The Creation of the World or Globalization (SUNY Series in Contemporary French Thought)

Jean-Luc Nancy

THE C R E A T I O N OF THE W O R L D or

Globalization

Translated and with an Introduction by Francois Raffoul and David Pettigrew

STATE UNIVERSITY OF N E W YORK PRESS

T H E C R E A T I O N OF T H E W O R L D or

Globalization

S U N Y SERIES IN CONTEMPORARY FRENCH THOUGHT

David Pettigrew and Francois Raffoul, editors

Sabanci Universitesi

3010100796340

M2>3 Published by STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS ALBANY © 2007 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic; magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.

For information, address State University of New York Press 194 Washington Avenue, Suite 305, Albany, NY 12210-2384 Production, Laurie Searl Marketing, Anne M.Valentine

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nancy,Jean-Luc. [La creation du monde ou la mondialisation. English] The creation of the world or globalization / Jean-Luc Nancy ; translated and introduction by Francois Raffoul, David Pettigrew. p. cm. — (Suny series in contemporary French thought) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13:978-0-7914-7025-1 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-7026-8 (pbk.: alk. paper) 1. Globalization—-Philosophy. 2. Political science—Philosophy. 3. Teleology. I. Tide. B2430.N363C7413 2007 303.48'201—dc22 2006013428 10

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Contents

Translators' A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s Translators' Introduction

vii 1

Author's Prefatory N o t e to the English Language Edition

27

Author's Prefatory N o t e to the French Language Edition

29

I.

31

Urbi et Orbi

II. O f C r e a t i o n

57

I I I . C r e a t i o n as D e n a t u r a t i o n : M e t a p h y s i c a l T e c h n o l o g y

75

IV. C o m p l e m e n t s

91

Notes

113

Index

127

Translators' Acknowledgments

W e w o u l d like to t h a n k J a n e B u n k e r , e d i t o r - i n - c h i e f o f S U N Y Press, for h e r s u p p o r t o f this project from its earliest stages. W e also w o u l d like to express o u r appreciation for t h e s u p p o r t provided b y a C o n n e c t i c u t State University R e s e a r c h G r a n t and for the research-reas­ signed t i m e provided b y D o n n a j e a n Fredeen, D e a n o f the School o f Arts and Sciences o f S o u t h e r n C o n n e c t i c u t State University ( S C S U ) . W e also t h a n k J. Philip Smith, f o r m e r I n t e r i m President, a n d Ellen Beatty, Associate Vice Presi­ d e n t for A c a d e m i c Affairs, o f S C S U for their s u p p o r t o f the translation project from its i n c e p t i o n . T h a n k s to Troy P a d d o c k , Associate Professor o f History at S C S U , for his assistance w i t h o u r research regarding Carl Schmitt. At Louisiana State University, w e are especially grateful to J o h n Castore for his assistance w i t h t h e preface, a n d t o Troy M e l l o n for h e r careful review o f t h e final manuscript. W e t h a n k C a t h y Leblanc, Professor o f English at the Universite de Lille 3, as well as Pierre J a c e r m e , Professor E m e r i t u s o f Lettres Superieures at lycee H e n r i IV for their advice c o n c e r n i n g key translation questions. For all o f h e r s u p p o r t o u r appreciation goes to M e l i d a Badilla C a r m o n a . Finally, w e w o u l d like to express o u r gratitude to Professor J e a n - L u c N a n c y for his generosity and help c o n c e r n i n g the translation.

vu

Translators' Introduction

i T h e thinking of the w o r l d developed in Tlie Creation of the World o r Globalization' unfolds in a play b e t w e e n t w o terms that are apparendy synonymous, o r used interchangeably, namely, globalisation and mondialisation. N a n c y addresses, in his prefatory n o t e to the English edition o f the text, this linguistic particularity found in the French language, w h i c h possesses t w o terms for designating the p h e n o m e ­ n o n k n o w n in English simply as "globalization"; these terms,globalisation and mon­ dialisation, are rendered here as globalization and world-forming, respectively. As a matter o f fact, the t e r m globalization, as N a n c y notes, "has already established itself in the areas o f the world that use English for contemporary

information

e x c h a n g e " (CW, 27), whereas "mondialisation" does n o t allow itself to b e translated as easily and w o u l d even be, according to Nancy, untranslatable. If the two terms seem, at first glance, to b e indistinguishable, converging in the designation o f the same p h e n o m e n o n , that is, the unification of all parts of the world, in fact they reveal two quite distinct, if n o t opposite, meanings. At stake in this distinction is n o t h i n g less than two possible destinies o f o u r humanity, of o u r time. O n the o n e hand, there is the uniformity produced by a global economical and technological l o g i c — N a n c y specifies, "a global injustice against the background of general equivalence" (CW, 54)—leading toward the opposite of an inhabitable world, to " t h e u n - w o r l d " [immonde]. And, o n the o t h e r hand, there is the possibility o f an authentic world-forming, that is, of a m a k i n g of the world and o f a making sense that N a n c y will call, for reasons w e will clarify later, a "creation" of the world.This cre­ ation of the world means, as he makes clear, "immediately, w i t h o u t delay, r e o p e n ­ ing each possible struggle for a world, that is, for w h a t must form the contrary" o f globality (ibid.).

2

1

Tlie Creation of the World o r

Globalization

It is this contrast in m e a n i n g that N a n c y endeavors to reveal in order to o p e n the possibility of a world. F r o m the b e g i n n i n g , h e emphasizes that the global or globality is a p h e n o m e n o n that is m o r e abstract than the worldly o r world-forming; h e refers to globality as a "totality grasped as a whole," an "indis­ tinct totality," while the world, the worldly, w o r l d - f o r m i n g calls to m i n d rather a "process in expansion," in reference to the w o r l d o f h u m a n s , o f culture, a n d o f nations in a differentiated set. In the final analysis, w h a t interests Nancy, in this distinction b e t w e e n " w o r l d - f o r m i n g " a n d "globalization," is that w o r l d - f o r m i n g maintains a crucial reference to the world's h o r i z o n , as a space of h u m a n rela­ tions, as a space o f m e a n i n g held in c o m m o n , a space of significations o r of p o s ­ sible significance. O n the o t h e r hand, globalization is a process that indicates an "enclosure in the undifferentiated sphere o f a unitotality" (CW, 28) that is p e r ­ fectly accessible and transparent for a mastery w i t h o u t remainder. Therefore, it is n o t insignificant that the t e r m mondialisation remains untranslatable, w h i l e g l o b ­ alization tends to the integral translatability of all meanings and all p h e n o m e n a . N a n c y will therefore have a tendency to oppose these t w o terms, to m a r k their contrast, going as far as to suggest that globalization, far from b e i n g a b e c o m i n g world, w o u l d lead, rather, to a proliferation o f the u n - w o r l d . A t the b e g i n n i n g of the b o o k , N a n c y questions w h e t h e r the p h e n o m e n o n o f globalization leads to the giving b i r t h of a w o r l d o r t o its contrary. Further, w i t h i n the essay " Urbi et orbi" h e discusses globalization as " t h e suppression o f all w o r l d - f o r m i n g o f the world," as " a n u n p r e c e d e n t e d geopolitical, e c o n o m i c , a n d ecological catastro­ p h e " (CW, 5 0 ) . T h e question, henceforth, b e c o m e s the following: " H o w are w e to conceive of, precisely, a world w h e r e w e only find a globe, an astral universe, or an earth w i t h o u t sky . . . ?" (CW, 47). N a n c y begins w i t h the following fact: the w o r l d destroys itself. H e r e it is n o t a matter, h e clarifies, o f hyperbole, fear, o r anxiety, o r s o m e t h i n g cata­ strophic; or o f a hypothesis for reflection. N o , it is, according to Nancy, a fact, indeed the fact from w h i c h his reflection originates. " T h e fact that t h e w o r l d is destroying itself is n o t a hypothesis: it is, in a sense, the fact from w h i c h any t h i n k i n g o f the w o r l d follows" ( C W , 35). T h e t h o u g h t o f t h e world, o f t h e b e i n g - w o r l d o f the world, is thus rendered possible, paradoxically, w h e n the w o r l d destroys itself or is in t h e process o f destroying itself. In effect, it is "thanks t o " the event o f globalization—for Nancy, the suppression o f the w o r l d — t h a t the w o r l d is in the position to appear as such. Globalization destroys the w o r l d and thus makes possible the e m e r g e n c e of the question relating to its being. T h i s is w h y N a n c y begins his t h o u g h t o f t h e w o r l d w i t h an analysis o f global­ ization, that is, the destruction o f t h e world. N o t i n g briefly the features o f this destruction, N a n c y highlights the shift in m e a n i n g of t h e papal formulation "urbi et orbi," w h i c h has c o m e to m e a n , in

2

Translators' Introduction ordinary language, " e v e r y w h e r e a n d anywhere." T h i s " e v e r y w h e r e a n d a n y ­ w h e r e " consecrates t h e disintegration o f t h e w o r l d , because it is n o l o n g e r p o s ­ sible, since this disintegration, to f o r m an o r b o f t h e world. T h e orb o f t h e w o r l d dissolves in t h e n o n - p l a c e o f global multiplicity. T h i s is an extension that leads to the indistinctness o f t h e parts o f the world, as for instance, the u r b a n in relation to t h e rural. N a n c y calls this hyperbolic a c c u m u l a t i o n "agglomeration," in t h e sense o f t h e c o n g l o m e r a t e , o f t h e piling up, o f w h i c h the " b a d infinite" (CW, 47) dismantles the w o r l d :

3

This network cast upon the planet—and already around it, in the orbital band of satellites along with their debris—deforms the orbis as much as the urbs. The agglomeration invades and erodes what used to be thought of as globe and which is nothing more now than its double, glomus. In such a glomus, we see the conjunction of an indefinite growth of techno-science, of a correla­ tive exponential growth of populations, of a worsening of inequalities of all sorts within these populations—economic, biological and cultural—and of a dissipation of the certainties, images and identities of what the world was with its parts and humanity with its characteristics. (CW, 33—34) T h e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f globalization is a c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f wealth that never occurs w i t h o u t t h e exclusion o f a m a r g i n that is rejected i n t o misery. N a n c y thus notes t h e correlation o f t h e process o f technological a n d e c o n o m i c p l a n ­ etary d o m i n a t i o n w i t h t h e disintegration o f t h e w o r l d , that is, the disintegra­ tion o f t h e " c o n v e r g e n c e o f k n o w l e d g e , ethics, and social w e l l - b e i n g " ( C W , 34). E v e r y t h i n g h a p p e n s as if accessing t h e planetary, the c o v e r i n g o f t h e w o r l d in all its totality, m a d e t h e w o r l d at t h e same t i m e disappear, as the m e a n i n g o f t h e totalizing m o v e m e n t also disappears. T h e access to totality, in t h e sense o f t h e global a n d o f t h e planetary, is at t h e same t i m e t h e disappearing o f the w o r l d . It is also, N a n c y emphasizes, t h e e n d o f t h e o r i e n t a t i o n a n d o f the sense (of t h e w o r l d ) . Globality does n o t o p e n a p a t h , a way, o r a direction, a possi­ bility; rather, it furiously t u r n s o n itself a n d exacerbates itself as the blind t e c h ­ nological a n d e c o n o m i c a l exploitation, o n its absence o f perspective a n d o r i ­ e n t a t i o n . In short, " T h e w o r l d has lost its capacity to f o r m a w o r l d [/aire monde]" (ibid.). T h e p r o f o u n d nihiHsm o f t h e logic o f globalization is h e r e revealed for, as N a n c y c o n c l u d e s , " e v e r y t h i n g takes place as if the w o r l d affected a n d p e r m e a t e d itself w i t h a d e a t h drive that s o o n w o u l d have n o t h ­ i n g else to destroy t h a n t h e w o r l d itself" (ibid.). T h u s , w h a t appears in this t o o b r i e f recapitulation is, o n the o n e h a n d , the a n t i n o m y b e t w e e n the global a n d t h e worldly (which allows for a differentiat­ i n g o f t h e t h o u g h t o f w o r l d - f o r m i n g in opposition to globalization), b u t also,

3

Tlie Creation of the World o r

Globalization

above all, the role that the appearance o f the n o t h i n g that plays in the world, 4

in its event as in its destruction o r in its destruction as event. It is therefore a question for us o f b r i n g i n g forth this " n o t h i n g o f the world," w h o s e character­ istics N a n c y reveals, for o n e senses that it is in this n o t h i n g that the cross-des­ tinies o f globalization and w o r l d - f o r m i n g are at stake, as well as the question o f c o n t e m p o r a r y nihilism; a nihilism w h o s e hard k n o t will have b e e n fractured by the n o t h i n g o f the ex nihilo o f the creation o f the world. At first, N a n c y begins t o r e c o n s t r u c t the historic e m e r g e n c e o f the q u e s ­ tion of the w o r l d , that is, the way in w h i c h the w o r l d is b e c o m i n g a p r o p e r philosophical question, t h r o u g h a process that he calls t h e " b e c o m i n g - w o r l d of t h e w o r l d " (CW, 4 1 ) . T h e w o r l d as p r o b l e m a n d as t h e p r o p e r site o f h u m a n existence was covered, obscured, by t h e classical figures o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y a n d representational t h i n k i n g , all t h e w h i l e , paradoxically and silently, u n d e r m i n ­ ing o n t o - t h e o l o g y from w i t h i n . T h e w o r l d , w r i t e s N a n c y in a striking passage, was o r has f o r m e d " t h e self-deconstruction that u n d e r m i n e s from w i t h i n o n t o - t h e o l o g y " (ibid.). N a n c y begins by n o t i n g that t h e w o r l d emerges as w o r l d w h e n it c o m e s 5

o u t of representation, w h e n it frees itself o f t h e so-called w o r l d v i e w o r Weltan­ schauung. T h e representation of the w o r l d , in effect, implies a vantage p o i n t , therefore a position that is outside o f t h e world, from w h e r e t h e w o r l d may be able to b e seen and represented. S u c h a representation reduces and, thus, n e u ­ tralizes the world. T h i s is w h y N a n c y insists o n t h e fact that t h e w o r l d emerges as w o r l d against the b a c k g r o u n d o f a historical withdrawal o f the representa­ tion o f the world. S u c h a representation supposes a cosmotheoros, that is to say, a subject-of-the-world representing the w o r l d in front o f itself as an object. It supposes, o n t h e o t h e r hand, t h e representation o f a principle and of an e n d o f t h e world, the w o r l d e n d i n g in such a view; it devotes itself, in the end, to the reduction o f t h e w o r l d to the status o f an object, a w o r l d regarded as " o b j e c ­ tive." However, it is from all these features that the w o r l d escapes: " T h e w o r l d is n o longer conceived of as a representation

T h e w o r l d is thus outside r e p ­

resentation, outside its representation and of a w o r l d o f representation, and this is how, n o d o u b t , o n e reaches the m o s t c o n t e m p o r a r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e w o r l d " (CW, 43). A subject-of-the-world

keeps the w o r l d in its gaze, its sight, in

such a way that the world is thus represented as "a w o r l d d e p e n d e n t o n the gaze o f a s u b j e c t - o f - t h e - w o r l d " (CW, 40). As for this subject, it is, of course, n o t of this world, n o r any l o n g e r " i n " the world, in the sense o f b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d : it is n o t worldly. Positioning itself outside t h e world, it gains, so to speak, a t h e ­ ological status. H e r e o n e can see t h e d e p e n d e n c y o f the representation o f the w o r l d o n o n t o - t h e o l o g y . T h e w o r l d is thus missed, passed over, in its represen­ tation, by onto-theology, and o n t o - t h e o l o g y reveals itself in the positioning a

4

Translators' Introduction subject: " E v e n w i t h o u t a religious representation, such a subject, implicit o r explicit, perpetuates the position o f t h e creating, organizing, and addressing G o d (if n o t the addressee) o f t h e w o r l d " (CW, 40). A n d in fact, the w o r l d o u t ­ side o f its representation "is above all a w o r l d w i t h o u t a G o d capable o f b e i n g t h e subject o f its representation" (CW, 43). A s e c o n d characteristic o f t h e o b s c u r i n g o f the w o r l d is thus o n t o - t h e o l ­ ogy, o r w h a t N a n c y calls " t h e great transcendent accounts o f rationalism" (CW, 41). N a n c y w o u l d even identify " w o r l d - f o r m i n g , " that is, the i m m a n e n t s t r u c ­ ture of the w o r l d — t h e fact that t h e w o r l d only refers to itself and never to a n o t h e r w o r l d (postulate o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y ) — a s a " d e t h e o l o g i z a t i o n " (CW, 51). T h i s will be, in effect, a leitmotif in Nancy's t h o u g h t o f the world: t h e w o r l d is an absolute i m m a n e n c e ; w e will r e t u r n to this.

II For Nancy, t h e w o r l d emerges as a p r o p e r philosophical problem against t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f a withdrawal o f onto-theology, and its p u t t i n g into play as an absolute existence is correlative to t h e disappearance o f G o d . B e c o m i n g - w o r l d is thus the inverse o f "theologization." In effect, w h a t used to stand in the way of, o r obstruct, a t h o u g h t o f the w o r l d (as absolute i m m a n e n c e and value) was t h e division o f the totality o f b e i n g according to the tripartite n a t u r e - m a n - G o d . G o d , for Nancy, a m o u n t s to this: a n o t h e r w o r l d placed n e x t to this world, o t h e r than this w o r l d . " [ F ] o r a G o d distinct from t h e world w o u l d b e a n o t h e r w o r l d " (CW, 44-45).'' G o d is w h a t is outside the world. It is to that extent that the s u b ­ j e c t o f representation was b o u n d to theism. N o w , the first proposition o f an authentic t h o u g h t o f the w o r l d is that t h e w o r l d never refers to a n o t h e r world. C o n c e r n i n g t h e limits o r t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f the world, N a n c y states, " [ T h e world] never crosses over these edges to occupy a place overlooking itself" (CW, 43). A n d , if o n e "leaves this world," it is n o t to attain a n o t h e r world; it is simply n o longer b e i n g - m - t h e - w o r l d , n o longer b e i n g in a world, n o longer having a world. To that extent, "this w o r l d " is the only world. T h u s , to die is to leave the world, as world, and n o l o n g e r to leave this w o r l d for a n o t h e r world.To n o longer b e is to n o l o n g e r b e in the w o r l d . T h i s is w h y a w o r l d does n o t get crossed over (it does n o t have an outside), rather, it is traversed: from b e g i n n i n g to end, from o n e edge to another, b u t never in order to access an outside o r a beyond, site o f t h e divine.This is w h y the expression " t h e sense o r m e a n i n g o f the world [le sens 7

du monde]," the tide o f o n e o f Nancy's major w o r k s , cannot signify the sense of the world as objective genitive, an encompassing o f the world as totality o n the basis o f an external overview (following t h e formula ofWittgenstein, according

5

Hie Creation of the World o r

Globalization

t o w h i c h " t h e m e a n i n g of the w o r l d must be situated outside the w o r l d " ) , but, rather, a subjective genitive, p r o d u c e d from the internal references o f the world ("Thus the m e a n i n g o f the w o r l d does n o t occur as a reference to s o m e t h i n g external to the w o r l d " [CW, 4 3 ] ) . T h e world only refers to itself, and its m e a n ­ ing does n o t c o m e from the outside, it "circulates," N a n c y tells us, " b e t w e e n all those w h o stand in it, each time singular and singularly sharing a same possibil­ ity that none of them, any place or any God outside of this world, accomplishes" (ibid; o u r emphasis). It is in this sense that the w o r l d is n o t o f t h e order of a substance, a support, or a basis: the world does n o t presuppose itself; it exists as an e x t e n ­ sion of itself, as gap from itself, w i t h o u t g r o u n d o r against the b a c k g r o u n d of nothing." T h u s , let us specify that w h e n N a n c y speaks o f m e a n i n g , he does n o t i n t e n d by this t e r m the same thing as "signification," in the sense o f an a c c o m ­ plished given m e a n i n g , b u t rather the o p e n i n g o f the possibility of the p r o d u c ­ 9

tion o f significance. M e a n i n g is n o t given, it is to b e invented, to be created, that is to say, as w e will see, o u t o f n o t h i n g , ex nihilo . . . As w e can see, N a n c y ' s t h o u g h t w i t h respect t o t h e w o r l d is a t h o u g h t o f a n absolute i m m a n e n c e in o p p o s i t i o n to the t r a d i t i o n o f t r a n s c e n d e n c e (position o f an o t h e r w o r l d ) . A n d nevertheless, N a n c y shows that t h e w o r l d , the q u e s t i o n o f t h e b e i n g - w o r l d o f t h e w o r l d , o p e r a t e s w i t h i n o n t o - t h e o l ogy; h e shows that such o n t o - t h e o l o g y self-deconstructs a n d c o n f i r m s , in spite o f itself, t h e u n i t y o f t h e w o r l d a n d its radical i m m a n e n c e . H e i n d e e d w r i t e s that t h e classical t h i n k i n g w i t h respect to G o d " q u e s t i o n e d t h e b e i n g w o r l d o f t h e w o r l d " (CW, 41). H e states it very clearly: in classical o n t o - t h e ­ ology, in the e n d it was a m a t t e r o f n o t h i n g else t h a n t h e w o r l d . In fact, N a n c y continues, " t h e r e is n o n e e d of a p r o l o n g e d study to n o t i c e that, already in the m o s t classical metaphysical representations o f that G o d , n o t h i n g else was at stake, in t h e e n d , t h a n the w o r l d itself, in itself, a n d for itself" ( i b i d . ) . W h a t , in effect, did t h e classical transcendences o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y provide an a c c o u n t of? T h e w o r l d . T h e y provided its i m m a n e n t structure, supplied "a reason i n t e r ­ nal t o the general order o f t h i n g s " (CW, 44). G o d is effectively t h e G o d of the ii'orld, H e is t h e subject o f the w o r l d , o f its fabrication, o f its m a i n t e n a n c e , and o f its destination. O f the w o r l d , G o d was t h e creator, t h e organizer. In this sense, for Nancy, o n t o - t h e o l o g y w o u l d elaborate n o t h i n g o t h e r than " t h e i m m a n e n t relation o f the w o r l d to itself" (CW, 41). Is it a c o i n c i d e n c e that in p h i l o s o p h y the "vertical" theological t r a n s c e n d e n c e b e c a m e replaced w i t h K a n t by a " h o r i z o n t a l " t r a n s c e n d e n c e that is n o t h i n g o t h e r than the h o r i z o n and structure o f the w o r l d itself? In K a n t , w e see to t h e position of t h e w o r l d as transcendental, that is, t h e very place for w h a t appears and happens, or, as N a n c y writes, the w o r l d appears in Kant's p h i l o s o p h y as " t h e place, d i m e n s i o n , and actuality o f t h o u g h t : t h e s p a c e - t i m e o f m e a n i n g and t r u t h " (ibid.), a n d n o

6

Translators' Introduction l o n g e r simply as an object o f vision (for t h e subject). T h e r e f o r e , N a n c y will locate a " b e c o m i n g - w o r l d o f the world," as h e refers to it, in those classical fig­ ures o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y that are t h e " c o n t i n u a l c r e a t i o n " o f Descartes ( m a i n t e ­ n a n c e o f t h e w o r l d ) , t h e Dieu sive natura o f Spinoza ( G o d as t h e w o r l d ) , etc. ( N a n c y also includes in this list Malebranche's "vision in G o d " and Leibniz's " m o n a d o f m o n a d s , " internal logic o f t h e world.) In each instance, it is a q u e s ­ tion o f t h e w o r l d , o f its t r u t h and its m e a n i n g . It is to this e x t e n t that the q u e s ­ tion o f the w o r l d will have f o r m e d t h e self-deconstruction that u n d e r m i n e s o n t o - t h e o l o g y a n d that t h e g o d o f metaphysics has m e r g e d w i t h t h e w o r l d , i n d e e d has b e c o m e t h e w o r l d . T h i s g o d o f metaphysics has b e c o m e the w o r l d in t h e sense that t h e G o d o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y has b e e n "progressively stripped of the divine attributes o f an i n d e p e n d e n t existence, and only retained those o f the existence o f the w o r l d considered in its i m m a n e n c e " (CW, 44), w h i c h a m o u n t s to saying that t h e s u b ­ j e c t o f the w o r l d (God) disappears in o r d e r for the w o r l d to appear as subject. In o t h e r words, t h e b e c o m i n g - w o r l d o f t h e w o r l d signifies that the w o r l d loses its status as object (of vision) in order to reach the status o f subject (previously o c c u p i e d by G o d as i n d e p e n d e n t existence). H e n c e f o r t h , there is n o t h i n g b u t the ( i m m a n e n t ) w o r l d as subject o f itself. T h a t is to say, for Nancy, the w o r l d is 10

always a relation to itself. T h i s relation to itself, as w e n o t e d above, does n o t p r o c e e d from a g r o u n d o r a basis; it is an extension o f itself, relating to itself from the p r o p e r extension o f t h e world. N a n c y writes: The God of onto-theology has produced itself (or deconstructed itself) as sub­ ject of the world, that is, as world-subject. In so doing, it suppressed itself as God-Supreme-Being and transformed itself, losing itself therein, in the exis­ tence for-itself of the world without an outside (neither outside of the world nor a world from the outside). (CW, 44) G o d thus disappears, b u t H e disappears in the world, w h i c h immediately m e a n s that w e can n o l o n g e r speak meaningfully in terms o f b e i n g within the w o r l d [dans-le-monde]

in t h e sense o f w h a t is c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n s o m e t h i n g else, b u t

only in terms o f being-i'/z-the-world [au-monde]. T h e preposition "an"

"in,"

explains Nancy, represents, in French, w h a t n o w encapsulates t h e entire p r o b ­ l e m o f the world. T h i s shift from " w i t h i n " to " i n " indicates the radical i m m a ­ n e n c e o f the world: e v e r y t h i n g n o w takes place in the world, that is t o say, r i g h t at the w o r l d , a meme t h e world, as N a n c y often writes. It is a m a t t e r for us o f advancing in this p r o p e r t h o u g h t o f the w o r l d that deploys itself from t h e detheologization that w e have only t o o briefly discussed. N a n c y proceeds t o expose the principal characteristics o f t h e b e i n g - w o r l d o f t h e world.

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The Creation of the World o r

Globalization

T h e first characteristic o f the w o r l d is thus its radical i m m a n e n c e . T h e w o r l d n o l o n g e r refers to a transcendence, to a beyond, to a g o d outside the w o r l d and distinct from the world; in short, the w o r l d n o longer refers to a n o t h e r world: N a n c y writes, " W h o e v e r speaks o f ' t h e w o r l d ' r e n o u n c e s any appeal to ' a n o t h e r w o r l d ' o r a ' b e y o n d - t h e - w o r l d ' [ontre-nwnde]" (CW, 3 7 ) . T h i s is why, in this original t h o u g h t o f the world, it is n o t a m a t t e r o f a seculariza­ tion o f the theological: the w o r l d occurs outside o f t h e theological scenario. It is n o longer possible, in effect, to measure t h e m e a n i n g o f the world by refer­ r i n g it to an external and transcendent m o d e l . T h e i m m a n e n c e o f the w o r l d signifies, in the first place, that there is n o m o d e l for the world, since the w o r l d is n o longer r e d u c e d to o r adjusted to a representation o r to a principle: t h e world is an-archic. W i t h o u t an e x t e r i o r principle, it therefore can only refer to itself, a n d its m e a n i n g only arises from itself. It is absolutely free from all refer­ ence to an exterior: this is w h y the world's i m m a n e n c e is ab-solute, detached, w i t h o u t c o n n e c t i o n . N a n c y thus speaks of " t h e " world, "absolutely"; this a b s o lutization of the world b e i n g o n e o f the senses o f w h a t w e refer to as " w o r l d forming." T h e w o r l d is an absolute, since it is n o l o n g e r relative to a n o t h e r world. T h e sense o f the w o r l d manifests this i m m a n e n c e , because the sense o f the w o r l d is referred to a making-sense, w h i c h is the w o r l d as such: the w o r l d makes sense of itself by itself. T h e m e a n i n g is never a reference to an outside world, b u t only refers to itself, such a self-reference b e i n g the world. T h u s , N a n c y w r i t e s , " O n e could say that w o r l d h o o d is t h e symbolization

of the world,

the way in w h i c h t h e w o r l d symbolizes in itself w i t h itself, in w h i c h it articu­ lates itself by m a k i n g a circulation o f m e a n i n g possible w i t h o u t reference to a n o t h e r w o r l d " (CW, 53). T h e w o r l d manifests, therefore, an absolute i m m a n e n c e . T h e w o r l d is absolute, b u t nonetheless finite. It is finite, since, as w e will see, it c o m e s from n o t h i n g in o r d e r to r e t u r n to n o t h i n g , a n d it is only itself a g r o w t h of/from n o t h i n g . T h e i m m a n e n c e o f the w o r l d is therefore the c o n j u n c t i o n o f a finit u d e a n d of an absolute; it is an absolute finitude. T h i s absolute finitude takes the f o r m o f an excess. T h e world, n o longer b e i n g a representation o r a vision, manifests its m o d e of b e i n g as an excess w i t h regard to this vision. T h e w o r l d exceeds its r e p r e ­ sentation; it leaves it, a n d it appears outside this m o d e l , excessive, eccentric, a n d singular. Excess of a p u r e event, f o u n d e d o n n o t h i n g , outside representation, the w o r l d escapes from all h o r i z o n s o f calculability (in opposition to the logic o f e c o n o m i c a n d technologic globalization). A w o r l d in excess has therefore the m o d e o f b e i n g o f an unpredictable event a n d for that reason c a n n o t b e the m a t ­ ter o f a choice b e t w e e n possibilities. It w o u l d b e rather, "a violent decision w i t h o u t appeal, because it decides b e t w e e n all a n d n o t h i n g — o r , m o r e precisely,

8

Translators' Introduction it makes b e i n g s o m e t h i n g in the place of nothing" (CW, 59; o u r emphasis). T h u s , it is a question o f a decision for, " w h a t is in n o way given in advance, b u t w h i c h constitutes the e r u p t i o n o f the new, that is unpredictable because w i t h o u t face, and thus t h e ' b e g i n n i n g o f a series o f p h e n o m e n a ' by w h i c h K a n t defines free­ d o m in its relation to t h e w o r l d " (ibid.). A c c o r d i n g t o t h e very structure o f any event, the w o r l d occurs in t h e incalculable, resistant to identity, a c c o r d i n g to w h a t D e r r i d a refers to as t h e possibility o f t h e impossible. For D e r r i d a , t h e impossible, w h i c h h e w r i t e s as im-possible for reasons that will appear below, is possible a n d takes place as i m ­ possible. In fact, t h e im-possible is, a c c o r d i n g t o D e r r i d a , w h i c h N a n c y fol­ lows, t h e very structure o f t h e event. T h e impossible, in this c o n t e x t , does n o t m e a n that w h i c h is n o t simply possible, a n d therefore w i t h o u t effect. T h e impossible, o r t h e im-possible, m e a n s : that w h i c h happens outside t h e c o n d i ­ tions o f possibility offered in advance b y a subject representation, outside t h e transcendental c o n d i t i o n s o f possibility, w h i c h , for Nancy, actually r e n d e r impossible t h e subject o f this e x p e r i e n c e o f the w o r l d . W e n e e d to h o l d t o g e t h e r the following t w o statements: Tlie transcendental

makes

experience

impossible: the im-possible is the possibility of experience. The: w o r l d arrives as such an im-possible. D e r r i d a often w r i t e s that an event o r an invention is only p o s ­ sible as im-possible. T h i s is w h y N a n c y will specify, " O u r question

thus

b e c o m e s clearly t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e impossible e x p e r i e n c e o r the e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e impossible: an e x p e r i e n c e r e m o v e d from t h e conditions o f possibility o f a finite k n o w l e d g e , a n d w h i c h is nevertheless an e x p e r i e n c e " (CW, 65). T h i s e x p e r i e n c e is t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e excess w i t h respect t o t h e conditions o f anticipating possibilities. E x p e r i e n c e takes place in the excess o f t h e i m - p o s s i ­ ble as t h e structure o f t h e event. T h e w o r l d is thus excessive, e x c e e d i n g the conditions o f possibility o f r e p ­ resentation and o f t h e transcendental, b u t , nevertheless, establishing a p r o p e r s t a n c e . T h e w o r l d is w i t h o u t foundation ( w i t h o u t representation), b u t it m a i n ­ tains a stance in this n o t h i n g : T h e w o r l d "[i]s essentially, n o t the representation o f a universe (cosmos) n o r that o f a h e r e b e l o w (a degraded world, if n o t c o n ­ d e m n e d by Christianity), b u t t h e excess—beyond any representation o f an ethos o r a habitus—of

a stance by w h i c h t h e w o r l d holds itself b y itself, configures

itself a n d exposes itself, refers to itself w i t h o u t referring to any given principle n o r to any assigned e n d (CW, 47). T h i s stance referred to in this passage b y N a n c y is an ethos and a habitus; it is also a praxis. N a n c y explains that t h e world, if it does n o t w a n t to be a land of exile o r a vale o f tears, o r simply t h e u n - w o r l d [immonde] that it is b e c o m i n g today, m u s t b e t h e place o f a possible habitation. A b o v e all, t h e w o r l d is a place. M o r e p r e ­ cisely, it is the place o f a possible taking-place, w h e r e there is "a g e n u i n e place,

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The Creation of the World o r

Globalization

o n e in w h i c h things can genuinely take place (in this w o r l d ) " (CW, 42). T h e w o r l d is the place of any taking-place, o f any possible taking-place, the place w h e r e "there is r o o m for everyone [tout le monde]" (ibid.). N a n c y insists o n this dimensionality o f the world: t h e w o r l d "is n o w h e r e " ; it is, rather, " t h e o p e n i n g of s p a c e - t i m e " (CW, 73), a " s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l dis-positing dispersion," w h e r e everything can take-place, if it is the case that " w h a t takes place takes place in a w o r l d and by way of that w o r l d " (CW, 42). T h e w o r l d is t h e place and the d i m e n s i o n o f a possibility to inhabit, to coexist. T h e w o r l d "is only for those w h o inhabit it" (ibid.). It is a place for a p r o p e r taking-place and dwelling, because to take-place is n o t to simply o c c u r b u t to properly arrive and h a p p e n . T h i s properness indicates here t h e ethical d i m e n s i o n o f the world, an originary ethics o f b e i n g - o f - t h e - w o r l d . T h i n k i n g together t h e stance o f the w o r l d and the originary sense of ethos as dwelling, N a n c y explains that t h e world is an ethos, a habitus, and a place o f dwelling. It is also a praxis: the sense o f t h e w o r l d is n o t given a p r i o r i , and o u r coexistence in the w o r l d is n o t given either, n o r is it able to rely o n any substantial basis. N o t able t o rely o n any given, the w o r l d can thus only rely o n itself. T h a t is t o say, t h e w o r l d suddenly appears from n o t h i n g . . . from itself. T h e sense o f the world, n o t given, is to create, because "[t]he withdrawal of any given thus forms the heart o f a t h i n k i n g o f c r e a t i o n " (CW, 69). T h e world, resting o n n o t h i n g , is to invent in an original praxis o f m e a n i n g ; " m e a n i n g is always in praxis" (CW, 54), N a n c y clarifies. It is never established as a given, it is never fulfilled o r achieved; it is to b e m a d e and enacted. B e i n g itself, as it is always " b e i n g w i t h o u t given," has t h e m e a n i n g o f an act, o f a m a k i n g .

Ill T h i s m a k i n g (sense) from nothing given is a creation ex nihilo, c o m i n g

from

n o t h i n g , and m e a n i n g , e m e r g i n g from n o t h i n g , allows the w o r l d to appear as a n o t h i n g - o f - g i v e n and as w i t h o u t - r e a s o n . N a n c y poses, in recalling Heidegger's Principle of Reason, that, " n e i t h e r reason n o r g r o u n d sustains t h e w o r l d " (CW, 120, n . 2 0 ) . T h e world, n o t g r o u n d e d o n any principle, is zfact; it is only a fact (even if it is a singular fact, n o t b e i n g itself a fact within t h e world). It is n o t founded in reason, o r in G o d . It is the fact o f a "mystery," N a n c y writes, t h e mystery o f an accidental, errant o r w a n d e r i n g existence (according to W i t t g e n ­ stein, w h a t is mystical is the fact that t h e w o r l d is). T h e w o r l d is n e i t h e r n e c e s ­ sary n o r c o n t i n g e n t , if c o n t i n g e n c y is defined in relation to necessity. R a t h e r , it w o u l d b e b e y o n d o r before necessity a n d o f contingency, an absolute fact. It is possible to free the facticity o f t h e w o r l d from t h e necessity-contingency c o n -

10

Translators' Introduction ceptual couple by c o n s i d e r i n g this fact o f the w o r l d " w i t h o u t referring it to a cause (neither efficient n o r final)" (CW, 4 5 ) . T h e world is a fact w i t h o u t cause and w i t h o u t reason, it is "a fact w i t h o u t reason o r end, and it is o u r fact" (ibid.). W e are thus called, in this t h o u g h t o f the w o r l d as absolute i m m a n e n c e , to take o n this facticity w i t h o u t reason o f t h e w o r l d , as well as its non-sense, o r rather that its sense only lies in such a fact: " T o t h i n k it is to t h i n k this factuality, w h i c h implies n o t referring it to a m e a n i n g capable o f appropriating it, b u t to placing in it, in its t r u t h as a fact, all possible m e a n i n g " (ibid.). T h e w o r l d is a signifi­ cance w i t h o u t a f o u n d a t i o n in reason, or, as N a n c y writes suggestively, a " r e s ­ o n a n c e w i t h o u t r e a s o n " (CW, 4 7 ) . T h e w o r l d is w i t h o u t reason, and is to itself its entire possible reason. T h i s facticity o f t h e w o r l d is its a b a n d o n m e n t , a b a n d o n m e n t by and a b a n ­ d o n m e n t to. N a n c y refers to this a b a n d o n m e n t o f the w o r l d as its poverty. T h e w o r l d is never a possession, b u t an a b a n d o n m e n t : the w o r l d is poor. T h i s poverty ( w h i c h is n o t misery b u t t h e b e i n g - a b a n d o n e d as s u c h ) " is d u e t o the n o t h i n g that t h e w o r l d manifests: c o m i n g from n o t h i n g , resting o n n o t h i n g , g o i n g to n o t h i n g ,

12

the w o r l d is, writes N a n c y in an striking passage,"the n o t h ­

ing itself, if o n e can speak in this way, o r rather nothing g r o w i n g [croissant] as something" (CW, 51). N o t i n g t h e etymological links b e t w e e n g r o w i n g [croissant], b e i n g b o r n [nattre], to g r o w [croitre], cresco, and creo, N a n c y introduces at this stage t h e m o t i f o f creation; to g r o w a n d to create: the m o v e m e n t of the world. " I n creation, a g r o w t h grows from n o t h i n g and this n o t h i n g takes care o f itself, cultivates its g r o w t h " (ibid.).Thus, in this sense, poverty grows. T h e creation o f w h i c h N a n c y speaks, that is, the creation of the w o r l d (which is a subjective genitive), o u g h t t o b e u n d e r s t o o d in a radical n o n t h e o logical sense. It w o u l d even b e , in its c o n t e n t and its logic, a nontheological n o t i o n , if it is the case that creating can only b e ex nihilo, e m e r g e n c e from n o t h ­ ing, and n o t from G o d ("creation is a motif, o r a concept, that w e must grasp outside o f its theological concept," N a n c y insists [CW, 50]). Because the w o r l d rests o n n o t h i n g , it exists ex nihilo, in a creation o f itself. C r e a t i o n lies entirely in t h e ex nihilo a n d n o t in the position of a theism, against w h i c h N a n c y p r o ­ claims, n o t simply an a-theism, b u t an " a b s e n t h e i s m " (ibid.). God is absent in the creation of the world and disappears in the world. C r e a t i o n is n o l o n g e r referred to theology, b u t to t h e ex nihilo," w h i c h for its part is referred to a veritable mate­ rialism, if it is the case that t h e "ex nihilo is the g e n u i n e formulation o f a radical materialism, that is to say, precisely without roots" (CW, 5 1 ; o u r emphasis). N a n c y engages this m o t i f o f creation to t h e exact extent that he takes leave w i t h all reference to a given in his t h o u g h t o f the world: n o t h i n g is given, all is to b e invented, t o b e created: " T h e w o r l d is created from n o t h i n g : this does n o t m e a n fabricated w i t h n o t h i n g by a particularly ingenious producer. It m e a n s

11

The Creation of the World o r

Globalization

instead n o t fabricated, p r o d u c e d by n o p r o d u c e r " ( C W , 51). T h u s , N a n c y expresses that creation, in his t h o u g h t , is " t h e exact o p p o s i t e " (ibid.) o f p r o ­ d u c t i o n , w h i c h supposes a given, a project, a n d a p r o d u c e r . C r e a t i o n is w i t h ­ o u t a transcendent creator (creation w h e r e t h e creator collapses a n d disap­ pears, according to the logic o f the a u t o - d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f Christianity that w e analyzed a b o v e ) , " a creation i m m a n e n t to itself, a creation of itself, a n d from itself: " I f the w o r l d is the g r o w t h of/from n o t h i n g — a n expression o f a formidable a m b i g u i t y — i t is because it only d e p e n d s o n itself, w h i l e this ' s e l f is given from n o w h e r e b u t from itself" (ibid.).The w o r l d is created from n o t h ­ ing, that is to say, as n o t h i n g , n o t in the sense o f n o t h i n g n e s s , b u t in t h e sense o f n o t h i n g given a n d n o t h i n g o f reason. T h e w o r l d emerges from n o t h i n g , is w i t h o u t p r e c o n d i t i o n , w i t h o u t m o d e l s , w i t h o u t given principle a n d e n d . C o m i n g from n o t h i n g signifies: the presentation o f n o t h i n g , n o t in t h e sense o f a p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the u n a p p a r e n t o r o f negative theology, b u t in t h e sense w h e r e " t h a t nothing gives itself a n d that nothing shows itself—and that this is." ( C W , 1 2 3 , n . 2 4 ) . T h e creation of the w o r l d is thus that praxis o f m e a n i n g a n d o f dwelling, w h e r e there is a p r o p e r taking place, a n d it is such a creation o f the w o r l d as an unpredictable appearance, as an e r u p t i o n o f t h e new, as absolute b e g i n n i n g , as dis-positing openness (the ex of ex nihilo as differance), as selfhood a n d coexis­ tence ( c o - or w i t h are " i n t r i c a t e " in t h e ex) that N a n c y gives us to t h i n k a b o u t 5

in these pages, w o r l d - f o r m i n g as an alternative to globalization.' It is a m a t t e r o f affirming a n d o f willing the world, a w o r l d w i t h o u t foundation o r founded o n n o t h i n g , w i t h o u t reason, w i t h o u t e n d , w i t h o u t a u t h o r a n d w i t h o u t subject, b e y o n d representation: the only possibility of c o m i n g o u t o f the u n - w o r l d .

