passed through the police station in Taba and were occasionally obliged to obtain permits.36 But the journey from Palestine to the head of the Gulf and to Aqaba generally followed the course Beersheba–Auja–Qseimme– Quntilla–Naqab–Aqaba–head of the Gulf. A journey along this route (which passed through three different territories – Palestine, Egypt and Trans-Jordan) did not require a permit. Characteristic activities of a border area were apparent only along the northern part of this borderline, as the small village of Rafah developed into a passage point between Palestine and Egypt. Even in Rafah the British did not take the location of the border into consideration, when they constructed army camps in its vicinity during the Second World War. After the war, when it was revealed that the borderline traversed an army camp, it was suggested that the line be moved and fitted to the existing conditions, although nothing was done about the matter. The borderline’s legal status and its accurate location remained unclear until the end of British rule over Palestine. Nevertheless, the 1906 line served as the uncontested borderline. The existence of this line caused a few geographical changes in Palestine. The most

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convenient route that passed through Egyptian territory was regarded as unnatural for Palestine, and the British administration’s officials opposed the obligation of passing through foreign territory when travelling from one part of the country to the other. Pressure exerted by the governor of the southern district resulted in the construction of a metalled motor road which led from Beersheba to the Gulf of Aqaba through entirely domestic territory – along the Arava. This route, although vulnerable to floods, largely symbolized the connection between the southern Negev, the Arava and the head of the Gulf of Aqaba with the rest of Palestine. Its construction resulted from the adoption of the 1906 line as the borderline between Palestine and Egypt. During the 1930s the British decided to establish a police station at Umm Rash-Rash, on the coast of the gulf, although permanent police stations had been operating in nearby Taba (Egypt) and Aqaba (Trans-Jordan). The need to accurately define Palestine’s sovereignty limits at the head of the Gulf had also resulted from the existence and adoption of the 1906 borderline. It therefore seems that even though the separation line passed through a desolate desert area without a single permanent settlement, its geographic influences were apparent from the local activity. The Bedouin tribes were forced to change their movement patterns, and to adjust to the new situation. They diminished their wandering routes according to the line’s location.37 The continued activity relating to the 1906 line as the borderline between Palestine and Egypt was sufficient to embody it in the general consciousness, as Palestine’s southern boundary. As it will be shown, every new delimitation proposal regarding the country’s borders, and every idea about the division of Palestine in the future, took this line for granted and without wanting to change or define its accurate location. The 1906 line was adopted as a border as early as 1919, and it became modern Palestine’s first borderline under British rule. This had occurred before the decision about the establishment of mandate Palestine was reached.

4

The northern boundary From allocation to delimitation

Determining the boundary The process of determining Palestine’s northern boundary during the British period was longer and more complicated than all other border determination processes that took place in this period. The discussions over its setting and location had lasted for over eight years – from the early ideas about this line in the Sykes–Picot agreement to the final signing of the boundary treaty in March 1923. Questions regarding the line’s accurate location and its administration continued to linger even after the agreement was reached, and they were brought up for discussion during all of the British period in Palestine. Two main reasons caused the prolongation of the discussions over this specific borderline. Apparently anyone who had anything to do with the post-war future of the Middle East regarded himself as entitled to intervene in the course of determining this boundary. The British government and its various political and military branches, the French administration and its changing governments, the French regime in Syria and Lebanon, the Zionist Organization, the Middle Eastern Arabs led by Faisal, nationalists from Lebanon and the Arabs of Palestine – all participated in the discussions, in one way or another. Each party had its desirable, obligatory boundary and each side did its utmost to convince the other participants of the correctness of its claims. The second reason was attached to the fact that Palestine’s northern boundary, unlike its eastern or southern ones, was about to separate between the control and influence areas of two imperial superpowers – Britain and France – with a worldwide legacy of boundary delimitation. This explains why the political aspect became the central axis of the discussions over the future of this line. An additional difference that contributed to the extension of the discussions was the expected geographical location of the borderline. Regardless of the proposal that would eventually be accepted, the line was destined to pass through settled areas, and thus become a ‘superimposed boundary’ – one that might create difficulties for the local inhabitants. At times, delimitating a line of this type necessitated special awareness and

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consideration of the existing settlement situation, because the decisions about the line’s location and about administering it might cause serious changes and perturbation in the lives of the people who lived in the border area. Summing up the difficulties associated with the borderline’s administration, and all the political significance that emits from it, clearly revealed the different views concerning Palestine’s territorial delimitation, and the various ways in which such a delimitation was going to be achieved. Another exclusive trait that characterized the northern boundary was its justified title: ‘international boundary’. It was determined following bilateral negotiations and an official agreement signing by two sovereign governments, which resided on either side of the line. Palestine’s southern and eastern boundaries did not admit such a status. Determining the northern boundary of Palestine began with allocating the controlled areas according to the Sykes–Picot agreement, in 1916. This ‘allocation’ had to go through a reconfirmation stage at the end of the war, in 1918. The discussions that dealt with the ‘delimitation’ of this line had lasted for two years thereafter, and an agreement was reached in December 1920. The line’s ‘demarcation stage’ was carried out on the ground during 1921, and following negotiations, a final demarcation agreement was reached in March 1923. The ‘administration stage’ included arrangements that resulted from the actual marking. From this point onwards the border region was managed, and local arrangements and agreements were established between 1924 and 1947, in order to facilitate local living conditions. The marking of the borderline was constantly assessed within this framework. Our discussion of the northern boundary will follow these stages.1

The allocation stage The point of origin for all the discussions about the northern boundary was the Sykes–Picot agreement. While this agreement did not have the ability to influence the discussions about the future of the rest of the boundaries of Palestine, it was used as a basis for the discussions over the northern one. The British (and the Zionist Organization) tried to deviate the designated line as far north of the agreed line as they possibly could, while the French did their best to hold on to it. According to the agreement (see Chapter 2) the northern separation line intended to leave all the Christian holy sites in Galilee (Nazareth and the north-western part of the Sea of Galilee) under international control. Britain had to have full control over Haifa Bay, the cities of Haifa and Acre and an area in the hinterland of the bay. The line that was planned for the north of Palestine connected a point on the western shore of the Sea of Galilee with a point on the Mediterranean coast north of Acre. The area north of this line was supposed to have become an area under direct French control (see Figure 6).2

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Since the agreement was signed, and especially since the talks over the region’s future had begun, attempts to clarify the map that accompanied the agreement were made. Enlarging regional parts of the original map, which had an extremely small scale of one inch to twenty-five miles, generally did this. Identified points in the landscape were sought out and discussed thoroughly during the time, and it became apparent that the separating lines between the French area and the international area in the west of Palestine, and between the intended Arab states, A and B, were unclear. These lines were marked along different courses on different maps. One version shows the northern line as originating from the Tabgha Springs, on the north-western shore of the Sea of Galilee and continuing diagonally directly to Yar’un (today in southern Lebanon) and from there in a straight line to the Mediterranean Sea in Ras-El Naqura. On a different version it originates from a point north of Tiberias, continues west to Kafr-Manda in lower Galilee, reaches the British control area in the Bay of Haifa (the ‘Red Area’) and follows this area’s northern line until it reaches the Mediterranean coast, north of Acre. The original map shows the line’s origin as north of Tiberias, from where it continues to the Akhziv area, on the Mediterranean coast. Uncertainties regarding the location of the line in the vicinity (north or south from it) of the town of Dar’aa (southern Syria of today), the location on the eastern side of the Sea of Galilee and the River Jordan, were also raised.3 As mentioned, the Sykes–Picot agreement had officially ceased to exist during wartime. By the end of the war, and along with the conquest of the eastern Mediterranean by the British, it was necessary to reopen the discussions about the region’s future in general, and about the future of Palestine in particular.4 Three major questions required an answer. The first one dealt with the very existence of Palestine as a separate territorial unit; the second one dealt with the new sovereignty over Palestine; and the third – which is of importance to our matter – dealt with the delimitation of the new territorial unit. As mentioned, the Sykes–Picot agreement determined that a separate administrative unit – an international one – would exist in Palestine. Appeals and contests were generated against this determination. The main objectors to this part of the problem were the Arabs and their representatives in Syria and in Palestine. These objectors demanded that ‘Great Syria’, which included Palestine according to their opinion, should not be parted, and that the whole country should be regarded as an integral part of the future Arab kingdom. Despite the Arab opposition, the other participants in the discussion all seemed to agree about the establishment of a separate territorial unit – Palestine – both because of its international religious significance and because of the promise to assist the establishment of a Jewish national home there. This British promise was adopted by all the victorious nations. The sovereignty issue was easily settled as well. Different proposals about the future arrangements were suggested, and among them was to

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adopt the Sykes–Picot agreement, which regarded the country as an international unit. Nevertheless, by the end of the war it was easy to see which way the wind was blowing. The British government and its various representatives had contested the Sykes–Picot agreement from the very beginning, and the demand for exclusive British control in Palestine was gaining popularity following the British military activities in the region.5 Prime Minister Lloyd George had claimed, in an internal discussion during April 1917, that ‘the French must be forced to accept our patronage over Palestine’. The Premier’s view was given publicity as soon as the war ended, and from the beginning of 1919 he claimed that ‘Palestine is the strategic barrier to Egypt’. The British personnel stationed in the Middle East backed this position. During the summer of 1917 a long memorandum was written by Commander Hogarth, one of the leaders of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, in which he demanded that the agreement should be cancelled, and that Palestine should be fully annexed to the British Empire.6 The Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, which was preceded by many discussions throughout 1917, had also originated from the concept of British control over Palestine together with a special status for the Jews. The activities of the British troops, and the reorganization of their military control areas in Palestine (see Chapter 2), had revealed these intentions to all. Nevertheless, the British authorities were cautious about revealing their position regarding Palestine at all levels, and all their actions in the region were explained by the necessity of winning the war. It was at internal discussions within the British government systems, and in discussions with the Zionists, that Britain expressed its aspirations openly. The British even sketched a map of Palestine, as they saw it in their vision. Understanding that the main discussion about the delimitation of Palestine’s boundary would involve negotiations with France, the British representatives suggested creative ideas regarding the northern region – all at France’s expense, whereas their suggestions about the southern and eastern boundaries remained vague. William Ormsby-Gore, a Member of Parliament (and later Colonial Secretary), who had joined the Jewish delegation committee to Palestine as a liaison officer, presented his ideas about Palestine. He suggested a northern line that ran along the lower Litanni river, from west to east up to the river’s bend next to Metulla, and onward east to the summit of Mount Hermon. In the east – from Mount Hermon to the south, so that the true Houran would be excluded.7 This line was based on physical landscape features, and it did not have a realistic vision of the area. It was clearly proposed after the author had studied general maps of the Middle East, following consultation during the meetings and discussions with the members of the Jewish delegation, and not according to real knowledge of the area. The British statesman could not have visited the area at the time he presented his proposal because it was still controlled by the Ottomans. This phenomenon characterized most of the participants who discussed the northern boundary, and as mentioned,

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most of them had no first-hand knowledge of the area. The physical landscape features in Ormsby-Gore’s proposal were the Litanni river and the summit of Mount Hermon – geographic sites which stimulated the imagination of British statesmen for quite a long time. A similar idea, that proposed the establishment of an independent state in Palestine (not necessarily a Jewish one), was put forward in a detailed memorandum, prepared by the political intelligence department of the British Foreign Office, shortly before the end of the war. The memorandum that deals with Palestine places its northern boundary on the Litanni river, so that the city of Tyre is included within the country’s boundaries (see Figure 8).8 The end of the war led to the opening of discussions about the future of the region, and just prior to that, a significant and meaningful fact that would largely influence the discussion of Palestine’s boundaries became fixed and changed the face of reality in the area. General Allenby, who had organized the military control areas (see Chapter 2), changed the northern delimitation of Palestine. Not only did he dictate direct and exclusive British military control over all the area that was intended to become ‘international’ according to the Sykes–Picot agreement, but he also broadened this area in a northerly direction. Instead of aligning along the Sea of Galilee–Akhziv line, the military government had spread over the ‘Occupied Enemy Territory (South)’ (the area that remained under the jurisdiction of a British officer), all the way up to a line that connected Ras-El Naqura and the swamps near Lake Hula. By these means, Palestine now ‘included’ the southern mountainous area of Upper Galilee, Safed and all the Sea of Galilee (the lake itself was supposed to be divided according to the Sykes–Picot agreement) and Lake Hula. This division was a military one, and it was done according to the administrative Ottoman units, but from this stage onwards the British did not retreat from their holding on to this line, and they even tried to ‘push’ this administrative separation line northwards (see Figure 7). The Peace Conference that would discuss the future of the Middle East among other, more important issues, was about to be opened on 1 January 1919, in the Palace of Versailles, just outside Paris. However Palestine’s future was practically determined before the beginning of the conference. The results of the ‘allocation stage’ that had been cancelled along with the official cancellation of the Sykes–Picot agreement were discussed in direct talks between the British and French Prime Ministers. The French Premier, Georges Clemenceau, agreed to accept future British control over Palestine in a meeting with Lloyd George in London at the end of 1918, but even then, the limits of this control area remained undefined.9 The conclusion had been arrived at in an unofficial conversation between the two leaders, and from here onwards two attitudes emerged and awaited future discussion. On one hand the French held on to the line that was defined in the Sykes–Picot agreement, while acknowledging

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British control over the area south of it. On the other hand the British wanted to gain control over all of Palestine, up to the banks of the Litanni river. In spite of the differences of opinion concerning the territory, the understanding over the allocation of areas between Britain and France enabled the opening of the next stage of discussions over Palestine’s boundaries – the ‘delimitation’ stage. Nevertheless, it had taken another year and a half before this understanding received its official conformation, in the resolution of the San Remo conference on 24 April 1920, where both countries got the mandate to rule the Middle East. Now, after the understandings over Palestine’s territorial exclusiveness and about the identity of its ruler had been reached, it was time for the long and exhausting discussion regarding the accurate delimitation of the separation line between the British and the French control areas in the Middle East – Palestine’s northern boundary.

The delimitation stage: initial ideas The primary negotiators to be concerned with the northern boundary were the British and the French. The discussions involved government representatives from almost all the existing levels – from Prime Ministers through the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, expert committees and a long line of politicians, military men and officials from both sides. The majority of the officials who were involved in determining the borderline never visited the area they were discussing, and their discussions were mainly based upon small-scale and largely inaccurate atlases and maps. Nevertheless, the various participants showed admirable knowledge and understanding of the region, and it seems as if they extracted their knowledge and their assumptions from the experts who were familiar with the area. The British activity associated with the northern boundary was coordinated with, and supported by, the various Zionist organizations, which regarded its location as a central part of their overall demands for Palestine. The British echelons faced the French claims, and their ambitions were military-strategic, but also economic. The military argued for a convenient northern defence line, while the statesmen, attentive to the Zionist demands, tried to achieve a borderline that would enable the fulfilment of the Zionists’ development plans. Nevertheless, the British wanted to reach an agreement with France, their wartime ally, without causing great and unnecessary turbulence in the Middle East. The French were keen on strengthening their control in Syria and Lebanon. The main motives for their activity were the cultural-religious tradition that had connected them with the Middle East, the imperialist competition with Britain and the prestige that might accompany economic development – as a prize for the victorious nations. The ties between the Middle East and French Africa, and the French ambition to collect compensation for the loss of the status that they had enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire, were also

Plate 8 Shmuel Tolkowsky (1886–1965); courtesy Zionist Archive, Jerusalem.

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backing the French politicians to stick to their positions. In this way every retreat from the Sykes–Picot agreement was regarded as a retreat, as a loss of prestige and as a harmful blow to the French international posture.10 Therefore the struggle over Palestine in general, and over the northern boundary in particular, saw Britain trying to push the separation line to the north, against France, which regarded any change or movement as a retreat and a blow to their possessions in the region. Although the Zionist Organization and its institutes did not officially participate in the negotiations, they were the first to address the accurate delineating of Palestine’s (Eretz Israel)’s northern boundary. The first to acknowledge this issue was Shmuel Tolkowsky, who had written an article about the desirable boundaries of Eretz Israel for a book that was edited in 1915 by Harry Sacher, one of the leaders of the Jewish community in Britain. In the book, which was published a year later, Tolkowsky explained that Eretz Israel’s northern boundary passed along the last five miles of the Awalli river (north of Sidon), and from there in a straight, south-easterly line to the southernmost point of the Lebanon mountains and Mount Hermon. From there it runs to the point where longitude 36° E meets latitude 33° 15⬘ N, and then onwards, along another straight south-easterly line to Bosra (south of Jebal Druze), which is situated on latitude 32° 30⬘ N, and continues south from there . . ..’11 At the beginning of 1917, when the contacts between the Zionists and the British government over the future of Palestine were in their early stages, Tolkowsky was approached by the Lord Sieff, one of the leaders of Britain’s Jewish community. He was asked to prepare an article about the boundaries for the Palestine newspaper, the newsletter of the British Committee for Eretz Israel, which was practically the mouthpiece of the Zionist Organization in Britain.12 Even though Tolkowsky had repeated his proposal, the newspaper published the demand for a boundary that would pass to the north and to the east of the suggested line, and would encompass the city of Damascus and control of the Hijaz Railway.13 The British journalist Herbert Sidebothom made this expansion contrary to the ideas presented by Tolkowsky. The statesmen of the Foreign Office did not accept it either. The spatial vision of the Zionist leadership was broad enough, though it lacked the necessary accuracy in the details. This explains why the Zionist leader Nahum Sokolov presented to Sir Mark Sykes the Zionist claim for a northern border ‘from the Ladder of Tyre to the Syrian Desert, including the mountains that overlook Lebanon and the Golan’.14 Weizmann had already presented the formula that had later turned into the key sentence concerning the determination of Palestine’s boundaries. In early 1918, during a conversation with Mark Sykes, Weizmann announced that he aspired to a Palestine that resided between ‘Dan

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and Beersheba, and from the sea to the desert’.15 He held his position and presented it to General Allenby in Palestine after the southern part of the country had been conquered, a few months later. This central military event, and the activities of the Jewish Committee in southern Palestine, had speeded up the internal discussions within the Zionist leadership over the future of Palestine. In order to base its claims in a scientific manner, the Zionist Organization approached a British company, and invited a survey regarding Palestine’s economic future. The report that was prepared by the Benton company discussed the irrigation of a million agricultural acres (400,000 ha) in Palestine, and a demand for control over parts of Lebanon, the south of the Lebanon mountains, Mount Hermon and the Yarmuk river’s sources was presented.16 A borderline that enabled direct control of Palestine over these areas was therefore viewed as obligatory. The end of the war and the preparations for the Peace Conference had accelerated the internal discussions regarding the northern boundary, and on 8 November 1918 the Zionist Advisory Committee on Eretz Israel prepared its proposal about the country’s boundaries, and based it upon ‘historical, economic and geographical reasons’. The ‘demanded’ northern boundary was different from all the suggestions that were presented to the Zionist Organization. It followed the course ‘from the Litanni river to the Banias, close to and north of the Jordan’s sources, and from there in a south-easterly direction – to a point that is situated south of Damascus, close to and beyond the Hijaz Railway.’17 A number of memoranda based on this demand were presented to the British Foreign Office, and they included substantial arguments for the maximal Zionist demands regarding the north of the country. Two residents of Palestine, who were staying in Paris during the Peace Conference discussions on the northern boundary, provided the professional basis for the Zionists’ demand: Shmuel Tolkowsky and Aaron Aaronson. The Zionist leadership asked Tolkowsky, whose articles about the boundaries had appeared in the Zionist media during the war, to prepare a memorandum that would justify the Zionist claims in the north. The demand was for a line that would follow the southern limit of the autonomous province of Lebanon, until it reached latitude 33° 45⬘ N (near the town of Zabadani). From there – in a straight south-easterly line – to the point where longitude 36° E meets latitude 33° 30⬘ N (between Katana and Rashaya – north of Mount Hermon). In addition the Zionist Organization had turned to Aaron Aaronson, agronomist and leader of the Nili spy network, whose opinion was accepted by the British military and intelligence, and asked him to prepare a memorandum about this issue as well. Tolkowsky repeated the views he had presented in the past, in favour of a line that originated from a point on the Mediterranean coast, north of Sidon and along the southern borderline of autonomous Lebanon.18 But

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unlike the Zionist demand, the line that he proposed continued a few kilometres south until it reached latitude 33° 38⬘ N, and from there directly to the 33° 30⬘ N–36° E point. Tolkowsky continued to argue that secure boundaries were necessary. Nevertheless, claims that acknowledged the settlement dispersion were added to his proposal – among them the need to separate the Christian population of Lebanon from the Moslem settlements in the south of that country. Tolkowsky believed that the local Moslems would not want to be annexed to French-influenced Christian Lebanon, and would eventually join a British-Jewish Palestine. Apparently another specialist, Haim Margaliot-Kalvariski, Baron Rothschild’s and the JCA official, put this last argument forward in the north of the country. Kalvariski had presented a memorandum in July 1919 in which he demanded that the city of Sidon be included in Palestine.19 He claimed that the southern boundary of the autonomous territory of Lebanon, which was set in 1861, followed the Awalli river north of Sidon, and that this was actually the historic borderline of Eretz Israel. (Tolkowsky had claimed the very same thing.) Kalvariski argued that the region’s Moslem residents would not want to join a Christian district, and would prefer contact with the Moslems of Palestine. Sidon, according to Kalvariski, had always served as Palestine’s northern port, and detaching it from its agricultural hinterland would cause the whole region to become paralysed, because the Lebanon mountain region conducted its commerce through the port of Beirut. He claimed that the inhabitants of Sidon regarded the possible annexation to Lebanon as the worst sort of calamity that they might be confronted with. Another argument he presented was that the Jews regarded Sidon as an integral part of Eretz Israel, and therefore did not celebrate the second Yom-Tov (holy day) of the Diaspora, which is celebrated in every place beyond Eretz Israel’s traditional boundaries, in this city. He added that even the Ottoman government regarded the Sidon sub-district, with Marj-Ayun, Hasbaya, Rashiya and the Golan, as part of Filistin, as the prohibition laws against land purchasing and settling for Jews related to this region too, contrary to the northern areas of Damascus, Homs and Hamma. Aaron Aaronson’s position was different. As an agronomist and an agricultural specialist he had addressed the country’s economic, and mainly agricultural, development. This is why his arguments regarding the northern border, focused on the need for irrigation water. Aaronson aspired at achieving a boundary that would promise the inclusion of the sources of the Jordan, Litanni and Yarmuk rivers. As a scientist he rejected the romantic argument about the ‘natural boundaries’ and claimed that ‘what are regarded as the natural boundaries of Palestine are nothing but an unstable vision, an outcome of the fact that Palestine is situated on the continental meeting point between Africa and Eurasia’.20 Therefore Aaronson presented a northern boundary according to his views. It originated from the coast, south of Sidon on point 33° 34⬘ N, so that all of the

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Zaharani basin would be included in Palestine, and would continue east along the western slopes of Mount Hermon, to the Qara’un bridge. From there the line would continue east, between the basins of the Qara’un stream and the El-Tiyam stream to the 33° 36⬘ N–36° E meeting point, north-west of the summit of Mount Hermon, which was also destined to remain in Palestine. From there the borderline would continue in a southerly direction along 36° E longitude towards Qatana and Sasa, so that the water flowing to Damascus would remain outside the boundary of Palestine, and on towards the Yarmuk river, west of the Hijaz Railway. Aaronson’s approach became the baseline of the official Zionist demand. The Zionist Organization centred its claims regarding the desired delimitation of Palestine’s northern boundary on development, irrigation and populating of the land – unlike Tolkowsky’s strategic, or Kalvariski’s cultural-historical, attitude. The Zionist leadership, and later on the British policy makers, had placed the country’s economical development at the centre of their claims about the northern boundary. Sokolov strictly rejected the religious reason (i.e. Christians versus Moslems). He claimed that he did not wish for the inclusion of the city of Sidon, ‘because too many Gentiles live there’.21 The need for a substantial amount of water for the irrigation of Palestine turned into the central argument for the specific location of the boundary. These were the main arguments, around which the Zionist demands that were presented to the Peace Conference in Paris, on 3 February 1919, had formed. Accordingly the northern boundary was supposed to: originate from a point on the Mediterranean coast, next to and south of Sidon, and to continue along the watershed of the Lebanon slopes, to the Qara’un bridge. From there to El-Bire, along the line that separates the basins of the Quran and El-Tiyam streams, and in a southbound direction – along the line that separates the eastern slopes of Mount Hermon from the western slopes – to the vicinity of Beit-Jan. From there the line would continue to the east and cross the watershed of the Muganiya river, next to and west of the Hijaz Railway . . ..22 This version differs from all the internal Zionist versions that have been mentioned, but it is linked with Aaronson’s approach. This description is very detailed relative to the mode in which the eastern and southern boundaries were described. The northern boundary’s location was explained by stating that: Palestine, as a semi-arid country, is dependent on the available water supply. This is why it is highly important to not only to secure the water sources that are currently feeding Palestine, but also to conserve and control them at their sources. Mount Hermon is the true water

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A proper treatment of the waters of the Litanni river would serve the development of Palestine and Lebanon, and this explains the aim of an international arrangement that would ensure the rights of the population living south of the Litanni river. The general Zionist demand for the optimum boundaries for Palestine emphasized the inclusion of the areas that were regarded as necessary for the economic consolidation of the country. According to the Zionist memorandum: The geographic area of Palestine must be as wide as possible, so that it could absorb and sustain a large population that can carry the burden of a modern government better than a small state, in which the amount of the population is necessarily confined. The boundary memorandum was presented on 3 February, and was received in its final form by the Peace Conference on 9 February 1919. The geographic knowledge of the proposal’s authors – both concerning the location of the places mentioned and about the geographic terminology (watershed, collection basins, ranges etc.) – were limited, and the experts were called upon once again. Shmuel Tolkowsky prepared an improved proposal. This was not a final version and, following a deeper study of the subject, it was decided to move the proposed boundary a few kilometres to the north, in order to include the area around the Qara’un bridge (on the Litanni river). The idea behind this move was not merely to set the bridge itself as a post along the boundary, but mainly so that it would be easier to divert the waters of the Litanni in the desired direction southward, from a higher point along its course. The Zionist Organization remained wedded to this version of its demands for the northern boundary, and it hadn’t retreated from it when the first boundary agreement was signed, on 23 December 1920, almost two years after this proposal was put forward.23 The Zionist leaders did everything they could, exerting constant pressure – by writing and holding meetings – on anyone they regarded as an influential actor on the process of determining the boundary’s location. Pressure was directed at the various government levels in Britain24 – the Foreign Office, the political leadership and the War Office’s personnel – in order to convince them not to retreat from the British standpoint, which originally resembled the Zionist position. France confronted Britain in this subject so the Zionist activists tackled the French representatives. The Zionist representatives met with the French President, the various Prime Ministers, the leaders of

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the Senate and the heads of the political parties in an attempt to convince them to retreat from their rigid position, which was not ready to accept any changes along the northern boundary.25 Memoranda, meetings and pressure were also directed at the United States, which seemed, during a certain period, to be an optional compromise agent between the two sides. During the negotiations, the Zionists managed to persuade the US President, Woodrow Wilson, to harness his European representatives’ efforts for achieving the borderline they desired.26 Nevertheless, the Zionist Organization had been fighting a rearguard action since the beginning of 1920, and it was eventually forced to accept the terms of the agreement between Britain and France. Even the Tel-Hai events, and the fall in battle of Yossef Trumpeldor and his comrades, did not influence the line’s location, contrary to the popular Israeli view. The Zionist efforts had induced both the British and the French governments to realize that some changes should be made along the northern borderline, and the result of this realization was the moving of the Sykes–Picot line to the north. Two major Zionist arguments had influenced the location of the northern boundary. On one hand, the Zionist development plans for Palestine and the need for irrigation water persuaded all the sides to consider this issue, and to grant the whole of the Jordan river to Palestine. On the other hand, as will be discussed later, the existence of a Jewish settlement in Metulla during the twenty-five years that preceded the border discussions had also influenced the setting of the boundary along the course that was finally determined. The political pressure and the political efforts of the various Zionist organizations, and the incidents that had occurred in the region, were nothing more than a background of demands that could not create new facts in the area. Ultimately the whole matter was subject to the direct negotiations between the British and French governments, and the internal calculations of each side determined the final precise location of the boundary. The British had used the ‘Zionist’ arguments in order to achieve their goals along the northern line for quite a while, but in the end it was the Zionist representatives who believed in the pressure that they were creating more than the British representatives. The British delegates to the discussions emphasized that they were working for the Zionist cause,27 and that they were trying to achieve the best possible line – just as the Zionist Organization demanded – time after time. But actually the British government had formed its own ideas about the northern boundary (which were similar to the Zionist line, though they differed in detail), and it did not need a booster for the negotiations it held with France. The British position as regards the northern boundary of Palestine had formed during the general discussions over the future of the Middle East. Arnold Toynbee, who was a junior member of the British delegation to the Peace Conference, had stated before the talks began that there was no reason for Palestine not to extend up to the southern border of Lebanon,

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that is to say, northwards – as far as the banks of the Litanni river.28 The general British view had been formed around the biblical formula ‘from Dan to Beersheba’ even earlier, in respect of the area that Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, had demanded in his meeting with the French Prime Minister in November 1918. Strange as it may seem, it was the biblical formula, which was popularly translated into ‘the area up to the Litanni along the coast, and from there towards Banias – ancient Dan – or to Lake Hula in the land’s interior’29 that stood on the centre-stage of the discussions. The proposals of the Foreign Office, and of the British delegation to the peace talks in Paris, had formed by the beginning of May 1919. A detailed memorandum30 that was prepared by the Foreign Office dealt with the boundary issue, and was accompanied by detailed maps, presenting three options for the delimitation of Palestine’s northern boundary. The first showed the maximal boundary, which was demanded by the Zionist Organization. This line included the Hasbani river because of its significance for Aharonson’s irrigation plans. This line was supported by the British military delegation. The political delegation opposed the line, and its members claimed that it would lead to the inclusion of the extreme Moslems, who lived in the vicinity of Rashiya and Hasbaya, in Palestine. They added that the waters of the Dan river and Banias river were sufficient for those irrigation needs. The second line was proposed by the political delegation itself, and originated from the mouth of the Litanni river to longitude 35° 32⬘ E (near the Litanni bend). From there it would continue until level point 2,794, on Mount Hermon, and from there to the south along the watershed that separates the waters that flow to the Jordan river from the waters that flow east in the direction of Damascus and the Yarmuk. After crossing the Tasil-Pik road it would continue to the origin of Wadi El-Masjid, 2 km south-east of Pik, and continue along its course until reaching the Yarmuk river. According to the delegation’s opinion, this line would leave the Jordan – which is a Holy Land river according to the Christian tradition too – in Palestine, in addition to the fact that it was a good military line. Strategically speaking, it was important to consider whoever might reside on the northern side of the line. At the time, the concept of the mandate and French control over Syria were yet to be decided, and the British political delegation claimed that this was a good security line, even if France did not receive the mandate over Syria. If the French did end up as Syria’s rulers – according to the delegation’s line of thought – it would be best to achieve the maximal ‘Zionist line’ and to include all of south Syria within the borders of the British mandate. The preferred limit line, in this case, would originate at the Litanni river, which reaches the origins of the Banias river. From there in a straight north-eastern line to the Euphrates river, so that the town of Palmira (Tadmor) – in the Syrian Desert – would be included in the Britishcontrolled area. The memorandum’s authors offered a third option for a

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‘minimal line’ that did not include the Tyre enclave, and which passed between Ras-El Naqura, the Jordan and the Litanni. The supporters of this proposal claimed that the residents of Tyre were anti-Zionist Moslem fanatics, and that there was no point in including them in Palestine. The officials of the Foreign Office claimed that this line would not affect the intention of including all of the Jordan river in Palestine. It is therefore apparent that the British delegation had marked Palestine’s northern boundary before the negotiations had opened, and that this line deviated from the regional military administrative line set by General Allenby. The proposed line was very different from the Zionist proposal. These ideas were presented during internal discussions, and they did not leave the delegation’s work files for the time being, and were not presented during the negotiations. The War Office, which stood behind the military delegation, had its own ideas as regards Palestine’s northern boundary. The military experts agreed with Aaronson’s opinion about a borderline that would pass north of the Litanni river. They preferred not to use the river itself as a borderline, in spite of the military advantage associated with a river-based boundary. According to their proposal, the boundary crossed the river at a place where the river leaves the Lebanon’s Bak’aa (the Rift Valley). The army was concerned about a future military confrontation with the French or with any other force which would control Syria and the Middle East. When it became clear that France was destined to control Syria, the War Ministry aspired to achieve the best possible boundary between the French and Mesopotamia.31 The military experts sketched their desired borderline on a map that was scaled at 1:1,000,000 from the Zaharani river to the letter N of the word ZAHARANI (on the mentioned map) north towards the 1,680 level point on the Lebanon mountains. From there to the east, so that the Jenin mountain would be included. The border would pass north of Mount Hermon to level point 594, north of the road to El-Maksura and to Jebel-Turfa so that it would include the towns of Rashiya, Sasa and Dana. From there it would continue in a straight line through JebelMastanni – level point 490 – Jebel-Debias, Jebel-Bishri and El-Munkara, so that El-Hiwi would stay in Syria, and from there to the Khabur river and the Euphrates. This line was supposed to leave all of southern Syria – without Damascus and Jebel-El-Sharki on its north-eastern side – within the British-controlled area. This proposal reflected all the British imperial ambitions in the region, and it did not spring from the specific intention of fulfilling the Zionist Organization. The British political delegation, the leading actor throughout the discussions, opposed this line for political reasons, and due to the logistic management difficulties at certain points in the Syrian Desert, especially in Palmira–Tadmor.32 General Allenby joined this line’s opponents as well. In contradiction to the complex British stand, the French position regarding the northern border was firm and uniform. France demanded

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that the Sykes–Picot agreement be recognized, and that the line which was outlined as the northern limit of the ‘international area’ in the agreement, should now serve as Palestine’s northern boundary. The French position was influenced both by political developments in the Middle East and by the frequent changes of government in France. During 1920, the year that the issue of the northern boundary was addressed, Faisal had crowned himself ‘King of the Arabs’, and took the throne in Damascus. Later, in August that year, Faisal was driven away by French forces. During the same year, three governments were replaced in France, and each of them had a different view about the future location of the northern boundary in Palestine. These events toughened the French position, and enabled the permanent staff of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs – which was anti-Zionist, anti-Arab and even anti-British – to influence the negotiation process and the decisions. France had been witnessing the British taking over all of Palestine and Mesopotamia, and they aimed at securing for themselves full control over Syria and Lebanon, while preventing the Arabs from taking over Damascus. During the initial stages of the negotiations, until the summer of 1920, France tried to block Faisal’s outlet to the Mediterranean Sea by demanding control of all its eastern coast, from Alexandretta in the north to Acre in the south. Later on, when they were already in control of Syria, they aspired to secure a convenient transport link from the Houran and the Golan to the Mediterranean Sea, in order to create a territory that they could comfortably rule. They considered any deviation from this stand as a blow to French honour, and to their status in the Middle East. This is why they tried to secure all the available area that would ensure them convenient control over Syria and south Lebanon. The French position, which was presented during the discussions over the location of the borderline, was fuelled by the personal opinion of General Gureaux, who was the appointed commander of the French forces in the Middle East, and by the opinion of his political adviser, De Crix. These two supported French expansion as far south as possible.33 French political-territorial aspirations were opposed by the British government representatives, the British government itself and the representatives of the Zionist Organization, who found themselves fighting for every piece of land that they wished to see as a part of the Britishcontrolled Palestine. When the internal discussions about Palestine’s northern boundary were held, Britain and France were still considerate of the US view as well. On 21 January 1919 the Americans presented outlines of reports and proposals concerning the Middle East in general and Palestine in particular.34 The intelligence department of the US delegation to the peace talks prepared these outlines, and the reports emphasized the importance of returning the Jews to Palestine. In order to achieve favourable results, their plan suggested borders so that the new state would control its water sources – for the production of electricity and for irrigation. According to

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it this issue had to be seriously considered, because the survival of the new state was dependent on the possibilities of sustainable agricultural development. A map accompanied the memorandum marked with a borderline that resembled the proposed ‘Zionist’ borderline, including the south-western part of the Litanni river, Mount Hermon and the Golan in Palestine. The American proposal was never discussed, and the fact that the United States had retired from the negotiations about the future of the Middle East prevented the continuation toward this direction. An official meeting between the British Premier Lloyd George and the French Foreign Minister Pishon took place in London on 20 March 1919. At this meeting the British demanded changes along the line that was delimited in the Sykes–Picot agreement, so that the Jebel Druze would be included in the British control area.35 Pishon firmly objected to this demand, and argued that Britain had already received Palestine, and that France would not give up anything else. During a British–French experts’ discussion, held shortly after this meeting, France demanded to expand its control to the area south of the Yarmuk and east of the Jordan, down to the Dead Sea.36 Lawrence of Arabia supported this demand. The French attempt at gaining territorial increments east of the Jordan river was a response to the British northward expansion ambitions west of the river. In order to strengthen their position against the British (and Zionist) claims, the French summoned a delegation of Lebanese residents to the Peace Conference. This delegation represented the Lebanese demand for a ‘Greater Lebanon’ within its natural boundaries, which had been truncated during Ottoman rule. The Lebanese delegation demanded the creation of the modern state of Lebanon, and not just upon the territory of the Ottoman autonomous province. They sought the inclusion of the ports of Beirut and Tripoli, the Bak’aa valley with the Jordan sources, and all the Phoenician coast including the historic towns of Tyre and Sidon.37 According to the delegation’s argument, all these areas had comprised Lebanese territory in the past, and their addition to the autonomous district was a primary condition for the existence of a modern state. Without these areas, the Lebanese claimed, commerce and agriculture would not be possible and the local population would continue to emigrate to foreign lands. They added that the population of these areas had expressed a wish to join Lebanon (through signed requests that were probably organized by the French). There were two French motives for the establishment of ‘Greater Lebanon’. On one hand, the establishment of this kind of state, with the inclusion of the southern land around Tyre and Sidon, would probably disconnect Faisal’s intended Arab state, which was supposed to be established in Damascus, from any possible outlet to the sea, making it dependent on French goodwill. On the other hand the addition of Moslems to the Christian population of Lebanon might promise a continuing connection between France and the Christians, should the Christians wish to

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preserve their political dominance. In order to achieve these goals, France had to push for the maximum southbound expansion of the area under its control. France faced the British–Zionist demand to push the borderline to the north. The British–French dispute was apparent during the last meeting of the ‘Grand Trio’ – the US President Wilson, the French Premier Clemenceau and the British Premier Lloyd George, which took place at the end of May 1919. The British claim to Palestine and Mesopotamia was pressed again during this meeting, and final agreement about the division of the region into mandated units – British and French, without the Americans – was reached.38 It was now time to determine the borderlines that would separate the British and the French control areas.

