The Changing Japanese Family
The Japanese family is shifting in fundamental ways, demographically and in terms of atti...
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The Changing Japanese Family
The Japanese family is shifting in fundamental ways, demographically and in terms of attitudes towards family and societal relationships and the role of family in society. These changes include an ageing population, delayed marriages, a birth rate which has fallen below the level needed for replacement, a decline in three-generational households, a rise in single men and women who continue to live with their parents and a decline in family businesses. This book explores the causes and consequences of the demographic transition, the changing shape and definition of the family, the shifting boundaries between the family and community and the changing role of the state. It provides overviews of the role of the labour market and the social welfare systems, as well as case studies of the ‘training’ of mothers by the community and the growing awareness of child abuse. The shifting gender balance is considered through studies on language use and Japanese fatherhood. These issues are set in an international context, including comparisons with southern Europe, where similar changes to the family and its role are occurring. Overall, this book presents a thorough examination of the changing nature of a key social institution and will be of interest to anyone interested in contemporary Japan. Marcus Rebick is University Lecturer on the Japanese Economy at Oxford University and a fellow of St Antony’s College. His research interests include labour economics, the Japanese economy, the economics of ageing and the economics of higher education. Ayumi Takenaka is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Bryn Mawr College. Her areas of research interest include immigration, ethnic and racial identities, social inequality and mobility and comparative demography.
Routledge Contemporary Japan Series
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Small Firms and Innovation Policy in Japan Edited by Cornelia Storz
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Cities, Autonomy and Decentralization in Japan Edited by Carola Hein and Philippe Pelletier
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The Changing Japanese Family Edited by Marcus Rebick and Ayumi Takenaka
The Changing Japanese Family
Edited by Marcus Rebick and Ayumi Takenaka
First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2006 Editorial selection and matter, Marcus Rebick and Ayumi Takenaka; individual chapters, the contributors
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN10: 0–415–36808–1 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–02782–5 (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–36808–7 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–02782–0 (ebk)
Contents
List of figures List of tables List of contributors Editors’ preface Acknowledgements
vii ix xi xiii xv
PART I
Introduction 1 The changing Japanese family
1 3
MARCUS REBICK AND AYUMI TAKENAKA
PART II
The demographic transition 2 Demographics of the Japanese family: entering uncharted territory
17
19
NAOHIRO OGAWA, ROBERT D. RETHERFORD AND RIKIYA MATSUKURA
3 Japanese youth’s attitudes towards marriage and child rearing
39
NOBUKO NAGASE
4 Strong in tradition and yet innovative: the puzzles of the Italian family FRANCESCA BETTIO
54
vi
Contents
PART III
The shifting gender balance 5 Changes in the workplace and their impact on the family
73
75
MARCUS REBICK
6 The emergence of ‘nurturing fathers’: discourses and practices of fatherhood in contemporary Japan
94
AYAMI NAKATANI
7 Changing language, gender and family relations in Japan
109
TESSA CARROLL
PART IV
Shifts in the boundaries of the family 8 Mother-rearing: the social world of mothers in a Japanese suburb
127 129
AYUMI SASAGAWA
9 Policing the Japanese family: child abuse, domestic violence and the changing role of the state
147
ROGER GOODMAN
10 Changing families and policy responses to an ageing Japanese society
161
MISA IZUHARA
11 Different paths to welfare: family transformations, the production of welfare, and future prospects for social care in Italy and Japan
177
ROSSANA TRIFILETTI
Index
205
Figures
1.1 Percentage of population over age 65, selected OECD countries 2.1 Living arrangements of elderly persons aged 60 and above in selected countries in 2001 2.2 Change in average age of death among fifty oldest persons in Japan, 1950–2002 2.3 Actual values and values predicted by the Lee-Carter model 2.4 Projected life expectancy at birth for Japanese men and women, 2000–2025 2.5 Trends in period parity progression ratios in Japan, 1950–2000 2.6 Compositional change in married Japanese women by the number of children they have, selected years 2.7 Trend in the proportion of marriages that are arranged, the proportion of newly married couples who coresided with parents at the time of marriage and the proportion of husbands who were eldest sons, Japan, 1955–1998 2.8 Familial support ratio by prefecture, 1975 and 2025 2.9 Trends in norms and expectations about care for the elderly, Japan, 1950–2004 3.1 Percentage of never-married Japanese in their late twenties and thirties 3.2 Work status of married women with a child or children 3.3 Percentage of users of child-care leave 4.1 Period fertility and female employment rate in EU countries, 2003 4.2 Multidimensional scaling of EU countries 4.3 Adult children living with their parents, by age, 2001 5.1 Self-employed and family workers as a percentage of those working 5.2 Trends in the gender-based pay differential for full-time workers
6 20 21 22 23 25 26
28 33 35 40 41 42 55 60 62 77 86
viii
Figures
10.1 Number of persons in household (all ages) 10.2 Type of households among those aged 65 and above 10.3 The preferred place to receive care among those aged 65 and above, by household type
163 164 169
Tables
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1
5.2 5.3 11.1 11.2 11.3
The effect of coresidence among the elderly aged 65 and above on their place of death, Japan, 1990, 1995 and 2000 International comparison of the projected familial support ratio in 2005 International comparison of the speed of population ageing International comparison of the projected proportion of those aged 75 and above in those aged 65 and above for selected industrialized nations in 2025 Sample statistics for interviewed subjects Characteristics of women interviewed Fertility and women’s labour market participation in Europe, Japan and the United States Demographic indicators for EU countries, 2001–2003 Characteristics of population in age group 20–34 – ECHP sample for Italy (2001) Transition matrix for Japanese workers who changed jobs or stopped working between October 1997 and July 2002 The correlation of part-time work and unpaid family work for Japanese married women, 1992 and 1997 Percentage of management posts held by women in Japan Timing of elderly and child-care measures in Italy and Japan Timing of population ageing in Italy and Japan Timing of the fall in fertility in Italy and Japan
30 32 34
34 43 44 56 58 63
79 80 85 188 190 192
Contributors
Francesca Bettio teaches at the University of Siena, Italy. She is an economist by training, with a PhD from the University of Cambridge, UK. Her main areas of expertise are labour and population economics as well as gender economics. Tessa Carroll was a lecturer in Japanese Studies at the University of Stirling until August 2005. Her research interests lie in various aspects of language planning and language change in Japan. Roger Goodman is Nissan Professor of Modern Japanese Studies at the University of Oxford. His recent publications that relate most directly to his contribution to this volume include Children of the Japanese State (OUP) and Family and Social Policy in Japan (CUP). Misa Izuhara is Research Fellow in the School for Policy Studies, University of Bristol. She works in the areas of housing and social change, ageing and social policy. Her publications include Comparing Social Policies: Exploring New Perspectives in Britain and Japan. Rikiya Matsukura is a lecturer at the Nihon University Population Research Institute in Tokyo. Her research interests include marriage and fertility in Japan. Nobuko Nagase is an associate professor in the Graduate School of Humanities and Sciences at Ochanomizu University in Tokyo. Much of her work focuses on the analysis of patterns of labour supply behaviour of Japanese women, child-care support programmes and social policy. Ayami Nakatani is currently an associate professor in the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Okayama University in Tokyo. A social anthropologist, her research concerns include the formation of the ‘modern family’ in Southeast Asia. Naohiro Ogawa is Deputy Director and Professor at the Nihon University Population Research Institute in Tokyo. His most recent work has been on fertility, ageing and health in Japan.
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Contributors
Marcus Rebick is a lecturer on the Japanese economy at the University of Oxford and a fellow of St Antony’s College. His research is on the labour market and its institutions in Japan. He has recently published The Japanese Employment System: Adapting to a New Economic Environment (OUP). Robert D. Retherford is the coordinator of Population and Health Studies at the East–West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii. His research has been concerned with family and health issues in Japan, Nepal and India. Ayumi Sasagawa is a part-time lecturer at Musashino University and Aoyama Gakuin University. She has a PhD in Anthropology from Oxford Brookes University. Ayumi Takenaka is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Bryn Mawr College. Her areas of research interest include immigration, ethnic and racial identities, social inequality and mobility and comparative demography. She has conducted field research in Japan, Peru, the United States, Mexico and the United Kingdom. Rossana Trifiletti is Associate Professor in Social Policy and Sociology of the Family at Florence University. Her research interests are in qualitative sociology of the family, social policies, gender issues, women’s work, qualitative methods in comparative research and the history of sociological thought.
Editors’ preface
Japan, between the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s, was a relatively stable society with a booming economy and uninterrupted one-party rule. Since the mid-1980s, however, with the bubble of 1988–1990 and its collapse, it appears that there have been many changes. At least, there has been much public discourse about changes. In the mid-1990s, the Liberal Democratic Party lost power for the first time since 1955. The economy entered a prolonged slump from which it may be only just emerging. Demographically, the population is ageing at a very rapid rate. There also appear to be changes in society, most notably in the position of women and the rising age of marriage. This book developed from a conference held at St Antony’s College, Oxford, in November 2002. The editors organized a conference to look at the changes taking place in the Japanese family during a period in which other aspects of Japanese society appear to be changing rapidly. We believe that it is difficult to understand many of the other changes that are taking place in Japan without some sense of what is happening in families. We recognized from the start that many of the changes taking place in Japan, such as the ageing of the population and declining birth rates, are found in other industrialized countries. For this reason, we decided that a comparative perspective would be useful. We decided that Italy, a country that also has low fertility, rapid population ageing, few out-of-wedlock births, a large sector of small family-run enterprises and, until the 1990s, one-party dominance by the Christian Democrats, would make for an interesting and useful comparison. During the conference, one of the themes that kept emerging in discussion was how the boundaries of the family have been shifting – through new patterns of co-habitation, through the involvement of the state and the community – and how the definition of the family itself seems to have evolved. After inviting a couple of additional contributions, we have organized this book loosely around this theme. Through a comparison with Italy, we learned that many of the demographic and familial changes that have taken place in Japan are far from unique. We hope that the case studies presented in this volume will offer insights for other countries currently undergoing, or about to undergo, similar changes.
Acknowledgements
The editors are grateful to all those individuals and organizations that helped us organize a successful conference, on which this volume is based. The Asian Studies Centre of St Antony’s College, the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, the Oxford University Astor Travel Fund and the Oxford University Sasagawa Fund provided financial support. Ann Buchanan, Rosa Fernandez, Eirini Flouri, Nanette Gottlieb, Joy Hendry, Heather Joshi, Mike Murphy, Lidia Sciama, Theresa Smith, Nobue Suzuki, Yoshimi Umeda and Bruce White contributed to the conference by participating and providing useful feedback. The editors would also like to thank the following for permission to reproduce published material: the Nihon University Population Research Institute (Figure 2.5); The Population and Development Review (Figure 2.7); Oxford University Press (Tables 5.2 and 5.3). Finally, we gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Jennifer Griffiths, the secretary of the Asian Studies Centre, who helped with the conference and the preparation of the manuscript. Japanese names in this book are given in Western order (surname last), except in quoted material.
Part I
Introduction
1
The changing Japanese family Marcus Rebick and Ayumi Takenaka
The 1990s saw major changes in the way in which the Japanese think and talk about themselves. One area where this is manifest is in discourses about the family. The family is in ‘transition’ (Imamura 1990; Ochiai 1997); it is in ‘crisis’, (Hayashi 2002); and other times, it is simply described as becoming more diverse in its forms and definitions. In contrast to an idealized nuclear or extended family, there are many more families today (White 2002). There are so many types of families that they could even be described as ‘individual networks’ (Fukushima 2002). How has the family changed, or remained unchanged, and why? To what extent is this unique to Japan? And what implications does it have for Japan as well as other industrial societies? In the context of economic slowdown and major demographic shifts in the 1990s, the Japanese family has undergone a number of significant changes. The marriage rate has fallen, while the divorce rate has risen. The patterns of cohabitation of members of the extended family have also shifted with the decrease in ‘traditional’ three-generation households and with the increase in the number of young men and women who continue to stay single and live with their parents. Meanwhile, the mean age of first marriage has climbed to the world’s highest level, and fertility has fallen to a level well below replacement. Japan is the most rapidly ageing society in the world, and the population is projected to decline after 2006. This rapid ageing of the population will necessarily imply great change in intergenerational relations, as there will be far fewer young to look after the old. It will also have significant ramifications for the nation’s social welfare and labour market. These issues are at the heart of public debates in Japanese society today. Rapid social transformation accompanied by population ageing, plummeting fertility rates and diversified definitions of the family are, indeed, common among many industrial countries. Italy, in particular, faces similar problems and has many characteristics that invite comparison with Japan. Both countries have low divorce rates and low rates of birth outside marriage. In both countries, children tend to live with their families until marriage. Both countries have an industrial structure characterized by many small firms and family-run enterprises. Both countries experienced defeat in the Second World War but recovered with rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s. This is part of the reason why both countries have had rapid demographic transitions to low fertility in the early
4 Marcus Rebick and Ayumi Takenaka post-war period, leading to an ageing population structure in the early twenty-first century. Both countries also began to receive growing numbers of immigrants (foreign migrants) in recent decades. (As of 2002, 2.0 million and 1.5 million foreign residents were registered in Japan and Italy, making up 1.6 per cent and 2.6 per cent of the nations’ populations, respectively SOPEMI 2004).1 These numbers, however, remain fairly small in comparison to other industrial countries, although immigration is increasingly seen as a way to ‘substitute’ for the decreasing and ageing populations (United Nations, Population Division 2000). Moreover, both countries appear to have similar approaches to the provision of social welfare. Esping-Andersen (1990) places Japan in a corporatist/conservative group along with Italy in his scheme of ‘three worlds of welfare capitalism’. In this view, Japan, along with Italy, is typical of countries that are ‘strongly committed to the preservation of traditional familyhood . . . (t)he state will only interfere when the family’s capacity to service its members is exhausted’ (ibid.: 27). Using Italy for a comparison, we come to see that the changes occurring in Japan are representative of a pattern common to other countries, especially those of Southern Europe, rather than an aberration based on ‘unique’ features of Japanese society. This volume examines the changes that are taking place in the Japanese family comparatively by looking at broader social, economic and global contexts. We begin by looking at the demographic changes including the rising age of marriage, declining birth rate and ageing of the population and their effect on social welfare arrangements in Japan. It is no longer considered desirable or even feasible to leave the care of children or the elderly entirely to the family. The demographic change is also compared to similar trends in the south European countries. The next part of the book looks at the gender balance of labour and responsibility both within the household and at work, including the way in which the Japanese language reflects these shifts in the gender balance. The third and final part of the book explores the changing definition and function of the family. There has been a shift in the boundaries between family and community and between family and state, and the role of the state in the provision of social welfare has increased. Here, we also find a useful comparison with developments in Italy. Before beginning our discussion, we would like to clarify some of the terms that we will be using in this introduction. The term setai refers to a household, officially defined in Japan as a group of people sharing a kitchen. The term ie, usually rendered in English as ‘stem family’, refers to a family lineage with a (theoretically) eternal existence, stretching from the distant past into the future. The ie, which was institutionalized in the Meiji period in an attempt to modernize the nation’s family system, is preserved through patrilineal links between generations. Typically the eldest son inherits responsibility for the ie, taking over as its head. All of his siblings will either marry out of the ie (in the case of women) or move out (in the case of younger brothers). Reinforced by a patriarchal head and hierarchy by birth, the ie system maintained a strict gender-based role division within the family and household. What makes the Japanese ie distinctive, however, is the widespread use of adoption whenever the survival of the ie is at stake. If there are no sons, or if none
The changing Japanese family 5 of the sons is suitable to be an heir, the husband of a daughter may be adopted to become the new head of the ie. If there are no children at all, then a son may still be adopted. An important feature of this system, therefore, is the continuity of the ie, or family line, rather than an emphasis on blood relations. Japanese law, since the beginning of the Meiji period, has underpinned this system by stipulating that all Japanese belong to the ie (thus, non-Japanese residents do not belong to one), as reflected in the population registration system. Known as koseki, this registration system ensures that all married couples and their children share a surname as a family unit. The vast majority of the time, women change their names in marrying or moving into their husbands’ registries. Finally, the term kazoku is typically translated as family and broadly understood as blood-related kin and conjugal relationships, while katei, or ‘home’, broadly refers to the ‘family domain’ or a place where kazoku shares a communal life. Kazoku is the most amorphous and the hardest to define, and some use the term to refer to people’s sense of family, or family identity (Ueno 1994). Murdock (1949) defined the family as ‘a social group characterized by common residence, economic cooperation, and reproduction’. The family, since then, has diverged so much in its functions, types, and meanings, and it is difficult to define it simply by these characteristics (Tsumura 2002). It may be more useful to think of ‘the family’ in terms of boundaries. Boundaries are shifting for all these – the concepts of setai, ie, kazoku and katei. Before we discuss these shifts, we must look more closely at the demographic and socio-economic changes that are taking place, and how they are related to the state of the family.
Japan’s demographic transition Ageing Japan, followed by Italy, is the most rapidly ageing society in the world. Figure 1.1 shows trends in the proportion of the population over the age of sixty-five over time in comparison with some other OECD countries to illustrate this point. In 1950, the proportion of the population aged 65 and over represented only 5 per cent of Japan’s population; by 1997, this rate increased to 15 per cent, surpassing the proportion of children under 15, and increased further to 20 per cent by 2005. The proportion of the elderly over 65 years of age is projected to increase further to 22.5 per cent in 2010 and 30 per cent in 2030 (CAO Cabinet Office 2004a). The causes of this phenomenon are well known and reviewed by Ogawa et al. in this volume. Japan moved through what is usually called the ‘first demographic transition’ rapidly in the late 1940s and early 1950s, with the total fertility rate (the number of children born on average to each woman over her lifetime) dropping from 4.54 in 1947 to 2.04 in 1957 (MHLW1 2004). At the same time, neo-natal mortality rates dropped due to better health care and nutrition. There is nothing exceptional about this pattern, common to all economically developed societies, but its rapidity has resulted in the rapid ageing of the population that we see today. The other factor that has been important is the great increase in longevity of the
6
Marcus Rebick and Ayumi Takenaka 30.0
Germany Japan Italy UK US OECD Total
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0 1990
1995
2000
2005 Year
2010
2015
2020
Figure 1.1 Percentage of population over age 65, selected OECD countries. Source: United Nations, Population Database.
Japanese population. In 2003, Japan had the highest life expectancy in the world, at 78.4 for men and 85 for women (Statistics Bureau 2004). Life expectancy has increased consistently over the period since the Second World War, rising by nearly 30 years since 1947, but half of this rise occurred in the 13 years up to 1960. In the years since 1960, life expectancy rose more gradually, but this is the period in which Japan overtook other developed countries. Cohabitation patterns Along with ageing, Ogawa et al. (Chapter 2, this volume) point out that the patterns of cohabitation have shifted with the decrease in three-generation households, both in terms of absolute numbers and share of all households. In 1975, three-generational households represented 18 per cent of all households, but the percentage decreased gradually to 10 per cent in 2002, while the share of single-member households increased, from 18 per cent in 1975 to 23 per cent in 2002 (MHLW1 2004). Elderly households, made up of members over 65 years of age, also grew in numbers, constituting 15.8 per cent of all households in 2003. Overall, the average number of household members steadily decreased, from 5 in 1950 to 2.5 in 2004 (ibid.). The meaning of cohabitation, however, brings us to another of the ways in which the boundaries of the family have become blurred. In recent years, many families have resolved the difficult problem of care for the elderly by developing arrangements where the older generation lives next to the younger ‘nuclear’ household, but not directly with it. One example of this may be seen in cases where property is subdivided and the younger family lives in a separate house next door. Another arrangement is to have the house itself subdivided with
The changing Japanese family 7 a separate apartment for the older generation to live in (Brown 2003). Bettio (Chapter 4, this volume) reports a similar trend in Italy where many grown-ups continue to live near their parents after moving out of their parental homes. At the same time, living nearby does not automatically translate into close family relationships; Japanese children, who live with, or near, their parents more frequently than American and Swedes, for instance, reportedly maintain less frequent contact with their parents (Inoue and Ebara 2005). While these arrangements may not technically be defined as cohabitation, it would be difficult to classify them as completely separate households. A question that arises is how to define a household (setai), or how to classify a variety of arrangements, including the cases where different generations live in close proximity in the same city, rather than separated by great distances. From a policy viewpoint, it is important that statistics reflect this variety as much as possible, taking into account the blurring of what in the past may have been seen as a clear distinction. Falling fertility Another significant demographic shift over the last ten years has been the decline of the fertility rate to levels well below replacement level. In 2004, for example, it is estimated that the total fertility rate stood at 1.29 whereas the level needed for maintenance of the population is 2.1 (MHLW2 2005). Although the decline in fertility first became a major issue in the 1990s, the actual decline from replacement levels began in 1973 and has continued steadily ever since. This decline in fertility is usually distinguished from the earlier decline as there was a period of stable fertility from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s. The earlier decline was caused by the new availability of contraceptives (mainly condoms) and the legalization and provision of abortion. At the same time, falling levels of infant and child mortality would have meant that families needed fewer children to be sure of reaching a desired family size. The more recent decline of the last thirty years, sometimes referred to as the ‘second demographic transition’, is largely attributed to improved employment opportunities (including higher wages) for women, along with the rapid growth in the educational attainment of women. In 1970, the average woman aged 25–29 working full-time as a regular worker earned only 62 per cent of what her male counterpart earned.2 By 1999, she was earning 83 per cent.3 The percentage of managerial posts held by women tripled between 1982 and 2003 (Rebick, Chapter 5, this volume). In 1970, 18 per cent of high-school graduate women were going on to higher education, and most were headed to two-year colleges. In 2003, 47 per cent were headed to higher education (compared to 42.7 per cent of men), and almost two-thirds of these went to four-year universities (MOE 2004).4 The declining fertility rate is also due to perceived difficulty in raising children, particularly by working mothers. As Nagase (Chapter 3, this volume) points out, many women perceive that it is difficult to balance work and childrearing, and this is, in part, attributable to a perception of inadequate childcare facilities and high costs associated with childcare (CAO Cabinet Office 2001a).
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Marcus Rebick and Ayumi Takenaka
Consequently, the ideal number of children (2.62 in 1982 and 2.56 in 2002) far exceeds the number of children women actually have (Inoue and Ebara 2005). Declining marriage rate, delayed marriages Rising aspirations and the rising opportunity cost of marriage have led to an increasing average age of (first) marriage – 29.6 for men and 27.8 for women (MHLW2 2005) – which is associated with a drop in the number of children born within marriages. (Out of wedlock births remain very low in Japan, at 1.9 per cent of all births in 2002, compared to 11 per cent in Italy, 56 per cent in Sweden, 41 per cent in the United Kingdom and 34 per cent in the United States. (Bettio, Chapter 4, this volume; Martin et al. 2003). They have also led to a dramatic rise in the proportion of women who never marry (Ogawa et al. Chapter 2, this volume). On average, the drop in the number of children within marriage and the rise in the proportion of women who never marry have contributed about equally to the decline in fertility (Retherford et al. 1996). Much of the decline in the numbers born within marriage can be attributed to the increasing age of first marriage. There are a number of plausible explanations for these trends explored in the chapters by Ogawa et al. and Nagase. One is that women continue to have difficulty balancing a career with a family. As Nagase shows, there is a tendency for young working women to put off marriage or having children because they believe that once they start a family, they will either need or want to devote all of their time to raising children. Indeed, a 1997 survey by the Cabinet Office shows that women consider ‘loss of freedom’ as the major opportunity cost associated with marriage. Even though the government is encouraging firms to become more family friendly and has mandated maternity leave, this has not had much effect in practice (Sato 2000). Also, many women now increasingly view marriage, even with a financially secure partner, as an unattractive prospect. This is, in part, attributable to the gender division of labour so prominent in post-war Japan. While men have assumed responsibility for the majority of the earnings, the role of women has been relegated to household chores and childcare. As Rebick (Chapter 5, this volume) shows, men continue to engage in long hours of work, despite the recent decline in the official number of working hours. The men also spend many hours socializing with work colleagues after working hours. One well-publicized survey reports that for households with young children, men spend, on average, as little as 5 minutes per day on housework (compared to 3–4 hours for full-time working women) and less than half an hour on childcare (versus over 4 hours on average for women) (CAO Cabinet Office 2001b: table 10). Moreover, the type of housework men actually engage in is different from that of women, as described by Nakatani (Chapter 6, this volume): fathers’ housework typically includes ‘playing with children’, ‘bathing children’ and ‘shopping on Sundays’, while relatively few fathers prepare meals or change diapers (Inoue and Ebara 2005; Yuzawa 2003). Whether or not these figures (obtained in a household survey where women were the primary respondents) are true, women continue to bear the primary responsibility for raising a family. Moreover, while women are often left with the full burden of childcare, they are also responsible for
The changing Japanese family 9 the care of their elderly parents or their spouse’s elderly parents. As Nakatani shows in her chapter, the absence of men at home also leads to stress and mental health problems as women feel increasingly isolated in their suburban neighbourhoods. In part, as a consequence of these ‘barriers’ associated with marriage, women’s expectations of prospective marriage partners have reportedly gone up, as Carroll describes in her chapter; today, women expect of men not only three ‘highs’ (high income, high level of education and tall height), but also three ‘goods’ (good looking, good natured and good background). Higher expectations of prospective marriage partners, in turn, help delay marriages. The patrilineal ie system in Japan may be contributing to difficulties in marriage as smaller family sizes now mean that many families have no sons to carry on the family line. For example, a one-child family has only a 50 per cent chance of having a son. In cases where there is no son, it becomes necessary for a son-in-law to be adopted into the family in order to carry on the family line and attend to the memorial rites for the deceased. This can become more difficult as normally the adopted son cannot be a first son, as he already has responsibilities to his birth family. Thus some of the women who have no brothers may feel restricted to finding a spouse that has an older brother (Ochiai 1997). This is possible, but much more difficult in a world without arranged marriages. Resolution of this problem requires not only a change in the entire concept of the family system in Japan, but also a change in the legal basis of family formation in Japan. Moreover, the recession of the 1990s has also likely had an effect on marriage rates. Economic considerations are important in the marriage decision, particularly when a secure income is needed in order to pay for the considerable costs of setting up a new household. As Rebick (Chapter 5, this volume) explains, the 1990s saw a sharp downturn in the job market for new school and university graduates and many young men are unable to find long-term positions in firms. There has been a growth in both unemployment and the use of casual labour, particularly among young men and women. Unemployment rates reached 10.4 per cent in 2001 for men aged 15–24 and 8.7 per cent for women. More than 40 per cent of working men and women in the same age group were working either part-time or in short-term contracts, with much lower earnings than full-time employees.5 This is also one area where the Italian experience is similar to that of Japan (Bettio and Trifilletti Chapters 5 and 11, this volume). Cohabitation of the young with their parents before marriage may also be a factor in the delay of marriage and childbirth. As Ogawa et al. (Chapter 2, this volume) point out, there are increasing numbers of young adults who live with their parents until their late twenties or beyond. Sometimes referred to as ‘parasite singles’, they make up 19 per cent of all men and 14 per cent of all women between the ages 25 and 34 (Yamada 1999). There has been some debate about exactly why this is happening. One sociologist (ibid.) blames the children for being parasitic and their parents for being overly indulgent. Other observers (Genda 2001) see the poor state of the labour market and the lack of job opportunities as responsible for the inability of many young people to settle down. Certainly, the difficulty that young graduates have in finding good, stable full-time jobs seems to have some
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relation to the delay of marriage, but it is not clear that the trend would be reversed even if economic growth picks up in the future. There are good reasons to believe that the labour market for new graduates may never recover to its former character, as firms are restructuring their personnel policy away from hiring large numbers of full-time ‘core’ employees directly out of school and relying more heavily on contract or other forms of temporary labour. In other words, the tendency for children to live at home is unlikely to change in the future. In this respect, the Italian case as described in the chapter by Bettio provides us with an interesting comparison with Japan. In Italy, the same tendencies for later marriage and for children to live with their parents are also evident and this is referred to as the ‘long family’ pattern. As Bettio points out, many of the characteristics of Japanese society that may act to lower fertility are also present in Italy. In Italy, women do the vast majority of household tasks. As in Japan, there is a marked tendency for young people to live with their parents. Births out of wedlock are rare and young couples do not tend to live together before marriage. The demographic trends that we have examined in this section are of great concern to the government. Ageing of the population, declining fertility and delayed (or fewer) marriages, the government views, would ‘threaten the vitality of society . . . and economic growth’(CAO Cabinet Office 2005b) and are top priority issues in government policy today. (In 2002, the government allocated three trillion yen for children and family support.) In trying to reverse these trends, the government has launched a series of campaigns (e.g. the ‘Welcome Baby Campaign’ of 1992) and initiatives (the Angel Plans of 1994, 1999 and the new Children and Childrearing Support Plan (kodomo, kosodate oen plan) of 2005). One set of initiatives aims to facilitate women to both work and have families. Along with paid maternity and paternity leave policy, they provide subsidized childcare. The government has also promoted the concept of ‘family-friendly’ employment practices, such as flexible shifts, job sharing and crèches at the workplace. Another set of policy initiatives is directed at young singles, promoting stable employment and encouraging them to marry (sooner). In an attempt to increase full-time employment for youth, the government has set up special employment agencies and career counselling services throughout the country. With aid from the central government, local governments have also hosted a variety of dating activities for youth. (In 2001 and 2002, the Nara Prefectural government ran a massive campaign distributing leaflets entitled, ‘Marriage Story: Cinderella Story of the 21st Century,’ to its young single residents (Asahi Shinbun 6/12/02). With declining arranged marriages, governments, both central and local, are increasingly attempting to take over the role of matchmakers.
