The Crisis of the Italian State: From the Origins of the Cold War to the Fall of Berlusconi and Beyond

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The

Crisis of

THE Italian State: From the Origins OF the Cold War TO THE Fall of Berlusconi Patrick

McCarthy

MACMILIAN

©

99 5 by Patrick McCarthy

1

All rights reserved. this publication

No

No

may

reproduction, copy or transmission of

be

made without

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paragraph of this publication

written permission.

be reproduced, copied or

transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,

Road, London

Any

person

publication

90 Tottenham Court

W1P9HE.

who may

does any unauthorised act

in relation to this

be liable to criminal prosecution and

claims for damages.

First

published 1995 by

MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London Companies and representatives throughout the world

RG21 6XS

ISBN 0-333-66052-8

A catalogue from the 10

record for this

book

is

available

British Library.

98765432

04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96 Printed in the United States of America by

Haddon Craftsmen PA

Scranton,

civil

To the memory of my parents Anne and William McCarthy

y276870

CONTENTS

Frequently Used Abbreviations

viii

Biographical Sketches

ix

Preface

xxiii

1.

Corruption and the Overworked State

2.

The Postwar Setdement: Catholic Hegemony?

3.

Italy

1

17

and the World: Helpful Americans,

Rich Europeans, and Resourceful

Italians

41

4.

Clientelism as the Art of Government

5.

The

6.

Enrico Berlinguer and the Historic Compromise

103

7.

From

123

8.

February 1992 to March 1994: Revolution

Publicization of the

Economy

Craxi the Exacter to Bossi the Spoilsport

and Restoration? Or Change? 9.

Clan Rule

Conclusion:

61 81

139 167

The

Elusive Citizen

193

Notes

199

Index

221

FREQUENTLY USED ABBREVIATIONS

AD

Alleanza democratica; Democratic Alliance

AN

Alleanza nazionale; National Alliance

CCD

Centre cristiano democratico; Center of Christian Democracy

CGIL

Confederazione generale

italiana del lavoro; Italian

General

Confederation of Labor

CSIL

Confederazione

italiana sindacati lavoratori; Italian

Confederation

of Labor Unions

CNL

Comitato

Comit

Banca commerciale

CSM

Consiglio superiore della magistratura; Supreme Council of Magistrates

DC

Democrazia

ENI

Ente nazionale idrocarburi; National Petroleum

FI

Forza

IRI

Istituto per la ricostruzione industriale; Institute for industrial

Committee of National Liberation

di liberazione nazionale;

italiana; Italian

cristiana; Christian

Italia; Let's

Go

Bank of Commerce

Democratic Party

Company

Italy

reconstruction

Lega

Lega Nord; Northern League

MSI

Movimento

PCI

Partito comunista italiano; Italian

Communist

PDS

Partito democratico della sinistra;

Democratic Parry of the Left

PPI

Partito popolare italiano; Italian People's Party

PS I

Partito socialista italiano; Italian Socialist Party

RC

Rifondazione comunista;

sociale italiano; Italian Social

Movement Party

Communist Refoundation

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

These brief biographical notes characters of

my story.

are discussed in the book.

lives

Thus

Italo

Calvino

is

and others

AGNELLI, GL\NNI

under

fall

Bom Turin,

that

whole. People

as a

the text are not included here: Enrico

are described within

Di

Berlinguer, Silvio Berlusconi, Enrico Cuccia, Antonio Sciascia,

life

presented as a left-wing

does not permit an account of his work

intellectual; space

whose

are designed to help the reader situate the

Often the sketches depict only the aspects of a

Pietro,

Leonardo

this category.

1921. Grandson of Giovanni Agnelli.

Took

over the

running of Fiat 1966. Currently Chairman of Fiat. 1974-76 Chairman of Employers

wage indexation.

Association, where he helped negotiate

AGNELLI, GIOVANNI Born 1866. Founded

1899 and ran the company almost

Fiat in

until his death in 1945.

AGNELLI, SUSANNA Born 1922.

Sister

of Gianni. Minister of Foreign Affairs

in the

Dini government.

D'ALEMA, MASSIMO Born 1949 life in

the

of L'Unita. Replaced Occhetto ALFIERI,

into a

Communist

as Secretary

CARMINE Camorra leader,

rival

war against organized crime. Has turned

AMATO, GIULL\NO Born for the

family.

Has spent

his entire active

PCI-PDS. Former Secretary of the Young Communists and former

PSI

in

of the

PDS

in

of Raffaeie Cutolo. Arrested

in the post- 1992

state's evidence.

1938, University Professor. Elected

1983. Held

editor

1994.

many government

member of padiament

posts including Treasury Minister

1988-89. Influential in reform of banking system. Close collaborator of Bettino Craxi.

Prime Minister 1992-93.

D'AMBROSIO, GERARDO Member of Milan pool of magistrates who launched Clean Hands investigation. Believed to be favorable

AMBROSOLI, GIORGIO Appointed by government financial misdealings. Refused cover-ups. in 1979.

Film of his

life,

to the

the

PDS.

to sort

out Michele Sindona's

Murdered by U.S. Mafia at Sindona's behest

A Middle-class Hero,

1995.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

X

ANDREATTA,BENIAMINOBorn

1928. University Professor of Economics.

DC Senator

1976-present. Minister of Treasury, 1981-82. Minister of Foreign Affairs in Ciampi

government 1993-94.

ANDREOTTI, GIULIO Born 1919. Has

spent entire adult

life

DC.

in

Protege of

De

Gasperi. Considered close to Vatican. Perennial Minister. Prime Minister during the Historic

Compromise

years

1976-79 and again 1989-92.

Had

Andreottiani. Influential in Sicily via Salvo Lima. 1995 sent to

his

trial

own

faction, the

for alleged ties with

Mafia.

ARLACCHI, PINO list,

1994.

Sociologist, expert

on organized crime. Elected to parliament on

PDS

Member of anti-Mafia Commission.

BADALAMENTI, GAETANO Leading member of Mafia family defeated by the Corleonesi in the early 1980s.

BARESI,

FRANCO

Now

in prison in the

United

States.

Captain of AC Milan and of Italy.

One of the world's great defensive

soccer players.

BASSOLINO, ANTONIO Born 1947. Active 1972. Elected

in the

PCI. Elected to Central Committee

Mayor of Naples 1993.

DE BENEDETTI, CARLO Born

1934. Industrialist and financier. 1978

CEO and

main

shareholder of Olivetti. Chief owner of La Repubblica and L'Espresso. Has admitted

paying bribes to obtain government contracts.

BERLUSCONI, PAOLO Born 1949. Business investigation in the Clean

Hands

associate of his elder brother Silvio.

Under

operation.

BIONDI, ALFREDO Born 1928. Lawyer. 1968 elected member of parliament

for the

PLI. Minister of Justice in 1994 Berlusconi government.

BORSELLINO, PAOLO Born Palermo, 1940. Magistrate who played leading campaign against Mafia. Murdered July

1

role in the

992.

BOTTAI, GIUSEPPE 1895-1959. One of founders of Fascism. Minister of Education 1936-43. Fostered intellectual dissent but kept

CAGLIERI, GABRIELE

1

it

within

strict limits.

926-93. Engineer and executive in chemical industry.

Had links

with PSI. Vice-chairman of Enichem. 1989 named head of ENI. 1993 committed suicide after the

CALVI,

Enimont scandal broke.

ROBERTO

Financier,

Michele Sindona and Licio

owner of Banco Ambrosiano. Backed by Vatican. Ties Gelli.

1981-82 fraud was uncovered and Calvi was

to

jailed;

the press reported stories of huge bribes to politicians; Calvi was found dead, hanging

Biographical Sketches beneath a bridge

in

London.

It

is

xi

unclear whether he committed suicide or was

murdered.

CALVINO, ITALO Born 1 923. Communist

intellectual

who broke with the PCI

author of La giornata di uno scrutatore{\965), which offers a

critical

in 1956,

but sympathetic

view of the party.

GUIDO

CARLI,

1914-92. Governor of the Bank of Italy 1960-75, President of Con-

findustria 1976-80. Minister of the Treasury in

CARNEVALE, CORRADO Born 1931 Supreme Court which power

suspended from the magistrature

in

in

Italy.

CEFIS,

this

September 1992 and

1940. Sent to Palermo as head of anti-Mafia

December 1992. statesman, whose diplomatic

Favored separation of church and

EUGENIO Born

Accused of using

in

April 1993.

CAVOUR, CAMILLE 1810-61. Piedmont unite

courts.

on Mafiosi. Investigated

GIANCARLO Born Piedmont,

pool of magistrates

of Agrigento. President of a section of

made by lower

reviews decisions

to overturn sentences passed

CASELLI,

in province

1989-92 Andreotti government.

skills

helped

state.

1921. Collaborator of Mattei. 1967 President of ENI. 1970-77

President of Montedison.

DALLA CHIESA. CARLO ALBERTO 1920-82. General of successful anti-terrorist campaign.

the Carabinieri.

Appointed Prefect of Palermo

in

1978 led

1982 and quickly

murdered by Mafia. CIAMPI,

CARLO AZEGLIO Born

1920. Governor of the

Bank of Italy 1979-93. Prime

Minister 1993-94.

COLLODL CARLO Tuscan

author, published Pinocchio in 1880.

COLOMBO, EMILIO Born

1920. Elected to parliament in 1948.

Basilicata.

Perennial Minister including Prime Minister

DC

chieftain in the

and Minister of Foreign

Affairs.

CONSO, GIOVANNI Born Justice in

1922. Magistrate and University Professor. Minister of

Amato government. Drafted March 1993

CORBINO, EPICARMO

decree which aroused popular fury.

Liberal Party politician. Minister of Treasury in early postwar

governments. Supporter of austerity and opponent of currency exchange.

COSSIGA, FRANCESCO Born 1928. Cousin of Enrico Berlinguer. Elected

DC member

of parliament 1958. Minister of Interior during Moro kidnapping. President of the Republic 1985-92.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

xii

CRAXI, BETTING Born 1934. Secretary of the PSI 1976-93. Prime Minister 1983-87. Ally of Silvio Berlusconi. Massive accusations of corruption 1992-present. Currently resident in Tunisia.

CRISPI,

FRANCESCO 1818-1901.

inclinations. to resign as battle

In united Italy a left-wing leader with authoritarian

1894 harsh repression of Sicilian

Prime Minister

after the Italian

protest.

Supported colonization but had

army was defeated by

the Abyssians at the

of Adua 1896.

CRISTOFORI, NINO Born Under-Secretary in the

1

1930. Andreotti's emissary to Emilia-Romagna.

Ferrara,

989 Andreotti government.

CROCE, BENEDETTO 1 866- 1952. Philosopher, he was the leading thinker of Liberal

Italy.

historian, literary critic.

Slow

Neo-Hegelian,

to oppose Mussolini, he

became a

focus of cultural resistance to Fascism. Influenced Antonio Gramsci as well as the

post-World

War

generation.

II

CURTO, DIEGO Born Messina, extra shares

was

1925. Acting President of Milan court. Sequestered the

which Raul Gardini bought

to gain outright control

CUTOLO, RAFFAELE Leader of one branch of Camorra. 1981 he Red Brigades

terrorists the release

of Enimont. Curt6

Imprisoned September

accused of accepting a bribe in return for this action.

1

992.

negotiated with the

of Antonio Gava's henchman. Giro

Girillo.

He

is

currently in prison.

DINI,

LAMBERTO Born

General of the Bank of

1931. Banker. 1976-80 Italy.

official

Minister of Treasury

in

of the IMF. 1979-94 Director

1994 Berlusconi government.

Prime Minister since December 1994.

DONAT-CATTIN, CARLO Born 1919.

DC chieftain

in

Piedmont. Perennial Minister.

DOSSETTI, GIUSEPPE Born 1913. Organized Catholic

anti-Fascist groups. Joined the

Leader

DC

Nuove.

1945 and became leader of the left-wing

in

1952.

of faction, Forze

Abandoned

political life in

DRAGO, NINO Born

1924.

faction.

Resigned from parliament

1956 and was ordained

in

a priest 1959.

DC leader in Catania. Mayor of city 1964-66. First elected

to parliament 1968.

CARLO Born 1894. Worked at Montecatini 1926. Named pany 1956. Was President when Montecatini ftised with Edison. FAINA,

FANFANLAMINTOREBorn to Parliament in 1946.

Appointed Senator

1908. University Professor. Joined the

Held numerous

for life in 1972.

President of com-

DC in

ministerial posts, including

1945, elected

Prime Minister.

Biographical Sketches

FALCONE, GIOVANNI 1939-92. Magistrate

at

paign. His investigation helped lead to 1986

worked

for Ministry

xiii

who led the anti-Mafia cam1991 moved to Rome where he

Palermo trial.

of Justice. In 1992 (outside of Palermo) the Mafia murdered

Falcone, his wife, and his three bodyguards. FELLINI,

La

FEDERICO 1920-93. Film

dolce vita (1959),

and La

voce della

director. Films include

Le notte di Cabiria (1957),

which includes an attack on the corruption of prosperous

Luna (1989),

Italy,

a diatribe against modernity.

FERRUZZI, SERAFINO 1908-79. Founded the family firm, Ferruzzi of Ravenna. Began with transportation of grain, built up a food-products conglomerate and then diversified.

Remained unpretentious and was nicknamed "the

men

in Italy.

FINI,

GIANFRANCO Born

1952. Joined the

MSI

at

Peasant."

an early age. Replaced Almirante

Parry Chairman 1987. 1993-presentled the party's revival and into

He was one of richest

its

as

1995 transformation

AN.

DC chieftain in the Marche.

FORLANI, ARNALDO Born 1925. Lawyer and 1989-92 Party Secretary

Minister.

in

CAP

Frequently

Hands

period. Investigated in Clean

operation.

GARDINI, RAUL Born 1933. Son-in-law of Serafino Ferruzzi head of company.

1

broke with

rest

committed

suicide.

GASPARI,

of Ferruzzi family.

REMO

whom

he succeeded

as

987 took over Montedison. Launched the Enimont venture. Later

Born 1921.

When

Enimont scandal broke

the

DC chieft:ain in

in

1993 Gardini

the Abruzzo. Perennial Minister.

DE GASPERI, ALCIDE 1881-1954. Born in Trento that then belonged to Austria. Member of the Austro-Hungarian parliament 1911-18. Helped found PPL Imprisoned 1927-28 and then found refuge in Vatican library. Leading role in organizing

DC from 1942 on. Prime Minister in December 1945. Won landmark elections Led party and government

GAVA, ANTONIO Born 1930. Silvio. President

1948.

until 1953.

DC boss in Naples, a position he inherited from his father

of the provincial Council of Naples

1

of the Regional Council of Campania 1970. Elected

963.

Member and then President

to parliament 1972.

ministerial posts including Interior. 1993-present accused of ties with

Held

several

Camorra.

GELLI, LICIO Born 1919. In his youth he was a Fascist. Created masonic lodge,

Propaganda 2 (P2), which reached

its

peak

in 1970s. Its

members,

politicians, busi-

nessmen, and policemen, plotted against democracy while enriching themselves by drugs and arms trade, financial fraud, and blackmail. List of members discovered 1981.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

xiv

Gelli fled,

was

jailed in Switzerland, escaped,

charges filed against him, he lives a normal

GENTILE, GIOVANNI

1

and was recaptured. Despite numerous

life in Italy.

875- 1 944. Philosopher and politician. Neo-Hegelian and friend

of Croce. Belief in thought

as action led

him

to Fascism. Initiated reform of secondary

education 1922-24. Killed by partisans.

GIULIANO, SALVATORE 1922-50. Bandit, of peasant

on behalf of large landowners.

beries

delle Ginestre.

on the run

after

Committed murders and

rob-

origin, officially

1943. Linked with Sicilian independence movement.

1947 organized

In

Captured and died of poison

in prison.

May Day massacre at His

role

Portelle

taken over by Mafia.

A founder of PPI. Active in DC from 1943. On the Left of party with authoritarian tendencies.

GRONCHI, GIOVANNI 1887-1978. President of the Republic

1 955-62.

LAMA, LUCLANO Born 1921.

Partisan in

Romagna. Trade unionist and PCI member.

1970-86 General Secretary of CGIL. Associated with wage

Compromise. Elected LA MALFA,

UGO

to senate 1987.

1903-79.

An

On

anti-Fascist

restraint

during Historic

the Right of party, considered a reformer.

who became

the leading figure in the PRI.

Expert in economics, believer in the free market but also in informed state intervention.

Considered close

to

Northern industrial

L\ PIRA, GIORGIO 1904-77. Joined

DC

circles.

1945,

member of Dossetti's

faction.

Mayor

of Florence 1951-57 and 1961-66. Active opponent of the Vietnam war.

LAURO, ACHILLE 1982-87. Arms Italian

shipping

Monarchist

line.

who went

LEONE, GIOVANNI

dealer

and

politician.

Mayor of Naples 1951-58. over to

MSI

Bom Naples,

Founded the

Practiced a crude

largest private

formof clientelism.

in 1972.

1908. Elected to parliament for

DC

1946. President

of Republic from 1971-78. Forced to resign after accusations of corruption. LEVI,

CARLO

1902-75. Artist, writer, and anti-Fascist. His most famous book, Christ

stopped at Eboli (1945), describes his confinement in Lucania. L'Orobgio, a novel about the early postwar, has been

LIGRESTI,

much

SALVATORE Born

in construction

discussed recently.

Catania, 1932. Entrepreneur based in Milan. Prominent

and owner of the insurance company SAL Further

interests in

motor-

ways, hotel chains, and clinics. Associate of Craxi. Frequendy investigated during Clean

Hands

operation. His holding group

fell

into difficulties

and has been tended by Enrico

Cuccia.

LIMA, SALVO Born Palermo, 1928. Spent his entire active

life

in

DC.

City councilor

and then mayor of Palermo. 1968 elected to parliament. 1979 withdrew

to

European

xv

Biographical Sketches

Parliament. Close

ties

with Andreotti. Widely regarded as the

DCs

ambassador to

no longer Mafia. Murdered by Mafia 1992 probably because he could

his

fulfil

promises.

DE LORENZO, FRANCESCO Born

Naples, 1938.

Member of

parliament for PLI.

Multiple accusations Minister of the Environment 1986, Minister of Health 1989-92. against

him

Clean Hands investigation.

in

LUZZATTI, LUIGI 1841-1927. Economist and

politician.

Favored

state invention in

industry and also the creation of cooperatives.

MANCINO, NICOLA Born

1931. Lawyer and politician.

DC

provincial secretary for

Minister of Avellino, and regional secretary for Campania. Elected senator in 1976. Interior in

Ciampi government.

Now member of PPI.

MARTELLI, CLAUDIO Born 1 943. Joined the PS 1 in 1 967, became secretary of the Milan Minister. branch in 1975. Craxi's number two. In 1989 became Deputy Prime Implicated in Clean Hands investigation suddenly abandoned politics in 1993.

MARTINAZZOLL MINO Born 93 1

1

Elected Senator for the

.

DC in

1

972, and

member

the Clean of parliament in 1983. Considered honest. Became Party Secretary during from Withdrew investigation but could not avert electoral defeat in 1994.

Hands

politics

but has returned

as

Mayor of Brescia.

MATTEL ENRICO 1906-62. Businessman, partisan commander, member of DC. At AGIP he headed the successful search for hydrocarbons in the Po Valley. Founded ENI and challenged the

Died

an

in

international oil companies. Associated with Neo-Adanticism.

air crash

which many

enemies, although there

is

Italians believe to

his

scant proof

MATTIOLI, RAFFAELE 1895-1973. Economist, leading part in rebuilding

have been orchestrated by

Comit

civil servant,

after the interwar crisis.

and banker. Played

a

Retained his role in the

postwar years. Helped create Mediobanca.

MAZZOTTA, ROBERTO Born

1

940. Elected

national deputy-secretary of the

banking,

DC

named Chairman of Italy's

delle Province

Lombarde). Forced

member of parliament for the

largest savings

to resign

Bank of Italy 1948-60. One of

MERZAGORA, CESARE Born Pirelli.

1948

1

972,

bank, Cariplo (Cassa di Risparmio

during Clean Hands investigation.

MENICHELLA, DONATO 1896-1984. Director General of the

DC in

1979. In 1987, with no previous experience of

IRI 1933-43. Governor of

Italy's great civil servants.

1898. 1920-27 with Comit. 1938 General Manager of

elected to senate as

DC independent. Appointed

President of the senate

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

xvi

in

1958 and Senator

1968-78 President of

for life in 1963.

company, Assicurazioni Generali.

In

DE MITA, CIRIACO Born

Avellino, 1928. 1963-present

leader of the Left faction.

1

Hands

CAF

insurance

parliamentarian. 1

De Mita

has survived the Clean

investigation.

Helped

Socialist politician. Minister for Industry 1946-47.

up SVIMEZ, an organization

set

MORO, ALDO

to

develop the South.

DC

1916-78. Elected to parliament for the

supreme mediator. Key

role as Party Secretary

1976 President of the

DC and,

in

1948. Considered the

and Prime Minister

in the

Center-Left

along with Berlinguer, architect of the Historic

Compromise. Kidnapped, held hostage, and murdered by the Red Brigades His

letters

from prison

parry's Right, seeking to transform the

Worked on economic

much of

1978.

in

are a last attempt to mediate.

NAPOLITANO, GIORGIO Born 1928. Joined

for

Became

988-89 Prime

period. Despite accusations that he misused

after the Irpinia earthquake,

MORANDI, RODOLFO 1902-55.

years.

DC

982-89 Party Secretary. Clashed with Craxi.

Minister. Lost both posts at start of

government funds, sent

Italy's largest

1972 moved away from DC.

issues

PCI

the

PCI

into a

in

1945. Became leader of the

Western European

Socialist party.

during the Historic Compromise and on foreign policy

PCI

the 1980s. Supported the transformation of the

into the

PDS

1989-91.

OCCHETTO, ACHILLE Born Elected to parliament in

1936. 1963-66 Secretary of the

Young Communists.

1979 member of the Central Committee. 1988

1976.

appointed secretary of PCI and next year undertook the slow but

mation into the PDS. Secretary of PDS until defeat

in

European

successftil transfor-

elections of 1994.

1947. DC politician and Mayor of Palermo. Rebelled DC collaboration with Mafia and formed La Rete, a left-wing. Catholic protest

ORLANDO, LEOLUCA Born against party,

which performed poorly

was reelected Mayor of Palermo PAjETTA,

in

1993.

GIANCARLO Born Piedmont,

and sentenced

1911.

Member

of clandestine PCI. Arrested

to 21 years in prison in 1933, released in 1943.

Garibaldi brigade during the Resistance. Held

Famous

of 1992 and 1994. Orlando

in the national elections

for the

many

Vice commander of the

leadership posts in postwar PCI.

independence of his thought. Died during the transition to PDS,

troubled by

splits in party.

PANNELLA,

MARCO

from the PLI. Used

Born 1930. civil

In

1956 supported the

Partito Radicale

when

it

split

disobedience and referenda to obtain social reforms. In the

1970s the Radicals led struggle for divorce and abortion. However since 1992 Pannella has resisted the transformation of the system that allowed

him

to be a leader

of dissent.

Biograp hical Sketches

xvii

PARENTI, TIZIANA Member of Milan pool. Anti-PDS, she quarrelled with other members of pool. She resigned and was elected been

PARRI,

to parliament

on the

FI

list.

However she has

Anti-Fascist journalist. In 1943 helped found the

FERRUCCIO 1890-1981.

Action Party and the Justice and Liberty partisans. Prime Minister

overthrow marks the end of the Resistance's attempt PASOLINI, PIER

PAOLO 1922-1975.

PCI and

also

to

Writer and film director. Active

admired peasant Catholicism. In

been

as

The Lutheran

1945, his

in Friulan

his last years

modernity, condemning technology and consumerism as

books such

in

shape the postwar government.

PCI

1 949 because of his homosexuality. Remained close

but was expelled from the party in to the

also

of FI. At present head of parliamentary anti-Mafia Commission.

critical

Letters.

Murdered

in a

he denounced

new forms of Fascism

in

homosexual incident that has never

fully explained.

PELLA, GIUSEPPE

1

902-8 1

.

DC politician. Prime Minister in

1

953-54 when

EDC was

a great issue.

PERTINI.ALESSANDRO 1896-1990. Militant Socialist from 1918 and ardent opponent of Fascism.

Socialist parliamentarian,

unloved by Craxi.

Named

President of the

Republic in 1978, he became very popular by speaking out on issues such as the

government's incompetent response to the Irpinia earthquake.

PICCOLI, FIAMINIO Born 1915.

Doroteo or Centrist

POPE PIUS

XII

faction.

DC chieftain

Has held many

in Trento. Generally

posts in party

(EUGENIO PACELLI) 1876-1958.

belonged to the

and government.

Elected Pope in 1939. Reluctant to

speak out against Nazism but strongly anti-Communist. Provided leadership in after the collapse

the

of Fascism. Authoritarian, he was also devoted to

dogma of the Assumption.

In his

PRANDINI, GIANNI Born 1940, Brescia

DC in

as Minister

last

DC youth groups,

Italy

defined

of lay, modern society.

years feared the ravages

active in

Mary and

became President of the

1969. Rival to Martinazzoli. Elected to parliament in 1972. His period

of Public Works provided him with

limitless opportunities for "taxing"

construction companies and he has been a target of the Clean

PREVITI, CESARE Born 1934. Lawyer

among whose

clients

Hands was

investigation.

Silvio Berlusconi.

Minister of Defence in Berlusconi government. 1994 appointed coordinator of FI.

Considered close to

PRODI,

ROMANO

AN.

Born 1939. Economist, University

1982-89 chairman of IRI. Returned

to post in

Professor.

1995 formed movement, the Olive Tree, which unites the Catholics of the

Linked with

1993-94 and was active

PDS and

PPL Probable Prime Minister if his movement wins

DC Left.

in privatization.

Center-Left

the next elections.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

xviii

RIINA,

T0T6

Considered head of Sicilian Mafia. His family, the Corleonesi, defeated

other families in the wars of early 1980s. Arrested in 1993. Supposedly on the run, he

had

for

many

campaign

years been living a

normal

who

to discredit the Mafiosi

standards Riina

considered a violent man.

is

Palermo. In prison has conducted a

life in

have turned

He

is

evidence.

state's

currently

on

trial

Even by Mafia

(Spring 1995) for

the murder of Falcone.

RIZZOLI,

ANGELO

expanded

after the

1889-1970. Publisher and

World War

produced films by Angelo followed

Fellini,

De

II

Sica,

and

Rossellini.

and became entangled with

Gelli

S.p.A.

and the P2. In 1985 the publishing house are

major shareholders.

Manager of

1974, in 1976 became Managing Director of Fiat

in

Masterminded the restructuring of

dispute with the unions in

Rizzolis encountered financial

Industrial executive. Joined Fiat as Central

and control

finance, planning

He also

His son Andrea and his grandson

However the

was taken over by Gemina, where the Agnellis

ROMITI, CESARE Born 1923.

His publishing empire

Europeo and Oggi.

1974 the firm took over the great newspaper of

in his footsteps. In

the Milan bourgeoisie, II Corriere della sera. difficulties

industrialist.

to include the periodicals

1980s and handled the

Fiat in early

autumn 1980. Has been accused

Fiat paid bribes to obtain contracts.

Postponed

since

bitter

1992 of knowing

his retirement to supervise the present

reshaping of the company.

ROVELLI.NINO Born 1917. 1966 Chairman ofSocieta

Italiana Resine (SIR).

Consid-

ered close to Andreotti.

RUFFOLO, GIORGIO Born 1926. Economist. 1956-62 head of of ENI.

relations

1

983

elected to parliament as a Socialist.

Minister of the Environment. Elected in 1994 on the

RUINI, CARDINAL CAMILLO Born

of

Italian

93 1 Ordained 1 954, became bishop

A DC

1915-90.

Numerous

.

chieftain in Veneto. Ally

in

1

983.

Head

a hegelian analysis

first

to

after Unification

1861-62. 1872 awarded chair of literature

nineteenth century.

of Antonio

Bisaglia.

1817-83. Critic and literary historian. Imprisoned for activities

Bourbons 1850-53 and exiled

1856-60. Returned to Naples

is

987 named

party and ministerial posts. Prime Minister 1968-70 and 1973-74.

DE SANCTIS, FRANCESCO against the

italiana

1

list.

Council of Bishops. Considered very anti-PDS.

RUMOR, MARIANO Doroteo.

1

Unloved by Craxi.

AD

and public

research

of

at

Turin 1854-55 and then to Zurich

and became Minister of Education

Naples University. His Storia della letteratura

Italian society

and culture from

De Sanctis was admired by both

its

beginnings to the

Croce and Gramsci.

*"'

Biographical Sketches

SARACENO, PASQUALE Born 1903. Economist and then in 1933

at the

planner.

reorganized IRI. 1946 helped found

Worked

at

Comit and

SVIMEZ. One of Italy s most

able technocrats.

SARCINELLI, he

MARIO Born

reftised to bail

1934.

Worked

out Sindona and other

at

Bank of Italy. 1979

briefly jailed because

DC proteges with taxpayers'

money. Recently

appointed head of Banca nazionale del lavoro. Sardinia. Professor of law and writer. SATTA, SALVATORE 1902-75. Born at Nuoro in postwar Italian novels, II gtorno del Author oiDe Profiindis (1948) and one of the best giudizio.

Catholic and DC politician SCALFARO, OSCAR LUIGI Born 1918. Magistrate, devout Elected President of Interior. of Minister 1983-87 with a reputation for honesty.

Republic 1992.

SCELBA,

MARIO 190 1-91.

DC politician. Minister of Interior from

1947

to 1953.

Did

tense period. not hesitate to use force to keep order in a

PCI at Livorno Congress of 1 921 SECCHIA, PIETRO 1 903-73. Founder member of the he became a Resistance leader. 1943 in 1931 jailed by Fascist government. Released Togliatti, calling for a tougher line. After the Liberation he frequently opposed

family. Held several posts in SCHIMBERNl, MARIO Born 1923 in a modest Roman Appointed chairman 1980. Forced out chemical industry. Went to Montedison 1977.

byCardini 1987. SEGNI,

MARIO Born

1939. Elected to parliament for the

DC in

1976.

Took up

cause

Leading role in organizing the of electoral reform and the method of the referendum. but did in 1993 and formed his own movement 1991 and 1993 referenda. Left but fold Catholic he returned to the not join forces with the Uk. In 1994 elections

DC

his Patto

won

Prodi. only 4.6 percent of the vote. At present backing

government 1920-21. In SFORZA, CARLO 1872-1952. Foreign Minister in die Giolitti to Italy and gravitated returned he opposition throughout the Fascist years. In 1943 towards the lay

and

Italy's

parties.

As Foreign Minister, 1947-51, he supervised the peace

treaties

entry into the Adantic alliance.

the Left of the party. SIGNORILE, CLAUDIO Born 1937. Joined PSI in 1956. On whittled down. gradually power his saw but 1976 in Formed an alliance with Craxi

Various government

posts.

Tax expert and financier. Ties with Andreotti and Franklin Bank (New York) which was

SINDONA, MICHELE Born 1 920

in Sicily.

and Vatican. Acquired Banca

Privata

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

XX

declared insolvent in 1974. Sindona's Italian empire collapsed too and he was eventually

imprisoned.

SINIGAGLIA,

Member of P2. He

OSCAR 1877-1953. A

war he headed the public

died of poison while he was in prison.

far-sighted dirigist.

company,

steel

Went

to IRI in 1930. After the

and helped

Finsider,

Italy

develop a modern

steel industry.

SPADOLINI, GIOVANNI 1925-94. Was the director of

and oi

Held

II

Corriere della sera (1968-72). In

and was the

several ministerial posts

II Resto del

Carlino (1955-68)

1972 he was elected Senator first

non-DC Prime

for the PRI.

Minister 1981-82.

1987-94 Speaker of the Senate.

STURZO, LUIGI 1871-1959.

Politician

and

Founded

priest.

the Partito Popolare in

1919. As Party Secretary opposed Fascism but lost the support of the Vatican. In 1924

he went into

exile.

TAMBRONI, FERNANDO 1901-63. ment which strations,

DC parliamentarian.

ruled with the support of the neo-Fascists.

which were put down by the

was not a legitimate coalition partner

police with for the

many

In

1960 he formed a govern-

The

big anti-Fascist

deaths,

showed

demon-

MSI

that the

DC.

TAVIANI, PAOLO-EMILIO Born 1912. Leader of the Resistance

member of parliament for the DC in 1945. Helped Perennial minister. Member of Doroteo faction.

in Liguria. Elected

negotiate the Coal

and

Steel Pool.

TOGLIATTI, PALMIRO 1893-1964. Friend of Gramsci. Co-hunder of L'Ordine nuovo (1919) and of PCI (1921). Led the party after the arrest of Gramsci. Leading role in

Third International. Collaborated In

1944 launched the new party

but saved the PCI ruling group.

in Stalin's crimes

at Salerno.

Established the strategy of parliamentary

methods and cooperation with the Catholics. Moved, between 1956 and

his

death

in

albeit slowly,

away from Moscow

1964.

TRENTIN, BRUNO Born France 1926. Trade Unionist. 1941-45 fought tance in France and

Italy.

1949 began work

at

CGIL and

in

in the Resis-

1950 joined the PCI.

the Left of party, he was an advocate of worker control. Active in

On

Hot Autumn of 969. 1

Trentin grew more moderate and, as Secretary of CGIl, he supported Occhetto's transformation of the PCI into the PDS. In 1993 he helped negotiate the

framework of

new

Italian labor relations.

VALERIO, GIORGIO Born 1904. Engineer. Career director of Edison at

moment

in electrical industry.

Managing

of nationalization.

VALLETTA, VITTORIO Born 1883. President of Fiat from 1946 responsible for Fiat's postwar success and for

its

tough labor

to 1966.

relations.

Considered

Biographical Sketches

VANONI, EZIO 1903-56.

DC

politician,

xxi

economist and planner. Elected Senator

in

1948. As Minister of Finance (1948-54), he began a reform of the tax system,

introducing annual individual tax returns. As Minister of the Budget (1954-56), he

put forward, along with Saraceno, a development plan that stressed public intervention in the

economy.

VIGAN6, RENATA 1900-76. Active

in the Resistance alongside her

husband Antonio

Meluschi. Her novel L'Agnese va a morire (1949) and the film based on

much discussed

in the recent debates

VIOLANTE, LUCIANO Born 1941. Worked parliament for the PCI in 1979. As

Commission he exposed

for

1 1

in 1960.

LUCHINO

have been

years as judge in Turin. Elected to

member and then Chairman of

the links between the political class

Resigned as Chairman in 1994. The Mafia has threatened to

VISCONTI,

it

about the Liberation.

1906-76. Film director, close to PCI.

the anti-Mafia

and organized crime.

kill

Made

him. Rocco e i suoi fratelli

Other films include L'Os5essione{\^Al), which launched neo-realism, and

Gattopardo{\^G'i).

//

PREFACE

This book grew out of the

last

chapter of a

book

that

Towards

New

Regime"

elections of 1992. In "Inching

consequences of that election

roles in

were taking

my first

The

Crisis

my analysis

I

am

telling

is

too, has

government

of it, and

I

.

Essentially this

I

5,

public figures

which

It

in

it

my manuscript

just

work is

histories

attempt-

So the

to the publisher.

as

tale

a historical essay. Chapters 2 through 7 each begin last

and

I

three years

and then uncover

My starting point emerges elections

origins.

its

Italy: there are

Not

already

have drawn liberally on them. Similarly chapter

Enimont venture

1992

to the events.

when I was

ends, as any book on contemporary Italy should,

is

in

no sense an

analysis of the entire Italian

economy

that help explain current

So

or the privatization program.

history to explain the turbulent years

separate the

played important

an attempt to grasp the causes of

December 1994

picks out certain strands in the

issues like the

who

been written in close proximity

fell

deals with economics,

economy.

18, 1993,

arrest in the final version.

have the pretention of writing a history of postwar

many excellent

tried to trace the

.

with a significant issue of the that

I

could merely note Lamberto Dini's appointment

unfinished and .

many

Italian State represents

It,

coedited on the Italian

a simple narrative account written

were under

Prime Minister before dispatching with three dots

was

draft

Silvio Berlusconi's

ing

place. In fact,

It

of the

the Italian upheaval.

I

on the period that ended with the April

referendum on institutional reform. as events

a

from 1992

in chapter

1

I

have used

to 1995.

from

a review of the events that

from Berlusconi's coming to power.

Italians

have

quite simply been living through a fourth attempt to (re-)found the state. This obliges

me

the state

is

to undertake the

and how

it

daunting task of defining what the "problem" of

emerged from the Unification period.

Chapter 2 argues that the third (re-)founding course with the demise of the Christian Democrats.

how

that regime emerged and where its weaknesses

state in

its

international context because, unlike

had considerable room

to

maneuver and

that

at the Liberation It

lay.

Chapter 3

many observers,

more

had run

then goes back to look sets

I

decisions were

its

at

the postwar

argue that Italy

made in Rome

(which includes the Vatican) than in Moscow, Washington, or Brussels.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

XXIV

Chapters 4 and

5

draw on the Clean Hands investigation

to

examine the

Although

structure of systemic clientelism that underlay the postwar order.

that

order was in no sense a complete failure, clientelism undermined the Liberation

attempt to construct a state that could pass the efficiency,

historic

and

it

led to the events

compromise

most

as the

of 1992

serious bid to

postwar order, while chapter 7 looks Craxi's Socialists

up

set

a

regime

new

attempts and of the resistance to them. tale,

but offers some reflections on

Two

principles have guided

me

and modernization

crisis

political

Chapter 9 analyzes the Berlusconi government

the

Bettino

Northern League.

February 1992 to March 1994, in their

years,

examines the attempts to

remedy the weaknesses of the

digger, the

historical context. It depicts this period as a crisis; it

Chapter 6 analyzes the

at the last actors to take the stage:

and the regime's grave

Chapter 8 deals with two

of representation and

tests

to 1995.

as the

and economic

The conclusion does not its

main

order.

product both of those definitely

end

protagonist, the Italian state.

throughout the work. The

that in

first is

limiting the importance ascribed to the international setting, or rather in trying to

show how

issues.

it

meshed with

"Italian

Time," one has

the magistrates, the big companies, and is

to deal

with a host of Italian

These include not merely the polidcal actors but the Church, the Mafia,

many

others.

To

an enormous and probably foolhardy undertaking, but

deal with

all

of them

necessary

it is

if

one

believes that the present upheaval has multiple causes, of which changes in the

behavior of social groups

—

Italy

are the

—

the magistrates or the small industrialists of northern

most important.

The second

principle

can indeed change, that

is

my conviction

many

Italian

weakness and that the present attempt into a restoration.

done

his

On

the

utmost to prove

that informs

last

that Italian society

and government

commentators exaggerate to

refound the

state will

point Silvio Berlusconi has

me wrong. But in general

much good Italian commentary seems

—

their country's

not inevitably turn

at least until

now

the skeptical, lucid pessimism to

me a trait of Italian political

culture rather than the correct conclusion to draw from Italian history. I

have enjoyed the advantage of wrinng

the Paul

this

book

at the

Bologna Center of

H. Nicze School of Advanced Internadonal Studies, where

rounded by colleagues whose knowledge and experience of Italy

I

am

sur-

are greater than

mine. For their kindness in reading several chapters and suggesting improvements,

wish to thank Vera Zamagni, John Harper, Gianfranco Pasquino, and Thomas Row. Others who have been generous with their knowledge of Italy include I

Fernanda Minuz, David EUwood, and Adrian Lyttelton. Several friends from the Facolta di Bologna have provided

me

with insights and information: Marco

Cammelli, Filippo Cavazzuti, Carlo Guarnieri, and Piero Ignazi.

I

also wish to

thank Gianfranco Brunelli, Valentino Di Leva, Geoffrey Dyer, and Eric Jones.

"xv

Preface

Under

these circumstances the conventional phrase that

author's responsibility takes

on

fresh

meaning.

I

am

all

errors are the

also responsible for all

own. opinions and judgments. All translations from Italian to English are my information: out dig me helped have Several Bologna Center students Barbara Matusik, Zach Messitte, and David Riggs. the Bologna Center for granting I wish to thank the Nitze School and

book was

me

1994 during which much of Robert Evans, the Director of the Center, has been unfailing in his encouragement, as has David Calleo, the Director of European Studies at the Nitze this

a sabbatical semester in

School.

The

Center's library staff has been helpful and efficient and

also like to express

Meera Shankar's

my gratitude

skills

written.

I

would

Gramsci of Bologna.

to the staff of the Istituto

were invaluable in producing the

final version

of the

manuscript.

Zaki Laidi not merely enabled also stimulated

Finally

I

me

to write

me

to publish this study in French,

but

it.

wish to thank

my

wife, Veronica,

and

my

daughter, Kate, for

putting up with me.

—

Patrick

McCarthy

Bologna, January 1995

1

Corruption and the

Overworked

State

994 Italy had lived through three years filled with many kinds of turmoil. Hundreds of her politicians had been charged with taking the end of

1

By

The man who

bribes.

incarnated the postwar political order, Giulio Andreotti,

stood accused of working with the Mafia, while the party that dominated that order, the

Democrazia

companies. Fiat and tracts.

A leading

cristiana

(DC) had

all

but vanished.

Italy's

most famous

Olivetti, admitted offering bribes to obtain public con-

exponent of family capitalism, the Ferruzzi of Ravenna, saw

empire disintegrate, while another company, Fininvest, had tried to take over the government. A country that had always flaunted its Europeanism had seen its

its

currency forced out of the European Monetary System (EMS). If

unwelcome, there were

these developments were

attempt was

made

which included

to deal

Italy's

also successes:

new

electoral

creating parties,

leading bank, the Banca Commerciale Italiana (Comit),

system was

two broad

and gave

a serious

with the huge public debt; a privatization program,

was underway; the head of the Mafia, Tot6 Riina, had been a

many of

installed,

which worked

coalitions of Left

to the

and Right

arrested.

fairly well in

Moreover

March 1994,

in place of the

many

small

Right coalition a majority, albeit an unstable one.

No one thread can

guide us through

this labyrinth

of change.

One

could

argue that behind the sound and fury of magistrates closing prison doors behind politicians lay a process

of economic modernization, which began

had been blocked by the old

political system.

earlier

but

This offers a plausible interpreta-

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

2

tion of the

governments

led

by Giuliano Amato (from

One

Azeglio Ciampi (from 1993 to 1994).

sound and fury there (from

lay

May to December way

nothing

at all

and

1

992

to

1

993) and Carlo

could also argue that behind the

that Silvio Berlusconi's

government

1994) represented a restoration of the postwar regime.

most famous of these

events,

the public contracts auctioned off by the political class. As the Clean

Hands

^)

,'The simplest

begin

is

to consider the

by the Milan magistrates

investigation launched

corruption case for at

to

least

two

great as to indicate that bribery

reasons'. First, the

from the 1950s

to the 1990s,

number of inciderits was

political scientists

so

which the

it.

had

It

political order, as

it

could not survive.

This special brand of corruption was widely magistrates began to expose

was no ordinary

was the norm rather than the exception. Second,

the auctions formed part of a system without existed

revealed, this

a

had demonstrated that

known

before the Milan

name—clientelism; it

was an

setdement, while historians had explained that

it

journalists

integral part

and

of the postwar

flourished a century ago. Italy

Romana

has just "celebrated" the hundredth anniversary of the Banca

scandal,

which involved leading politicians such as Giovanni Giolitti and Francesco Crispi in the near-demise of the bank.'

^^

Immediately three questions

a subject of scandal?

Why

do

its

How did it

roots go so deep?

~^'"The end of the Cold War seemed

arise:

Why has clientelism suddenly become

assume such importance in the postwar period?

One

answer to the

first

question looks outward:

has enabled Italy to get rid of a political class that

to be eternal."'^ This

is

certainly true in that the collapse of the Soviet its

name and

1989 and 1991. That removed the

DCs role

empire prompted the Partito comunista italiano (PCI) to change perhaps also as a

its

identity between

bulwark against

Communism and

hastened

its

decline.

However, world time and national time do not move

PCI had been seeking in

1979, while the

a

new

identity since the

end of the

in

harmony. The

historic

DCs share of the vote dropped more in

compromise

the 1983 elections,

when East-West relations were tense, than it did in the 1992 elections. It would be more correct to say that the interplay of national history and the East- West confrontation created a political settlement in 1948 that grew into a stable order. After going through various phases, in the 1980s this order began slowly to

crumble under both international and domestic pressures (such as the increasing independence of northern

Italian society).

These pressures erupted

in the

volcano of events in 1992 through 1994. Systemic clientelism was a

\// 1^ '

clientelism

vital

means the plunder of the

element in

state

by one or

this order.

Simply defined,

several political parties

and

the simultaneous use of the state to plunder the private sector. Clientelism

depended on and spawned other traits of the postwar order. The most important

Corruption and the Overworked State was the domination by one in

government. Other

groups and a strong

party, the

DC, and

3

the lack of alternation of parties

-^f

were the fragmentation of parties and interest

traits

Communist

Party.

The postwar order was coherent and

it

evolved both in response to international pressures, which constituted one of the several reasons for the exclusion of the PCI, logic. its

The

mentor

parties

in plundering.

Segments of the

Yet

DC

The occupation of public and

private space by the

came

with most groups

strike bargains

to terms with the

would be wrong if

to

imperfectly so.

Communist saw

in society.

Mafia and traded a degree of

enormous

clientelism

—

it

if

order was wholly bad.

It

was

from government, but they held

and from the 1 960s on they were consulted

levels

than some kind observers pretend.

Communist Party, The political order

unbalanced economic growth and the

DC softened some

The PCI

issues.

less heretical

of the tensions

this

quarter or third of the electorate that voted

representatives barred

its

on many national

imagine that

The

power at the local and regional

fostered

own

its

DC and then outdid

for votes. it

democratic,

although

to

from the

of government led them to

impunity

and partly according

Partito socialista italiano (PSI) learned

brought with

it.

itself

There

is

was

a heretical

a thin line

especially the southern Italian version

between certain kinds of

— and mediation.

The basic foreign policy choices, which were as much made by Italy as forced upon her, were correct. Membership in NATO brought security cheaply, while the decision to break with Fascist autarky and to move toward European unity and the open world economy can hardly be faulted. The manner in which this long march was organized may be criticized and certainly the price was high. In the 1950s rapid industrial growth, export-led

and concentrated

in the

North, maintained the historic gulf between North and South, strained big cities like

in the

Milan and Turin, and alienated the workers. They presented

their bill

1970s when social tension ran higher in Italy than in Britain or France. Repeatedly Italian society devised ways to adapt to European

When

(EC) requirements.

the

government entered the

EMS

—

the concession of a wider band. In the early 1980s industry

industry

—was

enough

flexible

enforced stability of the

toward the United

lira

States,

percent of GDP, rates up,

to switch exports

against the

mark made them more

more

difficult.

to

60 percent. High German

worsening the debt and causing

be protected by even higher

which had derived

At Maastricht,

government debt, which was running

down

especially small

from Germany, where the

where the high Volcker dollar made

In 1992 adaptation was ted herself to bring

prestige

Community it won

in 1979,

rates. In

from

a

expensive, and sales easier.

had commitmore than 100

Italy at

interest rates forced Italian

run on the

lira,

which then had

to

September 1992 the parties of government,

Italian participation in the

EC,

suffered the

~\^

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

4

humiliation of watching the Ura drop.Qut of the to reduce surplus steel forced closures

EMS. Meanwhile EC measures

and cut backs

at

Taranto

South. Symbolically the Bagnoli plant, opened in 1908 to industrialize the South,

was closed under

EC

in the vulnerable

as part

pressure

of the attempt

some 80

years later.

Italy responded with another burst of modernization: the privatizations,

the Fiat restructuring,

and the expansion of the stock market

are examples.

The

Employers Association, small businessmen, and the expanding urban middle class

of Lombardy and

whether

Italy

much of the North had begun in the late

could continue

such an expensiye

to affprd

1980s to wonder

political class^

protest took various forms: support for electoral reform to shift

demands

party secretaries to the voter,

most important, the

for administrative decentralization, and,

o£the NorthernJLeague^

rise

So the Clean Hands investigation regime a

not

crisis.^ It is

really a

"good" people against

micro-illegality, of

estimate

is

that

Their

power from the

moral

"evil" leaders.

which

tax evasion

more than $300

is

best understood as the eruption of a

issue, certainly

Daily is

the

not the moral revulsion of

is marked by a diffuse most obvious manifestation. One

in Italy

life

billion in revenue goes undeclared each year.

Salary earners succeed in hiding only 6.5 percent of their earnings, but the

self-employed conceal 59 percent of theirs. Conversely people have to buy goods to

which they

from bureaucrats and

are entitled as citizens

license, a hospital bed, or a residence

permit

politicians.

A driver's

may frequently be obtained without

unreasonable delay only by offering cash. In a characteristic confusion of state

^and market, '^'^

state representatives

have

Similarly incipient clientelism

is

set

up

a false market.'*

present in the

way

Italians use personal

contacts to avoid going through the usual administrative procedures. Bureaucratic delays are

circumvented by mutual favors. Such behavior

from the good personal Italian

or are

life.

all

Moreover

I

relations that are

do not wish

equally dishonest.

The

exercises the greatest power,

Other

elites,

My aim is

is

to

such

as the

1

inseparable

such an attractive feature of everyday

to suggest that Italians disregard morality

political class

and the moral

apparent in their furious reaction to the Berlusconi decree of July

is

is

the

most

Amato

decree of

blame because

to

sensibility of

many

Italians

March 1993 and

it

was the

994, which undid the work of the Milan magistrates.

business

community, bear

demonstrate that the

real issue in the

their share

of responsibility.

Clean Hands investigation

the systemic clientelism associated with the postwar order.

Clientelism became systemic in the mid-1950s,

when

the

DC could^no

on anti-Communism to win elections and also wanted a nrieasure of independence from the Church. Its solution was to buy support by taking over state resources and channeling them to its voters. This process worked, and the longer rely

next step, taken in the late 1950s, was to expand the nationalized sector to

Corruption and the Overworked State

5

provide fresh resources. Since clientelism consumes legitimacy by reducing the

and since

state's ability to arbitrate

a check on the

DC,

there

was no alternative governm£nt

the process continued and grew.

with the nationalization of the the private sector whenever

it

electrical industry in

The

to place

next phase, associated

1964, was to place a tax on

did business with the state sector or used the

state's

grown strong enough to impose its own taxes and there came a period of competitive clienteUsm. At this point Enrico Berlinguer could declare that the moral question had become the dominant

services.

By

the 1980s, the PSI had

political question. Clientelism

campaign marks

was the core of the regime so the Clean Hands

Italian society's

postwar settlement.

It is

attempt to break with the degeneration of the

unlike the Watergate investigation that purged the

aberrations of the U.S. political order, leaving the order intact.

Two

examples

will suffice

to

demonstrate

Although the Milan

this.

magistrates began their inquiries before the 1992 elections, there can be

doubt

had the ruling DC-PS I

that,

investigation

coalition

would have been blocked,

The second example

is

as

won

previous investigations had been.

the behavior of the magistrates themselves. Previously

they had splintered and formed alliances with the factions of the political

Indeed

little

a decisive victory, the

class.

many of them have been accused of contributing to corruption: Corrado

Carnevale has supposedly protected the Mafia, and Diego Curto played a role

Enimont

in the

intrigue

where Raul Gardini paid huge bribes

to politicians in

The magistrates took action in 1992 because they saw that the political class was weak and that they could act with impunity. That Milan should take the lead was logical. The

order to

sell his

share of a chemical venture back to the state.

PSI city government, dominated by Bettino Craxi's friends and relations, had flaunted

its

dishonesty. This provoked the dual response of a Lega surge, which

resulted in the

1993 election of Marco Formentini

onslaught led by Antonio Di Pietro,

who

as

mayor, and a

traditions of Italian populism, as a

Molisan peasant, but behind

corporation that understood that

its allies

must seek

a

new

was characterized by a desperate need to grow because

simultaneously self-destructive, then the distinguishing its

aged

penetration into every

illegal activity.

The

target: Craxi,

too naively arrogant to better but

who had last

trait

nook and cranny of Italian

magistrates have

mown down

have incurred greater public censure than others.

primary

whom stood

were about to collapse and that

a it

role.

If clientelism

was

legal

has been depicted, in the best

The

life,

long; Andreotti, "Alcide

De

where

elites,

was

it

encour-

some of whom

political class

killed the goose that laid the

it

of the old regime

was the

golden eggs, was

Gasperi's heir," resisted

was accused of more serious crimes. The civil service could not escape,

not even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where diplomats and administrators

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

6

have been accused of making profits out of Italian aid to the Third World. Next

came

committed

who

who

the representatives of the state sector, such as Gabriele Cagliari,

also

suicide; then the great private

committed

"publicized

"

suicide.

economic dynasties and Raul Gardini,

Enimont posed the

economy, while the Ferruzzi collapse

difficult question

plementary issue of family capitalism. Cesare Romiti and Carlo

made

their acts

The

of confession and have

—

so far

— been

and he paid them political system."

is

De

com-

Benedetti

forgiven.

private sector has been allowed to plead that

the old regime. This

of the

raised the separate if

it

was a mere victim of

dubious, for Gardini considered that bribes were normal

"in order to establish regular, reliable dialogue

When

Fiat's

with the

construction subsidiary, Cogefar, was found to

have paid bribes to obtain public contracts, Romiti waited and then con-

demned

the political parties, while offering to cooperate with the magistrates

and furnish them with documentation. In February 1994 the documentation turned out to be incomplete and a top Fiat manager was fired for suggesting that Romiti

knew more than he was

exacted from helpless companies hardly relationship between the private sector

remembering

that Fiat's founder,

fits

that bribes were

the conflictual but symbiotic

and the

state.

Nor can one

Giovanni Agnelli, offered

Turin Fascist Party and that Vittorio

known

The notion

revealing.

Valletta,

who

help

to finance the

ran Fiat for decades, was

to distribute largesse.

However, the employers'

pleas, the

DC-

economic shortcomings of the

PSI coalitions, and the hardship created by the world recession enhanced the prestige of the entrepreneurs

and helped Berlusconi win the 1994

charges against the Minister of Health, Francesco

De

Lorenzo,

elections.

left

The

the medical

profession untouched but brought into fresh disrepute the public health service,

whose

inefficiency

worked

had already provoked a flood of

against the state,

which was

fair

protest.

So Clean Hands

but had far-reaching consequences.

De

Lorenzo's cohort Duilio Poggiolini, a fairy-tale villain with a shrewish wife and a chest

ftill

of gold, was a doctor, academic, and bureaucrat. Only the

last

category was discredited by him.

One the 1990

Rome,

of the most intriguing cases

World Cup involved much

Lazio, Turin,

siasm for soccer has, follow the 1994 his

is

soccer,

and Naples clubs have if that

where the stadiums

all

been investigated. Yet enthu-

can be possible, increased.

World Cup with

built for

bribery and where the owners of the

Not only

did Italians

passion and anguish, but Berlusconi turned

ownership of AC Milan into a key theme of his

electoral

campaign. That

he stands accused of having paid part of star player Gigi Lentini's transfer fee in Switzerland to avoid taxes

Champions Cup

was forgotten

shortly after he

won

as his

the election.

team won the European

As the

Italian elites

were

Corruption and the Overworked State

mown

down, soccer emerged

as a

the great defensive player, was

become

form of populist patriotism. Franco

more of

Baresi,

had

a hero than ever because Craxi

a pariah.

One

of the rare

Bank of Italy, which Prime Minister

Hands

9

elites to

explains

emerge unscathed was the upper echelon of the

why its

For the

in 1993.

investigation should not go

became

president, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi,

on

why the Clean June 1994 a new continent

seems no reason

rest there

forever. In

of corruption was discovered: some of the taxation police had systematically taken bribes from companies, which they then allowed to

This

also involved allowing

companies

Since the firms were receiving

illegal

to conceal the

goods

for their bribes,

Many

than ever to believe they were mere victims. distributed after the cates

how

make false tax returns.

names of their

Milan magistrates began

it

real

owners.

became harder

of the bribes had been

their investigation,

which

indi-

tenacious the practice had become.

In an especially dark cranny of Italian society lived the Secret Services.

The army chief of staff. General Canino, the government, and

resigned

amid rumors of plots

on themselves and

funds, supposedly designated for clandestine missions,

Although comic,

lovers.

against

revelations that high Secret Service officials had lavished

this

had a

a pillar of the postwar order.

sinister side

They were

their

because the Secret Services were

weapon

the government's

against

subversion but also against the legal activities of the PCI. Elements in the Secret Services had ties both with right-wing terrorism

of the government

official

Bruno Contrada

and with the Mafia,

as the trial

revealed.

A thorough investigation of the Secret Service archives might throw light on

the

many

Fontana

at

Bologna station

Rose of the Winds, which flourished

Aldo Moro

to rescue

Some

bombs

mysteries of the old order such as the

1969 or

in

in

placed at Piazza

in 1980; right-wing conspiracies like the

in the

1

970s; the police's puzzling inability

1978; and the nature of

CIA

members understood

involvement in

Italian

Hands was no ordinary investigation of corruption but the instrument of regime crisis. Having much to lose, they counterattacked by making charges against a string of Interior affairs.

ministers

—

Secret Service

a post

occupied by the

DC

that Clean

for the past

47

years

— including

the

incumbent, Nicola Mancino, and the President of the Republic, Oscar Luigi Scalfaro.

The

logical explanation

is

that,

while unable to execute a coup,

element of the Secret Service wanted to block the transition to Scalfaro

a

new

this

regime.

had pledged there would be

early elections, but if he were indicted and would be postponed. The Secret Servicemen who Scalfaro had taken money, Riccardo Malpica and

forced to resign, the elections

made

the accusation that

Maurizio Broccoletti, were not

men

of great substance

—

it is

intriguing that

no

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

8

more

serious attempt

was made

proof of what was

as a further

to save the old order

—but

their action serves

at stake.

After Unification, Benito MussoUni's seizure of power in 1922, and the

Republic created after his

sweeping away the

most other

elites

a

fall,

new regime was

and administrative

political

struggling to be born.

elite

had collaborated, the Milan magistrates were unwittingly

preparing the ground for the fourth attempt to (re-)found the Italian '

end of the Cold War, the need

to

state.

groups that considered the postwar order too expensive and too

cient,

and perhaps most of all a

demand

its

The

modernize the economy, the emergence of

social

There was

By

and demonstrating how

ineffi-

own excesses were bringing the old order down. which found expression

for citizenship,

in the pressure for

an electoral system that gave more power to the voter, and that helped inspire the anti-Mafia campaign.

will

mean that the bid to create a new regime will succeed or mark an improvement. On the contrary it has been argued that it

fail, as

did the three others. Italy has always, so the tale runs, been^overned

All this does not

that will

it

by blocs that either exclude or else embrace and

^

j;hey collapse

stifle

opposition. Eventually

beneath their internal contradictions, but the forces that compose

them re-emerge and govern under new names. Another commentator sums "^

up: "behind

all

the innovations of two years of crisis the old principle of change

without change re-emerges, massively victoriously."^

This view, which

associated with

is

Giuseppe Tomasi Di Lampedusa's

novel, The Leopard,^ underestimates the changes in previous shifts of regime,

such

as Mussolini's

rule.

Such

suppression of democracy or the postwar shift to Catholic

a fatalistic interpretation,

prophecy, blinds observers to

formation was, despite

its

Italy's

which tends

to

become

a self-fulfilling

dynamism. The postwar economic

distortions, a great adventure,

x-

trans-

-

Certainly there was continuity throughout the earlier regime

example, the Liberation the bureaucracy and the entrepreneurial

shifts.

For

class survived

unscathed. So this time the democracy and relative prosperity of the Republic will

—one

likely:

it is

hopes!

— remain

Less desirable elements of continuity are

intact.

hard to imagine that the Mafia, the Camorra, which runs crime in

Naples, and the ndrangheta, which operates in Calabria, can be obliterated. /'

Moreover some actions by the Berlusconi government, such on

state television, the reluctance to

to block the

believers in

embrace austerity,

as the

and above

all

onslaught

the attempt

Clean Hands investigation, provide compelling arguments

for the

change without change.

Yet Berlusconi's government lasted only seven months and segments of Forza

Italia (FI) resisted Fininvest,

the government. Admittedly

it

which never quite managed

may yet succeed.

A key issue

is

to take over

the long-sought

Corruption and the Overworked State

from

electoral reform: the switch

the

number of seats

votes

directly

is

determined by the number of

receives nationally) to the British, winner-take-all, constituency-based

it

system for 75 percent of the

with proportional representation limited to

seats,

the remaining 25 percent. Critics

weak

bling,

proportional representation (in which

full

a party obtains

9

coalition

who

argue

it

has produced the old squab-

government might remember

that the French Fifth

Republic's voting system, introduced in 1958, did not produce coherent Right

and

Left blocs until the

to complete the

new

parUamentary elections of 1967, that

constitutional arrangements,

needed before there was alternation of parties a plethora of small parties has

begun

and

in power!

it

The

took

five years

23 years were

that

trend away from

in Italy, further electoral

reform

is

much

and Massimo D'Alema, the new secretary of the ex-PCI, the Partito

discussed,

democratico della sinistra (PDS), has given priority to the formation of a broad Center-Left coalition.

Moreover Berlusconi's attempt Italy,

The

to take over state television, the

Bank of

and the magistrates encountered strong opposition from public opinion. "fax people"

remembered

government by clientelism meant

that

occupation of the state by parties and lobbies, which then expanded the

power over the economy and throughout had hoped

civil society.

Many right-wing voters

neoliberalism and the Lega's federalism were

that Forza Italia's

instruments to push back the invasion of the overbearing

The programs of FI and of the PDS sought a

state that

modest. Shorn of

power

financial

huge public sector and bureaucracy,

to the regions

Governments with secure parties

would be

when

time

state.

demonstrate that Right

Left alike

aurid

was strgng^because, to borrow Michel Crozier's term, its

tht^^sp^

state's

it

would

it

was

delegate

and organize a genuine market economy.

majorities based

on fewer and

better able to bargain in fora like the

the state's role as negotiator has

less

faction-ridden

European Union

at a

grown more important. Such at least

are the aspirations.

Whatever the outcome,

it

remains true that the fundamental problem

three years has been the state. Since

during the

last

short in

two duties of representation and

its

its

formation

efficiency. It has

deprived of broad support and facing strong enemies, such the post-Unification period.^ a population,

protected

Unable

many of whom

itself from

them with

to project

did not a large

its

ism;

it

Italy.

could simply remain absent,

To

as the

Catholics in

its

citizens,

on it

but defensive bureaucracy.

Such a state had various options, none of them to authoritarianism, as Mussolini did;

has fallen

national project outward

themsplyes to be

feel

it

been "besieged":

it

satisfactory. It

could resort

could win tainted support by

as the Liberal state

these various faces of the state

—

clientel-

did in most of southern

authoritarian, overbearing,

and

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

10

absent

—

the governed responded with fitful rebellion (Southern banditry in the

own

post-Unification years), with absence of their

on the black

(a reliance

economy), or with offering tainted support by forming

clientelistic

These were confrontations between non-citizens and

a non-state.

ment had

Moscow

compete with other

to

of loyalty

foci

like

networks.

The

govern-

or the Vatican,

while the individual found other communities like the family.

Unity

is all

equivalent of the political alliance,

factions. It

is

the

more sought

tessitore,

Such against the crippling.

because

it is

rare.

who knows how

There

because British and American parties dissolve

"

The

is

no English

weave together a

to

equally hard to translate stare insieme, which

experience than "being together. full citizen,

after

the politician

is

less easily

a

more

individual, perhaps because he

into

intense is

not a

needs a community. generalities are of limited value,

Lampedusian

and

pessimists, that the

Each country has

its

Anomaly.

it is

more important

problem of the

Italian

to stress,

Italian state

commentators tend

to

is

not

admire

the strong French state, which French observers often consider remote, overcentralized,

The

and hence weak. A country's defects are the reverse

Britain,

whose

demonstrate astonishing loyalty to their

citizens

envy. In any case the Italian state was not absent

with left-wing

terrorists;

it

dispatched them

sense of citizenship was present

postwar Italy been without

and Ugo La Malfa

are

among

"state's

when confronted

state,

whom might

in the

1970s

fairly efFiciently. Similarly a

strong

the Resistants of World

men": Alcide

De Gasperi,

War II. Nor has

Enrico Berlinguer,

merely three examples.

Yet the^problem of the coincidence.' In the spring of last

side of its merits.

absent Italian state has impawned a race of small entrepreneurs,

attempt to correct

1

state

remains and

979 the

historic

is

by a

historical

compromise, the postwar order's

by including people

itself

illustrated

in the

government who

represented the excluded one-third of the population not ridden with clientelism, collapsed. /At that precise to read Salvatore Satta's novel. is

moment the general public had the opportunity The Day ofJudgement. Its hero, Don Sebastiano,

a notary and hence the representative of the Liberal state in Nuoro. However,

he perceives the

beyond

all

state as a

criticism

magical realm, where the king and his ministers are

and where the notary's stamp

wields with awe. As the

is

a sacred object that he

book advances Nuoro changes, but no more modern

sense of the state emerges. Instead society disintegrates like family,

and

his

only genuine contact

is

the feudal

bond

Don

Sebastiano's

that ties

him

to his

farmer, Zio Poddanzu. Satta's novel illustrates the difficulty that his fellow Sardinian, Berlinguer,

had

failed to

at the

overcome.

To examine it in a historical perspective we must glance

period after Unification.

Corruption and the Overworked State

11

THE STATE— OVERBEARING OR OVERWORKED? The

Italian state

was condemned

to interventionism. Italy's industrial

government 1911

and protectionism.

contracts,

after a series

of difficulties,

a private

the Bagnoli, Piombino, and Savona

and increased post-Unity

tariffs.

Italy's

Steel

money was Italy

economic record

ated,'*^ Italian

was

is

more

in a

money; afterward

to issue

issuing

newly established Bank of

skills

much

has been

exagger-

businessmen did turn too readily to the government and a vicious

set up.

tariffs that

Unabl e to survive on its own,

when

privat e indjjstry^formed powerful

the results were

less

disastrous than

provoked the commercial war with France between 1886 and

890, the effect was to weaken the

state's ability to act as

intervention was excessive and incoherent.

of big industries on

its

own.

It

an independent

Meanwhile

failed to develop into a strong capitalist class capable

like

improvement and

respectable. The Banca Romana scandal

orderly manner.

lobbies to deman^^public help. Even

the

was guaranteed subsidies

it

entrusted, with certain exceptions, to the

and proceeded

circle

and

State intervention often brought about

Although the dearth of entrepreneurial

1

mone^,„

one of many examples. In

is

consortium was formed to take over

steel plants

was possible because banks had the right

Its

weakness

her with no option but to supplement private initiative with public

left

of running a large

had successful companies

like

arbiter.

the private sectoil

number

Ansaldo and banks

Comit, and perhaps more should not have been expected. But private

industrialists

continued

to rely

In turn this

damaged

their

political class

had too

little

succeeded in weakening

on

a state that

could not respond

confidence in the

Rome

satisfactorily.

governments. So the

autonomy from the entrepreneurial class and yet That the new industries, such as chemicals and

it."

electricity,

required complex organization,

even more

difficult.

made

public-private cooperation

World economic time was not kind

Statejresources were limited

to the

new

nation.

by the national debt, which stemmed from

the wars of Unification. In 1866 revenue covered only 40 percent of public

expenditure and government paper had to be floated at the exorbitant interest rate

of 8 percent.

The problem was

of progressive income fell

tax

was introduced

most heavily on the poor and

one of many

The

a tax

as early as

1864, indirect taxes on food

on grinding wheat and corn provoked

rebellions in 1869. Despite this the Right,

fledgling state for the

jTiasses

exacerbated by tax evasion. Although a kind

state's

first

narrow

which governed the

15 years, performed well.

social base

and

its

inability to

were identified by Antonio Gramsci

win the

as its greatest

allegiance ofjche

weakness.

It

was an

inherited problem: from the eighteenth century on, the southern peasants

watched the enclosure of

common

land; in the

Napoleonic years they were

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

12

promised that for

it

would be given back

but, since this never happened, they

governments, including their new

all

Tomasi Di Lampedusa their passivity.

Italian masters, a

felt

profound mistrust.

depicts their skepticism in 77?^ Leopard hut overstates

For example, Giuseppe Garibaldi's landing

in Sicily

was accom-

panied by peasant uprisings, which he put down.

Camille Cavour, the the South,

The

which

first

saw

correctly

Prime Minister of the new in Unification yet

state,

never visited

another foreign conquest.

big landowners formed an alliance with the northern industrialists and

-L obtained

tariff barriers to protect their grain.

Southern

industrialists suffered

from northern competition and the masses were ignored by the government except

when

and military

taxes

Unification but

it

service

fell

due.

The Mafia

assumed a more organized form

existed long before ~

at this point.

Ji

more correctly after 1876 when the Left that was already came to power in Rome, the state imposed an authoritative! rule even as it talked of democracy and citizenship. The ruling class, made up' of the old landowners but also of the new middle class that had bought up Church land, bought protection from the Mafia. While acting as a mediator between the rich and the poor, the Mafia was already an autonomous force with

\

a variegated social structure, active in Palermo as well as in the countryside. Its

After 1860, or

^'^'dominant in Sicily

i

made

presence was

possible

by the absence of the

state, its

"opponent, model

and accomplice."'"

The state was Even here and

absent in the South because

in the

masses did not speak

Center

Italian,

it

had

it

was overworked

in the

to struggle to create citizens. In

North.

1860 the

but dialects, while in Turin the traditional language

\// of the court was French. Local traditions, in part the legacy of the city states, were

^^

powerful. Yet Unification fostered in the northern bourgeoisie the sense of

building a

new

Italian nation.

This fueled the industrial ambition of Giovanni

Agnelli and Vittorio Valletta: the / in

The Sanctis

state

found

its

FIAT

stands for Italy and the

T

for

Turin.

De

philosophy in the neo-Hegelianism of Francesco

and Benedetto Croce. Although he was

criticized as

undemocratic and

reluctant to oppose Mussolini's seizure of power, Croce's view of the Italian state as a

youth.

It

moral and led

intellectual force influenced

many of them

anti-Fascism,

which

did.

to

two generations of educated

Marxism, which did not please him, and fostered

Neo-Hegelianism

jostled with the disenchanted fatal-

ism that was another legacy of the past but was reinforced by the

and has thrived

since.

That

fragility also left a space to

be

state's fragility

filled

by the

many

brands of populism, of which Gramsci's was merely the most sophisticated.

More influential than Croce in shaping the state's economic role was Luigi who believed that intervention was necessary in ordinary as well as in

Luzzatti,

exceptional periods. Since he also

championed cooperatives and mutual

aid

Corruption and the Overworked State societies, Luzzatti's

by

thought penetrated CathoHc

Even

far the strongest cultural influence.

circles.

13

The Church remained state like Romagna

an ex-Papal

in

the people distinguished between the Vatican, which they hated, and the local clergy,

whom

they considered close to them. At the other extreme the Church

was dominant

Veneto, where

in the

helped the peasantry to weather the

it

1880's Depression.

The weakness of literary

work

it

post-Unification Italy

is

revealed

by the most famous

produced: Pinocchio (1880). The orthodox reading

a parable of the state

where the puppet becomes

a citizen

is

that

it is

through acquiring a

moral conscience. But the Marxist and Catholic readings are equally convincing: that Pinocchio's urge for capitalist Italy

Fairy

who

freedom marks

his alienation

from the new

and that Pinocchio cannot save himself but needs the help of the

represents Mary. In

my opinion

Carlo Collodi's book

is

an image of

the state besieged by the Socialists and the Catholics.

became apparent. programs meant

After 1876 the pitfalls of the state's narrow social base

The

lack of parties with broad, active

membership and

clear

down into clans clustered around a chieftain. Holding more important than using power and cUentelism was rampant. The ambivalent need for and distrust of authority meant that liberar Italy oscillated between two kinds of leadership: compromising tacticians and selfthat pairliament broke

pxiwer became

proclaimed strongmen, such

A comparison with politics

as Giolitti

Crispi. is

illuminating. In France as well

turned into a game where, behind the labels of Right and Left, centrist

coalitions were formed, overthrown,

the

and

the Third Republic

and

rebuilt.

Panama affair, were frequent. However,

Corruption scandals, such

as

a glance at the respective education

systems reveals the difference. Whereas the Italian state schools

made

little

impact because of inadequate funding and scant sense of mission, the French elementary schoolmaster exerted enormous influence.

may have chosen

a limited state but

it

was, as Gramsci

The French middle felt,

a strong class.

back Boulanger and the anti-Dreyfus movement, whereas the class

Italian

It

class

beat

middle

could not do without Mussolini. The Third Republic pushed through a

divorce law, whereas in Italy divorce was not definitively legalized until 1974.

The

role

of the Catholic Church was very different in the two countries.

Emile Combes's anti-clericalism was narrow-minded, but the break with the

Church and

the legacy of the (nowadays unjustly decried) Revolution gave the

Third Republic a firm state

identity.] In Italy the

and contributed

to

its

denounced modernity and legislation

were

demise. In

liberalism.

Vatican resisted the birth of the

Although Cavour's disestablishment

—

made a distinction between upper and lower clergy

left intact

while diocesan were not

new

1864 the encyclical Quanta cura

—

the

parish revenues

C hurch began tojupport peasant

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

14

supposedly

revolts in the South. After 1870, Pius IX,

a prisoner in the Vatican,

obtained a favorable interpretation of the laws that regulated the Church's financial situation.

He

still

forbade Catholics to vote in national, but not

local,

elections.

The

was that the Church competed with the

result

people's loyalty.

"recognize the

new

It

much

exercised

Anti-clericalism was not strong

it.

Italy

but

it

of

enough

become

to

cement of

the

prevented Catholics from identifying with the regime. In

1905 Catholics were allowed into the political

state as a focus

influence within the state while refusing to

game with

to vote.

But although

Giolitti tried to

draw them

the 1913 Gentiloni pact, they entered

when

the

game was being destroyed by universal suffrage and the post- 19 18 economic turmoil. The Partito popolare italiano (PPI), which maintained a certain distance from a Vatican that considered as

it

an experiment, did not define

defending a Republic led by lay politicians

strong Socialist party.

It

the Vatican. In 1922 the

which lamented the

like Giolitti

its

role

and blessed with a

was outmaneuvered by Mussolini and abandoned by

new Pope

Pius

XI opted

lack of Church support in the

for the Fascists over the PPI,

1924

The Vatican

elections.

allowed Mussolini to break up the PPI and then struck an excellent bargain

with him in 1929.'^

As one reviews the the disparity between

its

historic

problem of the

Italian state

exiguous resources and the demands

one

is

struck by

made upon

it.

It

was created by an efficient but small kingdom, which employed conquest, craft, aid from dangerously strong foreign powers, and an alliance with a scattered,

The new state could rely on no national whether defined by language or worldview. The organization that came

brave but vague nationalist movement. culture,

closest to

embodying such

was founded the new

a culture, the

state

Church, was

was challenged by a

its

enemy. Soon

Socialist

after it

movement, which,

because the masses were divided and pre-political, took messianic forms (such

forms were unthinkable in a

working

class

state like Britain,

where

a strong,

operated within a long parliamentary tradition).

was placed the burden, imposed by world time, of turning nation

endowed with an

agriculture.

and a

To

industrial

economy and

a

European councils had

to

more than

plundered

it

overworked.

it

pillaged

one group

and the weak It

bequeathed

fled

There

is

to help another, It

nothing

is

it

be acquired

it

as it

satisfied

sought to catch

none.