The delimitation stage: summaries and decisions The official talks had not begun yet, but the general discussions that have been mentioned yielded a number of proposals. These proposals were summarized in a memorandum that was prepared in August 1919 by Eric Forbes Adam, a member of the British political delegation to the peace talks. The memorandum dealt with the issues of mandate division among the various nations, and it emphasized that the northern border of Palestine was a French–British problem, which would be dealt with without interference from any other actor.39 The author added a map to his memorandum, on which four borderlines were marked. The first one was the Sykes–Picot line. The French proposed the second line in February 1919, so that the Mosul area joined Palestine as a British-controlled area south of the Sykes–Picot line. The third line was marked according to the British proposal for the military division of the areas in the Middle East. The War Office had proposed this line in June 1919. The fourth line was proposed by France in response to the War Office’s line. Forbes Adam clarified that the French were not willing to accept the War Office’s line, which was marked blue on his map, because they had already given up Palestine, parts of Armenia and the Mosul area. The blue line moved Palestine’s northern boundary to the north, to the area south of Sidon, and it included the eastern town of Palmira under British control. According to the author’s opinion, the British proposals were strategic (in their nature), but in the case of the northern boundary of Palestine they were based on agricultural development plans. Palmira was considered important for the British military positioning, because it was the only settlement in the Syrian desert north of the ‘Ja’afer Depression’ (in south Trans-Jordan) in which water was abundant, and through which the overland connection from British Mesopotamia to Palestine could be established. The British army regarded Palmira a central point for the oil pipeline, the road and the railway, which would connect the Persian Gulf with the Mediterranean Sea. Forbes Adam pointed out that even the British politicians found this military demand hard to accept,

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because all the routes leading west from Palmira passed through Damascus or through Syria’s northern coastal region. These areas were about to become French in any case, and this is why Palmira’s strategic value had shrunk, from a British, imperial point of view. It was also not clear at that point whether Britain would come up with the funds necessary for constructing the railway (which was never built) and a pipeline (done only fifteen years later) from Iraq through the desert to the Mediterranean Sea. As far as Forbes Adam was concerned, there was no point in basing the British borderline demands on the dangerous assumption of a future war with France. The British political stance had always sought a borderline based upon economic needs, and it opposed any strategic view about the issue. Forbes Adam, who later represented Britain during the official discussions with France over the northern boundary, thought that Britain should aim for a borderline that would include the southern part of the Litanni river and all of the Hasbanni river. This, even if the land demanded by the War Office and the Zionists north of the Litanni would not be included. Adam’s memorandum was received and accepted by the political delegation, and it became the official British base for the negotiations with France. The main French demand – to receive full control over Syria – had grown stronger since the French troops finished their missions in Europe. France sent soldiers to Cilicia (in today’s southern Turkey) to enforce its control over that region. It now demanded that Britain remove its soldiers from Syria, so that French troops could replace them. It was clear to France that only military control over the area could serve as the basis of a territorial claim. Officials of the British Foreign Office, headed by Balfour, accepted the French demand – especially when it seemed to suit the urgent need to release soldiers from military service. Balfour urged the Premier Lloyd George to officially recognize the French mandate over Syria and Lebanon and to constitute the northern boundary of Palestine according to economic concepts and not according to strategic military ones, so that the necessary water for the agricultural development of the country would be included. Lloyd George assembled an internal British conference with the participation of representatives from the War Office, and of General Allenby, Governor of Egypt, in order to discuss the British position regarding the military separation line between France and Britain in Palestine. The meeting was held in Douville, France,40 and it was there that Allenby claimed that the village of Banias was clearly ‘the ancient Dan’. Lloyd George was opposed to the inclusion of Mount Hermon in Palestine, and Allenby supported this view, demanding that Britain retreat from its claim to control the Druze mountain (Jebel Druze). The War Office officials – possibly motivated by Aaronson – demanded that the waters necessary for Palestine’s future agricultural development be included in its future territory. Allenby agreed to this, but argued that two-thirds of the Jordan waters came from the Yarmuk and

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not from the Jordan’s northern sources, which was why the preferable borderline should run from the coastline south of Tyre to Banias. Lloyd George intervened at this point, as he wanted to examine the publications of the historical geographer George Adam Smith, which dealt with the Holy Land’s geographical past. In addition, he wanted to see an accurate map of the Sykes–Picot agreement. When he learned that the borderline dictated by the agreement crossed the Sea of Galilee, Lloyd George demanded that the whole lake should be included in Palestine. He argued that the French had plans for irrigating the land in the south of the Golan with the lake’s waters, while the Zionists intend to divert the Litanni’s waters to the Jordan river. In the course of the discussions, it was proposed that an American negotiator, a clergyman who had researched the historical geography of the Holy Land, should be summoned in order to point out the accurate location of ancient Dan. That, due to the confusion caused by the different versions regarding Palestine’s boundaries in the past. All the participants agreed that Britain must control Palestine, and that Syria should be given to France when the British troops evacuated it as part of the process of demobilizing men from the services. According to Allenby’s suggestion, Lloyd George presented France with a military separation line running from the Litanni river to Banias, towards the Hijaz Railway and on to Dar’aa, east of the tracks.41 France agreed to the concept of separating the forces by a line which left all the coastline north of the Litanni river, the Druze mountain and Mount Hermon under its control. Britain demanded that France should occupy only the ‘Blue Area’ of the Sykes–Picot agreement, north of the separation line, while the internal part of Syria would remain under the control of Faisal and the Arabs. The French were unwilling to accept this part. Nevertheless, on 15 September 1919 it was agreed that the British forces would retreat from Syria, and reorganize south of the separation line that was later named ‘the Douville line’. It was mutually understood that this line was not a borderline separating future control territories and that it would not be considered during the negotiations about the future of the region.42 The French had protested against this agreement that did not allow them a stronghold south of the Litanni river, and General Gureaux, the commander of the French forces in the Middle East, was keen on achieving all the ‘Blue Area’ of the Sykes–Picot agreement. Britain refused and its representatives demanded that the separation line should run from the Litanni river to Banias, which was included in the British territory. From there to the Mugariya stream (next to El-Hader in the Golan), and to a point south-west of Leja and west of the Druze mountain, which would remain in French territory, so that all the streams that flow to the Jordan would remain in British territory. The British forces were instructed to occupy any point that they regarded as necessary, without considering the location of the line, which was merely a military separation line of temporary validity.43

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The British retreat from Syria began in October 1919, and was completed during December of that year. Nevertheless, the British forces were now positioned along a line that was different from the ‘Douville line’. Allenby met General Gureaux, as the retreating process neared its end. In order to withstand the claims of the French general, Allenby agreed to move his troops back, and to position them along the line of the Occupied Enemy Territory (South). This meant the line from Akhziv, on the Mediterranean coast, to a point north of Lake Hula. By this determination, which was also due only to military need, Allenby had given up military control over the area south of the Litanni river, while meticulously keeping the territorial division of the military administration that had been operating for over a year. The British forces had also retreated from the area east of the Jordan river. This was how the whole of the Occupied Enemy Territory (North) remained in French hands, the Eastern Area remained in Faisal’s hands and the Southern Area remained under the direct control of the British army. The local military leaders had agreed that the decision formed no basis for the negotiations about the political boundary between Palestine and Syria. France continued to press for the Sykes–Picot line, and the British War Office pressed for a line that ran north of the Yarmuk river and north of Lake Hula. Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen of the War Office, who served as the chief political officer in Palestine and who was responsible to the Foreign Office too, feared the fixation of temporary arrangements in the area. He therefore proposed a political borderline that would pass ‘from the Mediterranean Sea, along the Litanni river’s northern bank (so that all of the waters of the south Litanni remain in Palestine). From there to the east so that it will include all of the waters that flow from Mount Hermon to the Jordan and Litanni rivers.’44 This line, and its eastern and southern continuation lines, won the title of the ‘Meinertzhagen line’. It was later discussed during the assemblies of the Zionist Organization (which still saw it as the line that Britain officially proposed), and during the discussions held by British politicians, as a sort of compromise line. Nevertheless, like most of the ‘widening suggestions’ it never received official confirmation. The Zionists received a full report about the military separation talks and were well aware of the line’s meaning although at that point in time this line was regarded as unsatisfactory. The fear of it becoming fixed renewed Zionist pressure on the United States, France and Great Britain, which was exerted in order to resist the possible loss of control over the Litanni river’s waters.45 The unclear situation in regard to the regional administrative and authoritative limits burdened not only the politicians but the stationed forces as well. A number of local military leaders regarded Tyre as a port that belonged to Palestine, others saw Quneitra as situated beyond its territory.46 The unclear situation drove Colonel Stanton, the military governor of Haifa, to write a memorandum. He presented the problem of

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Haifa’s water supply as yet another argument for setting the borderline in the north.47 It was already becoming apparent that Palestine would not control the Litanni, and the governor of Haifa feared that the implementation of the Sykes–Picot line would cut Haifa off from its only abundant water source, the Qarun stream with its big reservoir in the old ruined Monfort Crusaders’ fort. Therefore Colonel Stanton raised a demand for a borderline that would pass along the Ras El Naqura ridge and emphasized the geographical, physical and settlement advantages of a line that ran along the top of a projecting ridge without any existing settlements on agricultural land on it. This was the first actual mention of the line that would eventually become Palestine’s north-western boundary. This memorandum spelled out the urgency of the borderline problem for the Foreign Office. French pressure and the pressures of the War Office, and actions taken by different actors in the Middle East – French, Arab and British – and the confusion that surrounded the location of the borderline, all brought the French Premier Clemenceau to visit London again. Clemenceau arrived with the general secretary of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Philip Bertelou. The meeting with the British Prime Minister was intended to reach a final decision over the problematic issue of the separation line between Britain and France in Palestine.48 France was willing to accept the line suggested by the British in exchange for receiving the mandate over Syria (which would include the Houran, the Druze mountain and the water sources of Damascus). The French were willing to discuss the water needs of the Jewish settlements in the north, without making territorial concessions. The Foreign Office experts discussed the French positions, and Forbes Adam prepared another memorandum with a detailed description of what the two sides proposed.49 According to this paper, France had taken its stand on the Sykes–Picot agreement, and following the concessions they had already made in Mosul and in Palestine, the French were now unwilling to retreat from the line that was decided upon in that agreement. This line, according to French sources, was agreed upon following deep and serious consideration. Forbes Adam pointed out that France recognized the Zionist position but all it was willing to do to support it was to come up with a technical economic agreement, and not with a territorial agreement, and that there was no economic reasoning that would lead it to yield territorially. Forbes Adam postulated that an essential conceptual difference existed between the British and French interpretation of the term ‘national home’, and that this difference was influencing their borderline standpoints. He claimed that the French, who had accepted the Jewish ‘national home’ concept, were thinking of protection and help for the Jewish settlements that already existed in the region. A number of settlements were situated north of the Sykes–Picot line and up to Metulla in the foothills of Mount Hermon, but the vast majority of Jewish settlement in Palestine was situated south of the line. Forbes Adam thought that France was willing to

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deal with the villages that were under the patronage of the Jewish Colonization Association. These settlements were established or supported by the French Baron Rothschild, and France was destined to control most of them, according to the Sykes–Picot agreement. This claim was partially true, because most of the northern Jewish settlements – Metulla, RoshPina, Mishmar-Hayarden, Yesod-Hama’ala, Ein-Zeitim and even the new settlements of Tel-Hai, Kfar-Gil’adi and Hamra – were supported by the JCA, which was also operating from France. It was clear to the French that the Zionist Organization did not have major influence in France, and the French Jewish representative on the Committee of Delegates, Silvan Levy, had opposed the Zionist demands when he appeared before the Peace Conference. Forbes Adam further postulated that the driving force behind the French will to annex Galilee to its territory was the Arab ruler of Damascus, Faisal. Faisal had reached an agreement with the Zionists and the French regarded this move as pointing against them, which is why they were keen on placing the boundary as far south as possible. Forbes Adam thought that unlike France Britain had a different approach towards the Jewish National Home, and it intended to turn Palestine into the ‘national home’ and into a state which was delimited within historical and geographical boundaries. The intention was to gradually create an independent Jewish state by means of slow and controlled immigration, and economic improvement. Like others, Forbes Adam did not believe that Palestine would ever become a state for all the Jews (in the world). It seemed to him that 3 million instead of the current 60,000 would be able to settle there – and especially Jews from the East, that had never come to Palestine. This was why Britain must make sure that the country was delineated within borders that would enable economic development, without which the necessary settlers and the money would never arrive. The memorandum’s author admits that Britain should have compensated France for the concessions it made in Palestine, and he suggested ways of changing the boundaries between the British and the French colonies in Africa, in exchange for concessions that had been made in the Middle East. Nevertheless he rejected the French demand for controlling the area south of the Yarmuk and east of the Jordan. It was clear to Forbes Adam that Britain could not find an attentive ear to its claims within the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore he concluded his memorandum by suggesting that the two Prime Ministers should meet again, because of the friendly mutual relations that existed between them, and because of Lloyd George’s stubborn adherence to the formula ‘from Dan to Beersheba’. Everyone now knew that ‘Dan’ was situated much further north than the Sykes–Picot line, although Clemenceau himself had retreated from his acceptance of the biblical formula. The Prime Ministers did not meet again. Instead, the meeting was held between Bertelou and the new British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon.

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The Frenchman repeated the demand for Britain to accept the Sykes–Picot line in exchange for one-third of the water from Mount Hermon, which would be turned over to the Jewish settlement in Palestine.50 The British were firm about the country’s water needs. They proposed a new separation line – from a point north of Acre, near Ras El Naqura, towards the Litanni bend and through Mount Hermon, south of Hasbaya, and southward along the half-way line between the River Jordan and the Hijaz Railway – up to the Yarmuk river. Bertelou rejected this idea, and demanded that France should control the Safed area, all of the Yarmuk valley and the Druze mountain. Curzon reminded the French of the price that Britain had had to pay for the occupation of Palestine, and threatened to turn to an American arbitrator if France did not accept the formula ‘from Dan to Beersheba’. The French did not change their position, and they also demanded that the military separation line should follow the Sykes–Picot line along its entire length. France reached agreement with Faisal concerning the way in which Syria would be controlled at the beginning of January 1920. But this agreement, which was capable of solving all the problems of controlling the Middle East, did not last long – mainly due to the collapse of Clemenceau’s government, and to the consequential taking over of power by the socialist Milrand. The French position became tighter than ever, and French public opinion angrily opposed any concession in favour of Britain, especially in Palestine and in Syria. The officials of the French authorities in the Middle East headed by General Gureaux pressed their government to avoid any additional withdrawal in Palestine. The Zionist Organization, for its part, had renewed its pressure in the American and French directions. Nahum Sokolov met the French President De Chanelle. Weizmann turned to the Jewish-American Supreme Court judge Louis Brandies, a personal friend of President Wilson, and asked him to influence the American leader to press Britain and France, and to explain the Jewish interest – not merely the British one – concerning the northern boundary. The Zionists of America, who were led by Brandies, Juliann Mark, Rabbi Stephan Weiss, Judge Felix Frankfurter and Ya’acov De-Haz, sent telegrams to Curzon and to Milrand concerning the northern boundary. Brandies was extraordinarily helpful in that he managed to convince Wilson of the righteousness of the Zionist claims. Wilson reacted by instructing his Secretary of State, Robert Lensing,51 who led the American delegation to the Peace Conference, to do all that he could to convince the British and the French of the justice of Zionist claims regarding the northern boundary. In addition, the Zionist Organization turned to Lloyd George once again, and the economic argument was emphasized in contrast to the historical one; economically, it was preferable to position Palestine’s borderline north of the Litanni river. As mentioned, the historical argument limited Palestine to Banias (Dan). The negotiations continued, and the area that was the subject of the

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discussion remained practically ownerless. The British retreat to the south and the French advance from the west were both following the separation lines of the military administrative areas, but the two sides were still dependent on urban bases, while occasionally sending troops to patrol the area. The northernmost British bases were in Acre and Safed, and the French were based in Sidon and Rashia. The entire region between these posts had become a ‘no man’s land’ although the military separation line was marked upon the maps.52 The Tel-Hai incident in which eight Jews, including the Jewish leader Josef Trumpeldor, were killed in an Arab attack, occurred in this very region, in March of 1920. It deeply influenced the Zionist perspective as regards the location of settlements and their role in determining the positioning of borderlines.53 It is clear today that there was no connection between the incident in Tel-Hai and the determination of Palestine’s northern border during the British period, and that the main negotiators were not concerned with the incident while it occurred or at any point thereafter. Even the Zionist leadership preferred to ignore the incident when they discussed the future of the northern boundary with the British and the French. Apparently the Tel-Hai incident had significantly influenced only the Jews in Palestine. During the discussed period, between January 1919 and July 1920, 150 French officers and 3,432 French soldiers were killed and wounded in collisions with the Arabs in this region, and thousands of Christians and Moslems were butchered by each other. The death of eight Jews, significant as it may have been for the Jews in Palestine, had no meaningful influence on the process of designing and positioning the northern borderline. In the meantime, matters were developing in the north of Palestine: on 8 March 1920 the Syrian Arab Congress in Damascus declared the establishment of an independent Arab State in the Middle East, and the Emir Faisal was crowned as its king. This move caused an outraged response from the French, but Britain did not express any real objection to the move even though Faisal had declared that Palestine was part of ‘Great Syria’. In order to escape from the standstill into which the border discussions had slipped into, in order to mark the borderline, and to deal with Faisal’s coronation swiftly and efficiently, Bertelou arrived in London again. Shortly after Faisal had been crowned, Bertelou presented a new compromise proposal – a line that would pass between the Sykes–Picot line and the line that was demanded by Britain. This line: would originate from the Mediterranean Sea in Ras-El-Ain, pass through Kana and cross Wadi Asoor, continue along Wadi El-Ma and thereby pass north of Turon (Tibnin). Then the borderline will cross the Saloukiya stream, pass south of El-Hula and climb northwards next to Bet-Rehov, and continue in a straight line to the Litanni bend, thereby leaving all of the river’s basin within Palestine. From there the

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The appearance of ancient names, which didn’t exist in the current reality (Bet-Rehov, Turon and more), is very noticeable in this proposal. This points to the source from which the marking of the line was taken – some geographical-historical atlas, which helped the French to fit it to the formula ‘from Dan to Beersheba’. It was difficult to locate the line on the delegations’ maps, but the British delegation, headed by Robert Vansittart, assumed that this was the best line that Britain could achieve, and was ready to accept the French proposal. Vansittart claimed that Britain had fought the battles for the Zionists, and that France had actually accepted Lloyd George’s formula by suggesting this line. Although the ‘Bertelou line’ did not give the Zionists all the water they wanted, it did give them a convenient borderline east of the Jordan river. Vansittart’s explanation included an attempt to interpret the formula ‘from Dan to Beersheba’. He claimed that both delegations had been working according the historical atlas of George Adam Smith and that the term ‘Dan’ meant the territory of the tribe of Dan, not the town of Dan – as it appears in maps 32, 34 and 35 of this atlas. Bertelou gave no explanation for his proposal. The British War Office claimed that this move was part of the French effort to establish a state in Lebanon, against Faisal, which was why the French were trying to include all of the Litanni river within this state, as its main water source. This concept seemed logical and the British delegation was willing to accept it. Nevertheless, the British delegation insisted on securing all the necessary water for the Zionist development plans, while raising questions about the future of Quneitra, and about the possibility of constructing a railroad track through the Yarmuk valley. As a result of the pressures exerted by the British military delegation, and possibly due to those laid by the Zionist delegation, Britain refused to accept a borderline that answered to the majority of the Zionist aspirations. At that time it simply believed that more could be achieved. When the French Premier Milrand, who based his foreign policy on toughness, did not receive a clear answer to Bertelou’s proposal, he returned to the old demand of adopting the Sykes–Picot line. Britain, under pressure to release military troops, facing a bloody Arab–Jewish riot in Jerusalem (Passover 1920) and the attempt to solve the crises over Faisal’s crowning, was ready to compromise on the principal matter. On 24 April 1920 the San Remo conference decided to divide the Middle East into mandatory territories under the patronage of Great Britain and France. Britain received the mandate over Mesopotamia and Palestine, and France received the mandate over Syria and Lebanon. The border-

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lines between the new territorial units were meant to be determined through direct negotiations between the sides involved, and the discussions from this point were more pragmatic. The Zionist Organization continued to exert pressure in every possible direction in order to achieve the borderline it wanted. Attention turned to France, and talks between French representatives at various levels and Zionist representatives were held throughout the second half of 1920. The Zionist activists managed to reach even the President of the Republic.55 The contacts with the British continued as well, and the Zionists were fully informed about all the relevant talks between Britain and France. The Zionist activity was aimed at the Litanni river line, but it seemed as if Britain had already retreated from this idea during the spring of 1920. The British main effort was now directed at achieving a better arrangement in the Yarmuk valley, in order to fulfil the imperial plans of connecting Iraq with the Mediterranean Sea via a railroad track and an oil pipeline. It seemed that the water problem in the north would be solved by a distribution agreement and not through territorial control. The obscurity continued, and the British War Office prepared its troops for spending the winter in Quneitra and in Banias, while France demanded that the British troops in Semah be evacuated. After the signing of the San-Remo agreement it appeared as if a peace treaty with Turkey would be signed soon. This peace treaty might determine the region’s future, and Vansittart requested clarification of the official British standpoint in regard to the northern boundary of Palestine. Britain did not accept the ‘Bertelou line’ although Lloyd George himself declared that the upper River Jordan was never subject to Jewish control, and that for this reason it should not be included in Palestine. At that point in time, France was willing to give even more. In the effort to reach an agreement with Britain, so that the British would allow them to handle Faisal, the French representative Cameroux had agreed to give up the ridge between the ‘Bertelou line’ and the ‘Meinertzhagen line’, east of the Jordan, so that Quneitra remained in British hands. According to Vansittart this was the minimum that the Zionists were willing to accept. Nevertheless, Britain insisted on achieving its targets in the Yarmuk valley, and in addition the fate of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers had not been determined yet.56 The Foreign Office claimed that the northern border should also be discussed with Weizmann and with Faisal, and that it could not send accurate orders. British hesitations concerning the distribution of the Litanni’s waters and concerning the control of the Yarmuk valley had also prevented a clear answer, and the opportunity of achieving a convenient borderline in the north of the country was lost. On 1 June 1920 an agreement between France and the Turkish troops in Cilicia was reached, and the French army that was no longer needed in the north was free to flow south towards Syria and Lebanon. France had actually been granted the ability to act independently in Syria, and the forces led by General Gureaux provided it with the confidence to act. On

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21 June Milrand presented an official suggestion to Britain.57 He claimed that Bertelou did not have the authority to propose the line that he had put forward in March 1920. Now France was officially retreating from its demand for the Sykes–Picot line. The French demanded to settle the line from Ras El Naqura to the Jordan river, north of Metulla and Banias, and from there to the northern shore of Lake Hula and along the Jordan and the Sea of Galilee to the Yarmuk. The line would continue east from this point, along the Sykes–Picot line. A map on which this line was accurately marked accompanied the French proposal, and Britain was requested to express an opinion. The Zionist Organization, which was also invited to respond, objected to the line because it did not include any proposal about the waters of the Litanni river. Nevertheless, the ‘Milrand line’ included all the Jewish settlements in the north within the British territory, and so fulfilled the Zionist demand, which had mainly been expressed after the Tel-Hai incident. The Zionist Organization asked the British delegation to freeze the talks, so that its representatives could have the opportunity to meet the French representatives once again, and the talks were halted for a month. This month was a crucial one for the future of the Middle East. The British military regime had ended on 1 July 1920, and Herbert Samuel assumed his post as the civilian High Commissioner. Samuel supported the Zionist position (he was among its formulators a year earlier) and he could see the similarity between the Zionist position and the official British position (unlike the discrepancies about the southern and eastern boundaries). He therefore demanded clarification regarding the northern boundary, and specific answers about the inclusion or exclusion of Dar’aa, with its important railway junction, within the British territory, as according to the Sykes–Picot agreement, this remained unclear. The regional military authorities had begun to question why the borderline deviated north from the Sykes–Picot line, west of the Jordan river, while in the east – near the Yarmuk – it did not. France was not free for negotiations at that point in time because they opened their military offensive towards Damascus, in July. The French forces entered the city on 24 July 1920, drove Faisal out and annulled the independent State of Syria. This action passed without any British intervention, although Britain had backed Faisal all the way, because it was decided that France had a free hand to do as it pleased in Syria. General Gureaux declared the division of Syria into autonomous provinces in September, and he ‘created’ ‘Great Lebanon’ by joining the Tripoli area, the Bak’aa and the area around Tyre and Sidon to the Christian autonomous unit of the Lebanon mountains. The need to conclude the boundary between France and Britain now seemed a marginal issue on the international scene. The sides had almost reached agreement about the delimitation of the western part of the borderline, west of the Jordan river, and it was only the disagreements about the Yarmuk valley and about the railway which pre-

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vented a final arrangement. The British military leaders continued to press for the addition of all of the Yarmuk valley to the British territory, or at least for joining the area between Semah and El-Hamma to Palestine. The War Office even checked the possibility of constructing the railway through the southern Wadi A-Zarka valley instead of the Yarmuk valley. At the same time, Samuel demanded that Semah should remain in Palestine, and not within French territory. The liquidation of the Arab State in Damascus was regarded by the British administration in Palestine as a golden opportunity to seize the land that it wanted to annexe east of the Jordan. Both the British and the French were pushing the local population to demand annexation to one side or the other, and Herbert Samuel tried to interest Allenby, who was in Egypt, to seize all the land up to the ‘Bertelou line’. The commander of the British forces in the region was ready to carry out this mission, but the War Office consulted the Foreign Office, and it rejected any idea of marching north from the Sykes–Picot line east of the Jordan.58 During September 1920, Milrand’s government had lost power in France. Leygues constructed a new government with an extreme foreign policy, and it did not agree to any concessions in Palestine. During discussions within the British Foreign Office, the question of the ownership over the Banias river was raised. Samuel claimed that the Banias river, Metulla and Lake Hula would remain in Palestine, but that Dar’aa, the Yarmuk valley and part of the Sea of Galilee would remain in French territory. France now demanded a line from Nesibin to Semah, south of the railroad and parallel to it, so that Dar’aa and the Yarmuk valley would remain in French territory, and that Britain would be permitted to construct a connecting track between Semah and the Hijaz Railway, south of Dar’aa. From Semah the line would cross the Sea of Galilee to the mouth of Wadi Masoudiya, and onwards through it, until it met Wadi Jerba. The line would continue to its sources (5 km south-west of Quneitra) and from there to the El-Hushba stream, and northwards along its course to the point called ‘Zoharra’, and on to the west so that the Banias river and Metulla remained in Palestine. In this region, separate discussion over the line that would produce the most convenient way from Tyre to the Houran (which would remain French). From Metulla the line would continue along the watershed between the streams of Para, Horon and Karun – which would remain in British territory – and the streams of Duble, Ayoun and Zarka, which would remain French. The borderline would end at Ras El Naqura, which would remain French.59 The Frenchmen who lingered in the area, and knew it well following its military occupation, delineated this line by their forces. Anachronistic names and meaningless map lines were not used for describing this line. Instead, a detailed description of a borderline running along existing and familiar streams, watersheds and roads was given. No explanation was given with this proposal. The clear intention of enabling Palestine to use all the streams that flow to the Jordan from the Golan Heights in the east, and

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from Galilee in the west, while not allowing it to use all the water flowing to the Sea of Galilee, was apparent. In addition the issue of a convenient passage between the French-ruled areas east of the Jordan and the coastal strip next to Tyre was emphasized. The geographic principle ‘water for Palestine, access roads to Syria’ had replaced the historic biblical formula ‘from Dan to Beersheba’. This borderline demand was presented at the end of September 1920, and it is similar to the final version that the two sides agreed upon, three months later. Still, this period of time was necessary for the sides to agree about this version. In his response to the French proposal, Foreign Secretary Curzon writes that Britain is demanding the ‘Meinertzhagen line’ without the Litanni river. This means ‘from north of Ras El Naqura to the hills that are situated five miles west of the Hula, and northwards from there to a point between the Litanni and the Hasbani to El-Bire’, and from there along the ‘Meinertzhagen line’ to the Yarmuk. The central part of this line passed north of Metulla, north of what was demanded earlier, and even the British representatives at the boundary talks objected to the line, because it included the fanatical Moslem populations of Hasbaya and Rashiya in Palestine. In general, the British representatives claimed, ‘Britain is now in a defensive position in the argument, and that there is no point in suggesting new proposals that contradict the French demand, which is not willing to hear of the distribution of the Litanni’s waters, although France has agreed to this in the past.’60 The Zionist delegation too had failed in trying to persuade the French to retreat from their standpoint. Samuel, who was very active on the issue of the northern boundary at the time, presented a number of contra-claims against the French demand. He demanded full control over both banks of the Jordan, between the Hula and the Sea of Galilee, to enable the use of the water power, and full control over the Sea of Galilee and Semah in order to enable lake transport between Semah and Tiberias. Samuel also demanded that goods would be transported from the Golan to Haifa, and not to Beirut, and the use of the Litanni’s waters.61 The British representative Vansittart presented these demands to the French, apart from the one about the use of the Litanni’s waters, and it seemed as if France would agree to all of them, let alone full control over the Sea of Galilee. A French representative from Syria visited Samuel, and promised to take care of the subject of directing goods from the Golan to Haifa. Britain retreated finally from the demand to set the borderline along the Litanni river, and now tried to achieve a control over the Yarmuk river. The Zionist Organization made final attempts, with Weizmann personally addressing Lloyd George, and Brandies addressing the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Appeals were made to Jan Smuts, the South African representative at the Peace Conference and later South Africa’s Prime Minister, to other state leaders in the Anglo-Saxon world, to the government of the United States and to the French philosopher Henry Bergson and the French socialist leader Roger Levi.62 A British parliamentary com-

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mittee on Palestine decided that Britain should press the French government concerning the northern boundary, because foreign control over the waters of the Jordan basin and the lower part of the Litanni would harm the future development of Palestine. These attempts were all in vain against an uncompromising French view, which was supported by French public opinion and by the pressure of the French forces in the area. Samuel tried to achieve more border privileges. He wanted to receive onethird of the Litanni’s waters for Palestine’s use, and to leave all of the Sea of Galilee in British territory. In exchange, he offered permission for the Syrians to fish in the lake, and to give the French a passage way from the Golan to Tyre, and one-fifth of the expected hydro-electric power from Rutenberg’s planned plant.63 With these proposals Samuel connected the plans to construct a hydro-electric plant in the north and the location of the borderline for the first time. This connection had a major influence on the final determination of the northern boundary. The final discussions that led to the border agreement had started in December 1920. On 4 December 1920 the French Premier Leygues received British approval for the line that France proposed. This proposal was a bit different from the original one, in that it left the village of Banias within French Syria. The solution of the water problem in the north was postponed until an arrangement would be reached after a survey with the participation of British, French and Zionist experts had been conducted. The French government promised to ‘behave in a very liberal way, and with generosity’.64 On 23 December 1920 the boundary agreement between Britain and France regarding the part between Nesibin in the east and the Mediterranean Sea in the west was signed. This agreement dictated a borderline that goes from Nesibin to Semah, south of and parallel to the railway, and as close as possible to it, so that the British government could construct a track of its own in the valley. The port and the station in Semah would be jointly controlled. The boundary would originate from Semah, and cross the lake to the mouth of Wadi Masoudiya, and onwards through this dry stream, and later through Wadi Jerba to its source. From there the line would turn towards the way that leads from Quneitra to Banias, and reach it at the point called ‘Soukik’, and along this road to Banias, although the road itself would remain within the French mandated area. Detailed marking would be made along this part of the line, so that the French mandated area would have a transport link to Tyre and Sidon through French territory. In this way, the continuity of the entire route, east and west of Banias, would be promised. From Metulla the boundary would pass along the watershed between the Jordan valley and the Litanni river, turn south and continue along this watershed. Further south, the borderline would principally continue along the watershed between the Para, Horon and Qarqara streams, which were to remain in British territory, and the Ayoun and Zarke streams, which were to remain in the French mandated area. The connecting point of the

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boundary with the Mediterranean Sea would be at the port of Ras El Naqura, which would remain within the French mandated area.65 The boundary agreement includes a number of sections in which the French positive response to British imperial needs, and the French transport needs, are apparent. Section 5 determined that the part of the Hijaz Railway that runs between Semah and Nesibin in the Syrian Desert would be used by both sides, and that a track towards Iraq might be constructed from there. Britain was also granted the possibility to lay an oil pipeline between Iraq and the Mediterranean Sea through French territory, if the technical surveys showed it was necessary. Another section determined that a British–French demarcation committee would be established within three months of the agreement’s signing, and it would mark the line accurately. The 23 December 1920 agreement concluded the ‘delimitation stage’ which is usually the longest and most complex among the steps leading to the formation of a new boundary. All the political factors had taken an active part throughout the discussions. Political pressures, economic, historical, strategic and other arguments were presented during this stage. The delimitation stage can be summarized as a British–Zionist battle for the water for Palestine’s irrigation plans, against a fight over French prestige in regard to their holding of territories in the face of the retreat from the Sykes–Picot agreement. The majority of the discussions during this stage were held in Europe, using historical atlases and maps that were neither detailed nor accurate. Using them caused inaccuracies, and these were revealed when the time for marking the borderline came.

5

The northern boundary Demarcation and administration

The discussions over the initial demarcation stage The special location of the northern border of Palestine, and the specific problems and conditions associated with this line, dictated that it should be physically marked in an accurate and precise manner. The northern boundary was a ‘superimposed boundary’ signifying that it was placed through a settled area that was previously devoid of any other borderlines. It was to become a clear political separation line between two separate political units with a different set of rules, laws and administrative systems. People who found themselves on both sides of the new line had to adjust to its existence, and only its accurate demarcation could help the local inhabitants to get used to it. The borderline was supposed to follow projecting geographical landscape elements such as ridges and streams, in order to facilitate its administration by the various authoritative bodies, and in order to ease the change for the local population. Nevertheless, only along some parts of its course, and mainly along its western part, was it indeed a clear and outstanding separation line. Without clear and prominent marks, one could not recognize that a borderline passed through the region. The majority of Palestine’s eastern boundary line, which was determined shortly afterwards, passed along salient landscape elements – the Yarmuk river, the Jordan and the Arava Rift. Beyond that, it was only an administrative separation line between two British mandated areas. The southern boundary was marked in 1906, although it passed through a desolate desert region, and the fact that it wasn’t accurately marked didn’t bother anybody. In addition the British rulers of Egypt and Palestine did not relate to the borderline as a line that limited their movements. The northern border of Palestine separated the protectorates of two sovereign superpowers – Great Britain and France. The Middle East – and Palestine in particular – was fixed in the consciousness of the people who ruled it, and it was directly controlled by the countries concerned, unlike distant mandate regions in Africa or the Pacific Ocean. Therefore an accurate agreement, which would be determined by a boundary committee, was obligatory. This committee was supposed to pass

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along the full length of the proposed line, to figure out all the details, and to mark the boundary in clear way. These complications led to a demarcation process that lasted for more than two years, until all the difficulties were alleviated and a final agreement was reached. Even after that, certain problems concerning the borderline’s delimitation were raised. This need was clearly foreseen when the boundary agreement was signed in December 1920, but actually nothing happened in the border region. Civilian administrations were governing British Palestine and French Syria, but the areas that were now ruled by Britain and France were statutorily still part of the Ottoman Empire. The new regime in the area would not be recognized by the states of the world as long as the final peace agreement with Turkey was not signed, and it was signed only three years later, on 29 September 1923. The Turkish government did not confirm the previous ‘Sèvres agreement’ from September 1920. Nevertheless, until this agreement, the ‘Lausanne agreement’, was signed, the occupied mandate areas were governed through a mutual understanding, but without any international recognition. This situation was apparently influencing the reality along the northern borderline. During the British military administration period (from October 1918 until July 1920) the northern border ran along a straight line from the north of Lake Hula to the Mediterranean Sea. This line continued to exist even after civilian administrations were established in Palestine and in Syria. The boundary agreement that was signed in 1920 still did not change the situation. During the following three years, the area north of the line mentioned remained under French control. During the months that followed the signing of the agreement the local villages, including Metulla, whose residents returned to their homes in November 1920, did not pay taxes to the British or to the French. Later on, when order was restored, the villagers were part of the French mandated area. The residents of Metulla and Kfar Gil’adi even participated in the elections for the Lebanese Parliament in Beirut, just like the rest of inhabitants of that area. Residents of Metulla, who visited the Jewish settlement of Ayelet Ha-Shahar, south of Lake Hula, were arrested for crossing the border without permission.1 The first census that was carried out in Palestine in October 1922 included the settlements up to that line, and the population living north of it were not counted. Even after the final agreement was signed in March 1923, it still took another full year for the change of ownership to take place. This action was completed only in April 1924, when the residents of the north, along with their farm land, became part of Palestine. This chain of events may seem a little odd today, but it wasn’t so back then. After the agreement was signed at the end of 1920, no practical action concerning the demarcation of the borderline was taken by either of the sides involved. The three-month period that was determined in the agreement as the time frame for the establishment of a boundary committee had passed, and it was only Herbert Samuel, the British High Commis-

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sioner of Palestine, who was disturbed by this lack of action. Samuel wanted to govern an area with defined boundaries, and he pressed for the appointment of a boundary commission as soon as possible. The Foreign Office did not immediately respond to Samuel’s request, possibly because it was in the midst of the process of passing Middle Eastern affairs to the responsibility of the Colonial Office. This process was completed only in January 1921, and only in March, after the Cairo conference (March 1921) had established the methods of governing the British Middle East, did the activities for appointing the commission commence. Thus the commission on the demarcation of the northern boundary was appointed five months after the agreement was signed. This commission included two senior representatives of each side. Lieutenant Colonel Stewart Newcombe from the Engineering Corps, who became an expert on Palestine surveying by carrying out among others surveys in Sinai and the Negev prior to World War I, was the leading British representative. The head French representative was Lieutenant Colonel N. Paulet. The commission was supposed to deal only with the part of the separation line between the British and the French areas in the Middle East. This was, because the status of the area east of the Jordan and south of the Yarmuk rivers had yet to be determined, and because the mandated status was still unconfirmed. Determining the borderline east of the Jordan river was not regarded as a problematic issue due to the fact that the line was supposed to follow the agreed Sykes–Picot line as close as possible. The borderline difficulties between Palestine and Lebanon and the Syrian province of Damascus were complex and immediate, which is why the commission dealt with that part of the line that ran between Ras El Naqura and Semah.2 The commission had extensive authority, according to section 29 of the Sèvre agreement’, which was supposed to be the peace agreement with Turkey. This section stated that a boundary committee would have the power not only to determine those parts of the line that were defined as a line that should be fixed on the ground. If the committee saw it as necessary, it might even change details that were determined by administrative or other boundaries. The committee would have to follow the line described in the agreement as closely as it could, and it would take as much account of administrative boundaries and economic interests as possible. Prior to the beginning of the commission’s work,3 in early June 1921, the British representative, Newcombe, travelled along the line from Ras El Naqura to Semah. Following the trip, and after he had consulted Herbert Samuel, Newcombe presented a number of technical suggestions that were sent to the French High Commissioner in Syria. The suggestions included the marking of the borderline on the maps of the Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF), which were the most accurate and detailed existing maps, and the acceptance of this line as the baseline for the discussions. The proposed borderline was determined and confirmed in

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December 1920, but it was not marked on a large-scale map. Newcombe proposed that the boundary should be delineated along the edges of existing farming and grazing grounds, so that the inhabitants through whose land the line was about to pass would not suffer greatly, even if it meant that the agreed line would be changed. The passing of equivalent land from one side of the line to the other would balance every territorial change that might be caused by this decision. As far as Newcombe could see, it should be no real problem to delineate the line between Ras El Naqura and Banias. But between Banias and the Sea of Galilee the borderline was supposed to pass through the land of the Emir Mahmud El-Fa’ur, the leader of the Arab El-Fadal tribe, which was a very influential, semisettled, landowning Bedouin tribe in the region. According to Newcombe, a situation in which one tribe was divided between two countries must be avoided, and he suggested that the Emir’s lands be left as one unit within the French or the British territory. Two possibilities were consequently apparent. The first would divert the line to the west of the proposed borderline so that it would pass from the east of Lake Hula from the Banias to the Jordan river, and along the Jordan itself up to the Sea of Galilee. In exchange for this part of the Golan Heights, which would remain in Syria, Palestine would receive all of the Sea of Galilee (as mentioned before, the lake was supposed to be split according to the 1920 agreement) together with the land along the lake’s eastern shore – from Semah stream (Wadi El-Kawassa) to the village of Semah. This land belonged to Sir Abas, a Bahai from Haifa. Palestine would also receive land in the Hasbani river basin and Syria would receive fishing rights in the Sea of Galilee. The second possibility was to move the borderline to the east, so that all the Emir’s lands excluding Quneitra, a number of villages and the Quneitra–Tyre road (which was to remain in French territory in any case) would remain in Palestine. Syria would be compensated by land south of the railroad next to Mazarib and Dar’aa in addition to a large area south of the Sykes–Picot line, east of Nesibin. Newcombe regarded his job from a broad perspective and not merely as a technical one. He suggested requesting the French to leave the village of Semah, and the adjoining station within Palestine. He also wanted the railroad and the dock at Semah to remain under joint ownership and the end point of the borderline to be moved from Semah to El-Hamma, which he claimed was the natural and historic boundary between the lands of the region. El-Hamma was supposed to remain in Palestine so that the irrigation plant that would divert the Yarmuk’s water towards the Jordan valley could be constructed. While Newcombe was getting ready for the demarcation work, the French were preparing too. The French High Commissioner, General Gureaux, instructed his team with orders in which he determined that the two main issues to be addressed were how to leave the road from Quneitra to Lebanon in French territory, and how to allow full water rights to Pales-

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tine. According to Gureaux’s investigations, the part of the 1920 agreement line between Ras El Naqura and Metulla passed through the land of the following villages: Alma El-Sha’ab, Ramia, Ayta El-Sha’ab, Rumeish, Samugaliyya, Katamon, Yar’un, Aytaron and Adissa in Lebanon. On the Palestine side the line was supposed to pass through the land of Basa, Yordat, Idmit, Tarbiha, Fassuta, Sasa, Kfar Bir’am, Malkiya, Kadesh, Balidda and Hounin. Gureaux agreed to Newcombe’s line of thought, and he too was ready to make the necessary changes in order to make things easier for the local villagers. Shiite Moslems inhabited six of the villages that were mentioned. The French mandate authorities wanted to avoid their disconnection from the Shiite majority in southern Lebanon, and Gureaux wanted to check the possibility of leaving these villages in Lebanon, although this was supposed to become a very complicated operation, which opposed the agreement. Gureaux even claimed that the move would be beneficial to the neighbouring villages, and that the British governor of the northern region agreed with his view. Another of Gureaux’s demands was to leave the road that passes north of Metulla, from Banias to Sarida in the west and to Qli’aa in the east, in Syria. The French planned to construct a telegraph line along this road, although the move would disconnect the northern lands of Metulla from the village. The Banias spring and the stream that flows from it were supposed to remain in Palestine, while the village itself was to remain in Syria. Gureaux supported the first of the two options regarding the land of the Emir Fa’ur, suggested by Newcombe, so that the land east of the Jordan river would remain under French–Syrian sovereignty. Gureaux, who knew of Rutenberg’s plans and was influenced by them, leaned towards delineating the borderline along the Jordan, so that all of the hydraulic works could be carried out within the territory of Palestine, on the left (eastern) side of the river. In this way, the line would run 10 m east of the riverbank and east of the shore of the Sea of Galilee. The land belonging to Sir Abas, Semah and El-Hamma would consequently remain in Palestine, and the fishing rights of the Syrian residents in the Sea of Galilee would be kept. Gureaux understood that in order to build an irrigation canal from the Yarmuk to the Jordan, El-Hamma must remain in Palestine. It therefore seemed as if the two sides had agreed about all the controversial issues even before the committee started its actual work. The constant Zionist pressure concerning the development of Palestine and the water needed for these plans was clearly apparent during this stage of the discussions as well, and the French side was the one that was supposed to give all the areas for the fulfilment of these plans. The delegations were off on their mission on 24 June 1921, and thirty Senegalese soldiers, a number of Syrian policemen and only six Palestinian policemen escorted them. The demarcation work that commenced in Ras El Naqura went smoothly and without interruption, and the committee reached Semah two weeks later, on 8 July, after it had marked the line

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from Ras El Naqura through Metulla, Banias, the Jordan and Lake Hula. The demarcation was done by erecting stone cairns, ‘boundary pillars’, in the appropriate places, and every cairn was seen by a straight view line from both of its sides. The demarcation was carried out according to the agreements between Newcombe and Gureaux, and the committee tried to follow the concept of not traversing the villagers’ lands to the best of its ability. Maps that showed the private ownership of the lands did not exist, and the leaders of the villages on both sides of the proposed lines were interviewed. The borderline ran according to the agreements and understandings that were reached in these meetings. The 1920 line was problematic for the local leaders and landowners like Kamal Bay-El-Sa’ad, the head of the Shiites, and Emir Mahmud El-Fa’ur of Quneitra, and it did not satisfy the wishes of the villagers of the Marj-Ayoun valley. Newcombe claimed that ‘the current line fulfils everybody’s needs, although it might not fulfil the will of the Jewish villagers of Metulla. Unfortunately, their representatives were absent when the committee passed through their areas, and we could not consult them.’ For this reason and due to the location of the road from Quneitra to Tyre – north of and close to the northern houses of Metulla – the northern lands that belonged to its villagers in the Marj-Ayoun valley remained outside British Palestine. This was contrary to the general determination idea, but as we shall see it was not an unusual case. The boundary was accurately marked. However, when Newcombe described the line east of Metulla, he paused and claimed that the borderline issue should not be concluded. He claimed that the passing of villages (as was dictated by the situation east of the Jordan river) should not be dealt with until the dispute over Lake Hula and its vicinity could be settled. According to Newcombe’s demand, the issue was reopened for internal British discussion, and this discussion prevented agreement about the northern border from being reached at this early stage.