IV T h e third part o f Tlie Creation of the World o r Globalization

o p e n s the question

o f w h a t o n e m i g h t call the undecidability of b e g i n n i n g s . O n e b e g i n n i n g w i t h w h i c h N a n c y is c o n c e r n e d in this text is the b e g i n n i n g o f philosophy itself. O n Nancy's account, philosophy begins from itself a n d evolves as a " t e c h n o l o g y o f logos!'"' W i t h this se//"-beginning, N a n c y suggests that there is a " d e n a t u r a t i o n " o f history. A natural history is i n t e r r u p t e d , c o r r u p t e d , o r " d e n a t u r e d " b y a p h i ­ losophy that N a n c y understands as a t e c h n o l o g y o f logos, a t e c h n o l o g y that engenders metaphysics." T h i s self-beginning paradoxically arises o u t o f the withdrawal o f b e g i n n i n g : the withdrawal

of beginning, Nancy

explains,

"belongs to s e l f - b e g i n n i n g . T h e b e g i n n i n g remains u n g r o u n d e d " (CW, 80).To that extent, t h e self-beginning is w i t h o u t principles o r ends, and h u m a n s are

12

Translators' Introduction h e n c e f o r t h fabricated t h r o u g h such technology, if t e c h n o l o g y is to be u n d e r ­ stood "as t h e planetary d o m i n a t i o n o f the absence o f b e g i n n i n g and end." T h e t e c h n o l o g y o f logos thus reveals t h e d e n a t u r a t i o n o f history, o f the h u m a n b e i n g and o f life itself. Life, N a n c y insists, is n o l o n g e r p u r e o r bare, b u t rather p r o ­ d u c e d according to technology. O n Nancy's account, life b e c o m e s techne, and politics t h e m a n a g e m e n t o f ecotechnology. Nancy's text, t h e n , addresses t h e b e g i n n i n g o f philosophy as a t e c h n o l o g y o f logos that denatures history and h u m a n life. E v e n w h e n it claims to b e the o t h e r o f all techne, even w h e n it appeals to s o m e ideality o r naturalness, p h i l o s ­ o p h y is irreducibly an original techne. A n d it is n o accident, as N a n c y reminds us, that philosophy from its i n c e p t i o n has presented itself from the outset "as a dialogue w i t h technologies o r their m e t a - t e c h n o l o g i c a l interpellation: b e g i n ­ n i n g w i t h Sophistry, and m o d e l i n g itself o n mathematics, the arts o f t h e c o b ­ bler, t h e c a r p e n t e r o r in general" (CW, 89). As w e will see, N a n c y associates this self-beginning o f philosophy w i t h t h e p h e n o m e n o n k n o w n as "globalization," t h e planetary d o m i n a t i o n o f t h e process o f d e n a t u r a t i o n b r o u g h t a b o u t t h r o u g h technology. N a n c y reveals t h e convergence o f technology, metaphysics, and globalization, emphasizing that "metaphysics, as such, is essentially historical, accomplishes itself [s'acheve] in the f o r m o f technology," and that " t e c h n o l o g y must b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h e planetary d o m i n a t i o n of the absence o f b e g i n n i n g and end, o r o f t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f any initial o r final given—of

any phusis o r o f

any muthos" (CW, 81). T h e use o f t h e t e r m ^ m a t u r a t i o n w o u l d imply, it seems, an originary state o f nature that w o u l d have b e e n rfe-natured; an original state to w h i c h o n e w o u l d have to r e t u r n in o r d e r to restore one's p r o p e r nature. However, as m u c h as such a reading m i g h t s e e m to be e n c o u r a g e d b y the t e r m denaturation, Nancy's i n t e n t is to reveal d e n a t u r a t i o n as such, that is, the w i t h ­ drawal o f principles and ends, t h e n o t h i n g o f origins. S u c h a withdrawal has also a n o t h e r n a m e : technology.'* T h e resource o f t h e undecidability a n d groundlessness o f b e g i n n i n g s is that another b e g i n n i n g , that is to say, o t h e r beginnings, w o u l d b e possible. In fact, for Nancy, t h e b e g i n n i n g s o f p h i l o s o p h y can o n l y be w r i t t e n as plural, o r even as "singular plural." T h i s plurality ensues from t h e absence o f g r o u n d . T h i s is w h y h e asks: "Is it possible to make history, to begin again a h i s t o r y — o r History itself-—on the basis o f its n o n - f o u n d a t i o n ? " (ibid.). It is this possibility that the third section o f Tlie Creation of the World explores: n o t a particular b e g i n n i n g o r a p r o p e r b e g i n n i n g as an alternative to philosophy's self-beginning, b u t the very fact and possibility o f o t h e r beginnings. W h i l e the first b e g i n n i n g involves the denaturation o f philosophy and the m o v e m e n t o f globalization, N a n c y gives t h o u g h t to a n o t h e r event o f creation, a n o t h e r distinctly different b e g i n n i n g that, in contrast w i t h globalization, w o u l d be an authentic "world-forming." As w e

13

The Creation of the World o r

Globalization

saw, the world that emerges in such an event o f creation is n o t the world as an object, b u t rather a world that is indissociable from events of m e a n i n g . It is an issue, thus, of revealing the undecidability of beginnings so as to give t h o u g h t to the fact o f singular plural beginnings, a fact that as w e will see constitutes the task and c o n t e n t of justice. In the section of the text e n t i d e d " C r e a t i o n as D e n a t u r a t i o n : M e t a p h y s i ­ cal Technology," N a n c y addresses the constitutive aporia o f philosophy's b e g i n ­ nings. N a n c y suggests that the seed of t h e b e g i n n i n g is c o n t a m i n a t e d and d e n a ­ tures the philosophical project. H e writes: Philosophy begins as the self-productive technology of its name, of its dis­ course, and of its discipline. It engenders or it fabricates its own concept or its own Idea for itself at the same time that it invents or constructs these instru­ mental and ideal realities that are the "concept" and the "Idea." In this oper­ ation, the best known and most prominent feature is the differentiation of itself from what is called "sophistry": with respect to this technology of logos, philosophy defines itself and constitutes itself as that tecline that is at the same time different from any other techne because it states first, or finally, its truth. In that very way, it invents itself also in its difference from any other knowl­ edge, any other discipline, or any other science. With respect to this major dif­ ference, its self-institution is the key. (CW, 77; our emphasis) As self-inaugural, philosophy is unable to give t h o u g h t to its o w n b e g i n ­ ning, since this self-beginning o p e n s an aporia. E i t h e r it w o u l d posit a position from w h i c h it evolved (in w h i c h case it w o u l d n o t have b e g u n from itself) or it proposes itself as an accident o f the West, in w h i c h case, as N a n c y asserts, it has n o necessity (cf. C W , ibid.). N a n c y unfolds further aporias i n h e r e n t in t h e relation b e t w e e n p h i l o s o ­ p h y and history." O n the o n e h a n d , p h i l o s o p h y betrays history, h e asserts, since h i s t o r y — i f left u n t o itself—would b e s o m e t h i n g w i t h o u t b e g i n n i n g and w i t h o u t e n d . N a n c y w r i t e s , " T h e r e is thus a betrayal o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f history a n d o f t h e w o r l d in t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l self-constitution a n d s e l f - b e g i n ­ n i n g " (CW, 7 9 ) . As a 5e/f-beginning that conceives o f its o w n e n d s , p h i l o s o ­ p h y c o r r u p t s t h e natural history o f t h e w o r l d a n d natural history m u s t b e e x c l u d e d from its a c c o u n t . O n the o t h e r hand, N a n c y suggests that philosophy reveals history, he writes: It is precisely by defining itself as an autonomous process and thus as history (philosophy is history and makes history as soon as Plato refers to its proper . provenance in Anaxagoras, Parmenides, and Socrates) that philosophy unveils

14

Translators' Introduction the problematic order of an auto-constitution that must appropriate itself (that is to say, auto-constitute itself) through the mediation of its own temporal and genealogical difference along which the auto- alters itself primordially as much as it identiBes itself. (CW, 79-80)

T h e aporia o r chiasm, as N a n c y refers to it, opens a space o f uncertainty, inside and outside o f history, a chronological time of history and a mythical time out­ side o f history. In o t h e r w o r d s , t h e self-constituted d u r a t i o n carries its c h r o n o ­ logical time, and that w h i c h falls outside o f this time is left to the n o n p h i l o sophical, o r the mythical. F o r N a n c y , as w e saw, a history that has b e g u n itself from itself is d e p r i v e d o f g r o u n d , c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e aporia o f a b e g i n n i n g w i t h o u t reason and f o u n d a tion:Yet, paradoxically, this w i t h d r a w a l o f g r o u n d is t h e very g r o u n d of t h e h i s ­ tory that has b e g u n from itself. "Is it possible o r n o t to assume t h e n o n - f o u n ­ dation o f t h e West as the reason for its o w n history? A n d since this history b e c o m e s t h e history o f t h e w o r l d : is it possible o r n o t to assume the n o n - f o u n ­ dation o f t h e history o f t h e world? T h i s m e a n s : is it possible t o make history, t o begin again a h i s t o r y — o r H i s t o r y itself-—on the basis o f its n o n - f o u n d a ­ t i o n ? " (CW, 81). It is this lack o f g r o u n d , this r e - b e g i n n i n g and thus this u n d e cidable, that N a n c y reveals as h e writes, " I n this way, p h i l o s o p h y always insti­ tutes itself in a m i x t u r e o f decision a n d indecision w i t h respect to its o w n subject; and ' d e c o n s t r u c t i o n ' in s u m is c o n g e n i t a l for it since it constructs itself o n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g that it m u s t b e a n t e r i o r to its edifice and even to its o w n p l a n " (CW, 83). T h e b e g i n n i n g o n w h i c h N a n c y d w e l l s — w h i c h is n e i t h e r the only o n e n o r t h e last o n e — i s that o f philosophy as a t e c h n o l o g y oElogos. It is this absence o f b e g i n n i n g and " e x h a u s t i o n o f e n d s " that constitutes the " d e n a t u r a t i o n " o f history and o f m e a n i n g . H i s t o r y is d e n a t u r e d t o t h e e x t e n t that it n o l o n g e r has a natural b e g i n ­ n i n g o r an e n d . " T r u t h — t h e t r u t h o f p h i l o s o p h y and o f h i s t o r y — c a n d o n o t h i n g else, h e n c e f o r t h , t h a n o p e n o n t o t h e abyss of its o w n b e g i n n i n g , o r o f its o w n absence o f b e g i n n i n g , e n d , a n d g r o u n d " (CW, 8 2 ) . T h e r e is c o n s e q u e n d y n o e n d , n o b e g i n n i n g , n o future, a n d n o possible a n t i c i p a t i o n . have

been

thought

through

to

such

an

extent

that

they

20

have

Ends been

" e x h a u s t e d " in t h e process. It is perhaps in t h e obsession o f p h i l o s o p h y w i t h t h e p r o b l e m a t i c o f ends that t h e e n d loses any significance, as metaphysics accomplishes itself b y w i e l d i n g technology. N a n c y explains as m u c h in his i n t e r v i e w r e c o r d e d in t h e film Der Ister w h e n h e states that technology, l a c k ­ i n g its o w n e n d , infinitely strives for an e n d , thereby erasing t h e m e a n i n g o f 2

e n d as s u c h . '

15

The Creation of the World o r

Globalization

V O n the basis of this b e g i n n i n g w i t h o u t principles o r ends, and its attendant technology o f logos, h u m a n s are themselves expressed or fabricated in t e c h n o ­ logical m o d e s . " T h e r e is a m o v e m e n t that is c o n t e m p o r a r y to h u m a n b e i n g s — technology as h u m a n , quite simply, Homo fiber,

p r o d u c e r and conceiver o f

Homo sapiens, technician of itself" (CW, 86). As history is d e n a t u r e d by a t e c h ­ nology o f logos, so is the h u m a n being, as can be seen particularly in the c o n ­ t e m p o r a r y ethos of biopolitics and b i o p o w e r . N a n c y states that the expression biopolitics designates the order o f a p o l i ­ tics devoted to the m a n a g i n g a n d c o n t r o l o f life. Nancy's text draws, in this respect, o n Tlie History of Sexuality

Volume I: An Introduction, by M i c h e l F o u ­

c a u l t . - Foucault w r i t e s o f t h e focus o n the b o d y in t h e seventeenth century, a focus o n the discipline and " e x t o r t i o n " o f t h e b o d y "as a m a c h i n e , " and o n t h e biological processes (HS, 1 3 9 ) . T h e s e t w o foci constitute a "biopolitics of the pop­ ulation," a " b i p o l a r t e c h n o l o g y — a n a t o m i c a n d b i o l o g i c a l " w h o s e " h i g h e s t function was perhaps n o l o n g e r to kill b u t to invest life t h r o u g h and t h r o u g h " (HS, 139). Further, for Foucault, this " b i o p o w e r " was an i m p o r t a n t p r e c u r s o r to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f industrial capitalism, w h i c h " w o u l d n o t have b e e n p o s ­ sible w i t h o u t t h e controlled insertion o f bodies i n t o t h e m a c h i n e r y o f p r o ­ d u c t i o n and t h e adjustment o f t h e p h e n o m e n a o f p o p u l a t i o n to e c o n o m i c processes" (HS, 141).These bioprocesses a n d c o n d i t i o n s w e r e facilitated by t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f socializing institutions, " ( t h e family a n d t h e army, schools and the police, individual m e d i c i n e , and t h e administration o f collective b o d i e s ) " (HS, 1 4 1 ) . T h e s e institutional t e c h n i q u e s c u l m i n a t e in the c o n j u n c t i o n o f b i o ­ logical and political existence. Politics and power, as biopolitics and b i o p o w e r , p e r m e a t e , control, and transform every level and aspect o f lived e x p e r i e n c e . It is this idea o f t h e p e r m e a t i o n and control o f life by t h e technologies o f b i o p o l ­ itics and p o w e r that N a n c y discusses. N a n c y states that, except for the n e e d for further investigations into t h e p r e m o d e r n forms o f biopolitics, h e has " n o t h i n g to add to this [Foucault's] his­ torical thesis" (CW, 93). H e asserts, in c o n c e r t w i t h Foucault, that "natural life" is " h e n c e f o r t h inseparable from a set o f conditions that are referred to as ' t e c h ­ nological' and w h i c h constitute w h a t must rather b e n a m e d ecotechnology w h e r e any k i n d o f ' n a t u r e ' develops for us (and by us). . . . It is in this c o n t e x t that a 'biopolitics' is possible, since it is defined by a technological m a n a g e m e n t o f life" (CW, 94). It is clear that for the m o s t part N a n c y shares Foucault's t h i n k ­ i n g in this c o n t e x t , i n c l u d i n g the view that "politics (still assigned to the State) progressively takes for its object the controlled m a n a g e m e n t o f natural life."' However, N a n c y challenges Foucault in the sense that h e asks w h e t h e r it is s i m -

16

Translators' Introduction ply the case that "life" is t h e object o f a controlling power. F o r Nancy, "life" does n o t offer a sufficiendy philosophical problematic. "I believe it necessary h o w e v e r to ask if'life' truly constitutes t h e object (real o r imaginary, is n o t the issue n o w ) o f these p o w e r s , o r if it is n o t rather is a destinal figure ('race' o r 'the h u m a n worker') that c o m e s to substitute for the classical figures o f sovereignty. T h e r e d u c t i o n o f these figures to 'life' is n o t sufficient to g r o u n d their political a n d affective p o w e r " (CW, 9 4 ) .

23

N o n e t h e l e s s , N a n c y emphasizes that, " w h a t forms a world today is exacdy the c o n j u n c t i o n o f an u n l i m i t e d process o f e c o - t e c h n o l o g i c a l enframing and o f a vanishing o f t h e possibilities o f forms o f life a n d / o r o f c o m m o n g r o u n d " (CW, 95). M i c h a e l H a r d t and A n t o n i o N e g r i also address Foucault's w o r k in a s i m i ­ lar vein, in their b o o k Empire. H a r d t and N e g r i e c h o Nancy's treatment o f F o u ­ cault's philosophy a n d his critical t h i n k i n g o f t h e sovereign state o f e x c e p t i o n from w h i c h the w o r l d is controlled. Significandy, w h a t is " c r e a t e d " from this sovereign position o f t h e E m p i r e is a " c o n t r o l that extends t h r o u g h o u t the depths o f t h e consciousnesses a n d bodies o f the p o p u l a t i o n — a n d at the same t i m e across the entirety o f social relations" (E, 24). H e n c e , it can b e said that the sovereign creation o f life as techne by biopolitics is a w o r k of death. ( N a n c y speaks i n this regard o f a "total destruction [biological, ecological, ethological e n g i n e e r i n g ] " [CW, 89].) H a r d t a n d N e g r i state that w i t h biopolitics " p o w e r is n o w exercised t h r o u g h m a c h i n e s that direcdy organize t h e brains (in c o m m u ­ nication systems, m o n i t o r e d activities, etc.) towards a state o f a u t o n o m o u s alienation from t h e sense o f life and t h e desire for creativity" (E, 2 3 ) .

24

Follow­

i n g t h e section in Tlie Creation of the World that addresses biopolitics, N a n c y addresses t h e "sovereign" position from w h i c h the eco-technological enfram­ i n g o f h u m a n life operates.

VI Nancy's problematic w i t h respect to the question o f sovereignty is developed in t h e section o f t h e text entitled "JBc Nihilo Summum

( O f Sovereignty)." In that

chapter, N a n c y endeavors to d r a w t h e c o n t o u r s of sovereignty, c o n t o u r s that are, as h e puts it, o u t l i n e d " a r o u n d a hollow." S u c h a sovereignty, w h i c h he c o n ­ trasts w i t h d o m i n a t i o n a n d mastery, w o u l d b e an "anti-sovereignty," a k i n d o f "negative sovereignty," o r a "sovereignty w i t h o u t sovereignty." T h a t negative sovereignty is i n d e e d m a r k e d by a hollow, a h o l l o w that marks the absence o f any theological foundation, t h e withdrawal o f substantiality and subjectivity— o n e thinks here o f his earlier w o r k o n Tlie Retreat of the Political—in t h e very

17

The Creation of the World o r institution of sovereignty.

25

Globalization

It also marks the n o t h i n g from w h i c h , ex nihilo, sov­

ereignty is exercised, as it is n o l o n g e r f o u n d e d o n a n y t h i n g b u t itself a n d its o w n creation, its o w n self-institution. "Instituting sovereignty," N a n c y insists, " c a n n o t b e itself instituted. B e t t e r still, there is n o t , in a general way, an insti­ t u t e d sovereignty: contradictio in adjecto" (CW, 1 0 7 ) . T h e sovereign, thus, "is the existent w h o depends o n nothing." Indeed, N a n c y contrasts an atheological sovereignty from traditional theologico-political sovereignty, stressing that the sovereign has n o substantiality whatsoever, that it is based o n n o t h i n g : its exer­ cise "supposes that n o t h i n g either precedes it o r supercedes it, that n o a u t h o r ­ ity o r instituting force has b e e n exercised before it. Sovereignty is the e n d o f any political t h e o l o g y " (CW, 99). T h e sovereign is n o t h i n g except for w h a t it creates. T h e invention of sovereignty is n o t " t h e secularized transcription o f a political theology b u t the creation o f an atheological assumption," N a n c y writes evocatively. Because o f this d e t a c h m e n t from any g r o u n d , sovereignty is to be t h o u g h t o f in terms of the exception to the law o f w h i c h Carl S c h m i t t spoke. " T h e same c o n d i t i o n that ensures that sovereignty receive its c o n c e p t also deprives it o f its power: that is, the absence o f s u p e r i o r o r foundational authority. For the sover­ eign a u t h o r i t y m u s t be essentially o c c u p i e d w i t h f o u n d i n g itself o r w i t h over­ c o m i n g itself in o r d e r to legislate p r i o r to or in excess o f any law. In a rigorous sense, the sovereign foundation is infinite, o r rather sovereignty is never founded. It w o u l d , rather, b e defined by the absence o f foundation o r p r e s u p ­ p o s i t i o n " (CW, 103). This is w h y the exercise o f sovereignty takes place entirely u n d e r the c o n d i t i o n of the "state o f e x c e p t i o n " w h e r e laws are suspended, betraying the fundamental illegitimacy o f sovereignty as the c o n d i t i o n o f legit­ imacy having to legitimize itself. It is the exceptional position o f sovereignty as a source o f law, control, and power—itself outside the l a w , " p r i o r to o r in excess of any law"—-that holds Nancy's attention. H e seeks to interrogate the n o n substantial source from w h i c h the sovereign operates, w h e t h e r a medieval suzerain, an early m o d e r n sovereign, o r a singular existence, as a site from w h i c h 2

the creation o f a w o r l d could ensue. '' N a n c y undertakes a historical and philosophical analysis o f the sovereign's situation of e x c e p t i o n from w h i c h a "sovereign" operates, by d r a w i n g a dis­ tinction

b e t w e e n a suzerain and a sovereign.The suzerain in the medieval w o r l d

was connected to a lineage—from G o d to t h e eldest (even o n e w h o is deceased) to the suzerain. T h e sovereign, o n Nancy's account, is detached, free to create the law and free to rule from above. It is absolute in t h e sense that it has n o relation, n o measure and n o equivalence to a n y t h i n g o r anyone. T h i s p r o b l e m a t i c o f such an e x c e p t i o n a l sovereignty is also central to M i c h a e l H a r d t a n d A n t o n i o N e g r i ' s Empire. F o r H a r d t and N e g r i , t h e t r a n -

18

Translators' Introduction s c e n d e n t sovereign is an a m o r p h o u s " E m p i r e " that has n o b o u n d a r i e s , limits, o r particular t e r r i t o r i e s . T h e y assert that t h e r e is n o c e n t e r for the E m p i r e . T h e E m p i r e "suspends history a n d t h e r e b y fixes t h e states o f affairs for e t e r ­ n i t y " (E, xiv). Nancy's t r e a t m e n t (as well as that o f H a r d t and N e g r i ) o f sovereignty is also e c h o e d in t h e w o r k o f G i o r g i o A g a m b e n w h o has focused o n the e x c e p t i o n o f 21

t h e sovereign in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.

A g a m b e n , in p a r ­

ticular, reminds us o f the crucial link b e t w e e n the c o n c e p t o f t h e state o f e x c e p ­ tion and the political t h e o r y o f t h e n o t e d G e r m a n j u r i s t Carl Schmitt. F o r it was S c h m i t t w h o , in his text Political Tlieology, explicitly equated the sovereign w i t h the state o f e x c e p t i o n , stating that the "Sovereign is he w h o decides o n t h e exception.'"* For A g a m b e n , this state o f e x c e p t i o n means that t h e sovereign p o w e r operates, as it w e r e , outside o f o r above the law. It is the only and absolute law, as A g a m b e n explains: " T h e state of e x c e p t i o n is n o t a special k i n d o f law (like the law o f war); rather, insofar as it is a suspension o f the juridical o r d e r itself, it defines law's threshold o r limit c o n c e p t " (SE, 4). T h i s c o n t e m p o r a r y discussion a b o u t "sovereignty" b e t w e e n Nancy, A g a m ­ b e n , a n d N e g r i and H a r d t , does n o t s p r i n g from s o m e arcane historical i n t e r ­ est b u t o u t o f a concernful e n g a g e m e n t w i t h Schmitt's corpus and the sover­ eign excesses that it seems to have justified and enabled. A g a m b e n shows, for example, that, following Schmitt's w o r k s in the 1920s and early 1930s, " t h e Nazis spoke o p e n l y o f a gewollte Ausnahmezustand,

a 'willed state of exception,"

for t h e p u r p o s e o f establishing t h e N a t i o n a l Socialist S t a t e ' " (SE, 3). In Tlie Concept of the Political, S c h m i t t defines politics in terms o f a conflict b e t w e e n 2 J

friend and enemy, o r t h e " f r i e n d - e n e m y constellation," as h e d u b b e d it. ' In the same text, S c h m i t t speculates that t h e f r i e n d - e n e m y distinction can be applied to a domestic c o n t e x t , in w h i c h the g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d identify its o w n p e o ­ ple, o r s o m e g r o u p o f its citizens, as t h e e n e m y (CP, 32). H e p r o p o u n d s that "[e]very state provides, therefore, s o m e k i n d o f formula for the declaration o f an internal e n e m y " (CP, 46). In Legality and Legitimacy, Schmitt thematizes, in a matter-of-fact m a n n e r , that the p r i m a r y effect o f the legal possession of p o w e r lies in t h e " p r o p e r use o f t h e extraordinary powers in the state o f exception."

30

T h e state o f e x c e p t i o n o f w h i c h S c h m i t t spoke, and that the Nazis wielded, was provided and legitimized b y Article 4 8 o f t h e W e i m a r C o n s t i t u t i o n . Article 48 (Measures d u r i n g the disturbance o f security and order) provides that

the President can utilize the necessary measures to restore public security and order, if necessary with the aid of armed force. For this purpose he may pro­ visionally suspend, in whole or in part, the basic rights established in Articles 114,115,117,118, 123, 124,153. (LL, 103)

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The Creation of the World o r

Globalization

T h e "basic rights" established in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, 153 included such matters as personal freedoms, domicilic sovereignty, freedom o f expression, peaceful assembly, a n d others. Schmitt's theoretical reservations a b o u t the viability o f parliamentary d e m o c r a c y and e m p h a t i c legitimation o f the state o f e x c e p t i o n played all t o o well into t h e hands o f A d o l p h H i d e r . In fact, H i n d e n b u r g used Article 48 to suspend civil liberties after the February 27, 1933, R e i c h s t a g fire. H i d e r t h e n m o v e d to tighten his grip o n power.

31

Hitler outlawed his m a i n political opposition and p u s h e d b o t h the Enabling Acts (March 2 3 , 1933) and the N u r e m b e r g Laws t h r o u g h parliament. T h u s , t h r o u g h legal means and parliamentary procedures Hitler m a n e u v e r e d himself i n t o a "state o f e x c e p t i o n " provided by Article 48 and so t h o r o u g h l y t h e m a tized by Schmitt, thus assuming absolute power. T h e e n g a g e m e n t by Nancy, A g a m b e n , a n d H a r d t and N e g r i o f Carl Schmitt's c o n c e p t o f the political and his f o r m u l a t i o n o f a state o f e x c e p t i o n , that is to say, a state o f e x c e p t i o n by w h i c h a g o v e r n m e n t declares its o w n cit­ izens to be t h e e n e m y and assumes e m e r g e n c y p o w e r s and takes action to eliminate the threat,

32

can also be read against the b a c k g r o u n d o f Jacques D e r -

rida's seminal essay, " T h e Force o f Law."

33

F o r it is in this text that D e r r i d a

addresses, a m o n g o t h e r topics, S c h m i t t a n d his relation t o N a t i o n a l Socialism. It is also in this text that D e r r i d a raises the question o f t h e ethics o f d e c o n struction and its relation to responsibility and justice. N a n c y ' s e n g a g e m e n t of the question o f t h e exceptional sovereign stands against this backdrop, w h i l e he provides his o w n interpretation. His i n t e n t i o n is, in t h e e n d , to explore t h e undecidable resources o f the position and t h e action o f t h e sovereign. N a n c y explores the e x t e n t to w h i c h the position o f the sovereign o r t h e subject o f the sovereign could be the p e o p l e , as in the case o f a participatory democracy. H e writes:

The sovereign people possesses nothing less and nothing more than the absolute monarch: namely, the very exercise of sovereignty. This exercise is nothing other than the establishment of the State and of its law, or of the law that makes a State. It supposes that nothing either pre­ cedes it or supercedes it, that no authority or instituting force has been exer­ cised before it. (CW, 99; our emphasis) It is this resource o f t h e sovereign (with t h e p r o m i s e o f t h e sovereignty of t h e people) that N a n c y ' s project offers for further q u e s t i o n i n g . N a n c y emphasizes that t h e sovereign is related o n l y to itself a n d creates itself a l o n g w i t h any of its institutions. H e w r i t e s , " T h e sovereign does n o t find a sover­ eignty that is given: it m u s t c o n s t i t u t e it and thus c o n s t i t u t e itself as sover-

20

Translators' Introduction e i g n " ( C W , 100) F o r N a n c y , t h e n , t h e sovereign is thus in a state o f exception, w h e t h e r m o n a r c h , p e o p l e , o r singularity. T h r o u g h his analysis, N a n c y seeks to approach t h e very possibility o f sov­ ereignty as t h e nonsubstantial place from w h i c h a n o t h e r b e g i n n i n g , a n o t h e r creation, a n o t h e r w o r l d (or a w o r l d anew) could ensue. In Tlie Creation of the World, N a n c y advances u p o n his proposition in Tlie Sense of the World that the loss o f t h e theological sovereign o p e n s the possibility of a n e w sense o f politics, and raises t h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w t h e sense o f b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n can m a k e itself "sovereign in a n e w w a y " (SW, 9 1 ) . T h i s n e w way could b e formulated as fol­ lows: T h e sovereign is based o n n o t h i n g : " n o finality, n o o r d e r o f p r o d u c t i o n o r subjection, w h e t h e r it c o n c e r n s the agent o r t h e patient o r the cause o r the effect. D e p e n d e n t o n n o t h i n g , it is entirely delivered over to itself, insofar as precisely, the "itself" n e i t h e r precedes n o r founds it b u t is the nothing, the very t h i n g from w h i c h it is s u s p e n d e d " (CW, 103). Nancy's t h i n k i n g w i t h respect to this possibility o f a n e w sense o f politics and justice is further developed in t h e c o n c l u d i n g section o f the b o o k , e n t i d e d "Cosmos

Basileus" a tide that implies that a w o r l d o r cosmos issues its o w n

m e a n i n g from its o w n a u t o - c o n s t i t u t e d and therefore u n g r o u n d e d sovereignty.

VII N a n c y insists t h a t t h e w o r l d is subject to n o authority, arising ex nihilo. H e also marks that t h e u n i t y o f t h e w o r l d r e m a i n s diverse, m u l t i p l e . In this respect, h e is able to claim that, " T h e s h a r i n g o u t [partage] o f t h e w o r l d is t h e l a w o f t h e w o r l d . T h e w o r l d d o e s n o t have any o t h e r law, it is n o t s u b m i t t e d to any a u t h o r i t y , it does n o t have any s o v e r e i g n " ( C W , 109). T h e law o f t h e w o r l d is thus s h a r i n g , a n d this d i s t r i b u t i o n , r e p a r t i t i o n , o r a t t r i b u t i o n i n h e r ­ e n t in s h a r i n g o p e n s t h e q u e s t i o n a n d space o f j u s t i c e , t h e p r o p e r o r a p p r o ­ p r i a t e a t t r i b u t i o n t o e a c h . " T e r r i t o r i a l place, n o u r i s h m e n t , a d e l i m i t a t i o n o f rights a n d duties: t o e a c h a n d each t i m e as a p p r o p r i a t e . " Justice is c o - e x t e n ­ sive w i t h t h e s h a r i n g o f t h e w o r l d a n d t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p a r t o f each s i n g u ­ larity (justice designates w h a t m u s t b e r e n d e r e d , restituted, r e t u r n e d , given i n r e t u r n t o each singular existent). N o w , this s h a r i n g , j u s t like t h e w o r l d , is n o t given. Similarly, j u s t i c e is n o t given, b u t to create; t h e r e lies t h e struggle for j u s t i c e . N a n c y had already emphasized in Tlie Inoperative Community

that m e a n i n g

is a n d can only b e as shared o u t . However, as inoperative as the c o m m u n i t y may be, t h e t e r m community itself still suggested a c o h e r e n c e (the " c o m m o n " ) that N a n c y a t t e m p t e d to deconstruct. H e n c e t h e c u r r e n t text, Tlie Creation of the

21

Tlie Creation of the World o r

Globalization

World, shifts from the vocabulary o f " c o m m u n i t y " to a t h i n k i n g o f the w o r l d in t e r m s o f the singularity o f creation as w o r l d - f o r m i n g . Yet there are crucial elements in the Inoperative Community i n Tlie Creation of the World o r Globalization.

that are present

In Tlie Inoperative Community,

if

using the t e r m community, N a n c y was challenging the i m m a n e n c e o f c o m ­ monality, o r o f a c o m m u n i t y of essence, as he t e r m e d it. To address this threat o f i m m a n e n c e , associated w i t h the threat o f totalitarianism, N a n c y has recourse to Heidegger's Mitsein, b e i n g - w i t h , and being-toward-death, as a m o d e o f finitude that is expressed in Dasein's radical singularity. For Nancy, w h a t b e i n g - w i t h a n d b e i n g - t o w a r d - d e a t h reveal is a sharing [portage] of singular existences. " T h e sharing itself is n o t a c o m m u n i o n . . . n o r even a c o m m u n i c a t i o n as this is u n d e r s t o o d to exist b e t w e e n subjects. B u t these singular beings are themselves constituted by sharing, they are distributed a n d placed, o r rather spaced, by the sharing that makes t h e m others" (IC, 25). For Nancy, in Tlte Inoperative Community, c o m m u n i t y is composed of singular existences that "share" their singularity in their being toward death.

"Community"

he writes, "does not sublate thefinitude it exposes. Community itself, in sum, is nothing but this exposition" (IC, 26). Such finite singularities are exposed to each other. C o m ­ munity is the co-sovereignty of singular beings. T h e exposition of singularity is w h a t is " c o m m u n i c a t e d " (IC, 29). B u t this communication is not, N a n c y insists, a b o n d . Singularities are given w i t h o u t c o m m u n i o n and w i t h o u t b o n d (ibid.). For Nancy, this m u t u a l exposure o f the singularities is an undecidable t e n ­ sion from w h i c h t h e struggle for t h e creation o f w o r l d m u s t u n f o l d . T h a t s t r u g ­ gle, in its singularity and the infinitely finite e n a c t m e n t o f possible beginnings, is n o t h i n g less than, for Nancy, the c o n d i t i o n and definition o f justice. To create the world means: immediately, without delay, reopening each pos­ sible struggle for a world, that is, for what must form the contrary of a global injustice against the background of general equivalence. But this means to conduct this struggle precisely in the name of the fact that this world is com­ ing out of nothing, that there is nothing before it and that it is without mod­ els, without principle and without given end, and that it is precisely what forms the justice and the meaning of a world. (CW, 54—55) T h e suppression o f such a creation o f m e a n i n g , o f " e a c h possible struggle for a world," w o u l d constitute injustice. This openness to n e w beginnings, n e w creations, n e w worlds, is contrasted by N a n c y w i t h the " u n w o r l d " of the t e c h ­ nology wielded by metaphysics and globalization. N a n c y thematizes a w o r l d that is always already u n d e r f o r m a t i o n a n d concludes that justice w o u l d b e a w o r l d that is constituted by this inexhaustible creation o f m e a n i n g .

22

Translators' Introduction In an a t t e m p t to o p p o s e t h e e m p i r i c m a c h i n e o f eco-technology, t h e n , N a n c y offers the sovereignty o f t h e world. N a n c y suggests that the sovereignty o f t h e world—Cosmos Basileus—reveals

t h e excess o f life w i t h respect to c o n ­

trolled m a n a g e m e n t . B u t w h a t is ultimately at stake w i t h this sovereign w o r l d in opposition to the control of b i o - p o w e r is justice. For Nancy, the creation o f t h e w o r l d (as a subjective genitive) is literally the w o r k o f justice. As w o r l d forming, the w o r l d is justice-in-act. T h i s justice is a justice that is appropriate, a justice that is d u e . W h a t is appropriate to singularities in their being? T h e ulti­ m a t e measure o f appropriateness is exposure o f singularities to o n e another. N a n c y writes: But existence is nothing other than being exposed: expulsed from its simple self-identity and from its pure position, exposed to the event, to creation, thus to the outside, to exteriority, to multiplicity, to alterity, and to alteration. (In a sense, certainly, this is nothing other than being exposed to being itself, to its own "being" and also, consequendy, being exposed as being: exposition as the essence of being.) (CW, 110) Justice h a p p e n s i n t h e singular-plural expositions o f existences

and

remains an inappropriable that is shared o u t by each b u t irreducible to a p a r ­ ticular o r a w h o l e . N a n c y asserts in this respect that "[jjustice r e n d e r e d to the singular plural is n o t simply a d e m u l t i p l i e d o r diffracted justice. It is n o t a u n i q u e justice i n t e r p r e t e d a c c o r d i n g to perspectives o r subjectivities—and nonetheless it remains t h e same justice, equal for all a l t h o u g h irreducible and insubstitutable from o n e to the o t h e r " (CW, 6 1 ) . T h i s is an infinite justice, c o n ­ sequently, w h i c h m u s t b e r e n d e r e d b o t h t o t h e p r o p r i e t y o f each a n d t h e i m p r o p r i e t y c o m m o n to all: r e n d e r e d to b i r t h and to d e a t h , w h i c h h o l d b e t w e e n t h e m t h e infinity o f m e a n i n g . T h e w o r l d w o u l d b e t h e justice o f each creation for m e a n i n g . Justice w o u l d b e a w o r l d constituted by this i n e x ­ haustible creation o f m e a n i n g . T h i s does n o t m e a n , however, that justice o r m e a n i n g c a n n o t b e achieved, b u t m e a n s that each time it is enacted and each t i m e it remains to b e created o r re-created. In his essay " T h e Force o f Law," D e r r i d a suggested that deconstruction responds to a sense o f responsibility w i t h o u t limits and is always "already engaged by this infinite d e m a n d of justice . . ." (FL, 19). D e r r i d a is c o n c e r n e d w i t h the aporia o f law, an aporia w h e r e b y t h e establishment of a law, that is to say t h e exercise o f the right to m a k e law, abrogates the next act o f lawmaking. A n d the subsequent act must o v e r c o m e the previous (FL, 36). T h e act of l a w m a k i n g always involves an o t h e r and cuts w i t h violence against the other. B u t for D e r ­ rida deconstruction allows us to recognize the instability and undecidability in

23

The Creation of the World o r

Globalization

the law and justice that renders it always " t o c o m e , " a " t o c o m e " that w o u l d imply o n g o i n g interpretation and re-creation. For Nancy, this freedom of a sovereign creation of m e a n i n g is at its core radically undecidable. H e writes o f " t h e insatiable a n d infinitely finite exercise that is the b e i n g in act o f m e a n i n g b r o u g h t forth in the w o r l d [mis an monde]" (CW, 55). It is the measure o f t h e resources o f Nancy's philosophical w o r k that the text explores the dimensions o f this undecidability o f creations, o f such "infinitely finite" beginnings. S u c h is the resource o f the undecidable: any b e g i n n i n g could n o t be the only b e g i n n i n g o r the last. N a n c y opens a space of interrogation b e t w e e n at least t w o beginnings: o n the o n e hand, the self-begin­ n i n g o f philosophy that denatures history and h u m a n i t y (globalization), and, o n the o t h e r hand, the possibility o f o t h e r beginnings that enact the w o r l d o f j u s ­ tice t h r o u g h the plurality o f b e g i n n i n g s . Nancy's articulation of the u n d e c i d ­ ability o f beginnings opens a space for t h e reflection o n a b e g i n n i n g that w o u l d lead to the creation of a w o r l d s y n o n y m o u s w i t h justice. As a b o o k , Tlie Creation of the World o r Globalization

enacts the singular and

plural beginnings that N a n c y associates w i t h justice. T h e b o o k is i n d e e d o r g a ­ nized a r o u n d separate sections in w h i c h N a n c y himself begins again, a nouveau, w i t h each discussion.The plural b e g i n n i n g s in the text,"LMn et Orfc/',""Of C r e ­ ation," " C r e a t i o n as D e n a t u r a t i o n : Metaphysical Technology," " N o t e o n the T e r m Biopolitics','"Ex

Nihilo Suminum

( O f Sovereignty)," a n d "Cosmos

Basileus"

each enact a performative portrayal o f singular plural beginnings. Section I ("Urbi et Orbi"), for example, evokes t h e beginnings o f t h e Christian world, o n the o n e hand, and a Marxist worldview, o n the other, as N a n c y speculates o n these dimensions o f the b e c o m i n g - w o r l d o f the world. T h e creation p o r t e n d e d by M a r x was a w o r l d that is n o t b e y o n d the w o r l d b u t a w o r l d " i n fact," i n s o ­ far as it is created "each time," a w o r l d that is outside of representation and w i t h o u t G o d , as discussed earlier. •

And if our world is neither necessary nor contingent, or if it is both at once, what does that mean? More generally, how does one disentangle oneself from this conceptual couple? Perhaps by considering a fact without referring it to a cause (neither efficient nor final).The world is such a fact: it may well be that it is the only fact of this kind (if it is the case that the other facts take place within the world). It is a fact without reason or end, and it is our fact. (CW, 45) As n o t e d earlier, w h a t is central to t h e singularity o f t h e plural b e g i n n i n g s is that the beginnings o r creations c o m e from a n o t h i n g that arises, as h e emphasizes, " w i t h o u t - r e a s o n " a n d grows " o f / f r o m n o t h i n g " : in this first sec­ tion, w h a t is at stake is n o t seizing t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n w i t h M a r x b u t the

24

Translators' Introduction creation of t h e w o r l d . T h i s straggle for creation is, N a n c y writes, "precisely what forms the justice a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a w o r l d " (CW, 55). Following this b e g i n n i n g o f the t e x t , " Urbi et Orbi" N a n c y begins again in t h e second section, " O f Creation," w i t h an e n g a g e m e n t w i t h Kant, t h r o u g h Lyotard, o f t h e relation o f j u d g m e n t to beginnings and ends. M o r e precisely, N a n c y is c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends, a b o u t w h a t is never a c t u ­ ally given in advance, b u t constitutes the e r u p t i o n o f t h e n e w and t h e u n p r e ­ dictable. F o r Nancy, Kant's Critique of Judgment presents us w i t h yet a n o t h e r c r e ­ ation paradigm and is intrinsic to t h e philosophical project: its birth certificate: " T h e j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends o r a b o u t t h e end, a b o u t a destination o r a b o u t a m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r l d is t h e e n g a g e m e n t o f a philosophy (or a b o u t w h a t o n e calls a "life") ever since an e n d is n o t given: this is the birth certificate o f p h i ­ losophy and o f o u r so-called ' W e s t e r n ' o r ' m o d e r n ' history" (CW, 59). Reflective j u d g m e n t , for its part, is considered by N a n c y as a m o d e in w h i c h a w o r l d is n o t c o n s t r u c t e d b u t created. Reflective j u d g m e n t is the j u d g ­ m e n t o f a particular for w h i c h n o c o n c e p t exists. B u t m o r e i m p o r t a n t than the claim that the universal is n o t given in t h e reflective j u d g m e n t , is the r e c o g n i ­ tion that w h a t is actually missing is n o t t h e c o n c e p t o f a reality, b u t t h e very existence o f that reality as given. T h e issue is thus n o t to construct, b u t to c r e ­ ate. N a n c y w r i t e s : The "Idea," to use this Kantian-Lyotardian lexicon, is no longer a concept used in an analogical or symbolic mode outside of the limits of possible expe­ rience or of given intuition. It is no longer a concept without intuition, han­ dled by virtue of something that substitutes for a sensible given: it becomes itself the creation of its own scheme, that is to say, of a novel reality, which is the form/matter of a world of ends. (CW, 62) N a n c y thus appropriates this discourse o f reflective j u d g m e n t insofar it points to t h e creation o f t h e w o r l d , u n d e r n o concept, w h e t h e r already given o r to construct. H e n c e , h e seeks to articulate a third form o f j u d g m e n t that w o u l d b e a creation o u t o f t h e n o t h i n g (ex nihilo), a " j u d g m e n t o f a reason to w h i c h is given in advance n e i t h e r end(s) n o r m e a n s , n o r a n y t h i n g that constitutes w h a t e v e r k i n d of'causality k n o w n to u s ' " (CW, 66). Ultimately, N a n c y evokes a j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends w i t h o u t any given criteria, b u t w h i c h is by itself the ethos and praxis o f its o w n finality. S u c h an e x p e r i e n c e , as N a n c y calls it, w o u l d b e an e x p e r i e n c e r e m o v e d from conditions o f possibility, and h e n c e t h e i m p o s , sibility o f e x p e r i e n c e o r e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e impossible o f w h i c h D e r r i d a speaks. As N a n c y asserts, in the book's o t h e r " b e g i n n i n g s " such " C r e a t i o n as D e n a t uration: Metaphysical Technology," "Ex

25

Nihilo Suuimum

( O f Sovereignty)," o r

Tlie Creation of the World o r

Globalization

"Cosmos Basileus," w e are in a time in w h i c h ends have b e e n exhausted, and it is for us to decide, to b e g i n again. W e e n c o u n t e r the position o f the undecidability o f beginnings, as the singular plural existences of the world, stand in relation to creation as "sovereign."We b e l o n g to the world, b u t in an ecstatic and singu­ lar plural manner, described suggestively by Giorgio A g a m b e n as a state o f "ecstasy belonging, " the "topological structure of the state o f e x c e p t i o n " (SE, 35). S u c h a "topological structure" entails, for A g a m b e n "being-outside

and yet

34

belonging" (SE, 3 5 ) . Perhaps this topological structure articulates the sharing-out o f singular plural existences that is central to Nancy's t h i n k i n g of the w o r l d as justice. Such is the possibility that J e a n - L u c Nancy's Tlie Creation of the World o r Globalization, invites us to think.

26

Author's Prefatory Note to the English Language Edition

N o t e on the Untranslatable

Mondialisation

It is n o t w i t h o u t paradox that in m a n y languages the French t e r m

mondialisa-

tion is quite difficult to translate, a n d that perhaps this difficulty makes it almost "untranslatable" in t h e sense that the t e r m has acquired in t h e recent Vocabulaire europeen des philosophies.This

difficulty lies in t h e fact that the English t e r m glob­

alization has already established itself in t h e areas o f the w o r l d that use English for c o n t e m p o r a r y i n f o r m a t i o n e x c h a n g e ( w h i c h is n o t necessarily symbolic e x c h a n g e ) . T h e r e are therefore at least t w o terms (this b e i n g said w i t h o u t b e i n g able to take into a c c o u n t a considerable n u m b e r o f languages, w h i c h w o u l d i n t r o d u c e a s u p p l e m e n t a r y p e r s p e c t i v e — w h i c h o f course w o u l d b e impossi­ b l e ) — t w o terms to designate t h e p h e n o m e n o n that understands itself o r seeks to b e u n d e r s t o o d as a unification o r as a c o m m o n assumption o f the totality o f t h e parts o f t h e w o r l d in a general n e t w o r k (if n o t a system) o f c o m m u n i c a ­ tion, c o m m e r c i a l exchange, juridical o r political reference points (if n o t values), and finally o f practices, forms, and procedures o f all kinds linked to m a n y aspects o f ordinary existence. T h e French language has used the w o r d mondialisation since the middle o f t h e twentieth c e n t u r y — w h i c h seems to m e slighdy before the t e r m globalization appeared in English. T h e reasons for this neologism should b e studied for their o w n sake. W h a t e v e r those reasons may b e , the c o n n o t a t i o n o f the t e r m mondial­ isation gives it a m o r e concrete tonality than that of globalisation, w h i c h desig­ nates, in French, a m o r e abstract process leading to a m o r e c o m p a c t result: the "global" evokes t h e n o t i o n o f a totality as a w h o l e , in an indistinct integrality.