The shifting gender balance In the context of these demographic changes, ‘the family’ has taken on divergent meanings and functions in contemporary Japanese society. These changes are observed in terms of kazoku, katei, setai and the ie, as well as boundaries between family and other social institutions.
The changing Japanese family 11 One manifestation of this is the shift in the gender balance in the workplace, the division of labour at home and expected gender roles. The other is the change in the relationship between the family and community and between the family and the state. The division of labour in the Japanese workplace has gradually changed over the past few decades. The labour force participation rate of women age 15–64 has risen from 50 per cent in 1975 to 60 per cent in 2004 (MHLW3 2005). Much more significant, however, is the fact there has been an increase in the rate at which women physically work away from the household. In 1975, 40 per cent of working women worked at home, either as self-employed (often piece-workers) (naishoku) or as family workers. By 2000, that ratio had dropped by almost two-thirds to 14 per cent. As the external wage rate for women has risen, married women increasingly have moved to employment outside of the home as part-time workers (Osawa 1988). The number of female part-time workers increased from 0.57 million in 1960 to 8.6 million in 2004, representing over 30 per cent of all female workers today (Inoue and Ebara 2005; MHLW4 2004). As Rebick discusses in this volume, the decline of family-run enterprises in the 1990s almost certainly accelerated this trend. At the same time that women are moving into outside employment, the government is encouraging businesses to set up day care facilities at the workplace, allowing women to bring their families into the workplace. In 1996, 6 per cent of firms with more than 500 employees had set up an on-site crèche (Sato 2000).6 As women have become increasingly involved as employees after marriage, and as their education levels have risen, they have also started to seek better working conditions and seemingly more interesting and challenging work. As we have seen, more women participate in the labour force and engage in high-status occupations today. In Japan, however, despite the introduction of legislation to discourage age discrimination, it remains difficult to enter career-track employment after the age of thirtyfive (Ono and Rebick 2003). The only way in which women can avoid having to do this is to maintain a career job through most of the period of raising children. We have already mentioned government initiatives to encourage firms to reemploy women after they take a break for childrearing, and to provide on-site daycare. Even if a break is taken, however, men must start to take more responsibility for childcare and other household tasks if women are to manage full-time careers. Attitudes concerning the gender division of work have shifted more noticeably. According to a government survey on gender equality, in 1992, 60 per cent of respondents supported, while 34 per cent opposed, the statement: ‘Husbands should work outside the home and wives should take care of their families.’ In 2005, this trend reversed, slightly more people (48.9 per cent) opposing the view than supporting it (45.2 per cent) (CAO Cabinet Office 2005a). As Nakatani (Chapter 6, this volume) shows, there are, indeed, signs that the boundaries that distinguish men’s work from women’s work are beginning to shift, but at present, most of the shift is taking place in attitudes rather than in reality. Carroll’s chapter (Chapter 7, this volume) shows us that gender relations are also changing in language use, with greater equality in terms of address. This reflects the trend that a growing number of married couples see themselves as ‘friend couples’ (Nakatani Chapter 6, this volume; Ochiai 1997).
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Shifts in the boundaries of the family While the gender balance in work between men and women is making a modest shift, there are other boundaries that are opening in such a way as to alter the relationship between mother and child. In the past, young parents were given advice and help in raising children from their parents and other relatives including siblings. As Ochiai (1997) points out, there were more of these resources available during the 1950s and 1960s than today, because parents of that generation tended to have many more siblings since they were born prior to the first demographic transition. Today’s parents are not so fortunate, and the problems of mothers finding it difficult to raise children in isolation have been a major concern in Japan over the last twenty years. One way in which this problem is being ameliorated is through the increasing involvement of the community with families in the neighbourhood. Roberts (2002) reports on an initiative taken by a nursery in Tokyo, and Sasagawa (Chapter 8, this volume) describes a programme for ‘educating women to be mothers’ in a middle-class suburb of Tokyo. The blurring of the boundary between the family and the outside world is also seen in language use as Carroll (Chapter 7, this volume) describes how the distinction between the family in-group versus the outside (uchi-soto) is being altered in colloquial language use. The growing number of ‘friend couples’, mentioned earlier, blurs the boundary between family and friend. And so does the current tendency that youth establish closer friendships with schoolmates because of the reduced number of siblings (Carroll, Chapter 7, this volume). She also speculates that the frequent absence of grandparents, along with growing privatization at home (due to more private rooms and the ubiquitous presence of TV sets etc.) may have eroded children’s communicative skills in dealing with the outside world.
Family and the state We also see a blurring of the boundary between the family and the state. Goodman’s account of the discovery of child abuse in Japan (Chapter 9, this volume) shows us how the state has become directly involved in the parenting of children. Before the 1990s, child abuse was considered to be rare or even absent in Japan and this was attributed to the (alleged) strong family structure and stability of the society. In the early 1990s, however, Japan ‘discovered’ that child abuse did exist, and since then, the number of cases of reported abuse has increased exponentially. The state’s reaction to this has been to become involved in these cases, even removing children from their families, where before, little action was taken by authorities. In this manner, the family is no longer viewed as a sacrosanct entity immune to the outside world. Izuhara points out in her chapter that the development of state pensions in the 1960s had already brought the state into the sphere of the ‘family’ to some extent, by reducing the need for intergenerational transfers from children to their parents. This was especially important at that time, because rapid growth meant that the savings of the older generation could not provide for an acceptable standard of living in newly affluent Japan. Japan also desired to match Western levels of provision of
The changing Japanese family 13 basic social welfare. Despite this intervention by the state, the majority of the old in Japan continued to live with their families in three-generation households as in the past. Recently however, this has become more problematic for a number of reasons. Rising levels of affluence now mean that many families do not aspire to these living arrangements. The fall in the number of children in each family also means that there are many cases where it is difficult for the children to accommodate parents, especially if they have demands on both the wife and husband’s side. Many of the elderly do not wish to leave their homes in the countryside if their children now live in the cities. Finally, the higher age at which women now have children means that they can often be caught in the position of having to care for two generations at the same time, or two generations in succession without much of a break. The government has responded to this problem through a ‘Gold Plan’ to increase the provision of old-age care institutions and also by providing old-age care insurance to help individuals pay for their institutionalized care. Nevertheless, the government would prefer if families were able to cohabit with their elderly as much as possible.7 The desire of the Japanese government to rely on families for welfare provision, both for the elderly and for young children, is similar to the pattern observed in Italy and Southern Europe. In both cases, the deliberate use of the family as a resource by the state appears to be greater than is the case in liberal welfare regimes where individual self-reliance is given greater emphasis. There is a temptation to draw simple parallels between the Italian and Japanese cases. For example, Catholicism and Confucianism are sometimes held to be the most important influences behind the reliance on the family. As Trifiletti (Chapter 11, this volume) points out, however, the story is not nearly that simple. In both cases, an examination of the historical process that has led to the present welfare regime is necessary for a full appreciation of its ideological origins. These shifts in the relationship between the state, family and community attest to the changing boundary between the public and private spheres. Long considered a private sacrosanct entity, the family’ has, indeed, been shaped by the outside world. Sasagawa (Chapter 8, this volume) explicitly tells us how community and school activities help define motherhood, and how mothers, in turn, internalize their own sense of what it takes to be a ‘proper’ mother through participation in such activities. Nakatani (Chapter 6, this volume) also discusses how parental roles are shaped, and reinforced, by the outside world; ‘nurturing fathers’, who actively devote themselves to childrearing, often face barriers, and become discouraged, because most childcare facilities and services are designed for mothers. ‘The family’, then, cannot be examined in isolation from the outside world. Consequently, it may only be defined in relation to other social institutions. The changing ‘family’ in Japan is a manifestation of the broader societal changes we witness today, as well as a force in shaping the future trends.
Conclusion The Japanese family has evolved and continues to evolve. In some respects, however, it has not changed. Despite the rapidly declining birth rate and increasing age of
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(first) marriage, as Bettio (Chapter 4, this volume) points out, births out of wedlock have remained rare. Albeit the current trend towards delayed and fewer marriages, majority of Japanese do eventually get married, and most women (88 per cent) and men (87 per cent) do intend, and aspire, to get married ‘some day’ (Inoue and Ebara 2005). Despite changing attitudes towards (ideal) gender roles, as mentioned earlier, there is a persistent societal belief in the importance of intensive mothering for infants (Curtin 2002). Even though growing numbers of women advance their careers without interrupting work, more women (56 per cent versus 28 per cent) still aspire to assume the primary responsibility for childrearing by quitting work (Inoue and Ebara 2005). ‘Nurturing fathers’, discussed by Nakatani (Chapter 6, this volume), are increasingly praised and idealized at least by government campaigns, yet in reality, such fathers continue to face many difficulties in society. There is a persistent gap between the ideal and actual practices. Despite its diversifying functions, moreover, ‘the family’ has remained the most basic unit of society (Ida 1998). It continues to serve as the basis for the country’s welfare policy and employment and hiring practices. There are growing concerns today about the alleged decline of ‘family values’ in association with the increasing divorce rate, domestic violence, and single parenthood (Yuzawa 2003). Despite these ‘problems’, ‘the family’, or kazoku, continues to be regarded the most important thing in one’s life (Tokei Suri Kenkyujo 2004). In other words, while the types and meanings of ‘the family’ have become more diverse, ‘family ideals’ have remained more or less uniform (Ida 1998). As we have seen, there is no fixed type or definition of ‘the family’. If we focus on boundaries, it becomes clear that the family is a coping mechanism that adapts to, and also shapes, broader demographic, economic and social changes. The Japanese family is not necessarily in ‘crisis’; neither are there uniquely Japanese ways in which the family is changing, as is mostly clearly shown by the case of Italy.
Acknowledgement We are grateful to Scott North for his comments on an earlier version.
Notes 1 There are some 500,000 residents with Korean nationality in Japan, who might better be described as a native-born minority group. The foreign-born population in Japan is probably closer to 1 per cent of the population. 2 Includes monthly salary and semi-annual bonuses. Figures from the Wage Census. 3 Rebick (Chapter 5, this volume) shows in Figure 5.2 that the average gender differential has narrowed substantially over the past twenty years, even when controlled for age and education. 4 If we include those who have attended senmon gakko (technical training schools), the proportion of Japanese who have some form of higher education rises to around 70 per cent for both men and women.
The changing Japanese family 15 5 Special Survey of the Labour Force Survey, February 2001, and Labour Force Survey, Annual Report, 2001. 6 The provision of off-site daycare has probably been more influential in allowing women to work while raising young children. The government’s Angel Plans have developed daycare to the point where Japan now has some of the best provision in the OECD. 7 The policies of the Angel Plans including daycare provision and the Gold Plan are somewhat contradictory in the role that they provide for women. The Angel Plans, with their emphasis on the provision of state-subsidized daycare are encouraging women to stay at work. The Gold Plan, however, has emphasized the provision of family-based care for the elderly and this tends to keep women at home.
References ‘Asahi Shinbun’ ‘Kuni ga en musubi “chotto matte” ’ State-initiated match-making: ‘wait a minute’ (Accessed 6/12/2002). Brown, N. C. (2003) ‘Under one roof: The evolving story of three-generation housing in Japan’ in Traphagan, T. and Knight, J. (eds) Demographic Change and the Family in Japan’s Aging Society, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, pp. 53–71. CAO Cabinet Office (2001a) Kokumin Seikatsu Hakusho, Tokyo: Naikakufu. —— (2001b) Shakai Shakatsu Kihon Chosa – Seikatsu Jikan (Zenkoku) (Basic Survey of Social Life – Time Use) Online. Available http://www.stat.go.jp/data/shakai/ 2001/jikan/zenkoku/zenkoku.htm (Accessed 17/6/05). —— (2004a) Annual Report on the Aging Society, Tokyo: Naikakufu. —— (2004b) Shoshika Shakai Hakusho, Tokyo: Naikakufu. —— (2005a) Danjo Kyodo Sankaku Shakai ni kansuru Seron Chosa (Public Opinion Survey on a Gender-equal Society), Tokyo: Naikakufu. —— (2005b) Shoshika Shakaitaisaku no Kihonteki Wakugumi (Basic Framework of Measures for Declining Fertility). Available http://www8.cao.go.jp/shoushi/ framework.html (Accessed 19/4/05). Curtin, S. J. (2002) ‘Changing Attitudes Towards Gender Roles in Japan: 2002 Snapshot’, Social Trends 8. Glocom Platform. Online. Available http://www.glocom.org/ special_topics/social_trends/20020924_trends_s8/ (Accessed 1/7/05). Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Fukushima, M. (2002) Aremo Kazoku, Koremo Kazoku, (That is a Family, and This is Also a Family), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Genda, Y. (2001) Shigoto no Naka no Aimai na Fuan: Yureru Jakunen no Genzai (A Vague Anxiety at Work: Shaken Youth in Contemporary Japan), Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha Press. Hayashi, M. (2002) Kazoku no Fukken (The Restoration of Fatherhood), Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho. Ida, H. (1998) Singuru Tani no Renai, Kazoku ron (Toward Individually Based Family and Loving Relationships), Tokyo: Sekai Shisosha. Imamura, A. E. (1990) ‘The Japanese Family’, Online. Available http://www.askasia.org/ frclasrm/readings/r000128.htm Inoue, T. and Ebara, Y. (eds) (2005) Women’s Data Book, Tokyo: Yuhikaku. Martin, J. A., Hamilton, B. E., Smith, P. D., Ventura, S. J., Menacker, F. and Munson, M. L. (2003) ‘Births: Final Data for 2002’, National Vital Statistics Reports, 52(10),
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Hyattsville Maryland: National Center for Health Statistics. Online. Available http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr52/nvsr52_10.pdf (Accessed 16/6/05). MHLW1 (various years) Kosei Tokei Yoran (Handbook of Welfare Statistics), Tokyo: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. MHLW2 (2005) Jinko Dotai Tokei Geppo Nenkei (Gaisu) no Gaikyo (Population Trends Monthly Reports Annual Totals). Online. Available http://www.mhlw.go.jp/ toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/geppo/nengai04/kekka4.html (Accessed 16/6/05). MHLW3 (various years) Rodo Tokei Yoran (Handbook of Labour Statistics), Tokyo: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. MHLW4 (2004) Rodo Hakusho (White Paper on Labour), Tokyo: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. MOE (2004) Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Monbu Kagaku Tokei Yoran (Handbook of Education and Science Statistics), National Printing Office, Tokyo. Murdock, G. P. (1949) Social Structure, New York: The Free Press. Ochiai, E. (1997) The Japanese Family System in Transition: A Sociological Analysis of Family Change in Postwar Japan, Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation. Ono, H. and Rebick, M. E. (2003) ‘Constraints on the level and the efficient use of labor’, in Magnus Blomström, Jennifer Corbett, Fumio Hayashi and Anil Kashyap (eds) Structural Impediments to Growth in Japan, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 225–258. Osawa, M. (1988) ‘Working Mothers: Changing Patterns of Employment and fertility in Japan’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 36(4): 623–650. Retherford, R. D., Ogawa, N. and Sakamoto, S. (1996) ‘Values and Fertility Change in Japan’, Population Studies, 50: 5–25. Roberts, G. S. (2002) ‘Pinning hopes on angels: reflections from an aging Japan’s urban landscape’, in Roger Goodman (ed.) Family and Social Policy in Japan, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 54–91. Sato, H. (2000) ‘The Current Situation of “Family-friendly” Policies in Japan’, Japan Labor Bulletin, 39(2): 5–10. SOPEMI. (2004) Trends in International Migration, Paris: OECD. Statistics Bureau. (2004) Japan Statistical Yearbook, Tokyo: Tokeikyoku. Tokei Suri Kenkyujo (2004) ‘Kokuminsei no kenkyu: dai-11ji zenkoku chosa’ (Study on national culture: the 11th national survey), Tokyo: Tokei Suri Kenkyujo. Tsumura, A. (2002) ‘Kazoku Seisaku, Danjo Byodo to Shakai Hosho’ (Family Life, Gender Equality, and Social Security), Ohara Shakai Mondai Kenkyujo Zasshi, no. 526, 527: 22–38. Ueno, C. (1994) Kindai Kazoku no Seiritsu to Shuen. (The Establishment and End of the Modern Family) Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. United Nations, Population Division (2000) Replacement Migration: Is It A Solution Declining and Ageing Populations? New York: United Nations. White, M. I. (2002) Perfectly Japanese: Making Families in an Era of Upheaval, Los Angeles and Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Yamada, M. (1999) Parasaito Shinguru no Jidai (The Age of the Parasite Single), Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho Press. Yuzawa, Y. (2003) Deta de Yomu Kazoku Mondai. (Problems of Family Seen Through Data), Tokyo: NHK Books.
Part II
The demographic transition
2
Demographics of the Japanese family Entering uncharted territory Naohiro Ogawa, Robert D. Retherford and Rikiya Matsukura
Introduction In a number of industrialized countries over the past few decades, fertility rates have been below the level needed to ensure the eventual replacement of the population, and in recent years life expectancy at birth in many of these countries has been quickly approaching eighty years. As a result, population age distributions have been changing markedly, with a relative increase in the number of the elderly and a relative decrease in the number of the young. These age-structural shifts have already been generating a wide range of disruptions at both societal and familial levels in these developed countries (Ermisch 2003). Japan is one of the salient examples of these demographic transformations. Japan’s fertility decline was both the earliest to occur in the postwar period and the greatest in magnitude, while its longevity is at the highest level in the contemporary world (Mason and Ogawa 2001; Ogawa and Retherford 1997). Consequently, Japan’s population ageing process has been extremely rapid, and is expected to accelerate further in the years to come. Although Japan’s current demographic situation is similar in many ways to that of other industrialized countries, there are some important differences that relate to family organization (Hodge and Ogawa 1991, Ogawa and Retherford 1993, 1997). For instance, multigenerational households are still fairly common in Japan, whereas they are very rare in the West (Ogawa and Ermisch 1996). According to the 2001 round of the International Survey of Lifestyles and Attitudes of the Elderly, the proportion of the elderly at ages 60 and over living in three-generation households was only 2 per cent in the United States, 1 per cent in Germany and virtually 0 per cent in Sweden, but 22 per cent in Japan, as shown in Figure 2.1 (Cabinet Office 2002). It should be stressed, however, that due to rapid demographic shifts as well as changing lifestyles, the corresponding figure for Japan has been steadily declining over the past two decades; it was 37 per cent in 1981 and 32 per cent in 1991. Although the Japanese government once viewed the persistence of coresident households as a unique asset that could be tapped to offset the adverse effects of population ageing (Ministry of Health and Welfare 1978), the validity of this view has been increasingly questionable.
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Japan
South Korea
The United States of America
Germany
Sweden
0
20
40
60
80
100
% One-person household
Three-generation household
Married couple only
Other household types
Married couple with single child
Figure 2.1 Living arrangements of elderly persons aged 60 and above in selected countries in 2001.
Despite these declining trends in multigenerational coresidence, approximately 30 per cent of married Japanese women of reproductive age are still living with their husbands’ parents. As discussed in previous studies (Hodge and Ogawa 1991; Ogawa and Retherford 1993), the main determinant of nuptial coresidence is whether or not the husband is the eldest son. As a result of a secular decline in fertility, the probability of the husband being the eldest has been rising. Therefore, for young Japanese women, postnuptial coresidence has been an increasingly serious hindrance to committing to marriage, which is in turn likely to contribute to delaying the timing of marriage. This is one of the primary reasons why Japan has become one of the latest-marrying populations in the world – a far cry from the universal-marriage society of earlier years (Retherford et al. 2001). In this chapter, we will discuss how some of these demographic factors have changed over time, and to what extent they have affected the family organization in post-war Japan. In addition, we will examine to what degree Japan’s post-war demographic shifts have affected its family structure, informal intergenerational support system and conjugal relationships. To facilitate the discussion that
Demographics of the Japanese family 21 follows we will heavily draw upon data gathered in the various rounds of the National Survey of Family Planning conducted by Mainichi Newspapers and a wide range of official data published by the government of Japan such as population census and vital statistics.
Increasing survivorship to ever later ages The story of Japan’s post-war economic miracle has often been told by economists (Ogawa et al. 1993). No less striking, however, was the unprecedented rapidity with which Japan’s demographic transition was completed. Taking mortality improvements for example, when Japan joined the OECD in 1964, Japan’s life expectancy at birth was lower than that for any of the OECD member countries in Western Europe at that time. By the mid-1970s, however, Japanese life expectancy was one of the highest among all the OECD members. In 2003, life expectancy at birth rose to 78.4 years for men (the third highest in the world following Iceland and Hong Kong) and 85.3 years for women (the highest in the world). These long-term improvements in life expectancy at birth in post-war Japan are outlined in Figure 2.2. In this graphical exposition, the data on the average age of the fifty oldest deaths in each year over the period 1950–2002 are plotted separately for men and women (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare various years a). It is worth remarking that the average age of the fifty oldest deaths increased substantially over the second half of the twentieth century for both sexes. In the case of women, the average age of the 50 oldest deaths was 101 in 1950, but increased to almost 108 in 2002. Similarly, it rose from 99 to 106 years during the same period for men. More importantly, the plotted average age trends of the fifty oldest deaths indicate that the tempo of life prolongation has been considerably faster since the second half of the 1960s for both sexes. It should be remembered that the universal medical care programme came into effect in 1961. Taking into account the timing of this important development in Japan’s social security system, it seems plausible that the nation-wide availability of better medical care services 110 108 Age
106 104 102 100 98 1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975 Year
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Figure 2.2 Change in average age of death among fifty oldest persons in Japan, 1950–2002.
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substantially contributed to improving life expectancy at birth and raising the probability of surviving to older ages. These trends in the improvement of mortality for men and women seem to point to the high likelihood that Japan’s life expectancy will continue rising in the years to come. To forecast Japan’s life expectancy for both men and women up to 2025, we have applied the Lee-Carter method to the newest version of a long-term economic-demographic-social security model developed by the Nihon University Population Research Institute (NUPRI), a detailed description of which is available in Ogawa et al. (2002). As described elsewhere (Lee and Carter 1992; Ogawa 2003a), three parameters need to be estimated in the Lee-Carter method, and we have used time-series data over the period 1950–2000 to estimate the parameters. It should also be stressed that one of the key parameters, expressed as (k), has been estimated as a function of the per capita medical expenditure measured in terms of 1990 constant prices, although the conventional Lee-Carter method assumes a function of the time trend. Figure 2.3 presents how well the 90 per cent confidence interval of the LeeCarter method keeps track of actual mortality changes in recent Japan. In this exercise, the parameters have been estimated over the period 1950–1994, and these estimated parameters have been utilized to forecast the mortality change during the period 1995–2003. As can be clearly seen by inspecting these forecast results, one may safely conclude that the Lee-Carter method is applicable to contemporary Japan. The forecast results derived from the NUPRI model show that the life expectancy at birth for males is anticipated to rise from 77.64 years in 2000 to 83.85 years in 2025. In the case of females, the corresponding expected change 95
90
Age
85 Actual
Women 80
Actual
75 Men 70 1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000 Year
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
Figure 2.3 Actual values and values predicted by the Lee-Carter model. Note The values before 1995 are actual values and the values after 1995 are predicted by the Lee-Carter model with 90 per cent confidence intervals indicated.