Suggestions for changing the borderline, and its final demarcation Newcombe, who had participated in military and political negotiations in the past, wanted to use his position as the technical marker of the boundary to leave his personal fingerprint on the region by creating an absolutely new line. He had already shown a tendency for creativity and independence with his ideas about the lands of Emir El-Fa’ur, and he also conducted discussions of his own accord with the French and with the Emir. It can be assumed that Newcombe’s pressure convinced the Emir, who decided to remain in French territory, although he regarded the French as a foreign conqueror and preferred the British side. That was because he did not want his land to remain in a territory on which a Zionist state was about to be established. Newcombe’s anti-Zionist views

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were also revealed in the case of the farmland of Metulla, and now – after the demarcation work had ended and the agreement was about to be signed – he raised a revolutionary proposal. Palestine, according to this proposal, would give up the entire ‘Galilee panhandle’. He suggested a line ‘From Kadesh, which will remain in Palestine, to a point south of Nebi-Yosha, and in a straight line from there to the east in such a way that it would circle the Hula Lake and continue south.’ In exchange for giving up this northern territory, Newcombe hoped to add all of the Yarmuk valley to the British-controlled area, including the rail track between Semah and Dar’aa, while establishing a joint French–British company that would use all the northern water. Newcombe explained his proposal with strategic arguments: he thought that the planned northern line was inconvenient to protect, and that British needs required control over the rail track in the Yarmuk valley. The High Commissioner of Palestine, Herbert Samuel, could not accept this proposal. Nevertheless he refrained from rejecting it vigorously, unlike his tireless activity during the discussions that led to the 1920 agreement. Perhaps the riots of May 1921 damaged Samuel’s belief in the political future of Palestine. He sent Newcombe’s proposal to London with a personal note saying that he, Samuel, could not decide the matter because the governor of the north of Palestine, Henry Cox, and Pinhas Rutenberg, the man who was connected with all the plans for the use of the northern waters, were in London. The Foreign Office received the proposal, rejected it immediately, and claimed that it excluded the biblical ‘Dan’ and the swamp area that the Zionists planned to drain and cultivate north of Lake Hula, way out of Palestine. The Colonial Office, now in charge of Palestine, joined this opinion, rejected Samuel’s hesitation and vehemently required him to disregard Newcombe’s opinion and to follow the agreement’s original line. The officials of the Colonial Office added that 30,000 to 40,000 Jews could be settled in this region, and the Zionists would not give it up, as they would not give up the Banias river, which they needed for the fulfilment of Rutenberg’s plans. The Zionist Organization, which received a full report about Newcombe’s proposals, launched an immediate campaign to prevent any changes that might damage its interests in Palestine. At this time it emerged from the struggle over the waters of the Litanni river (which failed with the signing of the 1920 agreement) and went on to defend the project of draining the Hula swamps and the construction of Rutenberg’s planned hydro-electric power station. The Foreign Office and the Colonial Office accepted the Zionist claims, but it was the War Office, which had supported all the Zionist plans during 1919–20, that moved its support in favour of Newcombe’s ideas. The War Office claimed that its experts had been aiming for the implementation of the ‘Douville line’, and that the 1920 line was militarily inconvenient. They supported Newcombe’s proposal because it would relieve them of the tiresome task of defending a difficult boundary.

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In order to support their position, the War Office’s experts declared that they would not provide British soldiers for guarding the northern boundary, and that only local gendarmes would be allocated if necessary. The Colonial Office rejected these arguments and asserted that the military claims concerning Palestine’s northern border were unconvincing. Only the political and economical arguments were important in this case. The High Commissioner in Palestine fitted himself to this determination, saying that as regards the area north of Lake Hula future economic development was more important than the current strategic difficulty, and Newcombe’s line divided it. He added that the French wanted a road that would bypass Metulla, from Banias to Sidon, but such a road did not exist, and had to be constructed. The French were ready to reach a boundary agreement if Britain would construct the road, which would cost around $400, and, according to Samuel, it was better to wait for the irrigation experts before a final decision was reached. The Colonial Office was convinced and emphasized that no real changes should be made along the line that was agreed upon in 1920. It was decided that the final demarcation would not occur before the views of Rutenberg, and of two of the Office’s senior officials – Vernon and Herbert Young, who were in the Middle East at the time – could be heard. Samuel opposed the official appointment of Pinhas Rutenberg as the British representative in the water discussions because he feared the objection of the Arabs and the French. He therefore proposed that General Grant, the manager of the Palestine Public Works Department, should be appointed as official representative, and that Rutenberg should be his deputy. The Colonial Office agreed to this line of thought. In the meantime, Samuel tried to act locally and he requested that a British representation would be sent to control Metulla and collect taxes there in order to demonstrate sovereignty over the area. The Colonial Office prevented this action because it wasn’t interested in creating a new crisis. The indefatigable Newcombe did not retreat from his proposal and he presented new arguments. Following a survey that he conducted in TransJordan he claimed that ‘a railroad track cannot be constructed along Wadi Zarka, and only the Yarmuk remains, which is why the boundary should pass north of Dar’aa and Mazarib’. Newcombe’s political opinions hadn’t changed and he claimed that his proposal was not accepted only because Rutenberg oppose it, and that Rutenberg was not British, not an altruist who cared about the well-being of the public, and that Rutenberg’s position was not clear to him. The Colonial Office left the whole matter for Rutenberg, Newcombe, Samuel, Vernon and Young to discuss. The Office’s representatives met Newcombe, and Young summarized the discussion by remarking that he had ‘discussed the boundary issues with Newcombe. Newcombe has been doing all that he can for the British interests, but he did not yet understand that at this point in time the British interests include the successful outcome of the Zionist plans (emphasis added).

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Herbert Samuel, who had been passive throughout the discussions and did not fight for Palestine’s needs, now requested the Colonial Office to instruct Newcombe to carry out his mission accordingly. His request was granted and a memorandum from London that included directions about reaching agreement about the road that would be constructed between Banias and Metulla, at the expense of those who would be using the water (the Zionists), was sent. Meanwhile the signing of the boundary agreement was postponed, and all waited for Grant’s and Rutenberg’s report. This report was prepared in full co-operation with the French, who were also seeking a quick and final arrangement in the region. The report was presented in November 1921, and Palestine’s need for all the regional water, together with the fact that the 1920 agreement did not meet that need, was emphasized in it. The Grant–Rutenberg report stated that the French had agreed to remove the boundary to the north and to the east, so that the dams and bridges which were needed for Rutenberg’s projects could be constructed on the Hasbanni and Banias rivers. It was also agreed that the borderline would run east of the Jordan river, in order to enable the digging of a canal along its course. The borderline was supposed to be located about 20 m above the canal, along the 175 m contour between Banias and the Hula Lake, and along the 35 m contour between Lake Hula and the Sea of Galilee. The report claimed that ‘the French have an honour problem, and the British have a water problem’. Grant and Rutenberg commented on the road between Banias and Tyre too. They explained that such a road was indeed marked on the maps of the PEF, but in reality it was an almost impassable gravel road, due to the absence of a bridge across the Hasbanni river. In addition, it was impossible to traverse it from Banias to the coast during the wet winter and spring months. The report proposed that the British government should build a bridge over the Hasbanni and that the boundary should be diverted to it, north of what was written in the agreement. The authors shared Newcombe’s opinion, and agreed that the proposed boundary did not answer the needs of the water supply and that it was not safe enough for the population that would settle there in the future, although they did not accept his proposals for changing the borderline. They claimed that a regional economical boom would attract many Bedouins, and the area would be hard to defend. This is why only a more easterly boundary that ran along the foothills of the Golan Heights and include the village of Banias and its water springs could solve the problem. Experts estimated that the construction of the bridge and the road would cost around £5,000 but that the expected income from this area would quickly return the investment. Another of the report’s recommendations was that all the areas north of the borderline, land that was needed for Rutenberg’s projects, would become ex-territorial areas. Samuel added a note to the report stating that Rutenberg himself should meet the expenses attached to the construction of the road. He also said that in any case it was clear

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that the French are unwilling to give up the Banias river, and that they would demand changes along the borderline. The demanded changes were in the area of the Druze mountain, and Samuel claimed that he was willing to concede any foothold on this mountain in exchange for a line that would pass east of the Sea of Galilee. This idea shifted the discussion from the ‘Galilee panhandle’ to the Yarmuk valley, east of El-Hamma. All the disagreements along the boundary’s western part had been solved, and the last question that remained open was the one about the Yarmuk valley. Eventually, after the eastern boundary between Palestine and Trans-Jordan was determined in September 1922 (see the next chapter), there was no longer any reason to place the border between Palestine and Syria east of El-Hamma. But during the discussed period the eastern boundary was not yet determined and the various negotiators could see no difference while discussing the positioning of the line to the east or west of El-Hamma. A year earlier, in November 1920, Samuel had proposed to give up the western and southern slopes of the Jebel Druze, because he did not want to be bothered by that problematic population. Newcombe now raised a similar suggestion. T. E. Lawrence ‘of Arabia’, who was employed by the Colonial Office, claimed that the suggestion of placing the boundary east of El-Hamma was not good, because it would reduce the rights of Trans-Jordan (which was at that time controlled by Abdullah). Lawrence explained that this would be a loss of good and fertile land. Samuel was willing to give the French all of the Druze mountain in exchange for the area east of the Sea of Galilee, and this was in contradiction to Newcombe’s idea – to exchange the Druze mountain for British control over the Yarmuk valley. The Colonial Office accepted Lawrence’s view, and rejected the idea of giving up the Druze mountain altogether by claiming that the area was worth more than the land east of the Sea of Galilee, and that it would become very fertile if only the Zionists would cultivate it. The Colonial Office also opposed any ex-territorial idea, which was presented by the Grant–Rutenberg report. Samuel secured Gureaux’s agreement to all the changes that he proposed along the line, but the Colonial Office rejected the idea, and in doing so prevented the achievement of an overall agreement about the borderline from the Mediterranean Sea to the Desert. The difficulty now focused on the Yarmuk valley, where British imperial interests (the railroad and the pipeline) collided with Rutenberg’s development plans for the north. The French were ready for concessions in the north, but the local British authorities tried to make additional territorial gains in the area south of the Yarmuk river. The Colonial Office wanted to bring matters to a close because the time it had taken had greatly exceeded expectations. The year 1921 had ended without an agreement, and it seemed as if the standstill in the negotiations was caused by a number of disputable issues, which could not be solved regionally (and apparently also not in London or Paris). The French diplomat De Crix, who was involved in the talks at

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an earlier stage, suggested that an agreement regarding the segment of the boundary from the Mediterranean Sea to El-Hamma might be signed, and that the road between Metulla and Banias could be discussed later on. He also proposed a special committee that would discuss the boundaries east of El-Hamma. This proposal was rejected, but just like in 1920, the sides eventually accepted the French suggestion. Meanwhile, a number of land strips east of the Jordan, which were important for digging canals for Rutenberg’s development plans, were reopened for discussion. The French, who had previously agreed to this demand, now refused to reconfirm it. Newcombe refused to sign the agreement and claimed that ‘an agreement cannot be signed without the consent of both sides’. On 20 January 1922 an agreement concerning the location of the line east of the Jordan river was achieved. The road between Metulla and Banias became practically the boundary – although it could later be open to final corrections. The line south of Banias would run: 1. East of the Hula lake, above Tel-El-Kadi, so that a drainage canal could be dug out from there to the lake; 2. Instead of passing 10 m east of the Hula lake, the line would pass 10 m above the lake; 3. From the Bnot-Ya’akov bridge the line would continue along the bridge’s altitude line, to enable the construction of a water canal from the bridge to Tel-Rafia. In this manner, three strips of land east of the Jordan river would be given to Palestine. One will be 1 km wide and 17 km long, the second one will be 200 m wide and 5 km long and the third one will be 300 m wide and 9 km long – along the foothills of the cliff. These strips were worthless to the French, and they were only intended for enabling the implementation of Rutenberg’s development plans, and the drainage of Lake Hula. The French did not demand joint control over the Jordan river’s water during any of the stages of the discussions, and it was therefore unnecessary to use these land strips to keep them away from the riverbank. The boundary committee had once again emphasized the concept of ‘giving road rights to Syria, and water rights to Palestine’. The final agreement was reached on 3 February 1922, and everything was ready for the official signatures. But the French government intervened at this point, and, following a renewed urge to achieve a better agreement, blocked the whole process. That move was made after another change in the French regime had occurred. Leygues’s government had fallen and the peace agreement with Turkey – the Sèvre agreement – was cancelled. The final and official mandate for Palestine had been accepted in the meantime, and the first census, which did not include the inhabitants of the ‘Galilee panhandle’, was carried out. Fourteen months later, on 7 March 1923, the French were more conciliatory, and an agreement ‘between HM government and the French government regarding the

Figure 12 The borderline between Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, 1923.

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borderline between Palestine and Syria, from the Mediterranean Sea to ElHamma’ was finally signed. This borderline was marked in detail on the map that accompanied the agreement, which was especially drawn for this purpose. The boundary was actually a series of lines along prominent landscape features: streams and ridges, and mainly a series of straight lines running between seventy-one stone cairns. These were already placed in 1921, and their location was accurately marked in the area and on a map. In addition to a detailed description of the boundary, the agreement included a number of special permits, which were given to each of the sides. Palestine could construct a dam that would elevate the water levels of Lake Hula and of the Sea of Galilee, so long as the landowners, whose land would be flooded by this act, were compensated. The agreement clearly stated that the boundary between the point where the Jordan river enters the Sea of Galilee, and the sulphur springs at Mesifer (north of Nuqieb), where boundary marker No. 61 is positioned, would follow the lake’s eastern shore and would be located 10 m from the shoreline. The fishing and water rights of the Syrian and Lebanese population in the Jordan river and in the Sea of Galilee were kept, although these areas were under the exclusive sovereignty of the government of Palestine. Allowing the French to use it, and even to construct their own dock at Semah, solved the problem regarding the railroad section between ElHamma and Semah.

The 1920–1923 boundary lines The 1923 border differs from the line that was agreed upon in 1920 in a number of principal details. This resulted from changes that were made for the benefit of both sides, for the well-being of the local population and for future development plans. In a summarizing report,4 which was prepared by the Colonial Office, five stages of the boundary’s demarcation process were reviewed. Rosh-Hanikra to Metulla It is said that the final line corresponds to the agreements of 1920 by passing between the basins of the various streams. Nevertheless, it mentions that the Huron stream in Palestine and the Al Ayun stream in Lebanon could not be located in the area although they appear on the PEF’s maps. South-west of Metulla the borderline follows the watershed between the Litanni and the Jordan rivers in compliance with the 1920 line, and the small adjustments that were made along this part were done in order to avoid the disconnection of the villagers’ land from the villages themselves. This report was only partially accurate, and Moshe Braver has shown5 that the actual changes were in fact significant. The main change

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Figure 13 The northern boundary, 1920–3.

occurred in the vicinity of the Palestinian village of Sa’sa, whose land stretched north far beyond the 1920 line. The markers of the 1923 line included most of the village’s land in the British territory, and by doing this they cut the southbound ‘inlet’ that the 1920 line had created. The land of the Lebanese villages of Balida, Marun A-Ras, Aisha A-Shab and Ramia were eventually left in Lebanon as compensation. Another significant difference was made where the line meets the Mediterranean Sea. It was marked along the Ras El Naqura ridge so that the small fishing port of Ras El Naqura village remained in British territory, in definite contradiction of what was written in the 1920 agreement. Metulla to Banias The borderline left the dirt road between Metulla and the village of Banias in Syria, according to the 1920 agreement. The Banias spring was

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excluded from Palestine’s territory, but the Dan spring was included. This decision was taken in order to let the villagers of Banias, whose village was left in French territory because the road between Quneitra and the sea passed through it, to use the spring’s water. The line was set a few hundred metres from where the water originated, so that the water that wasn’t used by the village would flow on towards Palestine. It was agreed that the British government could raise the question of the boundary’s precise location between Banias and Metulla, under accepted conditions between the concerned governments, in regard to the construction of a more northerly road between these two points, as a final borderline. This ‘hidden’ paragraph gave Palestine the opportunity to demand the Banias spring, but nothing was done about this issue during the British period. It is worth noting that, along this section, Palestine had lost control over the third river that feeds the Jordan – the Hasbanni, in addition to the loss of the Banias spring. By observing the map and by surveying the area, the people involved had understood that the sources of this river, which generates a large amount (25 per cent) of the water that flows into the Jordan river, are located a long way north of Metulla, north of the town of Hasbaya. Due to the distance between these sources and Metulla, the Zionist Organization and the British negotiators refrained from demanding the inclusion of the Hasbanni in Palestine after they had retreated from their demands regarding the Litanni river. During the last few years, it was revealed that the majority of the water that flows into the river originates from the El-Wazanni springs, about 3 km south-east of Metulla. A borderline that would have left the waters of the Hasbanni river in Palestine could easily have been delineated in 1923. Being unfamiliar with the hydraulic system prevented the determination of a line that would not have infringed any of the boundary’s delimitation principals. The village of Banias to the Sea of Galilee Here the report mentions the major modification that was made in 1923, because the 1920 agreement dictated the setting of an international boundary through the lands of Emir El-Fa’ur. Palestine lost any foothold in the Golan Heights as a result of this change, and its boundary was moved to the west, almost following the Jordan river. Nevertheless, according to this division, Palestine controlled all of the Jordan river itself. From the north of the Sea of Galilee to the point where the Jordan meets the Yarmuk The boundary was significantly modified along this section too. The 1923 line left all of the Sea of Galilee within Palestine, along with a strip of land east of the lake, together with the villages of Nuqieb, Samara, Ein-Jib and Semah and all of the valley that lies east of it. The authors of the report

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thought that the ability to control activities on the lake (fishing, transport and commerce) was achieved by this change. It was agreed that the Sea of Galilee would remain under a single sovereignty – British Palestine – customs could be collected there and a dam could be constructed where the Jordan flows out from the lake. This division left Sir Abas’s land within Palestine, and thus land was returned in exchange for the land of Emir ElFa’ur in the Golan Heights. By observing maps from the Ottoman period one can see that the borderline near the Sea of Galilee was very similar to the Ottoman regional delimitation division. While the area north-west of the lake belonged to the district of Quneitra, the land south-east of it belonged to the district of Tiberias, and therefore remained in Palestine. Along the Yarmuk valley A major modification had occurred here. The line ‘moved’ to the north, and the entire valley up to El-Hamma was included in Palestine. This enabled the construction of a canal to convey the Yarmuk’s water to the Sea of Galilee for irrigation purposes and for Rutenberg’s hydro-electric projects. In addition land that was owned by residents of Palestine remained in its territory. The agreement of March 1923 determined the final location of the only international boundary that British Palestine had – the northern boundary. This line was delineated according to decisions taken during the political discussions between two sovereign countries, and its determination was accompanied by long and tedious political negotiations. Apparently, each of the three participants in the process had some of its demands accepted and fulfilled, while others were rejected and turned down. France had aspired to set the boundary along the Sykes–Picot line, and this is where the boundary east of El-Hamma, along the Yarmuk river and in the Syrian Desert, was eventually located. On the other hand, the boundary west of the Jordan river was moved north into the region that the French regarded as promised to them. The British position was more complex. The location of the northern boundary was insignificant for Britain, and imperial needs dictated that it should concentrate on the Yarmuk valley. All the British activity intended to shift Palestine’s boundary to the north was in fact done in order to achieve the Zionist goals. By joining the battle of the Zionist Organization, Britain faced a possible dispute with the closest ally it had during the war that had just ended – France. The British found themselves ‘pushing’ the western section of the borderline as far to the north as they possibly could, in order to secure the future economic development for the Jewish settlers who were about to arrive in Palestine. Britain did not achieve its own goals in the Yarmuk valley. A part of the railroad section from Dar’aa to Semah did pass through British territory, but the section from El-Hamma and eastwards

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passed through French territory. The rail link between two areas of the British Middle East – Palestine and Trans-Jordan – became dependent on French goodwill. The boundary did not answer strategic military needs, and the politicians did not achieve the Litanni river line either, and they were forced to settle for a compromise solution. The Zionist Organization was extremely displeased with the final outcome of the borderline determination process, and regarded itself as the side that had made the most painful concessions (just as it did in the case of every other boundary determination). The fact that Palestine was disconnected from the Litanni river and from the wheat-growing areas in the Golan Heights was regarded as damaging all of the country’s development plans. Every retreat from the line that was proposed by the leaders of the organization was looked upon as giving up parts of Eretz Israel. As things turned out, even the advantages that were actually achieved by the 1923 line were not used and benefited from, and none of the arguments that were previously raised was translated into action. The Hula swamps were not drained, mainly because of delaying legal problems. The area north of the Sykes–Picot line did not experience major Jewish settlement activity, and only later – at the end of the 1930s – were a small number of Jewish settlements established in it. The irrigation plan for Palestine was not carried out either, and Rutenberg’s plan was only partially executed, and it didn’t directly rely on the water sources of the northern Jordan river and of the Sea of Galilee. The Sea of Galilee was not meant to remain as the central water reservoir of Palestine according to the 1920 agreement. It was only the State of Israel, which had later benefited from the advantages that the northern boundary agreement had given to mandate Palestine. Israel drained the Hula swamps, established a large number of settlements in the valley and constructed the National Water Carrier, which brings water from the Sea of Galilee to the rest of Israel. Three main elements played key roles in determining the final location of Palestine’s northern boundary. The central argument during the ‘allocation’ stage was a biblical-historical one, and it was based on the notion that Eretz Israel is situated between ‘Dan and Beersheba’. The British and French, who took it upon themselves to establish a political territorial unit in Palestine, were conscious of the country’s glorified past, and this approach guided them in regard to the delimitation of the area. From the minute that this formula was laid on the negotiation table, it was clear that changes along the Sykes–Picot line in the western part of Palestine must be made, and it seems as if this fact was clear to the French side from the beginning. Hints and allegations about the Sykes–Picot agreement were more of a pressure tool than a target of its own, and so the boundary was moved northwards – almost by itself. The discussions over Dan’s precise location were only locally significant. The inclusion of all the Jordan river in Palestine resulted from this line of thought too. The second element that influenced the boundary’s location was the

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constant and stubborn Zionist demand for an economic boundary and for control of the water sources in the north of the country. This demand, which was presented in all directions, did not experience changes and alternations throughout the negotiations, and it was strong enough to influence the various negotiators. Not all of the demanded waters were eventually included, but the constant attempts to include the maximal amount of water for irrigation and the electricity plans finally led to the inclusion of the Dan spring, the common Jordan river, the Sea of Galilee, Lake Hula and part of the Yarmouk’s water in Palestine. The Zionist demands were not based on the historical past, and they caused the northward shift of the borderline. It helped the British in their struggle and convinced the French to soften their position in regard to the western part of Palestine. The third element in determining the course of the northern borderline was the human and physical landscape. Prominent landscape elements such as the watershed between the Jordan and Litanni rivers and other watersheds, the ridge line at Ras El Naqura, stream beds, all dictated the location of the line even before it was marked. The ‘delimitation’ stage was mainly based on these landscape elements, and they are the ones that determined the division of settlements between the French and British territories. The human structure in itself had influenced the line’s delimitation, when it was physically marked in the area. Grazing grounds, roads and the location of cultivated land had dictated the precise placement of the line more than the physical landscape features. Apparently, the thoroughly discussed issue of the Jewish settlements east of the Jordan river and the Sea of Galilee prevented the inclusion of these areas in the territory outside Palestine. But it was only Metulla – the sole settlement in the region that was regarded as a Jewish settlement by both French and British – which significantly contributed to the line’s final location. Metulla is situated east of the watershed between the Jordan and the Litanni rivers, so it would have probably remained in Palestine, although it also sits north of the Dan springs, which might have led to a different determination. The Tel-Hai incident did not influence the borderline’s location. The shaky existence of the Jewish settlement of BneiYehudda – east of the Sea of Galilee – and the fact that Baron Rothschild was the owner of vast areas on the Golan Heights did not lead to the inclusion of these parts in Palestine.

The administration of the boundary line The act of signing the boundary agreement on 10 March 1923 had officially concluded the delineating chapter of Palestine’s northern boundary, but it did not mark the end of the boundary discussions. When a borderline is set through a settled region, and especially when it is set through an area with limited transferability, with a difficult topography

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and dense vegetation, there are always problems that arise in regard to its demarcation and the need to maintain the demarcation with time. When the agreement was signed it looked as if the act of officially passing the land that lay north of the 1919 military separation line would close this matter. But practically, it took another year before Palestine could report in April 1924 that the mission had been carried out into effect. In spite of the accurate marking on the surface and on maps, the effort that was made in 1921 in order to define the location of the northern boundary turned out to be slightly inaccurate. The reasons for this were the discrepancies that existed between the maps that the commission members used, due to inaccurate measurements that were made along the topographically difficult line from Ras El Naqura to Metulla. As long as life went on, the line’s precise location did not bother anyone. The fence that was placed along the line in 1938, and the northern road that was constructed that same year (see below), were set according to the topographic convenience, and they were moved away from the boundary when it was necessary. Accurate cadastral measurements had not reached this difficult mountainous region yet. In August 1940, a year after the outbreak of World War II, an incident between French forces and local Arabs occurred in the area east of Metulla,6 and the two sides could not decide whether it had occurred in Palestine or in the French territory. This incident led to a new inspection7 of that part of the boundary between border pillar No. 19 – east of the village of Bir’am – to border pillar No. 40 – next to Banias. The British–French inspection found most of the border pillars to be situated exactly where they had been placed, and their accurate location was reconfirmed.8 Border pillar No. 26 was absent but its cement foundation was identified and its accurate location was agreed upon. Border pillar No. 35 had completely disappeared, but the precise description in the 1923 agreement enabled the team to replace it accurately. Nevertheless, the inspection revealed that border pillar No. 22 was placed 500 m northwest of the Salha police station although it should have been placed 400 m south of it. After twenty years of activity in the region, new geographical elements had been formed, and moving the pillar to its correct location would have transferred part of the boundary fence, part of the northern road and even a corner of the police station building to Lebanon. The French were willing to accept the incorrect location of the pillar, but they demanded that border pillar No. 33, which was situated 1 km south-west of the village of Hunin, should be moved eastwards so that the gravel road that passes there would become Lebanese territory. The road was not marked on the maps from 1923, but the boundary surveyors agreed to the arrangement according to which border pillar No. 22 would stay in place, and a new border pillar would be placed at point No. 33. The politicians were expected to reach formal agreement about the matter, but this never happened because Nazi Germany conquered France

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shortly afterwards. While the discussions continued, the surveyors reached border point No. 38, near the village of Banias, where the boundary was never marked owing to the local villagers’ hostility towards the French authorities. The British did not use the opportunity to reopen the question of the location of the borderline between Metulla and Banias. Later on, an official from the land registration office in Safed raised the issue for discussion,9 but the fall of France prevented any further discussions. The presence of lots of British soldiers in the region during World War II, together with the mistakes discovered by surveying one section of the borderline, led to the decision to use the professional troops to survey the full length of the northern boundary. A French–British team set out on a six-day survey in January 1941, along the section between Ras El Naqura and the point where the last survey had been started, a few months before (border point No. 19, next to the village of Bir’am). Following this survey, a detailed report describing the many difficulties in accurately identifying the various boundary segments was written.10 The surveyors reported for instance, that: the boundary is hard to identify along some segments, between border pillars No. 4 and No. 5. It continues southwards from the summit of Jebel El-Mashke for 600 m, and then eastwards for another 200 m until it meets Wadi El-Jouranni stream, which is described in the agreement as Kouta’iya stream. . . From here the boundary passes along Wadi Jouranni eastwards for 2.5 km, up to the point that is described in the agreement as ‘the place where it continues along the bottom of the small stream, left from Wadi Kouta’iya’. This point is very difficult to reach, and we suggest placing a border stone on the spot, and whitewashing the facing rocks. From this point the line continues straight for 600 m in a south-westerly direction to border pillar No.5. Other parts of the boundary were similarly described. Border pillar No. 8 had completely disappeared, although its location could be traced from the remnants. In order to facilitate the boundary’s accurate location, the surveyors suggested the introduction of ninety-three border cairns, which would be placed along the surveyed section, between border pillars No.1 and No. 19, in areas where the precise identification was especially difficult. These border cairns were to be white in colour, and 2 m in height, so that they could easily be detected. Forty-five border cairns were supposed to be built by the French and forty-eight by the British, and the project was to be carried out simultaneously by both sides. The report recommended that the villagers be notified about the location of the border pillars and the border cairns, and that the work of clearing vegetation around them should involve the local inhabitants.

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The task of identifying the boundary points along the ridges in an accurate manner was difficult and tiresome. From a topographic point of view, it is easier to place a border cairn where streams join together or on a bend in the course of a stream. Marking a boundary along a ridge could lean to one side or the other, because mountain ridges are not clear homogeneous lines, but rather a whole and complex surface. Both the British and the French were aware of this problem, and due to this difficulty it was decided that the maps that were prepared by the Survey of Palestine, to a scale of 1:10,000 (on which every border post was marked), would sufficiently serve the survey’s needs. As mentioned, though, the precise location of these points was not determined according to trigonometric measurements. The surveys and the measurements that were described dealt with the boundary section between Ras El Naqura and the Banias river, or in other words the boundary between Palestine and Lebanon. The border with Syria was easier to locate because the majority of it passed through an open plain. It was therefore unnecessary to re-identify the border points, because they were clear and projecting from the surface. This boundary was relatively controlled in comparison with the Lebanese boundary, because most of the traffic – by train, vehicle, beast or foot – between Palestine and the French areas was along this section. The camps of the Trans-Jordanian Frontier Force were positioned next to the line in Semah and in Rosh-Pina, while motorized and foot patrols were carried out along it. This explains the absence of particular marking activity along the boundary with Syria after this line was delineated and marked in 1921. When Lebanon and Syria received full independence in 1946, they wanted to re-examine the boundary with Palestine.11 Their demand did not lead to any operative action until the establishment of the State of Israel. The accurate demarcation of the borderline, and the attempts to keep this demarcation by erecting cairns and border stones, represented only one of the problematic issues that arose from the delimitation and placement of a boundary in northern Palestine. More complex problems originated from the introduction of a boundary into a region that knew nothing of barriers to movement and development for hundreds of years. When the boundary agreement was signed in March 1923, it looked as if the only remaining steps were the official transformation of the land that lay beyond the military separation line of 1919, and the notification of local inhabitants about the political changes and the new land status. Practically, this process took over a year to complete, and the official hand-over of land ownership had ended on 1 April 1924. Palestine now controlled fifty-five new villages and settlements, and 329 km2 were added to its territory. Some 219 km2 of them comprised the ‘Galilee panhandle’.12

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Of the many difficulties that arose from setting the new boundary, the problem regarding the land that belonged to the villagers of the border region was the most important one. Even though both sides agreed to hand all the land to the authority that controlled the village’s built-up area, it was discovered that villages were disconnected from part of their land, because orderly land registration books did not exist. The markers of the 1923 line were well aware of this problem, and it was decided that landowners who had land on the other side of the line could continue to cultivate it without being disturbed, because the demarcation process did not rely on accurate cadastral measurements. Shortly after the boundary agreement was signed it was revealed that twenty villages now had their land divided between the territories of the two newly created mandate areas, Palestine and Lebanon. Eight of them remained on the Palestinian side of the line (including Metulla), and twelve remained in Lebanon. Eighteen villages of this type were strewn along the boundary between Palestine and Syria, three in Palestine, and fifteen Syrian villages that had a major part of their land (at times about half of all the villages’ lands) in Palestine’s territory. A local agreement that was reached in October 1923 determined that the villagers’ taxes would be divided among the various jurisdictions according to the percentage of land that they controlled. After this land was measured and calculated, the percentage of tax that every village had to pay and the authority that would collect it were determined. In this manner the residents of Metulla paid 80 per cent of the ‘tithe’ tax, which was levied on crops, to the government of Palestine and 20 per cent to the Lebanese government. The residents of Manara village paid half their taxes to Palestine and half to Lebanon, the villagers of DirMimas paid 75 per cent to Lebanon and 25 per cent to Palestine. Those from Banias and Tel-Azaziyat paid most of their taxes – 60 per cent of all the crop tax – to Palestine although their villages were in Syria. There were even some cases in which 99 per cent of the taxes were paid to one state and 1 per cent to the other. This occurred in the Palestinian village of Kadesh, and in the Syrian villages of Nueira and Rafit.13 All in all, Palestine controlled 2,907 ha that belonged to Syrian villagers and 2,729 ha that belonged to Lebanese villagers. Thus, a total of more than 5,600 Syrian and Lebanese-owned hectares were now in Palestine’s territory.14 The taxpaying arrangement was disrupted later on, when Lebanon abolished all taxation of crops and land, and Palestine changed the system and started collecting a permanent tax on land ownership, instead of taxing crops. British and French officials were discussing the way the taxes should be divided prior to the onset of World War II, and a new agreement that would solve the problem was signed in November 1938. This agreement had to go through a series of changes as well, and in May 1945 (the month in which the war in Europe ended), a new agreement was reached regarding the division of the taxes that were collected from the villages along the boundary between Palestine and Lebanon.15

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Passing a borderline through a region in which the lifestyle was previously unaccustomed to the existence of boundaries created other problems such as transport, accessibility and commercial and private use of the roads on business and for visiting relatives. Nevertheless, two years after it was established the new boundary proved to be a powerful separation line between the two states when the Druze revolt broke out in 1925. This revolt was aimed at the French regime in Syria, and it occurred near the boundaries of Palestine – from the two sides of ‘Galilee panhandle’. Even though border cairns marked the line, not a single military incident occurred on the Palestinian side: all the groups involved respected the line and did not cross it. During the revolt the French had to request permission for their forces to pass through the territory of Palestine. This fact, and the rest of the problematic issues that had appeared during two years of boundary experience, led to renewed discussions about the regional administration. These discussions dealt with the administrative steps that the authorities could take in order to facilitate the boundary’s administration, and life in its vicinity. The talks concluded with the ‘Bon Voisinage agreement’, which was signed in Jerusalem on 2 February 1926 by the High Commissioners of Palestine (Plumer) and of Syria (De Jouvenille). Certain regulations were set by this agreement, among them: roads and routes that cross the boundary would be used by the local inhabitants, while passengers need not present passports or pay a toll. The residents and the police of Syria and Lebanon are permitted to use the way from El-Hamma to Banias, along the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan river. The residents of Palestine can use the road between Alma-Sha’ab and Ramiya, along the boundary, the Metulla–Banias road and others. The governments involved have the right to move military forces along the ways, on both sides of the boundary, but these moves should be reported as soon as possible.16 A number of regulations concerning land cultivation rights were also set out in the agreement. All the cultivation and pasture land rights, which were previously held by the residents of the border area, continue to be valid after the signing of the agreement, and the land will stay in its owners’ possession. The farmers will be able to cross the boundary freely, and without a passport, and transport beasts, work tools, seeds and agricultural produce with them, without paying customs dues. This right is shared by the landowners, their workers and farmers who lease their lands. All the rights regarding the use of water will remain as they are, and fishing and sailing rights in the Sea of Galilee will now contain all the rivers and streams in the region.

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The agreement also contained sections regarding freedom of passage for residents of Lebanon to the religious celebrations at the Nebi-Yosha mosque, located in Palestine. The co-operation of the authorities on both sides of the line in guarding the public safety and tax-free status for all the local agricultural and industrial products that would pass into the neighbouring sub-districts on the other side of the boundary were also mentioned. The governors of the districts were authorized to give local permits to the residents of the border sub-districts (Acre and Safed in Palestine, and Tyre, Marj-Ayoun and Quneitra on the Syrian–Lebanese side) for crossing the boundary. It was also determined that ‘the governments of Syria and Lebanon would maintain the odd-numbered border cairns, and Palestine would maintain the even-numbered ones’. This agreement became the cornerstone of all activity in the border region, and it served as a central component of everything that was going on in the north, for quite a long period of time. Although the line was a known and recognized international boundary, it did not pose a barrier to any of the economic or social activities on either side. The Bon Voisinage agreement lifted all the complications that might have resulted from placing a borderline there, and life in its vicinity remained generally unchanged. The drop in the number of citizens who lived in the mountainous northern regions of Palestine, in the villages and in Safed too, was only partially explained by the disconnection of their villages from their economic markets in Lebanon and in Syria. The Hijaz Railway between Trans-Jordan and Palestine, and the continuation of the track to Damascus, operated undisturbed throughout the mandate period, and commerce between the settlements on both sides of the boundary continued to flourish even when World War II was raging. In spite of the existence of a separating borderline, people continued to cross it freely, and whenever it was necessary – Houranite workers would flood the Palestinian labourmarket in almost unlimited numbers. Customs barriers were erected between the French and British territories, although the mutual customs dues were low, in order to keep commerce going. Both the British and the French did not invest substantial resources in developing the border region, because they did not see a need to develop such desolate areas. Only in critical times could government activity be observed in the border region – mainly the construction of roads. Such was the case with the Metulla–Rosh-Pina road, constructed during the Druze revolt in 1925–6. The long ‘northern road’ between Ras El Naqura on the Mediterranean coast and Rosh-Pina was constructed in 1937–8, during the Arab Revolt of 1936–9. During World War II, while the Vichy (pro-German) government controlled the French territory, a number of access roads were constructed in mountainous Upper Galilee, in order to prepare for the British invasion into Syria. The formation of a borderline in the north of the country had practically set the limit of Jewish settlement in this area. Unlike the southern and

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eastern border regions, a Jewish settlement had existed close by the northern borderline, even before its location was determined and confirmed. Metulla in the north, Yesod-Ha’Ma’ala in the east and Deganya in the south were already located in the area where the new line was positioned. From this point onwards, the Jewish settlement expanded within this confined area and according to the boundary agreement, and it did not deviate from it. During the 1930s and 1940s, settlements were established close to the boundary (Hanitta, Manara, Ein-Gev, Sha’ar Ha-Golan and more) but no attempt was made to settle the land beyond the line. Due to the fact that the State of Israel had inherited this borderline, the delimitation of the line during the 1920s had apparently defined the Jewish settlement limit up to the 1967 war. After that war, Jewish settlement spread east, into the Golan Heights. Another settlement landscape element, unique to the border region, became apparent with the establishment of the guard system along the northern boundary during the Arab Revolt of the 1930s.17 The boundary, which was easy to penetrate along the full length of its course, served as an ‘entrance gate’ for Arab volunteers, which fought against the Jewish settlements and the British authorities in Palestine. In order to combat these penetrations, a border fence was erected along the boundary in 1937, and police stations and pillboxes were constructed at central points. The planners of the fence had returned to the strategic point of view of Newcombe and the commanders of the military regime by constructing it. They understood that it would be hard to defend the whole boundary, and that it would be especially difficult to protect the ‘Galilee panhandle’. This was why the line was diverted from the vicinity of Kadesh to the east in a straight line to the Metulla–Rosh-Pina road, and south from there to the point where the Jordan flows into the Sea of Galilee. The fence south of the Sea of Galilee was constructed along a straight line between the edge of the lake and the Yarmuk river, thus leaving the ‘Galilee panhandle’, Ein-Gev and El-Hamma out of the protected area. Nevertheless, this defensive act did not declare that Britain had given up any of Palestine’s land. One cannot consider the placing of the customs station in RoshPina, instead of on the Bnot-Ya’akov bridge or in Metulla, as a sign that the British authorities were willing to give up even a bit of Palestine’s territory. The small changes that eventually took place along the border were made only in order to consolidate existing situations, and they did not bring a real change in the boundary. The northern boundary of Palestine was given official validation and international recognition by the nations of the world only, much later. It was only during the ninety-eighth session of the League of Nations in 1934 that the British and French representatives thought it appropriate to notify the relevant committees of the existence of a boundary agreement. This too was only done after questions had been raised by some committee members. The agreement was presented to the League of Nations, and

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it was received as an official document confirming that Palestine had a boundary in the north, along the section between Ras El Naqura and ElHamma. The discussions over the connecting section of this borderline, east of El-Hamma, continued for a long time after the discussions about the boundaries of Palestine had concluded. Only on 31 October 1931 did the governments of Britain and France reach agreement regarding the borderline between Syria and Trans-Jordan.18 During that time, Palestine was a territorial political unit west of the Jordan, and it had its own constitution and citizenship separate from those of Trans-Jordan. This explains why the determination of this boundary will not be discussed here.

6

The eastern boundary

General background and boundaries of the past The eastern boundary was the last of Palestine’s boundaries to be delimited during the British period. Ideas and general discussions over this line’s location were held while the determination of the rest of the country’s boundaries was still taking place, but it was only in the summer of 1922 that practical discussions concerning the eastern boundary commenced. These discussions were brief and rapid, and Zionist interests and Arab aspirations were all part of the process of determining it. In this case, though, the decisions were all to be taken by British politicians, and there was no need to discuss the boundary with another political entity, in a similar way to the occurrences along the southern boundary and unlike what happened along the northern one. A scarcity of discussions characterized the long process of determining the eastern boundary, and proposals and contra-proposals were not presented with accompanying maps. Nevertheless, several proposals regarding the borderline’s location were presented, and historical, economic, strategic and political arguments and explanations, similar to the processes along the other boundaries, supported each and every one of them. The Zionist Organization, the British administration in Palestine and its vicinity, British politicians in London and the local inhabitants together with the Arab politicians all presented suggestions regarding the location of the borderline. The suggestions ran from the Jordan river line in the west to the desert’s edge, east of the Trans-Jordanian heights in the east. The traditional view and the historic European outlook had always regarded the settled lands east of the Jordan river, between the Yarmuk and the Arnon (Wadi El Mujib) rivers as an integral part of historic Palestine. This region, often referred to as ‘Eastern Palestine’, was administered separately from the area west of the river for generations. The kingdoms of Mo’ab, Ammon and Edom existed here during the biblical era. The kingdom of Israel controlled the Gil’ad, but the kingdoms of Ammon and Mo’ab continued to exist concurrently. During later periods, the Nabatians controlled part of this region, the Romans had formed two

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provinces on the two sides of the Jordan river and the Arabs ruled the eastern bank with a different and separate name, Urdun, as early as the 7th century CE. The First Crusader Kingdom (1099–1187) had controlled all the lands west and east of the Jordan river and the Arava valley, although its rule did not last long. During the centuries that preceded the determination of the boundaries of modern Palestine, the area east of the Jordan was usually controlled by the ruler of Damascus, and not by whomever was ruling western Palestine. The southern part of this region – south of the Dead Sea – belonged to the province of Hijaz for generations, and it was ruled from the city of Medina in the Arabian Peninsula. In 1908 the Ottoman regime had decided to change its own internal division, and to move the district of Ma’an from the province of Hijaz to the province of E-Sham (Syria), which was centred on Damascus, although it is not clear whether the move was actually implemented. The obscurity regarding this administrative move caused a boundary dispute between the emirate of Trans-Jordan (and later the Kingdom of Jordan) and Saudi Arabia, a dispute which was solved only in 1965. In case the transaction was actually carried out, the province of E-Sham (Syria) had extended all the way to Aqaba in the south and to the administrative separation line with Sinai in the south-west. Thus, all of the area east of the Jordan river and the Dead Sea, the Arava and the central and southern parts of the Negev belonged to this province.1 Accordingly, the area east of the Jordan valley was not an integral administrative part of Palestine for many generations. The process of determining the eastern boundary of Palestine was tightly bonded to the establishment of the territorial-political unit of Trans-Jordan. The final location of the line was therefore an outcome of the decisions that delimitated the spatial boundaries of that territory, which was formed after World War I, just like Palestine and its other neighbours to the north and to the east. In order to determine the position of this borderline, it was necessary to compromise between two opposing approaches. On one hand the Zionist Organization and its supporters in the British government and public regarded the fertile and settled area east of the Jordan and Arava valleys as an integral part of the future Palestine. This area was needed for Palestine in order to provide a convenient defence line for the centre of the country against the Bedouin tribes from the Arabian Peninsula, and as a site for settlement and economic and agricultural development. On the other hand the Arabs and their supporters in the British regime regarded the area as an integral part of the Arab state which stretches from Hijaz to Syria (a state that includes not only the area east of the valley, but also western Palestine). For the first time in history, the Jewish national movement was about to discuss territorial matters with the Arab national movement, and an external power – Britain – was invited in to mediate between the sides.