27

The Creation of the World o r

Globalization

T h u s , there has b e e n in the English globalization the idea o f an integrated total­ ity, appearing for example w i t h the "global village" o f M c L u h a n , w h i l e mondial­ isation w o u l d rather evoke an e x p a n d i n g process t h r o u g h o u t the expanse o f the world of h u m a n beings, cultures, and nations. T h e usage o f either t e r m , o r t h e search for an English translation that w o u l d keep the semantics o f " w o r l d " ' are n o t w i t h o u t a real theoretical i n t e r ­ est: the w o r d mondialisation, by k e e p i n g t h e h o r i z o n o f a " w o r l d " as a space o f possible m e a n i n g for the w h o l e o f h u m a n relations (or as a space o f possible significance) gives a different indication t h a n that o f an enclosure in t h e undif­ ferentiated sphere o f a unitotality. In reality, each o f t h e terms carries w i t h it an interpretation o f the process, o r a w a g e r o n its m e a n i n g a n d future. T h i s also means that it is understandable that mondialisation preserves s o m e t h i n g u n t r a n s ­ latable while globalization has already translated everything in a global i d i o m . J e a n - L u c Nancy, D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 4

28

Author's Prefatory Note to the French Language Edition

" T h e creation o f t h e w o r l d or globalization": the c o n j u n c t i o n must be u n d e r ­ stood simultaneously a n d alternatively in its disjunctive, substitutive, o r c o n ­ j u n c t i v e senses. A c c o r d i n g to t h e first sense: b e t w e e n t h e creation o f t h e w o r l d or global­ ization, o n e m u s t choose, since o n e implies t h e exclusion o f t h e other. A c c o r d i n g to t h e s e c o n d sense: t h e creation of t h e world, in o t h e r words globalization, t h e f o r m e r m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d as the latter. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e third sense: t h e creation o f the w o r l d o r globalization, o n e o r t h e o t h e r indifferendy, leads us to a similar result ( w h i c h remains t o b e determined). T h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f these three senses a m o u n t s to raising t h e same q u e s ­ tion: can w h a t is called "globalization" give rise to a world, o r to its contrary? Since it is n o t an issue o f prophesizing n o r of controlling the future, the question is, rather, h o w to give ourselves (open ourselves) in order to l o o k ahead o f ourselves, w h e r e n o t h i n g is visible, w i t h eyes guided by those t w o t e r m s w h o s e m e a n i n g evades u s — " c r e a t i o n " (up to this p o i n t limited to t h e o ­ logical mystery), " w o r l d - f o r m i n g " [mondialisation] (up to this p o i n t limited to e c o n o m i c a n d technological matters, generally called "globalization").

29

I

Urbi et Orbi

Urbi et orbi: this formulation d r a w n from papal b e n e d i c t i o n has c o m e to m e a n " e v e r y w h e r e a n d a n y w h e r e " in ordinary language. R a t h e r than a m e r e shift in m e a n i n g , this is a g e n u i n e disintegration. T h i s disintegration is n o t simply d u e to t h e dissolution o f t h e religious Christian b o n d that (more o r less) held the "Western w o r l d t o g e t h e r until a r o u n d t h e m i d d l e o f a t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y to w h i c h t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y effectively relinquished its certainties (history, science, c o n q u e r i n g h u m a n i t y — w h e t h e r this t o o k place w i t h o r against ves­ tiges o f Christianity). It is d u e to t h e fact that it is n o l o n g e r possible to i d e n ­ tify either a city that w o u l d b e " T h e C i t y " — a s R o m e was for so l o n g — o r an o r b that w o u l d provide the c o n t o u r o f a w o r l d e x t e n d e d a r o u n d this city. E v e n worse, it is n o l o n g e r possible to identify either the city o r the o r b o f the w o r l d in general. T h e city spreads a n d extends all t h e way to the p o i n t w h e r e , w h i l e it tends to cover t h e entire o r b o f the planet, it loses its properties as a city, and, o f course w i t h t h e m , those properties that w o u l d allow it to be distinguished from a "country." T h a t w h i c h extends in this way is n o l o n g e r properly " u r b a n " — e i t h e r from t h e perspective o f urbanism o r from that of u r b a n i t y — b u t megapolitical, m e t r o p o l i t a n , o r co-urbational, o r else caught in the loose n e t o f w h a t is called t h e " u r b a n n e t w o r k . " In such a n e t w o r k , the city crowds, the hyperbolic a c c u m u l a t i o n o f c o n s t r u c t i o n projects (with their c o n c o m i t a n t demolition) and o f exchanges (of m o v e m e n t s , products, and

information)

spread, and t h e inequality and apartheid c o n c e r n i n g the access to the u r b a n milieu (assuming that it is a dwelling, comfort, and culture), o r these exclusions from the city that for a l o n g t i m e has p r o d u c e d its o w n rejections and outcasts, accumulate proportionally. T h e result can only be u n d e r s t o o d in terms o f w h a t is called an agglomeration, w i t h its senses o f c o n g l o m e r a t i o n , o f piling up, w i t h the sense o f a c c u m u l a t i o n that, o n the o n e h a n d , simply concentrates (in a few n e i g h b o r h o o d s , in a few houses, s o m e t i m e s in a few protected mini-cities) the w e l l - b e i n g that used to b e u r b a n o r civil, w h i l e o n the o t h e r hand, proliferates w h a t bears t h e quite simple a n d unmerciful n a m e of misery. T h i s n e t w o r k cast u p o n the p l a n e t — a n d already a r o u n d it, in t h e orbital b a n d o f satellites along w i t h their d e b r i s — d e f o r m s the orbis as m u c h as the urbs. T h e agglomeration invades and erodes w h a t used to b e t h o u g h t o f as globe and

33

Tlie Creation of the World o r

Globalization

w h i c h is n o t h i n g m o r e n o w than its double, glomus. In such a glomus, w e see the c o n j u n c t i o n o f an indefinite g r o w t h of t e c h n o - s c i e n c e , o f a correlative e x p o ­ nential g r o w t h of populations, o f a w o r s e n i n g o f inequalities o f all sorts w i t h i n these p o p u l a t i o n s — e c o n o m i c , biological, a n d c u l t u r a l — a n d o f a dissipation o f t h e certainties, images, a n d identities o f w h a t the w o r l d was w i t h its parts a n d h u m a n i t y w i t h its characteristics. T h e civilization that has represented the universal a n d reason—also k n o w n as t h e W e s t — c a n n o t even e n c o u n t e r a n d recognize any l o n g e r the relativity o f its n o r m s a n d the d o u b t o n its o w n certainty: this was already its situation t w o centuries ago. (Hegel w r o t e in 1802: " [ T ] h e increasing range o f acquaintance w i t h alien peoples u n d e r the pressure o f natural necessity; as, for example, b e c o m i n g acquainted w i t h a n e w c o n t i n e n t , h a d this skeptical effect u p o n the dogmatic c o m m o n sense o f the E u r o p e a n s d o w n to that time, and u p o n their indubitable certainty a b o u t a mass o f concepts c o n c e r n i n g right a n d truth.")

1

T h i s skepticism, in w h i c h H e g e l saw the fecundity o f t h e destabilization o f dogmatisms today, n o l o n g e r harbors the resource of a future w h o s e dialectic w o u l d advance reason farther, ahead or forward, toward a t r u t h a n d a m e a n i n g o f the world. O n the contrary, it is in the same stroke that the confidence in historical progress weakened, the convergence of k n o w l e d g e , ethics, a n d social w e l l - b e i n g dissipated, and the d o m i n a t i o n o f an e m p i r e m a d e u p o f t e c h n o ­ logical p o w e r a n d p u r e e c o n o m i c reason asserted itself. T h e West has c o m e to encompass the world, a n d i n this m o v e m e n t it dis­ appears as w h a t was supposed to o r i e n t the course o f this world. For all that, up until now, o n e c a n n o t say that any o t h e r configuration o f the w o r l d or any o t h e r philosophy o f the universal a n d o f reason have challenged that course. E v e n w h e n , a n d perhaps especially w h e n o n e d e m a n d s a recourse to the "spir­ itual," unless it is to the " r e v o l u t i o n " (is it so different?), the d e m a n d betrays itself as an e m p t y wish, having lost all pretense o f effective capacity, or else as a shameful escape—and even w h e n it does n o t appear as a s u p p l e m e n t a r y m e a n s of exploiting the conditions created by t h e e c o n o m i c a n d technological exploitation. (To take w h a t is "positive" o f t h e West a n d to infuse it w i t h s o m e ­ t h i n g n e w — " v a l u e s " — o n the basis of an African, Buddhist, Islamic,Taoist, p e r ­ haps supra-Christian o r s u p r a - c o m m u n i s t soul, such has b e e n for a l o n g time the sterile t h e m e of m a n y a dissertation . . . ) . T h e world has lost its capacity to "form a w o r l d " [faire monde]: it seems only to have gained that capacity o f proliferating, to the extent o f its means, the " u n 2

w o r l d " [immonde], which, until now, a n d whatever o n e m a y think of retrospective illusions, has never in history impacted the totality of the orb to such an extent. In the end, everything takes place as if the world affected and permeated itself w i t h a death drive that soon w o u l d have n o t h i n g else to destroy than the world itself.

34

Urbi et Orbi It is n o t a question o f " w e i g h i n g i n " for o r leaning toward either the destruction o r t h e salvation. For w e d o n o t even k n o w w h a t either can signify: n e i t h e r w h a t a n o t h e r civilization o r a n o t h e r savagery arising o u t o f the ruins o f t h e West m i g h t be, n o r w h a t could b e "safe/saved" w h e n there is n o space outside o f t h e e p i d e m i c (in this respect, A I D S is an exemplary case, as are c e r ­ tain epizootic diseases o n a n o t h e r level: t h e scale o f t h e world, o f its t e c h n o l o ­ gies and o f its habitus, brings t h e terror o f t h e plagues o f t h e past to i n c o m ­ mensurable heights). T h e fact that t h e w o r l d is destroying itself is n o t a hypothesis: it is in a sense the fact from w h i c h any t h i n k i n g o f t h e w o r l d follows, to t h e point, however, that w e d o n o t exacdy k n o w w h a t " t o destroy" means, n o r w h i c h w o r l d is destroying itself. Perhaps only o n e t h i n g remains, that is to say, o n e t h o u g h t w i t h s o m e certainty: w h a t is taking place is really h a p p e n i n g , w h i c h m e a n s that it happens a n d h a p p e n s t o us in this way m o r e than a history, even m o r e than an event. It is as if b e i n g itself—in w h a t e v e r sense o n e understands it, as exis­ tence o r as substance—surprised us from an u n n a m a b l e b e y o n d . It is, in fact, the ambivalence o f the u n n a m a b l e that makes us anxious: a b e y o n d for w h i c h n o alterity can give us t h e slightest analogy. It is thus n o t only a question o f b e i n g ready for the e v e n t — a l t h o u g h this is also a necessary c o n d i t i o n o f t h o u g h t , today as always. It is a question o f o w n ­ ing u p to t h e present, i n c l u d i n g its very w i t h h o l d i n g o f t h e event, including its strange absence o f presence: w e m u s t ask a n e w w h a t the w o r l d wants o f us, and w h a t w e w a n t o f it, e v e r y w h e r e , in all senses, urbi et orbi, all over the w o r l d and 3

for t h e w h o l e w o r l d , w i t h o u t (the) capital o f t h e w o r l d b u t w i t h t h e richness o f t h e world. Let us b e g i n w i t h a lengthy citation to w h i c h w e must give o u r sustained attention: In history up to the present it is certainly an empirical fact that separate indi­ viduals have, with the broadening of their activity into world-historical activ­ ity, become more and more enslaved under a power alien to them (a pressure which they have conceived of as a dirty trick on the part of the so-called world spirit [Weltgeist], etc.), a power which has become more and more enor­ mous and, in the last instance, turns out to be the world market. But it is just as empirically established that, by the overthrow of the existing state of soci­ ety by the communist revolution (of which more below) and the abolition of private property which is identical with it, this power, which so baffles the German theoreticians, will be dissolved; and that then the liberation of each single individual will be accomplished in the measure in which history becomes transformed into world history. From the above it is clear that the

35

The Creation of the World o r

Globalization

real intellectual wealth of the individual depends entirely on the wealth of his real connections. Only then will the separate individuals be liberated from the various national and local barriers, be brought into practical connection with the material and intellectual production of the whole world and be put in a position to acquire the capacity to enjoy this all-sided production of the whole earth (the creation of man).

4

T h i s text from The German Ideology dates from the time that is considered, n o t w i t h o u t reason, as that o f the " e a r l y " M a r x : h e nevertheless formulates w h a t was his conviction to the e n d according to w h i c h " c o m m u n i s m " is n o t h i n g o t h e r than the actual m o v e m e n t o f w o r l d history insofar as it b e c o m e s global a n d thus renders possible, a n d perhaps necessary, the passage to consciousness a n d enjoyment o f h u m a n creation in its entirety by all h u m a n beings. H u m a n beings w o u l d henceforth b e freed from w h a t limited the relation in w h i c h they mutually p r o d u c e themselves as spirit a n d as body. In o t h e r words, it was his conviction that h u m a n i t y is defined b y the fact that it produces itself as a whole—-not in general, b u t according to t h e c o n c r e t e existence of each, a n d n o t in the e n d only h u m a n s , b u t w i t h t h e m the rest o f nature. This, for M a r x , is t h e world: that o f the m a r k e t m e t a m o r p h o s i n g itself o r revolutionalizing itself in reciprocal a n d m u t u a l creation. W h a t M a r x will define later as "individual property," that is to say, neither private n o r collective, will have to b e precisely the property o r t h e p r o p e r o f each as b o t h created a n d creator w i t h i n this shar­ ing o f "real relations." T h u s , for M a r x , globalization a n d t h e d o m i n a t i o n o f capital converge in a revolution that inverts the direction [sens] o f d o m i n a t i o n — b u t w h i c h can d o so precisely because the global d e v e l o p m e n t o f the m a r k e t — t h e i n s t r u m e n t and the field o f play of capital—creates in a n d o f itself the possibility o f reveal­ ing the real c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n existences as their real sense. T h e c o m m o d i t y form, w h i c h is the fetishized f o r m o f value, must dissolve itself, sublimate or destroy itself—in any case revolutionize itself, w h a t e v e r its exact c o n c e p t — i n its t r u e form, w h i c h is n o t only t h e creation o f value b u t value as creation.Transcribed in terms closer to o u r c u r r e n t linguistic usage (if w e retain t h e distinc­ tion

5

of senses b e t w e e n "globalization" [globalisation]

[mondialisation]—a

and "world-forming"

distinction that s o m e t i m e s in France in particular e n c o m ­

passes t w o usages o f the same w o r d mondialisation—these

semantic c o m p l e x i ­

ties are the indicators of w h a t is at stake): globalization makes w o r l d - f o r m i n g possible, by way o f a reversal o f global d o m i n a t i o n consisting in the e x t o r t i o n of w o r k , that is, of its value, therefore o f value, absolutely. B u t if globalization has thus a necessity—the necessity that M a r x designated as the "historical p e r ­ f o r m a n c e " o f capital a n d that consists in n o t h i n g o t h e r than t h e creation by the

36

Urbi et Orbi m a r k e t o f the global d i m e n s i o n as s u c h — i t is because, t h r o u g h t h e i n t e r d e p e n ­ d e n c e of the e x c h a n g e o f value in its m e r c h a n d i s e - f o r m ( w h i c h is t h e form o f general equivalency, m o n e y ) , the i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n o f everyone in the p r o d u c ­ tion o f h u m a n i t y as such c o m e s i n t o view. If I m a y focus even m o r e o n this p o i n t : c o m m e r c e engenders c o m m u n i ­ cation, w h i c h requires c o m m u n i t y , c o m m u n i s m . O r : h u m a n beings create the w o r l d , w h i c h p r o d u c e s t h e h u m a n , w h i c h creates itself as absolute value and e n j o y m e n t [jouissance] o f that value. C o n s e q u e n d y , the " c o m m u n i s t r e v o l u t i o n " is n o t h i n g o t h e r than the accession o f this global c o n n e c t i o n to consciousness and t h r o u g h it t h e libera­ tion o f value as t h e real value o f o u r c o m m o n p r o d u c t i o n . It is t h e b e c o m i n g conscious and t h e mastery in act o f t h e self-production o f h u m a n beings in the twofold sense o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f h u m a n quality ("total humanity," free p r o ­ d u c e r o f freedom itself) and o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f each by the others, all by each a n d each by all ("total humanity," as circulation o f value freed from equivalence, circulation o f t h e value that responds to t h e h u m a n b e i n g itself, each time sin­ gular, and perhaps also t o others, o r t o all o t h e r existents as singular). Certainly, each o f t h e determinative concepts o f this interpretation o f the history o f the w o r l d appears to us today as w h a t w e k n o w to b e its fragility: process, consciousness, t h e possibility o f u n c o v e r i n g a value a n d an end in itself. W e could n o t e that these concepts are n o t those u p o n w h i c h M a r x constructs his a r g u m e n t explicidy: they rather s u b t e n d his a r g u m e n t . B u t w h a t diminishes their role also reveals their u n c o n t r o l l e d and h i d d e n presence. W h a t e v e r the case, s o m e t h i n g remains nonetheless, in spite o f everything, s o m e t h i n g resists a n d insists: there remains, o n t h e o n e h a n d , precisely w h a t happens to us and sweeps over us b y t h e n a m e o f "globalization," namely, the exponential g r o w t h o f the globality (dare w e say glomicity) o f the m a r k e t — o f the circulation of everything in t h e f o r m of c o m m o d i t y — a n d w i t h it of t h e increasingly c o n ­ centrated i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e that ceaselessly weakens independencies a n d sover­ eignties, thus w e a k e n i n g an entire o r d e r o f representations o f b e l o n g i n g ( r e o p e n i n g t h e question o f the " p r o p e r " and o f "identity"); a n d there remains, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e fact that t h e e x p e r i e n c e u n d e r g o n e since M a r x has increasingly b e e n the e x p e r i e n c e that t h e place o f m e a n i n g , o f value, and o f t r u t h is t h e world. W h o e v e r speaks o f " t h e w o r l d " r e n o u n c e s any appeal to " a n o t h e r w o r l d " o r a " b e y o n d - t h e - w o r l d " [outre-monde]. " W o r l d - f o r m i n g " also m e a n s , as it does in this text from M a r x , that it is in " t h i s " world, o r as " t h i s " world'—and thus as the world, absolutely—that w h a t M a r x calls p r o d u c t i o n a n d / o r the creation o f humanity, is b e i n g played o u t / ' O u r difference w i t h h i m nonetheless reappears o n this very point: w i t h h i m , " h u m a n " implicidy remains a teleological o r eschatological t e r m , if w e

37

The Creation of the World or

Globalization

understand by that a logic w h e r e t h e telos a n d / o r the eschaton take the position and the role o f an a c c o m p l i s h m e n t w i t h o u t remainder. For M a r x , the h u m a n being, as source and a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f value in itself, c o m e s at the e n d o f his­ tory w h e n it produces itself: the source must therefore e n d entirely spread o u t and accomplished. For us, o n the contrary, " t h e h u m a n b e i n g " is reduced to a given principle, relatively abstract ("person," "dignity") and as such distinct from an actual creation. In t r u t h , it is t h e figure o f " t h e h u m a n b e i n g " and w i t h it the configuration o f " h u m a n i s m " that are erased o r blurred w h i l e w e have, at the same time, the m o s t compelling reasons n o t to replace t h e m w i t h (the fig­ ures of) " t h e o v e r m a n " o r " G o d . " It is, however, n o t certain that w i t h M a r x the teleo-eschatological logic is so stricdy geared toward the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of a final value. In a sense, it is even the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f such a finality that remains lacking in M a r x (if the absence o f a finality is a lack at all . . . ) — a n d this is perhaps w h a t p r o d u c e d all sorts o f m y t h - p r o d u c i n g interpretations. In Marx's entire text, n o t h i n g d e t e r ­ mines, in the end, any a c c o m p l i s h m e n t except as, essentially o p e n a n d w i t h o u t end, a freedom ("free labor") and a "private p r o p e r t y " (that w h i c h is p r o p e r to each in the exchange o f all). B u t w h a t , since M a r x , has nonetheless r e m a i n e d unresolved [en souffrance]—and w e k n o w w h a t "suffering" m e a n s here—is p r e ­ cisely the grasping o f a concrete w o r l d that w o u l d be, properly speaking, the w o r l d of the p r o p e r freedom and singularity o f each a n d o f all w i t h o u t claim to a w o r l d b e y o n d - t h e - w o r l d or to a surplus-property (in a n o t h e r capital). Q u i t e to the contrary, the w o r l d w h i c h , for M a r x , could be the space o f the play of freedom and o f its c o m m o n / s i n g u l a r a p p r o p r i a t i o n — t h e infinity in act o f p r o p e r e n d s — o n l y appears to us as a bad infinite, if n o t as the i m m i n e n c e o f a finishing that w o u l d be the implosion o f t h e w o r l d and o f all of us in it. A t this point, it is necessary to clarify the nature o f absolute value in itself: the o n e that M a r x designates as " v a l u e " p u r e and simple, n o t a use-value o f w h i c h exchange-value exploitation.

is t h e p h e n o m e n a l

mask and social e x t o r t i o n

or

7

M u c h attention is usually given to " c o m m o d i t y fetish," the c o n c e p t a n d / o r representation o f w h i c h are certainly i m p o r t a n t ; b u t this also risks fetishizing this "fetishism" and risks m a k i n g it the o p e n secret o f c o m m o d i t y . N o w w e must distinguish t w o perspectives: the first is that o f the p h e n o m e n a l i t y o f value (of " m e a n i n g " o r o f " t h e h u m a n " ) , a p h e n o m e n a l i t y that t h e "fetish" can m a k e us forget (by r e d u c i n g it to a religious mystification)" that it probably pertains to a general law according to w h i c h value o r m e a n i n g can o n l y be ( r e p r e ­ sented,' even if n o t stricdy speaking "fetishized." T h e o t h e r perspective—the only o n e I will consider here—is the o n e that m u s t consider value as such, t h e " t h i n g in itself" b e h i n d the p h e n o m e n o n . '

38

0

Urbi et Orbi Absolute value is, in fact, h u m a n i t y i n c o r p o r a t e d in the p r o d u c t t h r o u g h w o r k as h u m a n w o r k . It is thus h u m a n i t y p r o d u c i n g itself by p r o d u c i n g objects (or, I will r e t u r n to this, creating itself by p r o d u c i n g ) . " B u t w h a t is h u m a n i t y ? W h a t is t h e w o r l d as t h e p r o d u c t of human beings, a n d w h a t is t h e h u m a n b e i n g insofar as it is in the world a n d as it works this world? W h a t is the "spiritual r i c h n e s s " o f w h i c h M a r x speaks, w h i c h is n o t h i n g o t h e r than t h e value o r m e a n i n g o f h u m a n labor as h u m a n , that is t o say, also, "free," b u t free to t h e e x t e n t that it is t o itself its o w n e n d a n d that therefore it is n e i t h e r value m e a s u r e d a c c o r d i n g t o its use n o r value giving itself as general equivalency (/( too is its own end, b u t abstract a n d formal, a finality for itself...)? that is n e i t h e r

finalized

W h a t is a value

n o r simply equivalent t o itself? W h a t is a " h u m a n

v a l u e " toward w h i c h t h e w o r k refers, o r w h o s e trace it bears, w i t h o u t h o w ­ ever signifying it and w i t h o u t c o v e r i n g it w i t h a mystical veil? (This question, w e n o t e , a m o u n t s to asking: W h a t is h u m a n value considered at a level b e y o n d t h e reach o f " h u m a n i s m " ? ) . '

2

Perhaps by c o n s i d e r i n g its inverted figures o n e can approach this value. O n S e p t e m b e r 1 1 , 2 0 0 1 , w e witnessed t h e collision, in the s y m p t o m and symbol o f the clash, b e t w e e n t h e U n i t e d States (summarized in t h e n a m e , heavy w i t h m e a n i n g , o f " W o r l d Trade C e n t e r " ) and Islamic fanaticism, t w o

figures

of

absolute value that are a l s o — n o t s u r p r i s i n g l y — t w o figures o f m o n o t h e i s m . O n t h e o n e hand, the G o d w h o s e n a m e is inscribed o n the dollar, and o n the other, t h e G o d in w h o s e n a m e o n e declares a " h o l y war." O f course, b o t h G o d s are instrumentalized. B u t I neglect here t h e e x a m i n a t i o n o f the instrumental logic that is latent, at least, i n every religion. It remains that these t w o figures p r o c e e d from t h e same u n i q u e G o d (or from t h e same O n e taken as G o d ) and expose t h e enigmatic sameness o f t h e O n e that is, n o d o u b t , always self-destructive: b u t self-destruction is a c c o m p a n i e d b y self-exaltation and an over-essentialization. Let us keep in m i n d in any case that these t w o figures present absolute value as ail-powerfulness and as all-presence o f this ail-powerfulness. Value is therefore first itself instrumentalized therein: it serves the reproduction o f its o w n power, indefinitely, t h r o u g h spiritual o r m o n e t a r y capitalization.Value has value t h r o u g h this endless autistic process, and this infinite has n o o t h e r act than the r e p r o d u c ­ tion o f its potentiality (thus in b o t h senses o f t h e word, p o w e r and potentiality). T h e "bad infinite," following Hegel, is i n d e e d the o n e that cannot be actual." O n the contrary, the e n j o y m e n t o f w h i c h M a r x speaks, implies, as for any enjoy­ m e n t , its actuality, that is to say, also the finite inscription o f its infinity. It is n o t p o w e r that wills power, n o r presence that insists in itself, b u t the suspension o f . will, the withdrawal, if n o t the fault, that marks enjoyment as enjoyment o f a t r u t h o r of a sense, o f a "spiritual w e a l t h " o r a " b e a t i t u d e " in Spinoza's sense (that is to say, as an exercise, as t h e act o f a relation to the totality o f m e a n i n g or truth).

39

The Creation of the World o r

Globalization

P o w e r founds itself o n itself as if o n a reason that is always sufficient w i t h respect to its exercise, even if destructive and self-destructive. E n j o y m e n t does n o t give an a c c o u n t of itself. It is in this actuality w i t h o u t reason or e n d (no d o u b t the "free labor" o f w h i c h M a r x spoke) that value can b e i n c o m m e n s u ­ rable, unable to b e evaluated, to the p o i n t o f n o l o n g e r b e i n g a " v a l u e " and b e c o m i n g w h a t t h e G e r m a n calls Wiirde, b e y o n d the Wert, and w h i c h w e trans­ late as "dignity." T h e question posed by the world in formation is this o n e : h o w to d o justice to the infinite in act, of w h i c h infinite potentiality is the exact reverse? W h e n the bad infinite appears to b e clearly w i t h o u t end, completely u n b o u n d (having rid itself o f its teleological h u m a n i s m ) , t h e n this question imposes itself, stark and blinding.To reverse an infinite i n t o another, and p o t e n ­ tiality into act, is w h a t M a r x calls "revolution." It is necessary, in the end, that the w o r l d has absolute value for itself—or else that it has n o value whatsoever, as t h e two forms o f all-powerfulness, w h i c h have n o t h i n g b u t c o n t e m p t for the world, indicate. It is in the e n d necessary that the infinite reason that gives an a c c o u n t o f itself allows the actual w i t h o u t - r e a s o n (or actual existence) to a p p e a r — o r that it liquidates itself in its disastrously i n t e r m i n a b l e process. O n e may assume that the p r o b l e m o f t h e a p p r e h e n d i n g o f the w o r l d (of its absolute value) is posed in the following way: the w o r l d takes place, it h a p ­ pens, and everything seems as if w e did n o t k n o w h o w to a p p r e h e n d it. It is o u r p r o d u c t i o n and o u r alienation. It is n o t an accident if, since M a r x , the " w o r l d " and t h e " w o r l d l y " [le mondial] have r e m a i n e d u n c e r t a i n d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , overly suspended b e t w e e n the finite a n d t h e infinite, b e t w e e n a n e w and f o r m e r world, b e t w e e n this world and an o t h e r : in short, o n e may assume that the " w o r l d " has fallen short o f w h a t it should be, o f w h a t it can be, perhaps of w h a t it already is, in s o m e way that w e have n o t yet d e t e r m i n e d . A n d it is probably d u e as well to the fact that " t h e w o r l d " has b e e n secondary to the c o n c e p t of a w o r l d " v i e w " (it was n o accident that a Weltanschauung played by accident a major political and ideological role in Nazism). It is as if there was an intimate c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n capitalistic d e v e l o p m e n t and the capitalization o f views o r pictures o f t h e w o r l d (nature + history + progress + consciousness, etc.—all " v i e w s " gathered in a picture w h o s e c o m p o s i t i o n h e n c e f o r t h is b l u r r e d and runs o n the canvas). A w o r l d "viewed," a represented w o r l d , is a w o r l d d e p e n d e n t o n the gaze of a subject o f t h e w o r l d [sujet du monde].A

subject o f the w o r l d (that is to say

as well a subject o f history) c a n n o t itself b e w i t h i n the w o r l d [etre dans le monde]. Even w i t h o u t a religious representation, such a subject, implicit o r explicit, p e r ­ petuates the position of the creating, organizing, a n d addressing G o d (if n o t the addressee) of the world.

40

Urbi et Orbi A n d yet, remarkably, there is n o n e e d o f a prolonged study to notice that, already in the most classical metaphysical representations o f that G o d , n o t h i n g else was at stake, in t h e end, than the world itself, in itself and for itself. In m o r e than o n e respect, it is legitimate to say that the great transcendent accounts of rationalism elaborated n o t h i n g else than the i m m a n e n t relation o f the world to itself: they questioned the b e i n g - w o r l d o f the world. I only ask, in passing, that o n e reflect o n the sense of "continual creation" in Descartes, o n that of Spinoza's Dens sive natura, o n the "vision in G o d " in Malebranche o r o n the " m o n a d o f m o n a d s " w i t h Leibniz. It w o u l d n o t b e inaccurate to say that the question o f the w o r l d — t h a t is to say, the question o f the necessity and m e a n i n g o f the w o r l d — will have formed the self-deconstruction that u n d e r m i n e s from within o n t o - t h e 1 1

ology. ' It is such a m o v e m e n t that m a d e possible, after Kant w h o was the first to explicidy confront t h e world as such (and, in sum, did n o t h i n g else), n o t only the entry o f the w o r l d into t h o u g h t (as an object o f vision), b u t its emergence as the place, the dimension and actuality, o f thought: the space-time of m e a n i n g and truth. In this respect, Marx's insistence o n the w o r l d — a n insistence that e m p h a ­ sizes b o t h the " w o r l d w i d e " (coexistence) and the "worldly" (immanence)—is itself a decisive advance o f t h e self-deconstructive gesture. (In this respect, and however paradoxical it may seem, it is indeed in Husserl and Heidegger that it continued, and as well as, albeit differendy, in Bergson and Wittgenstein.) In any case, t h e decisive feature o f t h e b e c o m i n g - w o r l d o f t h e w o r l d , as it w e r e — o r else, o f t h e b e c o m i n g - w o r l d o f t h e w h o l e that was formerly a r t i c u ­ lated a n d divided as t h e n a t u r e - w o r l d - G o d triad—is the feature

through

w h i c h t h e w o r l d resolutely and absolutely distances itself from any status as object in o r d e r to t e n d toward b e i n g itself t h e "subject" o f its o w n " w o r l d h o o d " — o r " w o r l d - f o r m i n g . " B u t b e i n g a subject in general m e a n s having to become oneself... In o r d e r t o grasp o n c e m o r e w h a t is at stake in the question of the w o r l d as it presents itself to us in this way, let us consider the question o f the c o n c e p t in its simplest form: W h a t is a world? O r w h a t does " w o r l d " mean? Briefly, I w o u l d say first: a w o r l d is a totality o f m e a n i n g . If I speak o f "Debussy's world," o f " t h e hospital world," o r o f t h e " f o u r t h world," o n e grasps immediately that o n e is speaking o f a totality, to w h i c h a certain meaningful c o n t e n t o r a certain value system properly belongs in the order o f k n o w l e d g e o r t h o u g h t as well as in that o f afFectivity and participation. B e l o n g i n g to such a totality consists in sharing this c o n t e n t a n d this tonality in the sense o f " b e i n g farniliar w i t h it," as o n e says; that is to say, o f a p p r e h e n d i n g its codes and texts, precisely w h e n their reference points, signs, codes, and texts are neither explicit n o r exposed as such. A world: o n e finds oneself in it [s'y trouve] and o n e is familiar w i t h it [s'y retroiwe]; o n e can b e in it w i t h " e v e r y o n e " ["tout \e monde"],

41

The Creation of the World o r

Globalization

as w e say in French. A world is precisely that in w h i c h there is r o o m for every­ o n e : b u t a genuine place, o n e in w h i c h things can genuinely take place (in this world). O t h e r w i s e , this is n o t a " w o r l d " : it is a " g l o b e " o r a " g l o m e , " it is a "land o f exile" a n d a "vale o f tears." F r o m this brief characterization a few implications follow. First, a w o r l d is n o t a unity o f the objective o r external order: a w o r l d is never in front o f m e , o r else it is n o t m y world. B u t if it is absolutely other, I w o u l d n o t even know, o r barely, that it is a world. (For instance, for m e , a few fragments

of Hittite art d o n o t even suggest the world o f that art.) As s o o n as a

w o r l d appears to m e as a world, I already share s o m e t h i n g o f it: I share a part o f its i n n e r resonances. Perhaps this t e r m resonance is capable o f suggesting the issue at hand: a w o r l d is a space in w h i c h a certain tonality resonates. B u t that tonality is n o t h i n g o t h e r than the totality of resonances that the elements, the m o m e n t s , a n d the places o f this w o r l d e c h o , m o d u l a t e , a n d modalize. T h i s is h o w I can recognize a short passage from B a c h o r fromVarese—-but also a frag­ m e n t from Proust, a drawing from Matisse, o r a C h i n e s e landscape. (It can b e n o t e d , provisionally, that it is n o accident that art provides the m o s t telling examples: a w o r l d perhaps always, at least potentially, shares the unity p r o p e r to the w o r k o f art. T h a t is, unless it is the opposite, o r rather, unless the reciprocity b e t w e e n " w o r l d " a n d " a r t " is constitutive of b o t h . T h i s also c o n ­ cerns the Marxist s " e n j o y m e n t " o f universal humanity.) It follows from this that a w o r l d is a w o r l d only for those w h o inhabit it. To inhabit is necessarily to inhabit a w o r l d , that is to say, to have there m u c h m o r e than a place of sojourn: its place, in the strong sense o f the t e r m , as that w h i c h allows s o m e t h i n g to properly take place. To take place is to properly arrive a n d h a p p e n [arriver]; it is n o t to " a l m o s t " arrive and h a p p e n and it is n o t only " a n ordinary occurrence." It is to arrive a n d h a p p e n as p r o p e r a n d to p r o p ­ erly arrive a n d h a p p e n to a subject. W h a t takes place takes place in a w o r l d a n d by way o f that world. A w o r l d is the c o m m o n place o f a totality o f places: o f presences and dispositions for possible events. Presence and disposition: s o j o u r n and c o m p o r t m e n t , these are the senses of the t w o G r e e k words ethos a n d ethos, w h i c h c o n t a m i n a t e each o t h e r in t h e m o t i f of a stand, a "self-standing" that is at t h e r o o t o f all ethics. In a different m a n n e r yet oddly analogous, the Latin t e r m s habitare a n d habitus c o m e from the same habere, w h i c h m e a n s first " s t a n d i n g " and "self-standing," to o c c u p y a place, and from this to possess and to have (habitudo h a d m e a n t a " m a n n e r o f relating to . . . " ) . It is a having w i t h a sense o f being: it is a m a n n e r o f b e i n g there a n d of standing in it. A w o r l d is an ethos, a habitus and an inhabiting: it is w h a t holds to itself a n d in itself, following to its p r o p e r m o d e . It is a n e t w o r k of the selfreference o f this stance. In this way it resembles a s u b j e c t — a n d in a way, w i t h -

42

Urbi et Orbi o u t a d o u b t , w h a t is called a subject is each time by itself a world. B u t the m e a ­ sure o r the m a n n e r o f a w o r l d is n o t that o f a subject if the latter must p r e s u p ­ pose itself as substance o r as p r i o r s u p p o r t o f its self-reference.The w o r l d does n o t presuppose itself: it is only coextensive to its extension as world, to the spacing o f its places b e t w e e n w h i c h its resonances reverberate. (If a subject s u p ­ poses itself, it subjects itself to its supposition. It can thus only presuppose itself as n o t subjected t o any supposition. It is still, n o d o u b t , a presupposition: thus, precisely, w e can say as well that t h e w o r l d presupposes itself as n o t subjected to a n y t h i n g other, a n d that is the destiny o f t h e so-called " m o d e r n " world. W e could thus say that it presupposes itself only, b u t necessarily, as its o w n revolu­ tion: t h e way it turns o n itself a n d / o r turns against itself.) T h u s , t h e m e a n i n g o f the w o r l d does n o t o c c u r as a reference t o s o m e ­ t h i n g external to t h e world. It seems that m e a n i n g always refers to s o m e t h i n g 15

o t h e r than w h a t it is a m a t t e r o f giving a m e a n i n g to (as the m e a n i n g [sens] o f the knife is in t h e c u t t i n g a n d n o t in t h e knife). B u t t h o u g h t in terms o f a world, m e a n i n g refers to n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n to t h e possibility o f the m e a n i n g o f this world, to the p r o p e r m o d e o f its stance [tenue] insofar as it circulates b e t w e e n all those w h o stand in it [s'y tiennent], each time singular and singu­ larly sharing a same possibility that n o n e o f t h e m , any place o r any G o d o u t ­ side o f this world, accomplishes. T h e stance o f a w o r l d is t h e e x p e r i e n c e it makes o f itself. E x p e r i e n c e (the experiri) consists in traversing to the e n d : a w o r l d is traversed from o n e edge to the other, a n d n o t h i n g else. It never crosses over these edges to occupy a place overlooking itself. T i m e has passed since o n e was able to represent the figure of a coswotheoros, an observer o f a world. A n d if this time has passed, it is because the w o r l d is n o l o n g e r conceived o f as a representation. A representation o f the w o r l d , a worldview, m e a n s t h e assigning o f a principle a n d an e n d to t h e world. T h i s a m o u n t s to saying that a w o r l d v i e w is i n d e e d the e n d o f the w o r l d as viewed, digested, absorbed, a n d dissolved in this vision. T h e N a z i

Weltanschau­

ung a t t e m p t e d to answer to absence o f a cosmotheoros. A n d this is also w h y H e i ­ degger in 1 9 3 8 , t u r n i n g against this N a z i s m , exposed the e n d o f the age o f the Weltbilder—images

o r pictures o f t h e world."'

T h e w o r l d is thus outside representation, outside its representation and o f a w o r l d o f representation, a n d this is how, n o d o u b t , o n e reaches t h e most c o n ­ t e m p o r a r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the w o r l d . Already w i t h M a r x , there was an exit from representation that was prescribed by t h e w o r l d as t h e unfolding o f a p r o ­ d u c t i o n o f m e n b y themselves (even if, w i t h M a r x , this p r o d u c t i o n retains fea­ tures o f representation). A w o r l d outside o f representation is above aE a w o r l d w i t h o u t a G o d capa­ ble o f b e i n g t h e subject o f its representation (and thus of its fabrication, o f its

43

The Creation of the World o r

Globalization

m a i n t e n a n c e and destination). B u t already, as I indicated, the G o d o f m e t a ­ physics m e r g e d into a world. M o r e precisely, t h e " G o d " o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y was progressively stripped of the divine attributes o f an i n d e p e n d e n t existence a n d only retained those of the existence of the w o r l d considered in its i m m a n e n c e , that is to say, also in the undecidable a m p h i b o l o g y o f an existence as necessary as it is contingent. Let us recall, for instance, Spinoza's G o d , t h e " i m m a n e n t cause of the world," or Leibniz's G o d , w h i c h created " t h e best o f all possible worlds," that is to say, was limited to b e i n g a reason internal to t h e general order o f things. T h e G o d o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y has p r o d u c e d itself (or deconstructed itself) as subject o f the world, that is, as world-subject. In so d o i n g , it suppressed itself as G o d - S u p r e m e - B e i n g and transformed itself, losing itself therein, in the existence for-itself o f the w o r l d w i t h o u t an outside (neither outside of t h e w o r l d n o r a world from the o u t s i d e ) . T h e speculative Weltgeist m o c k e d by M a r x b e c o m e s — a n d b e c o m e s w i t h M a r x himself—Welt-Geist

o r Geist-Welt:

no

l o n g e r "spirit o f w o r l d " b u t rather world-spirit o r spirit-world. F r o m this very fact, the existence o f the w o r l d was at stake as absolute exis­ tence: its necessity o r its contingency, its totality o r incompleteness, b e c a m e t h e inadequate terms o f a problem, a p r o b l e m that God's disappearance transformed completely. Correlatively, b e i n g " i n " [dans] the w o r l d could n o longer follow a container topology, any m o r e than the w o r l d itself was found " w i t h i n " s o m e ­ t h i n g o t h e r than itself. This is h o w b e i n g - w i t h i n - t h e - w o r l d has b e c o m e b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d [etre-au-monde].Thi$

[etre-dans-le-monde]

preposition an [in] r e p r e ­

sents, in French, w h a t encapsulates the p r o b l e m of the world. To b e m o r e precise, o n e should add: " w o r l d - f o r m i n g " [mondialisation] was preceded

by

a "world-becoming"

[mondanisation].