Demographics of the Japanese family 23 95
90
NUPRI
90% confidence level
Age
Women Government 85
90% confidence level NUPRI Men
80
Government
75 2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
Year
Figure 2.4 Projected life expectancy at birth for Japanese men and women, 2000–2025.
is an increase from 84.62 years in 2000 to 89.44 years in 2025. Figure 2.4 shows these projected results, coupled with the 90 per cent confidence interval for each sex. These mortality future trajectories suggest that the life cycle pattern of the Japanese population is likely to continue shifting to a pronounced extent during the first quarter of this century. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the magnitude of uncertainties involved in these projected mortality scenarios is considerable, as indicated by the 90 per cent range of forecasting errors. For males, the computed range is from 81.76 to 85.55 years, and for females, from 88.04 to 91.21 years. These uncertainties involved in the simulated results for Japan’s future mortality changes point to the need for each individual to make an appropriate contingency plan for the final few years of his/her life. Japan is now at the fourth stage of the epidemiological transition, the stage in which the onset of degenerative disease is delayed (Martin 1989). At present, three degenerative diseases, that is, cancer, heart disease and cerebrovascular disease, are the major sources of mortality. It should be observed that unlike many developed countries where heart disease is the number one killer, cancer has been the leading cause of death in Japan since 1981. Due to a consequence of diversified dietary patterns, however, the intake of salt has been declining, which has, in turn, reduced the incidence of stomach cancer. In contrast, the incidence of lung cancer has been increasing dramatically over the past few decades; it rose by a factor of 7.6 times for men aged 20 and over, and 6.6 times for their female
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counterparts during 1965–2002. Although the percentage of Japanese males who smoke fell from 82 per cent in 1965 to 47 per cent in 2004, it will take considerable time before such changes in smoking habits among men over time lead to a decline in the incidence of lung cancer. Moreover, the percentage of young women at ages 20–29 who smoke grew from 7 to 21 per cent during the same time period (Japan Tobacco Corporation 2005). It is also worthwhile to note that although the decline in the intake of salt has contributed to the reduced incidence of cerebrovascular disease, after adjusting age compositional differences, Japan still has one of the highest death rates from cerebrovascular disease among industrialized nations (Martin 1989). It is often the case that elderly survivors from this disease are paralyzed to a certain degree, which partially accounts for Japan’s wide prevalence of bedridden cases.
Delayed timing of marriages and births Unlike the case of the United States or that of European countries, Japan’s postwar baby boom was extremely short; it lasted only for the three years 1947–1949. Following this short post-war baby boom, Japan’s fertility declined markedly. During the period 1947–1957, the total fertility rate (TFR) declined by more than half from 4.54 to 2.04 children per woman. Although there were only minor fluctuations around the replacement level following this period until the first oil crisis in 1973, the TFR started to fall again and reached 1.29 in 2003, quickly approaching Italy’s 1.23 for 2000 (see Chapter 4). In line with these changes in the TFR, the birth cohort size varied considerably over time. During the baby boom period, there were, on an average, approximately 2.7 million births per year, but by 1957, the number of births had decreased to 1.6 million. In the early 1970s, however, despite the low fertility rate, it increased to more than 2 million, as an ‘echo’ effect of the baby boom cohorts. Since then, it has been on a downward trend again, recording 1.12 million in 2003, considerably less than one half of the annual total births recorded during the baby boom period. To examine the demographic sources of these fertility changes in post-war Japan, period parity progression ratios (PPPRs) can be calculated from 1950 to 2000, using data from a series of population censuses and vital statistics. A detailed description of the methodology for computing PPPRs has been provided elsewhere (Ogawa and Retherford 1993). The trends in the calculated PPPRs are depicted in Figure 2.5. In this graph, the line labelled B to M indicates ratios of progression of women from their birth to their first marriage (PM). The difference (1⫺PM) is the synthetic proportion of women who never marry, that is, the synthetic celibacy rate. The plotted result for B to M indicates that the synthetic celibacy rate increased almost five-fold during the post-Second World War decades, from 4 per cent in 1951 to 19.3 per cent in 2000. This massive shift in the synthetic celibacy rate suggests that Japan is no longer a universal marriage society (Retherford et al. 2001). Between 1951 and 2000, the other progression ratios declined from 97.4 to 85.7 per cent for marriage to first birth (P0), from 93.3 to 77.0 per cent for first to second
Demographics of the Japanese family 25 100
B to M M to 1
90
1 to 2 80 70 60 50 2 to 3
40 30
4+ to 5+
20 3 to 4
10 0
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Year
Figure 2.5 Trends in period parity progression ratios in Japan, 1950–2000. Source: Naohiro Ogawa et al. (2003).
birth (P1), from 58.1 to 32.4 per cent for second to third birth (P2), from 62.5 to 16.1 per cent for third to fourth birth (P3) and from 56.7 to 19.5 per cent for four-plus to five-plus births (P4). Based on these computed probabilities of having children among married Japanese women, we compare a change in the composition of married Japanese women by the number of children they have, in 3 selected years over the last 50 years, as displayed in Figure 2.6. As can easily be seen from this graph, actual family sizes became increasingly homogeneous in Japan between 1951 and 1975, stabilizing at two children (Hodge and Ogawa 1991; Ogawa 2003b). Over the last twenty five years of the last century, the composition of married Japanese women by their number of children became more diversified. For example, two-child families are still the norm, but fewer than one half (47 per cent) of the initial cohort have two children. More importantly, the proportion of married women who remain childless has increased substantially over the recent two decades or so. Because P0 has been declining steadily since 1973, these synthetic cohort percentages who remain childless cannot be dismissed as the result of short-term fluctuations. A similar observation is applicable to the case of PM, the synthetic cohort percentages who never marry. Over the period 1975–2000, the singulate mean age at
26
Ogawa, Retherford and Matsukura
2000
1975
1951
0
10
20
30
40
Childless Three children
50 %
60
One child
70
80
90
100
Two children
Four children or more
Figure 2.6 Compositional change in married Japanese women by the number of children they have, selected years.
marriage of single persons (or SMAM, calculated from age-specific proportions of single persons) increased from 27.6 to 30.8 years for men, and from 24.5 to 28.6 years for women, making Japan one of the latest-marrying populations in the world. During the same period, the proportion never marrying, as measured by the lifetime celibacy rate (calculated as the average of the proportions of single persons at ages 45–49 and 50–54), rose especially for men. It was only 2.1 per cent in 1975, but increased to 12.6 per cent in 2000. For women, it grew only marginally from 4.3 to 5.8 per cent during the corresponding period. Evidently, urbanization and educational attainment are two socioeconomic variables known to influence age at marriage and the proportion never marrying. From 1975 to 2000, the proportion of those residing in urban areas increased only to a slight extent from 76 to 79 per cent. In contrast, the enrolment ratio for tertiary education recorded a remarkable increase, particularly for women. In 1975, 33 per cent of women of eligible age were enrolled in junior colleges or universities, compared with 44 per cent for men. By 2003, these figures had risen to 48 per cent for women and 50 per cent for men (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 2004). Some of the recent empirical studies (Ermisch and Ogawa 1994; Ogawa and Retherford 1993; Retherford et al. 2001) have demonstrated, by using both macro and micro-level data, that women’s rising
Demographics of the Japanese family 27 educational attainment is one of the main determinants driving recent marriage trends, and that urbanization is a relatively minor factor. Female employment is another socioeconomic factor that exerts a strong influence on marriage. Rising educational levels of women, coupled with expanding job opportunities particularly in the service sector in the 1980s and 1990s, have been the main engine driving the expansion of female paid employment. Rising educational levels have led to higher wages, which have been shown to have a strong positive effect on the probability of a single Japanese woman working full time. The effect of rising educational levels on women’s full-time work is amplified in Japan, as in other industrialized nations, by the economic returns to tertiary education which are higher for women than for men (Clark and Ogawa 1992; Ogawa 2000; Ogawa and Clark 1995). The ratio of female to male hourly wage (including bonuses) for full-time work among those below age 30 increased from 74 per cent in 1973 to 90 per cent in 2003 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare various years b). The considerable rise in the wage ratio for younger persons occurred because of increasing gender equality not only in educational attainment, but also in job tenure as women married later and worked longer before resigning (if they did resign) to marry and start families (Retherford et al. 2001). Apart from these socioeconomic forces, the phenomenon of single adults continuing to live with their parents has become quite common in contemporary Japan. These single adults have been termed ‘parasite singles’ because they are grown children who tend not to contribute much to paying for household expenses (Retherford et al. 2001). Among single women aged 22 and over, excluding students, the proportion living with parents was fairly steady during the 1990s, at 95 per cent in 1990 and 94 per cent in 1998 (Population Problems Research Council of the Mainichi Newspapers 1998). The rising rate of divorce is another factor making marriage less attractive to Japanese women. The rising divorce rate signals to women that marriage is increasingly less likely to provide them with long-term security. Between 1960 and 1995 the total divorce rate (the number of divorces that 1,000 newly married women would have by age 50 according to this year’s age-specific divorce rates) increased from 81 to 203 (Ogawa and Ermisch 1994; Yamamoto and Kojima 1997), implying that approximately 20 per cent of marriages will end in divorce. Recently released estimates of the crude divorce rate (divorces per 1,000 population) indicate a jump from 1.6 to 2.3 between 1995 and 2003. The value of 2.3 exceeds the value of 1.9 for France in 2000 and is approaching the value of 2.4 in Sweden in 2001. In contrast, in Italy, a predominately Catholic country, the corresponding figure is 0.5 for 1999 (United Nations Various years). There is one important development in the mechanism of marital fertility in the 1990s: although P1 had remained around 85 per cent for almost two decades, it began to fall appreciably in the 1990s, which corresponds with Japan’s prolonged economic recession. A recent study by Ogawa (2003b) has yielded two valuable findings, using micro-level data gathered in the 2000 round of the National Survey on Family Planning (Population Problems Research Council of the Mainichi Newspapers 2000). First, married women were influenced by the increased economic uncertainties in the 1990s which significantly affected their
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Ogawa, Retherford and Matsukura
interval from first to second birth. Married women who were exposed to various risks arising from the exceptionally long recession and employment restructuring have an 81.5 per cent probability of having a second birth, as compared with a 90 per cent probability among those who were not exposed to such economic risks. Second, the timing of second birth was closely related to the months spent between marriage and first birth, which has been expanding in recent years. This result implies that the increasing interval between marriage and first birth in recent years has been contributing to the increase in the next birth interval. Because a more detailed analysis of the recent drop in P1 has been made elsewhere (Ogawa 2003b), we do not discuss this aspect here.
Changing pattern of coresidence and declining probabilities of home deaths Marriage-related value shifts have also occurred with the change in the form of marriage. Between 1955 and 1998, the proportion of marriages that were arranged fell from 63 to 7 per cent, as presented in Figure 2.7 (Population Problems Research Council of the Mainichi Newspapers 2000). The decline of arranged marriage appears to be closely linked to the end of universal marriage in Japan (Retherford et al. 2001). Closely related to the decline of arranged marriage is the decline in the proportion of newly married couples who coreside with parents. Between 1955 and 1998, the proportion of newly married couples who coresided with parents fell from 64 to 23 per cent (Population Problems Research Council of the Mainichi Newspapers 2000). As plotted in Figure 2.7, the fall in this proportion was cushioned somewhat by the rise in the proportion of husbands who are eldest 80 70
Husband is eldest son
60
Arranged marriage
%
50 40
Coresidence with parents
30 Coresidence with husband’s parents 20 10 Coresidence with wife’s parents
0 1955
1960
1965
1970
1975 Year
1980
1985
1990
1995
Figure 2.7 Trend in the proportion of marriages that are arranged, the proportion of newly married couples who coresided with parents at the time of marriage and the proportion of husbands who were eldest sons, Japan, 1955–1998. Source: Robert D. Retherford, Naohiro Ogawa and Rikiya Matsukura (2001), p. 86.
Demographics of the Japanese family 29 sons, who traditionally coreside with their parents. As can be seen from Figure 2.7, the proportion of husbands who were eldest sons rose from 40 to 72 per cent between 1957 and 1998 as a consequence of earlier fertility decline. It is also important to note that the traditional pattern of coresidence with husband’s parents rather than wife’s parents is disappearing. Extrapolation of the trend in coresidence with husband’s parents and the trend in coresidence with wife’s parents suggests that the two curves will converge in about two decades. In addition to the declining proportion of newly married women living with their parents (-in-law), the proportion of the elderly coresiding with their children has fallen substantially in Japan, as mentioned in the introductory section of this chapter. Because coresidence facilitates an exchange in resources between generations within each household, these recent declining trends in the prevalence of multigenerational coresidence have been affecting various aspects of post-retirement life of the elderly in Japan. One of the salient examples of these effects can be seen in the change in the place of deaths among the elderly. For instance, the proportion of deaths among the elderly aged 65 and over that occurred at home has declined steadily over time. In 1965, it was 82.6 per cent, but declined to 13.3 per cent in 2001 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare various years a). To shed light on such marked changes in the place of deaths among the elderly over time, we have undertaken a multiple regression analysis, employing data for 47 prefectures for the three years 1990, 1995 and 2000. The explanatory variables in the regression are (1) the proportion of those aged 65 and over living with at least one family member (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications various years) and (2) the number of hospital and clinic beds per 100,000 persons (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare various years c). The first explanatory variable is expected to represent the availability of caregivers to elderly persons at home, while the second explanatory variable, the availability of hospital and clinic in-patient services, is a substitute for in-home care for the elderly. It should be noted that all these variables were introduced into the regression in the natural logarithmic form, so that each estimated coefficient represents the elasticity of each explanatory variable with respect to the dependent variable. The regressions were conducted separately for males and females. Table 2.1 presents the computed results. A few points of interest emerge from this table. First, the availability of caregivers coresiding with the frail elderly is a principal factor in determining their probabilities of dying at home, although the magnitude of its impact declined over time in the 1990s. For instance, in 1990, a 1 per cent fall in the proportion of those aged 65 and over living with at least 1 family member led to an approximately 11 per cent decrease in the number of deaths at home among elderly men. The corresponding value for 2000 dropped to 3 per cent. Second, the reduction of such impacts over time is more pronounced among men than among women. This result conforms to the fact that because wives’ survivorship at older ages has been considerably higher than that for husbands in contemporary Japan, the incidence of living in one-person households and the incidence of dying in an institution have been substantially higher among
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Ogawa, Retherford and Matsukura
Table 2.1 The effect of coresidence among the elderly aged 65 and above on their place of death, Japan, 1990, 1995 and 2000 Dependent variable
Explanatory variables
Natural logarithm of the proportion of deaths of persons aged 65 and over that occurred at home
Natural logarithm of the proportion of those aged 65 and over living with at least one family member
Natural logarithm of the number of hospital and clinic beds per 100,000 persons
10.864*** (5.33) 2.869*** (4.09)
⫺0.045 (⫺0.38) 0.048 (0.26)
7.938*** (4.77) 2.645*** (3.91)
⫺0.156 (⫺1.40) ⫺0.167 (⫺1.12)
3.205*** (3.20) 1.793*** (3.35)
⫺0.227** (⫺2.57) ⫺0.291** (⫺2.37)
1990a Men Women 1995b Men Women 2000c Men Women
Notes Units of analysis are prefectures. Values in the parentheses underneath the estimated coefficients are t-statistics. The number of observations is 47 for each year. a Adjusted R2 ⫽ 0.398 for men and 0.298 for women. b Adjusted R2 ⫽ 0.369 for men and 0.367 for women. c Adjusted R2 ⫽ 0.261 for men and 0.387 for women. ** Statistically significant at the 5 % level. *** Statistically significant at the 1 % level.
the wives than among the husbands. Third, although the availability of in-patient services at hospitals and clinics was not a significant explanatory variable in either 1990 or 1995, it became a statistically significant predictor in 2000. Fourth, the estimated elasticity of each of the two explanatory variables with respect to the proportion of the elderly dying at home changed drastically in the 1990s, thus suggesting that there has been an emerging pattern of substitution of institutional care for in-home care. This finding is consistent with Japan’s escalating costs for medical care services in recent years (Ogawa and Retherford 1997).
Japan’s declining population and limits to the informal support system A population projection produced from the most recent version of the NUPRI model, coupled with the 2002 United Nations population projections (United Nations 2003), infers that the Japanese population had become the oldest
Demographics of the Japanese family 31 national population by the end of 2003, surpassing the Italian population. Furthermore, Japan’s total population, which was 126.5 million in 2000, is projected to increase to 127.5 million by 2005. After reaching this peak, the nation’s population is expected to decrease continuously to a level of 120.1 million by 2025. The total number of those aged 65 and over is expected to grow steadily from 22 million in 2000 to 37.3 million in 2025. Moreover, due to sexual mortality differentials at higher ages, the predominance of women among the aged population is expected to become increasingly pronounced over time. Special attention should be drawn to the results computed by the authors (Ogawa et al. 2002) showing that the number of very old women aged 85 and over will increase at an astonishing pace over the next 25 years. This fast feminization of the very old population suggests that in a virtually universal marriage society such as Japan, the number of widows will grow rapidly in the next few decades. Because of declining family support by adult children (Ogawa 2003a; Ogawa and Retherford 1997), the increase in elderly widows is very likely to lead to a considerable rise in the demand for institutional care in the years ahead. It is worth noting at this point in the discussion that the number of those aged 100 and over is projected to increase at an annual rate of 11.1 per cent during 2000–2025, which implies that this age group is the fastest growing segment of the population. In 1963, the number of centenarians was only 153, but it is expected to grow to more than 168,000 by 2025. It is also interesting to observe that the median age of the population is forecast to rise dramatically in the years to come. In the case of both sexes combined, it increases from 41.5 to 51.1 years old during 2000–2025. More importantly, the familial support ratio, which relates the female population at ages 40–59 to the total population aged 65–84, is expected to decline substantially over the next 25 years. The value of this index was 1.30 in 1990, and is projected to be 0.65 in 2010, thus indicating that it will decline by 50 per cent in 20 years’ time. These results indicate that the demographic potential for familial support by adult children for the elderly diminishes rapidly, starting from 2007 when the large cohort of baby boomers exits the age group 40–59. In Table 2.2, these projected results are compared with those of the 2002 United Nations population projections. In 2005, Japan’s familial support ratio is the lowest in the entire world, followed by Greece and Italy. The declining trend of the familial support ratio points to the high likelihood that the traditional extended family system will be continuously weakened with the passage of time. Although in 2000 the government started the Long-term Care Insurance Scheme (LTCI) to alleviate the family’s burden in taking care of older parents at home, the number of households without any caregivers is expected to rise so that the effectiveness of this new scheme is likely to be increasingly limited over time. To gain further insights into this issue connected with the LTCI, we have computed the familial support ratio for all the administrative units (approximately 3,400) in Japan for the selected years 1975 and 2025. The results are depicted in Figure 2.8. A brief glance of these maps reveals that the number of administrative units having a familial support ratio less than one has
32
Ogawa, Retherford and Matsukura Table 2.2 International comparison of the projected familial support ratio in 2005 Country
Women aged 40–59/elderly persons aged 65–84
Japan Greece Italy Germany Spain Sweden Portugal France Switzerland United Kingdom United States of America
0.77 0.78 0.81 0.83 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.33
Sources: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision, New York, 2003. Data for Japan are based on the NUPRI population projection.
been and will be increasing at an alarming rate over the period 1975–2025. More surprisingly, it is projected, though not shown in the maps, that a fairly large number of administrative units will have a familial support ratio less than 0.1 in 2025. These projected results based upon administrative units clearly point to the need for major revision of the LTCI scheme in the years ahead. To place Japan’s future population ageing process in a wider perspective, these projected demographic results for Japan can be further compared with those derived from the 2002 United Nations population projections. As displayed in Table 2.3, the tempo of Japan’s population ageing is unprecedented. Its aged population (i.e. the proportion aged 65 and over) reached the 10 per cent level in 1984 and it was the latest country to reach this stage among all the industrialized nations listed in Table 2.3. Despite this delayed onset, Japan is expected to be the first country in which the aged comprise more than 20 per cent of the total population among all the countries appearing in this table. The length of time required for this proportion of Japan’s population to increase from 10 to 20 per cent is only 21 years. Japan is ageing at a tempo twice as fast as Italy and more than three times as fast as Norway and Sweden. Furthermore, the age compositional shift of the aged population itself deserves special attention. A close examination of data in Table 2.4 reveals that Japan’s proportion of those aged 75 and over among those aged 65 and over for 2025 is likely to be by far the highest in the world, followed by Sweden. Obviously, this marked age compositional shift of the Japanese population will generate a substantial effect on the pattern and level of demand for medical care services, as has been discussed elsewhere (Ogawa 2003a). These demographic shifts in the first quarter of the twenty-first century in Japan are both massive and drastic. No less alarming, however, are value shifts among the Japanese people. These value shifts are well captured in time-series data
1975
Figure 2.8 Familial support ratio by prefecture, 1975 and 2025.
2.0– 1.5–2.0 1.0–1.5 0.5–1.0 0.25–0.5 –0.25
65–84
Women 40–59
2025
2.01.5-2.0 1.0-1.5 0.5-1.0 0.25-0.5 -0.25
65–84
Women 40–59
Table 2.3 International comparison of the speed of population ageing Country
Year in which the aged population reaches
Japan Canada Finland Italy Australia Spain Greece Switzerland Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden Norway United States of America
10%
20%
1984 1984 1973 1966 1985 1975 1968 1960 1969 1952 1957 1947 1954 1972
2005 2023 2015 2008 2028 2019 2019 2011 2023 2010 2018 2012 2021 —
Time required to increase from 10% to 20% (years) 21 39 42 42 43 44 51 51 54 58 61 65 67 —
Sources: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision, New York, 2003. Data for Japan are based on the NUPRI population projection.
Table 2.4 International comparison of the projected proportion of those aged 75 and above in those aged 65 and above for selected industrialized nations in 2025 Country
75⫹/65⫹ (%)
Japan Sweden Italy United Kingdom Switzerland Denmark Germany Finland Greece Spain Austria France Uruguay Belgium Norway Netherlands United States of America
59.1 51.9 49.9 48.9 48.4 48.2 48.1 48.1 48.0 47.7 47.6 47.6 46.9 46.9 46.8 45.1 42.8
Sources: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision, New York, 2003. Data for Japan are based on the NUPRI population projection.
Demographics of the Japanese family 35 gathered in a series of nation-wide surveys concerning fertility and family planning, which have been carried out every other year since 1950 by Mainichi Newspapers (Population Problems Research Council of the Mainichi Newspapers 2005). Since the first round of the survey, except for a few rounds, a question regarding the dependence on children for old-age security has been asked of currently married women of reproductive age who have at least one child. The precoded responses are as follows: (1) ‘expect to depend on children’, (2) ‘do not expect to depend on children’ and (3) ‘never thought about it’. Figure 2.9 shows inter-temporal changes over the period 1950–2004 in the percentage of the respondents who chose the category of ‘expect to depend on children’. The proportion of respondents who expect to depend on their own children declined almost continuously over the period in question. Almost two-thirds of Japanese married women in 1950 expressed the expectation to depend on their own children for old-age security, but only 11.1 per cent in 2000 intended to do so. In addition, since 1963, a question on the attitude of these married women towards taking care of aged parents has been asked in the successive rounds of the Mainichi Newspapers’ surveys. The precoded response categories are as follows: (1) ‘good custom’, (2) ‘natural duty as children’, (3) ‘unavoidable due to inadequacy of public support resources’ and (4) ‘not a good custom’. Figure 2.9 presents changes in the percentage of those who chose one of the first two response categories: (1) ‘good custom’ or (2) ‘natural duty as children’. The plotted result indicates that the proportion of respondents who felt that providing care for elderly parents was either a good custom or natural duty had been, by and large, stable over the period 1963–1986. From 1986 to 1988, however, the percentage distribution changed dramatically. Since then, the decline has continued, albeit at a slower pace. We can speculate that this sudden shift in filial norms was caused 90 Good custom or natural duty
80 70 60
%
50 40 Expect to depend on children
30 20 10 0 1950
1956
1962
1968
1974
1980 Year
1986
1992
1998
2004
Figure 2.9 Trends in norms and expectations about care for the elderly, Japan, 1950–2004.
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Ogawa, Retherford and Matsukura
by a series of policy changes introduced from the mid-1980s that aimed to transfer the responsibility for taking care of the frail elderly from government to families (Ogawa and Retherford 1997). It is worth remarking that further in-depth statistical analysis of time-series data has shown that the recent trends in both the attitudes of Japanese married women towards aged parents and their dependence on children for old-age security are likely to continue in the future, but will also be seriously affected by any changes in social security policy adopted by the government (Ogawa 2003b; Ogawa and Retherford 1993, 1997; Retherford et al. 1999).
Concluding remarks In this chapter, we have discussed Japan’s unprecedented population ageing and their impacts on family organization. Continuing low fertility over the last fifty years is a principal demographic factor accelerating population ageing in post-war Japan. It should be noted that the demographic causes of fertility decline shifted between 1950–1975 and 1975–2000. Before the first oil crisis in 1973, the decline in marital fertility was a primary cause, but since then, delayed marriage has been a major factor. In addition, the delayed timing of first and second births has become increasingly important in the 1990s. Because the reduction of fertility is a principal demographic factor accelerating population ageing in post-war Japan, the government has been making strenuous efforts to implement a variety of policies and programmes to remove or mitigate difficulties involved in child rearing since the early 1990s. To date, however, the impact of these government interventions on actual fertility behaviour has been fairly limited. Also, these government policies and programmes have been primarily designed for raising marital fertility, although the main source of recent fertility reduction lies in the increase in the proportion of young Japanese singles. At present, no specific policy interventions have been made to change these nuptiality trends, although there have been proposals to impose heavy taxes on so-called parasite singles to urge them to get married (Takahashi and Voss 2000). Will Japan’s fertility fall even further to aggravate the ageing process of its population in the years ahead? Is there likely to be a fertility resurgence in the future due to the government’s continuing efforts to implement new policies? At this moment, there are no definite answers. However, to address these questions, fertility in Japan should be continuously monitored, and studies on policy effects should be carried out when new survey data designed for such purposes become available. Apart from raising fertility, Japan has a number of policy options to cope with adverse consequences of population ageing. For instance, because Japan is still a largely age-graded society (i.e. age plays an important role in establishing social hierarchy), the age structural shifts are likely to generate a wide range of disruptions at both societal and familial levels. To alleviate the seriousness of these adjustment problems, therefore, the government can change age-based institutional factors such as the mandatory retirement age and the pensionable age.