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The position of the Zionist organization The Jewish position as regards the eastern boundary was already presented in 1915, in Shmuel Tolkowsky’s essay, which was later adopted by the Zionist leadership.2 As present before, according to Tolkowsky’s view, the eastern boundary of Eretz Israel should start next to the town of Bosra, which is situated on latitude 32° 30⬘ N, in the foothills of the Druze mountain, east of the Hijaz Railway. From this town the boundary will run south, parallel to the railway and in a distance of ten to twenty miles east of it, to the Ja’afar depression, which is situated twenty miles east of Ma’an. From this depression the line will take a southwestern course, until it reaches Aqaba.3 The last sentence was changed later, and with the publication of the demands in the Palestine newspaper it was amended to ‘from this depression the line will take a southwestern course, until it reaches the eastern shore of the Gulf of Aqaba, a few miles south of this town.’4 Tolkowsky took Palestine’s position as the passage land between Euro-Asia and Africa and between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean very seriously. This explains why he demanded that the Hijaz Railway, together with its branches to Haifa and the optional connection from Ma’an to Aqaba be included in Palestine. From a strategic aspect, it was important to form boundaries that were easy to protect, along which the developing Palestine could defend itself. He claimed that ‘modern history clearly proves to us that international agreements do not guarantee the protection of a flourishing land from being attacked by a stronger and jealous neighbour. The sole guarantee of security is a well defended boundary.’5 Tolkowsky, who was very familiar with the geography of Palestine, claimed that it was only the row of fortresses constructed along the desert’s edge which managed to defend Palestine and Gil’ad from Bedouin invasions. Such protection would be provided, according to Tolkowsky, by using the Hijaz Railway, and especially the section that would be constructed from Ma’an to Aqaba, in order to transport men and supplies to every point along the desert’s edge in an efficient and rapid manner.6 Tolkowsky’s article was published anonymously, and it was commissioned, as mentioned (see Chapter 2), by Israel Sieff, one of the leaders of the Zionist Organization in Britain. Sieff specifically requested Tolkowsky to mark a line that would include the Hijaz Railway and the town of Aqaba within Palestine, and indeed that is what was written and published.7 Britain was at the time discussing the Sykes–Picot agreement on the future of the Middle East with France, and it was also committed to the Arabs, who were allies in the war against the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the Foreign Office objected to the inclusion of the Hijaz Railway in Palestine. The railway was the property of the Moslem community (and not of the Ottoman regime), and it

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was built with funds that were raised throughout the Moslem world, including India (which was at the time a British colony). Weizmann put the Foreign Office’s objection to the boundary proposal, and Tolkowsky quickly composed a memorandum that explained his position regarding the Hijaz Railway. Tolkowsky argued that the fact that Moslems had funded the railway’s construction was the only argument in favor of giving it to the Arabs, and that a number of crucial points went against this line of thought. He explained that giving the railway to an Arab force, which would be trained by Europeans, would open all of Palestine to them. The country would then be unable to defend itself against an external force, which might choose to attack at any point and at any time, while the Jordan and Arava depressions would impede the efficient movement of forces eastwards. He also thought it economically impossible to disconnect the areas east of the Jordan river from the railway. Tolkowsky claimed that even if the Arabs were permitted to control the railway and use it for the transport of pilgrims and of Jewish manufactured goods from Palestine to the Gulf of Aqaba, the situation would remain problematic. It will make all the area east of the Jordan dependent on the goodwill of the Arabs, who would also control the water sources on the eastern side of the river.8 He added that Arab administration of the Hijaz Railway was likely to be unreliable and would damage regional development. Tolkowsky’s familiarity with the region led him to believe that the construction of a parallel railway would be uneconomical, because such a line would require the construction of bridges and tunnels in order to traverse the rivers that flow to the Jordan from the east. He also raised the issue of hygiene, claiming that pilgrims brought all the ‘Eastern diseases’ (cattle plague, cholera, etc.) to the west, and that one mustn’t expect the Arabs to maintain proper hygienic and sanitation conditions along the railway. He foresaw that the Arab world was nearing a religiously based unification, and the establishment of sultanhood rule in Egypt (a move which was discussed in those days), and the kingdom of Hijaz, were only steps that would lead to the renewal of the Caliphate. Tolkowsky warned that the Caliphate would use the Bedouin force to attack Palestine. Nevertheless, he understood that the railway would not be entrusted to Jewish hands. He pointed out that if the Arabs received it, they would also receive all the area east of the Jordan and Arava valleys. Tolkowsky concluded by proposing that the railway itself should become the boundary between the Jewish Eretz Israel and the future Arab state that would be situated east of it. The administration of the railway itself should be undertaken by a superpower (we can assume he meant Britain) that could defend it and Palestine. Tolkowsky was committed to his position, and he pressed it on a number of occasions. The leadership of the Zionist Organization had retreated from this demand under British pressure, and demanded a line that would run ‘next to and west of the railway’.9 Nevertheless, the aspira-

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tion of controlling the area all the way to the edge of the desert was never abandoned. When the opportunity arose with the fall of Faisal and his expulsion from Damascus in the summer of 1920, the old Zionist claim to place the eastern boundary of Palestine on the desert’s edge was pressed once again. Britain rejected this claim consistently.

The British view of the eastern boundary and the wartime arrangements The British view as regards the eastern boundary of Palestine was apparent through several publications written during the war and following it. The British Encyclopaedia Britannica had claimed in 1911 that ‘the Jordan is not a boundary, and it only separates western Palestine from its eastern part. The eastern boundary is unclear, and it seems as if the pilgrims’ route from Damascus to Mecca should be the adequate boundary.’10 In the military handbooks which were published at Allenby’s headquarters while he was conducting the war in the region in 1917, it is said that the boundary of Palestine is ‘in the east – the pilgrims’ route and the railway between Damascus and Ma’an’.11 In a later publication of 1918 there is a definite distinction between eastern and western Palestine. The eastern border of western Palestine was the Jordan valley and the Arava depression. Eastern Palestine is confined in the east by the Syrian Desert; in the south by a line that runs from west to east through Ma’an; in the west by the Jordan and the Dead Sea depression; and in the north by a line that passes along the foothills of Mount Hermon in the direction of Damascus.12 Another British handbook, published in 1920, but actually prepared during the war, gives another description. It says that the physical boundary is ‘the Egyptian–Turkish border in the south, and its continuation, along a straight line, from Aqaba to Ma’an, from there to the El-Ja’afar Depression, and onwards along the Hijaz Railway including the Druze Mountain, near longitude 37° E.’13 The political viewpoint was different from this geographical approach. The British objection to the expansion of Palestine to the east – to the desert’s edge and even to the railway – was based on the various agreements that were made during the war, and especially on the agreements between the British and the Arabs. The correspondence between Hussein, the Shariff of Mecca, and the British Commissioner of Egypt, Henry McMahon, did not promise Arab control over the area that lay west of the Rift to the Arabs, as far as British policy makers were concerned. It did, however, have a lot to say about the future of the area east of the Rift, and thus, indirectly, over the location of the eastern boundary of Palestine. The British adopted the idea that Palestine is situated ‘west of the districts

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of Aleppo, Hamma, Homs and Damascus’ (see Chapter 2) as they claimed that the district of Damascus included all the land east of the Rift. On the other hand, the Sykes–Picot agreement had designated the area east of the Rift – from the Yarmuk river to Aqaba, including the central and southern Negev – to become a part of an independent Arab state under British patronage. This state was meant to stretch east to the British territory in Mesopotamia. Therefore the British regarded the area east of the Jordan as a part whose future was different from that of western Palestine, when discussing the future of the Middle east with the French. The De Bunsen committee had called for the establishment of an independent Arab state to the east of the Rift already in 1915, and the Sykes–Picot agreement called for such a state to be established too. During 1917 a decision regarding independent Arab control over the area east of the Rift had consolidated.14 The independent Arab forces, who were commanded by Faisal and directed by T. E. Lawrence, had acted only on the eastern side of the Rift by conquering Aqaba, and by harassing action along the railway until they entered Damascus. Arab troops did not participate in the fighting in western Palestine, although British forces – who had moved and acted east of the Jordan after the southern part of western Palestine was taken, were returned from the areas that were occupied. Allenby’s major military assault on the Ottoman–German army had taken place in the area that lay west of the Rift, while the majority of the military assaults that had been launched on its eastern side were mounted by Faisal’s soldiers. Nevertheless, British forces had fought east of the Jordan river, and they even occupied the town of Amman. The Arab forces met up with the British (actually Australian) troops only after they had already conquered Damascus. At the beginning of 1918, soon after the southern part of Palestine was conquered, the Foreign Office determined that ‘Faisal’s authority over the area that he controls on the eastern side of the Jordan river should be recognized. We can confirm this recognition of ours even if our forces do not currently control major parts of Trans-Jordan.’15 This view brought with it military administrative action that had more than a resemblance to a political decision. As has been mentioned (see Chapter 2), Allenby had divided the area he occupied into military administrative areas, at the conclusion of his military operation in the Levant, at the end of October 1918. During this reorganization the Occupied Enemy Territory (East) was defined as ‘all the areas east of the region that was mentioned’, which meant east of the Occupied Enemy Territories South and North, whose boundaries were defined according to the Ottoman administrative division. Ali Riza El-Rikabi, an Arab general who had defected from the Ottoman army and served as Faisal’s chief of staff, was appointed the governor of this area. This division was part of an administrative act, although the fingerprints of the Sykes–Picot agreement, the Hussein–McMahon letters and Arab military activity are clearly seen on it. Both the Sykes–Picot agreement and the military control areas were

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poorly defined, and especially when dealing with the Sea of Galilee, the Dead Sea and the Jordan river. The map that accompanied the Sykes–Picot agreement had set the eastern boundary of the ‘International Area’ along a line that passes east of and parallel to the Jordan river, and east of the Sea of Galilee. On the other hand, this borderline encircles the Dead Sea from the west and continues west to the Mediterranean Sea, so that the Dead Sea remains outside the ‘International Area’, as part of the future Arab state. The military administrative division is unclear about this issue as well. The Ottoman administrative division did not determine to which district the Dead Sea belonged, and because the new military division followed the old Ottoman administrative division, this point remained obscure. In addition, control of the Negev area was left undetermined, because it was situated south of the Sanjak of Jerusalem, and not east of it, as it was written in Allenby’s division. The boundary of the Occupied Enemy Territory (South) appears on British army maps which were prepared at the time. It originated from the Gulf of Aqaba, following the Arava valley and crossing the Dead Sea. Then it continued along the Jordan river to the mouth of the Yarmuk river, followed the Yarmuk to the east reaching El-Hamma, and from there ran north along the Jordan river, thus encircling the Sea of Galilee from the east, and leaving it in Palestine.16 Apparently, the British rulers of Palestine already knew what the politicians planned eventually to do with the region, and they drew the map accordingly. It was only a military map, without any political significance. Nevertheless, some other activities gave this line more of a meaning. Control over the districts of Karak and Salt, east of the Jordan and the Dead Sea, was officially given to a local Arab dignitary, right after Allenby had declared the area as a military administrative area, and defined its boundaries.17

Political activity at the end of the war The Jewish Committee of Delegates, which was active in Palestine at the time, sensed that Britain was considering whether to establish a separate political unit on the eastern side of the Jordan even before the country was fully occupied. This did not alter the Zionist demand for that land. Shortly before the British invasion to the north of Palestine, Weizmann met Allenby and ‘reminded’ him that Palestine was situated between Dan and Beersheba, and between ‘the Mediterranean Sea to a line east of the half-way point between the Jordan river and the Hijaz Railway’.18 He emphasized for the first time that, due to its religious character and the course of its construction, the Hijaz Railway would not be included in Palestine (which was supposed to become the Jewish state eventually), and that the borderline would pass to the west of it. This standpoint had not changed during all the public hearings and the correspondence of the

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various Zionist delegations. In an attempt to neutralize the British (and French) influence on the boundaries of Palestine, Weizmann met Faisal in January 1919, and they decided to assemble a joint committee, which would determine the boundary between the two future states – the Jewish Eretz Israel, and the Arab state.19 In the draft that preceded the official agreement, a ‘process for the determination of the eastern boundary of Palestine, east of the Jordan river’ was mentioned, but this line was erased from the final version. During the discussions that were held between the Zionist and British delegations prior to their appearance before the Peace Conference, the Zionist leaders repeated the formula of ‘in the east – a line close to and west of the Hijaz Railway’, and this statement did not attract a British objection. The Zionists’ experts – Tolkowsky and Aaronson – had both proposed a line ‘along the Hijaz Railway, three miles west of the track up to Ma’an, and from there to the Gulf of Aqaba, a few miles south of this town’.20 And sure enough, the Zionist Organization requested the Peace Conference to set the eastern boundary of Palestine ‘in the east – a line that runs next to and west of the Hijaz Railway up to the Gulf of Aqaba’, without accurately defining the location of this line.21 The reason for this demand was given by the fact that: the fertile highlands east of the Jordan river have been politically and economically connected to the lands that lay west of the river since biblical times. The possibility of both Palestine and Arabia [the name that was given to the future Arab state] to freely access the railway is economically fair. The agricultural and other development of Houran and Trans-Jordan would inevitably increase Palestine’s need for an outlet to the Red Sea, and its need to develop good ports on the Gulf of Aqaba. Aqaba was part of Eretz Israel during King Solomon’s time. The ports that would be constructed in the Gulf of Aqaba would be free [of customs] and all of the regional commercial exchange would pass through them. The Zionist Organization was demanding not only to control the fertile highlands of Trans-Jordan, but to also control Aqaba and the northern part of the Gulf, according to Tolkowsky’s and Aaronson’s ideas. Nevertheless, the Zionist Organization did not forget the proposal about ‘the edge of the desert’ line. Weizmann turned to Churchill,22 who was at the time the War Secretary, and in the long and detailed letter that he sent in September 1919, he described the desirable boundaries for Palestine from the Zionist point of view. Weizmann returned to the demand that had already been published in the newspaper Palestine in 1917, in which he had determined that the bordering points to the outer world should be Bosra in the east, Haifa in the west and Aqaba in the south. In his letter, Weizmann requested Churchill to set the eastern boundary on the edge of the settled area, so that Palestine would also control the Hijaz Railway east

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of the Jordan river and the Arava. The Zionist claim in regard to that area had gradually consolidated around its agricultural potential. The strategic point in Tolkowsky’s argument had disappeared, and Palestine’s agricultural need for growing grain crops on the fertile highlands of TransJordan was emphasized. Arthur Rupin, the manager of the Zionist Organization’s office in Palestine before the outbreak of World War I, prepared a relevant memorandum about the subject23 after he had received the necessary information from Tolkowsky (but not his memorandum regarding the Hijaz Railway).24 Rupin’s arguments were quickly adopted as the central Zionist reason for adding the area east of the Jordan river to Palestine. During 1919 and 1920, the Zionist delegations were mainly concerned about the northern boundary, because they felt that Britain would accept their claim to the eastern lands. The British Colonial Secretary Alfred Milner, who had participated in formulating the Balfour Declaration, supported the addition of the area east of the Jordan river to Palestine. Balfour himself had expressed his positive opinion about the matter on a number of occasions.25 The Zionists’ hopes continued to rise following the presentation of the Meinertzhagen Line26 proposal by Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen. This proposal, which did not affect the process of determining the northern boundary at all, became the central component of the Zionist claim for the eastern boundary, although Weizmann (just like other Zionist leaders) had occasionally demanded to remove the line to the east. The agreement on the northern boundary, which was signed in December 1920, disappointed the Zionist Organization. This event opened the way for a more precise type of demands in regards to the eastern borderline. Weizmann approached the British Foreign Office in January 1921, and requested them to include all of the area from the Jordan river to the desert within Palestine.27 This was done after the Arab Kingdom, which was established in Damascus during the spring of 1920, had fallen following the French occupation of Damascus. Weizmann declared that a Jewish settlement east of the Jordan would be able to protect itself, and to defend the boundary, thus reducing the British army’s expenses in the region. This was also why all the area south of the Yarmuk river should be opened to settlements of this kind. The British obligation to compensate the Arabs was clear to Weizmann, and the Foreign Office was requested ‘not to compensate the Arabs at Palestine’s expense’. In order to allow convenient passage from Palestine to East Africa and to Asia, Weizmann requested that the borderline should be delineated from Ma’an to the Red Sea, south of Aqaba. The newspaper Palestine also expressed this opinion, and it also demanded to place the eastern boundary along the desert’s edge.28 In January 1921 the responsibility of managing Palestine had passed from the hands of the British Foreign Office to the Colonial Office. The Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill assembled a conference in Cairo at

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Plate 9 Lord Milner (1854–1925); courtesy Zionist Archive, Jerusalem.

the beginning of March 1921 to discuss the future of the British administration in the Middle East. Weizmann had written Churchill a letter in which he specified the Zionists’ demands in regard to the eastern (and southern) boundary.29 He repeated the arguments for giving the fertile areas to Palestine, and especially the areas of the Gil’ad and Moav. In order to draw British support, Weizmann ‘gave up’ the area south of Ma’an, and he claimed that Palestine did not need it, and that it should

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be joined to Hijaz (as it was in the past). Weizmann demanded that the south-eastern borderline of Palestine should run from a point near Ma’an (which would not be part of Palestine) along the old Roman road to Aqaba. He argued that the residents of Karak and Salt, the two single large settlements east of the Jordan river, were mostly Christian, and for that reason they should not be joined with the Moslem state in Hijaz but attached to Palestine. He added that a vast Jewish settlement in the region would only push it forward economically, and security-wise. This was the last public appeal made by a Zionist representative for the eastern boundary of Palestine. As will soon be seen, the political fate of the area east of the Jordan river was set during the Cairo conference. The practical discussions over the precise location of the eastern line, which took place later on, did not even involve a Zionist political delegate. The British position as regards the eastern boundary of Palestine had been changing with time, and with the regional political developments and turmoil. Two views characterized the British approach to the matter. On one hand, there were those who supported the Zionist approach for a borderline that ran along the railway or along the desert’s edge. On the other hand there were those who were convinced from the beginning that the Jordan river should be set as the boundary, and that a separate territorial unit should be established in Trans-Jordan. The position of the Foreign Office, and especially that of its officials and the experts they hired, was that the area east of the Jordan belonged to the Arabs, and that in addition to the Sykes–Picot agreement and the Hussein–McMahon correspondence. On the other side were people who had visited Palestine, or were supporters of the Zionist Organization, and they argued for a more eastern boundary. The proposals they suggested were also leaning on the traditional approach to the bordering of Palestine. Ormsby-Gore suggested, after a visit, that the eastern borderline should be set 10 km east of the river line,30 and west of the mountains, so that the Zionists would control the Jordan river. Ormsby-Gore was also influenced by the opinions of the Foreign Office, and when he presented his proposal in Cairo, he repeated his ideas, adding that the Arabs objected to the historical claims of the Zionists to Gil’ad. This meant that the eastern boundary of Palestine could be the Jordan river – or a parallel, more easterly, line, which would allow Palestine to use it efficiently. He thought that it was better if all of the Jordan valley were be included in Palestine, but Faisal and the Arabs were opposed to that and demanded that the borderline be placed along the Jordan. In a memorandum31 prepared by the intelligence department of the Foreign Office, it was suggested that the Jordan river line (and its continuation, the line from the Dead Sea to Rafah) should become the eastern boundary of Palestine. Arnold Toynbee explained the decision by stating that ‘we cannot fulfil all Zionist demands about including parts of the Trans-Jordan in Palestine, because Jewish settlements do not exist there, and the local population has publicly

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announced its will to join an Arab Syrian state.’32 This may be the first case in which the Jewish settlement situation is closely tied in to the arguments that set the location of one of Palestine’s boundaries. This connection was developed further at a later stage. This time the argument was brought in to resist the Zionist claims for convenient boundaries in the east. Toynbee had therefore recommended that Trans-Jordan should be part of an Arab state, and that the Jordan would serve as a good and natural barrier. Nevertheless, Toynbee accepted Ormsby-Gore’s point and claimed that the area between the river line and the foothills of the mountains could be given to Palestine because of its sub-tropical climate, which could not serve as land for settling without proper irrigation and scientific agriculture. The Jews, he added, had the tools to do these things and they have just as much right to this no man’s land as the Arabs, possibly an even greater right. The British representatives involved in the Middle Eastern issue – Mark Sykes and Ormsby-Gore – both supported a line east of the Jordan river, but not all the way up the mountains.33 The retreat of the British forces from Trans-Jordan in the spring of 1918 was only a military move, although it indicated British political ideas about the future of the region east of the rift. According to their position, the land that lay east of the Jordan river was destined to be part of the Arab Syrian state, which would be centred in Damascus and headed by Faisal. When the Paris Peace Conference was assembled, the British delegation presented an official proposal, based on maps, for the future borderline of Palestine. On those maps the eastern boundary was located about 10 km east of the Jordan river, in a series of parallel lines.34 The originating point of the line was on the Yarmuk river, at the point where it met Wadi El-Masid (a narrow ravine in the Golan Heights). From there the boundary was supposed to pass through these points: (A) a point that is situated 2 km east of Umm-Quies, along the road to this village. (B) A point that is situated south of Wadi El-Arab. (C) A point that is situated 3 km east of the junction between ‘the Valley road’ and the road that passes through Wadi Zarka. (D) A point in Wadi Sha’ab, 7 km east of the place where it spill into the Jordan. (E) A point in Wadi Judiyya, which is situated 4 km north of the town of Madaba, 10 km east of the shore of the Dead Sea. (F) A point in Wadi Hassa, about 10 km from the place where the riverbed is crossed by the road that runs parallel to the eastern side of Wadi Arava. (G) A point that is situated 8 km west of El-Tafila. From here the line continued in a westerly course, crossing the Arava valley and the Negev until it hit the 1906 administrative line (see Chapter 3 for details). A map that was prepared for the discussions over the southern boundary clearly shows the proposed eastern line.35 The line which is

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marked on the map does not accurately follow the description that appears here. It runs along the 300 m contour east of the Jordan river, thus separating all of the Jordan valley that stays in Palestine, and the Ridge of Moab with the land to the east of it, which remained Arab territory. Lord Balfour, who headed the British delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris, had also expressed his opinion in a letter he sent to Lloyd George. He requested that Britain set the eastern borderline in such a way as to leave all the available agricultural land east of the Jordan in Palestine, while leaving the Hijaz Railway in the hands of the Arabs.36 Balfour repeated the ‘Zionist formula’ for the eastern line shortly afterwards, and called for a line that ran parallel to the Hijaz Railway and west of it. Herbert Samuel, who was very active in pushing the Zionist initiatives forward, wrote many letters to the decision makers in Britain, and demanded the track in the east.37 It seemed as if Britain would indeed set the eastern borderline of Palestine along the Hijaz Railway. The Zionist leader Sokolov met Colonel Gribon of the War Office and Lord Milner, the Colonial Secretary, in November 1919.38 Gribon claimed that the issue of the eastern borderline should be solved later in direct negotiations between the Jews and the Arabs (who had conquered the area) under British arbitration. Milner, on the other hand, supported vast Jewish settlement on that land, and claimed that the Jews should demand as much as they could in regard to the area east of the Jordan, due to its agricultural importance for Palestine. Colonel Meinertzhagen added his support to the Zionist idea by proposing a line which would run twenty-five to thirty miles east of the Jordan river, west of the Hijaz Railway, from a point halfway between the Yarmuk and Semah to a point east of Aqaba, which could serve as a port on the Red Sea.39 Meinertzhagen’s reasons for suggesting this line were presented a year later, during a meeting of the Inter-Official Committee on Palestine that discussed the eastern boundary.40 Meinertzhagen claimed that his proposal left Palestine the wheatfields it needed, and it included the Christian populations of Irbid and Salt, and a number of British-supporting Bedouin tribes, in Palestine. On the other hand, Meinertzhagen did not think that the Hijaz Railway should be included in Palestine, because of the problems associated with control of the Moslem pilgrims. Meinertzhagen rejected the claims of T. E. Lawrence, who said that giving the Dead Sea to Palestine would damage the nomadic patterns of the Bedouins in the Arava valley, due to the topographical conditions that include impassable cliffs. He had accepted Weizmann’s opinion as regards a port in Aqaba, because this town would not be used by anyone for the next fifty years. Concerning the phosphate deposits that might be present east of the Rift, Meinertzhagen claimed that not all the natural resources could be included in Palestine, but that the oil shale near the Yarmuk river would remain within the country, and could be extracted and used. Meinertzhagen rejected the idea of a line that ran along the Arava valley. He claimed that white men would not be

Figure 14 The ‘Meinertzhagen line’. Source: Richard Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary (London, 1952).

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able to work there, and therefore the line should not be delineated through there. He added that the line he proposed did not harm any of the Bedouin tribes, any more than any of the other proposed lines would damage their nomadic patterns in the south of Trans-Jordan. It looked as if the War Office accepted Meinertzhagen’s claims, and that it supported the proposal to pass the line east of the Jordan and near the Hijaz Railway. When the line was actually discussed, Faisal was ruling firmly in Damascus, and the area east of the Jordan was practically ruled by his officers, with British supervision. Officially, it was still occupied enemy territory, although everyone could see that the near future would bring with it a British mandate over Palestine, and an establishment of an independent Arab Syrian state to the east of it. Therefore the following three approaches to the problem of the eastern borderline were considered. The British delegation to the Peace Conference, headed by Lord Balfour, supported the Zionist demand for a boundary that would pass near the Hijaz Railway. The Foreign Office, which was currently directed by the acting Foreign Secretary, Curzon, supported the Jordan river line, while General Allenby and others pushed for direct negotiations between the Zionist Organization and the Arabs about the line’s location. In October 1919, while the discussions were still being held and following agreement about the retreat of the British forces from Syria, the last soldiers who were stationed east of the Jordan river were withdrawn, and the whole region remained under the exclusive control of Faisal from Damascus. The Zionist Organization, which focused all its efforts on the decision in the Peace Conference, did not find it appropriate to become involved in what was going on, even after Faisal was declared king of independent Syria in March 1920, and even though his representatives controlled Trans-Jordan. The British government rejected Allenby’s proposal, and it refused to officially recognize King Faisal. Nevertheless, the British leaders, who feared the consequences of the riots in Syria, accepted Arab control over the land that lay east of the Jordan. On 24 April, in San Remo, it was decided to hand the mandates over Palestine and Mesopotamia to Britain without precisely defining the boundaries of the mandated territories. The officials of the Foreign Office discussed the future of the area east of the Jordan, and concluded with three possible outcomes.41 One proposal regarded the land as part of the independent Arab kingdom of Hijaz, ruled by Hussein, who had declared himself King of Hijaz. The second proposal regarded the area east of the Jordan as part of the territory over which Britain had just received a ruling mandate, and the third regarded it as part of the Arab kingdom of Damascus, which was headed by Hussein’s son Faisal. The political situation of the region was very unstable, and all concerned awaited political developments in order to see what would happen. The British decision to appoint Herbert Samuel as the first civilian

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High Commissioner of Palestine brought with it the renewal of the demand for Trans-Jordan, only from now on it was a demand presented by a British High Commissioner, and not by a representative of the Zionist delegation. Herbert Samuel wanted the Foreign Office to set the eastern boundary according to the ‘Meinertzhagen Line’,42 so that Petra, and Aqaba too, would be included in Palestine. In addition, Samuel demanded the option of constructing a new port on the Red Sea. He justified the demand on defence, economic and monetary grounds, all of them essential aspects of Palestine as a modern state. The Foreign Office did not relate to this demand. When he did not receive an answer, Herbert Samuel repeated his demand,43 and claimed that the famous geographer, George Adam Smith, whose writings were used to discuss the northern boundary of Palestine, had stated that the Jordan river was never the boundary of Palestine. Apparently Samuel feared British views in regard to the Jordan river line, and about the establishment of an Arab state to the east of it, and he wanted to secure the boundaries of Palestine. Samuel’s appeals received no answer, and he assumed his position on 1 July 1920 without a clear definition of the eastern (and northern) limits of the territory he was supposed to govern.

The formation of Trans-Jordan French forces advanced towards Damascus shortly after Britain’s civilian government had been established in Palestine. Faisal fled from Syria on 24 July 1920, and the Arab state that had been established east of the Jordan valley ceased to exist. The French occupation of Syria brought up the question of the exact location of the southern limit of French territory, and that of the fate of the area south of the Yarmuk river. The question of the eastern limits of Palestine was addressed again in the British Parliament, and the Foreign Office replied by saying that Palestine did not control any land east of the Jordan valley.44 General Congreve, the commander of the British forces in Egypt, expressed his dismay at the obsessive attachment to the Sykes–Picot line east of the Jordan river (along the Yarmuk river and onwards), while on its western side the line was constantly deviated from. He suggested solving the matter by conquering all the land east of the Rift, including Quneitra, Dar’aa and Salt, and he declared that all of Trans-Jordan could be governed from Salt, if only the local population would agree to it. The War Office’s reply to Congreve’s appeal was that it would not allocate the troops needed for such an operation and that the British military presence in the Middle East was about to decrease. The War Office stated that Britain did not aspire to control the area east of the Jordan valley. Congreve was not satisfied with this explanation and demanded to set the eastern boundary of Palestine as far east and as far north as possible. He argued that the eastern defence line could be located east or west of the Jordan valley, but that the valley itself was an

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inconvenient line to defend. He still thought that Dar’aa and Salt should be occupied. Nevertheless, Congreve admitted that he lacked the necessary military strength to carry out this mission, and that he was technically incapable of doing it.45 The collapse of the Arab Kingdom east of the Jordan valley had motivated Samuel to repeat his request for removing the proposed eastern boundary to the ‘Meinertzhagen line’, and seizing the area that had become ownerless.46 The Foreign Secretary Curzon proposed to penetrate this area slowly and quietly, by sending in a number of British officers who would control the region. According to his plan, these districts were to join Palestine47 administratively following a gradual annexation process, and at a much later stage. The British Inter-Official Committee held a discussion about the eastern boundary of Palestine at the end of August 1920.48 Herbert Samuel wanted to learn about the exact location of the north-western boundary of Hijaz, and re-demanded that Aqaba should be included in Palestine. The British Ministry of Agriculture also wanted to add the Salt region to Palestine, and to establish full British control over the phosphate deposits that were present there.49 The Ministry of Agriculture explained that all the agricultural phosphates that British farmers used were imported, mainly from Germany, apart from a small amount from Pacific islands, and that this was an unhealthy situation. The opinion of the British military leadership in Egypt was also presented and so was Colonel Meinertzhagen’s plan for the eastern border (see the previous section). The War Office rejected all the proposals that might cause it to spend more resources, and the idea of handing France control over Trans-Jordan in exchange for a more convenient borderline for Palestine in the north was also dealt with. Herbert Samuel continued to lobby for including Trans-Jordan in Palestine, while the Foreign Office stated that ‘the policy of HM government is that Trans-Jordan should become an independent area, closely connected with Palestine. The eastern boundary, south of the Sykes–Picot line, will be determined through negotiations between our representatives and the local rulers.’50 Samuel could not concur, and he continued to present constant demands for changing the eastern line. The Foreign Office was unwilling to change its own position, and it demanded that a special independent status be given to the lands that lay east of the Jordan river. Telegrams bearing answers of this type were all that Samuel received in response to his demands. He therefore conducted his first meeting with the Trans-Jordanian nobles, on 20 August 1920, in Salt accordingly. In this meeting, both sides agreed that British patronage would be given to the region,51 which would be governed by local leaders with the help of British advisers. Nevertheless, the limits of the area in which this special administrative policy would be implemented were not discussed. At the time, the southern limit of the French regime in Syria was not clear, and neither was the northern limit of Hussien’s kingdom in Hijaz. Palestine’s eastern

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boundary and Iraq’s western one were also undefined at that point in time. Nevertheless, the apparent meaning was the area south of the Yarmuk river, and east of the Jordan river and the Dead Sea, while the more southern part the Edom-Ma’an heights, was seemingly part of the kingdom of Hijaz. Samuel’s report of the meeting’s outcome received the same type of response that he had received from the Foreign Office previously, and its officials continued to declare that the area east of the Jordan valley should be included in the future Arab state that would be established in the region. Meanwhile, the meetings of the Inter-Official Committee on the future of the Middle East continued. The committee reached a final decision by the end of September 1920 to include the area east of the Jordan valley in the independent Arab state. This decision was also conveyed to the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference.52 The British were now concerned with the character of the future Arab ruler of the eastern land. Crowning Faisal, who had escaped from Damascus, was one of the options, and the name of Abdullah – Hussein’s second son and Faisal’s brother – was also mentioned as a possible ruler for Trans-Jordan.53 Samuel, who wanted Britain to rule the area directly, did his best to try and conserve the existing situation – British control over local sheiks – by constantly demanding to send British troops to the region. The Foreign Office officials, who regarded the controlling arrangements as final – British mandated rule with a local government – proposed to set the boundary along the course of the Jordan river (and the Yarmuk river), but they offered no solutions for the area south of the Dead Sea. By the end of 1920 the British government had decided to transfer the conduct of Middle Eastern affairs from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office. This move took place at the beginning of 1921, and until it was carried out the discussions over the future of the area east of the Jordan valley were postponed. The Zionist Organization’s efforts to extend Palestine’s territory to the east relentlessly continued. During 1919 and during the first half of 1920 most of the Zionist activity was directed to the north, although demands for the eastern boundary were presented at several discussions. Some of the proposals pointed to the Hijaz Railway and demanded that the eastern line be set to the west of it, while others demanded that the boundary should run along the desert’s edge. These demands did not appear to be urgent, because the Zionist leadership tended to regard the location of the eastern boundary as an easy to solve issue. This assumption was based on Balfour’s support and on Colonel Meinertzhagen’s proposal. The eradication of the Arab Kingdom in Damascus in the summer of 1920 had focused Zionist attention on that side of the country, and on the future of the eastern boundary’s location. Weizmann turned to Samuel and asked him to move the Meinertzhagen line to the east, and set it along the desert’s edge.54 Weizmann was convinced that the British Foreign Office’s position was not to set the boundary along the Jordan river. The Office’s

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experts supported the Meinertzhagen proposal, but this line did not fulfil Zionist aspirations. Weizmann added that Allenby, the newly appointed High Commissioner of Egypt, regarded Palestine as the area west of the Jordan valley, and had claimed that the area east of the valley did not belong to Palestine. It was already clear to the Zionists that they were fighting a losing battle. In an appeal to Windham Deedes, the Chief Secretary of the government of Palestine, Weizmann requested that an arrangement concerning the territory of Palestine be reached rapidly, because it was no longer probable that Trans-Jordan would ever become part of the country.55 In public Zionist demands remained unchanged, at least outwardly, and the demands for a more convenient eastern borderline were even increased following the conclusion of the discussions about the northern line and the decisions that were reached by the end of 1920. Shortly after this agreement was given publicity, on 5 January 1921, Weizmann sent the Foreign Office a long letter,56 in which he pleaded to discuss the eastern and southern boundaries, after the northern boundary was determined. The final decisions as regards that boundary seemed a disaster according to the Zionist view, and Weizmann now requested that all the area south of the Yarmuk river, which was recognized as the borderline between the British and French territories, should be added to Palestine. Weizmann presented the known arguments about the need to settle the land east of the Jordan river, in order to protect Palestine, and about needing Jews to implement such settlement. Weizmann explained that the settling of Jews east of the valley would not change the policy that Herbert Samuel had presented to the Arab leaders in Salt. This move would not only enable the administrative separation between TransJordan and the area west of the river, but it would also reduce the expenses of the British government because the Jewish settlers would defend themselves. Weizmann demanded that the proposed borderline be moved to the east and set along the desert’s edge once again, while allowing the Arab world to use the Hijaz Railway. He also repeated the old Zionist demand for a line from Ma’an to the Red Sea, in order to ensure Palestine’s southern outlet. Witnessing the political promises that were being made to the Arab world led Weizmann to plead with the British decision makers to avoid making concessions at Palestine’s expense. In addition to the letter to the Foreign Office, Weizmann set out on a public campaign. In an article that was published in the newspaper Palestine on 8 January 1921 a similar demand was presented – to set the eastern boundary of Palestine along the desert’s edge and from Ma’an to the Gulf of Aqaba. The British reply to the Zionist and Arab demands was to be given by the Colonial Office, which had just been given responsibility for the conduct of Middle Eastern affairs. Weizmann wrote Churchill a long and detailed letter on 1 March 1921, shortly after the matter had passed from Curzon to Churchill, who was considered a friend and supporter of Zionism. In the letter he repeated all the Zionist requests and demands

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concerning the future of Palestine.57 When it came to boundaries, Weizmann repeated the demand for an eastern line along the edge of the desert, and from Ma’an to the Gulf of Aqaba. The British reply was supposed to be given during the Cairo conference that Churchill had personally convened in order to discuss the whole Middle Eastern issue. Churchill had to consider not only the demands of all the sides, but also the new political situation that was created with the fall of Faisal’s kingdom, and with his brother Abdullah’s military march in the direction of Damascus. Above all, Churchill had to establish an administrative system which would minimize the expense to the British taxpayer of the maintenance of the army and the administration in the Middle East. The decision of the Cairo conference was that Abdullah would control Trans-Jordan as an Emir for a limited period of time; six months, and that his status would be dependent on the British administration of Palestine.58 The exact status of the Arab regime and its relationship with the British would be dependent on the decisions of the British High Commissioner who was stationed in Jerusalem but was also ordered to keep an eye on developments east of the Jordan valley. It was also decided that the mandate that Britain had received over Palestine and Mesopotamia (Iraq) would also include Trans-Jordan, and that Trans-Jordan would be administered by an independent Arab system under British supervision.59 Although the discussions in Cairo were long and thorough, and although Churchill visited Jerusalem in order to discuss matters with Herbert Samuel, the Emir Abdullah and representatives of the Jews in Palestine,

Plate 10 Winston Churchill, Herbert Samuel and Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan in Jerusalem, 1921; courtesy Zionist Archive, Jerusalem.

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no official line separating the three British mandated regions, Iraq, TransJordan and Palestine, was delineated. The results of the Cairo conference were a failure for the Zionist Organization, but Britain had won itself a devoted ally east of the Jordan. The Zionist Organization still hoped that the Cairo decisions would not alter anything in regard to Zionist aspirations about settling Jews east of the Jordan valley. Churchill had even hinted that he would not oppose such a move if only it would be carried out quietly, but even he was aware of the Zionist need to use massive propaganda in order to push the settlement forward.60 Apparently, this position prevented the continuation of the Zionist pressure as regards the eastern borderline. Certain Zionist politicians, and especially the circles that surrounded Ze’ev Jabutinski, regarded the British decisions and the quiet Zionist approval as treason. The call ‘Two banks for the Jordan river – this one is ours and so is the other’ was heard from then onward. Even the other side of the Jewish political map did not lose its faith in achieving a better political solution, and in a famous song – which was composed many years later – one can find the words ‘from Metulla to the Negev, from the sea to the desert’. The allusion is clearly to the desert that lies east of the Trans-Jordanian heights and not to the Judean desert. Anyhow, later on occasional land purchasing attempts were made, and plans for settling the eastern land were presented,61 but no official Zionist demands concerning the location of the eastern borderline were ever raised. This situation gave the British administration a free hand in determining the boundary’s location. The White Paper published by the British government following the bloody events of May 1921, and the discussions over the future of Palestine (and of Trans-Jordan) that followed them, did not clearly define the boundaries between the two territories. However, they did explicitly determine that the sections in the mandate terms having to do with the Jewish national homeland did not apply to the areas east of the Jordan river.