The

strong

was absent and overbearing because

to Fascism

answer was simple: "The State intelligence.

it.

to

modern

subsistence

be won.

Unsurprisingly the Italian state was frenetically active up. Because

this state

Italy into a

continue the work of Unification, colonies had

seat at the

homogeneous

Onto

its

dilemma

to

which Giovanni

the great will of the nation and hence

does not

know and

never does

it

it

was

Gentile'^s its

great

remain aloof

Corruption and the Overworked State

from what concerns the

citizen,

whether economically or

morally."'''

15

By

pro-

fessing to offer such a solution Mussolini's regime aggravated the problem.

Masked behind

Of

rhetoric for

20 years

it

again became the key issue in 1943.

the state's two rivals in the years from Unification to Fascism, the

Catholics were stronger than the Socialists. In the third phase of the state's history they

would not stand

aside

and

criticize.

The Postwar Settlement: Catholic

One postwar

Hegemony?

indication that the years from 1992 to

1992

elections the

1994 mark the end of the

is

the collapse of the Democrazia cristiana (DC). In the

DC

vote dropped by 4.6 percent from the 1987 figure to

order

29.7 percent, which was around 20 percent below

its

landmark

result

of 1948.

A target of protest even before the Clean Hands investigation, the DC was swept away by the magistrates' revelations. A splinter group had already formed: in 1991 the ex-DC mayor of Palermo, Leoluca Orlando, began the Rete (Net-

work) with 1

992

by their party's ties to the Mafia. In the which had become a left-wing movement with a strong

Sicilian Catholics disgusted

elections the Rete,

moral conscience, gained 1.7 percent.' In party's

1993 the

new

went back

DC

split into three

to the

Mario Segni, the leader of the campaign formed an

groups: the largest rallied around the

Mino Martinazzoli, who name Partito popolare italiano

secretary,

electoral alliance

tried to clean

house and who

(PPI); a second

for institutional reform,

with the PPI under the

group abandoned Martinazzoli and, when

name

band

fifth

band took the name Cristiano

with

and eventually

Patto Segni; the third

Silvio Berlusconi entered politics,

ran under the Forza Italia banner as the Centre cristiano democratico

A

left

sociali

and ran

as part

(CCD).

of the left-wing

coalition, the Progressisti.

The 1994

elections

mark a Catholic diaspora. The group

Right fared better than the two that went

Left, for the

went

to the

won 32

seats,

that

CCD

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

18

whereas the Rete

remained

at the

won

9 and the Cristiano social!

The

6.

PPI-Patto Segni

Center and was hurt by the new electoral system. The two

gained 11.1 percent and 4.6 percent respectively but were limited to 46 In a situation as fluid as the Italian

it is

impossible to say even

Catholics are finished as an organized political force, but there

now

allies

seats.

that the

scant chance

is

of their recovering their former dominance.

The Church,

so self-confident in the postwar years, stuck

but appeared not to grasp what was happening,

much

what

less

by

to

"its"

party

do about

it.

Before the 1948 elections Cardinal Ildefonso Schuster of Milan had stated that "votes

may be given only to candidates or

lists

of candidates

who offer the surest

guarantees that they will exercise their mandate according to the spirit of and

following the guidelines of Catholic morality."^ the

DC

The coded message

to vote for

was repeated before every election up to and including that of 1992.

Before the 1994 elections the hierarchy was ambiguous.

Cardinal Camillo Ruini, the president of the Council of Bishops, harked

back

to the

language of the postwar period

the Italian people, the lie

cement of

in their Christian faith. "^

when he

their unity

He added

and

asserted that "the soul of

their greatest

logically that "the

moral strength

Church can

in

no

up propagating its moral and social teachings, even where they overlap with politics." But in the days that followed conflicting statements came from sense give

the Council,

which defined the Church's

role

now

furnishing the faithful

as

with general moral guidelines, or alternatively exhorting them to vote for Martinazzoli's party."*

Certainly the bishops backed the attempt to reform the splitting

it.

They punished

back toward

it.

DC

without

Segni for leaving the party and helped guide

In January 1994 Pope John Paul

him

declared that Catholics

II

should be "united and coherent,"^ which was powerful language because "Catholic unity" had been another coded exhortation to vote conflicting interpretations were given to the Pope's statement.

drew

closer Cardinal Ruini

movement

endorsed the PPI and,

The Church was of

made

inspired by Christian

religion: in the

albeit less

a specific statement beliefs,""^

while

DC. But As the

again

elections

about the need for "a

many

diocesan newsletters

warmly, Mario Segni's movement, the Pact.

facing three problems.

The most

postwar years around 70 percent of

obvious was the decline

Italians

attended Sunday

mass; by the mid-1980s the figure was 25 percent.^ Then, too, fewer Catholics

heed the Church's instructions on 15 percent.^

Many

former

Finally, Catholic activists

how

to vote:

one

poll cited the lowly figure

DC voters deserted to the Lega in

who still

link politics with religion are infuriated

corruption. In 1991 they supported Segni's referendum the hierarchy hesitated.

The Rete had

on

of

the 1922.elec tions.

electoral

by

DC

reform when

the backing of a group of Palermo Jesuits.

The Postwar Settlement: Catholic Hegemony?

19

After the elections Cardinal Ruini had kind words for Forza

had offered increased funding

However Ruini was it

at

once

Italia,

name of

for Catholic schools in the

which

choice.

by other bishops,^ and the Church, while

criticized

could discreetly press for an alliance between the PPI-Patto and the Right,

could hardly abandon the PPI after calling on the faithful to support

it.

Pope

John Paul seemed to suggest another option: the Church would speak out '° its own right on political matters.

The

bishops had raised the question of whether the

and concluded rather

responsibility for political corruption

operation. Dubious its

around

one

money from

bank, Istituto per

le

In general the hierarchy

ence in

What

Italy,

the drug companies financed

Church's role

to consider the

but

it

will

PDS

partial success into the

the 1992 elections the

PDS won a disappointing

and

investigation

wanted its

1993

it

move funds

minor issues but they force

the

Communists? The PCI

between 1989 and 1991. In

16.1 percent of the vote, while

to remain Communist, Rifondazione com-

5.6 percent.

spoils thereof enabled the

in

conferences,

its

played from 1943 to 1948.

it

allies,

was transformed with

unista (RC), was pleased with

did

maintain considerable cultural influ-

of the Catholics' old antagonists and

government and the

it

in systemic clientelism.

likely to

is

to be

not play the linchpin role

the breakaway group that

hastily that

opere di religione (lOR), was used to

Enimont deal. These may appear

in the

Church bore any

emerged unscathed from the Clean Hands

not. In fact the Vatican has not

while

in

was

Italy's

The PCI-PDS's

PDS

exclusion from

to survive the

strongest party.

Clean Hands

However

the Pro-

PDS, were defeated clearly in the 1 994 elections as the PDS won 20.4 percent of the vote and RC 6 percent, while the Progressisti gained 215 seats to the Right's 366. gressisti,

the left-wing coalition gathered around the

So the

PDS

Unlike the PCI

has taken up the role of opposition in the

it is

new

parliament.

not an illegitimate candidate to govern and the international

constraint of the U.S. veto has vanished.

However

in

an age where ideology

is

supposedly in decline, anti-Communism played a major role in the 1994 elections. Explaining

why he

could not form an alUance with Occhetto, Segni

cited the "Westernness" of his values.

Berlusconi was far Left

won and

more

explicit.

'

He

'

If this

harked back to the 1948 elections,

promised "show

trials

and prison"

if

the

described the 1994 contest as a choice between "freedom and

—

Contemporary anti-Communism is very different it appears to show that if the Communist does not exist, the anti-Communist will invent him from the postwar brand. Its existence does not contradict my thesis that slavery."^^

—

the years 1943 to 1992 form a historical period that has ended.

We must now turn

to the

beginning of that period to examine

protagonists and the kind of state they created.'^

Orthodoxy holds

its

major

that events

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

20

in Italy

West

were shaped by their international context, namely, the nascent East-

conflict.'''

destinies than

would

I

like to

suggest that Italians had

usually thought, that the

is

was the Vatican and that the U.S.

role

settlement, but secondary in shaping

more control over

their

most important "international"

was decisive

actor

maintaining the postwar

in

it.

AN ANGELIC BUT VERY DETERMINED PASTOR The

must be considered

assertion

last

first.

reveals that four long years separate the

A glance at the chronology of events

overthrow of Mussolini in July 1943

from the announcement of the Marshall Plan in

mid- 1946 the American decision

must

at all costs

Prime Minister

was slow

Washington

in

was promised

government

By

USSR

a

if

we

situate

major threat that

we must still conclude that De Gasperi became December 1945 and that the DC emerged as the largest party

to

1946 without massive U.S. backing. In

select

the

DC

as

January 1947 brought at the

in

June 1947. Even

be checked,

in

in the elections of June

States

in

to consider the

May

moment when

its

little

fact the

champion: De Gasperi's

United trip

financial aid to Italy, although

he dismissed the PCI and PSI from the

1947.

the next year the United States was pouring in resources and simul-

taneously threatening not to include Italy in the forthcoming Marshall Plan the Left

won

the April elections. Since the Italian

shape in 1947

United

this threat certainly

widened the

From

uprising, although

this

moment

margin of victory. The

it

rather saw itself supporting an

Italian

until

William Casey's intervention in the

illegal

aid,

financing of friendly parties, and bagloads

of dirty tricks to keep the PCI out of power.

Between 1943 and 1946 the United

hard, however, to demonstrate

It is

that the Italians could not have achieved this

it

local elec-

governments deployed firm statements, economic

Hollywood's dream machine,

but

DCs

if

in sorry

'5

tions of 1985, U.S.

ers

economy looked

States did not rule out direct military intervention in the event of a

Communist effort.

to

more

States

on

own.

their

had many policies and policy-mak-

did not envisage Catholic hegemony. In the April

provided more battalions than the Americans.

One

American and-Communism. Catholic unionists wanted munist-led Confederazione generale dei lavoratori

1

948 crusade the Vatican

feels that

the

DC

exploited

to split off from the

italiani

Com-

(CGIL) so the AFL-CIO

put up the money. The United States lavished subsidies on Giuseppe Saragat's Social

Democrats,

who

broke away from the Socialist

Part)',

in the

hope of getting

The Postwar Settlement: Catholic Hegemony?

21

working-class support for the government, but the Social Democrats were never

than a useful, minor

The

when

period from 1943 to 1946 was

power were

more

DC.

the

ally for

the foundations of Catholic

1943 the existing order disappeared.'^ The coup of July 25

laid. In

dispatched Mussolini, while the armistice of September 8 led to the disintegra-

and the collapse of the

tion of the army, the flight of the king, that remained

Fascist state. All

was the war.

Space permits only a few snapshots of the chaos, the details of which are well

known. In

and the Mafia

Sicily, bandits, separatism,

all

grew stronger.

During the Allied rule of Naples 60 percent of the goods that arrived at the port ended up on the black market.

No

the winter of 1943-44.

and people

a day,

'^ '

Sardinia was cut off from the mainland during

coal was distributed, bread was rationed

ate grasses that they gathered in the fields.

at

1

50 grams

The

division

between South and North was reasserted, while Milan and Turin were aban-

doned

Wehrmacht and

to the

Where

there

Allied bombing.

had been an order of sorts suddenly there was none. Gentile's

statement ceases to be rhetorical and becomes ironic.

damage done by

the

war

to Italian industry

was

8 percent of the 1938 productive capacity.'^ But this to roads, bridges,

Moreover the was

painful.

and

which made

railways,

cultural disarray caused

On

September

a direct

fails to

no more than

include the

damage

impact on the population.

by the collapse of the 20-year-old regime

many

8,

has been noted that the

It

relatively slight:

people simply gave up and went home.

The case of the young Pier Paolo Pasolini was typical. Rounded up by the Germans while he was serving with his unit near Livorno, Pasolini escaped, hid in a ditch, and then made his way across Italy to Friuli and his mother. The shock was all the greater because Fascism had been so pervasive. It is erroneous to assume that Mussolini's ineptitude, demonstrated by his decision to fight a loyalty.

to fear

war

One

for

which he had not prepared, had

and opinion turned against him only

the Turin strikes of

on

left

space for other foci of

proof is the lack of opposition. Until the war Mussolini had

March 1943 began

as

as military defeats

little

mounted. Even

an economic protest and then took

a political dimension.'^

Fascism compensated for

its

inefficiency

by being many-sided. ^'^

forged alliances with industry and with the Church. Although

working

class

it

offered at least

such modern pleasures

among

as the

the educated youth,

some young workers cinema and

soccer.

in

Turin

When

it

It

had

repressed the

their first taste

of

potential rebels arose

Giuseppe Bottai was dispatched

to explain to

them

that their sentiments were a return to the original sources of Fascism. Indeed the

example of culture is

reveals

how

difficult

a discourse of cultural opposidon that

is

it

was

to oppose. Pasolini's early writing

striving unsuccessfully to

become

political.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

22

Only after July 1 943 does he realize

there

had been

Fascism had wrongftiUy suffocated without

The pessimistic

commentary on vision blinds him to

my

in

the 1943-45 years

best

him

knowing is

man whom

a "political it."^'

De

Satta's

the conflict between Fascists

Profondis. His

and

anti-Fascists,

but enables him to seize the disintegration. Freedom "cannot be reduced to a political or

even a

legal issue

Christian liberty, which

is

.

.

each of us must conquer and preserve

.

based on self-denial." All

.

human institutions,

ing the state, are built on individual effort, which has collapsed in

Italy.

.

now

"ten or twenty Italys or as

citizens ... in the disintegration

himself.

many

that

Looting

and trading on the black market are the marks of an "individualism which only itself and there are

.

includ-

serves

as there are

of the state each person becomes a state unto

"•^^

Vacuums are quickly filled. The mood of helplessness indicated one obvious The arrival

solution to the question of who should run the country: foreigners.

of U.S. troops,

many of Italian origin,

working class of northern

inspired the

dream of America.

Among the

myth of the USSR preceded PCI proselytizing, less with Palmiro Togliatti's new party than with

Italy the

while socialism was associated

Red Army. Groups that were not helpless dealt directly with the foreigners. In March 1947 Vittorio Valletta, whom the Allies had helped back to power, drew up Fiat's shopping list and headed for Washington. The habit of the arrival of the

appealing to foreigners to quash one's domestic enemies grew rapidly. In February

1945 Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, the veteran right-wing

randum

to

American

officials

saying that the

PCI "was

leader, sent a

memo-

complete control" of

in

the political situation.^^ Influential Italians pleaded helplessness in order to exploit the foreigner, not in order to be governed by him.

The vacuum

left

by Fascism was

filled

by the Vatican rather than by

As Mussolini's ally, the Papacy could appeal to the segments of the population that had supported him. While he could lay no claim to and-Fascism, Pius XII had taken care to separate himself from the regime, and he had his own shock troops, the Catholic Action. He had earned respect by the Allies.

remaining in

Rome when

the king fled.

the population from the war.

It tried

The Church devoted itself to sheltering

to persuade the Allies

not to

bomb and

the Nazis not to deport. It

was inevitable that

turn to the Church.

not be a Catholic

-^^

if

It

in the disintegration

was

you

still

are

of their country

the greatest cultural influence.

born in

Italy?"

asked Federico

Italians

should

"How can

Fellini.

you

Bombing

encourages prayer and Pius XII offered an emotional brand of religion replete

with pilgrimages, processions, and miracles, which ironic

sympathy

in films like

Fellini

would chronicle with

The Nights ofCabiria. Pius

Mary, whose Assumption into heaven would be proclaimed

stressed devotion to as

doctrine in 1950.

The Postwar Settlement: Catholic Hegemony?

23

However if Mary was forgiving and if the processions provided a respite from main trait in Pius's strategy was authority. In the film Pastor Angelicus (1942) the Pope is presented as the supreme leader, a more authentic version

fear, the

of Mussolini.

The Vatican had prepared for the demise of Fascism. In 1929, the year De Gasperi was given a poorly paid post in the Vatican library. He was being held in reserve. The Church began to distance of the Lateran Pacts, Alcide

itself

from Fascism

after the

1938 Hitler-Mussohni agreement because of the

Nazis' anti-Catholic policies. In 1940, Italy's entry to the

Vatican a blunder and, In his Christmas

as

war seemed

to the

opinion turned against Mussolini, so did the Church.

Day message of 1942

the

Pope condemned racism. By now

the ex-Popolari were regrouping.

Not that the Vatican displayed any great liking for democracy. authoritarian solutions: in Fascist organizations,

which implies

some Vatican

that

It

toyed with

to take over the

were considering

leaders

government based on king-army-church. September 8 put an end

a post-Fascist to

July 1943 Catholic Action wanted

such dreams and in December Monsignor Domenico Tardini, a close advisor

to the Pope, could write that "without

doubt

democracy," although he added that "the

The

it

will

Italians are

be necessary to return to

not ready for a republic.

"^^

Vatican's willingness to oppose the restoration of democracy has

probably been exaggerated,

as

have

its

DC

doubts about the nascent

December 1945 Tardini complained

and De

that the party

had drifted

too far to the Left, but as early as 1942 the Vatican began presenting

De Gasperi

Gasperi.'^ In

to the

them

Americans

as a

postwar leader, while in December 1945 Tardini urged

make De Gasperi

to help

a successful Prime Minister.

The more

difficult

questions are what sort of democracy and what sort of state the Vatican wanted for Italy.

One must consider

the Pope's priorities

and the Church's view of the

state.

On

the

first

question, country time and world time ran together: the

Pope's priority was the defeat of

was ever willing

Hitler, Pius

Communism.

to repeat that

Reluctant to speak out against

Communism

was

evil.

The

Vatican

turned a deaf ear to Franklin D. Roosevelt's claim that he could integrate the

USSR into

a world order or persuade

1942 Tardini was worried its

chance.

it

As early as would provide Communism with

to stop persecuting religion.

that postwar chaos

The Pope watched with growing alarm

nist-led Resistance in northern Italy

because the masses were "emotionally unstable

The Vatican

and

influence in

Commuresult

impredictable."^''

feared the worst in Eastern Europe, but

to prevent the spread of

Communist

the spread of the

and warned that trouble could

it

was determined

Communism into Western Europe and to limit Italy. To achieve these goals it wanted the United

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STA TE

24

States to

remain in Europe, so

Americans

as

nean from which

1943 Tardini generously offered

Italy to the

undertake both a civilizing mission and a vast economic

to

operation."

One may suspect

civilization

was

flair for

in

"a magnificent base in the heart of Europe and of the Mediterra-

less

that Tardini's faith in the U.S.'s ability to spread

strong than he pretended.

The Vatican

shared the Italian

exploiting helpful foreigners.

DC

wanted the

In Italy the Vatican

power with the PCI confined

in

to

would have preferred a monarchy, for it distrusted the concept of anti-Fascism and it disliked the Comitato di liberazione nazionale (CLN). The Vatican was tempted by alliances between the DC and the Right, including opposition.

It

Movimento

the

but

The

them.

and

sociale italiano

(MSI)

after

it

was willing to admit that there were

it

was founded

Vatican was determined to retain the power

to have the Lateran Pacts (which gave the

education and marriage into what,

after

as well as

June 1946,

it

had gained

it

1929

in

Church much power over

much freedom from

this plan

was not that

Historians of the postwar period dwell too

much on

tunity of creating a Social Democratic Italy.^^ filled,

December 1946, not making

paying

taxes), written

recognized would be a Republican constitution.

The prime problem with

vacuum was

in

practical reasons for

was too right-wing.

it

the supposed lost oppor-

From

the

way

1943

that the

the opportunity to create such an Italy was small, as

I

shall

argue in discussing the Resistance, the PCI, and the postwar economic deci-

Our

sions.

focus, however,

the key question

is

why

is

from the viewpoint of the

different:

unsatisfactory. Neither Right nor Left has

that

is

representative

doubtless religious

and

efficient.

considered that

it

it

The

it

any monopoly on creating

was helping create

was creating

To

must consider the Church's various views of the

During each incarnation of the Fascism,

it

it

stood aloof and acted

formed

a

wary

a strong Italy,

crisis

explain

why

alliance as

Commu-

from

earlier

so,

we

different.

At

this

was

Italian question.

state the Vatican's role as

a state

endowed with

resisting international

a state that, while different

versions, did not resolve their shortcomings.

Unification,

992-94

Vatican's vision was clear-sighted and

and moral authority and capable of

nism. In fact though

1

the third attempt to (re-)found the Italian state proved

was

an alternative focus of loyalty. During helped to legitimize the

it

state,

while

gaining power through the Lateran Pacts. In the third phase, the

Church was

participating

power. Whereas the Fascist Party had been

Church's creation. Between the two to

a rival,

more and gaining more

the

lay a tiny space that

DC De

expand. But the dominant party of government in the

dependent on the Church's organization

to get itself elected.

was

virtually the

Gasperi would try new Republic was

Moreover,

political

legitimacy was subordinate to religious legitimacy, which resided in the Vatican.

The Postwar Settlement: Catholic Hegemony?

25

This situation was in harmony with the Church's teaching. The supposedly progressive Pope Leo XIII accepted democracy, but he considered

among many.

form of social arrangement

It

it

one

could not claim to represent right

or justice, which were concepts enunciated by the Church. Following Aquinas's

thought, the

Church defined

the

common good

ments measure themselves against Vatican

it.^^

In

and

and of

it

demanded

itself,

the source of legitimacy, but two other factors strengthened

as

position. In the interwar period, an age of dictatorships, the

more

dictatorial.

The

tarian.

Where Benedict

XV

took

its toll.

his

Catholicism was a total

When he saw a new social trend he sought to assimilate

worldview.

erupted into Italian

run by parish

life after

priests. It

women's

skirts

that, if

could

is

its

Church became

had been modest, Pius XI was authori-

Communism

struggle against

Although Pius XII accepted democracy,

it

that govern-

this established the

it:

the

cinema

war and by 1950 one third of all cinemas were

the

easy to smile at Pius's obsession with the length of

but control of people's bodies set the rules

is vital.

of sexual behavior,

it

The Church understood

could easily

set the rules

of

politics.

The second

factor

was that the chaos of depression and wars reinforced

the Augustinian notion of history

as a battle

against unflagging

to this struggle his personal pessimism, Pius XII considered institutions harmful

and

states

among

evil.

the most harmful. ^° There existed an

incompatibility between the things of Caesar and the things of God. the

new

Pius

but a base from which to launch his international crusade against

Communism. One hegemonic church

The

is

tempted

to revise

affirmations

made by

their subordinate position. calls for

DC

freedom of

politicians in favor of incorporating the

show

that they understood

and accepted

who was

Minister of Education in

religion for the individual

and then moves without

Guido Gonella,

transition to assert that Catholicism institutions of the state

spokesman

Cavour's statement and speak of a

in a non-state.

Lateran Pacts into the Constitution

tal

To

republic was undesirable but necessary: a barrier between himself and

his faithful

1946,

Bringing

most human

must be the state

religion:

must be based on Christian

"The fundamenethics."

refuses to restrict Catholicism to the private sphere or to

Another

admit that

public institutions might be neutral. Either the schools teach religion or else

they will be "areligious, which for practical purposes means anti-Christian."

Giorgio La Pira, Giuseppe Dossetti's supporter, denied that there could be a lay state:

Man

had

new and

state's

and social institutions must reflect it.^' Vancan over the DC was the prime cause of the

a religious nature

The supremacy of

the

weakness. Instead of acquiring legitimacy through representation

efficiency,

it

received legitimacy

from the papacy. Ultimately,

this

could

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

26

only be the shadow of the legitimacy accorded to Pius. If to non-Catholics, of

whom

comment,

there was, despite Fellini's

a

good number, such

a state could

only be a foreign body from which they were excluded, to Catholics

DCs

secondhand garment. The source of the this lack

would

it

DC need demonstrate no sense of the state. domain

treat the public

as its private property.

too hasty in refusing responsibility for political corruption.

Cassa per

il

Mezzogiorno was counterpoint

by the party

it

win

ability to frailty

a

lies in

of sovereignty. If the state was legitimized only, but completely, by the

Vatican, then the

on

was

it

systemic clientelism

later

to the cult

of Mary. Such behavior

endorsed troubled the Vatican only when For the

elections.

and the need

rest

From the 1950s The bishops were The looting of the

it

threatened the

of the time, clientelism emphasized

DCs

human

for the angelic pastor.

In practice the Vatican was

through the property speculation

in

more directly besmirched by corruption Rome, which took place in the 1950s under

the so-called Vatican's mayor, Salvatore Rebecchini, or through lOR's collab-

oration with Roberto Calvi. But the papacy's greatest responsibility in the

current

crisis is that it

running the

removed from the

state institutions fairly

DC the need to acquire legitimacy by

and

objectively.

who

Gaetano,

finds

since Christ has target in the

come,

all

—

things are permitted to

indicated an affinity with

To ment on

men.

Don

— Pope Paul VI

Gaetano's sublime cynicism.

ties is

the

most important

single

crisis.

place the prime responsibility for the troubles of the postwar settle-

the Vatican

1943 vacuum. From

is

not to

condemn

perspective

its

it.

No

other force could have filled the

—and from

Italy's

—

it

in according priority to the struggle against international

tainly history, in the shape of Joseph Stalin, did litde to state.

Leonardo

priest,

Sciascia's particular

choice of friends

Don

investigation of Andreotti's alleged Mafia

event in the present regime

novelist

the contemplation of human stupidity, argues that,

DC was Giulio Andreotti, whose

and Salvo Lima

The

God in

The

Todo Modo: the

Sciascia offered a theological explanation in

We

must next look

at the

may have been right Communism. Cerhelp the new Italian

DC and the domestic political context.

A PARTY IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY In the 1946 elections the electorate.

The Vatican

Seventy-five percent of

DC

had no control over the hierarchy or over

delivered the vote with

DC

its

its

doctrine of Catholic unity.

parliamentarians belonged to Catholic Action,

which claimed 2.5 million members

to the

DCs

1

million.

The

party joined

27

The Postwar Settlement: Catholic Hegemony? eagerly in the growing

anti-Communist crusade. As

to U.S. officials the plan for a postwar

had outhned include the Communists.^^ ^^^^ing the 1946

early as

1942 De Gasperi

government

elections the

Pope

that did not

invited Italians

civilization" and "a choose between "over a thousand years of Christian God."" of and religion of materialist state devoid of spiritual ideals, politicians of while Resistance, By now it was becoming clear that the while it was and base moral many hues would invoke it as the Republic's reality. Republic's the determine certainly the Republic's ideal, was not going to not on doubt retrospective The strength of the MSI in the 1994 elections casts notion The country. in the the moral value of anti-Fascism but on its strength Allied of because failed— of a renovating "Wind from the North" that somehow the away sweep to opposition, southern inertia, or Togliatti's skepticism?— were forces All three opposing failings of Italy's past, is only partly correct. too weak to overcome them. was Resistance the and others, were so but present, was too small and it came too late. At the end of 1943

to

The

Resistance

rise to mere 9,000 partisans and not until 1945 did the number already taking shape. 100,000. By then the compromise with Italy's past was

there were a

Like the French Resistance, the Italian

movement

possessed internal fissures

Osoppo, where emerged once, or even before, the invader was defeated. case where the PCI and Partito Pasolini's brother was killed, was only one the it acquired a mass following, Although blows. to d'Azione partisans came working class, much less the Resistance was not the expression of the entire

that

entire nation.

Since this was a

civil

war and

war as well as a national struggle from many in the business community.

a class

it provoked it is hard to see how dethroned Vittorio Valletta whom it later allowed back; present in the been had The correct. both actions could have been most of its but many— among example one Resistance— Enrico Mattel is once he Scelba, Mario why explain helps This supporters stood aside from it. the from Resistants removed 1947, February became Minister of the Interior in

hostility

against the Nazis,^^ It

DC

public administration as fast as he could. national community: partisans personified the vision of a genuine ethic of solidaritytheir But they were what the new state ought to have been. than a national rather themselves citizenship at its best— was a projection of

The

reality.

This discrepancy lies

novel about the

at

Vigan6's the heart o^'Agnese vaamorire, Renata

Romagna Resistance, which reads quite differendy in 1995

than

driven to rebellion

when Einaudi first published it in 1949. Agnese a mother to the young her husband dies in deportation and she becomes and the Resistance network, partisans. So a link is made between the family

it

is

did

when

which

is

to

Vigano notes that be the nucleus of the postwar social order. Yet

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

28

many working-class

families

collaborate with the

Germans. Indeed she hints that the partisans

one of them, La Disperata,

is

villages

chose to ignore the Resistance and to

who

an orphan

are outsiders:

when

loses his fiancee

her family

he has become a partisan. Moreover Agnese, who has lived in "for more than fifty years, her whole life, she had fended for herself

discovers solitude

and

—

and she expected

little

shadows the postwar

from others"

—

The

novel thus fore-

and the

collective in the

also dies alone. ^^

failure to link the individual

citizen-state dialogue.

The

Resistance's defeat

increased the

CLN's power

came

as early as

became Prime Minister of a government however, achieved

Parri,

who

little.

November

1945.

had

Parri

that included the six Resistance parties.

In Carlo Levi's novel he

belongs to an imaginary Italy that

Its victories

Germany's surrender, Ferruccio

until, after

is

is

eternal, suffering

Both the Communist and Christian Democrat

depicted

and

full

as a saint

of miracles.

politicians are depicted as quietly

when Parri falls in November, the Christian Democrat with more reason he knows that "he has the winning cards in his hand and his mind is at ease."^^ In December De Gasperi became Prime Minister. The Vatican had enlisted Allied support for De Gasperi and it was now pleased

—

that northern Italy

was returned

to Italian control.

cally conservative government,^'' as

that were slowly

De

Gasperi's was a generi-

was dictated by the two economic choices

and painfully being made:

to internationalize the Italian

do so by allowing the private sector to take the lead. Thus De Gasperi, who had talked of worker participation in industry, abandoned the

economy and

to

A month

works councils that the Resistance had created. the ban

on laying off workers was

their jobs.

However

part)'

DC

the exact nature of

defined. Moreover, while

Catholic

partially lifted

and the

it is

and

in

he took office

after

February 240,000

lost

conservatism remained to be

correct to see an emerging alliance between the

lay northern industrialists, the

two groups were very

different.

The 207

seats,

issue

DCs strength was

demonstrated

in the

June 1946

elections.

It

won

while the PCI claimed 104, and the Socialists 115. By straddling the

of republic or monarchy,

De

Gasperi preserved a large chunk of the 64

The emergence of the Fronte won 30 seats, demonstrated a reaction and reminded the DC that there were votes to be won

percent southern vote for the monarchy.

dell'uomo qualunque (FUQ), which against anti-Fascism

among

the lower middle class that disliked

the Northern

The founding of elections of lesson.

— and exaggerated—

the strength of

Wind. the

October 1947

Despite

its

MSI and

its

relative success in the

—4 percent and

three councilors

—

Rome

local

reinforced the

left-wing Fascist leadership, the MSI's voters were the

The Postwar Settlement: Catholic Hegemony? conservative southern lower middle classes its

DC

overlap with the

—

it

DC

domination and

FUQ flagged — and

as the

MSI Rome

councilors

MSI was

tenacious enough to

to constitute a

tenuous link between

backed Salvatore Rebecchini for mayor. The survive 50 years of

grew

was demonstrated when the

29

the Berlusconi government and Mussolini's regime. However, in 1947

was

yet another sign that Italian society central Italy

had seemed

Although

threatened in the

autumn of 1946.

Socialists in his in

Yet

De

and

for the parliamentary vote

DC,

success was

its

Inflation soared, but with the

government De Gasperi could not

and and

Communists

deflate the

economy,

September the Liberal Treasury Minister, Epicarmo Corbino, resigned. Gasperi needed the Left for the signing of the unpopular Peace Treaty

overcome the

was

to be in 1945.

trend was working mostly for the

this

it

than northern and

far less left-wing

in

government

trialists,

on the Lateran

Pacts.

Once

these obstacles were

February and March 1947 respectively, he could oust the Left from in

and above

national time

May

with the enthusiastic support of his party, the indus-

By now world time had caught up with

the Vatican.

all

and the U.S.

authorities

had

finally learned the truth

Soviet regime that the Vatican had been expounding to

them

about the

since 1940.

Marshall aid was announced and Americans took the responsibility for decisions

made by

largely

What

sort

Italians.

of party was

it

that,

the postwar settlement? There was

and

its

one year of excitement

later,

no contradiction between

its

dominated

popular base

conservatism: both the Gaullists and the British Conservatives enjoy

strong support outside the middle and upper classes. Exponents of change

who stress the continuity with Fascism are right that the lower who had found in Mussolini a bulwark against working-class demands, now turned to the DC. But the political order was different: there were now elections and freedom of speech. The DCs alliance with the Northern lay capitalists did not make it the without change

middle

classes,

party of capitalism.

It

did not pass antitrust laws or modernize the stock market.

The traditional pattern of a private sector that relied it

distrusted

was continued. ^^ But

this

industry than in Giolitti's age and was cized"

economy was 25

too heavily on governments

time the government had fewer

more

years away, but the

willing to intervene.

ties

The

with

"publi-

DC of 1948 felt no admiration for

the market.

On flexibility

the positive side the

with policy

DCs

as well as in

sectors of Italian society.

The

definition of itself as Catholic gave

dealing with most of the

many

it

different

old alliance between northern industrialists and

southern landlords could not suffice in an age of mass democracy. In the early

1950s the

DC

pushed through

a

moderate land reform

in the South:

it

broke

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STA TE

30

up some of the big estates, whose owners received generous compensation, and distributed the usually uncultivated land to small farmers.

it

aid via the Cassa per to

il

mezzogiorno

promote development

battle for the land

and

a

(a

fund

set

up

in

They received state

1950 by the government where the

in the South). Social tensions in the South,

had broken out

as

soon

as

Fascism collapsed, were alleviated

new version of the old alliance was formed. The DCs willingness to use the state was demonstrated by

its

decision to

maintain and expand the nationalized sector. In the 1940s and 1950s well:

ENI

is

the best-known example, but

never have developed a

by Oscar

modern

steel

DCs

The important

virtues

virtues.

once more the

industry without the public sector, guided

were pragmatism and mediation. In the tumultuous

The

parallel

Italian state

marked the 1950s and 1960s

with the post-Unification period

is

these were

obvious and

was overworked. Good motorways were

network lagged. Social

rail

worked

it

probable that Italy would

also

Sinigaglia.

process of socioeconomic change that

the

it is

built but

services

were expanded but they were often

DC government in

the period before the Naples congress

chaotic.

The

defects of

may be traced back to The DC excluded the groups in northern and central Italy from mediation who were not Catholic and who bore the brunt of the economic reconstruction. Toward them the state of 1954 were the reverse side of its merits, because both the umbilical cord that tied the party to the Vatican.

was overbearing, not

to say authoritarian.

Secondly

socioeconomic change but they did not direct

DC governments mediated in either

it

of the

classical

by dirigisme or by acting as arbiter of a liberal economy. The group that suffered most at DC hands was the northern and central

conservative ways:

Italian

working

class.

demonstrations went a

Modena

Mario

far

Scelba's use of the police during strikes

beyond minimum

crowd, which had assembled

force. In

to protest against factory layoffs,

no exception. Between 1947 and 1950 some 60 workers were

more than 3,000 were wounded Along with this went a certain cultural

police, while

party

left

killed

were

by the

1950 alone. ^^

repression.

The Church and

its

the press alone because there was a parallel Catholic press, but they

extended their control over radio and Andreotti

in

and

1950 the shots fired into

felt justified in

television.

Film censorship took place and

denouncing Vittorio De

which kept the Ministry of the

Interior for

itself,

Sica's

Umberto D. The DC,

also tried to

monopolize the

Ministry of Education to ensure that the Catholic religion was taught in state schools and that state

Groups

that

money flowed

to Catholic schools.

had government support joined

Vittorio Valletta got rid of

PCI and CGIL

^°

in the repression.

militants, isolated

them

At

Fiat,

in special

The Postwar Settlement: Catholic Hegemony!' workshops, and gave bonuses

On May strators.

to

who supported in-house or Cathwhen compared with Sicilian tactics.

workers

His methods were mild

olic unions.

1947 the bandit Salvatore Giuliano

1,

The

Sicilian

31

fired into a

crowd of demon-

landowners were using the bandits in the struggle to keep

by the Mafia with

their land. Later Giuliano

was

The Mafia had resumed

pre-Fascist role of protecting the landowners, while

itself profiting

Liberal

its

killed

from land reform.

and then

Initially separatist,

— demonstrating DC

began the alliance with the

its

it

ability to adapt to

police connivance.'^'

became Monarchist or

new developments

that was sealed in the

mid-1950s and

—

it

lasted

until the 1990s.

Not

all

these acnons were equally grave,

share of responsibility.

The PCI

and opposidon groups bear

their

did nothing to improve labor relations in Fiat.

That, too, has been a feature of Italian history: opposition groups seek not a

change of government but a different poUtical order. The PCI was a revolunonary party, or pretended

governments tation

it

was. This compelled

—

But repression damaged

or allowed

—

DC-led

the

their capacity for represen-

and hence the legitimacy of the new republic.

The

The

to use force.

DCs second weakness was that, while hyperactive,

it

lacked a project.

GauUists were historically identified with the state and the British Conser-

vatives with their empire. Other Christian Democrat parties devised projects, which gave them direction and around which they rallied support. The Ger-

mans

created the social market based

on

a mixture

of

free enterprise

and

codetermination, while the Dutch and Belgian Chrisdan Democrats developed their Catholic sense

contrast the its

DC did

of an organic society into an not use

its

culture of interventionism to plan the Italian

clear project of

which the

DC was a part;

Church's victory),

it

its

landslide

economy. The Vadcan had

state

may be

applied to the

triumph (which was

a

DC of

in reality the

faced an exacting master in Pius XII, a grumbling rival in

the northern industrialists, and an implacable opponent, albeit it

and

DC had none.

the

Indeed the concept of the "besieged" the 1948-54 years. Despite

By

efficient corporatism.

excellent dirigistes like Pasquale Saraceno

pretended, in the PCI. This led

it

to

surround

itself

less

mighty than

with a bureaucracy that

defended the government from the country rather than allowing the govern-

ment

to shape the country.

opposidon role

it

to the

had played

It

for previous

passed, unscathed,

However

it

The

regime in the

was not

public administradon, which would fuel

1980s, played for the

had

from the second

left it

DC and

its allies

the

governments. to the third incarnation

a Fascist bureaucracy for

transition in 1922. Mussolini

suited him, but he

late

it

had circumvented the

largely intact. In

of the

state.

had made the same tranquil state apparatus

1943 Badoglio got

rid

when

it

of the few

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STA TE

32

Fascists

whose

loyalty

was

in doubt,

but neither he, nor

— more

surprisingly

DC

the left-wing ministers in the postwar governments, nor the

undertook a

much less a purge, of the civil service. The bureaucracy of post-Unification Italy was drawn from Piedmont and Sardinia and was modeled on the French civil service. From 1900 on. South-

reform,

erners flooded into

it

because they had few options in the private sector and

The bureau-

because their juridical, formalistic culture gave them an advantage.

cracy was conservative and rigid and the fragmentation of Italian society

produced

a plethora of regulation, difficult to explain

conservative mind-set of this It

also

appealed to Pietro Badoglio, whose government from

was made up of military and

civilian bureaucrats.

Resistance purged the northern Salo Republic and the prefects,

and slow

German

occupiers.

1

The

943

to

to

944

1

obey the

Resistance appointed

own

its

but the upper echelons of the career service fought back. They found

support from the Liberal Party, and one of the reasons for Ferruccio

was the

Fascism.

For the same reason the

which had continued

civil service,

The

to apply.

civil service facilitated its transition to

Parri's fall

issue of the political prefects.

The

Left either failed to understand the importance of the state apparatus

or was too timid to challenge

it,

so the bureaucracy won out.

At

first it

distrusted

the upstart Christian Democrats, but since the middle and lower echelons of the civil service were

drawn from

was

the lower middle class that

rallying to the

DC, agreements were soon reached. "We'll be better off with the priests," is how Carlo Levi sums up the reaction in the Roman offices. So it proved. Before the 1948 elections the

bureaucracy and

of the

DC

granted salary increases to most

after the election the civil service

levels

of the

embraced the new masters

state.^^

Forty-five years later the fruits of this symbiotic relationship were apparent

Clean Hands investigation, when

in the

police,

were accused of accepting

service

had become a demand

many

groups, including the taxation

bribes. In the late 1980s,

in the

reform of the

civil

growing protest against the regime while

the habit of buying votes through promised salary increases in the public sector

had contributed both

to the public deficit

and

to spiraling

wage

costs in the

private sector.

Democracy and

efficiency have

become

vation and preservation of the political order.

bureaucracy protected by tions,

such

as

its

lesser priorities

Thus

than self-preser-

"citizens" confront a

the elite that had run IRI and the nationalized banks under

Mussolini and that served the Republic equally well, the postwar has been ill-equipped to

manage

played

all

its

remote

intricate regulations. Despite outstanding excep-

defensive role

a

modern economy and,

too well.

civil service

unfortunately,

it

has

The Postwar Settlement: Catholic Hegemony?

The

DCs

need

to

and the second by Giuseppe Catholic thinkers

him

was apparent

for identity

major attempts were made

provide one. Dossetti.

De

Montalambert and

like

The

in the years

first

was

33

1948-54 and two

initiated

by

De Gasperi

Gasperi had read the liberal French his Austrian experience

had allowed

to study a Catholic state that was not dominated by the Vatican.

years in the PPI he

From

his

drew contrasting conclusions, one of which was that Luigi

Sturzo had been correct in separating Papacy and party.

De

him in a different way: by seeking alliances some of them on his left. His aim was to allow the

Gasperi sought to emulate

with non-Catholic

parties,

DC to mediate between an autonomous

precise character of this

from period

Church and

which would

create the space for

The autonomy and whether De Gasperi's concept of it varied

to period are subjects

understood the need

society,

was Catholic, but not

Italian state that

for the

solely Catholic.

of controversy.'*^ At the very

government

least

De Gasperi

to avoid being driven to the right

and

make its own decisions. The development of the anti-Fascist movement in the last year of the war suited him well, because it created an alternative pole to the Vatican and widened his room for maneuver. It was an obstacle to the Vatican's recurrent to

temptation, exhibited

DC

as late as

the

Rome

local elections

of 1952, to push the

into forming alliances with the Far Right. In the 1946 referendum

Gasperi resisted Papal pressure to

call

on

De

DC supporters to vote for the retention

of the monarchy.

By

late

1946 De Gasperi could

see that

both economic and foreign policy

considerations were rendering impossible his coalitions with the Left. As a

Catholic and a conservative he had no reason to seek permanent cohabitation

with the PCI, although he was Luigi Gedda.

De Gasperi

Republic, although the Cold

government. PCI,

if it

less

crudely anti-Communist than someone like

continued to consider the PCI a legitimate part of the

Fiis service to

War had removed

its

legitimacy as a party of

the Republic was his intuition that

were not to collapse into

civil

it

needed the

war.

After his outright victoty in the 1948 elections

De

Gasperi continued to

The Liberals and the Republicans provided a link with community of northern Italy; the Social Democrats offered a symbolic bond with the working class. By forging such ties De Gasperi hoped to strengthen the fragile sense of national unity. The lay parties would lighten seek coalition partners. the lay business

the weight of Catholic rule.

De without

The second

lesson he

with the Vatican was

essential:

Gasperi's openness should not be exaggerated.

had learned from it

his

PPI years was that the

tie

the PPI had been easy prey for Mussolini.

the power to

move

far

Moreover he did not have

from Pius XII who controlled the

DC

electorate.

De

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

34

Gasperi had no interest in building up the party's organization; the

was

to

back

his

DCs

role

government. But such a non-party could not support him against

Anyway De Gasperi was not above using the Vatican made on him by the Dossettiani. His vision was different

Pius and Catholic Action. to quell the attacks

from

Pius's, if

only because he thought in terms of citizens and

states.

But he

believed in Catholic unity and in negotiating with non-Catholics from a position of strength.

This explains

why he altered

the election rules in

1953 so

coalition might, with a reduced share of the vote, maintain

Only then could

from

aside

not articulate a vision of society. free

that the

DC-led

outright majority.

DC extend tolerance to coalition partners who would have

the

no other options. Moreover endorsed the

its

He

his

one great intuition, De Gasperi did

did not rein in Scelba and he neither

market nor defined a coherent pattern of public intervention.

He left the DC neither capitalist nor an ti -capitalist but perhaps both. It remains true that De Gasperi saw the Italians not merely as the faithful but as the sum of various cultural groups. All these criticisms

and more were made by

Gasperi from 1946 until 1951,

when he gave up

Dossetti,

who

battled

De

Where De Gasperi

politics.

read Montalambert, the Dossettiani's bible was Jacques Maritain's

L'Humanisme

integral (1936), of

Dossetti believed

transform the party,

—

which they offered

against the Augustinian view

human

own

Church. There should be no

to

concessions to lay values, although the Catholic party would groups.

The

DC should assert itself and take up

interpretation.

that Christianity could

no separation of Church and

condition. There should be

which meant no subordination of party

their

—

work with

all

social

the difficult but glorious task

of building a truly Christian society. This would require a long political struggle

during which the Catholic party would be apostolic but never sectarian, while lay values

would of themselves become

Christian.

Since the ideal Christian society was based on the brotherhood of Dossetti looked toward the PCI. relished the future classless society.

liberalism

He

man

rejected historical materialism but he

The

Dossettiani attacked Luigi Einaudi's

and affirmed that the market could not

create full

employment;

state

Maynard Keynes and William Deal and he wrapped them in quotations from St.

intervention was necessary. La Pira invoked

Beveridge

as well as

the

New

Matthew's gospel. The Keynes of the Cronache not a reformer but a Franciscan. While Dossetti's

magazine

much power in

La

Pira's

populism.'*'*

it

sociali {Social

criticized the nationalization

to the centralized state)

Chronicles) was

looked kindly on the Labor Party,

program (because

it

gave too

and preferred co-ops. The vision present

widely read "L'attesa della povera gente"

is

a Utopian Catholic

The Postwar Settlement: Catholic Hegemony? As such the Vatican, its

could not

it

kindness to the PCI,

it

was

DC culture.

the void in

fill

which distrusted

its

35

Although unwelcome

view of the Church-party relationship

as integrally

De

Catholic as

Gasperi's

to

as well as

more

prosaic

strategy of an outright majority. If Dossetti could not govern with the PCI, then

he wanted to govern alone.

Nor did he offer a solution

to the

problem of the state,

which was supposed to dissolve into the reborn Christian community.

However

long

as

as

they were active both

demonstrated an awareness of the

DCs

had

situation: the Catholic party

power was

Gasperi and Dossetti

The judgment

"pragmatic, empirical and directionless.'"*^

up the

De

predicament. After they

failed to

is

left it

harsh but

re-found the

became it

state,

sums

but

its

assured.

DILEMMAS OF A REVOLUTIONARY PARTY The opportunity

to take control

new

of the

republic was conceded to the

DC by

Communists never challenged the DCs leadership. "46 The struggle between the two seemed equal but, even before the United States entered the fray in late 1946, it was not. Anti-Communist tirades about Cossacks watering their horses in Roman fountains masked the its

ally-antagonist, the PCI: "In reality the

imbalance of a conflict between the Vatican, the

and most of the middle working

class

other.

Communism was

threat of

made

on the

class

on one

DC. Moreover

the

industrialists, the state apparatus,

and the northern and central

The Soviet threat was,

PCI had no

it

was, while

it

Italian

arguably, great, but the internal

not, although the fear of

PCI seem stronger than

the

side,

Communism

was

real.

This

increased the real strength of the

better solution than

its rival

to the

problem of the

Italian state.

moment when the interests of the Communist movement, as defined by Stalin, overlapped with the of the Italian Communist Party, as defined by its secretary. Entry into

Togliatti's speech at Salerno reflects a

international interests

the Badoglio government, the formation of as broad an alliance as possible

and

the subordination of Socialism to the national struggle against the Nazis suited

USSR. They also constituted Togliatti's plan to re-establish Communist Party that could work legally to block any return of

the war goals of the in Italy a

Fascism, while gradually expanding

its

own

influence.

In April 1944, not anticipating the breakup of the anti-Nazi front, Togliatti envisaged the creation of a

International

model of a revolutionary

new mass elite.

He

party to replace the Third

foresaw a prolonged period in

government during which the PCI would penetrate

civil

society

and then,

in

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

36

indeterminate form, the establishment of hegemony. Here again, the failure of this

strategy

stemmed from domestic

East- West split First,

worsened the

Italian

considerations, although the

defeat.

the social bloc, which was supposed to gather around the project,

was internally contradictory. Progressive democracy was to become the

rally-

ing-point for a coalition of the industrial workers, the peasantry, and broad

segments of the middle be isolated

class.

The

reactionary, monopolistic bourgeoisie

and the workers would spearhead the

vast,

would

national-popular alliance.

The rather obvious drawbacks were that the lower middle classes were the group most imbued with Fascism and that the entrepreneurs wielded much of the economic power.

Nor were the Gramscian underpinnings of the project any more conThe dominant view of Gramsci's prison writings is that they are an

vincing.

"open" work, subject to diverse interpretations.

''

In the

way he chose

to

who understandably neglected the earlier, more radical of Ordine nuovo (New Order), emphasized the themes of a long march

present them, Togliatti, articles

through the existing institutions, the weakness of an missed

as parasitic

and Malthusian, and hence the

Italian capitalism dis-

inevitability

of hegemony.

The results were positive in that they strengthened the new party's commitment to parliamentary democracy and to its own growth in membership, but negative in that they discouraged the PCI from acting rapidly to shape the emerging postwar structures, especially the economic

structures.

That

task

could be postponed until the social bloc was in place and the parliamentary alliances

were working. Fiegemony was relegated

served to justify present prudence.

This seems capitalist

to

to a

remote future and yet

it

"^^

contradict Gramsci's view that the precise nature of

development was unpredictable and could be

altered

by the strategy

of the working-class movement. Nor is it clear that, when he writes of penetrating civil society, Gramsci means the existing organizations. However Togliatti's conservative reading justified his extreme caution during his period as Minister

of Justice,

when he

left

duced under Mussolini

the Rocco code

—

intact; offered

—

the criminal law procedures intro-

an amnesty that the magistrates were

able to use to let serious Fascist crimes, including torture,

defended the corps of magistrates, although

it

go unpunished; and

had a conservative

bias

and had

been subservient to the dictatorship.

Such minimalism was

paralleled in the

economic sphere, where the PCI

failed to press for

Mauro

combated

and allowed the taxation of war

inflation

reform of the

Communist

Scoccimarro's currency reform, which would have

Minister, Fausto Gullo,

ownership of land, was watered

down with

profits.

Even the agricultural

which did promote peasant

Togliatti's acquiescence.

When

The Postwar Settlement: Catholic Hegemony? inflation soared in

1946 the Communist ministers

serious attempt to fight

it

reasons.

DC. This

led

government made no

with selective credit controls.

For the PCI's failure to use,

main

in the

37

much

less

change, the

state, there are

two

The first is the priority that Togliatti gave to working with the him to weep no tears for the Parri government and to support De

Gasperi's premiership. Parri was the incarnation of the Resistance, which was a source

of PCI strength but that Togliatti distrusted. In part

aristocratic skepticism, typical ings. In part

it

perspective that stressed political action rather

than the guerrilla war waged in the North. But mostly party

would be guided down dangerous paths

cooperation with the Togliatti's

whose

had

faith

for the tenacity with

could be

was

fear that the

away from

new

the goal of

Catholics.'*''

Sunday mass, and he had contacts with the But this was not the reason

won

social ramifications.

which he pursued the

ostensible reason was the

who

it

that led

upbringing was marked by Catholicism: his uncle had been

a priest, his parents attended

Salesians

an

of the Third International, about popular upris-

Roman

was the

this reflected

DCs

alliance with the

role as representative

DC. The

of the Catholic masses,

over to left-wing positions. If one doubts Togliatti's

inexhaustible variations on this theme,

because one respects his realism.

it is

His true motive was the need to legitimize the PCI. His pessimism was revealed in a conversation with lyrical

some young Communists who were waxing

about the changes the PCI would make.

replied, if in a year's time

The

we

are not

sense of illegitimacy

Togliatti's fear as groundless.

not have done better

acts

his ally.

—

It will

the

PCI and one cannot dismiss PCI would

changes

—whether currency reform

would have enabled

that

of conciliation merely invited

Moreover minimalist

wage

to

support the daily demands of

increases, restrictions

to appease the Liberals

on

layoffs,

its

it

to bargain better

De

Gasperi to use

practice could not atone for

maximalist doctrine: the identification with Stalin's

which had

be enough, Togliatti

jail.

can, however, ask whether the

to fight for structural

DC. Repeated

and then discard

in

would haunt

One

or renewal of the state apparatus

with the

all

USSR. Nor could

a PCI,

working-class constituency for

and controls on the price of food, hope

and private-sector

industrialists, to

whom De

Gasperi

had entrusted the economy.

How much on

can one explain Togliatti's persistence? Certainly he relied too

his personal relationship

with

De

Gasperi.

When

PCI's vote in favor of the Lateran Pacts would earn

he exulted that the it

20 years

government,^' he was underestimating the Vatican's toughness. felt

no gratitude

for

Communist

Togliatti's realistic, pessimistic

support.

worldview

is

The

in

the

The Church

explanation that best suits

that he believed that the Catholic

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

38

The PCI had no

Church was uncontrollable. it,

even

if

Communists allowed

If the state, a

them

second reason

lay in their

DC

the

monopolize and undermine the

to

own culture. Their maximalist doctrine taught

that the Italian state was nothing

within

choice but to strike a deal with

the deal was bad.

more than

the

sum of the capitalist forces economy was

Intervention to remedy the shortcomings of the

it.

nonsense because the state "was no different from the machine

it

was supposedly

repairing."^^

This view, which drew on Lenin's theory of imperialism, had survived

Communist

participation in the Popular Fronts.

Togliatti to justify his minimalism,

was not

it

of Social Democratic experiments such of PCI identity.

trait

central Italy

who had

While

mere

it

was certainly used by Rather

tactic.

It

overlapped

as the

Atlee government. As such

fought in the Resistance for a new. Socialist society. Togliatti's choice

PCI do more than support any and every working-class demand. The

of parliamentary gradualism. While awaiting the to

arrival

of hegemony, the

temptation to organize coherent state intervention recurred in the so-called course of 1946 offered

was

it

appealed to the militants of northern and

Such revolutionary purity did not mesh perfecdy with had

it

USSR as a "different" society and with the rejection

with the admiration for the

an essential

a

wage

as well as in

the

CGIL's employment

restraint in return for

The new

plan.

government planning and

works councils. The 1949 plan called

for the nationalization

industry and public works to create

full

supposed a reformist, Keynesian

state,

new

course

a role for the

of the

electrical

employment. Both schemes pre-

which cannot be considered a facade

for

PCI failed to find a language that could concessions wrung from a liberal state or as signs of

private capital. Yet in both cases the

present

them other than

as

working-class hegemony.

Such schemes might not have worked, but work would have offered the model of a reformist to

the attempt to state. It

make them

probably illusory

is

imagine that alliances might have been forged with the Republicans or with

DC planners such as Pasquale Saraceno and Ezio Vanoni. such

as

Rodolfo Morandi would have been encouraged

But

at least Socialists

to develop their plan-

ning projects. After 1947 the PCI was excluded from power because of its with the

USSR, but

it

also

engaged

in a "self-exclusion."^'* It turned

ties

away from

the business of government.

This

is

the true form of duplicity practiced

that he preached tants did

not turn in their arms

commitment needed

to

by Togliatti.

democracy but plotted revolution.

democracy

to create socialism.

at the Liberation.

as a tactic

The

It

They viewed

and believed

has been argued

Many Communist

that the

the

new

mili-

party's

machine gun was

party kept a paramilitary structure intact that

The Postwar Settlement: Catholic Hegemony?

39

went into action after the attempt to assassinate Togliatti on July 14, 1948. the wave of strikes, DC offices were attacked, and at Abbadia San lines was Salvatore, the telephone center that controlled the North-South

Amid

occupied. Milan, Turin, and

Genoa appeared on

the brink of insurrection.

There was no plan by the leadership for an uprising, although for a day continue, Luigi Longo and Pietro Secchia hesitated, allowed the disturbances to and strikes the As help. no them offered who Soviets and consulted the

PCI

occupations flagged, the unlawful

activity.

Their

who on

on the workers to cease all which provided the

duplicity lay in their hesitation,

pretext for Scelba's repression. Togliatti,

leadership called

his

^^

way

to the hospital

lose their heads, never

showed sympathy

Pajetta occupied the

Milan prefecture

had told

in

comrades not

his

for illegal activity.

When

November 1947

to

to

Giancarlo

protest the

dismissal of the CLN-appointed prefect, Togliatti was furious. Ever afterward

he mocked Pajetta for lusting after revolutions. When the Cominform criticized was the PCI for allowing itself to be dismissed from the government, Togliatti obliged to declare that the this

was no more than

in his defense

PCI was not

a gesture,

limited to legal forms of retaliation. But

which provided him with room

of the parliamentary road against

for

maneuver

critics like Secchia.

PCI was considering was necessary to draw into the

Togliatti's real duplicity lay in pretending that the

when in fact it was not. Probably this new party and into parliamentary democracy the northern

revolution

Italian militants

who

machine gun. But the price of preaching revolution was the shunning of reformism. This condemned the PCI to immobility. Secchia believed in the

became the voice of an alternative policy that advocated working-class pressure, to gain in the form of strikes, demonstrations, and occupations, in order concessions. This seemed to Togliatti dangerous but, while he was probably we'll never do right, there is truth in Secchia's outburst that "if we listen to you anything."

The PCI's

exclusion and self-exclusion from the state

excellent party of local government in the regions

Romagna

it

set

it

made

it

into an

dominated. In Emilia-

out to construct a model society with a broad

class base

and

it

succeeded in winning over segments of the middle class and some small entrepreneurs. The reformist and revolutionary strands were reconciled because the practice was Social Democratic social services

—

—while Communism

public investment in infrastructure and

acted as a Utopian goal and as a moral

codc^*^

Emilia- Romagna could not be transferred to Italy because structed against Italy. party, for the state,

The consequences

and

for the

it

was con-

of the PCI's (self-)exclusion for the

DC were profound.

Having no

representatives

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

40

in the

upper

levels

of the

civil service

or the nationalized industries, the

lacked knowledge, as the years of the historic compromise culture was primarily one of opposition rather than of

organization

knew

it

best

was

left-wing reformist party that

own. The

its

would be obliged

and consequently make them more

become that

it

the

PCI

reveal. Its

government and the because there was no

to use the state's instruments

efficient. Finally the

DC

permanent party of government without having

was allowed to

to

demonstrate

could represent the electorate or act efficiendy.

achievement was to wean a radical working

Togliatti's

illusory revolutions

and toward the new

Gasperi's distinction between the

PCI

cofounder of the Republic. Togliatti

which

state suffered

would

as a

state.

tion of the

pillar

DCs central role.

in governing, in return for a

away from

party of government and the

set his

De

PCI

as

party off on a road of heresy along

lay Berlinguer's appreciation of the value

However another

class

His work complemented

of the Republic's institutions.

of the postwar settlement was the PCI's recogni-

By not challenging the DCs right to take the lead modest role in government before 1947, and for

assuming the leadership of the opposition from 1947 to 1976, the PCI became an

an antagonist.

ally as well as

There are as well as

affinities

between Communist and Catholic culture.

major differences,

and the way the

DC ran

Parallels,

between the way the PCI ran Emilia-Romagna

exist

the Veneto.

The Catho-Communist Franco Rodano's

quest to unite both faiths by setting the Marxist concept of history within a Christian metaphysics

is

emblematic. In the 1940s the Communists' defects

complemented the Catholics. Both were supposed

ally-antagonists created mass parties that

democratic values and yet the Church and the PCI had

to instill

Leninist structures. Jealous and all-embracing, each saw itself as the pole of identity that the state state

was best For

this

left

is

supposed

to represent. Tacitly the

reason the notion of Catholic

term hegemony

is

two agreed the

Italian

weak.

hegemony

is

questionable. If the

used to indicate not merely possession of power but the use

of that power to guide the whole of society toward defined goals, then the Catholics were not hegemonic. this conclusion.

A glance

at Italy's role in the

world reinforces

Italy

and the World:

Helpful Americans,

Rich Europeans, and Resourceful Italians

Several

recent events demonstrate hovi^ the intertwining of Italy with the

outside world has changed. April 1993,

it

rather than a

contained

Communist

PDS

When

the

ministers.

Ciampi government was formed

in

They were from an ex-Communist

Party and they resigned after a day or so. Yet they

evoked memories of 1947 and of the 40-year U.S. veto on PCI participation

in

the government. This time there were no anathemas from Washington. During the 1994 elections the

anti-Communism was homegrown.

In the debate about foreign policy a

it

has been argued that Italy

must find

new framework. The end of the Cold War has deprived her of both automatic

U.S. protection and of occasional, safe revolts against

without the heavy-handed but

easily exploited

it.'

In Europe the

lira's

must

it

was no longer enough

act too.

departure from the

defeat for the Europeanist strategy,

may well be harder

Americans. In 1993 Foreign

Minister Beniamino Andreatta, warned Italians that to follow other countries; Italy

Life

EMS

in

September 1992 was

a

which was such an important part of the

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

42

postwar settlement. Andreatta reacted by reaffirming

designed to allow

ment proclaimed

Italy's belief in a federalist

Amato and Ciampi governments pursued austerity policies Italy to re-enter the EMS. However the Berlusconi govern-

Europe, while the

its

preference for a "Europe of the Fatherlands"

EU, while

its

macroeconomic policy was weak.

The postwar

settlement involved opening the Italian

economy

world economy, which created hardships that have returned

to the

in the present

Unemployment has given rise to demonstrations, which have a special bitterness rooted in the reconstruction years when the working class paid a high price and waited a long time for a prosperity that now seems menaced. The recession.

threat to the Bagnoli

question,

and Taranto

steel plants has

when

attempts to resolve. In October 1993, 11.3 percent, in the

reawakened the Southern

which had never really gone away but which

it

was 7.7 percent

South, with

in the

Sicily, Calabria,

national

North and

Italy

had made strenuous

unemployment stood

at

the Center, but 18.9 percent

and Campania with more than 20 percent

unemployment.^

To

adapt the economy to the international order, the state

playing catch-up received

much

—had

—once more

struck a bargain with the northern industrialists.

aid but a large nationalized sector was created too.

sides are struggling: Fiat has cut

They

Now

both

workers and dividends, while Efim has gone

bankrupt.

However,

in support

a modernization to

world trends,

crisis,

of the

the Italian

thesis that the years

economy

1992-94

reflect, in part,

has begun to recover. Adaptation

albeit following national traditions,

is

present in the Fiat

restructuring plan as well as in the privatization program. In spring 1994 the

stock market soared and

more

shares were traded than at any time since the

mid-1980s, while the denationalizations of Credito Italiano and Comit proceeded smoothly.

World

time, in the shape of the

Cold War and the

internationalization of

the economy, did create extra difficulties for the weak Italian state. However, while the state was not able to dominate outside events,

they offered

—such

as

membership

in the

EC. So

it

could seize the opportunities

it is

correct to say that "Italy has

been shaped by international conditions to an extent unknown in any other

Western democratic country, with the exception of Germany,"^ provided one acknowledges that

Italians

found ways

to exploit those constraints.

The PCI The

disappointed Stalin in the 1940s and irritated Brezhnev in the 1970s.

Americans did not want the

DC did.

DC to

enjoy a monopoly on government, but the

Similarly the Italian republic can not survive the end of the

Cold

War

and the advent of the Internal Market without being re-founded, but both the spur and the obstacles to change

come from

within.

Italy

This chapter

on domestic

is

and

World

the

43

divided into four parts: the influence of the East- West

split

EC, and the

poHtics, Italy's place in the world, her role in the

impact on her economy and society of the process of internationalization. In these discussions the unity

thematic rather than chronological.

is

HELPFUL AMERICANS The Truman

administration entered the battle of the 1948 elections in the

of

November

1946.'^ In

the Republicans gained control of the Senate

fall

and

House. The Democrats needed a cause and Stalin thoughtfully provided one. I

have argued that the 1948 result was the conclusion of a long struggle in which

the bloc that gathered around the

But

in

DC was far stronger than the Left's supporters.

1947 the outcome of the elections was

relations

This worked against the

Communist

the Western

Left. Stalin's rejection

the United States offered bread,

supported

Italy's right to Trieste,

insights into the Italian

money,

a statement that the

and military assistance. The

way of dealing with

insurrection.

Truman

all

the Prague

By

contrast

Western powers

last

of these affords

helpful foreigners. According to the

December

14, 1947.

tough U.S. statement pledging military intervention

Communist

aid, his call for

and above

Togliatti's conciliatory strategy.

peace treaty, Allied troops were to leave Italy by a

of Marshall

Parties to take a harder line,

coup of February 1948 undermined

wanted

in doubt, while East- West

were deteriorating.

De Gasperi were a

if there

obliged and the United States also offered to

send a military mission.^ However, DeGasperirefused

this, just as in

March 1948

he refused a U.S. offer of massive reinforcements for the police and army.

Two

The

issues are involved.

had no objection

political elite

they sought to shape

it.

De

first is

was more useful than the

a backlash in a nation

actions were

Gasperi and the Italian

he did from the Vatican. The second

as

threat of force

still

suffering

months before the

funding of the

De

domestic

affairs,

reality

from war and

election the

is

that he believed the

of force, which might produce defeat.

United States combined covert

DC with threats not to send Marshall aid if the Left won.

welcome

to

De

deflationary policy despite

but

Gasperi maneuvered to gain autonomy from the

United States

In the

that

to outside interference in

Gasperi

who

Both

continued, however, with Einaudi's

American suggestions

that increased

government

spending would be popular.

The politics

pattern that the international situation

would impose on

was taking shape. The Soviets damaged the PCI by

Italian

their behavior but

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

44

they also provided

it

with money.

The United

kept out of the government and had as

DC

Church, the

welcomed

and

this help.

its

To

satellites, as

States ensured that the

PCI was

The

Catholic

power

little

as possible.

well as the majority of Italian voters

speak of American imperialism

absurd.

is

However

the

forms that U.S. pressure took were often irksome and conversely the United States

was often exasperated by

its

inability to get

its

way.

Usually American demands helped Italian leaders to do things that they

would have done anyway, although perhaps

in a different

Booth Luce prophesied there would be

war

to

a civil

in

1

manner.

954,^ Italians

When

Clare

flatly refused

comply. But when she reminded Fiat that the Pentagon was not awarding

military contracts to companies in del lavoro

which the Confederazione generale

(CGIL) organized the workforce,

shop-stewards elections the

italiana

Valletta took action. In the

1955

Communist metalworkers union dropped from 63

percent to 36 percent and in 1957 to a mere 21 percent.''

However, while Valletta may have been spurred by Luce's unsubtle reminders, he had been waging a long war against the PCI and the

1949 he had ceased dealing with the works council and the

Communist

director of social services.

in

CGIL.

1951 he had

In

fired

Moreover the PCI contributed

to

the difficulties of its union by not updating its analysis of the working conditions in a

modern, mass industry. In general the United States set parameters:

it

could veto the PCI but

could not refashion the government. American interference damaged political culture least until

in the

the

1

by blocking the alternation of

970s and perhaps

later,

government was overwhelming

eyes of

its

citizens

parties in

power

it

Italian

—although

at

domestic opposition to any PCI presence

—by weakening

the state's prestige in the

through ostentatious interference (although the citizens had

scant regard for the state anyway) and by subordinating economic and social issues to

the

MSI,

was not

free

An acts as

anti-Communism. Covert funding encouraged corruption. Funding as Ambassador Graham Martin did in 1972,^ encouraged a party that of violence.

unanswered question

is

whether the

CIA participated

of terrorism perpetrated by the Far Right.

The aim of such

in the plots

they were not undertaken autonomously by right-wing groups

emerged from the MSI and who traced was

to threaten the

PCI with

and

actions, insofar

who

often

their legitimacy to the Salo Republic,

a Fascist takeover

and

to

remind the

might not be indispensable. Evidence of CIA participation

DC

exists in the

that

it

proven

complicity of segments of the CIA- trained Italian secret services.

The

Solo Plan, orchestrated in 1964

delicate phase,

when

the Center- Left was in a

was led by Giovanni de Lorenzo, an ex-head of SIFAR

(Servizio

informazioni forze armate), which had been financed and organized by the

and

Italy

World

the

45

CIA.^ Vito Miceli, head of SID (Servizio informazioni

difesa)

participating in the subversive organization, the Rose of the at

NATO

and had

Graham

close ties to

Martin. There was

SID involvement

coverup of the 1969 Piazza Fontana bombings and perhaps in the

in the

bombings themselves, which and yet

it

raises the possibility

CIA knew in 974

of CIA knowledge or involve-

Edgardo Sogno was plotting

a

coup

did not share the information with the Italian government."^

One

ment. Certainly the

1

that

observer concludes that the student and worker

The

back.

and accused of

Winds, was trained

movement "had

Italian secret services, in all probability linked

to

be beaten

with the American,

NATO secret services, thought the Greek solution might work: bombs, a

swing

to the Right, if necessary

Similarly there

some

sort of

terror,

coup.""

circumstantial, although not as yet concrete, evidence

is

that the Italian secret services manipulated the left-wing terrorism of the 1970s

damage the PCI.'"^ It is surprising that the Red Brigades were not broken up in 1 976 when they were weak and infiltrated. Here again the question of CIA involvement is raised and no definite answer can be given. in order to

CIA helped set up the Stay Behind or Gladio organization, mooted in 1950 and took shape in 1956. Supposedly designed provide resistance and intelligence in the event of a Soviet occupation, this Finally the

which was to

illegal

in

first

formation was probably used against the PCI. '^

such actions,

role

its

was

If the

to reinforce the U.S. veto.

CIA did participate

Here again there

is

no

evidence to suggest that segments of the Italian secret services were dragged

The United States probably money and training, especially during the recruits. However it conferred legitimacy on

kicking and screaming into right-wing plotting. played a formative role in providing late

1940s, but

it

never lacked

Italian participants.

DC power.

It

America guaranteed a

did not invent or impose

it,

political

but

it

system that revolved around

did help.

ATLANTICISM AND NEO-ATLANTICISM The

choice of Atlanticism was

flaunted her loyalty to

made with

a certain reluctance. Later Italy

NATO on many occasions: in the early 1980s she hosted

the Cruise missiles at Comiso, with far fewer protesters than the installation of

such missiles provoked in Germany, Holland, or even Britain. But Italy has her

own

worldview, which

1993

is

often unshared

and unloved by the United States. The

clash over Somalia

was the most recent example.

From September

8,

1943,

relegitimize the country. Like

Italy's

prime foreign policy goal was

to

Konrad Adenauer, Carlo Sforza sought equal

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

46

treatment. Italian objections to the peace at

treat)^

included the disappointment

being considered a conquered enemy, instead of an ally against the Nazis.

The road

Italian delegation to the

De

Gasperi to Paolo-Emilio Taviani

meetings of the

to anything, because

what counted was

European

'''

integration.

This did not prevent

Schuman to

demonstrate

from negotiating

Italy

world of NATO and the EC, Italy's interests its

Conversely

feet.

Italian

skillfully in the

was

Pella,

criticized

Pact. Ernie Bevin felt he

disliked,

Trieste

Steel

international

When

Italian state.

of

line

policies that

austerity, as

were

confirmed by

it

A

created irritated the Europeans.

when

Italy

was invited

case of

to join the Brussels

was being generous and he was outraged when

Italy

mood

voters into the

that

arms of the

Left.

Moreover he detected

a

was disappointed with the peace treaty and that wanted

and the colonies given back.'^

The

next year Italy joined the Atlantic Alliance.

and the government

realized that

NATO

offered security, and

then so

much

knew

Coal and

new

Gasperi feared supporting military alliances, which were widely

and driving

nationalist

support for

by the Marshall Plan administrators, and the

foot-dragging came in early 1948,

De

power of the

sometimes persisted with

it

The Einaudi

balance of payments surpluses

declined.

led the

were not served by international organizations, the government

internationally unpopular.

Giuseppe

to reinforce the

who

Plan. Taviani was to agree

Pool. Like the other European countries, Italy sought, in the

dragged

which explains

to legitimacy lay in joining international organizations,

the instructions given by

by dragging

its

feet

The it

election was over

was

isolating

itself.

members expected little from Italy, and as a Christian Democrat De Gasperi

the other

if

the better. As an Italian

that enlightened self-interest dictated joining.

of policy was conducted with trumpet

blasts

But although the change

of commitment to Western

defense, the national concerns remained.

The

first

Gronchi and

was

for peace. Its constituency ran

to the Dossettiani,

who

from the PCI via the PSI

with great reluctance."' Where Sforza identified the tradition of the

to

accepted entry into the Western alliance Italian nation

Western Enlightenment, many Catholics

identified

it

with the with the

Church and with a Mediterranean culture that was uncapitalist and populist. Pope Pius XII himself was lukewarm about the alliance. Forty-two years later the Catholic-Communist front

would re-emerge during the Gulf War of 1991

when the PDS, at the Rimini Congress, where it was officially breaking with its Communist past, proclaimed its distaste for military action against Saddam Hussein and found

By now

the

common ground with

Catholic protesters.

Cold War was over and the position of orthodox Atlanticists was

weaker because the enemy was no longer the mighty USSR. However the

distaste

and

Italy

for the

Gulf War had deep

roots.

The

World

the

47

the bipolar structure of the Cold

emerged

neo-Atlanticist tendency that

the 1950s was inspired in part by a Third Worldism, which led

War and European

it

to question

in

both

Amintore

colonialism.

Fanfani's attempt to begin a dialogue with Egypt after the Suez conflict, Enrico

Mattel's dealings with the Algerian rebels, and Giorgio La Pira's later attempt to

mediate Italy,

in the

Vietnam

conflict are examples.

having no colonies, was able to deal

Behind

fairly

of them

all

is

the belief that

with developing countries.

Students of continuity in foreign policy would see the neo-Atlanticist

and her geographical position on the Mediterranean

thesis, that Italy's culture

offered her a sphere of influence in revised

North Africa and the Middle

form of Mussolini's dreams of empire. Certainly the

a fairer relationship

East, as a

idealistic vision

of Italian nationalism against the dominant Western powers. Fanfani, supported the invasion of Abyssinia, was such

The economic dimension of to obtain a

who had

a nationalist.

the policy was provided

Offeis to Iran and Egypt of a better deal than the U.S.

were designed

of

with the Third World overlapped neatly with a reassertion

measure of independence

by Enrico Mattel. companies

oil

ofi^ered

domain of energy.

in the

Between 1948 and 1962 Mattel doubled Ente nazionale idrocarburi (ENI)'s share of the

amount of

petrol sold in Italy. His discovery

miracle.

Meanwhile foreign companies were allowed

Mattel's success in

and exploitation of

Po Valley was one reason

the natural gas deposits in the

competing with the

oil

to drill

giants

for the

economic

only in

Sicily.'''

was limited;

in 1962,

before he was killed in a plane crash, he was in the process of compromising

with them.

The whole

enterprise of neo-Atlanticism was dubious.

were not united

nists

Gronchi were Base.

rivals,

The most

was barred by

among

protago-

DC, the movement was the PCI, which and formed no more than temporary alliances

while Mattel founded a separate faction of the

likely

candidate to lead such a

illegitimacy

its

Its

themselves: Amintore Fanfani and Giovanni

with Mattel. The goals of neo-Atlanticism and

its

relationship with orthodox

Atlanticism were unclear.