This

means

that

the

" w o r l d l y " w o r l d o f Christianity, t h e w o r l d as created and fallen, removed from salvation and called to self-transfiguration, had to b e c o m e t h e site o f b e i n g a n d / o r beings as a w h o l e , r e d u c i n g the o t h e r w o r l d therein. B u t , as w e will see, it is from the feature o f " c r e a t i o n " that an inscription is thus transmitted to t h e global w o r l d — w h i l e the internal d e m a n d o f a transfiguration is transferred to the " w o r l d l y " world. For the m o m e n t , w e could say: w o r l d - b e c o m i n g engages a displacement o f value, and w o r l d - f o r m i n g a displacement o f p r o d u c t i o n . B u t n e i t h e r aspect of the process is a m e r e "secularization" o f the theological: it is c o m p l e t e displacement o f the stakes. T h e w o r l d does n o t replay the roles o f t h e theological script for its o w n p u r p o s e : it displaces everything in a n o t h e r script, w h i c h precisely lacks a scene that is given or laid o u t in a d v a n c e . " This brief metaphysical excursus only has a very specific function here: that o f s h o w i n g that " t h e world," in o u r philosophical tradition, has c o m e t o b e identified firsdy w i t h the totality o f beings that l o n g e r refers logically to any o t h e r b e i n g (to n o o t h e r world: for a G o d distinct from the w o r l d w o u l d be

44

Urbi et Orbi a n o t h e r world), and secondly, identified w i t h the question, enigma o r the m y s ­ tery o f the raison d'etre o f such a totality. If it is necessary w i t h o u t b e i n g the effect o f a superior reason (or will), w h a t is that necessity? B u t if it is n o t n e c e s ­ sitated by anything, isn't it t h e n c o n t i n g e n t ? — a n d in this case w h e r e does the fortuitous errancy o f this existence go? A n d if o u r w o r l d is neither necessary n o r contingent, o r if it is b o t h at once, 1

w h a t does that mean? M o r e generally, h o w does o n e disentangle oneself from this conceptual couple? Perhaps b y considering a fact w i t h o u t referring it to a cause (neither efficient n o r final).The w o r l d is such a fact: it may well be that it is t h e only fact o f this k i n d (if it is the case that the o t h e r facts take place w i t h i n the world). It is a fact w i t h o u t reason or end, and it is o u r fact.To think it, is to think this factuality, w h i c h implies n o t referring it to a m e a n i n g capable o f appropriating it, b u t to placing in it, in its t r u t h as a fact, all possible m e a n i n g . Marx's text cited earlier can b e replaced w i t h i n the h o r i z o n of this p r o b ­ lematics in several ways. It is first possible to see in these lines the reflection o f a sort o f inverted o n t o - t h e o l o g y , w h e r e t h e i m m a n e n t cause o f a world exist­ i n g in itself eternally (like t h e m a t t e r of/from w h i c h it is m a d e : o n e should l o o k h e r e at Marx's studies o n E p i c u r e a n materialism) is the p r o d u c t i o n o f h u m a n ­ ity itself represented as t h e final and total a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f self-production (total m a n w o u l d almost b e the accomplished self-production o f m a t t e r as the c o n d i t i o n and force o f p r o d u c t i o n ) . B u t it is also possible—and it is even in s o m e respect necessary—to interpret it differendy: indeed, if the p r o d u c t i o n o f total h u m a n i t y — t h a t is, global humanity, o r the p r o d u c t i o n o f the h u m a n i z e d w o r l d — i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f the "sphere o f freedom," a freedom that has n o o t h e r exercise t h a n t h e " e n j o y m e n t o f the m u l t i m o r p h i c p r o d u c t i o n o f the entire world," t h e n this final p r o d u c t i o n d e t e r m i n e s n o g e n ­ u i n e end, n o r telos o r eschaton. It is i n d e e d n o t d e t e r m i n e d by the self-concep­ t i o n o f h u m a n i t y and o f world, b u t rather by a b e y o n d o f p r o d u c t i o n itself, here named "enjoyment." E n j o y m e n t — i n w h a t e v e r way o n e wants to understand it, and w h e t h e r o n e stresses a sexual c o n n o t a t i o n (by b o r r o w i n g from a Lacanian problematic o f t h e "real," if y o u will, s o m e t h i n g I d o n o t w a n t to explore further here) o r by stressing the S p i n o z i s t i joy, o r mystical " u n i o n " (are these t w o senses that different? It is n o t certain . . . ) — e n j o y m e n t , therefore, is w h a t (if it " i s " and if it 1

is " s o m e t h i n g " ) " maintains itself b e y o n d either having o r b e i n g in the same way that it unfolds b e y o n d o r before activity and passivity. B y identifying this e n j o y m e n t o f the global p r o d u c t i o n o f humanity, M a r x . indicates an excess w i t h respect t o p r o d u c t i o n as well as w i t h respect to p o s ­ session (and this is perhaps that very t h i n g w h i c h h e tried to call later " i n d i ­ vidual property," o n c e again, n e i t h e r private n o r collective). N o t e — a troubling

45

Tlie Creation of the World o r

Globalization

circumstance—-that such an excess o f e n j o y m e n t (and e n j o y m e n t is excessive or it is n o t enjoyment) constitutes s o m e t h i n g like the exact parallel o f profit that is the law o f capital, b u t a parallel that inverts the sign o f surplus-production. This is the case in the sense that the e x t o r t i o n o f surplus-value profits from the value created by t h e w o r k to deposit it in the a c c o u n t o f t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n in general equivalency (according to t h e law of an indefinite addition, the p r i n c i ­ ple o f w h i c h is also excessive, b u t an excess w h o s e raison d'etre is accumulation, t h e e n d / g o a l b e i n g to indefinitely r e p r o d u c e t h e cycle o f p r o d u c t i o n and alien­ ation). In that sense e n j o y m e n t w o u l d b e shared a p p r o p r i a t i o n — o r appropriat­ ing s h a r i n g — o f w h a t c a n n o t be accumulated o r w h a t is n o t equivalent, that is, o f value itself (or o f meaning) in t h e singularity o f its creation. B u t sharing sin­ gularity (always plural) means to configure a w o r l d , a quantity of possible worlds in the world. T h i s configuration (features, tones, m o d e s , contacts, etc.) allows the singularities to expose themselves. T h e e x t o r t i o n o r the exposition o f each to the others: the most i m p o r t a n t is n o t to say, " H e r e is the decisive alternative!" (which w e already k n o w ) . W h a t matters is to be able to think h o w t h e proximity o f the two " e x - , " o r this twofold excess is produced, h o w the same w o r l d is divided in this way. In a way, profit and e n j o y m e n t thus placed back to back behave like t w o sides of the infinite: o n the o n e h a n d , the infinite that H e g e l called "bad," the infinite o f the i n t e r m i n a b l e g r o w t h o f accumulation, t h e cycle of investment, o f exploitation and reinvestment (one could say that it is the cycle of infinite wealth as it b e g a n w h e n the w o r l d , b e c o m i n g precapitalistic, c a m e o u t o f t h e order in w h i c h wealth was a c c u m u l a t e d for its shine rather than for its r e p r o ­ duction),

19

o n the o t h e r h a n d the actual infinite, t h e o n e by w h i c h a finite exis­

tence accedes, as finite, to the infinite o f a m e a n i n g o r o f a value that is its m o s t p r o p e r m e a n i n g and value. I d o n o t at all find it unreasonable to say that this perspective, w h i c h can s e e m perfecdy abstract o r idealistic, distant from harsh reality, is precisely w h a t w o u l d be capable o f diagnosing that w h i c h secredy drives o u r w o r l d insofar as it seems surrendered to an infinitely u n r u l y unleashing o f appetites o f enjoy­ m e n t : s o m e m o v e d by t h e drive o f e x p o n e n t i a l accumulation, others provoked by t h e strategies of p r o d u c t i o n that are subjugated to this drive. U n d e r the u n r u l y unleashing o f the bad infinite (an u n r u l y unleashing r i g h d y called " d e r e g u l a t i o n " in

free-market

thinking!) that regulates itself according to the

indefinite as such, there is a secret desire for t h e actual infinite: a desire for absolute value. N o w it is manifest—it is even w h a t c u r r e n t times render each day m o r e manifest—that n o abstract value, n o equivalence n o r any given r e p ­ resentation o f h u m a n beings o r of w o r l d (or o f a n o t h e r world), can satisfy this expectation. O n e does n o t enjoy the h u m a n b e i n g of h u m a n i s m , or, if y o u p r e -

46

Urbi et Orbi fer, the h u m a n b e i n g o f h u m a n i s m does n o t have j o y : it is par excellence the h u m a n w i t h o u t joy, it does n o t even k n o w tragic j o y (let us say, in o n e w o r d , the j o y o f k n o w i n g oneself to be finite) and it k n o w s n e i t h e r the mystical j o y (that o f effusion) n o r t h e Spinozist and Nietzschean j o y (let us say, the o n e o f k n o w i n g oneself hie et nunc infinite and eternal). H o w can this b e considered in an actual relation w i t h t h e world, o r rather w i t h w h a t happens to us as a dissipation o f the w o r l d in t h e bad infinite o f a "globalization" in a centrifugal spiral b e h a v i n g like the e x p a n d i n g universe described by astrophysics, all t h e w h i l e d o i n g n o t h i n g else than circumscribing the earth m o r e and m o r e in a h o r i z o n w i t h o u t o p e n i n g o r exit? H o w are w e to conceive of, precisely, a w o r l d w h e r e w e only find a globe, an astral universe, o r an earth w i t h o u t sky (or, to cite R i m b a u d and reversing h i m , a sea w i t h o u t a sun)? It at least supposes o n e f o u n d i n g c o n d i t i o n . T h i s c o n d i t i o n is n o t h i n g else t h a n t h e following: it is a m a t t e r o f b e i n g able to take c o m p l e t e l y a n d seriously i n t o a c c o u n t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f world, in a way that has perhaps never taken place in o u r h i s t o r y — b u t for w h i c h o u r history today w o u l d offer t h e possibility. If t h e world, essentially, is n o t the representation of a universe (cosmos) n o r that o f a here b e l o w (a humiliated world, if n o t c o n d e m n e d by Christianity), b u t t h e excess—beyond any representation o f an ethos o r o f a habitus—of

a

stance by w h i c h the w o r l d stands by itself, configures itself, and exposes itself in itself, relates to itself w i t h o u t referring to any given principle o r to any d e t e r ­ m i n e d end, t h e n o n e must address t h e principle o f such an absence o f p r i n c i ­ ple direcdy. T h i s m u s t b e n a m e d t h e " w i t h o u t - r e a s o n " o f the world, o r its absence of g r o u n d . It is n o t a n e w idea to say that the w o r l d is " w i t h o u t rea­ s o n " o r that it is exclusively and entirely its o w n reason. W e k n o w quite well that it is found in Angelus Silesius ("the rose grows w i t h o u t reason"), b u t o n e does n o t always n o t i c e h o w it w o r k s w i t h i n all the great formulations o f the m o s t classical rationalism, i n c l u d i n g and especially w h e n they are trying to find and posit a " p r i n c i p l e o f r e a s o n " for all things.

211

If I say that this t h o u g h t w o r k s w i t h i n t h e consciousness a n d the u n c o n ­ scious o f the West, I m e a n that it is i n d e e d an actual w o r k , transformative and productive o f value—a value that capital is n o t able, in spite of everything, to c o m m o d i t y w i t h o u t remainder: t h e value o f the world, or m o r e precisely the value o f "world," the value o f b e i n g - w o r l d and o f b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d as sig­ nificance o r as a resonance w i t h o u t reason. B u t if capital is n o t able t o absorb all significance in the c o m m o d i t y , a l t h o u g h it aims at n o t h i n g other, that is perhaps also because it does n o t entirely c o m e from the c o m m o d i t y alone: w h a t precedes capital is wealth as

47

Hie Creation of the World o r

Globalization

glitter, the wealth that does n o t p r o d u c e m o r e wealth, b u t w h i c h produces its o w n splendor and its o w n o p u l e n c e as t h e g l o w o f a m e a n i n g i n w h i c h the w o r l d is w r a p p e d (but also blinded and suffocated by its glitter—at the same time that such glitter is captured by the hierarchy). Capital converts the glitter into an accumulation that produces a wealth that is defined by its o w n (re)productivity: in this way, it transforms t h e brilliance into t h e indefinite process of a m e a n i n g that is always to c o m e o r always lost, and s y n o n y m o u s w i t h e n r i c h ­ m e n t . O n e could say that wealth loses in p o w e r o f m e a n i n g w h a t it gains as p o w e r o f accumulation. O n e should never forget that t h e w o r d wealth o r i g i ­ nally designated the order o f p o w e r and greatness, t h e o r d e r o f magnificence in the n o b l e sense o f the t e r m :

21

t h e so-called g r a n d e u r o f the soul, perhaps its

glory and exaltation. O n e can also recall that it is n o accident if the signs o f this spiritual greatness, in the beginnings of the proto-capitalist West, shift from wealth to Christian o r philosophical poverty. In this inversion o f signs and in the h e n c e f o r t h i n t e r m i n a b l y ambivalent relation that t h e West maintains w i t h m o n e y (and c o m m e r c e , finance, etc.), it is n o t only the b e g i n n i n g o f the capitalist transformation o f society that is at stake. It is also the m o r e secret, and tricky m o v e m e n t by w h i c h , in capital, a change in t h e nature of " w e a l t h " is a c c o m p a n i e d by placing g r a n d e u r in reserve (in secret), that is, by placing value in t h e " v a l o r o u s " sense o f the w o r d . Value b e c o m e s b o t h the r e m a i n d e r and the excess o f capital, o r t h e foreign b o d y that weakens and u n d e r m i n e s it from w i t h i n , as t h e o t h e r o f its "political economy," like the s u p e r - e c o n o m y o r a n - e c o n o m y that m u s t reveal its gap a n d its violent d e m a n d there. It is that absolute value o f v a l u e , " and n o t h i n g else, that erupts a n e w in Marx's w o r k . (But this is also why, far from s u b m i t t i n g history, culture and t h e h u m a n ­ ity o f h u m a n beings to an e c o n o m i c causality, and " s u p e r s t r u c t u r e " to "infra­ structure," M a r x analyzes, o n t h e contrary, the way in w h i c h t h e transforma­ tions of v a l u e — t h a t is to say, t h e transformations o f t h e evaluation o f value (or of sense, o r o f t r u t h ) — m a k e e c o n o m i c a n d social transformations possible, etc. In t h e transformations o f t h e evaluation o f value, w h i c h are t h e transforma­ tions o f the p r o d u c t i o n o f the ways o f life, t h e technological and cultural processes are inextricably j o i n e d a n d in reciprocal relation. M a r x did n o t reverse t h e supposed " H e g e l i a n " history from an ideal d e t e r m i n a t i o n to a material d e t e r m i n a t i o n : he suppressed all d e t e r m i n a t i o n s e x c e p t that o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f h u m a n i t y b y itself, a p r o d u c t i o n that is itself precisely d e t e r ­ m i n e d by n o t h i n g other.) Today, wealth as a quantity that can b e capitalized is identical to the infi­ nite poverty of the calculable quantities of the market. B u t that same m a r k e t also produces a g r o w i n g o r d e r o f symbolic w e a l t h — w e a l t h o f k n o w l e d g e and

48

Urbi et Orbi significance such as those w h i c h , despite their submission to c o m m o d i t i e s , m a d e the greatest culture o f m o d e r n times, and such as those w h i c h seem to b e invented today as a giant productivity that disseminates sense (symbols, signs, m o d e s , schemes, r h y t h m s , figures, sketches, codes for all gains a n d losses, in all senses, if I may say so). It could well b e that capital—and perhaps its o w n c a p ­ ital, its head and reserve, t h e primitive a c c u m u l a t i o n o f its o w n sense—appears in its insignificance a n d disseminates in a novel significance, violendy dissemi­ n a t i n g all signification in order to d e m a n d the forcing o r breaching o f a sense yet to b e invented: t h e sense o f a w o r l d that w o u l d b e c o m e rich from itself, w i t h o u t any reason either sacred o r cumulative. T h u s , w e propose a hypothesis w i t h respect to an internal displacement o f t e c h n o l o g y and capital that w o u l d m a k e an inversion o f signs possible: the insignificant equivalence reversed into an egalitarian, singular, and c o m m o n sig­ nificance. T h e " p r o d u c t i o n o f v a l u e " b e c o m e s the "creation o f meaning." T h i s hypothesis is fragile, b u t perhaps it is a m a t t e r o f grasping it, n o t as an a t t e m p t at a description, b u t as a will to act. H o w e v e r , such an inversion o f signs w o u l d n o t remain a simple formal inversion, if t h e "signs" were t h e indexes o f an eval­ uation: it w o u l d b e a m a t t e r o f a general reevaluation, o f an Umwertung

on

w h i c h M a r x and N i e t z s c h e w o u l d finally concur. O n the o t h e r hand, such a possibility m u s t n o t b e t h e object o f a p r o g r a m m a t i c and certain calculation. S u c h certainty o f a p r e d i c t i o n w o u l d i m m e d i a t e l y render t h e Utmuertimg ster­ ile and w o u l d p r e d e t e r m i n e its projects, its representations and, w h y n o t , its party w i t h its operatives

It must b e a possibility o f the impossible (accord­

ing to a logic used often by D e r r i d a ) , it m u s t k n o w itself as such, that is to say, k n o w that it happens also in t h e incalculable a n d t h e unassignable. T h i s does n o t m e a n that t h e possibility o f the impossible remains formal o r constitutes a transcendental w i t h n o relevance to any experience. It must devote itself to b e i n g actual, b u t the a i m o f actuality m u s t take i n t o account, at the same time, a boundless leap outside o f the calculable and controllable reality. After all, the transcendental is also, always, that w h i c h constitutes conditions o f possibility o f e x p e r i e n c e , w h i l e at t h e same time rendering impossible the subject of that experi­ ence as itself an empirical subject. W i l l i n g the world, b u t n o t willing a subject o f the w o r l d (neither substance n o r a u t h o r n o r master), is the only way to escape t h e u n - w o r l d . A n d t h e materialism o f actuality—of the concrete life o f h u m a n b e i n g s — m u s t here conceive o f m a t t e r as impenetrable, namely as the i m p e n e ­ trability o f the t r u t h o f t h e world, t h e " m e a n i n g o f the w o r l d " b e i n g t h e p a s ­ sion o f this t r u t h . It w o u l d thus b e a m a t t e r o f p r o d u c i n g a n d / o r o f allowing for a wealth to b e given that w o u l d b e e n r i c h e d only b y t h e splendor o f such a m e a n i n g and that, in this way, w o u l d also b e "poverty," if this w o r d does indeed designate

49

Tlie Creation of the World o r

Globatization

since the b e g i n n i n g o f the W e s t — n o t by a c c i d e n t — n o t the misery resulting from spoliation, b u t the ethos (and also the pathos), the value o f w h i c h does n o t derive from o w n e r s h i p (of s o m e t h i n g o r o f oneself) b u t in a b a n d o n m e n t . Poverty, o r the b e i n g - a b a n d o n e d — i n all the c o m p l e x ambivalence o f these t w o senses: a b a n d o n e d by and a b a n d o n e d to. ( O n e c o u l d s h o w t h e e m e r g e n c e o f a triple figure o f poverty in this sense: p h i l o s o p h i c a l - G r e e k , Jewish, o r R o m a n . ) T h e three aspects o f wealth w o u l d be: glitter, capital, dissemination, and they w o u l d constitute three m o m e n t s o f the b o d y : the glorious and hieratic b o d y o f the G o d s , the w o r k i n g b o d y subjugated to the speculative spirit, the b o d y exposed to contact w i t h all bodies: a w o r l d o f bodies, a w o r l d o f senses, a world of b e i n g - i H - t h e - w o r l d . B u t it goes w i t h o u t saying that these m o m e n t s d o n o t simply succeed each o t h e r like so m a n y stages of a process, o r like the ages o f t h e world. It is their coexistence a n d their conflict that needs to be t h o u g h t . W h a t is m o s t troubling a b o u t the m o d e r n e n i g m a — f o r specifically this is w h a t constitutes the m o d e r n and w h i c h makes it, for t h e last three centuries, an e n i g m a for itself, w h i c h even defines the m o d e r n as s u c h an enigma, w i t h ­ o u t any n e e d to speak of the " p o s t m o d e r n " — i s that t h e w i t h o u t - r e a s o n c o u l d take the f o r m b o t h o f capital a n d o f the mystical rose that represents the absolute value o f t h e " w i t h o u t - r e a s o n . " O n e could almost be t e m p t e d , even b e y o n d the wildest imaginations o f today's free m a r k e t capitalists, to present t h e rose as t h e ultimate revelation o f the secret o f capital—a revelation that p r o ­ j e c t e d , it is true, until the indefinable e n d o f p e r p e t u a l reinvestment. O t h e r s w o u l d be t e m p t e d — a n d w e all are today, m o r e o r less—-to reveal, o n the c o n ­ trary, that the secret o f the rose and o f capital t o g e t h e r occurs like an u n p r e c e ­ d e n t e d geopolitical, e c o n o m i c , a n d ecological catastrophe, globalization as the suppression o f all w o r l d - f o r m i n g o f the world. It is in all respects n o t only reasonable, b u t also required by the v i g o r a n d r i g o r of t h o u g h t , to avoid recourse to representations: t h e future is precisely w h a t exceeds representation. A n d w e have learned that w e m u s t grasp the w o r l d o n c e m o r e outside of representation. N o w , in o r d e r to distance such t h i n k i n g o f the w o r l d from representation, there is n o better way than this o n e : to grasp t h e " w o r l d " o n c e m o r e according to o n e of its constant motifs in t h e W e s t e r n t r a d i t i o n — t o the e x t e n t that it is also the tradition o f m o n o t h e i s m — n a m e l y , t h e m o t i f o f creation. To appropriate this motif, I m u s t take a preliminary precaution, b u t in an elliptical m a n n e r . " C r e a t i o n " is a motif, o r a c o n c e p t , that w e m u s t grasp o u t ­ side o f its theological c o n t e x t . Let m e indicate h o w this can be d o n e s c h e m a t ­ ically: as I have previously suggested, it is theology itself that has stripped itself o f a G o d distinct from the w o r l d . A t the e n d o f m o n o t h e i s m , there is w o r l d w i t h o u t G o d , that is to say, w i t h o u t a n o t h e r world, b u t w e still n e e d to reflect

50

Urbi et Orbi o n w h a t this means, for w e k n o w n o t h i n g o f it, n o truth, n e i t h e r "theistic" n o r 23

"atheistic"—let us say, provisionally, as an initial attempt, that it is absentheistic.

If " c r e a t i o n " m e a n s anything, it is t h e exact opposite of any f o r m o f p r o ­ d u c t i o n in t h e sense o f a fabrication that supposes a given, a project, a n d a p r o ­ ducer. T h e idea o f creation, such as has b e e n elaborated by the m o s t diverse a n d at t h e same t i m e m o s t c o n v e r g e n t t h o u g h t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e mystics o f t h e three m o n o t h e i s m s b u t also t h e c o m p l e x systems o f all great metaphysics, is above all t h e idea o f t h e ex nihilo (and I d o n o t e x e m p t M a r x from this, to the contrary: w h i l e his u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Christian creation is only instrumental, for h i m value is precisely created . . . ) . T h e w o r l d is created from n o t h i n g : this does n o t m e a n fabricated w i t h n o t h i n g b y a particularly ingenious producer. It m e a n s instead that it is n o t fabricated, p r o d u c e d by n o producer, a n d n o t even c o m ­ i n g o u t of n o t h i n g (like a miraculous apparition), b u t in a quite strict m a n n e r and m o r e challenging for t h o u g h t : the n o t h i n g itself, if o n e can speak in this way, o r rather nothing g r o w i n g [croissant] as something (I say " g r o w i n g " for it is t h e sense o f cresco—to b e b o r n , to g r o w — f r o m w h i c h c o m e s creo: to m a k e s o m e t h i n g m e r g e a n d cultivate a g r o w t h ) . In creation, a g r o w t h grows from n o t h i n g a n d this n o t h i n g takes care o f itself, cultivates its g r o w t h . T h e ex nihilo is t h e g e n u i n e formulation o f a radical materialism, that is to say, precisely, w i t h o u t roots. T h u s , w e can n o w clarify w h a t w e said earlier: if t h e w o r l d - b e c o m i n g (detheologization) displaces v a l u e — m a k e s it i m m a n e n t — b e f o r e w o r l d - f o r m ­ i n g displaces t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f v a l u e — m a k i n g it universal—the t w o t o g e t h e r displace " c r e a t i o n " i n t o t h e " w i t h o u t - r e a s o n " o f the world. A n d this displace­ m e n t is n o t a transposition, a " s e c u l a r i z a t i o n " o f t h e o n t o - t h e o l o g i c a l o r m e t a ­ physical-Christian s c h e m e : it is, rather, its d e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d e m p t y i n g o u t , a n d it o p e n s o n t o a n o t h e r s p a c e — o f place a n d o f r i s k — w h i c h w e have j u s t b e g u n to enter. If t h e w o r l d is the g r o w t h of/from n o t h i n g [croissance de rien]—an expres­ sion of a formidable a m b i g u i t y — i t is because it only depends o n itself, w h i l e this "self" is given from n o w h e r e b u t from itself. B u t it is also because it is the g r o w t h of/from n o t h i n g o t h e r than n o t h i n g , a n o t h i n g that obviously is n o t a p u r e a n d simple nothingness, o n the basis o f w h i c h n o g r o w t h could b e c o n ­ ceived, b u t w h i c h is t h e w i t h o u t - r e a s o n [rien de raison] o f the world. In this sense, t h e " c r e a t i o n " o f the w o r l d is in n o way a representation that is o p p o s e d to t h e representation o f an eternity o f t h e m a t t e r of t h e world. In t r u t h , n o n e o f these things, creation o r eternal matter, are representations, a n d this is w h y they are n o t o p p o s i t e s . T h e eternity o f m a t t e r only means that there is n o t h i n g outside the world, n o o t h e r world, a n d n o space-time that w o u l d n o t b e that o f " o u r " world. T h i s eternity is t h e eternity o f space-time, absolutely. C r e a t i o n

51

Hie Creation of the World o r

Globalization

is t h e g r o w t h w i t h o u t reason of such a space-time. T h e t w o concepts c o r r e ­ s p o n d to each o t h e r at the exact limit o f metaphysics a n d physics: and this limit is n o t o n e that separates two worlds, b u t o n e that shares o u t the indefiniteness o f t h e universe (or the indefiniteness o f its expansion, as c o n t e m p o r a r y c o s ­ m o l o g y has it) and the infinity o f its m e a n i n g . By writing that " t h e sense of the world must he outside the world,"

24

Wittgenstein simultaneously stated two things: that the world in itself does n o t constitute an i m m a n e n c e of meaning, but that, since there is n o other world, the "outside" of the world must b e open "within i t " — b u t open in a way that n o other world could be posited there. This is also w h y Wittgenstein writes further: "It is n o t how things are in the world that is mystical, b u t that it exists" (TLP 6.44, 88). T h e m e a n i n g o f this fact is the m e a n i n g that the w i t h o u t - r e a s o n makes possible. N o w , this means that it is m e a n i n g in the strongest and most active sense of the t e r m : n o t a given signification (such as that o f a creating G o d o r that o f an accomplished h u m a n i t y ) , b u t m e a n i n g , absolutely, as possibility of transmission from o n e place to another, from the o n e w h o sends to the o n e w h o receives, and from o n e e l e m e n t to another, a reference that forms at t h e same time a direction, an address, a value, o r a meaningful c o n t e n t . Such a c o n ­ tent constitutes t h e stance of a world: its ethos a n d its habitus. Clearly, neither m e a n i n g as direction [sens] n o r m e a n i n g [sens] as c o n t e n t is given. T h e y are to be invented each time: w e m i g h t as well say to be created, that is, to create from n o t h i n g and to b r i n g forth that very w i t h o u t - r e a s o n that sustains, drives, a n d forms the statements that are genuinely creative o f m e a n i n g , such as in science, politics, esthetics, and ethics: o n all these registers, w e are dealing w i t h multiple aspects and styles o f w h a t w e could call the habitus o f the m e a n i n g o f the world. (I limit myself to speaking of " s t a t e m e n t s " to remain close to the sphere w h e r e w e situate m e a n i n g m o s t c o m m o n l y ; o n e should also think o f gestures, actions, passions, and formalities, etc. . . . Solidarity, love, music, cybernetics are also m e a n i n g in act.) T h i s does n o t at all m e a n that a n y t h i n g makes sense in j u s t any way: that w o u l d b e precisely the capitalist version o f the w i t h o u t - r e a s o n , w h i c h estab­ lishes the general equivalence o f all forms of m e a n i n g in an infinite uniformity. It signifies o n the contrary that the creation o f m e a n i n g , and w i t h it the enjoy­ m e n t of sense (which is n o t foreign, o n e should n o t e , to the e n j o y m e n t of senses) requires its forms, its inventions o f forms and the forms of its exchange. W o r l d h o o d , in this regard, is the f o r m o f forms that itself d e m a n d s to be c r e ­ ated, that is n o t only p r o d u c e d in the absence o f any given, b u t held infinitely b e y o n d any possible given: in a sense, t h e n , it is never inscribed in a represen­ tation, and nonetheless always at w o r k and in circulation in the forms that are b e i n g invented.

52

Urbi et Orbi O n e could say that w o r l d h o o d is the symbolization

of the world, the way in

w h i c h the world symbolizes in itself w i t h itself, in w h i c h it articulates itself by m a k i n g a circulation o f m e a n i n g possible w i t h o u t reference to a n o t h e r world. O u r task today is n o t h i n g less than t h e task o f creating a form or a s y m ­ bolization o f t h e w o r l d . T h i s seems to us to b e the greatest risk that h u m a n i t y has had to confront. B u t it m a y well b e that it has already d o n e so several times, perhaps even that t h e w o r l d itself has already d o n e so several times. T h i s is n e i ­ ther an abstract n o r purely a formal t a s k — w h e t h e r this w o r d is taken esthetically o r logically. It is t h e extremely c o n c r e t e a n d d e t e r m i n e d task—a task that can only b e a s t r u g g l e — o f p o s i n g the following question to each gesture, each c o n d u c t , each habitus a n d each ethos: H o w d o y o u engage the world? H o w d o you involve yourself w i t h t h e e n j o y m e n t o f the w o r l d as such, a n d n o t w i t h the appropriation o f a quantity o f equivalence? H o w d o y o u give form to a differ­ ence o f values that w o u l d n o t b e a difference o f wealth in terms o f general equivalence, b u t rather a difference o f singularities in w h i c h alone the passage o f a m e a n i n g in general a n d the p u t t i n g i n t o play of w h a t w e call a w o r l d can take place? However, as I m e n t i o n e d , this task is a struggle. In a sense, it is a struggle o f t h e West against itself, o f capital against itself. It is a struggle b e t w e e n t w o infinites, o r b e t w e e n e x t o r t i o n a n d exposition. It is the struggle o f t h o u g h t , very precisely concrete a n d d e m a n d i n g , in w h i c h w e are engaged by the disappear­ ance o f o u r representations o f the abolishing o r o v e r c o m i n g of capital. It d e m a n d s that w e o p e n o r discern in capital a n o t h e r type o r a n o t h e r k i n d of a flaw t h a n w h a t w e u n d e r s t o o d t o b e i n s u r m o u n t a b l e contradictions, and that capital was able to o v e r c o m e , thus o v e r c o m i n g also o u r representations. W e m u s t consider capital in t e r m s o f its h e i g h t a n d p o w e r — i n terms o f its " w e a l t h " and "fortune." T h e m o m e n t has c o m e to expose capital to t h e absence o f reason, for w h i c h capital provides t h e fullest d e v e l o p m e n t : a n d this m o m e n t c o m e s from capital itself, b u t it is n o l o n g e r a m o m e n t o f a "crisis" that can b e solved in t h e course o f t h e process. It is a different k i n d o f m o m e n t to w h i c h w e m u s t give t h o u g h t . B u t such t h i n k i n g is n o t only theoretical: n o w as in the past, it is practi­ cally manifest a n d necessary—in the sense o f the necessity a n d manifestedness o f t h e w o r l d — t h a t the struggle is straightaway and definitively a m a t t e r o f c o n ­ crete equality a n d actual justice. In this sense, Marx's d e m a n d is n o t obsolete. T h e " t h i n k i n g " o f w h i c h w e are speaking is necessarily involved b o t h in the q u e s t i o n i n g o f t h e "sense o f the w o r l d "

23

a n d in i m m e d i a t e , political, e c o n o m i c ,

and symbolic acts. B u t t h e difference b e t w e e n Marx's revolution a n d the o n e in w h i c h w e are perhaps u n d e r w a y w i t h o u t o u r k n o w l e d g e — a n d o f w h i c h a

53

The Creation of the World o r

Globalization

thousand revolts, a thousand rages, a thousand creations o f signs are the flashing indicators—could b e sketched provisionally in the following way: by c o n c e i v ­ ing o f itself as a reversal o f the relation o f p r o d u c t i o n , Marx's revolution p r e s u p ­ posed that this reversal was equivalent to a conversion o f the m e a n i n g o f p r o ­ d u c t i o n (and the restitution o f created value to its creator). W h a t w e have b e g u n to learn is that it is also a matter o f creating the m e a n i n g o r the value o f the reversal itself. O n l y perhaps this creation will have the p o w e r o f the reversal. Further, w h e n M a r x w r o t e that philosophers c o n t e n t e d themselves w i t h interpreting t h e world, a n d that it was h e n c e f o r t h a m a t t e r o f c h a n g i n g it, h e specified n o t h i n g w i t h respect to the relations that the transformation e n t e r ­ tains w i t h the prevailing interpretations: D o t h e f o r m e r suspend the latter? D o the latter d e t e r m i n e , o n the contrary, the former? O r e k e isn't it a m a t t e r o f transforming the relation b e t w e e n t h e m , a n d o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g (that is to say, o f enacting) that m e a n i n g is always in praxis, a l t h o u g h n o practice is limited to enacting a t h e o r y a n d although n o t h e o r y is able to diminish practice? B u t the gap b e t w e e n the t w o is necessary to w h a t is called praxis, that is to say, meaning 2

at work [au travail], o r even truth in the work [a l'ceuvre]. '' This gap is n o t the gap b e t w e e n a n interpretive philosophy a n d a transfor­ mative action, n o r is it the gap b e t w e e n a regulative Utopia a n d a resigned p r a c ­ tice, n o r t h e gap b e t w e e n a f o u n d i n g m y t h a n d the v i o l e n c e that s o u g h t to incarnate it. Indeed, u n d e r the three

figures—interpretation,

Utopia, o r m y t h —

b e n e a t h their differences, the possibility o f a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f t r u t h to a form, o r o f a c o m i n g into presence o f an accomplished m e a n i n g remains p r e s u p ­ posed. B u t the issue, o n the contrary, is t o b e attentive to t h e gap o f m e a n i n g w i t h itself, a gap that constitutes it o r that is its truth. S u c h a gap always places m e a n i n g in excess o r in deficiency w i t h respect to its o w n w o r k . In excess o r in deficiency w i t h respect to its w o r k does n o t m e a n outside o f all labor, b u t m e a n s a labor w h o s e principle is n o t d e t e r m i n e d by a goal o f mastery (domination, usefulness, appropriation), b u t exceeds all submission to an e n d — t h a t is, also exposes itself to r e m a i n i n g w i t h o u t e n d . H e r e it is art that indicates the stakes: the w o r k of art is always also a m e a n i n g at w o r k b e y o n d the w o r k [a I'oeuvre au-dela de I'ceuure], as well as a w o r k w o r k i n g a n d o p e n i n g b e y o n d any m e a n i n g that is either given o r to b e given. B u t t h e o p e n i n g w i t h ­ o u t finality is never a w o r k n o r any p r o d u c t : it is the e n j o y m e n t o f w h i c h M a r x spoke, as e n j o y m e n t by h u m a n beings o f w h a t opens their h u m a n i t y b e y o n d all h u m a n i s m . (This w o r k is n o t w i t h o u t labor, any m o r e than this e n j o y m e n t is w i t h o u t suffering.) To create the world means: immediately, w i t h o u t delay, r e o p e n i n g each p o s ­ sible struggle for a w o r l d , that is, for w h a t m u s t form t h e contrary o f a global injustice against the b a c k g r o u n d o f general equivalence. B u t this means to c o n -

54

Urbi et Orbi d u c t this struggle precisely in the n a m e o f t h e fact that this world is c o m i n g o u t o f n o t h i n g , that there is n o t h i n g before it and that it is w i t h o u t models, w i t h ­ o u t principle and w i t h o u t given end, and that it is precisely what forms the j u s ­ tice and the m e a n i n g o f a world. O n c e again, t o create as a struggle, w h i c h w h i l e struggling—consequendy, by seeking power, by finding forces—does n o t seek t h e exercise o f p o w e r — n o r p r o p e r t y — w h e t h e r collective o r individual, b u t seeks itself and its agitation, itself a n d the effervescence o f its t h o u g h t in act, itself and its creation o f forms and signs, itself and its c o n t a g i o u s c o m m u n i c a t i o n as propagation o f an enjoy­ m e n t that, in t u r n , w o u l d n o t b e a satisfaction acquired in a signification o f the w o r l d , b u t t h e insatiable a n d infinitely finite exercise that is t h e b e i n g in act o f m e a n i n g b r o u g h t forth in the w o r l d [mis an monde].

55

II

1 T h e text that begins here, a n d w h i c h first was given as an h o m a g e to Lyotard, links u p w i t h t h e e x c h a n g e that t o o k place w i t h h i m t w e n t y years ago.' A t the time, t h e issue was a question o f j u d g m e n t , and m o r e precisely: a j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends, c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e secret o r explicit decision that necessarily s u b ­ tends a philosophical gesture, a n d w h i c h constitutes its ethos, t h e decision a b o u t w h a t matters—for e x a m p l e "a world!' a w o r l d " w o r t h y of t h e n a m e " — c a n n o t b e a choice b e t w e e n possibilities, b u t only a n d each t i m e a decision a b o u t w h a t is n e i t h e r real n o r possible: a decision a b o u t w h a t is in n o way given in advance, b u t w h i c h constitutes t h e e r u p t i o n o f t h e new, that is unpredictable because it is w i t h o u t face, a n d thus t h e " b e g i n n i n g o f a series of appearances" by w h i c h K a n t defines freedom in its relation to t h e world. S u c h a decision is a b o u t t h e neither-real-nor-possible, thus, n e i t h e r given n o r representable, b u t i n s o m e way necessary and i m p e r i o u s (like Kantian free­ d o m in its relation t o t h e l a w that it is itself), and consequently it is a violent decision w i t h o u t appeal, for it decides [tranche] b e t w e e n all and n o t h i n g — o r m o r e e x a c d y it m a k e s s o m e t h i n g b e in place o f n o t h i n g [elle fait etre quelque chose an lieu de rien], a n d this s o m e t h i n g is everything, for freedom c a n n o t b e divided, as K a n t k n e w as well, n e i t h e r freedom n o r its object o r effect. T h e j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends o r a b o u t t h e e n d , a b o u t a destination, o r a b o u t a m e a n ­ i n g o f t h e world, is t h e e n g a g e m e n t o f a p h i l o s o p h y (or a b o u t w h a t o n e calls a "life") ever since an e n d is n o t given: this is t h e b i r t h certificate o f p h i l o s o ­ p h y a n d o f o u r so-called " W e s t e r n " o r " m o d e r n " history. In this sense, it is t h e certificate o f a day o f w r a t h in w h i c h t h e tension and the decisiveness o f a (first, last) j u d g m e n t are unleashed, a j u d g m e n t that only d e p e n d s o n itself. T h i s 1

is t h e dies irae o f w h i c h Lyotard speaks in his Tlie Confession of Augustine

and

in t e r m s o f A u g u s t i n e a n d Isaie, as t h e day in w h i c h t h e heavens will b e e n v e l o p e d as in a volumen, folded u p o n t h e light of signs a n d o p e n i n g to the dark opacity before creation o r after its annihilation, o r even w i t h d r a w n

from

t h e w o r l d as t h e precise m o m e n t a n d place o f its creation a n d decision: s p a c e ' t i m e outside o f space and t i m e . A n d thus also dies ilia: that day, that illustrious day, m o s t remarkable because it is r e m o v e d from all days, t h e day of e n d as the day o f infinity.

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W e should derive the following from Lyotard's interest in w h a t K a n t calls "reflective" j u d g m e n t , a j u d g m e n t for w h i c h " t h e universal is n o t g i v e n " — Kant's proposition for w h a t exceeds the limits o f the mathematico-physical object o f " d e t e r m i n a n t " j u d g m e n t a n d of the transcendental schematism, w h i c h b e c o m e s for Lyotard the general proposition o f " p o s t - m o d e r n i t y " : if t h e u n i ­ versal is n o t given, this does n o t m e a n that it needs to be d r e a m t o r " m i m i c ­ k e d " (the weak version of the philosophy o f the "as if," a m o r e o r less latent formulation o f so-called " v a l u e " philosophies), it m e a n s that it is to b e invented. In o t h e r words, it seems i m p o r t a n t n o t to simply pose a " j u d g m e n t w i t h o u t c r i ­ teria" (another expression from Lyotard), itself defined as a j u d g m e n t " m a x i ­ mizing concepts outside of any k n o w l e d g e o f reality" (and thus in the first place the c o n c e p t of final e n d o r of destination o f the w o r l d a n d o f h u m a n beings). B u t o n e needs to understand also that k n o w l e d g e is lacking here, n o t because of an intrinsic deficiency o f h u m a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g (a finitude relative to the m o d e l o f an intellectus intuitivus) b u t because o f the absence, p u r e and simple, of "reality," w h i c h is effectively n o t given (the absolute finitude o f a Dasein w h o puts into play n o t h i n g less than t h e — i n f i n i t e — m e a n i n g o f being). In o t h e r words, the j u d g m e n t w i t h o u t criteria is n o t only (or perhaps n o t at all) an analogical and approximate, symbolic and n o n s c h e m a t i c m o d e of d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t . It is n e i t h e r its extension, n o r its projection, n o r its fig­ uration. Perhaps even, in the end, the t e r m judgment

contains an ambiguity in

its false s y m m e t r y o r its apparent continuity. For whereas t h e first proceeds b y construction, o r schematic presentation, that is to say by the d e p e n d e n c e o f a c o n c e p t o n an intuition, w h i c h defines the conditions o f a possible experience, the second is placed b e f o r e — o r p r o v o k e d b y — s o m e t h i n g that c a n n o t b e c o n ­ structed, w h i c h corresponds to an absence o f intuition. T h i s absence of i n t u ­ ition forms the Kantian c o n d i t i o n o f the " a b s o l u t e " object, the o n e that c a n n o t be an object, that is, the subject o f principles and ends ("God," o r n o w m a n , in any case the rational subject, w h i c h b e c o m e s the precise t e r m of the n o n i n t u itable subject of sufficient reasons and final ends). T h e inconstructible o f an absence o f i n t u i t i o n — w h i c h m o r e o v e r produces an absence o f c o n c e p t if those of "first cause" and "final e n d " are thereby w e a k e n e d in their very s t r u c t u r e — defines the necessity, n o t o f c o n s t r u c t i n g in the v o i d ( w h i c h has n o m e a n i n g , except b y simulacrum) b u t o f letting a void e m e r g e , o r to m a k e w i t h this void w h a t is at issue, namely the end, w h i c h is henceforth the issue o f such a praxis rather than a stricdy intellectual j u d g m e n t . To say it in a w o r d : n o t to construct b u t to create. (Here I allow myself a brief digression: to e n c o u n t e r the inconstructible in the Kantian sense, this is also a n d at the very least is w h a t " t o d e c o n s t r u c t " means, a w o r d that is n o w t o o often used by the doxa to m e a n d e m o l i t i o n a n d

60

Of Creation nihilism. Yet, t h r o u g h Husserl, H e i d e g g e r , and D e r r i d a , this w o r d — o r i g i n a l l y Abbau and n o t Zerstdrung—would

have rather led us toward w h a t is n e i t h e r

c o n s t r u c t e d n o r constructible, b u t is set b a c k from the structure, its e m p t y space, and w h i c h makes it w o r k , o r even that w h i c h pervades it. Lyotard stated at that t i m e that the j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends should b e freed from

Kant's unitary teleology, that o f t h e reign o f a "reasonable humanity."

Aware o f the fact that t h e substitution o f plurality for unity alone simply risked displacing an u n c h a n g e d structure toward t h e r e n e w e d c o n t e n t that h e n a m e d " t h e h o r i z o n o f a manifold o r o f a diversity," h e rushed to add that the final p l u ­ rality i m p o s e d w i t h it t h e irreducibility o f singularities—which h e u n d e r s t o o d in t h e sense o f t h e Wittgenstein's "language g a m e s " — a n d that the universal c o m i n g t o s u p p l e m e n t a " n o n g i v e n " universal could only b e the prescription o f " o b s e r v i n g t h e singular justice o f each game." In o t h e r words, w h a t is necessary is a w o r l d that w o u l d only be the w o r l d o f singularities, w i t h o u t their plurality c o n s t r u c t e d as a unitotality. B u t w h a t is thus necessary is a world. A n exigency appears here that will have constantly—we can be certain o f i t — i n h a b i t e d o u r t h o u g h t s and that always accompanies in various ways a c o n ­ c e r n that in the e n d is c o m m o n t o o u r absence o f c o m m u n i t y , perhaps to o u r refusal o f c o m m u n i t y and o f a c o m m u n i t a r i a n destination: h o w to d o justice, n o t only to t h e w h o l e o f existence, b u t to all existences, taken together b u t dis­ tinctly and in a discontinuous way, n o t as t h e totality of their differences, and differends—precisely n o t t h a t — b u t as these differences together, coexisting o r c o - a p p e a r i n g , held t o g e t h e r as m u l t i p l e — a n d thus together in a multiple way, if o n e can p u t it this way, o r as multiple together, if w e can state it even less a d e ­ quately . . . — a n d held by a co- that is n o t a principle, o r that is a principle o r archi-principle o f spacing in t h e principle itself. (Twenty-five years ago, Lyotard 3

already w r o t e : " W e w o u l d love multiplicities o f principles .. .")

To d o justice to t h e multiplicity and to the coexistence o f singularities, to multiply thus, and infinitely singularize the ends, such is o n e of the concerns left to us by that time w h i c h as " p o s t " could well be a first time, a time suspended in the preexistence o f a n o t h e r time, a n o t h e r b e g i n n i n g and a n o t h e r e n d . Justice r e n d e r e d t o t h e singular plural is n o t simply a demultiplied o r dif­ fracted justice. It is n o t a u n i q u e justice i n t e r p r e t e d according to perspectives o r subjectivities—and nonetheless it remains t h e same justice, equal for all a l t h o u g h irreducible and insubstitutable from o n e to the other. ( O n e o f the secrets o r o n e o f the m o s t powerful resources held in history for t h e last t w o centuries, o r since Christianity is h i d d e n here: the equality o f persons in the incommensurability o f singularities.) T h i s justice is thus, to take up a t h e m e that is also f o u n d in Augustine's Confessions, w i t h o u t c o m m o n measure: b u t its

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incommensurability is indeed the only u n i t w i t h w h i c h w e will have to m e a ­ sure the j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends. T h i s implies t w o c o n j o i n e d considerations: o n the o n e hand, the e n d o r t h e ends will b e i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e to any d e t e r m i ­ nant aim of a goal, o f an objective, o f any a c c o m p l i s h m e n t , a n d o n the o t h e r hand, h u m a n " c o m m u n i t y " (perhaps also the b e i n g - t o g e t h e r o f all beings) will have n o o t h e r c o m m o n measure t h a n that excess o f the i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e . In o t h e r words, w h a t Kant called "reasonable humanity," instead o f b e i n g the t a n ­ gential approximation of a given rationality (as, for instance, in Utopias a n d their models o f mechanical equilibrium), o r instead of simply consisting in the c o n ­ version o f this postulated unity into a diffraction o f singularities, will have to conceive o f its o w n rationality as the i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y o f R e a s o n in itself, o r t o itself. Such a j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends can n e i t h e r b e simply defined as a m a n n e r o f extrapolation from the d e t e r m i n a n t j u d g m e n t n o r as an extension of concepts outside o f the conditions o f k n o w l e d g e , u n d e r the Kantian c o n d i t i o n o f a "solely reflective" usage. A t this point, it b e c o m e s n o d o u b t necessary to t h i n k that whereas K a n t understands this usage according to a strategic p r u d e n c e toward the metaphysical Schu>armerei,we m u s t t h i n k it also in terms o f an active and productive invention o f ends. W e could also formulate this as follows: the Kantian order of postulation instead o f constituting a simple s u p p l e m e n t of r e p ­ resentation to the harshness o f the m o r a l law that is s u p e r i m p o s e d o n a finite k n o w l e d g e , must constitute by itself the praxis of the relation to ends. W e can therefore think that the " m a x i m i z a t i o n o f c o n c e p t s " o f w h i c h Lyotard spoke m u s t b e taken b e y o n d itself, w h i l e at the same time taken liter­ ally: the maximum

carried to t h e e x t r e m e , b u t here precisely the e x t r e m e is n o t

determinable a n d the maximum

behaves like an infinite extension o r an excess.

In the m o v e m e n t o f this excess, the " c o n c e p t " that was " m a x i m i z e d " wavers and changes its nature o r status: this is h o w t h e j u d g m e n t o f the sublime behaves w h e n " t h e c o n c e p t of the large n u m b e r is transformed into t h e Idea of an absolute o r actual infinite.""