The delimitation of the eastern borderline After the decision to separate western Palestine from Trans-Jordan was reached, it took more than a year until the question of the borderline’s precise location was addressed. Everybody assumed that the Jordan river separated between the territories, but the line’s accurate location was not known. Abdullah did not know the limits of the area that he controlled – whether the southern Negev was included in it, or whether his rule extended all the way to the Jordan river, the Sea of Galilee and the Dead Sea. Since the British administrators who were busy organizing the administrative systems in Palestine and in Trans-Jordan travelled and acted freely on both sides of the valley, they were not in any special hurry to define the accurate location of the line. Nevertheless, the discussions that were held in the spring of 1922 in preparation for the publication of the official

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mandate for Palestine, and the need to clearly define the area in which the ‘Zionist’ sections of its terms would not be implemented, required an accurate definition. These discussions were one of the three main factors that led to an accurate determination of the line separating Palestine and Trans-Jordan – the eastern border of Palestine. The other two were the discussions over the extraction of the natural mineral wealth of the Dead Sea (which were held in June and July 1922) and the new constitution for Palestine that was due to be published in August that year. The mandate terms included, as mentioned, a section that cancelled the need to implement the sections dealing with the Jewish national home on TransJordan’s territory (clause 25), and the constitution of 10 August 1922 was given to Palestine only. The initial practical push for the accurate delimitation of the eastern borderline was given by the mineral extraction discussions.62 The general opinion of the British administrators was that the minerals should be extracted from the Dead Sea communally, in order to ensure the efficient development of all of the area. Colonel Solomon, the head of the department of industry and commerce in the government of Palestine, and Alan Kirkbride, the representative of the Chief Secretary in political matters, prepared a report for the Chief Secretary in June 1922. In this report, Solomon demanded that a railway be built from the south of the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba, exclusively through Palestine’s territory, and a Palestinian port constructed at the head of the Gulf, to avoid the fee for using the Suez Canal. Alan Kirkbride presented maps in which he showed that official boundaries between Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and between Trans-Jordan and Hijaz, were never determined. He claimed that the border passed south of the Dead Sea, through the central river bed, Wadi El-Jib, but that boundaries in a southern, eastern and western direction were never determined. The discussion was concluded by sending a message to the Colonial Office, requesting it to deal with the boundary issue, and to leave the western bank of Wadi Arava, and the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, in Palestine, so that it could construct a port there. The Chief Secretary (who stood in for the High Commissioner) sent the message to the Colonial Secretary. It also included a recommendation to approve the rights of exploiting the minerals of the Dead Sea because they feared the competition imposed by a French company that was interested in controlling the markets in the east. Therefore the Chief Secretary asked London to delimit a boundary which would leave Palestine the required space in order to construct a railway track and a port. The Colonial Office decided that the matter was not an urgent one, and transferred it to the Foreign Office (which dealt with boundaries). A remark about the lack of actuality was added and explained by the fact that the Dead Sea minerals would not be extracted for a long time (true enough: the extraction activity only started eight years later). In any case, the officials of the Colonial Office claimed, the extraction works would be constructed in the

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north of the Dead Sea, which is why a railway track to Aqaba was unnecessary, and that the construction of a modern port was a matter of many years to come. Nevertheless the Foreign Office recommended that Palestine’s demands be met, and its boundaries determined once and for all. At the time, the northern boundary was determined but not yet marked, and it was clear that the 1906 line effectively served as Palestine’s southern boundary. Only in the east was the borderline still unclear, and it was time to take a decision about it. An additional meeting about the Dead Sea minerals was held between the representatives of Palestine and John Philby who represented TransJordan. Both sides decided to establish a joint company for the mineral extraction, although it was also decided that the extraction of the minerals from the ground surrounding the Dead Sea would be done separately. For this reason, two points were to be determined, one in the middle of the Jordan river before it spills into the north of the Dead Sea, the other in the south, as close as possible to the centre of the southern coast of the Dead Sea, and connected by a line on the maps. All the area east of this line would be part of Trans-Jordan, and all of the area west of it part of Palestine. Sovereignty over the Arava, from the south of the Dead Sea to Aqaba, was also discussed. Philby agreed, in Trans-Jordan’s name, to give up the western bank of Wadi Arava (and thus all of the Negev area). Nevertheless, a precise borderline was still not determined along the territories of Palestine and Trans-Jordan. Philby’s relinquishment of the Negev was necessary,63 because the future of this area was uncertain. In a discussion regarding the southern boundary, the Egyptian aspiration to acquire the Negev area was presented. On the other hand the southern part of Palestine belonged, according to one of the versions, to the sanjak (district) of Ma’an within the vilayet (province) of Hejaz. King Hussein of Hijaz demanded to receive this area after claiming that a transfer action, to add it to the vilayet of Syria (A-Sham) was supposed to be done in 1908. It is not clear whether this action was completed. Philby claimed that Emir Abdullah had his father’s permission to negotiate over the future of the sanjak of Ma’an, which was actually ruled by him, and that he could therefore ‘afford to concede’ the area west of the Arava in favour of Palestine. This concession was made following British pressure and against the background of the demands of the Zionist Organization for direct contact between Palestine and the Red Sea. It led to the inclusion of the Negev triangle in Palestine’s territory, although this area was not considered as part of the country in the many centuries that preceded the British occupation. The second and main reason for the setting of a borderline came from Herbert Samuel, the British High Commissioner of Palestine and TransJordan, who demanded to determine the borderline after the publication of the mandate for Palestine.64 The mandate was confirmed on 24 July 1922, and the League of Nations supported section 25, which dictated that

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certain sections having to do with the Jewish national home would not be implemented in the territory of Trans-Jordan. Samuel explained that Trans-Jordan was demanding to include all of the area east of the Jordan river within its territory, from the point where the river leaves the Sea of Galilee, all the way to the Dead Sea. This area was not included in the vilayet of Beirut or in the sanjak of Jerusalem. Trans-Jordan also demanded the area south of the Dead Sea, Auja-El-Hafir line, which was the southern limit of the Ottoman sanjak of Jerusalem. Trans-Jordan demanded this area although in internal discussions it had already conceded it, and Samuel knew of this agreement (he may have even been behind it). In his appeal to the Colonial Office, Samuel remarked that the area between the Sea of Galilee, El Hamma and the mouth of the Yarmuk river – the ‘Semah triangle’ – had belonged to the British district of Tiberias and Galilee since the British took over. According to Samuel, this area was not only crucial to Rutenberg’s hydro-electric project (these plans had already won the British government’s support), but also to the strategic needs of the British Empire, which wanted to control the rail track from El-Hamma to Semah. Samuel proposed that the borderline south of the Dead Sea should be set between the Dead Sea and Aqaba, in such a way as to later enable Palestine to construct an independent port on the Gulf of Aqaba. He added that the Zionist Organization was pressing to establish settlements in the Semah triangle, and that if this move were to occur before the delineation of a borderline, unnecessary tension would build up. Due to all of the reasons mentioned, Palestine requested that its eastern boundary would be accurately determined in the fastest possible way. The publishing of a constitution for Palestine on 10 August 1922 gave the final push necessary for the determination of a precise borderline. One cannot declare a constitution without accurately defining the territory in which the constitution is valid. Consequently, the Colonial Office confirmed Samuel’s proposal a few days later, and recommended him to announce that the borderline was determined according to strategic and economical needs.65 Nevertheless, it was necessary to define the line’s location accurately. The Colonial Office had decided not to establish a boundary committee, and to entrust the line’s determination with ‘the man in the region’ – the High Commissioner himself. This decision was backed by the Foreign Office. Samuel, who was an experienced British statesman and an administration expert, was very familiar both with the regional relationship balance and with the area itself. He accepted the mission that was imposed on him. In a telegram that he sent the Colonial Office on 27 August 1922, he suggested that the borderline be set ‘along a line that runs from the Gulf of Aqaba through the centre of Wadi Arava, the Dead Sea, the Jordan, Baisan and the eastern limit of the district of Tiberias’.66 This version did not satisfy the Colonial Office, which wanted to know ‘which of the Jordan river’s banks forms the borderline? Does only half the Dead Sea belong to Palestine? Where is the eastern limit of the district

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of Tiberias?’ Samuel was asked to define the borderline accurately, in terms of ‘latitude and longitude, village names or natural landscape elements’, as always appears in boundary agreements. The Colonial Office demanded to see a defined line mainly because it wanted total administrative separation between Trans-Jordan and Palestine, while Samuel tried to obscure the definition on purpose, according to his initiative of keeping only a slight administrative separation between two parts of Palestine. Samuel had to bend to the pressure of the Colonial Office, and he was forced to give a more precise definition. Nevertheless, he did not desert his aspiration for the expanding of Palestine, and he started his description by stating that ‘just in case you assume that the authorities of Hijaz would not agree that Aqaba would serve as a boundary town, the borderline would be set as follows . . .’. This introduction is apparently trying to explain Samuel’s earlier evasion. Now Samuel described the line: it originates from a point on the Red Sea, two miles west of Aqaba, passes through the centre of Wadi Arava, the centre of the Dead Sea and the Jordan river until the mouth of the Yarmuk river, where this river joins the Jordan. The line would follow the Yarmuk river upstream along the centre of the water flow, until it reaches point No. 32, R-124 on the map of the EEF [Egyptian Expeditionary Force]. Samuel also remarked that ‘Trans-Jordan will express strong opposition if the line does not pass along the centre of the Jordan river’s flow.’ The Colonial Office accepted this version. Palestine was permitted to publish in its official newspaper, that the ‘Zionist’ sections of the mandate of Palestine: would not be implemented on the area that lies east of the line that originates from a point that is situated two miles west of the town of Aqaba, in the Gulf of Aqaba (Etzion Gaver), and passes through the center of Wadi Arava, the Dead Sea and the Jordan river, until it reaches the point where the Jordan and the Yarmuk rivers meet; and from there, through the center of the Yarmuk – to the Syrian boundary.67 The publication of this version in an official newspaper gave official validity to the existence of two separate mandatory territories – Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and this determination received international validity together with the acceptance of the corrected mandate’s sections by the League of Nations, on 23 September 1922. The eastern borderline was defined in writing, although it wasn’t marked in reality, and it appeared on maps only two years later. The obscurity regarding the line’s precise location, both along its terrestrial part, south of the Dead Sea, and along the Dead Sea and the Jordan river,

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continued to bother the boundary’s delineators during all of the British period. Unlike the situation along the northern and southern boundaries, the British officials who dealt with the eastern line had only a vague idea of the topographical and human structure in this region. Mapping the area, and mainly the parts south of the Dead Sea, brought about many mistakes, especially in regard to the alignment of the river beds. Wadi Arava appeared on the maps as a valley that runs between the Gulf of Aqaba and the Dead Sea (which was located 392 m below sea level), but in reality such a river bed did not exist.68 In the middle of the way, near the point where Wadi Jeraffi joins Wadi Arava, the surface reaches a height of 200 m above sea level, and the watershed between the Dead Sea and the Red Sea that is located there is not crossed by any stream. On British maps that were published before 1930, the boundary line runs from the half-way point between Aqaba and Umm Rash-Rash, northwards along the centre of the Rift (Wadi Arava) until it meets the mouth of wadi Jeraffi. From there it runs along the main valley up to wadi Hauzik, and finally along the course of the stream up to the Dead Sea. In 1930 the British authorities published a new map, which showed the boundary’s placement in relation to the alignment of the river beds along the lower points of the main dry rivers. The line’s originating point is situated 5 km west of Aqaba, in Palestine’s territory, contrary to the order of the High Commissioner. (Two miles are equal to 3.2 km, not to 5 km). The obscurity regarding the borderline’s location, and especially the fact that it remained unmarked, allowed Emir Abdullah, the ruler of Trans-Jordan, to contest the legality of the line and its location.69 He raised a demand for passing the Semah triangle and the Negev area to Trans-Jordan, shortly after the borderline was officially announced, by claiming that these areas belonged to the vilayet of Syria (A-Sham), during Ottoman rule. Even though the High Commissioner had rejected this demand in the past, it was now supported by some of the officials of the Colonial Office. In a memorandum that was prepared in this Office, it was said that ‘British Palestine is different from Arab Palestine’ and that ‘Churchill’s White Paper apparently relates to the lands of the vilayet of Beirut, and the sanjak of Jerusalem alone.’ Abdullah’s demand was rejected. Anyhow the unmarked borderline, combined with the events that have to do with the collapse of the Kingdom of Hijaz and Iben Saud’s occupation of the east coast of the Red Sea, had all contributed to the renewal of the Trans-Jordanian demand for control of the southern Negev. The demand was rejected definitively only in 1925, and it was not brought up by Trans-Jordan as long as Britain controlled Palestine. During the first years of the State of Israel’s independence, the Arabs again claimed Jordanian ownership of the southern Negev, and even attempted to achieve this goal by military means, before rapidly retreating from the idea.

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The problems of the eastern line’s delimitation The unmarked borderline bothered the members of the Survey of Palestine. The importance of the southern part of the line was only theoretical, and it was totally ignored by the few Bedouins and by the security forces and the government representatives from both sides. Nevertheless, this was an inconvenient situation for the people entrusted with drawing the maps and accurately marking the country’s borderlines. The head of the Survey of Palestine demanded that the eastern boundary should be accurately marked in 1931, and he emphasized the problems and difficulties caused by its current situation.70 In a memorandum that he prepared, he determined that the definition ‘the centre of Wadi Arava’ related to ‘the line running between the lowest points’ along the valley, and that this rule could be implemented only in the places where a single stream collects the flood water. This was indeed the situation along the majority of the borderline, but in three places (apart from the point where the valley joins the Dead Sea itself) there were difficulties in identifying these points. The line’s point of origin was unknown owing to the definition of ‘two miles west of Aqaba’ and the uncertainty as to where one should start the measurement. Some described this point as passing through the former residence of Peake Pasha (Lieutenant Colonel F. G. Peake), which was situated 1 km east of the port of Aqaba. Another description was ‘along Wadi-Arava’, meaning one of three streams that spill into the Red Sea, which are situated 1 km to 4 km from Aqaba. A third definition was ‘3 km from the fort of Aqaba’. The line’s location was also unclear near MlahatTaba (which should not be confused with the police station and the well of Taba) and in the vicinity of the watershed between the Dead Sea and the Red Sea. This situation caused the head of the Survey of Palestine to demand the establishment of a boundary commission to resolve the matter once and for all. Although the request was justified, the British administration in Palestine did not regard such action as urgent or necessary because it involved major monetary expense in a region that did not experience real problems related to the boundary and its location. This explains why the local government did not act on the matter, and the demarcation did not take place. Only years later, with the granting of independence to Trans-Jordan in 1946, did the British administrators feel the need to accurately define the borderline along the Arava, and to mark it properly.71 This line had become an international boundary, and this necessitated its precise demarcation. Nevertheless, only one short section along the boundary’s southern part was measured and marked. The line’s point of origin on the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba was determined for the first time, at a distance of 3.2 km west of Aqaba’s westernmost houses. From this point, the markers determined a straight line that ran northwards for 4 km, in the direction of the lowest point of the Arava valley. The determination of the line’s point of origin had envisaged the spatial

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Figure 15 The demarcation of the boundary between Trans-Jordan and Palestine near the Gulf of Aqaba, 1946. Source: Survey of Palestine, 1946.

expansion of Aqaba since 1922, and Trans-Jordan won an additional piece of land on the Gulf coast. Apart from marking this short section, the British regime did not continue the demarcation process until the end of the mandate period. It was satisfied with the general determination of the ‘lowest points line’ along the main stream that flows south towards the gulf, and along the stream that flowed north from the watershed towards the Dead Sea. The problematic sections near Mlahat Taba were not marked. The task of marking the boundary accurately along its full length was left for the State of Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan, which carried out this action after signing the peace treaty between them, in the 1990s. The section of the boundary between the Dead Sea and Syria did not require actual marking, because seemingly the Jordan and the Yarmuk rivers delineated a clear borderline, until the problem of an unmarked boundary was emphasized by certain hydrological events. The structure of

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the landscape along the Jordan’s course – a soft chalky surface – is prone to frequent changes that are caused by the unstable flow of the river, especially after the winter floods. The problems of setting the boundary along the centre of the river were apparent during the winter of 1927, when the Jordan overflowed and ‘transferred’ a strip of land 800 m long along the Bet-Shean valley from Palestine’s territory to Trans-Jordan. The experts at the Colonial Office gave their advice regarding the accurate alignment of the borderline, and Lord Plumer, High Commissioner in Palestine at the time, demanded to determine its precise location, due to the frequent changes in the Jordan river’s course.72 Plumer claimed that the boundary was set in 1922 without accurately defining its location, owing to the changes in the river flow, and that now, in 1927, it was situated in a different place. The boundary’s original (1922) location could not be determined. The British administrators of Trans-Jordan demanded to fix the existing situation, so that the boundary would always be along the river’s centre flow. The Colonial Office, mistrusting the scope of its own authority, sought the advice of the boundary demarcation experts at the Foreign Office. After studying similar cases from around the world it was concluded that international unanimity as regards boundaries located along rivers does not exist, as in every case, there was a different solution.73 For this reason, they proposed that Palestine should determine the location of its own boundary, and decide about

Plate 11 Field Marshal Herbert Charles Onslow, first Viscount Plumer (from left) (1857–1932); courtesy Zionist Archive, Jerusalem.

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the necessary future arrangements. The High Commissioner accepted this suggestion, and officially announced that the eastern boundary would remain in the centre of the Jordan river in any case, and that every change in the course of the flow would pass certain areas from Trans-Jordan to Palestine, and vice versa. This regulation remained valid during the rest of the British mandate period. It was adopted, following necessary changes and correction, by the governments of the State of Israel and of the Kingdom of Jordan when the boundary agreement was signed between them as part of the peace agreement of 1994. Another issue, which was not dealt with during the British era in Palestine, concerned the location of the boundary through the Dead Sea. The literal definition of ‘the centre of the Dead Sea’ might have been translated into an endless number of lines, all of which would be true to the term.74 The British administration did not even consider the matter, and the map printers marked the line in a non-uniform fashion. They didn’t take into consideration the change of the level of the lake’s surface. Such a change may alter the location of a line that is based on the division of the lake’s upper surface water. This issue too was left for the State of Israel and of the Kingdom of Jordan to deal with, and it is expressed in the peace treaty that was signed between the two states. The fact that the boundary south of the Dead Sea was never marked, and the lack of discussion concerning the location of the centre of the river, characterized the shape and location of the separation line between Palestine and Trans-Jordan during the British era. This was also the case concerning the boundary between the State of Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan. The borderline along the Arava valley was only marked seventy-five years after it was delimitated, when Israel and Jordan signed the peace agreement. The question of the boundary’s location along the Jordan river – is it the line that divides the upper surface of the water at high or low tide, or is it the line that divides the river bed – was not decided by the British. Unlike the northern and southern boundaries, the eastern boundary was merely an administrative separation line, and it did not have any real meaning, apart from the cancellation of the mandate sections that dealt with the Jewish national home. The movement of people and merchandise across the line was nearly free. The residents of Trans-Jordan worked in Palestine, and vice versa, and no taxes were levied on the passage of merchandise between the separate territories. Nevertheless, practically (although not in law), the establishment of Jewish settlements was never carried out on the eastern side of the line, which was determined in 1922, and it became an ethnic line. The one exception was the construction of a workers’ neighbourhood at Neve Ur in the 1930s for the employees of the hydro-electric station that was established on the Yarmuk river, near its confluence with the Jordan. The power station was constructed on the eastern side of the Jordan river, and the settlement of Neve-Ur was established east of it. This settlement

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was destroyed in 1948, when the Jordanian army occupied the power station. The process of determining the eastern boundary of Palestine continued throughout the first decade of the British mandate. This concluded the central process in which the boundaries of modern Palestine were determined for the first time to a certain degree of accuracy and demarcation. From this point onwards, frequent changes were made along the lines, although the basic structure continues to exist. Apart from the diversion in the Golan Heights – which did not receive international recognition – the borderlines that were set during the first decade of the British rule of Palestine continue to be valid today, dozens of years later and after the region has gone through several extensive political changes. The boundary between Israel and Lebanon (along the section between Ras El Naqura and Metulla), and the one between Israel and Egypt (from the Mediterranean Sea to the Gulf of Eilat), are firm and abiding, and their existence is not contested. So is the case of the boundary between Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan, between Hamat-Gader (El Hamma) and a point near Tirat-Zvi, and from the centre of the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Eilat-Aqaba. It seems as if the section along the lower Jordan will continue to be the western boundary of the Kingdom of Jordan although at the time of writing it is not clear who will enjoy sovereignty over the area to the west of that line. It is only along the section between Metulla and Hamat-Gader, along the boundary between Israel and Syria, that the opposing sides do not agree on the location of the boundary between them.

7

The partition plans, 1937–1947

Initial ideas for the partition of Palestine The delimitation of Palestine’s boundaries during the British period had ended in the middle of the 1920s, and it seemed as if the long discussion in regard to this delimitation had fixed clear and secure borderlines for many years to come. British policy makers believed that by delimitating Palestine, they had defined the territorial unit in which they had vowed to apply the plans and policies set out in the mandate for Palestine. This approach planned to establish one single state within the mandated Palestine, and it greatly affected the activities and developments in the area all through the 1920s, until the 1929 events brought with them the first fissures. Jewish–Arab tension increased, and it led to a different perspective on the country’s territorial future. Britain aspired to maintain a united control over all of Palestine. The territorial dimensions of this aspiration were identical both to the Jewish ambitions, after the Jews had practically given up their perspective of the ‘desired boundaries’, and to the Arab ones, after they had abandoned the ‘Greater Syria’ idea. Both wanted to establish their own control over all the territory that was defined as ‘Palestine’, when the British mandate began. This situation did not last long. When political tension escalated in the early 1930s, the idea of splitting the country into small political units, each of which would be fully ruled by one of the regional actors, was suggested. A multitude of plans to divide Palestine between the Jews, the Arabs, the British and the United Nations characterized the period between 1929 and 1947. The common denominator was the fact that none of the suggested plans was ever put into practice, and that most of them remained ‘paper plans’. Even the plan that was officially confirmed as a plan for the division of Palestine, the UN partition plan of 1947, was not implemented according to the original proposal. The armistice lines of the State of Israel, which was established shortly afterwards, in spring 1949, were very different from what the plan dictated. Another characterizing territorial component was that all the division plans that were proposed for British Palestine related only to

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this precise territory. Certain plans did offer to connect the area that was to become the Arab state to the territory of Trans-Jordan, but the implementation of this idea was far from easy. Apparently, although the determination of the basic delimitation of Palestine was not accepted as final, it was regarded as a spatial basis for the country’s future delimitation. A vast literature – mainly historical-political – explains and describes the background and setting of each of the plans by giving special attention to the political circumstances that led to their development.1 Nevertheless, the territorial delimitation that was proposed by these plans did not attract much academic attention, probably because it was never translated into clear spatial activities. The importance of the plans lay in their unequivocal determination that one united common regime could not exist within the area that was destined to be the modern Palestine, and that there was a political will for the division. The various plans had different views and suggestions as regards the territorial solution, but not about the basic concept that supported the division. This chapter will therefore deal with the territorial delimitation of the division plans, by attending to political and geographical concepts which stood behind them and motivated their presentation. The events of 1929 initiated a reassessment of the British approach to Palestine. A number of plans and proposals concerning the way Britain should treat the Jews, the Arabs, and Palestine in general, were composed between 1930 and 1933. Apparently, these plans and the consequent discussion did not cause Britain to change its basic policy: to keep Palestine as one single political unit. This approach is exemplified by the view of the High Commissioner, Arthur Wauchope, who wanted to establish a multinational political system – Arab, Jewish and to a known extent British, under continuous British mandatory control, within the territorial limits of Palestine.2 This was the official British policy up to the mid-1930s. The Arabs, for their part, aspired to establish their independent regime over all the country. The Jewish world, in Palestine and in the Diaspora too, had not yet consolidated a complete, cohesive view in regard to this territorial question at that point in time. Nevertheless, Zionism regarded mandate Palestine as the basic territory on which the Jewish State would be established eventually.

The ‘Cantons’ idea At the beginning of the 1930s, certain personalities suggested that Palestine should be divided, or that a partial regime, under general British patronage, should be established in different parts of the country – the ‘cantonization’ idea. Arab, Jewish and British representatives presented these plans. The Jewish proposals were first presented at the beginning of the 1930s, in reaction to the political turmoil that surrounded the

Plate 12 Sir Arthur Grenfell Wauchope (1874–1947); courtesy Zionist Archive, Jerusalem.

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publishing of Passfield’s White Paper, the ‘McDonald letter’ and the various investigation committees that had operated in Palestine at the time (the Shaw committee, the Hope-Simpson committee and others). Among the canton proposals one can find the journalist Itamar Ben-Avy, Yossef Luria of the Brith-Shalom movement, who saw the Swiss model as the one that should be implemented, and the jurist Dr Paltiel Dickenstein,3 – Secretary of the Hebrew High Court. These initial plans did not define the desired borderlines for the various cantons. Dr Avigdor Yacobson, one of the leaders of the Zionist federation and the Zionist representative in Paris and for the League of Nations, presented a political plan for a full division of Palestine,4 including delineated geographical dividing lines, in 1931. He suggested that the Jewish state should include the coastal plain, the northern valleys (Esdraelon, Harod, upper Jordan valley), lower Galilee and eastern Upper Galilee – which were all populated by Jews – and in addition, the unsettled Negev. The Arabs were supposed to receive the central mountain area – Judea and Samaria, the Gaza plain, western Galilee and the rest of Upper Galilee. Yacobson suggested that part of the Gil’ad (in Trans-Jordan) and the Golan (in Syria) should be added to the Jewish state. Regardless of these additions, Yacobson’s plan resembles the UN division plan that was determined sixteen years later, in many aspects. Yacobson included the need for Arabs to migrate from the territory of the Jewish state to that of the Arab one, and the Royal Commission (the Peel Commission) later adopted this very same suggestion. He also proposed that the Negev should be designated a Jewish development area for the future. The Jewish public received Yacobson’s plan with surprisingly strong support owing to the sudden urgency of solving the Jewish question when Hitler came to power in Germany. Apparently Weizmann supported it, although he never expressed this opinion publicly. Other figures such as Moshe Kleinman, the editor of the Zionist federation’s weekly newspaper, Ha’Olam, and David Ben-Gurion, reacted positively to Yacobson’s plan. Although the plan was never subject to a practical discussion, its very presentation revealed the possibility of dividing Palestine. The geographical characteristics of the division were therefore the existing dispersion of national (Jewish and Arab) settlements on one hand and the possibility of development and the future absorption of immigrants on the other. This plan did not relate to a historical settlement concept, nor did it consider economic or security needs. It was totally based on the human settlement situation that prevailed at the time it was drawn up. We may regard this case as the first time in which the link between the limits of the Jewish settlement and the limits of the future Jewish state was presented in a practical manner. This connection became a cornerstone in the process of spreading out the Jewish settlements in Palestine, from the beginning of the 1930s up to the present day. The Arab side had presented its own suggestions for a territorial

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Plate 13 Dr Avigdor Yacobson (1869–1934); courtesy Zionist Archive, Jerusalem.

division or for the division of authority. These proposals were usually presented in reaction to the ideas that were put forward by the Jewish side. One was presented by Musa El-Alami, the High Commissioner’s secretary and later on the Public Prosecutor. In 1933 El-Alami proposed to establish an independent Jewish canton along the coast between Tel Aviv and Atlit,

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and an independent Arab state in the rest of country’s territory. A detailed description appears in a memorandum that was written by Ahmed ElHaldi, the principal of the Arab College in Jerusalem.5 El-Haldi’s plan was published in 1933, and it was based on the formation of separate Arab and Jewish cantons, under the control of a central government in Jerusalem. His territorial proposals delimited the Jewish canton along the coast – between Tel Aviv and Haifa, west of the railroad that runs between Haifa and Lydda – together with the Esdraelon valley, the northern Baisan valley, the northern Jordan valley and the Hula valley. The Arabs were supposed to get all the central mountain region, the Negev and the coastal plain south of Tel Aviv and north of Haifa. The mixed cities – Jerusalem, Hebron, Bethlehem, Nazareth, Tiberias and Safed – would remain free cities, just like the port city of Haifa, which would remain free. In this case too, El-Haldi based his proposal on the distribution of the Jewish and Arab settlements in Palestine in the beginning of the 1930s. He basically adopted the ‘N model’ of the layout of the Jewish settlements as the delimitation lines for the future Jewish state. The territorial difference between this proposal and the one that was presented by Yacobson was that it did not allocate an area for the future absorption of Jewish immigrants, beyond the existing limits of the Jewish settlement. El-Haldi also ignored all the Jewish settlements located between Tel Aviv and the more southerly settlement of Gedera. El-Haldi’s memorandum did not include solutions to security or economic problems because the author did not foresee a political struggle between the two sides. Just like the Jews who presented their proposals for division he had built his plan on future economic co-operation between the Arab and Jewish states. Neither side had developed a public debate about these ideas. Soon after, political and economic changes that accompanied the period of the Jewish mass immigration of the mid-1930s altered the structure of the Jewish settlement in Palestine in an essential manner.

The British proposals for the division of Palestine during the 1930s The British regime had been acting according to the general view of the High Commissioner, Arthur Wauchope, who supported Jewish–Arab cooperation in the area that he controlled, until 1935. Fissures were first seen in this approach in January 1935, when Archer Cast, a senior exofficial in the Palestine administration, presented new ideas. Cast proposed to redivide the region including Trans-Jordan into three separate units (cantons), which would be co-ordinated by a central government.6 His delimitation suggestions included a Jewish canton that would be situated along the coastal plain, the valleys and eastern Galilee, with parts of the northern Negev. The capital of this area would be Tel Aviv. The Arab canton was supposed to include all the area east of the Jordan river, the

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western mountain region, the inner plain, the Gaza area and western Galilee. The capital of that area was supposed to be Nablus. The third canton would be British, and it would include most of the Negev, the Dead Sea, an enclave surrounding the city of Haifa, with its port and refineries, and direct control over Jerusalem and Bethlehem. A corridor would connect these two cities with the Mediterranean Sea. The geographical basis of Cast’s proposal was the existing situation of the Jewish and Arab settlement in Palestine. Unlike the Arab and Jewish proposals that were mentioned, Cast did include a geographical solution for the Jerusalem–Bethlehem enclave, which was supposed to remain under British control, and he did not leave out the Dead Sea with its economic potential. The inclusion of the territory of Trans-Jordan in his solution for the political problems of Palestine revived the view that locating the borderline along the Jordan river was a temporary and artificial step. The British imperial need to control the region and to defend the Suez Canal found its territorial solution in the Negev, where army camps and airstrips could be constructed without the interference of a hostile population, be it Jewish or Arab. The allocation of the northern Negev to the planned Jewish canton can be explained by the need to allocate land for the absorption of Jewish immigrants in the future, although Cast’s plan had tied this part to the finding of water in the region. This plan included a realistic geographical deployment, future settlement solutions, militarystrategic deployment, the use of economic potential and even a treatment of territorial-religious values, and was thus underpinned with deep and multi-directional geographic thought. Some of Cast’s territorial views found their place later on, both in the proposal of the Royal Commission of 1937 (the British corridor between Jerusalem and the sea) and in the formation of an enclave surrounding Jerusalem and Bethlehem, in the UN plan of 1947. Other British officials presented their plans for dividing the country at the beginning of 1936. Plans and proposals piled up, as the political situation in Palestine deteriorated. Stafford Cripps, a Member of Parliament, proposed in September 1936 to establish two states in Palestine – a Jewish one and an Arab one – which would be bonded by a federation under the patronage of Britain. Cripps assumed that the Jewish state would be situated along the coastal plain and the northern valleys, according to the distribution of the settlements at the time. Douglas Duff, the ex-deputy commander of the District of Jerusalem, published a more detailed proposal in his book Palestine Pictures. Duff proposed the establishment of two cantons – an Arab one and a Jewish one – within a federal state that would belong to the League of Nations (and not under British patronage as was suggested in Cripps’s proposal). Duff too based his division according to the existing settlement situation, although he proposed to establish a British colony along the coast, between Atlit and the Lebanese boundary (including Haifa and Acre), and a free corri-

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dor between Jerusalem and Jaffa. Duff also offered to join the Arab canton (which mainly consisted of the mountain region and the Negev) with Trans-Jordan. Political–strategic–economic concepts were combined in this plan (British control over the Bay of Haifa and along the oil pipeline), together with religious needs (British control over Jerusalem and the routes leading to it) and the human geographical reality. Duff assumed that the Arab part would not be able to sustain itself economically within the territory that it was destined to have.

The Arab Revolt, the royal commission’s partition plan and its aftermath The Arab Revolt that started in April 1936 was the main driving force behind the first public discussion concerning the territorial future of Palestine. The British government had decided to react against the revolt, which was aimed at the British as well as at the Jews, by sending an investigation committee to Palestine. The committee’s mission was to examine the reasons that led to the inter-factional riots, and to assess British policy towards Palestine. Unlike the previous investigation committees, this one was appointed directly by the Crown, and was therefore a ‘Royal Commission’, not answerable to the political British government or its representatives in Palestine. In its final report the Royal Commission recommended the establishment of two sovereign states in Palestine – a Jewish one and an Arab one. The commission also recommended that Britain should continue to hold Jerusalem, which would be connected by a corridor to the Mediterranean Sea. Thorough researches have been undertaken into the political sides of this historical episode, and its aftermath.7 Nevertheless, one must examine the political and geographical motives that lay behind the people who presented the various division plans for Palestine, and to examine closely the connection between them and the territorial delimitation they suggested. In February 1937, when the Royal Commission visited Palestine, the first official Zionist plan8 to divide Palestine between its Arab population and the Jews was presented by the Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion (later the first Prime Minister of the State of Israel), in a general assembly of his Labour Party, Mapai. Continuing the ‘triple division’ ideas that were already presented (Arab, Jewish, British), Ben-Gurion proposed a territorial division that included within the Jewish state the eight sub-districts (referred to as ‘districts’ in his plan) in which a large enough Jewish settlement existed. Some 313,000 Jews were living in the sub-districts of Jaffa, Ramla, TulKarem, Haifa, Nazareth, Tiberias, Baisan and Safed by 1936. In order to sustain a Jewish majority in these parts, which also included 394,000 Arabs, and in order to give the Arab state an outlet to the sea, Ben-Gurion recommended leaving the cities of Jaffa, Ramla and Tul-Karem in the Arab

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Plate 14 Chaim Weizmann (left) and David Ben-Gurion; courtesy Zionist Archive, Jerusalem.

state in addition to the Christian holy city of Nazareth. In this manner, only 300,000 Arabs would remain in the suggested Jewish state, and the Jews would comprise a marginal majority there. He added that the subdistricts of Acre and Gaza couldn’t be included in the Jewish state because they contained only small number of Jews, but that the Jewish right of settlement there, should not be given up. These parts were to remain under non-permanent sovereignty, and they would be open to receive Jewish settlers in the future. The same model was proposed by Ben-Gurion for the northern Negev and for the Arava valley, with the outlet to the Red Sea. Ben-Gurion ‘conceded’ Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and claimed that ‘the Jerusalem enclave should become an international region controlled by the British, with local Jewish–Arab management’. The Jewish territory was supposed to include the central and northern coastal plain, up to the boundary with Lebanon, the Esdraelon valley, Galilee and the Jordan valley up to Baisan, the Dead Sea, part of the Judea Desert and all the Arava valley up to the Gulf of Aqaba. The mountains of Judea and Samaria and the Jordan valley from Baisan to Jerico were supposed to comprise the Arab state, which also included the main bulk of the Negev, without the Arava valley. Ben-Gurion’s plan destined the sub-district of Acre and Gaza to become autonomous districts, not under Jewish or Arab control (the

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identity of the ruler remained obscure), and in any case open to Jewish settlement. Out of Palestine’s 27,000 km2, the Jewish state was supposed to contain 10,000 km2, the Arab state 14,500 km2, 2,000 km2 were to remain in the autonomous districts of Acre and Gaza and 500 km2 in the Britishcontrolled area around Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Ben-Gurion’s concepts were based both on the existing Jewish and Arab settlement distribution and on the optional vast Jewish settlement in the future. This was the first time a senior Zionist leader had publicly recognized the right of the Arabs to sovereign control over a part of Palestine. Faithful to the views he had expressed in the past, Ben-Gurion demanded that the Jewish state should have an outlet to the Red Sea, and he included the Dead Sea – where the Jewish Potassium Company was operating – in his demands. The need to add Haifa with its port to the Jewish state was also emphasized in his plan: ‘Haifa must be included within the boundaries of the Jewish state. I think that this is an express condition of all the plans, and we can promise the

Figure 16 Administrative map of Palestine, 1936. Source: Survey of Palestine, 1937.

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British that they would continue to control the port for twenty more years, by a contract.’ Another condition laid down by Ben-Gurion was the territorial connection between the Jewish state and Lebanon. Lebanon must bound it in the north, and the Arab canton cannot be situated between our state and Lebanon, because we must make sure that we will have a neighbour with a historic interest in living in peace with us. That neighbour is Lebanon, where the Christians are in constant threat of being swallowed by the Moslem majority, and it has a vital interest in keeping a peaceful relationship with us. This was the first instance in which the international relations of the future Jewish state, and its integration in the Middle East, were presented. This proposal clearly spelled out the intention of establishing a Jewish state with British patronage, along the south-eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, and establishing a Christian state under French patronage along the central part of the same coast. Additional steps that were considered were cementing these two states by a treaty, and linking each of them with a European power. By this means a territorial structure that would be able to stand firm against the Moslem world would be constructed, and the European strongholds in the Middle East would remain in place. The suggestions of the Royal Commission (see below) were also supportive of this concept. Ben-Gurion’s detailed plan was never properly discussed, because it was presented during a time in which all the sides were waiting for the report of the Royal Commission. This report was published in the summer of 1937, and it determined that ‘division is the only method of treating the “disease” ’.9 ‘Disease’ was the word that the Commission had used to describe the political situation in Palestine. The partition plan was based on the establishment of two separate sovereign states as soon as possible. An Arab state (that would include Trans-Jordan), which would be situated in that part of Palestine to the east and to the south of the proposed borderline, and a Jewish state that would include the areas to the north and west of the same line.10 The boundary was supposed to ‘separate the land that was purchased by the Jews, and on which they had settled, and the land that was settled, or mostly settled, by Arabs’, according to the commission’s view. Its location was meant to allow ‘enough space for the Jewish state to expand in terms of population’. The line’s delineators restricted their proposal by pointing out that the line they offered was not the only possible one. Given their inability to delineate a precise borderline, they proposed that a boundary committee would better define the accurate separation line between the various territorial units that were about to be established in Palestine. The commission apparently regarded its mission as to deal with the allocation aspects of the partition, and it

Figure 17 The Royal Commission’s partition plan, 1937. Source: Survey of Palestine, 1937.