Demographics of the Japanese family 37 Besides these policy options, the government should explore the possibility of redefining the age of elderly persons. Up to this point, our discussions have been based on the definition that the age of the elderly population is sixty-five years and over. This fixed definition of the age of the elderly leads to many serious adjustment problems in the labour market and in the operation of the social security system. To solve these problems, therefore, one can propose that a new concept of the age of elderly persons should be introduced and accompanied by relevant changes in policies and programmes. In the case of Japan, if the definition of the aged is gradually shifted from 65 years old in 2000 to 75 years old in 2025, the proportion of the elderly will remain around the 17 per cent level for the next 25 years. Undoubtedly, this change in the definition of the aged will call for massive social engineering under strong government leadership in cooperation with the private sector.
References Cabinet Office (2002) Report on the Fifth International Survey of Lifestyles and Attitudes of the Elderly, Tokyo: Gyosei Printing Company. Clark, R. L. and Ogawa, N. (1992) ‘Employment Tenure and Earnings Profiles in Japan and the United States: comment’, American Economic Review, 82: 336–345. Ermisch, J. F. (2003) An Economic Analysis of the Family, Princeton, NJ and London: Princeton University Press. Ermisch, J. F. and Ogawa, N. (1994) ‘Age at Motherhood in Japan’, Journal of Population Economics, 7: 393–420. Hodge, W. R. and Ogawa, N. (1991) Fertility Change in Contemporary Japan, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Japan Tobacco Corporation (2005), ‘Outline of Japan Smoking Rate Survey 2005’, JT News Release, 18 October 2005, Tokyo. Lee, R. D. and Carter, L. (1992) ‘Modeling and Forecasting the Time Series of U.S. Mortality’, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 87: 659–671. Martin, L. G. (1989) ‘The Graying of Japan’, Population Bulletin, 44: 1–42. Mason, A. and Ogawa, N. (2001) ‘Population, labour force, saving and Japan’s future’, in M. Blomström, B. Gangnes and S. La Croix (eds), Japan’s New Economy: Continuity and Change in the Twenty-First Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 48–74. Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. (2004) Statistical Bulletin of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Tokyo: Government Printing Office. Ministry of Health and Welfare. (1978) White Paper on Health and Welfare, Tokyo: Health and Welfare Statistics Association. Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. (Various years a) Vital Statistics of Japan, Tokyo: Health and Welfare Statistics Association. Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. (Various years b) Basic Survey on Wage Structure, Tokyo: Rodo Horei Kyokai. Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. (Various years c) Survey on Medical Facilities, Tokyo: Health and Welfare Statistics Association. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. (Various years). Population Census of Japan, Tokyo: Japan Statistical Association.
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Ogawa, N. (2000) ‘Women’s career development and the timing of births: the emergence of a new fertility mechanism?’ in The Population of Japan: An Overview of the 50 Postwar Years, Tokyo: The Population Problems Research Council of the Mainichi Newspapers, pp. 131–155. Ogawa, N. (2003a) ‘Population ageing and its impact on the socioeconomic system in Japan’, in Ageing in Japan 2003, Tokyo: Japan Ageing Research Center: 123–150. Ogawa, N. (2003b) ‘Japan’s Changing Fertility Mechanisms and its Policy Responses’, Journal of Population Research, 20: 89–106. Ogawa, N. and Clark, R. L. (1995) ‘Earnings Patterns of Japanese Women: 1976–1988’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 43: 293–313. Ogawa, N. and Ermisch, J. F. (1994) ‘Women’s Career Development and Divorce Risk in Japan’, Labour, 8: 193–219. Ogawa, N. and Ermisch, J. F. (1996) ‘Family Structure, Home Time Demands, and the Employment Patterns of Japanese Married women’, Journal of Labor Economics, 14: 677–702. Ogawa, N. and Retherford, R. D. (1993) ‘The Resumption of Fertility Decline in Japan: 1973–92’, Population and Development Review, 19: 703–741. Ogawa, N. and Retherford, R. D. (1997) ‘Shifting Costs of Caring For The Elderly Back to Families in Japan’, Population and Development Review, 23: 59–94. Ogawa, N., Jones, G. and Williamson, J. (1993) Human Resources in Development along the Asia-Pacific Rim, Singapore: Oxford University Press. Ogawa, N., Kondo, M., Tamura, R., Matsukura, T., Saito, A., Mason, S. and Tuljapurkar, N. (2003) Long-term Perspectives for Japan: An Analysis Based on a MacroeconomicDemographic-Social Security Model with Emphasis on Human Capital, Tokyo: Nihon University Population Research Institute. Population Problems Research Council of the Mainichi Newspapers. (1998) The Future of the Family: Beyond Gender – Summary of the Twenty-fourth National Survey on Family Planning, Tokyo: The Population Problems Research Council of the Mainichi Newspapers. Population Problems Research Council of the Mainichi Newspapers. (2000) The Population of Japan: An Overview of the 50 Postwar Years, Tokyo: The Population Problems Research Council of the Mainichi Newspapers. Population Problems Research Council of the Mainichi Newspapers. (2005) Changing Family Norms among Japanese Women in an Era of Lowest-low Fertility: Summary of the First National Survey on Population, Families and Generations in Japan, Tokyo: The Population Problems Research Council of the Mainichi Newspapers. Retherford, R. D., Ogawa, N. and Sakamoto, S. (1999) ‘Values and fertility change in Japan’, in R. Leete (ed.), Dynamics of Values in Fertility Change, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 121–147. Retherford, R. D., Ogawa, N. and Matsukura, R. (2001) ‘Late Marriage and Less Marriage in Japan’, Population and Development Review, 27: 65–102. Takahashi, H. and Voss, J. (2000) ‘Parasite Singles – a uniquely Japanese Phenomenon?’ Japan Economic Institute Report 31A, Washington, DC: Japan Economic Institute. United Nations. (2003) World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision, New York: United Nations. United Nations. (Various years) United Nations Demographic Yearbook, New York: United Nations. Yamamoto, C. and Kojima, H. (1997) ‘Nuptiality and Divorce in Japan: 1995’, Journal of Population Problems, 53: 45–66.
3
Japanese youth’s attitudes towards marriage and child rearing Nobuko Nagase
Introduction The marriage age in Japan is rising with no end in sight. According to the 2000 Census, only 43.5 per cent of women in the 25–29 age group were married, down from 76 per cent in the 1980 Census. The proportion of unmarried men is rising even more rapidly. The Census showed that 45.1 per cent of men aged 30–34 stayed ‘non-married’, while the figure was 26.4 per cent for women (see Figure 3.1). This has contributed to declining fertility, as marriage is still strongly associated with childbirth in Japan. Most marriages in Japan are followed by childbirth within a year and a half, and the rate of childless married couples remains very low (Nakata and Mosk 1987). Less than 2 per cent of children are born out of wedlock. As few as 7 per cent of singles in 2002 had any experience of co-habitation with a partner, though this rate had risen by two to three points since 1992, according to the Twelfth Japan National Fertility Survey (2002). Why has marriage in one’s early twenties lost its appeal to Japanese youth? According to Ono (2003), single women, especially the more educated, are reluctant to get married due to the highly-gendered roles of husband and wife in Japan (also Iwagami 1999). Yamada (1999) and Miyamoto et al. (1997) explain that this is because they can enjoy a higher standard of living by living with their parents. Single women who live with their parents are indeed likely to delay marriage, controlling for education, age and work status (Nagase 2002). Others have pointed out that the rise in the educational attainment of women has increased their earnings and thus the opportunity cost of leaving work to get married (e.g. Higuchi and Abe 1999, Yashiro 1999). Iwasawa (1999) attributes delayed marriage to the changing nature of partnerships among youth in Japan. She states that more youth today engage in sexual relations prior to marriage and seek intimate relations outside the traditional framework of marriage, even though premarital pregnancy often compels young couples to get married (if not, pre-marital pregnancies are often terminated by abortion).1 Also, an increase in non-standard employment is creating young workers of both genders who cannot get stable work with sufficient income to form new families (Nagase 2002). In short, despite the government’s numerous attempts to help youth form new families,
40
Nobuko Nagase 80.0
Male 25–29 Male 30–34 Female 25–29 Female 30–34
70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Figure 3.1 Percentage of never-married Japanese in their late twenties and thirties.
such as the ‘Angel Plan (1994)’, ‘New Angel Plan (1999)’, ‘Measure Against Declining Birth Rate and Plus One Proposal (2002)’ and most recently, the ‘New-New Angel Plan’ (2004), these efforts have not yielded the intended results. This chapter examines how Japanese youth view marriage and child rearing drawing on data from the Eleventh and Twelfth Japanese National Fertility Survey in 1997 (hereafter Eleventh JNFS and Twelfth JNFS),2 conducted by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, and on the interviews I conducted with 123 women and 43 men in collaboration with a team of researchers. These interviews will be supplemented by the Survey on Women’s Work and Family Life conducted in 2001 by the Japan Institute of Labor.3 I will start by looking at some background data on marriage and work in Japan before proceeding to the analysis from interviews.
Marriage and work: mother’s care as a social norm Many young women, particularly highly-educated and affluent urban residents, are reluctant to get married, because they perceive that it is difficult to balance child rearing and career. Many women also feel that they would have to change their life style to a large extent after marriage. This is observed in the labour participation rate of mothers with young children. Although the labour force participation rate of mothers with school children is on the rise, only about 30 per cent of mothers whose first child is under age 1 participate, and this percentage has shown no increase for the younger cohorts (Nagase 2003). This is in contrast to many Western countries where the labour force participation rate of mothers with very young children is on the rise. This is so despite the fact that the passage of Equal Employment Opportunity Act in 1985 led to a higher percentage of females
Attitudes towards marriage and child rearing 41
Married for 5 to 9 years
Married for 0 to 4 years
Full-time housewife
0%
20%
40%
Full-time employment
Non-standard employment
Full-time housewife
Non-standard employment
60%
Full-time employment
80%
100%
Figure 3.2 Work status of married women with a child or children.
enrolling in universities and enhanced career opportunities. The implementation of the Child Care Leave Law in 1992 also made it easier for workers to combine full-time work and family care, as it gave workers the entitlement to take childcare leave during their children’s first year. According to the Eleventh JNFS that surveyed women who were less than 49 years of age in 1997, about 40 per cent of women resigned from regular work at marriage, and among those who continued regular work at marriage, another 40 per cent resigned work at pregnancy or at birth (Nagase 1999, 2003). The Survey on Women’s Work and Family Life, mentioned earlier, also showed that over half of the female respondents said that they quit work, either because they wanted to take care of their children themselves or they were trying to avoid the double burden of work and child bearing. Even the most recent survey, Twelfth JNFS of 2002, showed a similar trend, although more women do return to work with shorter periods of non-participation. As shown in Figure 3.2, about 70 per cent of mothers who had children right after marriage were full-time housewives (60 per cent for those who are married for 5 to 9 years). The Twelfth JNFS gave a somewhat different picture in terms of child-care leave use. As shown in Figure 3.3, for children born after 1998, over 70 per cent of females who continued full-time work after the birth of their first child took leave, reflecting enhancement of the Leave Law. The Leave Law has been enhanced in three phases. In 1995, workers at small branches were also given the rights that had previously only been given to workers in branches with more than 30 employees. In 1997, a child-care leave allowance was introduced and funded from employment insurance. In 2001, the allowance was increased to 40 per cent of earnings. Today, more women are taking advantage of child-care leave. However, if we look at the use of child-care leave with respect to all births, we find that the percentage is merely 14 per cent and the change has been small. This is because many women quit work (and thus do not take leave) either at marriage or at pregnancy or at childbirth; less than 30 per cent of mothers continue fulltime work after childbirth. It is also because most non-standard employees lack entitlement to the leave.
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Nobuko Nagase 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1989–1991
1992–1994
1995–1997
1998 on
Year when child was born Percentage of children born Percentage of women who continued full-time work
Figure 3.3 Percentage of users of child-care leave.
Interviews with young urban employees and reference groups Why do many women quit work at marriage or childbirth, and how does it relate to their delaying marriage? In this section, I analyse their attitudes towards marriage and child rearing drawing on the interviews we conducted. Methodology In 1997, I collaborated with a group of researchers in conducting and analysing semi-structured interviews with written questionnaires. The study was supported by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and was conducted and analysed by an interdisciplinary team of scholars including psychologists, economists and sociologists.4 We interviewed 51 full-time female employees and 26 full-time male employees in their twenties and thirties in 6 large enterprises in the Tokyo metropolitan area. As a reference group, we conducted additional interviews with 33 full-time working women and 17 full-time working men in Yamagata, Fukui and Shizuoka prefectures. For comparative purposes, we also interviewed 19 full-time housewives and 20 part-time working women in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Respondents were first asked to fill in questionnaires concerning personal attributes such as age, educational attainment, income and dwelling. The questionnaire sheet also asked how one would like to have children taken care of when one
Attitudes towards marriage and child rearing 43 worked, and whether one would want to continue work after childbirth and on what conditions. The questionnaire sheet then gave twenty sets of opposing adjectives, namely ‘imperfect–perfect’, ‘warm–cold’, ‘calm–volatile’, ‘like–dislike’, ‘enjoying–suffering’, ‘strong–weak’, ‘thoughtful–wayward’, ‘passive– positive’, ‘simple–difficult’, ‘stiff–soft’, ‘lively–tired’, ‘dark–light’, ‘stable–unstable’, ‘irresponsible–responsible’, ‘grateful–troublesome’, ‘non-attractive–attractive’, ‘trustworthy–loose’, ‘faithful–non-faithful’, ‘sensitive–dull’, ‘boring–interesting’, and respondents were asked to scale whether their impression of becoming a parent was very close rather close or did not relate at all to each set of adjectives. They were then asked to give freely three adjectives for ‘marriage’ and ‘child bearing’ to explain why they gave such adjectives, and to give episodes that helped them form their views.
Characteristics of the interviewees The sample statistics of the interviewed women shown in Table 3.1 are of interest. Even though two-fifths of employed women in Tokyo were married, only one woman had any children. On the other hand, in the non-metropolitan areas, more than half of full-time employees were married and among those, about half had children. In Tokyo, it was mostly full-time housewives and part-time women workers that had any children. Very few full-time women workers had any
Table 3.1 Sample statistics for interviewed subjects Firm
Women
Men
Married Childless Large firms, 19 metropolitan Tokyoa Large firms, 10 nonmetropolitan areab Full-time 3 housewives Part-time 1 workersc Sub total 33 Total
Single At least 1 child
Married Childless
Single At least 1 child
1
31
7
4
15
9
14
4
7
6
16
0
—
—
—
17
2
—
—
—
43 123
47
11
11 43
21
Notes a There were six firms. Employees were interviewed at three different branches of one of the firms. b There were three establishments that were part of two of the large firms in Tokyo. c These were in one firm, different from the firms in Tokyo.
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children. This is consistent with the finding of a larger study that nearly 80 per cent of mothers with new-born babies in urban areas were full-time housewives (Nagase 2003). The female full-time employees interviewed in Tokyo were the most highly educated. Table 3.2 shows some other characteristics of the women interviewed. Among the 51 full-time employees, 34 had a four-year university degree, 14 had a two-year college degree and only 2 had no more than a high school education. The hiring standards at large enterprises were high and competitive and some of the women interviewed in metropolitan area had jobs with high career prospects. On the other hand, among the 33 interviewed outside the Tokyo metropolitan area, a majority of 29 had only a high school degree, and their levels of educational attainment levels were lower. Moreover, most of the women interviewed were workers at local branch factories. Among those interviewed in Tokyo, the parttime workers were the least educated, as less than half had post-secondary education. The educational level of full-time housewives was higher than that of part-time workers, as the majority had post-secondary education, though most had two-years rather than four years of education after high school. This difference in educational attainment is consistent with many studies that have found that the less educated are likely to return to work as part-time workers after a spell away from work during child bearing (Higuchi 1992, Nagase 1997). Moreover, over 50 per cent of the single women were living with their parents, but only one married woman in Tokyo lived with her parents. She was successfully able to combine work and child rearing. Co-habitation with in-laws after marriage has declined in general. Nevertheless, co-habitation with in-laws Table 3.2 Characteristics of women interviewed Variable
Average age Age range Education High school Two year college University Average tenure (yrs) Tenure range (yrs) Cohabitation with parents (%) Live near parents (%) Sample size
Tokyo
Non-metropolitan area
Tokyo
Married
Single
Married
Single
Housewife
Part-time
28.6 22–38
26.9 20–35
27.8 23–33
23.9 20–29
34.6 29–40
34.8 24–40
1 7
1 7
16 1
13 3
1 9
11 5
12 6.9
22 5.6
0 8.6
0 6.4
8
2 2.1
3–15
2–13
5–14
3–10
5
55
56
88
11
11
35
10
29
6
42
33
20
31
17
16
19
18
0–7
Attitudes towards marriage and child rearing 45 continues to be common in non-metropolitan areas. As shown in Table 3.2, the majority of the interviewees outside the Tokyo metropolitan area were living with parents or in-laws after marriage. None of the married women in Tokyo lived with their in-laws. For men, the educational attainment of the full-time workers interviewed was similar to that of the women. Among 26 male employees interviewed in Tokyo, 24 had a university or higher degree, whereas 15 out of 17 interviewed in nonmetropolitan factories only had a high school diploma. The average age of singles was 29.4 for men and 26.9 for women in Tokyo, while it was younger (25.3 for males and 23.9 for females) in the non-metropolitan areas. The average ages of the married men and women were about the same in the two areas. The perception of marriage among women There were three types of responses when women were asked about attitudes towards marriage. The first was a more traditional view that getting married was considered a necessary part of life. Those women associated single life with liberty, and wanted to enjoy single life for some time before getting married. They perceived that once they got married, however, their main identity would be ‘housewife’ and that they would work mostly to help ends meet. My image of marriage is ‘happiness’, ‘endurance’ and ‘dream’. I say ‘endurance’ because if you choose to live with in-laws, you may have to endure small troubles, and if you choose not to live with in-laws, you will have to do everything by yourself. I want to travel here and there before I get married. (Non-married employee, early twenties, non-metropolitan area) Whom you marry determines your destiny, whether you can live rich or whether you have to work through your life. (Non-married employee, early twenties, non-metropolitan area) I want to have two children. Marriage is happiness and also a constraint. I want to get married in my twenties, because I feel you get more blessings if you marry young. (Non-married employee, early twenties, Tokyo) A second type was found among the better-educated Tokyo females. They were more self-centred, and enjoyed their private urban life. When they had a child, most of them wanted to become a careful and loving full-time mother like their mothers. However, they felt rather burdened with the image of the good mother, and also, because marriage eventually would mean quitting work, they were not rushing into marriage. Also their salary was good enough for their needs.
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Nobuko Nagase I always had my way in my family. Marriage may not allow this kind of life, but I will have to try. I want to live a close distance to my parents, near enough to see their faces everyday, but far enough so that I don’t have to do that. (Non-married employee, late twenties, Tokyo) I want to take full care of my child when it is small. But I think a couple without children is also attractive. What bothers me about marriage is that you may not be able to spend (money) as you wish. (Non-married employee, late twenties, Tokyo) I don’t want to lower my standard of living by having a child. My mother stayed home to raise me and she let go of her own wishes in order to spend money on me. I feel mothers should give all their affection towards children. So if I am to have a child, I should quit work to care for the child. (Non-married employee, late twenties, Tokyo)
The last type sought to have both career and family. These women wanted to be recognized at work. Raising children carefully was also an important life goal. However, it was difficult to reach this goal with their and their husbands’ working hours. Work is equally demanding, both for males and females at my workplace. You can’t go home at 5 pm if you want to be recognized at work. In-laws pressure me that it’s time that I deliver the family’s baby, and this is something that really gets me down. Marriage makes your social relations much more complex and constrained. (Married employee, early thirties, Tokyo) I want to continue working and have two children. But I feel that taking several months leave twice is asking for too much. Maybe I can only have one child. There is one Leave user at my workplace. She is time pressured to be on time and rushes to day-care. Perhaps two children are too much. My husband is so busy that I cannot depend on him on weekdays. Why do only I have to take the burden? I don’t know when I can really make up my mind to have a child. (Married employee, early thirties, Tokyo) Many of the last type had equally demanding, or equally treated jobs as men. They needed to be able to handle pressures and do overtime work in order to get high recognition at work. However, it was mostly women that were expected to do the housework and child care. Their frustration was high, especially when in-laws and their spouses expected them to take the traditional role of women to do the housework and rear children. On the other hand, they seemed to be satisfied with life when their husbands helped with housework. Many felt that child raising is
Attitudes towards marriage and child rearing 47 important, and because of that, they were frustrated and were hesitant about the timing of childbirth. The last type, however, was not the majority. On the other hand, full-time housewives seemed to have more positive views on marriage and child rearing. Overall, they were satisfied with life as housewives, although some reluctantly became housewives by forfeiting their career. Many wanted to work part-time to help the household budget when their children got older. Home is the foundation of living, and a place to which you belong. Childraising is your personal growth and also acceptance of your child’s personality. (Married, in late thirties with one child) I enjoy the life of a full-time housewife. You can even take naps. Life is much better when you get married. I enjoy being with my child. (Married, in late thirties with one child) Marriage gave me the happiness of gaining new family members. It also gave me a feeling of stability. On the other hand, you cannot have much contact with the outside world for a decade if you have three children. I can lead a stable life with my husband’s income, but I feel that I cannot spend just as I wish. (Married in late thirties with three children) I was reluctant to quit work, but I thought happiness is in devoting yourself to your husband and your children. After a while, though, I found that I lost my own self. I feel I am trapped in my role as mother to raise perfect and ideal children. (Married in late thirties with two children) The difficulty of balancing work and child raising Regardless of their views on marriage, most working women, or 80 per cent of the full-time working singles interviewed, expressed their desire to get married, have children and continue work after childbirth. Yet, many perceived it difficult to continue work after childbirth due to a lack of what they considered necessary conditions: (1) their employers’ understanding and cooperation, (2) their husband’s willingness to share the burden of household duties and, for employees in Tokyo, (3) availability of good day-care centres right after maternal leave or child-care leave and in the non-metropolitan areas, (4) grand-parental help in child raising. Among the 20 married full-time working women interviewed in Tokyo, only one had any children. Among the single or married but childless women interviewed in Tokyo, about a half replied that they wanted to take care of any future child by themselves or have a relative take care of them. Some said that they simply wanted to do so,
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Nobuko Nagase
while others believed that their child’s development might be harmed otherwise. This kind of reply was also found among non-metropolitan employees, but while many of these employees would be able to ask for grandparents living nearby to take care of children, most urban employees lacked such support. I would like to be a full-time mother when I have children. I don’t have a bad image of child-care facilities. Still, I would like to provide good care myself. I would like to return to work if possible when my children got older. (Non-married employee, early twenties, Tokyo) When I do have a child, I want to take care of it myself and love it very much, because I think the foundation of a person is formed before age three. (Married employee, late twenties, Tokyo) In my workplace, I now see a few mothers who use child-care leave and continue working after having children. They seem so busy and burdened. I would not choose such path unless it is a necessity. (Non-married employee, late twenties, Tokyo) Another group of women wanted to combine work and child rearing, yet felt compelled to choose between the two. I would like to have children very much and also to continue to work, but day care centres in a convenient urban location lack play-yards, and also, they are not open long enough. I think I will have to quit my work if I have a child. (Married employee, early thirties, Tokyo) I want to continue working, but it will be very difficult to do so when I have a baby. I will think about having a child when I come near my time limit for having a baby. (Married employee, late twenties, Tokyo) Some women, albeit a few, were determined to have both children and career, but many expressed anxiety. I want both, but thinking about the negative impact on my work, and thinking about the likelihood that my child may suffer from my working, I don’t know when I can really have a child. (Married employee, early thirties, Tokyo) In the interviews in the non-metropolitan areas, the replies were different. Many of them seemed to work not for their own life goals, but mostly as part of a family decision to make ends meet. The majority had in-laws in the household
Attitudes towards marriage and child rearing 49 and so, unlike the situation in Tokyo, the gap between overtime work and day care opening hours was not an important issue. Rather, the concern of most working wives was to maintain harmonious relations with their in-laws. They wanted to have children, in part, to unite the extended family. Living with in-laws is not easy. But you feel strengthened when you have in-laws to talk to when you have problems with child-raising. Having a child is such a blessing. (Married employee, early twenties, non-metropolitan area) Raising a child is a mother’s happiness. However, I have to continue work and have my child cared for by my mother-in-law. (Married employee, late twenties, non-metropolitan area) The difference observed between Tokyo and the non-metropolitan areas was also attributable to a differential in financial needs. The average income of husbands was lower in the non-metropolitan areas.
Image of parenting To examine the kinds of images women held of parenting, I conducted a twodimensional factor analysis of the twenty sets of adjectives mentioned earlier. The first factor showed uneasiness and anxiety, such as ‘suffering’, ‘volatile’, ‘dislike’, ‘boring’, ‘tired’, ‘dark’ and ‘wayward’. The second factor referred to hope and forward expectations, such as ‘responsible’, ‘trustworthy’, ‘sensitive’, ‘attractive’, ‘strong’, ‘faithful’, ‘grateful’ and ‘warm’. I scored and made two indices with an average of 100 for the entire group and compared the index average between groups. The uneasiness index, the first factor, was higher among married and childless full-time workers in the Tokyo group (101) than their counterparts in the non-metropolitan areas (95). The difference was statistically significant, supporting the view that full-time employees in non-metropolitan areas do not have as much anxiety over child raising. The uneasiness index was also higher for the educated, both in Tokyo and in non-urban areas, though the forwardness index, the second factor, was not significantly different. The uneasiness index was significantly higher for the group of married and childless women who selected ‘baby-sitters’ as their expected choice of child care. Their average score was 110, 10 per cent higher than the average. Baby-sitters are more expensive in Japan having no governmental subsidy, compared with subsidized child-care centres. Baby-sitters are often chosen as complementary help by metropolitan employees who work longer hours than the opening hours of subsidized day-care centres. Therefore, the result can be interpreted as showing that individuals with the strongest commitment to continue working had significantly higher uneasiness towards becoming a parent. This was particularly the case for women living in Tokyo and women with higher education.