1

T h e "Idea," to use this Kantian-Lyotardian lexicon, is n o longer a concept used in an analogical o r symbolic m o d e outside o f the limits of possible e x p e r i ­ ence or of given intuition. It is n o longer a c o n c e p t w i t h o u t intuition, handled by virtue of s o m e t h i n g that substitutes for a sensible given: it becomes itself the creation of its o w n scheme, that is to say, o f a novel reality, w h i c h is the f o r m / m a t ­ ter of a world of ends. A t the same time, and according to the requirements m e n ­ tioned beforehand, this scheme must b e that of a multiple universal, namely, the scheme o f a differend or of a general o r absolute incommensurability. (In parentheses, w e shall n o t e t h e following: t h e schematism o f s u c h a w o r l d o f ends c o u l d very well c o r r e s p o n d to w h a t K a n t calls "nature." I n d e e d ,

62

Of Creation if t h e c o n c e r n o f the first Critique is t h e r e d u c t i o n o f the natural sensible m u l ­ tiplicity in favor o f an objectivity of e x p e r i e n c e , t h e c o n c e r n o f t h e third Cri­ tique is to d o justice, in a reflective m o d e , t o that sensible excess w i t h respect to t h e object that is c o n s t i t u t e d by t h e v e r t i g i n o u s a n d irreducible prolifera­ tion

o f t h e " e m p i r i c a l l a w s " o f nature. N o w , this proliferation, w h e r e t h e

u n d e r s t a n d i n g risks losing itself, c o r r e s p o n d s to n o t h i n g else t h a n to the q u e s ­ tion o f ends: To w h a t e n d is there such a multiplicity o f empirical principles? [A question that is specified especially in these: To w h a t e n d t h e "formative force" o f life? A n d to w h a t e n d t h e p r o d u c t i o n a n d progress o f h u m a n c u l ­ ture?] Nature, w i t h K a n t , n o l o n g e r constitutes a given o r d e r a n d b e c o m e s t h e o r d e r — o r always possible d i s o r d e r — o f an e n i g m a o f ends. B e t w e e n the first a n d t h e third Critique, t h e s e c o n d will have f o r m e d t h e m o r a l j u d g m e n t — a j u d g m e n t c o n c e r n i n g action regulated by a formal universality—according to w h a t could n o t for K a n t have t h e constituting o r constructive nature o f a s c h e m e , b u t w h i c h , u n d e r t h e n a m e o f type, nonetheless presents t h e analogi­ cal regulation o f a nature [the m o r a l reign as a s e c o n d n a t u r e ] . T h r o u g h this entire reevaluation o f nature, it is a m a t t e r o f only this: H o w can w e t h i n k the undiscoverable unity, t h e m o t i o n , i n t e n t i o n , o r destination o f this o r d e r o f things that carries naturally w i t h i n it t h e n o n n a t u r a l b e i n g o f ends? T h e q u e s ­ tion o f n a t u r e has thus i n d e e d b e c o m e that o f a universe n o l o n g e r sustained b y t h e creative a n d o r g a n i z i n g action o f a P r o v i d e n c e , and, consequendy, that o f a finality n o l o n g e r g u i d e d by t h e agency o r i n d e x o f an e n d : n e i t h e r o f one e n d n o r o f an end in general . . . ) W e thus n e e d to l o o k for a j u d g m e n t ruled by such a schematism, o n c e again, neither d e t e r m i n a n t (or presenting) n o r reflective (or representing as if) and, in o t h e r w o r d s , n e i t h e r mathematical n o r aesthetic (in the first sense o f t e r m according to Kant) a n d c o n s e q u e n d y perhaps b o t h ethical a n d aesthetic (in t h e s e c o n d sense o f t h e t e r m ) , b u t t h e n j u s t as m u c h n e i t h e r ethical n o r aes­ thetic in any usual sense o f these terms. To that end, w e n e e d to start again from that w i t h w h i c h j u d g i n g is c o n ­ c e r n e d : the ends, b u t m o r e precisely those ends that are distinct from b o t h the m e r e absence o f e n d (that is to say, mathematics) a n d the intentional e n d (the technological e n d , that is, that o f art in general, even if " w i t h o u t e n d s " — t o that extent, w e n e e d to stand outside o f art itself, as art itself d e m a n d s , w h i c h is never "artistic" in the last analysis). Perhaps w e have, t h e n , n o o t h e r c o n c e p t o f " e n d " than those that I j u s t m e n t i o n e d , a n d perhaps o u r question engages a r u p t u r e w i t h any k i n d o f e n d as an e n d that is sought after, that is, also as an e n d represented a n d executed by t h e effect of this self-moving representation (namely, in K a n t the e n d o f a Will) a n d at the same time as an e n d p r o d u c e d from a cause a n d m o r e broadly from t h e effect o f a c o n c o u r s e o f causes: formal

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cause, efficient cause, material cause, a n d final cause, this last o n e essentially encapsulating causality p e r s e — w h i c h , w e n o t e in passing, also means for A r i s 5

t o d e the G o o d as final e n d . In this sense, o u r question is t h r o u g h and t h r o u g h the question o f the G o o d in a w o r l d w i t h o u t e n d o r w i t h o u t singular ends . . . R e a d i n g Kant m o r e closely, w e can say that w e find ourselves, in reality, dealing w i t h an e l e m e n t already m e n t i o n e d briefly, the "formative p o w e r " o f 6

nature that K a n t describes as possessing an " i m p e n e t r a b l e property," and w h i c h "has n o t h i n g analogous to any causality k n o w n to us. " T h e reflective j u d g m e n t can only add to it a "distant analogy" w i t h o u r technological finality and causal­ ity. ( O n e can certainly n o t e that K a n t speaks here o f life, n o t o f nature in g e n ­ eral. B u t w e could s h o w that the first holds for t h e second: the Kantian dis­ tinction

is n o t b e t w e e n an inorganic nature and an organic nature [then, o n

a n o t h e r level, a culture], but b e t w e e n an o r d e r o f the conditions o f the u n d e r ­ standing and an order of the expectations o f reason. W i t h respect to the s e c o n d order, " n a t u r e " is from t h e outset entirely regulated by an "internal finality" that life exposes and that h u m a n i t y brings to a paroxysm.) N o w w h a t can clearly be seen in this "formative p o w e r " w i t h a u n i q u e causality is that the thesis o f a creation o f t h e w o r l d is r e n d e r e d inadmissible by t h e destitution o f a G o d - p r i n c i p l e o f t h e w o r l d , b u t at t h e same

time

revived o r m a d e m o r e acute by contrast by the d e m a n d t o t h i n k a w o r l d w h o s e reason and end, p r o v e n a n c e and destination, are n o l o n g e r given; a n d yet, w e n e e d to t h i n k o f it as w o r l d , that is, as a totality o f m e a n i n g , at least hypothetical o r asymptotic—-or as a totality o f a m e a n i n g that is in itself plural a n d always singular. Such an e n d that w o u l d exclude the intentional end, o r a final cause that w o u l d include the formal cause, o r substance itself, and w o u l d t e n d to identify w i t h the absence o f e n d w o u l d a m o u n t in Aristotle's t h o u g h t to an e m p t y t a u ­ 7

tology: " w h y a t h i n g is itself." B u t from the void o f tautology since Kant, the reality o f a n e w world, o r a n e w reality o f t h e w o r l d perhaps emerges. For the pure and simple absence of e n d c o n f o r m s to the mathematical scheme, o r to that o f the constructible object. B u t here w e are speaking o f the i n c o n structible, that is to say, o f existence, w h o s e inconstructibility, indeterminacy, and nonobjectiveness ultimately constitute for K a n t t h e definition of existence." Existence as such is precisely w h a t c a n n o t be presented as an object w i t h i n the conditions o f possible e x p e r i e n c e . As t h e first t w o "Analogies o f E x p e r i ­ e n c e " demonstrate, the substance changes in time, b u t it is n o m o r e b o r n there than it dies there. T h e substantia phaenomenon

is clearly coextensive to time and

space, w h i c h b o t h f o r m the unfolding o f t h e p h e n o m e n o n . K a n t recalls the principle, Gigni de nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti'' T h i s principle explic­ itly states the negation o f a creation. A n d it is also this principle that, w h i l e

64

Of Creation m a i n t a i n i n g t h e object w i t h i n the conditions o f possible experience, that is, as m e c h a n i s m , excludes in an impossible e x p e r i e n c e any consideration o f the e n d o f things as well as t h e provenance o f their existence as such. O u r question thus b e c o m e s clearly t h e question o f t h e impossible e x p e r i ­ ence o r t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e impossible: an e x p e r i e n c e removed from the conditions o f possibility o f a finite k n o w l e d g e , and w h i c h is nevertheless an experience. T h e j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends w i t h o u t given c r i t e r i a — a n d w h i c h makes by itself, in act, t h e ethos and praxis o f this "finality" in all respects singu­ lar—is t h e " e x p e r i e n c e " in question. In a sense, philosophy after K a n t was c o n ­ tinuously the t h o u g h t o f an e x p e r i e n c e o f the impossible, that is, an e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e intuitus originarius, o r t h e originary p e n e t r a t i o n by w h i c h there is a world, existences, their "reasons," and their " e n d s . " T h e p r o b l e m was as follows:

With­

out giving up on the strict critical delimitation of metaphysics, how can we reopen and inaugurate anew the essence of the metaphysical capacity and demands, and therefore of the discerning of reasons and ends? O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h a t is " i m p o s s i b l e " a c c o r d i n g to t h e K a n t i a n c o n ­ text o f a d e l i m i t i n g "possible," tracing t h e circumference o f t h e n o n o r i g i n a r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g (not creative o f its object, o r rather constructive o f its object, b u t n o t creative o f t h e t h i n g , n o r c o n s e q u e n t l y o f t h e p r o v e n a n c e - a n d - e n d o f t h e w o r l d ) , is also w h a t has c h a n g e d , since Descartes and especially since L e i b ­ niz, from t h e status o f t h e real t o t h e status o f t h e possible, n o w u n d e r s t o o d n o t as delimiting, b u t r a t h e r as t h e u n l i m i t i n g m o d e o f o p e n n e s s and activity. T h e w o r l d is a possibility before b e i n g a reality, reversing the perspective from t h e given to t h e giving, from the result to t h e p r o v e n a n c e ( w i t h o u t forgetting, however, that there is n o l o n g e r a g i v e r ) . T h e "best o f all possible w o r l d s " is an expression that refers above all to t h e activity by w h i c h this w o r l d is d r a w n (or 10

draws itself) from t h e i m m e n s i t y o f possibilities. T h e t h i n k i n g that i n a u g u ­ rates plural m o n a d i c singularity is t h e o n e that transforms (but w i t h Descartes and Spinoza) t h e r e g i m e o f t h o u g h t o f t h e p r o v e n a n c e - a n d - e n d o f the w o r l d : from creation as a result o f an a c c o m p l i s h e d divine action, o n e shifts to c r e ­ ation as, in s u m , an u n c e a s i n g activity and actuality o f this w o r l d in its s i n g u ­ larity (singularity o f singularities). O n e sense o f the w o r d (creation as a state o f affairs o f t h e given world) yields to a n o t h e r (creation as b r i n g i n g forth [mise au monde] a w o r l d — a n active sense that is n o t h i n g else t h a n t h e first sense o f creatio). H e n c e , even t h e creature that was t h e finite image o f its creator" and consequently

was b o u n d

to

represent

(interpret, figure)

creation,

itself

b e c o m e s a potential creator as subject o f possibilities and subject o f ends, as . b e i n g o f distance a n d o f its o w n distance, o r still (or at the same time) c o n ­ fronts " c r e a t i o n " — o r i g i n a n d e n d — a s t h e i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e and impossible o f its e x p e r i e n c e .

65

Tlie Creation of the World o r

Globalization

B u t that very fact, that there is in the w o r l d either t h e agency o r the p o w e r or at least the question a n d / o r e x p e r i e n c e o f its o w n creation, is henceforth given w i t h the world a n d as its very w o r l d l i n e s s — w h i c h ,

from

created,

b e c o m e s creative—even in the e n d as its w o r l d h o o d . T h e c u r r e n t state o f affairs is that there is in t h e w o r l d o r even as the w o r l d ( u n d e r the n a m e " h u m a n i t y " o r u n d e r o t h e r words, "history," "technology," "art," "existence") a p u t t i n g into play o f its provenance a n d e n d , o f its being-possible a n d thus o f its b e i n g a n d o f b e i n g in general, a n d that this p u t t i n g i n t o play itself b e the entire discernible necessity in place o f a b e i n g necessarily situated above a n d b e y o n d the w o r l d .

12

Consequently, w h a t indirecdy appears as a n e w problematic o f " c r e a t i o n " is t h e question o f a j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends that w o u l d n o t b e only a j u d g m e n t extrapolated b e y o n d the limits o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t also, o r rather, the j u d g m e n t of a reason to w h i c h is given in advance n e i t h e r end(s) n o r means, n o r anything that constitutes w h a t e v e r k i n d o f "causality k n o w n to us." T h e j u d g m e n t a b o u t the "ends o f all t h i n g s " m u s t b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h a c o n d i t i o n of b e i n g that w o u l d n o t d e p e n d o n causality o r finality, n o r c o n s e q u e n d y o n mechanical consecution o r subjective i n t e n t i o n . By destituting the creating G o d a n d the ens swnunim—sufficient

reason o f t h e w o r l d — K a n t also makes

clear that the reason o f the w o r l d pertains to a productive causality. H e opens implicitly a n d outside o f theology a n e w question o f " c r e a t i o n " . . . A t the same time, a second g u i d i n g indication is given to us: w h a t excludes the ex nihilo from the Kantian u n d e r s t a n d i n g is the necessary p e r m a n e n c e o f the u n i q u e p h e n o m e n a l substance in w h i c h changes o c c u r by way of causality. B u t the uniqueness o f this substance is itself t h e correlation o f the "principle of p r o d u c t i o n " (second Analogy) o f all p h e n o m e n a . N o w , w h a t w e have said thus far forces us to posit that the principle, n o t o f all p h e n o m e n a b u t o f the totality of p h e n o m e n a a n d o f p h e n o m e n a l i t y itself, o r the ontological principle o f the p h e n o m e n a l i t y of the t h i n g in itself, precisely c a n n o t b e a principle o f p r o d u c ­ tion; it must b e that w h i c h appears indirecdy as a "creation," that is to say, a provenance w i t h o u t p r o d u c t i o n . It is n e i t h e r procession n o r providence, n o r project, a provenance w i t h o u t a pro-, p r o t o t y p e , o r p r o m o t e r — o r else a pro- that is nihil in the very p r o p e r t y o f pro-venance. C o n s e q u e n d y , a n d even if w e still k n o w n o t h i n g o f such a "principle o f creation," it could well b e that w h a t p r o d u c t i o n connects a p r i o r i as a n d in the uniqueness o f a substance finds itself o n the contrary dispersed by c r e a t i o n — and n o less a p r i o r i — i n an essential plurality o f substances: in a multiplicity o f existences w h o s e singularity, each time, is precisely h o m o l o g o u s to existence, if existence is i n d e e d that w h i c h detaches itself o r distinguishes itself absolutely (what stands o u t in all t h e senses o f the expression), a n d n o t that w h i c h can b e p r o d u c e d by s o m e t h i n g else.

13

66

Of Creation In this sense, an existence is necessarily a finite cut o n (or in, o r o u t o f . . . ) t h e indefinite (or infinite as interminable) p e r m a n e n c e , in the same way that it is t h e n o n p h e n o m e n a l u n d e r n e a t h (or in, o r o u t o f . . . ) the p h e n o m e n a l o f the same p e r m a n e n c e . B u t this finitude is precisely w h a t constitutes the real and absolute infinite o r t h e act o f this existence: and in this infinite it engages its most proper end. At least in t w o ways, conjoined and c o - i m p l i c a t e d — o n e that pertains to the provenance and destination o f t h e world, and o n e that concerns the plurality o f subjects—the Lyotardian question o f a j u d g m e n t a b o u t ends w i t h o u t given end and w i t h o u t i d e o l o g i c a l unity, the question o f an e n d ad infinitum thus leads toward a question that it seems inevitable to call the question o f "creation."

2 However, this needs to b e further clarified. First, I only use t h e w o r d creation here in a preliminary o r provisional way, reserving the h o p e o f b e i n g able to transform it. In t h e end, this w o r d c a n n o t suffice for it is o v e r d e t e r m i n e d w i t h a n d overused by m o n o t h e i s m , although it also indicates in this entire philosophical c o n t e x t the w e a r i n g o u t [usure] o f m o n o t h e i s m itself (we will r e t u r n to this), and even if, furthermore, I d o n o t k n o w w h a t w o r d c o u l d replace it, unless it is n o t a m a t t e r o f replacing it b u t o f allowing it to b e erased in t h e existing o f existence. T h r o u g h all t h e significations t h a t are associated w i t h it, t h e w o r d cre­ ation refers, o n t h e o n e h a n d , to m o n o t h e i s t i c t h e o l o g i e s , " and, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t o t h e intellectual m o n t a g e o f t h e idea o f a p r o d u c t i o n from n o t h i n g , a m o n t a g e so often a n d so vigorously d e n o u n c e d b y t h e adversaries o f 5

m o n o t h e i s m . ' T h e n o t h i n g o r n o t h i n g n e s s used as a m a t e r i a l cause supposes in fact a p r o d i g i o u s efficient cause ( w h e r e t h e o l o g y seems t o yield to m a g i c ) , a n d supposes m o r e o v e r that t h e a g e n t o f this efficiency is itself a p r e e x i s t i n g subject, w i t h its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a final cause a n d o f a formal cause, unless t h e latter preexists, for its p a r t , w h i c h w o u l d a c c e n t u a t e t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . Stated i n this way, in effect, that is, at least a c c o r d i n g t o t h e m o s t o r d i n a r y t h e o l o g i c a l doxa, " c r e a t i o n " is t h e m o s t disastrous o f c o n c e p t s . ( O r else it is necessary to state that t h e nihil s u b s u m e s t h e four causes t o g e t h e r , a n d w i t h t h e m their subject: it o n l y r e m a i n s t h e n , a c c o r d i n g to all appearances, a w o r d w i t h o u t a c o n c e p t . . .) Further, o n e could s h o w that the intrinsic difficulties o f this n o t i o n have led to t h e m o s t powerful and m o s t s u b d e theological and philosophical e l a b o ­ rations in all the great classical t h o u g h t s , in particular w i t h respect to the free-

67

The Creation of the World or

Globalization

d o m of the creator in relation to o r in its creation, o r else c o n c e r n i n g its m o t i v e o r absence o f m o t i v e and certainly o f its i n t e n t i o n o r o f its expectation (glory, power, love . . . ) . H o w e v e r , it h a p p e n s , a n d certainly it is n o accident, that t h e thinkers o f the three m o n o t h e i s m s — p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e J e w i s h , C h r i s t i a n a n d Islamic m y s ­ t i c s " — h a v e d e v e l o p e d a t h i n k i n g , o r perhaps w e s h o u l d say an e x p e r i e n c e o f t h o u g h t that is q u i t e different, a n d that o n e can find in t h e w o r k o f H e g e l and Schelling a m o n g o t h e r s , a n d also certainly, albeit secretly, in H e i d e g g e r , b u t o n e , as I have suggested,-that was first implicit i n K a n t . N o w in this g r a n d tradition, w h i c h is also, if o n e considers it full scope, a t h i n k i n g o f B e i n g (of the B e i n g o f beings as a w h o l e ) o n t h e basis o f a m o n o t h e i s m in all o f its forms a n d ultimate c o n s e q u e n c e s (the G r e e k t h i n k i n g o f B e i n g o n t h e basis of w h i c h there is logos o f B e i n g , a l o n g w i t h t h e J e w i s h t h i n k i n g o f existence o n t h e basis o f w h i c h there is an e x p e r i e n c e o f existence: a b l e n d i n g that forms the strange " w i t h " o f o u r G r e e k - J e w c o n d i t i o n ) , o n e will find a twofold simultaneous m o v e m e n t : •

O n the o n e hand, the creator necessarily disappears in the very midst o f its act, and w i t h this disappearance a decisive episode o f the entire m o v e m e n t that I have sometimes n a m e d t h e " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f C h r i s t i a n i t y "

17

occurs,

a m o v e m e n t that is n o t h i n g b u t the m o s t intrinsic a n d p r o p e r m o v e m e n t of m o n o t h e i s m as the integral absenting of G o d in t h e unity that reduces it in and w h e r e it dissolves; •

O n the o t h e r hand, and correlatively, B e i n g falls completely outside o f any presupposed position and integrally displaces itself i n t o a transitivity by w h i c h it is, and is only, in any existence, t h e infinitive o f a " t o exist," and the conjugation o f this verb (Being is n o t the basis the existent, o r its cause, b u t it " i s " it o r it "exists" it). In this twofold m o v e m e n t , o n the o n e hand, the m o d e l o f causal p r o d u c ­

tion according to given ends has b e e n clearly delineated a n d classified in terms of the object, representation, i n t e n t i o n and will. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e n o n m o d e l o r model-less-ness o f b e i n g w i t h o u t g i v e n — w i t h o u t universal given, w i t h o u t agent given and w i t h o u t presupposed o r desired ends, that is to say, w i t h o u t o r w i t h n o t h i n g given, w i t h o u t o r w i t h n o gift given—has revealed its i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e real and will have challenged t h e j u d g m e n t that Kant, in fact, advanced in his way, implicidy inscribing the enigma o f creation. Being without given can only be u n d e r s t o o d w i t h t h e active sense o f the verb 18

" t o be," indeed, a transitive sense: " t o be," n o t as a substance or as a substrate, even less as a result o r p r o d u c t , n o r as a state, n o r as a property, even less, if it is

68

Of Creation possible, w i t h a simple function o f a copula. T h i s is t h e case because " t h e w o r l d is" forms a c o m p l e t e proposition w i t h o u t the attribute o f its subject, b u t as an act, and thus equivalent to "a doing," a l t h o u g h n o t c o n f o r m i n g t o any o f the k n o w n m o d e s o f " d o i n g " (neither as a p r o d u c i n g n o r e n g e n d e r i n g n o r p r o v i d ­ i n g a m o d e l , n o r f o u n d i n g , in s u m , a " d o i n g " n e i t h e r d o n e n o r to b e d o n e . . . ) . A transitive "being," w h o s e historical senses o f t h e terms used for the idea o f " c r e a t i o n " only give vague approximations (bara, t h e H e b r e w t e r m reserved for that divine act, kitzo, the G r e e k t e r m that signifies " t o plant," " d r a w from the wild state," " t o establish," t h e Latin t e r m creo, the transitive f o r m o f cresco " t o grow," thus " t o cultivate," to "care f o r " ) . " T h i s being is i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e to any given as to any operation that s u p ­ poses a given p u t i n t o play (and an a g e n t - o p e r a t o r ) . Its substance is equal to its operation, b u t its o p e r a t i o n does n o t operate any m o r e than it lets the . . . noth­ ing b e o r m a k e (itself), a n o t h i n g , that is, as w e know, res, the t h i n g itself. This b e i n g is n o t n o t h i n g , it is (transitively) nothing. It transits nothing into something, or rather nothing transits itself into something. T h i s t h e m e cuts short any t h o u g h t o f w h a t e v e r w o u l d remain b u r i e d at t h e heart o f b e i n g o r at the very b o t t o m o f it. T h e r e is n o t h i n g w i t h d r a w n in t h e i n n e r m o s t depths o f t h e origin, nothing but the nothing of origin. C o n s e quendy, the o r i g i n c a n n o t b e lost o r lacking, t h e w o r l d is lacking n o t h i n g , because the b e i n g o f t h e w o r l d is t h e t h i n g p e r m e a t e d by t h e n o t h i n g . Perhaps this should b e decisively separated from any t h o u g h t o f the p h e n o m e n o n (appearance/disappearance, p r e s e n c e / a b s e n c e ) , w i t h o u t for that m a t t e r a p p r o ­ priating the secret o f presence " i n itself": there is n o longer a t h i n g in itself o r a p h e n o m e n o n b u t rather the transitivity o f b e i n g - n o t h i n g .

20

Is this n o t , in the

e n d , w h a t N i e t z s c h e h a d b e e n t h e first o n e to understand? T h e withdrawal o f any given thus forms the heart o f a t h i n k i n g o f creation. This is also w h a t distinguishes it from m y t h , for w h i c h , in a general manner, there is s o m e t h i n g given, s o m e t h i n g primordial and w h i c h precedes it, w h i c h constitutes p r e c e d e n c e itself, and the provenance from it. M o n o t h e i s m is n o l o n g e r the regime o f t h e foundational m y t h , b u t o n e o f a history o f election and o f destination: the u n i q u e G o d is absolutely n o t the r e u n i o n o r the s u b s u m p tion (nor t h e "spiritualization") o f multiple G o d s u n d e r a principle (a u n i q u e principle figures very often at the foundation o f t h e mythological world). O n e needs to state the following: " p o l y t h e i s m " and " m o n o t h e i s m " are n o t related to each o t h e r like a multiplicity t o unity. In the first case, there are Gods, that is, presences o f absence (because t h e absolutely general law o f any presence is its multiplicity). In t h e s e c o n d case, there is atheism, o r the absenting o f pres­ ence. T h e " G o d s " are n o l o n g e r a n y t h i n g b u t "places" w h e r e this absenting arrives (to b e b o r n , to die, to feel, to enjoy, to suffer, to think, t o b e g i n and end).

69

Tlie Creadon of the World o r

Globalization

M o n o - t h e i s m o r a-theism is thus a c o m p l e t e m e t a m o r p h o s i s of divinity and o r i g i n . N o t h i n g is given any longer, except that alone w h i c h is still given (for t h e world of m y t h does n o t completely disappear, j u s t as the Babylonian myths of t h e "creation of the w o r l d " infuse the " B o o k o f G e n e r a t i o n " o r " B o o k o f Genesis"). It is the gift offered by the u n i q u e G o d , b u t if this gift is still given from o n e side (this is creation as a state, t h e w o r l d received by m a n ) , it c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to that state: it is m o r e properly giving, it is t h e very act of gift a n d in this act the singular history according to w h i c h t h e h u m a n b e i n g — a n d w i t h it all "creatures"—is a p a r t n e r m o r e t h a n a simple recipient o f divine action (for to receive the gift is part of the gift itself) is engaged. In its p r o f o u n d truth, creation is thus n o t h i n g that pertains to a p r o d u c t i o n o r fashioning o f the g r o u n d ; it is t h r o u g h and t h r o u g h the mobilization o f an act a n d this act is that o f a relation b e t w e e n t w o actors o r agents, G o d and his creature, c o n s e q u e n d y each o f t h e m singular. C r e a t i o n " m a k e s " w i t h " n o t h i n g , " because it makes n o t h i n g that is the o r d e r o f a substrate: w h a t it " m a k e s " is his­ tory and relation, and in this sense it is n o t h i n g n o r c o m e s from anything. It is thus n o t a question any l o n g e r o f a " m a k i n g " b u t o f a "being," b u t only in the sense that this being is nothing but the meaning of history or of the relation in which it is engaged. T h i s is w h y the m o s t n o t e d mystical version o f creation, that of the tsimtsoum o f t h e Lurianic kabala

21

states that the " n o t h i n g " of creation is the o n e

that opens in G o d w h e n G o d withdraws in it (and in s u m from it) in the act o f creating. G o d annihilates itself [s'aneantit] as a "self" o r as a distinct b e i n g in o r d e r to " w i t h d r a w " in its a c t — w h i c h makes the o p e n i n g of the world. C r e a t i o n forms, then, a nodal p o i n t in a " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f m o n o t h e i s m , " insofar as such a d e c o n s t r u c t i o n proceeds from m o n o t h e i s m itself, and perhaps is its m o s t active resource. T h e u n i q u e G o d , w h o s e unicity is the correlate o f the creating act, c a n n o t precede its creation any m o r e that it can subsist above it o r apart from it in s o m e way. It merges w i t h it: m e r g i n g w i t h it, it withdraws in it, and w i t h d r a w i n g there it empties itself there, e m p t y i n g itself it is n o t h i n g o t h e r than the o p e n i n g o f this void. O n l y the o p e n i n g is divine, b u t the divine is n o t h i n g m o r e than the o p e n i n g . T h e o p e n i n g is n e i t h e r t h e f o u n d a t i o n n o r t h e o r i g i n . N o r is t h e o p e n ­ i n g any l o n g e r a sort o f receptacle o r an extension p r i o r to things o f the w o r l d . T h e o p e n i n g o f t h e w o r l d is w h a t o p e n s a l o n g such things and a m o n g t h e m , that w h i c h separates t h e m in their profuse singularity a n d w h i c h relates t h e m to each o t h e r in their coexistence. T h e o p e n o r t h e " n o t h i n g " weaves the c o appearance o f existences w i t h o u t referring t h e m to s o m e o t h e r o r i g i n a r y o r foundational unity. As Gerard Granel w r i t e s , " T h e o p e n needs the closed o r even is a m o d e o f t h e closed, a c o n c r e t e expression o f t h e essential

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finitude

Of Creation that any form o f b e i n g m o d u l a t e s . . . it is at t h e Closed that t h e O p e n itself opens, w o u n d s itself, a n d only in this w a y is o p e n . " " B u t t h e " f i n i t u d e " in q u e s t i o n h e r e must, in t h e same m o v e m e n t , b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h e e n d in w h i c h o r toward w h i c h t h e o p e n infinitely o p e n s itself: an e n d indefinitely multiplied by a n d in every existing t h i n g in the w o r l d . T h e " w o r l d " itself is o n l y the u n a s ­ signable totality o f m e a n i n g o f all these ends that are o p e n b e t w e e n themselves and t h e infinite. T h e w o r l d o f m y t h , a n d o f polytheism, is the w o r l d o f given presupposi­ tion. O n t o - t h e o l o g y — t h e suspension o f m y t h — i s , o n the contrary, the order of posited presupposition: actively posited as t h e affirmation o f t h e u n i q u e G o d a n d / o r as thesis o f B e i n g . Insofar as it is n o t given, b u t posited, t h e p r e s u p p o ­ sition also contains t h e principle o f its o w n deposition, since it c a n n o t p r e s u p ­ pose a n y t h i n g like a cause (nor thus therefore like an end) o r like a p r o d u c t i o n , w i t h o u t also e x t e n d i n g , correlatively, t h e limits o f t h e world. T h e presupposi­ tion b e c o m e s there infinite o r null, a n d this simple statement contains the entire p r o g r a m of o n t o - t h e o l o g y w i t h respect to t h e g r o u n d and w i t h respect to t h e a u t o - d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f this g r o u n d , that is, w i t h respect to its access to t h e inconstructible. In o t h e r words, if nihilism corresponds to t h e accomplish­ m e n t o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y according to t h e logic o f a " b a d " infinite of p r e s u p p o ­ sition, o n the o t h e r h a n d , a t h i n k i n g o f " c r e a t i o n " constitutes the exact reverse of nihilism, c o n f o r m i n g to t h e logic o f a null presupposition ( w h i c h is equiva­ lent as well to a " g o o d " infinite, o r actual infinite). T h e ex niliilo contains n o t h i n g m o r e , b u t n o t h i n g less, than the e x - o f e x ­ istence that is n e i t h e r p r o d u c e d n o r constructed b u t only existing [etante] (or, if o n e prefers, etee, " m a d e " from t h e m a k i n g constituted by the transitivity o f being). A n d this ex nihilo fractures the deepest core of nihOism from w i t h i n . N e i t h e r given n o r posited, t h e w o r l d is only present: the present o f the p r e ­ sent o f the day in w h i c h it exists, dies ///a. T h a t illustrious and infinitely distant day, that day o f the e n d a n d o f the j u d g m e n t , is also the day o f all days, the today o f each here. This presence neither differs n o r is derived from any o t h e r p r e ­ supposed presence, any m o r e than from an absence that w o u l d b e the negative o f a presence: ex niliilo m e a n s that it is the nihil that opens a n d that disposes itself as t h e space o f all presence (or even as o n e will see, o f all the presences). In a sense, this presence does differ at all (it differs from n o t h i n g and it does n o t differ from a n y t h i n g w h i c h is): the o n t o logical difference is null, a n d this is certainly w h a t t h e proposition, according to w h i c h B e i n g is the B e i n g o f beings and n o t h i n g other, m e a n s . B e i n g is: that t h e b e i n g exists.This is how, for e x a m • pie, W i t t g e n s t e i n understands the m e a n i n g o f " c r e a t i o n " w h e n h e says that the w o r d describes the e x p e r i e n c e that I have w h e n "I U'onder about the existence of the tiw/rf."

23

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The Creation of the World o r

Globalization

" That the b e i n g is" can b e u n d e r s t o o d as the fiat o f creation. B u t this " t h a t " conflates the indicative, the subjunctive, and t h e imperative: thus, the transitiv­ ity o f the verb " t o b e " is m o d a l i z e d . T h e fact o f b e i n g is identical to t h e desire for b e i n g and to the obligation o f b e i n g ; o r being, b y b e i n g , desires itself a n d obliges itself. B u t in the absence o f any subject o f a desire, o r o f an order, this means that the fiat—the

fact of the fiat—erases

in itself the difference o f a

necessity a n d of a contingency, as well as that of a possible and o f a real. Since n o t h i n g produces the being, there is neither c o n t i n g e n c y n o r necessity o f its being, j u s t as t h e question o f the " f r e e d o m " o f a " c r e a t o r " disappears in the identity o f freedom a n d o f necessity required by creation ex nihilo. T h e nullity of t h e ontological difference is also t h e nullity o f t h e difference b e t w e e n n e c e s ­ sity a n d c o n t i n g e n c y a n d / o r freedom o r even b e t w e e n the " i s " a n d the " o u g h t " of being. Derrida's differance is t h e articulation o f t h e nullity o f the ontological dif­ ference: it attempts to t h i n k that " b e i n g " is n o t h i n g o t h e r than the " e x " o f exis­ 1

tence. T h i s articulation is t h o u g h t as that o f a Self-presence that differs itself. * B u t the "self" resolves itself in nihil as s o o n as the presupposition is deposed (and deposes i t s e l f . . . ) : the itself/self [se/soi] is the presupposition par excellence or absolutely, a n d it is n o t h i n g o t h e r (it is the presupposition w i t h its obligatory corollary, the postposition o f an e n d , of a final cause o f the world). T h e supposed (or the subject) b e c o m e s thus null o r infinite: it is itself the nihil and the ex-; it is t h e ex nihilo.The

entire b e i n g - t o - s e l f o f the b e i n g o f t h e world, a n d its pres­

e n c e consists in it. T h i s presence is n e i t h e r that o f a given present [Gegenwartigkeit, Vorhandenheit], n o r that o f a "self presenting." It is praes-entia, b e i n g — always-ahead-of-itself, stepping out of itself ex-nihilo. O n e should n o t understand differance as a sort o f p e r m a n e n t flight o f an asymptotic a n d unattainable self (a representation t o o frequent a n d t o o linked to a sort o f desire exhausting itself in the infinite) b u t rather as t h e generating structure p r o p e r to t h e ex nihilo. N o t h i n g presents itself-—which

also m e a n s n o t even a n o t h i n g , n o r the

n o t h i n g present themselves: this is the e n d o f negative theology as well as the e n d of a p h e n o m e n o l o g y in general, albeit that o f the u n a p p a r e n t . T h e present does n o t present itself, and it is n o less exposed. It is n o t h i n g o t h e r than that, and that is w h a t it falls to us to t h i n k henceforth. In the B e i n g o r in the presence o f "creation," the infinite as n o t h i n g (in­ finite = n o thing) passes into the finite. This is n o t an individuation o r a singularization, it is n o t a process o f p r o d u c t i o n o r o f generation a n d it is n o t a dialectical m e d i a t i o n . T h e infinite is finite: it does n o t c o m e o u t o f itself ad extra it is rather hollowed " i n itself" (in nothing) from its o w n withdrawal w h i c h also constitutes its o p e n i n g in w h i c h finite singularities dispose themselves. This o p e n i n g as n o t h i n g , w h i c h n e i t h e r presents n o r gives itself, is o p e n e d r i g h t at

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Of Creation the same level o f [a mime] t h e finite singularities as their b e i n g together o r their b e i n g - w i t h , a n d constitutes the disposition o f the world. As its n a m e indicates, rf/s-position is a gap, a n d its m o d e l is m o r e spatial than t e m p o r a l . R a t h e r t h a n t h e infinite delay o f a differance to itself in the sense o f a differing from itself, o r else as finitude itself—that is to say, the absolute­ ness-—of this delay (and not its finishing), it is the infinitely finite spacing o f the singularities that constitute the event o f B e i n g o r the event o f "being." B u t stricdy speaking, there is n e i t h e r b e i n g n o r event: n o t h i n g comes from n o r c o m e s forth if n o t h i n g is presupposed. T h e r e are existences, their styles, their c o m i n g s a n d goings . . . A c c o r d i n g t o this archi-spatiality o f disposition, w h i c h is also the spa­ ciousness o f the o p e n i n g , w h a t is at stake is n o t a provenance o f B e i n g (nor a b e i n g o f provenance o r o f origin), b u t a spacing o f presences. T h e s e presences are necessarily p l u r a l . T h e y d o n o t c o m e from the dispersion o f a presence: they are existing, b u t less in t h e sense o f an ekstasis from an i m m a n e n t "self" ( e m a ­ nation, generation, expression, etc.) than as disposed together a n d exposed to each other. T h e i r coexistence is an essential d i m e n s i o n o f their presences at the edges o f w h i c h t h e o p e n i n g opens. T h e co- is implicated in the ex-: n o t h i n g exists unless with, since, n o t h i n g exists unless ex nihilo. T h e first feature o f the creation o f t h e w o r l d is that it creates t h e with o f all things: that is to say the world, namely, t h e nihil as that w h i c h opens [ouvre] a n d forms [ceuvre] t h e world. C o e x i s t e n c e is n e i t h e r given n o r constructed. T h e r e is n o schematizing subject a n d n o p r i o r gift.

25

N o r , consequently, is it "self-giving": a u n i q u e pres­

ence, w i t h o u t d o u b t , w o u l d give itself (it w o u l d a m o u n t to t h e same thing, p e r ­ haps, b e i n g t h e cause o f itself, to b e causa sui like G o d ) . B u t coexistence is the gift and t h e h o l d i n g back j u s t as it is the subject a n d the thing, presence and absence, p l e n i t u d e a n d void. C o e x i s t e n c e is that w h i c h coheres w i t h o u t b e i n g " o n e " a n d w i t h o u t b e i n g sustained by a n y t h i n g else, o r rather by b e i n g sus­ tained b y n o t h i n g : b y t h e nothing o f t h e co- that is i n d e e d n o t h i n g b u t t h e i n b e t w e e n o r the w i t h o f t h e b e i n g - t o g e t h e r o f singularities. T h a t n o t h i n g - w i t h is t h e n o n - c a u s e o f t h e w o r l d , material, efficient, formal, a n d final. This means b o t h that the w o r l d is simply there (it is o r it permeates its "there," its spacing) and that it is t h e coexistence that it does n o t contain b u t that o n the contrary " m a k e s " it. T h a t the world is there means that it is n o w h e r e since it is the o p e n i n g o f space-time.That it is coexistence means that its o p e n i n g opens it in all the senses, partes extra partes, spatio-temporal dis-positing dispersion, and b e t w e e n space and 2

. time just as the o n e in the other, a m a n n e r identical to its proper distention. '' Such is the Auseinandertreten

of w h i c h Heidegger speaks, and w h o s e division o r

decision opens, in Heidegger's vocabulary, the belongingness to B e - i n g .

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The Creation of the World or

Globalization

T h e separation, the stepping-out-of-one-another, is at the same time, Entscheidung, decision: it is to the decision o f Being, the decision o f n o t h i n g into being or to being, that responds, o n the o n e hand, the disposition o r the (diffrac­ tion o f the world that is (that makes) the world, and, o n the o t h e r hand, the d e c i ­ sion of existence by w h i c h a "subject" comes to the world. " C o r n i n g to the w o r l d " means birth and death, e m e r g i n g from n o t h i n g and going to nothing, w h i c h are the relation to the world or the relation-world, the sharing o f its m e a n ­ ing and the w h o l e of existence as an ensemble o r partition o f singular decisions. It is for us to decide for ourselves.

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Ill

Creation as Denaturation: Metaphysical Technology

1 Philosophy begins from itself: this is a p e r m a n e n t a x i o m for it, w h i c h is implicit o r explicit in t h e w o r k o f all philosophers, except, perhaps, for M a r x — w h i c h remains t o b e d e t e r m i n e d — i f w e can assume M a r x is i n d e e d a philosopher, w h i c h also remains to b e d e t e r m i n e d ; in any case, the assertion holds, clearly, from Plato to H e i d e g g e r . Philosophy can represent to itself w h a t precedes its o w n b e g i n n i n g as an early stage (an infancy, t h e very beginnings o f reason), o r else as simply an e x t e r i o r i t y (a mythical w o r l d foreign to that of logos). In any case, this properly philosophical initiative belongs to philosophy itself. In a c o r ­ relative a n d identical way, philosophy gives itself its o w n n a m e : n o t only does it baptize itself, b y i n a u g u r a t i n g itself a n d in order to inaugurate itself, w i t h the n a m e philo-sophia, b u t it is philosophy itself that forges this w o r d , the first o f all the termini technici that it w o u l d forge in t h e course o f history (and it tells itself the history, o r t h e legend o f this linguistic initiative). Philosophy begins as t h e self-productive technology o f its o w n n a m e , its discourse, a n d its discipline. It engenders o r it fabricates its o w n c o n c e p t o r its o w n Idea for itself at t h e same t i m e that it invents o r constructs these instru­ m e n t a l a n d ideal realities o f the " c o n c e p t " a n d t h e "Idea." In this operation, the best k n o w n a n d m o s t p r o m i n e n t feature is the differentiation o f itself from w h a t is called "sophistry": w i t h respect t o this technology o f logos, philosophy defines itself a n d constitutes itself as that techne that is at the same time differ­ e n t from any o t h e r techne because it speaks first, o r finally, the t r u t h about it. In that very way, it invents itself also in its difference from any o t h e r k n o w l e d g e , any o t h e r discipline, o r any o t h e r s c i e n c e . W i t h respect to this major difference, its self-institution is t h e key. In o r d e r t o conceive o f its o w n provenance, philosophy m u s t choose o n e o f t h e following alternatives: either it represents its provenance as the p r o d u c t o f a c o n t i n u o u s progression o f humanity, o r it represents it as an accident w i t h ­ o u t conditions o r reasons. In either case, philosophy is deficient o r lacking w i t h respect to its tasks. In the first case, it m u s t retroactively project a s c h e m e o f g r o w t h o r progress p r i o r to the b i r t h o f philosophy that raises t w o difficulties:

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first, s o m e t h i n g o f philosophy must b e presupposed p r i o r to it, and in that case, philosophy w o u l d n o t have b e g u n from itself; second, this s c h e m e must also b e e x t e n d e d ahead o f it and as the s c h e m e o f b o t h its o w n history and history in general, w h i c h has n o t failed to provoke, in the history o f philosophy, w e l l k n o w n questions o n the n o t i o n of "progress" in general (that is to say, in the final analysis c o n c e r n i n g a supposed naturality a n d / o r c o n c e r n i n g its scientificity: thus c o n c e r n i n g the constitution o f its p r o p e r techne). B u t in t h e sec­ o n d case—with the thesis o f the accident that considers t h e West t o be an acci­ dent, according to the formulation so often repeated, a n d w h i c h can either refer to a happy accident, " t h e miracle o f Greece," o r else an u n h a p p y accident, a metaphysical decline from the fleeting d a w n o f t h e m e a n i n g o f B e i n g , w h i l e r e m a i n i n g subject to the same s c h e m e o f accident a n d c o n t i n g e n c y — i n this case philosophy fails to confer the least necessity to its techne, and it can fur­ t h e r m o r e n o t tolerate an appeal to it, in a m o r e o r less explicit m a n n e r , to a cat­ egory as inconsistent and as unphilosophical as w h a t is previously designated by the expression " t h e miracle o f Greece." W e will say that this expression is n o t philosophical b u t purely, and weakly, ideological. Still, it w o u l d be necessary to k n o w w h a t is m e a n t by "ideology," that is, h o w w e distinguish it from p h i l o s ­ o p h y : this leads us b a c k to the first formulations o f the p r o b l e m . B y willing itself auto-initiating a n d thus auto-finite o r auto-finalized—and by willing itself auto- in a general way, in b e i n g and in only b e i n g able to b e the will of the auto- in the t w o meanings o f the genitive—philosophy betrays a n d reveals the history o f a same m o v e m e n t , if o n e can, at least, try to understand by " h i s t o r y " in a provisional way, the reality o f a m o v e m e n t a n d o f a t e m p o r a l ­ ity that w o u l d n o t b e split b e t w e e n teleological necessity and blind accidentality a n d closed o n its o w n discontinuity. (Isn't the entire p r o b l e m for history today to resolve this antinomy?) Philosophy betrays history, because history, if it designates anything, desig­ nates above all n o n b e g i n n i n g and n o n c o m p l e t i o n by itself. If s o m e t h i n g such as a process-by-itself, speaking absolutely, is given s o m e w h e r e o r in s o m e way, it excludes, in principle, any history: n o t h i n g can h a p p e n to it except its o w n reduction as a process i n t o a result. (This is exacdy t h e p o i n t a r o u n d w h i c h o n e can debate the w e l l - k n o w n m o d e l o f " H e g e l i a n h i s t o r y " indefinitely: the p o i n t is to k n o w w h e t h e r the process is absorbed in the result, o r w h e t h e r the result is n o t , rather and w i t h o u t reserve, t h e process itself w i t h o u t final result. O n e will say as m u c h , and a fortiori, o f a Marxist history leading to the activity o f a "free labor," the p r o d u c t i o n o f a result as an infinite p r o d u c t i o n . . . ) History is the order o f w h a t locates the o r i g i n and t h e e n d elsewhere, in a n o t h e r time—that is to say, in time itself, since it is n o t h i n g b u t t h e alterity and the alteration o f the same, o r o f the same altering itself. H i s t o r y is n o t "nature,"

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Creation as Denaturation if " n a t u r e " has its o r i g i n and e n d in itself (supposing that nature exists or rather that it still exists in a history that precisely locates elsewhere, w i t h o u t end, the very naturality o f any nature: as if that history i n c l u d e d henceforth the natura naturans o f any natura naturata and, c o n s e q u e n d y also its natura denaturans). H i s ­ tory is t h e infinite deferral o f any nature, and this is why, from n o w o n , t h e fol­ l o w i n g question occurs to us: Was there ever "nature," since there was history, a n d thus an indefinite deferral o f any nature? Was there ever a "prehistory," n o t only in t h e sense o f a h u m a n prehistory, a n t e r i o r to a history conceived and archived as such (the history c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h philosophy), b u t in the sense o f a n o n h u m a n prehistory, a n d even p r i o r to life, a history o f the w o r l d o r o f t h e Universe that had n o t already b e e n always already historical in s o m e way? T h i s question leads to at least t w o others: that o f k n o w i n g w h e t h e r there can b e s o m e " p o s t h i s t o r y " in w h a t e v e r sense, and second, that o f k n o w i n g w h e t h e r it is possible, in a parallel and basically coessential o r c o d e t e r m i n e d m a n n e r , o f designating a p r e - a n d / o r a post philosophy . . . W i t h o u t claiming t o confront these questions as such, here and now, w e will agree perhaps there c a n n o t n o t b e in s o m e fashion a "history o f the world," if t h e w o r l d turns o u t n o t to have in itself its origin and its end, and that even if, and especially if any " o u t s i d e " o f t h e w o r l d must b e t h o u g h t as nothing, and even if, and especially if, the m e a n i n g o f the world is n o t h i n g o t h e r than the w o r l d itself in its o r i g i n a r y and final relation w i t h an infinite deferral o f the o r i ­ gin and t h e e n d in that nothing o f w h i c h it w o u l d b e the e x p a n s i o n — t h a t is to say, the g r o w t h o r the creation (it is t h e same word) o r even . . . the history. T h e r e is thus a betrayal o f t h e principle o f history and o f the world in the philosophical self-constitution and self-beginning. T h i s betrayal reveals itself by the fact that philosophy m u s t relinquish the task of t h i n k i n g a history o f the w o r l d if it is c o m m i t t e d to a s c h e m e o f a p r o p e r e m e r g e n c e : for t h e n it excludes t h i n k i n g that t h e w o r l d outside o f philosophy can b e c o n n e c t e d in any way to philosophical history. It is in a sense w h a t , in the philosophical foundation, the division o£muthos a n d logos signifies: this division \partage] is h o m o l o g o u s , in the w o r k o f all t h e philosophers from Plato t o Heidegger, w i t h t h e s c h e m e o f selfconstitution and its aporias, a m o n g w h i c h that o f history is t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t . B u t philosophy, at t h e same t i m e (if it is the same time, if it is n o t an o t h e r time

o f a n o t h e r history that w o u l d r e m a i n to be written) reveals history.