Yet most European countries

own way,

—

Britain as well as Gaullist France

its

That

should have a national vision of world

Italy, too,

to pursue

destiny.

it is

Nor

yet another proof that Italians sought

in the

affairs

States.

and should wish

some control over

their

did this attempt cease with Mattel's death and Fanfani's defeats.

Fiat bestrode the East- West divide

and

—have

from the United

a degree of independence

sought, each in

1970s

it

when

it

founded

incurred U.S. displeasure

when

its

it

plant at Togliattigrad,

sold a block of its shares

to Qadaffi.

In the 1980s Italian

would have wished, and

ties to

Italy

the

PLO

were closer than the United States

opposed the U.S. readiness

to use force in the

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

48

Middle Laura

of Arab

men

A

East.

dramatic conflict flared up after the hijacking of the Achille

October 1985, when the U.S. navy forced

in

terrorists to

into custody but the Craxi

national territory.

who was

Andreotti,

It

government

that he

group

a plane carrying a

wanted

States

to take the

asserted Italy's control over her

took charge of the group and then released them.

Foreign Minister in the Craxi years, persistently opposed

U.S. initiatives in the Middle East.

through the

The United

land at Sigonella.

UN, and

He sought to

work

avoid the use of force, to

to establish Italy as a mediator.'^

was without public support and, among the

There

is

no evidence

political parties, objections

from the PRI were outweighed by sympathy from the PCI. Criticisms of the substance of this policy are legitimate but not over-

whelmingly convincing. The Reagan administration was strong but inconsistent in

its

softer line

Persian

The most

stands on the Middle East.

is

promote

that the political will to

Gulf came up

for

debate

at the

G7

telling objection to Italy's it

meeting

been forced out and the caretaker Fanfani led the

more

was lacking. in

the

Once

Italian delegation.

there were various strands in Italian policy. Craxi supported the

Palestinian aspiration toward a

home

state,

but he distinguished between

moderate and extremist Arab countries and he was very anxious tic

When

June 1987, Craxi had

and party reasons

—

to

—

for

domes-

remain on good terms with the United

Andreotti sought rather to unite the Arab world so that

it

could find

States. its

own

solutions to the Palestinian question. This offered Italy a special role as the

Arabs' principal interlocutor at the risk of worsening relations with the

United

States.

In general the state behaved abroad rather better than

with the same flaws. The DC-led coalitions excelled could not

lead.

Nor could

their internal divisions.

in

it

did at home, but

mediation, but they

they pursue any heretical policy for long because of

This reduced

much of

mere

Italian foreign policy to

symbolism.

The aim of liberating the Third World Italian corruption. Craxi

took pride in increasing foreign

0.24 percent in 1983 to 0.4 percent of operation has questioned the tion

program

are

did not extend to liberating

way

aid

GDP in was

1986.

aid,

However

it

from

which went from

Hands

the Clean

distributed. Officials in the coopera-

under investigation, while money, allocated for projects

distant countries like Bangladesh, seems to have

gone only

in

as far as the pockets

of Italian politicians and businessmen. '^ Even before he became Prime Minister, Craxi was accused of engaging in shady deals with the dictator, Siad Barre, and the Somalians

remembered them when the

arrived in 1993.

exactly

Of course,

unknown

in

Italian

contingent of the

UN force

corruption in dealings with former colonies

France and Britain either.

is

not

and

Italy

Another criticism

the

World

that Italian heresy

is

49

would not have been

possible, if

the United States had not been present to protect orthodoxy. This view leads

United States

to the conclusion that, since the

be

with no policy

left

of re-founding the state

may

at

all.

is

now

withdrawing, Italy will

But such pessimism presupposes that the process

state will collapse. It

is

legitimate to argue that a stronger

be able to define and pursue a national vision, which the old regime

perceived but sacrificed

—

to

American strength and

Ciampi and Andreatta made

a start.

to

its

own

weakness.

Andreatta defined the new situation:

"There are no more 'locomotives' or outside

leaders. "^°

He

argued that Italy

can only act through international organizations and he threw himself strongly

behind the Februar)' 1994

NATO

ultimatum

in Bosnia.

spoken of the need to increase defense spending

armed

deliberately neglected

and

to

its

to see

policy

is

Italian

how

a

rebuke

improve

Italy's

to neo-Atlanticism

on the notion

that her culture

is

man." Yet

"closer to

grounded

in national culture.

Andreatta has defended the action of the

contingent in Somalia, emphasizing the knowledge of local conditions

UN

"to give

The

up an

arbitrary

and

resort to force.

unilateral use

He

writes of the need for

of violence."

cultural forces that steer Italy toward a Mediterranean role are

present. Recently !l Manifesto suggested that the Mediterranean countries

form

a

it is

there can be a greater national effort in foreign affairs unless

and negotiation against the American the

in order to

roots in Catholic populism, Andreatta dismisses "any so-called special

role" for Italy based

hard

what seems

forces. In

Ciampi has even

still

might

group that would bridge the gulf between wealthy Europe and the poor,

overpopulated

Moslem

nations.^' This

the kind of special role, which springs

is

from left-wing populism and which Andreatta condemns. Yet the very

Ciampi has spoken of the

The end of

Italy. "^^

bipolarity has

left

conversely, the situation in Algeria

Mediterranean

initiative

Andreatta

is

openings for regional groups and,

so desperate as to

make any

stresses the

need

for Italy to be "reliable. "^^ Synthesizing the

Dossetti, he claims that in the

universalism that stems from the Enlightenment, of which Italy in the

serious

welcome.

argument between Sforza and

membership

realistic

central importance of the Mediterranean basin for

West is

there

is

a

a part via her

European Community. Then there are the re-emerging

nationalisms in Central and Eastern Europe and the resort to fundamentalism in

North Africa or the Middle

East. Italy can play a role

with the second and third groups the

first.

might

This

is

as

long

as she

by engaging in

remembers

a dialogue

that she belongs to

an outline of what the foreign policy of a revitalized Italian state

be.

The

Berlusconi government had too short a period in office to leave

mark on world

affairs.

The Prime

Minister handled the

G7

meeting

at

its

Naples

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

50

During the Rwanda

well.

crisis Italy first

French contingent and then backed

off,

offered to send troops to support the

which

is

understandable but hardly a

The Berlusconi-Yeltsin meeting in October was overshadowed by the domestic problems that beset both leaders. The Italian government

sign of reliability.

pursued the goal of increasing

influence in the

Italy's

UN Security Council. But

task was bequeathed to future governments, in particular to

this

Susanna

Agnelli, Dini's Foreign Minister.

EUROPEAN UNITY: A NATIONAL STRATEGY Like the other defeated power, Germany, Italy needed the friendship of

all

her

Western conquerors. De Gasperi took care to link Atlanticism with European unity

and the habit has

persisted. Italy dislikes conflicts

Western Europe: during the 1 99 1

between the United States and

defense debates she maintained that the Western

EC

European Union could be the arm of the

and an

integral part

Atlanticism bears the connotation of battles, whereas Europe prosperity. In the postwar years the

common

Even today a

Mediterranean vocation small

ism.

complex

certain inferiority is

what has been

of

NATO.

associated with

perception was that other European

countries were richer than Italy and that association with rich.

is

them would make

The

lingers.

Italy

reverse side of the

"Tonio Kroeger complex":

called the

brown people cannot afford not to associate with tall, fair people.'^'' To the DC-led governments being European meant supporting federalEven

after

it

Fatherlands had

became obvious

won

that de Gaulle's vision of a

surrender her national sovereignty to a European authority. that the

weak

Europe of the

out in the EC, Italy proclaimed her willingness to

Italian state

had

less

sovereignty to

lose.

One explanation

Another

is

is

that the

informal networks by which the various clans exercised power could flourish

under a European government, whereas more formal national power systems could not.

Italy's

Europeanism

is,

ical fervor, indifference, craftiness

that

it

according to one view, composed of "rhetor-

and

lots

of quiet reservations."^^

I

would add

contains a healthy dose of national self-interest.

In the postwar years Italy helped try to turn the

OEEC

(Organization of

European Economic Cooperation) and the Council of Europe into forces.

De

Gasperi's government presented a plan

become permanent, would up a

political

disputes through interest in

lead to social

and

committee to discuss foreign its

own Court

such a project and

whereby the

OEEC would

cultural collaboration, affairs,

and would

federalist

would

set

settle internal

of Justice. Neither Britain nor France had any

it is

hard to imagine that

De

Gasperi and Sforza

and

Italy

did not

know

World

the

51

But they were pursuing the national strategy of rehabilitating

this.

post-Fascist Italy.

Reality It

was

a

dawned with

ECSC

the

Franco-German scheme and

(European Coal and Italy

Steel

Community).

was not consulted. However the De

Gasperi government emerged from the negotiations with several victories.

There was

to

movement of

be international, free

unemployment; the

Sulcis coal

in Sardinia received a special subsidy for

mines

modernization, which has allowed them to remain open

Community market

today; a

many

—

albeit barely

would provide cheap metal

in scrap

steelworks that used electric furnaces.

Most important,

access to Algerian iron ore for her full-process plants

on imported

which might ease

labor,

tariffs

to parlay her

until

was

to have

and was allowed

up to five years.^^ These concessions provoke three comments. The first is

continue

Italy

—

for Italy's

to

steel for

weakness into an advantage. The second

is

that Italy was able

that the Algerian iron

ore was a present from France, which had sought to keep Algeria out of the

ECSC but made an

exception for

France would repeatedly seek

Italy.

ties

In her bid to counterbalance

with

Italy.

period meshed with domestic economic policy because

government time steel

to

Germany,

Finally the five-year transition

implement the Sinigaglia Plan

gave the Italian

it

for a full-process,

modern

industry in the public sector.

The

Italian state

had demonstrated that its Europeanism was

of hardheaded national bargaining. The next development revealed that

when

there was no advantage to Italy,

aside. After hesitating until

June 1951,

Italy

military

also a

matter

European unity

Europeanism could be

was sympathetic

wish to re-arm Germany and to Rene Pleven's plan to do

Defense

in

to

cast

Dean Acheson's

this via a

European

Community (EDC). However, as the issue dragged on, old fears of alliances resurfaced. De Gasperi, who did not wish to repeat what he

perceived as his earlier errors in the sphere of security, namely his foot-dragging

over the Brussels Pact, launched a campaign to present the Pleven Plan as a step

toward European unity.

He

stressed Article 38,

which

set

out the goal of a

federation.

However, added the coalition

by the

to the

Social

concern for peace stressed by the Left and within

Democrats and segments of the DC, was Prime

Minister Pella's attempt to get concessions on Trieste in return for ratification

of the

EDC.

and framed postponed

Italy

would not say no

to a proposal

in the sacred language of

ratification until after the

European

backed by the United States

unity. Instead the

government

French vote, which fortunately

for Italy

was negative. Gasperi,

who had by now

left

Europeanism, but

his party did not.

Even

De

power, believed

De

this to

be a defeat for

Gasperi had allowed the

EDC to

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STA TE

52

take a back seat to the

1953

elections

his manipulation of the electoral

and

rules.

to the noisy

confusion that surrounded

This interpretation of the

ECSC

and

the

EDC gives little credence to the myth of De Gasperi as a founder of Europe,

but

it

itself

reveals an Italian state that

—provided

modernizing

own

their

its

saw

economy. In general

it

national strategies, helpful.

strong enough to impose

found

When

its

many

military risks

they were unhelpful, Italy was not

founding of the EC. To much credit for relaunching Venice, and Rome are the cities

in Italy's role in the

diplomats, especially to Gaetano Martino, goes

Europe

after the failure

of the

EDC.

Messina,

where the community was conceived and born. The removal of

tariffs

on

goods followed years of high growth and increased trade with the

industrial

other members: Between 1948 and 1953

23 percent to 48 percent of to

—and of

who were pursuing

neighbors,

view.

its

These strands run together its

European unity a means of legitimizing

in

could be done without too

this

57 percent. The

its

imports from them went from

Italy's

total imports, and

its

exports from

46 percent

economic results during the years that followed the

Rome

Treaty were even better: between 1958 and 1968 per capita annual income went

from $805

to $1,358.-^

Conversely

(CAP). In part it

also

stemmed from

from giving priority Italy a

Common

badly with the

Italy fared

CAP

money to

Italy,

but

to crops that they

European

made

it

it

CAP

price of

prevent France

was

a

major and

wheat brought

little

harder for her to persuade her farmers to switch

could produce more

bias in the

to

to cereals, of which France

minor producer. The high guaranteed

agriculture, but

its

was unable

political weakness. Italy

in the

Agricultural Policy

problems of

this reflected the structural

worked

efficiently.

against Italy

In general the north

and especially against the

South. Fruit and vegetables, of which Italy was a major producer, derived less

benefit than cereals and dairy products.

have had

difficulties,

Any

Italian

government would

but the complex, lengthy negotiations on the

place during the years of the Center-Left,

when

CAP

took

the political system was

growing more inward-looking and fragmented, and when systemic

clientel-

ism was entering a new phase.

Although economic modernization was spurred rather than caused by entry to the EC, the popular association of Europe with wealth was strength-

ened. This had two effects

on

the political

could not remain abreast of EC developments 1

992

—but they could

use the

Italy

— hence

if Italy

the trauma of September

EC as a way of coaxing and bullying the electorate

into accepting unpopular measures.

The EMS

they would lose prestige

elites:

Or

at least

they could

negotiations of 1978-79 provide a

was skeptical of the country's

ability to give

try.

good example. The Bank of

up the weapon of devaluation,

and

Italy

but Guido Carli, by

must

join the

foreigners were

version of the

now head of the employers

EMS

moderation and

public

less

a joint front.

the historic

EMS

The

money

to bail out

aid.

The obvious

EMS

ten, inflation soared,

to get rid

The

and the

a

budget that would provide

was not interested

in

forming

to a close,

and many

in the

DC wanted

of the PCI.

with the PCI went any immediate hope of

lira

was devalued by 6 percent

EMS

in

were forgot-

March 1981.

thanks to her wider band of 6 percent and

by two nongovernmental

a harsh confrontation in

EC

austerity measures of the Pandolfi Plan

Yet Italy survived entry to the to intervention

this case the

system was weaker than usual because the period of

successful, but

inflation.

in the

ally, Britain,

compromise was drawing

They were

lame ducks. ^^ In

were unable to obtain either

that would place pressure on strong currencies to prevent

political

to use entry to the

combating

organization, declared that Italy

not helpful. Italian negotiators

with financial

53

even though (or because) membership would entail wage

them from moving upward, or changes Italy

World

the

autumn 1980

and

in

20,000 workers. Meanwhile,

as

actors. Fiat

laid off

took the

initiative

already stated, the small enterprises switched their exports to the United States.

These two actions not merely improved the Italian economy but gave the state time to implement a deflationary policy, which was symbolized by Bettino Craxi's stand against

and the state

is

wage indexation

state followed.

a

theme

in the present

regime

Italian society

crisis.

Another lesson of EMS entry was that the

no

richer than Italy (as with Britain)

Italy's

problems (Germany).

unity and at the 1985 Milan

government was

Italy

way move "ahead" of the

in 1984-85. Italy Inc. pointed the

That segments of

tall,

fair-haired

men were often

and that they were not going

to solve

continued to press for greater European

summit of the

EC Council of Ministers

active in the process that led to the Single

Similarly Italy backed the Delors report

the Craxi

Europe Act.

on monetary union and held

the

EC

when preparations were made for what would become the Maastricht Treaty of December 1991. Some of the details of the changes that the Internal Market and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) would demand of Italy will be discussed in chapters 7 and 8. The presidency in the second half of 1990,

principles were,

first,

that the

EC

could be used by modernizers

Partito republicano italiano (PRI), the

Bank of Italy

(despite

its

— such

as the

wariness over

—

EMS), and the Employers Association to force the public to accept in name of Europe an austerity that it would not accept in the name of Italy. The second principle was that the DC-led coalitions would not be able to the the

oppose

a

modernization, which threatened their clientelistic base, because of

the prestige they derived

from "Europe." The events ofSeptember 1992 proved

once again that the rich Europeans were not going

to help Italy at the

expense

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

54

of their

own

interests.

would not agree

Germany would not lower

ization required the

Andreatta restated

open

to

up

interest rates, while France

mark. This time modern-

breakup of the postwar order. Italy's

must be a "Federal hard core to

its

to a general devaluation against the

to Central

European policy

at the heart

in traditional language.

There

of Europe"^^ that will be strong enough

Europe and other countries on the periphery. This

the old Italian concern for parity with France

and Germany and the

federalism offers the best chance of achieving

movement broke new ground

in stating that "a

it.

By

is

belief that

contrast Berlusconi's

European Union can and must

be realized without conflicting with the political and cultural institutions of its nations."^*'

Was

this a historic shift to a Gaullist

contradictory signs. Forza

Italia

view of Europe? There were

ran in the European elections on the slogan of

"counting more" in Europe, but the presence of Alleanza nazionale (AN) ministers

weakened the government. At the Corfu summit of the

EC

Council

of Ministers Berlusconi put up some opposition to the Franco-German attempt to

impose Jean-Luc Dehaene

laxity in

as

head of the Commission. But here again the

macroeconomic policy was important. Since Berlusconi did not reduce

the debt, he in effect took a third path, neither federalist nor Gaullist but

from the EU. By contrast the Dini government has spoken of return to the

away and a

austerity

EMS.

INTERNAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERNATIONALIST OPTION If joining the

movement toward European unity was also a way of strengthening economy to Europe and to the world nation state. Both the decision to open and the way it was done

the Italian nation state, then opening the

changed the

created problems for the state, while also providing the I

means

to alleviate

contend that internationalization brought a prosperity that

is

them.

one of the

greatest achievements of the postwar political order, even if the politicians did

not so

much

and mediate

create the its

economic miracle

as

help

it

along, allow

it

to

happen,

For internationalization also brought conflicts and

effects.

hardship.

Struggling with the Allied occupation and the fledgling state never established itself as a

The

first battle

came

in

constitution, the

1946 when the harvest was good and production

Inflation rose too, fueled

controls

new

dominant economic decision maker.

by

free

exchange of the

lira for

on bank lending and on the stock exchange

rose.

certain exports, lack of

in order to create

some

Italy

sort of capital market,

and

a

and

World

the

government

5 5

was not covered by

deficit that

a

long-term loan for fear of crowding out private investment.

The Communist Minister of Finance, Mauro Scoccimarro, proposed deal with this

by

currency exchange along Belgian

a

to

which would have

lines,

profits. The government would have taken control economy and could have deployed further measures such as selective credit and the long-term loan. The risk was that currency reform would damage private sector investment and confidence when exports were rising. Moreover

permitted taxation of war

of the

economy was modernizing: machinery, which in 1938 had represented 6 percent of exports, would reach 20 percent by 1947. the

Economists have anguished over the decision not to adopt Scoccimarro's proposal,^' but

I

would

like to

to opt for intervention

make two

observations. Firstly the political will

was not present: Prime Minister

key economic decisions to Liberals even in

lest it alienate

Secondly once the

state lost

control over economic reconstruction allies.

way

By

to

cope with

it

Gasperi

—

or rather did not fight

was Einaudi's

line

of

—

and

to the private sector

fell

1947 inflation had reached 50 percent per

early

De

political

the only

austerity. Interest rates

a result the

gone from 600

May

to the dollar in

It

to the dollar in

1946

to

900

this battle,

annum and

bank lending. As

stabilized.

the

its

thus causing a sharp decline in

was

left

Treasury Minister Epicarmo

September 1946, while Togliatti avoided pressing for the middle classes and endanger the PCI-DC

Corbino resigned currency exchange alliance.

after

were

lira,

raised,

which had

May

1947,

^^

cannot seriously be argued that opting for Scoccimarro's plan would

have meant opting against the internationalization of the economy. Internationalization

was both imposed on

Italy as a reaction against

war.

However

with

free trade.

Italy

by the United

States

and chosen by

an autarky, which was associated with poverty and

the example of France demonstrates that dirigisme

was giving up

Nor did its

the refusal of currency exchange

right to intervene.

intervention in the postwar economy.

There would be

It did,

however,

mean all

is

compatible

that the state

too

much

state

mean that the state would

not take control of the economy in what might be called the "GauUist" manner: it

would not

and

set targets

expulsion of the Left

allocate credit.

from the government

conflicts in the country,

adopt another

in

classic

Nor would

it,

because of the

1947 and because of the

class

method, which has been called

"Austrian"^^ and seems to suit Christian Democracy: nudging the social partners toward agreements.

The

DC did

not possess the authority to do the

support to do the second.

Nor could

it

first

nor the breadth of

follow the "Erhard" method, in which

the state sets the rules and then withdraws, allowing the market to function and

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

56

intervening only in the sphere of welfare. intervening so

much

as to

By

the 1970s the Italian state was

prevent the market from functioning. At no time in

the postwar period did the state govern

economic development and

its

social

consequences.

However was run

in

for the

first

20 years

after Mussolini's departure the

an updated version of the traditional alliance between

economy

a hyperactive

and

a suspicious but energetic private sector. This worked better than some would admit. Thus the attack on economic policy made in February 1949 by Paul Hoffmann, an ex-president of Studebaker who was the head of the European

state

critics

Cooperation Administration, was misplaced. Eager

for

quick increases

in living

way of combating Communism and inspired by Keynesian or New Deal ideas, Hoffmann criticized the Italian government for using Marshall

standards as a

aid to strengthen the

lira

rather than for job-creating public investment pro-

However there is a convincing argument that such schemes work only in a developed economy where excess capacity is lying idle, whereas in Italy capacity needed to be created. The same reasoning may be used against the CGIL's employment plan proposed in 1949.^"* By then there was a political will to intervene in the economy. It may be found specifically in the Dossettian wing of the DC an early nationalization, grams.

—

the

Nuovo Pignone

factory in Florence, was undertaken at the request of the

mayor, Giorgio La Pira

— and more

generally in the distrust of the market that

runs through Catholic culture. This

form of the old

may

be also be seen

as

the contemporary

view that the state should quite normally support the

Italian

private sector. ^^

The coherence of this view private sector could not do.

Mussolini had stepped in to three

major banks

in public

It

lay in the notion that the state did

bail

out the banking system. At the Liberation the

—Comit, Credito

hands and

a

what the

was a continuation of pre-war intervention when

italiano,

and Banco

di

new merchant bank, Mediobanca, was

Roma

—remained

created to provide

long-term and venture capital for industry. Despite the aggressively ideology of the postwar years, neither

nor IRI was dismantled. clearest

example of the

fund

liberal

(Azienda generale italiana petroli)

was turned by Mattei into ENI, which was the

state taking the lead in a vital sector.

statute in 1948, while a

EFIM

AGIP

AGIP

to finance the

IRI received a

new

engineering industry turned into

(Ente partecipazioni e finanziamento industria manifatturiera) in the

early 1960s.

The

private steel companies held that Italy should not develop a full-

process steel industry.

—

—

Most of them except Falck limited themselves to However IRI went ahead with the Sinigaglia Plan,

reprocessing scrap metal.

Italy

also inherited

and

from the 1930s, and

the

World

built a

57

modern

steel

industry that used

Algerian iron ore. Sinigaglia was part of a group of technocrats headed by

who had presided over IRI during the 1930s. Donate who became governor of the Bank of Italy in 1947, Saraceno, who

Alberto Beneduce, Menichella,

SVIMEZ

founded

(Associazione per lo sviluppo dell'industria nel

Mezzogiorno), and Raffaele Mattioli of Comit were also part of that group. is

tempting

to see these

men

freedom under Fascism and

power

as Italian dirigistes.

1940s they led the batde to use

in the late

in order to internationalize the

It

They had enjoyed much

economy. However, unlike

their

state

French

counterparts, they had no insntutions like the Ecole nationale d'administration

and they were not working within service or cooperation tial

now

a cultural tradition that favored the civil

between technocrats and

politicians.

They were

because their masters were busy saving the world from

but from the 1960s onward most of the public sector would clientelism.

The Bank of

Italy escaped,

fall

influen-

Communism,

prey to systemic

but Saraceno lived to see the willful

sabotage of his plans to transform the South.

The closest the Italian state came to drawing up a blueprint for economic development was Saraceno's outlines for a four-year plan, which

OEEC in 1948. Its title indicates that it could be no more than a summary and it played nothing like the role of the Monnet Plan. However, sketchy as they are, the outlines reveal that a series of choices were made in the postwar period, in harmony with the key decision to internationalize the economy. Saraceno called for productive investment to increase exports, while consumption and labor costs were held down. The he presented to the

strategy worked: In

1952 exports were 10 percent of

Italian

GDP;

in

1980

they were 26 percent. In 1951 Italy had 2.2 percent of world trade; in 1987 she had 5 percent. Moreover the growth figures were spectacular: from 1948 to

1963 the economy grew

at

an annual rate of 5.5 percent and industry

7 percent. Fixed investment grew by 10 percent per rising to

ized

26 percent

in

1963. By

now

there was a

annum

at

in the 1950s,

consumer boom symbol-

by the Fiat 600. This miracle was the Republic's triumph and

theme

that

which

Silvio Berlusconi

nothing changes

in Italy. It created

it

makes nonsense of the

an economic self-confidence on

would play in his 1994 campaign, when he promised new economic miracle and was believed. Yet there was a price to be paid.^"^ The choice of exports was a choice in favor of northern Italy and against the a

South, which exported risen steadily in the

North over

this

was

little.

South

Although one may argue that living standards have

too, the split in the

a choice against the

country remains. Within the

working class, since

employment and higher w^es.

it

gave priority to exports

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

58

The

opposite set of choices would have created greater

Moreover they were far-reaching. demonstrates how the Camorra grew by catering

were

real.

underclass that found jobs in smuggling

ills,

but these

ills

A

parliamentary report

to

an unemployed Naples

tobacco and then arms or drugs.

first

^''

The exclusion of the northern working class was apparent in the unemployment statistics: there were two million jobless in 1950 and many more underemployed. The decision not to emphasize consumption meant that in 1950 the average Italian ate 24 percent less meat than before the war. Nor was Valletta's view of labor relations untypical.

Here the

price

was exacted once unemployment declined

Worker militancy grew and

Hot Autumn of 1969 saw

which continued intermittently

protest, all

the

European countries, was

strong to be defeated and too alienated

compromise

—

to cooperate.

but so did inflation.

It

— except during

Growth remained

difficult for

the years of the historic

higher than in other countries

rose by 20 percent. Increases in

oil crises, prices

welfare fueled the deficit, which then fed

A

This period,

where the unions were too

never went below 10 percent, while in 1974 and 1980,

which were the years of the Interest

until 1980.

especially trying in Italy,

in the 1960s.

massive and bitter

on

on the debt was 2.5 percent of GDP

itself

and created today's problem.

1973; by 1982

in

further problem was that too few choices were

it

was 8.4 percent.

made and

that rapid,

uncontrolled development brought social and cultural tensions. Between 1958

and 1964

alone, a million

newcomers took up residence

in

northern

Italy.^^

Emigration weakened the fabric of southern society and created problems of in northern cities. They are given epic form in Luchino and his Brothers. Along with the optimism about the economy

housing and integration Visconti's Rocco

ran a renewed pessimism about Italian society's ability to organize itself This too finds cultural expression in Pasolini's later writing where modernization

depicted as a blind, role,

while

it

inhuman

force.

On

the level of political

is

economy the state's

did not degenerate until the 1960s, contained in embryo two kinds

of weaknesses.

The

first is

dependent on the to deal

that the private sector state. Valletta's policy,

is

both aggressively

with public power from a position of strength. His success in obtaining

U.S. aid was only one example. Yet throughout the 1950s Fiat enjoyed a

of protection that was the envy of other industries: cars were protected by

up

to

and

anti-statist

inherited from Giovanni Agnelli, was

45 percent of their

value, whereas the average

was 17 percent. ^^

level

tariffs

It is

not

a coincidence that Fiat has been less than successftil in other developed countries. Italy. '^'^

Two

out of every three cars

To make

this criticism

is

not,

made

in its Italian factories are sold in

however

to argue that Luigi Luzzatti

was

wrong, but that the state-private alliance should take more sophisticated forms.

and

Italy

The second weakness turn

its

hand

lame ducks steel

—

Fiat sold

its steel

all

Europe

across

successors

company, which went from a newspaper, //

became mere

inability to define

One companies this it

of the to

—but

tools

and

it

what the public

sector

in the

logic or

space for

and along

But the danger

was supposed

became a

virtue.

of

the

into a vast,

gas to petrochemicals

political parties.

his

lay in the

to be.

Too

intrusive to allow big

grow bigger, the state helped small companies by its neglect. Often

Where such

permitted local cultures to flourish.

South with

peasants,

no

left

took the form of not making them pay taxes or observe labor

also

full

when

Giomo. Mattel was indepeijdent, whereas

of the

state's defects

oil

pond

just

there were

AGIP, turned

empire-building. Mattel, instructed to close

way acquired

a

holding companies. The absence of a charter

limits to the big

the

become

IRI gradually

plant Teksid to the state in 1982

industry was being cut back

diversified

59

assumption that the pubHc sector could

lay in the

Not only did

to anything.

World

the

its

pattern of absentee landowners

no industry could develop. Where,

as in

But

laws.'^'

cultures were weak, as

and constantly moving

Emilia-Romagna, the Veneto,

or parts of Lombardy, there were peasant owners, sharecropping, and extended families rooted in Socialism or Catholicism, a special

brand of industrialization

took place. '^^

modeled on the

In these areas the firm was

family, with the father as

entrepreneur, the mother as bookkeeper, and children as workers. As the firm

grew,

it

employed neighbors but

Communist

it

remained

in the village.

The

Catholic-

com-

value of solidarity encouraged cooperation with other local

panies to create a production chain, rather than competition for market share.

Such companies made

traditional products like clothes or shoes, but

from the

1960s on they moved into medium technology areas like machine tools or electronics. They entered the tertiary sector, setting up firms to provide services to industry, and they employed larger numbers of women. Small industry was stimulated by the decentralization of production

undertaken by big companies during the 1970s entrenched in old industrial

areas.

But

this

Emilian town of Carpi had exported hats

They were a resource

little

of the century. Rather

—because overworked—

state

that helped Italy overcome the traumas of the

went down by 13.5 percent, employees went up by 11.5 vital in

escape strong unions

and

ties.

Whereas the number of workers

was

way to

at the turn

small companies were the fruit of the absent

of strong family and local

as a

was not the main impulse: the

the

in factories with

number

1

970s.

more than 500 employees

in factories with fewer than 100

percent.'*^ Flexibilit)', the great virtue

of such firms,

such a troubled decade. Internationalization did not disturb them:

Carpi's hats continued to travel light.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

60

CONCLUSION The Americans and had

to

the Europeans set the parameters within which the Italians

work. Born into the postwar world and nurtured by the Cold War and

by European

unity, the Republic benefited

Market, even

as

from Marshall

suffered from the Soviet threat

it

France and Germany. However, the margins of space -

acknowledge and within

greater than they often

aid

and the

and the need left to

Common

to catch

up withz:

the Italians were

space they maneuvered

this

^better than they often acknowledge. This becomes obvious the 1950s Italy

seemed

if

one considers the

issue

growing American

to be

in

of Americanization. In

its

culture:

Hollywood,

consumer goods, and sexual freedom were supposedly everywhere.

In fact as

one looks back, much of what was considered American was modernity as in other

European countries

—

there

washers, Even here Italy developed

is

its

own brand of modernity.'^'' Many symbols

— — never caught

of Americanization are thoroughly local other symbols

—canned

foods

lived

nothing uniquely American about dish-

the

Vespa and the

Fiat

600

—while

on. At a deeper level Italian habits

survived amidst the consumer society. Italians have never learned to buy and sell

property with American nonchalance and they have a thoroughly un-Amer-

ican savings rate.

This

is

not to deny that the limits on the freedom of the Italian state axe

obvious in decisions ranging from entering

NATO to joining the EMS. World

affairs

accentuated the distortions of national history. Catholic rule was more

severe

and the alienation of the northern working class deeper. Greater demands

were made on the damaging. As we

state

and

its

will see, the

inability to

DCs

respond to some of them was more

attempt to establish

itself as a

government

that could cope with the domestic repercussions of this difficult world took

shape in the mid-1950s.

Clientelism

as the

Art of Government

Beginning in 1992

clientelism, the special kind of corruption that lay at the

heart of the postwar regime, was exposed daily in the press and all

Of

on TV.

the examples the one that aroused most passion was the practice of Francesco

De

Lorenzo, Minister of Health in the 1989-92 Andreotti governments.

He

had systematically taken bribes from drug companies that wished to have their medicines certified by the government and hence put on sale. He had also taken a 5 percent cut

on contracts awarded

hospitals intended for

AIDS

to

companies that

built

new

facilities in

patients.

Although the bribery involving health care treatment aroused anger general population, the distinguishing feature of

De

organization. In addition to Duilio Poggiolini, he had

—one of whom committed —who performed and approved

battery of university professors

was exposed

marketplace.

firms involved

its

among

his helpers a

suicide

when

his role

the medicines for the

the tests

The

in the

Lorenzo's behavior was

knew what was expected of them and paid it may be seen as a kind of tax. The money

accordingly. As for the 5 percent cut,

went not only coffers

into the pockets of the minister

of the Liberal Party. Without

it

and

his helpers,

De Lorenzo would

but into the

probably not have

been elected nor appointed Minister.'

He had

gained control of a sector.

more common arrangement was

Remo Gaspari, the DC chieftain in the Abruzzo, saw his to the MSI in the local elections of 1993. He too had been

division by territory. capital, Chieti, fall

A

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

62

method

exposed: his

lay in using his position as a perennial minister to divert

government money to victories,

his supporters.

which enabled him

depended on

his local base

and

Their efforts

demand

to

at election

time brought him

power

a ministry. His

Rome

in

vice versa.

Sector and territory overlapped in the case of Gianni Prandini, the

Minister of Public

Works

in the Andreotti

He

was accused of

set rate

of 2.5 percent

government.

taking bribes from construction companies, using a

of the value of the contract. Other ministers were alleged to have looked after

Nino

their constituencies. For example,

Cristofori, Andreotti's emissary in

Emilia-Romagna, ensured that Ferrara received

its

share of Prandini's con-

tracts.

These examples

offer us a definition of clientelism.

the attainment

It is

and retention of power through the private expropriation of public resources, and through the use of the state to expropriate private resources. As practiced from the 1950s onward, its allies

may

it

was a system. Although individuals

have been free of

business and without

it

clientelism was a

it,

the postwar order could not function.

from ordinary corruption, which

is

remained

It is

different

DCs

45-year

rule.

Catholi-

while conservatism and interclassism

at the outset,

significant. Clientelism

and

mere by-product of wielding power.

a

Clientelism was not the only reason for the

cism was more important

DC

in the

normal way of conducting

worked

against the

DC

becoming

a valid

conservative party, because such parties defend the free market whereas clientel-

ism works apart from and against the state

gave the

to a crisis in

terminated

free

the 1970s and

DC rule.

I

"publicized" economy,

triggered the Clean

it

is

The more

left for

chapter

Clientelism's origins are said to that has remained a Gemeinschafi, a

rights.^

An

and by personal

idealized

votes for the old

money

example

ties is

lie

those based

is

it

helped lead

investigation that

sophisticated form,

I

the

that

is

regulated by vertical

by notions of citizenship and

The Leopard in which

Don

the King of Naples has sent

him

in

A

call

in the South. It belongs to a society

community

found

monarchy because

which

5.

rather than

so that he can study music.

explanation

Hands

have divided clientelism into two categories that begin,

roughly, at different moments.

relationships

market system. But occupation of the

DC significant control over the electorate, although

more

that "amoral familism'"* permits

Ciccio gifts

cynical version of the

no

on short-term advantage. The exchange

of

same

social contacts other than

vote, in

which the

elector

barters his possession (his vote) for a pension or a job, serves as an example.

However backwardness. city. It

it

is

too comforting to

tie

clientelism to the

The Clean Hands operation was centered in

might be argued that clientelism

in the

North

South and

Italy's

is less

to

most modern

the diversion of

Clientelism as the Art of Government

to selected

government aid

of pubHc

The auctioning

groups than the imposition of a tax on the market. is not an

contracts replaces the exchange vote. This

insignificant distinction but

it

does not appear fundamental, since each case

involves abusing the state to retain

Nor

is it

sufficient to note, as

practiced in Italy. This

is

63

and expand power.

we have done,

that clientelism has long

a description and not an explanation.

closer in linking clientelism

with Catholicism. At

its

been

One might come

best Catholicism produces

share with volunteer organizations such as Caritas, but they, while admirable, as citizenship, on clientelism the emphasis on individual "people" rather than well as a distrust of structures such as a public education system. This leads us back to the state and to the explanation that the unusually

unusual degree of rapid pace of economic growth led the state to undertake an special mediation.^ Italy's integration into the dynamic world economy placed need with the strains on the South, which needed help. Its need crossed

DCs

or a specific set of for a power base after its failure to find either a philosophy after the widespread became clientelism why both explain would This policies. it grew and changed along with why and Dossetti, and Gasperi De of departures Italy,

spreading, for example, through the public sector industries.

The prime aim

of clientelism

barter with whoever can

is

to

win votes and

deliver them. In Sicily this

so a politician has to

meant

the Mafia.

But there

in bending the law, is drawn to is a closer bond because the politician, engaged of the burden of pretense, are relieved that, law the outside groups that stand efficient.

So the

but rather a

logical, if

and the Mafia

is

It

between the

kinds of risks. It cannot be publicly,

edged by the

compromises

DC

extreme, extension of clientelism.

alliance

and

politician, while the

not an aberration also presents

especially not internationally,

Mafia

may

two

acknowl-

be unwilling to tolerate the

that he needs. Recently the Mafia has

become exasperated with

its violence the unreliability of the DC-led governments and it has turned against them and their agents. prime responsibility for corrupI have already argued that, although the no great tion in Italy rests with the political parties, civil society put up

opposition.

Or

rather opposition

emerged

as society

changed, under the influ-

itself It ence of international developments and of the modernization process who magistrates, the group is worth considering the evolution of one social

—

brought down the system of which they were formerly a part

—

for the interest-

ing insights this example offers.

This chapter

will deal

with the political system of which clientelism

was an integral part and with the mechanisms of clientelism itself It will of continue with a discussion of the Mafia and conclude with the example the magistrates.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

64

FANFANI'S IRONIC The

De

between

years

TRIUMPH

Gasperi's departure and the Center-Left coalitions are

often considered inconclusive and the 1953-58 parliament has been dismissed

last until

political order that

would

was Amintore Fanfani,

heir to

But behind parliament's immobility, the

as static.*^

the 1990s took shape.

both Dossetti and In the

De

The key

figure

Gasperi.

930s Fanfani had attended the Catholic University in Milan where

1

he developed a brand of corporatism. Economics depended on political cooperation, it

which

in turn rested

on Christian

ethics.

This was an

denied the existence of immutable economic laws.

activist

was

It

view since view that

also a

could overlap with Mussolini's economic doctrine and Fanfani supported Fascism, especially the Ethiopian War. However, as the regime stumbled toward

moved

collapse, he

to the nascent Christian

Dossetti's circle. This

was

logical because the

Democrat party and entered two shared a belief in state

intervention and in the mission of a Catholic parry. Fanfani,

Labor

who

did not inherit Dossetti's selflessness, became Minister of

1947 and campaigned

in

1949 when, produced

as

jobs,

for full

He had more

employment.

popular housing, and speculation.

He

became Minister of

later

Agriculture where he formed an alliance with landowners

him

reform. His broad support within the party enabled at the

who

to

were

resisting

become

secretary

1954 Naples Congress.

From

De

success in

Minister of Housing, he launched a building program that

Dossetti Fanfani had learned the importance of the party and from

Gasperi he had inherited the need to distance

wanted

to gain

it

from the Vatican.

independence from the northern industrial

elite.

He

also

Where De

them and their political spokesmen, the Liberals and the Republicans, to run the economy, Fanfani wanted the DC to run it. He agreed with Scelba's 1948 comment that Italians would have to get used to seeing Catholics running businesses and banks. The DC was to be endowed Gasperi had

initially left

with a project that would be Catholic corporatism, with a solid organization Fanfani increased the

number of party

officials

from 37,000

with funding of its own. There was a dash of de Gaulle a

in the

to

200,000

Fanfani

— and

who

took

pro-Arab stand in the aftermath of the Suez expedition. Neo-Atlanticism

suited the

DC, which was

a strong party

Fanfani would not allow his party to

and believed

in creating a strong Italy.

slip into aimless

pragmatism.

In 1957 he set up the Ministry of the Public Sector

big state holding companies, were regrouped within the

DC

may be

it.

greater control over the nationalized industries,

seen as foreshadowing the

and IRI and ENI, the

It

was designed

and

to give

retrospectively

end of the period when the public

it

sector was

Clientelism as the Art of Government

run

At the time there were

efficiently.

which feared the cantly the

henchman.

and

outside the auspices of the Employers Association. In 1957

ENI

Sicily. Fanfani's

aim was

sector; his followers

drill for oil

and gas

national territory except

all

more democratic but

a larger,

saw an opportunity

well-run public

still

for patronage.

Fanfani merely

also perceived

in

who was

a leader

as

seeking to

discipline them. After he increased the party's share of the vote in the

elections

from 40 percent

unpopular with

He was pushed

his followers.

The

Iniziativa Democratica, split.

name

1958

42.4 percent, he combined the offices of Party

to

Prime Minister, and Minister of Foreign

Secretary,

In

Intersind, a bargaining unit for public sector workers

received the exclusive right to

They

Employers Association,

clashes with the

of what has been called the "state bourgeoisie." Signifi-

Minister, Giorgio Bo, had been Enrico Mattel's

first

1958 he created

management

rise

65

which proved

Affairs,

out of his posts and his faction,

larger group,

which opposed him, took the

Dorotei.

The

issues

around which

this battle

was fought were revealingly confused.

Fanfani was associated with the projected opening to the Socialists, while his

opponents were

to the Right

Moro, who would Fanfani's bid to

moral

basis

instill

of him. Yet they elected

opening

lead the

into the

as

parry secretary Aldo little.

DC some sense of the state had failed and "the

of party discipline and unity had almost collapsed.

between Pius XII's death

mattered

to the Left. Clearly policy

"''

There

is

a link

October 1958 and Fanfani's ousting. The new

in

Pope, John XXIII, would leave the

DC somewhat freer and

it

had no wish

to

sacrifice that liberty to a strong leader.

Moro, who would remain one of the two or figures until his death,

lead Italy anywhere.

had

He

perceived his role as

factions within the party, next

party and the country.

among

He was

with Augustinian pessimism,

all

allies,

except those with

Moro

believed the

DC

only by embracing the PSI and the PCI and slowly

Moro's

on

the

increasing importance of the factions

rise.^ left,

They can be

from

set

the Andreottiani

such categories mean

litde,

on

is

whom

right,

he was bargain-

parallel lines.

Imbued

could remain dominant

them.

a parallel

a left to right line with Forze

on the

and the Dorotei

development

Nuove and

in the

to

Base

middle. But

except that the Dorotei, which prevented the party

Political ideas are

Prime Minister

and then between the

stifling

drifting too far left or right, constituted the

compromises.

DC

of intricate compromises couched in

His most memorable phrase was about converging

The

most important

He did not wish to mediating first among the various

the party's

a master

language that was impenetrable to ing.

three

a very different political vision.

in the years

no guide

compromise within the

to the factions. Andreotti

of National Solidarity because,

as a

became

right-winger,

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

66

he was supposed to counterbalance the Communists. Forze Nuove might be on the Left but

leader Carlo

its

faction to faction: Salvo

dreottiano, while

Remo

Donat Cattin loathed the PCI. People moved from

Lima began

when Taviani formed

Taviani

create factions of their

The

Fanfaniano and ended

his

own

who

left to

Doroteo

a

the factions

from the

MSI

—

was

to

them

The

as

maxi-

Andreottiani

municipal elections of

Nuove drew on the ConThe factions had a local base

to Fini. Forze

federazione italiana sindacati lavoratori (CISL). the Andreottiani in

Rome

conversely in the

1993 they delivered many votes

it.

leaders

form the Morotei.

to perceive

is

power, while simultaneously fragmenting

attracted voters

to

an An-

as

join Paolo-Emilio

The aim of most

faction.

own: Moro ceased being

method of analyzing

best

DC

mizing

as a

Gaspari was a Doroteo

Rome, Forze Nuove

in

Turin

—from which they

spread out

across the country; the Andreottiani, for example, grew strong in Sicily because

The

of Lima.

—

the parry

factions

conquered power centers that were outside but close

the Base was funded

by Mattel's ENI, while the Dorotei were

with the small farmers association, the Coldiretti. In spearheads of the

But

them

Rather

this

way

DC infiltrated the farmers or the bureaucracy

the

the factions were

penetration of society. it

neither steered

any particular direction nor united them under a firm government.

in it

present.

as

DCs

reinforced the historical and cultural fragmentation that was already

The

factions acted

—

the Dorotei did with Fanfani

as

emergence of dominant leaders or adventurous

policies.

Two

—

to prevent the

examples would

be President Giovanni Gronchi's unsuccessful attempt, in the years

1955

to

allied

election, to increase the

abortive bid in

1

960

to

powers of

change the

rules

his office,

after his

and Fernando Tambroni's

of the parliamentary game by governing

with the avowed support of the MSI.

The

political

characterized by

system that revolved around the faction-ridden capacity for maintaining and increasing

its

its

DC

power

was

at the

expense of the state and of civil society. Proportional representation encouraged a plethora of small parties that were divided by ideologies both old clericalism of the Liberals

—

and the Republicans, and new

—

the anti-

the pro-Americanism

of the Social Democrats. Seeking to differentiate themselves one from the other, they entered and abandoned coalitions, thus weakening the government.

This strengthened the of ruling. Since taries,

new

the voters'

parties,

coalitions

power was

parties

such

responsibility

were formed by agreement among

also reduced.

the party system was virtually internal antagonists

which were freed from the

immune

While

it

seemed

to attack. It

fragile

party secre-

and chaotic

was protected against

by its fragmentation and it could accommodate anti-system

as the Radicals. It

is

no coincidence

that in

1993 Marco Pannella

helped to mobilize parliamentarians against the Clean Hands investigation.

Clientelism as the Art of Government Recently

it

has been argued that the

PCI was an

system, ruhng jointly with the DC."^ Although

rule.

rarely consulted

One must

and

it

did

of

integral part

this

have maintained that there

I

were deep cultural bonds between the two groups, speak of joint

67

it

seems an exaggeration to

distinguish periods: until the 1960s the

PCI was EC.

best to block such initiatives as entry to the

its

It

was consulted about and approved the creation of the regional governments

in

1970, but the failure of the historic compromise showed the limits of PCI

power. In 1984-85 the

DCs

tried

it

and

failed to protect

ally as well as antagonist

because

it

wage indexation. The PCI was

protected the party system from

The Communists dominated

external antagonists.

the opposition but, since

they were considered illegitimate by the U.S. government

of

Italians,

On

they provided the

by a majority

which

the Far Right the neo-Fascists played a stabilizing role,

Tambroni interrupted when he the

as well as

DC with permanent power. them. Usually they protected

tried to legitimize

DC against the emergence of a conservative party that would have provided The MSI acted as a safety valve: was an annex in which the DC

competition.

could lodge

MSI won

it

its

right-wing voters, knowing that they would return. In 1972 the

8.7 percent as a protest against economic disturbances

student-worker movement. But

back

to the

The

DC and in

as

1976 support

final actor in the

the

PCI vote grew,

for the neo-Fascists

and the

went

the MSI's voters

slumped

to 5.5 percent.

system was the Italian secret services, operating with

or without the CIA. Their role consisted not merely in taking action against the PCI, but in lending a perpetrators,

its

hand

and laying

to right-wing violence,

false trails.

Such

threatened coups, were designed to unsettle the Left.

PSI to weaken the conditions

governments.

The bomb

at

it

had imposed on

promoting

it,

its

Piazza Fontana in

The Solo Plan drove

December 1969 came

as a

Hot Autiunn.

Fear

of a right-wing coup was one reason for Enrico Berlinguer's caution

the

DC

that

it

The secret services'

to

PCI's

as the

activities also served to

was not indispensable. Inevitably the factions used the

in their clan warfare: Andreotti's long periods as

the

entry into the Center-Left

counterblast to the powerful worker demonstrations of the

strength rose in the mid-1970s.

protecting

of terrorism, along with the

acts

warn

services

Defense Minister are thought

have given him useful contacts. Knowing the secrets of clientelism, the secret

services

could hardly

resist participating.

The mystery surrounding such questions, and

the string of massacres that

have never been fully explained, also protected the system. They made, and continue to make, rational analysis more

difficult,

for self-interested accusations, blackmail,

by omniscient, occult forces

—

and

while providing the material

tales

of intrigue masterminded

the CIA, the Free Masons, the Soviets,

it

barely

matters." But the effect was conservative: to maintain the existing order.

The

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

68

repeated government crises gave foreigners the impression that the system was unstable. In reality

was

it

the French Third Republic.

at least as stable as

This regime was in no sense wholly bad.

Its

most

spirited defender notes

that Italians, while always ready to castigate their politicians, also showered

with

attention.''^

Another defense might be that

flexible,

and seeking to draw people

change.

The

and an

itself to

'-^

—was needed

at a

—

government

in

France

responds to demands from below,

is

a third

1992-94 the Republic passed the supreme

Finally in

them

conservative,

time of rapid, economic

contrast between a centralized, hierarchical

Italian political order that

rationale.

in

system

this

of allowing

test

be drastically modified without abandoning democracy. However, by

its

lack of accountability,

to

itself,

by its negative strength, and by offering no

alternatives

the political system produced a caste that perpetuated itself through

clientelism.

The

irony of Fanfani's period as secretary

from the Vatican and the northern

industrialists

did so by exploiting instead of guiding the factions

is

resources.

them

to consider

The

DCs

The factions and

the

is

that his party did liberate itself

—

state.

as well as

A second

from him. But

way

it

to analyze the

fought for their share of public

as clans that

fragmentation '"* sharpened the

clientelistic

competition.

DCs satellite parties conducted civil wars, even while they

were united in their determination

European countries, the

to

maintain the system. In

expanded

state

its

role in the

So there was

responsibility for social welfare.

much

Italy, as in

most

1950s by taking on the

for the clans to fight over.

GETTING AND SPENDING WE INCREASE OUR POWERS A well-documented power

conquered the Veneto.

which had Italy.

PPI,

a

is '

^

a

DC

politician

and

his faction

The

DC owed had

it

its

Umberto Merlin, but

the

young

in 1954. It

lost in

some

Bisaglia

was the

parts of northern

local equivalent

of Fanfani's success

ideas, Bisaglia

local notables to the party organization.

Mariano Rumor of Vicenza were members of Fanfani's Initiative,

and central

member of Sturzo's

was one of a group that rebelled

Naples Congress. Untouched by ideology or

power away from

who

strength in the region to the Church,

After the war the party in Rovigo was led by a former

at the

amassed

provided by Antonio Bisaglia and the Dorotei,

popular appeal that

and dethroned Merlin

shift

how

example of

via clientelism

wanted

to

He and the older

faction,

Democratic

but they deserted Fanfani in 1959 and became Dorotei.

By now

Bisaglia

had established

gone from 220,000 members

in

his

1944

own power

base.

The

to nearly 8 million in

Coldiretti had

1958. They ran

Clientelism as the Art of Government

69

most of the consortiums that provided farmers with cheaper oil and fertiUzer, stored their crops, and gave them loans. They also ran most of the mutual funds set up in 1954 to extend health insurance to self-employed farmers.'^ As such they were an important organization in the countryside and a farmer could

They were a flanking organization for the DC and members of parliament. Bisaglia succeeded in becoming

suffer if he crossed them.

sponsored 85 of

its

President of the Rovigo Mutual Fund, a position from which the skillful direction of benefits brought votes.

In 1958 Enrico Mattel had Bisaglia appointed to the board of an

company by

called

clientelism.

not

all

Snam. Mattel

He was

is

ENI

often considered the founder of government

own some 60 members of parliament, most but The appointment of Bisaglia was an early

said to

of them Christian Democrats.

example of the publicized economy. alized industries

It

extended

and channeled some of

sector did not stand aloof

from

DC control

over the nation-

their profits to the party.

and

this process

The

in 1961, BisagHa,

private

who was

in the field, was named Rovigo agent of the Generali, Italy's He brought customers to the company and concompany. largest insurance on favorable terms could be converted into insurance offer ability to versely his

devoid of experience

political influence over

As

businessmen.

influence extended through the Veneto in the 1960s Bisaglia formed

his

links with the Grassetto family,

were meat importers.

It is

who were

in construction,

and

the Grosolis,

who

reasonable to suppose that he was helpful with public

contracts and food regulations.'''

More important was

his influence over the

Consortiums, set up by the government, in the Veneto. Here

Development

two

clientelism followed

patterns: factories

were allotted to

villages

with

mayors, while the companies that received grants often turned out to have owners. Perhaps most important of

all,

DC DC

the Dorotei installed their supporters as

members of the chain of local savings banks. power brought enough votes to send Bisaglia into parliament

presidents and board

Such 1963 and

local

make him an important member of his

to

Bisaglia joined Flaminio Piccoli

split in

1969

Popular

Initiative.

motorways

When

in the

Movement of

The three men also collaborated to build one of the most useless

in Italy,

which was

Rovigo. At the

DCs

became Prime

Minister.

were joined

faction.

and Rumor

in

the Dorotei

to run

1973 Congress

from Trento,

this

to

and

Piccoli

However fragmentation continued:

him

Vicenza

Rumor

in a generational struggle to oust

in the struggle to replace

Piccoli's fief, via

was the largest faction and hence Bisaglia

Rumor and were on

opposite sides

as faction leader.

By now Bisaglia was a frequent member of the government. In 1970 he became Under-Secretary to the Treasury and was placed in charge of a Deposits and Loans Fund that advanced money to local authorities. In March 1974 he

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

70

became Minister of Agriculture,

a post perennially held

was moved in

to the

by the

DC and used to

running smoothly. At the end of the year he

keep relations with the Coldiretti

Ministry of the Public Sector, where we

shall rediscover

him

our next chapter. Bisaglia's career illustrates the

way that

the

DC held onto power, after De

Gasperi's retirement, by channeling public resources to

process that destroyed statesmen a politician.

and

Each region where the

like a city-state:

its

supporters.

It

DC held power had

its

chieftain

Taviano ruled Liguria and xMoro Puglia.

who

"owned" the Veneto newspaper,

Resto del Carlino, published in nearby

Counterpoint

//

press.

Emilia-Romagna.

which was packed with

DC

remain weak and slow in order to permit and

During the 1950s the

it

Gazzettino and kept an eye on //

to the penetration of grassroots society

national bureaucracy,

ran

power

Political

extended not merely to the economy, but to the judiciary system and the Bisaglia

was a

citizens alike, while turning everyone into

was control of the

supporters and that had to

justify political intervention.

coalition parties colonized the social services.'^ Welfare

agencies such as the Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) and the Istituto nazionale assicurazione malattia

(INAM) mushroomed. Unlike welfare

agencies in Britain, they served only certain categories of people

why

explains

self-employed farmers had their

own

—which

health insurance system

and the regulations governing the sums of money they paid out were

intricate.

who were able to divert payments to the most grateful most needy. INPS was a source of uninterrupted Social

This suited the politicians rather than

the

Democratic patronage from 1949

from the Liberation

to 1965, while

to the 1970s. Party organizers

INAM

was run by the

were able

DC

to offer disability

pensions in return for votes. So the bureaucracy was not purely defensive and conversely

its

role in clientelism further alienated the public.

Unsurprisingly Andreotti invented the most ingenious brand of clientel-

During

ism.'^

his

many

spells as

Minister of Defense he reduced the funding

weapons and training but he increased military obedient, if ineffective, soldiers who marched from for

salaries.

He

thus created

their barracks at election

time to do battle with his opponents.

By Because

it

its

very nature the clientelistic process slowly undermined

created bad government

it

cost the

DC and

its satellites

itself.

voter support.

In turn this meant more clientelism to win back votes. When the international economy plunged downward in 1973, there were insufficient public resources for private exploitation it

lost

such bastions

and the as

ally-antagonist, the PCI. its

DC plunged too.

Rome and

Naples.

It

In the local elections of 1975

was, however, saved by

As Communist support grew, the

its

DC was able to play

other roles as the anti-Communist and Conservative party. However,

it

could

Clientelism as the Art of Government not cease to be

and

clientelistic

in the

supporters grew ever more desperate.

of a

clientelistic

web we need only

To

The South was

Gava family

IS

as

an example.

NOT PLEASED

DCs bid to become an autonomous mass

the key region in the

Between the

party.

1980s the quest for resources and

study the spinning and the unraveling

turn to the

DON ANTONIO

71

1940s and the mid-1960s the percentage of

late

bership that lived in the

North declined from nearly 50 percent

to

mem-

its

28 percent,

whereas in the South the figures were 18 percent and 30 percent and in the Islands 7 percent

and 17 percent. ^'^ The main reasons were northern

irritation

with inefficient public services and the battery of government agencies that steered

money

The

South.

to the

plans for state intervention

drawn up by

Saraceno, Morandi, and their helpers were distorted, and the Cassa, which was

supposed

fund

to

be used for special government intervention, became a discretionary

At

for politicians.

DC and northern

the

provided infrastructure and the alliance between

first it

industrialists

was evident

in the

way

that the machines to

build roads and the fertilizer for the pilot agriculture programs were the North. This pattern continued after the Cassa had

up

industrial plants.

However

made

expanded into

in

setting

the distribution of Cassa funds and the locating

of public sector plants were fought over by the

rival political clans in the

South.

Naples provides a well-studied example of government by clientelism.^' In the early 1950s the

who

in return split his

locally,

DC

gave

own

party.

whom

rateable values,

the Monarchist, Achille Lauro,

he gave public contracts, notaries and

and shopkeepers who were seeking

without an organization and

it

depended on

its

law^^ers,

licenses. It

who

fixed

was a clique

leader's ability to

occupy the

hall.

In

DC

as a fief to

While denouncing the Christian Democrats

he helped them nationally. As mayor Lauro surrounded himself with

builders, to

town

it

1957 Lauro developed delusions of grandeur and ran hard against the

in the regional elections, raising the

Sardinia.

Monarchist vote to 9 percent

Suddenly the Minister of the Interior learned of corruption

Naples town

hall

in

in the

and suspended Lauro. This was the beginning of the end

for

him and his power passed to the DC proper, in the shape of Silvio Gava. More properly power was passed to the Gava family: to Silvio, who was a government minister in the mid-1950s, and his sons, the best known being Antonio,

who was

and who went on

president of the provincial government from 1961 to 1969, to a national career in the

1980s.

From

his

immediate

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

11

family

—

a son-in-law held the Fiat franchise in

Naples

—

Silvio

Gava extended

who were members of the Consortium for Industrial Development and leaders in the Chamber of Commerce. Control of credit was

his

network

obviously lo

to friends

and

vital

1959 the Gava family gained control of the

in

Istituto per

sviluppo e I'industrializzazione del Meridione (Isveimer). Six years later the

publicly

owned Bank of Naples

them and they had

to

fell

already had

much

influence in the private Banca Popolare.

The

were the dominant force

local federation gave

them power

which increased, and was increased depended on and

in the

in the

in

Naples

both the

by, their

able to

do so because of

is

that, instead

of being a

DC. Their control

city

over the

and regional government,

economic power. Their power base

their ability to appropriate the public

They were

South.

and the Gavas

difference between Lauro

clique, they

money

that flowed to the

their positions in the national

government, which they obtained because they controlled the

DC. Theirs was a more ruthless version

DC local

of the Gaspari syndrome and their defeat

of Lauro marks the transition from unorganized to systemic clientelism.

One

measure of

their control

was the number of preference votes they

could accumulate. While proportional representation and the party

list

were

designed to weaken the power that local notables had exerted in the pre-Fascist period, the presence of preference voting

names on the

several

list

—provided

a

—

expressing a preference for one or

measurement of the popularity of each

of the party's leaders. Competition for preference votes sharpened the competition

among

the clans, required the distribution of public resources,

and

increased the victors' control over future resources. Unsurprisingly, preference

movement

voting was a target of the

for electoral

reform and in the 1991

referendum the number of preference votes was reduced unsurprisingly, in

Naples that

tion

"Don Antonio

— 53 percent—

marked

a defeat for

De

Equally

not pleased."

The

fairly

high

level

of participa-

— 97 percent—

in

Naples

of Antonio Gavas power.

He had

massive yes vote

him.

This was one milestone

Ciriaco

is

as well as the

survived feuds with Emilio

clan wars.

to one.

Antonio Gava opposed the referendum and the word circulated

in the decline

Colombo, the

DC

leader in Basilicata,

and with

Mita, the Avellino boss; these were nothing more than the usual

Gava seemed

to

have survived the more serious Ciro Cirillo

where he was accused of using the Camorra to obtain the

release

affair,

of his

henchman who was kidnapped by the Red Brigades in 1981. That Gava was later to become a leader of the Dorotei (now rebaptized as the Grand Center),

who imposed Arnaldo

Forlani as party secretary in 1989, and that he was briefly

Minister of the Interior, where he controlled the police force, political system's ability to

defend

itself.

is

proof of the

Clientelism as the Art of Government Gava's power electoral influence,

73

waned because of three overlapping factors: the loss of his the Clean Hands investigation, and the anti-Mafia struggle.

In 1992 a scandal in the health services at one of his strongholds, Castellammare

provoked 53

di Stabia,

arrests for bribery

and an investigation into

and the

ant, Francesco Patriarca. Elections followed

percent.

^^

The

Violante, the

roots

lie

vote dropped by 22

following year the Cirillo charge was pressed by Luciano

PDS

president of the parliamentary anti-Mafia commission.

Unlike the Mafia, the Camorra

whose

DC

his lieuten-

in the

is

unemployed Naples

an amorphous collection of bands proletariat.

From

here the

Camorra

extends through the rest of society, penetrating banks and influencing magis-

A

trates.

politician seeking to extend his clientelistic

inevitably encounter the Camorristi and

network

will

Cava had long-standing

almost

ties

with

them.

The

Naples' earthquake of 1980 unleashed a flood of government funds,

and contracts firms. '^

for clearance or rebuilding

Some 30

controls.

were distributed with no proper

percent of the $40 billion allotted went to Camorra-owned

At the same time, two attempts were being made to organize the and the other by Carmine Alfieri.

anarchical Camorra, one by Raffaele Cutolo

When

Ciro Cirillo, the President of the Reconstruction Committee, was

kidnapped

what

in April 1981, his

Cirillo

might

reveal,

who was

mentor, Cava,

probably worried about

turned to the stronger leader, Cutolo.

In July Cirillo was released after $1 million had been paid to the

Red

Brigades. Cutolo's price had three parts: improved treatment in prison and the

prospect of release; lighter police controls in Naples because the increased surveillance after the kidnapping

reconstruction contracts

was interfering with Camorra business; and

for firms

linked with his organization. All three

requests were granted after negotiations that featured other leading Christian

Democrats, such

as

Flaminio

Piccoli.

However President Sandro

Pertini blocked the transfer

of Cutolo

to a

more pleasant prison and instead shipped him off to Asinara in Sardinia. Cutolo

made

his

disappointment known, but the

weight behind Cutolo's band.

Alfieri.

The

DC

switched sides and threw

His firms received the contracts and

his

men

decimated

anti-Mafia commission concluded that, although the

between politicians and Camorra were endemic, "the key posinons he has held in the government and in his party with which he has been associated,

is

Antonio

Cava.""''

figure,

its

both

ties

for the

as well as for the actions

One can see

that Gava's

decision to turn to Cutolo and to strike the bargain was the logical conclusion his method of conducting polidcs. In the Naples mayoral election of November 1993 the DC could not find a presentable candidate and the winner was Antonio Bassolino of the PDS.

of

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

74

THE MAFIA— A DANGEROUS CLIENT In

March 1992, during

An

Mafia.

Lima was viewed

as

From 1968

Mafia.

the election campaign, Salvo

Lima was

killed

ex-mayor of Palermo and the head of Andreotti's faction

one of the chief intermediaries between the

1979 he had been

to

around 100,000 preference

votes,

and

in the

in

Rome

by the

in Sicily,

DC

and the

parliament, elected with

1979 he became

a

member of

European Parliament. He had been mentioned approximately 150 times

the

in the

reports of the anti-Mafia commission, although never formally charged. ^^

In 1982 the Mafia had executed the

No

because he was an opponent.

murder ties

in the

same way.

PCI

regional secretary, Pio La Torre,

attempt could be made to present Lima's

A slightly more plausible explanation was that Lima's

had been mostly with Stefano Bontade, whose family had been defeated

in the

Mafia wars of the early 1980s. However

killed

because the relationship between the

likely that

the Mafia,

Lima was

which he had

had broken down. His friend and fellow Andreottian from

personified,

Catania,

more

it is

DC and

Nino Drago, withdrew from

politics after seeing a

henchman, Paolo

Arena, murdered.

The most Andreotti's

mass

in the

—

likely reason for Lima's

failure to get the

death was

his

— and by implication

long prison sentences imposed on Mafia leaders

of 1986 reduced. The Mafia wars of the 1960s had ended with

trial

trials. The different outcome 20 years Lima had failed and why the DC-Mafia relationship

the extremely lenient Catanzaro and Bari later

poses questions of why

had broken down.

The unique

split

turned into a war between state and Mafia, which

in post-Liberation history,

and hence another

is

arguably

sign that the old regime

was ending. In the early 1980s the Mafia had dispatched isolated representatives of the state

who had

—but

Dalla Chiesa Borsellino

threatened

in the

1990s

who had spearheaded

1992 and bombs were placed

it

in

—

the best-known example

conducted

it

a war.

is

Carlo-Alberto

Giovanni Falcone and Paolo

the campaign against the Mafia were killed in

Rome,

Florence, and Milan in the

summer of

1993. However this time the state fought back not merely by arresting the head

of the Mafia, Tot6 Riina, but by delving into the DC-Mafia links and Andreotti's parliamentary immunity.

Where

lifting

Dalla Chiesa had complained in

1982 that the government had abandoned him, the Amato and Ciampi governments backed the pool of magistrates

government was more state's

hesitant:

it

in

Palermo.

The

Berlusconi

questioned the reliance on Mafiosi

who

turn

evidence and was generally hostile to the magistrates.

To discover what the DC-Mafia links were, we must glance back at Lima's pre- 1968 career

and

at

the Sicilian version of Fanfani's bid to create an

Clientelism as the Art of Government

autonomous its

parry. Lima's adult life

youth movement

was spent

in the

75

DC. He was

a

member of

before he was elected to the Palermo city council and placed

of public works. Along with Giovanni Gioia and Vito Ciancimino, he represented the DC of the 1954 Naples Congress. The Palermo branch had been led by right-wing notables, but now the party machine ousted them.

in charge

Money was

descending from

Rome

Where patronage had been centralized

zoning

it

in his office. ^^

distributed

He had

it

to rebuild Palermo.

by individual notables, Lima

a familiar array of gifts: building contracts,

licenses, access to credit, influence in the capital.

became mayor to individuals friends.

and Lima used

in

Before and after he

1958 he awarded thousands of contracts and permits, often who were front men for his

without capital or qualifications,

To conquer

the city the Fanfaniani destroyed

it:

Many

of

its

baroque

by skyscrapers and planning was nonexistent. Meanwhile the Mafia was undergoing its own evolution. The role it had played in aborting land reform to serve the interests of rich owners as well as its palaces were replaced

own, ended when the power of the owners waned. It was time to embrace the DC. Michele Navarra, who was the head of the Corleonesi in the 1950s, had stayed with the Liberals until the 1948 elections but had then deserted them,

Giuseppe Genco Russo of Caltanisseta had preceded him into the DC. When a DC official, Pasquale Almerico, worried aloud about this trend, he was murdered. More important Christian Democrats, such as Bernardo Mattarella, had been encouraging it as early as 1944. Giovanni Gioia, a future government minister, told Almerico that "certain kinds of comprises could not be avoided."-^'' The Mafia saw that the new rulers of Sicily were the party of

government, which took over the extensive powers of the special region that was instituted in 1947. Its right to hire civil servants without using the normal criteria

allowed poUticians a freedom that criminals could exploit.

The shift from

countryside to city came easily to an organization that had

historic roots in Palermo, where in the post-Unity years

owners of market gardens in the fertile of rapid change in the

city,

which

it

had protected the

Conca d'Oro. This had been

lost its role as capital

a period

of Sicily but benefited

from the expansion of agriculture. Such moments suit the Mafia and in 1950 another was at hand. Moreover the Mafia was in one sense continuing its role as mediator. The new rulers needed popular consensus in the shape of votes and the Mafia could provide them.

At polling time instructions were sent by the families on whose territory the constituency was located. Votes were normally to be cast for the DC, ^Aristide Gunnella of the PRI was sent in the occasionally for other parties

—

same year

as

Lima

to the

Rome

parliament, where he remained until his

embarrassed party got rid of him before the 1992 elections

—but never

for the

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

76

PCI. Perhaps more important was the distribution of preference votes within the

DC,

Lima's triumphant score demonstrates. In return, construction

as

and cheap

contracts

credit

were awarded

to firms controlled

by or

with

allied

the Mafia.

In Sicily, too, clans were formed. In Catania Drago, the Mafia chieftain,

Nitto Santapaola, and the Costanzo family, which

owned

com-

a construction

pany, joined forces. "^^ Clans needed lawyers to draft contracts, friendly policemen

who

Rome who

The Mafia-DC

Leonardo

presence pervaded every

Sciascia has depicted in novels like

However

it

changed

But the finance.

in that

it

DC satellite.

It

in the use

new forms of economic power.

acquired

city, all

42

stalls

were under Mafia control

in 1960.

families acquired interests in construction, transport, tourism,

They were

helped by northern firms that

company, Elettronica Sicula, formed an provided

moved

alliance with

non-Communist labor which bought a welcome

reliable,

northern firms, to

as

important: in the wholesale market of Palermo, for which

still

were granted by the

licenses

life,

had always been: an independent force specializing

It also

Agriculture was

to join the

nook and cranny of Sicilian The Day of the Owl?''

the Mafia was neither a diffuse influence nor a

remained what of violence.

such investigations as

could transfer unfriendly

money often opted

magistrates. Businessmen forced to pay protection clan.

down

turned a blind eye, friendly magistrates to slow

did occur, and influential officials in

and

The Genovese

don Paolino Bontade who

in the 1950s. in

south.

This

set a pattern for

the South by giving subcontracts

companies controlled by the Mafia or the 'ndrangheta.

The mere into an area

presence of a northern firm was sufficient to attract the Mafia

where

it

had hitherto not operated.

the Fiat plant. ^"^ In the Italy,

where

Turin.

it

It

arrived in Melfi along with

decade the Mafia has invaded central and northern

has penetrated the Adriatic tourist resorts as well as Milan and

chieftains

Its

last

were keeping themselves busy during

enforced residence in towns

far

from

their periods

The Mafia is both a national and an international institution. colonies increased

the 1920s States,

made

it

its

power

in Italy

by allowing

it

to enter the

its first

in crates

Its

American

drug

had shipped small quantities of opium and heroin

hidden

of

Sicily.

trade. In

to the

United

of food exports. During the 1950s, drug trafficking

great leap forward

and found the Mafia ready. Unexpected

were Fidel Castro and the French

state.

Raw

allies

heroin from the East was being

processed in laboratories run by the Marseilles gangsters and shipped to Cuba,

from where defeat

it

could enter the United States more discreetly. Fulgenicio Batista's

and the French

Special

American

skills

police's victory left a

were needed

contacts:

to

fill

that

vacuum.

vacuum. The

Gaetano Badalamenti had

Sicilians

had the

a brother in the Detroit

right

mob,

Clientelism as the Art of Government

while the in

its

Bonanno

family of New York had kept

home village of Castellammare

del Golfo.

its ties

77

with the

men

Moreover the drug

of honor

trade,

which

unwritten transactions, and dealings with people of many nationand cultures, creates the need for a core group that is dependable. The

entails travel, alities

Sicilian

Mafia answered the need because of

its

"ability to constitute a state: to

set rules, to control and to punish."^'

The drug trade did not take away the need for the alliance with the DC. The money had to be invested and magistrates had to be blandished or transferred. But

success altered the Mafia's dealings with the

its

became more opinion grew more

difficult for the politicians to

DC

in three ways. First,

hostile to the Mafia, especially after the

second great leap

forward in trafficking during the 1970s and the spread of drug addiction northern Italy as well as in other EC countries. Second, the enormous profits

in

—

1965 a

of heroin cost $350

kilo

$2'i5,000

—caused

rifts

it

maintain the alliance because public

at its place

of origin

and had

a street value

in

of

within the Mafia and were partly responsible for the war

980s. Finally the profits tilted the balance of power within the alliance

of the early

1

away from

the

DC. The Mafia was

less tied to

a ruling class than ever before.

was mayor of Palermo and awarding contracts, the Mafia needed him more than he needed them. By 1992 the reverse was true. This is a case where clientelism undermined DC power. Discredited by its

When Lima

dangerous acquaintances, the party was successfully challenged in Palermo by the Rete. In 1993 Leoluca Orlando was elected mayor, while Claudio Fava, whose

whom the Mafia had executed in 1984, almost might argue that Lima created Orlando. In turn Mafia arrogance spurred the state to a counterattack, which includes the most serious attempt in the Republic's history to purge the politicians, magistrates, and father

was a crusading journalist

emulated him

policemen

in Catania.

who

One

collaborated with

it.

The outcome, however,

is

uncertain.

MAGISTRATES: FRIENDS TURNED ENEMIES Although Antonio Di Pietro became the necessary hero

in a tale

where most of

the characters are villainous politicians, the Italian legal system has not

unscathed from the recent upheaval. Ordinary corruption

among

emerged

magistrates

has been uncovered: in Messina they took bribes in return for granting building permits.

More serious have been

the revelations of collusion with the Mafia

the Camorra. At Caltanissetta charges have been

made

and

that magistrates had

informed Mafiosi that they were being investigated and had helped block the procedures. In Naples 1 1 magistrates have been accused of collusion with the

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STA TE

78

Camorra, and one of them appears assault

on

new

his ex-wife's

to

have demanded

as

payment

a

Camorra

^^

lover.

Magistrates do not stand outside politics. In Milan a split emerged over the issue of corruption within the trate,

PDS. An avowedly anti-Communist magis-

Tiziana Parenti, wanted to press charges against

PDS

officials

opposition of her pro-PDS colleagues like Gerardo D'Ambrosio.

were not pressed and she elections

and made speeches

when

charges

the pool. She ran as a Forza Italia candidate in the

left

being manipulated by the

over the

The

in

Left.

which she claimed

that the judiciary system

Her charges were repeated by

was

Silvio Berlusconi

the Milan magistrates were investigating Fininvest in the days before the

election. ^^ After Berlusconi's victory

ment and

the Milan magistrates,

withdraw

his July

open war broke out between the govern-

who won

a notable victory in forcing

him

to

13 decree, which would have released from prison the

politicians implicated in the

Clean Hands inquiry. Equally disturbing have been

the cases where magistrates have acted as an integral part of the clientelistic

Enimont

system. In the

affair

Judge Diego Curto was arrested

for illegally

sequestering shares bought by Gardini's supporters.