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divided the region into territorial units. The delimitation was supposed to be carried out by a professional team. Nevertheless, the commission deemed it necessary to present at least one option for the territorial partition. The Royal Commission proposed that the separation line should originate in Ras el Naqura and follow the existing northern and eastern boundaries until it reached the Sea of Galilee. It would cross the lake to the outflow of the Jordan river and continue along the river’s course to a point north of Baisan. From there the line crossed the Baisan valley, following the southern edge of the Esdraelon valley to a point near Megido, and crossing the Carmel ridge next to the Megido road. When the line reached the coastal plain, it continued south along its eastern margin, before turning west so as not to include Tulkarm, and it met the Jaffa–Jerusalem corridor near Lydda. The line continued from the southern side of the corridor along the edge of the coastal plain to a point ten miles south of Rehovot, from where it turned west towards the sea.11 This borderline included all of the Jewish settlements and villages up to Be’er-Tuvia, but it excluded the settlements that lay to the east of the Jordan river (south of the Sea of Galilee), and the settlements that were situated south-east of the Jaffa–Jerusalem corridor. This corridor was the subject of another of the commission’s suggestions. The authors were careful to safeguard the holy value of Jerusalem and Bethlehem for the Christian world, and they assumed that Britain would be the best keyholder. This led them to propose the establishment of a territorial enclave that would stretch from the north of Jerusalem to a point south of Bethlehem. Moreover, they suggested giving this enclave the necessary outlet to the sea by creating a corridor that would be located north of the main road and south of the rail track, and would include the towns of Lydda, Ramle and Jaffa.12 This part would remain a special British mandated area, and would not be granted independence in the future. The political vision of the Balfour Declaration (the establishment of a Jewish national home) was not to be implemented in this area. Geographically, the area included mainly Arab but also some Jewish settlements that were located between Jerusalem and Jaffa. So were the two Jewish settlements of NeveYa’akov and Atarot, north of Jerusalem, Palestine international airport near Lydda, the huge military compound of Sarafend, between Jaffa and Ramle, and the port of Jaffa. In addition to the Jaffa–Jerusalem corridor it was suggested to include the city of Nazareth under this special status, and to give it the responsibility and authority for the holy shores and waters of the Sea of Galilee. The partition plan was to create three separate territorial entities. The future Arab state was intended to encompass 110,000 km2, 22,000 km2 of which were located west of the Jordan river, and the rest to the east of it. It would be bound by the newly agreed upon boundaries of the emirate of Trans-Jordan with Syria in the north, with Iraq in the east and with Saudi

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Arabia in the south. When this proposal was written, there were 500,000 people living in the part that lay west of the Jordan river (Palestine), and another 300,000 east of it (Trans-Jordan), totalling 800,000, the majority of them Arab. The Jewish state was supposed to encompass 4,840 km2 (half the size that Ben-Gurion proposed). Some 650,000 people were living within this part, a third of them non-Jewish. The total area of the Jaffa–Jerusalem corridor was twice as big as was planned by Ben-Gurion, at 900 km2, with 300,000 people living in it when the Royal Commission presented its plan. The partition plan was a political one, and its goal was to achieve the highest possible degree of separation between the Arab and Jewish populations. The partition was determined according to the existing settlement dispersion, just as in other proposals. Therefore, most of the Jewish settlements in the coastal plain, the northern valleys excluding the Baisan valley that was not inhabited by Jewish settlers, lower Galilee and the whole length of the upper Jordan valley were supposed to be included in the Jewish state. Although some new Jewish settlements were erected during the commission’s discussions, the Royal Commission did not consider their location, especially those in the Baisan valley. However, it did note that a total of 1,250 Jews would remain in the Arab state, the majority of them in the villages east of the Jordan river and a few that still lived in the Arab cities. Delineating this line, was a clear signal for the planners of the future Jewish settlements that their location might be critical for the political boundaries that would eventually be determined. This concept was the driving force behind the settlement strategy of the Jews of Palestine from this point until the end of the British mandate period, and it continued to influence Jewish settlement activities after the 1967 war.13 Nevertheless the report’s authors signalled that not every single village would influence the line’s location, and especially not the ones that were established while the discussions were already under way. By this, the commission members returned to the policy that was implemented in the early 1920s, when the location of the settlement of Metulla did influence the location of the northern boundary of Palestine. Transport aspects had also influenced the commission’s proposal. The definite mentioning of Megido as an area that would be included within the Jewish state had emphasized the importance of Wadi Ara, as a connecting route between the major Jewish settlement concentrations of the Jezre’el (Esdraelon) valley and the coastal plain. The Tel Aviv–Haifa road (which wasn’t constructed yet) was supposed to be the main transport route to the north, and its north-eastern branch – the wadi Ara route – was also supposed to remain within the Jewish state. The importance of transport routes in determining the separation lines was even more apparent during the discussions over the Jaffa–Jerusalem corridor. This corridor served as a convenient transport route between Jerusalem and the sea. Jaffa was supposed to remain an Arab enclave, surrounded on all sides by land that belonged to the ‘corridor’. To achieve this, land purchases and

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the evacuation of ‘of a narrow strip, on the north side and on the south side of the town’ were to take place. By creating these outlets from the corridor to the sea, Jaffa was to be disconnected from Tel Aviv in the north and from the Jewish settlements of Agrobank (Holon) and Bait Vagan (Bat-Yam) in the south, and a possible nationalist problem would be avoided. The country’s major airport – the Lydda Airport – was left within the corridor in order to permit easy access for the British, in addition to the rail track and to the main road between Jerusalem and Jaffa. The proposed transport arrangements were suggested to enable the Arabs freely to approach the ports of Jaffa (through the corridor) and Haifa (through the Jewish state), and to allow a free flow of people and goods between the Jewish state and the Egyptian boundary. The option of an outlet to the Red Sea, was not absent from the plan. The commission suggested the establishment of another territorial enclave on the northwestern side of the head of the Gulf of Aqaba (where the town of Eilat was later built), and to place it under the control of the superpower that would control the ‘corridor’. Proper arrangements would make sure that the Jewish state could use this region, in order to develop its exports and imports to and from East Africa and Asia. Another geographic concept that the commission considered was the need to allocate sustainable living space for future population growth, mainly of the Jewish population, which was expected to grow rapidly thanks to the free immigration of Jews to their future state. The main territorial options were to give either the Negev or western Galilee to the future Jewish state. Clearly, the Jewish state could not be limited by the boundaries of the existing settlement areas. The commission had to choose between placing the future Jewish state in one of two regions. One was the desolate (apart from the town of Beersheba, and tens of thousands of Bedouins) Negev, which did not really hold settler potential. The other was western Galilee, in which an Arab (Moslem, Christian and Druze) population – that was seen as less nationalistic in the eyes of the commission members – already existed. The commission members agreed with the Zionist leadership that the Negev was worthless in terms of settling. They had reached this conclusion when attempts to find water there failed, and following the investigations that were carried out in that region during the 1920s and early 1930s, regarding the settlement potential. On the other hand, Britain wanted to retain the Negev in British hands for military purposes, and even for maintaining the connection between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world (although this may have seemed less important at the time). The British were eager to form a barrier between the Jewish state and Egypt, and to aid Trans-Jordan’s Emir Abdullah against his opponent Iben-Saud, who wanted to take over Aqaba and the southern part of Trans-Jordan. Allocating the Negev area to the Arabs was politically convenient for Britain, and it did not conflict with Jewish aspirations. Although the Jews demanded control of the Negev, when the leadership faced the choice between this

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region and Galilee, it overwhelmingly chose to add Galilee to the parts that were already settled by Jews. The Zionist policy makers turned to Galilee after considering the Jewish land in its eastern part, the progression along Galilee’s coast – which was expressed in the establishment of Nahariya – the possibility of acquiring additional land in this region and the settlement potential there. Politically, the option of forming ties with the Christian Maronites of Lebanon also influenced the decision, as did the deep historic connection between the Jewish people and the Galilee area. The Jewish settlements in the Jezre’el valley and the need to defend them were another driving force. Therefore all of western Galilee from Safed to the sea, an area that lacked any Jewish settlement apart from Nahariya, was allocated to the future Jewish state. The official explanation for this act was historical-political rather than an economic one. On one hand the commission’s report claimed that in this part of the country the Jews had managed to survive almost continuously, and they emphasized the deep religious connection with the towns of Safed and Tiberias. On the other hand, the commission’s authors pointed out the relative peacefulness of the region, in which inter-religious tension was low (apart from the cities), and the fact that the Galilee Arabs were less responsive to the call for violent action. They assumed that the local Arabs would be willing to sell their land, and move to a different part of the country, outside the Jewish state, and that they would be easier to convince relative to the Arabs of the southern coastal plain. For all these reasons, the commission’s members thought that this part of the country could be added to the Jewish state. Apparently, the Royal Commission had accepted the general Jewish claim. Its members believed that a geographical solution must be found, so that ‘the boundaries of the Jewish state will permit reasonably sized population growth and development’, and it selected Galilee as the area in which this policy would be implemented. The commission’s report explained that the Arab population that would remain in the Jewish territory was no larger in the north than in the south (Gaza and Beersheba). The southern Arab population was centralized in the coastal plain, an area planned for future Jewish settlement, while the northern Arabs were mainly settled in the mountains. The Jews could therefore find plenty of room for settling and development along the northern coast, without obstructing the mountain inhabitants. The political connection with Lebanon was also mentioned. The transport links between the central mountain of Palestine and the Mediterranean Sea would also be disconnected (save for a bad road between Nablus and Acre) if the south were given to the Jews. Giving them Galilee would leave all of the southern coastal plain in Arab hands, thus creating a comfortable outlet to the sea. The addition of Galilee to the Jewish state was proposed in accordance with the Middle Eastern ‘high politics’. Just like Ben-Gurion’s reasons,

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far-sighted plans formed the basis for dividing Palestine into two separate parts (with the establishment of the emirate of Trans-Jordan), and for the division of Syria into two mandated territories (Lebanon and Syria). Britain and France were well aware that their reign in the Middle East was temporary, and that these areas would eventually win their independence. Neither superpower regarded the Arabs, and the Moslem element that they represented, as allies for the far future. In order to maintain their cultural and economic (and even political-advisory) grip on the region, Britain and France both aspired to form independent states that would be bonded to them, in the Mediterranean Sea’s eastern basin. Britain regarded the Jewish national home as an introduction to a Jewish state which would remain a grateful and faithful ally, and the British believed that this would also be the relationship between France and independent Lebanon. To strengthen the Jewish–Christian–European axis, the British were tending towards the creation of territorial continuity between the Jewish and the Christian states. That barrier would prevent direct and convenient access to the sea for the Arab–Moslem world, which would be dependent on the co-operation of the allies of the European superpowers. This far-sighted theory is not backed by any written documents, although it can be clearly seen that the decisions of the officials concerned were directing towards achieving this goal. Two important sites in which a major Jewish involvement was present were not included in the territory of the planned Jewish state. Rutenberg’s hydro-electricity plant in Naharayim, and Novomeiski’s potash factory on the Dead Sea northern coast, were both regarded as necessary assets which must continue production, but their location prevented any possibility of their inclusion within the suggested Jewish state. This decision hinted that desolate Jewish settlements couldn’t influence the determination of the boundary delimitation. In conclusion, the human-geographical foundations, the future settlement potential, transport routes and spatial connections were among the influential issues that led to the Royal Commission’s delimitation proposal as it was eventually presented. Religious reasoning (the need to protect the religious sites) and political reasoning (territorial continuity between the Jewish state and Lebanon and the prevention of a contact surface between the Jewish state and Egypt) were also among the influential factors in the delineation of the division lines. The plan that was presented by the Royal Commission was never put into effect, and it was officially cancelled in November 1938, following the investigation of the Palestine Partition Commission14 headed by Sir John A. Woodhead. The Zionist Organization had at that point accepted the idea of dividing the country,15 but it presented an alternative option of how to partition it.16 The proposal was put together by the Jewish Agency, and it was presented to the British Partition Commission in May 1938. This partition plan is practically the only one ever to be presented by

Figure 18 The Jewish Agency partition plan, 1938. Source: Survey of Palestine, 1937.

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an official and authorized Jewish political body. The proposal was mainly planned according to the researches of E. J. Brawer and Zalman Liphschitz, and it was mainly directed at the achievement of safe and secure boundaries for the Jewish state and to the acquisition of enough territory to support an economic base for this state. The proposed boundaries aimed at including most of the known water sources and at controlling the main transport routes. The fingerprints of the strategic policy makers were apparent in the Jewish Agency’s plan, with demands for secure borderlines, a demand that only grew stronger as the Arab Revolt raged on. The Zionist plan added the Baisan valley, the foothills of Samaria and areas that lay south of the Royal Commission’s line to the plan that was earlier proposed by that very same commission. The Jewish plan enlarged the total area of the British part, on account of the proposed Arab state. All of the Sea of Galilee, which was supposed to be divided between the two states, was left – according to the Jewish proposal – within the Jewish state, and it was meant to serve it as its major water source. The Zionist plan objected to leaving Jerusalem in British territory, and demanded that the city should be divided between the Jews and the Arabs. The Zionist proposal, together with the concept that lay behind it were promptly rejected. Nevertheless, the Royal Commission’s recommendation had a crucial effect on Jewish reaction to the various partition plans. During the final decade of British rule settlement activity accelerated, as it was believed that the area that would be populated with Jews would become the core of the future state, and that additional land would possibly be added. The establishment of new settlements in western Galilee, in the Baisan valley and in the Negev was intended to create geographical facts in preparation for the re-delimitation of Palestine’s boundaries (in case the country should eventually be split up into separate political units). The Royal Commission had determined the concept of partition and the conceptual base of the method, and the future borderlines were to be delimited from this point onward by addressing mainly the location of settlements and population (Jewish and Arab). Other factors, such as the physical landscape or development aspirations and possibilities, had become of secondary importance when it came to drawing the lines.

The partition plans during World War II The initial partition plan was indeed officially cancelled in November 1938, but the concepts it delineated were re-examined during World War II. Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, appointed a special Cabinet committee in the summer of 1943, in order to draw up a new policy regarding the future of Palestine as the end of the war approached. This was an internal British committee, and its discussions and conclusions remained secret. The members of the committee – Cabinet Ministers past and present – never visited Palestine, and the work done by the

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committee relied on testimonies and memoranda of British officials which had to do with Palestine.17 Churchill attempted to shape a policy which would enable the Jews to overcome the White Paper of 1939, which played down the idea of a Jewish national home, and even to establish their own state at the end of the war. Churchill believed that the most reasonable solution for the problem of Palestine was territorial separation of the Arabs and the Jews, and he recommended that the committee should reexamine the idea of partition, although he had rejected in time the conclusions of the Royal Commission of 1937. Besides the idea of partition, Churchill asked the committee members to examine the possibility of opening up the Negev to Jewish settlers, a step that would absolutely alter the territorial recommendation of the Royal Commission. A different way of dividing Palestine was proposed by the ex-Colonial Secretary Leo Amery, and the new committee discussed it.18 The large Arab population in northern Palestine, the anti-government activities that had occurred there in 1938 and the expected Syrian objection to the official partition proposal had pushed Amery to propose a new dividing line. His line would give the Jews eastern Galilee, including the area east of the Sea of Galilee, the northern valleys, the coastal plain from Haifa to the Egyptian boundary, including Jaffa, and the south of the country. The mountain regions, including the Upper and western Galilee, were supposed to remain in the hands of the Arabs while the British were to control Jerusalem. The inclusion of the area east of the Sea of Galilee showed that settlements that were established after the Royal Commission had proposed its plan (like the Jewish settlement of Ein Gev in the eastern coast of the Sea of Galilee) did actually achieve some of their political goals. This area – which was included in the proposed Arab state in 1937, was now offered to the Jews. It was the same with the southern part of the coastal plain, which was also added to the Jewish territory. On the other hand, the settlement activity in western Galilee did not cause the plan’s author to include this region in the future Jewish state. A number of committee members opposed the idea of giving the Negev to the Jews, both because of its dryness (and hence worthlessness to settlers) and because of not wanting to create direct contact between the Jewish state and Egypt, to the west, and Saudi Arabia in the south-east. Not wanting to disconnect Egypt from the rest of the Arab world was the excuse for rejecting the plan. The Lord Moyne, the British Deputy Minister of State for the Middle East, who was stationed in Egypt, and Harold McMichael, the British High Commissioner in Palestine, had together presented an overall plan for the Middle East. According to this plan, a Jewish state would be established in parts of western Palestine.19 North of it, and adjacently, a Christian state would be established in parts of Lebanon. A small international state under a British mandate would control the holy sites in Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The British would also control Ramallah – with its broadcasting tower, the springs in Ras-El-Ain (which were the

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main water source of Jerusalem), the military compound in Sarafend and the airport in Lydda. The Arab state would consist of Syria, Trans-Jordan and the Arab regions of western Palestine. Clear and accurate lines did not accompany this proposal. Anyhow it seemed as if the Negev, the central mountain region and the western part of Galilee, north of the Nazareth–Acre line, would belong to the Arabs. Eastern Galilee, the northern valleys, the Zevulun valley and the coastal plain, up to Ashqelon, were supposed to be included in the Jewish state. This plan was based on the updated dispersion of the Jewish and Arab settlements in Palestine. Nevertheless, the effort to prevent the unrest, which would have been caused by the resettlement (moving Arabs away from Jewish-controlled areas) that the ‘Royal Commission’ recommended was apparent. An additional difference between this proposal, and the one from 1937, was that regions for future development of the Jewish state were not presented together with territorial reasoning, although it is clear that the intention was to create territorial continuities without buffer zones. The plans did not mention a naval anchorage (Jaffa) for the British entity in Jerusalem, and they relied on an air connection through the airport in Lydda. The Arab outlet to the sea was supposed to be through the Acre region in the north, and through the Gaza region in the south. A more detailed plan that was presented to the committee was that of Oliver Stanley, the Colonial Secretary.20 According to Stanley a line that would originate near Auja-El-Hafir and pass through Halutza and Mamshit would run to the eastern shore of the Dead Sea. The area north of this line, including Beersheba, would be part of the Arab state, and the area south of it – would remain under the British mandate. In case a thorough investigation should lead to the conclusion that the region held potential for absorbing intensive Jewish immigration it would be handed to the Jews in a later stage. In the north it was proposed to add the mountain regions of western Palestine, including the mountains of Upper and western Galilee, to the Arab state. The coastal plain from Ashqelon northwards, the central valleys and the Sea of Galilee were supposed to be included within the Jewish territory. Stanley also suggested that the ‘Galilee panhandle’ should be added to the Arab state in order to create a territorial bridge between Arab Galilee and Syria. The committee concluded that the partition option was the only realistic way to solve the Palestine problem, and it wanted to determine separation lines that would leave a Jewish majority and a vast space for future development in the Jewish-controlled area. According to this same proposal, areas that were wholly or mostly populated by Arabs, and the land that those Arabs owned would not be part of the Jewish state. The committee did not regard the Bedouins and their presence in the Negev as a reason for including it in the Arab state. The final proposal that was presented to the British Cabinet adopted the majority of the suggestions of the Royal Commission of 1937, although the Negev was destined for the

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Jewish state, and western Galilee to the Arab one.21 Giving the Negev to the Jews was conditioned by the reaching of positive conclusions about the settlement possibilities of this region, following a soil survey there. The partition map differed slightly from the Colonial Secretary’s map, especially when it came to the Negev. The coast of the Dead Sea (together with the possibility to extract minerals from the sea) was not included in the Negev. The ‘Jewish’ part of the Negev, which was going to become Jewish in a gradual manner, was expanded and it stretched west to the area that lies south of Rafah. The Arab part of the Negev was also expanded south of Beersheba. Another significant difference was the inclusion of the ‘Galilee panhandle’ and eastern Galilee within the Jewish state. The committee’s plan was confirmed on 23 January 1944, but its implementation was postponed until the foundation of a special team who would delimit the precise location of the lines.22 This special committee was never founded, and following the pressure of the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, the proposal was never implemented. Its significance is obviously theoretical, although it also holds a number of concepts and ideas that were later carried into effect. The partition plan of the United Nations (see below) also allocated the Negev – and not the Galilee – to the Jewish state, and it determined that the Jerusalem enclave would not be connected to the sea. The reasons for these changes were mainly human-geographical ones, and switching Arab-populated Galilee with an empty Negev that offered settlement potential was also done accordingly. Even though the Jews established three Mitzpim (experimental settlements) in the Negev as early as 1943 in order to assess the possibility of sustaining life in the desert, it was not the influencing factor behind the decision to put the Negev in Jewish hands. The significance of the port of Jaffa for the Jerusalem enclave was no longer crucial, since air transport was available. Forming a corridor between the two cities would have disconnected parts of the future Jewish state, and the need to create it was now eliminated. None of these recommendations, which won British Cabinet approval, was ever implemented, and the idea of partitioning Palestine was postponed until the end of the war. A new investigation committee on the future of Palestine was set up in October 1945, half a year after the end of the war in Europe and shortly after the war in the Far East was concluded. This committee was faced with two substantial changes. On one hand, the Holocaust of European Jews during World War II and the need to settle 100,000 homeless Jews who were housed in temporary camps in Europe called for a rapid and immediate solution. On the other hand this was the first time the government of the United States was directly involved in the negotiations for solving the Palestine issue. Following prolonged discussions and visits to Palestine, this new committee published its recommendations on 20 April 1946.23 It practically called for the establishment of an undivided binational state

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under UN patronage and British supervision. It requested an immediate permit for the immigration of 100,000 homeless Jews from Europe to Palestine. The recommendations of this committee, just like the recommendations of all the other committees, remained conceptual ideas – because no really influential player supported their implementation. Nevertheless, it was decided to establish a British-American expert committee24 to find a way to implement the proposal. This committee, later referred to as the Morrison–Grady committee, began its deliberations on 13 July 1946 and presented its own recommendations for the partition of Palestine. It accepted and confirmed a British recommendation to divide the country into four semi-autonomic units. According to this proposal, British officials would run the Negev region and the Jerusalem– Bethlehem area, which comprised 43 per cent of Palestine’s territory. A mostly elected council, with the authority of a municipal council, would be established in the Jerusalem–Bethlehem area when the time was right. The Jews would control an autonomous territory which would include the Jordan and Hula valleys, eastern and lower Galilee, the valleys of Baisan and Harod, and the coastal plain from Haifa to Be’er-Tuvia, excluding Jaffa – all together about 17 per cent of Palestine’s area. The rest of the country – western Galilee, parts of lower Galilee, the Samaria and Hebron mountains and the southern coastal plain – would become an autonomous Arab territory, approaching 40 per cent of the total area. The separate units would be placed under the control of a British High Commissioner, who would head a central government that would take charge of foreign affairs, security, boundaries, police, customs and transport matters.25 This suggestion had returned to the ‘canton concept’ and the boundary was once again to be delineated according to the existing settlement pattern. The religious significance of the Jerusalem area, and the British intention of keeping the Negev, were the driving factors behind the formation of these two special units. As mentioned, the plan did not develop to its full extent, and no explanations of the delimitation together with accurate separation lines were presented. The importance of this proposal, similar to that of its antecedents, was due not to its implementation but to its continuing the central ideas of delimitation according to the settlement dispersion and boundaries, the uniqueness of Jerusalem, and not giving the empty Negev to either of the sides. The Morrison–Grady plan was not confirmed by US President Harry Truman, and was effectively dropped.26 In the summer of 1946 the Zionist Organization had launched a campaign to convince the United States to support the partition of Palestine and the establishment of an independent Jewish state in the Jewish part. This campaign did not aim at drawing maps and determining specific boundaries. Its aim was to persuade decision makers in the United States that only the establishment of such a state, even on a part of Palestine, would solve the problem of the country itself, as well as solving the problem of the Central and Eastern European Jews. The Americans were

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convinced by the Zionist claim, and supported the solution of partitioning Palestine and establishing a Jewish state there. President Truman announced this message at the termination of Yom Kippur on 4 October 1946.27 Although slight changes were later made, the concept of partitioning Palestine formed the basis of the American position from this point in time until the State of Israel was established in May 1948. The final assent to the British proposals for the partition of Palestine was given during a British Cabinet meeting in January 1947. The new Colonial Secretary, Arthur Jones, had presented a new idea in which the Jewish state received even less territory than that that allocated for it ten years earlier.28 The Colonial Secretary was backed by the High Commissioner for Palestine, General Alan Cunningham, and by the commander of the British forces in Palestine, General Evelyn Barker. The proposal, which was promptly rejected by the Jewish Agency due to the unreasonable delimitation, was also rejected by the Foreign Office headed by Ernest Bevin. This was the last British proposal for the partition of Palestine, and from this point in time onward the future of the country was discussed by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The UN partition plan of November 1947 In the spring of 1947 Britain officially turned to the General Assembly of the United Nations, and requested it to summon a special general assembly which would form a special committee for preparing the discussions over the future control of Palestine.29 On 15 May 1947 the assembly had decided to form a UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which would include representatives from Australia, Uruguay, Iran, Guatemala, India, Holland, Yugoslavia, Peru, Czechoslovakia, Canada and Sweden. UNSCOP was granted extremely wide authority, and it was requested to examine the facts and to learn all the questions, issues and problems in regard to Palestine. Its report was to be presented no later than 1 September 1947. The members of the committee spent a few weeks in the region. During the summer of 1947 they met representatives of the British government, the country’s residents and the Zionist Organization.30 The committee’s conclusions and recommendations were drafted following an intensive investigation of the local situation. The conclusions of this committee were not practically implemented either, but this time it did not happen because the proposing body was unwilling to carry out its own suggestions. The political and military events that had occurred in Palestine from the minute the recommendations had been confirmed, up to the point when it was time to implement them, were the reason for not implementing UNSCOP’s conclusions.31 Nevertheless, this committee’s recommendations carried special significance in regard to the boundaries of Palestine. They were confirmed by the General Assembly of the United

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Nations, and thus became a binding decision of the UN members. The proposed borderlines, which were drawn as an outcome of the central concept of dividing Palestine into two states, are regarded to this day by certain political bodies as the obligatory boundaries of the country. Even though these lines were never delineated in reality, and although the process was arrested during the allocation stage, the background of their setting and the information gathered for the purpose can show a number of post-war concepts and directions in regard to boundary determination around the world in general, and in Palestine in particular. Shortly before Britain officially passed the Palestine issue over to the United Nations to solve, the government decided to grant India its independence, on 20 February 1947. Although independence was only supposed to be given in June 1948, Britain had decided to grant India’s independence earlier than planned, in August 1947. The conflict between the Hindu and Moslem populations in India led Britain to divide the country into a Hindi state (India) and a Moslem one (Pakistan). The spread of the Moslem population led to the establishment of one state with two separate parts as East Bengal became Eastern Pakistan. This part of the country was 1,500 km away from the main part of Pakistan, which is situated west of India, and the Hindi state was in between. The bloodbath that erupted between the Hindus and the Moslems following this division (according to estimates more than half a million people were killed during the summer of 1947) and the emigration of over 10 million people who moved across the border from both sides, most probably influenced the recommendations of UNSCOP. The committee recommended that the British mandate over Palestine should be terminated. Most of the members supported the partition of the country into two states – an Arab one and a Jewish one – and leaving an additional international unit, ‘the metropolitan area of Jerusalem’.32 The Jewish state was supposed to comprise three territorial parts: the north-eastern one (the Hula and the Harod valleys), the central one (the western part of the Jezre’el valley and the coastal plain from Haifa to Gedera) and the third and southern one (the central and southern Negev). These units were to be connected by two touch-points with the Arab state; one was situated south-east of Afula, the other north-east of Majdal. The Jewish state was supposed to encompass 60 per cent of the country’s total area. In the summer of 1947 900,000 people were living in this part, half a million Jews and 400,000 Arabs. The intended Arab state was also supposed to consist of three territorial parts, and to encompass 33 per cent of the area of western Palestine. The northern part included western Galilee, bounded by the southwestern corner of the sub-district of Safed, and parts of lower Galilee and the Jezre’el valley up to Mount Tabor, including Shefar’am, Nazareth and Acre. The second and central unit included Samaria and Judea without the Jerusalem and Bethlehem area. The northern boundary of this unit was placed on the Jordan river, south-east of Baisan. It continued to a

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point south of Afula, turned south and continued parallel to the coast as far as the south-western corner of the Hebron mountains and then to the north of the Dead Sea, inclusive of Lydda, Ramla and their immediate vicinity. The third and southern unit included the southern coastal plain and the north-western Negev. The Arab state would be given an outlet to the sea along the coast between Ashdod and Rafah, in addition to the one in western Galilee. Some 700,000 people were living in these parts in the summer of 1947, 10,000 of them Jews. These latter were mainly scattered in western Galilee, in some villages north, west and south of Jerusalem, along the way from the coast to Jerusalem and in the area between Ashdod and Rafah. The Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem was to be entrusted to the hands of an international trusteeship. It was supposed to become a neutral and weapon-free region and to include the cities of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, with the surrounding villages. About 200,000 people were living in this region by the summer of 1947; half of them were Jews. They were supposed to enjoy the freedom of language, education and rituals in addition to their right to participate in the metropolitan area’s local elections. A governor representing the international trusteeship would head this neutral entity, he would be neither Jewish nor Arab, and not a resident of one of the states that would be established in Palestine at the time of his appointment. A foreign, recruited force would stand at his service. The main geographical concepts that led to the setting of these borderlines, were the dispersion of the Jewish and Arab populations, the villages’ limits, the land owned by the two peoples, the need to allocate an area for future Jewish immigration and a Jewish outlet to the Red Sea. The Jewish state was put together by allocating all the Arab-free, or almost Arab-free, land, where Jews had established territorial continuity, apart from Jerusalem. Isolated Jewish settlements, even those populated by a few hundred people, were not left within the Jewish state with the idea of preventing the inclusion of too many Arabs, under a Jewish regime. Most of the Arabs that would remain in the Jewish state were the 170,000 residents of Haifa, Jaffa, Tiberias and Safed, in addition to the rural population of the sub-districts of Haifa, Tiberias, Jaffa and Ramla. These regions were mixed, and the Jewish settlements in them could not be separated from the Arab ones. Due to the urban character of the Jewish settlement, the committee members preferred to leave the mixed cities and towns, and the adjacent villages, in Jewish hands. These villages depended on the nearby towns, and supplied them with agricultural produce. The main difference between this proposal and the earlier ones was that the Negev area – including the outlet to the Red Sea – was allocated to the Jewish state. Among the main reasons for this decision were the existing land owned by Jews, Jewish settlements that had sprouted in the northern part of the Negev but mainly the fact that, apart from Beersheba and the village of Khalsa, there were no permanent Arab settlements in the whole

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region. In contrast, large Arab populations lived in the north-western part of the Galilee, in the region between Jerusalem and the inland, on the coastal plain and north of the Dead Sea, and this explains why they were not included in the Jewish state. The precise delimitation of the borderlines clearly shows that the delineators tried to follow the boundaries of villages, sub-districts and districts as best as they could. The separation line between the Jewish and the Arab states in the north followed the borders of some of the villages situated there. All these Arab villages remained in the territory that was allocated to the Jewish state. From this point the borderline continued to lower Galilee along the line that separated the sub-district of Tiberias, which was allocated to the Jewish state, from the sub-districts of Nazareth and Acre, which remained in Arab hands. This tendency continued up to the Jewish village of Kfar-Tavor – which belonged to the sub-district of Nazareth but was to remain in the Jewish state. The delimitation of western Galilee was also partially along the line that separated the sub-districts of Acre (Arab) and Haifa (Jewish) and partially along the boundaries of the villages. Nevertheless, the committee did not always follow this principle, and in some cases the borders of certain settlements were crossed. Half the area of the small Arab town of Shafa’amr was allocated to the Jewish part, while a part of the land of the Jewish village of Merhavia was added to the Arab state in order to create the ‘touchpoint’ near Kfar-Yehezkel. The borderline near Baisan passed along the line that separated the sub-district of Baisan (Jewish) from the sub-districts of Jenin and Nablus (Arab) and along the line that separated the sub-district of Jenin from that of Haifa. The boundaries of some Arab villages were split without apparent reason along this part of the borderline too. In the inland coastal plain the line passed along the villages’ land, so that the rail track from PetahTikva to Haifa would remain in Jewish territory. An enclave that included the towns of Ramla and Lydda had formed south of Petah-Tikva, and was to be part of the Arab state. In the south-east the borderline ran along the dividing line between the sub-districts of Hebron (Arab) and Beersheba (Jewish), and in the south-west the borderline was almost identical to the line that separated the sub-district of Beersheba from that of Gaza, which was to be in the Arab state. The exceptional case in that region was the Arab village of Burir on which Jewish settlements were established in 1946. This proposal enjoyed the support of most of the committee’s members, although a minority proposal was also presented. This second suggestion would have offered the Jews only the land of eastern Galilee, the Jordan, Baisan, Harod and Jezre’el valleys, the Bay of Haifa and the coastal plain down to Be’er-Tuvia as one continuous unit. It also enlarged the international area of Jerusalem so that it included the Ramla-Lydda region, and added the Negev south of Beersheba to it. This proposal was rejected, and the UN Assembly was presented with the majority plan.

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The report formed the basis of a political struggle that took place during the second normal session of the UN Assembly in the autumn of 1947. The struggle concentrated on two central matters: the very concept of partition, and the actual boundaries of the two states. Britain, which was deeply involved in the discussions, demanded that all of the Negev should be included within the Arab state, while the Zionist representative tried to achieve a better borderline for the future Jewish state.33 The final map, which was presented to the Assembly for confirmation, was different in detail from what was suggested by UNSCOP. In the north, the boundary was diverted to the west so that the Arab village of Malkiya and part of the land of the Arab village of Kfar-Saliha were included in the Jewish state, as 37 per cent of the area of Malkiya was already in Jewish hands. South of it, the line was diverted to the west so that Jewish territory would include the road leading from Kfar-Tavor to Safed, although this change also placed some Arab villages in the Jewish state. The ‘touch-point’ between the Arab regions in Galilee and Samaria was moved to a point west of Afula, so that all the Jezre’el valley, inclusive of the Arab villages of Ein-Dor, Nin, Sulam and A-Dahi, were placed in the Jewish part. As a result of this change, the Arab villages of Yafe, Ma’alool and Mujdil, which were situated south-west of Nazareth and were intended to remain in the Jewish state by UNSCOP, were now inside the Arab part. Jewish irrigation plans were the driving force behind this change. South of Afula the proposed borderline passed along the line separating the Arab sub-district of Jenin from Nazareth, so that all the land that belonged to the villages in Jenin’s vicinity was included in the Arab state. On the inner coastal plain the line was diverted to the west, so that the Arab state included some Arab villages, which UNSCOP intended for the Jewish state, after it was found that there was no Jewish-owned land in these parts. The suggested borderline was delineated along the railway, so that the built-up area of the town of Qalqilya remained in the Arab part, while the town’s railway station and the adjacent track remained in the Jewish part. The Arab state was supposed to include some more Arab villages near the railway which earlier had been destined for the Jewish state. The line followed the railway to a point 5 km north of Lydda, where it turned west so as to include Ramla and Lydda in the Arab state, but not the village of Serafend and the nearby army camps. Another significant correction was the formation of an Arab enclave in Jaffa. All the municipal area of the city of Jaffa, with its 100,000 Arab residents, would become an enclave within the Jewish state, without a territorial connection to the Arab state. The nearest Arab point was located approximately 13 km away. The southern ‘touch-point’ was also removed from its original location. Thus the Jewish village of Kfar Varburg, supposed to remain in Arab territory according to UNSCOP’s proposal, was now in the Jewish part. The Jewish corridor in that region was extended by the inclusion of some Arab villages in the Jewish state as well as by the Jewish settlements of Sa’ad,

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Nir-Am and Gvar’am, which were established on land that was bought from the Arab villages of Sumsum and Najeb. Significant changes had been made along the proposed borderline in the Negev. In the eastern part, the line was moved northwards so that the site of Massada fortress and the Dead Sea coast up to the boundary of the District of Jerusalem became part of the Jewish state. In the central Negev the line was diverted to the south, so that the city of Beersheba, with its Arab population, and the road that leads to Beersheba from Hebron were included in the Arab state. In the western Negev the line was diverted to the east, so that a distance of 8 km separated the boundary and the railway from Gaza to Rafah. The line passed the area east of Khan-Yunes, leaving it in Arab territory, from where it continued south in a straight line to coordinate 700, and on in a south-easterly direction to co-ordinate 100.050. The line continued until it reached a point south of the ruins of the Nabatian town of Zbeta (Shivta), which remained in Jewish territory, but it was diverted eastward in such a way as to leave the ruins of Avdat inside the Arab state. From there the borderline continued south, turning west along the northern cliffs of Machtesh (crater) Ramon until it reached the vicinity of Mount Harif, where it joined the boundary between Egypt and Palestine. The changes were made in wake of the British–Egyptian pressure to include the area of Auja El-Hafir within the future Arab state. These border corrections limited the Jewish part of the Negev, which was worthy of cultivation, and it left more Jewish-owned land within the Arab state.34 On the other hand the urban Arab populations of Jaffa and Beersheba were taken out of the future Jewish state. In order to set the northern ‘touch-point’ it was necessary to include the Jewish kibbutz of Kfar-Ha’Horesh in the Arab part. The Arab villages on the northern and central coastal plain were now located in the Arab territory, and the Jewish part of the northern Negev was expanded so that most of the Jewish settlements in the region were included in it. The intention of following the existing borderlines of the villages and the proven ownership of land is apparent here as well, as only in rare cases were villages separated from their land. As another exception, one can regard the inclusion of the Massada fortress, and the area that lay north of the site, within the future Jewish state. The national symbolic importance of this site did not elude the members of the Ad hoc Committee on the Question of Palestine – the committee that determined the final partition lines. The pressure exerted by Moshe Novomeiski, the manager of the Palestine Potassium Company, in order to receive additional areas for the extraction of minerals in the south-western shore of the Dead Sea was also an influential factor in this northward expansion. This complicated and complex delimitation was proposed on the basis of the vague aspiration for peace and for full economic co-operation between the two states that would be established in Palestine. The committee members, who had a correct perspective on the local turn of events,

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wanted to push both sides into future co-operation by delineating the boundary the way they did. It was clear to all sides that two hostile countries would not be able to exist side by side along the borderlines that were proposed, due to the winding nature of the line and to the proximity of the settlements. The committee was pleased by the fact that quite a number of Jews remained within the Arab territory, and that many Arabs remained inside the Jewish one. They regarded this as some kind of insurance for the need to form co-operative ties between the new states. Several sections that accompanied the partition proposal had addressed this possibility, and the actual location of the borderlines strengthened the hope of peace and economic co-operation in Palestine (co-operation that didn’t even exist in a united territory under the British mandate). In the end this aspiration did not become a reality. The Zionist Organization accepted the partition proposal, but the Arabs of Palestine resisted it, and they started a war – with the support of the Arab nations – in order to defeat it. The territory that was destined to become the Jewish state had turned into the battlefield on which the Arabs and Jews of Palestine fought. At a later stage, the State of Israel continued to defend itself in a war against the Arab armies which had invaded its territory. When the war ended, armistice lines that followed the lines proposed by the United Nations to a certain extent were established, although the main reason for setting the lines where they were eventually located was the military positions that were reached by the warring sides. Discussing the setting of these boundaries remains beyond the scope of what can be encompassed in this book.35

Conclusion

The characteristics of the period This book encompasses a time span of approximately 100 years. During this period, the political boundaries of modern Palestine/Eretz Israel/ Filistin were delimited for the first time. This was a period in which Palestine turned from being a conceptual-spiritual ideal into a territorial political entity with its own defined boundaries, an expanse of land and a varied population. The specialty of the period discussed is in the fact that political negotiations became the central and main tool for shaping the country’s boundaries. Unlike all of its historical past, and in a striking contrast to what it had experienced from 1948 to the commencement of the peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt in the late 1970s, Palestine’s boundaries were settled during this period through political negotiations and in a peaceful manner. The delimitation process of boundaries is always a complicated matter, and a political discussion between the two sides that reside each side of the line always takes place at some point or other, although a military threat or fear of occupation is always hovering in the background. During the 100 years that are discussed in this book, from the first half of the 19th century to the presentation of the UN partition plan in 1947, political negotiations were the central component and the main driving force for all the delimitation processes that had occurred. Wars and military struggles, that have dictated and formed the country’s boundaries all along its history, were totally insignificant. At the brink of this period, the local military struggles were internal disputes within the Ottoman Empire, between Egypt and the central government. In the middle of the period the Great War was fought, and many victims died. But even these wars – which indirectly brought the need to delineate boundaries upon maps – did not dictate the location of the borderlines themselves, and no connection was made between the military activity and the boundary delimitation process. It is therefore even more important, to investigate the political history of Palestine in the modern era. The actions to delimit the country’s

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boundaries during that period were not taken under the pressures of time or of a military threat, but through political negotiations and mutual delimitation actions that were agreed upon by the sides involved. The political pressure exerted by certain players may have influenced the location of the lines, but even such pressure was not applied in order to end a war but rather to solve problems that had shown up as a result of this or that historical process. Sometimes a period of a hundred years can pass without any changes in the location of borderlines, and at times many changes occur in a short span. The discussed period can be divided into three sub-periods, both by the character of the delimitation process and by the possible results of this process. The first period: delimiting the boundaries during the Ottoman period During the first part – from the early 1840s up to World War I – all the territorial divisions were made for the internal purposes of the Ottoman Empire. These divisions characterized the crumbling of the empire, and they gradually ripped large territories from it. These areas passed to the control of other political units, as an initial step towards their independence. The crumbling process started in our region – in the south, when an independent dynasty formed in Egypt, and it eventually caused that country to break away from the Ottoman Empire, and to consolidate itself as an independent state. This long process rendered Palestine its southern boundary – the first boundary to be politically and accurately defined in all of the Middle East. The delimitation of this line consisted of two intermediate stages – one at the beginning of the period discussed and the other at the beginning of the twentieth century. Practically, these were internal division measures within the empire’s territory, but actually this process formed the south-western boundary of the Ottoman Empire itself. This borderline – the Taba-Rafah line from 1906 – is very significant in the present time although it was delineated during the first decade of the twentieth century. This line had become the boundary between the State of Israel and Egypt, not before it went through many transfigurations and incarnations. Many professional errors and topographical uncertainties accompanied the delimitation process. These mistakes had a substantial influence on the final setting of the current border between Egypt and Israel. Even though the region experienced vast political changes in the eighty years that had passed since the line was delimited, the location and course of the administrative separation line, which divided between various administrative units within the Ottoman Empire, hadn’t changed a lot.

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The second period: the delimitation of Palestine during the British period This period is the one in which the territorial character of Palestine as a united entity was determined. Between World War I and the end of the third decade of the twentieth century, Palestine was defined as a political unit, separate from neighbouring units north, south and east of it. This may have been the most crucial period in the history of Palestine’s delimitation. For the first time in hundreds of years, a territorial political unit with a name and defined boundaries had been formed in Palestine. The abstract notion of ‘Palestine/Eretz Israel’ had existed until then in its many forms and names, but the real limits of Palestine’s area were undefined, and anyone who was interested, could define it as he wished and according to his own point of view. After Palestine’s boundaries were determined during the British period, one could relate to a definite territory, and from that point onwards all discussions about the delimitation of the land had to relate to this territory. The importance of this period is not only due to the political definition of Palestine, but also because of the definition of the borderlines themselves. The lines that were set during the 1920s have become the valid boundaries between the State of Israel and neighbouring countries today. This is especially true in regard to the borderlines between Israel and Lebanon, and between Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan, along the line that runs from Hammat-Gader to a point south of Tirat-Zvi. A similar situation exists along the borderline from the centre of the Dead Sea, south to the Gulf of Aqaba. Even though the boundary between Israel and Syria was changed according to a unilateral decision of the Israeli government, the rest of the world regards the line that was set in 1923 as the valid boundary between the two countries. The setting of the Rafah-Taba line as an administrative separation line was also accepted as the south-western boundary between Palestine (which didn’t exist during the Ottoman time) and Egypt, which won its independence during this period. Later on, it bcame to be the recognized boundary between Israel and Egypt. It therefore seems that the second period of our discussion is the most important period in regard to the accurate delimitation of the boundaries of Palestine. This process has not ended yet, but it seems as if these boundaries will continue to serve as the main boundary lines of the State of Israel with its external neighbouring countries. It is worth noting that during this very period – the 1920s and early 1930s – most of the boundaries of the various countries of the Middle East were delimited, mainly those of Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the northern boundary of Saudi Arabia and even the western boundary of Egypt. With the exception of the boundary between Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which was also set during that period but was changed in 1965, and the one between Jordan and Iraq, which was updated in 1982 (in both cases the changes were

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miniscule), these boundaries are still valid, serving as the borderlines between the independent states of the Middle East. All of them were set not by the local inhabitants but by external powers. The third period: proposals for the partition of Palestine Discussions regarding the division of Palestine into smaller units with a territorial-political uniqueness had begun during this third period. This process began in the second half of the 1930s, reaching a peak in 1947 with the UN partition decision. If the decision had been implemented, the term ‘Palestine’ would have received a totally new meaning. It would have been comparable with the ancient division of biblical Eretz Israel in ancient times, when two separate states (Judea and Israel) were established during the reign of King Rehav’am (940 BC), and coexisted until the collapse of the kingdom of Israel in 722 BC. It was only during this short period that two separate political entities coexisted west of the Jordan river. During all the other historical eras, the territory that lies west of the Jordan was ruled by a single regime – either the self-rule of the country’s inhabitants, or as part of a greater empire that had Palestine as an integral part of it. The Roman Empire separated Palestina Prima (First Palestine) which included central Palestine and Palestina Segunda (Second Palestine) which included Galilee and the Golan. This division held for the Roman and the Byzantine periods, up to AD 638. As it eventually occurred, the discussed period in which the division suggestions were presented could have turned into another passing episode in the history of Palestine. The civil war that broke out in the autumn of 1947 between the residents of the future Jewish state and the residents of the future Arab state concluded with an Arab defeat, and brought with it the eradication of the partition concept. The war that started in May 1948 between the State of Israel and the Arab armies that had invaded it also concluded with an Arab defeat. One political unit was formed in part of Palestine – the State of Israel, and two foreign powers, Trans-Jordan (in the West Bank) and Egypt (in the Gaza Strip) controlled the other parts of it. This situation resembled other periods in the history of the country. Nevertheless, the partition concept has not faded away, and different ideas – which are based on the concept of dividing the territory according to national definitions – have been presented since the peace talks between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority began. The ‘Oslo accords’ that were supposed to divide western Palestine into two separate political units are the most obvious expression of this concept. The current divisional direction is again based on the deployment of the Arab and Jewish settlements, a concept that was introduced in the 1930s, in addition to the security concept, which is a modern idea. The three central concepts in regard to Palestine’s delimitation –

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separation from other, bigger units, the delimitation of a unique territorial unit and the partition idea – were all presented in one way or another during the period that this book discusses. Each of the three sub-periods that were outlined is characterized by one of these central concepts.