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Nobuko Nagase
Perceptions of marriage and child rearing among young men Now let us turn to the responses of men. Among 26 male workers in Tokyo’s metropolitan area that were interviewed, nearly 60 per cent were single, and another 15 per cent were married but had no children. Among 17 workers interviewed in the non-metropolitan area, about two thirds were married and more than 10 had children. Singles were asked to give three words for the impression they got from the word ‘marriage’ and then to explain their choices, and both the singles and the married men were asked to give three words for the impression they had of ‘being a parent’ and then to explain their choices. Some of the negative words given for their impression of ‘marriage’ among single men were ‘responsibility and duty’, ‘constraint’, ‘reduction of free time’, ‘takes much money’, and ‘compromising’. Some of the positive words given were ‘happiness’, ‘love’, ‘warmth’, ‘lifetime big event’, ‘having children’. However, to my surprise, more than a half, or 12 out of 21 single males, replied solely with non-positive words for their impression of marriage. The most often cited word was ‘responsibility’. Their impression on ‘being a parent’ was also rather negative, such as ‘difficult’, ‘much work’, although it included more positive words such as ‘treasure’, ‘enjoyment’, ‘love’ and more neutral words such as ‘education’ and ‘nurturing’. Many men also shared the view that children should be taken care of by their mother, so marriage meant taking the full responsibility for supporting the family. Marriage is ‘taking responsibility’. I would have to support my family well enough. Marriage is a ‘long period’. You are to spend thirty to forty years of life with another person. I am not too sure if I can get along with another person for so long. Marriage is a ‘constraint’, that is, losing freedom in the use of time. I would like to get married by forty. In order to do so, I need to make up my mind to say farewell to my single life’. (Non-married male employee, thirty five, Tokyo) My impression of marriage is ‘constraint’. Now I am free to do anything in my free time. I would need to be more thoughtful when I got married. I would lose my time for hobbies and time with friends. Marriage is also a ‘compromise’. Now I know that there is no perfect beauty, nor am I well-matched for such a person. Marriage is like ‘a white sheet of paper’. You can draw a gloomy picture or a rosy one, depending on how you live with your partner. I would like to put beautiful colours on it. (Single man in early thirties, metropolitan area) The impression contrasted with non-married women. Many women had a relatively non-negative impression on ‘marriage’ compared with men, but a more negative impression of the burdens of having children compared with men. This is perhaps because after marriage, women are expected to take the duties of
Attitudes towards marriage and child rearing 51 taking care of children while men are expected to take care of financial responsibilities. On the other hand, the impression of marriage and parenting was much more positive and concrete for married men. It was more concrete for those who already had children. Even for those who did not have children, married men gave more positive words to parenting, such as ‘something to look forward to’, ‘growth of own self’, ‘loving’, though some negative words such as ‘much money required’ were also mentioned by more than a few. I want my child to grow and to get good stimulation. I want to direct my children if they go wrong so that they do not trouble others. I don’t want to force my children, but I want them to do their best in whatever they do, either in studies or in leisure activities. (Married man in early thirties with two children, non-metropolitan area) Child-raising is hard work. My child would jump up on my face on weekend mornings when I was sleeping in bed, and I would have to take him out for a walk even though I might have been very tired. I used to dislike children before marriage, but having one’s own child is a different thing. Though marriage reduces freedom, it gives you a place to belong to. (Married man in early thirties with one child, Tokyo) These interviews show that parenting takes on a more positive meaning once one experiences it.
Concluding remarks I have shown how young women (and men), both married and unmarried, view marriage and child rearing. Aside from those who lived with in-laws in the countryside, very few women felt that continuation of their present work alongside child raising was possible or probable. Many also felt that a mother’s full time care was important for children. Thus, many women replied that they would resign from work when they had children, as many women in Japan, indeed, do. Due to the perceived difficulty in balancing work and family, women with a higher education, income and position and better work conditions were particularly reluctant to get married. Interviews with single men also showed that they lacked a strong motive to get married. Many men also expected their future wives to stay home to take care of children, so that marriage and having children meant taking financial responsibility for the whole household. Although those who were already married expressed a more positive attitude towards marriage and being a parent, more than half of single men viewed marriage as a commitment to duty rather than a blessing. The labour market in Japan for youth has changed rapidly since the interviews were conducted in 1997. According to the Eleventh JNFS of 1997, 80 per cent of women had full-time regular employment before marriage. However, more youth
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Nobuko Nagase
today are losing the opportunity to enter a full-time stable work position, and the proportion of new graduates who start their career in non-standard work positions has increased. The Twelfth JNFS in 2002 showed that one fifth of single males and one third of single females in the age group 25–29 were in atypical employment. The wage level of non-standard employees today is about 20 per cent lower than that of regular employees after controlling for education, occupation, age, tenure and firm size (Nagase 2004). Both because of low wages and unstable work hours, their annual income barely supports them. With the deteriorating labour market, youth would have further backed off from family formation and child raising since 1997. At the same time, for those women who were able to get into standard employment, the prolonged work hours and the increasingly competitiveness at work is likely to have made them more reluctant to give up their career, and thus, to get married and have children. In the 1980’s, more than half the women got married in a narrow range of a few years in their early twenties. Many disliked the thought that they would be seen as ‘on the shelf’. Our sample women who were interviewed in the late 1990’s showed no such pressure that they should rush into marriage. And this trend is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
Notes 1 Pregnancy prior to marriage was 13 per cent of all births in 1980, while the percentage rose to 26 in 2004. 2 The interview research was done with the support of Nenkin Fukushi Sogo Kenkyu Kiko, headed by Dr H. Jingu. The author would like to thank the group. 3 The survey was conducted among young mothers with the first child under six in Tokyo and non-metropolitan areas to compare their attitudes towards work and family. A total of 1,464 women were interviewed in Tokyo and the cities of Toyama and Takatsuki. The author was one of the research members involved in the survey. See Nihon Rodo Kenkyu Kiko (2003). 4 Hideo Jingu was the head of the research team. Kikuyo Aoki, Hiroshi Kojima, Yoshiko Kojima, Kenichi Narita, Masahiro Yamada and I were the other members of the research team.
References Higuchi, Y. (1992) Nihon Keizai to Shugyo Kodo (Japanese Economy and Work Behavior), Tokyo: Toyo Keizai. Higuchi, Y. and Abe, M. (1999) ‘Keizai hendo to josei no kekkon, shussan, shugyo no taimingu-kotei yoin to hendo yoin no bunseki’, (Timing of marriage, birth and work of women using panel data), in Y. Higuchi and M. Iwata (eds) Paneru Deta kara mita Gendai Josei-Kekkon, Shussan, Shugyo, Shohi, Chochiku (Panel Data and Women Today), Tokyo: Toyo Keizai. Iwagami, M. (1999) ‘20 dai 30 dai mikonsha no oya to no dobekkyo Kozo Bunseki-Dai 11 kai shussho doko kihon chosa dokushinsha chosa yori-’, (Singles in their 20’s and 30’s and their co-habitation with children using the 11th National Fertility Survey), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Journal of Population Problems, 55 (2): 17–29.
Attitudes towards marriage and child rearing 53 Iwasawa, M. (1999) ‘1990 nendai ni okeru joshi no patonashippu no henyo-’konyaku dokyogata’ kara ‘hikonnyaku hidokyogata’ e’ (The Transformation of Partnership of Japanese Women in the 1990’s: Increased Reluctance Towards Traditional Marriages and the Prevalence of Non-cohabiting Couples), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Journal of Population Problems, 55 (4): 1–15. Miyamoto, M., Iwagami, M. and Yamada, M. (1997) Mikonka Shakai no Oyako KankeiOkane to Aijo ni Miru Kaoku no Yukue (The Parent–child Relationship in the Declining Marriage Era – Where a Family is Heading, a Look at Money and Love), Tokyo: Yuhikaku. Nagase, N. (1997) ‘Wage Differentials and Labor Supply of Married Women in Japan: Part-time and Informal Sector Work Opportunities’, The Japanese Economic Review, 48 (1): 29–42. —— (1999) ‘Shoshika no yoin: shugyo kankyo ka kachikan no henka ka-kikonsha no shugyo keitai sentaku to shussan jiki no sentaku’ (Work and Child bearing Choice of Married Women in Japan: The Effect of Labor Practices), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Journal of Population Problems, 55 (4): 1–18. —— (2002) ‘Jakunenso no koyo no hiseikika to kekkon kodo’ (Marriage Timing and the Effect of Increase in Non-standard Employment Among the Youth in Japan), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Journal of Population Problems, 58 (2): 22–35. —— (2003) ‘Standard and non-standard work arrangements, pay difference and choice of work by Japanese mothers’, in S. Houseman and M. Osawa (eds) Nonstandard Work in Developed Economies: Cause and Consequences, Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. pp. 267–306. —— (2004) ‘Hitenkeiteki koyosha ni taisuru shakaiteki hogo no genjo to kadai’ (Social Protection for Non-standard Workers), Quarterly Journal on Social Security, 40 (2): 116–126. Nakata, Y. and Mosk, C. (1987) ‘The Demand for College Education in Postwar Japan.’, Journal of Human Resources, 22 (3): 377–404. Nihon Rodo Kenkyu Kiko (2001) ‘Daitoshi wakamono no shugyo kodo to ishiki-hirogaru furita keiken to kyokan-’ (Urban youth, their work activity and attitudes – the increase in experience as ‘Freeters’ and sympathy towards such a work style) Japan Institute of Labor Report No. 146. —— (2003) ‘Ikuji kyugyo seido ni kansuru chosa kenkyu hokokusho-’Josei no shigoto to katei seikatsu ni kansuru kenkyu chosa kekka’ o chushin ni’ (Report on the child care leave system, using the results of the Survey on Women’s Work and Family Life) Japan Institute of Labor Report No. 157. Ono H. (2003) ‘Women’s Economic Standing, Marriage Timing and Cross-national Contexts of Gender’, Journal of Marriage and Family, 65: 275–286. Yamada, M. (1999) Parasaito Singuru no Jidai (The Age of the Parasite Single), Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo. Yashiro, N. (1999) Shoshi Koreika no Keizaigaku: Shijo Jushi no Keizai Kaikaku (The Economics of the Declining Birth and Ageing Society-Reform with Emphasis on Market Mechanisms), Tokyo: Toyokeizaishinposha.
4
Strong in tradition and yet innovative The puzzles of the Italian family Francesca Bettio
Introduction The contemporary Italian family is attracting scholarly interest beyond the country’s borders for fostering changes that are less marked elsewhere, or for obstinately resisting change. In the late 1980s, Italy attained the lowest level of fertility in the developed world. At present, the country has the highest rate of children who delay leaving their parental home. At the same time, it is successfully resisting trends that are a matter for concern elsewhere like single motherhood. Questions naturally arise as to how these developments may be related and whether they are transitory or relatively stable developments. I cannot address all or even most such questions in this short chapter. My principal aim here is, more modestly, to provide a broad overview of salient features of the contemporary Italian family from a comparative European perspective, with passing references to non-European countries including Japan. I shall also attempt to illustrate that an interdisciplinary approach is important for understanding some of the causal links between changing and persisting aspects of family life in Italy. To serve this purpose, I shall contrive an imaginary exchange between an economist, a demographer and a sociologist, each asked to single out the most distinctive traits of the family in present day Italy and to help resolve some key puzzles. The final paragraphs will gather the threads of this imaginary dialogue. An economist’s point of view Ask an Italian economist which characteristics currently single out the Italian family from that of most other industrialized countries and s/he will probably identify the coexistence of record low fertility and low female participation in the labour market. At the turn of the millennium, Italy recorded the lowest level of fertility within the (then) European Union, as well as the lowest rate of female participation or female employment, immediately preceded by Spain or Greece. According to the most recent figures, the situation had hardly changed by 2003 except for Greece overtaking Italy as the least fertile country in the EU15 (Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1).
The puzzles of the Italian family 55 2.0
Ireland
France
1.8
Finland
Total fertility rate, 2003
Denmark Netherlands United Kingdom
Sweden
Luxembourg Belgium
1.6
Portugal 1.4
Austria Germany Italy
Spain Greece Rsq = 0.3093
1.2 40
50
60
70
80
Female employment rate, 2003
Figure 4.1 Period fertility and female employment rate in EU countries, 2003.
Italy’s order in the ranking does not change when Japan and the United States of America are added to the EU15 group of nations (Table 4.1), thus suggesting that the country’s score is somewhat robust to the composition of the reference group of countries, provided the latter are sufficiently close in terms of economic development and GDP. However, it is interesting to note that in 2003, Italy shared with Japan the second lowest position in the fertility ranking. The best fitting cross-section relation between fertility and female employment within EU15 is linear and positive, and explains a little less than one third of the total variance in fertility rates, with statistical significance of the Pearson correlation level at the conventional level. As is well known, the a priori expectation from home economics is that women’s employment and the level of fertility go in opposite directions when different countries or different years for the same country are compared, provided that child ‘quality’ and the cost structure are broadly comparable. The positive relation in Figure 4.1 is evidence that high fertility countries are not systematically associated with low employment rates for women. Many economists would be tempted to dismiss this evidence, because it does not control for cohort effects within each country or for country-specific factors that may distort the ‘true’ relationship at any point of time. For example, I had
56
Francesca Bettio
Table 4.1 Fertility and women’s labour market participation in Europe, Japan and the United States
Sweden Denmark Netherlands Finland United Kingdom Austria Portugal Germany France Ireland Luxembourg Belgium Spain Greece Italy Japan United States of America
Period fertility rate, 2003
Female employement rate, 2003
Ranking employment
Ranking fertility
1.71 1.76 1.75 1.76 1.71 1.39 1.44 1.34 1.89 1.98 1.63 1.61 1.29 1.27 1.29 1.29
71.5 70.5 65.8 65.7 65.3 62.8 60.6 59.0 57.2 55.8 52.0 51.8 46.0 43.8 42.7 56.8
1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 11
7 4 6 5 8 12 11 13 3 2 9 10 14 17 15/16 15/16
2.04
65.7
5
1
Sources: For European countries: Eurostat (Newcronos: Fertility Indicators; Employment Indicators); for Japan and the USA: Vital Statistics, US Bureau of Census and Rebick (this volume) for 2003 fertility rate estimates; OECD Labour Force Statistics for employment rates.
uncontrolled cohort effects in mind when, in my earlier work, I argued that there are (no longer) reasons to expect an ordered relationship across countries between fertility and women’s employment if fertility is measured by period fertility, that is, by an index that ‘synthesizes’ the concomitant behaviour of different cohorts of fertile women. This is because convergence of fertility levels to a narrow band around the replacement threshold of two children per woman leaves less room for adjustment to trends in participation. At such low levels of fertility, the burden of making motherhood more compatible with working life falls mainly on the timing of births. Since the latter varies across cohorts of women and is not necessarily synchronized across countries, an unordered relationship between concomitant changes in participation and period fertility can be observed . . . (Bettio and Villa 1998: 165–166) While this argument still holds, it is not so easy to dismiss the evidence that women’s employment and fertility are no longer negatively related across European countries on grounds that unaccounted country effects hide or distort the ‘true’ relation. Country-specific effects are found to be important (Kögel
The puzzles of the Italian family 57 2002), but they themselves ought to be explained consistently with the received theoretical wisdom, if the latter is to be accepted. Also, if we look at recent trends within rather than across countries, there is evidence that participation and fertility have not gone in opposite directions in some countries (e.g. Sweden or the United Kingdom), while they continued to behave as expected in others, such as Spain or Italy (Coleman and Chandola 1999). For many developed countries, moreover, the causal link between the two trends appears to have weakened starting with the mid-1980s (Engelhardt et al. 2001). In sum, explaining why Mediterranean countries, and Italy in particular, have consistently combined low participation and low fertility over the last 10 to 15 years is a challenge for theoretical economists and for scholars of comparative family studies. This challenge has generated a lively debate among economists, both in Italy and elsewhere (Ahn and Mira 2002, Brewster and Rindfuss 2000, De Laat and Sevilla-Sanz 2004, Del Boca 2002). Here, however, I shall deliberately neglect this debate for two reasons. As an economist, I find it more interesting to explore how related disciplines, like demography and sociology, might throw light on economists’ puzzles. Also, the debate among economists would unduly shift the emphasis from the family to the labour market, while the focus chosen for this chapter is the family. A demographer’s perspective How would an Italian demographer respond to the economist’s puzzle? Demographers are less faithful followers of home economics, and, although they have extensively used Becker’s theory to account for past demographic trends, they are likely to be less disturbed by the fact that the theory may need amendment.1 However, they would share with economists the concern over falling fertility and the idea that fertility is the key to an understanding of the Italian family from a comparative perspective. The central question to address for an Italian demographer would thus be related to, but different from that asked by economists and might be put as follows: the Italian family did respond to the post-war acceleration in the process of industrialization and rise in living standards with a rapid change in fertility behaviour, while it appears to oppose change in other respects. How can this singular combination of change and continuity be accounted for? And will it last? Among the countries of the old European Union, Italy still recorded the lowest (crude) rate of divorce, the lowest share of one-parent households and of young, one-person households (young ‘singles’) around 2002, as well as the second lowest rate of births out of wedlock (Table 4.2).2 Only those demographic indicators that are closely associated with the fertility decline have shown considerable change over the past decades. Age at first marriage and first pregnancy have been increasing fast and were close to or higher than the EU average by the end of the 1990s (Table 4.2); permanent childlessness also increased considerably and may well grow further: 18 per cent of women born in 1960 did not have children, as opposed to 12.8 for women born in 1940.
2.4 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.1 2.5 1.0 0.9 0.7 2.4 2.1 1.8 0.9 2.4 2.7
33.8 29.5 44.6 39.9 44.3 26.1 4.4 31.1 10.8 23.2 29.1 25.5 26.6 56.0 40.6
Births outside marriage per 100 births, 2002 27.4 26.7 29.6 28.5 28.1 27.2 26.6 27.9 27.4 27.7 28.2 25.9 27.8 30.1 27.2
Mean age of women at first marriage, 2000–2002
2.7 3.1 1.7 2.5 3.4 2.0 1.6 3.3 1.4 1.4 2.8 1.9 1.4 6.6 4.8
Share of one parent households, 2001 (ECHP) 28.18 28.47 29.9 29.59 29.4 28.8 28.9 30.6 30.3 29.5 30.4 28.8 30.7 30.1 28.7
Mean age of women at childbearing, 2000–2002
1.39 1.61 1.76 1.76 1.89 1.34 1.29 1.98 1.23 1.63 1.75 1.44 1.29 1.71 1.71
Period fertility rate, 2003
18.0 13.7 13.0 20.0 10.7 27.8 15.0 18.0 18.0 NA 18.0 5.0 12.0 13.0 21.5
Proportion of childless women, 1960–1964 cohort
Notes 2001 Crude divorce rate for Portugal; 1995 mean age for women at first marriage for Ireland; 1999 mean age at childbirth for Greece and belgium.
Sources: ECHP, eighth wave, own calculations; Eurostat: New Cronos, consulted March 2005.
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK
Crude divorce rate, 2000
Table 4.2 Demographic indicators for EU countries, 2001–2003
3.7 1.8 7.0 9.4 4.7 3.6 1.3 1.7 1.2 3.1 5.6 0.8 2.1 10.2 3.4
Share of young one person households, 2001 (ECHP)
The puzzles of the Italian family 59 Higher permanent childlessness might be taken to signal an important behavioural departure from a pattern characterizing until recently all Southern European countries, where rates of childlessness did not greatly exceed expectations of biological infertility (Tanturri and Mencarini 2003). However, it is still unclear how far voluntary childlessness accounts for this recent increase as opposed to ‘involuntary’ infertility due to postponement. Nor is the magnitude of the increase recorded for Italy so far exceptionally high within Southern Europe or old Europe at large.3 Overall, for a young Italian woman, the odds are still overwhelmingly in favour of marrying around the age of 27, without experiencing cohabitation or pregnancy prior to marriage and with only a 1 in 7 chance of subsequently experiencing divorce;4 furthermore, she may also be fairly confident that she will have at least 1 child with a legitimate spouse around the age of 30, while facing rather low prospects of building up a three-child family. In the language of demographers like Popenoe (1988), the Italian family appears to resist in important respects the so-called ‘de-institutionalization’, that is the tendency for ‘. . . . individual members [to be] more autonomous and less bound by the group and [for] the domestic group as a whole [to be] less cohesive’ (Popenoe 1988: 8). Followers of Lesthaeghe (1992) might prefer to view this same family as selectively resisting completion of the ‘second demographic transition’. According to Lesthaeghe, demographic change is driven by ‘postmaterialistic’ values rather than economic factors during the second demographic transition, and the latter features fertility fluctuations around replacement level alongside a pronounced decline of marriage in favour of cohabitation, rising prospects of marriage instability for those who marry, significant expansion of ‘atypical’ families including (voluntarily) childless couples, single parenthood and other variegated living arrangements. However, is the demographic behaviour that the Italian family displays truly distinctive in the European context? And should it be viewed as a mere expression of a yet not completed transition to a new demographic regime? In order to answer the first question, I obtained a summary picture of Italy’s comparative position in the current demographic scenario of EU countries applying the multidimensional scaling technique to the full set of demographic variables reported in Table 4.2.5 These are:6 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
crude divorce rate births outside marriage per 100 births mean age of women at first marriage percentage share of single-parent households with at least 1 dependent child mean age of women at childbearing period fertility rate permanent childlessness among women born in 1960/1963 percentage share of young persons households (30 years or younger).
Figure 4.2 illustrates the results. In the figure, countries are positioned in the two dimensional space according to a synthetic measure of distance/proximity
60
Francesca Bettio 1.5
Denmark Finland
1.0
Luxemb
Germany .5 Netherl
Spain
Austria
Italy
0.0 France
Greece
Portugal
–.5
Dimension 2
Sweden UK –1.0
Belgium Ireland
–1.5 –3
–2
–1
0
1
2
3
Dimension 1
Figure 4.2 Multidimensional scaling of EU countries. Source: Euclidean distance model: 8 demographic variables 2001–2003.
based on the values of all the eight variables. Italy has minimal distances from Spain and Greece, with the three countries forming a cluster clearly separated from the rest. Portugal is closer to Italy, Greece or Spain than to any other country in the figure, but much less close than any of these three countries are to one another. The strongest suggestion from this scaling exercise is that Italy is not an isolated outlier in terms of demographic behaviour and belongs to a distinctive but broader geographical pattern, Mediterranean or Southern European. In the demographic and sociological literature, Southern European countries typically include Portugal alongside Greece, Italy and Spain. However, both in my previous research on fertility and female participation in the Mediterranean (Bettio and Villa 1998) and in this exercise, Portugal behaves somewhat idiosyncratically, with some similarities but also important differences from the three other countries. For this reason, I prefer to talk about a Mediterranean pattern that fully includes Greece, Italy and Spain.7 What the given exercise cannot reveal is whether this pattern is just a temporary state of disequilibrium along a path that will eventually converge to that of the other European countries or whether it is developing into a true demographic variant. This is a grand question that I do not, and cannot, pursue here. But it can be scaled down to a more manageable issue, namely whether the combination of
The puzzles of the Italian family 61 selective change and adherence to tradition that singles out the demography of Italy (and Spain or Greece) from that of other European countries is a distinctive mark of new and widespread family patterns, or a statistical artefact reflecting coexistence of modern and traditional families, with the former bound to eventually take over the latter. If we opt in favour of the statistical artefact, then demographic or economic puzzles should be treated as transitory phenomena that need neither new theories nor policy action; time alone would resolve puzzles and problems. If we take the alternative view, it makes sense to look closer into these new family forms in order to start answering unresolved puzzles. A sociologist’s point of view An Italian sociologist would argue against the statistical artefact hypothesis. In her/his view, the mixture of tradition and change that the Italian (Mediterranean) family exhibits is actually generating new patterns that may well be passed over to future generations. The so-called ‘long family’ is arguably the most important of these ‘new’ patterns and refers to the tendency for young children to remain with their parents well into adult life. A closer look into the long family is thus warranted before I go back to the questions raised by economists and demographers. Figure 4.3 reports the share of young people still living with their parents in each EU15 member country, except Sweden. Italy records the highest or second highest share, no matter which age group is chosen; 81.3 per cent of young Italians aged 20 to 29 still live with their parents compared to 42.7 per cent in the United Kingdom, 35.2 per cent in the Netherlands and 29 per cent in Denmark and Finland. The gaps widen and become even more salient for people in their early thirties. Among young people in their late twenties (24–29), 75.3 per cent still live with their parents in Italy, as do 45.6 per cent of those in their early thirties. The corresponding figures are 26.5 per cent and 8.4 per cent for the United Kingdom, and 11.9 per cent and 3.2 per cent for Denmark! Also, young Spanish, Greeks or Portuguese do not differ too much from young Italians, lending further support to the suggestion that Italy belongs to a Mediterranean or Southern European cluster rather than behaving as an isolated outlier.8 The ‘long family’ is a relatively recent phenomenon that first attracted sociologists’ attention in the late 1980s in Italy (Cavalli 1993, Donati 1989, Scabini and Donati 1988), and is now widely researched by demographers and economists as well. It was soon recognized as a development that typifies Mediterranean countries and Portugal, but the trend towards delayed home leaving is common to several European countries as well as the United States of America (Aassve et al. 2001, Aassve et al. 2002, Bettio and Villa 1998, Cherlin et al. 1997, Fernandez Cordon 1997, Goldscheider 1997, Schmidt 1990) and has become sufficiently conspicuous in Japan to inspire parallels with Italy (Dalla Zuanna et al. 1998, Ogawa et al., Chapter 2, this volume, Rebick and Takenaka, Chapter 1, this volume). The contours of this phenomenon are relatively well known in Italy by now (as well as Spain or Japan) thanks to repeated surveys and plentiful research (Table 4.3). First, there are regional variations that are plausibly accounted for by
62
Francesca Bettio 10.3
Finland 2.8
Denmark
29
1.6
Netherlands
Age 30–34 Age 20–29
28.7
36.2
UK
8.4
Luxembourg
9.6
42.7 49.4 15.3
France
54.5
21.3
Austria
59.4
22.5
Germany
61.9
17.4
Belgium
70.3
Portugal
36.9
Greece
35.8
73.1 78.8 46.4
Spain
80.5
36.6
Ireland
81.1 45.6
Italy 0
20
40
81.9
60
80
100
Percentage share
Figure 4.3 Adult children living with their parents, by age, 2001. Source: ECHP sample for Italy (2001).
economic and social differences. With reference to the core group aged 20–34, the share of co-residing children varies from around 67 per cent in the Northern and central Italian regions to around 71 per cent in Southern regions. However, regional differences are no stronger than gender differences within each region, with a consistent over-representation of men among the ‘stayers’. Prevailing characteristics also vary with gender and across age groups, but if we refer to average values for the 20–34 year olds, we find that: ●
● ●
the overwhelming majority of adult children co-residing with their parents never married (95.9 per cent), the opposite being true for non-co-residing young adults co-residing adult children are better educated a considerable share of co-residing adult children are engaged in some form of paid work (51.1 per cent), and more still are able to count on their own income (63 per cent among men), but the corresponding figures for the non co-residing are considerably higher
The puzzles of the Italian family 63 Table 4.3 Characteristics of population in age group 20–34 – ECHP sample for Italy (2001)a % Share
Living with parents
Not living with parents
Share women Share never married Share having completed less than secondary education Share in paid workb and working ⬎15 hrs per week Share unemployed Share with permanent employment contract among all in paid workb and working ⬎15 hrs Share with no (own) income among men
44.7 95.9 27.0
60.1 22.3 43.0
55.1
65.6
19.1 61.1
7.2 65.8
37.0
10.3
Source: ECHP eighth wave; own calculations. Notes a Data are weighted. b paid work comprises paid employment, paid apprenticeship, paid training, self employment.