The question

as to

why Curto had been appointed to the sensitive position

he held, led to a debate about the Consiglio superiore della magistratura (CSM).^'^ As the

members

elected

by the party

body governing the corps of magistrates, it is composed of 20 from their ranks and ten chosen by parliament, which means

secretaries,

with the President

as its

chairman. Since the corps was

divided into factions that formed and abandoned alliances with one another

and with the

politicians, the

CSM

Cesare Previti, the Fininvest lawyer the

new government but switched

should be reshaped to

The to seek

who

unhappy

state

out politicians. This was not

conservative,

it

a specialized part

go back yet again to the

to be displeased

Unpurged

new because in autonomy from

late 1950s.^'^

pre-Fascist Italy the

the government and

of the public administration. Generally

set

up

special courts

it.

When

and for the rest he had no reason

with the magistrates. at the Liberation,

they gained greater independence because of

the Republic's distrust of executive power. it

in

CSM

form clans and

adapted to Fascism, which did not seek to transform

he needed them, Mussolini

1959 and

became Minister of Justice

yet again Italian society's tendency both to

judiciary system enjoyed only a limited

was considered

almiost

to Defense, has suggested that the

reflect the election victory.^^

origins of this

They demonstrate

could lay no claims to neutrality. Indeed

liberated the magistrates

The

CSM

was

set

from the Minister of

up belatedly

in

Yet

at

Justice.

precisely this juncture the magistrates turned to the politicians

extending their power through

civil society.

who were

Clientelism as the Art of Government

79

The reason lay in the magistrates' lackof identity as a corps. Discontented with the way they were regulating their own affairs in the key areas of promotion and

salaries,

Most

split into factions.

they

If the original issue

factions sought allies in the parties.

had been the younger magistrates' resentment against the

forms of selection imposed by their senior colleagues, and if they gained a more door to rapid and automatic mechanism of promotion, they also opened the

by political affiliation. Over the next two decades the intertwining of magistrates and

selection

increased.

The former were

were allowed tion

was

politicians

well represented in parliament, while the latter

This helps explain

a role in legal decisions.

rarely investigated. Their statute

why

corrup-

political

compelled magistrates

to

open

each inquiries, but not to pursue them. Fragmentation was increased because to vulnerable office each left this However freedom. city office enjoyed much local pressure: in

the office was regarded as sensitive to Andreotti's

Rome

opinions. Overzealous magistrates might find the

CSM

transferring

them

to

where the distant spots or conversely an inquiry could be moved to a city Gelli was Licio of investigation the 1981 magistrates were more pliant. In transferred

from Milan

to Rome.^''

Government by

clientelism

went ahead

unrestrained and representatives of organized crime often escaped surprisingly annulled the lightly. In 1988 the Supreme Court Judge, Corrado Carnevale,

which 1 00 members of the 'ndrangheta family, the Piromalli, had been convicted. ^^ The Mafiosi convicted in 1986 had high expectations of Cartrials in

nevale.

Of

the factions that the magistrates formed, Unita per

la

Costituzione

looked to the Center-Right, Magistratura Independente was legally conservative and distrusted politicians, while Magistratura Democratica (MD) perceived the judiciary system as a force for social equality. This stance led

the PCI, which had initially distrusted

but which found

itself

on

of the 1970s. Although it

the

same

what

it

side as the magistrates

this alliance

MD

to

support

considered class-based justice,

during the terrorism

could potentially turn against the system,

represented a further intertwining.

During the 1980s the magistrates did not appear restive. Wars were frequent but they were mostly struggles that pitted one group of politicians and Even President Francesco Cossiga's broadsides as an onslaught less on the magistrates, than on the political-judiciary power that the CSM had accumulated. But two signs of change were present. The first was that Berlinguer had instilled into the PCI more respect for the democratic institutions of the Italian state, which as it grew more critical of the meant that the PCI-PDS supported

magistrates against another. against the

CSM may

be interpreted

MD

magistrates' involvement

in clientelistic politics.

The second was

that the PSI,

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

80

having

among

support

less

the magistrates and determined to expand the

frontiers of clienteUsm, displayed hostility

toward the corps.

In 1981 Craxi attacked the magistrates

obtained Calvi's

release,

money

give details about

who had jailed Roberto

Calvi.

He

but the magistrates noted that Calvi had threatened to he had contributed to the PSI. In 1984,

now Prime

Minister, Craxi issued a decree setting aside a judge's decision that was unfa-

vorable to his friend Berlusconi with the

making me

comment

"these magistrates are

of 1994, had

furious."^'' Earlier Craxi, anticipating the Berlusconi

declared that he was the victim of a conspiracy spearheaded by left-wing

1987 the PSI led the

magistrates."^*^ In

civil responsibility

battle for a

referendum that extended the

of the magistrates for their rulings. Moreover, while Socialist

CSM

Minister of Justice Claudio Martelli's batde with the desire to appoint

Giovanni Falcone

complex struggle

pitting Falcone against the

Cordova,

who was

in

1991 over

his

head of the anti-Mafia squad was a

as

CSM,

his attacks

on Agostino

investigating PSI corruption in Calabria, was a defense of

the political system against an inquiring magistrate.

So the

Socialists

in the

1992

of the

1

undermined

Once

judiciary systems.

the cozy alliance between the political and

the weakness of the ruling politicians was demonstrated

elections, the magistrates

had every reason

987 referendum had demonstrated

so they sought

that as a

to

jump

ship.

The

result

group they were not popular

new forms of legitimacy. Their onslaught on clientelism brought it a coincidence that the Clean Hands

enormous public support. Nor was investigation began in Milan.

It

was the PSI's showcase

Northern League had demonstrated the

but the

city,

rise

of the

electorate's discontent, while the pool

of magistrates included representatives of MD. Magistrates in other elections

marked

cities

followed, as they realized that the

end of a power system

the

set

Avellino the politicians were strong enough to after

some hesitation, Di Pietro "with

the countryside

his

in the 1950s. In

stifle

1992

towns

the rebellion, but

like

Rome,

sided with Milan. his

and the

had worked with

up

chubby Molisan peasant's face, a face straight out of seemed a figure from another, purer Italy. He

past'"*'

hands and studied

at night.

He had

been a policeman

before qualifying as a magistrate, so he was the right kind of person to investigate political corruption.

was

His language lacked the polish of others

easier for ordinary Italians to

is

it

understand and they trusted him. However, contribution to an independent justice

that the old regime

was collapsing because of the contradic-

tions of clientelism.

tensions.

pool but

his personal

without underestimating system, the truth

in the

A

glance at the "publicized"

economy

reveals similar

The Publicization

Economy

of the

Silvio on

Berlusconi launched his election campaign with a speech

994, and a

1

the state

rally

on February 6. His main theme was

and more on

on January 26,

that Italy

must

rely "less

private initiative."' Offering yet another variant

on

populism, Berlusconi invoked the individual, the family, the small company, and the nation.

The distinctive

trait

piazzas" but to "decent people is

of his populism was

who

are sensible

his appeal

not to the "howling

and competent." Such language

Thatcherite. She had called for blood, sweat, and tears, however, whereas

Unemployment could be reduced by tax cuts; a new economic miracle was at hand. This was a reassuring, calm brand of populism, which relied on the cool medium of television. Although he used the language of Berlusconi radiated optimism.

soccer and spoke of "taking the field," the

owner of AC Milan inhabited a different

planet from his team's rowdier fans. His calm was the there

must be no doubt of the

The

rejection of the state

was categoric. The goal was

merely the economy but education and health with "an

Italy that

is

mark of his

superiority:

leader's ability to create jobs.

to privatize

care. Berlusconi called for a

so politicized, statist, corrupt

not

break

and hyper- regulated." The

appeal of this message, which came after a two-year saga of corruption where the

main

villains

had been the

politicians,

was obvious. Yet there was a

marvelous irony about the messenger. Berlusconi had epitomized the overlap

between the public and private domains, which had been created by the

and PSI occupation of the economy.

DC

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

82

His

first

fortune was

made

in property

development around Milan.

It is

hard to imagine that an activity so dependent on decisions about zoning could

be conducted successfully without

political

or that the loans that

allies,

Berlusconi obtained from banks were miraculously free of politics. Paolo Berlusconi, Silvio's brother, has been charged with paying bribes to obtain

zoning exemptions

in the

Milan hinterland and

to

persuade the state-owned

bank, Cariplo, to buy his buildings.

More

serious charges were

head of one of

its

made

against Fininvest. Marcello deH'Utri, the

companies, Publitalia, was accused of creating a slush fund,

undeclared to the taxation authorities and designed to provide

money for

bribes.

However our

interest lies

not in

Fininvest admitted bribing the taxation police.^ Fininvest's moral or legal status, but in using

between business and

politics that

it

as an example of that overlap

developed out of

DC and then PSI clientelism. who

Berlusconi flaunted his friendship with Craxi,

contributed mightily to

the creation of Fininvest's television empire. In 1981 the Constitutional

ruled that only the state networks could operate over

all

Court

the national territory

three years later a magistrate invoked this law against Berlusconi.

and

At once Prime

Minister Craxi issued a decree that allowed his friend's networks to continue operating.

A

1990 law, which permitted Berlusconi

was passed during the

last,

or

CAF

to

keep

networks,

his three

(Craxi-Andreotti-Forlani), phase of the old

regime, and Fininvest was duly grateful.

Its

present acting President declared that

"our news will reflect the view that Craxi, Forlani and Andreotti represent freedom."^ Berlusconi's only concern was to improve his relations with the

DC

while not irritating Craxi: Andreotti exacted his price for the law.

So Berlusconi incarnated what

I

am

calling "the state bourgeoisie":^

business groups that either run public enterprises, or else are in the private sector

but use and seek political power; or entrepreneurs, financiers, and attach themselves to parties that use political

power

for

fixers

economic

who gain.

Berlusconi though could convincingly take the anti-statist stance, because he

had spent some

1

5 years building a

commercial

TV empire that competed with

the state service.

The ambiguity of

the Berlusconi

phenomenon

lies

here.

Confronting

debts of $2.2 billion, the owner of Fininvest had to enter politics because control

of credit had been thoroughly politicized.

money was

One

of the banks

to

which he owed

the Banca nazionale del lavoro, which was until recently

by the PSI. In the 1970s the bank was a was a member. His privileged position

fortress

in television could have

a left-wing government. In the past the state bourgeoisie

behind the avowed

politicians.

directly for control of the state.

The

"owned"

of the P2 of which Berlusconi

collapse of the

CAF

been undone by

worked with and

led Berlusconi to bid

The Publicization of the Economy

many of his

Yet

voters

and

his

83

parHamentarians supported him because

they wished to use neoUberalism to drive back the invasion of the state into the

economy.

become

Two

March 28 victory: to would occupy the state, or to rid Italy

roads lay open to Berlusconi after his

the chieftain of a super-clan that

of the publicized economy.

Our word

I

task

to

is

examine how the economy was publicized. {Publicized \s

a

have chosen to denote the often indirect but always improper invasion

of the economy by the

the state.)

I

am

I

is

quite different from the nation-

and often legitimate takeover by

not discussing the Italian

companies and entire struggles

is

a direct

state bourgeoisie. It

alization of strategic industries that

sectors lived

shall describe.

economy

whole; thousands of

Yet from the 1960s on the state section was expanded

and made into an instrument of clientelism, social services.

as a

and mostly flourished heedless of the

as

had happened

earlier

with the

This distorted the historically close relationship between the state

and the private sector. The state extended its power not merely by placing a tax on pubhc contracts in the form of bribes, but by influencing the context in which private industry and finance had to operate. As well as damaging the

economy through

interfering with the free play of the

This reaction took the form of a struggle by the

and Turin the

market and preventing

from growing, publicization provoked a defensive

private firms

to resist the onslaught

DC. The

conflict

reaction.

lay, elite families

of Milan

of Catholic business and finance linked with

was masked by the open war that pitted the

DC and the

PCI and trade unions, which both grew stronger after the autumn of 1969. Meanwhile these struggles fostered and hid the development of small industry, which flourished because the state was busy elsewhere. private sector against the

These three developments require a

triple

reading of recent Italian history,

beginning with the Center- Left government of 1963.

THE DANGERS OF ELECTRICAL POWER By 1963

the

DC

had ruled

and Germany where the

for 16 years. In Britain

Right had been in power for similar periods, alternation took place. Party

won

the 1964 elections and the

coalition in

1966 before

it

SPD

The Labour

entered the government via a grand

began ruling without the

alternation of parties remained impossible because the

CDU

in 1969. In Italy

PCI was

illegitimate

the PSI was too small to form the core of a coalition that excluded the

and

DC. The

only solution was to bring the PSI into an expanded coalition. This would give a measure of representation to the hitherto excluded

working

class

and would

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

84

among

provide an impulse for reform. After inordinate ruminations

and

their international patrons,

government was formed

Washington and

December 1963 with Aldo Moro

in

Although some reforms were passed, such

the parties

the Vatican, the Center-Left

Prime Minister.

as

the application of a hitherto

as

ignored law that raised the school-leaving age, the Center-I^ft was a

The it.

DC

On

spoils

power system was

the contrary

it

in place

and the

Socialists

changed them: the PSI was given

and the hold of the

continued to be awarded

politicians

on

civil

as a privilege rather

1960 and 1970 the number of

a share of patronage

society was increased. Welfare

than claimed

as a right.

Between

disability pensions almost tripled, rising

1.2 to 3.4 million.'' For the PSI cooption proved electorally disastrous

1976

The

failure.

were too weak to change

from

and by

share of the vote had fallen from nearly 14 percent to below 10 percent.

its

DC and and

spheres,

its

The PSI economy,

antagonist/ ally the

their clash

PCI remained dominant

in their respective

was delayed until 1976-79.

initiated the process that, while

led to the distortion

expanding public power over the

of the private sector that resisted and compro-

The price that the Socialists demanded for entering the Center-Left coalition, after the Piano Solo had caused them to give up the issue of the local authorities' control over land use, mised, and to the growth of the state bourgeoisie.

was the nationalization of the

The demand was electricity

electrical industry.

logical

enough. In a country poor

energy sources

and was constantly denounced

the bulwark of private capitalism

producing more and cheaper

owned

in

was enormously important. During the pre- 1939 years Edison was

in

many

working well

By

electricity.

for

not

the 1960s electricity was publicly

other European countries. Moreover the state sector was

in Italy

and indeed ENEL, the public

electricity

company, while

unable to prevent the politicians from imposing bribes/taxes on firms that supplied

it,

serve, as the

But the

has performed adequately.

PSI hoped,

real trouble lay

as

the

The

nationalization of electricity did not

model of planning and of a more

rational society.

with Edison.

Shareholder compensation took the form of payments not to individuals

but to the

electrical

billion to invest.

companies, which found themselves with around $2.5

This has been described

capitalism, but if so the

as

an enormous boost to private

companies largely wasted

it.

two were predominantly owned by IRl and they with the telephone business, while

1980s was coveted by private

main shareholders

Pirellis

became

industrialists.

the Pirellis

The

a

its

five electrical firms

went ahead

food company and by the

Centrale, which had

and the Orlandos,

ventures before concentrating on

enough, but the

SME

Of the

flourished: SIP

financial

among

its

tried desultory industrial

component. This did well

withdrew and the Centrale

fell

into Michele Sindona's

The Publicization of the Economy

85

The

grasp before passing to Roberto Calvi's Banco Ambrosiano.

pany,

SADE, was owned by

had — — but they were happy

Volpi

the family that

tury

at the price

fourth com-

and the

established Venetian famiUes, the Cini

Marghera

industrialized Porto

earlier in the cen-

with the petrochemical giant, Montecatini,

to fuse

of losing control over their firm. Here was a sign that

capitalism had not overcome the fragility that Unification, and that the electrical dispute

it

Italian

displayed in the years after

would sharpen the disputes

in Italian

society/

This was dramatically demonstrated by the adventures of Edison, which

them disastrous. They when it moves into a way it falls back on support

has undergone four transformations, at least three of illustrate the difficulty that the private sector

high value-added area such

from

a state that

is

as chemicals,

encounters

and the

unable to help but eager to exploit.

Edison spent anything up to $100 million alized

and then

to ensure

avoid being nation-

at first to

ample compensation. Here again corruption

company needs

is

not in

buy political support because it cannot or is not allowed to cope on its own. Such bribery undermines both the free play of the market, which is manipulated by political favors, and the capacity of the state to set the rules of the game dispassionately. It leads to itself the issue.

Rather

it is

a sign that a

to

further evils like the distortion of information. Eugenio Cefis, the chairman of

Montedison

in the 1970s,

// Messaggero,

lavished

had learned much from Enrico Mattei. Cefis bought

money on

disregard for ideology gave smaller

Communist

Paese Sera}

The

// Corriere delta Sera,

sums

and with

cavalier

to the Catholic paper Avvenire

history of Edison demonstrates

how

asidi

the

industrial

entrepreneurship takes third place behind political intrigue and financial juggling. In

1991

this

would be the

lesson of

Enimont. Instead of constructing

a

chemical company, Raul Gardini spent his time manipulating the stock market to gain control of the firm,

In

1964 Edison had

and then bribing

as its

politicians to get rid of

head Giorgio Valerio

it.

who had no clear strategy.

He diversified with his compensation money, bought the Stan da chain of shops, and developed the petrochemical

side of his

company. But competition was

tough since he had to contend both with Montecatini and with ENI. The easy part of the industry

companies wish margins. Profit are synthesized.

is

the conversion of oil into basic petrochemicals. So

to concentrate is

on

this,

which crowds the

greater at the top of the industry

However

field

and

where complex chemicals

this requires technological expertise, lots

of research

and development, and long-term investment planning. Moreover the market was distorted by the generous government grants available

ment

in the South. Since technical expertise

and

all

cuts profit

skilled labor

were

Italian

for invest-

in especially

short supply here, a string of oil-processing plants sprang up along the coast.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

86

Ecologically risky, they provided few jobs because petrochemicals

is

not labor-

and they further sharpened competition.

intensive,

obvious answer was merger and in December 1965 Edison and

One

Montecatini came together in Montedison.

It

seemed

sensible: Montecatini,

run by Carlo Faina, had technical expertise but was in deep financial trouble, while Edison brought

compensation dowry. The new Montedison, while

its

Du Pont or ICI, had 80 percent of the Italian chemical percent of the EC market. Moreover its shareholder syndicate

small in comparison with

market and

1

5

the group of leading shareholders

who come

together to run the

company

—

in-

cluded a representative from IRI, which owned 16 percent of the shares, but also

Gianni Agnelli and Leonardo

company would remain private,

as

Pirelli.

was the

They were

a guarantee that the

new

man who had engineered the merger,

Enrico Cuccia. Private industry had never liked Mattel, had accepted with ill-grace

Fanfani's organization of the public sector, and distrusted the PSI's talk of

planning. Like the pre-war Edison, Montedison was to be the bulwark of private capitalism against the increasing inroads

made by

a state that

had long since

abandoned the noninterventionist philosophy of the Liberation. The best defense of a private enterprise is economic success, but Montedison had none. Faina had not wanted the merger, the two management teams never meshed and Valerio did not improve as an entrepreneur. Montedison's

second adventure began a block of to

its

in

1968 when Eugenio

Cefis, the

head of ENI, bought

shares with the connivance of Enrico Cuccia. Cefis saw no reason

compete with Montedison when he could take it over. As the student

of 1968 gave way to the

He

Hot Autumn of

sold bits of ENI's chemical sector to

across to

become

protests

1969, Cefis strengthened his position.

Montedison and

in

1971 he moved

president. Montedison's second disaster was at hand.

It

had

most talented and dangerous representative of the state bourgeoisie. Agnelli protested that the agreement to leave Montedison private fallen victim to the

had been

violated, but

Cuccia supported Cefis.

ENRICO CUCCIA: A DIRIGIST AGAINST THE STATE Cuccia has become a legend in family, he

grew up

of Finance.^

Comit by 1994

in

Italy.

Rome where

He married

Born

in

his father

1907 into a middle-class was

Sicilian

a civil servant in the Ministry

the daughter of Alberto Beneduce and was taken into

Raffaele Mattioli.

One cannot help

to gain control of the privatized

thinking that Cuccia's bid in early

Comit was

a deeply personal matter. In

The Publicization of the Economy the 1930s Cuccia belonged to what a

French

bank

I

group of "French"

called a

But

and make long-term loans

that could acquire shares in,

when

without

which loomed

was

It

companies.

A

of the

the larger because of the weakness of the

all

partially filled

to,

in order to avoid a repeat

had brought the banks down with them.

the collapsing industries

this left a gap,

stock market.

dirigists

After the war Mattioli and others saw the need for a merchant

state.

1936 law had separated banking from industry crash

87

by the banks

rolling over short-term loans,

but the need for a bank that would service industry remained. So Mediobanca

was created and Cuccia was appointed president.

was that Mediobanca would promote new indus-

Mattioli's expectation tries

and provide venture

capital,

but Cuccia did nothing of the kind. Instead

he bought blocks of shares in the leading companies, arranged mergers and

them and acted

share issues for

the shareholder syndicates,

control a its

stock.

as their consultant.

which allow small groups of important people

company without owning more than

He

new

He helped them put together

a relatively small percentage

to

of

up the interlocking holdings, which permitted the Agnellis to who came

set

defend the PireUis and vice versa. If Ugo La Malfa, another Sicilian north, was the political voice of the northern lay business

and

financial advisor fragility,

When

confessor.

he was called

in.

together

much more money in

new

would less

control.

is

another patient; and Fiat seems

he admires

profligate, while

stitch

settled.

new

thrift

and

austerity.

However their small sharehold-

injection of capital that only a few large investors can afford.

would

lose

by

it,

whereas

if

Cuccia had arranged a

takeover, they could have sold their shares at a profit. '° care about small shareholders.

He

dangerous. Cuccia does not like is

A believer in

canny Catholic).

When

But Cuccia does not

them learn that the market is the market either and he tries to restrict its play.

the Cuccia legend.

establishment.

the

would

For their insurance company, the Fondiaria, Cuccia

small shareholders

This

It

Ferruzzi family are suffering at Cuccia's hands for they have been

ers are suffering too.

arranged a

It

much

in return for

bully other banks into

attending to Ferruzzi; Salvatore Ligresti's construction and

is

insurance group

The

return for

its

its

shareholders syndicates with the same famous old names. At

present Cuccia

The

demonstrated

Mediobanca would put up money

controlling the errant company's behavior.

putting up

Cuccia was

elite,

Italian capitalism

facts

wanted

A and

to let

practicing Catholic, he defends the lay figures,

he admires James Joyce (another

Michele Sindona allegedly told him he was planning

murder of the lawyer Giorgio Ambrosoli, Cuccia informed neither

Ambrosoli nor the police." decision.'

The

What could have caused him to make such a man lives alone? Certainly whatever motivated

belief that each

him was informed by

a scant sense of citizenship.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STA TE

88

Another,

less

His work

now

nothing

is

of

six seats,

Freres, also shares.

and a truculent but

to

is

look

at

him

fragile private sector.

the provision of venture capital.

It

than the defense of a national capitalism. Here the constitution is

1980s the three public banks of national

revealing. Until the

Comit, Credito

Mediobanca's

state

more important than

appears

less

of Mediobanca interest,

way of understanding Cuccia

mythological

our context of an invading

in

shares.

Roma, had

a large majority of

in the shareholders syndicate they

had only three out

Italiano,

But

and Banco

di

whereas Cuccia's private sector supporters,

had three

This was

seats,

the

all

Lazard

like Pirelli or

although they owned fewer than 10 percent of the

more

ironic because the public banks collected the

money with which Cuccia doctored the ills of the private sector. The 1989 privatization regularized but did not change the balance of power. The state banks reduced their share to 25 percent and Cuccia's cronies on the market. As

increased theirs to 25 percent, while 50 percent was placed

Credito Italiano and Comit went private, the to half

of what

it

was.

It

state's

also

own

approximately 8 percent share of Mediobanca.'"^ In If he

Mediobanca

has been said, amusingly but incorrectly, that

Cuccia got ownership of Comit, he would

owned himself.

share of

himself through Comit's

Cuccia has always

reality

supported Cefis's bid to take over Montedison,

he thought that Cefis,

him, would use public

like

fell

when

money

it is

because

to strengthen the

private sector.

Cuccia's role has been to

economy. This the state began is

is

its

why

resist the

his great battles

invasion.

The most famous of them was

too simple to see Sindona's

rise

were Italcementi and Bastogi, which belonged cannot escape the concept of clans and

as the expression

state into the

two of Sindona's

to the Catholic,

it is

more

targets

correct to see

Sindona

of one Catholic clan made up of segments of the Mafia,

who had much

the clan looked outside Italy for

London and in the United helpful. Nor can one forget epitomized the

allies

in the

led

by

usual,

Hambro Bank of

where segments of the Cosa Nostra were

that the clans

form and reform;

in the battle

of

DC support, while Cuccia was allied with Cefis,

state bourgeoisie

In 1971 the Centrale

and found them

DC

Roma. As

influence over the Banco di

States

Bastogi Sindona did not have

who

It

Carlo Pesenti.

segments of the Vatican (although not lOR), and segments of the Giulio Andreotti,

when

against Sindona.

merely as the challenge of DC-backed finance

against the lay finance of northern Italy, if only because

One

DC-PSI

inroads of the

have been fought since the 1960s

fell

and

whom Agnelli

to Sindona,

who wanted

had excoriated.'^ to fuse

it

with Bastogi

to create a financial bloc. Bastogi contained in miniature the entire history

of

was a railroad company that used the indemnity

it

the Italian economy.

received

when

It

the railways were nationalized in 1905 to

become

a financial

The Ptiblicization of the Economy

company. In the

early decades of this century

By

hydroelectric power.

the 1960s

it

was important

had become

it

89

a

in financing

strongbox in which the

northern families could deposit the shares of their companies. Only trusted friends were given keys to the box. Clearly

when

Just

Sindona did not

qualify.

make

the Sicilian financier was about to

on Bastogi. Having president with public money from ENI, Cefis wanted to

his bid,

new

the

president of Montedison cast his eyes

established himself

as

privatize himself in

order to weaken the politicians' control over him. Bastogi

owned

Montedison

Italpi,

that

—

and Cefis planned

shares

in a familiar pattern

Montedison, but Bastogi, Cefis It

itself

to

merge

of interlocking share-ownership

owned

Montedison

a bloc of

—

chunk of company was owned by a

a

By owning

shares.

Italpi-

would own himself

has been argued that the battle of Bastogi was a struggle between two

intruding state bourgeois,''' but this too

could outbid Sindona

in the quest for

an oversimplification. Certainly Cefis

is

DC support, which

did not believe that Cefis would be able to

own

of money that had flowed from Montedison is

with

it

to the politicians

Sindona, playing on the

also true that

who

convinced Cesare Merzagora,

a sign that the

is

DC

himself, or that the steady steam

splits

would Ary up.

It

within the northern clans,

distrusted Cuccia, to

sell

him

the Generali's

shares in Bastogi. But the real struggle was between the northern establishment

and Sindona. Cuccia backed Cefis because he was gambling that the

wrong and

DC was

would run Montedison as an efficient private company. Pesenti simply thought anyone would be better than Sindona.

The

that Cefis

battle

was

fierce

and the Cuccia-Cefis

ation for the small shareholders.

stripped

it

of worthwhile holdings, such

company, and endowed

it

with a

forces

showed scant consider-

Before merging Italpi with Bastogi they

less

as its participation in

the Pavesi food

valuable bloc of financial stock.

'^

A

reputation for neglecting small shareholders clung to Cuccia and was used in

1994 by Romano Prodi Sindona

in the

also raised the issue

argument over the Comit

but

launched in September. His bid

it

was

lost in

main power struggle. There

is

1971

because Cuccia gained the support

failed in part

of the then Governor of the Bank of Italy, Guido aspect of the

privatization. In

the fury of the takeover that he

an

Carli,

which

illustrates

another

alliance, subject to the usual shifts

of loyalty, between the bank and the lay northern finance.

The Sindona

saga continued. Sindona was able to

useless Bastogi shares to Cefis

by threatening

legal action

sell

some of

his

now

over the issue of the

He had his Banca Privata and he began to build up a financial He also acquired the Franklin Bank in the United States. From

small shareholders.

group, Finambro.

1972

Amid

to June 1973, with Andreotti as

the chaotic

monetary

Prime Minister, Sindona's affairs flourished.

instability

he speculated on the

lira

and

in

December

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

90

1973 he was hailed Cefis,

as a

noble patriot by Andreotti. Since he was no longer battling

DC and the Banco di

Sindona had behind him the However,

in

allow Finambro

any role

Roma.

August 1973, Ugo La Malfa, then Treasury Minister, refused

to raise fresh capital

in the decision.

The DC mobilized

was ready. However Credito

to

on the market. Cuccia unconvincingly denied

Italiano

to save Sindona,

and the Banco

and Comit, which were

di

Roma were

historically lay,

not ready and the Banca Privata collapsed in the autumn of 1974. Sindona had no

doubt who was responsible and he resorted In April

1979 Cuccia went

to

to

New

Mafia tacncs, threatening Cuccia.

York and met Sindona

at the

Hotel

Informed that the Mafia had passed a death sentence on him, he still refused the demand that he help bail out Sindona with public money. Andreotti, Pierre.

who had his

lavished praise

Ambrosoli,

was

on Sindona, was once again Prime Minister, although

term was reaching an end. Cuccia returned to Milan where Giorgio

who was

killed in July.

been

briefly

tibility to

unraveling the

Meanwhile

a top

web of the Banca Privata's many illegalities, Bank of Italy official, Mario Sarcinelli, had

thrown into prison by the

government

Rome magistrates,

pressure, because he too

Sindona and other DC-backed businessmen such governor of the bank, Paolo fragile health. It

is

tempting

Baffi,

proving their suscep-

was unhelpful

Nino

as

in bailing out

Rovelli of SIR.

was saved from prison only by

to think that Andreotti

because of the prestige he had acquired

as the

was able

man who

his age

to take

The and

such steps

could outmaneuver the

PCI. As for Sindona, he died in prison, probably poisoned.

His case turned into a

clear

example of the struggle between entrepreneurs

by the Christian Democrat state, and the lay, private North. It is, however, too Manichaean to be typical. In

or financiers backed

businessmen of the general, relations

between the two alternated between

cooperation. Cuccia distrusted

Rome

hostility

and uneasy

but was willing to gamble on Cefis; La

Malfa's Republicans were a perennial coalition partner of the

DC,

while

enjoying the support of the northern families. But the private industrialists were all

too aware that the balance of power between

Rome and

the

North was

threatened by the creeping publicization of the economy. Against this trend

Cuccia was a bulwark. Inevitably he had the defects of his merits.

He showed

scant interest in

developing his native South and he distrusted high technology. By his liking for shareholder syndicates

formed behind closed doors Cuccia discouraged new

entrants onto the stock market

and the formation of new, powerful groups. Not

coincidentally, an expanded stock market and a larger

number of financial

firms

would have weakened Mediobanca's posidon. In his favor one might suggest that Cuccia was/is not a defender merely

—

of the mighty

the Agnellis

and

Pirellis.

He was eager to welcome

upstarts such

The Publicization of the Economy as Salvatore Ligresti or Cefis,

different

from those of the

91

provided that they played by his

state bourgeoisie. It

is

rules,

which were

hard to imagine that he thinks

highly of Fininvest. Berlusconi loves spending and publicity, both of which are

anathema

to Cuccia.

Berlusconi's debts

It

comes

as

no

surprise that Cuccia's estimate of

twice Berlusconi's estimate."" Cuccia

is

chieftain for he believes in an establishment: an sets

is

not just a clan

behaves properly and

an example of work and efficiency.

His achievement

is

have protected

to

companies against the intrusions of the

state.

Italy's

The

handful and that they are not big enough. There

DC

elite that

is

handful of

price

is

big,

private

that they remain a

a causal connection between

and PSI publicization of the economy and the exiguous, family-based

private sector.

A

limited but strong state,

which ran the public

services well,

would have provided space and encouragement for a larger private sector. In such a state Cuccia might have been a great dirigist. In Andreotti's Italy he could only fight with James Joyce's weapons of silence and cunning.

ABUSING THE PUBLIC SECTOR While Cefis was consolidating

new

public holding

his position at

Monteponi-Montevecchio, which was

called

handed

it

over to Egam.

Giampiero

Montedison, he was helped by a

company called Egam. Montecatini owned

a

mining firm

a perennial money-loser; Cefis

He wanted to rid himself of a Montedison was named to the board of Egam.'''

executive,

Cavalli; Cavalli

This seeming boon to private industrialists was invented in 1970 by the Minister of the Public Sector,

Antonio

Bisaglia also

of clientelism.

Its

who was none other than Flaminio Piccoli. men used it to pursue two forms

approved of it and both

charter was to take over failing

mining companies, whose

workers could be expected to show their gratitude in the voting booth. In this

does no great harm, but Egam, directed by Mario Einaudi

servant of the useless

itself

who was a faithful

DC and belonged to the Doroteo faction, went further. It bought

companies

in other spheres like

manufacturing and transport. As well

taking several companies off Cefis's hands, already in the public sector, such as

it

as

bought companies that were

Monte Amiata

that belonged to IRI.'^

Einaudi created a large public holding that had no prospect of becoming profitable. In three years

million. For this

it

Egam

companies were

eligible for

different

from what

this

is

acquired 40 companies with a turnover of $400

received a parliamentary grant of

many other I

$200 million and

its

kinds of government subsidies. Clearly

have hitherto called clientelism.

It is likely

that

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

92

Egam bought some lucky

most important entity,

of

its

companies

which

issue

is

the use of public

spawned an

in turn

exercised power and

all

were too high and that the

money

group. Villain e

it

who

weakens

with a rubbish bin.

1975 when it made a mistake, from which it never but which illustrates how it operated. It took over a Genoese Fassio, which owned ships, as well as insurance companies and

two newspapers,

// Corriere mercantile

and La Gazzetta del Lunedi. Insurance

Not only had Egam paid $ 1

1

million for 5

worth was around $7 million, but

it

are politically sensitive.'^

La Stampa, while

Significantly Giorgio La Malfa led the charge in

real total

economic

too real group of state bourgeois

was a long way from Egam's charter and newspapers

in.

mere corruption. The

prospered until

really recovered

joined

is

to create a fictitious

interfered with the market. In the long run this

the private sector, despite providing

Egam

at prices that

kicked back some of their gains. But that

sellers

1

the

PCI

percent of a group whose

had borrowed the entire sum

an interest rate of 17 percent from a savings bank run by a Doroteo.

probable logic of the venture was not economic but

political.

wanted the two newspapers because the main Genoese paper,

at

The

The Dorotei

Secolo XIX,

was

anti-DC, but more particularly because the papers were to be used against the

DC chieftain in 1967 and had

Liguria. Paolo-Emilio Taviani

later returned,

the younger leaders like Bisaglia,

This

is

left

the Doroteo current in

who was by now

Minister of the Public Sector.

an extreme example of how the public sector was run by the rules

When

of clan warfare.

the

bill

for the

the 1960s on, the burden of payment

of the

had

but was, along with Mariano Rumor, a target of

electrical industry

for the 16 years

it

may be

economic miracle had

fell

on the

at all

to

be paid from

Even the nationalization

seen in this context: the PSI presented

had been (self-)excluded

Democrats were not

state.

unwilling to pay

money. The nationalization changed the

its bill

from government. But the Christian

— provided they could

Socialists

use public

from enemies into junior

partners.

In general the need for the public to reinforce the private sector offered the opportunity to expand

DC power in

run until the 1960s, when the

initial

both

sectors. IRI

failure

and ENI were well

to define their role

damaging. They were unable to move out of sunset industries they had to bail out the increasing

accommodating

to

number of lame

proved

like basic steel,

ducks, and they had to be

worker demands. They continued to have their successes:

Romeo made money and was sold to Fiat in 1986, while at the same moment the SME could have been sold to De Benedetti. But haphazard conglomerations of holdings such as IRI and ENI were unusually vulnerable to

Alfa

the vagaries of the world economy. So the 1970s were especially difficult, while the 1980s saw improvement.

The downturn

that

became evident

in 1991

was

The Publicization of the Economy all

the

more

Market, did

The

best to block Italian

government

subsidies.

gravest weakness of the public sector lay in the political criteria that

had become supporters;

its

scale

tax,

of values.

It

existed to provide jobs

was a resource with which

it

These values spread not just a

because the EC, moving inexorably toward the Internal

difficult its

93

and money for DC-PSI

buy consensus and finance

to

were

but also a subversion of entrepreneurial values. Efficiency vanished

along with honesty because

it

too was useless.

part of publicization: the battery of

Once more corruption was a mere

government subsidies and the

selective

control of credit were just as pernicious. Private capitalism produced state bourgeoisie

Guido

feuds.

to the private sector. Bribes paid for public contracts

its

own

because political influence replaced market competitiveness.

Carli concludes:

"We

have taken responsibility from the entrepreneur

we have not done away with him. We have opened the road to state intervention but we have not planned it. We have corrupted socialism and capitalism alike. "^'^ Carli distinguished between the 1950s when there was an but

establishment

—

Menichella

Valletta, Mattei,

—and

the 1970s when, despite

Cuccia's efforts, there was none.

When Romano holding that had

Prodi returned to head IRI in 1993, he confronted a

lost

$3

However Prodi had an

billion the previous year.

advantage over his predecessors because the political

criteria lapsed

switch from the old regime to the Ciampi government. Whereas

had

resisted privatization because

of the

Egam syndrome,

off Credito Italiano and Comit, which brought IRI

chunks of IRI are heading

The

some

with the

DC and

PSI

Prodi was able to cash.

sell

Many unsalable

for liquidation.

difference in the problems Prodi has inherited

two brief examples from Finmare.

Its

may be

illustrated

by

ferryboat section, Tirrenia, has large debts,

but they stem in part from the burden of having to maintain a service to the small islands; this represents a public good, which

however, in Finmare's past

lies

may justify the financial loss; when it rented

the "golden ferryboats" scandal

boats from a private shipping firm at an enormously inflated price. ^' This represents collusion between the two segments of the state bourgeoisie. In the

1992 collapse of

causes were Italian.

engineering sector, in the

EFIM

Founded

EFIM

the world recession was a catalyst, but the

in the

postwar period

grew from the 1970s on.

South that soon showed enormous

other bits of

itself in

the politicians.

Its

order to

losses. It

show paper

profits,

financial section, Safim,

of President Giovanni Leone

who

It

as a

fund

began selling while real

fiction.

of itself to

bits

money

passed to

was headed by Mauro Leone, son

resigned after corruption charges, and was

himself implicated in the Clean Hands investigation.^^ For years

been an economic

to help the

acquired food companies

The world

EFIM

recession reintroduced reality.

had

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

94

The heart of the empire buik by the state Control of credit was indispensable both creation of vast financial fictions.

Some 80

owned: the savings banks are run by the presidents using political criteria. the usual criticism that there

Many

central

government, which chooses

number of them should be

chosen for

tend to lend

political reasons

treated

infiltrated

by

to launder money, while bank presidents

need

its

for the

banks are perfectly well run and even

with caution. ^-^ However, some banks in the South have been organized crime because of

and

percent of Italy's banks are publicly

too great a

is

bourgeoisie lay in certain banks.

for simple clientelism

money for

the

same

Moreover

reasons.

the secrecy that surrounds banking transactions fosters abuse.

That bankers should break the

law,

is

Roberto Mazzotta, the head of Cariplo, the arrested

by the Milan magistrates,

been appointed to

much

his post

it

unsurprising. However,

largest savings

bank

when was

in Italy,

did not appear coincidental that he had

without ever having worked for a bank, but with

experience in Christian

Democrat politics. A week later the president of Giampiero Cantoni, a Socialist appointee, had

the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, to resign.

This was ironic because he was appointed in 1989

president, Nerio Nesi (PSI),

and

his deputy,

after the previous

Giacomo Pedde (DC), had been

forced to resign in the arms-for-Iraq scandal.

The BNL's

role illustrates the dangers of a

by the DC-PSI power structure. The United States but

government

also

Italian

banking system that

is

shaped

government, eager to please the

own pro-Iraq policy, wanted to help the U.S. Some top BNL people considered it natural to

pursuing its

to break U.S. law.

lend a hand and the vehicle chosen was the BNL's Atlanta branch.

When

the

on the irregularity of the Atlanta operation, they were and American secret services knew all they wanted to know.

bank's officials reported ignored.

When

The

Italian

the scandal broke the Italian

government made scapegoats of Nesi and

Pedde, but protected the bank against prosecution by the U.S. Department of

The BNL probably

Justice.

finances

power

depended not on

structure.

its

lost

money

but that barely mattered, since

performance

in the

its

market but on the DC-PSI

^'^

THE POLITICS OF THE PUBLICIZED ECONOMY The in

Atlanta case

which the

BNL's

is

interesting precisely because

state bourgeoisie operated.

it

reveals the political context

Sindona's links with the Mafia and the

dealings with the secret services were not typical of the publicized

economy, but neither were they coincidental. The development of entrepre-

The Publicization of the Economy

9 5

neurship in the Mafia, Camorra, and 'ndrangheta was spurred by the state

The

bourgeoisie.

Piromalli family was allowed to acquire a fleet of trucks

and

Tauro by the companies and civil servants who ran the South along clientelistic lines. Organized crime

take over transport in Gioia industrial fit

development

in

into the publicization process,

The

alike.

which ignored the laws of state and market

Mafia's need to launder drug

money meshed with

launched by Catholic finance against the northern

elite.

the onslaught

After Sindona, Calvi

was the point of contact. Carmine Alfieri was different from the non-Camorristi businessmen

who won government

contracts after the Naples earthquake

because he used violence. But he shared with them the priority awarded to political

connections over market efficiency.

The

secret service,

while taking sides in cized

economy.

Its

its

role

which protected and threatened the feuds,

was most obvious in arms dealings

venture or EFIM's attempts to

sell its

secret service:

with Qaddafi, which took the form of arms for

The Magliana band such

as

in

Rome

Valerio Fioravanti;

system

for the publi-

BNL-Iraq

like the

Agusta helicopter. In general interna-

from the

tional ventures required help

political

performed the same functions

oil,

it

watched over trade

with bribes

at

both ends.

provided a network for right-wing

members of

terrorists

the secret service like Pietro

Musumeci, who drew on its arms supply for the explosive he helped place on the Milan-Taranto train; Mafiosi such as Pippo Calo who wanted to establish himself in Rome; and businessmen like Flavio Carboni who engaged in property speculation on the Sardinian coast and was Calvi's associate. One member of the band was even found to be in possession of a check made out to Andreotti by Nino Rovelli, owner of the SIR petrochemical company. ^^

A

central role in the ideology of the state bourgeoisie

anti-Communism. The overlap with right-wing and the P2 heightened but did not animated respectable entrepreneurs

create

made

anti-Communism, which

this

like Silvio Berlusconi.

merely that there had to be a Communist threat to hold on government, which

was played by

terrorism, the secret services,

The

justify the

reason

is

not

DCs permanent

publicization possible. Rather the state-

financed fictions and banks such as the Ambrosiano or the

BNL, which

frequently departed from market rules, could masquerade as champions of free enterprise It

lodge,

by using the

was

which was both

to save Italy

rhetoric of

logical that the

from

anti-Communism.

BNL should

employ

so

many members

of the P2

a center for right-wing extremists contemplating a

Communism and

an association of members

who

coup

helped

one another make money. There was no contradiction between the two. Absent from the P2 were the members of the northern dynasties

— Cesare

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STA TE

96

—whereas

Romiti boasts that not a single Fiat employee was a member

Donna of ENI,

Berlusconi.

as well as

One

of the P2's triumphs was to win

control of what had been the voice of the lay editor,

from

Angelo

Cefis,

the

was well represented by Giorgio Mazzanti and Leonardo Di

state bourgeoisie

Rizzoli,

who

was enlisted by

elite, //

Corriere della Sera.

Its

gained control of the paper in 1974 with backing

Gelli. It

is

tempting

to argue that the

the war of the state bourgeoisie against the Cuccias

and the

P2 was waging

Agnellis, rather

than against the PCI.

However,

this

suggestion does not hold up,

if

we consider

between the growth of publicization and the advance of the during the

late

the relationship

Left. It

was precisely

1960s and the 1970s, when the student/worker protest move-

ment peaked and when

the PCI's share of the vote grew, that the public sector

expanded. Cefis took over Montedison. Sindona and Calvi rose to wealth and the taxpayer's

Nino

money poured

One

Rovelli.

cover

at this time.

reason

is

DC-backed entrepreneurs like anti-Communism was a particularly useful

into the coffers of that

Another explanation

by worker militancy that

it

is

that the private sector

could not prevent the

shift

bourgeoisie. Indeed left-wing anti-capitalism allowed the state's

power and hence

Moreover the and

Left

its

was so weakened

of power to the state

DC to expanded the

own.

was culturally unprepared

for the dispute

private capitalism. Rinascita p\ih\\s\\cd thoughtful articles

between

state

on Montedison^''

and Egam, while the PCI toyed with the notion of a "producers' pact" between the enlightened, efficient capitalists

and the trade unions. This was

the core

at

of the PDS's election program of 1994, but in 1975 the PCI was both too anti-capitalist

and too eager

might have been the man grew increasingly more

and too virulently

The

first

to strike a deal

with the

isolated in the PCI.

anti-capitalist to tolerate

The New

Employers Association and the trade unions

the so-called

Giorgio Amendola

sides.

The

Left was too genetically

any producers'

sign of such an agreement was the

turned out badly for both

DC.

to bargain with the northern industrialists, but he

for

pact.

1975 deal between the

wage indexation,

austerity of the historic

a deal that

compromise and

EUR line should have pleased employers, but the union leadership

did not control theshopfloorand Romiti was planning as early as 1976 to defeat, rather than negotiate with, the workforce. ^^ His strongest supporter

was Cuccia.

Agnelli had previously struck a bargain with Cefis, which allowed

become President of Fiat

was worried that the

old dislike

of,

DC might use the

1973

oil crisis to

weaken

but dependence on, the Italian state reemerged

of world economic

him

to

the Employers Association with Cefis as Vice-President.

crisis.

against the working class.

The northern

elite

and the

at

the

it.^^

The

moment

state bourgeoisie united

The Publictzation of the Economy

97

CHEMICAL WARFARE Montedison, which was engaged

competitive industrial sector,

in a difficult,

but was also a honey pot for politicians, remained struggles,

which went on both during the

would-be establishment's attempt

rebellions, the

demise of

bourgeoisie, and shifts of

war against the Left and

autumn of 1980. Various

after the Left's defeat in the

struggles: the

a

proud family

power within

center of the power

at the

common

threads run through the

down two

to put

firm, further inroads

Cefis proved a disappointment to Cuccia because he was

a successful, private

1

976

elections the

who had Nino the

DCs

for the

Rovelli in his clan.

1974 divorce referendum. By the

were Moro and Andreotti, The next year Cefis resigned. His exit marked

figures in the party

end of the period when heads of the public sector conglomerates exercised

great

power

in their

foreign policy, Cagliari

own

Where Mattel had run ENI, conducted

right.

and exerted more influence over the

knew that he owed

throughout the Enimont After Cefis

his position at the

affair

the third adventure of

left,

name of popular capitalism,

holdings. ^'^

It

DC than

head of ENI

its

his

own

leaders, Gabriele

to the Socialists

and

he did their bidding.

Schimberni reign would not be a the

an entrepre-

weakened by the decline of Fanfani,

defeat in the

two dominant

less

Cefis was not able to turn

failed:

chemical company. However Cefis's

position within the state bourgeoisie was

who was blamed

state

that bourgeoisie.

neur than a politician. Cuccia's gamble

Montedison into

different

by the

disaster,

but

Montedison began. The Mario it

would represent

against the Cuccia

a rebellion, in

model of interlocking family

men who

began, however, with an alliance between the two

set

about further reprivatizing Montedison. Cuccia enlisted the Agnellis, the

Bonomis, and others

to

buy

block of publicly

a

owned Montedison

shares in

1981. This was the period of the P2 revelations and the state bourgeoisie was temporarily weakened.

by following

The next year Schimberni fulfilled his part of the bai-gain path and laying off 40,000 workers. The declining

in Romiti's

price of oil in the

mid-1980s helped Montedison achieve

The improvement, along with

a stronger position.

the stock market rally, triggered a

rift

within the family-based private sector. Schimberni raided Fondiaria (1986) and the

Bonomi

company

family's financial

abandoned Carlo Bonomi but insurance company, Fondiaria.

shared by the families.

power

elite.

He

To Cuccia it was both

By conquering

who came from

then challenged

it

Bi-Invest (1985).

The

establishment

bitterly resented losing the Florence-based

essential to the establishment

Schimberni, the

it

a

it

his territory

and

territory

Schimberni had upset the balance of

and Cuccia did not forgive him. poor

directly

Roman

family,

had already alienated

when he announced a huge

share issue in

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

98

1987. His aim was to dilute the ownership of his

with greater power. For

this,

company and

Schimberni has been praised

broad-based, Anglo-Saxon capitalism to which

Romano

as a

leave

its

president

forerunner of the

Prodi tried to lead Italy

with the privatizations of Credito Italiano (1993) and Comit (1994). Certainly

who

Schimberni was challenging Cuccia,

feared that a

company without

resist

a "hard

would be too weak

core" of wealthy owners united in a shareholders' syndicate

to

the inroads of the state bourgeoisie.

The second

half of the 1980s was a difficult period for Cuccia because

general prosperity and a broadened stock market were jeopardizing Mediobanca's role as a source of capital and the center of shareholder syndicates.

However

Ferruzzi group built an

1987 ended Schimberni's hopes of

the Wall Street crash of October

a share issue. In the

meantime the

and

its

families

had found a new champion

chairman, Raul Gardini.

The Ravenna

in the

family had

empire out of grain shipping and food. Serafmo Ferruzzi had taken

over Eridania, which had traditionally refined and marketed the sugar beet

grown

in the

Po

He and

Valley.

his son-in-law, Gardini,

president in 1980, turned Ferruzzi into the second-largest

who became

company

in Italy.

grow Gardini launched a successful takeover of Montedison in 1987. With a company that had a turnover of $4 billion, he gained ownership of a company that had a turnover of $9 billion. He blocked the new share issue and dispatched Schimberni, which pleased Determined

to diversify

and

to

Cuccia, but he kept Fondiaria, which did not.

Montedison was It

istic

The

fourth adventure of

starting.

unfolded between 1987 and 1993 and offers themes that are character-

of the Italian private

decisions were despite the

sector.

made without

The

secrecy of family capitalism, the

consulting shareholders,

its

—with banks —he reminds one of Carlo De

1936 law

are

present. If Gardini's energy

all

ambition were also typical to take over a

Benedetti

company that represented one third of Belgium's GDP

in exaggerated form,

was the

social

way

close relationship

who

—

and tried

so, albeit

fragmentation he created. Alien to any

notion of an establishment or of a balance of power, he rejected the alliance

with Cuccia. Even the Ferruzzi family

itself

broke up. Finally Enimont reveals

the struggle but also the symbiotic relationship between family capitalism and

an ever stronger state bourgeoisie. In 1989 Gardini

made two

attempts

at

expansion.

He tried

to corner the

soy market on the Chicago exchange and incurred losses estimated million. fair to

$300

the other shareholders.^' Like most family holdings, the Ferruzzi group

was a maze of different companies ria),

at

Of these $200 million were charged to Montedison, which was hardly

which was the group's

— Montedison,

Ferfin (Ferruzzi-Finanzia-

financial arm, Serafino-Ferruzzi,

which was the

The Publicization of the Economy family's

own

financial center,

moving money and situation difficult,

and many

and

this

others. This allowed great

made a true was compounded by

shares around.

99

It

freedom

in

evaluation of the financial the lax Italian laws about

disclosure of information even in publicly quoted companies. Gardini took full

advantage of such freedom, indulging in ill-named "back to back" opera-

Funds transferred from some companies

tions.

publicly

owned)

to other

(especially those that were companies (usually those owned only by the family)

were never transferred back.^^ There was

which undertook

also a

Group

Services Consortium,

tasks like security or publicity for the various

companies and

drained them of money.

Gardini 's second venture of 1989 was a return to the Cefis strategy of

mixing private and public. In yet another attempt group

in Italy,

Montedison and ENI

set

to

form an advanced chemical

up Enimont, where 40 percent of the

owned by each partner and the remaining 20 percent were placed on the market, with Montedison and ENI pledging not to buy them in order to secure outright control. Such an initiative seemed implausible. By 1989 ENI shares were

was securely under the control of the PSI, and the chemical industry's role of providing slush

funds for the parties

made

it

historic

unlikely that they

would

simply watch from a distance. In 1990 Gardini went on the attack and along

with

his associates

shares

he bought just over 10 percent of the remaining Enimont

and gained outright control.

Again

it

hard to imagine Gardini's plans. Did he seriously want to

is

succeed where Cefis and so

company

that could

many

others had failed and build a chemical

Du

compete with

Pont or ICI? Did he think the

bourgeoisie, reinforced by 14 years of Craxi's leadership of the PSI,

simply accept

$10 million

defeat? Gardini

its

to obtain a tax

is

state

would

alleged to have previously paid the politicians

concession for Enimont, which never materialized.

Or was he planning from the outset to sell his shares ENI at a profit? ENI and its political mentors responded by obtaining from Judge Diego

Surely that was a warning. to

Curto

a decision that the shares acquired

judicial system,

him

took

to take over

at the

by Gardini and

who had

10 percent) be sequestered. Gardini,

his associates (just over

scant faith in the fairness of the

this as a sign that the state bourgeoisie

Enimont.

He now

sought only to

sell

back

would not permit his shares to

maximum profit, which meant paying the maximum in bribes.

1991 the taxpayer bought back Gardini's shares

which Gardini

allegedly paid

$90 million

supposedly going to Bettino Craxi

Once more parties

and

Italy

for $1.9 billion, in return for

to the politicians, the largest

sum

the "owner" of ENI. ^^

a major chemical company. Once more the make a profit. However in June 1991 Gardini

was without

a family cooperated to

as

ENI

In January

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

100

broke with the Ferruzzi. In June 1993 came a dual Ferruzzi group had incurred in

Milan magistrates turned suicide

and

a victorious

its

race to

the debts

crisis:

which the

expand became unsustainable and the

their attention

Cuccia was called

Enimont. Gardini committed

to

in to stitch together a family firm

without a family.

CONCLUSION The

Ferruzzi saga

the Italian

control that

is

about the relationship between public and private

a tale

economy. The

ENI and

of the bribe

size

to dictate to

Montedison marked the conclusion of a process

began with the nationalization of Edison and the distortion of

sector,

in

as well as the politicians' ability to

which had worked well

in the

postwar years.

The

process were the use of public ownership not merely

a public

characteristics

of this

to protect otherwise

uncompetitive industries, but also to create fictional companies that had no

economic reason

but that expanded the power of the state bourgeoisie.

to exist

room

and

In turn this

weakened the

in place the

nucleus of family-owned big companies that were strong enough

to face the

tion, did

its

for growth,

left

marauding Roman hordes.

These two made a advantage.

private sector, limited

The

state did

tacit

agreement, which each tried to change to

not create a free market by extensive antitrust

its

legisla-

not protect the small shareholder, and watched while publicly owned

banks made dangerous loans. In return the companies paid bribes/taxes on public contracts and did not foster opposition to

between Catholic finance and the northern

framework of

this

agreement, although

it

DC-PSI

also

threatened

defended the northern establishment both against the for

wider share-ownership. The

tended

rule.

The

struggle

lay elite took place within the

state bourgeoisie

state

it.

Mediobanca

and against pressure

gained ground but overex-

itself.

This struggle, riddled with internal factional disputes and stabilized during temporary truces, has been overtaken by developments inside and outside of Italy. Increased international competition has

uncertain that they can compete without modifying

example, Fiat has gone through a year of change. not,

however, be seen

as

left

the family dynasties

their structure: as an

The collapse ol Ferruzzi should

the symbolic death of family capitalism.

Pirelli

German company Continental. The batde between Cuccia and Prodi has been won by Cuccia but it was far from a simple struggle between old and new forms of capitalism. One of the recovered from

its

catastrophe:

its

bid for the

The Publicization of the Economy

101

Hands operation is the pressure to regulate more information on shareholder syndicates.^''

best developments of the Clean

stock market by providing

as

the

In 1974 Eugenio Scalfari perceived the emergence of the state bourgeoisie marking the decline of the private entrepreneur. The fate of the Volpis was

and even

sealed

unwarranted.

Fiat

New

seemed

to

him weak.^^ His pessimism

of Parmalat, Benetton, Stefanel, and while

it still

was, however,

entrepreneurs have emerged in recent years: Callisto Tanzi

many

others.

Indeed the private

sector,

contains too few big companies, does not lack dynamism. Small

firms have developed, blissfully indifferent to Cuccia as to Sindona.

What Hands and

of the

state bourgeoisie? It has

investigation

and

Italian

opinion

is

been the prime target of the Clean aware of the need to separate public

private enterprise. Yet the Right's victory in the

1994 elections remains

ambiguous.

There was an ominous ring

in the

changed "to take account of the this

Lega clientelism?

It

Lega Nord's response to the

arrest

of

The leadership of the Milan bank must be new expression of the will of the people. "^^ Is

the Cariplo president, Mazzotta:

would appear

so.

Enrico Berlinguer and

Compromise

the Historic

the present Italian debates the

Incommemorations perfunctory, which

emotion. All

Italy

vi^eek later in the

gained more

that

odd

is

name

Berlinguer

European

votes than the

his funeral,

elections

for the first

Italian

and

he

is

It

was

PCI

a funeral

"the moral question,"

may

be said to have

1979 he struggled a

neglected,

to face

up

Communist, what he considered

it is

However both then and

to the failure

of

seeking to give a fresh its

values

—

rigor

partly because such an effort seems

Berlinguer helped

earlier

instill

the sense that Italian public institutions were precious and

defended.

form a

time, the

investigation.

in the years after

self-sacrifice. If

PCI

who made

to the creed but also to preserve

hopeless today. the

Hands

political

last

systemic clientelism, into the central

did so clumsily, but he

Communism. He remained

meaning

The

death seemed

for his party or policies. Still Berlinguer deserves

which was his forthright way of referring to

He

and

percent to 33 percent.

attention today because he was the only leader

Moreover

his

and sympathy took

when,

DC— 33.3

wreath for the man, rather than

anticipated the Clean

rarely invoked.

since his death triggered a genuine outburst of

stopped for

issue of Italian politics.

is

marked the tenth anniversary of

He himself defended them against the

terrorism of the

Red

into

must be Brigades,

at a cost to his party.

The main historic

reason Berlinguer

is

neglected

is

that his great adventure, the

compromise, the meeting of Communist and Catholic culture that took

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

104

concrete form in the governments of National Solidarity of 1976-79, was a failure.

to

'

important because

It is

reform

itself.

PCI nor

the

its

When

it

it

marks the postwar order's only serious attempt

failed, that

ally/adversary the

order began

DC was ever

its

decline. After

1979 neither

again as strong as

it

had been.

working

Part of the failure was the short-lived attempt to reconcile the

class

and

the industrialists in an Italian version of the "Austrian" solution.

The

situation out of which the historic

compromise emerged has already

been described. The international economic crisis triggered by the 1973 increase in oil prices bility

was especially grave in

One

reason for this was the vulnera-

of an economy that had grown so quickly:

her energy.

The second

deflation

and

in

class

The

imported 75 percent of

was stronger and more aggressive.

now had

It resisted

1975 obtained wage indexation. Yet another reason

growing discontent with the DC. Bisaglia was us."^

Italy

reason was that the price for postwar decisions

be paid: the working

to

Italy.

DC had too many factions

lucid: "the

and too few new

country

is

lay in

tired

was anger with clientelism and anger because there was no longer money clientelism.

for

Two decades of prosperity had brought a demand for social reforms,

which was expressed in the victory for the supporters of divorce referendum. Space was opening up for the PCI. This chapter the

of

There

faces or policies.

is

divided into four parts.

Communists, the second

The

first

updates

at the

my analysis of the

deals with the domestic issues

1974 of

historic

compromise, and the third with the international dimension. The fourth sections treats Berlinguer's last years.

The aim throughout

is

to see the PCI's

bid for power from the viewpoint of 1994.

A COMMUNIST PARTY TRIES TO REFORM Berlinguer and

Henry

Kissinger agreed that the

the Left, but in retrospect they were wrong.

The

would push Italy to movements of the late

oil crisis

protest

1960s were subsiding, and even before the Arab-Israeli

War

the unions were

concentrating on salary increases and job protection rather than on worker control. After

1974 the need

for deflation shifted

power back

to the employers.

Cesare Romiti claims he began to plan the restructuring of Fiat as early as

So the PCI's 1975 Congress took place at tide

was running strongly

for the

a delicate

Communists but

percent to 33.4 percent, which was only 2 percent below the

make

a

976.^

the long-term economic

trend was not. In July 1975 their vote in the local elections would

to

1

moment. The political

jump 6

DC. They needed

modest reform proposal, of which one ingredient was wage

restraint.

Enrico Berlinguer and the Historic Compromise

Such things

are not,

105

however, the stuff of congresses. In September 1973

Berlinguer had launched the historic compromise supposedly "in the light of events in Chile.'"^ In fact he Italian

Communist

had relaunched a policy that was rooted

history.

following year,^ Berlinguer was shy and had spent his entire adult party organization. Like so

in postwar

Although he would make the cover of Time the

many other

university-educated

life

in the

young men he had

been attracted by Togliatti's Salerno project. Too young to have ties with the Third International, Berlinguer was steeped in the culture of the postwar PCI. Ascetic and disciplined, he believed in the mystique of the Communist militant

who

has

more

He had

duties than rights.

also studied

Gramsci and agreed with

Togliatti about the importance of collaborating with the Catholics. Berlinguer's ancestors were Sardinian landowners and minor nobility. His

grandfather

moved

who

while his father,

and became

to the Left

a supporter of

Giuseppe Mazzini,

was elected to parliament in 1924, took part in the

Aventino breakaway. Berlinguer inherited the need to prevent any return of Fascism and the sense that Italian democracy was precious but fragile. He was close to his uncle, Stefano Siglienti,

acquaintance of

Ugo La

and held the post

who was

an economist and banker and an

PCI

Malfa. Berlinguer became the

until his death. If Italians

admired him,

secretary in it

is

1972

quite simply

because they considered him more honest than other politicians. In his Congress address Berlinguer analyzed the international economic situation in language that used but

updated traditional Communism. Lenin's

theory of imperialism was being vindicated and capitalism was running out of markets.

The

no longer be

OPEC countries easily exploited.

to defend itself

had demonstrated that the Third World could important, the working class had learned

More

sort of deflation

and so "the traditional

solution. "*" This was a

run the economy

as

warning that the

Einaudi did

after

is

no longer

a valid

government must not expect to 1947. Tight monetary policy and low Italian

wages would encounter tough resistance. Berlinguer accepted the need for deflation, but not the Christian

Democrats' version because "they did not

try to

make choices and set priorities,"

and because nothing was done "to reduce waste,

profiteering, luxury

and

The PCI would use deflation to create "new economic and social that are more productive and rational." Berlinguer called for "forms

speculation." structures

of consumption and

life-style

.

.

.

which

are better

and

also less expensive for

the national community."'' This view, a blend of traditional Socialist collectivism.

Club of Rome end-of-growthism, and

would be

a key ingredient in the culture

Berlinguer, political.

He

Berlinguer's

own form of asceticism,

of the historic compromise.

who knew little about economics, stressed that the real issue was

called for "a process

which

will gradually allow us to

emerge from

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

106

the logic of the capitalist system, role

the

of governing the nation."

and which

working

leads the

class to take

up

its

He linked the Gramscian notion of hegemony with

theme of collaboration between Communists and Catholics. His aim was not

merely to create a left-wing coalition and to govern with 51 percent of the vote. Rather he stated that

"all

our proposals tend and must tend towards unity."^

Unity was one attribute of the

historic

concept that Berlinguer had trouble

compromise, an extremely difficult

clarifying. In

simplest sense

its

it

means

nothing more than the coalition governments from 1976 to 1979 where the Christian Democrats had the support of the PCI, although there were no

Communist

ministers.

compromise. To him

However, it

that

how

not

is

Berlinguer saw the historic

was the meeting of the Communist and Catholic

cultures, the twin forces that

were shaping modern

framework

the values they shared provided the

Their dialogue and

Italy.

for a political agreement.

Berlinguer sought a conflictual but cooperative relationship with the

he accepted

The

as the legitimate

DC

that

party of the Catholics.

link with the postwar

PCI

is

clear.

Berlinguer was building

on the

Togliatti-De Gasperi notion that the two mass parties would consolidate

democracy

in Italy.

The time had come

emphasize the

to

"alliaiice"

component

of the adversary/ally relationship. The Communists would participate in the

government along with the Catholics, which would unblock the political system

and

resolve the

That study.

problem of the unrepresentative

the aspect of the historic

is

There were other

from causing

a

aspects,

dangerous

drift

such

Italian state.

compromise

that

is

most relevant

to this

preventing the economic difficulties

as

toward an authoritarian right-wing regime.

Here, too, Berlinguer was demonstrating his sense of the need to reform the state.

The

trouble was that few

non-Communists saw

in this

way, while few Communists could reconcile

beliefs.

Berlinguer was unable to explain

how

the historic it

with the

Italians feared

it

would indeed have

offered the

CGIL

further

left

1975 Congress anticipated the conciliatory

economic

crisis,

where he has traded wage

Many

Luciano Lama and bargaining partner,

strike

of productive

of Lama, Tren tin's speech at the

line

he has taken in the present

restraint for defense

of employment.

1975 he could not do so openly, which introduced into the

compromise

the

first

a crisis of capitalism

of two ambiguities.

and an opportunity

non-

economic planning. Trentin went

and admitted a link between high wages and "a

investment."' Although he was then to the

In

leaders,

as a responsible

willing to accept deflation in return for

of their

that consequence.

Support for Berlinguer came from the union

Bruno Trentin. Lama

rest

compromise would

the historic

allow Italy "to emerge from the logic of the capitalist system."

Communist

compromise

The PCI saw to seize

historic

in the oil price increase

hegemony.

Enrico Berlinguer and the Historic Compromise

As

PCI

have argued in chapter

I

1,

to neglect pragmatic reforms

give priority to Socialist society

—

as

any and every increase

was waiting

act

of faith. ""^

at the

Liberation

hegemony was "an it

had done

in its

in the future

own

led the

It

— and

to

belief that the

shaped the party's policy in the

electorate

its

The

power.

present." During the three years of National Solidarity

reforms that would have justified to

107

its

it

failed to achieve the

support of deflationary

measures.

The second ambiguity lay in the method chosen to strengthen the party and achieve hegemony, namely, the alliance with the DC. The PCI base was frequently anti-clerical and it viewed the DC as the arch enemy. This dislike was

—and — is

reciprocated by the Catholics. In the late 1960s the relationship

between votes for the

Communist where

it

PCI and attendance

vote was 10 percent or

less,

at

mass was revealing: where the

mass attendance stood

was 40 percent to 50 percent mass attendance was

percent.'^

at

58 percent;

down

The Catho-Communist Franco Rodano had influenced

leadership but not the rank

and

file,

and he had not influenced the

to

the

30

PCI

DC at

all.

In 1975 conflict took precedence over collaboration and at the Congress Berlinguer declared that "the essential thing today is to defeat the line taken by

DC leadership."'^ As secretary Fanfani served as

the present the "bad"

increasing

DC,

which both placated the

Communist

number of voters who were looking to

the

PCI

the incarnation of

base and pleased the as

an agent of reform.

There had, however, to be a "good" DC, which was popular and antiFascist. Berlinguer allotted this role to Aldo Moro who had shown some understanding of the 1968 upheaval. One doubts whether the theory of the two DCs had much validity and whether Moro's aims, as distinct from his tactics, were different from Fanfani's. It is difficult to speculate about what Moro would have done had he not been murdered, but from 1976 to 1978 he stranded the Communists in the area of government without decisive governmental power,

which eroded maintain the

their

support in the country.

DCs central role in political

My conclusion

is

life.'''

Missing from Berlinguer's endless speeches about the

any serious

analysis of the

way

it

that he sought to

DCs

two souls

ran the Italian state and economy.

attack clientelism, but he neglected

its

systemic character and the

way

He

is

did

that the

DC

had become inseparable from the state apparatus and the nationalized Only later did he see how deep the moral question went. When he dealt with the Church, he appealed to its ethical sense and ignored its desire

industries

simply to maintain faithful to vote

DC,

its

When

the Council of Bishops called

'^ It is

DC

on

the

DC corruption. He

was the party that offered the Church the greatest hard not to conclude that Berlinguer was worried by the

was forgetting that the share of power.

power.

Berlinguer responded by pointing out

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

108

Right in the early 1970s: the increase in the

shift to the

bombs

at Brescia

he

the

felt

and

and on the

PCI had no choice but

to prevent the return

The

historic

Leonardo

Sciascia

with the Catholics to legitimize

itself

of Fascism.

97 1 Sciascia had published

1

now

which a Christian

"my

declares that

decided that

// Contesto, in

it

party, which has been misgoverning for would misgovern better in an alliance with

Candido (1977) the Palermo

the International Revolutionary Party."'^ In

Communists

vote in 1972, the

compromise was attacked by two very different writers. rulers and opposition merging to bring about change

Democrat minister years, has

to ally

MSI

and the Chilean coup. Like Togliatti,

saw

without change. In

30

Italicus train,

turn into a mirror image of the Christian Democrats.

In an oblique

way

work

Pier Paolo Pasolini's

reflects the

two dominant

strands of the postwar settlement. His ideals are a pre-capitalist, rural Catholi-

cism and an anarchical, urban subproletariat. For the in the early

1970s he exalted the PCI

compromise, he

which had

felt,

its

DC

he had no

only pure force in

was nothing more than a

also lost

consumerism were

as the

sellout, less to

authenticity, than to modernity.

stifling the

Italy.

use,

The

but

historic

Catholic culture,

Technology and

very awareness that society could be different.

Bologna, the PCI's model city where Pasolini had attended university, was better run than cities

precisely there

is

DC

where the

nothing

was

power, but

in

it

was a

city

"where

different."'''

Varying arguments came to the same conclusion. Far from establishing

hegemony, the PCI would be drawn into the web of Christian Democrat power. Italy

was looking

DC, but the only candidate was a DC. It needed the alliance because it was Communist party, pledged to overthrow both the DC

for an alternative to the

party that wanted to ally with the

determined to remain a

and

capitalism.

Communist

Its

bargaining power lay in

had to be masked

as "sacrifices

had already assumed

class that

ability to control labor,

wage

but a

restraint

without compensation,"'^ made by a working its

hegemonic

role.

Or

else austerity

had

to be

working-class value, superior to the waste and selfishness of

presented

as a

consumer

capitalism.

Berlinguer's language cline"; Italy

its

party could not endorse the Austrian solution. So

was

vivid:

key words were "decadence" and "de-

was menaced by "fragmentation." Decadence took the form of an

which left Italians "ridden with anxiety" and prone By contrast, the PCI offered "new human values" based on work, which would create unity. '^ In this moral discourse lies the vision of "exasperated individualism," to "self-denigration."

a reborn Italian state, but the political

means of creating

it

were absent. At the

moment of its greatest electoral success, when it gained 34.4 percent in vote, the

PCI was weaker than

it

seemed and the

DC stronger.

the

1

976

Enrico Berlinguer and the Historic Compromise

109

more concrete matter of voters and members, we discover PCI spokesmen liked to point to an unbroken increase in votes from the Liberation on but this is misleading. Between the Constituent Assembly elections of June 1946 and the 1968 elections the PCI went from If we turn to the

similar weaknesses.

18.9 percent to 26.9 percent, which amounts to 8 percent in 22 years. Between 1972 and 1976 the party's share jumped over 7 percent, from 27.2 percent to

34.4 percent; previously

its

largest gain

had been 2.6 percent, between 1958

and 1963. A 7 percent increase was abnormal. Nor was the earlier electoral progress unmitigated by

failure. In a

party

membership was seen as a that took such pride in being a mass party the with defeat. In 1947 at its highest point the PCI had 2,252,446 members, but there In in. 1948 set decline the departure from government and the Cold War, were 2,1 15,232 members and by 1955 there were 2,090,006. The Khrushchev fall

in

and the invasion of Hungary reduced the army to below 2 million. Then the slide continued. It was briefly halted in 1964 but then began again despite the revival of worker militancy. In 1968 there were 1,495,662 members. Giovani Comunisti Still more worrying was the slump of the Federazione dei revelations

Italiani

(FGCI).

Its

membership

in

1968 was

less

than half of what

it

had been

in 1948.20

The PCI's achievement was Western Europe and

to have survived as a

Communist

party in

to have rooted itself in such organizations as the unions

and the cooperatives. By 1970

it

—

Marche in the 1994 elections). mont, Lombardy, and Liguria

was the

won by

Tuscany, and Umbria (regions

In the

—

it

largest party in Emilia- Romagna,

the Progressisti

most advanced

was the second

— along

with the

industrial areas

party, as

northeast where the Catholic influence was stronger and the

it

DCs

—

was

Pied-

in

the

lead greater.

its Gramscian strategy of bringing together Northern the PCI lagged. Even the electoral growth was peasants, Southern workers and largely at the expense of the Socialists and the high come had unsatisfactory. It

In the South, despite

pay came in the form of Bettino Craxi. The new recruits were predominantly working-class voters drawn from the subculture of the Left.2' The PCI was not yet able to draw many Center-Right or Catholic price the

votes.

PCI would

later

So there was no inexorable movement toward hegemony. So the 1970s mark a break in the party's history. There was no inexorable

Hegelian progression but rather an opportunity furnished by the wave of protest in Italian society. Yet despite the oil crisis, there was nothing in the voting patterns or in the general behavior of the Italian people to indicate that they had despaired

of capitalism,

much

less

that they discerned

"remained a small minority" and coUectivist

way of life and

direct

their ideals

any

alternative.

The

revolutionaries

of "social and economic equality, a

democracy" were

antithetical to the

fundamental

no

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

desire of its

modern

Italians,

which was and

is

unable to help them in

was a defensive

it

As such

it

that the

offered reform without risk. In this

it

met with electoral success.

In the divorce referendum Berlinguer to avoid

left

modernization .^'^ The PCI was attracting support from people who

less religious

the

However

was not for any kind of Commu-

Pasolini was right in arguing that the victory

sought

he was

it,

surprised at his margin of victory: 59.26 percent to 40.74 percent.

for

DC was

strategy.

was too prudent and, having done everything possible

nism but

improve

they looked toward the PCI. Initially the

this task so

compromise was appealing because

historic

sense too

for "each nuclear family to

Many people were becoming convinced

standard of living."^^

PCI

authority over

civil society.

most of

the largest party in

as

Next the

local elections

big cities

Italy's

of 1975

—Rome, Milan,

Turin, Florence, Venice, and Naples. Here the Communists were rewarded

as

the party of honest, efficient administration.

A

discrepancy was arising between what the PCI was and

Twelve years

attracting people.

"had taken on the burden, among

had never existed

liberal party that

were not voting reforms.

It

its

many

in Italy.

for working-class

why

it

was

Calvino had written that the PCI

earlier Italo

other burdens, of being the ideal

He was

"^"^

hegemony

prophetic because people

or for austerity, but rather for

seems impossible that they were not voting

for the Historic

promise that had become the PCI's banner; but they perceived

Rodanian fusing of the Catholic and Communist

it less

Comas

the

traditions than as a cautious

brand of reformism. This would explain the PCI's success votes, of which parties,

and

1

1

.