The participants in the boundary discussions Delimitation of boundaries is a matter for the states involved. Many political bodies, states and other organizations were involved in the process of determining the boundaries of Palestine. The period in which the delimitation was done, and the region through which a borderline was delineated, influenced the level of direct or indirect involvement of these bodies. The Ottoman Empire During the first period, before World War I, the Ottoman Empire was the central political entity as regards the delimitation of Palestine’s boundaries, although it played a passive role. It is worth remembering that the Ottoman Empire was involved in the process of determining boundaries in Europe and in the Balkan Peninsula throughout the nineteenth century, and at the beginning of the twentieth century too. The defensive Ottoman position attempted to achieve borderlines that would tear the least possible amount of land from the retreating empire. In 1841 it managed to push the autonomous Egypt back into the Nile valley and delta, giving up control over northern Sinai, but standing firm against the Egyptian demand to control all of Palestine (as part of Syria). Later on the Ottoman rulers tried to keep the Sinai Peninsula under their control, and although failing to do so, they succeeded in keeping the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. The importance of this achievement would only be revealed years later. World War I put an end to the existence of the Ottoman Empire, and its modern successor, Turkey, was not involved with Palestine and its boundaries. The British During this period the political power of Britain increased, and the country became the main actor and the dominant component in the process of determining the boundaries of Palestine. Prior to World War I, Britain was the political force that did its best to expand Egypt’s northeastern boundary, and by this to diminish the territory on which Palestine was located. The British pressure on the Ottoman Empire was exerted in order to move the borderline away from the Suez Canal, and this move eventually formed Palestine’s southern boundary, and Britain had become the first European power to be involved in the country’s delimitation. As it

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progressed, Britain became the leading factor in the process of determining the boundaries of Palestine. Discussing the British position is different from discussing the positions of all the other factors. While the demands of all the other participants – the Ottomans, the French, the Arabs and even the Zionists – were consistent and unequivocal, the British position was complex, and it was influenced by the political, cultural and strategic positions of a multitude of British decision makers. Changes and general political developments that occurred in Palestine itself, in the Middle East and in the outside world brought reoccurring changes in the various British positions. Britain was not involved with Palestine and its boundaries prior to World War I, and all its efforts were put in Egypt and northwards. The war, and the British occupation of the Middle East, changed this perspective. The leading view among the various British government levels was an aspiration for the formation of a strong and large unique country in Palestine, in order for it to sustain itself and the British regime that controlled it, to prepare it for independence and to enable it to absorb the Jewish immigrants that were expected to arrive there. This aspiration dictated British actions in regard to boundaries. It had to consider other imperial needs such as the aspirations of British Egypt in the south and the ties with the Arabs in the east, in addition to the needs of other powers – in practice those of the French regime that had established itself north of Palestine. The intention of creating a large and productive Palestine was not accepted by all British officials. There were those who were more attentive to the expansion aspirations of Egypt, and to those concerned with the establishment of a territorial unit east of the Jordan river. These officials were not concerned with the problems of delimiting Palestine itself. Even among the senior British officials in Palestine, and among the different departments of the government in London, one could not always detect a relevant united position. This resulted in occasional suggestions to cut the country’s intended territory. Nevertheless, the leading direction was the more prominent one, and a large territorial unit, Palestine, was formed as a result. Britain led the territorial unity concept during the 1920s, but later on, it was the one that presented the idea of partitioning the country into two separate political units in the late 1930s and during the final years of the mandate, whether they be joined to or separated from Trans-Jordan. Internal developments in Palestine, and mainly the acceleration of Jewish–Arab tension, led Britain to consider the partition of the territory between the warring factions again and again. The common denominator among all the proposals was the establishment of an independent Jewish state, the allocation of an area intended for a direct British control, and the transfer of the rest of the area to Trans-Jordan. This last concept was meant to create a large Arab state, which would in effect exist under

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British patronage. This position was not accepted by all the governmental bodies in Britain. Its opponents occasionally succeeded in eliminating it, both because they did not want to see the establishment of a Jewish state, and because they were reluctant to give up the British stronghold in Palestine. Many of the suggested plans were regarded as imaginary and unrealistic, and this caused all the British ideas to remain unimplemented. Towards the end of the period, Britain retreated from dealing with the issue of Palestine’s boundaries, and its government did not participate in the final act of dividing the country – the UN partition plan from 1947 – nor did it present any new ideas for solving the matter. From this point onwards, Britain was not involved in determining the boundaries of Palestine, and the mission was imposed on other actors. The Zionists The Zionist movement was officially established during the first Zionist Congress in 1897. Nevertheless, when the negotiations regarding the 1906 boundary took place almost ten years later, the Zionist leadership did not show any interest and was not involved in the process. Although Zionist representatives had already investigated the possibility of a Jewish settlement in the same region (the El-Arish plan), the same representatives did not regard themselves as an opponent in the political struggle that was going on concerning the Sinai Peninsula, and the Zionist Organization’s voice was not heard. The practical involvement of the Zionist element and its various branches in the negotiations regarding Palestine’s boundaries and their delimitation began during World War I. The main actions that were taken by the various Zionist representatives were internal discussions and external political contacts with several political bodies. It is impossible to correctly assess the contribution that these efforts yielded, but it is clear that, with the organization’s growing popularity, and as the recognition that its delegates received as the representatives of the Jewish people in regard to the future of Palestine consolidated, its influence increased. It is worth mentioning, though, that in spite of the flood of words – both oral and written – that accompanied the Zionist efforts to achieve the desired boundaries, it seems as if its real influence was rather minor. The various sides adopted the Zionist positions only when they suited their own point of view. During the period in which Palestine was defined as one territorial unit, the Zionist Organization did everything it possibly could to secure the maximal borderlines for the future Jewish state. The Zionist positions were clear to all, but apparently these positions were not translated into direct practical achievements. The eastern boundary between Palestine and Trans-Jordan was delimited in total opposition to Zionist demands, and so was the northern boundary. The Zionist claims to the waters of the Litanni river, Mount Hermon and the Golan Heights were all ignored. On

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the other hand, it was at the negotiations over the southern boundary, in which the Zionists played a very small part, that their demand for an outlet to the Red Sea found an attentive ear. The participants in the initial stages of the process all agreed that the area south of Beersheba was territory that should be added to Egypt, yet in spite of this it was Palestine that eventually won the region, including the outlet to the Red Sea. This outlet was used only after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Although the Zionist demands were not fully met (as mentioned, they wanted to include parts of northern Sinai as far as El-Arish in Palestine), the fact that the Negev was added to Palestine’s territory did not allow the Zionists to complain about the cutting back of land that belonged to Palestine in that region. The achievement here is a great one, because nobody regarded the Negev as part of Palestine prior to World War I. In all the other regions, the Zionist Organization regarded the location of the boundaries as harmful to the future of the Jewish state. For many years later the lands that lay beyond, and especially the area east of the Jordan river were seen as parts of Eretz Israel/Palestine that had been torn away from it. In truth, any area that was presented as part of the future Jewish Eretz Israel and that was not allocated accordingly was regarded, and still is regarded, as land intended for the Jews but taken unrightfully. And so the Eretz Israeli right wing sang about the two banks of the Jordan while the warriors of the leftist organization Palmach sang of their activities ‘from Metulla to the Negev, from the sea to the desert’, meaning the Syrian Desert, not the Judean one. ‘The Lebanese Galilee’ is another term that concealed Zionist longing for an area that was ‘taken’ from the destined land. The fact that Arab armies had occupied parts of western Palestine during the 1948 war lent legitimacy to the yearning to see all the land of mandate Palestine reunited under a Jewish regime, especially after the 1967 Six Day War. Ironically this aspiration was propagated by those who had fought the British regime with all their might. The Lebanon intervention by Israel in 1982 was regarded by some, mainly on the Arab side, as an attempt to recapture the old Zionist aspiration for the acquisition of the Litanni river. When the partition plans were presented, the Zionists did not have any official representation in the formal boundary discussions, and all the decisions were taken by other external actors. The various investigation committees – the British, Anglo-American and UN committees for solving the problem of Palestine consulted the Zionist representatives often enough, but in these cases too the Zionist positions were never once fully adopted, and the decisions did not fit Zionist hopes at all. In contrast to the initial delimitation of the 1920s, the partition plans required the Zionist leaders to choose between several division proposals. (They were not requested to do so in the 1920s.) Agreeing with the decision, and ‘accepting the verdict’ whenever it was necessary, emphasized the weakness of the Zionist Organization and the obligation to accept a diktat. As it

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turned out, this very same weakness became a crucial factor during all of the delimitation process, because acceptance of the partition concept, and confirmation of the partition plans (which was inconvenient at times) paved the way for Jewish independence in Palestine. The concessions that were made unwillingly enabled the Jews to gain international recognition at least for parts of Palestine, and this recognition helped to put the Jewish state on its feet. The passive role played by the Zionist Organization in regard to the delimitation of Palestine’s boundaries turned into the main accessory for the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948, while constant claims against this move were repeatedly heard in the background. The Arab world – and especially the Arabs of Palestine – who did not agree to the partition concept, had lost the option to become sovereign over parts of Palestine by the end of the period discussed by this book. The French The French position had formed prior to World War I, and it greatly influenced Palestine’s delimitation when the time came for its territorial definition. Before the war, the French regarded Palestine as an area that was subject to their influence, and they assumed that it would fall into their hands in the event of the Ottoman Empire collapsing. The events of the World War and French efforts in Europe obliged France to accept ‘partners’ for its control over Palestine, and this partnership was vaguely defined in the Sykes–Picot agreement, without even clearly naming the country. The end of the war placed the French at a relative distance from Palestine, and when the Middle East was divided between Britain and themselves they were mainly concerned with securing the best possible south-western boundary for the areas that they did eventually control. The French imperial point of view resembled that of Britain, prior to World War I. The British tried to adjust the boundary of Egypt and to move it northwards, and the French now wanted to place the boundaries of Syria and Lebanon as far south as they could. The French claims were based on agreements that were made during the war, and on their security needs in Syria, and these claims caused Britain to retreat from its maximal demands as regards the northern limits of its territory in Palestine. The French efforts were not sufficient to keep the Sykes–Picot line, and they were forced to give up the northern part of the Jordan valley and the north-eastern part of Galilee. Nevertheless, they succeeded in gaining control over the Litanni river, the Golan Heights and the outskirts of Damascus, and in so doing determined the northern and north-eastern boundaries of Palestine for a long time. After the northern boundary was set in the mid 1920s, France lost any interest in the delimitation of Palestine, and the rest of the discussions concerning the precise lines were held by Britain, which continued to deal with the issue until it left the country.

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The Arabs The Arabs of Palestine, and the Arabs of the neighbouring countries, were not involved with the delimitation process of Palestine. It is true that the Egyptian media protested against Britain for setting the 1906 borderline, and claimed it to be harmful to the Ottoman Empire, but this did not last for long. A similar episode occurred after World War I, when the idea of establishing ‘Greater Syria’ was momentarily presented. This idea termed Palestine ‘Southern Syria’, and it was a short-lived concept that faded fast without influencing the delimitation process. During the 1930s the contents of the Hussein–McMahon correspondence were questioned, and the Arabs wanted to know whether Palestine was included in the territory that Britain had promised them. The Arabs insisted that Palestine was not excluded from the area promised to them during the war but even in this case the Arabs did not present specific territorial claims. When the eastern boundary of Palestine was established, Abdullah followed the advice of his British advisers, and he hastened to demand the Semah Triangle and the Negev Triangle. These claims were mild and indecisive, and they failed to attract the appropriate attention. The Arab actors had demanded to add Palestine, whatever it meant, to ‘Greater Syria’, or to give it a special political status, which would be determined by external factors. It is difficult to understand this passive position as regards the precise delimitation of the country’s boundaries. It may have resulted from the early stage the Arab nationalist movement was still at. During the initial stage of defining the boundaries of Palestine, other matters were seen as more urgent and important for them. It may have resulted from the Arab way of seeing the overall issue, rather than dealing with the minor details, which characterized the relevant activity of the Zionist Organization. It must be remembered that the Arabs had not been delimiting political territories for centuries, and that all the boundaries in the Middle East had been set by Ottoman Turks or by foreign powers. The local inhabitants had a different perspective on boundaries, and it was unlike the European one. They were well experienced in defining ownership over land and nomadic wandering rights, but political delimitation with the aid of borderlines was an alien concept to them – a fact that became apparent during every one of the delimitation stages in Palestine, including the partition plan in 1947. Even then there was no Arab actor that dealt with map drawing or with demanding a certain way of delimitation. When Faisal and the Zionist representatives met following the end of the World War, both sides decided that the boundary delimitation should take place after the two new states were established, and apparently this was the predominant view in the Arab world. The main goal was achieving the political target, and the geographical delimitation was regarded as an irrelevance. This explains why all the proposals for the country’s delimitation were rejected by the Arabs, who could accept the finite nature of

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boundaries in regard to territorial claims. As a result of this, the Arab factor was absent from the long and important process of delimiting Palestine during the period discussed. The United Nations The establishment of a special UN committee on Palestine in summer 1947 marked the entrance of other actors – an international organization and various states from around the world – into the discussions of the country’s delimitation. The UN decision in regard to the future of Palestine was clear, although the precise delimitation is a matter for deeper investigation, and its results reflect the various approaches and the different aspirations of the members of the committee, more than anything else does. The lines of thought which were popular with the committee members are clearly seen in the decision to establish a Jewish state larger than all the territories that were proposed in the past. The committee did not fully adopt the Zionist claims, but the resemblance between the Zionist demands and the actual outcome was great, and it reflected the deep involvement of the Zionist representatives in the process of defining the United Nations’ policy. The delimitation that was determined by the United Nations did not exist even one single day – both because it was rejected by the Arabs of Palestine, and because of the Arab countries’ invasion of Palestine in May 1948. Nevertheless, the UN resolution has served as a basis for the international political treatment of the State of Israel for years. The lack of major embassies in Jerusalem, the state capital which was planned to be an international zone, and the idea of returning to the lines that were recognized by the United Nations as valid, are often presented. The international intervention, which gave the Jewish state the official recognition it required, did not manage to influence the location of the borderlines at all, and these were positioned according to military developments. Nevertheless the majority of the borderlines that were proposed by the UN committee (apart from Jewish control of western Galilee) were somewhat adopted and maintained with certain changes that were introduced during the cease-fire talks in 1949. An afterword The delimitation process of Palestine did not end in 1947. The partition plan brought with it the outbreak of a war between the residents of the country, and when this war was over the armies of the neighbouring Arab states invaded the young state in order to demolish it. When this war ended new lines were set. This new delimitation existed for nineteen years – until the 1967 Six Day War. The armistice lines, which were established in 1949, had defined Israel’s temporary delimitation until final boundary agreements were signed. This intention was never effectuated, and since

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1949 the borderlines have gone through a series of changes that came as a result of wars, occupations, cease-fire agreements and unilateral action of the government of Israel. It was only in the early 1980s that this tendency began to reverse, and war-free political negotiation recaptured the main role in the process of delimiting Palestine’s boundaries once again. In regard to the boundary delimitation within the country the battles still continue, and even though they are not always fought with weapons the final delimitation will be heavily influenced by the display of strength. The 100 year span discussed in this book clearly shows that political determinations, which are accompanied by clear and written agreements and by clear boundary demarcations, are there to stay. This is surely demonstrated by the fact that the British delimitation of 1906 and the delimitation that was achieved during the British period are still valid today. Any delimitation that is enforced under the pressure of a war and its results, or set by a unilateral act and without proper negotiation between the two sides that are to reside on both sides of the borderline, is prone to failure. The peace agreement between Egypt and Israel – the Camp David agreement of 1979 – exemplifies the validity and strength of proper and defined boundaries, as does the ability to use them as a baseline in times of necessity. The peace agreement between the State of Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan testifies equally well. The outcome of the wars of Israel, and especially of the ‘Six Day War’ and the ‘Lebanon War’, pointed out the tendency to return to past boundaries although reality might have changed dramatically. The historical-political process is the tool that has determined the location of boundaries in the past, and it is the tool that will serve for delineating the boundaries of Palestine in the future.

Notes

Introduction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Prescott (1965), p. 10. Brawer (1988), pp. 11–40. Prescott (1965), pp. 8–9. Curzon (1907), mainly pp. 9–23. Muir (1975), p. 27. Biger (1992). Curzon (1907), p. 54. Hartshorne (1936), pp. 56–7. Holdrich (1916), p. 46. House (1959), p. 329. Jones (1945), p. 4 of the introduction. Freeman (1881), p. 1. Wittlessy (1944), p. 331. Lapadelle (1928), p. 73; Jones (1945). Nugent (1914), p. 647; also stated in Prescott (1965), p. 66. See in detail Chapter 4. The acting manager of the Survey of Palestine to the Chief Secretary of the Government of Palestine, 31 August 1931, file V/10/31, section 2, Israel State Archive.

1 The delimitation of the country at the end of the Ottoman period 1 The reports regarding the administrative division of Palestine during the nineteenth century and up to World War I occasionally contradict each other, among other things due to frequent changes and to out-of-date information. See for example Handbook of Syria, pp. 239–41, and Ben-Gurion, Eretz Israel, pp. 52–3. 2 Handbook of Syria, p. 10. 3 Graber (1974), p. 4. 4 For a detailed description see Biger (1983). 5 Ha’or, year 7, No. 35, p. 147, 4 Tamuz 1891. 6 Droyanov (1932), pp. 398–9. 7 Hamelitz, No. 31, 10 July 1891, pp. 1–2. 8 Wissotzki (1898), p. 62, clauses 4 and 5. 9 Droyanov (1932), document No. 249, p. 274. 10 Klavarski’s memorandum from 26 July 1919, in file No. Z/4 25007, Central Zionist Archive. 11 See, for example, Ariel (1993), Hildesheimer (1965) and Tokchensky (1970).

Notes 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

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Tokchensky (1970), pp. 51–93. Smilanski (1904), p. 292. Ya’abetz (1891), pp. 12–16. Sokolov (1888), pp. 6, 12, 14, 41, etc. Wissotzki (1898), p. 118. Eisenstein (1908) for the term ‘Eretz Israel’. Aurbach (1912), p. 29. For a detailed description see Biger (1981). Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911), p. 600. Concerning this, see Anderson (1972) and Mariot (1978). A vast literature deals with Muhammad Ali and his activities. See, for example, Hoffman (1967), Rustum (1936) and others. 23 Richmond (1977), p. 50. 24 Ibid., p. 35. Regarding the siege of Acre see Gihon (1969), map 164. 25 Regarding the activities of Muhammad Ali and his son Ibrahim Pasha in Syria and in Palestine see, for example, Hoffman (1967), Shamir (1983) and Hoexter (1983). 26 According to Hurwitz (1975), p. 272. 27 Hurwitz (1975), p. 273. 28 The Green Book (1926), p. 11. 29 Regarding the refunding of the map see Biger (1987). 30 In regard to comparing the differences between the maps see Biger (1983). 31 Carte géographique de l’Egypt et de pays environnant, par M. Jacotin, Paris (1838). The map is scaled at 1:1,000,000. 32 Warburg (1969), p. 681. 33. Regarding this settlement attempt see Landau (1950), p. 169. 34 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (1906). 35 Hurwitz (1983), p. 277; Warburg (1969). Brawer (1988) summarises this subject on pages 60–79. 36 The Foreign Office rejected Cromer’s suggestion to determine the boundary line officially. The suggestion was carried out into practice only six years later. 37 Brawer (1984), pp. 370–1. 38 Bein (1939), pp. 370–1. 39 Head (1962), p. 203. 40 Brawer (1970), p. 129. 41 Brawer (1988), pp. 63–5. 42 Warburg (1969), p. 679; Head (1962), p. 194. Head’s article describes the Ottoman actions and the actual occurrences in detail, according to the writings of the Turkish commander Rushdi Pasha. 43 Hurwitz (1983), pp. 276–7. 44 Head (1962), pp. 198–9. 45 Great Britain Parliamentary Papers (1906). 46 Brawer (1984), pp. 133–6. 47 Egypt (1907). 48 Dinstein (1989), pp. 59–66. 49 Curzon (1907), pp. 15–16. 50 Brawer (1984), p. 131, had already emphasised the importance of this issue. 51 Regarding this affair see the memorandum of the Mayor of Aqaba, as given to Yitzhak Ben-Zvi during his visit to Aqaba in 1936. (Ben-Zvi, 1936.) 52 Woolley and Lawrence (1914–15), p. 70.

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2 The allocation stage 1 Regarding French–British rivalry in the Middle East see Navakivi (1969) and Monroe (1963). 2 Wallach (1994), pp. 100–5. 3 Williams (1972), p. 19. 4 Frieschwasser-Ra’anan (1955), pp. 62–3. 5 In regard to the De-Bunsen committee and its discussions see Friedman (1973), pp. 19–21. 6 The committee’s report in ‘secret’ document C.I.D. of 30 June 1915, in file CAB 27/1 in the PRO. 7 The Sykes–Picot agreement has been thoroughly discussed, and there is no need to spell out the diplomatic activity that accompanied it in detail. See Friedman (1973), pp. 97–118, Monroe (1963) and Navakivi (1969). 8 Biger (1983a), p. 428. 9 This incident has been thoroughly discussed by politicians and researchers since 1919, and debate has yet to conclude. See Friedman (1973), pp. 65–96. For detailed research on the matter see Kedouri (1976). 10 Royal Commission (1937), p. 46. 11 Samuel (1945), pp. 140–5. 12 In regard to the Balfour Declaration and the political negotiations for it see Stein (1966). The Zionist demand was presented by Rothschild, who addressed Balfour on 18 July 1917, file FO/371/3058. Milner, later on the War Secretary, presented the contra proposition, see the discussion in file CAB 21/58 in the PRO. 13 In regard to the war in Palestine see Wavell (1928). 14 On the French demand for combined control over Jerusalem and its rejection by Allenby, see Storrs (1938), p. 279, and Tennenbaum (1978), pp. 19–20. 15 Allenby to the War Office, telegram W.A. 1808 of 23 October 1918, file WO/101/718 in the PRO. 16 Regarding the United States and its involvement in the Middle East in general and in Palestine in particular see Manuel (1949). 17 Mercer (1989), p. 238. 18 Regarding the Peace Conference see Lloyd George (1931). 19 Frieschwasser-Ra’anan (1955), pp. 95–6. 20 Sidebothom (1937). 21 According to the statement that appeared at the beginning of all of the newspaper’s editions. The newspaper was first published on 1 January 1917, and it continued to be published until 1921. 22 Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi (1980). The discussion about the boundaries and the quotations are mainly from pp. 44–7. 23 ‘The boundaries of Palestine’, in the newspaper Palestine (1, 4) (15 February 1917). 24 Sacher (1916), also published in Palestine. For a discussion regarding the article see Tolkowsky (1981), lists of November 1915. The memo itself, in file A/248/14 in French (28 September 1915) and in English (3 February 1917), is in the CZA. 25 Articles in the newspaper Palestine of 15 February 1917 and 21 July 1919. 26 Hertzl (1960). 27 Documents of the political office of the Zionist Organization in Copenhagen (the management of the Zionist Organization moved there when war broke out), vol. 90 III, parts A and B. 28 Friedman (1973), p. 125. Britain had officially notified France that the Sykes–Picot agreement was no longer valid, see Tennenbaum (1978), p. 26.

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29 The Clayton memo concerning the meeting between Faisal and Weizmann on 18 June in file FO/371/3345 in the PRO, also see Sykes (1978), p. 47. 30 This is also the case with the later declaration of the Arab Congress, which crowned Faisal King of Syria, including the area of modern Syria, Lebanon and Palestine and Trans-Jordan. See the documents of the Foreign Office XIII 1963, p. 223. 31 See Manuel (1955), p. 273. 32 Manuel (1949), pp. 205–66. 33 Clause 22 of the Declaration of the League of Nations, which is where the following quotations are also to be formed. 34 A report concerns the meeting of Captain Yale of the American delegation to Paris with Faisal on 11 February 1919. Manuel (1949), p. 28. Regarding the proposals that were presented to the King-Crane Committee, see Manuel (1949), pp. 240–52. The decisions of the general Syrian Congress in Damascus, 2 July 1919, in the documents of the State Department, XIII, Paris Peace Conference, pp. 780–1. 35 The discussions of the British Cabinet from 5 December 1918 in file CAB 27/24. Discussions of the Eastern Committee on 19 December 1918 in file CAB 23/42 in the PRO. 36 Discussions of the Eastern Committee on 5 December 1918 in file CAB 27/24 in the PRO. 37 Lloyd George (1931), pp. 144–6. 38 Ibid., p. 1038. Regarding the negotiations between Balfour and Clemenceau see Tennenbaum (1978), p. 23. 39 Tennenbaum (1978), p. 23, according to the memos of the French Foreign Office. Also see the report regarding the summit between Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau in the files of the State Department, vol. 5, p. 3. 40 Memo on the political situation in Palestine, 22 August 1918, in file FO/406/40 in the PRO. 41 D.I.P. memo No. 480 of 28 October 1918 in file FO/371/4368 in the PRO. 42 Secret memo to the Eastern Committee, p. 49, 4 February 1919, in file FO/608/99 in the PRO. 43 Memo of 1 May 1919, document No. 8858 in file FO/608/99 in the PRO. 44 Memo of 17 February 1919, document No. 2117/161828 in file FO/371/4168 in the PRO. 45 Memo of the Zionist Organization and the remarks of Ormsby-Gore on this paper, in file FO/371/3385 in the PRO. 46 Memo of Aaronson and Tolkowsky of 2 February 1919 in file Z/4 – 25052 in the CZA. This is where the addressing letter of the Zionist Federation in London exists. 47 Frieschwasser-Ra’anan (1955), p. 102. 48 The Zionist Office in London, vol. 56, No. 127, memo of 1 December 1918 in the CZA. 49 Regarding the official version of the agreement between Weizmann and Faisal, whose original document was not kept, see the copies that exist in several places, among them the Weizmann Archive, file 1919, and in file 375/2/2 document No. 159 in file FO/608/98 (documents of the Peace Conference) in the PRO. 50 Document of the Zionist Organization to Balfour, 1 February 1919, files FO/371/4170 in the PRO. See Ben-Gurion (1971) I, pp. 164–5.

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3 The southern boundary during the British period 1 Clayton (Chief Political Officer in the Egyptian Expeditionary Forces) to Wingate (Governor of Egypt and the Sudan), letter of 15 November 1918 in Clayton’s private archive, document 1 in file G/ /s-514–1. 2 Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi (1980), p. 46. 3 Frieschwasser-Ra’anan (1955), p. 102. 4 Aaronson’s memo of January 1919 in file Z/4-16024 in the CZA. 5 In regard to Aaronson’s military mission in the area see Rubinstein (1984). 6 Memo of the Zionist Organization to the Peace Conference, document No. 1327 in file FO/608/99 in the PRO. 7 Memo of 22 August 1918, which was later distributed among the members of the political delegation to the Peace Conference, in file no. FO/406/40 in the PRO. Also see Sykes’s proposals to the Zionist political committee of 6 August 1918, as they appear in Tolkowsky’s diary (1981), p. 370. 8 See, for example, Encyclopaedia Britannica, (1911), p. 600. 9 Memo 480 P.I.D of 28 October 1918 in file FO/371/4368 in the PRO. 10 Colonel J. R. Maunsel’s memo to the War Office, 1 December 1918 in file WO/106/63 in the PRO. 11 In a memo of 12 December 1918, document 8002/IA in file FO/141/664 in the PRO. 12 In a memo of 23 January 1919, document 375/2/1/ in file FO/608/98 in the PRO. 13 Secret memo No. P.49 to the Peace Conference, 4 February 1919 in file FO/608/99 in the PRO. 14 For details regarding the discussions during the Peace Conference see Biger (1981a), pp. 128–33. 15 See a copy of the sketch in Biger (1988a), p. 206. 16 The documents that deal with these discussions are mainly in the British Foreign Office files Nos FO/141/664 and FO/608/98 in the PRO, and also see note 14 above. 17 Concerning Jennings-Bramly’s opinions see Brawer (1970), pp. 127–8. 18 Weizmann to Churchill, 19 September 1919 in file WO/32/5732 in the PRO, and Allenby’s letter to Churchill of 15 October 1919 there. 19 The report of Douglas Fox Inc. of 30 October 1919, document No. 2117/177659 in file FO/371/4187 in the PRO. 20 Dispatch No.148 of 2 November 1920 in file FO/141/433 in the PRO. 21 Biger (1981), p. 134. 22 Weizmann to Churchill, 1 March 1921. The letter’s copy is to be found in file No. Z/4–25054 in the CZA. 23 The full report regarding the Cairo conference and the decisions it reached in file FO/372/6343 of 12 March 1921 in the PRO. 24 Warburg (1969), pp. 685–9. 25 Document 8002/26 in file FO/141/664 in the PRO. 26 Warburg (1969), p. 685. 27 This map was printed as an addition to the Italian–Egyptian boundary agreement of 25 December 1925, in document No. 6 of the Green Book. Regarding the map’s originality see Biger (1983b). 28 Plumer to Emery (Colonial Secretary), despatch No. 579 of 20 May 1926, and the addressing of the Egyptian Foreign Minister by the High Commissioner of Egypt, documents 8002/32 and FO/141/664 in the PRO. 29 Memo J.1422 in file FO/371/63080 in the PRO, and also see Warburg (1969), pp. 686–7.

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30 Colonial Secretary to High Commissioner of Palestine, 28 November 1935 in file CO/733/75149/35 in the PRO. 31 Chief of the Survey of Palestine to the Land Commissioner of the Government of Palestine, letter of 11 February 1936 in file X/45/35 section 2 in the Israel State Archive. 32 Manager of the Survey of Palestine to Southern District Commissioner, letter T/4/B/SUB of 2 March 1922 in file B/4/I in section 2, ISA. 33 Manager of the Survey of Egypt to the Manager of the Survey of Palestine, 8 March 1922, file No. 10 in section 22, ISA. 34 Letter exchange of July 1928, document Sur/B/4/1, file B/4/I, section 2 of the ISA. 35 Discussions between the War Office and Foreign Office concerning slight changes of the boundary due to the location of some army camps. Letter exchanges of March 1947 in file FO/371/63032 in the PRO. 36 Julian (1942), p. 430. 37 Biger (1981a), pp. 135–6. 4 The northern boundary: from allocation to delimitation 1 2 3 4

Regarding the various stages of the boundary’s demarcation see the Introduction. For this matter, see Chapter 2. Biger, (1983a), p. 428 note 4. Concerning the British position in regard to Palestine see Monroe (1963), Navakivi (1969) and Freidman (1973), all of which deal with the relationship between Palestine and Britain, and with the empire’s aspirations as to the future of Palestine. 5 Frieschwasser-Ra’anan, (1955), p. 75. 6 Hogarth’s memo of 9–10 July 1917, in file WO/106/709 in the PRO. 7 Tolkowsky (1981), p. 370, impressions of a meeting of 16 August 1918. Also see Ormsby-Gore’s memo ‘A report of the political situation in Palestine’ of 22 August 1918 in file FO/406/40 in the PRO. 8 DIP memo No. 480 of 28 October 1918 in file FO/371/4368 in the PRO. 9 Foreign Office documents, vol. 1, part IV, pp. 340–1. 10. Tennenbaum (1978), p. 36 11 The line’s description in English and French in file A/248/14 in the CZA 12 Tolkowsky (1981), writings on 3 February 1917. 13 Palestine, edition of 15 February 1917 and Tolkowsky’s entries in his Diary (1981), of 17 and 24 February 1917. 14 Sokolov to Sykes, 17 February 1917 in the Sykes Archive. 15 Tolkowsky (1981), p. 280, entries of 25 February 1918. 16 The discussions with this company in files Z/4–694 and Z/4–1685 in the CZA. 17 Frieschwasser-Ra’anan (1955), p. 101. 18 Aaronson’s and Tolkowsky’s memos of 2 February 1919 in file Z/4–25052 in the CZA. 19 Memo of 26 July 1919 in file Z/4-25007 in the CZA. 20 Livne (1969), p. 241. 21 Tolkowsky (1981), p. 407. 22 The British received early notice regarding this demand, see document of 1 February 1919 in file FO/317/4170 in the PRO. Also see Tolkowsky, Diary, p. 407, note 8. 23 Weizmann to Balfour, 17 September 1919 in file Z/4–25050, and Weizmann’s meeting with Robert Vansittart, the man in charge of the talks on the northern boundary in the British Foreign Office, according to a letter of 14 October 1919 in file Z/4–565 in the CZA.

238

Notes

24 See the many applications and appeals to Balfour, Curzon and his substitute, to various officials in the Foreign Office, and to other British figures, mainly in files Z/4–25050, Z/4–565, Z/4–4093 and Z/4–1425 in the CZA. 25 Meetings of Sokolov with the French Premier De Chenelle on 11 March 1920 and with De Crix on 12 September 1919 In the same files as those cited in note 24. 26 Manuel (1949), p. 256. 27 Vansittart’s remarks in document 1375/2/44 of 11 March 1920 in file FO/371/5632 in the PRO. 28 Toynbee’s memo of 2 December 1918, in file FO/371/3398 in the PRO. 29 The report of the Eastern Committee’s meeting of 5 December 1918 in file CAB 27/24 in the PRO. 30 Document No. 8858 of 1 May 1919 in file FO/608/98 in the PRO. 31 War Office to Allenby in Cairo, telegram 78258 of 23 May 1919 in file WO/106/192 in the PRO. 32 Frieschwasser-Ra’anan (1955), p. 133. 33 Tennenbaum (1978), p. 32. 34 Manuel (1949), p. 220. 35 Frieschwasser-Ra’anan (1955), p. 77. 36 Ibid., pp. 110–11. 37 Navakivi (1969), p. 249. 38 Manuel (1949), pp. 244–5. 39 Memo of 9 August 1918, document 344/4/1 and document 17665 in file FO/608/84 in the PRO. 40 A report of the meeting on 10 September 1919 in file CAB 21.153 in the PRO. 41 Lloyd George to Clemenceau, 18 December 1919. Foreign Office documents, first series, vol. 4, certifications 366 and 398. 42 Curzon to Cambon (the French Foreign Minister), telegram 166 of 22 November 1919 in file FO/406/41 in the PRO. 43 War Office to Allenby, telegram G.T. 8176 of 22 September 1919, annex B to the War Office’s memo WL/622/3 that was sent to the Foreign Office and is located in document 2117/137607 in file FO/371/4138 in the PRO. 44 Memo of 17 November 1919, document 2117/161828 in file FO/371/4183 in the PRO. 45 Biger (1983a), p. 431. 46 Telegram No. 6865 of 25 November 1919, sent from military headquarters in Cairo to the Norforce, in file WO/95/4347 in the PRO. 47 Stanton’s dateless memo. It arrived at the Foreign Office on 22 October 1919 and was filed as document 2117/141025 in file FO/371/4163 in the PRO. 48 Foreign Office documents, vol. IV, certificate No. 404. 49 Memo of 30 December 1919, document No. 166023.51535 in file FO/371/4215 in the PRO. 50 Tennenbaum (1978), p. 32. 51 Manuel (1949), pp. 256–8. 52 According to the series of maps in file WO/153/1254 of the British War Office of various dates, from 1 August 1919 to 21 June 1920. 53 Regarding this incident and its influence on the Zionist public opinion see Rogel (1979). 54 Document 1375/22/44 of 11 March 1920 in file FO/371/5032 in the PRO, and the remarks on it by the officials of the British Foreign Office. 55 For example, the meeting between Sokolov and Leon Bergwanda, the newly appointed chairman of the French Parliament on 23 January 1920 in file Z/4–565 in the CZA and also note 25.

Notes

239

56 Vansittart to Curzon, E-4438, telegram No. 230 of 6 May 1920 in file FO/371/5244 in the PRO. 57 Vansittart to Young (of the British Foreign Office), memos of 29 and 30 June 1920 in file FO/371/5244 in the PRO. 58 Samuel to High Commissioner of Egypt, telegrams 156 and 161 of 30 July 1920, C.-in-C. British forces (Congreve) to the War Office, telegram 928/6 of 31 July 1920, War Office to Egypt, 7 August 1920. All in document 10168 in file FO/141/435 in the PRO. 59 Foreign Office to Samuel, 30 September 1920 in the file mentioned in note 57. 60 A letter exchange between Vansittart and Curzon, 30 September 1920 and 7 October 1920, in file FO/141/435 in the PRO. 61 See the details of the discussions in Biger (1983a), p. 434. 62 Frieschwasser-Ra’anan (1955), p. 134. 63 Samuel to Curzon, telegram 3912 of 27 November 1920, document 10168 in file FO/141/435 in the PRO. 64 Report of meeting between British and French delegates in London on 4 December 1920, British Cabinet document CP2238 in file CAB 24/116 in the PRO. 65 1920 agreement, Cmd 1195 of 23 October 1920. 5 The northern boundary: demarcation and administration 1 Kisch to Deedes, document KG/33 in file S/25/5 in the CZA. 2 Regarding this part of the discussions see details (including directions for the bibliographic sources) in Biger (1983a), pp. 435–8. 3 Cmd 1910 of 7 March 1923. 4 Undated memo, file D/144/31 in section 2 (Chief Secretary of Palestine), ISA. 5 Brawer (1970), pp. 7–9. 6 Clark (commander of the First Division) to the main headquarters, 16 September 1940 in file D/4D/41 in section 2, ISA. 7 High Commissioner to Colonial Office, telegram 1549 of 27 December 1940. 8 Report of 4 February 1941, located in file D/21/41 in section 2, ISA. 9 Officer in charge of Land Regulations to the Head of the Survey of Palestine, 20 September 1941, manager of the Land Arrangements to the Chief Secretary, 1 October 1941 and returning on 14 October 1941, in file Z5/3/15 No. 7, section 22, ISA. 10 Ibid. The report of the surveying expedition of the 18 January 1941. 11 Report of the Chief Secretary, 25 September 1946 in the file cited in note 10. 12 According to Mill’s (1932) report of the 1931 census. 13 Agreement of 16 October 1923, signed by the British Commissioner of the District of Nazareth and the French Commissioner of the administration of the Sidon area; Pinson, in the file cited in note 9. 14 Commissioner of Land to the Governor of the Galilee District, document RT/2/(4) of 8 October 1939 in file G.468, section 27, ISA. 15 Annex 2 to the official newspaper No. 1413 of the government of Palestine, 31 May 1945. 16 Agreement of 2 February 1926 in file D/21/41, section 2, ISA. Regarding the agreement see the detailed description in Biger (1983a), p. 439. 17 Regarding the northern boundary and the northern fence see Biger (1988b). 18 Regarding the southern boundary of the Golan Heights see Biger (1994).

240

Notes

6 The eastern boundary 1 Handbook of Syria, pp. 239–41. 2 Tolkowsky (1981), diary entry of 28 September 1915; the sources are in French in file A24/14/8 in the CZA. 3 Sacher (1916), p. 212. 4 Palestine 1, (15 February 1917). 5 Sacher (1916), pp. 212–23. 6 Palestine 1, 4 (15 February 1917), p. 27. 7 Tolkowsky (1981), entry of 3 February 1917. 8 Ibid., entry of 24 February 1917. 9 Ibid., 27 December 1917 10 See Chapter 1. 11 Military handbook on Palestine (1917), introduction, p. ii. 12 A Handbook on Northern Palestine and Southern Syria (1918), introduction, p. iv. 13 See note 1, p. 4. 14 Gilhar (1979), p. 48. 15 Foreign Office to General Clayton, Chief Political Officer at Allenby’s headquarters, 30 March 1918, in file FO/371/3043 in the PRO. 16 Map in file WO/95/4695 in the PRO. 17 Clayton to Foreign Office, document of 31 October 1918 in file FO/371/3364 in the PRO. 18 Meeting on 16 June 1918, document in file Z4/16024 in the CZA. 19 Document 159 in file 375/2/2 in file FO/608/98 in the PRO. 20 Memos of 4 February 1919 in file Z4/16024 in the CZA. 21 For details see Chapter 2. 22 Weizmann to Churchill, 19 September 1919 in file WO/32/5732 in the PRO. 23 Rupin’s memo of 20 November 1919 in file Z4/25053 in the CZA. 24 Tolkowsky (1981), entry of 1 October 1919. 25 Balfour to the British Premier, 26 June 1919, document 97958 in file FO/371/4181 in the PRO. 26 See Chapter 4. 27 Weizmann to the Foreign Office, 5 January 1921, in the Weizmann Archive, file 1921. 28 Editorial of 8 January 1921, found also in file Z4–25054 in the CZA. 29 Weizmann to Churchill, 1 March 1921, in file Z4/25054 in the CZA. 30 Ormsby-Gore’s memo of 22 August 1918, in file FO/406.410 in the PRO. 31 See Chapter 3. 32 Toynbee’s memo of 2 December 1918, in file FO/371/3398 in the PRO. 33 Sykes to Weizmann, 3 January 1919, Weizmann (1979), IX, No. 114 note 5. 34 The delegation’s memo of 1 May 1919, in file FO/371/3398 in the PRO. 35 See the line in Biger (1988a), p. 206. 36 See note 25 above. 37 For example, Samuel to Emery (deputy Colonial Secretary), 20 January 1920 in Samuel’s archive, file 1920. 38 Summary of the Zionist executive board, 4 October 1919, in file Z4/4093 in the CZA. 39 Concerning this line see Chapter 4. 40 Report of the 9th meeting of the committee, 22 September 1920, document 11698.4164 in file FO/371/5245 in the PRO. 41 See Young’s (an official of the Colonial Office) memo of 17 May 1920 in file FO/371/5035 in the PRO. 42 Samuel to Curzon, 8 June 1920, document 6224/2/44 in file FO/371/5053 in

Notes

43 44 45 46 47 48

49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

241

the PRO. Also see his appeals of 3 May 1920 (FO/371/5139) and 26 June 1920 (FO/371/5120). Ibid., appeal of 16 June 1920. Parliamentary question, 28 July 1920, and the Foreign Office’s reply, 29 July 1920, in document 9131/85/44 in file FO/371/5121 in the PRO. Congreve to the Foreign Office, 21 July 1920 in file WO/106/197 in the PRO, and the War Office’s reply of 7 June 1920 in the same file. Congreve’s appeal for permission to conquer Trans-Jordan in telegram 969/2 of 11 August 1920. Samuel to the Foreign Office, a series of appeals, telegrams 179, 180 of 7 August 1920 and others, in file FO/371/5121 in the PRO. Foreign Office to the High Commissioner, telegram 80 of 11 August 1920 in file FO/371/5122 in the PRO. Report concerning the committee’s meeting in file FO/371/5277 of 17 August 1920 (three), 24 August 1920 (five), 31 August 1920 (eight). Samuel to the Foreign Office, telegram 244 of 27 August 1920, in file WO/106/197 in the PRO. Ministry of Agriculture to the Foreign Office, 1386/20, C.F. from 18 August 1920 in the file cited in note 47. The Foreign Office to Samuel, telegram 70 of 6 September 1920 in file FO/371/5121 in the PRO. The meeting’s report in telegram 207, Samuel to the Foreign Office, 22 August 1920, in file FO/371/5122 in the PRO. Curzon (Foreign Secretary) to Robert Vansittart in Paris, despatch 157 of 30 September 1920 in file FO/371/51225245 in the PRO. Gilhar (1979), p. 62. Weizmann to Samuel, 29 July 1920, Weizmann Archive, file 1920. Weizmann to Deedes, 24 October 1920, Weizmann Archive, file 1920. Weizmann to the Foreign Office, 5 January 1921, Weizmann Archive, file 1921. Weizmann to Churchill (Colonial Secretary), 1 March 1921 in file Z4/25054 in the CZA. In regard to the Cairo conference and its outcome see Kleiman (1970). Annex 17 to the decisions of the Cairo conference in file 6343 FO/371/5122 in the PRO. Sidebothom to Cohen, 28 April 1921, a report of the meeting with Churchill in file Z4/18411 in the CZA. Concerning the settlement attempts in Trans-Jordan see Ilan (1985), pp. 358–459. Regarding the details of these negotiations see Elsberg, (1973), pp. 236–9. Understanding achieved in a meeting on 10 July 1922, in file 2.179 in the CZA. Samuel to Colonial Office, secret despatch, 28 July 1922, in file CO/733/13 in the PRO. Colonial Office to Samuel, despatch of 15 January 1922, file CO/733/13. Samuel to the Colonial Office, telegram 309 of 27 August 1922, document 42771 in file CO/733/24 in the PRO, and the relevant telegram exchange there. The official newspaper, special edition, 1 September 1922. Regarding the various approaches to the line’s location along the Arava see Brawer (1988) pp. 86–94. Regarding the prosecution in 1922 see Mills’s memo, 26 October 1922, in file CO/733/26 in the PRO. Concerning the demand of 1925 see Kisch (1939), p. 190 (writing on 14 April 1925). Manager of the Survey of Palestine to the Chief Secretary, 31 August 1931 in file V110/31 in the Chief Secretary’s archive in ISA and also a memo that deals with the boundary’s definitions there.