●
●
potential employment instability is higher for co-residing children in paid work. The simple indicator of instability adopted here is the share of ‘atypical’ employment among those in paid work (non-permanent employee contracts, trainee positions, self-employment etc.) finally, unemployment is disproportionately concentrated among co-residing children.
The fact that co-residing children tend to be better educated and yet better represented among the unemployed or atypical job holders is the net outcome of opposing tendencies. On the one hand the vast majority of students in Italy co-reside with their family until completion of college education, which tends to raise the educational level of the ‘stayers’. On the other hand the risk of unemployment or of holding atypical jobs tends to be lower among the better educated – although this is not consistently true across gender, age groups and regions. Given that unemployment and job instability have been found to significantly deter home leaving (Aassve et al. 2001), the better educated can be expected to leave the parental home more quickly once they have completed formal education. However, because of the sheer size of the student population the first tendency is likely to be dominant when the analysis concerns stocks rather than flows, as in Table 4.3. To throw some light on the bare figures of Table 4.3, let me first summarize the range of reasons that young Italians explicitly give for the delay in leaving the parental home, based on the telephone survey conducted by the Population Research Institute (PRI) in 1998 on a large sample of 20–34 year olds.9
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Francesca Bettio
The following five disadvantages of leaving home were cited most frequently: ● ● ● ● ●
economic disadvantages (higher costs: 53 per cent) housework (45 per cent) cooking (29 per cent) ironing (16 per cent) cleaning and tidying up (11 per cent).10
When the interviewee was asked to identify motivations that would induce her/him to leave the parental home, the most popular answers were: ● ● ● ● ●
to marry or cohabit (43 per cent) to work (35 per cent) to gain independence from parental family (33 per cent) to have own family (13 per cent) to meet the challenge (10 per cent), . . . but only if the following conditions were met:
● ● ● ● ●
having a stable job (56 per cent) being able to count on adequate monthly income (56 per cent) be married (46 per cent) having a place to live (39 per cent) being able to preserve living standard (18 per cent).
Perceived reasons given in responding to these types of questions should not be taken at face value, if only because the findings can vary from one survey to the next, depending on how the questions are phrased. Nevertheless, they provide a useful introduction to a more scholarly search for causal factors. Four such factors are most frequently cited in the literature as independent determinants of the long family, namely tight housing markets, rising educational standards, nature of welfare provisions and gender roles. A not too dissimilar set of factors is alleged to delay marriage decisions in Japan (Nagase, Chapter 3, Ogawa et al. Chapter 2, this volume). Tight housing markets raise the cost of setting up independent living arrangements and have been found to discourage home leaving (Ermisch 1999, Giannelli and Monfardini 2000, Haurin et al. 1993, Martinez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo 2002). Rising educational standards may also delay economic independence favouring cohabitation with parents, depending on the school system. In the Italian context where school fees are generally low, including university fees, and attending school or college is compatible with commuting (no campuses), sharing accommodation with parents considerably lowers the overall costs of additional years of schooling. However, tight housing markets have been recently experienced elsewhere in Europe, and educational standards have also risen elsewhere, including countries with school systems not too dissimilar from that in
The puzzles of the Italian family 65 Italy. It is thus open to question how far these factors can account for the comparative position of Italy, Spain, Greece or Portugal. By contrast, Italy shares with other Southern European or Mediterranean countries a distinctive welfare system (Esping-Andersen 1999, Ferrera 1996, Flaquer 2000, Jurado and Naldini 1997, Trifiletti 1998 and Chapter 11, this volume). Extensive welfare provisions offering safety nets to those who are unable to earn an independent living hardly exist in Italy. Selected (and generous) provisions are in place only for segments of labour market insiders, for example, workers made redundant or older employees of large firms threatened with lay-offs at ages close to retirement. The beneficiaries are still disproportionately adult men, since labour market provisions have traditionally been designed with the main male breadwinner family in mind. He was to be protected so that he could pass on welfare benefits to his wife and children. The family thus acquired the role of income insurance agency, and still retains it, despite the fact that two-income families are now common. I would argue that, from children’s point of view, the specific advantage of family versus state- or market-based income insurance is that the former is more generous and offers greater protection from the risk of an even temporary fall in living standards. Moreover, the safety net afforded by the family operates on a preventive basis, that is, not only are children sheltered when searching for a job; they are also encouraged to continue searching until finding an ‘adequate’ job (wait unemployment). Similarly, they are discouraged from leaving home if this implies a fall in their overall standard of living. In the Mediterranean setting, where young entrants into the labour market bear disproportionate risks of unemployment or of ‘atypical’ employment, they are likely to be commensurably discouraged from leaving the family nest. This is especially the case where labour market segmentation along age lines is sharper and where parents are more able to uphold the standards of living of their children. There is a clear parallel with Japan in this respect, where deteriorating labour market prospects for graduates and increase in non-standard employment among young people are reported to delay home leaving as well as marriage (Nagase, Chapter 3, Ogawa et al. Chapter 2, Rebick, Chapter 5, this volume). Recent econometric research is consistent with these contentions, at least in part. After controlling for a large number of personal and household characteristics, Aassve et al. (2001) and Becker et al. (2002) confirm that in Italy, unemployment and job insecurity reduce children’s chances of leaving home, whereas father’s unemployment increases it. Nagase and Rebick (Chapter 3 and 5, this volume) report similar findings for Japan that irregular employment and/or decreasing opportunities for young graduates contribute to postponing marriage. However, there are significant gender effects: Aassve et al. (2001) find that for male children in Italy, leaving home is conditional on finding a stable job, not simply a job, whereas for women, the key determinant is partnership formation since, presumably, they are also counting on the resources of the partner. This is exactly the same as the situation in Japan (Nagase Chapter 3, this volume).
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Gender differences nicely introduce the last factor that may account for the long family in Italy, namely rigidity of gender and parental roles in relation to housework and care work. If children take a modest part in housework and care work, then cooking meals, paying bills, tidying up their own room, arranging for medical appointments and so on represent ‘non-transferable resources’, that is resources that are largely lost when leaving the parental home. Alternatively, a mother’s housework and care services may be thought as a ‘public good’ inducing children to stay, as Diaz and Guillo (2005) argue. Availability of nontransferable resources has been shown to significantly hinder parental-home leaving in the Netherlands (De Jong et al. 1991), and this resonates with the evidence for Italy from the IRP survey quoted earlier. It makes sense therefore to hypothesize that, where quality or quantity of housework and care are higher and/or less equally shared between parents and children, children have a greater incentive to stay with their parents. In all plausibility, this is the case in Italy as well as other Mediterranean countries. In Italy, feminism did not gradually build up but took the country by storm in the 1970s. By the late 1980s, however, the fire of the movement had died down, with most of the efforts having gone into the right to abortion and equal opportunities at the work place. The intra-household division of labour was much talked about, but remained a private battle, which, it was hoped, would naturally turn in favour of women as they gained economic independence. It has, but not enough. Also, traditional standards of care expected from women have not been questioned and remain high at present, since sharing them was all that seemed to matter. Truly comparable data on the amount of hours devoted by men and women to housework and care work are not frequent, but whatever comparative evidence is available tends to place Italian women at the top of the ranking. I have constructed an indicator of unpaid care for the 14 European countries participating in the ECHP survey, as well as a measure of the gender gap in this indicator. The indicator is the number of adults devoting at least two hours daily to caring for children and/or adults, divided by the number of dependants, namely children under 16 and elderly over 70. A standardized average for this indicator between 1994 and 1996 may be constructed, with 100 set at the top value and 0 at the bottom. The values are: 100 for Italy, 80.7 for the Netherlands and Greece, 72.8 for the United Kingdom, 68.3 for Spain, 65.6 for Germany, 58.9 for Austria, 53.4 for Ireland, 47.7 for Luxembourg, 47.7 for Belgium, 43.8 for Denmark, 27.7 for Finland, 22.6 for Portugal and 0 for France.11 Also, Italy records the third highest value for the female–male gap in this indicator, after Ireland and Greece. With regard to the sharing of tasks between children and parents, the above quoted IRP survey as well as the results from the national Multiscopo Survey (ISTAT 2000) report that adult children living with their parents contribute rather selectively to housework, especially if they are male and employed. Contribution to housework is, in fact, the main source of conflicts between parents and co-residing children according to most surveys on delayed home leavers in Italy.
The puzzles of the Italian family 67
Gathering the threads I can now go back to the questions raised by economists and demographers enriched by the insights from sociologists. The long family reconciles tradition and change, low fertility and strong ‘tastes’ for children, cohesion and independence between children and parents in ways that complement each other. As such, it is a potentially viable scenario from a demographic perspective. However, although the long family evolved out of a clear set of received values it was sustained by specific economic incentives, like tight markets for rented accommodation, or highly selective welfare benefits that only the family could redistribute, for example weak income support schemes for first job seekers versus generous employment related pensions. Should such incentives change, the long family pattern will change. This is an incomplete and perhaps obvious answer to demographers’ questions about transition, but nevertheless provides a starting point. Now reconsider the economist’s puzzle about the coexistence of very low fertility and low female participation in Italy. In regard to fertility, I would argue that long (and cohesive) families raise the cost of children to parents and, to use a concept dear to home economics, decisively tilt the quantity/quality trade off against quantity and in favour of quality. On the one hand, rigidity of gender and parental roles in the sharing of housework and care tasks means that the longer children stay with parents, the higher the demands that each child makes on her/his mother’s time over the life cycle. Moreover, given the role of the family as an income pooling and an income insurance agent, the expected monetary cost of children to both parents tends to be higher the longer children stay at home, since they have been found to contribute relatively little to family finances even when they are working (see the above quoted IRP and ISTAT surveys). On the other hand, Italian parents appear to enjoy having their children around the house and to suffer when the latter depart. In this respect, delayed home leaving compensates parents for keeping the number of children low. From the point of view of parents, therefore, few children and long families are ‘complements’. This rigidity of gender and parental role does not, however, entirely conform to received notions of patriarchy, as some authors imply. McDonald (2000), for example, draws on the parallel between patriarchal family organizations and cultural settings where children are denied rights of their own to argue that restricted rights for children and the low value placed on the latter end up inhibiting fertility. While children in the Mediterranean may formally enjoy fewer legal rights than elsewhere or be relatively penalized in the labour market, this hardly reflects their actual standing in the family according to opinion surveys, perceptions of youth themselves or the informed view of many scholars (e.g. Palomba 2001). Ariès’ syndrome of ‘child king’ (Ariès 1980) sounds closer to the daily family experience in the Mediterranean than some traditional expression of patriarchy. There are other ways in which long (and cohesive) families may inhibit fertility, for example, by discouraging births out of wedlock among young people, a development that is boosting fertility in high fertility countries like the United
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Kingdom. What I want to stress is that the inhibiting influence of the long family on fertility ought to operate at any level of labour force participation of women. If this is correct, the long family goes part of the way towards explaining economists’ puzzle. This resonates, in part, with Ogawa’s contention for Japan (Chapter 2, this volume) that ‘. . . . the main source of recent fertility reduction lies in the increase in the proportion of young singles . . . ’ where singles refers to unmarried people and includes adult children living with their parents. In addition, there are reasons to believe that where weak public welfare provisions are in place, a ‘long family’ might also be inhibiting female participation, though this involves a more speculative kind of argument. Delayed home leaving keeps within the family the production of household goods and services that might otherwise be bought in the market if children experienced independent living, and experimented with less structured family forms before forming their own nuclei. Because market production (or public supply) of substitutes for housework and care services tend to be female intensive activities, failure to ‘export’ such goods and services to the market or the public sector may hinder growth in female employment (Bettio and Plantenga 2004; Freeman and Schettkat 2005). It is easy to recognize that the long family is only one of the possible causal links in the low fertility–low participation chain for Italy if only because one key actor, the labour market, was deliberately neglected, except for selected references. However, I did not set myself the task of providing a comprehensive understanding. I simply meant to show that an interdisciplinary perspective can be fertile if the aim is to understand complex and evolving institutions like contemporary families.
Notes 1 The proceedings of the conference ‘La bassa fecondità tra costrizioni economiche e cambio di valori’ held in Roma at the Accademia dei Lincei on 15–16 May 2003 are a representative and very good collection of demographers’ latest findings and multiple approaches. See Breschi and Bacci (2003). 2 Contrary to some popular images, low fertility has characterized some regions of Northern Italy also in the past. In regions like Piedmont the final number of descendants for women born in 1920 was already below replacement level (1.71 children per woman), although it rose to 1.82 among women born in 1940 (Terra Abrami and Sorvillo 1993: table 2). Significant differences still exist between the North and the South, although convergence is enhanced by continuing decline in the South and a (slight) recent reversal of the trend in the North. However, it is still unclear how much this reversal in Northern regions owes to the expected ‘catching up’ effect of cohorts having previously postponed birth, a genuine increase in the final number of descendants of native women, or higher fertility of recent migrant groups (see previous footnote for references). 3 The proportion of childless women for the cohort born in 1940 is 10.8 for the United Kingdom, 14.3 for Finland, 12.4 for the Netherlands, 4.7 for Ireland, 12.8 for Italy, 13.1 for Sweden, 8.7 for Belgium, 9.8 for Denmark, 8.0 for Spain, 8.4 for France and 5.6 for Portugal (Eurostat: New Cronos 2005). Compared to the values for the cohorts born between 1960–1964 the (simple) average increase for this group of countries is 5 percentage points, with Italy and Spain recording 5.2 and 4 points, respectively. 4 In 2001 (latest year available) the estimated number of divorces per 100 marriages was still 15.4 in Italy as compared to 69.6 in Belgium, 60.2 in Austria or 58.8 in Sweden (Eurostat: New Cronos 2005).
The puzzles of the Italian family 69 5 Multidimensional scaling is a set of data analysis techniques where each object (in this case each country) is represented by a point in a multidimensional space, usually a two or three dimensional space. The points are arranged in the space in such a way that the distances between pairs of points have the strongest possible relation to the similarities among the corresponding pair of objects. In the above exercise distances are Euclidean metric distances and the programme used is ASCAL in SPSS release 10–1. The use I make here of multidimensional scaling is purely descriptive, also because ASCAL cannot be utilized for inferential purposes. For an introduction to multidimensional scaling see Schiffman et al. (1981). 6 Two variables (per cent share of single parent household and of young, one-person households) are derived from own processing of ECHP eighth wave. 7 Significant differences between Portugal on the one hand and Italy, Spain and Greece on the other exist also in terms of welfare provisions and family policy. Because of these differences Flaquer (2000:13) also speaks of a Mediterranean Welfare Model comprizing Italy, Spain and Greece in lieu of a broader but more diversified Southern European Model. The fact that these four Southern European countries share a sufficiently distinctive welfare system (Trifiletti, Chapter II, this volume) is an important factor accounting for similarities in female labour market and fertility. 8 The source for the figures in Figure 4.3 and Table 4.3 are microdata from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) eighth wave and the calculations are my own. The eighth wave is the latest and last available from this source before transition to the larger panel called EU-SILC. A degree of caution on the reliability of these figures is in order, given that they are based on microdata. However, I checked my data against those based on the second ECHP wave reported in Aassve et al. (2002: Table 2) and I found no major difference in the age structure, sex, civil status, education and employment status with the data of my own extraction for the same wave. 9 Please note that all these survey questions allowed for multiple answers, thus frequencies do not sum to 100. The survey results are reported in Bonifazi et al.(1999: 60–63) for the figures reported here. 10 Note that in this case the least frequent disadvantages also include emotional loss, loneliness, lack of protection, higher responsibilities and ‘other’. 11 The ranking itself is not entirely stable from one survey year to the next, although the basic picture consistently shows Mediterranean countries plus the Netherlands and the United Kingdom at the top of this ranking. Note, however, that the high score by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands is likely to reflect intensive mother’s services in the first infancy rather than adolescence or adulthood, although available data are too gross to prove this latter point. For further details see Bettio and Plantenga (2004: values reported there refer to 1996).
References Aassve, A., Billari, F. and Ongaro, F. (2001) ‘The Impact of Income and Employment Status on Leaving Home: Evidence From the Italian ECHP Sample’, Labour 15(3): 501–529. Aassve, A., Burgess S., Chesher, A. and Propper, C. (2002) ‘Transition From Home to Marriage Among Young Americans’, Journal of Applied Econometrics,17: 1–23. Ahn, N. and Mira, P. (2002) ‘A Note on the Changing Relationship Between Fertility and Female Employment Rates in Developed Countries’, Journal of Population Economics, 15(4): 667–682. Ariès, P. (1980) ‘Two Successive Motivations for Declining Birth Rates in the West’, Population and Development Review 6(4): 645–650. Becker, S. O., Bentolilla, S., Fernandes, A. and Ichino A. (2002) ‘Job insecurity and children’s emancipation: The Italian puzzle’, presented at the ESSLE CEPR-IZA meeting, Ammersee, September.
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Bettio, F. and Plantenga, J. (2004) ‘Care Regimes in Europe’, Feminist Economics, 10(1): 85–113. Bettio, F. and Villa, P. (1998) ‘A Mediterranean Perspective on the Break-Down of the Relationship Between Participation and Fertility’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 22(2): 131–137. Bonifazi, C., Menniti, A., Misiti, M. and Palomba, R. (1999) ‘Giovani che non lasciano il nido’, Working Paper 01/99, Roma, Instituto di Ricerca sulla Polazione (IRP). Breschi, M. and Bacci, M. L. (eds) (2003) La Bassa Fecondità Italiana tra Costrizioni Economiche e Cambio di Valori, Udine: Forum. Brewster, K. and Rindfuss, L. (2000) ‘Fertility and Women’s Employment in Industrialized Countries’, Annual Review of Sociology, 26: 271–296. Cavalli, A. (1993) ‘Senza nessuna fretta di crescere’, Il Mulino, XLII (345): 35–42. Cherlin, A., Scabini, E. and Rossi, G. (eds) (1997) ‘Delayed Homeleaving in Europe and the US’, Journal of Family Issues, 18 (special issue): 608–626. Coleman, D. and Chandola, T. (1999) ‘Britain’s place in European population’, in S. McRae (ed.) Changing Britain, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 37–67. Dalla Zuanna, G., Atoh, M., Castiglioni, M. and Kojima, K. (1998) ‘Le mariage tardif chez les jeunes: les cas de l’Italie et du Japon’, Genus 54(3–4): 187–232. De Jong Gierveld, J., Liefbroer, A. C. and Beemink, E. (1991) ‘The Effect of Parental Resources on Patterns of Leaving Home Among Young Adults in the Netherlands’, European Sociological Review, 7: 55–71. De Laat, J. and Sevilla-Sanz, A. (2004) Working Women, Men’s Home Time and LowestLow Fertility in Europe, mimeo, Brown University Online. Available http://www.creato.no/ espe 2004/sider/pdf/sevilla.pdf (Accessed March 2005). Del Boca, D. (2002) The Effect of Childcare and Part-Time on Participation and Fertility of Italian Women, Journal of Population Economics, 15(3): 549–573. Diaz, A. and Guillo, M. D. (2005) ‘Family Ties and Labour Supply’, Investigaciones Economicas, 29(2): 289–329. Donati, P. (ed.) (1989) Primo Rapporto sulla Famiglia in Italia, Centro Internazionale Studi Famiglia, Milano: Edizioni Paoline. Engelhardt, H., Kogel, T. and Prskawetz, A. (2001) Fertility and Female Employment Reconsidered, MPIDR Working Paper WP 2001–021, Rostock, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research. Ermisch, J. (1999) ‘Prices, Parents and Young People’s Household Formation’, Journal of Urban Economics, 45(1): 47–71. Esping-Andersen, G. (1999) Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eurostat, New Cronos. Online. Available http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_ pageid ⫽ 1090,30070682,1090_30298591&_dad ⫽ portal&_schema ⫽ PORTAL (Accessed March 2005). Fernandez Cordon, N. J. (1997) ‘Youth Residential Independence and Autonomy: A Comparative Study’, Journal of Family Issues, 16(6): 567–607. Ferrera, M. (1996) ‘The Southern Model of Welfare in Social Europe’, Journal of European Social Policy, 6(1): 17–37. Flaquer, L. (2000) ‘Family policy and welfare state in Southern Europe’, Working Paper no. 185, Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, Barcelona: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Freeman, R. and Schettkat, R. (2005) ‘Marketization of Household Production and the EU-US Gap in Work’, Economic Policy, 20(41): 6–50.
The puzzles of the Italian family 71 Giannelli, G. C. and Monfardini, C. (2000) ‘A Nest or a Golden Cage? Family Co-residence and Human Capital Investment Decisions of Young Adults’, International Journal of Manpower, 21(2–3): 227–245. Goldscheider, F. K. (1997) ‘Recent Changes in US Young Adult Living Arrangements in Comparative Perspective’, Journal of Family Issues, 18 (special issue): 708–724. Haurin, D. R., Henderschott, P. H. and Kim, D. (1993) ‘The Impact of Real rents and Wages on Household Formation’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 75: 284–293. ISTAT (2000) Le Strutture Familiari, Roma: Collana Informazioni no. 17. Jurado Guerrero, T. and Naldini, M. (1997) ‘Is the South so different? Italian and Spanish families in comparative perspective’, in M. Rhodes (ed.) Southern European Welfare States Between Crises and Reform, London and Portland: Frank Cass, 42–66. Kögel, T. (2002) Did the Association between Fertility and Female Employment Within OECD Countries Really Change its Sign?, MPIDR Working Paper WP 2001/034, Rostock, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research. Lesthaeghe, R. (1992) ‘The second demographic transition in Western countries: an interpretation’, paper presented at the IUSSP and IRP Conference Gender and Family Change in Industrialized Countries, Roma: 26–30 January. McDonald, P. (2000) ‘Gender Equity, Social Institutions and the Future of Fertility’, Journal of Population Research, 17(1): 1–16. Martinez-Granado, M. and Ruiz-Castillo, J. (2002) ‘The Decision of Spanish Youth: A Cross-Section Study’, Journal of Population Economics, 15(2): 305–330. Palomba, R. (2001) ‘Postponement in family formation in Italy within the Southern European context’, paper presented at the IUSSP Conference International Perspectives on Low Fertility: Trends, Theories and Policies, Tokyo: 21–23 March. Popenoe, D. (1988) Disturbing the Nest: Family Change and Decline in Modern Societies, New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Scabini, E. and Donati, P. (eds) (1988) ‘La famiglia “lunga” del giovane adulto’, Studi Interdisciplinari sulla Famiglia, no. 7, Milano: Vita e Pensiero. Schiffman, S. S., Reynolds, M. L. and Young, F. W. (1981) Introduction to Multidimensional Scaling, New York: Academic Press. Schmidt, L. (1990) ‘Jovens: Familia, Dinheiro, Autonomia’, Analize Social, XXV (108–109): 645–673. Tanturri, M. L. and Mencarini, L. (2003) ‘Il mistero della donna senza figli: i risultati di un’indagine ad hoc’, in Breschi and Bacci (eds) La Bassa Fecondità Italiana tra Costrizioni Economiche e Cambio di Valori, Udine: Forum, 107–126. Terra Abrami, V. and Sorvillo, M. P. (1993) ‘La Fecondité en Italie et dans ses régions: analyse par périod et par génération’, Population 48(3): 733–751. Trifiletti, R. (1998) ‘Southern European Welfare Regimes and the Worsening Position of Women’, Journal of European Social Policy 9(1): 49–64.
Part III
The shifting gender balance
5
Changes in the workplace and their impact on the family Marcus Rebick
Introduction This chapter examines the changing relationship between the family and the workplace. Conditions of work, of course, have a very important influence on the family. Working hours will determine how much time is available for family interaction, and when it can take place. Pay levels will determine the family’s standard of living, but also affect the economic position of individual household members. If women have access to the same kinds of jobs as men, then their general economic position including their bargaining strength within marriage is strengthened. Higher levels of pay will attract individuals into work who might otherwise remain at home. Career ambitions may delay the decision to marry and have children. At the same time, the shape and size of the family has an impact on the labour market. Smaller families with fewer children free up time that can be spent at work. Individuals with fewer siblings may have a greater burden placed upon them at the point that their elderly parents need care and find it difficult to work. Workplaces are pressured to respond to changes taking place in family structure in order to accommodate the needs of their employees. This chapter does not aim to provide an overview of the relationship between work and family that exists in Japan. It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the general patterns, including the secondary position of women in the labour market and the high levels of job protection that have existed up to this point. I also do not attempt to explain all of the changes that are taking place in the workplace, focussing only on those changes over the past twenty years that are likely to have a major impact on family life. I begin with those changes that are primarily due to changes in the economic environment. These include the decline of the family-run firm, the increase in part-time employment and the poor labour market for youth. I then turn to efforts that have been made to improve the status of women in the workplace and their impact, especially the Equal Employment Opportunity Laws of 1986 and 1999. In the final main section, I turn to efforts that have been made to improve the work–life balance in Japan.
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The effect of the economic environment The Japanese economy reached a major turning point in 1992. Between 1975 and 1991, the economy had grown in real terms at an average annual rate of just over 4 per cent. Between 1992 and 2003, the average growth rate was a mere 1.2 per cent. The period since 1992 has been called variously ‘the lost decade’ (Yoshikawa 2002) to emphasize that Japan lost the opportunity for the greater wealth that would have come with higher growth or ‘the great Japanese recession’ (Kuttner et al. 2001). Initially it appeared that the bursting of the asset bubble in 1990 and ineffective government macroeconomic policy were the two most important factors. As the recession dragged on, however, the view became widespread that the institutional features of the Japanese economy, such as ‘life-time employment’, the close relationships between firms and banks and cross-shareholding between firms, were largely to blame for the low growth rates. In any case, the belief in the superior growth performance of the Japanese form of stakeholder capitalism, has faded away (Katz 1998, Porter and Takeuchi 1999). The most obvious direct effect of the recession on families has been due to the increase in the unemployment rate, which climbed from an average of 2.5 per cent in the 1980s to a fifty-year high of 5.4 per cent in 2002. The two groups that have been most severely affected are youth under age 25 and workers over 45 years in age, especially those without a university degree. There has been a sharp cutback in hiring of new school graduates and an increase in the numbers of middle-aged employees forced into early retirement. The system of guaranteed employment will likely survive in Japan, especially in the more successful firms and industries, but the proportion of employees who are covered by these guarantees will fall (Rebick 2005). The slowdown in the Japanese economy has had a major effect on family life in Japan.1 I begin by looking at the family-run enterprise.