5 million

were new voters,

in 1

1976 when

million

million from the Center- Right. ^''

it

gained 3.5 million

came from other left-wing

Many

of these were probably

working-class Catholics, a natural target of the historic compromise. But a its new who were "more critical, more voluble and more unstable. "^^ Once reforms did not come they would be more likely to desert. Moreover the

further discrepancy arose between the PCI's old electorate and

supporters the

speed with which

this

happened reinforces the view

support in the mid-1970s was

The same is

true of membership. Immediately after

and 1969 saw an the party had

increase of

grown

around

to 1,584,659,

a

set in again

and by 1979 there were only 1,761,297.

in

to

in

968 growth was slow

rise.

After 1972

1976 there were 1,814,317 members. But then decline

number of new members. members, whereas

1

foreshadowing the electoral

faster

and

PCI

thousand members. However by 1972

growth was

from 1972

that the increase in

fragile.

In

Still

more

revealing was the

1977 the PCI attracted fewer than 100,000 new

1976 the

figure

had been 174,473. In retrospect the years

1976 represent an exceptional period

in the party's history.

Enrico Berlinguer and the Historic Compromise

111

The first to depart were the young. In 1976 the party gained 38 percent of the new voters. They wanted change because unemployment in the age group 16-25 was running at 14.4 percent. However the most radical of the young came together in the 1977 Movement, whose protest was directed primarily against the PCI. In February Lama was driven out of Rome University, while in an in September the movement took over Bologna. The PCI found itself impossible position. Although the movement was too extremist and too prone to violence to represent a valid political option,

—

its

culture "of our

own

of forcing shops to reduce their prices and of creating "free spaces" struck a chord among young people.^^ At the very least it inside capitalism

needs"

—

was more appealing than cooperation with the DC. In 1979 the PCI won less than 33 percent of the new voters, and the problem grew worse in the 1980s.

The PCI's

success also disintegrated rapidly in the South.

It

had won 23.7

percent of the southern vote in 1972, 26.6 percent in the local elections of 1975, and 31.4 percent in 1976. But the Communists could offer nothing to replace

DC ciientelism

and

in

whole: 7.4 percent in

1979 their losses were higher than in the country as a Campania, 6.3 percent in Calabria, and 6.4 percent in

compared with 4 percent nationally.^^ These two examples indicate the difficulties

Sicily,

that the

hardly be expected to find instant remedies for youth

PCI faced. It could unemployment or

two of the sources of discontent that accounted for its success in 1976. Moreover Berlinguer's prudence was justified MSI because the DC vote held at 38.7 percent. It gained votes from the Right confirmed This Communism. and PLI in its role as a bulwark against

southern backwardness.

Still

these were

—

—

Berlinguer in his view that only the Catholics could confer legitimacy.

country was saying that

did not want the

it

PCI

as

an alternative to the

The DC,

DC. It probably wanted Calvino's ideal liberal party that it could not have. The postwar political system was showing that it could not reform itself. Next we shall see that it could not reform

but

it

was

also saying that

it

did not want the

society either.

FROM 1976 TO 1979: WAGE RESTRAINT AND DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC Berlinguer's decision to offer negative support to the post-election

by not voting against

it

was an attempt

toward and cooperation with the Andreotti, the

DCs most

to strike a balance

government

between antagonism

DC. The government was headed by

brilliantly

Giulio

devious representative, the incarnation of

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

112

the postwar order. Berlinguer's conversations with Andreotti were deliberately

The reality of the historic compromise lay in the detailed discussions that took place among the government, the employers, the PCI, and the unions.

vague.

Two

aspects are crucial: the trade deficit caused

by the

oil price increase for

which the solution was deflation, and high wage costs in a rigid labor market.^'' As the wage indexation agreement of 1975 had shown, there was a narrow strip of common ground between the employers least

temporarily

—

who were willing

to recognize

—

at

the fact of union power, and the union leaders,

who were

who were

regaining

concerned about investment and unemployment and control over the shopfloor militants.

The framework was

set

Andreotti government in the rates

went from 12 percent

by

a series

of austerity measures, imposed by the

autumn of 1976 and backed by to

the PCI. Interest

15 percent, tighter limits were placed on the

acquisition of foreign currency, prices of government-controlled items such as

tobacco, petrol, telephone services, and electricity were increased and modifications were

made

in the

wage-indexation system.

was "a success that has few precedents

in

The

result

Domestic demand was reduced by around 3 percent of

policy."^'

mid- 1977 the balance of payments was

in

investment boom.

wage

The

economic

GNP; by

the black, by mid- 1979 the foreign

debts accumulated between 1973 and 1976 were paid

On

of these measures

the history of Italian

and there was an

off,

"Austrian" solution was working.

costs the three-year contracts

had already been signed

at the

national level so the government and employers wanted measures to improve labor productivity and moderation in

On

December

9,

company and

plant level bargaining.

1977, a law amended the wage indexation system for

workers earning more than 8 and 6 million

lira:

their cost

of living increases

976 to April 1 978 were to be paid wholly or partly in the form of treasury bonds to be redeemed in five years. On January 26, 1977, the unions agreed to exclude cost of living increases from retirement for the period

September

1

bonuses. Further agreements were signed on flexibility that permitted increased shift

work, greater use of overtime, and greater internal mobility. In February,

one month

after Berlinguer set

asked for further union

out the philosophy of austerity, the government

sacrifices.

To

help employers,

security costs were to be paid out of general taxation

by an increase

in

VAT, which was not

and

some of

this

their social

was to be financed

to affect the cost of living increases.

This proposal, which had the backing of the International Monetary

Fund, outraged the shopfloor militants and embarrassed the union was

also a case in

legitimacy,

which the PCI, obsessed with the quest

leaders. It

for international

found itself caught between its base and the IMF, the symbol of Western

Enrico Berlinguer and the Historic Compromise

economic orthodoxy.

A

compromise was reached

so that the

113

VAT

were included in the cost of living calculations, but other items such as

increases electricity

were not.

tariffs

After these measures the union leaders kept trying to moderate the salary

demands

at

from 1976

company and to

1979

comparison with lost

by

strikes

million in

1 1

.4

met with

plant levels and

1976

in

1977 from

in

1.4

million

reasonable to suppose that the unions' choice of defending

it is

beyond the rearguard action and the

1977 and 71

to 15 million in

1978. Although unemployment went up

jobs through salary moderation prevented a greater increase.

recession,

the years

percent annually for the previous three years. Man-hours

dropped from 177 million

to 1.9 million,

During

success.

wages increased by only 2.6 percent annually in

real

parallels

None of this went

Democrats put up

that Social

in periods of

with the British Labour Party's social contract are

The difference was that the Communists were fighting on two other The political struggle to get into government took a new turn as the

obvious. fronts.

PCI, mindful of the services

was running with in

its

own

it

was rendering

constituency,

Italian capitalism

demanded

and the

greater power.

It

risks

it

succeeded

June 1977 in obtaining a formula of "policy agreements" where the party

secretaries

and

met with the government

their advisors

The second

a degree of governmental control into the

on

economic and

these projects are mostly negative: a typical

"massive, confused

by

legislative delays

leader of the

to establish policy.

front was a series of legislative projects designed to introduce

and

ineffective."^"

social area.

comment

is

Judgments

that they

were

Moreover they were frequently voided

and bureaucratic shortcomings. Fernando Di Giulio, the

Communist group

in

the House, concluded that "the state

apparatus was quite unable to carry out any serious acts of reform quickly.

This was the intentional result of Christian Democrat should only

now

discover

it

De

seems naive.

munists "having been for too

many years

rule.

That the PCI

Giulio concludes that the

Com-

outside the area of government, were

not able fully to appreciate the damage that had been done to the structure. "^'^ Their long (self-) exclusion

taken

from the workings of the

had

1976 to 1979 is unimpressive. on regional government fixed the

that the legislative record of the years

A

abortion law was passed.

transference of financial resources

decree

from the

state to local authorities,

did not give to the regions the power of taxation.

and

state

state

its toll.

Not

An

"^^

transfer land to the farmers

working

it

even

if

it

A law to limit sharecropping

was delayed; but

this

went through

in 1982.

Most disappointing was which was the

closest the

the law

PCI came

on

industrial reconversion

to giving the state a

new

(Law 675),

role in planning.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

114

by sector, and

to avoid being

stranded with lame ducks and economic fictions. Unsurprisingly,

DC ministers

It

was designed

managed

governments

to allow

Law

to circumvent

675.

to reorganize

The

state bourgeoisie survived the historic

compromise unscathed.

A batch and

rents

of laws dealing with

planning, construction of homes,

territorial

was similarly thwarted. The law that regulated construction was struck rent control was

homes failed to bound to create shortages,

especially because landlords in big cities preferred to

keep their apartments off

down by meet

the Constitutional

its targets.

Court and the plan

Without new homes

for building

the market.

PCI proposals for health reform foundered on poor state structures. An innovative plan to move mental patients out of institutions and help them live in the general community failed, because the systems for help were inadequate and the patients were thrown back on overburdened families. The December a unified health service run

1978 law creating sanitaria locale

Mostly

trators.

(USL) was bound

by

fall

local bodies called the

Unita

by the quality of its adminis-

The USLs became organs of

fell.

it

to stand or

clientelism

and helped

corrupt the PCI.^^

The

historic

compromise was doing

Democrats of doing.

Social

It

precisely

what the PCI had accused

had imposed wage

restraints,

while leaving

The PCI ran into the difficulties with which was familiar. The autumn of 1977 saw a series of

existing social structures intact.

the British Labour Party

demonstrations and strikes that the party tried to orchestrate in support of its policies

of increased investment, but which

sions of impatience with austerity.

for a

ignore

its

metalworkers so

EUR congress on

wage

triumph

it

pressed ahead.

Lama and

It

called

resigned.

February 13 the union leaders reiterated their support

restraint in return for for

the

2.

government of National Solidarity and on January 16 Andreotti

At the for

feared because they were expres-

Rome on December

metalworkers marched through

The PCI could not

it

The climax was reached when

investment to create jobs.

for the policy of bargaining, but

it

EUR was a symbolic marked an end

rather

than a beginning. In 1978 wage restraint was falling apart and along with it the historic compromise. High inflation, which came down only as far as 1 2 percent at the

made it difficult for the union leaders to control the October came the strike of nurses and hospital workers. When

end of the

shopstewards. In

year,

the issue of entry into the

the

PCI

feared

it

European Monetary System was posed

would mean

in

November,

further deflation, while the employers, worried

at losing the weapon of devaluation, wanted greater freedom to lay workers off. The common ground between unions and management was shrinking and the

PCI had exhausted

its

role as broker.

Enrico Berlinguer and the Historic Compromise

In

March

the

13

1

compromise between Communists and Catholics reached

peak when the PCI moved into the governmental coalition although not

its

into the government. As

Andreotti submitted a

whom

some of

if

list

to demonstrate that the

of ministers

—Antonio

Bisaglia

who were

all

DC

had the upper hand,

Christian Democrats and

and Carlo Donat Cattin

—were

fervent

opponents of collaboration with the PCI. Whether or not the PCI would have endorsed such a government became irrelevant when, on March 16, the day of

Red Brigades kidnapped Moro.

the confidence vote, the occasionally reluctant

Now the

impossible to fault Berlinguer's decision to throw the

It is

against terrorism and

front line

PCI and

the

DC joined together to defend the Italian state. to

PCI

into the

oppose negotiations with the Red Brigades.

This represented the best aspect of the Gramscian tradition, and in the long run it

helped save the PCI from the fate that

demonstrated the party's sense of the

befell so state.

many Communist

But

parties. It

term

in the short

it

was

damaging.

During the months of the kidnapping the PCI suspended the

DC

issues in order to organize

and neglected other

criticism

all

of

an endless round of

meetings denouncing the Red Brigades. Here again the fear of illegitimacy was lurking: a terrorists,

Communist Party could not run the risk of being soft on left-wing who also called themselves Communists. The Red Brigades traced back

their actions

to the

same partisan struggle

that

was a source of PCI

legitimacy.^^

However, Turin workers could not understand why the kidnapping should be kept separate from the 30 years of

of the

issue

Moro

DC misrule that had

helped create an environment in which terrorism could flourish. ^^ Leonardo Sciascia's

argument that the PCI was defending the

some young

people,

who

state "as

helped the Radical Party to

percent in the 1979 election.

The PCI

its

it

was, "^^ convinced

relatively

did not succeed in balancing

toward the Red Brigades with a concern for individual freedom.

was

correct, perhaps

Sciascia

all

was wrong in prophesying that the Moro

to point out the

Red

The

reaction

affair

would strengthen

DC hid behind PCI firmness while not forgetting

Brigades' links with

Communist

tradition.

There was no

reward for the Communists. In partial local elections of May 14 they

slipped from 35.5 percent in 1976 to 26.4 percent, whereas the

from 39

firmness

Its

^^ too correct.

the historic compromise.

electoral

high 3.5

its

percent to 42.6 percent.

DC climbed

In January 1979 Berlinguer called the

two-and-a-half year experiment to a close.

During the services. It

historic

compromise the PCI rendered

helped defeat the terrorist onslaught and

shape than

it

found

it.

The PCI

it left

the

failed in the task that

it

Italy

two major

economy in better undertook, again

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

116

without admitting

saw the

it,

of bringing Social Democracy to

of Social Democracy, and

crisis

it

is

departed mere months before Thatcher arrived. is

that the

PCI

failed to

events of 1968."^°

It

and hence unable

to

guide the reformist

Italy.

The

no coincidence

late

A specifically Italian

movement

that

1970s

that the

grew out of the

remained a Communist Parry, unwilling to change change the

political

system or society.

PCI

criticism

itself

The problems of the

DC negotiated with the Red Brigades to get Ciro autumn 1980 Romiti went into batde with the unions and crushed them. Berlinguerian austerity gave way to the irresponsibility of steadily rising deficits. Systemic clientelism entered its most exuberant phase. state

remained. In 1981 the

Cirillo released. In

NO The

historic

BRIDGE-BUILDERS REQUIRED

compromise

constraints within

affords an opportunity to study the international

which the postwar order operated. The 1975 Congress

leaving

would impede the

process

could be expected to gladden the hearts of

acknowledge any Soviet posing

it,

harmful and

as

threat. It as

set

would remain in NATO because of detente and divide Italy. Neither reason

out the PCI's view of East- West relations.

It

NATO supporters. The PCI did not

considered "anti-sovietism, whoever

is

pro-

an obstacle to the general struggle against imperial-

ism and reaction. "^^

Of course the matter was not so simple. The PCI had sought an increasing USSR ever since Togliatti's return in 1944. However

independence from the it

had never envisaged, and

memorandum and evolution, but

its

it

did not

condemnation of the Czech invasion did not imply a

condemnation of the Soviet system

and the

Italian

now envisage, a complete break. The Yalta

the invasion of Czechoslovakia were landmarks in the PCI's

whole. So during the 1970s

as a

Communists engaged

Moscow

in "mutual, if reluctant attempts at

forbearance.'"^^

Nor was past.

this

merely Berlinguer's reluctance to break with the Togliattian

At the 1975 Congress Berlinguer

political institutions

stated that, while Eastern Europe's

were not those that the PCI envisioned

for Italy,

economies had survived the early 1970s better because they were planned.

added

that,

its

He

whereas the West had lapsed into "corruption and fragmentation,"

Eastern Europe possessed "a moral climate that was superior."'*^

Behind these statements

PCI

lay the uncertainty that

political culture. Berlinguer stated that the

traditions to

which we intend

to

remain

pervaded other aspects of

PCI had

faithfiil.'"^'^

"solid international

But what were they?

A

Enrico Berlinguer and the Historic Compromise

Rinascita article tried unsuccessfully to spell

not be forgotten but the

them

out: the

Czech invasion must

USSR is now changing and moving toward detente;

PCI looks toward the non-Communist Western European of the

Anyway,

Italian Socialists.

also the liberation

117

movements

Left,

but

Two

Third World.

in the

critical

it is

must not be Eurocentric, because

it

the

there are

themes emerge from

this

confusion: the trust the party placed in detente and the growing attention for

the

non-Communist world. Each

reflected the PCI's desire to bridge the

between East and West, without, however, abandoning the

As a

much

was

it

drew

closer to

government the PCI

gap

East.

tilted ever further

westward. In

publicized interview of June 15, 1976, Berlinguer stated that

NATO

Compromise from ending up

like the

a shield that protected the Historic

Prague Spring

—

"I feel safer

Communist

the Soviet

on

Party's

this side.'"*^ Surely this

XXV

was anti-Sovietism? At

Congress of February 1976 Berlinguer

affirmed that the Italian brand of Socialism was based on an expansion of previous democratic conquests

— no

longer dismissed as formal or bourgeois

November 1977 he went

and would take place

in a pluralist system. In

when,

anniversary of the Russian Revolution, he declared that

at the sixtieth

democracy was

a "historically universal" value, thus

of the Soviet brand of Socialism. The equal;

it

was

Italian

undermining the

further

validity

brand was no longer separate and

superior."*^

To what

extent Berlinguer had the party behind

him

is

has been estimated that the base was generally anti-U.S. and

hard to

assess. It

anti-NATO and

that it was divided about the USSR, with as many as 25 to 30 percent of the members opposing Berlinguer's clear break with Moscow in December 1981.'^^ This would explain why Berlinguer, obliged between 1976 and 1979 to impose

domestic policies that displeased the base, took care periodically to praise the Soviet Union. His speech defending the Russian Revolution, delivered appropriately at the Festa de

The PCI made ting that Russian that Lenin

1'

Unita in September 1978, was one example.'^'

increasingly desperate attempts to resurrect Lenin.

Marxism was

must be

"a closed

reread critically.^°

Admit-

body of doctrine," Berlinguer argued

But what did

this

mean? Well, the Lenin

of left-wing infantilism could be invoked against the 1977 Movement, or the

Lenin of Brest-Litovsk could

justify

compromises with one's opponents. In

return the Lenin of the one-party state could be forgotten.

How heresies but

did the Soviets perceive the Italian comrades?

admired PCI success. The PCI was becoming

opposition party, but Alternatively

it

it

They

less

disliked

might become an anti-Washington government

has been suggested that the

PCI

of a pro-Moscow, party.

Red Brigades received help from

Eastern Europe because their terrorism embarrassed the PCI.^' In retrospect is

clear that the

PCI was engaged

in a

long slow

movement out of

it

the Soviet

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

118

As long

orbit.

The

detente lasted forbearance could continue.

as

invasion of

Afghanistan and the imposition of military rule in Poland would lead to a clear

But

break.

1970s the PCI wanted

in the late

thus wanted It also

wanted

to be tolerated

The PCI needed

lost.

remain a Communist party and

by the United

who won

period the United States could not control

who

to

the Soviet connection.

During the postwar

States.

in Italy but

government. As already stated, Kissinger and Berlinguer were

could control

it

remove the American veto on

to

entry into

its

in partial

agreement

about the economic problems of the 1970s. They stemmed from a capitalism that

might create

envisaged chaos in

Italy,

and an end

Soviet aid,

a shift to the Left

Communists

the

to Italian

in other countries like France,

forcing their

democracy. In turn

this

way into power,

where conventional wisdom held

States

would

Moreover Kissinger was under pressure policy of detente

seemed

to be

working

agreement supposedly gave them accords provided

them with

that the

dominant world power. This helped

power and

viewed the rising

was

right.

flight

while the Helsinki

Weakened at home by WatergUnited States no longer appeared

trigger the current of U.S. neoconserva-

New

Right disliked Kissinger's acceptance of the fact of

of the division of the world into blocs. Small

wonder

that

it

Communist

a proof that

it

But even without

influence in

Western Europe

this pressure Kissinger

his

would

as

have been intransigent

view of the world

supposed that the Soviets should have no influence

nists

in the

as

two blocs pre-

Western

bloc.

Kissinger the PCI's professions of pluralism were a fiction.

might make

his

The SALT

as a traitor.

toward Eurocommunism, because

To

United States because

in favor of the Soviets.

from Saigon, the

and abroad by the

Soviet

retreat into isolation.

in the

a military advantage,

the

In particular the

Com-

The EC

political legitimacy.

ate

tism that viewed Kissinger

of

offers

would have repercussions

munists would prove the dominant partner in the Union of the Left.

would be weakened and the United

of

crisis

throughout Europe. Kissinger

a pretense of democracy or they

Commu-

might be sincerely democratic,

but once they attained power, they would follow the logic of

Communism

in

PCI mask for

terminating pluralism and bidding for absolute control. ^^ This view of the

seems doubly wrong. traditional

First,

Communism,

in the Italy

because the PCI's worldview was not a

but rather the form that

refusing to admit that a party with

with

Communism

had assumed

of the 1970s. Second, Kissinger overestimated the PCI's strength,

34 percent of the vote

in a

country teaming

NATO soldiers would simply be unable to take over the government. The

is that, to Kissinger, the PCI was a pawn in the game he was conducting with the Soviets and the American neoconservatives. Any victory for the PCI could be used against him.

probable reason for this error

larger chess

Enrico Berlinguer and the Historic Compromise After the June 1976 elections the United States and

immediately. At a Group of Seven meeting in Puerto Rico if Communists

Jim Callaghan, supported it

its

allies

moved

was decided that

entered the government, Italy would be isolated and there would

be no more international loans.

make

it

119

The

this stand.

Helmut Schmidt and

Social Democrats,

Indeed Schmidt took the decision to

^'*

public.

The

arrival

of the Carter administration

1976 seemed

in

announce

to

a

change of policy. During the campaign Jimmy Carter had attacked Gerald Ford

Zbigniew Brzezinski

for excessive interference in the affairs of allies, while

substituted the notion of the polycentric world for Kissinger's

might mean or that in the

it

that the

United States would cease to make

would consider the economic

government

in return for

wage

Either of these developments

change

in U.S. foreign

issues

—

—

his belief in

lent itself to

would have represented an enormous place.

Although there were

— Cyrus Vance was

relatively

was

in

no sense left-wing and

his

Amer-

America's mission to bring democracy to the world

anti-Communism.^^

In 1977-78 the parallels with the postwar period were clear. States used

This

the Carter people endorsed the Kissinger line.

Carter's foreign policy, while erratic,

icanismo

blocs.

felt in Italy,

and accept a Communist presence

poHcy and neither took

and Brzezinski hard

two

views

restraint.

differences of opinion within the administration soft

its

and was used by the DC. Each time the United

The United

States

wanted

a

PCI in opposition, it obtained the second but not the first. The State Department pressed Andreotti to introduce reforms but, predictably, although he did precisely the opposite, he was applauded as a new De Gasperi when he visited Washington in July 1977, because he was keeping the PCI outside the government. ^^ Christian Democrats encouraged Washington to make its views known and then used those views as a reason for not admitting PCI ministers. Ambassador Richard Gardner complied by reiterating traditional U.S. policy: "we do not want Communist Parties to be influential reformist government and the

or dominating in Western European governments."^^ In his in

memoirs Brzezinski claims

ending the

historic

success stories of the Carter years. "^^

statement

is

that the

no sense can the

that U.S. efforts

compromise and

a

dragon that

Its

used such influence as

spokesmen sped

to leave

it

had

itself

invented. In

years.

possessed to project a moderate image.

across the Atlantic bearing brand

power if defeated

it

an example of how the United States hurled

back the Brezhnev onslaught of the post-detente

The PCI

were a "distinct help"

was "one of the less-known

The only criticism one might make of this

United States slew

Italian case serve as

that this

in an election.

new visas and promising

But anti-Communism was

a necessary

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

120

part of

American

and the United

political culture

which was quite separate from

Beriinguer's.

States

The only

its PCI made of

had invented

criticism to be

the PCI is that if it had discarded its obsolete cultural baggage it might have made Kissinger and Brzezinski work harder. The veto remained. The PCI wanted to build bridges between East and West but world time was working against the historic compromise. Detente was giving way to the last phase of the Cold War.

U.S. opposition was probably

Compromise than recovered

its

the

its

determination to remain a

knowing why. During the Its its

it

important

in the failure

of the Historic

old role as a bulwark against the Eastern hordes, while the latter

paid the price for

of where

less

DC opposition or the PCI's own weaknesses. The former

years

1976

to

Communist party without really

1979 the PCI almost

"any sense

lost

stood in society."^'

decline dates from 1979.

It

never again came close to power and by 1987

share of the vote had fallen to 26.6 percent.

benefit in the long run

they declined too.

The

from

their victory.

The

Christian Democrats did not

As Communist influence diminished,

antagonists had fought each other to a standstill

could not resume their

afterward.

tacit alliance

The

and they

compromise

historic

is

significant because the attempt to reform the political system left the system

bankrupt. In turn

this

accounts for the fascination of Beriinguer's

last years.

BERLINGUER FROM 1979 TO THE TWILIGHT OF THE PCI

1984:

Beriinguer's position as secretary was not seriously threatened

the historic compromise. Indeed he was allowed to as the

December 1981 break with

and the choice of the

alternative

the Soviet

Occhetto transform the PCI into the

The

party's verdict

which looked

on

Union,

government

PDS

in

is

compromise, was too extreme.

September 1980, which offered PCI support

sigent in

This stand

in isolation.

November 1980 helped unfavorable. ""^

The

Right,

Critics cited his speech at the Mirafiori to the Fiat

workers

if they

unions decided to occupy the factory. BerHnguer was equally intran-

opposing the modification of the wage indexation system

stand that led to the PCI's defeat in the referendum of 1985. disliked the Italy

of

to Giorgio Napolitano, felt that Berlinguer, reacting against the

historic

their

failure

decisions, such

between 1989 and 1991.

Beriinguer's last years

gates in

and

by the

make major

theme of Communist

"difference,"

which

in 1984, a

The same

critics

isolated the party. In an

where terrorism was being beaten back, where

a recovery

from the

Enrico Berlinguer and the Historic Compromise

121

economic traumas of the 1970s was underway, and where the working class was decHning

in

numbers and

power, Berlinguer stranded the party in the

in

sterile

purity of opposition, while Craxi's PSI was growing in importance.^'

One reason for discussing Berlinguer's last years is precisely his awareness that Communism in Italy, though masked by victories like the overthrow of the Cossiga government in 1980 and the 29.9 percent vote won in the 1983 elections, was approaching a

crisis.

Berlinguer watched the

rise

of

which he saw an exasperation of the individualism he had felt that Craxi was turning the PSI into the bulwark of a new

neoliberalism, in

denounced.

He

no solutions. So Berlinguer made a desperate Communism. He emphasized the old distinction between Social Democrats who accepted capitalism and Communists who fought to transcend it. Now, however, he transformed this difference into a Right. Eastern Europe provided

attempt to redefine

moral stance:

Italian

of the values of consumer capitalism. This reaffirma-

a refusal

tion of Communism as self-sacrifice

must be seen

creed by invoking the energies of its youth. in prison for his beliefs

how

absurd

it

seemed

The

haunted Berlinguer.

to

as a

ideal

It is all

bid to revitalize a dying

of a Gramsci

who

died

too easy to understand

Emilia-Romagna Communists who had made

their

party strong by creating wealth and a stable government. Berlinguer re-

mained "faithful to a teleological dynamism, lived on."^^

project which, although

had

it

lost its

Yet while draped in cultural pessimism and unable to find a coherent political outlet, the discourse

of

Communist

problems: the occupation of the state by the

difference pointed to Italy's real parties,

systemic clientelism, and

the growing alienation of the citizens. Until 1979 Berlinguer had believed in the Toghatti-De Gasperi vision of the Republic, where the major parties especially the

DC

and the PCI

—would spread democracy by involving

the

masses in government. Belatedly realizing that the postwar settlement had

turned into systemic clientelism, Berlinguer abandoned

this vision.

His concept of difference was yet another service to

Occhetto could invoke lay in

its

it

sparse political content. Berlinguer

up the

belief in a

"good"

could not help to reform the (although

up the

this

issue

although he did

He

failed to

know

form an

in

power.

He

placed too

because

weakness

alternative

He

did not

that the existing alliance

probably would have been impossible anyhow).

much hope

He in

DC

with the PSI did not take

new forms of

women's movement.

Yet Berlinguer's

was

state.

of electoral reform.

protest like the

that he

DC,

Its

knew that it involved an

government but he did not envision alternation of parties give

his party

during the Clean Hands investigation.

last

intuitions were correct.

living in the twilight

He

realized

— unhappily

of the PCI and he knew that the postwar order

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

122

was breaking down. In 1980 he stated that "today the moral question has

become the most important national bourgeoisie, there was a sense of

Even as

in the

issue. "''^

what the

In his attacks

Italian state

1970s he had tried to ensure that the

on the

state

might and should

men nominated by

be.

PCI

the

heads of banks were chosen for their ability rather than for their party

affiliation.*^

Spurred by the revelation of the P2 lodge and the Calvi

1981, Berlinguer uttered a cry of protest: "the parties have occupied

affair in .

.

.

the

structures of local government, the welfare agencies, the banks, the nationalized industries, cultural institutions

the outcry of 1992.

and

hospitals."*'^

His words almost foreshadow

7

From Craxi

the Exacter

to Bossi the Spoilsport

If

the

and

DC

received

most severe punishment from the electorate

its

if Berlinguer's sense of

Communist

difference

lectual upsurge, then essentially the Republic is left

why

with the problems of explaining

elections of

1992 and how and why

world time:

Italy

East-West

split

it

came

could not change until the

had run

was the PCI's its

course by 1979.

the crisis did not

lies

in the

domestic

come

One

until the

One obvious answer lies in Cold War ended even though the then.

only conditioned but did not determine the

Another reason

in 1983, last intel-

political

Italian situation.

developments.

The PSI

first

gave the postwar settlement a reprieve by promising to modernize Italy and then

undermined Craxi's

the clientelistic order

Milan

—stepped

votes, threatening

solve the

its

the Lega,

political

its

greed. Into the opening

role as the linchpin

—

literally into

DCs Northern

of the postwar order, but proposed to

by terminating it. developments are inseparable from economic and

problem of the

These

by

which not only took away the

Italian state

social

companies of thejv4ilan hinterland, the kind of companies that had dragged Italy through the 1970s, but which

trends: the Lega gave voice to the small

were underrepresented the

first

politically.'

This chapter

is

divided into three parts,

dealing with the PSI, the second with the Lega, and the third with

the years before 1992.

economic and to manage.

Running through each

social processes that the political

section

is

an analysis of

system finally proved unable

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

124

BETTING CRAXI: THE SYSTEM DEVOURS ITSELF In the 1994 elections the PSI simply disappeared. Ottaviano Del Turco, recently installed leader,

won

a seat in

mere 2.2 percent of the vote and above which a party was

A

segment.

run

at

minimum,

— Giorgio Ruffolo with —while ex-Prime Minister Giuliano Amato did not Lombardy the PSI won only

1.5 percent.

Deprived

parliamentary immunity, ex-leaders like Claudio Martelli had their

passports taken

away and

are awaiting

country house in Tunisia.

to his

so failed to reach the 4 percent

few ex-leaders ran in other formations

In Bettino Craxi's

all.

their

its

his party gained a

eligible for seats in the proportional representation

Alleanza democratica (AD)

of

Emilia-Romagna, but

Socialists,

and have

Craxi has not waited, but has fled

trial.

The Clean Hands

who had accumulated power now gone down with it.

investigation decimated the

during the

last years

of the old regime

In 1972, roughly a decade after the Center-Left governments began, the

PSI polled

at

9.6 percent. In 1976, despite the surge of the Left,

The

9.6 percent.

reforms and for

had not forgiven

electorate

its

emulation of

it

DC clientelism.

for

the

in

cooperation with the PCI.

subordination to the relations

DC,

The two belonged autonomy and Signorile

agreed that the PSI had been punished for

but, whereas Signorile

at

implement

Signorile.

PSI, Craxi stressing

They

remained

it

failure to

In a generational coup Craxi

became party secretary with the support of Claudio to different currents

its

saw the solution

in

its

improved

with the Communists, Craxi believed that greater self-assertion would

new support. The two views were compatible as long as the PCI privileged relationship with the DC, but after the end of the historic

bring the party

sought a

compromise Craxi and Signorile clashed and Craxi won

Much ship, but

out.

attention has been paid to Craxi's personality

one wonders whether he deserves

the PSI from

1980

to

1992

like a

minor

it.^

and

style

of leader-

Blustering and bullying, he ran

Stalin, while

during

his four years as

Prime Minister he made ostentatiously bold decisions, some of which grate

when examined

strongman was the Crispi

closely. It

first

is

not incorrect to argue that

postwar politician to readopt a

and even of Mussolini. However, Craxi

aging regime rather than the birth of a

new

style

this

disinte-

would-be

reminiscent of

reflected the decadence of an

authoritarianism.

His strategy rested on the perpetuation of Communist illegitimacy.

Anti-Communism came the

who remembered from his youth Communists between 1948 and 1956. Moreover

naturally to Craxi,

Socialist subordination to the

PCI furnished him with

a pretext

by snubbing the PSI during the

compromise.^ Communist illegitimacy provided the PSI with

its

historic

goal of creat-

ing an autonomous left-wing party of government, while in the meantime

it

From Craxi justified coalitions

125

the Exacter to Bossi the Spoilsport

with the

DC. The

mistake of the Center-Left would be

However the corrected by tougher bargaining with the Christian Democrats. foreseeable the for place in remain would twin pillars of the postwar settlement future, even if they

were

less

massive. Craxi's gamble was that

PCI and

would emerge weakened from the historic party that space would open up for the more modern and pragmatic said he

A

would

DC

compromise— which they did — and that he

create but did not.

PCI. Sociological trends were indeed running for the PSI and against the in 1982 47.7 glance at the Communist Party in the Vcneto reveals that

members were workers, whereas in 1988 the number had dropped to 43.3 percent. Conversely the number of pensioners had increased by nearly the same amount 16.7 percent to 20.6 percent. The working class

percent of

its

—

were was growing older and with it the PCI. However the postwar barriers 22 breaking down: of the delegates to the Federation congresses of 1990 had percent Moreover 30 organizations. Catholic to belonged had percent been active in parish activities in their childhood and 40 percent had mothers

who were

practicing Catholics.^

Although these

figures

may

exaggerate the

are a degree of openness extended by the mass of Catholics to the PCI, they immediate the in than easily more change could loyalties sign that political

postwar years.

One

reason was that class divisions were

less

1960 the average

sharp. In

was twice as salary was three times the average wage. In 1970 the average salary Like other much. as times 1 only was .3 it 1983 by and much as the average wage

European

societies Italy

which an underclass

—

was turning into

1 1

out, while others were clustered together.

into consumers

changing It

roles

whose

tastes

of women

became

a constellation

of social groups, of

percent of the working population

The general

were similar

made

—was

clearly left

prosperity turned workers

to those of other

their political attitudes

more

consumers. The diverse.

a cliche to contrast the activism of the early 1970s with the

concentration on private

life

in the 1980s.

back. 5 But the 1970s had not really

Amoral familism was supposedly

marked

with the attempt by the

a break

1980s demonstrated no wish change was in to go back on social reforms like the right to divorce. The major class. the size and nature of the working class and of the urban middle

family to improve

its

economic

status, while the

Working-class growth had peaked in 1971 when the working population, 6 percent

more than

it

represented 47.1 percent of

in 1951.

decreased to 42.7 percent, which was another reason

could only increase. Meanwhile the urban middle

from 1951

to

1971—26.5 percent

1983 reached 46.4 percent.

An

to 38.5

But by 1983

why the

class,

it

had

PCI's difficulties

which had

also

grown

percent—went on growing and

intriguing statistic

is

in

that the category of

126

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

"artisans" declined

from 6 percent

1951

in

to 5.3 percent in 1971,

which was

predictable, but then rose to 5.8 percent in 1981. Since this category includes

owners of small businesses,

it is

probable that they grew by more than 0.5

percent, while conventional artisans continued to decline. Certainly the

number

of self-employed increased from 24 percent in 1980 to 29 percent in 1988.''

As

European countries, industry employed

in other

of the labor force. In 1971 the figure was

42

a smaller percentage

up 7 percent from 1951,

percent,

35 percent. Unlike other European countries, 40.3 percent of industrial workers were in plants with fewer than ten employees; the but in 1983

it

was back

at

corresponding figures for France and percent. Agriculture had long lost

its

Germany were 22.3

percent and 18.2

army, declining from 43 percent in 1951

18 percent in 1971 and 13 percent in 1981. But the service sector was

to

growing from 15 percent

The

in

1951 to 30 percent

in

1971 and 37 percent in 1983.

percentage of government employees rose with

from 7 percent

it

to 10

percent and then to 15 percent. If the

final

set

of figures hints

bureaucracy, the other

statistics

show

at

the lasting problem of the state

the transition to a society based less on

and labor. Moreover at precisely the moment when march of the 40,000 who protested against the 1980 strike appeared to mark the split between the white-collar and blue-collar workers at Fiat, that distinction was being eroded. Continuing a process that had been noted during the division between capital

the

Valletta's reign, the

upper

levels

of the industrial workers were turning into

technicians.

The development was not uniform,

for in the early

1

980s the robotization

of the workplace also de-skilled Fiat workers.^ But, as the Fordist

broke up, the

it

also lost

common

political

to attract other social groups.

To

working

class

oversimplify,

sense of society was represented by a better-educated group, less

influenced by the its

its

power

PCI

or by the Church, and less unionized,

more

flexible in

behavior, without any vision of an order outside Western capitalism,

but displeased with self-reliance

and

DC

rule.

Small business, with

distrust of the state

on which

it

its

particular culture of

nonetheless makes demands,

was especially important.

The weakened working

class faced

employers

who had

reacquired their

self-confidence after the defeat suffered by the PCI. Cesare Romiti's bold stand,

which all

rather frightened the coalition

Fiat suppliers.

ment regained

The worker

control of the shopfloor. Eventually this

1992 and 1993 wage agreements

marked that the

a reconciliation

CGIL

government, reshaped not

just Fiat

but

militancy of the 1970s disappeared and manage-

—

would

lead

—

to a tripartite consultation process,

between the working class and the

state, albeit

in the

which

on terms

of the 1950s or the 1970s would have judged unacceptable.

From Craxi The

the Exacter to Bossi the Spoilsport

127

old difference between North and South was blurred but unchanged

by the development of small industry in the Center. In the 1970s

private-sector

white-collar workers were 15.9 percent of the working population in the

northwest and 12.6 percent in the Center and northeast, but they were only 8.4 percent in the South.

The

figures for public-sector white-collar workers

were 7 percent, 8.1 percent, and 13 percent.' Whoever ruled

whether Christian Democrats,

Socialists or, as today, the

in the

South,

National Alliance, was

doomed to support a large role for the state. The postwar problem of finding a policy blend that suited North and South remained. The change was that a party that challenged the DC should be Center-Left and

Was

interclass.

Italo Calvino's ideal liberal party

about to

be called into existence by Craxi?

The answer was

no, but

we must

of his leadership, leaving the fourth for

briefly consider the first three periods

later.

The

the PSI wait, terrorized at the prospect of

weakened. Then

it

DC rank and

to negotiate.

file,

The

from 1976

and

Red

tried to split the

to 1979,

demise, until the

struck at Berlinguer's strategy. During the

the PSI called for concessions to the the

first,

its

Brigades, played

saw

PCI was

Moro kidnapping

on the emotions of

DC and the PCI, which had refused

contrast with Berlinguer's sense of the state was glaring.

Next PCI by publishing an essay of Proudhon and denounced the PCI's

Craxi, switching tactics, tried to delegitimize the

where he

set the

PSI in the tradition

Marxist heritage. '° This was one of many attacks on the Communists' collective

memory. Others would include onslaughts on Gramsci Togliatti's neglect sides

or, alternatively,

exposed the excessively subtle way that the PCI reconstructed

were accompanied by a celebration of the PSI's Socialists,

on

of the imprisoned Gramsci. Intellectually crude, these broad-

although in reality the party had

Labour Party or the French

ties

little

its

past.

They

with other western European in

common

with either the

Socialists.'

In the 1979 elections the PSI gained

some votes from

the

PCI

in the South.

This began a long march in the South that involved clientelism and organized crime. Overall the PSI increased

its

ties

with

vote by only 0.2 percent. Craxi's

conclusion was that the party must return to government, which would isolate the

Communists

the

DC congress of February 1980, he took advantage of the victory of the groups

that

To

in opposition

and allow the Socialists

opposed cooperation with the PCI and forced

his

to

undertake reform. After

way into

the government.

underline the difference with the Center-Left, he insisted on obtaining nine

ministries, including Finance, Public Sector,

To

and Defense.

appeal to the growing urban middle

stand on social issues such as abortion.

It

class,

the PSI took a libertarian

talked vaguely of electoral reform, but

feared a British or French voting system that

would

greatly reduce the

number

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

128

of

seats

it

president, It

held in parliament. Instead

it

called for the direct election of the

which suited Craxi's image but had no chance of being implemented.

succeeded, through individuals like Giorgio Ruffolo, in attracting intellectu-

als

who wanted

to

reform

Italy,

PSI was caught in a vicious

DC,

it

in the

dissipated

war

gave them scant power in the party.

it

this,

they refused to reward the PSI

DC.

needed to bring pressure on the

solution Craxi could devise was to

win the war

The BNL,

for spoils.

PSI wrestled for control of ENI, a larger chunk of state television, the

and

government

local

agencies. Inevitably scandals resulted.

The ENI-Petromin

bribery hit the press in September 1979, although Craxi manipulated

weapon

to defeat Signorile. In

May

included such well-known Socialists

1981 the published as

Enrico

Liguria, Alberto Teardo. In July the jailed

lavished

money on

the PSI,

The

own making. By governing with the The only way it could assert itself was

its

As the voters perceived

with the increased support

The only

it

of

reformist energies.

its

for spoils.

but

circle

list

Manca and

it

into a

of P2 members

the party chief in

Roberto Calvi claimed that he had

which prompted Craxi, who presumably feared

further revelations, to attack the magistrates for imprisoning Calvi. This sparked

war between the PSI and the magistrates, which contributed

the long

Clean Hands investigation. The public grew accustomed

Teardo and

carted off to prison.

Giuseppe

la

his associates

Ganga somehow avoided

fall

thinking that

of the

DC

.6

'^

percent in

1

983, despite

and the stagnation of the PCI. Craxi was right

many voters wanted change,

of modernity through

1

1983, while

jailed in

a similar fate in Turin.

Unsurprisingly the PSI vote went up by only the sharp

were

to the

to seeing Socialists

slick,

in

but the PSI offered only the trappings

expensive party congresses designed for

without reason Berlusconi was drawn to the

TV. Not

Socialists. Craxi's quest for

was rewarded when he took advantage of the

DCs

power

become Prime

defeat to

Minister.

To understand his economic policy we must review the events of previous years.

The ending of the temporary Austrian

compromise, and the second increase

solution, provided

in oil prices,

which

imports by 70 percent in 1980 and by 49 percent in 1981, billion trade deficit in

percent.'^

1980 and with an

historic

with a $20

was around 20

in full swing, led

and labor-shedding of big industry and by the export

small business.'^ In 1983 growth ran at 2.9 percent and level for

left Italy

inflation rate that

However by 1983 economic improvement was

the restructuring

by the

raised the cost of oil

the next two years.

By including

it

continued

the black or untaxed

flair

by of

at this

economy Craxi

could proudly announce in 1987 that Italy had overtaken Britain in per capita

GDP. He was also fortunate that he was in power when oil prices and the dollar dropped in 1986.

From Craxi

the Exact er to Bossi the Spoilsport

129

This was a boon to the anti-inflation struggle, in which Craxi played his part. In

1984 he cut back the mechanization of wage-indexation

with a decree that enhanced his image

He

Politically this

was genuinely bold, and Berlinguer, who was

the

CGIL

The

into a crusade of opposition.

to

of

majority of

went on long

after

which Craxi won by

Berlinguer's death and culminated in a 1985 referendum,

54 percent

mood

in his

Communist

battle

did so

bold decisions.

as a leader willing to take

hard-line opposition, helped Craxi by launching the

meet the

to

government's target of reducing inflation to 10 percent for the year.

46 percent.

This victory established Craxi

one of the two or three dominant

as

in Italian politics. His role in pressing for the Single

Europe Act

at the

figures

Milan

summit of 1 985, and the way he refused to hand over the Achille Lauro terrorists to the Americans, helped make him indispensable to the formation of a government.

If

he did not lead

it,

he had

at least to

bless

De

it.

Mita's

government of 1988-89 went unblessed and did not last. The wage indexation victory was won despite the PCI, and thus contributed to the Communists' decline to 26.6 percent in the 1987 elections.

The economic

effect

of the decree was

ment offered concessions such fell

to 10.6 percent in

1984 and

international factors, the

won by management Moreover

still

only because the govern-

prices

money much of a

tight

over labor played as

was

slight, if

down

below 10 percent

to

Bank of Italy's

Italian inflation

and Craxi was unable

as

holding

it

controlled. Inflation

in 1985.

policy,

Probably the

and the

role as the

running 4 percent above the

victories

government.

EC

average,

to gain a lasting disinflation, as Mitterrand did in France.

On another, even more vital issue Craxi made no impact. The government debt had grown rapidly, spurred by spending on social programs health care

—

could do nothing to halt

GDP, and was

percent of

By 1981

in the 1970s.

it.

When

lira.

he

left

at

55 percent of

power

in

1987

it

GDP

— such

as

and Craxi

had reached 92

Bank of

because of its obligation to maintain the value

The government turned

Tesoro (BOT), which drove

group that

stood

fueled by interest payments.'^ In 1981 the

Italy ceased financing the deficit

of the

it

to massive issues

interest rates

resisted attempts to tax the

of Buoni Ordinari del

up and created

a powerful pressure

bonds, thus increasing the debt.

So the rosy glow of prosperity that accompanied the

later years

of Craxi's

premiership and that suited the Socialists' image as modernizers was short-lived. It

faded

as

soon

as

the world

economy turned

sour in 1990.

Italy's

old strengths

—

and weaknesses remained. Her entrepreneurs were dynamic Berlusconi's TV empire was thriving and in 1986 he acquired AC Milan. However, industry

The big companies like Fiat expanded their financial operations, which made money and helped them avoid remained weak

in the areas

of high technology.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

130

high hiterest

rates.

But small firms were damaged by

interest rates,

and the

The

attempt to enlarge the stock market caused only brief worries for Cuccia.

bourgeoisie did well under Craxi, as the example of Berlusconi

state

demonstrates. left

To

say this

Visentini law,

not

The economic factors that contributed

to the

1

992 upheaval were

untouched.

all

—of

not in

is

not to

condemn

Craxi's prime ministership.

The 1984

pay more

—although

which forced shopkeepers and

their share

style, the

Craxi formed a

of taxes, was another achievement. In substance although

much

PSI governed

wary

artisans to

DC.

like the

was no coincidence that

It

alliance with his Foreign Minister, Andreotti. In the

elections the electorate rewarded the PSI, increasing

percent. This convinced Craxi that his

its

methods were

correct, but in fact his

attempt to dominate the political system was undermining ingly he had helped call

its

enemy

1987

share of the vote to 14.3

it,

since

unknow-

into being.

THE BARBARIANS MARCH ON ROME In the

1994 elections the Legawon 8.4 percent of the

vote,

which with the help

mosdy winner-take-all system turned into 122 seats in the House. Umberto Bossi's triumph was overshadowed by two problems. The first was

of the

that he

had been obliged

to

form an

which had

alliance with Forza Italia,

threatened to take over his policies and his supporters.

The

free

market, the

family business, the contempt for the old regime were Berlusconi's themes, and his ability to

frame them

in a language that

was populist but governmental rather

than populist and protesting, appealed to the Lega's more sophisticated supporters. Bossi's share of the vote

dropped by 2 percent

in

Milan

went down from 9.2 percent

The Lega

to 16 percent.

strongholds of Varese, Brescia, and Bergamo, but Pavia and

it

ran behind Berlusconi's

army

in the

it

in

1992 and

ran ahead of FI in

was overtaken

in

it

its

Como and

Veneto. Around 19 percent of

the Lega's 1992 voters deserted to Forza Italia."'

The second and become been the

all

way

A

overlapping difficulty was that the Lega would have to

a party of government, whereas

too successful: for the

new

it

was designed

it

had helped bring down

one, but

it

movement

There was

a small upsurge

Veneta gained over

in 1984,

modeled

its

of regionalism and

5 percent of the vote.

it

destructive power.

in part

had

the old regime and prepare

risked losing the political space

brief glance at Lega history reveals

regionalist

for opposition. It

had won. It

began

as a

on the Unione Valdotaine.

in the

1983 elections the Liga

While seeking the

special status

From Craxi awarded

to the

the Exacter to Bossi the Spoilsport

Val d'Aosta, Bossi tried to present Lombardy

The son of a poor

131

as a cultural unit.

family of farmers, he had seen his rural region transformed

by industry and he fought

for

its

traditions, especially

its

dialect.

However he

gained scant support. Lombardy was not Sardinia, voters did not care about the

and

dialect,

in

any case there was no overt

mood

of protest. Bossi's career

who was Prime

counterpoint to Craxi's, and in the mid-1980s Craxi,

is

Minister,

was successfully leading the attack on wage indexation. All that remained of was the sense of a strong "them" and a rebellious "us."

Bossi's first phase

The way

which the "us" was redefined

in

indicated by the Lega's

is

Without money to buy TV time, Bossi stuck up posters and scribbled While spray-painting graffiti, he got into fights. All this confirmed his

language.

on

walls.

view of language

as transgression.'''

language characterized by

and

porters

to the

"Roman

like

and the

its

However, he abandoned the

dialect for a

crudeness. Allusions to the virility of Lega sup-

impotence or sexual preference of

their

opponents, slogans

on the physical appearance of other politicians, deformation of their names Berlusconi becomes Berluskaiser robbers," attacks

—

established the Lega as the incarnation of the swaggering males of the small

bars around Milan. '^ Italy had produced yet another brand of populism.

The

"us" took

economic and

social shape.

"We" were

the working class,

the self-employed, and the small businessmen of Lombardy, the unappreciated

wealth creators. Culture was replaced by

North

The

as

real

opposed

to

common

interests: the industrious

immigrants with other customs or to

"them" became the

idle Southerners.

Rome government, which redistributed money to

the South and placed bureaucratic obstacles in the path of northern wealth creation.

One manifestation came

in

1994 with

its

of the economic component in the Lega's regionalism

attempt to prevent Cariplo from forming

counterpart in Puglia.'^

An example

ties

with

of the Lega's economic populism

is

its its

The Lega backed privatization, Credito Italian© and Comit fell into

hostility to the Cuccia-Agnelli establishment.

but

objected strongly to the

it

Cuccia's grasp, even the

DC and

its

borrow money

if it

way

that

did ironically strengthen Cuccia by helping destroy

dubious financiers. In general, small businesses resent having to at interest rates that

Lega's link with

them was

may

be almost double the prime

The new

rate.

reflected in the statement of Vito Gnutti, the

Minister of Industry, that "their interests would be a central preoccupation" of the Berlusconi government. ^"^

With it

won

its

reshaped identity the Lega grew. In the general elections of 1987

3 percent in Lombardy.

to 8 percent

and

By

the European elections of 1989,

in the local elections of

1990

it

it

leapt to 19 percent.

of the second increase indicates that a protest, which had been

had

risen

The

latent,

size

had

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

132

suddenly taken form. Geographically the protest was strongest

won

medium-sized towns: the Lega

DC

20.8 percent in Varese and 20.1 percent in the the province of Milan in

it

it

and

reached

stronghold of Brescia. In

gained 2.3 percent more than in the city

Como the difference was greater

The Lega even invaded

in the small-

only 12.9 percent in Milan but

—22.9 percent compared with

while

itself,

8.2 percent.

1

red Emilia, reaching 6.7 percent in Parma, while the

Liga Veneta achieved scores that offered hope to the future Lega

Nord

—

7.2

percent in Verona and 5.9 percent in Rumor's old stronghold of Vicenza.

The

social

and economic

factors lay in the mixture of

malaise present in a predominantly Bisaglia explained

—but

was perceived

in

inhabitants of the

way

in

—

did not correct

concentrated, he maintained, it

DC electorate.

on

the

the South

Varese or Brescia

As

DC state had

and on the big northern sophisticated

the state bourgeoisie

cities,

bureaucracy.^'

as a taxing, inefficient

Lombardy periphery were

The expansion of

1982 the astute

phenomenon. The

enough

which the government worked, but they were unable

advantage.

achievement and

early as

but

The

to grasp the

to turn

it

to their

damaged them, while the

Austrian solution promised by the historic compromise was irrelevant to them.

Prosperous but only recently

so,

they tolerated the regime until the situation

changed. By 1990 the economy was starting to decline.

very

The political situation had changed too. Craxi was both out of power and much a part of government by clientelism. The DC, far from renewing

itself,

offered in Andreotti

The transformation of

and Forlani

the

PCI

its

into the

most devious and

PDS

its

weariest leaders.

was so painful

as to

provoke

desertions rather than converts.

The

common

long-delayed to

all

crisis

of

politics

had

arrived. ^^

Some

elements were

western European countries: economic specialization and de-

centralization broke

up the red subculture based on the Fordist working

while Pius XII's nightmare came true

as

prosperity

undermined

class,

religion

and

The population was more mobile: 33 percent of Italians now live in places where they were not born. The percentage of the electorate voting for the two major parties declined from more than 66 percent in 1975 the white subculture.

to

around 45 percent

in 1990.

coalition suffered in the

1992

Both the leading

elections: the

parties

of the governmental

DC dropped 4.4 percent to below

30 percent and the PSI sUpped 0.7 percent. In

Italy as in other countries

skepticism about government grew: whereas in 1967 only 33 percent of people

surveyed

felt

that the

government was not honest, 85 percent held

1980. But the level of disillusionment in Italy was a

1989 comparative survey 29 percent of people

competent and 49 percent

Germany were 51

felt it

far felt

view in

higher than elsewhere: In that the

was not. The equivalent

percent and 16 percent.'^^

this

government was figures for

West

From Craxi

the Exacter to Bossi the Spoilsport

133

The

expressions of the crisis of poHtics were various and contradictory.

One form

was the demand for a kind of militancy, which took more account

of the individual's needs. The Verdi, the

movement sought

decreasing significance

memory of

because the

and the women's

Fascism had faded, which permitted a revival of the

MSI. Yet another form was the

new

Parti to radicale,

new forms of participation. Another form was the of the Left- Right spht; this was a complex phenomenon

to provide

re-creation of the traditional mass party

on

a

Lega brought people together around the theme of regional

basis: the

People voted out of opinion rather than out of belief and hence

identity.

switched their vote more especially

among

world into good and

Yet the need for identification created

easily.

educated voters

less

evil.

—

Lega that divided the

parties like the

Irene Pivetti's opinions

not typical of the Lega, but their intensity

is.

on

and Fascism

religion

The myths

are

that depict the citizens

of Lombardy towns driving back Emperor Barbarossa and rapturous meetings at Pontide are designed to answer this need. Similarly the structure of the party,

which discourages facdons and grants authority from the Lega's

to the charismatic leader, stems

role as a Gemeinschafi.

Such uniformity masked poUtical and

drew 60 percent

to

70 percent of its

social differences.

from the

voters

By 1 992

the Lega

ex-parties of government,

but a substantial minority came from the former PCI. Socially the interests of working-class supporters were frequently in contradiction with those of the self-employed.

The Amato government's

decision to impose a

minimum

tax

on

the latter suited the former. There was a fundamental clash between Lega

supporters

who were voting primarily as

were voting while the

for the free market.

first

saw

in

increased with success.

him

a protest against

Rome and

The second group was tempted by

those

who

Berlusconi,

the personification of the old regime. Diversity

When

Milan

fell

to the

Lega in the mayoral elections of

1993, the Lega voter was likely to be better educated than before, to be middle-class,

and

to have voted PSI in the past rather than DC.-^''

— Marco Formentini gained 57 percent of male of female vote—was more abandon she

the

the

also

likely to

Despite mistakes of strategy, such

as

He

or

vote but only 43 percent

the Lega.

ignoring the 1991 referendum on

reform of the voting system, the barbarian hordes continued to grow between

1990 and 1992. They marched out of Lombardy, incorporated the other northern leagues, and proclaimed the Northern Republic at Pontide in 1991.

won 20 percent of the vote in Lombardy and 17 They were halted, albeit with difficulty, at the frontier of Clean Hands revelanons provided fresh impetus. The Lega

In the 1992 elections they

percent in the North. Emilia.^^

Then

the

and the magistrates reinforced each

other.

There

is

truth in Bossi 's claim that

"without our electoral victories the politicians would have sent Di Pietro to

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

134

break stones in some Sardinian mine."^^ Conversely the magistrates gave

credence to the Lega's tirades against

Roman

robbers. In 1993 Bossi himself

was accused of taking money from Montedison, but

still

the Lega could claim

victory for the politics of protest. Craxi's capital of Milan had been conquered

by Formentini and the reprieve granted

to the political system

was over.

As the prospect of power drew closer, the Lega set out its plan

The term

Italy.

federation

is

for a federal

probably incorrect and should be replaced by

no more

confederation because there was to be

Union. ^'' There would be three republics: Padania

but rather an Italian

Italy

in the

North, Etruria in the

Center, and a southern republic, which has not earned the dignity of a name.

them would be

Associated with

the

autonomous regions of the Valle

Trentino-AIto-Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia,

power would be held by the

republics,

Sicily,

which were

which was

to

own parliamoney were left to

to have their

ments. Power over foreign and defense policy, justice, and the Union,

d'Aosta,

and Sardinia. Most of the

have an elected legislative body and a directly elected

prime minister. However economic power would be the prerogative of the republics.

This vision

is

consistent with the Lega's history.

It offers

freedom from

Rome and a Padania government that can implement free market policies. From our perspective

it

the Italian state.

may

It

be viewed

as

an extreme attempt to solve the problem of

consigns to the scrap heap both the

DC project of finding

a mass Southern base to support the interests of northern industry

dream of working

a

Gramscian

class. It

alliance

between

a

and the PCI

southern peasantry and a northern

would simply do away with the bureaucracy, which

unreformable. Since the Lega gained power

less

it

considers

has been heard of the indepen-

dent republic of Padania and perhaps the Lega's confederation will serve

merely

— but

vision

it

is

this

would be important

an indication

of,

—

as a catalyst for fiscal federalism.

rather than a solution to, the

As a

breakdown of the

postwar order.

THINGS FALL APART AND THE CENTER DOES NOT HOLD Craxi's image as a bold decision

maker was designed

to appeal to the

modern

segments of Italian society, which admired efficiency.^^ However between 1987

The government crisis of 1987 lasted make DC and PSI implausible coalition partners. Craxi was equally bitter in his onslaught on President Cossiga.'^^ The republic's institutions were further discredited two years later when De Mita's and 1989 he played an obstructive four

months and was

role.

so bitter as to

From Craxi government

wanted

fell

in

another long

crisis, artificially

European elections

to use the

whether

the Exacter to Bossi the Spoilsport

as a test

135

prolonged by the PSI, which

of PCI strength in order

to force national elections. Cossiga cooperated, allowing

to decide

Giovanni

Spadolini to waste several days in an "exploratory" mission, which had no reason for existence. PSI manipulation

made

was

clear

when

which

the objections,

it

had

De Mita, vanished as soon as Andreotti become the DC candidate. ^° The CAP (Craxi-Andreotti-Forlani) period began with the all too obvious to

agreement that Craxi would become Prime Minister

after the

1992

elections,

while Andreotti piled up power to bid for the presidency, and Forlani maneuvered to defeat him. In 1991 Cossiga joined in the discrediting of the institutions

by issuing

diatribes against the magistrates, his

his fancy indicated.

There was a

own

party, or

whomsoever

He

was worried

logic to Cossiga's behavior.

him and he was demonstrating his ability to fight back. Cossiga was also protesting the attacks on the president's institutional role, which he himself damaged by his harangues. In this he was supported by Gianfranco Fini and thus helped the revival of the MSI. Meanwhile the revelations of corruption grew more frequent. In 1987 Rocco Trane, Signorile's secretary, was arrested, while Craxi's friend, Salvatore that the Gladio investigation

Ligresti, a builder

might lead

of Sicilian origin

to

who seemed able

to raise surprising

of money from unknown sources, was involved in the investigations.

in-law, Paolo

Meanwhile the Craxi clan exacted enormous

Pillitteri,

Craxi's son, Bobo,

Other

DC

of

amounts

many Milan

tribute: a brother-

was the mayor, while the post of party secretary went

who was also named by Berlusconi

Socialist clans

clientelistic

first

to the

to

board of AC Milan.

occupied Salerno, where Carmelo Conte established a

network, and Naples, where Giulio Di Donato had to battle mighty

champions

like

Don Antonio

or Andreotti's ambassador, Paolo Cirino

The PSI replaced the PCI as the second party in the South unmodern methods. by thoroughly The DC-PSI rivalry rendered intolerable what the political system had Pomicino, and

Bari.

long tolerated. Internal rebellions broke out: Mario Segni's plan for constitutional reform and his use of referenda to allow the electorate to speak directly;

Leoluca Orlando's protest against DC-Mafia

revolt of the magistrates.

Whereas

in the

ties;

and

especially the

1960s the system had been sealed

off from outside attack thanks to the United States and the PCI,

now

it

was

vulnerable.

The end of the Cold War released DC voters who turned to the Lega. In move toward unity the EC countries began to wonder aloud what closer ties with Italy might bring. They noted that funds allotted for vocational training vanished into the pockets of DC poUticians. They discovered they were paying CAP money to nonexistent Southern farmers. Helmut Kohl asked their

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

136

rhetorically

whether there was a

neighboring

states.^'

risk that

The need

organized crime could spread out into

hold the value of the

to

mark

against the

lira

introduced tension into the Italian economy.

Growth

held up well in 1989 at 3.2 percent, but inflation ran at 7 percent,

double the French

EMS, but

the

rate. In

as the

January 1990 the

lira

entered the narrow band of for 1990 went down to Macroeconomic policy was

world economy declined, growth

2 percent, while inflation remained

at 6.1 percent.

contradictory because Andreotti did not cut public spending

lest

unpopularity

should damage his presidential hopes, while the Bank of Italy protected the

with high interest

rates.

The

deficit

BOT.

by the

By

the

summer of 1991

reduction, but the

fall

the

EC

IMF

had joined the

budget showed no

in calling for deficit

The Employers

political courage.

Association, fearful of the 1992 deadline, was louder than usual in

of the

The

way public sector wages were pushing up

criticism

its

labor costs in the private sector.

association backed the June 1991 referendum because

more

lira

could only increase, financed and worsened

it

considered that a

efficient Italian state

was a prerequisite for competing with French and

German industrialists. The referendum was

the clearest sign of discontent with the political

system.

PDS one,

It

started as Segni's revolt

A modest proposal

backing. it

became the litmus

test

from within the DC, and then

to reduce the

of faith

in the

it

number of preference

as

and 95.6

Segni and Occhetto indicated. This manifestation of

disaffection foreshadowed the defeat of the

Another

votes to

regime because Craxi advised the

electorate "to go to the beach." 62.5 percent of voters disobeyed

percent of them voted

received

early signal

CAF

in the

1992

elections.

was the growing demand for reform of the

state

apparatus. In 1990 a law was passed that limited the secrecy of decisions, allowed

more

controls,

and increased the accountability of

Parallel to the rise

same year

a

of the Lega went the

new law

civil servants

move toward

gave greater power to local

privatization of some services,

and introduced

(Law 241).

decentralization. In the officials,

local referenda

made

possible

(Law 142). Both

trends were accelerated after 1992 and the innovation of the direct election of the

mayor came

hard to see

how

in 1993.

Although such changes increased

they can

reform of the central

make

citizen

a decisive difference without a

state apparatus.

power,

more

it is

radical

^^

Of all the overlapping reasons for the regime crisis that the 1992 elections the end of the Cold War, EC pressure, the defections from

exemplified

within the

one for

I

—

—

DC, the disaffection of the magistrates, and the rise of the Lega

would

like to stress

is

the change in Italian society.

1990 detected a widespread frustration with the

The

the

Censis survey

social services

and with

the Exacter to Bossi the Spoilsport

From Craxi

the self-perpetuating, directionless rule of the

"waiting stage,

"^^

DC-PSI

coalitions, but also a

during which people were reluctant

reported the same massive distrust of

137

to act.

In 1991

it

concern about the spread

the parties, a

of organized crime to the North, and a coolness toward Europe that was linked with doubts about Italy's ability to compete. However, now the mood was active

and

The

Italians

were eager

for change.

stemmed from

strong protest vote in the 1992 elections

this

mood,

which was, however, complex. The "new" culture in Italian society distrusted intermediaries and sought a greater role for itself. It favored decentralization and privatization. It was proud of its professionalism and tended to associate politics

with competence. This made

ideological parties

and

cumbersome

a

it

dissatisfied

with the "old" culture of

state bureaucracy.

The

wealthier sup-

by technocratic and neoliberal solutions. However the opposite problem was also present: the new was inseparable from the old.^'* As Vito Gnutti's remark, quoted earlier, indicates, the emerging

porters of the Lega could be attracted

small businesses did not wish to do without the state, even it.

The two trends could overlap

unsuccessful they could

fall

withdrawing

back, each in

it

own

was inseparable from

attempt to (re-)found the

if

Italian state began.

But

if

of the weak state and of

—

the family and local

investigation was about justice

a struggle for wealth

they distrusted

different state.

way, on the time-honored

forms of traditional allegiance

networks. The Clean Hands

but

its

new and

to reallocate the resources

methods of forming clans to fresh

in creating a

and

citizenship,

and power. In 1992 the fourth

8

February 1992 to March 1994: Revolution and

Or Change?

Restoration?

Certainly

two years often seemed

these

The postwar

like a revolution.

political order collapsed and Giulio Andreotti's career ended. Clearly the

Berlusconi government can be seen as a restoration: the Prime Minister

member

former

economic power

DC-led

state

and the overlap between

of the Craxi clan is

more apparent than

was a process of change:

modernization.

To

it

However

is

a

and

the downfall of the

and a

a regime crisis

oversimplify, the urban middle

DC-PSI governments no

decided that the

ever.

was both

political

classes

crisis

of

of Northern Italy

decided to change the political system.

1

This view implies that the old regime was not capable of achieving incremental change.

Credito Italiano

begun

is

perceive the Berlusconi

Forza

Italia

the leaner,

mean

won

The

all

EMS

bad and that

privatization of

the culmination of a series of banking

afrer Italy entered the

and

phenomenon merely

efficient state that a

as a restoration.

those voters were right:

I

shall

modern economy

Italy

is

Comit and

financial reforms,

in 1979. Similarly there

the 1994 elections was that a bloc of voters

more

'

longer served their interests. So they

is

no reason

One

felt it

reason

to

why

would provide

needs. This does not

argue in chapter 9 that they were mistaken.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STA TE

140

At the core of Italian state.

From

the debates

society

in the

the familiar but thorny problem of the

had changed from

the 1950s on, the state

overbearing force, and the civil

lies

PDS and

must be beaten back. and

Italia

Privatization

programs of Left and Right

their historic distortions

Forza

it is

far

from

its

clear that Italy

is

it

an

invasion of

and decentralization were

Yet countries find

alike.

a besieged to

could agree that

pillars

hard to correct

doing away with

the overworked state.

Change took many overlapping and oblique forms

One may

in the two-year span.

argue that the year between the 1992 elections and the April 1993

referendum was a period dominated by a tearing-down process, while the next year was a time of reconstruction. Yet

economic policy was consistent

at least

The

various strands in the tale began to intertwine.

The murders of Falcone and

Borsellino heightened public anger with the

up

1994

to the

political class,

elections.

but in the 1994 elections economic

than either the anti-Mafia struggle or the takes the

form of a

story,

issues

were more important

Clean Hands inquiry. This chapter

whose main but often hidden protagonist

is

the state.

THROW THE RASCALS OUT N^The Clean Hands operation began on '

PSI

official

February 17, 1992, when Mario Chiesa, a

and head of an old people's home. La Biaggina, was

However he did not for a

languish in

jail

newspaper

articles.

turn state's evidence until Antonio

Di

arrested in Milan.

Pietro

had

few weeks. Then there was a small spate of further

left

him

arrests

to

and

These were overshadowed, however, by the March 12 murder

of Salvo Lima in Palermo. In Milan the magistrates were moving cautiously, fearful that they

would be accused of

interfering with the April 5 elections.

Afterward they quickened their pace and by mid-June, 16 PSI, 14 Christian

Democrat, and 7

them

suspects.

PDS

politicians

The prime

target

were informed that the magistrates considered

was the Craxi clan, but by September 1993,

2,600 people were under investigation, including 325^pafliamentarians.

The first questions come

as

that the arrests

such a shock? and

was^ endemic, ranging

Why did

and

they

revelations pose are:

come

from micro-illegality

to systemic corruption. It

discussed in sources available to the general public.

Adriano Zampino,

Turin

city council

a surveyor

some

Why did they

at this point? After all bribery

To

had been

take only one example,

whose confessions had helped bring down the

ten years earlier,

had declared

to

La Repubblica

that "I

am no different from 90 percentof businessmen who work on public contracts." The

politician

was

"like

an addict in search of drugs, he always needs money."

February 1992

to

Dismissing any distinction between the

added that "the system works

To

say that

most

141

and civil society, Zampino

political class

in the private sector too."^

Italians

"knew" of corruption

An

complexity of the verb "to know."

from the flood of details

March 1994

to underestimate the

is

occasional newspaper article

that deluged Italy

different

is

from April 1992 onward. However

the previous awareness suggests that corruption was not the cause but the catalyst

of a greater anger. The

with the public health

De Lorenzo

service; the real issue

scandal unleashed pent-up wrath

was the low

Since the health service was no worse than

why were involves in the

deficiencies exposed in

its

all

Milan

Initially,

De

1992 rather than

A

1982?

in

earlier,

answer

full

lie

Rossi's

weakened the DC-PSI power system. voter irritation was

had a majority of seats

won

and in

Pietro breaking stones in Sardinia. In addition, the April

margin was too small coalition

of care.

magistrates' initially slow pace in investigating abuses

elections

coalition

level

had been ten years

the themes already discussed, but clues to the immediate reasons

statement about

1992

it

still

muted. The four

in the

House

parties

of the governing

—331 out of 624. However

to permit the traditional clan warfare.

only 47.

1

percent of the vote, the

the

Moreover the

DCs share went down

by 4.6

percent, and the PSI's record of improving in each election was broken, as

share declined from 14.3 to 13.6 percent. also fared badly.

The Republicans

its

The parties of responsible opposition

increased their share of the vote by a

mere

0.7 percent to 4.4 percent, which Nvas-a poor reward for their withdrawal from the Andreotti government in parties that

were more

The PDS's

16.

1

1

clearly

99 1

.'

new

It

was

a hint that the electorate

percent was a disappointment to Achille Occhetto. That

the party had survived the collapse of world

name and symbol, Togliatti's heresies. The 5.6

courage in changing state

and

to

its

chance

—

if it

is

—

problem recurred two years

By contrast

made

that he

ever existed

Communism

was testimony

to his

as well as to Berlinguer's sense

of the

percent lost to Rifondazione

Com-

unista was evidence of the PCI's orthodoxy. against Occhetto

was seeking

or different.

The criticism

the change so hesitantly that he lost the

to create a broader Left

whose performance was

share

went down by 0.5

around the PDS.^ This

later.

the parties of protest, such as

Lega,

that could be leveled

a death

percent,

RC,

blow to the

fared well. Best of all

was the

DC in northern Italy. The MSI's

which demonstrates

that the causes of

its

1994

success were not yet present. But these three parties, along with the Rete, the Verdi,

and the remnants of the Voter the

irritation

"why now?"

was that

Partito radicale gained 25.3 percent

was heightened by the

state

of the vote.

of the economy.

To

return to

question, the specific reason for the anger with the social services

their cost

was much

greater.

Government revenue

as a

percentage of

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

142

GDP

had

risen

from 33.3 percent

the contradictions of Andreotti's

increased over 20 years and by 1992 effects

was pressure on the

December 1991

in

ment

Italy

lira,

1980

in

stood

it

which had

103 percent of GDJEi^ One of the

at

defended with special care because

to be

had signed the Maastricht agreement with

monetary union. This required

to

to 43.3 percent in 1991. In general

government had grown sharper. The debt had

spending to continue, which drove up

austerity, yet

inflation. It

which was 3.5 percent higher than the Maastricht

commit-

its

Andreotti allowed domestic

reached 6.2 percent in 1991, guidelines.

However, despite

domestic demand, because of the world recession, exports were declining, which caused rising unemployment in the northern industries.

was growing harder to find room

It

to

maneuver within the confines of the

EC requirements. In harmony with the trend toward independent central banks, the government gave the Bank of Italy freedom In the previous October

it

required reserves. This was free trade in services

to set the discount rate in

had given the banks

pan of a package

to enable Italian

banks to compete once

was introduced by the Internal Market. JHowever both innova-

dons reduced the government's

ability to finance

its

about the economy was muted and the financial In the

debt.

crisis

Here again public concern

came only in

meantime the old regime demonstrated the blows

in the election

January 1992.

greater control over the use of their

the

it

summer. ]

was receiving

of the President and the choice of Prime Minister.

The CAP

arrangement that Craxi should take the second post and either Forlani or

The parliamentary The Milan magistrates

Andreotti the former, was undermined by three factors. majority was too exiguous to tolerate the clan divisions.

were undermining the position of the confronting the

May

state,

DC and

the PSI.JThe Mafia strategy of

which took the form of murdering Giovanni Falcone on

23, forced the regime to change.]!

As

if to

demonstrate that the order could no longer function, President

Cossiga resigned after the election. This disturbed the plan that he would ask Craxi to

form

a

government,

after

which the

Socialists

would concede the presidency

to

DC. So the presidential vodng took place before the trade-offs had been made. The splits within the DC, where Forlani's leadership was contested by the reformist Segni, by the "left-wing" faction of De Mita and, more discreetly, by Andreotti's the

supporters, dragged out the process,

which was not

demand

revelations of corruption created a

candidate. Oscar Luigi Scalfaro's election it

when

in itself unusual.

But the

for that elusive creature, a clean

became

possible.

The Mafia promoted made

they killed Falcone; his murder triggered a moral revulsion that

further intrigues appear scandalous. It is

unlikely that the Mafia sought to influence the presidential choice.

murder was part of complicity.

Over

a

war with the

the next

state that

two years

stemmed from

this strategy

the

The

breakdown of

would provoke an

energetic

February 1992

March 1994

to

response from segments of the judicial and political further

damage

DC,

the

evidence of

as

drive the state toward reform.

the outcome of this war,

its

143

would be

class. Its effects

to

former complicity emerged, and to

The Mafia has also suffered severe defeats. However many other matters discussed in this chapter,

of so

as

remains uncertain.

The that

it

may

reasons for the decline of complicity

of both the Mafia and the "should not

DC.

be sought in the behavior

Until the 1980s^the Mafia had lived by the rule

make war on

the state. "^u hen the overlapping factors of th^

huge sums of money brought by the drug trade and the coming militaristic Corleonesi, led

had always sought there

with the state

an equal;

as

power of the

to

rule obsolete.

The Mafia

now if equality were refused,

would be war.

The to grant

were

to deal

by Toto Riina, made the

very ferocity of the Corleonesi

what they wanted

— impunity or

made

it

Italian public opinion, especially after organized

pressure

from the EC. Helmut Kohl's

among

Other obstacles

crime moved north, and

rhetorical question

Maastricht plan for closer cooperation

government

difficult for the

at least light sentences.

was

typical,

while the

Ministries of the Interior

and

police forces reduced the space for delicate compromises.

_iv^For

and other reasons the convictions

these

at the

mass

not overturned in the appeals courts and Salvo Lima was

trial

of 1986 were

killed.