242

Notes

71 Brawer (1984), pp. 375–6. 72 Plumer to the Colonial office, despatch 802 of 25 July 1927 document 44551 in file CO/733/142 in the PRO, and the correspondence that appears there. 73 Concerning the problems of delimiting river boundaries see Bouchez (1983). 74 Concerning the problems of delimiting lake boundaries see Haritini (1981). 7 The partition plans, 1937–1947 1 Among the books that deal with this subject Dotan (1980) deals with division plans from 1937; Kleiman (1983) deals with this issue too. Galnor (1995) deals with crucial decisions concerning the state and land during the British period, Dotan (1981) describes political developments, including historical-political information (although not geographical information) regarding the division plan, Katzburg (1977) mainly deals with the British Cabinet committee from 1943; Cohen (1976) also deals with this issue; Ilan (1979) is mainly about the Anglo-American committee of 1946, Avizohar and Freeman (1984) is a source for articles and documents that deal with various aspects of this subject. Katz (1998) has dealt with the division plan, and has published a number of articles and a book about it. 2 Dotan (1981), p. 55. 3 Ibid., pp. 70–4. 4 Ibid., pp. 76–8. 5 Memo of the Colonial Office of 5 December 1933 in file CO/733/248/17688 in the PRO. 6 Memo of 18 January 1935 in file CO/733/283/75288 in the PRO. 7 Dotan (1980); Kleiman (1983); see note 1. 8 Avizohar (1984), pp. 206–11. 9 Royal Commission (1937), chapter 22, clause 1. 10 Ibid., clause 6. 11 Ibid., clause 20. 12 Ibid., clause 11. 13 Oren (1978). 14 Kleiman (1983), part 2, pp. 101–27. 15 Regarding the reasons and the discussions within the Zionist Organization about this subject see Dotan (1980). Galnor (1995) deals with this matter from a different perspective. 16 Katz (1998) is all about the proposal of the Zionist Organization. 17 Concerning the committee, its structure and its mode of action see Cohen (1976). Katzburg (1977) also deals with this issue extensively, chapter 4. 18 Emery’s plan of 31 July 1943, document P (14)(43)(3) in file CAB 95/14 in the PRO, and see the map in Katzburg (1977), p. 81. 19 Protocol of the Cabinet meeting of 4 November 1943, in file FO/371/6876 in the PRO. 20 Colonial Secretary to the Cabinet committee, file FO/371/444/35041 in the PRO. About the incident in general see Katz (1998). 21 Report of the committee on Palestine, 20 December 1943, in file CAB 66/44 in the PRO. 22 For a full version of the War Cabinet’s meeting of 25 January 1944, at 5.30 p.m., see Katzburg (1977), pp. 30–5 (certificate No. 5). 23 Regarding this committee, its structure and discussions, see Ilan (1979), pp. 204–46, and Dotan (1981), pp. 307–12. 24 The Anglo-American investigation committee. 25 The British Cabinet’s discussions in file CAB 128/6 and various documents in files FO/371/52539 and CO/537/259’2321 in the PRO.

Notes

243

26 Ilan (1979), pp. 228–30. 27 Ibid., p. 243. 28 The British Cabinet’s discussions and the memo of the Colonial Secretary of 16 January 1947, document C.P. 47 (32) in file CAB 129/16 in the PRO. 29 Concerning the British actions that preceded the decision to pass the subject of Palestine on to the United Nations see Cohen (1983), especially pp. 58–85. 30 The report of the UN committee. 31 Regarding the debates of the UN General Assembly see Rosen (1985). 32 Detailed map, UNSCOP Partition Boundaries, Survey of Palestine, September 1947, note 30. 33 Regarding the struggle for changing the land’s boundaries see Hurwitz (1951), pp. 284–6. 34 A thorough comparison between the UNSCOP map and that of the General Assembly shows these differences. The maps are located in the map library, the map archive of the Department of Geography, Tel-Aviv University. 35 Concerning the process of determining this boundary politically see Rosenthal (1988), Biger (1988c), and Brawer (1988).

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Z. Ilan: Longing for a Jewish Settlement in Trans-Jordan, Jerusalem (1985) (Hebrew). S. B. Jones: Boundary Making: A Handbook for a Statesman, Washington DC (1945). J. Julian: ‘Wandering in Sinai’, Royal Central Asian Society 29 (1942), pp. 422–43. Y. Katz: Partner to Partition, London (1998). N. Katzburg: Policy in a Maze, Jerusalem (1977) (Hebrew). E. Kedouri: In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth, Cambridge (1976). P. H. Kisch: Diary of Eretz Israel, Jerusalem (1939) (Hebrew). A. Kleiman: Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World, Baltimore MD (1970). A. Kleiman: Divide and Rule, Jerusalem (1983) (Hebrew). M. Y. Landau: ‘Documents from the British archives regarding the Jewish settlement attempt in Midyan during the years 1890–92’, Shivat Zion 14 (1950), pp. 169–78 (Hebrew). P. De Lapadelle: La Frontiere: Étude de droite international, Paris (1928). A. Livne (ed.): Aharon Aharonsson: the Man and his Period, Jerusalem (1969) (Hebrew). D. Lloyd George: The Truth about the Peace Treaties II, London (1931). F. D. Manuel: The Realities of America–Palestine Relations, Washington DC (1949). F. E. Manuel: ‘The Palestine question in Italian diplomacy, 1917–20’, Journal of Modern History 27, 3 (1955), pp. 273–81. M. S. Mariot: The Eastern Question, London (1978). D. Mercer: Chronicle of the Twentieth Century, London (1989). Military Handbook on Palestine, Cairo (1917). E. Mills: Census of Palestine, 1931, Alexandria (1932), vols 1–2. E. Monroe: Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1956, London (1963). R. Muir: Modern Political Geography, London (1975). Y. Navakivi: Britain, France, and the Arab Middle East, 1914–1920, London (1969). W. V. Nugent: ‘The geographical results of the Nigeria-Kamerun Boundary Demarcation Commission’, Geographical Journal 43 (1914), pp. 630–51. The Official Newspaper of the Government of Palestine, 1920–48. A. Oren: Settlement during the Struggle Period, Jerusalem (1978) (Hebrew). ‘Palestine’, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edn., XX, (1910–11). Palestine newspaper (London), 1917–21. J. R. V. Prescott: The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, London (1965). Report of the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP), official record of the General Assembly, second session, Sup. No. 11, doc. A/364, 5 vols (1947). J. C. B. Richmond: Egypt, 1789–1952, London (1977). N. Rogel: A Front Line without a Hinterland, Tel-Aviv (1979) (Hebrew). S. Rosen: ‘The United Nations and the independence war’, in Y. Wallach (ed.) Hayinou Ke’Holmim, Giv’ataim (1985) (Hebrew). Y. Rosenthal: ‘From war to a peace agreement: the cease-fire negotiations between Israel and its neighbours, 1949’, Idan 10 (1988), pp. 177–200 (Hebrew). Royal Commission: Report of the Royal Commission on Palestine, Parliamentary Document No. 5479, Jerusalem (1937). S. Rubinstein: ‘Aaron Aharonsson’s plan for the development of the vacant land between Jaffa and Rafah from 1918’, Cathedra 29 (1984), pp. 118–78 (Hebrew). A. J. Rustum: The Archive of the Royal Egyptian Expedition to the Levant, 1831–1840, Damascus (1936). H. Sacher (ed.): Zionism and the Jewish Future, London (1916). N. Sokolov: Eretz Hemda, Warsaw (1888) (Hebrew).

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Index

A-Tur 29, 30 Aaronson, A. (Zionist leader) 61, 62, 63, 74–6, 81, 109–11, 114, 115, 166 Abas (Bahai leader) 136, 137, 148 Abdul Hamid II (Ottoman Sultan) 30 Abdullah (Emir of Trans-Jordan) 142, 176, 178, 179, 181, 184, 204, 229 Acre 17, 22, 23, 44, 64, 102, 103, 116, 124, 125, 196, 205, 210, 214; county (sub-district) of 13, 156, 198, 199, 216; district of 13, 53 Aden 41 administration stage 9, 11, 101, 102, 133, 150, 155 Africa 5, 8, 63, 110, 123, 161 Afula 214, 215, 217 Akhziv 103, 105, 121 Aleppo 41, 43, 53, 70; district of 47, 48, 164 Alexandreta (Iskanderun), 70, 116; Bay of 41, 43; region 47, 53 Ali Riza El-Riqabbi (Arab general) 53, 164 Allenby, E. (British General) 53, 54, 56, 65, 72, 88, 89, 91–5, 105, 109, 115, 119–21, 129, 163–5, 173, 177 Allocation stage 9, 37, 41, 51, 69, 70, 79, 101, 102, 105, 149, 200, 214 Amery, L. (Colonial Secretary) 209 Amman 164 Antarctica 8 antecedent boundary 6 Aqaba 11, 27, 29–35, 37, 38, 40, 43, 61, 64, 72, 74–6, 81, 83, 86, 89, 93, 94, 98, 99, 100, 160, 161, 163, 164, 166, 167, 169, 171, 174, 175, 180, 182, 183, 185, 186, 204, 224; accent (Naqb-el-Aqaba) 32, 33, 37, 99; Gulf of 11, 14, 24, 28–30, 32–5, 37, 38, 46,

48, 63, 75, 76, 78, 81, 83, 84, 86–9, 91, 93, 98–100, 161, 165, 166, 177, 178, 180, 182–6, 189, 198, 204, 222 Arab Bureau 86, 104 Arab revolt 156, 157, 197, 208 Arab state (Kingdom) 43, 44, 47, 64, 76, 78, 83, 93, 103, 117, 125, 129, 160, 162, 164–7, 170, 173–6, 210; in Palestine 191, 193, 195, 197–200, 202, 203, 208, 211, 214–18, 223, 225 Arabian Peninsula 13, 22, 29, 47, 160 Arava Valley (Wadi) (depression, rift) 6, 8, 11, 13, 14, 27, 32, 46, 72, 83, 84, 86–9, 91–4, 100, 133, 160, 162, 163, 165, 167, 170, 171, 180–5, 188, 198 Argentina 5, 8 Armenia 42, 118 armistice lines 190, 219, 230 Arnon River (Wadi al Mujib) 14, 19, 21, 159 Ashdod 215 Ashqelon 17, 210 Asia 5, 63, 167, 204 Asia Minor 23 Asquith, H. (British Prime Minister) 49 Atlit 194, 196 Auja El-Hafir (Nizzanna) 6, 37, 84, 88, 89, 94, 99, 182, 210, 218 Australia 6, 213 Austria 24 Austria–Hungary 41, 56 Awali river 60, 108, 110 Ayelt Ha-Shahar 134 Baghdad 43; railway 63 Baisan 17, 182, 198, 202, 214, 216; subdistrict of 197, 216; valley 195, 202, 203, 208, 212, 216

250

Index

Balfour, A. (Lord) (British Foreign Secretary) 49, 84, 85, 87, 119, 167, 171, 173, 176 Balfour Declaration 49, 51, 53, 64, 104, 167, 202 Banias 10, 69, 71, 74, 108,114, 119, 120, 124, 127, 128, 131, 136–43, 146, 147, 151, 152, 154, 155; springs 137, 147; river 64, 114, 129, 153 Bashan 17, 18 Bedouin tribes (population) 83, 84, 86–9, 93, 94, 100, 136, 141, 171, 173, 185, 204, 210; force 162; invention of 160, 161 Be’er-Tuvia 202, 212, 216 Beersheba 13, 17–20, 31, 37, 51, 60, 85, 87–9, 91–4, 99, 100, 204, 210, 211, 215, 216, 218, 227, sub district of 205, 216 Beirut 24, 53, 70, 75, 110, 117, 130, 134; county of 13, 53; province (vilayet) of 13, 182, 184 Beit-Jan 76, 111 Ben-Gurion, D. (Zionist leader) 58, 60, 81, 193, 197–200, 203, 205 Ben-Zvi, Y. (Zionist leader) 58–60, 81 Bertelou, P. (French Foreign Secretary) 122–6, 128 Bertelou line 126, 127, 129 Bethlehem 195, 196, 198, 199, 202, 209, 215; internationalization of 42 Bevin, E. (British Foreign Secretary) 213 Bir’am 151, 152 Bnei-Yehuda 17 Bnot-Ya’akov bridge 143, 157 Bon Voisinage agreement 155, 156 border fence 157 Bosporus strait 42 Bosra 61, 63, 108, 161, 166 boundaries: arbitrators 8; artificial boundaries 4; definition 1–3; delimitation stage 9, 11, 35, 37, 58, 60, 65, 72, 76, 79, 80, 101, 102, 106, 118, 132, 149, 150, 153, 179, 185, 202, 206, 221–4, 228–31; demarcation stage 9–11, 35, 37, 102, 133–5, 137–40, 145, 151, 153, 154, 186; following boundary 6; International boundaries 80, 98, 102, 147, 148, 156; natural boundaries 4–6, 25, 58, 61, 110; pioneering boundary 6; political border (boundary) 5, 7, 8; secure

boundaries 110; superimposed boundary 6, 101, 133 Brandies, L. (US High Supreme Court Judge) 124, 130 Britain (Great Britain) 3, 13, 35, 37, 41, 43, 44, 46–9, 52, 53, 56, 63, 65–70, 74, 75, 78, 82, 83, 91, 92, 95, 96, 101, 102, 106, 108, 112, 113, 117, 119–34, 148, 158, 160–3, 171, 173, 174, 176, 178, 179, 190, 191, 196, 197, 202, 204, 206, 214, 217, 224–6, 228, 229; as arbitrator 8; in Egypt 28, 29; helping the Turks 23, 24; in World War I 42, in Sykes–Picot agreement 64, 65 British Army 43, 53, 80, 87, 121, 167 British Cabinet 208, 210, 211, 213 British Colonial Office 97, 98, 99, 135, 139–42, 145, 167, 176, 177, 180–4, 187 British Eastern Committee 71 British Empire 29, 42, 56, 104, 182 British Foreign Office 30, 65, 71, 80, 82–4, 91, 96–8, 108, 109, 112, 114, 115, 119, 121, 122, 127, 129, 135, 139, 161, 162, 164, 167, 169, 173–7, 180–2, 187, 213 British (His Majesty) Government 33, 42, 47, 49, 51, 65, 82, 98, 101, 104, 108, 143, 147, 160, 173, 175, 177, 179, 182, 197, 213, 225 British military delegation to the peace talks 88, 94, 95 British Ministry of Agriculture 175 British Palestine Committee (British Committee for Eretz Israel) 58, 108 British Parliament 174 British political delegation to the peace talks 71, 84, 85, 88, 89, 94, 113, 114, 118, 119, 171, 176 British War Cabinet 67, 83 British War Office 65, 75, 88, 92, 95, 112, 115, 118, 119, 121, 122, 126, 127, 129, 139, 140, 171, 173–5 Cairo 28, 30, 63, 98, 104, 169, 178 Cairo to Cape railway 63 Cairo conference 96, 97, 135, 167, 169, 178, 179 Canaan 17 Canada 213 Carmel ridge 202 Cast, A. (British official) 195, 196 Cecil, R. (Lord) 58

Index Central Powers 41 Cheetham, M. (Acting British High Commissioner, Egypt) 84, 87, 88 Chile 5, 8 Churchill, W. 95, 96, 166–8, 177–9, 184, 208, 209 Cilicia 43, 119, 127 Clayton, G. (chief political officer, Palestine campaign) 93 Clemenceau, G. (French Premier) 69, 70, 105, 118, 122–4 Coalition (the) 41, 42, 56, 65 coastal plain (in Palestine) 193, 198, 202, 203, 205, 209, 210, 212, 214–17 Committee of Ten 76, 84, 91 Cromer (Lord, Evelyn Baring) (British consul in Egypt) 30–4, 38 Crown Colony 80 Cunningham, A. (High Commissioner, Palestine) 213 Curzon, N. (Lord) (British Foreign Secretary) 4, 5, 6, 67, 71, 123, 124, 130, 173, 175, 177; boundaries’ definition 4, 6, 9 Cyprus 41 Czechoslovakia 213 Damascus 16,18, 19, 23, 33, 48, 53, 60, 70, 71, 74, 75, 89, 108, 109, 111, 114–17, 119, 122, 123, 125, 128, 129, 135, 156, 160, 163, 164, 167, 170, 173, 176, 228; district of 47, 48, 110, 164, 173, 174, 178 Dan 17, 18, 69, 114, 119, 120, 123, 124, 126, 139, 149; river 114; spring 147, 150 Dar’aa 103, 120, 128, 129, 136, 139, 140, 148, 174, 175 De Bunzen, M. (British statesman) 42; committee 42, 43, 164 Dead Sea 13, 17–20, 24, 27, 28, 46, 71, 72, 82, 83, 85–9, 93, 117, 160, 163, 165, 170, 171, 176, 179–86, 188, 189, 196, 198, 199, 206, 210, 211, 215, 218, 222 Dead Sea resources 85, 86, 180, 181 Dead Sea–Beersheba–Rafah line 71, 82, 83, 169 Deeds, W. ((Chief Secretary, Palestine) 177 Degania 157 Dodecanese Islands 42 Douville line 120, 121, 139 Duff, D. (British official) 196

251

E-Shams province 14, 28, 48, 160, 181, 184 East Africa 81, 167, 204 Eden, A. (British Foreign Secretary) 211 Egypt 5, 6, 16, 21–32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 47, 51, 61, 64, 65, 70, 78–89, 91–3, 95–100, 104, 119, 129, 133, 163, 174, 175, 177, 189, 204, 206, 209, 218, 220–5, 227, 228 Eilat 32, 83, 204 Ein-Gev 157, 209 Ein-Gib 147 Ein Quderath 37 El-Alami, M. (Palestinian Arab statesman) 194 El-Arish 25, 28, 30–2, 34, 37, 38, 63, 64, 74, 75, 78, 81, 91–7, 226, 227; Wadi 18, 19, 21, 32, 91 El-Bire 76, 111, 130 El-Fa’ur (Fa’ur), M. (Bedouin leader) 136–8, 147, 148 El-Hamma (Hamat-Gader) 129, 136, 137, 142, 143, 145, 148, 155, 157, 158, 165, 182, 189, 222 El-Halidi, A. (Palestinian Arab educator) 195 El-Ja’afar depression 61, 118, 161,163 El-Kuran stream 76 El-Wazanni springs 147 Eretz Israel 13, 15–18, 21, 49, 51, 58, 60, 67, 74, 78, 81, 108, 110, 149, 161, 162, 166, 220–2, 227 Euphrates River 60, 114, 115, 127 Eurasia 110, 161 Europe 5–8, 49, 51, 63, 69, 70, 119, 132, 154, 211, 212, 224, 228 Ezdraelon (Jezra’el) valley 60, 193, 195, 198, 202, 203, 205, 214, 216, 217 Faisal (Arab Leader) 47, 66, 67, 75, 76, 89, 101, 116, 117, 120, 121, 123–8, 163, 164, 166, 169, 170, 173, 174, 176, 178, 229 Far East 81, 211 Filistin 13, 15, 25, 27, 110, 220 Forbes-Adams, E. 118, 119, 122, 123 France 7, 41, 42–4, 46–9, 64, 65, 67–70, 74, 78, 101, 104, 106, 108, 112–24, 126–30, 133, 134, 148, 151, 152, 158, 161, 164, 175, 206, 228; involvement in the Muhammad Ali crisis 22–5 French Africa 106 French Empire 3, 8

252

Index

French Government 42, 64, 131, 143 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 116, 121, 123 ‘from Dan to Beersheba’ 60, 67, 69, 71, 88, 108, 114, 123, 124, 126, 130, 149, 165 Galilee 15, 16, 42, 67, 102, 103, 105, 123, 130, 156, 182, 195, 198, 205, 211, 216, 217, 223, 228; eastern 209–12, 216; lower 56, 203, 212, 214, 216; Upper 193, 209, 210, western 193, 196, 204, 205, 208–12, 214–16, 230 Galilee panhandle 139, 141, 143, 153, 155, 157, 210, 211 Gallipoli 43 Gaza 17, 18, 27, 32, 33, 37, 46, 51, 69, 88, 93, 99, 196, 210, 218; plain 193; Strip 223; sub-district of 198, 199, 205, 216; Wadi (stream) 19, 21, 86, 87, 88 Gedera 195, 214 Germany 9, 29, 41, 64, 69, 151, 175, 193 Gil’ad 17, 63, 159, 161, 168, 169, 193 Golan (height) 16, 17, 43, 60, 64, 71, 108, 110, 116, 117, 120, 129–31, 136, 141, 147–50, 157, 170, 189, 193, 223, 226, 228 Grant (Head, Palestine P.W.D.) 140, 141 Grant–Rutenberg report 142 Gray, E. (British Foreign Secretary) 49 Great Wall of China 3 Greece 21, 22, 23, 34 Guatemala 213 Gulf of Suez 24, 26, 28 Gureaux (French General) 116, 120, 121, 124, 127, 128, 136–8, 142 Hadrian’s Wall 3 Haifa 32, 43, 44, 63, 64, 102, 121, 122, 130, 136, 161, 166, 195, 196, 199, 212, 214–16; Bay of 44, 64, 65, 76, 78, 102, 103, 197, 203, 204, 209, 216; subdistrict of 13, 197, 216 Hamma 16; district of 47, 48, 110, 164 Hanitta 157 Harod valley 193, 212, 214, 216 Hasbani River 114, 119, 130, 136, 141, 147 Hasbaya 16, 53, 110, 114, 124, 130, 147

Hebron 218; mountains 195, 212, 215; sub-district 216 Hermon Mount 17 -19, 21, 60, 61, 71, 72, 74, 76, 78, 95, 104, 105, 108, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115, 117, 119–21, 124, 126, 163, 226 Herzl, T. (Zionist leader) 31, 63 Hijaz, 64, 70, 86, 87, 89, 93, 160, 175, 180, 181, 183; kingdom of 162, 173, 175, 176, 184; province of 13, 27–31, 34, 36, 160, 169, 181; railway 19, 31, 61, 63, 64, 72, 74–6, 78, 108, 109, 111, 120, 124, 129, 132, 156, 161–3, 165–7, 173, 176, 177 Hogarth, D. (British Officer) 86, 87, 104 Holland 213 Holocaust 211 Holy Land 13–15, 114, 120 Homs 16, 23; district of 47, 48, 110, 164 Houran 16, 18, 43, 60, 63, 64, 78, 104, 116, 122, 129, 166 Hovevi Zion 16, 17 Hula Lake 18, 43, 56, 69, 71, 105, 114, 121, 128–30, 134, 136, 138–41, 143, 145, 149, 150; swamps 149; valley 64, 195, 212, 214 Hussein (Sharif) (Arab Leader) 47, 48, 66, 70, 93, 163, 173, 175, 176, 181 Hussein–McMahon (British–Arab) correspondence 47, 48, 51, 66, 164, 169, 228 Iben Saud (Saudi Arabia founder) 184, 204 Ibrahim Pasha (Egyptian leader) 23, 24 India 34, 63, 162, 213, 214 Indian Ocean 63, 81, 161 International Area (unit), 46, 102–5, 116, 165, 214, 230 Iran 213 Iraq 70, 97, 98, 119, 127, 132, 176, 178, 179, 202, 222 Israel, 46, 80, 149, 188, 189, 220, 221, 222; boundaries 8, Government of 222, 231; independence war 6; State of 12, 35, 40, 46, 58, 80, 149, 153, 157, 184, 186, 190, 197, 213, 219, 221–3, 227 Istanbul 23, 28, 33, 42, 63, 64 Italy 41, 42, 43, 66 Jabutinski, Z. (Zionist leader) 179

Index Jaffa 13, 52, 63, 197, 202, 203, 204, 209–12, 215, 218; Arab enclave of 217; sub-district of 197 JCA (Jewish Colonization Association) 16, 110, 123 Jebel Druze (Druze Mountain) 21, 43, 61, 108, 117, 119, 120, 122, 124, 142, 161, 163 Jedda 29 Jenin 18, 217; sub-district of 13, 216, 217 Jennings-Bramly, W. (Sinai Governor) 31, 32, 33, 38, 87, 97 Jericho 13, 198 Jerusalem 15, 17, 27, 51, 155, 178, 195–9, 202, 208–10, 212, 216, 230; district (Sanjak) of 13, 15, 18, 34, 36, 53, 72, 83, 165, 182, 184, 196, 202–4, 215, 218; internationalization of 42, 46, 198, 214, 215, 230; metropolitan area of 214, 215 Jerusalem–Bethlehem enclave (area) 196, 198, 202, 211, 212, 214, 216 Jerusalem–Jaffa (Jaffa–Jerusalem) corridor 202–4 Jewish Agency 206, 207, 208, 213 Jewish Law (Halacha) 16 Jewish state 193, 195, 197, 199, 200, 203–6, 208–19, 223, 225–8, 230 Jones, A. (British Colonial Secretary) 213 Jones, S. (Political geographer) 7, 9 Jordan (Kingdom of) 37, 160, 186, 187, 189, 222 Jordan River 5, 8, 13, 15, 17, 19, 24, 43, 46, 48, 53, 63, 64, 69, 71, 72, 74, 78, 89, 103, 113–15, 117, 119–21, 123, 124, 126–30, 133, 135–8, 141, 143, 145, 147–50, 155, 157–60, 162–7, 169–71, 173–6, 179, 181–3, 186–8, 195, 196, 202, 203, 214, 223, 225, 227; basin 131; sources 109, 110, 117, 120 Jordan Valley (depression) 15, 71, 131, 136, 160, 162, 169, 171, 174–6, 178, 193 195, 198, 203, 212, 216, 228 Judea 16, 193, 198, 214; desert 179, 198, 227 Kadesh 139, 157 Karak 165, 169 Kfar Gil’adi 134 Kfar Tavor 216, 217 Khan-Yunes 27, 28, 218

253

Kirkbride, A. (British official) 180 Kurnub (Mamshit) 88 Ladder of Tyre 108 Latakia district 53 Lausanne agreement 134 Lawrence, T. E. (Lawrence of Arabia) (British Officer) 38, 47, 88, 89, 117, 142, 164, 171; map of 38, 39 League of Nations 67, 68, 98, 99, 157, 181, 183, 191, 196 Lebanese Baka’a 60, 115, 117, 128 Lebanon 22, 41, 48, 53, 67, 68, 71, 74, 77, 101, 103, 106, 108–10, 112, 113, 116, 117, 119, 126, 127, 135–7, 144, 145, 146, 151, 153, 154, 156, 189, 200, 205, 206, 209, 222, 228; autonomous district of 53, 108–10, 117; Government of 154; Greater Lebanon 117, 128; mountain 10, 19, 60, 67, 76, 108–10, 115, 128 Lensing, R. (US Foreign Secretary) 124 Levi, S. (French Zionist) 123 Leygues (French Premier) 129, 143 Libya 22, 38, 42, 97 Litani (Qasamia) River 18, 19, 61, 64, 69, 71, 72, 74, 75, 78, 95, 104–6, 108, 112, 114, 115, 117, 119–22, 124, 126–8, 130, 131, 139, 145, 147, 148, 150, 226–8; bend of 124, 125; mouth of 64; sources of 110 Lloyd, George D. (British Premier) 51, 52, 69, 104, 105, 114, 117–20, 123, 124, 126, 127, 130, 171 Lloyd (Lord) (British representative in Egypt) 98 London 18, 24, 31, 32, 51, 65, 69, 70, 75, 97, 105, 117, 122, 139, 141, 142, 159, 180, 225 Lydda 18, 195, 202, 215, 216, 217; airport 204, 210 Ma’an 32, 34, 35, 61, 74, 161, 163, 166–9, 177, 178; district of 181 McMahon, H. (British High Commissioner in Egypt) 47, 163 McMichael, H. (High Commissioner, Palestine) 209 Madaba 72 Majdal 214 Manara 154, 157 Margaliot-Kalvariski, H. 110, 111 Marj Ayon 138; sub-district of 13, 16, 18, 110, 156

254

Index

Marsina 47 Massada fortress 218 Mazarib 136, 140 Mecca 19, 29, 47, 66, 163 Medina 29, 47 Mediterranean: coast 15, 24, 32, 43, 64, 72, 76, 91, 102, 103, 109, 111, 121, 156; sea 17, 18, 21, 27, 32–4, 41, 42, 44, 46, 48, 53, 63, 70, 71, 74, 76, 81, 85, 103, 116, 118, 119, 121, 125, 127, 132, 134, 142, 143, 145, 146, 161, 165, 189, 196, 197, 205, 206 Megido 202, 203 Meinertzhagen line 72, 121, 127, 130, 167, 172, 174–7 Meinertzhagen, R. (Chief Political Officer, Palestine) 72, 94, 121, 167, 171–3, 175, 176 Merhavia 216 Mesopotamia 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 53, 67, 69, 70, 115, 116, 118, 126, 164, 173, 178 Metula 18, 104, 113, 121, 123, 128–31, 134, 137–41, 143, 145–7, 150–2, 154–7, 179, 189, 203, 227 Middle East 25, 41, 42, 46, 47, 48, 51, 53, 56, 58, 63–71, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81, 83, 92, 97, 101, 104–6, 113, 115–17, 120, 122–6, 128, 133, 135, 149, 161, 164, 168, 174, 176, 178, 200, 206, 209, 221–3, 225, 228, 229; Arabian Middle East 48 Milerand (French Premier) 124, 126, 128, 129 Milerand line 128 Milner, Lord (British Colonial Secretary) 38, 167, 168, 171 Morrison–Grady committee 212 Mosul 41, 43, 53, 56, 69, 70, 118 Moyne, Lord (British statesman) 209 Muhammad Ali (Egypt ruler) 21–30 Nablus 18, 196, 205; district of 13, 53; sub-district of 13, 216 Nah’al 29, 30, 33, 38, 93, 99 Naharayim 206 Nahariya 205 national homeland for the Jews (Jewish National Home) 49, 58, 60, 65, 103, 121, 123, 179–80, 182, 188, 202, 206, 209 Napoleon, B. (French Emperor) 3, 37; invention of Palestine 22; siege of Acre 23, 24

Nazareth, 42, 102, 195, 198, 202, 210, 214, 217; sub-district of 13, 197, 216, 217 Nebi-Yosha 139, 156 Negev 13, 21, 27, 31, 37, 38, 46, 61, 64, 72, 81, 83, 84, 88, 91, 93, 94, 135, 160, 164, 165, 170, 179, 181, 184, 193, 195–8, 204, 208–12, 214–18, 227 Negev triangle 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 94, 95, 181, 229 Nesibin 129, 132, 136 neutral zone 43 Neve-Ur 188 New York 18, 58 Newcombe line 140 Newcombe, S. (British Officer) 135–43, 157 Nicholson, A. (British politician) 43 Nili spy ring 61, 74, 109 North America 6 northern valleys (in Palestine) 193, 203, 209, 210 Nuqieb 145, 147 Occupied Enemy Territory 53, 55, 105, 121, 164, 165, 173 Ormsby-Gore, W. (Colonial Secretary) 58, 71, 82, 83, 104, 105, 169, 170 Ottoman Army 42; Empire 12, 21–4, 28–31, 33–5, 37, 38, 41–3, 46, 47, 49, 51, 54, 56, 64, 66, 67, 74, 82, 94, 97, 106, 134, 161, 220, 221, 224, 228, 229; regime (Government) 13–16, 19, 29, 31, 34, 37, 110, 162 Owen, R. (British Officer, Egypt) 32, 33 Pakistan 214 Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF) 31, 38, 135, 141, 145 Palestine: government of 154, 180 Palestinian Authority 46, 223 Palmerston (Lord) (British Foreign Secretary) 24 Palmira (Tadmor) 95, 114, 115, 118, 119 Paris 27, 56, 71, 80, 82, 84, 86, 88, 105, 109, 142, 171, 193 Parker, A. (Governor of Sinai) 38, 86, 87 Paulet, N. (French Officer) 135 peace agreement between Egypt and Israel 80, 231 peace agreement between the Kingdom of Jordan and Israel 186, 188, 231

Index Peace Conference 56, 57, 64–7, 69, 71, 74–6, 80–4, 88, 91, 95, 109, 111–13, 117, 123, 124, 130, 166, 170, 173, 176 Permanent Mandate Committee 98 Persian Gulf 41, 42, 43, 46, 63, 118 Peru 213 Petra 174 Philby, J. (British official in TransJordan) 181 Picot, G. (French statesman) 43 Pishon (French Foreign Secretary) 117 Plumer (Lord) (High Commissioner of Palestine) 98, 155, 186 Prussia 24 Qalqilya 217 Qantara 96 Qara’un Bridge 76, 111, 112 Qarun stream 121 Qseimme 32, 37, 91, 94, 99 Quneitra 10, 60, 121, 126, 127, 131, 136, 138, 147, 148, 156, 174 Quneitra–Tyre road 136 Quntila 32, 37, 99 Rafah 6, 18, 27, 28, 31–5, 37, 51, 61, 71, 82, 85, 88, 89, 92–4, 96–9, 211, 215, 218 Rafah–Aqaba line 31, 32 Ramallah 209 Ramla 18, 197, 202, 215, 216, 217; subdistrict of 197 Ramon crater (Machtesh) 13, 35, 218 Ras-El-Ain 209 Ras El Naqura (Rosh Hanikra) 24, 43, 46, 64, 103, 105, 115, 121, 124, 128–30, 132, 135–8, 145, 146, 150–3, 156, 158, 189, 202 Ras El Naqura–Sea of Galilee line 56 Ras Muhammad 34, 96 Rashia 16, 53, 74, 109, 110, 114, 115, 125, 130 Ratzel, F. 2 Red Sea 11, 22, 24, 32, 60, 63, 72, 78, 81, 88, 89, 91, 95, 166, 167, 171, 177, 181, 183–5, 198, 199, 204, 215, 227 Rehovot 202 Richards, E. (British politician) 71, 83 river of Egypt 60 Romania 21, 63 Rosh-Pina 153, 156, 157 Rothschild, E. (Baron) (French Jewish philanthropist) 110, 123, 150

255

Rothschild, N. (Lord) (British banker) 49 Royal Commission 193, 196, 197, 200–3, 205, 206, 209, 210; line 208 Rupin, A. (Zionist leader) 64, 167 Rushdi Pasha (Colonel) (Ottoman Officer) 33, 35 Russia 8, 43, 46, 49, 63, 65; role in Muhammad Ali crisis 23, 24; in World War I 41, 42, 43, 56 Rutenberg, P. 139, 140, 141 Rutenberg’s hydro-electric plant 131, 137, 139, 142, 143, 148, 149, 182, 188, 206 Sacher, H. (Zionist leader) 108 Safad, 43, 56, 64, 105, 124, 125, 152, 156, 195, 205, 217; sub-district of 13, 156, 214 St Catherine’s monastery 30 St Petersburg 18 Salha police station 151 Salt 18, 165, 169, 174, 175, 177 Samaria 15, 193, 198, 208, 212, 214, 217 Samuel, H. (High Commissioner, Palestine) 49, 72, 96, 128–31, 134, 135, 139–42, 171, 173–8, 181–3 San Remo 173; conference (agreement) 68, 106, 126, 127 Sarafend 202, 210 Saudi Arabia 8, 160, 203, 209, 222 Sea of Galilee (Lake of Tiberias) 10, 17, 24, 42, 43, 46, 102, 103, 105, 120, 128–31, 136, 137, 141, 142, 145, 147–50, 155, 157, 165, 179, 182, 202, 208–10 self-determination 56 Semah 10, 17, 127, 129–32, 135–7, 139, 145, 147, 148, 153, 171, 182; triangle 182, 184, 228 Sevre agreement 135, 143 Shafa’amar 216 Sidebothom, H. 58, 108 Sidon 17, 18, 21, 24, 60, 71, 75, 76, 108–11, 117, 125, 128, 131, 140; county (sub district) of 13, 16, 110: district of 22, 23 Sieff, I. (Lord) (Zionist leader) 108, 161 Sinai (peninsula, desert) 5, 13, 21, 24, 25, 27, 29–32, 34, 37–9, 42, 43, 51, 75, 81, 83, 86, 87, 92–7, 135, 160, 224, 226, 227

256

Index

Smith, G. A. (Historical geographer) 120, 126, 174 Smuts, J. (South Africa Premier) 130 Sodom Mount 88, 91 Sokolov, N. (Zionist leader) 17, 108, 111, 124, 171 South America 6 Stanley, O. (Colonial Secretary) 210 Sudan 22, 25 Suez 27, 29, 33–5, 97; Canal 28–32, 35, 37, 42, 43, 51, 53, 63, 75, 81, 82, 93, 95, 96, 180, 195, 224 Survey of Egypt 99 Survey of Palestine 153, 185 Sweden 213 Sykes, M. (British statesman) 43, 44, 108, 170 Sykes–Picot agreement 43, 45–8, 51, 53, 56, 58, 64, 65, 69, 70, 75, 84, 89, 101–4, 108, 115, 117, 120, 122, 123, 128, 132, 149, 161, 164, 165, 169, 228 Sykes–Picot line 113, 118, 121–6, 128, 129, 135, 136, 148, 149, 174, 175, 228 Syria 15, 22–5, 28, 33, 42, 47, 53, 68, 70, 72, 78, 101, 103, 105, 106, 114–16, 119–22, 124, 126–8, 130, 133, 136, 137, 142–6, 153–6, 158, 160, 173–5, 186, 189, 193, 202, 206, 210, 222, 224, 228; Great (Greater) Syria 103, 125, 190, 228; Southern Syria 228 Syrian–African Rift (the Rift) 43, 163, 164, 171, 174, 184 Syrian Desert 63, 108, 114, 115, 118, 132, 148, 163, 227 Taba 6, 33, 34, 40, 96–100; Ras 35, 99 Tabgha springs 103 Tabor Mount 214 Tafila (A-Tafila) (El Tafila) 72 84, 86, 94, 170 Taurus Mountains 23, 47 Tel Aviv 194, 195, 203, 204 Tel-El-Kadi 143 Tel-Hai event (incident) 113, 125, 128, 150 Tiberias, 103, 130, 195, 215; sub-district of 13, 148, 182, 183, 216 Tirat-Zvi 189, 222 Tolkowsky, S. (Zionist leader) 60, 61, 74, 75, 107–12, 161, 162, 166, 167 Toynbee, A. (British historian) 84, 88, 92–4, 113, 169, 170

Trans-Jordan 6, 11, 16, 78, 97–100, 118, 140, 142, 149, 156, 158, 160, 164, 166, 169, 170, 173–88, 191, 193, 195–7, 200, 202–4, 206, 210, 223, 225, 227; Frontier Force 153; highlands 18, 159, 166, 167, 179 Tripoli (Lebanon) 117, 128 Tripoli (Libya) 22, 97 Truman, H. (US president) 212, 213 Trumpeldor, Y. (Zionist leader) 113, 125 Tul Karem 197, 202; sub-district of 13, 197 Tunisia 22, 23 Turkey 10, 23, 25, 89, 97, 119, 127, 134, 135, 143, 222, 224 Turkish Government 134 Turkish–Egyptian boundary (the 1906 line, Taba–Rafah line) 13, 41, 46, 61, 70, 72, 74, 75, 80, 83, 84, 86, 89, 91, 93–5, 97–100, 133, 163, 170, 221, 222, 226, 228, 231 Tyre 17, 18, 71, 105, 115, 117, 120, 121, 128–31, 138, 141; sub-district of 13, 156 Umm-Bugma Mine Company 97 Umm Rash-Rash 6, 32, 33, 37, 100, 184 United Nation 190, 211, 212, 214, 219, 227, 230; General Assembly 12, 213, 216, 217; resolution of 29 November 1947 (division, partition) 12, 22, 46, 190, 193, 196, 213, 220, 223, 226, 229, 230 United States 8, 49, 66, 67, 81, 89, 113, 116, 117, 121, 211; boundary with Mexico 8; in World War I 41, 56 UNSCOP 213, 217, 230 Uruguay 213 Vansittart, R. (British statesman) 89, 126, 127, 130 Vernon (British statesman) 84, 140 Versailles (Palace of) 56, 105 Wadi A-Zarka 129 Wadi Ara 203 Wadi El-Jib 180 Wadi Jerba 10, 129, 131 Wadi Mara 18 Wadi Masoudia 10, 129, 131 Wadi Saba 87, 88 Wadi Zarka 71, 140, 170

Index War of 1967 (Six Days War, 1967 war) 157, 203, 227, 230, 231 Warburg, O. (Zionist leader) 64 watershed 112; as a boundary 5; in Palestine boundaries 71, 72, 76, 114, 129, 145, 150, 184 Wauchope, A. (High Commissioner, Palestine) 191, 192, 195 Weizmann, C. 49, 50, 75, 95, 97, 108, 124, 127, 130, 162, 165–9, 171, 176–8, 193, 199 West Bank 223 Wilson, W. (US president) 56, 57, 65, 113, 118, 124; fourteen principles 65 Wingate, R. (British High Commissioner, Egypt) 84 Wooley, L. (British Archaeologist) 38 World War I (First World War) 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, 19–21, 38, 40, 41, 46, 49, 51, 56, 58, 63, 80, 97, 98, 135, 160, 167, 221, 222, 224–8 World War II (Second World War) 99, 151, 152, 154, 156, 208, 211

257

Yabok River 17, 61 Yacobson, A. (Zionist statesman) 193–5 Yarmuk River 5, 43, 46, 61, 71, 72, 109, 111, 114, 117, 119, 121, 123, 124, 128, 130, 133, 135–7, 140, 147, 148, 150, 157, 159, 164, 167, 170, 182, 183, 186; sources of 110; Valley 60, 124, 126–9, 139, 142, 147, 165, 171, 174, 176, 177, 188 Yar’un 103 Yesod-Ha’Ma’ala 157 Young, H. (British statesman) 140 Yugoslavia 213 Zaharani River (basin) 10, 111, 115 Zevulun valley 210 Zionist Organization 17, 28, 31, 43, 49, 51, 58, 61, 63–8, 70, 71, 74–6, 78–81, 88, 91, 95–7, 101, 102, 108, 109, 111–16, 121, 124, 127, 128, 130, 139, 147–9, 159–62, 166, 167, 169, 173, 176, 179, 181, 182, 206, 212, 213, 219, 226–9