Indeed, the self-designation o f philosophy as self-foundation,

self-beginning,

and 5e/f-completion, belongs to t h e same operation, w h i c h also consists in p r o b lematizing from the outset (and again at the same time) any structure and any process that is anfo-constitutive and d//fo-referential. It is precisely b y defining itself as an a u t o n o m o u s process a n d thus as history (philosophy is history a n d makes history as s o o n as Plato refers to its p r o p e r provenance in Anaxagoras,

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Parmenides, a n d Socrates) that philosophy unveils t h e problematic order o f an a u t o - c o n s t i t u t i o n that must appropriate itself (that is to say, a u t o - c o n s t i t u t e itself) t h r o u g h the m e d i a t i o n o f its o w n temporal a n d genealogical difference along w h i c h the auto- alters itself primordially as m u c h as it identifies itself. B u t , at t h e same time, it is outside o f this history that the possibility o f an a u t o - c o n ­ stitution was designated: in an order o f phusis as t h e o r d e r o f that w h i c h is for itself the gift a n d the i m m e d i a t e genesis o f its o w n nomos, its o w n techne, a n d its o w n logos. B u t t h e logos, properly speaking, forms itself from that w h i c h it has to conquer, mediately, diz-logically, o r dia-lectically, a phusis that is n o t given to it (or if o n e prefers a phusis that it gives itself only by immediately dividing from itself, dia-lectically a n d thus historically). A remarkable chiasm occurs in w h i c h t h e " a u t o " a n d the "alio," the " b y itself" a n d the " b y the other," c o n t i n u o u s l y e x c h a n g e their places. T h i s chiasm is t h e very e m e r g e n c e o f philosophy, o f t h e W e s t , a n d o f history. Instantaneously, and at the same time, t w o times are inaugurated: the chronical or chronological t i m e of history a n d the achronical o r anachronical time of an outside o f history. B u t the first, the time of autochronic, in s u m , is the time o f difference o r as difference, w h i l e the second as h e t e r o c h r o n i c (its time outside o f time) will b e the time (or t h e space) o f given n o n d e f e r r e d identity. Philosophy constitutes this spacet i m e as that o f t h e muthos. T h e following paradoxes result: at t h e same time the space-time o f t h e muthos falls outside o f history and b e c o m e s the first time o r t h e p r e h i s t o r y o f history, h e n c e f o r t h perfectly p r o b l e m a t i c since it is b o t h inside a n d outside historicity. N o w , this p r o b l e m is n o t h i n g b u t the p r o b l e m o f t h e historicity o f p h i l o s o p h y itself, a n d o f the impossibility o f t h i n k i n g its o w n b e g i n n i n g : the p r o p e r b e g i n n i n g o f the a u t o - b e g i n n i n g . In a parallel m a n n e r , by designating and instituting itself, p h i l o s o p h y designates an o t h e r — i t s other, its proper o t h e r — a r e g i m e o f m e a n i n g a n d o f t r u t h : a r e g i m e o f a//o-constitution w h e r e the t r u t h is given, b u t n o t to b e c o n q u e r e d . In w h a t p h i l o s o p h y baptizes as muthos, t r u t h is given from an " o u t s i d e " that is n o t a past a n d that is n o t t h e process o f an (auto) p r o d u c t i o n , w h i c h is i m m e m o r i a l a n d c o n s e q u e n d y always present, b u t is a presence, w h i c h escapes from t h e instantaneous insta­ bility o f the philosophical present. P h i l o s o p h y is the destabilization, t h e sus­ pension, a n d t h e dissolution o f the mythical present. T h i s is w h y its obsessive fear b e c o m e s t h e present a n d t h e presence of time, o r rather its absence, namely, chronical t i m e . B u t in this w a y p h i l o s o p h y conceals its o w n presence, and its o w n c o m i n g to presence. T h e withdrawal of the b e g i n n i n g belongs to t h e self-beginning. T h e 1

b e g i n n i n g remains u n g r o u n d e d . T h e question o p e n e d by philosophy in its his­ tory a n d as history, the question o p e n e d by philosophical historicity as an

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Creation as Denaturation essentially auto-constitutive d i m e n s i o n o f philosophy, is the following: Is it o r is it n o t possible to assume the n o n f o u n d a t i o n o f the b e g i n n i n g as the r e a s o n — thus as the g r o u n d — o f t h e historical process itself? B u t this question is o b v i ­ ously n o t h i n g o t h e r than the foEowing: Is it possible o r n o t to assume the n o n foundation o f t h e West as the reason for its o w n history? A n d since this history b e c o m e s t h e history o f the w o r l d : is it possible o r n o t to assume t h e n o n f o u n ­ dation o f t h e history o f t h e world? T h i s means: Is it possible to make history, to begin again a h i s t o r y — o r H i s t o r y itself-—on t h e basis o f its n o n f o u n d a t i o n ? Is it possible to assume b o t h t h e absence o f t h e a u t o - c o n s t i t u t i o n (thus a relation to t h e prephilosophical o t h e r t h a n t h e entirely problematic relation t o t h e lost and desired exteriority o f phusis and tnuthos) and t h e absence o f a u t o - c o m p l e t i o n (thus the e n d o f teleologies, theologies, a n d messianisms)?

2 S u c h a question is that o f metaphysics and technology. If metaphysics, as such, itself essentiaEy historical, accomplishes itself in t h e form o f technology, and if t e c h n o l o g y m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d as t h e planetary d o m i n a t i o n o f the absence o f b e g i n n i n g and end, o r o f t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f any initial o r final given—of phusis o r o f any muthos—how

any

can o n e conceive o f this process and thus c o n ­

ceive o f history e x c e p t according to the exhausted t h e m e s o f progress a n d / o r o f decline, o f the fortunate a n d / o r u n f o r t u n a t e accident? T h e c o m p l e t i o n o f metaphysics—its end and its plenitude—happens

in his­

tory insofar as it is precisely the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f t h e historical possibility itself, o r the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f t h e " m e a n i n g o f history" as it has b e e n r e c o g ­ nized at least since Nietzsche, b u t perhaps also, in a m o r e c o m p l e x manner, since H e g e l himself, a n d in the way in w h i c h Husserl and H e i d e g g e r have a t t e m p t e d to grasp it as p r o b l e m and as resource at t h e same time. T h e historical possibility, properly speaking, as it was p r o d u c e d in its course by philosophy (or metaphysics: t h e possibility o f a metaphysical history a n d a metaphysics o f history) is t h e possibility that a process w o u l d c o m p l e t e the real­ ization o f a reason, o f a g r o u n d , and o f a rationality. It is thus the possibility that t h e historical process functions as a natural process. Metaphysical history is his­ t o r y t h o u g h t as physics: as a "natural history," to use this old expression in w h i c h precisely " h i s t o r y " did n o t yet have t h e m e a n i n g o f a process, b u t o f a "coUect i o n . " T h e t r u t h o f this history was that in t h e end, it d e n i e d itself as history by . b e c o m i n g nature (again). In this elaboration, that w h i c h is exhausted is the bringing to completion. W h e t h e r the t e r m is n a m e d presence, subject, Supreme Being, o r total humanity,

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in each case the capacity of assumption and absorption of a terminus ad quern is exhausted. Very precisely, w h a t is exhausted is n o t h i n g o t h e r than the exhausting itself in an end (teleology). Now, it is this exhaustion (accomplishment, maturation) that philosophy had constituted as a history after having remodeled according to Christian salvation, itself understood as a temporal process, the anamnesic m o v e ­ m e n t of the Platonic u-topia or of the ec-topia.What is exhausted is thus the pres­ ence of a terminal present of history, a presence that w o u l d n o longer be praesentia, being-ahead-of-itself, but only b e equal to itself, in itself indifferent. T h a t the exhaustion is e x h a u s t e d — t h a t natural history breaks d o w n a n d is denatured—is w h a t is s h o w n by the r u p t u r e that philosophy carries o u t by, in, o r o n itself: a historical r u p t u r e o f its history, w h i c h H e i d e g g e r called the " e n d o f p h i l o s o p h y " to indicate the d e p t h a n d seriousness o f that w h i c h in history thus happens to History, and by virtue o f w h i c h a "history o f b e i n g " or a " d e s tinality"

o f its "sendings," perhaps even the e n d o f the these sendings t h e m ­ 2

selves, can only, at least, be denatured. B u t this denaturation

is w h a t requires us to

consider the e x t e n t to w h i c h , at w h a t d e p t h — p r o p e r l y w i t h o u t g r o u n d — h i s ­ tory is n o t and c a n n o t be a u t o - g e n e r a t i n g o r autotelic, the e x t e n t t o w h i c h , t h e n , it c a n n o t r e t u r n to itself o r in itself, o r reabsorb itself in any " e n d o f history." It requires us, o n the contrary, to see finally, as if before us, the difference and the alteration o f t h e auto that metaphysics, w h i l e p r o d u c i n g it, first endeavored to cover or deny. Consequently, if o u r expectation o f the future is henceforth deprived of anticipation, o f representation, and o f concept, it must n o less, like a Kantian j u d g m e n t w i t h o u t concept, form a postulation of t r u t h ( a n d / o r o f universal) as a n o n - g i v e n truth: " d e n a t u r a t i o n " must itself b e postulated as t h e " r e a s o n " o f the process, of that history w h o s e form is also that of an errancy. N o n - g i v e n , n e i ­ ther as seed n o r as c o m p l e t i o n — w h i c h also means, always, n o n - m y t h o l o g i c a l — truth is first, as such, o p e n and o p e n to itself: it is the structure and the substance of an e n c o u n t e r w i t h itself, awaiting a n d / o r loyalty toward itself, toward the self that is n o t given. In this sense, t r u t h empties itself o f all presentable contents ( w h e t h e r o n e thinks o f it in a sacral m o d e o r in m o d e o f positive k n o w l e d g e ) . B u t this void is the void of the exhaustion o f w h i c h I have spoken: truth is e m p t y o r rather emptied of any " c o n t e n t , " of the plethora o r the saturation of a completion, e m p t i e d of the plethora and therefore o p e n in itself and o n itself. This means, above all, that it is o p e n o n the question o f its o w n historic­ ity. T r u t h — t h e t r u t h o f philosophy and o f history—can d o n o t h i n g else, h e n c e ­ forth, than o p e n o n t o the abyss o f its o w n b e g i n n i n g , o r o f its o w n absence o f b e g i n n i n g , e n d and g r o u n d . T h e historical gesture—that is, b o t h t h e theoretical gesture w i t h respect to "history," o f its concept, and the practical, active gesture in o u r time, in order to

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Creation as Denaturation appropriate this time, in o r d e r to ereignen a n o t h e r story [chronique] o f the w o r l d — t h i s gesture b e c o m e s t h e n necessarily " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n . " To " d e c o n ­ struct" m e a n s to disassemble w h a t has built u p o n t h e beginnings in order to expose that w h i c h b u r r o w s b e n e a t h t h e m . It is therefore the same t h i n g to destabilize (not destroy) the structure o f the philosophical (or metaphysical) tra­ dition and to destabilize the historical a u t o - p o s i t i o n i n g of that tradition. W h a t was built, from w h a t b e g i n n i n g s a n d h o w these beginnings are d e t e r m i n e d as s u c h — a n d still a n d perhaps above all, as I w o u l d like to show, w h a t is the p r o v e ­ n a n c e o f these beginnings? " D e c o n s t r u c t i o n " perhaps m e a n s n o t h i n g other, ultimately, t h a n t h e following: it happens h e n c e f o r t h that philosophy c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d itself apart from the question o f its p r o p e r historicity—and n o longer only in t h e sense of its internal historicity, b u t also in the sense o f its external provenance, b u t also in a way such that the external provenance and internal p r o d u c t i o n are inextricably tied. (This is w h y it can only involve edges, extremities, ends, o r limits o f philosophy w i t h o u t , clearly, any a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o r c o m p l e t i o n . W h a t else is, ultimately, at issue w i t h H e i d e g g e r and w i t h D e r rida [who, in part despite Heidegger, opens again this d i m e n s i o n o f d e c o n ­ struction] if n o t t h e following: that philosophy c a n n o t r e t u r n to itself n o r in itself as its autology requires, except by e x c e e d i n g its a u t o n o m y and thus its o w n history in every respect?) T h e beginnings o f philosophy: the w o r d must be w r i t t e n as plural, for it is n o t possible to n a m e only o n e , b u t n e i t h e r is it possible to n a m e n o n e . (To d e s ­ ignate only o n e b e g i n n i n g w o u l d n o d o u b t already submit to the metaphysical 3

denial o f alteration). P h i l o s o p h y certainly b e g a n as such and it stated that it began: n o d o u b t it never stated itself w i t h o u t stating also that it begins and that it begins itself again. B u t t h e subject, w h i c h it wants to be, o f this inauguration, u n d o e s itself o r destitutes itself, as w e saw, in the very gesture o f its i n a u g u r a ­ tion. In this way, philosophy always institutes itself in a m i x t u r e o f decision and indecision w i t h respect to its o w n subject; and " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n " in s u m is c o n ­ genital for it since it constructs itself o n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g that it m u s t be a n t e ­ r i o r to its edifice and even to its o w n plan. T h i s m i x t u r e o f decision and i n d e c i s i o n — o r the decision o f positing itself w i t h o u t a decision b e i n g reached a b o u t itself o r a b o u t the immediately infinite mobilization o f this d e c i s i o n — c a n b e analyzed in a m o r e precise m a n n e r . By b e g i n n i n g , philosophy prescribed to itself as its most p r o p e r law b o t h an i m p o s ­ sible amanesis (in t h e i m m e m o r i a l ) o f its o w n origin, and a blind perspective o n the t r u t h it awaits, to w h i c h it tends o r seeks. O n the o n e hand, philosophy p r e • sents itself as b e i n g w i t h o u t b e g i n n i n g o r b e g i n n i n g by itself ( w h o c o m e s to free t h e prisoner from t h e cave?), and, o n t h e o t h e r hand, t r u t h absents itself in the obscurity o r in t h e blinding light o f w h a t must c o m e , insofar precisely as it

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must c o m e w i t h o u t ever arriving, like the last step, never reached o r secured, w h i c h passes b e y o n d the dialectical ascension, a n d w h i c h does n o t b e l o n g to the chronological time o f succession a n d o f a c c o m p l i s h m e n t . T h e double postulation o f a r e t u r n to the i m m e m o r i a l a n d an advance to w h a t does n o t c o m e designates w h a t w e call "metaphysics": a metaphysics that is said to b e " e n d e d , " only in o r d e r to say that it exhausts that w h i c h claims to c o m p l e t e b o t h its retrospection a n d prospection. B o t h m u s t b e incapable o f ending: they m u s t b e the very i n c o m p l e t i o n c o n f o r m i n g to the essence o f p h i ­ losophy, w h i c h turns o u t also to b e indissociable from its history, its e x t e n d e d i m m o b i l i t y (metaphysics) into the absenting o f its o r i g i n a n d its end. It follows from these premises that t w o claims must b e set forth in the same m o m e n t : metaphysics is w i t h o u t b e g i n n i n g o r e n d , a n d metaphysics begins a n d ends. It perhaps does n o t cease to b e g i n a n d to e n d , t h e " w i t h o u t - b e g i n n i n g o r - e n d . " It is in this sense that it is finite, in t h e structural a n d n o n d i a c h r o n i c sense: it is finite in that it articulates a non-given o f m e a n i n g o r o f s o m e m e a n ­ ing (a " n o n - g i v e n " that constitutes, n o d o u b t , the " v o i d " o f its truth: o n t o l o g i cal finitude is w h a t opens o n the v o i d — b u t it is b e i n g that is o p e n e d by this very o p e n i n g , b e i n g insofar as it is n o t b u t opens itself i n / a s space-time). S t r u c ­ tural finitude deconstructs historical endings [finitions] (for example, such fig­ ures as rationalism, empiricism, o r criticism, a n d the figure o f o n t o - t h e o l o g y , o r even the

figurative

figure

labeled as " o n t o - t y p o l o g y " by Lacoue-Labarthe).

Similarly, w i t h an unlimited scope, metaphysics itself always begins, has b e g u n , and begins again, as Abbau o f w h a t is gebaut (and that always has t h e character o f b e i n g a t e m p l e o r a palace, o f a residence a n d o f a m o n u m e n t , thus also an empire o r enterprise). F r o m the outset, o r even ahead o f itself, in a history u n d e r w a y before its h i s t o r y — b e t w e e n the twelfth a n d n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y before o u r e r a — p h i l o s ­ o p h y was the d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e edifices o f a w o r l d that s h o o k the m y t h o religious w o r l d o f given m e a n i n g , a n d o f full a n d present t r u t h . T h e unsettling o f this w o r l d was the c o n d i t i o n , perhaps already the b e g i n n i n g , o f philosophy, of history, a n d of t h e " W e s t e r n accident": a n d if o n e looks back toward w h a t m a d e this accident possible, o n e will presumably have to t h i n k even m o r e so that it was hardly an " a c c i d e n t " i n t h e ordinary sense (and perhaps hardly " W e s t e r n " in the ordinary s e n s e — t h e " W e s t " having already p r e c e d e d itself, and having b e e n dispersed in the a n t e r i o r history o f t h e world, j u s t as, today, it succeeds itself, disseminated in a b e c o m i n g - w o r l d

[devenir-monde]).

In the w o r l d w h e r e philosophy is b o r n , a w o r l d w i t h i n w h i c h a n u m b e r of d e t e r m i n a t e

technologies

were

developed

(iron, w r i t i n g ,

commercial

a c c o u n t i n g — t o w h i c h w e will r e t u r n ) , tragedy begins as f o r m i n g b o t h the last testimony o f cult a n d of sacrifice, a n d as t h e first attestation o f a flight o f m e a n -

84

Creation as Denaturation ing and o f t h e abyss o f t r u t h : frankly, it is in this way that the terms o r the c o n ­ cepts, o r t h e questions o f m e a n i n g and o f t r u t h are p r o d u c e d . T h e four c o n d i ­ tions o f philosophy identified by B a d i o u , w h i c h I m e n t i o n here for their clar­ ity, and w h o s e n a m e s and n o t i o n s are also p r o d u c e d in this m o m e n t — p o l i t i c s , science, art, and l o v e — c o m p o s e a four-part multiplication o f this flight and of this o p e n i n g . I will n o t dwell o n the four dispositions o f w h a t o n e could call the inaugural flight [echappee] o f t h e West: w e see w i t h o u t difficulty h o w each is structured by this fleeing into absens (to b o r r o w a w o r d from Blanchot). Poli­ tics, science, love, and art are four structures o f t h e impossible. A t t h e same time, w h a t the four have in c o m m o n is a n o t h e r transversal d i m e n s i o n of t h e flight: namely, the i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y b e t w e e n the four " c o n d i t i o n s " (an i n c o m ­ mensurability that was u n k n o w n or, from t h e outset, r e d u c e d in a m y t h i c o - r e l i gious world). P h i l o s o p h y is t h e c o m m o n site o f this incommensurability: it articulates flight o r absence as t h e general r e g i m e o f the i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e . W h a t was later called metaphysics is thus p r o d u c e d as the articulation o f that incommensurability: t h e very i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y of b e i n g in-itself, of b e i n g w h i c h ex-ists to itself, o r that o f t h e atelic and anarchic (this w o r d in m e m o r y o f R e i n e r Schiirmann) principles and ends. T h a t metaphysics t o o k place is n o t only a given fact (de facto in the history o f a p e o p l e , it takes place at a given m o m e n t , in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n space and it is in this sense t h e factum rationis empiricum o f p h i l o s o p h y — n o t w i t h o u t an O r i e n t a l analogon, w h i c h is given at t h e same time, constituted by B u d d h i s m or Confucianism, an analogy that w o u l d n e e d a l o n g discussion) b u t still it is this very thing, this event that constitutes metaphysics. For it h a p p e n e d , it appeared as a flight, as a d e p a r t u r e : namely, the flight o f the G o d s (a flight for w h i c h in the West m o n o t h e i s m is the first n a m e , in itself already pregnant w i t h the " d e a t h o f G o d " — a n d o n e could add, w h a t did Plato d o if n o t weave together tragedy and m o n o t h e i s m j u s t before Hellenistic Judaism, and t h e n Christianity c o m p l e t e d the w o r k ? ) . T h i s flight is n o t simply an absenting, a leavetaking, o r a suppression, n e i t h e r is it an Aujliebung in t h e twofold Hegelian sense. It is above all a m a r k i n g : a trace o f an absence, a subtraction, to b o r r o w from B a d i o u ; a withdrawal, t o b o r r o w from H e i d e g g e r ; an inscription, in the case o f D e r r i d a . T h a t is to say, the flight o f t h e G o d s traces o r initiates an o p e n i n g o f an u n p r e c e d e n t e d m e a n i n g : in t h e same gesture, m e a n i n g is in flight as past and as to c o m e — b u t in the same stroke, " m e a n i n g , " is precisely and absolutely, t h e idea o r the question o f m e a n i n g (and o f a t r u t h that responds to it).'' If metaphysics begins as a science o f principles and ends, this is because principles and ends are crossed out [banes], if I can use the a m p h i b o l o g y allowed by slang, crossed o u t a n d g o n e [rayes et partis] (slang also suggests split [failles]), o r else, in a m o r e elaborate m a n n e r , divided from and in themselves, and thus

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"inscribed." It is only from the m o m e n t they are crossed out that they appear as such as "principles" and as " e n d s " : subtracted from their very agency (from the foundation and realization o f temples, empires, and lines o f succession), o p e n as questions o f m e a n i n g .

3 N o w , this subtraction—this s u b t r a c t i o n / a d d i t i o n o f m e a n i n g that constitutes philosophy from s o m e w h e r e (in any case, it happens s o m e w h e r e , in the c o n ­ tingency o f a place and o f a p e r i o d , o r o f several places and several periods) o r by s o m e force (whose very o c c u r r e n c e is c o n t i n g e n t : n o t h i n g d e t e r m i n e s the necessity o f w h a t takes place, a l t h o u g h it does take place, potentially, at the scale o f h u m a n i t y and t h e world). T h i s force, in all respects, is that o f technology. B e h i n d w h a t will b e c o m e , in a very precise sense that w e will n e e d to analyze, techno-logy, there is a w h o l e range o f techniques, like that o f iron followed by that o f c o m m e r c e (including b o t h a c c o u n t i n g a n d shipping), w r i t i n g , and u r b a n p l a n n i n g . W i t h this m o m e n t in t h e history o f technologies, there is a s o m e t h i n g like a threshold that is crossed. T h e r e is a m o v e m e n t that is c o n t e m p o r a r y to h u m a n b e i n g s — t e c h ­ nology as h u m a n , quite simply Homo faber, p r o d u c e r and conceiver o f Homo sapiens, technician o f itself—a m o v e m e n t that from the outset proceeds by s u b ­ traction o r by e m p t y i n g o u t (from t h e loss o f the oestrus, for example, until stone carving and wall painting) b u t w h i c h , until t h e n , presents itself first as a m o d e o f behavior and adaptation, as the m a n a g e m e n t o f subsistence conditions for an animal deficient in given conditions. T h i s m o v e m e n t , w h i c h will always already have b e g u n w i t h " h u m a n s , " and w h i c h c o n s e q u e n d y t h r o u g h h u m a n s , in h u m a n s , and before h u m a n s c o m e s from " n a t u r e " itself, this very m o v e m e n t takes o n a n o t h e r form: instead o f e n s u r i n g subsistence, it creates n e w conditions for h u m a n s , o r even produces a strange "surplus-subsistence" [sursistance] in nature or outside o f it. T h e p r o d u c t i o n o f m e a n s o f subsistence distinguishes already the N e o l i t h i c e p o c h : n o w — b e t w e e n t h e t e n t h and seventh c e n t u r y before o u r era o n the arc o f Asia M i n o r — o n e could say that a production of ends appears as such. B u t h o w could w e n o t see this p r o d u c t i o n o f ends e m e r g e — silendy, secredy—from p r o d u c t i o n that is itself n o t p r o d u c e d from nature o r 5

from the world, o r from the animal o r from m a n w i t h i n it. C o n s e q u e n d y from w h a t will w e have to n a m e history o f t h e world? W i t h this b e c o m i n g h u m a n , this m o v e m e n t appears to itself as its o w n principle and its o w n e n d . T h a t is to say, properly w i t h o u t principle and w i t h ­ o u t e n d since it proceeds from an initial d e t a c h m e n t , w h i c h o n e can n a m e

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Creation as Denaturation " h u m a n c o n d i t i o n " a n d w h o s e p e r m a n e n c e involves an e x t r e m e instability and mutability o f w h a t has thus b e e n detached (contingency forms thus the n e c e s ­ sity o f this " h i s t o r y " ) . A n d w h i c h is w h a t w e can call, feigning to believe that there w o u l d have b e e n first a p u r e and stable " n a t u r e " : denaturation. A n d o n e could t h e n say that " h u m a n i t y " is the indexical n a m e o f t h e indefinite and infi­ nite t e r m o f t h e h u m a n denaturation. It is in d e n a t u r a t i o n that s o m e t h i n g like the representation of a " n a t u r e " can b e p r o d u c e d o r o f an autotelic o r d e r and thus n o n t e c h n o l o g i c a l order that poses t h e n at t h e same time t h e e x t r e m e difficulty o f conceiving h o w d e n a t u ­ ration arises from nature and in nature ( h o w t h e deficient animal can b e p o s ­ sible, t h e animal w i t h o u t set conditions). It is thus also there that comes forth, o n the o n e hand, a specific t e c h n o l o g y o f interrogation peri phuseos o r de natura rerum at t h e same time as a t h i n k i n g o f t h e n o n n a t u r a l o r i g i n of nature in the f o r m o f a "creation ex nihilo!' In these different ways, metaphysics constitutes from t h e outset t h e q u e s t i o n i n g o f d e n a t u r a t i o n as such, in o t h e r words, o f the escape from principles a n d ends, o r o f B e i n g as n o t h i n g that is. S u c h a q u e s t i o n i n g is m a d e possible, i n d e e d inevitable, as soon as a d e n a ­ t u r i n g event t o o k place: such is t h e event that w e n a m e "technology," w i t h p h i ­ losophy, w h i c h is itself the self-referential and self-reflective r e g i m e o f that event. T h i s event is part o f a w o r l d , n o t only in t h e sense that the world, before any " h i s t o r y " has always already b e e n its possibility (which therefore can b e said to b e n e i t h e r necessary o r c o n t i n g e n t : any m o r e o r less that the w o r l d itself). To say that there was s o m e t h i n g like a nature—phusis o r natura, here o n e should n o t follow Heidegger's distinction b e t w e e n these names, as if h e w e r e m a r k i n g the distance o f a m o r e " n a t u r a l " nature, o n e that w o u l d n o t have har­ b o r e d t h e possibility o f h u m a n t e c h n o l o g y — i s only possible if o n e contrasts this nature w i t h a n o n - n a t u r e . In o t h e r words the very m o t i f o f " n a t u r e " is by itself " d e n a t u r i n g . " T h e "physics" o f t h e Presocratic Ionian is the t e c h n o l o g y o f m a n i p u l a t i o n o f t h e object " n a t u r e " that emerges w h e n t h e mytho-religious o r d e r is disassembled: such a physics is a t e c h n o l o g y o f crossed-out ends, and crossed-out principles. T h e n a m e o f metaphysics, w h i c h appears t h e n by accident, is in n o way, in the end, accidental. It was already a n n o u n c e d in the technological apparatus that p r o d u c e d " n a t u r e " as an object o f b o t h theoretical and practical m a n i p u ­ lation, w h i l e seeing to it that " t e c h n o l o g y " clearly b e c o m e s a principle and an e n d for itself-—as is t h e case in c o m m e r c e , in w r i t i n g or in t h e very p r o d u c t i o n o f principles and ends. T h i s m o v e m e n t is necessarily a becoming since precisely - w h a t is at issue is w h a t is n o t given and since technology in general is the k n o w - h o w w i t h respect to w h a t is n o t already m a d e : w i t h technology, history is contrasted w i t h nature. B u t it is j u s t as necessary that this b e c o m i n g n o t f o r m

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a meaning, either progressive or regressive. T h e obsession w i t h m e a n i n g , w h i c h nonetheless will have d e t e r m i n e d an entire section o f metaphysics, is only t h e r e c u r r e n t effect o f a mytho-religious "physics" seeking to r e c o n q u e r itself in spite o f metaphysics or t h r o u g h it. T h i s is w h y metaphysics is continually in the radical ambivalence o f an o p e n i n g and o f a closure o r in the difficult topology that allows a closure by an o p e n i n g and an o p e n i n g by a closure. If there is a " m e a n i n g " o f the w o r l d according to technology, it can only b e measured b y an i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e standard of the non-necessity and of t h e nonnaturality o f t h e w o r l d (that is to say, o f t h e totality o f possible signifyingness), w h i c h also implies its nonhistoricity in the metaphysical and t h e o - t e l e o logical sense o f the w o r d history. S u c h a m e a n i n g , such an absence and such an "absentheism" are quite precisely those o f the technological event itself. T h e r e is thus a p r e c o n d i t i o n that makes the logical a n d philosophical c o n ­ ditions of the W e s t e r n accident possible. T h i s p r e c o n d i t i o n is indissociably his­ torical, technological, and t r a n s c e n d e n t a l — w h i c h also m e a n s necessary as the reason o f philosophy as metaphysics, and nevertheless c o n t i n g e n t because there is n o sufficient reason o f this reason-—if n o t t h e general a n d congenital ( c o n ­ natural) denaturation o f nature that always already harbors, w i t h o u t necessity and w i t h o u t contingency.just as the universe itself is n e i t h e r necessary n o r c o n ­ tingent, the possibility o f technological m a n . (Rousseau, it seems, is the foremost thinker—therefore also the m o s t p r o b ­ lematic'—-of this infinitely twisted d e n a t u r i n g inscription in nature itself, w h i c h is also the inscription o f t h e flight o f t h e gods.) Politics, science, art, and love (a fourfold that, u p o n reflection, is very Rousseauian) each respond, w i t h m u t u a l incommensurability, to the technological c o n d i t i o n in its state of metaphysical a u t o n o m i z a t i o n . E a c h is structured by t h e unassignable character o f its o w n principle and end, each is a t e c h n o l o g y o r a technological configuration, o r rather each opens o n t o an indefinite chain o f technological transformations. T h i s fourfold is as c o n d i t i o n e d as c o n d i t i o n i n g w i t h respect to philosophy. ( O n e could also articulate each o f the four by s h o w i n g that each serves as an e n d for the o t h e r three, in a way that the structure remains always o p e n and c a n n o t be totalized and that, in addition, each " e n d " is i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e w i t h the others w h i l e f o r m i n g simultaneously the telos and the limits o f the others.) B u t this is also, o r first, w h y philosophy as such begins: it begins as a tech­ nology of m e a n i n g a n d / o r of t r u t h . In this sense, it is n o t at all a prolongation o f the mytho-religious world, n o r its o v e r c o m i n g by progress, n o r its Aufliebnng, n o r its decline o r its loss: it is the technological reinscription o f " n a t u r e " and o f the "gods." W h e n m e a n i n g is d e n a t u r e d — o r d e m y t h i f i e d — t r u t h emerges as such: it is a matter o f c o n s t r u c t i n g m e a n i n g (the principle and e n d of B e i n g as. such) o r else p u n c t u a t i n g absence [absens] and, finally, w i t h the t w o always i m p l i -

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Creation as Denaturation cated in any metaphysical c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d d e c o n s t r u c t i o n w o r t h y o f the n a m e . It is n o t a surprise that sophistry, at a given m o m e n t , b e c o m e s the c o r ­ relation a n d c o u n t e r p o i n t o f a technological c o m p l e x (once again c o m m e r c e , law, u r b a n planning, c i t y — i n Asia M i n o r d u r i n g the time o f t h e pre-Socratics). It is n o t only a t e c h n o l o g y o f logos, w h i c h is invented and organized along w i t h o t h e r technologies. W i t h t h e very c o n c e p t o f logos, reaching from the o r d e r o f discourse to that o f verifying autonomy, it is a technology that manages p r o ­ d u c t i o n , n o l o n g e r o f subsistence, n o r even o f a surplus subsistence, b u t of m e a n i n g itself. It is in this sense that I therefore n a m e metaphysics a teclmo-logy: the flight into a verifying a u t o n o m y o f technology, o r o f "denaturation." B u t this a u t o n o m y repeats in an infinite abyss, all o f the constitutive aporias o f the auto- in general. O n e should thus w o n d e r w h e t h e r this explains w h y philosophy w i t h Socrates was presented straightaway as a dialogue w i t h technologies o r their m e t a - t e c h n o l o g i c a l interpellation: b e g i n n i n g w i t h Sophistry, a n d m o d e l i n g itself o n mathematics, t h e arts o f t h e cobbler, carpenter, o r in general. Similarly o n e will recall that A r i s t o d e considered that philosophy could only h a p p e n 6

b e y o n d t h e satisfaction of t h e necessity o f subsistence: as if it itself was the o p e n i n g o f a n o t h e r genre o f satisfaction, b u t in a continuity o r in an analogy o f the technological posture. (We can also consider the wonder that Aristode designates in t h e same passage [and after Plato] as the b e g i n n i n g o f philosophy designates n o t h i n g o t h e r than t h e t e c h n o l o g y p r o p e r to a n o n - k n o w i n g : n o t i g n o r a n c e w a i t i n g for a teacher, n o r i n e x p e r i e n c e in the process o f b e i n g initi­ a t e d — w h i c h are b o t h modalities o f t h e mytho-religious w o r l d — b u t

the

k n o w l e d g e that articulates itself, first, o n its o w n abyss.) O n e could also c o n s i d e r — a n d I c a n n o t dwell o n it as w o u l d b e n e c e s ­ s a r y — t h e possibility, i n d e e d the necessity o f d e t e r m i n i n g the history o f t e c h ­ nologies u p to o u r time w i t h o u t giving it a n o t h e r m e a n i n g in its fundamental c o n t i n g e n c y t h a n t h e indefinite relation o f technology to itself a n d to the escape o f its denaturation. O n e w o u l d have to examine, in this respect, the s u c ­ cession o f technologies o f t h e i m m e d i a t e s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the h u m a n b o d y (tools, arms, clothing), o f the p r o d u c t i o n o f subsistence (agriculture, animal husbandry), o f e x c h a n g e (money, w r i t i n g ) , t h e n , w i t h a n o t h e r t u r n , o f m e a n i n g and t r u t h (sophistical, philosophical), o f wealth as such, o f p r o d u c t i o n itself (capital, labor), o f society (democracy) a n d finally, o f nature itself, or o f its c o m ­ plete denaturation, w h e t h e r by m u t a t i o n o r by total destruction (biological, ecological, ethological engineering) . B u t w h a t w o u l d t h e n give the t o n e and • t h e direction o f this series, its principle a n d its e n d , nonetheless w i t h o u t p r i n ­ ciple or e n d , w o u l d b e t h e "architechnology," the p r o - d u c t i o n o f the pro-ducer, o r t h e ex-position o f the exposed, t h e " n a t u r e " o f m a n as the denaturation in

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h i m o f the w h o l e o f "nature," w h a t w e call today t h e "symbolic," in o t h e r words the o p e n i n g o f an e m p t y space w h e r e t h e infinite " c r e a t i o n " o f the w o r l d is (re)played—unless the possibility arises that the symbolic is barred there a n d disappears there a n d w i t h it h u m a n i t y itself. T h e event o f t e c h n o l o g y — t h a t is t o say, for us, for a l o n g time, history a n d metaphysics as h i s t o r y — w o u l d thus have a m e a n i n g in a sense that w o u l d b e n e i t h e r directional n o r significant: b u t i n t h e sense that w e say that " s o m e o n e has business sense," for example, o r "a musical sense," o r in general w h e n o n e "has a sense" o f this o r that technology, in that sense, t h e n , this w o u l d b e t h e sense of principles a n d ends (of b e i n g as such o r o f existence) there, w h e r e , quite precisely n e i t h e r end, n o r principles, n o r b e i n g are given o r available, a n d w h e r e existence exposes itself, lacking sense, m a k i n g this lack its very t r u t h . Metaphysics is t h e n a m e o f this sense: t h e savoir-faire o f denaturation, o r o f t h e infinitization o f ends. This implies above all n o t a k n o w l e d g e , b u t a n ethos: logos itself as ethos, that is to say, the t e c h n o l o g y o r the art o f standing in and abiding in t h e escape o f the absence. T h e art o f standing, o r w h a t p e r m i t s in general h a v ­ ing o r maintaining a standing in, including, a n d especially, w h e r e there is n o l o n g e r any s u p p o r t o r firm basis for w h a t e v e r stance there is.

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IV

Complements

1 A N o t e on the Term:

Biopolitics

W e have heard quite a bit in recent years a b o u t t h e t e r m biopolitics. T h i s w o r d was created by Foucault. It has b e e n used by several theoreticians in various senses. T h e variety o f these senses and a certain general i n d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the t e r m require a clarification. In particular, t h e use o f similar t e r m s such as " b i o e t h i c s " furthers the c o n ­ fusion since " b i o e t h i c s " is c o n c e r n e d w i t h the m o r a l decisions m a d e w h e n confronted by t h e n e w possibilities o f biological technology (or of " b i o t e c h ­ nology") a n d does n o t claim to designate an ethics generally restricted to the 1

bios. "Biopolitics," o n t h e contrary, seeks to indicate the order o f a politics g e n ­ erally d e t e r m i n e d b y life and devoted to its m a i n t e n a n c e and control. W h a t is m e a n t b y biopolitics, in principle, is n o t "a politics a b o u t life o r living" b u t , rather, "life d e t e r m i n i n g politics," o r else " t h e sphere o f politics coextensive w i t h the sphere o f life."

2

F o r F o u c a u l t , i n a m o r e n a r r o w way, t h e w o r d designated t h e fact that, from t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y o n , t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f h u m a n life

3

b e c a m e an expressly political affair (health, n u t r i t i o n , d e m o g r a p h i c s , e x p o ­ sure t o natural a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l d a n g e r s , etc.). U n t i l that time, p o w e r h a d little interest in this a n d h a d o t h e r objects for its exercise: first a n d foremost, t e r r i t o r y . I have n o t h i n g t o a d d t o this historical thesis, w h i c h is certainly i m p o r t a n t , e x c e p t t h a t it seems t o m e that it w o u l d r e q u i r e a m o r e precise e x a m i n a t i o n o f w h a t t h e biopolitical p r e o c c u p a t i o n s w e r e before t h e m o d ­ e r n era (there was a politics o f w h e a t in R o m e a n d a politics o f b i r t h in A t h e n s , for e x a m p l e ) . Foucault considered that totalitarian politics—Nazi first, socialist as w e l l — w e r e biopolitics because they w e r e devoted, rather than to t h e d o m i n a t i o n o f their adversaries, to t h e mastery o f a p o p u l a t i o n , of a "race," o r o f a " p e o p l e " defined according to n o r m s o f health, o r productive vitality, etc. (Foucault ranks everything u n d e r a very general category o f "racism.") H e r e I will n o t e n t e r

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into the precise examination o f these theses. I believe it necessary, however, to ask if "life" truly constitutes t h e object (real o r imaginary, is n o t t h e issue n o w ) of these powers, o r if it is n o t rather a destinal figure ("race" o r " t h e h u m a n w o r k e r " ) that c o m e s to substitute for the classical figures o f sovereignty. T h e reduction of these figures to "life" is n o t sufficient to g r o u n d their political and affective power. A c c o r d i n g to t h e e x t e n s i o n r e c e n d y given to t h e c o n c e p t , o r r a t h e r a c c o r d i n g to that w h i c h is in reality a c h a n g i n g o f t h e c o n c e p t u n d e r t h e same w o r d , it seems o n e m u s t u n d e r s t a n d t h e following: politics (still assigned to t h e State) progressively takes for its object t h e c o n t r o l l e d m a n a g e m e n t o f natural life. However, it is clear that so-called "natural life," from its p r o d u c t i o n to its conservation, its needs, and its representations, w h e t h e r h u m a n , animal, vegetal, or viral, is henceforth inseparable from a set o f conditions that are referred to as "technological," and w h i c h constitute w h a t must rather b e n a m e d ecotechnol­ ogy w h e r e any k i n d o f n a t u r e " develops for us (and by u s ) . T h a t life is precisely the life that is n o longer simply "life" if o n e understands it as a u t o - m a i n t a i n i n g and auto-affecting.What is revealed, rather, w i t h ecotechnology, is t h e infinitely problematic character o f any " a u t o " in general. It is in this c o n t e x t that a "biopolitics" is possible, since it is defined b y a technological m a n a g e m e n t o f life. This supposes that existence thus m a n a g e d is n o longer, tendentiously, an existence that engages anything else t h a n its r e p r o d u c t i o n and its m a i n t e n a n c e t h r o u g h finalities that remain t h e secrets o f power, unless they are simply blind or purposeless finalities o f the eco-technological totality in m o t i o n . T h u s bios—or life as a " f o r m o f life," as the e n g a g e m e n t o f a m e a n i n g o r of a " b e i n g " — m e r g e s w i t h zoe, bare life, a l t h o u g h such life has, in fact, already b e c o m e techne. Politics is thus implicidy n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n the a u t o - m a n a g e m e n t o f ecotechnology, t h e only form o f possible " a u t o " - n o m y that precisely n o l o n g e r has recourse to any heretofore possible forms o f a politics: n e i t h e r t h e self1

f o u n d i n g "sovereignty,"' since it is n o l o n g e r a m a t t e r o f founding, n o r t h e " d i s ­ cussion c o n c e r n i n g the j u s t i c e " o f an Aristotelian polis, since there is n o l o n g e r a polis, n o r even the contestation o r t h e differend, since living and p o w e r g o in the same direction according to an asymptomatic consensus a n d devoid o f finality, o r o f truth. T h e t e r m biopolitics in fact designates neither life (as the f o r m of life) n o r politics (as a f o r m o f coexistence). A n d w e can certainly a d m i t that in fact w e are n o l o n g e r in a position t o use either o f these t e r m s in any o f their ordinary senses. B o t h are, rather, henceforth subject to w h a t carries t h e m together into ecotechnology.