This was a

who knew so much about the Mafia, was killed next and then

warning. Falcone,

Borsellino. The bombings in Florence, Rome, and Milan during summer of 1993 were committed by the Mafia. Riina has been nothing if

came Paolo the

May

not consistent: in

who

1994 he indicated Luciano Violante, Giancarlo

Caselli,

Communists and as warfare does not mean that the Mafia

replaced BorseUino in Palermo, and Pino Arlacchi as

enemies to be dispatched.^ The resort to has given up the quest for

pursuing both

allies

within the political and legal system.

strategies, believing that fear will

Meanwhile a furious Craxi was forced were an insuperable obstacle

to his

It is

spur complicity.

to recognize that the

Milan scandals

being designated Prime Minister.

He made

way for his advisor, Giuliano Amato, at the head of the four-party coalition. Although the new government looked different.' First, there

like so

was no alternative to

governing coalitions had been made and they rested

remained

— DC

inviolate.

no new potential the Lega or clans left

had

leadership,

to

RC

all

old governments,

Throughout

unmade but

was

the postwar years

the principles

these were vanishing, but the elections

their

it

on which

exclusion, proportional representation

The PRI and

as the saviors

expend

to challenge

Now

rulers.

PCI

it.

many

the

PDS

had no

had brought

desire to be

branded by

of a discredited regime. Within the coalition the

energy on trying to escape prison, so they had none

Amato. This

liberated the

government

in

its

economic

policy.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

144

The second

of a 1990 law on banking that opened the way

and reversed the 1936 law

to privatization

industry.

no

He was

secrets.

whom

From June 1992

he had worked were

leader,

that forbade banks to hold shares in

also Craxi's collaborator for

to April

whom

Socialist corruption held

1993 Amato watched

Within

politically destroyed.

De Michelis, Ando, and Di Donato were deputy

Amato was an

novelty was the Prime Minister himself.

intelligent reformist, the author

his

as the

own

men

with

party alone

placed under investigation.

The

PSI's

Claudio Martelli, made a doomed attempt to reform the party

before suddenly abandoning politics in February. Craxi was allowed to hang far

on

too long as Secretary and, even after he resigned, parliament voted in April

not to remove his immunity. Five party secretaries had to be replaced in the lifetime of the

most

Amato government, and

ministers

— De Lorenzo was only

serious case

— departed

Yet even

he presided over the death throes of postwar

as

the

regularly at the behest of magistrates.

a brave attempt to tackle the

economic

crisis.

In the

Italy, Amato made summer of 1992 the

contradictions of Andreotti's policy exploded: the projected deficit stood at

$120

billion

and the

lira

was exposed. Amato responded with measures to cut

by $20 billion. Some of his fiscal maneuvers were one-off, as opposed structural, and of dubious legality, such as the tax imposed on bank accounts.

the deficit to

However Amato

also

attempted structural reforms. In a July 31 agreement the

government endorsed an employer- union plan

to scrap

wage indexation. This

prepared the way for the July 1993 agreement, which outlined a new framework for collective bargaining.

fin September

Amato produced

a package that included severe cuts in

social spending, especially in health care

the

PDS, RC, and

and pensions. Although attacked by

the unions as unjust, the package and the follow-up 1993

budget both limited the financial damage and

at least tackled

underlying Italian

problernsj Health care was to be administered by the local and regional authorities but financed

central government;

by the

Amato

transferred the

responsibility for controlling costs to the regions. Budgetary overruns were to

be financed from their resources, but they were granted some increased auton-

omy in

taxation. This

was

Amato

toward uniting the fi4nctions of administration

a step

and finance and toward a more

real decentralization.

raised the general retirement age, cut

reduce the opportunity for early retirement. abolishing the special pensions that the

To

deal with

income

Amato imposed

a

tax evasion,

minimum

tax

In the sphere of pensions

back indexation, and

He

tried to

took a tiny step toward

DC had used for clientelistic purpose&i

rampant among self-employed

professionals,

on the self-employed.^

In September he froze public sector salaries, which in 1991 had risen

by

8 percent and in 1990 by 18 percent. In the 1993 budget he changed the

February 1992 Structure of public sector pay.

subjected pay to

to

March 1994

He reduced parliament's power to grant increases,

not administrative law,

civil

145

set

up an autonomous body

to

negotiate with the public sector unions, encouraged the kind of contracts used in the private sector,

and

tried to link

wages

to productivity.

The budget

also

contained a clause requiring parliament to provide financial coverage for any

new expenditure it passed.__; The principles of -financial sector,

responsibility

and of disciplining the public

which underlay these measures, mark an attempt

worked

state

and

more

to give

to

reform the over-

responsibility to civil society.

unfortunate in that such principles, which signaled a break with

Amato was

DC rule and

would guide the Ciampi government, were overshadowed by popular

ment of austerity

who

that inevitably hit poor people hardest.

thronged the piazzas the rewards were

all

To

resent-

the demonstrators

the less clear because financial

problems continued. Thus while government spending excluding interest on the debt did not exceed revenue for the

were so high that the 1992

deficit

first

time in 30 years, interest payments

was 10.7 percent of GDP, the same figure

1991, while the debt rose from 103 percent to 108 percent of GDP. the austerity measures save the

then forced out of the

The start

total

EMS

in

devalued by 7 percent and

first

September 1992.

devaluation amounted to around 20 percent and

of a long-term, export-fueled

strated the

which was

lira,

same dynamism

as

Nor did

revival, in

as in the

it

was the

which small companies demon-

1970s. For this

Amato can

take

no

credit,

although his reforms of the public sector must in the long run help private employers.

even

if

He was

tough enough to terminate the economic

submarket

rates

fiction

of EFIM,

government bonds paying

a plan to repay creditors with long-term

caused outrage in the international financial world and had to

be withdrawn. His government drafted a plan for extensive privatization of

banks and industrial companies;

this

continued his 1990 law and was in part

enacted by Ciampi.

The rewards of inflation

was running

austerity

were present

at 4.2 percent,

1

if

not evident. By October 1993

percent below the pre-devaluation rate,

while the increase in unit labor costs declined steadily from 7.6 percent in 1991 to 3 percent in the first half of 1993.

to 15 percent in

The

September 1992, stood

discount

at 1

1

The price of austerity was a worsened recession: dropped by an annualized

The immediate of it were

rate

political

to reinforce the

v/ith the political class.

rate,

percent in the

of 1.2 percent, the consequences of the

which had been

when Amato

left office.

second half of 1 992

first

raised

GDP

decline in a decade.

crisis

and Amato's handling

Clean Hands revelations by increasing popular anger

Another

result

was

to

concern: between mid- 1 992 and mid- 1993 the

make unemployment a central unemployment percentage rose

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

146

>

from 11.1

companies employing more than 500 people employ-

to 13.1. In

ment was reduced by 6

number of hours covered by

percent and the

the Cassa

Integrazione Guadagni (CIG), which provides compensation for the tempo-

unemployed, was increased by 23 percent.^ While unemployment

rarily

heightened political protest, issues rather

marked

it

a

more

significant shift.

Economic

than corruption or institutional reform would decide the 1994

elections, j

In tne winter of 1992-93 Italy was living through the destruction of the

old political order. Local elections In September support for the

December

it

made

dropped by 6. 1 percent

in

by 7.7 percent

a harbinger

The MSI's share of the vote leaped from 8.4 of

its

DC

The

in

the PSI.

Mantua and

Monza. Even more ominous was

percent decline in Reggio Calabria, which revealed that

crumbling.

DC and

clear the fate of the

DC went down

its

its

in

7.3

southern bastion was

percent to

1

6.6 percent,

success the next year.

Mino

attempted reform and

who was

Martinazzoli,

un-

touched by the Clean Hands investigation, became party Secretary on

October

12, 1992.

But the old leaders were tainted by more than bribery.

March 1993 Gava's

In

ties to

Camorra were exposed, while

the

in April

Andreotti's parliamentary immunity was removed so that the investigation into his links with the Mafia could go ahead. Forlani's Secretary was dragged

off to prison in chains and Forlani himself

the

Enimont

trial.

Clientelism had turned against the

party retained two assets. [The the

DC

as

who was

the

would reappear,

reluctantly, in

DC. However,

was the Church, which continued

first

main instrument of

its

power.

The second was Mario

the

to see

Segni,

leading the battle for institutional reforrnJTo the chagrin of the

Council of Bishops, Segni

the

left

DC on

March

29, 1993, declaring that

it

could not be reformed; however, the Church hoped Segni might repent and acted to ensure that he did.

The PSI had no such assets so it

it

simply disintegrated. In the local elections

25 percent of its previous vote and was severely punished

lost

In Varese

its

from 12.9 percent

to 5.5 percent. It too

attempted reform with

Benvenuto and then Ottaviano del Turco union leaders

to revive popular

Once more

the

support

suffer far less than

to

tion,

Lombardy.

as Secretary,

PDS, which presented

its rivals,

DC

itself as the

DC

its

Monza Giorgio

attempt to use

party of responsible

or PSI votes.

It did,

however,

losing only 2 percent in Mantua. Occhetto's task

demonstrate that the PDS-PCI, while

stood outside the

but

first

failed.

opposition, was unable to win the mass of

was

in

share plunged from 10.6 percent to 4.2 percent and in

it

had been tainted with corrup-

power system. In general he was

Milan branch had sinned, but

this

successful.

The

could be blamed on the Right of the party,

February 1992

one of whose

leaders,

of the PCI-PDS

to

March 1994

147

The

Gianni Cervetti, was placed under investigation.

role

obtaining public contracts for the red cooperatives and of

in

the co-ops in steering profits back to the party was frequently cited, but did not

become

a

major issue

large bribe to a

PCI

December 1994. The

until

official,

money for himself; he was The PDS leaders had not

Ferruzzi group had paid a

Primo Greganti, but he swore he had kept the

model Communist

either a rogue or the

militant.

The memory of

enriched themselves personally.

Berlinguer counted for something and Occhetto never failed publicly to praise the magistrates.

So the

PDS became

opportunity, which

become

by default the only strong party

had been seeking since

it

in Italy. It

had the

1989-91 transformation, to

its

the cutting edge of a Left-Center coalition. Conversely the prospect of

PDS-led government would galvanize the Right. 1993 was Occhetto's 1994 would be Berlusconi's.

a

year,

In the local elections of late 1992 protest continued to dominate. In

Varese the Lega, whose share jumped 9 percent to 37 percent, had more votes than the

DC,

PSI,

and

PDS

combined.

RC

and the Rete

also

performed

well.

March 1993 the Amato government discovered how strong the mood of anger was. The magistrates were methodically mowing down Italy's elites and it seemed they might never stop. Whether in a desperate attempt to halt them, In

or because genuine problems had arisen, such

unemployment

as the

in the construction industry that

backlog of

and the

trials

stemmed from

the blocked

public contracts, the Minister of Justice, Giovanni Conso, produced a decree. It

transformed the

illegal

financing of parties from a crime, punishable accord-

ing to the usual procedures, into a an offense that could be canceled by

repayment, a

fine,

and

a five-year

ban on holding

did not need to organize opposition.

An

office.

The PDS and

the Lega

outraged public understood only that

the politicians were granting themselves an amnesty. Fury ran so high that the

decree was swiftly forgotten, while

He making

stayed until April 18.

As

Amato in

offered to resign.'

1991 the referendum was the means of

the changes that the parliamentary majority sought to block,

institutional reform

was the road to

referendum, which called for senate elections to use the

British, winner-take-all

system for 75 percent of the seats with the remaining 25 percent proportional representation, was once

more Mario

by the PDS. Their goal was

something

to create

and

reform. |The author of the

political

Segni,

left

to

who was backed again

like the

two-party system,

to'

bring about a clear electoral victor, and to give the voter rather than the party secretaries the

The

power to choose the government. The electorate understood

turnout was high

percent.

It

— 77 percent— and

the yes vote

was accepted that the method of voting

won by 83 for the

this:

percent to 17

House would be

"e-

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

148

altered too

and with the end of full proportional representation (PR) another

of the old regime came crashing down.

pillar

The

series

of events

the disgrace of Andreotti to

1994

in April

—

— marked

the referendum, Amato's resignation, and

the end of the

first

period within the 1992

'° Already in 1992 Censis saw "a growing need for leadership."

years.

People wanted organization, a word that Berlusconi would use frequently.

OCCHETTO The demise of the old regime was as

RULES!

reflected in the choice of Carlo Azeglio

Prime Minister. Ciampi was not a politician and

Italy

he was the leader of almost the only

The bank was

elite that

of the

historically suspicious

as President

had not been

political class,

which

uneducated and spendthrift. So Ciampi brought economists into

who moved in the bank's orbit, like Luigi Spaventa, or who by their parties, like Beniamino Andreatta. Romano Prodi

Ciampi

of the Bank of

mown it

his

down.

considered

government

had been marginalized

IRI. This

was supposed

to be a transitional

and organize

the change of voting procedures

parliament. In fact Its

it

remained in

transitional character freed

not

just

elections to

office nearly a year

from the

it

returned to head up

government, which would supervise

parties,

renew a delegitimized

and took

significant action.

which were now preoccupied

with staying out of jail but with the elections.

In June local elections were held in Milan, Turin, Catania, and smaller towns. TThey used the

new

mayor and two

—

i^ounds of voting

well as marking a shift of offered a

trial

—RC,

Left

method

that the parliament

power from center

—

direct election

had passed

to periphery, this

run for the parliamentary elections because

building. Since the Lega sought since the

electoral

DC

no

allies

it

in

many of the

March. As

new method

entailed coalition-

and could not have found them and

was in chaos, coalition-building was the prerogative of the

PDS —of —and of

the Rete, and the

Alleanza Democratica (AD)

The campaign demonstrated between Segni and Occhetto, was

the Center-Left

—

the Republicans and

Segni's dissident Christian Democrats.

that the key alliance of the referenda, that fragile.

The two came

together in Catania

behind the Republican who won, Enzo Bianco, but more often they disagreed, as in Milan where both lost. This failure, which would help shape the 1994 elections,

was not

just

another example of the fragmentation of Italian culture.

—^ Some of the problems were inherent in coalition-building: Segni had a wider following as an individual, while the If the

two were

to

come

PDS

had a more powerful organization.

together in a structure such as the

AD,

then Segni

February 1992

March 1994

to

149

wanted the dissolution of existing party organizations into that he

would head. Occhetto, however, having spent two

rank and

PCI

to transform the

file

up

to give

into the

RC

PDS, could hardly now ask them

alliance,

was caused by such factors

fall,

broad movement

new home.

their

But the breakup of the referenda until the

a

years persuading his

and the pressure

as

which did not occur

Church placed on

that the

officially

Occhetto's refusal to break with the Segni. These were signs of a

deeper incompatibility that continued to separate the ex-Communists from the

post-Vatican

Catholics. If they were to shape the

II

shaped the old

—by

their co-operative

antagonism

—

new regime

as

they had

the heirs of Togliatti and

De Gasperi, and of Berlinguer and Moro, would this time have to work together. But they could not, and

new

old differences took Still,

the

South

it

it

to Berlusconi.

as the chief

winner

in the

June

elections. In

once again became the second party and surprised

Valentino Castellani first

Their

its

swept the towns of Ravenna, Ancona, and Siena, while

performance in Campania. Rete on the

would open the door

forms: abortion replaced atheism./^'

PDS emerged

traditional territory in the

their failure

after

It

spearheaded the coalition that

itself

by

won Turin

its

for

he had run 16 percent behind Diego Novelli of the

round. Turin and Catania proved that Occhetto was a

talentecL,

alliance-builder.

However

won it

the victory

masked weaknesses. In Milan and Turin the PDS

only 9.5 percent and 8.8 percent of the vote, running behind

much

lost

of its working-class support.

supported were well to the

Then

right: Castellani

endorsed by Agnelli. The collapse of the

RC to which

too the successful candidates

was a Catholic who was

DC had left a huge space that centrist,

PDS-backed candidates could occupy. That did not mean the PDS occupy for

this space, or that a

it

also

itself could

Center-Right party would not emerge to compete

it.

The mood tional reform.

country was changing, perhaps in response to

in the

Able

to cast a "real" vote, the electorate

well as protest. This was evident in Milan, part because he was challenged Rete's

Nando

dalla Chiesa,

and

institu-

rewarded competence

where Marco Formentini won

from what was perceived in part because

as the

as

in

Far Left, the

he projected a practical image.

The Lega swept across the North. It was the largest party in Vercelli, Novara, Pavia, and many smaller towns, as well as in the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Its anti-statist discourse was all the more popular because of the corruption revelations. However the Lega faced difficulties: the local elections revealed that it

too needed

allies

—

any other party but

now

in

it

demonstrate that

Novara

its

26.8 percent was nearly 10 percent ahead of

\yas 5 percent it

behind the Left coalition

could govern.

—and

it

had

to

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

150

DC

For the

warning came

Another

the elections were a disaster outside the South.

share dropped from 22.4 percent to 14

in Trieste as the party's

percent, while the MSI's rose to 17.1 percent from 12.2 percent. In Sicily,

DC

however, the

held on to Agrigento and remained the largest party in

Catania. Although

Rome

of

its

merged with reports of

revelations

DCiemained strong south However as corruption

share of the vote declined, the

with around 30 percent of the

clientelism dried up, the

DC faced

ties to

electorate.!

organized crime and as sources of

the greatest difficulties of the three parties.

The November-December round of local elections confirmed this. Over summer the Church had made it clear to Segni that it was backing Martinazzoli and that it would do its utmost to prevent him from gathering Catholic support." The result of Segni's painful meditations was that he broke with Occhetto and with AD, but he did not rejoin the DC. Thus he weakened the

the Left, isolated himself, and did not help his old party.

Martinazzoli soldiered on, but in the local elections the

Remo

South. In

from 25 percent

Gaspari's stronghold of Chieti the to

provincial capitals

36 percent, took over the council. The neo-Fascists won four and the others being Benevento, Latina, and Caltanissetta

—

— dropped by 30 percent—but

became with 16.4 percent the fourth largest party in losses in the

South severe

—

in Caserta

its

the mayoral races of Rome and Naples

Naples in

both

were

it

ended up endorsing

cities

split

it

Rome and

MSI's success

The

it

share

Italy.

Not only were the DCs in

could not present serious candidates. In

Togliatti's ex-Secretary,

was eliminated on the

evenly between the

percent in

DC collapsed in the

MSI, whose share jumped

first

round.

On

Massimo Caprara, while

the second

MSI and left-wing candidates.

round

Gianfranco

its

votes

Fini's

47

Alessandra Mussolini's 43 percent in Naples marked the

DC. won both cities

in supplanting the

Left not only

but also swept Venice, Trieste, Genova,

and Palermo, where Leoluca Orlando was

elected

on the

reinforced the lesson of alliances to the Lega because

29 percent and

it

became the

largest party, yet

it

its

lost the

first

round. Genova

vote rose 15 percent to

mayoral race to the

Left's

candidate, Adriano Sansa. These elections were Occhetto's triumph and yet they revealed the PDS's weaknesses.

was a leading an example

PDS

Of all

the

new mayors only Antonio

exponent, while in Trieste Riccardo

for Berlusconi?

Illy

Bassolino

was an entrepreneur

Both he and Sansa were Centrist candidates operating

with scant opposition from the Center-Right. Moreover the specter of a Left-

Center government hegemonized by the ex-Communists would and did galvanize Berlusconi.

He

understood that

many

Italians

were voting for clean

faces

and

competence, that they were not quite ready to vote Lega or MSI, but that they

were unenthusiastic about the PDS. Finally the

size

how mobile

would be

the electorate was. Occhetto's rule

of the voting swings revealed short-lived.

February 1992

March 1994

to

151

STATE VERSUS MAFIA Throughout 1993

the

war on the Mafia continued under both the Amato and

Ciampi governments. In January Toto Riina was

many Mafiosi who were fugitives from justice had simply gone home neighborhoods. Like other citizens, they sent their

the run." In fact

on

living in their

children to state schools.

'^

a

arrested after long years "on

policeman

When they met policemen,

who hunted down

was

fugitives

glances of nonrecognition were the

mark

each looked the other way;

likely to

be murdered.'^ Those

that the state in fact recognized the

Mafia's role in the postwar order.

Palermo marked a

Riina's arrest after long years of tranquil existence in

break.

It

did not change Mafia strategy, which continued, under Bernardo

Provenzano, the

new Corleonese leader,

emphasize military struggle.

to

Tommaso

Buscetta considered this an error and argued with unconscious irony that Riina

was destroying Cosa Nostra. The chairman of the Anti-Mafia Commission, Luciano Violante, agreed, stating that the campaign against the Mafia was going

and

well because "institutions

Mafia

threat. '^[Citizen

who were

magistrates

civil

society have

very aware" of the

sure of government backing were the marks of a state that

was no longer absent and did not inspire

The

now grown

support in Sicily and more efficient work by police and

in

its

population merely

distrust,

over organized crime took several forms.

state's victories

i

The most

which led to the jailing of Nitto Santapaola, Carmine Alfieri, who decided to collaborate with the blitz in January 1994 led to the arrest of 62 members

obvious was the wave of

arrests,

the Catania chieftain, and

Then

authorities.

too a

of the 'ndrangheta who were operating in Lombardy, and,

significantly, the first

initiative taken by the Lega Minister of the Interior, Roberto Maroni, was

another onslaught on the Lombardy 'ndrangheta in June 1994. Just as important has been the peeling

of Bruno Contrada drew attention service

in the

to the overlap

and the Mafia. Violante's report

Masonry, while the

issue of the

autumn of 1993.

A

murdered and, conversely,

away of the Mafia's

allies.

between segments

dealt with

Mafia

The

trial

of the secret

infiltration

of Free

Church and the Mafia was posed dramatically

priest

working

in a

poor parish of Palermo was

allegations of complicity

were leveled against Bishop

who was called a close friend of Salvo Lima. Nor A dramatic moment occurred in the revelations of the

Salvatore Cassisa of Monreale,

did magistrates escape.

who

Camorrista

Campania

turned

state's

evidence, Pasquale Galasso,

magistrates, "Gentlemen,

many

when he

of you are not cops,

told the

many of you

are on^our side."''*

The most

controversial subject of the investigation has been the Mafia's

I

links with the

DC

and

in particular with Giulio Andreotti.

This includes the

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

152

Mafia may have murdered two men as favors to Andreotti: Mino Pecorelli, who ran a blackmailing newsletter, and Alberto Dalla Chiesa, who supposedly had compromising evidence on Andreotti 's behavior during the Moro kidnapping although the Mafia had ample reasons of its own to want Dalla Chiesa dead. The Andreotti faction in Sicily has been described as "polluting allegations that the

—

and

political, social

who

leader

According

and Andreotti has been

institutional life,"

called the political

Mafia power."

"for a long period assured the continuation of

to this

view Andreotti was trapped in his 1989-92 prime ministership

by anti-Mafia opinion and obliged back to prison

whom

Although the

to take

such measures

Corrado Carnevale had

state's

encouragement offered

released

sudden success was the

as

on

result

sending 41 Mafiosi

appeal.

of new

to arrested Mafiosi to collaborate

choice of good personnel (including Giancarlo Caselli), the

real difference

public opinion. Violante notes that the state cannot maintain

by relying on

its

servants

—

the police and magistrates

tactics, like the

with justice and the

effort

its

—but needs

was

simply

a strong

public opinion to keep ministers' focussed and to outweigh the political forces

Thus two dangers

that encourage complicity.

lay in wait for the

BerlusconT^

government.

The Italia

first

would

was that by reacting against left-wingers

seize

on

made by

errors

like Violante,

Forza

the present anti-Mafia apparatus and

weaken the campaign. Berlusconi's Minister of

Justice,

Alfredo Biondi, was

and

a survivor of

the old regime that had indulged in complicity. Tiziana Parenti,

who became

both a lawyer, accustomed

to seeing the plaintiffs viewpoint,

head of the Anti-Mafia Commission, offered legitimate criticism of the reliance

on the Mafiosi who

repent.

When

he

named

they attacked Violante as a Communist,

however unwittingly, following Riina who, when

Berlusconi's supporters were,

Violante, Caselli, and Pino Arlacchi as targets, also branded

them

as

Communists."^

The second danger was Italia.

That

it

Mafia would succeed in

that the

was trying to do so was certain, given

Centro Cristiano Democratico, sent dreotti

from Messina, while

at least

mean

to parliament

its

infiltrating

two ex-followers of An-

one of Lima's acquaintances was elected

members supported

the Mafia, merely

directly

by

that, as

Tiziana Parenti stated, the danger of infiltration was very

FI.''^

This does not

evidence of Mafia help for FI and

Conversely threats were

made

FI

AN

against local, left-wing officials.

organization that defended the landowners makes

while political opposition has in recent years I

real.^^

Fresh

candidates emerged in January 1995.

Mafia's political alliances are grounded in pure self-interest,

from the Rete and the PDS.

Forza

history. FI's ally, the

it

its

Although the history as an

inclined to favor the Right,

come more from

shall return to this topic in

the Left, notably

chapter

9.

\

February 1992

to

March 1994

153

THE CHANGING ITALIAN ECONOMY The economic

policy of the

Ciampi government continued Amato's poHcy and

—

was based on the same principle structural change. Priority

went

must be accompanied by

that austerity

to cutting

government spending, which was

scheduled to produce a 1994 deficit of less than 10 percent of GDP. If interest costs are taken out,

spending ran

five-year

at 1.8 percent

government bond went down from

To

below revenue.

Ciampi concentrated on reducing

the interest payments

rates:

deal with

the interest on a

11. 7 percent to 7.5 percent

during

his year in office.

The

had bottomed out and

recession

payments surplus of $12

billion, as

opposed

1993

in

Italy ran a balance

of

to a deficit of $22 billion in 1992.

GDP was running at +3.2 percent, as opposed to -1.8 percent

In the last quarter

in the first quarter.

However unemployment remained high with

the historic

down into 7.7 South. The working

regional differences: a national figure of 11.3 percent broke

percent for the Center-North and 18.9 percent for the class

continued to change and to shrink

blue-collar jobs.

The

as there

was a 7.1 percent decline in

employment, compared with a 3.6 percent decline

overall figure of -5.5 percent explains

why

in white-collar

Berlusconi's promise of a

million jobs was so seductive. '^

The Ciampi government's greatest achievement was the July agreement on incomes policy and bargaining, which set up a new tripartite structure for collective bargaining.

such

as greater

Employers gained concessions in labor market

freedom

to use

flexibility,

temporary workers and lower entry wages for

which training was given. Unions gained stronger representation

rights

at the plant level, although local pay increases were to be awarded only

when

jobs in

they were in step with profits.

Most important, a bienniel meeting of govern-

ment, employers, and employees

is

for reducing public indebtedne,ss

to set a

low

target

and maintaining employment

context a national incomes policy will be designed. It is

of inflation with provisions levels.

In this

^°

tempting, although premature and exaggerated, to see in the July

1993 agreement the model of a national community. Premature because the

new system was

strained in the

fall

of 1994, and exaggerated because,

as

already

argued, the bargaining power of imions was weak. However, the "Austrian" solution had

As the

come

large

to Italy.

companies have been recovering from the recession and taking

fresh shape, Enrico Cuccia's role has

been significant once more

.

He

attracted

the magistrates' interest for his handling of the Ferruzzi collapse but nothing

came of finance,

this inquiry.

from the

Cuccia benefited fi'om the extinction of DC-backed

recession,

which has compelled companies

to turn

back to

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

154

He

him, and from the privatization program.

and

a financial

industrial order that

has used these boons to outline

recognizably his and

is

is

designed to enable

northern Italian companies to survive in the world economy.

The

of the

ills

elite

were not

all

the same. Ferruzzi suffered from Gardini's

much

megalomania, family knavery, and too

component companies were Pirelli

needed time

Ligresti's

solid,

from

to recover

Many

diversification.

him

company, SAI, was was

Fiat

hit

its

of Germany. Salvatore

failed invasion

its

ENI and

property empire was tottering, while his dealings with

Craxi brought

of

including Eridania Beghin-Say and Himont.

with

a spell in prison in 1992. But here again Ligresti's insurance solid.

by the international slump

demand

in

and exhibited

for cars

the special fragility of Italian capitalism. Traditionally too dependent on the Italian market,

its

share of that market dropped from

over four years. In the

while industrial vehicles

more than $1

993 plummeted 15.9

first

billion

half of

its sales

1

60 percent

to

of cars declined by

1 1

40 percent .7 percent,

percent. Losses for the year ran to

and the prospect of future Japanese competition was

ominous.

With

Cuccia's advice. Fiat devised a strategy that

slightly less so.

Meanwhile it obtained

but became more independent of

ment

that Gianni Agnelli

staying

on

it.

all

it

left it a

itself

came

and Romiti, who had been expected

state,

the announceto retire,

Into the shareholders pact

newcomers, Alcatel and Deutsche Bank, while existing

Mediobanca

family firm, but

could from the Italian

In September 1993

reassure the markets.

to

the help

were

came two

Italian partners, like

their position. The reshuffle

and the Generali, reinforced

was

important because, while Fiat remained a family firm, the family no longer ruled alone.

On

majority.

the board

The

it

had seven votes out of

entry of Alcatel and Deutsche

1 1

,

but nine were required for a

Bank marked

a strengthening

of

a capital increase of $3.5 billion, the largest ever

by

foreign alliances.^'

Next

Fiat

announced

money was

an Italian company. Partof the

to be

put up by existing shareholders,

but a large chunk came from the market. In a rather dubious maneuver

Rinascente shares were offered to Fiat shareholders, while the holding

company's

financial arm, IFIL,

launched a takeover of Rinascente. This meant

that without being asked IFIL shareholders were

being saddled with Rinascente (which

Then

in

is,

pumping money into

and

January 1994 Fiat announced plans to lay off 14,000 workers,

6,000 permanendy and 8,000 because of the decline criticized the

Fiat

however, in good health).

company but

Fiat

responded that

7,000 jobs directly and 4,000 more

unemployment and with an

among

at its its

election at hand, the

in

demand. The Church

Melfi plant

suppliers.

it

was creating

With

government had

increasing

to intervene.

February 1992

to

March 1994

155

The tripartite agreement provided a package of early retirement, solidarity and CIG, which protected most of the jobs. Some of the provisions

contracts,

looked safer,

feeble: the

Arese plant in Milan was kept open to work on ecologically

primarily electrical, cars. Arese's chances of remaining open appear slight,

while the Naples plant

is

to

Turin, where jobs were saved

do nothing but process worn-out

cars.

at Mirafiori, Fiat looks less central.

^^

Of Fiat's 261,000 workers, in

low-wage countries

abandoning

on becoming

Italy or

Italian state has

100,000 are employed outside

a

nomad

once more proved generous.

runs at about $100 million;

it is

authorities are likely buyers. to

more than $ 1

billion.

to

around $7.5

billion.

Luigi Luzzatti

mean

Poland. Does this

like

putting up

Moreover

Even

in

Italy, especially

that Fiat

bent on

is

multinational? Far from

it.

The

share of the job-saving packet

Its

money for

Yet Fiat can respond that

its

the electric cars

Melfi

total aid for

is

and

expected to

local

come

investment program comes

^^

would have understood

and government. Combined with

this

cooperation between

a strong, if less

company

dominant family presence,

it

way of confronting the world economy. The entry of Alcatel and Deutsche Bank will push Fiat toward greater internationalization, perhaps

is

the Italian

toward a joint venture or even a merger with Renault. its

on

reliance

the Italian

market by

selling half

of

Fiat's goal

its

new

abroad. Cogefar has been separated from the group, which

— that

not a proof

The

Italian

Enrico Cuccia,

illicit

stitched together the

DC

disappearance of the

to

diminish

a signal

Puntos,

— although

relations with the political class are to be discouraged.

road toward internationalization

who

is

is

cars, the

new

is

being

mapped out by The

Fiat shareholders pact.

could have brought the decline of Cuccia

countless Anglo-Saxons have observed,^^ he and the

DC

if,

as

had complemented

each other and worked together to prevent the emergence of a broader capitalism. Cuccia's

power may yet decline because forces pressing for an Anglo-Saxon

system are strong, but

Cuccia

is

this has

coalitions

possible the privatizations.

were sold

yet.

As with

Fiat

it

seems that

helping strengthen Italy in a more open financial world.

The end of the DC-PSI made

not happened

damaged

to suitable bidders, in this case

economy and Nuovo Pignone,

the publicized

Some companies,

like the

General Electric. Others, hke the

Credito Italiano, were placed on the market, with a block of shares reserved for institutional investors

and the

rest for the general public.

This provoked an enormous and misleading dispute that pitted Prodi, the

DC Left with which he

commentators against

The former group

Romano

PDS, and most Anglo-Saxon Cuccia, the Milan-Turin families, and Giorgio La Malfa. is

associated, the

called for popular capitalism with

the widest possible

distribution of shares, while the latter preferred "hard cores" that

would control

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

156

the banks. Prodi tried to achieve his ends by restricting the that

any group could buy

settled,

in

was discovered that Cuccia had put together

it

companies

that,

by buying 10

to

1

5 percent

a

number of shares

When

the dust had

web of

interlocking

Credito or Comit to 3 percent.

of the shares, controlled the banks. ^^

Supporters of popular capitalism pointed out that in Italy only 6 percent

of families

owned

shares,

whereas in France the figure was 14 percent. They

noted that only 5 percent of Italian companies were quoted on the stock market, while the French figure was while

would be

it

1

this

was misleading because,

many more

The government should

Credito and Comit had plenty. to

However

5 percent.

advisable for Italy to have

encourage popular investment, such

as

small shareholders,

take

and has taken steps

pushing the Consob to improve the

flow of information and passing the January 1992 law that regulates the Societk di

Intermediazione Mobiliare or multifunctional investment firms. But small

investors could not run

Comit.

when he spoke of creating more big companies problem of having too many

Prodi was on safer ground

and more merchant banks

to resolve Italy's historic

Of the world's

dwarfs and not enough giants.

43 and

Italy

only

But

7.

500

to achieve the goal

None

companies Britain has rivals,

Comit and Credito who

repre-

Prodi should have had alternative bidders for sented powerful financial interests.

largest

of strengthening Cuccia's

emerged. In the Anglo-Saxon world

such interests are frequently pension funds that entrust the companies, in which they hold blocks of shares, to professional managers. This system has

but arguably profits.

makes

for greater financial

power and

more

a

its

defects,

intense search for

So the law of April 22, 1993, which sets up and regulates private pension

programs, its

it

may

be the most important

move

made toward widening

Italy has

financial markets.^*'

Here may be the future, alternative sources of power to Mediobanca. However Cuccia can hardly be blamed for taking control of Credito and Comit when no rivals challenged him. As for pension funds, Cuccia is busy tightening his links

with the Generali and regaining control of Fondiaria. If insurance

companies become even more important, then he will be ready. His aim in gaining control of

Comit and

staffing

it

grandson of Alberto Beneduce, in

world finance and

in the

with his proteges, such

is

new

to

form a vast

industries.

as

Enrico Beneduce, the

financial bloc that can play a role

Cuccia

is

watching the privatization

of Stet, IRI's profitable telecommunications company.'^'' In forming his bloc he has foreign Freres,

Commerzbank, which bought

into Credito Italiano. friends to the

He

allies like

into Comit,

the Deutsche Bank, Lazard

and

Allianz,

which bought

continues to reach outside his traditional

medium-sized entrepreneurs

like

circle

of

Luciano Benetton, Diego Delia

Valle (of Tod's shoes), and Achille Maramotti (of Max Mara),

whom he wishes

February 1992 to bring into in

a

to

March 1994

157

Gemina, Credito, or Comit.^^ The sons of Romiti and Cefis work Is this merely another example of the tyranny of the family or

Mediobanca.

renewed attempt

Once more

to create

there

is

an establishment?

no need

to overestimate Cuccia's importance, since

the vast majority of Italian companies flourish outside his empire, or to create

the counter-myth of Cuccia as a selfless patriot. In order to preserve the

dominance of Mediobanca, Cuccia has limited the power of Fincomit, Comit's merchant bank, which is a potential rival. ^^ Prodi and the PDS were right to insert into the

new

privatization projects regulations that allow minority

The Lega

shareholders to be represented.

scant attention to small business. But

without a

state,

is

it

is

right to

grumble that Cuccia pays

remains true that Cuccia, the

His relationship with Prime Minister Berlusconi

seemed the

start

dirigist

using traditional methods to modernize Italian finance. is

intriguing. In

what

of an alliance Mediobanca was asked to usher Mondadori onto

the stock market, but in mid- 1994 the old coolness between the two very different

men seemed

THE Behind the

how

to return.

^*^

1994 ELECTIONS:

intricate struggles

A DEBATE ABOUT THE STATE

among the political parties lay several visions of To oversimplify, the doomed Centrists of

the Italian state ought to work.

the PPI-Patto Segni offered a clean version of the

The

the market and the populace.

campaign on a reform

that would

DC state mediating between

left-wing Progressisti

axed their entire

create a state that administers less

and governs

more; they also offered economic continuity with Ciampi. As already explained, the Lega sought to terminate the overworked state by forming an Italian union.

Alleanza Nazionale (AN) called genetically for a stronger

Italy.

Forza

Italia (FI)

combined with an appeal to entrepreprojects were full of gaps and contradic-

offered a neoliberal critique of the state neurial creativity. Although

all

these

demanded an end to the overbearing state and the publicized economy. Moreover the electorate was offered a choice, albeit highly distorted, between tions, all

the principal options of the Progressisti and FI.

After a final

flirt

with the Lega in January 1994, Segni returned not to

Martinazzoli's rebaptized Partito Popolare Italiano, but to an alliance with

The Church of its 1948

blessed the PPI-Patto Segni formation, but

effort.

The

its

it.

help was a shadow

DC past and the new electoral system spelled doom for who had voted DC

the Catholics. They retained only 53 percent of the people in

1992,^' while Segni suffered the extra humiliation of losing his Sassari

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

158

The

constituency.

method squeezed the Centrists in a way all Ashdown; with 1 5.7 percent of the votes, they gained

winner-take-all

too familiar to Paddy

approximately 7 percent of the

with four

seats,

seats. In

Toni

the once white region with

to Forza Italia. In

Remo

won

it

and

rule

only 14 percent, once more

it

of the PSI

virtual disappearance

The postwar

the transformation of Italian politics.

under Catholic

left

Italia.

This electoral result along with the

marked

Veneto they were

small entrepreneurs going over

Gaspari's Abruzzo the PPI-Patto was reduced to 15.4

percent of the vote, while in Western Sicily

outdistanced by Forza

Bisaglia's

its

was ending with Catholic

order had begun Martinazzoli

defeat.

resigned and was replaced by Rocco Buttiglione. Cardinal Ruini did not resign. Paradoxically, in a time of recession, the Church's voluntary organizations are

more valuable than If the PPI's

There was

ever

.

downfall was inevitable, the Left's defeat was more surprising.

a spurious logic in the proposition that the crisis

would bring

to

DCs

power the

antagonist, the Progressisti.

However

accept that the 1993 triumphs were too easily won, then there

evidence of PDS or Progressisti strength.

The PDS gained 4

than in 1992 and remained the core of the

RC

great help.

seemed

to

run

its

percent

NATO.

1.9 percent

must

At

least

RC existed and won

surely lead to

reason for existence

when

its

we

more votes

Left. Its coalition partners

own campaign and

state if

much

not

is

were no

Fausto Bertinotti played

into the hands of the Right by calling for the taxation of government

questioning

DC

of the

bonds and

6 percent, whereas the Rete's

demise. Alleanza Democratica had lost

Segni spurned

it,

and Ottaviano Del Turco's

its

Socialists

barely survived Craxi's disgrace. In total the PDS's smaller alUes reached a mere

8 percent.

The

Right-Left split

Verdi's solo performance

— Rete and RC

meant

against

AD

and PSI

spoke with

that the Progressisti

— and

many

the

voices.

Left-wing fragmentation therefore survived the end of the Cold War.

Another reason

Communism. up ideology. that he

politics to

this

country

.

should use such language

One answer lies in the older

—

.

is

.

nothing for the

explained

joy.

I

He

offered this

understood that he cared

Italian family. "^^

understandable, but

why

the continuity between the

did

it

new and

That Berlusconi

work? the old

—and even

regimes. Italian leaders from Mussolini to Craxi had disseminated

anti-Communism. The PCI had ceased

many

had given

unpleasant, threatening grimace.

His thin moustache trembled with a hideous

nothing for

PDS

block a left-wing dictatorship.

Massimo D'Alema: "He wore an

anti-

when he

In this supposedly de-ideologized age only the

Silvio Berlusconi resorted to 1930s' language

had entered

portrait of

was the re-emergence of

for the Left's defeat

Italians

and

to

Moreover

in

to exist only three years before

Occhetto and D'Alema were tainted by

their past.

February 1992

March 1994

to

159

the years 1993 to 1994 fear of chaos, inspired by the deteriorating

and the disappearing elites, was

economy

strong as the anger that had dominated

at least as

1992 and 1993. Anti-Communism, which in a country non-Communist, left-wing traditions present in France in

that lacks the strong swiftly turned into

hostility to the entire Left, offered security.

More into

all

important, the regime

areas

of society. At

and punish the invading

least in

crisis

was caused by a

Northern

state. FI

had expanded

state that

Italy the electorate wished to repulse

and the Lega could be

trusted to

do

this,

whereas the Left could not.

Herein

lies

it

state. It

defines as "a perverse

strangled the forces of struction of the state, its

mechanism

This

making

is

which must be an

much

British

would

message credible.

deficit reduction

spent

arbiter

is

It

—

just

and

PDS would

efficient

but modest.

not use public works

must

but the

take,

campaign was

Its

PDS

never succeeded

lackluster, partly because

not a theme that makes left-wing hearts beat

lost the

for the Left's defeat

PCI

old

was not

Silvio Berlusconi's message.

the state had failed them.

Both

it

Occhetto

forgetting that

in Italian elections.

main reason

sense of illegitimacy. But the

uninspired campaign,

its

faster.

NATO,

merchant bankers and Turkish colonels do not vote

Perhaps he had not

other, has

seek, for example, to help the private sector

time reassuring the City of London and

compete with

on the

gives priority to the recon-

financial markets.

certainly the road Italy

its

interest and,

work and production. "^^

or expansion of demand, but

in

on the one hand, has destroyed the

that,

promised war on unemployment, the

grow by developing

an excellent critique

offers

diagnoses the real significance of corruption, which

and guarantor of the general

state as regulator

In

The PDS's program

a great irony.

of the overbearing

was

its

inability to

sides told the electorate that

The PDS offered to reform the state, Berlusconi it the dynamism of the entrepreneur. The PDS

offered also to substitute for

offered difficulty, whereas Berlusconi was optimistic. In the Italy of 1994 his

message was more appealing.

The more

true of

felt differently.

Tuscany where

percent.

the

red belt

votes than the entire Right

PDS

The

Left

was the

also Sicily,

In

Emilia-Romagna the

—36.6 percent

PDS

to 3 1.9 percent.

alone gained

The same was

the Progressisti took 50.1 percent to the Right's 29.5

had mixed

results in the

largest parry in

South, carrying Campania, where

Naples with 23 percent, but losing Puglia and

where the anti-Mafia campaign did not carry over into the

Even more troubling

to the Progressisti

elections.

was the heavy defeat suffered

in the

"modern" regions of Lombardy and Piedmont.

The PDS proved unable

to

convince the discontented supporters of the

old regime, winning fewer than 15 percent of the 1992 PSI voters and a mere

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

160

2.5 percent of

DC voters.

the expense of

its

come

gain of roughly 4 percent seems to have

Its

coalition partners:

it

won

16 percent of 1992

RC

at

14

voters,

percent of Verdi's, and 16 percent of Rete's.

The until the

brought

result

European

percent, while FI's rose

percent.

1

crisis

The MSI seemed

when

it

1

The choice of Massimo D'Alema marked

to ally

PDS

how

remained:

to cease being an

how

with the Catholics, and

The

to project

would re-emerge

questions

of December 1994.

an unlikely candidate for a major role in the new order. achieved the 8.7 percent that so worried Berlinguer,

Old dilemmas were

failed to capitalize

on

torn between

its

roles as a southern, conservative party

spokesman

popular protest in areas

for

come

the PDS's share of the vote dropped

vision of the reformed state.

its

In the 1970s,

by

whether

Party,

governmental

in the

when

but the problems of the

a shift of style,

ex-Communist convincingly

Occhetto's resignation, which did not

cries for

elections,

its

success.^

to resolve the contradiction

exacerbated:

like the outskirts

by remaining a

and

of Rome.

it

it

still

a radical

as It

was

continued

1980s

Fascist party. In the

it

The calmer mood both of Italian politics and of the study of Fascism made the MSI less of a pariah. The first sign that it might be accepted as a legitimate party came in 1983, when

changed

in

two ways, neither of them

Craxi declared that

with

it

decisive.

was not unconstitutional and that he was ready to bargain

it.

However, while Michelini, the

MSI

this

opened the door

did not

know how

that

the

its

1

static,

when

even

percent to 5.9 percent.

It

not seen by most of the electorate as

an alternative

At

of politics drew

to,

in the

1987 elections

it

was

before

vote dropped

by

form of protest

as a valid

against,

much

less

the existing regime.

as successor to the ailing Giorgio is

its

as

ignored the obvious fact that Fascism was

the Sorrento Congress of December

Fascism "there

crisis

estrangement from the flagging DC-PSI system. So

MSI remained

nearly

As the

was more valuable because

closer, the party felt that its Fascist identity

the badge of

had remained closed to Arturo

to respond.

1987 Gianfranco Fini was elected

Almirante in the

name of

continuity. In

everything," stated Fini's congress motion. Fascism was not a

period or creed to be consigned to history or to be viewed with nostalgia;

both universal and

Italian

and

it

could renew

itself without

it

was

help from outside.^^

Decline continued: membership had dropped from 383,000 in 1984 to

120,000

in 1987, while in the

down by 0.4 in

January 1990. But Rauti's

radicalism

—

—could

nity

European

elections of

1989 the MSI vote went

percent. This at last gave Pino Rauti his chance spell as Secretary

anti-capitalist, anti-American,

proved that

and

in quest

his

and he ousted Fini brand of left-wing

of an ideal

commu-

neither retain the MSI's conservative voters nor profit from the

February 1992

to

March 1994

161

crisis of politics. In the 1990 local elections the MSI's share of the 4 percent and the next year Fini returned as Secretary. He threw the party behind Cossiga's attacks on the existing system and the notion of a presidential republic. Perhaps because of this Fini limited the party's losses: in

now

evident

vote

fell

1992

to

its

share of the vote logical to

It is

fell

by only 0.5 percent.

deduce that the MSI's success

primarily not from what

it

in

1993 and 1994 stemmed

was or did, but from outside

causes. Its long exclusion

from government enabled it to benefit from the Clean Hands investigation, but the decisive factor was the collapse of the DC vote in the South. Next in importance was the legitimacy it derived from Berlusconi's statement, made between the two rounds of the Rome mayoral election, that he would vote for

by Craxi was completed and Berlusconi then moved from endorsing the MSI to accepting it as a coalition partner: "There is no reason to discriminate against Alleanza Nazionale (AN) ... we are following its Fini.

process begun

The

evolution with interest.

This time the

"^^

MSI

leadership seized the opportunity. Fini understood the

—

DC

had unwittingly bequeathed to him "No one can do without us."^'' In the summer he had founded AN, which was a front organization, not very different from organizations proposed by Michelini in the

power

that the

1950s and by Almirante in the 1970s.

It

was

to be "a great center-right pole

bringing together people from the MSI, from the Catholic party and from the

—

But a more determined effort was made at least superficially to separate AN from Fascism, one spokesman comparing it implausibly with the historic Right that had governed Italy after Unification.^^ The all-important negotiations with Forza Italia were helped by the

lay parties."^^

presence of

that

Domenico Mennitti, who was among

would have broken with

enough

Berlusconi's advisors. As a

of the MSI, Mennitti had proposed in the 1987 Congress a reform

member

Fascist continuity.

to proclaim that "Fascism

is

Now

Fini

had moved

irrevocably consigned to history.

far

We are

nostalgic

Fini also performed well on TV, kept his distance from the populism of Alessandra Mussolini, and ignored Rauti's sniping.

He

did not, however, steer his party through the painful self-scrutiny that

post-Fascists.

'"^^

Occhetto had imposed on the PCI. Fini waited until the election was won before asserting that Mussolini was the greatest Italian statesman of the century and that until

1938 Fascism had many positive

features.

Yet in

MSI minds

there

is

no contradiction between such statements and protestations of the party's commitment to democracy. Fini would admit a break with Fascism but not a complete denial of

it,

and he wanted the other

with anti-Fascism. There

way AN

may

interprets the fiftieth

parties to

make

a similar break

then be a national reconciliation,

which

anniversary of the liberation of Rome.

is

the

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

162

As already argued, given anti-Fascism in the country

AN as

is

and Mussolini's regime do not

many

attract

of his evolution made

a role in the

than

it

was

percent in the European

1

likely that Fini

it

away from Mussolini toward some and

of

loss

pardy by the foreign criticism of the "Fascist ministers"

elections caused as the logic

success, the strength of

its

The elements of continuity between many voters, but nor do they deter

might be expected. However the

as

and

Fini's strategy

questionable.

sort

of

government would make

this

preserve the Berlusconi

government

in

as well

to

move

Gaullism. Electoral success

Italian

more

1970s or 1950s. This explains

in the

would continue

MSI

palatable to the

why

base

Fini fought so hard to

January 1995. His greatest

fear

that

is

AN will

be sent back to the MSI's ghetto. In the run up to the January 1995

congress

it

AN

coalitions,

any schism

will

against the Left

and

looks as

Running

if

be small.

with the DC-PSI

in favor of a break

performed well in the elections.

gained 13.5 percent of the

It

Rome. The Roman

vote with peaks of 27.5 percent in Puglia and 27 percent in

AN

bureaucracy was seeking protection in the new order and the defection to

of a group of Christian Democrats, notably the Andreottian, Publio

became Minister of Transport out the South voters saw interclass cluster

in

in the

AN

a

new government, was

revealing.

happy blend of protest and

could no longer guarantee. In Molise it

more

Through-

An

reassurance.

difficult

South was predictable,

DCs

AN

1992

was the

Romagna and Tuscany success in projecting a

its

Lombardy

relatively well in

share reached 9 percent

and

1 1

1980s

achieved 5.9

percent.

AN talks a great deal about the need for a strong state. In the

it

colleges, while in red Emilia-

TV image of responsibility may have

are leitmotifs.

DC

largest

electorate.

performed

Center-North. Running without FI support

percent and 6.4 percent in two of the

anti-Communism

which the

role,

AN

Abruzzo,

as in the

gained 9.8 percent of the

If success in the

the

who

of shopkeepers, free professionals, and young unemployed

voted for the continuation of the government's traditional

party. Nationally

Fiori,

it

Here

Fini's

been important.

Law and

ran a

order and

campaign

for the

reintroduction of the death penalty. Fini has called for a reassertion of Italy in

Europe by

citing Italian claims

Maastricht agreement

as "a

residual illegitimacy tends to Similarly,

it

it

market makes

that cannot be won.'""

weaken any government

accepts the privatization

"talk of the free

base makes

on the former Yugoslavia and condemned the

match

program

me reach

for a

—

even

machine

in

if

However AN's

which

it

participates.

Rauti has declared that

gun'"*^

— but

its

southern

support interventionism with the attendant danger of clientelism.

The key to the Right's movement that brought them creator Silvio Berlusconi,

and

success was not the Lega nor

together in the his

company,

Freedom

AN,

but the

Pole: Forza Italia,

Fininvest. FI

is

a

its

complex phe-

February 1992

to

March 1994

163

nomenon and should not be explained away too simply. Berlusconi does not owe his victory solely to TV. Certainly he could not have won without the TV blitz

he launched in January 1994, but he initiated his political activity in the the medium 1 993, while in his TV commercials and appearances

spring of

late

Nor

sole message.

was not the

is

and untypical company, operation.

My thesis

that emerged from

political

power because Fininvest most others to run

better suited than

that Forza Italia

is, first,

a

phenomenon" an example of

the "Berlusconi

naked economic power replacing

country rich

in

—

or

is

a particular

burdened with

is

a special

a political

kind of populism

— many brands of

populism, and that suited the historical moment of 1994. Second, FI is an ambiguous movement that reopens the debate about the overlap between state

and market.

One more

characteristic of

any populist movement

country where businessmen

leader. In a

is

its

charismatic

are also celebrities, Berlusconi

had the

advantage of being involved in two newsworthy activities, soccer and TV. It was his good fortune that as he advanced toward becoming Prime Minister, his team AC Milan was marching to victory in both the Italian championship and the European

whereas

Champions Cup.

in Italy

it is

In England soccer

is

labeled working-class,

followed by all social classes. AC Milan brought Berlusconi

not merely mass enthusiasm but an aura of patriotism, which he exploited in the name he gave his movement. Forza Italia, or "Let's go Italy," is chanted at international soccer matches. offered like

him

Meanwhile

free publicity as well as

ownership of three

his

TV

stations

the endorsement of his popular performers

quizmaster Mike Buongiorno. In a period

when

politics as spectacle

was

important, the creator of spectacles had an advantage.

Another advantage Berlusconi enjoyed over other businessmen was that he had created, not inherited, his empire. He was not a friend of Cuccia and he spoke of the "rarefied air" of the Employers Association.'^^ Much of his money came from selling TV time to small businesses and he was able to empathize with their owners. Indeed he had long depicted his networks as the voice of the people: "I think we can be against the TV of the palaces of power ... we can

be

a positive

The facile

TV

.

.

.

one with which people can

feel at

home."'^^

linking of "people" with "positive" implies an

but answered the worries of the electorate.

ideally suited to his

new

role. Fininvest's debts

take charge of the vast national debt.

the old regime

as a

member

More

optimism

Of course,

that

was

Berlusconi was not

hardly seemed to qualify

him

to

important, he was identified with

of the Craxi clan

who had been

tainted during the

Clean Hands investigation. His opponents were quick to suggest that he had entered politics to gain control over the state-owned banks to which he owed

money and

over the magistrates

who were

harassing him.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

164

Although he was an had another side to him. of state TY.

when sell

He

integral part of the publicized

He was

had dared

who

the plucky David

to start

up commercial

PCI supposedly exercised hegemony and

the

economy, Berlusconi

challenged the Goliath

1970s

television in the late his

networks did not merely

goods but spread the values of the market economy such

as

"freedom,

individualism and meritocracy.'"^^

So

at a

moment when

the state was struggling and the politicians were

discredited, people looked for a savior.

period after July 25,

1

Then

943.

One may make

Italians

now

the "angelic pastor." That they should specialized in

projecting the image of the

man in white," who

turn to an entrepreneur

consumer goods would have seemed

that his nightmarish vision of

the comparison with the

turned to the Pope, "the

to Pasolini definitive

modernity had come

But

true.

in fact,

proof while

modern manager, Berlusconi appealed to such state, anti-Communism, and the

robust Italian traditions as distrust of the

He harked back to the postwar economic miracle and promised to He would create a million jobs: the round number seemed more like

family firm. repeat

it.

a parable than an item of

Already we networks, his

magazines

economic

policy.

see the ambiguity of his victory. Since he

publishing companies Mondadori and

like

Panorama and the newspaper,

overlap that helped bring about the 1992 lawyers was defeated in his bid to

1994.

The wary voters

become

//

crisis.

still

owned

his

TV

Silvio Berlusconi editions,

Giomale, he worsened the

Significantly

one of his many

regional president of Sardinia in June

suspected that Berlusconi, the construction tycoon, had

designs on their coastline.

The opposite interpretation is that Berlusconi was not Craxi's successor and that

he understood the need

to

reform the

state.

Populism

appealing to a particular segment of the electorate that

is

frequently a

way of

feels itself neglected.

Berlusconi sought the support of the small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs of

Northern

Italy and,

more

generally, of the urban, educated

middle

class. FI's

Program speaks of removing "the bureaucratic muddles and the innumerable obstacles

which prevent the creation of wealth. """^ The Thatcherite language

characteristic

of his manner. Berlusconi wanted to cut back the welfare

reduce taxes on individuals and companies. in calling for the transfer

is

and

He went part of the way with the Lega

of power to the regions. However

program whether Berlusconi appreciated

state

that the

it is

unclear from the

market requires

rules

and

that

only a modest but strong state can provide them.

Another

trait

of populism

is

its

use of a simple, frequendy emotive

language that appeals to the people over the heads of the

on D'Alema demonstrates, Berlusconi people are to be defined

as

is

elites.

As

his

onslaught

passionately anti-Communist. If the

good, there must be an

evil villain

whom they defeat

February 1992 before they enter the promised land.

March 1994

to

However emotional

rare in Berlusconi's public appearances because he

right-wing vote.

He

left slang,

outbursts were fairly

was vying with Bossi for the

and sexual

invective,

165

allusions to his rival

and

used the language of calm reason: moderation and balance 2xe terms that recur in his speeches.^''

more frequent

Still

is

made few

the verb "to organize." Berlusconi

which

references to technology,

is

a

theme

ill-suited to

populism, but he pitted

and ideology of

the order of the business world against the chaos

Implicit was the contrast between the state services

Organization was never dull or mechanical, but was associated with

which was the mark of

produced the

company were

branches of the holding

political

movement Forza Italia. Three which

especially important. Publitalia,

TV time, used its contacts all across Italy to win the support of local business

leaders, to set

up Forza

Italia clubs,

and

to find candidates.

a financial firm, worked through the broader set

sector.

creativity,

the entrepreneur.

Fininvest's creativity

sells

politics.

and the private

up clubs and generate an

electoral base.

circle

of

journalists tested the potential candidates

Italia,

investment cUents to

Diakron conducted public opinion

most troubled the

polls to discover the issues that

its

Programma

electorate. Fininvest's

TV

and trained the best of them in public

TV performance.^^

speaking and

Tensions emerged in the FI clubs. Clubs were formed by ex-Socialists and ex-Christian Democrats looking to disguise their pasts. In Sicily there were fears

of Mafia

infiltration.

and the way

managers. In some at

Conversely club members resented the weight of Fininvest

cities,

each other's throats.

members

by Marcello

Publitalia, led

such

No

as

own were

one, not even Berlusconi,

knew how many clubs

there were. In February FI claimed there were 10,000 clubs

million members, which was

One

less a

and

or 1

statement of fact than a boast.

aspect of these maneuvers concerns us. Berlusconi had not decided

what he wanted FI

to be. Certainly

it

traditional party apparatus, bureaucratic

But should

was reserved

for Berlusconi?

charismatic leader

Or

"his" people.

it

who

it

could not and should not become a

and bent on extending

and

super-clan of Fininvest. Alternatively FI could

belt

between

civil

interprets the desires of

lead just as easily to the usurpation of

new

It

power over

This would lead to plebiscitary democracy, to the

instinctively understands

would

its

be merely an electoral machine, while political power

civil society.

influence.

its

Italia

dell'Utri, reserved safe seats for

Bologna, Publitalia and Programma

society

become

power by the

the transmission

and the government, whose decisions

could be the Center-Right, modern

it

would

capitalist party that Italy has

never had. This was, in essence, the issue that underlay the seven-month Berlusconi government.

Clan Rule

Forza

emerged from the elections

Italia

as the largest party,

of the vote. In the industrialized, modern northwest

with 21 percent

gained 25.7 percent,

it

which was more than the PDS and RC together. It swept Sicily, eclipsed the PPI in the Veneto, and trounced the Lega in Milan by 28.6 percent to 16 percent. It demonstrated its appeal to the working class by winning the Lingotto-Mirafiori constituency in south Turin, where

and where the PDS's candidate was the secretary of pulverized

its

opponents among young

under the age of 25. percent of

DC

It

drew

voters

voters,

many Fiat workers

lived

Turin federation. FI

its

winning 39.6 percent of those

from the old and new

parties:

voters and nearly 15 percent of PSI voters;

it

it

also

gained 25.8

seduced 18.6

percent of Lega voters and, had the two parties not formed an electoral alliance, that figure

As was the

and

it

would

surely have been higher.

was, the Lega with a mere 8.4 percent of the vote

1

seats

and

component in the Freedom Pole's House group. FI had 95 seats With a total of 266 seats the pole had an outright majority over

largest

AN

the Left,

109.

which had 202

seats,

and the Center, which won 46

the pole had only a relative majority: 31.'

won 22

1

5

1

seats to the Left's

1

seats.

In the senate

22 and the Center's

So the British system of voting, accompanied by the residual 25 percent it had produced

proportional representation, had not functioned perfecdy, but a

dominant

coalition.

However, the question of the

coalition's internal consis-

tency remained.

On May

1 1

,

after a surprisingly

presented his government. istic

It

long period of preparation, Berlusconi

was surprising because such tardiness was character-

of the old regime, with which Berlusconi was ostentatiously breaking, and

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

168

because the delay stemmed from the same familiar causes, namely, the battle

among unlike

the coalition partners for jobs. Yet Italy's

predecessors.

its

"new" government was

first

As already argued, the Amato and Ciampi governments

had marked a break because they had functioned without the

safety net

of

DC

domination, PCI exclusion, and PR. But they had been merely temporary

governments of

transition,

whereas the Berlusconi government possessed the

legitimacy of having been elected under the British system that allowed the voters to

make

more

a

direct choice.

the Prime Minister

Two

further innovations were the preeminence of

and the lack of

a

hegemonic

party.

So the government

possessed various kinds of strength along with a clear vulnerability.

AN, including the Ministry of Agriculture, the much DC clientelism. That the environment was given to Altero who had run the MSI organization and who liked hunters and motor-

Five ministries went to

source of so Matteoli,

ways, indicated where the

new government's

became both Minister of

Tatarella

and deputy Prime Minister. President Scalfaro have participated directly international backlash as

not

priorities did

lie.

Giuseppe

the Post, a position that oversees television, insisted that the

in the Salo Republic,

AN ministers not

but their presence

some of their foreign counterparts

still

refused to

caused an

meet them.

The Lega gained the important post of the Ministry of the Interior, which much of the regional government apparatus. It also obtained the

oversees

Ministry of Industry, which Vito Gnutti could use to help small companies.

However

the Lega was both within and without the government. As Minister

of the Interior, Roberto Maroni incarnated the responsible party that understood the need to compromise, while strated the Lega's purity

The

Umberto

Bossi

roamed

free

and demon-

by attacking FI and AN.

choice of Lamberto Dini, a high

official in

the

Bank of

Italy, as

Treasury Minister demonstrated that Berlusconi understood the need to offer the international financial markets a reassuring symbol. the road loyalists,

lawyer

would be

long. Berlusconi brought into the

by one count ten

who was

initially

in all.^

From symbol

government

to reality

his Fininvest

The most important was Cesare

Previti, a

destined for the Ministry of Justice (an amazing idea!)

but was switched to Defense, a post that he combined from October on with the job of leading FI. Berlusconi installed a non-Fininvest lawyer,

Domenico

Contestabile, as Undersecretary of Justice, but he gave the sensitive post of

Undersecretary to the Prime Minister to Gianni Letta,

who had

been

in charge

of government relations for Fininvest. Another sensitive position, the Ministry for Relations with Parliament,

on Berlusconi's had

its

own

TV

went

networks and a

to Giuliano Ferrara, a regular performer

man

not renowned for

his tact. Publitalia

voices in the government: the Undersecretaries for the Interior

for Transport,

Domenico Lo Jucco and Gianfranco Micciche.

and

169

Clan Rule

Although Fininvest had introduced into the campaign both marketing techniques and the myth of management's ability to solve all problems, and although entrepreneurs and managers made up 51 percent of its parliamentary group, it made no attempt to adapt business methods to government. Indeed Berlusconi complained that he could not impose his decisions

on the govern-

as he had done in his entrepreneurial career, but had to spend his days mediating. There was a paradoxical contrast between the image of a charismatic leader and a government that demonstrated that it was weak rather than

ment

authoritarian in the key areas of justice and the economy. This weakness sprang

from two main sources. The first was that FI turned out to be a clan rather than an agent of reform, which was the real significance of the Fininvest contingent. The second was that Berlusconi had no party to rally support behind him once his

charisma was tarnished.

Examples of the

first

weakness were the enduring conflicts between the

of Fininvest and the Prime Minister.

owner

was affected by

A company

to cut state pensions?

It

could be argued that

as large as Fininvest

Did the Prime Minister wish

a battery of government decisions. this

favored the private pension

on the co-ops, then Standa the conflicts through his sharpened Berlusconi Moreover could only benefit. magistrates. Milan the on war purge of state television and his funds run by

Fininvest. If the

Weakened by

budget increased

taxes

these troubles, he was unable

conduct a policy of economic and grassroots protest, he found that

austerity.

—

his lack

unwilling

as well as

Caught between the

—

to

financial markets

of a majority in the Senate

—

—

and more importantly his dependence on the Lega in the House made him an easy target. The confident narcissism of the campaign was strained: Berlusconi's allusions to himself as Christ carrying his cross

and Bossi was transformed into Judas.^ Then, when

his

grew more frequent

governing coalition

fell

apart, the charismatic leader appealed over the head of parliament to "his"

people.

This merely masked the reality that the problem of the Italian state had

not been solved. The Berlusconi government was unable to act as arbiter. Its budget was criticized as class-based in that the pension cuts fell most heavily on the working class and were not balanced by sacrifices from the self-employed.'^

But even

this

was

less

that

might have been accepted from a genuinely strong government obviously using public resources to serve private ends.

campaigns conducted to silence the magistrates and to purge

The

state television

took away the government's prestige.

Not that the other political actors were blameless. Perhaps it was inevitable that the Left paid lip service to reducing the public debt while

the budget cuts.

The PPI

flirted

it

whittled away

shamelessly with Right and Left alike. Alleanza

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

170

Nazionale obstructed the separation of state and market by slowing privatizations

and by trying

This was more serious

Italy.

The

1992.

parties

down

the

extend the power of the parties over the Bank of

to

as

it

hampered the reform movement begun

had not completed the

task of reforming themselves.

in

The

Lega had not made the transition from a protest movement to a partner in

government. Most serious of all, FI remained a virtual party, devoid of organization

and of goals. Berlusconi opted

to

keep

it

powerless. These were the parties

of a political system in transition. Alternatively

it

small-

tempting to see in their behavior the triumph of

is

change-without-change.

A new alliance was taking shape between the Northern

and medium-sized

amnesty and voted Forza keep public

money

who

industrialists, Italia

or Lega,

benefited from the income tax

and the South, which

relied

on

AN

to

flowing. Yet the impulse to reform the state was present in

the protest against the decree of July

1

3,

1

as well as in the

994,

by both the unions and the Employers Association

to

confused attempt

maintain the agreement

of July 1993.

The sive.

Berlusconi government's record

Lamberto Dini began

to reduce state

is

not, however, entirely unimpres-

ownership of the savings banks by

capital on the market. The privatizaSME's supermarket chain was sold off, as Nazionale delle Assicurazioni (INA). The Finance

prodding them to put 50 percent of their tion

program made some

was a half share

progress:

in the Istituto

Minister, Giulio Tremonti, launched a plan to simplify the

income

tax system,

which represents the best chance of combating evasion. Fresh blows were struck at the

Mafia. In general, however, citizenship did not flourish between

May and

December 1994. The Berlusconi government cannot be considered advanced the reform of the state, even Italy

if it

could not but try out. Clans and populism were rooted in

they were seen the

bound

last

to re-emerge

to

may represent a pseudo-solution

during a crisis.

have that

Italian history;

We certainly have not, even now,

of Berlusconi.

POLICY: BATTLING

THE MAGISTRATES NOT THE DEFICIT

The government's first economic measures blended coherence with facility. Tax cuts were off^ered to employers who were young, who were starting up for the first time, who reinvested their profits, and above all who hired new workers. The last group received a tax credit equal to 25 percent of the starting salary of each new employee. Labor law was changed very slightly to make it easier for small business to hire, although nothing was

done

to

promote temporary or

Clan Rule

Nor was

part-time employment.^

it

171

how

clear

the tax cuts were to be financed,

which was an example of Berlusconi's conviction that confidence could be a substitute for thrift.

In foreign policy national assertiveness found expression in the that Slovenia setdc

differences with Italy before

its

demand

could apply for

it

EU

membership. Inevitably Slovenia responded with allusions to Mussolini's inva-

which were embarrassing

sion,

On European

when

by

increased FI's share of the vote to 30.6 percent in the

elections.

This huge jump not only forced Occhetto's resignation but

awakened

in Berlusconi the

coalition without the

In retrospect

dream of triumphant

meddlesome

it is

clear that

squandered the opportunity early,

AN ministers.^

desire to be governed

its

it

Berlusconi

it

government with

to a

June 12 the electorate demonstrated

Bossi,

it

had

proclaimed that higher taxes

and

indirectly benefiting his

Bank

hostile to the

own

why

such dreams were one reason

of the need for

consumer spending, but

elections

to use his popularity in order to

tough budget. Another reason was

than to convince

fall

and of a

whose Lega lost 20 percent of its vote.

his desire to

seduce the electorate rather

During the

sacrifices.

election

were unnecessary, thus

campaign he

flattering the voters

company dependent on domestic

Fininvest, a

relatively unaffected

Berlusconi

push through an

by the state of the

lira.

Berlusconi,

of Italy because his predecessor, Ciampi, had been

its

president, simply underestimated the speed and the force with which financial

markets would

react.

However,

it is

hard not to conclude that Berlusconi gave

priority to clan interests.

Thus he postponed financial measures until the fall, although the Constitutional Court still managed to add approximately $15 billion to the debt through a retrospective decision about pension

rights.

The markets took note

and were further alarmed by a squabble between the government and the Bank of Italy over Dini's successor. Berlusconi blocked the nomination of Tommaso

Padoa Schioppa,

whom

by the markets

an attempt to interfere with the bank's independence, which

was the very

as

last

he considered a Ciampi protege. This was interpreted

thing that foreign financiers

— perhaps

naively

—expected of

a

government of businessmen.

Two months after Berlusconi had taken office the lira had declined by 4.2 percent against the mark, while the stock market

nected with Italy interest rates

—had

lost 7.7

—

in part for reasons

and foreigners started

to

withdraw

their

quarter of 1994 there was a negative capital flow of

made a proposal to what was

money. In the second

$14

billion.''

Berlusconi

cut the 1995 deficit by $29 billion without, however, saying

to be cut or

order to protect the

uncon-

percent of its worth. Banks began to raise their

how

lira,

the

fresh revenues

were

to

be raised.^

On August

1 1,

in

Bank of Italy raised the discount rate by 0.5 percent.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

172

This provoked fresh accusations from the governing coalition about a

supposed

The

in

plot,

American Jews

which Ciampi, the bank, foreign

allegedly were active.

The

attacks

financiers,

on the bank were

and even led

by AN.

of Dini's successor was allowed to drag on until October, when a

issue

compromise candidate, Vincenzo Desario, was appointed. Meanwhile spokesmen kept up

One

AN

their sniping in a bid to gain greater control over the bank.

of their proposals was that the Governor be appointed for a fixed period

rather than for

life.'

This went directly against the thrust of reform, which had sought resolve the twin

problems of the overworked

The same may be

One

state

to

and the publicized economy.

government's campaign against public television.

said of the

of the indirect consequences of the Clean Hands operation had been an

attempt to diminish political interference with television. Under the old regime

main channels were "owned" by the DC, the

the three

respectively

and

their nightly

news bulletins

Claudio Dematt^ and Gianni

Locatelli,

had been

and the PCI-PDS

PSI,

A new team,

reflected this.

installed to clean

Augean stables as well as to cut costs. However on June 30 the government forced both men

led

by

up these

audiovisual

installed as the public television ties

with Berlusconi.

An

supremo

Letizia Moratti,

attempt to create balance was

Marchini, whose father had had close

ties to

had an unfair advantage over

made when Alfio named to the

the government, the

money

people paid for their

try to cut state television's budget,

would reduce the to sell

its

TV

licenses.

it

that the state

received, via

Now

he could

which was indeed bloated. In turn

and make

this

more difficult for state television Naturally extra money would flow into the Fininvest

service offered

advertising slots.

felt

channels because

his

and

the PCI, was also

governing board. As an entrepreneur Berlusconi had always television

to resign

whose family had

it

coffers.

As

a politician Berlusconi

news broadcasts and of the

talk

was concerned about the

shows on

changed the heads of the three networks and

news broadcasts. She appointed

who had worked was thought

to

for Fininvest

be

a follower

Channel 3 was allowed the

as the

political slant

state television. In

also the

people in charge of the

heads of Channel

and was regarded

of the

September Moratti

as close to

1

and 2 news

a

man

AN and a man who

of Craxi before he went over to Berlusconi.

'°

to remain in opposition, with left-wingers in charge of

news and the network. However the new network head, the well-respected

Sergio Zavoli, turned the job

The

battle over state

down, fearing

TV, which saw

took up enormous space in the media. average Italian cared:

TV

that

Channel 3 would be gutted.

the resignation of Alfio Marchini,

One

doubts, however, whether the

had always been politicized and only the

bias

was

Clan Rule

173

being altered. Even that was not certain. Berlusconi continued to complain bitterly

about the antigovernmental prejudice in the news coverage and Channel

when he

3 was alive and well

left office.

The key

issue

is

not that Berlusconi

succeeded in taking over or in crippling state TV, but that the governmental coalition spent so

done

much

time trying to do

to place supporters in

the

many

that

it

had

lost

damage

start, if only

because Forza

Italia

contained

lawyers accustomed to defending clients against prosecuting magisreal issue was Fininvest's role in corruption and how much knew of it. Here the government showed none of the sloth it revealed

But the

trates.

Berlusconi in dealing

with the economy. Cesare Previti spoke frankly of wishing to win the

magistrates over to the government. Alfredo Biondi had to be

more

he suggested separating the investigating magistrates from the

which if

the

out in the struggle

war between the government and the magis-

Relations were tense from the

trates.

One consequence was

so.

felt

key positions.

Of greater moment was so

which

to relations with the Lega,

raised the suspicion that he thought they would be

they were isolated.

On July

more

reticent but

of the corps,

easily controlled

'

13, while Italy

was playing Bulgaria

Cup, the government issued Poggiolini's wife,

rest

and hundreds of others

to leave prison. It also limited to three

in

thesemifinalof the World

that allowed

a decree

jailed in the

months

De

Lorenzo, Diulio

Clean Hands operation

the length of time the magistrates

could investigate a suspect without informing her or him, and

newspaper coverage

until the decision to put the suspect

on

it

banned

trial.

Like the Amato decree, Biondi's initiative provoked a flood of protest that

was

in

no way mollified by

Italy's

"everybody-in-the-piazza"

victory over Bulgaria

On July

percentof those contacted were opposed.'^

and Antonio Di Pietro read was

against him.

a

their

moment when

Di

Pietro's blazing

statement on

One

has

left

They

One might

showed

that

felt

on the media was used

by the viewers

to be authentic

to counter the

impact

speculate that the collapse of political structures in Italy

space for three charismatic figures

—

are very different in their personalities

Berlusconi, Bossi,

and

and Di

Pietro.

in their roles but their clashes

have been key scenes in the drama of the 1994 government. After his

performance Di Pietro was hailed the

83

TV.

Berlusconi's emphasis

emotion was

poll

14 the Milan Pool resigned

and the "cool" men of the Fininvest networks were unable he made.

its

loss to Brazil in the final. In a

barded with fax messages denouncing the decree.