The decline of the small family-run firm One of the noted characteristics of both Japan and Italy, compared with many other OECD countries, is the high concentration of employment in small and family-run enterprises (OECD 2003, Patrick and Rohlen 1987). Over the period since the end of the American Occupation, however, the proportion of Japanese that are either self-employed or employed as unpaid family workers has been in decline. Figure 5.1 shows the trends over this period. The decline in self-employment and family work has been most dramatic for women, the majority of whom are family workers. While much of this decline is due to the falling rate of employment in agriculture, Figure 5.1 shows that the same trend is taking place outside of agriculture. Outside of agriculture one can break the trends into three periods. There is a very rapid decline up to the mid-1960s, followed by a period of relative stability up to the mid-1980s. From the late 1980s, the rate of decline increases, and is especially rapid in the case of women. Measuring of the extent of self-employment is notoriously difficult (Aronson 1991), and some of the decline could be a statistical artefact. Small family
Changes in the workplace 77 80
Men Women Men, Non-agricultural Women, Non-agricultural
70 60 50 40 30 20
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
0
1955
10
Year
Figure 5.1 Self-employed and family workers as a percentage of those working.
businesses may choose to incorporate the family members onto a formal payroll as employees. If this was an important trend, we should expect to see an increase in the proportion of employees working in very small companies. According to the Labour Force Survey, in 1990, 7.6 per cent of all employees worked in businesses with fewer than five employees. In 2002 this had barely risen to 8 per cent, suggesting that while there may be some movement to incorporate family businesses, the bulk of the trend is due to self-employed or family workers leaving their jobs at a faster rate than new employment is being generated in family-run businesses. The main cause of the long-run trend away from family-run enterprises has been the declining share of agricultural employment in Japan. Nevertheless, as we have seen, there has also been a long-run trend away from family-run enterprises outside of agriculture which has accelerated since the late 1980s. This latter decline may be attributed to two factors. The first comes from the observation that many of today’s family-run enterprises have no heir who is able or willing to take over the running of the firm after the retirement of the older generation. This in turn is partly due to the smaller size of the family and is related to the rapid decline in the fertility rate that took place in the early 1950s. It is also due to the fact that today’s youth are better educated and may find outside work alternatives that are more attractive than remaining with the family firm. A second factor that has been particularly important since the late 1980s has been the deregulation in many industries along with the economic downturn of
78 Marcus Rebick the 1990s. Deregulation has removed many of the protections previously enjoyed by smaller businesses that enabled them to survive downturns in business conditions. One of the areas where this has been most evident has been in the retail sector. Prior to 1994, the Large Store Act impeded the establishment of retail stores larger than 500 square metres. The definition of a large store was narrowed in 1994 to mean more than 1000 square metres and the Act was finally repealed in 1998. This is undoubtedly one of the causes of the decline in the number of small family-run retail stores (Flath 2003). At the same time, there has been an increase in the numbers of large stores (1994 definition), especially speciality super stores. In the alcohol retail business, deregulation since the late 1980s has increasingly allowed for the sale of alcohol outside of licensed specialized liquor stores. As convenience stores and supermarkets have taken over much of the trade, so family-run liquor stores have been pushed out of business (Nitta 2003). A third factor that is important for the decline in small stores in the retail sector has been the more widespread ownership of automobiles (Flath 2003). Car usage for shopping trips has increased in Japan and Flath (2003) shows that in those prefectures where car ownership has increased the most, the decline in small retail stores has been the most pronounced. Finally, many smaller businesses that acted as suppliers to larger firms in manufacturing, have seen their business move abroad as large firms have developed cheaper supply networks in countries with lower labour costs. This is part of the ‘hollowing out’ of Japanese manufacturing. Growth of part-time employment The decline in the family-run business has had especially important implications for the role of women. I should note that this decline in family work has not been associated with a decline in female participation in the labour force. To the contrary, women’s employment to population ratio between the ages of 16 and 64 has shown a small increase from 56 per cent to 57 per cent between 1990 and 2004, despite the recession. This is above the average for the European Union, and substantially higher than the rate for Italy, which is barely 40 per cent. Nevertheless, the family business provided a form of employment that allowed women the flexibility to look after household matters including raising children while working part-time. With a decline in these opportunities, it would be natural for many women to seek part-time work as a substitute. Indeed, the rate at which women work part-time has increased rapidly, just as the rate of self-employment or family work has declined. According to the Labour Force Survey, between 1960 and 2003, the proportion of women employees who worked part-time (defined as less than 35 hours per week) rose from 12 per cent to 41 per cent.2 As I will discuss shortly, in recent years, some of this rise has been due to the poor state of the labour market for youth. Nevertheless, in the case of women, the bulk of the shift towards part-time work occurred before 1990 and is spread across age groups. It is reasonable to expect that the decline in unpaid family work may be directly related.
Changes in the workplace 79 To investigate this possibility, I have used two different methods. One approach is to use evidence on change of employment status that is given in the Employment Status Survey (Shugyo Kozo Kihon Chosa) conducted every five years by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. This is a large household survey covering over 400,000 households and thus covers more than a million individuals. In 2002, the published statistics of this survey allowed one to look directly at the movement of men and women who changed jobs. A transition matrix is shown in Table 5.1. Each column of figures represents job changers coming from a particular employment category. The figures show the percentage of these job changers that move into a given employment category. The table shows that of those who continued to work, women are far more likely to move from self-employed or family status to non-regular forms of employment including part-time work. For example, 17.6 per cent of women who left self-employment or family workers status moved to non-standard employee status, while only 3.9 per cent moved to full-time regular employee status. The vast majority of these non-standard employees were part-time workers. By contrast, 17.6 per cent of men moving from self-employment went to full-time status while only 11.6 per cent moved to non-regular employment. This provides some support for the argument
Table 5.1 Transition matrix for Japanese workers who changed jobs or stopped working between October 1997 and July 2002 (%) Status in 2002
Previous status Selfemployed or family
Men Self-employed or family Regular employee Nonstandard employee Directors Not employed Total Women Self-employed or family Regular employee Nonstandard employee Directors Not Employed Total
Regular employees
Nonstandard employees
Director
6.7 17.6
6.6 40.0
3.6 19.1
9.6 18.5
11.6 2.3 61.9 100.0
14.9 2.5 36.0 100.0
29.0 0.5 47.8 100.0
14.2 24.2 33.5 100.0
4.6 3.9
2.9 18.8
2.2 9.7
4.8 14.3
17.6 0.5 73.3 100.0
24.4 0.4 53.5 100.0
38.7 0.0 49.3 100.0
33.3 14.3 33.3 100.0
Source: Employment Status Survey (2002), Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication.
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that much of the decline in self-employment/family worker status is related to the rise in part-time employment in the case of women. The second method that I have used to investigate this problem is to exploit the variation across prefectures in the rates of family work and part-time employment. The reason for using this method is that microdata, especially longitudinal data, are not available.3 Table 5.2 shows that for married, employed women, a 1 point drop in the percentage of family workers is correlated with a 0.8 point increase in the percentage of part-time workers. A much stronger test of the hypothesis can be made by looking at the correlation between the changes in the shares of part-time workers and family workers over the five-year period between 1992 and 1997.4 Here we see that a 1 point drop in the rate of family work is significantly associated with a 0.6 increase in the rate of part-time employment as shown in row 2, column 3. I will use this latter, more conservative figure to look at the overall effect of the decline of family work. The share of family workers among employed married women dropped by 2.32 per cent between 1992 and 1997. My model would thus predict that the share of part-time workers would rise by 1.44 per cent (0.62 ⫻ 2.32 ⫽ 1.44 per cent). In fact, the share of part-time employment amongst married women rose by 3.08 per cent in this time period. So, this exercise suggests that the decline in the family firm explains not quite half of the increase in part-time employment for married women in Japan. The decline in the family-run firm is not the only source of the rise in the proportion of part-time workers in Japan. There are a number of other factors on both the supply and demand sides of the market that are responsible for Table 5.2 The correlation of part-time work and unpaid family work for Japanese married women, 1992 and 1997
Share family Workera ⌬ Share family workerb Constant R2 Observations
Share part-timea
Share regular employeea
⫺0.81* (0.24)
0.02 (0.27)
0.46* (0.04) 0.20 47
0.32* (0.05) 0.0002 47
⌬ Share part-timeb
⌬ Share regular employeeb
⫺0.62* (0.16)
⫺0.09 (0.16)
0.016* (0.004) 0.25 47
⫺.002 (.004) 0.006 47
Source: ‘The Japanese Employment System’ by Marcus Rebick (by permission of Oxford University Press. www.oup.com). Calculated using data from the Employment Status Survey (1992, 1997) Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Notes a Values for 1997 only. b Change from 1992 to 1997. * Significant at the 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
Changes in the workplace 81 this trend (Rebick 2005). The first point to note is that the rise in part-time work cannot be attributed to changes in the industrial or demographic structures. The rise in part-time work is found within most industries and demographic groups, so the move towards service sector industries and the ageing of the population are not in themselves explanations (Houseman and Osawa 1998, Rebick 2005). A long-standing source of the increase in part-time work has been the increased labour force participation of married women. Between 1980 and 2003, the labour force participation rate of women aged 35–50 rose by more than 10 percentage points to roughly 70 per cent, with much of this increase occurring in the 1980s. More than 90 per cent of women in this age group are married, and married women are more likely to work part-time or as family workers than as full-time workers (Rebick 2005: table 4.4). So there has been an increase in the supply of these workers at the same time that the numbers of family workers have been falling. The increase of part-time work among youth In recent years, however, the most important source of the increased number of non-regular workers including part-time work, contract-based work and casual work, has been the youth labour market. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, more than 80 per cent of new graduates from secondary school or university had found secure employment in full-time jobs by the date of graduation. Since 1992, those rates have dropped by at least 20 percentage points (MOE 2004). New graduates who do not find full-time work (or go on to higher education) usually take up part-time jobs, although many remain unemployed. Youth working part-time are usually referred to as ‘freeters’, a term coined from the English word ‘free’ and the German word for work arbeit. Although this group has been criticized for not having the same devotion to work as their parents, the rapid increase in part-time work in the 1990s amongst youth has much more to do with the decline in the opportunities for full-time work (Genda 2001). The decline in the proportion of young men holding full-time regular employment (i.e. not on a temporary contract) has important implications for the future of the Japanese family. Part-time work does not pay that well, is much less secure and comes without many of the fringe benefits including family benefits that are associated with full-time work. Increasingly we are finding, however, that young men are unable (or, in some cases, unwilling) to hold jobs that will allow them to support a family. This has also made them much less attractive as marriage prospects in a society where marriage is often determined by practical considerations (see Carroll, Chapter 7, this volume). Finally, many marriages are formed on the basis of workplace introductions, and it is possible that young part-time workers experience a kind of social exclusion that makes it more difficult for both men and women to meet a prospective marriage partner. Consequently, the trend towards part-time work among youth is likely to exacerbate the current trend towards late marriage and diminished fertility.
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The fall in the rate of young graduates getting regular employment coincides with the downturn in the Japanese economy of the 1990s. It might thus appear that this trend will be reversed in the future if the economy recovers, or as the size of graduating cohorts diminishes. Japanese employers, however, have become more sensitive to personnel costs, and have increasingly turned to cheaper part-time labour whenever possible (Houseman and Osawa 1998). For example, a government survey of employers in 2003 (MHLW 2003a) found that more than half stated that a major reason for hiring part-time workers was to save on wage costs, and roughly 1 in 7 had plans to increase the proportion of part-time workers. One reason for this increased level of cost-consciousness may be that the high value of the yen since the late 1980s has pushed up Japanese labour costs in the international arena. A second reason may be found in changes in corporate governance. Japanese firms are becoming more sensitive to their valuation on the stock market as the system of bank-centred finance declines in importance (Abe 2002, Hoshi and Kashyap 2001). Finally, slower growth itself may encourage the use of part-time workers, as employers are less confident that they can guarantee the employment of full-time workers in the future. These factors suggest that the difficulty young graduates have in finding full-time permanent jobs might not be a temporary phenomenon. Young Japanese have also expressed changes in attitudes as others (e.g. Matanle 2003) have noted. They are much more ambivalent about whether they wish to stay with the same employer, and their turnover rates have increased (Genda 2001). Surveys of young Japanese part-time workers suggest that the majority of them are working part-time, either to delay taking up a career, or else to pursue other ambitions, perhaps in the arts. It is possible, of course, that much of this is ex–post rationalization of the fact that they have been unable to find the right kind of permanent job. Nevertheless, it is likely that changed attitudes amongst youth concerning the desirability of full-time work along with the fact that many of today’s youth come from wealthier families and have greater freedom, will also act to keep the rate of part-time employment at higher levels than in the past (Yamada 1999). To conclude this section of this chapter, economic changes that have taken place since 1990 have had an important impact on the workplace. First, the decline of the small family-run firm has accelerated due to deregulation and the outsourcing of work to foreign countries. As a result of this, more men and women are working as employees, away from the household. Since the early 1990s, the downturn in the Japanese economy has also had a major impact on the labour market for new graduates. The poor prospects for full-time work for new graduates have created a cohort of young men who have poorer marriage prospects. At the same time that this is taking place, however, the career prospects for those women who do find full-time work have been improving, and some women are postponing marriage to advance their working careers. The change in the conditions for working women is the subject of the next section.
Changes in the workplace 83
Efforts to improve women’s position in the firm The past twenty years have seen some direct efforts to improve the position of women in the workplace through changes in the law. In particular, the Equal Employment Opportunity Laws (EEOL) of 1986 and 1999 have been enacted in order to improve the position of women and change the culture of the workplace. As we shall see, however, these laws have only been implemented in a weak fashion and it is difficult to assess their impact on women’s employment. The EEOL of 1986 was preceded by a number of court cases in the 1970s that had established the rights of women to fairer treatment using existing labour law. The law of 1986 made many of these rulings more explicit and should have made it more difficult for firms to openly discriminate in hiring and promotions. The law was enacted partly in response to pressure from the United Nations during its International Decade for Women (1976–1985), and received a great deal of attention in the national media prior to its enactment. This in itself may have contributed to changing behaviour on the part of firms. Nevertheless, the law was weak because it did not set penalties for firms that failed to comply with its requirements. The law also suffered from the problem that rather than emphasizing the rights of women to fairer treatment, it took a paternalistic attitude towards women. Women were still exempted from working late at night and from jobs that required physical strength. To some extent, these provisions allowed firms to continue discriminating against women, by denying them access to jobs that might require work late at night. As I will discuss in the following section, track-based hiring would also become an important mechanism for continuing discrimination. The EEOL of 1999 removed some of the paternalistic provisions on women’s employment and set up a system whereby settlement of disputes could take place by mediation. There is no obligation, however, for either side to accept the terms of the mediation. The preference for mediation over judicial settlement is characteristic of much of Japan’s employment law. Thus social change comes not through legislation but through the actions of the parties involved. Given the power imbalance between firms and their employees, the system tends to favour the status quo. The courts remain as the place where the greatest changes are made, through interpretation of existing law.
Sexual harassment and the EEOL5 One area within the EEOL where there has been a specific effort to change women’s working conditions has been in the area of sexual harassment. The issue of sexual harassment in Japan was raised, as in other countries, by feminists, especially in the legal profession. The term sexual harassment (seku hara) came into use in 1989 when the first court case involving an editor and her boss received a great deal of attention in the mass media. The public became very interested in the issue and there was considerable discussion about the meaning of sexual harassment and the extent of the problem. The senate hearings on the appointment
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of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court and a class action suit against Mitsubishi Motors in the United States also received a lot of attention in Japan. A survey by the Japanese government in 1997 revealed that more than half of Japanese women claimed that they had been the recipients of unwelcome speech or actions in the workplace. The government took action by incorporating an article in the revised EEOL of 1999 that would explicitly deal with sexual harassment. Article 21 states that, employers are required to give necessary consideration, from the view point of employment management, to ensure that their women workers do not suffer any disadvantage in their working conditions by reason of their responses to sexual speech and behaviour in the workplace, and that their working environments do not suffer any harm due to such sexual speech and behaviour. As with other provisions of the EEOL, however, the law is mainly to be enforced through ministerial guidance and social sanction. Nevertheless, the concern about litigation and the unwelcome attention that this brings have led most large companies to institute a number of changes to address the problem. Pamphlets, posters, revised work regulations, memos and announcements at meetings are used to raise the consciousness of employees. Consultation services are also offered where employees can discuss their problems in confidence. The extent of these changes should not be exaggerated, however. A survey cited by Tomita (2000) indicated that while 70 per cent of firms with more than 1,000 employees had instituted some of these measures, only 10 per cent of firms with less than 100 employees had done so. Furthermore, there is still a large perception gap between men and women concerning what constitutes harassment. It is difficult to assess the full impact of the two EEOLs, as there have been many other factors that have affected changes in women’s position in the workplace, including the increase in the educational attainment of women over this period. The first place to look for changes is in hiring practices. Hiring practices Here we find that about half of large companies have found a way to meet the requirements of the law and yet evade its intentions by setting up dual-track hiring systems open to both men and women (MHLW 2003b). Individuals hired into general work positions (ippan shoku) work at clerical jobs with limited career prospects. On the other hand, sogo shoku or comprehensive work jobs are available to those who want full career opportunities. Sogo shoku jobs, however, require a much greater commitment on the part of employees and also require that the employee be willing to relocate if asked to do so. The result of this dual-track hiring system has been that gender-based employment differences are perpetuated through self-selection. A survey conducted by the Japan Association for the Advancement of Working Women in 2000 found that less than 4 per cent of sogo shoku positions were filled by women (JIWE 2000). In the largest firms with more than 5,000 employees this fell to 2 per cent. Virtually all men apply for sogo shoku positions. Many firms are now offering an intermediate career track which does not require that an employee be able to relocate, in the attempt to attract
Changes in the workplace 85 more women into comprehensive careers. Finally, since the revision of the EEOL in 1999, most firms have made it possible for an ippan shoku employee to move to sogo shoku work, provided certain conditions are met, such as willingness to be transferred internally between company establishments (MHLW 2001). Women in management A second place where we might look at the effects of the EEOL is in promotions to management positions. Japan is noted for the very low percentage of women found in managerial positions, as suggested by Table 5.3. Table 5.3 does indicate, however, that the share of women in management has roughly tripled in the two decades from 1982–2003. The low share of women in management can be attributed to two factors. The first is simple discrimination in the promotion process. The second, however, is that at least 40 per cent of women work part-time, and since virtually all managers are full-time workers, this reduces the numbers of women that are candidates for management positions. Increasingly, a university degree is required to attain management positions in Japanese firms. The fact that Japanese women are less likely than men to have attended a four-year university course also limits their access to management positions. If we compare the share of female managers among full-time university-educated women workers, age 35–50, with the corresponding share for men, we find that women are about a third as likely to achieve managerial posts as men. Although this still suggests that discrimination is present in the workplace, it does not seem to be at the same levels as might be inferred from Table 5.3.6 The three-fold rise in the proportion of women managers between 1982 and 2003 shown in Table 5.3 has as much to do with the increasing number of full-time career-oriented women with university educations as it does with changes in discriminatory practices. The gender gap in pay Another area where we can see an improvement in the position of women is in the gender gap in pay for full-time workers. As shown in Figure 5.2, the unadjusted Table 5.3 Percentage of management posts held by women in Japan Rank
1982
2003
Division chief (bucho) Section chief (kacho) Supervisor (kakaricho)
1.0 1.5 3.4
3.1 4.6 9.4
Source: ‘The Japanese Employment System’ by Marcus Rebick (by permission of Oxford University Press. www.oup.com). Computed from Japanese Wage Census (1982, 2003) Japan, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Health, Welfare and Labour.
Marcus Rebick
Raw Adjusted
0.70 0.65 0.60
2002
1998
1994
0.50
1990
0.55
1982
Women’s average hourly earnings as share of men’s
0.75
1986
86
Year
Figure 5.2 Trends in the gender-based pay differential for full-time workers.
gender gap narrowed by ten points between 1982 and 2003 as women’s average hourly earnings as a share of men’s rose from 0.58 to 0.68. Much of this narrowing has come from the increased educational attainment of women. In 1950, less than 40 per cent of women went on to high school after completing middle school, and only 5 per cent of women went on to tertiary education. In 2003, 97 per cent of women went on to high school and 47 per cent of high-school graduates went on to a 2- or 4-year college. If we also consider the numbers of high-school graduates attending specialized training schools (senmon gakko), such as nursing schools, the proportion rises to around 70 per cent. In order to account for the effects of this increased educational attainment, as well as changes in the age distribution, I have used regression analysis to account for these changes. (The data source is the Japanese Wage Census, a major survey of establishments conducted by the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Labour; details of the estimating procedure are given in Rebick 2005.) The adjusted figures that control for age and education are also shown in Figure 5.2. The fact that the adjusted curve lies above the raw curve indicates that women tend to have poorer educational attainment than men, and that a large proportion of full-time women employees are young, less-experienced workers (many of whom will quit full-time work prior to having children). Even if educational attainment is more nearly equal for today’s graduates, there are still many middle-aged women workers with much less schooling. The adjusted curve only rises by some 7 points between 1982 and 2003. This suggests that increased educational attainment and changes in the age structure only account for 3 points of the 10-point narrowing of the unadjusted gender differential. The rest must come from other sources, including fairer treatment of women in the workplace. Some of this may be attributed to the EEOL of 1985, but we should note that the narrowing of the gender differential adjusted for age and education starts well before the act was enacted in 1986.
Changes in the workplace 87 At this point, I must emphasize that all of these observations have been for full-time workers. Part-time workers have much lower average hourly earnings than their full-time counterparts and this gap has grown as the position of full-time women relative to men has improved. As a result, despite the improvements in the position of full-time workers detailed earlier, the gender gap in Japan for all workers remains the highest in the developed world (Blau and Kahn 2003). Nevertheless, the enhanced career opportunities for women working full-time have had an important impact on family formation. It is worth summarizing some of the points made so far that concern women’s employment. First, as mentioned in the previous section, there has been a dramatic shift away from working as an unpaid family worker towards working as an employee, usually as a part-time worker. At the same time, Japanese (incorporated) businesses have become much more dependent on female labour, and thus more likely to provide working hours for part-time workers that allow them to mix work with caring for family members. Alongside this, there has been a general shift in the way in which women are regarded both by law and also in public opinion. Women are less likely to be barred outright from developing careers in firms and from being promoted to managerial positions. The development of sexual harassment legislation shows that women are less likely to be seen as sex objects in the workplace. Nevertheless, the numbers of women managers remain very small relative to other countries and this is largely due to the fact that women still tend to have interrupted working lives. Married women tend to leave employment to raise their children and return as part-time workers. It is difficult for a woman returning to work after an extended break to resume a career or embark on a new one. Unless the management of employees changes to allow for employees to start careers after their mid-thirties, it is unlikely that the numbers of women in managerial positions will greatly increase. The direct effect on the family is that women who wish to have more developed working careers will tend to put off marriage and child birth and this is a factor in the decline in the average fertility rate. The next section looks at how government action and changing business practice in the larger firms are coming to terms with these issues.
Efforts to improve the work–life balance Japanese policy makers have long been interested in encouraging greater participation of women at work. Indeed, given the projected decline in the working-age population, the future of the Japanese economy will depend, to a large extent, upon whether or not there is an increase in both participation and in working hours by women (Ono and Rebick 2003).7 At the same time, policy makers are aware that it is difficult for Japanese women to raise children and work at the same time. This reduces the extent to which married women can work, but it also encourages many young women to postpone marriage or child birth if they wish to continue working. The government has instituted a number of policies to change these conditions. First, there has been a concerted effort to improve the provision of childcare in
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Japan. The Ministry of Welfare introduced the first of a series of ‘Angel Plans’ in 1994 that aimed to provide subsidies for childcare and also to increase the number of places available. A combination of national and local government subsidies now cover some 75 per cent of the cost of childcare at government-licensed childcare centres (CAO 2003).8 A study for the British Department of Work and Pensions (Bradshaw and Finch 2002) puts the average monthly cost in purchasingpower-parity terms of childcare after subsidies at £231 for a couple with one child under the age of 3. This is roughly average for the twenty-two countries surveyed in the study and slightly higher than the cost in Italy of £178. The quality of childcare offered at licensed centres, whether public or private, is considered to be good by objective standards. In 2003, some 2 million children 3 and under or about 29 per cent of the pre-school population were in licensed childcare in Japan, about double the levels seen in the United Kingdom or the United States (Bradshaw and Finch 2002, IPSS 2003). Licensed centres all employ government-qualified child minders (hoikushi) who usually pass a twoyear qualifying course in order to gain the qualifications. Virtually all of them thus have some post-secondary school education and most have a two-year university education. The hoikushi are well-paid, especially in the public sector, with good benefits. There are, however, still waiting periods to gain a childcare place in some parts of Japan, and the hours of licensed centres do not always meet the needs of full-time working parents. In these cases, parents may resort to the use of an unlicensed centre, which is unsubsidized and thus more expensive, as well as having a staff of poorer quality. In 2003, roughly 200,000 children under three were in these kinds of arrangements. A second action of the government aimed at helping working women was the passage in 1992 of a Childcare Leave Law that allows a parent to take up to one year’s leave from a firm after the birth of a child. The law was revised in 1995 to become the Child Care and Family Care Leave Law, and workers are now allowed to take leave to look after other family members such as parents for up to three months. Under the new law, which applied to all establishments, the government provided up to 25 per cent replacement of earnings if the worker has insurance and has worked for two years prior to taking up leave. In 2002, this was raised to 40 per cent replacement (10 per cent of which would be paid after returning to work). The law has proved to be a success – in 2003, almost three quarters of women who were employees at the time of the birth of a child took up leave (MHLW 2003b). One study, conducted between 1992 and 1995, when firms with less than thirty employees were not covered, found that women were twice as likely to return to work at the same company if they had taken leave under the new scheme with 80 per cent returning (Higuchi et al. 1997). Virtually all of the leave under these laws is taken by women – the Survey of Women’s Employment Management of 2003 found that less than half a per cent of men were taking up the leave available. This is not especially surprising – a replacement rate of 40 per cent of a man’s salary is not very attractive to families unless the mother continues to work and is the top earner. Even if the replacement rate was raised in Japan, however, many men would feel that the cost to their career advancement might be too high (see also Nakatani, Chapter 6, this volume). The Angel Plans
Changes in the workplace 89 and Child and Family Care Leave have been more successful in raising the labour force participation of women than they have been in improving the gender balance of responsibility in the family. A third policy of the government has been to encourage firms to adopt ‘familyfriendly’ policies. These policies include subsidies for childcare, the provision of crèches at work, flexible hours of work, exemption from overtime or shorter hours of work. Some firms, for example, have introduced schemes whereby workers can retain the status of ‘regular worker’ while working part-time (tanjikan seishain seido) (Matsubara 2004). Some firms have also developed routes to allow women who work part-time to move to regular worker status (Takeishi 2003) or else to take on greater responsibility at work. One of the barriers that remains, preventing more firms from adopting this strategy, is the need to be able to transfer their regular workers to other parts of the company, sometimes in far-flung locations. As a result, the implementation of these schemes remains limited at the present time. Perhaps the biggest single change in the workplace in terms of its effect on the family has been the general reduction of working hours. The measurement of hours of work varies, depending on whether one uses data from surveys of establishments or surveys of households. Establishment-based surveys only measure paid hours of work, and given that (even more than in other countries such as the United Kingdom or the United States), there is a lot of unpaid overtime in the typical Japanese workplace, there will be a downward bias on the measurement.9 Establishment-based surveys will also fail to measure total hours of work if the employee works at another job. Household surveys, on the other hand, suffer from the problem that hours of work may be only rough estimates. Nevertheless, whichever survey is used, Japanese hours of work have fallen substantially, especially since the start of the recession. According to the establishment-based Monthly Labour Survey, in 1986, Japanese in establishments with more than five employees worked an average of 2,132 hours (2,236 hours and 1,954 hours for men and women respectively). This fell to 1,828 hours in 2003. On the other hand, the household-based Labour Force Survey shows a similar drop from 2,392 hours in 1990 to 2,204 hours in 2001. Although the latter set of numbers suggest that Japanese still work some of the longest hours in the OECD, the drop in hours worked has been substantial.10 The largest part of this drop has come in average hours worked per week as the percentage of employees that worked on Saturdays fell from 50 per cent to 10 per cent. It is noteworthy that this change has come over roughly the same period that the Ministry of Education has phased out Saturday schooling. This freeing up of Saturdays has undoubtedly had a major effect on family life as families (at least those with primary-age school children) have more time to spend together on the weekend. Despite the reduction in working hours, the working day remains long in Japan. Given that government-subsidized childcare does not always cover these long hours, and given the preferences of many mothers to prioritize their children in early years, it remains difficult for women to continue working full-time after child birth. Short-time regular employment may be a solution, but its implementation remains limited so far.