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Complements B u t t h e n t h e d a n g e r o f t h e w o r d is revealed in that it seems t o a u t h o ­ rize t w o forms o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , b o t h o f w h i c h surreptitiously m a i n t a i n an u n u s u a l sense o f t h e t e r m . O n e can a t t e m p t to t h i n k that this life, r e d u c e d to an absence o f f o r m o t h e r t h a n its m a n a g e m e n t m o t i v a t e d b y an e c o n o m i c a n d social p o w e r that o n l y seeks its m a i n t e n a n c e , finds itself dialectically delivered to an absence o f ends t h r o u g h w h i c h it w o u l d find itself as t h o u g h in its n a s c e n t state, e x p o s e d to t h e absence o f t h e m e a n i n g o f its bare c o n ­ tingency, such that it w o u l d b e therefore capable o f r e c l a i m i n g as its o w n i n v e n t i o n : an indefinite b i r t h , sliding b y its v e r y e r r a n c y a n d b y its absence o f justification o u t s i d e o f t h e d o m i n a t i o n that m a n i p u l a t e s it. T h e f o r m o f life w o u l d b e t h e furtive play o f an elegant w i t h d r a w a l from t h e g r i n d i n g m a c h i n e . O n e can t h i n k o n t h e c o n t r a r y that t h e c o n t r o l thus revealed o f a t e c h n o l o g i c a l p r o d u c t i o n o f life places fife in t h e state o f p r o d u c i n g itself as a whole, and of reappropriating the exteriority of domination in a c o m m o n a u t o - p r o d u c t i o n o r a u t o - c r e a t i o n w h o s e vitality reabsorbs a n d accomplishes, in itself, any politics. In o n e way o r another, b y an emphasis u p o n life itself o r politics r e a p p r o priated in c o m m o n , w h a t is p u t i n t o play again is the twofold dialectical p o s tulation b y w h i c h , o n t h e o n e h a n d , an e x t r e m e figure (previously k n o w n as t h e proletariat) is revealed—the bareness o f w h i c h establishes its t r u t h - c h a r a c ­ t e r — w h i l e , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e p o w e r reappropriated by the living c o m ­ m u n i t y effectuates t h e n e g a t i o n o f political separation. T h i s figuration and this negation have h a u n t e d the Western consciousness ever since the invention o f d e m o c r a c y p u t an e n d to politics f o u n d e d o n figures o f identification. B u t it is clearly insufficient to seek a n e w figure ( w h e t h e r figureless, a n o n y m o u s , and stripped of identity), o r to r e n d e r dialectical t h e negation o f the identificatory pole. T h e s e t w o motifs, o p p o s e d o r conjoined, can give m o m e n t u m , perhaps, to necessary struggles—and there are n u m e r o u s . B u t they c a n n o t address the p r o b l e m o p e n e d by democracy, that is to say, a p r o b l e m posed by e c o t e c h n o l ogy that d e m a n d s , o r that produces, the absence o f separable figure and the absence o f identifiable end: because until this p o i n t it was b e t w e e n figures and ends, b e t w e e n p h e n o m e n a l i z a t i o n o f a teleology and a teleology o f a p h e n o m enalization, that any part o f life a n d / o r o f politics, o f m e a n i n g o f life, o r o f f o r m of politics, has operated. It is n o t a q u e s t i o n h e r e o f d e v e l o p i n g this clarification further. At least it s h o u l d serve to s h o w that w h a t forms a world today is exactly t h e c o n j u n c ­ tion o f an u n l i m i t e d process o f an e c o - t e c h n o l o g i c a l enframing and o f a v a n ­ ishing o f t h e possibilities o f forms o f life a n d / o r o f c o m m o n g r o u n d . T h e " w o r l d " in these c o n d i t i o n s , o r " w o r l d - f o r m i n g , " is only t h e precise f o r m o f this p r o b l e m .

5

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2 Ex Nihilo

Sumimim

( O f Sovereignty)

Sovereignty designates, first, the summit.'' For the pleasure o f language, let us refer to es souvereinites des monts, a twelfth-century translation o f in summits

mon-

7

tium (in the Latin Vulgate bible, cited by La C u r n e ) . T h e s u m m i t towers over and dominates. (Summus, supremus, superanus a r e — i n sum—linguistic cousins.) O n e has said "a large t o w e r that is master and sovereign o f the d o o r of t h e casd e " (Ibid.).The fate o f the w o r d in language pertains to the attribution o f d o m ­ ination to the s u m m i t and, consequendy, to the analogical parallel b e t w e e n height and p o w e r (to w h i c h o n e can add the implication o f value o r excel­ lence).This parallel is itself d o u b l e d in the origin o f the summa, w h i c h pertains to the fact that the s u m o f t h e addition was inscribed o n the summa linea, since the R o m a n s calculated from the base t o t h e height. It follows as well from this history that sovereignty is n o t first o f all t h e quality o f b e i n g at the s u m m i t b u t t h e s u m m i t itself (a t e r m that has a b o t a n i ­ cal sense as well as academic), t h e s u m m i t , t h e sovereign: it does n o t have t h e sense o f an attribute b u t that of the substance o f a subject w h o s e b e i n g consists in height. T h e highest dominates properly only according to the military sense i n d i ­ cated by the example of the "large t o w e r " : from o n h i g h it is easier to survey and strike w h a t is below. S u m m i t s have always b e e n places o f fortresses and citadels. B u t t h e n warlike d o m i n a t i o n immediately involves elevation and alti­ t u d e raised to the sky, standing o u t against the sky, and p e n e t r a t i n g i n t o it. T h e sovereign c o m m u n i c a t e s w i t h the e l e m e n t detached from the earth, freed from gravity. In t h e same way the chief o r the head (the captain, the capital o r capitol) rises above the g r o u n d by virtue o f the erect stance o f the b o d y o f the biped w h o s e straight stance (haughty carriage) casts the gaze into t h e distance, separates t h e hands from the feet, distances the sense o f smell from t h e soil and from its genitals. B u t the sovereign is m o r e than a chief: the chief extends and completes a b o d y ; the sovereign rises above the body. T h e sovereign is at the height because t h e h e i g h t separates t h e top from the b o t t o m and frees the f o r m e r from t h e humility o f t h e latter: from t h e h u m u s , from the back b e n t from w o r k i n g the earth, from laying d o w n in sleep, from malady o r death, and from extended

things in general. E x t e n s i o n holds

everything at the same level, b u t the t h i n g that is n o t e x t e n d e d , w h a t l o o m s over extensions and inspects it, is t h e thinking thing and the subject o f the g e n ­ eral g o v e r n m e n t o f things. In t h e place o f a sensibility o f t h e near, t h r o u g h t o u c h , smell and taste, it makes the organs o f distance, sight and hearing, p r e -

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Complements vail. T h e sovereign is n o t c o n t e n t to react to w h a t surrounds a n d neighbors it; it gathers i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t messages a n d dispositions from distant realities w i t h the aim o f b e i n g able to i m p o s e its law o n t h e m . ( T h e e m b l e m s o f the sovereign are the eagle a n d t h e sun.) T h e sovereign is elevated because h e i g h t separates. T h e separation ensures t h e distinction a n d t h e distinction ensures t h e differentiation o f levels necessary to establish a hierarchy that is less a sacred c o m m a n d m e n t than t h e sacred char­ acter o f a c o m m a n d m e n t , o r o f g o v e r n m e n t as such: its separate, discrete, secret, and w i t h d r a w n nature. Its withdrawal gathers it in itself b y r e m o v i n g it from the d e p e n d e n c y o f things pressed against each other, entangled in t h e action and reactions o f the others. T h e sovereign is separated from this d e p e n d e n c e and this endless e x c h a n g e o f m e a n s a n d ends. It is itself neither a means n o r an e n d . It is o f a n o t h e r order, o f an o r d e r that indexes any horizontality, its t h i c k ­ ness a n d its c o n n e c t i o n s , o n a p e r p e n d i c u l a r verticality.The sovereign does n o t only t o w e r over: it is transversal. As summit (summum, supremus), the sovereign is n o t only elevated: it is the highest. Its n a m e is a superlative: literally w h a t raises itself above from below, and w h a t is n o longer comparable o r relative. It is n o longer in relation, it is absolution. T h e sovereign is t h e highest, it is t h e extremity o f elevation: it is the m o s t high. T h e M o s t H i g h is t h e o n e w h o s e h e i g h t is n o longer relative, a n d even n o t relative to lesser heights. It is H e i g h t itself, all h e i g h t a n d n o t h i n g b u t height (grammatically, it is in fact w h a t w e call an absolute superlative) . T h e M o s t H i g h does n o t allow m e a s u r e m e n t . It escapes observation w h i l e at the same time it is inaccessible to scaling. It does n o t exactly pertain to the opposition b e t w e e n t h e t o p a n d the b o t t o m b u t rather t o t h e difference b e t w e e n t h e h e i g h t and w h a t has n e i t h e r h e i g h t n o r d e p t h (altus has b o t h senses).The M o s t H i g h is the Inequivalent itself. It is n o t equivalent to any k i n d o f equivalence or inequiva­ lence. It is, to t h e contrary, o n its basis alone that s o m e t h i n g like the register o f equivalence o r inequivalence can b e posited. T h e M o s t H i g h is the o n e o r that toward w h i c h the head itself c a n n o t t u r n w i t h o u t t o p p l i n g i m m e d i a t e l y off t h e axis that attaches it to the body. It ceases t h e n to b e the head. E i t h e r it loses itself in t h e h e i g h t o r it falls back into the equivalence o f t h e b o d y w i t h itself. T h e M o s t H i g h can only p r o d u c e o n e thing: vertigo. T h e vertigo is that w h i c h takes h o l d at the s u m m i t . Vertex is a n o t h e r n a m e for the s u m m i t . It is the p o i n t w h e r e the vertical is at its peak: it returns there (vertere) o n itself, n o longer having r o o m to g o h i g h e r since it is t h e highest possible elevation.Vertigo is the .affect o f the s u m m i t . It is the apprehension o f t h e incommensurability b e t w e e n t h e horizontal a n d t h e vertical, b e t w e e n the base and t h e s u m m i t . It is the ver­ tigo o f the absolute insofar as it is w i t h o u t any relations: in the absence o f the

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slightest relation it can only t u r n o n itself. B u t it is in this sense that the sover­ eign must d e t e r m i n e any establishment o f relations o r their regulations. T h e sovereign has h a d a certain t w i n in language a n d in t h o u g h t : the s u z e r a i n . T h e t w o terms have at times shared o r e x c h a n g e d their significations. T h e y also have t h e same root in t h e sus, the dessus, a n d the au-dessus.They

are

t w o forms of the superior. However, in the e n d , the sovereign is i n c o m m e n s u ­ rable w i t h the suzerain.This is precisely t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e transition from feu­ dalism to the m o d e r n political age. T h e suzerain occupies a certain height w i t h i n an ordered system. T h e suzerain has the vassal (originally the servant) b e n e a t h it.Vassal a n d suzerain are b o u n d to each o t h e r by a reciprocal o a t h o f allegiance a n d assistance. T h e o a t h pledges fidelity, that is to say, loyalty. T h e feudal o r d e r — w h i c h involves t h e r e g i m e o f the fief—rests

o n the loyalty pledged b e t w e e n vassals a n d suzerains.

T h i s loyalty is exercised in b o t h directions, a n d w i t h i n t h e fief, w h i c h is the d o m a i n over w h i c h the lordship rules, w h i c h , at first, is the a u t h o r i t y o f the elder (senior). T h e elder is n o t the highest: t h e succession o f ages depends o n nature, it does n o t d e f i n e — n o t exacdy o r entirely—a difference in the same way that height does. T h e elder is always b e h i n d o n e older still, even if the dead father. T h e right is thus an ancestral o n e : it is n o t conferred according to t h e absolute­ ness o f height in itself. T h i s is w h y there are several heights o f lordship, a n d the sire (the o t h e r n a m e for lord) can b e d u k e o r marquis, simple k n i g h t o r b a r o n . H e r e , the b o n d , the manifold o f b o n d s that founds the fiefs a n d the vassalages, takes p r e c e d e n c e over p o w e r ; it gives it its raison d'etre. In a certain m a n n e r , p o w e r is here b o u n d from the outset. In t h e case o f sovereignty, o n t h e contrary, it is p o w e r that founds a n d forms the b o n d . T h e b o n d is n o t o n e o f loyalty b u t authority, in the precise sense that the sovereign is the a u t h o r o f the law, whereas loyalty supposes a law that precedes it. T h e feudal order is itself subordinated to an a u t h o r i t y that surpasses any suzerain: that o f the only lord that merits the tide in an absolute sense, O u r Lord, the All-Mighty, the creator a n d r e d e e m e r o f t h e world. N o d o u b t , his­ torically, the feudal order was nevertheless the source o f the conditions o f a duality of p o w e r s — t e m p o r a l a n d s p i r i t u a l — w h i c h opens the way to an a u t o n ­ o m y o f t h e first. B u t the feudal o r d e r only b e c o m e s properly a u t o n o m o u s w i t h the principle (this is i n d e e d the right t e r m : it is the province o f the Prince) o f sovereignty. T h e sovereign is n o t a suzerain a m o n g others; it is freed from any b o n d . Therefore, it n o longer has vassals, only subjects. ( O n this a c c o u n t the entire w o r l d will b e c o m e subject a n d the lowest vas­ sals will n o l o n g e r have servants b e n e a t h t h e m , servants attached to the glebe.

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Complements T h e r e will n o l o n g e r b e an e m i n e n t p r o p e r t y o f t h e glebe, b u t o n the contrary the subjects will all b e c o m e proprietors. W i t h respect to the p r o p r i e t o r in the modern

sense, the suzerain disappears w i t h o u t b e c o m i n g sovereign. T h e

suzerain has authority, b u t it is n o t d u e to its property. It does n o t have to give it a law b u t has only to enjoy it, o r if this w o r d is t o o noble, to profit from it.) T h e subject o f t h e sovereign can b e u n d e r s t o o d in t w o ways: as t h e o n e w h o is s u b j e c t e d t o t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e sovereign, o r as t h e o n e w h o c r e ­ ates a n d a u t h o r i z e s this a u t h o r i t y . T h i s a m p h i b o l o g y leads in a c o n t i n u o u s m a n n e r from m o n a r c h y t o d e m o c r a c y . T h e sovereign p e o p l e possess n o t h i n g less a n d n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h e absolute m o n a r c h : namely, t h e v e r y exercise o f sovereignty. T h i s exercise is n o t h i n g o t h e r than t h e establishment o f the State and of its law, o r o f t h e law that makes a State. It supposes that n o t h i n g either precedes it o r supercedes it, that n o a u t h o r i t y o r instituting force has b e e n exercised before it. Sovereignty is the e n d o f any political theology: if it b o r r o w s the fig­ ure o f divine law it does so precisely to m o d e l this figure o n t h e features o f the sovereign. T h e s e features are defined b y t h e following a m p h i b o l o g y : it is the subject o f t h e exercise to w h i c h it is subjected. W h e r e divine a u t h o r i t y operated b e t w e e n creator and creaturfr—that is to say, t h r o u g h an absolute difference in nature, b u t w h e r e the creature c a m e from t h e act o f the c r e a t o r — t h e r e , t h e difference disappears in favor of an e x c e p ­ tional identity, w h i c h is precisely that o f t h e sovereign. W h a t e v e r its concrete d e t e r m i n a t i o n may b e (republic o f a prince, o f a council, o r a people), sover­ eignty must b e identical to itself in its institution and its exercise. It has n o o u t ­ side to precede, found, o r duplicate. T h e sovereign is a relation t o itself (to itself as to t h e law), a n d it is o n l y that (while t h e c r e a t o r is essentially o n l y a relation to t h e o t h e r , a n d the b o n d o f loyalty also d e p e n d s o n this relation). A twofold c o n s e q u e n c e fol­ lows from this: •

T h e first c o n c e r n s t h e so called m o t i f o f "secularization": w i t h o u t w i s h i n g to e n t e r i n t o t h e i m m e n s e debate a r o u n d this c o n c e p t , I suggest simply here that m o d e r n sovereignty (sovereignty as a m o d e r n concept, the o n e that is attributed expressly to J e a n Bodin* a n d also anticipated in the w o r k o f Machiavelli) is n o t the secularization o f a divine sovereignty, precisely because divine sovereignty contains, by definition, the s u p r e m e reason and p o w e r that m o d e r n sovereignty is assigned w i t h giving;

•

T h e second c o n s e q u e n c e consists in referring to the sovereign the constitu­ tive problematic o f t h e relation to self o r o f a u t o position in general: t h e self o f a relation to self c a n n o t be given p r i o r to this relation itself, since it is the

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relation chat makes the self (self m e a n s relation to self and there is n o case in w h i c h there is a subject of self). The

sovereign does n o t find a sovereignty

that is given: it m u s t constitute it a n d thus constitute itself as sovereign. Each of these implications contain, in turn, several others, and in particular: •

F r o m the first, it is necessary to c o n c l u d e that G o d , o r t h e divine, in g e n ­ eral, can in n o way b e "secularized," since "secularity" designates the o r d e r external t o divinity, w h i c h can only b e u n d e r s t o o d in a r e g i m e o f distinc­ tion (either m o r t a l / i m m o r t a l , o r c e n t u r y / e t e r n i t y , o r w o r l d / k i n g d o m o f G o d ) ; it means either that politics can never absorb religion if religion has a p r o p e r consistency o r that there is n o a u t o n o m o u s religion and that it is always the i n s t r u m e n t o f a politics that t h r o u g h it gives itself the ultimate agency of authority and o f legitimacy (perhaps that m u s t yet be stated o t h ­ erwise, by distinguishing religion as always political in o n e way o r another, and t h e relation to the divine that should be n a m e d otherwise, a p o i n t that I leave o p e n here).

•

F r o m w h a t precedes, o n e will c o n c l u d e also that the possibility o f the dis­ tinctions thus presented pertains to the W e s t e r n - m o n o t h e i s t i c articulation o f the " d i v i n e " : in w h a t is called " p o l y t h e i s m " there is n o separation o f politics a n d religion (in a sense o n e could say there is n e i t h e r o n e n o r the other); for m o n o t h e i s m , o n the contrary, there is a tension b e t w e e n the separation o f the two and the effacement o f the o n e by the other.

•

F r o m the second implication, o n e will c o n c l u d e that sovereignty can only b e defined as an institution (in the active and transitive sense of the t e r m , a n d here precisely as an institution o f self)—an infinite institution that n e v ­ ertheless includes w i t h i n it the i m p e r i o u s necessity o f the finite m o m e n t o f its institution (this time in the conjunctive senses o f t h e instituting and t h e instituted): there is thus an intimate contradiction o f sovereignty and, t h r o u g h it, o f m o d e r n politics, (that is, atheological), w h i c h is perhaps also, as I j u s t suggested, politics p u r e and simple. T h e sovereignty o f the p e o p l e designates very clearly, in Rousseau's w o r k ,

the m o s t radical state o f the sovereign contradiction: in distinction from t h e m o n a r c h w h o could h i d e b e h i n d a divine reference, h o w e v e r formal it may b e , as sovereign the people must b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h e subject o r the b o d y that forms itself: such is the object o f t h e contract that b e c o m e s , in R o u s s e a u , in addition to a pact o f security, t h e very institution o f the contractors and their body, in o t h e r words, h u m a n i t y itself as it is stated in The Social Contract.'' T h e sovereign p e o p l e are a people w h o constitute themselves as subjects in all senses

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Complements of t h e w o r d : namely, as the self-relation o f each in the relations o f all to the o t h ­ ers and as the subjection o f all to this relation. B u t since the relation to self is infinite, the people is also infinitely lacking to, o r in excess o f itself. In this sense, t h e m o d e r n political question could be r e d u c e d to the q u e s ­ tion o f sovereignty: D o e s n ' t it define the political impasse par excellence as the impasse o f subjectivity? A n d , if that is t h e case, can w e either conceive o f a n o n subjective sovereignty o r conceive o f a nonsovereign politics? O r rather, must w e t h i n k o f t h e t w o things together? Sovereignty itself, as a s u m m i t , poses t h e p r o b l e m o f the nature o f the s u m ­ mit. W h a t is its relation to t h e base and w h a t results from it for its p r o p e r c o n ­ stitution? D o e s t h e s u m m i t rest o n the base, does it lean o n it, o r does it detach from it and accede to a n o t h e r ontological sphere? Is t h e s u m m i t t h e region, tangential to t h e sky, w h e r e elevation takes place, reverses the ascent i n t o a descent and, thus r e t u r n i n g u p o n itself, attaches its h e i g h t t o t h e soil, giving it thus b o t h its e q u i l i b r i u m and its dimension? O r is it t h e p o i n t w h e r e t h e elevation b e c o m e s absolute, cutting itself from the soil and from the base and indicating a completely different agency that relates less to w h a t it overhangs than to t h e fact that n o t h i n g hangs over it? In t h e first hypothesis, t h e s u m m i t subsumes and assumes the base that, after all, is its base, the foundation and the seat o f its o w n being. B u t in this sense, t h e highest is never t h e M o s t H i g h , never the absolute height. It is always situated at a relative altitude, and, finally, n o d o u b t it is always, at b o t t o m , primus inter partes. T h i s also implies that this s u m m i t is in an essential relation w i t h a b o t t o m , w h i c h is also a g r o u n d , a seat, a place, and an assurance that is also a resource and a capital o f authority, o f legitimacy, a n d o f the p o w e r of execution. A n d since I have s p o k e n o f capital: In this acceptation, is the s u m m i t the same as capital? O r m o r e exacdy, does capital proceed from that structure according to w h i c h t h e s u m m i t accumulates and enables the resources o f the base, as well as its p r o d u c t i o n s from the place w h e r e they d o n o t simply r e p r o ­ d u c e t h e base itself? To w h a t e x t e n t is c a p i t a l — w h i c h I understand clearly here in the Marxist sense—linked to sovereignty? To w h a t extent is the n o n t h e o logical a u t o n o m y o f t h e State substantially linked to the accumulation—also n o n t h e o l o g i c a l — o f wealth, that is to say, o f t h e riches that n o l o n g e r shine for a sacred glory b u t for itself and for its o w n p r o d u c t i o n ? W i t h capital, in any case, it is clear that the s u m m i t accomplishes an accumulation of a mass, a sum, and that this mass m u s t n o t cease to g r o w : t h e capital is sovereign in t h e sense that it only serves itself. T h e w o r d capital defines wealth as sovereign: it is dis­ tinguished

from

the wealth that serves t h e needs o f necessity, and from the

wealth that serves n o p u r p o s e except to c o n c e n t r a t e (and that dispenses and that disperses) a h i e r o p h a n t i c eclat. H e r e w e find the reason for t h e c o u p l i n g o f

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the sovereign m o d e r n state and capital: the a u t o finality, w h i c h also presents itself as a finality w i t h o u t end, o r in t h e a u t o p r i n c e d o m that gives itself its o w n investiture. In t h e s e c o n d hypothesis, sovereignty is essentially different from mastery, according to the way o f t h i n k i n g that was, t o t h e p o i n t o f paroxysm, that o f Bataille. Mastery may very well only serve itself b u t it is still a service: it s u b ­ mits to its project, o r to the project that it is. T h e master is himself the project o f subjecting the slave to himself, and, t h r o u g h t h e slave, o f assuring a m e a n s o f existence, w h i c h forms the o r d e r to w h i c h the slave has submitted from t h e outset. T h e master is submitted to this submission, w h i c h is, in t h e last account, submission to means geared to an e n d w h o s e final dignity remains obscure: W h y m u s t existence maintain itself (as if it b e l o n g e d to these things w h o s e b e i n g seems constituted by an inert persistence)? U n d e r these conditions the sovereign is the o n e w h o d e t a c h e d itself from mastery and its fundamental servility. It is n o t that the sovereign r e n o u n c e s mastery, at least n o t as a g o o d that it w o u l d a b a n d o n for a s u p e r i o r g o o d . T h e sovereign does n o t weigh o r calculate mastery according to s o m e scale o f val­ ues. It stands exclusively and straightaway at the h e i g h t o f absolute value. This height is thus altitude in itself, elevation that has ascended to t h e s u m ­ m i t w i t h o u t t h e ascension representing any process o f accumulation or c o n ­ quest, any progression toward an e n d . In t r u t h , it c a n n o t even b e a question o f ascending to the s u m m i t . It is a d e t a c h e d s u m m i t , w i t h o u t any contact w i t h t h e outside o f t h e w h o l e structure built u p o n the base: a n d since this outside is n o t h i n g , and there can be n o question o f access, o r an access that can be i m m e ­ diately e x p e r i e n c e d as a p e n e t r a t i o n into n o t h i n g , sovereignty turns o u t stricdy to b e that nothing itself. (As w e know, Bataille was given to write, "sovereignty is N O T H I N G , " w h e r e the capital letters are m e a n t to raise an infinite irony in the face o f any effort to capitalize t h e absolute sovereign.) N o t b e i n g anything [rien] or, even m o r e precisely, b e i n g nothing, sovereignty is nonetheless s o m e thing: it is that very particular thing that nothing [rien] is. N o t " t h e nothing," as if it was an entity, and specifically, the entity o f a negation o f b e i n g . T h a t is w h a t is called,"nothingness" ["le neant"]. Nothingness is n o t n o t h ­ ing [rien]: it is that w h i c h b e i n g turns into as soon as it is posited for itself and as unilateral. W h e t h e r o n e considers, w i t h Hegel, that b e i n g pure and simple is pure abstraction, o r o n e thinks w i t h H e i d e g g e r that being, o r to be, cannot be s o m e ­ thing that is an entity, o n e must resolve to think of b e i n g as its o w n effacement that negates it and, while negating it, allows for the spacing o f the concrete. T h e r e is n o ontology w i t h o u t the dialectic o r the paradox of a meontology. O n the o t h e r h a n d , nothing [rien] is the t h i n g itself, res: the first sense o f " n o t h i n g " is " s o m e thing"(for example, w e still say today: " I t is n o t possible to

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Complements think n o t h i n g a b o u t s o m e t h i n g w e k n o w n o t h i n g about," w h e r e w e clearly hear " s o m e t h i n g " ) . If nothing has slid, t h r o u g h the negation " n o . . . t h i n g " ["ne . . . rien"] to a privative sense.it is by k e e p i n g t h e sense o f " t h e t h i n g " : " o n e m u s t t h i n k n o t h i n g " signifies " o n e m u s t t h i n k n o thing," thus, " n o t a thing, n o t a single thing." Nothing is t h e t h i n g t e n d i n g toward its p u r e and simple b e i n g o f a thing, consequently also toward t h e m o s t c o m m o n b e i n g o f something a n d thus toward the vanishing, m o m e n t a r y quality o f t h e smallest a m o u n t of b e i n g ness [etantite]. T h a t w h i c h is n o t h i n g is w h a t subsists this side o f o r b e y o n d subsistence, o f substance a n d o f subject. It is w h a t realizes o r reifies existence right w h e r e it is d e t a c h e d from its o w n position: r i g h t w h e r e it exceeds the stance, t h e sta­ tion, a n d t h e stability o f beings.This p o i n t is its contact w i t h t h e b e i n g that p e r ­ meates it: it is the p o i n t o f cancellation o f the ontological difference. B u t this dif­ ference is cancelled only t h r o u g h b e i n g infinitely sharpened. It is thus the p o i n t w h e r e existence exists as t h e e n g a g i n g o f its very being. H e i d e g g e r names it Dasein: b e i n g t h e " t h e r e , " b e i n g that "there," w h i c h is the very p o i n t w h e r e t h e entity itself opens b e i n g . T h e sovereign is t h e existent w h o d e p e n d s u p o n n o t h i n g — n o finality, n o o r d e r o f p r o d u c t i o n o r subjection, w h e t h e r it c o n c e r n s the agent o r the patient o r t h e cause o r the effect. D e p e n d e n t u p o n n o t h i n g , it is entirely delivered over to itself, insofar as precisely, t h e "itself" n e i t h e r precedes n o r founds it b u t is the nothing, the very t h i n g from w h i c h it is suspended. Nothing as a s u m m i t , acme, o r h e i g h t o f existence: separated from the exis­ tent itself. Sovereignty essentially eludes the sovereign. If sovereignty did n o t elude it, the sovereign w o u l d in n o way [en rien] b e sovereign. T h e same c o n d i t i o n that ensures that sovereignty receive its concept also deprives it o f its p o w e r : that is, the absence o f superior o r foundational a u t h o r ­ ity. For t h e sovereign authority must b e essentially occupied w i t h founding itself o r w i t h o v e r c o m i n g itself in order to legislate p r i o r to o r in excess o f any law. In a rigorous sense, the sovereign foundation is infinite, o r rather, sovereignty is never founded. It w o u l d , rather, b e defined by the absence o f foundation o r p r e ­ supposition: neither in Athens n o r in R o m e was there a p u r e absence o f p r e ­ supposition p r i o r to the law. S o m e t h i n g o f the divine o r of destiny remains. O n that basis, if t h e sovereign exercises its power, it is entirely o n the c o n ­ dition o f the "state o f e x c e p t i o n " w h e r e laws are suspended. T h e fundamental illegitimacy that is in this case the c o n d i t i o n o f legitimacy m u s t legitimize itself. T h a t can b e u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s o f w h a t Carl Schmitt calls "political t h e o l ­ ogy," given that this theology, nevertheless, is in n o way theological, o r it only

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retains from theology an atheological idea o f all-powerfulness. O n e e n c o u n t e r s again the debate o n secularization, w h e r e w e could say that S c h m i t t conserves t h e attributes o f G o d w i t h o u t its p e r s o n , w h i l e B l u m e n b e r g proposes to t h i n k that w i t h o u t the p e r s o n the attributes also change their change. W h a t t h e n is the all-powerfulness o f t h e people? T h i s is the question. A n d perhaps it is absolutely necessary for d e m o c r a c y to be able to envisage this q u e s ­ tion w h i l e maintaining the principle o f the nothing o f sovereignty. B e i n g n o t h ­ ing, o r b e i n g founded o n nothing, does n o t m e a n b e i n g powerless [ne rien pouvoir]: it means to found and measure p o w e r by that nothing w h i c h is the very thing o f the reality of the people: its nature as nonfoundational, nontranscendent (at least in the usual sense), nonsacred, nonnatural etc. Res publico, summa

res—nihil.

If sovereignty is n o t a substance that is given, it is because it is the reality that the people must give themselves, insofar as it is n o t , itself, a substance o r a given subject. A people are always their o w n invention. B u t it can also invent itself by giving itself a sovereign and by giving itself to a sovereign or even by giving the sovereignty to itself. In each case the people d e t e r m i n e themselves differendy and d e t e r m i n e the very sense o f the w o r d people differendy: assem­ bled people, subjected people, insurgent p e o p l e — o r rather: people as a body, p e o p l e as a group, p e o p l e in secession. C o n s t i t u t i n g sovereignty, alienating sov­ ereignty, revolutionary sovereignty. It is always a m a t t e r o f the combinatory, o f t h e intersection or t h e disjunction of these agencies: and, consequently, of w h a t remains b e t w e e n t h e m as the e m p t y space o f sovereignty "itself." As the highest, the absolutely high, the sovereign detaches itself from the b o t t o m . T h e r e is n o l o n g e r a relation to the b o t t o m . T h e sovereign does n o t even l o o k from top to b o t t o m . It does n o t b e h o o v e it to descend n o r c o n d e s c e n d . T h e sovereign only has a relation w i t h w h a t is n o t the b o t t o m as the c o r ­ relate o f the top, following the measure o f a scale, b u t rather t h e d e p t h , t h e c o r ­ relate o f the elevated according to the boundlessness [demesure] o f the absolute: t h e d e p t h and t h e altitude are equally d e t a c h e d (ab-solute). T h e sovereign a n d the f o u n d e r are correlates and conjoined as t w o absolutes or two sides o r m o m e n t s o f the same absolute. T h e o n e w h o founds is sovereign (this is the dynastic, imperial, familial, hierarchical, and h i e r o p h a n tic aspect)—the line o f the furrow b y w h i c h R o m u l u s consecrates the s o i l — a n d t h e o n e w h o is sovereign founds (this is the princely, singular, decisive aspect that seizes o p p o r t u n i t i e s — t h e strike o f the sword b r o u g h t by R o m u l u s to R e m u s ) . T h e ambiguity of sovereign violence is b e t w e e n these t w o blades, of the p l o w or o f the sword, o r in the fact that the same blade can serve b o t h p u r ­ poses. B u t it lies equally in the fact that t h e foundation is w i t h o u t g r o u n d , and that the furrow w h e r e o n e lays the first stone is also a gaping gash.

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Complements Today, however, w e are n o t in this ambiguity: w e are n o t able to grasp a f o u n d i n g violence (or w h a t could b e the p r o l o n g a t i o n o f it: a war that o n e could call " j u s t " — w h e t h e r it b e a foreign w a r — b e t w e e n established sover­ eignties—or a civil w a r — i n order to retake o r refound a sovereignty).Violence has b e c o m e unilateral. It appears t h e n , and sovereignty w i t h it, as p u r e violence, straightaway and definitively deprived o f legitimacy, openly installing its illegit­ imacy in t h e guise o f p o w e r . T h a t this violence is increasingly realized as a v i o ­ lence o f capital m e a n s that t h e sum is installed in the place o f the summit, and h e n c e t h e infinity o f the a c c u m u l a t i o n in t h e place of the absolute in act. T h e c o u p l i n g o f the sovereign state a n d capital enters into dehiscence. Self-founda­ tion a n d self-accumulation b e c o m e h e t e r o n o m o u s . Capital n o longer has a n e e d o f t h e State (or in a limited way), and t h e State n o l o n g e r k n o w s o n w h a t to f o u n d itself o r w h a t it founds. In a parallel way, capital n o l o n g e r needs borders—at least m a n y o f t h e m , and that w h i c h replaces t h e borders is o f the o r d e r of a delimitation o f "zones," w h i c h are o f a different order. W i t h t h e border, w i t h the territory and w i t h the nation-state, local constraints, subjections forbidding access to the p r o d u c t i o n o f h u m a n i t y by itself a n d subservience to particular sovereignties disappear. B u t the marks o f sovereign d e t e r m i n a t i o n are also effaced: a circumscription that permits the inscription o f a s u m m i t . T h e r e is n o w o r l d s u m m i t : o r w o u l d it be necessary, rather, to conceive o f the w o r l d itself, n o t according to a renewed sovereignty b u t in place o f any sovereignty? Posed in M a r x i a n t e r m s , t h e q u e s t i o n is o f k n o w i n g if, how, and w h e n the process o f capital m a k e s necessary a n d possible, n o t the restoration o f statebased sovereignty, b u t t h e reclamation o f sovereignty at its roots, w h i c h is noth­ ing a n d in this nothing t h e t h i n g itself, w h i c h is precisely n o t a root b u t the s u m m i t , the inverted radicality o f t h e u n c o m p r o m i s i n g , inconsistent, and absolutely resistant s u m m i t : t h e s u m m i t as ex nihilo, w h e n c e a w o r l d can e m e r g e — o r its contrary. O r perhaps it is a q u e s t i o n — i n o t h e r terms o r by slightly shifting the p r o b ­ l e m — o f separating politics from sovereignty. T h a t is to say that it w o u l d b e a question t h e n o f assuming that "politics" n o l o n g e r designates the assumption o f a subject o r in a subject ( w h e t h e r i n d i ­ vidual o r collective, w h e t h e r conceived as a natural organic unity, or as a spiri­ tual entity, as an Idea, o r as a Destiny), b u t designates the order of the subjectless regulation o f t h e relation b e t w e e n subjects: as individual as collective or c o m m u n i t a r i a n subjects, groups o f different kinds, families o f different sorts, interest groups, w h e t h e r labor o r leisure, local o r moral affinities, etc. T h e m a i n a x i o m here w o u l d b e that these groupings are n o t subsumable u n d e r a sole c o m m o n b e i n g o f s u p e r i o r rank.

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T h e political order w o u l d define its regulation by an equality and b y a j u s ­ tice that w o u l d n o t postulate an assumption o f a subject. In that sense politics w o u l d b e subjectless: n o t that it does n o t require agents, b u t it w o u l d n o t claim t o f o r m by itself a place o f identity o r a r e t u r n to the self. It w o u l d , o n t h e c o n ­ trary, define a space w i t h o u t r e t u r n to t h e identical. O n e needs to consider the following: 1. T h e invention o f sovereignty has decidedly n o t b e e n the secularized tran­ scription o f a political theology b u t the creation of a n atheological a s s u m p ­ tion (echoing, to b e sure, s o m e t h i n g o f the G r e e k polis a n d of the R o m a n R e p u b l i c , b u t w i t h o u t the resource o f a religion o f t h e polis a n d w i t h o u t slavery—and in a generally atheistic a n d capitalistic c o n t e x t ) : this assumption postulated b o t h , w i t h o u t k n o w i n g it, the institution o f t h e State (self-stabil­ ity) and the dissolution o f that State (or apparatus) in a c o m m u n i t y — a c o n ­ tradictory postulation w h o s e dissolution w e are dealing w i t h ; 2 . T h e current situation is that o f having to reinvent politics otherwise, by reconsidering it o n the basis o f its double withdrawal, in t h e m a n a g e m e n t of "civil society" (itself issued from a dehiscence o f the civitas) a n d / o r in the assumption o f a c o m m o n b e i n g (destinal a n d ontological sense o f "politics"). N e i t h e r o f these withdrawals guarantees a politics: b u t they p r o d u c e , o n the o n e hand, management"

that manages n o t h i n g , a n d o n the o t h e r hand, the

paranoia o f identity, w h i c h demolishes all identities. It follows that t h e twofold withdrawal traces the c o n t o u r s o f w h a t remains to b e : an agency that regulates the organization o f the c o m m o n w i t h o u t t h e assumption o f a c o m m o n s u b ­ stance o r subjectivity. T h e difficulty is o f conceiving o f politics w i t h o u t a subject: n o t w i t h o u t a u t h o r i t y o r d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p o w e r — b u t w i t h o u t a self that reaps, in the end, the benefits o f its action. T h e difficulty is as simple as it is daunting: namely, that power, w i t h o u t w h i c h it is poindess to speak o f politics, is only exercised against its will. T h i s is the p r o b l e m o f equality in w h i c h political m o d e r n i t y consists— and sovereignty itself, as s o o n as it defines a s u m m i t that is n o t measured by any given height. Liberty a n d fraternity, together, could represent this absence o f given height (of foundation, o f father). T h e sovereign c a n n o t b e a father—or else t h e father must b e the very p e r s o n o f t h e n o t h i n g ( n o t h i n g o r " n o o n e " ["personne"] is the same " t h i n g " ) . " At this p o i n t the perspective is reversed: the " p e r s o n o f the n o t h i n g " ( w h o c a n n o t t h e n b e either a p u r e nothingness o r " n o o n e " ) o r t h e "nonsubjective a g e n c y " (which nevertheless c a n n o t b e an object).This is w h a t outlines exactly, a r o u n d a hollow, the c o n t o u r s o f sovereignty. To separate politics from sover-

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Complements eignty poses a p r o b l e m , a p r o b l e m w h o s e schema is that o f an antisovereignty, of a negative sovereignty, o f a sovereignty w i t h o u t sovereignty: in sum, the schema o f sovereignty itself, o r t h e schema o f t h e "very h i g h " w i t h o u t altitude n o r vantage p o i n t . It is n o t sufficient, indeed, to designate politics as a regulatory organ o f j u s ­ tice and o f equality b e t w e e n the u n e q u a l and h e t e r o g e n e o u s spheres o f c o m ­ m o n existence (accepting that " c o m m o n existence" is a pleonasm). It is still necessary that this vanishing fine, o r infinite perspective ("justice and equal­ ity"), trace a recognizable figure, n o t as a face b u t as a tracing o f m e a n i n g . H o w can there b e a m e a n i n g that is transversal o r transcendent t o all spheres of m e a n i n g , a t r u t h o f all meanings, in s u m , and w h i c h , nevertheless, does n o t assume a subject, a substance, or, in the end, a T r u t h ? T h e creation o f such a m e a n i n g — t h e constituting, instituting, legislating gesture, a gesture that is always b o t h foundational a n d revolutionary—is the p r o p e r c o n c e r n of sover­ eignty. It is t h e c o n c e r n , therefore, o f that w h i c h carries in itself, o f necessity, its own emptying.

Post-Scriptum F r o m w h a t p r e c e d e s , it m u s t follow that i n s t i t u t i n g sovereignty c a n n o t be itself instituted. B e t t e r still, t h e r e is n o t , in a general way, an i n s t i t u t e d sov­ ereignty: contradictio in adjecto.The

s u m m i t bases itself as m u c h as it " s u m m i t s

itself." S o v e r e i g n t y takes place i n t h o u g h t as t h o u g h t . H e g e l u n d e r s t o o d this b y w r i t i n g that o n l y p h i l o s o p h y c o n t e m p l a t e s t h e majesty o f t h e sovereign.

12

T h a t m e a n s that t h e exercise o f sovereignty is t h e exercise o f t h o u g h t , at least if t h o u g h t is u n d e r s t o o d as t h e act o f reason in its m o s t o n t o l o g i c a l a n d n o n gnosological sense (reason as ratio, a m e a s u r e o f t h e i m m e a s u r a b l e s u m m i t ) . Precisely w h e n t h e sovereign w a s a k i n g , royalty had t o be t h o u g h t as such in o r d e r to b e royal ( t h o u g h t : s y m b o l i z e d , r e p r e s e n t e d , e x p e r i e n c e d , h o n ­ o r e d , a n d this t o t h e h e a r t o f its b e i n g - n o t h i n g ) . T h e d e c a p i t a t i o n o f t h e k i n g signifies t h e laying b a r e o f t h e t h o u g h t o f sovereignty: its message p r o c l a i m e d in all t h e heads. T h i s implies that its exercise is t h e same exercise o f that w h i c h w e call " c i t i z e n s h i p " o r "politics." Q u i t e plainly, it c a n n o t m a k e p h i l o s o p h e r s , as specialists o f a k i n d o f discourse, i n t o e x c e p t i o n a l citizens: that m e a n s , o n t h e contrary, that political t h i n k i n g in act, o r t h e political act, t h a t is, t h e t h i n k i n g act, is at stake i n t h e actual actions o f all citizens, a n d o f e v e r y o n e , a n d that e v e r y o n e m u s t have access to t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f this t h o u g h t in act. B u t t h a t refers necessarily also t o t h e u n i q u e p r o x i m i t y o f p h i l o s o p h e r s w i t h politics, from P l a t o t o H e g e l , to M a r x , a n d to H e i d e g g e r

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himself: this p r o x i m i t y defines t h e indistinct z o n e w h e r e k n o w l e d g e can will itself all powerful b u t w h e r e , in a s y m m e t r i c a l m a n n e r , t h e sovereign p o w e r addresses its o w n t h i n k i n g to itself.

P.-S.

2

T h e apolitical f o r m o f c o n t e m p o r a r y politics (the passage to t h e limit o f t h e State) has already b e e n n a m e d " E m p i r e " several rimes (just as imperialism has b e e n linked to the d e v e l o p m e n t o f capitalism, a n d n o t only in t h e c o n t e m p o ­ rary age b u t ever since the precapitalism o f Antiquity). E m p i r e does n o t pertain to sovereignty: it pertains to d o m i n a t i o n . T h e master is n o t the sovereign. T h e sovereign does n o t legitimize itself: it imposes itself in t h e n a m e o f a r i g h t that is already given a n d posited (the r i g h t o f the pater familias,

t h e right o f the

mighty, dynastic right, right o f c o n q u e s t ) . Sovereignty, if it must b e t h o u g h t , must b e contrasted w i t h empire. T h a t is to say, precisely w h e r e the right is n o t given, a situation that perhaps properly defines right: w h a t remains r i g h t as a fact, relation to a given fact as m a k i n g right. Sovereignty supposes a funda­ m e n t a l contestation o f any r i g h t acquired in this m a n n e r . Force c a n n o t m a k e right: this is Rousseau's a x i o m o f w h i c h w e are all persuaded, b u t w h i c h implies that the p r o p e r force o f right poses a particular p r o b l e m . T h e "reverse o f e m p i r e " does n o t designate the project o f a destruction o f the E m p i r e as was the case in t h e past for the destruction o f t h e State (assuming that w e have entered into an era o f Empire) b u t t h e necessity o f t h i n k i n g b o t h o n e a n d the other: that w h i c h could b e p r o p e r to the f o r m " E m p i r e " w h i l e t h e f o r m " S o v ­ ereign state" does n o t admit the reverse.'

P.-S.

3

3

A fragment. O n the o n e h a n d the sovereignty o f the State, as State, dislocates and fragments itself-—without so m u c h as i m p r e g n a t i n g t h e w h o l e , contrary to the totalitarian desire. In this sense it is b r o k e n , d e c o m p o s e d , a n d does n o t k n o w h o w to grasp t h e idea, n o r t h e resource o f its o w n instituting force. O n the o t h e r hand, t h e same process shows that sovereignty, in its essence as sum­ mit is necessarily detached as extremity a n d as p o i n t that is i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e to a base a n d to a n edifice. In fact, the s u m m i t c a n n o t b e c o n n e c t e d to the e d i ­ fice. In this sense sovereignty is a fragment in a m o r e essential m a n n e r : it is a fragment that is n o t totalized o n itself, a fragment in principled subtraction, a principle o f subtraction and n o t imposition o r foundation. In this respect, it is

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Complements certain that sovereignty c o n c e r n s t h e e x c e p t i o n to w h i c h Carl Schmitt links it by definition. B u t it is a question precisely o f t h i n k i n g the exception: it is n o t only w h a t gives itself outside o f right, outside o f t h e institution. It is also w h a t does n o t give itself at all: that w h i c h is n o t a b r u t e fact, a given that prevents a passage to the limit o f right, b u t that w i t h d r a w s from any given. It could be said that t h e e x c e p t i o n exempts itself.The difficulty w i t h Schmitt is perhaps that he sutures in silence this e x e m p t i o n o f t h e e x c e p t i o n , o r the p r o p e r logic o f the absence o f foundation (and as w e know, h e was able to retrieve that operation w i t h the n a m e o f "der

Fiihrer").