It

and that reached

new form of the syndrome, newspapers and radio stations were bom-

climax before the heartbreaking

economic transformation.

as the

He

TV

voice of a peasant Italy that had survived

was "an emigrant from Molise," broad-

shouldered and hardheaded but "gentle."'^

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

174

Berlusconi took a tough stand on July 14 and capitulated on July decree was withdrawn but the war

Berlusconi,

Two

who had

The its

tax

records were being examined. Prominent

was Fininvest and on July 26

9.

companies whose

investigation into the bribes offered by, or exacted from,

police

1

went on. The Milan Pool continued

among

a warrant

firms that had bribed the tax

was issued

for the arrest of Paolo

authorized the payments.

days before

meeting was held

this, a

at

Arcore, Silvio Berlusconi's

mansion outside Milan. Present along with the Prime Minister were two other

members of the government, one of whom was

Previti.

The

acting president of

and the lawyers of the accused executives

Fininvest, Fedele Confalonieri,

also

took part. Nothing could better symbolize Berlusconi's lack of any sense of the state's role as arbiter

and the way he confused the

and public

private

spheres.

Although the conflict between the owner of Fininvest and the Prime Minister was

not

much

now

apparent, Berlusconi did

it.

Perhaps there was

company. Divesting himself of bits and taking some companies

onto the stock market were a committee of three wise

recommended all

to resolve

he could do. Fiad he so wished, he could not have sold such a large and

diverse holding

and

little

at best palliatives.

men

a blind trust.

But

this

made

government knew what the

his

To buy time

Meanwhile the Clean Hands

little

activities

Berlusconi had set up

and on October 8 they

to study possible solutions

sense since the Prime Minister

of Fininvest were.

investigation

drew ever

closer.

On Septem-

ber 3 Di Pietro had suggested a political solution: companies that had paid

would be given three months to confess and provide information; in would be immune from criminal prosecution.

bribes

return for their cooperation they Ironically this

would have

suited

all

businessmen except Berlusconi,

who

could

hardly avail himself of such an opportunity after protesting his innocence so volubly.

On October

5 Francesco Borrelli, the

head of the Pool, made the oblique

statement that "we are drawing close to the highest levels of finance and politics."''^

This was widely interpreted

as

meaning

that Berlusconi

would be

charged and Borelli was widely condemned for issuing a threat. Berlusconi retaliated

by asking the

discussed the case, Borrelli's istrates

it

CSM

to discipline

him, but, although the Council

took no action.

unwise statement reflected the pressure under which the mag-

were working. They were vulnerable because they had used preventive

detention in ways that went beyond the intent of the law. feel that

the balance between the claims of society

had swung too

far against the latter.

the magistrates had acquired political out, clientelism

was

less a

and the

It

was legitimate

rights

Moreover, whether they sought

power because,

as

I

to

of the accused it

or not,

have argued through-

matter of individual morality than a

pillar

of the

Clan Rule postwar order. So

more

albeit

175

now the Milan Pool was generally supported by the PDS and, by AN, because these parties had stood largely outside

discreetly,

that system.

As rumors that Berlusconi would be charged grew ever more frequent, the war grew more

ferocious.

Charges were made that Di Pietro had mishandled

evidence and he was investigated. In

Milan

to the

office,

which was interpreted

dispatched inspectors

an attempt to discredit the Pool.

as

war spread

In a dangerous development the

campaign. Defenders of the turned

November Biondi

and

to Sicily

to the anti-Mafia

of the accused argued that the Mafiosi

rights

who

evidence were treated too favorably and the imprisoned Mafia

state's

chieftains too harshly.'^

The

anti-Mafia struggle continued under the Berlusconi government. In

September Antonio Cava was arrested on charges of collaborating with the Camorra, while the investigation into Andreotti's

ties

with the Mafia went ahead.

Nitto Santapaola's deputy was arrested and decided to

tell all

he knew about the

Catania crime family. In Palermo Michelangelo La Barbera was arrested and accused of helping to organize the murders of Falcone and Borsellino.

Yet the fears that the campaign against organized crime would be damaged

by the government's war with the magistrates forcibly

by Giancarlo

drew attention

Caselli, the

to the parallels

They were

persisted.

head of the Palermo Pool,"^

expressed

who once more

between the language that Berlusconi's supporters

used to attack the magistrates and the anathemas uttered by Toto Riina.

Moreover the charges not, received help

that FI

and

Riina's financial advisor

On November

was

that he

candidates in Sicily had, knowingly or in

January 1995 when

arrested.'^

22 the long-awaited

delivered to the Prime Minister.

him

AN

from the Corleonesi, were revived

It

letter

from the Milan Pool was

was severe in that

was being investigated but

also

it

did not merely notify

summoned him

to appear with his

lawyer before the magistrates. Berlusconi had already declared that he would

not resign and he press

won sympathy because

and because the

letter

the

news was leaked

in

advance to the

was delivered while he was hosting an international

conference on crime in Naples. Previti

was

characteristically blunt:

interrogated."'^ Berlusconi was slightly

"a

more

Prime Minister should not be subtle but he

made

it

clear that

he considered the accusations against him not merely groundless but politically motivated. In a logical but dangerous extension of his populist worldview he

began to claim both that the magistrates had no authority over him because they had not been elected and that parliament could not overthrow the voters had chosen

him

to lead the country.

Using

him because

his religious language,

declared the people's representatives to be "anointed by the Lord.""

he

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

176

Behind such extravagances image he was projecting.

He

felt

now

that he

This modern entrepreneur sounded

male

—

like a character

fear

unsure of the type or reality of the

had become both

from an Alberto Sordi film

Jekyll

and Hyde.

of the traditional Italian

like a caricature

—when he swore on

of his children that he was innocent. Meanwhile matches.

could not hide the

a troubled Berlusconi

that he, the creator of spectacles, was

AC

the heads

Milan had started

to lose

^'^

The Prime

Minister fought back. Ferrara and the other hired guns kept

blazing away at the magistrates.

An

appeals court decision transferred the

To

of the tax police cases from Milan to Brescia.

towns that had fewer and old regime.

Amid

less

first

transfer political cases to small

experienced magistrates had been a tactic of the

who had made

a storm of protest, the judge

resigned and was hailed by the Berlusconi

camp

as a

the decision

martyr.

Then on December 6 Antonio Di Pietro resigned. He explained that his work and he himself had become so politicized that he felt unable to perform his duties as a magistrate. At this time we can only speculate about his other motives, but a profound weariness with the entire situation must have played a The

part.

hired guns blamed tensions within the Milan Pool and sought to

annex Di Pietro

as a chief

Berlusconi in that

martyr.

the support of public opinion.

bourgeoisie and Gherardo

"body and soul country."'^'

He

The

resignation was a political victory for

member who was

deprived the Pool of the

it

Colombo was an

to a peasant culture

too was a

came from the

Borrelli

man

carried

is

man who could be draped in sayings were much quoted: "Idle

of tradition and a

the mantle of a very different populism. His chatter

our ignorant urbanized

alien to

is

Milan

but Di Pietro belonged

intellectual,

which

best able to gain

traditional

on the wind but documents

Di Pietro

sing."'^^

be

will surely

heard from again. Berlusconi appeared before the magistrates on first

December

13.

It

was the

time in postwar Italy that a Prime Minister had undergone such a

On

humiliation, which reflected the change in the country.

summoned

Andreotti had been

two occasions

before the magistrates while he was Prime

Minister and each time he had evaded them.^^ Berlusconi remained in the Milan

law offices for seven hours and he conference.

recovered, though, the

first

time

It is

to cover

issues

of

transfer,

left

without giving the promised press

The media master was unable

—

and struck back using

street

to project

videos, his

a bribe paid

how much

at all.

networks, and

He

—

for

demonstrations.

probable that the magistrates questioned

up

any image

TV

by Fininvest

Berlusconi

him chiefly about an attempt

to the tax police.

knew of the

Swiss

But there were

payment

also the

in the Gigi Lentini

of Publitalia's alleged creation of secret funds to pay bribes, and of

Clan Rule

177

whether Berlusconi owned more than the 10 percent to which he was Umited

by law of the pay- TV company Telepiu.

To

his supporters

mattresses

.

.

.

was quite simply clan warfare: "We're going

it

"there's a general war, the magistrates

have joined

in, it's

everybody fighting

everybody" (Marcello Dell'Utri)."^ Berlusconi's strategy was

going to resign even

by

to the

everyone against everyone else" (Domenico Contestabile);

if,

He

was not

trial.

Elected

fixed.

he expected, the magistrates sent him to

as

the people to lead Italy, he could not be deposed without fresh elections. His

roles as savior

of the nation and

both excluded

his role as

Throughout

hung over

the

the financial

as

Prime Minister

in a parliamentary

in that

democracy.

would be arrested had markets, depressing the lira and government bonds. The

fall

traditional contradiction

the possibility that Berlusconi

of the

Italian

that in the lifetime of the Berlusconi

economy had returned. Spurred by a lira government

lost

against the mark, Italian exports soared. Fiat's sales in

higher than a year

complementary

clan chieftain were

10 percent of

its

value

Europe were 28 percent

while the small companies throve and modernized,

earlier,

lowering their distribution

costs. ^^

However

Italian

German

offer yields 4.5 percent higher than

government bonds had

bonds^*"

to

and the debt hovered

around 120 percent of GDP. In 1992 and 1993 government spending

without interest payments, so

it

was

vital

would have been

in the black

not only to make cuts but to be seen

making them. Only a demonstration of government resolve in imposing austerity would convince investors to keep lira and buy treasury bonds, which would in turn reduce interest rates and the deficit. World time in the shape of free

movement of capital was

which the

EU

pressing

on

Italy.

industry and a wasteful public finance had austerity

was

Without the

capital controls,

had eliminated, the old contradiction between a dynamic

become untenable.

A

display of

essential.

Much hung on

the budget that

had

to atone for the missed opportunity

bound by his promise not to its way out of its problems, break with Ciampi's methods. To this must be added the

before the summer. Yet Berlusconi remained increase taxes,

and by

by

his

his desire to

view that

objective weakness created

reluctance to

open up

The government

a

tax for people

legal

problems and the consequent

hostile front.

come from

who now

construction that infringed

could expand

by Fininvest's

new

set the target

Increased revenue was to

income

Italy

of a $30 billion cut in the 1995

three sources: an amnesty

deficit.^''

on nonpayment of

paid up, a similar amnesty on penalties for

on the building code, and special

of loopholes. Here already were the budget's

first defects.

taxes or rather closure

The two

instruments of the old regime, simply rewarded the traditional

fiscal

amnesties,

evasion that

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

178

was one sign of a lack of citizenship. Since they favored the self-employed they provoked the criticism that the budget was class-based, although the difference between self-employed and

not correspond to the difference between

salaried did

middle and working class. Meanwhile the amnesty on abuses of the building codes infuriated environmentalists.

proposal to reduce the tax

co-ops

alike.

The special taxes were less controversial, although the

immunity of the

cooperatives

annoyed red and white

A tax on dummy companies set up to avoid taxes was an anticipation

of Tremonti's proposed simplification of the entire taxation system.

The

financial

markets also noted that the amnesties were "one-off' measures rather than structural

ing

improvements

—

in the

government's capacity to

raise

money.

—

So the other component of the budget the cuts in government spendassumed greater importance. A minor clash took place over the subsidy

for Alto Adige-Siid Tirol.

minority

who were

The proposal

already worried by

to cut

it

infuriated the

AN's presence

in the

German-speaking

government. Since

formed part of the international agreement with Austria, it had eventually to be restored. A more significant issue was the cut in the health the subsidy

budget, which involved closing some hospitals as well

who

of people

obtained free medicines. But even

this

as

reducing the number

was overshadowed by the

problem of pensions. Far from representing the Berlusconi government's neoliberalism, which

was

spending on pensions was

in practice nonexistent, the attempt to reduce

The

of the state pension fund

necessary and

Amato had begun

accounted

22 percent of public spending and would reach 40 percent

for

it.

deficit

2025.'^^ Pensions represented in miniature the flaws

As argued special

in

chapter 4, the system had been

government intervention

the "bill"

fell

due, spending

in the

left in

a

in

of the postwar settlement.

haphazard

state to

permit

form of clientelism. In the 1970s, when

on pensions

rose along with other social measures.

Costs were further increased by the decision to upgrade low pensions, by the so-called

baby pensions, which allowed people

relatively short

time

—say

15 years

—and

to retire

from

their jobs after a

obtain a percentage of their

full

by the concessions won by public-sector workers who were retire far earlier than in the private sector, where 35 years were needed

pensions, and

allowed to

for a full pension.

In this context the government's proposals were not harsh. At

attempted a structural reform but, faced with strong opposition, cutting costs. half was to

Of the

it

first it

settled for

approximately $30 billion involved in the budget, about

come from

extra revenues.

represented the major item but

Of the

amounted

to

other half the cuts in pensions

no more than $6

which was approximately 4 percent of planned spending on

to

7

billion,

state pensions in

1995. These savings were to be achieved by blocking for the year retirement

Clan Rule based on years worked,

as

through a change

methods used

in the

opposed

to age,

179

and by reducing future pensions

to calculate them.

Since pensions were such a sacred cow, reaction to the government's proposals was rapid. That the figures were approximate and the administrative

complex added

details

not allay

fears.

Indeed he proved unable to explain the changes in a convincing

The

It

would to

all

solidarity

and on October 14

a national strike

as the

took place.

would

has been argued that adoption of the British electoral system clearer political debates

lead to firmer choices. ^°

interest groups but

among

desirable but Berlusconi's

state.

to their

own electorates.

Such

development

a

to serve private interests.

had undermined

it

Unlike them,

which made cooperation with the unions more

The

other actors did

on September 23

little

to help.

At

Berlusconi and urged

him

and above

endangered.

The

to be firm.

all

it

its

pander

to

In turn this

would

both probable and

to

impose

its

policy.

legitimacy by using

was branded

as right-wing,

difficult.

a dinner in Agnelli's house in

the Northern industrialist elite

social peace

is

government lacked the authority

Like the old DC-led governments,

power

the various socioeconomic actors and

Governments would no longer have

would cater

put an end to the overworked

its

his skill lay in seduction rather than in

trade unions saw an opportunity to reaffirm their role

champions of social produce

on

be taken away from pensioners, "^^ but he did

will

manner, revealing once more that reasoning.

Berlusconi could legitimately state

to concern.

September 9 that "nothing

made

its

Rome

peace with the upstart

However employers simultaneously wanted

they did not wish to see the agreement of July 1993

unions, though, regarded the change in the right to retire as a

violation of that agreement

and they threatened

that pension cuts were necessary but

they could have agreed

to

felt

and supported

have worked, remains unknown.

It

to

withdraw from

They knew Whether method would it.

they should have been consulted. cuts,

is

whether the Austrian

clear that the

spuriously strong government using the Gaullist

attempted firmness of a

method did not work.

On November 12 1.5 million people demonstrated against the budget in Rome. Once more Berlusconi talked tough and then gave way. He had little choice as his supporters abandoned him. AN remembered its heritage of social concern (which went back

Prime Minister, and the

to Salo), the

Lega saw an opportunity to attack the

CCD reverted to DC-style mediation. Berlusconi came

to an agreement with the unions in time to avert another strike planned for

December

2.

Early pensions

would be blocked only

a general reform was negotiated.

until

June 30, 1995, while

The proposed change

in calculating the

amount of money in a pension was forgotten. The budget was passed by parliament in the last days of the Berlusconi government. The general pension reform was bequeathed to the Dini govern-

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

180

ment. Meanwhile the budget figures had been overtaken by fresh expenditures

from the November floods and from the high

that resulted

government's aim had been to reduce the

deficit

8 percent but the financial markets were skeptical.

supplementary budget would be needed

$12

in

interest rates.

from 10 percent of

The IMF

The

GDP

to

declared that a

February 1995 to save a further

billion.

Judgments on the Berlusconi government's handling of public finance are mostly negative. The stock market had stood

lira

at a

lost

25 percent of

of GDP.^' Inflation, a product of the weak

December

it

value, while the

its

record 1,050 to the mark, and the debt was around 125 percent

went above 4 percent and,

has risen by 15 to 20 percent,

it

may

lira,

was

well go higher.^^

last surfacing:

at

since the price of

in

raw material imports

The

million jobs that

more than a unemployment between November 1993 and November 1994 went

Berlusconi had promised in the election campaign were never parable:

up from

1

1.3 percent to 12 percent,

The budget

which was higher than

in France.^^

saga prompts two general considerations.

The

first is

that

Berlusconi was guilty of not concentrating his attention on this vital issue and

expended

that he

ation issue,

that

is

all

too

much

energy

as a clan chieftain.

The second

the political actors failed to provide leadership

all

on

consider-

the pension

demonstrating that the March 27 elections had not brought a positive

transformation.

habit of avoiding social clashes by postponing

decisions lived

still

The old regime's on. The state was

POLITICS

It

overworked and weak.

WORSE THAN USUAL?

has been argued that the attempt to create a

on tinkering with

on

referenda,

to

make complex

their behavior.

distrust

and

^"^

new regime

electoral systems,

has relied too

much

and on using simple methods

decisions. Parties

and other associations have not changed

If anything, they

have been weakened by the electorate's

are less capable than ever of providing leadership.

substantially correct,

may be unduly pessimistic.

It

This view, while

ignores the fact that, despite

much recycling of old Christian Democrats and Socialists, these are new parties. The governing coalition contained two parties that had never been a part of the postwar order and a third whose role had been marginal. FI and the Lega have

not had the time to turn themselves into parties of government, although has

made

who

is

the change

all

too successfully:

Meanwhile the

PDS

has a

new

AN

leader

trying out a strategy that cannot yet be considered a success or a failure,

while the PPI's

new

secretary

must adapt

his strategy to the

still

changing

181

Clan Rule relationship electoral system as well as redefine his

redefining

its

own

with the Church, which

is

role.

such as not a case of change-without-change. That old habits, before. as in indulged be could they that fragmentation, lived on does not mean election an after year one than less Before 1992, the collapse of a government ministers, with the would have meant nothing more than a reshuffle of the old

So

this

is

process to be repeated several times over. class has

to step aside to

had

make way

Now

it

has

meant

that the political

for neutral technicians.

may also mean

It

the Lega. This is not politics as fresh elections and the destruction of a party— usual. There is some hope but no usual, although politics may be worse than

guarantee that a

be part of the transition from

in fact

A

future regime. 1

994

Italia's

problems they faced

may

the old regime to an as yet undefined

May and December

as well as possible ftiture

its

developments.

At the time of the elections charismatic leader, his company,

existence was virtual until the

had been made up of three components:

and

Berlusconi government

review of the parties' behavior between

illustrates the

Forza it

new order will emerge. The "new"

fall.

machine. a plethora of clubs that served as an electoral

The

clubs had

no

remained separate from the say in the organization of the campaign and they top. the from run was itself which political movement,

March 28 elections there was a period of conflict as the clubs distrusted achieve some power but Berlusconi and his lieutenants

After the struggled to

them.

One

reason for this was that the

the mass parties were

strong in Italy.

crisis

of politics and the reaction against

Overlapping with

desire to avoid having an organization with

come between him and

"his people."

quickly without a structured

He

its

own

this

was Berlusconi's

bureaucracy and interests

could make policy decisions more

movement and

to

win support he

relied

on

his

TV

The clubs reported channels, Gianni Pilo's polls, and his own flair for seduction. been appointed by had who Codignoni, Angelo to a senior Fininvest manager, to do. Members nothing them gave who Berlusconi as the head of the clubs and elections the clubs asked questions were simply expelled and after the June The political again. needed be would were left dormant until such time as they

who

movement, which numbered about 4,000, fared no leader, Domenico Mennitti, was forced out in June. After the elections, though, there was a fourth parliamentarians. Inexperienced,

owing

better,

and

component

its

activist

in PI: the

their election to Berlusconi, they none-

warnings about Mafia infiltration split had developed between are an example— and to take sides. By the fall a and that looked toward Previti, and the the segment that was close to clubs were closer ties with the PPL At the same time the theless

began

to criticize—Tiziana Parenti's

AN

segment

that

wanted

in 1995. reactivated because of the need to fight local elections

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

182

These twin developments could have signaled

— and may

The

transformation of FI into an agent of reform.

still

signal

the

demands of that

Europe's

but confined

of FI

vertical structure

last Stalinist party^^

—would have

to

could transmit

to, civil society,

society to the FI leadership.

power and the

political

in,

the

which

direct interest in furthering Fininvest's fortunes, while the clubs,

Berlusconi envisaged rooted

—

parliamentarians have no

To do

this,

—which

they must be given

has been described as

be turned upside-down.

Since this would present a risk to Berlusconi's authority, he was reluctant.

He

preferred a presidential council,

composed of men chosen by him and

dominated by Fininvest executives. Even of all Berlusconi liked to

ing a courtier, and entrust

had no regular meetings,

him with

a particular task.

for best

summonThus Dell'Utri, who had like a

king

returned to Publitalia, remained politically influential.

officially

In October Previti was is

this

summon a long-standing loyalist,

named coordinator of FI and proclaimed that "it movement from the center to the periphery

necessary to go ahead with the

in order to arrive as quickly as possible at the reverse

not sound convincing and Previti power.

Still his

is

rarely

viewed

remark shows that the leadership

be present in political

as well as civil society.

was named head of the FI group

as

is

movement. "^^ This does an advocate of grassroots

aware of the need

At the same

for FI to

moment Vittorio

Dotti

House. Yet another Fininvest lawyer,

in the

Dotti distanced himself from Previti and called for cooperation with the PPI. Significantly he also promised a freer debate within the group.

The defeat in

the partial local elections of November 20,

^^

when

the FI vote

dropped by approximately 10 percent from the European

elections, spurred the

on December

19, confronted with

trend toward rebuilding the clubs. Then, the governmental

crisis,

Berlusconi told a Milan meeting (which took place

appropriately in a theater) that "a tide of ordinary people, a great freedom will

make

and

justice

The

the high priests of the Palace understand is

whose

march

side the Italy of work

on."^^

appeal to the piazza against the palace

marked another milestone

Berlusconi's populism. It embarrassed the doves in the parliamentary group

damaged

FI's

bid for

autonomy

since the

in

and

movement was being ordered

to

mobilize on behalf of its leader, rather than invited to share in his decisions. At

did not take kindly to the piazza: the Turin clubs managed to

least initially FI

turn out approximately 7,000 people on stration

was a

flop.

Moreover

outchanted by more practiced

it

December

20, but the Milan

was embarrassing

to

demon-

be outnumbered and

AN militants wearing Celtic crosses.

Berlusconi has not resolved the problem of what to do with his movement,

but his experience dispense with

it.

as

Prime Minister has surely taught him that he cannot

FI's structure

remains

vertical:

below

Previti are the regional

Clan Rule

and

this

system

is

be stood on

to

One

are the base.

into the it

who may indeed have been elected to parliament or to who have been appointed to their party jobs. Supposedly

local coordinators,

regional councils but

who

modern

head and power

its

remains skeptical. There

not remain a mere appendage of its

AN

is

tingly.

leader.

will

emanate from the clubs

a chance that FI could turn

is

never had. But this requires that

capitalist party that Italy has

^^

the segment of the victorious coalition that fared best during the

Berlusconi government.

in

183

It

defined

its

and pursued them unremit-

goals simply

Gianfranco Fini understood that he had been offered legitimacy, a

government and the chance

without

whom

loyalty, to

to

grow. All these

they might disappear.

which

The

came from

gifts

first pillar

Bossi's flagrant disloyalty gave

added

role

Berlusconi,

of Fini's strategy was

luster.

During the formation of the government AN was modest

in

its

demands.

some of Berlusconi's campaigns, such as the struggle with the Bank of Italy, AN provided the shock troops and, when the government fell, AN fully In

endorsed Berlusconi's plan for immediate elections. Linked with loyalry was the

which once more contrasted with

display of responsibility, Fini

abandoned

black shirts

all

— and

traces

was

Roman

the self-styled voice of the

Rauti's ally in the January it

suits replacing

of Fascist populism, which he abandoned to his

Teodoro Buontempo, solemn;

Bossi's fecklessness.

— doublebreasted

of Fascist mythology

1995 congress.

a self-conscious attempt to

Fini's

critic,

subproletariat

and

language was serious and

demonstrate statesmanship.

Loyalty to Berlusconi did not exclude marking out different positions.

On the July 13 decree, AN, which had been greatly helped by the Clean operation, took a softer stand than FI. During the budget dispute its

it

heritage of social reform. But disagreement was kept low-key.

harbor hopes of replacing the foreseeable future

it

FI, for

its

Hands

never forgot

AN

might

organization was certainly better, but for

needed Berlusconi. The

1

percent decline in

its

vote

at

the European elections, which followed the foreign criticism, was a warning.

The second pillar of AN's strategy was a penetration of the state apparatus. Masked as a defense of the strong nation-state, this mobilization to put supporters into key jobs revealed that

example of

state

TV

AN

had inherited

has already been noted.

DC

clientelism.

The Minister of

The

Agriculture,

Adriana Poli Bortone, who demonstrated a tenacity worthy of Bisaglia, moved her supporters into key posts in the farmers' organizations. ""^ If the privatization

program slowed down, one of several reasons was AN's

economic and government

political

power

AN would create

its

own

would play

it

stayed in

state bourgeoisie.

In turn this overlapped with the party's defense of

feared that privatization

desire to preserve the

associated with Enel or Stet. If

its

southern base.

into the hands of Cuccia,

whom

it

AN

greatly

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

184

distrusted. It disliked the splitting

be

left

up of Enel, favored by the Lega,

behind. Although Cariplo

is

state-owned,

AN

lest

the South

was wary of the Milan-

based bank's incursions into the South. '*' Similarly AN's Minister of Transport, a

member

former

rail

of the Andreotti clan, protected Bari's role as a center of the

network. Attention has been given to whether or not

noted that

AN

nothing more than the old

is

of January 1995, after which the operation. Fini,

who

MSI

MSI

a

has been

seems

a cosmetic

formerly claimed that in Fascism there was everything,

right to note the cultural void.

and

It

Certainly the planned congress

will cease to exist,

wishes to retain virtually nothing of it."*^ This is

AN remains Fascist.

.""^

champion of the

But the

resistance to

is

real issue

change in

now

equally unconvincing and Rauti

may be AN's

role as a

new

DC

Italian society.

The Lega emerged from the 1994 elections with its dilemma sharpened. The mayoral elections of 1993 had taught Bossi that he needed allies and he found one in FI. The anti-Southern strand in the Lega and the anti-Fascist tradition in Northern Italy ruled out an extension of the alliance to AN. Indeed the epithet "Fascist pigs" became part of Bossi's stream of invective. The alliance between FI and the Lega worked and the Lega duly won its 122 seats. Yet Bossi attacked Berlusconi throughout the campaign. After his victory he declared

candidly that he had formed the alliance only because "otherwise

been torn to shreds.

His

fears

were understandable. As the linchpin of the three-party Freedom

would gain the

Pole, FI

leadership of the coalition and Berlusconi

become Prime Minister. His appeal

to a large

already strong, was enhanced by the

system had produced a majority that the Lega

had

must

arrived.

difficult

we would have

'"^^

mood

because

it

difficult

to

would

Bossi's electorate,

in the country.

must now go

cease to be a party of protest

This would have been

segment of

The new

work. The

voting

moment when

and become a party of government anyway, but

entailed working for Berlusconi.

it

would be even more

The distinctive trait of Lega

thinking was federalism but Bossi probably had few illusions about the average voter's interest in the

which was

independent republic of Padania.

— and remains—an

issue,

junior partner in the government the Lega

would

ment

assert the

As

it

Maroni

Lega's

a

to shreds.

into the govern-

head of the Lega delegation, while he himself remained outside

to

autonomy. One should not, however, overemphasize the

rational nature of this choice. trust, has

to tear

solution Bossi derived was to send Roberto

as the

Italia.

under Berlusconi's control

fall

and next election there would not even be any need

The

Fiscal decentralization,

could be undertaken by Forza

Maroni

never trusted, Berlusconi.

does, he can't help

it,

it's

explains: "the truth

He

is

is

that Bossi does not

suspicious of everything Berlusconi

stronger than he

is."'*''

Behind the personal clash

Clan Rule berween rwo charismatic leaders the

last

a cultural conflict that reveals

TV

Berlusconi was rich, Bossi was poor, and while Berlusconi had

channels, Bossi had spent years writing slogans

more dangerous than to save

Lombardy from went too deep.

but to Bossi he was

While Maroni

But even

its

a

still

from Communism,

Bossi's

plates of spaghetti in Sardinia.

But

to

undermine the old regime,

place. Berlusconi

sought to incarnate a new

had been

Bossi's role

but he had nothing to put in Italy,

walls.

In August the two were supposedly reconciled

Italy.

and were photographed eating incongruous their rivalry

on

the differences were the parallels. Each considered himself

a sacred vessel: Berlusconi's mission was to save Italy

was

much about

three hectic years in Italy.

Where three

lies

185

member

of the Craxi clan.

participated loyally in the

government and pleased Lega

voters with measures like the attempt to block the Mafia's advance in the North,

Bossi

denounced "Emperor Berlusconi" and watched him grow weaker. In

December he decided government and that

moment had come

that the

However

restore the Lega's purity.

admired Berlusconi thought otherwise.

the influence

it

Bossi's

withdraw from the

to

the segment of the Lega

charisma no longer exerted

had before the 1994 elections and the long-awaited Lega

split

took place. It is

hardly surprising that the three parties, so different and so unsure of

their identities, failed to

form a coherent

coalition.

One might

imagine that

Maroni's wing of the Lega could govern comfortably with a Forza possessed

some autonomy. Such

chosen between Right and Berlusconi in his Christ

a coalition could include the

Left.

role, a

The

Forza

Italia that

PPI once

it

had

alternative right-wing coalition of a

Italia

ruled by Previti, and a clientelistic

AN appears less suited to a modernized Italy. On elections

July 29 the PPI elected Rocco Buttiglione

party secretary.

as

had demonstrated that the Center could not survive on

winner- take-all system but also that the percentage of votes 15.7 percent percent

if

one adds the A.G percent of Segni's Pact

—could bestow

no guarantee

victory

on the

Left or the Right.

it

their votes

an alliance that would offer

own

The

in the

had obtained

to the PPI's

ILl

There was, however,

that the Center could maintain that share because

might well decide that

its

its

supporters

were wasted. Buttiglione's task was to form

his party a place in

government.

An

overlapping

question was what the Church's role would be in the changed political order. Buttiglione was faced with a right

Formigoni was a spokesman left

— Rosy Bindi —

tion,

—

that looked to the

PDS.

which he pursued coherendy, was

from which

AN

—of which Roberto

wing of his party

that wished to ally with Berlusconi,

and

a

Buttiglione's contradictory solu-

adopt

as a goal

an alliance with FI

was excluded; however the way

to attain

such a goal was to

to

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

186

demonstrate the PPI's power by forming alliances with the issues

and

alliance enabled

Mino

PDS on

Martinazzoli to be elected mayor of Brescia.

Buttiglione was regarded as being close to Pope John-Paul

Church's support was reduced, the

vital to the

Church

still

enjoyed what one might

House Speaker

specific

of November 20 such an

in certain places. In the local elections

II

and the

PPL Although its political influence was much

provided

party with a structure. Moreover

"its"

call institutional

power

since President Scalfaro

Irene Pivetti were devout Catholics. Although the

been obliged to give up the doctrine of Catholic unity,

it

it

and

Church had

replaced

it

with the

more modest goal of promoting cooperation among Catholics in the various parties. "The seeds are to be found in many fields," said the Vatican Secretary of State, Cardinal Angelo Sodano.'*''

However, determination

summoned

as it

argued

earlier,

had shown

the

Church hierarchy lacked

When

in the postwar period.

the vision and

Berlusconi was

before the magistrates, Avvenire £nsi warned the PPI against allying

with the PDS"*^ and then,

as if realizing that this constituted a

defense of the

Prime Minister's conduct. Cardinal Sodano declared that the PPI was

make

own

its

doing

decisions. In

however, he

so,

still

free to

took time to warn

Catholics of the importance of abortion as a political issue. Berlusconi's brand of

consumerism and

to Christ irritated the hierarchy.

However

the

his habit

money

of comparing himself

allotted in the

budget

to

large families and the promise of funding for Catholic schools were forms of

seduction that the Church could not ignore. red Bishop of Ivrea,

Nor was

who had been Berlinguer's Opus Dei supported him.

Church united. The denounced Berlusconi,

the

ally,

while the conservative

Both the PPI and the hierarchy probably realized

that

most Catholics would

PDS. In 1994 the hierarchy did not a different path, even if it had one to

prefer to ally with FI rather than with the

have the power to persuade them to take offer.

and

When Berlusconi grew weaker the PPI offered its own vote of no confidence

yet

it

did not exclude a future alliance with FI. Ambiguity reigned.

The PPI-PDS

alliance

was one option

for Buttiglione

but

cornerstone of D'Alema's policy. Elected to replace Occhetto by the council,

which gave him 249 votes

perceived as the candidate of

important PCI

official

it

was the

PDS national

Walter Veltroni's 173, D'Alema was

to

Communist

tradition

—

his father

had been an

and he himself had been head of the Young Communists

and of the party bureaucracy. By contrast Veltroni, an expert on the media and an admirer of Bobby Kennedy, was considered better able to overcome the

anti-Communism

that Berlusconi

had exploited and

to appeal to Centrist voters.

D'Alema, however, followed a double-pronged

PDS

apparatus, especially by leaving

it

alone.

strategy.

He

Where Occhetto

defended the

called for daily

Clan Rule

D'Alema

transformations of the party, is,"

1

said that the

87

PDS must "become what

it

namely, a Social Democratic party with a strong organization. "*' The second

part of his strategy

November 20

was that the

PDS must form

an alliance with the Center. The

were a triumph for D'Alema,

local elections

proof that the PPI could win votes by forming joint

who

used them

as

with the PDS.

lists

Both D'Alema and Veltroni believe that the March defeat stemmed from

To remove the obstacle cited then by Segni, D'Alema decided that the PDS would not give priority to its relationship with RC.^'^ The risk D'Alema is running in his bid to convince the voters that he the failure to ally with the Center.

have abandoned

and

his party

still

spurn his embrace. Meanwhile

in

proud but

all

traces

of sectarianism

is

that the Catholics

may

RC with its 40 parliamentary seats remained

sterile isolation, able to

organize opposition to the budget but not

to help offer an alternative.

In the

fall

of 1994 the magistrates deepened their investigation into the

which the red co-ops may have illicitly financed the PCI-PDS. Although the detective work was difficult because of the historic and organic relationship

ways

in

between the cooperative movement and the

Left, this

seemed

to

be a scandal

consisted of alleged cases in which the

PCI-PDS

obtained public contracts for co-ops, cases in which co-ops paid the

salaries or

waiting to be unearthed.

It

social security contributions

cases in

of people who

in fact

worked

for the party,

which co-ops were born, received grants from the

authorities,

and then died, having turned the grants over

and

Italian or

EU

to the party.^' In

January 1995 accusations were made against the co-op national president, Giancarlo Pasquini, and the scandal Despite

may

reach the

PDS

leadership.

the Left has probably gained popularity because of the

this

Berlusconi government's errors, and yet two problems remain.

summed up als."^^ In

in the accusation that the Left has "yet again

one sense

this

is

anti-Mafia stand, and to

its

it

unfair to the

no

The

first is

positive propos-

PDS's 1994 election program,

remains true that the Left has not linked

its

its

proposals for reform of the state

with a vision of social change. This leads to the second problem of the intrinsic electoral

to

support of the Clean Hands investigation. However

weakness and

its

resultant reliance

Left's

on the highly dubious

alliance with the Catholics.

Both aspects of this problem have

out the history of postwar

Italy as a legacy

existed through-

of the PCI's (self-)exclusion from

government. They led Berlinguer to the historic compromise and they survived Occhetto's innovations.

The PCI-PDS

has changed a great deal but

been able to spawn a broad Left-Center coalition that can win

it

has not

elections.

Occhetto's victories in 1993 were short-lived.

The

parties

of opposition have not then reshaped themselves into

a

credible alternative to the barely credible coalitions of the Right. Until the Left

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

188

comes

to

power with or without the Center, the reform of the ItaUan

state

became

clear

cannot be completed. But the disarray of almost the government collapsed on

when

THE The

December

withdrawn from the government

summons

causes of

its

the parties

21, 1994.

FALL OF BERLUSCONI down but

Lega's defection brought Berlusconi

decree, the

all

if

it

had not

by the magistrates,

Bossi could not have

lost credibility.

and the budget

fiasco

November 20

disintegration. Pi's defeat in the

The

July 13

were the

real

local elections

demonstrated that Berlusconi was vulnerable. Yet during the battle that followed his skills

and the weakness of his opponents.

announced elected

his resignation, he set

by the people and,

if

and the people must make

fall

On

he demonstrated

December

out his case in the Milan theater.

parliament overthrew him, its

it

his populist's

two days before he

19,

He had been

delegitimized itself

choice again via fresh elections. Berlusconi

resorted to emotional language: Bossi was a Judas

who had

to be

"massacred'V^

he himself was a victim whose only crime was that he would not hand

Italy over

Communists. He hammered home this message on "his" state TV as well as on the Fininvest channels. On December 19 he was on TV live from the theater and on another channel in a specially prepared video: he competed with to the

himself for the nation's attention.

Although he did not enemies reduced

his

cast

himself

as

to a

forget his other weapons, such as polls that

showed

handful of votes and allusions to soccer in which he

"an attacker capable of scoring 30 goals

.

.

.

whose opponents

are breaking his legs,"^'^ Berlusconi stuck to his strategy of excoriating his political rivals

and appealing over

Italian people. In this

their evil heads to the

Manichaean world there was room

compromises. Equally, such mundane

became

issues as the deficit

to

On

of

December 30 he

December 21 was

issued a fresh blast in

be illegitimate and called again for elections.

invited

and the plunging

lira

irrelevant.

Berlusconi's resignation speech on Bossi.

good TV-watching

for only the tiniest of

him

a diatribe against

which he declared parliament

An

outraged President Scalfaro

to step aside for the nation's sake. Berlusconi

had the

full

support

AN and of the Previti wing of FI, but the Dotti wing, disturbed by the bitter

polarization of politics, began suggesting that he give

of his government, such

as

way

to another

member

Urbani or Dini. Although Berlusconi quashed

this

promising demonstration of FI's autonomy, he allowed Dell'Utri to suggest on

189

Clan Rule

might be acceptable, if it were January 6 that an Urbani or Dini government early elections. strictly limited in time and guaranteed resembled the innumerable crises of sense no in crisis governmental This the postwar order.

However long they

lasted

and however frequent they were,

appealing to the people, was now their parameters were clear. Berlusconi, by who, in turn, did not possess representatives oftheir undermining the legitimacy the resilience of the old

DC.

Berlusconi laid bare their

fragility,

which may

in

the long run be a useful service.

The Lega split a

a

supported into a majority that backed Bossi, a handful that

and pro-Berlusconi formation called the Federalisti liberaldemocratici,^^ than other anything for vote to minority led by Maroni that was not prepared

new

together by Freedom Pole government. The first and third groups were held Bossi, However annihilated. a dread of fresh elections, in which they would be myth great a were if it as crisis like Berlusconi, lived through the government a

Knight of the which he, a dying King Arthur, was destined to defeat the the Lega's share but Golden Mask, the Prime Minister.^^ One cannot help

in

doubts about

The had a

future, although Bossi continues to fascinate.

its

Lega's divisions

reliable

meant

that neither Berlusconi nor the opposition

President majority in the House. This created a further novelty:

Scalfaro played a

more

active role than presidents

had done when the

DC was

rather than the plebiscitary strong. His goal was to defend the parliamentary Buttiglione held the view of democracy and to avoid new elections. Meanwhile

government, PPI together on a position of supporting a non-Berlusconi that it be a whether led by PI or a Catholic like Romano Prodi, provided and provoke government and not simply one that would collapse on command whether Behind this facade of unity lay a seething confusion about real

elections.

the PPI should go into elections— if they were

and whether

its

long-term future did not

lie

held— in

alliance

with the PDS,

in a coalition with PI,

and even

with an AN that would renounce Fascism at its January congress. The PDS stood compact behind D'Alema, who opted for the cautious "rules." Determined to policy of calling for a government of "truce" and of of the March 28 verdict the reverse to conspiring show that the PDS was not a government, such in AN even and FI include elections, D'Alema wanted to D'Alema also "truce" By demand. on collapse provided again that it would not electoral law the in change a meant he meant an end to polarization; by "rules"

of 25 percent proportional representation, the establishment ecoof enactment the and tighter regulations on TV campaign advertising, nomic measures to calm the financial markets and of antitrust legislation. reform Although such "rules" marked a sensible contribution toward the

to eliminate the

of the

Italian state,

one cannot help suspecting that D'Alema's ecumenism

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

190

residual fear of illegitimacy.

masked the PDS's

with Berlusconi. In general their desire to get rid of

One may

Such timidity

opponents were able

his

him and they seemed

to have

no

the initiative

left

to agree

on

little

except

own.

project of their

agree that Berlusconi's blend of clan warfare and (in practice weak)

authoritarian populism offers Italy

less

hope than

the politics of cooperation.

But cooperation must not slip back into the endless mediation of the old regime; it

must take

active forms.

use sharp conflicts,

On

it

Post-Cold

War

Italy

should be able to tolerate and

should not fear them.

One

January 12 a delicate compromise surfaced.

of Berlusconi's

ex-ministers would form a government of technicians. It would not guarantee early elections, but would have a specific, limited program to be executed in a

few months.^'' This would allow both sides

Lamberto Dini was invited by Scalfaro

to

to claim victory.

undertake the

The

next day

Dini announced

task.

from

a four-point program: a supplementary budget, pension reform, a switch

PR

to winner-take-all in the regional elections, scheduled for

equal access to lation.

TV

June 1995, and

during campaigns. Significantly absent was antitrust

But the formula worked

initially,

legis-

he had a

for Berlusconi claimed

gentleman's agreement that there would be elections in June, while the Lega

wished the government long

life.

However when Dini announced

his

team of ministers on January

17,

Berlusconi discarded his tolerant stance. Neither then nor in his January 23

speech in the parliamentary debate on confirmation did Dini mention elections. Berlusconi returned to his victim's role, insisting that Scalfaro had deceived

him, and also declared that democracy was being subverted.

He

was probably

disconcerted at the breadth of parliamentary support for Dini, which included the

PDS

although not RC. Nor can the sharp

percent in the

day of trading

first full

rise in

the stock market

nomination

after Dini's

— have

—

pleased

him. Dini's January 23 speech expanded the number of government projects

and a return

to include privatization is

to the

EMS, two issues on which Berlusconi

vulnerable and that cannot be handled by a government of transition. Yet

knew from Pilo's polls that FI's electorate would not tear down a right-wing but reforming government.

Berlusconi his bid to

His solution, which was emulated by Dotti's doves

wanted

PDS

began work with

can only speculate yes votes are

is

long

it

that the

noted

new

and has handed

but followed

this

will last. It has

the

suit. is

The

in

conservative Dini thus

a fragile

government and one

—

the

302

votes.

The

no outright majority

270 abstentions and RC's 39 no

without enthusiasm. The underlying

political class has

him

AN and the CCD, was abstention.

but not FI backing. His

how

outnumbered by

financial markets ever,

to vote yes

follow

demonstrated

its

issue,

how-

inability to govern Italy

responsibility for key decisions to neutral experts.

Although

Clan Rule Dini

being compared with Ciampi, the two governments are very different

is

poHtical entities.

a

new electoral

had

Does failed too?

Ciampi operated during a hiatus while the pohticians prepared

system; Dini was needed because the

this

One

mean

Di

that the broader reform

indication that

of Lega, PPI, and

up the jobs

product of that system

it

movement

in the local health centers

Lombardy who had

by parry

affiliation.

in chapter 7, the social

the option of giving

was

it.

in Italian society has

might have done so was the

Socialist politicians in

Pietro began his investigation, clientelism

As argued

first

govern efficiently and there were no alternatives to

failed to

after

191

alive

of a group

arrest

allegedly divided

Nearly three years

and well

in Milan.

groups pressing for reform of the state had

up and trying

own

to defend only their

interests.

Berlusconi's two amnesties indicated that might be happening.

Indeed

it

has been stated that "the discourse of change

is

going out of

However the same source maintains that Italy "has no genetic flaw and is not condemned to collective tragedy. "^^ The problem is how to resolve the contrast between economic dynamism and social incoherence. Such incofashion."

herence, which provides a breeding ground for the politics of charismatic leaders

who govern with TV and opinion

polls, has

not been cured by the Clean Hands

operation. Rather the designation of the old political class as scapegoat has

absolved the mass of citizens from the task of self-scrutiny. I

shall return in the

conclusion to the societal issues that

Berlusconi phenomenon, but

I

politics leads to the conclusion that the period

February 1992

is

and

Berlusconi stage a comeback?

him, but that lesser

many

My impression

will the Catholics turn

and

in the

will the

the end of the road for the Lega,

him

is

and on February 17 he

has been a time of change is

Can

continuing.

that the elites have lost faith in

as a great leader

brought down by

same way next time around? Which way

PDS

which

succeed in avoiding isolation?

Is this

when Maroni's supporters Andreotti made secret trips to

split yet again

divided? Fresh evidence has emerged that Giulio Sicily

It

and that change

restoration,

Italians perceive

men. Would he govern

behind the

of Italian history that began in

unfinished and unpredictable.

rather than of revolution

lie

wish to note here that the analysis of recent

will stand trial. It

is

time for

my

three dots

.

.

.

Conclusion:

The

Elusive Citizen

Throughout this study

I

have invoked writers to provide insights into politics

and society because, whatever been,

it

the one

much

was

a great period

most

of

else the

central to our preoccupations

read during

the last three years.

may or may not have

postwar period

Italian writing

Toto

and cinema.

is

Leonardo

Of all

Sciascia,

these writers,

who

has been

Riina, supposedly illiterate,

quoted

from The Day of the Owl, while L'Unita copublished four small volumes of Sciascia's occasional writings.

inevitable, but the real reason

of citizenship

He

is

at the core

That he would be

why

Sciascia

is

cited in the

being reread

is

Mafia debate was that the concept

of his writing.

when he worked as an elementary schoolteacher World War II, he was struck by the absurdity of explaining

has recounted that

in the years after the

Italian unification to the

schoolmaster

is

hungry, barefooted children

who were his pupils.^ The

the incarnation of the state and Sciascia realized that his was a

non-state and his pupils noncitizens. Several of his novels depict the

may serve its

as

an example.

same discovery and The Day of the Owl Bellodi, who comes from Emilia with

The policeman,

civic traditions, learns, as

he

sets

about finding a murderer in

Sicily, that

bystanders have seen nothing, informers are killed, and the mystery recedes. Bellodi succeeds in interrogating a Mafia chieftain,

the

Don

stand

Roman

politicians

Don

Mariano, but behind

and Bellodi finds himself transferred out of

Sicily. Sciascia reverses the traditional detective story to

recount a parable of the

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

194

absent

The policeman

state.

Mafioso

izens, the

strips

it

representative, the bystanders are

is its

of its power and substitutes for

its

noncit-

laws a counterstate

its

based on violence while his accomplices, the politicians, divert the instruments of government to private ends.

That they and

Sicily

its

are in the capital,

Mafia

as

Rome, demonstrates

that Sciascia considers

To Roman

unreason he opposes a

emblematic of

Italy.

mythical Paris, citadel of the Enlightenment and inhabited by writers

like the

(whom Sciascia seeks to emulate), Pascal, and La of these may guide us in our discussion of the second

inevitable Stendhal, Diderot

Rochefoucauld. The

last

phase of Sciascia's discourse on citizenship.

So

far

we have

a social order that

is

seen

how

the

self, as it

ideally inspired

by

moves outward

justice

Self-identification takes place in solitude:

himself explains that his family defended

I

and

do not

him

to

make contact with

reason, discovers only chaos. trust, therefore

I

am.

against the Fascist state.

Sciascia

But

in his

novels the family does not even possess the crude unity of "amoral familism"; is

conflict- ridden

and

self

and

irrational.

less

when he

Sciascia admits that

laceration" within himself

attacks the

As La Rochefoucauld

the narrator feels an affinity with

of killing him, thus admitting

The

Don

is

feels a "split,

Mariano, while in Todo

his complicity in

DC misgovernment. institutions,

and hence no

Sciascia

PCI ceased

denounced the

to criticize the

historic

accused of using the anti-Mafia struggle

The

as a

compromise, because,

Aldo Moro,

by an unholy

dominant

a

alliance

whom

he

means of gaining power.

absence of legitimate power explains

the kidnapped

state.

its critics

Christian Democrats and joined in

misgovernment. Similarly he turned against Leoluca Orlando,

it

a

no united, much

"the system," a Foucaultian monstrosity that draws

its self- alienation.-

in his eyes, the

from

is

quest turns into a circle in which there are no citizens, no families,

Instead there

their

Don

there

Gaetano, but he also accuses himself

no regional or professional groups, no genuine into

Mafia he

tells us,

reasonable, self Bellodi finds himself admiring

modo

it

So the violence of the counterstate penetrates the

why

Sciascia offers as a

figure in the system

who

is

model

expelled

of the Red Brigades, the Communists, and the

Catholics. Suddenly powerless,

Moro

can

tell

the truth in his prison letters.

Similarly Sciascia intimates that he, the narrator, can transcend the laceration

of the

self

powerless absent

hard to see

why

special grace, escape the general alienation.

The

by using the language of

literature should,

by some

Moro and

literature.

However

it is

the omniscient artist are subterfuges behind

state. Sciascia's vision

whom lies the

of Italian history, in which the governing group

draws in a segment of the governed and resumes oppression under a different

name,

is

akin to the pessimism of the

But unlike Tancredi,

Lampedusa

whom

he came to admire.^

Sciascia's characters try desperately to

become

citizens:

Conclusion

Una

the hero of his last novel,

195

storia sempUce,

accomplishes his duty but

is

rewarded by being forced into an act of violence.

The quest for citizenship is a parable of the last three years of Italian To probe it using very different methodological tools we might consider

history.

Robert Putnam's suggestive

thesis that the

presence of the "civic community.'"* Since

key to good government

Putnam

governments and poses the question of why Emilia- Romagna Calabria a failure,

we must

its

life,

a success

is

and

However we may begin with his civic community, which is rich in

twist his argument.

assertion that the determining factor

associational

the

is

deals with Italy's regional

is

the

among

encourages horizontal interaction, and engenders trust

The historical model is the medieval commune and the memory

participants.

of its democratic procedures has survived into the twentieth century. Certainly Putnam's remarks on clientelism are apt. clientelism breeds

narrow

self-interest

and

distrust

competitors. Putnam's view of the Catholic to the civic

community

however, that along with life

—

horizontal links,

A vertical relationship, who

of one's equals

Church

as

are also

providing an alternative

is

akin to

my

its

vertical

bonds, the Church can also create

interpretation of Pius XII.

would add,

I

—

via parish

one example of which would be the white cooperatives of

the Veneto.

to

However it is the nature of the participation in associations that appears me more problematic than Putnam maintains. Admittedly I have the unfair

advantage of writing after the revelations of systemic clientelism in northern Italy

civic

—

revelations that

would appear

community. Participation

to contradict the

in associations

is

notion of a successful

obviously not the same in

all

countries: parent- teacher organizations offer a very different kind of experience in

Bologna than

in

Sociologists of the

Washington. But there may

also

be differences of quality.

Third Republic have argued that French associations were

often merely delinquent peer groups. In Italian associations, as in political parties, the

tendency toward fragmentation

is

masked by

of the 1970s, belonging

in the student assemblies

—and decisions

the importance of stare insieme that the associations

Such and argue

do not lead outward

traits are easily

goal

are infrequent,

which means

wider groups.

that the formative experience

experience stem the suspicion of others, the fear of conspiracies Berlusconi

is

as

Salvadori and

prone

Craxi was

as

Cammelli depict

besieged individual,

who

equipped for war, such

as

trusts

—and

As

—once more schema

was not the

but the centuries of foreign occupation. From

commune

early medieval

a facade of unity.

own

explicable if we reverse Putnam's historical

more banal fashion

in a

to

is its

—

to

this

which

the disenchanted pessimism. Just as

the besieged state, so

one might

only organizations that are

the clan or the family.

talk of the

close, tight,

and

THE CRISIS OF THE ITA II AN STATE

196

Of the

clan

has maintained

we have

its

said

enough.

Of the

family Paul Ginsborg notes that

because jobs and housing have grown more scarce.

The

family outward toward the broader society.^

La Famiglia

liantly depicted in Ertore Scola's

society

who

fails

home

strength by adapting: adolescents remain at

The

the family:

The problem

lies

in turning the

inward-directed family

grandfather laments the decline of his friend Carducci,

has degenerated into the poet laureate of the

roams the world but returns final

shot

That is

is

to the family

new and

the son

artificial Italy;

intriguing.

where the

flat,

1

Of course I am exist.

ties

not using

to the

it

PDS, should make such

to argue that

That would be

960s,

entire film takes place.

of the family assembled: biological continuity, a society unto

Scola, a director with close

community does not

bril-

is

(1987). In each generation political

places his hopes in the Partito d'Azione, while his grandson, a child of the late

The

it

for longer

itself

a film

Robert Putnam's

foolish, faced as

am

I

civic

with the red

However I am suggesting that in Italy the community is very much a Gemeinschafi, dependent on close relations and emotional bonds. The PCI and the Church, as well as the Lega and FI, have fostered this kind of community. Moreover some of the great demonstrations cooperatives of Emilia-Romagna. civic

of citizenship in the

three years have been passionate, spontaneous,

last

The Putnam maintains

fax people are an example, despite their

defensive.

correctly that a

a broader, social trust. In our terms this

modern system of government requires would be more of a Gesellschafi, a cool,

rational calculation that enlightened self-interest

with people one does not direction. This kind of tions.

be

One

left

know but whose

community

returns to Violante's

to the police

is

best served

self-interest points

deals in contracts

comment

by collaboration

them

and above

in the

all

that the anti-Mafia struggle cannot

if

do not lend themselves

approach. Prominent it is

is

perpetual demonstrations are required to enable

or to convince public representatives to do their job, then something issues

same

in institu-

and the magistrates. Pressure from public opinion

necessary in any country, but

Many

and

advanced technology.

to

is

amiss.

the "everybody-in-the-piazza"

among them are institutions and laws regulating the market:

difficult to organize

demonstrations in support of a stronger Consob (the

equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Commission). Yet the need to regulate the stock market

information

is

and

exercised power over

not have arisen

to

encourage companies and brokers to provide more

of a Prime Minister who own networks competed, would

great. Similarly the bizarre situation

if

state

TV, with which

his

codes of conduct for public

The example of electoral

officials

had been

reform, long considered a matter to which most

people were indifferent, demonstrates

how

an alliance of political leaders and

experts can create an interest in supposedly remote issues. that this

is

no longer the key

in place.

issue,

While

it is

possible

Pasquino has pointed out that the struggle

Conclusion

to

change institutions

changes.

is

197

a learning process that does not

To take another example,

end with the

may have educated

Berlusconi

first

the electorate

on the importance of the public-private divide by his July 24 meeting at Arcore. privatizations have widened interest in the workings of the stock market.

The

Credito Italiano's present bid to take over Credito Romagnolo, unthinkable five years ago,

is

providing small shareholders and even the general public with

precious insights into contemporary capitalism.

The history of the last three years in Italy has instilled a hope that the actions of the Berlusconi government have not extinguished. Institutional change does not mean

much

unless the public servants believe in

here again an evolution has taken place. to

it

and

But

in themselves.

The magistrates have had

to fight so hard

defend an independence that they had previously surrendered that they will

surely not relinquish

again.

it

The memory of Di

performance should remove the need

A nation should build on

its

for future

TV

impassioned

Pietro's

such performances.

strengths. Since local ties are strong in Italy, a

approach would be to expand them so that they embrace more people and

fruitful

undermine

a wider range of tasks. Decentralization could strengthen rather than

the state, provided that

it is

undertaken without rhetoric and that responsibility

and power move together from center

to periphery.

The tendency toward what

has been called "neo-feudal anarchy,"

which

from the inadequacy of the

overworked

state,

should be corrected by widening the sense of community.

The changing

Italy will

wither away and even will

parallels

of course remain

if governments

not decline. This

drawn

results

entirely as

is

Italy.

The

it

should be. Throughout

but

it

will

of Italian

trait

political culture.

and must remain

solution, but

Above

it

not going to

is

for

Franco Baresi

this

book

can produce

all Italy

The

state

for foreign

may

models

and

so

own

can produce

on

—

new

—

The gamble of the

last

three years has

the urban middle classes of northern Italy,

is

move-

will not be able to realize their goals merely by gaining

version of clan government offered

which

a

Italian version of the Austrian solution.

citizens.

a greater share of power in a clientelistic state.

create a state,

is

cease to be overworked

the small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs of Lombardy, the anti-Mafia in Sicily,

have

interventionist. Italy cannot adopt the "Erhard"

its

been that the protesting social groups

ment

I

with France and Britain, but these elucidate arguments and do

not create models. Indeed the excessive admiration

damaging

family

perform better, admiration

Nor will

they be bought off by the

by Berlusconi. Rather they

neither overbearing nor absent because

it

will is

have to

no longer

overworked, in which the market functions and public goods are not sold to the highest bidder but are distributed in a efficient. In short these

Sciascia

and citizenship

manner that is recognizably fairer and more

and other groups will cease to

be

will

break out of the trap depicted by

elusive.

NOTES

Chapter

1.

The newspaper

II

1

Manifesto marked the celebration with a book, II crac delta

Banca Romana (Rome:

II

Manifesto, 1993).

June 27,

2.

Ralph Dahrendorf,

3.

Gianfranco Pasquino, "A Case of Regime Crisis" in G. Pasquino and

McCarthy,

eds..

Espresso,

The

End of Postwar

1

993,

p. 5

1

Politics in Italy:

o/;5>5>2 (Boulder: Westview, 1993), p.

P.

The Landmark Elections

1.

4.

Franco Cazzola, L'ltalia del Pizzo (Turin: Einaudi, 1992), pp. 10-59.

5.

For Giuseppe Garofano's judgment of Gardini, see La Repubblica, November 23, 1993. For Romiti's mishaps, see

March

1,

La

Repubblica, February 16, 1994,

Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torrinese, 1983), 6.

Sergio

Romano,

LItalia scappata di

mano

7.

Giorgio Bocca, Espresso, }u\y 15, 1994,

8.

The

Italian

name

without change 9.

Massimo

and

1994. For Agnelli and Valletta, see Piero Bairati, Valletta (Turin:

is

for

it is

pp.

62 and 310.

{M'lhn: Longanesi, 1993), pp. 10-16.

p. 5.

gattopardismo and the historical process of change

called trasformismo.

L. Salvadori, Storia dltalia e crisi di regime (Bologna:

1994), p. 36. See also

Marco Cammelli, "Sistema

II

Mulino,

politico bloccato, stato

accentrato" (manuscript version). 10.

Vera Zamagni, Dalla periferia al centro (Bologna:

much on

have drawn

Denis

Mack

Smith,

this

Italy,

book a

for the

II

Mulino, 1990),

economic data

p.

in this chapter

Modem History (Ann Arbor:

143.

I

and on

University of Mich-

igan Press, 1969), for the political data. 11.

Giulio Sapelli, Sul capitalismo italiano (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1993),

12.

Salvatore Lupo, Storia della

Mafia (Rome: Donzelli, 1993),

p.

p. 158. See also

pp. 19-66 for a discussion of the Mafia during this period. Also

Catanzaro,

// delitto

1988), pp. 84-141.

come impresa:

storia sociale della

156.

Raimondo

Mafia (Padua: Liviana,

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

200

13.

Giorgio Galli, Storia della Democrazia cristiana (Bari: Laterza, 1978), pp. 7-19. Galli goes as far as to say that the

14.

Giovanni Gentile, quoted

in

Church hierarchy "Hquidated"

Alberto Asor Rosa, Storia

the PPI

(p. 5).

d'ltalia, vol. 4,

t.

2

(Turin: Einaudi, 1975), p. 1411.

Chapter 2

1

on the 1 992 and 1 994

Statistics

elections are taken

from La Repubblica, March

30, 1994. 2.

Gianni Baget-Bozzo,

II Partito cristiano al potere (Florence: Vallechi,

3.

y4yyfwr^, September 21, 1993.

4.

La

Repubblica, October 26, 1993,

5.

La

Repubblica, January 11,1 994.

6.

n Manifesto,

7.

The

figures

Difficult 8.

La

9.

L'Unita,

1974),

220.

vol. l,p.

March

and L'Unita, October 27, 1993.

15, 1994.

on mass attendance are taken from

F.

Spotts and T. Wieser,

Democracy {Cambridge: Cambridge University

March

Repubblica,

Apn\

Italy,

Press, 1986), p.

A

247.

30, 1994.

15, 1994.

10.

La

11.

La Stampa, October

12.

La

13.

The main

Repubblica, April 14,1 994.

Repubblica,

4,

March

1993.

29, 1994.

historical works,

Pietro Scoppola,

La

on which

I

have drawn heavily in

repubblica dei partiti {BoiognA:

propostapolitica di De Gasperi (Bolognx. dell'Italia

II

II

this chapter, are:

Mulino, 1991), and La

Mulino, 1977);

Silvio Lanaro, Storia

repubblicana (Venezia: Marsilio, 1992); Aurelio Lepre, Storia della

prima Repubblica (Bologna:

II

Mulino, 1993); Paul Ginsborg, Storia

dal dopoguerra a oggi (Turin: Einaudi, 1989).

Claudio Pavone, Una guerra

civile:

un

On

the Resistance

d'ltalia

have used

I

saggio storico sulla moralita della

Resistenza (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1991). See also "L'ltalia repubblicana: tre autori a

confronto," Passato e presente,

14.

For a debate on

15.

Silvio Lanaro, op.

op.

cit., p.

and

a.

XI, n. 29 (1993), pp.

this issue see "L'ltalia repubblicana: tre autori a

44.

cit., p.

the Reconstruction

On the general issue see John L. Ha.rpei, America

of Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University

commonly thought with skillfully.

1-32.

18.

1986), p. 87. Harper argues that Italian groups had

it

1

confronto,"

On

Press,

more fi-eedom than

is

respect to the

United States and that they exploited

the 1948 elections, see

David Ellwood, "The 1948 elections

Notes

A

in Italy:

and TV, States

Cold War Propaganda

vol. 13, n.

201

Battle" in Historical Journal

ofFilniy Radio

(1993): 19-33. See also James E. Miller, 77?^ United

1

and Italy, 1940-1 950 {Chzpei

Hill: University

of North Carolina

Press,

Mulino, 1990),

403.

1986), pp. 213-74. 16.

A. Lepre, op.

17.

Paul Ginsborg, op.

18.

Vera Zamagni,

19.

P.

20.

The

cit., p. 9. cit.,

II

p.

Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti, pp. 74-81. Italian

term

—

poliedricita

is

Littorio, Prefazione di

21.

pp. 42-44.

Dalia periferia al centra (Bologna:

P. P. Pasolini to

Marina Addis Sabe,

see

U. A. Grimaldi (Milan:

Luciano Serra undated (August 1943) in

1940-1954 (Turin: Einaudi, 1986),

p.

Gioventii italiana del

Feltrinelli,

1973),

p. 33.

P. P. Pasolini, Lettere

184. For his early writings, see Mario

Ricci, ed., Pasolini e "II Setaccio" {Bologna.: Cappelli, 1977).

22.

Salvatore Satta,

De

and

Profitndis (Milan: Adelphi, 1980), pp. 79, 175,

book was written between June 1944 and April 1945.

Satta's

It

was

16. first

published in 1948. 23.

Ennio Di Nolfo, Vaticano

e Stati Uniti

1939-1952 (Milan: Franco Angeli,

1978), p. 427. 24.

A. Lepre, op.

On

the

contemporanea I'f/«/>^,

25.

18.

cit., p.

On

(Bari: Laterza,

see

pp. 96-103. nella societa

1988), pp. 33-57. For Fellini's

Cardinal Domenico Tardini, Ennio di Nolfo, Vaticano 1952, op.

cit.,

pp. 279-81.

have used these documents

I

see

Lanaro thinks the Vatican's rise

politica di

flirtation

of anti-Fascism

—

De

46

Gasperi, p.

must be

op.

cit.,

Uniti 1939-

e Stati

as a

major source for

treated with care as they constitute

win the U.S. government over

the Vatican's campaign to

by the

comment,

October 20, 1993.

the Vatican's role, although they

26.

cit.,

Guido Verucci, La Chiesa

Pius XII, see also S. Lanaro, op.

Church under Fascism,

to

its

views.

with a Salazar-like solution was blocked Laproposta

pp. 90-95. Scoppola agrees

— but argues

that the Vatican continued to be

tempted by authoritarianism. 27.

Ennio Di Nolfo,

28.

For good discussions of

op.

Antonio Gambino,

cit., p.

450. Tardini gives Italy away on

this issue, see

P.

30.

On

31.

P.

De

293.

106 and

Gasperi, p. 73.

Pius XII and the state, see G. Baget Bozzo, op.

Scoppola,

p.

cit., p.

Storia del dopogiterra (Bari: Laterza, 1975), p. 103.

Scoppola, La proposta politica di

29.

Paul Ginsborg, op.

cit., vol.

1, p.

ed., Chiesa e State nella storia d'ltalia (Bari: Laterza,

261. 1967), pp.

783, 786, and 794. 32.

At the same moment the Vatican was wondering whether the Axis powers would not be better than the Allies

Di Nolfo, op.

cit.,

at

maintaining order once the war ended. See Ennio

pp. 190-200. For

De Gasperi's

statement, see

p. 54.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

202

33.

G. Verucci, op.

cit.,

218. See also Enzo Collotti, "Collocazione inter-

p.

nazionale dell'Italia dairarmistizio

L

'Italia

alle

premesse dell'alleanza arlantica,"

dalla Liberazione alia repubblica (Milan: Feltrinelli,

1

in

976) pp. 79- 1 07. ,

Collotti argues that domestic actors used the international situation to advance their cause

and

that

De Gasperi saw the coalitions with the

Left as a

temporary

phase. 34.

The

thesis

of the three overlapping struggles

found

is

in

Claudio Pavone, op.

cit.

35.

Renata Vigano, L'Agnese va a morire (Turin: Einaudi, 1949),

36.

Cado p.

142.

p.

Levi, L'Orologio {Txxnn: Einaudi, first published 1949, re-edited 1989),

much

308. Unsurprisingly Levi's novel has been

discussed in the

last

two

years.

37.

For an assessment of De Gasperi's government as conservative, see

"The Rebirth ofthe Party System 1944-1948,"

in S.

of Italy 1943-1950 (New York: Humanities

Press,

J.

Woolf,

F.

The Rebirth

ed.,

who

tive, states his case in

in

L

'Italia

38.

Guido

39.

These that

both of his books and also

—

op.

cit., p.

op.

from A. Lepre, op.

74.

Gasperi was not a conserva-

in

"L'awento

cit.,

di

De Gasperi,"

pp. 31 5-49.

cit., p.

128. David Ellwood notes

cit., p.

killed in Sicily alone at the

time of the 1948

23.

Lanaro uses the term 1950s

in the schools in the

41.

cit., p.

Carli, Intervista sul capitalismo (Bari: Laterza, 1977), p. 71.

36 labor leaders were

Silvio

De

dalla Liberazione alia repubblica, op.

figures are taken

elections

40.

argues passionately that

The

1971), pp. 57-94.

majority of Italian historians take this view. See Giorgio Galli, op. Pietro Scoppola,

Catalano,

real cultural repression to describe the

—

atmosphere

"L'ltalia repubblicana: tre autori a confronto,"

27.

Nicola Tranfaglia,

ed.,

Mafia, Politica e Ajfari 1943-1991 (Bari: Laterza,

1992), pp. 20-42. 42.

Carlo Guarnieri, "Bureaucrazie pubbliche e consolidamento democratico: caso italiano," Rivista italiana di scienza politica,

73-103. See also Marco Cammelli, op. 43.

The two outstanding

historians

radically different positions

a.

XVIII,

n.

1

il

(April 1988):

cit.

ofthe DC, Scoppola and Baget Bozzo, take

on De Gasperi. Scoppola has dedicated

great

De Gasperi fought to create that De Gasperi should not be

learning and passion to defending the thesis that a

DC

that

was autonomous ofthe Vatican,

considered a conservative, and that even after 1947 he maintained a link with the PCI,

which he considered an authentic

Bozzo, whose

II Partita cristiano al Potere'is

De

ofthe new

republic. Baget

Gasperi saved Italy from Pius XII

(p.

359), declares

from 1946 on De Gasperi should be considered

a conservative

passion, denies that that at least

part

written with equal erudition and

Notes

(p.

De

508), and concludes that

Gasperi

203

Rebirth ofItaly, op. AA.

cit.,

De

Gasperi see

S. J.

Woolf, The

pp. IIAA?).

Giorgio La Pira, "L'attesa della povera gente," Cronache sociali (J anusiry 1950): 2-6. For this discussion of Dossetti

He

was himself a Dossettiano.

whom

is

I

G. Baget Bozzo, op.

46.

Ibid., p.

47.

L.

much on

have relied

Baget Bozzo

not uncritical of Dossetti (op.

De

he accuses of not standing up to paragraph that follows

in the

45.

DC without a worldview (p.

the

left

510). For a non-Italian historian's view of

However

Gasperi.

cit., p.

who 347)

the judgment

my own.

is

67.

cit., p.

510.

Domenici, "Unificazione

e pluralita

Gramsci," Critica Marxista

in

(1989/5): 76. 48.

On Togliatti's use and abuse of Gramsci see Paul Ginsborg, op. cit., p. hegemony

see

Aldo Schiavone, Per

il

nuovo

Pa

On

57.

(Bari: Laterza, 1985), p. 85.

For an analysis of Togliatti's strategy and the interpretations of it, see Donald Sassoon, Togliatti e la via italiana al socialismo (Turin: Einaudi, 1980), pp.

The most complete

1-62.

history of the

PCI

Paolo Spriano, Storia del Partita comunista

end of the war remains

the

at

italiano, vol. 5 (Turin:

Einaudi,

1975). 49.

Giorgio Bocca, Palmiro Togliatti {Komt: L'Unita, 1992 edition), pp. 341-58.

50.

Antonio Gambino, op.

51.

Giorgio Bocca, op.

Bocca

is

sharply critical of Togliatti's attitude. cit., p.

cit.,

492.

411. Sergio

p.

brilliant if unflattering insights into the

relied

on

his secret

whose

Bertelli,

PCI

//

Gruppo contains

leadership, argues that Togliatti

diplomacy with the Vatican, see

//

Gruppo (Milan:

Rizzoli,

1980), pp. 340-51. 52.

Franco Rodano, quoted in G. Bocca, op.

53.

Claudio Napoleoni, "Due opposti giudizi sull'economia

(May

1

my

"I

comunisti

riformismo," Studi Pietro

169.

Di Loreto,

italiani,

storici, n.

was not,

is

of duplicity

different

PCI presented "the

from

il

New

Deal

e

il

italiana," Rinascita,

PCI and the

difficile

"Doppiezza" {Bologm: is

based partly

PCI was pretending

his.

Nor do

Scoppola

I

II

Mulino, 1991),

to be revolutionary

feels that

"II

PCI

my

p.

my

when

it

agree with Pietro Scoppola that the

new

La

material from

repubblica

Cominform

indicates that Togliatti considered resorting to force after the

expelled from the government. But

sented by Aldo Agosti,

del

on Di Loreto 's book but

gravest of threats" to Italian democracy, see

deipartiti, op. cit., p. 108.

reformist

problema

2/3 (1992): 457-78.

Togliatti e la

My discussion

conclusion, namely, that the

files

405.

949): 234. For a longer discussion of the postwar

state, see

54.

cit., p.

PCI was

interpretation of the evidence

e la svolta del 1947," in Studi storici, n.

1

—

pre-

(1990):

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

204

53-88

—

55.

him and

to

on

given

is

comunismo

rossa,

cit.,

pp. 465-75. Secchia's

509.

p.

success story of EmiHa-Romagna

The

conform with Soviet

to

disarm his opponents within the PCI.

For the assassination attempt, see G. Bocca, op.

comment 56.

was feigning toughness

that Togliatti

is

criticism of

is

recounted by Fausto Anderhni, Terra

socialdemocrazia reale (Bologna: Istituto Gramsci,

ideale,

1991). For the parallels with the

DC in the Veneto, see Carlo Trigilia,

partiti e piccole imprese, (Bologna:

II

Grandi

Mulino, 1986).

Chapter 3

Romano,

1.

Sergio

2.

L Vnita, January

3.

Sergio eds.,

Romano,

From

L'ltalia scappata di

mano

(Milan: Longanesi, 1993), p. 123.

28, 1994. "Italy

and the

New

Europe,"

D. Calleo and

in

the Atlantic to the Urals (Washington:

Gordon,

P.

Foundation of European

Studies, 1992), p. 169. 4.

For

this

account of the 1948 elections

The United

States

and

Italy

I

have drawn heavily on James Miller,

1940-1950 (Chapel

Hill: University

of North

Carolina Press, 1986), pp. 213-74. 5.

Pietro Pastorelli,

1987),

p.

La

Politica estera italiana del dopoguerra (Bologna:

II

Mulino,

118.

6.

Claudio Gatti, Rimanga

7.

Piero Bairati, Valletta (Turin:

tra noi (Milan: Longanesi, 1990), p. 40.

Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torrinese, 1983),

pp. 254-69. 8.

Claudio Gatti, op.

9.

Sergio Zavoli,

10.

La

cit., p.

120.

notte della Repubblica

Claudio Gatti, op.

cit., p.

(Rome: I'Unita, 1994),

p.

23.

133. In general Gatti exonerates the CIA, but he

not altogether convincing; see

my

review of his book

11.

Giorgio Bocca, Ilterrorismo italiano (Milan: Rizzoli, 1978),

12.

Giorgio Galli, Storia delpartito armato (Milan: Rizzoli, 1986), pp. 326-30.

13.

Claudio Gatti, op.

was

to

cit.,

Pasquino, (Bologna: 14.

p. 14.

American sources deny that Gladio

be used against the PCI, but see Franco Ferraresi, "Una struttura segreta

denominato Gladio,"

15.

pp. 29-44. Gatti's

is

Polis (1992/3): 597-99.

Politica in Italia Edizione 92, a cura di S.

II

Mulino, 1992),

Hellman

e

G.

p. 94.

P. Pastorelli, op. cit., p. 176. Ibid., pp.

129-44.

Commons States in

The

offer to join

was made

in

guarded language in Bevin's

speech of January 22 and was repeated explicitly by the United

March 1948.

205

Notes II partita cristiano alpotere, op. cit., pp.

272 and 409.

16.

G. Baget-Bozzo,

17.

Nico Perrone, Mattel, ilnemico italiano (Milan: Leonardo, 1989), pp. 97-105. Perrone notes that

De

Gasperi resisted strong U.S. pressure in 1951

granted Mattei exclusive rights

in the

Po Valley

(p. 54).

On Mattei, see also Dow

Votaw, The Six-legged Dog {Berkeley. University of California 18.

John Harper, P.

when he

Press, 1964).

Venezia," Politica in Italia Edizione 88, a cura di

"II vertice di

Corbettae R. Leonardi (Bologna:

II

Mulino, 1988), pp. 69-92. Also

Affari Internazionali, L'ltalia nella politica internazionale

Istituto

1985-1986 {M.'\[2in:

Angeh, 1988), pp. 25-72. 19.

"II

cerchioquadrato," supplement to

II

Manifesto, February 13, 1994. For

Craxi and Siad Barre, see Sergio Turone, Corrotti e corruttori (Bari: Laterza, 1984),

283. Craxi was not of course unique in

p.