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Conclusions The last twenty years have seen a number of important changes in the labour market that have had an impact on the family. The Japanese family-run firm is in decline at the same time that women have increasingly been employed as part-time employees. The prolonged recession in Japan has had an impact on the ability of both young men and women to gain secure full-time employment that offers attractive career prospects. This, in turn, has likely been a contributing factor in the decline of both the marriage and the fertility rate. The Japanese government, because of its concerns about the fertility rate, and because it wishes to increase the contribution of women to the market economy as the working-age population falls, has passed legislation aimed at improving the ability of women to manage a work–life balance. Despite the fact that Japan has some of the best and moderately-priced institutional childcare in the developed world, married women with young children either do not work, or tend to work at part-time jobs. Once women have moved to part-time work, it is very difficult for them to return to regular worker status, even if their hours increase. Although improved childcare arrangements, such as extended hours for nurseries, may have a modest effect on women’s options, the fact remains that the long working hours and the closed nature of the employment system for regular workers make it difficult for women to balance an ambitious career with raising children. The Japanese government will have to take much more forceful action if it wishes to change the gender imbalance. Japanese firms are unlikely to make the necessary changes on their own, although some firms, especially foreign firms or their subsidiaries such as IBM, are making serious efforts. The government will also have to increase the spending aimed at children, including raising the replacement rate for lost earnings during parental leave. Neither of these are likely in the future. The Japanese Ministry of Health, Welfare and Labour’s consensual approach to policy making makes it unlikely that firms will be put under pressure to change their personnel management (Weathers 2004). The Ministry of Finance is unlikely to approve of major new public benefits given the poor state of the government’s finances. Despite the fact that the gender imbalance in the labour market remains entrenched in Japan for the foreseeable future, the attitude towards women at work has changed substantially over the past twenty years, and there is much more awareness of issues such as sexual harassment. Increasingly, young people take the view that both women and men should have working careers. Family life has become more balanced with the move toward the five-day work week, a sign that the Japanese have recognized that they are now a wealthy country.
Acknowledgement I would like to thank Ann Waswo, Roger Goodman and Ayumi Takenaka for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. Parts of this chapter are based on Rebick (2005).
Changes in the workplace 91
Notes 1 One of the likely effects of the recession is that some families will find their income substantially reduced if, for example, a highly-paid member was to lose his or her job and be unable to find another job with comparable compensation. I will not deal with this issue in this chapter except for the special case of youth being unable to find well-paid full-time employment. 2 These figures, however, understate the real level of part-time work as many women employees who work more than thirty five hours per week are classified as part-time by their employer and receive much lower pay and poorer benefits. Some government surveys classify the number of part-time workers by whether the employer treats them as such, but the Labour Force Survey provides information on the number of hours worked. This latter definition is closer to the one used by most other countries. For more details see Rebick (2005). 3 There is one longitudinal survey of younger women in Japan run by the Institute for Household Economy, but its small size makes it impossible to study the movement of women from self-employment or family work in any meaningful way. 4 This is an estimate that removes the fixed effects associated with each prefecture. 5 This section is to a large extent based on Wolff (2003). 6 A recent survey of women in sogo shoku jobs shows that more than 60 per cent believe that there is still gender-based discrimination in promotions and pay in their firm. 7 Rebick (2005) examines other ways of dealing with the decline in the labour force, including productivity growth, outsourcing of work to other countries and immigration. Nevertheless, increased participation by women is one of the ways in which the fall in the labour force could be ameliorated. 8 The cost of childcare will vary, however, depending on the locality and the circumstances of the family. 9 Mizunoya (2002) uses comparisons between household and establishment surveys in several OECD countries and finds that in 1993, Japanese average annual overtime hours at 270 were more than double those of the United States or the United Kingdom and ten times as high as those of Germany. 10 For example, MHLW (2004) Table K-11 reports that employees in the UK and US worked an average of 1,902 hours and 1,991 hours, respectively, while in France and Germany, the average stood at around 1,550 hours (comparable figures for Italy are not available). These figures do not, however, take into account unpaid overtime.
References Abe, M. (2002) ‘Corporate Governance Structure and Employment Adjustment in Japan: An Empirical Analysis Using Corporate Finance Data’, Industrial Relations, 41(4): 683–702. Aronson, R. (1991) Self-employment, Ithaca, NY: ILR Press. Blau, F. D. and Kahn L. M. (2003) ‘Understanding International Differences in the Gender Pay Gap’, Journal of Labor Economics, 21(1): 106–144. Bradshaw, J. and Finch N. (2002) A Comparison of Child Benefit Packages in 22 Countries, London: Department of Work and Pensions. CAO (Cabinet Office) (2003) Hoiku Sabisu no Genjo to Kadai: hoiku sabisu kakaku ni kansuru kenkyukai hokokusho (Childcare Services: Report of the childcare services cost study group). Online. Available http://www5.cao.go.jp/seikatsu/price/hoiku (accessed 18 April 2005). Flath, D. (2003) ‘Regulation, distribution efficiency and retail density’, in M. Blomstrom, J. Corbett, F. Hayashi and A. Kashyap (eds), Structural Impediments to Growth in Japan, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, pp. 129–154.
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Genda, Y. (2001) Shigoto no naka no Aimai no Fuan (A Vague Unease at Work), Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha. Higuchi, Y., Abe M. and Waldfogel J. (1997) ‘Nichi-bei-o ni okeru ikuji kyugyo shussan kyugyo seido to josei shugyo (Childcare and Maternity Leave Policies and Women’s Employment in Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom)’, Jinko Mondai Kenkyu (Journal of Population Problems), 53: 49–66. Hoshi, T. and Kashyap A. (2001) Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan: The road to the future, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Houseman, S. and Osawa M. (1998) ‘What is the nature of part-time work in the United States and Japan?’, in J. O’Reilly and C. Fagan (eds), Part-time Prospects: An International Comparison of Part-time Work in Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim, London: Routledge, pp. 232–251. IPSS National Institute of Population and Social Research. (2003) Child Related Policies in Japan, Tokyo: National Institute of Population and Social Research. Online. Available http: http://www.ipss.go.jp/s-info/e/childPJ2003/childPJ2003.htm (accessed 10 March 2005). JIWE (Japan Institute of Workers Evolution). (2000) Daisotsusha no Saiyo Jokyo Oyobi Sogoshoku Josei no Shugyo Jittai Chosa (Survey of the Employment of University Graduates and Sogo Shoku Women). Online. Available http://www.jiwe.or. jp/jyoho/chosa/employSurvey/employSurvey.html (accessed 10 March 2005). Katz, R. (1998) Japan, The System that Soured: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Economic Miracle, London: M. E. Sharpe. Kuttner, K. N., Posen A. S., Fischer S. and Makin J. (2001) ‘The Great Recession: Lessons for Macroeconomic Policy from Japan / Comments’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2: 93–185. Matanle, P. (2003) Japanese Capitalism and Modernity in a Global Era: Refabricating Lifetime Employment Relations, London: RoutledgeCurzon. Matsubara, M. (2004) ‘Tanjikan seishain no kanosei (The Possibility of Having Short-time Regular Employees)’, Nihon Rodo Kenkyu Zasshi 528: 69–79. MHLW (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare). (2001) Kosu Betsu Koyo Kanri Seido no Jittai Jokyo to Shido Jokyo ni Tsuite (Concerning the Track Employment Management System). Online. Available http://www.mhlw.go.jp/houdou/0110/h1005-3. html (accessed 10 March 2005). MHLW (2003a) Shugyo Keitai no Tayoka ni Kansuru Jittai Chosa (Survey on Employment Diversification). Online. Available http://wwwdbtk.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/kouhyo/ indexkr_26_2.html (accessed 18 April 2005). MHLW (2003b) Josei Koyo Kanri Chosa (Survey of the Management of Women’s Employment) Tokyo: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. Online. Available http://wwwdbtk.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/kouhyo/indexkr_19_3.html (accessed 18 April 2005). MHLW (2004) Rodo Tokei Yoran (Handbook of Labour Statistics), Tokyo: Kokuritsu Insatsu Kyoku. Mizunoya, T. (2002) ‘An International Comparison of Unpaid Overtime Work Among Industrialized Countries’, ILO Bulletin of Labour Statistics. Online. Available http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/papers/listart.htm (accessed on 18 April 2005). MOE (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology). (2004) Monbu Tokei Yoran (Handbook of Education Statistics), Tokyo: Ministry of Finance. Online. Available http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/toukei/002/002b/koumoku.html (accessed 18 April 2005).
Changes in the workplace 93 Nitta, M. (2003) Henka no Naka no Koyo Shisutemu (The Employment System in a Changing Japanese Society), Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. OECD. (2003) Labour Force Statistics, Paris: OECD. Ono, H. and Rebick M. E. (2003) ‘Constraints on the level and efficient use of labour’, in M. Blomstrom, J. Corbett, F. Hayashi and A. Kashyup (eds), Structural Impediments to Growth in Japan, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago. Patrick, H. T. and Rohlen T. P. (1987) ‘Small-scale family enterprises’, in K. Yamamura and Y. Yasuba (eds), The Political Economy of Japan: Volume 1, The domestic transformation, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 331–384. Porter, M. E. and Takeuchi H. (1999) ‘Fixing What Really Ails Japan’ Foreign Affairs, 78(3): 66–82. Rebick, M. (2005) The Japanese Employment System: Adapting to a New Economic Environment, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Takeishi, U. (2003) ‘Hiseiki rodosha no kikan rodoryokuka to koyo kanri no henka’ (Changing Labour Management to Make Non-standard Workers Become Core Workers), Nissei Kenkyusho, 26: 1–36. Online. Available at http:// www.nli-research.co.jp/doc/syo0212a2.pdf (accessed April 18 2005). Tomita, K. (2000) ‘Sekushuaru harasumento no jittai to boshi no tame no hairyo gimu (The Status of Sexual Harassment and Obligatory Measures to Prevent it)’, Nihon Rodo Kenkyu Zasshi, 42(5): 16–22. Weathers, C. (2004) ‘Temporary Workers, Women and Labour Policy-making in Japan’, Japan Forum, 16(3): 423–445. Wolff, L. (2003) ‘Sexual Harassment Law in Japan’, unpublished paper, Sydney: Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales. Yamada, M. (1999) Parasaito Shinguru no Jidai (The Age of the Parasite Single), Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho. Yoshikawa, H. (2002) Japan’s Lost Decade, Tokyo: International House of Japan.
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The emergence of ‘nurturing fathers’ Discourses and practices of fatherhood in contemporary Japan Ayami Nakatani
Introduction The aim of this chapter is to examine contemporary views and/or debates over fatherhood in Japan. The roles and responsibilities of fathers in parenting have attracted considerable attention among journalists, social critics and the public as well as policy makers from the late 1990s onwards. In this chapter, I will identify divergent expectations for father roles and contrast them with actual practices through the use of various statistics and personal accounts of fathers and mothers. In particular, this study will focus on the key issues of ‘nurturing fathers’, who actively engage themselves with the early phase of child rearing and thus clearly challenge the conventional division of labour by gender. The term ‘nurturing fathers’ has been taken from a book by Kyle D. Pruett (Pruett 1988), who conducted qualitative research on American fathers who were the primary caregivers to their children. This term caught my attention, because it evoked a somewhat unsettling sentiment. On the one hand, mothers were no doubt expected to nurture their children. Thus, if they did not fulfil their mother roles properly, they would be disqualified as mothers (cf. Dowd 2000: 1). On the other hand, most fathers did not engage themselves with nurturing activities. According to the time-use data collected by the Statistics Bureau in 2001, Japanese men of double-earning households with children less than 5 years of age spend only 16 minutes on an average per day nurturing their offspring (Statistics Bureau 2001). At the same time, we also see a seed for future change. Against a backdrop provided by the legislation of childcare leave, open to both women and men, the presence of actively engaged fathers has been put under the spotlight in one way or other, despite their small number.1 In 1996, the percentage of male employees who utilized the law and took childcare leave remained at 0.16 per cent of those who were eligible (those having a child less than 1 year old), although this was 8 times higher than the percentage 3 years previously.2 Yet their increasing visibility in the course of the 1990s derives primarily from the extensive coverage by the media. Firsthand accounts of men’s experiences as full-time fathers were publicized by magazine interviews, TV documentary films and their own writings. Even the annual report by the Ministry of Health and Welfare (presently
Discourses and practices of fatherhood 95 Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, MHLW hereafter) featured them, in 1998, with the intention of encouraging other fathers also to take childcare leave. In the same vein, the ministry launched a nation-wide campaign in March 1999, which was meant to publicize ‘the joy of childcare’ and ‘the importance of the joint responsibility of the parents’. As a response to a proposal at the ‘Meeting of the Learned to Consider Measures to Cope with Fewer Children’ held in December 1998, this public relations activity formed part of the governmental efforts to tackle the declining birth rate; this particular campaign succeeded in achieving publicity, thanks to the timely employment of the husband and baby son of a famous pop singer, Namie Amuro, for posters and TV commercials. Its controversial copy, ‘A man who does not raise his children will not be called a father’ (Kosodate shinai otoko o chichi towa yobanai), also became the talk of the town for a while and received mixed reactions from different segments of the population. The couple got divorced three years later, but MHLW has continued with its efforts to raise public awareness on this matter and to encourage fathers to take childcare leave by launching another series of campaigns in 2002. On the basis of such developments in the past decade, one might argue that the dominant discourse on fatherhood is characterized by moral as well as institutional support for those who would venture into full-time fatherhood by taking advantage of newly available childcare leave. More or less coincidentally, however, another stream of books and writings promoting the more ‘traditional’ notion of fatherhood has gained a large readership. A prime example is Michiyoshi Hayashi’s book titled Fusei no Fukken (Reinstatement of fatherhood), published in 1996. The popularity of this book was also widely reported in the media. As a certain newspaper article put it, fusei (fatherhood) became the ‘key term of an era’ (Asahi Shimbun 7 May 1997). Importantly, the ideal image of a father advocated by authors, such as Hayashi, differs from that of a ‘nurturing’ one, as will be examined in the following section. In either case, the notion of fatherhood is in vogue. This chapter thus attempts to examine what underlies the present situation and changes concerning contemporary fatherhood in Japan, especially in relation to an array of social and historical forces that serve as a backdrop for new developments in the domestic domain as well as in society at large. The bulk of my data for the present study consists of survey results, a wide range of commercial publications, governmental reports, magazines and newspaper clippings, collected between 1996 and 2002. I also made personal observations and conducted informal interviews on various occasions, such as at seminars and symposiums related to father roles and child rearing, and in daily interactions with fathers of different backgrounds.
To lead or nurture?: divergent views of fatherhood The number of publications that critically examine the position of contemporary fathers and present normative views of ideal fatherhood has been on the rise since the early 1990s in Japan. We can identify three major factors behind this renewed
96 Ayami Nakatani attention to fatherhood. First, social problems facing young people have become increasingly apparent, as exemplified by the fact that more and more serious crimes have been committed by children in their early teens, and also by the fact that bullying and suicides have been widespread among school pupils all over the country. In many cases, such worrying situations have been attributed to the malfunction of the families of the children involved; especially excessive care of the mothers and the lack of concern of the fathers have been regarded as the source of problems. Second, a sharp decline in the birth rate over the last decade has persisted without any sign of an upturn, and has raised public awareness that conventional gender roles need to be modified. Third, partly owing to economic stagnation and the emergence of men’s studies and ‘men’s lib’ movements in the early 1990s, the notion of masculinity has been cast in a new light; that is, men have started to question their work-oriented lifestyle, and to search for a new balance in work and other, more personal elements in their lives.3 The rise in public interest in fatherly roles is scarcely a new phenomenon. Since the mid-1970s, social critics, journalists and psychologists alike have repeatedly voiced their worries that the prevalent family situation, typically labelled as ‘the absence of fathers from home (chichioya fuzai)’ or ‘the lack of paternal authority ( fusei no ketsujo)’, will cause a negative impact on children. In their opinion, the stronger presence of a father vis-à-vis his children is the best means of solving the social problems noted earlier.4 The lines of rhetoric put forward by these ‘pro-fatherhood’ critics have remained surprisingly unchanged over time. Often building on a nostalgic image of the ‘ganko-oyaji (stern father)’ or ‘kaminari oyaji (thunder father)’ who used to be the domineering figure in pre-war Japanese families,5 they argue that fathers have ‘essentially’ different roles from those of the mothers; the fathers can take their ‘turn’ when children grow old enough (say, after entering a primary school) to understand their moral lessons. Fathers are encouraged to play with their children more often and to teach them basic social manners such as proper greetings as well as the core rules of their family. They should also talk about their own philosophies and views of life (Hayashi 1996; Hirai et al. 1993; Takahashi 1980). By contrast, mothers are to be there to look after the babies and toddlers on a day-to-day basis. Kamidera (1978), for example, states, ‘It is important for a father to concern himself with child rearing . . . .but he must not try to take away his wife’s foremost concern’ (ibid.: 81). In his view, a mother naturally values childcare as the most satisfying element in her life (ikigai), thus it is almost malicious for the husband to attempt to interfere with her task. He should simply support the motherly roles in his own ways, instead of just emulating his wife’s behaviour and thereby infringing her sanctified domain (ibid.: 81–82). Similarly, Hayashi, author of a 1996 best-seller Fusei no fukken, stresses that the role of the father is not to share the housework; he has ‘more important things to do’ (Hayashi 1998: 65–66). Characteristically, this body of literature never tries to challenge the existing view of gender roles. Rather, the authors tend to draw a clear-cut boundary between the mother’s and the father’s responsibilities. The implied message is that
Discourses and practices of fatherhood 97 the father is justifiably exempt from committing himself to the routine care of his children, especially with trivial, yet essential, chores in the early stages of child rearing, such as feeding and changing diapers. What these critics strongly advise instead is the need to enhance the father’s presence vis-à-vis the school-age children – the father portraying himself as a wise, leading figure of the family, if not the tyrant as in the old days. The father is also expected to play an essential role in ‘connecting’ the family domain (katei) with a larger society by exposing his children to the rules and values outside the home.6 An alternative type of publication, however, has also emerged since the beginning of the 1990s: feature articles, published interviews and personal memoirs of the fathers who actively committed themselves to infant care during the postpartum period by obtaining childcare leave. Significantly, most of these authors are neither academics nor professional writers who tend to be seen enjoying flexible working hours, but are ordinary ‘salaried men’ or company employees.7 Some of them are also active in social movements aimed at putting pressure on the government, political parties, and other relevant bodies to realize a better working environment in which men can more easily engage themselves with childcare.8 In sum, the popular discourse on Japanese fatherhood does not present a single viewpoint. Although it is more or less agreed that men must review their previous, work-oriented lifestyle and become more actively engaged with the family domain, the ways in which actual father roles are defined differ significantly. On the one hand, a group of advocates for the father’s stronger presence endorses the ideal image of the father who assumes active roles mainly in socializing and disciplining children. On the other hand, ‘practising’ fathers emphasize the importance of a more practical and total commitment to childcare activities including those at the early infancy phase. It is the latter wave of opinions and practices that would challenge the status quo in the conventional distribution of gender roles. Before examining them in more detail, I will first take a look at the current situation of the domestic division of labour in Japan.
Ideals and reality: a division of labour at home The Prime Minister’s Office (now Cabinet Office) has conducted a series of public opinion surveys on various aspects of gender equity since the early 1990s. All of these surveys include a question concerning the public views on the fixed division of labour by gender, as represented by the popular idiom, ‘Men should be at work, women should be at home (Otoko wa shigoto, onna wa katei)’. In the survey conducted in February 2000, only 25 per cent of the respondents affirmed this way of thinking. This ratio has been on the decrease since 1987, when 43 per cent agreed with the idea (Prime Minister’s Office 2000a).9 The shift in the public opinion on this issue can be discerned in many other surveys as well. In another national survey undertaken in September 2000, the vast majority of both male and female respondents stated that men should commit themselves actively to the ‘care, socialization (shitsuke) and education of their children’
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(91 per cent and 94 per cent respectively).10 In the previous, comparable survey of 1993,11 the percentages of a favourable response to men’s greater engagement with parenting were 89 per cent for men and 93 per cent for women. Interestingly, the gap between male and female views has shrunk somewhat during the past seven years. Yet it must be noted that parenting in this context refers to a wide range of activities. In other words, a father’s greater commitment to his children’s lives, as supported by these respondents, can be realized in any form; he may be simply expected to have a greater say in his children’s affairs, without furthering his involvement with day-to-day matters in the domestic sphere. To substantiate this point, another question with regard to men’s sharing of general housework, such as cooking, washing and cleaning, attracted less enthusiasm. Those who thought that men should commit themselves actively to such domestic chores accounted for 71 per cent of the male respondents and 73 per cent of the female respondents. Compared with the earlier survey (in 1993) in which only 65 per cent of men and 68 per cent of women responded positively, these figures still reveal significant attitudinal changes; however, sharing parenting does not necessarily entail a greater involvement by men in general housework even on the level of ideals. In practice, it was the wife who mainly performed household tasks in the 87 per cent of the households of married respondents (both men and women); even among the respondents in double-earning households, only 12 per cent of them practised task sharing by all members of the family. The current state of affairs of the so-called ‘double burden’ endured by working mothers is vividly illustrated by another survey that asked the parents of pre-schoolers about both the ideal and actual practices of task sharing in the home.12 First of all, it is striking to see a wide discrepancy in the views held by the conjugal couple. In every aspect of childcare, including cooking, feeding, washing up, giving children a bath, playing, getting them to day-care centre and collecting them, the percentage of the wives who believed the task must be shared by the parents exceeded that of the husbands who agreed; the difference was the greatest for such tasks as meal preparation and comforting babies during the night. As far as the ideal pattern is concerned, however, the husbands still expressed their willingness to share. Almost 70 per cent of them thought they should also change diapers and put the children to bed. More than half of the husbands agreed to share 12 tasks out of 15 on the list. Yet the reality is quite different. To take diaper-changing for an example, 60.8 per cent of the husbands saw it (ideally) as a shared task, while 39 per cent of them said it was their wives’ job. In reality, only 27 per cent actually shared it. The results of other surveys also confirm that so far as task-sharing is concerned, there is a persistent gap between the stated ideal and actual practices.13 On the whole, as we have seen earlier, men’s entry into the domestic sphere is seen in a positive light by both men and women. Nevertheless, the tasks directly related to parenting and those of household maintenance are perceived differently. Moreover, the husband’s actual commitment is largely confined to specific types
Discourses and practices of fatherhood 99 of task, such as playing, giving a bath and general socializing (shitsuke). Other tasks, including changing diapers, putting children to bed and feeding, are primarily performed by mothers, even when they also have a paying job (see also Cabinet Office 2003: 42).
Mother’s talk: gender politics in shared parenting If the gender division of labour in the home has not changed significantly even among double-earner families, the next question that arises is, do wives accept or resent this situation? The following commentaries, taken from a magazine specializing in child rearing, are reproduced here to illuminate the ways in which working wives perceive the fact that they often assume parental duties single-handedly. I understand that my husband is stressed out with work and wants to take a break on holidays. But I do work, too. I am also exhausted; I also want to take a rest. Yet it’s me who has to do the housework and take care of the children at home. I wish my husband would understand where I stand and how I feel. (Chiisai Nakama May 1997: 26) When our child falls ill, it is invariably me who takes time off from work. My husband never does. It may be because he assumes greater responsibilities at work than myself, but once, our child got chicken pox and could not go to day care when my husband happened to have a day off. He however went fishing, while I took leave and felt apologetic to everyone at my workplace. (Chiisai Nakama July Special Edition 2001: 33) My husband would say, ‘I am doing much better than so-and-so’ (in sharing parenting). But I cannot stand him when he leisurely watches TV after the evening meal while I busy myself with washing up and then putting our children to bed. (Chiisai Nakama January 2003: 22) The magazine Chiisai Nakama (Small Pals) that published the mother’s statements given in the previous lines is distributed directly to a fixed rea