P.-S.

4

A n d if sovereignty was t h e revolt o f the people?

3 Cosmos

Basileus

T h e unity of a w o r l d is n o t o n e : it is m a d e o f a diversity, including disparity and o p p o s i t i o n . " It is m a d e o f it, w h i c h is to say that it is n o t added it to it and does n o t reduce it. T h e u n i t y o f a w o r l d is n o t h i n g o t h e r than its diversity, and its diversity is, in t u r n , a diversity o f worlds. A w o r l d is a multiplicity o f worlds, the w o r l d is a multiplicity o f worlds, and its unity is the sharing o u t \partage] and the m u t u a l exposure in this w o r l d o f all its worlds. T h e sharing o u t o f t h e w o r l d is t h e law o f the world. T h e w o r l d does n o t have any o t h e r law, it is n o t s u b m i t t e d to any authority, it does n o t have any sovereign. Cosmos/Nomos.

Its s u p r e m e law is in it as the multiple and m o b i l e

line o f t h e sharing o u t that it is. Nomos is t h e distribution, t h e repartition, and t h e attribution o f t h e parts. Territorial place, n o u r i s h m e n t , a delimitation o f rights and duties: to each and each time as appropriate. B u t appropriate in w h a t s e n s e ? T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f appropriateness—the law o f t h e law, absolute justice—is n o w h e r e b u t in the sharing itself and in the exceptional singularity o f each, o f each case, according to this sharing. In any case, this sharing is n o t given, and " e a c h " is n o t given (that w h i c h is the unity o f each part, the o c c u r r e n c e o f its case, t h e configuration o f each world). It is . n o t an accomplished d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h e w o r l d is n o t given. It is itself the gift.The w o r l d is its o w n creation (this is w h a t " c r e a t i o n " means). Its sharing is at every m o m e n t p u t i n t o play: universe in expansion, illimitation o f individuals, and

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infinite d e m a n d o f justice. T h i s is why, for us, cosmos basileus replaces Pindar's nomos basileus, the k i n g d o m o f a given law. "Justice" designates w h a t must b e rendered (as o n e says in French, rendre jus­ tice). Justice must b e restituted, returned, given in return to each singular existent: that w h i c h must b e accorded to it in return o f the gift that it itself is. A n d that entails also that w e d o not k n o w exacdy (one does n o t k n o w an juste as, again, o n e says in French) w h o o r w h a t is a "singular existent," neither w h e n c e n o r whither. By virtue of the gift and the incessant sharing of the world o n e does n o t k n o w w h e r e the sharing of a stone or o f a person begins o r ends. T h e delineation is always wider and the same time m o r e narrow than o n e believes w h e n o n e grasps it (or rather o n e grasps quite well, as long as o n e is attentive to w h a t extent the c o n t o u r is trembling mobile and fleeting). Each existent belongs to m o r e groups, masses, networks, o r complexes than o n e first recognizes, and each also detaches from t h e m and from itself, infinitely. Each opens and closes o n m o r e worlds and in it, as outside of it, hollowing o u t the outside inside and reciprocally. W h a t is appropriate is thus defined b y t h e measure p r o p e r to each existent and to the infinite, indefinitely o p e n , circulating a n d transforming c o m m u n i t y (or c o m m u n i c a t i o n , c o n t a g i o n , contact) o f all existences b e t w e e n t h e m . This is n o t a twofold appropriateness. It is the same, for c o m m u n i t y is n o t added to the existent. T h e existent does n o t have its o w n consistency and s u b ­ sistence b y itself: b u t it has it as the sharing o f c o m m u n i t y . C o m m u n i t y ( w h i c h also has n o t h i n g subsistent by itself, w h i c h is contact, j u x t a p o s i t i o n , porosity, osmosis, frictions, attraction a n d repulsion, etc.) is cosubstantial w i t h the exis­ tent: to each a n d to all, to each as to all, to each insofar as all. T h i s is, to trans­ late in a certain language, the "mystical b o d y " o f the w o r l d , o r in a n o t h e r l a n ­ guage, the reciprocal action o f t h e parts o f the world. B u t in all the cases, it is coexistence by w h i c h existence itself a n d a world in general are defined. Coexistence remains at an equal distance b e t w e e n j u x t a p o s i t i o n and i n t e ­ gration. Coexistence does n o t h a p p e n to existence from w i t h o u t , it does n o t add itself to it a n d o n e c a n n o t subtract it from it: it is existence. Existence is n o t m a d e alone, if o n e can say it that way. It is Being that is alone, at least in all o f the ordinary senses that o n e can give to being. B u t exis­ tence is n o t h i n g o t h e r than b e i n g exposed: expulsed from its simple self-iden­ tity and from its p u r e position, exposed to t h e event, to creation, thus to the outside, to exteriority, to multiplicity, to alterity, a n d to alteration. (In a sense, certainly, this is n o t h i n g o t h e r than b e i n g exposed to b e i n g itself, to its o w n " b e i n g " and also, consequendy, b e i n g exposed as b e i n g : exposition as the essence of being.) Justice is thus the r e t u r n to each existent its d u e according to its u n i q u e creation, singular in its coexistence w i t h all o t h e r creations. T h e t w o measures

110

Complements are n o t separate: the singular p r o p e r t y exists according to t h e singular line that j o i n s it to the o t h e r properties. W h a t distinguishes is also w h a t connects " w i t h " and "together." Justice must b e r e n d e r e d to t h e line o f the proper, to its cut each time a p p r o p r i a t e — a cut that does n o t c u t a n d that does n o t rise from a b a c k g r o u n d , b u t a c o m m o n c u t that in o n e stroke separates and makes contact, a coexistence w h o s e indefinite i n t e r t w i n i n g is the sole g r o u n d o n w h i c h the " f o r m " o f exis­ tence rises.There is t h e n n o g r o u n d : there is only the " w i t h , " proximity a n d its spacing, t h e strange familiarity o f all t h e worlds in the world. For each its m o s t appropriate h o r i z o n is also its proximity w i t h the o t h e r h o r i z o n : that o f t h e coexistent, o f all the coexistents, o f coexisting totality. B u t " p r o x i m i t y " is n o t strong e n o u g h if o n e does n o t understand that all the h o r i ­ zons are the sides o f t h e same cut, o f t h e same sinuous a n d instantaneous line that is that o f the w o r l d (its unity). T h i s line is n o t p r o p e r to any existent, a n d even less to an o t h e r k i n d o f substance that w o u l d l o o m over t h e world: it is t h e c o m m o n impropriety, t h e n o n b e l o n g i n g a n d the n o n d e p e n d e n c e , the absolute errancy o f t h e creation o f t h e world. Justice m u s t therefore b e rendered b o t h to the singular absoluteness o f the p r o p e r a n d to the absolute i m p r o p r i e t y o f t h e c o m m u n i t y o f existents. It must be rendered the same t o each: such is the play (or the sense) o f the world. T h i s is an infinite justice, consequently, w h i c h must b e rendered b o t h to t h e p r o p r i e t y o f each a n d t h e i m p r o p r i e t y c o m m o n to all: rendered to birth a n d to death, w h i c h h o l d b e t w e e n t h e m t h e infinity o f m e a n i n g . O r rather: it m u s t b e rendered to b i r t h a n d t o death, w h i c h are, o n e w i t h the o t h e r a n d o n e into t h e o t h e r (or o n e t h r o u g h t h e o t h e r ) , t h e infinite overflowing o f m e a n i n g , a n d therefore of justice. T h i s is a b i r t h and death a b o u t w h i c h it is appropriate—this is t h e strict justice o f t r u t h — t o say n o t h i n g , b u t a b o u t w h i c h true speech d e s ­ perately seeks t h e p r o p e r words. T h i s infinite justice is visible n o w h e r e . O n the contrary, an unbearable injustice is unleashed e v e r y w h e r e : the earth trembles, the viruses infect, m e n are criminals, liars, a n d executioners. Justice c a n n o t b e r e m o v e d from the mire o r fog of injustice, any m o r e than it can b e projected as a s u p r e m e conversion o f injustice. It is intrinsic to infi­ nite justice that it m u s t collide brutally w i t h injustice. B u t h o w a n d w h y it is intrinsic to it, o n e c a n n o t explain. T h i s n o l o n g e r pertains to interrogations o n reason o r pertains to t h e d e m a n d s o f m e a n i n g . It is intrinsic to the infinity o f justice a n d to the u n i n t e r r u p t e d creation of the world: in such a way that infin• ity is never in any w a y called to accomplish itself, n o t even (above all) as an infi­ nite r e t u r n o f self i n t o self. B i r t h a n d death, sharing and coexistence b e l o n g to t h e infinite. T h e infinite, as it were, appears and disappears, divides itself a n d

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coexists: it is the m o v e m e n t , t h e agitation o f t h e general diversity o f the worlds, w h i c h m a k e t h e w o r l d (and w h i c h " u n m a k e " it as well). T h i s is w h y justice, is always also—and perhaps first—the d e m a n d for j u s ­ tice: the complaint a n d protestation against injustice, t h e call that cries o u t for justice, a n d the breath that exhausts itself for it. T h e law o f justice is this u n a p ­ peasable tension toward justice itself. Similarly, the law o f the w o r l d is an infi­ nite tension toward the w o r l d itself. T h e s e t w o laws are n o t only h o m o l o g o u s ; they are t h e same a n d u n i q u e law o f absolute sharing (one could say: the law o f t h e Absolute as sharing.) Justice does n o t c o m e from the outside (what outside?) to hover above t h e world, to repair o r accomplish it. It is given w i t h t h e w o r l d , in it a n d as t h e very law o f its givenness. T h e r e is n o sovereign, n o t e m p l e n o r tablet o f t h e law, w h i c h is n o t stricdy speaking the w o r l d itself, t h e severe, inextricable, a n d unachievable line o f its h o r i z o n . O n e could b e t e m p t e d to say: there is a justice for t h e world, a n d there is a w o r l d for justice. B u t these finalities o r these r e c ­ iprocal intentions will express w h a t is at stake very poorly. T h e w o r l d is to itself the s u p r e m e law o f its justice: n o t t h e given w o r l d " s u c h as it is," b u t rather t h e fact that the w o r l d happens, a properly i n c o n g r u e n t c o n g r u e n c e . T h e only task o f justice is thus to create a w o r l d tirelessly, the space o f an unappeasable a n d always u n s e t d e d sovereignty o f m e a n i n g .

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Notes

Translators' Introduction 1. Jean-Luc Nancy, Tlie Creation of the World or Globalization, trans. Francois Raffoul and David Pettigrew (Albany: State University of N e w York Press, 2007). Hereafter cited as CW, followed by the page number. 2. Following the proposed alternative by Nancy: "can what is called 'globalization' give rise to a world, or to its contrary?" (CW, 29). 3. Nancy will add in a note farther in the text that the term globalization could just as easily be referred to as "agglomerization" (CW, 118, n.5), in reference to the glomus. As for the concept of the "bad infinite," which Nancy borrows from Hegel, it signifies in this context that the infinite "is indeed the one that cannot be actual" (CW, 39), that is, the bad infinite "of a 'globalization' in spiral" (CW, 47), which Nancy contrasts with the actual infinite of the finite being (CW, 71). Let us simply indicate that the infinite in action sig­ nifies for Nancy the world itself as "absolute value," that is to say, as the existence of the world put into play as "absolute existence" (CW, 44) so much so that it is necessary "in the end, that the world has absolute value for itself" (CW, 40). 4. Nancy evokes on several occasions globalization as an event that "sweeps" over us, which comes to us from an unspeakable elsewhere, and which, through a weakening of "independencies and sovereignties" and of "representations of belonging" that makes itself (CW, 37), opening the possibility of a questioning of the proper and of identity. The world as such gives itself to vision in this weakening, because it is nothing other than the putting-into-play of a possible habitation. 5. He writes, for example, "the future is precisely what exceeds representation. And we have learned that it is a matter for us of reconceiving the world outside of repre­ sentation" (CW, 50). 6. Nancy also clarifies:"At the end of monotheism, there is the world without God, that is to say, without another world" (CW, 50; our emphasis).

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Notes 7. Jean-Luc Nancy. Tlie Sense of the World, trans. Jeffrey Librett (Minneapolis: Uni­ versity of Minnesota Press, 1997). Henceforth cited as SW followed by the page number. 8. Nancy thus will specify that the world is a dimensionality without origin, founded on nothing, an "archi-spariality" or a "spaciousness of the opening" without a provenance of being but that is a "spacing of presences" (always plural and singular) (CW, 73). 9. O n the difference between sense and signification, see the opening pages of Tlie Sense of the World. 10. The decisive characteristic of the becoming-world of the world, explains Nancy, "is the feature through which the world resolutely and absolutely distances itself from any status as object in order to tend toward being itself the 'subject' of its own 'worldhood'—or 'world-forming.' But being a subject in general means having to become oneselP' (CW, 41). 11. O n poverty, see the recent edition and translation by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Ana Samardzija of the Heidegger lecture on June 27,1945, La pauvrete [DieArnmt] (Strasbourg: Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, 2004). 12. In the following chapter, " O f Creation," Nancy will analyze the expression "to come to the world": "That 'coming to the world' means birth and death, emerging from nothing and going to nothing" {CW, 74). 13. "If'creation" means anything, it is the exact opposite of any form of production in the sense of a fabrication which supposes a given, a project, and a producer. The idea of creation, such as it has been elaborated in the most diverse and most convergent thoughts . . . above all means the idea of the ex nihilo" (CW, 51). 14. "The 'nothing' of creation is what opens in God when God withdraws in it (and in sum from it) in the act of creating. God annihilates itself [s'aneantit] as a "self" or as a distinct being in order to "withdraw" in its act—which makes the opening of the world" (CW, 70). Also, a few lines farther: "The unique God, whose unicity is the cor­ relate of the creating act, cannot precede its creation, any more that it can subsist above it or apart from it in some way. It merges with it: merging with it, it withdraws in it and withdrawing there it empties itself there, emptying itself it is nothing other than the opening of this void. Only the opening is divine, but the divine is nothing more than the opening" (ibid.). 15. However, it is important to stress that Nancy refuses to simply oppose two dif­ ferent fates of the world as if they represented different levels of existence. This is the sense of the "ex" just mentioned. As he explains in his reading of Marx, "Extortion or the exposure of each through the others [exposition des wis par les atttres]: the most impor­ tant is not to say,'here is the decisive alternative!' (which we already know). What mat­ ters is to be able to think how this proximity of the two 'ex-' or this twofold excess is produced, how the same world is divided in this way. (CW, 46; our emphasis). Also,"What is most troubling about the modern enigma—for specifically this is what constitutes the modern and which makes it, for the last three centuries, an enigma for itself, which even

114

Notes defines the modern as such an enigma, without any need to speak of the "postmod­ ern"—is that the without-reason could take the form both of capital and of the mysti­ cal rose which represents the absolute value of the "without-reason" (CW, 50). 16. Nancy explains that, "Philosophy begins from itself: this is a permanent axiom for it, which is implicit or explicit in the work of all philosophers" (CW, 77). 17. The movement of history is in and of itself the withdrawal of nature and naturality. Nancy thus explains that"[h]istory is not'nature,' if'nature' has its origin and end in itself (supposing that nature exists or rather that it still exists in a history which pre­ cisely locates elsewhere, without end, the very naturality of any nature: as if that history included henceforth the natura naturans of any natura naturata and, consequendy also its natura denaturans.) History is the infinite deferral of any nature and this is why, from now on, the following question occurs to us: was there ever 'nature,' since there was history, and thus an indefinite deferral of any nature?" (CW, 79). 18. "With the becoming human," he explains, "this movement appears to itself as its own principle and its own end. That is to say, properly without principle and with­ out end since it proceeds from an initial detachment, which one can name 'human con­ dition' and whose permanence involves an extreme instability and mutability of what has thus been detached (contingency forms thus the necessity of this 'history'). And that is what we can call, feigning to believe that there would have been first a pure and sta­ ble 'nature': denaturathn. And one could then say that 'humanity' is the indexical name of the indefinite and infinite term of the human denaturation" (CW, 87). 19. For instance, with respect to what we might call the aporia of the subject, Nancy shows how, in the self-inauguration of philosophy, the subject that philosophy "wants to be, of this inauguration, undoes itself or destitutes itself... in the very gesture of its inau­ guration" (CW, 83). 20. Nancy explains that "our expectation of the future is henceforth deprived of anticipation, of representation, and of concept" (CW, 82). 21. Der Ister.A film by David Barison and Daniel Ross, 2004. 22. Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York:Vintage Books, 1980). Henceforth cited as HS followed by the page number. 23. It would in fact be more a matter of an "ecotechnology" insofar as natural life has become indissociable from a series of technological conditions. Farther on, he would clarify his reservations with respect to the motif of life, explaining that life is an "insuf­ ficient" notion to designate the managed, regulated, or deregulated totality intended in the notion of bio-politics, and that "'world' would be a more precise notion: a 'world' as the reverse of a 'cosmos,' and as concern (mourning and awaiting) for a 'totality of meaning'" (CW, 125, n.13). 24. This problematic is reminiscent of Foucault's treatment in Technologies of the Self of "technologies of power" and of "technologies of self." In this seminar, Foucault speaks of these two technologies in particular as "technologies of domination" (TS, 18).

115

Notes 25. For instance, Nancy insists that politics cannot be thought in terms of subjec­ tivity. Rather, it would be a matter of showing how sovereignty "no longer designates the assumption of a subject or in a subject,"but instead,"the order of the subjecdess reg­ ulation of the relation between subjects." O n this between, farther on he evokes the "empty space of sovereignty," itself to be understood as the nonsubstantial between of sharing, a sovereignty structured in that sharing of the world (CW, 104). 26. In Tlie Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Hol­ land, and Simona Sawhney (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), hence­ forth cited as IC followed by the page number, Nancy cites Bataille's comment that "Sovereignty is N O T H I N G . " Sovereignty is an exposure to an excess, a transcendence. Nancy emphasizes that such an excess "does not present itself and does not let itself be appropriated (or simulated)" (IC, 18). Nancy speaks of the limits of Bataille's thought, a thought that was perhaps trapped in a circle between communism and fascism. Nancy seeks to conceive of sovereignty in terms of singular existences.These singular existences are sovereign in their difference; a sovereign difference that is shared. Nancy addresses the work of George Bataille as a forerunner to the thinking of a community that exists in a destabilizing excess of itself. Such a community would exceed totalization. In the Inoperative Community, Nancy credits Bataille with being the first to experience the inability to regain any immanence in the "outside of itselF' of a lost communion (IC, 9). Such a community communicates ecstasis. However, Nancy is circumspect about Bataille's thinking with respect to the poles of community (communism) and ecstasis (fascism). He writes that Bataille "gave up the task of thinking community properly speaking" (IC, 25). 27. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) and State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 28. Carl Schmitt, Political Tlieology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge: The M I T Press, 1985), 1. O n page 2 of the same text, Schmitt continues, "The decision on the exception is a decision in the true sense of the word." Schmitt's point is that the sovereign is the sovereign only insofar as it makes this decision. Without this power, there is no real power. Henceforth cited as PT followed by the page number. 29. Carl Schmitt, Tlie Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: Uni­ versity of Chicago Press, 1996), 36. Henceforth cited as CP followed by the page num­ ber. 30. Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham: Duke Uni­ versity Press, 2004), 35. Henceforth cited as LL followed by the page number. 31. Hajo Holburn, A History of Modern Germany. 1840-1945 1969), p. 724.

(New York: Knopf,

32. Hardt and Negri speak in Empire of a "control that extends throughout the depths of the consciousnesses and bodies of the population—and at the same time across

116

Notes the entirety of social relations," and Agamben specifies that the state of exception has become "the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics" (SE, 2). 33. Jacques Derrida,"The Force of Law," in Deconstmction and the Possibility of Jus­ tice, ed. D. Cornell, M. Rosenfeld, and D. Carlson (New York: Routledge, 1992), 30. Henceforth cited as FL followed by the page number. 34. O n page 35 of SE, Agamben asserts that Carl Schmitt's theory of sovereignty depends first on his norion of the state of exception. There is for Nancy as well a pri­ macy of the state of exception from which the singular plural existences create the world.

Author's Prefatory N o t e to the English Language Edition l . T N . W e have chosen to render mondialisation (which in French is the word used for what the English-speaking world knows as globalization) as "world-forming," in order to maintain the reference to "world" that Nancy seeks to emphasize in contrast to "global," as well as in order to retain the sense of a creation of meaning that is inherent in Nancy's notion of world. Hence the term world-forming will contrast with globaliza­ tion following Nancy's intention in this book.

Urbi et

Orbi

A first version of this text was written for a lecture given in Bordeaux, in March 2001, in the context of the cultural event "Mutations" organized by the association Arc-enreve and by Nadia Tazzi. 1. GeorgWilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of Its Different Modifications and Comparison to the Latest Form with the Ancient One," in Between Kant and Hegel. Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Ideal­ ism, ed. and trans. George di Giovanni and H. S. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 333. 2. T N . The term inimonde is used ordinarily in French to mean "base," "vile," or "foul," but Nancy plays here with the literal sense of the term, which we have kept and rendered accordingly as un-world. 3.TN. Nancy plays here on the term "capital(e)": capital as monetary concept and capital as a city. 4. Karl Marx, Tlic German Ideology, in Tlie Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C.Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), 163-64. Henceforth cited as M E R followed by the page number. Translation slighdy modified. (The German term translated by "creation" is indeed its corresponding Schopfung: one could study in Marx the usages of this term and its relation with value in itself, that is to say, with work in itself, as well as its differ­ ence and its relation with the Produktion that pertains to the interdependency of work.)

117

Notes 5. "Globalization" is the term that is most generally used outside of France. Its crit­ ical sense could also be rendered, following what I have indicated with respect to glo­ mus, by agglomerization [agglomerisation] ... 6.This also means that "Marx has not yet been received," as Derrida says in Specters of Marx:Tlie State of the Debt, Tlie Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Roudedge, 1994), 174. A minimally rigorous reading of Marx, whether from Derrida or another (Michel Henry for instance, or Etienne Balibar, or Andre Tosel, or Jacques Bidet, among others), confirms this observation. But we must add two remarks: on the one hand, doesn't the history of the world today, under the guise of "globalization," produce as its own necessity the scheme of an entirely different "reception" of Marx, and, on the other hand, isn't the fact of not yet being received and never being completely received, the reason that the force of a thought goes beyond itself and its proper name? 7. The clearest text is perhaps that of "Marginal Notes on Adolphe Wagner's 'Lehrbitch der politischen Okonomie'" in Vol. 24 in Tlie Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 50 volumes (NewYork: International Publishers, London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1975-), 531 and particularly the section "Derivation of the Concept of Value." 8. "Mysterious" and "mystical," are words that Marx uses with respect to fetishism. Cf. Capital, I, I section, 4. M E R , 319-20. 9. N o doubt the problem does not end there, any more than the more general question of phenomenality.The nonphenomenal and yet actual presence remains a motif to explore. But I cannot dwell on it here. 10. This is, clearly, a provisional image. But it is a matter of at least indicating that the reality of value is not simply economic, or, in a more complex way, that the reality of economy is not economic in the simple mercantile sense, perhaps even that the real­ ity of the market is n o t . . . , etc. In any case, the reality of the phenomenon is no more here than elsewhere identifiable as a "pure phenomenon." O n this "phenomenological" complexity and its implications in the relation "use-value-exchange-value," I refer the reader to Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, chapter 5, "apparition of the inapparent: the phenomenological 'conjuring trick,'" particularly p. 160:"[O]ne would have to say that the phantasmagoria began before the said exchange-value, at the threshold of the value of value in general... ." O n the reality of the economy one can reread Michel Henry, Marx: A Philosophy of Human Reality, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin (Bloomington: Indi­ ana University Press, 1983), chapter 7, "The Reality of Economic Reality" (even if to disagree with his interpretation of "living reality"); as for the reality of the relation of "expression" in which value is constituted and on the nature of "concept" or the "con­ tent of thought," one can look up the work by Pierre Macherey ("A propos du processus d'exposition du 'Capital'"), in Lire le Capital (PUF, Paris 1996). At the intersection between these diverse approaches, one will find at least one common point: the charac­ ter of a value "in itself," which precisely is not a "thing in itself" but the actuality of a praxis that has "value" by itself absolutely and in the materiality or the complex corpo-

118

Notes reality of the transformation in which it expresses itself, gives itself, and creates itself. Reconsidering here the famed "epistemological break" of Althusser, I am wondering if one should not understand, under the guise of "epistemology" that was then in usage, that it was not a matter of elaborating anew, against an idealism of value, a practical thought of value, which first meant: against a humanism that presupposed "human value," a thought presupposing the insufficiency of the concept of "man" faced with the absolute value of a "creation of man." See Louis Althusser, "Marxism and Humanism," in For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (New York:Verso, 1990). 11. N o doubt it is possible, and perhaps necessary, to understand "value" in Marx according to what Louis Gernet explains of the "The Mythical Idea ofValue in Greece," in Tlie Anthropology of Ancient Greece, trans. John Hamilton SJ, and Blaise Nagy (Balti­ more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), on the condition that we understand well that "mythical" designates here the reality of the "virtue of symbols" (178). Namely: the value of the valorous ones who measure themselves in the athletic agon, recompensed by a "prize" the material reality of which, a "pricey" object, does not have "value" as a monetary currency would, but as an offering (royal and divine) given to the one who shows his or her worth as the most valorous: wealth here is not capitalized (that would be hubris) but it makes the brilliance of what "shows its worth" shine in gold, which we might risk translating into a "to produce oneself"—produce what? Nothing other than a valorous man, or the value of a man. But this happens, Gernet tells us, before the invention of currency, and competition does not yield to commerce, if we can say it in this way. However, Gernet does note that continuities are maintained between "mythi­ cal value" and "monetary value," and we know that on this point much could be added (in particular from psychoanalysis). H o w can we articulate with precision the relation I am sketching here between Marx and the "mythical" world, between abstract value and symbolic value (in the strong, active and ostensive sense of the word)? This is what needs to be elaborated. 12. As we can understand, this remark means that Heidegger's concern with respect to humanism hardly differs from Marx's with reference to "total man." 13. GeorgWilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Tlie Enq'dopedia of Philosophical Sciences, trans. Gustav Emil Mueller (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), §94, 125. The "good" infinite, infinite in act, is that which is identical to the finite in which it actualizes itself. 14. One will find numerous indications in Paul Clavier's Le concept de monde (Paris: PUF, 2000), a perspective however quite different from mine. 15. T N . Nancy plays on the polysemy of the word sens, which includes: meaning, direction, and in this particular case function or even usage. 16. See the final page of Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in Tlie Question ConcerningTcchnology and Other Essays, trans.William Lovitt (New York: Harper, 1977), 153. 17.With respect to "secularization" and to the necessity of opposing to that model the model-less thought of another (il)legitimation of the modern world, I can only

119

Notes refer to Hans Blumenberg, who seems to me to be the unavoidable point of departure in this matter. 18. O n this question, see Jean-Luc Nancy, L' "il y a" du rapport sexuel (Paris: Galilee, 2001). 19. See supra, p. 119, n . l l , relative to the "mythical value" analysed by Gernet. Let us clarify the following: it does not matter whether the archeo-philological deduction of such an operation be exact or not, from the perspective of empirical knowledge. O n e cannot moreover ignore that phenomena of precapitalization have preceded capitalism, nor in general that wealth as power has always accompanied wealth as brilliance, just as religion as domination has always accompanied sacred symbolism. What matters is that capitalism forces us to seek the value of value, whose extensive form it deploys so exacdy that it renders all the more insistent its absence of intensive form (an absence that we interpret as a loss, which remains certainly insufficient, as would any thought of loss). Capitalism exposes the inverted form of an absolute and singular value through general equivalence. What can the reversal of this inversion, or "revolution," mean in Marx's terms? 20.1 will limit myself to mentioning here, Martin Heidegger, Tlie Principle of Rea­ son, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). In reality, it is a matter of commenting upon, or better, of extending and taking farther that thought according to which the "principle of sufficient reason" becomes an imperious demand of reason when it becomes sensible, if not intelligible, that neither reason nor ground sustains the world. 21. This was the sense of the word in French, and the German kept the two senses of reich /Reich. One can note an analogous displacement of the sense of fortune. 22. In German, it is still this Wiirde, which one translates by "dignity" (in Kant, for instance), but which belongs to the semantic group of Wert,"value." 23. "Absentheism": an absent God and an absence in place of God, but also the absence from work as liberation from servitude or as the sabbatical rest of the creating God (Genesis II: 2—3), the rest of the one who nevertheless does not know fatigue (Koran L, 38), vacancy of the vacant . . . (One also called the landowners who never appear on their land "absentheists"!) 24. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (New York: Roudedge, 2001), 6.41, 86. Henceforth cited asTLP followed by the page number. 25. In the sense that a world is itself a space of meaning, see Jean-Luc Nancy, Tlie Sense of the World. 26.This is the moment to note many analogies or places of encounter between this work and the work of Antonio Negri in Kairos.Alma Venus, multitude, trans. Judith Revel (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 2001), a book that I was only able to read after this text was

120

Notes already written. In particular, the motif of creation plays an important role in Negri (although he does not refer to its theological provenance, nonetheless apparent). But if there is more than one disagreement, the point where I am most in disagreement with him is the following: for him, "meaning" seems to be posited as something obvious, and its nature not questioned. It seems to me, on the contrary, that everything here requires that we rethink the meaning of meaning, including as common sense (or sense of the common), or rather as such. But if meaning is always of the common and in common, it does not follow that the "common" makes immediate sense: it has to produce itself (thus think itself) as such—as "meaning-in-common," which means forms, languages, arts, celebrations, philosophies, etc. One must therefore think the works in which mean­ ing creates itself in a determined way, even if its creation largely exceeds the closed space of the works. And we must think how these works communicate meaning—which is not "their" meaning.

O f Creation 1. La Faculte dejuger (collectif), (Paris: Minuit, 1985). 2. Jean-Francois Lyotard, Tiie Confession of Augustine, trans. Richard Beardsworth (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 37. 3. Jean-Francois Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 255. 4. Jean-Francois Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, trans. Elizabeth R o t tenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 114. 5. Richard McKeon, ed., Aristode, Metaphysics, A, 2, 1013 b 25, in Tlie Basic Works ofAristotle (New York: R a n d o m House, 1941), 753. 6. Immanuel Kant, Tlie Critique ofJudgment, trans, James Meredith Creed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), % 65,19-24 7. Richard McKeon, ed. Metaphysics, Z, 17,1041 a 10-25, in Tlie Basic Works of Aris­ totle (New York: Random House, 1941), 810. 8. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 210. 9. Ibid., 215. 10. In this respect, Spinoza represents, ahead of his time, a conjunction of this "pos­ sible" and of the "real," a way of gathering the "giving" and the "doing," which more­ over suppresses at the same time the difficulties and aporias linked to a "God" and to a "creation," a creation that Kant analyzed and critiqued. This is why one saw, following Kant, a flurry of Spinozisms. However, the Spinozist's substance still keeps at a distance, or neutralizes, it seems to me, the question of the "generosity" of the world as I wish to indicate it here (more than one Spinozist, I know, will disagree with me . . . ) .

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Notes 11. It is important to mention briefly that it is precisely this status of the image of the creator (status of man but also in some respect of the universe and/or nature) that will have made possible, or even necessary, the transformation we are speaking of here. In other words, this transformation comes from the fact that creation is not first pro­ duction (we will get to this later) but expression, exposition, or extraneation of "itself." With Leibniz, it consists in the "continual outflashings of the divinity." Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Monadology, in Leibniz: Discourse on Metapliysics, Corrrespondence with Arnauld, Monadology, trans. George Montgomery (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1980), % 47, 261. 12.This is also the reason why it is possible and desirable to show that the Kantian revolution in its entirety rests on nothing other than a question of creation, at the same time recognized and rejected by Kant himself (the great book by Gehrard Kriiger on Kant's morals includes more than an indication on this issue). 13. We recognize here a corollary of Kant's thesis on being, which "is not a real predicate." Not being a predicate, being is the subject of existence and as such it "is" noth­ ing other than existence. 14. Of which it is a common feature quite independent from their well-known dif­ ferences. 15. All the necessary arguments are in particular present and often repeated by Valery (see his Cahiers, passim). 16. But also in more than one spiritual meditation, neither properly mystical nor properly speculative, such as that of Simone Weil, to give a modern example. 17. See "La deconstruction du christianisine" a very succinct sketch of this theme p u b ­ lished in Etudes philosophiques 2 (1998), and the indications already given in Being Sin­ gular Plural, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O'Byrne (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), and then in La Pensee derobee (Paris: Galilee, 2001). 18. As Heidegger invites us to think in Wliat is Philosophy, trans. William Kluback and Jean T.Wilde (Albany: N C U P Inc., ,1956). Being is not simply an intransitive verb: it speaks intransitivity itself, but it speaks it in such a way that it must be heard in "the transitive sense" (49). 19.1 will reserve a precise examination of the philological and theological history of the vocabulary of creation for another occasion. Let us recall here that the mystical rose (see above page 47) grows [croit] without reason. 20. A displacement of the thought of desire also results from this: see L' "il y a" du rapport sexuel. 21. I will not address the references that would be necessary, with respect to the Kabbalah (in particular the studies from Gershom Scholem) as well as other interpreta­ tions, whether Christian or Muslim, of "creation," and I will not draw upon Schelling's analyses: all this, clearly, remains in the background. 22. Gerard Grand, Etudes (Paris: Galilee, 1995), 126 and 132.

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Notes 23. Ludwig Wittgenstein, "A Lecture on Ethics," Tlie Philosophical Review LXXIV, no. 1 (1965): 8. 24. Jean-Luc Marion, for his part, attempts to refer this difference to a "difference without compare [sans egale]" that would be prior [en deca] to any temporality and in the simultaneity of a "call" and a "responsal." Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phe­ nomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 295. This powerful and eloquent proposition does not emerge yet out of a "selfgiving" (and of a "self-showing") of the phenomenon, whereas I propose here, simply, that nothing gives itself and that nothing shows itself—and that is what is. 25.The aporia of the gift, according to Derrida, is that it "must not even be what it has to be, namely, a gift" (Given Time: Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992], 69), since itcannot wish to give nor will itself as gift without suppressing its own generosity and gratuity. The gift is nothing, or gives noth­ ing. This is the sense that one must give to the "this is nothing" that a giver says after he/she is thanked. 26. Contemporary astrophysics and cosmology do not cease, in this respect, to nourish thought and questioning. 27. Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 61. We can recall that creation, in Babylonians myths where the monotheistic narrations find their sources, is first of all a separation, for instance of sky and earth, or of earth and water. To create is not to posit, but to separate.

Creation as Denaturation: Metaphysical Technology This text, presented in Fribourg-en-Brisgau in 2000 at the Congress of the Deutsche Gesellschoft fiir phanomenologische Forschung, reconsiders and also revises selections of a presentation devoted to Alan Badiou's polemical relation to Heideggerian historicity (or historicality) and is forthcoming in the proceedings of the Colloquium devoted to Alain Badiou,"La pensee forte" organized in October 1999 in Bordeaux. 1. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. II, trans. P. Klossowski (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), 381 (sec. ix "being"). 2. O n this word and its motif, this work recalls here (as well as through mutual tex­ tual communication) the work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in Poetique de I'histoire (Paris: Galilee, 2002). 3. In truth it would be necessary to undertake a work specifically devoted to the way in which philosophy envisions or refuses to envision its own beginnings: from Plato to Hei• degger it excludes the anthropological investigation of its provenance, and the self-engen­ dering, whatever it is called (logos or thaumazein), institutes itself and reflects itself. It is as if philosophy had to be a second nature, rather than the technology of denatured truth . . .

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Notes 4. "Meaning" as question, tension, and intentionality, as passion too, and passion for truth, proceeds from the absence of given meaning, or what Bernard Sriegler caUed,"the originary disorientation" in Technics and Time I: Tlie Fault of Epimethiis (Stanford: Stan­ ford University Press, 1998). 5. Serge Margel, Logique de la nature (Paris: Galilee, 2000). 6. Richard McKeon, ed., Metaphysics A, 982 b22, in Tlie BasicWorks of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), 692.

Complements l . T h e word biopolitics can also assume the following meaning today: "an ethicosocio-political reflection on the problems posed by biological technoscience," with an emphasis at times on "political power interested the biotechnological possibilities." . . . Thus to limit ourselves to a few recent examples in the volume Biopolitik, directed by Christian Geyer (Frankfurt-am-Main: Surkamp), as in no. 1 of Mif/f/ttirfes, "Biopolitique et Biopouvoir" (Exils, 2000), which opens discussions on the concept itself. 2. N o doubt one also encounters more narrow usages of the word. But I consider here the usages that claim to be the most properly philosophical and to engage with this term propositions that fundamentally reevaluate each of the terms that compose it. I do not seek to classify these usages under names or works: I am only characterizing ten­ dencies. 3. Human life was what was at issue for Foucault. We see without difficulty that vegetable and animal life followed a parallel destiny at the same time (breeding, care, etc). In any case, that destiny began long ago ever since the beginnings of cultivation and breeding. Certainly, there is henceforth a mutation in this technological continuum: the question is precisely of learning to understand it. 4. O n the condition of not confusing, as is often the case, between "sovereignty" and "domination." 5. See below note 13 on page 125. 6. An early version of Ex Nihilo Sumnium was presented at a colloquium entided "Sovereignty" at the Regional center of literature at Montpellier, Castries chateau, July 2001. 7. Dictionnaire historique de I'ancien langage franfais: on Glossaire de la langue francaise (Paris: Niort, 1875-1882). 8. T N . See Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters From Six Books of the Com­ monwealth, ed. and trans. Julian H. Franklin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 9. T N . Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Tlie Social Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston (Lon­ don: Penguin Books, 1968).

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Notes 10.TN. In English in the original. 11. T N . Nancy plays here on the twofold sense of the word persomie in French, which means either person or no one. 12. Hegel, Philosophy of Right §281, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). "Hence the majesty of the monarch is a topic for thoughtful treatment by philosophy alone, since every method of inquiry, other than the speculative method of the infinite Idea which is purely self-grounded, annuls the nature of majesty altogether." (186) 13. This determination is similar to those that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri suggest with their concept of "Empire": absence of borders, suspension of history, social integration [see Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard Uni­ versity Press, 2001)]. In brief, it would be a question of a Moebius strip, each side of which passes incessandy into the other. That is not sufficient reason, to my mind, to make of this "Empire" "the biopolitical nature of the new paradigm of power" (E, 23), because power does not sets itself up there as such in the same way as in the State, and because "life" is a quite insufficient notion to designate such a managed regulated or deregulated totality. The "world" would be a more precise notion: a "world" as the reverse of a "cosmos," and as concern (mourning and awaiting) for a "totality of mean­ ing." 14.TN. An earlier version of this essay appeared in Being Singular Plural. Professor Nancy has revised the text and a new translation has been provided of the entire essay.

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Index

Agglomeration, 33

Derrida, Jacques, 49, 61, 72, 83, 85

Aristotle, 64, 89

Descartes, Rene, 4 1 , 65

a-theism, 70

detheologization, 51 rfi'5-position, 73

bad infinite, 38,39, 40,46, 47, 71 Bataille, Georges, 102

ecotechnology, 94-95

becoming-world, 4 1 , 84

Ent-scheidung, 74

Bergson, Henri, 41

experience, 37, 43, 49, 60, 62-66, 71; of the'impossible, 65; of thought, 68

biopolirics, 93-94, and bioethics, 93, as technological management of life, 94 bios, 93,94

Foucault, Michel, 93

capital, 3 6 , 3 8 , 4 6 , 47-50, 5 3 , 1 0 1 ; vio­ lence of, 105

German Ideology, Tlie, 36 globalization, 27,36,37,47; and creation

"commodity fetish," 38

of the world, 29; as exponential growth

Cosmos basileus, 110

of globality, 37; and global idiom, 28;

creation, 50, 6 6 , 7 0 , 7 2 , 7 9 , 1 0 9 ; as denat-

and glomus, 34; as understood by Marx,

uration, 74, 82, 87; enigma of, 68; and

36; as notion of totality, 27; as suppres­

the ex nihilo, 5 1 , 7 0 , 7 2 - 7 3 , 87; of humanity, 37; of meaning, 49,107;

sion of world-forming, 50 God, 38-40, 60,64, 66,69,100,104;

and monotheism, 50, 67,70; and

absenting of, 68; and causa stii, 73; cre­

value, 36, 75; as a non-theological

ating, 52; "death of," 8; as merged with

notion, 50; as distinct from produc­

the world, metaphysical representations

tion, 51; as withdrawal of the given,

of, 41; and "secularity," 100; unique,

69; of the world, 29, 90, 111

70-71; and the world, 43; 44,50

"deconstruction," 83

Hegel, George Wilhelm Friedrich, 34,

denaturation, 87, 89; of natural history, 82

39, 46, 48, 68,78, 81, 85,102,107

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Index Heidegger, Martin, 4 1 , 43, 61, 68, 73, 81-83, 85, 87,102-103,107 history, 78; as denatured, 82; as exhausted, 82; as the infinite deferral of nature, 79; and philosophy, 78-79; "of the world," 79 humanity, 33-34,36-37, 39, 42, 48, 52-54, 61, 64, 66, 77, 81, 86-87, 90, 100,105; as "total humanity," 37; as producing itself, 37,39, 45; as reason­ able, 61-62 Husserl, Edmund, 4 1 , 61, 81 judgment, 59; about ends, 59, 62-63, 66-67; "reflective," 60, 62-64; without criteria, 60 justice, 40, 53-55, 61, 63, 94,106-107, 110-111; absolute, 109; as demand for, 112; as infinite, 111; and injustice, 111; as rendered, 61,110-111; and the unsetded sovereignty of meaning, 112

and history, 78-79, 81-82; Kant's con­ cept of, 62-64; as nature-world-God triad, 41 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 47, 49, 69, 81 Nomos, 80,109 Nomos basileus, 110 nothing, the, 5 1 , 67, 69, 72,103 and nothingness, 51, 57,102, 106; as the open, 70 onto-theology, 41, 4 4 , 7 1 , 84; inverted, 45; the God of, 44 "overman," the, 38 Parmenides, 80 philosophy, 77; beginnings of, 83; and history, 78; and the dissolution of the mythical present, 80; as revelation of history, 79; as self-instituting, 77; as technology of logos, 77 phusis, 80, 81,87 Plato, 77, 79, 82, 85, 89,107

Kant, Immanuel, 41, 59-64, 65-66,68, 82

power, 34, 39-40, 48, 53-55, 66, 68, 93-96, 98-99,103-106; of nature, 64; sovereign, 108; techno-logical, 34

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 4 1 , 44, 65 Logos, 77,79, 80, 89, 90; of being, 68 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, 59-62, 67

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 88,100,108

Malebranche, Nicolas, 41 McLuhan, Marshall, 28 Marx, Karl, 36-39, 45,48, 51, 53-54,107 metaphysics, 85, 87, 88; as history, 90; as a science of principles and ends, 85; as a techno-logy, 89 mondialisation, 27-28; as untranslatable, 27. See also world-forming monotheism, 39, 50-51, 67-69, 85, 100; deconstruction of, 70 muthos, 79-81 nature, 36, 40, 64, 86, 94, 98; and denaturation, 87-90; "empirical laws of," 63;

reflective judgment, 60, 62-64

Schmitt, Carl, 103,109 Schiirmann, Reiner, 85 sharing [partage], 36, 4 1 , 4 3 , 4 6 , 7 4 , 1 0 9 , 111; absolute, 112; singularities, 46; of the world, 110 Socrates, 80, 89 sovereign, 96, 97,99,102, 104,106,108; as author of the law, 98; as existent dependent on nothing, 103; at the height of absolute value, 102; as incommensurable with the suzerain, 98; as self constituting, 100; and the state of exception, 103 sovereignty, 96, as nothing, 102; of the people, 100; and state of exception,

128

Index 103; as summit, 97,101; and suzerain, 98 Spinoza, Baruch, 39, 4 1 , 44, 65 suzerain, 98, 99 teclm'e, 77, 78, 80, 94 techno-science, 34 technology, 49, 66,77, 8 1 , 84, 87; and "biotechnology," 93; event of, 90; of logos, 89; as tcchno-logy, 86, 88-89 tragedy, 84 value, 27,34, 3 6 - 3 8 , 4 0 - 4 1 , 44, 47-54, 96,102; and absolute value, 37-39; and dignity, 40; and surplus-value, 46; and value-philosophies, 60 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 4 1 , 52, 61,71 world, the, 28, 34-35, 4 0 - 4 1 , 47, 55,73; as absentheistic, 51; and art, 42; and

the being-world of the world, 41; and "beyond-the-world" [oiitre-monde], 37; as creation of the world, 29, 37, 54, 109; as destroying itself, 35; as gift, 109; as an inhabiting, 42; "mystical body of," 110; of singularities, 61; as outside representation, 43,50; as space-time of meaning and truth, 41; and subject-of-the-world, 40, 49; as totality of meaning, 41; and the worldly, 40; and world-becoming, 4 1 , 44, 51; and world-history, 36; as with­ out God, 43,50 world-forming [inondialisation], 29, 36-37, 4 1 , 44, 5 0 - 5 1 , 95; and the un-world, 34; and world-becoming [mondaiiisation], 44; and worldhood, 41 zoi, 94

129