Italian foreign aid to Senegal into

government 20.

officials, see

5«^ (Dakar) November

Beniamino Andreatta, "Una

Italy.

For the diversion of

the pockets of Senegalese

and

Italian

11, 1993.

politica estera per l'ltalia," II Mulino, (1993/5):

881-91. cerchioquadrato," op.

21.

"II

22.

La Stampa, February 21 1994.

cit.

,

23.

La Repubblica, October

24.

Luigi Spaventa,

25.

Sergio

26.

F. R. Willis, Italy Chooses

1

1

,

993.

La Repubblica, August

Romano, L

Italia scappata di

2,

1978.

mano, op.

cit., p.

114.

Europe (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1971),

pp. 30-41.

23 and 72.

27.

Ibid., pp.

28.

Peter Ludlow, The

Making of the

EMS

{hondon: Butterworth, 1982), pp.

205-17. 29.

Beniamino Andreatta, op.

30.

Alia ricerca del buon governo, campaign material of Forza

31.

See Vera Zamagni, Dalla periferia al centro, op.

scommessa

cit., p.

888.

Europa (Milan: Marzorati,

government intervention was

32.

31

"Una

The Humanities

1

988). For the view that

more

possible, see Marcello

De

Cecco, "Economic

Woolf,

ed..

The Rebirth ofItaly

Policy in the Reconstruction Period," in

York:

Italia, p.

pp. 403-20. See also

sul futuro: I'industria italiana nella ricostruzione," in L'ltalia e la

politica dipotenza in

(New

cit.,

S. J.

Press, 1972), pp. 135-55.

Pasquale Saraceno, Intervista sulla Ricostruzione, a cura di Lucio Villari (Bari: Laterza, 1977), p. 104.

33.

Michele

Salvati,

Garzanti, 1984), 34.

Economia

e Politica in Italia

Vera Zamagni, "Una scommessa Saraceno, op.

dal dopoguerra a oggi (Milan:

p. 68.

cit., p.

127.

sul futuro," op. cit., p.

480. See also

P.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

206

163.

35.

p. Saraceno, op.

36.

David Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe {London: Longmans, 1992), is

Michele

also

cit., p.

196. This

p.

main theme.

Salvati's

37.

Commissione Antimafia,

38.

Michele

39.

Vera Zamagni, "The

Relazione sulla Camorra,

December 21 1993, ,

pp. 7-22.

Salvari, op. cit., p. 60.

Economic Miracle

Italian

Power in Europe 11 (New 40.

The Economist, January 29, 1994,

41.

Patrick

McCarthy,

"Italy:

See

43.

Michele

44.

Pier Paolo D'Attorre,

Ennio p.

di

Nolfo, ed.,

207.

63. State," International

Economic

Ideas,

6-9.

Grandi partiti e piccole imprese, op.

42.

Trigilia,

p.

The Absent

(November-December 1993):

Cado

revisited,"

York: Walter de Gruyter, 1992),

cit.

Salvati, op. cit., p. 134.

in his edited

"Sogno americano e mito sovietico nell'Italiacontemporanea,"

Nemici per la pelle (Mihn: Franco Angeli, 1991),

p.

31.

Chapter 4

1.

Espresso, ]u\y 18,

1993, pp. 40-46 and August

2.

Espresso, July 18,

1993, pp. 67-69.

3.

P.

A. Allum, Politics

and Society

1,

1993, pp. 24-34.

in Post-war Naples

(Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1973), pp. 12-11 4.

Edward C.

Banfield,

Free Press, 1958),

p.

The Moral

Basis

of a Backward Society (New York: The

83.

5.

Giorgio Galli, Storia della Democrazia cristiana (Bari: Laterza, 1978),

6.

V7L\\\G\n'hox%, Storia dltaliadaldopoguerra a og^^\xxm.\Y^\n2Axd^\, 1989),

7.

G. Baget Bozzo,

II Partito cristiano e

\911), p. 119. For this section

on Giorgio 8.

For the

DC

Galli,

I

factions, see

9.

For a

full

G. Pasquino,

analysis

e caso italiano

of the

299. 193.

Tapertura a sinistra (Florence: Valleschi,

Feltrinelli,

S.

Tarrow,

"II resistibile

DC: A

eds.,

Party for All Seasons,"

(London: Cass, 1980), pp.

declino della

DC,"

ed., (Bari: Laterza, 1985), pp.

political system, see

as

1975), pp. 1-82.

G. Pasquino, "Italian

Lange and

88-109. See also Mario Caciagli, politico italiano,

p.

have drawn heavily on Baget Bozzo as well

Eanfani {Mihn:

in Italy in Transition, P.

p.

Giovanni

in IlSistema

101-27.

Sartori, Teoria dei partiti

(Milan: SugarCo, 1982). See also Sidney Tarrow,

"The

Italian

Party System Between Crisis and Transition," American Journal of Political Science, vol. 21, n. 2

10. 1

1.

Sergio

The

Romano,

Italian

word

(May

1977): 193-221.

L'ltalia scappata di

for this

is

mano

dietrologia.

(Milan: Longanesi, 1993), p. 15.

Notes

12.

207

(New Haven:

Joseph La Palombara, Democracy Italian Style

Yale University

Press, 1987). 13.

Sidney Tarrow, Between Centre and Periphery (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). See also

Gianfranco Pasquino, La Repubblica dei cittadini ombra

(Milan: Garzanti, 1991), 14.

p. 17.

For a discussion of fragmentation, see Joseph La Palombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 137-42.

1

5.

This account

taken from Giampaolo Pansa, Bisaglia, una carriera democristi-

is

ana (Milan: SugarCo, 1975). 16.

Joseph La Palombara, Interest Groups in Italian

17.

Giorgio Galli, Storia della Democrazia Cristiana, op.

Politics,

Paul Ginsborg, op.

19.

Gianfranco Pasquino, "Italian DC," op.

20.

Giorgio Galli, Storia della Democrazia Cristiana, op.

21

For Lauro and for Gava's career until the

.

Allum, op.

pp. 235-46.

108.

cit., p.

1

970s

1

cit., p.

285.

have drawn heavily on Percy

pp. 274-324. This superb study caused

cit.,

cit.,

pp. 255-59.

pp. 201-08.

18.

cit.,

op.

cit.,

Gava a

certain

amount

of trouble.

December

12, 1992.

22.

II Manifesto,

23.

Giorgio Bocca, Z'/w/^-rwo (Milan: Mondadori, 1992),

24.

Commissione Antimafia, Relazione

sui rapporti tra

25.

Z-'f/mVi.

sulla

Commissione Antimafia,

159. See also

Mafia

March

e politica.

May

p.

210.

Camorra, December 21, 1993,

relatore

28, 1993, p. 97.

13, 1992.

26.

Raimondo Catanzaro,

27.

Salvatore Lupo, op.

op.

cit., p.

cit., p.

190.

165. There are major differences of interpretation

between Lupo and Pino Arlacchi, La Mafia imprenditrice (Bo\o^na.: 1993).

Where

Arlacchi distinguishes between an old and a

stresses continuity.

businessman

as

depicts

it

closer to

28.

La

29.

A

as a

p.

Luciano Violante, Relazione

II

Mulino,

new Mafia, Lupo

Whereas Arlacchi considers the emergence of the criminal

to be the

major development

normal phase

in recent

Mafia history, Lupo

in the Mafia's evolution. In general

Catanzaro

is

Lupo.

Repubblica, February 26, 1994.

fresh controversy over Sciascia's interpretation

of the Mafia broke out

in

1993. For a balanced judgment, see Nicola Tranfaglia in La Repubblica,

December

21, 1993. For Lupo's view, see op.

cit., p.

219.

30.

Commissione Antimafia, Insediamenti e infiltrazioni di soggetti ed organizzazioni

31.

S.

di tipo mafioso in aree non tradizionali,

Lupo, op.

op. 32.

cit., p.

cit., p.

238.

// Manifesto,

December

17, 1993, p. 21

195. For the history of the drug trade see R. Catanzaro,

October 21,1 993.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

20 8

33.

34.

Tiziana Parenti, Forza

Convention, Rome, February 6, 1994,

Italia

by Press Office of Forza

Italia. Silvio

La Stampa, November

15, 1993;

Avvenire,

December

La Repubblica, November

35.

L

For the historical account

and

17, 1993;

July 22, 1994, p. 49.

have drawn heavily on Carlo Guarnieri,

I

istratura e Politica in Italia (Bologna:

account of the 1980s 37.

provided

21, 1994.

9, 1993.

36.

'Espresso,

text

La Stampa, March

Berlusconi,

differs slightly

Giampaolo Pansa, Lo

Sfascio

II

Mag-

Mulino, 1992). However Guarnieri's

from mine.

(Rome: L'Unita-Sperling

e Kupfer, 1993), pp.

91-98. 38.

Giorgio Bocca, op.

39.

Claudio Fracassi

40.

L 'Espresso,

41.

Giampaolo Pansa, I Bugiardi (Rome: L'Unita-Sperling e Kupfer, 1993),

e

cit., p.

34.

Michele Gambino, Berlusconi, una biografia non autorizzata

(Rome: Awenimenti, 1994),

p.

61.

July 22, 1994, p. 48. p.

189.

Chapter 5

1.

The in

quotations from Berlusconi are taken from

TV," reproduced

biografia

in

"II

Messaggio di Berlusconi

Claudio Fracassi e Michele Gambino, Berlusconi, una

non autorizzata (Rome: Awenimenti, 1994), pp. 56-58, and from

Berlusconi's February 6 speech to the Forza Italia Convention (text supplied

by Press Office of Forza

Italia).

2.

For Fininvest's troubles with the Milan magistrates, see LEspresso, July 29,

3.

C. Fracassi e

4.

Giampaolo Pansa, I Bugiardi {Rome: L'Unita-Sperling e Kupfer, 1994),

5.

The term

1994, pp. 57-59.

M. Gambino,

state bourgeoisie

and Giuseppe Turani indicate groups that

op.

cit., p.

44.

wns popularized

as well as

worked

1970s by Eugenio

in the

by Guido Carli

—

in the public sector

see note 7.

and were

power system. Such groups were contrasted with the state bourgeoisie has

expanded since the 1970s,

I

p. 19.

Scalfari

They used

part of the

it

to

DC-PSI

private sector. Since the

have expanded the term to

include private sector groups that rely heavily on political power. Because the entire Italian private sector

is

linked with the state

involves a difficult but necessary distinction.

the 1990s intervened

1970s, they too may, bourgeoisie.

more massively

when they

—

see chapters

Moreover because

in business

1

and 3

—

this

politicians in

than they did during the

play this role, be included in the state

209

Notes

6.

Aurelio Lepre, Storia della prima Repubblica {Boio^nx.

7.

On

II

Mulino, 1993),

the nationalization, see Giorgio Mori, "La nazionalizzazione in

La nazionalizzazione

dibattito politico-economico," in

p.

215.

Italia:

il

dell'energia elettrica:

Atti del Convegno per ilXXVanniversario dell 'istiruzione dell 'Enelihatn: Laterza,

1989), pp. 91-116.

Eugenio

Scalfari e

My

account of Edison's misadventures owes

Giuseppe Turani, Razza padrona (Milan:

much

Feltrinelli,

to

1974).

See also Guido Carli, Intervista sul capitalismo italiano, a cura di Eugenio (Bari:

Scalfari

new

1976), pp. 76-112. Carlo Scognamiglio, the

Laterza,

Speaker of the Senate, saw in the nationalization of the electrical industry the first

economic power from Milan

sign of the shift of

to

Rome,

see Espresso,

April 29, 1994, p. 62. 8.

Espresso, July 4,

9.

For Cuccia

I

1993,

p.

89.

have drawn on Fabio Tamburini,

Un Siciliano a Milano

(Milan:

Longanesi, 1992). See also Steven Solomon, "The Last Emperor," Euromoney

(October 1988): 42-60 and Geoffrey Dyer, "Cuccia's Last Stand," Euromoney

(December 1993): 26-32. Another good Agnelli 10.

Espresso, ]\i\y 11, 1993, p. 43.

11.

F.

1

2.

13.

Tamburini, op.

cit., p.

L Vnita, February

25,

1

of Cuccia

is,

Alan Friedman, pp. 87-109.

299.

994.

For the Cuccia-Sindona struggle cit.,

portrait

and the Network ofItalian Power {London: Harrap, 1988),

I

have used E. Scalfari and G. Turani, op.

pp. 280-95; F. Tamburini, op.

cit.,

pp. 237-304;

and Giorgio

Galli,

L'ltalia sotteranea {Bzn: Laterza, 1983), pp. 169-77.

281.

14.

E. Scalfari e G. Turani, op.

15.

Ibid., p.

16.

Espresso, July 11, 1994, p. 46. Fininvest's estimate

cit., p.

288.

Cuccia's around S4 billion. For recent data

LIT

1

,500 to the dollar, which

is

E. Scalfari e G. Turani, op.

18.

Giorgio Galli, op.

19.

Giampaolo Pansa,

20.

G. Carli, op.

cit., p.

69.

21.

G.

cit., p.

180.

22.

La Repubblica, February 22, 1994.

Bisaglia,

op.

Economist, February 12, 1994.

This

my

of

interpretation

cit.,

pp. 320-36. For the

PCI view,

see

and June 20, 1975.

24.

is

and

rate

356.

cit., p.

23.

arms-for-lraq affair

billion

180.

Rinascita, February 21, 1975,

Galli, op.

around $2

a rough average for the years 1990-94.

17.

cit., p.

is

we have used an exchange

of Alan Friedman's exhaustive account of the

Spider's

Web (New

York: Bantam Books, 1993).

June 27, 1993, pp. 22-30.

25.

Espresso,

26.

Cesare Romiti, Questi anni alia Eiat {Mihn: Rizzoli, 1988),

p.

82.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

210

27.

Napoleone Colajanni, "Dietro Cefis

See, for example,

March 28.

Cesare Romiti, op.

29.

E. Scalfari e

30.

Steven Solomon, op.

17.

cit., p.

G. Turani, op.

view favorable

cit., p.

460.

57; F. Tamburini, op.

cit., p.

£j/>r«5
August

8,

32.

Espresso,

August

1

33.

The

,

Sergio Cusani

money La

35.

E. Scalfari e

36.

La

Repubblica,

pp. 386-404. For a

cit.,

cit.,

pp. 242-57.

pp. 240-64.

1993, pp. 64-70 and August 15, 1993, pp. 46-54. 1993, trial

p. 59.

did not provide precise information on the amount of

how much went

or

34.

cit.,

Schimberni, see Alan Friedman, Agnelli, op.

to

For the establishment's view, see Cesare Romiti, op. 31.

chi governa?" Rinascita,

21, 1975.

March

9,

to Craxi.

1994.

G. Turani, op.

cit.,

and 460.

pp. 29

Repubblica, February 3, 1994.

Chapter 6

1.

Communist spokesmen have historic

compromise and the

during 1976

But 2.

this

is

Antonio

to 1979, see

tried to distinguish

reality

Alessandro Natta, Critica marxista

Bisaglia in

Giampaolo Pansa, p.

Cesare Romiti, Questi anni

4.

Enrico Berlinguer, "Imperialismo

r/w^ (European

p.

3.

Reprinted

(Rome: Riuniti, 1975),

edition),

salvezza e

(Rome:

la

una

carriera democristiana

e coesistenza alia luce dei fatti cileni,"

p.

in

La

questione comunista,

609.

June 30, 1975, cover page.

Enrico Berlinguer, "Intesa e lotta di tutte la

7.

ed.,

Bisaglia:

alia Fiat {M'lhn: Rizzoli, 1988), p. 17.

September 28, 1973,

Antonio Tato,

6.

(1985), p. 29.

355.

3.

5.

2,

specious.

(Milan: SugarCo, 1975),

Rinascita,

between the project of the

of the governments of National Solidarity

rinascita dell'ltalia,"

le

forze

democratiche e popolari per

XLV Congresso

del PCI, Atti e risoluzioni

Riuniti, 1975).

Ibid., p. 25.

45 and

51.

8.

Ibid., pp.

9.

"Intervento di BrunoTrentin," Riunite, 1975),

p.

XIV Congresso del PCL Atti e risoluzioni {Kome:

446.

10.

Aldo Schiavone, Per ilnuovo /'C/(Bari:

11.

Ibid., p. 76.

Laterza, 1985), p. 85.

Notes

1

2.

Giuseppe Are, Radiografia di un partita:

2

PCI negli anni 70

il

(Milan: Rizzoli,

p. 51.

1980), 13.

E. Berlinguer, "Conclusioni,"

XIV Congresso del PCI,

14.

Alberto Asor Rosa argues that

Moro wanted

the

p.

DC

634.

to retain

its

central role

but to become a more popular party, see A. Asor Rosa, "La cultura politica del

compromesso

15.

storico," Laboratorio politico, nos. 2-3, (1982): 12.

how Moro pursued

to see

Intervista,

February

3,

1976, reprinted

nio Tato, ed., (Rome: Riuniti, 1984),

by Gianni Baget Bozzo political analysis

60. This surprising omission

hard

DC, la Chiesa e

noted

is

...

culture has never attempted

of the Catholic Church and especially of the

Gianni Baget Bozzo, "La

it is

Conversazioni con Berlinguer, Anto-

in

p.

—"Communist

politico, nos. 2-3, (1982):

But

the second goal between 1976 and 1978.

Italian

a

Church."

compromesso storico," Laboratorio

II

339.

16.

Leonardo

17.

P. P. Pasolini, Letter e luterane (T\inn:

18.

Giorgio Amendola, "Coerenza e severita," Politica ed economia, July-August

19.

For Berlinguer's language, see Austerita, occasione per trasformare

1976,

Einaudi, 1976),

p.

51.

p. 7.

(Rome: 20.

Sciascia, // Contesto (Turin: Einaudi, 1971), p. 74.

Marzio Barbagli

e Piergiorgio Corbetta,

rinnovamento del PCI,"

FGCI

Inchiesta,

"Partiti e

p.

movimenti:

January-February 1978,

figures see Marcello Fedele, Classi e partiti negli

1979),

I'ltalia

Riuniti, 1977).

p.

aspetti e

11.

For the

anni 70 (Rome: Riuniti,

184.

21.

Barbagli e Corbetta, op.

22.

Paul Ginsborg, Storia d'ltalia dal dopoguerra a

cit., p. 8.

oggi, vol. 2,

(Turin: Einaudi,

1989), p. 462. 23.

The judgment most

clearly

that the Historic

Compromise was

by Gianfranco Pasquino,

anni settante," La Giraffa e

il

"II

PCI

primarily defensive

Liocorno, a cura di

S.

Angeli, 1983), p. 45. His interpretation was attacked cit., p.

Italy.

16

My

—^who argues

interpretation

that Berlinguer is

24.

P. P. Pasolini,

is

aimed

at a Socialist

yet another sign of

"10 giugno 1974. Studio

Italia," Scritti corsari i}AA'i.w.

its

PCI

sulla rivoluzione antropologica in

halo Calvino, La giornata di uno scrutatore (Tunn: Einaudi, 1963),

27.

Giuseppe Are, op.

Gianfranco Pasquino, II

strategy

Garzanti, 1977), pp. 46-52.

Arturo

Mulino, 1977),

cit., p.

op.

ambiguity.

25.

in Italia (Bologna:

—

transformation of

26.

Parisi e

put

Belligni (Milan: Franco

byAIdo Schiavone

closer to Pasquino 's, but the fact that

could be interpreted so differently

is

nel sistema politico italiano degli

132.

eds., p. 30.

p. 37.

Continuita e mutamento elettorale

1

1

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

212

28.

McCarthy, "The Parliamentary and Non-Parliamentary

Patrick

Far-Left," in Italy at the Polls 1979,

American Enterprise

Howard

Institute, 1981), pp.

R.

Penniman,

Parties

of the

(Washington:

ed.,

193-211.

29.

G. Pasquino and A.

30.

Robert Flanagan, David Soskice, and Lloyd Ulman, Unionism, Economic Stabilization

529-61.

I

and Incomes Policy Q^zsKm^ton: Brookings

rocommunism Michele

32.

Ibid., p. 10.

as

Salvati,

Fernando

much on

have relied

31.

33.

Parisi, op. cit., p. 28.

incomes

Institute, 1983), pp.

of what the authors

call

Eu-

policy.

"Col senno

di Giulio e

this analysis

di poi,"

Quademi piacentini G.

Emmanuele Rocco, Un

ministro

(1982): 7.

ombra si confessa (Milan:

Rizzoli, 1979), p. 39.

152-53.

34.

Ibid., pp.

35.

For more detailed analysis of these laws see Gerardo Chiaromonte, Le della solidarieta nazionale

Vacca, Tra compromesso e solidarieta (Rome: Riuniti, 1987),

judgment on them,

negative

Comunisti italiani e

il

scelte

(Rome: Riuniti, 1986), pp. 48-49, and Giuseppe

see

Leonardo Paggi

e

p.

Massimo

107

ff.

For a

D'Angelillo, /

riformismo, (Turin: Einaudi, 1986), p. 149.

36.

Alberto Franceschini, Mara, Renato e

37.

Stephen Hellman, Italian Communism in Transition: The Rise and Fall of the Historic

Compromise

in

io

(Milan: Mondadori, 1988), pp. 3-6.

Turin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.

87-90. 38.

Leonardo

39.

Both Hellman

Sciascia, L'Affaire

—

op.

cit., p.

Moro

91

(Palermo: Sellerio, 1978), p. 32.

—andGinsborg—

op.

cit., p.

the PCI's Third International heritage re-emerged in

towards

512

—

suggest that

lack of sensitivity

civil liberties.

40.

Paul Ginsborg, op.

41

Enrico Berlinguer, Per uscire dalla

.

its

ber 10, 1974, op.

cit., p.

cit., p.

539. crisi.

Rapporto al Comitato centraU, Decem-

22.

42.

Joan Barth Urban, Moscow and the Italian Communist Party (London: Tauris,

43.

Enrico Berlinguer, "Intesa e

44.

Ibid., p. 34.

45.

Adriano Guerra, "Condizioni per un nuovo internazionalismo,"

1986), p. 304.

March

7,

1975,

June

lotta," op. cit., p. 20.

15, 1976. Reprinted in Conversazioni con Berlinguer, p. 70.

46.

Intervista,

47.

For an analysis of the speech, see Giuseppe (Bari: Laterza,

Rinascita,

p. 19.

Fiori,

Vita di Enrico Berlinguer

1984), p. 333. See Aldo Schiavone, op.

that Berlinguer's remarks shocked

many

cit., p.

Italian Marxists.

87,

who stresses

Notes

2 13

48.

Giampaolo Pansa, Ottobre addio (Milan: Mondadori, 1982),

49.

"II

September

18, 1978.

1976. Reprinted in Conversazioni con Berlinguer,

50.

Intervista, July 15,

51.

La Repubblica, July

52.

p. 111.

discorso di Berlinguer a conclusione del Festival di Genova," L'Unita,

For

4,

of U.S. foreign policy

this interpretation

Ph.D.

Allin's

I

have drawn heavily on Dana

"Understanding the Soviet Threat

thesis,

to

Western Europe:

American Views 1973-1985," Paul H. Nitze SAIS, European

Henry

Kissinger,

The Italian

"Communist

Parties in

How-

Western Europe," Eurocommunism:

Austin Ranney and Giovanni Sartori,

Case,

Studies.

my own.

ever the judgments are 53.

p. 65.

990.

1

eds.,

(Washington:

AEI, 1978), pp. 185-88. 54.

Giuseppe

which was

takes the tone of nationalist outrage,

and unsuccessful PCI

a frequent

him two

prevent

He

288-89.

Fiori, op. cit., pp.

years later

block Italian entry into the

tactic.

Schmidt's hostility did not

from appealing personally

EMS,

see

Chiaromonte, op.

to Berlinguer cit.,

Tribune wing of the Labor Party showed some sympathy 55.

Mario Margiocco,

56.

Ibid., p.

57.

Stati Uniti e

Richard N. Gardner,

Laterza, 1981), pp.

// Corriere della Sera,

p.

il

The

PCI.

233-37 and 278.

November 15,1 977,

compromesso

Roberto

p. 6.

storico," // Mulino,

May-June

387, notes that there was no pressure on the United States from the

DC groups supposedly favorable to 58.

for the

270.

Leonard!, "Gli Stati Uniti e

1978,

PCI {Buri:

not to

pp. 138-39.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and

the PCI.

Memoirs of the National

Principle:

Security

Advisor {London: Weidenfeld, 1983), pp. 31 1-13. 59.

Stephen Hellman, op.

60.

Paolo Franchi e Luciano Canfora, Micromegas,

61.

One Emilia was the

on

who

Marc

"Due

ipotesi su

Enrico Berlinguer," in

more

me

that Berlinguer

and that he had brought

this distinction

asked to remain anonymous, told

Communist

secretary of the

leader

favorable

PDS

see

judgment on Berlinguer's

last years

Massimo D'Alema, "Berlinguer non

the PCI, also be

by the

era triste,"

June 17, 1994, pp. 48-50.

Lazar, Maisons rouges (Paris: Aubier, 1992), p. 325. Lazar's thesis

historians,

63.

leader,

last great

L'Espresso.

147.

(1988): 79-88.

himself] For a

new

62.

1

cit., p.

both

Italian

and Anglo-Saxon, have

which was very much a Communist

drawn from

Piero Ignazi's

"Documento approvato

Dal Pci

overstressed the heretical party.

The same

al Pds (Bologna:

dalla Direzione del

printed in Conversazioni con Berlinguer, op.

II

is

aspea of

conclusion could

Mulino, 1992).

PCI, November 27, 1980,"

cit., p.

213.

that

re-

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

214

64.

Guido

65.

Intervista, July 28, p.

Carli, op. cit., p. 23.

1981. Reprinted in Conversazioni con Berlinguer, op.

cit.,

251.

Chapter 7

1.

Diamanti, "Cosi compatti

Ilvo

1993, 2.

squadroni del Nord?"

gli

December

Reset,

p. 13.

See John

Harper, Bettino Craxi and the Second Center-Lefi Experiment, ]ohns

L.

Hopkins University Bologna Center Occasional Papers, Bologna, 3.

Gerardo Chiaromonte, Le

4.

Gianni Riccamboni, L'identita

1986),

p.

scelte della solidarieta

Italy,

1986.

democratica (Rome: Riuniti,

30.

1992), pp. 169 and

esclusa (Turin: Liviana,

188. 5.

Carlo Carboni, "Introduzione,"

1970-1985 6.

in

C. Carboni, ed.. Class i e Movimenti in Italia

(Bari: Laterza, 1986), p. xiii.

Alessandra Venturini,

mercato del lavoro negli anni Ottanta,"

"II

Giangiacomo Nardozzi,

ed.,

// ruolo della

Banca Centrale

in

nella recente

evoluzione dell 'economia italiana {Mihn: Franco Angeli, 1993), p. 108. 7.

Paolo Sylos Labini, "Struttura sociale, sviluppo e op.

cit., p.

Marco

9.

Arnaldo Bagnasco, "La struttura

10.

Revelli,

a

Lavorare in Fiat (MWnn: Garzanti, 1989),

"II

Vangelo

On

"

see

L

'Espresso,

my "The

Penniman,

and

Political

ed., Italy at the Polls

Tarrow,

eds.,

(London:

this period, see

F. Cass,

John

L.

"The

Italian Socialist

Indispensability," in

David Hine, "The

Howard

Lange and

1980), pp. 133-48.

G. Pasquino, "Modernity and Reforms: The PSI Between

Harper, op.

cit., p.

14.

On

Politics

(J^nu^ry 1986): 112-35.

Craxi's premiership, see also

David Hine,

"The Craxi Premiership," in Robert Leonardi and Raffaelle Nanetti, Italian Politics,

vol

R.

Italian Socialist Party

in Italy in Transition, P.

Gamblers and Entrepreneurs," West European 13.

Launches an

1979 (Washington: American Enterprise

Institute, 1981), pp. 141-71. See also

On

August 27, 1978, pp. 24-29.

Tribune, September 28, 1978.

under Craxi: Surviving But Not Reviving,"

12.

C. Carboni, op.

Italian Socialist Party

the 1976 to 1979 period, see Gianfranco Pasquino,

Party: Electoral Stagnation

S.

122.

di classe nelle tre Italic," in

socialista,"

contemporary reaction

anti-Communist Crusade, 11.

p.

75.

Bettino Craxi,

For

C. Carboni,

218.

8.

cit., p.

classi sociali," in

1

(London:

Frances Pinter, 1986), pp. 105-16.

eds.,

Notes

14.

215

See Jan Kregel, "La politica del cambio della Banca d'ltalia e della industria italiana

1980-1985,"

ristrutturazione

la

Giangiacomo Nardozzi, op.

in

cit.,

pp.

59-98. pp. 299-301.

15.

Aurelio Lepre, op.

16.

Censis, L'ltalia in Politica

17.

Umberto Bossicon Daniele Vimercati, Knupfer, 1992),

18.

cit.,

3 (Rome: Censis, 1994), //

p. 47.

For the Lega's language, see Roberto lacopino I'ha

p. 16.

Ven to da I No rd {Mihn: Sperling and

e Stefania Bianchi,

La Lega

ce

cruda (Milan: Mursia, 1994).

19.

La

Voce, April \2, \994.

20.

La

Voce,

May

10, 1994. In April 1994,

the average small

when

the prime rate was 8.35 percent,

company

in Lazio paid 15 percent, see

quoted by

Ilvo

La

Voce,

May

12,

1994. 21.

Antonio

22.

Renato Mannheimer, "La

Bisaglia,

Mannheimer, also

23.

del consenso per

La Lega Lomharda {Mihn:

i

partiti tradizionali," in R.

1992), pp. 13-33. See

Feltrinelli,

Gianfranco Pasquino, La Nuova Politica

p.

43. For the phases of Lega history

Biorcio's

"Nel ventre della Lega,"

Pasquino, La

25.

cit.

(Bari: Laterza, 1992), pp. 3-15.

Roberto Biorcio, "La Lega come attore politico," in La Lega Lombarda, op. cit.,

24.

ed.,

crisi

Diamanti, op.

Ilvo

Nuova

I

have relied on

II Manifesto,

Politica, op. cit., pp.

this article,

on

July 16, 1993, and on G.

15-36.

Diamanti, "Intervista," L'Unita, December 10, 1993.

Renato Mannheimer, "The

electors of the

Lega Nord," in G. Pasquino and

P.

McCarthy, eds., The End ofPostwar Politics in Italy {^ovAAev. Westview, 1993), pp. 85-107. 26.

R. lacopino e S. Bianchi, op.

27.

Gustavo Zagrabelsky, "Pathos e For the Lega's federalism, see

96.

cit., p.

realta del

Federalismo,"

II Manifesto,

December

Reset, op. cit., p. 18.

12, 1993.

28.

Gianfranco Pasquino, La Repubblica dei cittadini ombra, op.

29.

Enzo Balboni,

"I

nodi costituzionali di una

difficile crisi di

in Italia, Edizione 1988, Piergiorgio Corbetta e

gna: 30.

II

cit., p.

74.

governo," Politica

Robert Leonardi,

eds., (Bolo-

Mulino, 1988), pp. 47-68.

Gianfranco Pasquino, "La Edizione 1990,

crisi

del

governo Di Mita," Politica

Raimondo Catanzaro

Mulino, 1991), pp. 51-68.

On

in Italia,

e Filippo Sabetto, eds., (Bologna:

the PSI between

1987 and 1992,

see

Hine, "The Italian Socialist Party and the 1992 Election," in The Postwar 31.

Politics in Italy, op. cit., pp.

An ex-DC

II

David

End of

50-62.

parliamentarian, Angelo Rojch was arrested for allegedly pocketing

vocational training funds, see see Giorgio Bocca,

La

Voce,

May

13, 1994.

For Kohl's comment,

Z'/«^r«o (Milan: Mondadori, 1992),

p. 10.

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

216

32.

Sabino Cassese

"Come sono

e Giulio Vesperini,

cambiati

i

rapporti tra sistema

Ginsborg (Milan: U

politico e burocrazia," Stato dell'Italia, a cura di Paul

Saggiatore-Bruno Mondadori, 1994), pp. 488-93. See also Marco Cammelli, op.

cit.

1990 (Rome: Fondazione Censis, 1991),

33.

Censis, Italy Today

34.

Gianfranco Pasquino, La Repubblica dei cittadini ombra, op.

p. 9. cit., p.

77.

Chapter 8

1.

Giampaolo Pansa, I Bugiardi {Rome: L'Unita-Sperling

e Kupfer, 1994), p.

190. 2.

Giampaolo Pansa, Lo

Sfascio

(Rome: L'Unita-Sperling

December

107-14. First published in La Repubblica, 3.

See our "The Communists Divide and

Postwar Politics in

McCarthy,

Patrick 4.

Italy (Boulder:

OECD,

eds., pp.

Do Not

Westview,

1

e Kupfer, 1993), pp.

14, 1983.

Conquer,"

in

The

End of

993), Gianfranco Pasquino and

31-49.

Economic Survey 1992-1993,

Italy (Paris:

Organization of Economic

Cooperation and Development, 1993), pp. 13-29. 5.

Commissione Parlamentare sui rapporti tra

6.

La

M^y

Voce,

Mafia

fenomeno

d'Inchiesta sul

e Politica, Relatore:

della Mafia, Relazione

Luciano Violante,

p. 57.

26, 1994.

8.

OECD, op. cit., pp. 45-49, 60, and 68-76. OECD, Economic Survey 1994, Italy (Paris: Organization of Economic Coop-

9.

See our "Inching Towards a

7.

eration

and Development, 1994),

eds., op. cit., pp.

10.

in

G. Pasquino and

P.

McCarthy,

168-70.

Censis, Rapporto sulla situazione del Paese

1993),p. 1 1

p. 13.

New Regime,"

1992 (Rome: Censis Foundation,

xxii.

Gianfranco Brunelli, "Nel tramonto della DC," Chiesa in

Italia 1993,

Annale

di "II Regno" {Bologna: Edizioni Dehoniane, 1993), p. 100. 12.

Commissione Parlamentare

13.

Ibid., p. 55.

May

14.

L'Unita.

15.

Commissione Parlamentare

d'Inchiesta, op.

cit., p.

28, 1994. d'Inchiesta, op.

cit., p.

report was written by Alfredo Galasso. 16.

See Giorgio Bocca, L Espresso, ]une 10, 1994,

17.

Espresso,

18.

La

May

34.

27, 1994, pp. 66-68.

Repubblica. April

1

3,

1

994.

p. 5.

105. This section of the

Notes

19.

2

OECD,

For Ciampi's economic policy see

Economic Survey 1994,

Italy op.

pp. 11-53.

cit.,

20.

European Industrial Relations Review256 (September 1993): 15-19.

21.

La Repubblica, September 29, 1993, and October

22.

£f(?«ow/VA January 29, 1994, p. 63; L'Unita, February

1,

1993. 1

1,

1994, and February

23, 1994.

1994, pp.

23.

Espresso, July 1,

24.

Economist,

25.

La

26.

Banca Commerciale

27.

La Repubblica, February

28.

Voce.

May

52-57.

1

14, 1994, p. 81.

Apn\ 26-28, 1994. Monetary Trends

Italiana,

8

1

1

,

n.

49 (August 1993):

Luciano Benetton speaks of "a new period of the entrepreneurs," see

La Repubblica, March

29.

LaVoce,}Azy\2,\99A.

30.

Espresso, April 15,

31.

The

1994,

p.

and June

140,

on switching

votes

5,

Italian

economy with new

1994.

10, 1994, p. 45.

from La Repubblica, March 30, 1994. The

election figures are taken

figures

p. 13.

994.

come from

Censis, L'ltalia in Politica

3 (Rome:

Censis, 1994), pp. 14-16. 32.

Panorama, February

33.

Programma

34.

This summary of (Bologna:

4,

di govemo

II

1994,

MSI

I

also

L'Unita, January 20, 1994.

37.

La Repubblica, December

38.

Ibid.

39.

Domenico

40.

II Manifesto.

41

Espresso, April 8,

Fisichella,

La

December 1

994,

7,

Ignazi, // Polo escluso

wish to thank the author for allowing article "II

MSI

me

da Almirante a Fini."

1

Voce,

993.

May

20, 1994.

12, 1993. p.

62.

La Repubblica, January 29, 1994.

43.

L'Unita, U2iic\\ 11, 1994.

44.

Stefano E.

D'Anna

ium, 1994),

e Gigi

Montecalvo, Berlusconi in Concert {hondon: Otz-

p. 191.

45.

Ibid., p. 59.

46.

//

47.

For a longer but

Programma

di Forza Italia, p. 6. still

incomplete study of Berlusconi's language see

iinguaggio di Silvio Berlusconi," 48.

on Piero

246.

II Polo escluso, op. cit., p.

36.

.

1.

1

manuscript version of his

35.

42.

p.

history draws heavily

Mulino, 1989).

to consult the

p. 11.

PDS,

del

Diakron was not

On

FI, see

legally a part

Alessandro

II

Regno,

May

of Fininvest but

Gilioli,

Forza

Italia

my

"II

15, 1994, pp. 276-78.

its

independence was

a fiction.

(Bergamo: Ferruccio Arnoldi

17

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

218

Edirori, 1994). For a longer account of the campaign see my "Forza Italia: The New Politics and Old Values of a Changing Italy," to be published in Stephen Gundle and Simon Parker, eds.. The New Italian Republic: From the Fall of

Communism

of Berlusconi (London: Routledge,

to the Rise

in press).

Chapter 9

1.

The

figures

on

from Gianfranco Pasquino, The Unexpected

seats are taken

Alternation: the Italian Elections of 1 994

Bologna, 1994),

p.

members change

1.

1

The author warns

their party affiliation.

{^o\ogm Center Occasional

Papers,

that the figures are imprecise because

Thirteen parliamentarians

left

the Lega

May and December. L 'Espresso, May 27, 1994, p. 42.

between 2.

3.

For the changes crea

I'uomo

in Berlusconi's

politico,"

language see

4.

Romano

Prodi,

5.

La

September

6.

L

7.

LEspresso, August 12, 1994, p. 36.

8.

Economist, July 30, 1994,

9.

La

10.

Voce,

Espresso,

La

Voce,

Berlusconi: La parola

November

17, 1994.

10, 1994.

June 10, 1994,

25.

p.

23.

p.

Repubblica, September 20, 1994.

The names of these men were Carlo head of Channel this revived the

1

Rossella

change-without-change dispute.

TV

September

11.

La

Voce,

12.

La

Voce, ju\y 16, \994.

13.

Ibid.

14.

La

15.

Among

ex-DC member;

The new head of Channel

network was placed

Piero Vigorelli, another ex-Craxi supporter see II Manifesto,

May

and Clemente Mimun. As the

Moratti appointed Brando Giordano, an

was Daniele Brancati. The regional

who had gone

in the

3

hands of

over to Berlusconi,

18, 1994.

13, 1994.

Repubblica, October 6, 1994. the

many who made

and Tiziana Maiolo, Voce,

September

for the rights politics

16.

my "Silvio

EuropalEurope, 3 (1994): 243-58.

1 1

,

such statements were Domenico Contestabile

the chairperson

of the House Justice Commission, see La

1994. Both had been

New Left militants who

of imprisoned comrades. They had changed

but not about prisoners.

L Vmta, December

9,

1994.

their

had fought

minds about

Notes

17.

2

Pino Mandalari's phone had been tapped and his conversations with and

about FI and

AN candidates were recorded, see Panorama, ]3LnusLrf

12, 1995,

pp. 28-30. 18. 1

9.

20.

La

December

Voce,

14, 1994.

La Repubblica, November 26, At

one

least

1

994.

sports journalist attributed this slide to Berlusconi's absence, see

La Stampa, October

30, 1994.

21.

Giorgio Bocca, La Repubblica, December

22.

The il

vento

is

also

ma

much

Voce,

December

24.

La

Voce,

December

25.

Romano

26.

Economist,

November

Voce,

December

3,

1994,

p.

29.

La

30.

Gianfranco Pasquino, op.

31.

Financial Times,

32.

La Repubblica, January

8,

33.

La Repubblica, January

1

34.

Mauro

35.

Z.a5?/zw/>^z,

17, 1994.

78.

The Anglo-Saxon

financial press

the Italian political struggle.

in

damaged him

Berlusconi's fmancial laxity

36.

porta

and La Repubblica, November 23, 1994.

14, 1994,

La

Prodi,

Economist, June 30, 1994, p. 23.

Voce,

le

"paper sings,"

14, 1994.

willy-nilly a protagonist

Ibid.

literally

used by Bossi.

La

28.

1994.

cana canta." The expression "carta canta,"

23.

27.

7,

translation loses the alliteration of the Italian: "Le chiachiere se

of the

in the eyes

Its

became

criticism of

Italian elites.

September 29, 1994.

Calise,

cit., p.

December

Dopo

January

1

14.

16, 1994.

995.

0,

1

995.

la Partitocrazia

(Turin: Einaudi, 1994),

p.

102.

9, 1995.

Forza Italia informa, October 31, 1994. (Text obtained from the FI Press Office in Rome).

November

37.

La

Repubblica,

38.

La

Voce,

39.

For a longer analysis of the groups in FI see

December

vicissitudini di

L 'anno politico

un

1994.

my

"Forza

partito virtuale," in Piero Ignazi

in Italia 7i?i?¥ (Bologna:

December

40.

LEspresso,

41.

La

42.

Piero Ignazi, Postfascisti^

Repubblica,

3,

20, 1994.

II

Mulino,

Italia, le vittorie e

and Richard Katz,

eds.,

in press).

23, 1994, p. 17.

November

8

,

1

Dal

994.

MSI ad AN (Bolognz:

113-21. 43.

La Repubblica, November 23, 1994.

44.

Secolo d'ltalia,

November

25, 1994.

II

Mulino, 1994), pp.

19

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

220

45.

La

Repubblica,

March

46.

La

Repubblica,

December

47.

La

Repubblica,

December 11,1 994.

48.

/I

49.

La

50.

Panorama, ]3inuzxy 13, 1985,

51.

L'Espresso,

52.

Gianni Vattimo, La Stampa, January

53.

L'Espresso,

wf«w, November Repubblica,

29, 1994.

23, 1994.

25, 1994.

December

January

January

5,

5,

11, 1994. p. 16.

1995, pp. 44-46.

December

1995.

9,

p. 29.

1995,

54.

La

55.

This group was animated by Alberto Michelini,

Repubblica,

to Berlusconi

and who

24, 1995.

widely regarded

is

as a

who had gone over from Segni for Opus Dei.

spokesman

56.

La

57.

II Giornale,

58.

Censis, Rapporto sulla situazione sociale delpaese

K(?rf,

January

6,

1995.

]2nwiry 13, 1995.

tion, 1994), pp. 11

1994 (Rome: Censis Founda-

and 23.

Conclusion

1.

Leonardo

Sciascia,

La

Sicilia

(Rome: Mondadori, 1979), political views that Sciascia

come metafora,

p. 23. This

is

the

intervista di Marceile

Padovani

most complete statement of his

was ever persuaded

to

make. For the "laceration,"

see p. 74. 2.

The

3.

Leonardo

Italian

word

is

Sciascia,

contesto,

which

is

the

title

of one of Sciascia's novels.

Fatti diversi di storia letteraria e

civile,

vol.

2 (Rome:

L'Unita-Sellerio, 1993), p. 15. 4.

Robert D. Putnam, with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella

Democracy Work: Civic Traditions

in

Modem

Y

Nanetti,

Italy (Princeton:

Making

Princeton

University Press, 1993), p. 86. 5.

Paul Ginsborg, "La famiglia italiana oltre in his edited Stato dell'Italia (Milan:

pp. 284-90.

6.

Ibid., p. 16.

il

privato per superare I'isolamento,"

Saggiato re-Bruno Mondadori, 1994),

The family has of course undergone changes,

sulla situazione sociale del Paese

308-16.

II

see Censis, Rapporto

1994 (Rome: Censis Foundation, 1994),

pp.

INDEX

Abbadia San

Salvatore,

Ansaldo,

39

1

96

Abruzzo, 61, 162

anti-capitalism,

AC

anti-clericalism, 13

Milan,

6,

81-82, 129, 135, 163.

anti-Communism,

176; see also Berlusconi; soccer Achille Lauro,

Agnelli, Gianni, 86, 88, 90, 96-97, 149,

anti-Dreyfus movement, 13 anti-Fascism, 12, 22-40 162, 184

154, 179 Agnelli, Giovanni (Fiat's founder), 6, 12,

4-5, 19-20, 27-40,

95, 119, 124, 158-59, 164

48, 129

the,

anti-Mafia, 8, 73, 140, 151-52, 159,

175

58

Agnelli, Susanna, 50

Arena, Paolo, 74

Agrigento, 150

Arlacchi, Pino, 143, 152

154-155

Alcatel,

Alfa

Associazione per

Romeo, 92

Alfieri,

Carmine,

lo

sviluppo

dell'industria nel 1,

Mezzogiorno

(SVIMEZ), 57

51, 73, 95

46

Algeria, 47, 49, 51, 57

Atlantic Alliance,

Alleanza democratica (Democratic

Atlanticism, 45-50

Alliance) (AD), 124, 148, 150,

authoritarianism, ol Italian state, 9

158

Avellino, 73

Alleanza nazionale (National Alliance)

A wen ire,

85, 186

Azienda generale

(AN), 54, 152 157-58, 161-62, 167-72, 175, 179-85, 189-90

italiana petroli

(AGIP), 56, 59

Almerico, Pasquale, 75 Badalamenti, Gaetano, 76-77

Almirante, 161

Badoglio, Pietro, 31-32

Alto Adige-Sud Tirol, 178

Amato, Giuliano,

2, 42, 74,

143-47, 153, 168, 178; cree,

124, 133,

Amato

de-

BafFi, Paolo,

Bagnoli

90

(steel plant), 4,

Banca Commerciale

4

1

1,

42

Italiana (Italian

Ambrosoli, Giorgio, 87, 90, 95

Bank of Commerce) (Comit),

Amendola, Giorgio, 96

42,56-57,86-90,93, 131, 139,

Ancona, 149

156-57, 163

Andreatta, Beniamino, 41-42, 49, 148

Banca nazionale

Andreotti, Giulio,

Banca Popolare, 72

1, 5,

26, 48, GG, 82,

del Lavoro,

89-90

88,90,97, 132, 135-36, 139,

Banca

141-44, 151-52, 162, 190;

Banca Romana,

governments, 61-62

Banco Ambrosiano, 85

Privata,

1

94-95

1,

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALL-iX STATE Banco

Roma,

di

88-90

56,

Bank of Italy, 7,9,

57,89, 129, 136,

11,

142, 170-71, 183

Broccoletti, Maurizio, 7-8

Brussels Pact, 46, 51 Brzezinski, Zbigniew,

19

1

Bank of Naples, 72

Buongiorno, Mike, 163

Barbarossa, Emporer, 133

Buoni Ondinari

Baresi, Franco, 7 Bari,

del

Tessoro (BOT),

129. 136

Buontempo, Teodoro, 183

135

Barre, Siad, Basilicata,

48

Buttiglione, Rocco, 158, 185, 189

72

Bassolino, Antonio, 73, 150

Cagliari, Gabriele, 6,

Bastogi, 88-89

Calabria, 8, 42, 80, 111

Batista, Fulgencio,

76

Callaghan. Jim.

XV, 25

Benedict

97

19

1

Calo, Pippo. 95

Beneduce, Alberto,

5,

86-87, 156

150

Caltanissetta.

Benetton, 101, 156

Calvi. Roberto, 26, 80. 85. 95-96. 128

Benvenuto, Giorgio, 146, 150

Calvino,

Bergamo, 130

Camorra,

Berlinguer, Enrico,

5, 10,

40, 67,

Italo,

110-11, 127 73, 77-78, 146

8, 58,

Camorrista, 151

103-106, 112, 115, 118, 120-21,

Campania, 42, 111, 149. 151, 159

123-24, 127-29, 141, 149, 186-87

Canino, General, 7

Berlusconi, Paolo, 82

Cantoni, Giampiero, 94

Berlusconi, Silvio, 6, 8, 17, 19, 29, 42.

Caprara, Massimo, 150

50,

57,78,80-83,91,95, 130-31,

Carboni. Flavio. 95

135, 139, 147-48, 167-71, 173-75,

Cariplo. 82. 94. 131, 184

176-77, 179, 181-85, 187-90;

Caritas,

Berlusconi decree, 4

Carli,

63

Guido. 51-52,89,93

Beveridge, William, 34

Carnevale, Corrado,

Biaggina, La, 140

Carpi, 59

Bianco, Enzo, 148

Carter,

Jimmy,

Caselli,

Giancado, 143, 152, 175

97

Bi-Invest,

Biondi, Alfredo, 152, 173-75 Bisaglia,

Antonio, 68-70, 104, 115. 132

1

5.

79. 152

19

Casey, William, 20

Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (CIG), 146

Bo, Giorgio. 65

Cassa per

Bologna,

Cassisa, Bishop Salvatore of Monreale,

7,

bombings,

Bonanno

111, 165

7,

143

family,

il

mezzogiorno, 26, 30

151

77

Castanissetta,

77

Bonomi, Carlo, 97

Castellammare del Golfo, 77

Bontade, Paolino. 76

Castellammare

Bontade, Stefano, 74

Catania, 148, 150-51

Borrelli, Francis, 174,

176

Borsellino. Paolo, 74. 104. 143. 175 Bossi.

Umberto, 123, 130-33. 141. 168-

69. 171. 173, 183-85. 188 Bottai, Giuseppe, 21

Brescia, 130, 132. 176,

di Stabia,

73

Catholic Action, 22, 23, 34 Catholic Church (Catholicism), 4-5, 12, 13-15,

17-40,44, 59,62,68,

114-15, 125, 146, 151, 154, 157, 186-87, 189-90 passim

186

Cavalli,

Giampiero, 91

9,

hide

123

Cavour, Camillo, 12-13, 25

Commerzbank, 156

CDU,

Common Agricultural Common Market, 60

83 96-97

Cefis, Eugenio, 85-89, 91,

Center of Christian Democracy. See

cristiano

democratico (Center of

Christian Democracy)

(CCD),

Communism, 23,41-59,

103-104, 115,

124, 163, 185

Centro cristiano democratico Centre

Policy (CAP), 52

17,

Communist Re-Foundation. Conca d'Oro, 75

179, 190 Ccrnetti, Gianni, 147

Confalonieri, Fedele, 174

Chiesa, Mario, 140

confederation

Chieti, 150, 161

Democrazia

italiani

(CGIL), 20, 30, 38, 126

conservatism, of Italian

Ciampi, Carlo Azeglio,

2, 7,

41-42, 49,

74,93, 145, 148, 151, 153, 157,

Don; The Leopard, 62

CIG, 155

Conte, Carmelo, 135 Contestabile,

clan warfare,

1

Develpment,

for Industrial

72

Cini, 85

73

29

(GSM), 78-80, 174 Consortium

Ciancimino, Vito, 75

Cirillo, Giro,

state,

Consiglio superiore della magistratura

Conso, Giovanni, 147

168, 171-72, 177, 190

Ciccio,

federation, of Italian

Confederazione generale dei lavoratori

cristiana

44-45, 67

7,

vs.

134

state,

Christian Democratic Party. See

CIA,

See

Rifondazione comunista

Domenico, 168

Contrada, Bruno,

151

7,

Corbino, Epicarmo, 29, 55

90

clans, 76, 88, 135, 167-90; clan rule,

Corfu summit, 54 Corleonesi, 143

167-90 passim Clean Hands investigation,

2, 4, 6-8, 17,

19, 32, 48, 62, 66, 73, 80, 93,

100-

Corriere della Sera, 11,85, Corriere mercantile,

II,

96

92 5-15

101, 103-105, 121, 124, 128, 133,

corruption of Italian

136, 140, 145-46, 162, 172-74, 183,

Cosa Nostra, 88, 151;

187, 190

Cossiga, Francesco, 79, 134-35, 142, 161

clientelism, 2-4, 61-80, 82, 91-92, 94,

state,

Council of Europe, 50

174-75 passim

covert funding, 44

Coal and

Craxi, Bettino, Steel Pool,

46

163, 172

41-42, 46-50, 109,

Graxi-Andreotti-Forlani (CAP), 82, 135

Credito

120, 123, 135-36, 158 Coldiretti, 66,

48, 53, 80, 82, 99,

Craxi, Bobo, 135

Cogefar, 6, 155 8, 33,

5, 7,

109, 121, 123-38, 139-44, 158, 161,

Codignoni, Angelo, 181

Cold War,

68

italiano, 42, 56,

Crispi, Francesco, 13, 124

CoUodi, Carlo; Pinocchio, 13

Cristiano sociali, 17-18

Colombo, Gherardo, 176

Gristofori,

Comiso, 45

Groce, Benedetto, 12

5f(f

Banca Commerciale

88-90, 93, 98,

156

Colombo, Emilio, 72

Comit.

Mafia

Council of Bishops, 18, 107, 146

103, 111, 124, 127, 146, 162,

CLN, 28

see also

Italiana

Cronache

Nino, 62

sociali (Social Chronicles),

34

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

224

Di Lampedusa, Giuseppe Tomasi; The

Crozier, Michel, 9

Cuccia, Enrico, 86-91, 96-97, 101, 130-

Leopard, 8, 12

Di

31, 153, 156, 163, 183-84

Pietro,

Antonio,

5,

77, 80, 133,

140-41, 173-76

Curto, Judge Diego, 78, 99

Diakron, 165

Cutolo, Raffaele, 73

Dini, Lamberto, 50, 170-72, 179-80,

D'Alema, Massimo,

188-90; Dini Government, 54

158, 160, 164,

9,

dtrigisme.5Q,i\,m,S9,

186-87, 189 Dalla Chiesa, Carlo-Alberto, 74, 152

Disperata, La, 28

D'Ambrosio, Gerardo, 78

Donat

DC-PSI

Dorotei, the, 65-66, 69, 73; Doroteo

coalition, 5, 6, 55. 88, 93-94,

100, 135-36, 139, 141, 155, 160

de Gaulle, Charles, 50, 64

De De

5, 10,

15

faction, 91

63-64

20, 23, 27-

29, 33, 35, 37, 43, 46, 50-51, 55, 63-

Dossettiani, 34,

46

Dotti, Vitorio, 182

Drago, Nino, 74, 76

64, 106, 119, 121

De De De

1

Dossetti, Guiseppe, 25, 33-34, 49, 56,

Benedetti, Carlo, 6, 92, 98

Gasperi, Alcide,

Cattin, Carlo, 66,

Lorenzo, Francesco,

141-44

6, 61,

dynamism of Italian

state,

8

Mita, Ciriaco, 72, 129, 134-35, 142

EC

Sanctis, Francesco, 12

decentralization of Italian state, 140

Dehaene, Jean-Luc, 54

Council of Ministers, 54

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 53

Dei, Opus, 186

Edison, 84-85

DelTurco, Otaviano, 124, 146, 158

Egam, 91,96

Delia Chiesa, Nando, 149

Einaudi, 27, 34, 43, 55, 91, 105

Delia Valle, Diego, 156

Emilia-Romagna, 39-40, 59, 62, 70,

deirUtri, Marcello, 82, 165, 182, 188

109, 121, 124, 132-33, 159, 162

Delors report, 53

Employers Association,

Dematte, Claudio, 172

ENEL,

Democratic Alliance. 5^^ Alleanza

ENI-Petromin

Enimont

democratica

Democratic Party of the democratico della

Democrazia

Left. 5d'^Partito

(DC),

1, 3, 7,

Demo-

17, 20-21,

23-26, 28-29, 30-32, 37, 39-40, 4244, 48, 51-65, 81-83, 88-91, 95-96,

103-109, 111-12, 115, 120-21, 123-

128 Ente partecipazioni

e

finanziamento

dustria manifatturiera

in-

(EFIM), 42,

56,93,95, 145

165, 168, 172, 179-80, 183, 189

Etruria,

Di Donato, Giulio, 135-43

128

78, 97-99, 146

56, 64, GG, 69, 85-86, 92, 97, 99,

Eridania,

Deutsche Bank, 154-56

bribary,

affair 5, 19,

Ente nazionale idrocarburi (National

36, 139-49, 150-51, 153, 157, 160,

Desario, 172

65, 136

Petroleum Company) (ENI), 30, 47,

sinistra

cristiana (Christian

cratic Party)

4,

84, 183-85

98

134

European Coal and

Steel

Community

(ECSC), 51

European Community (EC),

3,

43, 46,

Di Donna, Leonardo, 96

49-50, 52-53, 57, 77, 86, 93, 129,

Di Giulio, Fernando, 113

135-36, 142-43

lib

I ride

European Cooperation Administration,

France, 10-11, 13, 51, 126, 129;

180

Gaullist, 47-48,

56

European Defense Community (EDC),

Franklin Bank, 89 Free Masonry, 151

51

European Monetary System (EMS),

1,

Freedom

Pole, 162, 167, 184, 189

4,41-42,52, 54,60, 114, 136, 145,

Friuli-Venezia Giulia, 149

190

Fronte dell'uomo qualunque (FUQ),

European Union (EU),

9,

54; Italy

and

28-29

171, 187

Europeanism, 51

Galasso, Pasquale, 151

Gandini, Raul, 5-6, 98-99, 154 Faina, Carlo,

86

Garibaldi, Guiseppe, 12

Remo, 6 1

Falcone, Giovanni, 74, 140, 142, 175

Gaspari,

Fanfani, Amintore, 47-48, 64-66, 68

Gaullism, 29, 31, 162, 179

Fascism, 14-15, 21-22, 23, 26-41, 44,

Gava, Antonio, 71-74, 146

78, 133, 160, 183, 189

,

GG, 72,

71-72

Gava,

Federazione dei Giovani Comunisti

Gazzetta del Lunedi, La, 92

(FGCI), 109

Itaiiani

Cabiria,

Silvio,

Gazzettino,

The Nights of

22

Gedda,

II,

Luigi,

70 33

Gelli, Licio, 79,

Ferrara, Giuliano, 168,

Ferruzzi group,

1,

176

98, 153-54

Ferruzzi, Serafino, 6, 87, Fiat, 1, 4, 6, 12,

98-100

30-31, 42, 44, 53, 58,

96

Gemeinschaft, G2, 133

Gemifia, 157 Generali, 89, 154

Genoa, 39

60, 72, 96, 101, 104. 126, 129, 154-

Genova, 150

55, 177

Gentile, Giovanni, 14, 21

Fini,

Gianfranco, 160-62, 183-84

1, 8,

82, 91, 162-63, 165,

168-69, 171-74, 176-77, 181-82

Finmare, 93 Fioravanti, Valerio, Fiori, Publio,

Genttiloni pact, 14

Germany, 28, 53-54

Finicomit, 157 Fininvest,

50

Gava Family, 71-72

Fava, Claudio, 77

Fellini, Federico, 26;

1

95

162

Gerneli, 156 Gioia, Giovanni, 75 Giolitti, 13,

14

Giornale,

164

Giorno,

II,

II,

59

Florence, 56, 74, 110

Giuliano, Salvatore, 31

Fondaria, the, 87, 97, 156

Gladio organization, 45; investigation,

Ford, Gerald, 119

135

Forlani, Arnaldo, 73, 82, 132, 142,

146

Gonella, Guido, 25

Formentini, Marco,

Forza

Italia (Let's

Gnutti, Vito, 131, 136, 168

5,

Go

133, 149

Italy) (FI), 8-9,

19,54,78, 139-40, 152, 155, 157-

Gramsci, Antonio, 11-13,36, 105-106, 109, 115, 121, 134

Grassetto family, 69

59, 161-63, 165, 167-68, 170-71,

Great Britain, 14,40,47-48

173, 175, 180-82, 185, 188-90

Greganti, Primo, 147

Forze Nuove, 65-66

Gronchi, Giovanni, 46, 66

THE CRISIS OF THE ITAIIAN STATE

226

Grosolis,

69

Gross Domestic Product (GDP),

3, 48,

John Paul II (Pope), 18, John XXIII (Pope), 65

186

19,

57-58, 128-29, 141, 142, 145,

Keynes, Maynard, 34

180

Kissinger, Henry, 104, 108

Group ofSeven(G7), 48-50 Group

Services Consortium,

Kohl, Helmut, 135-36, 143

99

Gullo, Fausto, 36

La Langa, Guiseppe, 128

Gunnella, Aristide, 75

La Malfa, Giorgio, 155

hegemony, 36, 40; hegemony, CathoHc,

historic

LaMalfa, Uga, 10,87,90, 105 La

20-40

Pira, Giorgio, 25, 34, 47,

56

Lama, Luciano, 106, 111, 114

compromise, 96, 103-108,

Lateran Pacts, 24, 25, 29, 37

110-12, 120, 128. 132, 194

Hot Autumn of 1969, 58,86

150

Latina,

Lauro, Achille, 71 Illy,

Lazard Freres, 88, 156

Riccardo, 150

Iniziativa democratica,

Internal Market,

Lazio, 6

65

Lega Nord (Northern League) (Lega), 4-

42

Monetary Fund (IMF),

International

5, 18,

80, 101, 123, 130-31, 133-36,

143, 147, 150, 157, 159, 162, 168-

112, 136, 180 internationalization of Italian state,

43

Istituto nazionale assicutazione mallattia

70, 180-81, 184, 189-90; Lega clientelism, 101

Lenin, 38, 105, 117

(INAM),70 Istituto nazionale della previdenza

sociale (INPS),

Lentini, Gigi, 6, 176

Leo XIII (Pope), 25

70

Istituto nazionale delle assicurazioni

Leone, Giovanni, 93 Leone, Mauro, 93

(INA), 170 Istituto per la ricostruzione industriale;

Letta, Gianni,

168

32

Institute for industrial reconstruction

Levi, Carlo, 28,

(IRI), 56-57, 59, 64, 84, 86, 91-93,

Liberalism of Italian

148, 156

Liberation, the, 8

Istituto per le

opere di religione (lOR),

I'industrializzazione del

Meridione

72

Bank

ol

Commerce.

5^f Banca

Parry.

SeePamto

172

4, 59, 109, 124, 131, 133,

pop-

Longo, Luigi, 39 Luzzatti, Luigi, 12-13, 58,

olare italiano

socialista italiano

Lombardy,

146, 151, 159, 190

italiano

Italian People's Party. 5^<'Partito

Italian Socialist Party.

Lo Jucco, Domenico, 168 Locatelli, Gianni,

Italia

Communist

comunista

41,55, 135, 142, 171

Livorno, 21

Commerciale Italian

151-52 lira, 3,

Italcementi, 88 Italian

128

Lima, Salvo, 26, 66, 74-75, 77, 140,

Istituto per lo sviluppo e

(Isveimer),

31

135

Ligresti, Salvatore, 87, 91,

Liguria, 70, 92, 109,

19,26

state, 13,

155

SeeP^nko Maastricht Treaty,

3, 53,

142-43, 162

111

Indt

Mafia

as state, 1,

7-8, 12, 17, 21, 26, 63,

Milan Pool, 173-76

74-80, 88, 94-95, 135, 142-43, 151-

Mirafiori, 155

52, 165, 175, 181 passim

Modena, 30

Magistratura Democratica

(MD), 79-80

Molise, 162

Magliana, 95

Monarchism, 31,71

Malpica, 7-8

Mondadori, 157, 164

Manca, Enrico, 128

Monnet

Mancino, Nicola, 7

Montecatini, 85-86

Manifesto,

II,

Montedison, 86, 88-89, 96-97, 134

49

Monteponi-Montevecchio, 91

Mantua, 146 Maramotti,

Achille,

Monza, 146

156

Morandi, Rodolfo, 38, 71

Marchini, Alfio, 172 Maritain, Jacques, gral,

L'Humanisme

inte-

Moratti, Letizia, 172

Moro, Aldo,

34

Maroni, Roberto, 151, 168, 184-85,

Martelli, Justice Claudio, 80,

124

5,

10,

116

Movement) (MSI), 24, 22-28, 44,61,66,67, 133, 135, 141, 146, 150, 160-62, 184 cial

Mino, 17-18, 146, 150,

186

Mussolini, Benito, 8-9, 12-15, 20, 21-

Martino, Gaetano, 52 12, 13, 40, 127; cult of,

Mattarella, Bernardo,

1 1

Movement of the Popular Initiative, 69 Movimento sociale italiano (Italian So-

Martin, Graham, 44-45 Martinazzoli,

7, 65, 70, 97, 107,

149; kidnapping 152

Moscow,

189, 190

Marshall Plan, 20, 43, 46, 60

Marxism,

Plan, 57

26

75

Mattei, Enrico, 27, 47, 59, 65, 69, 85,

23,29,31,33,36-37,47,56,64. 78, 124, 158

Musumeci,

Pietro,

95

93,97 'ndrangheta, 8, 76, 151

Matteoli, Altero, 168 Mattioli, Raffaele, 57,

86-87

Mazzanti, Giorgio, 96

Naples, 6, 8, 64, 70-73, 77, 95,

Napoleonic

Mediobanca, 56, 87-88, 90, 100, 154,

Napolitano, Giorgio, 120

years,

National Alliance.

157

NATO,

Menichella, Donato, 57, 93

3,

Siff*

Merzagora, Cesare, 89

Nazism, 23

85

neo-Atlanticism, 45-50,

Messina, 52, 77, 152

neo-Fascism, 67

Micciche, Gioanfranco, 168

neo-Hegelianism, 12

Michelini, 160

New

Milan,

5, 18,

21, 29, 53, 74, 76, 79, 90,

1

16, 118,

158-59 Navarra, Michele, 75

II,

Alleanza nazionale

45-46, 49, 50, 60,

Mennitti, Domenico, 161, 181

Messaggero,

10,

11-12

Mazzotta, Roberto, 94, 101

Melfi, 76, 154

1

150, 155, 175

64

Deal, 34

Northern League. See Lega Nord

94, 101, 109, 123, 128, 130-32,

Northern Republic, 133

134, 140-43, 146, 148-49, 150, 152-

Novara, 149

53, 157-58, 162-65, 167, 169, 176,

Novelli, Diego, 149

182, 184, 188, 190

Nuoro, 10

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

228

Occhetto, Achille, 19, 136, 141, 147-

135, 140-41, 143, 146-47, 149,

49, 150, 158, 171, 186-87 Olivetti,

158-59, 167, 172

Ordine nuovo (New Order), 36

Pasquini, Giancarlo, 187

Organization of European Economic

Patriarca, Francesco,

Cooperation (OEEC), 50, 57

PattoSegni, 18, 185

Orlando, Leoluca, 17, 77, 84, 135, 150

Paul VI (Pope), 27

Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele, 22

Pavia, 149

Osoppo, 27

PCI-DC PDS-PCI

73

SeeDC-VC\

alliance.

Peace Treaty, 29, 43, 46

Padania, 134, 184

Pecorelli,

Paese Sera, 85

Pedde, Giacomo, 94

Pajetta, Giancarlo,

39

Pella,

Palermo, 17, 74, 76-77, 140, 150, 175;

Panama

Jesuits,

affair,

18

Guiseppe, 46, 51

73

Pertini, Allesandro,

88

Piano Solo, 84

13

Piazza Fontana (bomb), 7, 45,

66

Piccoli, Flaminio, 69,

67

91

Piedmont, 32, 109, 159

Panorama, 164 Parenti, Tiziana, 78, 152, 181

Parito d'Azione,

Pillitteri,

27

Paolo, 135

Pilo, Gianni, 181

Piombino,

Parmalat, 101 Parri, Ferruccio, 28, 32,

37

Pirelli,

Com-

Partito comunista italiano (Italian

muunist Party) (PCI),

2, 3, 7,

19-22,

1

Leonardi, 84, 86, 88, 90, 100,

154 Piromalli family, 95

24, 27, 30-31, 34-41, 43-46, 48, 53,

Pius XI (Pope), 14

65-67, 70-71, 74-76, 92, 96, 104-

Pius

16, 121, 124-36, 140-42, 147, 158,

PiusXIII(Pope),31

164, 168, 172

Pius XII (Pope), 22, 25, 33,65,

Partito democratico della sinistra cratic Party

(Demo-

of the Left) (PDS),

9,

IX (Pope), 14

132 Pivetti, Irene, 133,

186

19,41,46,73,78, 132, 136, 140-

Pleven, Ren^, 51; Pleven plan, 51

41, 143, 146, 148-50, 152, 157, 159-

Po

60, 167, 180, 185-87, 189-90

Poggiolini, Duilio, 6, 61

Partito popolare italiano (Italian

98

Valley, 47,

Pomicino, 135

People's Party) (PPI), 14, 17-18, 68,

Pontide, 133

157-58, 169, 180-81, 185-86, 189-

populism. Catholic, 49; populism,

90

Italian, 5,

170, 183

War

Partito radicale, 133, 141

post-Cold

Partito repubiicano italiano (PRI), 48,

post-Unification

143

53,

Partito socialista italiano (Italian Socialist

187

Mino, 152

Pesenti, Carlo,

Pandolfi Plan, 53 Pannella, Marco,

coalition

coalition, 146-47, 172,

P2, 95

Palermo

108

Pasolini, Pier Paolo, 21, 58,

1

Party) (PSI), 3, 5, 20, 28-29, 46,

65, 80-84, 91-92, 99, 123-24, 132,

Italy,

190

Italy,

9-11, 30, 32

PPI-Patto, 18-19, 157

PPI-PDS

alliance,

186

Prague, 43; Prague Spring, Prandini, Gianni, 62

1

17

Indt

Previti, Cesare, 168,

173-75, 181-82,

185, 188 state, 4,

139-40

Ruini, Cardinal Camillo, 18, 158

Rumor, Mariano, 68-69,

passim

Romano,

Prodi,

Rovigo, 68-69 Ruffolo, Giorgio, 124, 128

of Italian

privatization

229

189

Safim, 93

Programma

Italia,

165

Progressisti, 17, 109,

Salerno, 35, 135

157-58

publicization of Italian

Salo Republic, 32, 44, 168, 179

economy, 81-

101 passim

SALT agreement,

Puglia, 70, 159,

182

162

Santapaola, Nitto, 76, 151

Saraceno, Pasquale, 38, 57, 71

Putnam, Robert, 194, 196

20

Saragat,

Sarcinelli,

Rauti, 160-62

Mario, 90

Sardinia, 21, 32, 51, 71, 73, 95, 131,

Ravenna, 1,98, 149

134

Reagan administration, 48

Satta, Salvatore;

Rebecchini, Salvatore, 26

Red Army, 22 Red Brigade, 45,

10;

73, 103, 117

Reggio Calabria, 146 crisis

118

Sansa, Adriano, 150

Publitalia, 82, 165, 168, 176,

regime

92, 132

89, 93, 98, 148, 155,

of Italian

state,

4

Remo, 150

The Day ofJudgment,

DeProfondis.ll

Savona,

1

Scalfari,

Eugenio, 101

Scalfaro,

Oscar Luigi,

7,

142, 168,

189-90 Scelba, Mario, 27, 30, 34,

La 1 40

Repubblica,

64

Schimberni, Mario, 97

Rete (Network), 17-18, 77, 141, 147, 150, 152, 158

Schioppa,

Tommaso

Padoa, 171

Schmidt, Helmut, 119

Rifondazione comunista (Communist

Schuman

Plan,

46

Re-foundation) (RC), l4l, 158,

Schuster, Cardinal Ildefonso, 18

160, 167, 190

Sciacia,

Riina, Toto,

1,

74, 143, 151-52, 175,

193

Rinascita,

Secchia, Pictro,

96

39

SecoloXIX,")!

96-97

Segni, Mario, 17-18, 19, 135-36, 146,

Angelo, 96

Rizzoli,

76

Scoccimarro, Mauro, 36, 55

Rimini Congress, 46

Rivoli,

Leonardo, 26, 193; The Day of

the Owl, II Contesto,

148-50, 158, 187;

Rocco code, 36

see also

Rodano, Frano, 40, 107

Segni Pact. See Patto Segni

Rome,

Separatism, regional, 31

6,

1

1-13, 22, 33, 52, GG, 70, 74-

75,79,95, 110, 133-34, 150, 161, 179

23

Rose of the Winds (right-wing group),

7,45 Rovelli,

Serafino-Ferruzzi, 98-99 Servizio informazioni difesa,

Romiti, Cesare, 6, 95-96, 104, 126, 154 Roosevelt, Franklin, D.,

Nino, 90, 95

V 2x10

Segni (Segni Pact).

45

Servizio informazioni forze armate

(SIFAR), 44-45 Sforza, Carlo, 45-46, Sicily,

49-50

12,21,42,47,63,66,75, 111,

134, 150-52, 165, 167, 175, 190

THE CRISIS OF THE ITALIAN STATE

230

Siena, 149

Togliatti, Palmiro, 22, 27, 35-40, 43,

Signorile, Claudio, 48, 124, 128,

135

Sindona, Michele, 84-85, 87-90, 94-96,

55, 105-108, 116, 120, 141, 149-50

Togliattigrad,

47

Trane, Rocco, 135

101 Single Europe Act, 53, 129

Tremonti, Giulio, 170, 178

Sinigaglia, Oscar, 30; Sinigaglia Plan,

Trentino-Alto-Adige, 134

51, 56-57

150

Trieste, 43,

SIR, 90, 96

Truman

SME,

Tuscany, 162

84, 92, 170

Snam, 69

Turin,

12,21, 39,76, 110, 115, 128,

140, 148-49, 167; Turin strikes, 21

soccer, 173 social democrats,

6,

administration, 4

20-21

Socialism, 13-15,40, 59, 126-27, 180,

190

Unification of Italy, 12, 14-15, 24, 161;

wars of

Societa di Intermediazione Mobiliare,

156

1

Unita sanitaria locale (USL),

1

14

United Nations, 48, 50

Sogno, Edgardo, 45

United

Solo Plan, 44-45

47,49,51,67,88-89 USSR, 20, 22, 35, 37-38, 46-47

Sorrento Congress, 160

States, 20, 22, 29, 35, 41, 43-45,

Spadolini, Giovanni, 135

Spaventa, Luigi, 148

Vald'Aosta, 131, 134

SPD, 83

Valerio, Giorgio, 85

Stalin, Joseph, 26, 35, 37,

42-43, 124,

182 stampa,

Valletta, Vittorio, 6, 12, 22, 27, 30, 44,

58, 93,

La 92

stare insieme, 10,

195

Vanone, Ezio, 38

Stay Behind organization. SeeG\z(^\o

Varese, 130-32, 147

VAT, 112-13

organization Stefanel, 101

Sturzo, Luigi, 33,

126

Vance, Cyrus, 119

Vatican, the, 10, 13, 19-20, 22, 43, 64,

68

68,88, 186 passim Veitroni, Walter, 186

Tambroni, Fernando, GG

42

Taranto

(Steel plant), 4,

Tardini,

Monsignor Domenico, 23-24

Tatarella, Guiseppe,

Veneto, the, 13, 40, 59, 68-69, 125, 130, 167

Tanzi, Callisto, 101

168

Venice, 52, 68, 110, 150 Vercelli,

149

Vigano, Renata; L'Agnese va a moririe, 11

Tauro, Goia, 95

Violante, Luciano, 73, 143, 151-52

Taviani, Paolo-Emilio, 46, GG, 70,

Visconti, Luchino; Rocco

92

Brothers,

Teardo, Alberto, 128

and His

58

Volpi, 85, 101

Teksid, 59 tessitore,

10

Yeltsin, Boris,

50

Thatcher, Margaret, 8 Tirrenia,

93

Todo Modo, IG

Zavoli, Sergio, 172

Zumpino, Adrianno, 140-141

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Los Angeles This book

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